Bahrain: An R2P Blindspot?

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Introduction

While the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been described as having ‘begun to change the world’\(^1\) the post-intervention turmoil in Libya and the crisis in Syria have cast a shadow over its efficacy.\(^2\) In this article I argue that the international community’s engagement with Bahrain, though generally overlooked, also has a number of implications for assessments of the contemporary efficacy of R2P.

The article starts with a brief overview of the uprising in Bahrain in 2011 and events since. It then argues that Bahrain constitutes an “R2P situation”, before examining how key actors integral to the implementation of R2P have engaged with crisis. In the final section this engagement is analysed and four implications are advanced. The article argues that the international engagement with Bahrain demonstrates that the US and UK, as two of the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), continue to prioritise national interests over the protection of human rights; that R2P is applied selectively by NGO’s specifically focused on the concept; that R2P has not become a “lens” through which intra-state humanitarian crises are viewed; and that states can avoid international censure by undertaking certain policies which enable them to violate R2P’s principles without incurring significant costs.

The Crisis in Bahrain 2011-2015

Details on the 2011 uprising and the situation since are contested; to minimise bias, the following narrative is based on the analysis provided by international NGO’s, UN agencies and, in particular the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report.\(^3\)
The 2011 Uprising

In early 2011 a Facebook page called “February 14th Revolution in Bahrain” called for mass protests on the 14th February. Despite the deployment of the Bahraini police, protests were held across the country; BICI noted they focused on ‘political grievances and…socio-economic demands’ and involved ‘a large degree of popular support that crossed religious, sectarian and ethnic lines’. By the 16th February some 12,000 people had gathered at the Pearl Roundabout in the capital Manama in a ‘festive’ mood. In the early hours of the 17th over 1,000 armed police cleared protesters from the roundabout; three people were killed by the police as some resisted. This sparked an escalation in tension as opposition parties – the most vocal being Al Wefaq – and civil society organisations condemned the security service’s heavy-handed tactics and called for more popular participation. The funerals of those killed became rallies for the opposition and by the 19th February the protestors had regained control of the Pearl Roundabout, where some 15,000 protestors gathered in ‘celebratory’ mood. At this stage the Crown Price accepted that the protestors constituted ‘a very significant proportion of our society’.

On the 20th February some 80-85% of employees in Bahrain took part in a nationwide strike. By the 26th the demands of the protestors – which now included large numbers of university students and staff – had hardened and the Monarchy’s offers of reform were rejected in favour of the chant, “The people demand the removal of the regime” which had become the rallying cry of protestors across the region. BICI found that this change in demands was not accompanied, however, by a change in tactics and ‘the protestors remained peaceful’. The main opposition group Al Wefaq repeatedly called for the protests to remain non-sectarian and peaceful. In early March negotiations between protesters and the government faltered on the issue of the role of the Monarchy. During this period various
armed groups – described as “vigilantes” by the US Ambassador to Bahrain – began to target both Sunni and Shia’s and sectarian tensions rose.

On the evening of the 14th March the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Jazeera Shield Forces entered Bahrain. According to the Force Commander the aim was, ‘…to help the government to bring goodness, peace, and love to Bahrain’. The decision was also justified on the grounds that Bahrain needed support against “external threats” meaning Iran, but fears about Bahrain precipitating a ‘snowballing effect from Bahrain into other GCC members’ were also to the fore. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that he viewed the intervention ‘with concern’. Following the arrival of the GCC Jazeera Shield Forces, Al Wefaq issued a statement describing the intervention as, ‘…a sign that the governing authority of Bahrain considers itself to have lost all legitimacy’. On the 15th March King Hamad passed Royal Decree No. 18 which declared a “State of National Safety” for three months. According to BICI this, ‘opened the door for the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention’.

On the 16th March the government sent 5,000 personnel to clear protestors from the Pearl Roundabout; according to BICI the force used was ‘unnecessary and disproportionate’ and the security services engaged in ‘terror-inspiring behaviour and unnecessary damage to property’. The International Crisis Group (ICG) described the government’s response as ‘brutal repression’.

Later that day a curfew was declared and all demonstrations were banned. The 17th witnessed mass arrests described by BICI as often undertaken in a purposely ‘terrorising manner’. Checkpoints were established throughout Bahrain at which Shia were often ‘verbally abused because of their religious and sectarian beliefs’. From the 1st March to the end of April Shia religious buildings, including 28 mosques, were demolished. According to BICI this was viewed by the Shia community as ‘a collective punishment’ that served to
‘inflame the tension between the GoB and the Shia population’. Likewise the ICG described the government’s repression as sectarian and a report in the New York Times accused state-owned media of stoking anti-Shia sentiments.

Following the crack-down, the National Security Agency and Ministry of the Interior engaged in ‘a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to torture’. According to BICI, detainees ‘…were subjected to various forms of mistreatment, including beatings, kicking, lashing with rubber hoses and verbal insults’. BICI noted, ‘these measures fall within the meaning of torture as defined in the Convention Against Torture’. BICI found that between 14 February and 14 April 35 people died; five were tortured to death. The report noted that torture had long been central to the Bahraini security apparatus and stated that torture was ‘a systemic problem’. The European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights also argued that the torture perpetrated by the Bahraini authorities constituted ‘an overall pattern of crimes that might constitute crimes against humanity’. The manner in which the Bahrain government and security forces responded was ultimately summarised by BICI as ‘unnecessary, disproportionate, and indiscriminate’.

Post-2011 Reform?

The situation became less volatile after April 2011; BICI was established by the King in June 2011 and released its report in November that year which, in addition to providing a comprehensive narrative of the crisis, advanced recommendations on political and judicial reform. In the intervening period, however, progress on implementing the recommendations has been slow and systemic human rights abuses continue. Indicatively the UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) wrote, ‘In our view the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry made sensible recommendations and the Bahrain government's failure to implement
them fully is inexplicable’. The FAC report also expressed concerns about ‘a number of regressive policies’ implemented since 2011 such as the banning of street protests, revoking the nationality of opposition activists, banning opposition groups from meeting foreign officials without the government’s permission and a member of the government present, the lack of judicial independence, and ‘serious concerns about due process’.

Since the 2011 uprising many human rights organisations, think tanks, UN bodies and government organs have issued highly critical statements and reports on the Bahraini government’s continued violation of basic human rights and systemic use of torture. In August 2012 44 international NGO’s signed a letter condemning Bahrain’s suppression of political opposition and the curtailment of human rights. In January 2013 the UN Human Rights Council condemned ‘the continued harassment and imprisonment of persons exercising their rights to freedom of opinion and expression in Bahrain’. A report by Human Rights Watch in February 2013 declared that there had been ‘no progress on key reform promises’ stating that the governments promises on reform ‘mean nothing’. The UK FAC 2013 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy likewise concluded ‘we see little or no evidence that Bahrain has made enough progress in implementing political reform and safeguarding human rights’. In April 2013 the Bahrain government cancelled a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, the second time that the Rapporteur had been denied entry since 2011. In February 2014 the International Federation for Human Rights stated, ‘Bahraini authorities continue to fail in their promises of implementing the BICI recommendations’. In July 2014 Tom Malinowski, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, was expelled from the country after he met with leaders of the opposition. The UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled in July 2014, ‘Bahrain in violation of its international human rights obligations’. In June 2014 47 countries issued a joint statement at the UN Human Rights
Council’s 26th Session which described the human rights situation in Bahrain as ‘an issue of serious concern’ noting ‘the lack of guarantee of fair trial’, ‘the repression of demonstrations’, ‘the continued harassment and imprisonment of persons exercising their rights to freedom of opinion’ and ‘ill-treatment and torture in detention facilities’. An article in Foreign Policy in March 2015 affirmed that violations were still occurring, noting ‘allegations of the use of torture, sexual abuse and forced confessions were again commonplace’.

HRW’s 2013 country report on Bahrain noted ‘the government failed to fully implement the commission’s core recommendations’, and that the ‘Security forces used excessive force in 2012 to disperse anti-government protests’. Its 2014 report stated ‘Bahrain’s human rights record regressed further’, highlighted, ‘Continuing reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention’ and again condemned, ‘The government’s failure to implement key recommendations of the BICI’. HRW’s 2015 report likewise listed a series of indictments of the Monarchy noting, ‘…the justice system has failed to hold members of the security forces accountable for serious rights violations, including in cases where their use of excessive and unlawful force proved fatal’ and the ‘…failure to address the security forces use of lethal and apparently disproportionate force’. The report also notes that Bahraini government has jailed opposition leaders on ‘vague terrorism charges’, curtailed freedom of expression, facilitated the ‘physical abuse and forced labour’ of migrant workers, and passed a new law giving the Interior Ministry the power to revoke the citizenship of any Bahraini who ‘causes harm to the interests of the Kingdom or acts in a way that contravenes his duty of loyalty to it’.

A March 2015 report by Reporters Without Borders condemned the ‘…systematic persecution of journalists and human right defenders and the renewed deterioration in the climate for freedom of information in Bahrain’. A 2015 review of press freedom globally
found Bahrain to be 163rd out of 180. In Freedom House’s 2015 report likewise recorded a sharp decline in freedom within Bahrain since 2011 giving the country a score of 6.5 (7 being the lowest possible). In 2013 The Genocide Prevention Advisory Network ranked Bahrain second in the list of “Countries with High Risks of Genocide and Politicide if they should have Major Conflicts or State Failures” noting a ‘sharp increase after 2010’ in the column “Recent Changes and Hazards”. The organisation’s most recent “Countries at Risk of Genocide, Politicide, or Mass Atrocities” also listed Bahrain. In 2014 Cherif Bassouni, Chair of BICI, noted the Bahraini government’s implementation of his recommendations had been ‘piecemeal’ and warned that people ‘who do not have the hope of seeing themselves as equal citizens’ eventually ‘explode’. He stated that unrest is ‘bound to continue to increase unless we address the social and economic reasons’.

Amnesty International’s 2014/15 country report on Bahrain notes, ‘The security forces regularly used excessive force’ listing various methods employed including, ‘severe beating, punching, electric shocks, suspension by the limbs, rape and threats of rape, and deliberate exposure to extreme cold’. This echoes two other reports published by Amnesty International in 2015; the first condemns ‘…the rampant abuses including torture, arbitrary detentions and excessive use of force against peaceful activists and government critics, which continue to take place in Bahrain four years after the uprisings’, and with respects to the BICI recommendations states ‘most of these measures have had little impact in practice’. The second report published in April 2015 is more ominous; it finds ‘Bahrain, today, continues to go through a political and human rights crisis’, hopes for reform have ‘all but evaporated’, ‘tension within the Kingdom remains critically high’ and ‘Bahrain is more deeply divided than ever’.

An R2P Situation?
R2P is about much more than coercive military intervention; such action is invariably presented as an option of last resort within R2P. In his 2009 report, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon outlined three “Pillars” of R2P; Pillar I: ‘...the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations’; Pilar II: ‘...the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations; Pillar III: ‘...the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection’. Thus, the applicability of R2P – and the means by which it can be operationalised – extends far beyond just reacting, through non-consensual military intervention, to actual cases where the “four crimes” are occurring.

R2P advocates have, indeed, continually sought to distance the concept from coercive military intervention and present it as primarily a means to prevent the occurrence of the “four crimes” by working with the state in question through Pillar I and Pillar II. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued that the ‘the ultimate purpose of the responsibility to protect [is] to save lives by preventing the most egregious mass violations of human rights’. Likewise Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre on R2P stated, ‘R2P has real value precisely because it has the potential to improve the prevention of mass atrocities and protection of vulnerable populations’. The 2014 crisis in Gaza led to a debate about R2P’s applicability; in response to claims that R2P did not apply in Gaza, Bellamy stated,

There should be no question about whether R2P “applies” or not. In fact, posing that very question mistakes what states agreed about R2P in 2005. R2P is not conditional. It does not arise or evaporate with circumstance. It is universal and enduring; it applies everywhere, all the time.

An “R2P situation” does not, therefore, only mean one that meets a threshold for military intervention or even a case where one or more of the four crimes has occurred.

This applicability beyond reacting to actual cases of the “four crimes” is reflected in the wording of Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document;
Paragraph 138 reads, ‘This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means’, while Paragraph 138 commits the international community, ‘to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out’. Within the remit of prevention there are myriad issues deemed to be within R2P’s purview on the basis that they are potential catalysts for the outbreak of one or more of the four crimes. Ban Ki-Moon’s prescriptions on the Responsibility to Prevent in 2013 focused on the need to ‘build societies that are resilient to atrocity crimes’ by leveraging R2P long before atrocities are committed; he stated,

Building resilience implies developing appropriate legal frameworks and building State structures and institutions that are legitimate, respect international human rights law and the rule of law in general, and that have the capacity to address and defuse sources of tension before they escalate. It means building a society which accepts and values diversity and in which different communities coexist peacefully.

In 2014 The Joint Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (OSAPGR2P) published the “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention”. This was described by the UN Secretary General as ‘a guide for assessing the risk of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ which places, ‘the prevention of atrocity crimes at the centre of our work’. The report notes, ‘Atrocity crimes tend to occur in countries with some level of instability or crisis’ and advises states to use this framework to address the root causes of tension and conflict.

Does Bahrain Warrant Attention?

The number of fatalities during the 2011 uprising was not very high in relative terms but this excuse was explicitly rejected by HRW; criticising the international community for ‘averting their eyes’ during the government crack-down, they stated that the number of
people killed in less than two months in 2011 was ‘substantial and greater than the casualties resulting from five years of protracted unrest in the 1990s’. Thus, while the number of the fatalities was certainly less than other crises, this overlooks the sudden spike in fatalities and Bahrain’s small population.

Looking at the crises specifically with respects to R2P’s “4 crimes”, again the evidence suggests that, in relative terms, the 2011 uprising and its aftermath were not characterised by the egregious commission of these crimes. There is no evidence of genocide having been either planned or undertaken in Bahrain; if one adopts a circumscribed definition of “war crimes” as being reserved for criminal acts undertaken during international armed conflict then again this is not applicable to Bahrain; while the government’s response to the uprising has been marked by sectarianism, heavy-handed tactics against predominantly Shia villages and the destruction of Shia mosques, it is difficult to argue that ethnic cleansing has been evident. Crimes against humanity, however, appear to have been perpetrated both during and since the uprising. Article 7 of the Rome Statute lists torture as a crime against humanity, a point made by the OSAPGR2P in its framework for analysis. In addition to systemic torture there has also been evidence of ‘murder’, ‘deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law’, ‘persecution against any identifiable group’ and ‘intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’ which are all covered under Article 7 of the Rome Statute if ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’. BICI did find that torture at least, was indeed ‘systemic’.

Even if it is the case that crimes against humanity haven’t been committed – which contradicts the evidence supplied by reputable human rights NGOs like Amnesty, HRW and the ICG – or were committed on a relatively small scale, this does not mean Bahrain is not an “R2P situation”. As detailed in previous sections, it is incontrovertible that systemic state-
sponsored human rights violations occurred during the March 2011 uprising and since; that Bahrain is experiencing sectarian tension exacerbated by what some have alleged to be state-orchestrated persecution of Shias\(^{71}\); that the political and judicial system do not conform to normative standards; and, most worrying that the situation at present is deteriorating, described by some as a “crisis” with tensions ‘critically high’\(^{72}\) that threaten to ‘explode’.\(^{73}\)

The OSAPGR2P’s 2014 report – described by Ban Ki-Moon as a means through which to implement the preventative element of R2P\(^{74}\) – lists 14 ‘risk factors’ which are presented as a means to ‘guide an assessment of whether a particular State faces the kind of stress that could generate an environment conducive to atrocity crimes’.\(^{75}\) Of the 14 “Risk Factors” listed 8 appear, on the basis of the evidence detailed earlier, to be manifest in Bahrain either during the 2011 uprising or in the period since; these are, “Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability”; “Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”; “Motives or incentives”; “Capacity to commit atrocity crimes”; “Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups”; “Signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group”; “Signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population”; “Serious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law”.\(^{76}\) Collectively this constitutes definitive grounds for deeming Bahrain, both in 2011 and since, to be a definite “R2P situation” especially when taken in tandem with the various ominous warnings about the situation deteriorating of late.

**Where is R2P?**

Since 2011 Bahrain has witnessed ‘brutal repression’\(^{77}\) by the government against pro-democracy protestors, ‘systemic torture’\(^{78}\), external military intervention, state-sponsored sectarianism\(^{79}\), and institutionalised corruption within the judiciary\(^{80}\); in the past four years the situation has steady deteriorated to the point where many have issued warnings that the
situation could soon explode into open conflict again; indicatively the ICG warned that the government’s tactics were ‘Laying the groundwork for a potential future uprising. In this tense atmosphere, any further provocation or violent action could trigger an explosion’. Yet, despite the evidence presented by various human rights NGOs, states, UN bodies and BICI, the application of R2P to Bahrain has been minimal. The following sub-sections assess the manner in which three actors/groups central to the operationalisation of R2P have responded to the crisis in Bahrain.

The Security Council’s Response

The Security Council was established long before R2P but it is central to the application of the concept; the efficacy of R2P is, to a large extent, dependent on the Security Council’s willingness to invoke and act upon the concept. Some have argued that as R2P has not initiated, or called for, structural reforms of the UN, it has facilitated the perpetuation of the Security Council’s, and specifically the P5’s, powers which has meant that narrow national interests continue to impede the enforcement of human rights. In response, however, many R2P advocates have argued that the Security Council’s disposition towards R2P has improved dramatically in the past five years. This has manifest, supporters claim, in the upsurge in Security Council Resolutions which mention R2P, the use of R2P and associated terms in Security Council debates, the unwillingness of any Security Council member to disavow R2P, and most emphatically, Security Council Resolution 1973 which sanctioned the use of force against Gadhafi’s Libya in March 2011.

Yet, while expressions of optimism about the Security Council’s recent ostensible embrace of R2P, and the principles it embodies, are increasingly common, the Security Council’s response to Bahrain has been negligible; no Security Council Resolution or Presidential Statement has ever mentioned Bahrain since the crisis began.
The Secretary General’s Response

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has been a particularly vocal proponent of R2P which he described as ‘a core part of the world’s armour for protecting vulnerable populations from the most serious international crimes and violations’. In his 2012 report on R2P Ban Ki-Moon reaffirmed the need to see R2P as a means to prevent atrocity crimes by tackling root-cause issues such as ‘discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, stigmatization, dehumanization and denial of fundamental human rights’. Each of these have been evident in Bahrain since 2011.

Since the crisis in Bahrain began Ban Ki-Moon has issued 15 statements specifically on Bahrain. The statements have consistently reiterated certain themes namely, the need for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, calls for the full implementation of the BICI recommendations, the right to protest, judicial independence, and adherence to international humanitarian law. In none of these statements on Bahrain, however, did the Secretary General mention R2P. Additionally, since 2009 he has issued six annual reports on R2P, none of which refer to Bahrain.

The Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect

In October 2014 OSAPGR2P published the “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes” which emphasised the need for pro-active preventative action to mitigate the deleterious effects of societal tension which could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. The report outlined 18 “Risk Factors” each with a set of on average 8 “Indicators”; the evidence presented suggests that the situation in Bahrain meets at least 8 of these “Risk Factors” and many more of their associated “Indicators”. In particular the report warns that atrocity crimes
invariably stem from discriminatory practices and societal fissures; given the reports of ‘systematic sectarian discrimination’\textsuperscript{94} and ‘sectarian turmoil’\textsuperscript{95} within Bahrain, and the fact that violence already broke out in 2011, the situation appears to be an archetypal situation of concern.

Despite this, to date OSAPGR2P has not engaged with Bahrain. The Special Advisers have not visited the country; their website lists all the 42 official statements made by both Special Advisers to date, none of which mention Bahrain; the website also lists 9 “Country Situations” but Bahrain is not listed.\textsuperscript{96}

The NGO Response

The role of NGO’s is central to the promotion of R2P, and indeed a key part of the strategy underpinning its normative role.\textsuperscript{97} The following analysis focuses on the three most prominent NGO’s singularly focused on R2P namely The Global Centre for R2P (GCR2P), the International Coalition for RtoP (ICRtoP) and The Asia Pacific Centre for R2P (APCR2P). Building on the presumption that ‘global civil society’ has an influence on state behaviour, these R2P-orientated NGOs seek to promote the concept and highlight the plight of people across the globe at risk from, or suffering, one or more of the four crimes.\textsuperscript{98}

Asked about the GCR2P’s engagement with Bahrain, Ryan D’Souza – GCR2P’s Advocacy officer – responded, ‘We don’t have any publications on Bahrain but we did carefully monitor the situation at the time of the instability in Bahrain’.\textsuperscript{99} Since January 2012 GCR2P has published the “R2P Monitor” bi-monthly, describing it as ‘applying an R2P lens to situations where populations are at risk of, or are currently facing, mass atrocity crimes’.\textsuperscript{100} None of the 21 editions published have mentioned Bahrain. The GCR2P’s website also hosts a “Populations at Risk” section with the countries listed divided into groups; “Current Crises”, “Imminent Risk”, “Serious Concern”, and “Previously Studied Situations”. Bahrain
is not one of the 23 countries listed. The GCR2P publishes an “Occasional Paper Series” which has focused on a number of intra-state conflicts, but never Bahrain. There is additionally no record of the GCR2P having ever issued a statement on Bahrain. The GCR2P has never published their own tweet or Facebook post on the situation. The GCR2P also retweets/reposts links from other NGO’s and the international media on a wide variety of issues; since the uprising in Bahrain began the GCR2P has mentioned Bahrain in just one tweet and two Facebook posts.

Bahrain is not listed by the ICRtoP on its “Crises” page. When asked about its coverage of Bahrain, ICRtoP responded ‘We have not published anything directly on Bahrain…we have not tweeted or posted on Bahrain’. The ICRtoP has actually published one tweet on Bahrain and one Facebook post both of which referred to reports by others.

Since 2011 the APCR2P has published “R2P Ideas in Brief” short articles on ‘important issues of R2P concern’. None of the 28 articles focus on Bahrain, nor do any of the Centre’s 9 “Newsletters” published to date. The Centre’s list of its staff’s publications since 2011 does not include anything on Bahrain and its academic journal Global Responsibility to Protect has never published an article on Bahrain. The APCR2P has never mentioned Bahrain on twitter but it has published seven Facebook posts.

Other less prominent R2P-orientated organisations evidence similar trends. The Canadian Centre for R2P, the Montreal Institute for Genocide Prevention and the Will to Intervene Project have never published anything on Bahrain; collectively they have published two tweets on Bahrain.

Collectively, since 2011, the GCR2P, the ICRtoP, the APCR2P, the Canadian Centre for R2P, the Montreal Institute for Genocide Prevention and the Will to Intervene Project have published three tweets and eight Facebook posts about Bahrain. Since the GCR2P joined twitter in September 2011 it has issued a total of 8,600 tweets, an average of over 200
per month; since the ICRtoP joined twitter in April 2011 it has issued 12,500 tweets, an average of 250 a month. Thousands of these tweets constitute the organisation’s retweeting reports and statements from other NGOs on a huge array of issues; from April to June 2015 alone, the GCR2P and the ICRtoP have retweeted on issues such as the destruction of UNESCO World Heritage Sites\textsuperscript{114}, the rehabilitation of Child Soldiers\textsuperscript{115} Resolutions on small arms trade\textsuperscript{116}, the election campaign for a new UN Secretary General\textsuperscript{117}, a conference on women’s role in peacebuilding\textsuperscript{118}, “Earth Day”\textsuperscript{119}, and North Korea’s non-compliance with the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.\textsuperscript{120} Given that combined they have issued over 21,000 tweets since April 2011 on an eclectic array of issues, it is remarkable that they have only mentioned Bahrain once. The APCR2P is primarily focuses on a region which does not include Bahrain, yet, it has published tweets on a number of issues related to areas outside this region such as policing in Sudan\textsuperscript{121}, the crisis in Burundi\textsuperscript{122}, and the conflict in Syria.\textsuperscript{123}

While Bahrain has not been at the very top of the international political agenda, and the crisis is certainly not as grave as elsewhere, it has been regularly commented on by high-profile human rights NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty International, as well as newspapers such as \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{The Guardian}, \textit{Le Monde} and many others; to have consistently neglected to even refer to these reports and articles via twitter and Facebook is clearly noteworthy.

**Assessing the Bahrain Blind Spot**

The situation in Bahrain both during the 2011 uprising and since, appears to clearly warrant more attention than it has achieved, particularly from those closely connected with promoting and implementing R2P. The demonstrably paltry coverage outlined above has four implications for assessments of the contemporary efficacy of R2P.
Security Council Mendacity

In looking for explanations for the complete absence of any references to Bahrain at the Security Council since 2011 it is perhaps obvious that geopolitics has played a significant role; both the US and the UK are allies of Bahrain. In 1995 the US chose Bahrain as the base for its Naval Fifth Fleet and in 2002 the US declared Bahrain to be ‘a major non-NATO ally’. Since the 2011 uprising the US has continued to sell millions of dollars’ worth of arms to the Monarchy; though it initially put restrictions on the sale of certain weapons, it has begun to repeal these and recently increased the size of its naval fleet based there.

Justifying the resumption of arms sales to Bahrain, the US State Department acknowledged that the human rights situation in Bahrain was not ‘adequate’ but spokesman John Kirby argued, ‘Bahrain is an important and longstanding ally’. The UK-Bahrain relationship was described by the Royal United Services Institute as ‘crucial to the UK’s pursuit of its national strategic aims’ and the UK FAC noted that ‘Bahrain provides an immensely valuable home in the Gulf for UK naval assets which would be difficult to find elsewhere’. To this end, the UK announced in 2014 that it was starting construction on a new £15 million naval base in Bahrain.

Given their close ties, the US and UK are perhaps understandably reluctant to publicly rebuke Bahrain through either a Security Council Resolution or a Presidential Statement. This has obviously troubling implications for R2P; the manner in which both countries have shielded their ally from censure, and indeed continued to provide the Monarchy with arms and investment, suggests that these democracies, both of whom have historically been rhetorically supportive of R2P, continue to pursue foreign policy strategies which at times relegate human rights to a secondary position behind narrowly conceived national interests. Given that R2P is, to a great extent, dependent on the P5’s support for its practical
application, the persistence of this disposition will naturally inhibit the realisation of R2P across all three Pillars and lead to its politicised application.

The Selective Application of R2P

R2P ostensibly ‘applies everywhere, all the time’; the coverage of Bahrain by R2P-orientated NGOs, however, appears to contradict this as these NGOs have been virtually silent on Bahrain. It is impossible to believe that these organisations were ignorant of the situation in Bahrain or indeed the myriad reports by NGO’s on this situation; indeed both HRW and the ICG are members of the ICRtoP. It is potentially conceivable that these organisations did not recognise the applicability of R2P to Bahrain. While this strains credulity, even if this was the case, it contradicts the “R2P applies everywhere” narrative; if these organisations specifically focused on R2P don’t recognise an “R2P situation” then what hope is there that other actors, especially states, will?

The final, more troubling explanation relates to a long-standing critique of R2P, and indeed human rights-orientated NGOs generally, namely that both serve “Western” interests. There is an obvious link between Western state interests – especially from the UK and the US – and the monarchy in Bahrain, and indeed its major ally Saudi Arabia. It could conceivably be argued, therefore, that the R2P NGOs have not focused on Bahrain because they have, covertly or otherwise, been encouraged to refrain from embarrassing a Western ally; this charge has been made previously with respects to the lack of R2P coverage of Israel by these NGOs. The APCR2P is primarily funded by the Australian government, while the ICRtoP and the GCR2P are both based in New York. The GCR2P lists those who have provided it with ‘generous financial support’; there are 15 governments, only two of which are not European or North American (Mexico and Rwanda), seven foundations, all of which are US-based, and three individuals, all of whom are US-based. This does not
necessarily mean this organisation is controlled by Western interests of course, but in tandem with the selective application of its “R2P lens”, could be interpreted as supporting the charge that R2P is applied frequently in accord with Western interests and perspectives. Whether this is true or not, such perceptions naturally inhibit the efficacy both of R2P and these NGOs. R2P was lauded as a value-neutral substitute for “humanitarian intervention” which was deemed to be too closely associated with Western interests\textsuperscript{134}; the selective application of R2P, particularly with respects to an obvious ally of the West, will naturally undermine the concept’s popularity.

*The “R2P Lens”*

A key element of the strategy underpinning R2P is to develop an “R2P lens” through which intra-state unrest is viewed.\textsuperscript{135} In his 2010 report on prevention and R2P Ban Ki-Moon advocated this stating, 'the existing mechanisms for gathering and analysing information for the purpose of early warning do not view that information through the lens of the responsibility to protect'.\textsuperscript{136} The “R2P lens” appears to have been ineffective in the course of the crisis in Bahrain; since 2011 R2P-orientated NGOs and the OSAPGR2P have, essentially ignored the situation and additionally, those organisations that have sought to highlight both the ongoing systemic human rights abuses and the potential for the situation to explode into mass conflict, have not employed R2P in so doing. Those that *have* focused on Bahrain, such as the ICG, Amnesty International, HRW and indeed the UN Secretary General, have never mentioned R2P in any of their reports or statements. Illustrative of the absence of a link between the humanitarian crisis and R2P is the fact that only one human rights organisation has ever mentioned R2P and Bahrain in the same tweet.\textsuperscript{137} This suggests that R2P has not become a “lens” through which human rights violations are viewed.
**How to Oppress with Impunity?**

The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights claimed that the lack of any international condemnation of the 16th March 2011 crackdown emboldened the Khalifa Monarchy to commit further atrocities. In the years since, they note, ‘the authorities in Bahrain, due to the lack of international consequences, have no incentive to stop the human rights violations’. Thus, Bahrain potentially provides insight into how governments can engage in, and get away with, oppression against their own people in the post-R2P era.

The government has managed to avoid international censure of the type meted out to other oppressive regimes such as Libya, Syria, Myanmar and Burundi through a combination of factors. First, as noted earlier, Bahrain has cultivated a series of alliances with key international actors, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US. These states have shielded Bahrain from international censure at important international fora – such as the Security Council – and raised the political costs for others tempted to criticize them. Second, Bahrain has engaged with the international community in ways which have made condemnation of its internal policies unattractive to those with important investments – political, economic and reputational – in the country, a point openly acknowledged by the UK FCO report. Bahrain is a key venue for international investments, an important oil exporter and has major investments in the US and the UK; a report by *The Financial Times* found that Premier Group, an investment firm run by the Monarchy, has investments worth £900 million in the UK alone. The Monarchy, though religiously conservative, has also sought to open the country up to tourism and international sport; illustratively, the “Bahrain Grand Prix” has taken place annually since 2004. As a result a number of non-political international figures have a vested interest in cultivating a benign image of Bahrain; Formula 1 chief executive Bernie Ecclestone, for example, has resisted calls to boycott the country due to the human rights violations, describing protestors as simply ‘lot of kids having a go at the police’.

Third, the monarchy established BICI which enabled it to do two things; first, present itself as progressive and open, and second, advance a narrative since that it was instituting reforms.\footnote{143}
This later point, indeed, has been a common refrain issued when criticism has flared and has often been echoed by both the US and UK when justifying their continued support for the Monarchy.\footnote{144} Yet, this has been rejected by others as disingenuous; indicatively Kenneth Roth stated that those who argue that Bahrain’s human rights record has improved are living ‘in a dream world’.\footnote{145}

Finally, the monarchy has expressed its fulsome support for R2P thereby sidestepping any criticism for antipathy to the concept, such as has been directed at Venezuela, Nicaragua, Sudan and Cuba.\footnote{146} In September 2012, describing itself as ‘a country responsive to its international responsibilities’, the Bahraini ambassador stated in the General Assembly;

> Our organisation must therefore shoulder its responsibilities for the protection of unarmed civilians and must not allow the procedures for the United Nations to impede its ability to prevent crimes against humanity. It must put aside the narrow geopolitical interests and proceed to the attainment of the supreme goal which is the responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts.\footnote{147}

This recognition that “the responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts” is “the supreme goal” contrasts sharply with the myriad reports published since 2011 discussed above which charge Bahrain with systemic human rights abuses, the use of excessive force and violent sectarianism. It is also potentially significant that at the 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P Bahrain was one of the few states not to issue a statement on R2P; it was only after the 2011 uprising that Bahrain expressed its support for the concept. To derive benefits from rhetorically supporting R2P whilst systemically acting against its ethos clearly has ominous implications for the utility of R2P.

**Conclusion**
The 2011 response by the Bahrain government was described by HRW as a ‘systematic and comprehensive crackdown to punish and intimidate government critics and to end dissent root and branch’. Yet, the international response – from the Security Council, the OSAPGR2P and R2P-orientated NGOs – at the time was negligible.

Since 2011 Bahrain has witnessed repeated systemic human rights violations and exhibited numerous signs of looming calamity; given the sectarian nature of the conflict, the persistent simmering violence, the government’s repressive tactics, the failure to implement the BICI reforms and the fact that external forces have already militarily intervened – the GCC force in 2011 – and others – most notably Iran – are alleged to be stoking internal dissent, Bahrain exhibits many obvious warning signs. Yet, whilst this has been regularly highlighted by the international media and reputable human rights organisations, the response from those most closely associated with R2P has continued to be paltry.

R2P is presented as a framework for preventing conflicts by helping states to address sources of tension domestically – as well as a reactive means to halt the occurrence of one or more of the “four crimes”. According to Bellamy, ‘R2P provides a commonly understood political framework which actors and institutions of all shapes and sizes, ranging from individuals to global organizations and superpower states can utilize, individually or collectively’. In the case of Bahrain, this normative role for R2P has not materialised and this has troubling implications for the future efficacy of R2P.

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1 Alex Bellamy (2014) *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 111
3 A number of NGO’s specifically focused on Bahrain have released reports outlining the continued repression and lack of reform post-2011. These include the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, and Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain. Their analysis is not included here, nor is that of the Bahraini government.
5 Ibid, 72
6 Ibid, 82
7 Ibid, 83
8 Ibid, 83
9 Ibid, 164
10 Ibid, 98
11 Ibid, 142
13 Silvia Colombo, ‘The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring, in The Arab Spring and the Arab Thaw, ed. John Davies (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 169
15 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 134
16 Ibid, 419
17 Ibid, 166
18 Ibid, 416
20 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 148
21 Ibid, 159
22 Ibid, 329
23 International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform’, 4
25 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 298
26 Ibid, 152
27 Ibid, 417
28 Ibid, 219-225
29 Ibid, 300
30 The European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, ‘Submission to Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry: Re. Specific Incidents of Violence Against Peaceful Protestors in the Kingdom of Bahrain and Their Widespread and Systemic Character’, 9 September, 2011, 2
31 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 268
32 Ibid, 422
33 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The UK’s Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain: Volume I’, 11
34 Ibid, 89
42 ‘Joint Statement on the OHCHR and the Human Rights Situation in Bahrain’, 26th Session of the Human


57 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, UN General Assembly A/63/677, 12 January, 2009, 8-9


59 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, 28

60 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 56


65 Ibid, 2

66 The BICI report found that 35 people had died during the 2011 unrest; Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 219


68 This restricted understanding of war crimes is arguably no longer tenable, however, since the ICTY ruling


70 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 300


73 Antoun Issa, ‘Bassiouni: Bahrain’s Progress Limited by “Piecemeal” Approach to Reforms’.


75 Ibid, 6

76 A case could be made for the other six, and would no doubt be made by NGO’s specifically focused on Bahrain. The 8 chosen are derived from the evidence presented by international NGOs and the BICI Report.

77 International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform’, 1

78 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 300


80 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The UK’s Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain: Volume I’, 89

81 International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform’, ii

82 Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 137; Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 11; Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, 25


93 All six reports can be accessed via http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/core-rtop-documents (accessed 26 June 2015)


98 The aims and strategy of each organisation can be found on their websites; GCR2P,
134 Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 33
136 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’, A/64/864, 14 July, 2010, 4
137 The Auschwitz Institute published a tweet on 19 July 2012 linking to an article in *E-International Relations*; and another on 31 October 2012 linking to a report by the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights
139 Indicatively, the ICG described Bahrain as ‘an existential issue’ for Saudi Arabia. International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform’, 21
140 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The UK’s Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain: Volume I’, 11-12
144 Abrams ‘How Obama Caved on Bahrain’; Editorial Board, ‘Bahrain’s Rulers Now Flout the US Openly’
145 Tweet from @kenRoth, January 21, 2015
147 ‘Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain at the Sixty-Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly’, 4
148 Human Rights Watch, ‘Bahrain’s Human Rights Crisis’.
149 International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform’, 21
150 Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defence*, 89