Governance of relocation: an examination of residential relocation processes in housing market renewal pathfinder areas in England

Orna Rosenfeld
School of Architecture and the Built Environment

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GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION

AN EXAMINATION OF RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESSES IN HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL PATHFINDER AREAS IN ENGLAND

ORNAA ROSENFELD

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Abstract

This thesis examines governance processes shaping policy-induced residential relocation in a differentiated polity. It has been known since the post Second World War slum clearance that demolition and residential relocation present some of the most complex forms of planning intervention. Whilst intended for the benefit of the wider community, when mismanaged, housing demolition and relocation may incur heavy psychological costs of enforced relocation and the social cost of the destruction of healthy communities.

Launched in 2002, Housing Market Renewal (HMR) was the largest housing demolition initiative devised in the UK since the post Second World War slum clearance. Its key feature was the high degree of responsibility devolved to new sub-regional partnerships, the Pathfinders. The government did not provide standards nor guidance for residential relocation process or its outcomes. Pathfinders were entrusted to develop their strategies in response to their circumstances and contexts. Between 2002 and 2011, HMR partnerships demolished over 30,000 homes and acquired an additional 15,000. This caused approximately 50,000 residents to move from their homes. Yet research about residential relocation remains limited in several ways.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, residential relocation has been examined as a matter of social and political debates, focusing mainly on negative residential relocation outcomes long after the process was over. This was no different in the case of HMR. HMR attracted the attention of critical gentrification research. This body of research argues that the gentrification in HMR is orchestrated by the state as the key actor and presents relocation outcomes as predominately negative.

This study challenges that stand. Drawing on governance theory this research argues that understanding cross tenure residential relocation in the context of a differentiated polity entails an ability to grapple with disparate matters, such as institutional complexity, governmental fragmentation, multiplication of agencies and complex webs of relationships. Distinctively, it focuses on procedure and works towards devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance has a profound impact on relocation delivery.

The findings show that cross tenure residential relocation in a differentiated polity is delivered by a complex network of actors from public, private and community sectors. Residential relocation practices vary on project scale and are shaped by interaction of five distinct processes. The relocation outcomes are the result of a network operation, differ on sub-regional, local authority, project and household level and are both positive and negative.

The thesis recommends further exploration of ‘governance of relocation’ as a model for researching residential relocation in other differentiated polity contexts and provides recommendations for future policy design.
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT \hfill 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS \hfill 3

LIST OF TABLES \hfill 7

LIST OF FIGURES \hfill 7

LIST OF BOXES \hfill 8

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS \hfill 9

AUTHOR’S DECLARATION \hfill 10

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS \hfill 11

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION \hfill 13

1.1 IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE OF RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION RESEARCH \hfill 13

1.2 THE CASE OF THE HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL INITIATIVE \hfill 16

1.3 RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION IN HMR RESEARCH \hfill 17

1.4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: GOVERNANCE THEORY \hfill 19

1.5 METHODOLOGY \hfill 20

1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE \hfill 22

CHAPTER 2: HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL: THE HMR INITIATIVE BACKGROUND AND LAUNCH \hfill 25

2.1 INTRODUCTION \hfill 25

2.2 RE-EMERGENCE OF LOW DEMAND FOR HOUSING DEBATE \hfill 25

2.2.1 CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF LOW DEMAND AND REASONS FOR POLICY INTERVENTION \hfill 27

2.2.2 THE RISE OF THE LOW DEMAND ISSUE IN THE POLICY ARENA \hfill 30

2.3 HMR RESEARCH EVIDENCE BASE: DETR REPORT AND CURS RESEARCH \hfill 31

2.3.1 LOW-DEMAND HOUSING AND UNPOPULAR NEIGHBOURHOODS \hfill 31

2.3.2 RISK OF HOUSING MARKET CHANGE AND SUB-MARKETS \hfill 33

2.3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE BASE ON RELOCATION IN THE HMR FRAMEWORK \hfill 35

2.4 HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL LAUNCH \hfill 36

2.4.1 HMR GOALS \hfill 37

2.4.2 THE HMR FUND AND INTERVENTIONS \hfill 39

2.4.3 HMR IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY \hfill 41

2.5 HMR PATHFINDERS \hfill 41

2.5.1 THE PATHFINDER AREAS: KEY FACTS \hfill 42

2.5.2 THE PATHFINDER PARTNERSHIPS \hfill 51

2.6 CONCLUSION: RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION THE FORGOTTEN NEMESIS OF HMR \hfill 56

CHAPTER 3: RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION \hfill 58

3.1 INTRODUCTION \hfill 58

3.2 POLICIES PROPOSING LARGE-SCALE HOUSING DEMOLITION IN ENGLAND FROM THE 1850S TILL THE 2000S \hfill 59

3.2.1 INTRODUCTION OF SLUM CLEARANCE – NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND \hfill 59

3.2.2 THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1914–1939) \hfill 60

3.2.3 POST SECOND WORLD WAR SLUM CLEARANCE (1954–1968) \hfill 62

3.2.4 35 YEARS OF ABSTINENCE FROM LARGE-SCALE HOUSING DEMOLITION \hfill 65

3.2.5 RETURN TO LARGE SCALE HOUSING DEMOLITION IN HMR (2002–2011) \hfill 67

3.2.6 HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL AND CRITICAL GENTRIFICATION LITERATURE \hfill 68

3.3 FROM ‘DISPLACEMENT’ TO ‘RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION’ \hfill 71
### CHAPTER 4: GOVERNANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>DEFINING THE TERM ‘GOVERNANCE’</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>FROM UNITARY STATE TO DIFFERENTIATED POLITY?</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>REFORMS OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT AFTER 1979</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>NEW LABOUR’S VERSION OF DIFFERENTIATED POLITY (1997–2010)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE GOVERNANCE DEBATE IN THE UK</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>GOVERNANCE ORTHODOXY AND GOVERNANCE SCEPTICS</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>CONCLUSION: TOWARDS GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>RESEARCH AIM, OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>GROUNDED THEORY AS QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>APPROACH TO THE SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3</td>
<td>PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.4</td>
<td>‘POSITIONALITY’ OF THE RESEARCHER</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>METHODS</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1</td>
<td>SAMPLING AS ENTERING THE FIELD</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>PILOT STUDIES</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3</td>
<td>PATHFINDER SURVEY</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.4</td>
<td>CASE STUDY</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1</td>
<td>CORRESPONDENCE AND ENTERING THE FIELD</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2</td>
<td>INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3</td>
<td>OBSERVATION</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.4</td>
<td>SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>RESEARCH CHALLENGES</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>LIMITATIONS OF CHOSEN METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 6. RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION DELIVERY IN HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL PATHFINDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION: THE WAY TO RELOCATION? NO GOALS, NO GUIDANCE AND PARTIAL LEGISLATION …</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.1</td>
<td>THE COMPULSORY PURCHASE ORDER</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>THE PATHFINDER APPROACH TO RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION: PROJECT FOCUSED</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>REASON 1: TENURE OF RELOCATION AFFECTED RESIDENTS</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>REASON 2: PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td>REASON 3: CONSIDERATION OF THE ‘HUMAN FACTOR’</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4</td>
<td>REASON 4: DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH BASED ON LEGISLATION AND HMR FUNDING</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.5</td>
<td>CONCLUSION: PROJECT FOCUSED APPROACH TO RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION DELIVERY</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>THE ‘RELOCATION MATRIX’: RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESSES SHAPING RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION DELIVERY IN HMR PATHFINDERS</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESS 1: PLANNING STRATEGY</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.2</td>
<td>RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESS 2: COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.3 Residential relocation process 3: financial assistance provision 158
6.3.4 Residential relocation process 4: alternative property provision 162
6.3.5 Residential relocation process 5: relocation support 167
6.4 Conclusion 169

CHAPTER 7. RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION DELIVERY IN BRIDGING NEWCASTLE GATESHEAD: PATHFINDER AND PROJECT LEVEL 172
7.1 Introduction 172
7.2 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead background 173
7.2.1 Perceived problems and need for HMR intervention 179
7.3 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder 182
7.3.1 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead goal 182
7.3.2 Selection of the BNG areas 183
7.3.3 BNG intervention areas 184
7.3.4 Project focused approach to residential relocation 186
7.4 The Scotswood project: protesters turned into the council’s co-developers 187
7.4.1 Scotswood project residential relocation processes 188
7.4.2 Scotswood residential relocation outcomes 197
7.5 The Walker project: ‘Walker Promise’ and Walker challenges 199
7.5.1 Walker residential relocation processes 201
7.5.2 Operationalisation of the ‘Walker Promise’ and residential relocation outcomes 206
7.6 The Bensham and Saltwell project: Save Britain’s Heritage 213
7.6.1 Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes 214
7.6.2 Bensham and Saltwell: Save Britain’s homes and relocation halt. 218
7.7 Conclusion 220

CHAPTER 8: ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN BNG RELOCATION 226
8.1 Introduction 226
8.2 Definition of relocation roles and responsibilities 226
8.3 Delegation of responsibilities over residential relocation processes 228
8.4 Exploring residential relocation governance arrangements 232
8.5 Actors’ roles, responsibilities and position in the relocation network 234
8.5.1 BNG board and team 234
8.5.2 Local authorities 238
8.5.3 Arms length organisations 243
8.5.4 House builders (private developers) 246
8.5.5 Registered social landlords 248
8.5.6 Third sector voluntary organisations 250
8.5.7 Community 250
8.6 Conclusion: governance arrangements and impact of relocation outcomes 254

CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS TOWARDS GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION 257
9.1 Original contribution to knowledge 257
9.2 Thesis summary: addressing the main research objectives 258
9.2.1 Objective 1: To examine how residential relocation is delivered in a differentiated polity 259
9.2.2 Objective 2: To identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities 262
9.2.3 **OBJECTIVE 3:** TO EVALUATE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY RELATE TO RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION DELIVERY AND OUTCOMES 263

9.3 **GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION: A WORKING DEFINITION** 265

9.3.1 **GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION AS A GOVERNANCE ORTHODOXY MODEL** 266

9.4 **GOVERNANCE OF RELOCATION VERSUS STATE LED GENTRIFICATION** 267

9.4.1 **DISPLACEMENT PERSPECTIVE** 267

9.4.2 **RELOCATION OUTCOMES** 268

9.4.3 **POSITION OF THE STATE IN RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION** 269

9.4.4 **POSITION OF THE AFFECTED RESIDENTS IN THE RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESS** 270

9.5 **NEW QUESTIONS RAISED AND NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION RESEARCH** 272

9.6 **REFLECTIONS ON THE HMR INITIATIVE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY INDUCED MIXED-TENURE RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION** 273

9.6.1 **RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION IN LOW DEMAND HOUSING MARKETS** 275

9.6.2 **DECISION MAKING PROCESS: DEMOLITION VS RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION** 276

9.6.3 **PROJECT SCALE AND TIMING** 276

9.6.4 **RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION PROCESSES IN CROSS-TENURE RELOCATION** 277

9.6.5 **RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS** 281

9.7 **CONCLUSION** 281

APPENDICES 283

APPENDIX 1. PATHFINDERS’ BOARDS 283

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF RESPONDENTS 284

APPENDIX 3 PATHFINDER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (PHONE / E-MAIL) 293

APPENDIX 4 IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY INTERVIEW SCHEDULE AND QUESTIONS 295

APPENDIX 5 SECONDARY DATA SOURCES 303

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND LIST OF REFERENCES 306

THE AUTHOR’S PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCE PAPERS 335
List of tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-1</td>
<td>Pathfinders interventions in the housing market</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-2</td>
<td>HMR original total funding and outputs per year 2002-2011</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-3</td>
<td>Pathfinders with the list of local authorities</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-4</td>
<td>Pathfinders: area, population, households and household spaces</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-5</td>
<td>Pathfinders’ governance structures by type</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3-1</td>
<td>Residential relocation vocabulary</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-1</td>
<td>Aims and objectives of the study</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-2</td>
<td>Research objectives and operational tasks</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-3</td>
<td>Primary data collection timeline</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-4</td>
<td>Methods used in this research</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-5</td>
<td>Techniques of data collection used in each method</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-6</td>
<td>Process of identification of respondents</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-7</td>
<td>Respondents responsible for residential relocation HMR Pathfinders (survey)</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-8</td>
<td>BNG respondents based on identified residential relocation processes</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-9</td>
<td>Observation type and contribution to specific research methods</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-10</td>
<td>Secondary data sources</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6-1</td>
<td>Community involvement: actors and relevance to residential relocation process</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6-2</td>
<td>Statutory compensation based on CPO as applied in the HMR framework</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6-3</td>
<td>List of innovative FAPs in the RNS and BNG pilot studies in 2008</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-1</td>
<td>Percentage in each tenure 2001</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-2</td>
<td>Percentage of each dwelling type</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-3</td>
<td>BNG outputs achieved up to February 2011</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-4</td>
<td>Scotswood residential relocation outcomes summary</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-5</td>
<td>Walker residential relocation outcomes</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-6</td>
<td>Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation outcomes</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-7</td>
<td>Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-8</td>
<td>Summary of Walker residential relocation processes</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-9</td>
<td>Summary of Bensham &amp; Saltwell residential relocation processes</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8-1</td>
<td>List of actors involved in residential relocation delivery based on the Residential Relocation Matrix in priority areas in BNG Pathfinder</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8-2</td>
<td>Percentage of council housing in each BNG priority areas (projects)</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9-1</td>
<td>Debate points: State led gentrification versus governance of relocation</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9-2</td>
<td>Pros and cons of HMR in residential</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-1</td>
<td>Demolition of local authority housing in England 1990/1-2001/2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-2</td>
<td>Mixed tenure ‘low demand’ for housing in England</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-3</td>
<td>CURS three stage risk index (high risk)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-4</td>
<td>Map of HMR Pathfinder areas</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-5</td>
<td>Tenure by Pathfinder Intervention Area, 2001</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-6</td>
<td>Pathfinder intervention area tenures mix (census 2001)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-7</td>
<td>Pathfinder intervention areas: Population aged 16-74 economic activity</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-8</td>
<td>HMR Pathfinders position and links with central, regional and local government</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6-1</td>
<td>Residential Relocation Matrix</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6-2</td>
<td>Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6-3</td>
<td>Collision of protesters and those wishing to relocate in Liverpool</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6-4</td>
<td>Resident support examples</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7-1</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder area in Tyne and Wear conurbation</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7-2</td>
<td>Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7-3</td>
<td>Contrasting results of Newcastle and Gateshead regeneration initiatives</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7-4</td>
<td>Vital indices overall ranking 2006</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7-5</td>
<td>Change in house prices 1996 to 2005</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of boxes

Box 6-1. Voluntary vs Compulsory Purchase ........................................ 138
Box 6-2. Project Focused Approach to Residential Relocation .................. 139
Box 6-3. Project Focused Approach: Tenure of Relocatees ......................... 140
Box 6-4. Project Focused Approach: Partnership Arrangements .................. 141
Box 6-5. Project Focused Approach: Partnership Agreements ..................... 141
Box 6-6. Project Focused Approach: Consideration of the ‘Human Factor’ ........ 141
Box 6-7. Project Focused Approach: Legislation and Funding ..................... 142
Box 6-8. Planning Strategy: Parliamentary Acts Used ............................... 150
Box 6-9. Planning Strategy: Project Phasing ........................................ 151
Box 6-10. Planning Strategy: Project Phasing Impact on Relocation Options .... 151
Box 6-11. Planning Strategy: Tenure Mix ........................................ 152
Box 6-12. Community Involvement: Statutory Engagement ......................... 155
Box 6-13. Community Involvement: Difference in Residents’ Attitudes .......... 156
Box 6-16. Financial Assistance Provision: Difference in FAP Availability ........ 161
Box 6-17. Alternative Property Provision: Housing Provision by Private Developers 164
Box 6-18. Alternative Property Provision: Difficulties in New Housing Delivery 165
Box 6-19. Alternative Property Provision: Homeswap Scheme ........................ 165
Box 8-1. Local Authorities: Delegation of Responsibilities and Contracting Out 238
Box 8-2. R&RT Position in BNG Governance Structure ........................... 245
Acknowledgements

This study will argue that residential relocation in differentiated polity is shaped by a ‘complex network of actors’. I would like to draw a parallel to this idea by saying that, just as residential relocation depends on the sizable resources and networks shaping it, thesis development depends on it too. Both are characterised by a complex but identifiable set of processes, requiring considerable resources. The author, similarly to the relocatee, depends on support from a ‘complex network of actors’ to complete the journey and achieve her goal.

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This document has been professionally proofread by Dr. Shani D’Cruze.
Author’s declaration

Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any university or other institute of learning.

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List of Abbreviations

AAP - Area Action Plan
ABI – Area Based Initiative
AC – Audit Commission
ADF - Area Development Framework
ALMO – Arms Length Organisation
APP – Alternative Property Provision
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BME – Black and Minority Ethnic
BNG – Bridging Newcastle Gateshead
CABE – Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
CC – City Council
CCM – Constant Comparative Method
CDA – Comprehensive Development Area
CHI – Chartered Institute of Housing
CPO – Compulsory Purchase Order
DCLG – Communities and Local Government - successor to ODPM, 2006
DETR – Department of Environment Transport and Regions
DPD - Development Plan Documents
EEL – Elevate East Lancashire
EP – English Partnership
ESRC – Economic and Social Research Council
EU – European Union
FAP - Financial Assistance Packages
GH – Gateshead
GIA – General Improvement Areas
GIS – Geographic Information System
GT – Grounded Theory
GW – Gateway (Hull & East Ridding)
HA – Housing Association
HAA – Housing Action Area
HCA – Homes and Communities Agency
HMA – Housing Market Area
HMR – Housing Market Renewal
JRF – Joseph Rowntree Foundation
LA – Local authority
LAA – Local Area Agreement
LDF - Local Development Frameworks
LDP - Local Development Plans
LDS - Local development Scheme
LSP – Local Strategic Partnership
MBC – Metropolitan Borough Council
MSP – Manchester Salford Partnership
NAO – National Audit Office
NCC – Newcastle City Council
NDC – New Deal for Communities
NH – NewHeartlands (Merseyside)
NRA - Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments
ODPM – Office for Deputy Prime Minister - replaced by DCLG, 2006 ODPM, 1997-2001
PIP – Places for People
PIA – Partners in Action (Oldham and Rochdale)
PPG – Planning Policy Guidance
PPP – Public Private Partnership
RDA – Regional Development Agency
RNS – Renew North Staffordshire
R&RT – Resettlement and Relocation Team
RR – Residential Relocation
RRO – Regulatory Reform Order
RSL – Registered Social Landlord
SCI - Statement of Community Involvement
SEU – Social Exclusion Unit
SRB – Single Regeneration Budget
TSY – Transform South Yorkshire
TV – Tees Valley Living
UDP - Unitary Development Plans
UK – United Kingdom
UL – Urban Living (Birmingham-Sandwell)
USA – United States of America
UTF – Urban Task Force
YHN – Your Homes Newcastle
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Importance and Relevance of Residential Relocation Research

Examination of policy-induced residential relocation is critical. Residential relocation presents one of the most complex aspects of urban regeneration and development. Achieving synergies between demolition, residential relocation and new building comes with extreme difficulties in managing the interests and actions of different stakeholders (Cole & Flint, 2007:2). The risk of incurring social, economic and environmental damage is high (Carmon, 1999; Pacione, 2005; Power & Mumford, 1999). Whilst residential relocation may result in improvements in living conditions for the wider community as well as relocatees, failures have been known to cause heavy psychological costs of enforced relocation and social costs of community destruction (Carmon, 1999). Therefore, policy-caused residential relocation raises fundamental questions about the interaction of the state with its communities and individuals. For this reason, it is deemed important to examine the way emerging practices of cross-tenure residential relocation in differentiated polities evolve and shape residential relocation outcomes. This thesis focuses on the specific issue of planned housing demolition and consequent residential relocation and in order to achieve this it takes a sociological approach.

In the 2000s, housing clearance and demolition forcefully re-emerged as important state policy strategies to renew the decayed neighbourhoods and low demand housing markets of Western Europe and the USA. In the USA, HOPE VI was established in 1993 to redevelop the ‘most severely distressed’ public housing projects in the nation (Popkin et al., 2004). In Canada, demolition of the country’s largest public housing estate near downtown Toronto, has attracted lots of attention (Cahuas & Dunn, 2010). On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1997 the Dutch government launched a highly ambitious restructuring programme to tackle the problems of early post-war neighbourhoods in which low-cost social rented apartments often dominated the housing stock (Kleinhans & Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2008:565–566). France was no different; in 2003
the French government launched an ambitious urban renewal programme aiming to demolish 250,000 social housing units in 300 of the most deprived neighbourhoods by 2013 (Lelevrier, 2010).

In England, the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative was launched. In 2002, the programme proposed demolition of around 60,000 homes as part of a strategy to renew weak and failing housing markets in the North of England and the Midlands. Between 2002 and March 2011, HMR partnerships acquired and demolished over 30,000 properties, refurbished around 108,000 and completed 15,000 new homes (Audit Commission, 2011a:4). Whilst a certain percentage of the demolished properties were vacant, HMR has also engaged in the demolition of occupied properties (Cole & Flint, 2007). The intervention required relocation of residents from dwellings earmarked for clearance. This author’s estimate\(^1\) is that at least 50,000 people were relocated from their properties as the result.

What North American and continental European neighbourhood restructuring programmes had in common was a focus on the demolition of social (or public) housing and new building of mixed-income housing (Kleinhans & Kearns, 2013).

Differently from these programmes, the English HMR initiative engaged in demolition of neighbourhoods that were already mixed tenure and aimed to alter their tenure ratio. This meant that residential relocation in the HMR framework affected residents of not one, but three different tenures: owner-occupiers, social as well as private tenants. The tenure difference meant a different institutional context for each tenure. However, HMR was set up to ‘think big’ (Ferrari, 2007), programme designers envisaged a ‘tenure blind approach’ to housing on the sub-regional level (Cole & Nevin, 2004). The guidance or standards for residential relocation were not provided. Yet, research about residential relocation in the HMR framework remains limited.

Similarly to the current neighbourhood restructuring programmes in Europe and the Hope VI programme in the USA (see Uitermark et al., 2007; Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Wyly & Hammel, 2004; Lees et al., 2008), HMR has attracted the attention of critical gentrification research (see Cameron, 2006; Allen 2008). In this paradigm, residential relocation is conceptualised as ‘displacement’ – an unintended consequence of housing market shifts. Peculiarly however, regardless of the mechanism assumed to cause housing market change in various branches of gentrification studies (market, state or its powerful coalitions), or of the immediate cause of

\(^1\) Estimate based on vacancy rates and average household size in the intervention areas.
relocation (e.g. rent increase or planned demolition), the ‘displacement’ outcomes seem to be the same: negative (in aggregate) and harmful to the affected residents. Residents are seen as victims of structural forces they can do little to influence. Whilst it is important to take into consideration possible negative outcomes, gentrification seems to be a totalising narrative (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013) that conflates different types and causes of relocation (e.g. relocation due to housing rent, price and tax increase, planned demolition) wherever and however these occur.

An emerging body of research on neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation in Western Europe and the USA has recently begun to contest the ‘displacement’ arguments put forward by gentrification studies. Various authors from both sides of the Atlantic present evidence that residential relocation outcomes can be both positive and negative and depend on a myriad of factors. For instance, T. Allen (2000) argues that residents’ ‘biographical’ and ‘socio-psychological’ personality traits have a significant impact on the perception of residential relocation outcomes. Kleinhans and Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff (2008), Kleit and Manzo (2006) and Goetz (2002) point out that residents’ attitudes pre-relocation have a significant impact on the way residential relocation outcomes are perceived. In the UK, research focused on the examination of residential relocation outcomes provides evidence contrary to that of HMR critics. For instance, in the case of Liverpool, the city that has been famously used as a stepping-stone for the gentrification critique of HMR (Allen, 2008), Steele (2010) reports high levels of satisfaction with the replacement homes among relocatees: ‘Housing association tenants (95%) and private rented tenants (91%) were most satisfied with their new home compared to owner occupiers (77%)’ (Steele, 2010:2).

However, neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation studies face a conceptual problem. Relocation studies have traditionally restricted themselves to focus on residential relocation outcomes. This has left a curious silence surrounding the institutional context, residential relocation process and governance arrangements (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013; Rosenfeld, 2013). As the result, contemporary neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation studies struggle to explain why residential relocation outcomes turn out to be mixed (beyond residents’ perceptions about them, differences in residents’ personality traits or their personal context).

Comparing residential relocation experiences in the Netherlands and the USA, Curley and Kleinhans have boldly argued that the majority of the literature ‘is connected to an outdated institutional context of urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s’ (Curley & Kleinhans, 2010: 371).
The conceptual framework for examining a policy-induced residential relocation process and delivery mechanism shaping its outcomes is missing.

This research aims to address this gap. Distinctively, it focuses on procedure and works towards devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance has a profound impact on relocation practice and, in turn, on its outcomes.

1.2 The Case of the Housing Market Renewal Initiative

Housing Market Renewal is an important case for examination of contemporary residential relocation practice, not only because of its scale and rarity but also because of its distinctive features, such as its focus on the operations of the housing market rather than housing conditions per se, scale and cross-boundary working, devolution of central power, emphasis on partnership working and mixed tenure relocation (Cole & Nevin, 2004, Ferrari & Lee, 2010; Leather et al., 2007); issues that have not yet been explored in the context of relocation research.

Covering selected areas of 26 local authorities, HMR is known as the second largest housing demolition initiative in the UK after the post Second World War slum clearance. HMR aimed to renew weak or failing housing markets in the North of England and the Midlands through a mixed approach to clearance, redevelopment and refurbishment of the existing housing stock (Cole & Nevin, 2004, Nevin & Leather, 2006). Housing demolition and clearance presented an important part of the HMR strategy. Approximately one-third of the government’s £2.2 billion HMR budget was invested in housing clearance, demolition and property acquisition (Audit Commission, 2011a). By April 2011, 30,000 homes were cleared, only about half of the 60,000 demolitions initially planned, which makes relocation less of an issue that it might have been, though still significant. 2

The spatial organisation of the HMR programme was unique, when compared to many previous regeneration programmes in the UK (Cole & Nevin, 2004:19). HMR intervention areas were identified through research carried out by Birmingham University and subsequent analysis by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) of the sub-regions where the problems of low demand and abandonment were most acute (Audit Commission, 2011). Therefore, the boundaries of the Pathfinders did not follow established administrative contours; they were sub-regions covering weak or failing housing markets across two to six adjacent local authorities, as

---

2 HMR was initially planned to run between 2002 and 2018. In April 2011, the HMR initiative was prematurely discontinued by the Conservative Government.
identified through the raft of studies (Cole & Nevin, 2004:19). The selected areas typically included old neighbourhoods that had been de-industrialised in the past few decades and had experienced long periods of economic decline (Leather et al., 2007:4). The Pathfinders’ intervention was organised in series of projects in each local authority.

The new Pathfinder administrative bodies were sub-regional strategic partnerships made up of central, regional and local stakeholders that involved joint work over a number of adjacent local authority areas (Leather et al., 2007:41). An additional feature that set HMR apart from contemporary urban restructuring policies elsewhere as well as previous British housing initiatives, was a high degree of responsibility devolved to sub-regional partnerships – the Pathfinders (Leather et al., 2007). However, all Pathfinders faced potential contradiction. They were non-statutory bodies and did not possess powers with which to enforce implementation of their strategies. In order to achieve their HMR goals, Pathfinders needed to establish links, develop relationships and influence partners with the necessary statutory powers (Cole & Nevin, 2004:34). Each Pathfinder was required to define their own governance structure and membership according to the goals adopted in their local context. This raises important questions about the way relocation was delivered in the HMR framework as well as questions about accountability over residential relocation.

Namely, the delivery of residential relocation alongside other operational aspects of HMR was assumed to be thought through at the sub-regional or local level, as appropriate. In contrast to the preceding British housing policies replete with guidance notes, in the case of HMR, ‘government requirements and guidance have been kept to a minimum’ (Leather et al., 2007:4). HMR was expected to develop organically, in response to changing market conditions. Therefore, the account of HMR residential relocation in this research provides an important source of information about situated residential relocation practice in a differentiated polity.

1.3 Residential Relocation in HMR Research

Housing Market Renewal generated significant controversy. Effectively it split the research community in England between academics supportive of the initiative and others critical of it. The supportive academics argued that the devolution of state power to Pathfinders, presented ‘a radical change in the relationship between the central government and those localities undergoing changes’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:viii, ix); this method promised responsiveness to local circumstances and residents’ needs. HMR critics argued that, on the contrary, by devolving power to the sub-regional partnerships, HMR was ‘a more top-down approach compared to other recent
regeneration initiatives’ in England (NAO, 2007:6) and that it was characterised by inequalities in power and capital (Webb, 2010).

Residential relocation has not been given much attention by HMR supporters. Their work focused on examining and advancing HMR implementation on a large scale (Leather et al., 2007; Cole & Nevin, 2004; Cole, 2008; Ferrari, 2007). With the exception of Cole and Flint’s (2007) report examining ‘some of the issues about support for residents in HMR Pathfinders during the clearance and relocation process’ (ibid., p.1), residential relocation was seen as a short-term disruption of individual households necessary to achieve housing market growth. However, residential relocation has been a bête noire of the HMR critics. HMR’s goal to renew low-value housing markets attracted the attention of critical gentrification research, which conceptualised as harmful the ‘displacement’ of low-income residents (Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003, 2006; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012).

In the UK, perhaps more than in other countries, the debate about gentrification has moved from the ‘traditional’ argument that displacement is driven by market forces, to claims that gentrification is now a deliberate strategy of state-funded urban regeneration policies (see e.g. Atkinson, 2004; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008, Lees et al., 2008). Termed ‘state-led’ or ‘state-sponsored’, this type of gentrification, according to Hackworth and Smith (2001), represents an extension of the global reach and power of capital in promoting gentrification and involves an enhanced role by the state. Residents affected by demolition and relocation are more often than not presented as the victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence.

The recent wave of research in the UK has tied gentrification more explicitly to the agenda and language of ‘urban renaissance’ (Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2008). According to Lees, ‘urban renaissance’, and HMR as part of it, is ‘an aggressive, revanchist ideology designed to retake the inner city for the middle classes’ (Lees, 2008: 2449) – an ideology by which the low-income residents are vengefully displaced to make room for the state’s favoured middle class (Macleod, 2002; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). Unlike other gentrification researchers, the critical gentrification theorists (see Slater, 2010) acknowledge the existence of a wide range of actors involved in HMR conception and delivery, but only to argue that the state is the one that controls them (Allen, 2008, Macleod & Johnstone, 2012).

This thesis challenges this stand. The use of state-led gentrification and critical gentrification perspective implies that residential relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood simply as the result of a structural shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. It
implies a view of politics and policy as something travelling linear fashion through democratic arenas to the point of implementation and producing identical results at household level. This thesis argues that this perspective is too simplistic. A research system that focuses on the way that central and local government (or Pathfinders in this case) operate fails to account for the much more complex (and interdependent) bargaining and negotiating process that takes place at neighbourhood level. Understanding of ‘displacement’ (or residential relocation) in gentrification studies is inevitably a selective one, which sacrifices the institutional detail of cross-tenure relocation and obscures the work taking place on a day-to-day basis as the residential relocation process is delivered. Understanding such issues necessitates an engagement with disparate matters such as institutional complexity, the delegation of tasks and contracting out, the multiplication of agencies and complex webs of relationships.

1.4 Theoretical Considerations: Governance Theory

This thesis suggests that the emergence of a governance perspective (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al, 1997) provides an opportunity to develop a theoretically informed approach and a better grounded examination of the complexities of cross-tenure residential relocation in differentiated polities.

In the UK, the term ‘governance’ has been mainly used to describe a gradual shift from a system of hierarchical government to a more fragmented polity (Hudson & Lowe, 2009), also termed a differentiated polity (Rhodes, 1997). In the process of political and economic changes initiated by Conservative administrations from 1979 and continued (for rather different reasons) under Labour since 1997, the universalistic welfare state has been eroded by neo-liberal reforms (Kearns & Paddison, 2000:846). According to governance theorists, a differentiated polity has arisen, where multiple actors from private, public and community sectors are involved in policy design and delivery and ‘the municipal council as the sole organism that proposed and disposed policies and services has been replaced by a network of agencies’ (Booth, 2005:262, 268).

The governance debate in the UK has focused on the transformation of local government (Lowndes, 2005). According to Davies (2005:312), two dominant but seemingly contradictory strands of governance literature that seek to conceptualise the change that took place since 1979 dominate British academia. The first is ‘governance orthodoxy’ and the second are the ‘governance sceptics’.
The ‘governance orthodoxy’ model, chiefly advocated by Rhodes (1997), considers that the government is no longer supreme, but depends on myriad public and private actors to deliver its policies. Hence, governance refers ‘to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state’ (Rhodes, 1997:15). This conceptualisation ‘replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the hierarchical] Westminster model’ (Rhodes, 1997:9) with a relational concept of horizontal transactions. There is no dominant party that can coerce decision-making; policy outcomes are the result of the cooperation or non-cooperation of network members (Kickert et al., 1997).

On the other hand, ‘governance sceptics’ argue that despite government attempts to involve a wide range of stakeholders and promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power continues to be centralised (Davies, 2004:30). According to Davies (2003, 2004a), Bache (2003) and Marinetto (2003), far from disengaging, or empowering other actors, the national state is actually augmenting its power over local politics. John and Cole (1998:384) argue that the influence of central government does not stop at the level of the local authorities. Through a system of partnership networks, it manages to influence local businesses and the private sector as well.

The debate between ‘governance orthodoxy’ and the ‘governance sceptics’ is nuanced and theoretically elaborate. Lowndes (2005) suggests that these narratives offer internally coherent accounts of local government transformation in the UK, but that they fail to capture the different trajectories of change and continuity that characterise English governance. The reality, she argues, lies somewhere between the two poles depending on each particular case (Lowndes, 2005). These two extremes open up creative spaces. Amid them, institutional entrepreneurs build the ‘rules of the game’ to respond to their specific contexts. This thesis thinks in the creative spaces between the extremes of ‘governance orthodoxy’ and ‘governance scepticism’ to examine governance processes shaping the experiences of neighbourhood restructuring-induced residential relocation.

1.5 Methodology

The aim of the research is to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation practice and explain how these processes affected residential relocation outcomes based on the case of the Housing Market Renewal initiative in England. The research has three objectives:

1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in differentiated polity
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities, and
3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation practice and residential relocation outcomes.

Governance is an interpretive art (Rhodes & Bevir, 2003, 2006). According to Rhodes and Bevir, the starting point of an enquiry must be to unpack the meanings, beliefs, and preferences of actors in order to then make sense of understanding actions, practices, and institutions rather than to impose a pre-set model. In order to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR Pathfinders this research employed an inductive research strategy. Grounded theory was used as methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Qualitative methods are deemed the most suitable in this case as they provide a refined close up of the residential relocation process in real time.

The complexities of the research aim and objectives required a multi-scale examination: one that considers residential relocation practice at national, sub-regional and local levels. The examination of how residential relocation was delivered in the HMR framework was conducted on four levels:

1) National level (ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry)
2) Pathfinder level (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder)
3) Local Authority (two BNG local authorities, Newcastle and Gateshead)
4) Project level (three BNG Pathfinder Projects involving large scale residential relocation).

Four primary methods were used to support different scales of inquiry: pilot studies, a qualitative survey (ten Pathfinders), an in-depth case study (selected representative Pathfinder and its projects) and a literature review. These methods are supported by a number of data collection techniques: semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and phone; individual and group), observation and site visits, and secondary data analysis. Semi-structured interviews represent the key source of data in this research. In total 44 interviews have been conducted comprising over 40 hours of recorded interview material with the representatives of the national agencies, the Pathfinders, their partners responsible for the relocation aspects, as well as community representatives affected by residential relocation. In the course of the research six out of ten Pathfinders (operating at the time of inquiry) were visited.

In order to explore how residential relocation was delivered, and identify the residential relocation processes shaping residential relocation outcomes, a qualitative survey was conducted with representatives of ten Pathfinders responsible for residential relocation delivery (that operated at the time of inquiry). This inquiry was supported by two pilot studies and face-to-face interviews with the actors responsible for HMR at the national level, representatives of English Partnerships Housing Corporation (later Homes and Communities Agency), the National Audit Office, the
CABE (the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment) and e-mail correspondence with Nevin and Leather Associates, the Audit Commission and the DCLG.

An in-depth inquiry into residential relocation processes, identification of the actors delivering them and their roles and responsibilities is based on a case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder and its three primary intervention areas (three projects). The respondents include representatives from private, public and community sectors: the Pathfinder Board and Team, Newcastle City Council and Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (several departments), leaders of the community groups in the Scotswood and Walker neighbourhoods, private developers, local ALMOs and Registered Social Landlords.

In order to ensure a maximum level of generalisability within the limits of the study as well as its qualitative methodology, it was deemed imperative to select a partnership that was typical of others based on the general governance structure it adopted. BNG, like seven other Pathfinders (out of 10 at the time of inquiry), adopted ‘strategic partnership’ as their overall governance structure. At the time of selection BNG was the second most advanced Pathfinder in terms of the number of demolitions and property acquisitions. Between 2002 and 2008 it had demolished 1,560 properties, and that number reached a total of 3,000 by March 2011 (BNG, 2011).

The examination was conducted in three stages, for three months at the beginning of 2008, the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. This meant that the residential relocation delivery and the governance processes shaping it could be examined in real time, and linked to residential relocation outcomes presented by the relocated residents.

1.6 Thesis Structure

The thesis is organised in the following way. Chapter 2 presents the context of this study, the Housing Market Renewal initiative, in more detail. It explores how HMR came into being, presents the research evidence that underpins it and discusses the way housing demolition re-emerged as an important housing strategy. The chapter addresses some of the main issues HMR aimed to tackle, its goals and the way the initiative was planned to be delivered at sub-regional levels. The Chapter concludes by presenting some key debates about HMR implementation challenges and the importance of researching residential relocation in this framework.

Chapter 3 engages with the research related to residential relocation in the UK since the nineteenth century. The first section examines the way housing demolition emerged as a state intervention in
England in the nineteenth century and the research about the first housing demolition launched after the foundation of the welfare state, the post Second World War slum clearance. This is followed by examination of the literature critical of HMR, with special attention given to critical gentrification studies that emerged to examine potential ‘displacement’ in this context. Special attention is given to examining the concept of ‘displacement’ as defined in governance theory and argumentation for the need for its replacement in the case of planned demolition caused residential relocation. The chapter concludes by providing a definition of the residential relocation concept used in this research.

In Chapter 4, I consider in more detail the ideas about governance that inform this research. The first section provides a definition of the term ‘governance’. The next section presents a historical overview of change of modes of governing in Britain from a unitary state to a more fragmented polity. Section four provides a definition of differentiated polity under the New Labour government and links it to the HMR goals and objectives. Section four engages with the governance debate in the British literature. Section five presents the two lines of governance theory used to describe the perceived changes in British governance: governance orthodoxy and governance sceptics (Davies, 2005). Rather than imposing a model, the chapter asks whether policy implementation (and residential relocation as its integral part) emerged from a network system of loosely interlocked actors, in which each had discretion to act in autonomous ways (governance orthodoxy), or whether relocation was determined by a more top-down system where central government had the power to steer the networks for its benefit (governance sceptics). This issue is important because, depending on the nature of governance, government can either impose a single policy line or can facilitate the development of locally tailored strategies. It has a fundamental influence on the way residential relocation may be delivered in a differentiated polity.

Chapter 5 presents the methodology, methods and techniques of data collection used for this research. It presents grounded theory as a qualitative inductive strategy used to bridge the conceptual gap identified in residential relocation studies. The chapter also presents the research design, strategy and process that have been developed to answer the research aim and objectives of the research.

Chapter 6 is the first of the three chapters that present the results of the empirical enquiry conducted for this study. Here the Pathfinders’ approach to residential relocation at the HMR level is discussed. The chapter shows that the Pathfinders developed distinct strategies for residential relocation that differed at a project level. The evidence shows that residential relocation differs
between Pathfinders, between local authorities within a Pathfinder, and between projects within a local authority. The chapter identifies residential relocation processes typical for HMR Pathfinder relocation practices. It presents a conceptual model for residential relocation process analysis built on governance theory and extensive empirical research. The ‘Relocation Matrix’ is an amalgam of emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR framework. In the next chapter, the Matrix is used to facilitate an in-depth examination of governance processes shaping residential relocation in the BNG Pathfinder, to identify actors involved and analyse their work together.

Chapter 7 presents an in-depth case study of the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. Based on the conclusions of Chapter 6, it examines residential relocation in three primary intervention areas (three projects): Scotswood, Walker (both in Newcastle) and Bensham and Saltwell (in Gateshead). The chapter shows distinct approaches that developed to deliver residential relocation in different projects and their effects on the residential relocation outcomes in each case.

Chapter 8 identifies the actors delivering each of the five residential relocation processes identified in Chapter 6, in the case of the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. It shows that the residential relocation in HMR in general and BNG in particular depended on the co-operation of a myriad of actors on a project scale, actors coming from different backgrounds. The chapter then examines the delegation of responsibilities related to residential relocation delivery in the BNG Pathfinder and maps the networks shaping residential relocation, based on interaction of the identified actors. The chapter then evaluates identified governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation outcomes.

Chapter 9 is the conclusion of this thesis. Here, each of the three research objectives are answered; by doing so the chapter reflects on the work done in the thesis as a whole. Based on the evidence collected, analysed and presented in this study, the concluding chapter argues that mixed tenure residential relocation in the context of differentiated polity was delivered by complex networks of actors. The thesis concludes by recommending further exploration of ‘governance of relocation’ as a network governance model, in order to enable greater in-depth understanding of residential relocation delivery in other contexts of differentiated polity.
Chapter 2: Housing Market Renewal: the HMR Initiative Background and Launch

2.1 Introduction

Housing Market Renewal (HMR) was launched with an aim to tackle the problems of ‘low housing demand’ in the north of England and the Midlands. The initiative caused lots of controversy as the theoretical concept of market restructuring was translated into practice. This chapter explores the ways Housing Market Renewal came into being, its theoretical underpinning, key principles and conceptualisations shaping HMR as an intervention, HMR goals and implementation strategy. The chapter sets an overall policy context for the study and shows the relevance and importance of looking into aspects of residential relocation in this framework.

Chapter 2 is organised in the following way. The first section examines the re-emergence of the ‘low housing demand’ debates in England in the 1990s. The next section presents some key explanations of the low housing demand research that led to policy action. The third section engages with the specific evidence marshalled to support the development of Housing Market Renewal initiative. It discusses some of the implications the research had on the conceptualisation of residential relocation in the HMR framework. The HMR initiative launch, goals and implementation are discussed next. The chapter concludes by presenting some key challenges in HMR implementation in general and residential relocation in particular.

2.2 Re-emergence of Low Demand for Housing Debate

The development of the Housing Market Renewal programme followed a re-emergence of national debate about the causes of low housing demand in decayed post-industrial neighbourhoods in the north of England and the Midlands (Nevin, 2010). In the UK, the rates of housing demolition had been running low since the post Second World War slum clearance was abandoned in the early
1970s (Balchin & Rhoden, 1998:221). Therefore, the reports about council stock demolitions in the mid-1990s attracted the attention of the research community. In 2004, Bramley et al. presented evidence that demolitions had increased from 3,700 properties per year in 1990 to over 10,000 in 2001 (Bramley et al., 2004:217) (see Figure 2-1: Demolition of Local Authority Housing in England 1990/1-2001/2). Similar results were reported in a DETR (2000a) study.

**Figure 2-1: Demolition of Local Authority Housing in England 1990/1-2001/2**

Demolitions of LA housing in England, 1990/1–2001/2

These studies showed that the demolished properties were not slums or estates in particularly bad physical condition, they were often traditionally designed terraces or housing less than a decade old (Bramley et al., 2004:63). In some city areas RSLs\(^3\) and local authorities were increasingly unable ‘to find tenants for even modern and well maintained properties, including (notoriously) some brand new property’ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:23): waiting lists were non-existent. Rather than clearing sub-standard or uninhabitable properties (like in the case of the post Second World War clearance), the demolition of good council stock was a reaction to an increasing trend of population

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\(^3\) Registered Social Landlord or RSL, is an alternative term for a ‘housing association’ in the UK. RSLs are private, non-profit making organisations that provide low-cost social housing for people in need of a home. Although independent they are regulated by the state and commonly receive public funding. They are now the UK’s major providers of new housing for social (as well as in some cases private) rent.
leaving certain regional and local areas in England. Demolition of social housing in the 1990s resulted in renewed interest in ‘low housing demand’ research.

The studies showed that low demand was affecting not only social tenure, as previous research argued (see Power, 1987) but that low housing demand was a cross-tenure problem (Bramley & Pawson, 2000). A series of papers and reports between 1997 and 2001 presented evidence about volatility in tenancy turnover, significant falls in waiting lists for social housing, increasing vacancy rates in social and private rented sectors and hyper-deflation in house prices (see for example Bramley, 1998; Holmans & Simpson, 1999; Cole, Kane & Robinson, 1999; Keenan, 1998; Lee & Murie, 1997; Murie et al., 1998; Nevin et al., 2001; Pawson & Bramley, 2000; Webster, 1998).

Bramley, et al. (2000) and Nevin (2001) showed that the areas affected by low demand were mainly comprised of neighbourhoods that had been de-industrialised in the past few decades and experienced long periods of economic decline. They found that people continued leaving their neighbourhoods even when the economic circumstances of their local authority improved. At the same time it was revealed that the areas in question were the recipients of substantial investment through different urban regeneration policies and interventions (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Leather et al., 2007). This suggested that housing quality was not the core of the problem causing lack of desirability of available properties. Over the period 1999-2002, research evidence on the scale of the problem of low housing demand accumulated and concern grew amongst housing policy-makers about the causes of the problem and potential solutions (Leather et al., 2007:6).

2.2.1 Causes and effects of low demand and reasons for policy intervention

The significant characteristic of HMR was that the need for policy intervention emerged from a variety of academic voices pointing out in their own way the problems northern regions faced. At this point, it is useful to bring to attention the fact that ‘low housing demand’ is an economic, theoretical concept (Squires, 2009). The literature about low housing demand varied, and as with any academic debate, far from being groomed and ready for policy action, the low-demand literature was characterised by a variety of opinions, presenting competing reasons and causes of ‘low demand’ for housing.

Several explanations of the causes and effects of low demand are available. Their comprehensive reviews and analyses are out of the scope of this study. For this reason, I opt for one of the possible categorisations: Bramley’s (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b; DETR, 2000a, 2000b). This is because it
underpinned the research leading to the launch of HMR. According to Bramley the causes of low demand can be placed in three categories: economic restructuring, changing housing preferences and social processes at the neighbourhood level.

2.2.1.1 Economic restructuring and migration

The restructuring of local and regional economies has been used as the principal explanation for the occurrence of low demand for housing (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b, Holmans & Simpson, 1999; Murie et al., 1998; Power & Mumford, 1999; Webster, 1998). Bramley showed that most of the low-demand (social housing) localities coincided with areas where traditional manufacturing, industry and mining had been in decline since the 1960s and 1970s, ‘a position which worsened dramatically in the 1980s’ (Nevin et al., 2001:7). These regions have typically experienced long periods of economic decline, as job patterns shifted and people moved away to take up new opportunities (Leather et al., 2007:4), thus contributing to decreased housing demand. The effect of this was the emergence of housing abandonment and housing surpluses.

Webster (1998) pointed out that big cities in the north of England and the Midlands lost two-thirds of their manufacturing employment since 1979, compared to a national loss of around a third. In the 1990s this resulted in a population loss of 40,000 people annually (Lowe, 2004:127). While the quantification of the population loss was self-explanatory, there was less consensus about the reasons or direction of out-migration. According to Holmans and Simpson (1999) people were leaving for the South, a part of the country that enjoyed a better economy; others suggested that an inter-regional urban-rural shift was more prominent (Champion et al., 1996). While the reasons for the population loss were debated, there was much more consensus about where the regions were that lost the most population. The evidence suggested that the areas that had lost the most population were: Tyne and Wear, Teesside, Yorkshire conurbations, as well as Merseyside and Greater Manchester, and cities in the East Midlands (Bramley, 1998a, 1998b). The population loss differed depending on the region. For example, a DoE report (1996:24) showed that inner areas of Manchester and Newcastle lost 19% and 21% of population between 1971 and 1981, and 10% and 8% between 1981 and 1991.

2.2.1.2 Changing housing preferences

According to low-demand literature, the movement of population was also encouraged by changes in people’s house-type preferences. Suburban property types, such as houses with gardens, seemed to be more favoured than smaller terraced houses or flats in the inner cities. ‘Changing housing
aspirations’ (DETR, 2000a, 2000b) or preferences (Nevin et al., 2001) have been cited as significant factors in decreased demand for housing in low-demand affected areas.

Different authors gave different explanations for such a shift in ‘housing aspirations’. Some of the explanations that were most cited were: a generous supply of housing (private and social) in suburban greenfield areas and a planning approach that favoured peripheral development (Power & Mumford, 1999); accessibility of lower-priced private properties in the north of England and the Midlands (Bramley, 1998a; Murie et al., 1998; Power & Mumford, 1999); accessibility of low-interest mortgages; and availability of Housing Benefit that boosted movement from the public to the private-rented sector (DETR, 2000a; Nevin et al., 2001).

The change of preferences was seen to disproportionally affect the old terraced housing, properties that were built in the nineteenth century to house an industrial labour force. With industry gone, some authors pointed out the asymmetry between labour and housing markets. According to Ferrari and Lee the changing demand debate referred to the way in which housing in older industrial urban cores had been built to service a different economic era (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:74). Consistent with the theoretical underpinning of the low-demand debate, urban economists argued that some British cities and regions were the legacy of historic development and economic agglomeration that has occurred in response to a number of economic signals that no longer exist (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:74). Terraces were seen as an obsolete market product that there was no demand for.

2.2.1.3 Social processes at neighbourhood level

One of the reasons quoted the most in the research that led to the design of Housing Market Renewal policy and the arguments for demolition, concerns the appearance of surplus housing due to low demand (DETR, 2000a; Nevin et al., 2001). The argument was that, when surplus housing becomes vandalised and later squatted by drug abusers and petty criminals, an increase in antisocial behaviour further contributes to low housing demand. These effects stigmatise and fuel abandonment of the area. According to the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU, 1998) such areas became epicentres of the social residualisation process as those households that could afford to rapidly left the area. The remaining population, according to this conceptualisation, is the one that cannot afford to live anywhere else.

Some authors observed that the spiral of decline in some inner-city neighbourhoods was highly localised, and that it operated at a micro level within individual streets (Lee & Murie, 1997; Lowe,
Keenan & Spencer, 1998). City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget allocations attempted to rectify this situation in the late 1990s as the funds were targeted at finding relief for the socio-economic problems of these neighbourhoods (Kleinman and Whitehead, 1999). However, Kleinman and Whitehead (1999) showed that these interventions did not stop the abandonment of the areas. They argued that successful economic regeneration in the absence of significant improvements to the quality of the urban environment, in fact, increased residential volatility, as residents were ‘empowered’ – but only to move out of the poor quality neighbourhoods they lived in.

2.2.2 The rise of the low demand issue in the policy arena

One of the key features of the debate around low and changing demand was an agreement that problematic market conditions were the result of a complex interplay of national, regional, sub-regional and local factors (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:45). None the less, references to the problem of ‘low demand’ in the academic literature, according to Bramley et al. (2004), implied that weak or declining housing markets result in various negative consequences which all call for public responses (Bramley et al., 2004:76).

The Social Exclusion Unit Report (1998) officially highlighted the problems of low demand for the first time. It emphasised that ‘surplus housing [was] a growing problem and in some areas [led] to near abandonment’ (SEU, 1998:27). This work mainly considered causes of the phenomenon and subsequently raised concern amongst the policy makers about the potential solutions to the problem. In 1999, Planning Action Team 7 (DETR, 1999a) pointed out that the existing body of research on the issue was not sufficient to draw conclusions as to the geographical scale, tenure spread, cause and effects of the phenomenon.

At the governmental level this low demand debate was informed by two studies, one focusing on the national level (DETR, 2000a, 2000b) and one on the regional level (Nevin et al., 2001). Housing Market Renewal intervention areas were identified through research carried out by Birmingham University and subsequent analysis by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) of the sub-regions where the problems of low demand and abandonment were most acute (Audit Commission, 2011a). The research comprised the evidence base for HMR and informed the approach adopted in the programme. For this reason it is briefly presented in the next section.
2.3 HMR Research Evidence Base: DETR report and CURS research

The detailed report of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) research named ‘Low demand housing and unpopular neighbourhoods’ (DETR 2000a) and the subsequent M62 Corridor Study (Nevin et al., 2001) are two key documents underpinning the Housing Market Renewal approach (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Leather et al., 2007). They formed what is considered to be the main research evidence that led to the creation of Housing Market Renewal in 2002. The M62 Corridor Study provided major inputs to a submission to the 2002 Spending Review proposing the introduction of Housing Market Renewal Areas and the creation of a Housing Market Renewal Fund (Leather et al., 2007; Nevin, 2001; Nevin, et al., 2001). The DETR (2000b) proposed some general guidance for tackling the problems of low demand. The ensuing Select Committee Report (2002) supported the creation of a Housing Market Renewal Fund (Cole & Nevin, 2004:12).

2.3.1 Low-demand housing and unpopular neighbourhoods

The first low-demand research at the national scale was commissioned by the DETR (2000a, 2000b). The key contribution of the DETR study was to assess the national coverage of the low-demand problem and the fact that it was affecting different housing tenures. The DETR (2000a, 2000b) research demonstrated that low demand was a cross-tenure problem (DETR, 2000a, 2000b). It estimated that 377,000 local authority housing units had been affected by low demand, followed by 92,100 registered social landlord (RSL) units (in the social sector as a whole around 469,100 properties were affected) and 375,000 privately owned dwellings in England (DETR, 2000a:48). This was a departure from the previous research that mainly defined low demand as a problem experienced by social landlords with particular neighbourhoods or dwelling types, referred to as ‘difficult-to-let’ housing (Power, 1987). The DETR research did not undertake a detailed spatial analysis of how the problem affected neighbourhoods.

The DETR study provided data on how widespread the problem was nationally and regionally on local authority scale. The exercise was based on the concept of ‘Housing Market Area’ (HMA) (DETR, 1999, 2000a). While HMAs do not follow local authority boundaries by definition, in the absence of available data, the DETR research based its results on a postal survey of the local

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4 The ‘Housing Market Area’ is an area within which most households seeking to set up home or move to a different home would look for housing opportunities. It is closely related to concepts of ‘Travel to Work’ or ‘Local Labour Market Area’, which define zones within which people working in particular places tend to live. The corollary of this pattern is that the forces of demand and supply in the housing market tend to work themselves out within the HMA (DETR, 2000a:40). HMAs are not confined to local authority areas.
authorities. Therefore, in the DETR study HMAs were conceptualised as local authority areas\(^5\) (see Figure 2–2: Mixed tenure ‘low demand’ for housing in England). Maps below show the geography of low demand according to the DETR study. They show that local authorities suffering from low housing demand were concentrated in the north of England and the Midlands (black colour).

**Figure 2-2: Mixed tenure ‘low demand’ for housing in England**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage local authority low demand housing</th>
<th>Percentage private sector low demand housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: DETR, 2000a:53</td>
<td>Source: DETR, 2000a:54</td>
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</table>

DETR reports formed a basis upon which it was possible to begin to chart some of the factors underpinning the problem locally. However, because of the acknowledged data limitations, one of the main recommendations of the DETR research (1999, 2000a) was to take the analysis of the occurrence of low demand onto a smaller neighbourhood scale. Part of the research output, the Good Practice Guide (DETR, 2000b) recommended further development of research and use of a wider range of indicators to map and monitor unpopularity and contribute to profiling neighbourhoods in a way which could distinguish different kinds of problem area (DETR, 2000b:Ch.2).

\(^5\) This means that for the purpose of the research it was assumed that a local authority area was self contained. This of course was a crude estimation, taking in consideration that, for instance, Manchester focused most of its housing development outside of its own LA boundaries.
2.3.2 Risk of housing market change and sub-markets

The suite of regional analyses undertaken by the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS) between 2000 and 2003, gave a more in-depth view of low demand at regional and local levels. ‘CURS work was to develop a diagnostic tool that could help to clarify the scale and extent of the problem and which could help policy makers to develop and prioritise a programme of interventions’ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:47).

First and most influential among them, the M62 Corridor Study (Nevin, 2001; Nevin et al., 2001) was commissioned by a consortium of local authorities, RSLs, and the National Housing Federation. Nevin et al. (2001) introduced a more dynamic term: risk of housing market change, or the risk of housing market failure. This dynamic dimension of low demand phenomena suggested that certain areas that were not in the most critical state at the time of research could deteriorate.

While the key part of the rationale for a strong policy intervention was the prevalence of empty and unused residential property, the concept of the risk of low demand pointed to the danger of some of the areas being abandoned in the future (Nevin, 2010:716). This had an impact on the conceptualisation of the intervention areas.

The basic calculation of risk in the M62 Corridor Study combined indicators known to be associated with low demand for housing: the proportion of economically inactive population, the proportion of the economically active population that was unemployed, the population over 65 years of age, the proportion of dwellings that were flats and terraced houses (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:49–50). Subsequent studies introduced refinements. The ‘3 stage process’ gave an indication of the extent to which properties within the area may be considered to be at risk of low demand (see Figure 2-3: CURS Three stage risk index (high risk)). The concentration of particular dwelling types and socio-economic characteristics implied that there may be significant housing market problems in identified local authority districts and those markets should be monitored for change (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:51). CURS’ studies ‘formed the backbone of analytical approaches that simultaneously examined geographical scale and the possibilities of market change over time’ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:43).
Figure 2-3: CURS Three stage risk index (high risk)

Source: Adapted from Leather, Murie, Roberts and Ferrari (2004)
2.3.3 Implications of the research evidence base on relocation in the HMR framework

The idea of using evidence to inform policy is not a new idea. What was new at the time of the launch of HMR, however, was the emphasis the British government had given to the evidence-based policy approach since 1997. As part of the Blair government’s reforming and modernising agenda, the aim had been to try to shift away from ideologically driven politics and towards rational decision-making (ODI, 2005). Housing Market Renewal was one of the first urban renewal policies crafted in this way under New Labour.

In the case of HMR, the government did not provide the meticulous guidance that characterised preceding British policy. The studies presented and informed the specific approach taken in the HMR programme. The conceptualisation and selection of HMR intervention areas had been shaped by research evidence about low demand (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).

The intervention that caused relocation in the HMR framework is clearance and demolition (as well as acquisition of the properties for this purpose). Ferrari and Lee (2010:96) point out that, ‘in seeking to reshape local housing markets, demolition was seen as highly necessary, right from the start of the low-demand debate, and certainly in the construction of the evidence base from HMR and the dissemination period during the launch of the programme’. They continue by saying that, ‘while the market analysis contained in the DETR (1999a, 2000a, 2000b) and Nevin et al. (2001) did not assert to be a route map to the bulldozer, demolition was discussed enthusiastically during this period as a primary tool and a means of addressing what was perceived to be the “last chance” to get regeneration and renewal right in the areas of HMR’ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:96).

For this reason, consideration of the implications of this research evidence on HMR design and residential relocation practice is deemed ever more important. The purpose here is not to argue for and against demolition. The study focuses on the process of residential relocation. This process commences only after the decision to demolish has been approved. The aim here is to point out issues the implementers needed to deal with as a result of specific conceptualisation of HMR.

The DETR report findings and re-conceptualisation of the low-demand problem as a ‘cross tenure’ problem had a significant impact on the selection of the intervention areas. In order to ensure that all tenures were included without ‘discrimination’, HMR designers envisaged a ‘tenure blind’ approach (Cole & Nevin, 2004). However, as a result of the conceptualisation of low demand as a cross-tenure issue and an all-inclusive approach to selection, intervention areas were of mixed tenure.
Introduction of the concept of properties ‘at risk’ (Nevin et al., 2001) moved the attention away from the properties that were already vacant to those areas that were inhabited and at risk of being abandoned. This in turn meant relocating residents of different tenures from neighbourhoods earmarked for demolition. These issues, along with some other practical implementation issues, had not been considered in the research that led to the launch of HMR. In this way, indirectly, the research introduced novelty in the residential relocation practice – cross-tenure relocation that has little precedence in the UK and abroad.

The key influence of the CURS research was in the conceptualisation of the geographical footprint of HMR intervention areas – the Pathfinders. The studies showed that low-demand areas or those ‘at risk’ do not comply with administrative borders and may flow over several neighbouring local authority areas. HMR intervention areas – the Pathfinder areas – were conceptualised as sub-regions covering weak or failing housing markets of two to six adjacent local authorities.

The definition of HMR intervention areas in turn influenced the structure of Pathfinders, the administrative bodies entrusted to deliver the initiative. Pathfinders were established partnerships of two to five adjacent local authorities. Among other practical interventions, residential relocation needed to be delivered in this potentially novel and complex context. While the theoretical and data limitations and assumptions were clearly stated, and the market meticulously studied, the research underpinning HMR did not consider the practical implementation of theoretical concepts it rested upon. Most importantly for the present study, the issues relating to residential relocation or governance on sub-regional level were not considered nor developed. Without going into discussion about the extent to which research evidence needs to provide practical solutions, here it is deemed important to note that these were the issues that were left to the sub-regional partnerships to tackle.

2.4 Housing Market Renewal Launch

Housing Market Renewal had a rapid genesis (Ferrari & Lee, 2010). In 2001, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) identified the areas which were to participate in the programme using local authority housing statistics returns (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b). These returns showed that 161 local authorities in England as a whole suffered from at least some low demand for housing. At first, 23 authorities that seemed to have the most severe problems of low demand based on DETR research (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b) were chosen to make their submissions to the government (NAO, 2007:29). The Audit Commission (2012) points out that the Pathfinder
areas were first identified through research carried out by Birmingham University and subsequent analysis by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).

In March 2002, the final report of the Select Committee enquiry into empty homes made strong calls for a market renewal strategy. After considering the available research and submissions by local authorities, on 10th April 2002 the government announced nine sub-regional areas which would have the opportunity to work with government to establish Pathfinder projects (News Release, 2002/0154:10 April 2002). Pathfinders were established in Newcastle and Gateshead, Hull and East Riding, South Yorkshire, Birmingham and Sandwell, North Staffordshire, Manchester and Salford, Merseyside, Oldham and Rochdale and East Lancashire (see Table 2-3: HMR Pathfinders with the list of local authorities).

A resource of £24 million was made available from the Capital Modernisation Fund for their initial work in 2002. In February 2003, HMR became a part of Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future and the nine Pathfinders received an additional £500 million. Three further partnerships were subsequently added and received funding from 2006. These were Tees Valley, West Yorkshire and West Cumbria. Pathfinder areas encompassed parts of 26 local authority areas, while a further 13 made up the three additional partnerships. Between April 2002 and April 2011 HMR Pathfinders received funding totalling £2.2 billion pounds from the public purse and attracted an additional £1 billion of private funding (Audit Commission, 2011a).

About 900,000 homes and two million people were included in the Pathfinder areas which included about half of the one million low-demand properties in England based on 2002 estimates (Audit Commission, 2011a).

2.4.1 HMR Goals

HMR is most commonly referred to as the initiative that had a goal to renew weak and failing housing markets in the north of England and the Midlands. According to the Audit Commission (2011a), HMR goals were deliberately broad to allow the Pathfinders to define their own sets of objectives that suited their local circumstances and market dynamics. However, this also allowed for metamorphosis of HMR initiative goals at the governmental level during the time of its implementation between 2002 and 2011.

The original submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review defined Housing Market Renewal as a philosophy that integrated housing, planning and regeneration strategies to produce a process
of renewal that reversed the negative socio-economic trends that caused decline of housing markets within a sub-region (Cole & Nevin, 2004:9). At the time of the first national evaluation of HMR, Leather et al. (2007) saw Pathfinders as partnerships that were ‘seeking to revive the housing markets in their areas, to make these areas attractive to a wider range of households including those with choice about where they live, to contribute to the creation of sustainable communities in these areas, and to contribute to their longer term economic prosperity through improvement of the quality of housing offered’ (Leather et al., 2007:viii). For the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) the success of the programme was determined by the extent to which the Pathfinders had closed the gap between the housing markets in the Pathfinder areas and the relevant regional housing markets (NAO, 2007:22).

Ferrari and Lee (2010:114) note that ‘changes in the emphasis and focus of HMR policy have been detectable throughout its short life … and have affected its evolution’. Pathfinders were free to interpret HMR goals and to develop strategies for market recovery that suited their specific circumstances and contexts. According to Cole and Nevin (2004), at the heart of this decision was the recognition of the distinctiveness of each of the nine Pathfinders (see sections on Pathfinder key facts). As a result, each one of the Pathfinders had their own sub-regional goal. For the Bridging Newcastle and Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG) this was ‘creating great places to live’ (BNG, 2011); the Manchester Salford Pathfinder goal was to ‘support the economic growth potential of the Manchester City region’ (MSP, 2012); while the NewHeartlands (NH) mission was to ‘deliver sustainable communities in the NewHeartlands area’ (NH, 2008). Moreover, as Pathfinders’ intervention consisted of a series of local projects and development schemes, goals were defined for each one of them separately. In BNG for example, the goal for one of its primary intervention areas (Walker Riverside Regeneration) was: ‘Over the next 10-15 years, to gradually improve the local environment, housing, shops, schools, transport, education, and health services to make Walker a vibrant local economy and location of choice for families to live, stay and work, now and in the future’ (NCC, 2007a:1).

Review of the Pathfinders’ annual reports and business plans from 2003 till 2011 showed that HMR goals changed at the sub-regional level and the partnerships also developed their local strategies. In other words HMR goals evolved on three scales, national, sub-regional and local, each seeking to adjust to the emerging circumstances and relevant prompts and contexts.

This brings us to question the manner in which HMR funding and implementation was envisaged, and the issues that ultimately caused residential relocation in this framework.
2.4.2 The HMR Fund and Interventions

The Housing Market Renewal Fund was made available on the basis of evidence suggesting a strong connection between housing market weakness and a progressive cycle of urban decline (Cole & Nevin, 2004:ix). The majority of the programme was related to capital expenditure and physical renewal (Cole & Flint, 2007:7). Although it was recognised that housing market weakness was not solely a product of deficiencies in the quality of or demand for housing, HMR funds could not be used to directly fund non-housing improvements.

Therefore, the Pathfinders were expected to implement HMR and achieve the (various and changing) goals they set for themselves through a series of interventions related to the physical change of local housing markets. According to the NAO (2007) a set of interventions was available to HMR Pathfinders. These are presented in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-1: Pathfinders interventions in the housing market</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• the acquisition of land and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• site preparation and reclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the clearance of surplus and obsolete property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• assistance with new build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• renovation and refurbishment programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• environmental improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• gap funding for new housing for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• award of renovation and environmental improvement grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• enhanced neighbourhood management service for neighbourhoods in transition awaiting clearance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from NAO (2007:12)

As thinking about the programme developed, the Audit Commission became involved in the capacity of ‘critical friend’ to the Pathfinders (Cole & Nevin, 2004:24). Whilst there was not – implicitly or explicitly – any uniform yardstick against which Pathfinder strategies were being measured (Cole & Nevin, 2004:37) the outputs the Audit Commission focused on were quite straightforward and related to physical intervention: the number of demolished properties, the number of new builds (and converted properties), the number of refurbished ones, the number of acquired properties and the land acquired (see Table 2-2: HMR original total funding and outputs per year 2002-2011).
The NAO’s taxonomy of HMR Pathfinders’ interventions and the Audit Commission’s focus, indicate that regardless of the complexity and change of HMR goals, partnerships’ work on the ground focused on housing improvements and involved physical intervention into the built environment.

Housing clearance and demolition were central to achieving the aims of the Housing Market Renewal programme. The acquisition and demolition interventions aimed at large-scale change were possibly what really marked HMR out as different to previous approaches (Ferrari and Lee, 2010:97).

As it can be seen in Table 2-2: *HMR original total funding and outputs per year 2002-2011*, demolition and acquisition (for demolition) activities together comprised around a third of the HMR budget. Demolition allowed for a ‘clean start’, acquisition allowed demolition. These interventions when conducted in the inhabited areas caused residential relocation from properties earmarked for demolition.

However, it is important to point out that residential relocation was not acknowledged as one of Housing Market Renewal’s goals, interventions or outputs, nor was funding for relocation sufficiently considered at the outset.
2.4.3 HMR Implementation Strategy

Housing Market Renewal strategy emerged without a restrictive framework being designed by central government to be imposed on the target areas (Cole & Nevin, 2004: 28). There was little policy making at the government level and a relatively light touch from a small HMR team at the ODPM (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24).

The HMR approach was in sharp contrast to English urban renewal initiatives in the previous 30 years that had been ‘replete with guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the outset’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24). The HMR programme was hinged on an approach of ‘learning by doing’. It was expected to develop organically, in response to changing market conditions. The key feature of the HMR programme was a high degree of responsibility devolved to form new sub-regional partnerships (Leather et al., 2007). Pathfinders were given the freedom and responsibility to translate a national strategy and idea into something tangible, meaningful and deliverable at the local level (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:70). The devolution of central power to lower tiers of government was seen as a good way to increase sensitivity to local circumstances and responsiveness to housing market change that was considered to be missing in British planning around that time (e.g. Barker, 2006).

This broader framework was planned to ‘allow the Market Renewal Strategy to plan for the provision of a target population and shape urban form according to likely migration patterns, demographic change and fluctuations in income and wealth’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:9). According to Cole and Nevin, at the heart of this decision was the recognition of the distinctiveness of each of the nine Pathfinders (see next section).

However, the implementation strategy for HMR also meant that no guidance was provided for specific implementation issues. No guidance was provided in regards of residential relocation and local governance issues that are the key focus of this study. The Pathfinders were entrusted to develop these on their sub-regional level.

2.5 HMR Pathfinders

The term ‘HMR Pathfinder’ or ‘Pathfinder’ refers to both a geographic area of intervention and an administrative body, a partnership established to implement HMR. The next two sections present some of the key characteristics of Pathfinders as geographic areas and Pathfinders as partnerships.
2.5.1 The Pathfinder areas: key facts

As mentioned earlier, the Pathfinder areas did not follow administrative borders. Pathfinders all operated on a sub-regional level. They covered weak and failing housing markets in parts of two to five neighbouring local authorities (Audit Commission, 2011a). Table 2-3: HMR Pathfinders with the list of local authorities lists the Pathfinders by name, the year of establishment and the local authorities each Pathfinder included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathfinder name</th>
<th>Alternative name</th>
<th>Local authorities</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridging Newcastle Gateshead</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Newcastle and Gateshead</td>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateway</td>
<td>Hull &amp; East Riding</td>
<td>Hull and East Riding of Yorkshire</td>
<td>GW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform South Yorkshire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sheffield, Barnsley, Rotherham, and Doncaster</td>
<td>TSY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Living</td>
<td>Birmingham Sandwell</td>
<td>Birmingham and Sandwell</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renew North Staffordshire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Stoke on Trent, Newcastle under Lyme, Staffordshire Moorlands</td>
<td>RNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Salford Partnership</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Manchester and Salford</td>
<td>MSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NewHearlands</td>
<td>Merseyside</td>
<td>Liverpool Sefton and Wirral</td>
<td>NH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in Action</td>
<td>Oldham and Rochdale</td>
<td>Oldham and Rochdale</td>
<td>PIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevate East Lancashire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Blackburn with Darwen, Hyndburn, Burnley, Pendle and Rossendale</td>
<td>EEL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three Pathfinders added in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathfinder name</th>
<th>Local authorities</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tees Valley Living</td>
<td>Middlesbrough, Hartlepool, Darlington, Redcar and Cleveland, Stockton on Tees</td>
<td>TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Yorkshire</td>
<td>Bradford, Leeds, Wakefield, Kirklees and Calderdale</td>
<td>WY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Cumbria</td>
<td>Allerdale, Barrow in Furness and Copeland</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Audit Commission, 2012.
A geographical footprint of the original Pathfinders demonstrated a high degree of correlation with those areas identified as ‘at risk’ in the CURS report on changing demand. However, the final boundaries were subject to a degree of negotiation between local authorities and the ODPM’s Market Renewal team (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:57). This resulted in the inclusion of areas that were not envisaged for intervention based on research.

Ferrari and Lee (2010:66) point out that the negotiations ‘would have had to account for local political priorities and sensitivities’. For instance, the NAO (2007) report found that many of the projects included in the Pathfinder areas were in fact so called ‘off-the-shelf’ schemes that the local authorities had previously identified but had not been able to implement due to a lack of funding (NAO, 2007:17), or areas where regeneration efforts had failed previously.

Their inclusion points to the fact that the Pathfinders needed to deal with at times complex local histories and relations between the stakeholders, especially between the existing community and the local authority in question. As will be shown in the empirical chapter, these contextual nuances had a significant influence on the residential relocation approach and delivery in HMR. Figure 2-4: Map of HMR Pathfinder Areas, shows the location of HMR Pathfinders and their geographical coverage.
The system of Pathfinder selection was one of the reasons HMR intervention areas differed substantially from one another. While the majority of the Pathfinders consist of two authorities (i.e. BNG, GW, UL, MSP, PIA), others are made up of four (TSY) to five local authorities (TVL). Consequently, Pathfinders differed in size. For instance, TSY, the largest Pathfinder, covered 14,286 hectares, while UL less than a quarter of that, at 3,295 hectares. The difference in
geographical size did not equate to population size; at 161,296 UL had more than half of the TSY population. HMR intervention areas also varied in number of households and household spaces see Table 2-4: *Pathfinders: area, population, households and household spaces*.

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>161,295</td>
<td>152,354</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>58,009</td>
<td>57,160</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>63,756</td>
<td>60,631</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNS</td>
<td>5,612</td>
<td>150,447</td>
<td>146,637</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>61,461</td>
<td>64,100</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>65,285</td>
<td>67,896</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>5,402</td>
<td>272,559</td>
<td>246,464</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>114,359</td>
<td>109,647</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>124,539</td>
<td>118,345</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5P</td>
<td>6,379</td>
<td>260,984</td>
<td>240,370</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>109,766</td>
<td>102,085</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>124,533</td>
<td>116,243</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>4,946</td>
<td>183,548</td>
<td>183,143</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>72,424</td>
<td>72,593</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>77,463</td>
<td>77,106</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEL</td>
<td>8,818</td>
<td>213,900</td>
<td>206,770</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>82,991</td>
<td>81,754</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>91,090</td>
<td>89,870</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSY</td>
<td>14,286</td>
<td>311,713</td>
<td>297,887</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>126,487</td>
<td>125,132</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>132,887</td>
<td>131,461</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GW</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>253,524</td>
<td>241,412</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>103,113</td>
<td>103,078</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>108,619</td>
<td>110,538</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>3,686</td>
<td>170,623</td>
<td>154,790</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>73,207</td>
<td>68,716</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>79,270</td>
<td>74,035</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All pathfinders</td>
<td>59,271</td>
<td>1,978,593</td>
<td>1,869,827</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>801,817</td>
<td>784,265</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>867,442</td>
<td>846,125</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Different contexts dictated variance in the types of settlements covered and reasons for HMR intervention. Some of the Pathfinders tended to cover relatively freestanding or isolated settlements and local economies in their entirety (e.g. Renew North Staffordshire, Elevate East Lancashire and Hull) while others are a part of much wider conurbations, such as in Birmingham, Sandwell, Manchester and Salford (Leather et al., 2007:13). Cities such as Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield and Birmingham, have been the focus of successive government regeneration initiatives prior to HMR. In contrast, in places such as North Staffordshire and East Lancashire the collapse of the urban infrastructure and the more testing prospects for inward investment raised issues about ‘catch-up’ costs of regeneration, particularly in relation to transportation and environmental improvement (Cole & Nevin, 2004:37).

While the Pathfinders had different starting points and different contexts, they all ‘exhibited housing market weakness, manifested in the presence of neighbourhoods with property prices lower than average, high vacancy rates, high population turnover, low demand for social rented housing, low sales values and, in extreme cases, housing abandonment and failure of the market for owner occupation’ (Leather et al., 2007:4).

Population loss and abandonment were two of the key issues HMR wished to tackle. According to Leather et al., over the ten-year period between 1991 and 2001, the Pathfinders’ population fell by
an average of 6%. While all suffered population loss, the degree of this loss was different across areas. The Pathfinders that suffered the largest population loss were NewHeartlands and Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (9%), followed by Manchester and Salford (8%). Population loss resulted in housing abandonment in the most extreme cases. Vacant properties were a significant measure of market weakness, both for particular property types and tenures, and for wider neighbourhoods (Leather et al., 2007:56). The Pathfinders had a higher rate of vacancy than the regional and national average. At the time vacancy levels in England as a whole were around 3%; the Pathfinders’ average was 7.5%. The vacancy rate similarly to other indicators was quite different across HMR intervention areas. For example, Manchester and Salford Partnership (MSP) had over 11% of vacancy in its intervention area, while Renew North Staffordshire’s vacancy stood at exactly half of MPS’s, at 5.6% (Leather et al., 2007).

The unpopularity and abandonment of the properties in the Pathfinder areas was linked to prevalence or ‘oversupply’ of one type of dwelling (DETR, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b; Nevin et al., 2001). Flats and old terraces built around a hundred years ago were found to be less popular than other types of property available in the same localities. Terraced housing was the prevailing dwelling type in the majority of Pathfinders (e.g., EEL (68%), NH (55%), GW (54%) and PIA (50%)) and comprised 47% of all properties (in comparison to 26% in England as a whole). The situation was a bit different in Transform South Yorkshire where semidetached homes formed the majority and in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Tyneside where flats⁶ were the prevalent property type.

Clearance and demolition was seen as an important strategy to reduce the number of so-called ‘unpopular properties’ or properties that were in ‘oversupply’ and replace them with other types. This intervention caused residential relocation. The next sections aim to present some of the Pathfinder areas’ characteristics that are deemed particularly important for examining residential relocation delivery. The data presented is based on the 2001 Census, because it was this data that informed the choice of the Pathfinders and defined the intervention initially.

### 2.5.1.1 Pathfinders’ tenure composition

Pathfinder intervention areas covered old neighbourhoods built for workers in traditional industries. This is the reason the prevalent type of dwelling was the terraced house. In the

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⁶ These are pairs of single-storey flats (also called Tyneside flats) within a two-storey terrace, a common type of Victorian housing in urban England. Their distinctive feature is their use of two separate front doors onto the street, each door leading to a single flat.
In the nineteenth century, when the majority of the housing in Pathfinder areas was built, properties were privately rented. After the Second World War this housing was transformed into council housing. From the 1970s onwards, the council stock has been sold off to the occupiers through ‘Right to Buy’ and transferred to the Housing Associations and ALMOs who took over the maintenance and management of the stock for the local councils. Consequently, Pathfinder intervention locations contained a patchwork of housing tenures, mostly inhabited by economically disadvantaged people.

Figure 2-5: Tenure by Pathfinder Intervention Area, 2001 presents the tenure ratio in each of the nine original Pathfinders in 2001. It shows that in 2001, when the data was collected, there were three main and two secondary tenure categories present in the Pathfinder areas. These are: owner occupiers, social housing tenants and private tenants. The first group is further subdivided into the owner occupiers (outright) and those with a mortgage, while social tenancy is divided into housing provided by local authorities and housing associations.

In general terms, in the Pathfinder areas collectively, the proportion of owner occupiers was much lower (48%) than in England as a whole (69%). At the same time, the proportion of local authority

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7 An Arms Length Organisation, commonly referred to as ALMO, is a non-profit company that provides housing services on behalf of a local authority. ALMOs are usually set up by the local authority to manage and improve all or part of its housing stock. Ownership of the housing stock itself normally stays with the local authority.
tenants was over twice the 27% national average. Levels of renting from housing associations, at 10%, were also higher than the national average (6%).

Individual Pathfinder intervention areas differed significantly from the overall picture. Figure 2-6: *Pathfinder intervention area tenures mix (census 2001)*, presents a breakdown of tenure types in individual Pathfinders based on the 2001 Census data. For instance, Elevate East Lancashire (65% owner occupation combined) was the closest to the national average of 69%, reflecting the historically high level of home ownership in this area. Five areas, Renew North Staffordshire, Partners in Action, Gateway, Urban Living, and Transform South Yorkshire, had around 50% owner occupation. Finally three, New Heartlands, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and Manchester Salford Partnership, had around 40% owner occupation (Leather et al., 2007:29).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathfinders</th>
<th>Percentage of tenure in the pathfinder intervention areas (%)</th>
<th>Owner Occupiers</th>
<th>Social Tenants</th>
<th>Private T.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owning Outright</td>
<td>Owning with Mortgage</td>
<td>Local Authority Tenants</td>
<td>Housing Association Tenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging Newcastle Gateshead</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevate East Lancashire</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateway Hull</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Salford</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newheartlands (Merseyside)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in Action</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renew North Staffordshire</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform South Yorkshire</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Living (Birmingham and Sandwell)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leather et al., 2007 based on the 2001 Census.

The tenure mix within the individual Pathfinder areas was not homogenous either. Individual projects within each Pathfinder differed significantly from the overall Pathfinder picture. For example, in the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead, three priority intervention areas each had a quite different tenure mix from that of the BNG averages. The Scotswood scheme area was 46.9% owner occupied housing, 30.3% of all housing belonged to the local authority, 10.5% to housing associations, and 9.6% to private landlords. In Walker, another BNG development project within the same Pathfinder local authority (Newcastle), the tenure ratio was different. Here, around 80%
of the housing was socially rented when the neighbourhood was chosen as a BNG intervention area. In Bensham, a BNG priority scheme in Gateshead, private renting seemed to be particularly high, at around 29%, with pockets of 40 to 60% of this tenure. Here, for example, owner occupation was quite high in comparison with Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, standing at 48% of the total housing.

HMR market failure was partly attributed to the ratio of the tenures being wrong for the issues HMR wished to address. One of the main HMR goals was to adjust the tenure mix in favour of owner occupation, a tenure that seemed to help communities be more sustainable. Demolition and clearance were important strategies of achieving tenure mix change in the Pathfinder areas. Therefore, residential relocation affected tightly bound communities and housing arrangements irrespective of the nature of ownership. No other policy in the UK has embarked on the demolition of mixed tenure neighbourhoods on a scale comparable to HMR. In addition, no other policy has attempted to do this with so little residential relocation guidance.

2.5.1.2 Selected economic indicators and population characteristics

In order to understand what section of the population was affected by HMR interventions in general and by residential relocation in particular, it is important to explore some of the economic indices as well as population characteristics within the Pathfinder areas.

The overall economic activity in the Pathfinder areas was significantly lower (53%) than in England as a whole (64%). It was the lowest in Manchester Salford Partnership (47%) and NewHeartlands (48%) Pathfinders. While Gateway Hull, Transform South Yorkshire, Partners in Action and Elevate East Lancashire were better off (around 56%) they were still much less economically active than England as a whole. Figure 2-7: Pathfinder intervention areas: population aged 16-74 economic activity shows that the unemployment in the Pathfinder areas was much higher than the national average in 2001 (when the evidence was collected). Given the low levels of economic activity, it is not surprising that average incomes in the Pathfinder areas were significantly lower than those for surrounding areas and the regions within which they were located. Average incomes for the majority of Pathfinder areas fell in the range of 80-85% of the regional average.
However, explanations differed for such low economic performance in the Pathfinder areas. While some Pathfinders had large proportions of students (MSP), in others the reason for economic hardship may have been high concentrations of the disabled and unemployed people on benefits (BNG), or a high proportion of black and ethnic minority (BME) population (UL, 84.8%). On average, the proportion of white British people in the Pathfinder areas was close to or higher than the national average. For example, in Gateway white British people made up 97.7% of the population, followed by RNS, NH and BNG with around 93% each. At 11%, the proportion of people in the Pathfinder areas, who were permanently sick or disabled in 2001 was almost twice the national average. BNG and NH had the highest proportion of this group. While the age structure and household composition data suggests that the proportion of retired people aged 60-74 in Pathfinder areas was much lower compared to the national average, the household composition data points to a high proportion of single parents in NH (14.3%).

The common denominator, however, was that for different reasons the population found in the Pathfinder areas was economically challenged. The Pathfinder areas were seen as the result of a
residualisation process: in other words, people lived in the Pathfinder areas only because they couldn’t afford to live anywhere else. Clearly, as with other indices the reasons for this varied between the individual Pathfinders. The characteristics of the population in the Pathfinders suggest that different issues needed to be dealt with in the process of relocation. Clearly this raises questions about the resources and strategies Pathfinders needed to develop in order to relocate the residents from the areas earmarked for demolition.

2.5.2 The Pathfinder partnerships

The new Pathfinder administrative bodies were sub-regional strategic partnerships made up of central, regional and local stakeholders that involved joint work over a number of adjacent local authority areas (Leather et al., 2007:41). Each Pathfinder comprised a Pathfinder Board and Core Team. HMR partnerships were the only public bodies eligible to bid for HMR funding. HMR resources were supposed to be used creatively to initiate development, foster partnerships, fund new ways of doing things and attract private funding.

![Image: HMR Pathfinders position and links with central, regional and local government](image)

‘Department’ refers to DCLG
Adopted from NAO, 2007 (Red emphasis added by the Author)
Pathfinders were introduced into a maze of institutions already operating in HMR areas. Figure 2-8: *HMR Pathfinders position and links with central, regional and local government* shows the position of the Pathfinders in relation with the regional and local agencies. The objectives were to ensure that HMR met its market renewal objectives in terms of the operation of sub-regional housing markets, and to balance and synchronise the already existing programmes, policies and streams of funding with that of HMR.

However, all Pathfinders were faced with a potential contradiction. Pathfinders were non-statutory bodies and did not possess powers with which to enforce implementation of their strategies. In order to achieve their HMR goals, Pathfinders needed to establish links and develop relationships with a number of different partners in the public and private sectors for each HMR objective (Cole & Nevin, 2004:34). In order to deliver demolition and residential relocation Pathfinders needed to influence partners with the necessary statutory powers (Cole & Nevin, 2004:34). This requirement clearly put emphasis on the ‘ability’ of each of the Pathfinders to develop such relationships in each specific sub-region.

In addition, ‘no guidance has ever been issued to the Pathfinders which set out Government expectations in respect of Governance’ (ECOTEC, 2007). Each Pathfinder was required to define their own governance structure and membership according to the goals adopted in their local context. As a result the Pathfinders’ governance structures differed from one partnership to another. As will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this issue had an important impact on the way residential relocation was planned and delivered in the HMR framework.

2.5.2.1  *Pathfinder boards*

Pathfinder boards were the main governing bodies of HMR sub-regional partnerships. They were strategic bodies set up by each Pathfinder to collaboratively make decisions about key aspects of HMR implementation and attempt to draw partners in to achieve the main HMR goals in their sub-regional constituencies. In other words these were strategic bodies that were normally not involved in the day-to-day delivery of the programme. Interventions such as residential relocation were normally not on the boards’ agendas, unless residential relocation halted the development plans for any reason. According to ECOTEC (2007) the functions that the Pathfinder boards tended to cover were:
• Strategic Development
• Market Intelligence
• Communication
• Financial Management
• Monitoring and Evaluation
• Partnership Development
• Advocacy (ECOTEC, 2007:4).

The Pathfinders’ boards varied in size as well as in membership. Appendix 1 Pathfinder board membership shows some of the key stakeholders that were normally represented on the Pathfinder boards according to NAO (2007). Key partners in all Pathfinders were the local authorities and their local strategic partnerships. Regional Development Agencies, and national agencies such as the Housing Corporation and/or English Partnerships (latter merged into Homes and Communities Agency) were present at all boards. Pathfinder boards varied in inclusion or non-inclusion of the private sector. For instance, MSP, GH and PIA had private sector developers on their board while others did not report these actors on their board in 2009. At the local level the variation was in the inclusion of the housing associations, and agencies such as the police, Strategic Health Authority, and New Deal for Communities.

2.5.2.2 Pathfinder governance structures

Governance form follows function. In the absence of central government guidance the Pathfinder structures evolved at the sub-regional level in response to their specific context as well as the goals the Pathfinders set themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-5: Pathfinders’ governance structures by type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic partnerships</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal unincorporated partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company limited by guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merged with regional regeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pathfinders’ governance arrangements changed frequently as they were adjusted to the local circumstances. At the time of inquiry there were four major governance arrangements that
Pathfinders operated by. As is shown in Table 2-5: *Pathfinders’ governance structures by type*, the majority of the Pathfinders adopted ‘*strategic partnerships*’ as the governance structure. However, there were three additional types of governance forms existing across the Pathfinders at the time of writing. These are: Informal unincorporated partnership, Company limited by guarantee, and a Merger.

2.5.2.2.1 Strategic partnership

Adopting a form of ‘strategic partnership’ (SP) as a Pathfinder’s governance structure was government’s suggestion, not a directive. None the less, six out of nine original Pathfinders adopted this form. For this reason, special attention is given to SP. In general terms, ‘strategic partnership’ is a form of macro-partnership that aims to join existing partnerships in an area (in the Pathfinder’s case, a sub-region) and provide strategic direction. This local governance structure was devised by the New Labour government and initially designed for the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) (Bailey, 2003). The form was later adopted for the purposes of HMR Pathfinders. The advantage strategic partnership governance structure was thought to be able to secure was a more advanced stage in the development of urban policy in England. Namely, at the beginning of the 2000s, England’s urban regeneration landscape was overpopulated with a multitude of small partnerships. Bailey (2003:444) points out that these ‘partnerships were set up often in very localised areas under a series of piecemeal and unfocused policy initiatives’. For instance, in BNG, the sub-regional ‘strategic partnership’ form was adopted as the preferred mechanism to bring together Newcastle and Gateshead councils as well as an existing array of centrally funded agencies, existing partnerships, the private sector and local people. The objective was to align their work and resources and ensure that a collaborative approach was taken to renew the housing market.

In the case of HMR Pathfinders in general and BNG in particular, the ‘strategic partnership’ governance form was adopted from the Local Strategic Partnerships model. This model has four main characteristics (see DTLR, 2001:10). When applied to the case of HMR Pathfinders these characteristics are the following:

1. Pathfinders bring together at a sub-regional level the different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives, programmes and services support each other and work together;
2. Be a non-statutory, non-executive organisation;
3. Operate at a level which enables strategic decisions to be taken and yet is close enough to individual neighbourhoods to allow actions to be determined at the community level;
4. Be aligned with low and weak demand boundaries at a sub-regional level.
2.5.2.2 Informal unincorporated partnership

The Manchester Salford Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder (MSP) was the only Pathfinder that adopted informal unincorporated partnership as their governance structure. The word 'unincorporated' means that the founding members have not constituted the group in a formal manner and it is run informally. Such a partnership is not recognised by law as a legal body. Members have a contractual rather than statutory relationship; they have all have agreed or 'contracted' to come together for a particular purpose. Unlike an incorporated partnership (e.g. a limited company) an unincorporated partnership has no legal rights because it is not perceived as a separate entity, unlike a limited company. An informal, unincorporated partnership has no existence or personality separate from its individual members. The individual members are legally responsible for the acts and omissions of the entire association.

2.5.2.2.3 Company limited by guarantee

Elevate was the only Pathfinder that adopted the ‘company limited by guarantee’ governance structure (English Partnerships, 2005). It is owned by its local authorities. The design of this type of structure came about as a result of local circumstances. According to the Audit Commission (2009)

‘The Elevate Pathfinder has been acknowledged as one of the most complex in terms of political and geographic make-up. The reason for this is because it covers four district councils, one unitary and one county council, making it essential for governance and delivery purposes to establish an effective and accountable delivery mechanism. The separate and short-term decision-making and planning processes across the various partnership boundaries required the establishment of a new legal entity that was local authority owned but with sufficient autonomy and flexibility to plan and respond to the manifest challenges and emerging opportunities across the sub-region’ (Audit Commission, 2009).

2.5.2.2.4 Merger

In 2007, Renew North Staffordshire (RNS) merged with the North Staffordshire Regeneration Partnership (NSRP). NSRP itself runs as an unincorporated body. This meant that the strategic decision-making had become part of the regional agency’s responsibility and had been taken away from RNS. This is the only Pathfinder that ceased to exist as an independent body.
2.6 Conclusion: residential relocation the forgotten nemesis of HMR

This chapter presented the background of Housing Market Renewal, an initiative that reintroduced large-scale housing demolition and clearance in England. The chapter also showed that HMR was designed differently from preceding housing policies developed in the UK. It was down to sub-regional partnerships, the Pathfinders, to formulate their sub-regional strategies and manner of HMR implementation in the year following the announcement of the Sustainable Communities Plan. No precise template for this was provided. The programme was expected to develop organically, as programmes were adjusted to meet changed market conditions, and as a result of Pathfinder experiences elsewhere (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).

According to Ferrari and Lee (2010) interventions aimed at large-scale change, such as through the acquisition and demolition of properties, were possibly what really marked HMR out as different from previous approaches (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:97). Most importantly for the present study, HMR devised a cross-tenure approach which meant that the programme caused relocation of residents across different tenures: owner occupiers, social and private tenants.

However, residential relocation was not listed as one of HMR’s goals or interventions at the national or Pathfinder levels. No guidance was issued to set the standards for residential relocation delivery and outcomes. Residential relocation was also not considered in the research leading to the launch of HMR. The authors of the M62 Corridor research, for instance, envisaged a ‘tenure blind’ approach in order to include all properties in the intervention areas irrespective of ownership (Cole & Nevin, 2004; Nevin, 2010; Nevin et al., 2001). However, the issue complexities that this approach would cause in terms of residential relocation from these areas were not accounted for.

Several authors have pointed out the challenge HMR presented in terms of implementation generally. As early as 2004, Cole and Nevin pointed out that ‘there [was] a need for a greater degree of clarity at the national, regional and local level about what the Market Renewal programme [was] trying to achieve’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:x). Ferrari and Lee argued that ‘the ambition and rhetoric of the programme created confusion as to how precise interventions would bring about perceived improvements in the market, which in turn confused the degree to which HMR was accountable, and how Pathfinders should consult’ (Ferrari & Lee, 2010:125). Related to this point was the lack of guidance as to the way in which Pathfinders’ governance structures were to be set up. As shown above the Pathfinders’ governance structures developed on sub-regional level and differed markedly.
The issue that seems especially important when considering residential relocation is that the Pathfinders did not have statutory power to intervene in the built environment; in other words they could not directly demolish housing nor relocate residents. These issues needed to be attended to through collaboration with partners that possessed this power. This raises questions about the way relocation was delivered at the Pathfinder level as well as questions about accountability over the intervention. Examination of the way the Pathfinders responded to the complex demands of HMR intervention is at the heart of this study.

The next chapter looks into the way the issue of residential relocation was conceptualised and researched in the HMR framework as well as the research that preceded it.
Chapter 3: Residential Relocation

3.1 Introduction

In the UK, the demolition of older housing has been an active policy area since the late 1880s, when the government first authorised the statutory demolition of unsanitary slums (Power, 2008). Therefore, the Housing Market Renewal (HMR) initiative is part of an extensive history of ideas and ways of conducting urban renewal and research about residential relocation. This chapter presents an overview of the literature on policy-caused residential relocation in Britain. The focus is on state policy planned housing demolition and residential relocation caused specifically by this type of intervention. The chapter is organised in two main sections: first, an overview of the policies planning mass housing demolition and inducing residential relocation; second, a definition of the terms displacement and residential relocation. The historical overview is divided into three main sections. First, an overview of the way demolition and clearance came to be part of state intervention in the UK in the nineteenth century; the interwar slum clearance; and the post Second World War slum clearance and its critique. Second, the 35 years in which mass demolition was abandoned as state intervention in the UK. Third, the re-introduction of mass clearance with the Housing Market Renewal programme in 2002. In each of the sections five key questions are addressed: (1) Who were the key actor/s shaping residential relocation according to the available research? (2) What was the process like? (3) What were the residential relocation outcomes? (4) What was the tenure of the residents affected by residential relocation? (5) What was the term used by researchers to describe residential relocation in the given period?

The conceptual section provides a discussion of gentrification theory and the term ‘displacement’ that came to dominate research of planned demolition caused residential relocation in the 2000s in the UK and abroad. It provides an argument for deviating from this critical line of inquiry and suggests a need for adopting an alternative research approach. The chapter concludes with
providing a definition of the concept of residential relocation used in this research, based on discussion of the various forms it might take.

3.2 Policies Proposing Large-scale Housing Demolition in England from the 1850s till the 2000s

3.2.1 Introduction of slum clearance – nineteenth-century England

For much of this historical period, development proceeded in an unregulated fashion. In the nineteenth century, the urban population of industrial England saw unprecedented growth as people poured into the cities in search of new sources of income. The absence of planning combined with high demand for basic shelter led to extreme overcrowding and insanitary conditions. According to Gibson and Langstaff (1982) the rationale for the first slum clearance in Britain was rooted in the anxiety that epidemics of diseases such as cholera could spread from the slum areas and slum dwellers to the ‘healthy’ (middle class) city quarters.

Housing demolition and clearance were first introduced in 1868, by the Artisans and Labourers Dwelling Act (Torrens Act). The Act gave local authorities the power to demolish individual unfit houses. While the 1868 Act focused on individual houses, slum clearance was first put forward in 1875 with the passing of the Cross Act (Artisans and Labourers’ Dwellings Improvement Act 1875). This Act first permitted the local authorities to purchase and clear areas of unfit housing, as well as build on them. In the years between 1848 and 1872 five housing and public health acts were passed, which established basic levels of sanitary provision, building standards and provided housing for the labouring classes (Malpass & Murie, 1994:32). The 1875 Public Health Act consolidated previous measures, established principles for the purchase of land by local authorities and set up the framework for extending local building by-laws (Malpass & Murie, 1994:32). The ideas put forward in the 1875 Act were further advanced, with the first Housing and Town Planning Act 1909, which empowered the local authorities to provide plans for urban development (including streets and districts in a planned and organised manner) and draw up schemes for the clearance and rebuilding of slum areas (Malpass & Murie, 1994:35). The Acts enabled the local councils to force owners (mainly landlords) to repair or demolish dangerous properties at their own expense. While the use of these first Acts was fairly limited, the introduction of the legislation marked a turning point for a state that previously did not intervene in the activities of the housing suppliers.
3.2.1.1 ‘Slums’ and ‘slum dwellers’ in Victorian England

In Victorian England areas of substandard housing were termed ‘slums’. The term ‘slum’ came with an implication (and assumptions) about the characteristics of the ‘slum dwellers’. These assumptions in turn shaped the relationship between the authorities clearing ‘slums’ and affected residents (so called ‘slum dwellers’) as well as the relocation process itself. In nineteenth-century England, the working-class slum areas were considered to be the loci of disease, crime, and other forms of social pathology (Gauldie, 1974; Gibson & Langstaff, 1982; Wohl, 1977).

The fear and repulsion of the lower classes by the ruling elite (Gauldie, 1974) left little room for, or interest in examining the economic and societal causes of poverty (Wohl, 1977). The dominant discourse simply attributed the blame for poor living conditions to those affected by them (Wohl, 1977). For instance, Bosanquet (1899) and Booth (1902) blamed poverty and disease in slums on husbands drinking away their earnings and submitting their wives to having more children than they could support.

The elitist stance of the upper class effectively divided the population into Etzioni’s (1993) notion of ‘us and them’, the emancipated ‘us’ and the ‘them’ in need of cultivation and rule, a system of rule where the line of division between the two poles was employed to justify intervention without consultation about the intervention or support of residents through residential relocation. The approach to slum clearance and relocation of the period is best illustrated through Gauldie’s words: ‘clear away the filth, clear away disease, clear away the paupers’ (1974:132).

The relocation was termed ‘forced eviction’ (Young & Willmott, 1957). While compensation was provided for the owners of the demolished housing (starting from the reformed Torrens Act 1879) it is worth pausing to mention the tenure composition in the UK at the time. Prior to the First World War 90% of households rented their accommodation from private landlords, 2% rented from local authorities and only the reminder were owner occupiers (Pacione, 2005:220). Slum clearance affected mainly the private tenants renting in cheap ‘slum’ areas. Therefore, slum clearance simply led to the displacement of those affected often to other areas of poverty and overcrowding in the private rented sector.

3.2.2 The interwar period (1914–1939)

The interwar period in Britain led to far more state intervention than had seemed possible before 1914 (Malpass & Murie, 1994:44). According to Ravetz (2001) the new housing policy can be
seen as one result of a war which provided political motivation and opportunity to the more organised and respectable elements of the working class. Throughout the period the role of the local authorities in the implementation of central government housing policy was strengthened (Malpass & Murie, 1994:63). The introduction of financial assistance for slum clearance and housing provision (including replacement housing) by the state played a key role in this process. It set the pattern of roles in which central government provided financial assistance and local authorities built and managed the housing (Malpass & Murie, 1994:53).

According to Malpass & Murie (1994:44) interwar housing policy consisted of two main elements (a) rent control in the private sector and (b) development of the public sector, which can itself be separated into two distinct activities, provision for general housing need and for need arising from municipal slum clearance programmes. This section focuses on the issue of slum clearance and resultant relocation.

While the Acts of the late nineteenth century did not have a significant take up, the initiative in the 1930s resulted in over 1.25 million housing units being demolished or sealed up and more than one and a quarter million people re-housed (Gibson & Langstaff, 1982). Slum clearance affected primarily the private rented sector that included a high proportion of the oldest and poorest dwellings, many built before 1919 (Pacione, 2005:223).

The housing policies between 1914 and 1920s focused on easing housing shortage after the war. After 1930 local authorities were pushed towards a different role, abandoning general housing needs in favour of slum clearance. The Housing Act of 1930 (called the Greenwood Act after Arthur Greenwood, the then Labour Minister of Health) introduced, for the first time, a state subsidy specifically for slum clearance. The subsidy was related to the number of people displaced and re-housed, rather than, as in previous Housing Acts, the number of houses built (Bowley, 1945; Hobhouse, 1994).

In 1930, local authorities were required to draw up plans for slum clearance. The 1930 Act stated that, in deciding whether a dwelling was unfit for human habitation, local authorities were to take into account the extent to which sanitary conditions or the repair of a particular house fell short of the local by-laws or the general standard of working-class housing in the district. However, these standards were not clearly defined and were opened to interpretation by local officers. According to Burnett (1978:238) there were many who felt that this lack was one of the chief failings of the Greenwood Act.
After a slum clearance area was declared by the Council and approved by the Minister of Health, the council had the obligation to re-house residents (mostly private tenants) affected by the intervention. From 1933 local authorities were encouraged by the subsidy system to concentrate their new build on the needs generated by the clearance programme (Malpass & Murie, 1994:46). Thus affected residents were to be relocated into council housing that was generally in better condition. In practice however, the resultant housing programme was limited politically and financially, and affordable only by the most affluent members of the artisan class (Swenarton, 1981).

When contemplating slum clearance schemes, it was extremely difficult to find alternative accommodation which those displaced could afford. In cases where alternative properties were not available for any reason, the councils would purchase private property and divide it into two-flat dwellings to re-house residents and allow building work to proceed (Hobhouse, 1994).

According to Hobhouse (1994) slum clearance did break up existing communities. Some cleared sites were simply not usable for re-housing and the residents would be relocated to remote council estates, while, where the site was reusable, the first group of people had to be removed elsewhere in order to allow initial clearance and redevelopment. Not surprisingly, there is plenty of evidence that many slum dwellers did not welcome their enforced move. For instance, the occupants of Spring Gardens Place, Millwall, declared a clearance area by the London County Council (EEN, 22 May 1936, p. 4), did not want to move from their existing cottages to new council flats on the nearby West Ferry Estate because they feared loss of their gardens and privacy (Hobhouse, 1994).

In the interwar period, the private rented sector declined quite rapidly as a proportion of all housing because of slum clearance and the transfer of over 1 million existing rented houses into owner occupation (Malpass & Murie, 1994:48). By the outbreak of the Second World War, the pattern of housing tenure had been significantly redrawn: in 1944, 12.4% of housing was rented from local authorities, 62% privately rented, 25.5% owner occupied (Pacione, 2005:221).

### 3.2.3 Post Second World War slum clearance (1954–1968)

The end of the Second World War brought a new sense of social idealism and public responsibility (Short, 1982). It became commonly accepted that there were limits to what free markets could achieve and that strong social policies were needed to protect people from the negative outcomes of the markets (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:44). Following the Beveridge Report (1942) the wartime coalition government and later the Attlee Labour government elected in 1945 introduced a number
of key reforms that radically extended the scope of state action in key spheres of social policy. The increased scale of state intervention that underpinned new social policies reflected a view that government could effectively intervene to tackle social ills. The UK saw the establishment of the welfare state.

In 1947, the landmark Town and Country Planning Act was passed. The essential change that it introduced was nationalisation of development rights and their associated values (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2002:161). The 1947 Act granted local authorities the power to acquire land for public works by compulsory purchase and provide compensation to the land owners. The Act formalised and legalised mass demolition and relocation as state (or state supported) intervention. This legislation became the most important institutional background for residential relocation after the Second World War and onwards.

The 1954 Housing Repairs and Rent Act restarted slum clearance which had been in abeyance since the 1930s (Malpass & Murie, 1994:66-67). The 1956 Housing Act introduced a subsidies system to help the local authorities in delivering slum clearance. It financed the demolition of obsolete housing as well as replacement council housing. With cross-party support for clearance throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, levels of slum clearance were sustained at around 12-60,000 dwellings per year (Short, 1982). Between 1955 and 1979, 1.5 million dwellings were demolished and 3.79 million people relocated in the UK (Pacione, 2005:233). This is undeniably an impressive quantitative achievement and would not have been possible without continuous support and empowerment of the local authorities from the centre.

The way the young welfare state democratic system was organised ensured that the way forward was articulated at a central government level and implemented through the system of hierarchy by the local authorities. In political terms the period between the 1940s and 1970s comprised a unitary state and a political system with strong central-local orientation (Cerny & Evans, 1999). The surrounding governmental dynamics meant that action was mobilised principally through parliamentary decisions and professionalised modes of implementation. The decision making reflected the political and professional belief that society operated in ways that were relatively homogenous, activities guided by clear goals and well-defined problems. The approach allowed the government as the central ruling body to identify and respond to the (perceived and at times abstract) needs of the population. The post Second World War slum clearance and subsequent

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8 The social policies of the era were based on strictly standardised units and social behaviours. For instance, they assumed male wage earners, child-rearing women, and a particular view of a family: the traditional nuclear family.
residential relocation was delivered in a way nowadays widely referred to as a ‘top-down’ approach (Malpass & Murie, 1994:64). Following the central government’s plans, local authorities were the main housing providers at the time and had statutory power to relocate residents from dwellings earmarked for demolition.

While statutory compensation was provided, it was rarely sufficient to enable households to purchase an alternative property somewhere else. The re-housing choices were limited to council housing, at least in part because slum clearance had played a key role in shrinking the private rental market (Power, 1993:209). This period saw an increase of council housing supply. Many council estates (also used for relocating residents from slum clearance areas) were a part of new towns and so-called overspill estates (built after the New Town Act 1946). Even though social housing provided much superior accommodation to that which was demolished, replacement estates were remote from the city centre where the slums were located, were poorly served by public transport, and lacked amenities (Coleman, 1985). Relocation from the inner city slum areas as well as general decentralisation of housing supply to the peripheries of cities contributed to the decay of inner city areas that later became part of HMR.

Young and Willmott (1957) showed that relocating people into the new social housing estates may have achieved better housing standards but broke many social ties and networks which people had previously relied on. The relocation was conducted with little or no regard to the willingness or ability of the relocated residents to support the expenses. Young and Willmott (1957) argued that the state’s new role in housing clearance and housing provision was influenced by a continuation of the Victorian perception that the poor are financially irresponsible and socially dysfunctional. Young and Willmott (1957) argued that the state’s focus on meeting assumed needs resulted in insensitivity towards other important aspects of people’s lives. The residents affected by relocation were largely ignored in the process, as their needs and characteristics were assumed rather than inquired into. The approach effectively took housing decisions away from residents affected by residential relocation and placed responsibility in the hands of the state and its delivery bodies. In some cases the communities appealed against demolition and compulsory purchase, however in deciding the outcomes the courts tended to put the primary importance on the issue of housing standards defined by the state or delivering authorities. The residential relocation was termed ‘forced relocation’ or ‘enforced eviction’.

In the 1970s the critiques of slum clearance mounted (Davies, 1972; Dennis, 1970, 1972; English & Madigan, 1976; Parker 1973). The coercive nature of the clearance policy, the effects on the
existing population and stress imposed on the residents, and its discriminatory outcomes, have been heavily criticised (English & Madigan, 1976; Parker, 1973; Young & Willmott, 1957; Power, 1993). Modern high-rise building, celebrated by the planning and architectural profession for its modern aesthetics and capacity to provide mass housing, was blamed for being inhuman in scale and unfit for family life. For example, in Liverpool, thousands of residents affected by slum clearance chose to share accommodation in terraced housing instead of moving to new council flats (Power 1987:53). The clearance schemes attracted criticism for their potential to cause problems to the affected residents (Coleman, 1985). Often redevelopment projects continued for over two decades as new building never caught up with the pace of demolition. For much of that time unused buildings, vacant lots and half-empty streets covered the centre of the city, causing vast economic and social damage (English & Madigan, 1976; Pacione, 2008; Parker, 1973; Young & Willmott, 1957; Power, 1993).

Mounting criticism coming from academic research, combined with economic difficulties and growing public resentment of the damage that large-scale redevelopment was inflicting upon settled urban communities (Dennis, 1970, 1972) led to the abandonment of the slum clearance in the 1970s. The resulting ‘enforced relocation’ in slum clearance led to questioning the right of the state to intervene in the built environment. The assumptions and beliefs on which the new welfare state paradigm was based in the UK (such as rational central rule approach, which many governmental agencies adopted), came under severe challenge as wider social and economic shifts began to undermine key elements of it (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:46).

### 3.2.4 35 years of abstinence from large-scale housing demolition

The 1968 White Paper ‘Old Houses into New Homes’ marked the end of the period of high levels of construction and demolition and the beginning of a shift towards rehabilitation and improvement of existing dwellings (Malpass & Murie, 1994:70). The end of the post Second World War slum clearance was officially marked with the publication of Labour’s ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’ White Paper in the late 1970s. This was the start of the period of almost 35 years when there was virtually no housing demolition in the UK.

This period in UK planning history is remembered for its introduction of small area-based initiatives, a tradition that continued up to introduction of HMR in 2002. Area based improvement policies were first used after the 1969 Housing Act which introduced the use of General Improvement Areas (GIAs). This Act advised the local authorities to declare GIAs in owner occupied areas in order to improve housing through voluntary take-up of improvement grants.
In response to criticisms of the GIA policy (see Short & Bassett, 1978) the 1974 Act supplemented GIAs with Housing Action Areas (HAAs), introduced compulsory improvement powers and strengthened the role of housing associations. Under the 1974 Housing Act, local authorities were empowered to declare HAAs to raise the housing quality and remove the underlying causes of housing stress in small areas of multiple deprivation (Short & Bassett, 1978:153). According to Kirby (1979), in the first instance the introduction of GIAs and HAAs did not mean that the clearance programme had been abandoned. Rather, the demolition was much smaller in scale and targeted at the worst properties while others were to be given improvement and repair (Kirby, 1979:87). Nonetheless, this piece of legislation reflected convergence of two trends in British housing policy, the shift in resource deployment from housing clearance and redevelopment to housing improvement and the growing use of area based policies.

3.2.4.1 Conservative government 1974-1997

An important changing point in British housing policy came in 1979 with the arrival of the Conservative government (Malpass & Murie, 1994:97). Facing economic crisis and not content with reworking the prevailing political economic philosophies, government’s intent was liberating markets while dismantling the pillars of the welfare state (Hall, 1979). The state project was dubbed Thatcherism (Jessop et al., 1998). ‘The role of urban policy was to assist with wealth creation and emphasis was placed on the (re) creation of markets in inner urban areas … Public private partnership in property development (rather than public sector led and funded initiatives) was seen as the route to economic and social as well as physical regeneration’ (Cochrane, 2007:89).

Economic and ideological drivers meant it was now the tenure, rather than the age or type of housing that was problematised and deemed to be in need of remediation. This period has seen massive council stock transfer into private ownership through ‘Right to Buy’ legislation and further strengthening of the housing associations (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006; Malpass & Murie, 1994).

Enterprise zones and urban development corporations⁹ (UDC) were established in a number of cities, directly appointed by central government and with planning powers to acquire land in anticipation of ‘leveraging’ private sector input, but crucially bypassing local government control (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988, Deakin & Edwards, 1993).

⁹ UDCs had multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms. These new institutions required public and private sector collaboration and were furnished with their own planning powers to attract capital to post-industrial areas.
From the 1990s, ‘a new wave of urban policies encouraged localities to compete for resources, with winners and losers based on “quality of their bids” rather than scale of deprivation’ (Oatley, 1998). The initiatives in the early 1990s, such as City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget, were built on the earlier established area-based initiatives tradition.

These reforms brought change in the relationship between central and local government. The position of local government was weakened significantly, while the private sector was included in service delivery (e.g. through privatisation of services traditionally provided by the state), this resulted in inclusion of a wide range of actors from public and private sectors into policy delivery.

In this period the residents did not relocate directly because of housing demolition but because of the economic changes in their localities (e.g. closure of the traditional industries). It was long term unemployment that made the residents move from the most severely deprived inner city areas. Others were displaced because of housing rent change, housing tax and price increase in regeneration areas. A heartfelt sense prevailed that 15 years of Conservative policy had done little for the urban areas annihilated by 1980s deindustrialisation, not least Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Tyne and Wear (MacLeod & Johnstone, 2012:6). The trends led to deterioration of inner city areas and widening spatial inequality in England.

3.2.5 Return to large scale housing demolition in HMR (2002–2011)

After almost two decades of Conservative rule, the Labour party regained power in 1997. One of the key goals of the Labour government was to tackle social inequality that had intensified during the Conservatives’ 18-year reign particularly in inner-city localities. The deepest concentration were in public or council housing estates increasingly residualised because of the Right to Buy initiative and an associated reduction in the commitment to build new council housing (Murie, 1997a).

The number of initiatives appeared to signal a commitment to reverse the trend towards escalating inequality, such as New Deal for Communities (NDC). A new ministerial body was established, the Social Exclusion Unit as well as the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit; Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 2001) mapped out a vision for long term community regeneration. These programmes were characterised by a new political language of social inclusion and ‘people-based

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10 In 1979, 14% of the UK population was classified as living in poverty, in the late 1990s 26% of the population was classified as living in poverty. In total 14.5 million (Gordon et al., 2000).
regeneration’ (Colenutt, 1999; Hills & Stewart, 2005; Imrie & Raco, 2003) that replaced the market-led regeneration of the previous period.

Working alongside these ‘regeneration’ policies was the urban renaissance; a vision of the ‘good city’ led by Lord Rogers (UTF, 1999). The emphasis was placed on innovative brownfield reuse and redevelopment, mixed use developments, quality streetscapes and public spaces, socially and culturally mixed neighbourhoods and higher urban densities. The report and subsequent white paper (DETR, 2000) had an aim to attract capital and people back to England’s city centres where exodus had become the prevailing trend (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:7). One programme to encourage the formation of sustainable communities – albeit marginally predating the official plan and which, as we have seen, was designed to stretch the geography of the urban renaissance – was Housing Market Renewal (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:8). Housing Market Renewal reintroduced large-scale housing demolition after 35 years when this policy tool was not utilised.

3.2.6 Housing Market Renewal and critical gentrification literature

In 2002, Housing Market Renewal was launched as a part of New Labour’s goals to reduce social inequality, promote urban renaissance and the creation of sustainable communities. HMR proposed demolition of around 100,000 residential units (this number was latter reduced to 60,000) therefore HMR became known as the second largest intervention of the kind since the post Second World War slum clearance.

The Housing Market Renewal initiative generated significant controversy. The apparent paradox between creating sustainable communities and resorting to radical physical intervention attracted lots of attention. Effectively it split the research community in England between academics supportive of the initiative and others critical of it. The supportive academics argued that the devolution of state power to Pathfinders (see Chapter 2), presented ‘a radical change in the relationship between the central government and those localities undergoing changes’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:viii, ix); this method promised responsiveness to local circumstances and residents’ needs. HMR critics argued that, on the contrary, by devolving power to the sub-regional partnerships, HMR was ‘a more top-down approach compared to other recent regeneration initiatives’ in England (NAO, 2007:6) and that it was characterised by inequalities in power and capital (Webb, 2010).

Residential relocation has not been given much attention by HMR supporters. Their work focused on examining and advancing HMR implementation on a large scale (Leather et al., 2007; Cole &
Nevin, 2004; Cole, 2008; Ferrari, 2007). With the exception of Cole and Flint’s (2007) report examining ‘some of the issues about support for residents in HMR Pathfinders during the clearance and relocation process’ (ibid., p.1), residential relocation was seen as a short-term disruption of individual households necessary to achieve housing market growth. However, residential relocation has been a bête noire of HMR critics. Demolition and clearance raised concerns about the displacement of households. Housing Market Renewal, much like the Hope VI programme in the USA, and similar programmes in Europe, had attracted the attention of ‘critical gentrification research’ (Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003, 2006; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). In the UK, perhaps more than in other countries, the debate about gentrification has moved from the ‘traditional’ argument that displacement is driven by market forces, to claims that gentrification is now a deliberate strategy of state-funded urban regeneration policies (see e.g. Atkinson, 2004; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008; Lees et al., 2008). Termed ‘state-led’ or ‘state-sponsored’, this type of gentrification, according to Hackworth and Smith (2001), represents an extension of the global reach and power of capital in promoting gentrification and involves an enhanced role of the state. Residents affected by demolition and relocation are more often than not presented as the victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence.

Cameron’s (2003) work played a significant role in conceptualising HMR as a state-sponsored gentrification initiative. He argues that the state’s role has been even more prominent where gentrification takes place in weak housing markets than in the well performing areas that have underpinned most British work on gentrification (see for example Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2003, 2008). For Cameron and Coaffee (2005) the struggle over displacement of the poorest residents by the middle classes in UK provincial cities is ‘an irrelevance’. They argue that ‘in cities most affected by deindustrialisation where the need for regeneration is most pressing, private capital has typically to be dragged “kicking and screaming”’ (Cameron & Coaffee, 2005:45). The argument continues that in low-demand housing markets like the HMR Pathfinders, the overt driver of gentrification and ‘displacement’ is neither gentrifiers nor capital, but the public sector in the form of the central and local state (Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or Pathfinders in the HMR case (Cameron, 2003). Cameron (2003) assessed the Going for Growth initiative in Newcastle upon Tyne, a plan that later became a part of the HMR intervention areas, against different models of gentrification. Building on the wider body of gentrification literature, Cameron proposed a new model of state-led gentrification that he termed: *public policy led gentrification*.

The recent wave of research in the UK has tied gentrification more explicitly to the agenda and language of ‘urban renaissance’ (Atkinson, 2002; Lees, 2008). According to Lees, ‘urban
Orna Rosenfeld  Governance of Relocation

renaissance’, and HMR as part of it, is ‘an aggressive, revanchist ideology designed to retake the inner city for the middle classes’ (Lees, 2008: 2449) – an ideology by which the low-income residents are vengefully displaced to make room for the state’s favoured middle class (Macleod, 2002; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). Unlike other gentrification theorists, the critical gentrification theorists or revanchist style commentators acknowledge the existence of a wide range of actors involved in HMR conception and delivery, but only to argue that the state controls them.

For Macleod and Johnstone (2012), HMR is ‘a process where a neoliberalizing state project enrols a range of agents’ and choreographs conditions for the displacement of low-income residents (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:11). As the result ‘… the geographical contours of the emerging urban form are increasingly choreographed through the control over and purification of urban space’ (MacLeod, 2002:603).

Allen (2008) extends the critique of the HMR programme using ‘contemporary class analysis’ (Allen, 2008:195). He argues that, ‘HMR represents a breaking of the English working class living in the inner city, in terms of both its being toward the market for houses and its visibility on the urban landscape’ (Allen, 2008:202). His argument is that the planning in the HMR framework as well as the type of the housing proposed are aimed at the state’s preferred middle class. He arrives at a conclusion that the reasons for displacement are rooted in dramatic differences in the consumption of housing by the middle and working classes (Allen, 2008:199). Allen (2008) identifies agents implementing HMR ‘as powerful coalitions of middle-class actors’, supported by the state in ‘institutionalised profit making’, emphasising the state as the central actor in the process of displacement.

According to critical gentrification theorists, HMR was deployed to ‘wipe out working-class imagery from strategically important parts of the urban landscape’ (Allen, 2008:150) with the aim of inscribing a new urban aesthetic onto the landscape of neighbourhoods that is meant to please the middle classes (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012:12). The residents affected by the interventions are seen as victims of structural forces they can do little to defy. The outcomes of the displacement are seen as negative and harmful for the residents in aggregate. A wide array of negative feeling has been targeted towards the HMR programme by critical gentrification theorists, and as Macauley (2006) has pointed out, these seem to have ‘an instinctive opposition to this approach of regeneration’. There have been a very limited number of contributions that contradicted this dominant view of the HMR critics and their conceptualisation of residential moves within this
framework as ‘displacement’. While such studies are relatively scarce in the UK, the works of Kettle et al. (2004), Steele (2010), Perry (2006) and Castella (2006) point to the mixed outcomes of residential relocation in the HMR framework.

For instance, Kettle et al.’s (2004) research conducted in Leeds points out that there appeared to be an acceptance among residents that, in certain circumstances, the time was right for demolition and that, overall, this decision was welcomed. These researchers point out the need to improve the process of decision making as that does not always allow for a full consideration of alternatives.

In different research in NewHeartlands, the Pathfinder that had been a stepping-stone for the critique of HMR by Allen (2008), the gentrification claims were contested in a different way. Steele (2010) in his (Pathfinder sponsored) report shows that: that on average 90% of respondents in this Pathfinder reported they were happy with their new home (Wirral 100%, Sefton 92% and Liverpool 84%) (Steele, 2010:2). Clearly, one could argue for potential bias as the report was commissioned by the Pathfinder. None the less, the results raise questions about the homogeneity of the results presented by HMR critics. Finally, Cole and Flint (2007) in their report on the issues of residential relocation in HMR, point out that there are several examples of good practice where the Pathfinders and local authorities engaging in relocation were providing a wide range of advice and support to the affected residents. They note resident support in terms of guidance, financial assistance, and the improvement of community involvement in the process.

3.3 From ‘Displacement’ to ‘Residential Relocation’

In terms of the literature concerning the matter of policy or development-induced resettlement, there is no one term that captures the phenomenon. As seen in the overview presented in this chapter, depending on the line of thought, relocation has been variably termed ‘forced eviction’, ‘enforced relocation’, ‘displacement’ and ‘involuntary displacement’. This study argues that employing these terms at the start of an exploratory study comes packed with assumptions from the previous (sometimes historical) research about the issue. The terms ‘forced eviction’ and ‘enforced relocation’ have their roots in the research developed around the issues of demolition in the interwar slum clearance and post Second World War slum clearance (Dennis, 1970, 1972; Davies, 1972; English et al., 1976; Parker, 1973; Young & Willmott, 1957). They come to depict the fact that the residents asked to leave their homes were ignored in the process and forced to relocate to council-chosen premises without much consultation or choice to do otherwise. The terms also come with institutional baggage implying that the young welfare state had the power to ‘enforce’ relocation in a hard-to-challenge, top-down manner. More importantly the labels ‘forced eviction’
and ‘enforced relocation’ are in fact conclusions of the research carried out about relocation that took place between the 1950s and the 1970s in the UK. As such they are they seem to be packed with assumptions about the way the process of relocation had been carried out in a different era.

In the 2000s, planned demolition has re-emerged as a state tool for urban regeneration. In England, Housing Market Renewal was launched. The research on this topic has been cast in a critical gentrification framework (see Allen, 2008; Cameron, 2003; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). The relocation from properties earmarked for demolition was termed ‘displacement’, even though the concept was initially coined to describe the process of residents moving from out of their properties because of housing price, rent or tax increase. This thesis argues that the predominant conceptual angle of gentrification does not seem appropriate for the case of planned demolition caused residential relocation. In the special issue on residential relocation (see Housing Studies Journal), visiting editors Keinhans and Kearns (2013) emphasise that ‘whereas gentrification studies often approach displacement as a negative usually unintended outcome [of housing market shifts], restructuring and relocation studies should acknowledge that residents’ transitions may be intended [and planned], and treat the desirability and effects of relocation more openly, as potentially positive or negative’.

The next section provides a discussion of gentrification theory which engages with the ‘displacement’ issue at the heart of current gentrification debates. It offers justification for deviating from this critical line of conceptualisation and inquiry that had come to dominate planned demolition driven residential relocation research. The section supports the argument that in addition to gentrification research alternative research is needed (Keinhans & Kearns, 2013; Rosenfeld, 2013); one that has the capacity to engage with the specific institutional context of planned demolition driven residential relocation (where statutory compensation and other forms of assistance are available to residents), the complexities of this process and its diverse outcomes. The section concludes with providing a more neural concept for examination and conceptualisation of planned demolition driven relocation.

### 3.3.1 Gentrification theory

Gentrification is a term that was initially coined to describe the process of taking over working-class areas of London by the middle classes through refurbishment and upgrading (Glass, 1964).

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11 Also referred to as ‘neighbourhood restructuring’ caused residential relocation.
The process of gentrification is argued to occur rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed (Glass, cited in Lees & Davidson, 2005). In the 1950s many cities experienced the gentrification of select central and inner-city neighbourhoods, most notably London and New York. ‘By the 1970s gentrification was widely regarded as an integral residential component of a larger process of urban restructuring linked with wider economic and social trends in capitalist society’ (Pacione, 2005:213). Displacement was part of the original definition of the gentrification process (Slater, 2006:747). It is considered to be a consequence of housing market shift, whether caused by the market or the state. More contemporary literature considers gentrification as a broad phenomenon of middle-class occupancy in previously working-class areas (Lees & Davidson, 2005; Smith, 1996). Consequently, the term displacement came to cover a wide variety of causes of residential moves in the built environment. According to gentrification theorists, residents may be displaced as a result of housing demolition, ownership conversion or rental units, increasing housing costs (rent, taxes), landlord harassment and evictions. Those who avoid these direct displacement pressures may benefit from neighbourhood improvements, but may suffer as critical community networks and culture are dismantled (Newman & Wyly, 2006).

3.3.1.1 Critical gentrification theory vs mainstream gentrification theory

According to Brenner et al. (2009) there are two lines of thought in gentrification theory so called ‘mainstream gentrification research’ and ‘critical gentrification research’. They both ‘view gentrification as essentially a class based process whereby working class or rundown areas of the city are transformed into middle class residential areas often with attendant changes in commercial use’ (Hamnett, 2009:476; Slater, 2010). However, their position about the issue of displacement is different.

At the heart of critical gentrification critique is that gentrification everywhere and always involves working-class displacement, that it is reprehensible and it must be opposed (Slater, 2010). In Slater’s view ‘displacement is and always will be vital to an understanding of gentrification, in terms of retaining definitional coherence and of retaining a critical perspective on the process’ (Slater, 2006:748). Critical gentrification theorists view displacement as having predominantly negative effects on the affected residents.

To the contrary the ‘mainstream gentrification’ theorists argue that gentrification does not always involve displacement nor is displacement the key cause of working class decline (Hamnett,
They provide a more balanced view on urban regeneration (within a framework of gentrification theory) and a critique of the critical gentrification position.

Critical gentrification research has been used to frame research on residential relocation caused by neighbourhood restructuring and planned demolition in the USA and Europe and it has been employed as a principal framework for studying relocation in HMR. In the next section I take a closer look at the definition of ‘displacement’ as proposed in this line of thought, and contrast it with mainstream theorists, as well as my own views on the displacement concept (that are not gentrification related) in order to point out the need for adopting a new, more neutral term that enables closer engagement with this specific cause of residential relocation and differentiates it from other possible causes of displacement.

### 3.3.1.2 Displacement

The term displacement covers different causes of residential relocation in urban areas: displacement due to housing rent increase (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996) ‘middle class invasion’ in global cities (Slater, 2006, 2010) demolition of the existing housing in low demand markets (Cameron, 2003, 2006; Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or the style of replacement housing (Allen, 2008). These are used interchangeably and in conjunction to explain the reasons for the working class moving from areas undergoing change. For critical gentrification theorists displacement is always present.

Mainstream theorists disagree with this position. For instance, Hamnett (2009, 2003) argues that there is a consistent assumption in the literature that gentrification is a cause of working class displacement, rather than a universal corollary (Hamnett, 2009:477). He argues that ‘the notion that gentrification equals displacement has been uncritically accepted as a conventional wisdom’ (Hamnett, 2009:477). In his critique of Slater’s work (2006, 2009) Hamnett points out:

> Slater is so convinced about the inevitability of displacement in all forms that he cannot see, and thus denies, the possibility of forms of urban social class change which do not necessarily hinge on displacement but reflect underlying changes in occupational structure (Hamnett, 2009:477–478).

He points out, for instance, that the private rented sector in London has greatly declined in size since the 1960s. He adds that ‘while there is no doubt that rapid house price inflation can and does effectively price out low-income residents (Hamnett, 2009) this is not the same as direct or forced displacement as is often simplistically assumed’ (Hamnett, 2009:477). Owners cannot be directly
displaced and council and social rented tenants generally have considerable security of tenure (ibid.).

In the case of planned demolition, residential movement is easier to spot, the residents are asked to relocate in order to allow redevelopment to proceed. However, what is usually omitted in the critical gentrification research is that based on the plans proposing demolition, affected residents are eligible for statutory compensation and other forms of support that residents who are priced out from their neighbourhood are not. Therefore, in this case as in the example brought by Hamnett, residents affected by planned demolition cannot be directly displaced. Relocation involves a long policy, planning and legal procedure and negotiation with the residents. In this sense Hamnett’s assessment of the displacement definition put forward by critical gentrification theorists applies to the specific case of planned demolition caused residential relocation as well:

By extending the definition of displacement so widely as to embrace provision of any new middle class housing in the city, whether conversion or new build, and any shops or restaurants that the middle classes may visit, Slater’s arguments lose both analytical and coherence and political bite’ (Hamnett, 2009:481).

3.3.1.2.1 Displacement outcomes and the position of the affected residents

In general terms critical gentrification views gentrification as an expression of urban inequality that has serious (negative) effects, and that academics have a role to play in exposing these effects and perhaps even challenging them (Hartman et al., 1982). The costs of neighbourhood revitalisation are argued to fall principally on displaced households who would not otherwise have moved but are forced to do so by raising occupancy costs that they cannot afford to pay (Pacione, 2005:218).

Residents affected by displacement (regardless of its cause) are more often than not presented as passive victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence (Allen, 2008). The outcomes are argued to be harmful and negative wherever and however displacement takes place.

Displacement from home and neighbourhood can be a shattering experience. At worst it leads to homelessness, at best it impairs a sense of community (Marcuse, 1985a: 931).

Efforts by the policy makers or practitioners to re-house residents back into their community don’t change critical gentrification theorists’ view on residential move. For instance, Fullilove (2004) equates displacement with a clinical condition called root shock:

Root shock, at the level of the local community, be it neighbourhood or something else, ruptures bonds, dispersing people to all the directions of the compass. Even if they manage to regroup, they are not sure what to do with one another. People who were near
are too far, and people who were far are too near. The elegance of the neighbourhood – each person in his social and geographic slot – is destroyed, and even if the neighbourhood is rebuilt exactly as it was, it won’t work. The restored geography is not enough to repair the many injuries to the mazeway (Fullilove, 2004:14).

Critical gentrification theorists argue that even when the displacement is relatively rare its impact is still so harmful that it requires widespread concern and should be opposed (Freeman, 2005: 488) along with the policies proposing it, according to Marcuse (1985).

In the Housing Studies special issue on planned demolition incurred residential relocation Kleinhans and Kearns (2013) point out that ‘whilst it is important to take possible negative effects into consideration, we do not need (nor should we) adopt such a totalising narrative in respect of all restructuring processes, where ever and however they occur’. While it is important to minimise the residential move in development and redevelopment projects, critical theorists’ argument about displacement outcomes seem to be hyperbolic.

While we know a lot about why regeneration initiatives (causing gentrification, according to gentrification theorists) should be cancelled, this body of literature has very little to say about the way residential relocation should be carried out in cases where the residents agree with the intervention. The guidance and solutions in this policy area are the scarcest.

3.3.1.2.2 Displacement measurement

Apart from the issue of conflating causes of displacement and a generalised view on their outcomes, perhaps the strongest argument against employment of the ‘displacement’ concept to capture residential movements incurred by planned demolition is the difficulty of its measurement. While critical gentrification theorists claim that displacement is a critical issue they are not able to show how many residents it affects.

The magnitude of dislocation is unknown ... though the scale of renovation, demolition, deconversion, and condominium conversion noted ... implies that tens of thousands of households have been involuntarily displaced through various forms of gentrification over the past twenty-five years in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa alone (Ley, 1996: 70).

Atkinson (2000) has called measuring displacement ‘measuring the invisible’, whereas Newman and Wyly sum up the quantification problem as follows:

In short, it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those people are poor … By definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers and census-takers go to look for them (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 27).
Marcuse (1985) attempted to measure displacement by proposing four types of measurement: a) economic/physical, where numbers of residents priced out or subjected to violence are estimated; b) last residents, counting only the last resident; c) chain, counting the residents, over time, who have been displaced from a property of area, and; d) exclusionary, where the number of people who have been vacated voluntarily from a gentrified area is counted. There are different forms of displacement and correspondingly different measures of the number of people affected. Critically the choice of definition affects observed level. Atkinson (2000) points out that ‘the difficulties of directly quantifying the amount of displacement and replacement and other ‘noise’ in the data are hard to overcome’ (Atkinson, 2000: 163).

Along with the confusion over the way to measure the number of residents affected by so-called displacement, in gentrification studies there is no consensus about the territorial unit in which residents are affected by ‘displacement’. The terms used are ‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’. However, their size and scale are opened to interpretation. This is further complicated by spill-over effects (the fact that the increase of prices can affect not only the regenerated but also the neighbouring areas).

At this point it is important to reiterate that the present study does not dismiss the occurrence of residential relocation, it challenges the usage of term ‘displacement’ to describe it in cases of planned demolition caused relocation where statutory compensation and other forms of support are available to the affected residents. The argument here is that residential relocation of this type is measurable and predictable, it is institutionally distinct from displacement caused by housing rent, price or tax increase. It is not an unintended consequence of market change. The number of residents affected and the territory are known; these details are required for approval of the plans proposing demolition. This is not to say that residential relocation should not be minimised whenever possible, but that its institutional context and process is distinct and can be more directly influenced for better outcomes. Therefore, placing it under the umbrella of ‘displacement’ (as covering various causes of residential move) is counterproductive.

3.3.1.2.3 Actors causing displacement

Critical gentrification theorists emphasise the role of the state in gentrification. According to gentrification theorists, governments’ involvement in gentrification can be both indirect (and enabling) and direct. For instance, central government’s taxation policy (e.g. relief on mortgage interest repayments, increasing or lowering housing tax) and grants for home improvement can facilitate gentrification (Pacione, 2005: 215). A direct influence may be exerted by local
governments which stand to benefit from the replacement of low-income groups through physical intervention such as refurbishment or planned demolition by middle-class consumers whose incomes boost the local economy (ibid.).

The use of state-led gentrification and critical gentrification theory implies that residential relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood simply as the result of a structural shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. However, this understanding is inevitably a selective one, which sacrifices institutional detail of cross-tenure relocation and obscures work taking place on a day-to-day basis as the residential relocation process is delivered.

A research system that focuses on the way that government operates fails to account for the much more complex (and interdependent) bargaining and negotiating process that takes place at neighbourhood level.

3.3.2 Conceptualising the term 'residential relocation' in this research

The term ‘residential relocation’ in this thesis is used to describe a process by which residents whose homes are earmarked for demolition are moved to alternative accommodation. It is linked to specific plans proposing demolition which have defined boundaries, and contain details about the residents and other stakeholders affected. It refers to a planning intervention that by its legislative definition entitles affected residents to receive statutory compensation and various levels of other support. In this study the term relates to relocating owner-occupiers, social and private tenants from the homes they occupy in the areas of HMR intervention.

Residential relocation can legally start only after the plans have been approved by the acquiring authority and appropriate government minister (DCLG, 2004, 2010). The residential relocation process develops only after the demolition plans are approved by the majority of the involved stakeholders. The key difference between ‘residential relocation’ and various forms of ‘displacement’ is that residents affected by demolition plans are eligible to statutory compensation and other types of support. This makes the institutional context of residential relocation (due to planned demolition) different from that of displacees due to rent or housing price increase who are not eligible for any type of support or compensation.

It is important to emphasise that the concept of residential relocation, unlike displacement, is not linked to the possibility of gentrification or its absence. Residential relocation is carried out at the beginning of the regeneration process when the outcomes of the projects still cannot be known. In
other words, the goal of the project may be to attract better earning residents at some point, but there is no certainty that this goal will in fact be achieved or when. Regardless of these final results, residential relocation is carried out because it is in most cases a prerequisite for redevelopment of the new building to commence. As such residential relocation is an integral part of the urban regeneration process rather than being its consequence. Table 3-1: Residential relocation vocabulary provides a ‘residential relocation’ vocabulary as used in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-1: Residential relocation vocabulary</th>
<th>Term definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential relocation</td>
<td>- is a residential move from properties earmarked for demolition to alternative ones. It refers to relocation of owner occupiers, social and private tenants in projects where statutory compensation and other forms of support are available. - Residential relocation is an integral part of urban regeneration process rather than its consequence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential relocation practice (delivery)</td>
<td>- Refers to various chains of activity that shape residential relocation experiences and outcomes for the residents. - Residential relocation practice is delivered by professionals (e.g. local authority departments, housing associations etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential relocation process</td>
<td>- Refers to a particular line of activity that shapes residential relocation in conjunction with other processes. - Residential relocation processes start when the demolition has been approved; they end (on household level) when relocation to alternative property has been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential relocation outcome</td>
<td>- In general terms refers to the location, size, physical condition of alternative property after the residential relocation process is over. Specifically it refers to residents’ perceptions about the end result of the residential relocation process (e.g. in terms of proximity to their work, social networks and their preservation or lack thereof, degree of continued contact with old neighbours).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocatee</td>
<td>- Is a resident relocated from property earmarked for demolition to an alternative one.</td>
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</table>

3.4 Conclusion

In proposing a more neutral term ‘residential relocation’, the thesis joins the emerging body of knowledge termed ‘neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation’ that exists in Europe and the USA (for example Dekker & Kleinhans, 2010; Goetz, 2002; Kearns, 2010; Kleinhans, 2010, Varady et al., 2001). Using the term ‘residential relocation’ means that rather than assuming the nature of residential relocation outcomes and its process, these elements needed to be examined in a given context. This leaves space for a more open and balanced starting position for analysis, a position that is open to new institutional insights about the phenomena. In the next chapter, I propose a theoretical perspective to enable examination of the residential relocation process in HMR and in differentiated polity more generally.
Chapter 4: Governance

4.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that institutional changes that have taken place in Britain since the late 1970s have not been sufficiently taken into account in residential relocation research. These changes have resulted in the redistribution of previously centralised economic and political power in space (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2006). Therefore, continued focus on the operation of central and local government, or residential relocation outcomes without attention to processes that shape them, may fail to account for the nuanced bargaining and negotiating process that now takes place, or to identify who is accountable for its outcomes. Understanding such issues entails an ability to grapple with disparate matters, such as governmental and institutional fragmentation, multiplication of agencies and complex webs of relationships.

This study suggests that the emergence of a governance perspective (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997) provides an opportunity to develop a theoretically informed approach and a better grounded examination of the complexities of cross-tenure residential relocation in a differentiated polity. The term governance signifies ‘a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule’ (Rhodes, 1996:652–3). It ‘calls into our focus of attention the [potential] complexity of governing and the range of governmental and non-governmental bodies that are engaged’ in policy delivery (Stoker, 2006:1). It introduces concepts of ‘heterarchy’ and ‘networks’, as alternatives to those of state ‘hierarchy’ and the market (Stoker, 1997, 2006; Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 1998). Most importantly, a governance perspective challenges assumptions about rational and linear policy implementation and includes the possibility of an imperfect delivery process with uncertain and diverse policy outcomes (Kickert et al., 1997). In simple terms, a governance perspective suggests, that ‘the way
The things are being done’ (to borrow a phrase from Kearns and Paddison (2000)) in public policy design and implementation has changed since the 1970s.

The chapter is organised in following way: the first section introduces the term ‘governance’ and presents the ways it is defined in the literature. The next section presents the historical overview of changing modes of governing from a centralised unitary state to a more fragmented polity. Section four provides a definition of differentiated polity under New Labour government and links it to HMR goals and objectives. Section four engages with the governance debate in the British literature. Section five presents the two lines of governance theory used to describe the perceived changes in British governance: governance orthodoxy and the governance sceptics (Davies, 2005). The chapter concludes by casting this study between these two poles of theoretical thought in order to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework.

4.2 Defining the Term ‘Governance’

Reviews of the literature generally conclude that the term – governance – is used in a variety of ways and has a variety of meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1997a, 1997b). The traditional use of governance and its dictionary entry defines it as a synonym of government. More recently, Anne Mette Kjaer (2004) examined the term and its usage in different fields of political science including comparative politics, international relations, and public administration policy. She found that most definitions refer to something broader than government alone: to the ‘steering’ and rules of the game as well as to institutions and institutional change. Whilst the term ‘governance’ has several meanings, in general terms, it conveys the idea that public decisions rest less within hierarchically organised bureaucracies (e.g. the model that was operating at the time of post Second World War slum clearance) and take place more in network relationships between key individuals located in a diverse set of key organisations at various territorial levels (John, 2001). In the context of wider political studies, the ‘governance’ protagonists argue that in the past fifty years, but especially since the 1970s, the Western state apparatus has been challenged to redevelop in the face of the new political and economic realities (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:131). According to Stoker (2006), there are four distinct factors that caused the change in the way society was governed in the advanced industrial period of the past half-century. These are:

- Economic development and the associated globalisation of the world economy
- More demanding and sophisticated customers, taxpayers and citizens
- Technological developments particularly around the management and transmission of information
- The overarching diversity and complexity of society (Stoker, 2006:2)
As the result of these changes, Brenner argues, state activity has been ‘re-scaled’. This involved both ‘up-scaling of authority to transnational and global institutions and a down-scaling of responsibilities to the sub-national level’ (Brenner, 2004:3). The body of literature developed around the concept of ‘governance’ raises questions about the ways the policies are delivered. The governance protagonists point out that the pre-eminent mode and manner of governing has been altered (Jessop, cited in Kearns & Paddison, 2000:847). ‘Governance’ literature ‘calls into our focus of attention the complexity of governing and the range of governmental and non-governmental bodies that are engaged in it’ (Stoker, 2006:1). It expands the view on policy design, delivery and implementation (Hudson & Lowe, 2009) by pointing to the creation of a structure or an order which is the result of the interaction and multiplicity of governing and mutually influencing actors rather than sole operation of a government (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993:4).

However, as Kjaer (2004) states, different disciplinary fields address different governance issues at different geographical scales (i.e. global governance, national, regional, local, and neighbourhood governance). While there might be ‘agreement that “governance” refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred’ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Pierre & Stoker, 2000:32), this agreement does not extend much further (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001:21). The theoretical debates are complex and nuanced. Nonetheless, all versions of ‘governance’ definitions address the importance of networks, of reciprocity and accountability. Davies suggests ‘that the change in the styles of governing may vary between geo-political levels of governance as well as between political systems’ (Davies, 2002:318).

4.3 From Unitary State to Differentiated Polity?

In the UK, the term ‘governance’ has been mainly used to describe a gradual shift from system of hierarchical government to a more fragmented and networked polity – also called ‘differentiated polity’ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Rhodes, 1997). Here, the term local governance denotes that local government in Britain has been transformed from the dominant public institution to its being one body among many which participate in a complex framework of governing (John, 1997:253, cited in Davies, 2001:303).

According to Rhodes (1997) a differentiated polity is made of a multiform maze of institutions (Rhodes, 1997:3). ‘A “differentiated polity” is characterised by functional and institutional specialisation and the fragmentation of policies and politics’ (Rhodes, 1997:7). Here the independence of organisations and interdependence coexist. ‘The differentiated polity both
Orna Rosenfeld
Governance of Relocation

describes the new institutional setting of British government and identifies the constraints on executive power which undermine policy’ (Rhodes, 1997:4).

Rhodes (1997) argues that between 1945 and the 1990s the institutions of British government have experienced two revolutions. The post-war Labour government built a welfare state and its institutions. But these survived barely three decades before a reforming Conservative government sought to redefine most and abolish many (Rhodes, 1997:4). The differentiated polity can be defined as the British government’s search ‘for a new operating code to manage the shift from direct to indirect controls’ (Rhodes, 1997:195).

In the process of political and economic changes started by the Conservatives and continued (for rather different reasons) under Labour since 1997, the universalistic welfare state has been eroded by neo-liberal reforms (Kearns & Paddison, 2000:846). ‘The municipal council as the sole organism that proposed and disposed policies and services has been replaced by a network of agencies’ (Booth, 2005:262, 268). The direct outcome of these changes has been the involvement of numerous actors from public, private and third sectors in the delivery of public services. Salmon (2002) argues that:

> Massive proliferation has occurred in the tools of public action, in the instruments or means used to address public problems. Where earlier government activity was largely restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services by government bureaucrats, it now embraces a dizzying array of loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, economic regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and much more (Salamon, 2002: 1612).

The governance theorists, chiefly Rhodes (1997) put forward an argument that British government should be seen as a fragmented or differentiated polity rather than a unitary state. This idea became the centre of governance theory debate. The next section looks into this historical transformation in more detail.

4.3.1 Reforms of the Conservative government after 1979

In 1979, the Conservatives came to power deeply dissatisfied with traditional representative local government and saw the solution lying in the inclusion of the private sector in policy making and delivery (Booth, 2005:262). Responding to the perceived rigidity of hierarchic and bureaucratic structures and perceived interest group domination in the professions, closed policy communities and the institutions of corporatism, the neo-Conservative governments of the 1980s carried out series of reforms characterised as the ‘new public management’ (Kjaer, 2004).
The Conservatives directly challenged the power of local authorities, the government’s first allies in policy and public services delivery, by restricting their financial autonomy. Part of the public services was privatised and suppliers alternative to the local authorities were invited to compete for the state funding allocated through a bidding process (Oatley, 1998:94).

The benefits of such a system were believed to include reduced costs, partly because the inherited public sector bureaucracies were seen as inherently wasteful, partly because competition provided incentives for greater efficiency. According to Malpass and Murie (1994:97) the changes that the Conservative government introduced in this period led to ‘a shift in the nature, direction and methods of state intervention in housing’.

Political differences between central government and local authorities and the impact of privatisation had resulted in the fragmentation of local services and institutions. This meant that delivery typically required the involvement of local government with special purpose bodies, the voluntary sector and the private sector (Rhodes, 1997). In this period public-private partnerships with their own multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms and planning powers were entrusted with the delivery of urban development and regeneration programmes. This involved minimisation of local government and community involvement in planning for regeneration and its implementation (Imrie & Raco, 2003:3).

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, urban policy in Britain was dominated by property-led regeneration, characterised by the use of public subsidies, tax breaks and reduction in planning and other regulatory control. The rationale was to create a context that would encourage corporate capital to invest in the cities, the benefits of which, according to the government’s view, would ‘trickle down’ into local communities (Imrie & Raco, 2003:3).

However, to many commentators the consequence of Conservative government’s social and economic agenda was the intensification of inequality and poverty in the cities (Fainstein et al., 1992; Pacione, 1997; Imrie & Raco, 2003). ‘A concern with the ‘socially excluded’ became one of the early defining characteristics of New Labourism’ (Ferrari, 2007:124).

4.3.2 New Labour’s version of differentiated polity (1997–2010)

As New Labour came into power in 1997, many voices urged radical changes in the orientation of urban policy (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). After eighteen years of Conservative rule regional demographic and employment performances displayed major differences between the South and the North of England (ODPM, 2005:20), between the city centres and non-central inner
areas (Guy et al., 2005:235–236), as well as the more peripheral former industrial towns (Lee & Murie, 1999). The issue of social exclusion, in particular, played an important role in framing New Labour’s approach to governance and urban and housing policies. In response to overwhelming evidence about social inequality and spatial polarisation, ‘immediately after the 1997 election, the [Labour] government set up a new ministerial body, the Social Exclusion Unit, to coordinate and monitor policies tackling social exclusion’ (SEU, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001). In 1998 the government’s Social Exclusion Unit headed up by the prime minister, published the report, ‘Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal’ (SEU, 1998). The strategy identified problems at a spatial level and officially highlighted the problems of housing abandonment and low demand for the first time (SEU, 1998).

The antidote to the observed problems was seen in economic restructuring, increasing connectedness and competitiveness of the most deprived areas. ‘For Tony Blair and his advisers, the attainment of such solutions depend[ed] on the re-scaling of government … the devolution of power to new layers of community governance’ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:5) and modernising government by continuing the process of dismantling the cornerstones of the post-war welfare state first started in the late 1970s (Imrie & Raco, 2003:12).

According to Imrie and Raco (2003:4) ‘in particular, discourses of community [were] pivotal in framing the policy agenda for cities, and the core of Labour’s approach to the revitalisation of cities is the revival of citizenship and the activation of communities to spearhead urban change’. These related to (a) inclusion of the community in policy making (b) helping the most deprived communities thrive, as articulated by HM Treasury:

This requires nothing less than “refocusing main programmes to ensure that improving life in deprived neighbourhoods is one of their key objectives” while simultaneously “creating new and stronger co-ordinating mechanisms at the local level to enable services to work together more effectively” (HM Treasury, 2000 para 23:3).

A range of area based initiatives (ABIs) have come from government to develop new ways of working in local authorities and other agencies such as the health service and the police (e.g. New Deal for Communities), and ‘Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders’ as well as projects that target specific sections of the community, such as Sure Start and Education Action Zones. In addition, the New Labour government highlighted a ‘desperate need for urban regeneration’ (Blair, 1997 cited in Ferrari, 2007:125). In addition, the government saw urban blight and poor housing conditions being inextricably linked with observed social problems. Such views ‘led directly to such various policies and programmes as urban renaissance (UTF, 1999), Decent Homes (DETR,
2000c), the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 2001) and, of course, Housing Market Renewal (ODPM, 2003). The latter, in particular, has signalled both an acceptance of the dominance of the market in housing provision as well as a will to intervene in its operations as necessary’ (Ferrari, 2007:125).

Labour’s vision of the implementation of these initiatives was seen as a ‘re-articulation of active citizenship, with the state[’s role] moving from that of a provider of [welfare] services, to that of a facilitator – enabling communities and individuals to take more responsibility for the conduct of their own lives’ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:1). Therefore, the state ‘should exercise only limited powers of its own, steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing’ (Rose, 2000:323–4). An important element of this process was the re-scaling of government and the devolution of power to new layers of community governance (Imrie & Raco, 2003:5). In Blair’s words:

After years of intervention centrally … I want power devolved down in our public services, so that the creative energy of our teachers, doctors, nurses, police officers is incentivised and released. These are the social entrepreneurs of the future (Blair, 2001:1 cited in Imrie & Raco, 2003:7).

Labour’s agenda for change was based on two realisations. First that there was too much reliance by individuals on the power of the state and that individuals and communities ‘still often expect government to deliver as though we were in a by-gone era’ (Blunkett, 2002:1 cited in Imrie & Raco, 2003:13). Second, that in the words of Blunkett, ‘government never could do it all … We have deluded ourselves if we believed we could simply deliver from the centre’ (Blunkett, 2002:1 cited in Imrie & Raco, 2003:13).

The devolution of power from the centre was intended to enable the government to focus on strategic issues on one hand and to allow local flexibility in policy implementation on the other (Imrie & Raco, 2003). It was based on the premise that ‘social fragmentation and economic inequalities could only be solved by the pursuit of partnership between government and civil society. Such partnerships were envisaged ‘to revolve around the development of a society based on connecting individuals with the plurality of broader social networks’ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:7).

According to Imrie and Raco (2003:26) despite the rhetoric of empowering the locality there were also some tensions and contradictions that underpinned aspects of the New Labour policy programmes. These tensions and contradictions along with ideas of innovation shaped the nature of New Labour’s version of differentiated polity in which HMR and residential relocation were delivered.
For instance, ‘at the local level, responsibility for policy development has not reverted to local authorities, as was the case in earlier rounds of urban policy. Instead, it has shifted to ‘a range of supra-local organisations based on partnerships, including Neighbourhood Renewal Teams, Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)’ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:17). In 2002, the Labour government established nine specialist administrative bodies in order to implement Housing Market Renewal (see Chapter 2).

However, ‘the funds come with ‘strings attached’ (Imrie & Raco, 2003:21). According to Stewart (2000:123) New Labour’s ‘measures for “modernising” local government [were] a mixture of incentives and sanctions and decentralisation [was] the reward for improved performance’ (Stewart, 2000:123 cited in Davies, 2002:316). Eligible partnerships, such as Local Strategic Partnerships, or HMR Pathfinders in this case, could only access funds if they had a government approved renewal strategy (Imrie & Raco, 2003:21). Therefore, the partnerships operated under some level of central government control and guidance. Hence, one can argue that only certain aspects of central power were devolved. By defining what these were and what were the aspects left to the partnerships and their members to develop, we can define the level of central influence over specific elements of the policy such as residential relocation in HMR.

4.3.2.1 How ‘differentiated’? The role of the government in Housing Market Renewal

HMR was conceived to ‘think big’ (Ferrari 2007:126); it was put together as a vision rather than a blueprint. It was based on the acceptance of the idea that housing markets reflect the connectivity of places. At a structural level, the diagnosis of housing market problems was associated with a problematic imbalance of functional connections such as patterns of migration or commuting and economic flows between areas (Ferrari 2007:126) that resulted in spatial and social fragmentation in HMR Pathfinder areas. According to Ferrari ‘by taking a sub-regional perspective on market conditions [HMR] was aimed as a strategy that could take better account of how the market responded to intervention’ (ibid.).

However, the government’s vision about the nature of change in the housing markets in Britain altered by 2007 not once, but twice. In 2007, Ferrari (2007:124) pointed out that ‘the early years marked a concern with the renewal of housing’ but that this focus was changed and that after Barker’s reports (Barker, 2004) it shifted to ‘overriding concern with new housing supply’ (Ferrari, 2007:124). It was a shift of focus from that of low demand and abandonment in the 1990s to deep concern with house price inflation in the 2000s. As the result the concern with renewal has been replaced by that of ‘growth’ (DCLG 2007a). ‘The Brown government’s aspiration to provide an
additional three million homes by 2020’ (Ferrari, 2007:125) supported this change in government’s focus.

As was pointed out in Chapter 2 (see section ‘HMR Goals’), the emphasis and focus of the HMR programme changed throughout its short life. However, it is important to point out that the HMR goals did not change at the same pace on different scales. The Pathfinders were entrusted to define their own sub-regional goals. Goals were also set for each of the Pathfinders’ projects at the local authority level. Pathfinders’ goals did not change at the same pace as the change of the strategic goals on governmental level as they needed to provide continuity in the physical interventions for which HMR funds were provided (Chapter 2). For instance, the BNG goal, ‘creating great places to live’ was defined in 200412 and was kept unchanged till the closure of HMR in 2011.

The measure for success of HMR Pathfinders on the governmental level also did not change significantly. Empty properties, low or falling housing prices, and (for the social rented sector) high rates of turnover and refused offers to let, were seen as key indicators that needed improving. They constituted the government’s success criteria for HMR, as articulated in its plan for housing to 2010, Homes for All (ODPM, 2005). According to Ferrari (2007:126) ‘they also form[ed] the basis for ongoing monitoring of the outcomes of the programme’. HMR funding was distributed to Pathfinders for a specific set of interventions that focused on physical intervention in the housing stock. According to the Audit Commission (2011a:19) the funding was focused on four key areas, these were: housing demolition, refurbishment, new building and acquisitions.

Pathfinders were the only public bodies eligible to bid for HMR funding. HMR resources were supposed to be used creatively to initiate development, foster partnerships, fund new ways of doing things and attract private funding. Pathfinders were established to present an effective challenge to the way that local government operated (Cole & Nevin, 2004).

According to Cole and Nevin (2004:23) compared to other area-based initiatives (e.g. NDC, NRA) the HMR programme was marked by a considerable degree of latitude for individual Pathfinders and a flexibility of approach about how they should be supported by central government. The government departments such as ODPM had a relatively small team to support HMR, while the Audit Commission was employed as a critical friend, scrutinising Pathfinders based on the goals they set for themselves rather than nationally set ones.

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12 In this case the definition of the goal in 2005 is linked to the change of the local government and the change in the Pathfinder leadership rather than reflecting the change in the government’s trends, as the issue of the lack of supply was not relevant in the sub-region.
According to Cole and Nevin ‘this devolution of responsibility and the freedom for local partnerships to design and implement solutions in response to local drivers of change [was] a distinctive feature of this programme and mark[ed] a radical change in the relationship between central government and those localities undergoing such changes’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:viii, ix).

However, this view was not shared by all. Namely certain aspects of central control of the HMR programme remained at central government level. ODPM/DCLG set out the broad expectations, but at the same time approved Pathfinders’ prospectuses set out sub-regional plans and strategies; it also provided and had control over eligible grant spending based on a performance monitoring framework. While the Audit Commission was used as a ‘critical friend’ according to some, it was a means of central control according to others.

For Jones and Ward (2002) ‘Labour’s recourse to urban renaissance [of which HMR was seen as a part] through context of community, seem[ed] to signify no more than procedural change and the rescaling of government in ways that [did] not effectively reduce the powers of the central state (Jones & Ward, 2002). In 2002, the Audit Commission noted that ‘Labour’s urban policy programmes [were] not a radical departure from previous policy and ‘at the local level it appear[ed] to mean more of the same’ (Audit Commission, 2002:10 cited in Imrie & Raco 2003:31).

These contradictory views suggest that the balance between continuity and change in local governance therefore needs a better explanation (Davies, 2002:304) and examination that is better focused. Namely, this study argues that because housing policies are vast and complex undertakings central control (or lack of it) may not be equally exerted on all its elements and aspects. The picture at the strategic level may not be the same at the implementation plane, or in specific interventions such as residential relocation in this case.

4.4 Theoretical Considerations: the Governance Debate in the UK

In his theoretical discussion about centralisation and decentralisation of state power, Davies (2002), points out that New Labour’s ‘mode of governance [was] characterised simultaneously by the diffusion and augmentation of State power’ (Davies, 2002:302). According to this author ‘there is a paradoxical process of decentralisation and centralisation occurring’ (Davies, 2002:315). ‘Partnerships may be as much about bringing other groups into co-operation with the state as they are … about bringing local authorities into partnerships with other ‘stakeholders’ and creating
networks’ (Davies, 2002:15). Here, some responsibilities (as well as funds) for regeneration liberate while others imprison local political initiative (ibid.).

The overview of the political changes presented in this chapter, suggest that numerous changes have been introduced into the way that policy in general (or public service) and housing policy in particular has been delivered in Britain. Because the changes had mainly affected (or were supposed to affect) the way local government operates, the governance debate in the UK had focused on the ‘change of the local government’ (Lowndes, 2005). According to Lowndes (2005) there are two dominant but seemingly contradictory narratives about the state of English local government, one arguing that local government has been ‘transformed’ and other that it remains ‘unchanged’.

On one hand, we have the story of ‘local government transformed’ which catalogues the arrival of the ‘new public management’ and, more recently, new political structures inside local authorities, in a context characterised by new roles for non-elected bodies, commercial and voluntary sector contractors and multi agency partnerships. On the other hand, there is a story of ‘local government unmoved’, which holds that – despite several hundred pieces of legislation – local authorities still look very much like they did in 1979, a collection of professionally driven service departments and a form of politics still dominated by committee conventions, the party group and the whip (Lowndes, 2005:291).

She continues by pointing out that ‘the balance between transformation and immovability has varied in respect of different aspects of local government, and in relation to the different experience of 400 or so local authorities’ (Lowndes, 2005:292). This position suggests that while some aspects of local government may have changed the others may have stayed the same. It is ‘inertia and innovation [in combination] that have characterised, respectively, the political and managerial domains of local governance’ (ibid.).

Therefore, rather than taking a generalised view on the state of local government, its operation, the way it is delivering policies or specific interventions (eg. residential relocation), the issue needs to be examined in each specific case. Housing and urban policies are vast and complex undertakings; they consist of a myriad of processes, interventions and projects. As Lowndes pointed out in her discussion paper about the change of local government in Britain: ‘We need to be clearer about our object of analysis, avoiding any unified conception of local government (or indeed, local governance)’ (Lowndes, 2005:292).

The next section looks into the two theoretical lines of thought that seek to conceptualise the change in the way the Britain is governed and casts analysis of governance possesses shaping
residential relocation between them in order to explore to what extent there has been a change in large scale relocation since the 1970s when it was last used and last (intensively) studied in Britain.

4.4.1 Governance orthodoxy and governance sceptics

Two lines of thought are considered as possible contrasting ends of the continuum of network governance. These are used as a theoretical underpinning of this research. Davies (2005: 312) develops ‘a schematic distinction’ between two strands of governance literature that dominate British academia, that appears to be relevant to this question. The first is ‘governance orthodoxy’ and the second ‘governance scepticism’. According to Davies, the first strand of literature, notably Rhodes (1997), emphasises horizontal transactions in the rise of autonomous, self-governing networks, without a dominant party that can coerce the development of decision making. They argue that the power of the state is ‘hollowing out’. But the second strand, including Davies (2003, 2004), Bache (2003), Marinetto (2003) and others, perceive that far from disengaging or empowering other actors, the national state is actually augmenting its power over local politics using the noted changes in governing (Davies, 2005:311). So-called governance sceptics emphasise ‘the continued, or growing, power of the central state in the institutions of local governance’ (Davies, 2005: 312). Davies stresses that ‘the protagonists in this debate often present nuanced arguments which recognise complexity and acknowledge competing views’ (Davies, 2005:311). The detailed examination of these is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, by presenting these two strands of thought we begin unpacking residential relocation research assumptions and thinking about the ways residential relocation as a policy task may be delivered in the context of a differentiated polity.

4.4.1.1 Governance orthodoxy

The ‘governance orthodoxy’ model, chiefly advocated by Rhodes (1997), considers that the government is no longer supreme, but depends on myriad public and private actors to deliver its policies. Hence, governance refers ‘to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state’ (Rhodes, 1997:15). This conceptualisation ‘replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the hierarchical] Westminster model’ (Rhodes, 1997:9) with a relational concept of horizontal transactions. There is no dominant party that can coerce decision-making; policy outcomes are the result of the cooperation or non-cooperation of network members (Kickert et al, 1997).
The body of literature that Davies brands ‘governance orthodoxy’, provides an alternative to the rational central rule approach (Kickert et al., 1997:7). ‘Governance orthodoxy’ considers that the government is no longer supreme and that public policy making takes place in networks consisting of various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureaux, and organisations) who all have their own goals and strategies. The decision-making process is seen to be fragmented into different policy arenas (housing, regeneration, social integration) and different levels (Europe, national, regional, local and neighbourhood) as the network actors come from very different backgrounds (national and local government, private for-profit organisations, third sector, non-profit organisations, community organisations) (Van Bortel et al., 2007:100). According to Kickert et al. (1997:32) the policy is the result of interaction between a number of actors.

The ‘network’ concept describes the governance architecture that emerges as a result of a relationship (planned or spontaneous; formal or informal) between the network actors. Here, the leading role of governmental actors is no longer self-evident. A networked decision-making process does not imply equal importance of all actors involved or dominance of one, and the network is more than a simple membership structure. It is a highly complex structure, resulting from the individual decisions of the actors involved. The advocates of network governance highlight the necessity of networked forms of decision-making to manage uncertainty, resolve problems, access expertise and enable citizen engagement in a complex society with dispersed power and resources (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, cited in Van Bortel et al., 2009:94). The contributions that belong to this group of governance theories ‘assume that the power of actors is linked to the resources they possess rather than the position in the hierarchy’. In theory, every actor involved in the policy decision-making process can perform a leading role, depending on the context. This body of thought points out that as a result of the network’s operation the policy results are uncertain and mixed.

Kooiman and Van Vliet observe that in the new system:

No single actor, public or private, has all the knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993:4).

4.4.1.1.1 Rhodes' model: horizontal interaction

A stream of work that has undoubtedly been the most influential in the planning field in the UK is the policy network approach or so-called ‘Rhodes’ model (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:153). Some
authors argue that the conceptualisation of governance presented in this work has gained a ‘semblance of orthodoxy’ in the past decade (Davies, 2005; Marinetto, 2003:593) as a considerable body of scholarship emerged following its lead (Bailey, 2003; Evans, 2001; Kickert et al., 1997; Marsh & Smith, 2001).

Governance according to the ‘Rhodes’ model (and related literature) refers ‘to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state’ (Rhodes, 1997: 15). Rhodes claims that although hierarchies and markets continue to vie with networks in the governing arena, networking is pervasive (2000b:xiv). Rhodes defines policy networks as having the following characteristics:

1. **Interdependence between organisations.** Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors. Changing boundaries of the state means that the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque.
2. **Continuing interaction between network members,** caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes.
3. **Game-like interactions,** rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants.
4. **No sovereign authority,** so networks have a significant degree of autonomy from the state and are not accountable to it. They are self-organising. Although the state does not occupy a sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks. (Rhodes, 1997).

The key characteristic of Rhodes policy networks is interdependency. In other words, the government is no longer seen as a sovereign ruler whose goals are realised through a hierarchical system. The actors involved in the policy process develop relationships and interact because they depend on one another for resources (e.g. information, funds, resources, expertise).

Rhodes sees central-local relations as a complex game in which various levels of government are interdependent and in which they exchange resources (Rhodes, 1997; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In Rhodes’ model and related literature, the concept ‘policy network’ is used to indicate patterns of relations between interdependent actors involved in the process of public policy making.

The model ‘replaces the zero-sum concept of power in [the hierarchical] the Westminster model with a relational concept which emphasises resources, not personality and the context of the relationships, not individual volition’ (Rhodes, 1997:9). As there is no supreme authority, the networks are seen as self-governing. The state becomes overseer of a collection of inter-organisational networks made up of governmental and societal actors. In other words, central and local government are seen as one of the actors in the maze of institutions involved, rather than their ‘manager’. One of the crucial implications of the notion of governance understood this way is
change in the power relations between central government and the other actors involved in the policy process. According to Rhodes, because of the perceived shift from the system of hierarchy to one of network, the questions about accountability and responsibility in the decision-making process become crucial. In the context of this thesis the Rhodes model, in theoretical terms, challenges the assumption that residential relocation is delivered by central or local government alone. However, Rhodes’ model is not the only conceptualisation of the new governance.

4.4.1.2 The governance sceptics

‘Governance sceptics’ argue that despite government attempts to involve a wide range of stakeholders and promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power continues to be centralised (Davies, 2004:30). According to Davies (2003, 2004a), Bache (2003) and Marinetto (2003), far from disengaging, or empowering other actors, the national state is actually augmenting its power over local politics. John and Cole (1998:384) argue that the influence of central government does not stop at the level of the local authorities. Through a system of partnership networks, it manages to influence local businesses and the private sector as well.

In Davies’ categorisation of the governance literature in the UK, the ‘governance sceptics’ contest the ideas put forward by ‘governance orthodoxy’. This body of knowledge is in essence a critique of ‘governance orthodoxy’. It ‘argue[s] that the national state remains the critical player in sub-national affairs (Davies, 2002:301, 2001, 2003, 2005; Pierre & Stoker, 2000). For instance, Davies argues that ‘there is a paradoxical process of decentralisation and centralisation occurring in which responsibilities for regeneration imprison, rather than liberate, local political initiative’ (Davies, 2002:315) and uses the case of partnerships to support this claim.

Namely, according to Alcock, the policy idea of partnership is the institutionalisation of the governance principle by government action (Alcock, 2002:243). It is this central idea that underpins New Labour’s political economy and drives its normative commitment to networked multi-level governance. Partnership is claimed to reflect a notion of civil society ‘within which all partners, and all citizens, have mutual interests and obligations in securing local social and economic progress’ (Alcock, 2002:243).

The key idea that the ‘governance sceptics’ put forward is that ‘despite government attempts to promote local networks in the form of partnerships, political power continues to be centralised to an extent unparalleled in recent UK history’ (Davies, 2004:30). Moreover, they argue that the state uses the partnerships (like those founded to deliver Housing Market Renewal) to reinforce its
power, rather than promote inclusive, consensual and participative ethos responsive to the local actors and circumstances. They argue that partnerships are a distinctive mode of governance which fits neither the ‘old’ model of governance by government, nor the ‘new’ model of governance by network (Davies, 2002:302). For Davies, ‘policy partnerships are instruments of central government’ as the ‘elected officials can exercise control over them’. The ‘partnership networks … tend to reflect central political priorities, sometimes down to the detail of individual projects’ (Davies, 2002:313).

The main argument in support of this claim is that the policy funding is still provided and strongly controlled by the government. For instance, Beynon and Edwards (1999) and Morgan et al. (1999) argue that the reliance of partnerships on non-local sources of funding severely constraints their capacity to develop strategies around local interests (Davies, 2000). Therefore, the decentralisation of state power to the local partnerships can be seen as reorganisation of state administration, rather than an exercise in empowerment and inclusion of the local actors. According to Davies, by setting up partnerships the government is in effect, ‘attempting to buy new governing capacity in the locality, rather than leaving local governance to markets and networks’ (Davies, 2002:315, 2000, 2001).

‘The influence of the state over the locality appears to be growing rather than contracting’ (Davies, 2002:313). By controlling the funds the government in effect controls the local partnerships and therefore controls the policy process and its outcomes. John and Cole (1998:384) go further to argue that the influence of central government doesn’t stop at the level of the local authorities, but through the system of partnership network, now influences local businesses and the private sector as well. Peters (1998:29) argues that ‘state led’ partnerships could subvert private sector goals ‘in the name of achieving broad public sector goals’. Davies (2002) adds that ‘partnerships could therefore be a way for a government committed to market-led growth to win influence over the market through incorporating business leaders into its view of regeneration’. He concludes that, ‘partnerships may be as much about bringing other groups into co-operation with the state as they are about bringing local authorities into partnership with other stakeholders and creating networks’ (Davies, 2002:315). For the governance sceptics, the ‘governance as networking’ thesis is misleading as a characterisation of local regeneration politics in England. They argue that the state is still more than capable of getting its way in the politics of regeneration.
4.5 Conclusion: Towards Governance of Relocation

The debate between ‘governance orthodoxy’ and ‘governance sceptics’ is nuanced and theoretically elaborate. Lowdes (2005) suggests that these narratives offer internally coherent accounts of local government transformation in the UK, but that they fail to capture the different trajectories of change and continuity that characterise English governance. The reality, she argues, lies somewhere between the two poles depending on each particular case (Lowndes, 2005). These two extremes open up creative spaces. Amid them, institutional entrepreneurs build the ‘rules of the game’ so as to respond to their specific contexts. This thesis thinks in the creative spaces between the extremes of ‘governance orthodoxy’ and ‘governance sceptics’ to examine governance processes shaping the experiences of neighbourhood restructuring-induced residential relocation.
Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods

5.1 Introduction

Governance is an interpretive art (Rhodes & Bevir, 2003, 2006). According to Rhodes and Bevir, the starting point of an enquiry must be to unpack the meanings, beliefs, and preferences of actors in order to then make sense of actions, practices, and institutions rather than impose a pre-set model. In order to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR Pathfinders this research employed an inductive research strategy in the form of Grounded Theory (GT) methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Within this methodological framework, qualitative methods were deemed the most suitable as they provide a refined close-up of the residential relocation process in real time. The key contribution is a detailed account of residential relocation practice in HMR.

The research started from empirical data in the form of pilot studies, and through GT’s constant comparative method, data collection and analysis, identified concepts capturing residential relocation practice. These concepts were tested through a survey of HMR Pathfinders and an in-depth case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead, and linked with the theoretical ideas relating to governance in the concluding sections of the thesis. Its findings are specific to HMR, but may be replicated in other case studies.

The empirical inquiry in this study was conducted from late 2007 till August 2011. The complexities of the research aim and objectives required a multi-scale examination: one that considers residential relocation practice at national, sub-regional and local levels. The examination of how residential relocation was delivered in the HMR framework was conducted on four levels:

1) National level (ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry)
2) Pathfinder level (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder)
3) Local Authority (two BNG local authorities, Newcastle and Gateshead)
4) Project level (three BNG Pathfinder Projects involving large scale residential relocation).
Semi-structured interviews provide the key of this study. In total, 44 interviews were conducted with respondents from the public, private, and community sectors comprising approximately 40 hours of recorded interview material (see Appendix 2). The roles of the interviewees range from executive and managerial (on the national and Pathfinder level), to service and delivery (e.g. local authority, private developers, ALMOs, RSLs), and residents affected by relocation (resident representatives and leaders). Apart from semi-structured interviews, a number of methods and data-collection techniques have been used to support the process of empirical inquiry. These are presented in detail in this chapter.

The chapter starts with a closer look at the thesis questions in order to identify the reasons behind such questioning, and the implications these have for the choice of data-collection methods, techniques and data analysis. This is followed by a discussion about Grounded Theory as a qualitative research methodology that has been adapted to examine residential relocation processes in HMR. The research methods and techniques are presented next followed by presentation of the data analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of research limitations and ethical considerations in the empirical work.

5.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions

As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework. In order to achieve this aim, the thesis examines how residential relocation is delivered in HMR Pathfinder areas in England. It identifies actors involved in residential relocation practice, examines how actors work together and how this shapes residential relocation experiences and outcomes for the affected residents. The table below presents the Aim and the Objectives of this study.

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<th>Table 5-1: Aims and Objectives of the study</th>
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<td><strong>Aim</strong></td>
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| **Objectives** | 1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in a differentiated polity  
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities, and  
3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation delivery and residential relocation outcomes. |

At the outset it was deemed important to explore ‘how residential relocation is delivered in the Housing Market Renewal framework?’ (Objective 1). This involved examining the Pathfinders’
approach to relocation at national level, and identification of specific processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework. The interest was to identify the scale or territorial unit on which residential relocation processes unfolded in the HMR context (e.g. sub-region, local authority, community, neighbourhood, project or other).

The second objective was to identify actors involved in residential relocation delivery, their roles and responsibilities. The key approach was going beyond the official lines of communication (e.g. Pathfinders’ local authorities) and to identify other potential actors involved in the residential relocation process. This involved exploring on what level residential relocation delivery is orchestrated (e.g. governmental, Pathfinder, local authority level or some other level). The focus was on understanding delegation of roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential relocation. The last objective was an analytical one: ‘to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation delivery and residential relocation outcomes’. This included mapping governance arrangements (including governance structure, and its membership) shaping residential relocation process and their outcomes. The aim was to analyse the nature of the actors’ interactions within the identified governance arrangements, and to evaluate how their work together affected residential relocation outcomes.

The Table 5-2: Research objectives and operational tasks below lists in detail the research questions that have been developed to help achieve the research objectives.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Objectives</th>
<th>Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1) To examine how residential relocation is delivered in Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders. | • How is residential relocation delivered within HMR?  
• How is residential relocation supported by legislation and guidance (if any)?  
• What processes shape residential relocation delivery and outcomes? |
| 2) To identify the actors involved in residential relocation and their roles and responsibilities. | • Who are the actors delivering residential relocation in HMR?  
• What governmental level do they operate at (national, Pathfinder and local level)?  
• What sector do they operate in (private, public, third sector)?  
• What are the roles and responsibilities of each of these actors in residential relocation? |
| 3) To evaluate governance arrangements within HMR with special regard to residential relocation. | • What is the delivery mechanism through which the identified actors operate (e.g. hierarchy, network, market)?  
• How do the identified actors interact within this mechanism (e.g. is there a leading actor, or can we talk about horizontal transactions)?  
• What is the impact of the above on residential relocation practice and on the way residential relocation outcomes are shaped? |

### 5.3 Grounded Theory as Qualitative Methodology

The nature of the research and its purpose, has determined the choice of Grounded Theory (GT) methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), as the most appropriate to accommodate examination of residential relocation in the HMR framework. There is very little academic literature about residential relocation processes in general and cross-tenure residential relocation process in particular.

Grounded Theory is an exploratory methodology that gives preference to the data. In the GT framework the subject is not studied but discovered. As such, GT allows the researcher to begin with a partial framework of local concepts and/or existing theoretical concepts (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990), designating a few principal features of the structure and process in the situations that [she] will study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:45). Therefore, GT is well suited for examining phenomena about which there is little research or literature available. Data as well as certain questions are expected to arise from fieldwork results rather than from pre-existing research. GT accommodates this approach, in the most efficient way. Facilitated by ‘constant
comparative method’ and a system of data analysis (i.e. open, axial and theoretical coding), GT as methodology gives the researcher the flexibility to adapt the inquiry as her understanding in the field deepens as well as a rigorous and systematic framework for identifying new conceptual categories or their properties from evidence (then the evidence from which the category emerged is used to illustrate the new concept).

At the outset it is important to mention that, there are lots of ‘flavours’ to Grounded Theory (GT) (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Most significantly, there is a distinction between Grounded Theory as a tool for generating theory from data (that itself is systematically obtained from social research) and Grounded Theory as methodology (used in research where there has been little previous research) in conjunction with other available theoretical work. In this study GT was used as an inductive qualitative strategy.

According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), a qualitative approach is the most adequate and efficient way to contend with the complexities of an empirical situation and to obtain information about structural conditions, consequences, deviances, norms, processes, patterns and systems (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:18). In this study it was used examine residential relocation processes shaping relocation outcomes, to identify and analyse actors’ way of working, relationships, meanings and perceptions of the residential relocation process and their effects on residential relocation outcomes in the HMR context.

In terms of approach to the literature review, GT can be further, schematically, divided into Glaser’s original empiricist and the Straussian version. After publishing the first version of Grounded Theory in 1967, Glaser and Strauss disagreed about the role of the literature in a research project and developed two different branches of Grounded Theory. Glaser stayed close to ‘the original empiricist, inductive’ GT approach (Glaser, 1978). He argued for postponing the literature review until the data are collected to avoid ‘theoretical contamination’. According to Glaser ‘there is a need not to review any of the literature in the substantive area under study’ because the researcher must take care ‘not to contaminate, be constrained by, inhibit, stifle or otherwise impede [her] effort to generate categories (Glaser, 1992:31). This quote refers to related literature; literature in the same research area as the study being conducted.

Contrary to Glaser, Strauss accepts the use of secondary literature prior to the fieldwork (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 52). In fact, Strauss in collaboration with Corbin, argued for the possibility of ‘integrating’ concepts and ideas from other theoretical work into GT research (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
In general terms, Glaser’s approach to literature review seems to be better suited in cases where GT is used to create a theory, while Strauss’ version appears more appropriate in cases where GT is used as methodology in conjunction with other theoretical work, such as the case in this study.

In this thesis a Straussian version of GT was used for two reasons. First and foremost, because GT is used as methodology and second due to the perceived impossibility for the author to examine residential relocation process in an ‘uncontaminated’ way.

The reasons for this are the following. First, residential relocation in this study is conceptualised as an intervention caused by planned demolition of housing. It is examined within a specific state initiative (HMR) that had its distinctive design and institutional contexts. This meant that the policy documentation and related material needed to be reviewed in advance and in the course of the empirical work. Second, it can also be argued that one generally has come in contact with views on social policies and exclusion via the media, education, political affiliation etc. Third, the author, an architect and an urban strategist by training, had substantial professional experience in development-induced residential relocation abroad prior to commencing this study (see section ‘Positionality’ of the researcher). This means that in the case of examination of residential relocation caused by planned demolition it is illusionary to argue for Glaser’s ‘uncontaminated’ approach to the fieldwork. In fact, it was knowledge about the field of residential relocation and the challenge the practice faces that were the reason for and inspiration behind this research. From this perspective, the research built on a general theoretical framework (in this case governance theory, see Chapter 4) that could support the study (rather than lead it). By reviewing the secondary data and theoretical literature the researcher examined a variety of practical as well as theoretical concepts, that helped support systematisation of the empirical findings as well as her own preconceived ideas (through formulating alternatives to her own preconceptions).

5.3.1 Concepts and conceptual framework

A concept is a relevant conceptual abstraction capturing and explaining the social action in the area studied (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:23). The origin of the concepts in this study is twofold following the Straussian GT approach. They derive from governance theory on one hand, and are identified from the empirical evidence in the process of continuous comparative analysis that consists of data collection and analysis. In GT, ‘constant comparative method’ (CCM) is a strategic method for generating concepts from data.
As noted in Chapter 3, a conceptual framework for analysing residential relocation processes in a differentiated polity is missing. Therefore, the grounded theory methodology approach allowed for a conceptual framework to be systematically generated in the process of data collection and analysis in the course of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994:17).

Concepts and the conceptual framework are in fact conceptual innovation and a contribution of the study, rather than the findings being the results of a predefined conceptual framework. The role of the GT’s CCM was to help identify conceptual categories from empirical data (related to the residential relocation process), to link them with concepts ‘borrowed’ from governance theory, and tie them both into a coherent explanation of the way the examined aspect of the social world operates (see thesis conclusion).

In order to link residential relocation practice with governance theory, the existing theoretical concept of ‘game’ was used. ‘Game’ is a metaphor for ongoing, sequential chains of activity governed by both formal and informal rules, with a high degree of interactive decision making that takes place in a network environment’ (Lynn, 1981:144). In other words, ‘game’ is a concept used in governance theory to signify complex processes that play out in network environments (Rhodes, 1997).

While the concept itself is defined, its nature needs to be explored and examined in each individual case (Lowndes, 2005). The way the game develops and unfolds, the actors involved in it, and the casual links between the game and its outcomes (in essence the aims and objectives of the study) are unknown.

For this reason Grounded Theory methodology as inductive qualitative strategy was needed to identify these and generate concepts relevant to the residential relocation process from the empirical research. In order, to allow for identification of concepts from data, Grounded Theory methodology required an iterative process of data collection, coding, analysis, also called ‘constant comparative method’ (CCM) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:47). Therefore, the research design and research process are inextricably linked in Grounded Theory methodology. In fact, the research design is the research process.

To illustrate, in this research, practical concepts and categories describing relocation practice in HMR were first identified (see Chapter 6) on Pathfinder level. These were tested in the BNG case study (the respondents were invited to give their feedback on the concepts identified by the researcher). In the analysis of respondents’ narratives the first task was to disentangle individual
‘chains of activity’ (or individual relocation processes), to understand who was delivering them and how they each operated. The next analytical step was to bring identified ‘chains of activity’ together and examine how their interplay (through the work of identified actors) shapes residential relocation experiences and outcomes on project level.

Based on the results of analysis a conceptual model was built – the ‘Relocation Matrix’ (Chapter 6). This conceptual model systematises the chains of activity (or residential relocation processes) shaping relocation in HMR. The Residential Relocation Matrix is a model based on extensive empirical research and drawing on the governance concept of ‘game’. In Chapters 7 and 8, it was used to identify the actors involved in the residential relocation process on Pathfinder, local authority and project levels, to map governance arrangements related to residential relocation and evaluate these in relation to residential relocation outcomes on project level. Grounded Theory as methodology allowed for flexibility in approach to exploring the way the game developed on HMR, Pathfinder and local authority levels, as well as to understanding the scale relevant to residential relocation studies, and to identify actors outside the conventional channels of communication.

In the process of research facilitated by GT, discovered empirical categories (residential relocation processes) were integrated with an existing theoretical concept from governance theory (game). In this thesis, the approach allowed for linking two fields of research that have not been linked prior to this study: residential relocation and governance theory, and to allow for examination of residential relocation process and its impact on the outcomes.

The approach facilitated conceptual innovation in relocation studies that would not have been possible using the existing and according to some authors ‘outdated’ (Curley & Kleinhans, 2009) theoretical frameworks customarily used for examining relocation. Most importantly, a conceptual framework built this way presents one of the key findings of the research process (see Chapter 6, ‘Relocation Matrix’). The concept of a ‘game’ examined through Grounded Theory methodology allowed the governance of relocation to be researched between the creative conceptual spaces opened by governance orthodoxy and governance sceptics (see Chapter 4). Distinctively, the approach allowed the present research to focus on residential relocation procedure and work towards devising a theoretical vehicle that shows how governance has a profound impact on relocation delivery.
5.3.2 Approach to the selection of respondents

The second research objective sets out to identify the actors involved in residential relocation in HMR. This clearly suggests that the respondents for the research are not known but that they need to be discovered as a part of research exercise. Sampling in Grounded Theory methodology is not based on statistical criteria. Grounded Theory uses 'theoretical sampling': 'this is the process of data collection … whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses [her] data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 45). Identification of the respondents in this study is presented latter in the chapter. Casing and ‘scales’ of inquiry.

Part of the challenge facing sociology is ‘casing’ – the act of constructing the case as an ‘analytic unit’ (Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:248). Trying to unravel the conception of the case, Ragin (1992, cited in Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:248) distinguishes two dimensions – specific versus general, and empirical units versus theoretical constructs. One of the key questions in sociology is whether the researcher explicitly uses a theory to determine the boundaries of the case, or treats the case as something produced by the social world. In this study ‘case’ was treated as something produced by the social world. Establishing the ‘case’ of planned demolition induced mixed tenure residential relocation is one of the findings of this study.

‘Grounded theory follows the tenets of the Chicago School of ethnography where the sociological case is elicited from ethno-narratives of actors in the field: the institutionally and internationally delimited ways members in the field ‘case’ their action’ (Tavory & Timmermans, 2009:243). GT adherents observe that social life remains ordered and narrated through institutional and inter-subjective mechanisms. Following these logics, in this study the ‘case’ of residential relocation delivery was defined based on the empirical data, through the interviews and correspondence with the actors in the field. In order to achieve this, empirical inquiry has been conducted with relevant respondents on four programme scales:

1. HMR (national scale)
2. Pathfinder (sub-regional)
3. Local Authority (local)
4. Project/Scheme (micro local)

The empirical inquiry showed that the scale relevant for examining HMR-induced residential relocation is a ‘project’ or ‘scheme’. The finding challenges the common ‘scales’ of ‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’ used to examine residential relocation. By development project I mean an area planned for regeneration on local authority level that is a part of wider masterplan or local...
development plan and has a planning permission. Contrary to scales such as ‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’, the boundaries of the project are clearly defined; the number of residents affected by demotion and residential relocation are known and the residential relocation support provided is based on this information.

5.3.3 Primary data collection

Considering the nature of the study, a strategic decision was made at the beginning to start the fieldwork six months into the PhD programme. The scoping of the study started in December 2007. After suitable respondents had been identified, the in-depth empirical inquiry was then developed in the following stages:

1) May to July 2008 (Pilot Studies)
2) January to March 2009 (Pathfinder survey)
3) November 2009 and January 2010 (In-depth Case Study)
4) HMR closure feedback Inquiry (Mar-Aug 2011)

Table 5-3: Primary data collection timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PhD start</th>
<th>National Level &amp; Pilot Study Interviews May.–Jul.08</th>
<th>Pathfinder Level Survey Interviews Jan.–Mar.09</th>
<th>Pathfinder &amp; Local Level Case Study Interviews Nov.09.–Jan.10</th>
<th>HMR Closure Feedback Inquiry Mar.-Aug.11</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 2007</td>
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5.3.4 ‘Positionality’ of the researcher

Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998) originally considered the researcher as a research instrument. The researcher was presumed to be a ‘neutral knower’ (Charmaz, 2006:247). Her person (social position as a gendered, classed etc., research instrument) was not considered in the initial iterations of Grounded Theory, principles and practice. None of these original theorists accounted for the positionality of the researcher in the research process (Charmaz, 2006:247).
The work of feminist and other critical geographers has been critical in highlighting the importance of reflecting upon the multiple positionalities of the researcher (Anderson, 1998; Kobayashi, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2005) and thinking through the ways in which various identities may influence and shape research encounters, process and outcomes. It is through this work that the importance of researchers’ positionality was introduced in Grounded Theory methodology (Charmaz, 2006). Positionalities may include aspects of identity – race, class, gender, age, sexuality, disability – as well as personal experience of research such as research training, previous projects worked on and philosophical persuasion of the researcher (Hopkins, 2007:391). Greenbank points to the potentially distorting effects on research of factors which are not often discussed such as the career aspirations of the researcher, and values linked to their educational background (Greenbank, 2003:798).

The qualitative approach employed in this research is in essence work with people. As such it is to a large extent influenced by relationships between the researcher and the researched (respondents). In the process of conducting qualitative research researchers necessarily ‘take’ personal, cultural and professional stories from the respondents. These depend on negotiations of power between the researcher and the interviewee. It is what Charmaz (2006) calls ‘give and take’ research practice. ‘Give and take’ is a framework where who will give and who will take and what will be given and taken is ever present as an interactional subtext between the researcher and the researched (Charmaz, 2006: 248).

The aspects of the author’s positionality that were considered relevant and important to the way this present research was conducted are the following:

1. Researcher was born outside of the UK, is not a native English speaker and arrived in the country for the purpose of education and research.

   As such I did not share the mentality, background, culture or social conditioning that my local counterparts may have. This had an impact on the research process in the following ways:
   a. I did not have contacts or networks to rely on to contact the research respondents. I needed to discover, identify and develop relations with them by myself. While this posed initial difficulties and challenges it allowed for discovery of the relocation actors and networks rather than following the formal channels of communication.
   b. As a foreigner I do not have a clear position in the English class system. I do not have any class-related values or assumptions or assumed power relations that are the result
of such social location. I used this difference from the local population to freely approach and converse with the research respondents from different sectors and different roles (e.g. HMR management in DCLG, and residents affected by relocation).

c. As a foreigner I did not have access to information about the post Second World War clearance prior to commencing this research, similarly I did not have ‘national’ memories (direct or indirect) of the post Second World War slum clearance that proved to be emotional for many of the locals I have encountered. This meant that I have approached questioning about demolition without judgement that may have stemmed from this social conditioning.

d. Being educated outside of the United Kingdom for most of my life I had to ‘catch up’ with learning about the British planning system and approach this from scratch, which was time consuming.

(2) Architect and Urban Strategist by training, the researcher had five years of professional experience in designing, managing and leading large-scale urban redevelopment projects abroad (including large-scale demolition, relocation and rebuilding) before commencing the research.

This meant that I was acquainted in detail about project delivery and the elements such complex interventions require. I was professionally acquainted with the technical details, project management elements and processes (in terms of design, licensing, demolition, construction, community involvement and relocation). This said, my knowledge was formed outside the English context. While my professional background proved valuable in communication with the respondents (especially relocation-affected residents, professionals involved in project delivery and relocation practice on the ground) I also needed to be open and learn the particularities of the HMR context, and to make a transition from an architectural to the social science tradition.

Local-foreigner relations are complex and sensitive (Allen & Rosenfeld, 2010), even more so when the research is done about an issue as sensitive as redevelopment and demolition in deprived neighbourhoods. Considering my social location, I consciously prepared myself to establish and re-establish rapport with my respondents throughout the interviews, and took a strategic decision to position myself as a ‘foreigner who needs to be taught’, rather than a ‘researcher who inquires’ about a research subject. This clear power positioning on my side helped me navigate though the complex and sensitive landscape of residential relocation in HMR.
5.4 Methods

Following GT logics the methods were adjusted to the object under study and not the other way around. Consistent with the overall qualitative approach, qualitative methods and techniques of data collection were used in this research. These are presented in the table below, along with a brief explanation of their purpose in this research. Four main methods of primary data collection were used: sampling, pilot studies, survey and in-depth case study. In accordance with the GT approach, methods were adjusted in response to findings in the process of the study.

As there is little information about the ways residential relocation was carried out in the HMR framework, the first task was to explore the field: to identify who were the actors involved in residential relocation in the HMR framework. Scoping of the study started from the top down: in other words, the government and national agencies were contacted first. This exercise indicated that the responsibility for residential relocation lay with the Pathfinders. Following these findings, pilot studies were conducted along with interviews with the available representatives of national agencies between May and July 2008. The results of the pilot studies indicated the existence of various strategies and approaches to residential relocation within the HMR framework that differed within and between Pathfinders, between and within their local authorities as well as at a project level. These results pointed to the need for verification of HMR level. Between January and March 2009 the Pathfinder survey was conducted. The survey results confirmed the initial findings, showed that there was a need for an in-depth case inquiry into residential relocation practices on project level within a sub-region (Pathfinder level). The case of residential relocation delivery was defined as ‘project’ or ‘scheme’ on local level. This study was conducted between November 2009 and January 2010.
This section presents these methods as well as the reason they were chosen. The section concludes by providing a link between the methods and techniques of data collection.

### 5.4.1 Sampling as entering the field

As a newcomer to England, the author did not have access to the field prior to this research. Therefore a strategy was designed in order to penetrate into the field, identify relevant contacts, establish and build relationships in order to (in later stages) be able to identify respondents relevant to this research (see also following sections; ‘Correspondence and entering the field’ and ‘Process of identification and selection of research respondents’).

Sampling was a part of this strategy. This part of the study consisted of a review of the secondary data (see Techniques of Data Collection). The potential correspondents’ contact details were identified on the websites of the relevant organisations. They were contacted first by e-mail and then by phone. Where relevant they were asked to provide an interview or recommend other respondents relevant for this research.

At this stage representatives of agencies which funded, oversaw, scrutinised, or provided research for HMR were contacted (such as such as the DCLG, the Audit Commission, the National Audit Commission, Nevin Leather Associates LLP, English Partnerships, the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment, and the Housing Corporation). Accessing the field top-down was a strategic move considering the researcher’s social location. Being able to refer to

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**Table 5-4: Methods used in this research**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Overall aim</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>- Identification of the actors responsible for residential relocation on national and Pathfinder level, their roles and responsibilities.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Pilot studies | - Identification of the main issues relating to residential relocation practice.  
                      - Identification of the main actors delivering residential relocation in specific Pathfinder settings.                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Survey      | - Testing of the concepts and hypotheses about residential relocation practice identified in the pilot studies.  
                      - Examination of the residential relocation approach in all nine (original) HMR Pathfinders. Identification of the main actors delivering residential relocation in specific Pathfinder settings.                                                                                           |
| Case Study  | - Testing the concept and hypotheses identified in the pilot studies and survey.  
                      - In-depth examination of residential relocation practice in the chosen Pathfinder. Mapping HMR Pathfinder governance structures (with special attention to residential relocation delivery).  
                      - Identification of the project teams (comparison groups) within the local authorities (e.g. Walker, Scotswood teams).  
                      - Development of the relevant concepts and conceptual model.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
respondents from national organisations helped in eliciting a response from the Pathfinders and their local authorities, after initial difficulties in penetrating the field (see section on Challenges).

Following the information, recommendations and contacts provided from the representatives of the above agencies, individual Pathfinder representatives were contacted; this included the Pathfinder directors and Pathfinder research and strategy teams. The aims of exploration at this early stage of research were:

1) To identify and establish contacts with the relevant organisations;
2) To build a network that would lead to identifying the key players relevant to the research;
3) To determine the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved;
4) To start establishing the governance arrangements in HMR, and specifically those related to residential relocation;
5) To commence the casing of residential relocation delivery.

5.4.2 Pilot studies

The aim of the pilot studies was to understand how residential relocation was practiced in the HMR framework and who was responsible for it. Two contrasting pilots were chosen: Renew North Staffordshire (RNS) and Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG). BNG and RNS contrasted in terms of the number of demolished, renewed and new-built properties. At the time of selection (2007), RNS was among the less advanced in HMR implementation whilst BNG was among the most developed partnerships. RNS and BNG were in very different regional housing markets. Yet, they were among most advanced Pathfinders in terms of development of financial assistance packages for relocation (HMRC 2006a; Cole & Flint, 2007). This indicated the existence of some sort of strategy for residential relocation at the Pathfinder level that could be examined. It was hoped that this choice would provide a broad overview of the Pathfinder’s approaches to relocation in contracting contexts.

Both BNG and RNS Pathfinders were visited. In BNG this included a visit to Newcastle, to the BNG Pathfinder and the ALMO offices (where the interviews took place), and to the Walker redevelopment project where the demolished areas as well as the new-built homes could be observed. In RNS the visit included the RNS Pathfinder offices, the Housing Sanctuary (Housing Association) offices (where the interviews took place) and a tour of the redevelopment site in Stoke on Trent where the process of demolition could be observed as well as the new properties built to replace the old.

Techniques for data collection included face-to-face semi-structured interviews, site visits and observation and secondary data analysis. Four individual and three group interviews were
conducted (in total 10 respondents) with key players involved in residential relocation in Newcastle (BNG) and Stoke on Trent (RNS). Both local authorities were visited. The respondents comprised Pathfinder team representatives, local authority representatives, English Partnerships, the Housing Corporation and local ALMOs. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to an hour and a half (see Appendix 2 for the List of Respondents).

The pilot studies showed that there were significant differences in approach to managing residential relocation delivery. These differences were evident not only between Pathfinders (which was initially expected) but between the local authorities involved (within the same Pathfinder). Indeed, different public organisations were found to have a hand in residential relocation in different projects at a single local authority. The results indicated a situation that was not documented in the literature previously. In order to test these findings and validate them, a ‘Pathfinder survey’ was devised.

**5.4.3 Pathfinder survey**

All ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry were contacted. The respondent from each Pathfinder responsible for residential relocation (a Pathfinder Team member or local authority officer depending on the governance arrangements) was asked to describe the approach to residential relocation in their Pathfinder. For a detailed list of the survey respondents see Table 5-7: *Respondents responsible for residential relocation HMR Pathfinders (Survey)*. The questions were designed as a direct result of information obtained in the pilot studies’ data analysis. These concerned the delivery of residential relocation, the potential strategy and the overall approach to residential relocation.

The approach is typified by the label ‘qualitative survey’. While the statistical survey analyses frequencies in member characteristics in a population, the qualitative survey analyses the diversity of member characteristics within a population (Jansen, 2010). Techniques for data collection included structured to semi-structured phone interviews with key players responsible for residential relocation in all Pathfinders and secondary data analysis. All Pathfinders responded to the Pathfinder survey (one representative per Pathfinder). A total of eight phone interviews were conducted, two respondents preferred to provide the information via email. Support data included visits to six Pathfinders, including redevelopment and relocation sites, analysis of redevelopment project documentation (e.g. masterplans, business plans and reports). The survey confirmed that the approach to residential relocation across Pathfinders and their local authorities was not standardised; it differed on Pathfinder, local authority and project level.

112
Considering the scale on which residential relocation was found to be managed it was deemed vital to examine residential relocation delivery in-depth using a representative case study, in order to identify the particular governance arrangements as they related to residential relocation.

5.4.4 Case study

According to Yin, the case study is deemed the most appropriate for investigation of 'a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context in cases [where] the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (2003:23; Yin 2003a: 2). Using the Pathfinder survey results and secondary data analysis, the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder (BNG) was chosen as the most appropriate Pathfinder for this type of examination for the following reasons. Firstly, in terms of representativeness the BNG was a strategic partnership, a form of governance structure that has been found (in the course of the Pathfinder survey) to be adopted by seven out of ten Pathfinders. Second, survey results confirmed that BNG was the most advanced Pathfinder in terms of number of demolitions and relocations in this category (MSP, the only Pathfinder that had higher outputs at the time of inquiry was the only Pathfinder that adopted an informal unincorporated partnership governance structure). At the time of selection, BNG had three primary projects or schemes (involving large scale demolition) at different stages of implementation. These were: Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, and Bensham and Saltwell in Gateshead. This meant that residential relocation delivery could be examined in real time (or relatively shortly after completion) and could be compared between the projects. The following techniques of data collection were used: face-to-face semi-structured interviews (one-to-one and group interviews), observation and secondary data collection. A total of 31 respondents were interviewed, consisting of nine individual and five group interviews. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to two hours and were held at the respondents’ offices or residents’ homes. For detailed list of respondents see Table 5-8: BNG respondents based on identified residential relocation processes.

5.5 Techniques of Data Collection

The aim of this section is to provide a closer look at the techniques of data collection used in each of the methods covered above. Glaser and Strauss (1967) point out that the research process ‘allows multi-faceted investigation in which there are no limits to the techniques of data collection, the way they are used, or the types of data acquired’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:65). Glaser asserts ‘all is data’ in grounded theory research. The techniques used are adjusted to the object under study and not the other way around. The techniques used in this research were chosen to ensure best
results within the framework of each method (see section on Challenges). The table below shows which exact techniques of data collection were used in each of the four methods covered above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of primary data collection</th>
<th>Primary data collection</th>
<th>Secondary Data collection</th>
<th>Web Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Observation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>E-mail Correspondence</td>
<td>Phone Correspondence</td>
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<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>Face-to-Face</td>
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<td>One-to-One</td>
<td>Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Site/Project Visit</td>
<td>Office Visit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Residents’ Home Visit</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sent by Respondents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Six out of ten Pathfinders were visited during the course of research. This was not an integral part of Pathfinder survey but it has provided valuable information about the nature of the redevelopment projects including residential relocation.

5.5.1 Correspondence and entering the field

E-mail and phone correspondence was a technique used to establish contacts and gain access to the field. Potential correspondents’ contact details were identified on the websites of the relevant organisations. E-mail was used to contact the representatives of the governmental and national organisations responsible for HMR, who otherwise because of their position may be hardly accessible. It took several attempts to establish contact, for three reasons. First, because of the position of the initial list of the respondents, second because of research fatigue, and third, and most important, because of the heavy critique HMR was exposed to. Some of the e-mail correspondents who provided information that was crucial for research were included in overall list of respondents for this research (see Appendix 2). After an initial ‘ice breaker’ period of three months, the technique enabled relatively free and frequent contact throughout the study. This was especially helpful as the respondents were located in different parts of the country.
5.5.2 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are the key source of information in this research. 44 interviews in total were conducted in the pilot studies, survey and case study, comprising in total approximately 40 hours of recorded interview material. Two main interview approaches are used in this research: face-to-face (one-to-one and group interviews) and telephone interviews. Appendix 2 provides detailed information on type of interview (or other correspondence method) and length of each interview, date and place it took place, along with details of the roles and positions of each respondent in their organisation and sector. It also shows interviewees’ codes used in the empirical part of the thesis.

A semi-structured interview design was deemed most appropriate because it gives the researcher flexibility to adapt the interview questions to themes emerging during the interview as well as to the respondent’s background.

The interviews were designed to adapt from a semi-structured to an unstructured approach. For instance, in the initial stages of research (scoping and pilot studies) the questions were predominantly open ended to allow the respondents to speak their mind. The survey questions (qualitative survey) were structured. In the first stage of case-study research the interviews were less structured, while in the concluding stages it was deemed appropriate to allow for focus on specific themes, hence semi-structured interview design.

5.5.2.1 Face-to-face interviews

This type of interview was chosen as the most suitable for both the pilot studies and case study, because they have the capacity to provide answers to the interview questions and also allow in situ observation of the respondents in the place where their knowledge and experience is shaped. This also meant that, in order to conduct each interview, the researcher travelled to the office of each respondent (for the detail about the location of the interviews see Appendix 2).

Whilst initially one-to-one interviews were envisaged, at times the respondents preferred to give interviews in groups. This was especially true at the beginning of the research when rapport needed to be established with various organisations and their teams. Instead of cancelling the interviews or requiring the respondents to be interviewed separately, this behaviour was treated as information. This also led to contact with more respondents. The group interviews normally lasted around two hours.
5.5.2.2 Telephone semi-structured interviews

Telephone interviews were chosen as the most appropriate approach for conducting the Pathfinder survey, to ensure a good response rate, and to be time/cost efficient in terms of the research framework.

5.5.2.3 Process of identification and selection of research respondents

The process of identification of key informants in this research (for the full list see Appendix 2) consisted of several stages (see Table 5-6: Process of identification of respondents) and it was managed in a top-down manner. That is, the representatives of the national organisations were contacted first, followed by contact with management of individual Pathfinders, Local Authorities and then relocated residents.

Between December 2007 and March 2008 (the sampling stage), national organisations and government departments, the DCLG (managing HMR at the governmental level), English Partnerships (providing part of the funding for key redevelopment projects, represented on the boards of Pathfinders), the Housing Corporation (providing part of the funding for key redevelopment projects, represented on the boards of Pathfinders), and the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (setting the redevelopment standards for new buildings, an important aspect for replacement housing), were contacted. In addition, the respondents of the major agencies responsible for HMR design and research were contacted. This included Nevin Leather Associates (Nevin and Leather provided key research that was used to lobby for the launch of HMR, Leather led the research about national evaluation of HMR for the DCLG) and the National Audit Office (the NAO provided research and evaluation about HMR). These actors had significant knowledge about the operation of HMR, and were able to point out respondents who could be relevant for the present research. In addition, their reputation enabled the researcher to get easier access to the Pathfinders (see Research Challenges). Following the recommendations and contacts provided by the actors on the national level, Pathfinders’ directors and management were contacted.
The research was presented and Pathfinder directors asked to recommend people who were the most suitable to answer the research questions. This stage was conducted between March and April 2008. The process was not easy as the directors tended to forward the e-mail to departments of

<p>| Table 5-6 : Process of identification of respondents |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Level of informants</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-mail and phone correspondence with the Pathfinders’ directors and departments and personnel they entrusted to respond to research inquiry.</td>
<td>RNS and BNG Pathfinders (sub-regional level)</td>
<td>March and April 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 respondents volunteered to take part in the pilot studies, eight in BNG and four in RNS</td>
<td>RNS and BNG Pathfinders (sub-regional level), Housing Associations and ALMOs, Local Authorities.</td>
<td>May – July 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail and phone correspondence with over 40 contacts in 10 Pathfinders and their local authorities.</td>
<td>Nine Pathfinders (plus Tees Valley)</td>
<td>December 2008 and January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 respondents (phone interview) /2 e-mail respondents</td>
<td>Pathfinders Survey</td>
<td>January – March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying respondents responsible for identified processes shaping residential relocation delivery: planning strategy, community involvement, financial assistance packages, resident support, alternative property provision in BNG.</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder, Local Authorities (Newcastle and Gateshead) (sub-regional level)</td>
<td>September – October 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 respondents interviewed face to face, 9 individually, the rest in 5 group interviews.</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinders (sub-regional level), Local Authorities, Housing Associations and ALMOs, registered social landlords, private developers, community groups.</td>
<td>November 2009 – January 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their choice, and these took some time to answer (clearly this did not guarantee that the right person was the one who answered the research call).

Clearly, this put the control in the Pathfinders’ hands, but this was done intentionally: first, to get access by developing rapport with the Pathfinder management, who controlled the information and contacts in HMR sub-regions. As mentioned earlier, accessing the field top-down was a strategic move (see section about Sampling). At the end of the process 12 respondents volunteered to take part in the pilot studies, eight in BNG and four in RNS (see Appendix 2). Although the choice of respondents in the pilot studies was not entirely within my control, their interviews comprised valuable data to build on, and to identify the relevant respondents in the next two stages of research: Pathfinder survey and case study.

Between December 2008 and January 2009, the ten Pathfinders operating at the time of inquiry were contacted by e-mail and by phone. The process of identification of respondents suitable for this study consisted of contacting three to five people in each Pathfinder team or the relevant local authorities depending on the organisation of each individual Partnership assessing their suitability for the study and willingness to contribute to it. The correspondence took place by e-mail and phone. Around 40 people were contacted in the ten Pathfinders.
At the end of the process, 23 respondents were identified as suitable to contribute this study because of their involvement in residential relocation. Out of the initial 23, six respondents agreed to give phone interviews; the respondents from TSY and NHL preferred to provide relevant information by e-mail. The list of the respondents in the Pathfinder survey is presented in the table below. The difference in the respondents’ home organisation is representative of the difference in the distribution of roles and responsibilities in each Pathfinder over delivery processes in general and residential relocation in particular. This part of the research findings was discovered in the process of respondent identification.

The respondents for the case study were identified after survey data was analysed. A Pathfinder survey data analysis (coding) exercise revealed five distinct urban regeneration processes that shaped residential relocation across these various Pathfinder projects (see Chapter 6 for more details). Based on the results of analysis a conceptual model was built – the ‘Relocation Matrix’. This conceptual model systematises the chains of activity (or residential relocation processes)

### Table 5-7: Respondents responsible for residential relocation HMR Pathfinders (Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathfinder Name</th>
<th>Pathfinder Team</th>
<th>Local Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(BNG) Bridging Newcastle &amp; Gateshead</td>
<td>Area Development Manager</td>
<td>BNG Respondent S1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EEL) Elevate East Lancashire</td>
<td>Development Manager</td>
<td>EEL Respondent S1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GW) Gateway Hull</td>
<td>Operations Director</td>
<td>GW Respondent S1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MSP) Manchester and Salford</td>
<td>(Manchester City Council) Assistant Director for Housing Investment/ and council representative on MSP Board</td>
<td>MSP Respondent S1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NHL) Newheartlands Merseyside*</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>NHL Respondent S1-5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PIA) Partners in Action/Oldham Rochdale HMR Pathfinder</td>
<td>HMR Market Analyst/Former Relocation Officer</td>
<td>PIA Respondent S1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RNS) Renew North Staffordshire</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>RNS Respondent S1-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TSY) Transform South Yorkshire*</td>
<td>Programme manager</td>
<td>TSY Respondent S1-8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TV) Tees Valley</td>
<td>(Hartlepool Borough Council) Housing Regeneration Coordinator</td>
<td>TV Respondent S1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UL) Urban Living</td>
<td>Area Initiatives Manager; Housing Strategy Division (CPO)</td>
<td>UL Respondent S1-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
shaping relocation in HMR. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, financial assistance allocation, alternative property provision and resident support.

These conceptual categories describing the residential relocation processes were used in the BNG case study to identify the final set of respondents responsible for residential relocation within Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder, its local authorities and on the level of individual development projects.

In Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (case study), interviews were conducted with key players delivering each of five relocation processes in the Scotswood and Walker neighbourhoods in Newcastle, and Bensham and Saltwell in Gateshead. The table below presents the list of respondents identified in BNG as playing an important role in residential relocation.

| Table 5-8 : BNG respondents based on identified residential relocation processes |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| **Processes**                  | **Pathfinder** | **Newcastle** |
| Planning Strategy              | Pathfinder Board, Area Programme Coordinators East and West (Pathfinder Team). | Newcastle City Council departments: Regeneration & Environment Directorate, Area Based Regeneration Teams East and West, Directors, Project Managers and Planning Officers. |
| Community Involvement          | Area Programme Coordinators (Pathfinder Team). | Scotswood Village Resident Association, Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre, residents & representatives, Cambrian Resident Association, Walker Network resident groups representatives. |
| Financial Assistance Allocation| BNG Pathfinder Board. | NCC, Property Services (NCC). Your Homes Newcastle Housing Association |
| Alternative Properties Provision | - | Bellway, Taylor Wimpey (Private Developers), YHN (ALMO), Places for People (RSL), Local Housing Associations (Choice based lettings), NC City Council |
| Resident Support               | - | Relocation Team (Your Homes Newcastle Housing Association) |

Gateshead MBC departments: Development & Enterprise, Planning & Environmental Services, Planning Officers.

Saltwell & Benwell Community Group, SAVE Britain’s Heritage.

GH MBC Development & Enterprise, Property Services, Neighbourhood Management Team, Housing Company HA.

Private Developers, Housing Company Housing Association, Local Housing Associations (Choice based lettings).

Housing Options Team (Housing Company), Neighbourhood Management Team (Gateshead Council).
Residents affected by relocation were identified in the last stage of the empirical study, the case study. The qualitative method and constraints on data availability did not permit for the selection of all residents affected by residential relocation in BNG and this had implications for the way that the research questions would be answered. In order to overcome this challenge the strategy was adopted to access the community activists, representatives and leaders who were (a) affected by demolition and relocation themselves, (b) played an active role in their community and thus had extensive knowledge about relocation of their neighbours and/or community members, (c) were involved in working with the local authority or their partners in shaping residential relocation in a certain way.

Nonetheless, access to the residents was a complex and difficult undertaking, first because of data protection legislation (see Research Challenges) which dictated that no personal data was to be released by the Pathfinders, and the second because the Pathfinders had received extensive criticism based on cases identified by researchers. The process of access to the residents required first building trust and rapport with other actors identified to be involved in residential relocation, especially the ALMO and Neighbourhood Management Team (in Newcastle) and Neighbourhood Management Team (in Gateshead) which dealt with the residents on a one-to-one level. This process took from the first visit to BNG in mid-2008 till late 2009, when the first interviews with residents were done.

At the end of the process, the Residential Relocation Team (part of the ALMO) in Newcastle provided information and contacts of one resident affected by relocation, an activist of the Cambrian Resident Association (involved in the community involvement process through Walker Residents Network). The Neighbourhood Management Team in Newcastle provided contact with Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre and organised a meeting with five activists and volunteers, affected by residential relocation (the representatives of the team were present at the meeting). The Neighbourhood Management Team in Gateshead ignored the requirement to provide contact with the residents on several occasions (secondary data available online from activists groups was used instead).

The available contacts were used to conduct interviews with the residents whose details were made available and to visit their homes after relocation. The interviews were also used to ask the resident representatives for contacts of their counterparts or neighbours who were affected by residential relocation.
In Scotswood, contacts were made with the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre, where five activists were interviewed. The women affected by relocation themselves volunteered their time helping their neighbours through the residential relocation process. In 2008, these Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre activists received national recognition – a Queen’s Award for their voluntary services. During the group interview, an invitation to a Joint Working Group\(^\text{13}\) meeting was secured by the researcher.

Attending that meeting in January 2010, led to identification, contact and interviews with the chair\(^\text{14}\) of Scotswood Village Resident Association and two activists. These residents were relocated by the HMR intervention from Scotswood. The group played a key role in leading Scotswood community from the days of protests against the Newcastle’s demolition plans in 1999 (prior to HMR), through securing engagement in the planning process, to establishing the Scotswood Village Resident Association as a player in the decision-making process in planning and residential relocation in Scotswood (through work in the Joint Working Group and Steering Group). Through the Joint Working Group and Steering Group they influenced the way residential relocation was shaped in Scotswood as well as in other parts of BNG Pathfinder.

For instance in Walker this resulted in devising a planned community engagement exercise by NCC and RSL. In the case of Walker, the approach to identification of residents resulted in visiting the new homes of the former Cambrian Estate Residents relocated into newly built bungalows, and interviews with an additional three residents who were also actively involved in the community engagement exercise in Walker.

As shown in this section, the identification of the respondents was a complex operation. It is illustrative of the complexity of the phenomena researched. The strategy and process of informant selection was overall successful both in terms of access to the field, identification of actors involved in HMR residential relocation delivery and answering research questions (based on their interviews). In this research the process of respondent identification also forms a part of the research findings of this research. It shows that actors from public as well as private and community sectors played a significant role in HMR delivery.

\(^{13}\)The Group was a co-operation between residents, local councillors and council officers that has been meeting monthly to discuss redevelopment of Scotswood.

\(^{14}\)Scotswood Village Resident Association chair was chosen by her community members. She had a well-known history of community activism not only in Scotswood as a neighbourhood but earlier as part of a trades union in the shipping industry in Newcastle for which she received an MBE from the Queen.
5.5.2.4 Interview design and schedule

Three interview questionnaires were designed for this research (see Appendix 4). These were the pilot study interview questions, survey questionnaires, and case study interview questions. The questions were attuned to each interviewee by thorough exploration of their background.

It was considered imperative that a flexible, yet rigorous, approach should be adopted towards the interview design schedule, both because of the differences in the respondents’ backgrounds, likely contingencies, and the requirement within the qualitative approach to follow up new avenues of enquiry that were not previously envisaged.

For this reason, the interview design was developed to factor in these differences and allow for the cross-comparison of the findings, as well as to allow adjustments to the questionnaires in advance of, or during, the interview.

Flexibility in conducting and managing the interview was established through an interview schedule that was designed to contain few layers of organisation:

1) First, the main structure of the interview comprising the opening section (0), the interview context setting (1), interview questions (2), and interview closing (3), with possible questions stated in each section.

2) Second, the main interview question (section 2), contained three additional layers of organisation:
   - The interview goals (silent reminder only): their function was to help the interviewer navigate the interview while being focused on research objectives.
   - The interviewee background adjusted interview questions: aimed to elicit the context-situated knowledge relevant to the research questions.
   - The background texts: the purpose of these texts was a reminder about the specific interviewee background details, to help establish the researcher’s credibility and develop a rapport between the two.

The specific feature of the interview schedules is the level of detail, which could easily lead it to be mistaken for a more structured interview. The large number of questions had a specific purpose: to assist the researcher to swiftly rephrase the interview questions in real time depending on the themes raised by the interviewee (the intention was not to read each separate question).

This layered interview design gave me the flexibility to move in a 'continuum between semi-structured and unstructured interview' (Dencombe, 2003:167) depending on the specific interview dynamics, while staying focused on interview objectives.
5.5.3 Observation

The milieu where respondents shape their opinions about phenomena and construct their 'reality' in interaction with their counterparts is considered an integral part of their narrative (Mason, 2002). Visits to redevelopment sites were deemed an important source of information about the nature of neighbourhoods HMR operated in: to draw conclusions about the condition of the properties earmarked for demolition and the alternative properties provided for relocation, as well as the general condition of the redevelopment process.

During the course of this research five out of ten Pathfinders were visited: BNG, RNS, MSP and NH. Whenever possible interviews were conducted in the respondents’ offices. This included the following locations: London, Newcastle, Gateshead, Sunderland, and Stoke on Trent (see Appendix 2, List of Respondents). In the case of the affected residents, more precisely community group representatives, interviews were conducted in Newcastle, in their homes (Walker) and their Neighbourhood Centre (Scotswood). The visits were recorded by taking textual (paper) and visual notes (photographs and videos when possible). The data was collected by note taking, and visual note taking which involved photography and video. The table below summarises the types of observation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation Type</th>
<th>Type of visit</th>
<th>Sampling &amp; Survey</th>
<th>Pilot Study</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathfinder Visit (including projects)</td>
<td>Pathfinders: BNG, RNS, TYS, MSP, NH</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Visit</td>
<td>All face to face and group interviewees</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home visit</td>
<td>Relocated Residents in the Case Study (BNG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.4 Secondary data collection

Cole and Nevin (2004) point out that HMR contrasted with many other regeneration programmes in the UK, that have been replete with guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the outset. This meant that identification of the secondary data was a research exercise in itself. In order to collect the information about the background and strategy for HMR, the secondary data in the form of the Pathfinder reports, annual reports, business plans, and HMR initiative evaluation reports from the Audit Commission, the National Audit Office, and Parliament were key. (For the background to HMR see table below).
One of the research findings of this study is that the specific residential relocation approaches and policies developed differently at the Pathfinder, local authority and project level, depending on the context. Part of the secondary data was only available on those levels, and could be identified only when pointed out by the respondents.

The secondary data was reviewed to strategically support each stage of the research from the initial scoping, through the pilot studies, the survey, and the case study. At each stage, the documents supporting the empirical findings were reviewed and analysed. The table below presents the categories of agencies and institutions whose reports and online material were used in the secondary data collection.
### Table 5-10: Secondary Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Agency Type</th>
<th>Agency Name</th>
<th>Reports and Online Information Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Governmental agencies’ reports</td>
<td>Includes: Audit Commission, House of Commons, DCLG, HCA, NAO, ODPM.</td>
<td>Annual reports, national and other evaluations, scrutiny reports, parliamentary sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other agencies’ reports</td>
<td>Includes: CIH, CABE, CURDS, ECOTEC.</td>
<td>Guidance, research reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nine HMR Pathfinders</td>
<td>BNG, GW, TSY, UL, RNS, MSP, NH, PIA, EEL, TV.</td>
<td>HMR chairs’ reports, Pathfinders’ business plans, Pathfinders’ annual reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder</td>
<td>BNG annual reports, BNG business plans, BNG Board Meeting Minutes, BNG Newsletters, BNG Website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council</td>
<td>Financial Options for Home Occupiers, Walker Riverside area action plan, Walker Riverside Promise, Scotswood area action plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>Gateshead MBC</td>
<td>Home options, Bensham &amp; Saltwell area action plan, ‘Gateshead no stranger to Change’ film and videos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Public Agencies (operating in BNG case study)</td>
<td>Your homes Newcastle, Places for People.</td>
<td>YHN Relocation Pack, info about Relocation Team, PiP Walker Riverside action plan, Walker Promise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and urban design consultants (operating in BNG case study)</td>
<td>GVA Grimley, Urban Initiatives, Rudi.net, ReUrBa2.</td>
<td>GVA: Bensham Saltwell area action plan, Urban Initiatives: Scotswood masterplan, Others: reports and case studies of Walker and Scotswood projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Lenders (equity loans) (operating in BNG case study)</td>
<td>David Cumberland, ARC4.</td>
<td>Information about the loans and equity loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third sector</td>
<td>SAVE Britain’s Heritage, Street Fighters, No Demolition in Bensham, Fight for our Homes</td>
<td>Reports about the operation of SAVE in Gateshead, evidence on SAVE trials, Others: websites about the protests against demolition and residents’ testimonies (audio and video).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Evening Chronicle, Chronicle Live, BBC (reports and shows).</td>
<td>Includes: national media and newsletters online related to HMR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For detailed list of secondary data resources see:

1. Appendix 5 Secondary Data resources which contains extensive list of online data consulted.
2. ‘Bibliography and list of references’ at the end of the thesis which contains detailed list of all research reports, evaluation reports, guidance, business plans, annual reports etc. (column Reports and online information description) listed by the name of the organisation marked in column ‘Agency Name’ in this table.
5.6 Data analysis

Qualitative research above all works with texts. Therefore the data collected via interviews (audio, notes) and observation (notes, visual notes: photography and video) was transformed into texts by note taking, recording and transcription. The Grounded Theory approach provides a systematic guide for textual analysis through open, axial and theoretical coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006). This approach aids development of the theoretical concepts and theory based on the 'life world' examination.

Open coding is the first stage of a text analysis. It is about labelling and categorising of phenomena. As such, open coding is used to identify and name initial codes. The mental openness that characterises the Grounded Theory approach starts here. At this stage, the codes are identified without any restrictions. This approach allows for the discovery of the unexpected (Charmaz, 2006). Open coding results in large number of initial codes (e.g., names of actors' positions, tasks performed). These codes are used to identify more general categories within the text such as institutions, work activities, social relations, social outcomes, etc.

Axial coding is the process of relating codes (categories and properties) to each other. It results in a reduced number of codes as the data is further analysed. According to Charmaz (2006:60) 'the purpose of axial coding is to sort, synthesise and organize large amounts of data and reassemble them in new ways after open coding'. In these terms, the objective of axial coding is to help define major categories relevant for research and specify their properties. In the final stage the aim is to explain relationships between chosen categories in order to explain the phenomenon to which they relate. Strauss (1987: 64) views axial coding as building ‘a dense texture of relationships around the 'axis' of a category’ (Charmaz, 2006:60). The identified processes of residential relocation presented in Figure 4 are the best example of axial coding in this report.

Finally, theoretical coding (or selective coding) validates relationships between categories developed in axial coding and builds theoretical relationships (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006). It results in defining few major categories central to define the phenomena at hand (usually reducing the number of those inherited from axial coding). Charmaz (2006:63) points out that theoretical codes have as an aim to help tell an analytical story that has coherence. ‘These codes not only conceptualise how the substantive codes are related, but also move the emerging story in a theoretical direction’ (ibid.). The final step is ordering categories in the way the researcher sees their potential to explain the collected data. The goal is, for example: ‘to define conditions under which the researched phenomena change and outline the consequences; learn its temporal and
structural orderings and discover participants' strategies for dealing with them’ (Charmaz, 2006:63).

5.7 Research Challenges

Several challenges have been encountered in the course of this study. Housing Market Renewal caused significant controversy because of proposed demolition. It has received negative media coverage on the national and local level. By choosing to research residential relocation this research tapped into some of the most sensitive issues Pathfinders dealt with. This made the access to the field and identification of the respondents relevant for the research and willing to contribute to it, challenging.

Because of the wide and negative media coverage as well as growing academic critique of the initiative at the time, many Pathfinders were found to have built communication teams and data sharing policies to control information. The practitioners involved in HMR were extremely cautious in accepting invitations for interviews. In NewHeartlands Pathfinder (one of the extreme cases) a screening system for researchers was developed in order to limit the negative coverage the Pathfinder received from works like Allen (2008). The author of this study, for instance, was asked to fill in a form for research application that needed to be considered by the Pathfinder. No response was ever received to the form.

On HMR Pathfinder level, detailed data about the actual relocation location of residents proved impossible to get from the Pathfinders or their local authorities. Under the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, all personal and sensitive organisational information, however received, is treated as confidential. Some of the reactions to the inquiry can be best illustrated by this e-mail from the BNG Head of Research and Strategy:

Please note that we will share as much information with you as we can but some of your questions will relate to single cases and it would not be appropriate to release details on these matters (BNG Head of Research and Strategy, E-mail 22.04.2008).

The exact number of the residents relocated within the Pathfinders was unascertainable. This is the same difficulty Cole & Flint (2007) quoted in their report when researching the issues of demolition, relocation and affordability. The Pathfinders in general were very reluctant to release information about demolition numbers and relocation numbers. The estimates had to be worked out from published reports (such as the Audit Commission’s reports), reported vacancy rates and demographic information (such as household sizes).
Entering and progressing through the field was time-consuming and required creativity, patience and persistence. After the initial challenges, the strategy of contacting the respondents from the top down was found to be very effective, when the research passed the screening of a ‘boss’ it was easier for the lower tiers of management (especially service providers) to accept the invitation. That said, not all the invitations to contribute to this research were answered and accepted despite considerable effort on the researcher’s side.

The emphasis on qualitative data means, in essence, developing relationships with people. As demanding as this is in normal situations, questions about demolition and relocation delivery seemed to be especially sensitive. Considering the challenges both the researcher and the interviewees faced, all efforts were made on the author’s side to accommodate the respondents who were willing to contribute this study. Personal contact and conversation (interview or a phone interview) seemed to be the method preferred by most. For this reason each respondent was interviewed in their own office whenever this was possible. While the invitations to interview were strictly one-to-one, some of the respondents came to interview sessions in a group as they felt more confident to talk about the issues in this way. In order to build and sustain rapport with the respondents and their organisations and community groups, their wish was accommodated. Therefore group interviews in this research were not a result of the research design per se but proved appropriate in specific and sensitive context.

5.8 Ethical Considerations

I approached the interviews firmly believing that as ‘field-workers we need to exercise common sense of moral responsibility’ (Punch, 1986 in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:72), and ‘as [the] ones most often initiating the research relationships, our care and our responsibility is first directed towards our participants’ (1998:169). My main concern throughout the process was how to build and maintain the trust of my respondents, and represent what they said truthfully and accurately. As the issues under research proved to be sensitive, special efforts were made avoid raising emotive subjects, causing additional anxiety to respondents. The fact that I was a foreigner with practical experience in designing redevelopment plans that involved demolition and relocation, seems to have put respondents involved in residential relocation delivery at their ease. This experience also gave me the know-how in approaching the residents affected by demolition and asked to relocate.

The issues of demolition in HMR have been heavily criticised in the media, so additional care had to be taken to reassure the practitioners that interviews would not jeopardise their reputation, or
their or their Pathfinders’ work. Focus on procedural and delivery issues, extensive preparation and researching respondents’ backgrounds prior to the interview helped achieve this.

Special attention was given to the anonymity of the respondents during and after the research. Prior to each face-to-face interview, informed consent was obtained from all participants in the interview, whilst the survey had no identification clause at all. In the case of the phone interviews, after the respondents agreed to this form of interview by e-mail, permission was asked to record the conversation. (In one case it was not granted and this was respected.)

5.9 Limitations of Chosen Methodology

The limitation of this research derives from the methodology used. Qualitative methodology allows the examination of a limited number of cases and respondents. Time is an apparent problem with this approach as it time consuming in every stage: respondent identification and access to the field, data collection, data processing and analysis. Within the qualitative framework employed, this implies that the researcher’s own views, experiences and observations have an impact and shape the analysis and interpretation. In order to guarantee research validity within this framework, the positionality of the researcher was acknowledged. Generalisation potential is limited, and can be improved through further testing or linking to a theoretical body of knowledge. The explorative nature of this research means that the results and the conclusions have to be tested in other contexts. Considering the aim of this research these limitations did not jeopardise the validity of the study.

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter presented the methodology, methods, and techniques of data collection as well as the list of respondents who provided the information that this study builds on. The results of the empirical investigation are presented in the next chapters.
Chapter 6. Residential Relocation Delivery in Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders

6.1 Introduction: The way to relocation? No goals, no guidance and partial legislation ...

The Pathfinders were given ‘a mandate to experiment’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:24): to develop their strategies in response to local circumstances. The government requirements and guidance have been kept to a minimum (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23). This was in sharp contrast to English urban renewal initiatives in the past 30 years (Cole & Nevin, 2004:18) that have been ‘replete with guidance notes, templates and regulatory advice from the outset’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004:23-24). HMR was not based on a precise set of interventions that could be easily scoped and replicated in different contexts (Cole & Nevin, 2004: 28). The programme was expected to develop organically, as programmes were adjusted to meet changed market conditions, and as a result of Pathfinder experiences elsewhere (Cole & Nevin, 2004:5).

According to Leather et al. (2007), one of the key features of the HMR programme was a high degree of responsibility being devolved to newly formed sub-regional partnerships. This decision was underpinned by a recognition by policy makers that the exact nature of the problems and the reasons for housing market failure varied across the affected areas. Following this logic, HMR did not provide guidance to define procedures nor standards for delivering residential relocation, either on the national, regional or local levels. The flexible approach to policy delivery was intended to maximise positive results through decisions better adapted to local conditions, suited to the demands and needs of the local population (Cole & Flint, 2007). HMR goals were expected to be interpreted and translated into tangible strategies at sub-regional level by Pathfinders. The present chapter examines the way the Pathfinders responded to the complex and challenging demands of HMR and how they crafted their approach to residential relocation. This is the first of three chapters that present the results of the empirical study into residential relocation in HMR
Pathfinders. Chapter 6 focuses on the national Pathfinder level. It presents key results of the qualitative survey of ten Pathfinders (operating at the time of inquiry) and related secondary data analysis. The chapter starts by setting out the wider context in which HMR relocation played out. This is followed by an overview of HMR implementation strategy and legislation underpinning demolition directly, and residential relocation indirectly. The next section presents respondents’ accounts of the residential relocation delivery approach across ten Pathfinders. The concluding section presents the Residential Relocation Processes identified in this research. The Residential Relocation Matrix is presented next; this is first of the three conceptual models developed in this study based on extensive empirical research and drawing on governance theory.

All Pathfinders had to accommodate a potential contradiction. On one hand the government provided the partnerships with HMR funds and wished to see them maintaining an effective challenge to local government and the ways those organisations ‘do things’ (ECOTEC, 2007). On the other hand, Pathfinders were set up as non-statutory bodies. This meant that they did not have the power to demolish housing nor relocate residents. Pathfinders depended on their local authority partners, who held the necessary statutory powers to carry out relocation. At the early stages of HMR implementation, the legal agreements which facilitated HMR demolition and subsequent relocation tended to be dominated by provisions which enabled local authorities to act lawfully (ECOTEC, 2007:3). In other words, in the absence of specific guidance on residential relocation, the Pathfinders and their partners needed to rely on general legislation that enabled them to intervene in the built and inhabited environment. This section examines the key piece of legislation, the Compulsory Purchase Order, which empowers local authorities in the UK to demolish and clear housing. The aim is to explore how this legislation relates to matters of residential relocation and to what extent the Pathfinders and their partners could rely on it to guide cross tenure residential relocation in the HMR framework.

6.1.1 The Compulsory Purchase Order

In the HMR framework, demolition was entrusted to the local authorities in the first instance as the Pathfinders were non-statutory bodies. In the UK compulsory purchase powers are provided to enable local authorities to purchase land to carry out a function ‘which Parliament has decided is in the public interest’ (DCLG, 2004:6). ‘It is important to note that the acquiring authority does not have the powers to compulsorily acquire land until the appropriate Government Minister confirms the CPO’ (DCLG, 2004:4). This means that the local authority plans must be approved first. The plans define the borders of the intervention (or redevelopment project)
and include details of the residents affected by demolition and later relocation, including their tenure (DCLG, 2004:12). Based on these plans the residents are eligible for statutory compensation and other available forms of support.

It is important to point out that local authorities 'can acquire by agreement at any time and they should attempt to do so before acquiring by compulsion' (DCLG, 2004:4). The property acquisition may affect owner occupiers, private landlords or housing associations. In the HMR framework, housing demolition affected three tenures: owner occupiers, private and social tenants. In some cases the local authorities may also be the owners of the properties earmarked for demolition. According to the CPO legislation all three tenures are eligible to statutory compensation regardless of the manner in which the property was acquired from the property owners (agreement or compulsion). This framework was also used by Pathfinders to lever government's funding for this purpose. Planned housing demolition thus makes the institutional context of the residents affected by relocation different from those ‘displaced’ by housing rent increase, housing price or tax increase. Whilst the first group is guaranteed statutory compensation the other three are not.

However, the CPO is not a residential relocation guidance. CPO is legislation that enables local authorities to lawfully intervene in the built environment and guarantees residents statutory compensation in case of demolition and relocation.

6.1.1.1 Acts of Parliament and re-housing

In order to be able to demolish or clear housing using a CPO, the acquiring authorities are required to justify such action. In other words, CPO is subordinate legislation to Parliament Acts. According to the respondents interviewed for this research, Pathfinders’ local authorities used the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and/or the Housing Act 1985 to justify demolition in their areas. Here it is important to point out that the Housing Act 1985 does not require local authorities to provide plans for redevelopment in order to get the demolition approved. The physical act of demolition is not linked with new building. This means that alternative properties for relocation are not available in the demolition areas by default. The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requires plans to be made for redevelopment as justification for demolition, however the local authorities are not required to provide alternative properties for relocation in the new development.

While social tenants are statutorily required to be relocated or ‘decanted’ by local authorities in cases where they (the local authorities) are the owners of the social housing (the key Acts being the
Land Compensation Act 1973 and the Planning & Compensation Act 1991), ‘there is no obligation on an acquiring authority to provide alternative premises’ for owner occupiers or private tenants (DCLG, 2010:17). The acquiring authorities are obliged to show that they have sufficient housing in their area to cater for relocation; this is one of the conditions for CPO approval. However, the location, size, condition, tenure or affordability of these ‘available’ properties is not defined. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the local housing authority is obliged to provide alternative property for relocation. DCLG guidance states:

‘Where no suitable alternative accommodation is available on reasonable terms the local housing authority has a duty to re-house a resident whose dwelling has been compulsorily acquired regardless of which public authority was responsible for the acquisition’ (DCLG, 2010:22).

If the residents affected by demolition are re-housed in this way ‘this will not affect the amount of compensation which the acquiring authority pays and an authority must not seek to make a reduction to reflect re-housing’ (ibid.). This means that a compulsory purchase order does not require acquiring bodies to carry out residential relocation except in exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the interpretation of what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ depends on the acquiring authorities and their discretion.

6.1.1.2 CPO and tenure

As stated previously, residential relocation in the HMR framework affected mixed tenure neighbourhoods, which included owner occupiers, private and social tenants. The CPO differentiates between tenures. The primary function of the CPO is to enable appropriation of land from its owners (e.g. owner occupiers, private landlords, housing associations) in the name of the public interest, and to secure statutory compensation for affected residents (in the HMR case: owner occupiers, private and social tenants). Compensation, following an acquisition, is based on the principle of equivalence. This means that a resident asked to leave their property and relocate to an alternative one should be ‘no worse off’ in financial terms after the acquisition than they were before. Likewise, the affected resident should ‘not be better off’ (DCLG, 2010:8). Clearly, the notion of ‘no worse off’ is open to interpretation: an interpretation that is formed through negotiation between the residents and the acquiring authority.

The CPO differentiates between the owners and occupiers of the property. The property (or land) owners are entitled to compensation that equals market value. In addition, the CPO guarantees compensation for home loss and disturbance to the actual occupier of the property. This means
that, in addition to being compensated for the value of the land taken (in the case of the owner occupiers), occupiers are also entitled to the losses occasioned by being ‘disturbed’ from land or premises (DCLG, 2010:17). This means that the occupiers of the property (social and private tenants) are entitled to this compensation. While the market value of the property is decided at the local level, the rate for home loss and disturbance is standardised at the national level. Contrary to HMR’s vision of a ‘tenure blind’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004) approach to housing, CPO legislation differentiates between tenures, based on equity stake and occupation.

6.1.1.3 Community involvement and CPO boundaries

Because of the nature of the intervention, CPO legislation does not require community consultation as plans are formulated (DCLG, 2004). Whilst obtaining residents’ support is considered good practice, such effort is not specifically required from the acquiring authorities. The residents may become aware of the possibility of the CPO in the formulation stage because of the initial field work by the local authority. While some local authorities may prefer not to communicate with the residents at this stage, others may choose to make direct contact with the residents, seeking to explore their attitude toward the intervention or even start negotiations for acquiring land by agreement. For instance, Cole and Flint (2007) reported that several residents they interviewed reported learning of clearance plans and the designation of clearance areas by word of mouth or rumour (Cole & Flint, 2007:23).

After the initial stage of information gathering the clear boundaries of the CPO are defined, but it is only after the government’s approval is given that the acquiring authority is obliged to publish the CPO in the local press. In the present research, the BNG residents reported that they learnt about the demolition of their neighbourhoods in the local newspapers but were not informed or consulted about the plans previously. Formal Notices, including a copy of the Compulsory Purchase Order and the statutory forms, are served upon all persons with legal interests in the land. This is subject to a 28-day objection period.

Once the agreement of purchase is settled, the local authorities are not obliged by the CPO legislation to provide support for residents through the process. DCLG guidance states: ‘most [local authorities] will help you [the affected resident] to identify possibilities available on the market’ (DCLG, 2010:17).
6.1.1.4 CPO and the type of housing market

It is important to emphasise that the CPO mechanism assumes the existence of homogenous, healthy, operating markets, where statutory compensation can enable property owners and private tenants to find a ‘like for like’ alternative property without much help. The assumption is that the owner occupiers will be able to find alternative property similar to their old one using the statutory compensation (market value of their property, home loss and disturbance payments). Similarly, the assumption is that with the home loss and disturbance payments social and private tenants would not have any losses in the relocation process and will be able to find an alternative property for the same rent they were paying in the areas earmarked for demolition.

The detail that received little attention at the launch of HMR was that low-demand housing markets are considered an ‘unlikely exception’ in CPO legislation (DCLG, 2010:8). According to DCLG (2010) guidance on the CPO process:

‘In exceptional circumstances when dealing with unusual or specialised land for which there is no general market, compensation may be assessed by considering the cost of providing an “equivalent reinstatement” of the property … [However]…it is extremely unlikely that circumstances giving rise to a claim for equivalent reinstatement will occur in the case of residential properties’ (DCLG, 2010:8).

No guidance is provided to the local authorities or residents in cases of low demand. The DCLG guidance recommends those affected by relocation in low demand areas to proactively seek advice if their property is in a low market area but there is no saying as to where this help may be found: ‘if you feel that your property which is being acquired is one for which there is no general market or demand you should seek professional advice’ (DCLG, 2010:8).

In other words, the CPO legislation was not intended or designed for the areas of low housing demand that HMR was established to tackle. In the early years of HMR implementation, the conceptual clash between the legislative framework and HMR Pathfinders specifically set up to work in low-demand areas, backfired on the residents affected by relocation. An ‘affordability gap’ has been identified 'between the statutory compensation packages paid to relocated owner-occupiers and the cost of purchasing an alternative property elsewhere' (Cole & Flint, 2007:9. See also: Leather et al., 2007; NAO, 2007). The size of the gap varied, but an average figure quoted in consultants’ reports for Pathfinders was around £35,000 (Cole & Flint, 2007:2). As the result, the residents affected by relocation refused to move and the delivery of many Pathfinders’ projects was brought to a standstill.
In response to this situation, the ODPM had recommended that the Pathfinders should consider solutions beyond the CPO legislation:

‘To achieve their objectives in relation to demolition, Pathfinders may need to develop arrangements which go beyond the statutory requirements of compensation for owners affected by compulsory purchase. This may help them to achieve demolition more quickly and at less ultimate cost than if they rely exclusively on compulsory purchase powers’ (ODPM, 2004:105).

The CPO’s assumption of healthy housing markets put the local authorities within the HMR framework in a complex situation, as the programme was set up to tackle the low and failing housing market by demolition. Pathfinders could not rely on the CPO and needed to develop alternative solutions.

The emphasis in the literature, especially literature critical of HMR, is on the CPO as legislation used to compulsorily purchase properties from owner occupiers, and the difficulties this may represent (see for example Power, 2007; Pritchard, 2007; Edwards & Martin, 2006). While it is important to engage with these issues, the problem is that they represent only a fraction of the ways in which residential relocation was conducted in the HMR framework. Focusing on purchase by compulsion alone is insufficient, for the following reasons:

1) HMR interventions affected three tenures. Property purchase by compulsion directly affected only owner occupiers and only a small percentage of these (see next point). The manner of property purchase did not affect social and private tenants; these residents were eligible for statutory compensation available through the acquiring authority regardless of their property provider. Local authority tenants were relocated following the decanting policies (and with available statutory compensation). In these cases the properties were not purchased as the property was LA owned.

2) Property acquisition may be carried out by agreement or compulsion. According to the Pathfinder survey respondents, property purchase by compulsion was used as the last resort by the Pathfinders and their local authorities and was applied only in the later stages of HMR implementation. For instance, the BNG Pathfinder reported that purchase by compulsion was enforced only in 2008/9 (CS-BNG Team respondent 1, CS-YHN Relocation Team respondents 1, 2, and 3). In the BNG redevelopment area of Scotswood, only six out of over 1,200 demolished properties were acquired by compulsion. Respondents from Oldham and Rochdale and Elevate East Lancashire reported having
acquired the majority of the properties by agreement as well. For illustration I provide also the quotes from two respondents from Manchester Salford and Gateway Hull Pathfinders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6-1. Voluntary vs Compulsory Purchase</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘What we tend to do is run acquisition by agreement programme at the same time as we are preparing and submitting CPOs. In terms of going to the full extent of the property by compulsion. The ultimate extreme of CPO. I think we’ve done in case of two properties. ... But even when we are at that stage we have lots of fairly intensive work going on by the officers on the ground to agree housing solutions and to avoid coming to that confrontational ... taking possession by force’ (MSP Respondent S1-4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘We haven’t taken CPO at all yet. We will just start it [March, 2009]. There are one or two owner occupiers who won’t negotiate’ (GW Respondent S1-3)</td>
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3) According to the professionals dealing with purchases for the local authority, the majority of the owner occupied properties were acquired through negotiation and agreement. Here the CPO framework was used to guarantee the residents the statutory compensation not to acquire properties by compulsion. This quote from the Gateway Hull respondent best explains this approach: ‘We compensate as if we were doing CPO’ (GW Respondent S1-3). A similar approach was reported in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and Manchester Salford as well.

4) Pathfinders could only partially rely on the CPO legislation because this assumes the existence of homogenous housing markets (where the average housing prices are the same). In order to enable residential relocation the Pathfinders needed to develop alternative strategies.

In the absence of HMR guidance the Pathfinders and their local authorities relied on CPO legislation to enable them to lawfully intervene in the built environment. However, as it was showed in this section (a) CPO legislation was only partially relevant to the case of HMR (b) the Pathfinders did not acquire all the properties by compulsion, a large number of properties were acquired by agreement (c) private and social tenants were not affected by the manner of the acquisition process.

As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, this has led to the proliferation of a range of residential relocation strategies as the Pathfinders and their local authorities made a great effort to develop local solutions for residential relocation.
6.2 The Pathfinder Approach to Residential Relocation: Project Focused

Considering that residential relocation was not listed as an HMR goal or intervention by the programme designers (see Chapter 2), and that the available legislation was ambiguous, the question that the next section will address is: how did the Pathfinders respond to this situation and how was residential relocation delivered at a Pathfinder level? This was the objective of the pilot studies and the Pathfinder survey conducted for this research. The Pathfinder representatives considered responsible (by their own partnerships) for aspects of residential relocation were asked what their approach to residential relocation was, whether guidance, policy or strategy for residential relocation was available on their sub-regional level. The following section covers the main themes that emerged from this inquiry.

When asked how they would describe their approach to residential relocation, respondents (Pathfinder survey) suggested that the implementation strategy and residential relocation delivery differed, depending on each individual project or scheme at the local authority level. All ten Pathfinders that took part in the survey indicated that their approach to relocation depended on the project or scheme at hand. Box 6-2 Project focused approach to residential relocation presents some illustrative quotes from the Pathfinder survey. The respondents pointed out that the approach to planning might differ between and within the local authorities and their teams, as well as the implementation.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 6-2 Project focused approach to residential relocation</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘It varies from scheme to scheme …. It depends… I am sorry that the answer is ‘it depends’, but it depends on the scheme that you are doing … area that you are working on…..’ (MSP Respondent S1-4).</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Implementation strategy depends on each specific project. Approach to planning is also different. It depends on the local authority in question. In general terms masterplans are produced for all renewal areas. However, on the project level the approach may differ’ (EEL Respondent S1-2).</td>
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<td>‘The projects in two local authorities are not the same size. It would not be appropriate to do the same thing’ (PIA Respondent S1-6).</td>
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<td>‘One of the things I think is quite interesting, and has been quite obvious to me across the whole of the west of the city, has been just the extent to which every project and every area whether it’s residential or economic or whether it’s physical or social, every scheme comes with their own history, whether there should be or not is another matter, but there isn’t one standard route by which these projects happen’ (BNG Respondent S1-1).</td>
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6.2.1 **Reason 1: tenure of relocation affected residents**

One of the key HMR goals was changing the tenure ratio in the affected areas. This meant not only that the residents were offered the opportunity to change their tenure in the process (especially from social and private tenure to owner occupation) but that the new housing provided following the demolition had a different tenure mix. However, the overall HMR approach was envisaged to be ‘tenure blind’. A tenure blind approach, according to Nevin and Cole (2004), was envisaged to apply equally to dwellings in intervention areas, and provide resources for renewal, regardless of their tenure.

However, this overall approach did not take into account the legal difference of the residents of different tenures in the process of relocation. As the Pathfinder Survey respondents reported, the tenure of residents affected by demolition made the key difference in relocation.

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<th>Box 6-3 Project focused approach: tenure of relocatees</th>
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<tr>
<td>‘The team doesn’t take a different approach by definition. The difference in approach is the result of CPO legislation’ <em>(UL Respondent S1-10).</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>‘There are obvious differences between the tenures just because of the legislative position ... and then you get a layer of some political things ...’ <em>(MSP – Respondent – S1-4).</em></td>
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As shown in the previous section residents were eligible to different types of statutory compensation depending on their tenure. The approach to relocation also differed depending on ownership or occupation. It was clear from the outset that the reason for such differentiation was CPO legislation, as well as the tenure mix planned in the new development. The political matter the MSP respondent was referring to was the intention of the Pathfinders to change the tenure ratio in their constituencies. This intention affected the possibility of people affected by residential relocation returning to their old neighbourhood.

6.2.2 **Reason 2: partnership arrangements and agreements**

The approach to residential relocation was reported as differing on the development project level depending on the partnership delivering each specific project. When asked about the way that residential relocation was delivered within specific projects, an important point was made by a representative of NewHeartlands in his e-mail response. He pointed to the fragmentation within the partnership as well as the multiplicity of actors involved:
This means that the partners involved in relocation in different Pathfinder areas may have differed.

The way the Pathfinders and their partners organised the delivery and delegated responsibilities also had an impact on the way HMR implementation in general, and residential relocation in particular, was delivered. Gateway Hull and Transform South Yorkshire respondents presented contrasting approaches.

Several Pathfinder representatives (Elevate East Lancashire, Manchester Salford, Tees Valley and Urban Living, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead) emphasised the importance of the ‘human factor’ in relocation delivery. The respondents responsible for residential relocation stressed that relocation delivery was significantly influenced by the way the residents reacted to Pathfinder projects proposing clearance. In fact, several Pathfinder respondents stressed that sensitivity and responsiveness to the community affected by demolition and residential relocation was the main reason for adopting different approaches to HMR implementation at the project level.

The respondents emphasised that it was impossible to know how the residents would react to plans for demolition. The response might be very different from scheme to scheme. The Elevate East Lancashire Pathfinder respondent stated that in some schemes residents protested against
demolition while others just wanted to leave; the same was reported in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead.

6.2.4 Reason 4: difference in approach based on legislation and HMR funding

Finally, the Pathfinders who were involved with compulsory acquisition commented on links between their relocation practice and the CPO legislation that provided an overall framework. The survey respondents pointed to the complexities of relocation on a project level caused by CPO legislation. First, because of the different ways in which the residents reacted to the demolition plans; second because of the HMR funding regime aimed to cover the expenses of statutory compensation (see CPO).

<table>
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<th>Box 6-7 Project focused approach: legislation and funding</th>
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<td>‘Our team does not take different approach by definition. The difference in approach is the result of CPO legislation. Every household is bound to react differently to the CPO, this is the reason of the CPO implementation is extremely varied in practice. Because of the way CPO is set up, there is a difference in CPO process in case of every project, on the level of the household’ (UL Respondent S1-10).</td>
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<td>‘If you work with the community and you work with people ... when you are moving somebody from their home there is expectation from the funders (the government) that it is very easy to do that. That it can be done in a precise timescale ... within a quarter. But that is not possible even when you are moving your own house. It is not always possible to get people to move. That seems to be lost when we are doing the report to the government. The current framework is totally inflexible. It needs to be flexible to the human need, rather that the rigid process they have now’ (TV Respondent S1-9).</td>
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<td>‘We acquired most of them [properties earmarked for demolition] but didn’t ... 2 flats within that block and didn’t acquire the shop so we couldn’t demolish that whole corner. We had boarded up properties here, but I’d already started negotiations with [the shop owner] ... Now, it gets to November last year and we’re still saying “oh, we’ll give you £200k for your property,” ... That’s in my programme and in my budget that I’ll spend £240k on number 1, 2 by March 31st 2010, but if I don’t spend that, I can’t carry it over and take it with me, I get me next year’s funding but it doesn’t include that £240k but I’m still negotiating with him, we still haven’t bought it. For now, I’ve got to find ... ‘cos he might suddenly say in June “alright then, you can have it,” but the money that I had set aside for that £240k is gone and communities [DCLG] won’t give that back. Government won’t give us that back, we can’t carry money over from one year to the next. It’s like there’s this cut off which says “if you haven’t spent it, you lose it”’ (CS-NCC East Team2).</td>
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According to the UL respondent, it was the nature of the law that dictated the relocation approach, not only for the project as a whole, but at the household scale within each project. His team found that every household reacted to the plans for demolition differently, while some residents were happy to move, others resisted. Negotiations with residents from the same street or even the same
row of terraces may take a different amount of time. For this reason according to this respondent it was impossible to phase demolition and relocation using CPO.

Inability to phase relocation resulted in further challenges for the Pathfinders because the HMR funding regime was planned for precise targets and time scales as indicated by the quotes from the TV and BNG (CS-NCC East Team2) respondents described in Box 6-7: Project focused approach: legislation and funding. In attempting to satisfy the wishes of the residents (and avoid purchase by compulsion that involves court appeals) and work with HMR funding streams, the Pathfinders and their partners were frequently forced to change or alter plans and approaches within a single project as well.

6.2.5 Conclusion: project focused approach to residential relocation delivery

The examination of residential relocation delivery across ten Pathfinders showed that the decentralised approach to policy design, combined with the lack of residential relocation guidance, has led to the proliferation of a range of strategies for residential relocation that substantially differ over time and space. The Pathfinders indicated that they had taken a so-called project focused approach. Projects varied considerably between Pathfinders and within their boundaries. Project characteristics, community reaction to the project, tenure and structure, and mode of partnership working have been quoted most often as the key reasons for taking different and project focused approaches. An unexpected finding of the Pathfinder survey was that the survey respondents, in effect, ‘cased’ residential relocation onto a ‘project or a scheme’ level. The ‘project’ or ‘scheme’ level was the scale and area to which the respondents referred when conceptualising the boundaries of their social action related to residential relocation practice. The scale or case of the ‘project’ was delimited based on interviews with respondents responsible for residential relocation (on the Pathfinder or local authority level) or actors in the field (see Chapter 5, Methodology and Methods). A ‘project or a scheme’ refers to an area planned for redevelopment, which in this case involves planned housing demolition and clearance. Relocation-related studies often refer to a ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘community’ as the focus of their examination; the size, the boundaries of the area, and the number of residents affected (for example, by displacement in gentrification studies) are not clearly defined and are open to interpretation. Unlike ‘neighbourhood’ or ‘community’, a ‘project’ (or a scheme) has planned and defined boundaries as well as a known number of residents affected by demolition along with their tenure and other details. In fact, as shown previously, the project boundaries and information about the affected parties are requirements of the CPO procedure (DETR, 2004). It is based on these details that statutory compensation, and any other
forms of support, are made available to residential relocation affected residents. Consequently, the residential relocation approach and practice differed between the Pathfinders, within Pathfinders between the local authorities, and within local authorities on a project level. However, even within the micro-local scale of a ‘project or a scheme’ there are variations to the approach as noted by the TV, BNG and UL respondents.

The flexible approach envisaged by HMR designers was aimed to maximise positive results through decisions being better adapted to local conditions, suited to the demands and needs of the local population (Cole & Flint, 2007). However, in reality the respondents noted that that they were unable to guarantee any particular residential relocation outcome. For instance, the GW respondent noted in her interview: ‘Although we would like to offer everyone the same option, we haven’t had the new built option15 in all places’ (GW – Respondent S1-3). In other words, since there were no set rules, standards or guidance for residential relocation provided by HMR on the national, policy or local levels, and because the legislation only attended to residential relocation issues in part, the practitioners involved in residential relocation delivery designed their strategies in response to specific issues related to each particular project within their local authority. Community reaction to the demolition plans was just one of these factors. For example, BNG and GW respondents indicated that in some particularly deprived parts of their Pathfinders some residents ‘could not wait’ to be relocated out of neighbourhoods that suffered high levels of deprivation, crime and physical deterioration. They took statutory payments of a few thousand pounds (social tenants) to make the desperate move. Other residents in the same neighbourhood founded community pressure groups and forced the local authority to provide new or refurbished homes, of a size and quality and in a location they desired.

As will be shown in Chapter 7 in detail, as the result of this project focused approach, residential relocation outcomes were highly uncertain and contrasting in terms of process length, location, quality and size of alternative properties. These differences were present at Pathfinder, local authority, project and household levels, between and within tenures.

For instance in BNG (see Chapter 7), some residents were relocated from homes worth less than £20,000, into sustainable homes worth eight times the price of their old property (without any monetary transaction). They were moved to the opposite side of their street (the Cambrian Estate in the Walker project). Other residents in the same local authority struggled to find or afford

15 In some areas of GW the Pathfinder was offering newly built properties to demolition and relocation affected residents. This was an option preferred by the residents.
alternative accommodation within the boundaries of their local authority (Scotswood project). The relocation process lasted a couple of months for some, up to a decade for others (from the moment the decision to demolish had been communicated to the residents).

It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all Pathfinder projects and their characteristics. Each Pathfinder included a number of neighbourhoods, and there were several schemes within each of them. For instance, MSP Pathfinder was involved in over fifteen neighbourhoods through eight major intervention areas. According to its 2008-11 business plan, NewHeartlands worked in thirteen neighbourhoods and developed several projects within each of them. BNG Pathfinder developed 13 different projects, among those eight proposed some degree of demolition. In order to analyse the residential relocation delivery across Pathfinders and their projects, two strategies were followed. First, the processes shaping residential relocation across the Pathfinders and their projects were identified, based on the respondents’ interviews (Pathfinder survey and pilot study). Second, in order to provide an in-depth insight into residential relocation delivery on the project level, a BNG Pathfinder case study was conducted, focusing on three primary intervention areas involving large-scale demolition and relocation (Ch. 7).

6.3 The ‘Relocation Matrix’: Residential Relocation Processes Shaping Residential Relocation Delivery in HMR Pathfinders

The focus on the project level indicates the complexity and diversity of the approaches and strategies that Pathfinders took in their efforts to deliver residential relocation. The observed dynamics and changeability of the approaches to residential relocation raise fundamental questions about the processes shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework and, crucially, accountability and responsibility for these.

This research sought to systematise the observed residential relocation approaches in order to establish causal links between residential relocation experiences and governance processes shaping them. For this reason residential relocation processes were first identified. In order to allow analysis of relocation processes identified in this study, and understand how their interplay shaped residential relocation outcomes on project level, a conceptual model was built drawing on the ‘game’ concept and extensive empirical research. The ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ presents an amalgam of emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR framework (Figure 6-1: Residential Relocation Matrix).
The reason for making such conceptual model was the following. This research found that as the result of HMR programme design and partial legislation that was incompletely relevant to its context (i.e. CPO) there was no consensus among partnerships as to what residential relocation entailed, nor who was officially accountable for it. For example, for some of the respondents high in the Pathfinder hierarchy (e.g. Pathfinder Board, Pathfinder Directors) residential relocation appeared to be ‘something that local authorities do’ (TV Respondent S1-9). However, for the practitioners in local authorities ‘residential relocation is something that [they] didn’t do for at least twenty years’ (TV Respondent S1-9) as the respondent from Tees Valley Pathfinder pointed out.

The previous section showed that different approaches to relocation emerged and evolved in the course of HMR programme implementation at the project scale, in each local authority across the Pathfinders. The interviews with respondents in the pilot studies, the survey, and later the case study all confirmed that residential relocation practice developed in response to the issues that the respondents responsible for residential relocation encountered in their local authorities at the project level. However, these lessons were rarely recorded, exchanged or learned from. Rather, each of the 26 local authorities involved in the HMR programme invented and re-invented its own residential relocation solutions as perceived problems arose.

The analysis of the respondents’ answers and the pilot study suggested that there was no consensus about what residential relocation delivery entailed. Depending on the project the respondents had at hand at the time of inquiry or the prevailing issues affecting their Pathfinder in terms of residential relocation (e.g. relocatees tenure composition) ‘compulsory purchase’, ‘neighbourhood management’, ‘community consultation’, ‘property acquisition’, ‘decanting’, ‘financial assistance’ were all referred to as a part of ‘residential relocation’. For instance in Pathfinders such as UL and more specifically in Sandwell, where large-scale owner occupied areas were earmarked for demolition, local authority ‘compulsory purchase’ and ‘property acquisition’ were referred to as residential relocation by the interview respondent (UL Respondent S1-10). In projects primarily inhabited by social tenants, like in Walker in BNG Pathfinder, relocation was referred to as ‘decanting’ (BNG Respondent S1-1). In the areas where residential relocation has been going on for a long time (e.g. four to eight years), ‘neighbourhood management’ was referred to as part of the residential relocation process (see Chapter 7, Bensham project in Gateshead) even though this related to maintenance of the empty properties and support to residents awaiting relocation. While for some respondents community involvement presented a part of residential relocation practice
(e.g. MSP Respondent S1-4) others referred to community involvement as the process that was missing or omitted from this element altogether.

In order to make sense of the disparate practices which Pathfinders developed on the project scale and to tackle perceived complexity, a conceptual model was built based on empirical data analysis (i.e. coding). This research sought to (a) identify the residential relocation processes common to all the Pathfinder projects and (b) systematise these in a coherent model with the capacity to provide analytical direction. The empirical research was divided into three stages. The first stage was an explorative one. It consisted of BNG and RNS pilot studies, interviews with Pathfinder, local authority and housing association (in RNS) and ALMO (in BNG) representatives, and secondary data analysis. The findings were coded and analysed. Several residential relocation processes were identified as shaping residential relocation in these Pathfinders. In order to ensure the relevance of the findings to other Pathfinders, a qualitative survey was then conducted with all Pathfinders. The respondent from each Pathfinder responsible for residential relocation (a Pathfinder Team member or local authority officer depending on the governance arrangements) was asked to describe the approach to residential relocation in their Pathfinder and report whether the processes of residential relocation identified by the researcher in the pilot studies were relevant in their case. In the last stage the list of residential relocation processes (or the working variant of the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’, see Appendix 4, Figure 4: Processes involved in residential relocation) were given to the in-depth case study respondents for feedback. Based on the results of analysis a conceptual model was built – the ‘Relocation Matrix’.

The analysis of respondents’ narratives in the pilot studies and subsequent feedback through the qualitative survey of ten Pathfinders and the BNG case study, led to identification of five distinct processes shaping residential relocation in the Housing Market Renewal framework. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, resident support, alternative property provision and financial assistance provision. While some processes, such as planning strategy, are well known to affect residential relocation prospects, others, such as financial assistance provision, community involvement, alternative property provision and resident support, have been advanced or developed from scratch (depending on the tenure in question) during Pathfinder operation.

The development of the residential relocation process emerged out of response to challenges Pathfinders and their local authorities encountered while attempting to relocate three affected tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants) using available legislative tools.
At this point it is worth pausing to reiterate that this research distinguishes between the decision making process related to demolition and the decision making process related to relocation. The thesis focuses on the cases where the agreement to demolish and acquire properties has been reached by the stakeholders involved, primarily the residents. The five residential relocation processes describe HMR residential relocation delivery from the moment a decision to demolish or acquire properties has been approved. Very few studies focus on this issue. The argument is that only after demolition has been approved does a set of relocation processes evolve, and that these processes shape residential relocation outcomes. The assent to demolition does not guarantee positive outcomes to the residents (just as disagreement with it does not necessarily bring negative residential relocation outcomes). The process of residential relocation itself shapes relocation outcomes. The residential relocation outcomes depend on the level of advancement of each of the residential relocation processes in the case of an individual project, the actors that deliver them and the nature of their governance arrangements.

**Figure 6-1: Residential Relocation Matrix**

![Matrix diagram showing the relationship between planning strategy, community involvement, resident support, financial assistance provision, and alternative property provision for different types of tenants (Owner Occupiers, Social Tenants, Private Tenants).]

Based on HMR empirical study.
The ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ is a conceptual model that systematises the chains of activity (or residential relocation processes) shaping relocation in HMR. Drawing on GT methodology of a simultaneous process of data collection, coding and analysis, the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ also presents part of the conceptual framework of this study (see Chapter 5) that emerged in the course of this research. As such, it is a frame designed and imposed by the author to capture the governance processes shaping residential relocation, identify actors involved and enable analysis on the Pathfinder, local authority and project scale (see Chapters 7 and 8). In the next section, the Matrix is used to facilitate an in-depth examination of governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR Pathfinders, and identify actors involved.

### 6.3.1 Residential relocation process 1: planning strategy

Planning strategy relates to a planning exercise that concerns the design of a specific scheme or project area and its implementation strategy. Planning strategy is not necessarily related to, or a factor in, residential relocation. However, planning strategy fundamentally influences relocation prospects, whether it plans for relocation within the project or omits planning for it.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, planning strategy proposing demolition (and leading to relocation) needs to follow the CPO legislation. However, CPO legislation does not require the acquiring authorities to plan for relocation, re-housing, or to secure new properties within the new development for relocation. These are left to the discretion of the acquiring authority. The local authority must, however, show that it has the capacity to re-house. Clearly, the location, size or estimate of what constitutes ‘like for like’ property is open to discussion. Even though legislation guiding the legal aspects of planning has changed during the implementation of HMR to include some of the elements not covered by the CPO process, it needs to be appreciated that the changes took some time to implement. For instance, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (PCPA) 2004 provided greater flexibility in the ways by which local authorities can justify demolition and introduced statutory community engagement. It also required local authorities to develop Local Development Frameworks (LDFs) to replace old Local Development Plans (LDPs) or Unitary Development Plans (UDPs). However, in 2007, the Chartered Institute for Housing pointed out that ‘many authorities were still in the process of compiling their LDF and that the planning process was still guided by LDPs or UDPs which were several years old (Lister et al., 2007:109).
Considering HMR specifically, the National Audit Office (2007) pointed out that many of the Pathfinders’ projects or schemes put forward when bidding for HMR funds were mainly ‘off the shelf’ projects. In other words, in many instances the plans for proposed demolition had already been approved or started before the launch of HMR.

The Manchester Salford Pathfinder representative, amongst others, pointed out that there were two main Parliamentary Acts that the Pathfinders used to justify their demolition plans. These are the Housing Act 1985 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (Box 6-8 Planning strategy: Parliamentary Acts used). Which Parliamentary Act was used to justify demolition determined whether new building was planned or not at the time of the demolition proposal. The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requires the local authorities to draft the plans for redevelopment to justify demolition. While there is no requirement to build properties for relocation, this option is open. This is not the case when the clearance is approved using the Housing Act 1985. Under the Housing Act 1985, local authorities are not required to have a plan for redevelopment to justify demolition.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 6-8 Planning strategy: Parliamentary Acts used</th>
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<td>‘[within the Town and Country Planning Act framework] ... you start with: we need to build a school, we need to put a road… etc. Then you are looking where can that be best done and how to deliver. In other words, you have a very clear view of what your game is and what you want to achieve’ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA).)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Under the Housing Act powers you actually have a reversed logic [to that of Town and Country Planning Act]. You are in a situation where you need to go through and exclude any other option but clearance. So you’ve got a group of ‘problem’ properties here .... You’ve looked at repairing them, You’ve looked at changing ownership … and concluded … none of that will work … none of that is appropriate … Therefore you have to clear. So what you have here [within the Housing Act framework] is reverse … what you end up with is this piece of land that is going to be cleared ... and a question: what will I do with it? ’ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA).)</td>
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The choice of the Parliamentary Act fundamentally influenced the direction relocation practice took in each individual project; whether the affected residents were able to relocate back into their neighbourhood or not (Figure 6-2: Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme).

While the newer plans may have been commissioned after PCPA 2004 became law, this did not guarantee that the improvements this legislation brought were utilised. In a number of Pathfinders, no building was completed prior to demolition regardless of the Act used because of the way the redevelopment was phased.
Box 6-9 Planning strategy: project phasing

‘Initially we didn’t plan before we demolished’ (PA Respondent S1-6).

‘There has been only demolition’ (UL Respondent S1-10).

‘The approach that we’re taking is really to get through the demolition and the site assembly before anything is handed over to the developers ... it always works on the basis that we take care of the demolition and basically provide a green space for future development’ (CS-NCC Team 3).

While some of the Pathfinder representatives argued that the new properties (when finished) were first offered to the residents affected by relocation, the teams delivering relocation on the ground commented that relocation into these properties was not possible simply because the relocatees were eligible to be relocated (using statutory compensation, financial assistance and resident support) only once. Once the residents have been relocated using the assistance available based on the fact that the property they own or occupy is earmarked for demolition, they are not entitled for help in new relocation or to bid for new properties. Quotes from the group interview (pilot studies) with the residential relocation officers and BNG Pathfinder representative best illustrates this point.

Box 6-10: Planning Strategy: Project phasing impact on relocation options

Author: But once they [relocation affected residents] have been relocated they cannot move back [to the rebuilt neighborhood] because they slide down the priority ladder.

CS-BNG Team1: Exactly. They will be knocking down somewhere else in the city and they will get those people a priority....

CS-YHN Relocation Team1: So the idea that the people will be able to move back is a theoretical one. The reality is, that they will probably not have the opportunity to do so...

... anybody with a housing priority, homeless or something like that, will come on the top of the list. So if you've been homeless living in different part of the city, they will have the chance to move to Scotswood much better than somebody who lived there previously for 30 years and has moved out of Scotswood because they had to. But they are not housing priority anymore because they have been adequately re-housed.

At the later stages, Pathfinders developed a so-called sequenced or staged approach to redevelopment (e.g. MSP and BNG Pathfinders). This meant that the relocation of the residents was factored into the redevelopment plans: a number of homes were built prior to demolition, a portion of the residents relocated, and then their homes demolished in order to give space for the next stage of redevelopment and relocation (see Chapter 7, Walker Project). However, this approach did not guarantee that all the residents affected by relocation were able to relocate to new homes in their neighbourhood.
The next issue that was identified as vital in terms of the planning strategy process is the question of tenure. As mentioned earlier, one of HMR goals was changing the tenure ratio in the intervention areas. While the aim was to keep the areas mixed in tenure, the objective was to change the tenure ratio from social tenure to owner occupiers. This meant not only that the residents were offered the opportunity to change their tenure in the relocation process but that the new housing provided following the demolition usually had a different tenure mix than the areas earmarked for demolition.

**Box 6-11 Planning strategy: tenure mix**

'The percentage of affordable housing doesn’t necessarily respond to number of households moving out of a clearance area ... The result is that in some cases residents relocate in close proximity of their old property and that in other cases they relocate within the borders of the local authority’ (EEL Respondent S1-2).

This meant that, depending on the planned project tenure ratio a percentage of the residents were relocated back into their old neighbourhood (given that construction was completed by the time they needed to relocate) while others did not have the opportunity to do so.

**Figure 6-2: Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme**

- **Planning Strategy RR inclusive?**
- **Owner Occupier** Refer to general free market offer
- **Social Tenants** Refer to Choice Based Letting System
- **Private Tenants** Refer to the private rent market offer

In cases the planning strategy doesn’t include RR other RR processes may assist relocation.

Planning strategy plans part of its new building supply for the purposes of RR. (for delivery see APP process)
Planning strategy is a defining process in terms of residential relocation. It sets the key options for relocation, whether it plans for it or not. This section showed that the projects involving residential relocation had different planning strategies. Therefore, the extent to which re-housing on the same site was intended for residential relocation-affected residents and the extent to which residential relocation outcomes were shaped by other residential relocation processes differed from the outset. The graph above Figure 6-2 (Planning Strategy and Residential Relocation Scheme) indicates the complexity as well as the variety of forms that relocation within a project took, depending on the planning strategy adopted. This said, planning strategy does not have the capacity to shape the residential relocation outcomes entirely. In cases where relocation was not attended to in the planning strategy because of the way demolition was justified or because of the planned tenure mix, the residents had to find an alternative property through other means, supported by other relocation processes (identified in this study), which are described in the following sections.

6.3.2 Residential relocation process 2: community involvement

CPO legislation empowering local authorities to demolish does not require community consultation in the planning process because of the nature of the intervention (DCLG, 2004). However, the councils’ initial failure to consult properly on the strategy generated a great deal of anger and protests against HMR plans. Following the initial unrest and followed by extensive negative media coverage, the Pathfinders experimented with different types of community involvement to enable redevelopment to proceed.

After the enactment of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 that made community engagement in the planning process (in general terms) compulsory, some HMR local authorities resorted to extensive engagement exercises. Others decided to design their plans ‘bottom-up’ (MSP-Respondent S1-6), drafting their plans based on consultation with the community before commencing the planning exercise (e.g. MSP). However, community involvement was rarely crafted for relocation purposes specifically. As the NAO respondent noted in his interview for this research, ‘deciding which parts of the community to involve and when remained a challenge until the end of the programme’ (NAO Respondent 1).

In this research it was found that community involvement (be it formal or informal) influenced the process and shaped the outcomes of residential relocation in several ways. First, community
involvement influenced the length of the residential relocation process. Community protests were proven to have the capacity to delay the process of redevelopment, reduce number of properties planned for demolition and consequently the number of relocations as well as to reshape the ways residential relocation was delivered (e.g. change the value of financial assistance packages, provision resident support and/or alternative property provision).

Based on the analysis of community involvement modes across Pathfinders, three basic types were identified: statutory community engagement, community protests, and institutionalised protest groups’ engagement (see Table 6-1: Community Involvement: Actors and Relevance to Residential Relocation Process).

Table 6-1: Community Involvement: Actors and Relevance to Residential Relocation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Involvement</th>
<th>Actors involved</th>
<th>Residential Relocation Relevance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statutory community engagement</td>
<td>A chosen group of residents was consulted about the matters of demolition and masterplanning. The residents were not necessarily affected by relocation.</td>
<td>This process was not directly related to the residential relocation issue as such. Rather consultation was designed to cover general planning issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Protests</td>
<td>These were self-organised resident groups. In the vast majority of cases the residents were directly affected by demolition and had to relocate when the clearance was approved.</td>
<td>The community protests were directly linked to demolition and were organised against it. When well-coordinated, protests led to change of the residential relocation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised protest groups’ engagement</td>
<td>These were resident protest groups that were institutionalised and formed a part of the local governance. In some cases they were given decision making power and were regularly consulted about the change in their neighbourhood as well as residential relocation process and choices.</td>
<td>This community involvement type was the most relevant to shaping of residential relocation process directly. Community groups directly affected by demolition and residential relocation were involved in the decision making process regarding residential relocation.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The extent to which one or more of the community involvement modes listed above were present and/or influenced relocation practice varied from project to project (an example is given in the next chapter that examines relocation in BNG in-depth).

6.3.2.1 Statutory community engagement

In the year HMR was launched, the Housing Corporation (2002, 2003) emphasised the importance of engaging the community in the planning and regeneration process. In 2004, two years after the
launch of HMR, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 made community involvement compulsory across the board. In 2004, the ODPM stated ‘the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill specifically requires that Local Development Documents must have regard to the Community Strategy, giving spatial expression to those elements that relate to the physical development and use of land’ (ODPM, 2004:4). Two documents directly linked to statutory community engagement are the Local Development Scheme (LDS) and the Statement of Community Involvement (SCI). However, as mentioned earlier, some of the local authorities struggled with the implementation of the changes made by the Act. In addition, even in places where the PCPA 2004 was implemented, non-statutory plans such Area Development Frameworks (ADFs) and Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments (NRAs) formed a part of the HMR process. Community engagement in these was not required but considered as good practice.

In cases where statutory consultation went ahead, there were two major issues concerning residential relocation. First, as a CIH report (2007) pointed out, there were difficulties with community engagement in HMR emerging from the ‘competing requirements of the different statutory processes, the wishes of residents themselves and the difficulty of accommodating different timescales’ (Lister et al., 2007:111). Second, the broader perception emerging from the expert testimonies in this research was that the Pathfinders and their local authorities did not have a consultation strategy that specifically addressed issues of residential relocation (see Box 6-12: Community involvement: statutory engagement).

**Box 6-12: Community involvement: statutory engagement**

‘We’ve got a group of residents that we speak to, so called, residents’ sounding panel. They are people from lots of different areas ... they are not all from the clearance areas ... but they have their views on it ... We have exploited that to see what is going on. What pressures there were ... it was quite interesting actually’ (PIA Respondent S1-6).

‘Oh, they [residents’ representatives] were all for it, regeneration in Walker, but not at the cost of their homes. They all wanted it but not if it affected them ... others ... when their homes wasn’t gonna be demolished, they sort of walked away ’oh, it doesn’t affect us’... they walked away. Ours, we knew we’d lost ours, so we said: ’right we’ve lost our estate, it is I gone’ ... but we are sticking together for what we want’ (CS- Walker Resident1).

This meant that in some cases the statutory consultation did not bring the expected results as the residents who were affected by demolition and residential relocation were outnumbered by other community representatives. This meant that some tensions related to residential relocation were not resolved and some residents resorted to protests or formed pressure groups despite statutory engagement taking place.
Community protests

Residents’ protests were very characteristic of the first years of HMR implementation, with their numbers peaking between 2003 and 2005. A lack of timely and/or relevant community engagement and consultation resulted in residents’ discontent that was widely covered by the media. According to a BBC report in April 2004 (BBC News, 6 August 2004), about 80 residents lobbied Parliament to protest at the plans. Some other examples included concerted efforts to overturn the decision to demolish 162 Victorian houses in the Nelson West urban renewal programme, in Pendle in Elevate East Lancashire. The demonstrations against demolitions in Liverpool’s Walsh Streets and ex-Beatle Ringo Starr’s birthplace in Madryn Street became one of the symbols of HMR controversy. While it is important to acknowledge the issues that the residents faced, community protesters were often presented as a homogenous group and generalisations made based on the ‘loudest’ ones.

This research found that there were several types of community objectors and protesters who had different motives to object against the plans. Depending on the type these groups had different influences on the residential relocation process and outcomes.

1) Residents who opposed demolition of their own home and neighbourhood outright
2) Residents who wished to be ‘listened to’ and taken into account in the process of planning and relocation
3) Residents and groups who did not have a stake in the area, but protested against demolition for idealistic and other reasons.16

Box 6-13 Community involvement: difference in residents’ attitudes presents quotes from the first and second group in order to illustrate the difference in views and attitude these groups had.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 6-13 Community involvement: difference in residents’ attitudes</th>
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<td>‘They will have to bring the bailiffs, bring the boot boys and they will have to walk over our younger member to get to the older members. And will do it very public – they are not having our houses’ (Action group member PIA, BBC News, 6 August 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘We’re not against regeneration, just the wholesale demolition of Spital Hill. We would like to be listened to and to take an active role in rewriting the Masterplan … There is a lot of concern and fear about what’s happening’ (Dave Harvard, Burngreave Messenger March 2005).</td>
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The three groups had different objectives and different influences on the demolition and relocation process. While the first and the third group worked to stop the intervention completely, the second group wished to be taken into consideration and have chance to influence it. These groups were variably present in different projects. When operating in the same project, they were not

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16 Interestingly, the heritage lobby had become involved, supporting the retention of inner city Victorian housing that has faced charges of obsolescence (see for example Inside Housing, 15 August 2003).
necessarily in alignment. In fact, relocation of those residents who wished to move and use the statutory compensation offered to make a new start was at times stopped or significantly delayed because of protests by external groups or parts of the community that did not have stake in the areas earmarked for demolition, as was the case in BNG in Gateshead or in NHL in Liverpool (see Figure 6-3: Collision of protesters and those wishing to relocate in Liverpool below) for example. These issues are rarely taken into account when examining residential relocation, yet they had a fundamental influence on the residential relocation process.

6.3.2.3 Institutionalised protest groups and ‘bottom up’ planning

One of the more important phenomena identified in this study is what I term institutionalised protest groups. Their title, as well as their position, was controversial. The advantage of this research was that it was conducted in the mature stage of HMR implementation. In the period between 2007 and 2011 it was observed that some of residents’ groups that initially protested against demolition in their areas joined Pathfinders’ and/or their local authorities’ decision making process (in regards to planning process in general and/or residential relocation in particular).
other words, the former protest groups became institutionalised and their leaders joined the Pathfinders’ partners in planning for relocation. In BNG for example, the Scotswood residents’ group, which fiercely protested against Newcastle CC’s plans in 1999, joined the Joint Working Group (in 2002) that brought together NCC officers, local councillors and community representatives to work together on the BNG plans in their area. As a result, the Scotswood residents influenced the way residential relocation was delivered not only in their neighbourhood but in other parts of the city as well (see next chapter for more details). In this research, ‘institutionalised protesters’ were found to have made a significant difference (and improvement) to the residential relocation practice in their local authorities and helped secure better residential relocation outcomes for themselves and their neighbours.

In some other Pathfinders, MSP for example, the local authorities took a so called ‘bottom up’ approach to consultation and consulted the residents about the potential plans before drafting them, suggesting a CPO, or confirming any action. This was done in order to avoid and minimise dealing with the areas where the residents resisted demolition, and to focus on those who supported intervention. The approach proved to be more financially sustainable and less time consuming than others based on regular CPO procedure. In these cases the residential relocation outcomes seemed more acceptable to the residents because they were consulted in advance and because residential relocation was conducted in cases where the residents expressed their agreement with it.

The review of the Pathfinder projects as well as the media reports on demolition suggested that both formal and informal community involvement had an impact on HMR development in general and residential relocation in particular. For this reason, ‘community involvement process’ in this study refers to both formal and informal forms of community engagement related to the residential relocation processes.

6.3.3 Residential relocation process 3: financial assistance provision

Financial assistance provision in this research refers to all financial assistance designed to facilitate relocation for owner occupiers, social tenants and private tenants. Housing Market Renewal has been a major source of proliferation of innovative financial assistance packages (FAPs). Unlike the planning strategy, which has been long known to set the trajectory of residential relocation, FAP
allocation was developed as a response to the difficulties Pathfinders faced. Two years into HMR delivery, an affordability gap was identified between the statutory compensation offered to owner occupiers and the price of alternative property somewhere else (Cole & Flint, 2007). Owner occupiers who were not in a position to sustain their home ownership in the process of residential relocation, or who could not afford to move somewhere else, refused to relocate. Innovative FAPs were developed to bridge the affordability gap and facilitate relocation.

In the first years of HMR implementation, statutory compensation based on the CPO legislation was offered to the residents in the areas earmarked for demolition. Table 6-2: Statutory compensation based on CPO as applied in the HMR framework shows the way the statutory payment was made available to owner occupiers, social and private tenants affected by residential relocation in the HMR framework. Owner occupiers (outright and with mortgage) were entitled to all three types of compensation (market value of their property, home loss and disturbance payments). By agreement between the Pathfinders, social and private tenants were entitled to home loss and disturbance payments where the maximum values were defined on the national level (these two payments together did not exceed £4800).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compensation Tenures</th>
<th>The market value of the property</th>
<th>Home Loss Payment</th>
<th>Disturbance Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Owner Occupiers</strong> (outright and with mortgage)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓ (plus 10% of the market value of the property)</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Tenants</strong> (Local authority and HA)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Tenants</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description of the statutory compensation.**

Owner occupiers receive the market value of their property, based on a valuation conducted by their council and/or an independent valuer. The affected residents receive a payment to compensate them for the process of having to relocate. This is a fixed statutory payment equal for all tenures across England. All tenures receive this payment. It covers actual expenditure occurred in relocating (e.g. replacing some fixtures and fittings, etc). This amount is higher in the case of owner occupiers.

As mentioned earlier, the CPO legislation assumes the existence of a healthily operating market when defining statutory compensation. It was noticed early on that this compensation would not allow the owner occupiers to afford an alternative property somewhere else. For this reason, at the outset relocation grants were offered along with the statutory compensation. However, these were
not sufficient. Comments from the BNG, TV and UL Pathfinders support this claim (Box 6-15
Financial assistance provision: relocation grants).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6-15 Financial assistance provision: relocation grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When we started six, years ago, there has been a basic package available to owner occupiers, the value of maximum £10,000. This was a grant. It wasn’t sufficient …’ (BNG-Respondent-S1-1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘The original grant was not sufficient for the residents to move and purchase an alternative property. Because of residents pressure the grants have been raised to 15,000 pounds so that the people could access owner occupation’ (TV-Respondent –S1-9 (LA)).

‘The initial value of the grant was £12,000, however the residents were facing equity gap and were not able to move to an alternative property. After consultation with the residents the grant was raised to 20,000’ (UL –Respondent –S1-10 (LA)).

According to David Cumberland Associates (cited in Cole & Flint, 2007:9), the outstanding gap remained at around £35,000 (after statutory compensation and relocation grant). While the affordability gap may have affected the social and private tenants because of the potential difference in rent, this issue has not gained too much attention. Namely, HMR set as one of its objectives to increase owner occupation in the Pathfinder areas in order to renew the housing markets. The danger of decreasing existing home ownership in the process of residential relocation gained political attention. In 2004, the ODPM pointed out that the Pathfinders would have to build a solution for the relocation of owner occupiers that went beyond the requirements of the CPO legislation, and use a newly drafted Regulatory Reform Order for this purpose:

‘Pathfinders will need to consider the circumstances of each owner and identify what help could be provided to assist them to move. The flexibility is now available to local authorities under the Regulatory Reform Order 2002 (England and Wales). This allows local authorities to make top up payments to home owners in addition to any statutory entitlement under CPO procedures’ (ODPM, 2004:105).

In July 2002, three months after the launch of HMR, the Regulatory Reform Order (RRO) was enacted. Under the Regulatory Reform Order 2002 local authorities gained powers to develop appropriate forms of assistance for home owners, including increased grant aid, loans, provision of materials, advice and information. The RRO was the basis upon which innovative financial assistance packages were developed by the Pathfinders. According to the ODPM (2004), the FAPs available were: special purpose lending vehicles, local authority loans, faith loans, partial equity purchase, re-sale covenants, and homesteading. While this list presents an orderly picture, in reality the Pathfinders offered a varied number of FAP options. Table 6-3: List of innovative FAPs in the RNS and BNG pilot studies in 2008 presents the list of innovative financial assistance packages
developed in the two pilot studies of BNG and RNS. The table illustrates that the FAPs on offer were numerous as well as differing between the Pathfinders.

**Table 6-3: List of innovative FAPs in the RNS and BNG pilot studies in 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity Loans for purchase and improvement (largely replacing grants)</th>
<th>Relocation equity loan (in Gateshead only), HomeBuy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest-free repayment loans</td>
<td>Relocation grant (only as a last resort)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared ownership for elderly and tenants</td>
<td>Shared ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new-build offer – sale and rent</td>
<td>Discounted sale options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeswap offer</td>
<td>Homeswap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting tenants into owner-occupation</td>
<td>Capital and Interest repayment loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair deal for private tenants</td>
<td>Unsecured loan (through the council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation grants in hardship cases</td>
<td>(tenants can also use HomeBuy and the First Time Buyers initiative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RNS (Pilot study, 2008)  
BNG (Pilot Study, 2008)

The availability of FAPs, their value, and the sources of funding and provision also differed across the Pathfinders’ local authorities. FAPs on offer changed over time and may have been different on a project scale within the same local authority, depending on the time of implementation and time of relocation.

**Box 6-16 Financial assistance provision: difference in FAP availability**

*The availability of FAPs used to be different across the local authorities. But this has changed recently. Today, the FAPs are equally available across all local authorities within the Pathfinder. The value may slightly differ based on the state of the local market’ (EEE Respondent S1-2).*

*The financial package and the way it works is the same but it is a different amount … It is different in both local authorities, but that is because the [affordability] gap is different. The FAPs are always designed to plug a specific gap’ (PIA – Respondent – S1-6).*

*There are some local specifications. We would look at the market conditions and we would usually set a ceiling. We will support you up to this level’ (MSP – Respondent – S1-4 (LA)).*

At the outset, the sheer number of choices and possibilities seemed to confuse the residential relocation-affected residents more than assist them. The Pathfinders invested a considerable amount of time explaining FAP options to residents. This caused additional delays in the residential relocation process. As a result the residents lived for prolonged period of time in half boarded up streets.

The development of FAPs made a fundamental change in the residential relocation process. It resulted in a change of the role of the local authorities in the relocation process and introduced a new set of actors in the process. Pathfinder local authorities assumed a new role, that of a lender. Organisations like ALMOs and RSLs were further contracted to manage or distribute FAPs to
relocatees. Partnerships and private lenders (e.g. ARC4, Kickstart) provided funding for FAPs additional to that of the HMR fund.

Unlike other residential relocation processes, that affected all tenures, FAPs influenced residential relocation prospects for owner occupiers the most. The reason is that the compensation and FAPs they received had, in the majority of cases, a direct impact on the type of property they could relocate to.

Development of financial assistance packages enabled home owners to move and gave them freedom (within the constraints of the local market and resources available) to relocate within the boundaries of their local authority. However, application of FAPs also resulted in the formation of a new tenure – shared ownership. In other words part of the alternative property equity that was not covered by the statutory compensation and grants was made available through equity loans owned by local authorities (as lenders). Future research should examine the long-term effects of this relocation option on relocatees.

Based on the Pathfinder survey, this section argues that the high dependence on financial assistance for relocation (in the form of grants, loans and equity loans) made policy extremely sensitive to both micro- and macro-market shifts. A highly localised approach to policy design (and in particular to the relocation of residents) has led to the proliferation of a range of FAPs that differed substantially between the Pathfinders, their local authorities and between individual projects. In addition depending on the time of relocation (at the beginning of project implementation or at more mature stages) FAPs may have differed on a project level as well. It appears as if FAP provision and availability changed in a frenetic race with both micro- and macro-economic shifts. As the result, relocation outcomes for owner occupiers differed as well, at the sub-regional, local authority, project and household level, and have been inconsistent, even chaotic, in form. Even though a substantial proportion of the £2.2 billion policy fund has been invested in demolition and relocation, the process has been overshadowed by great uncertainty for residents.

### 6.3.4 Residential relocation process 4: alternative property provision

Alternative property provision (APP) in this research refers to the process of planning for and/or securing properties for re-housing residents from properties earmarked for demolition. It refers to alternative dwelling provision for all tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants) whose relocation is required by HMR interventions.
The alternative property provision process has a crucial impact on residential relocation outcomes. The properties meant to replace homes lost to demolition have certain characteristics related to their type and location. These have an impact on the residents not only in terms of the physical environment, but on their economic standing and the development or redevelopment of social relations within the relocated household unit and the community. In this research, type of property relates to its physical characteristics (such as old, new built, refurbished), its size (e.g. two, three, four bedroom) and dwelling type (e.g. flat, terrace, bungalow etc.). The ‘type’ of the property defines the living space of a household unit (e.g. family) and caters for their specific needs (e.g. disability, elderly population, religious needs, or simply personal preferences and aspirations) and social relations between household members. The location of the property defines the aspects of affordability, in terms of its location in the local sub-markets as well as its proximity to the old, demolished neighbourhood and its community. In those terms the location of the alternative property defines and redefines (in the case of residential relocation) the wider social relations of the relocated household with its surroundings.

Re-housing or alternative property provision is not required by CPO in general terms. Only the social tenants are required to be re-housed based on the ‘decanting policy’ of their housing providers (housing associations or local councils). However, such a legal requirement does not exist for owner occupiers and private tenants. The acquiring authorities are not obliged to provide alternative properties for owner occupiers and private tenants, except in exceptional circumstances. The Pathfinders started developing alternative property provision options for these two tenures only after the ‘exceptional circumstances’ (in other words inability to move because of the affordability gap or unavailability of alternative properties) were proven. However, similarly to FAPs, APPs varied between the Pathfinders, their local authorities and depending on the project, timing, tenure or delivery.

6.3.4.1 Owner occupiers

There is no legal obligation to re-house owner occupiers. The CPO works under the assumption that the residents will be able to find an equivalent property somewhere else with the statutory compensation to which they are entitled. Following this legislation the relocation ’depends what is available in the housing market at the time you choose to move … and the amounts of money’ (PIA Respondent S1-6), as a PIA respondent pointed out. However, in the case of HMR this was not possible, for the simple reason that the cheapest and most ‘unpopular’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004)
homes were designated for demolition. In many cases the available FAPs were not sufficient to bridge the affordability gap, or simply properties for relocation were not available.

At the beginning of HMR implementation, in the majority of Pathfinders there was only demolition. In many cases the residents could not afford to buy properties in the same state as their old one in other parts of the local market. For this reason, in some of the Pathfinder projects redevelopment was planned in advance or in sequence with demolition. This enabled the owner occupiers to invest their statutory compensation and the FAPs they were eligible for in new-built homes in their old neighbourhood. The option enabled the relocatees move into brand new properties that they would not be able to afford otherwise and preserve connection to their old neighbourhood and social networks. However, this option was not widely available. The process was not without challenges. Namely, general property provision within the HMR framework was entrusted to private developers. These agents provided affordable properties under agreement with the acquiring authorities, in exchange for access to large sites. This meant that the local authorities and Pathfinders became dependent on the private sector to deliver residential relocation.

**Box 6-17 Alternative property provision: housing provision by private developers**

*‘Each developer agreement has a certain percentage of the affordable housing (10-25%). The percentage is decided upon in collaboration with the local authority. The agreements are made between the local authority and the developer’ (EEL Respondent S1-2).*

*‘In some cases you have a very straightforward development agreement, where there is a developer, the city council is separate, but we agree that this land will be made available at certain time. In all the situations you have the council as an active partner. However, when there are specific requirements for the site in terms of affordability, the council is in tighter partnership, with a stake in the game, as opposite to the situation when owner occupier schemes are delivered to the market’ (BNG Respondent S1-1).*

In 2008 alternative property provision in the form of new-built homes was especially challenging because of the financial crisis that affected the housing sector as a whole. According to the respondents the main challenge was the ability to sell the properties built for sale. The revenue for these partially financed the affordable properties built for relocation. As the result the private developers stop building altogether (for more details see Chapter 8).
Apart from the provision of new affordable properties for relocation, the Pathfinders developed a Homeswap option, to help owner occupiers relocate. The Homeswap scheme was designed and launched in the Seedly and Langworthy areas of Salford, MSP Pathfinder. Homeswap allowed people with negative equity (especially owner occupiers with mortgages) to choose an alternative property in a retained area, in close proximity to their old neighbourhood, which is then renovated both internally and externally to their specifications and to modern standards. In 2008, the Audit Commission (2008:12) reported that the scheme was one of the most popular relocation options in HMR framework.

In 2003, the council reports showed that Bridging Newcastle Gateshead started to transform Tyneside flats into larger properties and offer them as a Homeswap option (NCC, 2003). In the same year the approach was being explored in Transform South Yorkshire (House of Commons, 2008). By 2005, when the MSP Homeswap scheme was publicised as one of the most popular residential relocation options (SCC, 2005), the approach was adopted in three additional Pathfinders. NewHeartlands offered the scheme to home occupiers in Sefton Council, Bedford Road and Queens Road and social tenants in the Klondyke redevelopment areas (NewHeartlands 2005a, 2005b; Cole & Flint, 2007). Tees Valley Pathfinder developed Homeswap options in Middlesbrough, Gesham clearance area, with Hartlepool and Redcar and Cleveland local authorities following (HBC, 2005; RCBC, 2011; MC, 2011). At the same time Partners in Action

### Box 6-18 Alternative property provision: difficulties in new housing delivery

‘The challenge is the new building. This is because there is no market for housing in general at the moment. The developers are reluctant to start new building’ (EEL Respondent S1-2).

‘We need mechanisms that will allow us to get on with new building ... to be able to relocate ... New building has been stopped by the credit crunch’ (GW Respondent S1-3).

‘The biggest problem [in new housing provision] is confidence about being able to sell and the impact that this has ... because when the stock is sold that money can be taken somewhere else to a next phase ... everything is just cluttering up at the moment’ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA)).

### Box 6-19 Alternative property provision: Homeswap scheme

‘We buy properties on the open market near demolition areas and transfer those to our housing association partners. West Hull and East Hull have different housing associations ... They let these as social rented housing. We fully fund the purchase and transfer it to them ... we have 100% relocation rights from our relocation areas to those properties’ (GW Respondent S1).

‘That [Homeswap] proved to be very successful and popular. It also gave you the double benefit, not only were you helping relocating people and avoiding resistance to compulsory purchase ... people were comfortable that they were not being disadvantaged. It also meant that you are retaining residents from the community and that you are getting secure owner occupation on properties that were currently standing vacant’ (MSP Respondent S1-4 (LA)).
Pathfinder (PIA) was examining adopting the scheme as well (Partners in Action, 2005). However, the scheme was not as widely available as it appeared. Usually a dozen homes per project were available through Homeswap. For instance, MSP Pathfinder that invented the scheme, distributed just around 150 Homeswap homes, while it demolished several thousands.

6.3.4.2 Social tenants

Re-housing or decanting social tenants in the event of housing demolition is required by law. Decanting is a legal term used to explain the process where residents are required to move from their (rented) homes, because an authority with compulsory purchase powers has redevelopment plans for their home. Government legislation has an impact on how HAs or local authorities can implement their decanting policy. The key Acts to be taken into consideration are the Land Compensation Act 1973 and the Planning & Compensation Act 1991.

The plans that require decanting may involve demolition or major repair or improvement to the property (resulting in a significant change of character to the property, e.g. building an extra room), and may require the resident to move out, either temporarily or permanently, for the works to be completed (CIH, 2010). Decanting is done within the properties of the housing provider or through a choice based lettings system. In both cases the social tenants are eligible for a priority card in order to ensure their relocation from areas affected by demolition.

Depending on the Pathfinder, local authority or specific project, the social tenants were relocated into existing social housing properties of the council or housing associations (through a choice based letting system). In some cases where new properties were available for social tenants, they were relocated in brand new properties (such was the case for a number of social tenants in BNG and MSP Pathfinders).

While social tenure was the one of the three that received the most support, there were also challenges that social tenants faced in accessing alternative properties. This research found that the demolition of social housing led to increasing pressure on the social housing stock in the Pathfinder areas. This was because of the HMR goal to reduce social housing in the intervention areas. Generally the number of social tenure units demolished was larger to number of new built ones. This led to long waiting lists and a prolonged process of residential relocation in some cases.
6.3.4.3 Private tenants

Private tenants, unlike social tenants, were not required to be re-housed. However, this research found that the Pathfinders developed various ways to attend to the needs of the private tenants. In Newcastle (BNG), for example, private tenants were relocated in the social rented properties as there was no other available option. In several Pathfinders a Private Landlord Accreditation scheme was developed in order to ensure decent housing standards for private tenants.

The enactment of the Housing Act 2004 had a special influence on the issue of private tenants’ relocation. The Housing Act 2004 granted local authorities power to license all landlords in areas of low housing demand or similar areas, where poor management of the private rented sector frustrated efforts to create sustainable communities. The accreditation was, in effect, an agreement between private landlords in the intervention areas and the local authorities, which guaranteed certain housing standards from the landlord. But it also meant that the residents, both private and social tenants, could be referred to these agents to be relocated to an alternative property.

In summary, alternative property provision significantly influenced residential relocation options and outcomes within a project area; specifically the type and location of a property and the social change that comes with it. In addition, the process of alternative property provision had a vital impact on the process and length of residential relocation for all tenures (feelings of certainty or uncertainty among the residents). While planning strategy set an overall plan and direction for general housing provision in the planned area, alternative property provision had its own pace as it depended not only on the authorities planning and approving redevelopment plans (i.e. Pathfinders and local authorities) but on numerous property providers for all three tenures. Cross-tenure relocation in HMR meant that property provision depended on different housing providers such as private developers, RSLs, ALMOs and private landlords. In turn the Pathfinders and local authorities depended on these actors to complete residential relocation. Dependence on disparate actors to deliver APP for relocation was a challenge that was not envisaged in HMR design, which planned for a ‘tenure blind’ approach to housing.

6.3.5 Residential relocation process 5: relocation support

‘To exercise real choice requires not only a range of options but also accurate information about them’ (Lister et al, 2007:85).

As shown in previous sections, residential relocation was a complex intervention, involving trial and error and frequent changes of approach. This put relocatees in a challenging position. They had
to negotiate the complexities of public service delivery and navigate through changing relocation options and choices and also to respond to many consultation and engagement activities. This led to confusion and disillusionment among the residents and uncertain residential relocation outcomes, as well as wasted resources on the Pathfinders’ side. In some cases the councils faced protests and resistance despite community engagement being completed. Resident support as a residential relocation process for all affected tenures evolved in response to the increasing complexity of the residential relocation process in the HMR framework.

It is worth noting that resident support was not required from acquiring authorities under the CPO legislation. During the time of HMR implementation, resident support process developed, from mandatory support to social tenants (under decanting policies), to cover owner occupiers as well as (though less often) private tenants. The previous sections showed that the relocation options differed between projects in the same local authority and changed during the time a single project was implemented. Information relevant to one project was often not relevant in the next. The relocation process and options differed between tenures. The respondents in the pilot studies pointed out that there was a different approach to counselling about relocation depending on the tenure type. Because of the legislative position, the information needed to be provided to owner occupiers, social and private tenants was different; the organisations to which relocatees needed to be directed for alternative properties for instance, were also different. In addition, different tenures were eligible for different types of FAPs and properties.

The residential relocation information systems and teams were set up at first in response to community pressure (see Chapter 8) and later through the support of the Regulatory Reform Order 2002. The RRO granted local authority funding for appropriate forms of assistance advice and information among other things.

Resident support processes developed to cover a wide range of information and advice to the relocation affected households (e.g. organising the removal, finding an alternative property, contacting the right organisation for issues of property valuation, distribution of FAPs, providing information about alternative property options and choices in each household case, etc.). In many Pathfinders printed, web and video information was supplied in order to support the residential relocation teams’ work and keep residents informed about relocation choices and options (for illustration see Figure 6-4: Resident support examples).
In the process of HMR delivery, special purpose relocation teams were set up on the local authority or Pathfinder level depending on the case. These teams were a part of local council staff, ALMOs or local Housing Associations depending on the case. The relocation teams were the frontline delivery service that dealt with all the details of relocation, and usually had up-to-date information about the project phasing, availability and value of FAPs along with the APPs. These teams worked with each individual household that was affected by demolition daily on a one-to-one basis, in some cases for several years, as reported by the relocation team in BNG’s Your Homes Newcastle ALMO. The respondents reported that because of the length of involvement, teams developed a strong relationship with relocatees.

Resident support was proven to be an important residential relocation process that helped the residents navigate through the dynamic and complex maze of residential relocation choices and options, and reduced anxiety and feelings of fear and uncertainty among the residents. The teams were also used by the Pathfinders to learn about the community and the possibilities of intervention in more mature stages of HMR implementation.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter showed that residential relocation practice developed in a complex and demanding policy context. It showed that residential relocation in HMR was delivered differently and variably, not only on Pathfinder or local authority, but on project level within each of the 26 Pathfinder local authorities. There was no consensus among practitioners as to what residential relocation entailed.
The development and evolution of residential relocation delivery was a result of responses to issues the respondents encountered in their local authorities at project level.

In order to make sense of the disparate approaches across numerous Pathfinders’ projects, the study built a conceptual model – the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ – drawing on extensive empirical research in GT tradition and the governance theory concept of ‘game’. This tool is presented in Figure 6-1 (Residential Relocation Matrix). The Residential Relocation Matrix systematises residential relocation processes identified to shape residential relocation in the HMR framework. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, resident support, financial assistance provision and alternative housing provision. The five residential relocation processes describe HMR residential relocation delivery from the moment a decision to demolish or acquire properties has been approved. This issue is important, as residents’ agreement to demolition and relocation did not guarantee acceptable residential relocation outcomes and vice versa. The residential relocation processes were found to differ depending on the tenure affected by housing demolition; they were differently developed across Pathfinders and their projects. The procedural approach to residential relocation contributes to the literature concerning residential relocation in two main ways. First, it shows that residential relocation consists of several interdependent processes. The findings suggest that focus on residential relocation as a homogenous process or focus on one of its processes (e.g. new building) may not have the capacity provide an explanation about the nature of the residential relocation outcomes or the solutions needed. Community involvement (Power, 2007) may not be sufficient if private developers refuse to build alternative properties for relocation. Phasing new building, demolition and relocation (Cole & Flint, 2007) may be vital in a limited number of cases where new building is planned for relocation, but not in others.

The findings in this chapter point to the need to identify residential relocation processes as they relate to a specific project, analyse them together, and use the results to explain how their interaction shapes residential relocation outcomes. It is only through such in-depth analysis that the researchers will be able to tackle the complexity of the processes shaping specific residential relocation outcomes.

Identifying the processes that shaped mixed tenure residential relocation in HMR is important, not only to describe how residential relocation was delivered but also to facilitate in-depth analysis of residential relocation practice on project scale, to help identify the actors shaping residential relocation and their roles responsibilities in this framework. These themes are addressed in the
following chapter through the in-depth case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead and its three primary intervention areas: Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell.
Chapter 7. Residential Relocation Delivery in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead: Pathfinder and Project level

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed that HMR Pathfinders developed their approach to relocation on the level of individual projects and that the residential relocation approach differed between the Pathfinders, within Pathfinders between the local authorities and within local authorities at the project level.

This chapter presents the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder and its three primary intervention areas (three projects). It examines in detail how residential relocation processes were delivered at project level. The results presented here are based on more than thirty face-to-face interviews conducted within the pilot study in May 2008, and the in-depth case study conducted between November 2009 and January 2010. This allowed for examination of residential relocation practice in real time. The BNG Pathfinder was chosen because at the time of inquiry it was one of the most advanced Pathfinders in terms of demolition. The Pathfinder had one of the most developed relocation financial assistance strategies. It was confirmed as representative of the majority of the Pathfinders, when the survey results showed that seven of the ten Pathfinders adopted a strategic partnership governance structure. Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (BNG) was set up as a strategic partnership of Newcastle City Council (NCC), and Gateshead Council. Newcastle and Gateshead are two administratively sovereign cities which face each other across the River Tyne. Newcastle and Gateshead are located in the north east of England. The BNG Pathfinder area is a part of the wider Tyne and Wear conurbation (see Figure 7-1: BNG Pathfinder area in Tyne and Wear conurbation). The chapter is organised in the following way. The first section sets out the BNG background. The next three sections individually address the BNG primary areas: Scotswood, Walker and Bensham. In these projects the number of demolitions was the highest, these were also the areas into which the Pathfinder put the majority of its resources.
Each of the sections covers key information about the project and its background, examines five residential relocation processes, identifies actors involved in each of the processes and presents the attainable residential relocation outcomes.

Figure 7-1: BNG Pathfinder area in Tyne and Wear conurbation

Source: Audit Commission (2005:5)

7.2 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Background

Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder was established in 2002-3. It covered the inner core areas of Newcastle and Gateshead Councils. Activity in Newcastle was focused on Elswick and the Discovery Quarter, Benwell and Scotswood, Byker, Walker, and the Cowgate and Blakelaw neighbourhoods. In Gateshead, it was focused on Dunston and Teams, Felling, Deckham, and Bensham and Saltwell (see Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of
intervention). These neighbourhoods formed a Newcastle Gateshead sub-region and had specific intervention areas and specific projects defined within their boundaries.

**Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention**

![Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention](image)

Source: BNG, 2006

The BNG sub-region had a population of around 150,000 people living in 77,000 homes (52,000 properties in Newcastle and 25,000 in Gateshead). The Pathfinder covered an area of over 3,600 hectares (Audit Commission, 2005; Leather et al., 2007).

Similarly to other Pathfinders, Newcastle and Gateshead have suffered severe economic decline in past decades, and found themselves among the most deprived English regions. Once the nineteenth-century powerhouse of industrial revolution, the Tyne region’s shipbuilding, mining and heavy industry, had attracted labour to the area. In that period the majority of the terraced houses and Tyneside flats were built for the industrial labour force.

However, the story of industrial success began to fade in the twentieth century. In fact, in the Tyne region industry had been in decline for most of the twentieth century and the situation substantially worsened at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a resulting poor environment, low educational attainment and high crime levels meant that the neighbourhoods surrounding the urban
core showed all the symptoms of multiple deprivation (Audit Commission, 2005) and became some of the most deprived areas in the country (BNG, 2011:46).

In an effort to revitalise the area socially, economically and physically it has been the subject of many urban regeneration initiatives designed in England since the Second World War and the subsequent slum clearance. In the 1960s, small-scale Urban Aid measures were introduced to support social and environmental projects. In the late 1970s, after publishing the White Paper, ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’, Newcastle and Gateshead were designated as Inner City Partnership authorities. In the 1980s, the West End of Newcastle became one of the Conservative government’s Enterprise Zones and later Urban Development Corporations. Other policies included the government’s City Action Teams established in 1985, West End City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget in the mid-1990s. Some of these projects were successful, others less so (Robinson, 2003; Audit Commission, 2004, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 7-3: Contrasting results of Newcastle and Gateshead regeneration initiatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead Millennium Bridge, Newcastle-upon-Tyne; By Xavier De Jauréguiberry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Now we have a paradox of parts of Newcastle Gateshead booming; attracting a world-wide audience with new homes in exciting neighbourhoods, but set against areas of multiple deprivation’ (BNG, 2004).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Quayside, large-scale regeneration had replaced the former shipping premises with imposing new architectural achievements, the landmark Gateshead Millennium Bridge and major cultural developments including the Baltic Centre for contemporary art. However, in former industrial neighbourhoods such as Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle, or Bensham and Saltwell in Gateshead, the interventions did not bring the expected results. These areas continued to top the list of the most deprived areas in England and lose population.
The contrasting stories of urban success and failure have resulted in a patchwork-like housing market in the sub-region. Figure 7-4: Vital Indices overall ranking 2006 shows that some of the most viable (pink colour) areas were in close proximity with the least viable ones (dark purple). In the HMR framework, this indicated instability and a lack of balance in the local housing market.

The Vitality Index is a statistical market intelligence model that operates at a neighbourhood level and shows relative levels of vitality or deprivation at the local level. The index is made up of six domains that each use one or more indicators to summarise performance in that domain: housing, health, crime, education, income, unemployment. Where more than one indicator was used in a domain, the statistical technique of factor analysis was used to summarise the indicators into one overall score (or factor) based on the interrelationship between them.

Map Source: Newcastle City Council (2007)

The BNG area covered the weakest sections of the sub-regional housing market. Figure 7-5: Change in house prices 1996 to 2005 shows that housing prices in the BNG area were significantly lower than in England as a whole, and lagged behind average prices in the sub-region as well as more locally in Newcastle and Gateshead. The West End of Newcastle in particular gained national coverage in 1999 with the availability of properties for 50p to investors who agreed to refurbish them (BNG, 2011:9). In 2004, a CRESR17 evaluation confirmed BNG still represented a concentration of low house prices, containing four of the ten lowest priced postcode sectors within the North East (CRESR quoted in Audit Commission, 2005:17).

17 CRESR - Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University
In BNG, as in other Pathfinders the turnover of social housing was high. Between 2000 and 2001 it was 14.5% (Leather et al., 2007:104). This further fortified the claims about the housing market weakness in the sub-region.

Economic activity in the BNG area was only 52.1% (while England as a whole was 64%) with incomes significantly lower than in the city region (ratio of Pathfinder median income to the city region was 0.78) (Leather et al., 2007:218). In the 1990s, economic growth was a quarter of the national average, while in 2005 the figures indicated 1.3% of economic growth compared to 3.1% nationally (Audit Commission, 2005:7). In 2001, BNG had the highest proportion of people who were permanently sick or disabled (12.4%) among the Pathfinders. BNG was also among the Pathfinders that had a high percentage of retired population (13.1%) and students (8.6%). Figure 7-6: *Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder key facts table*, presents a comprehensive overview of the BNG facts and figures according to Leather et al. (2007) based on the 2001 Census. BNG, like the other Pathfinders, was entrusted to identify the specific problems that led to housing market failure in their jurisdiction and to develop locally adopted solutions based on this evidence.
### Figure 7-6: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder key facts table

#### Size and type of pathfinder area

| Area | Hectares | 3,686 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 154,370 | 1,646,618 | 9.37 |

#### Composition of pathfinder area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population by Age group (% 2001)</th>
<th>0-15</th>
<th>16-24</th>
<th>25-44</th>
<th>45-59</th>
<th>60-74</th>
<th>75+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Other</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Households | Household spaces (2001) | 68,716 | 74,035 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income (2005)</th>
<th>Mean Income £</th>
<th>Ratio of pathfinder to city region</th>
<th>Median Income</th>
<th>Ratio of pathfinder to city region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20,263</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>17,284</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Status (2001)</th>
<th>Economically Active</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Permanently sick or disabled</th>
<th>Retired</th>
<th>Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Type of dwellings within pathfinder area

<p>| Dwellings within pathfinder area | 77,000 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dwelling type (% 2001)</th>
<th>Detached</th>
<th>Semi-detached</th>
<th>Terraced</th>
<th>Flat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vacant dwellings (no. 2001)</th>
<th>Vacant household spaces</th>
<th>Vacancy rate</th>
<th>Ratio to regional average</th>
<th>Ratio to national average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,261</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Vacancy rate (% 2005) | 4.90 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure (% 2001)</th>
<th>Ownin outright</th>
<th>With Mortgage</th>
<th>LA tenants</th>
<th>HA tenants</th>
<th>Private tenants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Source: Leather et al. (2007:218)
7.2.1 Perceived problems and need for HMR intervention

The evidence about the BNG Pathfinder is elaborate. Its comprehensive overview is out of the scope of this thesis. For this reason in this section the focus is on the issues that the BNG Pathfinder itself identified as the most pressing, and based on which it defined its goals and objectives. The problems that the BNG Board and Team considered especially critical were: population loss, vacant properties, oversupply of the same type of property, and high levels of social housing (BNG Key Facts, 2008, Leather et al., 2007).

7.2.1.1 Population loss, and vacant properties

Population loss from BNG areas seemed to be a particularly important problem to tackle for the BNG officials. Census data showed that the area lost over 20,000 people in the period between 1981 and 2001 (BNG Key Facts, 2008). This made BNG one of the Pathfinders most acutely affected by population loss. Leather et al. (2007:xiii) indicated that BNG and NewHeartlands topped the list of the Pathfinders with a record 9% population loss in the period between 1991 and 2001.

The population loss in BNG was associated with industrial decline. However, a number of studies showed evidence that the geography of the Newcastle and Gateshead housing market had expanded since the nineties. While the old inner suburbs declined, new housing development was supplied outside Newcastle and Gateshead. The studies pointed to relative ease of travel into the two cities and development of a culture of commuting to work. For instance, research carried out by consultants Experian for BNG (Experian, 2005) found that historically only one in ten people taking up jobs in Newcastle Gateshead actually made their home there, with North Tyneside in particular housing many commuters in professional occupations.

Tyne and Wear Housing Market Assessment, by Coombes et al. (2004), found that in 1991, Newcastle’s housing market included North Tyneside and part of Tynedale but that by 2001, it was part of a much wider housing market that also included Northumberland and part of Cumbria. Also while Gateshead was relatively self-contained in 1991, by 2001 its market operated with parts of Tynedale and Derwentside. The report suggested Newcastle was much more strongly linked with areas north of the Tyne and beyond the Tyne and Wear border in particular than with Gateshead (Audit Commission, 2005:17)
The North East Housing Aspirations Study (Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners, 2005) confirmed a significant movement away from the Pathfinder to North Tyneside, Tynedale, Derwentside and Castle Morpeth (Audit Commission, 2005:18). Figure 7-7: Migration patterns on sub-regional level Tyne and Wear presents a map of internal migration in the Tyne and Wear sub-region.

Despite the overall population increase due to international migration in the 2000s, both Newcastle and Gateshead continued losing their population due to out migration to surrounding areas (BNG, 2011:65). As a result of these trends, the area experienced population loss and housing abandonment. According to the 2001 Census, the vacancy rate in the Pathfinder area was 7.1%, making over 5,200 vacant household spaces (Leather et al., 2007:218).

Nathaniel Lichfield and Partners’ (2005) study suggested that if insufficient desirable housing was available in the short term, current migration and price trends would continue. Hence, one of the BNG goals was diversification of housing supply in the inner city cores of the two cities.
7.2.1.2 Tenure and oversupply of the same type of property

According to the 2001 Census, the Pathfinder target areas had a large amount of social rented stock (47.3% in total) (Leather et al., 2007; BNG, 2011). The ratio of owner occupiers in the area at 39.9% was lower than in Newcastle (53.3%) and Gateshead (53.1%), and significantly lower than the national average (68.7%) (see Table 7-1: Percentage in each tenure 2001). One of the key objectives of the BNG Pathfinder was changing the tenure ratio by reducing the amount of social housing and increasing owner occupation. In some cases this required clearance and demolition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-1: Percentage in each tenure 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All owning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BNG (2011: 73)

The BNG intervention areas comprised poor quality housing that was relatively small. Three dwelling types dominated the area: flats (33.6% mostly Tyneside flats), terraces (30.6%) and semi-detached properties (31.6%). Semi-detached properties were newer and usually belonged to the social rented sector. Tyneside flats and terraces were built around the 1900s and were mostly in the private rented sector or low income owner occupation. The Pathfinder area lacked a supply of larger family homes; increasing the availability of these was one of the BNG objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-2: Percentage of each dwelling type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BNG (2011: 73)
7.3 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder

In September 2003, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (BNG) submitted its first proposals to the government. Here the partnership outlined the approach to be adopted to tackle what were considered ‘long-standing problems’ and create a stable housing market in the North East sub-region. The BNG sub-regional HMR goal was ‘creating great places to live’ (BNG, 2011). Demolition was an important part of this strategy. It was seen as a potential to ensure a clean start in areas that had been in decay for decades. BNG planned for the demolition of around 4,300 residential units between 2003 and 2018. By February 2011, two months before the cancellation of the HMR programme, the Pathfinder had demolished close to 3,000 properties and acquired 1,200 (BNG, 2011). The exact number of the residents relocated within the Pathfinder is unobtainable (see Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods). Considering the average empty property rate at 7.1% for BNG, and given the prevailing household composition (Leather et al., 2007:26), the author’s conservative estimate is that at least 6,000 people were relocated during the BNG operation.

Table 7-3: BNG Outputs achieved up to February 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Demolitions</th>
<th>Acquisitions</th>
<th>New Build or Conversion</th>
<th>Land Acquisition (Hectares)</th>
<th>Properties Improved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Newcastle</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>3835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Gateshead</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>3053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total BNG Area</td>
<td>2855</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>6888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BNG (2011:15):

7.3.1 Bridging Newcastle Gateshead goal

‘Creating places where people want to live, work, learn and invest is key to the future of Newcastle Gateshead, the North East and the country as a whole. These are the central ideas behind our aim to redress housing market failure.’ (BNG, 2005)

In order to solve the identified problems the BNG Pathfinder defined a goal to ‘create great places to live’. The goal was developed at the sub-regional level as envisaged by HMR designers. As seen above, the BNG goal was quite different from the overall HMR goals at national level. Review of the BNG annual reports and business plans showed that BNG defined its goal as place making in 2004/05 and stayed loyal to it until the programme closure in 2011.
BNG’s objectives primarily addressed the issue of critical population loss from the area, limited choice of dwelling types and poor condition of housing stock. One of the major concerns of the BNG officials was changing the tenure ratio, as the prevalence of social tenure was considered unsustainable.

The BNG goal and objectives were in reality directly linked with providing better quality and improved choice of housing. As can be seen in the Table 7-3: BNG Outputs achieved up to February 2011, the work to be carried out concerned physical improvement of the housing stock: home refurbishment, land acquisition, land preparation (for development), new building and home clearance (BNG Key Facts, 2008). Land acquisition and clearance caused residential relocation.

7.3.2 Selection of the BNG areas

Having considered some of the key BNG characteristics in the previous section, it is necessary to look into the way the BNG area and projects were selected. BNG developed a Vitality Index. The Vitality Index has been cited in national evaluation commissioned by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) as ‘one of the best examples of a [market intelligence] model … to present various analyses of neighbourhood vitality’ (Audit Commission, 2005:15). According to the Audit Commission the model played an important role in defining the Pathfinder boundaries and informing the stakeholders of market conditions and change at a range of local levels. However, interviews with representatives of the two councils and the BNG Pathfinder team showed that BNG’s list of intervention neighbourhoods comprised areas where regeneration initiatives had been tested and failed in the past or where the funds had simply run out.

In 1999, just before the launch of the national HMR strategy, Newcastle City Council developed the Going for Growth initiative. At its core was the view that previous attempts to regenerate the poorest areas of Newcastle had failed and that a different strategy was required. NCC launched a bold plan to demolish large areas in the West and East Ends of Newcastle (Scotswood and Walker). Similarly, on the other side of the Tyne, Gateshead Council attempted to regenerate the Bensham and Saltwell areas using a Single Regeneration Budget and several other schemes. However, these ambitious plans did not attract sufficient funding and/or had run out of funds.

HMR funding was essentially used to fund the Going for Growth strategy in Newcastle and plans in Gateshead that were already on the council’s agenda. In January 2003, the Director of Community and Housing at the NCC, in his report to BNG wrote: ‘the Pathfinder provides the
most significant opportunity to deliver long-term Going for Growth objectives’ (BNG Report, 15 January 2003).

Undoubtedly, these areas could not show great results in housing market measurement as they were already identified as decaying and deprived, but relying on the market intelligence (Vitality Index) as a sole defining reason for inclusion in the HMR programme would be ignoring the history of the BNG intervention areas. By including so called ‘off the shelf’ projects into BNG’s work, the partnership inherited a complex landscape of failed urban regeneration initiatives and challenging stakeholder relations, especially demolition-affected residents who had quite a negative experience of residential relocation long before HMR had been introduced (Wainwright & Wainwright, 2000).

7.3.3 BNG Intervention Areas

BNG intervention areas consisted of inner areas of older private housing and refurbished local authority dwellings around the city centres of the two conurbations: Newcastle and Gateshead. As mentioned earlier, BNG Pathfinder covered a number of neighbourhoods (see Figure 7-2: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead neighbourhoods of intervention). In each of these neighbourhoods a number of projects were defined.

At the time of inquiry, BNG Pathfinder had 13 separate intervention areas (projects) where identified BNG activities were carried out in different proportions.

Figure 7–8 (Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder projects) shows the individual projects included in the BNG boundaries.
In some of the areas the BNG team and partners focused on housing refurbishment alone. However, eight of thirteen BNG intervention areas included a percentage of housing demolition along with refurbishment efforts, these were:

1) **Pathfinder Priority Areas**: Scotswood, Walker (Newcastle) and Bensham (Gateshead).
2) **Other strategic and mixed demolitions**: Ouseburn (Newcastle) and Teams (Gateshead)
3) **Private Housing Stock Clearance**: Felling (Sunderland Road and Brandling) (Gateshead).
4) **City Council Stock Clearance**: Cowgate, Blakelaw, Kenton (Newcastle).

In 2007 (at the beginning of this research), a series of strategic commission reviews established a clearer vision of the BNG goals. This helped in the identification of the three priority areas for investment (Scotswood, Walker Riverside and Bensham and Saltwell) with lesser interventions to be progressed in the other BNG areas (BNG, 2011:9). The number of planned demolitions was the highest in the so-called Pathfinder Priority Areas: Scotswood, Walker (Newcastle) and Bensham (Gateshead). In Scotswood over 1,500 homes were planned for demolition, 400 in Walker and over approximately 440 in Bensham and Saltwell (BNG Key Facts, 2008). Over three quarters of the £223,401,092 BNG budget (2003-2011) was concentrated in these areas (BNG, 2011:9). Figure 7-9: *Total spend by Intervention Area 2003-2011 (£m)* shows that the BNG priority areas, Scotswood, Walker and Bensham and Saltwell, received the most funding. These were also the
projects BNG had focused on at the time of the inquiry. This allowed the residential relocation processes to be examined in real time.

**Figure 7-9: Total spend by Intervention Area 2003-2011 (£m)**

Source: BNG (2011:15)

### 7.3.4 Project focused approach to residential relocation

‘It’s like a tale of two cities, to be honest. The approach on the East End and the West End [Newcastle]... they are just miles apart. It is really interesting to see how one city can take such a different and diverse approach to regeneration’ (CS-YHN Team1).

These words of a relocation officer in Newcastle best illustrate the approach to regeneration and consequent residential relocation within the HMR framework. As other Pathfinders, BNG had taken a project-based approach to redevelopment and residential relocation. According to BNG Pathfinder the planning strategy and implementation was adjusted for each project case and was therefore different between the intervention areas in general and priority areas in particular.

‘So we have visions for each of our areas, what we want them to look like ... each of these areas is distinctively different in terms of approach. In Scotswood, you see, it is 65 hectares of developable land in one public sector owned chunk, so it is just one huge site near the city centre ... Walker is a little bit different; it is not a big site. We had to ensemble 5 to 50 houses on one end and then another 100. Bensham ... is an unbelievable dense network of terraced streets that has very small individual units’ (CS-BNG Team1).

This project focused approach to redevelopment had a significant impact on residential relocation practice as will be shown in the following sections. At the time of inquiry, three Pathfinder Priority
Areas (Scotswood, Walker and Bensham) were the main focus of the Pathfinder and its partners, and received the most funding; for this reason they are examined as cases of residential relocation. They collectively present the case study of residential relocation processes in the BNG Pathfinder. Each of the following three sections addresses one of the priority areas. The project background is presented first, followed by examination of relocation processes, actors delivering them as well as indicative residential relocation outcomes. The chapter concludes by pointing out the differences between the approaches and their impact on residential relocation outcomes. It provides analysis of residential relocation in the three projects using the Residential Relocation Matrix (see Table 7-7: Summary of Scotswood residential relocation, Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes, Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes) at the end of the chapter.

7.4 The Scotswood project: protesters turned into the council’s co-developers

Scotswood is a part of the West End of Newcastle. The southern boundary is clearly delineated by the River Tyne. While the boundaries have been changed several times since the plan’s inception, for the respondents in this research the northern boundary of Scotswood was defined by the Fenham suburb. At the dawn of HMR, Scotswood had a prevailing white population (95.8% in comparison to Newcastle as a whole 93.1%). It was 46.9% owner occupied, while 30.3% of the housing belonged to the local authority, 10.5% to the local housing association and 9.6% to private landlords. The majority of the properties were semidetached (46.8%), according to the 2001 Benwell and Scotswood Ward Census data, and 21.7% was terraced housing. Flats in Scotswood made 24.9% of all housing (less than in Newcastle as a whole 30.3%).

Scotswood used to be home to some of the biggest names of the Tyne region’s heavy industry: Vickers, Elswick, Threes Engineering, Anglo Great Lakes, Glass Tubes, Ever Ready, Metal Spinners and the Elswick Leadworks are some of them (Robinson, 2003). In the 1970s the process of deindustrialisation removed most of the West End’s traditional economic base. The result was persistently high unemployment, deprivation and population decline. Since the industrial decay commenced in the neighbourhood, Scotswood has been subject to a majority of the ‘regeneration schemes, policies and initiatives launched in England’ (Robinson, 2003). ‘A policy laboratory’, Scotswood has been continually weakened by outmigration, by stigma, by criminal activity as well as by the top-down imposition of ‘solutions’ (Robinson, 2003). There has been a proliferation of
partnership approaches, involving more and more agencies and local residents. This formed a confusing and fragmented policy landscape.

In the process the Scotswood population dropped from 11,000 in 1981 to just over 6,500 in 2001 (Robinson, 2003). In 2002, Scotswood was one of the most extreme examples of housing market collapse (BNG, 2008:32). Under BNG, 1,500 homes were planned to be demolished and around 1,800 properties built between 2003 and 2018. In February 2011 (two months before the cancellation of HMR), 1,256 homes were demolished, 427 acquired and only 18 built. BNG refurbished 877 homes in this neighbourhood (BNG, 2011:16). This author’s estimate is that at least 2,500 residents have been relocated during HMR implementation.

7.4.1 Scotswood Project residential relocation processes

This section examines the development of Scotswood residential relocation processes and their impact on residential relocation outcomes. Scotswood is the first project in which demolition and relocation started in the BNG Pathfinder. In many ways the development of residential relocation processes in this project influenced the approach to residential relocation in other BNG priority areas.
7.4.1.1 Planning strategy

The demolition and relocation in Scotswood started before HMR was launched. In 1999, Newcastle City Council launched the Going for Growth initiative in an attempt to develop a long-term overarching strategy for the whole city that would join the existing partnerships and funding streams. The Going for Growth initiative was a bold approach aimed to tackle what were considered long-standing problems of deprivation and population loss that previous initiatives failed to solve. The vision was simple: NCC envisaged replacing the neighbourhood with ‘a world class urban village’, but at the outset there was little idea about what this may mean (Robinson, 2003). Like many early Pathfinders’ plans, Scotswood demolition (CPO plan) was approved under the Housing Act 1985 and did not require redevelopment plans. The initial plan was to clear around 7,000 homes, create a large-scale cleared site and to kick-start regeneration by attracting mass house builders (private developers). However, no plan, strategy or support was envisaged for residential relocation from the site.

Following the bare bones of the CPO legislation, the residents were not consulted about the NCC plans. They read about the council’s plans to demolish their homes in the local newspaper. No community involvement or resident support was planned. While social tenants were planned to be relocated under the council’s decanting policy, alternative property provision was not planned for private tenants and owner occupiers. Regardless of the fact that Scotswood was known to be one of the most extreme examples of housing market failure, a place where homes would change hands for the symbolic price of fifty pence (50p), the Council’s Property Services standard envisaged statutory compensation (CPO) with consideration of a relocation grant of around £10,000. This was not sufficient for the owner occupiers to relocate anywhere else. The Scotswood Residents Association chair, who relocated herself in the process, recalled:

‘I could not have gone, I couldn’t have bought a hen-cree for that, I couldn’t afford anything and I would have had to move into a council house, which wasn’t what I wanted to do, nothing against council houses, nothing against council tenants, but I didn’t want to do that. I’d owned my own house all my life, my mother and father had owned it before me so I didn’t really want to give it up for nothing so I decided I was gonna stick it out till I got what I felt was a reasonable offer or a reasonable price, not for another house, a reasonable offer of a like for like situation’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

The council’s initial failure to consult properly on the strategy, its paternalistic stance, top-down approach, insensitivity and apparent inability to see how people would actually be affected by it, generated a great deal of anger and undermined much of its credibility (Cameron, 2003; Robinson, 2003). Owner-occupiers refused to move, some of them because the statutory compensation didn’t
allowed them to, others, social tenants among them, because they didn’t want to see Scotswood demolished entirely. During the Going for Growth initiative, Scotswood residents organised protests against the council’s plans under the banner ‘Save our Scotswood’. The Scotswood Residents Association chair and a handful of residents organised a meeting in the Church Hall, but to their surprise 400 residents turned up. Residents protested against NCC planning strategy.

‘We got a huge amount of people who came along and Newcastle City Council got up and said what their intentions were and they were booed off the face of the earth because people said they weren’t going to fall for it, we will fight it all the way ... we said “you are not going to do this to us, we aren’t going to be put out of homes, we’ve invested, we’ve put our money where our mouth is and we’ve stayed here through all the trials and tribulations that have gone on”’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

The Scotswood Residents Association chair, a leader in her own right, held community meetings in her home in a half boarded-up street with crime mounting and services being cut. As a result of the community pressure that got local and national media attention, the NCC began to reconsider its plans.

‘Newcastle City Council came along and started accepting the fact that we weren’t going to go away, we weren’t just going to sit back on our laurels and be told what was gonna happen to us, that we wanted some involvement in it’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

At the beginning of the 2000s the residents’ requirements began to be answered. The group received support from their local councillors. They helped the residents get organised, secured the funding for design training sessions, and the residents (former protesters) joined planners in redesigning their neighbourhood.

‘Labour councillors and it has always been a Labour led area, the Scotswood and Benwell areas, so they’ve been a great support and quite honestly, where we were all maybe going in a different direction, they brought us all together as a whole and said to us “come on now, we’ll support you, help you, give you some financial help ....”’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

In 2003, Scotswood became a part of BNG’s primary intervention areas. The planned demolition had been significantly reduced under residents’ pressure. As a result more of Scotswood was retained than originally planned. However, the planning strategy did not change. In 2009, the West End Area Based Regeneration director presented the planning strategy in the following way:

‘The approach that we’re taking is really to get through the demolition and the site assembly before anything is handed over to the developers ... it always works on the basis that we take care of the demolition and basically provide a green space for future development’ (CS-NCC West Team1).
From 2003 onwards HMR funding supported consolidated plans for the assembly of a 60-hectare site for redevelopment in Scotswood (BNG, 2011:17). From 2004 onwards work began to develop proposals for the replacement housing offer in Scotswood. A masterplan for the area – including an exemplar housing site – referred to as ‘the EXPO’ was approved as late as 2009. The redevelopment was envisaged to coincide with an international festival in 2011-13 (the Expo) which would provide prime examples of sustainable housing in England (Rudi.net, 2011). In late 2008, Resettlement and Relocation Team officers responsible for relocation in the neighbourhood revealed in their interview for this study that the relocation from several hundreds of demolished properties in Scotswood had been completed. Scotswood redevelopment strategy meant one direction for relocation: out of Scotswood. Rebuilding started on 1 March 2011, almost a decade after demolition started and three years after all but six residents had been relocated from over 1,200 demolished homes.

While the BNG planning strategy for Scotswood was more moderate than the original ‘Going for Growth’ initiative, it did not plan for residential relocation. Residential relocation was shaped by other residential relocation processes that evolved during HMR implementation, mainly because of Scotswood community pressure.

7.4.1.2 Community involvement

The Scotswood residents’ role in planning the future of their neighbourhood underwent quite a metamorphosis from the start of demolition plans in 1999 through involvement in the BNG initiative and beyond. Initially protesters against Newcastle City Council’s ‘Going for Growth’ plans, under BNG Pathfinder Scotswood residents became convincing ambassadors of the BNG plans. Most importantly, the Scotswood residents’ involvement played a vital role in evolving and reshaping residential relocation processes in the West End, as well as in BNG Pathfinder as a whole. Rather than the process being statutorily guided it was an initiative of the residents affected by demolition and residential relocation. Scotswood Residents Association chair said during her interview:

‘Well, because we were Scotswood & Benwell, and we’ve always been well organised, well involved, made ourselves involved, we’ve insisted on the involvement’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

The Scotswood residents’ involvement in Scotswood redevelopment changed from the position of protesters in 2002. This is when Scotswood Joint Working Group was founded. The Group was a co-operation between residents, local councillors and council officers that has been meeting
monthly to discuss the development of Scotswood. With the foundation of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead the Scotswood Residents Association and Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre groups became a part of the overall Pathfinder governance. Scotswood residents officially gained decision-making power in Newcastle. The Scotswood Residents Association chair ascribes this success to the fact that they were the only such resident group in Newcastle at the time:

‘We’ve been in it from the start, so we had the decision-making powers and we sat round the table with people who came to us with the kind of decisions … because we were the only one [resident group in the city]’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

The negotiations between the residents and the council meant that some of the former protesters against the council’s plans, agreed for their homes to be demolished under BNG to give way to new development.

‘We came up with fantastic plans for this and we produced them, with the help of architects, but we all sat round and, contrary to what Tony Flynn [Councillor, Newcastle City Council Leader 1994-2004] thought at the time, all of the people in Scotswood weren’t thick, we were intelligent people, we were able to do this, so we came up with all these plans and we produced them and gave them to them and then they started to think “well yes, perhaps this can work” because a lot of us, in the process of this planning, gave up our homes, I did’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

Fundamentally, however, the Scotswood residents’ agreement to give up their homes meant that they were determined to get the best out of relocation – a ‘like for like situation’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1). The council and BNG were now required to provide residential relocation solutions for the affected residents that were initially not available. Involvement of the community in the council’s work in Scotswood brought several changes in residential relocation practice. These were:

1) Changes in the planning strategy. While the NCC plans did not change in terms of approach, the number of homes planned for demolition was reduced by around 800.
2) Increase of the relocation grant and development of financial assistance packages for owner occupiers.
3) Alternative property provision for owner occupiers. Through the Joint Working Group, arrangements were made for home owners to swap houses. In the private sector the landlords have been put under tighter control and an accreditation scheme launched.
4) A Resettlement and Relocation Team was founded to provide support to all residents affected by relocation regardless of tenure.

However, the Scotswood residents’ influence did not end in their neighbourhood. Their representatives were invited by other resident groups, notably Walker neighbourhood residents, to advise them about involvement in the process.
'Yes, we were invited by all of their groups because they, long after we started, they were starting up new groups and they wanted a bit of help in starting up these new groups and so we went along and sat in and listened to how they were running them and then give them an idea of what we’d done and how we’d got involved so, yes, we did, and then all of a sudden the Walker groups seemed to take off and they seemed to be getting things done an awful lot quicker than we were’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

As the result of the Scotswood residents’ involvement in the planning process, residential relocation practice has been changed not only in this neighbourhood but in other Newcastle projects, as well as in BNG as a whole. Their activism attracted media attention and their influence continued after the residential relocation process ended.

The Scotswood women who fought for better relocation options, and helped their neighbours through voluntary work in the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre, have won a Queen’s Award for Voluntary Service. The Scotswood Residents Association chair, an MBE herself, was reported by the BBC (Denten, 2007) to have been taken to Sweden to be consulted about the suitability of the eco-homes produced there for Scotswood. While the ‘Scotswood Grannies’ will probably not be able to come back to Scotswood, they are continuing to be involved in the consultation about the new plans for the new village there:

‘So, we’re looking to get all of these things for our children, for our future, and incorporate into that some of our heritage, some of the things that went on when we were young that children would enjoy and would like to have because we were the industry on the Tyne and we’ve had shipbuilding, we’ve had armament factories, we’ve had mining, we’ve had so much work and so much industry on the Tyne ...’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

7.4.1.3 Financial Assistance Packages (FAPs)

Under the Going for Growth initiative, the residents were advised to take a mortgage to move and buy an alternative property, which they refused. Their actions brought redevelopment to a standstill. The Bridging Newcastle Gateshead funding enabled a change in the approach to residential relocation that was not possible beforehand. Therefore, in general terms the arrival of the BNG in Scotswood was seen as a positive development. A Resettlement and Relocation Team officer remembers:

‘The major innovation [of the BNG] is worth of packages for relocation, when the BNG first came into being ... I don’t know what would have happened if the BNG hasn’t come about. The decision [under Going for Growth initiative] was taken without knowledge of where the money was coming from ... ’ (CS–YHN-Relocation Team1).
In 2003, when BNG was founded, the BNG Board took on re-examination of the financial assistance packages (FAPs) for residential relocation in response to residents’ refusal to relocate. With statutory compensation for social and private tenants set at a national level (Home Loss and Disturbance summing up to around £4,600) the focus was on owner occupiers. The first attempt to tackle the affordability gap for the owner occupiers in Scotswood was increasing the existing relocation grant from £10,000 to £25,000. The grant enabled relocation from Scotswood:

‘... For what we found in Scotswood was that a lot of owner occupiers were older people, who had been there for quite some time. People who didn’t have access any longer to mortgage, didn't necessarily want to move in a hurry and didn't want to take any loans ... because they have been living in the houses with their mortgages paid off, didn't have any housing costs, other than bills. They didn't see why they had to be penalised, by having to move and take out a mortgage. They found voice in BNG, and the council responded and the packages came about. When the packages had been increased up, that's when we had people moving in quite large numbers and quite successfully from Scotswood’ (CS – YHN-Relocation Team1).

In 2006, three years after BNG was founded, the ‘Financial Options for Homeownership Policy’ was completed. The policy set what help (financial and otherwise) was made available to people who lived in areas which had been identified for clearance or improvement (BNG, 2006). This policy became one of the key strategies for relocation on BNG level. It defined financial assistance packages for relocation not only in Scotswood but in BNG as a whole. As it will be seen in the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases, the FAPs outlined in ‘Financial Options for Homeownership Policy’ assisted relocation in these projects as well.

In the years that followed, various financial assistance options have been offered: Homebuy, shared ownership, discounted sale, and equity loans, among others. According to a Resettlement and Relocation Team officer there was a limited uptake of different packages and grants and equity loans seemed to be the most popular with the residents:

‘We did have several packages available, on bit of mix and match front. But we've only had one person who used anything other than the relocation grant. Relocation grant is very free, given the flexibility to buy in the market. So they don't have to buy a particular house. It can be added into their basket, if you like. For example, if somebody is buying a property for 100,000 pounds and their current valuation of their property is only 60,000. Than they can access the 25,000 grant, and if they are still short, they can access something else which is called: equity top up. That allows them to access additional 15,000 pounds’ (CS – YHN-Relocation Team1).

18 ‘Equity top up’ or ‘Equity Loan’, is a loan provided by BNG (partially funded by HMR budget, partially by other public agencies such as the Housing Corporation, English Partnerships) and managed by the local authority conducting residential relocation. The loan is repayable on sale at the same percentage of market value as at time of purchase. No ongoing fees or interest are payable. Intended as a loan of last resort for residents who cannot obtain or afford...
While the development of FAPs enabled residential relocation, and improved on the old statutory compensation it had shortcomings as well. Namely, the access to FAPs could not guarantee the relocation near old neighbourhoods nor could it enable relocation in close proximity to old neighbours. Relocatees were forced to buy a property available on the market.

7.4.1.4 Alternative property provision

At the outset, in Scotswood alternative properties were secured only for social tenants. They were ‘decanted’ to available council properties within a three-mile radius according to Relocation Team officers. Owner occupiers and private tenants were not secured alternative properties. They were expected to be able buy or rent an alternative property within the NCC boundaries using the statutory compensation and latter FAPs. As the result of residents’ refusal to move, the NCC invested in thinking about ways to secure alternative properties for owner occupiers and private tenants as well. After 2004, a ‘private landlord accreditation’ scheme was set up. In this novel scheme, the NCC partnered with private landlords with the aim of ensuring access to decent housing for private tenants affected by relocation. Where reasonable re-housing options for private tenants were not available, they were also offered social housing.

In order to secure alternative properties for owner occupiers (and some long-term social tenants) a ‘Homeswap’ scheme was launched. The Newcastle City Council bought empty properties just north of Scotswood and refurbished them based on relocatees’ specifications, at times down to the location of the sink in the home (CS-Scotswood Resident4). The Scotswood Residents Association chair described:

‘The Council paid for it, to my specifications, because the house I had was to a very high standard so I wanted the house that I was going into to have the same standard. I had central heating, I had a beautiful car port out in the back and everything was done, double glazing and all the things up to the standard, it wasn’t only of my specifications, but Newcastle City Council’s standards so the house was done up … [but] it took a while and I had to live in a street with huge amounts of boarded up houses and all the threats and crime and burning buildings next door … Because my move was taking longer to get the house ready for me to move into so I had to live in the street where all of this demolition and crime was going on’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

After the initial hardship and delays, the scheme proved to be very successful. The residents interviewed for this research stayed relatively close to one another, and reported to enjoy their new neighbourhood. Apart from being happy to have stayed together, they seemed proud that they had

commercial loans at reasonable rates. The effective APR depends on house price inflation. Over a long term 30-year period it averages about 7½% with a long term of 2.4% real increase over inflation (BNG, 2006).
secured better relocation options for owner occupiers. Homeswap enabled people to remain near to their old neighbourhood and neighbours. It also helped NCC to reduce resistance to relocation and securing owner occupation in properties that were vacant. However, the scheme was limited in that it catered for only several dozen home owners from Scotswood.

7.4.1.5 Resident support

An additional breakthrough that the Scotswood residents achieved in residential relocation delivery in BNG was setting up resident support for all tenures. Under the Going for Growth initiative, Newcastle City Council’s Housing Office in Scotswood was the only point of call for the residents affected by planned demolition. Following its statutory duties NCC provided resident support only to its social tenants, largely ignoring nearly half of the population it aimed to relocate (48% of the Scotswood population was owner-occupiers, 10% was private tenants). In 2002 the Resettlement and Relocation Team was founded by the city council in response to Scotswood residents’ pressure. A Resettlement and Relocation Team (R&R Team) officer recalled:

‘Our team originally came into being six years ago [in 2002]. The reason the team came about is because, in the West End in Scotswood the original plan for the city was Going for Growth plan ... There were hundreds of people to be moved from Scotswood. There was one housing office in Scotswood that was absolutely flooded with people ... The Housing Office was predominantly dealing with council tenants ... they would not have been in a position to offer any assistance to owner occupiers or private tenants in the areas. At the time there were lots of campaigns by the communities. And the residents said: “Look, the resources aren’t there to help us with the stress” ... And that is how our team initially came about, because of the residents’ demand’ (CS-YHN Relocation Team1).

The R&R Team service had developed to cover meeting all relocation affected residents regardless of tenure, helping them through the process by providing relevant information, verbally or through information packs as well as directing them to organisations that could take care of their inquiry if the R&R Team could not. Their mission statement was the following:

‘We are here to help residents find a new home. We can provide you with as much or as little support and assistance as you need. We can meet you in your own home, or if you prefer, at a suitable alternative venue, to discuss what you need. We will answer any questions or concerns you may have about your relocation, and provide you with sufficient information for you to decide where you would like to relocate to’ (R&RT, 2007).

In the years to come the R&R Team not only advanced assisted relocation in Scotswood but also became a main port of call for relocation in Walker, in the East End of Newcastle. The interviews with the residents, NCC officers, as well as BNG staff all confirmed that this team, ‘a street level’
service delivery, was trusted not only by the residents but by officials to deliver relocation. They balanced a difficult situation of being between the authorities asking residents to move and the residents themselves and strangely, they became a part of residents’ lives and the team BNG would call to assist in cases where relocation came to a halt. After the foundation of the Newcastle ALMO in 2004, the R&R Team was transferred to this organisation and became a city-wide residential support service for residential relocation (see Walker project for more details).

In Scotswood specifically, with the establishment of BNG in 2003, the Neighbourhood Management Team was founded and received funding from BNG. It had offices established in the neighbourhood and had an aim to help manage the neighbourhood in the process of residential relocation, especially when homes were boarded up and remaining residents waited for relocation.

In addition to this service, the Scotswood residents organised their own voluntary resident support. The residents organised themselves and founded Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre. Here, residents who had already been through the residential relocation process, volunteered to help their neighbours through the process.

Establishment of residential support for all residents was an innovation in residential relocation practice in NCC, proved to help reduce the levels of anxiety and feelings of uncertainly among relocatees and therefore contributed improvement of relocation process.

7.4.2 Scotswood residential relocation outcomes

The planning strategy meant one way for relocation: out of Scotswood. The Benwell Scotswood Area Action Plan (part of the wider Local Development Framework for Newcastle) was adopted by the council on as late as 4th November 2009, six years after BNG was launched, or ten years after the first demolitions had been announced to the residents under the Going for Growth plan. It was only on 23rd April 2010 that the Evening Chronicle announced that the preparatory work had started:

‘Work has finally started on the long-awaited regeneration of a famous Tyneside neighbourhood. Ten years after the vision for the Scotswood area of Newcastle was unveiled and whole streets were demolished, work to build houses has started. Thanks to millions of pounds of Government cash, contractors will work to clear and level the land left bare after hundreds of homes were pulled down’ (ChronicleLive.co.uk, 23 April 2010).

The building had started on 1st March 2011, a month before the HMR initiative cancellation, as the public private partnership, a joint venture between Newcastle City Council and developers Barratt,
Keepmoat and Yuill, was announced to have kick-started work in Scotswood where the residents had long been relocated. The £435 million Scotswood project was planned to eventually deliver 1,800 high quality, eco-friendly family homes, schools, retail, leisure, commercial and community buildings, roads and drainage and utilities infrastructure over 15 years. The return of the original residents according to the R&R Team will not be possible even though 25% of the homes are planned to be affordable. According to the R&R Team, residents were eligible for resident support, financial assistance for relocation (or priority card in case of social tenants) only once.

‘They would be moving back out of choice, rather than we would have set up to move them back. We move them once, then we build what we planned to build, next year, and then independently they can choose to move back into the area’ (CS-YHN Relocation Team1).

As the rebuilding of Scotswood started several years after all relocation had been completed, the residents would simply not be eligible to residential relocation assistance. In addition, FAPs to owner occupiers came with a condition of remaining in alternative property for five years. In other words, the residents who were among those who received and used the relocation grant and equity loan to move, were required to stay in their alternative property for at least five years, or are otherwise required to repay it to the council. Similar constraints are put on the residents who were relocated through the Homeswap option.

According to the R&R Team social tenants moved to alternative council properties in Fenham neighbourhood, north from Scotswood, an area that was considered better than Scotswood among the locals:

‘What we find in relocation team is a general rule of thumb, people don't tend to move more than 3 miles from where they live currently. People move at times much further but that’s an exception. Generally, they tend to stay within 3 miles radius. People from Scotswood move to neighbourhoods like: Fenham … ’ (CS-YHN Relocation Team1).

While the precise data about relocation outcomes, especially for owner occupiers and private tenants was unobtainable, the respondents’ testimonies and media reports (including both local and the BNG media) suggested that the results varied. While some residents were relocated through the Homeswap scheme near their old neighbourhood this option was not widely available. Many of the original owner occupiers took equity loans in order to move, however this option did not guarantee them access to homes in close proximity to their old neighbourhood. The residents that have been interviewed for this research, the Scotswood Residents Association leader and the volunteers from the Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre who have been involved in the redevelopment process from
the days of Going for Growth, have been relocated through the council’s ‘Homeswap’ into the council refurbished properties just north of Scotswood, overlooking their old neighbourhood:

‘The whole package now is really good, it worked well for me, but not without an awful lot of heartache’ (CS-Resident Scotswood1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-4: Scotswood residential relocation outcomes summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Owner Occupiers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocated within three miles radius. Option used: grants at the beginning of the process; Homeswap, equity share when available. Homeswap allowed some residents to stay near to their old neighbours. Challenges included: uncertainty living long years in blight in half boarded-up streets, many of the residents ended up in a form of shared ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocated within three miles radius. Options used: relocated within ALMO stock, relocated through choice-based system. Challenges included long waiting lists, over demand for social housing, eligibility for smaller properties because the standards changed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largely undocumented. The private landlords have been accredited but there is doubt about the ability of the old residents to afford the accredited schemes. Offered to become social tenants, but many remain not eligible.</td>
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7.5 The Walker Project: ‘Walker Promise’ and Walker Challenges

The Walker neighbourhood is located east of the city centre, near the Tyne, in Newcastle’s East End. It is situated between Welbeck Road and the banks of the River Tyne. Walker was the traditional home of the ship-building community. When the dockyards in the city declined, the neighbourhood experienced a significant economic and social downturn. Between 1971 and 2001 Walker lost 41% of its population (NCC, 2007). There had been almost no new house building in the area for nearly 40 years, meaning that there were few opportunities for local young people to return and settle in the area as adults.

In 2000, the National Index of Multiple Deprivation rated Walker as the most deprived ward within Newcastle. The decay had adverse effects on the remaining population. The council records show that by the turn of the century life expectancy in Walker was ten years lower than the city average. In 2005, the rate of Job Seeker’s Allowance claims was 71% above the city average and 550 households in every 1,000 received housing benefit compared to less than 300 per 1,000 across the city. Unemployment in Walker was double that in Newcastle as a whole and 3.5 times the national average (NCC 2007). But the community has kept a strong sense of identity; family ties remain strong and community groups attract high levels of voluntary activity. The area is predominantly white, around 90%.
The Walker ward has the highest proportion of social rented properties of any ward within a Pathfinder area in the north east of England. According to Census 2001, 73% of social housing was in local authority ownership (4,871 housing units in total), 5% was privately rented and 22% owner occupied (1,801 housing units, private rented and owner occupied combined). One of the key objectives of the Walker Riverside plans was changing the tenure ratio to 80% owner occupied and 20% affordable (including both social rented and low cost home ownership). By February 2011, BNG had demolished 599 dwellings and acquired 189 (BNG, 2011). According to the Walker Riverside Action Plan, the demolition mainly affected Tyneside flats and maisonettes (86%) and less other types of accommodation; houses (5%), sheltered accommodation (8%) and bungalows (1%). While originally 1,700 dwellings were planned to be built (between 2003-2018) only 189 had been completed by the end of the HMR programme. 497 homes have been refurbished (BNG, 2011).

Figure 7-11: Walker Arial View

Source: Google Maps 2011.
7.5.1 Walker residential relocation processes

The Walker project commenced after Scotswood. In many ways the approach to redevelopment in Walker was set up based on lessons the partners learnt in the case of Scotswood. For this reason, residential relocation processes at the commencement of this project were much more developed. The former Walker project leader recalls:

‘In Walker, in a way, for that programme, we’ve had a number of foundations in place, we’ve got the Walker Promise, we had a relocation team to work with, we’ve got the choice-based letting scheme in Newcastle, so if people want to move out of Walker they can and we were giving them a guarantee saying they could’ (CS-NCC East Team2).

This section examines residential relocation processes in Walker and the way their operationalisation shaped the outcomes in this project.

7.5.1.1 Planning strategy

Initially, Walker was a part of Newcastle City Council’s Going for Growth initiative. The council envisaged mass demolition in this part of Newcastle as well. With the foundation of BNG the Walker neighbourhood (also referred to as ‘Walker Riverside’), became a part of the Pathfinder’s priority areas. However, the approach to the planning strategy was different to that in Scotswood. The planning strategy in Walker was designed around the existing community. The aim was to avoid mistakes made in Scotswood, the former director of Area Based Regeneration (NCC) in Walker recalled:

‘Lots of lessons have been learnt from Scotswood. The amount of backlash the council had from the community and then didn’t build anything back nobody would ever support that in Newcastle ever again. Regeneration is an expensive business it cannot be done on the cheap particularly if people are there. You have to design around them’ (CS-PfP Team1).

In 2002, Newcastle City Council contracted Places for People (RSL)\(^\text{19}\) to deliver the area action plan in Walker Riverside. At the time the NCC was quite understaffed according to the former planning officer (Walker). The Walker NCC team consisted of two, a planning director for Walker

\(^{19}\)Registered Social Landlord or RSL, is an alternative term for a ‘housing association’ in the UK. RSLs are private, non-profit making organisations that provide low-cost social housing for people in need of a home. Although independent they are regulated by the state and commonly receive public funding. They are now the UK’s major providers of new housing for social (as well as in some cases private) rent. RSLs may also run shared ownership schemes to help those who cannot afford to buy a home outright. In the recent years some of nationwide RSLs (such as Places for People working in Newcastle) have developed regeneration and planning services as well. They are often contracted by the local authorities to prepare plans, redevelopment strategies and conduct community engagement exercises; such was the case in Newcastle’s Walker project.
Orna Rosenfeld  
Governance of Relocation

and later a planning officer. A visionary in his own right, the NCC Planning Director for Walker (later Project Director in PfP) supported the PfP approach at the council. Places for People (PfP) set out to consult with the residents about the redesign of their neighbourhood in order to inform redevelopment plans, in effect to design around the community. The results of the community inquiry were used to finalise the submission of a draft area action plan. The interview with the PfP project director revealed an approach that facilitated inclusion of residential relocation as an integral part of the planning strategy in Walker:

‘...[we collect] fine detail about their [residents’] housing aspirations ... and their affordability of those aspirations .... Then you have to take it away and work with partners to inform the development plan ... so that if you have the confidence that 10 or 20% of that community wants to stay together... This informs the tenure mix and informs the house types that we may need to prioritise in an early phase or at least build into the scheme so you can re-house people within the scheme ... so that is what we did. Before you even get to drawing plans where houses go ... You end up with building trust [with the community]... and overcoming that uncertainty. People are by and large fearful of change ... you have to establish that trust through dialogue ... long before planning application goes in ... it is far too late then ...’ (CS-PfP Team1).

Places for People took forward plans for the Walker Riverside area through their Development Framework Plan, released in November 2002. The Draft Walker Riverside Master Plan was accepted by Newcastle City Council for consultation in July 2003 and received final approval in 2007. The plan set a long-term aim to build up to 1,780 new homes, and to replace up to 330 occupied social rented dwellings (NCC 2007:1). High standards for new developments were adopted by the partners following intensive work with CABE. All homes were designed to meet lifetime homes standards. Alongside the housing redevelopment, a new neighbourhood centre ‘Heart of Walker’ was planned, with new shops, leisure facilities and a new building for the primary school, over the period 2006 until 2021.

Published in 2006, the ‘Walker Promise’ is a precedent in the HMR framework and was designed specifically for the issues of residential relocation. The document was one of the outputs of community consultation, and it was made in order to help the residents and the partners navigate through the complex governance structure in Walker in the process of residential relocation delivery. The Walker Promise introduction states:

20 ‘Lifetime’ homes are homes incorporating 16 design criteria that can be universally applied to new homes at minimal cost. Many local planning polices in the UK require the Lifetime Homes standard in new developments. Good design, in this context, is considered to be design that maximises utility, occupiers’ independence and quality of life, while not compromising other design issues such as aesthetic or cost effectiveness. Housing that is designed to the Lifetime Homes Standard is aimed to be convenient for most occupants, including some (but not all) wheelchair users and disabled visitors, without the necessity for substantial alterations.
The Promise is a written statement that describes how the Partners involved in the regeneration programme for Walker Riverside will work with you if you are affected as a result of areas of housing being identified for redevelopment. This Promise includes information for residents, community and voluntary organisations, and local businesses within the seven neighbourhoods identified in the Walker Riverside Options Report’ (Walker Promise, 2005:2).

The document ‘promises’ affected residents that they will be supported to achieve their housing aspirations in the relocation process, both if they wish to remain in the project area and if they want to move elsewhere. It also included a commitment to allow residents to remain living close to neighbourhoods and in existing social networks where possible. In order to achieve this, a staged approach to redevelopment was devised. Contrary to the approach in Scotswood, the PfP strategy was to prevent local people from being displaced by demolition. Former Project Leader at NCC explained:

*The approach was that we wanted to really take the community with us ... we decided what we wanted to do is basically have them involved in the whole project, so we would clear some land, build some houses and move some of the community in, then knock their houses down, build some more houses, move the next lot of community in, but what that did, I think we underestimated how much time that would take.* (CS-NCC East Team2)

In each stage between 50 and 100 homes were planned to be cleared and rebuilt. Wherever possible, open or cleared sites would be developed first to allow relocation.

### 7.5.1.2 Community involvement

As shown in the previous section, community involvement and consultation from the start was at the heart of planning strategy in Walker. The community consultation exercise consisted of extensive community consultation that lasted over two years. It was based on Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation, which clearly differentiated between occasions where residents were being informed, consulted and were invited to participate. In addition, PfP set up an information centre in the neighbourhood. A full-time Community Engagement team was based on site within an information centre, providing local people with up-to-date information on all aspects of the programme. The planning officer at NCC recalled:

*‘There was a lot wider involvement ... we did loads of involvement... It was a huge effort; it was over and above what was normally done ... At the time the Community Engagement Team were doing the hands-on community work, so they were in a mobile temporary hut down the Cambrian and they were fielding people’s concerns about programmes that they have on a day to day basis.’* (CS-NCC East Team1).
The intensive consultation and engagement with the community enabled the partners, notably PfP and the small NCC team to develop in-depth knowledge about the community in Walker. What they found was that the community in Walker was varied. Whilst some street areas were made of tight-knit communities such as the Cambrian, others were more transient. This knowledge influenced the residential relocation strategy (Walker Promise), and options were designed for those residents who expressed a wish to stay in Walker and those who preferred to leave and find an alternative property somewhere else in Newcastle.

It needs to be stressed however, that while the community was extensively consulted in Walker, unlike the community in Scotswood, Walker residents did not have decision-making power, something which later reflected on the operationalisation of Walker Promise.

7.5.1.3 Alternative property provision

In contrast to the case in Scotswood, in Walker alternative property provision for residential relocation was a planned as a part of the planning strategy and the relocation specific Walker Promise. Detailed information about the community affected by Walker plans, allowed NCC and PfP to plan for alternative property provision in Walker strategically. The alternative property provision was designed for two types of relocatee from Walker (a) those who expressed a wish to leave Walker and relocate somewhere else (b) those residents who wished to stay in Walker.

Residents who wished to leave Walker were offered FAPs (see next section). The social tenants were able to relocate through the Choice Based Letting System with a priority card. This allowed them access to social housing offered by nine local housing associations in Newcastle. This is how the Walker Resident Network representatives (relocated residents themselves) perceived the reactions of some of their counterparts:

‘As soon as some of them found out that you got a home loss payment, what was it then £3,000 and something? It was a lot of money to some of them, never seen that much money, you know what I mean, if they’ve never worked. Some of them would measure it in how many cans they could get, they’d think “oh, I’m away, I’m moving off that estate” ‘cos they had what you called the priority card, they could move away. They had to be re-housed because they were part of a regeneration area, they could move wherever they wanted, they could argue and stick for Walker but some of them moved ...’ (CS-Resident Walker1).

Private tenants were offered social housing in the local ALMO (YHN). In addition, the Walker Promise, made a difference to the properties they could access. Namely, it stated that all relocatees regardless of tenure would be offered a ‘like for like’ property.
The residents who expressed a wish to stay in the neighbourhood went through a different process (owner occupiers and social tenants). After the consultation was over these residents were offered new built ‘lifetime standard’ properties. Wherever possible open or cleared sites would be developed first to allow one-stop decanting (social tenants) or re-housing (owner occupiers). The alternative properties were provided by private developers. PfP and NCC made an agreement with preferred developer Belway to provide 20% of agreed affordable properties at the beginning of the redevelopment process in order to cater for relocations in Walker. The relocatees were further consulted about the precise location of their alternative property. One of the residents relocated in this way described the way the residential relocation process was carried out in her street:

‘We [residents] said 'right we want to stay here ... So, there was a plot preference, so we as a group off the Cambrian went ... you go up and had a plot preference and you could pick what plot. They basically put the old estate down on a map and they put a new estate on the top of it so you could see where you lived then and where you would like to live, you had a choice of three. This happened over a period of months’ (CS-Resident Walker1).

An early success at Walker Riverside was the Cambrian Estate. This was a small estate of 84 homes towards the eastern end of Walker. A decision was taken early on to demolish and rebuild with 143 new homes to be built for sale and rent. Bellway built 40% of these, they were affordable housing to re-house the existing community. This provided a one-move solution. The new properties were built on an empty piece of land (that had been cleared sometime in the 1990s) in close proximity to the old estate. Only when the residents were moved across the street into the new development, was the Cambrian demolished. The residents from the old Cambrian Estate were moved across the street to a new development before their old estate was even demolished.

However, even though alternative property provision in Walker was meticulously planned early on it faced challenges in the operationalisation stage; this influenced the extent to which the preferred solutions were available.

7.5.1.4 Financial assistance packages

At the time the Walker project relocation commenced, the FAPs were defined in BNG based on the Scotswood experience. The BNG ‘Housing Policy for Home Ownership’ (BNG, 2006) was in place. Therefore, the residents in Walker projects did not face the difficulties that their counterparts in Scotswood had in regards to financial assistance for residential relocation.
It has to be appreciated that the intervention in Walker mainly affected social tenants. There were fewer than 100 owner occupiers affected by the intervention. Around half of the owner occupiers in Walker stayed in their neighbourhood using the new built option that was offered to them in exchange for FAPs they were eligible for.

7.5.1.5  Resident support

Similarly to the case of FAPs, resident support was established in Newcastle before the Walker project implementation commenced. YHN’s Resettlement and Relocation Team was fully operational and had already accumulated considerable experience in Scotswood relocation. The residents interviewed for this research reported that the R&R Team was very helpful in guiding them through the process and helped them relocate to property they wanted.

In addition in the first stages of the Walker project implementation PfP also established an information desk in the area, that had an aim to help relocatees through the process. The residents, some of whom were initially wary about the new plans, welcomed the approach:

‘Oh, I’ll tell you what they’ve put out, at the top of Church Street they had these Portakabins for an information centre which was run by Places for People, it was the best thing they’ve ever done because if anybody had any queries in Walker, you could go in there and say “do you know what’s happening on my area of Walker?” and they could tell them straightaway’ (CS- Resident Walker 1).

7.5.2  Operationalisation of the ‘Walker Promise’ and residential relocation outcomes

The Audit Commission publicised the Walker Promise as a good practice example of the preferred way of doing relocation in HMR. However, the implementation of the Walker Promise was not without challenges. In fact, what promised to be a breakthrough residential relocation practice ended up in delays and broken promises.

It has to be appreciated that the governance arrangements in Walker were much more complex than those in Scotswood. While in Scotswood, NCC envisaged to lead the whole operation in-house, in Walker the tasks were delegated to other actors.

In order to deliver this ambitious plan a separate Walker Riverside regeneration partnership was formed with a distinct governance structure, project board and delivery team. Walker Riverside was a partnership between Newcastle City Council, Places for People, local community networks (Walker Riverside Community Network), English Partnerships, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder, the Housing Corporation, the voluntary sector, the business sector, and OneNE. Co-
optees were private developers Bellway Homes, Emblem Homes, E5, and Government Office North East. Partner organisations formed the Walker Riverside project board (formed in January 2005), which took strategic decisions about the regeneration area (NCC 2007). It is worth pointing out that the Walker Riverside Project Partnership operated as a sub-partnership in BNG. In other words, while some actors such as NCC or English Partnerships were involved in Walker at the BNG level, others such as Bellway or Places for People were responsible and took decisions solely relating to the specific project of Walker Riverside. In this environment the operationalisation of the Walker Promise proved to be more complex than envisaged.

The interviews with former Walker planning officer, planning director and project leader, and the Walker Riverside Community Network representatives, revealed that there were four main challenges that hampered the implementation of the Walker Promise and shaped the final output in Walker and residential relocation outcomes.

7.5.2.1 Walker Promise complexity

Residential relocation based on plot preference and phased development turned out to be more complex than initially envisaged. While the residents were able to pick a plot for their alternative property, this choice was at times at odds with the choice and wish of other residents affected by relocation. These issues have had a knock-on effect on development phasing and contributed to redevelopment delays. The Walker project leader who was in charge of organising relocation recalls:

‘Now, human nature being human nature ... Mrs Jones might decide “well, actually I want that bungalow up there” and that would probably be phase 4 but we need her house to build phase 1, how on earth are we gonna do that? ... We’ve got to move her out of the house and move her into a house on the understanding that she’ll move back ... house where they’ve built 3 years down the road ... and that’s the bit that the residents get frustrated at, “it’s 3 years down the road if I’m gonna get the house that I wanted, although I’ve already picked it”. The whole thing is about trying to make those times knit and when it comes to residents being given their preference match, human nature being what it is, you’re not gonna get them all to pick the bungalows in order, so you’ve got to try and manage that whole thing as well, so that has a knock-on effect ... and you end up with people having to move twice’ (CS-NCC East Team2).

The complexity of the owner occupiers’ relocation phases based on their aspirations and preferences had a knock-on effect on private developers’ behaviour. The private developers entrusted to deliver the affordable homes for relocation were not always in a position, or willing, to follow the complex allocation and reallocation system. The situation resulted in tension between
the residents and the private developers entrusted to deliver their homes for re-housing. A Cambrian resident group resident recalls:

‘Michel […] he worked for E5, he was a great guy to talk to and we had this meeting and he said “obviously, there’s people who’ve picked a plot and we can’t build that plot until you move”. Well I knew straightaway who he was getting at, it was us and our neighbour. We had to move from Bernard Street over to Malaya Drive in a brand new house, temporarily, till they pulled our block down so they could build these’ (CS-Resident Walker2).

Involvement of the individual households in the process, each one with their own plot preferences, housing aspirations and a clear view of the neighbours they wished and wished not to live next to, contributed to low output in practice.

In 2007, a BNG Newsletter proudly advertised that the first 27 homes in Walker were completed and that the first residents were relocated into new homes built to ‘lifetime standards’. Walker Resident Network representatives interviewed for this research, as homeowners, were relocated into new bungalows of their preference near their old neighbours. According to their testimony 90% of their neighbours who wished to stay in Walker were able to do so. At the time of the visit to their new ‘lifetime standard’ home, the residents seemed to be content with the relocation outcome and proud of their input in the plans but critical of the limited output of the partners and the delays that caused to some of their counterparts.

7.5.2.2 The ALMO’s political ambitions

The relocation of the social tenants was not without its challenges either. In 2004, a year after BNG was set up, Newcastle City Council transferred the management of its stock to their Arms Length Organisation (ALMO). Your Homes Newcastle ALMO took over the management of 29,000 tenanted local authority properties. In Walker, this meant that 73% of all housing was now under ALMO management. This organisation was now legally responsible for decanting the council’s residents in the event of demolition.

However, quite soon after the council stock transfer to Your Homes Newcastle, YHN management began to lobby against demolition. Demolition in Walker meant an income loss for the new organisation for three reasons. First, Walker council residents were planned to be relocated though a Choice Based Letting System to other housing organisations therefore YHN lost rental income coming from these residents. Second, as an ALMO, YHN was legally obliged to decant its residents and bear the costs of decanting. Third, as the BNG goal was to reduce the number of
social housing units, the ALMO did not have the right to build new properties and recover some of its costs. At the same time the ALMO became eligible for government funding to refurbish its stock to meet decent homes standards. Quite soon after the council stock transfer to Your Homes Newcastle, the organisation produced evidence suggesting that demand for social housing had changed since the launch of HMR and that there was now much more demand for it. The following is what the former NCC planning officer for Newcastle City Council reported:

*The organisation [ALMO] ... it felt ... started to struggle with over demand for social housing, too much demand. And was starting to be very resistant to demolition and also it was getting millions of pounds of stock improvement so there was actually a political rivalry going on between the officers of Your Homes Newcastle and the officers in the Regeneration Directorate .... Where we really couldn’t work out what was going on half of the time ... All this stuff about increased demand, how much of it actually has any substance ... Trying to get our head around the validity of the figures, and was this just a bid in order to increase the number that Your Homes Newcastle had ... an increase of the organisation’s influence or something like that ... so there was a lot of suspicion going on between these two sides and then from their side there were certain [Newcastle City Council] officers who weren’t into demolition and disagreed with it ...’ (CS-NCC East Team).

The ALMO, which was initially not a part of the decision-making process, was now lobbying against demolition and for expansion of the council stock, a goal that was at odds with the HMR framework and BNG’s goals. The political rivalry led to delays in the delivery of the Walker regeneration and had a knock-on effect on relocation in the social rented sector.

The financial crisis that started in 2007 helped one actor: the ALMO. The increased need for social housing became a nationally accepted fact. By 2011, YHN secured itself the right for new building. According to their new built offer available in 2011, the ALMO took over several sites (among them properties that were initially planned to be for sale) that were built or were in preparation to be built in BNG redevelopment areas, for example: Byker – Bolam Coyne; Elswick – Bristol Terrace; Fenham – Reedsmouth Nursery; Walkergate – Fossway; and Walker – Greenford Road (YHN, 2011).

7.5.2.3 Political rivalry and indecision

The complexity of the Walker Promise delivery was not the only factor that hampered Walker Promise relocation ambitions. In June 2004, just a year after it was founded, BNG’s work in Newcastle was shaken to the core. In June the same year, the Labour administration that had ruled Newcastle for over thirty years and won the HMR bid for the city, lost the local elections. Liberal
Democrats, who had lobbied against demolition and heavily criticised their opponent’s plans, took
power.

By early 2005, changes started to take place in the BNG Partnership. In September 2005, Leo Finn,
the BNG Board Chair, announced he was stepping down. This was followed by BNG’s director
resigning the following November. The same year substantial restructuring took place in
Newcastle City Council. Just hours after their victory, the Liberal Democrats symbolically declared
that the Going for Growth plans (that HMR was now funding) would be scrapped. After initial
pride in their bold claims, the party changed its mind, as it was realised that the move would result
in the loss of lavish HMR funding.

While the plans were kept, the change of local government somehow translated into a change of
ownership of the Walker Riverside plans. What was to follow was a period of rivalry between the
political parties, challenging the goals and objectives inherited from the previous administration,
especially questioning the scale of and justification for demolition in priority areas. In Walker, in
the words of one of the planning officers:

‘It’s a bloody nightmare ... We put a lot of time in trying to manage the political situation
because it’s a bloody nightmare in Walker just simply because the members tend to be in
opposition to everything so I’d put a planning application in for 25 shiny houses on
there, even if some of them are socially rented they’ll object. We’ve got most of our
Planning Acts though by a wing and a prayer and I really mean that ... just simply
because they feel they have to object because it is not their policy, it’s Liberal Policy ...
so regardless whether it would be good for Walker to have all these new shiny facilities ...
as far as the Labour members are concerned, it’s a Liberal policy and they’ll object.
They accuse us of social engineering ... it’s what they usually say to us’ (CS-NCC East
Team2).

In other words, after the council was taken over by the Liberal Democrats, the Labour councillors
objected to the plans even though these had been set up (especially demolition) by their own party
in 1999. The demolition planned in ‘Going for Growth’ under Labour’s reign now equalled ‘social
engineering’ in the eyes of the same Labour councillors only because the council was now under
Liberal Democrat control. The situation was frustrating for the residents who, after years of
consultation, bargaining and negotiation, had agreed to the scale of demolition acceptable to them,
each picked their preferred plot and looked forward to be relocated into new homes in Walker:

‘And we were in the middle waiting for things to happen, it was very political. It was
terrible, so you would go to the meeting and you’d have a Labour Councillor saying, “I
don’t agree with that” and I was saying “well, why not” ... “Oh, no, that wouldn’t work”
and so it was delayed, it was political, y’know ... this [name] took it over and he said
“oh, things aren’t working the way they should work” and he was gonna dissolve it, so
he said. He stopped in February and we as community reps said “you have no authority to stop that [the project], we need a meeting to see what’s going on” and he just said ‘well, I ‘don’t think it’s working and we’re doing away with it but will get something else’” (CS-Resident Walker1).

Residents’ frustration was shared by the practitioners who were tasked to deliver the Walker Regeneration project and residential relocation. By the time of the inquiry the Walker Planning Director, his assistant planning officer and the Walker project leader, a group of practitioners of vision and extraordinary commitment to the community they felt they were meant to provide a service to, had all resigned and left Newcastle City Council. The political changes resulted in over 18 months’ delay in project implementation. According to the Resettlement and Relocation Team working with the residents on a day-to-day basis, it was not the decision to demolish that was a problem in Walker but indecision about it.

7.5.2.4 Private developers walk off site

In Walker new housing provision was entrusted entirely to private sector developers. The agreement between the council and developers obliged the house builders to provide 20% of affordable housing in Walker. The affordable housing was planned for relocation and for this reason these properties were planned to be delivered at the beginning of the regeneration process.

An early success at Walker Riverside was the Cambrian Estate that was built by Bellway. New homes were provided to the social tenants and these relocated before their old estate was demolished. However, because of the political tensions between the stakeholders in Walker, indecision and complexity of the Walker Promise relocation operationalisation, not many homes were delivered. A Cambrian resident lucky enough to have been relocated to one of the finished properties pointed out:

‘Bellway, who’s the builder, the City Council and Places for People who were actually running the thing and as I say they were put in place in 2002 ... 2010 coming up very soon, and all they’ve built is these here, they built 27 along there, they were all for rent and before that...’ (CS- Resident Walker 1).

In 2008 building across the Pathfinders as well as in BNG had stopped because of the global financial crisis. Bellway the private developer faced the harsh reality of not being able to sell its commercial properties in Walker. The inability to sell homes for owner occupiers meant that the promised affordable units planned for relocation in subsequent stages could not be delivered. A Cambrian estate resident remembers the day everyone walked off the site:
'John came and said everybody had walked off site who were in here. The lad we knew that worked for Bellway, he was a labourer. We moved in September, no we moved in in the June and that first September, everybody left the site and everything just stopped. It was the same at Riversgate, the credit crunch, and then people say “what’s happening?” and I say “oh, they’re starting phase 2 soon” “oh, I’ll believe that when it happens”... They are awaiting a bungalow further over, but because they said they were building here for the next people that are waiting to be re-housed, the rented accommodation, he’s getting the one next to us when it’s built, they’re starting anytime now. They’re supposed to be on site this week, but they’re changing a gas main or something…” (CS- Resident Walker 1).

In 2012, the commercial properties that were built in Walker two years before were still on the market. Bellway was offering residents from elsewhere in the country free relocation in order to increase their chance of sale. An inability to sell commercial properties resulted in halting new building for relocation as well. Alternative property provision in Walker provided ‘fabulous’ (CS-Walker Resident1) relocation outcomes for some residents (e.g. the Cambrian Estate), while others were left in temporary accommodation uncertain of when and whether they would be able to complete the move.

By 2008, the original NCC Walker team that designed the Walker Promise had resigned, Bellway had walked off the site, Places for People closed its information centre, and the residents were left in limbo despite a fine-grained and well-intentioned relocation strategy. In January 2010, when the last stage of the BNG case study was conducted, some of the Walker residents were still waiting to be relocated, others were in temporary accommodation hopeful that their homes would be finished in the near future. The council was paying their rent. The closing interviews with BNG staff revealed that only around 150 new homes had been built in Walker, while over 599 were demolished. Overall the results were limited. What promised to be a model relocation attempt turned into disappointment for both residents and partners involved.
### Table 7-5: Walker residential relocation outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Owner Occupiers</strong></td>
<td>Around 30 households were relocated into new ‘lifetime standard’ homes. Challenges: Limited output, many remain in temporary accommodation. Unsuccessful housing provision had left some residents disappointed because they could not get new built property to relocate to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Tenants</strong></td>
<td>The Cambrian Estate residents were relocated in new properties. Residents from more transient estates were happy to leave the area. The residents who expressed the wish to stay in the neighbourhood were enabled to do so. In the new developments (new streets) some old neighbours were re-housed next to one another according to their wishes. Challenges: Some of them were eligible only for smaller apartments as their condition was reassessed and the NCC housing standards changed; long waiting lists and delays because of the ALMO’s opposition to demolition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private tenants</strong></td>
<td>Largely undocumented. The percentage of private tenants in Walker was very small. The residents were offered to become social tenants where applicable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### 7.6 The Bensham and Saltwell project: SAVE Britain’s Heritage

The Bensham and Saltwell neighbourhoods are considered one by the local population. They are situated across the river in Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council, the second BNG local authority partner. Bensham and Saltwell is an inner urban neighbourhood in Gateshead. It is situated in the west of central Gateshead and south of the River Tyne. The area has been known for its limited choice of housing options and poor quality. Pre-1919 older terraced houses and flats provide 88% of the available stock. Although there is considerable variety within the terraced form, there is still an unusual dominance of flats (42%), compared to 13% average for the North East and 20% average for England (GVA Grimley, 2006). Owner occupation is quite high in comparison to Scotswood and Walker in Newcastle and was standing at 48%, according to the 2001 Census. The area has particularly high levels of private renting, 29% on average. The 2001 Census indicates that there are concentrations of private renting activity within the neighbourhood where this tenure exceeds 40% and even 60% of the stock (GVA Grimley, 2006). High levels of private renting seem consistent with a relatively large ethnic minority population that normally cannot afford to buy or is not eligible for social housing (Allen & Rosenfeld, 2010). The neighbourhood has a diverse population, with large Jewish and Muslim communities. In comparison to its northern counterparts, Scotswood and Walker, this BNG priority area did not seem to have lost as much population. The Census 1991 and 2001 indicated a loss of around 12% population between 1991 and 2001.
By February 2011, some 405 properties had been acquired, and only 119 demolished. The demolition of the acquired properties and new building (total number of new built units was 11) was held up because of the intervention of national campaign group, SAVE Britain’s Heritage (BNG, 2011:20).

7.6.1 Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes

The case of Bensham and Saltwell does not provide evidence about relocation outcomes nor residential relocation processes (based on evidence available at the time of inquiry). However, it is included in this study in order to make a different point that is equally important for examining residential relocation practice. Earlier in this thesis, it was argued that the processes shaping residential relocation are set in motion only when agreement about demolition is reached by all partners. In the absence of agreement about demolition residential relocation cannot start. Bensham and Saltwell’s case is the example that supports this argument. It shows the SAVE Britain’s Heritage (third sector actor) intervention and the impact of this on residential relocation practice.
7.6.1.1 Planning strategy

The Bensham and Saltwell (B&S) neighbourhood in Gateshead has been subject to regeneration interventions prior to BNG. In 1996, a Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) programme was approved to halt decline and poverty in the area. The SRB was linked to the Capital Challenge programme within the overall context of the Area Regeneration Strategy, and the two were coordinated to ensure that a range of concerns in the area was addressed. These initiatives focused on social regeneration and did not give sufficient results, according to the officials.

In 2003 Gateshead Council put Bensham and Saltwell forward as the primary intervention area within the BNG framework. The housing market was seen to be failing because of limited choice and poor quality in housing, in which vulnerable socio-economic groups tended to live.

After the foundation of BNG, Gateshead Council contracted out neighbourhood planning and part of the community consultation to private consultants. GVA Grimley, in association with Social Regeneration Consultants (SRC), Nathaniel Litchfield and Partners, delivered the plan in February 2006.

In December 2005, a preferred plan for Bensham and Saltwell was circulated to residents. A total of 440 properties were proposed to be demolished which represented around 5% of the total housing stock in the Bensham and Saltwell area. The properties to be cleared were within those areas identified as exhibiting the greatest characteristics of housing market instability (GVA Grimley, 2006:23). According to these plans over 70% of the 550 residents who were involved in the planning process agreed to the changes proposed in their neighbourhood (GVA Grimley, 2006:17).

The planning approach in Bensham and Saltwell was similar to the one in Walker in general terms. First, the demolition was planned only after the plans for redevelopment were completed and the Council had a clear vision of the future development goal. Second, the demolition was confirmed only after consultation with the residents in the area. Third, a phased or a staged approach was adopted. A planning strategy was designed to accommodate phased relocation. This meant that the area was sub-divided into manageable projects. According to the responses of the Gateshead Council Neighbourhood Manager responsible for relocation, demolition and relocation were planned at the scale of a block of houses rather than street or neighbourhood. GVA plans were drafted based on the availability of relocation support, financial assistance and the Homeswap option for re-housing (GVA Grimley, 2006:21).
7.6.1.2 Community involvement

The planning in Bensham and Saltwell started with large-scale consultation. In Gateshead the preparation of Neighbourhood Action Plans involved consultation with local residents, community groups, local voluntary organisations, businesses and other stakeholders such as churches, schools and service providers. Targeted consultation had been undertaken with specific groups such as school children and the Jewish community. BNG estimated that over 4,000 people had been involved in the process (CAG, 2006:8). The council took the role of informing the residents about the plans:

‘We didn’t want to go in to the community just saying: “whether you like it or not we are demolishing your street”. It was never about that. It was about building a story. This is what is wrong with your neighbourhood, why it is going wrong, what happens if we don’t do anything ... giving them all the factors ... then options are produced and community is consulted again. We have gone back again and again about 4 or 5 times’ (CS-GH MBC Team1).

In addition to statutory consultation, the street representatives had been chosen, and a series of small workshops were held with the community between January and March 2005 to ascertain residents’ views on the key issues and opportunities for the area (GVA Grimley, 2006).

7.6.1.3 Financial assistance packages

At the time of inquiry, the financial assistance packages for relocation were set at the Pathfinder level. ‘Financial Options for Homeownership Policy’ (BNG, 2006) set the FAPs for the entire Pathfinder and these were made available in Gateshead. The Neighbourhood Management team was entrusted with their distribution to the residents. At the time of inquiry not many FAPs had been taken up as the relocation was delayed by SAVE Britain’s Heritage objection to the council’s demolition plans.

7.6.1.4 Resident support

Differently from Newcastle where resident support was provided by the local ALMO, in Gateshead this service was provided by Gateshead Council’s Neighbourhood Management team. In contrast to the R&R Team, the team in Gateshead had a long-standing presence in the Bensham and Saltwell neighbourhood and had extensive knowledge about the community before HMR implementation commenced in the area. In Gateshead, perhaps differently than in Newcastle, the Neighbourhood Management team seemed to have more input into the development phasing in terms of relocation matters. This influence may have been down to the fact that the Neighbourhood
Team was a part of Gateshead MBC and in close working relationship with the planning department. The development phases were designed in consultation with Neighbourhood Management who had fine-grained insight into the population in Bensham and Saltwell due to their long presence in the area. Their strategy, according to the interviews, included tackling those areas that were most problematic and where people expressed the wish to relocate. The manager of this unit interviewed for this research pointed out:

‘Who wants to move? Generally our team knows that because they have been working with the community ... So we started with the pocket with worst housing, the most voids, most problems, which is a logical place to start ... Till now we haven’t had difficulties in who wants to go, because people pretty much have wanted to go’ (CS-GH MBC-Neighbourhood Team1).

In terms of residential relocation support the Team in Gateshead provided similar support to its counterpart the YHN Resettlement and Relocation Team in Newcastle. Gateshead Council’s Neighbourhood Management team manager said in her interview for this study:

‘This [resident support] can involve anything, organising the removal, paying the disturbance, informing them [the residents] on time scales ... We help them find suitable alternative accommodations. This is irrespective of their tenure. We really are the signposting section ... if we don’t manage it, we’ll enable it to happen ... When they [the residents] don’t know where to come to they come to us’ (CS-GH MBC-Neighbourhood Team1).

However, as the redevelopment in this project was delayed and halted by SAVE Britain’s Heritage group, the primary function of the Team was distributing information about the process. The Team manager reported that the residents who were interested in relocating from the neighbourhood (and were delayed by SAVE’s intervention) needed special attention and help with the process as the Council’s attention had been shifted from relocation to approval of the plans.

7.6.1.5 Alternative property provision

While alternative property provision in Bensham and Saltwell was envisaged though a staged approach to redevelopment outlined in the planning strategy, it was not carried out because of the delays caused by the intervention of SAVE Britain’s Heritage group. As stated earlier, by February 2011 only 11 housing units had been built. Alternative property provision for social tenants was secured through the local ALMO. The social tenants were relocated to available social housing.
7.6.2 Bensham and Saltwell: SAVE Britain’s homes and relocation halt.

At the time of inquiry Gateshead Council was going through a legal battle with SAVE Britain’s Heritage. This group, as many others that were active during the implementation of the Housing Market Renewal across Pathfinders, ideologically opposed demolition of English terraced houses that characterise post-industrial inner cities in England. SAVE has been campaigning for historic buildings since its formation in 1975 by a group of architects, journalists and planners. As such they can be categorised as a third sector organisation. While not having a stake in the area, SAVE appealed against the Gateshead BNG plans on the basis of incomplete planning documentation. It argued that the prior approval document was incomplete as it had not considered the need for an Environmental Impact Assessment. This led to re-examination of the plans by the government’s Office for the North East.

As a result the plans and the development had been halted. At the time of inquiry, the respondents representing Gateshead MBC suspected that the group wished to delay the HMR implementation in the area until the partnership ran out of funding, ironically, two years afterwards this became reality. In July 2011, three months after HMR had been cancelled on a national level, the Evening Chronicle published that the Bensham and Saltwell revamp plan had finally been unveiled. This came after a bitter legal battle with SAVE Britain’s Heritage, that opposed the demolition that had been proposed in the 2006 Bensham and Saltwell Neighbourhood Action Plan, was completed (GVA Grimley, 2006).

In Bensham and Saltwell, the relocation process was delayed for the residents effectively before it began. In terms of residential relocation research this case as well as similar ones is important for two reasons. First, it shows that a third sector organisation with no stake in an area can significantly delay the process, in fact that without agreement about demolition residential relocation cannot proceed as planned. Second, it needs to be appreciated that the focus of the group was not on the residents but on the buildings that need to be saved according to SAVE’s perspective. It is important to emphasise that not all residents agreed with their ideology (as much as not all residents stood by the council’s plans).

SAVE did not conduct community consultation about their plans or intentions. The reality is that this group did not consult the affected community about their plans; it set out to convince it. Clearly there were residents opposing demolition, but there were also those who wished to take the statutory compensation and available assistance to leave the area. These residents saw demolition and relocation as the opportunity to move out of old council properties in Gateshead into better
accommodation. In Bensham and Saltwell in contrast to the Scotswood case where the community and third sector protests led to improvement of the residential relocation process for the affected residents, SAVE’s intervention led to confusion among the residents.

The council’s clearance work in the areas progressed in the meantime, but not following the plans for phases, rather avoiding areas that were under SAVE’s scrutiny and under Gateshead’s ownership. Despite the fact that much more support for residential relocation was available in this neighbourhood than in Scotswood (especially in the first years) the results were much more concerning in Gateshead. The residents whose neighbourhoods were earmarked for demolition, continued living in half demolished and half boarded up streets not only during the BNG period but after HMR cancellation when regeneration work was stopped in its tracks (April, 2011). Residents whose homes were earmarked for demolition found themselves in a difficult situation. The delays caused by SAVE’s intervention and the cancellation of the HMR initiative, meant that much of the residential relocation support that was organised and secured through BNG was no longer available, however because of the plans the value of their homes was more devalued than before HMR had commenced in the area. As the result they felt that they were stuck in the area without hope of being able to leave (Inside Housing, 2011).

This example also shows the wide variety of residents and third sector actors that may influence residential relocation by delaying demolition, regardless of whether the residents in the intervention area wish for it or not. Therefore, the example raises questions about the role of the third sector in the relocation process, and their power and right to stop, delay or cancel relocation (for those who wish for it).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-6: Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Owner Occupiers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the time of inquiry one show home for Homeswap was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some owner-occupiers stopped in their intention to sell their home and leave the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tenants were decanted from the council’s properties. The relocation was local, within their own ward or a neighbouring ward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community kept together by plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private tenants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relocation was delayed with the purchase of the properties due to delay of the plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.7 Conclusion

This chapter examined residential relocation practice in three BNG priority areas using the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ (five processes identified in this research). It showed that the approach to relocation in BNG Pathfinder differed between two councils: Newcastle and Gateshead, as well as within the councils’ schemes. A procedural approach to residential relocation analysis pointed out the complexity and dynamics of residential relocation practice on Pathfinder level.

Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell projects in BNG Pathfinder suggest that relocation processes emerged and changed at different rates and in different directions. In doing so these created time and context-dependent residential relocation practices that shaped residential relocation outcomes on project scale. Table 7-7: Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes; Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes; Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes, present summaries of residential relocation processes, actors involved and residential relocation outcomes at the start and closure of three BNG priority areas.

There are several conclusions that I wish to draw from the presented ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ diagrams (Table 7-7: Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes; Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes; Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes).

1) The importance of the availability of residential relocation support, options and choices. In other words the importance of the level of development of residential relocation processes (i.e., planning strategy, community involvement, FAPs, resident support and alternative property provision) in shaping residential relocation outcomes.

A comparison of the Residential Relocation Matrix diagrams at the beginning of each of the three projects, suggests that at the outset residential relocation practice was not developed in BNG. In Scotswood little residential relocation support was available at the outset. It was the absence of acknowledgement of specific cross-tenure residential relocation requirements in low market demand areas that was leading to negative residential relocation outcomes (e.g. lack of FAPs, resident support, alternative property provision).
The case of Walker however, showed that institutional learning took place in the process of relocation. The NCC and BNG learnt from the mistakes made in Scotswood and adjusted their approach to residential relocation in Walker. As the result residential relocation processes at the beginning of the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell projects were developed and pre-planned. In these projects more favourable residential relocation outcomes (for the residents) were available from the beginning of the project implementation. However, their offer was not maintained till the project’s closure and the cancellation of HMR. Both the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases indicated that the behaviour of actors (directly or indirectly) involved in residential relocation could alter the plans. The Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases indicated that the plans for relocation were as good as their operationalisation and collaboration of the actors involved in them. This brings us to the second point.

(2) **The importance of the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential relocation practice (formed by interaction of residential relocation processes) their cooperation and non-cooperation in shaping residential relocation outcomes.**

The three projects showed that different actors were able to change the course of relocation and variably influence residential relocation practice and outcomes. The number of actors involved in residential relocation processes grew from the Scotswood case to the Walker and Bensham and Saltwell cases. Actors from public, private as well as third sectors are well able to determine the course of residential relocation and took centre stage depending on the time and scheme in question.

For instance, initially ignored, Scotswood Village Residents Association and Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre residents protested, but later joined the decision-making process and changed residential relocation practice in BNG. The case in Walker showed that private developers had the ability to provide some exceptionally good residential relocation outcomes for the residents (in the form of new affordable housing) as well as to leave the site when the circumstances do not go their way. In Bensham in Gateshead relocation was stopped before it even began. SAVE Britain’s Heritage stopped the process by taking the council to a legal battle over the Environmental Assessment of their intervention.

This poses questions about how the actors defined their roles and responsibilities in the process and how their interaction unfolded.
The case of BNG and its three priority areas shows that the availability of residential relocation support in the form of five identified processes was crucial to be able to start residential relocation and to secure acceptable residential relocation support, options and choices for relocatees. However, it also indicates residential relocation outcomes depended on the behaviour of actors involved in residential relocation practice, their cooperation or non-cooperation. These matters along with the questions about roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in residential relocation are examined in the next chapter.
### Table 7-7: Summary of Scotswood residential relocation processes

#### Scotswood residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotswood Start</td>
<td>Planning strategy did not contain plan for residential relocation (RR)</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council (NCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Minimal within legal framework</td>
<td>NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Available only to social tenants</td>
<td>NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory compensation available to all tenures</td>
<td>NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>Planned only for social tenants</td>
<td>NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Governance arrangements at the start: Newcastle City Council took a top-down approach to planning. It followed the basic CPO guidance. The result was residents’ refusal to move and protests against the plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scotswood residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotswood End</td>
<td>Planning strategy remained the same</td>
<td>NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Involved in planning and decision making process. Scotswood residents' associations and groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Relocation team founded for all tenures</td>
<td>Arms Length Organisation (ALMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory comp., FAPs available to home owners</td>
<td>Pathfinder, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>Secured for owner occupiers and private rent</td>
<td>NCC, ALMO, Private Landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Governance episode that brought change: Foundation of the BNG Pathfinder in combination with inclusion of the Scotswood residents in the decision-making process brought change to NCC relocation strategy and helped bring better RR outcomes than were possible with statutory guidance applied at the start.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homeswap – refurbished properties close to old neighbours and old neighbourhood
Decanted to ALMO properties within 3 miles from old home
Access social housing and secured private rent properties
Table 7-8: Summary of Walker residential relocation processes

Walker residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walker Start</td>
<td>Residential relocation included in the strategy</td>
<td>RSL, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Plans based on intensive community consultation</td>
<td>RSL, Private Consultants, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Relocation team supporting all tenures</td>
<td>ALMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory comp., FAPs available to home owners</td>
<td>Pathfinder, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>New properties, Choice Based Lettings, Private Landlord Accreditation</td>
<td>Priv. Developers, Housing Associations, Priv. Landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Access social housing and accredited private rent properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governance arrangements at the start: NCC contracted a preferred Registered Social Landlord to draft the plans for Walker. Plans were based on intensive community consultation. The plan promised residents who wished to stay in Walker options to do so.

Walker residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walker End</td>
<td>Redevelopment strategy remained the same</td>
<td>RSL, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Reduced communication, residents’ initiative</td>
<td>Walker residents associations and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Relocation team supporting all tenures</td>
<td>ALMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory comp., FAPs available to home owners</td>
<td>Pathfinder, NCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>New building stopped. Relocation out of Walker continues</td>
<td>ALMO, Housing Associations, Priv. Landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Difficult access to social housing, long waiting lists, resettlement to accredited private rent properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governance episode that brought change: Arms Length Organisation contracted to manage NCC properties opposed demolition plans. The change of the ruling party in NCC resulted in questioning the demolition plans as well. Indecision and delays resulted in Private Developers and preferred RSL stopping new building in Walker.
Table 7-9: Summary of Bensham & Saltwell Residential Relocation Processes

Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes at the start of the project in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bensham &amp; Saltwell Start</td>
<td>Residential relocation included in the strategy</td>
<td>Private Consultants, Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (GH MBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Plans based on intensive community consultation</td>
<td>Private Consultants, GH MBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Management team - all tenures, ALMO - social tenants</td>
<td>GH MBC, ALMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory comp., FAPs available to home owners</td>
<td>Pathfinder, GH MBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>New properties (planned), ALMO properties, Private Landlord Accreditation</td>
<td>Priv. Developers, ALMO, Priv. Landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Governance arrangements at the start: NCC contracted a preferred Registered Social Landlord to draft the plans for Bensham and Saltwell. Plans were based on intensive community consultation. The plan promised residents who wished to stay in Bensham and Saltwell options to do so.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bensham and Saltwell residential relocation processes at closure of relocation in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Relocation Matrix View</th>
<th>Process Description</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bensham &amp; Saltwell End</td>
<td>Planning strategy brought into questioning.</td>
<td>Private Consultants, GH MBC, SAVE Britain’s Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Strategy</td>
<td>Increased communication (web, media) with residents to clarify the process.</td>
<td>GH MBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Management team - all tenures, ALMO - social tenants</td>
<td>GH MBC, ALMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Support</td>
<td>Statutory comp., FAPs available to home owners</td>
<td>Pathfinder, GH MBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>New building did not take place (at the time of inquiry).</td>
<td>ALMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Property Provision</td>
<td>Governance episode that brought change: SAVE Britain’s Heritage objected to the Gateshead Council’s plans on the grounds that these lacked an Environmental Impact Assessment. The case was brought to court. By the time the court case was settled (in favour of GH MBC) the process was critically delayed and redevelopment and relocation were not completed before cancellation of HMR in 2011.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 8: Roles, Responsibilities and Governance Arrangements in BNG Relocation

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the story of relocation in three BNG projects. It showed that the approach to relocation delivery differed among the three. The cases of Scotswood, Walker and Bensham showed that actors involved in residential relocation practice belonged to public, private and community sectors. They were all able to significantly influence the process of relocation at different times. These findings raise questions about roles and responsibilities of actors involved in residential relocation and their formal and/or informal governance arrangements. This chapter examines these issues. Such analysis is important in order to understand the way residential relocation was delivered in HMR and in a differentiated polity more generally.

This chapter is organised in the following way. The first section addresses the question of ‘roles and responsibilities’ in residential relocation. It discusses the notion of ‘responsibility’ in relation to residential relocation as defined by legislation enabling demolition and the residential relocation processes identified in this study in the HMR framework. This is followed by examination of delegation of responsibilities related to residential relocation. Roles and responsibilities of selected actors are examined in section four along with the governance arrangements that define actors’ interaction. The chapter concludes by arguing that residential relocation in the HMR framework and in a differentiated polity more generally, is delivered by a complex network of actors.

8.2 Definition of Relocation Roles and Responsibilities

Residential relocation has been known to be one of the most complex planning interventions. However, there is no consensus about what the residential relocation process entails precisely in literature or practice. In Chapter 3 it was shown that gentrification theorists refer to relocation as
‘displacement’ – a forced residential move caused by the operation of the market or the state. Residential relocation and neighbourhood restructuring researchers tend to focus on the outcomes rather than the residential relocation process. However there is little agreement as to what the outcomes should be (in terms of location, size of quality) (Kearns & Kleinhans, 2013).

There is no more agreement about what relocation entails among practitioners either. The Pathfinder survey showed that, 'compulsory purchase', 'neighbourhood management', ‘decanting' and ‘property acquisition’ were all referred to as 'residential relocation' (Chapter 6). The legislation recommends that residents are ‘not worse or better off’ after the procedure. Clearly, what is ‘better or worse’ is open to interpretation by both the agencies causing relocation and relocatees themselves. The findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that different relocation processes emerged and evolved in the course of the HMR programme implementation, without pre-planned strategies or governance arrangements to deliver them.

The question about ‘responsibility’ in relocation is a difficult one. For a definition of ‘responsibility’ to exist, there must be some sort of standard or a requirement, a goal to achieve, so to speak. If so, what are the goals or standards to be achieved in residential relocation? Here it is worth pausing to point out that residential relocation is a result of intervention in the built environment, a planned housing demolition. The goal is not to relocate per se, but to regenerate an area. The question of the ‘right to intervene’ in the built environment, has been discussed by many. The view of the issue remains negative for gentrification theorists. The assumption is that the intervention is forced upon neighbourhoods and communities that ultimately resist it. However, there is much less discussion about cases where agreement to intervene in the built environment and demolish has been reached, cases where residential support is provided (Curley & Kleinhans, 2009). Consequently, there is much less clarity about residential relocation roles and responsibilities in these cases.

With no guidance or standards for residential relocation, Pathfinders and their local authorities developed residential relocation practices on local policy level. Their ‘right to intervene’ in the built environment had been defined by CPO legislation. For this reason, a good way to start exploring actors ‘roles and responsibilities’ in residential relocation is to reflect on the requirements of this legislation.

The primary function of the CPO (apart from empowering the acquiring authorities to intervene in inhabited areas) is to guarantee statutory compensation to affected residents. A CPO requires local authorities to show that they have the capacity to re-house, but it does not require them to relocate.
or find alternative properties for affected residents. Whilst resident support is considered a good practice acquiring authorities are not required to perform this function. LAs are also not required to consult because of the nature of the intervention. Separate legislation requires social tenants to be ‘decanted’, but this requirement does not exist for owner occupiers or private tenants except in exceptional circumstances.

As shown in Chapter 6, HMR areas are an ‘exception’ as far as the CPO is concerned. The CPO rests on the assumption that housing markets are healthy, operational and homogenous. Based on this assumption statutory compensation (to property owners) can ensure relocation into a ‘like for like’ property. Housing Market Renewal rests on the assumption of the existence of fragmented local markets and was launched to tackle their weak and failing parts. Clearly, in exceptional circumstances ‘roles and responsibilities’ of acquiring authorities are even more difficult to define. The legislation that empowers local authorities to demolish properties is partial in defining responsibilities in relation to residential relocation, especially in the case of HMR.

Chapter 6 identified five distinct processes that partnerships developed in order to deliver residential relocation in the HMR framework. These are: planning strategy, community involvement, financial assistance provision, alternative property provision and resident support. These processes evolved in response to local circumstances and the challenges partners faced on the ground. They present a significant development of residential relocation practices when compared to the requirements defined by CPO legislation enabling demolition. The case of BNG showed that considerable resources were invested to deliver residential relocation processes (e.g. increasing the relocation grant and introduction of FAPs, resident support and community involvement). For this reason in this study, relocation ‘roles and responsibilities’ are examined and established based on five residential relocation processes that Pathfinders developed on the ground. Using the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ (Chapter 6), the actors involved in residential relocation processes are identified, and then their roles and responsibilities in relation to residential relocation processes examined.

### 8.3 Delegation of Responsibilities over Residential Relocation Processes

Much like other Pathfinders, Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder was not a statutory body and as such did not have the power to intervene in the built environment, demolish housing or relocate residents. BNG depended on its partners to deliver these interventions. Thus, BNG like other Pathfinders had to accommodate potential contradiction. On one hand the government wished to see Pathfinders and their boards maintaining an ‘effective challenge’ to local
government. On the other hand local government possessed the statutory power to deliver HMR interventions. Residential relocation was delegated to BNG local authorities, Newcastle and Gateshead. The delivery arrangements which facilitated HMR relocation tended to be dominated by provisions which enabled local authorities to act lawfully.

However, the cases of Scotswood, Walker and Bensham presented in Chapter 7, indicated that the local authorities delegated residential relocation tasks further, to other organisations. There are three reasons for this. First, the lack of skills. It should not be forgotten that the majority of LAs involved in HMR had not undertaken demolition for over 35 years since the abandonment of slum clearance in the 1970s. Second, HMR caused cross-tenure relocation, for which there are few precedents in general. This brought complexities that were not envisaged nor planned for at the outset. Third, local authorities seemed to have very limited resources to tackle the tasks at hand.

Figure 8-1: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation responsibilities (BNG Pathfinder) shows the delegation of roles and responsibilities over residential relocation in relation to residential relocation processes identified in this research (see ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’, Chapter 6). It shows that BNG Pathfinder delegated responsibility for residential relocation to local authorities (in the BNG case to NCC and GH MBC) in the first instance.

![Figure 8-1: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation responsibilities (BNG Pathfinder)](image)

*Based on BNG case study*
The scheme also shows that local authorities delegated the tasks further to other organisations. Planning and statutory community consultation was contracted out in both local authorities. While Newcastle contracted the RSL to plan for Walker project, Gateshead preferred private consultants in the case of Bensham. Financial assistance package provision stayed the responsibility of local authorities. However, it needs to be pointed out that the funding for these came from the BNG partnership and to smaller extent from private lenders. Alternative property provision was one of the most complex and fragmented processes because of cross-tenure relocation. Housing providers for each tenure were involved in the relocation process (ALMOs, RSLs and private landlords and private developers). As shown in Chapter 7, community involvement consisted of three separate processes: statutory engagement, protests and institutionalised community involvement. This meant involvement of disparate organisations supporting each one of these. Resident support was provided by councils, ALMOs and/or housing associations depending on the local authority and tenure.

The delegation scheme identifies organisations involved in residential relocation delivery in the BNG pathfinder based on the residential relocation processes. However, as the Residential Relocation Matrix indicated (Chapter 6), residential relocation processes developed variously depending on tenure. The evidence presented in Chapter 7, suggested that the delegation of the responsibilities in the BNG Pathfinder also differed depending on the local authority and project in question. Based on the collected evidence, and systematisation based on the Residential Relocation Matrix, this study is in a position to identify the organisations and their departments involved in the residential relocation process, not only by identified residential relocation process, but by tenure, local authority and project. The table overleaf presents a comprehensive list of the actors involved in the residential relocation processes by tenure and project in BNG.
### Table 8-1: List of actors involved in residential relocation delivery based on the Residential Relocation Matrix in priority areas in BNG Pathfinder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RR Processes and Tenures</th>
<th>Newcastle City Council</th>
<th>Walker Project</th>
<th>Gateshead MBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes all tenures</td>
<td>NCC, Area Based Regeneration (West End)</td>
<td>Area Based Regeneration (East End), RSL (Places for People)</td>
<td>Planning and Environmental Services, Private Consultants (GVA Grimley)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory (all tenures)</td>
<td>N/A (based on CPO)</td>
<td>Representatives of the wider Walker, managed by NCC and RSL.</td>
<td>Representatives of the wider Bensham and Saltwell, managed by GH MBC and GVA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unplanned – Opposition (all tenures)</td>
<td>Scotswood neighbourhood residents</td>
<td>Walker residents</td>
<td>SAVE Britain’s Heritage (voluntary organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised * (all tenures)</td>
<td>Scotswood Village Residents Association, Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre.</td>
<td>Walker Network (association of residents’ groups)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Involvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Tenures</td>
<td>Resettlement and Relocation Team, part of Your Homes Newcastle ALMO (all tenures).</td>
<td>Resettlement and Relocation Team, part of Your Homes Newcastle ALMO (all tenures)</td>
<td>GH MBC Neighbourhood Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tenants</td>
<td>Gateshead Housing Company ALMO</td>
<td>Housing Options Team (vulnerable, private and social tenants).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Tenants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All tenures Statutory Compensation</td>
<td>NCC Property Services, NCC Legal Services.</td>
<td>NCC Property Services, NCC Legal Services.</td>
<td>GH MBC Property Services, GH MBC Legal Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Occupiers Innovative FAPs</td>
<td>NCC Strategic Housing, private lenders.</td>
<td>NCC Strategic Housing, private lenders.</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Management Team, private lenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Occupiers**</td>
<td>Homeswap option: NCC for (refurbished).</td>
<td>Homeswap option: NCC, RSL &amp; Private Developers (for new and refurbished).</td>
<td>Homeswap option: GH MBC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tenants</td>
<td>Your Choice Homes (choice based lettings) local HAs, NCC Accredited Private Landlords, NCC for Homeswap (refurbished).</td>
<td>Your Choice Homes (choice based lettings) local HAs, Private Developers (Bellway), RSLs (Places for People) for Homeswap (via Walker Promise), NCC Accredited Private Landlords.</td>
<td>(choice based lettings) local HAs, GH MBC Accredited Private Landlords.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
* The former protesters joined the council in making the plans
** Owner occupiers and private tenants are encouraged to choose from the properties in the free market, in this case their properties are not provided by the partners involved.
Table 8-1: List of actors involved in residential relocation delivery based on the Residential Relocation Matrix in priority areas in BNG Pathfinder shows further fragmentation or roles and responsibilities over residential relocation on a micro scale. The analysis in this section shows that different departments within identified organisations were entrusted to deliver one or more residential relocation process. The observed multiplication of actors and agencies raises questions about governance arrangements that shaped their interaction in residential relocation practice.

8.4 Exploring Residential Relocation Governance Arrangements

At the outset it was deemed important to explore, rather than assume the mechanism shaping residential relocation in the HMR framework. Governance literature suggests that policy making is characterised by institutional fragmentation and that delivery depends on a network of actors, rather than the market or the state (Chapter 4). However, there is no agreement about the way the policy network operates. In other words, networks may be self-governing as governance orthodoxy suggests, or manipulated by the state according to the governance sceptics. This dichotomy suggested that the governance arrangements needed to be examined in specific cases and contexts.

In this study governance arrangements formed around residential relocation processes were identified through a two-stage exercise.

1) First the governance network was mapped, based on information collected in the first stage of the BNG case study (see Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft)).

2) Second, in order to establish validity of these conclusions and further examine interaction of the identified actors, the initial residential relocation governance graph was taken to the respondents for feedback in the second stage of the case study.

Results of the first stage of the BNG case study indicated that residential relocation was delivered by a complex network of actors. Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft) presents the residential relocation governance network mapped using the residential relocation matrix and identified actors in the case of the Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder in the first stage of the case study. The relocation network is a network of actors within wider Pathfinder governance structure. It is a thematic sub-network that forms within this wider structure to deliver the five residential relocation processes. The network is in effect a map of actors’ links and interactions that develop to deliver residential relocation.

As seen in figure below, the relocation network stretches from the Pathfinder board, through local authorities, their departments, external contractors (e.g. RSLs, HAs, developers, private lending companies), to the relocated community. As the BNG Pathfinder covered two local authorities, the
relations between local authorities varied. The reasons for this were differences in governance structures of the two local authorities (Newcastle and Gateshead). Within this framework the relations within a single local authority varied and were adjusted to every project delivered. Actors were seen to interact variably with the community asked to relocate.

Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft)

Designed based on pilot study and secondary data analysis.

All – refers to all tenure groups within a community affected by relocation; Owners – refers only to owner occupiers

Figure 8-2: BNG Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure (Draft) was built based on the results of the first stage of the interviews in the BNG case study. In order to test validity of these conclusions the network members (case study respondents) were asked to give their feedback in the second stage of the case study examination. In this way, theoretical propositions about the potential existence of a network and its operation in case of residential relocation were examined by the very actors identified to be a part of the relocation delivery network. The final conclusions about the shape and operation of the relocation network in BNG were built in collaboration with the actors responsible for residential relocation processes in BNG. This exercise also helped establish respondents’ position in the network and prompt questions about the nature of their interaction with other actors. Their feedback is presented in the following sections in form of notes and sketches on Figure 8-2.
8.5 Actors’ Roles, Responsibilities and Position in the Relocation Network

This section examines roles and responsibilities of selected actors identified to be involved in delivery of one or more residential relocation processes in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead. It presents the respondents’ feedback on governance structure based on the first stage of the BNG case study. In doing so it allows for examination of governance arrangements, actors position and interaction within the BNG relocation network.

The section explores the roles and responsibilities of the actors who were identified to have the most involvement in shaping residential relocation strategies, processes and their delivery in BNG. These are:

1. BNG Pathfinder Board and BNG Team
2. Local Authorities
3. ALMOs
4. House builders (Private Developers)
5. Registered Social Landlords
6. Community and Third Sector Organisations

8.5.1 BNG Board and Team

The BNG Board was the Pathfinder’s main governing body directly accountable to ODPM and latter HCA. It was composed to ensure representation from key stakeholders in BNG. The Board was the only body eligible to bid for the government’s HMR funding. BNG’s Board was responsible for overall Pathfinder strategy and finances. The BNG Team was the Board’s operational body. Its task was to translate the Board’s decisions into action. The Team was closely involved in the development of BNG priority areas (projects). BNG Pathfinder was a non-statutory body. This means that the Board and Team did not have the statutory power to intervene in the built environment. However, it did have an influence over residential relocation though BNG funding.

8.5.1.1 BNG Board

The Board had an important role in developing and funding financial assistance packages for relocation. This work began by attempting to tackle affordability problems in the Scotswood priority area. Here an affordability gap was indentified between statutory compensation and the price of an alternative property somewhere else. The owner occupiers refused to move. The
concerns resonated with the national goal of increasing and sustaining homeownership in low-demand areas (see DCLG, 2004). A BNG Board member pointed out in the interview for this research:

‘The Pathfinders are trying to develop packages which will help them deliver that change programme [HMR], hence the equity packages...’ (CS-BNG Board-English Partnerships).

The ‘Financial Options for Homeownership Policy’ (BNG, 2007), that become one of the key strategies for residential relocation of owner occupiers in BNG, was incepted by the BNG Board in the first years of BNG’s existence. However, this also meant that the Board shaped the nature of FAPs. In the first years the focus was on increasing the residential relocation grant. When this proved to be financially unsustainable because of market recovery and increased property prices, the strategy changed. Loans, equity loans and the Homeswap scheme were introduced and funded partly from the BNG budget. The Board also partnered with the Housing Corporation, English Partnerships, commercial lenders, as well as the private developers, to be able to deliver these. FAPs helped owner occupiers relocate to better quality housing. While ‘lending’ was financially more sustainable than ‘grants’ this also meant that the Pathfinder’s approach resulted in the formation of an additional tenure in the relocation process: shared ownership. A BNG Board member commented on the strategy:

‘It is not an easy option ... that the Pathfinder staff will take. It is the best value for money for you and your family in the long term as well as for the public sector in the short and medium term. Being difficult is, probably ... our job. But in a nice way... ’(CS-BNG Board - English Partnerships).

Sustained problems around affordability brought the issue back to the Board in November 2007. At this time an Affordability Task Group was founded to look at housing allocations. In May 2008, the Board received a housing options and affordability update. ARC421 was contracted to look at Housing Options and Affordability. The interest in the issue continued throughout 2008 and the beginning of 2009. At this time the concern about affordability was widened to include the challenges arising as the result of the global financial crisis. In summary, the BNG board’s role as a non-statutory body meant that it took over responsibility for the financial management of the programme. In terms of residential relocation the main influence was on definition and funding of the financial assistance packages for relocation of owner occupiers, who otherwise would not be able to move.

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21 ARC4 is a housing and regeneration consultancy that specialises in: housing market research and analysis; affordability and affordable housing policy, strategy and delivery; assisting in establishing homeownership products and intermediate rental options that underpin economic growth options and support the excluded middle market.
8.5.1.2  BNG Team

In essence the role of the BNG Team was to implement the BNG Board decisions by bringing together the work of actors from public, private, community and voluntary sectors. The Team’s role involved coordination of programme development, financial strategy, project appraisal and approval, implementation (working with delivery partners), monitoring, evaluation of the impact of the programme and programme reviews. In other words, the BNG Team was a central point of call for other partners involved in HMR delivery in BNG. The feedback from BNG Head of Development and Area Programme Coordinator presented in the Figure 8-3: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (Feedback) stands witness to this.

![Figure 8-3: Bridging Newcastle Gateshead (Feedback)](image)

Respondents: Head of Development (CS-BNG Team2), Area Programme Coordinator (East) (CS-BNG Team3).

This is how the Area Programme Coordinator interviewed for this study saw his role:
'I am a programme coordinator. So basically I am acting as a part of partnership, my job is to coordinate all the programmes across three specific areas. I work specifically in East End which covers Walker Riverside and Byker. My role is to be involved in everything that goes on in those areas in terms of ... from project accepting, which I take part in as well, through project completion. In all those projects I am the BNG link, for any issues that arise ... any funding that needs to be done or allocated appraisals of the projects that come through to see if they are viable ... I am involved across a whole spectrum of all that goes on here ...' (CS-BNG Team 3).

In their interview (the second stage of the BNG case study) the BNG team representatives (Head of Development and Area Programme Coordinator (East)) highlighted that there was much more interaction between the Team management and the Regeneration and Environment Directorate in Newcastle and Development Enterprise in Gateshead, departments responsible for planning strategy, than initially assumed. Area Programme Coordinators on the other hand worked with the teams delivering the programme.

The Team, especially Area Programme Coordinators (APCs), had a good insight into the development of the priority areas because of their work with the two councils, and was able to raise concerns relating to these to the Board and secure funding if needed. For instance, in Scotswood, the BNG team set up and funded a neighbourhood management team in order to help the residents through the relocation process. While having a good insight into specific projects and schemes in the Pathfinder area, especially Walker, Scotswood and Bensham, the BNG team or the APCs were not directly involved in residential relocation or planning for that matter.

‘All the policies are administered by Newcastle City Council. We just really fund the options that come from that policy ... We have an influence but it is just an influence. We don’t have a statutory position ...’ (CS-BNG Team 3).

Whilst the government was expecting the Pathfinders to challenge the way the local authorities operated there was little evidence of this in BNG. The BNG Team was employed by Newcastle CC, and while operating quite independently, it served a purpose of resolving conflicts and helping in crisis rather than being a core shaker. Funding FAPs for relocation of owner occupiers in Scotswood was such an intervention. When asked who they considered to be responsible for residential relocation delivery, the representatives of the BNG team referred to the Resettlement and Relocation Team in Newcastle (see ALMO section) and Neighbourhood Management Team in Gateshead (see Local Authorities section).
8.5.2 Local authorities

Newcastle City Council (NCC) and Gateshead Metropolitan Council (GH MBC) were the key BNG Pathfinder partners. Local authorities or councils are statutory bodies with the power to intervene in the built environment and compulsorily purchase land when deemed necessary. They played an important role in BNG. Newcastle was BNG’s host local authority. As stated previously, the BNG Team was employed by NCC. Gateshead MBC was the Pathfinder’s accountable body. Local authorities in BNG had a strong influence over BNG development plans and strategies, especially in the first years.

However, because of the shortage of staff and resources many functions were delegated and contracted out to other agencies. For instance, at the time of inquiry the planning officer in Gateshead MBC pointed out that HMR intervention in his council was the largest they have ever done and that the council needed help. In Newcastle several respondents pointed out the same.

Residential relocation processes were delegated and contracted out differently as previously shown in the comprehensive table of actors. Here it needs to be stressed that the delegation of responsibilities was different in Newcastle than in Gateshead. This influenced the way residential relocation was planned in their constituencies. In the following sections I address this issue for the two councils separately.

8.5.2.1 Newcastle City Council

The roles and responsibilities of Newcastle City Council (NCC) changed and evolved in the process of HMR implementation. At the outset the Council saw as its role to assemble the land and de-risk it for private developers. Following the basics of CPO legislation in Scotswood (see also Chapter 7), NCC did not provide resident support, nor consult the residents. Alternative properties were provided for social and council tenants as required, however they were not planned for owner occupiers or private tenants. The council’s approach to relocation in Scotswood changed in
response to community protests and later involvement. Residents’ protests and refusal to move caused lots of controversy in the council, and split the practitioners into those supportive of the intervention and those who opposed it. After initial community protests, new teams were set up to support residents through the relocation, and engage with them. The restructuring of NCC between 2005 and 2006 led to the setting up of Area Based Regeneration teams in the East and West End of Newcastle. These teams were responsible for regeneration in Walker and Scotswood respectively. This is how the Area Programme Director (West) described his role:

‘I’m Area Programme Director with Area Based Regeneration which is a new division set up within the City Council and it’s very much a delivery focused role ... I’ve got equivalents in the north and east, but my job is basically to ensure that projects are delivered, which has been a weakness of Newcastle in the past terms of delivery ... June 15th was when I started, so I’m 5 months in post’ (CS-NCC West Team1).

After the establishment of Area Based Regeneration teams, NCC’s approach to relocation continued to develop differently in East and West Newcastle. The relocation governance scheme below shows the Area Based Regeneration teams being separate. Their interaction with the BNG Team was separate too. Namely, the BNG Team had Area Programme Coordinators for East and West of the BNG. In his feedback on the proposed governance scheme, the Area Based Regeneration (West) Director stressed this point.
The accounts of the Planning Officers in East End Team suggest that the NCC area teams were fairly independent and that they could draft their strategies to suit specific projects:

‘We did what we wanted.’ (CS-NCC East Team1) recalled Walker planning officer.

‘We had no standards, but we had a way of working that we worked towards to try and ensure people got feedback, they had plenty of choice and all the rest of it, but there was no formal guideline’ (CS-NCC East Team2) said the project leader for Walker.

According to the account of these respondents, the Walker Promise relocation strategy (see Chapter 7) was in fact a vision of the East End Planning Director (later Project Director at Places for People).

‘[Area Director] just pushed it through basically. He saw that one of the only ways that would enable the community to move and be on board with it was to make this Walker Promise ... albeit that a lot of people in the housing section didn’t agree with it because obviously it was giving people the right to have ‘like for like’ [property in relocation], which is in odds with choice based letting scheme’ (CS-NCC East Team2).
Establishment of area teams in NCC’s East and West End increased the council’s capacity to advance the projects however many of the tasks were still contracted out. This presented further fragmentation on the local and project level. In the case of Walker, the NCC contracted out the masterplanning to Places for People (registered social landlord and preferred developer, see Registered Landlords section) and Llewellyn Davies consultants. Alternative property provision in general as well as for purposes of relocation was entrusted to private developer Bellway (note that the respondent made on the scheme). In 2004 the management of the council’s stock in Walker as in Scotswood was contracted to ALMO Your Homes Newcastle, as was the residents’ support. The same year the Resettlement and Relocation Team moved from NCC to YHN. NCC retained the responsibility to manage the Walker Riverside plan through the planning system and project manage its implementation. Consequently the outcomes have been different, and have been differently shaped. While the residents achieved their ends through protests in Scotswood, the residents in Walker were engaged from the outset. The council’s representatives interviewed for this research considered R&RT (YHN) team, and departments such as Property Services (CPO) and Strategic Housing (managing FAPs) to be responsible for relocation.

8.5.2.2 Gateshead MBC

This section examines the Gateshead’s roles and responsibilities in regards to residential relocation in Bensham and Saltwell, one of the three BNG primary intervention areas.

Differently from Newcastle, the organisation of Gateshead council was more centralised. The council did not have separate area teams. Work with BNG involved links with the Area Programme Coordinator (East). As the feedback sketch indicates, the Council’s planning department saw itself as a coordinator or manager of different departments and organisations involved in the process. However, loyalty lay with the council and council departments and keeping tight links and relationships in-house seemed very important. After the foundation of BNG, Gateshead Council contracted out neighbourhood planning to GVA Grimley consultants. The company worked in association with Social Regeneration Consultants (SRC), Nathaniel Litchfield and Partners and delivered the plan in February 2006. The planning exercise involved intensive community consultation in which both the private partners and the council took part. B&S Community consultation was a part of bigger exercise that involved all the BNG area in Gateshead.
While planning was contracted out, quite differently from Newcastle, Gateshead council kept tight control over its ALMO and quite easily relocated social tenants from intervention areas. Unlike
Newcastle, Gateshead council provided resident support to residents affected by demolition and relocation through their Neighbourhood Management team (the team that performed the same function as R&RT in Newcastle).

The role of this council’s department evolved in the face of the SAVE Britain’s objection to demolition. According to the Neighbourhood Management department representative SAVE’s campaign caused lots of confusion among the residents, some of whom saw BNG intervention as an opportunity to move from their deprived areas or sell their home to the council (especially in 2007 and 2008 when the crisis started). The Neighbourhood Management Team felt they needed to ‘manage’ the information about the BNG intervention.

“They caused a huge confusion with the residents, because it sends the wrong message out. So it is like … aw ... the project has come to a halt ... and we constantly have to manage the message: ‘no it hasn’t, we are still buying up your property ... and this is what you do if you want to sell ... and put them back on the right track again’ (CS-GH MBC Neighbourhood Team1)

Gateshead MBC developed a sophisticated communication and marketing strategy on the ground and online (see Appendix 5). Local Neighbourhood Management officers provided information to affected residents directly. Videos of relocated residents and their stories about the process and the outcomes were put on the council’s web site, together with the privately produced movie ‘Gateshead no stranger to change’. The street representatives (residents) were involved in the process and were able to stream the information to their neighbours.

8.5.3 Arms Length Organisations

Arms Length Organisations or ALMOs are non-profit companies set up by local authorities. Their primary responsibility is day-to-day management and maintenance of the councils’ housing stock. In 2004, a year after BNG was set up, both Newcastle and Gateshead councils transferred management of their stock to Arms Length Organisations (ALMOs). In Newcastle, Your Homes Newcastle ALMO took over the management of 29,000 tenanted local authority properties, while in Gateshead, the Gateshead Housing Company ALMO took over this task for 25,000 units. To an extent the difference in the ALMO’s roles in residential relocation can be linked to the percentage of the council properties within each project (see table below).
Table 8-2: Percentage of council housing in each BNG priority areas (projects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Council Housing %</th>
<th>ALMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Scotswood and Benwell</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Your Homes Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Walker</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Your Homes Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gateshead</td>
<td>Bensham and Saltwell</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>The Gateshead Housing Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Census 2001 used as evidence base in BNG

In statutory terms local authorities or organisations managing their properties (ALMOs) are responsible for relocating or ‘decanting’ their social tenants from properties earmarked for demolition. Alternative accommodation may be offered from the ALMO’s stock. Alternatively, relocation can be arranged online through a choice based letting system. In both cases affected residents receive a so called ‘priority card’ due to demolition that enables them to relocate.

The roles and responsibilities of the AMLOs in BNG differed. In Gateshead Council, Gateshead Housing Company (ALMO) supported only the residents it was obliged to – social tenants. The Council’s Neighbourhood Management team was the one providing the resident support for other tenures.

In Newcastle, the role of Your Homes Newcastle (YHN) ALMO was considerably wider than that of its counterpart in Gateshead.

The Resettlement and Relocation and Team was originally set up by Newcastle City Council in response to Scotswood community pressure. In 2004, when Newcastle Council transferred its stock management to Your Homes Newcastle ALMO, the Resettlement and Relocation Team was transferred to this organisation. Inclusion of the Resettlement and Relocation Team into YHN ALMO effectively widened the role of this organisation in respect to relocation delivery in Newcastle. Instead of being responsible solely for support of council tenants, YHN was supporting owner occupiers as well as private tenants. The transfer resulted in a prolonged fight between NCC and YHN ALMO, over influence over the Resettlement and Relocation Team (especially in the case of Walker where the ALMO objected to demolition, see Chapter 7). A section of the R&RT group interview illustrates the complexity of the R&RT’s position in the BNG partnership operation.
Box 8-2 R&RT position in BNG governance structure

**Author:** What is your role in relocation and housing market renewal?

**CS-YHN Relocation Team1:** I think it's essentially quite complicated how we fit in with it because obviously you do have BNG you have the City Council and you have Your Homes Newcastle and sometimes there are other agencies as well ... communities, there are all these people putting money into a pot for regeneration. Our line managers are the managers here at Your Homes Newcastle but we have an awful lot to do with strategic housing and the area based regeneration schemes at the City Council.

**Author:** And the Pathfinder team as well ...?

**CS-YHN Relocation Team1:** We don't have that much to do with them, we do see them at meetings but that's probably our senior managers that probably have more to do with seeing them.

**Author:** So you don't meet [Area Programme Coordinator East] from the BNG?

**CS-YHN Relocation Team1:** I haven't seen him for a while, he used to come along to meetings we were at but he tends to deal really with the Council and then the Council then deal with us over here at Your Homes Newcastle, so it's quite a complicated process.

**CS-YHN Relocation Team2:** No-one deals with us directly at that level I suppose we're delivering the service on the ground so I suppose instructions come down through regeneration really from a context where you've got Head of Regeneration at the City ... senior officers at Your Homes Newcastle, have a regular four weekly meeting with them discussing strategy, discussing new schemes. I suppose that's where the information is fed through to us and it comes cascading down through line management to our level where we're asked to go and start consultations with residents.

**CS-YHN Relocation Team1:** Yeah ... I think it can depend on the scheme that we're actually working on, certainly in the Walker Riverside Regeneration, I think we had probably much closer links with the Council at that particular time.

**Author:** You as a team?

**CS-YHN Relocation Team3:** Yes ... It depends on each scheme, quite often a scheme like Walker will have a project which will be made up of hundreds of staff on the Council, from BNG, Your Homes Newcastle, sometimes we are asked along to that and invited to it, sometimes we're not, it depends ...

**CS-YHN Relocation Team1:** but whichever one of those is the master if you like we will answer the call to it ... I think our role in this process is to make sure that everybody is aware of what the residents’ expectations are, basically, what's been promised to those residents and how we are supposed to fulfil them.

R&RT feedback on the BNG relocation network shows that the team worked with various departments in Newcastle City Council (Property Services, Strategic Housing) both Area Regeneration Teams, and was in contact with the BNG Team. At the same time this R&RT worked on a one-to-one basis with residents affected by relocation in Newcastle from the moment demolition was announced in their areas, and guided them through the process until the moment they were relocated and settled into an alternative property. One of the R&RT team members said:

'We are in a privileged position, we met everybody ...’ (CS-YHN Team1).

In the course of the interview with the R&RT it became apparent that the team developed loyalty, not toward NCC or YHN, but toward residents they felt they were serving. The R&RT team’s
approach and good relationship with the relocatees resulted in better residential relocation outcomes and improved process according to the Walker and Scotswood residents interviewed for this research. This in turn resulted in the R&RT being often considered ‘accountable’ or ‘responsible’ for relocation even though they were a ‘street service’.

8.5.4 House builders (private developers)

A distinctive characteristic of HMR was formal involvement of private house builders (private developers) in the intervention delivery. Moreover, the private sector developers were entrusted to provide new housing in the HMR framework. Across the Pathfinders different mechanisms (developer panel, developer competitions, developer’s agreements and RSL agreements) were
devised to engage private developers in Housing Market Renewal. The role of the house builders in the relocation process differed depending on the project and agreements with Pathfinder partners.

Involvement of private developers in cross-tenure residential relocation is a precedent. In the UK, private developers have been known to avoid building in deprived areas as they consider them too risky. Therefore, they consider it imperative for the council to de-risk the land before their arrival. Clearly, in this line of reasoning, providing properties for residential relocation was not something that private developers considered doing at the start. The Financial Director of Taylor Wimpey North East, a BNG Board member, asserted:

‘You would not build in those areas unless they are seriously subsidised and de-risked. BNG are facilitating site preparation. So they are providing the land they are preparing the land for development and then they are providing some funding to lower land cost for the developer, effectively de-risking it’ (CS-BNG Board Taylor Wimpey1).

This said, the Walker case showed that it was in fact possible to engage private developers and secure alternative properties for relocation from these actors. However, this required planning and partnership working, rather than simply preparing the site and giving it to a developer to build on after relocation alongside other work is finished. In the Walker case, Places for People envisaged using some of the affordable properties planned for the site to relocate residents affected by demolition back into new properties in their own neighbourhood. An early success in Walker Riverside was the Cambrian Estate (see Chapter 7). It provided a one move solution and relocation into new ‘lifetime standard’ properties near their old neighbours.

Alternative property provision for relocation is clearly a significant change in what is perceived as the ‘traditional’ role of private developers. Whilst arrangements with private developers achieved success initially, the output was fairly limited. A PfP project director noted:

‘There is not a great volume of housing that’s built in a way we have approached in Walker … because it is costly it is difficult and it is not a kind of thing that most developers do … up until recently...’ (CS-PfP Team1).

Housing provision was one of the most challenging aspects of HMR among other reasons, because of the inherent tension between the private developers and the public sector. There was significant difference in culture and ethos of the two, that led to long delays and cases when developers walked off sites (see Walker case, Chapter 7) before completing the building. The involvement of private developers in HMR was as loose as the sketch the Taylor Wimpey respondent showed in the graph below: the private developers were there but not really linked with any of partners in the network.
8.5.5 Registered Social Landlords

Registered Social Landlords, more precisely Places for People (PfP) in the case of BNG, played an important role designing a strategy for residential relocation delivery. NCC contracted PfP to take forward plans for the Walker Riverside area through NCC Development Framework Plan. Following its successful completion, PfP won a competitive bid and was named Lead Regeneration Partner for Walker in 2004. In the case of Walker, the RSL’s role covered planning strategy, part of housing provision as well as Walker neighbourhood residential relocation strategy.

In order to develop the planning strategy for Walker, PfP (see the feedback below) developed strong links with the Pathfinder Management (Development Department) and the Regeneration and Environment Directorate at NCC. Most importantly, PfP worked closely with the R&RT (YHN ALMO) to be able to deliver residential relocation according to the Walker Promise, in other words to enable the residents to achieve their housing aspirations in the residential relocation process. The core of the PfP strategy was to minimise the impact of the intervention on the existing community and to reinvigorate it.
The interviews with Newcastle City Council officers who used to work with PfP in the Walker programme suggested that the approach was very much a result of strong personal commitment by the PfP Chief Executive and PfP Project Director. In his interview for this research the PfP project director stressed:

‘I feel very strongly that fine grained sensitive approach to local residents and what they need is well worth the money. Essentially understanding who your customers are, who the residents are. Those are the people who rent. Because the cost of redeveloping an estate times and times and times again is just ludicrous’ (CS-PfP Team1).

Through engagement with the community, Places for People were able to create a group of resident advocates for their plans for future work. Residents relocated into Bellway’s new properties on the Cambrian Estate were some of them.

While the project delivery in Walker was not completed as planned (see Chapter 7) the case of Walker indicates that the RSLs took an important role in HMR implementation in general and residential relocation in particular. This role covered community involvement, resident support, alternative property provision and planning strategy.
8.5.6 Third sector voluntary organisations

The influence of voluntary organisations on residential relocation practice depends on each case. For example, in Newcastle there was no evidence that any such organisations (residents groups and organisations are classified as ‘community’) had significant influence over the relocation process or the HMR delivery process more generally. In Gateshead however, the SAVE Britain’s Heritage group took issue with the demolition of English terraces in the Bensham and Saltwell areas.

This group was by no means specifically interested in matters of relocation. It was opposing demolition. SAVE appealed against Gateshead Council’s plans based on the claim that the plan did not have an Environmental Assessment. This resulted in significant delays. To illustrate, work in Bensham had only started in 2011, the year HMR was cancelled by the government.

Here it needs to be mentioned that the focus of this group was not the residents but buildings. Residents affected by demolition were not consulted by this group about their feelings about demolition nor their wish to relocate. Instead, assumptions were made that the community as a whole opposed demolition, and that this should therefore be stopped. The residents that had already been informed about their relocation and agreed with it were delayed in making the move.

In Bensham, the SAVE appeal resulted in significant delays in the BNG programme implementation.

While not having a direct interest in residential relocation per se, the Gateshead case shows that third sector organisations had significant influence on residential relocation process whilst they were focusing on stopping demolition.

8.5.7 Community

Oh! Me lads, ye shud a’ seen us gannin,
Passin’ the folks upon the road just as they were stannin’.
Thor wis lots o’ lads and lasses there, all wi’ smiling faces
Gannin’ alang the Scotswood Road to see the Blaydon Races.

19th century by Geordie Ridley

More often than not residents affected by relocation are presented as victims of the residential relocation process. The assumption is that residents have little influence over the process but have to bear its consequences. The story of Newcastle residents comes to challenge this assumption.
The old Geordie song ‘Blaydon Races’, epitomises the spirit of relocated Scotswood community members even though the Scotswood Road houses are long demolished. During the interviews conducted with the representatives Scotwood Residents Association and Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre it was hard not to be inspired by relocatees, women in their 60s, Geordie Grannies, determined to get things straight for themselves and their neighbours. Authorities proposing demolition in Newcastle ‘shud a’ seen them gannin’.

The Scotswood residents’ role in remodelling their neighbourhood underwent a metamorphosis from the time demolition was first announced in their neighbourhood under the Going for Growth initiative in 1999 through implementation of Housing Market Renewal between 2003 and 2011. Protesters against demolition in the days of Going for Growth forced themselves into the planning and decision making and at the end became keen advocates of the partners’ regeneration plans. In this process they transformed the way residential relocation was delivered in their neighbourhoods and in Newcastle as a whole (see Chapter 7).

Residents found support in local councillors who helped raise funding for community consultation and involvement in planning. The real breakthrough was inclusion of the representatives of the Scotswood community in the work of the council. The Joint Working Group was founded in 2002. The group involved cooperation between residents, local councillors and council officers responsible for planning strategy in NCC. Scotswood residents got a voice in the council and decision making power.

The Scotswood Residents Association leader was among the respondents asked to give feedback on relocation network governance scheme prepared by the researcher. The respondent marked the position of the Joint Woking Group (between (Area Based Regeneration Team (West) and the Regeneration Directorate) in the overall governance network supporting residential relocation in BNG. She also pointed out that the Scotswood residents were present in the Steering Group operating at a higher level. This involvement resulted in securing better outcomes for the owner occupiers relocated from Scotswood and improving the residential relocation practice in Newcastle as a whole. Residents’ voluntary involvement in the Joint Working Group and the Steering Group, resulted in reducing demolition in Scotswood by 800 properties; resident support for relocation (all tenures) was set up (see ALMOs), relocation grants were increased and FAPs designed to enable relocation of the owner occupiers alternative property, provision (owner occupiers) were organised. The Homeswap scheme was designed by the Council and funded by BNG. While primarily designed for owner occupiers the representatives of the Scotswood Neighbourhood
Centre interviewed for this research pointed out that the scheme was at times available to the social tenants as well. Homeswap enabled relocation into homes refurbished by the council following residents’ specifications.

Apart from this work, Scotswood residents were involved in supporting their own community through the relocation process. This was crucial as the process was taking years for some. Scotswood residents’ activism attracted visits from the local media, politicians and ministers and earned them the Queen’s Award for voluntary work. The community representatives were also determined to empower the community in the East End of Newcastle that was affected by demolition.

‘Yes, we were invited by all of their groups [Walker] … we’re starting up new groups and they wanted a bit of help in starting up these new groups and so we went along and sat in and listened to how they were running them and then give them an idea of what we’d done and how we’d got involved. So, yes, we did, and then all of a sudden the Walker groups seemed to take off and they seemed to be getting things done an awful lot quicker than we were’ (CS- Residents Scotswood1).
The influence of community groups was not equal across Newcastle. For instance, Walker Network (the network of residents associations in Walker neighbourhood) did not have a decision making power. This said, the community in East End was statutorily engaged in the planning process from the start (see Chapter 7). However, the Walker Promise was designed by the council, based on the lessons learnt in Scotswood.

As the result of the engagement as well as successful relocation (into new and refurbished properties) residents’ representatives became advocates of the BNG plans in both Walker and Scotswood. They took pride in the results of their work and changes that they achieved in the planning process and residential relocation outcomes they secured for themselves and their neighbours. Interestingly, in the process the residents took ownership of the plans to the extent that they began to ‘police them’.

A Walker Network representative, relocated herself, seemed to be quite judgemental of her fellow residents who easily moved away and then complained over the residential relocation outcomes:

‘They had to be re-housed because they were part of a regeneration area, they could move wherever they wanted, they could argue and stick for Walker but some of them moved ... And then when they’ve seen how they’ve built it ... we stuck it out, all our neighbours here, we said “no, we want to stay there” so we stuck it out and now when they see the houses they say “oh, wish I’d stayed there”, but it had already gone. “Oh, I’m coming back,” I said “you can’t come back, you’ve moved away there’s other people has priorities over you now”’ (CS-Resident Walker1).

In Scotswood the residents’ comments felt like a sort of policing of their fellow neighbours who obstructed the development of the plans they drafted with the council. The Scotswood residents’ leader said:

‘I can only see a future for Scotswood that we wouldn’t have had if we’d stuck with the place the way it was and the people who are appealing against it with CPO’s, there are 4 of them, and I didn’t think that they had enough clout to warrant their CPO’s, I mean there’s the house that remains on Armstrong Road, he didn’t put anything but bad into the area all the time he owned the house, ... he multi-occupied it, like a bed & breakfast kind of thing with a room and they were all people who were on benefits, the house was occupied with undesirables, that’s all I can say, because they caused an awful lot of problems and he has gone against the CPO ... he’s talking about demolishing it and making it into a multi-occupational place again, bed & breakfast or the like. Now, we don’t want that, none of us wanted it, we wanted it to be demolished as it was ear-marked for, it was in the picture ...’ (CS-Residents’ Leader Scotswood).

In one of the reports about the area, ReUrba (2005) pointed out that residents’ representatives sounded a bit ‘like ambassadors for the Council’s plans’ and rightfully asked: how do they avoid
being branded an extension of the local government? The example of the Newcastle residents challenges the assumption about the role of the residents in demolition and the relocation process. It shows that the community was well able to influence the Pathfinder’s plans and strategies. Their success was based on the awareness (as well as persistence) that the Council depends on them to move in order to develop. By refusing to move the residents bargained for a relocation deal that they considered fair and acceptable and in the process reshaped the residential relocation approach in Newcastle and in BNG more widely.

8.6 Conclusion: Governance Arrangements and Impact of Relocation Outcomes

This chapter identified actors delivering residential relocation, examined their roles, responsibilities and governance arrangements. This section provides concluding remarks. The solutions Pathfinders developed in order to respond to the challenges of relocation on the ground, call for rethinking of the way relocation roles and responsibilities are defined in a mixed tenure context. This research identified five distinct processes shaping residential relocation in HMR (see the ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’). The roles and responsibilities of actors have been examined based on these findings. The analysis shows not only that numerous actors were involved in residential relocation in HMR in general and BNG in particular, but that their ‘traditional’ role in terms of relocation changed and evolved. For instance, private developers who have been known to avoid building in low demand areas altogether were entrusted to provide alternative properties for residents affected by relocation. The ALMOs’ role evolved from providing resident support to social tenants only to include residential relocation support for all tenures. RSLs found themselves designing relocation specific strategy aiming to meet residents’ housing aspirations in the relocation process, and so on. The process was not without challenges. Some of the results were achieved through ‘trial and error’, error that took the form of negative residential relocation outcomes. However, the results point out the change in the sector, and call for re-examination of the way relocation is researched, re-examination of actors involved in the process, their roles and responsibilities and governance arrangements.

One of the key findings presented in this chapter is that residential relocation was delivered by a multitude of actors from public, private and community sectors. Fragmentation of delivery characterised residential relocation in the HMR framework. The reason for this was residential relocation complexity compounded by cross-tenure residential relocation and the practice of task delegation. Traditionally, local authorities have been regarded as responsible and accountable for
residential relocation process and outcomes. Based on evidence presented in this study, we can no longer claim this. As shown in the previous chapter local authorities depended on a myriad of actors to deliver residential relocation. They were not in a position to fully influence or control the behaviour of these actors. Residential relocation in mixed tenure context is delivered by a complex network of actors. Figure 8-10: Governance of Relocation in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder presents the final form of the BNG relocation network based on the feedbacks provided by the respondents. Residential relocation process and outcomes were the result of cooperation or non-cooperation of network actors involved in specific projects at specific times. Consequently, residential relocation was characterised by uncertainty, mixed outcomes and delays. In governance literature delays and uncertainty have been defined as characteristics of the operation of complex networks of actors, unclear or changing goals (Kickert et al., 1997). These have certainly been identified in the relocation practice examined in this research.

Based on the extensive empirical research this study is in position to claim that residential relocation network operation resembles the model described by governance orthodoxy theorists (Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al, 1997). Future research should look in more detail at the possibilities of the management of the relocation networks shaping development caused residential relocation. The concluding chapter provides a definition of the ‘governance of relocation’ based on the research presented here and provides recommendations for the development of future research and practice.
Figure 8-10: Governance of Relocation in Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder

Based on the case study conducted between March 2008 and January 2010
Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions towards Governance of Relocation

9.1 Original Contribution to Knowledge

This research has examined mixed-tenure residential relocation delivery in the context of a differentiated polity. Drawing on governance debates and extensive empirical research, its key innovation is in devising a theoretical framework that shows how governance has a profound impact on residential relocation outcomes at the scale of individual projects. Using the example of the Housing Market Renewal initiative in England, the study showed that the practices of residential relocation consisted of five distinct processes and were delivered by a complex network of actors. It provided a fine grained examination of institutional contexts that evolved around residential relocation in Pathfinder areas on the national, sub-regional and local levels. The findings challenge assumptions and conclusions put forward by HMR critics, notably gentrification studies. The thesis recommends further exploration of ‘governance of relocation’ as a network governance model, in order to enable greater in-depth understanding of residential relocation delivery in other contexts.

This research represents a substantial and original contribution to knowledge because it examines certain key aspects of residential relocation that are under-researched and under-theorised. To date there is very little published knowledge about the way mixed-tenure residential relocation is delivered in the context of devolved state policy implementation. An extensive search of the research literature on residential relocation revealed a gap in academic research. While residential relocation outcomes receive overwhelming attention, the examination of institutional aspects of relocation as well as relocation process has been neglected. By moving beyond the conventional focus on residential relocation outcomes, this study makes a significant contribution to an emerging body of research on neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation that has developed in response to state planned housing demolition policies in Western Europe and the
USA over the past decade (see for example Allen, T., 2000; Cole & Flint, 2007; Goetz, 2003, 2002; Kleit & Manzo, 2006; Kearns, 2002; Kleinhans & van der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013).

The novelty of the approach lies in the development of a conceptual model for capturing and analysing residential relocation processes. The research shows that institutional fragmentation, the multiplication of actors and confusion over ‘who does what’ take effect not only on a wide policy plane, but also affect residential relocation as practical intervention. Its key contribution is a unique process-focused perspective on state induced residential relocation delivery. The governance networks that emerge around relocation processes have a profound impact on the relocation delivery and outcomes. The conceptual models this thesis has generated on the basis of extensive empirical study of HMR relocation in England are themselves an original contribution to knowledge (see Thesis Summary below).

The task for future residential relocation research is to test in other contexts the conceptual models developed here. Although focused on the English example, the conclusions and insights developed have wider relevance. In the past decade initiatives similar to that in England have been developed in the USA and Western Europe. The thesis argues for further exploration and development of residential relocation research that focuses on examination of the residential relocation processes and related governance issues in other contexts and their influence on residential relocation outcomes.

The results of this thesis also have direct policy relevance. It examined an aspect of HMR that has received little attention, in both research and official HMR reports. It accomplished a better understanding of the nature of residential relocation delivery, localised gaps in the existing legislation and guidance, specified the processes involved as well as residential relocation delivery mechanisms. Hence, the changes required for more resident adjusted residential relocation in the policy process can be identified. In doing so, more appropriate solutions can be achieved.

9.2 Thesis Summary: Addressing the Main Research Objectives

This thesis has examined governance processes shaping cross-tenure residential relocation in the Housing Market Renewal initiative in England. It aimed to fulfil three key objectives:

1) to examine how residential relocation is delivered in a differentiated polity,
2) to identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities, and,
3) to evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation delivery and outcomes.

These objectives have been addressed more broadly in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. In this section I provide short summaries to link these to the theoretical debates presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and reflection on the thesis as a whole. The thesis takes a sociological approach underpinned by governance theory and was researched using grounded theory as the qualitative methodology. Answers to the research aim and objectives in this study are drawn from extensive empirical inquiry that builds on two pilot studies, the Pathfinder survey and an in-depth case study of the BNG Pathfinder. The key source of data is 44 interviews with key stakeholders shaping residential relocation practice, from private, public and community sectors, at national, sub-regional and local level (see Chapter 5).

9.2.1 Objective 1: To examine how residential relocation is delivered in a differentiated polity

The Pathfinders were given ‘a mandate to experiment’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004) and they did. In the absence of governmental guidance or standards, residential relocation delivery evolved at the Pathfinder level, or more precisely as the respondents indicated, on the project level within each individual Pathfinder. The Pathfinder survey and in-depth BNG case study showed that a devolved approach to policy design (and in particular to the relocation of residents) led to the proliferation of a range of strategies that substantially differed over time and space (Chapter 6). This research sought to systematise the observed residential relocation practices in order to establish causal links between residential relocation outcomes and governance processes shaping them. The analysis of respondents’ narratives in the pilot studies, subsequent feedback through qualitative survey of nine Pathfinders and the in-depth case study, led to identification of five distinct processes shaping residential relocation practice in the Housing Market Renewal framework. These are: redevelopment strategy, community involvement, resident support, alternative property provision and financial assistance provision.

The development of residential relocation processes emerged out of response to challenges Pathfinders and their local authorities encountered while attempting to relocate residents in HMR projects using available legislative tools. Identified residential relocation processes describe relocation delivery from the moment the decision to demolish has been approved by both authorities and residents affected the intervention.

At this point it is worth pausing to reiterate that this research delineates between the decision making processes related to (a) demolition, and (b) relocation. The thesis focuses on the cases
where the agreement to demolish and acquire properties had been reached by involved stakeholders, primarily residents. Very few studies focus on this issue. In literature critical of HMR, the attention has been on the cases where the residents disagreed with the intervention outright. The importance of considering cases where residents agreed with the intervention is twofold. First, only after demolition has been approved and agreed upon does a set of relocation processes evolve which then shape residential relocation outcomes. Second, agreement to demolition does not guarantee positive residential relocation results, just as initial disagreement with it does not guarantee negative ones. The processes of residential relocation shape relocation outcomes.

While some processes, such as planning strategy, have been known to affect residential relocation prospects, others such as financial assistance provision, community involvement, alternative strategy provision and resident support, were invented or advanced from (depending on the tenure in question) during Pathfinders’ operation. The evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that relocation practice was especially complex because of the coexistence and interaction of the five identified relocation processes affecting three different tenures, as well as different levels of development and change of processes at the time of implementation.

In order to allow analysis of relocation processes identified in this study, and understand how their interplay shaped residential relocation outcomes on project level, a conceptual model was built drawing on the ‘game’ concept and extensive empirical research. The ‘Residential Relocation Matrix’ presents an amalgam of emerging residential relocation processes identified in the HMR framework (see Figure 9-1: Residential relocation matrix (Ch. 6)).
As was shown in Chapters 6 and 7, residential relocation processes identified in this study changed in different ways, reflecting innovation introduced by the actors involved, their cooperation or non-cooperation. In addition, the observed processes did not move in the same direction or with the same speed, nor they were necessarily compatible or reinforcing.

Innovations like financial assistance packages or alternative property provision for relocation involved establishment conventions that shaped the behaviour of many different organisations beyond the elected local authority and resulted in additional actors joining residential relocation delivery.

Using the Residential Relocation Matrix designed in this research (Chapter 6) it was possible to identify and track changes in different relocation processes on project scale (as well as in each stage of each individual project). This conceptual model was also used to establish links between residential relocation processes (based on tenure), actors delivering them and residential relocation outcomes. The Residential Relocation Matrix formed a conceptual framework that enabled examination of governance processes shaping residential relocation in HMR on specific project scale and specific stage of project implementation. It is the key conceptual innovation that allowed focus on the procedure of residential relocation.
9.2.2 Objective 2: To identify actors involved in residential relocation, their roles and responsibilities

Pathfinders were set up as non-statutory bodies. Therefore, Pathfinders’ Boards and Teams did not have the power to intervene in the built environment, to demolish property or to relocate residents. These tasks were delegated to the local authorities the Pathfinder covered. However, the increasing complexity of residential relocation practice and additional resources this required put pressure on local authorities. As the result, in BNG, as in other Pathfinders, local authorities resorted to the practice of task delegation and contracting out. As a result, various actors were included in the process of residential relocation practice where the resources seemed to be missing.

![Scheme of delegation of residential relocation processes (BNG Pathfinder) (Ch. 8)](image)

Based on BNG case study

Figure 9-2: Scheme of delegation of residential relocation processes (BNG Pathfinder) (Ch. 8) presents a schematic delegation of the responsibilities linked to residential relocation processes in the case of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder. As HMR did not provide any guidance for
relocation practice, the roles and responsibilities of actors were identified in relation to residential relocation processes (Residential Relocation Matrix).

The findings indicate that residential relocation practice in HMR was dependent on the myriad actors drawn from beyond the boundaries of the formal institutions of government (central and local), from public, private and community (third) sectors. Various organisations and their departments were found to have played a significant role in residential relocation practice in BNG. Therefore, residential relocation in the HMR context was shaped by the interaction of a large number of actors that came from very different backgrounds.

While some commonalities existed, the involvement of actors varied at Pathfinder, local authority and individual project level and depending on tenure. No actor had a full overview or knowledge of all actors included in the process. The residential relocation outcomes were shaped by cooperation or non-cooperation between these actors. The results indicate that the nature of Pathfinder partnerships, transformation in local government, institutional fragmentation and contracting out, have each had a vital influence on the way that residential relocation was delivered in HMR.

**9.2.3 Objective 3: To evaluate governance arrangements as they relate to residential relocation delivery and outcomes**

This study showed that mixed tenure residential relocation in the context of differentiated polity is delivered by complex networks of actors. The ‘network’ concept describes the governance architecture that emerged as a result of an interaction and relationship (planned or spontaneous) between actors identified using the Residential Relocation Matrix. The relocation network presents all actors connected by certain type of residential relocation process and/or interaction of several processes. It maps actors identified to be involved in residential relocation practice (including the five residential relocation processes) in BNG Pathfinder.
According to the analysis in this study, a ‘relocation network’ is an organically developed sub-network interwoven with the official (government recognised) BNG Pathfinder governance structure designed to deliver the main HMR goals. ‘Governance of relocation’ is not a planned governance arrangement, it is a network that emerged in response to the processes required to deliver residential relocation in the HMR framework. Therefore, the membership and shape of the ‘relocation network’ differs between the Pathfinders. The common denominator was the link between the Pathfinder team and the local authority. However, the branches of the network within this wide structure differed and changed depending on the local authority and project in question. Actors from other public and private organisations, the community and the third sector formed a part of the relocation network. Therefore, the decision making related to each of five residential relocation processes was fragmented into different arenas as the actors came from very different backgrounds. The examples of the Scotswood, Walker, and Bensham and Saltwell projects in BNG showed that residential relocation practice was a result of cooperation or non-cooperation between interdependent parties with different often conflicting goals, interests and strategies. Interaction of actors in the relocation network following the residential relocation processes forms the ‘governance of relocation’.

Based on the case study conducted between March 2008 and January 2010
Given the mechanism shaping residential relocation identified in the case of HMR, the key question deriving from governance theory debate is who rules this network? Are there any actors who have disproportional control over residential relocation processes?

The evidence collected for this study showed that none of the actors involved possessed the power or resources to fully determine the strategies of other actors and therefore fully determine residential relocation outcomes. Having delegated responsibility over disparate relocation processes to other agencies, Pathfinder teams and local authorities depended upon other actors from public, private and community sectors to deliver residential relocation.

As the result residential relocation outcomes differed between Pathfinders, local authorities and within individual redevelopment projects. While some residents got relocated on the opposite side of their street to a brand new property, others struggled to find or afford alternative accommodation within the boundaries of their local authority (Chapter 7). In different cases, the relocation process lasted from a couple of months to a decade from the moment the decision to demolish had been advertised to the residents. The key challenge for future policy design proposing demolition and incurring residential relocation is the recognition of residential relocation networks and the creation of governance capacity in the midst of observed complexity.

9.3 Governance of Relocation: a Working Definition

After extensive empirical examination of the HMR case, this study is in a position to provide a working definition of ‘governance of relocation’ and position it within creative spaces of governance orthodoxy (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997) and governance sceptics (Davies, 2004; Bache, 2003) (Chapter 4).

'Governance of relocation' is a form of ‘steering’ residential move from properties earmarked for demolition to alternative ones. ‘Governance of relocation’, relates to governance processes and networks specifically linked to the issue of residential relocation after the agreement to demolish has been reached and where systems of statutory and other support are available.

Residential relocation practice consists of several inextricably linked processes adjusted to different tenures (‘The Relocation Matrix’). The residential relocation processes are delivered by numerous actors from public, private and community sectors. The multiplicity of actors might be seen just as an ecological adaptation to the complexities of residential relocation processes in demanding HMR, and in a differentiated polity more generally.
Actors depend on one another to relocate residents from the areas earmarked for demolition, as well as to achieve their own goals in the process. Their cooperation or non-cooperation shapes the relocation delivery process and residential relocation outcomes.

The actors form a relocation network. The relocation network is created by myriad actors from public, private and community sectors. It is not a planned network. It develops in order to deliver one or more residential relocation processes and differs on a project level.

In HMR, the relocation network was a thematic sub-network of the wider Pathfinder governance. This network was found to form organically in response to the circumstances on the ground. Residential relocation practice and outcomes are the results of network operation.

### 9.3.1 Governance of relocation as a governance orthodoxy model

Based on extensive empirical research this study argues that ‘governance of relocation’ resembles the model described by governance orthodoxy (Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997). Relocation networks are self governing and hard to control. They operate on the basis of interdependency and are self organising, inter-organisational networks independent of the state. The decision making process is fragmented into different arenas (see relocation processes) and different levels (sub-regional, local, project).

The conceptual link between residential relocation as a practical intervention and that of wider governance theory, allows for revision of the way residential relocation is conceptualised and researched. Devising a theoretical framework to capture the residential relocation process allows new questions to be asked about restructuring and residential relocation that were not asked before.

For instance, questions about accountability (Rhodes, 1997) for relocation processes and their outcomes; the effects of cooperation or non-cooperation of network members on relocation experiences; questions about the way the residential relocation networks could be managed or better organised (Kickert et al., 1997) and how best practice could be institutionalised and residential relocation outcomes acceptable to residents achieved.

This conceptual and theoretical extension contributes to the emerging body of knowledge on neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation (Varady, et al., 2001; Goetz, 2002, 2003; Kearns, 2002, 2010; Kleinhans, 2003, 2010; Cole & Flint, 2007) by providing both a new perspective on the institutional context of residential relocation and a conceptual framework for researching the residential relocation process in other contexts.
9.4 Governance of Relocation versus State led Gentrification

HMR induced relocation has attracted the attention of critical gentrification theorists (Chapter 3). Conceptualised as ‘displacement’, relocation was seen as state led or state sponsored (Cameron 2003, 2006; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). The ‘governance of relocation’ challenges assumptions and conclusions put forward by gentrification theorists and HMR critics on the following points:

1) Displacement perspective
2) Uniform outcomes
3) Centrality of the state in residential relocation
4) Position of the affected residents

9.4.1 Displacement perspective

The findings presented in this thesis challenge the ‘displacement’ perspective presented by HMR critics (see Cameron, 2003; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). This research argues that the critical gentrification perspective is limiting for an examination of planned demolition induced residential relocation (where forms of statutory and other support are available) for several reasons.

First, the term displacement covers different causes of residential relocation in urban areas: displacement due to housing rent increase (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996) ‘middle class invasion’ in global cities (Slater, 2006, 2010) demolition of the existing housing in low demand markets (Cameron, 2003, 2006; Cameron & Coaffee, 2005) or style of replacement housing (Allen, 2008). According to Slater (2004) the focus on gentrification studies is on the effects of the displacement rather than on its cause. This study argues that disregard of relocation causes leads to neglect of important institutional differences between different types of relocation. For instance, displacement due to housing rent increase or so called ‘middle class invasion’ does not entitle residents affected by the phenomena to statutory compensation or any other form of support; however planned demolition does. Because of the difference in institutional context different actors are involved in shaping residential relocation outcomes (or ‘effects’ as Slater terms them) in different types of relocation.

Second, in gentrification studies there is no consensus about the territorial unit in which residents are affected by ‘displacement’. The terms used are ‘community’ or ‘neighbourhood’. However, their size and scale are opened to interpretation. This further leads to lack of clarity about the number of residents affected by ‘displacement’. On the contrary, in the case of planned demolition induced residential relocation the boundary of areas planned for housing demolition, the number of
residents affected as well as the details about these residents are known. They are required for approval of the plans. Moreover, the approved plans form the basis on which the residents affected by interventions are eligible for statutory compensation and in the case of HMR other forms of residential relocation assistance (see The Relocation Matrix).

This study argues that clear definition of the cause of residential relocation is important in order to identify the relevant institutional context, the actors involved in the process as well as the delivery mechanism shaping residential relocation. This fine grained information can allow planning for residential relocation that has a better prospect to provide outcomes acceptable to relocatees.

9.4.2 Relocation outcomes

Critical gentrification studies tend to take a predominantly negative displacement perspective on outcomes of the relocation process regardless of the displacement cause or mechanism shaping it (market, state, powerful coalitions). The effects of ‘displacement’ are seen as predominantly negative and harmful to the residents. This study showed that residential relocation outcomes are far from being uniform; they are mixed. By suggesting that the displacement outcomes are predominantly negative regardless of process or context, the state-led gentrification (Cameron, 2003) stance resembles the ‘conventional steering perspective’ in policy analysis literature.

Here, ‘the central government is seen as society’s central ruler, and citizens and private organisations and lower tiers of government, [are] considered more or less passive objects of these steering efforts’ (Kickert et al., 1997:5). From this perspective, policy implementation is a neutral and technical exercise where similar actions are assumed to produce similar outcomes. In other words the processes conducted to achieve policy goals are uniform and always bring the same outcomes.

This thesis showed that far from being uniform, residential relocation processes differ significantly not only between Pathfinders but within them, on local authority and project level. Formal rules are not always strictly followed, they may be ‘bent’ or even ignored. Emerging processes change at different rates and in different directions, reflecting local circumstances, the network structure and relationships delivering any given project.

Most importantly, residential relocation possesses are carried out in advance of redevelopment and regardless of the success or failure of that redevelopment. In the HMR case it is hard to argue for repopulation of the intervention areas by the ‘middle class’ as the Pathfinders underperformed in
terms of new housing provision (Audit Commission, 2011), in some cases they failed to sell commercial properties and attract any population (see Chapter 7). Nonetheless, some of the around 50,000 residents relocated by the intervention had good residential relocation outcomes while others, not as lucky, did not.

The account of residential relocation experiences and the dynamics of relocation processes presented in this thesis reinforces the claims of policy analysts that ‘policy is not a settled end product and the significance of the moment and place of delivery is that policy can be and usually is remade during implementation’ (Hudson & Lowe, 2009:245).

9.4.3 Position of the state in residential relocation

The findings of this study challenge the idea of the centrality of the state in the residential relocation process as put forward by HMR critics (Cameron, 2003; Allen, 2008; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). The use of a critical state-led gentrification paradigm implies that residential relocation outcomes on the household level can be understood simply as the result of a structural shift in state activity, which takes place on a grander scale. The findings presented in this study showed that residential relocation in the HMR framework was delivered by a complex network of actors, whose members came from beyond the Pathfinder and local council, from other public, private and community organisations.

Central government launched and provided key funds for HMR. It had a role in approving the plans proposing planned demolition. It can be therefore argued to have had a role in inducing relocation in general terms. However, in terms of residential relocation processes that ultimately shaped residential relocation outcomes (e.g. location, size, quality of the properties, proximity to old neighbourhood or neighbours) the central government had little or no influence. The residential relocation processes were developed on the project scale and variably shaped by relocation networks.

Pathfinders and local authorities were dependant on myriad actors from public, private and community sectors to deliver residential relocation. In this sense it is better to think of residential relocation as a process of negotiation inside a complex system of organisations and agencies rather than a state-crafted outcome.
9.4.4 Position of the affected residents in the residential relocation process

In critical gentrification literature the residents affected by demolition and relocation are more often than not presented as victims of powerful actors and structural forces that they can do little to influence (Allen, 2008; Slater, 2006, 2010). In contrast to the claims in the literature critical about HMR, the case of BNG showed that communities and third sector organisations were more than able to take a stand and achieve their goals in the process.

The majority of Pathfinders resorted to negotiation with relocatees of different tenures rather than legal force. Purchase by compulsion was used as a last resort for owner occupiers (For example, in Scotswood only 6 out of over 1,200 demolished properties were purchased by compulsion).

This study showed that the ‘governance of relocation’ networks operate on the basis of dependency. Demolition or new building is not possible as long as the properties are occupied. Many of the residents affected by residential relocation in BNG seemed to be well aware of their bargaining position and used it to their advantage. For example, the reduction in the number of properties planned for demolition (Scotswood) or delay of the entire project (Bensham & Saltwell); relocation into new homes or refurbished homes of relocatees’ choice (Scotswood and Walker); change of the residential relocation practice in the Pathfinder (Scotswood). From the perspective of the Walker team leader at NCC, rather than being a matter of ‘force’, ‘relocation is an art of persuasion’ (CS-NCC East Team2).
### Table 9-1: Debate points: State led gentrification versus governance of relocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-led Gentrification (in HMR)</th>
<th>Governance of Relocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relocation</strong></td>
<td>Displacement caused by rent increase, housing price increase, housing taxes increase, planned demolition. Other: housing built for taste of the middle classes, arrival of the middle classes.</td>
<td>Relocation caused by redevelopment plans/projects, where statutory compensation along with other forms of support is available to residents affected by demolition and relocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cause</strong></td>
<td>State-led or/and sponsored gentrification.</td>
<td>Redevelopment/Restructuring projects involving housing demolition and clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial</strong></td>
<td>Neighbourhood/Community (undefined boundary).</td>
<td>Development Project or Scheme (defined project boundary with planned number of units proposed for clearance and new building).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of</strong></td>
<td>Number of residents affected by displacement cannot be precisely known.</td>
<td>Number of residents affected by demolition (of the property they occupy) and relocation is known. Relocatees’ details including their tenure, are a part of the compulsory project documentation needed for plan approval. Based on this information the residents are eligible to statutory compensation and other available forms of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>relocated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>residents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relocation</strong></td>
<td>State.</td>
<td>Complex network of actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading</strong></td>
<td>State (central and local). Powerful coalitions (Pathfinders).</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor/s</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Multitude of actors from private and public sector.</td>
<td>Multitude of actors from private, public and third sectors (community and voluntary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relocation</strong></td>
<td>Victims of the process.</td>
<td>Actors in the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>affected</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>residents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relocation</strong></td>
<td>Negative, harmful for the residents.</td>
<td>Mixed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.5 New Questions Raised and New Directions for Residential Relocation Research

The nature of the research purpose determined a unique choice of research design in order to accommodate such analysis. The grounded theory methodology (comprising mixed qualitative methods and techniques) allowed in-depth exploration of residential relocation practice, building conceptual models about residential relocation processes and linking them to wider theoretical concepts of governance theory. However, this thesis is only a beginning in a research shift from focus on relocation outcomes to that of relocation process. Further work is required.

Grounded theory as qualitative methodology has its limitations and available evidence can only take the study so far. The nature of qualitative methodology allows for consideration of limited numbers of cases. Based on the in-depth analysis of the HMR case with special attention to the BNG Pathfinder, this study suggests that more research is needed to develop understanding about the nature of residential relocation processes, the structure of networks delivering residential relocation, the ways these come to being, evolve and behave in other policy, political and housing market contexts.

The conceptual models built in this research based on the HMR case need further testing in other contexts. As the HMR initiative has been cancelled, the possibilities of testing the conclusions in other Pathfinders would be challenging and require historical analysis. However, the anecdotal evidence shows that many of the former Pathfinder areas are left with a half-finished project and that relocation is continuing. Examination of these cases would be beneficial, as the new partnerships take over the projects Pathfinders left unfinished.

The findings based on the English case would benefit from further testing and application in other differentiated polity contexts, such as the USA and Western Europe where programmes similar to HMR have been developed. It is quite possible that the decentralisation and fragmentation of service delivery that the governance theorists point to (see Kickert et al., 1997; Kjær, 2004) now affects aspects of residential relocation in these contexts. However, these issues have not been explored. While addressing the issue of wider relocation research internationally Curley and Kleinhans (2009:371) point out that ‘the majority of the literature … is connected to an outdated institutional context of ‘traditional’ urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s’. The ‘governance of relocation’ offers a fresh perspective to residential relocation research.
Neighbourhood restructuring and residential relocation studies (see Allen, T., 2000; Cole & Flint, 2007; Goetz, 2003; Kleit, R. G. & Manzo, 2006; Kearns, 2002) would benefit from further examination of relocation processes (Rosenfeld, 2013). At the moment the studies in this domain show an overwhelming focus on residential relocation outcomes (Kearns & Klein Hans, 2013). Based on the results presented here, the author suggests further exploration of the capacity of governance network concepts, ideas and theory to contribute to the development of relocation studies (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997).

The outcomes of state policy induced residential relocation can be improved only if the details of the processes shaping them are well understood, the actors delivering them are known and their interaction mapped. The potential could be examined for managing relocation networks so as to produce more appropriate and certain residential relocation outcomes in the future. The theoretical work developed by Kickert et al. (1997) may be of use in this endeavour.

9.6 Reflections on the HMR Initiative and Recommendations for Future Policy Induced Mixed-tenure Residential Relocation

In April 2011 HMR was cancelled by the Conservative government as the financial reality in Britain (and the rest of the world) changed. While the cancellation of the policy was not envisaged at the commencement of this research (the initiative was planned to run until 2018), the thesis seems to be in a unique position to reflect on the last four years of residential relocation practice in the HMR framework and give recommendations for future policy development in terms of residential relocation.

Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders’ implementation strategy was envisaged to be ‘learning by doing’ (Cole & Nevin, 2004). The evidence presented in this study shows that some residential relocation practices and processes were truly innovative. However, the time it took to develop these, their availability and distribution will ultimately be the results upon which this initiative will be judged for the years to come. Table 9-2: Pros and cons of HMR in residential presents a brief list of pros and cons of HMR in regard to residential relocation delivery.
Table 9-2: Pros and cons of HMR in residential relocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovative residential relocation practices development in response to local circumstances.</td>
<td>No guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community involvement in development of plans concerning demolition (not required by CPO).</td>
<td>Time and resources needed for mixed-tenure residential relocation severely underestimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of specialised financial assistance packages to facilitate residential relocation.</td>
<td>Partial legislative framework supporting residential relocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of resident support for all tenures (previously mandatory only for social tenants).</td>
<td>Conflict between HMR vision of ‘tenure blind’ approach and CPO legislation underpinning demolition and relocation for different tenures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of alternative property provision for owner occupiers (Homeswap, affordable properties)</td>
<td>Conflict between the HMR goals and the CPO legislation – low demand areas considered as an exception by CPO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the housing conditions for the private sector tenants by accreditation of private landlords.</td>
<td>Long delays. Relocation taking up to 8 years to complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable learning material for future policies inducing residential relocation.</td>
<td>Limited output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainly for all partners involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living blight and limbo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited availability of innovative solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No relocation specific community involvement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of evidence about HMR residential relocation practices lies in the fact that they were developed without much central guidance and in response to local circumstances. Over eight years of HMR implementation the Pathfinders crafted their approaches from having few skills and tools to tackle relocation in low demand areas, to some state of the art strategies such as the Walker Promise in BNG. The evidence about these practices and their mode of delivery provide a valuable insight into the challenges, possible approaches and solutions in state policy induced mixed-tenure relocation in a differentiated polity. It is situated knowledge about residential relocation developed in response to local circumstances.

The future policies proposing residential relocation should consider the lessons that can be learnt from the HMR example recorded in this study. At the moment the former Pathfinders face two challenges, the first is finishing the projects that have been left unfinished, the second is recording the learning that has developed through HMR implementation.

At the moment there is nothing to capture the technical expertise and good practice and make sure it is not lost. Because it is at the end of the Pathfinder process you end up not clearing and then clearance is necessary again. ... To go through that entire learning process again, it is very expensive, very stressful and it slows things down. It means that
mistakes are done which are stress for the residents, stress to authority and cost ... So investing in maintaining these skills, I think, is well worthwhile (MSP Respondent S1-4).

Based on the work on residential relocation delivery completed in this research, together with the conceptual advancements developed, the recommendations this thesis puts forward for policy development are as follows.

9.6.1 Residential relocation in low demand housing markets

The case of HMR suggests that future policy makers should take into consideration different types of housing markets when planning for interventions inducing residential relocation. It is no longer sufficient to rely on the available legislation (CPO) that assumes the existence of homogenous housing markets.

Failure to factor-in specific housing market characteristics and market change in redevelopment may lead to adverse results for residents affected as well as jeopardise efforts for policy implementation and redevelopment. In the HMR case, lack of consideration of market differences and market dynamics in residential relocation resulted in adverse results for the residents. At the beginning of HMR implementation owner occupiers faced an affordability gap and were in danger of losing home ownership in the process. Lack of market consideration in residential relocation also endangered financial sustainability of the programme on Pathfinder level. Even though HMR rested on the idea of market renewal, the change of prices was not considered for properties earmarked for demolition. As the market started to recover, the price of the properties planned for demolition increased as well, however this was not factored into the Pathfinders’ budget at the outset.

Residential relocation costs along with FAPs suitable for specific market conditions should be planned in advance of residential relocation, possibly in the planning stage of projects proposing housing demolition. Considering market fragmentation is required not only in planning about demand and supply of housing but residential relocation as well. Market intelligence should be used for modelling the potential prices of residential relocation and FAPs in the early planning stages as well as for their adjustment at the time of project delivery. This kind of planning may provide more realistic estimates about residential relocation costs for the partners as well as the residents and help prevent or at least reduce adverse results for the residents and partners.
9.6.2 Decision making process: demolition vs residential relocation

There is a need to delineate between the decision making process behind demolition and the decision making process shaping residential relocation, especially in terms of actors involved in the two.

The networks delivering and ultimately shaping the outcomes of residential relocation come into being only after the demolition is approved and set in action. Because of the timeframes needed to carry out redevelopment (up to a decade in BNG), this also means that actors or networks that approve demolition and set relocation in action may not be the ones delivering relocation; they may not be interested in residential relocation practicalities nor be in a position to steer the operation of relocation networks or ultimately be present at all. In Newcastle for instance (part of BNG case study), the HMR funding was won by the Labour administration that ruled the city in 2002. In 2004, Labour was heavily defeated in Newcastle by the Liberal Democrats, not least because of criticism of Labour’s demolition plans. In the first days of their rule the Liberal Democrats symbolically proclaimed the cancellation of HMR plans in Newcastle. However, the prospect of losing lavish HMR funding that supported part of the NCC staff seemed too a big a loss for the city council. The two parties reversed their position on demolition after the local elections. The Liberal Democrats became demolition ambassadors while Labour opposed them (the same plans their party approved). Backstage of these local political battles, relocation networks (operational or working networks of practitioners, planners, community associations and ALMOs) led by a small council team were trying to deliver what was agreed and promised to the residents. Policy designers and researchers alike should take into consideration that the actors and agencies approving demolition and carrying out relocation may not be the same, nor operate in the same way.

9.6.3 Project Scale and Timing

The findings in this thesis showed that the respondents involved in residential relocation practice conceptualised their actions at a project scale. However, regardless of a very small scale of redevelopment (in comparison to the sub-region or local authority) the key problems encountered by the residents affected by demolition and relocation were long delays or simply long periods between the time that the demolition was first announced to the moment of relocation. This resulted in residents living in blighted half boarded up streets where maintenance and services were systematically cut for up to a decade. The size of the projects and the staging of redevelopment has to be taken into consideration in projects that propose demolition.
proposing land assembly and large scale demolition (e.g. 1,500 residential units in Scotswood) to be completed before the site is delivered to developers are not appropriate for the effective management of residential relocation. They are hard to manage and are bound to take several years to complete because of their size.

This approach should be at all costs avoided, for the following reasons: first it results in long waiting periods for the residents; second, it requires considerable resources for neighbourhood management, maintaining empty properties and costs of policing the neighbourhood in order to protect the waiting residents from crime until the demolition is carried out. Most importantly because of the sheer size of the projects the rate of non-completion in large scale projects (accompanied with blight) is much higher than in smaller more manageable ones.

Smaller projects of between 50-100 residential units are more appropriate in order to minimise waiting periods for the residents and the added costs for the partners. Larger projects proposing demolition and residential relocation should be staged and phased, each phase should involve demolition of no more than 100 residential units. Each stage should include plans for relocation (whether via alternative property provision or FAPs), with a clear vision as to where relocatees could move to. Lastly, in cases where redevelopment has to be stopped for any reason (e.g. financial crisis) smaller projects are easier to maintain while allowing the rest of the neighbourhood to function relatively intact.

9.6.4 Residential relocation processes in cross-tenure relocation

The development of diverse relocation practices identified in this research stand witness not only to the innovation that Pathfinders achieved during HMR implementation, but to the need to develop residential relocation practice and relocation options that go far beyond available statutory compensation and support. Future policy makers should take into consideration that residential relocation consists of several processes that are linked and mutually influencing. These processes differ for three tenures (owner occupiers, social and private tenants). Based on the findings in this study it is recommended that the relocation processes and their interaction should be planned in order to provide relocation outcomes acceptable to the relocatees, and to reduce delays and unplanned costs for the partners.
9.6.4.1 Planning strategy

Planning strategy sets out broad relocation prospects within a project. The plans define whether part (or all) of the relocation could take place within the redeveloped area or would have to take place outside it. At the moment providing strategy for residential relocation is not required in plans inducing residential relocation. However, the findings of this research showed that it is no longer sufficient to assume that residents affected by demolition can find alternative properties in the market without help.

The recommendation deriving from this research is that planning strategy should incorporate residential relocation whether the residents are relocated back into the redeveloped area or relocated out of it, to other neighbourhoods. Failure to do so results in unnecessary delays, feelings of uncertainty for the residents, a difficulty in estimating the real duration of project implementation and potential financial losses for the project implementers.

Planning for residential relocation within the planning strategy should be based on in-depth knowledge about the community potentially affected by demolition. Understanding which proportion (and tenure) of residents wish to stay in their old neighbourhood (and where) and what proportion wish to leave, can help the planners design planning strategies that cater for the needs of the affected community, bring potentially better residential relocation outcomes, avoid unnecessary delays (that arise when relocation matters are dealt with post planning approval) and protests against the plans.

This said, planning strategy in itself is not sufficient in order to achieve positive residential relocation results. For instance, planning strategy that incorporates residential relocation, is not sufficient to achieve planned results without effective alternative property provision. In order to support planning strategy other residential relocation processes should be developed.

9.6.4.2 Community involvement

After the publication of Planning and Compulsory Purchase Order 2004 community engagement became a compulsory part of planning. While PCPA 2004 made a significant change in the planning system and brought improvements to the planning process in general terms, the statutory engagement it requires is not sufficient for residential relocation purposes. Development of relocation specific community engagement is needed in order to cater to the specific needs of relocation affected residents, for three reasons.
First, statutory engagement requires inclusion of a wide group of residents (not necessarily affected those by demolition or relocation) that can outnumber the residents affected by demolition and thus skew discussions away from demolition and relocation issues facing potential relocatees. In those cases, as presented in Chapter 6, the feelings of fear and uncertainty (about the intervention) among the residents, and in extreme cases protests against the intervention resume regardless of community engagement (see Chapter 6).

Second, relocation specific consultation is needed prior to the planning stage in order to collect intelligence about the residents’ position on demolition, and to avoid intervening in neighbourhoods where the majority of residents are against the intervention outright. Demolition in areas where the affected communities are against demolition should be avoided at all costs. More often than not interventions in such areas are significantly delayed, rarely completed and offer little value for the money. In these cases the resources are not invested in redevelopment but costly court battles around compulsory purchase.

Third, in areas where residents agree with the intervention in general terms, relocation specific consultation is needed prior to the planning stage in order to collect intelligence about the residents who wish to stay in their old neighbourhood (or at least near to it) and those who wish to leave. This can allow more effective development of planning strategy and other residential relocation processes needed to cater for these two groups.

Finally, policy designers and practitioners alike must acknowledge authorities’ dependence on relocatees to deliver residential relocation and consider them as an important part of the relocation network, that has the capacity to delay and reshape residential relocation practice and should therefore be involved early on in the project in order to avoid unnecessary delays, conflicts, financial loss and adverse residential relocation outcomes.

9.6.4.3 Financial assistance provision

Housing Market Renewal has been a major source of proliferation of innovative Financial Assistance Packages (FAPs). Development of financial assistance packages by the HMR Pathfinders suggests, that (a) statutory compensation guaranteed by the state is not sufficient (b) that additional financial assistance for relocation is needed in low housing demand areas.

The findings presented in this study showed that simple reliance on statutory compensation and lack of planning for FAPs can result in an affordability gap for the residents (owner occupiers),
adverse relocation outcomes, refusal to relocate, delays and unplanned costs of relocation. Therefore, FAPs should be planned in advance of the relocation commencement preferably in the planning stages of redevelopment.

**9.6.4.4 Alternative property provision**

Alternative property provision (APP) in the case of housing demolition is variably required by law depending on the tenure. The present study showed that alternative property provision is important for all tenures. Planning and delivering alternative properties for relocation allows residents to stay in their old neighbourhood or in close proximity to it. It allows relocatees to stay near their old neighbours and preserve their local social networks. Most importantly, alternative property provision of newly built or refurbished properties (e.g. ‘Homeswap’) allows achieving relocation outcomes that are seen as positive by relocatees (see Chapter 7).

Contrary to the common perception, alternative property provision offers value for money to the acquiring authorities in several ways. First, it guarantees investing the state supplied statutory compensation and FAPs in the properties provided within the project. In case empty properties are refurbished (Homeswap) it guarantees secure owner occupation of empty properties and saves maintenance and policing costs otherwise needed to secure empty properties. In the case where a large segment of the neighbourhood is rebuilt, alternative property provision (new housing) guarantees first-time buyers (using FAPs). As pointed out in the Walker case, residents who express a wish to stay in the neighbourhood often create a good base for developing a sustainable community in their area because they are committed to it. Affordable properties that are now a compulsory part of most of developments can be successfully used for this purpose.

Most importantly, effective alternative property provision that combines community involvement can help reduce residents’ fear about the intervention, resistance towards redevelopment plans and acceptable relocation options for relocatees. Future policy designers should factor in alternative property provision for all tenures in plans proposing demolition and most importantly provide mechanisms that guarantee delivery of planned alternative properties.

**9.6.4.5 Resident support**

Future policy and redevelopment plans proposing housing demolition should provide resident support for relocation to all tenures. It is not sufficient to assume that residents affected by demolition are able to find an alternative property somewhere else with the statutory compensation.
In cases where residential relocation is induced by policy intervention, the planning authority should be obliged to provide resident support (either directly or by contracting another agency).

Resident support should guarantee engagement with potential relocatees from the moment demolition plans are approved to the moment residents are relocated and settled in their alternative property. In some cases support will be needed in order help residents through the settling process, especially in the case of vulnerable groups such as the elderly and BME population.

9.6.5 Residential relocation governance arrangements

Mixed tenure residential relocation in differentiated polity is delivered by a complex network of actors. Therefore, it is no longer sufficient to assume that the local authorities are able to steer relocation practice only because they have statutory powers to intervene in the built environment. To the contrary, local authorities are dependent on other actors, including the affected community to do so.

Future policy makers should take into account the practices of delegation and contracting out, and would benefit from an awareness of networking practices found to exist in mixed tenure residential relocation delivered by complex partnerships. In this context the accountability and responsibility for the residential relocation process and outcomes should be clearly defined. Future policy would benefit from considering ways to enforce delivery of agreed relocation aspects, especially related to alternative property provision.

This would enhance strategic intercalation between the actors and possibly manage the complex networks in order to achieve residential relocation outcomes acceptable to the residents, minimise development and relocation delays and avoid additional development costs.

9.7 Conclusion

Institutional fragmentation, multiplicity of agencies and complex webs of relationships, the breakdown of established networks, the disparity of powers and responsibilities across different tiers and departments, private, public and community sector bodies and confusion over ‘who does what’ are the reality of spatial governance (Albrechs & Balducci, 2009:66) but not only, as this study has showed they are present in residential relocation processes in a differentiated polity as well. These findings should not be taken lightly. They point to the need to craft different policy
solutions for residential relocation delivery and to develop a new line of research with the capacity to tackle the complexity of residential relocation process and outcomes in a differentiated polity.

In the 2000s demolition has forcefully re-emerged as an important strategy to renew decayed neighbourhoods in the UK as well as in the USA and Western Europe. The example of Housing Market Renewal in England presents a vital source of information about the way mixed-tenure relocation can be delivered in differentiated polity. The HMR Pathfinders developed their practice with very little central guidance, in response to the local drivers of change and local contexts. While it has taken some time for the new practices and new residential relocation processes to take root, in the last years of HMR implementation Pathfinders had advanced residential relocation practices in innovative ways.

This thesis provided a conceptual innovation to researching residential relocation. It argued for a procedural approach to residential relocation research, where the complex governance networks are seen as the context in which residential relocation processes are shaped. Having shown that residential relocation is delivered by complex networks of actors, rather than by structural shifts in the state or the market, the thesis argues that there is a need for more studies to test these results as well as further advancement of residential relocation studies through ideas about governance. The work of governance theoreticians such as Rhodes (1997) and Stoker (1997) in the UK, or Kickert et al. (1997) in the Netherlands could be of special significance.

Future policies could benefit from acknowledging the existence of residential relocation networks and exploring possibilities of their management in order to achieve residential relocation outcomes that are acceptable to relocated residents. Kooiman et al. (1993), in their book *Modern Governance*, point out the importance of ‘co-governance’, a new form of steering which they describe as ‘doing things together instead of doing them alone, either by ‘state’ or ‘market’ (1993:1). Further advancement and testing of the idea of ‘governance of relocation’ may be one step forward to ‘doing things together’ in relocation.

Given the dynamic complexity of the residential relocation process in the HMR framework, it is believed that the approach taken in this thesis has considerable potential both to reveal the contingency of residential relocation outcomes on governance processes in other contexts and to provide a basis for further development of process focused research on residential relocation.
Appendices

Appendix 1. Pathfinders’ Boards

Examples of the Pathfinder Board Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridging Newcastle Gateshead</th>
<th>Gateway Hull</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Board Members nominated by Gateshead Council</td>
<td>4 Board Members nominated by Hull City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Board Members nominated by Newcastle Council</td>
<td>4 Board Members nominated by East Riding of Yorkshire Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Board Members nominated by the Newcastle Local Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by Hull Local Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Board Members nominated by the Gateshead Local Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by East Riding of Yorkshire Local Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by Homes and Communities Agency (this replaces the Board Member representing English Partnerships)</td>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by the National Housing Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National:</strong></td>
<td><strong>National:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by One NorthEast</td>
<td>1 Board Member nominated by the Homes &amp; Communities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board Observers:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 person proposed by the Audit Commission</td>
<td>2 lead developer representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 person proposed by the Government Office North East</td>
<td>2 community sector representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 person proposed by the New Deal for Communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manchester Salford Pathfinder</th>
<th>Partners in Action Pathfinder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Board Members:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Board Members:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Vice-Chancellor of the University of Salford.</td>
<td>Chair - independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chair: Alliance and Leicester plc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE Countryside Properties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBLA Architects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Member for Neighbourhood Services, Manchester City Council.</td>
<td>3 Rochdale Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Member for Housing, Salford City Council.</td>
<td>3 Oldham Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Development Agency.</td>
<td>Rochdale Divisional Commander, Greater Manchester Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National:</strong></td>
<td>Rochdale Centre for Diversity and Rochdale Local Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homes and Communities Agency representative (to be appointed)</td>
<td>Great Places Housing Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-voting members:</strong></td>
<td><strong>National:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Office North West.</td>
<td>Homes &amp; Communities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from the Department for Communities and Local Government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Independent:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector, independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the Pathfinders Prospectuses and secondary data provided by the respondents in 2009.
### Appendix 2: List of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role/Position</th>
<th>Organisation &amp; Department</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mode of inquiry</th>
<th>Length Hour/Min/Sec.</th>
<th>Date dd.mm.yyyy</th>
<th>Recorded or notes</th>
<th>Location of inquiry</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Respondent code in the thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Director</td>
<td>Nevin Leather Associates LLP</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>(no permission to quote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Policy Manager</td>
<td>English Partnerships Corporate Strategy Division</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>(no permission to quote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Housing Market Renewal Team Manager</td>
<td>Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.08.01</td>
<td>08.05.2008</td>
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<td>CABE Offices 1, Kemble Street</td>
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<td>CABE-Respondent1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Director of Housing &amp; BNG Board, TV Board &amp; EEL Board Member</td>
<td>English Partnerships (Later HCA)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.10.00</td>
<td>19.05.2008</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>BNG Offices 1st Floor, Central Exchange Buildings, 128 Grainger Street</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
<td>NE1 5AF</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Head of HMR Division</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>London</td>
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<td>6. Research Manager (responsible for HMR reports)</td>
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<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>cca. 1 hour</td>
<td>12.03.2009</td>
<td>Notes (No permission to record)</td>
<td>NAO Offices 157-197 Buckingham Palace Road, Victoria</td>
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<td>Role/Position</td>
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<td>7.Head of HMR Team</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
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<td>8.Professor/Head of Research</td>
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<td>e-mail (documents)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>(no permission to quote)</td>
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<td>9.Head of Research And Strategy</td>
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<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>e-mail notes</td>
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<td>BNG Head of Research And Strategy</td>
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<td>e-mail</td>
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<td>e-mail notes</td>
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<td>CS-BNG Team4</td>
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<td>Face to Face Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>00.34.01</td>
<td>19.05.2008</td>
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<td>12.Head of Development</td>
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<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>00.56.19</td>
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<td>13.Area Programme Coordinator (East)</td>
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<td>CS-BNG Team3</td>
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<td>14.Team Leader Development (CPO)</td>
<td>Gateshead MBC, Property Services Previously NCC</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>00.51.04</td>
<td>19.05.2008</td>
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<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 5AF</td>
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<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview (documents)</td>
<td>00.52.02</td>
<td>19.05.2008</td>
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<td>YHN Offices YHN House, Benton Park Road</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE7 7LX</td>
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<td>Mode of inquiry</td>
<td>Length Hour/Min/Sec.</td>
<td>Date dd.mm.yyyy</td>
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<td>(R&amp;RT Team)</td>
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<td>by e-mail</td>
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<td>17. Investment Manager West Midlands</td>
<td>Housing Corporation</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview</td>
<td>01.18.34</td>
<td>14.05.2008</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>Beth Johnson Housing Association Three Counties House, Festival Way</td>
<td>Stoke on Trent ST1 5PX</td>
<td>PS-RNS Team1</td>
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<td>18. Head of Development (Midlands &amp; North)</td>
<td>Beth Johnson Housing Association</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>cca. 2 hours</td>
<td>03.07.2008</td>
<td>Recording lost due to computer crash, Notes used</td>
<td>RNS Offices Civic Centre Glebe Street</td>
<td>Stoke on Trent ST4 1RJ</td>
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<td>19. Programme Manager</td>
<td>Renew North Staffordshire Pathfinder</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
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<td>20. Policy and Strategy Officer</td>
<td>Stoke on Trent City Council Housing Enabling Team</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>00.31.34</td>
<td>16.01.2009</td>
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<td>PS-RNS Team2</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Housing Regeneration Coordinator</td>
<td>Hartlepool Borough Council (for Tees Valley Pathfinder)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
<td>cca.30 min.</td>
<td>19.01.2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Development Manager</td>
<td>Elevate East Lancashire Pathfinder</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview (documents by e-mail)</td>
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<td>Accrington, Lancashire EEL-Respondent S1-2</td>
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Pilot Study Pathfinder Level Inquiry

Survey Pathfinder Level Inquiry
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<tr>
<th>Role/Position</th>
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<th>Length Hour/Min/Sec.</th>
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<th>Recorded or notes</th>
<th>Location of inquiry</th>
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<tr>
<td>23. Area Initiatives Manager</td>
<td>Sandwell Council (for Urban Living Pathfinder)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>cca.30 min.</td>
<td>20.01.2009</td>
<td>Notes (No permission to record)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Sandwell</td>
<td>UL – Respondent S1-10</td>
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<td>24. Assistant Director for Housing</td>
<td>Manchester City Council (for Pathfinder)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>00.20.09 00.30.43</td>
<td>21.01.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>MSP – Respondent S1-4</td>
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<td>25. HMR Market Analyst (past relocation officer)</td>
<td>Oldham and Rochdale Pathfinder</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>00.43.29</td>
<td>06.03.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Oldham</td>
<td>PIA – Respondent S1-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Operations Director</td>
<td>Gateway Hull (Hull &amp; East Riding) Pathfinder</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>00.36.42</td>
<td>19.03.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>GW – Respondent S1-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Programme Manager</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council (for Transform South Yorkshire)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Feb. &amp; March 2009</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>28. Programme Manager</td>
<td>Newheartlands (Merseyside) Pathfinder</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>e-mail</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Feb. &amp; March 2009</td>
<td>e-mail notes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>NHL – Respondent S1-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Head of Development</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder (BNG Team)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview</td>
<td>01.28.04</td>
<td>25.11.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>BNG Offices 1st Floor, Central</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 5AF</td>
<td>CS-BNG Team2</td>
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**Survey Pathfinder Level Inquiry**

**In-depth Case Study Pathfinder (BNG) and Local Level Inquiry (Phase 1)**
<table>
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<th>Date dd.mm.yyyy</th>
<th>Recorded or notes</th>
<th>Location of inquiry</th>
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<tr>
<td>30. Area Programme Coordinator (East)</td>
<td>BNG Pathfinder (BNG Team)</td>
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<td>Exchange Buildings, 128 Grainger Street</td>
<td>CS-BNG Team3</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Area Programme Director (West End Newcastle)</td>
<td>(NCC) Area Based Regeneration (West End)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.10.29</td>
<td>25.11.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>West Newcastle Regeneration Centre, Old Library Armstrong Road</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE15 6AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Resettlement and Relocation Team Officer 1</td>
<td>YHN ALMO Resettlement and Relocation Team (R&amp;RT)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Group Interview</td>
<td>02.04.06</td>
<td>25.11.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>YHN Offices YHN House, Benton Park Road</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE7 7LX</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Resettlement and Relocation Team Officer 2</td>
<td>Places for People (RSL)</td>
<td>Public/Private</td>
<td>Face to Face interview</td>
<td>00.42.28</td>
<td>26.11.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>Places for People, 3rd Floor Maybrook House, Grainger Street</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 5JE</td>
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<td>34. Resettlement and Relocation Team Officer 3</td>
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<td>35. Projects Director (resigned as Area Director for East End Newcastle)</td>
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288
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<tr>
<td>36. Finance Director &amp; BNG Board Member</td>
<td>Taylor Wimpey North East (Private Developer)</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.53.22</td>
<td>26.11.2009</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>Taylor and Wimpey, North House, Wessington Way</td>
<td>Sunderland SR5 3RL</td>
<td>CS-BNG Board Taylor Wimpey</td>
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<td>37. Neighbourhood Officer/Manager</td>
<td>Gateshead MBC Neighbourhood Management Team</td>
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<td>Face to Face Group Interview</td>
<td>02.03.30</td>
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<td>Gateshead MBC Civic Centre Regent Street</td>
<td>Gateshead NE8 1HH</td>
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<td>38. Senior Planner</td>
<td>Gateshead MBC Development and Enterprise</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.12.44</td>
<td>26.11.2009</td>
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<td>Gateshead MBC (as above)</td>
<td>Gateshead NE8 1HH</td>
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<td>39. Senior Environmental Health Officer</td>
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<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE6 3UF</td>
<td>CS-Resident Walker 1</td>
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<td>40. Resident1/Residents Group Leader (Walker)</td>
<td>Cambrian Resident Group/ Walker Network</td>
<td>Community</td>
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<td>41. Resident2/Residents Group Leader (Walker)</td>
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<td>Community</td>
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<td>01.08.28</td>
<td>27.11.2009</td>
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<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU</td>
<td>CS-NCC-East Team 1</td>
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<td>Face to Face Group Interview</td>
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<td>Scotswood Neighbourhood Centre 221, Woodstock Rd,</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE15 6HE</td>
<td>CS-Resident Scotswood2</td>
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<td>45.Resident3/Community Activist (Scotswood)</td>
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<td>Date dd.mm.yyyy</td>
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<td>51. Resident/Leader (Scotswood)</td>
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<td>25.01.2010</td>
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<td>West Newcastle Regeneration Centre, Old Library Armstrong Rd.</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE15 6AU</td>
<td>CS-Residents Scotswood1 (Leader)</td>
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<td>52. Programme Manager/Team Leader Walker Riverside (Resigned)</td>
<td>(NCC) Area Based Regeneration (East End)</td>
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<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>01.35.38</td>
<td>26.01.2010</td>
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<td>Sunderland City Council Civic Centre Burdon Rd.</td>
<td>Sunderland SR2 7DN</td>
<td>CS-NCC East Team2</td>
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<td>53. Senior Area Project Officer (East End)</td>
<td>(NCC) Area Based Regeneration (East End)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Face to Face Interview</td>
<td>02.00.00</td>
<td>25.01.2010</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council Civic Centre</td>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8PD</td>
<td>CS-NCC East Team3</td>
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<td>54. Training Support Officer</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council</td>
<td>Public &amp; Community</td>
<td>Meeting Observation</td>
<td>02.00.00 10.00 a.m. to 12.00 a.m.</td>
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Appendix 3 Pathfinder Survey Questionnaire (phone / e-mail)

Questionnaire

Governance of Relocation
- Housing Market Renewal Demolition Areas -

Date: 12.01.2009
Form of communication (please choose the most convenient media)

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1) What is your role in the implementation of the Housing Market Renewal policy (specifically relating to resident relocation, distribution of financial assistance packages for relocation or development phasing)?

2) What are the main issues around relocation of residents (by tenure) in your Pathfinder? What are the major challenges?

3) How many demolitions a) have been planned, b) are in process, c) have been completed? Is the development influenced by the recent credit crunch?

Phasing:

1) Is your approach to phasing demolition/clearance, relocation and new building standardized or different across all projects (only projects that involve demolition) in your Pathfinder?

(please choose your column according to your answer to the previous question)

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<td>Does the approach to phasing differ on each local authority level or each individual project level? Please specify.</td>
<td>Is the approach to phasing standardized for the whole Pathfinder or on each local authority level?</td>
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<td>Why are different approaches to phasing taken?</td>
<td>Why was a standardized approach chosen?</td>
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<td>What are the main differences between (local authorities/projects) within the Pathfinder?</td>
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<td>What are the main factors (problems/goals/pressures?) used in making decisions about phasing?</td>
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2) Who (organizations and their departments) is responsible for building a strategy for development phasing?

Relocation:
1) Is the approach to resident relocation and matching residents with alternative properties standardized across tenures (council, RSL, private rent, owners)?

(please choose your column according to your answer to the previous question)

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<td>Please explain how does the approach differ for each tenure group?</td>
<td>If yes, why was a standardized approach taken?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What were the main factors used in making decisions about the relocation of residents? (How did these relocation decisions relate to tenure categories?)</td>
<td>What were the main factors used in making decisions about the relocation of residents?</td>
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</table>

2) Who (organizations and their departments) is responsible for building a strategy for relocation (please specify for each tenure group)?
3) Who (organizations and their departments) is responsible for informing the residents about the housing options (please specify for each tenure group)?
4) To what extent is the community (all tenures) involved in the process and at what stages? Do you have some recommendations regarding that?
5) What is the role of the community and its power? Politicians or Community who influences the outcomes more?

Financial assistance packages for resident relocation:
1) Briefly outline the main financial assistance packages (FAPs) available for relocation of each tenure group (or send a Pathfinder document if available)
2) Is the availability of financial assistance packages (FAPs) for relocation equal across the local authorities?
3) How is eligibility for FAPs determined for each tenure? (or send a Pathfinder document if available)
4) Who (organizations and their departments) is responsible for making decisions about eligibility and FAPs allocation process?
5) Is there a link between financial assistance packages allocation and approach to phasing of demolition projects? Please elaborate.
6) Are the issues around relocation and FAPs allocation included in the community engagement process?

Please send any policy documents relating to phasing demolition and new building, relocation and allocation and eligibility for FAPs.

Thank you very much for your professional insights and contribution to this research. Please note if you are interested in receiving a final report of this study.

Best Wishes,

Orna Rosenfeld
Appendix 4 In-depth Case Study Interview Schedule and Questions

Meeting: BNG Pathfinder Team

(Name 1 Deleted see Ethics Section)

(Name 2 Deleted see Ethics Section)

Meeting details:
Date & Time: 25.11.2009 at 11.00 till 12.30 (next Your Homes Newcastle).
Address: 1st Floor, Central Exchange Buildings, 128 Grainger Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 5AF

AIM: This research aims to examine governance processes shaping residential relocation and their impact on residents in Housing Market Renewal areas, using a case study of Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder.

1) What are the main issues that the Pathfinder is facing nowadays especially regarding projects that involve demolition and relocation?
2) At the beginning I would like to ask you what are the developments in the projects in the BNG where the demolition is planned / carried out / completed demolition and relocation.
3) How many homes have been demolished? How many residents have been relocated?
4) What is the starting and ending date of each project?
5) What is the length of each project?
6) When are the residents usually informed about demolition? How long before the actual demolition/relocation?
7) What is the average process length in each project?
8) Why does it vary?

BNG Pathfinder has 13 separate neighbourhoods that are under HMR intervention (see Figure 3). This research focuses on eight among them where demolition and relocation of residents has been executed, is in process or planned.

BNG demolition areas are:

5) Pathfinder Priority Areas:
   - Scottswood (800 demolished – 1400 planed),
   - Walker (Newcasttle) (299 demolished – map)
   - Bensham (Gateshead) (440 for demolition planned/done?). These areas are at the same time the ones where the clearance has been the highest.

6) Other strategic and mixed demolitions:
   - Ouseburn (Newcastle) (strategic demolition?)
- Taeams (Gateshead) (93 acquisitions, planned for demolition?)

7) **Private Housing Stock Clearance:**
- Felling (Sunderland Road and Brandeling) (Gateshead) (400 for demolition planned/done?)

8) **City Council Stock Clearance:**
- Cowgate (50 council flats demolished), Blakelaw, Kenton (Newcastle) (what is going on here?)

**Figure 3. Bridging Newcastle Gateshead Pathfinder intervention areas**


**OBJECTIVE 1:** To determine the processes shaping residential relocation and the strategies adopted by delivery agencies.

1) What are the main issues the projects in BNG face in the new economic climate? What are the main issues that you face relating to residential relocation?
2) What do you mean when you say residential relocation? What processes do you think about? Is that something you feel is partially your responsibility? Something that you have to take into account? What does residential relocation entail, in your Pathfinder? What processes does it consist of?
3) What are the processes commonly associated with residential relocation?
4) What is the main guidance for relocation? What do you base the strategy for relocation on?
5) To what extent is residential relocation included in planning of the urban regeneration process? How do you relate to that issue when planning your strategies?
6) Is the residential relocation considered an integral part of urban regeneration? If yes, why? If no, why? What about the delays and the financial losses because of delays or opportunistic behaviour of residents?
7) Show figure 4. Are there any other processes that shape the outcomes of residential relocation to your knowledge?
8) Who are the actors involved in each intersection?
9) Please relate these processes and actors to the mapped network: governance of relocation (Figure 5).
10) Is there a written guidance on National; Pathfinder; Local Authority; Project level? (use the Matrix to systematise the information). Which one of these processes and actors have a written policy/guidance about residential relocation? Who among the delivery bodies has a relocation policy?
11) Who do the existing strategies for relocation involve?
12) What are the unwritten guidelines and rules (like priority to the residents from the demolished areas and the distance)?
13) Are there any standards that need to be meet in relocation in terms of process length, quality of housing, location, other categories?
14) What is the influence of the tenure mix on this?

| Figure 4. Processes involved in residential relocation |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| **Name:**                                | **Description:**                                 |
| Area Development Phasing                 | Area Development Phasing: includes master planning and phasing development of each area within the project in terms of timelines for clearance, demolition, relocation and new building. |
| Community Consultation                   | Community consultation: entails engagement of the residents in various stages of the project development. |
| Financial Assistance Allocation          | Financial Assistance Allocation: is distribution of the financial assistance packages to the affected residents across tenures. |
| Alternative Housing Provision            | Alternative housing provision: is a process of building and/or refurbishing properties that will serve as alternatives to demolished ones. |
| Matching residents with alternative properties | Matching residents with alternative properties: involves guiding demolition affected residents (owner occupiers, private tenants, RSL and council tenants) through the process of search for the alternative property. |

Based on axial coding of Pilot Study data

**OBJECTIVE 2:** To determine and evaluate governance arrangements within HMR with special regards to residential relocation.

1) Show the map of governance of relocation, ask for the comments based on the answers related to the residential relocation processes.
2) Please fix the graph according to each project (Walker, Scotswood). Are there different/additional players involved?
3) Please explain relations between these actors for each project.
4) How are the relations defined based on what? In the case of the main policy goals the governance structures are put in place in order to deliver a certain goal. What is the case with residential relocation that is not a main policy goal?
5) Why is there a difference in the number and type of the actors involved? What are the main reasons for that difference?
6) Why do the governance arrangements change on the Pathfinder level and project level? How does that influence the project?
7) How does the frequent change of personnel influence delivery of the project and residential relocation? (delays, costs, outcomes for the residents)?
8) What is the core group of actors? What are the actors that usually change? What is the task of the core team/changing actors?
9) Are there governance arrangements directly made to deliver residential relocation? If yes what are they?
10) Who is held accountable for residential relocation outcomes, and by whom? What are the standards if any?
11) What is the manner in which these teams work together (from your perspective)? Who do you usually work with?
12) What are the links with residents? A) direct consultation? B) contact because they need to be informed about the options? How many residents are involved in each case? What are they usually consulted about? Who are the representatives, and what %?

**Figure 5. Bringing Newcastle Pathfinder Relocation Governance Structure**

- **Neighborhood Management**
- **Development & Enterprise**
- **FAPs Allocation Service**
- **Property Services**
- **CPO Agreement Team**
- **Planning & Environmental Service**
- **Planning Contractors**
- **Area Coordinator**
- **Walker R. Team**
- **Scottswood Team**
- **Regeneration & Environment Directorate**
- **City Council Property Services**
- **ALMO**
- **Newcastle City Council**
- **Gateshead Council**

*Designed based on pilot study and secondary data analysis.*
*All – refers to all tenure groups within a community affected by relocation; Owners – refers only to owner occupiers*
OBJECTIVE 3: To understand how decisions that influence relocation processes are made and their impact in terms of re-housing and relocation of the existing residents.

13) What is the manner in which these actors are connected and work with each other in different relocation processes?
14) How are the decisions being made? Who makes the decisions? What decisions are made – relating to which process? (use the Figure 4 and 5).
15) Who has the most influence in decision making process about residential relocation? Is this a subject of debates among these bodies at all?
16) Who makes the decisions about overall strategy of residential relocation? What process is that decision usually related to?
17) What are the main reasons different approaches to relocation have been taken in different projects?
18) How are the decisions relating to residential relocation being made on the: national (approval for demolition comes from the secretary of the state), Pathfinder, Council (approval of the master plan); Project (Walker, Scotswood), Household level?
19) Who has the most influence in each these?
20) What information is the one that shapes the decisions the most? (Community pressures, Financial Constraints, Election Interests, Technical Constraints, Other?).
21) What are the pressures, opportunities and constraints that most influence the decision making process.
22) How does the decision making process work considering that there is: a) no consensus as to what residential relocation is; b) there is no set goal apart from HMR; c) RR doesn’t have a defined network.
23) What is the manner of the decision making process? Are there cases of conflict and/or bargaining (who with whom?)
24) How does the power manifest in these networks and how does it travel? Who has the power?
25) Who wins and who loses? By which mechanisms of power? How can be these mechanisms be changed? Assumption: if there is no clear goal, and clearly defined governance system in the way the actors can interact with each other, power exertion, conflict and bargaining is more possible.

Changeability:

1) When were the rules/guidelines/standards for relocation set considering the HMR policy design and implementation in BNG?
2) When were the actors delivering relocation appointed? When were specific tasks/processes defined?

Interview closing:

Are there any additional comments you would like to make?

Thank you very much for your help.

Questions related to the respondents’ background (names deleted)
Has the CPO process been introduced in Newcastle since my last visit? In which areas has it been introduced?

How did that change (if at all) the practice of residential relocation?

Can you give me the areas where the residents from each area relocated (use the map). So I can visit them – the areas.

Are the delays in the projects caused by residential relocation accounted for? Is this something that the phasing of the projects is dealing with? Or the practitioners usually for the site to be cleared?

DO you delay the demolition because of the waiting lists? How does that influence plans and delivery? What are the alternatives?

How to recognise the genuine refusal to move and game play to get better price or home? How if at all are these costs accounted for?

Are the plans adjusted around the residents that do not want to move? If not why?

Tied into spending money on housing related activities. What aspects of relocation are counted into that (FAPs, alternative property discount, demolition, new building).

Focus: Scotswood, Walker, Bensham & Saltwell. What changed since then? Did the acquisition in any other area begin? Were residents informed about the plans in any other area planned for demolition?

Ask for the Area Action Plans that cover the demolition areas. (p. 3 of the interview). The secretary of the state approves the plan (which plan). Are residential relocation and expenses included in that revision? What are the criteria for the approval regarding residential relocation? What evidence is needed?

What are the governance arrangements in Scotswood (limited liability partnership that included English Partnership among other actors) and how do they differ from Walker or the situation in Gateshead? What are the main reasons they differ?

How does this influence the approaches to residential relocation if at all?

Are the developers waiting for the sites to be cleared or they are involved in the process and relocation?

Why is Walker different?

The tenders for these large sites are done though European Procurement Process. Is there any clause that relates to relocation – and the ways it is delivered if these things are done locally. Are sites given to this process only after they are cleared?

Are the costs related to residential relocation in terms of delays, legal costs (CPO), housing price raise, bargaining price (higher for those who wait), accounted for in the development process? Are these accounted for in any way? Are you aware of the differences for the project itself? Can you compare different projects in BNG?

What are the solutions according to your opinion? What are the good examples? What are the solutions: smaller sites; master developers?
8) You mentioned that in Walker there was an involvement with the master developer so that the issues have been resolved more efficiently.

9) Are there new buildings in Scotswood since the Oct 2008 now the developers have been appointed? Which ones?

Interviewees Background and details:

(Name Deleted see Ethics Section) leads on strategic development issues for BNG and contributes towards project appraisal delivery. He leads on the setting up of developer panels and design quality for BNG.

E-mail: (Deleted see Ethics Section)
Tel: (Deleted see Ethics Section)

(Name Deleted see Ethics Section) is involved in developing and coordinating the Bridging Newcastle Gateshead schemes in the West End of Newcastle, and he appraises schemes which request funding in the East and North of Newcastle. He also responds to planning issues which may affect BNG, and he produces maps to assist with strategy or project development.

E-mail: (Deleted see Ethics Section)
Tel: (Deleted see Ethics Section)

Map and Directions:

Address: 1st Floor, Central Exchange Buildings, 128 Grainger Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 5AF
Appendix 5 Secondary Data Sources

BNG Board Meeting Minutes and Annual Reports

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<td><a href="http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/housing_market_renewal">http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/housing_market_renewal</a></td>
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<td>Hull City Council</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hullcc.gov.uk">www.hullcc.gov.uk</a></td>
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<td>Keepmoat</td>
<td><a href="http://www.keepmoathomes.co.uk/news/designs-on-scotswood/">http://www.keepmoathomes.co.uk/news/designs-on-scotswood/</a></td>
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<td>Newcastle City Council</td>
<td><a href="http://www.newcastle.gov.uk">www.newcastle.gov.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>No To Demolition In Saltwell and Bensham</td>
<td><a href="http://www1.sbresidents.org/">http://www1.sbresidents.org/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partners in Action Oldham &amp; Rochdale</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oldhamrochdalehmrr.co.uk/">http://www.oldhamrochdalehmrr.co.uk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Renew North Staffordshire</td>
<td><a href="http://www.renewnorthstaffs.gov.uk">http://www.renewnorthstaffs.gov.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Your Choice Homes</td>
<td><a href="http://www.yourchoicehomes.org">www.yourchoicehomes.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Your Homes Newcastle</td>
<td><a href="http://www.yhn.org.uk">www.yhn.org.uk</a></td>
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304
Video

YouTube - Bootle's Klondyke estate demolition starts, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Z2SWwzeZTw&feature=related
YouTube - Housing Market Renewal http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=housing+market+related&aq=f
YouTube - Regeneration Game - Nigel Pivaro - Part One, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ernghhU_uAg&feature=related
YouTube - Regeneration Game- Nigel Pivaro-Part Two, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iVyAxZxFyss&feature=related
YouTube - Rotherham Housing Market Renewal, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx7fxrv9FZc
YouTube - salford slums- langworthy road, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdPoB71rNP8&feature=related
YouTube - spirit of the streets, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkpdjdhYks
YouTube - The Regeneration Game, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gbjQinNbQ&feature=related
YouTube - Where the Streets Have No Name, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0olQRaIR-pM&feature=related

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333


The Author’s Publications and Conference Papers

Awards:

- PhD research awarded Honourable Mention for innovation and selected to present Westminster University at University Graduate School Launch by vice-chancellor, Professor Geoffrey Petts, June 2012, London, UK.
- AESOP Association of European Schools of Planning and Journal of Town Planning Review joint award for best PhD contribution 2009 at AESOP Congress, July 2009 in Liverpool, UK.

Publications:


Selected Conference Papers:


(Continued)


