Borders in Post-socialist Europe: Territory, Scale, Society

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This book has taken much longer to write than was originally envisaged, and it has not been an easy project, changing considerably in format and contents since its first design. It started off as a conference-inspired project involving the author and two co-authors. The idea was to bring together different insights gained by the three authors from their work on borders and ‘transition’ in post-communist eastern Europe. Russian borders had attracted particular attention, as they experienced particularly far-reaching processes of re-bordering under the impression of the considerable geo-political and geo-economic changes that had swept across eastern Europe since the end of the communist regimes. Yet, interests changed and the book turned into a single author project with a stronger political-economic, rather than cultural-historical perspective as had initially been envisaged. Nevertheless, the main focus remained on the differentiating effect of a growing influence and impact of the European Union on eastern Europe. This included in particular the EU’s concept and practice of integration, and the effect that has had on national borders within and immediately outside its territory as it shifted eastwards to the edge of the territory of the former Soviet Union. This process changed fundamentally, and was intended and employed to do so, and created a new sense of positioning and belonging between the two poles of ‘Moscow’ and ‘Brussels’. Much of this ‘rejoining of Europe’, as it was termed and propagated across eastern Europe, was intended as a highly symbolic act of mowing away from the Soviet, that is de facto Russian, embrace of the post-War nearly half century, and signal a new, or, as it has been
portrayed and understood, restored, connectivity with western Europe. And that has stood as proxy for ‘the West’ in general, and ‘America’, in particular. In return, as a consequence of the nature of the European Union’s internal integration process, separateness from the outside became stronger, thus producing, and clearly signifying, new divisions emerging in Europe. The most prominent among those is the European Union’s external border which now coincides with the western border of the former Soviet Union. Because of its fortress-like nature, it is also dubbed as the ‘new Iron Curtain’. This name is also to evoke the old contrast between western (U.S.) and eastern (Soviet) blocs, especially in the light of today’s reference to ‘spheres of influence’ along that border, especially from a more assertive Russia.

These changes in ‘borderness’ as the product of quality and effect of borders, and their implementation ‘on the ground’, have become particular obvious in the Baltic States. There, the clear objective has been to redefine the border with Russia as ‘EU external’ as an affirmation of their leaving the Soviet Union and joining (western) ‘Europe’. And while joining the European Union may be viewed by some as a loss of hard won sovereignty, it also signals a westernisation and new connectivity and belonging, breaking with the period of involuntary Soviet embrace. Inevitably, these wider geo-political shifts in their meanings and realities ‘on the ground’ have had considerable effects along the new EU external border, felt most where they occur in a highly localised environment, such as urban areas separated by the new border quality. Yet these changes, especially in the Baltic States, also created loss visible, yet equally felt, divisions and thus inclusions and exclusions between different parts of society - in particular those representing the Soviet - and that is de facto Russian -
‘occupation’, as it is felt. All this is an integral part to the continuing process of post-communist transition, despite the seeming conclusion by some commentators that, after some 20 years of the end of the communist regimes and, instead, a formal inclusion into the (western-shaped) European Union. But there is a clear difference between formal processes and their institutionalisation, practices ‘on the ground’ and political discourses on the one hand, and, on the other, ways of doing things in day-to-day-living. It is for this reason that engagement with post-communist ‘transition’ remains interesting and relevant, especially in relation to spatial implications, and that includes borders.

The book is divided into eight chapters, with the first three providing the conceptual context and the framework for the comparative case study analysis. This focuses primarily on north-eastern Europe, especially the Baltic Sea Area, and examples from the German-Polish-Czech borders. These are presented to illustrate the changing nature of bordering as the European Union expanded eastwards. The first chapter introduces the concept of a duality of borders as demarcation lines of territories, thus actively shaping spaces, while, at the same time, also being the product of created spatialities, as they result from implicit separations between relational spaces. And these are defined by network-based connectivities between actors, be they places, institutions or individuals. Chapter 2 outlines the concept of post-communist ‘transition’ in eastern Europe in its dynamic geo-political, societal and economic implications, disrupting existing, and creating new, networks of political and economic relationships and connectivities. These benefit some and disadvantage other who find that they are not part of these emerging new networks. Accordingly,
existing borders, whether real or ‘virtual’, may be reduced in their bordering effect, even become invisible, while new dividing lines may be emerging elsewhere between those who are part of a network and those who are not. And this de-bordering and re-bordering effect reaches across spatial scales, international (European Union) to the local level. In some instances, such as towns or cities which straddle an international border, they may overlap, or overlay in a nested arrangement, which is affecting senses of belonging and connectivity.

Chapter 3 introduces the concept of multi-layered bordering as a synthesis of notions of vertical layering, perhaps also envisaged as ‘thickness’, of different spatial scales, such as in multi-level governance, and the more socially-oriented border studies. This leads on to the analytical framework, spanning the case studies, which argues for ‘bordering’ to be the more or less locally focused (i.e. localised) intersection between layers of spatial-administrative border-lines, and different qualities of borders as a combination of imagined and ‘real’ border qualities. And these include their shaping of identities and senses of belonging and separateness. In the latter case, borders are thus inherently more or less distinct - or fuzzy, when taking the opposite view. This fuzziness projects borders more as a border area, even frontier, whether real or ‘virtual’, that is experienced ‘on the ground’ as growing peripherality and/or marginality, or imagined. And depending on the degree of localisation, for instance urban areas dissected by layers of different scales of borders, as against peripheral, sparsely populated border regions, the relevance - actual and/or perceived, will vary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined virtual’.
Chapter four examines the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) as an illustration of multi-level and ‘composite’ borderness, as it illustrates the intersection and overlaying of real and imagined borders and associated ‘real’ territories, and imagined or portrayed ‘virtual’ spaces. The BSR thus provides a fascinating example of the combination of multi-level bordering of differing scales, and composite borderness as combination of the ‘real’ and ‘imagined’. The result is a plethora of different types, meanings, purposes and scales of borders, with some of statutory-legal consequences and others little more than programmatic representations in documents and on websites. The subsequent two chapters, five and six, zoom in on more specific examples of bordering and borderness within the BSR - the particular case of the Russian enclave of the Kaliningrad region, now surrounded by an outer border of the European Union with its reinforced protecting role for ‘fortress Europe’. This unique geo-political situation combines, or, that is, overlays, local and international dimensions of bordering, and the nature of borders as imagined and projected lines of separateness and difference. And this may be intended as a defensive strategy to affirm territorial ownership and relationships, and respond to historic legacies as the defining basis of ‘belonging’.

The second case of multi-level bordering and composite borderness within the BSR as example, in Chapter 6, also looks at the localised effect of a newly established EU outer border. The example of the city of Narva, located on the border between Estonia and Russia, brings together several types of bordering: the one constructed for political purposes, here, primarily, the affirmation of Estonia’s Europeanness and, the other, the internal divisions within Estonian society between ethnic Estonians and
the large groups of ethnic Russians, who migrated there during the Soviet period. In addition, there are layers of economic divisions associated with peripherality and "edgeness". The situation is thus complex, and makes policies aimed at alleviating the separating effect of such "composite borders" difficult and slow in showing the desired effects of establishing connectivity. Such attempts are more promising along borders with less complexity and, instead, a greater extent of shared political objectives and imaginations. The examples from the Polish-German and Czech-German borders, discussed in Chapter 7, illustrate the impact of shifting border qualities through reduced "thickness" in political-administrative terms, achieved as part of the EU integration process. And this includes such targeted specific policies as the Euroregion initiative. The de-layering of bordering, that is an effective reduction in "border thickness" in its political dimension, permitted opportunities for the development of networks and inter-actor relationships across the border. And this, again, produced a growing sense of mutual understanding and also trust. The degree of localisation played a role in this, as it affected the interest among local actors in creating cross-border links as a mutually beneficial project. Where such mutual interest, or expected likely benefit, is weaker, such as in more peripheral, less densely populated and more disconnected areas, collaborative links seemed slower in developing.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions - Towards composite multi-level borderness in Europe

Borders possess many different meanings and functions, even in a presumed ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1994; Yeung 1993). Much of this has to do with their presence in public discourse and, for those directly affected by them, as part of daily lives. There, they are part of an imagination and of values and characteristics associated with them, as well as distinct realities showing limits of claims to territorial ownership and control. Borders, as argued in this book, thus appear in varying disguises and degrees of visibility:

(1) as mere administrative boundaries, such as between municipalities, where they may be no more recognisable than, for instance, in signpostings or suddenly changing qualities of road surfaces; or

(2) as physically dominant and forbidding international borders, where fortifications impose a clear barrier function. And both scenarios have been illustrated by case studies.

The degree of permeability thus differs tremendously, working through variations in ‘mesh sizes’ (Krämer, 1999) to achieve a selective transparency. And the ability to impose a selection is an expression of power and territorial control and claim to ownership. As such, borders signify difference and, depending on their intended purpose and ‘message’, separateness or connectivity, as in building bridges. It is in
this respect that, in a European context, borders have taken on a central role both in
daily realities ‘on the ground’ and as rather more symbolic signifiers of either division
or integration. And nature and working of the European Union’s border policies mean
that both scenarios are concurrent - separateness reinforced on the one hand, while
reducing visibility and effect of borders, on the other. Borders thus as magnifying
glasses as well as indicators and instruments of identifying and developing
difference, identities and senses of belonging across all scales - local to European.
And in post-communist Eastern Europe, twenty years of continuing processes of
change have also meant changing notions and functions of borders and bordering -
marked by shifting public discourses. These have stretched between nationalism
and Europeanisation, between emphasising borders as markers of the spatial reach
of powers and belonging, and facilitators or encouragement to reach out and
collaborate with those ‘on the other side’.

The contradiction inherent to the re-bordering processes following the geo-political
changes in eastern Europe after the end of the Iron Curtain, has become particularly
evident in the process of Europeanisation with variations in bordering effects
between inside and outside. And those may emphasise more border (newly
bordering), or less (de-bordering). Much of this complexity is immediately associated
with the ambitions among eastern European countries early on to join the European
Union and following its integrational policies. As a result, borders underwent
considerable changes, gaining or losing in their separating, that is bordering, effect.
This process, however, follows two tacks; on the one hand, there is a continuing
attempt at reducing visibility and separating effect of borders as a central plank of the
European Union’s programmatic essence: promoting ever closer union and
togetherness. By the same token, on the outside, the defensive barrier effect is increased and reinforced.

In eastern Europe, over the last 20 years, borders have thus seen the furthest reaching changes in their nature and effect, going from the hermetic separation of a fortress-like Iron Curtain, to the de facto abolition of borders under the Schengen agreement. Togetherness and a notion of integration have thus, so the expectation, replaced division and separateness as dominant paradigms and experienced reality. The adoption of the Euro as common currency in a growing number of eastern European countries further adds to the appearance of a common space, seemingly substituting difference. Yet, the picture is not quite as simple. In some cases, borders have in fact become more divisive. Examples of this include the border between the newly independent Baltic States and their former fellow Soviet Socialist Republics, especially the dominant Russia. As of 1992, this border was transformed into a major political and programmatic dividing line not just in political terms, but also as marker and line of reference for the making and projecting of identities and belonging in a European context - that is the notion of European-ness. It is this seemingly contradictory process of increased - while also decreased - bordering as the process-defined dimension of borders (see Newman, 2006), which may involve both actual and perceived changes from ‘open’ to all but ‘closed’, that make eastern Europe such an interesting study area for the nature and effect of borders as both creators of territoriality and perceived and practised spatial relationships, while also outcome of such very relationships and processes.

There is thus a distinction between borders as the physical phenomenon per se, that
is the more or less visible appearance as the edge of a territory, and the effect such a projected ‘edgeness’ has on spatial functional relationships and communicative networks across such a dividing line. And this effect varies with the distance and thus immediacy of the presence of a border. Its bordering effect may be seen as a shadow cast either side as a sign of a border’s ‘reach’, varying in width and intensity with the literal height of a border, that is its actual and perceived barrier effect. Accordingly, lowering that height should, so the EU’s integrational agenda, be expected to reduce a border’s impact. There is thus as clear distinction between both the physicality and perception of a border, that is its geo-political nature as a demarcation line between different political-administrative entities, and its societal-experiential effect on people and their spatial relationships. And both together produce the bordering effect (Newman 2006). Borders are thus both product and shapers of bordering processes and effects, that is ‘borderness’.

The composite nature of borderness, consisting of borders as active, spatially-defining phenomena, as well as passive features created out of the projection and manifestation of space through geo-political agendas and people’s individual and collective imaginations, finds reflection in two main theoretical strands: Border studies, focusing in particular on the social dimension of borderness as it shapes, and is shaped by, imaginations of spatial belonging, ‘ownership’ and relationship. Ansi Paasi’s work (2003, ), for instance, belongs into this category of ‘border studies’, as well as Newman’s (2006) arguments about borders as outcomes of processes, rather than fixities, or Donnan and Wilson’s (1999) emphasis on the interaction between the role of the state, ethnicity, symbolism and identity in forming attitudes and responses towards borders, and, as a response to that, ‘relational
sovereignty’ as variable outcome of constantly negotiated social processes vis-a-vis
globalisation (Stacy, 2003). By contrast, borders are viewed as static, fixed and, in
their quality, rather uniform phenomena, signifying statehood and the nation state in
its sovereignty and territorial manifestation, which, again, set the basis for
international relations (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Starr and Most, 1976). There, cross-
border communication is less a result of personal movements and linkages, than
formal, negotiated agreements between state machineries about implementing, and
maintaining, a ‘border line’ as the edge of claimed territorial control and ownership,
although there are signs of looking beyond a state-institutional and legal
understanding. For instance, Albert et al (2001) observe “shift from boundaries that
are heavily protected and militarized to those that are more porous, permitting
cross-border social and economic interaction” (p 36). Depending on the degree of
permeability, this view of borders as protective defence lines of territories of power
and control suggests variable, ‘perforated’ sovereignty (Duchacek, 1992) as a result,
Here, borders act as selective gates between neighbouring territories, ‘filtering’ flows
of communication, in response to political agendas or economic rationale (Dunning,
2003). And these provide the conditions for the development of policy networks,
economic exchanges or, as selective, targeted information and ‘get-to-know-each-
other’ projects, cross-border community contacts. The example of Kaliningrad region
illustrated the variable porousness of borders. This is in response to national and
international politics as translated and imposed by the Russian government Moscow,
driven by its concerns about affirming territorial ownership both geo-politically and,
as ‘territorial socialisation’ (Duchaceck, 1992), identity.

This book has sought to bring together the two, largely separate strands of ‘border
debates’ (see Johnson, 2009) - political-administrative, with its scalar dimension, and social-relational, with its varying degree of imagination versus ‘realness’. This is, because borders inherently combine both: variably scaled territoriality and more or less imagined spatiality. While the former reaches from sub-local to the international dimension as the endpoints of a vertical scalar ‘structuration’, as Brenner (2001) argues, thus implying fixed territories with equally fixed and clearly defined, recognised and recognisable borders, the latter refers to the almost opposite characteristics: ‘fuzzy’, imagined, changeable borders, such as the EU’s near abroad (Christiansen et al, 2000), which are, by their nature, difficult to identify and locate. They relate to virtual spaces, imagined and projected, and thus, by implication, are also themselves virtual and imagined. Yet, both dimensions are part of the same phenomenon, that is the change from one kind of spatiality, to another, be that change clearly marked or gradual. The result is thus a combination, indeed, concurrence, of a scalar tiering of borders as part of vertically nested territoriality, and of the different nature of borders as, on the one hand, space-shaping edges around territories and, on the other, relationally space-defined *de facto* limitations, such as through social actor networks. Borders are thus a composite phenomenon, consisting of a layering of different scales of spatial reach, with the ‘layers’ showing a combination of imagined and ‘real’ (political-administrative) characteristics. And this layering varies between places, and over time, and differs in its visibility and effectiveness with the degree of localisation, and over time.

The examples presented in this book illustrate the composite, layered nature of borders, as they produce place and time-specific expressions. These are stronger in their bordering effect, that is their visibility and impact on people’s daily lives and
perceptions of being bordered, when confronted in specific localities, such as in the border cities of Narva or Frankfurt/Oder. There, borderness provides a more ‘concentrated’, focused picture, than when viewed against a spatially broader, that is, effectively, diffuser, regional or even national perspective. The case of Narva showed the localised intersection of two layers of bordering: Firstly, the internal divisions in Estonian society along ethnic-historical lines both in an imagined and physically manifested nature, as evidenced in the all but disappeared pre-Soviet structures, leaving large empty spaces, and their substitution by Soviet era housing blocks accommodating an equally Soviet era population with its continued strong identification with the nation and culture across the border. Secondly, there is the layer of geo-political borders coinciding in Narva: European, bi-lateral national, and local administrative. Combining the two ‘stacks’ of borders results in a mosaic of combinations between the two - that is the imagined social and ‘real’ physical-political, And these combinations may change over time and be ‘occupied’ by different actors.

From a localised perspective, border divisions are much more confrontational, as they are abrupt and contradicting the physical togetherness of urban areas: the international border regime becomes immediately visible in its physical presence and bordering effect on people as well as constructed response by them. Depending on the actual border regime, international borders in such localised manifestations may appear rather abrupt, disruptive and confrontational. In more rural, less localised border conditions, especially in less accessible areas, international borders tend to be less immediate, as they follow peripheral, nationally marginal territories. The difference became evident among the example of Euroregions: those focusing on an
urban centre divided by a national border, such as between Germany and Poland. This border, show a much greater presence and awareness of the immediate, localised coincidence of different types of borderness. And this is more likely to produce responses within and outside the political sphere. Effectively, there is a localisation of the layered, composite border characteristics, leading to locally specific answers to the other dimensions (scale and ‘realness’) of the border as well. By contrast, a lesser degree of localisation seems to lead to an equally less specific policy response, with less symbolic and (project) specific answers.

This book’s approach has thus sought to bring together two key concepts of borders, and examine them under the conditions of fundamental political-economic paradigmatic and de facto change: the concept of ‘new regionalism’ with its recognition of virtual (‘soft’) spatiality and borderness, instead of, and in addition to, conventional administratively shaped territoriality, and the concept of ‘multi-levelness’, that is tiered spatial-administrative structures (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Marks and Hooghes, 2004). This, of course, draws on the main arguments of the ‘scale debate’, as has been shaped over the last years by Neil Brenner (1998, 2000, 2001, 2004). On the one hand, this has meant to respond to a criticism by Johnson (2009) that much of the debate around scale and new regionalism, including the author’s work, has failed to fully engage with, and extend the theoretical concepts around regions, to embrace borders. This would mean to understand borders not as ‘on the outside’ of a territory, as a separate, external circumference, but rather an integral part of it. Of course, borders retain something special, as they mark the end - and the beginning - of a territory, and thus may sit at the meeting points of difference. This, of course, provides good opportunities for comparative studies and
analyses of variations in territorialisation and governance. On the other hand, this draws on actor-network-informed conceptualisation of relational spatiality, as advocated by Doreen Massey (2004). In particular, this refers to some recent work by the author of this book on the marginalising effects of network-based policy making and the associated spatiality of inclusion and exclusion (Herrschel, 2009). Borders follow differences in connectivity, so that some actors may find themselves excluded as a result of connectivities sought elsewhere. There thus seems somewhat of a conceptual contradiction - or mismatch’ - between the notion of ‘structuration’, as suggested by Neil Brenner (2001), based on the vertical organisation of governance, and the rather ‘unstructured’, seemingly ‘chaotic’ (Deas and Lord, 2006) reality of regionalisation found ‘on the ground’. The analysis started off from the premiss that there are essentially two main variables shaping nature and effect of borders. And this composite characteristic has been referred to here as ‘borderness’ (Bufon, 2003 ) as expression of a particular, reciprocal spatial relationship (which also includes ‘adjacency’). This reflects the varying nature of borders between ‘new’ and ‘old’ regionalism, that is ‘soft’ and ‘virtual’ versus ‘hard’ and ‘real’. The other axis depicts the scale, that is local to international, with each level reflecting particular attributes, such as legacies and engagement with the EU. The resulting combinations offer ‘typologies’ consisting of expressions of ‘scalar reach’ - vertically as part of multi-level governance, reaching out to higher (international) levels of governance, while the second axis measures degrees of ‘virtuality’ or ‘realness’ respectively (horizontal connectivity/reach), that is the degree of multi-level borderness. “Europe provides an excellent laboratory for exploring how border regions offer new spaces of/for governance, cultural
interaction, and economic development.” (Johnson, 2009, p 4). On the one hand there is a multi-tier governance arrangement from the local to international level, with associated variety of borders, then, on the other, there is the effect of fundamental restructuring of governance and territoriality, including nature and role of borders, across eastern Europe, shaped by EU eastward expansion and explicit integrational de-bordering policies. The result has been a complex picture of different types of borders overlapping and intersecting, changing their quality and related effect (i.e. their borderness) over time. As such, they “defy assumptions of hierarchical scalar neatness” (Deas and Lord, 2006, p1848) and, instead show complex interlacing without clear evidence of an underlying unifying organising principle.

Subsequently, border regions come in many forms and varieties, reflecting their divers geo-political settings and cultural-historic backgrounds (Paasi, 2004). What they share is their attempt at crossing administrative, including state - borders and boundaries, and thus challenging, while having to work through, existing regulative and institutional structures. Scope to do so is circumscribed by state-specific settings as well as ‘conditioning’ as far as value and desirability of such cross-border engagement are concerned, and what level is considered the most appropriate and desirable from a national perspective. In this respect, clear differences between countries emerged, with some, such as the Czech Republic or Russia, seeking to maintain central control of all border initiatives, as such control is viewed as a demonstration of the centres’ powers over their peripheries. Such awareness mattered in eastern Europe in the aftermath of decades of top-down centralised command government, and thus well established practices of, and perspectives on, the role of borders as signifiers of central control and affirmation of national
belonging (Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002). Much of this has to do with the actual and perceived peripheralities of border areas, as, by definition, they sit on the margins of territories, here the nation states. And permitting border areas, that is subnational administrative entities located near borders, to develop their own cross-border links to their respective neighbours, is viewed in traditionally centralised states as indication of ‘drifting away’, as the ‘thin end of the wedge’, potentially weakening central control and, ultimately, national control.

In addition to external national conditions circumscribing policy-making possibilities for local and regional actors in border areas, there is also the indigenous factor of capacity among such actors to take initiatives, formulate policies, bring together alliances, and develop networks aimed at trans-border engagement in the pursuit of a jointly identified cross-border policy agenda. Inception and operation of such connectivities, and their subsequent possible network relations, thus vary in their origin. They can reach from forms of top down implementation and ‘incentivising’, such as through EU policies, to genuine bottom-up arrangements on the back of a few key actors who develop, and gain support for, a strategic vision of cross-border collaboration at the local or regional scale. Even within the same programme such contrasts can be found: Euroregions on the Polish-German border suggest much more indigenous bottom-up input, than those involving Kaliningrad, constrained by national Russian structures, policy agendas and evidence of a defensive emphasis on national belonging. In addition, the new divisions between the EU and the ‘outside’ completely alter regional possibilities of lower key cross-border collaborations beneath the radar screen of international relations between the two countries.
Personalities, regional knowledge and policy-making capacity and capability matter. This reflects the fact that merely operating through administrative channels, relying on administrative ‘positions’ gained through positionings in government hierarchies, no longer suffices. The shift towards a post-modern (Johnson, 2009; Newman and Paasi, 1998) form of ‘chaotic’ regionalisation, combined with elements of post-socialist transformation challenges, is particularly evident in the plethora of variably scaled ‘virtual’ policy regions within the Baltic Sea Region. Those may embrace merely two cities, or they may include large sections of participating countries. The continuous, deep changes, which eastern Europe has undergone over the last 20 years mean that regionalisation processes continuously evolved in their nature, operation and agenda, responding to shifting national policies, a growing Europeanisation agenda, and learning processes. This ensured that bordering matters remained in flux, both in terms of the physicality of borders as dividing lines, and as societal constructs of identity. This inherent fuzziness contrasts with conventional ‘Fordist’ strictly structured, hierarchical government arrangements, where borders are fixed and clearly delineated. Again, the BSR illustrates this well.

Much of this seeming contradiction has to do with the perspective, with the angle taken, and here, scale does seem to matter. On the one hand, there is the overall picture of territoriality of governance, with its inherent hierarchical levels, even if these are not always neatly ‘stacked’ and ‘nested’, and are increasingly less so, it seems, as there is a use of both ‘real’ and ‘imagined’ (and/or imagineered) territorial images to locate, or project as located, power, relationships, control and ownership. And then, on the other hand, there are the ‘hands-on’ policy process-based, spatialities, such as the Euroregions, or marketing regions as the one in the Tri-state
border region Neisse-Nisa-Nysa, and there, on the German side, Upper Lusatia-
Lower Silesia, defined, by networks and (temporary) linkages between actors, rather
than fixed bounded territories. These are, in Doreen Massey’s understanding (2004),
relational spaces, rather than bounded static territories. Such relational, functional
connectivity-based spaces are not ‘real’ in the sense of being bordered and possible
to experience on the ground. But they exist as the implicit, indirect outcome, even
side effect, of projected interests and derived linkages.

There are thus two types of space concurring, interlinking and overlapping, thus
adding to the complex, even ‘chaotic’ (Dees and Lord, 2006) picture. They follow
different principles, although they also share some, such a institutions that provide
legitimacy and authority for the implementation and thus realisation of policy
agendas. Given their different modi operandi, structured territories and ‘chaotic’
spatialities respond differently to external ‘stimulants’, be they policy incentives or
economic developments. In this way, they reflect the division between two types of
economic policy makers which the author met on many occasions over the last
years: the dreamers and the technocrats. The former, such as regional managers or
economic development staff, work through building networks on the basis of
propagating an idea, an agenda and getting people ‘sign up’ to those. This may
include investors who get convinced of the suitability of a locality. Territory remains
largely in the background and more or less follows the network in its shape and
reach at a particular time, even for a particular type of policy fields. The technocrats
by contrast, such as planners, use territory as the given, that is as the starting point,
drawing boundaries and defining borders as guarantors of power and control against
‘encroachment’ and challenges by others outside. ‘Rescaling’ and ‘New
Regionalism’, two key concepts shaping the debates and discussions on governance and ‘state spaces’ embrace both bounded territory and territoriality as outcome of networks and linkages, with boundaries following as well.

These territorialised entities need not be contiguous. There can be spaces left out in between, creating - and reflecting - inclusions and exclusions on the basis of selective connectivity. And borders bring it all together; the different types of spaces meet and overlap, creating, as well as being created by, borders. There are thus different - inverse - dependencies between border and territory - outcome versus originator. They can alternate and overlap, adding, of course, to the notion of crowdedness and even ‘chaos’. Border spaces are thus produced/defined by a combination of relational spaces and fixed territories, bringing together the concept of new regionalism with its ‘soft’ or ‘virtual’ spaces, and the scalar understanding of a hierarchical, if not symmetrical and static, arrangement of spatialities. The case studies presented a broad sweep across eastern Europe, encompassing different types of EU-regions, processes of growing Europeanisation of borders (in the EU sense of the world), scale and range of policy objectives. Some were very narrowly focused on just one or two topics, others took a broader approach for longer viability. The BSR offered the most complex and diverse picture, very much reflecting a multi-level border ‘landscape’ which undergoes continuous dynamics. And this is an important point that emerged, too, the inherent flexibility and variability of cross-border relationships and their spatial manifestations, in response to both fixed and shifting functional-economic, yet also cultural-political relationships and connectivities - as well as differences. And these, ultimately may supercede merely administratively based borders dividing territories of state power and control. In this respect, the
trans-border programmes and the Schengen Agreement offer fascinating opportunities to observe possible further de- and re-bordering processes, not just in a reconfiguring post-communist eastern Europe, but in other parts of the European Union as well, creating fuzzier ‘transition zones’ (Newman, 2006a) and edges, rather than maintaining clear, dividing, demarcation lines?