The discursive construction of national identity by the newspapers in North Cyprus.

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THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY BY THE NEWSPAPERS IN NORTH CYPRUS

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ABSTRACT

The research investigates the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national identity by the newspapers in North Cyprus. The aim is to discover the representation and reconstruction processes of national identity within the press and examine the various practices employed to mobilise readers around certain national imaginings. Therefore, as well as examining the changing concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity throughout history, it focuses on how these concepts have been moulded through the Turkish Cypriot media. Highlighting historical, political, economic and cultural factors, which contributed to shaping national identities, the study locates the Turkish Cypriot media within these relations to offer an understanding of the media environment in which the news texts are produced.

Using Critical Discourse Analysis, in particular the discourse-historical approach, the research analyses ongoing transformations in the definition of self and 'other' and the linguistic construction and reproduction of national identity in the news discourses. Focusing on three significant events that occupied the public and media agenda within the last decade, the news discourses are studied based on their content, strategies used in the production of national identity and the linguistic means employed in the process. With this, the nationalist tendencies embedded in news discourses as well as discriminatory and exclusive practices are sought out.

Finally, the study discusses the findings such as the conceptualisation of Turkish Cypriot identity showed variations in time, the newspapers did not diverge from the universe of official discourse and rarely challenged the nationalist discourses. Yet, the newspapers had differences mainly based on their stance to the Cyprus issue and their definition of national interest and identity. The conclusions that arise from the research, one of which is a suggestion for further research, are debated in the study.
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

Five months after the border in Cyprus was opened to public crossings in both directions, a protest took place at the main checkpoint in Nicosia. A donkey appeared at the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint with a fake passport that identified it as ‘Mr Cyprus’. The Turkish Cypriot police arrested three people, two Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot in relation to the protest. 

Afrika, a Turkish Cypriot daily, reported the incident with the headline ‘2 Greeks, 1 Turk and 1 true Cypriot were arrested’ (Afrika, 23 September 2003, p.1). By calling the donkey ‘the true Cypriot’, 

Afrika did not insult Cypriots but mocked the nationalist idea that there were no Cypriots but only Turks and Greeks. The idea had found embodiment in the expression of Rauf Denktas, the TRNC president at the time, who it was claimed, asserted that ‘there’s only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey’ ( Çağlar, 1995)\(^1\). The protest and its coverage by Afrika are good examples of how problematic the self-identification of Turkish Cypriots has been. They indicate the ongoing struggle between different concepts of national identity such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot as well as revealing Turkish Cypriots’ search for an identity. Pointing to this search for identity, Cenk Mutluyakali, a journalist, also suggested that despite owning different identity cards throughout the years that identified them as one or the other, Turkish Cypriots still suffered an identity crises. He highlighted this ambivalent experience of Turkish Cypriots in one article with the question ‘Have you ever had a collection of identities’ (Mutluyakali, 2005).

National identity has not only been a problem in the context of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots. The end of the Cold War era, globalisation and the revived tensions over ethnic identity raised questions about nationalism and national identity. On the one hand, globalisation led to an increase in the interaction of people through the advancement in communication technologies, travel and population movements. These changes not only seemed to decentre national identity and challenge

\(^1\) In an interview in Kibris FM radio Denktas denied having said that the only true Cypriots are wild donkeys in Cyprus. He explained that it was the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios who had used that expression in a news interview and that he only reiterated this story of Makarios in a conference. For further details see Kibris, Silahlanip, Savaşırız, 22 November 2005 or http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/25002/PageName/Ic_Haberler.
established nation-states but also, by eroding traditional ways of life, made it difficult for individuals and groups to define themselves. On the other hand, the resurgence of nationalism following the end of the Cold War led to a ‘widespread (re)construction of identity based on nationality’ (Castells, 2004, p.30). The emergence of nationalism was not only in the form of ethnic conflicts, as seen in Eastern Europe with the fall of the Soviet Union, but also extreme forms of it reappeared in Europe in places like France, Germany and the UK (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996). In either case, national identity has become a key concept and a heavily politicised issue.

Local, ethnic, or religious identities have also become an arena for identity politics and sometimes are seen as undermining national identity. However, national identity is like a ‘trump card’ that overcomes all other identities and binds people together, despite their differences (Calhoun, 1997). It still plays the crucial role in identifying who ‘we’ are and connects us to a place, culture and history, giving a sense of belonging in a world system of nations. As it is based on difference from the ‘other’, depending on the context, time and the ‘other’, national identity is constantly redefined and renegotiated. It is debatable whether there has ever been a homogenous nation but the presence of foreigners/outsiders has not only created ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups but also eroded the definition of national homogeneity revealing the hybrid nature of national identity.

Nationalism and national identity, which constitute a significant part of everyday life, cannot be reduced to only extreme manifestations. This is where the importance of studying national identity derives: The banal forms of nationalism not only allow nationhood to be taken for granted but also shape the way people see and understand the world within a national frame. Thus, studying its production and reproduction helps to create awareness of the conflicts and tensions produced by these processes as well as increasing discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for the sake of nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999).

The role the media play in this process is not only in the imagination and construction of a national identity but also in the articulation of it, which also influences political decision making processes. The power of the media in the opinion-shaping process and the ability to communicate ideas to large numbers of
people make the media an important participant in the production and propagation of national identity. However, contrary to the image of a unified nation enhanced by the national media, the global media provide a fragmented social and cultural world to both individuals and groups. The new communications technologies have not only disrupted the simultaneous experience shared by the members of a nation but also deconstructed national cultures by introducing new ones, thus bringing changes in the participation in public life (Morley and Robins, 1995). A resource for different identity discourses, the global media encouraged the questioning of the concept of national identity as homogenous and enacted the formation of hybrid identities.

Yet, the media is an influential instrument in uniting people, especially dispersed populations, around their national and ethnic identities. A recent study showed how the USA government and military officials used national American core values and promoted a sense of national identity to mobilize public support behind the ‘war on terrorism’ after September 11 attack in 2001. According to the study, the media contributed to attempts to create a united American nation against a demon ‘enemy’ (Hutcheson et.al., 2004). In the same way, the media can also have a divisive effect as the discourses and representations in the media that resort to stereotyping, ignorance and bias can encourage intolerance towards the ‘other’ and in some cases be an initiator of violence (Bromley, 1998; Howard, 2002). As seen in the examples of conflicts in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia, the media have the power to manipulate the concept of national identity in order to mobilise the public and lead to a violent conflict. The manipulation of the media for a certain political purpose can result in political crises and conflicts, the media being the main facilitator. At the same time, they can be instrumental in conflict resolution. By providing accurate and balanced accounts of events, as well as representing diverse views and building confidence, the media can contribute to the reduction or even prevention of conflict. Thus, a new approach called peace journalism has been developed to highlight awareness of the responsibility of the media in attempts at conflict resolution.

This is why the discourses and representations of national identity in the media in Cyprus, where a search for a peaceful settlement continues, are important in terms of their practices related to nationalism. In Cyprus, the politics of identity played a central role in the increase of inter-communal tension and the creation of the Cyprus
problem. Considering the role nationalist movements and the politics of identity played in fuelling of the conflict between the two communities on the island and the creation of the Cyprus problem, the importance of the debates about national identity becomes clear. In the past, attempts to forge a Cypriot identity failed as the two communities cultivated Hellenic and Turkish national identities based on ethno-nationalist concepts. Changing social, political and economic conditions such as globalisation and population movements not only challenged the concept of a homogeneous Turkish Cypriot national identity but also led to a hegemonic struggle between different constructions of national identity. Recently, as the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem intensified, the question of identity became the focus of public debate again. Internationally and within Cyprus, there is growing recognition that, for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, there should be reconciliation between the island’s two communities but the question is ‘how can two communities with distinct senses of national identity live under a common state’.

Self-identification has been a problematic issue for Turkish Cypriots. The various terms they use to define themselves, such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, and Cypriot, sometimes used interchangeably, shows the ongoing battle for the acceptance of a specific identity. Each term indicates a particular conception of nation and national belonging that the person or the group identifies with. For example, one nationalism, which developed during the years of inter-communal struggle, sees Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation, making no distinction between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Another nationalism, developed in reaction to Turkish nationalism, asserts cultural differences from Turks to maintain a distinctive and separate identity as Cypriots. This version of Cypriot nationalism is constructed mainly in opposition to Turks rather than Greek Cypriots. Today, ‘located between Turkish nationalism and expressions of Cypriotism’ (Ramm, 2006, p.523), both the ‘Turkish’ and ‘Cypriot’ identities are trying to establish their legitimacy and the media are one of the sites where the struggle has been taking place.

As the identity issue increasingly became important among Turkish Cypriots, so its construction and renegotiation by the media also gained significance. For example, the Turkish Cypriot media have been in a key position in the formation and maintenance of public attitudes towards Greek Cypriots and later, as Cypriot
nationalism developed, in reaction to Turkish nationals. This is why, as the attempts for a settlement to the problems created by the inter-communal conflict and division in Cyprus continue, the role the media play in either reinforcing or lessening division through the construction of identities or in encouraging reconciliation or provoke conflict becomes significant.

This research investigates the construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity in North Cyprus. It examines the changing concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity and focuses on how they have been moulded through the Turkish Cypriot media, specifically the newspapers. Considering their efficacy in the opinion-building process, their influence on political decision-making and the effect that may have on communities’ perceptions of self and the ‘others’, the main objective of the research is to examine the media texts to see which concept of Turkish Cypriot national identity they articulate and also to study the ways in which they construct it. In North Cyprus, the role of the media in conceptualising a national belonging has not been questioned extensively and studies exploring the media’s relationship with national identity and nationalism have been minimal. This is why one of the main aims of the study is to contribute to the enlivened debate within the Turkish Cypriot community about the issues of identity, citizenship and the role of the media, rather than provide definite answers to the national identity problem.

There are four hypotheses that underlie the framework of this research: The first assumption is that national identity is discursively constructed. Its definition changes depending on the national project pursued or its context of production. It is based on the oppositional metaphors of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ to create unity among the members of the ‘us-group’ and assert its distinction from the ‘they-group’. Such collectivisation helps to emphasise the homogeneity of the members of the national community as well as assert its difference from other communities. Attributing certain characteristics to the ‘national we’ while casting the ‘other’ in a negative light are some of the features of the discursive construction of national identity.

Secondly, there is not a single national identity. Since national identity is a dynamic concept that can shift with different circumstances and contexts, diverse concepts of
national identity can coexist. In the context of North Cyprus, various discourses and conceptualisations of national identity are in an ongoing struggle for hegemony.

Thirdly, the media not only contribute to the production of national identity but also, by reproducing it everyday, naturalise the ideologies of nationalism and national identity. Mediation of national symbols, which are embedded in the social practices of everyday life, helps national identity to be internalised and taken for granted. By shaping national attachments into a common sense, the media also encourage a portrayal of nations and national identities as natural phenomena.

Finally, the prevalence of a nationalist discourse in the media is an obstacle to discussion about the formation of a pluralistic and democratic society and citizenship. Putting communal rights ahead of individual ones leaves no space within the media for the constitution of a democratic concept of citizenship and different collective identities. Existing discourses, even the ones that claim to be anti-nationalist, replace one form of national identity with another.

Taking the scholarly literature as the starting point, Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts and arguments to be used in the research. Outlining the definition of terms and the relevant theoretical perspectives aims to provide a framework for discussions on the concept of Turkish Cypriot national identity in the North Cyprus context. Divided into three parts, the first one examines the various approaches to nationalism and nation. Nationalism, a discursive construction, is not only an extreme manifestation but discernible in everyday life and integrated into daily practices. It is this naturalised form that hides its constructedness and strengthens the ideological power of nationalism. Examining the cultural and social sources of identity in the second part, it discusses the boundary-drawing process during the production of national identity. The last part of the chapter is on the role of the media in the conceptualisation of national identity. It looks into how the discourse and representations in the media contributes to the construction and renegotiation of national identity.

The subsequent two chapters provide historical background to Turkish Cypriot identity and the Turkish Cypriot media. Chapter 2 studies the constitution of various
concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity over the years and the diverse means of self-
identification that bring with them a particular national imagination. The story of the
identity formation of Turkish Cypriots, which includes competing conceptions, is
told in relation to both Greek Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey who are both in
the position of the ‘other’. It gives a descriptive historical analysis of how Turkish
Cypriot identities evolved and also offers an analysis of the main features of these
identity conceptions.

Chapter 3 focuses on an historical investigation of the role the Turkish Cypriot media
in the construction and redefinition process of national identity. The struggle against
the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement not only employed the media as a crucial
instrument in disseminating the nationalist ideology and forming public support for it
but also set the boundaries within which the news media have been operating. An
examination of media dynamics, mostly based on the accounts of journalists and
academics in North Cyprus, offers a picture of the factors that influence the
conditions and practices of current news production.

Chapter 4 outlines the methodological and theoretical guidelines of the research
paradigm as well as describing the research tools that are used in the analysis.
Since one of the main assumptions of the study is that national identity, a
phenomenon taken for granted, is constructed discursively, Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA), a critical approach to discourse, is adopted as the research
paradigm. Among various methods of the CDA, the investigation uses the
‘discourse-historical approach’ developed by the Vienna School of Discourse
Analysis. Based on the theory that situational, institutional and social contexts shape
or affect discursive acts, this method combines historical, social-economic-political
and linguistic perspectives to identify the relationship between texts and social
practices (Wodak et al., 1999, Wodak, 2001b).

The following three chapters, 5, 6 and 7, test the data using the analytical tools as
suggested by the discourse-historical approach against the hypotheses outlined. Each
chapter, concentrating on a chosen case study, investigates the news texts to locate
the various definitions and dimensions of national identity. Chapter 5 studies the
discursive construction of national identity as it was reflected in news reports of the
border clashes between the demonstrators from both sides in 1996. Focusing on the themes of linguistic construction of the nation, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy and national history, the analysis examines newspaper texts to see which concept of identity was articulated in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks on the island.

Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of news reports of the opening of the border crossings. The border in Cyprus, a manifestation of separation and severance of communication between communities (Gumpert & Drucker, 1998), was opened in April 2003 for public crossings, allowing people from both communities to go to the ‘other’ side they had not seen for 29 years. The concept of ‘home’ and the construction of the past and common culture are some of the themes this chapter focuses on.

Chapter 7 investigates attempts to open another crossing in Lokmaci, one of the military barricades in the divided city of Nicosia. Regarded as a symbol of the division, the debates concerning the opening of this crossing raised issues about the sovereignty of the nation, national interest and differences in the treatment of the ‘other’. The coverage of these debates in the press also holds light to the dominant conceptualisation of national identity and reveals whether there has been any change over the years.

The concluding chapter highlights the main issues that arose during the examination of the data and ascertains whether the main assumptions of the study are validated. It presents an evaluation of the most important findings of the research which, outside of Cyprus, could be helpful in similar studies of national identity, especially in states experiencing conflict. As stated previously, rather than give definite answers to questions of identity, the study aims to contribute to the ongoing debate as well as prove a useful resource to those engaged in social policy and the development of the media.
CHAPTER 1: NATION, IDENTITY AND THE MEDIA

This chapter discusses the working definitions related to the study as well as present arguments about national identity and the role of the media in the conceptualisation of a national identity. Divided into three sections to offer a more detailed debate on each issue, the first part of the chapter focuses different understandings of nation and nationalism and the second presents various approaches to national identity, while the third part studies the relationship between the media and national identity. Defining such key concepts and setting out the main assumptions of the study provides a framework for discussions of the concept of Turkish Cypriot national identity.

Nationalism

Different theories of nationalism make it difficult to study it under one general theory. Whether nations are invented or reconstructed based on the pre-existing groups are the dominating debates on nationalism. The description of what the nation and nationalism are and also of their origins is different for primordialists, ethnosymbolists and modernists. While primordialists stress the antiquity and naturalness of nations and see national identity as a natural part of human beings, ethnosymbolists highlight the role of pre-existing ethnic ties in the formation of modern nations. Modernists, on the other hand, believe in the modernity of nations and nationalism. They disagree with the idea that nations grow out of certain ethnic groups and instead argue that ethnicity gained significance in the age of modernism (ÖZkırımlı, 2005). Furthermore, new approaches that question the absence of women, ethnic minorities and the everyday dimension in these theories have also emerged, enriching the debate on nationalism and national identity (ÖZkırımlı, 2000).

Highlighting the difficulties of studying nationalism under one general theory because of the diversity of approaches and theories on the issue, Özkırımlı (2000) suggests focusing on the discourse of nationalism and its reproduction on a daily basis as the common denominator. In this research, adopting the idea of the
modernity of nationalism and nations, I also study them as discursive formations and ideological forces.

In contrast to the arguments of primordialists or ethnosymbolists, nationalism is a feature of modernity and the nation state is a modern institution. The transformation of sovereignty from monarchs to people played an important role in the construction of modern states. The rise of notions such as the 'will of people' and 'democracy' not only constituted people as citizens who give nation-states their power and legitimacy but also replaced the power of divine right with the legitimacy of the people (Calhoun, 1994). Thus, as Habermas (1998) puts it, the invention of the nation was a catalyst in the transformation of early modern states into democratic republics. Belonging to a nation created solidarity and connection through a concept of citizenship between people who had shared no relation before and provided the state with a source of legitimation. Yet, despite its relationship with the 'will of people', nationalism is not always be related to democracy. As Jenkins and Sofos (1996) state, albeit being linked to popular sovereignty and being an expression of national will, nationalism does not always represent all social identities and interests within the national community. Nationalism also has a potential for totalitarianism, which can be used to repress the diversity within the community and promote sameness. Calhoun (1994) also stresses that 'nationalism is all too often the enemy of democracy rooted in civil society' (p. 325). Therefore, despite being related to democracy there is 'nothing inherently democratic about nationalism' (Calhoun, 1997, p.126).

The processes of modernity such as new communication technologies, social mobility, commerce, education and a changing concept of time made it easier for people to gain national consciousness and imagine themselves as part of a national community. In these 'imagined communities', as Anderson (1993) describes them, even though members of a nation have never met each other, they have the image of communion in their minds. The shared image of the community is strengthened by the media's reflection of national histories, shared cultural symbols and language. Thus, the reproduction of nations or the imagining of communities is a mental act that requires people to believe and participate (Anderson, 1993). It is this psychological dimension of nations that requires the self-consciousness of being a
political community that constructs and strengthens nations (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Renan (1990) describes this mental act as a ‘daily plebiscite’ because a nation’s existence depends on ‘consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life’ (p.19). People participate in the existence of nations by believing and identifying with them. Therefore, it is important that people define themselves and are defined by others as a ‘nation’ (Billig, 1995). However, as Sofos (1996) points out, this imagination of communities is not just a mental or an intellectual exercise, but also a very material one as witnessed by acts of war, genocide, ethnic cleansing and displacement. He also argues that, rather than aiming at ethnic unity alone, multiculturalism, democracy and civil society could also be the goals of an imagined community.

Markers such as blood, language, culture, religion or citizenship, on which national identity is based, influence the concept of nation and the understanding of ‘our’ identity and ‘others’ (Mansbach and Rhodes, 2007). A nation can be imagined based either on cultural similarities such as language, history and ethnic ties, or on political will, which gives the priority to citizens. In the first imagination, nation is established on beliefs about the characteristics of ethnic origin and the common descent of the community. Based on the ‘German model’, such a nation is called Kulturnation (Knischewski, 1996). The second form of an imagined nation takes political citizenship as the basis of belonging to the nation, regardless of ethnic origin. Categorised as the ‘French model’, this type of nation is named Staatsnation (Knischewski, 1996). Despite this common distinction, some research shows that such a dichotomy cannot strictly be applied to nation states (Wodak et al., 1999) as different forms of existing nationalisms combine cultural and political elements in different ways at the same time (Wodak et al., 1999, Biswas, 2002). This study also tests the data to find out if such a dichotomy is valid and whether such a distinction can be applied to nations.

Nationalism is a discursive construction, which makes it difficult to talk about one form of nationalism. Depending on the political project targeted, it is constructed in various ways and therefore has different meanings to different members of the nation, sometimes conflicting with each other (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). What unites all these concepts of nationalisms is its discourse, which is a kind of language
that fosters solidarity and national identity as well as contributing to the production of nationalist self-understanding among the members of the community.

Nationalistic discourse shapes the aspirations of people in terms of a nation and national identity and also produces nationalist thought and language (Calhoun, 1997). Highlighting the role of nationalistic discourse in the unification process, Herzfeld (2005) defines it as a 'doctrine of reification' (p.117). According to Özkirimli (2000), there are three common characteristics of nationalist discourses:

The first one is that the interests and values of a nation overrule all other interests and values. Acting like a 'trump card', nationality overrides other particularistic identities (Calhoun, 1997, p.126). Even though these national interests and values are defined as unchanging, they actually transform depending on the imagination of the nation. Second, a nation is the only source of legitimacy. Existing in the world of nations and as the symbol of peoples' will, the nation has control over economic, political and military relations of a community within a bounded territory and can justify its actions on the basis of national interest. Third, it operates through the binary division of 'us' and 'them' and defines 'us' in terms of the 'other'. It is this dichotomy that acts as a unifying process within 'us' by producing a sense of distinctiveness from the 'other'.

Far from having a fixed meaning or being unitary, nationalism can be perceived either as a modernising and unifying process or as a separatist movement. It could even be differentiated as 'good' or 'bad' nationalism depending on the context (Calhoun, 1997). In nationalist discourses, while the nationalism of 'others' is portrayed in terms of 'irrational emotions' or as 'bad' nationalism, 'our' love of country is described as 'patriotism' (Billig, 1995). Such a narrow definition of nationalism neither reveals its ideological power that shapes everyday life, nor takes 'our' nationalism into account. In this projection, the power of nationalism is taken for granted and seen as the problem of peripheries, something that happens in developing countries rather than in established democracies. In contrast, loyalties to a nation are seen as 'patriotic' and as necessary. Alternatively, the 'others' struggle for the power of their nationalist projects is regarded as 'nationalism' and something dangerous (Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997).
The manifestations of nationalism are not only limited to extreme conditions but are also integrated into daily life without being realised. An ideology that integrates people and helps them to join the collective life of nation, nationalism provides people with a specific form of reality and shapes their consciousness to see and interpret the world in a certain way. Thus, it makes a nation a source of identity and makes belonging to a nation necessary and inevitable in a world of nations (Pickering, 2001). The ideological power of nationalism makes nations seem as if they have always existed rather than being constructions. For nationalism to be effective, its constructedness should not be apparent but on the contrary should be naturalised and embedded in the routines of everyday life (Özkirimli, 2000; Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002). To maintain its power, nationalism should also reproduce itself in daily practices. Billig (1995), who describes the process as ‘banal nationalism’, emphasises that certain habits, representations and practices of everyday life not only hide the ideological role of nationalism but also reproduces it as a part of everyday life. For example, by constantly flagging nationalism, the media and politicians remind citizens of their national identity in so many ways that it is not even registered. History and language are also the other elements that enhance the naturalisation and integration of nationalism in everyday life. Thus, embedded in the routines of daily life and internalised, nationalism has actually been shaped into common sense and a self-evident truth (Herzfeld, 2005).

Imposing a common language, education, and military service produces standardized citizens for a nation and establishes a unitary image of nation (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). The production of this unitary image requires the subversion of the differences between the members of a national community and the production of a sense of ‘us’ as the ‘same together’ (Pickering, 2001). Such a construction of national community leads to the perception of ‘us’ in a particular way, which is also useful in assuring a difference between nationals and non-nationals. Despite being accepted as fixed, the category definitions such as ‘who belongs to the nation’ and ‘who doesn’t’ also change depending on who to mobilize and how to mobilize them in support of the political projects of nationalism (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, alternative constructions coexist with the dominant nationalist interpretations and create tensions between the official and ordinary representations of nation. These counter constructions or narratives could challenge the totalising boundaries and
essentialist identities produced by the dominant nationalist ideologies (Bhabha, 1994).

The production of standardized citizens has tightened the relation between the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘society’, ignoring cultural and ethnic diversity and leading to these terms being used as coterminous. Billig (1995) points at how society is imagined, just like a nation state, as a bounded and independent entity. He notes that ‘society ....is created in the image of the nation state’ (p.53). According to Calhoun (1997), the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘people’ became historically intertwined with the rise of claims to popular sovereignty and nation became a way of describing ‘people’. Habermas (1998) also argues that ‘nation’ and ‘people’ have the same connotation in a political community shaped by common descent or at least by common language, history and culture.

Identification with nation is a crucial part of nationalism. Symbols, traditions and myths help people to identify themselves with a nation and also remind them of their nationhood. Giddens (1995) describes this emotional power of nationalism as ‘a psychological phenomenon’ (p.193) and stresses that in the contemporary world where traditions are shaken, feelings of commonality such as a shared language and a sense of belonging to a national community help to maintain ontological security. Identification with leadership and symbols not only provides people with security but creates a link with nationals and a differentiation from non-nationals as well. Thus, certain narratives and cultural symbols are adopted to enhance this sense of belonging and unity within the members of the community as well as to assert a cultural distinctiveness from other nations.

Nationalism enhances the sense of continuity of its national community by linking the present with the past. As Bhabha (1990) puts it ‘nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myth of time’ (p.1). The narrative of national histories constructs nations as entities that existed across time, regardless of whether the concept of nation existed or not (Calhoun, 1997). This continuity, which emphasises the similarities of a nation in the past and the present, strengthens the idea of an essential national identity. As Reicher and Hopkins (2001) state ‘the past is powerful in defining contemporary identity because it is represented in terms of a narrative
structure which invites those in the present to see themselves as participants in an ongoing drama' (p.150). Thus, a temporal link is achieved through 'structural nostalgia' that reconstitutes the past by highlighting the similarities between ancient and modern cultures (Herzfeld, 2005). The assertion of a fixed national identity not only conceals its modernity and constructedness but also reifies the essentialising strategies of nationalism. Although presented as such, nations do not have a single history but competing ones. The construction and reconstruction processes of national histories reflect the struggle for hegemony between different versions of nationalism. As part of the ideological power of nationalism, national histories not only provide continuity with the past but also act as the collective memory of a nation. Therefore, in the production of a collective memory, remembering is as important as forgetting or as Renan (1990) puts it, forgetting 'is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (p.11) because the violence utilised in the formation of a nation state clashes with the view of nation being given rather than created by force (Calhoun, 1997).

The impact of globalisation on nationalism and nation states is still an ongoing discussion. On the one hand, globalisation is said to cause the demise of nation-states and affect their coherence. On the other hand, nationalist movements in the wake of the Cold War showed that nationalism is still a powerful ideology. Describing such nationalist movements as 'forces of fragmentation', Biswas (2002, p.185) claims that even though such sub-nationalism could threaten the integrity of a nation state, it also strengthens and reproduces the idea of a nation. The transfer of some state functions which had been under the control of national governments to supranational organisations has reinforced the argument that the sovereignty of nation states is diminishing with economic and cultural globalisation. Challenging this view, Biswas (2002) stresses that rather than undermining the power of a nation state such changes have created new expectations in people and may result in nation states better performing and meeting demands of their people.

International recognition is another important aspect of being a nation. It is not enough to define itself as a nation in order to be recognised as a nation but gaining the acknowledgment of other nation states is also important. Joining in world affairs requires imagining the nation among other nations. In Billig's (1995) description, the
consciousness of national identity normally assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined as much as the national community does. Pointing at the relationship between nationalism and state, Bauman (1991) notes that 'nationalism without the state has been as flawed and ultimately impotent as state without nationalism to the point of one being inconceivable without the other' (p. 64). In this context, the system of the world of nations could be an incentive to nationalism but as, Calhoun (1997) states, it could also be a constraint on it because of the assumption that many nation states already exist. Such an approach can make it difficult for a new state to achieve international recognition.

National Identity

Modernity has replaced identification with kinship or the local groups of pre-modern times, with nation states. Giddens (1991) states that modernity has broken down the protective framework of the social relations of traditional communities, replacing them with other, impersonal institutions. This should not be taken to mean that kinship or local communities have lost their significance. They still shape identity and give a sense of belonging but they no longer offer a model for identification (Calhoun, 1994; Moores, 2000). The time and space distanciation of modern times no longer ties relations to a place and hence face-to-face relations. The development of the media has transformed the process of identity formation by providing individuals with mediated images. In a way, modern times have 'made the concept of identity distinctively problematic' (Calhoun, 1994, p.10). It does not mean that identity has been questioned more in this era than previous ones, but that it has become more difficult to establish identity. The nation state, another modern institution, has become an entity on which identity can be based because it provides people with a way of seeing and thinking of themselves. Consequently, identities are primarily 'anchored in national space' (Edensor, 2002, p.1).

National identity is a special kind of collective identity. It did not emerge as a criticism of institutionalism and centralisation of power and resources, but appeared to influence and assimilate the population to join national collectivity and unity (Gutierrez, 2001). Thus, it is the primary form of identity that creates coherence and
a sense of belonging by offering people authenticity, historical continuity and rootedness in a common territory (Dieckhoff & Gutierrez, 2001).

National identity is based on the concepts of sameness and difference. It could be associated with togetherness, based on some commonality where collective unity is highlighted, or it could be established through difference to the ‘other’. In either case, the existence of the ‘other’ is crucial in the construction of national identity because, like any identity, it does not exist in a vacuum but gains its meaning in relation to the ‘other’ (Hall, 1996). In a way, ‘there can be no ‘us’ without ‘them’’ (Billig, 1995, p.78). Similar to an imagined community, national identity is an invented phenomenon based on establishing a difference between self and the others. Therefore, difference from the ‘other’ is crucial in the definition of identity: anything that the ‘other’ is, ‘we’ are not. As Hall (1996) describes ‘... it is only in relation to the ‘other’, the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term – and thus its identity can be constructed’ (p.4). Cavallaro (2001) also draws attention to how the ‘other’ not only enables an individual to build a self-image but also gives meaning to it by either helping or forcing it to adopt a worldview in relation to itself.

The construction and reconstruction process of national identity involves the struggle between different versions of identity for hegemony. Different definitions of national identity are produced for different political projects. Depending on the definition of national interest, the categorisation of who national identity includes or excludes changes (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Evans (1996) suggests, the production of national identity, which is ‘the categorization of self or of ‘other’, inclusion and exclusion is an arena of contest between competing groups and institutions within society’ (p.34). In other words, with changes in the concept of national identity, new ‘others’ also emerge.

National identity is not a fixed or natural thing based on some common essence, as the essentialist would argue, but a concept that changes with different circumstances and contexts. In other words, it does not mean that it is passive and determined by social changes but is, on the contrary, a reflexive project that also contributes to these transformations. In this sense, reflexivity is the use of knowledge as a constitutive
element, as well as being a constant revision of it (Baker, 1997). Similar to the self in modern times, which ‘has to be explored and constructed as a part of a reflexive process of connecting personal and social change’ (Giddens, 1991, p.32), national identity also has a flexible form. Yet, despite its dynamic nature, national identity exhibits itself as a natural and fixed phenomenon. McCrone (2002) stresses that individuals consider their identity as fixed and immutable in any particular time and context. Furthermore, they claim particular national identities in different contexts over time and space.

The notion of a dynamic national identity clashes with the concept of ‘authentic’, traditional forms of identity, which emphasizes primordial ties. Essentialist approaches view national identity as centred, unified and fixed. Their assumption is that there is an underlying essence of identity that is natural and belongs to a shared culture. Contrary to this assumption, national identity is socially and discursively constructed and changes depending on the circumstances rather than being a natural or ‘given’ phenomenon. Therefore, it is not tradition-bound or homogenous, but a phenomenon that benefits from different sources which provide for different national identifications. However, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) emphasise, ‘national identity is always a project, the success of which depends upon being seen as an essence’ (p.222). For national identity to be effective it should not be seen as constructed but on the contrary, should be perceived as given or natural. This is why national identity is always produced as an essential and natural aspect of a nation.

Symbols, rituals, images and spaces are the resources for the production of national identity. These spatial, material, performative and embodied expressions of national identity are interlinked with each other, constituting a supply for a sense of national belonging (Edensor, 2002). However, their sharedness does not guarantee a consensus on their meanings. Rather than providing a fixed set of ideas, these cultural materials can be used and interpreted in different ways and hence act as diverse and multiple sources for the construction of national identity. The reflexive nature of these cultural representations contributes to the flexible character of national identity as well. Their dialectic relationship means that changes in the meaning of one also influence the meaning of the other. It is also that in the production process of a national identity, sometimes new symbols and rituals are
invented and circulated for members to identify with the nation and sometimes existing or old ones are evoked, reclaimed and reinterpreted to be embedded back into contemporary forms. The employment of cultural representations in the production of national identity depends on whether they support or undermine the construction of that identity. If they support it, then they are employed to essentialize the identity but if they undermine it then they are described as contingent factors (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

National identity plays a crucial role in the construction of nations. An identity is created and imposed on people to encourage them see and think of themselves in a similar way. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is achieved through the ideological state apparatuses as suggested by Althusser (Biswas, 2002). Shaped by state, politics, the media and everyday social practices, national identity is learned and internalised during the course of socialisation. The state, especially, has a role in the construction of national consciousness by a common education and military. It ‘shapes forms of perception, of categorisation, of interpretation and of memory which serve as the basis for a more or less orchestration of the habitus which becomes the basis for a kind of ‘national common sense’ through the school and the educational system’ (Wodak et al., 1999, p.29). Apart from daily practices, the importance of habitus becomes clearer in conflict situations, which makes one’s group characteristics seem natural and inherent while the difference of the ‘other’ group is viewed as unnatural and reprehensible (Mennell, 1994).

This differentiation or creation of boundaries is an important factor in the construction of national identity. Imagining national identity involves considering who is included in the nation and who is not. As Evans (1996) points out ‘the articulation of identity is premised upon the identification of symbolic boundaries’ (p.33). The crucial role of boundaries, whether they are in the minds of individuals or apparent, is to highlight the differences and similarities between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Constructed in relation to the ‘other’, they help to identify the self by identifying its difference from the ‘other’. Borders contribute to the production of national identity ‘through a process of negation, the creation of coherent sense of self through explicit rejections and denials’ (Evans, 1996, p.33). Drawing boundaries by defining the criteria of inclusion and exclusion strengthens notions of purity and unity. The
boundaries or borders provide the members of a group with a feeling of solidarity by allowing them to imagine themselves as a community, distinct and separate from the 'others'. As Goldman (1997) stresses, 'a unified sense of self and nation depends on the exclusion or 'othering' of any foreign element that disrupts that image of unity' (quoted in Morley, 2000, p.31). Just like in the formation of national identity, the boundary-drawing process also uses the resources of history, roots, cultural traditions, symbolic images and rituals (Edensor, 2002). However, the dynamic nature of national identity and multiple 'others' in a global world have made the process of boundary drawing more difficult.

In the discursive production of national identity, the concepts of space and time play crucial roles. For example, the discourse of national identity is generally rooted in a distant time. The primordial origins of nations that create continuity over time go together with their common project for the future. In the elaboration of national identity, the relationship between the past and the present is linked by the continual and selective reconstitution of traditions and social memory (Schlesinger, 1991). Formed as narratives, they allow the construction of national identity in a coherent temporal structure despite its dynamic context. Evolving around temporal axes of past, present and future, narratives create a biographical continuity and provide national identity with a collective memory as well as with a future orientation that represents the interests of the nation (Moores, 2000). Positioning identities in time and space creates a meaning and coherence as the basis of that identity and also allows it to presume continuity (Giddens, 1991). By arranging, interpreting, rearranging and reinterpreting, the past offers meaning to identity narratives as a way of expressing one's identity (Wodak et al, 1999).

National identity is constructed within a bounded space that creates an attachment to it. As Schlesinger suggests, a nation state does not resolve the problem of how a national identity is constructed but limits the possible elaborations of it and the national space is where these elaborations take place (Schlesinger, 1991). Nations, surrounded and separated from other national spaces by borders, bring people who live in it together and give them a sense of belonging and solidarity. While a nation resembles a big family, national space is treated as 'home' in nationalist discourses. Tablor's (1998) statement summarises this relationship well: 'a house identified with
the self is called a ‘home’, a country identified with the self is called a ‘homeland’ (quoted in Morley 2000, p.266). Thus, in many discursive constructions and embodiments of national identity, the notion of ‘home’ and ‘nation’ are used synonymously. The employment of the concept of ‘home’ for ‘nation’ not only gives a feeling of security and belonging but also as they are depicted as united and homogenous places, the construction of both involves the exclusion of anything foreign (Morley, 2000).

The impact of globalisation on the nation state is one of the common debates in studies of nationalism and globalisation: Does globalisation lead to the demise of nations? Globalisation has different definitions, varying from cultural homogenisation to Westernisation, that highlight different aspects of it (Özkırmlı, 2005). The economic and political challenges of globalization to the state cannot be ignored. It can also be argued that globalisation has disrupted the idea of nation as a homogenous and united entity. Developments such as new communication technologies and increased mobility have made it difficult to base the production of identity on a place (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). The formation of multi-cultural societies crashed the myth of pure and homogenous nations, providing sources for cultural hybridization. As Bhabha puts it, the juxtaposition of culture from the native locale and culture of the place of migration produces a ‘culture in-between’ (Bhabha, 1996, p.54) and hybrid identities become an inevitable condition. These identities ‘disassemble all forms of homogenous national identity’ (Baker, 1997, p.194). They also demand a new vision of that culture and national identity that includes hybrid identities or embraces multiple ways by which people identify themselves (Edensor, 2002; Morley, 2000).

As well as increasing the range of resources available for identity construction, globalisation also led to the emergence of multiple ‘others’ that made the inclusion and exclusion process more complicated. Hence, the establishment and maintenance of boundaries necessary for the preservation of ‘national unity’ have become more difficult. Permeable boundaries have allowed the arrival of foreigners or ‘others’ easier, breaching national borders and disrupting notions of the ‘purity’ and unity of nation. It was as if ‘all the members of the community lived in a paradisical state of social harmony’ and that things ‘have changed for the worse under the influence of
immigrants and their alien ways' (Morley, 2000, p.210). Therefore, in an effort to protect the unity of nation and national identity, nationalism increasingly articulates homogeneity among the members while asserting the difference and inferiority of ‘others’.

Despite the challenges of globalisation to the state, nation is still an important source of political and cultural identity. Globalisation has raised questions about the power of national identity but, contrary to the argument that national identity is eliminated under the influence of globalisation, it is renegotiated and reconstructed. For example, the globalisation of nationalist ideas enhances the notion that nations should have unique and distinct identities. As suggested by Biswas (2002), ‘assertion of collective identity both as an element of, as well as in response to, globalisation is then more nation producing than nation destroying’ (p.194). Edensor (2002) also argues against the idea that globalisation is weakening national identity. Implying that globalisation and national identity should not be taken as binary terms but as two interlinked processes, Edensor stresses that lack of spatial and cultural fixedness in the global world reinforces a new sense of belonging. For example, faced with the threat of the deterritorialisation forces of globalisation, national identity reconstitutes itself by re-territorializing either in local or national contexts. Özkınmlılı (2005) also describes a revival of nationalism and ethnicity as being a means of countering the threats of globalization to national distinctiveness.

Nations are assumed to have a distinct character that separates them from other nations that can be defined as the national character. National character, ‘a form of positive stereotyping, a collective ‘we’ through an imagined personification’, (Pickering, 2001, p.95) not only generalises certain characteristics to the population in general but also represents national identity as natural or given rather than a social construction (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Pickering, 2001). In other words, it portrays the traits that are the products of social relations as the essential and natural characteristic, which again can be used to gain consensus for certain nationalist projects. Herzfeld (2005) highlights that stereotyping can be used as a homogenising tool or act as a ‘totalising iconicity’ (p.29), which helps to manage the population. Having deprived the ‘other’ of certain positive properties, stereotyping could also be employed by the totalitarian regimes as an instrument in the repression of minority
groups. While stereotyping can be employed to emphasise ‘our’ national distinctiveness, it can also be used to attribute prejudice to outside groups that justifies their exclusion (Pickering, 2001).

National character also provides commonality and distinctiveness for the members of a nation in a world that consists of many nations. Even though both national identity and national character seem to have the same meaning, as Perry Anderson (1992) notes, there is a distinction between these two concepts. According to Anderson, character as a concept covers all the traits of an individual or a group, while identity as a notion involves self-awareness:

Identity in other words, always possesses a reflexive or subjective dimension, while character can at the limit remain purely objective, something perceived by others without the agent being conscious of it. What obtains for individuals holds good for peoples. If national character was thought to be a settled disposition, national identity is a self-conscious projection (Anderson, 1992, p.268).

Anderson also argues that there has been a shift from the discourse of national character to the discourse of national identity and it was the decline of the notion of national character that allowed the rise of the discourse of national identity.

Media and National Identity

Just like nations and national identity, the development of the media cannot be separated from the development of modern societies. Acting as a manufacturer and distributor of symbolic materials, the media have transformed the individual’s sense of self and community and restructured the ways in which individuals relate to one another and to themselves. However, it is not a one-way process, because as well as reflecting and constituting the modern society, the media were also constituted by it (Thompson, 1995).

One of the important impacts of the development of the media has been a change in the sense of place and time. In many traditional communities, it was the shared experience and spatial proximity that defined the sense of belonging. With mediated
experiences, this commonality is no longer defined by a shared locale. Fostering relations between the absent others as if they were present and creating a co-existence, the media have weakened self-formation and created communities without a place (Thompson, 1995). As a result, now individuals can be a part of a community without sharing the same locale.

An increase in mediated experiences created the conditions for temporal simultaneity. The temporal simultaneity of mediated experiences enhances a sense of co-existence even among people who are in other physical places (Giddens, 1991). It has 'an effect of synchronisation of cultural experiences across large distances' especially for migrant populations (Morley, 2000, p.168). New communication technologies not only create a link between the dispersed migrant populations and their nations but also promote a sense of belonging and social unity among its audience. They allow immigrants to maintain a link between their homeland and national identity. For example, in the case of Kurdish people, MED TV not only presented an opportunity for ethnic broadcasting that national regulations in Turkey did not allow at the time, but also created a feeling of community in the Diasporas. But, Bhabha (1999) raises a concern about the notion of 'national temporality' by asking 'if the virtual community shares the essential temporal structure of the modern nation-form and its social imaginary, then what will prevent the reproduction on the net of the worst excess of nationalism and xenophobia' (p.ix).

The media transform the process of construction of self-identity by introducing new forms of symbolic materials. Constantly introducing new worlds, new lifestyles, different beliefs and cultures, the media expand and transform the resources available to individuals for self-formation. In a sense, 'mediated experience' (Giddens, 1991, p.26) or 'mediated worldliness' (Thompson, 1995, p.34) shape the individuals' changing sense of the world. However, it does not mean that local experiences and face-to-face interactions are no longer important, but that many materials that contribute to the sense of personal identity have become mediated (Moores, 2000).

As well as introducing new forms of symbolic cultural materials to people's lives, the media also benefit from traditions, especially in the articulation of national identity. Like collective memory and symbols, traditions also contribute to the sense
of belonging, strengthening the links with the past, giving a sense of continuity and transmitting a national identity. Even though traditions seem to be threatened by modern culture, the media have reshaped the identity formation aspects of traditions. They have taken traditions out of face-to-face contexts and re-embedded them in new locales and in new contexts. By fixing them on a medium and transferring them from generation to generation, the mediation of traditions actually enables them to survive rather than lead to their demise (Thompson, 1995). The repetition or practice is an important factor in the lifespan of traditions, especially considering that most traditions are invented (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983). These invented traditions face the risk of disappearing unless they are integrated into daily life and repeated in everyday activities. It is important to note, however, that despite appearing to be fixed and unchanging, traditions are constantly negotiated and transformed.

The formation of nations, according to Anderson (1993), happened in part as a result of the mass media. Print media such as fictional books and newspapers particularly, contributed to the rise of national consciousness and the nation as 'imagined community'. With print media, language became standardised and gave people the opportunity to better understand and communicate with each other. This standard language, that later became 'national', helped to disseminate national consciousness among people. Anderson also suggests that the concept of 'empty time' allowed people to imagine the simultaneous occurrence of events across time and space. Knowing that the media were being consumed by the absent others led, in a similar way, to the imagining of a community and the conceptualisation of nation. However, advances in new media technologies make it necessary to extend Anderson's theory about the relationship between the print media and nation as the development of different forms of media have also contributed to the conceptualisation of nation. For example, broadcasting has played a crucial role in promoting a sense of national identity and helped to foster a sense of national unity as well as providing a focus for national identification (Morley & Robins, 1995; Barker, 1997).

The media play a crucial role in defining and renegotiating a national identity by contributing to the process of imagination and invention of a national identity through the representation of cultural forms such as landscapes, everyday places, events, cultural beliefs, habits and routines. The articulation of national identity is
sustained by the dissemination of mediated images, narratives, landscapes, events, habits and tradition through programmes, adverts, books, films and so on. These forms work because they are naturalised and interwoven into the daily practices of life; they are embedded in the routines of everyday life and disseminated as part of the daily ritual. By circulating images and narratives of national cultural symbols, the national media also provide a base for a national identity (Edensor, 2002). Also, the media do not just represent a nation but also redefine it in the way they represent it. By articulating national cultural values and mediating national symbols embedded in the social routines of life, the media presents its audience with a nation in symbolic form. In its representation, the national media generally portray the nation as united, homogenous and stable, making differences based on gender, ethnicity and class invisible.

The language of the media contributes to the definition of who ‘we’ are. The usage of ‘we’ in the media discourse creates a bond between the audience and the media. The media ‘use the nationalised syntax of hegemony, speaking to and for the nation’ (Billig, 1995, p.98), especially in the political and editorial columns of the print media, to enhance the sense of unity. The nationalist discourse that dominates particularly the foreign news creates a sense of ‘we’. Moreover, the structure of the news that separates ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ news also encourages the process of imagining a national community (Billig, 1995). In this way, the media help nationalism to be naturalised and internalised without being questioned.

In contrast to the positive light shed on ‘us’, the ‘others’ are identified by negative stereotypes in the media. By giving a stereotypical representation of the ‘other’, the media also provide a base for the reconstruction of ‘our’ identity because the depiction of the ‘other’ is related to ‘us’ and how ‘we’ define ourselves. Creation of ‘enemies’ of the nation by the national media enforces ethnocentric and nationalist perceptions among people. Thus, with their representation of the ‘enemy’, the media contribute to the construction of a nation and a feeling of unity among the members of the nation (Tsagarousianou, 1999). Another way of reinforcing people’s attitudes and perceptions is disseminating old cultural myths or negative portrayals of minorities or neighbouring countries. As well as reinforcing the concept of ‘enemy’, articulation of such representations by the media also leads to the fear of losing ‘our’
identity, purity and becoming a minority in ‘our’ homeland. As a result, nationalistic feelings and perceptions are enhanced towards the ‘others’.

The media can also be an important weapon during conflicts by provoking hatred. Such employment of the media was as seen in the examples of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Terzis (2001) also points to how both the Greek and the Turkish media initiated a conflict in the Imia/Kardak Aegean islets crisis in 1996, nearly bringing both countries to the brink of war. A flag had been placed on the islet by a Greek politician and was later removed by Turkish journalists. The story was reported in both countries and led to further incidents and media coverage full of nationalistic discourses and representations. As a result, both the Turkish and the Greek media increased tension between the two countries. Although the media is a strong instrument in shaping nationalist perceptions about the ‘other’, the audience is not passively influenced by them. In receiving the message and renegotiating its meaning it should be noted that not everyone in the audience accepts the categorisation or placement of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ division. Some challenge the binary opposition constructions of the media and resist their messages.

The media link national public life with the private lives of its citizens and mediate a sense of personal and collective identity. The term ‘public’ is related to state activities while ‘private’ refers to the personal relations outside the control of the state (Thompson, 1995). By penetrating into the private lives of people, especially broadcasting, the media forge ‘a link between the dispersed and disparate listeners and the symbolic heartland of national life’ and have ‘a role in promoting a sense of communal identity within its audience at both regional and national level’ (Cardiff & Scannell quoted in Morley, 2000, p.106). With the development of the media, any event can be turned into a public event, even though the public is not present at the place of its occurrence. By demonstrating social events as public events and taking them into the private spheres of homes, the media are linking the national public sphere with the private lives of its citizens (Morley, 2000). For example, nationalist ceremonies, in which national identities are performed in the most recognisable ways, are broadcast into the homes of individuals. Repetition of these ceremonies, as well as their increased mediation helps them to be inscribed in the memory and accepted as a part of social life (Edensor, 2002). The media also connect the
dispersed audience together. Watching television or listening to radio can give a sense of unity by knowing that many others are doing the same thing at the same time. It helps people relate to others and produce coherence among the audience, contributing to a shared sense of reality (Morley, 2000). Yet, such practice is not only limited to broadcasting, as newspapers also provide imaginary links with other members of a national community (Anderson, 1993).

The media are an arena in which different representations of ‘us’ and ‘others’ struggle for dominance. Despite the attempts of hegemonic discourse and representations to fix the meaning of national identity, there is an ongoing struggle for alternative representations and constructions of it. Even representations of the same national cultural forms can be used to reconstruct national identity in contradicting forms. The hegemonic version of national identity is reflected through the media because, in the public sphere, the national media represent the nation: Whoever is included or excluded from this public sphere is also included and excluded from the symbolic nation they produce. As Morley (2000) observes, ‘when the culture of that public sphere (thus of the nation) is in effect racialised by the naturalization of one ... form of ethnicity, then only some citizens of the nation find it a homely and welcoming place’ (p.118).

The media have not only become global themselves but have also contributed to globalisation through their circulation of images and discourses. The introduction of new worlds, new life styles, beliefs and different cultures through the media has increased the range of sources for identity construction. Using globally transformed cultural products, people constantly define their concepts of nation and national identity. As well as providing multiple resources for identity formation, the global media also make people aware of cultures different from their own and encourage awareness of the ‘others’. Such representation of the ‘other’ may facilitate the production of a national identity based on difference from the ‘other’ as well as develop an understanding and tolerance towards the different ‘other’, depending on how they are represented.

It has been argued that globalisation has diminished and threatened the power of nation states within which the media operate. Combined with the increased mobility
that makes boundaries more permeable, the new communication technologies have brought some fear that they undermine the capacity of national states to police the circulation of the mediated information. The issue of controlling who crosses the threshold and enters the sacred space of nation and home has become more challenging (Morley and Robins, 1995; Morley, 2000). There is also a fear that with the globalisation of the media, national culture is invaded by foreign cultural factors and that national identity is being threatened. Yet, focusing only on the negative impact of media technologies on the nation and national identity, and claiming that nations have lost their power, is undervaluing the continuing importance of nations. Because, through market definitions, frequency licensing, cultural policy and advertising, the power of nation states still continues (Straubhaar, 2001). When globalisation is perceived not only as a threat to national sovereignty and national identities but as surpassing the regulatory capacity of nations as well, attempts to ‘re-territorialize the media’ become expressions about the distinctiveness and integrity of regional and local cultures against the forces of globalisation (Morley & Robins, 1995). Despite the global circulation of information, national cultural factors still play a role in the selection and interpretation of messages. Edensor (2002) notes that the globalisation of the media has not diminished the ways in which national identity is represented but on the contrary ‘has unleashed a torrent of national representations, comprising a welter of stereotypical portrayals and symbols as well as avenues for dissenting and dissonant representations’ (p.142). Audiences who receive symbolic forms are situated in a specific time and place, which means that the source of appropriation is still national. Therefore, the national media still play a central role in people’s everyday lives. People still read national newspaper and watch and listen to national broadcasts. Straubhaar (2001) suggests that the ones who watch the globalized channels are mostly the middle and upper class elites, as the access to these channels is limited by economic and cultural capital.

On the other hand, the impact of globalisation on national cultures through the media cannot be ignored. Even though national cultures still shape the content of their cultural forms, they are also affected by the spread of global models. Straubhaar (2001) argues that adaptation of these models to national cultures and circumstances results in the localisation or hybridisation of these global patterns. Using these patterns, new materials and symbolic resources, national producers create cultural
products that are adapted to national audiences. In other words, hybridization is the interaction of local elements with global ones to create new forms of culture: Sometimes the local culture only slightly adapts to foreign elements but sometimes the result is the extinction of local culture and language (Straubhaar, 2001).

The global media are seen as a threat to national identities because they replace national identities with hybrid ones. Barker (1997) states 'globalisation has increased the range of sources and resources available for identity constructions allowing for the production of hybrid identities' (p.191). Hence, it can be argued that rather than threatening or leading to the demise of national identities, hybrid identities demand a new vision of that culture and national identity as globalisation has created conditions for a more inclusive version of national identity as well as making cultural purity a fantasy (Edensor, 2002). Therefore, a new re-articulation of national identity is required which will include these hybrid identities or embrace multiple ways in which people identify themselves.
CHAPTER 2: EVOLVING NATIONAL IDENTITIES

This chapter discusses how different concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity have been constituted over the years. In the analysis, as well as focusing on historical factors, I also study the economic, political and cultural perspectives that may have produced, renegotiated and transformed the concept of Turkish Cypriot identity. The aim of this part of the study is not to discuss the existence of a genuine Turkish Cypriot identity but to concentrate on the process of its construction.

Identity Definitions

The construction of an identity is an ongoing process which becomes very clear in Cyprus in the different ways by which both communities refer to themselves: One describes itself as Greek, Greek Cypriot, Cypriot Greek or Cypriot while the other calls itself Turk, Turkish Cypriot, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot or, as some writers do, Turkish Cypriot. Each term indicates a particular conception of national identity that the person identifies with (Ramm, 2002/2003; Papadakis, 2005) and each signifies a certain type of cultural and political belonging as well as a vision for the future. For example, while Greeks and Turks view themselves as the extension of their respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey, the term Cypriot refers to the idea that 'Cyprus has its own sui generis character and thus must be viewed as an entity independent from both the motherlands of the two main communities' (italics in original) (Kahn, 2002/2003, p.58).

Turkish Cypriot, on the other hand, is a general term that contains these two oppositional terms, Turkish and Cypriot. In some contexts, people use the term with a stress on Turkishness, yet in others it highlights Cypriotness. Who the 'other' is also has an influence on its definition and meaning. For instance, Turkish Cypriots stress their Cypriotness in relation to mainland Turks but their Turkishness when

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1 In this study, I will use the term Turkish Cypriot, not as an indication of its preferred meaning but because it is the common reference in the literature about Cyprus. I will also employ the term Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot because again it is a more common and widely used term.
positioned against Greek Cypriots. Even though word-by-word translation of the term Turkish Cypriot (which is how the community is referred to in English) is Türk Kibrislı, what Turkish Cypriots call themselves generally in Turkish is Kibrislı Türk (Cypriot Turk). Examining the meanings of both terms, one could perceive that Turkish Cypriot conceptualises the community as being Cypriot but characterises it as Turkish while the other, Cypriot Turk (or Kibrislı Türk) describes itself as being Turkish but being from Cyprus\(^2\). Recent developments, adding to this confusing list of identities, have brought new identity conceptualisations as well. Now according to research (Kadem, 2007), rather than being a term that connotes either Turkishness or Cypriotness, being Turkish Cypriot or Kibrish Türk refers to a new meaning that consists of equal degree of Turkishness and Cypriotness which, it can be argued, indicates a national identity distinct from both mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the concept of Cypriotism is now also being expressed with a stress on ethnicity that shows itself especially in written literature as Turkishcypriot.

The politics of identity has played an important role in the creation of the Cyprus Problem as identity has always been expressed through nationalist discourses (Calotychos, 1998). Attempts to construct a Cypriot identity failed as a result of competing nationalisms in Cyprus that did not allow the formation of a common Cyprus state and nationhood (Kızilyüreğ, 2002/2003; Kahn, 2002/2003). Despite having lived together for centuries, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots developed different and competing visions of identity and belonging that resulted in two conflicting visions for the future. The national/ethnic consciousness of both communities was cultivated by Hellenic and Turkish nationalisms and led both to see themselves as part of Greek and Turkish nations rather than a separate Cypriot nation. Nationalist narratives and ethnicization of politics over the years overcame the principles of tolerance and recognition of identities on which Cypriotism needed to be constructed (Kahn, 2002/2003). Instead, as Constantinou (2007) stresses, Cypriot identities are constructed in a hyphenated form which means that Cypriots had to become Greeks or Turks:

\(^2\) Turkish Cypriots call Greek Cypriots Kibrish Rum or Rum. In a similar way, in English the term Greek Cypriot emphasises Cypriotness but describes it as Greek. In Turkish Kibrish Rum means Greeks from Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots there is also a distinction between the mainland Greeks and the ones in Cyprus: Greeks in Greece are referred to as Yunanlı but the ones in Cyprus are called Rum. In this research I will translate Kibrish Rum or Rum as Greek Cypriots.
The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek-Turkish axis. Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility' (Constantinou, 2007, p.248).

The organisation of public life along ethnic lines by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus enhanced the institutionalisation of separate ethnic identities. Thus, as Constantinou (2007) maintains, modern governments and a politics based on the ethnic-national distinction not only made it difficult to use identities more flexibly but were also far from creating Cypriotness.

Identity became a problematic issue for Cypriots with the emergence of nationalism in the age of modernity which, according to some scholars, provides a good example for the study of issues such as the different effects of modernity and the development of nationalism and ethnicity (Bryant, 2004; Theophylactou, 1995). Cyprus’ encounter with modernity did not form a Cypriot identity but resulted in the emergence of two conflicting nationalisms with two different conceptions of national identity. This is why, rather than being singular, there are different approaches to and readings of the history of Cyprus. As one scholar describes, ‘there’s no “history” of Cyprus, there are “histories”’ (Nevzat, 2005, p.28). Struggling for acceptance, both nations’ competing histories try to tell the story of their nation in their own way. According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005), it is the competing and diverse understandings offered by the official Cyprus histories of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots that actually lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict. For example, claims about the existence of two national communities on the island have two different reference points in history: While Greek Cypriots claim a 3,000 years legacy to Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots take the Ottoman conquest in 1571 as the starting point of their history on the island (Calotychos, 1998; Bryant, 2004). Even the description of the Cyprus problem is different for the two communities on the island: Greek Cypriots emphasize the events of 1974 and present the Cyprus problem as an international issue in which Turkey invaded an independent state. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, claim that it is an inter-communal issue and focus their arguments on the inter-communal fighting in the 1960’s and the Greek Cypriot nationalism movement called enosis (union with Greece) (Calotychos, 1998; Papadakis, 1998;
Anastasiou, 2002; Tocci, 2001). As the Greek Cypriots' version of history tries to normalize the pre-1974 era by ignoring the strife in the aftermath of independence, the Turkish Cypriots' version tries to legitimize the Turkish intervention as the logical outcome of the inter-communal violence and their sense of insecurity in relation to Greek Cypriots.

Cyprus' Encounter with Modernity and Nationalism

It was around the end of the Ottoman administration and the start of the British rule in 1878 that Cyprus' encounter with modernity brought many significant changes to Cypriots' lives. Adopting an ideology of modernization, they also developed ethnic nationalism. The emergence of two conflicting nationalisms and political claims as a result of modernity led to what Bryant (2004) describes as 'ethnic estrangement' (p.2). The demarcation of the communities in Cyprus as 'Greeks' and 'Turks' seemed more obvious with the nationalist imaginations developed in modern times, especially when they constructed each other as the enemy.

The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571 is an important starting point in Cyprus history as it was with their arrival that Turks and Turkish ethnicity came to exist on the island (Kizilyürek, 1983; Nevzat, 2005; Beratlı, 1993). Having taken the island from the Venetians, the Ottoman Empire brought a number of Turkish people to settle in Cyprus. By organizing a settlement programme for a large number of Anatolians, mainly of Turkish ethnic origin, the Ottomans introduced a Muslim community to the island that already had a predominantly Greek Orthodox community (Beratlı, 1993). The traditional Ottoman system was based on the millet system, which organized the communities according to their religious identity. Each millet had its own religious leader and was autonomous in administering its own affairs. Therefore, membership of the community and definitions of identity were based on religion rather than ethnicity or nationality. The identities were constructed as Christian and Muslim, not as Greek and Turk.

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3 For a brief timetable of events, see Appendix.
The change from the traditional Ottoman system to modern politics and the new institutional and administrative structure of the British administration had a transforming effect on the people of Cyprus. Replacing the existing religious autonomy and communal foundations with a centralized state was instrumental in the transformation of the identities (Pollis, 1998). First of all, the existing hierarchies changed: For Muslim Turks, even though the British administration of the island was seen as a temporary situation, it not only loosened their links with the Ottoman government (if not cut them completely), but also reduced them from being a minority that governed to a minority being governed (Nevzat, 2005). The first experience of this change came as the British established the Legislative Council, a representative body constituted of the elected members from both communities as well as the representatives of the British administration. Although a similar representative body had existed under the Ottomans and was not so extraordinary, according to Nevzat (2005), it made a big difference for the Muslim Turks. The difference was that the Ottoman council was based on equal representation of each community, irrespective of their numbers, while the British legislative council was based on the representation of the communities, not on equal basis, but on their proportion to the overall population. As a result, the British legislative council included nine Christian Orthodox and three Muslim Turks with six British members. ‘This’, Nevzat states, ‘came as the first rude shock of British rule’ (p.117). This process, notes Pollis (1998), also facilitated the reformation of identities as Greeks and Turks to represent the interests of two communities. She claims that ‘this organ not only fostered the creation of distinct ethnic identities but ascribed to them political significance by structurally pitting each group against the other in competition for resources and power’ (p.93).

The replacement of the Ottoman governing system with the British administration also forced people to redefine their allegiances and relationship to the state. The most important redefinition was the transformation of Cypriots from being ‘subjects’ to ‘citizens’. The modern politics that the British introduced in Cyprus based its mode of legitimisation on the concept of equal citizenship. Taking part in such decision-making processes provided Cypriots with the self-consciousness that turned them into individuals and politically active citizens, as well as developing the idea of political autonomy (Nevzat, 2005). According to Habermas (1998), the
implementation of citizenship combined with membership to a culturally defined community strengthens social integration and paves the way towards imagining a national community which was also the case for the members of each of the two communities of the island.

In this context, the issue of identity became increasingly problematic for Cypriots. As the concept of national community developed the demand to state one's allegiance to it increased as well. In Cyprus, this was especially the case with a sect called linobambakoi which was Greek Orthodox but converted to Islam during Ottoman rule to avoid persecution and benefit from the opportunities available to Muslims. Even though linobambakoi (or linobambakoi) claimed to be Muslim and had the appearance of Turks, they practiced Christianity in secret. Not having a fixed religious identity led them to be called linobambakoi, which meant linen and cotton. The shifting nature of their religious identities was mainly ignored by both communities, but when ethnic/nationalist claims and aspirations gained strength, the linobambakoi were pressured to choose an identity between Orthodox Greek and Muslim Turk (Gürkan, 2006; Constantinou; 2007; Bryant, 2004). The shifting or perhaps ambivalent identities of linobambakoi, says Bryant (2004) 'became important only in a period in which it was considered important for them to declare their “true” Greek identity through professing their “true” faith' (p. 66).

The press and secular education in Cyprus, which were two important tools in the dissemination of nationalism and the imagining of a nation, developed during British rule. Referring to The Cyprus Blue Book of statistics in 1889-1990, Ünlü mentions that there were seven Greek newspapers and one Turkish newspaper being published in the first years of British rule (Ünlü, no date). Claude Deleval Cobham, who compiled and published a bibliography of Cyprus also mentioned the publication of 47 newspapers between 1878 and 1908, 28 of them being in Greek, 11 in English and six in Turkish (Cobham, 1908). The print media contributed to the imagining of a national community by creating relations with the 'absent ones', encouraging a sense of co-existence with other members of their community. Politicians in particular benefited from this characteristic of the media as they needed the newspapers both to instruct and create a 'public' for themselves in order to get support for their causes.
They took advantage of these newspapers, as the main source of information in Cyprus at the time, by using them to control public opinion (Bryant, 2004). Language was another element in the development of the national consciousness among Cypriots. In Cyprus, although there is no convergence between the language Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots use, language and religion were not always separated as distinctly. In some villages, many Muslim Turks actually spoke Greek as their first language. Being isolated from their ethnic community due to poor transportation and communication, these Muslim Turks adopted Greek as their main language (Nevzat, 2005; Kızilyürek & Gautier- Kızilyürek, 2004). The domination of the middle class by Greek Cypriots might have also increased the economic and social motivation for Turkish Cypriots to use Greek (Kızilyürek & Gautier- Kızilyürek, 2004). Apart from the language itself, dialects spoken on the island were different from the official forms of these languages. As Bryant (2004) explains, the Greek spoken by Cypriots was different from katharevousa, the official form of Greek or dhimotiki, the spoken language in Greece. In the Turkish Cypriots’ case, even though their dialect was not too different from the language spoken in Anatolia, they still had difficulties with the language used for bureaucratic purposes which was influenced by Arabic.

Education, which was another important tool in the dissemination of nationalism, went through a transformation during the British administration as well. Under the Ottoman Empire, lessons were conducted by religious leaders. While the content of education in the schools of Muslim Turks was based mostly on religion, it focused on national issues in the Greek Orthodox schools (Kızilyürek, 1983). Describing the education as ineffective, the British administrators set out to change the content and context of education in Cyprus which also increased national narratives. In order to give children education in their own languages, teachers and teaching materials were brought from Greece and Turkey. The new curriculum included Greece and Turkey’s histories and geographies which encouraged the construction of national identities among the Cypriot youth as Greeks and Turks. It can be argued that it was through education that Cypriots learned how to be Greeks and Turks or, as Bryant (2004) puts it, ‘through education Cypriots learned not how to think nationally but how to be nationally’ (p.127). The education in the schools of Cyprus was not just a nationalistic propaganda tool, but also a socialization process, which taught the
young generation to identify with their community's values and keep those values alive. Pollis (1998) suggests that by separating the schools for Greek and Turkish students and allowing these schools to recruit teachers from Greece and the Ottoman Empire (later Turkey), the British actually encouraged the construction and politicization of ethnic and national identities through education. However, as well as accepting that education was a prime area in which community segregation was institutionalized, Nevzat (2005) challenges the idea that it was the British who created this segregation. He argues that when the British arrived, nationalism was already in place and, to some extent, being disseminated through Greek Cypriot educational channels.

Development of Nationalism and National Identity in Cyprus

The changes that took place in Cyprus during its encounter with modernity were expressed through the medium of nationalism. Calhoun (1997) claims that nationalism has different dimensions: as discourse, project and evaluation. While nationalism produces particular versions of thought and language as discourse, it also sets out to advance the interests of the nation as its project. In evaluation, it fosters political and cultural ideologies to create a sense of loyalty and belief. In Cyprus, nationalism within the two main ethnic communities on the island developed as different discourses, projects and evaluation and failed to construct a collective sense of Cypriotism. Despite having lived in Cyprus together, both communities imagined themselves as part of other nations, namely Greece and Turkey. As Stavrinides (1999) explains 'thus, although Andreas and Ali may be natives and residents of Cyprus and regard the island as their common homeland, they do not normally regard themselves as compatriots but rather as neighbours' (p.15). Therefore, rather than joining together in an anti-colonial struggle for independence from British rule, these two communities' nationalism movements demanded enosis (unification with Greece) and taksim (partition) and they both struggled to integrate with their so-called motherlands of Greece and Turkey instead of working towards independence. As a result, the concept of Cypriotism did not develop among Cypriots until recent years.
There are many suggested reasons for the development of such nationalisms in Cyprus. Some explain it as the result of the foreign policy goals of countries such as Britain, Greece and Turkey as well as a result of Britain’s colonial policies (Pollis, 1998). It is also explained by the internal dynamics that point at the elites and leaders of both communities who shaped their nationalistic frameworks along with their nationalistic ideals (Kızılyürek, 1988). Even though the modernisation process and colonial policies, as well as geography, demographic changes, socio-cultural factors and economic factors played a role in the Cyprus conflict (Morag, 2004), they fall short of explaining the continuing stalemate today. Therefore, it is hard not to agree with Tocci (2001) who highlights irrational fear and prejudice in the communities as the main culprits.

The fear and anxiety of Turkish Cypriots about being a minority in a Greek state developed in the form of Turkish nationalism and as a resistance to the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. From the start, Turkish Cypriots opposed the enosis movement and were concerned that the island would be incorporated into Greece (Kızılyürek, 2002, 2003; Beratlı, 1991; Nevzat, 2005). Even though a nationalist consciousness among Turkish Cypriots became obvious during the 1920’s, which suggests that they were influenced by the developments taking place in Turkey, nationalism was discernible among the elites even as early as Britain’s arrival to the island. Nevzat (2005) recalls that the nationalism among Turkish Cypriots emerged first as the concept of an Ottoman nation and then in the wake of the Young Turk revolution in Turkey, as the idea of a Turkish nation. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, a strong identification with the Turkish nation took place among Turkish Cypriots. In other words, Turkish nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots was not just the consequence of the Greek Cypriot enosis demands but also the nationalistic movements diffusing from the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey. In either case, as Kızılyürek (2002) summarizes, Turkish Cypriots went through a transformation of their identity from being a ‘post-Ottoman’ minority in isolation to being conscious of their Turkish identity as part of the Turkish nation. Meanwhile, at the time of Britain’s arrival, there was already discernible nationalism among the Greek Cypriot elite. Influenced by the Greek Independence war against the Ottomans, the reconstruction of Greek religious identity into an ethnic/nationalist identity was already underway (Pollis, 1998).
The start of the First World War and the entry of Britain and the Ottoman Empire into the war on opposing sides created an ambivalent situation for Turkish Cypriots. On the one side was the administration that ruled them and on the other, the Ottoman Empire to whom they were still emotionally attached. With the start of the War, the ruling groups in particular expressed their support for and allegiance with the British (Kızılyürek, 2003, 1983; Egemen, 2006; Evre, 2004). Yet, the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War brought fresh anxiety about their future in terms of security and at the prospect of being a minority in a Greek state, making them feel isolated. Meanwhile, the new generation of Turkish Cypriots who were influenced by Turkish nationalist ideas identified themselves with the Kemalist movement and were critical of the British administration (Canefe, 2007, Egemen, 2006, Kızılyürek, 2003, 2002). The emergence of a Turkish resistance movement in Anatolia gave them new hope. The establishment of the new Turkish state played an important role in the reconstruction of the identity of Turkish Cypriots, which meant shedding their identity as the Muslims of Cyprus and adopting an ethnic/national Turkish identity. Now they were not the Muslims of Cyprus but Turks (Nevzat, 2005; Assmusen, 2004). However, they were not just adopting a national identity but also the Turkish nationalism that had encouraged it.

Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the separation between the two communities became more apparent, leading to the formation of two separate public spheres in Cyprus (Tombazos, 2003). The Treaty saw Turkey renounce its rights to Cyprus, leaving it out of the national territories of the new Turkish state, and made Turkish Cypriots the citizens of a British Crown Colony but attachment and identification with the Turkish nation continued to exist among Turkish Cypriots (Nevzat, 2005). The decision to follow Atatürk's project of modernization was an indication of the Turkish Cypriots' orientation towards Turkey. Reforms such as secularisation, the exchanging of the Arabic alphabet for the Latin one and the replacing of the fez with European-style hat were not obligatory for Turkish Cypriots, who were British citizens, but 'Muslims in Cyprus immediately and voluntarily adopted these new statements of their identity, even while their presumed "brothers" in Anatolia were in

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4 The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on the 24th July 1923, but came into force on the 6th of June 1924.
the throes of cultural upheaval' (Bryant, 2004, p.233). However, even though it seemed that the majority in Cyprus supported Kemalist reforms (Nevzat, 2005), 'as there was no social power enabling the adoption of these issues on behalf of its own class interest within the social practice of Cyprus, they merely remained as an ideology which excited the intellectuals' (Yaşin, 1990, p.67).

Meanwhile, education became one of the main centres for cultivation of a nationalistic ideology. When the British administration realised the role education played in the development of nationalism and the construction of national identities, there were already two fledgling nationalisms on the island. Following the 1931 revolt, which started as a protest against a taxation proposal and later turned into a nationalistic demonstration for enosis, the British administration applied many restrictive measures to society in general such as abolishing the Legislative Council and bringing education under their strict control. They took sections that encouraged Turkish and Hellenic nationalism out of the curriculum, as well as banning the recruitment of teachers and importation of teaching materials from Greece and Turkey (Kızılıyürek, 2002).

Education had a transforming effect on Turkish Cypriots' national identity. Turkish Cypriots saw education as a way of improving their community, by bringing culture and sophistication and creating politically aware people. Thus, they adopted Atatürk’s attempts at modernization and nationalism into the education of Turkish Cypriot youth (Bryant, 2004). The teachers and the teaching materials that came from Turkey told Turkish Cypriot youth not just about how Atatürk’s reforms were modernizing the country but also the achievements of Turks throughout history that encouraged pride in being a Turk. Through such teachings of the language, culture and history of Turkey, a concept of nation and identity was constructed around the notion of Turkishness among the youth. Education facilitated the conceptualisation of a Turkish Cypriot identity as part of the Turkish nation, socialising the youth into identifying with the Turkish nation. In other words, education taught Turkish Cypriot youth how to be Turkish. When the British administration realised the strength of Turkish national sentiment in Turkish Cypriot schools they tried to stop it. As an example, they changed the name of Turkish Lycee to Islam Lycee in an attempt to prevent identification with Turkish nationalism and once again make religion and
tradition the focus of identity (Kızılyürek, 2002; Nevzat, 2005). Yet the
modernisation process had already led Turkish Cypriots to shed their religious
identity as 'Muslims' and define themselves with an ethnic and secular one as 'Turks
of Cyprus' (Kızılyürek & Gautier-Kızılyürek, 2004). Even though representatives of
the Turkish Cypriot community initially employed both terms in their official
correspondences, they increasingly adopted the term 'Turk' to refer to the
community (Gürkan, 2006; An, 1997).

Overall, there were two important factors that shaped the nationalism movement
among Turkish Cypriots: One of them was Turkish nationalism and the other was
opposition to enosis (Kızılyürek, 2002). In the Turkish Cypriots’ view, there were
two ethnic communities on the island with different language, culture and religion
from each other's but similar to the nations they belonged to. Turkish Cypriots
believed that they belonged to the Turkish nation and that they should be a part of it.
Hence, when it became clear with the Treaty of Lausanne that Turkey would not
reintegrate Cyprus, some chose to emigrate there. Economic motives, insecurity and
fear caused by the island’s possible integration with Greece were among the reasons
for the emigration, but nationalistic sentiments towards Turkey also facilitated the
emigration of Turkish Cypriots from the island. The first Turkish consul, Asaf Bey,
who was appointed to Cyprus in 1925, was claimed to have encouraged Turkish
Cypriots to take Turkish nationality and emigrate to Turkey (Gürkan, 2006, Nevzat,
2005, Kızılyürek, 2002). Actually, from the start of the British rule, a considerable
number of Turkish Cypriots had already emigrated to Turkey, bringing the number of
Turkish Cypriots on the island to a considerably lower level.

The other factor that shaped nationalism among Turkish Cypriots was the Greek
Cypriot nationalism movement, enosis. Regarding enosis as a Greek Cypriot project
that neither included them nor held a future for them, Turkish Cypriots opposed the
union of the island with Greece. The sufferings of the Muslim community in Crete
after joining Greece in 1915, and during the invasion of Izmir in Turkey in 1919-
1922 were still fresh in the collective memories of Turkish Cypriots which made the
idea of being part of a Greek state a source of anxiety for them (Kızılyürek, 1983;

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4 The official use of the term 'Turks of Cyprus' started in the mid-1949 (An, 1997).
They believed that the annexation of Cyprus to Greece would be the end of their community. Therefore, whenever Greek Cypriots raised such demands during the Ottoman time, Turkish Cypriots argued that the island should be returned to the Ottomans and later, with the establishment of the new Turkish state, they demanded that Turkey should annex the island. Otherwise, they supported British rule which they regarded as being better than under Greek rule (Nevzat, 2005), leading some to interpret this as loyalty to the British.

The opposition to enosis not only took the shape of Turkish nationalism but actually they both fed on each other (Kızılyürek, 2002). By emphasizing the sameness of the language, religion and culture, Turkish nationalism was not just creating commonality among Turks but also, by reminding them of the victories of the Turks throughout history, it was providing Turkish Cypriots with a mythical past to be proud of. On the other hand, by reviving memories of Greek atrocities in Turkey and linking these with the Greek Cypriots' enosis campaign, this nationalism was creating a threat and an enemy for Turkish Cypriots to unite and fight against. So the adoption of Turkish nationalism not only came with its Turkish identity and its modernisation process but also with the notion of an enemy, the 'other' that is required for the construction of a national identity.

Despite the deteriorating relationship between and contradictory political demands of the two communities, the Greek Cypriots' armed struggle was to throw off the British and fulfil enosis and initially didn’t include Turkish Cypriots. According to Stavrinides (1999), that was because 'they assumed that once enosis was achieved, the Turkish minority would still be a Turkish minority within a Greek Cyprus, enjoying security and all the other acknowledged minority rights' (p.33). However, this is not how Turkish Cypriots viewed the issue and the British benefited from this divergence. The British response to Greek Cypriot attacks involved recruiting Turks as an auxiliary police force to control the riots and to help them fight EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the armed organisation that started the struggle against the British. As a consequence, the relationship between the two communities deteriorated further in such a way that Greek Cypriots started seeing Turkish Cypriots as another obstacle in the achievement of their national cause.
Britain’s suggestion of self-determination after the Second World War made Turkish Cypriots very uncomfortable. Self-determination would be based on the views of the majority and would have meant unity with Greece. When the suggestion was made, Greek Cypriots had already united behind the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church who had transformed itself from being a spiritual to an ethnic/national leadership (Pollis, 1998). Compared to their neighbours, Turkish Cypriots lacked such leadership, unity and organisation (Gürkan, 2006, An, 1997). Increased nationalist sentiments combined with insecurity about the future because of Greek Cypriots’ demands and Britain’s suggestion of self-determination led to Turkish Cypriot leaders deciding to organise for resistance. The formation of *Kibris Adası Türk Aznıklar Kurumu* (KATAK - Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island of Cyprus) in 1943 that later became *Kibris Türk Milli Birlik Partisi* (the Cyprus Turkish National Union Party) was the first mass organisation of Turkish Cypriots. Its aim was to protect Turkish Cypriots’ rights as well as to unite and mobilize them behind nationalistic policies. It was also to help and direct the development of the Turkish Cypriot community in economic and cultural issues in which, compared to Greek Cypriots, they had been left far behind (Gürkan, 2006).

Meanwhile, the Turkish nationalism that developed in Cyprus was unlike the one in Turkey in that it had a ‘pan-Turkist’ flavour (Yaşın, 1990, p.67). This could be explained by four reasons: First, it was normal for a community living outside national borders but adopting the identity of the Turkish nation to take it on in such a form. Second, the racist and chauvinist ideas that were spreading around the world and specifically in Turkey following the Second World War influenced Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Third, the cultural and ideological sources, values and symbols used in Cyprus to construct a Turkish identity among Turkish Cypriots were mostly the same as those used by the pan-Turkist groups in Turkey. Fourth, the ruling groups in Cyprus used such nationalism as an ideological weapon to control the population (Yaşın, 1990).

The Turkish Cypriots’ separatist attempt came in the form of a resistance group called *Volkan* (Volcano), which later restructured and renamed itself as *Türk *

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6 Pan-Turkism is an ideology and movement that aims to unite all Turkic people (Landau, 1995).
Mukavemet Teşkilati (TMT - Turkish Defence Organisation). Its main aim was to fight against Greek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants whom they regarded as their enemy. Now there were two nationalistic groups, opposed to each other, on the island.

In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots developed their national policy as taksim (the partition). The importance of this policy, claims Kızilyürek (1993), is that by making and demanding taksim, Turkish Cypriot leaders were making a decision on their future for the first time. He points out that until that time their demands for the return of the island or the continuation of the status quo were dependent on the decisions of other countries. Their own actions were limited to writing letters or sending telegrams, which didn’t go further than expressing their reactions. However, with the separatist taksim policy, they moved to a ‘historical participation’ level which meant they could make decisions on their own initiative and act accordingly rather than relying on others (p.32). The establishment of TMT in line with the taksim policy was actually a sign of Turkish Cypriot attempts to operate in this new way.

The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 created a state but not a nation. That was because the republic was not set up as a result of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ shared vision of an imagined community but was imposed as a joint effort by Britain, Turkey and Greece. Competing national identities had not allowed a joint national building process but separate ones. The lack of Cypriot nationalism did not support a Cypriot nation and the imagined community for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had already been founded on two different notions and had taken two different shapes. There were no symbols of Cypriotism. Even creating a Cypriot flag proved to be difficult. As Ahmet An (1998) points out, Greek Cypriots protested against the red colour of the Turkish flag being used in the Cypriot flag while Turkish Cypriots made the same objection to the blue colour of the Greek flag. Thus, a yellow map of Cyprus on a white surface with two green olive branches was used. Not adopting the flag as theirs and only using it in state offices, both communities continued to wave the Turkish and Greek flags on their national days. A national anthem was never composed for the new state; instead the Greek and Turkish national anthems were played (An, 1998; Tombazos, 2003). Meanwhile, both communities had already been celebrating the national days of their motherlands and
continued to do so even after the establishment of the Cypriot state. The common element was that they both excluded each other but included two other nations, Greece and Turkey. Despite their co-existence, sometimes in mixed villages, the social, political and cultural structure of everyday life on the island was at times based on two separate communities and emphasised the divergences between them. Communication and collaboration between the two communities was actually prevented or made increasingly difficult by the existing political, cultural and educational dynamics. Having been founded on such a structure, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus maintained and reinforced identities along ethnic lines rather than unifying and creating a Cypriot identity (Theophylactou, 1995). In other words, setting up a republic on the basis of two communities actually institutionalised the existing division (Faiz, 2003).

Cypriotism didn’t exist as an identity before 1974 and both communities described themselves as Greeks and Turks instead of Cypriot (Asmussen, 2004). Quoting Markides’ social categorisation of the identities of Greek Cypriots, which he suggests could also be attributed to Turkish Cypriots, Asmussen (2004) notes that the definition of identity in Cyprus was based on family, the community of origin (or village) and then the nation in this order. Thus, expressions of identity would be in the form of a series of statements such as ‘I’m Yorgos of the Pantel family, I’m a Potamian (from the village Potamia in the Nicosia district), I’m a Greek Cypriot, and I’m a Greek. I’m Ahmet of the Özgür family, I’m a Potamian, I’m a Turkish Cypriot, and I’m a Turk’ (Asmussen, 2004, p.1135). However, in the modern era the order of such classification of identity has changed and the sense of belonging and the definition of identity aligned more with the nation than the region or the family. As Calhoun (1997) remarked, national identities acted as the ‘trump card’ (p. 126) and overcame all other identities in Cyprus. With the emergence of national consciousness, national identity rather than place or kinship became the source of identity and solidarity.

The Republic of Cyprus did not diminish the importance of the nationalist projects of enosis or taksim but only quieted them for a while. Actually, the new republic meant that ‘a number of Greeks who had led the struggle for enosis and a number of Turks who had led the resistance to enosis would come together to collaborate in the
running of the state’ (Stavrinides, 1999, p.38). On the other hand, there were some who advocated a more harmonious relationship and cooperation between the two communities. Among these were two Turkish Cypriot lawyers, Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet M. Gürkan, who began publishing a newspaper called Cumhuriyet (The Republic) on the day the republic was declared. Their articles not only supported the new republic but also criticised nationalistic policies and actions in Cyprus. As a result of these views, they were both murdered a mere two years after the start of the publication. Similarly, a Greek Cypriot businessman, Nikos Lanitis, who published a series of articles in the English language newspaper, the Cyprus Mail, supporting the Cyprus state and calling for collaboration between the two communities was attacked for being unpatriotic (Stavrinides, 1998; An, 1998). Despite the existence of the Republic, there was no tolerance in either community for any ideas that diverged from nationalist ideals.

Bryant (2004) argues that the combination of democracy and ethno-nationalism didn’t work in the project of an independent Cyprus. In her view, both nationalisms were fundamentally democratic as they were based on popular representations but the political demands and guarantees that each community wanted were conflicting and excluding each other. The constitutional rights gained by Turkish Cypriots seemed unfair and undemocratic to Greek Cypriots. They believed that Turks were a minority and the constitution provided them with more rights than they deserved. The objectives of the majority were impeded because of the existing constitution. For the Turkish Cypriots, though, the numbers were not an issue as they were not a minority but equal partners of a bi-communal republic (Stavrinides, 1999). In the constitution, they sought certain guarantees not to be ‘tyrannized by the majority’ (Bryant, 2004, p.221). In other words, while Greek Cypriots wanted ‘justice’ and Turkish Cypriots ‘respect’, in both cases the ‘other’ community was seen as an obstacle in achieving these ideals (Bryant, 2004). In the end, Greek Cypriots set out to change the constitution that they thought of as undemocratic. President Archbishop Makarios’ suggestion of 13 amendments in the constitution, which included taking the right of executive veto away from Turkish Cypriots, was seen by the latter as the destruction of their constitutional rights. Turkish Cypriots first withdrew from the legislative and executive posts of the government and later, leaving their properties and jobs, moved into enclaves. Meanwhile, the inter-
communal violence had started leading to Turkey's planes bombing Greek Cypriot targets and, following a truce, the first border, which resulted from a ceasefire line, was drawn in Nicosia in 1964. The so-called Green Line that still acts as the buffer zone/border between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots today was the first boundary that separated the national space of each community.

Having separated from the Cyprus state, Turkish Cypriots set up their own administration within the enclaves, making them territories of a mini Turkish Cypriot state. Life in the enclaves meant not only geographical but also psychological segregation from Greek Cypriots and also from the world. When Turkish Cypriots withdrew to armed enclaves, communications and contact between the two communities became minimal as neither Greek Cypriots were allowed in the enclaves nor Turkish Cypriots allowed out. Being separated from Greek Cypriots by the enclaves gave Turkish Cypriots a sense of security and also a sense of unity and solidarity as well as strengthening the notion of 'us' as the victims against 'them' as the perpetrators. Little communication and contact made it difficult to see the other group's point of view. By defining the enclaves as their territories, Turkish Cypriots were involved in a process of exclusion and distinguishing who belonged to the nation and who didn't. As Evans (1996) suggests, once the borders are established, they give a sense of belonging to the group members and make it easier to impose unity and self-definition. They help minimise differences within the community while exaggerating differences from the 'others' (Billig, 1995). In Cyprus, this was achieved by ignoring the common characteristics between the two communities which was simpler once both communities were separated. For the Turkish Cypriot leaders who were also operating the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati (TMT- Turkish Defence Organisation), creating a unity and solidarity against Greek Cypriots was much easier when their community was confined within the enclaves. According to Yaşun (1990),

The Turkish speakers, the Muslims, the ones with a common tradition, found themselves coming together in the order of a military caste, surrounded by high barricades. They were only able to perceive themselves as members of a group, when they were locked up in the enclaves and doing military service. Their links with the outside world and even with the neighboring villages ceased. The structure of a closed society was firmly established. Just as in primitive tribes, they began to
regard their own conditions, existence and values as the centre of the world and the only reality (p.60).

Apart from its military missions, TMT also set out to change the consciousness of Turkish Cypriots so that they could see and define themselves as Turks. Combining Turkish nationalism as both an ideology and a separatist movement, TMT ran a set of campaigns to strengthen the concept of Turkishness amongst Turkish Cypriots. These ‘Turkifying’ projects (Kızilyürek, 2002) did not intend to turn non-Turks into Turks but to shape Turkish Cypriots’ nationalistic thinking. First of all, certain rules and restrictions were imposed on Turkish Cypriots with regards to their relations with Greek Cypriots. The ‘From Turk to Turk’ campaign which banned any economic relations or trade with Greek Cypriots not only aimed to deal a blow to the Greek Cypriots’ economy but also to create a Turkish Cypriot economy as it had suffered greatly since the break up of the state. Language, which is one of the crucial factors in the construction of a national identity, was also taken up by TMT as a unifying element. ‘Citizen speak Turkish’ was a project that forced Turkish Cypriots to speak in Turkish, even those whose mother tongue was Greek. The rule caused hard times for many as not obeying it meant paying fines which forced many into silence (Kızilyürek, 2002, Gökçeoğlu, 1994). As part of these projects, the Greek names of villages were changed to Turkish names, and Turkey’s national days were celebrated more vigorously (Kızilyürek, 2002; Kızilyürek & Gautier-Kızilyürek, 2004) so that, as Billig (1995) puts it, ‘the national flag can be consciously waved both metaphorically and literally’ (p.45). Considering that the production of nations requires a certain psychological imagination as well as actions, these Turkifying campaigns were designed to instil a nationalist psyche. TMT’s ideology of nationalism not only transformed the national identity of Turkish Cypriots but made it part of their everyday life and shaped it as a common sense. Having created a national community, TMT actually forced Turkish Cypriots into its imagined community by imposing a certain way of thinking and believing onto them. As Yaşın (1990) suggests, ‘the identity of Turkish Cypriot community was really formed in those days’ (p.60). Anyone who didn’t believe in it or criticised it did not have a place in it.
While the inter-communal tension and violence continued between 1963 and 1974, an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, and to take control of the government led to Turkey's intervention on 20 July 1974 in the name of protecting Turkish Cypriots. Following Turkey's military action, a mass exodus took place; Greek Cypriots moved to the south part of the island and Turkish Cypriots to the north. Negotiations since then have failed to produce a solution to the problem. As a result, the country has been divided and the so-called Green Line became the official border between the two communities.

After the Division

For Turkish Cypriot nationalists the Cyprus Problem was settled in 1974 with Turkey's military intervention. The north of the island, cleared of the majority of Greek Cypriots, became a home for Turkish Cypriots under Turkey's control. State nationalism set out to build and shape the nation socially, economically and culturally along the lines of Turkish nationalism. The process was carried out primarily through education and the media, which were under state control. For example, the content of education in North Cyprus was (until recently) dominated by the prevailing nationalistic discourses. Turkish Cypriot history books only referred to the atrocities of Greek Cypriots rather than positive experiences shared by both communities. Other school texts have been sourced predominantly from Turkey. Turkish rather than Turkish Cypriot literature, geography and history have been at the centre of the curriculum. The media, on the other hand, were controlled by the state and thus were tools for spreading the nationalist ideology.

Following the mass movement of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in 1975, the first wave of immigrants from Turkey came to the north. Their arrival was necessary to increase the population in the north and also to fill the labour gap to create a

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7 The term used to describe Turkey's military action changes according to one's political position on the issue. While it is 'invasion' for Greek Cypriots, for Turkish Cypriot nationalists it is 'liberation'. Intervention is the other widely used term for it (see also Killoran, 1998, p.160).

8 In the north of the island Cyprus history books are rewritten in 2004. Unlike the previous ones, new Cyprus history books do not focus only on the inter-communal conflict and the violence committed by the Greek Cypriot militia but includes other events and developments that were significant for Turkish Cypriots.
working economy. However, apart from the economic one, the most important impact of this immigration was on the development of a Cypriot identity. Since Turkish Cypriots identified themselves as part of the Turkish nation in relation to Greek Cypriots for years, immigrants were first welcomed as ‘our kinsmen’, signifying a blood relation. However, having lived with them for sometime and having discovered some differences, the positive feelings of Turkish Cypriots became ambiguous. The feelings were mutual though. While Turkish Cypriots became aware that they were dissimilar from their Turkish ‘kinsmen’, the immigrants discovered that the way Turkish Cypriots spoke, dressed and behaved were different from their own. Kızılyürek (2002) summarizes this process as such:

In the mean time, union with the ‘kinsmen’ from Turkey couldn’t be achieved and Turkish Cypriots gradually moved from the stage of ‘identifying with the Motherland’ to a new stage where they began discovering their difference. People coming from Turkey also didn’t find their kinsmen in Cyprus as they imagined them in their ‘national fantasies’. From the Turkish they speak to their clothing, from the looseness of their women to impiousness, Turkish Cypriots had many manners, which did not look like Turkish (Kızılyürek, 2002, p.292).

In order to stress their separate identity from mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots started highlighting certain differences, especially cultural ones. Such attempts were not necessary with Greek Cypriots as there were clear dissimilarities but with mainlanders, Turkish Cypriots needed to exaggerate ethnic distinctiveness and utilise cultural differences to maintain their distinction (Ladbury, 1977). In other words, Turkish Cypriots built upon perceived differences to establish a separate identity for themselves. Differences in culture and tradition ranging from clothing to perception of gender roles and religion caused tension between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. While Turkish Cypriots saw themselves as ‘civilised’, ‘educated’ and ‘western’ they referred to the immigrants as ‘uncivilised’, ‘illiterate’ and ‘oriental’ (Ladbury, 1977, p.317).

After the first wave of immigrants, the economic crises created by the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and the Gulf War in 1991 affected the south eastern regions of Turkey and led many people from those areas to come to North Cyprus in search of employment. This influx of a second wave of immigrants also caused certain
resentments among Turkish Cypriots as they were seen as having a negative impact on the political, social and economic lives of Turkish Cypriots. Lack of accurate demographic information combined with misinformation and propaganda also fed such perceptions (Hatay, 2005). Consequently, they were blamed for taking Turkish Cypriots’ jobs and causing unemployment among them, changing the demographic structure of the country and maintaining a nationalist, pro-Turkish government and increasing crime. The image of a ‘golden age’ before the immigrants arrived and everyone lived in harmony was constructed against the negative image of today ‘when everything is held to have changed for the worse, under the influence of immigrants and their alien ways’ (Morley, 2000, p.215).

Turkish Cypriots mainly refer to these immigrants as Türkiyeli, meaning people from Turkey, rather than using terms like ‘settler’ or ‘immigrant’. Türkiyeli, although not derogatory, is a term that constitutes them as a homogenous group defined by their nationality of origin. This fails to distinguish social, cultural, ethnic or class differences within this heterogeneous group. In other words, Turkish Cypriots do not make any differentiation between Turks, Kurds or any other ethnic group but consider them as people from Turkey.

Derogatory names that both communities use to refer to each other hold light to the ambiguous relation between Turkish Cypriots and the immigrants from Turkey. While Turkish Cypriots use garasakal (black beard), gaco (non-gypsy) and fica (seaweed) to refer to these people, mainlanders call Turkish Cypriots ‘English bastards’ or ‘seeds of Greek Cypriots’ to insult them. The word garasakal (or karasakal- black beard) was first associated with the Turkish military in Cyprus in 1960’s and later with all the people from Turkey. Initially, to call someone garasakal was not an insulting word but to the contrary was associated with respect and fear. But now, as an identity tag for all people from Turkey, being called garasakal is not a mark of respect or fear but more an expression of animosity - a derogatory word.

It was the second influx of immigrant workers which included Kurds that initiated the use of gaco (gajo) and fica (or fija). Even though, gaco is a word used by gypsies to define non-gypsies, Turkish Cypriots paradoxically use this word to define immigrant workers as ‘gypsies’. These workers shared the same stereotype, of being
dark-skinned, rough, dirty and backward, as that associated with gypsies and also came mostly from the south-eastern parts of Turkey where the workers often spoke Kurdish or Arabic which to some resembled a gypsy language. *Fica*, on the other hand, means seaweed on the shore. Long, dark brown strips of *fica* arrive by sea, making the water look dirty and unpleasant. For Turkish Cypriots, the workers are just like *fica*, washing up on their shores, uninvited. Yet Faiz (2004) explains that these names reflect a differentiation between Turkish immigrants: *garasakal* used for Turkish people with a higher socio-economic status and *gaco* and *fica* for those with a lower status. By calling people *fica* and *gaco*, Turkish Cypriots are expressing not only their animosity towards them but also how they resent their presence in their country.

The nationalist point of view rejects the idea of Turkish Cypriots having a separate national identity from Turkish people. Developed during the years of struggle against the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement, this view makes no distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks and regards Turkish Cypriots as an extension of the Turkish nation, with no distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics (Kızilyürek, 2002). The former TRNC President, Rauf Denktas became the embodiment of this argument, always emphasizing his Turkishness rather than his Cypriotness. In an infamous statement, which is attributed to him, he claimed the only true Cypriots were donkeys:

> I am an Anatolian child. I am totally Turk and my roots are in Central Asia. With my culture, my language, my history and with my whole being I am Turk. I have a state and a motherland. These so-called Cypriot culture, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot Greek, common Republic are all nonsense (...) Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek simply don’t exist nor do Cypriots. Don’t dare to ask us ‘are you Cypriots’. This could be perceived as an insult and may cause misunderstandings. Why? The reason is that there’s only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey (Çağlar, 1995).

This dominant concept of Turkish identity has been challenged by a Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot identity (Kızilyürek, 2002, p.290). In reaction to the hegemonic concept of Turkish identity, this new identity is based on the notion of a culturally and ethnically distinct Turkish Cypriot community. The process of its construction
can be described as a ‘transformation in terms of a re-imagining of political and cultural identity that challenged the previously prevailing Turkish nationalism’ (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p.147). According to Azgün (2000) its emergence was the result of certain social changes within the Turkish Cypriot community: First, it was because the self-esteem of Turkish Cypriots was restored as the danger of annihilation passed after 1974. Second, it developed as a reaction to the threat of cultural assimilation into Turkey. Third, the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus encouraged the establishing of differences with them as outsiders. Finally, nostalgia for the past of the island had grown. In a similar way, Yaşın (1990) also underlines the presence of Turkish immigrants as a reason for Turkish Cypriots emphasising their difference as Cypriot. He also argues that as Turkish Cypriots cannot oppose the annexation of the island on the basis of their ‘Turkishness’, they do that by emphasising their ‘Cypriotness’ (p.71). Thus, to stress the existence of this culturally and ethnically distinct community, a Cypriot cultural heritage has begun to be defined and reproduced. Studying the traditions, literature, art, folk dance and folk music of Turkish Cypriots, many cultural associations not only aim to promote their cultural characteristics but also resist and establish a difference to attempts at Turkification.

In 1990’s the Turkish Cypriot administration’s lack of control over some crucial internal affairs, such as economy and security issues, made the TRNC’s claim to sovereignty increasingly seem to be mere rhetoric in the eyes of the public (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). However, for the nationalist government of the time ‘the impression that political authority in the TRNC seemingly does not rest in the sovereign will of the Turkish Cypriots was not much of a domestic problem as long as much of the population conceived of themselves as Turks and the will of Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey as indivisible’ (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p.155). The combination of economic hardship with political discontent and repression as well as international isolation embodied this new sense of identity in a new movement called ‘This country is ours’ which expressed Turkish Cypriots’ demands for self-determination and control of their country’s future. Its emergence was also an indication that Turkey’s presence in Cyprus was no longer interpreted as being for the liberation and protection of Turkish Cypriots but for her own security interest (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005).
Cypriot identity is reflected particularly in Turkish Cypriot literature (Mehmet Ali, 1990). Many works of literature written within this framework have replaced Turkey with Cyprus as the 'motherland' and refer to Cypriots as 'us' while defining Turks as the 'other' (Yaşin, 1994, p.57). Thus, the construction of this new identity requires a new selection and reconstitution of the past. In the reproduction of a narrative for the nation, the commonalities with Greek Cypriots in culture, tradition and history are now emphasised under the concept of Cypriotism, excluding and marginalizing Turkish immigrants. In a sense, as Killoran (1998) points out, fostering an alternate Cypriot nationalism means that one nationalism is replaced with another one, leaving nationalism as an unquestioned issue.

The 1990's were a time when identity conceptualisations were not just increasingly differentiated among Turkish Cypriots but were also politicised in a way that reflected the particular political preferences of an individual. Each identity discourse signified a certain political orientation (Ramm, 2006). Meanwhile, as the struggle between Turkish and Cypriot nationalisms continued, Turkish immigrants arriving in North Cyprus have become part of the identity debate. Their presence has been seen as a political, cultural and economic threat by some Turkish Cypriots. Yet, as Hatay (2005) points out, many who arrived when young have been integrated into the Turkish Cypriot community and retain only weak links with Turkey. This was especially true for Cyprus-born immigrant descendents who complained of identity crises. Citizens of the TRNC, these people expressed their exclusion not only by Turkish Cypriots but also by Turks when visiting their family in Turkey. Considering themselves to be Turkish Cypriots, many talked about being treated as 'outsiders' in both places, as immigrants in Cyprus and as Cypriots in Turkey (Gildir, 2005, Uludağ, 2005).

It was under these circumstances that Cyprus experienced big changes. The latest attempt for a solution in Cyprus came in the form of a UN settlement plan in November 2002. Also known as the Annan plan, the plan generated discussions and debate over the future of the island among the communities of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community was divided into two groups: the ones who supported the plan and the ones who opposed it. It was also a division between the ones who saw their future within the EU in a partnership with Greek Cypriots and the ones who believed
their future lies with Turkey. In the referendum on the plan in April 2004, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the settlement plan. As well as being a sign of the transformation in their identity, the result also revealed a re-imagining of the community and identity based not on ethno-nationalism but on a post-national form of identity founded on a pluralist character (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). However, Greek Cypriots' rejection of the plan failed to bring a settlement to Cyprus and caused disappointment among Turkish Cypriots. Having beaten the status quo and marginalized their nationalist leaders, Turkish Cypriots realised that their neighbours did not share their eagerness for reconciliation and a shared future and felt rejected.

One of the most important developments, which brought big changes to Cyprus, was the opening of the buffer zone in April 2003. Having had minimal contact with the ‘other’ community since the division in 1974, both communities flooded to the ‘other side’ once the borders opened. The main incentive of both was to see the homes they were forced to abandon, visit their family graves and meet the people they knew in the past. The young generation met the ‘other’ for the first time. However, in this experience with Greek Cypriots, Turkish immigrants were left out. While Turkish Cypriots crossed the border not just to visit but also to look for employment, benefit from health services and have access to travel documents to go abroad using their citizenship rights from the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-origin TRNC citizens were confined to the north. Especially for the young generation who grew up considering themselves Turkish Cypriots rather than Turkish, and who also joined in and supported the transformation, this was a frustrating and excluding experience. They were being perceived and treated as outsiders by the Greek Cypriot authorities even though they didn’t feel as such. Their Turkish Cypriot identity raised questions about who belonged to the Turkish Cypriot community and who didn’t.

Globalisation and the multicultural post-national European Union have also encouraged the questioning of an identity beyond ethnic/national identities in Cyprus. Technological and economic developments have provided people with means of re-imagining an identity beyond the national one. As identification with

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9 In the referendum 64.9% Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan while 75.83% Greek Cypriots did against it.
Europe has always been a common point of both Cypriot communities, the EU has been regarded as a framework in which the concept of Cypriotness could be developed (Ramm, 2006; Ramm, 2002-2003). Both communities even used their Europeanness as a distinct feature that separated them from Turks and Greeks. According to Yaşın (1998) 'in the age of globalisation, it was easier for the intellectuals to express their belated and un-named Cypriot nationalism under the umbrella of European unification. In any case they believed that Cypriots are more European than Turks and Greeks' (p.231). However, the accession of Greek Cypriots to the EU, despite rejecting a reunification proposal, caused much resentment and mistrust towards the European Union among Turkish Cypriots. Their continuing isolation in the international arena, despite the promises of support, added to their frustration and, it has been argued, could dampen their enthusiasm for a future within the EU.

Analysis of Turkish Cypriot Nationalism and National Identity

During the transformation of identity from Orthodox Christians and Muslims into Greeks and Turks respectively, two divergent national consciousnesses used different interpretations of history as well as the differences in language and religion, to justify their identity and claim on the island. Despite having conflicting demands and exclusionary policies, Papadakis (1998) argues that both nationalism movements in Cyprus are actually the reflections of each other. For example, both communities presented their nationalism as 'patriotism', which is good and necessary, but the others' as simply 'nationalism', which is dangerously irrational. Both nationalist ideologies use the same structure of creating the 'other' as an unchanging evil and include elements of distortion and self-justification in their portrayal of the national self. The concept of unchanging evil not only signifies primordial links but also creates the impression of a continual threat, which is useful in the maintenance of the status quo and the justification of present actions. While Turkish Cypriot nationalists still talk about Greek Cypriots' demand for enosis and describe Greek Cyprus' entry to the EU as a disguised form of enosis, Greek Cypriot nationalists still refer to Turkey's expansionism ambitions. Relying on such myths, both nationalisms feed off each other. Bryant (2004), on the other hand, disagrees with Papadakis that these
nationalisms are within the same framework or are reflections of each other. Pointing at the differences in discourses, she categorizes the discourses of these movements as archaeological and genealogical.

...Turkish Cypriots speak of their history in terms of contingency and forms of historical proof exist within what I will call here an archaeological discourse, attempting to secure truth by tracing causation. Their Greek Cypriot compatriots, on the other hand, construct an ineluctable history discussed within the framework of what I will call a genealogical discourse in which historical proof is aimed at demonstrating truths that are taken to be self evident. In genealogical discourse one traces links between persons and events whose relationship to each other is already presupposed. In archaeological discourse in contrast one attempts to construct a causative sequence that will explain events. In the first, one validates truth; in the second one uncovers truth (Bryant, 2004, p.207).

During the construction of national identities and national imaginations, primordial ties play a crucial role. Claims to ancestral territories and descent are used to create a historical continuity and roots as nationhood is often evoked through the language of kinship and ancestry (Calhoun, 1997). Portrayal of nation as being like a large family (assertion of blood ties or talk about how ancestors fought their enemies) is the distinctive characteristic of nationalistic discourse. In Cyprus, both ethnic and national identities are also based on the language of primordial ties. In the Turkish Cypriots' case, the metaphor of blood has been used as a link between the land, ancestors and members of the community. According to Killoran (1998), 'nationality is inserted into the "families' shared blood", the nation's sacred soil and a national "family's" metaphorical genealogy' (p.164). It is the blood shed by ancestors in the conquest by the Ottomans and the martyrs during the inter-communal fighting that gives Turkish Cypriots the right to make a claim on the land (Bryant, 2004). Blood shed is also a link to ancestors as 'blood spilled in Cyprus was not only a legitimation of Turks' presence there but also expressed a spiritual kinship with the land' (Bryant, 2004, p.196). In a way, blood acts as the link between the past, the present and the future of the community or, in other words, it is the link between the ancestors of the living members of the community and their children.
The metaphor of blood is not merely used to justify the claim to territory but also used to 'create an ethnic distinction from the "violators" of the life source of Greek Cypriots' (Killoran, 1998, p.163). The claims of purity and continuity of the 'other' community is again challenged by blood. For example, the ethnic origin of the Turkish community in Cyprus has been a politically charged issue used by the nationalists from both communities. There have been claims by Greek Cypriots that Muslims were not Turkish descendants but converted Greeks, while Turkish nationalists set out to prove that Turkish Cypriots are descendants of the Ottoman Turks and not Greeks by blood (Nevzat, 2005; Killoran, 1998; Bryant: 2004).

In the nationalistic discourse, the nation is constructed as a family and the national territory as a home. In such an imagination, national identity is characterized by a sense of belonging, security and solidarity among the family members, which come from recognizing the family as the nation and the territory as home (Morley, 2000). In Cyprus, both communities used the concepts of a national family by reflecting kinship relations onto a nation. In the Turkish Cypriots' case, the matrimony of land and the blood of the Turkish martyrs created a national family with Cyprus being the offspring of a Turkish nation (Killoran, 1998; Bryant, 2004). In part, because of this and in part to encourage Turkish Cypriots to identify their statehood with the statehood of Turkey (Navaro-Yashin, 2003), in nationalistic discourses Cyprus is always referred as the 'Yavruvatan' (Babyland or infantland) and Turkey is always 'Anavatan' (motherland). The national family is "whole" in the marrying of the national father with the land and the citizens as their children' (Killoran, 2000, p.138). Benefiting from this conceptualisation, a house in which a mother with her two kids was murdered is turned into a museum, the Museum of Barbarism, to symbolise the violation of the nation. This museum not only functions to enhance the concepts of national home and family but also to remind people of the past conflict and hostility (Killoran, 1998). In reaction, the discourses related to Cypriot identity replaced Turkey with Cyprus as the 'motherland' (Yaşın, 1994).

The constant process of selecting, arranging, interpreting, rearranging and reinterpreting proceeds hand in hand with the identity construction process. In the production and reproduction of a national identity, the dialectical relationship between collective remembering and collective forgetting is an important element in
the creation of a nation (Billig, 1995). The official history narratives presented the 1960's as the bloodiest time in Turkish Cypriot history in the collective memory. The close relations and commonalities between both communities rarely occurred in them, limiting such points to personal narratives (Canefe, 2007). However, in Cyprus, the enemy is not just confined to the official history narratives but can be a lived experience. Individuals’ personal experiences and memories have also become a crucial determinant in the process. While experiences based on fear usually affirm and support the nationalistic discourses, they can also challenge it. This is why according to Bryant (2004) pressurising the personal memory to conform to the dominant nationalistic discourse becomes a requirement for the constitution of the nation as personal memory also acts as the legitimator of politics.

Different conceptualisations of Turkish Cypriot identity are in a constant process of construction and struggle to establish their legitimacy. Killoran (1998) argues that the legitimacy process ‘is continuously negotiated through the interweaving of the past with the present in a battle for control of a national popular memory, which is constructed reciprocally through the interaction of dominant and subordinate public representations of the past and private memory’ (p.161). Thus, the continual selection and reconstitution of the past is also linked to the present and shapes visions for the future. The nationalist groups constantly remind Turkish Cypriots of the violent past with Greek Cypriots and, claiming that their enemy’s aim has not changed, demand the continuation of Turkey’s support and protection in the future. On the other hand, Cypriot-oriented approaches stress the commonalities between the two communities and use conspiracy theories to explain the violent past. In their view, the future is within the EU after a settlement in Cyprus. In either case, the aim of both views is to create a unity behind the narratives constructed for the nation and, interestingly, both narratives are exclusionary. In the nationalistic ones, the sufferings or the point of view of the ‘other’ (the Greek Cypriots) is absent. Thus, while the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots are kept alive and reflected in the slogans of ‘We will not forget’, the violent actions of Turkish Cypriots towards Greek Cypriots are never mentioned. On the other hand, Cypriot narratives exclude the Turkish immigrants. Even though some have lived in North Cyprus all their lives, their return to Turkey is demanded, if necessary for a settlement, as a headline in Afrika stated: ‘the settlers should be compensated and should leave’ (Afrika, 25 June
In summary, exclusive of each other, different forms of national identity demonstrate the highly politicised nature of the identity issue. Having benefited from the usual resources of identity during their construction processes, diverse versions of national identity compete with each other to establish themselves as the 'real' category of self-identification.
CHAPTER 3: MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the role the media have played in the process of the construction and reproduction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. It also examines the media dynamics in which news texts are produced to offer a context for the media content. For this purpose I have conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews with media professionals such as journalists, editors and media managers as well as political figures, NGO representatives and academics through which I explore the factors that shape journalism in the TRNC. My aim is to provide an understanding of the production process of the texts I analyse in the following chapters.

a. Historical Background

The Development of the Turkish Cypriot Press

The Turkish Cypriot press developed mainly during the British administration. Lack of newspapers or magazines in Cyprus throughout the Ottoman period forced Turkish Cypriots to send their articles and poems to publications in Istanbul. According to Dedecay, Vamik Efendi, a Turkish Cypriot, had one of his poems published in Tercüman-i Ahval, an Istanbul newspaper, as early as 1863 (Dedecay, 1989). Soon after the commencement of British rule in Cyprus many newspapers began publication1.

The first Turkish language newspaper that appeared in the record book, Cyprus Blue Book (1889-1990), was Saded, a weekly newspaper, published only for 16 issues (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). For a long time, Saded was considered to be the first Turkish language newspaper but according to British Colonial Office documents, an earlier newspaper called Ümid is thought to have been published in 1879. A study of

1 The number of the newspapers published in the early years of the British administration is as discussed in the previous chapter.
correspondence between the Ottoman Empire and the British in 1880 revealed that the paper, published by Aleksan Sarrafian, an Armenian from Larnaca, might be the first Turkish language newspaper in Cyprus (Sonyel, 1985). This would make Saded the first newspaper published by Turkish Cypriots but not the first Turkish language one. According to these documents, the newspaper’s criticisms of the Ottoman administration and the Sultan Abdulhamid led the Ottoman authorities to write to the British government requesting the closure of the paper. Following this complaint, the British decided to ensure the newspaper did not reach the Sultan’s territories rather than close the paper (Sonyel, 1985).

Apart from revealing the existence of an earlier newspaper, this correspondence also confirmed that newspapers printed in Cyprus were not confined only to the island but aimed at readers abroad as well. Especially during the Ottoman Empire, this interaction was not one directional as publications from the Ottoman Empire were also distributed in Cyprus. Thus, as well as facilitating interaction between the people of Cyprus and the Ottomans, these early newspapers also acted as a ‘channel of diffusion of ideas and intellectual currents’ between two places (Nevzat, 2005, p.184).

The development of the press alongside a process of modernization contributed to the imagining of a nation and the development of a modern Turkish Cypriot society. By informing Cypriots of new worlds, beliefs and cultures, the print media not only transformed the relationship between self and the community but also shaped their sense of time and place by creating temporal simultaneity. Having been made aware of the existence of the distant others, these newspapers created a relationship between individuals and the rest of the members of their community that they had never before encountered. In the imagining of their national community, the press also reduced the distance and fostered a link between the communities on the island and other Greeks and Turks abroad. In summary, the development of the print media facilitated the creation of new publics. The combination of the new administration system the British had introduced to the island, the development of education and the improvement in transportation links between towns and villages also helped the
circulation of new ideas by the press. As Bryant points out, ‘the Cypriot public’ was "a new category created only in the age of print media" (Bryant, 2004, p.32).

Like the spoken one, the language of the print media was an important element in the advancement of a national consciousness among Cypriots. As Anderson points out, the media contributed to the process of constructing a national identity by standardizing vernacular languages, which later became ‘national’. That is to say, while certain dialects were more suitable to print language and continued to exist, others ‘still assimilable to the emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because they were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print-form’ (Anderson, 1993, p.45). In Cyprus, the situation was no different. Since early on, the newspapers published in Cyprus were not just confined to Cyprus but distributed abroad as well and so a standard version of the Turkish language had to be used in order to be read and understood outside the island by a wider Turkish readership. Thus Turkish and Greek were not only standardized as the print language by the media but also by becoming national languages, they encouraged a divergence between the two communities (Nevzat, 2005).

Education also had an impact on the development of the Turkish Cypriot press. Initially, low literacy rates among the Turkish Cypriot community limited the number of readers of these papers to only a few intellectuals. Compared to the early Greek Cypriots newspapers, there were only a few Turkish Cypriot newspapers and they sold few copies. For example, within the first years of the arrival of the British there were around a dozen Greek Cypriot newspapers with a combined circulation rate of around 2,000 compared with only one Turkish language newspaper, Saded with sixty-four subscribers (Dedeçay, 1989, Ünlü, no date). An increased emphasis on education within the Turkish Cypriot community raised interest in the press, which then was reflected in the circulation rate of the newspapers. The relationship between education and the press was not one directional though, as the press also showed great interest in educational matters and championed better education for Turkish Cypriot children.
An increase in the number of printing houses owned by Turkish Cypriots also contributed to the growth of the Turkish language press in Cyprus. Dedeçay (1989) argues that at the turn of the century newspaper production was not considered different from any other printing business and both were treated as the same. This was partly because it was necessary to own a printing house to launch a newspaper and partly because newspaper publishing was not seen as a profitable business on its own. Zaman, the earliest newspaper to survive till today, is also the first Turkish language newspaper that was published in a printing house owned by Turkish Cypriots. Previously, Saded was published in a Greek Cypriot printing house (Dedeçay, 1989).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the spread of new ideas and movements in Cyprus played an encouraging role in the development of the Turkish language press which, compared with the flourishing Greek language press, was still struggling. With the arrival of a number of exiled Young Turks to Cyprus ‘who hoped to use the British administration and their strategic position to write critically of the sultan’s regime’ (Bryant, 2004, p.33), the newspapers became the embodiment of new and competing thoughts. They propagated the ideas and movements that were also discussed in the clubs and coffeehouses (Bryant, 2004; Nevzat 2005). One such example, Krraathane-i Osmaniye or the Ottoman Club was initially a coffeehouse where newspapers and magazines could also be read and later was turned into a social club. Attended by the leading political figures and intellectuals of the time, the Ottoman Club provided Turkish Cypriot elite men a public sphere where they discussed political issues and current affairs (Fedai & Altan, 2000). In order to propagate their ideas, the club set up a printing house and launched Zaman. Later, similar publications with similar ideas followed.

Another common aim of these publications was to protest against the Greek Cypriot movement enosis. Samani (1999) notes that the Turkish Cypriot press developed as a response to the Greek Cypriot press which was promoting enosis. Ünlü also stresses that one of the reasons for the establishment of the Ottoman club was a reaction to the pro-enosis Greek club, Kipriyakos Silagos (Ünlü, no date).
Despite being under British administration, the Ottomans still had the power to influence and control the press in Cyprus through the Ottoman Printing Law the British left untouched until 1930 (Dedeçay, 1989). For example, when the Young Turks' articles, critical of the Ottoman administration and the Sultan, appeared in Zaman, its proprietor Hacı Derviş Efendi was accused of 'stain(ing) the honour of the State' and was sentenced to life imprisonment as well as withdrawal of his mir-i miran or the title of pasha by the Ottoman courts. However, in Cyprus, his sentence was not carried out but his title of pasha ceased to be used by the local government (Bryant, 2005). At a later date, Ahmet Tevfik, a prominent journalist of his time, was also banned from entering the Ottoman territory for publishing articles critical of the Sultan (Ateşin, 1999)². Again, the sentence was not carried out in Cyprus and Ahmet Tevfik, having ceased the publication of Akbaba, commenced another publication called Mirat-ı Zaman (Dedeçay, 1989, Ünlü, no date).

An interesting feature of the press at the end of the century was the emergence of satirical publications. Two Turkish language publications, Kokonoz and Akbaba, published by Ahmet Tevfik, consisted mostly of political and social satires. Disguised as humour, they criticised the administrations in both Cyprus and the Ottoman Empire. Another interesting characteristic of the satirical publications in Cyprus, according to Bryant (2005), was that in contrast to other publications, they were intended to be read by Cypriots in general, both Christians and Muslims. They existed at a time when there was still 'an obvious ambiguity regarding the boundaries of the community ... despite the growing politicisation of communal life' (p.39) which also explains their extinction when nationalism took control of both communities.

Turkish Cypriot resistance to British colonialism was also conducted through the press. It was especially reflected in disputes about the administration of Evkaf. Evkaf was a religious foundation that was in charge of the communal wealth of Muslims on the island and was regarded as an important institution by the community. The appointment of its administration by the British was strongly resented by some Turkish Cypriots, who were critical of the British influence on such an important institution.

² According to some sources Ahmet Tevfik Efendi was sentenced to death (see Nevzat, 2005).
foundation, while the pro-British Turkish Cypriot elite supported it. The debate between the pro-British group and the opposition was communicated through the press which was also divided into two camps. Sünuhat and Seyf, two newspapers opposing British influence over the Evkaf administration were engaged in a polemical battle with the rival papers, Mirat-ı Zaman, Vatan and Kibris that supported the administration (Dedeçay, 1989; Ünlü, no date).

The role of Turkish language newspapers in expressing Turkish Cypriots’ resistance to the British became clear especially in the early days of the First World War. In a confidential letter sent to the Secretary of State, Lewis Harcourt, on 4th September 1914, High Commissioner Goold Adams stressed that some local Muslim newspapers which had a great impact on the community turned their readers against them when England took over two war ships under construction for the Ottomans (Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 4th September 1914, CO 67/173; Nevzat, 2005; Samani, 1999).

Nevertheless, the hardships brought to Turkish Cypriots by the First World War also affected the press as there was no Turkish language newspaper published in Cyprus between 1916–1919. There are several possible reasons for the silence of the Turkish language newspapers: First, it could be that being at war with the Ottomans, the British authorities were intolerant of Turkish Cypriot support of the Ottomans and their expression of it in the press. Their increasing pressure on Turkish Cypriots and the obstruction of reporting on the progress of the war probably not only made it difficult for the journalists and the publishers to continue with their publications but might have killed their enthusiasm as well (Nevzat, 2005; Ünlü, no date).

Second, financial difficulties and the scarcity of essential materials such as paper and ink might have had an impact on the closure of the Turkish language press during the war years. However, as Nevzat (2005) argues, this does not explain how the Greek language press managed to survive.

Third, emigration that had started with the annexation of the island by Britain might have also reduced the readership and thus support for the press among Turkish Cypriots. Consequently the Turkish Cypriot newspapers found it hard to survive.
(Ünlü, no date). Kibris, the only newspaper that existed during 1914-1915, complained of this lack of support in an editorial:

On the island there are more than 15 Greek newspapers being published. They both meet their costs and make profit. Unfortunately, we cannot even meet our costs. Our friend Seyf unfortunately had to cease publication because of that. There is only one Turkish newspaper left on the island and that is Kibris. The condition Kibris is in is as stated (Kibris, 24 August 1914, quoted in Ünlü, no date).

The fourth reason for the demise of a Turkish language press could rest with the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community whom Bryant (2004) accuses of being 'the primary cause of the death of a flourishing local press' (p.106). According to Bryant, it was their demands for censorship to suppress opposing opinions that led to the dissolution of all Turkish language newspapers during the First World War. However, Nevzat (2005) disagrees with her by reminding us that rivalries and animosities in the community had started long before the war and resurfaced again in the press which emerged after it. This is why it does not explain the reason why it would specifically affect the press during the war years.

Interestingly, while there were no Turkish language publications during the war, six emerged in Cyprus in the aftermath. Even though the censorship and the unofficial warnings of the British government continued, there was some relaxation in the British policy towards Turkish Cypriot publications (Nevzat, 2005). Thus, Doğru Yol was launched in 1919, followed in 1920 by Söz, Ankebut, Davul, and Vatan newspapers and a journal/magazine called İrşad. With the start of the national struggle in Turkey around this time, Turkish nationalism amongst Turkish Cypriots was openly expressed and these newspapers became the main supporters and disseminators of this nationalism in Cyprus.

Despite rivalries regarding internal issues, the attitude of the Turkish language press towards Turkey was supportive. All of them published articles backing the Turkish nationalist struggle in Turkey and were instrumental in keeping nationalistic emotions alive among Turkish Cypriots. Among them, Söz was an especially ardent supporter of Turkish nationalism and was effective in upholding nationalist sentiments. It even received a letter of appreciation from the Director of Press and
Intelligence Office in Ankara in 1922 for its patriotic publications (Ünlü, no date; Öksüzoğlu, 1990). With the second highest circulation rate of 1,200 in 1922 (Ünlü, no date), Söz spearheaded the spreading of nationalist ideas although other newspapers also had a considerable rate of circulation at the time: Both Vatan and Doğru Yol were 800 while Davul’ s was 600 (Ünlü, no date). These figures were also a sign of an increase in the readership of newspapers among the Turkish Cypriot community.

The press had a crucial role in the transformation of Turkish Cypriots from Ottoman Muslims into Turks. Reporting and supporting the transformation the Turkish nation was going through after its war of independence in the 1920’s, the press encouraged the adoption of Kemalist reforms in Cyprus. It introduced the symbols of Turkish nationalism, which helped to enhance a sense of belonging and identification with the Turkish nation. For example, having received a printing machine with the Turkish alphabet from the Turkish government, Söz contributed to the spread of the alphabet reform by publishing a Turkish language newspaper using the Turkish alphabet (Dedeçay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). Later Ses, another newspaper, used the symbol of six arrows which represented Kemalist reforms and ideas (Dedeçay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). Hakikat, despite being a supporter of the Evkaf administration, referred to the government in Turkey as ‘our government’ and Turkey as ‘our fatherland’ (Nevzat, 2005, p.307).

The Turkish language press was divided on the issue of the emigration of Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus to Anatolia that had started with the commencement of British rule and increased following the Treaty of Lausanne: Two nationalist newspapers, Doğru Yol and Söz, were the main promoters of this emigration and, along with the support of Turkish Consul Asaf Bey, they encouraged Turkish Cypriots to emigrate to Turkey. In contrast, Birlik was pointing at the dangers the emigration was creating for the Turkish presence on the island as the population of Turkish Cypriots dwindled over the years, threatening Turkish interests in Cyprus. Yet anyone who questioned the emigration was criticised for not being a nationalist (Gürkan, 2006; Nevzat 2005; Fedai and Altan, 2000). According to Ateşin (1999) the move was a sign of the transformation of identity from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Turk’ as those who considered themselves Turk chose to emigrate to Turkey.
The press law introduced by the British in the 1930’s brought limitations for publishers and journalists in Cyprus. The adoption of the Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law in 1930 replaced Matbuat Nizamnamesi (the Ottoman Press Law), which the British, interestingly, had left in place until then. The same law had already been changed by the Ottomans in 1906 (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). Dedecay (1989) explains that this was partly because the island was still officially considered to be Ottoman territory and partly because of the influence Istanbul had on the press in Cyprus. Following the 1931 revolt, the British took restrictive measures and introduced the ‘Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law’ in 1934 which increased the power of the Colonial Secretary over the press. These laws gave the Colonial Secretary the power to issue orders of censorship, suspension and the suppression of publications. They also made it obligatory to get permission to publish a newspaper and failing to comply with this rule would be subject to fine and seizure (Dedecay, 1989). Under these laws, the Turkish language press found it hard to exist. Birlik as well as Hakikat, a newspaper that also published articles in English and was a supporter of the pro-British Evkaf administration, could not survive and both ceased publication in 1932. Masum Millet had to close down twice throughout its publication life of 1931-1934. To avoid the strict censorship and the risk of being seized and closed down, the newspapers changed their content, reducing their criticism of the government. Avoiding expressing critical opinions, the newspapers opted for safer options and, as a result, more world news started appearing in the papers (Ünlü, no date).

Apart from causing the closure of some newspapers, these laws also increased the animosity of the press towards the British. There was already an existing anti-Britishness among the Turkish language press which had existed since the start of colonial rule. One of the earliest newspapers, Zaman had, in its first issue, stated that fighting against British colonialism would be one of its main functions (Altay, 1969, Ünlü, no date, Ismail, 1988). Criticisms of the British government on the island appeared in the newspapers frequently. For example, the publisher of Masum Millet Con Rifat who was known for his anti-Britishness (Fedai, 1986) wrote an article called ‘editorial object’ in which he criticised the British government:

This Government not only restrained but also chained the press, the freedom of action and of speech, interfered with our language, destroyed with a stroke of a pen
the religious institutions without consulting the proper Turkish Authorities and obtaining their consent and did not yet replace them by the new ones in the way I have suggested and pointed out two years ago, wanted to govern us without laws and rules, subjected us to treatments which can only be meted out to a primitive and Bedouin Clansmen, ridiculed with the Moslem rights and openly challenged our social honor and dignity (Masum Millet, 11 April, 1931 quoted in Fedai, 1986, p.74).

The dialectical relationship between the press and Turkish Cypriot society led the newspapers to contribute to the transformation of the collective identity as well as being constituted and shaped by it. The press campaigned for a Turkish education which was crucial in the production of a Turkish Cypriot national identity. The newspaper publishers, who consisted of educated people such as lawyers, doctors and teachers, argued for an improvement of the curriculum in Turkish schools or, in other words, they campaigned for a nationalist education (Nesim, 1987). Halkın Sesi, the longest running Turkish Cypriot newspaper, announced in its first issue that it would campaign for the transfer of schools to the Turkish Cypriot community (Halkın Sesi, 14 Mart 1942, also quoted in Ünlü, no date, p.146). Such strong support for education was seen as a path to modernisation that was associated with Atatürk’s reforms in Turkey and Turkish nationalism (Bryant, 2004). For example, Söz newspaper urged ‘Before everything a national education is necessary for us. We will seek the source and components of it in the motherland, in the great Turkish spirit. An education system will come to us from Turkey. This is how it must be’ (Söz, 19 March 1931, quoted in Evre, 2004, p.97; also see Bryant, 2004, p.176).

In turn, the transformation Turkish Cypriots went through also influenced the press. Developed as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot, nationalist enosis movement, as well as the British administration, the press undertook the mission of defending the rights of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and engaging in the development of a politically and economically strong Turkish Cypriot community (Ünlü, no date; İsmail, 1988). It was also seen that an improvement in education standards would mean an increase in the readership of the newspapers, which contributed to the spread of nationalist thought through the people. Writing under the pseudonym ‘U’, a woman journalist Ulviye Mithat complained that the literacy rate and thus the numbers of readers of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers were much lower than the Greek Cypriot ones (Ses,
14 October, 1935 cited in Azgün, 1988). It was an indication of how the matter concerned journalists of the time. Despite this, it should not be thought that the dissemination of ideas through the press was limited only to the educated as the literate mediated the messages of the press to illiterates as well (Bryant, 2004).

Following the Second World War, increasing Turkish nationalism interwoven with Pan-Turkist ideas left no space for different imaginings of identity within the Turkish Cypriot community such as Cypriotism (Kızilyürek, 2002; Yaşın, 1990). In these circumstances, increasing cooperation between both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot workers and farmers within the trade unions was not welcomed from the nationalist point of view. They were seen as serving communism and communism was the enemy of Turkish nationalism. Such views found expression in the press as well and Türk Sözü and Sabah in particular, two newspapers with a Pan-Turkist and an anti-communist line, published articles critical of such activities (İsmail, 1988). They both were critical of Emekçi, the organ of the Cyprus Turkish Workers Organisation. In one article, Türk Sözü rejected the idea that the Turkish worker was communist and explained that 'communism rejects patriotism but the Turkish worker is a patriot' (Türk Sözü, 10 October, 1948, quoted in Ismail, 1988, p.104).

Nevertheless, such views were not recent as Söz had, as early as the 1930's, also suggested that 'the communist movements in this country are being instigated by the Greek Cypriots' (Söz, 13 August, 1931, quoted in Nevzat, 2005, p.329). Being a patriot was regarded as equivalent to being anti-communist and workers within bi-communal trade unions were pressured to resign. On the other hand, Emekçi and İnkılapçı, two leftist newspapers, claimed to be the voice of Turkish Cypriot workers and farmers and were encouraging them to organise within the trade unions to fight for their rights. İnkılapçı, that survived only for a few months, called for both Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers to unite and supported the unity of both communities (An, 2005). Emekçi, on the one hand, was critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and was engaged in constant polemic with the nationalist newspapers.

As the Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement progressed, there was an increasing pressure to unite the Turkish Cypriot community behind a resistance movement against the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, there was no tolerance for anyone who did not support but criticised or opposed the nationalist movement or even conceptualised a
different national identity. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist group, TMT, was not only fighting against Greek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants but also imposing their nationalistic aspirations on Turkish Cypriots and the press was not exempt from this. In 1958, Fazıl Önder, the publisher of İnklapçı who supported a Greek and Turkish Cypriot united workers movement, was murdered (An, 2005). Four years later, Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan, two lawyers who were publishing Cumhuriyet newspaper, were killed. Cumhuriyet, that had begun publication on the same day as the Republic of Cyprus was established, not only criticised the Turkish nationalist ideals of the Turkish Cypriot leadership but also called for harmonious relations between the two communities. In an article entitled ‘Cyprus belongs to Cypriots’, Cumhuriyet wrote

...the duty of every Turkish and Greek Cypriot is to respect the rights of the other, to make an independent Cyprus live and develop and work with all its effort to provide both communities more democratic, prosperous, happy and peaceful life. To claim the opposite, in our view, is not to see the reality, not to understand the reality or to shut eyes to the reality. In brief, Cyprus’ independence is not its being annexed to another nation or a state but to be governed by Cypriots (Cumhuriyet, 2 January, 1961, quoted in An, 2005, p.168).

Two different imaginings of national identity, Cypriot and Turkish, had found their expression through the print media. While Cumhuriyet defended the Republic of Cyprus and a Cypriot identity, Halkın Sesi and Nacak, two nationalist newspapers, were the voices of the Turkish Cypriot leadership who fought for taksim and did not believe in Cypriotness. Therefore, Cumhuriyet was engaged in a polemic with these papers, especially with Nacak, the unofficial organ of TMT (Dedeçay, 1989; Ünlü, no date).

During the inter-communal tension and conflict between 1963 and 1974, the community was governed by the Turkish leadership and the military, which put communal rights ahead of individual rights, preventing Turkish Cypriots from developing any civil organisation. As Kizilyürek (2005) contends, ‘in Cyprus, because of “national cause” for very long years concepts and practices such as “civil society”, “democracy”, “pluralism” were smashed’ (p.277). Lack of opposition was also reflected on the press and shaped it into a nationalist position. All the
publications during that period, such as Halkın Sesi, Mücahit, Limasol’un Sesi and Zafer, were in support of the nationalist movement of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and TMT. Any opposition to the leadership was silenced to create a unified voice for the sake of the national cause or otherwise was labelled as ‘anti-national’. However, in time an opposition movement led by the students and teachers’ union against the leadership emerged. Savas, a newspaper published by the poet Özker Yaşın during 1968-1973, had the courage to raise a voice of opposition against the Turkish Cypriot leadership. By reflecting the views of the opposition movement that was already underway and by calling for general elections, Savas, according to some scholars, pioneered a change within the community (Ünlü, no date; Azgin, 1998).

**Turkish Language Press after 1974**

The division of the island led to a new order for Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island which also brought new roles and challenges to the Turkish Cypriot press. The monopolistic control of the state\(^3\) over the media served as a propaganda instrument for the nationalist forces. The print media especially became instrumental in different political and ideological struggles as politics and the press became more interdependent in the aftermath of 1974. Opposition to the leadership had already started at the grass-root level and led to the foundation of new political parties. But, three Turkish language newspapers, Halkın Sesi, Bozkurt and Zaman that continued to exist after the division of the island were supporters of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and did not give much access to oppositional voices. In the new multi-party system, to join in the power struggle politicians first needed channels of communication to create a ‘public’ for themselves and to communicate their message to supporters. Thus, excluded from the existing public sphere of the media, the new parties set up newspapers that would reflect their views and policies. Such ideological and financial connections meant these publications or ‘party newspapers’ acted as the organs of the political parties and reported events in line with the views of these parties. In this way, the press became (and still is) an instrument for the

\(^{3}\) State refers to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus which was proclaimed in 1975 and also Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which was established by the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1983.
different causes and struggles of political actors. Party propaganda appeared in both opposition and pro-government newspapers: the opposition printed their criticisms of the government disguised as news reports while the pro-government newspapers praised government actions in their stories. Propagating the views of the parties they sympathise with is still a strong characteristic of the press today.

The Turkish Cypriot's nationalistic movement against the Greek Cypriot's enosis movement had been a powerful ideology in shaping and setting the boundaries within which the news media operated. It allowed the state to control them according to its own interests, which consequently excluded any oppositional voice from the public sphere of the media. According to the state, the struggle did not end but still continued under the threats of Greek Cypriots; this is why all Turkish Cypriots should unite behind the Turkish Cypriot leadership to present their voice as one to the world. In line with state policy, all the state and civil organisations were expected to function in accordance with the 'national cause'. The 'national cause' was the defence of the right of Turkish Cypriots to live independently from Greek Cypriots in their own state, one supported and guaranteed by Turkey and the presence of Turkish troops in the north of Cyprus. Opinions that did not comply with this view were regarded as undermining both the state and the nation and such opinion holders were branded as 'traitors'. Thus, it caused the newspapers to avoid reporting issues that were critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and the Turkish military, which were the main representatives of the 'national cause'. The left wing newspapers that took an oppositional stand to the nationalist view were constrained by censorship or self-censorship. The support of the nationalist press behind the 'national cause' represented the nation as united, homogenous and stable, making differences between members of the national community invisible, which aided the nation building process.

After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots depended on Turkey for the supply of manpower, the survival of the economy and for national security. This reliance intensified with the isolation Turkish Cypriots experienced in the international arena following the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. Increasing interaction between the TRNC and Turkey was also reflected in the Turkish Cypriot press. For instance, the daily arrival of Turkish newspapers after
1974 diminished the impact of the Turkish Cypriot press. Better printed, more colourful Turkish broadsheets led to a reduction in the circulation rate of Turkish Cypriot ones (Ünlü, no date). There are several possible underlying reasons for this development: First, it could be that reading Turkish newspapers reinforced the identification process of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey. Second, political, economic and cultural changes in Turkey have always had an impact on the TRNC which led many to follow the news there. Another reason for the loss of the readership of Turkish Cypriot newspapers could also be that having listened to the news on the radio or television, people were not interested in reading the same stories in the newspaper as the print news was very similar to that broadcast. Increasing interaction with the Turkish news media in Turkey, sometimes in the form of training, set examples of journalistic practices for the Turkish Cypriot journalists and publishers. However, the Turkish media in general was supportive of the position of the 'national cause' of Turkish Cypriots, regardless of their political and ideological position, and reproduced and maintained the nationalist ideologies and discourses dominant in North Cyprus.

The lack of communication between the two communities assisted the Turkish Cypriot administration in maintaining a strong concept of 'the enemy' in order to mobilise the populace against the 'other' and also to build and shape a nation. Asserting differences from the 'other' and reflecting the community as a harmonious one reinforces the feeling of unity among the members of the nation as well as strengthening ethnocentric and nationalist perceptions (Tsagarousianou, 1999). People on both sides of the line received information about the other through the media, which relied on the information provided by official sources. Thus, the portrayal of Greek Cypriots as an 'unchanging evil' and a continuous threat was not difficult and helped the state to maintain and justify the status quo. A common practice, especially among the right-wing press, was to strengthen the stereotype among Turkish Cypriots that 'all Greek Cypriots are bad and corrupt' by attaching news value to anything negative about Greek Cypriots. Papadakis (2005), pointing to 'the news from the south' page of a right wing Turkish Cypriot newspaper, observed that

Anything negative about the Greek Cypriot side was good news over here. They adored Greek Cypriot extremists. Any statement they found in the Greek Cypriot
press about Turkish Cypriots by extremists, made it to the section. If someone said ‘A good Turk is a dead Turk’ not only did it become news, it was presented as a general Greek Cypriot outlook (Papadakis, 2005, p.103).

The concept of Cypriotness that developed as a challenge to Turkish nationalism was both a cultural and political movement. Inevitably, the press became a site where the struggle for domination between two different imaginings of national identity took place. Depending on the media producer and its position within the political spectrum, the representation of Turkish Cypriot identity and its ‘other’ changed. While right wing pro-government newspapers such as Halkin Sesi and Birlik portrayed Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots as the ‘other’, the newspapers of the left wing opposition such as Yenidüzen and Ortam became the voice of an emerging Cypriot identity and posited Turkish immigrants as the ‘other’. On the other hand, commercial newspapers like Kibris claimed to be objective but actually reflected the political allegiances of their owners, which shifted over the years. Depending on their positions, the discourses of the newspapers on identity also varied. While the discourses of the nationalist papers were based on an essentialist Turkish national identity, in a similar manner the left wing newspapers highlighted the Cypriotness of Turkish Cypriots.

In their challenge to Turkish nationalism, the left wing press adopted the methods of the nationalist newspapers while emphasising Cypriotness. They portrayed Turkish immigrants as the new ‘enemy’, in much the same way the right wing press has often cast Greek Cypriots in this role. Events involving the immigrants have been dealt with in a similar manner, especially by the left-wing media. The number of stories showing immigrants in a positive light has been minimal in these newspapers. They have been represented as the cause of anything that goes wrong in the country. The mainlanders have been portrayed as gangsters, criminals and illegal immigrants who brought crime and corruption to the country and threatened the ‘harmonious’ life of Turkish Cypriots. Many stories constructed along the lines of ‘our safety in our country’ is being threatened by ‘criminals from Turkey’ appeared in the newspapers. While ‘they’ – the immigrants from Turkey- are ‘gangsters, murderers, thieves’, ‘we’, the Turkish Cypriots, are the ‘victims’. Such oppositional representation has not only intensified the perceived differences between Turkish Cypriots and
immigrants generally but also created fear amongst Turkish Cypriots about security, the loss of their identity and self-determination.

The transformation of identity the Turkish Cypriot community had been going through was clearly visible during the period in which the latest settlement plan for Cyprus, the Annan Plan, was debated. The arguments of pro-settlement and opposition groups were related through the media and the discourse of each newspaper changed in relation to shifts in discourses in the political arena. Unsurprisingly, while newspapers of the left adopted the discourse of settlement and described Turkish Cypriots as 'Europeans', newspapers on the right argued that a solution and joining the EU would achieve nothing but enosis. Despite this, the media in the north engaged in more open debate and reflected a spectrum of opinions during this period. According to a study of the information environment in Cyprus regarding the Annan Plan,

The Turkish Cypriot media and information environment reflected a wide variety of views rather than any single trend. While each media outlet eventually had clear leanings, each displayed a sufficient and comparable level of independence from official dictates (Ridder/Braden et.al, 2005, p.4).

The changes that occurred within social and political contexts also affected the press. During the ongoing hegemonic struggle, the dominant nationalist discourses were challenged, sometimes leading to a shift of alliance of the media organisation. Kibris and Kibrisli, two commercial and influential newspapers changed their policy from a very nationalistic stance to supporting the Annan Plan. Such a change in Kibris, the newspaper with the highest circulation in the TRNC, was radical, as the paper was known for its nationalistic position regarding the Cyprus issue. Today, the discussion still continues about what motivated Kibris to make such a change; whether it simply followed the support the public gave to the plan and reflected popular feelings or, realising the strong support amongst its readership for the plan, decided to campaign for the settlement so as not to lose its readership.
The development of national broadcasting played a fundamental role in building a sense of Turkish national identity among Turkish Cypriots as well as uniting them in the 'national cause' waged against Greek Cypriots. Until recently, it enforced a Turkish nationalist discourse as well as sustaining an official representation of Greek Cypriots as the 'enemy'. As opposed to the press, which developed as part of different political and ideological struggles, the broadcast industry, until commercialisation in 1997, was the main supporter of official ideologies and claimed to be the voice of the Turkish Cypriots.

Broadcasting in Cyprus started during the British Colonial era with the establishment of the first radio station, Cyprus Forces Broadcasting Service, by the British forces in 1948 (Dedeçay, 1988). The radio produced programmes for British military personnel on the island as well as broadcasting in Greek and Turkish. The British administration later set up a radio station for Cypriots, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service, which began transmitting in 1953. Following the introduction of television broadcasts, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service became the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. In 1959 it became the official state broadcaster and its administration was passed to both communities in Cyprus (Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991; Dedeçay, 1988). Like many aspects of public life in Cyprus, the constitution of the new republic organised personnel and administration of the broadcasting corporation along the lines of ethnic proportionality. According to this, 30% of its personnel and administration were Turkish Cypriots and 70% were Greek Cypriots. The same rates also applied to the programming: 30% of the programmes were in Turkish while 70% were in Greek (Dedeçay, 1988).

According to a publication by the Press and Information Office of the ROC concerning the mass media in Cyprus, the launch of the service received very little attention by the local press apart from an English language newspaper, Cyprus Mail (Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991). This was partly because it was seen as the propaganda instrument of the British administration. Aware of such concerns by Cypriots about the broadcast service, the British governor at the time assured the public that the service was not concerned with propaganda but, following the English
tradition, only aimed to inform the public (Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991). Yet, at the time, a resistance movement had been launched against the British and such statements were not found to be convincing. Conscious of the power of radio as an instrument to promote the views and policies of the British throughout the island, the Greek Cypriot nationalist group EOKA bombed the radio station three times to silence it during their struggle to overthrow the British (Dedecay, 1988; Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991).

Despite all this, Dedecay (1988) argues that, broadcast in three languages, English, Turkish and Greek, the radio programmes became a social routine of life. Having already attracted Cypriots' interest, the radio broadcast mass events such as festivals, carnivals, fairs and other entertainment programmes, which were relevant to the communities in general. By turning some exclusive events into mass experiences and linking the national public with private lives, the radio facilitated a sense of unity among Cypriots which may have served the interests of the British administration. The early radio broadcasts in Cyprus, by uniting the dispersed members of the audience and giving them a sense of belonging, may have contributed to the construction of national unity, but for each community separately. For example, for Turkish Cypriots who were spread around the island and surrounded mainly by the Greek Cypriot community, listening to Turkish language programmes on the radio and imagining the other members of the community doing the same thing at the same time might have forged a relationship with other dispersed Turkish Cypriots and enhanced their sense of being a community. Following the radio programmes being broadcast in Greek and Turkish as well as listening to the radio programmes of the motherlands may also have contributed to their imagining themselves as separate communities. However, it should be noted that some Cypriots listened to the radio in each other's languages as they were bilingual or trilingual, including English.

With the eruption of inter-communal armed conflict beginning on 21st December 1963, Turkish Cypriots were no longer able to work for the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. Though some still went to the radio station, which was in a Greek Cypriot dominated area of Nicosia, for another two days (until 23rd December 1963), difficulties and dangers prevented them from continuing to do so (Dedecay, 1988). Cyprus' jointly run radio and television services were left to the control of Greek
Cypriots, leaving Turkish Cypriots without any means of communication. No longer a part of the legitimate administrative organs of the Republic and excluded from official communication channels, Turkish Cypriots needed an alternative means of communication to broadcast and promote their ideas and news. Such communication was also required to provide Turkish Cypriots with a means of countering the propaganda and misinformation spread by the Greek Cypriot run broadcasting services. Apart from representing the voice of Turkish Cypriots, an electronic form of communication was essential to preserve contact within the dispersed Turkish Cypriot community as their communication was constantly obstructed by Greek Cypriots. As Bailie and Berberoğlu suggest, ‘during the 1963 through 1974 period it was necessary to create an electronic form of communication that could overcome the geographical boundaries faced by newspapers and surface mail because these forms of communication were constantly being interrupted by the Greek Cypriot forces’ (Bailie & Berberoğlu, 1999, p.256). Another important factor in establishing a broadcast media was to facilitate the unity of Turkish Cypriots behind the leadership and the ‘nationalist struggle’ against Greek Cypriots.

Launched in Nicosia on the 25th December 1963, within four days of the start of the inter-communal conflict, the radio broadcaster was given the name of Bayrak which means ‘flag’. Yet in this case, rather than implying ‘flag’, it was derived from the name given to the leader of TMT who also controlled the radio station, Bayraktar (Bailie & Berberoğlu, 1999). Bayrak radio, that was set up and operated by civilians, was actually under the administration of TMT and the radio came to be known as ‘the voice of the Turkish Cypriot Mujahedin’.

Since the transmission signal of Bayrak radio was not strong enough to reach parts of Cyprus beyond Nicosia and its surroundings, following Bayrak’s example, five other radio stations were founded in the main cities of Cyprus within a year. Canbulat Radio was set up in Famagusta, Gazi Baf’in Sesi (the Voice of Ghazi Paphos) in Paphos, Doğanın Sesi (the Voice of Nature) in Larnaca, Lefke Sancak Radio in Lefke and Limasol Sancak Radio in Limassol. The main aims of these radio stations

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4 During the armed conflict against Greek Cypriots, TMT divided Cyprus into military zones and each zone was called a Sancak. The radio stations set up in these areas were known as Sancak radio stations.
was to inform, to support the ongoing conflict against Greek Cypriots, to counter Greek Cypriot propaganda and provide the community with a channel of communication. Especially in areas where communication was interrupted, these radio stations acted as links to the outside. For example, when Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta came under siege from the Greek Cypriot militia who had cut off their communication channels, *Canbulat* Radio was their only means of communication with the other areas (Çatal, 2003). Operating under the administration of TMT, these radio stations were part of the armed conflict against the Greek Cypriots. As Erdoğan Erdem, who had worked on *Canbulat* Radio explained, the fight did not just involve weapons and guns but also the media as well. These radio stations had a different function to that of ordinary radio broadcasters, which was to work for the struggle and thus they were ‘national struggle media’ (quoted in Çatal, 2003, p.124).

Like *Bayrak*, these radio stations were under the military administration and functioned as channels that carried the instructions of TMT to people at large. The military used these broadcasts ‘to organise the community around a national struggle, to define the boundaries of that struggle and to encourage the Turkish Cypriot community to work in the interests of that struggle’ (Bailie & Berberoğlu, 1999, p.225). The aim of these stations was not only to propagate the military’s views on the events taking place but also to create public opinion in support of these views. İsmet Kotak, who had a commentary programme on *Canbulat* Radio in Famagusta described the radio station as acting as an ‘opinion leader’ (Çatal, 2003, p.70). By contributing to the creation of public opinion in favour of the leadership, these radio stations legitimized the establishment and control of an authoritarian leadership over the public. Also, counteracting the propaganda or misinformation spread by the Greek Cypriot broadcasting services, these Turkish Cypriot radio stations set out to transmit their version of events. Another important function was to act as communication channels through which people sent messages to their families and friends and in this way linked not only people to each other but also their private lives with the public one.

These stations, especially the main radio station *Bayrak*, used ‘the power of the idea of nation to involve people in a common sense of identity’ (Morley & Robins, 1995, p.91). At a time of insecurity and confusion, they acted as a symbol of security and
integration for Turkish Cypriots against the threat of the 'other'. By doing this, these radio stations played a fundamental role among Turkish Cypriots in the reconstruction of national identity along the lines of Turkish nationalism. Consequently, apart from acting as a means of uniting the community behind the military, they also aimed to emphasize close links with the 'motherland' Turkey. By evoking Turkish cultural myths, identifying the Turkish Cypriots' struggle with the one the Turkish nation had been through (Sayılı, 2000, p.72-73) and describing Turkey as the 'motherland,' the commentaries on Bayrak Radio and the other stations were contributing to the strengthening of the identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Turkish nation. At the beginning and end of their programmes, the radios played the Turkish national anthem and military marches (Sayılı, 2000). Not only on Bayrak but the programmes on other stations were also instrumental in creating such an affiliation with Turkey. For example, Canbulat Radio had history programmes about the Ottoman Empire and Turkish national heroes that were presented as part of the history of the Turkish Cypriot community. Cultural programmes such as Anadolu'yu Gezelim (Let's travel around Anatolia) introduced Turkish Cypriots to different cultural and folkloric characteristics of different regions in Turkey (Çatal, 2003, p.73). With special live broadcasts on Turkey's national days, which were also celebrated in Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots, these radio stations helped the spread of Turkish nationalism, as well as increasing the morale of the community, as such representations of nationalist rallies and public rituals play a significant role in the assertion of national unity (Tsagarousianou, 1999).

The radio transmissions were also instrumental in enforcing ethnocentric and nationalist perceptions among people. Providing a stereotypical presentation, the commentaries broadcast, especially on Bayrak Radio, described Greek Cypriots as murderous, savage and barbarous. For example, Bayrak frequently used a well-known poem called 'hatred' which spoke of wishing to 'crush the thirty thousand heads with a stone', 'extract with pliers the teeth of ten thousand', 'throw the carcasses of the hundred thousand into a river' and so on (Yaşın, 1990, p.55). Sayılı's documentation shows the 'hatred' poem amongst the poems that were read on the radio to maintain the morale and nationalist emotions of the public (Sayılı, 2000).
With the end of the armed conflict in 1974, all local radio stations apart from Bayrak and Canbulat ceased to exist. As the Turkish Cypriot community moved from the south of the island to the north, the radio stations positioned in the south of the island, such as in Paphos and Larnaca, closed down. The radio station in Limassol had already stopped transmission soon after its establishment (Sayil, 2000; Dedeçay, 1988). Set up to support the Turkish Cypriots’ fight against the Greek Cypriots, these stations had in many ways completed their mission with the end of the conflict and the division of the island in 1974. When Canbulat Radio ceased its broadcasting in mid-1970’s, Bayrak became the only radio station broadcasting to Turkish Cypriots. Despite the end of the armed struggle, Bayrak continued to stay under military administration until 1976 and only then came under a civil authority (Bayrak Bayrak Bayrak, BRTK documentary, 1998). As television broadcasts began in 1976, Turkish Cypriot broadcasting organised as Bayrak Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (BRTK-Bayrak Radio Television Corporation), the semi-governmental broadcasting corporation of Turkish Cypriots. With the establishment of the TRNC, BRTK transformed from being ‘the voice of the Mujahedin’ to being the ‘voice of the TRNC’.

The ideology of ‘national cause’, which had shaped the media during the era of armed conflict, still continued to be a powerful concept even after 1974. Under the control of the government, BRTK had the monopoly over broadcasting which also allowed it to become a political tool in reflecting the government’s policies and views (Turgay, no date). Thus, BRTK became instrumental in articulating the Turkish nationalist discourse and spreading the nationalist ideology. Claiming to be the voice of the TRNC, BRTK actually became the voice of the nationalist government which saw Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and excluded any oppositional views. As Bailie and Berberoğlu (1999) argue, the combination of the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘national struggle’ limited oppositional voices to official government policies in order to create a unified, single voice to present to the international community.

BRTK’s monopoly over broadcasting in the TRNC ended with the Establishment of Public and Private Radio and Television Law in 1997. Privatisation of broadcast media has not only provided increased access to the media but also increased the
diversity of voices heard in them. However, the ideological framework of 'national cause' still continued to define the conceptual boundaries of information gathering and dissemination as the commercial media owners implemented self-censorship on political issues regarding the Cyprus problem (Bailie & Berberoğlu, 1999).

The privatisation of the broadcast media provided different political, economic and social groups that had been previously excluded with a forum to join in public debate. The best example of this came during the coverage of the Annan Plan and the referendum on it. According to Ridder/Braden et al. (2005), who studied the media during the period that concerned the Annan Plan and the referendum, 'a rich and diverse information environment emerged' within the Turkish Cypriot media landscape (p.18). From the time the plan was leaked to the media until the completion of the referendum, the media were dominated by the two issues of the UN's settlement plan and the referendum, which was inevitable as 'the discussions among citizens on any topic invariably turned to the Plan as it came to dominate mainstream discourse' (Ridder/Braden et al., 2005, p.24). During this period, especially with panel discussions, the broadcast media created a forum for diverse political and economic views to be debated. Their talk shows and call-in programmes also encouraged the audience to take part in the discussions and make comments, which prompted people to speak out more than in the past (Ridder/Braden et al., 2005).

As in the case of the print media, the allegiances of some privately owned broadcast media shifted from the nationalist discourse to a discourse that favoured the plan. Kibris FM and Kibris TV, which are part of the Kibris Media Group owned by Asil Nadir, as well as Genç TV, became supporters of the plan. Meanwhile, BRTK, having positioned itself with the 'no' camp initially, changed its coverage of the plan to 'somewhat more positive but significantly more balanced' with a government change and appointment of a new director (Ridder/Braden et al., 2005, p.20).
b. Journalism in North Cyprus

This part of the study focuses on the institutional, political and economic factors that influence the production of news in the Turkish Cypriot media. As well as benefiting from the findings of other research on the issue, the investigation of media dynamics is also based on interviews I carried out to provide evidence of the conditions and practices involved in media production and also to map the reflection of power onto the media.

I conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors as well as political figures, a NGO representative and a media academic through which I explore the factors that shape journalism in the TRNC. Interviews were structured around various social determinants of the journalism as suggested by McNair (1998), such as professional culture and organisational determinants, political pressures, economic pressures, technological factors and the activities of 'extramedia social actors' (p.15). McNair argues that a variety of cultural, technological, political and economic forces in the society have a role in shaping the journalistic output and he proposes to study their impact on journalism. McNair's approach can be criticised for being very simplified in which the cultural, technological, political and economic factors of news production are studied exclusively of each other, as if they always influence the production individually and separately. Nevertheless, I adopted his approach in this study as it is still useful in providing a framework to describe and understand the social context of news production.

The interviewees included eight journalists and editor-in-chiefs from broadcast and print media, one media owner, two politicians, an academic and a representative of an NGO working in the field of conflict resolution. The roles and participation of the interviewees in the production of media texts have been determinants in the selection. Journalists were selected from different positions within different media groups with different political orientations. The newspaper owner was selected to provide the views of media owners and their influence on journalistic output. Interviewees from outside the media were selected in order to discuss their

5 The names and the positions of the interviewees are provided in detail in the bibliography.
relationship with the media and the role of the media discourse in a wider social, cultural and historical context. The academic and the NGO representative were chosen on the basis of their work on the media, conflict resolution and identity issues. Politicians, one from the government and one from the main opposition party, were interviewed to find out their relationship with the media.

All the interviews were conducted in the workspace of the interviewees, a place the interviewees themselves chose. When asked where they would prefer to do the interview they all invited me to their offices. Questioning some of them whether they would feel comfortable or relaxed talking about the media and their problems in their work places, they were all affirmative. Apart from two politicians who wanted to stay anonymous, the rest of the interviewees were willing to be identified in the study which encouraged me to think that they were being sincere and open in expressing their ideas and views during the interview. They stated their belief in discussing and exposing the problems in the media and journalism in North Cyprus as an important initial step in finding solutions to their problems. Therefore, they voluntarily gave between one and one and a half hours of their time to answer my queries which included a number of questions that ranged from ownership control to political pressure, from the Cyprus problem to the impact of technological advances. As mentioned before, the purpose of the interviews was to give me an insight into the conditions and practices of the media that might otherwise have been difficult to study.

Political Factors and the 'National Cause'

The Turkish Cypriot media have always been a site where struggles between different causes and interests have taken place. The conflict with the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement was especially influential in shaping the journalism practiced in North Cyprus. The attempts of the Turkish Cypriot administration to create a unified voice during and after the conflict set the boundaries within which the news

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6 Two politicians I interviewed asked to remain anonymous. They were very critical of the media and the journalism in the country but at the same time relying on the media to make their views public, they were worried of a backlash from the media.
media operated. For example, any criticism of the policies and practices of the
Turkish Cypriot leadership was regarded as undermining the state and national unity.
Thus, it created media that avoided criticising certain institutions, especially the main
representatives of the nationalist ideologies in the country such as the Turkish
Cypriot administration, Turkish embassy and the Turkish military. The rule applied
to both state owned media organisations such as BRTK and Türk Ajansi Kibris
(TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus) and to privately owned ones.

A similar control mechanism to the ideology of anticommunism, as suggested by
Herman and Chomsky (1988), was in play in the Turkish Cypriot media. Although it
is strange to think that communism can be a threat now, the idea behind it is
important because it is this ideology that ‘helps mobilize the populace against an
enemy’ (p. 29). It is useful in convincing people that there’s a serious threat which
helps to justify bringing some restrictions to their freedoms. In the Turkish Cypriots’
case, the anticommunism filter was replaced with the fear of Greek Cypriots’
domination of the island and their ‘never-ending’ ambition of enosis. Using such
fears and threats was a way of exercising political pressure on the media, which
helped to control journalists, the media and, indirectly, the public. The media acted
as a channel for communicating the messages and symbols, particularly of nationalist
groups, to the general populace in order to ‘manufacture consent’ (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988). Drawing a parallel with Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda
Model is not to ignore the other elements that the model fails to take into account,
such as the practical and organisational factors influential in newsroom practices, but
to highlight how powerful institutions controlled the media to mobilise support for
their own interests. For this purpose, a mix of formal and informal means of control
and pressure such as threats, imprisonment, the dismissal of critical journalists from
their jobs or the loss of state advertising were used to silence journalists. For
example, the editor in chief and a journalist from Afrika newspaper were jailed for
criticising the president7. This does not mean that political pressure is not applied to
journalists any more, but that, as some journalists interviewed for this study
expressed, it is not as intense as it used to be and with the recent political changes in

7 Sener Levent, the editor-in-chief and Memduh Ener, a journalist of Afrika newspaper were sentenced
to six months in August 2002 for criticising the president in an article “Who is the No. 1 traitor?” The
court appeal in October 2002 reduced their sentences to six weeks.
The affiliation of a media organisation with a political party is a well-known characteristic of the media in the TRNC. Even though such connections are not always stated in the masthead of a newspaper or on the ownership documents of the broadcast media, the relationship is still recognised by the public. This is not only because their content is shaped in a similar way to the political parties they are affiliated with but also because it is usual for the owners and managers of these organisations to openly express that their policies are in line with certain political views they favour (Çatal, 2006; Hançer, 2006). In these circumstances, the main aim of journalism is not to inform their audience but to provide interpretation and commentary on events, in line with the ideology and discourse of the political party. Therefore, some newspapers have a number of column writers but few or no reporters at all. İrvan explains that while such party journalism allows the political parties to establish communication with their supporters, it also shapes journalism and news selection according to party policies (İrvan, 2006). Meanwhile, official media institutions such as BRTK and TAK (the state news agency) are not free from political circumstances either as their directors and administrative board members change with changes of government.

One of the main ways of maintaining control within a newsroom is by socialisation, or learning and internalising the norms and policies of the institution, especially by new staff (Breed, 1999). In the Turkish Cypriot media, examples of this process were evident in state organisations such as BRTK and TAK where news reports were until recently checked to see if they were in line with the 'national cause' (Erçakıcıa, 2008). Even though some journalists interviewed from these organisations reported no such strict control over their news output anymore, they also admitted that it is because they have formed their own boundaries concerning what they can say or write. Nezire Gürkan, a journalist working for the state news agency TAK, notes that experienced reporters have developed a sense of auto-control which helps them to decide what they can and cannot write in their news articles and that new staff learn to do the same, in time. She also adds that knowing such boundaries limits any intervention by authorities in their stories and journalistic processes (Gürkan,
Personal Interview, 2006). Acknowledging that the reporters within BRTK have also developed self-control, Tumay Tuğyan, a journalist working for BRTK, explains that they and their news editors control and check that news reports are within the policy of the institution (Tuğyan, Personal Interview, 2006).

*News Sources*

Governments can become a 'communicator of enormous power' (Golding & Murdock, 1997, p.23). By giving subsidies to media organisations, governments can seduce them into promoting their policies and actions. Providing the media with information not only reduces the effort required to discover and produce news stories but, for the government, it also provides a way of controlling them (Golding & Murdock, 1997). After 1974 in North Cyprus, a government comprised of nationalist forces did not just act as a regulator of information but was also a powerful source of it. Its control of and constraints on journalists contributed to the development of a journalism that relied on the government and state bureaucrats as credible sources, making them the primary news source of the Turkish Cypriot media. It progressed in such a way that the government became the main provider of the media’s steady demand for information and news material.

The state news agency, Türk Ajansı Kibris (TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus), plays a crucial role in providing news and information to the media which not only reflects the views of state officials but is also 'approved' by them. Nezire Gürkan, a TAK journalist, describes the news produced by TAK as the 'official news' or, in other words, the news that is in line with state ideology and cannot be critical of state policies. Gürkan reveals that 'if the president phones the news agency and asks us not to report some of his remarks in a speech he had delivered earlier, then we have to follow his request' (Gürkan, Personal Interview, 2006).

Most, or in some cases all of the news items that appear in the news media come from the TAK agency. The media are heavily dependent on TAK, in part to maintain an image of objectivity and in part to protect themselves from criticism of bias and libel court cases. Reporting the officially approved news shields the media from any
risk of prosecution or endangering their relations with official sources. However, this relationship creates a bias towards authority and dominant groups. Another reason for using TAK's dispatches is to save time, labour and cost. Most of the news media use the news articles they receive from TAK rather than employing their own reporters, even in cases where their journalists have attended. There are only a few newspapers with an editorial team and a functioning newsroom with reporters which leads *Yenidüzen*’s chief editor Cenk Mutluyakalı to describe the TRNC as a ‘country where newspapers are published without any reporters’:

> In our country, newspapers are published without a newsroom staff or reporters. Editors go to the newsroom in the afternoon, get all the news from TAK, change the headlines, use the internet to prepare a couple of more pages and fill the rest of the paper with opinion columns. Their journalism is totally dependent on the news agency. We are a country where newspapers are published without any reporters (Mutluyakalı, Personal Interview, 2006).

Therefore, rejecting claims of diversity, Mutluyakalı argues that it is more like ‘an over abundance of newspapers rather than diversity’. He stresses that the advertising share of the media that have reporters and newsroom staff is the same as the ones that don’t employ any journalists and he believes that it acts as an obstacle in the development of the media (Mutluyakalı, Personal Interview, 2006).

As a result of the dependence on the official news agency, the media consists of the same stories with the same content, with only their headlines distinguishing them. As a journalist describes ‘if you read one newspaper, it means you have read all of them’ (Gürel, Personal Interview, 2006). The extent of the dependence of the media on TAK is such that, as Akay Cemal, the editor in chief of *Halkın Sesi* explains, if there is a mistake in a TAK story, it is repeated throughout the media (Cemal, Personal Interview, 2006). But what happens if a story is about an incident or an issue that the media organisation is critical of? Then they simply change the headline and some parts of the story according to their views and then publish or broadcast the rest as it is. There are many examples in the media where headlines and content do not match because the headline stresses something while the main body of the text is about something totally different.
Economic Factors

Economic forces such as ownership and advertising also have an impact on journalism in North Cyprus. The ownership of the Turkish Cypriot media can be categorised as a combination of state, political party and private, and each shapes and determines the media output according to their political and economic interests. For example, BRTK and TAK news agency are the state organisations and until recently were utilised to serve the 'national cause'. Kibris, the highest circulated newspaper, reflects the political and economic interests of its owner, a businessman. The media that are owned by the political parties mainly aim to provide these parties with a means of disseminating their political and ideological views to their supporters.

Unsurprisingly, as media owners do not want to publish or broadcast any news that is not in line with their political and economic interests, they are very closely involved in the news production process. Levent Özadam, a print journalist who worked as a radio news editor at the time of the interview, noted that it is a very common process for the owners of the media institutions to interfere with the content of the news and editorial decisions in North Cyprus. He recalls many incidents of his previous boss going to the newsroom with some businessmen and changing the content of news stories and page layout Özadam himself had already edited ready for the print (Özadam, Personal Interview, 2006). Çatal, (2006) and Hançer (2006) who conducted two separate pieces of research into broadcast and print media in the TRNC, found that the owners have the last say over news output. The news staff, who have learned and internalised the interests of the owners, apply self-censorship and do not publish anything that opposes it. The aforementioned research also revealed that this situation is accepted as normal by some of the personnel in these organisations.

The media owners can also use their media for ideological and cultural dominance to shape messages (Stevenson, 2002). While supporting certain ideologies and policies in the public sphere, they can restrict the flow of information, which is necessary for open debate. Having supported the nationalist ideologies and given very little space to opposition voices, Kibris Media Group (Erçakica, 2008), Genç TV and First FM shifted their allegiance from nationalist policies to ones that favoured a solution in
Cyprus and had a role in mobilising the public to give its support to the plan (Ridder/Braden et.al, 2005, Çatal, 2006; Hançer, 2006).

The media in the TRNC is mostly dependent on advertising and compete with each other for market share. Thus advertising has a big impact not only on the production of news but also on the content of the news. For example, as Yenidüzüen’s chief editor Mutluyakalı admits, it is difficult to write or say anything about a company that has given advertisement to the newspaper so as not to damage the financial relationship (Mutluyakalı, Personal Interview, 2006). In a similar way, some journalists and editors explained to Çatal, (2006) and Hançer (2006) that when requested by the advertiser, the media would publish or broadcast information (or, in some cases, advertising disguised as news) for the sake of maintaining a business relationship.

Meanwhile, the political position and views of the news media are important for advertisers. Şener Levent, the chief editor of Afrika newspaper, a radical left daily, told me that they get very little advertising from the state or from any other organisation because of the radical political views expressed in the newspaper (Levent, Personal Interview, 2006). Özal Ziya, the director of Radyo Mayıs also told Çatal, (2006) that there are businesses that advertise on their radio station because they are sympathetic to their political views as well as ones who don’t because they are against them.

**Professional Culture and the Production of News**

Within such a political and economic environment, journalists find it hard to fulfil their journalistic responsibilities properly. The intervention of owners in the private media and of the pro-government administration of the state-owned ones brings a number of limitations to their news production processes. Having internalised the policy of the media organisation, many journalists follow the rules and avoid challenging them.

One important consequence of this is that journalists steer clear of being critical, especially of state institutions. According to İbrahim Özejder, an academic in media
studies, the existence of a degree of criticism should not mislead people into believing otherwise:

Looking at the criticisms of one radical newspaper may give the impression that criticism is tolerated but actually it is not. They are an isolated group of journalists or intellectuals who are treated as a group with worthless ideas. They are allowed to be critical because their readers are limited. The ones who can reach wider audience are prevented from doing so either by strict laws or by the boundaries formed in the minds of their journalists that stop them from being critical (Özejder, Personal Interview, 2006).

Many Turkish Cypriot journalists and academics interviewed for this research also pointed to a lack of investigation and research as the main problem of journalism in the country. They point out that Turkish Cypriot journalists neither question nor have a critical approach to the issue they are working on, which reduces journalistic practice to merely recording what has been said. The underlying reason for such a lack of motivation and research among journalists could be explained in part by competition for market share not really creating a competition for exclusiveness and also in part with the journalistic practices developed in the conflict years that still prevail.

Without questioning or providing tools of interpretation, the news reports are no different than the press releases. They also lead to speculation and the appearance of many texts disguised as news items that actually go no further than reporting a rumour. Mete Hatay, an academic and a researcher in a NGO, criticises journalists for asking questions within the news text itself as a means of reaching information easily rather than researching and reporting the answer. Highlighting it as one of the common practices of the Turkish Cypriot media, either as a result of lack of sources or time, Hatay argues that not undertaking detailed research leads to speculation rather than proper reporting (Hatay, Personal Interview, 2006). Erçakica (2008) also points at speculation as an important feature of the print media in North Cyprus and states that ‘in the Turkish Cypriot press, it is known that the texts that are printed as “the news” are plagiarized from other media organisations, many news texts have distortions which reach to the point of slander and most of the time are done for political gains’.
Questioning the underlying reasons of such a journalistic culture, the younger generation of journalists blame the older ones for the lack of investigation and critical approach among journalists in North Cyprus. They argue that the older generation, who are mostly in editorial and management positions today, started their journalism during the conflict years and therefore learned not to ask questions or challenge state authority. As Ekmekçi, a journalist, puts it, 'the older generation has learned journalism within a different tradition that demanded loyalty to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey or Turkish Military but the young generation who has not been through that process is more critical' (Ekmekçi, Personal Interview, 2006).

The job market in the media sector may also be influential in the journalism practiced today. Considering that journalism is a low-income profession (Irvan, 2006), many journalists avoid challenging their employers so as not to risk their positions. As Çatal (2006) and Hançer's (2006) research shows, the media owners and managers choose to work with journalists that have similar political or ideological views. Anyone critical of the media organisation's policy or journalistic practices would either keep quiet or risk losing their position.

Perhaps as a consequence, some journalists have become lazy. Some of those interviewed argued that reliance on TAK for the production and distribution of the news has made some journalists lazy. Gürkan stressed that some journalists made a habit of using the TAK dispatches even when they had attended the event themselves (Gürkan, Personal Interview, 2006). Some also stated that journalists are satisfied with the information given to them as they often just record it without asking questions (Gürel, Personal Interview, 2006; Basri, Personal Interview, 2006).

**Technological Factors**

Technological developments have also had an impact on the journalism practiced in North Cyprus. While a lack of technology in newsgathering led the media to focus on providing editorials and commentary rather than news reporting, particularly in the past, at present it has enabled them to publish or broadcast the news with fewer staff. Despite this, in a small country, where five universities teach media studies, young
journalist candidates feel the pressure of equipping themselves not only with journalistic skills but also with technological skills such as using video, editing and page layout to find employment in the media.
PART TWO
CHAPTER 4: APPLYING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The underlying assumption of this thesis is that identity is socially constructed and in this process of construction the media play a significant role. Adopting the idea that symbolic constructions display an articulated structure which shapes them into truth within a given specific spatial-temporal setting (Thompson, 1990), I outline and discuss the general framework for the study of such constructions and the interpretation of their meaning.

In this chapter, I first discuss the social constructionist approach as it forms the basis of many theories about culture and society, one of which is discourse theory. It provides the general framework for the development of the methods that fall under the rubric of critical discourse analysis. Then, drawing upon this, I explore the research methodologies that have developed within the broad school of critical discourse analysis, which provides the theoretical and methodological parameters of this study.

Finally, I identify the particular subjects of this study, discuss the sampling logic and take a closer look at the appropriate research tools that are applied to the analysis of the data in the research.

Social Constructionist Approach

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the research paradigm adopted for this research, is based on a social constructionist approach which embraces a variety of theories about society and culture and recognises the social aspect of language use. Being critical of the concept of 'objectivity' (Lichtenberg, 1996), this approach has raised questions about the relationship between representation and reality (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002) and ways of understanding the world.
Explaining the philosophical assumptions of the approach, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) remark that representations of the world are not reflections of a pre-existing reality but a product of our categorisation of the world or, in discursive terms, products of discourse. As they note, ‘this does not mean that reality itself does not exist. Meaning and representations are real. Physical objects also exist, but they only gain meaning through discourse’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p.9). Therefore, the social world is not pre-given or determined by external forces but is socially and discursively constructed. Representations of reality contribute to constructing reality.

Another assumption is that the way in which we understand the world is historically and culturally specific and can change over time (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). This is to say, the production, circulation and reception of the meaning of symbolic forms are processes made possible by the rules and resources of a certain historical and cultural context and field (Thompson, 1990).

The link between knowledge and social processes is also important (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). In our understanding of the world we create knowledge through social interaction in which we construct common truths and compete over what is true and false. The social construction of knowledge has social consequences because different social understandings of the world will lead to different social actions. Within a particular worldview, some forms of action will be accepted as natural while others regarded as unacceptable.

The constructionist approach had a big impact on the development of theories in relation to language and discourse. Its view of language as a social practice and a medium through which meaning is produced and channelled has especially influenced cultural studies. Thus, many linguistic theories, such as the pioneering work of both Saussure’s semiotic approach and Foucault’s discursive approach, are all based on this broad school of thought (Hall, 1997).
The media, one of the means of producing and disseminating symbolic forms, play a significant role in the construction and reflection of reality. Providing a meaningful representation of the world and communicating it to others, the media help to naturalise social reality which also serves to establish and sustain power relations. Shaped within a certain social structure, in which the communication of symbolic forms and meanings are expressed, the media are one of the means through which 'reality' is made apparent.

From Language to Discourse

As research in the fields of language, meaning and discourse has demonstrated, language is a way of making sense of the world, relating to it, processing its complexity and also internalising it (Berger, 1984, Hall, 1997, Lee, 1992). Functioning as a classificatory instrument, language helps in assigning conceptual categories to human experiences as well as imposing a 'structure on our perceptions of the world' (Lee, 1992, p.8). That is to say, bound up with a world-view, language constitutes and represents reality rather than mirroring it. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002) explain, knowledge of the world is not a reflection of the truth but the consequence of the categorisation of the world, and in relation to that, of a world-view. Language does not only transfer meaning and information but also constitutes our social world, identities and relations. Within a culture, sharing the same linguistic and conceptual categorisations helps us to see the world through the same conceptual map and use the same language system to comprehend it (Hall, 1997, Lee, 1992). Yet language is not objective but heterogeneous and subject to the processes of different perceptions and interpretations (Lee, 1992). Meaning is not inherent in things in the material world but is a result of the production process of individuals (Hall, 1997).

Describing language as a 'social institution' (Saussure, 1983, p.15), it was Saussure who first focused on the social role of language in society. According to him and the structuralist model developed from his ideas, language is a system which people learn and internalise as part of their socialisation process to express certain concepts and ideas
(Hall, 1997). Therefore, to understand its role, it is important to study the internal relationships which give language its form and function (Lee, 1992, Ehrmann, 1970) or the systems of thought that shape language (Phillips, 2000). In his study of language, Saussure separated language into 'langue' which consisted of the rules and codes of the language and 'parole' which is the linguistic performance or the act of speaking and writing (Fairclough, 1989, Hall 1997). This approach views langue as the social aspect of the language while parole is related to the individual use that is made possible by these rules and codes of the language. Thus, the focus of linguistic study is the structure of language, as this is the part that generates meaning rather than the actual language use which is too arbitrary and lacks structural properties to be included in the study (Fowler, 1991; Hall, 1997).

The structuralist approach attracted criticism for excluding the interactive characteristics of language in actual use, ignoring the dynamic nature of language, and for trying to study language with 'the law like precision of a science' (Hall, 1997, p.35). The linguistic theories that developed in reaction to the structuralist approach came to regard language as a structure that is temporary and changeable, with meanings also changing according to the context in which they are used rather than being stable or fixed. The development of the semiotic theory of ideology (Eagleton, 1991) highlighted in particular how an ideological struggle takes place in language to determine meanings or define which linguistic norms are legitimate (Fairclough 1989). This does not imply that meaning is abstract or floating but, on the contrary, that it is fixed within a specific context and historical moment (Eagleton, 1991). The fixed meaning, such as that given in a dictionary, is only an indication that one of the meaning systems has gained dominance in the struggle (Fairclough, 1989). It is also related to the influence of ideology as a mechanism of power in modern societies in which language is in the centre of the ideological struggle (Fairclough, 1989).

Such approaches to language and language use led to the development of the concept of discourse. Discourse points at the close link between language and social relations as well as highlighting that 'language is a material form of ideology and language is
invested by ideology' (Fairclough, 1995, p.73). Thus, it is a concept that relates to the 'historical, political and cultural “fixing” of certain meanings and their constant reproduction and circulation via established kinds of speech, forms of representation and in particular institutional settings' (O'Sullivan et al, 1994, p.93). Reflecting the social power within language (Eagleton, 1991) as the products of social, historical and institutional formations, discourses influence how an issue can be talked about. In other words, just as a discourse governs a particular way of talking about a topic, it also rules out or limits other ways. This is why Michel Foucault, who played a central role in the development of the concept of discourse, was interested in the production and changing systems of rules of discourse at different periods (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). In his view, ‘each society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of the truth’ (cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 117) in which certain discursive formations are considered to be ‘true’. This process could also be explained with the close link between discourse, knowledge and power as it can be argued that power governs knowledge through discursive practices within an institution to regulate social conduct (Hall, 1997). Interpreting Foucault, Hall writes ‘knowledge linked to power not only assumes the authority of ‘the truth’ but has the power to make itself true’ (Hall, 1997, p.49, italics in original).

Research Paradigm: Critical Discourse Analysis

Influenced by the theories of Western Marxism and especially of the social and political thought of Althusser, Gramsci and Foucault, CDA is a critical approach (Titscher et. al. 2000; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Its critical attitude comes from being based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School which take into account the historical contexts of discursive interactions and argue for a link between linguistic and social structure (Titscher et. al., 2000). Wodak (2001a) also adds that the notion of critical inherent in CDA should be understood as ‘having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly and a focus on self-reflection’ (p.9). In line with critical thought, the underlying assumption of CDA is that as the power relations
that frame reality are reflected in discourse, the main aim of the analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use (Wodak et al., 1999, p.8). Along the lines of the social constructionist approach, CDA sees truth being related to power as well as being historically and culturally specific and contingent (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002).

Essentially, CDA has two main concerns: on the one hand, it is primarily concerned with language and linguistic structure while on the other hand, it is preoccupied with the relationship between language use and the social context it is situated within. In other words, CDA does not just deal with the linguistic structure of discourses but also with the socio-cultural and discursive practices in which these discourses are produced and received. For CDA, language is a social practice, which means that it is a socially and historically situated and purposeful action (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 2001). Although it assumes that people communicate within a particular language they learned as part of their socialisation process, it also believes that learning and using a language does not just involve constructing a linguistic structure but also selecting an appropriate discourse according to certain circumstances and settings (Fowler, 1991; Fairclough, 1989). Therefore, by treating discourse as a social practice, it investigates the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and tries to make people aware of the influences of language and social structure that they have been previously unaware of (Titcher, et al, 2000).

Discourses are structurally part of their contexts and therefore, contexts such as the social situations and structures in which discourses are produced and understood should also be included in the analysis of discourse (van Dijk, 1997). Describing discourse as a form of social practice, CDA examines the underlying structures, conventions and rules that discourses are related to. Yet the relationship of discourse and its context is not one-directional but dialectical which means that as well as constituting and shaping society and culture in many ways, discourse is also constituted by them. On the one hand, socio-cultural factors shape discourses; on the other, discourses influence social and political
processes and actions (Wodak et al., 1999; Fairclough, 1995). As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) explain

Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situation, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them (p.55).

Within this dialectical relationship, discursive practices can be constitutive in different ways: First, they can produce and construct particular social conditions which may encourage the construction of collective identities such as national and ethnical. Second, they can contribute to the legitimation of the status quo by perpetuating, reproducing or justifying it. Third, they may be instrumental in transforming the status quo and concepts such as nationality and ethnicity which are related to it. Fourth, they may be effective in dismantling and destroying the status quo and concepts such as nationality and ethnicity which are related to it (Wodak et al., 1999, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Depending on the aim, discourse can adopt different strategies or practices to achieve certain political, social or linguistic aims.

Developed within critical theory, CDA explores the concept of power and ideology in discursive acts and how these are exercised and negotiated in discourses. In its view, language is not powerful on its own but can be used to challenge, undermine and alter the power within social structures (Wodak, 2001a). Thus, CDA is interested in examining how discourse, using language, mediates ideology and manipulates power relations. According to Fairclough (1989), the relation between power and discourse has two dimensions, as 'power in discourse' and 'power behind discourse'. He explains that while 'power in discourse' suggests that discourse could be a place where power relations are exercised, 'power behind discourse' points at a process which shapes and forms relations of power. Power over discourse in the 'power in discourse' indicates power to control and change the rules of discursive practices. Both 'power in discourse' and 'power behind discourse' mean that discursive aspects of power relations are not
fixed but on the contrary, its exercise within discourses is negotiated and contested (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

Ideology, an important part of establishing and maintaining power relations, is circulated and reproduced through discourse (Johnstone, 2002). Embedded in language, ideology produces rules and conventions that promote an understanding and acceptance of the world. Using language, discourse presents a specific worldview in which certain actions and rules seem natural while others are unacceptable within that ideological discourse formation (Fairclough, 1995). In other words, while allowing certain perspectives and knowledge in particular domains of social life as legitimate, discourse excludes other possibilities and other perspectives from those domains. Given that discourse exercises power through knowledge (Jager, 2001), CDA questions the discursive formations of knowledge, power and ideology, especially in authoritative discourses, and uncovers the relationship between discourse and ideology (Johnstone, 2002). It focuses on the role of ideology in providing a framework for understanding the world so that it can make people aware of the ideological role of language and discourse by showing that institutions construct their own ideologies and discourses.

Another characteristic of CDA is seeing discourse as historical. As Wodak explains, ‘every discourse is historically produced and interpreted, that is, it is situated in time and space; and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups’ (Wodak, 2001a, p.3). This is why, for discourse analysis, it is not enough to understand the underlying conventions and rules and consider the culture and ideology that surrounds it but it is also necessary to recognise what the discourse relates to in the past (Titscher et. al. 2000). Meyer points out that CDA is based on the assumption that ‘all discourses are historical and therefore can be understood with reference to their context’ (Meyer, 2001, p.15). It is also that discourses are connected to other discourses that were produced before them which not only creates an intertextual situation but also requires these discourses to be uncovered as well.
It can be argued that 'the goal of CDA is often explicitly political' (Johnstone, 2002, p.45). Its political involvement comes from its concern for social problems and how these problems are constituted within discourse (Scollon, 2001). As a problem-oriented approach, CDA doesn't just focus on language but also on the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Fairclough and Wodak (1997) explain that CDA's interest in social and political processes and movements comes from its claim that they have a partly linguistic-discursive character and that they generally include cultural and ideological elements. Thus, it believes that studying the discourses of these social and cultural representations can reveal new ideological attempts to establish hegemony over certain discourses.

Unlike other discourse analysis, CDA does not have an objective stance and political indifference but on the contrary, has 'emancipatory objectives' (Fairclough, 2001, p.125) and 'allies itself with those who suffer political and social injustice' (Wodak et. al. 1999, p.8). It is interested in the way discourse is used in the reproduction of dominance, the violation of norms as well as the human and social rights of groups, institutions and, in some cases, nation states (van Dijk, 2001). Therefore, by choosing the perspective of the suffering ones and criticising unjust social conditions that have an effect on social practice and social relationships, CDA aims to contribute to the improvement of these conditions by providing alternative resources for people to tackle their problems (Titscher et. al. 2000; Fairclough, 2001).

It is this committed nature of CDA that has raised questions about it being a valid tool of analysis. As discourse can be construed in different ways, CDA, benefiting from the broad contexts in which it is used, brings its own interpretation to the texts. Yet, this could lead it to being seen more as an ideological and biased interpretation rather than an analysis. Its explicit political stance that forms the basis of its examination also enhances the notion that its ideological commitment is an important factor in the selection of the texts and also in their interpretation (Titscher et. al. 2000). Acknowledging this criticism, Titscher et. al. (2000) points out that the results are open ended in CDA and that its explicit position and commitment differentiates it from other analysis.
Furthermore, Meyer (2001) raises the question of whether it is 'possible to perform any research free of a priori value judgements' (p.17) which according to CDA it is not.

Acknowledging these debates and criticisms of CDA, there are two reasons for adopting it in this research: First, as CDA is suitable for use in research that explores social and cultural changes, it will allow observation of the shifts in the discursive construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity along with changes in social, cultural and historical contexts. The second reason is related to the nature of the phenomenon under study. The ideological power of nationalism has a naturalising effect on national identity, embedding it in daily life without it being realised. Studying a phenomenon that is taken for granted, such as national identity, requires a critical approach like the CDA's to reveal hidden power relations and ideological representations during its construction and renegotiation. Thus, following the CDA's approach, this study will not just examine the linguistic structure of the texts but will also explore the dialectical relationship between social-cultural factors and the discursive construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity.

The Discourse-Historical Approach

Developed by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis, the discourse-historical approach is a hermeneutic and interpretative way of studying discourse. Initially utilized to study anti-Semitism in public discourse, later the approach was applied to explore issues like the discursive construction of national identity and racism in general (Wodak, 2001b; Wodak et. al. 1999, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Influenced by critical theory, Wodak (2001b) explains how the discourse-historical approach follows a complex concept of social critique that consists of three interconnected aspects: The first one is text or discourse immanent critique which aims at discovering inconsistencies, (self) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text or the discourse. The second one is socio-diagnostic critique, which is concerned with the exposure of the persuasive, propagandist or manipulative character of discursive practices. It analyses a discursive
event within the framework of a wider social context rather than just focusing on the text to discover the social and political aims and functions of discursive practices. In this type of critique, the researcher brings in background and contextual information as well as social and political relations and structures to the analysis (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The third aspect is the prognostic critique, which is related to the ethico-practical dimension of discursive practice. It seeks to change and transform things by playing a role in finding solutions for social problems. One such example was the attempt by researchers to contribute to a transformation and improvement of communication by reducing language barriers in public places as well as providing guidelines for avoiding sexist language (Wodak, 2001b; Titscher et. al. 2000, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

Following the principle of triangulation, the discourse-historical approach benefits from a variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives as well as a variety of empirical data and background information. Therefore, it integrates interdisciplinary perspectives such as historical, socio-political and linguistic, as well as using various methods of data collection and sets of data in the analysis (Wodak, 2001b; Wodak, et. al. 1999). Thus, the approach is useful in examining the interrelation of discursive and social practices as well as structures (Titscher et. al. 2000; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The discourse-historical approach is also based on a four-level concept of context which is:

a) The immediate linguistic text, the semantic environment of an utterance.

b) The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses.

c) The extralinguistic social variables and institutional settings of a specific situation of an utterance.

d) The broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded or related to, such as the history of the discursive event and the history to which the discoursal topic is related (Wodak, 2001b, p.67; Titscher et. al. 2000, p.157, Wodak et. al. 1999, p.9).

Another important aspect of the discourse-historical approach is that it analyses the historical dimension of discursive events. The discourse-historical approach is especially
effective in the analysis of discourses about nations and national identities because it combines 'knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive "events" are embedded' (Wodak 2001, p.65; Wodak et. al, 1999, p.156). The approach is also useful in observing the changes particular discourses go through over a period of time which is one of the reasons for adopting the discourse- historical approach in this research. Even though the focus of this study is the discursive construction of a national identity by the newspapers in recent years, the process still needs to be located in a historical context to provide a better understanding of the issue. The integration of the historical dimension into the analysis also helps one to observe the shifts within the discourses related to national identity over the years.

The analysis of the discourse-historical approach is three-dimensional: The first one is establishing the contents or the thematic areas of the discourses related to national identity. In this study, similar to the research Wodak et. al. (1999) conducted on the discursive construction of Austrian national identity, I focused on five themes: the linguistic construction of an essential understanding of national identity, a common political past, common political future, a common culture and a national space.

The second step of analysis is to examine the discursive strategies employed in the texts. Wodak et. al. (1999) describes these strategies as conscious plans of action to achieve a certain political, psychological or other kind of objective. They listed the main strategies used in their data as construction, transformation, perpetuation or justification and dismantling or destructive strategies: Constructive strategies 'construct and establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation' (Wodak et. al. 1999, p.33). Strategies of transformation, as the name suggests, aims at transforming an established national identity into another one. In contrast, perpetuation strategy attempts to reproduce or preserve, support or protect a threatened national identity. Justification strategies are used to justify one's actions by legitimising them if, and when questioned, and also maintain and defend a tainted common national self-perception (Wodak et. al. 1999). Finally, destructive strategies are ones that are employed to dismantle parts of national identity without providing a new
model for it. In this study, I also examine the newspaper texts to find out which strategies were employed in the construction of Turkish Cypriot identity.

The third analytical unit of the discourse-historical approach is to study the forms of linguistic implementation employed in discursive actions. The underlying reason for such an investigation is to identify the linguistic means that express unity, sameness, difference and so on. The use of 'we' is especially important in discourses about nations and national identity (Wodak et. al. 1999) as well as other linguistic means such as metonymy, synecdoche and personification. While metonymy hides responsible agents of an action, personification attributes a human form to a phenomenon. Synecdoche, on the other hand, by replacing the name of a referent with another, can intensify or diminish the meaning (Wodak et. al. 1999).

Why Study Media Discourse?

The media plays a crucial role in reflecting and constituting modern society as well as being constituted by it. According to Bell (1991), analysing the media language is important not only because the media generate much of the language that is heard in society but also 'the media are dominating presenters of language in society at large' (p.3). Their role as a manufacturer and distributor of symbolic materials and as public opinion-shapers make them important ideological institutions of society. Therefore, the media discourse is a useful resource for analysing the relations of power and control within society as they are also reflected in language structures within the media. A critical investigation into how the media operate and how they communicate to an audience would create an understanding and awareness of how relations and structures of power are embedded in the forms of everyday language. Media discourses can reveal how language contributes to the legitimisation of existing social relations and hierarchies of authority and control in society. For example, media representations may translate official viewpoints into public idioms (Deacon et al., 1999) and encourage the
legitimising of the positions of these officials, which is also a factor in sustaining the order of that society (Fairclough, 1995; Trew, 1979).

The application of critical discourse analysis to media texts would show the links between the media texts and the socio-cultural processes in which they are produced. The dialectical relationship between media discourse, society and culture means that the media discourse not only contributes to social and cultural changes but is also constituted by them. According to Fairclough (1995), media texts are a 'sensitive barometer' (p.52) of socio-cultural changes as these changes can be found in the discursive practices of the media.

The news media, which is the main concern of this research, has an ideological role within society as an information provider. The societal structures and ideologies that dominate the selection and production of the news not only help them to be naturalised and treated as common sense but their claim to be factual promotes the quality of their persuasiveness as well (van Dijk, 1988). Rather than being just the transmission of facts, the news is also the embodiment of the assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes of its producers (McNair, 1998). However, ideological meanings are not only embedded within the news discourses but also in the routines of news production which lead journalists to adopt the frames and ideology of elite organisations, institutions and persons (van Dijk, 1988). As an example, linked to the configuration of power within society, the news media perceive some institutions such as government, the judiciary and the police as more important and newsworthy than others. Strengthening their institutional power and position, the news media accredit these sources as reliable and trustworthy. Thus, given that the news media’s production of ‘reality’ influences public understanding of the world, their attitudes and behaviour, whose reality they are reflecting becomes an important question in the news analysis.

The way the news media address their audience also has an ideological impact. Rather than speaking directly to their audience, the news media reports events mainly through other institutions, groups and movements, which readers identify with or support (Trew,
In other words, it is through these groups that the news media provide an interpretation of events. By providing dominant knowledge and attitude structures that fit with the general understanding of the social, political, cultural and economic structures of society, they treat them as common sense rather than raise questions about them. However, this should not be misinterpreted to mean that there is only one way of understanding and interpreting events; on the contrary, the news media act as a site of struggle between different understandings and interpretations for ideological hegemony in which the dominancy of ideas changes over time.

Methods and Research Tools

The main concern of this research is the discursive construction of national identity through the newspapers in North Cyprus; yet it is also interested in how these different and sometimes conflicting concepts of national identity are being imposed, legitimised and maintained by the news media. Therefore, it questions the strategies the news media employ to maintain and reproduce naturalized concepts of national identity. Analyzing the mediation of national identity, the study attempts to reveal the ideological assumptions, relations of power and control that underlie the media representation and discourse of national identity in the TRNC. Following CDA's idea that the media texts and society have a dialectical relationship in which texts shape society and culture as well as being shaped by them, the research explores the relationship between discursive acts and the construction of national identity through the media. For example, studying the discursive construction of national sameness and difference, as Wodak (2001) suggests, shows how the discursive construction of national identity leads to the political and social exclusion of some groups and exposes the discursive process of creating 'others' in relation to the construction of 'us'.

So far, the study has focused on the development of Turkish Cypriot identity and the Turkish Cypriot media in order to provide a broader socio-political and historical context for the discursive practices that are under investigations. The other three
contexts, as suggested by the discourse-historical approach, will be taken into account during the analysis of each case. The previous two chapters, which studied identity and media issues, benefited from an interdisciplinary approach that combined historical and socio-political perspectives using the data derived from various methods of data collection such as archival research and interviews. The interviews conducted in the context of news production are especially enlightening about the institutional settings of the discourses analysed.

The rest of the research will focus on the data collected by carrying out an analysis of selected case studies. As Titscher et. al. (2000) explains, 'case studies aim to analyse a phenomenon very precisely and every unit of investigation as an entity itself' (p.43). Multiple case studies, as will be the case in this research, are not aimed at developing statistical generalisations but theoretical ones, as well as examining the relationship between them based on the similarities or differences. The case studies chosen for this research are the newspaper coverage of three politically and culturally significant events for Turkish Cypriots in the last 12 years. The use of 'significant' is to indicate that these events occupied the agenda of Turkish Cypriots and led to many heated public and media debates. Focusing only on these recent years is not to deny the idea that the construction of national identity is an ongoing process, but to reflect the changes and the hegemonic struggles in the conceptualisation of a national identity within the Turkish Cypriot community that began around the mid-1990.

Among the daily newspapers published in the TRNC today, three of them, *Kibris, Halkın Sesi* and *Yenidüzen* are included in the study to note their reflection of Turkish Cypriot identity in their news reports. These newspapers were chosen because they reflect a broad spectrum of opinions in North Cyprus and are the three newspapers that have had long and steady publication lives. *Halkın Sesi* (The voice of people) is the longest surviving Turkish Cypriot newspaper, having begun publication in 1942. During the conflict with the Greek Cypriots, the newspaper played a key role in the promotion of Turkish nationalism. *Yenidüzen* (New Order) began in 1975 as the publication of the left wing CTP (Republican Turkish Party), which favours a solution to the Cyprus
problem based on a federation with Greek Cypriots. *Kibris* (Cyprus), on the other hand, is a commercial newspaper with the highest circulation in the TRNC.

Three case studies selected for the research are based on the newspaper reports of three events. The analysis covers a period of a week before and a week after the main event to include enough time to reflect the views of the newspapers and also to limit the timeframe of the study as the newspapers in some cases continued reporting on the issues for a longer period.

The first case study is about the demonstration by a group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists at the buffer zone in Cyprus in August 1996 that turned into violent clashes between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and resulted with the death of two Greek Cypriot civilians. I have chosen this event to see how the three newspapers articulated conceptualisations of a national identity in relation to Greek Cypriots and Turkish nationals in North Cyprus.

The second event is the opening of the border that separates the two communities on the island in April 2003. It enabled the members of both communities to cross to the 'other' side for the first time since the division of the island in 1974 and meet the people they had regarded as the enemy for years. This section questions the concept of border to find out who was included or excluded in the reproduction of the national community by the newspapers.

The third case study is about the removal of a footbridge in January 2007 which was initially erected to act as a crossing point and link the divided city of Nicosia. The footbridge, that attracted the criticism of the Greek Cypriot government when it was first built, caused a rift between the civil authority and the Turkish military in the north of the island when the Turkish Cypriot government wanted it to be removed. This part of the research focuses on the articulation of national identity in the debates surrounding the footbridge.
I have selected the newspaper coverage of these events to examine, not only because they occupied the media's agenda and created debate amongst Turkish Cypriots but also because of the relevance of these news texts to the construction of national identity. Along with Turkish Cypriots, the events also involved Greek Cypriots and Turks which is useful in the investigation of how oppositional metaphors were used in the construction of national identity and how the description of the ‘other’ was employed in ‘our self-perception’. Bearing in mind that the media and society have a dialectical relationship, the existing prejudices and stereotyping within the society might be reflected in the construction of the media texts as well as the media playing a role in constructing those prejudices and stereotypes. A discourse analysis of these texts may also provide evidence of how national identity was constructed through these prejudices and stereotypes towards neighbouring nations as well as through the self-perceptions of the Turkish Cypriots.

Exploring shifts in the concept of national identity within the media as a result of the ideological struggle will be another purpose of the analysis. Having discussed the idea that ideologies not only naturalise and turn some discourses into common sense but also give them meaning as though they had been permanently in place, the analysis will test the role of the newspaper texts in providing such a perception of national identity. Also accepting that meanings are not fixed but bound to change over time as a result of struggles for hegemony, which is an important characteristic of discursive practice (Deacon et al., 1999), the news texts are examined to find out if and what changes there are in the newspapers’ discourses and representations of Turkish Cypriot identity.

Research Limitations

In this research I focus only on newspaper reports and exclude broadcast ones for two reasons: First, broadcasting was under state monopoly until 1997 when commercialization of broadcasting was first allowed. When the border incidents took place in 1996, there was only the state broadcasting corporation, BRT, to cover the
incidents. Analyzing only BRT's news reports would only have provided me with the discourse related to the official concept of national identity and not other discourses. Secondly, the lack of broadcast news archives in the TRNC inevitably limits my research to only the analysis of newspaper coverage of the events. Even if I wanted to extend my research to broadcast and benefit from their news reports as well, I would not be able to find all the relevant broadcast coverage of the events under study. Insistence on carrying out such research would have risked the reliability and validity of the study.

The research is also limited to news reports and excludes all other types of texts such as editorials (including opinions columns). News reports and editorials have different functions as well as different production and reception processes: While news articles are regarded as informative and just giving the facts, editorials are seen as evaluative texts that include opinion. I am aware that this is a problematic approach, as news articles do not consist of objective facts but feature the opinions, values and beliefs of their producers as well. Despite that, in general the news is considered and understood to provide information about events and is accepted to be true or close to the truth and that attributes to them a persuasive function (van Dijk, 1988) which is why I have decided to concentrate only on such texts.

The main limitation of the study is related to me being a native Turkish Cypriot. As well as possessing the necessary linguistic skills, I believe I have an intimate knowledge of society, history and cultural resources that allows me to study the issue. On the other hand, I am aware that having been through the socialisation process of this community, through its educational system and other processes, this might lead to preconceptions about the issues under study, even at the subconscious level. Therefore, I cannot claim a socially neutral stance and not bring my own values and evaluations to the research. Yet, adopting CDA's philosophical assumptions, I make every effort to create the distance necessary to study the naturalised or common sense understandings of a phenomenon such as national identity. I am not questioning the ideological aspects of a discursive event to seek truth but to reveal how the claims to truth could be used to reproduce the power relations in the discourses surrounding national identity in North Cyprus. I
believe I will be able to maintain a critical attitude to interrogate the discourse related to national identity as reflected in the newspapers.
CHAPTER 5: BORDER CLASHES IN CYPRUS IN 1996

Introduction

This chapter examines the newspaper coverage of two demonstrations organised by Greek Cypriots at the border in Cyprus in August 1996. These were the two most violent incidences between the two communities since the division of the island in 1974 as they resulted in the death of two Greek Cypriot demonstrators and had a significant impact on relations between North and South.

The analysis focuses on the news texts to see how three different newspapers articulated conceptualisations of a national identity in relation to Greek Cypriots and Turkish nationals, who were also present at the clashes that occurred during the first demonstration. Through critical discourse analysis, the research aims to examine how the newspapers referred to different groups involved in the incidents. The analysis also enables one to compare the differences and similarities in the discourses within the Turkish Cypriot press.

The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Border Clashes Took Place

In protest at the division of the island a group representing the organization of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists, accompanied by supporters affiliated to European motorcyclist organizations, decided to break through the buffer zone into the Turkish Cypriot area. They started their rally in Berlin on 2nd August 1996 and planned to finish in Cyprus on 11th August 1996. The motorcyclists called their demonstration a 'peaceful anti-invasion activity' and claimed that their protest was for a 'borderless world' (*Kibris*, 11 August, p.2). A photograph in *Kibris* newspaper showed one of the motorcyclists wearing a t-shirt with a logo that said 'a world without borders' in English and Greek (*Kibris*, 7 August, p.1).
On 11th of August 1996, the day the motorcyclists’ demonstration was supposed to take place, the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation announced that it had cancelled the rally following pressure from the Greek Cypriot government, citing reasons of security. Yet, some Greek Cypriot demonstrators remained undeterred and after congregating at the border, crossed the buffer zone into Turkish Cypriot territory. Meanwhile, a sizeable group of protestors from the Turkish Cypriot side had also gathered at the border to stage their counter demonstration against the Greek Cypriot demonstrators and also to prevent them from breaking into Turkish Cypriot territory. When the Greek Cypriot protesters attempted to cross the buffer zone, the demonstrators from both sides clashed. One Greek Cypriot, Tassos Isaac, was kicked and beaten to death by a mob of men from the north. Some of these men belonged to Turkish ultra nationalist groups such as Ülkücü (Idealist). Originating in Turkey, the group had a pan-Turkist ideology and was largely supported by nationalist groups in the TRNC. It was reported in the media that around 150 supporters of this group had arrived in the TRNC in order to join the demonstration (Halkin Sesi, 13 August, p.3; Yenidüzen, 13 August, p.5; Kibris, 13 August, p.4).

On 14th August, the day of Isaac’s funeral, another demonstration was staged at the Turkish Cypriot border, which resulted in the death of another Greek Cypriot, Solomos Spiro Solomou. Having passed the UN buffer zone and reached the Turkish Cypriot side, Solomou climbed a flagpole in an attempt to lower the Turkish flag. He was shot dead by the military forces from the north. Both incidents increased the tension between the two communities.

In 1996, the Green Line acted as a barrier not just for crossing but also for communication between both communities. People on both sides of the Line got the news about the ‘other’ through the media, which relied on the information provided by official sources. The Turkish Cypriot media received the news about the ‘other’ through TAK which monitored and distributed the news from the Greek Cypriot side. BRTK also regularly listened to Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation’s radio station to follow the news there.

Ülkücü (Idealist) or Ülkü Ocakları is an organization with a pan-Turkist ideology. Pan-Turkism, on the other hand, is an ideology and movement that aims to unite all Turkic people (Landau, 1995).
At the time, the government in North Cyprus was comprised of nationalist forces and this was reflected in its ideology and practices as well as its media and communication policies vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots. It remained opposed to any contact with Greek Cypriots and advocated keeping the status quo on the island as divided into two separate states. In state pronouncements and policies, no distinction was made between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks.

The left opposition parties, on the other hand, such as *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi* (CTP- the Republican Turkish Party), supported a solution to the Cyprus problem with Greek Cypriots and criticised Turkey’s power and control over North Cyprus. They also spearheaded the new identity of Cypriot (or Turkishcypriot), which not only asserted distinct Cypriot ethnic and cultural characteristics but also did so by specifically emphasizing its difference from Turkishness.

Despite its claim to be a legal state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the state in the north, was not granted recognition from the international community. Actually, the establishment of the republic had a negative impact as it provoked economic sanctions being brought against the country. As a consequence, North Cyprus became more dependent on Turkey. In this context, its borders became a way of emphasising and legitimising the existence of the TRNC, if not for the international world, at least to its own people.

The Position of the Newspapers

The data for this case study consists of around 170 news texts from three daily newspapers *Kibris, Halkın Ses*, and *Yenidüzen*. Most of these texts were the same as each other, yet were counted separately as they appeared in each newspaper. Apart from representing a different spectrum of opinion, these newspapers also had the highest circulation figures between the seven daily and three weekly newspapers published in the TRNC in 1996 (Azgün, 1998). Taking the motorcyclists’ rally as the main event, the analysis only includes the newspapers between 4-18 August 1996, which limits the research to the reports a week before and a week after the demonstration.
Kibris, with the highest circulation in North Cyprus, supported the nationalistic conservative policies of the government in 1996. It gave the widest coverage to the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ attempt to cross the border and on some days the stories were extremely long. For instance, the day after the motorcyclists’ demonstration, the related stories filled a full five pages of the newspaper.

Halkan Sesi also supported the nationalist government and its policies at the time. Its coverage of the incidents that took place at the border had many similarities with Kibris’ coverage.

Yenidüzen, the newspaper of the left-wing main opposition party, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), unlike the other two newspapers analysed, did not print any stories about the motorcyclists’ planned action until 7th August 1996. Even then, the story appeared on the second page instead of the first, another distinction from the other two as they usually reported similar issues on their front pages.

Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News

The majority of the reporting during the period chosen consisted of public statements, press releases, press conferences and interviews given to the newspapers by the government and military authorities, political parties and civil organisations. They mainly covered the Greek Cypriot authorities having been called to cancel the motorcyclists’ demonstration and the fact that the security forces in the TRNC had taken all the necessary precautions to protect its borders. They also posited the idea that the demonstration would not help in finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus Problem. The statements from the representatives of the United Nation and other countries also appeared in these newspapers, expressing their anxiety before the incidents and their condemnation afterwards. The news from the foreign media (especially the Greek Cypriot media) was another source that the Turkish Cypriot media used to report the developments but only the stories that supported the political line of the newspapers were included as a way to increase or confirm the truthfulness of the newspapers’ views. For example, Kibris used a Reuter’s news dispatch in which the details of the incidents that led to Solomou’s death were given
great scrutiny in order to justify the position and actions of the Turkish Cypriot authorities (*Kibris*, 15 August, p.4).

Even though the appearance of a variety of sources in the papers can be interpreted as a reflection of a diversity of opinions and discourses in the society, their treatment within the newspapers is also important. For example, there were many examples of the newspapers reporting some aspects of the events while ignoring others or including certain parts of public statements they agreed with but at the same time avoiding those they did not. Another characteristic of the news during the period studied was that it dominantly reflected the views of state officials which reduced the newspapers to secondary definers of the events rather than being the primary ones (Hall et al, 1978 and also in Tumber, 1999). The process not only reproduced these sources as the natural authorities but reconstituted their discourses and representations as the norm without leaving space for the other or challenging ones. Tsagarousianou (1999) cautions that reduced diversity within national politics restricts the possibility of representation and identity negotiations separate from official definitions. Pointing at the example of the Greek mass media, Tsagarousianou notes that when combined with restricted access to the media, 'the systematic publicizing of official definitions of the situation and of nationalist discourse have achieved the closure of the universe of political discourse in general' (p.188).

There were many identical stories in the three newspapers which could be explained by two reasons: They all employed the same news dispatches from the news agencies, especially TAK and with very little editing and they all benefited from the same press releases or written statements from various groups and organisations in the production of their news articles. They published these press releases and statements with little or no editing due, perhaps, to the lack of sufficient staff, time or resources. This practice created an intertextual relationship which led to the publication of many press releases and announcements disguised as news as well as embedding their discourses into the news. As a result, the contents of the newspapers were very similar in general to each other. Often, the only differences in these newspapers were the headlines. Headlines can generally be described as summaries of the news texts (van Dijk, 1988) but in the case of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers
they reflect the position of the paper in relation to the issues raised in the stories. In *Kibris* and *Halkın Sesi* there were some identical headlines such as: ‘The UN is anxious’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 9 August, p.1) ‘Anxiety in the UN’ (*Kibris*, 9 August, p.1), ‘They’ve gone crazy (or insane)’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 15 August, p.1 & *Kibris*, 11 August, p.1), ‘We break the hands reaching out to the flag’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 16 August, 199:1 & *Kibris*, 16 August, 199:1). ‘They just don’t learn’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 18 August, 199:1 & *Kibris*, 15 August, 199:1). As the similarities of the headlines suggest, the representation and the news discourses in *Kibris* and *Halkın Sesi* showed strong resemblances in general. They both reflected the events from a nationalist framework and adopted the nationalist discourse that was dominant at the time. *Yenidüzen*, on the other hand, showed some deviance from the dominant discourse with its reconstruction of the events, the selection of words and themes in its reports.

Censorship by the state authorities was another factor that shaped the news texts during this period. *Yenidüzen* revealed that journalists had been warned that some censorship should and would be applied to their news reports on the day of the motorcyclists’ demonstration at the border. According to the newspaper, the authorities had cautioned journalists, saying that ‘friends, on this special day not everything can be filmed or written. This is a rule. Don’t forget that we have the names of each one of you’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.3). Yet, the newspaper did not disclose the identity or the status of the authority that had issued the warning. The only clue was that it happened as journalists gathered in front of the TRNC Public Information Office (functioning under the Prime Minister’s Office), as they waited to be taken to the border to report the events. Also telling was that journalists travelled to the border in military vehicles, implying that their newsgathering practices were limited and scrutinized by army officials. Stressing that this information was not included in the ‘official news bulletins of both sides’, *Yenidüzen* proposed credibility by suggesting that it was not following the censorship threat (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.3). Whether it followed it or not, the report implied that certain controls and restrictions might have been applied to journalists on other similar occasions.
Discourse Analysis

Among the themes discussed in the methodology chapter, the news texts analysis showed that the themes of understanding nation, the representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the collective past mostly appeared in the news texts. The essentialist understanding of Turkish Cypriot identity was embedded in the articles. The themes of common culture and common future occurred less often in the news discourses.

On the Understanding of Nation and National Consciousness

The news articles that were analysed showed that people living in the north of the island were identified by various references such as Turkish Cypriots, Turks and Turks of Cyprus, depending on the context and the ‘other’. In relation to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were referred to as ‘Turks’, ‘Turkish Cypriot community’ or ‘Turkish side’ in all three newspapers. The term ‘nation’ didn’t appear in any of the news reports. Whether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separate national entity was also ambiguous in the texts, especially in Kibris and Halkin Sesi. The demarcation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks as separate nations rarely appeared in these newspapers as the terms ‘Turks’ and ‘Turkish Cypriots’ were used interchangeably to refer to Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it was difficult to establish whether or not they were seen as a separate nation from the Turkish one. In some cases it was not even clear if the term ‘Turk’ also referred to Turkish Cypriots or just mainland Turks. Reporting that ‘Greek Cypriots exhibited animosity again towards Turks during Solomou’s funeral’ (Halkin Sesi, 17 August, p.1), Halkin Sesi left it ambiguous whether ‘Turk’ included Turkish Cypriots or Turkish nationals or both. In another example, reporting on a speech Turkey’s Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller delivered in North Cyprus, Halkin Sesi employed the term ‘Turkish’ to refer to the youth there: ‘Calling out to the Turkish youth on the island not to get provoked, Çiller said....’ (Halkin Sesi, 16 August, p.1). This ambiguity actually reinforced the connection between Turkish and Turkish Cypriots not as two separate nations but as a united one. A similar practice was also discernible in Yenidüzen. Referring to the territory on the north of the island as ‘Turkish territory’, Yenidüzen reported that Solomou had ‘crossed to the Turkish territory and attempted to haul down the
Turkish flag' (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p.1). It showed that having internalised the identity of Turk in relation to Greek Cypriots Yenidüzen also treated the interchangeable use of these concepts of identity as normal.

Along with the references to national identity, cultural symbols were also used to enhance the categorisation of Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks into one group. The national flag was one such example. Without making any distinction between the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags, Kibris referred to both as ‘our’ flag. This was especially clear in the news texts regarding the shooting of Solomos Solomou, when he had attempted to bring a Turkish flag down at the border. Kibris described the action as lowering ‘our flag down’ (Kibris, 15 August, p.1) even though the concerned flag was a Turkish flag rather than a Turkish Cypriot one. The underlying reason could be that representing the two flags as equivalent moderated the paradox of having two state structures for the members of one nation. The word ‘our’ was used to show the harmony and cooperation between Turkey and the TRNC as well as to help Turkish Cypriots identify with Turkish identity. It was also used as a synonym describing the people on the north of the island as Turkish, without making a distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. In contrast to Kibris, both Hallan Sesi and Yenidüzen described the flag as the ‘Turkish flag’ (Hallan Sesi, 15 August, p. 1; Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 1).

Kibris and Halkin Sesi benefited in particular from constructive strategies such as the strategy of unification to categorise Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people within the same group by emphasising common ancestry. The use of family metaphors reinforced the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC as similar to the one between ‘mother and baby’. Family metaphors are useful to assign certain rights and responsibilities to parents and also justify the dependence of the baby/child to the mother (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, portraying Turkey as the ‘motherland’ (anavatan) imbued some rights to it over the ‘babyland or infantland’ (yavruvatan) as well as assigning some responsibilities regarding its security. Reporting on a speech delivered by the Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller in the TRNC, Kibris edited her words as ‘Çiller ... emphasised the determination of the motherland Turkey to protect the rights of Turks in Cyprus’ (Kibris, 16 August, p.1). The statement not only reconstructed the relationship between two states along the
'mother-baby' discourse but also emphasised the 'mother's responsibility for protection of the 'baby'. Yet, it was vague whether it was hers or the paper's choice to use the term 'motherland' as the news report of the same speech in Halkin Sesi did not include the term 'motherland' but used 'Turkey' instead (Halkin Sesi, 16 August, p.1). Yenidüzen, on the other hand, did not even include the statement in its news article but published Çiller's photo on its front-page with a caption that said 'Mother's Cyprus landing' (Yenidüzen, 16 August, p.1). The term 'landing' likened her arrival in North Cyprus, along with a crowd of bureaucrats and journalists after the conflicts with the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, to a military action and evoked the one in 1974. The word 'mother' replaced the term of 'motherland' or Turkey and helped to personify Turkey with the image of its female foreign minister.

A similarly gendered representation of the nation was embedded in the news texts during the period studied. Although the demonstrators were not specified as 'men' in the texts, the photographs of the events showed only men as the demonstrators. The overall coverage of the events reflected only the men's point of view and the idea of women being involved in the incidents was treated as a divergence from the norm. For example, when the group of motorcyclists, who had set off from Berlin, arrived in South Cyprus, Kibris published a photo of a young woman to highlight the presence of women among the motorcyclists as something unusual (Kibris, 11 August, p.1). As the motorcyclists' rally was considered a violent and battle-like event, normally associated with men, the demonstrators being male was treated as normal.

The inclusion of women in the representation of the events was mostly as 'mothers'. According to Kibris and Halkin Sesi, TRNC President Denktaş warned that Greek Cypriot mothers should worry about the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' attempt to enter the country with force and without permission (Kibris, 6 August, p.4; Halkin Sesi, 6 August, p.4) as their children would be punished if they did so. The voices of women were included in the reports when a women's group made an appeal to mothers from both communities to stop their children from joining in the rally (Kibris, 8 August, p.3; Yenidüzen, 8 August, p.6). On another occasion, a woman was included in the news reports when a Greek Cypriot woman was shot and injured during the second border incident. Kibris reported that the woman was a mother who
had gone to the conflict zone to get her son out of the area, which suggested that she was not a demonstrator. The shooting of this woman was singled out in the reports even though nine Greek Cypriot demonstrators and two United Nations soldiers were also injured. As the source of the information was given as Reuters it is not clear whether it was Reuters that highlighted this woman's case or Kibris that chose to focus on it.

There was an emphasis on an ethnic community of common origin and descent rather than citizenship in the news discourses, which indicated that the nation was conceptualised as a Kulturnation. The newspapers characterised the nation as 'Turkish', implying a common history and ancestry as the basis for national membership of the nation. Kibris even reproduced the first border incident as a clash between the 'aggressive Greek Cypriots and our people of the same race' (Kibris, 12 August, p.2). The statement not only highlighted the existence of Turkish demonstrators at the rally but also justified their presence as part of the 'we group'. The concept of a nation based on the political will of citizens or Staatsnation appeared less in the news texts. Citizens were included in the newspapers to give their opinions but the term 'citizen' was used to distinguish ordinary people from the state authorities rather than stress the status of their belonging to the nation. In a way, even though the concept of Staatsnation existed in the news, the emphasis was more on Kulturnation.

The representation of the nation in the media involves representing boundaries which mark the inclusion and exclusion, or who belongs, to the nation. The inclusion and exclusion process, which is embedded in the news discourse, is not fixed but shifts depending on the national identity projects. Differences in the conceptualisation of national identity employ different categories, which involve different social actors in the 'we' group and 'they' group (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Yet, although the group inclusion and exclusion dynamics change, the strategies and linguistic means that are employed can be similar. Kibris was full of examples of linguistic means of creating a 'national we' through the usage of 'we', 'our' and 'us' that excluded the 'outsiders' or 'them'. For example, expressions such as 'our troops at the border' (Kibris, 11 August, p.1), 'our soldiers and our citizens are guarding the border' (Kibris, 12 August, p.2), 'yesterday they came to our border again' (Kibris, 15
August, p.1) contributed to the imagining of a ‘national we’. Similar references appeared less in *Hallan Sesi* but it supported the ‘us’ and ‘them’ division in a different way. The newspaper had a page that consisted of a selection of news from the Greek Cypriot press, which generally portrayed the south part of the island as a place full of crime, fraud and people who hated Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Separating the news reports from the north and the south of Cyprus not only enhanced a differentiation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots but also encouraged them to imagine themselves as a national community within its bounded territory.

The categorisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were different in *Yenidüzen* from the other two newspapers and was reflected in its discourse on borders. In its reports, while ‘us’ referred to the people who supported a peace process in Cyprus, ‘them’ were the nationalistic fanatics who opposed a solution in Cyprus, regardless of whether they were Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. It depicted both border incidents as the actions of ‘fanatics’ rather than defining them as Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. Running the headline ‘the result of fanaticism’ the day after the motorcyclists’ demonstration (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August p.1), it described the people involved at the clashes as ‘the instruments of the chauvinist groups who do not want a solution in Cyprus’ (*Yenidüzen*, 11 August p.1). For *Yenidüzen*, the physical borders were not regarded as the mark of exclusion or inclusion since there were people who belonged to the ‘we-group’ and ‘they group’ from both sides of the island. Instead, there were ideological and political borders between those in favour of a solution in Cyprus and those supporting the status quo.

Unlike *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*, national security and territorial integrity were not the main themes in *Yenidüzen*. The statements made by the Turkish military authorities, whose duty was defined as being to guard the national border, appeared on the front pages of *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*. In contrast, they received very little coverage in *Yenidüzen* and did not appear on its front pages. Instead, the themes of peace or a need for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus Problem were frequently employed in the articles. The difference shows that rather than supporting the nationalistic view, for which the boundaries acted as a separation line between ‘us’ and the ‘outsiders’ (or Greek Cypriots), *Yenidüzen* imagined Cyprus as one country but divided.
Adopting a 'we' discourse in the news texts also helped to strengthen the relationship between the media and the audience by reducing the distance between them. The national media not only symbolize the nation but also in some ways construct it. By speaking for and to the nation, the media represent the nation as well as depicting what is to be represented (Billig, 1995). Frequently using the deictic expression of 'we' in their reports, Kibris and Halkin Sesi claimed to be speaking to and for the nation they represented. The metonymic realisation of 'we' referred to both the newspaper itself and also to the society it addressed. The strategy not only forged a national 'we-group' but also represented its interests and affairs. Halkin Sesi claimed to voice the emotions and thoughts of the nation in its headlines. With the headline 'Come and let's see what happens' (Halkin Sesi, 11 August, p.1), the newspaper challenged the 'other' on behalf of the people. When it said 'Our attention is fixed on tomorrow' (Halkin Sesi, 10 August, p.1) it meant that as the whole nation 'we' are waiting to see what will happen the next day. Finally, by stating that 'Motorcyclists can never cross (the border)' (Halkin Sesi, 7 August, p.1), Halkin Sesi claimed to reflect the determination of the nation.

In some cases there was confusion about whose views the newspapers were reflecting and who the 'we' referred to. For example, quoting the Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller at the time, Halkin Sesi wrote:

A message from Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller to the Greek Cypriot Administration
WE DON'T LET THE BORDER TO BE PENETRATED

'If the TRNC borders are made to be unrecognisable whatever's necessary will be done' (Halkin Sesi, 13 August, p.1).

In this case, it is not clear who 'we' refers to; whether the words about not letting the border be broken-through belonged to Çiller or the newspaper was ambiguous. While introduced as a message from Ciller, 'We don't let the border to be penetrated' was not in quotation marks, the statement following it was. Quotations from legitimate and powerful sources increase the dramatic dimension of the news events and strengthen their rhetorical function and effect (van Dijk, 1988). As Tuchman (1999) describes, quotations are 'a form of supporting evidence' (p.301). Using quotations allow people to distance themselves from participating in the story and let the facts
speak for themselves (Tuchman, 1999). Yet, that was not the case with *Halkin Sesi*. Using the marks in one part of the headline to attribute those words to Çiller but not in others can be interpreted as the statements without marks belonging to the newspaper. In this context, rather than establishing a distance from the statement, the use of quotation marks actually reduced the distance between the views expressed by the speaker and the newspaper. In other words, it showed the newspaper’s support and agreement with Çiller’s statement as well as presenting it as the united opinion of an ‘us’ that included Turkey as well.

In *Yenidüzen*’s headlines, the expression of a ‘national we’ was not as readily emphasised. Instead the newspaper addressed its readership as if it were advising them on to how to behave in these extraordinary circumstances: ‘invitation to common sense’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 August, p.1), ‘do not get provoked’ (*Yenidüzen*, 11 August, p.1). Its tone was more like a lecture to them: ‘this was what was expected’ (*Yenidüzen*, 9 August, p.1) ‘Tension is disaster’ (*Yenidüzen*, 13 August, p.1). In its representation of the nation, rather than merely speaking on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, the newspaper pointed at both communities together. The expressions ‘the Greek and Turkish communities living in Cyprus’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 August, p.1) and ‘both communities are tense’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 August, p.1) are other examples which highlighted commonalities between both communities.

Apart from emphasising the unity of ‘us’, national symbols were also used to enhance the differences from Greek Cypriots. The employment of flags was one such example: The Greek Cypriot demonstrators were shown carrying the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greece while the Turkish Ülkücil (Idealist) demonstrators were depicted with their flags composed of their symbols of three crescents or a grey wolf. *Kibris* reported that the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were carrying ‘the flag of the ROC that they had demolished in 1963’ (*Kibris*, 10 August, p.2). The photos of them with ROC’s flags in their hands frequently appeared in the newspaper. Greek and ROC national flags were also positioned together, just as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ones were. On the day of the motorcyclists’ demonstration, *Halkin Sesi* predicted that the demonstrators would carry ‘the flags of Greek Cyprus, Greece and the European Union’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 11 August, p.3). In a similar way, reporting Solomou’s funeral, the newspapers highlighted that a Greek...
(not a Greek Cypriot) flag was wrapped around his coffin (Halkin Sesi, 17 August, 1997, p.1; Yenidüzen, 17 August, 1997, p.5) and that there was no ‘Cypriot’ flag at the funeral (Yenidüzen, 17 August, 1997, p.5). Yenidüzen also pointed out that during Isaac’s funeral ceremony at the border, Greek Cypriot demonstrators placed a flag, combining the Greek and ROC flags on the spot where Isaac was killed. This flag was described as a ‘Greekified Cyprus flag’: ‘the flag is interesting. It is made up of a Greek flag attached on to the upper left corner of a big ROC flag’ (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p.3). It was again Yenidüzen that drew attention to the flags the Idealists carried: ‘fanatics who carried three crescents and grey wolf flags with Turkish and TRNC flags and equipped with all kinds of sharp instruments...’ (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.3).

The newspapers frequently benefited from the ideology of consensus (Fowler, 1991; Hartley, 1982) to show the nation as united without any dissidents. The news reports in Kibris and Halkin Sesi reflected a homogenous, condemnatory and unopposed response to the incidents. Kibris combined all the statements and announcements from a range of civil society organisations and political parties in one story, which filled nearly two full pages. In Halkin Sesi, the treatment of such information varied: in some cases it gathered all the relevant information into one story and other times published them separately. To stress intra-national unity, though, it positioned opposing views next to each other. For example, by juxtaposing the statements by Mehmet Ali Talat, CTP (a left-wing party) leader and the ultra-nationalist right wing group Ülkücü close to each other twice, the newspaper gave the impression that all the political views were in harmony on the issue of the motorcyclist demonstration. It helped to reinforce and justify the nationalist views and discourses (Halkin Sesi, 8 & 11 August, p.1). The picture of a united Turkish Cypriot nation was also achieved by publishing the views of people on the issue as a separate feature, even though only those supportive of the actions and policies of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were included. Presenting these opinions as the general view of Turkish Cypriots, the papers depicted a nation without dissidents (Kibris, 4 August p.7 & 11 August p.7). The opposition to the official discourses rarely appeared in any of the newspapers.

The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ demonstration was described not just as an attack on ‘the national borders’, which symbolised the Turkish Cypriots’ ‘sovereignty’, but
also on the national space they consider as their 'homeland'. As Billig (1995) points out, imagining a nation requires imagining a community of people with its national space (p.74). The national space that was referred to was not just a piece of land but had 'become homeland through Turkish Cypriots' blood, hard work and struggles' as a military official stated (Kibris, 4 August, p.1). In a similar way, Halkin Sesi stressed that 'the borders of this homeland were drawn with blood' (Halkin Sesi, 4 August, p.1). The accounts of such statements made the demonstration at the border appear to be an attack on 'the TRNC's borders and its territorial integrity' (Kibris, 12 August p.1). The discourses in these texts also depicted the bordered territory of the TRNC as a homeland that was sacred and thus should be protected from the intrusion of the 'others'. The emphasis on its existence and its continuity, especially when attacked by the 'enemy', helped people to participate in its existence by believing and identifying with it. Considering that one of the founding myths of the TRNC was the need for security and safety from Greek Cypriots, an emphasis on their continued threat contributed to people's imagining themselves as a national community within a protected, bordered territory. Offering a different perspective, the homeland for Yenidüzen was Cyprus as a whole. There were references to 'our Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, 8 August, p.6), 'in our small island' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p.1), 'the small island in the middle of Mediterranean' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p.1) which suggested that Cyprus as a whole was imagined as a 'homeland'. Therefore, the events were reconstructed in the news reports not as an intrusion to 'our borders' but as the actions of a group of fanatics who were working to maintain the status quo and destroy efforts to find a peaceful solution on the island.

Related to the discourse on the impassibility of borders, Kibris and Halkin Sesi enhanced the idea that the integrity and security of the national territory was the responsibility of its military and police forces. Such thinking stressed the existence of the TRNC as a legitimate nation state and also naturalised and justified the use of violence by the state. Reporting on their front pages a statement by the Cyprus Turkish Peace Forces Commander Kundakçlı, 'no one can cross our borders with motorcycles. Whoever attempts it will be punished and necessary actions will be taken' (Kibris & Halkin Sesi, 4 August, p.1), both newspapers, Kibris and Halkin Sesi reinforced the idea of nation state having the capability for violence within its boundaries. Kibris also reported, again on its front page, that the troops at the border
were given orders to shoot anyone attempting to violate it (Kibris, 7 August, p.1). Thus, based on this notion that nations have the right to use violence within their boundaries, the deaths of two Greek Cypriots were normalised. Employing strategy of justification, the killings of two Greek Cypriots were shown in reaction to the violation of ‘our national borders and symbols’ (Kibris, 12 August p.1 & 15 August p.3).

Yenidüzen stressed that, rather than the security forces of the state, it was the Turkish nationalist group Ülkücü (Idealist), with the permission of the military authorities, who used force at the border during the first demonstration. Thus, Yenidüzen did not justify the killing of Isaac as a ‘patriotic act’ but on the contrary, described it as ‘lynching’. It described Isaac being beaten to death with iron bars by ‘angry Ülküçüler’ when his foot got caught in the barbed wire as he tried to get out of Turkish Cypriot territory (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.2). Defining Solomou’s death as the result of another action of fanatic Greek Cypriots, the newspaper wrote in a photo caption that it was ‘as if he was sent to death on purpose to scatter seeds of animosity between the two communities. What fanatics wanted happened and he died’ (Yenidüzen, 15 August p.1). At the same time, it described his attempt to snatch the Turkish flag as an ‘ugly behaviour’ (Yenidüzen, 15 August p.1) which meant that Yenidüzen also criticised his action from a nationalistic point of view. Its representation of the incident did not deviate from the dominant nationalist one as it also treated it as common sense that the flag and border were national symbols of sovereignty and unity and thus they should be respected by everyone. Halkın Sesi also based its report on a similar discourse and process of justification: ‘they’ve gone crazy: the young Greek Cypriot who dared to bring down the Turkish flag paid for his madness with his life when he was shot’ (Halkın Sesi, 15 August p. 1). The newspaper not only described the attempt to bring the flag down as madness but justified the killing for it.

The metaphor of blood was employed frequently during the period studied to remind readers of the martyrs and blood shed in the past to justify the right to claim the territory as homeland. Describing the homeland in this way also legitimised the

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2 In Turkish suffix ‘-ler’ makes the word plural.
violence committed for the sake of protecting it. For example, Halkin Sesi defended Solomou’s death in the following way: ‘the consequences of attacking our borders which have been watered by blood of martyrs and our moon and crescent flag have once more been confirmed’ (Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p.1). Kibris also employed the metaphor of blood in its reflection of the incidents at the motorcyclists’ demonstration in its headline ‘blood flowed’. However, the expression of ‘blood flowed’ did not reveal much about whose blood it was and who was responsible for it. Even though it published a photo of Tassos Isac on its front page next to the headline, ‘blood’ did not just refer to his but also to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish demonstrators who were injured during the clashes (Kibris, 12 August p.1). Showing pictures of ‘our’ victims who had been injured while acting ‘patriotically’ was an attempt to moderate the starkness of the death of one of the ‘other’. In Yenidizten, the image of ‘bloodshed’ was employed as a setback to the national project it favoured, which was the co-existence of both communities in a unified Cyprus. It attributed the blame for the bloodshed to the groups that it jointly called ‘fanatics’ and ‘chauvinists’ in both communities: ‘Was the fanatics’ show of strength and vulgar propaganda worth the blood shed and turning the two communities’ hopes of peace to a state of hopelessness’ (Yenidizten, 12 August, p.3)? ‘People want to see peace flowers not blood on the border’ (Yenidizten, 12 August, p.3).

The name of the state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), was mentioned in all the news texts of the analysed newspapers. Its national autonomy, independence and the impassibility of its borders were emphasised throughout the period studied. The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ demonstration was portrayed as an ‘attempt to violate the TRNC borders’ which was a way of confirming the existence and legitimacy of the TRNC, a nation state that was not recognised by the international world. Nations cannot be thought of in isolation but have to be imagined as part of the international world which is made up of nations (Billig, 1995). By reporting the remarks made by state officials and the military authorities that the TRNC national borders should not be breached without permission, Kibris presented the TRNC as a legal nation state that was part of the international world rather than excluded by it. It quoted a legitimate source, the TRNC’s London Representative Hakkı Müftüzade in an interview with BBC radio:
The TRNC state will take the necessary precautions with its police and courts just like any other country would against the people who try to break through the borders illegally. When motorcyclists come, they will be caught, arrested and appear in court. This is what our rules require (Kibris, 8 August p.3).

*Halkin Sesi* also quoted TRNC President Denktas, who said that the TRNC police would treat the motorcyclists the same way as the Greek Cypriot administration would have if a thousand motorcyclists from the north went to the south without any legal permission to enter the country (*Halkin Sesi*, 6 August, p.2). The claim that ‘any other country would have behaved the same way in a similar situation’ enhanced attempts to legitimise the nation state and also justified the use of the police force against the demonstrators.

While the name of the Turkish Cypriot state, the TRNC, was emphasised frequently, the name of the state in the south did not appear in the news texts. Rather than using its internationally recognised name, the Republic of Cyprus, it was simply described as ‘the Greek Cypriot Administration’ or ‘the Greek Cypriot side’. Having withdrawn from all the administrational and governmental positions of the republic in 1963, during the inter-communal conflict, the official national policy of Turkish Cypriots was to consider the Republic of Cyprus as an illegitimate republic. Therefore, the TRNC authorities refuse to use its official name. Having adopted and integrated the official discourse on this issue, none of the newspapers used the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ or described the administration as the ‘government’ in the period studied. Unanimously, they all described it as the ‘Greek Cypriot administration’. Predictably, the president of the Republic of Cyprus was also not referred to as the ‘president’ but simply as ‘the Greek Cypriot leader’. In contrast, the TRNC president was the ‘President’ and there was no need to mention the name of the TRNC to state that the Foreign Minister was the TRNC’s minister. It was because unless stated otherwise, the context of the news texts are understood to be the nation. Readers assume that the story that they are reading concerns their nation or happened within its boundaries (Billig, 1995). This is one of the ideological roles the media play in daily flagging the nation.
The news texts, especially in *Kibrıs* and *Hallan Sesi*, had an interdiscursive relationship with military discourses. Many news articles were constructed around the topic of national security at the border and adopted militaristic or war terminology. For example, 'order to shoot', 'the troops at the border are on alert' (*Kibrıs*, 7 August, p.1), 'our soldiers will fire' (*Kibrıs*, 7 August, p.1), 'Ülkücüler (Idealists) and university students battled at the front line' (*Kibrıs*, 12 August, p.4) were some of the militaristic expressions that were adopted within the news reports in *Kibrıs*. Similar terminology also existed within *Hallan Sesi* which reported that 'the military was on alert' (*Hallam Sesi*, 13 August, p.1), 'hot conflict' (*Hallan Sesi*, 11 August, p.1), and 'turned into a battlefield' (*Hal/an Sesi*, 12 August, p.1). Having depicted the clashes as a 'battle', *Yenidüzen* also employed expressions such as 'major battle' and 'battlefield' in its news texts (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.1).

As well as referring to the events at the border using war terminology, the news discourse in *Yenidüzen* focused mainly on the theme of 'peace'. It framed both demonstrations as blows to the attempt for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. Both border incidents were presented as the consequence of the continuing Cyprus problem and the lack of a permanent solution on the island. The differences in the frameworks of the newspapers were especially clear in the news texts about the statement given by the Turkish Foreign Minister Çiller in North Cyprus following the flag incident at the TRNC border. While both *Kibrıs* and *Hallan Sesi* chose to use an aggressive and nationalist quote from Çiller as the headline, 'we break the hands extending to the flag' (*Kibrıs* & *Hallan Sesi*, 15 August, p.1), *Yenidüzen*'s headline for the same event was, 'Call for peace from Çiller'. *Yenidüzen* restructured Çiller's statement in the form of messages to the UN General Secretary, the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece, the fanatics, the Greek Orthodox church, Europe and the TRNC government to work for peace in Cyprus (*Yenidüzen*, 16 August, p.1).

*Positive Self and Negative 'Other' Representation*

The choice of words and the linguistic construction of 'we' and 'they' groups can change, depending on the definition of the 'national interest'. While the 'we' group is portrayed as representing and defending the interests of the nation, the 'other' group
is depicted as opposing it (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Therefore the discursive construction of ‘us’, and the ‘other’ with negative attributes, maintains the binary opposition, which may contribute to the enforcement of conflict rather than reconciliation. The media’s representation can in this way also influence peoples’ attitudes and views. *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*’s news discourses were based around the concepts of ‘Turkish Cypriots and Turks’ versus the ‘Greek Cypriot motorcyclists or Greek Cypriots’. In this construction ‘us’ did not just refer to Turkish Cypriots but Turks as well. In other words, while Turks and Turkish Cypriot were in the ‘we-group’, Greek Cypriots and sometimes Greeks were in the ‘other’ group. The production of the concept of ‘we’ indicated sameness and the idea of being together.

Discriminatory and nationalist discourses use the strategy of dissimilation, which constructs the ‘other’ in a negative way and portrays it as ‘a deviance from a preferred norm’ (Wodak et al., 1999, p.33). Both, *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi* produced Turkish Cypriot national identity mostly on the basis of differentiation from the ‘other’. This is not to deny that they did not enforce the concept of a Turkish Cypriot identity with an emphasis on Turkishness but to note that the focus was more on the portrayal of the ‘other’ rather than ‘us’. In the reports included in the study, the negative description of the ‘other’ was employed in opposition to the positive production of Turkish Cypriot identity. While describing ‘them’ with negative traits such as ‘mad’, ‘fanatic’ and ‘provocateur’, both newspapers constructed ‘us’ as the opposite; ‘peaceful’, ‘patriotic’, and ‘with common sense’. The demonstration by a group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists was defined as ‘madness’, while the killing of two Greek Cypriot civilians was justified as a necessary and patriotic action. The negative representation of the ‘other’ and the positive representation of ‘us’ were extended to Turkey’s and Greece’s policies on Cyprus as well. One of *Halkin Sesi*’s headlines was as follows:

**HERE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK MENTALITY**

**THEY JUST DON'T LEARN**

While Çiller gave messages of peace, Simitis exhibited an aggressive attitude

(*Halkin Sesi*, 18 August, p.1).

In the overall coverage, the blame for the events was put on to the ‘other’. Even the responsibility for the bloodshed was shifted onto Greek Cypriots. For example,
showing a photo of motorcyclists carrying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, *Kibris* wrote in its caption, ‘fanatic Greek Cypriot motorcyclists who caused the bloodshed’ (*Kibris*, 12 August p.2). *Halkan Sesi* also pointed at the Greek Cypriot demonstrators as the cause of death rather than ‘our’ demonstrators. According to the paper, Isaac was killed during the clashes that had started as the Greek Cypriot demonstrators crossed the Turkish Cypriot border (*Halkan Sesi*, 12 August p.2). It also focused on the negative actions of Greek Cypriots rather than Turkish Cypriots.

In a different approach from the others, *Yenidüzen* did not differentiate ‘us’ and ‘them’ on the basis of nationality but on the political views and ideological positions in relation to the Cyprus problem; that is to say, whether they supported the idea of a peaceful settlement in Cyprus or the continuation of the status quo. The ‘other’ group included ‘fanatic’ Greek Cypriots and ‘fanatic’ Ülkücü militants (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.2). Referring to the Turkish Ülkücü demonstrators, the paper commented that ‘the other day fanatical and chauvinist Greek Cypriot protestors found exactly whom they wanted to see along the borders’ (*Yenidüzen*, 13 August, p.8).

Categorising both in the ‘other’ group, the paper portrayed both in a negative light. For example, it described the Greek Cypriot demonstrators as ‘a handful of adventurers’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 August, p.1), ‘the cause of lack of tranquillity in Cyprus’ (*Yenidüzen*, 11 August, p.3), ‘untethered’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.3), who ‘try to deal a blow to peace’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.2), ‘crossed the buffer zone like crazy’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.2) and ‘stoned the security forces like savages’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.2). Their ultra nationalist positions were illustrated in a similar way: ‘fanatic Greek Cypriot demonstrators who want to bomb the roads to peace and to reinforce lack of solution in Cyprus’ (*Yenidüzen*, 15 August, p.1) and also ‘the ones who became an instrument to the chauvinist groups who do everything to reinforce lack of solution in Cyprus’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.1). Meanwhile, *Yenidüzen*’s approach to the Turkish ultra nationalist Ülkücü group was no different. Critical of the idea that 2,500 motorcyclists from the group intend to go to North Cyprus from Turkey to launch a counter motorcycle demonstration, the newspaper wrote in its headline ‘As if this were the only thing missing’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 August p. 4). Another article reported that Ülkücü groups threatened the TRNC police because of the motorcycle ban issued on the day of the demonstration (*Yenidüzen*, 9 August p.3). While no criticism of Ülkücü groups appeared in the other two
newspapers, *Yenidüzen* condemned their actions as much as or more so than the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’. The photos of the clashes in *Yenidüzen* were not only of Greek Cypriots but were mainly of Ülkücü groups with Turkish flags or the flags of their groups. Showing disapproval of them, it published a photo of a group of men posing for the camera with the following caption:

*Joyful as if going for a Sunday out, to the beach or on a picnic ... No one could tell the difference if they didn’t carry stones, iron bars or chains instead of picnic basket. Some even brought their children with them.... but after such activities blood, tears and even war can follow. Shouldn’t someone have told this to them* (*Yenidüzen*, 13 August, p.8)?

Employing such a negative description of these groups was to differentiate and distance Turkish Cypriots from such nationalist Turkish groups. Therefore, *Yenidüzen* stressed that these groups were from Turkey or of Turkish origin: ‘the group consisting of Ülkücü from Turkey’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.1), ‘the groups which 80 % consisted of Turkish Ülkücü’ (*Yenidüzen*, 12 August, p.2).

In *Kibris* and *Halkın Sesi*, a negative portrayal and attributes was not just directed at the demonstrators but to the whole Greek Cypriot population. Generalising them as ‘Greek Cypriots’ rather than describing them as the ‘Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ or ‘demonstrators’, these newspapers attributed negative characteristics to the Greek Cypriot population in general. The term ‘Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ that the newspapers had been using until the day of the rally was replaced with the general term, ‘Greek Cypriots’ on the day of the demonstration. This could be partly because the demonstration was not the one that the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation had organised, as it had been cancelled, but the one that was adopted by other Greek Cypriot demonstrators. Still, such discourse defined the demonstrators not as a marginal group but as the representative of the Greek Cypriot community in general. Following the incident, both papers described them as ‘insolent’ (*Kibris*, 12 August p. 3) ‘aggressive’ (*Kibris*, 12 August p. 2), ‘brain washed’ (*Kibris*, 15 August p. 1) or ‘fanatics’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 17 August, p.4) and ‘obsessed with crossing the border’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 11 August, p.1).
Apart from their personality, their actions were also attributed with negative features: the demonstration of the motorcyclists was a 'fiasco' and 'brought the island to the threshold of war again'. They also 'exhibited Turkish animosity again' (Hallan Sesi, 17 August, p.1). The word 'again' indicated repetition of such behaviour that also helped to naturalise it as if all Greek Cypriots were anti-Turks. During the period studied, in contrast to the depiction of a united Turkish Cypriot nation, Greek Cypriots were 'divided into two groups' (Kibris, 8 August p. 3; Hallan Sesi, 14 August, p.6) and 'scared' (Kibris, 11 August p. 2). In Hallan Sesi, juxtaposed next to the announcement of a military official who stated that whoever crossed the border would be punished, there was another story: 'as 11th August, the day of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’ demonstration approached, they started getting scared' (Hallen Sesi, 4 August, p.1). Who was 'getting scared', the general public or the motorcyclists, was not clear and did not matter for the newspaper, as the concerned party was the 'other' group. Referring to Greek Cypriots with derogatory names and attributing negative characteristics to them was part of the predicational strategy that the newspapers employed which aimed not only to aggregate the nationalist hysteria amongst Turkish Cypriots against them but also justified and legitimized their exclusion and being cast as the 'enemy'.

Yenidüzen, on the other hand, was careful to differentiate the Greek Cypriot demonstrators from the general Greek Cypriot public by frequently describing them as 'a group of fanatics' or a 'handful of adventurers'. Avoiding stereotyping all Greek Cypriots by representing them all the same as each other, the paper attempted to stress the diversity within the Greek Cypriot community. In other words, Yenidüzen's discourse was based on the notion that not all Greek Cypriots were like the demonstrators who expressed their hatred towards Turkish Cypriots: the general population were not the 'enemy' but just like 'us', Cypriots, with whom 'we' want to live in peace, which emphasised a Cypriot-oriented identity rather than a Turkish one.

Europeans who had joined the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were also cast as the 'other' but their representation was more moderate than the Greek Cypriot ones. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) point out, there is a hierarchy within the 'other' groups. The derogatory terms that were employed to refer to the Greek Cypriots were not
used for the Europeans. Only Yenidüzen reported that ‘some Europeans who are bought by Greek Cypriots’ (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.2) also joined in the demonstration. Kibris simply described them as ‘some Europeans accompanying the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’. It estimated their numbers as being ‘around 200’ in comparison to ‘7 thousand Greek Cypriot motorcyclists’. Later in the article, the newspaper stated that there were ‘180 Europeans’ accompanying the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). After the demonstration, when the European Motorcyclists Union asked for permission to cross to the north, Kibris again emphasised their Europeanness: ‘European motorcyclists asked for permission to cross to the TRNC’ (Kibris, 12 August, p.5). Yenidüzen, on the other hand, generalised them as the ‘motorcyclists’: ‘motorcyclists asked for permission but could not get it’ (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.4).

There was also a self-glorification in the news reports throughout the period studied. Benefiting from the topos of comparison and difference that implies that ‘they are inferior compared to us’ (Wodak et al., 1999, p.38), the construction strategy draws a positive identity of ‘us’ in relation to the negative features of the ‘other’. Therefore, while the Greek Cypriot authorities and their policies were reported in a negative light as ‘war seeker’, ‘hostile’ and ‘provocateur’ in Kibris and Halkın Sesi, the actions of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were referred to as ‘peace oriented’, ‘resolute’ and as a ‘stern response’. After the incidents, the TRNC President Denktas was reported to have invited the Greek Cypriot leader Clerides back to the negotiating table for a peaceful settlement (Halkın Sesi, 17 August, p.4), which portrayed him as a peace oriented leader. In the overall reconstruction of the developments, the ‘we’ was depicted as the group who tried to keep the peace while the ‘other’ exhibited hostility.

In the positive presentation of ‘us’, the killings at the border were pictured as the consequence of Greek Cypriot provocation and their wrongdoings and both incidents were justified as patriotic acts by ‘us’. According to Halkın Sesi, people were influenced by what they had seen on the television:

As the Greek Cypriots who had started fire in the buffer zone increased their provocations, the emotions of people who had been watching the events on the television, especially live on the Greek Cypriot television channels, became highly
aroused and started flowing to the place where events were taking place. Greek Cypriots who jumped over the barbed wire to the Turkish area encountered the reaction of the people first rather than the Security Forces (*Halkın Sesi*, 12 August, p.2).

The clashes between the demonstrators from both sides were shown as between the ‘aggressive Greek Cypriots and our citizens’ or ‘people’ in the paper. *Yenidüzên* also used exactly the same information, which shows that they both benefited from the same sources or, having received the same information as a press release or news agency dispatch, copied it without making any changes. In either case, they found it acceptable to use it in their coverage of the events.

Another example of the positive representation of ‘us’ was showing how the TRNC’s nationalist President Denktâş and Ülküçü groups were sorry about what had happened. Reflecting a press conference organised by the latter, *Kibris* used the headline ‘Idealists are sorry as well’ (*Kibris*, 14 August, p.4). Considering that headlines express the major topic of the text (van Dijk, 1988), there was a contradiction in the headline and the news text. According to the text, even though Ülküçü groups had expressed their sadness about the death of a Greek Cypriot, they had also stressed that they would repeat their actions if the same things happened again. In contrast to the headline, the main news text was about justifying their presence at the demonstration and rejecting their responsibility for the killing (*Kibris*, 14 August, p.4) rather than expressing their consolation. *Yenidüzên*, as opposed to the others, highlighted different aspects of the press conference. According to the paper, Erhan Arikli, the leader of one of the Ülküçü groups at the press conference, supported the claims of Simerini and Mahli, two ‘fanatic right wing Greek Cypriot newspapers’, that Turkish Cypriots who worked on the Greek Cypriot side were responsible for Isaac’s death, not Ülküçü groups. The paper’s headline was ‘fanatic Arikli took refuge behind the fanatic Greek Cypriots’ (*Yenidüzên*, 14 August, p.6). The statement was also a good example of Papadakis’ (1998) argument of how nationalists on both sides of the border fed off of each other’s extremism in Cyprus.

The attempts of the Greek Cypriot administration to stop the motorcyclists from entering the buffer zone just before the demonstration were not regarded as sincere
by *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*. Very critical of the administration and the Greek Orthodox Church, both newspapers blamed them for the incidents. *Halkin Sesi* stressed that these attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration were only ‘for show’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 11 August, p.1). According to the paper,

The Greek Cypriot administration, on the one hand, by using the television channels and the print media is provoking the motorcyclists to break through the TRNC borders and go to Kyrenia but on the other hand, is trying to give foreigners the impression that it is not approving this action (*Halkin Sesi*, 8 August, p.1).

Printing a photo of the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and a Greek Orthodox priest holding a motorcycle, *Kibris* presented them as ‘here are the ones who provoke the Greek Cypriot youth’ (*Kibris*, 15 August, p.5). Previously, both newspapers had already included articles about the Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides criticising the motorcyclists’ demonstration plan: ‘if the determination of the state of our national cause is left to the motorcyclists or other groups, Cyprus will end up in disaster’ (*Kibris*, 6 August, p.4). In *Halkin Sesi* the same expression was reflected with some sarcasm: ‘if our national cause is left to the motorcyclists ... god help Cyprus’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 6 August p. 6). Highlighting these phrases, both newspapers aimed at giving the impression that even their own leader was mocking the motorcyclists’ action. Yet, nearly a week later, they blamed the Greek Cypriot leader for encouraging the motorcyclists.

*Yenidüzên*, on the other hand, depicted the Greek Cypriot authorities as anxious and trying to discourage the demonstrators. The first story *Yenidüzên* reported on the issue was actually how the Greek Cypriot authorities would use violence against the motorcyclists if necessary (*Yenidüzên*, 7 August p.2). The same story appeared in the other two newspapers without much emphasis while in *Yenidüzên* it appeared on a black background to attract more attention. *Yenidüzên* also published a statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, asking the motorcyclists not to cross the border (*Yenidüzên*, 11 August p.3). On the day of the motorcyclists’ demonstration, the newspaper wrote that the demonstrators ‘first had attacked Clerides and then the TRNC border’ (*Yenidüzên*, 12 August, p.1). Carrying more news from the southern part of the island in comparison to the other two newspapers, *Yenidüzên* also gave a perspective on what was happening there. For example, it
reported that the Greek Cypriot police had tried to barricade all the roads that led to the Turkish Cypriot side showing that they were also trying to stop the demonstrators (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.6). A news story about a motorcyclist appearing in court in the south for attacking a Greek Cypriot police officer also appeared in Yenidüzen, which indicated that the other side was punishing some of its nationals for breaking the law. With such stories, Yenidüzen provided a picture of Greek Cypriots not so evil and anti-Turk as the others did.

The criticisms by the Greek Cypriot press of their own government were used in the negative representation of the 'other'. Any Greek Cypriots' self-criticism for not doing enough to prevent the incidents were included in the news articles while no such criticism towards the Turkish Cypriot authorities was reported in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers. Stating that some Greek Cypriot newspapers were very angry at their own administration, Kıbrıs reported that Simerini, a Greek Cypriot daily paper, used the words, 'we disgraced ourselves' in its news article referring to the conduct of the motorcyclists and the Greek Cypriot government (Kıbrıs, 13 August, p.5). Similar criticisms that appeared in the international press were also adopted in the same way to justify the Turkish Cypriots' position. However, no such criticism regarding the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were included in the news texts. Moreover, criticisms directed at both sides were given as if they were only directed at the Greek Cypriot side. Kıbrıs ran an article with a headline that said 'the bloody incidents at our borders attracted the reaction of the world: the Greek Cypriot administration is guilty' (Kıbrıs, 13 August, p.4). The synecdoche of the 'world' actually consisted of Turkey's Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the UN's Cyprus Representative, the Nicosia Ambassador of the United States and the French Foreign Ministry. In contrast to the headline, the content of the text included condemnation of both sides for the border incidents rather than pointing the finger only at the Greek Cypriots. The same story was reported in Halkın Sesi with a similar headline 'the statements of the UN and France: the responsible ones are Greek Cypriots' (Halkın Sesi, 13 August, p.1). Kıbrıs also published a report prepared by the United Nations Peace Forces about the events on 11th August 1996 with a headline 'the Greek Cypriot police was ineffective'. The headline did not give any indication that as an account of the UN report, the news text also mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot police was criticised for allowing some Turkish Cypriot
demonstrators equipped with iron and wooden bars into the military area to clash with the Greek Cypriot demonstrators (Kibris, 15 August, p.5).

What the demonstrators from both sides would carry or carried was another issue that the newspapers focused on to negativize the ‘other’. Halkî Sesi announced beforehand the things that the Greek Cypriot demonstrators would carry when they broke through the border: the flags of Greek Cyprus, Greece and the European Union and chains (Halkî Sesi, 11 August, p.3). It seemed as though flags were categorised as dangerous items along with chains. In Yenidüzên, the items carried by Ülküçü groups were stressed more than the Greek Cypriot demonstrators’: stones, iron bars, chains, sticks, mace and firearms (Yenidüzên, 12 August, p.1). The paper also emphasised Isaac’s murder weapon as being an iron bar (Yenidüzên, 12 August, p.1).

To increase the effectiveness of their news, the newspapers used strategies that would promote their political positions and ideological beliefs. They reorganised the statements and opinions of reliable sources and sources that were regarded as the ‘other’ or the opposition to fit in with the newspaper’s views. They gave advantageous treatment to some while ignoring others. For example, Yenidüzên published only a short extract from a long statement made by Bülent Ecevit, who was Turkey’s Prime minister in 1974 during Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus and was still seen as the authoritative voice on national policy on the island. The extract the paper used was the part in which he had criticised the presence of Turkish Ülküçü groups in North Cyprus during the demonstrations (Yenidüzên, 15 August, p.5). The rest of his statement, in which he justified the presence of the Turkish military in the north of the island, was excluded from the text. As mentioned before, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çiller’s speech was also restructured to fit the political framework of the newspapers.

By putting the blame for the death of two Greek Cypriots on the Greek Cypriot administration, Kibris and Halkî Sesi used a strategy of justification in their news discourses which helped to downplay the negative actions of the ‘we-group’ in both incidents. For instance, there was very little reference to the circumstances and details of Isaac’s death even though Solomou’s was detailed. This could be because Solomou’s action was seen as more unacceptable and could be more easily justified
compared to the circumstances in which Isaac was killed for his attempt to enter the Turkish Cypriot territory. In Solomou’s case, he not only breached the border but also tried to haul down the flag. Therefore, in Kibris only two news texts appeared regarding Isaac’s death: one was quoting from an interview given to the Greek Cypriot television channels by a friend of Isaac’s (Kibris, 12 August, p.3). The other referred to the autopsy results which stated that Isaac had died as a result of blows to the head. Kibris and Halkin Sesi printed a statement by the TRNC’s Foreign Minister that announced that ‘the findings of the coroner confirm that the young man, of whose death we are very upset, was beaten as he crossed the barbed wires’ (Kibris, 15 August, p.3 & Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p.2) but included no further explanation.

As discussed before, his death was seen as a consequence of the patriotic action of the ‘national we group’ as he broke through ‘our barbed wire’, meaning the border. There was no indication from the state authorities whether the responsible ones would be found and punished. Interestingly, none of the newspapers raised the issue, but reported only that the Greek Cypriot government would demand an international arrest warrant for Isaac’s murderers (Kibris, 14 August, p.4 & Halkin Sesi, 14 August, p.2).

In a similar way, in Yenidüzen’s coverage of the events, the ‘we’ group, that is to say the presence of the Turkish Cypriots at the first border clash, was downplayed. Despite emphasising the negative actions of Ülkücü groups at the border, Yenidüzen made no reference to Turkish Cypriots’, as if there were none there. According to the newspaper, 80% of the demonstrators were stated to be Turkish (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.1) but without mentioning where the remaining 20% came from or whether it consisted of Turkish Cypriots.

The negative actions of ‘us’ were also mitigated. As part of this strategy, the news texts of both killings were constructed with passive sentences without referring to those responsible. There was no mention of the Turkish demonstrators killing Isaac in Kibris and Halkin Sesi. In a news article in Kibris, he was simply defined as ‘the dead demonstrator’ (Kibris, 14 August p.4) without specifying who had killed him. None of the newspapers asked such questions. Kibris and Halkin Sesi used passive sentences in their coverage of Solomou’s death as well: ‘Solomos Solomou (26) who climbed the flag pole in an attempt to bring down our flag was shot dead’ (Kibris &
Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p.1). The passive sentence again hid those responsible for his death which mitigated the actions of the ‘we-group’. The responsibility for what happened was also Solomou’s, according to the papers: ‘he paid for the attack to the Turkish flag and its borders with his life’ (Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p.1) because ‘when the crazy Greek Cypriot youth did not turn back despite all the warnings, our security forces had no choice but to shoot him’ (Kibris, 15 August, p.2). In contrast with the other two, Yenidedzen announced the ones responsible for the killings. In Isaac’s case it pointed at the Turkish rioters and described his death by ‘angry Idealists’ who hit him with iron bars. In Solomou’s killing, it identified the responsible one as the Mobile Strike Force (Yenidedzen, 15 August, p.1&2). Yet, Yenidedzen also frequently benefited from the use of metonyms and personification that hid the actions of the responsible ones. For example, the blame for what happened was put on ‘fanaticism’, a vague term that actually pointed at the nationalists without being specific. There were also personifying expressions such as ‘fanaticism left one dead behind it’ (Yenidedzen, 15 August, p.2) or ‘fanaticism is crying for “blood more blood” but pro-peace, intellectual people of Cyprus say “that is enough”’ (Yenidedzen, 15 August, p.2).

Another strategy of discrediting the ‘other’ was reporting everything it had said as a claim or mere suggestion rather than a definite statement. Therefore, verbs such as ‘claimed’, ‘alleged’ and ‘suggested’ were employed when a statement from the ‘other’ was included in the text. In contrast, the statements by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot authorities carried more definite verbs such as ‘said’, ‘told’ or ‘did’. Such linguistic practice attributes ‘truthfulness’ to the actions and statements of ‘our’ authorities while casting doubt and raising questions about the ‘others’. The practice was clear in all the three newspapers including Yenidedzen. One explanation for it is that most of the news from the Greek Cypriot side was written and distributed by TAK, which had adopted the official nationalistic discourse and the same was utilized by the newspapers.

The employment of quantification, another discursive strategy for intensifying or weakening the effect of the news (Fowler, 1991) was common in the three newspapers. Apart from the countdown of the days to the demonstration, there was a constant use of numbers in relation to the number of demonstrators. Large, rounded
figures were embedded in the news discourses. Emphasising the number of the members of the Greek Cypriot Motorcycle Federation as ‘7,000’, especially Kibris and Halkan Sesi might have aimed to escalate the fear and tension amongst Turkish Cypriots (Kibris, 11 August, p.2; Halkan Sesi, 11 August, p.3) who in return would justify the actions of the security forces. Depending on the construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the numbers of the demonstrators varied. Initially Kibris gave the impression that all seven thousand members of the federation would join the demonstration (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). Having stated the same number for the members of the federation, Halkan Sesi later challenged this number with the figures released by the Turkish Cypriot authorities as ‘2,500- 3,000’ (Hallen Sesi, 11 August, p.3). Yenidüzen did not mention the number ‘7,000’ but announced that ‘200 motorcyclists from 17 countries’ were arriving in South Cyprus for the demonstration, as reported on the CyBC radio station (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p.5).

Similar strategies were adopted in relation to the Ülkücü demonstrators. Although it appeared in the newspapers that ‘2,500 motorcyclists from Turkey would come’, (Halkan Sesi, 10 August, p.2; Kibris, 10 August, p.5; Yenidüzen, 10 August, p.4), later the number was reported to be ‘150’ (Halkan Sesi, 13 August, p.3; Yenidüzen, 13 August, p.5; Kibris, 13 August, p.4). Having stressed that there were ‘thousands’ of Ülkücü demonstrators at the demonstration (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.3), Yenidüzen later published the same news article as the others stating that only ‘150’ of them arrived in North Cyprus (Yenidüzen, 13 August, p.5). It meant that the newspaper was either contradicting its previous report or that there were many Ülkücü sympathisers living in the TRNC, as only 150 of them were from Turkey. The number of ‘thousands’ was based on Yenidüzen’s own reporter while the source of the figure ‘150’ was not clear. However, considering that the same figure appeared in all the newspapers, it probably came from an official source or the news agency and all three newspapers printed it without questioning.

On the day of the demonstration, the number of the demonstrators from both sides also varied according to the newspapers. Yenidüzen stated that ‘very few motorcyclists but lots of militants’ from the Greek Cypriot side were involved in the event (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.2). The newspaper was not specific about the Greek Cypriot demonstrators but emphasised the number of Ülkücü demonstrators at the
border as having increased from ‘around 500’ to ‘thousands’ (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.3). Kibris, on the other hand, reported that ‘around 500’ Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the buffer zone but then quoted one of the Greek Cypriot demonstrators estimate of the figure as ‘around 200’ (Kibris, 12 August, p.3). While the number of Greek Cypriot demonstrators in the first rally was not stated in Halkın Sesi, in the second one it appeared as ‘hundreds’ (Halkın Sesi, 15 August, p.2).

**The Construction of Collective History**

History and collective memory are the other important ingredients in the production of national identity. They create a narrative that allows people in the present to become a part of it. The continuity they produce establishes the character of national identity as essential and the status quo as the expression of that identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In the news discourses of Kibris and Halkın Sesi, history was used to generate continuity between the past and the present. There were constant references to the 22nd anniversary of Turkey’s military intervention in the island, which is called the 2nd Peace Operation. Both the 1st and 2nd Peace Operations are considered by Turks and Turkish Cypriots to be a time in history when Turkey liberated Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots’ atrocities and gave them the opportunity to live as a separate community in the north of the island. On the commemoration day of the 2nd Peace Operation, which was also the day Solomou was shot dead, Halkın Sesi published a story with a headline that said ‘no return to the past’. The story evoked the atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriot militia groups against Turkish Cypriots and suggested that Turkey’s second operation, which began on 14th August 1974, saved their lives. Even though the headline was in quotation marks there was no indication of whose words they were. Only when one reads the text does it become clear that it was a summary of the statements made by state officials to commemorate the importance of the day (Halkın Sesi, 14 August, p. 10). In contrast, there was no reference to the 2nd Peace Operation in Yenidüzen. The only reference made to 1974 was to note that the motorcyclists’ demonstration forced the island to live through the uneasiest 22 days since 1974 (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p.3).
Collective memory was also used to construct Turkish Cypriot identity through the negative representation of the 'other'. For example, two days before the motorcyclists' demonstration, *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi* published news stories about the 32nd anniversary of the commemoration of the people who had died during the fighting against Greek Cypriots in Erenköy, a village in the north east of the island which is now under the control of the Turkish military. Juxtaposed, just under the main story of 'Anxiety in the UN' regarding the motorcyclists' attack on 'our' borders, a photo in *Kibris* showed a family looking sad with some flowers in their hands in front of a gravestone. Next to the photo, on a red background with white font colour (also the colours of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags), the headline said 'we commemorated our martyrs who made history with their blood in Erenköy' (*Kibris*, 9 August, p.1). By reminding the readers of the suffering of the 'we' group in history, the newspaper evoked the negative acts of the 'other' in the past which also acted as part of the collective history. The combination of articles that *Kibris* had been publishing, about the Greek Cypriots' possible attack on 'our' borders and the memory of Turkish Cypriots who had been killed by them, was used to give the impression that Greek Cypriots continued their ambition of Enosis and that the Turkish Cypriots' struggle against them carried on. For example, instead of referring to the Greek Cypriot president with his status at the time, the newspaper described him as 'one of the leaders of the EOKA organisation that had caused bloodshed in Cyprus' (*Kibris*, 5 August, p.1). The strategy of emphasising the continuity between then and now was again employed to show the Greek Cypriot authorities' intentions as unchanging and anti-Turk. In other words, the construction of national identity through the collective history was carried out with the demonisation of the 'other'.

The commemoration ceremony of Erenköy martyrs was reported on page six by *Yenidüzen*, unlike the other newspapers that published it on their front pages (*Yenidüzen*, 8 August, p.6).

In summary, constant reconstruction and evocation of the past in the present encouraged the interpretation of present events from the perspective of the past. The actions and intentions of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were used to draw similarities with the actions of Greek Cypriots during the conflict years and this was employed to support the arguments of the nationalist groups who defended the status quo. For example, Denktaş, the TRNC President of the time, was quoted in *Kibris* as...
saying ‘If they do such things while the Turkish soldier is here I wonder what they would do if they were not’ (Kibris, 12 August, p.2). The view reinforced the need for the presence of the Turkish military in North Cyprus and naturalised the dependence of Turkish Cypriots’ security on the Turkish army.

‘No return to the past’ was also emphasised in the arguments that involved Kyrenia (Girne), a town on the north coast of the island where mainly Greek Cypriots lived until the separation of the island. The Greek Cypriot’s desire to return to Kyrenia has always been interpreted by nationalist Turkish Cypriots as a desire to return to the pre-1974 state. As this period symbolises a time when both communities lived together without the division and the presence of the Turkish military, this is regarded as unacceptable, especially by the nationalist groups in North Cyprus. Therefore, the pronouncement of the president of the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation that ‘our last stop will be Kyrenia’ was not welcomed and was treated with sarcasm as an unbelievable claim: ‘they claim to be going to Kyrenia’ (Kibris, 10 August, p.1). A day earlier, Halkan Sesi also ran a similar story using the same tone in its report about the motorcyclists’ intention of going to Kyrenia if the Greek Cypriot administration allowed them (Halkan Sesi, 9 August, p.1). Kibris’ headline for the same story was ‘on with Kyrenia dream’ (Kibris, 9 August, p.5). No news stories related to Kyrenia appeared in Yenidüzen.

The collective history was also employed in relation to cultural symbols. The day before the demonstration, Kibris published a photograph showing a motorcyclist with the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus and wrote ‘the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists are not neglecting to carry the flag of the Republic of Cyprus that they demolished in 1963’ (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). Even though the Republic of Cyprus still functions as a legitimate state within the international world, for Turkish Cypriot nationalists the republic ceased to exist when Turkish Cypriots stopped being a part of it.

The past was also employed to establish certain characteristics and actions of the ‘other’ as a trait that extended to the present. Kibris reminded its readers that the preceding year the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists had set some fields on fire and stoned the soldiers of the United Nations and Turkish Security Forces (Kibris, 4
August, p.3). In a similar way, *Halkın Sesi*, in its description of a Greek Cypriot daily, highlighted the close relations of its owner with the Greek Cypriot nationalist organisation, EOKA, as if it were relevant: ‘according to MAHI, the newspaper owned by Sampson from EOKA....’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 14 August, p.1). Yenidüzên's use of this strategy was against the Ülkcü leader Erhan Arıklı. Reminding readers of a previous statement in which he remarked that ‘the Turkish Cypriot leftists should be shot like dogs’, *Yenidüzên* employed it to reinforce his image as a violent fanatic (*Yenidüzên*, 14 August, p.6).

**Conclusion**

At times of crises or conflict, people rely heavily on the media for information. As the media have the power to influence people's perceptions of important political issues, the representation of conflict within the media are of paramount importance. Framing an issue in a specific way, that is to say the selective processing of information in a way that would lead to a certain interpretation may contribute to the maintenance of conflict. The analysis revealed that the newspapers played an important role in the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national identity. Benefiting from nationalist representations and the discourses of nationalist state representatives at the time, including the government, the president and the military, the newspapers not only legitimised and established them as the authority but also reinforced the tension and perpetuated the conflict between the two communities. That is not to say that they created the tension, as the elements of the conflict already existed, but to argue that they contributed to the aggravation and continuation of it.

The three newspapers analysed in this chapter had nationalist discourses and used a nationalist framework to represent the events. *Kibris* and *Halkın Sesi*, in a similar way adopted the dominant official nationalist discourse in their articles, which constructed the ‘other’ as homogenous and evil with the aim of depriving Turkish Cypriots of their independence. Apart from their nationalistic position, the resemblance between the two could be explained as the result of their close relationship with the military and governmental sources, which were the main information source on these issues and events. Giresun (2001), who studied *Kibris'*
news discourse for the same period, argues that corporate interests could also have a role in determining whose discourse should be represented. Having interviewed a number of journalists from Kibris, he concludes that it was in line with corporate interests to reproduce the dominant official nationalist discourse.

Yenidüzen’s discourse of the events was different from the other two as there was some resistance to the hegemonic nationalistic discourse as well as attempts to replace it with a Cypriot oriented one. This could be because of its affiliation with a political party that promoted good relations with the Greek Cypriot community. Thus it repeated ‘peace’ in its discourse and also pointed to a common future in contrast with the other two who focused on memories of the past. Yet, Yenidüzen also was not free from nationalist discourses, especially when it employed the official discourses which carried a nationalist framework.

The analysis of the data confirmed that the reproduction of identity in the news texts was not singular but context bound. Depending on the setting and the ‘other’, two main concepts of national identity existed, which were in constant struggle for domination. Although both called themselves Turkish Cypriot, one emphasized Turkishness and the other Cypriotness. However, in the news discourses Turkishness was stressed more as most of the stories positioned Greek Cypriots as the ‘other’. Even Yenidüzen, that articulated a Cypriot oriented identity, used Turkish identity in relation to the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, particularly in the second border incident.

The linguistic construction of national identity benefited from the use of the deictic expression of ‘we’ to emphasise unity which was maintained by the oppositional metaphors of ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, ‘us’ and the ‘other’ changed depending on the national identity projects and similarities and differences were drawn into different groups. The newspapers contributed to the imagining of a national community by asserting differences from the ‘other’ and reflecting the community as a united one. While self-representation of the ‘we’ group was positive, the ‘other’ was constantly attributed with negative features and derogatory names. Constant use of negative images and stereotypes for Greek Cypriots reinforced their perception as the ‘enemy’ in a way that dehumanised them. Simplification of the conflict to the
binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ also depicted each group as homogenised and excluded different views and perspectives within them.

Interchangeable use of the terms ‘Turkish Cypriot’ and ‘Turk’ made it difficult to establish whether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separate entity. Using the strategy of unification, especially *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi* categorised Turkish and Turkish Cypriots together as one nation. Despite its opposition, a similar collectivisation also existed in *Yenidüzen* which signified that it was a norm difficult to break. The characterisation of the nation as *Kulturnation* was also dominant in the news discourses. Even if some features identified with *Staatsnation* were present in the reflection of the events, the nation was usually reconstructed on the themes of common history and ancestry with mainland Turks.

The inclusion and exclusion process was achieved through various discursive strategies and linguistic means. The use of the deictic expression of ‘we’ and references to national symbols such as ‘our borders’, ‘our flag’ and ‘our territory’ contributed to the imagining of the nation as ‘homeland’. Representation of homeland as being under attack from an ‘enemy’ that is real and threatening was also employed to stress the unity of the nation against it. As Tsagarousianou (1999) points out, the media construct the nation and its enemies through the enactment of public rituals such as nationalist demonstrations and create a moral panic through particular means of representation of the enemy. *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*’s discourses assisted the creation of such moral panic which supported the sense of togetherness and also the negative perception of the ‘other’.

Stressing the state name, the TRNC, acted as a persuasive feature of the legality of a nation state that had not gained international recognition. It also justified its right to use violence for the sake of protecting the homeland which legitimised the death of two members of the ‘other’. Respect for the flag and the border were treated as common sense as none of the newspapers analysed in this study criticised Solomou’s death or raised questions as to why the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not stop him in another way. Significant lack of criticism contributed to the naturalisation of the Turkish nationalistic notion that the Turkish border and flag cannot be treated with contempt and that they are worth killing and dying for. In other words, these
newspapers acted for and became one of the nationalising institutions by contributing to the continuity of nationalist mythologies.

Finally, the nationalist discourses reproduced the myth of unity rather than encouraging identity negotiation. Therefore, the dominance of the nationalist discourses in the newspapers did not allow room for diverse and challenging discourses in the representation of these two nationalist demonstrations. Nationalist discourses not only perpetuate, reproduce and justify a social status quo and the national identities related to it (Reisig & Wodak, 2001) but also leave no public space for the negotiation of other identities. Lack of alternative discourses and representations contribute to the construction of a national identity that does not include diverse and plural understandings (Tsagarousianou, 1999). The process of reinforcing binary divisions and the demonization of the ‘other’ also creates obstacles to the formation of a pluralistic and democratic society and citizenship as well as the acknowledgement of internal national complexity and plurality (Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000).
CHAPTER 6: OPENING THE BORDER IN 2003

Introduction

The opening of the buffer zone in April 2003 was one of the developments that brought many changes to Cyprus. Having had no contact since the division of the island in 1974, the opening of the border by the Turkish Cypriot administration allowed both communities to cross to the 'other' side for the first time in 29 years and meet the people they regarded as their 'enemy'.

The developments that followed the opening of the border dominated the media. This part of the study analyses the news texts of the three newspapers during the first week of the border opening to find out who was included in the reproduction of the national community by the media. It examines the news discourses about the border crossings to see which concepts of identity these newspapers reflected.

The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Borders Opened

The border that separates the island into the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides is called the Green Line. The buffer zone which extends along the Green Line is under the control of the United Nations. Deserted, apart from two armies and a UN force, it is also called the Dead Zone (Papadakis, 2005). On either side of this zone there are Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot barricades and checkpoints. Until the 23rd April 2003 these barricades and checkpoints acted as a hindrance to the crossing of the border but on that day they became the gates that opened to the 'other' side.

The restrictions regarding the crossing of the border that separated the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot side of the island were relaxed on the 23rd April 2003 by the
Turkish Cypriot government. This meant that people were able to cross in both directions without the requirement for any special permission, as was the case before, simply by showing their passports or identity cards. Following the meeting of the Turkish Cypriot Council of Ministers on the 21st April, 2003, the Tourism and Environment Minister, Serdar Denktas, who was also the spokesperson for the cabinet, announced that crossing between the north and south of Cyprus would be ‘normalised’ (Kibris, Halkin Sesi, and Yenidüzen, 22 April, 2003, p.1). The decision was published in the Official Gazette on the 22nd April, 2003 and the next day Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were allowed to go through the checkpoints to the ‘other’ side. Thousands of people from both sides flooded to the border for the first time in 29 years. Many went to the towns and villages where they had lived and visited their old homes and family graves. Many stories of the meetings of old friends and neighbours appeared in the media.

When the border was opened, Cyprus had already been going through some changes. The UN had proposed a new settlement plan to reach a solution in Cyprus. The majority of Turkish Cypriots were in favour of this plan, also known as the Annan Plan, and had organised very large-scale demonstrations to express their support for the plan. Groups opposing the plan also staged protest marches, claiming that they supported a peaceful solution in Cyprus but not the one suggested by this plan. Hopes of finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem had had been crushed when the negotiations between the two sides on this UN brokered plan collapsed in the Hague in March 2003, to the disappointment of many Turkish Cypriots.

The decision to allow free crossing of the border came as a surprise to everyone as there was no indication of such a decision. The Turkish Cypriot government was a nationalist one which always claimed that Greek Cypriots still wanted enosis and that their atrocities towards Turkish Cypriots should not be forgotten. The TRNC President of the time, Rauf Denktas, also opposed contacts between two communities and therefore was

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1 Previously, crossings across the border were strictly limited. Anyone who wanted to cross the border had to apply for permission from the security forces.
seen as one of the main obstacles to the peace process. As both, the government and the President had been campaigning against the Annan Plan, the opening of the border was an unexpected move. The opposition interpreted it as a consequence of pressure from the Turkish Cypriot people as well as the new government in Turkey that seemed to want to eliminate the Cyprus Problem which had become one of the obstacles in its efforts to join the EU.

Soon after the Turkish Cypriot authorities opened the border, it became clear that it was semi-porous and not open to everyone, only ‘Cypriots’. The Greek Cypriot administration was anxious to stress at every opportunity that any settlement in Cyprus should not involve giving rights to immigrants from Turkey (‘colonists’ in its vocabulary) and refused to let any Turkish-born TRNC citizens into the areas under its administration. Anyone who arrived in North Cyprus after 1974 and subsequently became a citizen was not allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot authorities. This was a big disappointment, especially to the young generation born to parents of Turkish origin in North Cyprus and regarding themselves as Turkish Cypriots. At a later date, having slightly modified its rules, the Greek Cypriot government let people cross to the south whose place of birth was Turkey, if one of their parents were born in Cyprus or were married to a person of Cypriot origin.

The event was described as the ‘opening of the border’ by the media and the general public. I have also adopted this popular description in this study and defined the process as an ‘opening’ action. Actually, the expression ‘opening the borders’ did not mean that the border was abolished totally but that the travel restrictions between the north and the south of the island were relaxed, allowing people to cross to other side at particular checkpoints. Before, such crossings were strictly limited and required permission from the security forces. Also, as the term border referred to the checkpoints as well, it was employed in plural form in the texts.
The Position of the Newspapers

Similarly to the previous case study, the analysis aimed to include a week before and after the opening of the border on 23 April 2003. However, no news story related to the border crossings appeared in the newspapers until 22 April 2003, which limited the period studied to 22-30 April 2003. The study included around 160 texts.

During the period under study, Kibris was still a highly circulated newspaper but had shifted its allegiance from the nationalist position to one that favoured the plan. According to research that studied the media environment during this period, Kibris’ empathy with the masses was so close to propaganda that ‘the chief editor Süleyman Ergülü admitted that the editorial board was internally conflicted over professional ethics’ (Ridder/Braden et al, 2005, p.22).

Having changed its editorial team, Yenidüzen concentrated on becoming a newspaper with a broader appeal rather than being a mouthpiece of CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi- Republican Turkish Party). However, CTP’s influence was still apparent in the paper. Under the management of the new editor in chief, Cenk Mutluyakalı the newspaper changed its image to a more popular one and succeeded in increasing its circulation. It supported the Annan Plan and advocated a solution on the island within the framework of the plan.

Halkın Sesi, a conservative and nationalist newspaper, was sceptical of the Annan Plan. Even though its editor, Emin Akkor claimed that the newspaper stayed neutral in relation to the Plan (Hançer, 2006), its stance appeared to be oppositional. However, compared to the other daily newspapers that were against the Annan Plan, research on the media environment at that time suggests that Halkın Sesi was more balanced (Ridder/Braden et.al, 2005).
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News

The discourse and the representation of the events related to the opening of the border were mainly positive in the three newspapers analysed: Yenidüzen presented the opening as the ‘victory of the people’ (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p.1) echoing the leftist ideology of the party it was affiliated to. Kibbris emphasised the historical importance of the event: ‘the first time after 29 years’ (Kibbris, 23 April, p.1) and ‘a historical day’ (Kibbris, 24 April, p.1). Halkin Sesi was a bit cautious initially but still reported that the people crossing in both directions were ‘pleased’ (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p.1). Compared to the previous case study, the similarities in the discourse and representation of Kibbris and Halkin Sesi were not that many.

Another difference was the inclusion of many news articles concerning the experiences of ordinary people. The statements and announcements of the state authorities still existed in the form of news texts. Nonetheless, rather than journalism that was dominated by the press releases of state officials, politicians or powerful groups, the stories that filled the pages consisted mostly of interesting coincidences that Turkish Cypriots experienced when they met Greek Cypriots, their emotional visits to the places they used to live and problems experienced at the checkpoints. The image of ordinary people produced an image of society as a happy one and the news stories were constructed around the concepts of joy, tears and hope for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus.

As in the previous case study, identical stories appeared in the newspapers due to the source-journalist relationship and the dependency of the news media on externally produced texts, mainly news agency dispatches. Yet there was an increase in the number of news reports based on journalists’ reflections. They reported their observations of the checkpoints, especially at Ledra Palace, the main checkpoint in Lefkoşa (or Nicosia)2. They travelled with both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to their old towns and

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2 Nicosia is the English name of the divided capital city. Lefkoşa is the Turkish name and Lefkosia is the Greek one. To avoid confusion I will use the Turkish name, Lefkoşa rather than Nicosia, in this research to refer to the northern part in which Turkish Cypriots live.
homes and witnessed religious rituals on the 'other' side. Although direct descriptions of an ongoing event is a strategy used to emphasise the factual nature of events (van Dijk, 1988), in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers the description or the narration of the events were not devoid of the journalist’s emotional involvement in the events. Some news texts were more about expressing the opinions and comments of the journalists rather than any factual information.

Numbers in the form of statistics about those crossing the border were employed a great deal to increase the effectiveness of the news stories. Numbers generally suggest the truthfulness and precision of a story. However, despite using the same source, the police press office, the numbers announced in the newspapers did not match each other. This was because the crossings at the checkpoints were very intense and continued all throughout the day. The figures varied from paper to paper depending upon the time of the day the numbers were acquired. Therefore, to suggest the precision of their news reports, sometimes the newspapers stated what time of the day they had received their figures. For example, Halkın Sesi stated that the 'until 21.00 last night, 1,246 Greek Cypriots crossed to the North while 2,659 Turkish Cypriots to the South' (Halkın Sesi, 24 April, p.1). Yenidüzen also published the number of people who had crossed the border on its front page: ‘from the North to the South 2,659 persons, from the South to the North 1,246 persons crossed (by 19:00 o’clock)’ (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.1).

According to the figures these two newspapers gave, no one went over the border for two hours which was hard to believe considering the long queues of people on both sides. Kıbrıs, on the other hand, reported that 3,268 Turkish Cypriot visited South Cyprus while 1,476 Greek Cypriot crossed to the north the day before (Kıbrıs, 24 April, p.1).

Discourse Analysis

In this case study, five themes (as outlined earlier) occurred in the news texts. These were the linguistic construction of different understandings of nation, common culture
and common past as well as national space and common political future. The categorisation between 'us' and 'them' was less severe.

**On the Concept of Nation**

Citizenship became a debated issue, especially when TRNC citizens born in Turkey were not allowed to cross to the south side by the Greek Cypriot authorities. The restriction was not merely directed at these Turkish-born TRNC citizens but also at the younger generation of Cyprus-born immigrant descendents. In other words, it was not one's place of birth that mattered but also the parents' as well. The exclusion of these people by the Greek Cypriot authorities, preventing them from joining in the transitional period Cyprus was going through, turned the issue of citizenship into a dispute between the two sides. The Turkish Cypriot state authorities, as well as the opposition, reacted against this policy. They argued that the immigrants from Turkey and their Cyprus-born children were part of the Turkish Cypriot nation and that the Greek Cypriot authorities were discriminating against them.

The news texts reflected these political arguments. All three newspapers published articles that included statements by the Turkish Cypriot state authorities criticising the Greek Cypriots' policy of not permitting these people into the areas under their administration. The official discourse on the issue, that regardless of their place of birth these Turkish-born immigrants were 'our' citizens and should be treated as equal to ones born in Cyprus, was integrated in the news discourses.

Along with the official discourse of the state authorities, the newspapers also included the critical attitude of the opposition especially that of the main opposition party, to the Greek Cypriot government's exclusion of Turkish-born citizens. The meetings and the negotiations of Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of the main opposition party (CTP) at the

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3 In this research I will use the terms Turkish-born or Turkish-origin citizens not to describe their ethnicity but their country of origin.
time, with the Greek Cypriot authorities to allow these TRNC citizens to travel to the south got coverage in all the newspapers (Kibris, Halkin Sesi, & Yenidüzen, 27 April, p.3). The news texts concerning CTP’s efforts to convince the Greek Cypriot authorities to lift the restrictions for Turkish-origin citizens were significant as they showed their inclusion to the Turkish Cypriot nation. In the past, CTP was labelled as ‘anti-Turk’ because of its opposition to Turkey’s power in the country and the arrival of immigrants from Turkey to North Cyprus for work. In the mid 1990’s, it was not just CTP but the parties of the political left in general that saw immigrants in North Cyprus as representative of Turkey’s dominance and the main supporters of the nationalist government. However, in recent years things had changed and particularly the younger generation of Cyprus-born immigrant descendents, having aligned themselves with the left, supported the Annan Plan for a settlement in Cyprus (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005).

The references to the people from Turkey in North Cyprus in relation to their TRNC citizenship varied in the news texts: ‘Turkish-born citizens who have the TRNC identity card’ (Kibris, 24 April, p.4), ‘People from Turkey (Türkiyeliler)’ (Kibris, 24 April, p.7), ‘Turkish origin’ (Kibris, 26 April, p.3), ‘Turkish citizens’ (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.3), ‘people who were born in Turkey and not regarded Cypriot origin’ (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.3), ‘citizens who came from Turkey’ (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p.1), ‘Turkish origin TRNC citizens’ (Yenidüzen, 27 April, p.3) and ‘people who were born in Turkey and gained TRNC citizenship later’ (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p.2). The discourse of ‘citizenship’, which acted as a unification strategy, categorised Turkish Cypriots and Turkish-born citizens, who were excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities, as one group. Yet the categorisation was not based on ethnicity but on political belonging to the nation which showed that the nation was conceptualised as a Staatsnation rather than a Kulturnation. The concept of ‘citizenship’ characterised membership of the TRNC nation on the basis of political will, regardless of the place of birth and collectivised Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks into one nation. On the other hand, stating the origin of these people as ‘Turkish’ or ‘from Turkey’ not only failed to acknowledge them as a heterogeneous population with social, cultural and ethnic differences within themselves but also suggested a differentiation from Turkish Cypriots.
Yenidüzen and Kibris's coverage of the exclusion of Turkish-origin citizens was similar. They both printed short news texts about these citizens who were not able to cross the border and had to watch the others who could. Highlighting their plight, Kibris wrote:

Because Greek Cypriot officials allowed only Turkish Cypriots to pass, Turkish nationals had to watch the occasion from the top of the city walls. Those who could not cross to the Greek side watched those who crossed throughout the day with their families from behind the wire fences (Kibris, 24 April, p.7).

Like Kibrıs, Yenidüzen also noted that Turkish-born citizens were both sad and angry, not only at the Greek Cypriot administration, but also at the Turkish Cypriot government and Denktaş, for not being allowed to cross the border (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.3). In contrast to Yenidüzen and Kibrıs, Halkın Sesi's reflection of the issue was limited to a short paragraph within a story about the crossings (Halkın Sesi, 24 April, p.2) and to the official statements that not allowing Turkish-origin TRNC citizens to cross the border was discrimination among their citizens (Halkın Sesi, 30 April, p.2).

Interestingly, even though it was these citizens who were being discriminated against, none of the newspapers included their views and emotions. While Cyprus-born TRNC citizens, who could cross the checkpoints, appeared in the newspapers expressing their joy at being able to do so, no citizen of Turkish-origin appeared in the newspapers expressing their feelings or experiences at the checkpoints during the period studied. The newspapers published the opinions and efforts of the state authorities and the opposition parties about the unfair treatment these citizens had been receiving from the Greek Cypriot government but did not give any voice to them in their news articles. In a way, these people were not only excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities from the south part of the island but also from the Turkish Cypriot public sphere by the media that 'reproduced a symbolic form of nation' (Morley, 2000). It meant that in the mediation of the nation, they were not fully included in the symbolic representation of the nation. Even though they appeared within the political discourses that Turkish-origin citizens belonged to 'our' nation state, in the construction of public life or the reflection of the nation they were not present. Instead, Turkish Cypriotness or Cypriotness was the dominant characteristic of the public sphere that was provided by these newspapers.
Even *Yenidüzen*, the only newspaper that brought the issue to its front page with a headline that said ‘is it a crime to be from Turkey?’ (*Yenidüzen*, 25 April, p.1), did not include any views or experiences of these people in their own words. The text it published on its front page was limited to the opinion of the newspaper on the issue rather than including the voices of these citizens:

> The children who were born and grew up in Cyprus and shouted ‘peace’ in public squares...are being turned away from the border checkpoints because their parents or just their fathers are from Turkey. People who came from Turkey and have been living on the island, who have set up their businesses and earn their living (here) are being treated as second-class citizens because they are not of ‘Cypriot origin’ (*Yenidüzen*, 25 April, p.1).

It also linked the whole process to the collapse of the negotiations regarding the Annan Plan. Speaking on behalf of these Turkish-born citizens, *Yenidüzen* wrote:

> The borders are open, ‘excluding Turkish nationals’. Some of the people who were misled by the words ‘they will send you back under the Annan Plan’ can now see the facts much better (*Yenidüzen*, 25 April, p.1).

*Yenidüzen’s* argument was that if the Annan Plan was implemented, Turkish-origin TRNC citizens would have been citizens of the new entity and would have had no problem travelling anywhere on the island. In the text, it was not stated openly who ‘deceived’ the people from Turkey, yet it pointed the finger at the Turkish Cypriot state representatives who refused to accept the plan because in another part of the news text the newspaper defined them as the ‘people who pushed the plan away with the back of their hands’ (*Yenidüzen*, 25 April, p.1). In contrast to ‘their’ act of deception, the newspaper printed the relevant parts of the plan about the status of Turkish-born citizens as evidence of the truthfulness of its claim. By publishing these parts of the plan, *Yenidüzen* not only aimed to increase the impact of its news story but also accused the government and the President, who opposed the Annan Plan, of causing the problem encountered by these citizens.
In the mediation of the nation, the representations of the dominant or the majority were reflected as the image of the nation. For example, joy and excitement were the dominant emotions reflected on the front pages of the newspapers and everyone was reported to be happy. Halkın Sesi noted that ‘the one who goes (to the south) and the one who comes (to the north) are pleased’ (Halkın Sesi, 24 April, p.1). The emotions of the majority were extended to the whole nation and generalised to include all the people living in the TRNC, even though citizens born in Turkey were excluded. Ethnic minorities such as the Maronites and Greek Cypriots living in the TRNC were also absent from the mediated nation and the impact of the developments on these communities did not appear in the newspapers. Confined to their private sphere, the views of ethnic minorities were missing from the image of the nation in the period studied. The only reference to the Maronites that appeared in Kibris was a short photo caption that showed a group of people sitting in a garden:

... While the north and the south of Cyprus go through historical days following the free crossings after 29 years, the Maronites in the north also had a different weekend. Entertaining their guests from the south, the Maronites lit their ovens, made kebab on barbecue’ (Kibrıs, 28 April, p.9).

The Greek Cypriots living in North Cyprus were also excluded from the representation of the nation by the newspapers. There was no mention of the impact of the border crossings on this group, even though it made it easier for many Greek Cypriot families from the south part of the island to visit their relatives in the northern part and vice versa. The lack of representation of ethnic minorities contributed to the conceptualisation of the nation on the basis of cultural and ethnic elements of Turkish Cypriotness, which created a contrast with the imagining of the nation as Staatsnation.

In general, a Cypriot identity, based on common features, was stressed more in the news texts than a Turkish one. There was an implicit reference and linguistic construction of an essentialist understanding of Cypriotness. Following Wodak et al’s (1999) description of the essentialist understanding of national identity, it could be argued that such a reproduction of Cypriot national identity reduced the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as forging similarities in terms of emotional
attachment to Cyprus, national mentality and behaviours. The linguistic representation of these two communities as Cypriots was useful in drawing analogies between them and assigning them a national character. It was Yenidüzen that most often used the term Cypriot in that essentialist understanding: 'thousands of Cypriots' (Yenidüzen, 24 April p.4), 'they both were Cypriot: one from the north and the other from the south' (Yenidüzen, 24 April p.3) and 'thousands of people who regard Cyprus as the homeland' (Yenidüzen, 24 April p.3). Even though the last expression seemed to include Turkish-origin TRNC citizen as well, it actually did not as the rest of the story told of the people who were permitted to cross the border. In general, Yenidüzen employing unification strategy, which is a part of construction strategy, highlighted common characteristics and experiences rather than differences in order to categorise both communities as Cypriot.

Another headline in Yenidüzen, 'now the one who comes and the one who goes is Cypriot' (Yenidüzen, 29 April p.1), reminded readers of one of the most debated statements of President Denktaş in relation to the emigration of Turkish Cypriots and the immigration of Turkish nationals: 'the one who leaves is a Turk, the one who comes is a Turk'. It was a statement that denied the existence of a culturally and ethnically distinct Turkish Cypriot and also indicated indifference towards the emigration of Turkish Cypriots due to economic hardship, rising unemployment and partisanship. By stating that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who crossed in both directions were Cypriots, Yenidüzen challenged Denktaş's statement as well as categorising both communities under the identity of Cypriot. In contrast to the secrecy surrounding the number of Turkish immigrants in North Cyprus, Yenidüzen also proclaimed that '30 thousand Greek Cypriots arrived in one day' (Yenidüzen, 29 April, p.1).

The concept of Cypriotness also appeared in Kibris but less frequently compared to Yenidüzen: 'foreigners were not allowed, only Cypriots' (Kibris, 24 April, p.6). In Kibris' reproduction of identity, the term Turkish Cypriot was used more often. In Halkın Sesi, an emphasis on Turkishness in relation to the Greek Cypriots was present. In two separate news texts it interchangeably referred to the Turkish Cypriots living in
the south as the ‘Turks living in the South’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 24 April, p.5) and ‘Turkish Cypriots’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 28 April, p.4). Having crossed the border illegally before it was opened, these people were not allowed to go back to the north. Even though *Halkin Sesi* did not highlight the cases of citizens of Turkish-origin, it was the only newspaper that included the views and expectations of Turkish Cypriots in the south about a change in the rules which would allow them to revisit the north again.

The representation of both communities as Cypriots strengthened the imagining of a Cypriot nation but divided. Such conceptualisation in *Yenidüzen* was not surprising in that it had been promoting the concept of Cypriotness since the 1990’s. There were traces of similar thinking in *Kibris*, although it was not as frequent as in *Yenidüzen*. Reflecting the opinions and emotions of the people who had went across the border, *Kibris* generalised the view of one person to all: ‘Turkish Cypriots who say what an indescribable feeling it is to enter the separated part of the country in which they have been living for 20 years ...’ (*Kibris*, 24 April, p.3).

Newspaper reports about who really was behind the decision to open the border were conflicting. Although they all announced the decision as being the TRNC’s Council of Ministers’ (*Kibris*, *Halkin Sesi*, & *Yenidüzen*, 22 April, p.1), *Yenidüzen* and *Kibris* later suggested that the Turkish government was the real decision-maker in this matter. *Yenidüzen* expressed this view openly in one of its headlines: ‘not the government but the instructions opened the border crossings’ (*Yenidüzen*, 23 April, p.6). While the ‘government’ referred to the Turkish Cypriot one, the ‘instructions’ pointed a finger at the Turkish government. It meant that having decided to relax the crossing restrictions in Cyprus the Turkish government had instructed the Turkish Cypriot authorities to implement it. Neither the headline nor the main part of the text, which consisted of the accounts of speeches delivered in a parliamentary session, clarified whose instruction it was. It kept the Turkish government hidden as the responsible agent and left it to the readers to construe the responsibility of the Turkish government for this. In contrast, *Kibris* quoted President Denktaş as saying that the decision to open the border was taken together with ‘Ankara and the Foreign Ministry’ (*Kibris*, 28 April, p.7). Highlighting the
source of the change in Cyprus as Turkey rather than the TRNC authorities not only increased doubts about the sovereignty of the TRNC but also reinforced the image of it as a protectorate and Turkey as the state holding the power. It reduced the TRNC state to an entity that merely followed Turkey’s instructions. In a departure from the other two newspapers, Halkın Sesi announced that ‘Ankara welcomed the decision’ (Halkın Sesi, 23 April, p.4). The statement portrayed the TRNC as a sovereign country whose decision was welcomed and respected by the other one. In these texts, Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was employed as a metonym to refer to the Turkish government.

Regardless of whose decision it really was, according to Yenidüzen it was also public pressure on the nationalist governing groups that led to the change. Representing the opening of the border as the ‘victory of the people’ (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.1), Yenidüzen wrote that it was ‘Turkish Cypriots’ determination that brought freedom of travel after 30 years’ to the island (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.1). The discourse of ‘the will of the people’ shifted the power behind the transformation from state authorities to citizens, which also reflected the leftist ideology of the newspaper. The term ‘people’, acting as a generalising synecdoche, also suggested a sense of consensus which illustrated Turkish Cypriots as united in their determination to make a change in the ‘status quo’. Yet, ‘people’ referred only to the ones who supported the Annan Plan. Next to the story of the announcement that ‘the border is opened’ Yenidüzen published a photo that showed a crowd of people from one of the mass demonstrations in favour of the Annan Plan. Underneath the photo, in bold characters, it said ‘the power of the people will make you do more “on your way out”’ (Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.1). The expression suggested further changes in the political future of the TRNC and again there was an emphasis on the ‘power of the people’ as the cause of change. In a way, by positioning ‘people’ opposite the governing groups that represented the ‘status quo’, the newspaper implied that people would soon change the government and also the status quo. ‘Status quo’ was a metonym that Yenidüzen frequently employed to refer to the nationalist governing groups that included the government and the president. Portraying them as the ‘other’, the newspaper also personified it: ‘the status quo had a first slap on its face’ (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.1).
In contrast with Yenidüzen's discourse of 'people', Halkın Sesi's coverage of the developments was dominated mainly by official representations and discourses. The stories of ordinary people that appeared in Yenidüzen and Kibris were less evident in Halkın Sesi. Instead, the news texts were mostly based on the views of the government officials as well as the president whose statements were published in more detail compared to the other two newspapers.

Conceiving of the nation as a bordered space where a political administration governed over the population within the boundaries was evident in the news texts. All the newspapers described the administration in the north as the 'TRNC' and referred to the one in the south as the 'Greek Cypriot Administration', as in the Turkish Cypriot official discourse. In the news texts about the border crossings, the newspapers noted that Greek Cypriots crossed to 'North Cyprus' or the 'TRNC' while Turkish Cypriots crossed to 'South Cyprus' or to the 'Greek Cypriot side'. For example, Halkın Sesi stated that 'on the 4th day of the free crossings, despite the rain and hail, the number of Greek Cypriots that crossed from South Cyprus ... On the other hand, from the TRNC 7 thousand Turk went to South Cyprus' (Halkın Sesi, 27 April, p.1). The same expressions were also employed in both Kibris and Yenidüzen. Both depicted Greek Cypriots as crossing to the TRNC while Turkish Cypriots were shown as crossing to South Cyprus or the Greek Cypriot side, but never to the Republic of Cyprus. The name of the Republic of Cyprus appeared only once in Yenidüzen and this was to compare and challenge the functionality of the TRNC (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p.1). Apart from this exception, the portrayal of the administration in the north as a state and referring to the one in the south as only an administration contributed to the legitimation of the TRNC in the eyes of their readership. It also implicitly portrayed Greek Cypriots as crossing to the territory of a state that they opposed strongly. The terms 'north' and 'south' were two metonyms that, as well as pointing at the north and the south sides of the island, also referred to the political administrations that governed each side of Cyprus.

The concept of nation was used synonymously with the concept of 'home'. In the official discourses, the TRNC was reconstructed as the home of Turkish Cypriots while
Greek Cypriots visited it as ‘guests’. The notion of neighbourly relationships enhanced the idea of the existence of each community within their own territory and next to each other as separate states. Such representation and discourses were mostly employed and integrated in the news texts by Kibris. Proclaiming the new regulations regarding the border crossings, Kibris reported the Tourism and Environment Minister of the time, Serdar Denktas, as saying ‘we are ready to entertain our Greek Cypriot guests’ (Kibris, 22 April, p.1). In the news reports of the same statement in Halkin Sesi and Yenidüz, who used TAK’s news dispatch, the term ‘guests’ did not appear (Yenidüz, 22 April, p.2; Halkin Sesi, 22 April, p.6). In another statement, Serdar Denktas described the Greek Cypriots arriving to the north as ‘our tourist neighbours’ (Kibris, 26 April, p.3), which Kibris quoted as a subheadline within an article. The presentation of Greek Cypriots as ‘guests’ appeared in another headline of the same newspaper about improvements in Kyrenia: ‘Kyrenia is ready for the guests from South Cyprus’ (Kibris, 26 April, p.8).

The Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu’s words in a press release that ‘living side by side is the best solution’ (Kibris, 28 April, p.8) also supported the existing division and the guest-neighbour relationship. The text did not appear in Yenidüz, an ardent critic of the status quo.

Halkin Sesi did not define Greek Cypriots as ‘our guests’ but merely ‘Greek Cypriots’. Its representation and discourse of the border opening was very similar to official ones. The press releases issued by state officials appeared more frequently and in more detail in Halkin Sesi compared to the other two newspapers. For example, a statement by President Rauf Denktas, in which he expressed his satisfaction with the crossings but criticised the opposition on other issues, was given in detail in Halkin Sesi while in Kibris only a short part of it appeared and excluded the critical part. It could be that with the change of its allegiance in favour of the Annan Plan that was supported mainly by the opposition left-wing groups, Kibris chose not to publish those sections of his statement. The statement was not reported in Yenidüz at all. It was again only Halkin Sesi that printed a news text about the Tourism and Environment Minister Serdar Denktas stressing that there was no change in the views and policies of the Turkish
Cypriot administration in relation to the Cyprus problem, which indicated the continuation of the existing status quo, while no such report appeared in the others.

In contrast to the concept of 'home', *Yenidüzen* described the TRNC as a 'prison'. Reporting a statement by the opposition party leader Mehmet Ali Talat, *Yenidüzen* used the headline was 'we are free from the prison, we will also be free from a lack of solution' (*Yenidüzen*, 30 April, p. 1). The speech marks the newspaper used in the highlights on its front page indicated that they were quotes from Talat. Yet, in the headline of the story which claimed that the TRNC was a prison there was no such marks. It could be argued that the lack of quotation marks showed corroboration by the newspaper of the notion expressed in the statement that Turkish Cypriots were imprisoned in the TRNC. In a way, by using the deictic expression 'we' in the statement, *Yenidüzen* presented the conceptualisation of the TRNC as a 'prison' as the view of the newspaper as well as the readers' it addressed.

The rhetoric of 'prison' was employed to stress the feeling of being trapped in a place rather than being locked-away for any wrongdoing. It suggested that it was the decisions and policies of the Turkish Cypriot state representatives that made Turkish Cypriots feel as if they were imprisoned in their own country. Apart from the exclusion of the international world, the description of the TRNC as a 'prison' referred to the difficulties Turkish Cypriots had been facing in travelling abroad. As the TRNC was not an internationally recognised legal state, its passports were not accepted as valid travel documents by any other states apart from Turkey and this made it hard for Turkish Cypriots to travel out of North Cyprus. ‘Getting out of prison’ highlighted the sense of getting out of this country as a consequence of the change that started with the border crossings. One impact of this was that many Turkish Cypriots who were eligible for citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus obtained its passports or identity cards that allowed them to travel abroad. With these documents, Turkish Cypriots also benefited.

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4 Turkish Cypriots who want to travel abroad can obtain the passports of Republic of Turkey as the TRNC passports are not recognised as valid travel documents by the international world.
from other services the Greek Cypriot state provided to its citizens. Highlighting this, *Yenidüzen* criticised the TRNC’s status as a legal state:

Half of the population with the Republic of Cyprus’ and the other half with the Republic of Turkey’s passports and identity cards are starting a new life. The TRNC is a state whose passport and identity card are not needed (*Yenidüzen*, 25 April, p.1).

Whether imagined as a ‘home’ or a ‘prison’, the nation was conceived as a bounded space with some ‘gates’. The term ‘gates’ actually referred to the border checkpoints, which are also called the ‘border gates’. Thus, the relaxation of the restrictions on crossing between the two sides was reported as the ‘gates are opened’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 22 April, p.1). The expression was common throughout the news articles of all the newspapers. At the time there were only three checkpoints where crossings were taking place but they were portrayed as the ‘borders’ in general. *Yenidüzen* also employed the word ‘barricade’ for the checkpoints which blocked the crossings: ‘the Council of Ministers lifted the barricades’ (*Yenidüzen*, 30 April, p.1).

In contrast to the previous case study in which the official nationalist representation of Greek Cypriots was as the eternal enemy of Turkish Cypriots, the depiction of Greek Cypriots in the news texts during this period was positive. Especially in *Yenidüzen* and *Kibris*, the representation and discourse of the border crossings were reproduced as peaceful events and pointed at a positive common political future for both communities. For example, *Kibris* highlighted a quote from a Greek Cypriot family visiting their house in the north in its headline as, ‘we want peace’ (*Kibris*, 26 April, p.2). The discourse of ‘peace’ was dominant especially in *Yenidüzen*. Suggesting that ‘the crossings have led a strong wind of peace to blow on the island’, *Yenidüzen* reported that a friendship had started ‘between the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists and the young people from the north’ (*Yenidüzen*, 26 April, p.4). It also described the coach service that was provided by the Greek Cypriot authorities to take Turkish Cypriots to Limassol as ‘a peace coach’ (*Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.4). The discourse of peace not only supported the argument that ‘things will be better in future’ (*Kibris*, 30 April, p.5) but was also an emphasis on the discontinuity of the existing situation. Such discourse was not employed.
in Halkin Sesi, probably because it supported the state ideology that the peace had already existed.

_The Construction of a Common Past_

In the production of the news articles about the crossings to the ‘other’ side, the newspapers benefited from the past to highlight its importance in the present. There were frequent references to the past, especially to the year 1974, a turning point in history for the people on the island. It was in 1974 that Turkey’s military intervention divided the island into north and south and until April 2003, crossings were restricted. The significance of 1974 differed in the three newspapers analysed. Describing the day the border crossings commenced as an ‘historical day’, _Kibris_ stressed that it was ‘the first time after 29 years’ ( _Kibris_, 23 April, p.1) that people from both communities started to cross in both directions. The numerical rhetoric of ‘29 years’ referred to the length of time since such social interaction between the two communities had taken place. It also reminded one of a time in the past when there was neither a border nor checkpoints and when travelling from one part of Cyprus to the other was not described as ‘going to the other side’. Linking the experiences of crossings 29 years ago with the developments of today, _Kibris_ announced that ‘Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are visiting North Cyprus and South Cyprus after 29 years’ ( _Kibris_, 23 April, p.1). Using a strategy of perpetuation in combination with the strategy of transformation, the newspaper implied the continuity of the situation for ‘29 years’, which had just changed or signalled a certain transformation. However, despite the hint of transformation, there was no indication of conceiving of the national identity as threatened by this change. Another significance of the numerical rhetoric of ‘29’ was to increase the news value of the story and to make it more striking. Stating that something was happening for the first time in 29 years indicated that the event was extraordinary which no doubt fuelled readers’ interest.
Accordingly, *Yenidüzen* also drew similarities with the past and the present. Comparing the present time to the past, when there was no border, it published on its front page that ‘it has become similar to the state before 1974. This was the situation in 74, furthermore there was no time limit’ (*Yenidüzen*, 22 April, p.1). The temporal reference of 1974 was a metonym employed to represent the military and political actions that took place in that year and its aftermath that had changed and shaped the political situation on the island since. *Yenidüzen*, benefiting from the strategy of perpetuation, emphasised the similarity between the past and the present, implying that the time in between was a disruption in political continuity. Reminding one of the situation pre-1974, it evoked the time when both communities lived together, which was also consistent with its conceptualisation of a united Cypriot nation and national identity. It indicated the possible restoration of a co-existence which had been suspended in 1974. However, the present transformation was not exactly the same as the past. For example, border movements had a time limit, which meant that everyone was required to return back to their side of the island before midnight, or be fined. In the text, this condition was given in inverted commas to highlight and probably to mock it, as it was reminiscent of the fairy tale, Cinderella: ‘with the condition of returning back at 24:00’ (*Yenidüzen*, 22 April, p.1).

*Halkın Sesi*'s discourse of ‘1974’ was different than the other two newspapers. It defined 1974 as the date of the ‘Happy Peace Operation’, as it was referred to in the nationalist discourses. Such representation of 1974 connoted the conflict between the communities in the past and the sufferings of Turkish Cypriots. Even announcing the start of the border crossings, *Halkın Sesi* reflected this nationalist ideology by linking the development to 1974:

In Cyprus island, that was divided in two zones as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and South Cyprus Greek Cypriot Administration following the 20 July 1974 Happy Peace Operation, free crossing between sides was allowed yesterday for the first time in 28 years (*Halkın Sesi*, 24 April, p.2).
There was confusion in Halkin Sesi's representation of how many years since crossings took place. The text above stated it as the first time in '28' years but the one on its front page on the same day stressed that 'after 29 years Greek Cypriots were rushing to the north and Turkish Cypriots to the south' (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). Either prepared by two different people who had calculated the number of years differently or simply a typing mistake, the newspaper's attempt of showing its precision and exactness by using numerical information was undermined by the confusion or indecisiveness about the number of years which was also a crucial part of the story.

Halkin Sesi also stated that Greek Cypriots saw Lefkoşa, the north of Nicosia, for the first time after 40 years (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). However, the newspaper did not explain further why Greek Cypriots had not crossed to the north of the city for 40 years if the border was established only 29 years ago in 1974. Expecting the reader to know the reason, Halkin Sesi treated that piece of historical information as general knowledge. The 40 years period was a temporal reference to 1964 when Lefkoşa was divided by the so-called Green Line after the increasing tension between the two communities turned into armed conflict. By highlighting the length of time as 40 years to indicate the continuity of the present situation, Halkin Sesi employed a strategy of perpetuation that emphasised the difference between then and now as a justification.

People from both communities were reported to have crossed the border to see the towns, villages and houses they were forced to abandon in 1974. The newspapers were full of news articles about such visits and the reencounter of old friends and neighbours of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Journalists accompanied people from both communities during their visits to their old home town, houses or family graves to reflect their emotions, views and experiences. The analysis showed that the past was not represented by hatred or fear and the narrative of the past was not based on the memories of the conflict and suffering but, on the contrary, on nostalgic memories of family homes and neighbours. For some, there was clear longing for life in the past. Reporting a Greek Cypriot couple's visit to Kyrenia (Girne) where they used to live, Kibris quoted one of them as saying:
I am from Kyrenia. We’re going to the north, to Kyrenia for the first time in 30 years. I’ll go to the church and light candles. I’ll light my candles for peace, for us to go back to our pre-1974 places and live together’ (Kibris, 24 April, p.6).

Despite the suffering and the unpleasant circumstances that forced people out of their homes, people in the centre of such features were reported to be happy rather than angry. The story of an old woman called Hatice Attillaogullari was reproduced in this manner:

The flowers she had picked from her house in Akincilar village were for her grandmother’s grave, left forlorn for 40 years. When the first troubles started in 1963, they were taken hostage and were treated cruelly. Leaving their big citrus orchards behind, they resettled in Akincilar village. On the return journey that her old body had to endure with difficulty, she was happy. Having prayed at the neglected graves, she was welcomed in her village. On the way back, she had flowers from the house she used to live in 40 years ago (Yenidüzên, 29 April, p.5).

Written in a human-interest news style, these texts included people’s accounts of the past and their feelings as they remembered them in the present, along with the observations of the journalists. The news text about the search of two Turkish Cypriot women for their homes in Larnaca was one such news story:

Ayşe Aşaroğlu, who walking in the streets of Larnaca and showing excitedly the places she used to live to her daughter and son in law who have come to Cyprus from London for a holiday, said ‘these places are where we lived our childhood’. Naile Akalin, who pointed at a shop and said ‘this used to be Uncle Ahmet’s grocery shop’, seemed like reliving her childhood days there one more time. As they approached their house in Hacı İbrahim Street, the excitement of both the Akalin and Aşaroğlu families increased. But when they arrived where their house used to be and saw that there was an apartment block with shops at the bottom and flats at the top, they could not stop their tears (Kibris, 29 April, p.3).

It was not just the houses that were being visited but also work places, family graves and religious places. As places of importance they became symbols and the embodiment of the past and also their identity. Houses, towns or villages that were conceptualised as ‘home’ were also a source of a sense of belonging for people and provided a basis for an
identity. The articles about such visits functioned like links back to the past and depicted them as precious things that were lost in the past and searched for in the present.

It was not just homes that were once lost and now found but also personal collections such as photographs. *Halkan Sesi* published a picture of a smiling couple holding their wedding photos from 29 years ago (*Halkan Sesi*, 29 April, p.1). The only text regarding this event appeared as a photo caption that consisted of the names of the couple (not even their surnames) and stating that they had found the photograph in their old house in a village but without any further details. There was a similar story, treated in a similar way in *Yenidüzen* showing a woman holding a wedding photograph (*Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.1) again without any details as to how it happened. The importance of stories about finding personal items after 29 years was an indication that the people who had kept these items believed or hoped that their owners might return. Indirectly, it reflected an expectation of a change which would allow people to return to their old places and reclaim their belongings. The news text of a Turkish Cypriot family’s visit to the house they had owned in Limassol before 1974 was representative of the extent of this belief:

> Even her cupboards were there. They asked Üstündağ to open the drawer of the cupboard from 29 years ago. She couldn’t believe the contents of the drawer she had opened shyly. Photographs from when she was a young girl and the bairam⁵ greeting cards from her older sisters which she had received decades ago were still in the drawer she had left. They even kept the butterflies which she had made out of paper because they believed that one day she would return (*Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.5).

The evocation of the past through valuable personal items rediscovered in the present also enforced the representation of the past in a nostalgic way, which highlighted the positive aspects of the past rather than the difficulties of it. Why and under what conditions people had left their homes and hometowns was rarely mentioned. Not the atrocities and sufferings of the past but a longing for the things that were left behind and the joy of finding them were stressed. Greek Cypriots who were the ‘enemy’ in the nationalist discourses were being humanised and portrayed as long lost friends and

⁵ A Muslim religious festival.
neighbours. This practice was especially common in Yenidüzen. The day after the borders were opened, Yenidüzen reported on the meeting of ‘old Cypriot friends’ at the Ledra Palace checkpoint, the main checkpoint in Nicosia, as an event worth seeing (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p.4).

The past was not the same though. Going back to the houses they once owned created an ambivalent host-guest situation for the people: The ones who had owned the house in the past were now in the guest position. Papadakis (2005) described this confusing situation as follows:

Many people wanted to go back and thousands tried it. Instead, many came to understand this could not be because they were not the people who left — they were not the same people, nor were the places the same. Knocking on the door of their home to be allowed in, often welcomed and treated as guests, almost relatives, allowed to walk through every room and check the trees in the garden. They met the family now living there, understanding how this was now their home too, what it would mean to them too, if they had to leave (p. 245).

This ambivalence of the owner-guest relationship existed within the news texts. The belief that these houses actually belonged to the people who had owned them before 1974 was integrated into the news discourses of all the newspapers. The definition of houses previously owned by Greek Cypriots as ‘theirs’ was frequent in the news texts and showed that the information was treated as normal. Despite the gap between the present and the past, the term ‘their houses’ indicated continuity in that these properties were seen as belonging to the people who had owned them before the division but at the same time to the people who had been living in them. The discourse was evident in some of Kibris’ headlines: ‘Visited his house he had abandoned at 8 years old’ (Kibris, 26 April, p.2), ‘He found his home with his mother’s description’ (Kibris, 26 April, p.2) and ‘Kullos who was born after 1974 visited his family’s house’ (Kibris, 25 April, p.2). Yenidüzen, on the other hand, highlighted the ambivalent situation of guest-host relationship: ‘Greek Cypriots entertained the “owners of the house” in their house’ (Yenidüzen, 28 April, p.2). The inverted comas indicated the awareness of the ambiguous situation. Yenidüzen was consistent with its description of ‘the owners of
their house' as it repeated the same term in another article (*Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.4). In a similar way, *Halkın Sesi* also referred to the originally Greek Cypriot owned houses as 'their' houses but in some cases it added that they were their 'old' houses (*Halkın Sesi*, 24 April, p.5).

**Identifying the ‘Other’**

The discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was not as distinct as it was in the previous case study. The border crossing had created a positive atmosphere between the two communities which enhanced a sense of reconciliation rather than conflict enforcement. The news discourses were dominated by ideas such as ‘peace in Cyprus’ and ‘sisterhood/brotherhood of both communities’ which gave the impression that not only the physical borders but also the imagined ones were disappearing. Greek Cypriots were no longer cast as the enemy and attributions to them were no longer derogatory. Instead, the similarities and friendship between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were stressed. For example, both were characterised as hospitable. The newspapers reported how well Turkish Cypriots welcomed their Greek Cypriot guests and vice versa. According to the news reports, serving them traditional food and drinks, hosts from both communities tried to make their guests comfortable in the houses which, in some cases, had belonged to their guests years ago. The newspapers even attributed some practices as a common characteristic of both communities. For example, an everyday activity like the parking of cars was presented in terms of cultural similarity. *Kibris* quoted the first impression of a group of Turkish Cypriots who had crossed to the Greek Cypriot side: ‘We saw that Greek Cypriots park their cars on the pavements like (we do) in the TRNC. It looks like we are similar to each other on this issue’ (*Kibris*, 24 April, p.4).

Forging resemblances between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots helped to categorise them under the identity of Cypriot with an emphasis on the cultural coherence of both communities. Such thinking was visible especially in *Yenidüzen* as it accentuated
the similarities and had a discourse based on an idealised Cypriot identity. In a way, by following a construction strategy it renegotiated a Cypriot national identity. The concept of ‘us’ as Cypriots included Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots and a positive self-representation applied to both. Perhaps not to cast Greek Cypriots in a negative light, Yenidüzen did not report the attack by a Greek Cypriot family on a Turkish Cypriot one when the latter went to see their old house. A report of the incident appeared in Kibris and Halkin Sesi but not in Yenidüzen (Kibris, 29 April, p.2 & Halkin Sesi, 29 April, p.11).

In Kibris, the distinction between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was maintained, forging an ‘us’ and the ‘other’ group. However, the ‘other’ group was not cast as the enemy or a threat but as a group equivalent to the Turkish Cypriot one. The differences and likeness between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were blurred: Even though ‘they’ were not exactly like ‘us’, ‘they’ were not so different either. As well as acknowledging shared cultural habits, contrasts in cultural values and practices between these two groups were also mentioned. Unlike Yenidüzen, the collective representation of both communities in Kibris was not essentialised under the identity of Cypriot, even though, like Yenidüzen, it also acknowledged certain Cypriot characteristics.

For Halkin Sesi, Greek Cypriots existed as the ‘other’ group. It described the Greek Cypriot crowds arriving in North Cyprus in ‘surges’ (Halkin Sesi, 26 April, p.1). In Halkin Sesi the discourses that emphasised the similarities between the two communities were limited. It focused more on official discourses and actions rather than the stories of ordinary people. It also continued to publish a summary of the news from the Greek Cypriot press about this recent development. As mentioned before, this section of the newspaper published anything that showed the Greek Cypriot side as corrupt and bad. Although the news chosen in this period was not so negative, it still included reports from the Greek Cypriot dailies that cast them in a less than positive light: ‘Greek Cypriots: we are caught unaware’ (Halkin Sesi, 27 April, p.19), and ‘the Greek Cypriot press is now putting forth accusations of smuggling to have negative effects on bi-directional crossings’ (Halkin Sesi, 26 April, p.19). Meanwhile, in a positive self-
representation, *Halkın Sesi* quoted some Greek Cypriots as saying that Turkish Cypriots had treated them really well during their visits to the north (*Halkın Sesi*, 24 April, p.5).

The opening of the border was presented as a positive action of 'our' government in *Halkın Sesi* and *Kıbrıs*. In *Kıbrıs*, Greek Cypriots (*Kıbrıs*, 24 April, p.8) and in *Halkın Sesi*, Turkish Cypriots were reported as thanking the Turkish Cypriot authorities for opening the border (*Halkın Sesi*, 24 April, p.2). In contrast to the goodwill of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the Greek Cypriot ones were portrayed as the opposite, as creating obstacles for the interaction of the two communities. The blame for obstructing Turkish-origin TRNC citizens from going to the south and also Turkish Cypriots travel across the border with their cars, as the Greek Cypriots had been doing, was put on the Greek Cypriot government. Furthermore, reports of the Greek Cypriot authorities trying to discourage their people from crossing to the TRNC by claiming that it would lead to its recognition, enforced negative perceptions about them: 'the Greek Cypriot politicians, who could not hinder their citizens crossing to the TRNC, are talking about the risk of indirect recognition of the TRNC' (*Kıbrıs*, 25 April, p.5). In summary, the Greek Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot authorities were cast as the ones creating obstacles for the people of both communities to meet and blend together. It was also in this discourse that the responsibility for causing any rift between the communities was shifted from the people to the authorities. Ordinary Greek Cypriots, who were shown as crossing to the north despite the warnings of their politicians, were positioned in opposition to their state authorities. Such depiction also enforced the perception that Greek Cypriots did not support the policies of their own administration on this matter. They were even reported as arguing with their own police at the checkpoints for not being helpful to them (*Kıbrıs*, 29 April, p.5 & *Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.2). In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot police, or 'our' police, were described as 'working without avoiding any sacrifice' at the checkpoints (*Kıbrıs*, 27 April, p.4).

In *Yenidüzen*, the Turkish Cypriot authorities were not exempt from similar accusations. It categorised the nationalist governing groups such as the coalition government of *Ulusal Birlik Partisi* (UBP- National Union Party) and *Demokrat Parti* (DP - Democrat
Party), as well as President Rauf Denktaş, within the 'other' group and depicted them in a negative way. According to the newspaper, 'UBP-Denktaş duo and their supporters for years prevented both communities in Cyprus from coming together, getting closer' (Yenidüzen, 28 April, p.1). The newspaper also criticised the President for continuing his negativity despite the positive and peaceful atmosphere on the island (Yenidüzen, 26 April, p.4). Therefore, without stressing the role of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in opening the borders, Yenidüzen depicted the development as an action of 'the people' that had a negative impact on the dominant nationalist groups. The day the borders were opened, rather than reporting the official announcement on its front page, Yenidüzen chose to say that 'the power of these people will make you do more things "on your way out": the status quo will collapse' (Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.1). The Turkish word 'çökecek', which means 'will collapse', was written with dashes as 'çö-ke-cek' to emphasise it. Affiliated with the main opposition party, Yenidüzen was critical of the governing groups and associated them with the problems of the present time by calling them the 'status quo'. Claiming that Turkish Cypriots wanted more substantial changes within their country, Yenidüzen pointed at their expectations for the future:

Those who think Turkish Cypriots are 'their toys' have opened the borders 'for the time being'. But Turkish Cypriots want more, much more than that. More than just 'touring', Turkish Cypriots are waiting for the day when they would have an identity in the world (Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.1).

As seen in the statement above, by employing a strategy of transformation, Yenidüzen indicated a change in the political situation in the future as well as a re-imagining of national identity.

Yenidüzen, using the argument of usefulness for the visits of Greek Cypriots to the north, justified the action of opening the borders with economic benefits. It claimed that the Greek Cypriots' arrival boosted the country's economy '90 thousand Cyprus pound' in six days (Yenidüzen, 30 April, p.1). Yet, there was no mention of how much money Turkish Cypriots contributed to the South Cyprus economy. Comparison based on wealth existed within many news texts in which Greek Cypriots were depicted as wealthier than Turkish Cypriots. For example, news reports about the visits of Turkish
Cypriots to Limassol included their impression of it as being as developed as a ‘European city’, especially when compared to the north. However, the modernity and wealth of the city did not spread to the Turkish quarter of the city as *Yenidüzen* journalist observed that it was full of neglected buildings (*Yenidüzen*, 28 April, p.2). Reflecting the public’s feelings and thoughts about the crossings, *Halkin Sesi* also quoted someone describing Lefkosia (South Nicosia) as ‘more developed than our side’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 24 April, p.2).

The discourse in the newspapers gave the impression that more Greek Cypriots went to the north side of the island than Turkish Cypriots to the south. *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi* especially expressed their surprise regarding the Greek Cypriots’ enthusiasm in crossing to their side. Both reported that, contrary to expectations, a great number of Greek Cypriots had crossed to the TRNC (*Kibris*, 24 April, p.4; *Halkin Sesi*, 26-27 April, p.2). Their amazement revealed that in the wake of years of anti-Turk propaganda as well as the recent warnings of the Greek Cypriot government against an indirect recognition of the TRNC, they did not expect such large numbers of Greek Cypriots to go to the north. To stress the interest Greek Cypriots had been showing in North Cyprus, *Halkin Sesi* described them as ‘surging in crowds’. The newspaper reported that ‘due to the increasing demands of Greek Cypriots, great crowds formed on the third day of the crossing’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 26 April, p.1). *Kibris* also noted in one of its headline that there was a ‘big interest’ (*Kibris*, 25 April, p.1). Even though it generalised the big interest to both sides, it stated that ‘especially Greek Cypriots had formed long queues with their vehicles at the Ledra Palace and Beyarmudu checkpoints’ (*Kibris*, 25 April, p.1). *Yenidüzen* also remarked that the interest and the crush Greek Cypriots created at the checkpoints did not wane but increased (*Yenidüzen*, 29 April, p.2).

*The Linguistic Construction of Common Culture*

Culture, another significant element of national identity, acts as a source in its production. Cultural symbols can have various meanings and can be interpreted
differently. Despite this, shared meanings, habits, rituals and ways of speaking are resources for establishing a sense of belonging (Edensor, 2002). National identity is produced and reproduced depending on the invention and the circulation of these cultural materials.

In the news texts analysed, cultural materials were employed to draw similarities between the two communities as well as to state their differences. Both communities were imagined with certain qualities associated with them which were not just traditional ones but also the habits of everyday life that are embedded in the practices of daily social interaction. For example, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were described as being very hospitable. People from both sides were reported to have welcomed their guests and invited them for coffee (Kibris, 29 April, p.3; Halkin Sesi, 28 April, p.4; Yenidüzen, 29 April, p.5). In their accounts of meeting the 'other', people kept mentioning how they were invited in to drink coffee when they were on the 'other' side. The shared practice of drinking coffee was not treated as anything unusual since it was a habitual performance of everyday life for both communities. This form of habitus provided a shared form of identity between the two communities, linking them together through this daily habitual practice and creating a culture of coherence amongst Cypriots. As well as coffee, food was another form of representation of cultural similarity. For example, şeftali, a certain type of kebab common in Cyprus was described as 'Cyprus' well known dish' (Kibris, 24 April, p.4). The circulation of şeftali as a Cypriot dish rather than Greek or Turkish represented it as another shared cultural feature, maintaining the notion of a common Cypriot cultural identity.

Music, another cultural ingredient that can be associated with national identity also appeared in the news texts as another uniting component of Cypriot culture. In a romanticised description, Kibris noted that some Turkish Cypriots walked through the streets of Larnaca where 'Cypriot folk music' echoed (Kibris, 29 April, p.3). Folkloric music stresses national distinctiveness and authenticity. Describing the music as 'authentic' and 'Cypriot' in the news texts reproduced it as a shared cultural component of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The circulation of such representations sustained
the concept of a Cypriot identity. *Yenidüzen* also published an article about the performance of the bi-communal choir and folk dance group on its front page. This bi-communality of the choir and folk dance group implied common characteristics in the songs sung and the dances performed (*Yenidüzen*, 28 April p.1).

Along with shared cultural features, some cultural materials were treated as the national cultural symbol of only one group which highlighted the differences between the communities. Food and drink were two categories that induced such separation. One such example was a desert called *ekmek kadayifi*, a Turkish Cypriot speciality which the newspapers claimed Greek Cypriots longed to taste. Linking *ekmek kadayifi* together with the Greek Cypriots' homes in the north, *Yenidüzen* wrote that 'they have not forgotten the house and ekmekkadayifi (sic)' (*Yenidüzen*, 26 April, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand, a beer called KEO, a brandy known as 31 and wine were the drinks Turkish Cypriots associated with Greek Cypriot culture. According to *Kibris*, having crossed to the Greek Cypriot side,

> Some Turkish Cypriots went to a bar and did not forget to taste KEO and Greek Cypriots' renowned red wine. It was also noticed that, on the way back, many Turks carried '31' in their hands, the famous drink of the Greek Cypriot side (*Kibris*, 24 April, p.4).

Language, another cultural ingredient of national identity, also signified a difference between the two communities. In Cyprus, following the division in 1974, the physical boundary also acted as a boundary for the languages spoken predominantly on either side of the island; Turkish in the northern part and Greek in the southern part. Having crossed to the 'other' side, Turkish Cypriots became aware that the boundary of Turkish language on the island was not limited to the TRNC borders and that Turkish still existed in the Greek Cypriot part of the island. The newspapers reported that Turkish Cypriots who went to Limassol were surprised to see some posters on the walls in Turkish and heard some people speak to them in Turkish, mostly the Turkish Cypriots who lived in the Greek Cypriot side. The articles also stated that some of the street names where Turkish Cypriots used to live were kept in Turkish. These observations confirmed the role of the Turkish language as a source of national identity for Turkish
Cypriots which had enhanced imagining themselves as a separate national group from Greek Cypriots in the past as well as in the present.

National Space

Conceptualising a nation in spatial terms also contributes to the production of national identity. Edensor remarks that places and spaces that are regarded as national contribute to a sense of national identity with their cognitive, sensual and habitual impact (Edensor, 2002). Sometimes these places symbolise the combination of ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics of the nation.

In the news texts analysed, the link between national space and national identity was based, for the most part, on the 'other' rather than 'us'. Landscapes that were symbolically and ideologically important for the 'other' emphasised the differences between the two communities. Highlighting certain areas in the north as significant places for Greek Cypriots, in terms of religion, was one such example as religion was another signifier of national identity in Cyprus. In the past, the communities were defined by their religion as Christian Orthodox and Muslim rather than as Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. It was with the development of nationalism that national identities superseded the religious ones, yet religion kept its importance in the definition of national identities. The division of the island had brought religious division as well. The majority of people in the north of the island mainly follow the faith of Islam with very few Greek Cypriots or Maronites who share the Christian faith. In the south, it is the reverse. Therefore, many spiritual, religious and sacred places of both communities were left isolated following the movement of populations from one part of the island to the other after 1974.

Some of the significant places for Greek Cypriots were in Karpas (Karpaz), the peninsula in the north. Apart from the churches and monasteries that are spiritually important to the Orthodox Greek Cypriots, the presence of a small Greek Cypriot
community that stayed in that part of the country even after the division made it easy to associate the area with Greek Cypriots. Two newspapers, *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*, included news stories about Greek Cypriots visits to Apostolos Andreas, one of the monasteries in the Karpas area for their Easter service (*Kibris*, 28 April, p.1). *Yenidüzen* only mentioned that a high number of Greek Cypriots crossed to the north during the Easter break (*Yenidüzen*, 28 April, p.3). *Kibris*, especially, highlighted the religious rituals the Orthodox Greek Cypriots performed in churches and monasteries in Karpas with big colourful photos. The news of the Easter Service in the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas and the baptism ceremony of a baby in another church in Karpas appeared on the front pages of *Kibris* on two consecutive days (*Kibris*, 28 & 29 April, p.1). As well as representing the Orthodox religion as a national signifier of Greek Cypriots, these texts in *Kibris* also portrayed these places as the symbol of their ethnic, religious and cultural traditions. In contrast, there was no such report of Turkish Cypriots visiting religious places in the south side. Unlike Greek Cypriots, in the first week of the opening of the borders (which is the period this study focused on) Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to cross to the south with their vehicles which made it difficult for them to explore anywhere outside Lefkosia. It was only when the Greek Cypriot government organised coach services to the main towns in the south that Turkish Cypriots were able to go to these places as well.

Apart from Karpas, the newspapers also depicted Kyrenia (Girne), another town in North Cyprus, as a significant place for Greek Cypriots in which they showed great interest and visited in crowds. Considering that it was the home of many Greek Cypriots, this interest was not surprising and the newspapers treated it as normal. *Yenidüzen* reported that ‘Greek Cypriots also crossed to the North... and many ran to Kyrenia’ (*Yenidüzen*, 24 April, p.2). *Halkin Sesi* also reported that ‘Greek Cypriots rushed to Kyrenia and villages’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 24 April, p.2). Carrying a news report accompanied by a photo from Kyrenia, *Kibris* informed its readers that ‘With the opening of the borders, Kyrenia, the capital of tourism, faced a rush from many Greek Cypriots’ (*Kibris*, 26 April, p.8). There was no similar report about any other town in North Cyprus and this could be explained by two reasons. One, positioned next to the sea,
Kyrenia, its harbour in particular, was always seen as a beautiful spot and a tourist attraction. As stated above, *Kibris* described it as ‘the capital of tourism’, which was why Greek Cypriot excursions there were not thought of as unusual.

The second reason could be linked to the naturalising tendencies of nationalist ideologies. Over the years, the nationalistic discourses of Greek Cypriots implied their desire to return to Kyrenia, which symbolised a return to the pre-1974 situation. The loss of Kyrenia was associated with humanitarian, nationalist and economic factors as it was the capital of Cypriot tourism before and thus took a central position in the Greek Cypriot discourses. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot official nationalistic discourses pointed to such discourses of the Greek Cypriot officials as evidence of their continuing ambition for enosis. In both discourses, Kyrenia appeared as the dream of every Greek Cypriot and as the place where Greek Cypriots longed to go. The nationalist ideologies adopted by both communities made these discourses look ‘natural’. Embedded in the public consciousness, it seemed normal that every Greek Cypriot wanted to go and see Kyrenia. When the Greek Cypriots filled the streets of Kyrenia or the touristy harbour, the newspapers treated this as if it were to be expected.

Whatever meaning Greek Cypriots assigned to it, Kyrenia had a different significance for Turkish Cypriots, which shows how difficult it is to affix national meanings to national spaces. During the years after 1974, Kyrenia had been a landscape which acquired a national importance for Turkish Cypriots. The pictures of Kyrenia harbour had become the predominant image of the TRNC for tourist campaigns, together with other images that symbolised Turkish Cypriot culture. It was an example of a local place becoming an image that represented the national space. The photographs of Kyrenia harbour in the newspapers with some Greek Cypriot tourists showed familiar spatial features to Turkish Cypriot readers and reproduced it as a national space that they identified with.

In Cyprus, the houses, home towns or villages left behind because of the division were the other spaces that acted as a source of identification for the members of both
communities. Home, like nation, is a bounded space that encloses memories, emotions and gives a sense of belonging and security. The concept of home means not merely a physical dwelling but also signifies the familial relationship or sometimes the community. Therefore, the concept of home may extend beyond the physical structure and include locality so that one can feel at home in the neighbourhood, town or city. The news stories about going back to the houses owned before the 1974 division appeared in all three newspapers. They reported that the first place Greek Cypriots visited when they crossed the border to the north was the homes they had left behind. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, were not allowed to cross to the south with their cars in the first week, which restricted their trips to the places that could be reached with the coach services provided by the Greek Cypriot authorities. The newspaper reports on people visiting the homes they had left nearly 30 years ago stressed the value and the attachment they felt towards them. The meaning of home was also extended beyond the buildings to neighbourhood and hometown and they were depicted as the places of memories, emotions and relationships. The reflection of these visits to these places was in the form of nostalgia. *Halkin Sesi* summarised the emotions that dominated these trips as 'joy and sadness':

> Going around the streets with the excitement of seeing the house he spent his childhood and sharing his memories with his children, a father was getting ready to see his house when he found an empty field in its place. The rest of the visit past with sadness for the ones who encountered such bad surprises while for the ones who found their houses and walked around the rooms and garden the happiness reached at its peak (*Halkin Sesi*, 8 April, p.4).

*Kibris* also quoted a Greek Cypriot woman who had gone to see the house that she had abandoned nearly 30 years ago and who described it as a place of memories and familial relationships:

> I wanted to see my house. I got married here. My children were born here. I have 4 daughters and 6 sons. Apparently the house owner is abroad at the moment. I used to live opposite to my daughter. My daughter visited her house but I was deprived from that. That is my fate. I became a migrant when I was 40. I am both happy and sad to be here (*Kibris*, 26 April, p.10).
As the example above suggested, the individual and collective narratives were constructed around these houses as they were symbols of an identity, community and tradition that people had identified themselves with in the past. As well as describing themselves a Turk or Turkish Cypriots, people also identified themselves with local or regional characteristics, as being from Limassol or Larnaca. The houses formed a link between these concepts and also gave them a sense of attachment to those places. Therefore, they meant more than a place of residence but a bounded space that embodied values and meanings that were integral to the existence of the group and its identity. During the nation building process, especially after the division, any internal differences in the conceptualisation of local or regional identities were suppressed and made part of the national identity.

Conclusion

Focusing on the content, the analysis found that five themes suggested by Wodak et.al (1999) were employed in the discursive construction of the national identity. The analysis found that even though the themes of linguistic construction of common political past, common culture and national space occurred more often, there were also references to the themes of a common political present and an essentialist understanding of Cypriotness. The analysis also revealed that there were overlapping discourses of identity which existed within the news texts such as Turkish Cypriot identity co-existing with Cypriot identity. The overall analysis of the data supported the argument that rather than a single essentialist identity, there was an ongoing process of production of different identities and, depending on the context and the newspaper, the characteristics of national identity changed. In some cases, Turkish Cypriots were constructed as a separate group in opposition to Greek Cypriots, creating a 'national we' group that also included Turkish origin citizens. At other times, the cultural similarities of both communities were highlighted and their differences were suppressed to construct a common Cypriot identity.
The characterisation of the nation as both Staatsnation and Kulturnation co-existed in the coverage of the event in all the newspapers. Thus, as well as characterising national belonging on the basis of citizenship there was also characterisation of the national identity based on cultural similarities. The conceptualisation of the nation as Staatsnation was evident especially in the news texts about Turkish-origin TRNC citizens. Using the argument that they were TRNC citizens and should be treated as equals to Cypriot-born ones, the newspapers represented the concept of nation based on citizenship. Even though it seemed like a concern for democratic society and citizenship, in the mediation of the issue neither Turkish-born citizens nor other ethnic minorities were given any means of expression. The emphasis on Turkish Cypriots' excitement pushed the expressions of others' to the background. National self-perception based on cultural definitions was also evident in the news articles of Yenidüzen and Kibris in particular. Even in Halkın Sesi, it was hard to apply a strict dichotomy of national identification based on Staatsnation and Kulturnation since the features of both could be found in its news texts.

Like the definition of 'we' group, the representation of the 'other' also shifted depending on the context and the newspaper. Having positioned 'people' versus 'the nationalist governing groups', Yenidüzen treated the latter as the 'other' and portrayed it as the adversary of the 'people'. It treated Turkish origin citizens as part of the nation based on the model of Staatsnation but also drew on cultural analogies with Greek Cypriots. A similar constructive strategy was discernible in Kibris, yet Kibris kept the dichotomy between the two communities by reflecting their cultural differences as well. In Halkın Sesi, whose representation of the issue was dominated with the official discourses, Greek Cypriots maintained their position as the 'other'.

The rhetoric of 'home' was used in the newspapers in two different concepts. One was the reproduction of the official discourse that referred to the TRNC as 'home' and Greek Cypriots visiting it as 'guests'. The second was pointing at the places that signified familial and community relationships in the past. The individual and national narratives were constructed around the images of these houses and their surroundings that were
defined as ‘home’. The host-guest relationship kept its ambiguity but at the same time challenged the official discourse, which claimed that the houses abandoned during and after 1974 belonged to whoever owned them after the separation.

The year 1974 was a turning point in the history of Turkish Cypriots and the past came to mean the times before 1974. People revisited the houses they had lived in and searched for their neighbours and friends they had last seen before moving to the Turkish Cypriot or the Greek Cypriot side. The news articles about the visits to these places and the meeting of old acquaintances contributed to the reconstruction of the common experience these communities had in the past. The inclusion of such narratives of the past within the news stories also reinforced the nation’s cultural memory. Not merely the common past but also a common political future existed within the news discourses. *Yenidüzen*, especially, adopting strategies of transformation and dismantling, emphasised the discontinuity of the status quo and the necessity for a change in Cyprus, especially for Turkish Cypriots, between the present time and the future. Reporting the recent changes within the country, *Kibris* also implicitly employed a strategy of transformation, while *Halkin Sesi* used the strategy of perpetuation to stress the positive continuity of the existing situation that supported the nationalist approaches.

The role of the newspapers in reflecting the ‘other’ changed with the opening of the border. Before the crossings had started, the media was one of the means of getting the news on the ‘other’, which was largely controlled by state officials. The opening of the border not only made the communication of these groups unnecessary but also gave a chance for the media institutions to collect data for themselves rather than being provided by the official sources. In other words, rather than mediating the ‘other’ through these sources, having met and observed the ‘other’, the media controlled the method of transmission to the public. Meanwhile, the ‘other’ was no longer an abstract entity for the people or the readers but materialised through their encounters in everyday life. Therefore, the newspapers were not just mediating strangers to their readers but reflecting an issue that had become part of their daily life, especially in the first week of the border crossings.
There were differences in journalistic practices which were reflected in the news discourses. Rather than relying only on the externally produced texts and news agency dispatches, which they still continued to benefit from, the newspapers also carried out their own newsgathering practices. Journalists' observations were integrated more into the news texts, even though in some cases the comments of journalists replaced the facts. Along with the press releases of the state and the government authorities, the stories of ordinary people appeared more in the news articles. Such stories were more frequent in Yenidüzen, a newspaper that adopted the concept of 'people' in its discourse and representation. They were covered less in Halkın Sesi as it mostly used the official representation and discourse in its coverage of the developments. On the other hand, Kibris tried to amalgamate both. As Yenidüzen and Halkın Sesi kept their ideological positions in relation to the previous case study, Kibris shifted its stance from a nationalist one to one favouring a solution. Thus, compared to the previous case study, the similarities in the discourse and representation of Kibris and Halkın Sesi were less.

The routines of everyday life, which also reproduced and naturalised nationalism were embedded within the news texts. The circulation of the images of family homes not only mediated the domestic space but also linked private lives with the national public one, creating a sense of unity. The reflection of the similar habits and nationally shared cultural norms and values of Turkish Cypriots within the news reproduced a sense of similarity and togetherness. Identification with these quotidian ways provided a way of seeing the world and their mediation by the media helped them to be internalised and treated as common sense.
CHAPTER 7: LOKMACI CRISIS IN 2007

Introduction

The third case study focuses on the news texts concerning the removal of an overpass built at Lokmaci, one of the military barricades in Lefkoşa. The overpass, or footbridge, was erected to act as another border crossing between the northern and the southern parts of central Nicosia in December 2005. Contrary to the purpose of its construction, which was to bring both communities closer together by reuniting the divided city of Nicosia, the bridge became a symbol of the division. When it was first built, the Greek Cypriot government objected to the idea of an overpass for civilian use over a military area and refused to open the Lokmaci crossing until it was demolished. Later, when the Turkish Cypriot administration announced that it would remove the footbridge, the Turkish military that controlled the area then objected.

This part of the research examines the news discourses of the three newspapers to discover which concepts of national identity were articulated through the discussions surrounding the Lokmaci footbridge. It studies the way Turkish Cypriots conceptualised themselves and articulated their identity, having received a rejection from the Greek Cypriots to cooperate in an action they considered to be positive and also when a Turkish military Chief of Staff interfered with their internal affairs.

The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Bridge was Removed

Attempts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem failed when the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in a referendum on 24th April 2004. The result disappointed the

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1 Greek Cypriots refer to this crossing as the 'Ledra crossing' or Ledra Street crossing.
64.9%\(^2\) of Turkish Cypriots who voted in favour of the plan, crushing their hopes for a solution to their longstanding problems that were related in a way to the unsolved Cyprus Problem. The relationship between the two communities also seemed to be drifting apart after the referendum. Research on the relationship between the two communities revealed that neither community trusted the other (Lordos, 2005). Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots' entry into the EU, despite having rejected the settlement plan, made Turkish Cypriots feel let down by the EU which also eroded their trust in it.

There had also been changes in the political dynamics in the TRNC. The nationalist coalition government of Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP - National Unity Party) and Demokrat Parti (DP - Democrat Party) was replaced first by the CTP and DP coalition government but then by Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP- Republican Turkish Party) - Özgürlik ve Reform Partisi (ÖRP- Independence and Reform Party) coalition government. CTP's leader Mehmet Ali Talat had also been elected as the TRNC President in the presidential elections in 2005, replacing the nationalist leader, Rauf Denktas.

A total of five checkpoints had been functioning as crossing points on the island since 2003. Nevertheless, the opening of the Lokmacı barricade was seen as a step to build on the mutual trust of both communities by increasing contact between them. The Lokmacı checkpoint would have connected the centres of both cities, making it easier for people to cross from one part to the other. The barricade was set on a long shopping street called Ledra Street (or Uzun Yol by Turkish Cypriots) in the centre of Nicosia. When the armed conflict between the two communities flared in 1963, Turkish Cypriots set up a barricade there called Lokmacı, which was the first division between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Later, both sides erected walls on Ledra Street that not only divided the street but also became a symbol of the division\(^3\).

\(^2\) 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted 'no' in the referendum.
\(^3\) The Greek Cypriot side turned the wall into a memorial of the division by putting windows from which one could peek into the Turkish Cypriot side.
Shopkeepers in the north campaigned for a crossing to be opened at Lokmacı. The retailers in the Asmaaltı and Arasta areas, surrounding the Lokmacı barricade, considered the opening a crucial step in reviving their businesses. They argued that it would make it easier for Greek Cypriots to cross to the north and would also encourage tourists from the south to come and shop in Lefkoşa.

In December 2005, the Turkish Cypriot administration pulled down the defensive wall in the north side of the border to turn the Lokmacı barricade into a crossing gate. However, the area being a military zone as well as a shopping street, this created a potential problem that people crossing through the checkpoint might encounter the activities of Turkish troops stationed there. To overcome this problem, the Turkish Cypriot government built an overpass that would carry people over a road used by the Turkish military. The move angered the Greek Cypriot leadership. Arguing against the idea that Greek Cypriot civilians should cross over a Turkish military zone, it demanded the demolition of the footbridge as a precondition for any further negotiations on the reopening of Ledra Street or the Lokmacı gate. As a result, the Lokmacı crossing remained closed.

On 28 December 2006, TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat announced that the footbridge in the Lokmacı barricade would be removed. His spokesperson explained on behalf of the President that 'he decided for the demolition of the footbridge, which was claimed to have been an obstacle for the opening of Lokmacı Border Gate, with the aim of contributing to the decision of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides to resume the comprehensive negotiations in the first quarter of 2007 and to aid the development of cooperation between the two peoples' (TRNC President's Office, Official Web site accessed 2008). The move was also a good will gesture to facilitate talks and revive the peace process on the island following an agreement reached by two community leaders in a meeting with the UN Under-Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari (Aydın, 31 January, 2007). However, the decision sparked a heated debate within the country as

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198 Arasta and Asmaaltı are the names of two shopping areas that surround the Lokmacı barricade in Lefkoşa, North Nicosia.
well as Turkey and South Cyprus. Talat's pronouncement on dismantling the bridge he had built just a year before was criticised by the Turkish Cypriot rightwing opposition as giving in to the demands of the Greek Cypriot authorities. Meanwhile, not satisfied with the demolition of the footbridge, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, insisted that the area should be demilitarised, cleared of mines, derelict buildings repaired and symbols of the TRNC removed before the Greek Cypriot authorities would open the passage for public crossings. Otherwise, he announced, the Greek Cypriot side would not reciprocate in the removal of the bridge. This meant the wall that acted as a barricade on their side of the border would not be removed.

The Turkish military, having control of the area, also criticized the decision. According to the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yaşar Büyükanit, who opposed the dismantling of the bridge, such steps should be taken and implemented at the same time as the Greek Cypriot administration. A picture of a crisis began to emerge, which Kibris labelled as the 'Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January, p.1). Furthermore, Büyükanit disproved of public a statement that TRNC President Talat had made after a meeting in Ankara with the Turkish Foreign Minister and Büyükanit himself. In his speech after the meeting on the 5th January, Talat had denied having discussed the Lokmaci Bridge with them. But the General's statement contradicted him, revealing that the TRNC President lied to public concerning the topic of their meeting. Nonetheless, after some negotiations, a consensus was reached and the removal of the Lokmaci Bridge went ahead.

In the TRNC, people organised public demonstrations to express both their support and opposition to Talat's decision. A group of retailers from the Asmaaltı and Arasta areas, with the support of some right wing nationalist political parties, rallied against the removal of the bridge before the Greek Cypriot government pulled down the wall on their side. The demonstration caused a conflict with another group which claimed to be the real representative of the merchants and accused the first group of not acting in the merchants' interest. Meanwhile, another demonstration came from a group of civil society organisations that were outraged by the way TRNC President Talat was treated
by the Turkish military General Staff. They organised a protest march to express their support for Talat on the Lokmacı issue.

The footbridge was pulled down on 9 January 2007. The UN and the EU approved the move and described it as a contribution to the opening of the crossing. Yet, the crossing remained closed. The Greek Cypriot leadership continued to claim that the dismantling of the footbridge was not enough and other conditions such as the demilitarisation of the area and the removal of TRNC symbols should be met before they would demolish the wall on their side and open a border gate. The Turkish Cypriot side refused these demands.

The Position of the Newspapers

This part of the research covers the period between 2-16 January 2007 which is a week before and a week after the removal of the footbridge in Lokmacı on the 9\textsuperscript{th} January. The number of texts included in the analysis was over 200. A large proportion of these texts is identical but is still included in the count as they appeared in each newspaper separately.

There had not been much change in the editorial teams of the three newspapers but their political positions had altered. As CTP, the political party \textit{Yenidüzen} was linked to, came to power, \textit{Yenidüzen}'s position shifted from being part of the opposition to being pro-government. This transformation influenced the newspaper's discourse that continued to frame the issues from the perspective of CTP despite its attempts to change its image to a newspaper with a broader appeal.

\textit{Halkın Sesi} was consistent in its political position in that it supported the nationalist groups and right wing political parties which were in opposition. Therefore, \textit{Halkın}

\footnote{Lokmacı crossing opened to public crossings on 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 2008.}
Sesi's representation of the events reflected a degree of opposition to the governing groups.

Kibris continued its publication with the same editorial team and policy. Although, its coverage included the views and actions of various groups, its support of the government and the president was also discernible. It was Kibris that first described the situation regarding the footbridge as the 'Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January, p.1).

Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News

An overall analysis of the coverage of the 'Lokmaci crisis' showed that the majority of the news reports which appeared in the three newspapers was based on externally produced texts such as written press releases and the press conferences of state authorities, opposition parties and non-governmental organisations. The journalists' role in the coverage of the issue was reduced mainly to processing the information provided for them by the source, rather than originating the news texts, which suggests that the story construction was determined by sources rather than journalists. The argument is not to deny any involvement of journalists in the production process of the news. They certainly reported from the parliament meetings in which the Lokmaci issue was debated, interviewed politicians and reflected the views of some shopkeepers in the area on this matter. The attempt is to highlight the dominance of the views of sources compared to any news output originated by journalists. As a result, many similar news texts appeared in all three newspapers that did not go further than simply reflecting the views of the sources and therefore failed to provide definition and guidance to increase the understanding of the text.

The resemblance in the texts also suggested that the press releases or news agency dispatches were either published with little editing or were copied as they were. The heavy reliance on news agency dispatches or press releases not only contributed to the centralisation and control of information in the public sphere but also limited the
diversity in the discourse and representation of the events within the media sphere affecting the public one. The news texts that originated from such sources were easy to spot as they were identical and appeared in the three newspapers. *Yenidüzen* was the only one that indicated the source of the news article as ‘TAK’ or ‘Anadolu News Agency’ or ‘Greek Cypriot Press’, at the end of its texts.

Another consequence of using given information without putting it through the journalistic process was that many news items failed to include information that would help readers to understand the issue in detail. Thus, it forced readers to bring in their own knowledge about the issue as the texts sometimes did not even provide the crucial information. One such example was the news about the demonstration for the opening of Lokmacı/Ledra gate. Even though it was stated in the newspapers that a Greek Cypriot organisation called ‘Citizens for Opening of Ledra’ was going to demonstrate in favour of its opening, the reports of the event announced that it was staged by a bi-communal ‘Open the gates initiative’. However, all failed to explain how a Greek Cypriot organisation suddenly became a ‘bi-communal’ one and changed from being ‘Citizens for Opening of Ledra’ to ‘Open the gates initiative’ (*Kibris, Yenidüzen & Halkı Sesi*, 14 January, p.1) which showed that they all accepted the information provided by the sources without questioning or researching it further.

As well as processing the information sent by the sources, the newspapers also included articles from the other news media organisations and particularly from the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish press. The Turkish Cypriot media relied on the Greek Cypriot press to reflect the views of the Greek Cypriot authorities on the issue. Despite the fact that crossing to the Greek Cypriot side was possible and the communication lines between both sides were open, the journalists from the north chose to quote the Greek Cypriot press rather than gathering the information themselves. This could be explained by various reasons such as language barriers, lack of motivation or reluctance of the Greek Cypriot sources to speak with Turkish Cypriot journalists.
The articles from the Turkish media were useful in reflecting the related views and debates in Turkey as the issue also involved the Turkish government and military authorities. Interestingly, instead of simply reporting that they included features about Lokmacı, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers published the articles as they had originally appeared, without making any changes in them. This practice was common, particularly in Yenidüzen, although Halkın Sesi employed it as well. For example, Halkın Sesi published an article that included a statement by the General Staff which had already appeared in a Turkish daily, Milliyet (Halkın Sesi, 8 January, p.2). Such practices revealed a lack of motivation on the part of the Turkish Cypriot press to be exclusive or original. Yenidüzen also circulated an article about the ‘Lokmacı crisis’ on its front page that was written by a well-known Turkish journalist from the Turkish daily, Radikal. Yet it announced that it was written for both newspapers, Radikal and Yenidüzen (Yenidüzen, 8 January, p.1).

Interestingly, Kibris newspaper turned a routine newsgathering effort into a front page news story. The visit by a group of well-known columnists and editors from the newspaper to Ledra Street in South Nicosia and reports that they had conducted interviews with Greek Cypriot shopkeepers became the lead story that occupied the first three pages of the newspaper. Their move, as explained in the text, was to find out the feelings and views of the Greek Cypriot people and especially the shopkeepers on Ledra Street (Kibris, 12 January, p.1-3). It was a case of an ordinary news gathering practice being turned into a media event by the newspaper itself. It contributed to the cultivation of star journalists and also enhanced the image of the newspaper as holding the views of the ordinary public as important.

Either because of a lack of journalists or of other resources, Halkın Sesi produced few news stories itself on the issue but relied heavily on other sources such as news agencies or press releases. Therefore, many of the stories in Halkın Sesi were the same as the ones in the other newspapers and an original story rarely appeared in it. In one case, Halkın Sesi even published an interview the Democrat Party leader, Serdar Denktaş, had given to another Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Vatan. Without any explanation, Halkın Sesi...
printed the interview that had appeared in *Vatan* a day before. Considering that it was an interview the newspaper itself could have easily gotten, it is hard to explain the reason behind *Halkın Sesi*’s decision to print the piece (*Halkın Sesi*, 12 January, p.3).

As in the previous cases, the newspapers benefited a great deal from other texts such as press releases from different individuals and groups, propaganda from political groups and statements from privileged sources. The written press releases of many organisations, such as trade unions or associations, appeared in the newspapers, disguised in the form of a news article. The newspapers were also full of texts of party political propaganda, concealed in the news article which also reproduced their arguments. Such an intertextual relationship was discernible in many articles in the newspapers. One such example was the account of the Turkish General’s statement in the newspapers which was intertextually related to the TRNC Constitution. The relation aimed to enhance the truthfulness and persuasiveness of the statement. The interviews conducted by the newspapers were another form of ‘intertexts’ (Fowler, 1991, p.229). The ones *Kibris* and *Yenidüzen* carried out with Mehmet Ali Talat were not only regarded as newsworthy and were reproduced as news features, but also attributed to him a personal importance as well as rendering his speech significant.

**Discourse Analysis**

In this case study, of the themes devised earlier, there appear mostly the understanding of nation and the construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories based on national interest with a focus on the differences on the representation of the ‘other’. The linguistic construction of a common past and the question of the future are the other two themes that occurred in the news discourses.
On the Concept of Nation

The developments that turned the demolition of the footbridge into a ‘crisis’ were related to the issue of the political sovereignty, statehood and respectability of the TRNC. The objection and the obstruction of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces to the removal of the footbridge, a decision announced by the TRNC President, brought the civil power in North Cyprus and Turkish military authorities into conflict. The Turkish General Büyükanıt’s statements, in which he emphasised that the area where the footbridge stood was under the authority of the Turkish military, added to the tension. It meant that the civil power or the people’s elected representatives had no control over the area under dispute or over the rest of the national borders of the TRNC. Furthermore, the General Staff accused TRNC President Talat of lying to the public. Talat, who had a meeting with Turkey’s Foreign Minister and Turkish military General Staff in Turkey about the footbridge in Lokmacı, denied that they had discussed the issue. The General Staff Büyükanıt contradicted Talat’s words in his media interviews and statements, leaving the president in a difficult position. Later, Talat explained that he had spoken like that so as not to give an impression of a rift within the Turkish side over the issue (Yenidüzen, 10 January, p.6). As a result, the whole development created a picture of a crisis between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey’s military authorities, as well as undermining the authority of the civil power in North Cyprus and damaging the personal image of the TRNC President. Elected by the people, President Talat was identified as the representative of the people’s will in the TRNC. But the attitude of the Turkish Army General showed the will of people could be challenged and that power was not only with them but also in the hands of the Turkish army, especially with regard to security issues. The whole situation increased doubts about the statehood of the TRNC. The word ‘increased’ underlines the fact that Turkish Cypriots themselves did not fully believe such claims as they were aware that ‘an official discourse of Turkish Cypriot “independence” glosses over political and economic dependence on Turkey’ (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, p.112). Yet, in this case, Turkey was rarely referred to as the ‘motherland’.
Despite the ambivalent situation concerning the status of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot nation state was still depicted as a genuine one with an emphasis on its elected representatives. Yenidüzen and Kibris portrayed the president as the head of civil authority in the TRNC, resolute in his decision, having managed to resist the objections of the Turkish army. Reporting the outcome of the meeting in Ankara, Kibris attributed a determined tone to the President: ‘the bridge will be removed’ (Kibris, 6 January, p.4). Yenidüzen, having announced that the problem about the bridge was solved, noted that Talat had not taken a step back in his decision. The text underlined his status as the TRNC President, which also helped to legitimise the state. Referring to the meeting in Ankara that Talat had with Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Yenidüzen wrote:

The Foreign Ministry told Talat that Lokmaci Bridge had not only symbolic but also logistical importance. But Talat, stating that he had taken the decision for the demolition of this bridge as the TRNC President and would not change his decision, indicated that he might resign (Yenidüzen, 6 January, p.8).

Reproducing the official discourses about the footbridge at the Lokmacı barricade in the news texts not only enhanced the hegemony of this discourse but also justified the actions of the governing groups. The three newspapers used the same official explanation that ‘Talat has decided on the demolition of the footbridge, which was claimed to have been an obstacle for the opening of Lokmacı Border Gate, with the aim of contributing to the decision of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides to resume the comprehensive negotiations in the first quarter of 2007 and for the development of cooperation between the two peoples’. Interestingly, while the decision was initially portrayed as being ‘the Turkish Cypriot side’s’ (Kibris, 4 January, p.6; Halkın Sesi, 4 January, p.2; Yenidüzen, 4 January, p.7), following the conflict between the President and the Turkish military, it was stressed as being ‘Talat’s decision’. For example, the day after the footbridge was dismantled, a news text about the removal of the bridge appeared in all three newspapers that emphasised Talat as the decision-maker: ‘the Lokmacı Bridge which was removed by President Mehmet Ali Talat’s decision …’ (Kibris, 11 January, p.4; Halkın Sesi, 11 January, p.3 and Yenidüzen, 11 January, p.9). In a way, Talat’s power as the President of the state was still being highlighted even after
the bridge was removed. The underlying reason for this change could be to reinforce and emphasise the power of the civil authority in North Cyprus in the eyes of public, especially as it was challenged by the Turkish military. Interchangeable references to the decision as the ‘Turkish Cypriot side’s’ and ‘Talat’s’ also reinforced the equation of the nation with the image of the President of the state.

Depending against whom it was constructed, the national identity of Turkish Cypriots changed: When positioned opposite Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were frequently referred as Turk rather than Turkish Cypriot but in relation to the Turkish military, the term Turkish Cypriot was employed. There were constant shifts between these identities. Even in Yenidüzen which adopted the discourse of Cypriot in the previous case studies, the identification in relation to Greek Cypriots was based on Turkishness. In a front page story about the views of the shopkeepers on both sides of the Lokmacı barricade, Yenidüzen categorised them according to their nationality as ‘Turkish’ shopkeepers and ‘Greek Cypriot’ (Rum) shopkeepers (Yenidüzen, 5 January, p.1). In another news feature that also reflected the reactions of people to the issue, Yenidüzen generalised their views with ‘the Turkish side has taken another positive step’ (Yenidüzen, 10 January, p.10). Unlike the previous cases, there was not much emphasis on Cypriotism as an imagined national identity in the paper. Even when positioned opposite the Turkish army, the concept of Cypriot, as an expression of distinction, did not emerge. In this way, Cypriot identity was downplayed and a discourse of bipolarisation was adopted instead, especially in relation to the Greek Cypriots.

The bipolarising discourse of Turk and Greek Cypriot was adopted also in Kibris. In a front page story, Kibris noted that the ‘Turkish side’ applauded the removal of the bridge (Kibris, 10 January, p.1). The word ‘Turkish’ was sometimes employed as the shortened version of ‘Turkish Cypriot’. One such example was a statement issued by the TRNC President’s Office in which the term ‘Turkish Cypriot’ was used, yet in the headline it was changed to ‘Turkish’ (Kibris, 5 January, p.8). The exclusion of the word ‘Cypriot’ was clearly to shorten the headline but this also showed that it was acceptable for the newspaper to interchangeably refer to Turkish Cypriots as ‘Turkish/Turk’. It also
indicated that the demarcation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks as two separate nations was not viewed as starkly, particularly when in conflict with Greek Cypriots. In Halkın Sesi, the term ‘Turkish Cypriots’ rather than ‘Turks’ was usually used, which could be explained with its reliance on the official sources, whose statements the newspaper reported with few changes.

The Turkish military's General of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, justified and legitimised the Turkish army's actions in the country by referring to the TRNC Constitution. Pointing at Article 10\(^6\), which gave authority to the Turkish Armed Forces on national security issues, the General emphasized the legal basis of its power in a press statement. Both, Yenidüzen and Kibris reported on the announcement on their front pages. Kibris drew attention to the authority issue and pointed at the power the TRNC Constitution gave to the Turkish army over its national borders, which included the area where the Lokmacı Bridge stood. In its headline ‘the authority is ours’ (Kibris, 7 January, p.4), the word ‘ours’ referred to the Turkish Armed Forces and illustrated the point that they had the power to make decisions regarding the Lokmacı Bridge rather than the Turkish Cypriot leadership, although this part was not clearly stated. Highlighting the section that contradicted Talat's aforementioned press pronouncement in a separate text box, the newspaper quoted the general as stating 'it reflected or was made to reflect incorrectly in the press' (Kibris, 7 January, p.4). While the first part of the statement put the responsibility on the media, the second part was an expression that shifted the blame onto the TRNC President. Even though Kibris was one of the newspapers that had used the discussed statement of Talat, it did not comment or challenge the general's criticism of the media for wrongly reflecting the issue. Instead, it simply reported the press release without including any other information or making changes which, it could be argued, helped reflect the official discourse of the military. On the other hand, having quoted

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\(^6\) Transitional Article 10: The provisions of Article 117 of this Constitution shall not come into force as long as the defence and internal security of the Turkish people of Cyprus and the international situation so necessitate. All forces used in, providing the external and internal security on the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, shall continue to be so used, and the procedure and provisions being implemented regarding such forces and the bases of cooperation accepted and to be accepted in respect of these matters shall continue to be implemented.
most of the statement, the newspaper tried to distance itself from the views expressed in it.

The news article in *Yenidüzen* also highlighted Article 10 of the TRNC constitution, which gave the authority to the Turkish Armed Forces. Suggesting that the article was in conflict with the notion of democracy, *Yenidüzen* challenged the army's presence in the country:

> The transitional article 10 of the TRNC Constitution, which came on the agenda numerous times during the struggle for democracy in the north of Cyprus, but could not be abolished due to 'the existing security conditions' of the island once more appeared on the agenda due to the bridge at Lokmaci. (All the same it has been learned that the bridge will be demolished starting tomorrow) (*Yenidüzen*, 7 January, p.6).

Article 10 in the constitution creates an ambivalent situation in terms of sovereignty of the nation. The right and the authority it gives to Turkey's Armed Forces to guard the national borders also imposes restrictions on the civil governing power over security issues. Yet none of the newspapers raised strong criticisms of this article in the constitution, even when it emerged that it caused a conflict between the civil power and military authorities. Perhaps having accepted and internalised Turkey's domination in the north (and the north's dependence on Turkey) as normal, or perhaps reluctant to challenge this powerful institution of Turkey, the newspapers did not treat the involvement of the Turkish military general staff in their internal affairs as extraordinary.

Stating that the authority belonged to the Turkish Armed Forces 'until the conditions have changed (or were appropriate)', *Yenidüzen* voiced an expectation of a change, in terms of a peaceful settlement in Cyprus, and the phrase pointed at a time in the future when there would be no need for the presence of the Turkish army. It was a strategy of transformation that stressed a positive difference in the political situation of the nation state now and in the future. At the same time, it also naturalised and justified the power and the presence of the Turkish army in the country until that change took place. The newspaper reported that the General Staff's statement was construed as a reminder of the...
legal basis of its presence in Cyprus (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.6), but it did not reveal by whom. Thus, to inform its readers about the content of Article 10, rather than rely on their knowledge of it, Yenidüzen published the details of the article in a separate textbox as background information. It can be argued that in this context it was an attempt to make its readers aware of this undemocratic article in the constitution that had given authority to the Turkish military over their elected representatives. The details of Article 10 also appeared in Halkin Sesi but were integrated into the news text rather than appearing separately. The story linked President Talat's debated press announcement as the reason for the press release issued by the General Staff (Halkin Sesi, 7 January, p.2). In this context, the integration of the details of the constitutional article seemed to support the legitimacy claims of the Turkish army.

The national official discourse defining the Republic of Cyprus as the 'Greek Cypriot Administration' was again embedded into the news discourses of the newspapers. As part of this discourse, Mehmet Ali Talat was described as the 'TRNC President', while the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, was referred to as the 'Greek Cypriot leader', the 'Greek Cypriot community leader' or the 'leader of the Greek Cypriot administration'. None of the newspapers described him as the President of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, reporting a declaration by Tassos Papadopoulos, Yenidüzen referred to him as the 'Greek Cypriot leader' while in the same text described Mehmet Ali Talat as 'the President' (Yenidüzen, 13 January, p.9). In a similar way, Kibris described him as the 'Greek Cypriot community leader' (Kibris, 12 January, p.10) and Halkin Sesi 'the Greek Cypriot leader' (Halkin Sesi, 10 January, p.2) while both called Talat 'the President'. Accentuating the presidency of Mehmet Ali Talat in relation to the Greek Cypriot president not only reinforced the political legitimacy of the TRNC in relation to the 'other' state but also strengthened the role of the nationalistic official ideology in discrediting the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus. Not surprisingly, the territory of the Republic of Cyprus was depicted as the 'Greek Cypriot side' while the north was identified as the 'TRNC'. A news item from TAK concerning a demonstration organised in Lefkosia (the south side of Nicosia) reported that some politicians from the 'Greek Cypriot side' and some trade unions,
organisations and groups from the 'TRNC' supported the event (TAK, 13 January, 2007). The text appeared in the three newspapers but in *Yenidüzen* the term 'TRNC' was replaced with 'North Cyprus', probably in an attempt to equally represent both sides.

In the coverage of the developments regarding the Lokmacı Bridge, the concept of citizenship was employed frequently. For example, *Kibris* chose to call the people watching the destruction of the bridge as 'citizens' (*Kibris*, 10 January, p.4), while *Yenidüzen* described the ones whose views it reflected as 'citizens' (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.10). In *Halkın Sesi*, the word citizen did not appear in the articles originated by the newspaper itself but in the texts copied from other sources and also in the captions of two photos, again to refer to people in general. But the way the word citizen was used created confusion about its meaning. As well as the general public or ordinary people, anyone who was not categorised by occupation or other social grouping was referred to as a citizen. For example, *Yenidüzen* described a group of people who had gathered to watch the destruction of the bridge as 'a crowded group that consisted of mostly citizens, Arasta people/residents, shopkeepers and journalists' (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.11). The newspaper grouped the 'Arasta people, the shopkeepers and journalists' in a separate group from the 'citizen' category as if being a journalist or a shopkeeper was different than being a citizen or that one cannot be both. In other words, the term 'citizen' was used as a general term to describe ordinary people who could not be identified as belonging to a group based on occupational or other social category. A similar classification existed in another feature in the same newspaper. Reflecting the views of some shopkeepers and other individuals on the removal of the Lokmacı Bridge, *Yenidüzen* again categorised its interviewees as 'shopkeepers at Arasta' and 'citizens' (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.10).

The other two newspapers also employed the term citizen as a means of categorisation. *Kibris*, illustrating the scene at the Lokmacı barricade after the removal of the bridge, wrote, 'some citizens and the press who wanted to see the barricade without the bridge...' (*Kibris*, 11 January, p.4). Also a person who protested against the demolition of the bridge as it was being taken apart was referred to as a citizen. This person,
Makbule Ötüken, who was a well-known personality in the country because of her column in a nationalist newspaper and from other political actions, was referred as a citizen rather than any of her other identities (*Kibris*, 10 January, p.7). With a strategy of minimisation, the importance and the impact of her actions was mitigated because they contradicted the newspaper's position. Benefiting from the ideology of consensus in the representation of these events, the newspaper singled her out as the only person creating conflict. *Halkin Sesi* also separated the citizen from some political and civil organisations by saying that, 'Many political and civil organisations and citizens attended the demonstration' (*Halkin Sesi*, 6 January, p.3). All these examples suggest that although in these contexts the word citizenship did not emphasize membership of a nation state, it still indicated a form of belonging to the national community. The identification of belonging to the national community on the basis of citizenship depicts the national community based on the democratic participation of people and the exercise of citizens' rights rather than cultural qualities (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). Thus, it can be argued that such depiction indicated the conceptualisation and the reconstruction of the nation as *Staatsnation* within the news discourses.

The image of society as a nation state (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002) was discernable in the news texts. The representation of the views of citizens, non-governmental organisations or Members of Parliament contributed to the reproduction of the image of society, which also mirrored the image of nation. In a way, by printing the press releases and public announcements of different individuals and groups, three newspapers attempted to reflect the spectrum of opinion within the Turkish Cypriot nation, which also supported their claim to be a democratic platform of free expression. *Yenidüzen* in particular, through the reactions of the political party leaders, trade unions, civil organisations and business people claimed to ascertain the views and emotions of different segments of the society about the Lokmacı Bridge (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.1). By presenting the views of different sections of the society, *Yenidüzen* reconstructed the Turkish Cypriot nation in relation to the Lokmacı issue and the debates surrounding it and reconstituted its readers as the members of the society as well as the nation. The other two newspapers, *Kibris* and *Halkin Sesi*, also published similar public
announcements and statements but they limited their reports to the ones that reached the newsroom rather than presenting any other views. When it came to reflecting the public’s view, *Kibris* chose to give Greek Cypriot opinions on the issue rather than Turkish Cypriot. It published two features about the views of shopkeepers on the south side of the barricade but none from the north (*Kibris*, 5 January, p.4 & 12 January p.2-3). In *Halkin Sesi*, neither community’s views about the issue were reported.

Pointing at the role the media play in daily flagging the nation, Billig (1995) notes that unless otherwise stated, the context of the news texts is understood to be the nation and readers assume that the story they are reading concerns their nation or that it happened within its boundaries. For example, unless specified otherwise, ‘the Prime Minister’ means the prime minister of the country. However, this was not the case in the news articles in both *Halkin Sesi* and *Yenidüzen* regarding Talat’s meeting in Ankara. Even though the readers of the news texts were in North Cyprus, both newspapers, having used the same news article, called Turkey’s Foreign Minister ‘the Foreign Minister’, the Turkish Foreign Ministry ‘the Foreign Ministry’ and the Turkish General Staff ‘the General Staff’ (*Halkin Sesi*, 6 January, p.5; *Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.9) as if they also represented the TRNC. Such use of the definite article ‘the’ for the Turkish authorities was common in *Yenidüzen*, especially in texts produced by a reporter in Turkey. One such example was written by a journalist in Ankara in which s/he stated Talat’s status as the ‘TRNC President’, but described Turkey’s Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and General Staff with the definite article ‘the’, without stating that they were Turkish: the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the General Staff (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.8). The same article also cited Ankara as ‘the capital’ as if the readers were in Turkey. Another news article from Ankara also referred to Talat as the ‘TRNC President’ while Turkey’s Prime Minister was called ‘the Prime Minister’ (*Yenidüzen*, 11 January, p.8). All of this could be explained as a mistake on the part of the reporter in Turkey or because the news text was prepared for the Turkish media. Yet, it still does not explain the reason for the newspaper publishing it without making necessary changes or editing it for its readers. A similar practice was also visible in another text in the newspaper. In an article that summarised the developments in the Lokmacı issue, *Yenidüzen* reported
that ‘Talat, first met with the General Staff who had objected to the decision of the
demolition of the bridge and then with the Foreign Minister Gül’ (Yenidüzen, 8 January,
p.8) meaning Turkey’s Foreign Minister and General Staff. The treatment of Turkey’s
ministers and authorities in the news discourses as ‘the’ revealed their comprehension as
normal and common sense. It also strengthened the notion of dominance and governance
of the Turkish Cypriot state by the Turkish one. Contrary to the other two newspapers,
Kıbrıs was careful to use the proper titles for everyone, such as the ‘Turkish Prime
Minister’ and the ‘Turkish Foreign Minister’ and so on, even though it also benefited
from the same news text as Halkın Sesi and Yenidüzen (Kıbrıs, 6 January, p.4). On the
other hand, the members of the Greek Cypriot government were referred as ‘the Greek
Cypriot government spokesperson’ or ‘the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister’.

Nations are sometimes personified by their leaders, governments or the capitals of their
state. In many news discourses, Mehmet Ali Talat’s name and image stood for the
Turkish Cypriot nation. For example, his decision to remove the bridge was generalised
as the decision of the Turkish Cypriot nation: ‘President Mehmet Ali Talat announced
his decision to dismantle the bridge at Lokmacı barricade as a good will gesture of the
Turkish side …’ (Kıbrıs, 9 January, p.4). Although the three newspapers studied did not
employ the personification strategy for Talat as much, it still appeared in them when
they included reports from other nations’ media. Especially in Yenidüzen, which
included more news texts from other media compared to the other two, the
personification of the nation through the President appeared frequently: ‘Radikal
newspaper: Talat has overcome Lokmacı’ (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.7), ‘Financial Times:
Talat’s position strengthened’ (Yenidüzen, 13 January, p.8) meaning the Turkish
Cypriots’, ‘the Greek Press: Talat – Ankara conflict because of the bridge’ (Yenidüzen, 7
January, p.9). In all these cases, although Talat was portrayed as a single actor, he
actually symbolised the civil authority in the TRNC. In a similar way, the President of
the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, stood for the Greek Cypriot nation: ‘even
if the bridge is removed, Papadopoulos will not pull the wall down’ (Yenidüzen, 9
January, p.9), ‘Talat reacted to Tassos Papadopoulos, the leader of the Greek Cypriot
Administration who put the clearance of the symbols as a precondition for opening the
crossing gate' (*Kibris*, 10 January, p.10) or 'Papadopoulos wants to prevent the opening of Lokmacı by new provocations' (*Halkin Sesi*, 13 January, p.3). Again, in these expressions, although Papadopoulos was presented as a single agent, his name replaced the policies and actions of the Greek Cypriot government, which was an indirect metonym that stood for the Greek Cypriot nation.

The governments or capitals of the states were also employed in place of the nation. Ankara, the capital of Turkey, where its parliament and government are based, was employed as a metonym replacing the Turkish government. Headlining an article as ‘Approval also from Ankara: The bridge should be removed’ (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.8), *Yenidüzen* illustrated Turkey as a state respecting and approving the decision of another and equal state. In the same text, *Yenidüzen* used ‘Ankara’ to refer to the Turkish government several times:

- After the tension on Ankara- Lefkoşa line following the TRNC President Talat’s decision to remove the Lokmacı overpass, yesterday there was Cyprus (diplomacy) traffic in the capital.
- Ankara that does not want any tension in the TRNC....
- Ankara that does not want to leave Talat in a politically difficult situation and cause turmoil in the TRNC.... (*Yenidüzen* 6 January, p.8)

Lefkoşa, the capital of the TRNC, was employed only once as a metonym for its government and this was in the text quoted above.

The discourses about the Lokmacı Bridge had an interdiscursive relationship with the discourse on national security that was integrated into the news. The press statements of the Turkish General Staff and also the Turkish Cypriot opposition, especially UBP, employed the discourses of national security in relation to the Lokmacı Bridge. For example, the opposition argued that President Talat’s decision had overlooked security issues (*Kibris*, 5 January, p.7; *Halkin Sesi*, 5 January, p.3). The statement of the military, pointing to the TRNC Constitution, argued that the institution had given the authority for national security to the Turkish Armed Forces, which included the area
where the Lokmaci Bridge stood (*Kibris*, 7 January, p.4; *Yenidüzen*, 7 January, p.6; *Halkın Sesi*, 7 January, p.2).

**National Interest and the Categorisation of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’**

The developments regarding the Lokmaci Bridge situation were presented as conflict. For example, the disagreement between TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Turkish General, Büyükanıt over the fate of the footbridge was named as the ‘Lokmacı crisis’ (*Kibris*, 5 January, p.1). President Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, were also portrayed as being in conflict about the opening of the Lokmacı crossing. On a public level, the shopkeeper’s demonstration was depicted as a conflict between the group that claimed to be the ‘real’ representatives of the shopkeepers and the one which organised the rally. The construction of the developments as conflicts enhanced the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Therefore, binary categorisation with the positive self-presentation and negative portrayal of the ‘other’ was common in the news discourses.

The deictic expression of ‘we’ as an expression of self-presentation of nation rarely occurred in the news articles. It appeared in *Yenidüzen* only once in the expression, ‘our country’s agenda’, referring to the nation (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.10). Otherwise, the ‘we’ group was implicitly embedded in the selection and construction of the news texts. In many contexts, it constituted the Turkish Cypriot nation and in some cases referred to the group expressing an opinion. At times, who it referred to was unclear. As an example, *Halkın Sesi* quoted Talat in its headline as saying ‘We have no problem with the General Staff’ (*Halkın Sesi*, 6 January, p.1) without indicating whether ‘we’ stood for the President’s Office or the Turkish Cypriot nation. The same ambiguity existed in *Yenidüzen’s* headline, a quote from an interview with President Talat, ‘We have been wounded’ (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.1). Again, it was vague whether these were the words of the newspaper or the person interviewed, Mehmet Ali Talat, or if the word ‘we’ referred to the President or the Turkish Cypriot nation.
The representation of the 'other' group varied depending on the newspaper and the context of its construction. It appeared frequently and the identity of the group it referred to was clearer. For example, 'they' meaning the Greek Cypriot government *Kibris* wrote, 'they are looking for excuses not to knock the wall down' (*Kibris*, 4 January, p.6). Putting the leaders of Turkish Cypriot opposition parties in the position of 'they', *Yenidüzen*, a newspaper that backed the government, claimed that 'they bumped (or hit) against the wall' (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.1).

The concept of national interest plays a role in the construction of 'us' and 'them' groups. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) note that the inclusion of the 'we' group and the 'other' group is based on the concept of national interest. Far from being a fixed notion, national interest changes and also determines the treatment of the 'other'. If say, they enhance the national interest, they are to be embraced; if they threaten the national interest they are to be rejected. This means that one can view others positively as well as negatively and also that one can view some others positively while viewing different others negatively. All depends upon the way in which the national interest is construed, the way the other is construed and hence the nature of the relationship between the two of them (p.77).

Therefore, the different national interests supported by the newspapers determined who the 'us' and 'other' were in this case as well. Even though all the newspapers reported the views of various groups within the society, the ideologically close ones were given preferential treatment depending on the newspaper's conceptualisation of the national interest. For example, *Yenidüzen* and *Kibris* coverage of the issue favoured the removal of the bridge and represented it as being in the interest of the nation and depicted the groups who opposed or obstructed it as the 'other' group. In contrast, *Halkın Sesi* backed the groups that saw the move as a concession to the Greek Cypriot government's demands. In short, whether the groups defended or opposed the removal of the bridge defined the 'us' and 'them' groups for the newspapers.
In *Yenidüzen*, the image of the Turkish Cypriot nation was shown as being synonymous with the image of President Talat. Interviewing him on the Lokmaci issue, including the disputes he had with the Turkish Military authorities, *Yenidüzen* printed the interview on its front page with a headline: 'We have been wounded' (*Yenidüzen*, 10, January, p.1). Neither who 'we' referred to nor if these words belonged to the newspaper or the President were clear. Only a closer examination showed that these were not Talat's exact words but an interpretation of them by the newspaper. According to a transcript of the interview which was published by the newspaper, Talat had used the word 'wounded' on two occasions: First, 'Contrary to all these developments, we should have shown that Turkish Cypriots are the ones making decisions and carrying them out. Has this process left me in a difficult situation, wounded me? Yes, it left me in a difficult situation and wounded me' (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.6). Second, 'If you look at who is wounded by this event, according to me, everyone got wounded. First of all, the Cyprus cause got wounded' (*Yenidüzen*, 10, January, p.7). The newspaper replaced the expression 'everyone' with 'we'. *Yenidüzen*, in the highlights on the front page, also quoted Talat as saying it was the Turkish side which was wounded but these words did not appear in the main interview text. The omission or the differences in certain words could be the result of the reproduction process. Some words may be left out of the text as part of the summarising process of the reporter who was actually the Editor-in-Chief of the paper, Cenk Mutluyakalti.

Supportive of the Turkish Cypriot leader's decision, *Yenidüzen* printed more news articles favouring the idea of dismantling the footbridge. Although the views of the opposition also appeared in the paper, most of the stories in *Yenidüzen* were the opinions of different groups and organisations in the TRNC which backed its removal (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, 2007). The news reports involving the opposition groups showed more variation than the ones that supported it and carried a certain degree of sarcasm. For example, when a group of shopkeepers called Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Association demonstrated against the bridge being removed before the Greek Cypriot government
knocked down the wall on their side, *Yenidüzen* reported the event very briefly. During the protest march, which was also supported by the rightwing political parties with a nationalist stance, the group came into a conflict with another association called the 'Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailers and Artisans'. The latter accused the first one of being fake and therefore not representing the interests of the shopkeepers in the area. In its coverage of the demonstration, *Yenidüzen* was not very sympathetic to the demonstrating group and supported the idea that they were ‘fake’: ‘during the “demonstration” there were arguments between the real retailers and the group that calls itself “Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Association” which had actually come there from outside Lefkoşa’ (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.8). In the two photographs of the event, the chairman of the Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailers and Artisans, the group which opposed and interrupted the rally, was in focus rather than the demonstrators. Meanwhile, by putting the word ‘demonstration’ in quotation marks, *Yenidüzen* questioned the definition of their action as a demonstration.

*Yenidüzen*’s treatment of the opposition political parties was no different. Having announced that the conflict over the footbridge was resolved, *Yenidüzen*, on its front page, criticised two right-wing, opposition political party leaders who had opposed Talat over the overpass issue:

The opposition leaders who are not supporting Talat and who have been reinforcing the ‘civil authority- military unrest/tension’ with their statements hit a wall yesterday when the Military opposed the abolishment of the bridge at Lokmacı barricade and Talat who is in office with the support of the majority public gave signals of resignation. Ertuğruloğlu, the leader of UBP and Denktas, the leader of DP, succeeded once more in falling contrary to the will of Turkish Cypriots. (*Yenidüzen*, 6 January, p.1).

There were no further details or references to this long statement anywhere else in the newspaper. The colloquial phrase of ‘hit a wall’ not only meant that both politicians made a significant error but also, evoking the wall on the Greek Cypriot side, also portrayed them being as uncompromising as the Greek Cypriot leadership. The text appeared on the same day that the newspaper announced a consensus had been reached about the removal of the bridge. Equating the ‘support of the majority of the public’ with
the ‘will of Turkish Cypriots’ and reproducing their national interest as the same as Talat’s decision, *Yenidüzen* portrayed the two politicians as the ‘other’ who were working against the national will and the interest of the Turkish Cypriot nation. In other words, by defining the dismantling of the Lokmacı Bridge as being in the national interest, national identity was invoked in the argument against the interests these two politicians represented. The discourse also created a sense of consensus in which the interest of the public was given as the same and undivided. Benefiting from the ideology of consensus to create backing for the President, the newspaper not only implied that everyone agreed with it on the issue but also showed it as if the public’s interests were the same as the actions and policies of the state authorities. By doing this, the newspaper gave an impression of public support to the governing groups, which strengthened their authority and position in power. On the other hand, by employing the expression ‘one more time’ for the actions of the opposition, the newspaper suggested that what they had done had happened before, thereby establishing their behaviour as a trait.

*Yenidüzen’s* treatment of the opposition was not an isolated case. On its front page, *Yenidüzen* used headlines from two stories that involved statements from the leaders of two opposition parties, DP and UBP. Pointing at the DP leader, it combined his quote with its own comment: ‘Serdar Denktas still does not have any hope: is there anyone who believes that the bridge will be removed’ and for the UBP leader it said ‘Ertuğruloğlu continued to accuse Talat: the President is at fault’ (*Yenidüzen*, 7 January, p.1). The words ‘still’ and ‘continued’ belonged to the newspaper and suggested a continuation in the behaviour of the opposition leaders. These expressions attributed the characteristic of ‘pessimism’ to one, while showing the other as someone who was critical of the President. In short, employing a predicational strategy, the newspaper constructed both opposition leaders as social actors who belonged to the ‘out-group’ and indicated them as having negative traits. Furthermore, juxtaposed alongside their statements was the news that the demolition of the bridge would start the following day, as if it to say, ‘whether you believe it or not, the bridge will be removed tomorrow’. To enhance the effect of its practice, *Yenidüzen* twisted Denktas’s words by changing them. Having reported his words as being ‘is there anyone who believes that the bridge will be
removed' on its front page, the main text which appeared inside revealed that what he actually said was, 'is there anyone who believes that the wall will be pulled down when the bridge is removed' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.8). He was talking about the wall on the Greek Cypriot side of the border, not the Lokmacı Bridge. The layout of the stories inside also constituted a response to the leaders: next to the statements of both politicians there were two photos of signposts at the Lokmacı footbridge that said 'to be opened soon' in Turkish, English, Greek and German (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.8). This clearly reflected the newspaper's perspective regarding the Lokmacı debate.

The language used in the construction of the news texts which involved the opposition groups was also different from the one used for the governing groups. While anything the state officials said was constructed as the 'truth' and the verbs such as 'noted', 'stated', 'said', 'emphasised' were used to mark it, the statements of the opposition were given as 'claims', 'suggestions' or simply as expressing their opinions rather than pointing at facts. Such use of language not only discredited the statements of the opposition but also reinforced the power of the governing groups and their portrayal as the 'authority'. Authoritarian tones of the official discourses in the news texts were also employed to increase the factuality of what was being reported while it left the others as mere suggestions.

The Greek Cypriot administration was also characterised as the 'other'. In contrast to the positive image of the Turkish Cypriot administration, whose actions were presented as a contribution to the settlement process, and contributing to an improvement in relations between the two communities, the actions of the Greek Cypriot administration were depicted as obstructive. Yenidüzen depicted the Greek Cypriot government's policies as being threatening and against the national interest of Turkish Cypriots. It described the government as 'unwilling' (Yenidüzen, 6 January, p.8) to open the Lokmacı crossing and accused it of wanting 'more', 'No news of the wall but!.. the Greek Cypriot Administration wants even more' (Yenidüzen, 11 January, p.5), meaning more concessions. The paper was also critical of the Greek Cypriot government benefiting from the conflict between the TRNC President and the Turkish Army General in their
propaganda against the TRNC and its leadership: ‘Turkey’s General Staff’s attitude about the Lokmaci gate has been turned into “material” by the Greek Cypriot administration’ (Yenidüzen, 9 January, p.13). It also mocked the Greek Cypriot government spokesperson, Christodoulos Pashardis, for repeating his statement about Talat having no authority: ‘Pashardis’ record has got stuck again’ (Yenidüzen, 11 January, p.8). Yenidüzen described the demands of the Greek Cypriot government for all symbols belonging to the TRNC to be removed as a ‘new obsession in Lokmaci’ (Yenidüzen, 4 January, p.7).

**Kibris**

*Kibris*’ categorisation of the ‘us-group’ and ‘them-group’, as in Yenidüzen, was based on who supported and who opposed the removal of the bridge. The analysis revealed that *Kibris* also backed Talat’s decision and hence provided a positive representation of him. For example, following the conflict with the military, it quoted Talat with a firm expression that showed his determination: ‘the bridge will be removed’ (*Kibris*, 6 January, p.1). Along with that story, the paper also had four news articles that supported the decision to remove the overpass. On another occasion, quoting Talat in its headline concerning the wall on the Greek Cypriot side, *Kibris* again attributed a determined voice to him, ‘That wall will be pulled down’ (*Kibris*, 2 January, p.1), which portrayed the President as being resolved in his decisions. Publishing reports that some Greek Cypriots, or the members of the ‘other’ group, supported the dismantling of the bridge strengthened the perception of Talat’s pronouncement as a positive one. Reflecting the views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepers in favour of opening the Lokmacı crossing was one such example. Another was the report about a Greek Cypriot opposition party which praised the removal of the bridge as ‘a very brave step’ (*Kibris*, 10 January, p.5).

In contrast, the construction of the news article about the rally organised by a group of shopkeepers to protest against the removal of the Lokmacı footbridge aimed to discredit the group and the event. Having used a news agency dispatch as well as its own
reporter’s notes, the newspaper marked the event as not representing the interests of the shopkeepers and accused the demonstration and the demonstrators of being ‘fake’ and ‘remote controlled’ (Kibrıs, 6 January, p.7). Informing its readers that the Asmaaltı and Arasta Retailers Association demonstrated at Lokmacı, Kibrıs immediately added that the retailers in Asmaaltı and Arasta did not join the event, which implied that they did not support it. According to the paper, most of the demonstrators consisted of uniformed policemen and military personnel. The term ‘remote controlled’ was an expression used by the other association that had claimed to be the real representatives of the shopkeepers and Kibrıs employed it in its text. Yet, despite the strong tone of this accusation, the paper employed a linguistic exclusion to the people it claimed were controlling the demonstration and did not raise questions about their identity in the text.

Like Yenidüzen, Kibrıs also benefited from the idea and discourse of consensus to illustrate the Turkish Cypriot nation as united in their support of the president’s decision: ‘As the Turkish side applauds the abolishment of the bridge with a wish for the demolishing of the wall, now the discussion is as to what the Papadopoulos administration will do’ (Kibrıs, 10 January, p.1). The ‘Turkish side’ not only included the representatives of the nation but the nation itself. Further down the page, the newspaper announced that ‘everyone was there’ to watch the bridge being taken apart. ‘Everyone’ included the state and government authorities, the representatives of foreign countries, civil society organisations and citizens. The expression also implied consensus within society on the issue, as well as international support for the removal of the bridge.

Nor was the attitude towards the Greek Cypriot shopkeepers who were supportive of the Greek Cypriot government positive. Discovering that the views of the Greek Cypriot shopkeepers were the same as their government, Kibrıs cast them as being under the influence of their administration rather than as individuals with free will:

In Ledra Street where the Greek Cypriot National Council’s view is dominant, the opening of the Lokmacı gate by Turks is supported only if the conditions put forward by the Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos are met (Kibrıs, 12 January, p.3).
Halkin Sesi gave more coverage to views that opposed the removal of the bridge. A study of the accessed sources in Halkin Sesi indicated that even though there was a reflection of diverse views, wider coverage was given to the opinions of the opposition and nationalist groups that contested the decision and described it as giving in to the Greek Cypriot government. For example, the press statements by Serdar Denktas, an opposition party leader, were reported in length. Halkin Sesi even published a photograph showing him climb up the footbridge in the centre of its front page, even though there was no story that involved him on that page. The story underneath the photograph was totally unrelated to him but was about the demonstration of the shopkeepers (Halkin Sesi, 5, January, p.1).

Halkin Sesi reflected the rally organised by the Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Association differently. It did not mention the allegations of the association about the demonstration being ‘fake’ and ‘remote controlled’ or the conflict between the two groups which occurred during the rally. On the contrary, it represented the event as if the retailers in Asmaalti and Arasta had attended it in general (Halkin Sesi, 6 January, p.3). The story also appeared on its front page, with some photographs of the demonstrators carrying Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags. The demonstration was portrayed as a call to the Greek Cypriot people to pull the wall on their side down rather than a protest against the removal of the Lokmaci Bridge (Halkin Sesi, 6 January, p.1). This cast the action as a peaceful call to the ‘other’ rather than as opposition to the President.

The representation of Talat in Halkin Sesi was also dissimilar to that of Yenidüzen and Kibris. Although the news article about Talat’s meeting in Ankara was the same as Yenidüzen’s, Halkin Sesi’s transformation of the story created a different effect. Rather than highlighting that he and the General Staff had reconciled their differences regarding the Lokmaci issue and therefore the bridge would be removed, Halkin Sesi chose to draw attention to Talat’s denial of claims that a conflict existed between them: ‘we have no problem with the General Staff’ (Halkin Sesi, 6 January, p.5). Since no news report
about the conflict between the President and the General Staff had appeared earlier in the newspaper, the headline created a question mark about the relationship between these two institutions. Neither did the paper offer any explanation as to whether ‘we’ referred to the Turkish Cypriot nation or the Presidential Office.

*Halkın Sesi*’s treatment of Talat’s statement after the meeting in Ankara is also worth some scrutiny. Having published the news article that included what Talat had said regarding the outcome of the meeting, *Halkın Sesi* inserted a separate text box in the middle of the main article. Inside the box, it published two statements written in passive sentences that gave the impression that they were allegations made by other sources rather than by the newspaper. Yet, their aim was to raise doubts about Talat’s decision and whether it was approved by Turkey:

- It’s been alleged that the ‘Lokmacı Barricade’ gate that is planned to be opened to the Greek Cypriot side caused disagreement between President Mehmet Ali Talat and the army in North Cyprus.
- It’s also been said that the reason for Talat’s hasty visit to Ankara to meet the General Staff Yaşar Büyükakın and Foreign Minister Gül was to overcome this problem (*Halkın Sesi*, 6 January p.5).

Both statements, written in passive sentences, hid the responsible social actors behind the remarks. Their passive structure enhanced the impression that they were rumours which helped the paper to distance itself from them.

* Differences in the Representation of the ‘Other’

The President’s announcement about the removal of the Lokmacı footbridge encountered opposition from inter-national and intra-national groups. Yet, the treatment of these groups changed depending on the newspaper. Although both the Turkish military and the Greek Cypriot government made some demands regarding the Lokmacı footbridge, the Greek Cypriot ones were denounced strongly as interfering in the TRNC’s internal affairs while such criticism against the Turkish military was
downplayed. The differences in the attitudes towards these groups were obvious: on the one hand, the institution of Turkey, a country on which the TRNC’s existence depends and had a relationship based on dominance and dependence which was taken for granted. On the other hand was the country not only cast as the ‘enemy’ for years but, as its government consisted of nationalist forces, was regarded to be working against the national interests of Turkish Cypriots in particular by not opening the Lokmacı gate. Thus, while none of the newspapers raised questions about the dispute between the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Turkish military authorities, they all reproduced the statements of TRNC state representatives reacting angrily to the preconditions put forward by the Greek Cypriot government. For example, Yenidüzen, adopting a colloquial style, criticised the Greek Cypriot government: ‘there is no news of the wall (no development regarding the wall- SS) but!.. The Greek Cypriot administration wants “even more”’ (Yenidüzen, 11 January, p.5). The translation does not reflect the real denotation and sarcasm in the expression but it expresses that the Greek Cypriot government’s demands were unreasonable.

The dispute between powerful institutions such as the Presidency and the Turkish army was also reflected differently than that between the opposition and government. Kibris showed the Turkish military to be the cause of the obstruction of the bridge demolition process: ‘the military authorities are obstructing the removal of the bridge in Lokmacı’ (5 January, p.1). Describing the whole issue as a ‘bridge crisis’ on its front page (Kibris, 5 January, p.1), Kibris pointed the finger at the Turkish military for objecting to the removal of the footbridge: ‘the army is against it’ (Kibris, 5 January, p.1). Yet, by employing the general term ‘army’ as a generalising synecdoche to refer to the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, the newspaper avoided targeting anyone specifically. Nor did it specify the military authorities as Turkish, as it treated the information that the TRNC’s national territory and borders were guarded by the Turkish Armed Forces as common sense. Yet, it approached the press statement issued by the General Secretary’s Office more cautiously. It published the statement which identified the control and authority of the Lokmacı area as belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces with the same official discourse used in the statement. The only difference between the news article
and the press release was the personification of the Armed Forces in the headline, in comparison to the impersonalised style of the official discourse: ‘We have the authority’ (Kibris, 7 January, p.4). Through a strategy of personification, the Turkish Armed Forces were put in a subject position. Used to give a human form to such an entity, this strategy helps people to identify with it but also against it (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). As the ‘we’ in this expression was inclusive of the Armed Forces and exclusive of the civil authority the newspaper sympathised with, the expression was not meant to encourage its readers’ identification with the armed forces. On the contrary, it created a feeling of exclusion.

Yenidüzen’s construction of the military as the ‘other’ was different from its treatment of the political opposition in the country. It seemed cautious in its coverage of the General Staff’s role in the dispute and avoided the criticism it applied to the intra-national opposition. Nevertheless, in its reproduction of the statement released by the Turkish General Staff, the newspaper linked democracy discussions within the country to the TRNC Constitution that gave a legal basis to the Turkish Armed Forces’ authority in North Cyprus. By invoking the debates regarding the undemocratic nature of the article, Yenidüzen implied that despite the constitution, the presence of the Turkish army in the TRNC was not very democratic and was not welcomed by democrats in the country (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.6), which suggested indirect criticism of the presence of the army in the TRNC.

Nonetheless, both newspapers were cautious overall and avoided writing anything challenging about the Turkish army. This could also be the underlying reason why both newspapers adopted an impersonal voice to report the protests of some civil organisations against the Turkish general’s behaviour, which was perceived as undermining Talat’s authority and indirectly dishonouring the free will of Turkish Cypriots. Copying the news agency dispatch with very little editing (Yenidüzen shortened it) both newspapers distanced themselves from the event. Yenidüzen chose not to include the story on its front-page, as Kibris and Halkın Sesi had. Kibris’ headline was ‘Protest against violation of free will’, without specifying whose will it was. It put the
words 'violation of free will' in quotation marks, supposedly to highlight them, but did not add that it referred to the will of Turkish Cypriots (Kibris, 9 January, p.1).

Yenidüzen's headline was only a quotation from the declaration that was read during the rally: 'we protest against the violation of the free will of the people' (Yenidüzen, 9 January, p.8). The paper was careful to attribute these words to the organisers. In contrast, Halkin Sesi's headline stressed the name of only one organisation in the demonstration, even though it was a joint effort by three organisations, with some shopkeepers in the area joining in as well: 'Demonstration by This Country is Ours Platform to support Talat' (Halkin Sesi, 9 January, p.3).

Compared to the other two newspapers, Halkin Sesi reflected in more detail the Turkish army's perspective on the Lokmacı dispute. As well as publishing a press release from the military office, the newspaper also speculated that the General himself would publicly announce his disapproval of the demolition of the bridge a day before such a statement was issued (Halkin Sesi, 7 January, p.1). There were no further details as to the newspaper's prediction in the inner pages but the next day it published a news article that had appeared in Milliyet, a mainstream Turkish daily newspaper, that included an account of the General Staff Büyükant's views that proved the paper right. It was only Halkin Sesi that printed the article in detail. While the story did not appear in Kibris at all, Yenidüzen summarised and integrated it into another article about recent developments on the issue (Yenidüzen, 8 January, p.8).

The announcement that a group called 'Citizens for the Opening of Ledra', which was set up by Greek Cypriots campaigning for the opening of Lokmacı, got front page coverage in the newspapers. It was a case of the 'other' expressing support for an issue that was seen as being in the national interest of Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it got positive coverage from the newspapers as it reinforced the official discourse that the opening of Lokmacı was for the mutual benefit of both communities. Having labelled the wall on the south side as a 'wall of shame', Yenidüzen stated that the demonstration was organised by a group called 'Citizens for the Opening of Ledra', comprised of Greek Cypriots campaigning for the opening of the Lokmacı crossing gate (Yenidüzen,
12 January, p.1). It framed the group as being supportive of the Turkish Cypriots' demand for the opening of the crossing. Similarly, *Halkin Sesi* also reported that 'the Greek Cypriots who wanted Lokmaci to be opened' were going to demonstrate for it. *Kibris* announced that 'Citizens for the Opening of Ledra' was going to demonstrate in front of the Lokmaci barricade on its front page, without defining them as Greek Cypriots (*Kibris*, 12 January, p.1). It explained in its inner pages that it was a Greek Cypriot group who supported the opening of Ledra Street.

While the removal of the bridge at Lokmaci was shown as a sign of the Turkish Cypriots' resolution for peace and readiness to take steps towards it, the existence of the wall in the south side was used to portray the Greek Cypriot administration as the opposite. All the newspapers employed the derogatory names produced for the wall in the official discourses such as the 'wall of shame' used by the TRNC Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer on many occasions (*Kibris*, 6 January, p.8, *Halkin Sesi*, 6 January, p.4; *Yenidüzen*, 11 January, p.4). *Yenidüzen* used the phrase in relation to the demonstration by 'Citizens for the Opening of Ledra': 'Demonstration against the wall of shame' (*Yenidüzen*, 12 January, p.1) as well as defining it as 'Papadopoulos' wall of shame' (*Yenidüzen*, 14 January, p.1). A likeness between the wall in Nicosia and Berlin was also produced within the official discourses and was again adopted in the news discourses. All the newspapers reported the Prime Minister's speech in which he had described it as 'a wall of shame like the Berlin Wall' (*Kibris*, 12 January, p.5, *Halkin Sesi*, 12 January, p.2; *Yenidüzen*, 12 January, p.8). The comparison with the Berlin Wall appeared in *Yenidüzen* once more, when some German tourists talked about the similarity between the walls (*Yenidüzen*, 9 January, p.9).

*The Linguistic Construction of a Common Past: the Time before the Lokmaci Barricade*

The reference to a common past rarely occurred in the data analysed as the newspapers did not often reconstruct the past in their news articles. One such reflection was in the
reproduction of the speech that the TRNC Prime Minister Soyer made. Pointing out that Lokmacı was the first place where the division between both communities had occurred, Soyer described the barricade as the first one set up by Turkish Cypriots to protect themselves and to resist the *enosis* movement. Referring in his speech to the conflict years of the past, Soyer depicted the wall on the south side of Ledra Street as a symbol of the Enosis movement and claimed that it had no place in today's Cyprus (*Kibris*, 12 January, p.5, *Halkın Sesi*, 12 January, p.2; *Yenidüzen*, 12 January, p.8). Illustrating the past as conflict and the present as peaceful reinforced the image of the Turkish Cypriot administration being the pro-solution side in contrast to the Greek Cypriot side.

In the newspaper texts, the common past occurred only twice. The first was when *Yenidüzen* integrated the history of the Lokmacı barricade into the definition of the bridge: ‘it is still unknown what will happen to the footbridge on Ledra Street that used to function as a single street before Cyprus was divided into two zones in 1963’ (*Yenidüzen*, 8 January, p.8). Further down the text, it reminded readers that strife between the two communities was the reason for the Lokmacı barricade being established: ‘the first barricade that was set up between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot streets in 1963 when the inter-communal conflict started in Cyprus …’ (*Yenidüzen*, 8 January, p.8).

The second remark about the past appeared in *Kibris* when its editorial team visited Ledra Street to get the views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepers. The article reported that Greek Cypriots ‘expressed their wish to live as in the past when there were no borders and checkpoints in Cyprus’ (*Kibris*, 12 January, p.3).

Recent history, based on the actions of the ‘other’, was also embedded in the news discourses. The newspapers used the majority Greek Cypriot ‘no’ vote in the referendum on the Annan Plan as a metaphor for their political attitude. Pointing to the Greek Cypriot political parties that campaigned for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum, *Kibris* wrote, ‘starting with the Greek Cypriot community leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, all the ‘pro-no’ political parties …’ (*Kibris*, 12 January, p.10). *Yenidüzen* also alluded to the
referendum by saying that 'this time the sound of "oxi (no) to the barricades" came from
the South' (Yenidüzen, 14 January, p.1). By employing the Greek word ‘oxi’ in its text,
which frequently had appeared in the Turkish Cypriot media to reflect the opinion of the
majority of Greek Cypriots on the Annan Plan, Yenidüzen referred to common
knowledge of the recent past.

Future: Will the Wall be demolished?

In the coverage of the Lokmacı issue, there were three main issues that reflected
concerns about the present and the future. These were the national security conditions,
the image of the Turkish Cypriot nation state as a sovereign one and the future of the
wall.

Reporting on the dispute between the TRNC President and the Turkish military
authorities over the footbridge, Yenidüzen highlighted the fact that the national security
of the country was under the authority of the Turkish Armed Forces ‘until the conditions
are appropriate’ (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p.6). As well as justifying the military’s presence
at present, the phrase also voiced an expectation of a change in the future when there
would no longer be a need for the Turkish army to remain on the island.

The opposition of the Turkish military authorities to Talat’s decision to dismantle the
overpass was portrayed as damaging to the image of Turkish Cypriot sovereign
statehood. Such a depiction was discernible in both Yenidüzen and Kibris but was
particularly strong in Yenidüzen’s interview with Talat, in which he expressed the
opinion that the nation’s image had been injured. It also exposed the limitations of the
authority of civil state representatives in matters of national security.

The future of the wall in South Nicosia was also transformed into a national expectation.
Its destruction was given as the only obstruction to the opening of the Lokmacı crossing.
Especially after the removal of the footbridge, all the newspapers turned their attention
to the fate of the wall which acted as a barrier between the two sides. Benefiting from
the public declarations of politicians and government representatives, the demolition of
the wall was illustrated as a step that would bring both communities closer together.

Conclusion

The case study revealed that after the referendum on the Annan Plan, the dominant
national self-perception was similar to the one shaped officially, which was mainly as
Turkish Cypriot and Turk. Unlike the previous two cases, there was no emphasis on
Cypriot identity but more on a Turkish Cypriot one. Turkey and the TRNC continued to
be categorised as the Turkish side in relation to the Republic of Cyprus. In other words,
in a conflict with Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot newspapers had adopted the Turkish
identity and therefore the term, the Turkish side was employed frequently to emphasise
their distinction from them. The practice was not only noticeable in Halkın Şesi which
continued with its nationalist discourse but also in Yenidüzen and Kibris. Yenidüzen's
adoption of Turkish discourse in relation to Greek Cypriots was interesting as over the
years it had been promoting a Cypriot identity which highlighted the common
characteristics of the two communities. The identity of Turkish Cypriots became a topic
of debate, not only in relation to Greek Cypriots but also to Turks as well. The national
identity that was defined as Turkish when constructed in opposition to Greek Cypriots,
was switched to Turkish Cypriot when renegotiated in relation to the Turkish army. In
other words, despite the discourse of unity with Turks, Turkish Cypriot identity still
stressed a divergence. As a result, an articulation of Turkish Cypriot identity, which
emphasised a distinction between the Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots, was
discernible in the newspaper discourses. All this confirms that the conceptualisation of
national identity was context bound.

The underlying reason behind downplaying the identity of Cypriot could be explained
by two factors: First, the Greek Cypriots' rejection of the Annan Plan in the referendum
in 2004, in contrast to Turkish Cypriots' vote in favour of the plan, had caused much
disappointment, especially among the groups who supported the concept of a Cypriot national identity. From the Turkish Cypriot’s point of view, with their ‘no-vote’ in the referendum, Greek Cypriots not only rejected a settlement plan that would allow both communities peaceful existence on the island but also crushed the notion of Cypriotness as a collective identity that included both communities.

Second, with the election of a new government and President, the political dynamics of the country had changed. Despite being from CTP, a political party on the left that had been a promoter of Cypriot identity, the government and the President integrated their political party discourse into the state one, which resembled that of the previous nationalist government. Yenidüzen’s affiliation and Kibris’ sympathy towards the new government were reflected in their news discourses and both newspapers embedded its official discourse into their news texts. As the formal discourse stressed Turkish Cypriotness and also spoke of the Turkish side in relation to Greek Cypriots, both of these terms appeared more frequently in the newspapers when compared to Cypriotness.

In summary, the overall analysis showed that the discursive construction of national identity was based on the concepts of Turkish Cypriot and Turkishness in all three newspapers. Having adopted the official discourse, none of the newspapers showed much variation in their national self-perception and the expression of it. Therefore, despite the differentiation along political lines, the construction of the nation did not show any deviation but, on the contrary, complied with the official one. Unlike the previous cases, there was no attacking of one nationalism in order to defend another (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Each newspaper also benefited from the ideology of consensus to show their perspective of events was agreed upon by the general public. Using the language of consensus, the newspapers depicted the public as supportive of the national interest they promoted. Articulation of consensus, as if agreement had been reached, led to the perception that any differing view was a deviation from common sense.
Like the previous cases, there was positive self-presentation and negative ‘other’ presentation in the newspapers. Yet, the context of the categorisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ varied depending upon the newspaper and the context. For example, adopting the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s discourse, the newspapers represented the removal of the bridge as a step towards increasing cooperation between the two communities in contrast to the Greek Cypriot government’s obstruction of it. The Greek Cypriot government was pictured as the ‘other’ in all three newspapers.

When it came to internal politics, the categorisation of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ showed variation. Differentiation along political lines, in terms of national views and ideologies, played a role in the construction of the ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ of the newspapers. *Yenidüzen* and *Kibris* categorised the groups that supported the President in the ‘Lokmacı crisis’ as ‘us’ and presented them in a positive way while the opposition groups that disagreed with the decision were treated as the ‘other’. In *Halkın Sesi*, the situation was the other way round. Opposing views to the policies and actions of the President got extensive coverage throughout the period studied. These belonged to actors such as the main opposition parties and civil organisations with nationalist ideologies. Nonetheless, in the overall representation, two distinct discourses emerged: One was the discourse of the government and the President that the footbridge would be beneficial in facilitating relations between the two communities. The other was the discourse of the opposition groups and Turkish army officials which employed the discourse of national security.

The dispute between two powerful institutions, the Turkish army authorities and the TRNC President was another issue that created a dichotomy of ‘us’ and the ‘other’. Yet, neither got any strong criticism or negative representation. For example, none of the newspapers questioned why President Talat lied to the public about his meeting in Ankara, meaning that none of them perceived this as a problem. Only *Yenidüzen* quoted him in an interview, giving as an explanation for his behaviour that it was because he did not want to give the impression that conflicting opinions existed within the Turkish side (*Yenidüzen*, 10 January, p.6). However, when the issue was being debated, none of them,
including Yenidüzen, challenged or questioned the President on his stance at the time. At the same time, even though the disagreement with the Turkish army over Lokmacı damaged the image of Turkish Cypriot statehood and attracted the criticism of those who protested its national autonomy, the military was not so strongly portrayed as the 'other'. Seemingly, the newspapers were reluctant to criticise it. Therefore, strategies of avoidance and suppression of differences were employed and the consensus rather than conflict between these social actors was highlighted in the news articles. The criticism of the army was detectable only in Yenidüzen and Kibris, while in Halkin Sesi, which had argued in favour of Turkey's presence in North Cyprus for the security of Turkish Cypriots, support of the army was more obvious.

There was no discursive practice based on the essentialist conception of national identity. Production of national identity based on cultural elements rarely occurred in the news texts. Instead, there was an emphasis on citizenship, which indicated the perception of the nation as Staatsnation. The debates over sovereignty also enhanced the picture of a state based on political membership of the nation. However, the meaning of citizenship was ambiguous in the newspapers as anyone outside particular social categories, such as occupational groups, were called citizens. The newspapers also frequently used the label citizens as a general term for individuals and groups to reinforce the impression that people in general were supporting the actions that the newspapers were reflecting.

Embedding the nationalist discourses and their representations in their news texts, the newspapers contributed to their being internalised or treated as a matter of common sense. The relationship with Turkey, which is based on the TRNC's dependence and Turkey's dominance, shaped the construction of some stories and helped certain ideas and practices which emerged from this relationship to be taken for granted. One such example was the power of the Turkish army in the country and the article of the constitution which had given it this authority. Yenidüzen challenged them slightly but otherwise no voice was raised against it.
Generalising practices, especially synecdoche, were also frequently employed to create sameness between the people of the same group. In particular, some views of individuals were generalised as the attitude of the group they belonged to. For example, the opinions of a few shopkeepers or businesspeople about the issue were attributed to all shopkeepers or businesspeople. Such practices of generalisation helped the newspapers to create an impression that these groups were supportive of the same political interests as the papers. In contrast, mitigation strategies were applied in the reflection of the 'other's view along with actions to reduce their effect and importance.

The representation of many issues fell short of informing readers or encouraging them to question existing power relations; on the contrary, it naturalised and strengthened them. This was partly because ideological beliefs and practices were taken for granted and partly because the newspapers depended heavily on externally prepared texts. Powerful sources such as the President, government and political parties received wide coverage and their views shaped the agenda on the Lokmacı issue. As the newspapers took large parts of the statements or news agency dispatches and copied them directly, the articles in the papers were identical to the original one, forming an intertextual relationship. In particular, the news texts in Halkın Sesi were heavily based on information that came from outside sources rather than being generated by its own reporters, which often made it difficult to isolate its discourse form and the institutional voice. Studying the newspapers' transformation of these texts, the highlights and headlines chosen for the stories were sometimes the only means to distinguish the institutional voice of the newspaper. At the same time, differences in the representation of the same incidents in the press also confirmed that rather than reflecting reality, the news is represented or constructed by social and political factors and carries ideological differences.
PART THREE
CONCLUSION

Overview of the Findings

The analysis of the data holds light to the ongoing struggle to impose a legitimate mode of thought and expression about national identity and the role of the media in this. The research aimed to scrutinize the universe of discourse on national identity within the media or, as Bourdieu explains, the universe of things that can be stated and thought and the universe of things that are taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1977). Thus, the research not only studied stated expressions and thoughts but also undiscussed or hidden ones.

The investigation confirmed that there are many commonalities in the representation and discourse of national identity. For example, the newspapers stayed within the boundaries of the universe of official discourse and did not challenge its nationalist expressions in which the 'other' was treated as a threat and thus was propagated in negative terms. On the other hand, the differences between the newspapers were based on the degree of acceptance or rejection of nationalist rhetoric, their stance vis a vis civilian-military relations and a solution to the Cyprus issue.

On Thematic Contents

Nation, National identity and Differentiation

The main objective of the study was to examine the role the news media play in the construction and articulation of national identity and to investigate the various discursive practices employed to mobilise readers around a particular national imagination. Therefore, the news texts of the three newspapers regarding three politically and culturally important incidents for the Turkish Cypriots were chosen and the data was tested based on the content, strategies used in the discursive construction of national identity and the linguistic means employed.
The key assumption of the research is that national identity is produced and renegotiated through discourse. Constructed through the discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or in other words, through the discourse of difference and similarity, various definitions of national identity are employed to rally around different national projects. Contrary to the assertions that national identity is a natural phenomenon, the study confirmed that it is a product of the dialectical relationship between discursive acts and social practices. The discursive construction of national identity shifted and transformed with changes in the social, political and economic dynamics that were influential in its making as well as shaping these dynamics. For example, the articulation of Cypriot identity that developed as an alternative to Turkish identity was celebrated, especially when the border was opened for public crossings. Yet, it lost some of its appeal when Greek Cypriots rejected a solution plan with Turkish Cypriots and refused to open a new crossing in the divided city of Nicosia.

In contrast to the nationalist discourses that stress the unique character of national identity, the research established that the constructions of national identity are diverse and context bound. According to the analysis of the data, different versions of national identity such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot co-existed throughout the period studied. Although each presented itself as the real and natural identity, even within themselves these identities did not refer to a single collective definition, but on the contrary, had different meanings within different contexts. Depending on the setting, the newspaper and also the ‘other’, different concepts of national identity were defined and renegotiated within the news texts. In general, the national identity was referred to as Turkish Cypriot, but Turkishness was highlighted in relation to Greek Cypriots and indicated categorisation of the mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots in one group. In contrast, when identity was constructed in relation to the mainland Turks, and especially to assert a divergence between them, Cypriot identity or Turkishcypriot identity, which expressed certain distinctions from the other two, was highlighted. An essentialist understanding of national identity was also present in the reflections of the newspapers. According to this understanding, the national identity was presented as the authentic version with certain mental, character and behavioural dispositions attributed to it (Wodak et. al, 1999). For example, Turkish cultural symbols were utilised as ‘ours’ to encourage self-identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Turkish nation and to emphasise Turkish
identity within the Turkish Cypriot community. In a similar way, certain traditions, mentalities and behaviours common to both sides of Cyprus were highlighted to forge a sense of Cypriot identity and to produce a perception of a Cypriot character. In either case, a commonality was implied and national identity was presented not as a social product but as a natural part of people. Meanwhile, the meaning of Turkish Cypriot identity also changed in time to be an entity of its own, following social and political developments on the island in recent years. The new meaning indicated a separate identity from Greek Cypriots and also Turkish people that carried the characteristics of both Cypriot and Turkish identity, as new research has confirmed (KADEM, 2007).

The struggle for domination among these competing definitions of identity discourses was discernible during the periods the research focused on. Various discourses on national identity that embodied certain power relations and ideological assumptions had been battling for dominance. While Turkish identity provided a certain framework for understanding world relations, Cypriot identity required a different reality. During the struggle, the official discourse of national identity was sometimes challenged by the discourse of ordinary people. Yet, in some cases both discourses were equally present in the same newspapers. In 1996, the discourse of Turkishness was dominant in the news, which revealed its impact on popular discourses and its power as a state ideology while Cypriot identity appeared as its alternative. By 2003, the discontent with international isolation, the economic situation as well as increasing resentment of Turkey's control over the country encouraged Turkish Cypriot's identification with the concept of Cypriot which had gained more acceptance within the community. Thus, when the restrictions on crossing the border (in both directions) were relaxed in 2003, Cypriot identity, along with the Turkish Cypriot one, dominated the newspapers' discourses. This time, everyday discourses rather than official ones found a place in the media. However, the rejection of the UN Peace Plan by Greek Cypriots disappointed the supporters of Cypriotism which led to a renegotiation of identity. As Ramm puts it, this caused 'a growing tendency to express identity in terms of a separate Turkish Cypriotness instead of a Cypriotness shared with their Greek Cypriot co-islanders' (Ramm, 2006, p.531). Therefore, in the representation of the disputes and events surrounding the opening of another crossing in 2007, the newspapers highlighted the concept of
Turkish Cypriotness rather than Cypriotness. The other concepts did not cease to exist but a Turkish Cypriot identity, as a separate national self-perception apart from Cypriot and Turkish identities, was to be found in the news discourses.

The ideological stance of the newspapers was another determinant in the national imaginings they represented. It should not be assumed that each newspaper wrote about only one version of nationhood, as there was no strict dichotomy between the identity discourses of the newspapers. Yet, the ideological positions and the political parties the newspapers were affiliated with provided the framework and was a factor in shaping their discourses. Even Kibris, a commercial newspaper, was not free from such political influence and its account of events reflected the political tendencies its ownership sympathised with at the time. Its attitude towards the Cyprus issue and definitions of national identity shifted over a decade in line with its support of the political power in the country from a nationalist to a more pro-solution attitude.

Like national identity, the categorisation of the 'other' also changed, including and excluding different groups at different times. In the nationalist discourses, the 'other' was described through oppositional metaphors as being different than 'us' and was cast as the enemy and a threat to the nation. The concept of enemy, as seen in the case of the demonstration in 1996, was attributed to the entire Greek Cypriot population and their intentions were described as wanting to deprive Turkish Cypriots of their state and sovereignty. Demonization of the 'other' in such a homogenous way forges and forces the unity of the members of the national community without leaving much space to dissidents (Tsagarousianou, 1999) as well as increasing the conflict between co-existing and neighbouring communities (Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000). Thus, the domination of Turkish nationalism in official policies and discourses not only promoted the official representations of the events but also silenced internal dissidents, obstructing the formation of a pluralistic public sphere. On the contrary, the discourses that challenged official ones placed the state administrators that mainly consisted of the government and the president in the position of the 'other'. They presented these groups as the adversaries of the Turkish Cypriot people.
The image of Greek Cypriots as the ‘other’ was transformed from their being the ‘evil’ ones into ordinary people like ‘us’ when the crossing restrictions were relaxed on the island and contact between both communities increased. Then, the negative representation of the ‘other’ shifted to both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot administrations on the island for having prevented both people from doing so before. The picture became one of ‘people versus nationalist state administrators’. The political power groups governing both states were depicted as the adversary of people. Even though Halkın Sesi showed the Greek Cypriot government as the ‘other’ more than the Turkish Cypriot one, the other two newspapers, Yenidüzen and Kibris put the responsibility on both governments. However, it should be noted that even though the newspapers shifted their blame to the state authorities, the views and representations of the authorities still prevailed, as they were the main news sources for the media.

The situation was similar in the third case study, but here the attitude of the newspapers’ towards the government shifted following the changes in political power. For example, when the state authorities were comprised of nationalist forces, Yenidüzen treated them as the ‘other’ but when a left-wing political party took control of the government and the presidency, then it was Halkın Sesi that regarded them as the ‘other’, unlike Yenidüzen, which was affiliated with that party. The alteration illustrated how the discursive construction of ‘other’ changed in relation to power relations and the ideological position of the newspaper.

In addition to Greek Cypriots and state representatives, immigrants from Turkey in the TRNC were also treated as the ‘other’. Their representation also changed with time and the context but their treatment as a homogenous group did not. In contrast to the dominant nationalist narratives in the newspapers of 1996, nationalist Turks who were involved in the clashes with Greek Cypriots were cast as the ‘other’ by Yenidüzen. They were portrayed as negatively as the Greek Cypriot demonstrators. In 2003, when the border was opened to crossings only for ‘Cypriots’, excluding the Turkish-origin TRNC citizens, they were then referred to as the members of the Turkish Cypriot state and were included in the imagined national community. The omission by the Greek Cypriot government of these TRNC citizens from the crossings was criticised as a challenge to the unity of the ‘national we’. Despite this,
failing to give any means of expression to these citizens showed that they were not fully included in the symbolic representation of the nation. In fact, in the reproduction of the nation by the newspapers, no ethnic minorities were included. Turkish Cypriots were the dominant group and their accounts were generalised as the nation’s.

In 2007, it was not the immigrants from Turkey but the Turkish army, representative of Turkey’s power and domination in North Cyprus, that was implicitly treated as the ‘other’ by mainly Yenidüzen and Kibris. Yet, the Turkish army, a powerful institution both in Turkey and the TRNC, was not cast particularly strongly as the ‘other’. The attempts of the state authorities to downplay the conflict between the President and the army authorities were reflected in the newspapers that used them as their news sources. Therefore, avoiding challenging the military institution, the newspapers adopted the strategy of downplaying the conflict and instead highlighted the consensus between these two powerful institutions. In a sense, they all followed the official representation and discourse in reporting developments.

The characterisation of the nation was also context bound. As well as imagining it on the basis of a national culture that indicated an essentialist understanding of national identity, the idea of the nation as Staatsnation was also often implemented. The identification of the nation in the news discourses about the border clashes in 1996 was mainly based on the concept of Kulturnation. The domination of nationalist narratives led to the perception of the nation as an entity based on cultural similarities and common ancestry. 2003 was a year when challenges to nationalist approaches found expression in the mass demonstrations that followed the introduction of the UN’s Annan Plan. Mobilised to show their discontent with the government, these public demonstrations became a manifestation of a changing self-perception. In the midst of these developments, the opening of the border and the increasing contact of people with the ‘other’ community brought a new perspective to the understanding of collective identity. The discourse of national identity was not only shaped by citizenship or political belonging to the nation but also included culture based elements. Thus, the concepts of Staatsnation and Kulturnation were amalgamated into the discursive productions of the nation. In 2007, because of the nature of the incident that was studied and also because of a change in collective
consciousness and self-perception within the Turkish Cypriot nation, *Staatsnation* was the dominant feature in the representation of the nation in the news. The case concerned an issue of the political legitimacy of the nation state and created an ambivalent situation: on the one hand, Turkey was criticised as the ‘colonial power’, on the other its ‘guarantorship’ status was stressed. The discursive practices surrounding this conflict illustrated the nation as *Staatsnation* which equipped it with political legitimacy and the support of its citizens. As these findings show that despite drawing a distinction in the construction of the nation based on different elements at different times, in the overall representation it was hard to talk about the existence of a strict dichotomy between these terms. In the three cases, these two models for the nation co-existed, revealing that Turkish Cypriots have been shifting their alliances and identity between citizen based and culture based identity.

The use of the term citizenship associated with the civic model of nation was problematic. There was a lack of non-national definition of citizenship. Expressions such as ‘Turkish-origin citizens’ implied a differentiation from Cyprus born citizens based on ethnic origin or place of birth. In other instances, the term citizenship appeared simply as a general name for individuals or ordinary people to distinguish them from the state authorities or other public figures or to assert that they belonged to neither. Therefore, categorisations such as ‘shopkeepers and citizens’ were employed in some of the news articles. Meanwhile, citizens appeared in the newspapers mostly to express their views on the issues discussed. But, instead of promoting the involvement of citizens in political decisions, only opinions in line with the newspapers’ positions on the issue were included, in order to strengthen the image of the newspapers as being the voice of the nation. The label of citizens was also used to give the impression that people in general supported the ideas and actions the newspapers favoured. As a result, the newspapers failed to represent the real interests of citizens in the issues they reflected.

In events that involved ‘national security’, intra-national differences were played down and the unity of the nation was emphasised. In particular, when the borders of the national territory were claimed to be under threat in 1996, almost no dissident voices were heard in the newspapers. Having contributed to the creation of a moral panic by their representation of the events, *Halkin Sesi* and *Kibris* newspapers.
encouraged the public to unite behind the policies and actions of the national institutions and adopt their discourses. Yenidüzen, on the other hand, tried to distance itself from the dominant nationalist discourses and representations but without much success. The reports of the conflict between the Turkish army and the TRNC President about the national border and its security had similar features. This time, as well as forging the unity of Turkish Cypriots against the proclamations of the Turkish army authorities, there was also an effort to maintain an accord between the TRNC and Turkey. The discourse of this inter-national unity with Turkey, as well as the intra-national unity that was mediated by the newspapers, was not only for the consumption of the Greek Cypriot government, one of the actors involved in the issue, but also for the members of the nation state. Meanwhile, voices against the Turkish military were barely reflected in the newspapers. As a result, the dominant nationalist discourses, based on intra-national unity, limited the access of diverse discourses to the media.

Throughout the period studied, the dominant discourses in the news supported the existence and the legitimacy of the TRNC. Yet, there were occasions when challenging discourses also found their way into the newspapers. The legality of a state that was not recognised by the international community was emphasised with references to its national autonomy, independence and the impassibility of its borders. It encouraged people to participate in the existence of the nation state by believing and identifying with it. The concept of ‘enemy’ was another way of persuading people to imagine themselves as a nation within a bounded territory. Since the TRNC was established to provide security and safety to its people, the presence of an enemy reinforced this process. So when there was a threat from an ‘enemy’ in 1996, the legitimacy and authority of the state was emphasised more strongly than at any other time in order to mobilize people behind the idea of the nation state. In contrast, when the border was opened, bringing the two communities together rather than casting them as opposite to each other, the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state were questioned, particularly by Yenidüzen. Again, when doubts about the TRNC’s statehood emerged as a result of the public statements of the Turkish military authorities in 2007, the newspapers adopted the official discourses aimed at mending the image of the state, not only in the eyes of its people, but also the outside world. As Billig argues (1995), because it is not enough to define
oneself as a nation but also requires recognition as such, gaining the acknowledgment of other nation states is important. Yet, in the overall representation, the official discourses that promoted the TRNC as a legitimate nation state dominated the news discourses and representations.

The concept of border played a role in the conceptualisation of national belonging. The Green Line, particularly, acted as a geographical barrier that divided both communities and for a long time severed their communication and interaction (Gumpert and Drucker, 1998) Even though the boundaries of the state were fixed, the meaning of the border which divided the island into two zones shifted in time over the period covered by this research. In the first case study, there was an emphasis on the border as a symbol of Turkish Cypriots' territorial integrity and as their national space. It not only separated the 'national we' from the 'other' but also aided in the imagination of the bounded area as the homeland needing protection from the intrusions and threats of the 'other'. Such thinking justified the use of violence by the security forces in reaction to the violation of 'our borders' by the 'other'. The existence of the border acquired a new meaning with the crossings. It was not abolished but remained in its place and was only opened for crossing. This was an exception to the rule of division and separation. Even though it brought people from both communities together and there was a discourse based on cultural similarities, it also emphasised the separate citizenships of Cypriots on both sides of the border. The opening of the border, by discursively helping to reaffirm the statehood of both North and South indirectly, also stressed the existence of two separate states and citizenship. In the Lokmacı matter, the debate about who had authority over the TRNC's national security and borders brought the civil power and the Turkish military into dispute. In this case, the border became a symbol of the 'sovereignty' of the TRNC, not to protect it from enemy threats but to show its autonomy.

The Common Past

History was used a great deal in the reproduction of collective identities. In the news regarding the motorcyclists' demonstration in 1996, the narratives based on the sufferings of Turkish Cypriots during the inter-communal conflict of the past were
emphasised to portray Greek Cypriots as a continuing threat. They also demanded the unity of the national community. In these national discourses, the past symbolised a time which was associated with negative experiences of bloodshed, war and a fear that no Turkish Cypriot would want to experience again. The collective memory reproduced in this manner did not refer to any positive aspect of the relationship between the two communities (Canefe, 2007). In contrast, the news reports about the border crossings used history to highlight the commonalities between the two communities. Again, the purpose was to establish a link between the past and the present but this time history was reproduced based on the narratives of ordinary people rather than official ones. Constructed in a nostalgic way, these narratives focused on the experiences of daily life. References to the similarity of some cultural traditions between the communities helped the renegotiation of a Cypriot identity. Depicting these traditions as the character of the people on the island hid their constructedness and presented them as historical facts. The discursive construction of the past in the Lokmacı matter rarely occurred. It was only reproduced in official speeches that referred to the conditions under which the barricade was built in the past. It helped to distinguish the present as peaceful compared to the conflict of the past. Instead, 2004, regarded as another turning point in the history of the island, was referred to in order to underline the position of Greek Cypriot state representatives as uncompromising.

The Construction of a Political Future

The construction of a common political future varied depending on the period studied. While Yenidüzen stressed that a common future with Greek Cypriots in the shape of a solution in Cyprus was obstructed by the actions of the nationalist groups in 1996, the other two newspapers implied that the future for Turkish Cypriots was the continuation of the status quo with the ‘motherland’ Turkey. In 2003, the linguistic construction of the future highlighted the expectation of two changes for Turkish Cypriots: One was a change in political power in the TRNC and the other a solution in Cyprus in which both communities could peacefully co-exist. During the events of 2007 it was again Yenidüzen that voiced the expectation of a solution on the island in the future which would no longer require the protection of the Turkish
army. The statement 'until the conditions are appropriate' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, 2007, p.6) signalled the possibility of transformation following an alteration in the political situation of North Cyprus as well as in the will of the Turkish Cypriots.

On Turkish Cypriot Media

The Newspapers and National Identity

The study also confirmed that the newspapers acted as nationalising institutions by constantly reminding their readers of their nationhood. By embedding nationalist discourses in their news texts and reporting the nationalist proclamations of various sources such as the president, government and military officials, the newspapers replicated nationalist ideologies. Even ones that criticised nationalistic statements and policies cannot be said to have an anti-nationalist discourse as they replaced one form of nationalism with another or made their arguments against nationalism using nationalistic terms. Having internalised many nationalist discursive practices as common sense and as part of daily life, many times the news texts, rather than being critical of nationalist practices and discourses, actually enhanced them. For example, the killing of a Greek Cypriot for being disrespectful to the Turkish flag was treated as common sense. Therefore, none of the newspapers challenged the authorities about the way Solomos Solomou was stopped. His killing was justified as a patriotic action and went unquestioned by the three newspapers. Challenges to such discourses and other nationalistic discursive practices rarely occurred in the press.

The role of the newspapers in normalising certain nationalistic discursive practices was not limited to the reflection of the nationalist views of the state authorities. As Billig emphasises, the power of nationalism comes from being obscure and also obvious at the same time (Billig, 1995). The representation of the routines of everyday life in the news also contributed to the self-perception. The banal representation of daily life, such as the circulation of images of family homes and the shared cultural norms and values of Turkish Cypriots, not only linked private lives to the national public sphere but their mediation through the newspapers strengthened their internalisation as national and rational. In other words, by showing the routines
and assumptions of everyday life, the newspapers presented it as the nationally organised way (Edensor, 2002) as if that way of living is a part of the national character of Turkish Cypriots. Thus, they reinforced the view that national identity is a natural product rather than a social one. It is also important to note that the media are not the only responsible agent in the dissemination of nationalism in society but part of a complex public sphere that forms and redefines national identity. The research showed the media (in this case the newspapers) did not only influence the nationalistic imagination in the society but was also shaped by the prevailing discourses of the society.

The analysis also revealed that the discourses adopted by the newspapers attempted to mobilize their readers around certain political projects and national interests. Therefore, claiming to speak on behalf of and to the nation, the newspapers characterised the ideas they presented as the consensus of the nation. In line with the ‘consensual model’ (Hartley, 1993), the society was depicted as united behind one perspective. Differences or challenges to this perspective were characterised as deviance from the norm. Such representations allowed the newspapers to collectivise their readers around the national interest they had been promoting. Benefiting from the notion of unity without any diversity helped the newspapers state these views as self-evident and a matter of common sense. This approach not only allowed nationalism to be embedded in the news discourses but also hid its constructedness.

The dominance of nationalistic discourses in the news supported the unity of the nation without leaving much room for identity negotiations other than those for national identity. Hence, diverse and different identity discourses did not have much access to the public sphere through the newspapers. Even though regional identities were mentioned in 2003, when people crossed the border to see their homes, the dominant collective identity in the news articles was national identity. The mediation of the symbolic nation did not include any ethnic minorities, indicating their absence in the public sphere. The representation of women in the news also complied with the gendered representation of the nation. In the conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in 1996, women appeared in the newspapers mostly as ‘mothers’. When both communities started revisiting their homes, women were again portrayed within the dominant discourses and images of home and family life; as ‘wife and
mother's serving food to the guests or crying for their lost homes. In the Lokmacı case, which involved state politics and the military, women rarely appeared in the news.

Consequently, the lack of negotiation and redefinition of various identities formed an obstacle for the development of a democratic citizenship. The dominance of nationalistic discourses not only limited the reflection of society as a pluralistic formation but also prevented it being one by restricting diverse and different representations and discourses about it. In a way, the media failed in their role in the production and circulation of the diverse information necessary for the development of an informed citizenry (Golding & Murdock, 1997) as well as failing to represent divergent interests in society. Whether critical or uncritical in their intentions, by relying on authoritative and politically powerful sources in the production of their news stories it led to biased interpretations of events in favour of these groups. The uniformity of the ideas and frameworks given to readers hindered the newspapers from fulfilling their democratic role in the formation of an informed citizenry and providing them with a pluralistic public sphere.

Journalistic Practices

In the case of the Turkish Cypriot media, the ideological orientations and political views that shaped the news texts were recognisable. The newspapers failed to detach themselves from the stance and the views of the political parties that they were affiliated or sympathised with and instead, reflected the issues from their frameworks. The discourses that aimed to encourage the participation and mobilisation of their readers around the national interests they supported were no different than the groups they were affiliated with or backed. For example, Yenidüzen in a way similar to CTP, the political party it was linked with, challenged the nationalistic discourses of the government in 1996 and 2003, although its defiance did not go further than contesting the policies and actions of the nationalistic groups. When CTP came to power, even this limited challenge disappeared as it adopted the official discourse. With no alternative or challenging discourses, the domination of nationalist discourse within the media provides a hegemonic framework for the
understanding and construction of a particular social reality (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The Turkish Cypriot media became instrumental in this because they accepted and followed the dominant nationalist discourses. For example, none of the newspapers referred to the administration in the south of the island by its internationally recognised title, the Republic of Cyprus, but instead adopted the name given in the official national discourses, the Greek Cypriot administration. The newspapers rarely criticised the TRNC’s dependence on Turkey or the power of Turkey over the Turkish Cypriot administration but instead treated this as normal, which helped to naturalise it. In either case, the arguments of the newspapers against the nationalistic discourses and actions were not free from nationalist terms. While criticising one form of nationalism, they promoted the alternative national projects that they identified with. Yet, in the overall process of their news production, the newspapers used language and cultural symbols to constantly remind people of their nationhood. Banal nationalism was common in the discourses of the newspapers and they flagged nationhood to their readers.

When investigated, such practices are not independent from the broader socio-political and historical context of the media. In particular, the Turkish Cypriot press has always been a site where a struggle between different causes and interests has taken place. Thus, as well as informing public it has also been a central forum in winning the ‘political contest’ (Wolsfeld, 1997). Owning and controlling the media meant controlling the information environment. In part, the media gained such a characteristic as a result of the polarisation on the island. Acting as one of the main public spheres, the press has reproduced and circulated information to create public opinion behind the causes they have been defending and to secure the public discourses. For example, during recent changes introduced by the Annan Plan and the opening of the border, the media were instrumental in expressing and leading the transformation of the dominant discourses within the community.

The practices common in the Turkish Cypriot media also influenced the discourse of the news texts analysed. Relying on externally produced texts, such as news agency dispatches and press releases, as the sources of news and using these texts with minimal editing or merely copying them caused the appearance of identical news articles in the newspapers. Integration of the press releases of various groups and
organisations into the news discourse with little change created intertextuality which made the resulting news article very similar to the original document. In some cases, it also made it difficult to isolate the institutional voices and discourse forms of the newspapers. Such news stories, which gave only one perspective, were also far from reflecting a balanced and fair account of the events. Juxtaposition of different and sometimes conflicting accounts of stories without much guidance failed to provide clear information and understanding for their readers.

All the newspapers reflected the views of various groups in their coverage of the issues. This is because, as van Dijk (1988) points out, the 'truthfulness of events is enhanced when opinions of different backgrounds and ideologies are quoted about such events' (p.85). Nevertheless, an analysis of the overall representation of the issues by the newspapers showed that, despite including diverse views, they supported one or the other idea, which again reinforces van Dijk's (1988) argument that 'those who are ideologically close will be given primary attention as possible sources of opinions' (p.85). By doing so, even though the opinions of different social actors and groups are included in the representation or linguistic inclusion, the advantageous or disadvantageous treatment given in the representation still creates inequalities (Reisgl & Wodak, 2001).

**On Strategies and Linguistic Means**

The main strategies in the discursive construction of national identity were constructive strategies as well as strategies of justification, transformation and perpetuation. In the news articles in 1996, the newspapers usually benefited from the strategies of construction and justification. Construction strategies were mainly used to collectivise and unite people within certain groups such as Turkish and Greek Cypriot. Thus, the binary division within the texts was strong and strategies of justification helped shift the blame for much criticised actions to the 'other'. The nationalistic discourses that dominated the news in 1996 emphasised 'our' actions as 'patriotic' and 'their' actions as being 'crazy' or 'irrational'. As well as the intra-national sameness and unity, the solidarity and similarity with the Turkish nation was accentuated. The main strategies used in the reports of the events in 2003 were
strategies of perpetuation and transformation. Going through a time of change, on the one hand, the political continuity between past and present times was emphasised, while on the other hand, a necessary and desired political change between now and the future was predicted. Constructive strategies were also employed to forge a unity within communities with a perception of Cypriotteness as well as stressing Turkish Cypriotteness. Yenidüzen also adopted a strategy of discontinuation to announce the end of the political power of the governing groups, which implied a change in the future. In the articles on the 2007 Lokmaci issue, a transformation strategy which implied a political change between now and the future was used. Justification strategies were also employed by the newspapers for the presence of the Turkish army in the north and also the removal of the much disputed footbridge.

The news texts employed metonyms, synecdoche and personification to establish sameness between groups. While the capitals of the states were used as metonyms to refer to the governments, generalising synecdoche as a linguistic means was frequently utilised, especially to present a small group of people as the general population. Personification was another linguistic tool adopted in the discursive construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. Personification of the nation was especially common in the articles published in the Lokmaci case in 2007. As well as using the image of TRNC President Talat to refer to the Turkish Cypriot nation, Turkish Army Forces were also given a human form, which helped people to identify with or against it.

Conclusions

The TRNC, a new state founded as a response to the insecurity of Turkish Cypriots and a challenge to the claims of sovereignty emanating from the south, offers a unique case to study national identity. Despite being a state that is unrecognised by the international world and whose existence and rationale for existence has been challenged, the TRNC has had a reasonably long life, a material and spatial presence and imprint on society. It has been a source of expressions and experiences of national identity as well as producing a sense of belonging for its people. Nevertheless, the new state has not managed to fix the meaning of national identity.
but, on the contrary, has provided the context in which the various identity concepts of Turk, Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot have been debated, which confirms the dynamic and contested nature of national identity. Therefore, serious research into its media, as the significant contributors to the production and propagation of national identity, as well as challenging and modifying social imagination, was long overdue in order to study their role in the process.

There is no doubt that further research into media content, linguistic means and strategies as well as journalistic practices is required. For example, further research into nation and identity using other media such as radio and, in particular, online media would be useful to broaden the understanding of the role of the media in the construction and renegotiation of identity. One of the aims of this study was to open a channel for more discussion on the issue rather than provide definitive answers. Raising awareness of not merely the conflicts and tensions produced by the identity construction processes but also discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for the sake of nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999) are the key aims of the study.

As this research confirmed, particularly at times of crises or conflict, nationalistic opinions and discourses dominate the news without leaving any space for diverse views. As seen in the case of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, either because of the manipulation of powerful sources or the fear of being labelled as traitors, the media avoid challenging the dominant nationalistic opinions at such periods. There is a spiral of silence, which quietens any challenging or opposing opinion (Noelle-Neumann and Petersen, 2004; Salmon & Glynn, 1996).

The conflict between the two communities on the island has shaped the media environment and culture. Therefore, nationalist tendencies that are inherent in the media not only reproduce the myths, symbols and traditions which enhance loyalty to the nation but sometimes these tendencies cause the representation of events to be distorted so as not to let the ‘other’ use it against ‘us’ (Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000) or not to offend national sentiments (Wolsfeld, 2001). Despite this, the Turkish Cypriot media can play an important role in conflict resolution on the island. It is important that the media should recognise their responsibilities in the process and act in a way that would promote communication between the sides. The media should develop
norms and routines of news production that would encourage resolution rather than nationalist tendencies (Wolsfeld, 2001). Their impact on the peace process should also be researched and highlighted.

One of the roles of the media in the development of a democratic society is to allow diverse groups and organisations to express their alternative views (Curran, 1997). Unfortunately, in North Cyprus, rather than generating pluralism in society by reflecting all citizens' interests, the media are acting as the mouthpiece of official and powerful institutions. Instead of giving access to different perspectives, the media have become a means of exercising power for powerful groups. Thus, rather than representing society, it can be argued that the media are reflecting the views of these groups. In order to achieve a democratic society, a democratic media system, which would allow diverse views, is required as well as a more critical journalistic approach towards power relations.

For such a society it is also important that the media promote other identities such as gender and ethnic rather than just solely national ones. As well as encouraging the formation of a pluralistic society this will also help develop an understanding of the interests of different groups in the society. Therefore, the media should adopt a non-national definition of citizenship and also act as a public space where representation and negotiation of diverse identities can be carried out. Also, by highlighting the collective interests of citizens, the media can contribute to a peaceful co-existence of conflicting groups not only within the society but also their neighbouring societies.

Journalists have an important responsibility in the improvement of the media environment and the journalistic culture in the TRNC, especially if they want to play a role in the establishment of a democratic society and in conflict resolution. By ridding themselves of political control and their dependence on official sources and applying professional norms and routines in the production process of the news, journalists will increase their credibility and influence within the society. It is a hard and slow process to change the journalistic culture, but journalists in North Cyprus can start scrutinising their relationship with their sources and question their newsgathering practices. Not taking given information for granted and making questioning and research a standard part of their professional routine would help
them gain a more objective approach in their news construction process, therefore fulfilling their role as the facilitators of pluralism and debate in society.

Changing social, political and economic conditions as a result of increasing interaction, through the advancement in new communication technologies and mobility, not only render the concept of a homogeneous national identity impossible but also require a more inclusive or broad appeal. As the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem encourage new social imaginings, which brings new challenges for the society, the media can play a crucial role in facilitating or hindering (depending on their positioning in the social/political landscape) these new re-articulations and conceptualisations of identity. Studying media practices and discourse in such a period of change is an important task, in order to understand social change not only in North Cyprus but more generally.
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APPENDIX

TIMETABLE OF EVENTS IN CYPRUS

1571 The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus.
1878 Britain was given the administration of the island by the Ottoman Empire.
1914 The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War against Britain and in return Britain annexed Cyprus.
1923 With the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey denounced its rights on Cyprus.
1925 Cyprus became a British colony.
1955 EOKA launched an armed struggle against the British Administration.
1960 The Republic of Cyprus was established.
1963 President Makarios put forward a set of proposals for changing the Constitution.
In December inter-communal conflict started.
1964 The first border as a ceasefire line called Green Line was drawn in Nicosia.
1974 Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus.
1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established.