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**Democratisation, mass media and the anti-corruption drive in Africa: the case of Nigeria, 1999-2015**

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**DEMOCRATISATION, MASS MEDIA AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF NIGERIA, 1999-2015**

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to Almighty God for seeing me through the course and to pioneer Chairman of ICPC, Justice Mustapha Akanbi for his zeal for a corruption free Nigeria.

# DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I, Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where material has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated and acknowledged.

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My late parents were there every inch of the way before death took them away, so were my siblings. In all the challenges that I faced in the last six years, no one, apart from God deserve greater gratitude than my best friend and wife, Bukola. Together with our children, Opeyemi and Rhoda, they bore the challenges of my long and regular absence from home; she held forth graciously. Bukola deserves special tribute, were it not for her constant support, prayers and criticism, this dissertation would never have been taken to its conclusion.

For all the weaknesses of this dissertation, however, I accept all responsibilities.

**MAP OF NIGERIA**



**Source. Adapted from Ngex.com**

## GLOSSARY

| | |
|---|---|
| FOI | Freedom of Information (Act) |
| FRCN | Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria |
| MRA | Media rights Agenda |
| NBC | Nigeria Broadcasting Commission |
| NGE | Nigerian Guild of Editors |
| NPC | Nigerian Press Council |
| NPO | Nigerian Press Organisation |
| NUJ | Nigerian Union of Journalists |
| NTA | Nigerian Television Authority |
| ICPC | Independence Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission |
| EFCC | Economic and Financial Crime Commission |
| CCB | Code of Conduct Bureau |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| TI | Transparency International |
| GCB | Global Corruption Barometer |
| NDHS | Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey |
| NPC | National Population Commission |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| NPAN | Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria |
| FM | Frequency Modulation |
| DTH | Direct-to-Home |
| DBS | Direct Broadcast Satellite |
| NGOs | Non-Government Organisations |
| CBOs | Community Based Organisations |
| BPP | Bureau of Public Procurement |
| TUGAR | Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms |
| PCC | Public Complaints Commission |

NEITI        Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives

UNECA        United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

AUCPC        African Union Combating and Preventing of Corruption

UNESCO       United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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## ABSTRACT

Corruption is a local and global problem which has been exacerbated by neoliberal capitalism. One of the institutions available for curbing it is the media. This thesis examines the impact of democratisation and press freedom on transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs following Nigeria's return to "civil rule" in 1999. Largely qualitative, and nominally quantitative, in nature, the study covers some of the major socio-economic and political issues affecting the Nigerian media, and the inherent unethical conduct that has portrayed the fourth estate of the realm as a lapdog. The fieldwork involved the content illustration of news stories, focusing on features; newspaper headlines; editorials; opinion articles; and cartoons. My interviews were with twenty-five select-stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector in Nigeria, including former heads of anti-corruption agencies, politicians, legal practitioners, civil society activists, faith based leaders and media practitioners who had completed the instrument used for the study. The analytical framework deployed for this study is critical discourse analysis, which involves analysing responses from the twenty-five stakeholders, who were picked using a purposive sampling technique. These interviews formed the primary data for the study, and documentary research consisting of newspapers reports, official reports and in-house magazines published by two of the anti-corruption agencies formed the secondary data. A major finding of the study is that the current Nigerian media industry is structurally deficient in the credibility needed to perform its role as a watchdog, because its integrity has been compromised, following incidents of bribery and corruption, which are commonly subsumed into the derisive phrase, "brown envelope."

Fifteen years of "civil rule", and anti-corruption measures, such as the adoption Freedom of Information Act 2011, have not significantly been translated into reduction of corruption, since the press has been largely adjudged to be equally corrupt. Corruption has permeated the media sector, and it seemingly enjoys the connivance of the media proprietors, who often encourage reporters to use leverage on sources for pecuniary rewards by urging them to abuse their professional identity cards for "survival", since their salaries and emoluments are not paid on time. Moreover, the concept of "cash-for- news- coverage," where journalists only publish positive news in exchange for cash from the source(s), the suspect(s) or the aggrieved, is very common. The widespread practice of taking the "brown envelope" describes an unethical form of news commercialisation and, coupled with the bias of media houses towards adverts, this compromises their critical roles of advocacy and as the watchdog in society. Following the perpetuation of this perversion by the media, crooks are often portrayed as saints and falsehood overshadows truth. The findings therefore suggest that corruption is growing, rather than diminishing, in Nigeria, because the media are very weak. Essentially, the argument is that to overcome some of the challenges facing the media industry in Nigeria, there is an overwhelming need for media practitioners to establish a pool of resources, to gain majority control of newspapers (a virile organ of thought and an opinion shaper) and, invariably, to curtail political inference in their editorial contents and, eventually, to run their newspapers professionally. Broadly, this study contributes to extant literature on democratisation; it offers new paradigms for, and perspectives on media transparency. It establishes that political corruption is the negative outcome of the connivance and collusion between the mass media and the civil society in a transitional democracy. In specific terms, it reveals that there is need for a clear distinction to be made on the kind of media tradition that will aid the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria and in other growing democracies. The research

contributes to work on media and accountability in the context of neoliberal corrupt behaviours that have both local and global dimensions.

CHAPTER ONE

**INTRODUCTION**

**1.0     Background to the study**

Corruption has both local and global dimensions and it arguably exists in all societies to various degrees. The neoliberal capitalist environment in Nigeria, with its local and international institutions, has introduced economic reforms that have entrenched capitalist policies and predatory competitive behaviours. This thesis examines the role of the media in enhancing the culture of accountability and transparency in Nigeria. Public perceptions of corruption in public offices and in the private sector in Nigeria are staggering. The late Sani Abacha, the former Nigerian Head of State, was said to have embezzled $34billion and stashed it in Swiss bank accounts (Adebanwi, 2010: 118). The former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, allegedly misappropriated $90 million (22.5 billion Naira), (Ibid: 118), the former Governor of Bayelsa State, Solomon Peter Alamieseigha illegally amassed 1.8million pounds and $10million. One-time Inspector General of Police in Nigeria, Tafa Balogun, allegedly stole $20 billion (Ayittey, 2006: 2-8). The looting of the national treasury is worrisome. Indeed, Ribadu (2009: 2) asserted that "between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials had stolen or wasted more than $440billion". How did Ibori, who has just completed a jail term in UK prisons, and others, steal so much from the national purse? Although, successive Nigerian governments have attempted to curb corruption, it appears that their efforts have not yielded adequate reparation, because the integrity and transparency of public officials remain unsatisfactory.

Globally, scholars state that the mass media potentially play a crucial role in the anti-corruption drive (Tanzi, 1998; Harsch, 1993; Stapenhurst, 2000; Ojo, 2003; Chowdhury, 2004; Flanary and Watt, 1999; Franche, 1995; Skolnick and McCoy, 1984; Norris, 2006; Esipisu, and Khaguli, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Fox, (1988). Stapenhurst (2000: 4), specifically notes, "The media play a critical role in promoting good governance and help to curb corruption by investigating and reporting incidences of corruption in a professional and ethical manner". Rodney (2012: 15) argues that the media can act as a force against corruption in both tangible and intangible ways. He further notes (2012: 16) that the media can curb corruption in an intangible way by identifying the flaws and weaknesses in laws and regulations that create a climate that is favourable to corruption. In so

doing, the authorities are prompted to change, or to consider changing, those laws and regulations. Brunetti and Weder (2003: 1821) argue that press freedom is an important check on corruption. Similarly, Ojo (2003) argues that the media are the watchdog of government; helping to expose illegalities and to redirect governments onto the right track.

In tangible ways, the media can help to curb corruption in public life. Simon (1998) cited examples from Latin America where a surge in media reporting on corruption helped force no fewer than three Heads of State out of office, namely, Ecuador's Abdala Bucaram, Venezuela's Carlos Adres Perez and Brazil's Fernando Collor De Mello. In Nigeria, examples also abound of public officials who have been forced from office based on the exposure of their corrupt acts by the media. Tafa Balogun, a former Inspector General of Police; Salihu Ibrahim, Folake Etteh, Adenike Grange, Evan Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo, Haruna Abubakar and Adolphus Wabara, (all politicians) lost their positions due to media coverage of their corrupt activities while in public office (Adebanwi 2010: 118). This study investigates how the media are framing corruption-related stories under a democratic Nigerian society that operates a "free/active press" (Ronning, 2009).

Incidences of corruption in pre-colonial African societies were rare, and where they occurred they were quickly contained through the checks and balances that are inherent to the African traditional systems. Shortly after Nigeria attained political independence from the British in 1960, a new crop of indigenous rulers came to power. However, the anticipation and zeal of proceeding to a society that was free of corruption, and which was predicated on transparency and accountability, was truncated by the new rulers with their ostentatious life styles. The social crusaders, (novelists, playwrights, poets and musicians) captured the rot and they warned of the imminent collapse of values and virtues. One of the most popular social crusaders against the problem was the Nigerian-born Afro beat King, the late Fela Anikulapo Kuti. In two of his records, "*Teacher don't teach me nonsense" (1984)* and *"Authority Stealing" (1980),* he satirizes the version of democracy that is practised in Nigeria. Using very sarcastic tones and deploying features of linguistic analysis, he invested his lyrics on democracy with innuendoes, depicting the bastardisation of democracy and the warped sense of its practice, reiterating that a symbolic form of craziness was being foisted on the psyche of the Nigerian people by their leaders. He captures it succinctly:

*Democrazy, democrazy, Crazy demo. Demonstration of craze, crazy demonstration, if e no be craze, why for Africa as time dey go, things just dey bad, poor man dey cry, rich man dey mess. Democrazy, Crazy demo (Fela, LP 1984).*

Literal translation to English: Demonstration of craziness, demonstration of craziness, Crazy demonstration, demonstration of craziness, Crazy demonstration,

      If it is not madness, would it happen in Africa?
      As times pass, things get worse, the poor cries,
      The rich spoils the society,
      Demonstration of craziness, crazy demonstration.

      *You be thief/I no be thief*
      *You be rogue/I no be rogue*
      *You be thief/ I no be thief*
      *You be rogue/ I no be rogue*
      *You dey steal/ I no dey steal*
      *You be robber/ I no be robber.*
      *Argument about stealing (Fela, LP 1980).*

Literal translation to English: you are a thief, no; I'm not a thief,

      You are a rogue, no; I'm not a rogue,
      You have stolen, no, I have not stolen,
      You are an armed robber, no; I'm not an armed robber,
      Sharp argument about stealing,
      Somebody has taken, what belongs to another person.

Fela Anikulapo Kuti's lyrics, above, depict undemocratic practices and corruption in Africa and, particularly, in Nigeria. The songs remain relevant, almost three decades after he sang them. Essentially, the twin problems of maladministration and corruption straddle democratization in Nigeria and the situation has degenerated since the early 1990s. Several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, have remained at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), while several other regions of the World, sharing a similar colonial heritage, have begun experiencing double digit growth rate in their economies and development.

Social scientists have identified several factors relating to Africa's plight, but concur that corruption is the foremost obstacle to economic development. This emanates from the weaknesses of the institutions in Africa, with their attendant informalisation of infrastructure and social redistribution. It has been established, on the basis of observations by analysts, that those public officers who carry with them a commitment to serve the nation use such offices to serve their own private interests (Tignor, 1993: 176).

Available information reveals that corruption constitutes the most pressing governance challenge and is a major impediment to development on the continent today. A Transparency International (TI) Report showed that between 2007-2015, only three countries, Mauritius, Botswana and Cape Verde, met the minimum threshold of five points, the cut-off point for a tolerable level of corruption in any country. Similarly, the 2015 Global Corruption Barometers showed that Africa, as a region, is considered to have suffered most from public corruption (UNECA and AUCPCC working document).

Although, corruption is a global phenomenon, and it is not peculiar to any country, including Nigeria (Smith, 2008; Ribadu, 2007; Ribadu, 2006a; Ribadu, 2006b and Obasanjo, 1999), the bone of contention is its enormity in Nigeria. It should be stated that not all Nigerians are corrupt, and corruption has not always been condoned, particularly at the local and community levels. Smith (2008) describes corruption in Nigeria as a culture, and Adebanwi (2011) argued that it is a state policy. These scholars hinge their positions on the fact that from relatively mild manifestation at the country's independence in 1960, corruption of various kinds has snowballed since Nigeria's second attempt at democratic rule (1979-1983), but it spread rapidly during the military regime from 1983 to 1999. However, since independence, successive governments have made concerted efforts to tackle the vexing issue of corruption through campaigns. Despite structured efforts to boldly tackle the menace, the result has always been dismal failure.

What has emerged over the past 20 years has been a culture of impunity among both the elite and the generality of the people. By 1999, when the nation returned to democratic rule, the level of corruption had become frightening, as social and official ills pervaded the society. One of the

greatest expectations of Nigerians, in particular, and Africans, in general, was that on the return to civilian administration after 15 years of uninterrupted military rule, corruption would be reduced, if not eradicated.

Similarly, the third wave of democratisation in Africa (Huntington, 1993) had seen some scholars seeking to establish close links between the process of democratisation and the decline in corruption in public life. A key line of their argument is that democracies encourage respect for, and the expansion and deepening of, the freedom of the press and civil society. Seen in this light, the practices of the democratic ethos are assumed to ensure the accountability of political institutions (Ansah, 1988; Suphachalasai, 2005; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Ahred, 2002). This study critically investigates the universal generalisations, above. It also interrogates the view that democracy and press freedom result in economic development and reduce corruption in public life.

This research tests and examines the assumed interplay of democracy and press freedom in the anti-corruption drive in Africa, especially in the last decade of civil rule in Nigeria. It also examines the outcome of the interface of the media and civil society in the effort to proffer a solution, rather than being caught in the web of corruption. It appears that the mass media are not playing their advocacy role credibly under democratic rule because the culture of impunity that was experienced under the military appears to have worsened in Nigeria after 15 years of uninterrupted civil rule (Ajibewa, 2008: 267). Several unresolved cases of alleged corruption by senior public office holders are still pending in the courts as at June, 2015, after bail was secured (Nwokeoma, 2009), and these cases are not followed up properly by the media.

The strategic role of the media in all societies cannot be more stressed than Thomas Jefferson puts it:

> Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspaper, or newspaper without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter (Jefferson, 1787).

The media are seen as being important in all societies. Ansah (1988:13-14) similarly notes that there can be no democracy without the press. Traditionally, the media perform the articulatory role of linking the government with the populace through informing and educating the citizenry on the policies and programmes of the government. The press, in particular, serves as a form of police with which to check government in order to minimise the abuse of public trust or to instil a sense of probity and public accountability in governance. The press also makes deliberate efforts to influence the public by setting a political agenda. In this way, the press serves as the guardian of the public conscience. The question is: how credibly and efficiently have the media performed under democratic rule in Nigeria, especially, in their role as a watchdog?

Investigative journalism, which was the hall-mark of the press during military rule and at the advent of civilian rule in 1999, is declining, while the magnitude, in monetary terms, of stolen public funds continues to increase. The media are believed to be implicated in corruption as incidences of the *brown envelope* are common phenomena among Nigerian media practitioners. This unethical conduct is believed to be affecting the advocacy duty of the media. There is thus a need to re-examine the concept of democratic rule and the free press as antidotes to corruption in Nigeria, and this is the focus of this study.

## 1.1    Brief history of Nigeria

Corruption in Nigeria can also be understood in the context of the history and make-up of the State. It is the most populous Black nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an ethnically diverse population of about 167 million with 250 ethno-linguistic groups and well over 400 different languages (Maathai, 2009: 184; Dowden, 2005: 1 and Meredith 2006: 2). Nigeria has three major ethnic groups; the Yoruba in the West, the Igbo in the East, and the Hausa-Fulani in the North, together with several minority groups, which are spread across the length and the breadth of the country. The three major ethnic groups constitute about 68% of the population (Hausa-Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, and Igbo 18% (The World Fact Book, 2014).

As a former British colony, it is unsurprising that English is the official language. However, Pidgin—an admixture of local languages and English, and indigenous languages are also in use. Nigeria is also a multi-religious society, with about 50% of the Muslim population concentrated

in the North, 40% Christian in the South and Middle Belt areas, and the remaining 10% practise indigenous religions while the Yoruba, in the Southwest, are evenly split between both religions. Ethnicity and religion have been invoked in the fierce struggle for political power (Falola, 1999: 5-9, Falola and Heaton, 2008).

For administrative convenience, the country has been divided into six major geo-political zones: (i) the North-East (ii) the North-West (iii) the North-Central (iv) the South-East, the South-South (V) and (VI) the South-West zones. In addition, there are 36 states and 774 local government councils, and a Federal Capital in Abuja (the seat of power) spread over the six geo-political zones (NDHS, 2013).

The divisive ethno-regional rivalries that existed in the country were always a matter of public concern for scholars and the country's leaders (Meredith, 2006 and Adebanwi, 2012). On October 1, 1960, Nigeria had pockets of independent empires, states and communities, and these existed even before the British amalgamated the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria to become the Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The various ethnic and linguistic groups that made up the two protectorates were amalgamated by colonial fiat in 1914, without the inputs of the citizens (Ade-Ajayi and Ekoko, 1988). The various ethnic groups existed and operated as separate entities; each with its own origin, custom, tradition and language (Udo, 1984:14). These attributes were completely disregarded at the time of the amalgamation in order to form one political entity (Ayodele, 2006, Ade Ajayi, 1982).

Meredith (2006) notes that a prominent Northern Nigerian leader, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, remarked in 1948 that "Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people, themselves, are, historically, different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs, in their customs and do not show any signs of willingness to unite… Nigerian unity is only a British invention". Similarly, the Yoruba leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, wrote: "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression". There are no, 'Nigerians', in the same sense as there are "English", "Welsh", or "French". The word, "Nigerian" is merely a

distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not (Meredith, 2006: 8 and Ezeani 2013: 187).

Some have persistently argued that Nigeria, as a country, is a false entity, as the name given to the nation state had no input from the citizens. The name, Nigeria, was suggested by Flora Shaw, the mistress of Lord Lugard, a Governor-General of Nigeria during the colonial period (Ezeani 2013: 16). Indeed, owing to the political instability and security challenges facing the nation, some are questioning whether Nigeria is a country. Dawodu posits that Nigeria is a not a country but a "conspiracy". He asserts that "Nigeria is the playground of the elite, a volatile, ruthless place, where the haves leverage the have-nots and the have-nots let it" (Dawodu 2014:1).

Scholars and media observers believe that the complex and heterogeneous nature of the emergent Nigerian nation has resulted in an acute competition for, and conflict over, resource allocation, thus, breeding corruption and other social vices in the country (Ayoola, 2009). The manifestations and contradictions of these differences were at the heart of the processes that led to the collapse of Nigeria's First Republic, and corruption was said to be the salient factor that propelled the military to stage the first coup in the country (Joseph 1987, and Adebanwi, 2012;). Since 1966, successive military rulers and their civilian collaborators in Nigeria often cite the high level of corruption to justify their incursion into politics. Equitable allocation of the nation's natural and human resources remains a major challenge that confronts the country. Rose-Ackerman (1999:133), succinctly, argues thus that, "where ethnic divisions have not been well-handled, the result can be a state focused on sharing the spoils, not promoting overall prosperity". For some, this aptly describes the current situation in Nigeria after fifteen years of civil rule.

As the largest nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of 167 million (National Population Commission, (NPC) official figures in November, 2013), Nigeria has been in a perpetual flux and has suffered pervasive crises in the last three decades. Several academic studies have shown that corruption and other related offences have deprived the citizenry of the basic necessities of life. In-spite of Nigeria's abundant endowment of mineral resources and its being one of the top 12 oil producing nations in the World, an estimated 80 million Nigerians live below the poverty line

(Donnelly, 2008; Soola, 2009). The nation has the world's fourth largest reserve of natural gas, and yet poverty is pervasive in the country (Esan, 2009: 19).

Political corruption and its attendant consequences have resulted in non-credible elections. Elected political officers were thus more like rent seekers than statesmen. Corruption has therefore become a key instrument of state policy in Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2012). The 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Nigeria in the 152$^{nd}$ position, while the 2015 MO Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked the country 38th out of the 54 countries assessed (MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). In 2011, 2010, 2009 and 2008, Nigeria was ranked 41$^{st}$, 40th, 35$^{th}$ and 39$^{th}$, respectively by the same foundation. The Foundation Report on Good Governance noted that between 2011 and 2014 Africa witnessed a steady decline in overall governance progress.

Not only has the trend persisted, it has been noted globally. According to Lewis (1996:98), Nigeria's position in the international economy has substantially deteriorated, she was marginalized in global trade and capital markets and this provoked civil unrest. The agitation for a return to civilian rule received the backing of the International Community, giving birth to scores of civil society groups which served as platforms for the change of government. Eventually, on May 29, 1999, there was a transition to civilian government in Nigeria. Prior to this period, corruption had become ingrained in Nigerian culture (Smith, 2007).

To structurally address corruption and to redeem the country's image, the former President, Obasanjo, a one-time military leader and later a civilian president (1999-2007), established two anti-graft agencies: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002, in addition to several statutes on corrupt practices. Following their establishment, there was a slight improvement in Nigeria's perception index ranking (2002-2004) until the government's focus shifted to other issues. The 2015 perception index released by Transparency International, ranked Nigeria as the 36$^{th}$ most corrupt nation in the world (TI Annual Reports 2015). A former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, in a (2011) publication, entitled *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*, opines that despite Nigeria's return to civilian governance in 1999 after years of military

dominance, the country remains divided along ethnic and religious lines with crippling corruption and a weak government.

The slow pace of development, coupled with the overwhelming rate of corruption under democratic rule, has stood in the way of a democratic government effectively reducing corruption. Some scholars have stated that Nigeria is not into real democracy. According to Omotoso (2006:35),

> There is civilian rule without democracy in Nigeria, as all known principles and attributes of democracy are not adhered to. Democracy emphasises accountability, good governance, probity and transparency, but, all these, are lacking in Nigeria's democratic experience.

These remarks fit into what Robert Dahl describes as polyarchy, the system where countries satisfy the basic conditions of democratic governance, but are not practising the ethos of democracy (Dahl, 1991)

There have been critical calls questioning the justification for a democratic government where citizens die of starvation. Diamond et al (1999: 1) respond by stating:

> There is perhaps no more common and profound obstacle to the consolidation of new democracies than widespread corruption, human rights violation, illegality and abuses of authority by the holders of state power at all levels.

The implication of the current events in Nigeria is that the democratic experiments may be truncated by maladministration and corruption, as experienced in the First, Second and Third republics (Osoba, 1996 and Joseph, 1987). This study interrogates the kind of media that are capable of acting as an external control mechanism on corruption and bad governance, as well as helping to promote accountability under a democratic government.

## 1.2 Historical development of the media industry in Nigeria

Anti-corruption campaigns require robust media. Nigeria has one of Africa's freest, bravest and most outspoken media, but the media have faced challenges and constraints too (Rønning, 2009).

The history of the Nigerian mass media, especially the print media, has been a combative one since 1859, when the first newspaper, *Iwe Iroyin Yoruba,* was established in Abeokuta, in the present-day Ogun State by Henry Townsend. The establishment of other newspapers, like *The Comet* by Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian, in 1933, the *West African Pilot* by the late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, in 1937 and, later, the *Nigerian Tribune* by the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1949, among others, provided the platform for challenging colonial rule, especially any of the perceived undue dominance, bad governance, injustice and corruption at the time (Duyile, 1987 and Omu, 1978). Indeed, from the outset, politics remained central to Nigerian journalism, with an element of advocacy as its driving force (Babasola, 2009: 14). The peculiar nature of the media history is such that virtually all the newspapers that existed between 1880 and 1900 were political in nature (Omu, 1978: viii).

With a vibrant press that pre-dated the colonial era (Agbaje, 1992:41), the mass media in Nigeria played a significant role in the narrative of the social, political and economic landscape in the country. The political history of Nigeria is intertwined with that of its media, which commenced in 1859, even before the birth of the Nigerian state (Omu 1978). Indeed, Oso and Ibraheem (2014: 35) noted:

> From the struggle for and attainment of independence, to the struggle for the return to democratic rule during the period of military intervention in Nigerian politics, and the sustenance of the nation's nascent democracy, the Nigerian mass media have featured prominently in setting the agenda and charting the course for Nigeria's political development.

More importantly, the history of Nigeria's struggle for political independence cannot be complete without reference to the prominent role of print journalists, such as Horatio Jackson, Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, A.Y.S Tinubu, Anthony Enahoro, and this, perhaps was why Babatunde Jose argued that the war for Nigeria's independence was fought and won on the pages of newspapers (p.35). Most of the leading lights of the anti-colonisation movements had their roots in the media industry (Babasola, 2009: 14). Similarly, Golding and Elliot (1979:21) argue that "the Nigerian press was created by anti-colonial protests, was baptised in the waters of nationalist propaganda, and was matured in party politics".

Furthermore, Oso and Ibraheem also lauded the role that was played by the media during the military era:

> During the era of military dictatorship, the Nigerian media also gallantly rose to the occasion as the major opposition and dissenting voice to the various military governments that seized political power, intermittently, between 1966 and 1999. The country's vibrant media played an influential role in championing the struggle for the return to democratic rule and in challenging the excesses of the various dictatorial military regimes that held sway in power within that period (Oso and Ibraheem, 2014: 35-35).

It can be conveniently concluded that three distinct eras have emerged in which to situate the significant role played by the media in Nigeria: The first era, 1859-1966, is, generally regarded as the era of the "nationalist press" (Ibraheem et al 2013). The second era, between 1966 and1999, refers to the era of "guerrilla journalism" in Nigerian media history (Olukotun, 2004: 9). This study is of the view that the third era, 1999- 2015 can be likened to the "cheque-book journalism" period of Nigerian media history. Consequently, the media have shaped the structure, tone and tenor of the anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria. It can, however, be argued that the growth and development of the media has not been even between the Southern and Northern parts of the country. While missionary activities, Christianity and Western education aided the rapid expansion of literacy and the emergence of critical elite newspapers in the South, the case was different in the Northern part of the country. The first newspaper in the Northern part of the country, *Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo,* was established in 1938, almost 78 years after the first newspaper in the Southern part of the country (Duyile, 1987).

This evolution of the Nigerian press is partly responsible for the ways in which political and ideological issues are treated in the media (Oyovbaire, 20001). At their inception, newspapers were mostly owned by indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs, while television and radio started as government ventures (Eribo, 1997:59). Most of the newspapers of the 1960s and 1990s are extinct. As Olatunji (2013) has observed, Nigeria has always been a graveyard for newspapers and this is why Nigeria has the highest rate of newspaper mortality in the World. The media sector is sharply divided along the lines of the Southern and Northern regions of the country. Most of the nation's

newspapers and electronic media houses are located in Lagos, the former federal capital of Nigeria, and a few in Ibadan, the largest city in Africa. The media in the South are generally referred to as "the Lagos-Ibadan axis" of the Nigerian press, and they have always been in the opposition -from colonialism through to the military regimes.

Danjuma Goje, a former Governor of Gombe State (2003-2007), has argued that the press reflects the perspectives and ideological attitudes of the South-West political elite class (*Daily Independent Newspapers*, 21 May, 2009). He further said that the attitude largely influences the opposition stance that the press takes against any government that is headed by a Northerner, starting with Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic. The Nigerian press entered a new era after the country gained independence from its colonial masters. The nation is now standing on a tripod that is formed of the North, East and West. Each of the regions, at independence, had at least one newspaper published in either English or in the local language (Eribo, 1997: 53). The Western region government, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, established the first television station in Black Africa, in Ibadan, in 1959 (Agbaje, 1992).   Bolawole noted that ethnic considerations started to find their way into the media in the early 1960s (Author's interview 2009).

However, between the 1980s and now the mass media have made quantum leaps by attracting practitioners with high educational and professional skills. In the early days of journalism, most of the early practitioners, such as Alhaji Babatunde Jose, of the *Daily Times*; Alhaji Lateef Jakande; Chief Segun Osoba; Chief Abiodun Aloba; Chief Bisi Onabanjo, and others, were non-university graduates, (Babasola, 2009:18). It differed from what obtains in Britain, where the majority of journalists in the BBC and the print media were Oxbridge arts graduates (Webster, 2006: 172). The majority of the first generation journalists in Nigeria were self-made people and private students.

At the early stage, the profession was regarded as a calling for those who were not doing well in the society. Consequently, they are rated as low grade and they are not adequately paid. Today, however, there have been remarkable changes, with many journalists holding Bachelor degrees, Masters and Doctorates, and professionals from other disciplines are doing well in the field.

Bolawole, the former Editor of *Punch* Newspapers said, "It is no longer a profession for drop-outs. Nigerian journalists are academically sound; they are not inferior to any profession again". Segun Osoba and the late Bisi Onabanjo, both trained as journalists, both became civilian governors of Ogun State. Several media practitioners served as senators in the fourth National Assembly. Some of them include Chris Anyanwu, Ayogu Eze, Smart Adeyemi and Babafemi Ojudu.

The contemporary Nigerian mass media practitioners are better equipped, both academically and professionally, for the job than were those of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, because better training facilities, technology and tools are available to them; thus the process of information gathering is relatively easier, simpler and faster, than it was in the early 1970s and 1980s, when journalists deployed manual efforts.

As will be shown in this study, one can argue that the present crop of media practitioners is better placed than the older generation. However, the journalists of old adhered more strictly to the ethics of the profession than the present crop of journalists (Femi Soyinka, personal interview 2014). The widely held perception is that the early journalists were more honest, since they belonged to the class of those who were fighting for independence, and whose sole aim was to chase out the colonial masters.

One of the major challenges being faced by the leadership of the Nigerian Media bodies – the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ); the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE); the Newspapers Proprietors' Association of Nigeria (NPAN), is the issue of bribery in the media. The syndrome of the *brown envelope* started in the 1960s and, as Bolawole rightly said, the question of graft had existed since the colonial era and only became deeper in recent times. In practice, he explained, there are two manifestations of the *brown envelope* in Nigeria. The first category is the gifts that are handed down to media personnel after an assignment; these are usually not requested. The second type of *brown envelope* is when the journalist(s) actually requests that the organisers of an event offer some perk in order that their stories and photographs be published.

Under the first kind of *brown envelope*, there is no demand, and journalists may or may not be influenced by the gifts. In the second category, there is a kind of contractual agreement, as the public relations staff of organisations that are forced to part with money always put pressure on the journalists when their stories/photographs are not published in the newspapers or are not aired by the electronic media. Bolawole (author's interview) argues, "this is a criminal act, but so far, in the history of the media in Nigeria nobody has been caught or jailed for collecting or demanding *brown envelope"*. In spite of the shortcomings occasioned by the issue of the *brown envelope*, the Press has remained an integral part of Nigerian society. The media played a prominent role in ending Military rule and in the installation of democracy in 1999.

In fact, most people form their opinions, either on governance or democracy, on the basis of the agenda set by the mass media. Today, major events are seen by millions of people on television, listened to on radio, read in newspapers or surfed on the Web. The internet has also offered an information super-highway to journalists and researchers, and all of these sources have promoted the media and so there are over 393 media houses, (both electronic and print) operating in the country. The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the official regulatory organ of the broadcasting industry, has stated that 288 electronic media were functionally in operation in Nigeria as at June, 2015.

The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) has its five national stations in Lagos, Abuja, Enugu, Kaduna and Ibadan. FRCN is also served by a network of 37 stations around the country. Similarly, there are 68 privately- owned Frequency Modulation (FM) radio stations and 37 state owned television stations, including that of the Federal Capital Territory. Those not in the popular stream include private television stations (twenty-two); National Network public radio stations (two); National Network television, (two); Campus radio stations (twenty-seven), and others. As at October, 2014, Nigeria had 25 Direct-to-Home (DTH) television stations; 35 cable stations using MMDS channels, and two Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) stations (NBC: 2014 interview). As at 2015, there were over 105 newspapers and magazines in circulation in Nigeria; about 90 of these publications are privately owned, while the rest are owned by the government, at both federal and state levels (NPC Reports 20015).

**1.3     Objectives of the Study**

The major objective of this study is to assess the role of the media in the anti-corruption initiatives in post-1999 Nigeria. Specifically, the study seeks:

1. to critically investigate how the mass media have dealt with corrupt practices in Nigeria;

2. to evaluate reports on corruption in the mass media;

3. to identify the challenges of the media's reporting of corruption cases;

4. to investigate and analyse how the anti-corruption agencies have used the media in their campaigns.

**1.4     Research questions**

The thesis uses some research questions to explore the political, economic, ethnic and social context of the mass media in combating corruption in Nigeria. Questions One and Two are used as the focus of this study. This enables the researcher to examine the legal and para-legal relationships between the anti-corruption agencies and the media. The Remaining Three Questions serve as sub-questions.

I.   How have the anti-corruption agencies, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the Code of Conduct Bureau, used the media in their campaigns?

II.   What roles have the mass media and other non-state actors played in the anti-corruption drive?

III.   How do journalists perceive their roles in the anti-corruption drive and, by extension, what are the impediments to their work?

IV.   What has been the impact of the growing linkages between the media class and the political class in Nigeria's anti-corruption drive?

## 1.5  Purpose of the Study

Social scientist scholars believe that democracy encourages respect for, expands and deepens the freedom of the press and the civil society, and have concluded that a democratic ethos can be assumed to ensure the accountability of political institutions (Ansah, 1988; Suphachalasai, 2005; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Ahred, 2002). This study empirically and critically interrogates such universal generalisations, especially, in the transition to becoming a democratic regime. It also interrogates the view that democracy and press freedom result in economic development and reduced corruption in public life. Why, then, are the media in a democratic dispensation in Nigeria unable to overcome a legacy of corruption?

This study examines the interplay of democracy and press freedom on the anti-corruption effort in the last decade of civil rule in Nigeria, in particular, and in Africa, in general. It also attempts to analyse the outcome of collusion and connivance on democracy, the mass media and the civil society, since it is not solving but is, instead, complicating the problem. The rationale for studying Nigeria as a case study is premised on the following:

- Anywhere that corruption is mentioned among the global community of nations, Nigeria often comes up as one of the world's most corrupt nations (World Development Report 2014).

- It is a nation that is blessed with all the natural resources, yet the majority of the citizens live in poverty.

- It is a nation in which some of its leaders have been linked with a high degree of public looting, yet, in the same country, successive governments create ad-hoc committees and statutory bodies with which to curb the menace of corruption.

- It is a nation in which the media survey (broadcast and print) in the month of February 2014, reported 180 stories and news analyses on corruption. (Author's survey and ICPC, 2014 Weekly Newspapers Review)

- It is a nation where corruption appears to be pervasive.

- It is a nation that has experienced uninterrupted civilian rule for 16 years, is in Sub-Saharan Africa and has one of the most vibrant and free presses in Africa.

## 1.6    Significance of the Study

This study will contribute to media/cultural studies and political science by developing the body of research on the relationship between democracy and anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria. It will take, as its departure point, the recognition amongst researchers and anti-corruption agencies, the importance of the mass media, in the fight against corruption in the country.

Furthermore, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that the universal generalisation of democracy and press freedom as a panacea for the socio-economic, and political problems of modern states, should be revisited in view of the growing incidences of corruption under democratic rule in most African countries. Specifically, this study seeks to provide empirical findings to show that although, a concept may be universal, it does not, in any way, suggest that it will be consistent or predictable in its consequences. This study fills the gap in research on the kind of the media system that is capable of helping the cause of anti-corruption drives. One major finding of this study is that it is only uncompromising media that will aid the anti-corruption drive in both Nigeria and other fledgling democracies. Furthermore, its will provide the anti-corruption agencies with the requisite knowledge on how to better deploy the media in carrying out their mandates.

This research will also fill the gap in the literature on why Nigeria, both in reality and in perception, remains a corruption-ridden country, despite the exposure of such grand corruption by the Press (Babasola, 2009). It will provide an important analysis that can be used by non-state actors and civil society organisations to help them develop effective anti-corruption strategies.

The theoretical and methodological framework (the political economy theory, critical discourse analysis and In-depth interviews), that are deployed in the course of this thesis, remains the strength of its originality. The previous studies on this topic have used Social Responsibility Theory (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956), and Agenda Setting Theory (McCombs and Shaw,

1972) to justify and examine the roles of the media in society, in which the use of narrative analysis and in-depth interviews were deployed.

For the methodology, mixed methods or a triangulation method were used to complete the three inter-related strands of the work, while the Political Economy Theory of the media, and the Market-Media Theory, were used to navigate and interrogate the data in the course of this study. This research work also engages with African theories of democracy, as postulated by Ake (2003), and Nyamnjoh (2001 and 2005), as its guiding objectives.

In this regard, the research justifies the view that only a credible and strong willed media can aid the anti-graft campaigns, thus playing a small but crucial role in developing the democratic ethos in Nigeria.

## 1.7    Scope of the Study

Broadly, this study focuses on, and interrogates why, investigative journalism appears to be declining, together with its impact on the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. It examines the engagement of the Nigerian media with the three anti-corruption agencies: the ICPC, EFCC and the Code of Conduct Bureau. It reviews the historical backgrounds of the anti-corruption fight in Nigeria since Nigeria's independence in 1960, demonstrating the media's role in the configuration of a new course of action for transparency in the country.

The roles of religious bodies, youth, NGOs/ CBOs, professional bodies and traditional institutions are treated sparingly. This study limits itself to investigating the roles of the media, and it did not delve into the activities of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, and the details of the economic cost of corruption to the citizens of the country.

As will be discussed later, the respondents pointed out that what is lacking in Nigeria's efforts to reduce the incidences of corruption, is a strong political will to fight corruption in the land. Ayogu (2011) argues that politicians will not create the needed will; so they must be forced to do it. The role of the media therefore remains crucial to the success or failure of the anti-corruption agencies of the government in their fight against the vices in the country.

The study covers the period 1999-2015:

➢ Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, and the establishment of the first major anti-corruption agency through an Act of Parliament in September, 2000.

➢ Many of those who headed the anti-graft agencies are alive, accessible and disseminate information on the anti-corruption war in the country.

➢ The ICPC, EFCC and CCB were established and became fully functional during this period. The researcher is therefore able to have sufficient information to draw valid conclusions.

➢ 2015, the terminal date of this study, offers the required span of 15 years for a sustainable investigation of this nature.

## 1.8 An Overview of the Chapters
This study is divided into eight chapters.

**Chapter 1** provides the background and outline of the study. This is written to rationalise the need for, and timing of, the study. This chapter contains the introduction, the history of Nigeria, conceptual clarification and the place of the mass media in the society.

**Chapter 2** reviews the relevant literature to identify theoretical frameworks and to establish the gaps which the study will fill.

**Chapter 3** sets out the methodologies that guide the study and the ways in which data will be collated and analysed.

**Chapter 4** discusses press freedom and anti-corruption efforts under democratic rule from the global, African and West African perspectives. It discusses the interplay of press freedom, other non-state actors and democracy on the anti-corruption drive.

**Chapter 5** provides an insight into the relationship between the press and the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, emphasising the constitutional significance of the media, and it draws out the legal framework on press regulation content and the effects these have on the anti-corruption drive, from African/Nigerian perspectives.

**Chapter 6** considers case studies (high profile cases) and how these cases were treated and reported in the media.

**Chapter 7** provides a detailed account of the semi-structured interviews that were conducted and the findings drawn from the information given in them by the respondents, notably, media men and managers, anti-graft staff/management, civil society groups and key personalities in the country. It presents discussions on, and the narratives of, the media coverage.

**Chapter 8** contains concluding reflections, observations, makes recommendations, draws conclusions and suggests further research areas that may arise from the study.

## 1.9    Conceptual Clarification/Definition of Terms
### 1.9.1   The Media
In this study, the "media" or the "press" refer to…. publicly owned print media, privately owned media, online and offline publications, and I use the terms loosely to cover regional and community press also. Defleur and Dennis (1981: 148) view the media as "devices for moving messages across a distance or time to accomplish mass communication. These devices are classified into five groups to include the newspapers, magazines, films, radio and television. Hiebert et al (1974: 26) classify the media into seven divisions: newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, radio, television, books and sound recording. Blake and Haroldsen, in their Taxonomy Concepts of Communication, have grouped the media into two distinct parts: the print media and the electronic media of mass communication.

According to them, the print media include newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, direct mail circulars, billboards, skywriting, and other technical devices that transmit messages to the masses by appealing to their sense of sight, while the electronic media include radio and audio recording;

television, which comprises motion pictures and video recording. The primary focus of the electronic media is their appeal to the senses of sound and sight. The latest branch of the media are the social media, which include E-mail, internet systems, Twitter, Facebook, etc. The media perform five basic functions in any given democratic society and these include: Reporting the news, Interpreting the news; Setting an agenda for government action, Serving as a watchdog over the government and other powerful institutions in the society, and Playing an active role in public debate (Ojo, 2006: 13 and Sadeeq, 2006: 251). Most importantly, the media have been dubbed the 'Fourth Estate of the Realm' because of these functions.

### 1.9.2 Corruption

Corruption, like its twin sister, terrorism, is a very difficult concept or social phenomenon to define in the contemporary global environment (Oni, 2007:259). It should thus be noted from the outset that one overall definition of corruption may be impossible if we are to fully understand the word (Igwenyi, 2010). Williams (1991) notes that corruption, like obscenity, is more readily condemned than defined or explained. He posits that, like obscenity or beauty, it can exist only in the eye of the beholder (Williams 1991: 11).

In effect, researchers tend to view the concept from their own perspectives, disciplines and field experiences. However, it is important to have a fair understanding of the term. The word *Corrupt* comes from the Latin stem *Corruptus* which means "broken to pieces", or "destroyed" (Nwolise. 2006: 105).

The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as *the abuse of public office for private gain*. The Black Law Dictionary (1994) defines corruption as the act of doing something with the intent to give some advantages with official duty and right of others or official's use of a station or office to provide some benefits either personally or for someone else contrary to the rights of others. Sen (1999) notes that *corruption or corrupt behaviour involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit.*

In Colin Nye's classical definition, corruption is *behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private*

*clique) wealth or status gains* (Nye 1967:416). Updated versions with the same elements of the definition have been offered by Mushtaq Khan (Khan, 1996:12), and Osoba (1996: 372).

From the foregoing definitions, it is clear that the possible meanings of the word are endless, but certain key words are common; **benefit**, which need not necessarily be in "cash". It may be in kind or as sexual favours. Another phrase is **behaviour** --- behaviour which may be regarded as bad, deviant or as an illegal act. More importantly, most of these definitions were based on the perception and disciplines of the individual writers. As Andvig et al (2000) rightly put it, "recent political science classifications and definitions have tended to place corruption and the fight against it within the broader agenda of democratisation.

Also of interest to this researcher is the classification offered by Heidenheimer (1989) that reflects societal tolerance of corruption and other social vices. He classifies the degree of societal tolerance of corruption as *black, gray or white*. Heidenheimer notes that *black* corruption is a situation where there is "a majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion that would condemn" the practice in principle, and that wants to see it "punished". *Gray* corruption signifies that some elements, usually the elite, may want to see corrupt acts punished, but others may not support this, and the view of the majority may be "ambiguous". *White* corruption, on the other hand, according to him, is well accepted and is tolerated by both the majority of the elite and mass opinion. Both the majority elite and the masses may not vigorously support an attempt to punish offenders (Heidenheimer, 1989: 61). Going by these classifications, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to state where Nigeria, which is the focus of this study, belongs. If we take into consideration *black* corruption, as defined by the scholar, both the elite and mass opinion want corrupt acts punished but, in reality, nobody has served the prescribed punishment for their infractions in the country. The failure on the part of those in power to enforce the necessary laws on illegal acts may force one to tempt to classify Nigeria as practising *white* corruption.

However, the situation at hand, particularly as it is reflected in the media, is not anywhere near *white* corruption. Incidences of corruption and the daily wrongdoings of public officials are reported, while some opinions, both among the elite and the mass, demand the punishment of the

corrupt. For instance, the several laws that have been enacted to confront the menace of corruption, including those of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct, the Criminal Code and Penal Code, and the Public Procurement Acts, signify that these arrive from the will to punish the corrupt. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) also recognises the need to prevent corrupt practices and to abuse of power as one of the political objectives of the nation. The only conclusion one may draw from the analysis, so far, is that Nigeria is not practising *gray* corruption, since both the elite and the majority are very resolute that the corrupt must be punished.

So, there is a need to rethink these classifications in view of the current trends in Nigeria and other developing countries, where the establishment of various anti-corruption agencies has seen an upsurge in corrupt acts among citizens (Riley, 1998; Szeftel, 1998; Doig & Riley, 1998; Kpundeh, 2004; Johnston, 2005).

Indeed, in Nigeria, the enabling laws that established the two anti-corruption agencies did not define, in clear terms, what corruption is. For instance, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Act (2000) merely glossed over the definition of corruption. Section 2 of the Act defines it as to *"include bribery, fraud and other related offences"* (ICPC Act, 2000). The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), on the other hand, barely defines economic and financial crime, including offences such as "*fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices* (EFCC Act 2004).

In fact, most of the definitions have failed to make clear the distinction between fraud and corruption, this study contends that *fraud is deception,* while *corruption is the deliberate and determined abuse of the power and advantage that is conferred by office.* It is the contention of this researcher that the ICPC and EFCC Act definitions of corruption are vague, scanty, and that they are inadequate to fully explain the meaning of the social phenomenon to a large proportion of Nigerian society. What the Act has done is to describe the conduct and decisions in terms of the

motive of the decision maker or the actor. Olanipekun (2013) also notes that a reflection on the name of the ICPC indicates that something is missing. He opines that:

> The commission was established to fight corrupt practices and not for corrupt practices, as the name seems to suggest. Every time I read the sign board "Independent Corrupt Practices Commission", I become more convinced that we may be sending a wrong signal that the commission is established for corrupt practices. I, therefore, suggest that Section 3 (i) should be amended to read: There is hereby established a commission to be known as Independent Anti-Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (Olanipekun, 2013, p: 10-11).

What Olanipekun is stressing is that the name of the anti-corruption agency is a misnomer which should be re-addressed.

In his analysis, Williams (1991) notes that the various definitions mentioned can be grouped into three main areas: Organic or Biological Corruption; Moral Corruption, and Legal or Public Office Corruption. He explains that the utility of the organic or biological meaning of corruption lies less in explaining its nature than in underlining or over-emphasising the threat it poses to the survival of the polity in some prescribed form (Williams, 1991:12).

Moralists' definition of corruption, he argues, hinges on the premise that corruption means to pervert, degrade, ruin and debase integrity, virtue or moral principle. This set of analysts is more interested in an explanation than in condemnation and prescription (Ibid.13-14). He asserts that the moralists do not offer a means of identifying and explaining specific instances of corruption in different societies and, secondly, they do not admit the possibility that what is meant by corruption may vary from society to society, nor do they take any account the perceptions of participants.

His argument on the views of moralists may appear to be far from the truth. It is the contention of this researcher that most moralists tend to rely on the doctrines offered in the *Holy Bible* and the *Quran* for Christians and Muslims, and the unwritten code of practice of the traditional religion to justify their argument on the evil of corruption in the society. Legal corruption, on the other hand,

he explains, involves the observance of basic rules and laws governing any particular act. The destruction of integrity is crucial to both the legal and moral meanings of corruption (Ibid.15).

### 1.9.3   Anti-corruption

This generally means all efforts that are geared towards stiff fights against corruption. These include international conventions, treatises, protocols and agreements, as well as local laws and committees that are set up by nation states to fight corruption. It also includes bodies that are set up to implement the conventions and laws. For instance, in Nigeria, there are seven anti-graft agencies with the mandate to fight corruption and other social vices. They are:  the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR), the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (NEITI), the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), the Office of the Auditor-General of the Federation (TUGAR, annual reports 2011).

## 1.10    Summary

This chapter has set out the broad objectives of the thesis, and it provides a justification for the dissertation, establishes the rationale and stresses how compromised mass media are incapable of aiding the war against corruption. By extension, it also provides clues on the kinds of media systems that can help the cause of the anti-graft drive in Nigeria and elsewhere. A brief history of Nigeria is given, to situate and understand the challenges relating to ethno-religious divisions and to the installation of a culture of accountability and transparency. Finally, the polarisation of politics and the economy and the pursuits of the economic interest of the Nigerian mass media, appear to undermine the advocacy role of the media and of other non-state actors, in providing the platform for the much needed social change and development that is expected in the country after the military was ousted from governance.

# CHAPTER TWO

# DEMOCRATISTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

## 2.1    Introduction

This chapter focuses on the relationships between media and democracy, deploying a comprehensive framework to look not only at the impact of democracy on corruption, but also how corrupt media industry influences democratisation. There is a paucity of qualitative studies on media and corruption in Nigeria; although, the works of Adebanwi (2011), Obianigwe (2009) and Adeyemi and Okoriwe (2009) are relevant, they are insufficient. Several studies have been carried out around the problem of corruption in Nigeria, but, none of them has focussed, specifically on assessing the impact of a corrupt media on democracy and, by extension, on the anti-corruption drive in the country.

The last 10 years have witnessed an upsurge in the literature on the role of the media in the democratisation of Sub-Saharan Africa, but very little has focused on the kind of media system that is capable of helping the on-going anti-corruption campaigns in African countries. This research attempts to fill the gap. This chapter proposes to do three things: Section One seeks to make conceptual clarifications, while the second section reviews the relevant literature on democratisation, non-state actors, notably, the media, and corruption in Africa, with a particular focus on the last decade of democratic rule in Nigeria. The third section outlines a theoretical framework for the entire study. The main argument is that a corrupt media is capable of undermining democratisation in transitional regimes. There are several theoretical frameworks for understanding the media but, for the purpose of this study, political economy theory will be adopted for the entire work.

The chapter will also attempt to provide empirical findings that suggest that African societies in the pre-colonial era had elements of democratic culture and that the Western concept of democracy was not completely alien to African tradition and political organisation. Evidence from various literature also shows that the rule of law, checks and balances, formed part of the governance in most African states in the pre-colonial era.

## 2.2 The Definitions of democracy: from the West to the Rest: The contestation of democracy

The concept of democracy, as a system of government that is universally adopted, is a widely contested concept, because democracy means different things to different people. Overtime, the meaning of democracy has changed more than once and in more than one direction (Wiredu, 2000: 182). These definitions can be grouped into two schools of thought. One school argued that democracy involves the struggle for control of the society. Mikula (2008: 46) described democracy as a system of government in which power is said to reside with the people, who can rule either directly or through freely elected representatives. Schmitter and Karl (1991:4), on the other hand, have described democracy as a unique system for organising relations between the rulers and the ruled. They contend further:

> Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting, indirectly, through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.

Schmitter and Karl (Ibid: 4-8) also offered criteria that must be present in a democratic state as follows: rulers; the public realm, citizens; competition; regular elections; majority rule cooperation among the political actors; and representatives. Similarly, Dahl (1989: 221) listed the attributes of modern and thriving political democracy: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information and associational autonomy. Schmitter and Karl (1991: 9) added two conditions that are needed to make democracy thrive; First, popularly elected officials must be subjected to overriding powers of opposition from unelected officials, such as military officers, entrenched civil servants and state managers, and, second, the polity must be self-governing. Ayedun-Aluma (2011: 66) has defined democracy as "a political system or style of government which vests power in the people, operationalized as the majority of the people". The second school of thought believes that democracy is a 'vehicle' for organising the society for the benefit of all. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1993) define "democracy" as a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system to which it is joined, as a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful, regular and extensive *competition among* individuals and organized groups.

Similarly, Vanhannen (1997: 31) asserts that "democracy is a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people". However, for the purposes of this study; the researcher will align himself with the definition of democracy offered by Ake (2003), who defined the concept as "a political process where the real decision-making powers reside with the people". He argues that a democracy suitable to Africa would have the following four characteristics:

- A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power, over and above the formal consent of electoral choice. This will entail, among other things, a powerful legislature, decentralisation of power to local democratic formations, and considerable emphasis on the development of institutions for the aggregation and articulation of interests.

- A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights. It will be a social democracy that invests heavily in the improvement of people's health, education and capacity, so that they can participate effectively.

- A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights. It will have to recognize nationalities, sub-nationalities, ethnic groups and communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realisation, and it will grant these different groups the rights to cultural expression and political and economic participation. This could mean, for instance, a second legislative chamber, "a chamber of nationalities", with considerable power, in which all nationalities, irrespective of their numerical strength, are equal. It could mean convocational arrangements, not only at the national level, but also at the regional and community levels. It will also entail such arrangements as proportional representation and an electoral-spread formula, like the one used in Nigeria, by which a party must secure a stipulated minimum percentage of votes over a large part of the country in order to win.

- A democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative bodies should, in addition to nationalistic groups, have special representation of mass organisations, especially the youth, labour movement and women's groups, which are usually marginalised, but without whose active participation, there is unlikely to be democracy or development (Ake, 2003: 132).

In-spite of a lack of unanimity in relation to meaning, the consensus among scholars is on the origin of the concept of democracy. Ancient Greece is widely reported to be the origin of Western democracy, and the word democracy was coined from the Greek words *demos,* "the people and *kratia to* rule" (Nwauwa, 2003; Wiredu, 2010; Mikula, 2008; Sen, 2009).

## 2.3    Origin of Democracy: Divergent Views

Hornblower (1993: 2) expressed divergent views noting that the history of European democracy begins, arguably, not in Athens but in Sparta, where the popular assembly met at regular intervals. He argued that Athens was regarded as the root of democracy because the early political innovation was developed much further than in Sparta, and in an orderly and amazingly rapid sequence of reforms (p. 2). He also asked whether European and, specifically, Greek democracy really was the first democracy. Citing the works of Bernal (1987; 1991), Hornblower noted that the Phoenicians in Western Asia had something comparable to the self-regulating city-state, or polis, of archaic and classical Greece. "Since it is now agreed that the Greeks took their alphabets and their methods of colonisation, perhaps even the city-state concept itself, from the "Phoenicians", "we should be, similarly, prepared for the possibility of Phoenician origins for some of the Greek political arrangements we most admire." Strikingly, he queried what was special about democracy in Greece and provided a detailed account of events in Athens and Attica in 594 BC. He argues that, it was because of gaps in economic and social status amongst the people of Attica that the first great European reformer, Solon, legislated in 594 BC, which gave rise to democracy" (Hornblower, 1993: 2-3). As he rightly puts it, "the Athenian state, before Solon, was an aristocracy and he replaced this by the principle of eligibility by wealth" and "this is", he said, "a far cry from democracy". Later theorists would call it "timocracy", after the word for census-ratings, "*timai",* and Solon introduced a council of 400 members (p.4).

Indeed, Hornblower (1993: 1) noted that this council's institution was the first conscious, definite, and debatable political innovation in European history. It was the first concrete attempt to create what has been called a "third force, the first and second being the intellectual few and the masses" (Ibid: 5-6). Solon, he argued, also created a popular law court, "heliaia", to which there was a right of appeal against unjust decisions by magistrates, and to which the magistrates were made accountable.

If gathering citizens in a space for the purpose of discussing the affairs of their community is one of the criteria for crediting Greece as being the origin of democracy, it may be possible then to consider what had been described as the "Palaver House" in Duke Town (now in Nigeria) in the 14th century, where the citizens met to discuss state matters, and laws were enacted as being democratic in nature. Akinjide (2001:2) noted that "Ekpo", as a system, included the executive, legislative and police arm of the state, with the King presiding. The British, he noted admitted that "Ekpo", as a system, was the fairest and most effective instrument of government in the pre-colonial kingdoms and republics.

Furthermore, when the concept was first introduced in Athens, only male citizens were allowed to participate in the art of governance (Mukila, 2008: 46), excluding women, children, slaves and foreign residents. In reality, it is thus possible to contest whether the Athenian democracy from which the West draws its inspirations, can actually be referred to, in the real sense of the meaning, as democratic. Going by the way and manner in which it was first practised, it may well be referred to as an oligarchy, because equality and voting rights were not extended to a large majority of the citizens. Nevertheless, the West has consistently and over many decades, been promoting the concept as the best form of government, which should be embraced by all governments.

Indeed, most, if not all, countries now championing the cause of democracy were either under totalitarian, autocratic or monarchical rulers in the past. At this juncture, Keane's submission that democracy does not imply that representative or parliamentary democracy "is the alpha and omega" of political forms, may sound plausible (Keane, 1991: 169).

On the other hand, Hendricks (1997: 21) noted that although the word "democracy" has its origins in Ancient Greece, "Western Societies have no exclusive right to the term as a label for their own version of rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the majority of the people, because African societies, before colonialism, had a similar form of government. Soola (2009) also posited that the powers of the African King or Chief were limited by certain rights of the people. "The councils of traditional African societies imposed checks and balances on the rulers and provided a balance of power".  Hendricks (1997: 23), stated that the authority of the rulers was derived from the sovereign will of the people. He argued that Africans did not have to learn to rule themselves; they had been doing so for centuries before the Europeans arrived. Africans knew that democracy was, primarily, a doctrine of equality and self-rule and did not include ideas of racial discrimination. There was thus no need to "borrow" ideas of democracy from alien sources (Ibid: 27). Similarly, Wood (2004:11-12) argued that "many Western observers, in their eagerness to claim the invention of democracy, forget that its early appearance in the 'West' was not only temporary but also categorically different from its modern form".

Echoing a similar argument, Takaya (1997) noted that "democracy is African because centralised dictatorship is basically alien to the continent". Soola (2009: 29) argued that consultative decision-making and freedom of expression, which are key elements in Western democracy, were not alien to Africa. He noted that there were checks and balances in African traditional systems, as any chief who failed, "to respect human rights and rule of law could attract severe sanctions such as ostracism, destoolment or dethronement". Supporting this line of argument, Nwoko (1988) noted that democracy was part and parcel of the pre-colonial African state, in the sense that decisions were based on communal discussions. Nwolise (interview, 2014) explained:

> In my own village in Igbo land when you hear Ohanaeze, it means the people and their king taking decisions in the village square. In Ohanaeze meetings, a little child can make comments; you can call that direct democracy. So the white man did not teach us democracy, we have had democracy before they came.

Maathai (2009: 55-57) described the African traditional stool as being democratic in nature and in its functions. She argued that the African stool is comprised of a seat and three legs, with the first

leg representing democratic space where citizens' rights are respected. The second leg symbolises the sustainable and accountable management of natural resources, while the third leg stands for a culture of peace, fairness, respect, compassion, forgiveness, recompense and justice. She, however, admitted that the concept of democracy, as practised in the West, is merely, theoretical or abstract (Ibid: 60). Several examples from Asian countries, notably India and China, also cast doubt on Greece as the origin of democracy. For instance, Wood (2004: 33-34) noted:

> Indeed, there is some reason to believe that early India enjoyed democratic institutions, comparable to those of Greece. In the period from about 600 BC to AD 200, India consisted of republics, in many of which there existed a form of political participation that was eventually adopted by the Buddhist Monastic institutions, whose affairs were governed by periodic meetings of the monks themselves…. Village Councils, known as Panchayats, were, typically, composed of elected representatives with rather wide executive and judicial powers, including the responsibility for distributing land and collecting taxes. At some point in the past, women served on this body.

Supporting this line of argument, Jaffrelot (2000: 354) noted that India had always been a democratic society, even before the foreign invasion. He argued that "democracy was born in India; it was, merely, returning via the British after a long journey". Wood (2004: 63) argued further that China, with her Confucian style of governance, has a considerable degree of local autonomy, which is one of the underlining principles of the Western concept of democracy. Invariably, what Wood and others have said is that the Asian countries also have their own model of democratic systems, which seems to work better than what is operated in the West.

It is instructive to note that the political systems in most African states, before the scramble and eventual partition of the continent in 1884 by five European countries; Britain, France, Portugal, Germany and Belgium, were, somewhat, similar to the Athenian classical society, which is widely reported as being the birthplace of the democratic system of administering modern nation-states (Binns, 1994; Hargreaves, 1996; Pakenham, 2003; Meredith, 2006; Diamond, 1999; Kpundeh, 1992; Lewis, 1996).

Chazan, et al (1999) argued that when the Europeans arrived in Africa, they encountered indigenous states alongside well-organized segmentary societies with no overarching leadership structures. They cited the examples of the Kikuyu and the Igbo structures, in Kenya and Nigeria respectively (Chazan et al, 1999:27). They further argued that, in pre-colonial Africa, a variety of political forms were established, ranging from village headmen and councils, through chiefdoms that included a number of villages, to elaborate state entities such as Asante and Benin in West Africa, or Buganda and Zulu in East and Southern Africa. In each political unit, specific concepts of governance and methods of acquiring and using communication were developed. (Chazan et al, 1999: 81-84) Oromo political systems in Ethiopia and the Ovimbundu in Angola were further cited as examples of democratic political systems in the pre-colonial era in Africa.

An immense literature has been written on the democratic system in pre-colonial African societies. For instance, Roberts (2004) noted that in pre-colonial Nigeria, elders convened various forms of democratic dialogue under the tree. Africans, he argued, were successful in governance in the past but it was colonialism that successfully destroy the traditions of governance through conquest and statutes. (Roberts 2004: 26-27). Indeed, the British Foreign Office, in the record marked **FO 84/1527,** accepted the fact that most of the towns in Nigeria "lived separately, each under its own laws and government and that the city state was the focus of power politics". In addition, Davidson (1992: 86-87) argued that most traditional African societies were "segmentary societies where delegation of powers to titled persons was limited or minimal or non-existent. The community met as equals and decided things accordingly".

He cited the cases of the Igbo communities of Eastern, and the Yoruba communities of Western Nigeria, where checks and balances were found in the pre-colonial African states (Davidson, 1992: 86-87). He noted that the Asante system functioned on principles of constitutionalised delegation and devolution of power, and the inherent checks and balances, which form the pillars of a modern democratic system of government, such as may be seen at work under different guises in the history of a whole range of contemporary polities.

Following the same line of argument, Thomson (2000) has posited that stateless African societies did not lack political organization. Indeed, in most African communities, political structures overlap with communication patterns. Wilson (1982) argued that it is the traditional institutions that are usually authoritative sources of information. He further asserted that the medium of particular information is determined by the type of message to be sent, which, in turn, depended on the final authority of the king. Essentially, it is the village head and his council that constitute themselves as "gatekeepers" in the traditional communication process, because no information would be transferred without the authority of the chief.

Ugboajah (1980) noted that the leaders of African traditional socio-political systems recognised the need to control information output and specifically appointed certain persons who acted as information officers cum public relations officers, who were usually known as the village "gongmen". The concept of gatekeeping as part and parcel of the modern communication processes is thus not new to Africans. He argued that passing messages usually goes through several chains. From the source – Oba, Emir, and Council of Elders, whose deliberations occasioned the order, to the village square meeting: this is equivalent to the referendum in modern democracy, then to the gongman, who, in a timely way, reminds the people of the messages and accelerates people's co-operation.

The gongman, Ugboajah noted, is a trusted confidant, and is usually picked from one of the age-grade groups in the society. His task of news dissemination is not carried out for economic gain, as with the modern mass media, and thus it is imperative that the chosen gongman discharges his duties efficiently and effectively (Wilson, 1982). It can be argued that in the various African communities, age-grade groups, market men's/women's associations, etc., are part of the social institutional structures of the society and are also part of the political or traditional structures. From available records, therefore, political structures overlap the traditional structures and consequently, determine the communication patterns in a given traditional setting.

However, Thomson (2000: 8) has noted that Westerners, steeped as they are in state traditions, often regard the lack of state institutions as a sign of backwardness. "This, simply, was not the

case. The political systems that these societies developed were well- adapted to the environment they served". He also observed that considerable evidence of sophisticated forms of representation, justice and accountability existed among these communities, and that some of these grand civilisations were in advance, technically and socially, of their European contemporaries. Peter (2004: 25) observed that the denunciation of African civilisation as being primitive, backward, and therefore inferior to the superior civilisations of Western Europe, was untrue, as the history of pre-colonial independence was replete with rich examples of political and economic sophistication. He noted, though, that while some of these political systems degenerated into authoritarianism and economic stagnation, others embodied the blossoming of democratic practices and economic expansion.

The Western system of government, with the checks and balances between the arms of government, was part of the features of ancient African society. Peter argued that in ancient Oyo Town, the Alaafin enjoyed several formal powers, such as the appointment of provincial governors and the ability to declare war, in addition to an equally important set of informal powers, such as public persuasion, which grew out of the sacred nature of his office. The *Oyo Mesi*, he noted, likewise, enjoyed numerous formal powers: the selection of the Alaafin's successor from a list provided by the royal clan in the case of death or incapacitation; control over the process of choosing the Bashorun, the supreme Yoruba military leader, who was drawn from the ranks of the Royal Council; and, most importantly, the ability to impeach the Alaafin, should he stray from the accepted norms of Yoruba culture. As a result, a delicate balance of power existed between the two branches of government that fostered the maintenance of a relatively democratic society (Peter, 2004: 31).

Similarly, Freund (1998) argued that Igbo villages have been described by historians and anthropologists as being democratic communities where each household head was capable, through individual effort, of earning any coveted title, position and wealth. Davidson (1978: 139) also argued that intensely democratic, "mostly believing in equal opportunities for all to have their say, the Igbo have ruled themselves in a multitude of very small village sized governments".

Providing further insight, Reader (1998: 360) argued that archaeological evidence indicated that while communities throughout Africa maintained strong kinship and trade links over a wide area prior to their contact with external influences, the centralised and coercive regional control that is so typical of early state-formation elsewhere was not a feature of African social development.

Asking rhetorically, 'could Africa have developed differently? He argued that "were it not for the importuning of Europe, Africa might have enlarged upon its indigenous talents and found an independent route to the present that was inspired by resolutions from within, rather than examples from without" (Reader, 1998:361). This perfectly squares with the argument of Onadeko (2008) Rodney (1986) and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1996) that Africa's development was thwarted by colonial masters.

Steward (1986) and Olaniyan (1985) have also attested to the democratic system of government by the Borno Empire, before the arrival of colonial masters. Indeed, Davidson (1992: 63) noted that if one were to make a comparative listing of political structures in pre-colonial Africa, the result would confirm that pre-colonial political cultures undoubtedly displayed a great diversity, and an even greater unity.

Davidson (1992:63) draws a resounding conclusion on African democratic values, noting that, "its seeming eccentricity or inexplicability or unpredictability has existed only in the eyes of those who have not really looked." Ayittey (2012) argued that the components of indigenous African systems may seem, "Byzantine," put together with the others, they may produce, "beautiful music." Indeed, Smith (1969) concluded that, despite imperfections in Yoruba society, the system in operation in Yoruba Land was, in practice, "surprisingly democratic", with all the accountability and transparency ethos in place. Pinkney (2003:21) and Kpundeh (1992: 5) also provide practical elements of a democratic pre-colonial African societies. In fact, Kpundeh (1992: 7) stated that Colonialism was not a democratic system, and that the so-called colonial masters were not teachers of democracy because they took self-governance away from Africans.

In reviewing traditional African social, cultural and political settings, one can easily conclude that there is a presence of some of the features of democracy. Therefore, using Dowden (2009), one could suggest that most African kingdoms exhibited a balance of authority and democracy (Dowden 2009: 71) and so many of the important features of democracy can be located within African social, cultural and political settings.

In essence, describing the recent political developments in Sub-Saharan Africa as waves of democratisation may not be a correct understanding and interpretation of the history of African states in the pre-colonial era. Instead of referring to the political events in Africa from the beginning of the 20th century until now as waves of democratisation, it would not be out of place to refer to the unfolding events as being the restoration of the democratic culture/values of the African settings that were destroyed by colonialism. This section has, so far, corrected the prevailing myth that colonial masters were capable of bequeathing democracy to African countries, rather, it is the legacy of authoritarian rule and plundering that the Europeans left behind in Africa with which successive African leaders are contending, after almost seven decades of independence under their own flags.

## 2.4 Forms and Models of Democracy

Essentially, while the origin and meaning of democracy are still the subjects of debate among scholars, yet, its various (democracy) forms and models are contributory factors to the several challenges underpinning the understanding of democracy as a system of administering modern states. Pinkney (2003) has listed a fivefold classification of democracy which includes: radical democracy, guided democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy and consociation democracy. He defines Radical Democracy as a situation in which society is seen as an aggregation of undifferentiated individuals, and the democratic ideal is for the individuals to exercise their rights and protect their interests as active participants in the political arena (Pinkney, 2003: 10). Examples, he noted, can be found in Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, and in Guinea, under Ahmed Sekou Toure. Guided Democracy, on the other hand, is a society that is seen as an organic whole with common interests and leaders who claim to know what constitutes the interests of the general public (the will). Citizens only enjoy equality, whether politically or economically, to the extent

that their rulers deem this desirable. Kenya, Tanzania, Brazil, Indonesia, China, India, and Pakistan provide a variety of this system. He also noted that colonial rule might be regarded as guided democracy. In Liberal democracy, the society is seen as an aggregation of diverse citizens acting as both individuals and members of groups.

The state exists as a referee to ensure the representation and protection of diverse interests. Inequalities are perpetuated under this system as inherited wealth is allowed (Pinkney 2003: 12). This is mostly found in the Western and the advanced countries of the world. In fact, Kuper (2004: 1) puts it in a correct perspective when, he notes that liberalism and modern democracy are now the most widely accepted forms of official justification for political rule. In Socialist Democracy, society is seen as an organic whole with common interests and the state exists to allow for an even distribution of wealth and resources. Kuper (2004: 13) argued that examples are found in Nicaragua and Tanzania. In Consociation democracy, society is seen as being a culturally diverse country. Kenya and Nigeria are often cited as examples of this kind of democratic system, simply because of the heterogeneous population of these states.

The state exists not to promote any utopian ideal, such as socialism, the will of the majority, or the general will, but to act as a referee in the process of intergroup conflict. Citizens' participation in politics will mainly be on a regional basis. Immobilisation is a major problem of this system, with political change moving at the slowest pace. This system, he notes, encourages the emergence of a 'few privileged' people, thus promoting a political system that reinforces cultural divisions. Minorities may have some measure of influence, and this is a basic pre-requisite of this type of democracy with well-established institutions and procedures, a spirit of compromise, and an overarching sense of national loyalty. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland have this type in Europe. This study believes that it is the lack of these requirements in Kenya and Nigeria that has left them with a loose marriage of convenience, rather than with a durable form of democracy.

It is the contention of this study that experience with Liberal Democracy in the last two decades in nearly all of the African states has revealed the emergence of a formal/electoral system with nothing to show for the agitation for real democracy. As Pinkney correctly observes:

> The justification for democracy has never been, simply, that it offers a better means of material advancement, but unless it can give voters something in return for their votes, no amount of philosophical argument about liberty, human rights or political choice will ensure its survival. That is the challenge facing both Third World governments and Western governments that proclaim a belief in democracy.

To address this challenge, Held (2006: 304-305) advocated the concept of the cosmopolitan model of democracy that would establish an overarching network of democratic public fora covering cities, nation-states, regions, and the wider trans-national order. Such an arrangement, this researcher believes, will further undermine and worsen the 'cosmetic' democratic governments in Africa. Africa must be allowed to work out a model of government that suits its peculiar needs. As Pinkney (2003:2) puts it aptly:

> The West enjoyed the right preconditions, such as material prosperity, urbanization, cultures that encouraged tolerance and participation, and political institutions that had developed accepted ways of resolving conflicts. Third World countries lacked most of these preconditions and were, therefore, much less likely to be able to establish or maintain democratic political structures.

Moreover, an ideal of the cosmopolitan model of democracy is not likely to produce even results if one takes into consideration the fact that the unit of analysis in the West is based on individuals, while the unit of analysis in the Africa context, is still based on community. Nyamnoh (2005: 17) argued that the conventional notions of liberal democracy that focus on individual and citizens are not appropriate in an African context. More importantly, most Third World countries have not enjoyed the economic development and the civic cultural virtues that promotes democracy in advanced countries of the World (Pinkney 2003). This researcher's perspective tallies with the argument of Pinkney, that the sequences of development that are conducive to democracy in the West have not generally occurred in the Third World, and the developmental crises have, frequently, crowded in on one another over a short period of time (Ibid: 37). Indeed, Schmitter and Karl (2009: 13-14) offer what democracy is not:

1. Democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient economically than other forms of government.

2. Second, democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient administratively. The decision-making process is sometimes slower and the cost of getting things done may be higher than in the regime they replace.

3. Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable or governable than the autocracies they replace.

4. Finally, democracies do not, necessarily, lead to the opening of more economic opportunities.

They concluded that the notions of economic liberty that are currently put forward in neo-liberal economic models are not synonymous with political freedom, and may even impede it. Accordingly, they stress that what democracies can do more than other systems is to have the "capacity to modify rules and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances" (Schmitter and Karl, 2009: 14-15).

Scholars are also sharply divided on the impact of democracy on economic development. Pastor (1999),) noted that based on the results of a survey carried out in 100 countries in the 1990s democracy performs better, economically, than dictatorship. He insisted that "democratic regimes grew seven-tenths of one percent faster than their non-democratic counterparts". More established democracies in the developing world outperformed both new democracies and authoritarian governments.

Pastor (1999: 137) asserted that on the margin, and in the long term, democracies do better economically. However, Sen (2009: 310) also faulted the claim that non-democratic systems are better at bringing about economic development. She noted that the high economic growth of Singapore or China cannot be taken as "definite proof" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth, nor is the economic growth recorded in Botswana under a democratic

regime an indication that democracy works better economically. Sen (2009: 310-311) concluded with a word of caution:

> There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, the general statistical picture does not permit any such induction… If all comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in either direction remains extremely plausible.

Sen (2009: 319) argued that what democracy offers includes its intrinsic importance in the human, instrumental role of generating political incentives and a constructive function in the formation of values. It therefore means that there is the need for more multi-country surveying before an accurate evaluation can be reached on the impact of democracy on economic development. The unrelated link between democracy and economic development can be further explained, since most European countries were under democratic rule when they were hit by the "suffocating economic recession" of the 1930s and that of 2008.

In-spite of the fact that there was no convincing evidence to support the impact of democracy on economic growth, the International Financial Institutions, represented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have tied the granting of aid to developing countries to the installation of democracy. "Since 1991, the EU had insisted on 'a democracy clause', in each trade agreement with a Third World government", (Pastor, 1999: 136). Moreover, debates are ongoing on the economics of democracy and corruption. There are two schools of thought on this issue. Some suggests that democracies will not deter corruption but will actually promote it (Shleifer & Vishny 1998:4) while others believe that democracies with an independent/free press will deter corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Ades & Di Tella, 1997: 497-499; Treisman, 2000:1; Norris, 2006: 11). Chowdhury, (2004: 27), in particular, noted that "democracy and press freedom can play an instrumental role in making a country less corrupt. Sen (1999: 38-40) supports this school of thought, but with a word of caution. She notes that democracy may be a solution to the economic and political challenges of a state.

In view of the problems associated with democracy in Africa, such as corruption, ineffective leadership, political instability, as well as the growing decline in the economic prospects of most nations, it may well suit Africans to consider governing themselves through a "Trusteeship form of Government", which will be devoid of the excessive wastage of public funds that are usually spent for the conduct of the Western type of elections. Moreover, the money saved through this means can then be channelled for developmental purposes, which are begging for attention on the continent (Kuper, 2008).

## 2.5    The Media in the Democratic Process

The phenomenal rise of new media, and their convergence with the traditional media, has led to a series of political events around the world between 2009-2012 and has lent credence to the traditional liberal theorists' arguments around the democratic role of the media in modern society. Media scholars have argued that the media have a greater role to play, and that they even have greater responsibility in a democracy (Keane; 1991, McChesney and Nichols; 2010, Curran & Seaton; 2003, Murdock and Golding; 2005, Esipisu and Khaguli 2009:107, Chowdhury 2004). Voltmer and Rawnsley (2009) noted that the media is a dominant actor in political life across the world. The *Internet* and mobile telephony, supported by social networking media such as *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube,* are believed to have played a major role in the political events in the Northern part of Africa, generally referred to as the Arab Spring.

The ease and availability of these means of communication have allowed for increased public mobilisation and political activism since 2000. Examples abound of the growing influence of the media as an agent of political change. The 2009 anti-fraud protests in the Eastern European nation of Moldavia were organised by activists using Twitter. The Arab Spring of 2010-2011 witnessed the birth of a democratic government in Tunisia and a change of guard in Egypt, Yemen and Libya, while the on-going Syrian uprising is attracting international attention due to the power of the media, particularly the power of citizen journalism powered by social media.

Scholars have argued that the spate of protests induced regimes change across the North of the African region is due to the close relationship between the media and politics (Stokes 2008; Pintak 2011, Stack, 2009, Mudhai 2007). Pintak (2011) noted that the Arab Spring is one of the fallouts

of the media revolution that started with the deregulation of the media sector in the region in 1997, and that the authoritarian governments could not stop it. He declared that the electronic dam had burst, and with it their ability to control the flow of information, along with crusading journalists and digitally armed activists, this facilitated the move towards the democratisation of the region. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have also experienced some level of democratic change, particularly in the last decade, with the increased role of the social media (Adejumobi, 2000: 2).

This study therefore shares Tettey's (2001: 28) view that "the media and democracy are symbiotically related and so, mutually, reinforcing". Gunther and Mughan (2000), Higgins (2008), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Chomsky (1989) and Esipisu and Khaguli (2009) have supported this line of argument. In his analysis, O'Neil (1998:1) and Ansah (1988: 13) have noted that a strong connection exists between mass communication and democracy. They argue that the media are viewed as a vital conduit of relations between state and society. Akinfeleye (2012) argued that the media is the lubricating oil for democracy, as well as the propeller of an active democratic government, the world over. Voltmer and Rawnsley (2009) contend that the media fulfils two main functions in democratic life: they provide a forum where all voices can be heard, and they engage in a dialogue with each other. This argument is in tandem with the theory of the public sphere postulated by Habermas (1989).

Kelly and Donway (1990) note that one important role of the media as the "watchdog of the society". However, Berger (2002) has noted that since much of the African media has played a political propagandist role or a developmentalist role, its watchdog role is nothing to write home about.

The roles of the media in the wave of democratisation have also caught the attention of African scholars. Notable scholars, such as Eribo and Jong-Ebot (1997) and Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu (2007), have provided empirical evidence linking media to democracy. Hyden, et al (2007: 1) note that communication shapes democratisation, but that the causal link between the two variables would be dependent on the extent to which political actors in the states allow freedom of expression, which would influence the behaviour of journalists.

Hyden and Okigbo (2007) argued that the relationship between the media and democracy was not a linear one but one that is influenced by a number of intervening variables, e.g., the degree of state control, media representation of people's interests in society and the media's international connections. Making recourse to the past, they contend that the current wave of democratisation spreading on the continent is not the first attempt of African states to democratise.

According to them, the first attempt at democracy took place during the struggle for independence, with democracy as an integral part of the political agenda, and that the media were active participants (p.31). The first wave of democracy was at independence, but, this soon fizzled out with the military taking over the reins of government in the 1970s and 1980s.

Hyden and Okigbo, (2007) and Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) have described this period as a neo-patrimonial and hegemonic era (1960 to 1989) in which African leaders were co-opted into the formal institutions of state in order to serve personal needs. Bratton (2009) opined that a new wave of transition to multi-party rule began with the Namibian decolonisation in the 1990s, and it subsided only after Nigeria returned to civilian government in 1999.

This is the period Huntington (1991) termed the third wave of democratisation in Africa. It should be noted that Bratton did not refer to Nigeria as returning to democratic rule but to civilian government. Africans experienced a long period of colonial government between 1885 and 1960, and they barely partook in the second wave of democratisation that accompanied the break-up of Communist rule in Europe in the middle 20th century.

Scholars have argued that the current democratic rule in most African states was due to the mass political action of the 20th century, which started in the European colonial empires, the economic crises plaguing African states, the end of the Cold War, and pressure from domestic civil society groups (Bratton, 1994, 2009, Huntington 1991, Haynes 1997, Maathai 2009). Thomson (2000: 217-220) wrote that what was taking place in Africa was the second liberation of the continent and they attributed the wave of democratisation to four factors. These are the state's loss of authority occasioned by economic crisis, a new international political environment, the rejuvenation of civil

society, and precedents such as the election of Nelson Mandela as president and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, all of which were responsible for the culture of multi-party politics in Africa.

Haynes (1997:77) provided a better scenario relating to the intervening variables that have facilitated the current democratic rule in Africa:

> Collectively, the demonstration effects provided by developments in Southern and Eastern Europe served as a catalyst for the later generation of calls for enhanced human rights and, by extension, greater democracy in the Third World.

At this juncture, critical remarks are inevitable: This research will attempt to validate the assumption that the street protests might not lead to truly democratic government, as recent developments in Egypt that pertain to the presidential election have revealed. The results of the electoral processes do not move in tandem with the aspirations of those who planned the series of protests that forced Hosni Mubarak out of government after 33 years in office. Second, it is the contention of this study that the waves of democratisation may not have brought the much anticipated dividend that was expected by scores of Africans in the last one and half decades of democracy on the continent. Indeed, this study intends to investigate the extent to which democracy and free Press had helped the cause of anti-corruption in Nigeria. Going by the verdicts of Neild (2002: 13), "the introduction of democracy that is commonly said, nowadays, to be a way of suppressing corruption may be far from the truth, as history from France, Germany and the United States point to the fact that democracy may result in more corruption". He cautioned that there was a need to keep an open mind on the relationship between democracy and clean government.

## 2.6    Media as an Instrument of Democratic Accountability

Proponents of democratic rule, as a system of governance, globally, accorded the media the position of a critical element that is needed in a democratic regime. This section will attempt to provide a theoretical explanation of the media's role as instruments of accountability in governance. In conceptualising accountability, Schedler (1999:14) has argued that the notion of

political accountability rests on two basic pillars: answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about, and explain, what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power-holders who have violated their public duties. Schedler concluded that the main aim of political accountability is to ensure that the exercise of power is a rule-guided enterprise.

O'Donnell and Sklar (1999) expanded the concept of accountability into two different parts, namely, horizontal and vertical accountability. Diamond et al, defined horizontal accountability as the capacity of state institutions to check abuses of other public agencies and branches of government. Invariably, the horizontal accountability consists of state actors, such as of the judiciary, executive and legislative arms of government. Vertical Accountability, on the other hand, refers to control exercised by citizens, mass media and civil associations, "to enforce standards of good conduct on public officials" (Diamond et al, 1999: 3). For the purpose of this study, the elements of vertical accountability belong to the class of non-state actors (Schelder, 1999: 340). Similarly, O'Donnell (1999) argued that regular coverage by the media of the wrongful acts of public authorities is a dimension of Vertical Accountability (p.30). He noted that when the media report on the acts of wrongdoing of those in public offices, and when there are no appropriate sanctions from the state, the media tend to become surrogate courts.

O'Donnell defined horizontal accountability as the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and that are, factually, willing and able to take action that spans from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful (Ibid: 38). He contended that effective horizontal accountability is not the product of isolated agencies but of networks of agencies that include top government functionaries (Ibid: 39). O'Donnell noted that there were two main directions in which horizontal accountability can be violated:

1. Unlawful encroachment by one state agency upon the proper authority of another; and

2. Unlawful advantages that public officials obtain for themselves and /or their associates. He noted that this second category can fit into the term "corruption" (Ibid: 41).

He concluded that the effectiveness of horizontal accountability is dependent, to a large extent, on the kind of vertical accountability that only the political system existing in a state provides (Ibid: 45). In essence, O'Donnell establishes that an active vertical accountability is required before a state can be said to be operating an effective horizontal accountability. This dovetails into the submission of Schelder (1999: 334), who suggests that horizontal and vertical accountability are interconnected. Schmitter, however, defined horizontal accountability as the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognized, collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation within a polity, that have equivalent capacities to monitor each other's behaviour and to react to each other's initiatives. These powers may be made up of mixes of public and private organisations, and they may act out of purely political, as well as legal, motives (Schmitter, 1999: 61).

Schmitter (1999) in T*he Limits of Horizontal A*c*countability,* has argued that horizontal accountability is a necessity if democracy is to protect itself from its own potential for self – destruction (p: 59). He contended that horizontal accountability may not work in some countries, especially those with a strong state tradition, "there is every reason to suspect that state agencies, no matter how formally independent from each other, will tend to collude, all in the name of "the national interest", (p: 60). However, Bonner (2009) argued that the media do not always provide social accountability, simply because of their political and economic interests which may affect what issues are covered or how they are covered.

Indeed, the political and economic interests of most newspapers affect the vertical accountability role of the media. Harber (2014 209), for instance, noted that the capacity of the media to cover everyday news is on the decline, as most newspapers in South Africa are cutting their staff strength and others are merging. Camaj (2013: 316) has also noted that the vertical accountability of the media, as an external control on corruption, is dependent on the freedom that is provided by the

political system of a state. Moreover, Pastor (1999) described the role of the international community in election monitoring as the third dimension of accountability.

Interestingly, Diamond et al (1999) have argued that some political systems work perfectly with horizontal accountability, while others do not. To them, the democratic tradition is, essentially, hostile to horizontal accountability, while Republicanism and Liberalism are more supportive of horizontal accountability. Though they were silent on which system works harmoniously with vertical accountability, it is the contention of this study that all three political traditions are complementary to vertical accountability. This study investigates how the concept of vertical accountability, as discussed above, has impacted positively on the level of transparency and probity in public life in Nigeria.

## 2.7 Critical Approaches/Theories of the Media

Several attempts have also been made by scholars to justify the relationship between politics and media in society. One of the early exercises in this regard was made by Siebert and three others in 1963, but rapid global changes and the rise of new media have since confined their theory to the archives. First, Hallin and Mancini (2004) note that the theory postulated in the 1960s can no longer be used to understand the way the media now operate in an information age. Baker (2002) argued that the social responsibility theory lacks any systematic critique of capitalist media ownership and funding.

Rejecting the social responsibility theory of Siebert et al, (1956) in analysis of the media, Nordenstreng (2006) noted the *Four Theories of the Press* had been valuable for setting in motion discussion on the role of the media in society, but that the problem of the classic was that it collapsed into one level of consideration and at least three levels of analyses: "philosophical doctrines, political systems, and the press systems were needed". Berger (2002: 23) notes that "today only die-hard neo-Hegelian idealists would accept this kind of explanation offered by social responsibility theory". However, Momoh (2012) wants the social responsibility theory of the media to be revived. He argued that the theory should be revived in view of the perceived social and communication changes of the 21st century. This idea needs further research. For the purpose

of this study, three theories were reviewed and these are: The Normative Theories of the Press, The Market-Driven Theory and The Political Economy Theory.

The social responsibility theory is one of the normative theories of the press. Baran and Davies (2003) have described normative theory as an ideal way for a media system to be structured and operated. McQuail (2005, 2007) noted that normative theory addresses the issues relating to media structure, conduct or performance. Normative theories, therefore, have important consequences for media practitioners, because they are predominantly used to guide and legitimise the conduct and operations of media systems in all democratic and free societies (Ferre et al, 2002; Baker, 2002; Bourdieu, 1998, Gans, 2003; and Habermas, 1989). For a very long period, the normative theories provided the basic setting of the standard for professional practice in the media industry.

Haerpfer et al (2009) took a nuanced approach to the normative theory of the media, emphasising three separate levels of analysis: philosophical doctrines, economic systems and political systems, for the media roles, but showing their interconnectivity and linkages: In the philosophical traditions, issues such as the corporatist, libertarian, social responsibility and citizens' participation were analysed with different models of democratic systems, e.g., pluralist, administrative, deliberative and direct systems. The role(s) of journalism were treated separately as monitorial, facilitative, collaborative and radical, in any given society.

Similarly, Hallin and Mancini (2010: 104-116) argued that the comparative analysis of media systems is crucial in preventing false generalisations and in helping to sort out the relationship between media systems and their social and political settings in any given society. Using the three media system models they covered 18 different countries of Western Europe and North America in order to analyse the workings of the media in relation to the existing political systems, and they argued that the early development of the press in all the three models was strongly connected with the world of politics and further justified the linkage between media and politics.

They analysed the three models by employing four variables: political parallelism, professionalism of journalism; state control; and the influence of the market, but they were silent on how

cultural/social factors are likely to impact upon the media. This is the major flaw of their models. While conceding that they deliberately refrained from universalistic theory in their analyses, they argued that other analyses should be based on a deep familiarity with particular media systems and their historical contexts, and how particular forms of economic and political development shaped the media system. (Hallin and Mancini, 2010:119). They noted**:**

> We believe that, in fact, of the three models we examine, it is actually the polarised pluralist model, with its high degree of media partisanship, for example, and strong history of state intervention, that will have the most relevance for understanding media systems in other parts of the world.

This study believes that the best approach for African states, at this stage of their development, is to come up with a refined model of the democratic corporatist system in which a strong commercial press, developed alongside a strong party press and public service media, is connected to organised social groups, with the last media serving the interests of the poor and marginalised segments of society.

This model will serve the democratic needs of African society, in view of the prospects it offers, as Hallin and Mancini (2010: 112-114) note:

> There is a high level of political parallelism with a high level of journalistic professionalization. Journalistic autonomy is relatively high in the Democratic Corporatist System. There are laws to protect the autonomy of journalists against intervention by media owners and protections for journalists in public broadcasting are also strong…. They also have strong press councils to monitor the press activities and the media are seen as institutions serving society as a whole.

The model appears to be an ideal system that can serve the interests of a democratic society with a free press, but the status quo in Nigeria is quite different. There are no laws that protect the autonomy of journalists against intervention by media owners. Media practitioners are at the mercy of their owners. The Nigerian Press Council exists, but is not active. This is because members of its Council are hand-picked by the government. The passage of the Freedom of Information Act is

yet to have an impact on the media's role as the watchdog of the society. Lagos State is already in Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act in its domain.

Taking a different view, Schudson (2010), in his four approaches to the sociology of news, argued that there were four distinct approaches to explain how news production occurs: political, economic, sociological and cultural perspectives. He particularly omitted the influence of technology. This position is flawed in several respects because of the growing influence of ICTs in the media industry across the globe (Castells, 2009; Webster, 2006). It may be argued that to exclude the influence of technology on the media in this information age can be likened to a car without any engine oil.

Furthermore, Curran (2010: 128-129) has asserted that concern should no longer be confined to the media's link to big business: "the media are big business and that the market cannot give rise to independent watchdogs serving the private interest but to corporate mercenaries which adjust their critical scrutiny to suit their private purpose". His verdict was that practical steps should be taken to shield the media from the corruption generated by both the political and economic systems, as the market does not guarantee critical scrutiny of either public or private power, which are crucial to democracy.

Gunther and Mughan (2000: 403) argued that the media are strongly shaped by the interactions among macro and micro level variables, and this interaction can take different forms in different countries. To them, the macro factors are political culture; the structure of society; media and government institutions; norms governing the relationships between journalists and politics; regulatory practices, and the level of technological development of the communication industries, which shape the media's messages and their patterns of circulation. At the micro level, issues such as the attitudinal or cultural proclivities; the degree of exposure to each communication medium; the level of education, the cognitive complexity; the degree of embeddedness in an autonomous subculture or network of secondary associations, are crucial in determining the political nature of the media in any given society. Gunther and Mughan (2000:404) revealed:

> Thus, the proper focus for studies of the relationship between the media and politics is not the search for universal generalisation, but the search for more middle-level and contingent theoretical propositions.

They asserted that democratisation and media freedom have a symbolic relationship. This somewhat aligns, with the argument of Ogundimu (2007:207), that the relationship between the media and democratisation is multi-disciplinary, straddling four variables—political, cultural, economic, and technological. He argued that, in the cultural and political domains, the relations go in both directions, that is, the media influences democratisation, and vice versa. In the economic and technological domains, it is a one-way direction, that is, economic and technological factors shape the media, but not vice versa.

This submission underscores the need to re-think the universal generalisation of the concepts of democracy and press freedom as panaceas for economic growth and development. The wide gap in technological advancement and economic growth in the West and the developing world made it imperative for media scholars, particularly those in Sub-Saharan African countries, to stop using concepts developed in the West to analyse and interrogate issues in their locality. As Gunther and Mughan (2000) rightly observed, sub-cultural norms of the professional ethics of a journalist, regulatory structures, and the conscious choices made by media and the political class that exist in the West, differ to what is operating in the South.

Gunther and Mughan (2000) conclude that the behaviour of the elite will, to a large extent, determine the effects of the media, and not the technology, as postulated by some scholars. Ogundimu (2000) has argued that the media alone are not enough to sustain democracy. Agbaje (1992) noted that attempts to conceptualise the role of the media in contemporary politics, outside of the state, economic forces, international relations, and social movements, are prone to futility.

The attitude of the political class, not that of the media, remains crucial, and this is what Ogundimu (2007: 234) described as being a paradox:

> We are faced with the paradox in Africa that democratisation is, itself, a threat to democracy, because it unleashes forces that tend to

spur political instability. The media may be able to play a stabilising role, but it would be wrong to assume that they alone can make the difference as far as democracy goes.

Essentially, Ogundimu admitted that the media remained weak in most countries in Africa, but that the media have been instrumental in bringing about regime change in a few cases; and can very rarely perform the advocacy, watchdog and agenda-setting roles that are associated with the press in the West. Ogundimu (2007) was quick to suggest that the media in Africa must be creative and imaginative in order to solve the problem of disjuncture with the publics, where one tends to rely on foreign media rather than on the local media.

The question is: how can the media attain these creative and imaginative roles advocated by Ogundimu, when the incentive to be creative is lacking, and the economic well-being of an average journalist is dwindling rapidly? Second, the political class has total control of the media in most countries in the continent. This suggestion may appear unrealistic in view of the economic challenges facing most African states. An important point to note is that theorising on African media must take note of the frequent political insecurities on the continent (Banda, 2010: 282). The ever changing media industry is now being analysed from the political economy theory perspective. This theory is relevant to the focus of this study and it will be deployed in analysing this research.

### 2.7.1    The Political Economy Theory of the Media

In the last decade, many scholars have analysed media from the perspective of political economy theory and, primarily, they have focused on the economic determinant as the crucial factor in the production, consumption and dissemination of media products (Golding and Murdock, 1991; Mosco, 2009; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). The emphasis is on making a profit, while serving the interests of citizens is secondary in the operations of the media, whether in the North or the South. Hardy (2010) argued that the communication industry has moved to the centre of global capitalism, and public media are thoroughly integrated into capitalist production. Mosco (2008), adopting the same line of argument, noted that political economy is the study of social relations, particularly of the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of

communication resources. Ojo (2007:106) asserted that political economy is the tool for understanding the material production in societies and in the building of social forces and classes.

McChesney (2008: 12) further explained the political economy of the media as:

> A field that endeavours to connect how media and communication systems are shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial support, technologies, labour practices, and government policies.

In other words, media practitioners must not only understand their discipline, they must know how politics, economic interests, conflicts and passions interact with, and affect, their subject.

Merlo (2012:1) traced the metamorphosis of the theory to over 200 years, starting around the late 1700s, with the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, but it did not gain recognition until around the 1950s:

> In fact, it was not until the 1950s that the term "political economy" started to have a different and more precise, meaning, separate from the general notion that politics and government policy are intimately interrelated.

The theory of political economy owes its epistemological root to a French historian, Fernand Braudel. However, Thussu (2012: 2) and Murdock and Golding (2010) differ on the root of the political economy approach, noting that the theory emerged as a result of the critique of capitalism postulated by Karl Marx (1818–83). Ojo (2007) also noted that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were generally regarded as the founders of scientific political economy. Golding and Murdock argued that the Marxist's interpretation of communication was based on the question of power, which, ultimately, was seen as an instrument of control by the ruling class (Thussu, 2012). Thussu's position goes in tandem with the argument of Hardy (2010), which described the media as being an instrument of class power.

Golding and Murdock (1997) have noted that the starting point of a political economy of mass media is the recognition that the mass media remain, first and foremost, an industrial and commercial organisation, which produces and distributes commodities. They argue that the

advances in technology have attracted capital into each medium (Golding and Murdock, 2007: 4-7).

Hardy (2010) stated that the presumption of the theory is that media content is influenced by a combination of media ownership, finance and support mechanism, such as advertising and government policies. Mosco (1996:73) further argued that the transformation of the Press, the electronic media and telecommunications from modest, often family-owned, enterprises into large businesses of the 20th century industrial order, was a major impetus for the development of the theory.

Reviewing the concept from a different perspective, Hardy (2010) argued that critical political economy shares many of the aspirations of liberal accounts of a citizens-serving media, but it challenges the ability of corporate owned media to create the more diverse outlets that are needed in a democratic media system.

More importantly, the critical political economy of the media focuses on the fact that culture is produced and consumed under capitalism as a fundamental issue in explaining the inequalities of power, prestige and profit (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 34). Hardy (2010) opined that critical political economy is concerned with the examination of the transformation of media, together with "big" questions about the relationships between the media, capitalism and democracy.

Murdock and Golding (2010:61-64) assert that critical political economy is different from the mainstream economy in many respects. For them, the critical political economy approach is holistic, historical, and is centrally concerned with the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention, and it goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage with basic moral questions of justice, equity and public good. They have argued that five historical processes were central to a critical political economy and these are the growth of the media; the extension of corporate reach; commodification; the universalisation of citizens; and the changing role of state and government intervention. Pointing out the distinct feature of a critical political economy to the study of the media, Murdock and Golding (2010: 65) noted:

> Classical political economists believe that public intervention ought to be minimised and market forces given the widest possible freedom of operation. Critical political economy, on the other hand, points to the distortion and inequalities of market system and these deficiencies can only be rectified by public intervention.

Furthermore, Murdock and Golding (2010: 65-73) noted that what constituted public good was a subject of debate within the critical political economy of the media, in which issues linking the constitution of a good society to the extension of citizenship rights and the right to participate fully in social life are discussed.

Dwayne and Yong (2011:11) identified four perspectives of the political economy of the media. They concluded that all approaches to the political economy of the media "take it as axiomatic that the media industries, the structure of the markets they operate in, the patterns of owners, the strategies of key players, trajectory of development and so on, are important objects of analysis". They argued that in-spite of the rise in mass communication and media conglomerates in the last decade, recent events, particularly the examination of media concentration by governments in Europe and the United States, are showing signs that indicate that "we may be witnessing the return of the State and standing on the cusp of a post neo-liberal era" (Dwayne and Yong, 2011:15). This aptly captures the high level of information management by several governments.

McQuail (2010: 96) argued that the political economic theory of the media is an offshoot of the Marxist analysis of the modern media system. He pointed out that, "political-economic theory is a socially critical approach that focuses, primarily, on the relations between economic structure and the dynamics of the media industries and the ideological content of the media. From this point of view, the media have to be considered as part of the economic system, with close links to the political system". In what appeared to be a major critique of the concept of the political economy theory of media, McChesney (2008: 287), argued that because the media are treated as a business, the media have become significant anti- forces, particularly in the USA. He noted that democracy and capitalism cannot co-exist.

While admitting that the media were not the sole or primary cause of the decline of democracy, McChesney (2008: 427) argued that media concentration accentuated the core tendencies of a profit-driven, advertising-supported media system, hyper-commercialism and the denigration of journalism and public service. ''It is poison posting for democracy''. He further argued that a corporate commercial media system has dire implications for politics and broader culture. This is what Robert Entman (1986), described as "we are living in a democracy without citizens". McChesney (2008) noted that political economy of the media has always been about the task of promoting participatory democracy; and media and communications systems are a means to an end, and the corruption of journalistic integrity is always bad, but it becomes obscene under conditions of extreme media concentration, as now exist (p: 432).

Journalism, he argued, needed democracy. "Its survival, as a credible entity, depends upon the media being democratic" (Ibid: 151). He, however, lamented that neo-liberalism is altering the democratic roles of the media. He noted that "neo-liberalism works best when there is a formal electoral democracy, but when the population is diverted from the information, access and public forums necessary for meaningful participation in decision making are not in place" (Ibid: 285).

McChesney (2008: 287) rejected the arguments of the neo-liberal guru, Milton Friedman, who noted that profit-making is the essence of democracy, and that any government that pursues anti-market policies is being anti-democratic, no matter how much informed popular support it might enjoy. Instead, McChesney asserted that, in view of the extraordinary importance of media and communications in society, the subject of how the media is controlled, structured and subsidised should be at the centre of democratic debate (McChesney 2008: 427).

Taking a different view on the issue, Keane (1991:192) noted that there was a need to rethink the relationship between the media and democracy, contending that absolute liberty of the Press, in any given society, is not possible, as it has been advocated by free press advocates. He further argued that the market-led media, championed by the likes of Rupert Murdoch, does not provide a better alternative. Keane therefore advocated a revised public service model that accommodates a free press and market-led media forces. Keane correctly observed: "a society that is drugged on

either money or political authority, and contains no controversies over freedom of expression and representation, is a society that is surely dying or dead".

McManus (1994) explained that market-driven values and journalism cannot co-exist, because they are mutually exclusive. The market phenomenon, Curran and Seaton (1991:39) argued, gives the advertisers a '*de-facto* licensing authority' over the media since, without their support, many newspapers would fold. The end result of this market-driven journalism is that the ratio of the editorial content of the media is on the decline. This is what Cronkite (1997) described as sound bite journalism where too many stories were dictated by spin doctors and media experts resulting in an obsession with sound bites and pictures while issues that matters were neglected and investigation journalism suffered. Golding and Murdock (2005) opined that the media, especially public service broadcasting, operate in the context of capitalism, and this encourages the concentration of ownership, conglomeration and media imperialism.

. Although the commercialisation of the media allows the availability of more information, the quality of this information, as well as the public understanding of it, is declining. This, according to Williams, poses a "threat to democracy; public ignorance and apathy is growing as the serious, challenging and truthful are being pushed aside by trivial, sensational, vulgar and manipulated stories" (Williams, 2003:230).

On the contrary, Doyle (2006: 13) believed that the commercialisation of the media industry is not all bad. According to her, media commercialization is a kind of fresh air that is needed in the news market. She argued that, with commercialisation, the media would have access to more resources for innovation, and would have an increased range of output, as well as providing a chance for previously media-deprived communities to receive news. However, McChesney and Nichols (2010:96-97) argued that the media should be funded by the State to save the industry from total collapse, thus deepening the cause of democracy.

Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) argued that, in Africa, particularly Nigeria, where the ruling elite is corrupt and runs the state for its own interests, the political economy theory of the media will

suffice, because the elite class need the market to introduce new institutions. All these theories are relevant, but the Political Economy Theory is very useful to this study and it will be deployed in assessing the impact of a corrupt media on democracy, as well as the anti-corruption drive in Nigeria. The Political Economy Theory is useful to this study because its sees the content, style and form of media products, whether news, features, films, cinema or drama, as being shaped by the structural features of ownership, advertising and audience spending (Williams, 2003:56).

## 2.8 Theories of Corruption

To fully understand the existence and persistence of corruption in some states, a conceptual and empirical perspective is needed. Some theoretical postulations have attempted to explain this global malaise. Shah (2006: 236) posited that these ideas can be broadly grouped into three categories: the Principal–Agent Model, New Public Management Perspectives, and Neo-Institutional Economic Models.

### 2.8.1 Principal-Agent Model

Shah (2006) noted that the most widely used modelling strategy is the Principal-Agent model. He argued that a common thread in this model is that the government is led by a benevolent dictator (Principal), who is out to encourage government officials (Agents) to use public resources in a judicious manner and in the interest of the larger society. Under this Principal-Agent Model, several variants have been postulated to explain the phenomenon of corruption.

➢ **The Crime and Punishment Model** was developed by Gary Becker (1968). This model stated that scores of public officials will engage in the corrupt practices of accepting or demanding bribes as long as the expected gains of their acts exceed the expected costs of detection and punishment. To tackle this kind of corruption, it was suggested that the discretional power of the public official should be reduced and this would thus increase the probability of detection and the penalty for corrupt activities. Klitgaard (1988) later re-modelled this view thus: unrestrained monopoly power and the discretionary authority of government officials are responsible for corruption in the public sector. He states that:
**Corruption=Monopoly +Discretion- Accountability**

Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1978) deployed this model to explain corruption among elected officials and petty bureaucrats. To curtail corruption, strong internal controls should be introduced. Shah's model gained wide acceptance in public policy circles and it served as a foundation for empirical research and policy design in combating administrative, bureaucratic and petty corruption in Asian countries in the 1990s. However, he cautioned that this model was not appropriate in highly corrupt countries (Shah, 2006: 236-237).

- ➤ **The Legislators and Elected Public Officials.** While Becker and Klitgaard's variant of the Principal-Agent Model focused on public officials, this model stated that lawmakers and other elected public officials institute or manipulate policy and legislation in favour of particular interest groups and in exchange for "rents" or side payments. Legislators seek monetary gain from corrupt practices and assess their chances of being re-elected against the probability of being caught, punished, and losing an election, and doing so with their reputation battered. This conceptual framework is used to analyse political corruption or state capture, as in the case of Nigeria.

- ➤ This model was later re-designed as the agency model of corruption (Jain, 2001: 86). Jain, citing the work of Rose-Ackerman (1978), noted that legislative corruption cannot survive in a world of perfect information. He concluded that there was potential for corruption and legislators would balance increased income from corruption against reduced chances of re-election (2001: 86). Under this model, it is foreseen that the level of corruption within a society would result from an interaction of economic and political pressures within the society. Several variants of this agency model also exist, with the conclusion that policy-makers are viewed as predatory agents who are able to ignore the interests of their principals, almost completely.

- ➤ **Three–tier Principal-Supervisor-Agent Model:** This is an extension of the conventional Principal-Agent Model and was developed by Guriev (1999: 2). In Guriev's three-tier model, the mid-level official supervises the agent and reports to the principal.

He concluded that there was co-habitation of the top-level and bottom-level corruption, thus leading to a higher degree of corruption (Guriev, 1999: 23).

- ➢ **Industrial Organization Model.** This model was postulated by Shleifer and Vinhny in 1993. This model explains how governments function under centralised and decentralised forms of corruption. They concluded that, under centralised corruption, bureaucracies act like a joint monopoly, whereas, under decentralised corruption, bureaucracies behave as independent monopolies. To Shleifer and Vinhny, when bureaucracies acted as independent monopolies, the cumulative bribe burden tends to be higher (Shleifer and Vinhny, 1993:615).

- ➢ **Centralised and Decentralised Corruption Model.** This is another variant of the Principal-Agent Model. Waller, Verdier, and Gardner (2002: 689-690) distinguished between centralised and decentralised forms of corruption. They defined decentralised corruption as a system in which higher-level officials collect a fixed amount of bribe-income from each public official who takes bribes, without knowing the amount of bribe collected by the lower-level bureaucrats, while, in a centralised system, the bribe size collected by the lower-level officials is determined by the higher level of government, and this bribe is later redistributed between the two levels. For them, decentralised corruption is less harmful to the economy than a centralised form of corruption. Shah (2006) admitted that the effects of these forms of corruption varies widely in regimes. Enweremadu (2013), for instance, noted that Indonesia experienced more rapid economic development than Nigeria, partly because the country experienced a more centralised or organised form of corruption, while Nigeria experienced a decentralised form of corruption.

These variants of the Principal-Agent Model have been widely criticised. Groenedijk (1997: 210) posited that the Principal-Agent Theory has not been fully used to enhance our understanding of corruption. He argued that, contrary to the view held by advocates of the Principal-Agent Model, there was a divergence of interests between the principal and agent, "the actions of the agent do

not fully determine the outcomes, and the principal cannot, costlessly, monitor these actions. (Ibid: 213). He revealed that the main weakness of this model is that it lumps together the dis-utilities of different individuals (Ibid:213-214). Groenendijk noted that a related criticism is that "it is unclear whom the 'agency problem' concerns: the principal or the agent? Much of the earlier agency literature focused on the normative aspects of the principal-agent relations, from the angle of the principal" (Ibid: 214).

While re-designing the Principal-Agent Model, he insisted that an agent can decide not to be cooperative with the principal, contrary to the view of Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman. He concluded that the principal of these individuals, has the advantage that he can prescribe the pay-off rules, and that, supposing he is the agent's superior, he can use directives to control the agent. On his part, the agent can take advantage of the fact that the principal is faced with a lack of information about the agent's actions and also with uncertainty about the link between these actions and the outcomes. He argued that, in his model, that the principal and the agent are equally matched is no repudiation of the possible hierarchical character of the relationship between the principal and the agent, as is shown by the possibility that the principal, as the agent's superior, uses directives to curb the agent's behaviour (Ibid: 214).

### 2.8.2   *New Public Management Frameworks (NPM)*
This focuses on the fundamental discord within the public sector, especially, with its authorising environment, operational culture and capacity. Shah (2006: 240) noted that this discord contributed to such a level of impunity in government that the bureaucrat engages in rent-seeking behaviour, while citizens lack the necessary powers to constrain them. To tackle the discord, it was suggested that fundamental civil service and political reforms should be pursued to create a government that is under contract and is accountable. Shah (2006) argued that the fundamental goal of this framework was to ensure a greater emphasis on government accountability to the citizens through voice and exit mechanisms. Consequently, NPM is expected to reduce the opportunities for corruption (Ibid: 240). This model was later re-modelled as concept of the Citizens-centered Governance Model. Shah (2006) contended that citizens should be empowered to hold the government accountable and, thus, to reduce the opportunities for corruption. However, some scholars have rejected this model, arguing that NPM is capable of leading to higher corruption

rather than greater accountability (Batle.y 1999. Von Maravic and Reichard, 2003, and Scharpf 1997).

### 2.8.3   Neo-Institutional Economic Frameworks

This approach argues that corruption results from the opportunistic behaviour of public officials, as citizens are not empowered to hold public officials accountable for their corrupt acts or they face high transaction costs when doing so. Under this model, citizens are treated as principals, and public officials as agents. Principals are faced with incomplete information, while agents (public officials) are better informed. Owing to the difference in access to information, public officials indulge in opportunistic behaviour that goes unchecked and, in the process; the principals face high transaction costs. The end result is that there is a lack of the adequate countervailing institutions through which to enforce accountability on those in positions of authority.

Due to several inadequacies, e.g., a weak judiciary, a lack of public safety and weak enforcement mechanisms, in corrupt countries, those who are victimised by corruption are afraid to seek legal redress for fear of retaliation from the interests of the powerful. It is therefore recommended that citizens' empowerment, (through devolution, citizens' charters, bills of rights, credible elections, and other forms of civic engagements), be given priority in order to reduce corruption (Shah, 2006: 242). This model predicted that most of the anti-corruption programmes are unlikely to succeed, because they have failed to address the opportunities for corruption in the existing systems.

### 2.8.4   Patron-Client System

Anthropologists have used the culture of gift exchange to explain how social interactions amount to corruption, while others have stressed the importance of "solidarity networks and the logic of patron-clientism through which power and prestige depend on the redistribution of accumulated wealth that, in logic, encourages corruption", (Olivier de Sardan, 1999, Smith, 2001). This model stated that corruption, especially in Africa, can be explained through patronage between Africans and their leaders. Corruption is fueled by informal obligations and demands. These obligations are often fulfilled through corrupt enrichment. Under this model, corruption existed through mass participation and cultural toleration in the society. Richard Joseph, in a 1987 book, *Democracy*

*and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and the Fall of the Second Republic,* appeared to have provided empirical evidence for this model.

The above models reaffirm the widely held view that the incidence of corruption cannot be understood though a single model. However, for the purposes of this study, a combination of the Principal-Agent Model and the Patron-Client Framework would be deployed to explain the incidences of corruption and other public abuses in Nigeria. The variants of the Principal-Agent that are used to explain corruption are the crime and the punishment, as well as the legislators and the elected public officials. They are adopted because the models provide useful information with which to develop an understanding of corruption in Nigeria.

### 2.8.5   Theoretical Framework of the Media

For a credible study on attitudes towards corruption, it is imperative to provide a theoretical foundation through which to gain a knowledge of the nature of corruption and the expected role of the media in the fight against corruption. Ekundayo (2012: 3) identified three key theoretical foundations upon which an understanding of press freedom and anti-corruption in a democracy can be built. The theories include: the behavioural approach, modernisation theory and institutional theory.

*Behavourial Theory: C*orruption cannot take place without human interactions. Some scholars have argued that the human nature is inherently prone to corruption and it is therefore necessary to have rules and regulations governing human interaction, even in the Stone Ages. Kpundeh (1995) posited that a personal or individual level analysis of corruption is simply a consequence of human nature, and that human beings are all subject to greed and can behave corruptly to "rationally maximise their gain". Ekundayo (2012) argued that the values peculiar to a society will influence its perception and understanding of corruption and, by extension, the place of the media. He stressed that the behavioural basics of a society, to a large extent, will determine the role of the media in anti-corruption in a democratic setting. It can thus be deduced that the value systems of a society will not only be a constraint on the media, but will also provide the platform for both the media practitioners and the general public.

*Institutional Influences:* This approach is premised on the assumption that mass attitudes to democracy and its values are one of the results of well-enshrined principles of formal and informal institutions of the state. Kpundeh (1995) noted that corruption is a deep-seated problem, rather than merely the workings of a few bad individuals. He argued that most institutional corruption can be linked to structural problems, such as inefficient auditing procedures. This position tallies with the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), who label corruption the "new" arch-enemy of development in Africa (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 273; and Dahlstrom, 2002: 1). Corruption is described as being endemic and systemic, due to the pressures, demands and influences that are brought to bear upon government officials by members of the public, and these are critical forces in shaping the actions and decisions of those in power (Kpundeh, 1995: 6).

Ekundayo (2012) consequently stated that institutions remain the bedrock of a vibrant media in anti-corruption campaigns. He argued that it was "almost impossible" to have a vibrant media when critical state institutions are weak. The supporting institutions are the laws and the legal system, civic and religious bodies and educational institutions. He further noted that what must agitate the minds of researchers using this approach is finding plausible responses to the challenges of the ethno-religious lines of division in most of the African states, and the lack of a democratic ethos among the leaders. In essence, the ethno-religious divisions and the type of political system, (be it one-party, two-party, or a multi-party state) will be likely to influence the corruption index of a society.

*Modernisation Theory*: This theory explains the factors that facilitate social mobility and promote the adoption of mass attitudes (McQuail, 2008: 84). Barker (2008) defined modernisation as a post-Middle Ages, post-traditional order that is marked by change, innovation and dynamism. It encourages industrialisation, but one major feature of modernisation is the promotion of capitalism as a means of organising modern states (Barker, 2008: 178). It comes with the destruction of traditional ways of doing things and allows for the greed of the few. Modernisation theory underpins the assumption that the ideological and political systems of developing countries would be harmonised with those of the liberal West (Mikula, 2008: 128). To those in the West, developing countries' lack of democratic progress is due, largely, to widespread poverty, a small middle class,

gender inequality and violence, all of which have limited the level of the public that shows an interest in democratic governance (Mamdani, 1996). As Ekundayo (2012) puts it, the economic conditions of a country can be a major factor in knowing the operations of the media and the anti-corruption efforts in such a country. Corruption and the role of the media in the anti-corruption campaigns in Africa, as this research will attempt to show later, can thus be explained in one of these ways.

### 2.8.6    The Theory of Globalisation and its Impact on the Media

The enthronement of global capital by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), through policies of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, seriously erode the democratic role of the media. What is globalisation, and its impact on the media in Africa, especially in Nigeria? McChesney, (1998: 2) has defined globalisation as "the process by which economic activity, political values and culture have ceased to be constrained by geography and territory", and this blurring of borders is facilitated by the media.

Concretely put, William (1994; 224) notes that the media are seen as 'the shock troops' of the global cultural revolution as millions of people living far away from their countries of origin are easily connected to their roots through global media. Ampuja (2004) also argues that the essential feature of the globalisation of the media is the ongoing commodification of culture, which allows the emergence of a worldwide capitalistic system that promotes the interests and values of the powerful corporations which give rise to the ubiquitous brands.

This is what Watson and Hill (2003: 173) term media imperialism. To them, media imperialism is the process whereby the western capitalist media dominate 'Third World' countries with the aid of communication systems. Similarly, Richstad (2000: 277) has described this phenomenon as both cultural imperialism and communication imperialism. He notes that the influx of Western media products and the Western way of life, through programming such as *Big Brother*, were eroding indigenous cultures and values. Richstad concludes that there is no even dissemination of communication between the West and the Third World nations, stressing that only a one-way flow of information exists from the West to the Third World. News from the Third World is rarely reported in the West, except for the negative stories.

Narrowing the concept of media imperialism down to Nigeria, Umechukwu (2001: 135) posits that media imperialism is responsible for the ethnic prejudice system that pervades the Nigerian press. He notes that this affects the capacity of the media to perform credibly in the society, as issues of national importance in the media are framed from ethnic and religious perspectives.

More importantly, Williams (1994:224) argues that globalisation allows the audience to engage in two-way communication through the inter activity of technologies, such as the internet, email and the World Wide Web. Like every such concept, there are optimistic and pessimistic globalisers. The pessimists emphasise that new technologies increased the gap between the rich and poor, as well as corporations' control over global culture and the media. In fact, Akindele, Gidado and Olaopo (2002: 9) have argued that globalization is a form of entrapment for Africa, noting that globalization will lead Africa to "increased penury".

The optimistic globalisers have emphasised that new technologies allow for the diffusion of Western institutions across the world through which cultures are crushed. The world now has interdependence and planetary consciousness (Williams, 1994), thus allowing for what the media theorist McLuham (1964) called a global village. Williams (1994) further argues that globalisation blurs the cultural identities of local people, which pessimistic globalisers believe to be a threat to the nation state and the national identity. The end result of globalisation is that national government cannot prevent, regulate or censor the traffic on the information superhighway that is brought to their countries, thus freeing local people from narrow national contexts (Ampuja, 2004:67-70).

One thing that can be deduced from the globalisation theory is its logic of commodification, capital accumulation, profit maximization and competition, which permeates the world social order, including the media sector (Wood, 1997). Although foreign technologies, facilitated by globalisation, engendered the free flow of news and information in Africa, they have not been able to guarantee press freedom due to corruption and the lack of participatory democracy.

Globalization is increasingly widening the gap between the rich and the poor in the society and, in the process, the capacity of the media as a vehicle for social mobilization and participation, which are essential ingredients of democracy, is declining across the globe.

### 2.8.7    Relevance of These Theories to the Study

This study has adopted the Patron-Client and the Principal-Agent Models because they provide deeper insight into a knowledge of the drivers of corruption in Nigeria. First, the Principal-Agent Model variants (the crime and punishment, and two of the variants are based on the following premises:

- They seem to best explain the grand and legislative corruption in Nigeria.

- There are excessive discretionary powers for bureaucrats in Nigeria.

- Citizens lack the necessary adequate information to hold the state agents accountable.

- Amoral legislators easily and quickly find themselves re-elected into public offices.

- The chances of being caught for corrupt acts are far less than the benefits to be gained and there is no adequate punishment for the corrupt persons in the society.

- The type of electoral system appears to favour only the affluent, and thus rent-seeking is high.

- There is a general lack of democratic institutions and traditions in place, and the institutions of accountability of governance are non-existent.

- There is a weak judiciary.

- There is a lack of political will on the part of those in authority to fight corruption and other social vices.

More importantly, this study also deployed the Patron-Client Model on the following premises:

- A typical Nigerian politician faces much financial pressure from family, clan, and ethnic constituents.

- In Nigeria, corruption seems to be a connivance activity, since almost every sector is involved.

- The absence of state welfare institutions forces citizens to rely on politicians and bureaucrats for basic social facilities, with informal obligations and demands at the heart of politics.

- Corruption appears to be well tolerated in Nigeria.

- There are the solidarity networks which seem to justify robbing the state at the expense of one's kith and kin.

### 2.8.8   Basic Assumptions of These Theories

a. Corruption flourishes when the institutions of government are weak.

b. Corruption will flourish where there is a giver and a taker.

c. The absence of adequate sanctions for corrupt practices promotes corruption in society.

d. Unregulated monopoly and unbridled impunity enable corruption to flourish in the society.

e. Clientelism and prebendalism facilitate corruption.

f. Corruption is pervasive in all societies, but to various degrees.

## 2. 9    Summary

From the analyses so far, it is clear that the assumption that democratic rule is alien to Africa was an incorrect perception. Indeed, democratic virtues were inherent to most African societies' cultures and it would therefore be wrong to describe the on-going process in Africa as being made up of waves of democratisation. First, it is the contention of this researcher that the correct description ought to be the 'resuscitation of African democratic culture, which was destroyed and buried by colonialism.' Second, scholars in Sub-Saharan Africa must come up with a democratic ethos that recognises the communal nature of most African societies, advocating the application of a Western concept of democracy which encourages individualism and that appears to be unwieldy and expensive for the continent. The idea of democracy without elections may be given serious consideration in view of the social and economic challenges that confront the continent.

Literature on the forms of democracy, the role of the media in strengthening democratic rule, media as an instrument of democratic accountability and theories of the media, were analysed in order to have an understanding of the various issues. The Normative Theory, the Market-Driven Theory and the Political Economy Theory of the Media were discussed, but emphasis was placed on the Political Economy Theory because it is best suited to explaining and understanding how the mass media are influenced by the political and economic factors.

# CHAPTER THREE

# RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

## 3.1    Introduction

The methodologies employed for this study are largely qualitative and nominally quantitative research design. Qualitative methods were used to obtain the primary data for the entire study. A qualitative research method allowed the research "to share in the understanding and perception of others and explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives" (Berger, 2007: 8-9). In specific terms, in-depth individual interviews, documentary research and discourse analysis techniques were used as research tools for this study. The advantages and disadvantages of using these methods are examined. Data drawn from major stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector of the Nigerian economy were used to complement the primary data gathered through the qualitative research methods. This chapter examines the types of research strategies used, the nature of the data obtained, the sources of data, the methods of collection, the ethical issues involved, the challenges encountered, and how they were resolved, as well as giving a brief background of each of the participants. On the whole, the main goal of this section is to demonstrate the data gathering and the experience of the researcher during the field research.

## 3.2    Justification of Methodological Instruments

One basic fundamental framework required for all research work, whether qualitative or quantitative, is the choice of the specific methods used in any study. Consequently, researchers are expected to be careful and to engage in intensive scrutiny of their methods before embarking on any exercise. The challenge is further compounded by the non-availability of a single method with which to conduct research in the media and cultural industries (Snipe and Spencer, 2000: 2). The subject area, the media and cultural studies, determines the best approach to be employed in carrying out research in the social sciences. Stokes (2003:19) has argued that the object of analysis and the theoretical approach will determine the method to be used. Silverman (2000) noted that the objectives of a study are critical to the choice of research method. This approach is also called research design. Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008:46) defined research design as the logical structure of the research work.

This study deployed a mixed-methods approach. This allows for the combination of two or more methods in order to avoid the weaknesses that may be associated with one method. Stokes (2003) described this as a triangulation method. Stokes argued that the idea of triangulation is that one method confirms or reinforces another (Stokes, 2003:27). The triangulation method, as Ritchie (2000: 46) noted, involves "the use of different methods and sources to check the integrity of or extend, inferences drawn from the data". The triangulation method deployed for this study involves the use of in-depth interviews, the analysis of newspapers, and critical discourse analysis.

*3.2.1 In-Depth Interviews*
An interview is a conversation between two people with the objective of collecting relevant information for the purposes of research. Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant's experiences. The interviewer can pursue in-depth information around the topic. This study uses the in-depth interview, and it was deployed because of its usefulness. Kvale (2006: 841) puts it more correctly:

> The interviews give voice to common people, allowing them to freely present their life situations in their own words, and open for a close personal interaction between the researchers and their subjects.

Kvale (1983: 174) notes that in-depth interviews are the best form of approach for qualitative data collections. Kvale (1996: 1-2) opined "if you want to know how people understand their world and their life, why not talk to them?" The qualitative research interviews used for this study attempt to understand the world from the subjects' points of view, and to unfold the meaning of people's experiences. Easterby-Smith et al (2012: 128) argued that there are three kinds of interviews: highly structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. According to Easterby-Smith et al, researchers ought to know the advantages and disadvantages of each of the methods before choosing the type of interview. The interview method used for this study was semi-structured, as "it often gives a higher degree of confidentiality and the replies of the interviewees tend to be more personal in nature". Furthermore, it encourages the respondents to express themselves widely on issues raised. Denscombe (2003) and Easterby-Smith et al (2012) noted that interviewees' answers are open-minded, and this permits them to respond to questions based on their life/work

experiences. Indeed, the semi-structured interview allowed this researcher to exercise control over the nature and length of the answers allowed for each interviewee, so as not to lose track of the whole exercise.

This study used the in-depth interview method because it allows the interviewer to identify non-verbal clues from the interviewees. Non-verbal cues, such as voice, intonation, body language, etc., always add to the verbal answer of the interviewee. Besides, Green and Thorogood (2014: 125) argued that one major limitation of interview as a source of data was that 'they only provide access to what people say, not what they do and it is difficult to know any 'essential truth' on their response. The interviewer and interviewee also directly react to what the other says or does during an in-depth interview session (Wengraf, 2001: 194). It is very easy to terminate an interview, if compared to other research methods.

Similarly, in the course of an in-depth interview, a tape recorder may be permitted. Experiences in the field show that using a tape recorder ensures that the interview report is more accurate than it would be by merely writing out notes. The main disadvantage of using a tape recorder is that it is time consuming to transcribe the entire interview. Bryman (2001) notes that one hour of tape takes five to six hours to transcribe.

Indeed, Easterby-Smith et al (2012) listed six practical issues that may affect the outcome of an interview. They include: obtaining trust; being aware of social interaction; using appropriate language; getting access; choosing the location for the interview; and recording interviews. All these were fully observed in the course of the interviews which took place in Abuja, Lagos and Ibadan, three major metropolises in Nigeria.

Data was collected for the study primarily through detailed interviews with select- stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector in Nigeria. They include the former heads of the anti-corruption agencies, politicians, legal practitioners, civil society activists, religious leaders and media practitioners. Interviewees were chosen based on selective sampling. Sampling means the

"scientific" process of picking manageable population sizes that would enable a researcher to derive data for his study, as well as drawing inferences that are capable of findings.

Twenty-five persons: two former chairmen of ICPC, one former member of EFCC staff, one former senior official at the Code of Conduct Bureau, two religious leaders, three practising journalists, two veteran journalists, one labour leader, two civil activists, two politicians, two legal practitioners, three staff from the anti-corruption agencies, two retired academics and two federal lawmakers, were selected for the interviews. The interviewees were chosen based on specific traits. These traits include work experience and their position on the integrity issues. This sampling is what, Wimmer and Dominick (2000: 84) have described as the purposive sampling technique. For them, a purposive sample is a "subject selected on the basis of specific characteristics or qualities". This study deployed the In-Depth Interview (IDI) as the primary source of data collection for the study.

Specifically, Sarantakos (2013: 55) noted that many researchers are opting for mixed-methods approach because the methods offered them the possibility of achieving high standard, validity, popularity and credibility. Although mixed methods research have been criticized by some scholars but it remains an acceptable procedure in social research (Sarantakos 2013: 56).

### 3.3 Methods for Qualitative Data Collection

Easterby-Smith et al have argued that there are three basic approaches and tools for collecting qualitative data, and they have termed them *natural language data, observation* and *interactive* methods. The natural language data method involves using language to gain insight into social and organizational realities. Views, perceptions and opinions of the critical stakeholders in the field are discovered, and this is achieved through the in-depth interview (Easterby-Smith, 2012:126). The second grouping, which is termed the *observation method,* basically involves an ethnographic approach. This method deploys the examination and understanding of symbols, settings and observation in a context, achieved through, either participation, non-participation and, sometimes, visual methods, and the last tools are described as *interactive methods,* which involves such instruments as photographs or other visual metaphors. This study deployed in-depth interviews and documentary research. This qualitative research is explanatory in nature because it is

concerned with why the media are corrupt and what forces and influences these acts of corruption (Ritchie, 2000: 28).

Archives, libraries and the Internet were also used as secondary sources. An enormous amount of data on the corruption in the country exists in the public domain, but this study focuses on textual information and analyses, which Easterby-Smith *et al* have termed archival research (Ibid: 50). Major sources for archival research deployed for this study include: newspaper stories, official/annual reports and the in-house quarterly magazines of the various anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, where their activities and achievements are reported. Archival data are usually part of secondary data sources and these secondary data are used to complement the primary data sources. The main difference is that primary data is collected by the researcher who can frame the data collection after the research questions (Ibid.140).

Having practised journalism for two decades, and as a member of staff in the media department of one of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, ICPC, my exposure to these two different professions has given me leverage and has thus created "a strong form of constructionism" (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012: 51). It should be stated that the usage of mixed methods is still a subject of major debate among researchers, with those in favour arguing that using a range of different methods within the same study will increase the validity and generalization of results and the potential theoretical contribution, and those against the mixed methods doubting the competence of researchers to deploy different methods, and their possible ability to manage the contradictions that might emerge in the course of such an approach (Ibid: 61).

Qualitative research is used for this study in order to address the five research questions that have been asked to facilitate an understanding of corruption within the media and its consequences for their advocacy role (Snipe and Spencer, 2003: 5). Qualitative research was deployed because it allows me, the researcher, to attach meaning to people's actions, decisions, beliefs and values (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Bryman, 1988: 8 and Snipe and Spencer, 2003: 3). Quantitative research was sparingly used to make inferences from the data sourced from secondary sources.

All the interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2014 in Nigeria. Access to the interviewees was facilitated by the contacts that this researcher had earlier developed as a journalist. Since the issue of corruption is openly discussed in the country, as well as being widely reported in the media, it was not difficult for the respondents to state their views. However, in order to avoid any uniformity of opinions that may arise from members who belong to the same professions, efforts were made to contact people who were not working in the same office/organisation and, in the process, this study managed to tap into their reservoir of knowledge. This enabled the researcher to obtain access to a diverse range of views from various stakeholders.

All the interviews were audiotaped with the permission of the respondents and they were transcribed in full soon after the interview-sessions. Notes were also taken copiously during the interviews and expanded in detail later. These written notes supplemented the recorded interviews.

Each interview lasted about 45minutes. The venues/settings of the interviews were decided by each of the respondents. Most of the interviews were conducted in formal or informal settings, such as living rooms, a study, the press centre, while others were held in formal office rooms and news rooms. A few of the respondents, especially media practitioners, preferred to be interviewed at the weekend. As most of the stakeholders interviewed were fluent in English, the major part of the interviews was conducted in the English language. In the course of the interviews, some respondents resorted to their local languages to emphasise their arguments. The oral tradition was employed by this researcher to allow people to tell their own stories. Storytelling—narrative—is crucial to how people communicate their understanding of the world, and stories are seen as the primary means by which we articulate, store and communicate knowledge and experience (Mikula, 2008: 133).

The interviews centred on how the anti-corruption agencies deployed the media in their campaigns; the role(s) of the non-state actors in the drive to reducing corruption in the country; what role the journalists ascribed to themselves in the campaign, if any; the impact of democratic rule on the media and other non-state actors in the crusade against graft and other social vices, together with

other issues that emerged during the course of data collection. The interviews were aided by a semi-structured interview guide.

Additional data on corruption were collected from: Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1960, 1966, and 1999); Freedom of Information Act (2011); ICPC Act (2000); EFCC Act (2004); Code of Conduct Act; ICPC Law Reports (2013); and ICPC Annual Reports (2002 to 2015). A sample of the major accounts of corruption that appeared in newspapers during the period covered by this research work were collected. Opinion articles and news reports related to corruption during the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007) and the Yar'Adua/ Jonathan regime (2007-2014) were collected mainly from four English Language newspapers: *The Punch, The Daily Trust*, *the Nigerian Tribune* and *ThisDay*. Occasionally, stories from online media, such as *Sahara Reporter, Premium Times Online, and African Examiner,* were used to complement newspaper reports on corruption. *The Punch* and *Nigerian Tribune,* both based in the South-West, were picked because of their circulation, while *ThisDay and Daily Trust* were picked in order to know how the location and ownership structure are reflected in the framing of stories.

An important aspect of this thesis is the analysis of two cases: one involving former President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, in 2006, and the Otedola/Faroukfuel subsidy scam in 2012. The choice of two stories as case studies is based on their resounding impact on the well-being of the citizens of the country. The Obasanjo/Atiku scams exposed the depth of political corruption in the country, and the fuel subsidy scam showed the connivance of political elites and the deprivation caused to the basic social necessities of life.

Finally, the proceedings of the Anti-Corruption Committee of the Nigerian Senate were observed during one of its sessions preceding the passage of the 2012 and 2013 annual budget of the ICPC and EFCC. The researcher also observed one of the visits of the House of Representatives Committee on Anti-Corruption and National Ethics in the course of its oversight functions to the ICPC Headquarters in Abuja, in 2013. This not only aided the political construction of issues that are related to corruption, but also allowed the researcher to assess the commitment of the two

committees to the anti-corruption campaigns. In the course of these sessions, notes and information distributed to the press were collected.

## 3.4 Methods of Data Analysis

This study is largely qualitative, and nominally quantitative, as it deployed frequency and percentage sparingly. Discourse analysis is also a form of collection of the data used in natural language data. Shaw and Bailey (2009) define "discourse analysis as the detailed study of language in use such as talk, written text and symbol. It is concerned with the technique and competencies involved in successful and unsuccessful conversation. They noted that this allow researchers to build up a model of social life from an empirical understanding of actual linguistic event (Shaw and Bailey, 2009: 7). This method is not limited to conservations, but it may combine other textual sources, such as newspaper articles, newspaper headlines, sign language, including non-verbal cues (Ibid:199). Gregen (1999) noted that there are three main ways of viewing discourse analysis and these involved structure, rhetoric, or discourse as process. Easterby-Smith et al argued that language and linguistic systems and practices are formative in shaping social and organization realities. Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that Critical Discourse Analysis allow researchers to gain proper understanding of how language functions in articulating and transmitting of knowledge in a given situation. Mogashoa (2014) noted that written or oral messages convey meanings when analyse. Furthermore, Critical Discourse Analysis, Easterby-Smith *et al* argue, offered a useful tool for the social sciences, which enables an examination of aspects of power and persuasion within organisations to be considered in the context of a research study. Fairclough (1995); Lucke (1996); and Van Dijk (2006) also supported the use of Critical Discourse Analysis by researchers. Notwithstanding the shortcoming of Discourse Analysis, which Easterby-Smith *et al* (2012: 200) noted as being mainly inductive, this study deployed Critical Discourse Analysis because it is primarily concerned with analyzing the ways the four media houses that were picked for the research covered on anti-corruption issues within the period under study. Documentary research complements the in-depth semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis used in this study. Sample of stories on the two case studies were randomly picked within the period under study. The placement of the stories (front or inside page) in the newspapers was crucial in picking the stories for the analysis.

## 3.5 Ethical Issues

Ethical issues in research have become a subject of intense debate among scholars, especially among those in the medical and social sciences. Recently, there has been a consensus (from the latter) on a common set of principles guiding the conduct of research (Easterby-Smith et *al,* 2012: 95). Bell and Bryman (2011) identified ten ethical practices common that are to nine professional associations in the social sciences. The ten principles complied with in this study include: ensuring that no harm comes to participants; respecting the dignity of participants; seeking the full consent of each participant; protecting the privacy of subjects; ensuring the confidentiality of research data; protecting the anonymity of individuals/organisations, as the case may be; avoiding deception about the nature or aim of the research; full disclosure of affiliations; honesty and transparency in communicating about the research and avoiding any misleading or false reporting of research findings. The first seven principles protect the interests of participants and the last three ensure accuracy and a lack of bias in results.

This study strived for conformity with all the ethical standards expected in a research project of this nature. All the legal conditions and the actual and potential effects of the Official Secret Acts and Freedom of Information laws operating in Nigeria were fully complied with in the course of carrying out this study. At present, there is no data protection law in Nigeria.

All the participants involved in this study were adequately and properly briefed on the nature of the research, were treated politely and accorded due respect. The permission of all the interviewees was secured before the commencement of interviews. Almost Ninety-seven percent of the participants consented that data obtained from the interviews may be used. They also consented that their full identities, (especially their names) be disclosed while only three percent refused full disclosure of their identities. Those who gave their consent to use their names were reflected as such, but those who withheld consent did not object to being described. Samples of consent form endorsed by the participants are attached as appendix ix.

In the course of the interview sessions, the research procedure and the purpose of the research were fully disclosed, both verbally and in writing. Written consent was also secured from each interviewee before the interview process, and assurance was given to them that all of the

information would be kept both anonymous and confidential. This researcher explained the purpose of the research by providing information sheets, written in the English language, which is the official language in Nigeria. It was also explained to them that the interview was strictly for academic purpose.

Furthermore, each of the interviewees was informed that participation was voluntary and, more importantly, all of the documents and archival materials that were used in the study are public documents. No classified item was used, most especially because the nation recently passed the Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, all documents/facts whose accuracy could be potentially challenged or might provoke doubt were completely avoided in the study. Of course, concern for the jobs and personal security of the interviewees was given due consideration before choosing them, while the security of the researcher was also considered.

### 3.6 The Experience of the Researcher

The previous and current work experience of the researcher enhanced the fieldwork, as it was easy to gain access to different sources and personalities. It was also easy to book interview sessions with major stakeholders in the anti-corruption agencies in the country and to hear from former senior colleagues and friends in the media. My current status as a staff member of ICPC also provided the requisite access to the libraries where the archival materials that I needed were. As a media practitioner, my media background offered deeper insight, and this is one of the principles behind ethnography research. The researcher's journalistic background was helpful, although it created hindrances in different ways. Having worked in the print media for almost two decades, the knowledge of the operations of the print media helped my interview skills and, paradoxically, this knowledge and my contacts, as well as being a staff member of ICPC, put me at a disadvantage, since some professional colleagues (journalists) were not completely disposed to being interviewed on the issue of the *brown envelope*. In fact, two of them, described my attempt to carry out a study on corruption within the media as an attempt to cast aspersions on my primary constituency. This comment, was later reflected in their manner and ways when I obtained responses from the media practitioners. I was very conscious of this throughout the interview period. This made maintaining an effective balance between being a trained journalist and an

academic researcher more tasking. However, I was able to overcome this challenge because the research was not funded by any organisation.

One major drawback noticed in the course of the study is that most of the media respondents interviewed seemed to be economical with the truth in responding to the interview questions, while some were simply "patronising" as former colleagues. On seeing this trend, I took time to explain the purpose of the study to the practising journalists and reassured them that the research was purely being carried out as an academic exercise, and this had nothing to do with day-to-day work. This strategy later worked, as some interviewees relayed their experiences more freely.

## 3.7 Personal Reflections in the Course of the Research

After exhausting the nine-month *Study Leave* granted me at the commencement of this programme by my employers, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2011, it was difficult for me to secure another *Study Leave* (be it with or without pay) to return to London in 2013, in order to enable me to attend some seminars preparatory to the submission of my thesis.

The politicisation of my *Study Leave* within the Commission, to a great extent, resulted in my inability to complete the programme within three years, and I was forced to apply for writing-up status twice. While battling to secure my release to go back to London to complete my programme, I was posted outside Abuja. I was posted to the Academy of the Commission located in Keffi, Nasarawa State. The distance is about 66 kilometres from where I reside. I thus had to travel 66 kilometres each way daily, and, given the lack of public transport facilities, good road networks and the high cost of transport, this became a serious challenge to me. The stress of travelling daily and the financial implication of my studies and family took a huge toll on me, to the extent that I mooted the idea of abandoning the research and withdrawing from the programme. The situation was further compounded by the sudden death of my mother, this dealt huge blow on my capacity to concentrate and to reduce my academic work from 130,000 words to 90,000 words, as advised by my Director of Studies in the UK. It took me some time to regain my concentration level. However, with the encouragement of my immediate family and a couple of friends in Nigeria, I was able to carry my studies to completion.

## 3.8    Summary

This chapter has delineated the main sampling techniques adopted in selecting the participants, their backgrounds, the nature and the quality of the data generated by the 25 stakeholders interviewed. The main method deployed was qualitative, using in-depth interviews with critical stakeholders in the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria, such as journalists, former top operatives of the anti-graft agencies, religious leaders and civil social groups. The ethical issues of this study, along with the challenges and shortcomings encountered in its course, were highlighted, including the ways in which they were resolved. The aim was to ensure that the methodological strategies employed did not in any way affect the outcome of the study. Data obtained from the respondents were used in the Critical Discourse Analysis framework of the study. Empirical results from archival research and newspaper analyses were highlighted in Chapters Five and Six, while findings from the interviews were captured and discussed extensively in Chapters Seven and Eight.

## CHAPTER FOUR

## HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE IN NIGERIA:1960-2015

### 4.1    Introduction

This chapter attempts to provide a historical perspective on the problems of corruption in Nigeria and analyses the various efforts of successive governments to curb the menace. This section also attempts to provide answer to two questions: Is corruption inherent in African socio-economic systems? Is contemporary public corruption in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, a legacy of colonialism? Additionally, a brief review of the Acts that set up the three major anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria is undertaken, and the ways in which they have impacted on the level of corruption since the advent of democratic rule in 1999.

### 4.2    Corruption: Not an African Disease

The phenomenon of corruption is not a new concept in the world. The origin of the phenomenon is as old as man himself (Akpabio, 2005: 16; Obasanjo, 2014: 3). Fashola (2008) traced the origin of corruption as far back as the times of the Greek and the Roman empires. He noted that corruption was so pervasive during these periods that the Roman Empire had to privatise tax collection by auctioning the right to collect taxes to private citizens (Fashola, 2008: 6). Similarly, Stapenhurst and Sedigh (1999) argued that corruption existed in one form or another from the earliest days of social organisation. They revealed that the growth of the internet and media conglomerates have forced corruption out into the open (Stapenhurst and Sedigh, 1999: 2). Wraith and Simpkins (1963) noted that 19th century Britain was marked by great corruption. Africa, however, came under the searchlight during the post-colonial era, when scholars blamed the lack of development on the prevalence of corruption on the continent.

Corruption is now regarded as the social malaise or disease of the entire world (Chazan, et al 1999; Osoba, 1996; Williams, 1991; Doig & Theobald 2000; Nwolise 2006; Johnson & Sharma, 2004; Dowden 2009). It is not restricted to race, ethnicity, gender, education or illiteracy. It is neither a Christian nor a Muslim issue. Indeed, Dike (2005: 281) argued that corruption is not only found in democratic and in dictatorial governments but also in feudal, capitalist, and social economies.

It is therefore difficult to genetically determine the nature of corruption (Andreski, 1968: 95). Its degree and extensiveness vary from one setting to another (Chazan et al, 1999: 188 and Stapenhurst & Sedigh, 1999: 1). Moreover, Bicchieri and Duffy (1997: 477) note that corruption should not be blamed on moral fault or cultural backwardness "but is found in the mixture of economic and political power".

The EU Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmstroem, in a report on a survey carried out in 28 countries of the EU, noted that the extent of corruption in Europe was "breath-taking" and it costs the EU economy at least, 120bn euros (£99bn) annually (BBC News Reports, 3rd February, 2014). Dowden (2009: 446) explained that "corruption exists everywhere, not just in Africa. It happens in Europe and America, in India and China". Equally, corruption also accounts for the changes of several regimes, or the defeat of certain strong political parties in some countries (Olojede, 2008:276). Neild (2002: 209) noted that the Western countries are implicated in corruption of various degree by encouraging corruption by their action rather than impeding it. Moisa (1995:188) and Heywood (1997) assert that corruption was a global problem.

Nigeria has not been spared the scourge of corruption. There is hardly any area of Nigerian national life that has not been affected by the menace. Nigeria attained some form of notoriety for corruption in 1996, (during the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida), when she was regarded as the most corrupt nation in the world by Transparency International (TI). Nigeria was again ranked number one in the TI ratings between 1997 and 2000; it moved on the ranking to the 2nd position in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Nigeria improved in her ranking by moving to the 3rd slot in the world in 2004 and 2005; 5th in 2006, the 9th most corrupt country in 2007 and the 16th in 2008, 36th in 2015 (TI annual reports). Nigeria has consistently been on the negative side of the TI reports from 2009 to date.

Describing Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries is therefore questionable, taking into consideration that the bulk of Nigeria's hard currencies are lying in private accounts in Europe and America. Dibie (2007: 2) argued that a country which condones money stolen from another country is as corrupt as the public leaders who stole the money. What Dibie is stressing is that the

countries in the West (Western Europe and North America), are hypocrites to accuse Nigerians of corruption when they are providing safe havens for looted funds from Nigeria. This is, however, not to admit that corruption is not a challenge in the country.

The consequence and negative impact of corruption have also been widely treated in various studies in the field (Diamond, 1991; Doig & Theobald, 2000, Balogun, 2003: 130; Rose-Ackerman, 2010, Nwolise, 2006; World Bank Annual Reports, 2002-2013; Obuah, 2010; Adeniran, 2008; Osoba, 1996, Dike, 2003; Joseph, 1987; Sen, 2000; Zowam, 2007; Donnelly, 2008: 1; Ahuche 2013; Ayoola, 2007; Ellis, 2006). However, there are scholars who believe that corruption has a positive side which can be helpful to the society. Searle (1987: 3) noted that corruption is an endemic part of capitalism, but many businessmen think it is not an illegal one.

Leff (1964) in his "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Development" paper argued in defence of the functional role of corruption. Huntington argued that corruption may be helpful to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reforming it would be (Huntington, 1968:64). Otite (1986: 12) also asserted that corruption is a lubricator of the social system, a means to overcome economic obstacles and bureaucratic red-tapism. Indeed, Wraith and Simpkins (1963) have argued that corruption speeds up economic or financial transactions, thereby acting as grease which oils the wheel of business. Often, the example of the Asian Tigers, namely, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia, are usually cited to support this argument. Jain (2001:93), however, has asserted that there was no concrete evidence that corruption aids development. This section attempts to undertake a historical overview of corruption and various anti-corruption efforts since the birth of the country over 100 years ago.

## 4.3    Historical Overview of Corruption: The Nigeria Story
### 4.3.1   Pre-Colonial Era
It may not be out of place to claim that the partition of the African continent in 1884 by the West, at the Berlin Conference, without the consent of the people of the continent, was the beginning of corruption in African society. The logic is simple: Slavery, which was an integral part of colonization, which has been variously condemned and described as evil, may be, in the real sense of the word, called corruption, when the various definitions by scholars are taken into

consideration. If corruption is an abuse of power for private gain (Transparency International, 1998), then the invasion and eventual partition of the African continent by Europeans is one. Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere (2002) argued that various laws and treatises forced on the Africans were part of the corrupt tendencies of the Europeans. Despite all the talk about colonialist exploitation, nobody has yet tried to make a statistical cost-benefit estimate; but it is certain that what was "taken out" far outweighed what was "put into" the colonies (Andreski, 1968: 22). It can be easily inferred that corruption is one of the legacies of colonialism in Africa (Ekeh, 1975; Osaghae, 1988; Falola, 1998, Tignor, 1993; Lawal, 2006, Ochapa, 2006; Agbaje, 2007; Adadu, 2006, Aluko 2007).

Ezeanya (2012) noted that administrative corruption, although it is rampant across Africa today, is an alien culture. She argued that pre-colonial Africa was founded on strong ethical values, sometimes packaged in spiritual terms, but with the end result of ensuring social justice and compliance. As Ezeanya bluntly remarked:

> Colonialism introduced systemic corruption on a grand scale across much of sub-Saharan Africa. The repudiation of indigenous values, standards, checks and balances and the pretensions of super-imposing Western structures destabilized the well-run bureaucratic machinery previously in existence across pre-colonial Africa (Ezeanya, 2012:1).

Even though most pre-colonial African communities may have been centralised or decentralised and with unwritten laws, heavy emphasis was placed on accountability and good governance across several of the pre-colonial African communities (examples in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe), thus most of the anti-social behaviour was derived from British colonial rule (Osoba, 1996: 372 and Aluko, 2006; 18-20). The Portuguese, French, German and Belgian colonies were also implicated in such anti-social conduct. In his own verdict, Ochapa (2006: 40) noted that corruption was an immigrant into Nigeria but, regrettably, it has been naturalised. Similarly, Olanipekun (2013: 3) argued succinctly:

> Indeed, the common values of every indigenous society that now constitutes Nigeria abhorred stealing, greed, avarice, bribery and all

the vices which constitute the bundle of crime against God and humanity, known as corruption.

In Nigeria, among the Yoruba of South Western Nigeria, the institution of Oyo-mesi, the king making body, acted as a check against the abuse of power by the Alaafin (the Oba), or the King of Oyo. The Alaafin was constrained to rule with caution and respect for his subjects. When proven to have engaged in acts that undermined the interests of his subjects, such as gross miscarriage of justice for personal gain, the Oyo-mesi would, in the words of Yunusa Salami "present him with an empty calabash or a parrot's eggs as a sign that he must commit suicide" since he could not be deposed, according to tradition (Ezeanya, 2012: 7).

The warrant chieftaincy, which was introduced by the British in South Eastern Nigeria as an administrative policy, created a new and disproportionate playing field, and also the elusive culture of modern corruption in the Nigerian public life (Ahuche, 2013: 14). Andreski (1968) argued that in the ancestral villages Africans were taught the tribal code of behaviour, which was later derided by their British teachers, who preached something quite different (Andreski, 1968: 79-80).

In the same vein, Olurode (2009: 15) opined that some proverbs and fables from the African value system provided a good framework for distinguishing between moral and immoral conducts, legal or illegal acts, in the pre-colonial era. Some Yoruba proverbs such as: "Ise ni ogun ise", hard work is the only solution to poverty, "Oruko rere san ju wura ati fadaka lo", a good name is better than silver and gold, "Bi iro ba lo ni ogun odun, ojokan l'ooto o ba", no matter how long a lie may take, truth will prevail one day, "Bi enia bajale l'ogun odun seyin, to ba da aso aran bora, aso ole loda bora", If one adorns a colourful dress, 20 years after having committed a theft, it remains a stolen dress. Some of the proverbs may not condemn outright, but they certainly do not communicate an automatic approval of corruption.

While some may want to dispute the level of transparency and accountability in pre-colonial communities, it is the contention of this study that Chinua Achebe's works, such as *No Longer at Ease (2010), Things Fall Apart (2001)* and *The Anthills of Savannah (2001)* as well as Olagoke's work, *The Incorruptible Judge* (1972) explain in detail how the problem of corruption crept into

African culture and the attempts by the people to resist the new culture imposed on Africans. Ezeanya (2012: 12) insisted that 'there is no genetic code that predisposes Africans to corruption; neither does the "C" shaped sickle cell in the African's blood stream stand for corruption. The prevalence of corruption in Africa today is a process of socialisation, which commenced with the excessively corrupt colonial government'. Indeed, Achebe (2012: 54) described the pre-colonial era as "Era of Purity".

Furthermore, Hasty (2005: 281) argued that the contact of Africans with people all over the globe has contributed to the incidents of corruption. Olurode (2009: 17) submitted that Africa's encounter with the West was responsible for the blurring of the threshold between ethical and unethical behaviour. Lawal (2006:24) asserted that the white man concocted and used corruption to foster materialism and used it as a subterfuge to disintegrate the traditional social structures that existed in pre-colonial African society.

There are others who contend that corruption was part and parcel of pre-colonial communities in Africa, even before the arrival of the colonial masters. They believe that corruption was ubiquitous in complex societies from Ancient Egypt, Israel, Rome, and Greece, and so Nigeria cannot be an exemption (Fashola, 2008 and Ahuche, 2013).

It is the contention of this study that colonial masters should not be blamed wholly for the culture of corruption in Nigeria. Several studies have shown that the intra- and inter-ethnic wars of the pre-colonial era were waged mainly to subjugate other communities and to extract slaves. Many such slaves were sold off in exchange for items such as mirrors and guns. This study believes this to be correct just as it initially argued that colonialism is also corruption.

It is the view of this researcher that the checks and balances systems put in place in pre-colonial African societies might have been modified to meet the challenges of the modern state had the colonial masters not intervened in the evolution of the Black race. This may be contestable, but available records support this argument as already discussed above.

Indeed, the cultural explanation for the high level of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has also been faulted. Obasanjo (2014:3) argued that the culture of giving gifts in most African societies should not be blamed for the high level of corruption. He insisted:

> In our traditional life, there are hospitality and appreciation. These are distinguished, distinct and different from corruption in three significant ways. One, they are neither solicited for nor demanded. Two, they are not covert, they are open and transparent. Three, they are token items and not in terms of huge amount of money or obscenely kind.

In essence, giving gifts should not be an excuse for the high number of incidences of corruption pervading the political landscape of Nigeria.

### 4.3.2  The Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods

Even though the origin of corruption in the pre-colonial era may appear to be controversial, it is clear however, that the same cannot be said of the colonial era in most African societies while the colonial masters were in control. Osoba (1996), for instance, asserted that the colonial rule, which ended after the Second World War in 1947, was essentially the unrestrained autocratic and authoritarian rule which allowed the perpetration of corruption by some British colonial officials, aided and abetted by their compatriots among the European Christian missions (Osoba 1996: 373). Osoba asserted:

> Thus, the colonial authorities and their collaborators presided over a fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system, which facilitated the appropriation of huge surpluses for shipment to the metropolis from Nigerian peasant farmers and other petty producers via unequal terms of trade.

Osoba stated that this mode of colonial authoritarianism generated a crisis of accumulation whereby, in the favonian sense, "to be white was to be rich, and to be black was to be poor" (Ibid: 373). The end result of this system is the desperation among Nigerians to cut corners in order to join in with the new life introduced by the colonial government.

Similarly, Okonkwo (2007: 1) noted that, as early as 1947, Commissions of Inquiry were held in Nigeria to investigate cases of corruption. He asserted that the purpose of the inquiries was to

expose wrong-doing and punish the culprits. The colonial government report of 1947 indicated that "The African's background and outlook on public morality is very different from the present day Briton. The African in the public service seeks to further his own financial interest."

Several cases of wrongdoing were reported in the three regions. In 1956, for example, the Foster-Sutton Tribunal indicted the Premier of the Eastern Region, Nnamdi Azikiwe, for corrupt acts for his involvement in the affairs of the African Continental Bank (ACB) while still serving as a government official, which is contrary to the Code of Conduct for public officials. The tribunal, in its reports, felt that Zik did not sever his connections to the bank when he became a Minister, and he used his influence to further the interests of the ACB (Osoba, 1996: 375, Ahuche, 2013: 19).

In the words of a colonial government official, "Were a UK minister to be involved in a series of transactions, the result of which was that public funds were used to support an otherwise shaky institution in which he was directly interested, he would be forced to leave public life." However, Zik did not resign; instead he called for general elections in the region, which his party later won (Okonkwo, 2007). This sit-tight syndrome, as exhibited by Zik, still holds sway today in 21st century politics in Nigeria, as Nigerians are yet to witness their politicians resigning their positions for alleged indictment for corrupt practices.

Okonkwo (2007: 1) argued that the colonial government did not prosecute Zik for his failure to observe the code of conduct for government officials because they believed the NCNC was the only party to embrace national unity. "Without Zik, the NCNC would collapse".

A similar but different corrupt act was reported in the Western Region, where Obafemi Awolowo, the first Premier, and Ayo Rosiji, E. O Okunowo and Abiodun Akerele, three members of his party, the now defunct Action Group, were found guilty of corruption by the G.B.A. Coker Commission of Inquiry of 1962. The Coker Commission, in its reports concluded that "We came across evidence of reckless and, indeed, atrocities and criminal mismanagement and diversion of public funds. We are satisfied that Chief Awolowo knows everything about the diversion of large sums of money…into the coffers of the Action Group". The report stated that Awolowo, "without

a doubt, has failed to adhere to the standards of conduct which are required for persons holding such a post," (Okonkwo, 2007; Ahuche, 2013; and Osoba, 1996). The report of the commission was later described as a "spiteful document" because Chief Ladoke Akinola who had been premier of the region for more than two years was implicated severally in the investigation was exonerated by the commission, (Diamond 1988: 140 and Falola 2009: 82).

Moreover, the Northern region was also not spared incidents of corruption during the colonial era. The then the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, was accused, in 1943, by his own cousin, Alhaji Abubakar Siddique, of misappropriation of tax revenue as District Head of Gusau. It was during this period that the Northern Government enacted the "Customary Presents Order", a law to tackle allegations of corruption levelled against some of the native chiefs in Borno, which was reported to have been perpetrated in collaboration with the British officials in the district (Jibril, 2010).

Ayoola (2007: 9) also asserted that grand corruption was gradually introduced into Nigeria during the colonial period. This period, he argued, witnessed Western education, new religions, urbanisation, a monetised economy, formal international trade and exchanges. People were drawn from their traditional religions, beliefs and cultural practices and exposed to material demands and money as both a status symbol and social security. Dibie (2007: 554) noted that British people introduced corruption to Nigeria.

Indeed, the Indirect Rule system in Southern Nigeria brought with its incidences of public office corruption, as Native Court Presidents, known as Warrant Chiefs, were accused of the abuse of office and corruption. Ayoola (2007) noted that Warrant Chiefs were appointed outside the established traditional community chieftaincy system and they misused the new powers vested in them, and considering the influence and power these chiefs wielded all kinds of tricks and activities were exploited to secure and keep such appointments.

The above scenario is not an indication that pre-colonial African society was a perfect one, devoid of sharp practice. This researcher is of the view that the colonial masters contributed in no small measure to the vexed issue of corruption. Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998) argued that the colonial

masters systematically used material inducements to compel African chiefs/administrators to collaborate with them in the pursuit of their colonial project of dominating and exploiting their own peoples. The practices of post-colonial Africa's political and bureaucratic elite are merely an extension of such colonial policies and practices, and they have served to entrench it (Diamond, 1988).

Of course, it was not only Africans that were indicted for corruption related offences during the colonial era. Lawal (2006) asserted that some colonial officers were implicated in the embezzlement of public funds. According to him, between 1901 and 1902, three British officers in the colonial office namely, Captain Gonstedt, Major Hull and Captain MacLachlan, were accused of embezzling, three pounds, 28 pounds and 250 pounds respectively. Lawal (2006: 6-10) further explained that "between 1905 and 1906, a total sum of 942 British pounds was recovered from officers who were accused of various forms of financial fraud, while queries involving 640 pounds were yet to be replied…. Up to the 1940s, the colonial office still received serious reports of financial fraud in the colonial administration system".

Despite the fact that the first set of acts of corruption were uncovered in 1947, nobody was charged in Court for alleged corruption until 1966. The only case that was sent to the Court in Nigeria during this period (1947-1966) was, "the State versus Odofin Bello" (Olurode 2009: 28). Indeed, Dowden (2009: 446) opined that no big man in Nigeria has ever been punished for theft. This shows a gross lack of the political will to confront corrupt acts.

The period of de-colonisation was said to have witnessed an upsurge in corruption related offences in Nigeria. Osoba puts it in a proper perspective:

> It is to this period of decolonization that the pervasive phenomenon of 'ten per cent' kickbacks dates, as executors of a whole array of public policies insisted on a pre-payment to themselves of at least 10 per cent of the value of the favour being sought by members of the public (contract, licence, scholarship, employment, etc.) before performing the duty for which they were already being paid generous salaries and allowances from the public treasury (Osoba, 1996: 374).

Providing reasons why the British officers did not include the tackling of corruption as part of the de-colonisation process, the Governor of the Eastern Region, Sir Clement John Pleass asserted that "the aim of the colonial government was not to establish a standard of honesty in public life. Only time and education can do that. Eventually, sufficiently honest and enlightened people will be thrown up to rebuild the prosperity and good governance of the region" (Okonkwo, 2007). Have African leaders who governed after Independence fared any better on the issue of transparency and accountability in the First Republic and thereafter?

### 4.3.3   The First Republic: 1960 – 1966

The economic system bequeathed to most African countries coupled with the lack of private capital of those who took over the government at independence, have been blamed for the massive looting of public wealth from the State, which had previously been unavailable to them (Osoba, 1987: 375). Osoba argued that those who were unable to meet their financial obligations previously saw their new positions as an avenue along which "to diversify their activities into new, often dubious and fraudulent forms of primitive private accumulation at public expense".

Osoba (1987) further explained that various forms of fraudulent awards (including the outright sale) of unsecured government loans, produce buying and import licenses, to their cronies; the inflation of government contract values (and the consequent enlargement of payable kickbacks to themselves); and the straightforward looting of the treasury by its very custodians, which had hitherto been unheard of in Africa, suddenly became part and parcel of the post-colonial era on the continent. Osoba (1987: 375) gives a graphic description of the situation in Nigeria:

> The attempt by each of the three major political groupings that dominated the politics of the First Republic to monopolise, or, at least, have the lion's share of the loot from this systematic plundering of the wealth of the nation was a major factor in intensifying and embittering the contest for political power along ethno-regional lines --- a process whose high points were the Action Group crisis (1962), census crisis (1962- 63), federal election crisis (1964), Tiv rebellion (1964-65), and Western Nigeria election crisis (1965), making the country, more or less, ungovernable and culminating in the Kaduna Nzeogwu military coup d'état of January 1966 and the tragic and disastrous intrusion of the Nigerian armed forces into the political life of the country.

It can be inferred from the above that the post-Independence situation created an environment of political instability, the accumulation of wealth, and greed leading to an unstable Nigerian polity. Nwankwo (2001) and Igwenyi (2010) argue that the neo-colonial and dependent nature of the capitalism inherited from the British served as vehicle for mindless corruption and primitive accumulation of wealth. In fact, Ahuche posited that most of the political crises of the First Republic were a direct result of corruption in the country (Ahuche, 2013: 22).

Furthermore, Okonkwo (2007) argued that the First Republic, with Azikiwe as the President, was marked by widespread corruption. Government officials looted public funds with impunity. Federal Representative, and Minister of Aviation, K.O. Mbadiwe, flaunted his wealth by building a palace in his hometown. When asked where he had gotten the money to build such a mansion, K.O. replied, "From sources known and unknown". The Minister of Finance, Chief F.S. Okotie-Eboh, responded to charges of accumulation of wealth by government officials by quoting from the Bible, "To those that have, more shall be given. From those that do not have, shall be taken even the little they have" (Okonkwo 2007).

Achebe (1983: 82) insisted that the political thought of both Awolowo and Azikiwe, who were the two political leaders in the South West and South East regions at Independence, was based on a politics of material gain. "If we were a more discerning people, we should not have trusted them with our lives, even in the fifties and sixties".

The citizenry was said to have condoned the looting of the public wealth of the State in the First Republic. Olunloyo (2008) noted, for instance, that when Adegoke Adelabu was accused of mismanagement of public funds, Ibadan people picked up their talking drums and retorted thus:

> *Igunnu lo ni Tapa,*
> *Tapa lo niIgunnu*
> *Eje ki Adelabu o kowowana.*

Meaning that, *Igunnu masquerade belongs to the Nupe*
> *The Nupe own Igunnu*
> *Let Adelabu continue squandering our money* (Olunloyo, 2008: 16).

This kind of posture from the segment of the populace may have encouraged other politicians to engage in sleaze until the first military coup in the country on 15th January, 1966. Invariably, corruption was the hallmark of the First Republic, as undisguised personal enrichment by political office holders, through bribery, fraud, kickbacks, misappropriation and outright stealing, dotted the country's political landscape.

Indeed, Okonkwo (2007), Adebanwi (2010) and Ahuche (2013) opined that the military coup of 1966 was a direct response to the corruption in the First Republic. The popular support of the coup showed that the people rejected corruption. Despite the brutal killings of First Republic politicians, there was a widespread embrace of the acts in the country. The assassinations of Okotie-Eboh, who was notorious for flaunting his ill-gotten wealth; the Premier of the Western Region, Samuel Akintola, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region, were applauded by the masses (Okonkwo, 2007: 13; Ahuche, 2013: 23; Osoba, 1996: 375). Adegboyega Adewale, in his famous book, "*Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup",* described the politicians of the First Republic as a bundle of 'ten percenters', who engaged in widespread corrupt practices, especially kickbacks, at both the federal and regional levels (Adegboyega, 1984: 48).

### 4.3.4  The Military Era: 1966 – 1979

Okonkwo (2007) argued that the Aguiyi Ironsi government, which assumed power after the first military coup, instituted a series of Commissions of Inquiry into the affairs of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), Nigerian Airways (NA) and the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), but those indicted for corruption were released by Yakubu Gowon, who later became the country's Head of State through the coup of July, 1966, thus killing the zeal to punish the corrupt. "Youths knew no other life than corruption." "One could steal if he shared with those in the right places" (Okonkwo, 2007: 17). Ahuche (2013) argued that the Biafran civil war of 1967 contributed seriously to the high level of corruption, as the looting of public institutions, especially the offices of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in some of the disputed areas were targeted. He asserted:

> Many believed that corruption, for the most part of Gowon's administration, was kept away from the public view until 1975, when the corruption scandal surrounding the importation of cement engulfed his administration. Many officials of the Defence Ministry and the Central Bank of Nigeria were involved in the scandal. Officials were accused of falsifying ship manifests and they inflated the amount of cement to be purchased (Ahuche, 2013: 24-25).

It was during this period that two prominent individuals from the Middle Belt area of the country, Joseph Gomwalk and Joseph Tarka, the former Governor of the now defunct Benue-Plateau State and the former Federal Commissioner, respectively, were accused publicly of engaging in corrupt acts and were prosecuted to serve as a deterrent to others (Osoba, 1996: 376). Nwabueze (1992) noted that the Gowon administration, which came into power as the "corrective" regime, soon found itself entangled in a web of corruption that was more audacious and daring than the politicians that they overthrew. Military rulers, governors and their bureaucrats, or "super permanent secretaries", notoriously became brazenly corrupt (Nwabueze, 1992: 161). The oil boom of the early 1960s also provided a fertile ground for corruption by the elite (Osoba, 1996:379-380).

It was in the light of this open knowledge of corruption by the Gowon administration that General Murtala Muhammed seized power on 29th July, 1975, and enacted the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975 to probe the activities of all of the governors of the previous administrations, and all except two were found guilty of corruption and, consequently, had their property seized. The Murtala Muhammed regime embarked on a massive purge of the civil service and the military on account of corruption.

The Murtala Muhammed regime had been described by some scholars as Nigeria's first genuine experiment in ethical revival and cleansing (Ahuche, 2013: 25-26), but the euphoria that followed the massive purge of corrupt officials in the military and public service was short-lived, as Murtala Muhammed was killed in an aborted coup on 13th February, 1976. However, the second-in-command (then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters) General Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power and pursued the administration's programme until 1979, when he handed over to an elected civilian government. Corruption was also reported during this period, especially during the

FESTAC 1977 festival. Moore (2010: 142) suggested that the 1976 *Upside Down* music by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti highlighted the confusion and corruption of the Gowon-Obasanjo period. Unfortunately, musicians like Fela, and Thomas Mapfunmo in Zimbabwe, who can use music to draw people's attention to the abuse of those in public trust, are now absent from the music scene in Nigeria.

Certainly, 1966 to 1979 was an era of sustained and uninterrupted military rule in Nigeria. It spans 13 solid years of military governance, when the culture of impunity and secrecy crept into the political vocabulary of Nigeria. Osoba (1987: 376) opined that the military's lack of respect for financial discipline contributed to the high level of corruption from the Gowon regime to the Abacha era.

### 4.3.5    The Second Republic: 1979- 1983

Nigeria was in a state of confusion and corruption when the civilian government, headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, was sworn in as the elected, democratic President of Nigeria on 1st October, 1979. Corruption continued unabated during his administration, and nothing substantial was done to tackle the increasing cases of corruption in the country (Okonkwo, 2007). The monetisation of the electoral system by the Murtala Muhammed-Obasanjo regime was such that only the highest bidder would get elected into public office in the country. Osoba (1987: 379-380) averred:

> The strategy used by the politicians of the Second Republic to recoup their losses, while extending and consolidating their accumulative base, amounted to the refurbishing, combining and enlarging of all the known techniques of primitive accumulation previously practised in Nigeria.

This monetisation of democratic processes, which commenced in 1979, has since been carried over to the Fourth Republic, making public office, a "do-or-die" affair for those interested in seeking public life through politics. Shagari's failure to address this problem caused the administration to be perceived as notoriously corrupt (Ahuche, 2013:26).

Okonkwo (2007) and Ahuche (2013) argued that it was because Shagari was ineffective in stopping the looting of public funds by the democratically elected officials that General

Mohammadu Buhari, on 31st December, 1983, led a military coup to halt corruption in the country. Buhari arrested the state governors and commissioners and brought them before tribunals of inquiry. All of the bank accounts of politicians were frozen. Scores of federal government buildings mysteriously caught fire after investigators started to probe the finances of the officials working in the buildings. The NITEL building in Lagos, for instance, was set ablaze by yet-to-be identified arsonists in 1982 (Adebanwi, 2010: 113).

Buhari latched on to unchecked corrupt practices in the Shagari government and overthrew the civilian government. Justifying the military coup, Buhari, in his first broadcast to the nation, said, "It is necessary to reiterate that this administration will not tolerate fraud, corruption, squander-mania, abuse of office or graft, or other such vices that have characterised that administration for the past four years" (Buhari, 1983: 2).

The Buhari government also launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI). While this regime lasted, many former party stalwarts, ministers, state governors and commissioners of the previous administration, were arrested and prosecuted by Special Military Tribunals on the Recovery of Public Property. Some were imprisoned for life, for crimes ranging from 'unlawful enrichment' to 'contributing to the economic adversity of the country (Osoba 1996:381). It was yet another opportunity to instil integrity and accountability into public life in Nigeria, but the experiment was cut short by another palace coup, staged by General Ibrahim Babangida, the number-three-man in the government. Joseph (1987) asserted that corruption was responsible for the collapse of the Second Republic in Nigeria. The question to be asked is "why were the two previous administrations that attempted to rid Nigeria of corruption truncated mid-way into their programmes?" Further studies may be needed in this area.

### 4.3.6   The Military Era: 1983–1993
In the process of trying to instil discipline and probity into the way things were done in the country, the Buhari regime introduced several draconian decrees and launched policies which the masses considered very harsh (Osoba, 1996: 381). It was under this regime that Decree No 22 of 1984, which allowed for the imprisonment of journalists without trial for daring to publish a report or

story that might embarrass the government, was enacted. This regime was perceived to have violated the human rights of the citizenry by its style of governance.

It was this perceived human rights violation that Babangida used as leverage and seized power in August, 1985. President Babangida promised to operate an open door policy and to respect human rights. After consolidating himself in power, Babangida's regime was credited with authoritarianism, brazen corruption and waste. Though a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced, the activities of government were not reflective of austerity, frugality and modesty. Babangida released the politicians convicted by the Buhari tribunals, and he returned most of the seized assets (Ayoola, 2007:15). It was during the Babangida regime that Nigeria spent $12billion that brought more poverty, foreign debt, failed banks and wretchedness to the citizenry (Dibie, 2007: 7).

In-spite of his popular Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice, Self-Reliance and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) programme, the eight and half years of Babangida's administration became notorious for profligacy, "settlement", kickbacks, looting of the treasury, etc. Corruption became official state policy during this regime (Adebanwi 2011). Throughout his time in power, Babangida never took a public stand against corruption (Osoba, 1996: 381). He was later forced to step aside in August, 1993, for an Interim Government, after annulling the June 12th, 1993, presidential elections which had been adjudged to be free and fair (Akinola, 2002:5). As Ahuche (2013: 26) noted:

> Babangida transformed Nigeria into a family company in which every member was a shareholder, with even the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria accountable to the family, and had to make available whatever sums of money were demanded by any of its members.

While the regime of Babangida lasted, merit and hard work occupied the back seat in the affairs of the country. Lamenting the scenario, Osoba (1996: 381) asserted:

> The main distinguishing feature of corruption in the Babangida regime was the pervasive culture of impunity: any of his acolytes, however high or low in status, could loot the treasury to their heart's

content with impunity, provided they remained absolutely loyal and committed to the leader.

Gboyega (1996: 7) asserted that corruption under Babangida's rule reached "unprecedented levels in incidence and magnitude" and Dowden (2009: 282) noted that "corruption is a way of life in Nigeria".

### 4.3.7   The Military Era/Aborted Third Republic: 1993-1999

Following the series of street protests that followed the annulment of the June 12th presidential elections, which are believed to have been won by the late M. K. O. Abiola, Babangida was forced to step aside. An Interim National Government (ING), headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, was appointed to rule the country and, owing to the fact that the Interim Government lacked the capacity to curtail the annulled election crisis, it did not last. The Interim National Government was overthrown in a palace coup on 17th November, 1993, by a group led by General Sani Abacha, the number-two-man in the administration. Like previous military regimes, the Abacha regime described itself as a "corrective" one. However, events later revealed that the administration was seriously implicated in gargantuan corruption on a scale that was unheard of in the history of the country (Olaniyan, 2005: 19).

Igbikiowubo (2004) opined that it was a government that was known more for its silence. Millions of dollars were siphoned out of the country to Swiss Banks through dubious contracts and, in most cases, were taken directly from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) through security accounts maintained for criminal purposes. Adebanwi (2010) described corruption under Abacha as unparalleled in the history of Nigeria. An estimated $3.4billion were said to have been stolen by Abacha during his five years of most brutal and kleptocratic rule. Abacha's loot was traced to 130 banks across the world (Adebanwi, 2010). Although, this government introduced War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC), and set up the Failed Banks Tribunals to recover fraudulent loans, all of these were not reflected in the actions of the leadership (Igbikiowubo, *Vanguard, Nigeria, December 6th, 2004*). Dibie (2007) asserted that Babangida and Abacha were pioneers in hypocrisy, adept in corruption, greedy in material acquisition, in a fashion that had never been witnessed in the history of the nation (Dibie, 2007:7). Osaghae (1998) and Gboyega (1996) noted

that Nigeria witnessed its worst phase of military corruption under the Babangida and Abacha governments.

General Abdusalami Abubakar took over power upon the death of Abacha in June, 1998. Successive Nigerian governments have been discussing with the Swiss government how to recover several billions of Nigeria's money stashed away in Swiss Banks by Abacha and his family. The Nigerian government has only recovered $825 million from Abacha's family members, leaving a total of $1.3 billion frozen in several banks in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein (TI, 2004: 102). The government also seized assets believed to have been corruptly acquired by the Abacha family and their aides, and some were even auctioned. Although Abubakar's government was in office for nine months, it was characterised by much corruption. Indeed, the regime allegedly depleted the country's foreign exchange reserve from $6.7billion in 1998 to $4billion at the end of March, 1999 (Kolade, 1999; Olaniyan, 2005).

The money recovered from the Abacha family also disappeared mysteriously, and no meaningful explanation was offered for this. Abubakar was never questioned or charged for his alleged corruption, simply because he handed power to the civilians as promised. However, all contracts awarded, and appointments made, during this period were suspended by the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration that came to power on 27th August, 1999 (Ahuche, 2013:31).

Obasanjo set up the Christopher Kolade Commission to look into all contracts awarded by the Abubakar regime. Kolade, in his report, recommended the cancellation of 1,684 contracts, valued at $1.08billion, from a total of 4,072 reviewed. In addition, 770 contracts, valued at $4.6million, were recommended for renegotiation (Ayoola, 2007: 12). It appeared, then, that the civilian government was poised to rid the country of corrupt vices and restore her to the path of accountability and probity (Olaniyan, 2005: 21). However, events later revealed deep corruption through the privatisation and commercialisation policy of the Obasanjo administration.

### 4.3.8 The Fourth Republic: 1999 - 2015

Determined to confront the problems of corruption head-on, the first Bill forwarded to the National Assembly by the Obasanjo administration, was the Anti- Corruption Bill in June, 1999, which was intended to deal with the scourge of corruption (Adebanwi, 2010 and Enweremadu, 2013). That Bill was passed and signed into law on 13th June, 2000. This law, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, set up the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The Commission commenced operation on the 13th September, 2000, with the swearing-in of Justice Mustapha Akanbi as its pioneer Chairman (ICPC Annual Reports, 2005).

In his inauguration speech on 27th August, 1999, Obasanjo admitted that corruption was a hydra-headed problem confronting the country, and he pledged to tackle the menace:

> Corruption, the greatest single bane of our society today, will be tackled head-on at all levels... No society can achieve anything near its full potential if it allows corruption to become the full-blown cancer it has become in Nigeria. One of the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow unchallenged, and unchecked, even when it was glaring for everybody to see (Obasanjo's inauguration speech 27th August, 1999).

President Obasanjo also created the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) when Nigeria was included in the Financial Action Task Forces blacklist of Non-Cooperating Countries or Territories (NCCTs). The FATF's list of NCCTs includes countries or territories which are perceived to be non-cooperative in the global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. At that time, Nigeria, and eight other countries, were on the list. Obasanjo set up EFCC to remove Nigeria from the NCCT's list (Adebanwi, 2010: 31). The Due Process Office was also created in 2002 to further tackle corruption.

### 4.4 Overview of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria

The abortive coup led by Kaduna Nzeogwu on 15th January, 1966, was staged to end corruption and indiscipline in the country. The agenda of Nzeogwu and his colleagues always formed the basis of all subsequent military coups until the Abacha regime of 1996 (Osoba, 1996). In other

words, reducing the menace of corruption has always been on the agenda of successive governments in Nigeria.

Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, various programmes were initiated by the government to exterminate corruption. The Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo administration waged war against corruption through its Jaji Declaration. The civilian administration of Shagari also waged war against vices, while the Buhari regime launched "War Against Indiscipline" to confront the scourge. The Babangida administration, in 1989, inaugurated a committee on corruption and other economic crimes, while the late Abacha set up a number of probing panels to fight corruption (Bello-Imam, 2004). In spite of various initiatives by successive governments to fight corruption in the country, no single top official in government was indicted and punished for corruption for a decade, from 1990 to 2000 (Ayittey, 2006: 13). This was despite the fact that, between 1966 and 1999, successive administrations justified their seizure of power on the grounds of their purported desire to curb corruption (Adebanwi, 2010).

*Table 4.1: The table below provides a summary of the past and current initiatives.*

| S/N | Government/Regime | President | Anti-Corruption Programme(s) | Year(s) |
|-----|-------------------|-----------|------------------------------|---------|
| 1. | Military Regime | Murtala Mohammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo | Jaji Declaration Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal | 1975-1979 |
| 2. | Democratically Elected Government | Shehu Shagari | Ethical Revolution | 1979-1983 |
| 3. | Military Regime | Muhammadu Buhari | War Against Indiscipline (WAI) | 1983-1985 |
| 4. | Military Regime | Ibrahim Babangida | Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) | 1985-1993 |
| 5 | Military Regime | Sanni Abacha | War Against Indiscipline and Corruption(WAI-C) | 1993 - 1998 |
| 6 | Democratically Elected Government | Olusegun Obasanjo | Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) | 1999 - 2007 |
| 7 | Democratically Elected Government | Musa Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan | Continued with the anti-corruption agencies of the Obasanjo regime | 2007 till date |

Researcher's field work 2015

No single Politically Exposed Person (PEP) is presently serving a jail term for corruption related offences, despite the existence of EFCC and ICPC (Aluko, 2006: 202; Akanbi, 2014). I argue that this is due to the lack of a strong political will on the part of those in authority to ensure the full implementation of the various anti-corruption laws in the country.

### 4.4.1 The Obasanjo Government: 1999-2007

To some extent, the Obasanjo Government is the only Nigerian government during the study period that appeared more determined from the start to act against corruption. I argue that the pressure from its foreign democratic allies was also a reason for which it had to appear to do so. Soon after taking power on 29th May, 1999, the government introduced the Anti- Corruption Bill to the National Assembly, which was passed as the "Anti-corruption law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000".

The government also set up the ICPC, which became bogged down with court injunctions, brought upon it by accused persons. The constitutional nature of the enabling law was also challenged in the Court by Ondo State and 19 others. The matter was eventually thrown out by the Supreme Court three years after it was instituted (Interview with Akanbi, 2012). The government also set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which caused what Nwolise (2007) described as an "earthquake in the world of the corrupt in Nigeria". This anti-graft agency was led by a Lawyer, Nuhu Ribadu.

### 4.4.2 Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria

Many legal instruments exist in the country today to fight corruption. They include the Criminal Code under which the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) can prosecute persons alleged to have engaged in corrupt acts: The Penal Code, applicable in the North; the Code of Conduct Bureau; and the Recovery of Public Property Act of 1984, the Independent Corrupt Act 2000, as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2002/2004. However, this study will attempt to highlight the provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau, ICPC and EFCC, and to reveal the extent to which they can be effective.

### 4.4.2.1 Overview of the Code of Conduct Bureau

The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) is the first major legal anti-corruption agency set up by the Federal Government of Nigeria. It has the primary responsibility of checking corrupt practices in the Nigerian public service. It was established in 1979 during Obasanjo's military regime. The 1979 Constitution provided a list of Codes of Conduct for public officers. The military administration of Murtala /Obasanjo inaugurated a board before handing over power to the civilian government in July. This failed to make any impact because the National Assembly of the Second Republic did not pass the enabling law. Ten years later (1989), the Bureau got its legal mandate under the Babangida regime.

The Code of Conduct provision has since maintained a permanence of sorts in the Fifth Schedule of all the constitutions that followed thereafter; 1989, 1993, 1995, and the current 1999 constitution. A brief review of this code reveals:

In the Code of Conduct for Public Officers, as contained in Paragraph 12(1) of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, the constitutional right of citizens is specifically spelled out. Paragraph 3(a) of Part 1 to the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, provides that the Code of Conduct Bureau shall have powers to receive declarations by public officers made under Paragraph 12 of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, while Paragraph 3(c) of the same Schedule empowers the Bureau to "retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe."

Since 1999, the Code of Conduct Bureau has declined all requests for access to asset declarations by public officers on the ground that the National Assembly had not issued any instrument prescribing the terms and conditions upon which citizens could have access to the information (Media Rights Agenda 2012).

### 4.4.2.2 Overview of the ICPC Act 2000

It has been argued that it was the inability of the Code of Conduct Bureau and other ad-hoc legislation enacted prior to 1999, to reduce the menace of corruption that prompted President

Obasanjo to establish the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was similarly set up in 2002. The establishment of the two anti-graft bodies marked a new phase in the war against corruption and the abuse of power in Nigeria.

The ICPC Act deals comprehensively with corruption in both the public and private sectors of the economy. The Act stipulated that the ICPC shall consist of a Chairman and 12 other members, to be selected from each of the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. Section 6 of the Act provides for the duties of the ICPC, including:

[a] Where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has conspired to commit or has attempted to commit or has committed an offence under this Act or any other law prohibiting corruption, to receive and investigate any report of conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit or the commission of such offence and, in appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders;

[b] To examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where, in the opinion of the commission such practices, systems or procedures aid or facilitate fraud or corruption, to direct and supervise a review of them;

[c] To instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or parastatal on ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimised by such officer, agency or parastatal;

[d] To advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as the Commission thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or incidences of bribery, corruption, and related offences;

[e] To educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; and

[f] To enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.

The ICPC thus has a three-pronged mandate of enforcement, which includes receiving complaints and prosecuting offenders under the Act; a prevention mandate, that is, the review of practices, systems and procedures of public bodies which aid or facilitate corruption and instruct, advise or assist any officer, agency, or department on ways to minimise fraud or corruption; The last, but not the least, mandate is educating and mobilising the public against bribery and corruption.

The Act also defines 19 offences relating to corrupt practices and the abuse of office, among which are: accepting gratification (Section 8); fraudulent acquisition of property (Section 12); fraudulent receipt of property (Section 13); making a false statement or return (Section 16); bribing a public officer (Section 18); the use of office or position for gratification (Section 19); bribery in relation to auctions (Section 21); bribery in relation to contracts (Section 22); and failure to report bribery in transactions (Section 23). Moreover, the Act forbids the Commission from engaging the press in its investigative activities (Section 27, Subsection 4). It introduced a presumption of corrupt enrichment against any public officer who fails to explain the source of excessive interests in property having regard to his/her past and current emoluments.

Under the Act, the President and other high-ranking officers of the executive arm of government, who are covered by the immunity clause of Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution, can also be probed. By virtue of Section 52, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to authorise an independent counsel (a legal practitioner of not less than 15 years' standing) to investigate an allegation of corruption made against the President or Vice-President, or against any State Governor or Deputy Governor.

The Independent Counsel is required to make a report of his findings under this Section to the Federal Legislative House or to the relevant state legislative house, as the case may be. Section 64 of the Act makes provision for the protection of informers and information. Many journalists believe that the Section, which states that information shall not be disclosed to the public, should be removed to make the education mandate of the Commission more proactive (ICPC, Act 2000).

Following the Presidential assent to the ICPC Act in 2001, the President and Commander-in-Chief approved the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Monitoring Unit (ACTU) in federal ministries, extra-ministerial department/agencies and parastatals. Each ACTU will serve as the eye of the anti-corruption body in their agency, with powers to carry out the duties of ICPC except for the prosecution of cases. The Human Rights Watch (2011) reports on the war against corruption in Nigeria, scored the anti-graft agency low mark.

### 4.4.2.3 Overview of the EFCC Act (2004)

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was created in December, 2002, through an Act of the National Assembly. The Commission began operations in April, 2003, when its Board was inaugurated. It is charged with the following responsibilities:

- Investigation of all financial crimes e.g., Advanced Fee Fraud (otherwise known as 419) Money Fraud, Counterfeiting, Illegal Cash Transfer, Futures Market Fraud, Fraudulent Encashment or Fraudulent Diversion of Funds, Contract Scam, Forgery of Financial Insurance or Dud Cheques, etc.

- Coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes law, enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority.

- Adoption of measures to identify, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crime-related offences or properties, the value of which corresponds to such proceeds.

- Adoption of measures to eradicate and prevent the commission of economic and financial crimes, with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups that are involved.

- Facilitation and rapid exchange of scientific and technical information, and the conduct of operations geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes.

- Determination of the extent of financial loss, and such other losses, by government, private individuals or organisations.

- Collaboration with government economic bodies within and outside Nigeria in carrying out its functions, wholly or in part, analogous with those of the Commission.

The EFCC is also empowered to enforce the following laws:

1. Money Laundering Act 1995;

2. The Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995;

3. The Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994, as amended;

4. The Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act, as amended;

5. Miscellaneous Offence Act (Cap 410LFN); and

6. Any other law or regulation related to economic and financial crimes.

A critical analysis of the enabling acts revealed some basic differences between the ICPC and the EFCC, with regard to the functions of each organisation. It is instructive to note that while ICPC investigates corruption offences, as enshrined in the ICPC Act 2000, such as gratification, corrupt offers/demands, fraudulent acquisition of property, making false statements or returns in respect of money or property received, bribery, conferring undue advantage using one's office, price inflation and awards without budgetary provision, and others, EFCC investigates financial crimes, including advanced fee fraud (419), money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal money transfers, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, terrorism cybercrime and others. Second, ICPC implements only the provisions of the ICPC Act 2000, while, on the other hand, EFCC is the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the Money Laundering Act 2004, Advanced Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 1995, the Failed Banks Act 1994 (as amended), the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, 1991, the Miscellaneous Offences Act. In-spite of the enormous support received by the

EFCC from International Development Partners its impact is yet to be seen (Human Rights Watch Reports, 2011).

Furthermore, ICPC is not only a law enforcement agency, but also executes a preventive mandate through the mechanism of systems review in public organisations, identifying corruption prone areas and effecting changes. The EFCC does not have that responsibility (ICPC Position Paper, 2013: 16-17).

## 4.5 Anti-Corruption Drive under Obasanjo, Yar'adua and Jonathan: A Comparative Analysis

Every successive administration in Nigeria has always articulated and adopted the war on corruption as its national policy and, as such, this is the cardinal objective of such administrations (Adebanwi, 2010). This discourse seeks, therefore, to deconstruct these wars by analysing the administrations of ex-presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Umar Musa Yar'dua and Goodluck Jonathan, in order to assess the success(es) or otherwise of such attempts at corruption, Nigeria's bane in development.

In pursuit of the principle of Section 15(5) of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution, the Obasanjo administration, initiated the Bill to establish the ICPC as an instrument for executing its war on corruption and, in 2000, the Bill eventually became an Act of the Nigerian Parliament. In 2002, due to observed contradictions in the ICPC Act of 2000, and the challenges against an effective execution of the war on corruption, the Economic and Financial Bill was initiated, and this culminated in 2002 with its enactment as the EFCC Act by the National Assembly. The ICPC Act 2000, as an anti-corruption warhead of the Obasanjo administration, started on a sure footing by the appointment of Justice Mustapha Akanbi (retired), the erudite activist judge, as its pioneer Chairman.

However, the effectiveness of the Commission was constrained by the same government through under-funding and subtle intervention in its operations. This led to frustration for the Commission and the eventual disinterest of the retired judge in remaining as the Chairman of the Commission beyond his first term of appointment. Lamenting his frustration, Akanbi noted:

It is the government that frustrates the anti-corruption fight. The same people that should ordinarily assist you in making progress are the ones who, at your back, work against you to ensure you don't succeed. It was a very bad experience that even those in your team would do all manner of things to stop you from making progress. I never knew that even some members of the team were not willing to work, but saw the appointment as their way into political offices and benefits (Akanbi, *Daily Sun*, Tuesday, November, 27 2012).

What the retired jurist was saying, in effect, is that the nomination of politically exposed persons as members of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria is a serious challenge to the anti-corruption war in the country. Social critics believe that Obasanjo's government did not screen those nominated onto the Board of the ICPC, while others believed that appointment to political offices in Nigeria was generally seen as an avenue to either "compensate" or "rehabilitate" a supporter.

While it may appear that the ICPC was being frustrated and decimated by the same people who ought to nurture it, paradoxically, the EFCC, which came into existence as an institution of compulsion, due to the insistence of the international community, was somehow intentionally allowed to flourish momentarily. This unintended benevolence of the administration to the EFCC ultimately led to some major achievements from this anti-graft agency. In 2007, the late President, Umar Musa Yar'Adua also maintained the position of his predecessor on the war on corruption, although he demonstrated transparency by declaring his assets openly, unlike Obasanjo and later Jonathan (Adeniyi, 2011).

Under the Yar'adua government, the legal and administrative instruments of executing the war on corruption were rendered totally ineffective as the Attorney-General attempted to take over the prosecutional duties of the two anti-graft agencies, but was forced to drop the idea due to massive public opinion against doing so. He, however, succeeded in removing the pioneering Chairman of EFCC from office, and he installed his own person, Farida Waziri (Zero Tolerance, 2013:64).

The same could be said of the Jonathan administration, which appeared to be confounded on corruption in the polity. One of the staff of ICPC in this study interviewed asserted:

Obasanjo, notwithstanding his weakness as ordinary mortal, is deeply committed to the anti-corruption war. His commitment to the campaign to reduce corruption cannot be compared to that of Yar'Adua or Jonathan. Obasanjo has a principle which guides his anti-corruption stand, once you are caught, you will face the music. Baba will never support you again. This is the simple reason why you see that most people charged with corruption in the last 14 years were Obasanjo's friends or aides. The reverse is the case under Yar'Adua and Jonathan, even when you are caught, they will still use the system to protect you if you are close to them. So, to me, the zeal with which the war against corruption was fought under Obasanjo is different now (Interview 2013).

In fact, Obasanjo (2013) expressed worry over the high incidence of corruption under President Jonathan's watch. He noted that 'when the guard becomes the thief, nothing is safe, secure nor protected in the house' (p:10). The zeal to bring corrupt people to justice has reduced drastically. In 2005, for example, Nigeria moved from No.2 on the Corruption Perception Index table to No. 45, but the country had come down to No. 36 on the table, as at 2015 (TI 2015 reports). It is simply a fact that Nigeria is losing the battle against corruption. Indeed, during the Yar' Adua era, there was general perception that anti-corruption campaign was pursued with less vigour, with suspicious exoneration of high ranking suspects previously charged under the Obasanjo administration. Adeniyi (2011:10) noted that the implementation of the war against corruption during this period became 'dysfunctional and diabolical'.

Worried that the incidences of corruption were on the increase, scores of Nigerians, for the first time in the history of the country, staged a peaceful protest in Lagos in January, 2012, saying "No to Corruption" and yet scandals involving government officials continued to make the headlines of all the dailies.

*Figure 4.2:*



PETITIONS RECEIVED SINCE INCEPTION

ICPC Annual Reports 2000-2015

The chart, above, shows that petitions have continually been forwarded to the ICPC since its inception on 13th September, 2000. This clearly indicates that Nigerians put a reasonable level of confidence in the anti-graft agency, but the agency is constrained from carrying out its three-fold mandate of Enforcement, Prevention and Public Enlightenment/Education. Despite this wide mandate, the ICPC had achieved only 72 convictions since its inauguration in 2000.

*4.2.5.1 Comparison of Cases Filed in Courts and Convictions Secured Since Inception*
*Figure 4.3:*



ICPC Annual Reports (2000-2015).

The chart, above, reveals the number of cases filed, and the convictions secured by the Commission since 2000. The generally low ratio of the number of convictions secured to the number of cases filed may be attributed to the slow judicial process, which is obviously not within the purview of the ICPC. From the chart, between 2006 and 2015, the number of cases being won by ICPC appears to be on increase.

*Figure 4.4:*



Comparison of Cases filed in Court Under different ICPC Leaderships

**Comparison of Cases Handled Under Different ICPC Leadership**

From the chart, above, (2006-2010), when Ayoola was the chairman of ICPC, more cases were prosecuted if compared with those prosecuted under the first Chairman of the Commission, Mustapha Akanbi (2000 – 2005), while under Ekpo Nta (2010- 2015) the number appeared to be more, but the calibre of personalities convicted by the Commission is a concern to many Nigerians. The figures indicate that the Commission has yet to convict any VIP since its inception in 2000.

*Table 4.5: Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) Charged by the EFCC*



EFCC Zero Tolerance (2014).

From the chart, above, 2005-2008, more politically exposed personalities (PEP) were charged and brought to court under Nuhu Ribadu's tenure. The number of PEPs, however, dropped when Ribadu was removed as Chairman of EFCC, and then picked up slightly when Waziri was appointed. EFCC, on the other hand, advertised in the *Punch* Newspaper of 10th February, 2014, to the effect that the Commission secured 117 convictions in 2013, but no single VIP was on the list published.

In-spite of the consensus among Nigerians that corruption is one of the major challenges facing the country, President Goodluck Jonathan has been postulating a corruption theory that says "Corruption is not Nigeria's problem". In fact, during his visit to South Africa in May, 2013, he asserted that corruption was not a major issue in Nigeria. He repeated this assertion in Switzerland

when asked by reporters about the major challenge facing the nation. In March, 2014, in Namibia, he noted that corruption was over-exaggerated in Nigeria. Williams, in an opinion piece, "Nigeria is Corrupt: True or False" published in the *Guardian on Sunday* of 30th March, 2014, p. 21 noted:

> The President is of the mind-set that the global rating of Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries is exaggerated…. the President has entangled himself with a difficult assignment; he does not agree with the perception that Nigeria is down there on the ladder of world's most corrupt countries. He said, pointedly, that the perception is louder than the true situation on the ground.

The newspaper reports on President Jonathan's position on the problem of corruption expose the insincerity of the political elite in relation to the problem. Though the legal instruments to curb corruption in Nigeria appeared to be comprehensive, Nigeria occupied No. 142 out of 168 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for (2015), because heavy emphasis is placed on the role of law enforcement agencies, quasi-judicial bodies, prosecutors and judges, while neglecting the non-state actors, notably the mass media (Adeniran, 2008: 66). Opara (2007) offered two other reasons for the failure of the government's efforts to curb corruption:

> Past and existing statutory provisions have been ineffective because they target the symptoms rather than the cause of corruption in the country. Furthermore, they failed because of the time they were introduced by the regimes as a mere smokescreen and they therefore lacked the political will to enforce applicable law and rules (Opara, 2007:7).

Here, Opara's viewpoint that the political will to fight corruption is lacking, and thus, no matter how the anti-graft officials strive, such efforts will be futile. Similarly, the 2011 report by Human Rights Watch revealed:

> Many of the corruption cases against the political elite have made little progress in the Courts: there have been only four convictions to date and those convicted have faced relatively little or no prison time. Other senior political figures who have been widely implicated in corruption have not been prosecuted. At the time of this writing, not a single politician was serving prison time for any of these alleged crimes. Despite its promise, the EFCC has fallen far short of its potential and eight years after its inception is left

with a battered reputation and an uncertain record of accomplishment (Human Rights Watch, 2011:1).

The Code of Conduct Bureau was deliberately excluded from this analysis because the Bureau had only existed on the books, rather than in action. Chapter Five will examine the various forms of corruption affecting the advocacy role of the media.

## 4.6    Summary

While it may be conceded that Nigeria had a bad colonial experience, as corruption, exploitation and other vices were introduced to the Nigerian socio-cultural and political environment by the colonial masters, this study reveals that it is rather too late to keep blaming colonialism for corruption in Nigeria 56 years after independence. Similarly, several efforts and initiatives by successive governments to reduce the menace of corruption in the country have not yielded the desired results, owing to a lack of the political will on the part of those in authority to fully implement the various provisions of the laws enacted to fight corruption in the country. Third, the legal instruments that have so far been enacted in Nigeria appeared to be comprehensive in order to reduce the incidences of corruption, but they have failed because the horizontal and vertical instruments of accountability have not been fully mobilised by the State. Since 1966, corruption has remained a dominant political narrative among the military and civilian leaders as a legitimate means of gaining and sustaining power in the country.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## THE PRINT MEDIA IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS

### 5.1     Introduction

This chapter assesses the watchdog role of the media, both historically and through changing inter-disciplinary debates about democracy. It attempts to highlight the role of the media in the anti-corruption drive in a democratic setting, while interrogating the inability of the media to have a positive impact on transparency and accountability in Nigeria, despite the exposure of corruption in the media. In essence, this chapter sets out to outline the various forms of corruption within the media sector, from the global perspective, then to Africa and, finally, to Nigeria, the focus of this study.

### 5.2     The Role of the Media in Anti-Corruption

In Nigeria, just as in other societies, the mass media transmit ideas and new information to a target audience. Essentially, the media drive most of the adjustments in the behavioral pattern of people in society. The influence of the mass media extends to almost every segment of society. In other words, the media serve as an agent of change and, as the watchdog of society, it is expected to play a part in ensuring transparency and accountability in government, as well as to contribute to the efforts of crime –fighting institutions to curb corruption in the country (Nwuneli, 1990; Nwosu, 1990). However, a corrupt press cannot fight corrupt individuals.

The literature that is available indicates that, in the developed world, the media have not merely been agents that operate the checks and balances against the excesses of government; they have been at the forefront of socio-political change. The media expose the misdeeds of government and quickly investigate issues of corruption. The media are often regarded as "the Fourth Pillar in democracy" (Mendes *et al*, 2013: 1).

It must be noted, however, that while the media, both in developed and developing countries, have been relatively proactive, they are still faced with some shortcomings. Dahlstrom (2002: 4

) pointed out that a free press may not necessarily reduce corruption. He identified the "cash for news coverage" terminology to explain a situation in which "journalists agree to publish positive news against payment".

Citing a study conducted by the IPRA (2002), Dahlstrom showed that "40 percent of the respondents, chiefly senior practitioners, in Southern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, answered that they thought that "bribes commonly influence the editorial content". He also showed that "in Latin America 41 percent believed it was common to accept bribes to stop the publication of an article". The study even stated that another issue is the discounts given to political parties and candidates. Indeed, Anderson (2004) and Jhally (2004) argued that adverstising was a threats to democracy globally. Dahlstrom, equally, observed a similar trend with politicians through donations to their campaigns. A case in point was in the US, between 1993 and 2000, the media provided US$75 million to politicians. Other practices in the media industry, which some scholars have tagged corrupt practices, include checkbook journalism (Peters, 2003: 49-50). Peters (2003) provided a description of how media men in developed countries engage in corruption:

> In the developed world, the practice of freebies is well established. Journalists enjoy free air travel from airlines and hospitality at hotels and then write glowing travel articles. In Europe, members of media organisations often expect hotels and meals to be complimentary when they attend press conferences; they may even count on sponsors to provide gifts (Peters, 2003: 55).

Corruption in the media is thus not restricted to African media alone but it is a common phenomenon the world over. However, Tassseni, (2010: 5) noted that the media can only report the news, but their effectiveness in reducing corruption is dependent on other realities in the political system of the state. It may not be out of place to ask, at this juncture, whether the press can contain corruption in any given society?

Based on the 2013 press index reports by the Reporters Without Borders, what is notable is that countries which the EU report shows to be the least corrupt, such as Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden, are also the highest ranked in the press freedom index. In contrast, countries such as Greece, Bulgaria and Croatia, which rank relatively low in press freedom, also

rank among the most corrupt (*Reporters Without Borders 2013*). The question is, does this mean that there is a perfect inverse correlation between press freedom and corruption? The answer is "NO". The Czech Republic, for instance, is an exception. Though ranked very high in press freedom, it is reported to be one of the most corrupt EU countries.

Nigeria also is an exception, though it is not as strong on the corruption index as the Czech Republic. It performs better on the press freedom index (111 out of 180 countries) than it does on Transparency International's corruption index (136 out of 168 countries). It is the contention of this study that the media are not free, as has been widely reported in some literatures. The integrity of the Nigerian media seems to be in doubt. Corruption in the Media sector in Nigeria is said to be prevalent, to the extent that the media are generally perceived to be corrupt.

## 5.3     Factors That Influence Media Integrity

While explaining the role of the media in anti-corruption, Mendes (2013: 2-4), in a collaborative work with Transparency International, identified a number of factors that are likely to influence the integrity of the media in a democratic setting. These factors include:

### 5.3.1   The Constitutional and Legal Framework

The legal framework of a country has a huge impact on the integrity of the media that exist therein. It is the legal framework that determines the extent of freedom of expression, the right of access to information, media licensing and registration. While the legal framework has been relatively expanded in developed countries, the possibility of their expansion in developing countries is ubiquitously obvious. UNESCO disclosed that as at 2016, only 11 out of 54 African countries have passed national freedom of Information (FOI) laws while draft FOI laws in other African states are at different stages in the process towards their adoption. Such is the nature of the legal framework in which the media operates in many African countries.

Access to information is necessary if the media are to maintain their status as impartial information disseminators. However, practically, many African nations are yet to ratify the framework in order to efficiently allow for free information access. The constitutions of most African states make provisions for press freedom but, in reality, the media still struggle to carry out their duties in

society. The Freedom of Information Act has been passed and signed into law in Nigeria, but is yet to be fully implemented, due to litigation on its passage by some of the states.

Eribo (1997: 52) defined press freedom as the availability of a free market place of ideas and information for all the citizens without fear, favour, intimidation or obstacles. Similarly, McQuail (2000) argued that press freedom 'is a certain independence, sufficient to protect free and open public expression of ideas and information' and at the same time, prevent concentration of ownership and monopoly of control, whether on the part of the state or private media owners (McQuail, 2000: 144-145). The Committee to Protect journalists (2004) defined press freedom as the 'rights of journalists to report news without fear of reprisal'. This right to broadcast and print without intimidation and persecution is backed both constitutionally and by universal conventions. Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for instance, states:

> Every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (UN document).

Following the footsteps of the United Nations, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, Section 36(1), stipulated:

> Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.

Besides the freedom of expression accorded to individuals in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, the latter also gave a formal role to the Nigerian press to act as a watchdog, without interference. Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution stipulated:

> The press, radio, television and other agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free to uphold the fundamental directives contained in this chapter and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people.

This study believes that Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria ought to be amended so that a definite stand on the roles and protection of the media can be spelt out in clear terms. However, legal practitioners and media scholars have argued that there is nowhere in the world where the media enjoy absolute press freedom, including advanced democracies, as represented by the United States of America and Britain (Smith, 2004: 76).

It has been argued that the Nigerian press enjoys partial /qualified press freedom. It is imperative to look at the constitutional provisions on the media in America and Ghana, Nigeria's West African neighbour, for a brief comparison.

A preview of the American constitution, which provided a framework for the Nigerian constitution, would suffice. The first amendment to the American Constitution provided:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, infringing the freedom of speech, infringing the freedom of the press, limiting the right to peaceably assemble, or limiting the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances (First Amendment to US Constitution).

In Ghana, Sections 162 and 163 of the 1992 Constitution guarantee the freedom and independence of the media: Section 162

(1) Freedom and independence of the media are hereby guaranteed.

(2) Subject to this Constitution and any other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, there shall be no censorship in Ghana.

(3) There shall be no impediments to the establishment of private press or media; and, in particular, there shall be no law requiring any person to obtain a licence as a prerequisite to the establishment or operation of a newspaper, journal or other media for mass communication or information.

(4) Editors and publishers of newspapers and other institutions of the mass media shall not be subject to control or interference by Government, nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and views, or the content of their publications.

(5) All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free to uphold the principles, provisions and objectives of this Constitution, and shall uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people of Ghana.

(6) Any medium for the dissemination of information to the public which publishes a statement about or against any person shall be obliged to publish a rejoinder, if any, from the person in respect of whom the publication was made.

Section 163:

All state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting ones.

A dispassionate look at Section 39 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution gives a clearer picture of the kind of press freedom that the framers of the document envisaged for the media:

39(1) every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.

(2) without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (1) every person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions, provided that no person, other than the government of the federation or of the

state or any other person or body authorized by the president on the fulfilment of conditions laid down by an act of the National Assembly, shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless broadcasting station for any purpose whatever.

(3) nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. For the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of the courts or the regulation of telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematography films; or (b) imposing upon persons holding office under the government of the federation or of a state, members of the Armed Forces of the federation or members of the Nigeria Police Force or other government security service or agencies established by law.

However, a critical review of these sections revealed that press freedom is also curtailed by (Sub-Section two of Section 39 (2), which states that only the governments of the Federation or State; or their representatives and agencies can own, establish and operate or authorise a television or wireless broadcasting station. This instrument gives the government, through the Minister of Information and its agency- the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the power to issue and withdraw broadcasting licences. The cost of securing this licence runs as high as N20 million (US$105,263) and N15 million (US$78,947) depending on the state in which the station is to be located (African Media Barometer, 2011: 34).

As argued earlier, there is no society where there is absolute press freedom. Sawant, *et al* (2003) identified two categories of media control that are acceptable in all democratic societies. These are legal restraints, such as the Official Secrets Act, and journalism ethics designed and approved by the journalists, otherwise known as a Code of Ethics. Added to these controls are those imposed by advertisers (Babasola, 2009: 4-7). The Advertising market in Nigeria is believed to be worth

N20 billion (US$105,263,158) at the exchange rate of N190 to a dollar. This revenue, "is widely considered to be insufficient to support Nigeria's media industry" (African Media Barometer, 2011:30).

A critical study of the anti-press laws and legislation in Nigeria revealed that all have their origins in the colonial period (Elias, 1969: 1; Momoh, 2002; 10). Most of the existing laws were used by the British authorities between 1916 and the 1950s against Nigerians. Between 1917 and 1960, when Nigeria gained her independence from the colonial authorities, nine rules were made to restrict freedom of expression and media freedom. Between 1960 and the coup d'état of 1966, seven were enacted. Between 1966 and 1979 (the military era), 11 restrictive laws were promulgated to hinder media freedom, and between 1979 and 1999, a period of both military and civil rule, 14 regulations were enacted to cage the media (Momoh, 2002: 6-9).

A critical appraisal of the 1999 Constitution reveals that there is freedom of speech, but there is no freedom of the press in Nigeria. The Minister of Information at the federal level and the Commissioner of Information at the State level remain powerful officials who are in charge of broadcast sector, since they appoint the chief executives of the state-run broadcasting stations. "There is no true public service broadcaster in the country since public radio and television stations are managed much like parastatals" (African Media Barometer, 2011: 34).

### 5.3.2   Free, but Everywhere Chained

Although, the constitution and laws provide for freedom of speech and the press, the federal and state governments in Africa frequently restrict these rights; and cases were reported in which the government curtailed the right to speech and other expression. In Egypt, for instance, the court found Peter Greste (Correspondent), Mohamed Fahmy (Producer), and Baher Mohamed (Producer), guilty of reporting false news and of associating with the now outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Baher Mohamed was sentenced to an additional three years for being in possession of a spent cartridge. Greste was released after 400 days in prison, while his two other colleagues were later released on bail by the Egyptian court while their cases continue.

In Nigeria, Freedom House, in its May (2013) annual survey of media independence, (*Freedom of the Press 2013)*, described the Nigerian press as "partly free." Nigeria is reputed to have one of the most vibrant private domestic media in Africa (Ronning, 2009). It is also one of the countries on the continent where the cost of daily newspapers is high, while accessing television is relatively expensive and the literacy level is low. Nigerians pay to access television stations, with the exception of a few state-owned stations. An average Nigerian lives on $1.29 a day (Burleigh, London Daily Mail, August 9th, 2013), while the cover price of most daily papers is N150 and weekend papers sell for N200 (the cover prices were less than one US dollar as at March, 2016). Radio, to a large extent remains the most important medium of mass communication and information.

The Secretary-General of Reporters Without Borders, Jean-François Julliard, in a letter to President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of the 1st July, 2009, expressed deep concern about the various attacks on journalists in Nigeria. The organisation claimed that it registered 42 press freedom violations in Nigeria in the first half of 2009 and found that, for the most part, police officers or local officials, such as provincial governors, were responsible.

The United States of America, in her 2013 Country Reports, also documented various challenges that are being faced by the Nigerian media. In Section 2 of the Reports, the US State Department revealed that security forces detain and harass journalists sometimes for reporting on sensitive problems, such as political corruption and security. The report further explains that, on certain occasions, the security forces and police arrested and detained journalists who criticized the government. Reporting on matters of political corruption and security problems is particularly sensitive.

Curiously, the National Secretary of the NUJ, Mr Shuaibu Leman, in a statement noted:

> After about 15 years of uninterrupted democracy, we are yet to move away from anti-democratic practices that characterized military regimes… we say NO! To government who make a mockery of the freedom of expression and democracy when they

encourage a culture of impunity and lawlessness against the media (Leman, 2014, 1-3).

Besides the attacks on media practitioners, newspaper vendors and distributors have also suffered government clampdowns. For one week, 6th-11th June, 2014, several copies of various newspapers were seized and circulation drivers were arrested by the Nigerian Military. The Nigerian Army, in a statement by its Director, Defence Information, Major-General Chris Olukolade, justified this onslaught on the newspaper houses. Olukolade noted that the military action was informed by the information at its disposal that the circulation vehicles of the media organisations were being used to carry arms and ammunition for the insurgents in the North Eastern part of Nigeria (Soriwei, *The Punch* Newspapers, June 11th, 2014, p 8). The President of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) described the action of the military as being unacceptable under a democratic rule.

The Nigerian Press Organisation, including the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN); the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), and the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) have expressed worry over the clampdown on the media (Obaigbena, et al, *The Nation* Newspapers, 13th June, 2014, 13).

The kind of language used to address media men in the country is almost absurd. Journalists covering the National Conference for instance, decried the way they were "being treated like dogs", especially by the Conference Chairman, Justice Idris Kutigi (Okeke, *Daily Trust* 26th June, 2014: 66). Kutigi was widely reported in the media to have used uncivilised language about the media men while asking them to vacate the plenary of the conference:

> Pressmen, clear yourselves. The pressmen should disappear! Pressmen disappear…shut your cameras, shut everything and get out from the gallery, clear and get out from here. Disappear from here now. Security, get them out of here immediately. Get out of here. Disappear; get out, all of you.

What can be inferred from this report is that the Nigerian media are still confronting challenges with the advent of the civilian regime, despite the view that democracy always guarantees an atmosphere in which the press can thrive.

Despite the FOI Act, censorship or content restrictions are still a common practice in Nigeria. The US reports noted that journalists practise self-censorship while local media and NGOs have claimed that security forces have intimidated newspaper editors and owners in order to censor some reports of killings and other human rights abuses (US Country Reports, 2013). The government controls much of the electronic media through the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), which is responsible for monitoring and regulating the broadcast media. The law prohibits local television stations from transmitting programmes from other countries, except for special religious programmes, sports programmes, or events of national interest. Cable and satellite broadcasting is less restricted (Zikirullahi, 2005). The NBC, for example, permits live broadcasts of foreign news and programmes on these networks. Cable and satellite services are, however, required to dedicate 20 percent of broadcast time to local programming.

Licences for electronic media are also restricted by the government. The President is the sole authority for the approval of a licence to television and radio stations. Several applications for TV/ radio licences have been refused in the past because the government believes that the applicants are in the opposition parties (Mr X in NBC 15th December, 2013, Abuja, in an interview)

Libel laws/Official Secrets Act have been deployed by the present civilian government in order to harass and intimidate media practitioners in the country. On 3rd September, 2013, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Senator Bala Mohammed, ordered the arrest of Tukur Mamu, the publisher of the Kaduna-based newspaper, *Desert Herald*, on charges of defamation and extortion. The Minister claimed that Mamu published defamatory stories in the *Desert Herald* and demanded payment to stop further publication. Mamu was allegedly arrested to halt the publication of the book *FCT Administration: The Rot Within*, which allegedly accused the Minister of corruption. After the arraignment, there has been no further development in relation to the case since September, 2013.

Attacks on journalists are not restricted to the government and its officials alone, as a few non-state bodies have also threatened media practitioners in Nigeria since the advent of democratic rule. In 2013, Boko Haram threatened to kill journalists and attack media outlets for what the group described as inaccurate reports about them. The Abuja Office of *ThisDay* Newspaper Abuja office was petrol-bombed by people who were suspected of being terrorists in 2011, while threats were issued to the *Punch* and other media outfits in Abuja by the same terrorist body.

### 5.3.3   Media Ownership

In many developing countries, the government owns and finances media houses and thus the media houses and journalists tend to do their bidding. As Djankov, McLiesh, Nevona and Shlefer (2001) observed in a World Bank survey of media ownership in 97 countries around:

> We found that countries with more prevalent state ownership of the media have less free press, fewer political rights for citizens, inferior governance, less developed markets and strikingly inferior outcomes in the areas of education and health (p:31).

In Nigeria, the rate at which "politicians of questionable character" own media outfits, be it print or electronic ones, is a source of worry to most media observers (Olatunji, interview 2014).

### 5.3.4   Resources and Capacity

This may include the norms and values that should guide journalism. A combination of appropriate training, a remuneration package, quality control, the employee turnover, all have impacted on the media in Africa. The challenges posed by these factors have contributed to the low credibility of the media. Indeed, Nyamnjoh (2001) blame the poor remuneration of journalists for the menace of the *brown envelope*. However, Nwabueze (2010: 402) noted that the *brown envelope* syndrome cannot be divorced from the nature of the society within which a journalist operates. Nyamnjoh (2005, 73-74) noted that poor salaries and working conditions in African newsrooms have pushed journalists into "prostitution", or what he termed "a hand-to-mouth journalism".

Similarly, Lodamo & Skjerdal (2009) believe that poor journalistic training is another factor promoting the culture of impunity among media men. One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this summation is that the original foundation of the media profession in Africa was faulty,

especially on the issue of remuneration. Second, and more important, is that the African journalist lacks the requisite education and proper training. Bolawole (author's interview 2009) argued that in the early days of journalism in Africa, most of the leading lights were non-university graduates, this is unlike the situation in Britain, where the majority of journalists at the BBC and in the print media were Oxbridge arts graduates (Webster, 2006: 172).

Akinfeleye (2000) argued that the problem of the Nigerian press is foundational. Journalists are not properly trained because there is no co-ordination among institutions in Nigeria for the proper training of journalists; apart from the fact that these institutions suffer from inadequate staffing. Dare (1996) and Shobanjo (2002) argued that the major disability of an average Nigerian journalist is inadequate skills resulting from poor training. Regular training is important, because the role of the editor, as a media manager, has changed dramatically in the last two decades, with new and difficult demands being made on the practitioners (Dantiye, 2008:6).

This study contends that the faulty foundation of the journalism profession, as well as the educational inadequacy of the early journalists in Africa, may not be the justification for the higher incidence of *brown envelope* in Africa than in any other parts of the world. This is because many journalists in Nigeria have acquired university degrees, ranging from first degrees through Masters and doctoral degrees. Babasola (2009, author's interview) asserted that the media profession is no longer a profession for drop-outs. Nigerian journalists can hold their own academically; and they are not inferior to any profession (Babasola, 2009: 18).

It is the contention of this researcher that poor remuneration and the lack of proper training and education may not be valid reasons for media practitioners to engage in corruption. Some of the editors that engage in moonlighting (as consultants to individuals and corporate bodies), as the *Ayorinde vs. Azubuike Ishiekwene case* revealed, were not poorly paid, nor did they lack adequate education. It is just a matter of the poor understanding of the ethical roles of a journalist. Scores of media practitioners in the country were not aware of the enormous social responsibility that society places on the media. The orientation of most of the media practitioners is for an extreme desire for wealth at the expense of the public good, which the media ought to defend.

### 5.4 Forms of Corruption in the Media

For the purpose of this study, the five forms of corruption in the media are: Bribery; Gift and Advertisement; Nepotism; Media Capture; and Moonlighting. These five forms appear to capture the different types of corruption that have been prevalent in the media in Africa in the past few decades. These five forms were identified by Mara Mendes of Transparency International, in a collaborative study with the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, released in February, 2013.

#### 5.4.1 Bribery

The most popular corrupt practice in the Nigerian media is the acceptance of monetary inducement popularly referred to as the *brown envelope*. Generally, *the brown envelope* is a monetary inducement handed out to a person to pressurise them to do what the bribe giver wants. It is any form of gratification which a journalist receives to cover an event or to influence the judgment of a journalist. The event may be a press conference, an interview of any sort, a workshop, an impromptu or organized briefing. Basically, the coining of the phrase *brown envelope* evokes the idea of criminality in the mind of right thinking persons. This nomenclature is so regarded because it is derived from the underworld business of the wrapping of wares in business envelopes. It is perhaps, the most usual source of corruption in the media.

Nwabueze (2010) defines the *brown envelope* as all practices exhibited by journalists in the pursuit of gratification. Bolawole quoted in Babasola, (2009) defined the *brown envelope* as the practice of offering or accepting gifts, drinks, food or money in order to influence the judgment of a journalist in their course of their duties. The practice is not alien to other parts of the world, although practice differs from place to place. According to Obianigwe (2009), the term *brown envelope* is also used in some other African and Asian countries. The broad term that perfectly covers the practice is "envelope journalism". which refers to red envelope journalism, white envelope journalism, etc. More recently, however, the term "ATM journalism" is becoming popular in the society, and this indicates the change to the electronic transfer of bribes into journalists' bank accounts (http: //www.enwikipededia. org/).

Corruption in the media is multi-faceted. It may come through some of the ways mentioned above, or perhaps through what is called the "Media Executive Dinner", through generous offers of

expensive gift items, or through various forms of either political or economic gratification. At times, in a bid to get exclusive stories or a scoop, journalists may be tempted to give bribes, most especially if such stories are regarded as offering very highly sought-after information.

### 5.4.2 *Ethics and the Journalistic Profession*

The word, "ethics" is connected to the question of correct conduct within society. Etymologically, "ethics" comes from the Greek "ethos" meaning "character", which indicates a concern for virtuous people, reliable character and proper conduct (Ward, 2010). In short, "ethics has more to do with principles concerning the rights and wrongs of human conduct, principles which have some reasoned theoretical basis and which therefore apply objectively and impartially" (Besley and Chadwick, 1992: 7).

In order to guide the conduct of media practitioners in Nigeria, a Code of Ethics was developed by the Nigerian Press Organisation (NPO) and the Nigerian Press Council (NPC). There are 15 items in the Code of Ethics agreed by the two bodies, but only Item 7 remains relevant to this study. Item 7 specifically frowns at brown envelope. **Rewards and Gratification**

> i. A Journalist should neither solicit nor accept bribe, gratification or patronage to suppress or publish information.

> ii. To determine payment for publication of news is inimical to the notion of news as the fair, accurate, unbiased and factual report of an event.

Corruption in the media is, no doubt, an ethical issue, and damages journalists as well as media outfits' integrity and affects professionalism. In-spite of the code of ethics, corruption perpetrated through brown envelope is a serious problem within the industry (Ekerikevwe 2012: 516). However, most journalism organisations are somewhat reluctant to tackle the problem head on by implementing some of the codes of conduct of the profession, like their counterparts in other professions. Risley (2001) noted that when a journalist is confronted with ethical problems, he or she should consider the following principles:

- When there are two extreme positions in a situation, he or she should seek the middle ground, which Aristotle called the "Golden Mean".

- Act only as you would wish others would act.

- Consider the utilitarianism of our actions, that is, our action should produce the greatest balance of good over evil.

- Apply the veil of ignorance, that is, make ethical decisions as if you are equal to all members of society and, lastly, treat people in the same way you would expect to be treated.

These ethics are not totally obeyed by media practitioners in Nigeria. Extant literature on corruption in the media is replete with examples and cases of bribery involving journalists and their patrons. As Aiyetan (2007) observed that there are many examples of journalists, editors and media houses accepting bribes and paid material disguised as news stories, or extorting money either for publishing favourable stories or for not publishing damaging ones. It is equally noteworthy to state that bribes may take different forms; *soli* (in Ghana), *gombo* (in Cameroon), or *mshiko* (in Kenya), *keske, kola, goro kwa/qua, chope, awuf, egunje, communiqué* (in Nigeria) and "*perks"* (in Tanzania).

Apart from the local term ascribed to the "brown envelope", it also has English terms like, "family support", "better life", "the-journalists-are-going", "energiser" and "handshake" (Skjerdal, 2010: 375). However, for the purpose of this study, the terminology *brown envelope* will be adopted as the major source of corruption within the media sector.

Moreover, in 2007, the Public Communication Secretary and Kenyan Government spokesperson, Dr. Alfred Mutua, stated that the country's media "had become synonymous with corruption and, therefore, lacked the moral authority to accuse others" (Mutua reported in Mudhai 2007: 31). He accused some journalists in the print media of taking bribes from senior opposition politicians in order to influence content and he provided evidence of his claims.

So bad is the incidence of bribery in the media that a quote from the Ugandan Media Review reads: *"Yes, there is corruption in the media. And oh, we take bribes to write or suppress stories, we are biased, we favour certain politicians over others…."* (Wasswa and Kakooza, 2011: 7). Mare and Brand (2010: 426) noted that in Zimbabwe and Kenya - it seemed that *"brown envelope"* journalism is an accepted practice. They contend that in South Africa related practices, such as freebies and sponsored travel, are ubiquitous. Hasty (2005) posited that although the exposure of corruption is the primary genre of political news writing in Ghana, informal exchange of money, favours, and food between journalists and their sources are essential for news gathering and personal survival in the context of material and informational scarcity.

Skjerdal (2010: 372), in his work on brown envelope journalism in the African media, identified three ways in which corruption is practised in the media sector globally. He mentioned the *brown envelope*, publication in exchange for paid advertising, and journalists' employment when it shared with PR agencies.

Dirbaba (2010: 482), in a study conducted in Ethiopia, noted that bribery in journalism was no longer restricted to food and small gifts, but also to acquisition of property, such as land. He argued that apart from monetary incentives, land-grabbing corruption has emerged in Ethiopia. However, Mpagaze and White (2010) noted that the perception of corruption in the African media which tends "to lump together" as bribery, the refreshments and accommodation to attract reporters to cover public events, the "brown envelope" tip to cover expenses such as transport to draw journalists in to report on press conferences, and major payments to suppress information or falsify news accounts," is untenable.

They argue that statements that journalists are corrupt are rooted in the subjective "perception" of the journalists themselves who are part of the culture of journalism in many African contexts (Mpagaze and White 2010: 549-550). Onyisi (1996), exploring the arguments both for and against the practice of bribery, identifies four classes of people who view the practice from different perspectives:

> Idealists (who see brown envelope as a form of bribery and unethical practice in journalism and should not be accepted for any reason); Altruists/Culturists (who opine that it is offered to be nice to journalists and in line with the hospitality nature of African culture); Realists (who believe that though the practice is morally wrong, the Nigerian society is such that you need to do something to get your story published); and Opportunists (who have no firm conviction but simply believe that to accept or reject brown envelope depends on the situation (Onyisi,1996:81).

It is the contention of this work that denying the existence of corruption within the media sector may amount to being economical with the truth. Still, the link between *brown envelope* and journalists, whether for good or ill, remains crucially important to the social responsibility role of the media.

Dan Agbese, Editor-in-Chief of the defunct *Newswatch Magazine*, painted a sorry picture of the state of the Nigerian media on the issue of the brown envelope:

> The brown envelope is, perhaps, the most eloquent evidence that journalists accept gratification in the course of their duties. This has tarnished the image of the Nigerian press considerably. Most of us have, at one time or another, decried this practice with a rather high-minded feeling of hurt. My understanding is that the gratification is now offered in more acceptable colours of the envelope, such as white or blue. A more serious variant of this is the practice by some news editors to ask their reporters to make daily returns to them. Reporters who cover the political beat, said to be the most lucrative, make such returns. Those who don't, are yanked off the beat by their news editors or editors (Agbese, 2001, February 28th).

Unfortunately, journalists who dare to report incidences within the industry are treated with suspicion and even threatened by their colleagues:

> When, a few years ago, one of our quality magazines had the isolated and rare audacity to report on growing corruption in the media, the editor of the magazine confessed to me that he was assaulted with a barrage of intimidating complaints, short of curses from several professional colleagues who wondered what had suddenly come over him? From the point of view of these irate journalists, it was all right for the media to expose corruption in the

three other Estates of the Realm but the media's own linens; however foul-smelling, should be beyond inspection! (Olukotun, 2009: 17).

It may appear that these kinds of reactions to reports of corruption in the media are encouraging the culture of silence around the problem, thus encouraging the perpetuation of *brown envelope* culture among media practitioners. Out of 56 registered daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in Nigeria, only two: *The Punch* and *Daily Trust;* seem to publicly denounce the brown envelope syndrome.

*The Punch* Newspapers have an ethics statement placed at its right bottom column:

> *Ethical Complaints:*
>
> *We, Punch Nigeria Limited, do not demand or accept gifts or gratification to publish articles or photographs, neither do our journalists. Therefore, we implore you not to offer any to our journalists.*
>
> *In the event that a PUNCH journalist demands such, please send*
>
> *your complaint(s) to ethics@punchng.com or 08168214977.*

It is, however, surprising that when allegations of corrupt practices and abuse of office were levelled against the Director of Publications of Punch Newspapers by one of its former Editors, the management of the Newspapers did not sanction the Executive Director in question. He was given a safe passage to resign his appointment. Steve Ayorinde had, in a 12-page petition dated 1st March, 2010, catalogued a lot of infractions and corrupt practices perpetrated by his boss, Azubuike Ishiekwene, the Executive Director, Publications of the Newspapers (Pointblanketnews.com, accessed on the 21st January 2014).

Ayorinde noted in the petition, sent to the Chairman of the *Punch* Newspapers, Jibola Ogunshola, that Azubuike's corrupt acts, as well as his abuse of office and ethical misconduct should be probed. However, nothing was heard about the matter, except that Azubuike later headed *the Leadership Newspapers* as its Managing Director. If *Punch* Newspapers, supposedly noted for its transparency and anti-corruption stance, could condone such a high level of infraction against one

of its top managers, and nothing concrete was reported in the media to have been done in this regard, then it shows the media's penchant for protecting its own in the country. Bolawole argued, "this is a criminal act, but so far in the history of the media in Nigeria, nobody has been caught or jailed for collecting or demanding *brown envelope"*, (Author interview with Bolawole, 2009).

*Daily Trust*, an Abuja based Newspaper, placed a similar warning on page 3 of its publication:

> *NO, THANK YOU!*
>
> *Media Trust Limited journalists have pledged to uphold the company's policy of not asking or taking a gift by whatever name, from those they encounter in the course of their work.*
>
> *Please assist us by not seeking to influence our reporters and editors with your favours. Where they can, our journalists are expected to graciously decline a gift. When it is pressed on them, they are expected to declare it. The company will write a letter thanking the giver and donating the amount to charity. Report anyone who claims to be our staff, but engages in unethical conduct. To blow the whistle, send an SMS to 08035896941, 08185691881 or email to* whistleblower@dailytrust.com.
>
> *Help us produce newspapers you can trust.*

Akinkuotu, of *Tell Magazine,* noted that journalists have descended from the high pedestal into the modern jungle:

> This descent into anarchy can best be illustrated by the various scenarios as played by the Reporter on the beat, his almighty Editor and the Proprietor. There was a time when beat associations almost strangled the profession by their nefarious activities.....So if you read one account of an event in a daily, do not bother to read them elsewhere; it will be the same source. It will be the same in all the papers because it has been given the stamp of the beat association. If the price is right, many journalists are ready to deliberately distort stories and serve half-truths to the public (Akinkuotu, 2008:20-21)

He continued:

> The decay is further worsened when such stories get to the newsrooms and the final gate-keepers pass them, because

> reporters have "settled" them. There used to be a saying in many newsrooms that this story "smells". To remove the "odour," the reporter will need to settle such editor. And the story goes. And journalism is the poorer for it. (Akinkuotu, 2008:21)

Akinkuotu (2008), however, admitted that there were many practitioners who, despite the token pay, still see journalism as a calling and are using their abundant talents in the cause of uplifting society.

In another context, Nwabueze (2010) noted that the failure of media institutions to identify and punish journalists who accept brown envelopes shows that there is a limit to the self-regulation of the media. On whichever side of the argument one belongs, Nwabueze's verdict will suffice, "the practice of acceptance of gratifications has continued to pose a credibility problem to the journalism profession, invariably affecting the role of the press as a watchdog of the society" (Nwabueze 2010: 504).

While trying to understand the syndrome of the brown envelope, it will not be out of place to identify those who help to perpetuate the culture. Kasoma (2010) identified three top sources of brown envelopes and freebies in Africa. These are: Public Relations practitioners, politicians and business people (Kasoma 2010: 467). These three sets of people influence the editorial content of the media across the globe, especially in this era of globalisation.

It is not only field journalists who engage in unethical behaviour in the course of their duties; media owners and managers also engage in unethical practices in order to keep their businesses from collapsing. Some managers receive contracts from government officials in exchange for spiking stories that are not complimentary to them. This researcher believes that this has contributed significantly to corruption in the media.

Owing to the brown envelope culture among media practitioners in Nigeria, "truth is often suppressed and the highest bidder usually gets away with injustice and unfair treatment" (Okoro and Ugwuanyi, 2010: 142). The culture of the brown envelope is ubiquitous in Nigeria because "the media are fighting for survival amid economic pressures or political turmoil; it would be easy

to put journalism ethics on the back burner" (Ward, 2012). Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe (2012: 516) asserted that the brown envelope "is a new form of news commercialization in Nigeria". Aderogba (2013) noted that, as a result of this phenomenon, the media are largely corrupt.

### 5.4.3 Gifts and Advertisements

Gifts and advertisement are commonplace among journalists and their so-called patrons in many parts of Africa. Gifts are mostly rewards given to journalists for doing the bidding of their "clients". They may come in different forms and are very useful in cajoling those in developing countries, where salaries are very low (Mendes, 2013).

Mendes et al (2013), noted that corruption via advertisements "results from the widespread collusion between journalists and public relations and advertising organisations". They explained that placing advertisements in the media is one of the ways by which private individuals and companies can influence the editorial content of media organisations. Mare and Brand (2010), in *Business Journalism Ethics in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe,* argued that pressure from, or on behalf of advertisers, is a major impediment to ethical news production in the three countries being studied.

Besides business men using advertisements to influence the media, governments, mostly in Africa, still use a similar method to control the media. Edward Dickson (2009) noted that the government uses advertising as a weapon with which to control the media. Newspapers get a large percentage of their advertisements from government ministries and departments, and if government considers a newspaper is too critical, it instructs its officials to stop giving advertisements to such a newspaper. This leads to the use of nepotism to influence the work of the media.

Peters (2003: 44) has argued that the roles of advertising and corrupt journalistic practices undermine the media's ability to adhere to internationally accepted standards. For him, the independence of the media is also compromised by advertising. Although he admitted that advertising is vital to media companies' financial performance, he noted that advertising has had an increasingly pernicious impact on editorial departments. Journalists are increasingly expected

to produce material to suit sponsors and advertisers, blurring the line between advertising and editorial content.

He insisted that among many private newspapers in Africa the relationship between journalism and advertising is more straightforward. Since advertising departments are often understaffed, reporters are expected to solicit advertising while on assignment, thus earning a share of the fee, if they are successful (Ibid: 44-47).

### 5.4.4    Nepotism

Nepotism in the media occurs during the hiring and firing processes. In many African countries, the government has the power to appoint and remove journalists in government-owned media organisations. In many cases, top government functionaries are known to exert a great deal of influence on appointments to key positions in media houses. These appointees, in turn, ensure that the media content produced is in favour of their patrons. Such is the extent of the influence of nepotism on the media that Olatunji (2014 interview) rightly observed:

> An average Nigerian editor will tell you, 'my Publisher may wake up tomorrow and remove me and I will not want my standard of living to go down'. They will tell you that the average tenure of a Nigerian editor is three years. So the strategy is that within those three years, let me accumulate what I can accumulate with my position and go into public relations or start a business if my Publisher fires me.

It is when nepotism appears to have failed that the elite will resort to what some scholars call media capturing. For example, three editors (names withheld) were sacked at the *Nigerian Tribune*, Ibadan, Oyo State, for allegedly failing to toe the line put in place by some members of the Board of the newspapers.

### 5.4.5    Media Capture

The place of the media as the vital channel of information dissemination to the public puts the media in a position of being capable of influencing public opinion, public mood, and the perceptions of people, organisations or governments. In this vein, it is not out of place to agree with Mendes (p: 6) that "media capture is a present or latent risk in most developing countries,

with attempt by either private or governmental interests to capture the media for their own benefit". A top editor of a newspaper argued that the trend was becoming worrisome in Nigeria. His observation:

> Media capturing is taking different forms in the country now. Some editors, especially, news editors and political editors are on the monthly payroll of some bigshots in political and economic sectors, with the sole aim of capturing and protecting their interests in the media (Interview with an Abuja-based editor, December, 2013).

Moreover, Bolawole (interview 2009 by the author) noted that most politicians now see the ownership of a media house as a weapon to be deployed at the appropriate time. He argued that, to an average politician in Nigeria, a media house is an instrument of influence. "We are reaching a situation in the country that the culture of silence is taking over. People are afraid to criticise those in government because the government will deploy media outfits to attack them" (ibid: 2009). Dare (1996) toeing this line, noted that media owners set up newspapers to enhance their access to power in order to boost their businesses, not to carry out the business of journalism professionally. This is one of the major challenges to the Nigerian media industry, as owners' interests take precedence over the public good.

One journalist interviewed in Ibadan explained a different method of media capturing in Nigeria. He noted:

> What can be more capturing than the way federal and state governments are spending heavily on the media? In most states of the federation, including the nation's seat of power, Abuja, journalists are paid monthly. Some collect N10, 000; some N20, 000 from the offices of Chief Press Secretaries. It is part of a grand design by these image makers to control what those assigned to cover their offices are writing; this monthly stipend is called several names. Any journalist who writes something the CPS considers bad will be denied the money and most journalists are playing along, basically due to the economic pressure, now that most media houses owe their staff salaries running into one year in some cases (interview, August, 2013).

Felix Adenaike, (author's interview, 2014) retired Editor-in-Chief of the *Nigerian Tribune* Newspapers, Ibadan, argued that most beat associations formed by media men in Nigeria "are a platform for the collection of bribes". Strikingly, too, media practitioners who are not toeing this line of business are taking solace in moonlighting.

### 5.4.6 *Moonlighting*

Another form of corrupt practice in the media is what Hayes Mabweazara called *moonlighting*. In "Moonlighting in Zimbabwe", Mabweazara described the concept as additional journalistic work taken up by reporters to augment their income. He noted that when a reporter is involved in multiple interests, the primary motivation of the mother employer may be corrupted. Moonlighting has close links with other commonly known corrupt practices in journalism (Mabweazara, 2010: 444). He asserted that *Moonlighting* has taken on a "new" meaning that poses critical professional and ethical questions (Mabweazara, 2010: 446). Dele Oguntayo, who shared his experience with the researcher, asserted that the problem posed by the phenomenon is yet to be fully appreciated in Nigeria because some publishers and media owners are failing to provide a conducive environment in which their staff can work professionally.

Banda (2010) noted that moonlighting "is an ethical dilemma which falls under the conflict of interest in the journalism profession". Besides the issue of the brown envelope that has been extensively treated in this research, further study needs to be carried out on the issue of moonlighting, as it can create a conflict of interests that may further erode the credibility and performance of the media in the anti-corruption campaigns across Africa. It can then be concluded that the media, though, expected to perform certain roles in the society based on some constitutional provisions, are failing, not necessarily of their own volition, but due to certain societal and economic constraints. This study views those scenarios under which the media operate as RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY. The economic, legal and professional conditions needed by the media to discharge their duties are lacking in most African countries, and even in some parts of the developed nations.

Despite the picture painted in this chapter, the online media have succeeded where the mainstream media fail, by exposing the high incidence of corruption in most states in Nigeria. The online media

are leading the pack in exposing the wrongdoings of those in the corridors of power, as reflected in their coverage of the anti-corruption stories.

## 5.5    Summary

So far, attempts have been made to situate the ways in which the media in Africa and, by extension, in Nigeria, are faring in term of their advocacy role in society. In short, the study concludes that the media have been implicated in the corrupt practices of the *brown envelope*, moonlighting, nepotism, gifts and advertising. The media are therefore receding to become a lapdog, rather than the watchdog of society. Second, although the Freedom of Information Act was passed in Nigeria (2011), it has yet to reflect on the ways in which government affairs are run, because some states of the federation are challenging the constitutionality of the Act in the Courts. It is also the contention of this study that there is little the media can do to fight corruption without the active support of non-state actors, notably civil society, professional bodies, traditional/religious/academia and others. Additionally, the reporting of corruption- related stories remains a source of threat to media practitioners, despite the fact that the country is under a democratic dispensation. Where there is no adequate legal protection for journalists, it is difficult for the media to engage in advocacy journalism. Essentially, therefore, the media can only expose wrongdoings, while the punishment of the culprits remain the prerogative of the State. The media can therefore only be helpful in the anti-graft war with the active support of both the state actors and the non-state actors in the society.

# CHAPTER SIX

## COVERAGE OF CORRUPTION STORIES IN NIGERIA UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE: A DISCUSSION OF TWO CASES, POST-1999.

### 6.1     Introduction

This chapter focuses on the coverage of corruption cases by the four selected newspapers in the country, using variables such as ownership structure; the geographic location of the newspapers; the political interests of owners; and the ethnic bias of each newspaper. An attempt is further made to see whether the media coverage of corruption cases has caused the electoral defeat of a politician or an entire government. Has the publication of corrupt-related stories in the media provided disincentives for political or public office holders to be corrupt, or to condone corrupt acts in the country after 15 years of uninterrupted civilian rule? This chapter attempts to answer these questions using the findings of the fieldwork.

### 6.2     Analysis of Print Media in Nigeria

The media are not strangers to advocacy or the reform of moral ethics in Nigeria. They have advocated reforms and promoted accountability, just as public officials have tried to mobilise ethnicity and religious sentiments against their reportage. Although, allegations of corruption have been made against public officials in the past in such a way as to suggest that the media were partisan, this did not appear to be the dominant trend.

There are various tendencies in the Nigerian press coming from their differing interests, motivations and agendas. Whether considered from an ethno-religious perspective or from the socio-economic and political contexts, this has often defined the parameters of the discourse, constructing and deconstructing words, issues and personalities in ways that are fundamental to the Nigerian state. To this extent, the discourse on accountability and probity and its articulation in the media are dependent on their antecedents, proprietorship, ownership ties, location, work environment and the professional ethics subscribed to by the individual editors and their managers. The Nigerian media operate in an ethnically divided society where they are predominantly located, in the South-West of Nigeria. Four privately owned newspapers are selected for the purpose of this study.

*Table 6.1*
**The table below depicts the structure, locations and editorship of the four newspapers chosen for the study:**

| Media | Location | Editor | Kind of Ownership | Proprietor |
|-------|----------|--------|-------------------|------------|
| *The Nigerian Tribune* | Ibadan | Abdulai Debo | Private | The Obafemi Awolowo Family |
| *The Punch* | Lagos | Martins Ayankola | Private | The Olu Aboderin Family |
| *ThisDay* | Lagos | Ijeoma Nwogwugwu | Private | Nduka Obaigbena |
| *Daily Trust* | Abuja | Is'haq Modibbo Kawu | Private | Kabiru A Yusuff |

*Source: Author's Research (2014)

Most of the print media in Nigeria today are privately owned, with *The Punch* being the most widely read. Historically, the print media are reputed to have been in the vanguard of struggle in the pre-colonial and post-colonial era. This implies that the press has been at the vortex of power. The aggressive media campaign against the mismanagement of public funds, which was the hallmark of press activities at the advent of civilian rule in 1999, appears to be fizzling out. Although, the press played a key role in the installation of civilian rule in 1999, it appears that it has failed to live up to its potential of improving the quality of democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 444).

Furthermore, the privately-owned newspapers remain loyal to personalities and the causes of their proprietors. Essentially, their vision and mission cannot be divorced from the political aspirations of their owner(s). The predominance of the print media in Lagos and the South-West cannot be separated from the presence of the advertising and commercial infrastructure (which are conducive to the growth of the mass media), which are found in Lagos and in its geo-political area. In addition, the reading public to which the print media appeals, are predominantly Yoruba, and they

are the products of a liberal education and egalitarian culture and are well-grounded in the history of political activism.

## 6.3     The Search for Accountability: Case Studies

### 6.3.1   *Obasanjo/Atiku Crisis*

This was borne out by the crisis of confidence generated by the second term aspirations of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. Whilst the crisis lasted, a high level of corruption that had been perpetuated by top public office holders in Nigeria was exposed, particularly the alleged running of dedicated bank accounts by close associates of both the President and the Vice-President for selfish motives. The genesis of the Obasanjo/Atiku crisis could be traced to the 2003 PDP presidential primaries, when the Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, indicated his interest in vying for his party's (PDP) ticket as its flag bearer in the 2003 presidential election, despite the sudden decision of his boss to seek re-election.

Following intense persuasion by party stalwarts and elder-statesmen, Atiku later supported Obasanjo's re-election bid and agreed to enter the contest as his running mate. Immediately after the 2003 elections, the President moved against his Vice-President by whittling the latter's powers in government and removing certain portfolios that were under his supervision. In addition, some of the Vice-President's political appointees were removed; the President also, reportedly, led a campaign for the VP's impeachment, alleging abuse of office, when a case was raised against the VP for allegedly using his office to further his private business interests.

The probing of the Petroleum Trust Development Fund's (PTDF) funds with the Trans International Bank (TIB) necessitated that the EFCC followed up a letter of complaint from William Jefferson to President Olusegun Obasanjo over an alleged $6.5 million telecommunications deal between NDTU, owned by Otunba Reuben Fasewe, and his company, iGate. The issue came to the fore as a result of a $1 million bribe demanded from him before iGate could secure a contract.

The outcome of the investigation alleged that Atiku Abubakar used his office and position to divert funds, (approved for the PTDF operations), to the Equatorial Trust Bank (ETB) and the Trans

International Bank (TIB), Abuja, instead of implementing the projects for which the money was meant. These actions were said to have benefitted his private business interests and those of his friends and associates, rather than the public interest. This, it was alleged, amounted to mismanagement, misappropriation and abuse of office. Particular mention was made of the business interests of the Vice-President's associates in Netlink Digital Television (NTD), a satellite television project and the Mofas Shipping Company, where the Chairman was a long-standing friend of the Vice-President.

In the report, Atiku was alleged to have approved the sum of $125 trillion and a $20 million PTDF funds' placement in ETB and TIB, since it negated the purpose for which the funds were requested. It was reported that Otunba Fasewe received over N700 million in loans from the TIB shortly after the PTDF money was deposited there.

On the other hand, Atiku alleged that the Mofas Shipping Company account with TIB, which was allegedly being used for his personal interest and those of his associates, was actually used by the President and his political party PDP to divert public funds for personal, business and political activities between 1999 and 2004. It was alleged that the President's campaign funds were drawn from the said account, which was run by Otunba Fasewe.

The pattern of coverage of the scam by the four selected newspapers revealed the pursuit of different agendas by the media houses. An overview of these cases, as reported in these four Nigerian print media between the 7th and 29th September, 2006, are discussed later in this section. 2006 was marked by political corruption that rocked the seat of power in Nigeria. The four print media covered the corruption cases involving the two powerful personalities.

### 6.3.2   Analysis of Newspaper Reports

The *Punch* and *Nigerian Tribune* newspapers were picked for the first case study, tagged the Obasanjo/ Atiku Scam. This section of the thesis analyses the coverage of corruption related stories involving some key officials of the Third Republic, namely, the former President Olusegun Obasanjo and his deputy, Atiku Abubakar, as well as the scandal that rattled the House of Representatives in Abuja, the city which is the seat of power in Nigeria. The two newspapers

picked for the first case study, tagged the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal, framed the stories of the scandal in different ways. The headlines and the introductory paragraphs of each story in the two newspapers revealed the inherent agendas of those papers in terms of their sympathy or apathy. A critical discourse analysis of the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal revealed that the ownership structure and political affiliation of a paper plays a dominant role in the way news stories are framed by that newspaper.

An analysis of the news reports, starting with the *Nigerian Tribune*, clearly showed the bias and tone in defence of the coverage. A critical analysis of the headlines, in Table 6.1, reveals the subject and the object of the story. It is imperative to consider these two headlines from *The Punch* newspapers:

- How Atiku looted PTDF – Presidency

- Controversial Account belongs to Obasanjo and Atiku – Atiku aide

*The Tribune*, for instance reported:

- The EFCC report on Atiku.

- Atiku lists Obasanjo's 127 impeachable offences.

*The Punch* newspaper reported that the Presidency had given graphic details of how Vice-President Atiku, who supervised the Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF), had deployed the resources of the Fund for political activities. The second headline by *The Nigerian Tribune*, justified the actions of the Vice-President, claiming that the account was being jointly run by Obasanjo and Atiku. A crucial examination of all the headlines in *The Punch* shows that the paper was trying to be liberal.

The tone of the newspaper coverage neither condemned nor shamed the actions of the two leaders involved in the scandal. It was easy to discern that the newspaper was sitting on the fence and refraining from incurring the wrath of the Presidency, which might deny it the patronage of

advertising from government Ministries, Department and Agencies. However, T*he Nigerian Tribune's* position was defensive and provided media space for Atiku.

The coverage of the incident by the two papers did not reflect any deep ethno- regional division in the Nigerian media, as the two papers were based in Lagos and Ibadan respectively (both cities are in the South Western zone of the country, sometimes referred to as the Lagos - Ibadan axis). To a large extent, the political affiliation of the owners of the two newspapers determined the frame, tone and the structure of the stories and headlines.

These two stories, which emanated from the same scandal but with different tones and headlines, showed that the agendas of the papers were determined by their political affiliations. *The Punch* appeared to be reporting the investigative findings of a government agency, EFCC, which was controlled by Obasanjo, while *The Nigerian Tribune* carried a report from Atiku's camp listing 127 impeachable offences that were said to have been committed by Obasanjo. It was a case of different strokes for different issues. The newspapers fed their readers with the biased corruption related issues that filled the pages of many newspapers in Nigeria. This kind of reportage did not send the correct message to readers, and this is how newspaper editors frame stories that, directly or indirectly, shape the perception of readers.

The scenario, above, is a further confirmation that the way a language is deployed determines the direction of a discourse. For advocates of critical discussions, language can be used to represent speakers' beliefs, position and ideas in terms of spoken, written or oral message (Mogashoa,20014: 112). While the headlines in *The Punch* gave subtle indications that Atiku was guilty of the corruption allegation levelled against him, *The Tribune* concentrated on defending the Vice-President, giving him generous media space, bold headlines and catchy phrases in order to hit back at his boss in relation to the scandal. The newspaper reported the dirty deals of Obasanjo and did not provide an alibi for the financial misconduct levelled against Atiku. The following headlines will suffice:

- How Obasanjo operated MOFAS Account – Atiku.

- Atiku revealed more dirty deals.

A critical analysis of the news items reported has indicated that there was no single instance in these two newspapers that their news reports were efforts at investigative journalism; meaning that there was a dearth of investigative media practice in the country, but what we do have is more than one newspaper reporting on the same issue, and possibly casting similar headlines on the scandal. These headlines appeared in both *The Punch* and *The Nigerian Tribune* on the same day:

- PDP Suspends Atiku

- Atiku to Be Tried-Conduct Bureau

Curiously, none of the newspapers asked what had become of the President, who was alleged to have been involved in the scandal, based on the series of revelations about the scam. The lack of follow-ups by the media, and possibly also the lack of in-depth analysis of the event, portends a serious erosion of the responsibility for the Nigerian media's accountability.

When these headlines from *The Nigerian Tribune* are compared to those of *The Punch*, it can be easily inferred that the economic and political affiliations of the paper have played a central role in reporting on corruption related stories in Nigeria. One of the negative outcomes is that the reader who limited him/herself to *The Punch* or *The Nigerian Tribune* due to purchasing powers was likely to get a partisan account of the entire scandal. From this analysis, therefore, it is clear that corruption related stories were framed based on the economic and political affiliation of the papers, with little or no consideration for the behaviour of the gladiators in the state of affairs of the nation. The likely social effect on the readers of this kind of framing is that public space is filled with biased reports and the possibility of a public discourse that is based on facts and figures is nil.

The possibility that the readers of an average newspaper stick to their own myopic world view was therefore perpetuated. An ardent reader of *The Nigerian Tribune* is likely to view the scandal as an attempt by the Obasanjo led federal government to run a witch-hunt against his deputy, and possibly to prevent him from succeeding as president in office, while an average reader of *Punch*

newspapers may view the scandal as part of Obasanjo's anti-corruption crusade, which was meant to cleanse and sanitize the Nigerian political landscape.

*Table 6.1: Obasanjo/Atiku Corruption Scandal as Reported by The Punch and The Nigerian Tribune, based on Subject-Verb-Object (SVO)*

| Nominalisation | *SVO* | Newspaper | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *The EFCC report on Atiku* | The Punch | 8th Sept, 2006 |
| | *How Atiku, Adenuga, Mohammed, Babangida diverted public funds* | The Punch | 9th Sept, 2006 |
| | • *Text of the report President Obasanjo's administration panel of inquiry.* | | |
| Epic Battle | *Obasanjo VS Atiku* | The Punch | 10thSept, 2006 |
| | *Obasanjo, Atiku in war of letters Vice-President raises legal team, Gani says - it's over for him.* | The Punch | 11th Sept, 2006 |
| | *2003 poll: Obasanjo collected 50 million Naira from Dariye – Atiku.* | The Punch | 12th Sept, 2006 |
| | • *It's not true – Presidency Vice-President suspended vacation.* | | |
| | *How Atiku looted PTDF - Presidency* | The Punch | 13th Sept, 2006 |
| | *Atiku hits Obasanjo with Check Bomb… says President collected 36 million Naira through Fasawe's account.* | | 14th Sept, 2006 |
| | *PDP summons Atiku* | The Punch | 15th Sept, 2006 |
| | • *Vice-President chasing shadows says presidency.* | | |
| | • *Obasanjo is misleading Nigeria – Atiku* | | |
| | *Atiku should be impeached – Gani Fawehinmi* | The Punch | 10th Sept, 2006 |
| | *You can't have my wife's letters to Jefferson, Atiku tells Ribadu.* | The Punch | 9th Sept, 2006 |
| | *Atiku's loyalists chide Obasanjo* | Sunday Punch | 10th Sept, 2006 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Atiku drops fresh bombshell* | The Punch | 16th Sept, 2006 |
| • *Obasanjo's aide made over 100 withdrawals from controversial account – Vice-President* | | |
| • *Beg Nigerians for forgiveness – Presidency tells Atiku* | | |
| *Resign now, Presidency tells Atiku, No it's Obasanjo who should go – Atiku* | The Punch | 17th Sept, 2006 |
| *DDP suspends Atiku* | The Punch | 29th Sept, 2006 |
| *I'm ready for FBI, EFCC probes – Atiku* | Nigerian Tribune | 6th Sept, 2006 |
| *Obasanjo orders Atiku impeached* | Nigerian Tribune | 7th Sept, 2006 |
| • *Send request to Senate* | | |
| • *I remain Innocent – Atiku* | | |
| *Atiku lists Obasanjo's 127 impeachable offences* | Nigerian Tribune | 8th Sept, 2006 |
| • *As Senate receives EFCC reports on Vice-President* | | |
| *EFCC Reports: PDP mauls Atiku.* | Nigerian Tribune | 9th Sept, 2006 |
| • *Nobody can stop me – Atiku* | | |
| • *Obasanjo is playing Bole Kaja politics – Senior Advocate of Nigeria* | | |
| *Atiku's men ready with Obasanjo's impeachment motion* | Nigerian Tribune | 11th Sept, 2006 |
| *Controversial account belongs to Obasanjo, Atiku – Atiku's aides* | Nigerian Tribune | 12th Sept, 2006 |
| *Obasanjo VS Atiku* | | 14th Sept, 2006 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| • *Obasanjo sends Jefferson's letter to National Assembly* | | |
| • *Shun Atiku's handshake* | | |
| *How Obasanjo operated MOFAS account – Atiku* | Nigerian Tribune | 16th Sept, 2006 |
| *Obasanjo VS Atiku* | Nigerian Tribune | 18th Sept, 2006 |
| • *Atiku reveals more dirty deals* | | |
| • *PDP will decide Atiku's fate soon – Ali* | | |
| • *Gani asks Obasanjo to quit* | | |
| *Atiku shuns PDP's invitation* | Nigerian Tribune | 19th Sept, 2006 |
| *Atiku's Aide Arrested* | | 20th Sept, 2006 |
| *Atiku to be tried – Conduct Bureau* | | 27th Sept, 2006 |
| *PDP suspends Atiku. My suspension is illegal – Atiku* | | 29th Sept, 2006 |

Researcher's field work 2015

*The Punch* newspaper coverage appeared not to have been tilted in favour of either of the two gladiators, but the common theme that emanated from the coverage indicated that the news items, as published, was simply the reports provided by the two camps. None of the report was an effort relating to investigative journalism carried out by the newspapers. Second, there was no adequate follow up report on the scam. Invariably, the issue fizzled out. *The Nigerian Tribune* coverage of this particular story appeared to have favoured Atiku. This is because some of Atiku's media aides were former staff of *The Nigerian Tribune*, and perhaps the owners of the newspaper were not favourably disposed to the Obasanjo presidency. Just as in the reportage of *The Punch*, *Tribune*'s report was devoid of any investigative journalism and there was no deliberate effort to do the necessary follow-up, even after the two had left office.

What differed in all the surveyed newspapers were the headlines and the introductory parts of their stories, the body and sometimes the wording were the same, so that once you read a report by Newspaper A, you need not have read Newspaper B. It is pertinent to note that some of the headlines were front page lead stories, while a substantial part of the news items was used as "promos" for news stories that were in the inner pages.

*6 3.3   The Second Case Study*
**A synopsis of the Farouk Lawan Fuel Subsidy Scam**
The Second study is on the subsidy probe scandal involving a federal lawmaker from the North, Lawan Farouk, and a Lagos based businessman from South-West, Femi Otedola.

The House of Representatives had set up a Public Inquiry Committee, headed by the Hon. Farouk Lawan, to look into the allegations of corruption being perpetrated by oil marketers. The Committee held a series of closed door sessions and held a public hearing between January and February, 2012, which culminated in the submission of a Report on April 18th, 2012. It uncovered monumental fraud in fuel subsidy management.

The House considered the Report and passed the resolutions. However, it was later alleged that some monies had exchanged hands. Some sections of the media reported that the Oil Baron Femi Otedola had given the Hon. Farouk Lawan, and his associates, a $620,000 bribe to exonerate Zenon Oil from indictment.

The Chairman of the Committee, the Hon. Lawan, issued a statement denying ever collecting any bribe from anybody. However, less than 24 hours after that denial, Otedola admitted to offering the bribe in what he referred to as a "sting operation" involving security operatives. In a report on Premium Times, an online news agency, on the three occasions that Lawan visited Otedola in a C-class Mercedes Benz, during which five video recordings were made, each of them for a period of between eight and 10 minutes. It alleged that Lawan negotiated the terms of the bribe with Mr. Otedola over lunch during the first visit. On the second visit, it was reported that he received the first part of $250,000 at about 11 p.m. On the third visit, the recording indicated that he received the balance at about 5.05am. He was said to have put the money in his pockets and under the cap.

The coverage of the scandal by the two newspapers, which involved some key officials of the House of Representatives, revealed the ethno-regional divide of the Nigerian newspaper industry.

A critical analysis of the fuel subsidy scam and its coverage by both *The Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers revealed that the former was more sympathetic to the cause of the Federal Lawmaker than the latter. The partisanship showed in the headlines of *Daily Trust* is also vividly shown in some of the first few paragraphs of their news items. Though the issue was same, the newspapers reported select portions of the scandal that fitted into their narrative. Here are a few examples of the headlines published by the *Daily Trust* on the fuel scandal. The *Daily Trust* is based in Abuja and is owned by a Northerner.

- Farouk's Fall into a Big Trap
- $620,000 bribery Saga: Farouk Released, Vows to Sue FG
  - How He Fell into a Big Trap
  - Fresh multi-million bribery Trials House
  - Emergency Session after Spending 48 hours in Police Custody.
- Farouk in Condemned Criminal's Cell buys own bucket, cup, soap

In the above headlines, the *Daily Trust* newspaper did not hide its sympathy for Lawan, a suspect being tried for corruption-related acts. The introductory part of the first headline showed that the paper was trying to portray the accused as innocent to some members of the public, especially the readers from the Northern part of the country. The first paragraph read thus:

> Now, we've got him at last! This may be the Victory refrain of powerful elements in the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), the Presidency and among oil barons. They clink their glasses in a toast of exotic wines as they celebrate the fall of this middle-aged but young-looking man.

The above is the first paragraph of a front page lead story published in the 17th June, 2012, edition by *The Daily Trust*, on "Faroukgate". It is clear that *Daily Trust* chose to write from a partisan position in the process, and jettisoned the tenets of its profession. Facts and figures were suppressed and falsehood promoted as being the truth. Basically, this reflected the prejudice of the editors of the Newspaper. This bias ought to be reserved for opinion pieces and editorial pages, and not used as the introduction to a major news story. Regionalism and ethnicity played a definitive role in the publication of this story. Another feature article on Fraouk from the same newspaper reflected the way Nigerian media paints "a suspect as a saint" to members of the public. Here is the concluding part of a feature celebrating the Hon. Farouk Lawan at 47, in the same period as he was being probed by both the Police and the EFCC in relation to the bribery case:

> Lawan loves to do things to perfection. But is he a perfect man? The answer is definitely no. Reason: He is human. He has his shortfalls. He has worked to come thus far so he does not accept mediocrity or laziness.

The paper also published another headline and story:

> Police quiz, detain Farouk Lawan

The introduction of the story published on 16th June, 2012, read thus:

> Contrary to the directive of the Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Abubakar that no suspect should be detained beyond 24 hours, the police Special Task Force in Abuja has held Rep. Farouk Lawan for more than one day.

This write up, therefore attempted to polish and launder the image of the lawmaker. Readers may need to be educated on what the position of the paper was the last time a suspect was remanded in Police custody without due diligence.

However, *This Day* newspaper, owned by a Southerner and based in Lagos, demonstrated another viewpoint by running the story as if trying to convict the suspect, when the actual trial by a

competent court of law was yet to sit and rule on the case. These few headlines, among others, dotted the front and inside pages of the *This Day* newspapers:

> ➢ Lawan Promises to Tender Bribe Money to Police
>
> ➢ Lawan: I Received money, Not bribe
>
> ➢ Police Detain Farouk Lawan
>
> ➢ House Removes Farouk Lawan as Committee's Chairman
>
> ➢ Why Lawan was not Arrested after Collecting Bribe

One thing that is clear from the reports of the two newspapers is that they remained consistent in using Subject-Verb-Object in their headlines, (Yusha'u, 2015:137-156) and hardly deployed the elements of nomination in headlines, writing about the subject and the object of the story.

*Table 6.2: Headlines used by The Daily Trust and This Day on the Fuel Subsidy Scandal in the Federal House of Representatives*

| Nominalisation | *SVO* | Newspaper | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Investigators quiz, detain Farouk. | Daily Trust | 11th June, 2012 |
| | Lawan turns self to police. | | 19th June, 2012 |
| | Police quiz Farouk again. | | 29th June, 2012 |
| | $620,000 bribe House quiz Farouk. | Daily Trust | 29th June, 2012 |
| | $620,000 bribery saga: Farouk released. Vow to sue FG. | Daily Trust | 17th June, 2012 |
| | • How he fell into a big trap. Fresh multi-million bribery trails house. | | |
| | Farouk's fall into a big trap. | Daily Trust | 17th June, 2012 |
| | Farouk report without Farouk. | Daily Trust | 17th June, 2012 |
| | Farouk's agonists. | Daily Trust | 17th June, 2012 |
| | Farouk, Otedola faces house panel. | Daily Trust | 18th June, 2012 |
| | Criticism against our committee's work are baseless, says Farouk Lawan. | | 18th July, 2012 |
| | Again, Lawan turns self to police. | Daily Trust | 19th June, 2012 |
| | Farouk Lawan clocks 47. | | 19th July, 2012 |
| | Police quiz, detain Farouk Lawan. | Daily Trust | 16th June, 2012 |
| | Subsidy Bribe: I will be vindicated. | Daily Trust | 22nd June, 2012 |
| | Farouk in condemned criminal cell, buys own bucket, cup and soap. | Sunday Trust | 3rd Feb, 2013 |
| | Police quiz Farouk again. | Daily Trust | 26th June, 2012 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Farouk Lawan kept in condemned criminal cell, Kuje prison. | Daily Trust | 2nd Feb, 2013 |
| Subsidy probe scandal. <ul><li>Jonathan: I'm committed to Committee Report.</li><li>Investigators quiz, detain Farouk.</li><li>House begins probe on Otedola.</li></ul> | Daily Trust | 15th June, 2012 |
| House to hold emergency section on Bribery scandal. | This Day | 14th June, 2012 |
| Fuel subsidy probe: Otedola confirms bribe to lawmakers. | This Day | 15th June, 2012 |
| Lawan: I collected $500,000 bribe offer. | This Day | 12th June, 2012 |
| Police detain Farouk Lawan. | This Day | 15th June, 2012 |
| House removes Farouk Lawan as Committee Chairman. | This Day | 16th June, 2012 |
| Lawan promises to tender bribe money to police | This Day | 19th June, 2012 |
| ICPC on standby to prosecute Lawan. | This Day | 21st June, 2012 |
| Lawan: I received money, not bribe. | This Day | 29th June, 2012 |

This brief review of the coverage of the Obasanjo/Atiku and Faroukgate scandals confirms deep divisions exist in Nigeria's print media, in terms of political/economic affiliations, ethnicity and regionalism. This implies that globalization, with its attendant social media and digital communication, has not been able to erode ethnic colouration in news production. From the perspective of a critical discourse analysis, it demonstrates that newspapers can promote a particular ideological position linguistically. It is therefore very clear that all the four newspapers

used for the two case studies did not employ their headlines to condemn or to shame the activities of the subjects mentioned in the stories.

The Newspapers were very careful in their choice of vocabulary, and this is what Fairclough (1995) described as the process of categorization. In reporting the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal, *The Punch* and *Nigerian Tribune* consistently used the phrases: report, war of words, collected, impeachment, accounts, bombshell, and it refrained from employing vulgar language or phrases that were capable of costing the media millions of Naira in libel suits. The word "looting" was sparingly used, while words such as "stealing, cheating and pocketing of public funds", were hardly used in describing the behaviour of those connected with the scandal.

Similar restraint was also exercised in the second case studies, involving the Federal legislator, as soft language, such as "quiz", "detain" and "bribery", were used. Words such as "venality, corruption, fraud, arrest, jail," etc., did not feature in the vocabulary of the *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers. Previous studies have been carried out on how newspapers framed their headlines. Chiluwa (2007), and the work of Mohammed Yusha'u (2015), have analysed the ethno-regional divisions in Nigerian media in covering major crises, such as Boko Haram and the Niger Delta. This section of the thesis has clearly demonstrated how the ethno-regional divide is also affecting the reportage of accountability and transparency issues in Nigeria.

The indisputable fact that one can draw from these scenarios is that the news consumed by readers is a manipulated product, devoid of any sound empirical doctrines, packaged by chains of unethical gatekeepers and spin doctors, dished out to achieve an intended goal without the readers knowing it.

## 6.4    Editorials

All the selected newspapers wrote series of editorials on the level of corruption and the government's handling of it. *The Punch* newspaper presents a good example of such editorials. In one editorial entitled, *Oduah and the Triumph of Corruption*, published on Monday, October, 21st, 2013, the newspaper analysed how President Goodluck Jonathan and the National Assembly

handled the corruption charge against the then Minister of Aviation, noting that the task was daunting.

> Jonathan has in three years in office failed to demonstrate purposeful leadership and only pays lip service to fighting corruption and ensuring prudent financial management. It is dismaying enough that Oduah apparently sees nothing inappropriate in her actions and public anger over the $1.6 million (about N250 million) purchase, but it is even more troubling that the President has not deemed it fit to fire her. The National Assembly that should protect the public interest and exercise oversight on the Executive is equally greedy and uncaring. A passive electorate and weak civil institutions have also fostered a culture of impunity and lack of accountability in those occupying public office. It added that mind-boggling cases like this are bound to catch the attention of those who have been dehumanised and debased by an insensitive government. At an exchange rate of N155 to $1, Oduah's vanity would establish eight cottage clinics of N30 million each, or fund the sinking of 50 boreholes in a country where only 17 per cent of its 160 million people have access to pipe-borne water, according to a UNDP report.

In its conclusion, the *Punch* editorial, asserted that:

> the Jonathan government's chronic lack of transparency makes the odious cars' purchase possible. In a decent world, Oduah would not be defending the scurrilous affair but answering questions from anti-fraud agencies. The President should fire this minister immediately. Failing to do so suggests a lack of modicum of integrity in government. The President should search for an honest, passionate professional that understands aviation to succeed Oduah, the latest in a long line of ministers who lack knowledge of the industry. Jonathan should take the war against corruption more seriously, while the National Assembly should adopt a more vigorous and effective stance on its oversight responsibility. Nigerians should not be complacent but continue to demand accountability from public officials.

*The Punch*, in another editorial on Tuesday, December 23rd, 2014, under the headline, *Jonathan's N21 billion Donation: Impunity Taken Too Far*, and noted:

> *… we are also faced with a total collapse in political morality, with corruption worn now as a badge of honour. It is sad to note that there is an instinctive conclusion among the Nigerian public that the Jonathan government is the most financially corrupt, fiscally irresponsible, politically insensitive and socially disconnected in Nigerian history. What a shame!"*

The editorial, which ran from the front page and ended at page 26, also noted that a string of ugly scandals had dotted the course of the Jonathan administration in the previous six years. Other newspapers surveyed for this study have also written editorials on corruption and other forms of the abuse of power in the country. Whether the editorials were effective is yet to be seen.

## 6.5   Cartoons

At this juncture, a peep into the usage of cartoons as a vehicle for passing anti-corruption messages is imperative. As Enemaku (2005: 131) argued, "Cartoons are both entertaining and educative, and they project social messages in a vivid, satiric and visual form, combining sketches or graphic illustrations with apposite, witty expression" (Enemaku, 2005, 131). Cartoons have also been deployed by the Nigerian media in responding to the government's lip service anti-corruption crusade. A cartoon in the *Daily Trust* of Wednesday, 9th September, 2006, is a good example. In the cartoon under the pen name, *Ghana Must Go*, which is placed at the bottom right corner of the back page of the paper, was written; *Two fighting, President Obasanjo and his Vice, Atiku, with* a sketch depicting the two men at loggerheads, with the message, *"We are partners in corruption"*. This was apparently referring to the scam between President Obasanjo and his Vice-President in 2006. In 2007, another cartoon in the paper depicted how the $5million recovered by the EFCC was re-looted. Similarly, *Ghana Must Go* also had a cartoon on corruption in the Federal House of Representatives, under the heading, '*2 govs under probe in Britain, for looting…*Says High Commissioner'. A fellow was addressing his friend, "Yes, but in plain English, how did you come about this loot?" There are several other cartoons in the other two newspapers that are used as examples in this study.

## 6.6   Summary

The basis of the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria has come under the spotlight in recent times. In spite of the perceived priority attention accorded the fight against corruption by the government,

it appears that corruption had reached a phenomenal stage in Nigeria and is spiralling under a democratic rule, if the report on global ratings on anti-corruption efforts of governments is anything to go by. Ostensibly, it appears that the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria boils down to lip-service, if the newspaper reports, editorials and cartoons surveyed in this study were used as a yardstick.

One major theme that emerges from the analysis of the media coverage of corruption cases is that a culture of lethargy and torpidity, where the mass media have an interest in corruption cases, fizzles out after the arraignment of the suspects in Court. This is certainly an unhealthy scenario for proper accountability. In essence, the lack of a follow-up culture for stories is non-existent, and this is contributing to the higher level of impunity in society. One conclusion that can be reached from the media coverage of corruption cases is that ethnicity, ownership structure and the locations of media houses, still play a significant role in the framing of news reports. In Nigeria, as elsewhere, the media pursue different agendas, depending on their political, and sometimes on their socio-economic affiliations. Finally, the publication of corruption-related stories in the media is not a disincentive to unethical conduct in public, since the gladiators seemed to have muzzled the capacity of the media.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

# ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA

## 7.1    Introduction

This chapter focuses on themes from interviews with stakeholders in the anti-corruption sub-sector of the Nigerian state. They include: practising journalists, editors, officials of professional bodies, such as the Nigerian Bar Association, (NBA); the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ); the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE); past Heads of the anti-corruption agencies; a labour leader; a legal practitioner; retired University administrators; civil society activists; religious leaders-(Muslim, Christian and traditional faith worshippers), and the staff of anti-graft agencies. Twenty-five (25) respondents were interviewed. The analyses addressed five important questions; how have the anti-corruption agencies notably, ICPC, EFCC and the Code of Conduct, used the media in their campaigns? What role do the mass media and other non-state actors play in the anti-corruption drive? How do journalists perceive their role in the anti-corruption drive and, by extension, what are the impediments to their work? What are the impacts of the growing linkage between the media class and the political class in Nigeria's anti-corruption drive? Has Nigeria's democratic experiment impacted on the level of transparency and accountability in the country?


## 7.2    The Partnership Between the Mass Media and the Anti-Corruption Agencies

The mass media play a significant role in anti-corruption campaigns everywhere in the world. To a large extent, the success of any anti-corruption project depends on its deployment of the mass media. The role of the media in the publicity around, and investigation of, anti-corruption, is crucial to the success of such campaigns. The society needs information on corruption allegations, investigations and the conviction of corrupt government officials or persons. The agenda setting role of the media enables it to put certain issues in the forefront for public debate. Engaging the various media outlets in the anti-corruption campaign thus enables the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria to inform the public of developments in the fight against corruption, and also to leverage the information from the mass media in its investigations.

However, divergent views were expressed by all the 25 stakeholders who were interviewed by the researcher on the usage of the media by the three anti-corruption agencies in the period under study. While those who had worked in the anti-agencies were unanimous that they used the media as stipulated by the enabling laws of their agencies, others, from the civil society groups, and the media practitioners, were not convinced that the anti-graft bodies deployed the media very well in the discharge of their mandates. Presented below are comments from the stakeholders on the usage of the media by the anti-corruption bodies.

Mustapha Akanbi, the pioneering Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offence Commission (ICPC) noted:

> Actually, no anti-corruption project can succeed without the full support of the press. Therefore, within the limit of available resources, I tried, as much as possible, to make contact with the press. Sometimes I addressed the members of the press and they contributed by writing stories and articles which got published in the press. We make full use of the press as we ought to have done. We should have had special allocations targeted at the press to get them encouraged (12th May, 2013, Ilorin).

According to him, inadequate funds militated against the efforts of the ICPC to fully engage the mass media in the anti-corruption crusade. Akanbi stated:

> I have made friends among the media, if I have an engagement, I invite them, and when I invite them, what type of encouragement will I bring them for? What I am trying to say is that there must always be an avenue for media and anti-corruption bodies to have a discourse where there will be cross fertilization of views, an exchange of ideas of what will be done and what will not be done. For them to be identified, we must encourage them to show commitment to fighting corruption. Now you are doing such a thing, you spend plenty of money, either to call them to do a conference or a symposium.

Giving vent to the central importance of the media in the anti-corruption campaign, Uyim Akpabio, pioneering Director of Investigation and Educational Advisory Services of the Code of Conduct Bureau, (CCB), noted:

The media had been very useful to us in the Bureau. When I became the Director of Investigation and Education Advisory Services of the Bureau, I initiated some media related activities. We started a series of programmes -- Magazine programmes on Television titled "Reflection", with a focus on topical issues. It has an interview segment, mini- documentary, *vox pop,* and the feedback segment. While we were running that on television, we also had a programme on radio, which we called "Town Crier".

She, however, lamented the funding for the Bureau's media related activities as Akanbi of ICPC said:

And due to some financial constraints however, we had a break at a stage and when we became buoyant, we continued. The problems in sustaining these programmes were actually fund-related. Most of the media related activities can be very expensive, especially; the electronic media. It can mainly be done through an effective public-private sector arrangement. Many programmes have been designed and implemented. I'm sure you know EFCC and ICPC also have some programmes.

Going by the submission of the two, therefore, inadequate funding posed a serious challenge to the anti-corruption agencies in extensively engaging the mass media in its anti-corruption projects. Given the cost of engaging the mass media, adequate funding is needed by the anti-corruption agencies, as this has a direct impact on the level of engagement. Though funding seems not to be the problem of all of the anti-corruption agencies, some agencies enjoy better funding than others, be it from the government or from international donors. This edge reflects the disparity in the capacity of these various anti-corruption agencies to engage the mass media in their campaigns. As Chido Onumah, the pioneering Coordinator of the Crime Prevention Unit (Fix Nigeria Initiative) of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) noted:

We worked with the media, we supported their organizations, and we actually had programmes, because we were getting a lot of funding from the development partners: UNDP, the UN and the UNODC, for the training of journalists. For us, then, our relationship with the media was important and we used it effectively. The media were willing to work with our organization; they provided insight in some cases. Where we could not go directly because politically exposed people were involved, we got the media

involved, gave them the facts and aided them to investigate and report and bring it to the public, and that became a basis for the EFCC to move in.

This approach seems to have been the reason why the EFCC appeared to enjoy better publicity than the other two anti-corruption agencies in the period under study. However, the argument for more funding in order to engage the mass media in the anti-corruption campaign raises the question about how proactive and responsive the mass media are towards fighting corruption. The mass media are expected (on its own) to be disposed to fighting corruption, without being galvanized or reminded by the anti-corruption agencies. If the mass media sees themselves as a partner in fighting corruption, the cost of engagement will be reduced. There are other prevailing arguments on why the mass media are lacking in their fight against corruption. This will be extensively discussed later in this chapter.

Hassan Salihu, a staff member of the ICPC, gave a seemingly positive deployment of the media by the anti-graft agencies. He notes that the Commission used the media in the area of publicity and the reportage of its activities. Electronic and print media organizations report ICPC activities, such as anti-corruption campaigns, courtesy visits, anti-corruption news reporting, conferences/seminars, educational activities etc.

Emmanuel Ayoola, who succeeded Akanbi as the Chairman of ICPC, concurred with his predecessor on the role of the media, but he expressed regrets over the lack of pro-activeness by the media in the fight against corruption in the country:

> Well, one of the institutions from which we drew tremendous support when I was with the ICPC was the media. They were very cooperative and they supported the campaign whenever we invited them. We tried to encourage their partnership with us. Where necessary, we supplied them information. They participated in covering our activities, we used to hold interactive sessions and round table discussions, but beyond that, one would have wanted to see them as a corruption fighting machine on their own, instead of being a rear guard mechanism in the fight against corruption. I expect the media to be at the forefront in the fight against corruption

and all of the ills in society. I do not think the media are doing anything like that at the moment.

The role of the mass media should not only be seen against the background of reporting corruption activities. This makes the mass media seem to merely be responding to events as they happen. A more proactive reportage is expected from the media, for they can be the external accountability instrument that they are supposed to be, especially in a democratic setting for a successful fight against corruption. The media play the role of the "unofficial custodian of public information". This information constitutes an important part of the investigations on corruption, and thus the media are an integral part of the investigation process. Consistent with this assertion are the comments of Ayoola:

> The media in Nigeria are not sufficiently proactive in the fight against corruption; I do not know the reason for their lack of proactive enthusiasm in the fight against corruption, but one notices that, apart from two instances, they are usually indifferent. The media are very alert in publishing news of corruption, but seldom would they generate such news themselves through investigative journalism. So, if I were to rate the media, I would say, the media are a little less than average.

The duo of Olu Falae and Bishop Bolanle Gbonigi, the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, and the retired Anglican Bishop of Akure Diocese, respectively, blame the lack of media pro-activity on the relationship of the media with the political class. Femi Soyinka, a former University Administrator, also narrated his experience while trying to use the media in the course of his advocacy work: "the problem is that some media people, before they write any report, demand for money, and you know that very well, they are paid to report one way or the other".

The issue of corruption within the media is thus a challenge which must be addressed if the media are to perform their advocacy role credibly. The problem of corruption is one of the challenges identified in Section Five of this study. On how they were able to cope with this challenge, Ayoola and Femi-Soyinka provided different answers: Ayoola noted:

> Well, we held weekly conferences with the media. We also ensured that those of them covering the activities of the Commission were

accredited. Our main intention was to have an occasional roundtable meeting with them, which we held, and we were able to give them an opportunity of assessing our fight against corruption. We also rubbed minds with senior members in the profession and we benefitted from their frank opinions. Of course, whenever we called them they responded quickly.

However, for Soyinka, the media men were treated with suspicion:

I treat them with suspicion, of course, because I know that many of them will report correctly if given money, and if you do not give money, your stories will not be published.

Soyinka argued that the media practitioners of the 1960s and 1970s were braver than the present crop of journalists in Nigeria. According to him, the journalists of old were able to confront the social ills in the society, not because of their education, but because they had style and language and, more importantly, they were courageous.

Akanbi noted that, without the media, the anti-corruption battle will not create the needed impact in the society: "No anti-corruption project can succeed without the full support of the Press": He insisted that the anti-corruption fight cannot be fought by one man, neither by the Chairman of the ICPC, nor by the EFCC alone, neither by the President, nor by the political leadership, but by everyone in the country. His view affirms the assertions of the need for a holistic approach in the fight against corruption. Nwariaku also agreed with Akanbi on this. He stated:

Everybody suffers from the negative impact of corruption since national wealth is being stolen by some people. Every individual has a responsibility to fight, and in fighting corruption, I always advise that you start with yourself. You as an individual; must live up to a high moral ideal; that is why I have a slogan "Corruption Must Stop, Starting with me". You must begin to restrain yourself; be more responsible with people's resources at your disposal; because every individual in Nigeria, even the beggar, has his money in the national purse.

Ehirim, the Chairman of the Abuja chapter, NUJ, notes his contentment with the roles being played by the media and the civil society groups, so far. He noted that the mass media have been doing

more than enough, because of whistle blowers in some of the leakages in the fight against corruption:

> I am satisfied with the role the media have played. Look at all the things that the media have unearthed; all the scandals involving ministers, governors, political office holders and the ones championed by some other non-state actors, like the civil society groups, academia, lawyers. But the thing is that, have the anti-corruption agencies taken seriously the things that these whistle blowers came up with?

The comment above suggests a functional and performing media sector, but a lack of synergy between stakeholders. The media are necessary for combatting corruption, but such potential can be undermined when there is no strategic linkage and no functional relationship between the mass media and the anti-corruption agencies. Through the process of information dissemination, the mass media ensure public support for the anti-corruption agenda; it strengthens the partnership between all stakeholders and sustains the anti-corruption momentum. This reinforces the anti-corruption values in the society and serves as a deterrent to corruption.

While the EFCC uses the media as part of its investigative activities, one of the ICPC Board members has cited legal provisions against deploying the media for its investigative duties. Onumah highlighted more ways in which the EFCC works with the mass media. Dame Julie Nwariku, one of the oldest Board members of the ICPC, disagrees with EFCC's usage of the media as an extension of their Investigation Department:

> We fight shy of the media, to a large extent, we have not been using the media so much, because we believe, as an organisation with integrity, you do not publicise somebody's offence until you have concrete evidence, until it has been proven there is a *prima facie* case. The proof is that the person had been charged in court, found guilty, and convicted of the offence.

She concluded that the ICPC exercises more restraint when it comes to the issue of using the mass media:

You know some of the sister organisations do not have that kind of restraint. As far as they are concerned, if there is any allegation, as an anti-corruption agency, they must publish it, the people must get to know that there is an allegation against somebody. While others will just rush to the Press, ICPC is more restrained, because we believe in being thorough in such matters, because somebody's image is involved. We do not want to assassinate somebody's character for nothing, so we are thorough and it takes us time. We believe in investigating the allegations very thoroughly before making them public.

Yusuff Alli, Chairman of the Nigeria Bar Association's (NBA) Anti-Corruption Commission, noted that the media can perform more than they do in the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. "I think they are trying, but, they can do better".

Evelyn Eyo Ugbogu, The National Coordinator of the Child Education and Crime Eradication Foundation, (CECF), one of the NGOs working on anti-corruption issues, rates the anti-corruption agencies low in their usage of the media in the fight against anti-corruption in Nigeria:

The level of the coordination, and the amount of the synergy between the media and the anti-corruption agencies is very low, and if I am permitted to qualify it, I will say it is poor. In some cases, the media are not relating properly with the anti-corruption agencies. The media are supposed to be the link between the anti-corruption agency and the society. The media are supposed to educate the society about corruption and other related offences, but they are not there, the materials are not there, the empowerment is not there.

Ugbogu, of CECF, also provides an insight into the kind of working arrangements used by the media in a country where nothing happens without money changing hands:

If we actually wish to win this war, we should work together; there is supposed to be an avenue, an access of enlightenment, programmes from the corruption agencies to the media, so that they can disseminate the same to the society. And once you go to the media, they demand money from you, so it boils down to a lack of empowerment, because there is no material, no equipment and no training, that is the issue.

Apart from the views of the officials of the Anti-Corruption Agencies, the opinions of journalists on the role of the mass media show a different perception altogether. While there is agreement on the importance of involving the mass media in the fight against corruption, there seems to be some disagreement on the role that the mass media should play, and also on the level of synergy achieved so far.

Femi Adesina, former President of the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) and currently the Senior Special Adviser to President Buhari on Media and Publicity retorts:

> The anti-corruption agencies need the media in their campaign, as their effectiveness is measured by the quantum of information available to the public. If they do so much, and those things are not made available to the public through the media, it is then like winking in the dark. They know what they are doing, but nobody else knows. I think the ICPC, EFCC use the media better than the Code of Conduct Bureau.

Lekan Otufodunrin, Managing Editor of the *Nation Newspapers* simply concurs that:

> The media have been used to publicise the activities of the agencies through editorial publications and advertisements. Regularly, the activities of the agencies are published and broadcast by the print and broadcast organisations. They issue press statements and other information for the media to use.

Chuks Ehirim, the Chairman of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Abuja chapter, however, disagrees with his fellow media practitioners on how the anti-corruption bodies have been using the mass media in propagating their activities:

> Every successive government has always seen the media as an enemy and thus they should be avoided, so there has always been this "cat and mouse" relationship between the mass media and the government. These agencies appear to have taken a cue from this behaviour from the government, whether federal or state: and that is one of the problems that the media face; the problem throws up issues of arrest, the issue of trust; if the government is doing anything it wouldn't want the media to be part of it.

It can therefore be suggested that the media do not share the same optimism in the anti-corruption partnership as that held by the Anti-Corruption Agencies. This, of course, as opined by Chuks Ehirim, has resulted from the lack of trust between the media and the government. This distrust also extends to government agencies, regardless of the fact that they are anti-corruption agencies. The draconian laws against the media and government's high handedness has characterized the relationship between the mass media and the government, even after sixteen years of democratic rule. Professionals in the mass media still feel government's attitude towards the media has not changed much.

The constitutional framework for transparency in government and freedom of expression is also still lacking. A critical case is the "Information Bill", which suffered several setbacks in the National Assembly before it was passed into law in 2011. It is thus with some trepidation that many journalists view the government and its agencies. This distrust is mutual in the anti-corruption campaigns, because while the media sometimes see anti-corruption agencies as an extension of the government with a conflict of interest, since most of the people at the centre of corruption scandals are government officials, anti-corruption agencies also question the reliability of information from the media institutions, due to their questionable relationship with politicians. This latter assertion has two further aspects: firstly, that some media institutions are controlled or owned by politicians, and, secondly, that media institutions speaking against the government are tools of the rhetoric of the opposition.

Olalere Fagboola, a veteran journalist in Nigeria gives flesh to these assertions. He submitted:

> It is unfortunate that the government anti-corruption agencies themselves are perverted from the outset and, more unfortunate, is the fact that the media which themselves are crusaders of convenience, are not providing a level-playing ground on which corruption could be fought impartially, or even to a standstill. The media are also anti-corruption crusaders of convenience because they are also selective when it comes to whom to expose or attack on issues of corruption. The combination of virile anti-corruption agencies and incorruptible media could have been the best thing to happen, and the greatest weapon against corruption in Nigeria, but we have got it wrong.

To him, the pursuit of economic survival by both the media and the journalists makes it difficult for the media to perform effectively their role as a watchdog in society. He further argues that the media have mortgaged their sense of social responsibility and consequently are facing credibility problems, while the hazards of the profession have made journalism ignoble and journalists disposable, leading to the gross miseducation of the people.

He also posited:

> No doubt the press is the proverbial, unacknowledged social crusader and legislature of good governance, but the Nigerian press has got the half-hearted backing of the constitution, which gives it only the power to bark, but not the power to bite. The most unfortunate aspect of it is the fact that whereas the constitution does not give the press the legal teeth to bite, the people that constitute the greatest weapon, on which the press could have relied in its crusades against corruption, are not willing to support the media.

He posited that the anti-corruption bodies are not carrying the media along in their activities. He argued that a lack of transparency in the government leads to a lack of trust in government institutions. Citing examples from the concluded 2015 National Conference, where most of the committees wanted to ban the media from reporting on its proceedings, Fagboola pointed out that, recently, the lack of transparency has been emulated by the government, and this has extended to other government institutions. He further argued that there has not been effective synergy between media practitioners and the anti-corruption agencies.

Consistent with Fagboola's observation is that of Sunday Adewusi, Vice-President of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). He agrees with Fagboola that the agencies have not been using the media as effectively as they should be. Felix Adenaike, retired Editor-in-Chief of the Nigerian Tribune Newspapers also agrees with Sunday Adewusi. Adenaike rated the anti-corruption bodies low in their usage of the media:

> You see, they use the media to propagate the findings of their investigations into alleged corrupt practices by public officers and others. So, to that extent, they use the media, and the media have been collaborative in that regard, since the establishment of the anti-

corruption agencies, notably, ICPC, EFCC, of course, the Police, but they didn't do it well, because if they did it well, the ICPC and EFCC would have gone far.

Kunle Oderemi, a practising journalist, has a different view. He asserts that the EFCC and ICPC were doing a lot in the fight against corruption, but due to the negative perception of government agencies and a lack of knowledge of the internal workings and legal restrictions of the agencies, the public criticizes their activities. However, he conceded that the media have not been sufficiently mobilized for the anti-corruption war in Nigeria.

Similarly, Moshood Erubami, President of Nigerian Voters' Assembly, and the immediate past Chairman of the Transition Monitoring Group, former Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) in Nigeria, also subscribed to the position of Kunle Oderemi on why public perception of the workings of Anti-Corruption agencies seems to tend towards the negative:

> I think that, to a large extent, the EFCC has been very pro-active in the usage of the media and this is why, if you rate the three organisations, ICPC, EFCC, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, you will find out that EFCC is always in the limelight. Not necessarily because of the achievements that they have recorded, but because ICPC is not visible in the public domain in terms of activities. It is not that ICPC is not working, but that what ICPC is doing is not reflected in the media.

Segun Olatunji, former Managing Director and Editor-in-Chief of Nigerian Tribune Newspapers, rated EFCC and ICPC low on their usage of the media. He noted that the former was more visible than the latter in the media. According to him, the ICPC is a conduit for wasting government resources. This, he says, is as a result of its inactivity over long periods of time. He described the compromised judicial system as another challenge in the anti-corruption war, noting that in situations where judges were bribed, the truth was not enough protection for the media. He states:

> So why should you risk your newspaper for a fight that you know you can't win? In any case, the owner of the newspaper will soon call you to order, because, sometimes, these corrupt people are the most powerful people in this society. They go over the head of the media manager to the owner.

Giving further insight into one of the challenges faced by the media in the course of supporting the anti-graft battle in Nigeria, O. B. C Nwolise, former Head of Department, Political Sciences, University of Ibadan, noted that the media are handicapped in the anti-corruption war in the country. He argues that even when the media write editorials and blow the whistle on corruption allegations, the anti-corruption agencies, more often than not, fail to respond. Rather, the government witch-hunts the media institutions, saying they are inciting the public. The media are thus denied its watchdog and revolutionary vanguard functions. Consistent with the observations of Segun Olatunji, Nwolise also pointed out the corruption in the judiciary as an impediment to the success of any anti-corruption project. These views reveal that the judiciary is compromised and without an incorruptible judiciary, the anti-corruption campaign is on a wild goose case.

Data provided in answering Research Question One so far reveals that the three anti-corruption agencies have not deployed the media effectively in the anti-corruption battle in Nigeria. The reasons for this failure include: the inadequate funding of the anti-graft agencies; the lack of pro-activeness from the media on the anti-corruption issues; and constitutional provisions which prohibit ICPC from engaging the media in its investigation exercise. Findings reveal that there is a need for better funding of the anti-graft agencies, especially for publicity and education. The EFCC under Ribadu appeared to have enjoyed better media attention than the ICPC and the Code of Conduct Bureau, because the EFCC was able to access funds for mobilisation and publicity from development partners, such as the UNODC, the World Bank, and other development agencies.

## 7.3. The Role of Non-State Actors in the Anti-Corruption Drive

The fight against corruption is not restricted to government agencies. A holistic approach is required. The capacity of the anti-corruption institutions in carrying out their mandates is insufficient, and so an anti-corruption strategy requires all stakeholders to be involved and their commitment to the strategy. Non-state actors have important roles to play in the anti-corruption campaign. These include raising public awareness of corruption cases, monitoring public servants and public procurement, lobbying for legislation that gives access to public information, taking a stand against corruption and contributing to advancing the anti-corruption agenda (UNCAC,

2012). In some countries, the government engages non-governmental organizations in monitoring government activities. Some governments adopt this strategy with caution, because governments need to consider the possibility of non-state actors being involved in corrupt activities. It is against this background that an in-depth analysis into the role of non-state actors in the fight against corruption in Nigeria becomes imperative.

All the 25 stakeholders (100 percent) interviewed by this researcher conceded that the non-state actors were crucial to the anti-corruption campaign, not only in Nigeria, but also globally. They provided different views on the role of non-state actors in the fight against corruption. This section focuses on the following non-state actors: civil society organizations, religious institutions, traditional institutions and professional bodies.

### 7.3.1   The Role of Civil Society Organizations and Professional Bodies

The consequences of corruption cut deep into the fabric of any society. It is pervasive and it affects the development and growth of every society. Over the years, corruption has become a norm, and it is deeply embedded in the Nigerian society; some scholars have argued that corruption has been institutionalized in Nigeria and almost passes for state policy (Adebanwi, 2011). Public awareness of the problem of corruption has created the need for concerted effort from civil society organizations (CSOs). The concept of civil society has several meanings, but it generally refers to those human rights organizations, interest groups, professional bodies, non-profit organizations that operate outside the realms of state control. The CSOs play a strong role in the fight against corruption; they serve as a watchdog on the activities of both government and private institutions, they are involved in constitutional review, and they lobby for better laws that ensure government transparency. The CSOs are the trustees of the community, and thus they ensure social accountability and respect for fundamental human rights.

Responses from the stakeholders interviewed offered an insight on these assertions and deepens the understanding of the workings of CSOs in Nigeria. Adesina, the NGE President, conceded that there was a need for proper synergy between the media and the civil society, if the campaign against corruption and other vices is to be meaningful:

> The mass media and the civil society have a crucial role to play in anti-corruption. Nigeria is a country in which anything not placed on the front burners also gets forgotten. If the media do not continue to harp on the issue of corruption, then it will fester, and the country will be the worse for it. It is crucial that there is an interflow of information between the anti-graft agencies and the media. I believe this is where the civil society can come to help by providing the platform for interaction between the media and the anti-corruption agencies.

Erubami opined that the civil society had been doing enough, but there was a need for the civil society groups to engage in massive civil re-engineering to force the needed political will to confront corruption in Nigeria. He observed that advocacy has been continuing for several years, but the advocacy message is falling on deaf ears in government.

He also noted that the political will to fight corruption was crucial to the anti-corruption battle, but this is lacking among the political class of the country. "This is a problem because the involvement of politicians in corrupt activities predisposes them to insincere commitment towards the anti-corruption campaign". He lamented that the political class was so implicated in corrupt activities that the civil societies are helpless in fighting the scourge of graft. He noted that "there is a terrible lack of political will to fight corruption. It is a sad commentary".

According to Nwolise, there is nothing the civil society and the media can do to help the cause of anti-corruption fight based on the situation on the ground in Nigeria. He argued that the government and its officials do not feel they are accountable to the people, and this has led to widespread impunity in the system. He also indicted the judiciary for this problem. It is difficult for a corrupt system to change a corrupt process. The judicial system has not lived up to its responsibilities for ensuring social justice. Such gaps in the judicial system breed a culture lacking in public accountability. When the political class feels that it is above the law, there is no restriction on the corrupt activities that will occur in the society.

Anti-corruption advocacy and campaigns are capital intensive. This poses a challenge to CSOs with limited sources of funding. Olatunji provides economic reasons for the incapability of the

non-state actors to advance the anti-corruption war. He said that the corrupt people would continue to enjoy positive media coverage as long as the press pursues profit in order to remain in business:

> Unfortunately, the media and civil society cannot do much, and the reason is very simple. We are in a shrinking economy where the government control virtually everything. Even the so called private sector businesses are not really private, because most of the people who are shareholders in these big companies are politicians based in Abuja. So, if you think that when the government begins to fight against you, that the private sector will rescue you, that is just a utopia or false hope. When I joined the *Tribune* 26 years ago, the tonne of newsprint was N4, 700, then, because newsprint was very inexpensive, we did not need adverts. So we could fight corruption, we could write anything we wanted. But the same tonnes of newsprint today are about N200, 000. It means that the newspaper is sold at a loss. So how do you make profits? It is through advertisements. Unfortunately, those who steal are the ones that can afford to pay for these advertisements. So the media can't do much, because these corrupt people will just withdraw all their patronage and that will be the end of the so called newspaper.

Femi-Soyinka further gives clarification on this:

> I wouldn't say the civil society alone; I will say the community, the people. How many civil societies do we have? Where do they get their money from? How strong are they? How committed are they? I would say that the answer to what you are talking about lies with the community, though the civil society organizations can be a catalyst. If they are well trained and coordinated to do their assignment themselves, they can bring the people together, and provide a platform for the citizens to ask questions.

Ugbogu's views are also consistent with the foregoing. She said that poverty, the "fear factor" and the lack of coordination from the anti-corruption agencies, impede the work of Nigerian civil society groups:

> Poverty and corruption have made the Nigerian civil society close its eyes to what they are supposed to focus on; to what they are supposed to tame down; to what they are supposed to expose.

Interestingly, one of the major challenges facing CSOs is corruption within their rank and file. As observed by Ugbogu, most CSOs do not have a sincerity of purpose, because some were set up as money making ventures and, ironically, they indulge in the same acts they are fighting. Her comments were quite revealing:

> Let's assess the civil society that I belong to, for instance, I discovered much corruption within the system. People running the civil society organizations are also from within the community, and that means they are part of the system. But they are supposed to know better; in fact, they are supposed to take steps to correct the corruption that is within the society, but they are just doing exactly the same thing.

The civil society has to be credible in order to be considered a stakeholder in the fight against corruption. More importantly, Nigeria is still under the yoke of militarism. The situation is such that we have weak civil society organisations. There is no way our civil society (as presently constituted) can drive and reposition the nation in democracy. There is therefore a need to develop the civil society properly in order to mobilise citizens against corrupt public officials.

The fight against corruption requires a responsible professional elite that is diligent, courageous, vibrant, and holds the ethics of professionalism in high esteem. Professional bodies, like the National Association of Nigerian Students' Union (NANS), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASSU), were highly instrumental in the fight against military rule. However, the relevance of these organizations in recent times evokes divergent responses from the respondents who were interviewed for this dissertation.

Ayoola explained that professional bodies have been the engine room of the development of CSOs in Nigeria, but he lamented the apathy of the non-state actors in relation to recent anti-corruption issues in Nigeria. He also asserted that critical sectors of the nation, such as the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), the University Teachers and the Students' Union bodies, which used to be the nation's think-tank groups in the past, are now indifferent to the anti-corruption war in the country. He proposes:

I can't see anything that they do. We tried to fashion a National Integrity Outreach to make the fight against corruption stronger and more effective than mere rhetoric, and make everybody an active participant; active participant, not in the sense of merely criticizing the other man, but each segment of the civil society fashioning out its peculiar mechanism for combating anti-corruption. What we have in Nigeria is that we talk too much but, when it comes to every hand being on deck, you don't find any hand on deck. We are a nation of talkers, not a nation of doers.

Fagboola opined that the Nigeria Labour Congress, a pressure group expected to champion the cause of workers intelligently, has not lived up to expectations because the labour activists now pursue their selfish interests, and even when they come close to championing the interests of workers, they are very crude and unintelligent about it. Ayoola agreed that the Nigeria Labour Union has failed to be the arrowhead of the anti-corruption drive in the country:

Take the Nigeria Labour Union (NLC), for instance, I did not see or know the reasons why the NLC should not fund a radio and television station and establish a newspaper, because one would expect that the Labour Union should really be in the front line playing the watchdog against corruption.

However, Adewusi, Vice-President of the NLC, disagrees with the arguments of Fagboola and Ayoola. He said that the Congress is doing well in the fight:

The NLC has spearheaded the fight against corruption by using every opportunity and platform to sensitise the Nigerian public to the destructive effects of corruption on national development. The Congress has embarked on several protests and road shows over corruption, and these have helped to slow down corrupt tendencies of public officials. Yes, I am satisfied with the role of the Congress in the anti-graft campaign, because without such orchestrated interventions, the impunity would probably have been worse.

According to him, the NLC will continue to insist that accountability and transparency be imbibed by all public officials, or be forced on them through the application of the rule of law, and all that are implicated in corruption cases must be made to face the law. Besides, Ali, the Chairman of the NBA Commission on anti-corruption, urges his colleagues in the legal profession (as key players

in the justice sector), to do more to ensure the return of probity and accountability in Nigerian public life:

> I think we can do much better. I think all of us should put on moral armour and know that it is when we have a society that we can have a profession. I am not satisfied with the way some of our colleagues go about the supposed defence of these cases. Let us go back to the path of rectitude, let us go back to the old ways, where things were orderly, people were honest, people were their brother's keepers, neighbours were safe with themselves. We must reinvent, re-introduce and reinforce our value systems so that people don't worship money as we are doing now.

Another important aspect of democracy is political participation. Democracy requires involving people in the running of public affairs. CSOs are to demand public accountability from government officials and political office holders in the handling of public funds. It is important that the government knows that it is answerable to the people. The principle of political participation ensures that the civil society is not obstructed from questioning the affairs of the state. For government officials to feel the responsibility of being accountable, the principle of the rule of law must be strictly adhered to.

In addition, transparency and the freedom of information strengthen the formal processes and institutions that ensure public accountability. With the Freedom of Information Act, the non-state actors can use the budget of the Government as an instrument of accountability. When the budget of the government, and that of its various ministries, agencies and parastatals, are in the public domain, the civil society can use this to monitor the government and hold it accountable in its dealings. All these are democratic principles that the media and other non-state actors' need in the polity. The rule of law stipulates strict adherence to the law, decisions taken by the government must be in accordance with the law, thus disallowing any form of arbitrariness in the decision making process. Fundamentally, Nigerian citizens seem to have the capacity to tolerate aberrant behaviour on the part of their elected leaders and public servants alike.

### 7.3.2   *The Role of Religious and Traditional Institutions*
Nigeria is a country that has strong religious and traditional institutions. These institutions form

the very basis of the values and ethics of "good and "bad" in the society. Culture and religion inculcate norms and values that are expected to promote social justice and acceptable standards, thereby reducing vices, such as corruption in the society. Most Nigerians are very religious, as seen in the proliferation of various worship centres around the country. However, the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria today tells a different story, because it is ironic that a country with over 90% of its population ardent followers of some form of religious and traditional belief, is a melting pot of corrupt ideas and practices. This irony can even be extended further when one looks at developed countries that are supposedly experiencing a decline in religious belief, yet they rank low in the global corruption indices. This puts into question the relationship between the prevalence of religion in a society and the corrupt activities therein. However, religious and traditional institutions are still important stakeholders in the anti-corruption campaign, given their strategic roles in the society. Their role and the extent to which these roles have helped in fighting corruption is the focus of this section.

On the role of the religious and traditional institutions in the campaign, Akpabio opined that many people use religions and traditional bodies as a cover with which to commit crimes in the country and, unfortunately, when these issues are raised, some "sympathisers" politicize them.

Yusuf Ali, (SAN) deployed rhetoric on who will challenge corruption in the nation's religious circle:

> There is total destruction of self-moral value; everybody worships money. People don't ask where a person gets the money he spends carelessly any more. I have said it severally that the churches and the mosques are promoting corruption on a large scale. Otherwise, how can a President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) say somebody bought a plane for him. Who is the person? Are we not entitled to know?

Oderemi also submitted that the religious bodies, traditional institutions and professional bodies have failed woefully to help the cause of anti-corruption:

> One, the church, in particular, to me, is not playing a noble role. I will give you reasons: In those days, if a policeman arrested a

member of a particular family, that family is likely to go about with the stigma forever, but that trend has changed. These days, somebody who has been compromised while holding public office, somebody who the anti-graft agencies have to some extent arraigned, is still celebrated. The same person will go to church and be honoured; he would even occupy the first row seat in the church.

Two, traditional rulers' honorary titles are now based on heavy prices, so to say; they are given to the highest bidders. So, if you have enough money, nobody wants to know how you came about your wealth. As long as you are ready to throw part of it around, the traditional leaders will honour you, they will give you what is called the ''Otunba'' of this place, the ''Balogun'' of that place. It is quite unfortunate that, even in some communities in Nigeria today, those who are top monarchs are said to be people of questionable characters.

These views, above, suggest a compromise between both religious and traditional institutions. Religious and traditional rulers have become the appendages of politicians, and they are failing in their primary roles. The monetization and politicization of these institutions have far reaching consequences for the anti-corruption campaigns.

Gbonigi's illustration of the imprisonment and later release of a corrupt public official offers more insight into how the anti-corruption campaign is politicized. He states:

When we just say the Church aids and abets corruption, what do we mean? Bode George, for instance, behaved badly before he was jailed. After he had served his jail term, they arranged a thanksgiving service in Christ Church Cathedral in Lagos. What was being celebrated, that this man has become an ex-convict, what was he being thankful for?

Gbonigi acknowledged that there were still exceptions to this norm. He was particularly happy that Bode George was not treated with kid gloves during the so-called thanksgiving service, when the clergyman who preached on that day was courageous enough to condemn the corrupt activities of public office holders. He also agreed that Christian organisations, like the Bible Society of Nigeria, (BSN), the Scripture Union (SU), the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and many others, have been advising their members to steer clear of sin.

In his criticism of professional bodies, Ayoola lamented the lack of commitment on the part of religious institutions in fighting corruption:

> I will rate it as next to nothing. We interacted with religious bodies across the country, but after the interactive sessions, you don't see any sign of initiative on their part. I don't think the religious organizations, as a body, play any significant role in the fight against corruption.

Nwariaku suggested that this was also the same with traditional institutions in the country, especially when bordering on transparency:

> The general impression is that many people are getting titles that they do not deserve because of their shady behaviour. Some are even made traditional rulers through monetary inducement to the community leaders. As you enthrone people of questionable characters to traditional positions, young people watch, and it sends a very wrong signal to them.

Nwariaku, however, disagreed with the view on the culpability of the Church in the fight against corruption. She argued that no religious body deliberately sets out to mislead followers, except ISIS and other terrorist groups. The ICPC Board member noted that the responsibility of religious institutions is to give the message; to teach, to educate, and to draw the faithful onto the path of integrity. The retired Anglican Bishop Gbonigi asserted that the role of the church is "advisory and cannot go beyond praying and advising the faithful, but our prayers have helped in reducing the cases of corruption in the country":

> Whether the faithful live up to the teachings or not, the church cannot be held accountable, although I have a responsibility. Whether it is a church or a mosque, the leaders preach to the people, point out the right path to follow; the right path of truth. I do not think there is any religious organisation that misleads the people in telling them that 'this is right', when it is not right, except, of course, when you are thinking of the extremists.

Olatunji, also a Senior Pastor in the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), notes that most of these corrupt officials are not faithful members of religious institutions and, by extension, do not adhere to the tenets of the religion. The church is handicapped in enforcing code of conduct.

Olatunji further thinks that governments' meddlesomeness in the appointment of traditional heads has weakened the capacity of the traditional institutions in the society. He observes:

> Since government has to approve the appointment of any traditional ruler, so somebody who will be a traditional ruler has to also be either a politician or must have extreme political connections to even get there. That is not good, and has really whittled down the influence of the traditional leaders.

Research Question Two highlights some of the factors militating against the media and other non-state actors in the battle for a more transparent society; economic reasons, which force media practitioners to abandon their social responsibility to the society; the debasement of the cultural values of the state, making citizens worship money; the lack of synergy between the media and the anti-graft bodies and the limit to which religious and professional bodies can invade the privacy of their members. Two critical issues seem to have emerged from this section: First, Nigerian society is increasingly becoming dominated by pastors, evangelists, spiritual teachers, *olushos* and *woliis,* to the extent that some of the interviewers argued that religion has contributed to the high level of prebendalism in the country. Second, another critical issue that emerged is that the culture and tolerance of corruption has crept into the consciousness of an average Nigerian, including the media practitioners.

## 7.4    Journalists' Perception of their Role in the Anti-Corruption Drive, and the Challenges They Face in Carrying Out This Role.

Most of the journalists interviewed for this study agree that they have a role to play in the anti-corruption drive, but they lamented the series of challenges impeding their advocacy work. They agreed that a combination of political, economic and legal constraints have undermined the media's advocacy capacity to serve as the mirror of the society and to play their accountability role credibly.

Simon Kolawole, former Daily Editor of *ThisDay* Newspaper, and currently the publishers of *The Cable,* an online media site, stated:

As a journalist, I consider my role as that of an investigator and as exposing corruption where possible; and giving cases of corruption the necessary prominence to encourage official action.

Otufodunrin, one of the editors of *the Nation* newspapers, also noted that journalists know that they have a duty to help the cause of anti-corruption:

Journalists know that, as much as possible, they have a duty to make the society corruption-free, considering its implication for everybody. The major impediment has to do with lack of necessary information, sometimes, on corrupt practices across board. There is also the problem of a lack of co-operation of the agencies saddled with the prosecution of corrupt persons.

Oguntayo agreed that the media men have a role to play in the anti-corruption drive. He argued that journalists are to sanitise the society with their reports and promote a culture of integrity and probity in the conduct of government business.

However, a veteran journalist, Felix Adenaike, doubted the commitment of the media to the anti-corruption drive. He noted that the present crop of journalists wants to behave and live like other professionals, forgetting that their role in the society is quite different and peculiar. According to him, many of the present crop of media practitioners believe that they don't have any role in the anti-corruption drive of the state, so they can't make up their minds whether or not to join the campaign. They know they want to do it, but they can't bring themselves to do it, because they are prone to corruption. Adenaike noted:

You cannot perform the role of a watchdog if you demand and take bribes. Journalists are hampered to that extent in the effective performance of that role. A journalist is a missionary; you are out there to rid the society of filth, to be a watchdog, to hold society, and those who operate in it, including government, corporate bodies and individuals, to the laws of the land. To hold people up to such laws, you also have to obey the same laws. If you are a corrupt person, you can't excuse yourself that your pay is low, but you must live within your means. Many people don't want to live within their means.

The assertion that journalists do not know their role in the fight against corruption seems contestable. However, with the fall of educational standards and the influx of people to

journalism, this assertion is not farfetched. Otufodunrin's views seem more plausible, for he argues that the problem is not a lack of knowledge of its role, rather, journalists are constrained in their duties as a result of the prevailing circumstances in the society.

Certainly, the Nigerian media are faced with certain challenges that undermine its capacity, some of them include the lack of an effective legal framework that supports media practice, corruption in the media (where a journalist expects gratification for covering, or reporting on, events) and also, the problem of the ownership of media institutions by politicians or their stooges. This lack of professionalism has, to a large extent, compromised the media. Akpabio, (CCB) opined that the media are caught in the intrinsic web of these sentiments for three basic reasons:

> First, a lack of professionalism in the media, because the rank and file of the industry has been infiltrated and polluted by quacks. Therefore, there is an urgent need for capacity training in order to streamline their activities. Second, financial capacity is non-existent for members of the profession. Welfare and professional schemes are two crucial things for most professions, and it is a big challenge in the media industry. Third, there is the need for a clear career path, a clear progression in the sector. At present, this is lacking.

On the issue of corruption within the media, Bolanle Gbonigi, a retired Anglican Bishop, argued that corruption within the sector "is a reflection of what is happening in the society". However, he noted that corruption within the media was affecting the anti-corruption battle in the country:

> There are people within the media who are corrupt, and because those at the top are corrupt, they look at the situation in the whole country and say 'let me have my own share of the national cake'', and so they do all they can do to have their own share of the national cake. And now they talk about *brown envelope*, they receive it, not in thousands, but in millions, in order to sway the mind of the people in favour of a particular person.

Oderemi, Head of the Political Desk, *Nigerian Tribune* newspapers, also posited that corruption within the media sector was affecting their work. A lack of professionalism in the sector, according to him, "is due to people going into the media industries for the wrong reasons. Some go into the media with the notion that the profession is an avenue to make money. They do not care about the issue of ethics or their integrity; they do not matter to them".

This argument was further echoed by Adesina, the former President of NGE, who said that the media do not operate in a vacuum:

> It operates within a milieu, and if that milieu is overtaken by corruption, it is only natural that the media will be affected. Media men are not from another planet, and if they operate in an environment suffused by corruption, it is only natural that they will be affected. Clean up the society, and clean up the media too, because they are part of society. *Brown envelope,* if there are no givers, there will be no takers. When the consciousness on doing things right is very high, even the media falls into line. But when society is very permissive, expect the *brown envelope* syndrome to be pervasive.

Adenaike agreed with Gbonigi and Adesina that corruption in the larger society reflects on the media industry:

> They are members of the larger society and many people migrate into journalism to make money, but they get their focus wrong from the beginning; they think it is a glamorous job, so they can as well make money. The larger society is corrupt, and journalists, as part of that society which they are expected to police and clean up, sometimes, unfortunately, fall prey to the filthy lucre and take blood money, and this makes them vulnerable and corrupt. By extension, they can't do a thorough job. To be able to live above board and be a thorough professional, journalists must respect the ethics of the profession.

Ehirim observed that the practitioners who are ready to help the cause of the anti-corruption fight are not encouraged in carrying out their duty by the relevant agencies, and blamed it on the non-implementation of the Freedom of Information Act by some federal agencies and states' governments in the country. The lack of accurate information impairs the ability of the mass media in reporting credible information to the people, as required.

Oderemi paints a graphic picture of media practitioners' inability to perceive any definite role in the anti-corruption drive. His response is consistent with the earlier assertions. He stated:

> Most of us don't have the orientation, and this is unfortunate. Some of us don't even have the belief that we ought to be part of the team waging war against corruption, yet, we have the weapons, the

platform to use and pursue that cause through our write-ups, analyses, features, interviews, and so on. But some people don't see it that way, people would prefer to compromise. Placing the story as it is, they want to play ball and, possibly, to cover up a few things. Another factor is that of ownership. Many of those who own media houses are not professional journalists; they are more businessmen, so to speak; the social responsibility theory of the Press does not matter to them, in fact, they don't even understand what that means.

Oderemi also concurred with the argument of societal influence as a challenge to journalists in defining their role in the anti-corruption campaign. The Nigerian society measures success, most frequently, in monetary terms. This culture of getting rich at all costs erodes the ethics of professionalism and predisposes journalists to cutting corners.

Erubami, of CD, noted that media practitioners believe that they have both moral and legal obligations to expose the vices of those in positions of authority, but they are greatly constrained by the political leadership of the country and the corruption within the sector:

> The Fourth Estate of the Realm believes it has both moral and legal obligations to expose corruption and corrupt people, even at the risk of their lives. They publish and expose corrupt tendencies in the society. Their main impediments are the overbearing attitude of government operatives and the impunity with which they intimidate journalists and prevent them from publishing the truth; while the very poor remuneration is demoralizing.

Ehirim, Chairman of the NUJ, Abuja Chapter, argued that it was wrong to say media practitioners are involved in corruption. To him:

> When you put it that way, you are giving blanket condemnation to the entire profession. I can speak for myself, I can speak for several other journalists who are not involved in such a practice; that is not to say that one or two are not involved. There is a Committee that fights against quacks in the profession. There are people who are not representing any media organisation, but they go about with their recorders to 'interview' unsuspecting members of the public, and, at the end of day, they say "oga wetin dey for us now?" which is a language that no trained journalist would use. They are fake journalists, and in the event of being ripped off, they throw blanket blame on the generality of journalists, which is not fair.

In order to drive home his message, Ehirim insisted:

> What is *brown envelope*? It is a phenomenon in the media profession. Unfortunately, it has been given a very derogatory tag. I was on radio the other day, and this issue came up, and I was asking, when you go to a lawyer don't you pay a consultancy fee before anything? Most times when you go to the Hospital, you pay some money before you see the doctor. Why should the society see it as evil when a journalist does something for somebody and the person says 'thank you'? I am not saying it is a precondition before you can do your duty. In African culture, whenever somebody does any favour for you, you thank him. If a journalist interviews you and gets it published, and one day you meet him and say 'my friend, thank you very much for what you did for me, please can you have this? Is there any crime in that?

As earlier discussed, the ownership of media institutions by politicians is a prevailing impediment to a free press. Olatunji argued that the ownership structure of most media "is a serious issue affecting the advocacy role" of journalists:

> The role of the media, ordinarily, should be to expose corruption in all ramifications, because the media are supposed to stand between the governed and the governor; that is the ideal role of the media. But we are now in a society where journalists are assassinated for speaking the truth; we are now in a society whereby journalists are attacked for writing true stories.

Onumah concurred with Olatunji's submission, but provides an interesting dimension on why media practitioners appeared to be incapable of using their power to fight corruption:

> Many media houses are owned by politicians and even those that are owned by private businessmen do not pay salaries, and nobody holds them accountable. Imagine having a family, you have to work for 3-6 months without getting paid. *ThisDay* Newspapers are usually cited where this is common practice, and when reporters asked the Publisher about their salaries, he would be quoted as saying: 'young men, why are you asking me about salaries when I have given you an ID card?" So, there was an unwritten rule that you have to use what you have, to get what you want.

It is imperative to say that, in the course of this study, it was discovered that it was not only *ThisDay* Newspapers and the AIT television station that owed workers' salaries running into several months or even a year. Other media houses said to be owing staff salaries include: *Daily Independent, People's Daily, National Trust, Leadership, The Newswatch Times, Newswatch Magazine; National Mirror, PM/TheNews Magazine, The Union*, *New Nigerian* and *News Direct*. Apart from the non-regular payment of salaries and other allowances, journalists are among the least paid workers in the country, with some collecting salaries as low as N50, 000 per month, equivalent to $102 at the exchange rate of N490 to a US dollar.

Adenaike, however, faulted this line of reasoning, insisting that the poor salary should not be an excuse for media practitioners to engage in unethical behaviour:

> I don't think so; it could be a factor, but not a major problem. One, assess yourself as an individual, how do you value yourself? Do you value the ethics of the profession? Don't you appreciate a situation where somebody sees a banker salute him and commend him for what he represents, and then another person sees you as a reporter and calls you a press boy? The major issue is you as an individual, how much is your value, your name, your family name, and what is your goal in life? Do you just want to come into this profession and leave the place without making any impact?

Olatunji argued that most newspapers also engage in various unethical practices which militate against the watchdog role of the media, like organising extra-curricular activities. Olatunji identified three forms of these unethical practices as:

➤ **Political Awards:** Nigerian newspapers are now fond of organising political awards for State Governors or Local Government Chairmen. A governor or council chairman would be chosen as the Governor of the Year, or the Man of the Year, for a price. In the past, when such awards were based on the genuine contributions of the person to society, the Governor, or whoever is picked for the award, must pay millions of Naira to cover 'logistics'. At the same time, the recipient must get his friends and aides to place congratulatory messages in the newspaper. These advertisements will also rake millions of Naira into the coffers of the papers.

- ➢ **Corporate Awards**: This is a variant of awards organised by the media that are targeted at the captains of industry. Pictures of captains of industry will litter the pages of such newspapers. It also attracts a price tag. Millions of Naira are raked into the accounts of the media house.

- ➢ **Commercial News**: The broadcast outfits are guilty of this trend. Educative and informative documentaries that can help citizens grow, suffer as most of them are yanked off the air to provide adequate time for the friendly press releases. Millions of Naira are raked into the accounts of the organising broadcasting station.

Although all the journalists interviewed for this study acknowledged that they have a definitive role to play in the anti-corruption drive, it was only Simon Kolawole that personalised his answer. Kolawole noted "as a journalist, I consider my role as that of an investigator and as exposing corruption where possible, and giving cases of corruption the necessary prominence to encourage official action". What is in short supply in Nigeria is an equivalent of the Ghanaian investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyam Anas, who exposed high level corruption and wrongdoing in the Ghana judiciary, resulting in the removal of over 40 judges.

Research Question Three indicates that media practitioners perceive that they have a role to play in the anti-corruption drive, but they are unable to carry out this sacred duty because their rank and file have been infested with the virus of corruption. Although the *brown envelope* syndrome has compromised the watchdog role of the media, most of the media practitioners and union leaders interviewed were a little defensive on the issue. The change in the media landscape of the country, where only the rich class (populated by politicians and business men), can own and operate the media, has affected the way their employees-journalists operate. Advertising appears to have a damning impact on the media accountability role. It was discovered in the course of this study that some newspapers in Nigeria have turned their reporters into advertising canvassers. Payment of salaries is now being tied to the amount /volume of advertising generated by a reporter. For instance, some reporters in one of the Ibadan based newspapers were issued with queries for their failure to bring advertisements into the company from their respective beats.

The consequence of this is that reporters are expected to "play along" with the Chief Executive Officers of the organisations that they are assigned to cover, in order to be considered for advertising from the ministries and government agencies. The end result of this co-option of the media is that investigative journalism suffers a huge set back. A reporter with the Ibadan based newspaper (name withheld) retorted, "investigative journalism is becoming a dangerous terrain. We have seen cases where Editors have betrayed their reporters by contacting the affected personalities mentioned in a story in exchange for money".

The situation on the ground is that journalists, who are struggling to survive, cannot be forceful, as an external mechanism with which to engender accountability in the country. The result of this situation is that the media have been turned into a lapdog of the politically powerful and the wealthy few who run the government, so the media cannot be seen as the watchdog of society.

## 7.5 The Impact of the Growing Linkage Between the Media and the Political Class on Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Drive

In the course of this research, many of the stakeholders who were interviewed agreed that the growing linkage between the media and the political class is having a negative effect on the anti-corruption drive in the country. Onumah argues that, over the years, the media landscape of the country has changed from that of the pre-independence media era, (when the newspapers were mostly used as a platform to end colonial rule; to the post-Independence media era, when newspapers were published to fight the military dictatorship, and then democratic rule, when businessmen, following in the footsteps of those like the Ibrus and the Aboderins of this country, ventured into the newspaper business to protect and to defend their own personal and business interests. Onumah specifically retorted:

> We are in a period where the majority of the newspapers/magazines in the country today are owned by businessmen/politicians, they were set up to protect the business/political interests of their owners. For example, *The Nation* titles *are* owned by Bola Tinubu, a politician/businessman; *Champion* is owned by Iwuanyawu; *the Sun* and *the Telegraph* are owned by Orji Uzor Kalu, a former Governor of Abia-State, while the famous *Guardian* titles are owned by the Ibru family. Many politicians also own FM radio and television stations. What we now have is that the agenda of the

media has shifted from championing the national or anti-military struggle to purely defending the interests of politicians. Politicians who are accused of corruption own their media houses, and they fight their own wars through the same.

Olatunji lamented that the growing number of politicians setting up newspapers is casting serious doubt on the capacity of the media practitioners to report on, and defend, the truth in Nigeria:

> It is not good for the media; the truth is that when a politician establishes a newspaper that will protect his political interests, he is neither interested in a newspaper that will publish the truth, nor one that will protect public interests. Anytime the interests of a politician are at variance with the interests of the public, of course, the interest of the politicians takes precedence, and, of course, no society makes progress that way. So, it is obvious that, in Nigeria, we don't have a vibrant media.

Ayoola asserted that the payer of the piper dictates the tune. For him, the ownership of media outlets by politicians or businessmen with a vested interest in politics, creates a conflict of interest when the media cannot independently report on events without external influence and control. However, he suggested that the government should allow media houses to be quoted on the Stock Exchange, as this will throw the doors of the media outfits open in order to shift its corporate governance from individual to collective ownership.

This view was also echoed by Nwariaku, and she argued that this trend was prevalent; politicians were going the extra mile to manipulate the process in their favour, using all of the means possible, including the media. Adewusi also agrees with Nwariaku on this. Adewusi believes that the politicians have been using the media to cover their corrupt deals:

> The truth is that most media outfit owners are either big time politicians or friends of politicians. Unfortunately, when corruption issues relate to these publishers or their political friends, the publishers use their ownership influence to block the exposure of such corruption in their media. At some other times, they use the media to attack others who blow the whistle on them or their friends. For me, this is an unfortunate linkage.

Oderemi gives an insight into how some politicians, who are media owners, have been deploying their outfits to project the political interests of their friends/associates in government:

> The man who owns AIT, for instance, is a politician, and he knows how to play games and that, of course, is reflected in the political reportage, especially when the elections are around the corner. At the moment, the owner of the Silverbird Media Group had just been appointed to a Federal Government Board and, in the last few days, the man has started campaigning for the President, just as he did before the election. That alone is a problem for anti-graft agencies. *Thisday* and *The Nation*, are completely owned by politicians. The journalists working there must do the bidding of their owners, except if they want to lose their jobs.

Adenaike explained that media practitioners may maintain close contact with the political class, with a caveat that the media ought to be able to hold the politicians accountable. He, however, opined that if you ask and take gratification from a politician, then you have joined the class. "You now can no longer hold the politicians accountable to the electorates. I am not suggesting, by any means, that journalists should antagonize the political class, because if you don't have political contacts, you cannot have the relevant information to publish and analyse; you can't have tips to investigate". The veteran journalist, however, observed that:

> We now have a situation in which media people sign on to work for politicians while they are running their media. They work for them; they take money from them; they are on their payroll. How can you watch them? And if you watch them, how can you hold them accountable to the electorate?

To resolve this problem, Akpabio argues that the media houses and journalists should be insulated from the political interests of their owners/employers and from other external forces that are capable of undermining their professional duties:

> There should be an instrument that divorces the interests of the owner from the administrative policy of the media houses. I don't know how successfully that has been done, because that becomes a challenge, and, I can tell you, whenever you are approaching a political event, you see a number of papers emerging on the street. A particular newspaper can, from its front page through to the last

> page, focus on attacking a particular issue or individual in the opposition.

Fagboola was particularly irked by the growing influence and negative impact of the political class on the media industry in the country, noting that this has constituted one of the unwritten hazards of journalism in Nigeria. He explained that the ownership of media institutions in Nigeria as follows:

> In Nigeria, the pattern of ownership is built around 3 phases: government, private and government/private. The biggest ownership of the media is dominated by the government, especially, in the broadcasting world. But the private control 2/3 of the newspaper and magazine publications. This pattern of ownership definitely has a negative impact on the role of the media.

Ehirim, however, sees no reasons for concern on this issue. He stated that there was no need to worry about the growing number of politicians who own media houses. According to him:

> … even, within the political class there are factions. Some of them are in the PDP, some of them are in the APC, some in the Labour Party, while others belong to a few mushroom parties; so would it be possible for a man who owns a particular media organization with one party to tell his workers to cover up the atrocities of his opponent in another party, it is not possible? Rather, he would want to use the media outfit he controls to expose the corrupt practices in the other party".

He, however, conceded:

> I agree with you that, probably, it is difficult, if not impossible, for you to write against your employer or his political/business associates. So, I don't think it is proper to conclude that there is connivance between the media and the political class.

Adesina, the former NGE President, complained that the way the political class was manipulating the media with the journalists' helplessness was a big dilemma:

> The media class and political class are not necessarily adversaries. But we know there should be a sort of peer review between them. That is why some sort of critical discourse is needed for the review

to be effective. When the political class and the media are too chummy, critical review may be compromised. But the snag is that most of the media outfits of today are owned by the political class, since they are the ones that have the requisite funds. How, then, do you begin to censure your owners? A big dilemma.

The capital intensive nature of running media houses makes the ownership of these institutions challenging. Nwolise argued that it is the politicians that have the resources to get newspaper licenses and they own the media houses in the country.

Otufodunrin admitted that the growing number of politicians owning media institutions constitutes a major impediment to the constitutional role of the media in society:

> Journalists should be very professional in the discharge of their duties and avoid pandering to political interests. Ownership of media houses by politicians should be discouraged, since he who pays the piper, usually dictates the direction of the coverage. Monitoring organizations should ensure strict compliance with codes on broadcasting, in the case of broadcast stations.

To Olatunji, the only way for the media to reduce the controlling influence of politicians and businessmen in the industry is for journalists to pool their resources together, and to jointly fund and operate a media outfit that will be professionally run. Second, he advocated that foreigners should be encouraged to operate media houses in Nigeria. According to him, such a foreign owned newspaper will not have any attachment to the state and the political class.

However, Onumah does not believe that foreigners should be allowed into the newspaper sector in Nigeria, and he also faulted the joint ownership of a medium by journalists:

> I'm totally opposed to the idea of any foreign ownership of media outfits in Nigeria, because, at the end of the day, it remains a business and whoever owns it would have to survive to make a profit, so it will be the interest of the foreign owners first and foremost, to the detriment of the interests of Nigerians. On the issue of a jointly established media outfit by media professionals, we've seen it happen in the past. Take, for instance: The *News* magazine, *Tell, The Post,* and, of course, *Comet, and so on*. These were

papers/magazines owned by journalists, but few of them have managed to survive.

He also cited the case of *The Next,* a newspaper house that suffered systematic government persecution because of its vibrant reportage of corruption in government ministries.

In answering Research Question Four, it can be inferred that the growing linkage between the media and the political class constitutes such a serious threat to the independence and the capacity of the media to serve as a watchdog. Due to the poor salary, the irregular payment of salaries, and the fear of job loss, journalists use their media as a meal ticket for survival. At the same time, the owners deploy their employees to protect their political and economic interests, whether noble or ignoble. Overall, the vertical accountability roles of the media have been sacrificed, making the battle against corruption, a lost battle.

## 7.6 The Impact of Democracy on the Level of Transparency and Accountability: The Nigerian Experience

Democracy is a system of government that is rooted in certain principles. A consensus in the definition of democracy suggests that democracy is a government with the consent of the majority; it is a system of government based on the acquisition of power from the legitimacy that is offered by the people. If legitimacy resides with the people, then it is justifiable when the people demand good governance which is based on the principles of transparency and accountability.

Flaws in the Nigerian democratic system underscore that there is a problem with the application of democracy in Nigeria. The enthronement of democratic principles, which is a necessary requirement for good governance, is lacking. After fifteen years of democratic governance in Nigeria, given the chronic levels of corruption and the lack of accountability, there is a growing recognition of a missing link in the application, or practice, of democracy in Nigeria. Allegations of corruption threaten to erode any gains from democracy. There is widespread scepticism on the role of democracy in ensuring a transparent and accountable government and uncertainty about the instrumental values of democracy on good governance abounds.

Transparency and accountability determine a nation's growth and development. This view has been questioned by oppressive or undemocratic governments, such as those in Russia and China. These countries have experienced tremendous development in the absence of a democratic government. This suggests that a responsive and accountable government is not predicated on the premise of a democratic government. Although some of the interviewees such as Nwolise and Akpabio (personal interviews, 2104) argue that Nigeria is a nascent democracy and is in a learning process, expectations should thus not be too ambitious. The basic inherent principle in democracy justifies the demand for the benefits it claims to offer.

Consensus remains elusive on how democracy has brought about a transparent and accountable government in Nigeria. The twenty-five (100%) stakeholders interviewed had varying views regarding the impact of democracy on the culture of transparency and accountability in the country. However, there is an agreement that the structures of financial responsibility and accountability need to be strengthened to address the corruption menace that has plagued the country.

Onumah noted:

> The poverty rate is shooting off the roof, corruption, abuse of the
> rule of law, everything has worsened. The only thing that perhaps
> may not be as visible is the brutal killing of people, journalists, and
> attacks on everything, so, in the true sense of it, nothing has really
> changed in the last 15years.

Otufodunrin insisted that democratic rule has not really helped the cause of citizens, adding, "Much still has to be done through good governance at all levels. Politicians should fulfil their electoral promises and improve on the standard of living in the country". Erubami strongly believes that Nigeria still has a long way to go in order to attain democratic rule in the country:

> There is no way the kind of democracy we are practising now, can
> help the anti-corruption struggle. There is no democracy in Nigeria
> and the way to know whether there is democracy in any country is
> to know whether the law is allowed to rule, whether there is
> guarantee of human rights; whether everybody is equal before the
> law. Where those three fundamental conditions are not available in

any country, there is no democracy; this is because corruption itself is not synonymous with democratic status.

Ehirim asserted:

> I must tell you, as a Nigerian and as one of those who really fought for democracy, that l'm disappointed, in the sense that what we have been doing in the last 15years has not been democratic; we only have elections that are massively rigged. People who have no mandate from their people are the ones calling the shots and are grandstanding as leaders all over the country, and it doesn't bother them. Just look at how bad things are now, they don't care. It is only in Nigeria that failures are rewarded with a second chance.

Oderemi concurred with the argument of Ehirim that Nigeria is yet to have democracy. He insisted:

> We don't have democracy; they have turned democracy upside down. They don't even understand what democracy stands for. What is important to them is to build empires for themselves and their so called friends, or what have you. There is no democracy in Nigeria, and what we have is civil rule, being managed by the rich. Over the years, Nigerians have been at the receiving end, no gains from democracy as far as I am concerned.

Adesina described the last fifteen years of democratic rule in Nigeria as work in progress:

> It is not entirely a gloomy report, but the state of the country does not give much to cheer about. Looking at the level of insecurity, national suspicion, and the ill will of the ethnic nationalities towards one another, there is almost no country again. The onus is on Nigeria to use democracy to build a more cohesive country with happier, more prosperous people. That is not happening for now.

Findings suggest that the Nigerian government under democratic rule appears to be more corrupt and unaccountable in comparison to the military era. Given the inclusive nature of democracy, the number of public officials engaged in corrupt practices is huge, if compared to a military system that was run by a few loyalists. It is thus plausible to assert that the incidences of corruption under democratic rule in Nigeria are greater than they were during the military era. Onumah, formerly of the EFCC, submitted:

We haven't landed on democracy in Nigeria; democracy landed on us, which, in a way, is quite true. The expectation has not been met, we were hoping that, with the benefit of hindsight and with what we had been through: colonialism, various crises and military rule, our politicians would have put in their very best. In fact, there is a lack of contentment on the part of our politicians. *O*ur leaders are like modern day buccaneers; they grab with both hands, shoot and kill anything that is around them as a threat, they appropriate everything, and their ilk. What democracy has done in Nigeria is that it has legitimized barefaced banditry. So, people are stealing, but they do it under the cover of the law, they are legalizing their stealing, that is what democracy has done to the average person.

Olatunji also noted:

A lot of these "elected" officials got their positions through rigging, so they know that they didn't get there through the masses. Would a democratically elected leader be demolishing structures all over the place while ignoring the cries of the people? You are destroying a market without providing an alternative, is that how democracy works? You are relieving people of their daily jobs, you have not provided alternative jobs, is that what democracy is all about? But these people know that, at the end of the day, once they have the money to bribe the relevant organs of government, they would be re-elected. So, why should they bother about the masses?

It appears as if the government deliberately attempted not to be transparent because it is afraid that the citizens will link transparency mechanisms to accountability. The citizens are sceptical of the government's sincerity in relation to fighting corruption. The lack of transparency benefits the clandestine and corrupt activities that exist in the government. To this end, investigations into corruption allegations tend to be frustrated by the government and its institutions. An example is given by Akanbi; he notes:

Look at the case of Farouk Lawan. He was taken to court, and he said that the money he received was not a bribe but the giver said it was a bribe demanded by the lawmaker. Let him go to court and defend himself. If the judge believes his story, he would be discharged and acquitted. But look at the period the case has taken, the House was investigating on several occasions.

Democracy entails the institutionalization of the rule of law and the entrenchment of the principles of transparency and accountability in the political process. These principles are essential for a democratic political system. The absence of this in any democratic setting is a mockery of what democracy is, and a wishful expectation of the dividend it should bring. Growing public resentment and civil society activism are reflections of a disenchanted citizenry who feel they have been short-changed by the so called "democratic dispensation". Others are even of the opinion that Nigeria is not practising democracy. As Olatunji noted:

> What we have in Nigeria, as far as I am concerned, is a ''civilian rule'' not democracy, because in a democracy, corruption is fought to a standstill, in a democracy people are free to speak. For instance, in 1979, when democracy took off, media houses mushroomed, because normally a democracy should encourage transparency, should encourage people to be interested in their government. But this current democracy is not like that.

Akpabio also supported the forgoing argument, but she noted that the progress recorded by Nigeria in her quest for a democratic journey has been eroded by insecurity challenges:

> We are not matured at the level expected by some, especially, when one considers the space of time of democratic rule. It is ironic that after we had upheld democracy thus far, certain security issues are playing up, which means that there is a disconnect. The progress we have made has been wiped away by the insecurity issues.

Government officials appear to be opposed to the incorporation and consolidation of true democratic principles. It seems as if the adoption of democracy is a game of rhetoric, because there is no political will or commitment to translate democratic principles into good governance. Ayoola agreed with this view. He offered insight into why democratic rule appeared to be failing to promote the culture of accountability in our public system:

> Our democracy is not founded on values, selflessness, good ideology, and a self-generating character. We have a democracy that is not fashioned to do anything that is enabling; I think we have democracy in name only, not, in actual fact, in reality.

Democratic principles create the conditions for good governance, and the quality of governance is fundamental to the assessment of transparency and accountability in a political system. Accountability has to be built on the qualities of democratic principles, and when this is lacking, economic development in the economy is stalled. Proponents of democracy strongly argue that the growth and development of a country, and also the equity of its citizenry, are dependent on how well these principles are incorporated into the political system. An alternative assertion to the above was that given by Fagboola. Though he believes that Nigeria is yet to swim in the real river of democracy, he nevertheless believes that the lack of democratic principles in Nigeria results from a lack of development:

> It is not democracy that gives birth to development, but it is development that gives birth to true democracy, which is why it is only when we witness true development [which is that of the mind] that we would have a real democracy, including its dividends. Many politicians, in the name of building big roads, bridges and skyscrapers, have equated all of these infrastructures to mean the dividends of democracy.

Ugbogu, the National Coordinator of CEFE, sounds optimistic about the prospects of a better democratic rule in Nigeria. To her, Nigeria's democratic rule is still growing, and she pleads with Nigerians to keep hope alive in the system. She contended that "if we do the right things we need to do, if we work together, if the religious, traditional, community leaders and civil service personnel would work together as they are supposed to, it will work out".

Bishop Gbonigi opined that democracy has not helped at all, because of the groups mentioned above by Ugbogu. In his words:

> Unfortunately, the majority of our civil servants, our politicians, our business men and women, are very greedy. They look for positions in order to get possession. Look at the case of the Hon. Farouk Lawan, and Femi Otedola. It appears that corruption is on the increase under our civilian government".

Falae argued that one of the benefits gained under this democratic rule is that it has opened the eyes of the people to see the kind of monumental corruption going on around them, unlike during the military regime, when corruption was very secretive. He averred:

> But we are a democratic regime; there is more participation in political/corruption process. So we now know that stealing is going on, on a very large scale, but that has not deterred people from stealing. We know from the local level that Chairmen and Councillors who had nothing before have suddenly becomes millionaires overnight. So you don't need any rumours, you can see. Democracy has opened our eyes to see corruption everywhere, and it has not reduced. On the contrary, it has made it more widespread, for there are more participants, and democratic corruption as well.

Soleye, on his part, believes that democracy has been helpful in Nigeria, but insisted that some sectors of the economy have had more benefits than others in terms of the dividends of democracy. He singles out the media as one of the sectors that had always enjoyed the dividends of democracy. Soleye asserted:

> In fact, the beneficiaries of democracy are the mass media in Nigeria. If you say you don't see the dividend of democracy, you can say that, but the mass media cannot say that. Before 1999, the pagination of an average newspaper, such as *The Guardian, Nigerian Tribune,* and *The Punch* used to be about 20 to 30 pages, but it has expanded to an average of 68 pages. In fact, some of them are giving us bulletins free of charge. Are they not making profit from the volumes of adverts?

He asked rhetorically. "The media are the first beneficiaries of democracy. And the evidence, if you want to see it, go and look at the pagination and the number of adverts of an average newspaper."

This position appears to be in sharp contrast to the argument of Olatunji that the media sector is facing a serious challenge under the current democratic dispensation, with many newspapers dying because of the harsh economic environment in the country. Indeed, Hassan and Adewusi appeared to be on the same wave length, as they noted that democratic rule has not yet helped the cause of good governance and accountability in Nigeria. Hassan says "the only thing is that there is little

fear to perpetrate corrupt practices due to the existence of anti-graft agencies. Impunity is waxing stronger".

Data presented in answering Research Question Five suggest that democratic rule has not yet impacted positively on the level of accountability and development in Nigeria. Corruption is an element that frustrates any form of gains made in the past fifteen years of democratic rule in Nigeria, and political leadership in Nigeria is plagued with a history of a lack of accountability to the people. To some Nigerians, democracy may thus not necessarily be an antidote to corruption. Cases of corruption seem to be on the increase, and the living conditions of Nigerians are getting worse. Shallow practices of democratic principles are what are at play in Nigeria. A growing demand for the government to inculcate the culture of transparency and accountability is a reflection of the absence of financial policies, and of a framework that ensures accountability and hinders all the processes of financial misappropriation. The agitation for the full implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, by all the three tiers of government, thus suggests a simple but basic premise; accountability cannot be achieved without transparency.

**7. 7 Theoretical Implications for the Study**
The primary goal of literature reviews, as structured in *Chapter Two* of this thesis, is to identify the preceding, relevant knowledge and ideas that prevail in regard to the subject under investigation. In doing this, the strengths and weaknesses of the literature under review are examined in order to establish their significance, or otherwise, to the research. The primary responsibility for reviewing theoretical and empirical literature is to identify the existing gaps in the literature under review and to close the gaps, as part of bringing-up-to-date and contributing to knowledge.

In research like this, the role of the theoretical framework is to identify the theory or theories that are competent enough to explain the practical realities and to make representative predictions. In *Chapter Seven* of this research, the qualitative presentation and the analysis of interviews conducted with significant stakeholders in the anti-corruption subsector are presented. The identified stakeholders and the issues for interrogation were clearly spelt out in Chapter Two of this study.

Following from the above, it is significant to draw attention to the theoretical facts and the value that the analyses of the primary interviews conducted with significant stakeholders, as far as anti-corruption is concerned, were meant to validate the argument that was canvassed in the literature review in relation to the strengths and weaknesses alluded to above. The analyses of the field interviews with key stakeholders also helped to close the existing gaps that were identified in the course of the literature review. Moreover, from the various analyses, it is evident that the adoption of the political economy approach as the lead approach to explain the subject matter was quite in sync with the responses from the fieldwork.

This work bears a very close connection to the theories that are itemised for usage, starting with the Political Economy Theory. The Political Economy Theory is premised on the assumption that economics cannot be separated from politics. Proponents of this theory believe that political factor determines, to a large extent, the economic issues. Furthermore, the media, under this theory, lays more emphasis on profit making, while serving the public interest takes a secondary place in most societies, and, as a result, the communication industries have moved to the centre of global capitalism. Consequently, journalists must not only understand their discipline, but they must also know how politics and other social variables impact upon their subject, either positively or negatively.

This theory is very suitable for the analysis of the role of the mass media and other non-state actors in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015, because it appears that the major reason why the media are receding towards a lapdog status, instead of its watchdog role there is the economic consideration which, in turn, is determined by the political system. Owing to the prevailing economic situation, many newspapers can no longer survive without depending on government patronage, especially, advertising. This therefore means that the media only serve the interests of their sponsors at the expense of the public. A lot of independent media houses that try to write objectively about government officials and their cronies, have died prematurely, because they were simply starved of the needed advertising and patronage.

The Nigerian media industry is a perfect example of where this theory is utilised. The media content in Nigeria is influenced by a combination of media ownership, advertisements and the state/size of the economy. The media, which used to be known for agitation in the past, has suddenly become an instrument of power and control in the country. Accountability and transparency, regarded as critical pillars in a democratic setting, are generally lacking because newspaper owners now use their newspapers to cover scandals. Newspaper editors hobnob with members of the political class, not for the purpose of getting news items that will serve public interests, but to enhance their personal interests.

Moreover, the harsh economic situation, coupled with the lack of infrastructural facilities, such as electricity, potable water, a good transport system, and other social amenities in the country, make it difficult for the media to make a profit as they are forced to provide all these aforementioned facilities themselves. As a result of the economic situation in the country, most media organisations operate at a loss, with the staff bearing the brunt of the harsh conditions; the salaries and allowances of media practitioners are not paid for a period of three months to one year. Invariably, investigative journalism and the following-up of stories suffer greatly. To compound the situation, only a handful of investors and financial bodies are willing to invest in the media business because of slow, and sometimes low, returns on investment.

Due to a difficult operating environment, media growth and expansion have remained stagnant since the commencement of democratic rule in 1999. During the period under study, *The Next, News Nigerian, Compass, Westerner, New Age, Daily Times, Monitor, The Comet, Daily Sketch, Concord, The Moment, Triumph, Third Eye, Hallmark, Herald, Tempo Magazine,* and scores of regional newspapers appeared and have died as a result of harsh economic situation and government policies. In fact, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo stopped the printing of annual calendars for government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) by the media houses. This printing of calendars used to be a major source of revenue to most of the media houses in the country before 1999. In the field work carried out, and as analysed in Chapter Seven, it is evident that the economic goal of the media, most especially those owned by politicians, as they evidently are in Nigeria, and as demonstrated by the significant stakeholders, is to protect the political

interests of their owners. Consequently, the political and economic interests of media ownership which influence each other bring out in bold relief the value of the political economy theory in providing a lucid explanation and interpretation of the reality of the role of the media in fighting corruption, or not.

The availability of mobile internet is encouraging more and more people to key into information, entertainment, and even education, not from the traditional news sources, but increasingly from social networking websites. This is affecting the revenue profile of the average newspaper, as there is a steady decline in the sales of newspapers and advertisements. In response to this challenge, most newspapers are reducing their staff strength, introducing new marketing strategies, and reducing the cost of their operations. All these measures have, in one way or another, affected the capacity of the media to carry out their watchdog role in the society.

Some have introduced an online version of their papers. Media practitioners are also taking to the online media to get their messages across to Nigerians. Online media sites that have emerged in the last few years include: *Sahara Reporters, The Cable, Premium Times, Pointblank, Elendu, Newspot, Newsreel, International Centre for Investigative Reporting, and Witness Nigeria.* The coverage and number of hits on these sites remains an issue, because the population of Nigerians that have access to internet facilities is still very low. Understandably, too, these online media bodies have joined the struggle for the limited advertising, competing with the traditional media for the advertising from the government and their agencies. In fact, one of the anti-corruption agencies was reported to have signed an MOU with the scores of online media houses in Nigeria not to publish any "critical stories" on the leadership of the agency in question, with the promise of a supplement and advertorials. This is where the literature review on globalisation comes into play. The globalisation of the media and of technology has impacted upon the sector both positively and negatively.

The pursuit of economic interests has made many journalists throw ethics to the winds, as incidences of *brown envelopes* (bribe taking by journalists) are very rampant. This has affected the credibility of the media houses. The situation is so bad that most editors and their correspondents

are on the monthly pay roll of government officials and politicians, and so scandals of various dimensions are not reported in the media. Journalists write one-sided stories. Some journalists do not attend assignments due to the many beats assigned to them and thus syndicated stories litter the pages of most newspapers. Sometimes, when one reads a news item in one newspaper, there is no need to read the other papers, since they contain virtually the same story line, except for the introductory part and the headlines. This is because most newspapers hardly make any funds available for thorough investigation, as well as for follow-ups of the stories already reported in the media.

The situation is further compounded by the fact that most of the programmes on the electronic stations are usually devoted to commercial news, sponsored religious programmes and music programmes. Programmes that educate citizens on their rights, and that encourage active participation in the day-to-day affairs of the state, are hardly given enough air time. The way forward for the Nigerian media is to pay close attention to how media organisations in the developed countries respond to these challenges, while, at the same time, ensuring that they make their newspapers more attractive by introducing interesting features/items, and cheaper products.

The data collected from the stakeholders demonstrated that the perspective of some of the literature reviewed in Chapter Two that demonstrates that the media plays a fundamental role in anti-corruption, without interrogating issues like the political and economic interests of the owners, has created a huge gap in the literature, which, of course, the data collected takes care off. For instance, the perceptible reality in the increasing relationship between the political and media elites is becoming threatening, not only to the anti-corruption drive, but to democracy and democratization. It is very true that media owners are part of the ruling political and economic elites in Nigeria, it is also true that such media organizations are deployed to serve a political party and other patronage interests that are, in most cases, against good governance. The advocacy role of the media has thus been greatly undermined by the ownership structure, which is dominated by the political class.

Against this backdrop, the argument, as reviewed in Chapter Two, that the media are known to be an agent of democratization, may not be wholly valid within the context and experience of Nigeria

and as provided by the significant stakeholder interviews. This again points to the perceptible fact that isolating the media from political interest is very difficult, if not impossible. This is because, the establishment of the media, irrespective of the demonstrated economic interests, in the act of creating them, is first of all a political act; hence, the theoretical argument put forward in Chapter Two, that the media can be insulated from political interests, is an illusion, an argument that was captured in the stakeholders' interviews.

The point is that the media are not just there to serve the political interests of their owners, but the economic interests of the media organization, by serving the political interests of others--for a fee. This is so because political and economic interests are ostensibly inseparable, and that is why the media are easily available for manipulation to serve a pecuniary goal. The consequence of this is the subordination of public to private interest, whether the media are owned by the public or are privately owned, depending on the nature of ruling elites and the configuration of power and what it is used to serve.

The further consequence is that democracy and democratization take a back seat, with negative consequences for transparency and accountability. The submissions from the various stakeholders interviewed for the study indicated that democracy has not helped the cause of accountability and transparency in Nigeria, and this is a further confirmation of the existing literature, which suggests that democracy may not after all provide a solution to the political and economic challenges being experienced by the citizens. It is true that democracy, in a practical sense, could promote democratic accountability, but this is in so far as the media are not seen to be manufacturing voices of dissent against the war on corruption. This position confirms the argument of scholars such as Pastor (1999), Sen (2009) and Schmitter and Karl (1991) on what democracy can and cannot achieve as highlighted in the literature review.

Again, the kind of social and economic conditions of democracy argued by Claude Ake, mentioned in Chapter Two, cannot even be said to exist without anti-corruption. If the media are said to be the watchdog of society while sitting as the fourth estate of the realm after the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature, it cannot negate the fundamental values of anti-corruption. This

position has been made clear by the significant numbers of stakeholders interviewed. On this note, the literature needs to take seriously the argument that it is a media that is professional, ethical, and known for its integrity that can promote the social and economic values of democracy through anti-corruption.

Following from this is the point that when the media are not pursuing investigative journalism, it is impossible to have a professional and problem-solving mission and vision in the media sector. The essence of being a watchdog is to impartially discharge the responsibility of investigating the wrong doings of those in authority who are capable of undermining democratic governance and accountability. What the stakeholder interviews have added to the existing literature is that when media organizations are not pursuing investigative journalism, they cannot be proactive and, consequently, the needed social sense of responsibility will not be there to serve the public good. This again brings us to the social responsibility theory of the media, reviewed in Chapter Two. Although it was acknowledged in the literature reviewed that the media should carry out corporate social responsibility, but in actual fact this corporate social responsibility is experienced in rare cases because of the challenges highlighted above.

In essence, the business model already introduced to the media sector is antithetical to the democratic and advocacy mandates of the media, as the market now dictates the operations of the media, which are influenced by the political economy theory. In addition, the media ownership structure, advertising, the poor state of the Nigerian economy, and mobile internet, have all combined effectively to destroy the traditional role of the established Nigerian media, thus turning them into a lapdog.

The Principal-Agent, Cultural, and Patron-Client models of corruption have also been useful in this study in providing an insight into why media practitioners indulge in corrupt and unethical conduct. Journalists engage in collecting bribes, which are tagged as the *brown envelope,* because chances of being punished remain very low. In fact, despite the public condemnation of the *brown envelope* by media managers, no single journalist has been punished for engaging in this unethical act in the entire history of Nigeria. *The Punch* and *Daily Trust* newspapers have inscriptions, which

are boldly written on each of their editions, advising members of the public not to give *brown envelopes* to their staff, yet those accused of engaging in the act have never been punished.

The Cultural Model contends that corruption can be explained by the culture of gifts. As such, members of the society, in their interactions with the media, are expected to provide some form of refreshment and parting gifts (usually cash) at public functions. Corruption is therefore fuelled by informal obligations and demands. These obligations are often fulfilled through corrupt enrichment. Moreover, the institution of accountability in the media sector is very weak, as members of the three professional bodies in the sector are said to be involved in corrupt acts.

Principal officials of the Nigerian Guide of Editors (NGE), the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) have not sanctioned any erring member for allegedly violating their ethics. The culture of corruption within the media industry can be described as being a decentralised form, as well as a norm, as every cadre of the sector seemed to be involved- (editors, news editors, heads of desks and beat correspondents, etc.) This confirms the assumption of the proponents of the Principal-Agent Model, as argued in the literature review section, discussed in Chapter Two of this study.

This study also deployed the Patron-Client Model because a typical Nigerian journalist is faced with a lot of financial pressure from family, clan, hometown and ethnic constituencies. Cases abound where journalists are not paid their salaries and allowances for a relatively long time of as much as 12 months, yet they have to provide for their immediate family needs and meet other social obligations, hence, they resort to unethical behaviour to survive. This alliance between the political class and the media practitioners validates the Patron-Client Model, which says two unequal parties perform obligations to each other that are mutually beneficial.

The corrupt and unethical acts in the media industry are further compounded by the absence of state welfare programmes. Journalists, as citizens, are thus forced to rely on politicians and bureaucrats to provide some basic social facilities, which then engenders informal obligations and thus this practice is now at the heart of politics in Nigeria. As Femi-Soyinka also notes, because

"corruption is well tolerated in Nigeria, you cannot expect the media men, as members of the society to be different" (Personal interview, 2014). What Femi-Soyinka said, in essence, is that the level of corruption within the media is a reflection of what is happening in the greater society.

Due to failure on the part of the owners of media houses to pay a living wage, and to pay the salaries of their staff promptly, there are the solidarity networks which seem to justify collecting the *brown envelope,* instead of attracting advertising to the media houses. The unethical conducts of scores of journalists, then, contributes in no small measure to the decline in the revenue profile of their organisations. Findings have thus justified the Political Economy Theory, along with the Principal-Agent, Cultural and Patron-Client Models that were deployed in this study.

## 7. 8 Salient Findings of the Study

This study has investigated the role of the media in the anti-corruption efforts under the democratically elected government in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015. Five research questions were used for this purpose.

The First Research Question, directed at 25 stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector, sought to know how the agencies, notably, ICPC, EFCC and the CCB, use the media in their campaigns. It was discovered that the agencies have not effectively deployed the power of the media in carrying out their statutory mandates of fighting corruption and other social vices in Nigeria since 1999. It was obvious that, during the period under review, gross under-funding of the agencies did not help in encouraging their proper usage of the media. Two of the agencies, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Code of Conduct Bureau, suffered inadequate funding which affected their media engagement. However, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) did not complain about inadequate funding, because the agency secured a lot of funds from development partners, such as UNODC and the World Bank.

Furthermore, constitutional provisions appear to have prevented the ICPC from involving the media in its investigative activities. Section 27 of the ICPC Act 2000, forbids the agency from engaging in media activities, in any matter before it, until *a prima facie* case has been established. In specific terms, Section 27 Sub-Section 4 stipulates:

A report made under sub-section (1) of this section shall not be disclosed by any person to any person other than officers of the Commission or the Attorney-General until the accused person has been arrested or charged to court for an offence under this Act or any other written law arising from such report

This Section, invariably, prevents the ICPC from engaging the media in its investigatory activities. As Nwariaku notes, "ICPC does not use the media, because the agency will not want to assassinate anybody's character for nothing. ICPC investigates allegations thoroughly before making them public". On the other hand, EFCC treats the media "as an extension of its investigation department". This simply confirms the widely held view that the media are crucial to the anti-corruption campaign.

It was further discovered, in the course of the study, that there was no proper synergy between anti-corruption and the media in the anti-corruption campaigns; this is due to an ages-long suspicion which has continued between the media and the government agencies. As Ehirim (2014) rightly observes, "the government, right from the colonial era, has never seen the media as a partner in progress and, as such, the anti-corruption agencies, as appendages of government, seemed to have imbibed the practice, thus, the media are avoided as much as possible". This is affecting the advocacy role of the media as an agent of anti-corruption. In addition, the Nigerian Press is not fully backed by the Constitution. It only has the power to bark, and not the power to bite. Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution ought to be amended in such a manner as "to effectively mandate the media to hold public officials accountable". This lack of constitutional backing, this researcher believe, is preventing the media being proactive in the anti-corruption war. This situation is compounded by the failure of the Legislature to amend the enabling law setting up the three anti-corruption agencies. Several constitutional amendments have been proposed to the ICPC and EFCC laws, yet the National Assembly have declined to approve such amendments.

From the above, it is clear that a partially free press may not be a viable external control mechanism against corruption in society. It further validates the fact that the political will on the part of the State to provide adequate funds for the anti-graft war is crucial to any anti-corruption project.

The Second Research Question sought to discover the role of the mass media and other non-state actors in the anti-corruption drive. It was revealed that no anti-corruption project can succeed without the full support of the mass media. Findings from the interviews indicate that, due to the shrinking economy, the media and non-state actors cannot do much. For the mass media, the pursuit of profit has eroded their capacity to act as the watchdog of society.

The harsh economic reality in Nigeria, where millions of university graduates remain unemployed and many citizens live on less than $1.50 per day, is seriously affecting the media. The situation is so bad that many cannot afford to buy newspapers, thus giving impetus to the "free readers' association." At most newspaper stands, scores gather in the morning to read newspapers free, rather than buying them. Those gainfully employed can hardly feed their families, not to speak of buying newspapers, as their salaries cannot "take them home". A corollary to this is the fact that the reading culture among Nigerian youths appeared to be dying. They seem to prefer "pinging or chatting" on their mobile devices to newspaper reading. This has partly reduced the sales of newspapers. At the same time, advertising is declining because many companies are collapsing.

All these conditions make the mass media less committed to democratic accountability, thus weakening the fulfilment of their watchdog function, and stopping them from acting as the true Fourth Estate of the Realm in society. The end result is that the media that are supposed to be the main barrier to the abuses of power by those who exercise power, as postulated by Keane (1994:175), are also implicated in corruption and other abuses of power. This is reflected in the way politicians and civil servants who are accused of corrupt acts, still enjoy positive media coverage, both in the print and the electronic media.

The exigencies of the market and the pursuit of profit have forced the media to abandon their social responsibility to the society. The social responsibility of the media in helping the anti-graft drive is zero in Nigeria. In Hong-Kong, for instance, anti-corruption advertorials, press releases, announcements and jingles, are not paid for. The media organisations carry such messages without cost, because they consider them to be their contribution to the national anti-corruption drive.

The non-existence of active and viable civil society groups has failed to checkmate the drift of the media towards being a lapdog, for economic reasons. This study therefore believes that the lack of viable and active non-state actors remains a major challenge to the anti-corruption war in Nigeria.

Research Question Three examined the role that journalists perceive for themselves in the anti-corruption drive and, by extension, what has been the major impediment to their work. It was revealed that during the course of this study their role was critical to the anti-graft war. All of the journalists interviewed agreed that they have a definitive role to expose the corruption of those in positions of authority and, in the process, to help in promoting transparency in society, but due to the level of corruption among journalists, it has been difficult to perform their roles as expected. Incidences of *brown envelopes* are a daily occurrence among media personnel. Adesina (2014) argues that when the "society is very permissive, expect the brown envelope syndrome to be pervasive".

Allied to this is the fact that many of the journalists lack proper training. Many editors and journalists are not aware of their sacred duty as enshrined in the Constitution. Most of them are not properly trained to know that their own calling is different from other professions in society. Newspaper owners and managers hardly ever organise induction and re-orientation courses for their staff to educate them about their expectations in relation to their duties. They make up for this by learning from their colleagues on the beat.

Most media personnel are poorly paid, and they are sometimes owed salaries for periods of time ranging from three months to one year. The advent of capitalism and globalisation has so changed the media landscape of the country that only the rich, dominated by the political and business class, can own and operate the media in Nigeria. These rich media owners prefer flamboyant lives without paying the salaries and allowances of their staff, and so, staff members may resort to other sources of income to cater for their family needs.

Some publishers deliberately encourage corruption among their workers by simply telling them that their Identity Cards serve as their meal tickets to getting whatever they want. Furthermore,

most of the publishers use their newspapers to cover up scandals, so publishing corruption-related stories remains a no-go-area for the journalists working in such media houses. Most politicians/ businessmen set up newspaper outfits to solicit for contracts and other favours from the government, so any reporter who refuses to follow the dictates of his employer, risks losing his/her job. This situation is compounded by the various unethical practices in almost all the media houses, as editors and managers usually organise political awards, corporate awards and commercial views, for people of "*questionable characters*".

Some newspaper editors serve as media consultants to politicians and political parties. Three editors of Lagos based newspapers, for instance, were reported to be members of the strategic committee of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Censorship, Street (2001: 104-105) argued, is the most obvious form of state control. He noted, however, that self-censorship has proved to be a much more common, pervasive and insidious form of control. Self-censorship is very rampant among newspaper editors in the country, as they pander to the interests of owners and advertisers- an action that has eroded the vertical accountability of media practitioners.

In Nigeria, most of the media are privately–owned, the exigencies of the market and profit considerations usually override professional decisions. There is thus ample evidence from the interviews that the media have been dismally ineffective in holding political office holders accountable. The four newspapers analysed for the study pursued different agendas in their coverage of the two case studies.

Also in Nigeria, the practice of newspaper reports is to inform readers without setting an agenda for them. Most of the stories follow a sensationalist tone. The former Minister of Aviation, Stella Oudh, for instance, who was forced out of government for allegedly using N225 million to purchase two cars, was also given the Imo South senatorial ticket on the platform of the PDP, and the media did not highlight this issue because she gave them adverts and commercial news.

The Nigerian media appear to be like the developed/under-developed approach to modernisation, as postulated by Bill Siffin. Utomi (2014)) noted that under-developed media are characterised by

low social values, the limited education of journalists, the poor economic structure of the media (which are not profitable enough to pay journalists well), and the failure of the media owners to provide the right tools for the work. This, he describes as bazaar media. The developed media, on the other hand, are more sophisticated, more responsive to stakeholders, and more focused on the common good. These are the canteen media. As Utomi (2014) asserts, the Nigerian Press is closer to a bazaar than to the canteen end of the spectrum. Invariably, this study infers that the more the country experiences "civilian rule", the more the corruption increases on all tiers of government in Nigeria, including the media. Furthermore, the joint pursuit of economic and political reforms has provided a fertile ground for corruption in Nigeria.

Research Question Four examined the impact of the growing linkage between the media class and the political class in Nigeria's anti-corruption drive. Following the change in the socio-political and economic landscape of Nigeria, more and more businessmen and politicians have gone into the newspaper business, not for the public good, but to protect their political and economic interests. The situation is such that politicians, accused of corruption, have pocketed the media and they use them to launder their image. These newspapers are not only biased in their reportage of corruption involving their sponsors, they are used in defence of the accused persons. Ayoola justifies this line of reasoning, and said "who pays the piper dictates the tune. If I own a media house and I belong to a particular political party, I am likely to sack the Editor–in-Chief who sees himself differently, even if he is telling the truth".

The absence of an active newspaper regulatory body that lists and separates out the interests of the owner from the running policy of the media houses, remains a challenge. The growing interest of politicians to own newspapers is casting serious doubt on the capacity of the media to report and defend the truth in Nigeria. Olatunji (2012) notes that "any time the interest of the politicians is at variance with the interest of the public, the interest of the politicians will override".

Indeed, the truth is sacrificed for political exigencies and the free market, as media owners lobby for appointment into key government bodies. The owner of the Silverbird Television Station served on the Board of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) while, at the same time, the

Chairman of *Punch* Newspapers also served on two federal Boards. Their appointments onto the Boards was later reflected in the way these media houses reported government activities, while their tenure lasted.

The acceptance of political appointment by newspaper publishers has led to the large turnover of editors and the increased job insecurity of other editorial staff within the industry. Consequently, media practitioners spend quality time trying to secure a better future, instead of focusing on their jobs. So, some move from one politician to another, soliciting various forms of patronage from state officials. This encourages corruption, as they confer a positive status on those they should be exposing. Otufodunrin (2014) opines that monitoring organisations should therefore ensure strict compliance with codes of ethics for both broadcast and print media houses.

The linkage between the media and the political class constitutes a serious threat to the independence of the media. This study thus concludes that a free press that exists in a nation is not an indication that the media's capacity to function as a watchdog of society cannot be eroded by the socio-political and economic climates of the State. Based on the 2015 annual ranking of Freedom House, Nigeria's media were regarded as being partially free; yet, the media failed to perform their vertical accountability role in the country.

The media cannot perform its democratic accountability role without the active support of all of the elements of the horizontal accountability subsumed as the Executive, Judiciary, Legislature and the political/business class. The Nigerian media continue to reflect the political coloration of the State, (Siebert et al, 1963). Contrary to the views expressed by Soyinka and Nwolise (personal interviews 2013), democratic government in Nigeria did not guarantee transparency and media freedom within the period covered by this study.

Research Question Five explored the impact of democracy on transparency in Nigeria since 1999. There is a consensus of opinion among the 25 stakeholders interviewed that the democratic administrations in Nigeria in the last 15 years, have not impacted positively on the level of transparency and accountability in the country.

Although, Nigeria held elections in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, the situation in the country cannot be described as democratic, as the liberal theorists would want us to believe. The Nigerian democratic situation could be likened to what Nyamnjoh (2005: 24) calls "face-powder democracy", or what Dahl (1991) describes as a polyarchy. It has been observed that periodic elections in Nigeria have only seen the reward of failed politicians with re-elections across the board. It was also revealed that Nigeria is only experiencing civilian rule and not a democratic government. As Olatunji (203) noted, "in a democracy, corruption is fought, in a democracy, people are free to speak, but the reverse is the case now."

Onumah posited that what democracy has done in Nigeria in the last 15 years, is that "it has legitimised barefaced banditry". He describes Nigerian leaders as modern day buccaneers, "who grab with their hands, shoot and kill anything around them, and appropriate to themselves." It was further revealed that 15 years of the democratic experiment has only worsened the economic well-being of an average Nigerian.

The poverty rate, Onumah asserts "is shooting off the roof." Invariably, this confirms the argument of Sen (2009), Schmitter and Karl (2009), and Pinkey (2003), that democracy may not necessarily lead to economic growth and development. Fagbola (2013) argues that "it is not democracy that gives birth to development, rather, development gives birth to true and genuine democracy". Indeed, Nwariaku notes that "the gap between the rich and the poor in Nigeria is still very wide." The living conditions of millions of Nigerians remain bad, as they live on $1.50 dollar per day (Burleigh, 2013). The Global Prosperity Index, released on Monday, 2nd November, 2015, ranked Nigeria's prosperity as 125th of the 142 countries surveyed, and 26th of 54 states in Africa. The UK-based Legatum Institute describes prosperity as more than just the accumulation of material wealth. "It is also the joy of everyday life and the prospect of an even better life in the future". The Prosperity Index is the only global measurement of prosperity that is based on both income and well-being. "It is the most comprehensive tool of its kind and is the definitive measure of global progress" (The Legatum Prosperity Index 2015).

After 15 years of democratic government, Nigeria's performance in the 2014 Prosperity Index is poor in all the eight sub-indices used in the survey. It came 97th in Economy; 114th in Entrepreneurship and Opportunity; 120th in Governance; 123rd in Education; 132nd in Health; 137th in Safety and Security; 106th in Personal Freedom; and 108th in Social Capital. This ranking further confirms the findings of this study (www.li.com, accessed on Tuesday, 3rd November, 2015).

It was discovered that what has changed in the last 15 years is that "we no longer have people in khaki calling the shots at the three tiers of government (federal, state and local councils); we now have those people wearing *Agbada,* and other traditional dresses, directing the affairs of the nation" (Olatunji 2012, interview). One major feature of the democratic regime is that elections are massively and brazenly rigged. The use of money and "freebees" by politicians to buy their mandate, is on the increase. This is a serious challenge to the consolidation of the democratic ethos, and it undermines the vertical accountability of the citizens. There is no internal democracy in all the registered political parties because candidates are imposed on them by godfathers.

During elections, the electorate sell their votes to politicians and refrain from questioning their representatives on the utilisation of resources. The concept of *stomach infrastructure*, where voters are induced with rice and other food items, is now part of the political lexicon in Nigeria. As extreme poverty pervades the land, citizens negate their inalienable right under a democratic regime, the media and other non-state actors are expected to act as their guardian, but fail in their duties. Erubami (2012) argued that the kind of democracy being practised in Nigeria cannot help the cause of the anti-corruption campaign as the rule of law, which is one of the pillars of democratic government, is non-existent. Nwolise said that Nigeria has yet to practice true democracy, saying that most Nigerian political leaders behave as the master of the people, whereas, under a truly democratic regime, a leader is the servant of his people.

Furthermore, the security challenges posed by the menace of Boko Haram further validate the argument of Sen that democracy may not provide solutions to the social and political problems of a state. The challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency suggest a disconnection between democracy and the citizens of the affected states in Northern Nigeria.

The concept of liberal democracy, as practised in the West, cannot be wholly embraced in Sub-Saharan states, because globalisation has yet to eradicate the communal nature of the African states. The egalitarian and communal nature of Africans is in sharp contrast to the individualism that is inherent in most Western societies. There is the need to revisit the concept of electoral democracy as a panacea for the socio-political and economic challenges confronting Africa.

## 7. 9 Summary

The findings arising from the above discourse indicate that the contributions of the media (especially the print media) to the anti-corruption crusade have been mixed. The findings addressed the five research questions of this thesis. This analysis also explained that issues of media accountability, media ownership, and the economic/political interests of media practitioners, remain a challenge in a civilian administration, such as that in Nigeria. The end result is that democratic accountability has been abused by the media. The biased and one sided news reporting on corruption and other social vices that has filled the pages of the four newspapers analysed for this study has indicated that the media are not passing the correct messages, ones based on integrity and transparency, to the citizens, in gross violation of the sacred duty of the mass media as watchdog of democracy.

This chapter also provides a summary of the findings based on the research questions raised in this study. The thrust of the argument is that the media is receding to take on a lapdog position, rather than being a watchdog, which could be described as the Fourth Estate of the Realm in Nigeria. It is clear from the summary of the interviews and the analyses of the newspapers that the media are grossly implicated in the culture of corruption in Nigeria. The ownership structure of the media, the poor economic state of Nigeria, the unethical behaviour of media practitioners, and the declining revenue of media houses, resonate across the analyses and interviews in this study. The influence of the media in promoting the culture of accountability under a democratic government in Nigeria, therefore appears to be waning.

The diverse views expressed by the 25 stakeholders interviewed for this research reflect the general socio-economic discourse of the people. The triangulation method deployed has been useful in

fulfilling the objective of the study, as the data generated have been useful in analysing the vertical accountability role of both the media and other non-state actors in a democratic setting. Moreover, the findings of the study affirm the need to revisit some theoretical postulations in view of the emerging social, cultural, political and economic challenges of the globalised world. A partially free press and democracy may not necessarily help the cause of an anti-corruption struggle, nor engender the culture of transparency that is required for the consolidation of democracy. There is adequate evidence to show, in this study, that the Political Economy Theory is crucial to the analysis of the mass media in Nigeria. In addition, the Cultural Theory, Principal Agent and Patron-Client models remain very useful in investigating the anti-corruption drive in Nigeria. This study further justifies the usefulness of the Political Economy Theory in analysing the media. It also offers useful insights into how the universal generalisation of concepts must be revisited by scholars. The socio-political, economic and cultural factors of individual nations must be taken into consideration before a concept can be used to analyse events.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 8. 1    Areas of Future Research

This study should be replicated in other African countries to see how the media are helping the cause of anti-corruption campaigns and to assess the media's democratic accountability function in such societies. This will broaden the scope of media knowledge in Africa, and will provide a basis for comparison. A study should also be carried out on the mode of economic system that is suitable for the African media sector. This could provide useful information on how the media can operate, untainted, in a collapsed culture, where corruption and the abuse of power are systemic. This study has established that the free market media theory is antithetical to the consolidation of the media's democratic ethos in Nigeria.

In addition, a study should be carried out to explore the existing media systems and the policies which allow the media to make money from the internet and the mobile telephone, as in other climes. This will help to solve the impoverishment of the media and their propensity to corruption. Since this study focused mainly on the print media, it will add to the body of knowledge if a similar study is carried out on the electronics sector, most especially in view of the fact that the ownership structure in the electronic media industry, is evenly shared between the government and private individuals.

Furthermore, the research design deployed in this study is largely qualitative. A quantitative method might be used for the same study. Alternatively, a combination of the two approaches might be deployed for such a study. This may expand the existing scope of knowledge on the Nigerian media and other non-state actors.

### 8.2    Weaknesses

The option of deploying other theoretical approaches to address the central questions of this study, such as using the Agenda-Setting Theory and its status conferral function, might have added more impetus to the work. However, a careful analysis of the theory revealed that it falls short in addressing the challenges of the free market media world, where ownership structure, government

policies and economic climates are critical factors in analysing the media. The Agenda -Setting Theory has suffered heavy criticism, thus, its usefulness in analysing social issues is in doubt. The Political Economy Theory, and its variant models of Critical Political Economy Theory, were found to be more useful and relevant to the research work. The study also could not explore the "Four theories" of Siebert et al (1963) in detail, because of the criticisms that are highlighted in the literature review, and I believe that the *Four Theories* might probably have added more strength to the study. This is not to say that the study's failure to deploy these approaches has negatively impacted on the findings.

Additionally, the newspaper sample size used for the study could have been larger if the 15 years' period covered by the study is to be taken into consideration. This inadequacy has been compensated for by the triangulation methods of archival research, the content narrative of some newspapers and the critical discourse analysis adopted for the study. The outcomes and findings of the study have not in any way been undermined by this. Though the study is largely qualitative, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches would have added value.

## 8.3    Original Contribution to Knowledge

There is evidence in this study to show that the media play a crucial role in transitional democracies, such as Nigeria. In the democratic accountability of the media, this thesis has established that a free market media system is antithetical to the consolidation of the democratic ethos and the promotion of the culture of transparency in Nigeria. What has emerged from the study is that the media cannot carry out their vertical accountability role in society in a collapsed culture where corruption is both systemic and endemic. A partially free press may not be able to function as an external control mechanism on corruption and other social abuses.

The key finding that this thesis has put forward is that the universal generalization of the concepts of democracy and press freedom as a panacea to solving the socio-economic and political problems of modern states, needs to be revisited in view of the challenges and contradictions following the inception of democratic rule in Africa. Specifically, this study has provided empirical findings to show that if a concept is universal, this does not in any way suggest that its consequences would be consistent or predictable. Local conditions can challenge universal assumptions. It is clear that

a distinction needs to be made between the types of press that can help the cause of an anti-corruption drive. A press may be free, but still compromised and implicated in corruption, as revealed in this study. The outcome of the study, has added to the knowledge about how to investigate the relevant social phenomenon, since it relates to the capacity of the media as the watchdog of a society.

This research has also filled the gap in the literature on why Nigeria (both in reality and in perception) still remains a corruption-ridden nation, in-spite of the exposure of corruption by the Press. It is clear that the Nigerian media has receded to become a lapdog. The findings of the study have contributed to knowledge and scholarship, not only about how the media can be deployed for the anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria, but it has also offered useful hints about African democratic culture. The qualitative analysis and oral tradition approach that are adopted in this study may be useful to other, future researchers who are interested in studying the media and civil society organizations in Nigeria, Africa, and beyond.

## 8.4    Concluding Reflections and Conclusion

For the media, striking a balance between serving the public good and pursuing profit is an on-going debate, and will continue to attract the attention of media scholars for years to come. It is clear from this thesis that privately-owned media may not hold the key to the consolidation of democracy nor guarantee the watchdog function of the media in society. The present Nigerian media have become a tool in the hands of the powerful and the rich.

This study thus proposes that some measures ought to be put in place to address the challenges facing the media in the course of their constitutional duties in the society. First, an instrument must be put in place to ensure the large spread of the media ownership structure is in the hands of core media professionals, rather than the present situation, where almost 100 percent of the print media are in the control of politicians and businessmen. There is an urgent need for the media professionals to unite and establish a joint newspaper that will promote ethics and professionalism and that will carry out the democratic accountability function and engender the culture of transparency, which is an essential pillar of democratic government.

It is only professionally managed media that can demand accountability from those in positions of authority. A publicly quoted media outfit, as in the case of the old *Daily Times* newspapers (Nigeria), where members of the public can subscribe as shareholders, should be set up by the media practitioners, particularly, the veteran ones in the country. Moreover, government at all levels in the country should consider the payment of a subsidy to the media within their domains. This is in line with the position for which Hallin and Mancini (2004) canvassed, as well as the practices in some of the advanced democracies, for instance, in the United Kingdom, United States of America, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and others. Indeed, Schweizer and his colleagues, in their 2014 Media Policy Brief, supported public funding for private and independent media as part of measures to strengthen media operations in society. Furthermore, it will not be out of place if state and private organisations in Nigeria, and in other African states, can set up an endowment fund to cater for the growing financial needs of the media. Similar bodies exist in Europe, with the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy Centre for International Media Assistance.

Second, Nigerians must show the willingness and capacity to vote out corrupt politicians from office, because it is only when the state is well run that the economy can grow and can create the enabling environment for the media to function credibly. The present harsh economic situation is hampering the media from vertical accountability and from being the "*Fourth estate of the realm*". The poor economic situation is depleting the revenue base of most newspapers, as advertisements and sales decline. It is when the economic base of the media organization is virile that the modern tools for investigative stories and, in the process, the culture of follow-up of stories, will be resuscitated in the industry. The salaries and allowances of media practitioners will be both regular and paid. The era of journalists being owed three months to one-year of salary will stop. All these will reduce the menace of corruption among the media practitioners. It is only a well-paid journalist who can act as an agent of change and overcome the temptation of the *brown envelope* in society. When motivated, the incidences of unethical and unprofessional conduct in the sector will be reduced.

Third, there is a need for the regulatory agencies and professional bodies within the media industry to ensure that the code of conduct for both the electronic and print media are fully observed by the media owners. Adequate sanctions should be meted to those found contravening the ethics of the profession. Those found collecting and demanding the *brown envelope* should not be treated with kid gloves, as this contributes to the high incidence of corruption among the media professionals. The Nigerian Guide of Editors, (NGE), the Nigerian Union of Journalists, (NUJ), and the Newspaper Proprietors' Association of Nigeria (NPAN) should take a more pro-active interest in cleansing the media industry

Moreover, civil society groups and professional bodies, such as the Nigerian Labour Congress and the Nigerian Bar Association, should establish their own media to serve the public, thereby enthroning the culture of accountability in society. The training and re-training of media practitioners should be given adequate priority, so that the editors and managers can manage their media outfits both efficiently and effectively.

Finally, there is the need for a proper synergy between the media and the anti-corruption agencies in the country. To consolidate this synergy, the National Assembly should effect the relevant amendments that are forwarded to it by the anti-corruption agencies. I believe Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be amended, while Section 27, Sub-Section 4 of the ICPC Act 2000, should be repealed and replaced with a specific provision which allows the anti-corruption agency to further engage the media in its investigative activities.

It is pertinent to state that, in-spite of the challenges mentioned above, the media remain a viable instrument of information about events in society. The media provide adequate information in sports, entertainment, economic issues and politics/governance. This is reflected in the space allocated to these areas in the newspapers that are surveyed in this study. The importance of the print media in Nigeria is further reflected in newspaper reviews, which usually feature on the morning belts of most of the electronic media.

These newspaper reviews by the radio and television stations can be likened to the concept of the public sphere postulated by Jurgen Habermas (1989), because the Stations provide an environment in which citizens can interact and possibly air their views on the affairs of their society. For instance, *Nigerian Inform* FM radio station, on frequency 95.1, based in Abuja, allows listeners to comment on newspaper reviews on a daily basis from 6.30 a.m. to 7a.m.

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**Appendix I**
**A breakdown of the list of prospective interviewees follows:**

**(1) Anti-corruption Crusaders**: These are principal staff or heads of foremost anti-corruption agencies in the country. Their role as implementers of the various anti-corruption laws is critical. Therefore, their views are crucial to this study. Six stakeholders were interviewed in this category of anti-corruption stakeholders in Nigeria:

1. Justice Mustapha A. Akanbi-Pioneer Chairman of ICPC

2. Justice Emmanuel Ayoola- Immediate past Chairman of ICPC;

3. Dame (Mrs.) Julie Nwariaku- Member of ICPC Board and also, African Union- AU Commission on Anti-Corruption;

4. Dr (Mrs) Uyim Akapbio, Consultant of Ethics and Anti-corruption and Former, Director, Education Advisory Services-Code of Conduct Bureau;

5. Mr. Chido Onumah, Former, Head, Fix Nigeria Initiative of the EFCC; and

6. Hassan Salihu, Assistant Superintendent with the ICPC.

**(2) Members of the Non-State Actors:** This category includes members of the other non-state actors. They are not members of the state, that is, they are neither in the Executive, Judiciary nor Legislature. They belong to the third sector of the economy and their individual opinion on how state is governed is crucial. They possess enormous powers on the activities of their community.

1. Mallam Yusuf Ali- (SAN) Chairman, Anti-Corruption Commission of the Nigerian Bar Association NBA;

2. Prof. Femi Soyinka-Retired Academia and President of NELA, Ibadan, Nigeria;

3. Comrade Moshood Erubami- Former Chairman, Campaign for Democracy (CD);

4. Comrade Promise Adewusi, Deputy President, Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC);

5. Bishop Bolanle Gbonigi-retired Bishop of Anglican Communion Nigeria;

6. Mrs. Evelyn Ugbogu National Coordinator, Child Education and Crime Eradication Foundation; and

7. Prof Wande Abimbola- Retired University Don and Traditional Practitioner.

**(3) Political Class:** These are people who had served in public offices. Their experience and inputs into how state affairs are conducted is very important. They include:

1. Chief Olu Falae, Former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF)

2. Dr Onaolapo Soleye, Former, Finance Minister, under Gen. Mohammed Buhari's Administration

3. Prof. A. B. C Nwolise, Political Scientist and Head of Department, Political Sciences, University of Ibadan

**(4) The Media Sector:** These are those who ply their trade in the media industry. Their day to day experience is crucial to this study and by extension, in the anti-corruption campaigns in the country.

1 Dr Segun Olatunji- Former MD/ Editor-in-Chief of Nigerian Tribune and now Director of the Newspapers;

2 Mr Femi Adesina- Now, Senior Special Assistant to President Mohammed Buhari; and Presidents, Nigerian Guide of Editors (NGE)

3   Mr Chuks Ehirim-Chairman, Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) Abuja Council;

4 Mr Kunle Oderemi-Head, Political Desk, Nigerian Tribune Newspaper;

5   One senior staff member of NBC (name withheld);

6 Mr Felix Adenaike, Veteran Journalist, former Editor-in-Chief of *Nigerian Tribune*;

7 Mr Simon Kolawole, The Publisher of *Cabl*e Online Newspaper;

8 Mr Olalere Fagboola, Former Bureau Chief of *Punch* Newspapers, South-West Region;

9 Mr Lekan Otufundorin, National Coordinator, Journalists for Christ and Online Editor, t*he Nation* Newspapers.

10. Dele Oguntayo- Former, News Editor, *The Nation* Newspaper

**Appendix II**

INTERVIEW WITH NWARIAKU ICPC

Q. **Good afternoon, can i meet you Madam?**

A. I think you know me already, but my name is Julie Nne Onum Nwariaku. I am a second term board member; no we don't say board member, second term executive member of the ICPC.

Q. **So apart from that position in ICPC have you ever served in any capacity within Nigeria or outside Nigeria?**

A. Well, I was in the civil service and I ended my career as a Permanent Secretary, many years ago over twenty years ago or more and when Abia state was created, I was both Commissioner and the Permanent Secretary, for Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. I set up the Ministry of Economic Development and I had held very strategic positions as Permanent Secretary in strategic ministries; Ministries of Education, Land, Commerce and Industry and Finance. Then, when I finished with civil service I was the Executive Director of a bank though the bank has ceased to exist, Progress bank of Nigeria. I was Chairman and member of many corporations. I was the Chairman of the Abia state Broadcasting Corporation. I was a member of the Abia Glass

Industries ltd and quite a number of others. Then my work with the anti-corruption organisation, I was elected by African Head of States as a member of the African Union advisory board on corruption representing Nigeria and in fact, at some stage I was the Chairperson of that board. I am no longer the Chairperson but I am still on the board, my term will end next year because it is a two-year term subject to a maximum of two terms, I should be ending my term in the advisory board next year.

**Q. As one of the oldest member of the ICPC, how would you assess the usage of media by the anti-corruption agencies; the ICPC, EFCC, and CCB?**

A. Let me start with the ICPC. We fight shy of the media to a large extent we have not been using the media so much because we believe as an integrity organisation the Commission is chaired or headed by legal professional. The first two Chairmen, Akanbi was President of the Court of Appeal, Ayoola was a Supreme Court Justice. You know what is in the law, you do not want to publicise somebody's offence until you are sure , until you have evidence, concrete evidence, until it has been proven what is that proof. The proof is that the person has been charge to court and actually found guilty and convicted of the offence. So when I was discussing with justice Ayoola, at a stage I was worried about this very modest use of press and he said Dame supposing there is an allegation about somebody and you begin to investigate you have not concluded investigation the person has not been found guilty and you go and publicise it and eventually the person is not found guilty, you have destroyed that person's name because it won't be easy for you now to bring back that propagation you have made that the person was charge with so and so. So it is better to wait till you have convicted the person, then you can say what you then like. But you could of course use the press when somebody has been charged to court, you can just say this person has been charged to court for so offence, but it will be unfair on the bases of an allegation or a petition, you begin to go to town, go to press and say, so and so because even when he is discharged and acquitted and you go to press, people are not going to believe, they will say ah, one of those things, the man did this. So he said it is better to be patient, but you know some of the sister organisations, they do not have that kind of restrain because they are not lawyers, they are not judges. As far as they are concerned, if there is any allegation and as anti-corruption agency they must publish it, the people must get to know that there is an allegation against so and so. That is the difference between us. While others will just rush to the press, ICPC is more restrained because we believe in been thorough in these matters because somebody is image is involved, we do not want to assassinate somebody's character for nothing, so we are thorough and it takes us time. We believe in investigating the allegations very thoroughly before making it public.

**Q. So, from your experience do you envisage any specific role for the media and other non-state actor in the anti-corruption crusade idea, what I mean by non state actors are may be the civil society groups, the traditional institutions, the religious bodies! So what do you envisage, how can they assist in the fight against graft in Nigeria?**

A. The fight against corruption is every body's fight. The citizenry must be fully involved; everybody has a responsibility to fight corruption because in the final analysis the impacts of corruption on the economy rub off on everybody. Because when we say corruption, when are the people using their offices to access national wealth and making away with them, you are a head of hospital, you use the funds for running hospitals; you pocket it, or whatever. Everybody suffers from the impact of corruption since national wealth is been made away with by the individuals. The infrastructure or what we call the social amenities, the roads, electricity, public health and so on are not performing as optimally as suppose to perform because the funds meant for them are not fully applied to these things so if we all join hands in fighting corruption, of course we untie the resources, we bring back the resources, that are meant for facilities and then apply them to what they are meant for. So every individual has a responsibility to fight, and to fight corruption I always say start with the self. You the individual must live up to high moral ideals. I have the slogan corruption must stop starting with me. Begin to restrain yourself, begin to be more responsible with the people's resources that are at your disposal because every individual in Nigeria, even the beggar, his money is in the national revenue or national fund. Every individual, the taxes we pay go to that and nobody is happy that you are paying tax and it is been made away with by individual now. The non-governmental organisations or the civil society organisation also have a responsibility, to educate their members on integrity and values. The organisations themselves have values and I am sure they would not like to see their members been apprehended and imprisoned for corruption. That in itself will attack organisation. So every organisation has a responsibility if they are interested in seeing that their members live to the ideals of the profession. Civil society organisations yes if you have singled yourself a member of the civil society, if you have come together as a civil society organisation what you are saying is that you have come together, bind yourself together to defend the values, to defend the resources, to defend the integrity of the organisation. So that is why you see that members of the civil society organisation are the custodians of the people's values. So they are the eyes and the ears of the people. that is why you see them getting involved with organisation; finding out what organisations are doing, finding out how organisations are using their budget and finding out how the level of integrity is in organisations. You remember when we had the protest about fuel, some two or three years ago, it was the civil society organisations that championed the cause. They championed to say the fuel subsidy should not be removed, then they championed to say having removed it, how has it been utilized, they are very much interested in seeing how the revenue belonging to the people have been utilized. So all over the world, you have civil society organisations being champion of the cause of the people. They talk about standard of living of members of the society, of the grass-root. They talk about everything. So they also championed anti-corruption initiative. The United Nations recognised them. They have linkages all over the world. They do have their meeting and even the Africa Union (AU) recognises them too. Then when it comes to religious organisations, they are supposed to uphold the morals of society. And I remember when Arch-bishop John Onaiyekan came here to feature in the Chairman's Forum and I raised the issue and ask the

question, sir the churches are conferring knighthood on members but are the churches asking questions about how all these people they are conferring knighthood make their money or when they make huge donations to the churches then they are made knight. He said well if an individual think that they donating to the church or by being knighted that he is going to heaven that it not true this is just an organisation and it's a people. We cannot pretend that we know everything about the individual, yes of course we do ask questions, make inquires but the extent of our knowledge about the individual is limited but it is God that knows everything. We can ask a man question, drill him and he answers, we do not know whether it is true. He may decide to tell lies so the church cannot be held accountable for the action of the individual. The responsibility of the church is to give the message; to teach, to educate and to draw them on the path of integrity whether now they live up to it or not the church cannot be held accountable but they have a responsibility. Whether it is a church or a mosque, they preach to the people, point out the path; the right path to follow the right of truth, I do not think there is any religious organisation that mislead the people in telling them that this is right when it is not right except of course when you are thinking of these extremists like we are hearing about Al Qaeda, ISIS you know, saying killing people is right and all that. That is not what religious organisation stands for. They teach people how to be morally upright.

## Q. What of the traditional institution?

A. Aha that is another place where you have problems. People are being made chief here and there all over the place, they say people go and steal, I do not known but the general impression is that many people are getting is that those being titles do not merit it because of their behaviour, even some are being made traditional rulers by giving money to the community. That is unfortunate if it is really true that it is happening because the traditional stool is the traditional value of a community or society so when you make robber, thieves, traditional rulers, what are you saying, you have completely eroded the cultural integrity of the communities and that is not good for society and mark you, as you do all this, as you enthrone these people of questionable characters to position whether you knight them or whether you make them, I do not know what they make them, whether in the Muslim religion or whether you make them Chief of traditional rulers, the young people are seeing these things and it gives a very wrong signal to the young people because you even hear of cases where some children were asked what do you want to be when you grow up. They say I want to be a 419 as far as they are concerned 419 is the fasted way of making money they do not really understand what it is that is a wrong thing but they see those people that say they are 419 build mansion, have so many cars and are made chiefs, traditional rulers and they are say they want to be like them, thereby destroying the fundamental of our society. whether it is the church, whether it be civil society organisation we must all come together to fight corruption, because corruption had belittled and humiliated this county among comity of nations. But i think the situation is improving, a few years ago, it was so terrible all eyes were, you know people did not just hold Nigeria with any respect, it was not a good thing. You travel out and they say he's a Nigerian and you are searched so terribly. You know other nationals are allowed to pass but you

as a Nigerian you are almost stripped. People want to strip you and search you. So we must rebuild Nigeria, we must demonstrate that Nigeria is a country of integrity, of values and positive values.

**Q. I want to specifically ask you what of the political class have they associated in the fight against corruption?**

A. Well that is an area we have a problem all over the world, all over Africa, you will hear of governors even America been charged to court for corruption and actually been convicted and imprisoned. it happened in France, it happened in Italy and back home in Nigeria I am not saying the political class have done very well either, I will not say so. There is a terrible lack of political will to fight corruption it is a sad commentary but that is the situation and that because the political class try to comport themselves as if they are above the law, they do things as if they are above the law, even when they are charge to court or there are investigation going on against them they manipulate the process. The courts are not very forth coming fast enough; these matters are delayed and delayed well. You do not want to insinuate that there is political interference but it does not give the right signal. When people talk about political class, politically visible politicians, some of them behave as though they are above the law.

**Q. Ma, I want to know whether in your own estimation, our democratic experiment or government in the last 15years has impacted positively on the living standard of citizens.**

A. Yes I am glad you corrected it. It is no longer experiment, we are in it, we are trying very hard to fellow the principles of democracy and what are the principles. Openness, transparency, accountability. You must be accountable to people because if you are in government, if you have been elected a president or governor or member of the National Assembly or House of Assembly, it is the people and your loyalty must be to the people and therefore everything you do must be to the people and therefore everything you do must be focused on the interest of the people. It is debatable, standard of living, I think personally that standard of living has generally improved and that is firm believe, you see that many people, when everybody is carrying GSM (mobile phone). So many people owe cars of their own. I think that generally the standards have improved across board but may be when you are mindful of the fact the gap of the haves and the have not has not been bridged enough because as the masses, the standard of living is improving, the standard of living of those at the top is even improving, going higher and higher so we have not succeeded in narrowing the gap, the gap is still very wide between the rich and the poor but if you go to my village. For instance I do not see that abject poverty I used to see before, people looking almost not like human being people who cannot feed once, twice a day or three times, I cannot see it anymore. It is not there even the building, the houses they are building, they are now having many zinc roofed houses we are having many buildings. There are evidences people are dressing better. I see it but whether it has improved as it ought to have improved with the extent of our wealth as

a nation without oil money, I say no, it has not improved as it ought to improve but it has improved, the standard of living has improved, that is my conviction.

**Q. Finally ma, do you believe we can win the war against corruption do you think we can win it and what can we do win the battle?**

A. What do you mean by winning the war? What would you regard as having won the war?

**Q. From the available literature ma the incidences of corruption are on the increase?**

A. you see, I wanted you to explain what you mean because I think you have made the point reducing the level of corruption. Because if you say winning the war, is not eradicating corruption. It is not possible, there is nowhere in the world where there is no corruption. Everywhere, not even just in visible government, even in private businesses, even in homes, there is corruption. It is not possible, it is a part of human nature, some trait in humanity, people trying to cut corners, people try to take advantage of fellow human beings so that trait is always there. But can we reduce the level of corruption? Oh yes I believe very strongly that we can reduce the level and I believe we are moving towards there and I believe that corruption even at this stage in Nigeria is reducing. The brazenness is reducing, people now mindful that ICPC and other organisations and people are looking. We would say that ICPC is looking. It really means that people are mindful of that people are very careful of that, it is no longer so much business as usual; people know that we are looking, but there are number of factors that will help to reduce the level of corruption. Take for instance this thing we are doing, system study; we have been having interactive sessions with some MDAs where we have carried out system study. Part of the problem why there is corruption or part of the reason for corruption in government establishment is that the process themselves sometimes are so loose it gives people the opportunity to engage in corrupt practices. So in the system study we conduct, we look at the system, process to identify the ones that lend themselves to corruption exploitation, vulnerable system that encourage corruption loopholes that people exploit for corrupt practices. That is the essence of this system study, to strengthen the system and the processes, to reduce the loopholes, to block those system and process that can be exploited for corruption. So as you reduce those processes, you make it more difficult for public servant to engage in corrupt practices. Secondly as the laws generally, not only looking at the system itself but laws that are in place like the Financial Regulations, the Procurement Act, the Federal Character Commission, you see there are laws already in place, there is the ICPC law that puts in place that has identified what are corrupt practices and given penalties for them. As we try to enforce these laws because it is one thing to have these laws, it is another thing to enforce them but when people contravene these laws and nothing is done to them, you turn your eyes to it. It encourages impunity so you must enforce these laws and make sure that people who contravene these laws are penalised. In the law court, you hear the judges tell you there are so many loopholes they keep adjourning cases. The present Chief Justice has promised that she is going to block all these opportunities avenues for

which case are adjourned and I think she came up with policy, they are going to insist that corruption cases must be concluded within I think she said six months. These are the cases that can help curtail corruption. Then also you know what we are doing how we are building integrity studies into education. The Education Department will tell you more about it anyway. What we are doing about it including integrity studies into curriculum both at the primary, secondary and tertiary level that is we want what they say 'catch them young' we want to teach the young people about integrity, values we want to inculcate in them. The right values so that they themselves will know even if they are seeing their father, their parents doing these things, they will know that they are wrong. You know, it took us a long time to be where we are as far as corruption is concerned. It is not something we can fight to stop immediately. It will take some time, it took us quite some time to get to where we are so we will continue to fight corruption everybody all hands on deck we will continue to fight corruption applying all these processes, strategies I call them strategies. So as you know our own mandate, the ICPC has this mandate of preventing. Preventive is the key, if you can even prevent people engaging in corrupt practices you will have more than won half of the war. When you put that preventive measure and some people find a way of circumventing the preventive measure, then you catch them and then you deal with them. And then the education, it is an on-going thing; you must continue to go on at every opportunity, formally in schools, informally in home, religious organisations, society, professional bodies. So both informal and formal education, we must engage the people generally, the children especially in fighting corruption. So these are the strategies and I think and if we really are steadfast you will be surprised as I know we are already succeeding.

## 2. Mr Chido Onumah: Former Head, Fix Nigeria Initiative of the EFCC

Q.      **Please can we meet you?**

A.      My name is Chido Onumah. I'm a Journalist and an author, also currently a doctoral candidate at the autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain where I'm researching on digital newspapers in Africa.

Q.      **I understand you worked briefly with EFCC sometime ago?**

A.      Yes I worked with the EFCC. I joined the EFCC in September, 2006 and I left little over a year, to be specific at the end of December, 2007 of effective February, 2008 so I was there for about a year and six months. I was the head of the civil Society unit which was called Fix Nigeria Initiative. I learnt that since then it has gone through a lot of transformation in terms of

nomenclature at one time it was call Strategy and Re-Orientation Unit. Anyway I set up the unit prior to my joining in September 2006. They had a media and publicity unit but there wasn't really any interface with Civil Society not just to buy into the activities or programs of the commission but to become driving force. So in a sense even though there was tension and conflict between my unit and the media unit so to say but the idea was to actually look at the civil Society in a broad way including the media. We also believe that there was need to get the media engagement as one drivers of the anti-corruption process so the media engagement was part of which the people in media saw as an attempt to encroach their own field. Their responsibilities as people in media unit was that they were spokesperson for the commission and they were responsible for helping the society or the public through the media, understand what the commission was doing but also to paint the commission in a very positive light in public which was different from engaging the media properly terms of helping the media become active tools in the corruption process, so investigative journalism was a critical part of this public engagement. So the media was one part of the civil society engagement but the other part then was the public which we divided into different groups, so we had students including students in secondary schools, we had students in tertiary institutions, then we had the civil service which we realized and is still the same situation now as one of the major areas where corruption was really engraved so the civil service, public institutions an also the private sector, banks, the manufacturing concern and professionals generally.

These were the areas where we divided our work to just see how we can engage the critical sector of the society and see how we can partner with them to build the whole same anti-corruption process.

Q.     **Was the civil society willing to be part of your campaigns?**

A.     They were quite enthusiastic and I don't know why because by the time I joined in 2006, I think the commission had been in place for about three or four years and surprisingly there had not been any attempt to really reflect on the role of civil society which is quite important because at the end of the day, people who are corrupt have to deal with, they are from families, they are from communities, they are from states, etc. so it is the citizens in the states or communities and so on, who would be able to provide information about people who are corrupt or become whistle blowers

it is very important to get citizens along in the drive, it could be in churches, it could be in mosques and other religious setting. So when we introduced this process in 2006, people were more than willing and I remember vividly the launch in 2006. The labour was involved, every stratum of society, I think Adams Oshiomole who is now the Governor of Edo State was the president of the NLC, he was the special chairman of the occasion. Traditional rulers were involved. It was really a big event. People were concerned that corruption had taken its toll on the country and they were more than willing to contribute to the process and they felt elated that the commission considering the great job it was doing was actually reaching out to them. They saw themselves as part and parcel of the anti-corruption drive and we didn't have problem at all. It is quite unfortunate with the change of the government. Much of that has been eroded and really we've lost that steam. People are no longer keen and a lot of it has to do with how you assess or how you think about the commission. The kind of image the public has about the Commission will determine their enthusiasm and the level of engagement. So, to answer your question directly, yes! People were really interested. They were keen to work. We had Professors, Vice Chancellors, and other big shots in the society. Of course, we formed another committee, were called it interface, exchange, where we brought in Christian and Muslim leaders together. In fact, the head of CAN then – I don't know whether Makinde or so attended the event. The Sultan because of flight problems from Sokoto down to Abuja could not attend but that was how far we were able to draw the very big and mighty in society to come together. At each stage, each platform, the idea was to have a code of ethics that these leaders could pass on their members, associations, people and say this is how you should behave and this is what not just how to behave but also to help Nigeria understand that the depth of corruption and the damage that corruption, because there is also that lack of understanding in many place. The impact of corruption on the country: how to link corruption with the poor health delivery services, how to link corruption to the poor quality of education, the poor quality of graduates that we, for example the bad roads we have and untimely the accidents and deaths that occur on the road, it was very important for us to make that linkage between corruption not just making the linkage but helping people understand properly how linkage has played out. That was what we have in mind, in making this information for the different groups and associations in the country.

Q.      **What has happened from 2006 till now? Has there been any improvement?**

A.      Well, I don't know, this might come as a surprise since I left the commission, I haven't been a keen follower other that from the perspective of a columnist and writer. I write about what I see based on my interaction with people, based on report and so on. I'm no longer an insider; it will be about difficult to make a proper assessment in terms of what, but considering what is going on in social media and the press. I think there is a bit of disenchantment with the way the anti-corruption movement has operated in the last six, seven, perhaps eight years. People are no particularly enthusiastic but also part of the problem is the feeders from the government itself, the kind of things the action and in –action of government, so called body language of the government. We can be specific talk about the president himself, there is so many things that I have heard in the last five or six years that have not shown only the disinterest of the current administration in fighting corruption but also some level of incompetence in fighting corruption. We have seen cases where people who were convicted for all kinds of criminal acts bordering on financial, economic crimes have been pardoned and others have been elevated to high public office and so on. There have been cases of ministers under the present regime, who have been alleged to be involved in corrupt practices and so on, nothing has been done about them, so I think in its sense one can say Nigerians have really lost interest in both the regime and those who in a way are saddled with the responsibility of trying to deal with the situation. When I say situation I mean corruption and financial crimes and economic crimes.

Q.      **Sir there was this controversy of recent, on whether stealing is corruption or corruption is stealing, may I know from your perspective, there is any difference between stealing and corruption?**

A: I think that statement is quite unfortunate on the part of the government, the president this time around because it doesn't matter for a president to come out publicity to say, I mean stealing is a crime punishable by law, corruption is a crime punishable by law, so I just can't understand the reason behind the statement both are crimes but to help put this in proper perspective, of course they don't necessarily mean the same thing but one entails the other, so stealing does not entail corruption, so you could go and steal a goat or a cow which is a crime and punishable by the law of this country. That's not corruption, corruption entails stealing. Corruption means the misuse of

power to give yourself something you are not entitled to because of your position. So in a way, you are stealing. Corruption entails stealing. Stealing does not entail corruption but stealing of course is one of the different components of corruption. You could sign away contracts to your cronies, you may not benefit, so in essence, you may not have stolen but to have also through this act can be said to be corrupt because you signed away contact or lands to your cronies for your own. Invariably, you are benefiting from it one way or the other. I remember in 1995, when Abacha who was then the maximum leader of Nigeria, came out on his birthday anniversary, saying that he was fifty but he came out to say he felt like an eighty-year-old man and I remember talking about it with my editor then who said, look you have a story here, go and talk to clinical psychologist. I went to University of Lagos to Speak with the Professor in the department of the Psychology. He gave a proper insight for a fifty years old man to be thinking or feeling eighty and so on perhaps it's important for the media to get into the mind-set of the president in trying to understand why the present will public want to make a distinction between stealing and corruption and make a case for those not just making the distinction but making a case for those that the public accuse of being corrupt and say no they are corrupt, they are just stealing it could be a dangerous mind-set that would explain in the long term where we are heading to as country or what we should really expect from the leadership. Even if you are in government and you steal public fund, let's even throw away the word of corruption, do you have to be corrupt to be dealt with? If you steal public funds, if you steal your annual budget, if you divert it, is that not stealing? Is it not punishable? I mean, that also shows the level that Nigeria has sunken into the terms of the quality of leadership, in terms of the ideas that leaders throw up and the direction the country is going, you know, it's understandable therefore when you see many of the things whether you are talking about the president not declaring his assets. I mean he declared it as Vice President but much later he came out to say he was forced, because the president then Yar'Adua had declared his assets and I remember my organization the centre, we actually took him to court on the assets but we could not pursue the matter due to financial setback. When the lawyer whom we expected to handle the case started requesting, we had raised money privately to file the case in court, you know subsequently we were supposed to follow-up the hearings and all that but we didn't have money to pay the lawyer and we just left the case, but then we followed up at the level of the freedom of information Act. We actually wrote to the Code of Conduct Bureau to request the asset declaration

details of the president and the Code of Conduct of people, they didn't reply our letter and we could have gone to court if we had the resources but subsequently after that request was made the chair of the Code of Conduct came out publicly. Probably, in reference to our request I can't say but he made that statement after we had sent the request to say that the president was not obliged to make public his asset declaration which is true constitutionally but also there is an existing law which now says that people have the right to request for public officers. So if president is not obliged to make his declaration public, he is obliged to submit it to the Code of Conduct but the citizens of Nigeria can make request based on the new to say we want this; but nothing came out of it. We have to leave it at that.

**Q.** **I want to ask you direct questions on ICPC, EFCC and Code of Conduct. How would you assess their usage of the media?**

A. Well, I can speak for the EFCC because I worked there and in a way I've been following their activities because I still know a handful of the people there and I do think that perhaps that can be used as a pointer or an insight into what the others agencies you mentioned the ICPC and the Code of Conduct are doing with the media. I think when I was at the EFCC, the media was a very valuable and very important aspect of the work that the commission did because there was the realization that it will be really useless if at end of you didn't give the public a proper understanding of what the commission was doing, what the public itself needed to do, how about the commission and the public will synergize in terms of the fight against corruption but more importantly, the role of the media, not just reporting about the commission or informing the public about reporting corruption cases or informing the public about what's going on but how the media could work with the commission in terms of investigating cases of corruption. This is very important and we realize that very early in the process and I mentioned it earlier that one of the cardinal things we did as the civil society unit was to explain the role of the media in supporting the fight against corruption. So we worked with groups different from media groups like the Wole Soyinka Centre for investigative journalism. We supported journalists who were doing investigative work. At the end of the day, the EFCC work is also basically investigation and who is better to do this work than the media people. So we realize earlier that the media was a vital component of this work. We worked with the media, we supported organization, and we actually

had programs because we were getting a lot of funding which the commission didn't control. Unfortunately, not many people realized this and you know it's one of the criticisms of the commission. You had so much money, you ate so much money and so on and so forth but a lot of this money that came from the development partners UNDP, the UN and the UNODC for training of journalists, for training of lawyers were also because we worked well with the NBA and I remember a big conference we had in Abuja, by allowing the lawyers and the judges to come to the table and give us their take because lawyers and judges are capable of placing a lot of obstacles in the prosecution of corruption cases. The whole fight again corruption would lead to involving every section of the society and for us the media was important and we used it well. We used it effectively. The media was willing to work with our organization; they provided insight in some cases. Where we could not go directly because politically exposed people are involved, we get the media involved, give them the facts and aid them to investigate and report and bring it to the public so that could become a basis for the EFCC to move in. it was almost like we saw the media as an extension of the investigate unit of the Commission. As I said in some case, this is what we hear about the people, there are facts you can out more. We as EFCC we can't go and interview the person when we arrest him and you can't arrest somebody unless have something and by the time you try to arrest him the person may begin to make noise in the press. But the journalist they have the constitutional right, they can go and talk to people and once the facts are out in the public the EFCC can now say okay, I invite you for questioning and continue the investigation. So, that was how we worked. I don't know how much of that is done now.

**Q.        Were the journalists willing to play that role?**
A.      They were more than ready to play that role because we had already started some kind of partnership, we had invited into, to make them understand the role they would play and also how important that role was for the success of the anti-corruption thing both at the level of their own professional gathering like NUJ, NAWOJ, etc. it was a very interesting time because some of us, I mean myself and my immediate boss Dapo Olorunyomi who was the chief of staff of the commission. In fact, my joining the commission in 2006 was the first time I was coming back to Nigeria after I had left the country like 10 years earlier. So there was really this enthusiasm and

drive to do something but I think so much has changed with the removal of the chairman then and the coming of a different person who kind of relaxed so many of these.

Q: **In the course of interacting with the media, was there any particular impediment they complained while assisting your Commission then EFCC? Are there challenges that they faced in the course of carrying out their duties?**

A: Not really I don't remember because I think before my coming and before the setting up of the unit we had heard reports that the media that the Commission didn't have the access to the media. The reporter didn't have proper access to the Commission getting important response to issues but with my coming in and the creation of Fix Nigeria, we helped created internal synergy between the media and the EFCC media unit was still signing out press releases being the spokesperson of the commission but what happened was that I had a kind of working relationship with the executive chairman and this didn't go down well with a lot of the directors in the commission. People were like, you shouldn't go to Chairman directly, you have to pass through this person and that the Chairman will praise the work we are doing and sometimes he well calls every day we had an activity in the media, and anytime we did not have activity in the media he will call and say what is going on? What are you guys doing? So the media started relating with us more than the media department of the Commission. They participated in a lot of our programmes through which they got clarification. Sometimes they would come to me seek clarification and I had to in few occasions make some comments, but mostly, I represented the Chairman in a lot of things within and outside the country and I remember the Head of the Commission. It wasn't something I did deliberately, sometimes you go out and represent the Chairman and present paper, then the media will pick what they think is valuable for them from the paper but I don't remember, but we had a very good working relationship because as I said also we were not just saying who the media come to press conference, you give them like N10, 000 or N20,000 brown envelope. We thought that was not the way to go. So I thought that if you investigate a story, the commission will actually support you financially to investigate whatever you need to do is to come and brief us about your story so that way whatever you need in terms of facts and figures, the commission can supply you but commission can also facilitate that investigation. The commission gave out award to journalists for the work they are doing. Training of journalist in different aspect of reporting was also

encouraged training. Sometimes it took place in different parts of the country and those things were quite beneficial to them. So if for example, we are dealing with health reporters, we bring in experts who would help them in improving their writing skills but also people who teach them about investigating, how to understand what corruption in the health sector, where to look for or where to look at things like that, so that was the kind of synergy we had with the media then and it paid off greatly.

**Q: But sir there is this assertion in some quarters that even the media, the journalist, pressmen and their editors are implicated in some of these corrupt incidences they are talking about?**

A: Exactly, that is Nigeria for you; the media is an essential part of the society to a great extent. It is difficult to separate them. Even though they are expected to play a watchdog role, I think the media is an integral part of society so in a way whatever happens in the larger society, has a way of rubbing off in the media. A lot of their media homes are owned by politicians and even those that are owned by private businessmen they do not pay salaries and nobody hold them to accounts. Imagine having a family, you have to work for 3 or 6 months and no salaries. This practice is said to be very common in place like AIT, there was a time they were saying journalists who worked there for a whole year had not been paid and they all have homes in Abuja and some other prominent cities across the country and they drive some of best cars and they bring their cars to the office, and nobody ask question. So it almost looks like there is a tacit understanding that you have to find your way, that your meal ticket is not your salary but the ID you have, when I say it's not the job, you may not get paid as the end of the month. But you could use your ID as a meal ticket to getting what you want. I am not just being funny when i say that because I know that has been mentioned it. A lot of reference has been made to *Thisday Newspaper.* I have heard the stories told a million times by either reporter there or people that are close to reporters that Nduka Obeagbuna, the publisher of the newspapers wouldn't pay salary and people had gone to him and complained about salary and he will say young men why are you asking me about salaries when I have given you an ID Card, so there is an unwritten rule that you have to use what you have to get what you want.

**Q.     Do you believe that brown envelop is really affecting the anti-corruption war.**

A.      I think so, I still see it the media, the EFCC organize programmes for the media and still working with the media, I am not really an insider, I don't know how effective it is, but speaking broadly with what is happening in the country with the change in the media landscape, you know the media in this country and interestingly in what I am researching  on the dynamic are changing we used to have media pre-independence where the newspapers mainly that we had then were purposely out to even if they were used, they provided visibility for their owners or publishers, but they were mostly used as a platform for agitation to end colonial rule that was their agenda. Then there was a period where our newspapers were published to fight military dictatorship, but around that     period, we also saw the emergence of newspapers, which were published because of the ego of the owners or because of the political interest of their owners and then fast forward to now where we have democracy so called, the trend really is been media that is owned by nationalists and then maybe of late, businessmen like the Ibrus and the owners of punch. We have come to a period where many of the newspapers we have in the country today are owned by businessmen/politicians, so those papers mostly protect the interests of their owners but not just the  interest of their owners but also the political interest of their owners for example, *The Nation*, one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country is owned by **Tinubu**, **Champion** is owned by **Iwuanyawu**, if it still exists, *The SUN* and now *the Telegraph* is owned by the former governor of Abia-State, **Tele-Independence** by Ibru and so on, there is also in the electronic field a lot of politicians own FM Radio Stations, they are also venturing into TV as well as what you see in that the agenda of the media really has shifted from whether nationalist struggle or anti-military struggle to defending purely and simply the interest of politicians and you know what that means in practical terms. So that even politicians who accused of corruption own their media and they fight their war through the media have they own

Q.      **what do you expect from the editors' media practitioner in the real sense that they can enforce the kind of probity and transparency in the country now?**

A.      That is the expectation but in all honesty, I don't think the media can do much and I will give you a couple of reasons, because the media is part of the society, the media can't isolate itself from the society.

**Q.** **In the course of my interaction with the former MD and editor in-chief of Nigerian Tribune, he argued that if it is possible for the media to have a group of media men to put resources together and own their own media houses maybe that will bring some sanity to the system and secondly he was looking at the possibility of maybe we can get a foreign partner to come and invest in the media sector in Nigeria maybe that will give us the kind of succour for the media to do what is expected of them.**

A.      Well, there are good    sounding observations but I don't think either has any prospect, I'm totally opposed to the idea of any foreign ownership became at the end of the day it is business so whoever own the media thing would have to survive to make profit, so it will be the interest of the foreign owners first and foremost to the detriment of the people of Nigeria and the interest of Nigerians. So that for me is really a no-brainer, rather it is something that ought not to, something we shouldn't even begin to think about. But the issue of also journalists and media professional coming together, we've seen it happen now, in the case of the news magazine *TELL* even *THE POS,* then of course, *COMET*, these are papers owned by media men, but very few of them have managed to survive, so the point I'm making is that a lot depend on how the country is being run, how the country is being governed, became of you are in newspaper, you have to buy news print, you have to operate within the climate of no electricity, you have to depend on diesel, you have to depend on government for so many things and the environment, for so many things so as at the end of the day, you really find it hard to break through, then what of and this point is important, we saw, what happened *THE NEXT* beautiful paper, great reporting, great analysis, wonderful journalists, but how long did at last became there was conflict. We live in a country where the State in everything, the so called private sector unlike in the developed world where you have big businesses and institutions that don't depend on the state. Here even the private sectors you talk about, the richest men in Nigeria or the richest black man in Africa or around the world his business is more or less tied to the state whether it's a case of giving import waivers or suppressing other people who are running same line of business with the person, so in the case of *THE NEXT* Newspaper because they were focusing on the corruption on government, Ministries and so on, the paper was starved of necessary support. There was not just an official response in terms of observation to Ministries and Agencies not to advertise in the papers, the body language of the

government or Ministries says a lot in terms of how things are done, so at the end of the day, my argument is that the press depends a lot on the state for survival, so even if private individuals come together, bring in resources to run these newspapers houses, you may break down when you cannot break even if you don't have advertisement. In this country, 70 to 80% of newspapers adverts come from government and its Agencies whether JAMB are taking 20 pages to advertise JAMB matriculation UME, Ministry of health, ministry of Education, Nigerian Army recruitment, sometimes you will see 20 or 30 pages of names of people who have been shortlisted for admission or recruitment in Nigeria Army or Police. These days each page is about half a million, so the state have a poorly developed private sector in Nigeria and that has really gone a long way in defining the kind of media we have today. I think really to answer your question, how to deal in a difficult one, it's a bit challenging, how do you develop society? Then how can we develop the media it's difficult but I think the starting point is really not the media but the society, if we have a functional society where there is electricity so even the cost of setting up a media house will be minimal, you don't have to spend all your income on diesel, it will minimal, telephoning, light is functional, communication, cost of newsprint, it's within each reach organization, so if we have a very functional society, where with the help of a very good leader that would impact on the media so much, to take at the other way to say let's start with the media, its double if you have a media that is not just committed but can survive without the state and I don't see that happening, that's the big challenge.

**Q.** **Finally, how would you assess our democratic experiment in the last 15 years, has it impacted positively on the life of an average e Nigerian?**

A.      You have raised a very important question and actually may be I am working on this two part piece for my columns in punch and other newspapers and online publication and I have been thinking about it for months and I say to answer your question directly, democracy hasn't done anything for the masses of this country, there is a very funny statement that somebody made in reference to a statement that Malcolm made when he talked about the way Africa/Americans were being treated, when he said when they said planet rock was where a lot of the first immigrants in the US landed off the coast of Massachusetts and he said we didn't land on planet rock but planet rock landed on us. And somebody cannot Para-phrase it to say we haven't landed on democracy in

Nigeria, democracy landed on us which in away is quite true. The expectation has not been met, we were hoping that with eye sight and with what we have been through colonialism crisis and military rule, our politicians would put in their very best. In fact, there is lack of contentment on the part of our politicians. This lack of contentment was exemplified in something that has happened lately in Akwa-Ibom State and the governor who gave himself a very huge retirement package and I wrote about this in my last piece which was published in The *Punch. O*ur leaders are like modern day buccaneers, they grab with other hands, they shoot and kill anything, that is around them, they appropriate, so a governor because you've been a governor in a state, that can't survive for three months beyond the ill money he gets from Abuja, no manufacturing concerned, no industry, nothing on ground and  the governor commits N100,000,000.00 as medical expenses after retirement for himself and when was challenged, he says what he has done is to put a peg on it, that the law that was there before was open ended so we should praise him for that really, then you have him pay N5 million a month for his domestic aides, this is a state where officially the minimum wage is N1,000 for those who can find jobs, so the questions now is how many domestic servants does this man need or feels he is entitled to after he has left office, N5m a month is N60m a year. In 10years, N600m in 20years it's N1.2billion to domestic staff alone. We have not talked about the houses, the cars, they will change every 3 years and all the medical expenses just for domestic staff and this man is 51 years old, so all things being equal, he could die tomorrow but he might as well live for the next 30 ears. So let's even say he lives for the next 20 years, he would have spent N1.2b on domestic staff. This amount for the medical treatment when they queried him, he said it's not as of the people are going to collect up front, that it will be paid to the health institution, have you seen anything like that in Nigeria. The day he lives office, the first day of the year unless maybe he has a problem of course, he will even ensure that his cronies will the one who wins, who will be able to pay this money. Let us look at the case of Abia state, where someone left office and collected N1000million or N2000million, the first day he is out of office This is what our democracy has turned into, of course it's a big joke but what it has done in that it has legitimized for me corruption. What democracy has done in Nigeria is that it has legitimized face to face banditry, that's it. So people are stealing but they are stealing under the cover of the law, they are legalizing their stealing, that is what democracy has done for the average person but I am not in no way is calling for an end to this system or asking the military to return, that is a different

argument, I would never support the military coming back, it's left for Nigerians and the people to decide how they want to take over this country, make it a people republic, but what is pure and simple is that what democracy has done for us is legitimize face to face banditry. We still have the highest maternal mortality rate in the world 15 years after return to democracy, we still rank with some of the worst countries, I mean I don't mean worst country in terms of person but in terms of activities like polio, the poverty rate in shooting off the roof, corruption, abuse of the rule of law, every impurity everything has worsened, the only thing perhaps even at that it may not be as visible is killing of people, journalists and attack and everything but in the true sense of it nothing has really changed in the last 15years. If anything, it has gotten worse because now people can hide, maybe in the case of the military was so bare faced that you could see it. Now it's hidden under so many things. In the National Assembly, I was in a meeting or a discussion, with a member of the House of Reps who told me that some of his colleagues are like hunters, you know, once you are a director general or chairman of an agency and your coming to do your budget, they are ready to tear you apart and what they can get. They are not interested, if you have a budget of N1 billion half of it will first of all go to National Assembly members, then you have only half, and by the time you steal half of the remaining half for yourself and your directors and for everybody in your organization and at the end of the day you have nothing left to provide the basic service the organization was set up, this is the democracy we are having now It is sad that this is the fruit of our struggle for democratic rule. We talk about Boko Haram, militancy, kidnapping and violence, armed robbery and so on, in a sense there is an economic under-tone to the Nigerian crisis which itself is a fall-out of bad leadership but there is a lot that in wrong with Nigeria that is rooted in the structure of Nigeria, I'm one of those advocating restructuring of Nigeria. It is like people are feeding fat of this carcass until we, people want to turn Nigeria into a viable entity, we have to make people work for what they earn or work for what they want to earn, governors would need to devise creative ways for example, you are in a state where you don't get all your allocation any month and you have to task your people, task cooperation, industries within your entity and state, you have to do you VAT and everything to N3b every month in every quarter to pay salaries you decided to steal N2b out of that money, your people would necessarily rise against you, but the current structure has made our teachers so indolent so unproductive everybody is just dependent on oil, nobody is interested in building industries, nobody is interest in technology or expanding

manufacturing or agriculture, sometime last year I went to Chief Audu Ogbe to present a copy of my book. I told him I was going to interview him and he agreed and said okay before you even, let me talk a bit about my dissatisfaction with the way things are happening in this country, we spoke for almost an hour or two, he told me everything that happened from 1983 when Buhari took over power, and the things that transpired lately, that month he said he had just returned from India, he went to China and India and he said he went to a state in India and in that state he mentioned that they were 30,000 tractors working daily in that state, and in the place he visited no arable land is left without being farmed on so I asked myself, when I came back I did a piece after that NIS employment fiasco I said lets even leave India, let's look at our state, he said about 50,000 or 30,000 tractors in just one state he visited so I said let's take a state like Akwa-Ibom and ask ourselves, how many factory do they have there, in fact he told me that if you count the 19 states in Nigeria, you cannot find 10,000 tractors, so how do we expect to feed ourselves as a people, so I made the analysis, let's say every state in Nigeria we have 20,000 tractors working, so we are looking at one state, each tractor will have 5 and 6 people working around it, the mechanic, the driver whenever the tractor does either people picking tomatoes or people around so on the average, this tractor can provide employment for a 100,000 people. We need to ask what is wrong with our leaders, we have the land, we have the resources but nobody is willing, they will just be shutting between their states and Abuja, then go to Dubai and London for medical service. They prefer that their wives want to have babies they will go have it in Dubai or London, they want to die they will go and die in Germany, the amount of money we spend on medical tourism in country is so much. This is a challenge Nigeria must take seriously and not until we are able to break this circle in country. The people must have to take charge of their responsibilities as citizens, remove the dependence on oil as a means of livelihood and people who think their lives depend on it are fighting tooth and nail to protect the present structure so any attempt to say let's restructure this country in such a way that everybody will benefit from it is always thwarted and until we do, nothing is going to happen, that Boko-Haram exists today in the outcome of years of corruption, money meant for security, law enforcement has gone down the drain, so our soldiers are one of the worst trained in the world, they are the most corrupt our military. Our military are joining hands with militants in the Niger Delta doing bunkering and selling oil, soldiers are involved in all kinds of thing, police are involved in all kind of things it's like and we come to a conclusion that

there is no way out so everybody become a country on its own, if you are a teacher you can use your office to steal, harass female students if you are a judge you do your own etc, everybody does their own till the day the country will collapse, then everybody to your tents oh Israel. My take is that this country cannot survive for too long the way it's being run no country that run the way Nigeria is being run will survive, my fear is that we would not be able to prevent it disintegrates and I don't think it's going to disintegrate into a purely ethnic society maybe like Oduduwa Republic or Biafra. No, what we are going to have will resemble the state of things in Somalia where there in complete breakdown of law, order and anarchy. An OPC man maybe in controls a portion of Lagos Tinubu can control a portion of Lagos like dependency in the balance of faces, anywhere you just see a Militia, just controlling. There is no central governor or the central government is so weak. Book Haram has vertically taken over a section of the country, I heard people from the North who say that Boko Haram people have taken over about or 6 or 7 local governments in Borno State, every week or so they go to the market and collect like task from the people and market women and then who sell, like their contribution, they are the government of the place, so before you know it two weeks ago Biafra people went to Enugu and tried to hijack the government house before then three weeks ago they now went to take over a radio station. If the government can't deal with Boko Haram imagine two other or three Boko Harams incident repeating it say, one in the East, West, the middle belt, how are they going to cope, the country will just slide into anarchy, and all of this has been the result of bad leadership that has allowed corruption, indiscipline and everything to foster so for me. It is s a bid challenge how we're going to survive it, we have one of the most incompetent persons in-charge of the government, it is not worsen, under the military even if Abacha with brutal and mean and in competent but at least he was in-charge of the country he did what he though was right in his own stupid way, but this man, he's just not in-charge and everybody is taking advantage of him both in lack of strength and incompetence, anything can happen, so it's just as many people say we keep going and keep praying to God.

**3.INTERVIEW WITH FELIX ADENAIKE – A JOURNALIST**

**Q. Good morning Sir, I would like you to introduce yourself Sir.**

My name is Felix Adenaike, a journalist.

**Q. Can I know more Sir?**

Well, I was Chief Executive; of course i started as a reporter, and then graduated through the stages. I worked in various media organisations, at least four or five. Daily Times, where i started, West Africa Magazine in London, Sketch which i was M.D then Nigerian Tribune where i retired from as Editor-In-Chief.

**Q. How have the Anti-Corruption agencies, notably the ICPC, EFCC, and CCB used the media in their campaign?**

You see, they use the media to propagate the findings of their investigations into alleged corrupt practices by public officers and others. So to that extent they use the media, and the media has been collaborative in that regard since the establishment of the anti-corruption agencies, notably, ICPC, EFCC, of course the Police, but they didn't do it well, because if they did it well, the ICPC and EFCC wouldn't have come.

**Q. What role do you envisage for the media and other non-state actors in the anti-corruption war in Nigeria?**

Well, the first thing the practitioners of the media should do is to be above board. Well I dare say they are not. Many of media practitioners are also involved in graft. If you cannot clean your own act, you cannot expose other people. To that extent they are hampered. But by and large they have been effective in their exposing corrupt practices in society, acts of corruption particularly in public sector and the private sector too. So they have been effective, but they would have been more effective if they had cleaned their own act.

**Q. So do you think the level of graft within the industry itself or among the practitioners has affected their investigative and watchdog role?**

Yes, you cannot perform a watchdog role if you are not above board, if you yourself demand and take bribes. They are hampered to that extent in their effectiveness of performing their watchdog role.

**Q. why do you think journalists in Nigeria engage in corrupt acts and taking bribes?**

They are members of the larger society and a lot of people migrate into journalism to make money but they got their focus wrong from the beginning; they think, it is a glamorous job, so i can as well make money. So they got their focus wrong. The larger society is corrupt and journalists are not staying outside this larger society which they should police and clean up. They succumb to the dangling of money. They are part and parcel of the society above which they cannot stay and which makes them vulnerable. If the larger society is corrupt and they are part and parcel of the larger

society, and they are not strong morally to stay outside the corruption, they are corrupt; and to the extent which they are corrupt, they can't do their job.

**Q. so what is the solution?**

The solution has always been that simple but individuals have to make up their minds on what to do. I, Felix Adenaike will not be corrupt. I have not been corrupt after 47years in the profession and I don't think i will be corrupt for the rest of my life. It is not possible, it is unlikely. So it is individuals who have to subscribe to the ethics of the profession, first and foremost. When you subscribe to it, you live by the ethics of your profession and then you are above board. But if you have an inclination of if you cannot beat them you join them then you are finished. That Journalists would stand/gather as a whole and say, 'we won't do this or we won't do that' is a waste of time. Nigerian journalists won't do that. It is individual Journalists who would make up their minds that they won't be corrupt and they won't be corrupt. The profession itself would be clean and can therefore go ahead to clean the society.

**Q. Sir, some of the excuses given by professionals have to do with the level of salaries and allowances. In fact, they are some organisations said to be owing their staff 15months salaries, some have not even received salaries for years, yet you want them to be above board. How do you reconcile that?**

A corrupt person is a corrupt person. Low pay, low wages, poverty have always been with humanity, since God made man. Otherwise I am a Christian, and in the Bible we talk about poor people. It means poor people have been there all along. So the fact that you are poor does not dispose you to dishonour. The honour of a person is paramount. Some people are better able to resist temptation; no doubt about that. But if you are a thief no matter what, you will still. What about those people who steal billions? Do you need billions to survive in this country? N14billion, N2billion, N40billion, N100billion, do you need that to survive in this country? So it is greed. A thief is a thief no matter how much he makes, he wants more.

You see, a Journalist is a missionary; you are out there to clean society, to be a watchdog, to hold society and those who operate in the society; government, corporate bodies and individuals to hold them to the laws of the land. So to hold people as such, you have to obey. If you are a corrupt person, you can't excuse yourself that your pay is low. Live within your means. Many people don't want to live within their means; they say, my classmate is in an oil company. Why didn't you go there? My classmate is in the bank; why didn't you go there? If you are a fit and proper person to work in the oil industry, you are qualified to work in the financial services industry, why didn't you go there in the first instance? Why mourn your circumstance? Accept your place in the scheme of things. You are a journalist by choice not for want of better things to do. You are not a journalist if you don't have a sense of mission. If you are a journalist because you don't have other things to do, then you are not a professional. So you can't subscribe to the ethics of the profession.

**Q. Sir what of the other non-state actors like the religious sector, even the traditional institution, the labour; have they done credibly well?**

You see, Nigeria is a corrupt society. What that means is that all elements operating in that society have been, except the strong ones who have focus as to what they came into this world to do and those people who accept their situation. But those people who are chasing money irrespective of where they are stationed in life; traditional, clerical, religious and whatever, they are still human beings first and foremost; they will be corrupt because they are part and parcel of society. People who are not eligible to ascend traditional thrones bribe their way through. They foul the law up so that they can be made traditional rulers. So if you spend so much money, you will want to make the money back. You now subordinate your throne to the vagaries, to the whims and caprices of politicians.

**Q. I have been interacting with some members of the older generation of Nigerians and they say, Nigeria was not like this. So where did we miss it?**

Nigeria is an extremely materialistic society and we were not this many in those days. Everybody chases money now; that is the money ethics. It comes; we are subject to the internal influences and external influences. People want to drive the latest car; they want to wear the best dress, the best shoes, and most expensive wrist watches without having the ability to afford all these things. So money ethics is there; that is where we got it wrong. Everybody chases money now. There is this report i read a while ago, in a class of pupils in an elementary school, they were asked what profession they would want to choose later in life; they wanted to be politicians; politics is the shortest course to unearned income. We are not in politics in Nigeria for public service. We are not even in the traditional civil service for public service; we are there to make money. Civil servants live in houses they cannot afford to build. They didn't take any loan; their salaries cannot afford to build such houses from their pay; they drive expensive cars; they want to live like kings; they want to be like oil sheiks.

The fact that an increasingly larger number of people want to be things God didn't make them to be, that is now what is responsible for the bastardization of our values. People no longer care about family names as long as they have money. But money is not everything. You have to seek contentment. If you are a contented person, of course whatever amount of income you have, you will manage it. You cut your cot according to your cloth. The family values have broken down. Parents no longer look after their children. They concern their children to house helps, housemaids and so on. They no longer parent their children. So by that, they can pass the values of the family to the next generation.

**Q. As a veteran Sir, does the present crop of journalist in Nigeria perceive if they have any role to play in the anti-corruption war in Nigeria?**

They do, but they don't make up their minds to join the anti-corruption campaign. They know they want to do it but they can't bring themselves to do it because of corruption. They also are prone to corruption.

**Q. Finally Sir, there has been a lot of growing link between the political class and the media of late, do you think that this linkage has affected the level of watchdog**

You see, you hold the politician accountable, but if you go to the politician and ask for money, of course you have joined them. You now can no longer hold the politicians accountable to the electorates. I am not suggesting by any means that journalists should antagonise the political class. They belong in the same society. If you don't have political contacts, you cannot have political information that you publish and analyse; you can't have tips that you can investigate. But my experience has been that, i am a journalist, i am guarding my thoughts. You are in politics promising the public/electorate certain things. No matter how close you are to me, i will hold you accountable to your promise. At elections time, they issue manifestoes that they do not keep. *We now have a situation in which media people sign on to work for politicians while they are running their media. They work for them; they take money from them; they are on their payroll. How can you watch them? And if you watch them, how can you hold them accountable to the electorate?*

**Q. I spoke some time ago with former Chairman of ICPC and he was suggesting a public quoted media that would not be controlled by individual politicians so that there would be some freedom and objectivity. What do you think about that?**

I do not agree with that point of view. You see, we are in a mixed economy and we are running a democratic government; it is not perfect but that is what the constitution says. So it allows me to own property, including setting up a media outfit.

In the post-independence Nigeria the government came into the ownership of the media, and these media outfits were propaganda organs for political parties and government so they died a natural death. No government owned media is doing well now. But the private media are doing well.

The thing is, when people still money in public office, they launder it in setting up media organisation. You have to prevent that; prevent them from stealing money. But come to think of it, why do people have the propensity of stealing money? Because nothing happened to those who stole money yesterday, last year, 10years ago, 40 years ago; they work free and they enjoy their loot. But if they had been punished, I don't see why people should still be corrupt. You have to first clean up society. When you clean up the society, the media organisations work in the society. If I want to set up a media outfit to protect my business interest, the country shouldn't get on my way. That is not what sponsors corruption. What sponsors corruption is money, money, money! People have the appetite for unlimited amount of money. So if I have my money and I want to

invest in a course, and I need a media outfit to do that, no law should stop me from doing that. Then the law of the media should be clear. There should be a law of the land to regulate business activities; not to out breach press freedom. If a man is riding a car which you suspect he cannot afford to purchase from legitimate means, that person should be questioned; he should be stopped. We should have a system to find out, is the parson paying due tax? We can't just watch you in conspicuous consumption of resources you didn't make legitimately. Your neighbour is driving a Rozroiz; you know it is a custom built car and is very expensive; you can't pick it from a shop but you order it and it is manufactured for you. Where did you come about that money? Where is your factory?

So if you are making some secret money, how much is it? How much do you make per year? Have you paid due tax? These are the things that are wrong; so everybody exploits these loopholes. The laws are not being enforced nobody enforces the law. You didn't need the ICPC, you didn't need EFCC. You have the special branch in the police; you have the anti-fraud unit in the police. But once you take on them they look the other direction. Nobody gets punished, so people flaunt these things which have terrible implications for the morals of the society; for the morals of the young generations and the coming ones.

Q. Sir, do you think we can win this war against corruption?

Yes, we can! All you need is a good government. One good President would bring down everybody. Of course it can happen. You can't get the National Assembly as constituted at present to make laws, to execute economic saboteurs, because the place if filled up with people who shouldn't be there. They are there because they have money to win elections. So you can't expect them to make laws for the good governance of Nigeria or of the States. Those who are there are the highest bidders. They bribe their way into the National Assembly and to the State Assemblies. So they cannot make laws terminating their own interests. So we are expecting the impossible. We have to clean the Assemblies and make sure good people go there. We also need to have a good constitution. Now an amendment is being proposed that we should have independent candidates but we had that in the first republic. People who won't be nominated by their parties because they have money can win elections from their local constituencies. Their people will vote them in. so they will go and make a difference in the Assembly; either national or state. But if you have to go through a corrupt practice system of the highest bidder, then good people won't come into politics. Our constitution must be such as to attract good people to take a carrier in politics. That was the way it used to be in the first republic. So that is the way to clean up society by legislation.

If you don't punish those who have been exposed and established to be corrupt, then the anti-corruption agencies are bulldogs; toothless bulldogs at that. They are not empowered financially to cope. You rely on the Nigerian Bar Association to do prosecution for you free of charge. So the government is not serious. If the executive at any level wants to fight corruption they can do it.

One, you live by example, you live above board, transparently, then you can enforce the anti-corruption rules. There is nothing as effective as personal example. We don't show personal example; we just talk and preach. The Pastors preach, the Malams preach but they live extravagantly and scandalously. You can't change society like that. Parents must show their children that it is possible and practicable to live within your means and live a decent live. When you should be living in a room, why do you want to live in a flat? Why should a university graduate buy a jeep as his first car? He cannot run it unless he is stealing, and that is the vogue. Some undergraduates in one of the universities wanted to buy Hummer Jeeps as their first cars. They

made money through crooked means and they were arrested by the car dealers, handed over to the

Consent Form for Research

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated _____. | ☒ |
| 2. | I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation. | ☒ |
| 3. | I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. | ☒ |
| 4. | I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn. | ☒ |
| 5. | The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. | ☒ |
| 6. | If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other forms of data collection have been explained and provided to me. | ☒ |
| 7. | The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been explained to me. | ☒ |
| 8. | I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified in this form. | ☒ |
| 9. | Select only **one** of the following:<br>• I would like my name used and understand what I have said or written as part of this study will be used in reports, publications and other research outputs so that anything I have contributed to this project can be recognised. | ☒ |
| | • I do not want my name used in this project. | ☐ |
| 10. | I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form. | ☒ |

Participant:

Justice M.M.A. Akanbi (PCA) RJ _____ Signature _____ 13/11/2017

Name of Participant          Signature          Date

Researcher:

Oluwasina A Babasola _____ Signature _____ 14/11/2017

Name of Researcher          Signature          Date

Consent Form for Research

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

| 1. | I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated _____ | ✓ |
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| 10. | I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form. | ✓ |

**Participant:**

Femi Soyinka _____ 09/08/2017
Name of Participant      Signature      Date

**Researcher:**

Babasola, Oluwasina _____ 09/08/2017
Name of Researcher      Signature      Date

Consent Form for Research

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

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Participant:

KUNLE ODEREMI

Name of Participant        Signature        AUGUST 2, 2017
                                            Date

Researcher:

Behasola, Onwnema

Name of Researcher        Signature        August 2, 2017
                                           Date

Consent Form for Research

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated 24-07-2017 . | ☑ |
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Participant:

| Simon Kolawole | Tgk rhL | 24-07-2017 |
|---|---|---|
| Name of Participant | Signature | Date |

Researcher:

| Babasola, Olawsine | _(signature)_ | 24-07-2017 |
|---|---|---|
| Name of Researcher | Signature | Date |

## Consent Form for Research

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

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| 10. | I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form. | ☑ |

Participant:

UYIM AKPABIO Ph.D _____    28th July 2017

Name of Participant         Signature         Date 25/07/2017

Babasola, Oluwasina

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

| 1. | I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated 24 July 2017 | ☑ |
| 2. | I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation. | ☑ |
| 3. | I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. | ☑ |
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| 10. | I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form. | ☑ |

**Participant:**

_____      _____      24/7/2017

Name of Participant                Signature                          Date

**Researcher:**

Babasola, Oluwaseun      _____      24/7/2017

Name of Researcher                Signature                          Date