EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

A study of transnational social movement strategy

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of an attempt to help create a transnational movement against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War in the 1980s. The attempt began with the drafting and launch of the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament in early 1980. The thesis describes and analyses the work of the British group, European Nuclear Disarmament, or END, which was founded in order to further the aims outlined in the Appeal.

The thesis examines END’s work in three, overlapping, geographical areas: Britain, where END acted mainly as a pressure group on and/or ginger group within CND in an attempt to internationalize – END-ize – its work; in Western Europe (including Britain), where END (with other Western peace groups) was trying to create and sustain enduring ties amongst Western peace groups; and across the East—West divide, where END was one of a number of groups that engaged in dialogue with independent forces in the Soviet bloc – while maintaining relations with the regimes – with the aim of creating some kind of pan-European alliance that would bring together above all these forces and Western peace groups.

The study is conducted in terms of an explanatory framework that emphasizes the pre-existing networks out of which END emerged; the distinctive END worldview or ‘frame’ and the ways in which END supporters campaigned in its terms, tried to persuade others to adopt it, and/or adapted it – above all in dialogue with independent groups in the Soviet bloc; the resources and structure that helped determine the work END activists could do; the way in which this campaigning was shaped by END’s relationship with other peace groups, in Britain above all CND; and the political opportunities and constraints that END activists faced.

To date there has been no full-length study of END nor one that analyses the various dimensions of its campaign and how they shaped each other. This thesis thus aims to be a contribution to our knowledge of the West European peace movements of the 1980s; it also hopes to add to our understanding of transnational social-movement campaigning.
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Chapter 1

A Transnational Initiative in the Western Peace Movement

In the 1980s, in Western Europe, tens, sometimes hundreds, of thousands – occasionally millions – of people campaigned against the nuclear arms race, the Cold War, and the nuclear weapons policies of the superpowers and their alliances (though above all against the USA and NATO). These ‘peace movements’ – to use shorthand – emerged between 1979 and 1981 and began to go into decline from the middle of the decade. Simultaneously, similar ‘movements’ were active in many other countries around the world, including the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and various small countries in the Pacific. There was also peace campaigning in some countries in the Soviet bloc.

Maguire has argued that the “INF crisis was international in scope but was fought out on the national level”. The mobilizations in Western Europe were national in the sense that each movement was mostly made up of people living within the borders of the particular country; and these people directed most of their campaigning at their own national government since this had taken, or was threatening to take, the particular policy decision with which the campaigners disagreed. The organizations or coalitions that dominated the mobilizations were national: for example, in Norway, Nei til Atomvåpen; in

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1 Movement activists and many observers called them ‘peace movements’. However, the term was contested in the West: some opponents of the peace mobilizations challenged the latter’s claim that the movements promoted peace and that their opponents (for example, governments) by implication favoured war. In addition, some of the Western peace campaigners’ interlocutors in the East were at pains to point out that ‘peace’ had to include peace within states, that is, respect for human rights (see Chapter 6). However, unless otherwise indicated, I use the terms ‘peace activist’ and ‘peace movement’ neutrally, that is, as alternatives to ‘anti-nuclear weapons activist’, ‘anti-nuclear weapons movement’ and similar terms.

For a discussion of ‘movement’, see below, ‘Assessing Success and Failure’.

West Germany, the Koordinationsausschuss and its (in 1983—84) 30 member organizations;³ in Britain, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; and in the Netherlands, the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV). The publicly visible high points of the peace campaigns were the huge national demonstrations in many West European capitals in the autumn of 1981 and 1983. Many of the studies in English of the peace mobilizations of the 1980s have thus, understandably, focused on national movements.⁴ They have tended to analyse the domestic conditions facilitating or hindering peace campaigning; the demands made on national governments; and the allies at home national movements have or have not been able to find.

Yet these movements, as some scholars have shown, also had a strong 'transnational' element.⁵ That is – in a very simple definition – the movements, or parts of them, were regularly linked with each other across national borders. On the one hand, the national movements had been brought into being above all by NATO's 12 December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles as well as by the deterioration of East—West relations and the perceived growing bellicosity of the United States government (see Chapter 2). As a result – despite having additional national priorities – the movements had a central concern in common: opposing the deployments of these weapons systems.

On the other hand, the movements were connected with regard to actions and organization. Examples of campaigners crossing borders to participate in peace campaigning in the 1980s include activists from northern Europe taking part in the peace camp at Comiso in Sicily; women from West Germany, Holland and Sweden making up the 30,000 who 'embraced' Greenham Common air base on 12 December 1982; activists from Italy,


⁴ See note 12 for some examples.

Denmark, Britain, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, West Germany, and Ireland joining Belgian campaigners in Brussels at Easter 1981 to demonstrate for a nuclear-free Europe; and the peace march from Copenhagen to Paris in summer 1981, inspired by the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament, which passed through five countries, picking up support on the way.  

The more institutionalized, longer-term transnational networks of, and links between, national movements included the International Peace Coordination and Communication Centre (IPCC), under whose auspices of representatives of non-aligned peace groups in Western Europe and the USA met regularly to plan tactics and strategies; and the annual END Conventions at which non-aligned movements, political parties, trade unions, churches and other institutions came together to exchange ideas and plan strategy.  

The Western peace movement also contained another kind of transnational element. From the early 1980s, some groups – motivated by the desire to create some kind of “trans-continental movement” against the arms race and the Cold War – engaged in dialogue, and tried to work with, actors in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (CEE/SU).  

The transnationalism of the Western peace movement in the 1980s has been (as indicated above) the subject of studies of the role transnational relations play in domestic and international politics. However, most deal with specific aspects of this transnationalism. Thomas Rochon’s *Mobilizing for*

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7 The term ‘non-aligned’ was used in the 1980s to denote those Western peace groups – the majority – that opposed the nuclear weapons of both sides: in other words, were not pro-Soviet. It is important to note that the term also covers groups that supported the END Appeal but were sceptical about the value of the dialogue with independent groups in the East.

Peace, for example, focuses on the West European work of the peace movements but not at the relationship with groups and regimes in the East. Others have concentrated on the East—West campaigning of the movement. These latter works, in addition, look specifically at one or more of the possible outcomes of this campaigning: the (alleged) impact of the Western peace movement and/or other non-state actors on ‘new thinking’ in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev; the role that Western peace groups, by giving support to independent groups in CEE/SU, might have played in the ‘velvet revolutions’ of 1989–90; and the ideas that characterised, and the legacy for the post-Cold War period, of the relationship between independent groups in East and West.

In addition, most of these studies – Rochon’s book is the exception – have been (necessarily) brief. There has, as yet, been no full-length study of this transnationalism that focuses on transnational ‘movement-building’, that is, of how activists actually went about creating and sustaining these transnational relations.

It would thus seem important, if one wants to understand the transnationalism of the Western peace movements of the 1980s (and thus get a fuller picture of the movements as a whole), to try to explain not only the full

\[9\] Western peace activists variously called the non-state groups in CEE/SU with which they were in contact ‘independents’, ‘unofficials’, ‘dissidents’, ‘our friends’, or ‘our partners’. ‘Independents’, which I use in most cases in this thesis, highlights the most significant characteristic of these groups: that they were independent of their respective regimes.


geographical range of this transnationalism – its East—West and its West European dimensions – but also how and why it emerged, and was sustained and developed – and to do so in depth. One way to do this would be to focus on one group of campaigners who consciously set out to help create a transnational movement – and who, in so doing, intersected with many other such groups. Peace activists at all ‘levels’ of the movements both did the work of linking up national movements in the West and engaged in the ‘dialogue’ with actors in CEE/SU. A crucial role, however, was played by one, British, initiative and the activists, organizations and institutions associated with it: European Nuclear Disarmament. This initiative began life as the drafting, and then launching in April 1980, of the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament. It continued, among other things, with the work of the British group European Nuclear Disarmament (END), the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (the main organization behind the drafting and dissemination of the END Appeal), and the international END Conventions.

There have been no full-length studies of END to date. In addition to some of the works mentioned above, there were, in the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of studies which considered END (usually briefly) as one component in the British or international peace movement. The first book-length account of the East—West politics of the Western peace movement, E. P. Thompson’s Double Exposure, was published in 1985 and thus does not cover the second

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half of the decade. All of these works provide some insight into British END’s activity and the ideas its supporters advocated. However, they are all – not just those cited earlier – partial analyses: none of them looks at the full geographical range of British END’s work, nor do they study it in depth.

In principle, there are other ways to approach the transnationalism of the 1980s peace movement. For example, one could survey, using a comparative approach, the work of many or all of the Western peace groups involved in this ‘cross-border’ story. In doing so, one could focus on the broader structural changes that, arguably, helped give rise to the Western peace movement, or one could focus on these groups as conscious agents. This study is certainly an example of the latter: what Horn and Kenney called the “voluntarist variant” of transnational study. But it concentrates on one group, rather than on many groups, above all because the breadth of analysis one would gain from the latter approach would be balanced, perhaps undermined, by a loss of depth: it would be difficult to analyse in the necessary detail the three-dimensional nature of these groups’ campaigns. The attempt to create a transnational movement consisted of END (and other Western peace groups) simultaneously trying to influence a domestic audience, develop ties with other West European groups, and both create and sustain a relationship with actors, state and non-state, in the Soviet bloc. A detailed study such as this brings out, I hope, the peculiarities and difficulties of this work. Above all, I think, this

16 Some of these groups were in North America: for example, the New York-based Campaign for Peace and Democracy, East and West, and the San Francisco-based journal Across Frontiers.
approach is well suited to elucidating a key feature of the East–West aspect of END’s transnationalism: the tensions inherent in campaigning against nuclear weapons in the West while at the same time trying to undermine the Cold War by engaging with state and non-state actors in CEE/SU.

I do not claim, however, that British END was necessarily representative of the Western peace groups engaged in transnational peace campaigning. On the contrary, the fact that I have chosen to study one such group implies that I think that each group – for example, CODENE in France; IKV in Holland, ARGE-UFI in Austria – had its distinctive characteristics that have to be explained. However, I would contend that there are similarities between these groups, and between the contexts in which they operated and that this study can thus shed some light on the work of END’s allies in the Western peace movement. If nothing else, this study should indicate some of the research questions that can be asked about the transnational work of these other groups.

A note about names

The name European Nuclear Disarmament (END) referred, on the one hand, to the British group END and, on the other, to the END Convention and its main organizing body, the Liaison Committee. British END and the Convention/Liaison Committee, though they had a common origin, and though both had as their political framework the END Appeal, were separate entities. END was just one of many groups and organizations represented on the Liaison Committee and at each Convention. There was no pan-European organization called END. Nor is it accurate to label the Western peace movement as a whole ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’, as there were many organizations in the movement that were to a greater or lesser extent sceptical of, even hostile to, the END ‘idea’. One can, perhaps, talk of an END ‘current’ in the Western peace movement: this would consist of groups who campaigned within a framework provided above all by the END Appeal. But one would have to remember, as I argue in this thesis, that these groups interpreted the END approach differently. Finally, though the British group END was not referred to
at the time as British END, I will do so when it is necessary to distinguish it clearly from the Convention and the Liaison Committee.

Explanatory Framework
In this thesis I want to explain:

- both why and how a particular initiative, END, emerged as part of the general peace mobilization of 1980 and the particular institutional forms it took;

- British END’s strategy and tactics, throughout the decade, for creating a ‘transnational’ movement not just in Western Europe but spanning the continent. Doing this entailed developing relationships, in the West, above all with peace groups and to a lesser extent with political parties, and, in CEE/SU, with both independent peace and human rights groups as well as with state bodies. And

- the extent to which British END’s tactics and strategies, and its overall campaign can be said to have been a success or a failure.

The vast literature on social movements – spanning the disciplines of political studies, sociology, social psychology, international relations and history – has generated a wide range of ideas about and approaches to the study of social movements. Much of this work has been stimulated by the mobilizations in Western Europe and North America since the 1950s – the peace movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s; the US civil rights movement; the student movements; the anti-Vietnam war movement; the women’s movement; the environmental movement; and the peace movements of the early 1980s, to give only a partial list. Within this body of work one, influential, trend, ‘synthetic’ social movement theory, offers a framework for the study of social movements that combines two traditionally different approaches. ‘Resource mobilization theory’, long predominant in US studies of social movements, has traditionally emphasized, as the principal conditions for the formation and mobilization of social movements, changes in resources; opportunities for collective action – including those generated by the political process within which social movements become involved; and group
organization. Amongst European theorists, by contrast, social constructionism and framing theory have influenced work on social movement emergence and development. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald write of an “emerging synthesis” in the study of social movements, one which emphasizes three main factors: the “structures of political opportunities and constraints” that movements face; the formal and informal organizational means “available to insurgents”; and the “collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action”. Christian Smith, in his study of the US peace movement that opposed the two Reagan administrations’ Central America policy in the 1980s, also uses a three-part “multidimensional” approach: this argues that successful movements must enjoy concurrently expanding political opportunities, strong facilitating organizations, and rising insurgent consciousness.

While the studies in McAdam et al and Christian Smith’s, as well as those by other scholars, focus on movements, not organizations, a ‘synthetic’ approach – as I hope to illustrate in this thesis – could profitably be used to explicate the work of an organization within a movement. A theoretical framework that sought to explain the work of British END could thus focus on the ‘framing’ processes in which END activists engaged; the ‘organizational


20 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 2.


22 For further examples of the ‘synthetic’ approach, see Klandermans and Tarrow, ‘Synthesizing’; Tarrow, Power in Movement; and Adam Lent, British Social Movements since 1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
capacity' – structure and resources – of the END campaign; and the political opportunities and constraints faced by END campaigners. To these elements one could add two others which might enable one to analyse a group's specific place in the movement of which it is a part: a consideration of the pre-existing networks out of which the group emerged and which helped give it its organizational and 'ideational' character; and an analysis of the group's relationships with other parts of the same movement. I will briefly discuss and illustrate these elements of an explanatory framework before considering how – in terms of this framework – one might assess the success and failure of the END campaign.

**Already Existing Networks and Organizations**

Movements, as many scholars have shown, do not emerge out of nowhere. Jo Freeman argues that any investigation into the origins of social movements must be concerned with the "microstructural preconditions for the emergence of a . . . movement center" [an organization or core group]. Drawing on data about the civil rights, student, welfare rights, and women's liberation movements in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, she makes a number of propositions about movement origins. These include 1) that a "preexisting communications network" must be present "in the social base of the movement" if the movement is to emerge; and 2) that this network must be "cooptable to the new ideas of the incipient movement": that is, it must be composed of people who are "receptive to the ideas of a specific new movement". If a cooptable network (or more than one) is/are in place, then one or more "precipitants" are needed, depending on how well formed the network is: a "crisis"; and people must begin organizing – they must found a new group or spread an idea. But the crisis cannot have an impact nor the organizing succeed unless the cooptable network is in place.  

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24 Ibid., 10.
Christian Smith makes a similar case in his study of the origins of the US Central America peace movement of the 1980s. He shows how the movement was able to emerge (and continue) in part because of the work of 'movement midwives' and of 'feeder organizations'. Movement midwives are already existing organizations that "intentionally foster the initial emergence of a movement by helping to organize movement carriers [the organizations that help execute the movement's work]", but they do not try themselves to become movement carriers. 'Feeder organizations' are all those organizations that are not part of a social movement but which "channel . . . an ongoing supply of new members to the movement".

**Framing**

The people who come together to engage in collective action must, arguably, agree, however broadly, that a problem exists and about who or what is responsible for it – that is, they share a grievance. They must also, again possibly in broad terms, agree on the solution to that problem; on how the solution is to be effected; and on why effecting the solution is important.

The metaphors 'frame' and 'framing processes' usefully capture this key activity of a social movement (or part of one). They highlight the way social movement actors are actively engaged in a process of "fashion[ing] shared understandings of the world and of themselves" that will encourage others to become active – or, if they are already active, to remain so, or to otherwise demonstrate support. (These 'understandings' will – as indicated above – in part be 'carried' into the new movement by people who make up some of the networks out of which the new movement or groups emerge, though they will be combined with new ideas.)

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26 Ibid., 109.

27 Ibid., 110.

28 McAdam *et al*, eds, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 6.
The work of a social movement (or a part of one) can thus partly be understood as an attempt to get others to ‘align’ themselves with its frame: to see the world as it does and to campaign in terms of that vision. To this end movement actors are (among other things) actively trying to disseminate or diffuse their ideas. These framing processes can be broken down into four main elements: actors identify a problem and attribute blame or causality – what Snow and Benford (and others) have called diagnostic framing; they specify, in terms of tactics, strategies, and final aims, a solution to this problem – prognostic (sic), or remedial framing; they specify the agent of the solution; and they present moral arguments, appeals to a better life, or something similar – motivational framing.

The term ‘frame’ can mislead, however – when it is used as a noun – in two ways. First, because it can encourage the analyst to reify, that is, to treat the ideas and actions as if they constitute a thing that is somehow separate from the movement or group. The analyst must simply be careful not to fall into this trap; to remember that ‘frame’ is simply a convenient metaphor for the changing ideas and actions created by the actors who make up a movement. Secondly – a related point – the term ‘frame’ can suggest that the common understanding that helps bind collective actors together is static. On the contrary, within a movement activists are continually engaged in a process, framing. A group of people comes to a shared understanding about the world (or an aspect of it). Indeed, for a social movement (or part of one) to exist – that is, for people to think that they constitute a ‘movement’, and for others, outside the movement, to think the same – a group of people must share some kind of basic understanding. Yet this understanding is provisional in as much it

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31 Ibid., 415—420.
depends on everyone sharing it. It can be interpreted differently, and modified, by those who hold it; and it can be the subject of ‘negotiation’ and ‘frame disputes’.

Over time, a frame can develop; it can even cease to exist. Gamson and Meyer have written that framing should be thought of as an "internal process of contention within movements with different actors taking different positions".

This points to another aspect of ‘framing’. The concept ‘frame’ indicates that there are ‘boundaries’ around the ideas shared by participants in a movement; that is, that participating in a movement (or in a particular group within a movement) entails excluding certain ideas from one’s analysis. If one participates in a movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain one cannot simultaneously advocate that Britain acquire a new submarine-based nuclear missile system and be considered to be part of the movement.

Agreement with the ideas (and actions) that constitute a frame can ‘liberate’ an individual or a group to act in a particular way; it can also, by (necessarily) setting limits, constrain actors.

Another danger for the analyst is to present frames simply as the creation of ‘leaders’ which are then handed down to potential or actual activists.

I would argue that, while frames might be initially fashioned by certain individuals they then become the property of all who subscribe to them and can thus be, and are, modified by others. Benford has argued that, "for a more comprehensive understanding" of framing processes[,] . . . we need to design more studies which include the interactions, understandings, talk and the like of non-elites as well as of elites”.

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34 For an example of this approach see Baehr, ‘E. P. Thompson and European Nuclear Disarmament (END)’. For critiques of this approach see Benford, ‘An Insider’s Critique’, 421—422; Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, ‘Some Quotidian Meanings of “Frame and “Framing” and Some Non-Democratic Tendencies in Social Movement Theory’, in Colin Barker and Mike Tyldesley, eds, Conference Papers, Volume II, Sixth International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest, Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University, 2000.
**Organizational Capacity**

The generation of a distinct set of ideas cannot, however, on its own account for collective action. Activists (or would-be activists) must also create (or sustain) an organizational form or structure in order to conduct the campaign; and they must 'mobilize' resources on which to draw once established and when deciding on tactics and strategies.\(^{36}\) The structure, and the kinds of resources available, will be partly shaped by the already existing networks and organizations out of which the movement or organization emerged.

**Structure**

Social movement scholars agree that the structure of a movement (or of an organization within a movement) is an important factor in shaping the form and content of the movement's campaigning work.\(^{37}\) Both Byrne and Maguire have shown that the CND of the 1980s had a structure that combined party-style hierarchy and representative decision-making with decentralized, autonomous, decision-making by specialist sections and local groups.\(^{38}\) This allowed for national policy to be decided at the national level (amongst other places, at the annual conference and by the National Council and its committees) and for component parts of the organization to organize their own sub-campaigns. In Poland between 1985 and 1989, to take another example, Freedom and Peace was a decentralized, pluralist, movement: while the Freedom and Peace groups (or 'circles') in individual towns and cities were linked by their public and imaginative opposition to the regime, they had their own distinctive characters.

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\(^{35}\) Benford, 'An Insider's Critique, 421—422.


\(^{38}\) Maguire, 'New Social Movements and Old Political Institutions, 223–229; Byrne, *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, 81ff.
Individual groups thus had the freedom to organize their own actions on their own initiatives (to which other groups were invited).  

*Resources*

A movement’s (or an SMO’s) resources can be tangible and intangible, and they are either external to or located within the organization. Tangible resources include money with which to fund its work (which can come from non-activists, such as funding bodies, but also from passive members or supporters); places to meet; and means of publicizing the SMO’s work independently (for example, by producing its own publications and then distributing them). The single most important such resource is money, as it can be translated into many other kinds of tangible resource.

The most significant intangible resource (or, to be more precise, source of resources) is people. Freeman argues that movements “rely heavily” on people and, indeed, that social movements are “low on tangible resources, especially money, but strong on people resources”. People, she writes, bring three types of resource to a movement: time, commitment (both of which anyone can provide), and “specialized resources” (which only a few people have), such as expertise, access to expertise (for peace campaigners, for example, this can include defence experts), or access to the media. (They can also, one might add, constitute a financial base, in the form of regularly-paid membership fees.)

*Relations with Other Organizations*

Social movements consist of many groups and individuals. The form the movement’s campaigning takes is partly shaped by the kinds of relationships with each other the parts of the movement have. The West German environmental movement of the 1980s, Dieter Rucht has argued, was characterised by three dominant types of relations amongst the organizations in

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41 Ibid., 196
it: cooperation, competition, and conflict. Cooperation and coordination were "essential". He cites exchanges of information, holding joint press conferences, and engaging in joint actions. However, competition and conflict were also typical. By competition, Rucht means a "zero-sum . . . struggle" between organizations with "equal or similar means and ends" for "the same pool of resources" (which he defines as "sympathizers, adherents, members, donations, public subsidies") and thus for a position better than that of their competitors, as well as the fight for "access to administrative and political procedures" and "public attention". By conflict Rucht is referring to differences between actors with common interests over "preferred means and/or ends" – that is, what I have called frame disputes or tensions. An example of this in the environmental movement are the tensions between, on the one hand, the "nonpolitical conservationists" who offer a moderate critique of aspects of environmental policy and favour dialogue with the authorities, and, on the other, the "conflict-oriented political ecologists", who favour "disruptive actions" and argue for a fundamental social changes. Related to these differences are tensions over organizational forms, with the political ecology groups rejecting the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the more traditional conservationist groups. The three 'sectors' of this movement – conservationism, environmentalism, political ecology – "constitute the scene for an ongoing fight over resources, alliances, programs, and modes of actions". 

McCarthy and Zald also argue that SMOs in the same 'industry' compete for resources from both individuals and institutions (for example, government bodies, foundations, churches). However, in contrast to Rucht, they emphasize the "relative lack of conflict and the extent of cooperation

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43 Ibid., 77–88.

44 Ibid., 78.
among related SMOs”. They offer four reasons for this: 1) SMOs in a “fairly well established” industry agree to concentrate on particular functions and/or geographical areas (task specialization); when necessary they exchange their skills and expertise; 2) external social control can force SMOs to cooperate; 3) those SMOs with boards of directors or advisory council can share board members with other SMOs; these members will advise that the SMOs cooperate; and 4) SMOs may have overlapping memberships.

**Political Opportunities and Constraints**

Finally, while movements, or parts of them, frame the world, and while their work is shaped both by their organizational capacity and by their relations with other parts of the movement, they also operate in political contexts. Many social movement scholars have argued that one key variable in the explanation of the rise, campaigning and decline of social movements is the presence (or absence) of ‘political opportunities’. On the one hand, there are relatively stable, or enduring, aspects of opportunity and constraint, which include what Kriesi calls the “formal institutional structure of the state”, “informal procedures and prevailing strategies”, and, in Tarrow’s view, “modes of repression”. On the other hand, there are more changeable aspects of political opportunity. These include increased access to a political system; shifting or unstable political alignments; divisions amongst elites; the emergence of

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46 *Power in Movement*, 76—77.


48 Kriesi, ibid.

influential allies in or linked to the political system; and repression. Diarmuid Maguire has shown how such an analytical framework can be usefully applied to the study of the rise and fall of CND.\textsuperscript{50} He argues that CND’s “emergence, evolution, and impact” were strongly shaped by its relationship with the Labour Party.

It would be a mistake, however, to regard political opportunities simply as objective factors. In considering the impact of political opportunity structures on mobilization, one must distinguish between these opportunities and how they are framed.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Anti-Politics}

Synthetic theory can help one explain many aspects of a movement’s (or part of a movement’s) work. Yet it underemphasizes an aspect of contemporary social movements that another influential trend in writings about social movement – ‘new social movement theory’ – highlights. Some new social movement theorists argue that a “new politics” or a new “political paradigm” has emerged as a reaction to structural transformations of advanced industrial societies.\textsuperscript{52} The “new politics”, writes Habermas, is concerned with the defence, or reinstatement, of “endangered life styles”, or with putting “reformed life styles” into practice; with “quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, participation, and human rights”.\textsuperscript{53} Underpinning these diverse \textit{issues} is a distinct set of \textit{values}: “autonomy and identity . . . and opposition to manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization, regulation, etc.”\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} Maguire, ‘New social movements and Old Political Institutions’; ‘Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform?’, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds), \textit{The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements}, London, UCL Press, 1995, 199-228.

\textsuperscript{51} McAdam, \textit{et al}., eds, \textit{Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements}, 26.


\textsuperscript{53} Habermas, ‘New Social Movements’, 33.

\textsuperscript{54} Offe, ‘New Social Movements’, 829.
new politics has typical *modes of action*, too. Internally, NSMs tend to be fluid, decentralized, and non-hierarchical. Externally – in their relations with the outside world in general and political opponents or addressees in particular – they use "unconventional" methods such as large demonstrations, sit-downs, and peace camps. They do not play by the rules (just lobbying political parties, for example, or, in general, expecting established political institutions to solve problems).

The movements *formulation of demands* in the negative – ‘No Cruise!’; ‘Atomkraft? Nein Danke!’; and so on – is also unconventional. It indicates that NSMs are often ad-hoc and single-issue "veto alliances", rather than ideologically coherent and organizationally formal associations with positive programmes. Finally, with regard to the new social movements' *constituency*, Habermas has argued that 'new politics' is mainly the province of "the new middle class, the younger generation, and those groups with higher levels of formal education"; while Dalton, Kuechler, and Bürklin assert that the NSMs’ constituency is not a “distinct class, ethnic, or other social stratum”; rather, it is drawn from “communities of like-minded people”. These types of social actors, Offe writes, produce a “pattern of social and political conflict” that is the polar opposite of the model of class conflict: it is not between agents of the “mode of production”; and the demands are not “class-specific” but either universalistic or particularistic.

Explanations of social movements based on broad structural change may be too general, too reductionist to be useful for a study such as this, in which the unit of analysis is not a movement but a group within a movement.

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55 Ibid., 830.
56 Ibid., 830.
57 Habermas, 'New Social Movements', 33.
Tarrow has argued that, by suggesting that contemporary social movements share basic characteristics that place them in the same 'paradigm', NSM theory does not distinguish enough between and within movements. Can – for example – the peace movement, which has "deep roots in European history and a fundamentally political/security concern", be regarded as part of the same social phenomenon as, say, the German alternative scene, the Dutch squatters' movement, or the women's movement? Perhaps it can, but only if parts of some of these movements are excluded as 'old'.

Relatedly, Tarrow and Klandermans have argued that NSM theory does not explain how broad structural changes in advanced capitalist societies produce concrete instances of collective action.

However, while structural explanations might not help us understand the peace movement as distinct from other movements, nor a group within a movement – such as END – as distinct from other parts of the movement, the emphasis NSM theory places on contemporary social movements as expressions of a 'new politics' arguably points to an important aspect of these movements. The alleged distinctive characteristics of the NSMs – their values, issues, forms of action, demands, and their constituency and the kind of conflict it generates – can arguably be summed up by the term 'anti-politics'. These movements, that is, want neither to seize state power nor just to influence political parties. Instead, as Keane has argued – while they may also cultivate relations with the world of established politics – they concentrate on unpolitical activities:

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61 Tarrow, Struggle, 59.

the form their campaigning takes, expressing the values they cherish. Keane and others have argued that the concept ‘anti-politics’, and the related paradigm ‘civil society—state’ – in which civil society is a sphere of self-organized activity distinct from the state and official politics – help one understand the nature of the peace mobilizations of the 1980.63 To the explanatory framework outlined above one could, then, add this insight of new social movement theory: the notion of an ‘anti-political’ societal sphere distinct from (but also acting upon the state) could be understood as an element in a frame –that is, movements (or parts of them) explicitly frame themselves as having this role. At the same time, it could be a useful concept for analysing the work of contemporary movements.

Most of the studies cited above are of national movements. Will the framework outlined above, derived as it is from studies of social movements in one country, help explain transnational social movement activity of the kind being studied in this thesis? Keck and Sikkink, in their study of ‘transnational advocacy networks’, argue that ‘synthetic’ theory can help explain their objects of analysis. They consider the “institutional structures, both domestic and international, that encourage or impede . . . transnational activism”, thus pointing to the fact that, in addition to national political opportunity structures, groups or movements active transnationally might also be affected by opportunity structures in more than one country, or indeed by ‘international opportunity structures’; that is, by regular formal or informal relations amongst states; the “resources that make a campaign possible”; “relationships . . . among network actors, and between activists and their allies and opponents”,64 and, centrally, the “construction of cognitive frames” by network actors”.65 Indeed, the networks they describe have characteristics very much like those of


65 Ibid., 17.
national movements. Others have studied the East—West work of the Western peace movement at least partly in terms of the concept ‘civil-society—state’. Patricia Chilton, in her account of the “transnational coalition” made up of Western peace groups and independent groups in CEE/SU, describes this as having consisted of “civil society contacts” – where civil society refers to, in the East, the groups that were “not of the state”, and, in the West, roughly to “new social movements”. Mary Kaldor has focussed on the ideas, and the legacy, of the relationship between “social movements in . . . East and West”. She argues that the dialogue between these actors gave rise to a cluster of new ideas – “the coming together of peace and human rights . . . a new understanding of citizenship, and civil society, and . . . transnationalism or internationalism at the level of society” – which are expressed by the notion of “European or global civil society”. The object of analysis in these studies is principally transnational relations amongst groups. The focus of this thesis is a national initiative that produced a national organization, British END, but which had transnational goals and helped give rise also to number of transnational institutions and practices. Yet it seems a reasonable assumption, given the questions about END which I am trying to answer, that an explanatory framework which combines a ‘synthetic’ approach with insights derived from a ‘new social movement’ approach would be appropriate for this study.

**Assessing Success and Failure**

Most studies of social movements (or of parts of movements or of similar entities), when they discuss the question whether the movement has ‘succeeded’ or ‘failed’, focus, in part or whole, explicitly or implicitly, on ‘external’ success. They consider whether or not the movement has been able

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to influence the policies or behaviour of institutions, or sets of institutions, in the world outside the movement, group, or network

Keck and Sikkink, in their study of "transnational advocacy networks", measure success and failure, or "effectiveness", principally in terms of the influence that such networks have on the discourse, the procedures, the policies, and the behaviour of states and of public and private international organizations. They also measure influence in terms of "issue creation and agenda setting". While these can, in principle, happen without states and institutions being affected, Keck and Sikkink are mainly concerned with how they affect these bodies.\(^6\) Smith identifies four judgements that can be made of the Central America peace movement; two of these concern 'external' achievements: the movement's failure to influence government policy; and its "political successes" ("cautious\[ly\] apprais\[ed\]").\(^6\) William Gamson, in his study of 53 "challenging groups" in the USA between 1800 and 1945, suggests that we think of success as a "set of outcomes". These have two basic forms: to what extent is the "challenging group" accepted by its antagonists as a "valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests"? and to what extent does the group's "beneficiary" gain "new advantages" during and after the challenge? A group may have success in both categories, though to different degrees; in one only; or in neither.\(^7\)

Measuring success and failure in these terms is hard. Gamson has written that "success is an elusive idea". Is a group successful if its leaders are "honoured and rewarded" while its "supposed beneficiaries linger in the same cheerless state as before"? Or is a group successful whose leaders are vilified as its programme is implemented?\(^7\) It is even harder when the group under consideration has its external goals bringing about major changes in state-level international relations. Patricia Chilton points out in her study of the East–West

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\(^6\) Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 25


\(^7\) Gamson.. ibid., 28 and Chapter 3, passim.
"Peace and Human Rights Transnational Coalition" of the 1980s that it is difficult to prove "[c]ausal connections . . . where massive social and political change occurs". Christian Smith highlights an even more basic problem with trying to establish whether or not a movement has succeeded. Without a "comparative control case" – in which, in the case of his study, the Reagan administrations would not have been constrained by a peace movement – it is, in a sense, "impossible" to establish the degree of success or failure.

Gamson distinguishes between "external" and "organizational" goals. The latter he defines as the "enhancement of the strength and ability of the challenging group". To this one could add that activists succeed or fail in organizational terms to the extent that their 'organizational capacity', the mix of resources and organizational structure they achieve, both corresponds to its supporters'/members' wishes and is suited to the goals they want to reach. If the aim, for example, is to change a government's defence policy, is it best to set up a small and disciplined pressure group that targets policy-makers; or a large umbrella organization, such as CND, that combines the work of a pressure group with the radical, sometimes confrontational, politics of demonstration and resistance?

Activists, however, may be trying not just to influence external bodies, or to build and sustain a group, but also to create a movement or a network of movements or groups, either within national borders or transnationally. To this end, they will establish contact with other groups, or individuals and – if they are already active – conduct campaigns with them, or – if not – persuade them either to join and then stay in the campaign or to campaign in a particular way. In this process 'frame alignment' – establishing that others see the world in terms of how you frame it, or getting them to do so – is crucial. Tarrow argues that the constituent parts of a movement are connected through "common ways of seeing the world" or "common purposes and social solidarities"; they enjoy

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72 Pat Chilton, 'Mechanics of Change', 221.

73 Smith, Resisting Reagan, 365.

“solidarity and collective identity”. 75 Mario Diani argues that one defining characteristic of a movement is that a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations have a “shared collective identity”. In the process of elaborating a shared definition of themselves as being part of the same side in a social conflict” 76 they give “meaning to otherwise unconnected protest events or symbolic antagonistic practices, and make explicit the emergence of specific conflicts and issues”; that is, they create a ‘frame’ which helps bind them together”. 77 On the basis of this common frame the network of groups and individuals engages in conflict with, or challenges, authorities. 78 Keck and Sikkink suggest that ‘transnational advocacy networks’ consist partly of people “generat[ing] and organiz[ing] information” within “categories or frames”. 79 In certain cases, political opportunities or constraints will also affect if, and how, a movement or network is formed. An authoritarian regime, for example, will try to make it difficult for citizens to become active, let alone for groups to link together to form a movement, whether those groups are all within its borders or some of them are abroad and are trying, with the domestic groups, to create a transnational entity.

Success and failure can thus be measured in terms of the ability to create a movement or a network. Tarrow implies as much when he defines the West European peace movement of the 1980s as a transnational social movement: “sustained contentious interaction with opponents – national or nonnational – by connected networks of challengers organized across national boundaries”; the “challengers” were “rooted in domestic social networks”; the challenges were “contentious in deed as well as in word”; and the challengers’ connectedness, which consisted either of “common ways of seeing the world” or of “informal or organizational ties”, was more than “episodic”. 80 This begs

75 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 184.
77 Ibid., 11.
78 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 4.
79 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 10.
80 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 184.
the question, how was such a transnational entity created? Keck and Sikkink — though, as indicated above, they are mainly interested in whether or not such networks succeed in influencing others — devote much of each of their case studies to analysing the ability of activists to create 'transnational advocacy networks'; they thus implicitly regard this latter activity as a goal of such activists, and one which can therefore be assessed in terms of success and failure.

It is important to remember, however, that, although a movement is a network, one can use the term 'network' for other entities. In one case, for example, we may speak of a transnational movement, as Tarrow does with regard to the Western peace movement of the 1980s. In other cases, there may be fewer or and/more fragile ties between activists in different countries: Keck and Sikkink's 'transnational advocacy networks', for example.

This thesis is concerned not with the 'external' goals of the END initiative, as assessing success/failure with regard to these would be, as suggested above, extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is concerned, rather, with the process by which a group of activists tried to achieve their goal of creating a transnational alliance against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War and with whether they succeeded or failed in this aim. It will thus focus on the organizational form these activists created and on the ways in which they tried to create this transnational entities. It does so in the belief that this case study can make a contribution to understanding the characteristics of transnational social movement activism.

The Argument of this Thesis

The argument of this thesis is presented in terms of an explanatory framework that combines 'synthetic' theory with insights from 'new social movement' theory to highlight the key features of the END campaign. The catalyst for the formation of END, as for much of the Western peace movement, was NATO's 1979 'dual-track' decision. But this alone cannot explain the founding of END. END emerged partly out of various 'preexisting communications networks' made up of people who were receptive to the ideas that went into the END
world-view. Not everyone in these networks went into British END or got involved in the END Convention process; but these networks ‘provided’ people who did. The networks facilitated the emergence of END; they helped determine its organizational capacity once it had been founded; and they ‘provided’ some of the ideas which distinguished END from other peace initiatives.

In addition to the networked individuals involved, three distinct organizations – ‘movement midwives’— helped ‘give birth’ to the END initiative: the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND); and, above all, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF). Unlike Christian Smith’s movement midwives, these organizations already had, or went on to acquire, roles in the peace movement. Yet the point still applies: they were crucial to the emergence of END.

The END initiative was distinguished above all by its ‘frame’. The formulation and propagation of ideas was a, perhaps the, key feature of END campaigning: much END work consisted both of publishing ideas and of engaging allies, would-be allies, and opponents, at home and abroad, in often detailed, sophisticated, dialogue. The END frame, which grew in part out of a specific non-aligned tradition in the post-war British and European Left – was ‘created’ by the founders of END (above all Edward Thompson). It blamed both sides for the nuclear arms race and the Cold War; argued, as an alternative, for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Europe and the ending of the division of Europe; and identified above all social and political forces in both East and West, working together across the division of Europe, as the agents of this alternative.

The creation of this frame was accompanied by the founding not only of, in Britain, a new organization, END, but also, across Western Europe, of a new transnational institution, the END Convention ‘process’. One can talk of an END ‘current’ in the Western peace movement; this was made up of those individuals and groups who supported the END Appeal.
END activists in Britain were engaged in three, densely linked, types of campaigning. The basic aim of this work was to help create a "transcontinental movement" (END Appeal). On the one hand, they were trying to influence—END-ize—the British peace movement, above all CND: that is, they were trying to get CND to incorporate into its campaigning an END approach to the nuclear arms race and the superpower conflict. Dan Smith, one of END's co-founders, has described END as a "pressure group within the movement". At the same time, ENDers, with other Western peace groups, were trying to link up non-aligned peace groups, as well as political parties and other actors, throughout Western Europe (and beyond): the END Convention was a key vehicle for this. (This entailed, among other things, promoting ties between CND and non-aligned groups in Western Europe.)

Some END supporters were also trying, in a 'twin-track' approach, to help create a pan-European, "trans-continental" alliance with independent groups in the East, whilst maintaining relations with state bodies. This approach came to be labelled by some 'détente from below'. Some END activists conceived of the first 'track' in terms of societal spheres distinct from and acting upon the state—'civil societies'—linking up with each other. This campaigning entailed British END both itself engaging these groups in dialogue and trying to bring others in the West into these relations, including CND.

The dialogue with independent groups in the East involved thus not only the difficult work of trying to find common ground with independent activists whose worldview had been shaped by quite different circumstances. It entailed also trying to bridge two sets of dissimilar frames: that of the mainstream Western peace movement—including CND—which focussed on opposing Western nuclear weapons, and those hold by various independent actors in CEE/SU. Unsurprisingly, this East—West work gave rise to frame disputes and tensions within the END current and beyond, some of them quite serious. While British END largely pursued the dual approach outlined above, others, including some in the END current, were sceptical of the value of this.

81 Interview, 5 August 2003.
work and paid more attention to developments at state level in CEE/SU. Others again saw little value in trying to sustain a dialogue with official bodies in the East and concentrated their efforts on working with independent forces.

These three approaches to East—West relations – which represented three different conceptions of how movements could help end the East—West conflict, and each of which could be, and was, justified in terms of the END ‘frame’ – were often in tension with each other in the END current. Sometimes they gave rise to fierce disputes, above all at END Conventions. On occasion, there were arguments within British END over its Ostpolitik. British END’s relations with its allies were partly marked by these tensions. END’s relationship with CND, for example – which, to date, has not been analysed in any depth – was cooperative to the extent that both were campaigning against Western nuclear missiles and shared both ‘leaders’ and less prominent activists. (Nor were the two groups competing for resources: END’s size meant that it could not be a significant competitor in this respect.) But, with regard to East—West politics, there was a degree of conflict – ‘frame disputes’ – between CND and END, which made the task of influencing CND that much harder. (In addition, British END could occasionally feel constrained in its East—West work by the need to exercise this influence.)

Similarly, British END had cooperative relationships with a variety of West European groups outside the UK, in the IPCC and in the END Convention, and ‘bilaterally’ outside these frameworks. This is not surprising, as these groups not only campaigned broadly within the framework of the END Appeal, but emphasized that part of the END ‘frame’ which prioritised working with independent actors in CEE/SU. However, even with some of its allies in the West European movement END was sometimes in conflict over tactics and strategies: those representatives of peace organizations, political parties, and trade unions who were much more sceptical about the value of the dialogue with the ‘independents’ in CEE/SU. (In addition, some of these tensions were rooted in the different campaigning styles of END and other peace groups, on the one hand, and political parties and trade unions on the other.)
Most accounts of END focus – unsurprisingly, given its distinctiveness on the END 'vision' and pay little or no attention to the role resources and END's organizational form played in structuring its campaign. Yet END's campaigning was shaped not just by ideas; END's 'organizational capacity' also had important consequences for the kind of campaigning END was able to do. For example, well before the 1980s both Edward Thompson and Ken Coates were publishing many of the ideas that went into the END Appeal and otherwise informed END work; yet it was in part only when a new organization had been created that these ideas could reach a wide audience. The amount of money to which British END had access; the specific 'internal' resources which its activists brought with them, and the external ones on which it could draw – including using the CND structure as a way to reach the wider peace movement; and its structure (a loose, federal organization, with no, or [later] a very low, membership): all these shaped the kind of work British END could do.

British END's work was at least partly also shaped by its relationship with political systems, above all with regard to its 'cross-bloc' work. Here both national POSs in the East and international factors had an impact, directly and indirectly. Directly, because individual regimes in CEE/SU could, and sometimes did, implement an 'exclusive' strategy towards foreign activists. By doing this, these regimes hoped to undermine the contacts between these activists and 'independent' actors in their own countries. Indirectly, because the way the regimes treated their own domestic challengers, above all those who had contacts with the Western peace movement, affected the nature of these contacts. In addition, one could argue, as some have, that a distinctive set of

82 See Baehr, 'E. P. Thompson and European Nuclear Disarmament (END)'; Wylie, 'Creating Alternative Visions; Kaldor, Global Civil Society, Chapter 3 (which is also about other like-minded groups).

state-level international relations facilitated the East—West work of END (and other Western peace groups): the Helsinki Accords of 1975. But what also shaped END’s work in this respect was how END supporters framed the regimes in the East and the political opportunities they offered or denied.

The relationship with the political system in Britain was arguably less important in shaping END’s work; here it was the relationship with CND that mattered above all. Similarly, with regard to END’s work in non-UK Western Europe, the concept of POS has relatively little explanatory power. The groups in the other West European countries with which British END was trying to cooperate were, one might assume, affected by their national POSs. But as British END was not trying – or able – to affect policy or political debates in these countries it did not experience directly the effect of political opportunities and constraints in these countries.

Did British END create the right organizational form for its work? It was small and had a loose, federal structure; this gave it an autonomy which allowed it to initiate and develop politically controversial projects such as the dialogue with independent groups in the East and the END Convention process. At the same time, END’s close relationship with CND, and its leading role in international fora such as the END Convention process and the IPCC, gave END supporters platforms from which to broadcast their message much further than the size of the group would otherwise have allowed them to. On the other hand, END was relatively poor: it certainly had less money than it needed for its ambitious campaign. And being a non-membership organization for part of its existence meant that END found it hard to draw new people into its campaign.

Did the attempt to create a “transcontinental movement” succeed or fail? The West European movement was, as Tarrow and Rochon have suggested, a transnational social movement. END activists played a role in linking movements with each other, above all by initiating and helping to sustain the END Convention process, but also by starting and participating in campaigns, such as the North Atlantic Network. In Britain, END supporters

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84 Wylie, ‘Creating Alternative Visions’; Kaldor, Global Civil Society.
helped to keep CND engaged with other West European movements. Across the East—West divide, no ‘movement’ emerged. Instead, the dialogue between Western peace groups and independent CEE and Soviet groups gave rise to a network the participants in which gradually established some common political ground. This ground was firm enough for some of the participants in the dialogue to be able to cooperate in the founding of a new, post-Cold War, transnational citizens’ initiative, the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly.

In the West, however, many mainstream peace organizations, including CND, were not, or only barely, involved in this dialogue. Moreover, END’s participation in the dialogue, and the frame which underpinned this participation, was a source of tension between British END and CND. There was also an increasingly unbridgeable gap in the END ‘current’ between those groups committed to this dialogue and those sceptical of its value. The latter, particularly in the Gorbachev period, set much greater store in state-level changes in the East.

Sources and Method
This study draws on a range of secondary material and primary sources. The latter include published works by and semi-structured interviews with former END and other peace activists in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe, as well as interviews with former interlocutors of END in CEE/SU. Most of the interviews lasted one to one-and-a-half hours. Of crucial importance, however, were the previously almost entirely unused archives of British END.85 Most of these were, when the present author came to use them, still uncatalogued. The exceptions were the papers relating to British END’s work in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, which Hugh Baldwin, a former END activist and trained librarian, had put into order. My first task, therefore, was to catalogue the remaining END papers. In addition, this thesis draws on private and public archives of both CND and END activists, as well as on the official CND archive in the LSE.

85 Gillian Wylie used a few documents in these archives for her PhD thesis. She was unable to use more because, at the time, the END papers were still largely uncatalogued. See Wylie, ‘Creating Alternative Visions’.
The other primary source is of a different nature: the author’s own memory of these events. I was an activist in British END from the middle of 1982, when I attended the END Convention in Brussels and then joined the small London END group, until the end of 1989. From the summer of 1983 to the late spring of 1987 I was an employee of END. This experience both helped and hindered me in my research. On the one hand, I started out knowing a lot about much of what British END did (though about the periods 1980—mid-1982 and Spring 1987—89, when I was, respectively, not involved in END or only in one small part of it, I knew relatively little). This meant, arguably, among other things, that I could make better (or at least faster) sense of internal documents than could someone without my previous knowledge of END. On the other hand, one can know too much: I had to avoid getting bogged down in recounting events that seemed important to me as an activist but which were of little or no relevance for an historical account. In addition, my experience was, necessarily, partial, and in two senses: I was, as indicated, only actively involved in parts of END’s work; and, with regard to certain matters—particularly those to do with END’s Ostpolitik—I often was, or at the time had felt myself to be, on one of two or more sides of an internal argument. The latter was a bigger obstacle to overcome (the first could be removed by finding out what I didn’t know): I had to ensure that I was not misrepresenting the views of END activists with whom, at the time, I did not agree. I hope I have been able to do so. Nevertheless, I do have an interpretation of END’s work, which should emerge from this study.

Outline of this Study

In Chapter 2 I trace the founding of END in the context of the emergence of the peace movement in the UK in 1979—80 and I present and analyse the END world view—the ‘frame’ which helped give END peace campaigning its distinctive character. In Chapter 3 I examine British END’s structure and resources and consider how these shaped the kind of campaigning END activists were able to engage in. The following three chapters focus on this campaigning: Chapter 3 looks at END’s work in the UK, above all the central
relationship with CND; Chapter 4 at the attempts of END supporters to construct durable networks amongst West European peace groups and movements; and Chapter 6 at the dialogue with independent forces in Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the simultaneous relationship with Soviet bloc regimes. In Chapter 7 I consider the extent to which END’s campaign can be said to have been a success or a failure.
Chapter 2
Beginnings

Peace Movements Emerge
The founding of END in Britain in early 1980 was one event in the beginning of the anti-nuclear weapons mobilizations in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe. The catalyst of these mobilizations – the immediate ‘grievance’ – was the NATO ‘dual-track’ decision of 12 December 1979 to deploy 572 intermediate-range nuclear missiles (464 Tomahawk cruise, 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles) in five West European countries, beginning in 1983, in ‘response’ to the Soviet Union’s continuing deployment of its intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the SS-20s. These new Western weapons would be under the sole command of the US. West Germany would receive 96 cruise missiles and all the Pershing IIs; Italy 112 cruise; Belgium and the Netherlands 48 cruise each; and Britain 160 cruise missiles. The other part of the December 1979 ‘dual-track’ decision stated that none of these missiles would be deployed if the USSR withdrew all its SS-20s; the USA would, thus, enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union with the aim of removing these intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe.

The central focus of the West European peace campaigns over the next four to six years, depending on the country, was preventing the deployment of these US weapons. Movement activists argued that, far from providing a necessary ‘balance’ to the SS-20, cruise and Pershing II missiles offered a qualitatively new threat. Activists directed their criticism not just at the missiles but also at the military strategies that would govern their use. Before and at the beginning of the mobilizations, however, other, more general, factors help explain the origins of the peace mobilizations: the decline of détente and a growing fear of war; and, in Britain, a

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1 Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace, 4; Carter, Peace Movements, 114.
series of policy statements and moves by the British government (and revelations about past governments' behaviour).

National and international public opinion polls registered growth in the late 1970s in the fear of war amongst the publics of various NATO countries. Eurobarometer polls indicated that there was a "sharp upsurge in the 'fear of a world war within the subsequent ten years'" in what would be the five 'deployment' countries and France. 2 The opening words of the END Appeal appear therefore to have reflected a real mood: "We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely". 3

The growth of the fear of war in this period correlates with a decline in superpower détente. Russet and Deluca point out that it is not clear exactly when this increase in a fear of war became strong; but that it is likely to have been after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 4 The decline of détente was gradual; but it accelerated in the second half of 1979 and in 1980. In the late 1970s, there was increasing, and open, disquiet in Western military and political circles about the growth in Soviet military power and the 'projection' of this power into parts of Africa; in 1977 President Carter announced that the USA would deploy the 'neutron bomb' in Western Europe (and then cancelled this decision in 1978); in 1979 the US Senate made it clear that it would not ratify the SALT I Treaty that had been signed in June of that year by President Carter and CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev – and Carter withdrew it rather than have it defeated in the Senate 5; and December 1979 saw the 'dual-track' decision and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1980, the US

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3 'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament', 223.

4 See also Meyer, 'Neutralistische Träumereien?', 119.

boycott of the Moscow Olympics and, above all, the election in November of the right-wing and fiercely anti-Communist Ronald Reagan as president confirmed the ascendancy of a tough public ‘anti-Soviet’ policy in the USA. Less publicly, in July of that year President Carter had signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD59), which allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in fighting, rather than deterring, war.\(^6\)

In Britain, national developments also encouraged the growth of peace campaigning. Amongst the most important was the fact that, since the general election of May 1979, Britain had had a Conservative government led by a markedly right-wing, and, in foreign relations, strongly anti-Communist, prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. In 1980 a series of government policies (or revelations about them) helped stimulate anti-nuclear weapons campaigning. In February 1980, *Panorama* broadcast the civil defence film that the government would show in the run-up to nuclear war, while, in March 1980, the government published the pamphlet *Protect and Survive*, which proposed that people defend themselves from a nuclear bomb-blast and radiation by, amongst other things, sitting under a table or in a cupboard under the stairs. In June 1980, the government announced that 96 cruise missiles would be stationed at Greenham Common airbase; and it followed this, in July 1980, with the announcement that it would buy the Trident missile system from the USA as a replacement for Polaris as Britain’s ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent. Slightly earlier – in January 1980 – the House of Commons Defence debate had revealed that an earlier Labour government was also responsible for the perceived nuclear threat: in 1974 Labour government had secretly updated the Polaris missile system with the Chevaline warhead.\(^7\) James Hinton has argued, in the 1980s, that most “CND activists were in no mood to trust the Labour party”.\(^8\)


Yet the Labour Party was also involved in the upsurge of new anti-nuclear weapons campaigning. After the defeat of Labour in 1979 the left vigorously pursued a campaign to ‘democratize’ the party; that is, to make the parliamentary party more accountable to the party outside parliament.

One source of dissatisfaction on the left was precisely the Wilson and Callaghan Labour governments’ ignoring of conference policies on defence and of the left-dominated National Executive Committee’s proposals for cutting defence expenditure. The NEC (as well as ordinary Labour activists) promoted unilateralist policies as part of their campaign against the party leadership. The first mass demonstration of the new anti-nuclear weapons mobilization – an anti-cruise missiles rally in London on 20 June 1980 – was called by the NEC; the numbers attending it – about 20,000 – indicated, among other things, that there were many Labour activists ready to campaign on this issue. The passing by the October 1980 party conference of a resolution in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament was more evidence of a groundswell of support for this stance amongst activists. Maguire has argued that these developments helped create political opportunities conducive to the rise of the peace movement. While the party was not “present as an organized political entity at this stage of the movement’s development” in Britain, local party members were: they worked with religious leaders, former peace activists and organizers of other movements to “get the peace campaign of the 1980s off the ground”.

From late 1979 new peace groups sprang up around Britain. These included, amongst the earliest, the East Anglia Campaign Against the Missiles (EACAM) and the Campaign Against the Oxfordshire Missiles (Campaign ATOM) – each stimulated by the (incorrect) assumption that

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8 Hinton, Protests and Visions, 189.


10 Maguire, ‘Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties’, 211.
cruise missiles would be deployed at, respectively, RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk and RAF Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire — and Peace Action Durham, founded in January 1980. By the end of September 1980 there were more than 300 local groups with a combined membership of over 40,000.11

Developments at different ‘levels’, then, can be said to have stimulated the new peace mobilization in Britain (and elsewhere in Western Europe): the overall deterioration in relations between East and West; the strengthening anti-Communism in the United States, and its echo in the United Kingdom; developments in US nuclear weapons strategy; the dual-track decision of December 1979; a series of policy decisions by the British government. Some or all of these developments, one can assume, stimulated the relatively marked fear of war in 1979 and 1980. Peace campaigners attested, at the time and later, that these were amongst the developments were the reasons why they became active, and/or the cause of the new mobilizations.12 In addition, there was a growing enthusiasm for anti-nuclear weapons policies within the Labour Party.

The Founding of END

Alongside the multitude of local and regional groups that sprang up in 1980, two new initiatives with — as their names indicated — ambitious aims were launched: the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) (in 1979) and European Nuclear Disarmament (END). (Mattoo has explained persuasively why the WDC did not become a mass campaign and dwindled into obscurity after the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.13)

The founding of END can be explained partly in the same terms as one would use to explain the emergence of the many other peace initiatives in Britain. For example – as we shall see – one founder of END, Edward Thompson, began his campaign with an attack on the proposed deployment of cruise missiles; another founder – Ken Coates – was an active participant in the arguments within the Labour Party and wanted END to be a forum for discussion and debate that would, amongst other things, influence the party. But there is a crucial additional explanation for the launching of the END campaign: its founders, 'carriers' of specific political traditions on the British left, consciously wanted to create a distinctive initiative; and they were parts of networks and organizations which enabled them to do so.

An important part of the END initiative had its roots in the ideas and actions of the British New Left that emerged partly out of the splits in the Communist Party in 1956. Dorothy Thompson, a co-founder of END, has written that a “non-aligned...[New Left] political position” – “against the communists and the fellow-travellers, on the one hand, and Natopolitan social democrats, on the other” – could be “traced in the years before 1980, and it certainly emerged in the eighties with the foundation of END”. The ‘carriers’ of this ‘position’ were, among others, Thompson herself and her husband Edward, one of the most important founders of END and certainly the best known exponent of the END idea. Edward Thompson, looking back at END in 1990, wrote that, from 1956 “we [ex-Communists] developed in little journals, and then with the first British New Left – in association with friends in West Europe and C. Wright Mills in the USA – a new strategy of ‘active neutrality’ and a third way of peace

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14 Interview with Ken Coates, 12 December 2001.

15 And perhaps before: James Hinton has written that “[t]here is an obvious continuity between ‘Third Force’ ideas of democratic socialism between the two superpowers in the 1940s, and the ‘Beyond the Blocs’ politics of European Nuclear Disarmament in the 1980s”. Hinton, Protests and Visions, ix.

and human rights". 17 Thompson had, since the 1950s, campaigned in support of, and debated with, ‘dissidents’ in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Elsewhere, Edward Thompson spoke about the “long inheritance” of the END “line”, and his “own personal association” with it, which “stemmed from the impact of the 1956 events in the world Communist movement – the Hungarian insurrection and so on”.18

In Beyond the Cold War, he traced his commitment to an undivided Europe back to the end of World War Two when “[t]hroughout Europe men and women looked forward to the fruits of victory: a continent both democratic and at peace” – before these “expectations” were shattered by the “onset of the Cold War”.19 Kate Soper has argued that the “core themes” of Thompson’s ‘socialist humanism’ – the “rejection of the antithetical ‘philistinisms’ of social democracy and Stalinist Communism; the insistence that the sole route to genuine socialist emancipation lay on a course between the two; and the affirmation of our moral autonomy and powers of historical agency” – provided “the unbroken thematic thread of all Thompson’s writings”, from the biography of William Morris published in 1955 to the “denunciation of Cold War stasis and the ‘exterminist’ logic of the arms race in the 1980s”.20

Another ‘carrier’ of the New Left position in the 1960s and 1970s – indeed, in Dorothy Thompson’s view, one of its “most important and lasting vectors”21 – was the Institute for Worker’s Control (IWC). (She later described IWC events as “the only worthwhile thing happening on the Left in the 1970s”.22). Set up in 1964, the “principal inspiration” behind the


21 Dorothy Thompson, ‘On the Trail of the New Left’, 95.

22 Interview with Dorothy Thompson, 20 June 2001.
Institute – a historian of the Labour Party’s political thought has written – were Ken Coates and Tony Topham, who were also founding or early members of END.23 Coates was also the leading figure in the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF). The BRPF was another ‘vector’ of New Left ideas. It played a central role in the launch of – indeed, it was the key ‘movement midwife’ of – the END initiative (see below).

Ken Coates – who, amongst other things, had also run defence campaigns for Central East European and Soviet ‘dissidents’ (sometimes with the Thompsons)24, and most recently for Rudolf Bahro, the imprisoned East German Marxist regime critic – has traced the origins of END back to a seminar, ‘The Just Society’, convened in Bradford in 1976 by the Russell Foundation. (The papers from this conference are more evidence of a ‘Third Way’ tradition on the European Left.25) At the conference, Coates recalls, the exiled Czech scholar Eduard Goldstuecker suggested that the poor state of relations between East and West Europe and the “adverse conditions of work” of “independent socialist thinkers in the East” were “intricately related”; and only a “new and comprehensive European peace movement” could offer hope of a “real change for the better”.26 Goldstuecker’s comments prompted Coates, he writes, to see how such a movement could be brought to life: “we began to explore every contact which might help to generate such a movement. . . . I and others returned to this theme again and again, at international conferences of one kind or another” (including at one organized by the Italian Socialist

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Party). They had some success, as another account suggests: speaking later about the origins of END, Edward Thompson said that “it was all based upon earlier political work – the Russell Foundation had quite a large network of people in Europe and America to build on”. Coates himself wrote later that the result of his “skirting around the question of a European peace movement” in the 1970s was that “I had a small network of well placed Europeans, who could pick up on the END Appeal as soon as we were ready to circulate it”. Many of these contacts were in Social Democratic, Labour (Socialist International) and ‘Euro-Communist’ parties, as well as in trades unions.

The catalyst for the formation of END, as for the peace mobilizations throughout Western Europe, was, as indicated above, NATO’s 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles. Edward Thompson had responded to the decision with a polemical article in New Society (one of a series of six entitled ‘The State of the Nation’; October–November 1979) and in the New Statesman (‘The Doomsday Consensus’; 20 December 1979). In early January 1980 he wrote a letter to Tony Benn asking him to consider whether the Labour Party could not help mobilize a movement against cruise missiles. Tony Benn turned down the request. In Ken Coates’s account, this was because the Labour Party, as a constitutional party, could not be seen to be promoting civil disobedience; though he may also have done so because such a campaign, as described by Thompson, would have involved Labour cooperating, in

27 Coates, Listening for Peace, 11.
30 Thompson began the New Society series – only a small part of which was about cruise missiles – before the NATO decision. Both the New Society and the New Statesman articles were republished (in a sub-section tellingly entitled ‘Active Neutrality’) with other essays in Writing by Candlelight, London: Merlin Press, 1980.
31 The letter is dated 3 January 1980. END Archive. See also Coates, Listening for Peace, 12.
32 Coates, Listening for Peace. 12; Interview with Coates.
some kind of official capacity, with a range of organizations and social forces to which it was ideologically opposed (for example, Trotskyists and Eurocommunists) and over which, in such a campaign, it would have had little control. Thompson and Benn copied Coates into the correspondence; Coates was also in regular contact with Stuart Holland, the economist and left-wing Labour MP who became a leading figure in END in the early 1980s; and he had talked with the Marxist political thinker Ralph Miliband about a campaign against cruise missiles. 33

In his letter to Benn, Thompson had referred enthusiastically to the idea of a “conference around themes of european action against nuclear war (possibly neutrality?) [sic]” – which, he wrote, another leading left-wing MP, Eric Heffer, had told him he and Benn were thinking about. The idea was “splendid”, and a combination of a national campaign against cruise missiles with a “reaching out to european allies” would create a political initiative not seen for two decades (that is, since the demise of CND and the ‘positive neutrality’ initiative in the 1960s). 34 In ‘The Doomsday Consensus’ he revived “the policy of ‘active neutrality’” as an “alternative” to NATO policy 35

The beginning of the END campaign as such can be dated to the suggestion made by Ken Coates, in a telephone call to Edward Thompson in early January 1980, that there should be a European campaign against nuclear weapons the essence of which would be the demand for a nuclear-free zone in Europe. 36 Thompson, Coates recalls, “enthusiastically accepted this idea”. He then wrote an article for The Guardian, ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’, the first published text to outline some of the key features of the END approach, or frame (see below). 37

33 Coates, ibid., 12; Interview with Coates.


35 Thompson, Writing by Candlelight, 272.

36 Coates, Listening for Peace, 12; Coates, letter to author, 7 March 2001. See also E. P. Thompson, ‘Resurgence in Europe’, 81.
Thompson then also prepared the first draft of what would become the END Appeal. The drafting, and circulation of the Appeal over the next 2—3 months brought together individuals many of whom had personal, professional and campaigning ties going back many years; as well as organizations: the not just the BRPF, but also CND, the Catholic peace organisation Pax Christi; and the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), based in London. From the outset, the promoters of the initiative were bringing other people into the embryonic campaign. This work was done above all by the Russell Foundation. Mary Kaldor, a defence/peace researcher based at the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University, recalls that she was first approached by Ken Coates, whom she knew through having attended IWC events: “I had lots of contact with Ken . . . I’d been doing a lot of stuff on defence conversion and I’d been working with the Vicker’s shop stewards and with Lucas Aerospace . . . they were all connected”. She also knew Stuart Holland, who lived in the same building as her in Brighton. Dan Smith also recalls being approached by Ken Coates, whom he had met a few times. Smith and Kaldor already knew each other. As defence analysts, they had been members of the Labour Party Defence Study Group and co-authors of Sense About Defence. Smith – who was just to bring out a left-wing critique of British Defence policy, The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s – was also a leading figure in CND: he had been its national organizer for

37 Reprinted as ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’ in Writing by Candlelight, 277–282.
39 Interview with Dan Smith, 5 August 2003.
40 Interview with Mary Kaldor, 20 September 2002.
41 Interview with Dan Smith.
six months in 1973; its General Secretary in 1974 and 1975; and, since then, a member of its National Council.

On 12 February, after a meeting between the Thompsons and four directors of the BRPF, Ken Coates wrote to a list of left-wing politicians, trade unionists, writers, academics, as well as peace activists or organizations – mainly in Britain but a handful from abroad – inviting them to a meeting on 8 March to discuss Thompson's draft: “the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Europe, from Poland to Portugal”.44 This list included Bruce Kent, who, after having been Chair of CND since 1977, became its General Secretary in 1979; Pax Christi; Arthur Scargill, the president of the National Union of Mineworkers; Peggy Duff, who had been CND's first General Secretary,45 and General Secretary of the ICDP since 1964; Ralph Miliband; Robin Cook MP; and also Antonio Bronda, Claude Bourdet and Zhores Medvedev. Antonio Bronda was a journalist with L'Unità, the Italian Communist Party's daily newspaper; Claude Bourdet had been a leading figure in the non-aligned French Left since the Second World War, and “one of the main European theoreticians of a ‘third way’ since 1947”.46 His links with the Thompsons and Coates went back to the 1950s.47 Zhores Medvedev was a Soviet bio-chemist in exile since the Soviet government had stripped him of his citizenship while he was on an officially arranged research trip to Britain. He had close contacts with the BRPF.

44 Letter dated 12 February 1980. (END Archive.)


47 Dorothy Thompson, 'On the Trail of the New Left'; Interview with Coates.
Thompson’s draft was not only discussed at this meeting – held at Friends’ Meeting House in the Euston Road in London\textsuperscript{48} – but was also circulated more widely for comments – in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. In Thompson’s words, it was “knocked about and greatly revised, to its advantage” by, among others, Dorothy Thompson, Ken Coates, Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, Bruce Kent, Ulrich Albrecht, Claude Bourdet, and Zhores Medvedev.\textsuperscript{49} (Albrecht, a well-known West German peace researcher living in West Berlin, was brought into the growing END discussion by Mary Kaldor, who knew him through her work in peace research networks.)

At the 8 March meeting, following a proposal from Arthur Scargill that the Appeal should be addressed to a British audience – “Arthur didn’t want any messing about with Europe . . . it didn’t exist”, Coates later commented\textsuperscript{50} – it was agreed, as a compromise, that potential signatories outside Britain should be asked to endorse not the Appeal itself but an accompanying statement. The BRPF circulated the Appeal, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe with or without this statement, for signatures from March\textsuperscript{51} (Which is why, in parts of continental Europe, the document became known as the ‘Russell Appeal’.) The second large meeting to discuss the appeal, and the accompanying campaign, took place on 27 April in the Polytechnic of Central London building in the Marylebone Road. By this stage hundreds of signatures, in Britain and abroad, had already been gathered. The signatures were presented at the public launch of the Appeal at a press conference in the House of Commons on 28 April.

\textsuperscript{48} Richard Winkler, ‘END comes to the UK’, \textit{New Statesman} 14 March 1980, 380. There were other, smaller, meetings. See interview with Dan Smith; Coates letter 12 February 1980.

\textsuperscript{49} Accounts are given in: E. P. Thompson, ‘Resurgence in Europe’, 81, and \textit{Double Exposure}, 10ff; and in Ken Coates, ‘For a Nuclear-free Europe’, 240, and in \textit{Listening for Peace}, 12—14.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Coates.

\textsuperscript{51} E. P. Thompson, ‘Wave of Consciousness to Sink the Warmongers’ \textit{The Guardian}, 28 April 1980. Other ENDers did the same, though on a smaller scale.
1980. Other launch meetings were held simultaneously in Oslo, Paris, Berlin, and Lisbon. The European Nuclear Disarmament campaign had been launched.

The END frame

With the drafting of the END Appeal its authors established a consensus. This consensus was, in its most succinct form, the END 'frame'. Signatories to the Appeal expressed their agreement with this frame. However, though the clearest statement of the aims to which British END subscribed, the END Appeal did not contain the last word on British END's goals, nor on those of the people and groups who signed it. Written by many hands (even if E. P. Thompson's is the most evident), the document was a compromise, as one of its authors, Ken Coates, has argued. END activists could and did interpret the document differently, or emphasised some passages over others: in so doing they were stating, implicitly or explicitly, that they supported some, but not all, of the aims contained in the Appeal, or thought some more important than others.

The fact that the Appeal and the approach it sketched out could be interpreted differently became most evident in the East—West work of the peace movement. Amongst those groups and individuals campaigning in END terms – the END 'current' institutionalised above all in the international END Convention 'process' – there were three approaches to East—West campaigning, all within the END framework: one – 'twin-track' – approach which prioritised the dialogue with independent forces but nevertheless sought to maintain a relationship with state bodies; another which was sceptical of the value of this dialogue and concentrated on relations with 'officials'; and a third which focussed on the relationship with independent groups and largely ignored official bodies such as the peace committees. British END subscribed broadly to the first approach but, amongst the founders of the group, those associated with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation pursued the second.

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52 Interview with Ken Coates.
I first describe the basic END ‘frame’ as presented in the END Appeal. I then show how Edward Thompson, British END’s most influential campaigner, presented a fuller version of the END approach in early essays.

**The END Appeal**

The END Appeal is an important document not just because it expressed an agreement amongst a group of activists in early 1980. It is significant because, throughout the decade, it provided, in outline form, the political framework for END campaigning – and it did so because END campaigners explicitly recognised it as such a framework. For example, when British END became a membership organization in 1985, its membership form required potential members to sign the statement “I would like to join END. I endorse the END Appeal”. Taking part in the END Convention Liaison Committee, and attendance as a full participant in the END Conventions themselves, was also dependent on one’s endorsing the Appeal (or a statement expressing support for it [see above,])

When the Hungarian Peace Council decided to become involved in the END Convention process in 1987, it did so by signing the END Appeal.

The END Appeal outlined an approach to peace campaigning quite different to that of other parts of the peace movement. CND’s constitution, for example, while it had an internationalist element, framed the nuclear weapons problem as one that could be solved first by national, British, action. The END Appeal, by contrast, presented a pan-European approach that addressed the political underpinning of the nuclear arms race, the Cold War.

The Appeal diagnoses a problem, proposes a solution to it, specifies an agents of the solution, and offers a rationale for why people should effect the solution. The fundamental stance it takes is that of ‘non-alignment’: that is, opposition to both sides in the Cold War. “We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties.”
The main problem – the threat – is the nuclear arms race, participation in which is driving both sides – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – to develop ever more usable nuclear weapons, as well as strategies that make ‘limited’ nuclear war more plausible. The increasing expenditure on the arms race exacerbates social and political strain, which “feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa”. The consequence of all this: that “a third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely”.53

But it is not only the nuclear arms race that threatens. Though the phrase is not used in the Appeal, the fundamental problem is the Cold War, the whole confrontation – military, political, economic – between East and West. One aspect of this fundamental problem is that Europe is divided, people and ideas cannot travel freely within and across the blocs, and, on each side, as the “powers of the military and internal security forces are enlarged . . . [the] civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened”. In other words, the East–West conflict not only makes nuclear war more likely; it leads directly to curtailments of civil liberties on both sides.

The solution has various elements. The first is to make “the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal” a nuclear-weapons-free-zone: “to free [Europe] from nuclear weapons” and all related facilities. The statement asks the superpowers to freeze their respective intermediate-range nuclear weapons programmes: the Soviet Union should “halt production” of the SS-20; the USA should not “implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe”. And the authors of the Appeal “urge” the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

The Appeal contains objectives that are even more ambitious: freeing “Europe from confrontation, . . . [enforcing] detente between the

53 All quotations from END Appeal from 'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament', 223–226.
United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, ... [dissolving] both great power alliances": in short, ending the Cold War.

What would be the means to these ends? A “European-wide campaign” of popular protest. The Appeal’s authors “do not wish to impose uniformity” on the movement; on the contrary, it “will be the responsibility of the people of each nation . . . to decide upon its own means and strategy”. But “this must be part of a “trans-continental movement” in which “every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities”; and in which “less formal exchanges” between institutions, groups and individuals take place. The “common object” of these ‘exchanges’: “to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons”.

The Appeal commits its signatories to “defend[ing] and extend[ing] the rights of all citizens, East and West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange” – in other words, actively to defend the civil liberties of people, including in the Soviet bloc, who wish to take part in this movement.

The Appeal offers a vision of what a Europe not marked by nuclear weapons could look like. It does so in a passage that is strongly ‘antipolitical’ (and the style of which suggests it was written by Edward Thompson). This passage elevates the ties between people (and peoples) above those between states, and asks readers to pre-figure, in their actions, the goal for which they are aiming:

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to ‘East’ or ‘West’, but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

Finally, the rationale for this action is contained in the diagnosis of the problem: that the nuclear arms specifically, and the Cold War, not only threaten war in the near future, but also, in the present, suppress the civil
rights of people in Europe. Only by taking action themselves can Europeans free themselves from these burdens.

The END approach was expressed not only in the Appeal, but also in the writings of some of its best-known activists, as well as in some of the actions of END supporters. To know END, one has to understand the messages contained in its texts. Essays, articles, and full-length books by Mary Kaldor, Ken Coates, Dan Smith, and other END activists throughout the 1980s laid out a broad END approach. The best-known writings, and the most influential at the time, however, were those of Edward Thompson. Many END activists have testified to the influence of Thompson's writings. Mary Kaldor later described Protest and Survive and the END Appeal as the “inspirational documents” at this time; Lynne Jones has written of the profound impact that this essay had on her; and James Hinton, an early END activist and a leading figure in CND, later wrote that it “served to unlock the imagination of at least one inert activist (myself)”.

In response to a question about how people had become interested in END in a survey of END supporters conducted in 1982, 14 per cent mentioned newspaper articles and 15 per cent books, in both categories often those by E. P. Thompson. In addition, 32 per cent mentioned Thompson specifically as the reason, about which one of the organizers of the survey commented, “since he didn’t have a separate category on the questionnaire it is likely that the true number is much higher . . .”. This does not mean, of course, that everyone inspired by Thompson agreed with his every word; but it does indicate that he was the single most influential thinker in END.


Edward Thompson

Thompson presented his own response to the 'Second' Cold War in various essays and articles published in the period 1979–91. Amongst the most influential were those written at the start of the decade: Protest and Survive and 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization'—written in April and May 1980, respectively—and Beyond the Cold War, published in early 1982. The tone, style and content of these essays differs, but they (with later essays) can be treated as expressions, with variations, of a single 'take' on the Cold War.

The Cold War—the "fulcrum upon which power turns . . . in the world" and whose centre is in Europe—he writes in "Notes", has reached a state of 'exterminism'. Exterminism has, in both superpowers' societies, an "institutional base": this is the "weapons system" and its "entire economic, scientific, political and ideological support-system—the social system which researches it, 'chooses' it, produces it, polices it, justifies it, and maintains it in being". This "'leading sector' (weapons systems and their supports)" may not be highly visible, but it "stamps its priorities on the society as a whole", and "inflects the direction of growth". So the USA and the USSR do not have military-industrial complexes', Thompson states—that term suggests the "evil . . . can be restrained". Rather, they are such complexes": the "contamination, issuing from them permeates the "whole societal body".

It is from these "bases deeply enstructured within the opposed powers" that the inertia arises that propels the Cold War forward. In both the US and the Soviet Union the choices that the political and military elites make are, partly, determined by developments in the weapons and factories. In the US "pressure rises upwards from the laboratories and the

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57 Thompson, 'Notes', 3.

58 Ibid., 22.
strategic war-games simulation room to NATO planning committees . . . to the United States Secretary for Defence". 59 In the Soviet Union, the political elite's "decision" to pursue nuclear parity with the USA was taken under pressure from both ideological and bureaucratic. In both states politics "may be militarized: and decisions about weaponry impose the political choices of tomorrow". 60

Thompson is not arguing that there are "structural symmetries in the opposed superpowers". If a symmetry is becoming apparent in the early 1980s, it is "consequence and not causation". 61 On the contrary, at various points in his essays, Thompson emphasizes the differences between the two Cold War rivals. In Protest and Survive he writes that the United States "seems to . . . be dangerous and provocative in its general military and diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union with menacing bases. It is in Washington, rather than in Moscow, that scenarios are dreamed up for 'theatre' wars; and it is in America that the "alchemists" of superkill, the clever technologists of "advantage and ultimate weapons", are found. 62 And, despite the obvious irritation he feels towards the "Marxist left" and its "immobilism" in relation to the Cold War, in 'Notes' he characterizes the particular nature of the US's contribution to the Cold War in (albeit necessarily simple) Marxist terms: a "strong contributory thrust to exterminism comes from the normal dynamics of gigantic capitalist enterprise". In addition, "one can observe a collective capitalist General Will for survival or expansion."

The "basic postures of the Soviet Union", by contrast (in an analysis which also echoes those of some of his left-wing disputants, who see the USA as the protagonist in the Cold War, the Soviet Union essentially as a reactive antagonist), "seem to me, still, to be those of siege

59 Ibid., 9.

60 Ibid., 7.


62 Thompson, Protest and Survive, 25.
and aggressive defence". On the Soviet side, the “incremental thrust . . . towards exterminism is not aggressive and invasive, but . . . ideological and bureaucratic”.  

But if the two main participants in the Cold War are pushed by different forces, they are not only closely linked by, but to an extent their differences are subsumed under, their shared dependence on the Cold War: “the ruling groups [have] come to need perpetual war crisis to legitimate their rule, their privileges and their priorities; to silence dissent; to exercise some discipline; and to divert attention from the manifest irrationality of the operation”. The Soviet Union and the USA need the Cold War and so each other; they are addicted to ‘exterminism’.

This mutual dependence is what makes the Cold War a “reciprocal and inter-active process”. Its “inner dynamic” – each move by one adversary being matched by the other – determines that the Cold War’s “military and security establishments are self-reproducing. Their missiles summon forward our missiles which summon their missiles in turn. NATO”s hawks feed the hawks of the Warsaw bloc”. “Reciprocal” and “reciprocity” are key terms in Thompson”s writings. They “disclose”, he argues, “not a categorical definition but a historical process of mutual formation: reciprocity (and mutual incitement) in weaponry, ideological hostilities, internal security, control of satellites and client states, and so forth”.  

Within this logic of reciprocity, ideology plays a key role. Indeed, “ideology, as much as profit-making and bureaucratic growth, has motored the increment of weaponry”. “More than military-industrial pressures”,

63 Ibid, 70.
64 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 19.
65 Ibid., 22.
66 Ibid., 17.
68 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 22.
he later wrote, ideology is the "driving-motor of Cold War II". In the United States there is anti-Communism: the idea that "the United States is the leader of "the Free World", and the Commmies are the Other". In the Soviet Union, there is the notion that that country is "the heartland of the world"s first socialist revolution, threatened by the Other – Western imperialism, in alliance with 1,000 million Chinese". The intensity and effect of ideology is not identical in each camp: in the Soviet Union, he implies, ideology"s disciplinary function is greater; and it is "supplemented by more powerful and more intrusive security forces". But though different in content and effect, in function the two camps" ideologies are the same, and in three ways: they motivate "war preparations", legitimate "the privileged status of the armourers", and police "internal dissent". In addition – a modification of the last point – ideologies play a crucial role in bonding their respective populations together. These last two functions also take place at the bloc level: ideology serves to keep in line the client states of the two superpowers. These similarities in function may be why Thompson, in his discussion of both blocs simply refers to one phenomenon, "Cold War ideology".

Thompson’s contrasts his picture of the East-West conflict with two others, each of which proposes that the Cold War is marked by rationality. The "action-reaction" model implies that "the decisions of leaders actually determined force structure and that the leaders" orders were carried out by


70 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 20.

71 Ibid., 21.

72 Ibid., 22.

73 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 23.

74 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 21.

75 Ibid., 19.

76 Ibid., 21.
the military bureaucracy "... it further implies that "... the leaders of each side [react] rationally to the behaviour of the other side"."77 A Marxist analysis, for its part, "commonly" ascribes the "... cause of the Cold War to the evil will of 'imperialism'";78 it analyses events "... in terms of imperialism's supposed "rationality."79 In addition, Marxist analysts, with their over-attention to historical causes, actually prevent one from explaining the contemporary Cold War: "... the Cold War today, in its military and ideological emplacements and ritual confrontations, cannot be explained by returning again and again to its origins and allocating blame";80 for "... a river gathers up many tributaries on its way, and turns into unexpected courses"81. The present, Thompson seems to be arguing, is historically formed and thus can be subjected to rational analysis; but such a rational analysis might not see that the "object of analysis" is, in fact, "irrational"; if "... we drill all this in too tidy a logical formation we will be unprepared for the irrationality of the event".82 Moreover, while, at earlier points in the Cold War – say, in its first years – "... rational self-interest" might have driven the actions of the relevant elites,83 this is no longer so.

What, then, is to be done, in the face of this qualitatively new threat? In ‘Notes’ Thompson only briefly sketches the outline of an “anti-exterminist configuration”: a popular movement of opposition to the Cold War, the “most critical and decisive point” of which may be to “... engage in delicate and non-provocative work to form alliances between the peace movement in the West and constructive elements in the Communist world ...” which confront the exterminist structures and ideology of their own

78 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 2.
79 Ibid., 3.
80 Thompson, ‘Europe, the Weak Link’, 341.
81 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 9.
82 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 1.
83 Thompson, ‘America and the War Movement’, 44.
nations”. His relative silence on this matter, as he later suggested, can be attributed to the fact that the forces, in West and East, in which he placed his hopes, were visible only barely or not all. Similarly, the best-selling Protest and Survive contained only a few pages at the end on the “alternative logic”, the “opposition at every level of society” which would have to be generated. (Though the tone of these passages – written at the same time as their counterparts in “Notes” – are more optimistic and enthusiastic than the latter, so perhaps Thompson’s pessimism waxed and waned by the week.)

In Beyond the Cold War Thompson outlined at more length a strategy for ending the Cold War. Here he presented a vision of a ‘trans-continental movement’ against the Cold War. Written in late 1981 as a lecture, the relative optimism of Beyond the Cold War reflects the fact that, throughout Western Europe, huge national, and internationally linked, peace movements had emerged; and that, in the East, the Western peace movements had had their first positive response from an “independent” group: on 15 November 1981 the Czechoslovak human rights group Charter 77 had issued a “Statement on West European Peace Movements”, which, though by no means a simple endorsement of these movements, was warm and positive in tone. (See Chapter 6.) For the first time since the writing of the END Appeal, it seemed to Thompson that the emergence of some kind of “trans-continental” force might be possible: “something remarkable is stirring in this continent today . . . For the first time since the wartime Resistance there is a spirit abroad in Europe which carries a trans-continental aspiration”. Thompson points to the political significance of governments in East and West creating “nuclear-free zones”: these “make a space of lessened tension between the two blocs . . . and . . . loosen the

84 Thompson, ‘Notes’, 28–29.
85 Thompson, ‘Europe, the Weak Link’, 329—330.
86 Thompson, Protest and Survive, 30.
87 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 27.
bonds of the bloc system, allowing more autonomy, more initiative to the smaller states.” But his attention is focussed above all on what people, not states, are doing and can do: “we can glimpse”, he argues, “a détente of peoples rather than states – a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, . . . which sometimes defies the ideological and security structures of particular states”. Only this movement can end the Cold War: “[i]t is, precisely, at the top of the Cold War systems that deadlock, or worse, takes place. If we are to destructure the Cold War, then we must destabilise these systems from below”.\footnote{88 Ibid, 30–31.} This “people’s détente”, he spells out here, must entail the Western peace movement and the Eastern “movement . . . for freedom” recognizing “each other as natural allies”.

On one level, arguably, this cross-bloc alliance is proposed for instrumental reasons: if movements East and West opposing the Cold War appeared only in one half of the continent, they would – however immediately effective their work – be dismissed as agents of the other side, and so contained. A cross-bloc \textit{alliance} was the key to the success of a pan-European network of anti-exterminist movements: “So long as each bloc’s resistance movement can be categorized as the “ally” of the other” he wrote in “Notes”, “exterminism . . . will be able to police its own territory, reassert ideological control, and, eventually, resume its thrust.”\footnote{89 Ibid., 29.} Yet there is also an enthusiastic non-instrumental commitment to an undivided Europe, to the “reunification of European political culture”.\footnote{90 Thompson, \textit{Beyond the Cold War}, 30.}

Thompson sometimes describes this trans-continental movement differently. In \textit{Beyond the Cold War} he recognizes that the challenge being posed to “Atlanticist dogma” in the early 1980s by the “grumblers and third wayers” in West European Social Democracy is an expression of the tensions in the West which would contribute to such a movement.\footnote{91 Ibid., 16.} But
he argues (in a friendly tone) that the "transcontinental discourse" is the work of citizens, not politicians: "I am talking of a new kind of politics which cannot (with however much goodwill) be conducted by politicians. It must be a politics of peace, informed by a new internationalist code of honour, conducted by citizens." In "Notes" by contrast, he opens his arms to take in at least some political party activists:

Only an alliance which takes in churches, Eurocommunists, Labourists, East European dissidents (and not only "dissidents"), Soviet citizens unmediated by Party structures, trade unionists, ecologists... can possibly muster the force and the internationalist elan to throw the cruise missiles and the SS-20s back.

These differences are not 'contradictions'. In both cases Thompson envisages a movement that is opposed to blocs, states, and governments. The differences can perhaps be explained by reference to the audience Thompson was addressing: in Beyond the Cold War a peace movement lecture audience and readership whose 'strength' - to quote from his address to the huge CND demonstration on 24 October 1981 - Thompson wanted them to feel; in 'Notes' in part a 'Marxist Left' whose sectarian rejection of alliances with 'class enemies' such as 'Christians, neutralists [and] pacifists' he wanted to confront. Yet these differences nevertheless point, arguably, to a tension not only in Thompson's strategy for ending the Cold War but in that of END as a whole: namely, that between envisaging the 'trans-continental movement' as, on the one hand, an 'antipolitical' alliance of 'civil societies', of citizens outside state and political party structures; and, on the other, an alliance of such citizens and also forces within political parties.

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92 Ibid., 31.
93 Thompson, 'Notes', 30.
With the launch of the END Appeal what one might regard as the first phase of END’s work was over. The Russell Foundation and others had been collecting signatures, and drawing people into the campaign, since March. But the Appeal launch is the point at which, with the formal announcement of END’s existence, the founders of the END initiative turned outward to an even bigger potential audience. They now set about trying to help create the pan-European movement the statement had called for.

From now on, British END activists would focus on three regions (in campaigns that were often interlinked). In the UK, they tried to create a network of END groups and END-supporting individuals as well as to influence both other parts of the peace movement and institutions outside the movement (such as the Labour Party). In Western Europe (including the UK), they tried to help build links between movements and other institutions across the region. In CEE/SU they engaged in dialogue with ‘independent’ groups and individuals as well as with state bodies while trying to help promote such dialogue elsewhere in the movement. In order to do so, they had to create and sustain an organizational presence in the UK and exploit internal and external resources. In the next chapter I will examine British END’s organizational capacity and its impact on END campaigning in Britain and abroad.
Chapter 3
Organization and Resources

END Supporters/Members

The nature of END’s work was shaped partly by the kinds of people who campaigned under the END banner. In order to understand END, therefore, one must first know something about the characteristics of these people.

Some of these characteristics were revealed in a survey conducted in the summer of 1982. The survey was carried out by Peter Nias, a trained market researcher and at the time an MA student in the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University. It was sent out to the 700 subscribers of the END Bulletin in the May—June 1982 (no.9) issue of the magazine. Two hundred and twenty completed questionnaires were returned (31.5 per cent). This response “[b]ecause of the rather anonymous way of delivering . . . was considered to be excellent”.

Where appropriate — in order to highlight the peculiarities of END supporters — I compare the results of this survey of END supporters with those of a postal national membership survey Nias conducted of CND members in autumn 1985. Paul Byrne analysed the results of this survey in his 1988 study The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Nias used slightly different sampling methods for his 1982 END survey, on the one hand, and his 1985 CND survey, on the other: the former, as we have seen, went to all recipients of one issue of the END Bulletin; the CND survey questionnaires went to 1011 randomly generated national CND members (the latter were 10 per cent of the total). However, Byrne states not only that, ‘in

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1 Peter Nias, ‘END Supporters’ Survey Report’; Carol Freeman, ‘Report based on the END Supporters Survey 1982’. Both unpublished. END Archive. In the END survey, the percentages in most categories add up to more or less than 100 per cent. In some cases this is because respondents could tick more than one answer; in other cases one must assume it is either because percentages have been rounded up or because the survey analysts have left out ‘don’t-knocks’ or blank answers.

2 With a “sample error on the whole sample” of +/- 7 per cent, the results, Nias wrote, “could be applied to END Supporters as a whole within that ‘safety’ margin.” Ibid.

3 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 235. He received 620 replies, a response of 61 per cent. He also indicates that his survey has a sample error of +/- 4 per cent.
general terms, all three . . . previous surveys [of CND: by Frank Parkin in mid-1960s; Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard in late 1970s; and by Nias in 1982 4] produced very similar findings’, but also that the ‘massive influx of new members’ to CND between 1982 [when Nias conducted his first survey] and 1985 [the second one] ‘had little or no impact on the character and nature of the movement’. 5 Also, there is no reason to assume that the characteristics of British END supporters changed after 1982. For these reasons it seems acceptable provisionally to compare the results of the 1982 END survey with that of national CND members in 1985.

The END ‘idea’ attracted support from a noticeably older group than did CND’s campaign. None of END’s supporters were under 16; and only 7 per cent were aged between 17 and 24. The single largest number (43 per cent) were aged 25–40. Altogether 51 per cent were over 41 (41–59: 26 per cent; 60+: 25 per cent.) Of CND’s national membership in 1985, by contrast, 4 per cent were under 16; 20 per cent aged 17–24; 47 per cent 25–40; and only 29 per cent of whom were over 41 (41–49: 17 per cent; 60+: 12 per cent).

British END was also noticeably more male than CND: 67 per cent of its supporters were men, 33 per cent women. CND’s national membership, by contrast, was split almost exactly 50–50 between men and women.

British END supporters were very well-educated: 19 per cent “left full-time education” aged 18 or younger; 38 per cent aged 19–22, which, the survey report’s author states, “means that that they have some form of higher education”; and 40 per cent finished their education after the age of 23, “which would normally mean that they had some form of post-graduate education”. 6 In all, 78 per cent of British END supporters appear to have had some kind of higher education.

Twenty-one per cent of British END supporters were teachers; 31 per cent were in “higher education, either as lecturers, professors, or researchers”. That is, altogether 51 per cent worked in education. (Thirty two per cent were

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4 Frank Parkin’s informed his analysis of CND published in 1968 as Middle Class Radicalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); for Richard Taylor’s and Colin Pritchard’s, see their The Protest Makers (Pergamon, 1980).

5 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 56–57.

6 These figures leave 3 per cent of British END’s supporters unaccounted for. See footnote 1.
“professionals in other fields” and 14 per cent were in “unskilled jobs”. The rest were divided between working in the peace movement [3 per cent], in politics [1 per cent], for the church [2 per cent], and “in some form of community action” [1 per cent].

The reasons people gave for being interested in END also reflected the strong academic or intellectual nature of END’s ‘supportership’. Fourteen per cent mentioned newspaper articles and 15 per cent books.

END supporters in Britain, in other words, were highly educated, and many worked in education. (John Sandford, an END activist from 1980 [and a lecturer in German at the University of Reading] recalls that END, which had a “particularly strong constituency in academic and intellectual circles”, was “[v]ariously – and perhaps not entirely fairly – apostrophised as ‘Egghead CND’ and ‘PhD CND’.”)

At least 83 per cent worked in middle-class professions (if one assumes that “professionals in other fields” were in middle-class occupations).

One must be cautious comparing the above figures about END with those for the educational levels and the occupations of national CND members as Nias/Byrne seem to have asked slightly different questions about education and uses somewhat different categories for occupation. Nevertheless a comparison

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7 It is not unclear to what this category refers (and how it would have been understood by respondents).

8 Which comes to 104 per cent. See footnote 1.


10 Education While the British END survey seems to have asked only when respondents’ education ended, the 1985 CND survey asked respondents first if they were a school pupil or a student; if neither, when their full-time education ended; and if they held a diploma or degree. See Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 236.

Occupation. Byrne’s categories for the answers to the questions about occupation and employment and the British END survey report categories are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Byrne/CND 1985</th>
<th>British END Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional</td>
<td>Professionals in other fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>In unskilled jobs</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work for the peace movement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Work in the church</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In politics</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
can be made. Byrne concludes that 57 per cent of CND members had 'either a degree or a diploma' (he doesn't ask if the qualification is post-graduate), compared with 78 per cent of British END supporters. Byrne classifies 63 per cent of CND's members as having (had) middle-class occupations (compared to British END's 83 per cent) -- of these, 25 per cent were in education (though he doesn't distinguish between secondary and higher education); 22 per cent were in 'other professional' occupations; 13 per cent worked in 'caring'; and 3 per cent in scientific occupations. Of the remainder, he classifies 15 per cent as 'skilled manual'; and 4 per cent as 'manual'.

One can conclude from these figures that, if CND was 'middle-aged, middle-class, and well-educated', British END was even more so; it 'exaggerated' what Byrne identifies as the social characteristics of CND. 11

The strongly academic/intellectual nature of British END can be explained in two ways. First by reference to the 'academic' character of much of the END material: while the END Appeal was short and succinct, much of what END activists wrote -- from Edward Thompson's Protest and Survive and 'Notes on Exterminism' or the END Special Reports, to many of the articles in the END Journal -- was often dense and demanding and assumed a fair amount of prior knowledge. END would therefore have attracted activists who were drawn to, or at ease with, such material. Secondly, and relatedly, because of the networks of which both the founders and later activists were a part and along which they mobilized support for END: Dorothy Thompson, for example, with Jolyon Howorth of the French Department at the University of Aston, and John Sandford were extremely active in getting the Higher Education Lateral Committee off the ground in 1980. Universities and polytechnics were important 'feeder organizations' in the founding (and reproduction) of END.

| Community action |-------|
| On government work schemes |-------|
| No response |-------|

11 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 56.
**END Supporters/Members as Resources**

The kind of activists that made up British END – highly educated, many working in education, and a high proportion of these in higher education – meant that certain types of resources were common in END: these included specialist knowledge, for example of defence, or of the history and politics of particular countries, such as France or West Germany, those in Central Eastern Europe, or the Soviet Union (SU); familiarity with foreign languages, or an ability to learn them; and experience in research and writing. For these reasons, it is not surprising that so much of British END’s campaigning consisted of disseminating information and analyses in written form (see below).

The ‘academic’ nature of END is also reflected in the time and energy devoted to discussion meetings: for example, from 1984, the ‘quarterlys’, all-day meetings, held every 3 to 4 months, at which END supporters would discuss strategic issues in depth: for example, on the future of NATO; or on END’s relations with CEE/SU.

Set up as an ‘idea’, not as a demonstration-organizing kind of campaign (though it did do some of this), END attracted many activists who felt happiest discussing and disseminating ideas; this in turn meant that END would most easily reach those people for whom the diffusion and discussion of ideas was a central part of their peace campaigning. Arguably, the age of END supporters is an explanatory factor here: older campaigners are more likely to be attracted to a group whose activities consist mainly of writing, publishing, and talking.

These were not, however, the only resources within British END; and END was by no means only a publications and discussion group. There were plenty of people in the group with experience of, and skills in arranging, actions. From the outset, British END’s campaigning also consisted of public meetings, rallies, pickets, petition-circulating, and solidarity actions. I look at these in later chapters.

None of this is to say that ideas and strategic discussion were – by comparison – not a feature of CND’s work, at the national, regional, or local, level, or indeed of other peace groups. On the contrary, CND could and did draw on a wide range of expertise – in defence and foreign policy, for example – in formulating its case; and it used its publications to make some of this expertise
available to a wider audience. It is simply to point out that the discussion and dissemination of ideas made up a much larger higher proportion END’s activity than of CND’s.

‘We are not an organisation, but an idea’

An important decision which the founders of END had to take was about the organizational shape of END. Social movements, or the organizations which comprise them, in Britain in the post-World War II period have adopted various organizational forms, each of which has, arguably, reflected both the cultural values and aims of the particular movement and encouraged a particular style of campaigning. The Gay Liberation Front in 1971—72, for example, was a loosely structured, ‘flat’, network of self-organizing groups or networks, each made up of gays and lesbians who wanted to campaign in a style that suited them. There was no central steering committee. The organizational structure of the GLF, such as it was, reflected – indeed stated – both the movement’s place in the ‘counter-culture’, its emphasis on changing societal values rather than government policy, and its commitment to openness; and it encouraged self-organization and self-expression in campaigning. 12

CND in the 1980s, by contrast, was, in organizational terms, a hybrid. 13 On the one hand, its structure – with, for example, national members, an annual conference, and a National Council – resembled that of a political party. This in part reflected CND’s links with the organized left (above all, in CND’s wilderness years in the late 1960s and the 1970s, with the Communist Party), as well as the fact that one of its roles was as a pressure group in the political process. At the same time, local CND groups had a lot of autonomy to campaign as they saw fit. This reflected the fact that these groups had emerged independently of national CND.

In principle the founders of END were faced with a choice between creating either a national membership organization with some kind of democratic structure,

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12 See Lent, British Social Movement since 1945, 78 ff.
13 See Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 81—2.
or a non-membership organization. They opted for the latter: in an internal memo of April 1980 Edward Thompson wrote that it had “never been proposed that END should appear as a distinct organisation, with its own local branches, membership, &c.”

Ken Coates later described the choice as being between the first alternative and a federation of the organizations that had come together to launch the initiative: CND, the BRPF, and the ICDP. In 1981 E. P. Thompson described the END committee as a “coalition of several movements”. While this might have been a more or less accurate description of END at that point (though one would have to point out that that even then some founders of END – for example the Thompsons themselves – were on the committee as individuals, not as representatives of other organizations) it would not have been later on: as END established its own identity, activists on its various committees and groups were, increasingly, just END activists.

Why did END’s founders not want to set up a new membership organization? To have done so might have (if significant numbers had joined) given END more (or more regularly available) resources, both ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’; it might also have given END a greater presence, and therefore more influence, in the British peace movement. There are various possible reasons for this decision. END’s founders may have wanted to concentrate not on organizational matters but on what they were good at: pushing ideas – the END ‘idea’ – through talking, writing and publishing, and giving speeches. The words of leading END figures in the editorial of the third issue of the END Bulletin (October 1980) suggest as much: “We are not an organisation, but an idea.” In his April

14 See interviews with Dan Smith and Mary Kaldor. A membership organization on the British left in this period would almost certainly have had to have a formal, democratic structure.


16 ‘Memo on Relations Between END and the Russell Foundation, with Comments on Dan Smith’s Text (Already Circulated)’, 29 February 1982. END Archive.

1980 memo Thompson wrote END “offers . . . to provide a European alliance to CND, and a European political perspective”.

The founders of END may also have thought that, if they wanted to promote an ‘idea’, there was no need to set up such an organization: they would be able to influence CND and the broader peace movement relatively easily without creating a new structure. (After all, Bruce Kent, CND General Secretary, was one of the founders of END.) They may also have wanted not to be constrained by the demands that members of a democratic organisation make; and some may also have been wary of creating a structure that could be ‘entered’ by political groups and factions. In May 1981, when the ‘democratization’ of END was being discussed in the run-up to the first END Supporters’ Conference, E.P. Thompson argued against a structure being created which would “allow room for dedicated sectarians to play politics inside”. He and Dorothy Thompson, as memos by them in this period indicate, had another priority: for END to make its structures more ‘professional’, and in this way to create a system of greater accountability in END.

But the main reason seems to have been that a membership anti-nuclear organisation already existed – CND – which simply made it unnecessary to create a new one; and that to compete with CND could have weakened the peace movement. Edward Thompson wrote that END founders did not want to build a “mass membership organisation in competition with that of CND” – not least because, as he later wrote, [END] had been “founded with the support of other organisations (including CND)”. CND was not yet a mass organization in early

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20 Though Thompson could also be unprofessional. Meg Beresford, British END’s first organising secretary, recalls that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation were unhappy with the way that she was recruited to her post: by a telephone call from Edward Thompson, who appears not to have consulted anyone else on the matter. Interview with Meg Beresford, 18 December 2002.

21 Ibid.

1980; indeed, Thompson later wrote that that, in early to mid-1980, it was not clear that CND would be the “major beneficiary and organiser of [the] revived movement”. Nevertheless, as Dan Smith later recalled, the END founders felt there was simply no point in creating a membership campaigning group when one was already in place.

After its launch – once END had established a presence – activists voiced concern about aspects of END under various headings: the lack of democratisation – by which was meant creating a transparent and representative decision-making structure involving the various parts of END – and accountability, and about how money was acquired and managed; indeed, these concerns eventually gave rise to significant tensions and disputes within END. James Hinton, a founder member of Leamington END, wrote in 1981 – echoes of ‘PhD CND’ here – that, being an unaccountable and ad hoc grouping, END was seen in the peace movement as an elitist ginger group, and that, unless it were democratised, peace activists would not be prepared to put their energies into it. Meg Beresford, END’s first organizing secretary seemed to confirm this prediction when, in Autumn 1981 – though not here advocating ‘democratization’ – she wrote that END’s not being a membership organization meant that there simply not enough people to call on to perform mundane tasks like leafleting and running bookstalls. As did Edward Thompson in mid-1982 when he pointed out that END had not succeeded in involving new people or devolving functions to new groups within END. That ‘democratisation’ was important for some END supporters is evident in the fact that a significant part of the discussion at the first supporters’ conference, in May 1981, was devoted to END’s structure. It was “generally” agreed, Bruce Kent’s paper for the

23 Thompson, ‘Resurgence in Europe’, 83.

24 Interview with Dan Smith, 5 August 2003.


26 Meg Beresford, ‘Notes On END From the Office’, undated. END Archive.


conference on END's "interior structure" stated, "that what the Bradford meeting is about, is setting up the British Co-ordinating Committee on a more democratic basis". The conference did this by agreeing to add to the Coordinating Committee representatives of lateral groups and, if they became effective organizations, of the regions; and for the CC to meet sometimes outside London. These calls were friendly, and did not obviously reflect any tension generated by the issue. By the time of the next supporters' conference, however, in May 1982, END's organization had become a significant source of concern for END supporters. Participants felt, John Mepham wrote, that there is a "lack of democracy within END", which "detracts from its credibility"; there is organisational confusion and mystery" — which are "real obstacles to our work". Reflecting this disquiet, the conference agreed to set up a working party on END's structure. This quickly produced and approved a draft constitution. This was further amended at a special supporters' conference on 23 October on the question of a constitution for END, which, by a 'substantial majority', agreed that a formal constitution was necessary; and the next regular supporters' conference, on 2-3 July 1983, adopted the constitution with a few amendments. The new constitution did not radically change END's method of operations. But it formalised, and therefore made more transparent, its structure; and it added two new elements: it gave the supporters' conference some say in determining END policy; and it defined subscribers to the new END Journal as supporters. Part of its significance was, arguably, that from

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29 Bruce Kent, 'British END Co-ordinating Committee'.
32 The constitution was drafted by Dan Smith, and slightly amended at the 31 August 1982 meeting of the group (see Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 'The Choice Before END Supporters', insert in END Bulletin No. 11, 2).
now the dissatisfaction expressed by END supporters about END’s organization would take up less of END’s time.

Three years later, in 1985, when END did become a membership organization, the main arguments made in favour of this move were that it would raise END’s profile – partly by ‘disentangling’ END from CND – help END reach people who would otherwise find it inaccessible, provide a more regular source of income, and create a bigger pool of activists.35 Mary Kaldor argued that it had been a mistake not founding END as a membership organization in competition with CND, as this would have given END much more influence. Arguably, however, by 1985 it was too late to expect great benefits from END being a membership organization: as the numbers attending CND demonstrations indicated, the peace movement was shrinking. END membership never went above approximately 600.

It is, of course, impossible to know how END would have developed had it become a national membership organisation in 1980 and gained a significant number of members. It is possible – in a period, 1980–81, when people were forming all sorts of groups and, apparently, not seeing them as alternatives to each other – that END would not have competed with CND, but complemented it. Alternatively, END might have rivalled or even supplanted CND. It might also have had more influence in the British peace movement, and perhaps beyond it, amongst left-wing and liberal political activists. And it might not have suffered as many financial crises (see below). On the other hand, it is possible that END’s being very small and unconstrained by a ‘democratic’ structure and membership allowed it to pursue organizationally difficult and politically sensitive projects. It is arguable, for example, that Ken Coates and other END activists in the BRPF would have found much more difficult to set up the END Convention process if they had been answerable to a membership (Chapter 5); and that a larger membership, almost certainly more ‘mainstream’ left-wing in its attitudes towards Eastern Europe, would have prevented END from increasingly emphasizing, as it did, the ‘links’ between peace and human rights in Eastern Europe (Chapter 6).

These are all, however, counter-factual considerations. What we do know is that the founders’ decision about END’s organizational form helped determine

35 John Mepham, ‘END Supporters’ Conference’ END Journal 16/17, Summer 1985, 47.
what kind of presence END would have in the British peace movement and in British politics more generally: END became, and would remain, a small pressure group in its relations with actors outside the movement; and, in its relations with other parts of the movement, above all CND, a ‘ginger’ group.

**Finances**

If they are to campaign, activists must have money (in addition to their own skills and commitment and to externally acquired resources). How much money a group can raise, and the way it raises it, shapes the kind of work it can do. The decision of its founders not to create a national membership organization dictated how the group would raise money – as well as, arguably, *how much* money it could find.

This, in turn, influenced shaped its campaigning.

A membership organization has a regular and relatively reliable source of income in the form of its members’ dues. It has to ‘service’ that membership in some way (for example – in CND’s case – by providing information in a variety of forms: CND national members received, for example, *Sanity*, a members’ newsletter, and briefing sheets). In return the national campaign can use a proportion of income from members’ dues to fund other parts of the campaign: these include staff wages and office overheads; organizing national events that local or regional groups could not have put on themselves; organizing the annual conference; lobbying national political decision-makers; and generally keeping the campaign visible at a national level.

END, by contrast, had no (or very little) such income. According to a BRPF statement of accounts, from February to November 1980 (when, as indicated, the BRPF had the only END account) 84 per cent of END’s money came from donations and collections; from December 1980 to June 1981, 62 per cent.

According to END’s audited accounts, in financial year 1981—82, 62 percent of its income came from donations; in 1982–83, 79 per cent; in 1983—84, 74 per cent; in 1984—85, 70 per cent; in 1985—86, 69 per cent; and in 1986—87 (when donations were in decline) 49 per cent.36 (Put differently, between financial years

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36 The figures have been rounded up or down to the nearest figure. from the ‘Report to the END AGM 1987’; these figures were, in turn, taken from the audited accounts. No audited accounts, or
1981–82 and 1986–87, END’s income from donations averaged 67 cent per year; if one counts only 1981—82 to 1985—86, 71 per cent. This donated money came from two main sources: from individual and institutional donors in the United States and the UK.

Another possible source of income for a campaigning organization like END is sales of publications. From 1983—84 to 1985—86, according to the audited accounts, money from sales produced 14 per cent, 21 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, of END’s income. The bulk of this income was subscriptions to the END Journal; with smaller amounts made up of income from second-hand sales and from the sale of pamphlets and books. However, the increase in income represented by sales of the END Journal was more than made up for by the huge increase in expenditure represented by the costs of producing the END Journal (see below).

From the outset, then, END relied heavily on donations for its income. This made it very susceptible to ‘donor fatigue’, as the decline in money donated in 1986—87 indicates.

END’s Structure
The basic size structure that END would have for the rest of the decade took shape over the 12–15 months following the launch of the END Appeal. What emerged was a loosely organized federation, around (for most of this period) a national ‘centre’, of individuals and a few small regional and specialist groups of ‘supporters’. In the early years at least, the phrase ‘ad hoc’ (or even ‘inspired adhocery’) crops up in reports and internal memos as a description of how END functioned. A certain ‘order’ was introduced into END with the adoption, by its 1983 Supporters’ Conference, of a constitution (which among other things, defined the composition of END’s Coordinating Committee and stipulated that there had to be elections for key posts), by the concomitant separation of the BRPF and END, and with the introduction of membership in 1985. But the federal, and relatively informal, nature of END’s organization remained unchanged. One feature of the

indeed any end-of-financial year figures, are available for subsequent years: either they were not completed or the documents have been lost or are otherwise unavailable.
informality was that the constituent groups of END enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy.

'National' END
Those attending the 27 April 1980 consultation decided to create a 'steering committee' – known as the 'Committee of 7' because it had seven members: Ken Coates, Stuart Holland MP, Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, Bruce Kent, Peggy Duff, and Edward Thompson. By the end of 1980 the 'Committee of 7' had given way to a 'Coordinating Committee' (CC), which met monthly from early 1981 and was, at least formally, the main decision-making body of END from then until the demise of the group in 1992.

In January 1981 END campaigners established a Finance and General Purposes Committee (F&GP). This did not convene again until July 1981; after this it met more or less regularly until 1989. The F&GP, at various points, gave rise to ad hoc groups such as a policy group and a structure group.

In 1980 and early 1981 the END 'office' was that of the BRPF in Nottingham; this reflected in part the leading role the BRPF had played in the founding of END, as well as the unwillingness of END campaigners to centralize the operation either in London or at the Russell Foundation in Nottingham. In February 1981 an END office was opened in London, in a room rented from the ICDP, from then until the end of 1982, when END and the BRPF separated, British END had two 'centres'. In 1980 and until early 1981 END's only bank account was the BRPF's. An END bank account was opened in January 1981; END had sets of bank accounts from that point until the END—BRPF separation in 1982.

British END 'supporters' came together annually, from 1981 to 1985, at 'Supporters' Conferences'. The first such event was on 16 May 1981 in Bradford, where more than 300 supporters gathered; the second at County Hall in London, the third in Oxford; the fourth in Birmingham; the fifth in London. After 1985, when British END became a membership organization, its annual gatherings became AGMs.

37 At 6 Endsleigh Street.
Publications

Among the most important of British END’s committees were the editorial boards or collectives of the roughly quarterly END Bulletin (1980–83) and the approximately bi-monthly END Journal (1982—89). Founded in the summer of 1980 by the Russell Foundation, which produced the first three issues very largely on its own, the Bulletin was published until May 1983. The END Journal came out, under Mary Kaldor’s editorship, from December 1982 to Spring 1989 (37 issues). These two magazines were important because they were amongst the most visible forms END campaigning took in Britain (and, to an extent, abroad) — and were thus central to the END’s function as an ideas-disseminating group; they — and above all the END Journal — used up a considerable proportion of END’s income (see below); and the END Bulletin was a source of the intense disagreements that drove END and the BRPF apart in 1982 (see below). After the demise of the END Bulletin, the Russell Foundation continued to bring out END Papers, a booklet-sized magazine which had first appeared in 1981.

Both the BRPF and END produced a considerable number of other publications. The BRPF, through its press, the Spokesman Press, continued, after Protest and Survive, to publish pamphlets. END Churches Lateral Committee published its own journal, The Churches Register (see below). And, between 1982 and 1986, END (guided by its publications committee) published (in most cases with the Merlin Press) a range of pamphlets, most of which came out at short notice and covered topics of current importance. END did not publish books.


39 They overlapped only once, in May 1983, when the BRPF brought out the final issue of the END Bulletin.

itself, but END supporters were the driving force behind a number of commercially produced volumes. END activists also generated a wide range of internal publications. These were aimed at supporters/members or at peace activists in general and included briefing sheets on a wide range of topics; newsletters, both those produced centrally for END supporters/members as a whole or by individual working groups; and often lengthy reports of journeys to foreign countries.

Local and Regional Groups

In the upsurge of peace campaigning in 1980 not only did campaigners launch the END Appeal; some also created local END groups. In the end, however, relatively few groups with ‘END’ in their title emerged, or remained in existence for very long; and those that did were small. In May 1981 the END activist James Hinton could write that outside “the universities, Yorkshire and one or two towns like Gateshead and Leamington, END has little established presence on the ground”. This picture did not change in the rest of the decade. Only a handful of small local or regional END groups were established: London END; West Midlands END; and Glasgow END; West Yorkshire END, Hull END; Sheffield END; Nottingham END. Some peace groups without ‘END’ in their name did support END: Halifax Nuclear Disarmament Group, for example. But there was only the most basic national network of explicitly END groups. At the local level END was one, small, current in the movement.


43 Interview with Julian Harber, 21 November 2002.
**Lateral Committees**

In 1980 and 1981 END activists set up – in addition to the editorial board of the *END Journal* and the Publications Committee – specialist groups that focused on specific areas of activity. These ‘lateral committees’, the founders of END hoped, would establish links across Europe with people in similar professions, interest groups, or other social categories. Five ‘lateral’ were created: the Higher Education Lateral Committee (HELC), the Churches Lateral Committee (Clc), a Women’s Lateral Committee, the Trade Union Lateral Committee, and a Parliamentary Lateral Committee. 44 HELC played an important role in the early 1980s in disseminating information about END through higher education institutes and in organizing dayschools on international aspects of the peace movement, for example one in February 1982 on the West German peace movement. The Women’s Lateral Committee also concentrated on education and information dissemination through dayschools – for example one, in February 1983, on ‘Women and Peace in the Soviet Union’ – but it was also active in the early stages of British END’s dialogue with the GDR, as women on the committee travelled to the GDR to meet independent activists and official organizations. The Trade Union Committee promoted links with trade unions in other European countries. 45 The most durable of the committees was the END Churches Lateral Committee. The founder and the moving force behind it was Stephen Tunnicliffe, a former music teacher in Shropshire who had taken early retirement in 1980. Like so many others his concern for nuclear disarmament had been awakened in particular by Edward Thompson; and it was Thompson who helped push him into setting up the committee (with Mark James of the Catholic peace organization Pax Christi). The committee was founded in mid-1981 and was an active part of END until 31 December 1987, when Tunnicliffe stepped down as its coordinator. 46

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44 ‘For a Nuclear-Free Zone in All Europe’, *END Bulletin* 1, 980), 3.

45 The Parliamentary Lateral Committee was the least active of all.

END (like CND) was a largely secular organization. The Clc, though very productive (as we shall see) contained only a small number of END activists. As the coordinator, in his final report, wrote: the committee was always “in the main a loose affiliation of Christians coming together as representatives of their various organizations . . . and owing their first allegiance to those rather than to END”. As such, the Clc could, he wrote elsewhere, “claim to be fairly representative of Christian peace initiatives”. These initiatives included, in April 1983, Christian CND, Pax Christi, the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Quaker Peace and Service, Clergy Against Nuclear Arms, the Christian Peace Conference, and the World Conference of Religions for Peace. By June 1984, this list had been extended to include the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the British Council of Churches Peace Forum, Coventry International Peace Centre, and the West German organization Aktion Suhnezeichen Friedensdienste; in September 1987, all these organizations were still on the Clc. 47 In addition, various Churches were represented: in 1983, for example, the Baptist Church, the Church of England, the Methodist Church, and the Mennonites. The fact that there only a few END activists on the Clc, and that those that were (apart from Tunnicliffe) “tended to be fully committed outside the Clc”, 48 meant that most of the committee’s (and thus of END’s Christian) work was done by Tunnicliffe himself. That he was able to do so was partly a consequence of his being retired and thus having time for this work.

The committee’s work, conducted within a broad END framework, fell, like that of other parts of END, mainly into two categories: linking up and promoting dialogue amongst Christian peace activists; and disseminating information about Christian peace campaigning. In an early statement Tunnicliffe wrote that the CLc saw its “main task” as “coordination” in a context in which there were already many connections “between churches in different European countries . . . and peace organizations are often church-originated, or actively supported by the churches”. In particular, it hoped to “provide a forum for the many peace initiatives that have started within churches of many different denominations” in the UK; and it wanted


to help establish a Christian peace network throughout Europe'. 49 Later he wrote that the CLc was set up to ‘establish links with like-minded organizations in the UK . . . and overseas, starting in Europe but not restricted to any one geographical area’. 50 To this end, the committee organized various, relatively small-scale actions’ or events. Its main work, however, consisted of bringing out its own journal, *The Churches Register*, and of organizing two international theological seminars, in Hungary, under the title *The Theology of Peace*. (See Chapter 6).

**Task Groups/Working Groups**

Until 1983–84 the lateral committees were British END’s only specialist groups. However, as the ‘dialogue’ with independent groups in CEE/SU developed END supporters came together to monitor peace movement-relevant developments in particular countries. They often did so at first informally, later more formally in ‘task groups’ (later ‘working groups’). The first such group was the Hungary Working Group, set up in late 1982 following the foundation of the Peace Group for Dialogue in, and END visits to, Hungary; this was followed by a Soviet Working Group, set up after the foundation in June 1982 of the independent Moscow Trust Group; a Polish Working Group, established in 1983 by END activists formulating a reply to a letter from the independent group KOS (Committee for Social Self-Defence); a GDR (later ‘German’ and sometimes ‘German—German’, as it dealt with West Germany and West Berlin as well) Working Group, the catalyst for the creation of which was the arrest by the GDR authorities of two independent GDR peace activists and of an END activist (and the release of the latter); and a Czechoslovak Task Group, set up in 1983. There were two specifically West European working groups: a French Working Group, set up in 1985, and a Netherlands/Belgium Working Group.

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Disputes over Structure and Resources

The organizational motor of the new END initiative was the BRPF, an already existing organization with significant resources – offices and a printing press – to draw on, and with an address which people could contact for further information.\(^{51}\) It was the Russell Foundation, as we have seen, that had convened the two meetings at which drafts of the Appeal were discussed, and which announced and promoted the press conference at which the Appeal was launched. The Foundation did the main work of circulating the Appeal, in Britain and abroad, for signatures (which were still arriving at the BRPF in late 1982).\(^{52}\) The BRPF also convened another supporters’ meeting on 29 June, and took and distributed minutes of the Steering Committee meetings and of the 29 June meeting. The Foundation played the key role in the organization of the public launch meeting on 10 July at Central Hall. Amongst other things, he says, the BRPF produced END “banners and flags” which were then distributed to the anti-cruise missile demonstration on 15 June organized by the Labour Party (the first such mass demonstration of the new mobilization): “we mined that demo from end to end . . . we were trying to promote [the] Central Hall meeting . . . and we did.”\(^{53}\) The Foundation also played a key role in printing and disseminating END ideas in print. In the Spring the Russell Press had printed Protest and Survive; and in September it brought out Coates’s pamphlet European Nuclear Disarmament. In July the BRPF produced the first issue of what would become the main regular English-language source of information about the West European peace movements between 1980 and 1982, the END Bulletin.

Yet from an early stage in END’s life an increasingly bitter dispute between two groupings in the organizations, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, ‘Nottingham’, and those associated with the END office in London and the

\(^{51}\) Edward Thompson, ‘Light on Dark Places, or: Some notes on Bread-and-Butter Matters greatly Beneath the Interest of END Committee Members who Follow Higher Things’, internal memorandum, 24 June 1982. (Though he stressed that individual leading activists also paid a high proportion of postal, phone and travel costs out of their own pockets). See also Stephen Bodington, ‘Reflections on various END papers: a plea for some realism’, internal memorandum, 15 August 1982. END Archive.


\(^{53}\) Interview with Ken Coates.
Thomsons – ‘London’. This dispute – which assumed an increasingly large place in the work of at least the founders of END – had three, linked, causes: political and personal differences, and disagreements about structure and the use of resources. The political aspects centred on differences between the two groups’ strategic priorities: the BRPF was most interested in bringing political parties into the campaign and on doing so above all at a European conference of movements and parties; it felt increasingly that the rest of END was not giving this strategy enough support. ‘London’, by contrast, was interested above all in developing relations amongst movements. I look at these differences in chapters 5 and 6. The personal aspects consisted of the apparent lack of trust, and growing antipathy, between some END activists in the respective groupings. While in the early days of END there was, in E.P. Thompson’s words, “goodwill between all parties” (and, in Coates’s account, “very harmonious relationships between the half dozen people who had prepared the END Appeal”), by 1982—83 there was a high level of anger and bitterness in internal memos and letters. One is struck by the sharp and aggressive tone of the exchanges – these would have made it that much more difficult to settle political and organizational differences. Mary Kaldor later speculated that because both Coates and Thompson – the key figures in the respective groups – had “their upbringing on the old left” they “were into fights and factions and political control”.

The disagreements over resources and organization were rooted in two different conceptions of the desirable structure and function of END. The Russell Foundation wanted END to be relatively informal and ad hoc. Stuart Holland MP, writing in late 1982 for the BRPF and “some members” of the Coordinating Committee, said that END should be (or remain) a “broad front of forces on a

54 This has prompted Amitabh Mattoo to argue, with regard to the question whether or not END should have become a national membership organization, that the founders of END would have anyway been incapable of running such an organization: “factionalism within END” in 1980—82, he writes, “diminish[es] the significance of END’s claim that it never sought to compete with CND: the fact was that it never was in a position to do so.” Mattoo, ‘The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’, 79—80.

55 Letter to author..

56 Interview with Mary Kaldor.
confederal basis of joint agreement". He was thus opposed to the constitutionalisation process set in train by the restructuring group; he wanted, instead, to retain the “existing constitution” – Bruce Kent’s proposal on END’s ‘interior structure’ of May 1981. The BRPF opposed the new constitution as it centralised power in the Coordinating Committee by making the CC the only legitimate policy-making body; the CC would become, Holland argued, a “central committee” with a “federal role”. The “whole drift and weight” of the proposed new constitution, in Greendale and Topham’s view, was to “establish [the CC as] a central, authoritarian policy-making body” which would have “no accountability to anyone”. The draft constitution, they claimed, compared badly with “the constitution of even the most conservative and authoritarian of British Trade Unions”.

Critics of the BRPF, by contrast – though they were not all necessarily in favour of a new constitution – were exercised precisely by what the Foundation might have regarded as its ‘autonomy’, but what for some of them at least was its lack of accountability, above all perhaps with regard to the management of finances and to the running of END’s main publication, the END Bulletin. Edward Thompson’s criticisms of END’s poor management were directed at the CC in general, and at individuals on it (including staff members) who he thought had contributed to what he sees as END’s disorganization. But it is clear that, in his view, a particular obstacle to the more professional running of END was the unaccountable way the BRPF operated. He referred to a general problem: that, by

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57 In his introduction to ‘The Choice before END Supporters’. The insert contains Bruce Kent’s ‘Notes’; a draft of the proposed new constitution; and amendments to the draft from the chairman and secretary of the END Trade Union Lateral Committee. It was sent out in the END Bulletin in advance of the special supporters’ conference on 23 October 1982.


59 An example of what he saw as END activists’ bad financial management undermining the work of END concerned the ‘loss’ of £20,000 in 1982. In 1981–82 END’s chief US fundraiser was prepared to commit himself to raising the equivalent of £20,000 for END from US donors, for the twelve-month period beginning in March 1982. For a variety of reasons – which included leading END figures being overworked, their unwillingness, or inability, to devolve tasks, possibly the absence of anyone to whom tasks could be devolved, perhaps the general lack of clarity about who was responsible for what – meant (in Thompson’s account) that END did not do the administrative work required by the US fundraiser. As a result the fundraiser withdrew his commitment. END had passed up an opportunity to have someone else raise £20,000 for its campaigning work. Thompson, ‘Light on Dark Places’.
the autumn of 1981 the BRPF had almost stopped reporting to the CC on its END work. A more specific problem – which Thompson had regarded as such already by the end of 1980 – was that the BRPF, as one of two END 'centres' and with its own bank account, did not consult properly with the rest of END about the money it received or raised for, or spent on, END campaigning. Two events particularly irked Thompson (and his wife). In May 1981, the economist Joan Robinson donated lecture fees of $10,000 to END. She sent this to BRPF, which spent the money on its END activities. But, Thompson argued, the money was intended for all END’s work, including (but not just) BRPF’s. In October 1981, the BRPF issued an independent appeal for funds to pay for a planned meeting in Rome of European signatories of the END Appeal (see Chapter 5). This appeal was widely circulated at the huge demonstration in London in October 1981, and also, according to Thompson, to END Bulletin readers, and to former donors. This was, for the Thompsons, the straw that broke the camel’s work: it undermined, in E. P. Thompson’s account, the attempts underway since Summer 1981 to make END’s work more accountable and professional (which would have included closing down the BRPF’s END account). After a lengthy discussion (or argument) at the November 1981 CC the Thompsons withdrew from the CC. This withdrawal – which, as we shall see (Chapter 5), BRPF people interpreted as an attack on the Foundation’s political priorities – was an important marker in the deterioration of END–BRPF relations.

Other leading CC members also felt the BRPF was not accountable enough. "What BRPF does in aid of the cause [of European nuclear disarmament] is not always ordered, endorsed or approved" by END, wrote Dan Smith. This lack of

60 Thompson, ‘Light on Dark Places’.
61 See November 1980 letters.
62 See Nov 1980 letters and ‘Light’
63 ‘Light’; See Coates on this in interview; Important enough for DT to refer to 20 years later.
64 Thompson, ‘Light’.
65 Ibid.
accountability affected finances as well as, he suggests, policy-making more generally. Later Mary Kaldor described the Russell Foundation as "utterly opaque".

The END Bulletin also became a source of sharp disagreement between "London" and "Nottingham" in the summer of 1982— as, by now, probably any issue would have—and for two reasons. First, because the BRPF—which owned and published the Bulletin—was losing money on its production and asked the CC to cover its losses (which the CC did); secondly, because the two BRPF editors of the Bulletin, Tony Simpson and Stuart Holland, faced with what they thought was Mary Kaldor's inappropriate plan for its content, rejected her proposals and produced an issue according to their own, very different, content-plan. The September 1982 issue was entirely devoted to what the BRPF considered to be the most significant event of the END campaign to date: the successful holding, in July 1982, of the first END Convention. For Dan Smith, END's de facto chairman, the "sudden request for financial support" and the editorial "'repossession'" of the Bulletin "demonstrate[d] the difficulties for END if it does not own its journal". Indeed, this arrangement now seemed to him to be "utterly impossible". It would be better if the END CC owned the Bulletin. However, the BRPF decided not to pass the Bulletin over to END. In December 1982, the CC launched own magazine, the END Journal.

The acceptance by the October 1982 supporters' conference of the need for a new constitution, and the Bulletin crisis, together with continuing political differences— the holding of the Convention made the BRPF feel even more justified that its focus on a European conference had been right and the rest of END's lack of support for it reprehensible— was the effective point at which END and BRPF split. In the summer of 1983, before the END supporters' conference

67 See also two memos by Stephen Tunnicliffe: 'Comments on Dan Smith's memo on relations between END and BRPF', 16 February 1982; and 'Memorandum to the C.C. on 30th July, 1982', 28 July 1982. Both are in the END archive.

68 Interview with Mary Kaldor.

69 Letters and memos from Mary Kaldor and Stephen Tunnicliffe make the same point: Mary Kaldor to Ken Coates, 26 July 1982 and 3 September 1982; Stephen Tunnicliffe's memos of 16 February 1982 and 28 July 1982. END archive.
which finally agreed the new constitution, the BRPF formally withdrew from the Co-ordinating Committee. Given the existence of a “representative international committee for European Nuclear Disarmament” (the ‘Liaison Committee’ largely responsible for preparing the END Conventions), they wrote, and of “a variety of other international co-ordinating mechanisms grouping both general and particular interests; and given the existence, in the UK, of CND and other ‘specialist bodies’”, the BRPF could not see that a “structured British organisation” of the kind envisaged would have “any particular function”. 70

The separation of the BRPF and END, and the adoption of a new constitution by END, mark the end of a period of increasingly bitter argument and – partly because of this – the beginning of a period in which decision-making processes in the organization are more transparent.

After 1982
The organizational and resource disputes in END were particularly bitter in 1981 and 1982. However, tensions over the acquisition, management and allocation of resources were a feature of END’s activity until its demise. Perhaps the most evident persistent theme in internal discussions is that of financial crisis. In the period 1983-89, for example, a constant theme – and the source of some tension – within END was the amount of money that was being spent on the END Journal, given that about 50 per cent of the magazine’s expenditure was ‘subsidized’ – that is, the Journal cost an average of £30,000 to produce per year, only made about £15,000 per year in sales, and had the rest of its expenditure covered by money raised by END. (There was also tension about how the money that END Journal did have for promotion of the magazine was spent.) Overall, however, there was an agreement – indicated not least by the fact that the magazine was published until there was no money left to finance it (Spring 1989) – that END should continue to publish the Journal as an important part of the END campaign.

Resources (Partly) Outside the Peace Movement

British END was also able to draw on resources outside, or partly outside, the peace movement, and in varying degrees sympathetic to the movement – or at least to END. (Because of the informal nature of END’s campaigning it is sometimes hard to distinguish between someone who was an END activist and someone who was sympathetic to END’s aims but only provided advice.)

Some of these resources were not essential for END’s work, but arguably they made it easier, either because they were available at little or no cost, or because they were convenient. With many other parts of the peace movement (and, indeed, other ‘radical’ organizations) ‘national’ END was able to make free use in the evenings of the meeting rooms in County Hall, the headquarters of the Greater London Council (until 1986, when the GLC was abolished): some meetings of the Coordinating Committee took place at County Hall, as did the 1982 Supporters’ Conference and the launch in 1983 of END’s Special Report, *Turkey: Peace on Trial*. It also benefited from GLC funding, as in 1985/6, when, with the help of GLC money, it printed 10,000 copies of a leaflet as part a campaign-cum-network co-organized by END, the North Atlantic Network. Throughout the 1980s, from the first big meeting in March 1980 to the end of 1989 (October CC), END supporters met in one of two buildings in central London owned by the Quakers: Friends’ Meeting House and the Friends’ International Centre; it also met occasionally in the nearby Catholic International Centre.

In the mid- to late 1980s, the then END fundraiser, Jeanette Buirski, drew on her contacts in advertising and design to produce a range of products – badges, postcards, t-shirts, and posters – that aimed to present END as slightly more younger and snappier group than its ‘image’ suggested it was.

Other resources were more important, as they would have been hard to find elsewhere. The Merlin Press, founded and run by Martin Eve, who had left the Communist Party with the Thompsons in 1956 and was Edward Thompson’s principal publisher, published and distributed END pamphlets in the early and mid-1980s (see above under ‘Publications); Martin Eve brought a fund of publishing experience to the END campaign which was essential for a part of the END campaign to be possible.
END’s East European work was helped by the knowledge of a variety of British and exiled East European supporters of independent groups in CEE/SU and, in general, experts on various aspects of the East. Jan Kavan, the founder and head of the small Czechoslovak exile ‘press agency’, the Palach Press, was one of the main sources of information in Britain about the work of human rights and other independent activists in Czechoslovakia. The Palach Press published, among other things, the statements in translation of the human rights grouping Charter 77 and the monthly bulletin of VONS, the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Prosecuted. Kavan was in frequent telephone contact with Charter 77 activists. Sympathetic to the END campaign, Kavan helped organize both trips by British END activists to Czechoslovakia, and the dissemination in Britain and elsewhere of the many Charter 77 texts – the official ones as well as those by individuals – and on the peace issue. As we shall see in Chapter 6, in the West arguably the most influential exchange of ideas between Western peace activists and independent activists in the East was that, from 1981 to 1985, between Charter 77 signatories and IKV, British END and a few other Western peace groups. The impact of the Charter ideas is in part due to the strength of the ideas themselves; but there is a case to be made that, in Britain at least, it is due to the fact that the Palach Press determinedly ‘pushed’ the Charter 77 texts into the peace movement.

Individuals sympathetic to END also offered their help and advice, sometimes as members of Task/Working Groups, others at more of a distance: these included the political philosopher Steven Lukes and the political scientist April Carter, who had academic links to opposition intellectuals in CEE/SU; Paul Oestreicher, the International Secretary of the British Council of Churches and, later, Canon of Coventry Cathedral, who had long-standing ties with the Protestant Churches in the GDR (and in West Germany); and Zdena Tomin, a former spokesperson of Charter 77 who, with her family, had lived in exile in the UK.

**CND as a Resource for END**

CND’s huge national network – local and regional groups and a central bureaucratic and decision-making apparatus – was also a campaigning resource for END in various ways. British END’s ability to make use of CND as a resource was
partly made possible by the fact that END was closely intertwined with CND. In addition to END activists writing END-ish articles in *Sanity*, and thus reaching a wide peace movement audience, END was able to promote some of its work to local groups in the pages of *Campaign!*; and, in the form of paid advertisements, to CND members or sympathizers in the pages of *Sanity*.

END was also able to use local peace groups as a way to spread its message. The END archives show that many local peace activists wrote to END throughout the decade for information about peace movements or sympathetic groups in East and West Europe. They used END as a resource; simultaneously END used them as a way to disseminate its information. Local groups also provided platforms for END speakers, as we have seen.

END also used the local groups network as a way to both spread its message by selling its products. In 1983 and 1984, it distributed through local group mailings around 75,000 leaflets each time advertising the *END Journal*. It could not afford to have these leaflets distributed in magazines and journals (such as *Sanity* or the *New Statesman*); the CND local groups mailings therefore provided an almost-free resource which compensated for END’s lack of money.

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By the end of 1989 END had, in organizational and resources terms, become very small: membership was falling, the *END Journal* had had to close in the Spring for lack of funds, and the organizing secretary was made redundant. It was, as we shall see (Chapter 6), involved in lively dialogue and cooperation with forces in CEE/SU – these were, in many cases, about to play a central role in their countries’ ‘velvet revolutions’. Yet END, heavily reliant as it was on fund-raised money for its survival, shrank as this money dried up. Soon afterwards it would close, with many of its activists going into European Dialogue, the British branch of a new, post-Cold War pan-European initiative, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly.
Chapter 4
END in the British Peace Movement

In Britain, END supporters were active mainly in the peace movement, within which they tried above all to influence CND.

I have already argued (Chapter 3) that CND, the ‘peak’ organization in the British peace movement of the 1980s, was a resource for END. Acting as a kind of pressure or ginger group in the movement, and above all on and within CND, END supporters promoted an END approach within CND. Their aim was not just to get CND activists to think of their campaign as having international ramifications, or of being influenced by events abroad (others in CND did this, too, not all of whom were sympathetic to END) but specifically to think of CND as being part both of a West European movement and of an actual or potential ‘transcontinental movement’ that embraced the Soviet bloc, too, and which opposed both sides of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War. Here I analyse in detail the END—CND relationship: the intertwining of END with CND, and the cooperation between the two organizations; the tension in certain areas; and the ways in which END tried to ‘END’-ize CND. In order to be able to do this I must first outline the chief characteristics of CND.

CND: members, structure, frame
Founded in February 1958, CND enjoyed widespread support – and, arguably, had some influence on defence debates and British political culture – in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It then went into decline until, by 1977, it had 2618 national members. In the 1980s CND had two tiers: ‘national’ CND and the local groups. The national structure was very much like that of a political party.¹ CND had a national individual membership.

¹ Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 82.
This grew steadily, reflecting the fact that CND was the main beneficiary of the growing opposition to the government’s and US/NATO nuclear weapons policies: 4287 in 1979; and, approximately, 9000 in 1980, 20,000 in 1981, and 50,000 in 1982; and 110,000 at the end of 1984.² There was an annual conference, attended by individual members, delegates of local CND groups or other peace groups affiliated to CND, representatives of affiliated organizations,³ delegates of CND specialist sections,⁴ as well as by representatives of CND’s regions and ‘nations’.⁵ This conference made “[o]verall policy”, and elected both CND’s officers (chairperson, treasurer, and 4 vice-chairpersons) as well as 20 members of the CND National Council (or ‘Council’).⁶ National Council, which met quarterly, consisted of these 20 members, 80 elected by the regions and nations, CND’s officers, one representative from each of the specialist sections, as well as six representatives of Youth CND. Council elected CND’s National Executive, which met monthly, and its nine specialist committees,⁷ which did the same. CND had a large paid staff at its headquarters in London. Elected National Council members and staff together produced, among other things, CND’s publications: the monthly magazine Sanity, the monthly campaigning newsletter for local groups, Campaign!, as well as the many leaflets, pamphlets, booklets and books which helped spread the CND message.

The other tier of CND consisted of the myriad local groups throughout Britain and Northern Ireland. In 1979 there were 150 CND groups; in 1980, 300; and in 1981– roughly – 700; in 1982, 1000. The


³ For example, Scientists against Nuclear Arms (SANA).

⁴ Such as Green CND and Labour CND.

⁵ Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland.


number of "affiliated organisations" went up from 724 in 1979 to roughly 1000 in 1982. According to national CND, by 1984 local group membership stood at around 200,000 – about two times that of national membership.

CND's aims are outlined in the CND constitution. This document defines all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – indeed, all weapons – as a threat. (The constitution is 'even-handed' in its opposition to WMD wherever they are: it does not, for example, state that one country's nuclear weapons are less dangerous than another's.) Its solution to the problem posed by all these weapons is, first and foremost, unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain; the assumption is that this can help create a foreign policy for Britain that could, in turn, produce much broader ('worldwide') disarmament. The agent of the solution is, of course, at least in part, CND itself.

CND in the 1980s was a coalition. Maguire has argued that CND had three main, overlapping, "constituencies", distinguished above all by the tactics and strategies they advocated. The "Labour Movement Left" believed that to win CND had to win over the Labour Party and trade unions; it thus wanted CND to prioritise putting pressure on and working within the labour movement. The "New Movement Left" emphasized

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8 Minnion and Bolsover, eds, The CND Story, 150.

9 Though, of course, many local group members were also national members.

10 The constitution states that:

The aim of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the unilateral abandonment by Britain of Nuclear weapons, nuclear bases and nuclear alliances as a prerequisite for a British foreign policy which has the worldwide abolition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons leading to general and complete disarmament as its prime objective.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is opposed to the manufacture, stockpiling, testing, use and threatened use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by any country, and the policies of any country or group of countries which make nuclear war more likely, or which hinder progress towards a world without weapons of mass destruction.

11 As many of the contributors to its 25th anniversary book, The CND Story, recognized, implicitly or explicitly. See, above all, the introduction and chapters 4, 5, 7, and 8.
resisting military and political authorities, above all physically, and thus focused on non-violent direct action as a campaign tactic. The "Mainstream Centrist" current stressed the importance of winning over Churches, the professions, the centre parties, and shaping public opinion; its preferred tactics were education, lobbying, and demonstrations. Paul Byrne has identified "sub-groups" within CND, each of which had what one might today call its 'red lines': non-negotiable principles. These various parts of CND - as in any coalition - disagreed on various issues; I shall look at some of these below. Yet on a range of issues there was fundamental agreement: most importantly, on campaigning for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, either tout court or in steps, or on unilateral non-deployment of weapons systems.

In the period 1979–83/84, CND's focus was on preventing the deployment of cruise missiles and of the Trident missile system, as well as on opposing the government's civil defence plans. CND identified cruise and Trident missiles, as well as civil defence exercises, as part of a larger problem: the nuclear arms race in general, and, above all, the (alleged) trend in US nuclear weapons strategy towards warfighting. Cruise missiles (with Pershing II missiles, scheduled to be deployed in West Germany) above all were thought to be a component of such a strategy. (As was civil defence: a country's being prepared to survive a nuclear attack made it more likely that the same country would launch one.)

The emphasis on specific missiles (and on civil defence) in this period is reflected in the names of some of the groups that sprang up in 1980 – for example, the Campaign Against the Oxfordshire Missiles (Campaign ATOM); East Anglia Campaign Against the Missiles; Newbury Campaign Against the Missiles; the Scottish Anti-Trident Campaign; in the campaigns conducted by CND – for example, the 500,000-strong petition against the deployment of cruise and Pershing II in Western Europe, handed in at Downing Street on 14 February 1981; the campaigns against

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12 Maguire, 'New Social Movements and Old Political Institutions', 97.

13 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 128.
the government’s two civil defence exercises, Square Leg (September 1980), and Hard Rock (scheduled for September 1982); and the mass protest at and around Greenham Common airbase at Easter 1983. It was also evident in the resolutions passed at the annual conference. The 1982 conference, for example, passed “overwhelmingly” a resolution stating that it was “essential that CND’s major effort next year, in particular, should be directed against the Cruise missile programme” (and advocated “serious . . . consideration” of civil disobedience as a means of opposing the programme); and another that stated that the “campaign against Cruise missiles should be a main focus of activity during the year in which they are to be deployed, whilst the anti-Trident campaign . . . should be widened [from Scotland] to the rest of Britain.”14 In this period there was no significant dissent within CND, or the broader the British peace movement, that opposition to these missile systems and to civil defence were campaigning priorities.

After the defeat represented by the re-election of a Conservative government in 1983 and the deployment of cruise missiles from 1983, there was vigorous debate within CND about what its campaigning focus should be. It finally settled, in 1985, on the ‘Basic Case’, an education campaign that made the argument not against specific nuclear weapons systems but for complete unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain.

As suggested above, there were, however, sometimes sharp disagreements, or frame disputes, within CND. END supporters were involved in some of the fiercest debates. Before analysing these I shall examine the relationship between END and CND.

END: intertwined with CND

END was, in various ways, intertwined with CND. Not only, as we have seen in Chapter 2, was CND one of the organizations that, in E.P.

14 “Overwhelmingly” is from author’s notes made at 1982 CND conference. Resolutions (9 and 11 respectively) in ‘Final Agenda’ of 1983 CND Annual Conference. CND Archive, LSE.
Thompson’s words, “played a central part” in the launching of END. END founders also played a role in launching the new movement. In 1980 various END founders were in demand as speakers at local peace group meetings and rallies, none more so than Edward Thompson. In May and June Thompson addressed large meetings in Bristol and Nottingham as well as a “number of smaller meetings”. On 7 June 700–800 people heard him speak in Bradford. He was the main speaker at ‘national’ END’s big public launch meeting in London, at the Central Hall on 10 July. He addressed a 700-strong END rally in Newcastle at the end of August. His “public meetings up and down the country launched many a local group”, Hinton recalls. He was the main speaker at the first massive CND demonstration of the new peace movement, in Trafalgar Square on 26 October 1980. This prominence continued up to 1983: he was the main speaker at the national 1981 and 1983 rallies as well as at myriad local group meetings. In Thompson the peace activist END and CND were intimately linked. As in others’: Dan Smith recalls that “from my point of view, [in 1980] there wasn’t really that much difference [between END and CND]. If St Albans against the Missiles asks you to speak, you don’t distinguish between END and CND”.

This intertwining of the END strand in the new British peace movement and CND was also evident at the local level. I have described in Chapter 3 how some peace activists set up explicitly END groups in 1980 as well as later in the decade. END groups cooperated closely with CND and other groups. West Yorkshire END groups promoted the idea of a ‘Trans-Pennine Anti-War March’ for Easter 1981 both at the regional CND AGM and within West Yorkshire END; the march’s co-ordinating committee was made up mainly of members of Hebden Bridge END; and

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16 Interviews with Dan Smith (5 August 2003) and Mary Kaldor (20 June 2002).
19 Interview with Dan Smith.
the march itself was made up of peace campaigners from END, CND and other peace groups. In some cases, END groups simply merged with CND groups. In August 1980 Nottingham END combined with a small CND group founded in January to form Nottingham for Nuclear Disarmament (NND). NND’s “‘minimum’ policy statement” combined elements of both END’s and CND’s programme: “Nottingham for Nuclear Disarmament is opposed to all nuclear weapons, East or West”; “we want Britain to renounce possession of such weapons and to close all nuclear weapons bases”; and NND “see[s] a nuclear weapons free Britain as an essential step towards a nuclear weapons free Europe and the world and the end of nuclear alliances.”

In many cases the programme of an END group was very similar to that of a CND group. Hull END, for example, was planning to launch its campaign with a public meeting with the left-wing Labour MP Bob Cryer; to put on a public meeting with Edward Thompson in February 1981; to organize a public campaign to “expose the pretensions and falsities” of local civil defence plans; and to investigate military research being conducted at Hull University. (And Hull END, as a CND affiliate, regularly submitted resolutions to CND Annual Conference.) Sheffield END, for its part, organized a ‘Week of Action’ in October 1980, during which ‘The War Game’ was shown each night, a mock civil defence shelter was erected, and, on the last evening, a public meeting was held at which Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, and Phil Asquith of Lucas Aerospace spoke. And NND had on its agenda for autumn 1980 a fund-raising concert starring Peggy Seeger and Ewen MacColl; a day of action and disseminating


22 Other END groups were not affiliated to CND (for instance, London END).
information in Nottingham; and organizing a ‘Peace Train’ to take 600 supporters to the CND rally in London in October.

These activities might have been those of peace groups which did not have the name ‘END’. Though the END frame, as expressed in the END Appeal, was different to that of CND, this did not for the most part translate into radically different campaigning agendas on the ground. Moreover, local CND/peace groups ‘supported’ or (after mid-1985, when British END became a membership organization) were affiliated to END. In addition, as we saw in Chapter 3, local CND groups hosted END events (for example, the 1983 Autumn ‘Five Nations’ meetings, at which speakers from the five cruise/Pershing deployment countries spoke at public meetings around Britain; and the Autumn 1984 ‘Beyond the Blocs’ meetings, at which exiles from CEE/SU and END and other West European peace activists spoke at similar meetings about the Cold War and the East–West politics of the movement). At local/regional level CND and END groups were part of the same movement networks.

It is therefore not surprising that most END supporters were also members of CND. The 1982 END survey reveals that 74 per cent of END supporters were “paid-up members of national CND”\(^2\); 85 per cent belonged to a local disarmament group other than END. (Such a group need not have been, but very likely was, affiliated to national CND.) And 67 per cent of END supporters said they would be members of END and CND if END became a national membership organization.

At the same time, activists participated simultaneously in the *leaderships* of both organizations – in McCarthy and Zald’s terminology, the two organizations had overlapping ‘board’ memberships.\(^2\) These activists included:

- **Dan Smith**, a founder of END, a former CND national organizer (1973-4) and general secretary (1975-6), and a member of its National Council. From 1980 to 1984 he was active in both British END (he was a member of

\(^2\) Eighty-seven per cent of whom had joined since 1979.

\(^2\) Zald and McCarthy, ‘Social Movement Industries’, 170.
the Coordinating Committee until 1984, and British END chairperson in 1982) and CND (he was a member of CND National Council from 1981). From 1984 he concentrated his peace work in CND. (He was a CND vice-chair in 1984–87.)

- Meg Beresford, END’s first organizing secretary (June 1981 to November 1983), who was a founding member of Campaign Atom/Oxford CND in 1980, a leading member of CND’s National Council (1981-1984), and CND’s General Secretary from 1984 to 1989.

- James Hinton, in 1980 a founding member of Leamington END and a member of the END Coordinating Committee from 1980 to 1982, who was a member of CND National Council from 1981 to 1987 and the ‘linkperson’ (that is, chairperson) of the important Projects Committee for much of the same period. He was a key figure in the CND leadership.

- Julian Harber, a founder of West Yorkshire END in 1980 and an active member of it until 1985, and chairperson of END in 1983, who was a member of North West Regional CND from 1981 to 1987, a delegate of the region to CND National Council from 1983 to 1987, and a member of International Committee from 1983 to 1987.

- Barbara Einhorn, a member of the END CC, and active in the END Women’s Lateral Committee and in its German Working Group, who sat, as a co-opted member, on CND’s International Committee from 1985 to 1987.

- Sheena Phillips, who sat on END’s Coordinating Committee from 1983 to 1985, was a member of the END Journal editorial collective, and was CND’s Information Officer in the late 1980s;

- Ben Webb, who, as a deputy editor of the END Journal from 1987 to 1989, helped shape the magazine’s content, and then did the same for CND’s Sanity from 1989 to 1991; and

- Edward Thompson, co-founder of END, who was a vice-president of CND (an honorary post) from 1981 and who sat on CND’s National Council in 1983 and on its International Committee (1983—85 and 1987.) (Thompson, of course, was ‘involved’ in CND in innumerable other ways: as the author of books and articles for peace movement, left, and broader
audiences, and as a speaker at CND and other peace movement rallies and festivals.)

In addition, activists who had begun in CND structures became involved in END. CND’s General Secretary, Bruce Kent, for example, was one of the founders and a member of the original END ‘Committee of Seven’ (Chapters 2 and 3). Kent remained on the END Coordinating Committee until 1983, when he resigned because of work pressure. Kent was chairman of CND from 1977 to 1979 and its General Secretary from 1979 to 1985. Jane Mayes, the linkperson of the International Committee from 1981 to 1989, became END chairperson in 1989 (and was actively involved with the END Convention process from 1982); and Stephen Brown, CND’s International Worker from 1985 to 1989, was an active member of END’s German Working Group.

National END and CND also cooperated in a range of actions and policies. For example, both Sanity and Campaign! regularly opened their pages to articles by END activists or to advertisements or other information about END publications and campaigns; and CND activists published in the END Journal; from the end of 1982 to early 1984 the END office took up two rooms in one of the CND buildings in Finsbury Park in north London; Christian CND, one of CND’s most active sections, had a representative on the END Churches Lateral Committee; and there was, until CND appointed an international worker in 1984, a “tacit agreement” between the two organizations about “task specialization”: CND would concentrate on the British campaign while END would “represent the British movement abroad”. 25

The links between END and CND were formalized at various points: in 1983, for instance, Hugh Court (of Lewes CND), who replaced Bruce Kent as CND representative on the END CC, wrote reports of the CC’s meetings for the CND International Committee. From 1985, the IC and the CC exchanged minutes.

This cooperation was, arguably, aided by the fact that END was not competing with CND for external resources; or, to be more precise, that END was not threatening to attract resources that would otherwise have gone to CND. END ceded ‘defeat’ to, or withdrew from such competition over resources with, CND when END’s founders decided not to make it a national membership organization.

END supporters being in CND; END groups affiliating to CND, and CND groups supporting/affiliating to END; END groups participating in CND decision-making structures; CND groups hosting END events; campaigners being simultaneously active in both British END and CND, and/or moving between them; formal ties in the shape, for example, of exchanges of minutes of key committees: all this indicates not only how densely intertwined END was with CND, but also that the bulk of END supporters, at least, regarded British END and CND as complementary organizations, working broadly towards the same goals. Most would probably have agreed with Edward Thompson’s sentiment, expressed in an article in Sanity: “END . . . does not contradict the aims of CND, but extends these aims to the whole continent . . each of us needs the other”.

Influencing CND

Nevertheless, END and CND were separate entities, and ENDers were trying to promote a distinct approach within the movement and above all CND; that is, they were actively trying to ‘extend’ (or even, in one case, to ‘constrict’) CND’s frame. They were doing this specifically by – as any pressure group would – trying to shape CND’s agenda; to influence CND’s discursive position; and to shape CND’s behaviour. Byrne describes past and present END supporters – he calls them “internationalists” – as one of the sub-groups within CND. It is not, of course, always easy to show...


27 See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 25.

28 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 113ff.
influence. The fact that x advocates y, and z does y, does not mean that z does y because x has advocated it. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there is plausible evidence that END supporters did try to and, at least up to a point, actually did influence CND. They did so in two broad ways. On the one hand, by disseminating END ideas, both in their own and others’ publications and at public meetings and rallies, and by conducting campaigns: all of these activities aimed to persuade peace campaigners to frame the nuclear weapons problem in END terms.

On the other hand, at the national level they participated in certain key broad policy debates – frame disputes, when CND activists disagreed about campaign priorities. They also tried to shape the policy work of National Council and, more narrowly, of particular committees – and, above all, of the International Committee.

Policy debates
The frame disputes in CND in which END supporters took sides and tried to shape the direction of the CND campaign took place amongst the most active activists: those who came to CND conferences, or were members of CND Council, or were senior figures in CND and/or END. They involved at least in part – as one would expect – attitudes within CND, and CND’s official position, towards the superpowers. Before looking at them I will consider briefly some evidence regarding these attitudes.

The only survey of CND members which asked questions about attitudes towards the Soviet Union – the autumn 1985 Nias/Byrne survey – asked the question “Who do you think bears the main responsibility for the arms race in recent years?” 53 per cent answered the “USA”, and 42 per cent the “USA & USSR equally”. 29 (Byrne does not say what the remaining 5% said; Nias categorizes them as “Don’t knows. According to Byrne, only one person answered the “USSR”; Nias does not give a

percentage for this answer.)

The question and its answers are quite crude. It would have been possible for someone to regard the USA as the main driver of the nuclear arms race and to see the superpowers as jointly responsible for the Cold War as a whole. Or, the view that the USA bore main responsibility for the arms race could have been held by someone who was sympathetic or by someone who was hostile to the Soviet system. These figures do not explain underlying attitudes to the superpowers. Nevertheless, the figures do indicate that more CND members thought the USA bore greater responsibility for the arms race than did the USA and USSR together (and almost none thought the USSR more responsible).

The Nias/Byrne survey also asked whether or not respondents thought CND "should . . . campaign more actively than it already does against the nuclear weapons policies" of the USA and the USSR. Seventy-four per cent said 'yes' to the USA question, 69 per cent 'yes' to the USSR question. Byrne interprets this as meaning that "one [cannot] assume that activists (or indeed the less active) were more interested in campaigning against American rather than Soviet nuclear weapons policy": these figures show that "an overwhelming majority thought that CND should campaign more actively against the nuclear strategy of both super-powers". Byrne implies (rightly) that these answers suggest a basic 'non-alignment' amongst the respondents. However, they do not tell us whether or not the respondents thought CND should campaign as actively against Soviet as against US nuclear weapons; one can only speculate about this.

The views recorded in the Nias/Byrne survey were mainly those of passive CND members. Amitabh Mattoo, by contrast, conducted a "detailed examination" of the records of 41 peace groups founded in 1980: one can cautiously assume that, since such materials would have been

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30 There are some minor discrepancies between Nias's and Byrne's respective presentations of these figures.

31 Only forty-four percent of the respondents were members of local groups; only just over one quarter of these were active members. See Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 75.

32 Byrne, ibid., 69—70.
created by active members, the attitudes revealed would have been those of activists. On the basis of these records, Mattoo categorizes 30 peace groups as both “Anti-US” and “Anti-SU”, while only 11 were “Anti-US” and “Silent about SU”.  

In addition, James Hinton has argued that, that the “great majority of CND activists agreed that Russia bore some share of responsibility for keeping the Cold War going, and that it was vital for the new movement to be unaligned with either superpower”. However, “many peace activists were reluctant to break altogether from the view that American imperialism – not the Cold War itself – was the main threat to world peace.”

These accounts – a survey of national CND members (some of whom were also local group members), an examination of local group records, and the analysis (cum-recollections and impressions) of a leading CND activist – do not provide identical evidence. But they do suggest that non-alignment, in the sense of being strongly opposed to Soviet weapons as well as to US weapons (though not as strongly), was an important characteristic of CND. The form and themes of some of CND’s demonstrations indicates this non-alignment. One of the slogans of the 1981 demonstration – reproduced on some of the official placards – was ‘No Cruise! No Trident! No SS20s!’. In June 1983 CND organized a ‘human chain’ between the Soviet and US embassies in London. The 1984 national demonstration, on 26 October, on the theme ‘The human race, not the arms race’, went past the US and Soviet embassies to a rally. Similarly, the 1983 conference passed a resolution that, among other things stated that the “movement for nuclear disarmament has to be built equally within both power blocs, and unreservedly condemns all attempts to restrict freedom of speech and assembly for peace groups and disarmament groups whether in Eastern Europe or in Western Europe” and “condemn[ed]” both NATO’s

new weapons [cruise and Pershing II] as well as the “Soviet announcement of new weapons deployments in Europe and the Western Atlantic”.35

Yet these accounts also point to ‘anti-Americanism’ being a significant element in the CND campaign – as we shall see below. In the strategic frame disputes within CND in which END supporters were involved the tensions between these attitudes and those associated with END are reflected. END supporters were trying, among other things, to propagate, explicitly or implicitly, an END perspective on the superpowers: that is, that the USA and the Soviet Union, with their respective alliances, shared responsibility for the nuclear arms race and the Cold War. One such dispute concerned whether or not CND should campaign for (as opposed to just being formally in favour of) British withdrawal from NATO; another whether or not CND should campaign more strongly against Soviet nuclear weapons; and a third CND’s campaign focus after cruise deployment: should it include an East—West nuclear weapons freeze?

 Withdrawal from NATO
One of CND’s constitutional aims was the “unilateral abandonment by Britain of . . . nuclear alliances”.36 However, the evidence suggests CND activists and passive members were divided about the priority of withdrawal from NATO as a campaigning issue. Only 43 per cent of the respondents to the 1985 Nias/Byrne survey thought that Britain should leave NATO; and only 18 per cent ranked “Withdrawal from NATO” as the “most important” of six possible campaigning areas (it came bottom of the list).37 The “otherwise united” 1982 conference was “split right down the middle” on the issue:38 it voted by a small majority to instruct National Council “to campaign for British withdrawal from the NATO nuclear

36 CND constitution.
alliance". This suggest that, while passive members – at least in 1985 – may have not regarded such a campaign as very important, a significant number of activists did.

CND activists argued repeatedly, and often fiercely, about British withdrawal from NATO. Yet, despite the support within CND for withdrawing from NATO, expressed in the 1982 national conference vote, CND never did campaign strongly for it. (Though it did stimulate some debate within the movement by publishing both information about NATO, and arguments for and against withdrawal, as well as for Britain remaining within NATO but working to make it non-nuclear.) There is some evidence to suggest that leading CND figures associated with END played a part in ensuring that CND did not make NATO withdrawal a priority; they did so, with others, by deliberately not implementing conference policy. While one activist grouping within CND, centred on Labour CND,39 wanted CND to prioritise the campaign for withdrawal from NATO; two others, in the leadership, blocked attempts to do this: one consisted of leading CNDers with close ties to the Labour Party (for example Joan Ruddock, chairperson from 1981 to 1985), who opposed this prioritisation largely on pragmatic grounds – that is, because they knew it would be electorally unpopular.

The other grouping was made up of those leadership figures associated with END – what Byrne calls the “internationalist” school.40 The active support given by some in CND to NATO withdrawal as a campaigning issue was not shared by most END activists. The argument that often, implicitly or explicitly, backed up calls for British withdrawal from NATO and for CND to campaign on the issue – namely, that the NATO and or the USA were much more or even solely to blame for the

39 But including others hostile to the Trotskyism or quasi-Trotskyism of Labour CND, such as former CND Chair and Communist Party member John Cox. (See his speech to the 1982 conference, ‘Never Water Down Our Moral Message’, Sanity, December 1982, 29.)

40 For this three-part typology, see Byrne The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 113–117.
arms race – jarred with the END analysis. The END view further implied that withdrawal from NATO was not, alone, of key importance; it would be important only as part of a reciprocal process of bloc dissolution. In addition, END activists referred to the importance of keeping in line with the campaigning priorities of other West European movements or leading movement organizations as a reason not to headline the issue: in the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and Norway, they argued, movements were not arguing for their respective states to withdraw from NATO.

Campaigning against Soviet Nuclear Weapons

Whether or not to campaign for British withdrawal from NATO was a frequent source of strong disagreement within CND. Whether or not to campaign against Soviet nuclear weapons, or the Soviet Union’s role in the arms race, was much less so; yet, when it was debated, it gave rise to fierce controversy.

As we have seen, CND expressed opposition to the Soviet Union usually as part of an attack on both superpowers. The only public action organized by national CND that was directed solely against Soviet nuclear weapons was the protest against Soviet ‘counter-measures’ – the deployments of SS-s, -22s and -23s in ‘response’ to the first deployments of cruise missiles in the West – in London on 8 December 1984. After leafleting the public, the demonstrators handed giant Christmas cards which stated CND’s opposition to the Soviet missiles at the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and GDR embassies (the GDR and Czechoslovakia were the intended recipients of the missiles); at the same time individual activists ‘posted’ their own cards, each addressed to an official organization or private citizen in one of the three countries, into giant post boxes. This was

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41 One of the hard-left candidates at the 1985 CND conference for the post of CND Chair, Joy Hurcombe, the Chair of Labour CND, stated that the United States was entirely to blame for the nuclear arms race. Jamie Dettmer et al, ‘CND to Campaign on “Basic Case”’, *END Journal* 19, December 1985—January 1986, 8.

part of Operation Christmas Card, CND's 'détente from below' campaign, which was an initiative of END supporters in CND. The event included a torchlight procession through central London and ended with a short rally near the GDR embassy in Belgravia.43

This protest caused some controversy within CND. At the 1984 CND conference Shipley CND (a stronghold of pro-Soviet opinion)44, submitted an emergency resolution (for which it got at least 25 signatures) calling on the conference to cancel the demonstration "in view of the decision of the Soviet Union to agree to new talks with the U.S. government without conditions, and in order to assist in the generation of a climate for agreement". Nevertheless, the action took place, albeit on a modest scale45. By contrast, the one attempt to make more forceful campaigning against Soviet nuclear weapons official policy, produced fierce controversy and ended in effective defeat. A resolution at the 1984 national conference that called on CND to "campaign vigorously against Soviet nuclear weapons and policies" (whilst, among other things, "taking care to avoid cold-war rhetoric") was, after prolonged debate, not voted on. To do so, CND chairperson Joan Ruddock said, would cause "divisiveness";46 she would also have feared that a formal vote would result in defeat for the resolution and a public relations disaster for CND.

END supporters were centrally involved in this attempt to change CND policy. Unlike in the NATO debate, they were 'movers', not 'resisters': some of the resolutions parts of which eventually became the motion debated at the conference were submitted by groups or regions sympathetic to (or with key activists sympathetic to) END: Campaign Atom/Oxford CND, Lewes CND, Battersea CND, West Region CND. Some of the speakers for the motion were also END supporters or

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44 Its best-known member was Vic Allen. He later proudly admitted to having reported to the GDR Embassy on the discussions within CND.

45 The author participated in this event and recalls that the rally was small: a few hundred strong at most.

46 See Paul Brown, 'CND Ducks Call for Hardline on Russia', Guardian
sympathizers: Rip Bulkeley, Edward Thompson, and Dan Plesch. \(^{47}\) By contrast with the NATO-withdrawal issue, however, this time the END 'perspective' was on the losing side.

The fate of this resolution can be interpreted as a "victory" for the "pro-Soviet lobby" in CND. \(^{48}\) However, certain qualifications need to be entered. First, as one of the sponsors of the resolution noted, this 'victory' was at least in part due to the better organizational skills of the opponents of the resolution: they had 'mobilised' for the conference for months in advance – and were thus present in greater numbers than at previous conferences; and at the conference they made skilful use of "factional organisation and . . . procedural devices", something which they had learnt in their "long years in the wilderness of the authoritarian left". \(^{49}\) At the same time, the "wording of the resolution had been careless, giving an unnecessary . . . impression of absolute negativity towards Soviet foreign policy as a whole": this had made it impossible for those people who were "not against a non-aligned stance for CND as such", but who did not accept an apparent stance of "blanket hostility" towards the USSR – and who thought campaigning against NATO missiles was the priority – to vote for the resolution. \(^{50}\) In other words, poor planning on the part of the resolution’s sponsors, and skilful use of CND’s structures and procedures on the part of its opponents, were two of the reasons the motion was not voted on. Nevertheless, the whole affair highlighted – publicly at least \(^{51}\) – some significant matters about CND. Not only did the fact that some CND

\(^{47}\) The author was one of these activists.

\(^{48}\) See Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', 219–220.

\(^{49}\) Rip Bulkeley, 'Free, Free CND! A draft pamphlet on the need for CND to keep to a politically independent and non-aligned position with respect to Soviet nuclear weapons, and on the ways we need to organise to ensure this,' n.d., END Archive. The reference is to Communist and Trotskyist groupings in CND.

\(^{50}\) Rip Bulkeley, 'The Barr Hall Meeting, 8-12-84' (a report of an informal discussion amongst about 30 activists immediately after the CND action of that day). Unpublished. END archive.

\(^{51}\) The print media (predictably) devoted much attention to this event.
groups had felt it necessary to submit a resolution calling on CND to campaign more forcefully against Soviet nuclear weapons indicate that the organization as a whole had been relatively quiet about these weapons (as it had). The debate itself revealed that the spectrum of views within the campaign included strong opposition to CND’s criticizing the Soviet Union sharply, if at all. Finally, the debate showed that Trotskyists and strongly pro-Soviet Communists could, when necessary, be mobilised to defeat a clear anti-Soviet position.

To Campaign for a Freeze?

From the outset, the question whether or not CND should campaign for a Freeze was controversial (and made more so by the fact that it was not always clear if a unilateral freeze by Britain was meant or a bilateral freeze by both superpowers or, indeed, blocs.) In April 1983, National Council endorsed a resolution that called for a unilateral freeze by Britain on “nuclear weapons systems, testing and deployment” and declared support for a bilateral freeze on “SS-20s, Cruise, Pershing-2 and Trident”. CND activists associated with END were amongst those who advocated CND’s calling for a freeze. The official debate about the ‘way forward’ for CND after the first deployment of the cruise missiles in late 1983 – following the re-election of a Conservative government in June of that year – was kicked off in November 1983 by Dan Smith in Sanity. Arguing for a combination of “urgency” with “patience”, he outlined the “signposts” that the movement needed: an “independent British nuclear freeze”, which would mean not introducing the Trident missile system nor any more cruise missiles, nor the Tornado bomber; a “campaign against the US nuclear bases”, which would entail, inter alia, getting rid of the cruise missiles already deployed; supporting the “bilateral US—Soviet freeze”; and, because the “strategic goal of the disarmament movements must be the dissolution of the blocs and a nuclear-free Europe... giving more prominence to the campaign for a nuclear-free Europe”. The last two

elements would entail expressing opposition to Soviet as well as NATO nuclear weapons. Smith's reasons for advocating this framework included appealing to as wide a constituency as possible while continuing to express "radicalism", and "facilitating international cooperation among the disarmament movements".  

53 Julian Harber – at that point Chair of END – writing in the END Journal, argued that "the broadest possible coalition against cruise and Trident and for a nuclear freeze" had to be constructed; such a coalition would have to include unilateralists and those opposed to it; and one of its aims would be to promote cooperation with movements abroad.  

54 Mary Kaldor, in a letter to Sanity, backed up the call for a freeze "on development and production of all nuclear weapons" and combined this with one for the "withdrawal of all nuclear weapons on foreign territory". She described this as multilateral because it applied to all nuclear weapons states, but achievable by independent steps. She, too, promoted her proposal as a way connecting the British movement with movements abroad: "European and North American peace movements" needed "a new common platform".  

55 Later that year, another leading CNDer with links to END, James Hinton, repeated the call for a unilateral freeze on "deployment, production, research" in an article that called for a campaign for a non-nuclear defence policy that would appeal to both centrist and Labour voters.  

Arguments for and against CND adopting the freeze were made by others, too, in the pages of Sanity. But the demand had effectively been defeated already at the 1983 annual conference. Scottish CND submitted a resolution to the conference that called for a "unilateral freeze campaign in Britain" as a "step towards" unilateral nuclear disarmament, asked National Council to make cancellation of the Trident programme part of this  


56 James Hinton, 'No Longer Just Hoping For Miracles', Sanity, October 1984, 10.
campaign, and declared support for a bi- or multilateral freeze. However, after a sometimes angry debate, the resolution was narrowly defeated. Here, as elsewhere, the basic argument was that, by adopting the Freeze demand, CND would ‘dilute’ its message. The proposal was not submitted again to an annual conference.

In the end, the campaign decided to focus on British unilateral nuclear disarmament as such – the ‘Basic Case’. Launched in April 1986, the Basic Case campaign was, in its use of advertising techniques, more sophisticated than previous campaigns; but its focus on British nuclear weapons indicated the lack of influence of internationalist – let alone END-tinged internationalist – arguments in CND. Here, too, END’s influence was minimal.

International Committee and National Council
END supporters were present on various committees of CND. But, with regard to the formulation of CND’s international policy, the key body on which they sat was the International Committee. Though the IC dealt with the whole range of CND’s international contacts, its international work fell into three main areas: membership of the two main fora of the non-aligned Western peace movement, the END Convention ‘process’ and the IPCC; and a “process of dialogue” with official peace councils in the East. This dialogue took the form of relations with official peace committees and with defence and foreign policy experts at official research institutes in the Soviet Union, either in bilateral meetings, or in multilateral fora such as the conferences organized by the Greek peace organization KEADEA. The centrality of the ‘dialogue’ with official bodies is reflected in the the fact that the sections on East—West contacts in the available minutes of

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57 Resolution 21, Final Agenda, CND Annual Conference 1983. END Archive.


International Committee meetings deal mainly with contacts with the peace committees. Nevertheless, the relations with the peace committees did not entail identifying with the committees. The official CND ‘Guidelines on East—West Contracts’ were based on the ‘non-aligned’ 1983 CND conference resolution (see above); they specify clearly, for example, that in meetings with official bodies CND members should “express CND’s policy on all relevant matters” and should “express CND’s support for peace activists and peace rights in all countries”; they are reasonably positive about CND having relations with unofficial groups; and they state clearly CND’s support for “peace rights”.

CND’s interest in talking to unofficial groups in CEE/SU was not just rhetorical. On the 1985 and 1987 visits to the Soviet Union, CND delegations met (or tried to meet) members of the independent peace group, the Moscow Trust Group (see chapter 6); the CND observers at the 1983 World Peace Council conference in Prague met Charter 77 signatories (see below), and CND sent an official reply to Charter 77’s 1985 Prague Appeal; the link person and international worker met independent activists during a visit to Hungary at the end of 1986; and the IC sent the international worker to the peace and human rights seminar in Warsaw in May 1987 organized by Freedom and Peace. On the other hand, CND never became deeply involved in the dialogue between Western peace groups and independent activists in the East; CND activists did not see this relationship as a central part of their campaign (see Chapter

60 In his July 1986 report the IC worker wrote: “As usual, there has been a substantial amount of time devoted to East/West contacts (mostly, however, of the official sort)”. The official CND ‘Guidelines on East—West Contracts’ (agreed by the CND Executive in June 1985) deal first, and with fewer qualifications, with “discussions with official movements” and then with “discussions with unofficial and autonomous peace groups”. END archive.

61 Indeed, the Guidelines indicates that CND was non-aligned.


63 He was refused a visa by the Polish authorities.
And while, as indicated, CND did use the restrictive concept 'peace rights' to speak out in defence of some peace activists in CEE/SU (and Turkey) who were being harassed by their regimes, it was careful to avoid addressing the question of human right abuses as such, let alone the lack of democracy, in CEE/SU.

What role, if any, did END supporters on the IC and elsewhere play in influencing CND's Ostpolitik? END supporters in CND served on the IC on and off from its foundation in 1981, as either National Council or co-opted members. Some END supporters certainly felt it was important to have an END presence on the IC: it was needed to counteract the influence of activists too sympathetic to the CEE/SU regimes. "Most of the people interested in the IC", Dan Smith recalls, wanted to "link up to official peace committees" in CEE/SU. It was therefore crucial that CND's international policy would remain in reasonable hands; specifically, this meant having as 'linkperson' someone who did not share this view. Julian Harber has stated that he joined the IC in order to counteract the influence of the "wrong people". Other END supporters at various points on the IC included (as I have indicated above): Edward Thompson, Dan Smith, Paul Oestreicher, Barbara Einhorn, Julian Harber, and Gerard Holden (an END staff member and Soviet specialist in 1982-83). Dan Smith has argued that Jane Mayes – whose selection as IC linkperson he backed – in collaboration, after 1984, with the CND International Worker, Stephen Brown, made sure that the IC did not "link up" with official peace committees. Jane Mayes has argued that, by being on the IC, END supporters not only "inspired CND to be more internationalist", but also helped to keep it "OK" – it prevented CND from being "hijacked". She also remembers that there were frequent arguments on the IC over policy

64 James Hinton recalls that, for CND activists, "resisting American cruise missiles was both more tangible and less problematic than seeking alliances with dissident forces in the East". Protest and Visions, 186

65 Interview with Dan Smith.

66 Interview with Julian Harber.
towards CEE/SU.\textsuperscript{67} (The hostility some members of the IC displayed towards an END-influenced approach to East—West affairs, and towards Thompson, lends weight to the assertions that END supporters had some influence within CND.\textsuperscript{68})

Arguably, the outcome of a high-profile event in CND’s relations with officialdom and independent groups in the East was influenced by END supporters. In 1983 there was sharp debate about whether or not CND should attend the World Peace Council-organized ‘Assembly for Life and Peace, Against Nuclear War’ in Prague in June 1983, and, if so, with what status. On the IC and at the National Council Edward Thompson proposed a boycott, arguing that, since this would be a pro-Soviet event, there would not only be no benefit to, but, indeed, significant disadvantages for CND in attending it. CND’s opponents at home would use attendance, with whatever status, as a stick with which to beat CND; and CND’s presence would hurt peace movement relations with independent groups in the East.\textsuperscript{69} Other, ‘pro-Soviet’, members of the IC advocated full attendance. Bruce Kent, by contrast, suggested sending observers: not only because the Soviet Union was making the most constructive disarmament proposals, but also because attending the Assembly would be an important ‘bridge-building’ exercise between East and West of the sort CND to which was committed.\textsuperscript{70} This proposal was finally agreed after a sharp debate at National Council, in which some

\textsuperscript{67} Interview with Jane Mayes, 17 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{68} See the internal memo by George Hutchinson – ‘CND and Dissident Peace Groups in Socialist Countries’, June 1983 – in which he says that he is gravely concerned that CND is being pressured into pursuing close relations with independent peace groups in the CEE/SU; and the memo by Vic Allen – untitled, 7 November 1984 – in which he accuses END supporters in CND – he names Thompson and Jane Mayes – of being engaged in an “anti-Soviet crusade” for the sake of which they are ready to “sacrifice the unity of the peace movement”. END Archive.


\textsuperscript{70} ‘Notes on Edward Thompson’s Prague Peace Assembly Memo of 9.3.83’, undated, CND archive.
delegates not on the IC also argued in favour of full attendance. Two leading Council members (John Bloomfield, a Czech speaker and member of the IC; and Roger Spiller, a vice-chair) attended the Assembly as observers. They also had three meetings with signatories of Charter 77. (Significantly, the meetings were highlighted in the prominent report of the visit in Sanity.) In other words, the policy decision taken can be seen as a compromise between an END and a 'pro-Soviet' position.

One could argue that CND's participation in both the IPCC and the END Convention process was also partly the result of END supporters being active in the CND leadership, both on the IC and elsewhere. Some leading CND activists, including Bruce Kent, were at times unsympathetic to the IPCC and/or the END Convention process; indeed, according to Thompson, Kent tried to have CND pull out of both. Critics of END in the CND leadership – which, according to Thompson, included CND Chair Joan Ruddock – had, he argued, been held in check by the influence of END supporters; while the most hostile people, such as Vic Allen, had been neutralised. The commitment of some in the CND leadership at least to the END Convention process was made clear by CND being the main organizer of the 1987 END Convention, which took place in Coventry. At the same time, however, CND's relative lack of internationalism, or at least the reticence many in CND felt towards END, is also reflected in the fact that, though CND was involved in the END Convention process, there were still significant activists in the leadership who were unenthusiastic about it. The evaluation of the Coventry Convention by members of the preparatory committee and CND staff members indicates that CND

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71 Jon Bloomfield and Roger Spiller, 'Why We Went and What We Did', Sanity, August 1983, 6—7. One British delegate more sympathetic to the World Peace Council reported that the "British delegation" [of which the CND observers were not a part] "unanimously condemned Bloomfield and Spiller's "divisive activities in spending most of their time [with] . . . Charter 77 signatories". Douglas Peroni, 'Observers of What?', Letter, Sanity, September 1983, 36.

72 See interview with Jane Mayes.

73 E. P. Thompson, Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985, END Archive.

74 See interview with Dan Smith.
Council's support for the event was "lukewarm" and it "wasn't a full-fledged CND project"; as a result, CND did not "mobilise effectively for the Convention either in groups or in Specialist Sections."

The evidence suggests that END supporters both failed and succeeded in promoting END ideas within national CND and so shape the content of national CND's campaigning. On the one hand, where they were arguing against other tendencies within CND in public debate – at the annual conference or in the pages of Sanity – they were unsuccessful. END supporters were on the losing side in the NATO debate, in the Soviet nuclear weapons and policies debate, and in the discussion about the campaigning priorities for CND after 1983. Here it was evident that the END approach was just one amongst many in CND, and by no means the dominant one. On the other hand, END supporters were more influential in the national committees and councils of CND. Arguably they helped stop campaigning for British withdrawal from NATO becoming a CND priority. In addition, they helped CND maintain what Dan Smith has called a 'reasonable' position in East—West relations: maintaining a dialogue with official bodies – without identifying with them – while keeping up contacts with independent groups, and, at the same time, remaining actively involved in the non-aligned networks of the Western peace movement. They were able to do so partly because they sat on right committee – the IC – and/or on other leading bodies; and partly because of the general influence of END within the CND leadership. Dan Smith has argued that the fact that there were people on the National Council and the Executive Committee who were "happy and supportive" for Jane Mayes and Stephen Brown to act as they did is a "product of the END influence in a much

75 'Evaluation of END Convention – by members of BPC and staff who were involved in preparation and at Coventry'. END Archive.

76 CND and END cooperated easily on campaigns or other activities restricted to the West. For example, both were members of the North Atlantic Network, the IC co-funded a fact-finding visit to West Germany by two END activists in mid-1985; and in December 1986 an IC member and an END activist went on a joint fact-finding visit to France. This cooperation on Western matters was symbolized by the regular exchange of papers between the IC worker and the END worker (see above) and by the decision to run joint France and Netherlands/Belgian working groups.
more general way". 77 Similarly, the fate of two CND figures in their attempts to assume top posts in the organization reflects the way in which the posts were filled: one in private, the other in front of activists. Meg Beresford became General Secretary in May 1985 after an interview and appointment process. Dan Smith, by contrast, was defeated in his attempt to succeed Joan Ruddock as Chair of CND at the 1985 annual conference; here the various currents of CND activists hostile to END were able to vote to keep him out. 78

Yet CND never became internationalist in the way that END was: its main dialogue partners in the East were always official bodies. This is not surprising. CND was a large organization made up, as indicated above, of many different currents and ideological views; the only common denominator was opposition to nuclear weapons and demands for their unilateral removal from (or non-deployment in) Britain. Not only would it have made sense to most activists in such an organization to regard as the important interlocutors the regimes in the East, as it was the regimes that would bring about nuclear disarmament. There were also many people who were ideologically opposed to CND getting too close to independent groups. 79

77 Interview.


79 See a memo by Bruce Kent to the IC of 25 May 1987, in which he criticizes the IC’s decision not to send a representative to a meeting in Prague on 12 April, organized by the Czechoslovak Peace Committee, which brought together organizations from six of the seven ‘deployment countries’ – Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, West German, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia – plus the Soviet Union but did agree to send a representative to the international seminar in Warsaw organized by the independent group Freedom and Peace (WiP) (see Chapter 6). Attending the WiP event was, he implied, not a priority for CND as WiP was – he claimed – both catholic and nationalist and made democratization in Central Europe a condition of disarmament in the region; while the Czechoslovak meeting was, as nuclear disarmament was most CND’s members’ first concern.
Chapter 5
Campaigning across Western Europe

In 1980, at the same time as they were trying to bring to life an END campaign in the UK, END activists were beginning to develop links with existing forces, or help create new ones, in 'Western Europe'\(^1\) – political parties, trade unions, multilateral peace movement institutions and networks, and individual peace groups and activists in other countries. Above all from the summer of 1980, there was a flurry of transnational networking: activists’ meetings; peace research seminars; marches and demonstrations; and discussions about a European conference involving political parties as well as movements. Many of these events were organized, or co-organized, by British END. In all this, we can see – as with the launching of END – how the groups and networks with which END activists were already in contact helped these new links to flourish. Out of this networking grew new institutions that helped unite the Western peace movement. Yet, at the same time, we can also identify different approaches in campaigning between the Russell Foundation and other parts of END which gave rise to increasingly tense ‘frame disputes’ within END and added to the fractious arguments over finances and organization.

Peace Researcher Conferences
Both Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith were part of an international network of peace researchers, and from early summer 1980 used these contacts to organize a conference on the theme of nuclear disarmament in Europe. Mary Kaldor, for example, disseminated the END ‘idea’ to social democratic politicians and peace researchers on a trip to Scandinavia in

\(^1\) Understood here as a political, not a geographical, area. Some of what was (and is) defined as being part of the ‘West’ or in ‘Western Europe’ was to the east of some of the ‘East’ or ‘Eastern Europe’: all of Greece, much of Sweden and Austria, and some of Norway and West Germany.
May 1980. Originally planned to take place at the University of Sussex, where Mary Kaldor was based, the event – the “END Research Conference” – was eventually run at the left-wing Transnational Institute in Amsterdam in May 1981. The conference indicated some of the strengths of British END: its activists were able to draw together a group of “alternative” experts on defence and foreign policy who together provided not just valuable information in these fields for campaigners (and others), nor just critiques of existing superpower and alliance policies, but also proposals for alternatives to the status quo. The conference became, in its “discussions . . . more of a political consultation than a meeting of researchers’, Kaldor and Smith reported. Out of the conference came a book, Disarming Europe, which disseminated the content of the seminar to a wider peace movement audience. The next peace researchers’ meeting took place in Milan on 18-20 December, this time organized by END in conjunction with the Italian League for the Rights and Freedoms of Peoples and the Lombardy Metalworkers’ Union. Like the last one, this conference covered both existing “problems” – Spain’s impending entry into NATO, and battlefield nuclear weapons, for example – as well as ‘solutions’ such as nuclear-free zones in the Balkans and in the Iberian peninsula and the conversion of arms industries. The participants also discussed at length the implications for the peace movements, and the movements’ proper responses to, President’s “Zero Option” proposal and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

Activists’ meetings
From the summer of 1980, British END activists were organizing meetings that aimed to bring together movement activists from across Western

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2 See Mary Kaldor ‘Memorandum’ to Ken Coates, 28 May 1980. END archive.


Europe. The first such meeting, which took place at the Pax Christi centre in London in September 1980, was “initiated” by the ICDP. It brought together representatives of peace groups in France, West Germany, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and the UK. Over two days they discussed the goal of nuclear disarmament in Europe and the strategy for achieving it, and exchanged reports of peace campaigns in the countries represented. A British activist reported that the “early reaction of participants was generally that they would consider an all-European campaign”. This interest was confirmed by the enthusiastic response to a second activists’ conference, also initiated by ICDP and hosted by the West German peace group DFG/VK, which took place in Frankfurt on 7-8 March 1981: here, “over 60 representatives of European peace and disarmament movements . . . from . . . as far away as Helsinki, Dublin, and Rome” met to discuss, amongst other things, the Copenhagen to Paris march and the Brussels demonstration in 1981, future actions, and East–West relations.

The next international activists’ meeting – in Copenhagen on 5–6 September 1981 – was not organized, in part or whole, by END or one of its affiliated organizations in Britain but by the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and the Danish group Nej til Atomvåben. The participants at this meeting agreed to set up a “European Information Centre” at the IKV in The Hague. This was the International Communication and Coordination Centre, or IPCC, under whose auspices non-aligned Western peace groups met regularly until 1989 to discuss strategy. These groups met next in Antwerp on 7–8 December 1981. Unlike the END Convention Liaison Committee, the IPCC’s members were only (non-

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aligned) peace organizations; it contained no political parties. Its function, again unlike the Convention, was precisely to discuss, and plan campaigns and strategies for the West European peace movement.

**First Steps Towards a European Conference**

Perhaps the most significant steps in transnational networking were those taken by END founders with the aim of bringing together not just movement but parties as well in what was known at the beginning as a European conference. This gave rise by 1981 to the END Convention process, the largest transnational institution of the West European peace movements.

Ken Coates was mooting a "European conference" in his round robin letters in March and April 1980 to those people invited to meetings to discuss the draft END Appeal. In the early stages of the planning for this conference links between British END activists and social democratic and communist figures and parties throughout Western Europe played an important role in getting the process off the ground. Some of these existed already; others were established for the first time. Ken Coates was liaising in early summer 1980 with, among others, the leading Spanish socialist Fernando Claudin, about a European conference. On 9-11 February 1981, two political research institutes associated with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party (PCE), respectively – the Pablo Yglesias Foundation and Fundación de Investigaciones Marxistas – organized a conference in Madrid on Security, Co-operation and Human Rights. It was attended by, amongst others, representatives of socialist and Communist parties of Western Europe, as well as by a range of left-wing think-tanks and institutes concerned with security and disarmament – amongst them the Russell Foundation itself, the West German SPD’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the French Institut Socialiste des Etudes et Recherches. Though not an END event, the conference had as a “key item” on its agenda “[p]roposals for furthering the issue of a European nuclear free

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zone. Ken Coates, Stuart Holland MP and Mary Kaldor, in the words of a contemporaneous END report, “presented the case for END in all the main workshops”; and “received much encouraging support”.

At this conference the Luciana Castellina, then an MEP with the independent Italian left-win party, PDUP (Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity), became involved in the discussions about a conference. Out of this meeting, in one account, came a decision to hold an “initial planning session in Bologna in August 1980”, and this, in turn, produced the decision to organize the first broad international consultation on a European conference in Rome – the “Rome Consultation” – on 10/11 November 1981, to which some or all of the signatories of the “Russell Appeal” were invited. 70 people came, “representing between them most of the main forces and groups involved in the emergent new peace movement”. The Rome meeting was the formal beginning of what some later labelled the END Convention process. It took the decision to hold a major conference in the summer of 1982 that would bring together supporters of the END Appeal; and it appointed a “provisional liaison committee” to decide on the date, location, and agenda of the conference. This was the birth of the END Liaison Committee (LC). The meeting also mandated an organizing committee of three people to “make proposals


11 Quoted from the “account of END activities” produced for internal circulation (not clearly dated; probably written 12 May 1981). See also Coates, Listening for Peace, END Papers Special 2, Nottingham: Spokesman, n.d.; Talking Peace: The Inside Story of the European Nuclear Disarmament Conventions, agenor 97, périodique bi-mensuel, Juin-Juillet 1986; European Nuclear Disarmament Steering Committee minutes, 4 June 1980; minutes of the END meeting of 29 June 1980; minutes of the ‘Committee of 7’, 18 November 1980; minutes of the END Coordinating Committee, 10 March 1981; and ‘Madrid Report’.

12 Talking Peace, 7.

13 There is a discrepancy between the account in Talking Peace, where this claim is made, and the minutes of the END CC on 12/13 September 1981, which state that only “some of the signatories to the END Appeal” were invited to the Rome meeting.

14 Talking Peace, 8

about where the Convention should be held and how it should be organised". These were Ken Coates, Luciana Castellina, and John Lambert of the agenor group in Brussels: "a recognition of the group’s expertise in running multi-language European-level meetings aimed at overcoming the barriers to communication". Meeting for the first time in December 1981, the Liaison Committee agreed to hold the first Convention in Brussels in July 1982, timed thus so as to coincide with the second United Nations Special Session of Disarmament.

The list of participants at the Rome consultation indicates the geographical and political breadth of support for the END Appeal at this point – or at least for its central call for a European Nuclear Weapons Free Zone – and suggests the extent of the network which the work of END activists in Britain, and others, was helping to create. Supporters from Italy, Britain, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, West Germany, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Spain, and Greece were present. They included members of a range of peace organizations, large and small: from Holland, the Inter-Church Peace Council and Women for Peace; British CND; END (UK); Irish CND; the Finnish Peace Committee and the Committee of 100; from Belgium the Comité National d’Action pour la Paix et le Développement (CNAPD), the Vlaams Aktiekomitee tegen Atoomwapens (VAKA) and the Union Belge pour la Défense de la Paix (UBDP); Nej til Atomvåben in Denmark; Nei til Atomvåpen in Norway; from Italy Pax Christi; from France the Mouvement pour le Désarmement, la Paix et la Liberté, CODENE, and the Mouvement pour une Alternative Non-violente; from West Germany the Russell Initiative in Bremen and from West Berlin the Arbeitskreis

16 Talking Peace, 9.

17 Ibid.


19 For list of participants see ‘The Rome Consultation’, 116-117; and Jordan, ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’, 48–49.
Atomwaffenfreies Europa; from Switzerland ‘Atomwaffen Nein’ and the Swiss Peace Council; and from Austria, the Pugwash Group and Österreichische Hochschülerschaft.

The political parties represented included, from Italy, the Communist Party (PCI), the PDUP, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the Radical Party, and the Christian Democrats (DC); from Belgium, the Socialist Party (PSB); the Dutch Labour Party (PvDA); from Britain, the Labour Party; from Greece, the socialist party, PASOK; the West German Greens; and the Spanish socialists (PSOE). There were members of the three Italian trade union confederations present, and the British National Union of Mineworkers. 20

The Convention ‘Process’
The ‘Convention process’, then, had two main components: the END Liaison Committee (LC), which met every two to three months between Conventions, and was attended by anywhere between 30 and 100 representatives of various organizations; 21 and the annual Conventions themselves. After the Brussels Convention in 1982, Conventions were held in West Berlin (1983); Perugia (1984); Amsterdam (1985); Paris/Évry (1986); Coventry (1987); Lund, Sweden (1988); and Vittoria, Basque Country/Spain (1989). The first held after the collapse of (most of) the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 was in Helsinki and Tallinn (1990); the next was in Moscow (1991); and the process ended with a final Convention in Brussels in 1992.

The END Liaison Committee
The Liaison Committee was – with regard to the social and political forces represented on it – the broadest forum in the West European peace

20 It is not clear whether any of these parties and trade union bodies were represented officially, or whether all members of them who were in Rome were present in a personal capacity, as was the case with Liaison Committee meetings (see below). There were also notable absences in Rome. Perhaps most significant are those from West Germany: none of the large West German peace organizations were present; nor was the SPD.

21 Attendance figures to be confirmed.
movement. The sole criterion for participation in it was support for the END Appeal; there was no formal membership. While most people at LC meetings were there in a personal capacity – they were not mandated – a large part of the West European peace movement was represented on the Liaison Committee (certainly at the larger meetings). *Talking Peace*, the ‘insider’ account of the early part of the Convention process’, claims that, on it, “people from all the range of forces involved in the peace movements – competing political parties, established movements – as often as not from organisations that would not otherwise have sat at the same table – came to work together in solidarity and mutual confidence”. This, in fact, is not quite true. While many ‘grassroots’ campaigners took part in the Conventions themselves, what one might call the direct action wing of the peace movement – in Britain, for example the network of women activists centred on the peace camp at Greenham Common – was not represented on the Liaison Committee. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that it would have wanted to have been: sitting for two days around a table negotiating compromises with, amongst others, politicians and trade unionists, was a style of campaigning in which peace campers were not terribly interested. The Liaison Committee, in other words, brought together groups and organizations – or individuals in them – organized along more traditional lines.

Nevertheless, the range of forces represented on the Liaison Committee was broad: not only the non-aligned peace groups in the IPCC network, but also many left-wing parties – eurocommunist, socialist, labour and social democratic, as well as Green and ‘left-alternative’ – as well as trade unionists. The reason they were able to work together – most of the time – was because of the Liaison Committee’s limited remit. The LC did not speak for the (West) European peace movement, nor did it try to

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22 Minutes of Liaison Committee meeting, 17–18 September 1982, item 5: “Participation in the Liaison Committee is based on adoption of the END Appeal”.

organize it. Its job was simply to help arrange the next Convention. The LC was in charge of the programme of the next Convention; the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation took and sent out minutes of each meeting and sent out invitations; an ‘international coordination’ – usually based in offices in the European Parliament in Brussels – also did some of the organizing work; and organizing committees made up of local and national peace groups in the relevant country took care of most of the practical arrangements on the ground. Local and regional councils often provided financial and infrastructural support.

The disparate and informal nature of the LC’s make-up meant that its decisions had to be reached by consensus. This meant that, in principle a member of a small organization – British END for example – had the same power in the decision-making process (ultimately, the power of veto) as a member of a much larger one, such as CND; or that any minority could block the majority’s wishes. According to Talking Peace, however, in the search for consensus, ‘those who were clearly in a minority [were] simply asked to allow a decision to go ahead’.

The Conventions
The Conventions attracted between 800 and 2500 participants: in the 1980s, the largest was that held in West Berlin in May 1983; the smallest in Evry, outside Paris. The Conventions were not policy-making or resolution-passing bodies. They were conceived of as a continuing “forum for discussion”, in which activists in peace groups, political parties, trade unions, and other organizations that broadly supported the aims of the END Appeal could address a wide range (very wide, as we shall see) of issues related to the Western peace movement’s campaign.

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26 Talking Peace, p. 9.
27 Minutes of the Liaison Committee meeting, 17–18 September 1982, item 3: “It was understood . . . that the [Berlin] Convention would remain within its originally conceived framework, a forum for discussion”. “The Conventions”, Ken Coates wrote later, “were
(and the ‘process’ as a whole) was a new phenomenon, outside existing organizational frameworks. A British peace activist wrote, in 1982, during the preparations for the Brussels Convention, that up to that point that there had been two kinds of meetings at European level of peace movement activists: on the one hand, the big demonstrations of 1981, in which “substantial numbers of activists” could participate but were unable to “engage in any serious discussions, sharing of experience, forward planning”; and, on the other – referring to the activists’ meetings in Frankfurt in March 1981, Copenhagen September 1981 and Antwerp December 1981 (see above) – the meetings of “small numbers of leaders in more or less successful joint consultation”. “The essential novelty of the Convention”, he wrote, “is that it is designed to enable a significant number of peace movement activists to engage in detailed and purposeful discussions with one another”.

The decision about where to locate most Conventions were shaped in part by political considerations: Perugia, in Italy, for example, was chosen for the 1984 Convention partly in order to focus activists’ attention both on issues relevant to the Mediterranean area and on North-South issues.

The structure and content of each Convention, large or small, reflected the diversity of the participants’ interests and backgrounds: while most Conventions were organized thematically, under the broad thematic headings scores – sometimes hundreds – of workshops and meetings took place. Alongside these, activists in similar professions or social categories created as forums... very deliberately, we resolved not to agree resolutions or seek binding mandates.” \(\text{(Listening for Peace, 11)}\).

However, at the Brussels Convention, the Liaison Committee did send an “END delegation” to “make contact with the Israeli Peace Movement” \(\text{[this was in the context of the war in, and the Israeli invasion of, Lebanon]. That is, it acted as a single body. (Ken Coates, “What Are the Lessons of the First European Nuclear Disarmament Convention?”}, internal memorandum, 2 September 1982, 2 END Archive.}\)

\(28\) Talking Peace, 2.

approaches to END-style peace campaigning: for example, teachers, doctors, trade unionists, and scientists. These were part of the system of ‘lateral groups’ initiated by the founders in Britain. Women-only workshops were a feature of many Conventions. The huge number of themes and workshops at each Convention gave rise to the description of the Conventions as “bazaars” (which was sometimes a complaint).

The Conventions played a key role not only in strengthening but also in creating the networks that constituted the transnational peace movement. A movement consists not just of networks; it consists of networks of groups and individuals with some kind of common identity. That so many activists could meet and debate at Conventions indicates that they, at least, had much in common. But within this common identity there were also tensions. The Conventions and the Liaison Committee meetings provided a forum in which these tensions could be aired and debated, but not necessarily resolved. Arguably, too, the ‘Convention process’ – by regularly bringing together representatives of different strands of opinion – actually heightened these tensions.

Opinions within the END current diverged over various, and sometimes overlapping, issues. Some were peculiar to specific Conventions: in 1989, for example, profound differences over Basque politics played a role in the Convention. One, however, occurred at almost every Convention up to the end of the Cold War: the movement’s relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was the one subject in relation to which the Liaison Committee’s style of decision-making did not work – consensus could not be found – and which indeed, was the cause of the major crises in the Convention process. In fact, this issue came to dominate Conventions from 1983. I look at this aspect of the Convention in detail the next Chapter.

The decision to hold the first Convention in the Belgian capital, Brussels, the site of NATO headquarters, was made not, it seems, for political reasons – as a way of symbolically confronting the Western

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30 See “For a Nuclear-Free Zone in all Europe”, 3.
military alliance – but on pragmatic grounds.\textsuperscript{31} Brussels was the only place where the organizers could be certain that the necessary administrative skills and “practical backup” – including, importantly, interpretation facilities – were available.\textsuperscript{32} In short, resources decided the location of this Convention. According to the \textit{agenor} account, the organizations “grouping the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking peace movements” provided “invaluable practical assistance” during the Convention itself. It was not, however, they who provided the bulk of this help; they had originally been “unconvinced about the desirability of holding a Convention in Brussels”.\textsuperscript{33} Rather, it was the \textit{agenor} group that undertook the practical organizing of the Convention. Luciana Castellina’s office in the European Parliament, where two \textit{agenor} members were working as parliamentary staff for her and other MEPs, was the organizational hub of the Convention planning process.

The Convention, on 2-4 July, attracted about a thousand people from 25 countries.\textsuperscript{34} They met in large plenaries and listened to debates – but mainly they gathered in ‘affinity’ and ‘thematic’ workshops. The list of workshops and of workshop organizers gives some idea of the breadth of the networks involved.

\textit{Affinity workshops}:
- scientists (CERN group, Geneva);
- doctors (Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons);
- nuclear-free towns (Lydia Merrill, UK);
- women for peace;
- soldiers (Dutch soldiers VVDM);
- conscientious objectors (Dutch conscientious objectors);

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\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Talking Peace}, pp. 9 & 12. The European Parliament buildings contained interpretation facilities. Other sites considered had included Strasbourg, Basel, and Vienna.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Talking Peace}, 15–16.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid

- parliamentarians (Euro-MPs for Nuclear Disarmament);
- trade unions (Tony Topham, END);
- churches (END Churches lateral committee);
- peace movement activists (VAKA: Flemish Anti-Nuclear Arms Group);
- peace educators (Nigel Young, UK).

**Thematic workshops:**
- opposing missile sites (Comiso Committee);
- nuclear-free zones (Finnish Peace Committee);
- nuclear disarmament and the German question (Working group for a nuclear-weapons free Europe, Berlin);
- East–West Relations after Poland (UBPD, Belgium);
- State of Negotiations – UN, Geneva, etc (Silvia Boba, CGIL, Rome);
- French and British nuclear forces (CODENE, France);
- Civil and military nukes (Landelijk Energie Comm., Netherlands);
- Defence alternatives (International War Resisters, CNAPD, Belgium);
- Unilateral disarmament (Pacifist Socialist Party, Netherlands);
- Biological and chemical weapons (Sean Murphy, Open University, UK);
- Disarmament and the economy (Odd Andreassen, Norway);
- Disarmament and the Third World (Charling Tao/Christoph Wetterich, CERN).

Looking back four years later, the co-organizers, *agenor*, wrote that the Brussels Convention had "turned out more successful than anyone had dared to hope".\(^{35}\) It had succeeded, in *agenor's* view, above all because it

\(^{35}\) *Talking Peace*, 17.
brought together activists from most, if not all, parts of the peace movement, and had thus helped campaigners to begin to understand the differences between the movements. In agenor’s account, the peace movements of northern Europe, for example, began to “accept the key role of political parties”, including communists, in the emerging movements in Italy, Greece, and Spain. In a contemporaneous report, an Italian participant wrote that, at a conference that was simultaneously a “scientific conference and a concourse of activists . . . all the participants had seen and learned something.” The movement “had found in Brussels a great seat of direct communication”.

One of the organizers of the peace education “affinity” workshop, Dr Nigel Young of the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University, described the Convention as a “success – and an important building block for Berlin. It marks a new stage for END.” The report of the scientists’ affinity workshop states that the workshop “has made what we feel is a major step towards European co-operation”: . . . an agreement . . . to build . . . a confederation of European scientists’ organisations and of individual scientists working for nuclear disarmament, underpinned by an information network”.

Ken Coates, the main original moving force behind the Convention, saw the Convention as having been successful in a number of ways: it brought together a “powerful coalition of political forces” [that is, parties]; there was a “remarkable turnout from peace movements and social organizations”, with closer links being established between, for example, scientists, trade unionists, peace educators, as well as between peace campers and “nuclear weapon site protesters . . . Comiso [the proposed deployment site, in Sicily, for Italy’s share of cruise missiles] has become a continental key-word”. In short, the “END Convention has succeeded in assembling all the main currents of European thought” which had first signed the END Appeal. He regards it as extremely important that the –

37 Nigel Young, letter to Convention organizers, 8 July 1982. END Archive.
successful – Convention took place at the same time that the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament was meeting in New York – “only to produce a virtually nul result”. Coates also stresses the importance of the sending of an “END delegation to Israel” and of an “END mission” to Japan. For Coates, then, the Convention has been a striking success: a vindication of the Appeal and of the original decision to organize a European conference.

However, there were criticisms, too, of the Convention, which reflected some of the arguments within British END about the Convention (see below). One British participant wrote in a report for his local CND group that “there was a fair amount of disappointment at the fact that politicians had such a prominent role”; he saw the expression of this disappointment as part of debate that “ran through the whole convention”, namely about whether to “work for change through some of the established institutions (eg, socialist parties, T[rade] [U]nions)” or whether to “work at developing the movement at grassroots level and not to run the risk of being used and having our aims distorted by these institutions”. A West German who had also participated in the Liaison Committee, Michaela von Freyhold, said that what she “disliked” about the Convention was “too much preoccupation with big names ... it’s good [the VIPs] ... came, but instead of [their] giving public statements it would have been more interesting if we ... [could have] ... ask[ed] them ... about what they are actually doing, about the possibilities and limits of their influence.”

Nevertheless, assessed in terms of the aims set out by the initiators of the ‘Convention process’, the Brussels Convention was a success: it

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39 Coates, “What Are the Lessons?”, passim.

40 See footnote 27.

41 More positive reactions to the Convention – from Danish, German, Norwegian, and British participants – are in Fagerholt, Dagmar, et al, Untitled [Comments on END Convention], Brussels, END Bulletin 11, 1982, 6 & 8.

42 Patrick Burke, draft report on Convention for Battersea CND newsletter, undated. Author’s archive.

brought together representatives of many (though not all) non-aligned parts of the West European peace movement; and, in the Liaison Committee, it established a forum, unique in the peace movement, in which these parts could meet regularly and lay the groundwork for a cooperation.

A second Convention, with West Berlin as its venue, was mooted in late 1981; by the END Liaison Committee meeting on 15 June 1982, preparations for it in West Berlin were underway.\(^{44}\) The Liaison Committee then met four times (every two months) before the Convention itself: September (Brussels); November (Brussels), January (West Berlin); and March (Brussels). As with the organizing of the Brussels Convention, additional preparatory work was done by an International Secretariat and by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) in Nottingham. In West Berlin itself, the organizing work was carried out by a German secretariat; its members – from the city itself as well as from West Germany – were the Working Group for a Nuclear-Free Europe (*Arbeitskreis Atomwaffenfreies Europa* – AAK), the West Berlin grouping which had made the original proposal to hold the Convention in West Berlin, as well as representatives of Women for Peace, the Greens, the Berlin Alternative List, the Federal Association of Citizens Initiatives, the ‘Russell-Initiatives’, the youth branch of the German Trade Union Federation, the Humanist Union, and of the left wing of the SPD.\(^{45}\) A German Advisory Council was also established, on which sat some of the West German left-wing great and good.

The Berlin Convention took place on 9-14 May 1983.\(^{46}\) 2500 people attended it,\(^{47}\) about 2.5 times as many as were in Brussels. As at

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\(^{44}\) See LC minutes, 15 June 1982, item 1. [Possible discrepancy between *agenor* account, which says decision to hold EC in WB taken immediately *after* Brussels, with the date and location to be chosen in September; and the 15/6/82 LC mm, which suggest momentum for WB so strong by then decision effectively already taken.]


\(^{46}\) Known as such, even though it took place in *West* Berlin.

Brussels, the programme of the Convention gives an idea of the breadth of the participants’ concerns, as well as of the depth of their engagement with issues related to nuclear disarmament. Four ‘hearings’, on 9-11 May, at which ‘experts’ addressed campaigners, preceded the Convention proper: these were on the “significance of revolutionary developments in arms technology” and in the “arms economy”; the “crisis of arms control negotiations”; the “Palme-Report concept of common security”; and on “alternative European peace and security policies”. The “experts” included US defence analysts Bill Arkin and Fred Kaplan; the US economist Seymour Melman; and the peace researchers Hylke Tromp (from Holland) and Jan Öberg (Norway). This concern to inform themselves with the help of experts was not peculiar to participants in this Convention. Though ‘hearings’ of this sort were not repeated at future Conventions, specialists in many fields attended many of the other Conventions. Indeed, many of them were campaigners themselves. However, the “hearings” were by no means welcomed uncritically. One report comments on how their “size and format, with experts addressing the rest, helped to induce passivity in the listeners”.

The Convention proper was divided into six main fora and accompanying workshops: ‘Nato’s Arms Deployments and Strategies for Resistance’; ‘Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in Europe’; ‘The Two German States – A Nuclear-Free Zone?’; ‘Political Significance of Disarmament in East- and West-Europe’; ‘Social, Economic and Ecological Costs of the Arms Race’; and ‘Towards a New Internationalism – Peace Movement and the Third World’. There was also a ‘Women’s Programme’; ‘affinity
workshops'; national and regional fora; and a ‘special workshop’ on the ‘nuclear state and the restriction of civil rights’. But while “the general aim of the programme was [as in Brussels] to permit discussion of every theme of interest to the peace movement”, certain themes attracted most attention: the campaign against cruise and Pershing II missiles; the peace movement’s East–West relations as a whole; and the ‘German question’ in particular. Of these, the first was the theme of the opening plenary. The latter two provoked considerable controversy, stimulating public disagreements, written and spoken, between conference participants and non-participants – as, indeed, they had in the Convention planning process since the Brussels Convention.

Organizers of and participants in the Berlin Convention considered it to have been a success. The Liaison Committee decided that it wanted to organize a 3rd Convention, this time in Italy. As a tactic for promoting dialogue amongst West European peace movements – for bringing together activists in peace groups, political parties, trade unions, and churches – the Berlin Convention seemed to have fulfilled the aims of the Convention process’s initiators.

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52 Which, as in Brussels, brought together activists with common interests, professional and otherwise: medical workers; women; soldiers; psychologists; conscientious objectors; parliamentarians; churchgoers; scientists; writers; peace educators; trade unionists; and people concerned with “peace publications”. See Convention ‘Manual’, 57-58.

53 On, for example the “Pacific peace movement, especially Japan”, the “role of neutral and non-aligned states in Europe”, and the “‘Freeze’ campaign in the USA”. See Convention ‘Manual’, 60-62.


55 Talking Peace, 19.


57 However, while, as one participant noted, the “Convention, like the one the previous year, spent a good deal of time discussing ways of resisting the installation of the Euromissiles” (Gentiloni, p. 7.), another regretted the fact that the Euromissiles were “primarily discussed in relation to forms of action”. “There were no workshops on the Geneva talks”, the author notes, “and much more could have been made out of the presence of the leaders of the US freeze campaign” (Unsigned comment, "A Meeting of Minds", END Journal 4, 5.)
Subsequent Conventions followed the pattern established before and at Brussels and West Berlin. The Perugia Convention in July 1984 was, in response to criticisms of the size of West Berlin's, half the size of its predecessor. 1200 participants gathered to discuss and debate under three headings, one for each day of the Convention: ‘movement strategy’ (including the campaign against deployments; the relevance of nuclear-free zones); ‘security in the Mediterranean’ (including the militarisation of the region, the conflict in the Middle East, and nuclear-weapons-free zones); and ‘dialogue’ (with peace movements in the soviet bloc, in North America and the Pacific, as well as peace and liberation movements in the Third World). Yet, despite these thematic breadth the Convention was dominated by one issue, relations with independent groups and ‘officials’ in CEE/SU.

The July 1985 Convention in Amsterdam took place in the only deployment country that had not yet decided to accept its quota of cruise missiles. The Convention, attended again by about 1200 activists, was thus in part an opportunity to offer support to the Dutch peace movement. Discussions again took place under three main headings, each with sub-themes covered in workshops and plenaries: ‘East—West (which included ‘peace and security’; the ‘division of Europe’; and ‘disarmament’); ‘West—West’ (including opposition to deployments and the Strategic Defence Initiative, nuclear-weapons free zones, and the relationship between political parties and movements); and ‘North—South’ (including the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation, and underdevelopment as a source of conflicts).

The wide number of topics available for discussion at Amsterdam produced a desire for a smaller, more focussed Convention the following year. This, at Évry, outside Paris, in June 1986, was restricted to about 700 people and focussed on West European Security. For the first time since Brussels, East—West politics played a minor role.

In July 1987, the final Convention to be held in a deployment country took place. About 1000 activists gathered in Coventry to debate glasnost and perestroika, British defence policy, European identity,
unilateral disarmament, and 'détente from below'. Here, again, East—West controversy dominated the Convention.

In late June and early July 1988, the first Convention to take place in a neutral country took place. Lund, in Sweden, hosted 1200 campaigners. The themes of the Convention – the mood of which, following the INF Treaty and because of the Gorbachev reforms, was optimistic – were ‘new opportunities for détente’, ‘détente and the third world’, the role of trade unions in peace campaigning’, new tasks for the peace movements, and the arms race as an obstacle to détente and how to overcome it’.


The July 1990 Convention, the first since the ‘velvet revolutions’, took place, symbolically, in Helsinki, capital of a neutral country, and Tallinn, Estonia, in the liberalising Soviet Union. This time activists discussed under five headings: the future of the peace movement; the upheavals in Central-Eastern Europe; the militarisation of societies; the relationship between individuals, nationalities and states; and the global dimensions of peace.

The final two Conventions, in Moscow in 1991 and Brussels in 1992, marked the gradual collapse of the END process, as many of the original participants in it had shifted their allegiance to the new Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA), a pan-European network of groups and individuals founded by participants in the dialogue between Western peace groups and Eastern independent groups.

**Frame Disputes in British END**

The END Conventions arguably became, by the end of the West Berlin Convention at the latest, accepted landmarks in the landscape of the West
European peace movement, at least for those activists committed to transnational networking. This should not conceal the fact, however, that, when the Convention process was in its embryonic stage, and for a year or so after its ‘birth’ in Rome in November 1981, there were, in British END, sharp disputes about the wisdom of organizing a pan-European campaign in this way. These disputes were rooted in increasingly marked ‘frame disputes’ over which of two basic approaches END should prioritise for achieving the goals outlined in the END Appeal. Two key founders of END, Ken Coates and Edward Thompson, respectively, represented most clearly the two positions. The strategic frame disputes combined with disagreements over organizational matters as well as with personal differences – discussed in Chapter 3 – to bring about a split within END. They are thus part of the story of British END. But they also are part of the story about the difficulties involved in creating a transnational alliance.

Coates’s – and the BRPF’s – main interest was, as we have seen, in organizing a European conference in which both established institutions – political parties, trade unions, and religious “forces” – which supported the Appeal and peace activists would come together to help build an alliance to campaign for a European nuclear-free zone. Thompson was most interested in stimulating a ‘grassroots’, peace movement activity. His internal memo ‘END – the Next Steps: a Discussion Paper’, written in April 1980 (before the launch of the Appeal), and reprinted in the first END Bulletin, indicates that he was thinking most (though not exclusively) about how to stimulate activity outside the political sphere. 58 Other CC members, too, emphasized developing a European campaign in a variety of ways and not just through a European conference.

In the editorial comment that accompanies the END Appeal in the first issue of the END Bulletin, by contrast – from its style very likely written by Coates – the conference is presented as a key mechanism for promoting the END campaign: a “European conference . . . will be

58 E. P. Thompson, ‘Thinking about the New Movement’.
organized” in “the coming months” to “develop and co-ordinate the campaign”; the “decentralised activity” which the Appeal’s backers favour – the work of “lateral committees” – is nevertheless seen as “all . . . conducive . . . to the preparations of the European Conference”. 59

The differences in political and strategic emphasis between Coates (and the BRPF) and Thompson are most evident in the memos each submit to the END CC’s ‘strategy meeting’ in September 1981. Most of Thompson’s memo is devoted to the organization of END; but that part which deals with political developments in Western Europe or in East–West relations focuses heavily on movements: the “rapid growth” of the West German peace movement, in “political terms the outstanding development of the past five months”; the West European peace movement intervening as a “Third Negotiator” in the US–Soviet arms talks; the need for END to press forward with its “positive demands” for “de-structuring the Cold War or re-making and re-unifying European culture”; and the vexed question of a consultation amongst West European peace groups. Though he pays attention to the fortunes of political parties (for example, the possible coming to power of PASOK in the forthcoming elections in Greece), his focus is overwhelmingly on peace movements as distinct forces capable of intervening in national political processes and in inter-state (and inter-bloc) relations. 60

Coates, by contrast, emphasizes the role of political parties. He wants the “central preoccupation” of the meeting to be the “development of a European forum (or convention), linking all those European forces interested in continental nuclear disarmament”. He lists those forces, and it is striking that most of them are political parties and other institutions such as trade unions and Churches: in Britain, “an important part of the Labour Party . . . some nationalists . . . some liberals . . . many Christians and unattached professional people”, as well as a “big potential trade union response”; in “Europe” [sic], “at least . . . the independent-minded socialists

59 ‘For a Nuclear-Free Zone in all Europe’, END Bulletin 1, 1980, 3.

(including PASOK), the churches in Northern Europe, the Eurocommunists, the ecologists and associated independent radicals, the small parties of the independent left (PDUP, PSU in France, Pacifist Socialists in Holland”). He does not mention peace movements that exist independently of political parties. Instead he writes that “[s]ometimes” the “political forces” he has listed have “constituted formal peace movements, and sometimes they are in the process of so doing”; and he mentions the “various very small pacifist groups (WRI) or rather isolated peace groupings which include numbers of very committed people”. He also refers to the “mass public opinion” of “neutral or non-aligned nations . . . which shares our views”. He does not mention, in these comments, the emerging peace movement in West Germany, or the active Dutch peace movement, or indeed the British peace movement, the growth of none of which can be ascribed simply to the work of political parties or churches (or trade unions).

By the summer of 1982, the BRPF have come to regard – even more firmly after what they regard as the extremely successful first END Convention – the “Convention process” as the single most important strategy for achieving the goal of European nuclear disarmament; they think END should put all, or most, of its weight behind it. The editorial in END Bulletin 11, written by a BRPF employee, Tony Simpson, and Stuart Holland MP, who was close to the Russell Foundation, states that the “new movement for European Nuclear Disarmament . . . came live and kicking into the world at the beginning of July 1982, with the successful convocation, in Brussels, of its first representative conference”; the previous two-and-a half years are described as a period of “long gestation and some birth pains’. By implication, before the Brussels Convention, no European movement existed.61

The success represented by the Brussels Convention and the continuing work of the Liaison Committee makes it easy for Coates to decide what the priority should be for all those working for European

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nuclear disarmament. "We have no hesitation in proposing", he writes, "that this [preparing for the 1983 West Berlin Convention] should be the central core of activity and commitment until May 1983".  

62 "In BRPF's perception", writes Dan Smith in July 1982, "the focus for work now is the Liaison Committee which prepared the Brussels Convention and which will continue as the international preparatory committee for the Berlin Convention".  

63 There is, however, a clear difference of opinion about campaigning priorities amongst members of the END CC, BRPF and non-BRPF, as comments by some of its members make clear. Dan Smith: "Despite . . . the importance of the Convention process, I regard this as but one element of END's work of taking the politics and strategy of the . . . END Appeal to every possible corner of Europe and North America".  

64 In a letter to Ken Coates, Mary Kaldor writes: "Although I think the Convention is very important, I think there are lots of other important things happening too."  

65 The different attitudes towards the Convention amongst members of the CC become an important element in the END–BRPF dispute. Indeed, what the BRPF regards as the insufficient backing given by other parts of END to the Convention is a key source of its anger with the CC. Dan Smith notes that "there is anger and disappointment at what [the BRPPF] . . . regards as END's low level of commitment, financial and otherwise, to the Convention [in Brussels, July 1982]".  

66 The BRPF wanted £10,000 from END towards the costs of putting on the Convention, which, it argued, END had earlier agreed to produce; END donated £2,500.  

67 For details of this argument see CC minutes, 7 April and 5 May 1982; Stephen Tnullcliffe's "Memorandum to the C.C. on 30 July 1982", 28 July 1982; Smith, "Notes on the meeting"; Ken Fleet's letter to Meg Beresford, 10 September 1982;
Coates, in a memo circulated in September 1982, complains of the inadequate coverage in some issues of the Bulletin given to the Convention process; and objects specifically to the editor, Mary Kaldor's, content-proposal for the first issue of the Bulletin after the Convention, which would, in BRPF's view, have given quite inadequate coverage of the Convention. (The other two editors – both BRPFers – Stuart Holland MP and Tony Simpson, vetoed this proposal and prepared an issue devoted entirely to the Convention.)

Further, the BRPF regards the Liaison Committee, which played a key role in organizing the Convention, as more "END-ish", because more European, than British END. Coates writes that the fact that the Liaison Committee "has agreed to remain in being to prepare for [the 1983] Berlin [Convention]" shows that "END is now a fully European organization". He describes the CC as the "London Committee" and refers to END in Britain as "London END": END in Britain, in his view, is a small regional organization overshadowed by the END Liaison Committee. Dan Smith reports that "Ken Coates has taken to referring to the Liaison Committee as 'European END'".

The BRPF's anger at the rest of END over the Convention, then, is rooted in the Foundation's belief that it is not receiving adequate support for (or indeed that leading END-ers are actively opposing) what is the most, perhaps the only, successful strategy in place for achieving nuclear disarmament in Europe. Whether or not the BRPF were right to claim that END CC members were as strongly opposed to the Convention as they claimed is hard to say. The documents in the END archive suggest they were not. Rather, END CC members were concerned, on the one hand, about the BRPF's lack of accountability while, on the other, though they disagreed with the Russell Foundation about the relative importance of the Convention, they were not actively opposed to it. But the BRPF people

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68 Only one page, according to Coates. Ken Coates, untitled memo, 2 September 1982, END archive. At first sight, Coates's complaint doesn't make sense: two of the three editors of the Bulletin were BRPF supporters.
certainly appear to have believed that END CC members were vigorously opposed to the Convention.

These disagreements within END over organization, finances, and strategy (exacerbated by personal differences) culminated, as we have seen (Chapter 3), in the Russell Foundation withdrawing from British END. From that point on, the BRPF was able to concentrate on END Convention, while END, though it participated in the Convention process, was also able to press forward with its peace movement networking, both in Western Europe, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, between East and West.
Chapter 6
East—West Dialogue

Part I: British END’s East—West Relations

In the West, END supporters were trying to link up peace groups and individual activists and to promote the notion of a pan-European movement. In relation to Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, END supporters – with some other Western peace groups – became engaged in something more ambitious, delicate and complex: trying to initiate and sustain a dialogue with independent groups whose world views were shaped by quite a different social system, while pursuing relations with often very suspicious, sometimes hostile, regimes. In this chapter I analyse British END’s bilateral relations with Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; then its involvement in the two multilateral fora, the END Convention process and the European Network for East—West Dialogue, in which a significant part of the END ‘current’s East—West work was conducted; and, finally, I consider the internal difficulties British END encountered in trying to extend the transnational alliance into the Soviet bloc.

Political Opportunities and Constraints
Relations between British END (and other Western peace groups) and the regimes in CEE/SU consisted mainly of the specific relationship with the regimes’ ‘peace committees’.¹ The peace committees’ function was to help mobilize their own populations in support of the ‘peace’ (foreign and defence policies) of their states; to act as the respective state’s main interlocutor with West European and other foreign peace groups and

¹ British END’s bilateral contacts were largely limited to peace committees in the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Hungary. It also had contacts with these and other peace committees in ‘multilateral’ fora such as the END Convention.
movements; and, specifically in the 1980s, to try to ensure that Western peace movements campaigned in support of the Soviet bloc's policies. The peace committees were members of the Helsinki-based World Peace Council, established at the second World Peace Congress in Warsaw in 1950. The peace committees' tasks, as official descriptions of the committees make clear, flowed naturally from the committees' being in agreement with their states' foreign and defence policies. The GDR Peace Council, for example, was officially described as "the embodiment of the desire for peace of the people of the GDR in accordance with the peace policies of the socialist state"; while the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC) described the 'peace movement' that it was set up to co-ordinate as functioning in a state the "key principle" of whose "international activity" was "the struggle for a just and democratic peace". This distinguished the peace movement in the Soviet Union from the "anti-war" movements in capitalist and developing countries.

The regimes however – of which the peace committees were relatively small parts – were not just interlocutors for Western peace groups. They also helped create the 'objective' political opportunities and constraints – both enduring and changing – that faced END's (and other Western groups') transcontinental work. I will first consider these opportunities and constraints.

The enduring 'objective' POS, one could argue, consisted of the structure of the political system itself: that is, the fact that these were one-party states, in which the ruling parties, in principle, had a monopoly of public activity within their own borders. Access to policy-makers for domestic independent – unapproved – groups was impossible; for foreign

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4 Of course, there were significant exceptions to this rule: the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, and, to a much lesser extent, the Protestant Church in the GDR, enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the state. They could use this autonomy to create a 'space' in which Polish and East German citizens, respectively, could organize politically, and in other respects.
groups only through few, prescribed, channels. Any activity conducted by domestic non-state bodies – or not sanctioned by the state – was, in principle, necessarily oppositional: it posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling party. By entering into a dialogue with independent groups in the CEE/SU, END and other Western groups were, unavoidably, if indirectly, also posing a challenge to the legitimacy of the regimes. Engaging with independent groups meant challenging the status quo in the Soviet bloc. Arguably, the regimes recognized all this; this is why they cracked down, sometimes very harshly, on the small domestic independent groups and often tried to hinder contacts between these groups and foreign peace groups.

At the same time, arguably, there were international pressures acting on CEE/SU regimes that gave rise to a more open political opportunity structure than might otherwise have existed. Gillian Wylie, in her study of the relations between British END and Freedom and Peace (WiP) in Poland, argues that already in the 1970s changes in the “contemporary international system” were “opening opportunity structures for social movements in international affairs”. The most important such change in Europe was the Cooperation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which culminated in the signing of the Final Act, the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The Accords had three ‘baskets’. Basket one, which dealt with security issues, committed the signatories to recognizing the inviolability of borders in Europe; in other words, to accepting the de facto post-Second World War status quo. Basket two dealt with economic matters, such as trade. Basket three, meanwhile, committed the signatories to recognizing a wide range of (Western, liberal) civil and political rights.

There are various ways, one could argue, in which the Helsinki Accords (and the third basket above all) created the conditions for ‘trans-bloc’ dialogue. First, as Wylie writes, they provided “legitimacy to those groups calling for respect for human rights in state socialist states”. This,

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in turn, stimulated the formation of groups that wanted to monitor their regimes' compliance with the Helsinki Accords. In Czechoslovakia, for example, they prompted human rights activists to frame their work in terms of holding their regime to its support for two human rights covenants which had been "reiterated at Helsinki in 1975"; the result was the human rights group Charter 77. In other words, one could argue that the Helsinki Accords had helped bring these groups into existence; some of these groups later entered into a dialogue with the Western peace movement; therefore the Helsinki Accords indirectly helped make this dialogue possible. Secondly, one might argue that the signing of the Helsinki Accords, and the general process of détente of which it was a part (which included the treaties signed between West Germany and Soviet bloc states) created, in the form of official agreements, better conditions of East–West travel, from which the Western peace movements could benefit. These included, for example, the regularization of travel from West Berlin to East Berlin; or the accreditation of West German journalists in East Berlin by the East German government – some of these journalists carried documents between independent activists in the GDR and Western peace activists. Similarly, some West German MdBs, including Petra Kelly of the Greens, took large quantities of material across the border to GDR activists.

Nevertheless, their 'own' activists the regimes could, and did, harass in a variety of ways: by expelling them from their employment and giving them menial jobs instead; by refusing them (or their children) places at university; by using physical violence; by arresting, detaining and even imprisoning them; even by expelling them from the country. This, in some cases, affected the ability of these activists to organize, and, for those interested in so doing, to pursue the relationship with Western peace groups. Foreign activists the regimes could, and did, keep out of their countries by refusing them entry visas; on some occasions they

deported them. The regimes also could, and did, try directly to undermine, in various ways, the work of Western peace groups it disliked: either by attacking them publicly (see below: the Zhukov letter) or even by having their spies in these groups (see below: END GDR/German Group). There were, however, variations in the regimes' responses to their own independent and to foreign peace groups varied, both over time, and from country to country: they could expand and contract the political opportunities available for domestic groups to organize; and they could be more or less open to Western groups. This was the changing 'objective' POS that faced groups trying to develop cross-bloc contacts.

One can, with regard to some of these countries, establish a correlation between a country's 'political opportunity structure' and the nature of END's relationship with that country's regime: the more restricted these opportunities, the more tense, even confrontational, the relationship; the more 'liberal' the system, the more relaxed the relationship with the authorities. Similarly, one can – more obviously – in some cases posit a cause-and-effect relationship between the political opportunity structure, with regard to both domestic and foreign groups, and the degree of contact between 'civil society' actors in East and West: the more 'liberal' the regime, the greater the degree of contact between these actors; the less liberal, the less contact.

With regard to the Soviet Union, for example, in 1980—86 – the period in much of which relations between the Soviet Union and the West were tense, the Soviet Union's foreign policies stagnated, and the opportunities for domestic groups to organize were limited⁷ – the relationship with officialdom was largely confrontational, and the opportunities for dialogue with independent forces severely limited. In this period, the Soviet Peace Committee had a very antagonistic attitude towards END and other sections of the non-aligned Western peace movement. The first, public, and most extreme, display of this attitude was an open letter from the SPC president Yuri Zhukov to Western peace

movements in December 1982. Taking aim at the new END Convention process, Zhukov, accused the "Movement for European Nuclear Disarmament", and specifically the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, of trying to split the growing "anti-war movement" in East and West. "Soviet public organizations" working for peace, he wrote, were ready to help prepare the END Convention in West Berlin in May 1983, but such co-operation was impossible because of the Convention organizers' political platform, the END Appeal. This "foisted on others" the false notion that both blocs have "equal responsibility" for the arms race. He then, more extremely, stated that the END "movement" and the BRPF were consciously working in the interests of the USA and its allies: the claim about "equal responsibility" was being made in order to "disorient[e], demobilis[e], and undermine[e] the anti-war movement and to conceal and justify an aggressive militarist policy of the USA and NATO". 8

In the same period, from 1982—87, the Soviet regime dealt harshly with the small independent Soviet peace groups — including the best known in the West, the Moscow Trust Group (The Moscow Group for Establishing Trust Between the USSR and the USA). Members of the Trust Group were, among other things, imprisoned and detained in psychiatric wards, for activities that included "disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda", 9 taking part in vigils 10 or collecting signatures for the Trust Group’s first document. 11 As a result, the MTG remained a tiny group for much of its existence. The regime also occasionally prevented Western


peace activists either from entering the country or from meeting members of the Moscow Trust Group. The hostile attitude of the SPC persisted until 1986 when, with a change of leadership, the SPC identified itself with the developing reform process in the Soviet Union, and displayed a much more welcoming attitude to END. In May 1987, British END visited Moscow as official guests of the SPC and met a wide range of official bodies and unofficial activists. At home, the regime’s attitude to the Trust Group became more tolerant, too, with — coincident with the signing of the INF Treaty — members of the group were allowed to participate in a prime-time Soviet television programme.

The GDR regime also pursued relatively ‘exclusive’ policies towards both foreign and its own independent groups — though for the whole decade. At various points it placed entry bans on Western peace activists, including British END activists John Sandford, Lynne Jones, Mary Kaldor, and Barbara Einhorn. In addition, Einhorn was arrested and detained for four days in December 1983 after she had met the independent women peace activists, including Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe. The Stasi further tried to undermine END by having at least one spy (an ‘unofficial employee’ or Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter) in END’s GDR/German Working Group. The opportunities for GDR citizens to organize were also severely restricted. The regime cracked down on independent activity, including on the ‘Swords into Ploughshares’ activists in 1982, and, in 1983, Women for Peace and peace activists in Jena. Members of the Peace and Human Rights Initiative (IFM), founded in 1985, were subject to regular, low-level harassment, which included receiving hoax mail and having front-door locks glued shut. In January

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12 For example, the KGB prevented a CND delegation from taking part in a seminar organized by members of the Trust Group. ‘Back from the USSR’, Sanity, December 1985, 35.


15 Personal communication to author by Werner Fischer of the IFM.
1988, the regime arrested about 70 independent peace, ecology and human rights activists, as well as would-be émigrés, in the wake of a demonstration by about 100 people at the 17 January official rally honouring Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Those arrested included leading IFM members who had not taken part in the demonstration; under severe pressure from the authorities, the IFM members agreed to leave the GDR temporarily. (Two returned 6 months later.) At the same time, for much of the decade, the GDR Peace Council was suspicious of, and sometimes hostile to, British END.

The relatively liberal nature of the Hungarian regime, by contrast, was reflected in the more relaxed relationship between British END and other non-aligned Western peace groups and the Hungarian Peace Council (HPC). The HPC, for example, signalled its rejection of the invitation to attend the 1983 Berlin Convention with a letter to the LC that struck a much more conciliatory tone than had Yuri Zhukov's letter of the previous December, indicating where, in its view, it and West European peace movements had "common positions"—for example, on the issue of nuclear-free zones in Europe. In 1987, the HPC signed the END Appeal (though reserving the right to take an "autonomous" position on various aspects of the Appeal) and later that year took part in an independent international seminar in Budapest on the Gorbachev reforms co-organized by the European Network for East—West Dialogue and independent Hungarian activists and attended by Western peace activists. (See below). The Hungarian regime also helped create opportunities for independent activity at home and almost always let Western activists into the country and allowed them to stay when there. Peace activists from the West visited the country regularly until 1989. The most conspicuous

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example of the regime’s power to allow or prevent independent activity came in 1982—83 in relation to the new independent Peace Group for Dialogue (PGD), which was founded in 2 September 1982.

From mid-1982 to early 1983 the regime actively created opportunities for the PGD to organize, and for foreign peace activists to meet them publicly: in late November Mary Kaldor of END and Mient-Jan Faber of the IKV addressed a 150-odd strong audience, most of them PGD supporters, on the premises of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; two days later, the PGD held its own first public meeting, on Peace Council premises: 300-400 people heard four PGD members present their views on the need to end the Cold War and the importance of creating a nuclear-free Europe; in December, PGD published a pamphlet entitled ‘We want Dialogue! ’; in January 1983 the first issue of a journal, Dialogus; in February, the group held another public meeting, again on the premises of the Peace Council; in April, PGD a national conference; and, on 7 May, the movement achieved one of its biggest successes, when – with the permission of the Peace Council – about 400 PGD supporters, with their own banners, took part in an official Peace Council march.

However, from December 1982, the regime had also begun to restrict opportunities for independent action. In January 1983, the Party daily published articles implicitly aimed at PGD, one stating that the government’s adherence to peace polices made an “independent” peace movement impossible and that any “oppositional” or “anti-government” peace movement would not be tolerated; in February, two PGD members were refused visas for a visit to Greece, where they were to take part in a conference on nuclear-weapons-free zones; in May PGD members were refused visas for a trip to the second END Convention West Berlin; in April Dialogue members were summoned by heads of university departments and party secretaries for a “‘a good talking to’”; in

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May three members were summoned to a (friendly) meeting at the Ministry of Interior to discuss their activities; in June group members were prevented from joining an [official] peace march in Komarom, in Czechoslovakia, and from participating in the World Peace Council congress in Prague; and then, in July, in a crackdown which led to a crisis and the ‘dissolution’ of the PGD the police broke up an international peace camp planned by PGD members and deported thirteen Western peace campaigners, including Greenham Common women, who had wanted to attend it.21

In Czechoslovakia, the regimes’s attitude to Western peace activists was often hostile: in June 1983, just before the ‘Prague Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War,’ a peace conference organized by the pro-Soviet World Peace Council, the Czechoslovak Communist Party circulated a document to activists and functionaries which described END (‘active mainly in Great Britain’) as “the organisation with explicit anti-communist and anti-Soviet function”; a charge that was repeated a year later in an article in the newspaper Rude Pravo, which attacked Edward Thompson in particular and END general for trying to “weaken and paralyse anti-war efforts” and to “influence the peace movement according to Washington’s ideas”22. In June 1988 the regime broke up a peace seminar in Prague hosted by Charter 77 and the NMS and expelled the 34 foreign peace activists attending it.23 In Czechoslovakia, however, a correlation between this ‘exclusive’ attitude and END’s relationship with officialdom cannot be established as, for the almost the whole decade, no such relationship existed. The regime, like that of the GDR, also severely curtailed opportunities for independent organization. Charter 77 signatories, from the founding of the group in 1977, and other independent


activists were regularly physically intimidated, arrested and imprisoned, and pressured into leaving the country. These included Ladislav Lis, the Charter 77 signatory (and in 1982 one of the three spokespeople) who played a key role in promoting Charter 77’s side of the dialogue with the Western peace movement, who was sentenced in 1983 to 14 months in prison and three years of ‘protective supervision’ for distributing Charter 77 literature; and in 1984 to a further three months in prison for allegedly breaking the conditions of the supervision. He remained under ‘protective supervision’ until June 1987. In August and September 1986 the Czechoslovak authorities arrested the seven officers of, and another leading activist in, the Jazz Section, since its foundation in 1971 a focus for independent cultural activity in Czechoslovakia and, since 1983, a signatory of the END Appeal. Two of those arrested were sentenced in 1987 for 10 and 16 months respectively on charges of ‘illicit trading’. In 1988 the authorities arrested, and later sentenced, four members of a new independent peace group, the Independent Peace Association – Initiative for a Demilitarised Society (NMS), and, in January 1989, two more leading NMS activists as well one in another peace group, the John Lennon Peace Club.

In the case of Poland, for much of the decade, political opportunities were, unlike in the Soviet Union, the GDR or Czechoslovakia, often favourable to transnational dialogue with independent groups. Not only in 1980—81, in Solidarity’s first legal period, but also between 1983 and 1989, when the regime rarely denied visas to END supporters wanting to visit Poland; as a result, they did regularly – on average 3—4 times a year – and met a wide range of independent activists. (Two exceptions highlight this rule: the regime denied visas to a Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation peace-cum-trade


union delegation to Poland in September 1980, and to Mary Kaldor and Mark Thompson, respectively the editor and a deputy editor of the *END Journal*, and Stephen Brown, CND’s International Worker, when they tried to attend an international seminar in Warsaw, organized by WiP, in May 1987.) In addition, with the exception of the martial law period (December 1981—July 1983), and the partial exception of the period up to early 1985, there were independent activists willing and in a position to meet Western peace campaigners. END had no relationship with the Peace Committee until 1987, when, in the context of a slow liberalisation of Polish society (and when British END activists knew their relationship with independent forces was strong enough not to be undermined by their meeting the peace officials) an END activist attended a seminar organized by the Committee.

How important were the presence or absence of political opportunities in Soviet bloc countries in determining whether or not a non-confrontational relationship with regimes and a dialogue with independent forces could develop? Obviously, if all the regimes in the East had been extremely hostile to the non-aligned Western peace movement no relationship with them would have been possible. Similarly, if the regimes had been as repressive as, for example, that of Romania, the possibility for citizens to organize independently would not have existed in any CEE/SU country, and there would have been no pan-European contact. One can assume that a minimal willingness on the part of the regimes to deal with the non-aligned Western peace movement, as well as a minimal amount of freedom at home, and opportunities for Westerners to enter CEE countries and the Soviet Union were all conditions of significant East—West ‘dialogue’ at any level taking place. Yet this only partly explains the *extent* of the contacts with independent groups; and it does not explain the *content* of the dialogue with them, nor of the relationship with state bodies. To do this one has also to examine

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both how END activists (and other Western peace groups) framed these opportunities and the regimes, and the independent groups, and what strategies flowed from these framings; and

- the stance independent activists adopted towards Western peace groups.

A Twin-Track Policy

We have already seen (Chapter 2) how the founders of END both framed the world pessimistically and yet proposed, in an optimistic voice, the creation of a "transcontinental movement". 'Mainstream' END policy in its East—West relations, grounded in the basic END frame, was to pursue a 'twin-track' approach: dialogue and cooperation with independent activists while maintaining relations with the regimes. This reflected the view that a condition of nuclear disarmament taking place and of the Cold War ending was pressure on governments and regimes 'from below', both in East and West; but that peace activists - who were, after all, trying to change the foreign and defence policies of governments - also had to try to influence governments and regimes directly. In addition, END supporters felt they might be able to help create 'space' for independent activists by pleading their case with the authorities - and, if necessary, actively defending them against harassment.

This dual approach was, as indicated in Chapter 2, one of three broad approaches to East—West relations that activists in the West European END 'current' pursued, each of which could be defended in terms of the END 'frame'. I look below (Part II) at how these approaches were manifested in the END Convention process.

Even within British END the precise attitudes towards, and the policies pursued with regard to, both independent forces and official bodies in the East varied. In the early days of British END, when the relationship with CEE/SU was just getting off the ground, there were disagreements over the organization's East European strategy, among both supporters and 'leaders'. At the first national END Supporters' Conference (May 1981), for example, the discussion at the 'International Dimensions' workshop,
which focussed on the “the question of how to foster relations with Eastern Europe”, produced three views on this matter: some stressed the “importance of reinforcing links with official Peace Councils – especially by encouraging their members to visit Britain and discuss with us here”. Others “pointed to the danger that the pursuit of such contacts would discredit END with dissident opinion in the East”; and all agreed that the “development of lateral links was the best way of approaching the mass of people who were neither officials nor dissidents – though this was easier to pursue among doctors, scientists and academics than at the trade union level”.

The minutes of the British END Coordinating Committee strategy meeting of 12/13 September 1981 record a similar lack of consensus about who to approach in the East: “peace councils, dissidents, academics, youth organisations, women’s groups, churches, and ‘semi-official circles’”. In the run-up to this meeting, one leading activist, Fred Hasson, wrote in an internal document (after stating that it was a “waste of time” contacting “official peace councils in USSR, East Germany, etc.”) that “dissident signatories to the [END] appeal will not help in any constructive or positive way”. He advocated, as an alternative, establishing contacts with official “Youth and Student organisations in countries such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria”, and cited support for such a strategy by the Italian Communist Party’s youth wing – “they confirmed that this would be a logical progression for our movement, they said they could help through their international network”. This seems to suggest a preference for cautious dialogue with bodies that, while not oppositional, might be prepared to discuss ideas to which more conservative ruling forces are deaf.

At the same time, however, Edward Thompson wrote that this was the time for END to “bring forward” its “positive demands”: “de-structuring the Cold War or re-making and re-unifying European culture”.

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29 Minutes of END Committee, 12/13 September 1981, Coventry.

30 Fred Hasson, ‘Some thought on END’, 5.9.81. END Archive.
And this would mean that the “lateral and East-West strategies of END have to be activated and embodied in actual events, conferences, cross-European marches . . . and multiple relations which press steadily (but not in adventurist or provocative ways) for greater East–West communications and for at least a sketchy mutual understanding between the peace movement of the West and the movement for civil rights &c in the East”. 31 This echoed the hope he expressed in Beyond the Cold War – delivered as a lecture shortly after this – that the “movement for peace in the West and for freedom in the East” might recognize “each other as natural allies. 32

At one point, there was even a handful of people in British END who were hostile to the pursuit of relations with independent forces in the East (or at least in the Soviet Union) and advocated, if only by implication, closer relations with official bodies. Pieta Monks argued in the END Journal in 1983 that the “preoccupation of some activists within [British] END with the issue of human rights [in the Soviet Union] is potentially more dangerous and divisive to the British peace movement than anything Michael Heseltine or President Reagan could dream up” and was “increasing the hostility and mistrust between the Soviet government and END”. ENDErs should not assume, she suggested, that the SPC was not representative of the Soviet population. 33 By contrast, others in END advocated not pursuing contacts with official bodies at all: for John Keane the “balanced diplomacy” strategy was “highly implausible”, in part because it contradicted the “explicit privileging of citizens-based peace negotiations outlined in the [END Appeal]”. 34

32 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 33.
33 Pieta Monks,, ‘Détenue or Cold War From Below?’, END Journal 5, August—September 1983, 8.
In the end, though, what emerged out of discussion within END was a broad commitment, subscribed to by most END supporters, to the twin-track approach.

**Relations with Officials**

British END attempted to develop a relationship with the SPC in the early 1980s. The hostile attitude of the SPC, expressed in the Zhukov letter of December 1982 (see above), made this impossible. An END—SPC meeting in London in 1984 was characterised, Mary Kaldor later recalled, by a “horrible discussion”.35 This stormy relationship lasted, as indicated above, until 1986, when the SPC adopted a more friendly attitude.

British END activists had, as indicated, little or no bilateral contact with either the Czechoslovak Peace Council or the Polish Peace Council. The former stance reflected a view that the committee was fundamentally tainted by its association with a regime that itself – having been installed in the ‘normalization’ of the country after the suppression of the Prague Spring – fundamentally lacked legitimacy;36 the latter a view that, given the strength of ‘civil society’, this body both had little or no legitimacy and little significance; and the fact that, had such contact been established, dialogue with independent groups would have been difficult if not impossible. This stance only changed in 1987 when, as we have seen, and when British END had a strong relationship with independent forces.

By contrast, END activists maintained bilateral relations with ‘officials’ in the GDR for most of the decade. These relations included two meetings with the Peace Council in 1984; with representatives of the main women’s magazine, *Für Dich*, in 1982 and 1983; with the official women’s organization, the *Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands* (DFD), in 1983; as well as meetings with officials from the GDR embassy in London (for example, in 1985 and 1988), at which the participants discussed, among other things, GDR foreign and defence policy and the policies of

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36 See ‘Minutes of the Czech Task Group Meeting: 27th April 1984’.
CND and END. At the same time, the newsletter of the GDR group, *GDR Peace News* (later *Borderlines*), gave regular coverage to foreign and defence policy statements of the GDR regime. One member of the GDR Working Group advocated cooperation with and better understanding of the Peace Council. In 1986 he argued for a (positive) “reassessment” of the GDR Peace Council “in pursuit of common aims shared by Western peace movements and all those genuinely working for peace in the GDR”; and stated that “co-operation and dialogue with the Peace Council and other officials and experts are necessary and desirable for both them and us in the overriding cause of trust-building and peace-making”. These policies and views reflected a more sympathetic attitude to the GDR regime than that of other END activists to, say, the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes, as well as the belief that – while the dialogue with independent groups was still of key importance – the GDR regime had an important role to play in bringing about the aims of the peace movement.

Another END activist, Stephen Tunnicliffe, the co-ordinator of the Churches Lateral Committee, framed the relationship with CEE/SU in a similar way. He argued that END could do more to achieve its goals of ending the Cold War and the division of Europe by deliberately trying to collaborate with organizations that were not ‘like-minded’, that is, amongst others, with peace committees. Tunnicliffe put this approach into practice by organizing, with Bishop Karoly Toth of the Hungarian Reformed Church and President of the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference, two international seminars entitled ‘Theology of Peace’ in September 1984 and December 1987. This stance was perhaps closer to that reflected in mainstream CND Ostpolitik.

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37 For all these see documents in END Archive.
END activists often met members of the Hungarian Peace Council (HPC) when they visited Hungary; as well as, on occasion, of the 4-6-0 Club, a group created by former members of the PGD in 1983 after the PGD had dissolved in 1983 and which operated under the auspices of the HPC. Of the 21 reports in the END archives of visits by British ENDers to Hungary between October 1982 and May 1989, 13 record meetings – in addition to those with independent peace activists, members of the Democratic Opposition, and others – with the Hungarian Peace Council. This reflected in part the view that the HPC could act, as it had in the case of the PGD in 1982—83, to help create the conditions in which independent activity could develop.

**Dialogue with Independents**

However, the primary emphasis in British END was on relations with independent activists in the East. The ‘dialogue’ with these activists had a number of distinctive features. As new or existing groups, or individual activists, addressed the Western peace movement, or in some way took up the issue of peace, END supporters visited the groups, or wrote to them, and debated the possibility of cooperation across the division of Europe. Thus, precisely, a dialogue, an exchange of views began. This relationship developed – and common ground was found – but it did so unevenly, both over time and from country to country. In addition, END supporters supported and defended activists in the Soviet bloc when they were persecuted by the authorities for their involvement in independent peace work. At the same time, END supporters were trying to publicize, in its publications and elsewhere in the West, this dialogue and the work of the East European participants in it, and thus widen the constituency – for example, CND – involved in the dialogue. END supporters did this by forming country-specific working groups which monitored closely relevant developments in CEE/SU and disseminated information about this in reports, briefings, newsletters, and pamphlets. At the same time END
activists began to debate intensely the meaning of these new contacts amongst themselves.

In this dialogue, END’s size and structure was, as I have argued in Chapter 3, an advantage: END activists could pursue controversial policies without having to worry about being held accountable by a membership. It is worth noting, however, that END, like many other Western involved in this dialogue, combined smallness with being an integral part of international networks such as the IPCC and the END Convention process. Membership of these networks worked to END’s advantage by giving it a platform and an audience which a group of its size might otherwise not have had. In addition, British END’s smallness was, in some instances, not a handicap in CEE/SU either: here, some its interlocutors thought it and the END Convention were one, big, entity, END.41

The following survey highlights key developments in and features of this dialogue.

A Slow Start
The first steps in the dialogue were taken by END activists in early 1980. In the first 18 months or so of END’s existence – from Spring 1980 to November 1981 – there was, in fact, little dialogue. There were various reasons for this. On the one hand, there were no independent peace initiatives in the East. On the other hand, the responses that did come from other independent activists were discouraging. Dorothy and Edward Thompson received a cool reception from human rights activists when they visited Prague in the summer of 1980 with the END Appeal; and the first public reply from a Czech activist – the pseudonymous Charter 77 signatory ‘Václav Racek’ – to Edward Thompson was extremely negative. Stating that the social systems in the East are “totalitarian”, and that totalitarianism necessarily translates into “aggression and invasion”

41 See interview with Jaroslav Šabata, 20 July 1998.
abroad, he argued that the cause of peace is best served by getting rid of this, its main enemy; and that the peace movement should support that force "which is an instrument of democracy confronting totalitarianism", namely "the military forces of Western democracies". This stance was not likely to find much support in END. At about the same time, in an interview with Edward Thompson the independent Soviet writer Roy Medvedev — who, unlike 'Racek', was sympathetic to the END idea: he had signed the END Appeal — stated that the conditions both for an independent mobilization in the Soviet Union and for a cross-bloc discourse did not exist.

In one country, however, there were, in principle, opportunities for dialogue; that is, the political opportunity structure was favourable: Poland. From August 1980 to December 1981, a vast national movement, Solidarity, dominated Polish life and scores of publicly active individuals were available for Western peace activist to talk to. Yet END made little attempt to get into Polish affairs in this period, either by issuing statements or by visiting Poland. Some approaches were made: a 700-strong END public meeting in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in August 1980 sent a message of support to "the citizens of Gdansk and the fellow trade unionists in Poland now on strike", and hoped that they would eventually "join hands with us in a common campaign for European nuclear disarmament"; the message was taken to Gdansk by an END supporter, John Taylor; in September 1980, as indicated above, a Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

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43 'Václav Racek, 'Letter from Prague', in Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds, Voices from Prague, London: END/Palach Press Limited, 1983, 16. This letter is the second the Thompson and post-dates the beginning of the 'positive' dialogue with Charter 77 signatories. But I quote from it here as 'Racek' expressed the same views in the second letter as in the first.


'commission' (Labour MP Bob Cryer, Tony Topham, a BRPF employee, and Dan Smith, CND Vice-chair and an END founder-member) – the “purpose [of which] was to report back to labour movements and peace organisations on the developments on Poland” – tried to visit Poland but was denied visas; and in July and August 1981 Lynne Jones, on the END Coordinating Committee as a representative of the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, visited Poland and met, among others, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the Solidarity spokesman. In addition, END founders corresponded with individuals in Poland: Jozef Halbersztadt and Zygmunt Elbinski.

Yet, given the opportunities for contact available in Poland, this is very little. What is also striking is the apparent overall lack of engagement with Polish issues in END circles. There are records of discussions in END about Poland – for example, at the Coordinating Committee meeting of October 1981 – and other indications that ENDers were wondering how to respond to events in Poland, but little else. Yet there is, for example, no article in the first seven issues of the END Bulletin (which cover the period 1980–81) about the significance for the END project of the existence of Solidarity. In other words, in a country in which the political opportunities for dialogue are so great, END activists made next to no attempt to begin it.

There are various possible explanations for END's relative lack of engagement with Poland in this period. In 1980–81 ENDers, like other West European peace activists, were extremely busy getting their own movement, and indeed their own organization – END had to be created almost from scratch – off the ground (see Chapter 2.) They would have had limited resources; and one can speculate that over-worked END supporters might have regarded Poland as just one of a long list of crucial issues that needed to be addressed. But a stronger explanation for END's

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46 See 'Russell Commission to Poland'.

47 Interview with Lynne Jones, 9 March 1996.
'reticence' is perhaps how ENDers framed Poland. On the one hand, as Edward Thompson later wrote, they were unwilling to "intervene" with arguments about defence, disarmament, and foreign policy when these were not only not on Solidarity's agenda, but were being kept off it by Solidarity because they were too sensitive. On the other hand, one can speculate that END activists might well have been wary of a huge, unpredictable movement – with, indeed, no stated interest in defence and foreign policy – that was, by definition, provocative and destabilising. Another possible reason is that, for at least some early END activists, the "link between peace and human rights" in the Appeal – as Mary Kaldor later wrote – was a "formality". ENDers cared about democracy in Eastern Europe, but only "in a formal sense": "we [made the link] . . . because we wanted to establish the integrity of the peace-movement". If Kaldor's recollection was right, one can understand how a group of activists for whom a commitment to connecting peace and human rights was a formality would not respond to a movement that showed no interest in the peace movement's concerns.

However, Kaldor also wrote that, once having established this link, END activists then felt obliged to act on it. From the end of 1981, two developments occurred which made it possible for ENDers to do this; both indicated that there were possible interlocutors in the East for the END strategy. First, Central-East European individuals and groups already active on 'political' issues began to show, partly in response to approaches by Western peace groups, a public interest in the Western peace movement. Secondly, new groups in CEE/SU were formed which took up the issue of peace. Western peace groups responded to both these developments in Eastern Europe.

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The Dialogue Develops

The Soviet Union

The first discrete peace group in the Eastern bloc (as opposed to one- or two-person initiatives or one-off semi-public meetings) was the Moscow Trust Group (MTG), founded in June 1982 with a programme of proposals for establishing trust above all between the peoples of the USA and the USSR.\(^{50}\) However, though the MTG survived the often severe harassment some of its members were subjected to, it remained – until the reform process blossomed in the Soviet Union, when the MTG became just one of many unofficial groups – a marginal force in Soviet society: Roy Medvedev’s warning to Edward Thompson that the conditions both for an independent mobilization in the Soviet Union did not exist seemed to be born out. In this respect the MTG was different to the other groups and individuals in the Soviet bloc with which END was in dialogue, almost all of whom became significant actors in their countries’ politics as, from 1987, the Communist order slowly or quickly (depending on the country) collapsed. Nevertheless, British END supporters maintained close relations with MTG members, visiting them regularly and organizing support campaigns when MTG members were harassed by the authorities. Arguably, the impetus for this – beyond the basic END aim of working with independent peace forces in the Soviet bloc – was, as Mary Kaldor wrote in 1987, that they were a “symbol of independence and autonomy”; that is, that they symbolised the possibility of an independent peace movement emerging in the Soviet Union.\(^{51}\) The significant dialogue – in terms of its political-cum-intellectual content and/or the possible role of the groups in helping to bring about social change – was with groups in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the GDR.

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\(^{51}\) Kaldor, ‘Report on Soviet Trip’.
Czechoslovakia

With hindsight, the new phase in the dialogue between Western peace movements and CEE/SU independent activists can be dated to the issuing, on 15 November 1981, by two of the spokespersons of the Czechoslovak human rights group Charter 77, Dr Bedrich Placák and Václav Maly, and a member of the Group of Charter 77 spokespersons, Jiri Hájek, of a ‘Statement on West European Peace Movements’. The exchange of ideas that followed – which involved, on the Czechoslovak side, not only Charter 77 spokespersons, but also prominent individual signatories, including Jiri Dienstbier, Vaclav Havel, and Jaroslav Sabata – was arguably one of the most influential, at least for Western activists, in the entire dialogue with independents in CEE/SU. Various former Western activists have described the exchange of views between Charter 77 and Western peace groups as having significantly influenced thinking in the Western peace movement. The fact that this was so is perhaps partly attributable, in the case of British END (as I have speculated in Chapter 3), to the fact that the texts were promoted strongly by Jan Kavan of the Palach Press. But there are other, much more important reasons: the reputation of Charter 77 in general, and of many its signatories in particular; the clarity and directness of most Charter 77 texts on peace; and the fact that they contained often quite detailed proposals, and, above all, the fact that most of these texts supported the idea of a dialogue between the Western peace movement and Charter 77 and were, to a greater or lesser extent, sympathetic to at least some of their Western interlocutors’ aims. “The suspicion and near hostility with which the first approaches of British peace campaigners were greeted” in 1980 – exemplified by Racek’s letters – gave way to a welcoming tone and, amongst some Chartists, a desire for cooperation.52 This extending of “the hand of friendship” seemed partly to reflect Charter 77 signatories’ feeling of affinity with people who, in the words of an early Charter letter to the

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Dutch peace organization IKV, “[l]ike ourselves ... aim ... to build a movement not on the basis of existing official structures but by relying on the sense of responsibility of ordinary people’. 53

A central theme of Charter 77 documents on peace is the importance of getting governments to live up to the commitments they have made in international treaties and, therefore, of citizens’ movements themselves taking these treaties seriously and using governments’ non- or partial, compliance with them as campaigning tools. This emphasis is not surprising: Charter 77’s human rights work was, in one sense, a continuous attempt to get the Czechoslovak government to adhere to the commitments it had made when signing international treaties on rights. 54

The importance of states respecting treaties as a means of improving both inter-state and state–society relations is central to the ‘Prague Appeal’ of 11 March 1985. Signed not only by the three spokespersons but also “by a group of Charter 77 signatories representing a cross-section of opinion”, 55 the Appeal was in this sense perhaps the most representative Charter 77 statement on peace. While earlier Charter 77 documents on peace were mostly declarations, discussions of principles and values, or statements of general aims, the Appeal contained a specific ‘package’ of proposals for how Europeans should work together to attain peace in a divided Europe. It presented these within a framework – the “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Final Act signed in Helsinki”, as well as the “subsequent talks and the Final Document of Madrid” (the follow-up conference to Helsinki) – and with a clear aim: “overcom[ing] the superpower bloc structure by way of an alliance of free and independent nations within a democratic and self-governing all-European community living in friendship with nations of the


entire world". The proposals included the "creation of nuclear-free and neutral zones"; "renunciation of the use of force or nuclear weapons"; "rapprochement" between the European Economic Community and COMECON; and two which the Appeal's authors described as "taboo": the withdrawal of the USA's and the Soviet Union's military forces from Europe; and giving Germans in both states the right to decide "if or how they wish to unite their two states within their present frontiers [sic]".

For many Western peace campaigners, including those in END, the significance of the Prague Appeal, with its strong echoes of the END Appeal, was that it indicated that many of the concerns of at least that 'current' of the Western peace movement which wanted to cooperate with independent forces in CEE/SU were taken seriously by one of the most 'prestigious' of those forces.\footnote{The Prague Appeal was distributed at the 1985 END Convention.} A mark of the influence of the Appeal in this current was that it provided an "important stimulus" for a further stage in this East—West dialogue, the drafting of the 'Helsinki Memorandum'. (See below.

Arguably perhaps the most significant theme of Charter 77 documents on peace, however, was not the responsibility of governments, nor indeed specific proposals for ending the division of Europe. It was, rather, the idea of the "indivisibility of peace":\footnote{"The Indivisibility of Peace", 24.} the notion that there can be no peace \textit{between} states if there is no peace \textit{within} states; peace involves not only "peaceful coexistence" – détente – between states, but also the elimination of "violence and injustice within states" and "respect by the state authorities in all countries of human and civil rights".\footnote{Ibid.} By implication, to campaign for the former but not the latter is both politically short-sighted and morally indefensible. This was, indeed, perhaps the single most important 'idea' \textit{tout court} that came from the East; and it most coherent \textit{written} expression came in texts produced between 1981 and 1985 by Charter 77 signatories.
Linking peace (between states) and internal democracy was not foreign to the END ‘frame’. The END Appeal had not only stated that the Cold War entailed the erosion of ‘civil rights’ in East and West – and had thus implied that ending the Cold War would remove a profound threat to civil rights. It had also declared that supporters of the Appeal would defend the right of all citizens to take part in the East–West exchange. That is, END supporters would, as part of their work, uphold the rights of association and expression (at least of those engaged in this work). However, the notion of the indivisibility of peace went further: it placed the building of peace between states and respect for ‘human rights and freedom’ on the same footing. It made the achievement of the former conditional on the latter: “to guarantee peace it is necessary to eliminate violence and injustice within states and guarantee respect by the state authorities in all countries of human and civil rights”. The acceptance of this concept was, for Charter 77 (and for some other groups in CEE/SU) a precondition of cooperation with the Western peace movement: “we extend the hand of friendship across the frontiers to you who are working diligently for peace with dignity on our continent and throughout the world” (emphasis added.).

British END’s participation in the dialogue with Charter 77 reflect its fundamental support for Charter 77 and the openness of the END approach to new ideas, or to new formulations of ideas implicit in the END approach. In Spring 1982 E. P. Thompson wrote a statement, on behalf of END, which accompanied the publication in END Bulletin 8 (Spring 1982) of the November 1981 Charter 77 statement. This welcomed the statement and affirmed “support for its principles and our common conviction ‘that peace and freedom are indivisible’”. END’s letter to Charter 77 of 16 March 1984 repeated the commitment to the ‘indivisibility of peace’ – “[w]e welcome and endorse [your] . . . emphasis

59 Ibid.

60 The Indivisibility of Peace', 27.

on the inseparability of peace and democratic rights” – and expressed the view that a “genuine and lasting peace requires the “democratic transformation of Europe”. (The use of a phrase, ‘the democratic transformation of Europe’, which is a quotation from Jaroslav Sabata’s April 1983 ‘Letter to EP Thompson’, suggests END activists were not only being influenced by at least this Charter 77 signatory but that they saw a close link between his ideas and their work.) In between these two texts END supporters visited Czechoslovakia; organized solidarity campaigns in support of, respectively, Charter 77 signatory Ladislav Lis (see above) and a Christian activist from Moravia, Jan Pukalík, detained for collecting signatures opposing the deployment of Soviet ‘counter-measures’ in Czechoslovakia; and publicized the dialogue. The latter they did in the END Bulletin, and the END Journal, and in the Special Report, Voices from Prague, as well as in some articles in other publications. A key role in this work was played by the Czechoslovak Task Group, founded in 1983.

However, after 1985, British END’s involvement in the dialogue proper (that is, in the bilateral exchange of ideas) largely dried up. In 1986—87 and 1988–89 British END activists organized support campaigns for, respectively, the Jazz Section and peace and human rights activists in Charter 77 and the Independent Peace Association; and British ENDers visited Czechoslovakia, both to gather information and to maintain contacts with independents, as well as, in February 1989, to attend the trials of activists. But the exchange of ideas was pursued and developed, on the Western side, above all by a new organization founded in 1984, the European Network for East—West Dialogue (see below). The reason for British END’s non-participation in the exchange of ideas was, above all, the collapse of the CTG following disagreements within the Czechoslovak Task Group over END’s relations with CEE/SU in general and Czechoslovakia in particular and the withdrawal from END’s Czechoslovak work of key END activists. These disagreements, which
reflected basic underlying differences in approach to East—West relations, I return to below (Part III).

Hungary

The Peace Group for Dialogue was, like the Moscow Trust Group, one of the first independent peace groups to emerge in the Eastern Bloc. It was actively sought ties with the Western peace activists. One of its founders, Ferenc Köszegi, explained its goals in terms that he later said reflected the influence of Edward Thompson's, Mary Kaldor's, amongst others', writings on him: “action to prevent nuclear war”, for “nuclear catastrophe is our greatest enemy”; “total disarmament, creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, and the protest against the deployment of Perishing II [sic] and SS-20 missiles". Just as for British END so for the new Hungarian peace movement it was crucial to stand “firmly on a pan-European platform”; and Köszegi quoted in its entirety and with approval the “utopian” paragraph in the END Appeal.

The strategy for achieving this aim – as outlined by Köszegi – was to campaign as an ‘independent’ peace movement: independent not only of the regime but also of the ‘Democratic Opposition’. He wanted to pursue a ‘middle way’. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, or the Soviet Union, there was a space in Hungary for a group that campaigned publicly and was not sheltered by an officially recognized institution in the way that, for example, in the GDR, many peace and other unofficial workers took shelter under the umbrella of the Protestant Church; the simple fact that a new peace movement existed showed this.

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64 Ibid., 17.

65 Interview with Köszegi.

66 Another early PGD activist, Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, later recalled that he wanted to help create a peace movement that would campaign principally against Soviet nuclear weapons, and so ‘mirror’ the Western peace movement, which, in his view, emphasized opposition.
The PGD attracted many activists and sustained – by Eastern bloc standards – a high level of public activity until the end of June 1983. In this period, Western peace activists – ‘leaders’ and others – visited the group and tried to involve its members Western peace movement fora. At the outset, the PGD’s relations with the authorities, as we have seen, had positive consequences. By late October–early November 300 young people had joined and other groups were established outside Budapest. But the group dissolved as the authorities changed their stance towards it.

Unlike with Charter 77, British END’s (and other Western groups’) relations with Dialogue consisted largely of meetings in Hungary; there was no detailed, written exchange of ideas and principles as there was with Charter 77. Indeed, with a handful of exceptions, this form of dialogue characterised END’s dialogue with Hungarian independents as a whole.67

After the demise of the PGD, there was not again such a coherent and obvious interlocutor for END and other Western peace groups. END’s ties with Hungary after this period consisted of links, cultivated in frequent visits to the country, with individual independent activists, including a leading ‘oppositionist’, Miklós Haraszti, the sociologist Ference Mislivet, as well as with students at the Law College in Budapest, some of whom went on to form one of the new political parties of the period of transition from communism, FIDESZ. One of these students, Gabor Fodor, later stated that END and other Western peace visitors, including Mient Jan Faber of IKV and Dieter Esche of the European Network for East—West Dialogue, influenced the development of his political views.68 At home, to Western nuclear weapons; and, in the condition of ‘apathy’ and demoralization following the Polish ‘coup’ of December 1981, attract people who were critical of the system but did not want to go as far as joining the ‘democratic opposition’. He favoured close ties between this peace movement and the dissidents. However, Szent-Iványi went abroad shortly after the founding of PGD; and the group did, indeed, for its existence, try to pursue a ‘middle way’. Interview with István Szent-Iványi, Budapest, 26 June 1998

67 These exceptions included the novelist György Konrád’s book-length essay *AntiPolitics*, an excerpt of which was published in the *END Journal* (see ‘Going Beyond Yalta’, *END Journal* 10, June—July 1984, 16—19.

68 Interview with Gabor Fodor, Budapest, 28 August 1998.

Poland

British END’s relations with Poland followed the opposite pattern: after an unpromising start, END found an active and lively interlocutor that was centrally involved in its country’s political life.

As we have seen, END had not exploited the open POS in Poland in 1980–81. British END’s attempt to start a dialogue after this period with independent Polish opinion began in July 1982, when Mary Kaldor signed, with IKV representatives, a joint statement with representatives of the coordinating office of Solidarity abroad (in Brussels). In December 1983, Jan Minkiewicz, a representative of the office, spoke at the launch meeting of the *END Journal*; and he contributed an article on Solidarity to the first issue of the *END Journal*. In 1983 activists established a working group to deal with British END’s Polish work. Members of this group, like those of other working groups, visited Poland and, on their return, publicized what they had seen and heard in various ways: in internal reports, articles in the *END Journal*, and in a newsletter. The group also organized defence campaigns for harassed peace activists.

From 1983 to 1985, British END conducted a halting dialogue with independent activists in Poland, principally in KOS (Committee for Social Self-Defence), in the form both of face-to-face meetings and written exchanges. The difficult nature of this dialogue was due above all – in contrast to the dialogue with Charter 77 – to the mismatches between the

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frames of Polish oppositionists and that of END. While the 'indivisibility of peace' is an implicit or explicit idea in many Polish texts in this period, the dominant theme is that of the main, if not the only, threat to peace being posed by the Soviet Union; and that Western peace groups are apparently unwilling to acknowledge this. At the heart of the first KOS letter, sent in May 1983 to the West Berlin END Convention, was an explanation of why the "most dangerous form of militarism" was that of the Soviet Union, whose "expansionist policy" was based on military blackmail and aggressive and mendacious propaganda. The August 1984 letter to British END stated that "first task . . . is to stop" the "expansion of tyranny from the East into the West", and described the allegedly unbalanced demands in the END Appeal as "in our eyes, a continuation of the spirit of Yalta and yes, of the spirit of Munich, too". Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, writing to Mient Jan Faber of IKV in 1984, suggested that the peace movement's "tradition of one-sidedness" was indicated by, among other things, its silence about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; its indifference to Solidarity in its legal period; and the fact that a peace movement emerged not when the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20s but in response to the planned deployment of US missiles. "True, the peace movement is not as purely one-sided as it was in Stalinist times but even now one can get a justifiable impression that it is still using double standards."^70

END activists' internal reports of visits to Poland indicated that these activists were as interested in listening to the Poles they met as they were in telling them about the Western peace movement: that they were not necessarily looking for people who already agreed with them, or who would quickly sign up to the END agenda, but for an exchange of views. Yet the ultimate point of this dialogue was to find common ground; and these reports show that there was limited agreement between British END and KOS. However, with the foundation of Freedom and Peace (Wolność i Pokój or WiP) in April 1985 British END's relationship with

^70 Letter to Mient Jan Faber
Poland changed. With WiP there was vigorous dialogue and co-operation, and, though basic differences in outlook remained, these did not prevent British END – and other Western peace groups – and WiP from working together.

The catalyst for the foundation of WiP was the case of Marek Adamkiewicz, a student from Szczecin who had refused to take the military oath at the beginning of his (compulsory) military service. In addition, some of the WiP founders saw a campaign against the military oath as a way of mobilizing society at a point when it had become apathetic and the opposition was relatively quiescent and invisible. The campaign against the military oath became a central plank of WiP’s platform; this was soon joined by the demand that conscientious objectors be allowed to do an alternative to military service; and, after the Chernobyl explosion in April 1986, by campaigning against environmental destruction.71

WiP had no members, but, instead, ‘participants’, who acted openly, signing documents and taking part in public actions. It was a highly decentralized movement, with little formal organization; and it was small: according to Kenney, “[e]stimates of active participants in the movement range from 200—500, with major circles in Krakow, Wroclaw, Gdansk, and large ones in Warsaw, Gorzow, and Szczecin’.72 What it lacked in size, however, it made up for in use of the media. As the only opposition group producing “newsworthy events”73 – above all in 1985–87 – the fact that WiP activists got news of their actions to “Warsaw and Radio Free Europe immediately” – and therefore back to those many Poles who listened to RFE – meant that many more than just the relatively small number of bystanders knew about WiP events.

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72 Ibid., 17.

73 Ibid., 19.
Different WIP groups had their own, distinctive characters. The movement included people who earlier been involved in punk and anarchist movements, former (and current) members of the nationalist KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland, as well as “radical socialists” and “Christian Democrats”. What united WiP activists was the “broad acceptance of overarching goals” – even though different groups invested them with different political emphasis; a “generally common culture”, and, of course, opposition to the regime. According to Kenney, WiP was “the most important new opposition movement in Eastern Europe since the birth of Solidarity”. It “forced discussion on several completely new issues” and won “significant concessions from the communist regime”. Jones make a similar claim: “WiP had not only put anti-militarism permanently on the Polish agenda, it had played a major role in the democratic transformation of Polish society.”

From shortly after the founding of WiP, British END activists pursued contacts with WiP. Western peace campaigners and WiP participants met frequently between 1985 and 1989: members of British END, IKV, CODENE, of the West German Greens, West European members of the European Network for East—West Dialogue, as well as US peace and democracy activists, were amongst those who made frequent visits to Poland. Travel in the other direction was much more difficult. However, in 1986, leading WiP activist Piotr Niemczyk came to Britain and met British END activists, and, in 1987, Konstanty Radziwill spoke at the 1987 END Convention in Coventry (see below), while other WiP activists were also present at this Convention. Western peace activists


75 Kenney, ‘Framing’, 18


78 See Lynne Jones’s travel report, Summer 1985. END Archive
also campaigned in support of WiP activists when the latter were being harassed by the authorities: most notably, in support of Niemczyk and Jacek Czuputowicz (another WiP founder) in 1986, and of Slowomir Dutkiewicz in 1987.

WiP was, of course, above all the product of domestic, Polish, developments, both in its origins and in its strategy and tactics. Padraic Kenney argues that, while WiP (and other East European) activists who participated in this East–West dialogue “were united [with Western activists] in the struggle for peace and human rights”, for the Easterners this struggle was “also (and perhaps above all) a means to another end: a free, safe and democratic future in their own countries. Each [East European] movement, regardless of its international ties, ultimately fought for freedom at home”.79 Moreover, in the dialogue with WiP, disagreements remained, for example over unilateral nuclear disarmament. Gillian Wylie has argued that British END and WiP “endorsed different readings of the Superpowers and thus differing assessments of the wisdom of unilateral disarmament”. (Indeed, Lynne Jones’s impression was that, for WiP activists, the “anti-nuclear agenda” “was always secondary”.80) These ‘differences’, amongst others, Wylie continues, were a “source of dissonance in ‘detente from below’”.81 Yet various commentators have argued, and some WiP activists too, that WiP was influenced by the Western peace movement, and that it, in turn, influenced Western peace activists.

Lynne Jones (herself an important participant in the British END–WiP dialogue and one of the British peace activists who did most to explain WiP to a British peace movement audience) argues that “the influence of the Western peace movement with whom WiP were in contact” was evident in WiP’s Declaration of Aims of November 1985.

79 Kenney, Carnival.
81 Wylie, Creating Alternative Visions, 176.
(see above). Point 3 of this statement mentions specifically CODENE, IKV, and END.) Jacek Czaputowicz’s comment to an interviewer in 1987 indicates that he, at least, thought the link with Western peace movements beneficial: “we need something that will help to renew Polish political thought and we see a source of this in the peace movement in the West”. Arguably, this common ground consisted as much of the form of campaigning as of its content: WiP, like many Western peace groups favoured a practical, ‘small steps’ approach in its work, set relatively little store by grand theoretical statements, and, in some cities, had a distinctive ‘spontaneous’, action-oriented style.

For British END activists, whose dialogue with WiP continued until 1989, a – perhaps the – high point in their (and other Western peace groups’) relations with WiP (and the Polish opposition) was the May 1987 independent WiP seminar in Warsaw. Held in a church, and the first event of its kind, the seminar brought together about 50 Western peace activists and 200 Polish activists for three days of discussion on peace and human rights, ecology, and conscientious objection. For some British END participants the WiP seminar was an important step forward in the East-West dialogue. It both built on solidarity already established and provided a basis for intensified future cooperation. And the production of common statements in some of the seminar workshops suggests that they might have been right to think so. Mark Salter, of British END, wrote that everyone present “agreed that the seminar had been an extraordinary occasion, unprecedented in peace movement history”. He did not conceal the differences: “whatever the differences of understanding and perception – ‘like looking at each other through a glass wall’, commented one Pole”. But “everybody was united in a sense that the dialogue was worthwhile, that they wanted to continue it, and that they had found in each other


83 Two similar seminars were held subsequently: in Budapest in November 1987 and in Prague in June 1988.
natural allies and partners". Neil Finer made a similar point: "In many ways, the most important thing to have come out of the all the workshops (and the Seminar as a whole) was the shared feeling . . . that our movements were each other's natural talking partners, and a sense that whatever things still divided us, these were less important than the things which united us." There was, also, he wrote, a "sense of building on an underlying solidarity". Lynne Jones's speculation about the future relationships between activists in East and West was informed by a similar (though cautious) optimism. In a letter to E. P. Thompson she wrote: "I have this extraordinary feeling of excitement – that perhaps and it is only perhaps – there is really a new beginning here, the possibility of really forming some kind of independent and effective co-operation between peace, human rights, ecology movements that does stretch across frontiers and can't be ignored."

German Democratic Republic

The beginnings of an unofficial peace movement in the GDR can be traced back to the introduction in 1978 of compulsory pre-military training in schools for 15 and 16-year olds. In the autumn of 1980 the Protestant Churches organized the first annual 'Peace Weeks', ten days of discussion and services focusing on the Christian conception of peace and how it could be realised in the contemporary world. It was in 1982, however, that a flurry of initiatives and events suggested that there was a growing willingness in the GDR to take up peace issues independently of the state. In January 1982 the veteran oppositionist Robert Havemann and the East Berlin pastor Rainer Eppelmann launched the 'Berlin Appeal'. This document, with – in addition to its specific proposals for the demilitarisation of everyday life the GDR – its call for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, the withdrawal of "occupation troops" from

85 Finer, report on May 1987 trip to Poland.
both Germanys, and for people to have the right to discuss, and demonstrate about, these matters freely, echoed the END Appeal. It was eventually signed by more than 2000 East Germans. On 13 February 1982, the 37th anniversary of the British and US destruction of Dresden in World War II, 5000 young GDR citizens gathered in the Church of the Cross for the Dresden ‘Peace Forum’, an evening of lively discussion about peace issues (including the Berlin Appeal). Before and after the Forum, large – by GDR standards – numbers of young East Germans took to wearing the ‘Swords into Ploughshares’ emblem, the representation of a man beating a sword into a ploughshare, which was based on a sculpture given by the Soviet Union to the United Nations. The ‘Forum’ and the wearing of the emblem, above all, seemed to indicate – certainly to Western observers – that there was some kind of an unofficial peace movement in the GDR. In October 1982, hundreds of women wrote an open letter addressed to head of state Erich Honecker stating their opposition to a new law allowing for the conscription of women.87

British END’s relationship with independent activists in the GDR began, when – as in Hungary – these peace initiatives emerged in 1982. ENDers enthusiastically promoted the Berlin Appeal, circulating it for signatures and, eventually, getting it published in The Times in May 1983. John Sandford recalls that it was this work that brought together the “nucleus” of the later GDR/German Working Group.88 From 1982 ENDers visited the GDR: in April Ken Coates and the Labour MP Michael Meacher went to East Berlin to meet Robert Havemann; he died just before they arrived and they spent the evening with Rainer Eppelmann.89 Later that year END women – Jan Williams, Barbara Einhorn, and Jane


88 Sandford, ‘Mutual (Mis-)Perceptions’.

Dibblin – made between them two visits to the GDR to meet women activists. These visits continued up to the end of the decade, even though, as indicated above, two members of the "nucleus" of the GDR/German Working Group, Barbara Einhorn and John Sandford, were for much of this period denied entry to the country. Most of the visits, and thus the face-to-face contacts, were with independent peace activists in East Berlin, as it could be visited from West Berlin with a day-visa purchased at the border; trips to other parts of the GDR required applying for a visa 4—6 weeks in advance.

At home, after the publication by END/Merlin Press in early 1983 of John Sandford's *The Sword and the Ploughshare: Autonomous Peace Initiatives in the GDR*, ENDers in the GDR/German Working Group promoted independent peace activities in the GDR through a variety of channels. These included, in 1984, an unpublished update of Sandford's book; and, in 1987, in two editions, one German, one English, *Stimmen aus der DDR/Voices from the GDR*, a unique collection of documents by East Germans on peace, ecology, and human rights. In addition, the Group's newsletter, first published in 1985, *GDR Peace News* (later *Borderlines*), contained a mixture of news about peace-related developments involving, as well as documents by, state, Church and independent forces. The content of this newsletter was, indeed, a good example of END's twin-track approach to East—West relations.

Yet though END activists continued to monitor and report on the GDR, independent East German peace and human rights activists, according to Gerd Poppe, the member of the IFM responsible for East—West relations, gradually turned away from END. END's place in the East—West dialogue was taken over by the European Network for East—West dialogue.⁹⁰ This was not so much because of anything British END had done but because of perceived failings of the END Convention. But Poppe, like some others in CEE/SU, saw British END and the Convention process as one entity. At the same time, according to Poppe,

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⁹⁰ Gerd Poppe, 'Die Aussenbeziehungen der DDR-Opposition in den achtziger Jahren', unpublished draft article, 6 June 1997. 8. (END Archive.)
GDR activists became increasingly interested in developing relations with other *East European* groups. From the mid-1980s, he states, the key influences on the GDR opposition came from Eastern, not Western Europe: an indication that GDR oppositionists felt they did not have a great deal in common with Western peace activists.  

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91 Ibid.
Part II: British END, the END Convention ‘Process’ and the European Network for East—West Dialogue

However, as indicated, British END was not the only Western peace group trying to create a ‘cross-bloc’ alliance by engaging independent groups in the East in dialogue and, simultaneously, maintaining relations with Soviet bloc regimes. Others were, too, and their and British END’s East—West work often intersected in the main transnational institution of the West European peace movement, the END Convention ‘process’. The Ostpolitik of the Convention process not only affected British END’s East—West relations; it sometimes partly constituted them. In this section I therefore analyse this Ostpolitik and show how, as with British END, the way Western peace activists framed East—West relations decisively shaped their policies towards the East.

East-West Strategies in the END Convention Process

Mary Kaldor has written of how the goal of building a “transcontinental movement of citizens” was not “widely accepted”, indeed, was “bitterly contested” in the Western peace movement.\(^\text{92}\) While there were some differences within British END over what kind of relationship it should have with independents and regimes in CEE/SU, the differences were much greater in the Convention process. They were expressed in terms of campaigners emphasizing different aspects of the ‘project’ the END Appeal had sketched out with regard to East–West relations.

As the Convention ‘process’, and the debates over East-West relations within it, developed, two broad tendencies, or ‘streams’, emerged. Each of these, while still within the ‘pan-European’ current of the peace movement, framed the role of official and unofficial forces in the East, and

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the respective relationships between them and Western peace groups. differently. Specifically, each implicitly – or, in the period of Gorbachev’s rule, explicitly – framed the political opportunities offered or denied by the regimes in the East differently. These disagreements dominated the Conventions from 1983 until 1988.

One ‘tendency’ stressed the creation of a European nuclear-weapons free zone. In its East-West work, this strategy tended to promote contacts with official bodies in the East and was sceptical about the value of what came to be known as ‘détente from below’. This approach was promoted mainly by those adherents of ‘pan-Europeanism’ who were political party activists and trade unionists: for example, members of the Labour Party, the TGWU (Transport and General Workers’ Union), the West German SPD and the disarmament and security campaigning group linked to it, IFIAS (Initiative für Frieden, internationalen Ausgleich und Sicherheit). The most active British proponent of this approach within the ‘END process’ was the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF), though, as we have seen, it was also broadly favoured by CND. It reflected an understanding of the Western peace movement’s strategy in general, and of the END campaign in particular, that was similar to that of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD): namely, that détente and nuclear disarmament could and should be kept separate from the question of human rights and democracy in CEE/SU.

Others, by contrast – while supporting the idea of a nuclear-weapons free zone in Europe – increasingly emphasized that part of the project which called for an end to the Cold War and for Europe to go ‘beyond the blocs’. This approach prioritised the dialogue with independent groups in the East and the aim of creating an alliance of independent citizens’ initiatives in East and West (though for the most part not to the exclusion of contacts with official bodies). This approach was followed by peace groups, including British END; in France, CODENE; in

93. See, for example, Edward Thompson, ‘Beyond the blocs’, End Journal 12, October - November 1984, 12-15; Mary Kaldor, ‘Beyond the Blocs: Defending Europe the Political Way’, World Policy Journal 1, 1, 1-21.
Austria, ARGE-UFI; in West Berlin, the East-West Dialogue Group; in the Netherlands, IKV; and in the USA, the Campaign for Peace and Democracy, East and West – as well as by, in West Germany, the Greens. An important characteristic of most these groups, was that, like British END (and, in some cases, even more so) they were small, even marginal, in their domestic movements but also played key roles in international networks: the IPCC and the END Convention process. Participation in these networks put them in touch with other groups, and sometimes large organizations, in the Western peace movement. This combination of marginality and participation in the peace movement had, arguably, two consequences: first, it allowed these small groups to pursue what were - by the standards of the Western peace movement – radical East-West policies without having to worry about, as a result of this work, being marginalized within their movements: they were already peripheral. Secondly, the fact that they were active members of Western peace movement networks meant that they could not be ignored; they could disseminate ideas to other Western relatively easily, and, therefore, influence the debates in these groups.

In the Convention process the tension between these two strategies surfaced above all in the regular debates on the Liaison Committee about who from CEE/SU should be invited to the next Convention, and under what conditions. For example, should only signatories of the END Appeal be invited as full participants, with non-signatories attending as observers only? should only independent activists be invited? official peace committees and independents? should the presence of officials be conditional on that of ‘unofficials’? was this sensible, given that unofficial activists would almost certainly not be able to attend? (If this happened, there would be no CEE/SU presence at all the Conventions, which some felt would undermine the END commitment to dialogue with the East.)

Until 1987 independent activists from CEE/SU were either absent from the Conventions or, if present, only in very small numbers and almost anonymously: no declared independent activist would receive an exit visa from their regime if they stated that they wanted to attend the next END
Convention. The debates on the LC about how to ensure the presence of independents thus always had a touch of unreality about them. They were substitutes for more profound debates about the kind of political relationship the END Convention process, and the Western peace movement more generally, should have with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: with whom it should ally itself; and which forces in the East were the best vehicles for effecting the kind of change peace activists wanted to see brought about.

These debates were sometimes very heated – above all in the run-up to West Berlin in 1983, Perugia in 1984, and Coventry in 1987 – and even boiled over into the Conventions themselves, most notably at Perugia. The two approaches to East–West relations were pursued side-by-side within the framework of the Convention process until the end of the decade. By the time of the preparations for the END Convention in Coventry in 1987, one British END activist could note that there was a “fundamental divergence of peace movement perspectives” between these “two very differently motivated tendencies” on the Liaison Committee.94 But already at Perugia disagreements between these approaches had given rise to a new initiative, the European Network for East—West Dialogue, which effectively pursued a third strategy, one that focused on dialogue with independents to the almost total exclusion of relations with official bodies.

The West Berlin Convention

The emphasis and particular function of the [first END] Convention [in Brussels was] . . . to be the creation of links and the pooling of information among peace organisations from Western Europe”; 95 as a result East–West relations played a minor role in the discussions before Brussels,

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94 Pat Chilton, report on END Convention Liaison Committee meeting, 3-5 April 1987. (END Archive.). Pat Chilton was a member of British END.

and at the Convention itself. East European and Soviet participation in the Convention was minimal.

It was not until the preparations for the next Convention—West Berlin in May 1983— that East—West issues assumed prominence. The author(s) of the ‘insider’ agenor account later wrote that before Berlin the END Liaison Committee talked “repeatedly and interminably” about East—West issues; and that, at the Convention itself, East—West relations “really came to the fore”. Moreover, on the LC “east-west relations . . . was the one issue on which the search for consensus was condemned to fail”96.

The reasons why East—West issues became important before and at the Berlin Convention in a way that they had not been earlier were that END supporters actively made them so, and because of the intervention of outside forces. Firstly, the choice of West Berlin as the venue for the Convention—it was selected above all for political reasons: the city symbolized, as nowhere else in Western Europe did, the division of the continent to the ending of which the signatories of the END Appeal were committed97—was not uncontroversial amongst Western peace groups.98 Secondly, the inclusion on the Convention agenda of the ‘German Question’ many thought would be provocative and destabilizing. Thirdly, for the first time, the question of invitations to the East became controversial. The Liaison Committee decided to invite as full participants

96 Talking Peace, 20.

97 The ‘platform’, or ‘working paper’, agreed by the LC as a framework for the Convention gave this as one of the three reasons for choosing West Berlin. The others were that 1983 would be the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power, the consequences of which were more manifest in Berlin than anywhere else in Europe; and—seeing the Convention as an intervention in the domestic politics of the host country—that holding the Convention in West Berlin would offer the opportunity of influencing public opinion in West Germany (as well as elsewhere in Western Europe and the USA). See also Talking Peace, p. 18; Luciana Castellina, ‘Aufwiedersehen in Berlin’, END Journal 1, December 1982—January 1983, 20-21; and Jan Williams, ‘Why in Cold War City?’, END Journal 3, April—May 1983, 9.

98 Bruce Kent, the General Secretary of CND, in an internal report of a visit to Moscow on 25—27 October 1982, indicated his extreme concern about the choice of West Berlin as a venue for the Convention: ‘are we not daft —considering all the divisions in the German peace movement and the sensitivity of Berlin — to try to hold a Convention there??’. END Archive.
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all those who had signed the END Appeal. Non-signatories — official bodies or independents — would be invited as guests, or observers, with the right to speak in workshops but not in plenary sessions or international sessions. This, however, did not please the Soviet Peace Committee. Indeed, the SPC displayed a clear interest not just in attending but in becoming involved in the preparations of the Convention; in fact, in being accorded a key role, on its own terms, in the European ‘anti-war’ movement. The SPC’s president, Yuri Zhukov’s, 2000-word broadside against the ‘Movement for European Nuclear Disarmament’ was his response to being excluded from the process. (See above.) The letter’s intemperate tone and above all its misrepresentation of the END ‘movement’ made it easy to refute. Critical, and often strongly-worded, replies to the SPC document, or letters of support for the Convention, were sent from a wide range of opinion, from the Communist-founded Dutch group Stop the Neutron Bomb, to the East German exile Jürgen Fuchs, to British END CC. The effect of the Zhukov letter seems to have been to create a united front across a fairly wide range of Western peace movement opinion. But the SPC’s public hostility to the END ‘movement’ not only ensured that East—West relations would be controversial before Berlin; they also meant that no peace committees would attend the Convention.

Nor were any ‘independents’ who lived in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union present, with the exception of György Konrád, the Hungarian novelist at that point living temporarily in West Berlin, who spoke at the opening plenary. Various independent groups or individuals in Eastern Europe, also unable to attend, sent letters or statements to the Convention: from Czechoslovakia, Jiri Dientsbier, writing in his capacity as one of the spokespeople of Charter 77; from Hungary, the Peace Group for Dialogue; and from the Soviet Union, the Moscow Trust Group. Despite not being unable to attend the Convention, therefore, these groups were able to continue the dialogue with the Western peace movement.
The Perugia Convention

At the 1984 END Convention, in Perugia, the simmering dispute on the END Liaison Committee about what kinds of relations the LC should have with official committees and independent groups was brought out into the open. This process began when three Liaison Committee members from West Berlin, Dieter Esche, Jurgen Graalfs, and Walther Grunwald,99 wrote an open letter to all LC members, in which they argued that the LC was giving “covert priority” to a “dialogue with official representatives” rather than to “the dialogue with our real partners in Eastern Europe, independent peace groups and movements”.100 The reason for this, they claimed, was that “some people in the Committee regard independence of blocs as . . . mere rhetoric . . . without relevance for short-or medium-term strategies”, and for two reasons: some LC members “have problems when the discussion turns to subjects such as human rights, social emancipation or national self-determination in Eastern Europe”; and “[do] not want to provoke . . . official peace movements in Eastern Europe”. Dieter Esche later described the targets of these criticisms as a “traditional left-wing”, “social-democratic tendency”, which wanted to promote “only détente from above”, and which, for the sake of this détente, wanted to avoid a confrontation with the regimes of Eastern Europe. The key issue, in Esche’s words, was “do human rights and peace belong together . . . peace and democracy”, or should they be treated separately, as of course “high-level politicians” (“die grosse Politik”) did.101

99 The authors of the letter were members of a West Berlin group, ‘Initiative for an East-West Dialogue’, founded shortly after the END Convention held in West Berlin in May 1983. For the group’s open letter, see Across Frontiers, Premier Issue (Spring 1984), S1-S4. See also interview with Dieter Esche, 11 July 1998.


101 Interview with Dieter Esche,
The dissatisfaction of these and other LC members continued up to the Convention. The day before the Convention began a group of activists meeting in Perugia heard that all the Peace Committees were coming – that they had been invited as “organizations . . . as it were as guests of honour”; but that 59 invited independents from Eastern Europe, by contrast, had not been given permission to travel by their regimes. The response to this news marked the symbolic beginning of an institutional division within the END ‘current’ of the Western peace movement. On the following day, during the opening session of the Convention, a group of these activists – including members of the German Greens/the Alternative List, Lega per l’Ambiente, and ARGE-UFI – with red cloths tied around their mouths, climbed on to the stage carrying placards on which were printed the names of the Central-East European and Soviet groups and movement whose members which had been prevented from attending the Convention: Charter 77, Swords into Ploughshares (GDR), the Moscow Trust Group, Solidarity, KOS (Poland), and PGD (Hungary). In addition, one activist carried a banner with ‘Palestine’ on it, another with ‘Turkey’, to symbolise the Israeli and Turkish states’ refusal to allow two Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and a representative of the Turkish Peace Association, respectively, to travel to Perugia.

In the later words of one of the participants, the protest was not directed at the presence of the East European Peace Councils but at the absence of independent activists. The protest, and its theme, was both divisive and became a – perhaps the – dominant theme of the Convention. The daily Convention News reported that the “protesters were clapped as they came onto the stage. On behalf of the Liaison Committee, the chairperson, Ken Coates, asked the protesters to leave the stage, and stated that such a demonstration was not in the interest of dialogue, which also received hearty applause.” An American participant was struck by

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102 Ibid.

the intensity associated with East-West dialogue . . . at the Convention. The struggle over how to deal with the peace committee representatives . . . was quite divisive. No one opposed the expansion of dialogue to include the quasi-officials [sic] from the East, but ferment surrounded how to treat such representatives in the face of a refusal to allow independent peace people (with the partial exception of Hungary) to attend the Convention.\textsuperscript{104}

\textit{The Coventry Convention}

The 1985 END Convention – in Amsterdam – and the 1986 Convention – in Evry, near Paris – were not marked by the same controversy over East—West relations as had been Perugia and, to a lesser extent, West Berlin. The problem was dealt with for Amsterdam by hiving off the East—West side of the Convention to individuals and groups who would organize bilateral projects for the Convention with partners in the East. In addition, arguably, the fierceness of the dispute at Perugia led LC members to try to avoid such divisiveness. In addition, the LC members who had protested so loudly at the East—West policies of the LC were now concentrating their work in a new organization, the European Network for East—West Dialogue (see below). Evry avoided East—West conflict by concentrating on issues affecting Western Europe. At the 1987 Convention in Coventry, however, East—West relations, and controversy about them, again dominated discussions, with, as a leading US activist noted, participants debating the “diverse implications of glasnost and perestroika”. Yet, while East—West issues dominated at Coventry partly because participants wanted to debate the significance of the Gorbachev reforms, they did so also, before and after the Convention, because the old disagreements about the Convention’s East—West relations surfaced again; indeed so much so that they crowded out other issues. Melinda Fine noted that “movement leaders . . . spent [hours]

debating responses to [the] . . . violation of the Helsinki Accords" represented by the denial of visas to "independent activists from Eastern Europe"; yet "there was apparently little discussion of INF". Likewise, Juergen Maier, a member of the Federal Executive of the West German Greens, recorded that "END veterans" were so busy with the "old dispute . . . about the status of Eastern European official 'Peace Committees' and independent grassroots activists" that they largely "ignored that the political realities in NATO and Europe are changing in the wake of the INF negotiations": namely, the strengthening of NATO's European pillar and the transformation of NATO into a "superpower United States and a superpower-in-the-making Western Europe". 106

Invitations to the East were controversial – indeed, more than ever – because, for the first time, the Liaison Committee had invited not just all the Peace Committees, but, much more controversially, 107 the ruling communist parties of Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well. In the end, there were official delegations from the Soviet Union, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition there was, for the first time a significant number of independents present from Hungary and Poland. But the rows created by the invitations to 'officials' threatened, with another controversy, to undermine the whole Convention process. Some of the Convention organizers wanted a representative of Freedom and Peace (WiP) to speak at one of the plenaries. British END, as we have seen, was – with many other Western peace groups – a staunch supporter of the dialogue with WiP. The BRPF was not. At the May 1987 LC meeting Ken Fleet of the BRPF was recorded as expressing scepticism about WiP: "Freedom and Peace have not signed the END Appeal. They

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106 Juergen Maier, 'Impressions from the European Nuclear Disarmament Convention, Coventry/UK, July 15-18 1987'. END Archive.

are therefore not direct partners of ours". Ken Coates later wrote that Freedom and Peace "does not really fit into the European peace movement" because "it seems to make the disarmament of other countries [i.e., the West] conditional on a change in the political regime in Poland". While it would be quite proper for WiP members to attend a Convention it "was absolutely wrong to invite this organization to provide a speaker in the closing plenum at Coventry": Radziwill’s speech "did not represent the consensus of the European peace movements, and indeed had very little to do with the overall objective of European Nuclear Disarmament". After a bitter argument on the LC, with many of its members opposed to the proposal, the proposal for a WiP plenary-speaker was passed. (Konstanty Radziwill addressed the closing plenary.)

The invitations controversy pointed to profound differences in attitude to the new Soviet leadership, with proponents of ‘détente from below’ unwilling to place too much trust even in a reformist Soviet leader. The invitations to the communist parties were proposed by Ken Coates, who believed strongly the peace movements in the West should strongly support Soviet ‘new thinking’. “At the beginning of the decade [when the END Appeal was launched] . . . we might have been tempted to be equally censorious of the Soviet leadership [as of the US leadership]. Today, this would be quite unjust . . . Mikhail Gorbachev has carried the Soviet Union into an increasingly vigorous policy of disarmament.” These and related “changes in Soviet policy” are “profoundly significant” and “need a warm answering response from peace movements”: “we should be concerned to help them obtain a friendly reception by public opinion, East and West alike”. One can assume that the proposal to invite the communist parties

108 Minutes of END LC meeting, END Archive.
109 Coates, Listening for Peace, 20.
110 Ibid., 5.
112 Ibid.
was inspired by the wish to use the Convention to find common ground with – at least – the Soviet party: to “establish common perspectives, and a sense of solidarity and mutual support”, as Coates later put it.\footnote{Coates, \textit{Listening for Peace}, 9.} What the Western peace movement should not do is undermine Gorbachev. Writing after the Convention, Coates attacked Mient Jan Faber of IKV for – Coates alleged – doing just this. At the Convention, Faber, in Coates’s words, argued that, after “Gorbachev had brilliantly destabilized NATO with his disarmament policies . . . it was the task of the peace movement to similarly destabilize the Warsaw Treaty Organization with their politics of detente from below”. But, writes Coates, this is “not what most of us have meant by ‘detente from below’ Creating an upheaval in Eastern Europe” would “be precisely the way to undermine the Gorbachev revolution, at home and abroad”.\footnote{Ibid.}

Against this Lynne Jones of British END argued that, while Western peace groups did “welcome and support the changes taking place under Gorbachev [and] . . . his disarmament initiatives”, it was a mistake to think that “political change” was “solely a top-down” process. On the contrary, “far-reaching reform is only brought about by pressure from below. It is, therefore, important not to put too much trust in Gorbachev’s leadership but, instead, to “maintain . . . pressure “ as the “only way to maintain and extend reform”.\footnote{Lynne Jones, ‘Time For a Change’, \textit{END Journal} 28/29, Summer 1987, 19.} This stance was based on a view of the East-West conflict quite different to Coates’s, one which echoed the ‘utopian’ paragraph in the 1980 END Appeal: “The main division is not between East and West but between those who see the established power structures as part of the problem . . . and those who see them as part of the solution and wish to support them.\footnote{Jones, ibid., 20. The ‘utopian’ paragraph in the END Appeal: “We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to “East” or “West”, but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.”} For that reason, what was needed was
a "'league of oppositions' . . . an autonomous citizens' coalition that crosses the East-West divide, confronting issues of peace, democracy and ecology directly in a co-ordinated manner". A model of this approach is "the recent proposal for a Europe-wide campaign against nuclear-power construction, from Sizewell in England to Zarnowiec in Poland."\(^{117}\)

The arguments sparked off by the invitations to the Communist parties and the WiP-speaker affair were so strong that some participants questioned the viability of the whole Convention process. One British END activist suggested in early 1987 that "the Liaison Committee is now dominated by individuals and groups whose main interest is in talking to representatives of state power in Eastern Europe", not in "strengthening ties between social movements in East and West Europe".\(^{118}\) Another argued that the "LC does NOT represent the peace movement. . . . On East–West issues, the fact that the majority of [European Network for East-West Dialogue] contacts have pulled out, has shifted the political balance enormously"; and later recorded that the "mood among the peace movements [represented on the LC] is . . . [of] a growing sense of revolt": the "conditions are there for a serious consideration of withdrawing from the process which would probably collapse if IKV, Pax Christi, END, SPAS and CODENE left."\(^{119}\)

At the Convention itself, unhappy peace activists and those CEE independents present at Coventry held three meetings at which, among other things, they discussed the question of leaving the Convention process altogether. (The extent to which those present felt there was a gulf between the two 'tendencies' on the LC is indicated by the fact that these meetings were by invitation only. At least two leading members of the LC thought to be insufficiently sympathetic to the dialogue with independents were turned away: the Belgian activist Jean de Bosch and IFIAS representative Gert Weisskirchen.)

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\(^{117}\) Jones, 'Time for a Change', 33.

\(^{118}\) Patrick Burke, 'Report of Febl4'/15 1987 Liaison Comittee meeting'. END Archive.

\(^{119}\) Fiona Weir, 'Liaison Committee Report, 23/4 May 1987 Coventry'.

In the end these groups did not leave the Liaison Committee. But the Convention ended with both tendencies as firmly entrenched in their positions as they had been before the event. In her report of the next END Convention, held in Lund in 1988, Mary Kaldor described this separation bluntly: “the Liaison Committee . . . is unworkable, given the irreconcilable division between political parties and peace movements. . . . [T]he Liaison Committee is unable to reach a united position on East–West questions.”

The European Network for East—West Dialogue

The European Network for East—West Dialogue, or Network, represented a rejection of the approach to East—West politics that prioritised relations with official bodies. But it also indicated disagreements with those in the other tendency, for groups in the Network decided that they would simply concentrate on developing close relations with independent groups in CEE/SU, largely ignore official peace committees, and, crucially, not concern themselves with trying to bring in to the dialogue reluctant Western peace groups. Participants in the founding meeting of what would become the Network, at the Perugia Convention, stated that their aim was not to create a faction within the Convention process, or a “parallel or rival body to the Liaison Committee or other international coordination bodies of the peace movement”. Many members of the Network remained on the LC, at least in name. Yet the Network did, in effect, become, at least with regard to East—West politics, an alternative to the Convention process.

Coordinated by activists in West Berlin, and meeting roughly twice a year for planning sessions, the Network had two main campaigning foci: organizing seminars and conferences and producing publications. The former included, in Western Europe, a seminar on the meaning for contemporary Europe of ‘Yalta’, held in West Berlin on 8-10 February

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121 European Coordination for an East-West Dialogue, 'Protocol of the first Coordination meeting on 21 July 1984 in Perugia'. ('Protocol' drafted by Dieter Esche.)
1985, the 40th anniversary of the Yalta conference: ‘Peace in a Divided Europe – 40 Years after Yalta’; in May 1986, in Milan, a forum on the Helsinki process, ‘Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords’, the focus of which was the document of the same name (see below); and in September 1988, in Nijmegen, a conference on the Prague Spring and its consequences, ‘Twenty Years After the Prague Spring’.

The Network was small. But, arguably, it played a role in the East—West dialogue ‘from below’ quite out of proportion to its size. The combination of marginality in the Western peace movement with being represented in key international networks, characteristic of many of the groups promoting ‘détente from below’, was perhaps even more significant here. A key group in the Network, the Initiative East-West Dialogue in West Berlin, was itself on the periphery of organized left politics in that city: in the words of a co-founder, Dieter Esche, ‘absolutely marginal’.\(^{122}\)

Other figures important in its foundation and later were East European exiles – Jan Kavan, Jiri Pelikan, Jan Minkiewicz, Wlodek Goldkorn; they had links with, but were not active (let alone mainstream) participants in the peace movements of the countries in which they lived. Network activists were behind two of the three seminars, unique in their location – Central Eastern Europe – size, and breadth of participation, that brought together West European (and US) and independent Eastern activists (see above). The idea for the first –in Warsaw in May 1987– grew out of discussions between Jacek Czaputowicz of the host organization Freedom and Peace, and Dieter Esche of the Network;\(^{123}\) and the second – in Budapest in November of that year – was co-sponsored by the Network.\(^{124}\)

Its most influential, and best-known, contribution to the East-West dialogue ‘from below’, however, was *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords*, the ‘Helsinki Memorandum’, a document written in 1985–86 by

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\(^{122}\) Interview with Dieter Esche.


\(^{124}\) ‘Hungarian meeting a success’, *END Journal* 3, December 1987–January 1988, 8. The third seminar, in Prague in June 1988, was disrupted by the authorities.
independent peace and human rights activists in East and West Europe. Inspired in part by the ‘Prague Appeal’ (see above), the ‘Memorandum’, as its full title suggested, both outlined how the three ‘baskets’ of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act could be made interdependent and how the work of citizens, not just governments, was needed to realize the aims of the Act.

The Memorandum was important in the East-West dialogue for various reasons. First, as a tangible way of continuing and ‘deepening’ the dialogue: instead of statements or letters written on one side being sent to the other side or exchanged, or short documents being jointly drafted and signed by small numbers of Easterners and Westerners, this time a relatively wide circle of activists in both ‘halves’ of Europe were drafting the document together – and establishing common ground in the process. (Eastern and Western activist were equal partners in the drafting process: Gerd Poppe of the East German Peace and Human Rights Initiative has testified how he and other GDR activists valued their contribution to the drafting process being taken seriously. 125) Secondly, because it inspired further, practical steps in the East–West dialogue: both the Warsaw and Budapest seminars. And, thirdly, because it was an important part of the process that led to the foundation of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, the post-Cold War international organization-cum-network, launched in 1990, of ‘civil society’ organizations in the Helsinki states. Indeed, the Network dissolved when, in 1989, most of its active members became involved in the founding of the HCA.

Frame Disputes within British END over East-West Relations

The arguments at Perugia and the founding of the Network fed into and stimulated discussions within British END over the direction of its East—West policy. We have seen that there were differences of emphasis within British END’s basic ‘twin-track’ approach to East—West relations: while, for example in relation to Poland, END activists concentrated almost exclusively on the dialogue with independent forces; and with regard to the

GDR, they conducted this dialogue and maintained relations with the Peace Council; the transnational Churches work, carried out mainly by Stephen Tunnicliffe of the Churches Lateral Committee, focused almost entirely on relations with ‘officials’ in the East.

These differences in emphasis reflected different conceptions of how the ‘pan-European’ aims of END were to be achieved; that is, which social forces needed to be mobilised if these goals were to be reached. For most of the decade these varying approaches did not produce major disagreement – nothing on the scale, that is, of the arguments in the END Convention process before and at the Perugia and Coventry Conventions. One reason they did not is because there was a broad consensus within the group about its East—West policies; another, arguably, that British END’s federal structure produced a mutual live-and-let-live attitude in the organization – activists in one part of the group could have very little to do, if they wished, with those in another who might be pursuing a policy they did not like.\textsuperscript{126} On one occasion, however, stimulated by the Network dispute, the Ostpolitik of British END was a cause of sharp disagreement that both contributed to the break-up of one of END’s important working groups and, indeed, at one point seemed to threaten the same for the whole organization. This dispute was emblematic, in as much as it highlighted the essential features, and contradictions, of British END’s twin-track East—West strategy.

The disagreement – expressed, in late 1984 and early 1985, in increasingly fractious rows – was about END’s relationship with the Network. Some wanted the organization to join this new entity; others did not. The dispute, which surfaced at regular meetings of the organization’s ‘Coordinating Committee’, in memos and letters, and at specially convened meetings, reached a crisis in February 1985, just after the Network’s first

\textsuperscript{126} There might have been sharp disagreements about East—West politics between ‘Nottingham’ and ‘London’ if the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation had not left British END in 1982/3. But the East—West relations of the END ‘current’, at both levels, were still in too embryonic a phase in this period to become a major source of disagreement between the factions of British END. There were enough other issues to fight over.
public event, the Yalta seminar. British END had formally decided not to sponsor the seminar. One reason for doing so, was that, in its view, the rejection of the division of Europe symbolised by ‘Yalta’ had become associated with Western “cold-war propaganda” advocating the “roll-back” of Soviet hegemony only; another was that the seminar was taking place outside the “mainstream of the peace movement”. 127 Mary Kaldor and three of the four staff members, however, plus a handful of other END activists, attended the seminar; indeed, Mary Kaldor spoke at it. Shortly after their return, Edward Thompson, furious at what he saw as an undermining of an agreed position, announced his provisional withdrawal from British END. 128

In the arguments about the Network within British END, activists advocated two different approaches to the East–West dialogue ‘from below’. Some argued, amongst other things, that in the two existing transnational peace movement fora of the Western peace movement – the IPCC and the Convention process – East–West politics were marginalized. They favoured British END’s joining a new body that would concentrate on the dialogue with independents. These activists tended not to address or to downplay the possible deleterious effect on END’s relations with CND and other mainstream peace organizations of END’s joining the Network. Such effects might include these groups distancing themselves from British END, thus reducing the possibility of its influencing them. They would do this because British END was becoming involved in an organization, the Network, that would be too much concerned with an issue irrelevant to, or even harmful to the interests of, the Western peace movement: human rights and democracy in CEE/SU.

Others, most notably Edward Thompson, the most influential opponent of the Network within British END, argued that British END must remain committed to the strategy that was at the heart of END’s

127 Letter from Peter Crampton (chair of END) “[t]o all members of the provisional secretariat of the European Network for East–West Dialogue, 14 January 1985. (END Archive.)

128 Letter to British END Coordinating Committee, 9 February 1985. (END Archive.)
strategy for ending the Cold War: “plural” dialogue.\textsuperscript{129} (He also objected to some of the people linked to the Network: groups and individuals who, he claimed, not only did not support the END Appeal\textsuperscript{130} but, in some cases, had no credentials as peace movements or even – he mentions Polish KOS – actually welcomed NATO’s ‘modernisation’; \textsuperscript{131} and he argued that the Network might unnecessarily expose East Europeans to the attention of their security services.\textsuperscript{132} ) His case – argued forcefully in a series of internal letters and memos in early 1985, and in somewhat coded form, in \textit{Double Exposure} – was that the Network strategy would undermine this strategy, both in East and West: “To be effective, the dialogue between East and West must engage widening constituencies of citizens.” In the East, it must not, on the one hand, “be co-opted by official diplomatic organs”; while, on the other, “it must not be short-circuited into a few advanced intellectual groups” such as Charter 77 and KOS – on which, Thompson feared, the Network would concentrate.\textsuperscript{133} These groups, though admirable and important, were in a sense “Westerners”; that is, they wrote and acted partly with an eye to Western responses. The moments of breakthrough had come, he claimed, when Eastern Europeans had “thrown up their own forms”: the Peace Group for Dialogue, the Moscow Trust Group or ‘Swords into Ploughshares’.\textsuperscript{134} And in the West, the dialogue “must involve majority peace movements” such as CND.\textsuperscript{135} The large Western non-aligned movements, Thompson argued, had not been brought into the Network.\textsuperscript{136} In addition, the Network’s strategy of concentrating on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} E. P. Thompson, \textit{Double Exposure}, London: Merlin Press, 1985, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{130} E. P. Thompson, ‘END and the East’, internal discussion document for British END, 21 March 1985. (END Archive.).
\item \textsuperscript{131} ‘END and the East’: ‘Letter to END CC’, 9 February 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{132} E. P. Thompson, Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Thompson, \textit{Double Exposure}, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Thompson, \textit{Double Exposure}, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{136} ‘END and the East’.
\end{itemize}
independent CEE/SU groups undermined another aspect of the “plural dialogue”: the need to engage Eastern “officials”.

The Network dispute was also played out in the Czechoslovak Task Group. Here, disagreements reached such a pitch that Dorothy and Edward Thompson resigned from the group, arguing that it was placing too much emphasis on supporting ‘dissidents’ and not thinking enough about how to involve in the East–West dialogue a much wider spectrum of opinion, both in Britain and in Czechoslovakia, of those interested in ‘peace’; moreover, most other members of the group supported END’s joining the Network. (In her reply, Nancy Wood, the group’s convenor, reflected the views of the rest of the group that it was difficult to see, in the relatively closed society that was Czechoslovakia, who END could approach other than Charter 77 signatories.)

Eventually, the crisis in END caused by the row over the Network subsided. As the Network arguments threatened END’s cohesion – of which Edward Thompson’s threat to withdraw was the most dramatic expression – the Coordinating Committee dropped the issue. Thompson did not leave British END; and END did not join the Network. British END stayed in touch with the Network in various ways, including by sending observers to at least some Network meetings. Meanwhile, in the second half of the 1980s, up to 1989, British END continued its Central East European and Soviet work, as we have seen: END activists were frequent visitors to Poland and, with other Western groups, worked closely with Freedom and Peace; in Czechoslovakia, they maintained relations with Charter 77 and established them with the Jazz Section and the Independent Peace Association; they ran or participated in national and international defence campaigns in defence of peace and human rights activists in Czechoslovakia; they continued to support the Moscow Trust Group and to visit the GDR; and they opened relations with Slovenian peace activists. At the same time, the END Journal continued to publicize the dialogue and to

137 Thompson, Double Exposure, 151.
promote the idea of “detente from below”. British END supporters even participated as observers at planning meetings of the Network. And though British END campaigners played only a minor role in the drafting of the ‘Helsinki Memorandum’, they were active participants in the seminars. In other words, once British END had decided not to join the Network, it continued its East–West work alongside, and sometimes participating in, the Network. At the same time, “détente from below”, though continually contested, continued to be conducted within the Convention “process”.

Why, then, is the Network episode significant? It is of interest above all to the student of the Western peace movement of the 1980s because it was in the arguments about the Network that the tensions within the East–West component of the END ‘project’ were sharply (and, in the case of the Perugia demonstration, dramatically and publicly) revealed. These tensions were rooted in the difficulties inherent in a strategy of creating a movement, in the Cold War, that would span borders not only between countries but also between social systems. This strategy raised the question of how to combine the Western peace movement’s demands for détente and disarmament with the need for human rights and democracy in CEE/SU, whether this need was voiced explicitly or was merely implicit in the treatment of independent groups by their regimes. The peace movement’s demands entailed (a return to) stability in East–West relations. Democracy and more human rights in CEE/SU implicitly required a transformation of state–society relations: as such they challenged the legitimacy of the regimes in the Soviet bloc and were thus potentially destabilising.

The tensions manifested themselves on two levels. First, as we have seen within the END Convention process, where groups committed to the pan-European citizens’ dialogue and those sceptical of its value disagreed continually about the Convention’s relations with the East. Here, two kinds of pan-European strategy possible within the framework of the END ‘project’ co-existed: ‘détente from below’ and what might be called ‘détente from above’. The Network was created when enough proponents of ‘détente from below’ felt that the Convention ‘process’ could not
function properly as a forum for this dialogue. They then pursued an East—West policy that largely ignored state bodies.

The tensions were also evident within British END, as it reconciled its commitment to the dialogue with its commitment to its relationship with CND, whilst also talking to official bodies in the East. On the one hand, British END’s close engagement with independent groups in CEE/SU meant that the lack of human rights in, and the need for the democratization of, that region became an increasingly important issue for the organization. On the other hand, British END was a committed part of the British and West European peace movement; and its main partner in the UK, CND, which it wanted to influence, had little interest in linking its peace campaign with the issues of civil rights and democracy in CEE/SU, nor of promoting a strategy of cooperation with independent groups in the East. The same was true of some peace organizations outside the UK, and political parties in Britain and abroad.

This dilemma, in principle, faced all Western peace groups involved in the East–West dialogue. The Network represented one solution to the dilemma: the peace groups in it had decided that they would simply concentrate on developing close relations with independent groups in CEE/SU, largely ignore official peace committees, and, crucially, not concern themselves with trying to bring in to the dialogue reluctant Western peace groups. END, by contrast, offered another solution, with the tensions this created surfacing most sharply in the arguments about the Network: to try, until the end of the decade, to bridge the gap between the Western peace movement and independent peace and human rights groups in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while keeping open the channels to the ‘officials’. 
Chapter 7
Success or Failure?

Did British END succeed or fail in its aims? I have not tried in this thesis to reach a conclusion about whether or not END played a role in achieving its ‘external’ goals, and indeed whether these goals were achieved at all, as in both cases this would be very hard, if not impossible, to do. Instead I have described and analysed both the other main aim outlined in the END Appeal – the creation of a “transcontinental movement” against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War – and the extent to which British END played a role in creating it, as well as the organizational means END activists chose to conduct this campaign. In this chapter I thus assess – in terms of the explanatory framework of this thesis – the extent to which END achieved these aims.

Creating an Organization

The success or failure of British END as an organization can be judged in terms of two criteria: did its organizational structure correspond to its supporters’/members’ wishes? And was its structure appropriate to the tasks British ENDers had set themselves?

The founders of British END decided not to establish a national membership organization; in this they had the backing of many, perhaps all, early supporters of the group. They resulting organization was at the loose, spontaneous, rather than at the hierarchical, end of the organizational spectrum, a small federation of semi-autonomous local, regional and specialist groups directed by a more-or-less representative coordinating committee and serviced by a central office. With no members (only ‘supporters’) until 1985, and no more than 600 members from then until its demise – membership was introduced too late in the life of the peace movement for END to be able to attract more – its resource base, whether
measured in activists' time, energy and expertise, or in money, was relatively limited. It relied for the bulk of its income on fund-raised money.

However, from an early stage the group operated in a relatively disorganized way that the group – and some END supporters were unhappy about this. (Edward Thompson was at various points extremely exercised about the lack of financial and political accountability in END. Other supporters of British END expressed similar concerns. Such anxieties were voiced less often as the decade progressed – at least in public – but, in the early years of British END at least, it was clear that some supporters were not happy with the structure of END. ) The bitter row with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation – which significantly distracted many END activists, including most of its 'leaders' from carrying out their political work – was in part an expression of the disorganization of the group and of the unhappiness with this.

At the same time, British END was never able fully to solve a basic problem: how to be a small, flexible organization and yet be able to raise enough money to do all that its ambitious activists wanted to do. Every organization – in a social movement or not – has to worry about how to keep itself afloat financially: British END’s particular problem was that it wanted to do so without having a core source of income in the form of membership subscriptions. Overall, then, though the size and structure of British END corresponded to the wishes of END activists, the disorganization of the group and its lack of material resources, were a hindrance to effective campaigning. And activists were not able to solve the dilemma of how to be small and independent and free from as many internal and external constraints as possible, but financially relatively stable.

Was the structure of British END appropriate to the task at hand? On the hand, arguably, yes. British END was flexible and could be spontaneous. The lack of a transparent structure within which everyone would have been in some way accountable for their actions (before and after the introduction of membership) meant that British END activists
were able to engage in delicate work without having to worry about being challenged by a disgruntled or worried membership. This applies to the launching of the END Convention, something which would probably have been much more difficult to do had its main proponent, Ken Coates, been constrained by a democratic structure. But it is true above all of the dialogue with independent activists in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union whose agenda often fundamentally challenged that of many Western peace organizations. A large membership, containing as it probably would have a wider spectrum of views on East–West issues, and able to control other activists through policy-making conferences, might have watered down British END’s radical (by peace movement standards) approach to East–West relations. The range of political views in British END would perhaps have closer to that of CND, and it would have been harder than it was for END supporters who wanted to do so to engage in ‘detente from below’. (Many of the other Western peace groups actively involved in the East–West dialogue ‘from below’ were also small and marginal, and thus had the freedom to engage in controversial work.)

On the other hand, arguably, no: British END’s small resource base — whether measured in number of supporters or money — meant that its message could not be heard that well, at least in the UK. The fact that some ENDers – Edward Thompson, Mary Kaldor, for example – were prominent only offset this to an extent. By choosing to become (and then having to remain) a small organization British END limited itself to being a small pressure group on the margins of the British peace movement.

Building a Movement
The aim of helping to create a “trans-continental movement” against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War had three, closely linked, dimensions: involving CND, and to a lesser extent other political forces in Britain, in END-type transnational work; helping to build a pan-West European movement; and trying to develop some kind of alliance that spanned the East—West divide. Adapting Christian Smith’s argument, we cannot know what the British and West European movements would have looked like if
there had been no END. Nevertheless, this is a useful heuristic question to ask.

In Britain, END operated as a cross between a pressure group and a ginger group within the peace movement, above all national CND. In certain parts of the country, the peace groups that sprang up in 1980 were influenced by the END idea: for example, in Oxford, Campaign Atom; in the West Midlands, Leamington END; in Yorkshire, West Yorkshire END; and Hull END. Such groups, or individuals in CND who supported the END idea, promoted the END approach in CND (Though some of these groups lost their END character after a period.) The extent of British END’s influence on CND is, arguably, evident, among other things, in resolutions submitted to CND conference; campaigns organized by peace activists (for example, the 1981 ‘March Across the Sky’); the positive response some local CND/peace groups gave to END initiatives (for instance, the 1983 ‘Five Nations’ and the 1984 ‘Beyond the Blocs’ international-speaker tours); the “active internationalism” of the anti-cruise missiles campaign in 1980-83, in which CND cooperated with peace movements in other West European countries;¹ as well as in the fact that CND joined, and remained in, the West European peace movement’s two non-aligned fora: the International Peace Coordination and Communication Centre (IPCC) and the END Convention/Liaison Committee.

Moreover, some leading CND activists have testified to the influence on their thinking and/or campaigning of END ideas. Some founding members of – and/or leading activists in – British END were important, sometimes key, figures in CND. One could argue that this involvement, combined with the presence in the peace movement of British END as a distinct organization, helped push CND somewhat in an END-ish direction, though only as far other groupings and individuals would allow. Conversely, END provided an important counterweight to those International Committee members, or to others elsewhere in the CND leadership, who were pro-Soviet, or simply sceptical about the point of the

¹ The phrase is James Hinton’s: *Protests and Visions*, 194.
East–West dialogue ‘from below’, or who were strongly anti-American. Without END CND would have been markedly more pro-Soviet, and thus less attractive to a wide range of opinion in Britain.

Yet there were also clear limits to END’s influence on CND. When CND had to decide on a new focus for its work after 1983 it finally settled on the ‘Basic Case’ campaign, the aim of which was to persuade people of the case for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain (as opposed to just rejecting cruise and Trident missiles). James Hinton has argued that this campaign “failed to connect effectively with those changes in the international context which increasingly appeared to be making an anachronism’ precisely of unilateralism.” Further, CND was only ever peripherally involved in the dialogue with independent forces in the East. Indeed, CND invested – by contrast – considerable effort in a “dialogue” with officialdom in the East.) British END could not persuade CND of the value of ‘détente from below’ for CND’s core programme.

One can explain the extent of END’s influence within CND partly in terms of organizational capacity – British END simply did not have the resources with which to make a big impact on CND – and in terms of political opportunity structure: in a system of nation-states, in which political decisions are, or appear to be, taken by individual states, movements that try to affect such decisions will necessarily focus on individual states – they will be national movements. Any group, such as British END, that tries to persuade other campaigners to think of themselves as part of a transnational entity will face a particularly difficult task.

However, the limited influence of British END on CND is also ascribable to the differences between the ways in which the two organizations framed the world. In one crucial respect, at least, the organizations were in agreement: the need to stop deployment of US cruise missiles in Britain (and elsewhere in Western Europe). British END was an active participant in the anti-cruise campaign of the early 1980s. But there

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2 Ibid.
were fundamental tensions, even incompatibilities, between the CND and the British END 'frames'. Though many in British END would probably have agreed with the dominant view in CND that the USA more responsible for the arms race than the Soviet Union, the END engagement with Soviet as well as US power – with the Cold War – in Europe found only limited response in CND. Moreover, the argument that a “transcontinental movement” – necessarily composed in part of independent, even ‘dissident’, forces in the East – would have to emerge if the arms race and the Cold War were to be opposed successfully made almost no headway in CND.

Finally, it is worth remembering that British END’s being intertwined with CND shaped END’s East—West work. Though END activists were committed to the ‘dialogue’ with independent forces in CEE/SU, British END as a group resisted becoming fully engaged in the intensive dialogue represented by the drafting of the ‘Helsinki Memorandum’. This was partly because some END activists – including one very influential one, Edward Thompson – did not want British END to pursue an Ostpolitik that was too far away from that of CND.

In Western Europe, other peace movements were, like CND, national. Much of the peace campaigning took place locally. However, together, these movements also constituted a transnational social movement, that is, in Tarrow’s definition, they were “connected networks of challengers” both “rooted in domestic social networks” and “organized across national boundaries”, and engaged in “sustained contentious interaction with opponents – national or nonnational”. The movements were “connected” in two ways. First, they shared a “collective action frame”: that is, they agreed that a particular set of issues was a problem, offered a solution to that problem, and specified an agent of the solution. Second, the movements were linked, both informally and organizationally,

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and there were institutionalised, longer-term networks of, and links between, movements: most significantly, the IPCC, and the END Convention process.

British END’s work in this region consisted of trying to help build and sustain this movement. It did so above all by helping create the multilateral fora – the Convention process and the IPCC (indeed, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation wing of British END initiated the Convention process); by forging bilateral links with non-UK West European peace groups; and by co-organizing and/or participating in public peace movement events (including some of those mentioned above). The success of the IPCC lay above all in the fact that it limited its membership to a) peace groups and b) peace groups that were both ‘non-aligned’ – that is, which worked within the END framework – and were supported ‘détente from below’. That is, all its members stood in the same relation to the political process; and they broadly agreed on the importance of dialogue with independent groups in the East as part of a peace campaign: they had a common ‘frame’. Conversely, the permanent tensions, and frequent arguments, within the Convention ‘process’ can be ascribed to a ‘misalignment’ of ‘frames’ between two groupings within the process. On the one hand there were those who – while still subscribing to the aims of the END Appeal – were at best sceptical of the value of a dialogue with independent groups in the East; many of these were political party activists and trade unionists. On the other hand, there were those who saw this dialogue as a key element in a pan-European peace campaign; most of these were peace groups. Groups in both tendencies could agree on much to do with West European politics; their differences over East–West relations, however, made cooperation between them very difficult. So, while the Convention process was a success in the sense that it provided a forum in which representatives of many parts of the West European peace movement could meet, it was a (partial) failure when measured against the implicit aims of its initiators: to provide an institutional framework within which these many parts of the peace movement could agree common positions not just on Western but also on East–West matters. Put
differently, it revealed the profound differences – sometimes incompatible differences – over East–West matters amongst even END-supporting activists.

To the extent that all this work – the creation of bilateral links and multilateral fora, the organizing of public events – helped create a pan-West European movement, British END was partly responsible for the emergence of this movement. Of course, British END was only one group that can claim this credit. Yet a central role in this work was played by the END Appeal, by the fact that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation distributed it widely along networks it had helped create – and thus helping it to become what Edward Thompson called one of the charters of the peace movement – and by British END activists helping to create and sustain the relevant institutions. Similar institutional links might have been created had there been no END and no END Appeal; but it is clear that the Appeal and the frame it proposed, was crucial in helping to unite many sections of the Western peace movement.

In the *East—West politics* of the peace movement, the END frame was even more important. In the course of the 1980s, working broadly within the framework outlined by the END Appeal, a number of Western peace groups, amongst them END, entered into and sustained a dialogue, and indeed sometimes actively cooperated with, a range of independent groups in Central–Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: ‘détente from below’, as some called it. A negative response by Charter 77 signatories to the overtures of Edward and Dorothy Thompson in 1980 gave way to a lively exchange of ideas and analyses and the establishment of (some) common ground. The first visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR in 1982, for example, the drafting in 1985–86 by individuals in East and West Europe of a common document, *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords* – the ‘Helsinki Memorandum’, and the independent seminars in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague in 1987 and 1988 broadly on theme of détente, disarmament, and human rights: all of these can be seen in part as the outcome of the initiative first given voice in the END Appeal.
That this dialogue was possible is explicable partly in terms of the existence of a basic level of political opportunity in CEE/SU states. However, the Soviet bloc regimes were also able to constrict these opportunities, either by repressing their 'own' groups or by preventing Western activists from entering their countries; in 1983 in Hungary, for example, the regime's closing of the 'space' in which the Peace Group for Dialogue could operate brought an end to a lively relationship between the groups and Western peace groups. At the same time, one can identify a rough correlation between the nature of the political opportunity structure in individual CEE/SU states and the kind of relations END had with them: the more liberal the regime, the less confrontational the relations, and vice versa.

Yet the main explanatory factor of the content of the dialogue is the way END framed actors in CEE/SU states: the regimes and the independent forces, and how groups in the East responded to the Western peace movement. For many END supporters the END frame identified above all independent groups and individuals as the agents of the political changes END sought. They pursued the relationship with these groups in the framework of a 'twin-track' policy: the other, less, important track, was the relationship with official bodies, above all peace committees. In this relationship they both tried to disseminate END ideas about ending the nuclear arms race and the Cold War into official circles in the East and apply pressure on the authorities to increase the 'space' available to independent groups in the East.

There were, however, disagreements amongst END supporters, in Britain and abroad, over East—West relations. These disagreements broadly reflected the three different approaches to the Soviet bloc present within the END 'current' of the West European peace movement: in addition to the 'twin-track' approach, some END activists in the Convention process were sceptical of the value of 'détente from below' and were more interested in pursuing relations with state bodies in the East. Others again, once they felt that 'détente from below' could not be pursued satisfactorily in the END Convention process, partly detached themselves
from the process and set up a new organization, the European Network for East—West Dialogue, which concentrated on relations with independent groups and largely ignored state actors.

The pan-European entity that emerged out of this dialogue was a network of groups and individuals committed to a dialogue on a range of issues at the heart of which were 'peace' — in the sense of disarmament, foreign and defence policy, and détente — and 'human rights' and the relationship between the two. Various CEE/SU activists involved in the dialogue, at the time and later, said that their thinking on these matters had been influenced by the dialogue with Western activists. Arguably, many British END activists, starting out from the view — expressed in the END Appeal — that peace and human rights were linked in a limited sense, came to the view that the two were indivisible. In practice this meant that democracy in Eastern Europe was a condition of ending the Cold War. Mary Kaldor, a founder of END, has claimed that

by the end of the decade there was a growing consensus, at least among those who took part in the dialogue, that democracy in Eastern Europe was the best strategy for ending the Cold War but, at the same time, democracy could best be achieved within the framework of a détente process and a wind down of the arms race.⁶

The 'Helsinki Memorandum' was, one could argue, evidence of the existence of this consensus.

Beyond this consensus, however, there was, arguably, another, namely about the role of citizens in East—West, and by implication in any international, relations: namely that, just as 'civil society' — roughly, citizens organizing on social, political and cultural matters outside the state — were crucial for the domestic health of societies, so civil societies could link up with each other across borders to help bring about change in transnational relations. The view is expressed in the 'utopian' paragraph of

⁶ Mary Kaldor, Bringing Peace and Human Rights Together, 7.
the END Appeal as well as in Lynne Jones’s claim, made in 1987, that the “main division is not between East and West but between those who see the established power structures as part of the problem (and therefore wish to challenge them) and those who see them as part of the solution and wish to support them”. Again, the Helsinki Memorandum, drafted by individuals outside state structures in East and West, can be seen as exemplifying this consensus.

Mary Kaldor has argued that the essence of the dialogue is captured, with regard to both these areas of consensus, by the notion ‘transnational civil society’. First, the concept is a “statement about certain civic internationalist values”, specifically the notion of “democratic peace”, or the “inseparability of peace and democracy, disarmament and human rights”, around which notion the participants in the dialogue came together. Secondly, “transnational civil society” is a “description” of what happened: “autonomous self-organised groups operating across borders”.

On the Western side, the participants in ‘détente from below’ were for the most part not the large, mainstream, organizations of the Western peace movement. In this sense, the aim of creating a “trans-continental movement” was not realised. They were, rather mainly small, sometimes, marginal groups. Yet they were linked to, and could thus disseminate the content of East—West dialogue to, the mainstream movement either, as in the case of British END’s relations with CND, because they overlapped in many ways with the dominant peace organization of their country and/or because they were integrated into transnational West European peace movement networks such as the IPCC and the END Convention.

British END can, then, claim some success, but must also admit some failure, in the movement-building part of its work. It was unable to involve CND closely in ‘détente from below’; on the other hand, it arguably helped keep CND non-aligned. END did this both actively – END

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9 Ibid., 202.
supporters exerting pressure exerted from within and passively – by virtue of the example it set in the British peace movement. British END was also partly responsible for the creation and continued existence of the IPCC and the END Convention, the existence of which are important reasons why one can talk about a transnational West European peace movement. Finally, British END, for can also claim some responsibility for the emergence and development of the citizens' dialogue between East and West. This may not have been the “trans-continental movement” summoned up by the END Appeal, but it was more than might have been expected in 1980, when there were almost no contacts between the new END activist and independent opinion in the East.

A final measure of success, perhaps, for END and other activists involved in the East—West dialogue, was the creation of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA), the post-Cold War pan-European network of 'civil society' groups that grew out of the East—West dialogue. In 1980 the idea of a pan-European alliance of citizens had been just an idea; by the end of the decade the alliance was strong enough to give birth to a successor that did indeed span the continent.
Interviews conducted
(In brackets the relevant organizations or groups of which the interviewees were members or with which they were associated [and, in one case, a classification])

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Ken Coates (END, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), Matlock, 12 December 2001
Dieter Esche (European Network for East—West Dialogue), Berlin, 11 July 1998
Mient Jan Faber (Interchurch Peace Council), Amsterdam, 9 March 2003
Gabor Fodor (FIDESZ), Budapest, 28 August 1998
Miklós Haraszti (Hungarian Democratic Opposition), Budapest, 22 July 1998
Julian Harber (CND, END), Mytholmroyd, 21 November 2002
James Hinton (CND, END), University of Warwick, 21 June 2001
Lynne Jones (END), Cambridge, 9 March 1996; 10 August 1998
Mary Kaldor (END), Brighton, 20 June 2002
John Keane (END), London, 22 February 2000
Ferenc Köszegi (Peace Group for Dialogue), Budapest, 9 July 1998
Andras Kovács (Democratic Opposition), Budapest, 27 August 1998
Jan ter Laak (Pax Christi), Amsterdam, 10 March 2002
Arthur Lipow (END), London, 4 September 1998
Julianna Matrai (FIDESZ), Budapest, 1 September 1998
Jane Mayes (CND, END), Alston, 17 December 2002
Jan Minkiewicz (WiP/Freedom and Peace), Amsterdam, 11 March 2002
Ferenc Miszlivet (independent Hungarian activist), Budapest, 3 September 1998
Gerd Poppe (Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin, 14 July 1998
Ulrike Poppe (Women for Peace, Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin 14 July 1998
Jaroslav Šabata (Charter 77), Brno, 20 July 1998
Anna Šabatová (Charter 77), Prague, 15 July 1998
Dan Smith (CND, END), London, 5 August 2003
Ruth Šormová (Independent Peace Association), Soběslav, 16 July 1998
István Szent-Iványi (Dialogue, Democratic Opposition) Budapest, 26 June 1998
Dorothy Thompson (END), Worcester, 20 June 2001
Jan Urban (Charter 77), Prague, 17 July 1998
Peter Valki (Hungarian Peace Council), Budapest, 1 September 1998
Ole Waever (No to Nuclear Weapons, Denmark), London, 5 June 2002
Reinhard Weisshuhn (Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin, 13 July 1998
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A. Archives consulted

1) Papers of END and/or CND

i) END archive, 1980—1992. These are the papers from the END office. They are currently in my possession. This archive includes papers of the END Coordinating Committee, the Finance and General Purposes Committee, the Lateral Committees and Working Groups, of various ad hoc groups, as well as of regional END groups. It also includes papers relating to the END Conventions and the END Convention Liaison Committee.

ii) The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation END archive, Russell House, Bulwell Lane, Nottingham NG6 0BT. Much of this duplicates the material in the END archive, but some END papers – above all to do with the END Conventions – are available only here.

iii) CND archive, 1980—86, London School of Economic and Political Science, 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HD. These include CND Executive and National Council minutes, annual conference papers, and national committee papers.

iv) CND archive, 1981-89, Modern Records Centre, University Library, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL. CND Executive and National Council minutes, various CND publications, annual conference programmes, and specialist group papers.

v) James Hinton papers, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. These include END (‘national’ and Leamington END) papers for 1981—82 and papers relating to CND projects, 1982—87.

vi) Bruce Kent papers, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. These include papers relating to the founding of END.

vii) Halifax Nuclear Disarmament Group/Julian Harber Peace Movement Records, 1980—1990, Calderdale District Archives, Central Library, Northgate, Halifax, HX1 1UN. These included papers of local peace groups in the Halifax area, including END groups, West Yorkshire END papers, correspondence and leaflets, CND National Council and annual conference papers, CND International Committee papers 1985—87, and ‘national’ END papers, 1980—85.

2) Private papers

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We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demoted arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation. As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new more “usable” nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of “limited” nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process to influence smaller countries to forego the growth of industry that installs them, reinforce the nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors Warmament and detente between the contending military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures on their own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to “East” or “West”, but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state. It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organizations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. We must pay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claim to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement and to engage in every kind of exchange. We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and opinion, to engage in every kind of exchange. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.

British Committee E.P. Thompson, Bruce Kent, Dan Smith, Peggy Duff, Mary Kaldor, Stuart Holland, and Ken Coates.