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**THE PRESS, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND THE  
POLITICS OF BELONGING IN NIGERIA**

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of the University of Westminster for the degree of  
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# ABSTRACT

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Nigeria, today, more or less operates under an intricate web of antagonistic ethnic colonies engaged in all-against-all, low-burning feuds everywhere across the land, nurturing puzzling existential questions. This study seeks to validate the notion that the press may have played a significant role in the promotion of the ethno-regional culture that has dominated Nigeria's post-colonial politics. Studies on the effects of newspaper press have long established the significant role of the press in statecraft; however this study seeks to understand how the newspaper-press became complicit in the forging of a dysfunctional post-colonial political culture that makes identity politics a central electoral feature. In order to provide a historic understanding of ethnicised politics, the study deploys content analysis of nine newspapers over six federal elections from 1959 to 2011. But to unlock the present day construct of belonging, the study uses in-depth elite interviews with leading academics, politicians, and press owners and managers. The study finds that the press did indeed help to construct ethnicised political culture and identities. It directly links strong elite ethno-regional exclusionist politics with the press. However, the press neither acted alone nor was it always a willing accomplice. Press owners sold the soul of the press to service their own political interests, being often in cohort with political elites through common ethnic interests and power pursuit. Data from the study have forced fresh attention on the newspaper-press as an instrumentalised, predominantly urban-based elite-to-elite medium, and not in any measurable way a *mass* medium. The study proves that, in reality, Nigeria does not have a populist press. The study concludes with a proposition that the forum function of the press could still be deployed, from an agonistic perspective, to counter antagonism and re-imagine a more democratically productive ethno-federalist nation.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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AC– Action Congress

ACN– Action Congress of Nigeria

AD – Alliance for Democracy

AG – Action Group

ANPP– All Nigerian Peoples Party

APC – Arewa People’s Congress

APGA– All Progressives’ Grand Alliance

APP – All People’s Party

AU – African Union

Brig. – Brigadier

BYM – Bornu Youth Movement

CDC – Constitution Drafting Committee

CGS – Chief of General Staff

Col. – Colonel

Com. – Commodore

CPC – Congress for Progressive Change

CSO – Chief Security Officer

DTN – Daily Times of Nigeria

ECN – Electoral Commission of Nigeria

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EU – European Union

EUEOM– European Union Election Observation Mission

FCC – Federal Communications Commission

FCT – Federal Capital Territory

FEDECO – Federal Electoral Commission

GNPP – Great Nigeria People’s Party

IBB – Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida

INEC – Independent National Electoral Commission

ING – Interim National Government

IPC – Igbo People Congress

IPOB – Indigenous People of Biafra

IYC – Ijaw Youth Congress  
Lt. Col. – Lieutenant Colonel  
Maj. Gen. – Major General  
MASSOB – Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra  
MEND – Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta  
MILAD – Military Administrator  
MOSOP – Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People  
NA – Nigerian Army  
NADECO – National Democratic Coalition  
NAP – Nigeria Advance Party  
NCNC – National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (subsequently called the National Council of Nigerian Citizens after 1962)  
NEC – National Electoral Commission  
NECON – National Electoral Commission of Nigeria  
NEPU – Northern Elements Progressive Union  
NNA – Nigeria National Alliance  
NNDP – Nigerian National Democratic Party  
NNPC – Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  
NPC – Northern People’s Congress  
NPF – Northern Progressive Front  
NPN – National Party of Nigeria  
NPP – Nigeria People’s Party  
NYM- Nigerian Youth Movement  
OPC – O’odua People’s Congress  
PDP – Peoples Democratic Party  
PRP – Peoples Redemption Party  
UK – United Kingdom  
UMBC –United Middle Belt Congress  
UN – United Nations  
UPGA – United Progressive Grand Alliance  
UPN – Unity Party of Nigeria  
USA– United States of America  
VP – Vice President

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---

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♪ *To God be all the Glory, for the things He has done* ♪

Andraé Crouch.

# DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL

## AUTHORSHIP

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I, Richard Ikiebe, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where material has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated and acknowledged.

# SECTION ONE

## INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

---

This section contains the first two chapters of this study, which deals first with introductory issues in Chapter One, and then moves on in Chapter Two to begin to explore the context of the study and its main strands. This mostly background section reviewed literature relevant to the study, including aspects of the British colonial system, the early days of ethnic and elite politics and the dual role of the press as a professional institution, and a mobilising tool of nationalists, and later of partisan politicians.

# CHAPTER 1

---

## 1.1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This chapter provides an introductory overview to the entire study; it outlines the general background to the study, the motivation, research problems, study objectives, as well as the scope; and it situates the press as the focal point of the study.

The Nigerian press as an institution preceded the Nigerian nation. In 1959, the take off year of this study, journalism was exactly 100 years in practice, whereas the nation, as contrived by a British amalgamation fiat of 1914, was barely 45 years old and behaved more like cobbled patches of ethnic nationalities, and barely like one *united* nation. The two protectorates of North and South were integrated in name and on paper, but the British administered them separately until 1947 when administration became somewhat unified into an ethnocentric federation of three regions (Lynn, 2006; Buhari, 2010) with the South being subdivided into two regions.

Also in 1947, Northern and Southern political leaders met in a formal face-to-face meeting for the first time as citizens of the same country created over 30 years before (Osaghae, 2015). Up until 1947, colonial policies by design “fostered social distance among ethnic and religious groups” (Abdu, 2010, p67). As self-rule or independence became a more possible reality, nationalists who had agitated and fought against British colonial rule began to see allies in the fight, as future opponents, and perhaps more dangerously, as antagonists and enemies. The press became a major collaborator and weapon in the ensuing ethno regional combats, and as Aimufua (2007) notes, the press was “used and has continued to be used to promote regional, ethnic or sectional interests” (p3).

Nigeria today is a nation in a puzzling and enigmatic existence; its greatness is locked up in much discussed, but under-defined *potentials* as a much-endowed nation. More than a hundred years after the 1914 amalgamation of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, students of history are anxious that the nation-state may perpetually be oscillating between the brink of greatness and the verge of collapse.

Because of the historical nature and significance of the events leading to independence, it has become necessary to give a fairly extensive introductory narrative of the milestones on the route leading up to 1959. This is necessary because seeds of ethno-regional politics and conflicts of identity and belonging were planted long before 1959. Case in point is the 1941 intra-party election, “which provoked curious allegations of 'tribalism'” (Adebanwi, 2008, p437). This crisis snowballed and led to the fractionalisation of the dominant southern-based political party of the time – Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), and the eventual formation of two ethnic-based parties – the Action Group (AG) in the West; and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) in the East (Adebanwi, 2008). A Northern based party, the Northern Peoples’ Congress, emerged at about the same period.

From the beginning, therefore, two major political parties were birthed through a crisis of ethnic belonging; a third party emerged also dependent on ethno-regional affiliations in reaction to the first two. According to Abdu (2010), Nigerians have never been weaned of their “different ethnic and religious backgrounds” (p67). They tend to, and have continued to, “look more toward their primordial and parochial local groups for cultural, spiritual, social, ethical and linguistic satisfaction” (p67). In the search for clues as to how Nigeria became what it has become, it is important to seek out the roots of influences that framed ethnicity as a central constitution or a form of ideology, and therefore, an inevitable component in the nation’s politics. How is it that critical issues of belonging, inclusion or exclusion, and



representation became inter-linked with the press at the very inception of organised politics?

### **1.2.0 PRESS AND POLITICS: A BACKGROUND**

The decade between the mid 1930s and 1940s marked a significant era in the history of the press in Nigeria. There are several events and occurrences between the mid 1930s and up to 1959, the time this study began, that not only significantly set the stage for independence, but also defined the character of the Nigerian press, and politics, in the years and decades after. The era lasted about 25 years. It began at about the midway period between the amalgamation of 1914 and the independence of 1960; a momentous period of “transition from the society of ‘Black Englishmen’ to that of educated Nigerians who had no roots in British guardianship...” (Omu, 2000, p60).

The “Black Englishmen”, a community of returnee slaves, had up to this point, established themselves as the local power elite. They formed the clerical and middle level manpower cadre of the civil service and professional corps because of their education and knowledge of the English ways (Omu, 1978). In the 1930s, power gradually went from these old and established elite descendants of freed slaves to an emerging young, indigenous, educated elite. What these new leaders lacked by way of experience, they made up for in their adept use of the press to insistently demand for self-rule; and the press elevated them to the positions of nationalist heroes and legends. Whereas the voices of the old non-indigenous black elite demanded improvement in status, inclusion in governance, and for rights (to be treated fairly and decently), the new voices demanded full emancipation and self-rule – not accommodation or inclusion in governance or improvement in social status. They wanted colonial rule to end.

The period was also a significant era in the history of the press in Nigeria. The press began to have stronger influence on public

discourse. Its influence grew beyond a small circle of elite to include a growing number of ordinary literate Nigerians who were also growing in self-awareness and confidence; it was the beginning of a populist press. A newspaper colossus of the old order, Horatio Jackson, publisher of the highly influential *Lagos Weekly Record*, died in 1936: the *Record* itself, after over 40 years of publication, had collapsed three years earlier. Acclaimed father of modern Nigerian politics, Herbert Macaulay was old; the influence of his newspaper, the *Lagos Daily News*, which served his NNDP party as the “mouthpiece”, had waned significantly; it only managed to maintain sporadic appearances in the newsstand. The *Daily Service* and the *Daily Times* of the period were barely surviving (Duyile, 2009; Omu, 1978).

Then in 1937, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who would later become the first indigenous Governor-General, and President of the Republic, arrived from the United States of America via Gold Coast (now Ghana). He immediately on arrival, established the *West African Pilot*, and set a new tone for the press and politics, redefining both. Their arrival, the man and his newspaper, notably marked the end of the old staid journalism (Ige, 1995). Azikiwe and the *West African Pilot* infused the Nigerian press with an American brand of journalism, with vibrancy and colour in style, urgency in tone and assertive language, along with new production techniques (Duyile, 2009). As a direct fall out of the war in Europe, educated indigenous Nigerian elite began to use the press to question colonialism and demand self-rule. The nationalist press grew to “become a plague to colonialism...” (Nwankwo *et al.* cited in Ajibade, 2010, p252), and “they constituted themselves into a potent opposition to the British administration” in Nigeria (Sobowale, 1985 cited in Ajibade, 2010, p252).

This was the period that real and national political parties began to emerge; it was the end of the reign of South-based NNDP, the beginning of the short-lived, transitory period of the Nigerian Youth Movement. Two mostly Southern ethnic-based parties emerged out of

the ashes of the NYM – the NCNC from the Igbo dominated Eastern Region, and the Action Group from the Yoruba controlled Western Region. At about this time, two ideologically opposite parties emerged out of the Northern Region, the NPC representing the Northern establishment, and the NEPU claiming to represent the interest of the impoverished masses of the North.

The period also saw the emergence of fairly powerful politically active professional groups, which were forced by the colonial experience to mature quickly into influential political pressure groups. Prominent among these bodies were: the Railway Workers Union, Nigerian Union of Teachers, Lawyers Association, and other labour unions whose growth reached points where their voices could no longer be ignored by the British colonial government (Omu, 1978; Ige, 1995; Enahoro, 1965).

Very early in organised politics in Nigeria, newspapers took the front row positions of influence. The publisher of the *Weekly Record*, Thomas Jackson and Herbert Macaulay, publisher of *Lagos News* were the initiators and promoters of the first and most prominent political party – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). And for the better part of twenty-five years after its formation in 1922, the NNDP and its leader, Macaulay, almost singularly dominated the Nigerian press and political scenes (Omu, 1978). At about the same time in 1922, when the Clifford Constitution made it possible to engage in organised electoral politics, and the NNDP was being formed, two new newspapers, the *Nigerian Spectator* and the *Nigerian Advocate*, were established purposely as “electioneering newspapers” (Omu, 1978, p61). According to Omu (1978), the *Lagos Daily News* became Macaulay’s “stormy mouthpiece” (p64), and for the next 25 years, the NNDP dominated and won nearly every election.

Gradually, the institution of the press, not only served as a key armament of agitation, it also became a tool for framing the new nation-state. Much later, the press became a weapon against perceived

enemies and real opponents. Politicians used the press for flagrant self-promotion, and for reinforcing group identities, depending on the politician's need or preference (Sobowale, 2002; Jose, 1988; Awolowo, 1960; Osuntokun, 2010).

### 1.3.0 THE NIGERIAN NATION-STATE

According to James Coleman (1958), “the name *Nigeria* was first given to the north” (p44) citing historian Anthony Kirk-Greene and the London *Times* of January 8 1897, Coleman said the name was coined in the search for a shorter title for the “agglomeration of pagan and Mohammedan states which have been brought by exertions of the Royal Niger Company within the confines of a British Protectorate” (1958, p44). Two years later, “the first official recognition of the name *Nigeria* appeared in the debate in the House of Commons on the Royal Niger Company Bill in July, 1899” (Coleman, 1958, p44).

In 1906, for example, Lagos, which became a Colony of Britain in 1861, and Oil River Protectorates with Headquarters in Calabar, were joined to become Southern Protectorate. Eight years later in 1914, the patched work merged the contiguous British colonial Northern and Southern Protectorates – on paper (Coleman, 1958, Omu, 1978). The Nigerian nation was birthed, divided, and carved out from “three separate, independent, and uncoordinated forces” (Coleman, 1958, p42) where “the north was in a sense tacked on to the south” (Coleman, 1958, p44) as “the two separate protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria had only been united in 1914” (Lynn, 2006, p145) from a vast and an undefined territory designated as “British Sphere of Influence” (Coleman, 1958, p43). As such, political cleavages in Nigeria should not have surprised anyone; the surprise is that they have remained unresolved.

British colonial rule over the amalgamated Nigerian entity lasted 46 years, (1914-1960). However, under Governor Fredrick Lugard's “dual

mandate”, the two halves did not function as parts of one amalgamated state for 33 years (until 1947). In that year, an ethno-regional, “federation” of some sort was introduced as a form of governance, and Southern Nigeria was split into Western and Eastern Nigeria. In 1954, Nigeria was officially declared a Federation (Coleman, 1958; Ige, 1995; Enahoro, 1965).

Reasons, such as administrative convenience, were advanced as principal motivation, but the move inadvertently acknowledged and formalised the three main ethnic nationalities into semi self-governing regions. Between the time of the new constitution, introduction of new regional structures, and independence, the nation had barely 14 years to transition from a colonial state to an indigenous, democratic self-governing state. And in just two years after independence, in 1962, the euphoria of the adventure with self-rule had whittled considerably: the first major storm that rocked the boat of state was the Federal census of that year. Regional unrests, particularly in the Western Region, eventually led to large-scale ethnic clashes, which led to a military take over and a civil war (Osaghae, 1991). In Nigeria’s first 40 years of self-government, (1960-2000) the military took the lion share of nearly 30 years; and the nation became as much known for self-induced political instability for its profligacy, endemic corruption, as for its oil wealth.

At every stage of Nigeria’s evolution, the role of the press has been prominent: it led in the fight against the British for independence; politicians dragged it with them into ethno-partisan politics, to fight real or imagined political opponents. On its own, the press rose up against the military with one voice for the return of the country to democracy. This study utilises key election periods and processes to illustrate and ascertain the roles and influences of the press that may have contributed to defining ethno-political culture that has shaped Nigeria. It seeks to understand how, in the quest to belong, ethnicity became a dominant factor in elections, in self-definition, and formation of Nigeria.

#### 1.4.0 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study probes the claim that the Nigerian press may have played a far more significant role in the formation of the Nigerian nation-state. Quite early in the political history of Nigeria, newspapers became “outlets for electoral policies and propaganda” (Omu, 1978, p60). As such, the genesis of organised politics in Nigeria is steeped in the history of the press; the earliest national constitution in 1922 (Clifford) was the result of “newspaper press initiative and campaign for elective franchise” (Omu, 1978, p232).

Media scholars and professionals have understandably paid a great deal of attention to the role of newspaper-press in the struggle for independence from Britain; or in the struggle against military rule, for which many paid with their lives (Oso and Pate, 2011; Olukotun, 2005; Sobowale, 1985; Omu, 1978). While these struggles are very important, the problem remains: scant attention has been paid to what may have been a more fundamental role played by the press in the internal struggle for hegemonic supremacy by some; and the fight by others for inclusion within the Nigerian political space, their needs, and struggle to belong.

As Aimufua (2007) puts it, “one of the inadequacies of the Nigerian press is that it is divisive and promotes the aspirations of their owners, which in most cases are sectional” (p183). In the immediate post-independent Nigeria (1960-1966 in particular), true professionalism vanished from most newsrooms of press organisations. Of the few that remained steadfast, many were further torn between serving their communities (ethnic groups or regions) and serving the larger imagined nation (Jose, 1988; Nyamnjoh, 2005). They were also torn between intersectional conflicts of allegiance: loyalty to professionalism and ethnic politicians who owned and used the press as stepping-stones to national political relevance and prominence.

The problem became compounded as press, rather than provide a level-playing arena that integrates, became partisan, and more a probable agent of disunity. According to Sobowale (2002), the majority “promoted inter-ethnic hatred as well as inter-ethnic distrust and acrimony that eventually led to the collapse of the first republic” (p273). And Dare (1985) concurs, noting that through crude and overzealous partisanship, journalists transformed opponents of ruling parties into dissidents. This study, therefore, seeks to investigate, outside the commonly acknowledged but limiting role of the press in agitating for independence, the problem that the press may have contributed in the more fundamental manner to the forging of a dysfunctional post-colonial identity and character that modern Nigerian state currently has.

### **1.5.0 MOTIVATION**

The world of the Nigerian journalist is marked by constant tensions between the textbook ideals of the profession, and the reality of practice in a peculiar socio-political context: this is a driving ontological motivation. As a young practitioner, I imagined that journalism work should make Nigeria a fairer, more united and egalitarian nation, where everyone would feel a sense of belonging. However, as I matured in practice and as one from a minority ethnic group, I found my ideas and aspirations challenged and incongruent with the reality of everyday Nigerian journalism practice.

As a student and teacher of media history, I have had recurrent moments of pride in reading or hearing about the role that journalists played in the “struggle for independence”. The often repeated and fascinating narratives of the historic roles that newspapers and journalists played to secure independence from an unwilling and unyielding British Empire, have always been told with enthusiasm and measured drama.

We were regaled with stories of how Herbert Macaulay was acerbic and a terror to the colonial officers through the might of the pen; how Anthony Enahoro practically became a jailbird in his crusade against the British colonial rule; how Azikiwe moved political rallies and newspaper readers with spoken and written bombastic English; how Samuel L. Akintola, a great mobiliser wrote and spoke impeccable *Churchillian* English; and how assertive and self-assured the duo of Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello were – the British could not intimidate them (Osuntokun, 2010). This list of leading nationalists duplicates itself as the list of remarkable journalists (except Ahmadu Bello, first Premier of the Northern Region), before they became prominent politicians. I have also been part of the struggle against military rule, during which I lost a very dear friend and professional mentor.

With all the above in mind, I often wondered why such an erudite and astute group of professionals who became the first generation of political leaders produced such an ethnicised and divided nation, where virtually every group feels disaffected. I have also often wondered if the complete story, of the role that the press and journalists played in the formation of Nigeria, had been told.

### **1.6.0 JUSTIFICATION**

Since colonial days, the essential philosophies and ethos of the Nigerian political systems, as managed by the elite, has remained fundamentally unchanged. Some would argue that Nigeria's political condition might have been worse, but for the press. What is obvious then is that there is discernable tension between layers of interpretations of the roles that the press has played in post-colonial Nigeria. Many argue that the press played a far more significant role, if not in the designing of it, at least in the propagation and maintenance of the political culture on which modern Nigeria is built. A central justification for this study is the need to clarify if political culture of



representation within democratic process may have been deliberately constructed to fit the Nigerian context, making identity and *belonging* contentious issues in the business of nation-state formation.

This problem is not unique to Nigeria; it is a Pan-African problem. After over 50 years of independence for most African nations, issues of ethnicity, “citizenship and belonging have failed to disappear in favour of a single political and legal citizenship” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19). Rather than disappear, there has been a “resurgence of identity politics and overt tensions over belonging”, as various ethno-cultural groups seek equity, better representation, and greater access to national resources and opportunities (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19).

There were early signs, in the case of Nigeria, to indicate that the structures and designs of political associations/parties pointed in the direction of where the nation has now eventually found itself. Seeds planted in the 1940s, nurtured in the 1950s bore fruits in the mid-1960s leading to a bloody civil war. The nation has never recovered from the impact of established early patterns, which incidentally seemed to have been nurtured through the press. Today, after over 75 years since the days of nationalist agitations, not much has changed – we have well established but twisted political culture of conflict and protest.

In 2010, Muhamadu Buhari, who served as a Military Head of State about 30 years ago and was democratically elected the nation’s president in 2015, called the story of Nigeria, “a depressing story of a democracy without democrats, and of elections without the electorate having much say in the process” (Buhari, 2010, p3). Thus, Nigeria today presents a good case study as a nation in a paradoxical existence. Some experts (Ogundiya, 2005; Osaghae, 2015) see signs of looming implosion; they predict a great and gifted nation that may be about to fail – all of which are the result of a long history of ethnic distrust and divisions, regional loyalties, corruption, and inept leadership. Under

the above conditions, finding a justification for the need for the study is not difficult: the study is seeking an explanation for how Nigeria became a democracy without democrats, and what role the press played to get Nigeria into the company of pseudo-democratic nations.

If indeed, as Dare (2000) states, most pre-independence journalists were “firebrand nationalists who wanted to use journalism to change society” and build a nation (p15), what went wrong and at what point did the nation go wrong? And how did *nationalist*-journalists so quickly transform to so deeply polarised front-line politicians? Why was it that the parties themselves seldom spoke with consensus on major national issues of the day?

As noted earlier, media scholarship in Nigeria has focused on a partial narrative of the role of the early Nigerian press. They have tended to be celebrative about the press’ role in a self-congratulatory manner. While the applause may not be out of place entirely, it is only one of the many possible strands of narratives, as there is an undeniable role played by the press in the struggle for independence. The other strands are still waiting to be investigated.

Often, arguments have been advanced to the effect that the media cannot absolve itself of their contribution to the formation of today’s Nigerian nation (Omu, 1996; Dare, 2000). However, few clear direct studies on the role of the press per se are available that I’m aware of – the likes of Omu (1978), Agbaje (1992), Adebani (2002: 2016). While Omu, Agbaje and Adebani have done excellent work in these regards along with likes of Aimufua, (2007) and Oso (2014), their generations have been comparatively scanty, with the spaces between them, large and far apart. While other disciplines use the press’ narrative as authentic data sources to annotate, illustrate, or understand certain historic phenomena, there have been limited studies on media themselves and the role they played in the formation of nations like Nigeria.

One established assumption in scores of studies on media effects is that the press has the capacity to shape society (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Freedman, 2014); aside from this, alongside its role as the record keeper, it is the society's mirror – reflecting the society to itself (Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991). Even in weak democracies “the media have a complex relationship with sources of power and the political system” (McQuail, 2010, p523). The newspaper-press provides knowledge and education in order for people to use the information at their disposal to participate meaningfully, and have strong influence on public discourse.

Understanding the affiliation between the political power elite and the press, particularly during election periods, should provide deeper comprehension on the press, belonging, and democratisation (Nyamnjoh, 2005). According to Dare (2000), the press “operated primarily to strengthen the grip of (political) leaders over their followers, and thereby the fragmentation of the country” (p15). And Omu (1978) wrote that the newspaper-press provided “a remarkable example of over-zealousness and irresponsible partisanship” (p248).

Could it then be that the press lost power to cause change when it became as polarised and as divided along the same political and ethnic fault lines that divided the politicians and the nation? Could it be that the coalition of convenience between press and political elite in the pursuit of non-integrative ethno-cultural interests produced a detrimental political culture? Could it be that the failure of the press to decouple itself from the political class meant that the press became a “vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies, and orthodoxies... that blunt critical awareness and make participatory democratisation difficult?” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p2). Providing answers to these questions is central to the main quest of this study.

### **1.7.0 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES/GOALS**

One key objective in this study is to hopefully unravel the roles of the press in the politics of identity and belonging, and whether these roles have been positive or negative. These include issues of inclusion, exclusion, and the promotion of a sense of belonging in representative democracy. The research seeks to investigate, assuming that Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) is right, why after over 50 years of independence “ethnicity and an obsession with belonging have remained active forces on the African political scene” (p17).

### **1.8.0 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

In the struggle to belong within a society in search of an identity, it is not unusual to find the media willing and useful collaborators. Even in homogeneous or developed societies, the media are frequently required to moderate the process of integration, to define and explain the basic ethos of the community or nation-state to its members, and act as moderators or umpires in the public sphere discourse. Recent experiences in places like Rwanda or Egypt highlight the role that the press could play in mobilising nations towards set objectives. In these places and others, the press also played opposite roles: either as agents of accord and building consensus, or of discord and aiding disintegration. As a result of the foregoing, the four guiding questions around which the study is organised therefore are these:

1. Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria’s political culture and national identity?
2. Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”?

3. Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?
4. Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?

### **1.9.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

Problems associated with ethnicity, nationalism, and the use of media by owners to gain political advantages are not unique to Nigeria or Africa. What may not have been fully investigated, in the case of Nigeria and perhaps Africa, is the use of the press at election seasons to integrate component ethnic parts into one united nation, or use of the same process to keep the ethnic groups apart, and thereby perpetuating disunity.

This study should expand the scope of scholarship and conversation on the subject, and provide some understanding of factors that helped form Nigeria's press and contemporary political culture. According to Taylor and Harris (2008), there has been a "lack of a critical edge" on the part of scholars, to the discussion about the media; and this lack has "profoundly dangerous political implications" (p1).

The study should therefore help to understand some of the factors that have contributed to the formation of contemporary political and election culture. It should provide a holistic explanation of the role of press in the formation of the Nigerian nation-state for scholars, politicians, press moguls, regulators, practitioners, etc. The expectation is that by raising issues in this field, other academics will be drawn into media leadership and impact studies, from the perspectives of developing nations.

Of immense interest to me is the press' role not just as the provider of historical anecdotes, dates, data, and details which researchers in other disciplines use to make their claims and build their arguments but as a phenomenon worthy of investigation in its own right.

### **1.10.0 THE SCOPE AND PERIODISATION (1959 - 2011)**

Focusing on the key election sub-themes in the topic, the study uses six nationwide federal elections (1959, 1964/65, 1979, 1983, 1999 and 2011) to trace the evolution of, and the struggle to invent one coherent nation out of many socially and culturally incongruent regions and ethnic nationalities. In the overwhelming craving to acquire exclusive hold on power, as well as in the search to belong, elections became the most manifest reflection of the interplay of ethnic relations, and the press became not just a platform but also an active player and a reflector of reality. Thus, the study uses transition and consolidation elections as markers of this evolution through the Nigerian press' concomitant history with that of the nation and its operations in the delineated periods.

Among the several federal elections of over half a century (1959 – 2011), the significant pre-independence election of 1959, the post-independence elections of 1964/65, 1979, 1983, and 1999 stand out. The federal election of 2011 also stands out but for different reasons: for the first time, a person from a minority ethnic groups foiled the struggle for power amongst and between the Northern and Southern majority ethnic groups. These six illustrative election years form the framework of the study, three of which were transition elections while the others were consolidation elections.

### **1.11.0 TRANSITION ELECTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION ELECTIONS**

A transition election, as against a consolidation election, has the possibility of being peaceful, though not always. According to Orji and Uzodi (2012), “Based on available records, transition elections are relatively more peaceful than the consolidation elections” (p17). All other factors considered, it was therefore not totally surprising that the 1959, 1979, and 1999 elections were devoid of the type of large-scale violence, which the nation witnessed in the consolidation elections of 1964/65, 1983, and 2011.

#### **1.11.1 Transition Elections of 1959, 1979, and 1999**

The study begins with the last colonial election of 1959; it concludes with the 2011 election, the ninth nationwide federal election. The 1959, 1979, and 1999 elections are unique, in that:

- i. They were transition elections – 1959, from the British rule to the first self-rule government; 1979 and 1999 from the military rules to civilian administrations;
- ii. They were each a generation apart (twenty-year intervals);
- iii. The elections were fought and won with obvious strong ethnic exclusionist or inclusionist tendencies, if not agitations;
- iv. Using them allows the exploration of themes and factors rather than a chronological approach to the research.

Prior to the 1959 election, there were pre-election clashes between rival supporters and thugs working for rival political parties in some regions. There were also reported acts of intimidation (including unlawful

arrest, detention, and assault) of opposition politicians. However, these were manageable in the light of the novelty of democratic processes and culture. Nonetheless, the unsettling news of recurrent sporadic violence during the campaign period led some newspapers to make gloomy predictions that there would be rioting on December 12, 1959. But the day of the elections turned out to be relatively peaceful as “the innate decency and good sense of the Nigerian elector was once more displayed” (Post, 1964, p345). Kenneth Post (1964), further noted in his assessment of the 1959 elections, “...polling in the 311 constituencies...went off with remarkable smoothness. One particularly praiseworthy feature was the almost complete absence of outbreaks of violence on polling day” (p345).

In the case of the 1979 elections, the relative peace at election was orchestrated by the departing military authority, which acted as a strong umpire. According to Kurfi (1983), the “calm atmosphere...was not brought about by the existence of a fine political culture in the Nigerian people but was due to threats of immediate military retribution should law and order breakdown” (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p18).

Koehn (1981), corroborates Kurfi’s view, noting that the military played open and strong oversight roles to ensure that the elections went peacefully (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p18). The Head of State, General Obasanjo and his deputy, Major-General Yar’adua, effectively used the bully pulpit of government and left no one in doubt of their zero tolerance for anything that could truncate the electoral process, or threaten unity and peace of the country. Politicians themselves feared the possibility of postponement of the end to military rule should the elections fail (Orji and Uzodi, 2012).



### **1.11.2 Consolidation Elections of 1964/65, 1983, and 2011**

For most consolidation elections, “violence and repression marred the democratic character of campaigns...(parties) regularly used the control of systems of justice and administration to obstruct, harass, and punish opposition candidates and their supporters” (Diamond, 1990 cited in Emenyeonu, 1997, p22).

Contrasted with transition elections, Orji and Uzodi (2012) note that in consolidation elections, ruling parties tend to exhibit deliberate attempts to “contrive and monopolise the electoral space”, or else they “engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch deliberate plots” (p19) to move the process in their favour. “This pattern is reflected in ‘simulated landslide’ victories recorded by the ruling parties in the 1964/65, 1983, 2003, and 2007 elections” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p19).

### **1.12.0 THE LIMITATIONS**

Virtually all research studies have limitations that are unique to the subject of study, the research design or choice of methods of investigation. According to James Price and Judy Murnan (2004), “A limitation of a study design or instrument is the systematic bias that the researcher did not or could not control and which could inappropriately affect the results” (p66). In this study, some limitations occur in the chosen method of investigation, and in some areas of the research process itself.

#### **1.12.1 Limitations**

Interviews, which by their very nature produce self-reported data, have propensity for bias, inadvertently because of inclination of people to be selective in remembering past events; to exaggerate the impact of personal achievements or be defensive of one’s failures. In order to

mitigate some of these biases, I stretched the four research questions into 14 questions, some of them deliberately designed to ask the same thing in different ways.

Another area of limitation was gender inclusion. Of the 22 interviews, I could not, despite all efforts, as discussed in Chapter 6, get one female interviewee into the group. While I think that a female perspective would have been beneficial, because of the nature of the subject matter, I do not think it affected the overall result of the findings.

The scope of what newspaper materials to include for content analysis, in the data gathering process posed a form of limitation to the study. In designing the study, I chose to limit the genres to analyse to front pages and editorial comments for the simple reasons that editorials carry the paper's institutional position or opinions, and front pages are devoted to the most important news stories. It is now my belief that the study might have been more robust if it had included political news stories in the inner pages as well. A pilot study would have flagged this limitation early and narrowed the scope of materials to a fewer number of years of study and digging deeper into those materials could have ameliorated it. This said however, the front-page political news items still provided enough materials for analysis.

### **1.12.2 Delimitation**

On the opposite side of limitation is 'delimitation' which is a "systematic bias intentionally introduced into the study design or instrument by the researcher. In other words, the researcher has control over a delimitation" (Price and Murnan, 2004, p66). For this study, one delimiting factor is my decision to limit the scope in the choice of interview participants to elites who have had direct contact with the subject of investigation and have impacted it, or have been impacted by it. To include others outside the elite group may have distorted the overall findings.

Another issue was the decision to limit the study to newspaper-press and not include other mass media forms, particularly radio and television. This delimitation was informed by several factors: 1) Nigeria's broadcast organisations mostly do not archive news and programmes; records of old broadcasts are hard to find. 2) Until the early 1990s, they were all owned and directly controlled by government's agencies like the federal or state ministries of information. 3) With the deregulation of the electronic/broadcast industry, most radio and television stations are urban based and are driven mostly to commercial interests.

### **1.13.0 THESIS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW**

This thesis is structured into four main chapters of eight chapters, each with subtitles for ease of understanding, access, and reference.

#### **1.13.1 Chapter One. Introduction and Background**

This first chapter is a broad introduction to the theme of the study; it attempts to define the nature and scope of the research, its focus, and limitations. A central part of this introductory chapter is the historical and contextual background of some significant features of the study and how they interrelate. The chapter also looks at the motivation and justification for the research, questions for which the study aspires to provide answers; and lastly the chapter outlines the entire thesis structure.

#### **1.13.2 Chapter Two. Historical Context and Empirical Literature Review**

The research is anchored on the trifocal nation-building relationships between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging in a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria. The second

chapter is set out to review relevant literature central to the subject of study in six sections. The first section deals with signposts derived from Nigeria's status as a postcolonial state, and the second section reports on the result and consequences of the first – today's Nigeria as a much-divided nation. The focus in the third section shifts to the tangled relationship between press and politics; the fourth section highlights significant eras in the evolution of the Nigerian press. The fifth outlines attempts at national unity and integration over the years; and the final section provides a survey of the selected elections covered in the study, centring on how today's political culture has evolved over the years.

### **1.13.3 Chapter Three. Theoretical Literature Review**

This chapter surveys, reviews, and assesses conceptual thinking on press, electoral democracy, and the politics of belonging. The review examines relevant and related theories in the context of newspaper-press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial states where the newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon. To arrive at a theoretical framework in line with the objective of the study, attention is paid to aggregative and deliberative models with particular interest in the agonism as a likely theoretical platform on which a new applicable framework may be constructed.

### **1.13.4 Chapter Four. Methodology and Research Design**

This chapter discusses mixed methods of elite semi-structured, in-depth interviews and content analysis, which were my preferred methods for this study. The chapter also explains and justifies the overall research design and methods employed to drive the process of data collection, organisation, and analysis. To provide a background it was important to foreground the choices with a philosophical paradigm and in particular, the peculiarities of the African research cosmos. The chapter is divided into seven sections.

### **1.13.5 Chapter Five. Elite Interview Data Analysis and Results**

The specific objectives in this chapter are to analyse the collected data, develop themes, and display data results. The data for analysis were obtained in Nigeria through in-depth elite interviews of 22 subjects in three categories of press leaders, political leaders, and academicians.

### **1.13.6 Chapter Six. Newspaper Data Content Analysis and Results**

The focus of this chapter is similar to the previous one. It deals with content analysing data obtained from selected archival newspaper materials for the designated six election periods, spanning 52 years, (1959 to 2011). The objective in using content analysis is to establish the nature and patterns of press coverage over the election periods.

### **1.13.7 Chapter Seven. Discussion of Findings**

This chapter pulls everything together in terms of providing answers to the research questions, within the designed thematic framework of the research.

### **1.13.8 Chapter Eight. Conclusions and Recommendations**

Chapter eight provides an overall conclusion to the thesis. This chapter also includes the study's key contribution to knowledge, recommended areas for further research and investigation.

#### **1.14.0 CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an introductory overview based on the theme of the study; it situates the press as the focal point of the study. The chapter provides a background to the study and outlines the research problems and study objectives, as well as the scope and limitations. A central part of the chapter touches on historical and contextual backgrounds of some significant features of the study and how they interrelate. The chapter also looks at the motivation and justification for the research, questions for which the study aspires to provide answers; and lastly the chapter outlines the entire thesis structure. In the next chapter, I shall be looking at the factors that have combined to form characteristic of the press, and groomed the culture of politics, and how both have fared in the post-colonial Nigerian state.

## CHAPTER 2

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### 2.1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out to review relevant literature central to the subject of study; it contains six segments. The first segment is introductory: it briefly signposts derived postcolonial status from an ontological bearing, beginning a philosophical conversation that enfolds the study. Building on the postcolonial experience contextually, the second segment discusses the peculiar reality in today's Nigeria as a much-divided nation. In the third segment, the study focuses on the origins of the symbiotic, but also tangled relationship between the press and politics in Nigeria; and the fourth segment highlights the significant eras in the evolution of the press. The fifth outlines attempts at national unity and integration over the years, particularly during the era of the military. The sixth and final segment provides a survey of the selected elections covered in the study, centring on how today's political culture has evolved over the years. The research is anchored on the trifocal nation-building relationships between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging in a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria.

### 2.2.0 COLONIAL ONTOLOGY AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

From an ontological perspective, it is impossible to meaningfully discuss the state of the Nigerian nation-state without paying particular attention to the nation's deeply rooted colonial past and the overall experience of the nature and character of post-colonialism. In the light of Nigeria's current social-political realities, its peculiarities, proclivities and their attendant consequences, it is imperative to first examine the colonial legacies of the British Empire's largest geo-

political construct in Africa. Citing a 1987 report of the Political Bureau, Ayoade, Akinsanya and Ojo (2014) note:

Nigeria inherited a weak social-political structure, a defective and unbalanced federation, an intensification of ethnic consciousness and rivalries...and an inexperienced leadership... Independent Nigeria, despite the euphoria that greeted her birth, was [saddled with a] crisis-ridden future (p344).

Put slightly differently, Ekeh (1975) says, “Our post-colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics” (p111). The questions then become pertinent: How do contesting historical ontologies of an African nation-state, which are invariably informed by colonial experience, explain modern-day divided realities, which bear striking resemblances to the past? Does the postcolonial reality explain the politicisation of ethnicity that led to ethnicisation of politics?

Most scholars are agreed that the British led an already polarised nation to independence; as such, they established the fact that the colonial experience is largely to be held responsible for Nigeria’s defective structure from the start (Ayoade, Akinsanya and Ojo, 2014; Osaghae, 2015; Ogundiya, 2005). Understanding colonialism, and post colonialism – its direct consequence, remains relevant to the understanding of the ontological realities of most modern African states (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 2012; Bhabha, 1994; Spivak 1999). For Peter Ekeh (1975), post colonialism directly produced two publics in Africa, instead of one as in everywhere else:



...the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in modern post-colonial Africa: the existence of two publics instead of one public, as in the West. Many of Africa's political problems are due to the dialectical relationships between the two publics (p91).

Another significant consequence of colonial history on the postcolonial nation-state relevant to this study is what Mahmud Mamdani called “the politicisation of indigeneity”. According to him, citing Bala Usman, contemporary ethnic nationalities were actually created in the process of the formation of the colonial state in Nigeria” (2012, p105). It is therefore important that we begin by looking a little into Nigeria’s colonial history to understand how the effect has not only constructed a modern nation-state, but may also be responsible for its inability to shake itself free of its dark past. This postcolonial theme will be further pursued in the subsequent chapters on theory and methodology in order to provide a common philosophical orientation and framework for the study. Specifically on elections and ethnic relations, many would dispute that the British left behind an enviable legacy.

### **2.2.1 Historical Background**

One hundred years after the amalgamation of disparate ethnic groups that formed two large British colonial protectorates into one nation-state, political integration and unity for Nigeria have remained elusive, but the leading role that the press played in the quest for self-rule is not in question (Diamond, 1988; Agbaje, 1992). However, there have existed lingering questions about whether journalists, many of who were activists as nationalists, and then became national leaders, could have used the power of newspaper-press, the dominant mass medium from the beginning, to construct a more stable and united nation, rather than what has become contemporary Nigeria.

The constitutional history of Nigeria, and introduction to Western forms of politics and governance began in 1861 with the conquest of Lagos and the dethronement of Oba Kosoko by the British. A year after, Lagos was declared a 'Crown Colony' and a legislative council was introduced to advise the governor in framing legislation for the new Colony (Coleman, 1958, p50).

Lord Frederick Lugard, the colonial Governor-General and architect of the Nigerian-state was perhaps the most dominant and influential of colonial figures in the formation of Nigeria. In the years between Lugard's amalgamation of 1914 and the late 1940s, ethnically moderated politics, was hardly part of the dominant discourse. However, from about 1947 and into the nation's independence in 1960 and beyond, ethnic and regional tensions became the staple feature in increasing measures in the Nigerian press. Lugard's bias in favour of the Muslim Northern Nigeria was not disguised (Diamond, 1988; Cole, 1975). His administration and those of his line of successors were characterised by differential and preferential treatment of ethnic groups, religions, and regions. As observed by Diamond (1988), the creation of Nigeria was not done for the benefit of Nigeria or Nigerians. The British "carved out a highly artificial nation for their own convenience" and economic benefits (p14).

In particular, Lord Lugard regarded Africans as "the child races of the world... people in a low stage of development". As such, he promoted "racial distinction" which he said should be accepted as "the true basis of African education" (Lugard, 1923, pp72-80 cited in Turaki, 2013, p33). Following up on this worldview, various colonial administrators were openly contemptuous of the educated African elite. Contemporary elites like Henry Carr, and journalists like Herbert Macaulay and Horatio Jackson were perpetually at loggerheads with colonial rulers in the press (Cole, 1975). A case in point: Lugard appointed six illiterate African paramount chiefs as members of the Consultative Council, ostensibly to 'represent their people'. The

indigenous press of the time openly denigrated the Governor-General, regarding the appointments as an open mockery and a twisted model of inclusive governance (Coleman, 1958). Indeed, scholars like Turaki stated that colonial rulers felt threatened by educated Africans and for this reason, they actively discouraged missionary schools (Turaki, 2013; Cole, 1975).

### **2.3.0 THE POLITICAL JOURNEY: FROM DUAL MANDATE TO MULTIPLE MANDATES**

Nigeria became a nation-state through the 1914 amalgamation of three existing British colonial entities: the Lagos Colony (which became a colony in 1862) and the protectorates of British Northern and Southern Nigeria. Between the 1914 amalgamation and the 1960 independence, British colonial rule over the entity called Nigeria lasted for 46 years. However, because Lord Lugard deliberately kept the administration of the North separate from that of the South, with different laws, different policies, and different educational systems; the nation did not function as one amalgamated unit for about 33 of those 46 years.

Colonial rulers created administrative structures where an outsized majority of members was expatriate civil servants and resident businessmen. Elections were introduced for the first time in 1922; before then, a minute representation of African members “held their seats at the pleasure of the government” (Enahoro, 1965, p64). But the 1922 political system was designed “to see that government was not caused any embarrassment. The elected members could only play the role of very impoverished or weak opposition” (Enahoro, 1965, p64).

#### **2.3.1 1947**

In 1947, a “federal” type of governance and regionalism was proposed; Nigeria was officially on the journey to becoming a federation (Cole,

1975). Reasons of administrative convenience were advanced as the principal motivation for the split of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria into Western and Eastern Nigeria. The move officially acknowledged and formalised the three main ethnic nationalities into semi-self governing regions in 1954. Ideally, federalism may have been the best option for Nigeria, however, the immediate consequence of this peculiar federalism was that it motivated its leaders and sent them back to their mothers' huts, as ethnic boundary lines were drawn - officially. By independence, in 1960, then only a short 13 years away, ethnic, and tribal cleavages that were barely visible in 1947 had become political gorges.

### **2.3.2 The Challenge of Belonging: The State of Continuous Social Unrest**

The country, as it exists today, is vastly different from the Nigeria the nationalists had imagined. In the early days of the <sup>1</sup>First Republic (1960-1966), there were ominous predictive signals of the bloody conflicts that have become commonplace today. Signs of instability were manifest, but politicians, lost in the euphoria of independence, declared them as normal teething problems of new nations. For instance, to Muhammadu Buhari, the current president, "while its First Republic lasted, Nigeria was the example and toast of Africa" (2010, p5). Yet, by 1963, in just three years of independence, the excitement of self-governance had whittled considerably. The first major storm that rocked the boat of state was the federal census of 1962; it became a litmus test of readiness for self-rule. The unresolved controversy over the census results became a divisive crisis that snowballed into the election years of 1964/1965. The nation reeled and muddled from the much disputed census to much more disputed

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<sup>1</sup> To distinguish between military regimes and civilian governments, politicians have numbered elected governments by Republics. Consequently, the First Republic lasted between 1960 and 1966; the Second Republic – 1979-1983; the Third Republic – 1993; and the Fourth Republic is still on-going since 1999.

elections of 1964/65 until the military, under the guise of wanting to save the nation, overthrew an elected government in 1966; the Civil War followed the year after.

### **2.3.3 Fast Forward 51 Years (1966-2017)**

In today's Nigeria, 'ethnic militias' are spearheading "political contests between the politics of identity and citizenship" (Gore and Pratten, 2003, p212). A state of continuous social unrest has been made worse by perceived disenfranchisement by virtually all major ethnic groups. As a result of real or imagined non-inclusion, some now openly canvass breaking away. As Gore and Pratten (2003) put it, "ethnic militias invoke the spectre of separatism..." (p212). In addition, feelings of oppression, exclusion, or marginalisation by other minority ethnic groups have also birthed more ethnic militias. As Joshua (2013) puts it, "The inability of the state to perform its constitutional duties of maintaining law and order, justice and providing social services for the people has culminated in the emergence of ethnic militias" in virtually all parts of the country (p330). They emerged as defenders of whichever oppressed groups they claimed to represent. Gore and Pratten (2003), submit that some of these militias are further driven by "ethnic chauvinism, and vigilantism against crime and 'moral degradation'" (p212).

Some of the ethnic militias and pressure groups in Nigeria include: the O'dua People's Congress (OPC), the Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys, the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), and the Igbo People Congress (IPC). Others include the Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the dreaded Boko Haram.

While several of them are only engaged in rhetorical warfare with the state, some of them are armed and, have overtime, constituted

themselves into agents of terror across the nation. Describing the situation, Ajayi (2013) states, “a more dangerous dimension has been brought into the picture in the form of the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram movement” (p141). The situation has led to further social and political destabilisation, which has in turn fuelled economic stagnation.

Nigeria's unemployment rate as at June 2015, was given as 8.2% by the National Bureau of Statistics, a rise from 7.5% in the first quarter of the same year (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015, p4). These figures do not account for the gross underemployment situation where graduates are left with little alternatives but to take on roles far below their qualifications. The National Bureau of Statistics (2015) reports that the underemployment rate rose from 16.6% in the first quarter of 2015 to 18.3% in the second quarter (p4).

Gross mismanagement of funds and looting of the national treasury have not allowed Nigeria to realise its economic potentials and the country is in a situation where the few 'feast' on the commonwealth of all. Segun Joshua (2013), a political scientist, perhaps, best expressed the feeling of discontent by virtually all ethnic groups in the nation:

The Ogonis felt neglected, the oil producing states felt cheated, the northern minorities felt left out, the West felt robbed, the core North felt they only held the titles but real power has been elsewhere, the East has always felt oppressed and marginalized” (p331).

#### **2.3.4 A Failing Democracy?**

Democracy failed early in Nigeria. The first elected civilian administration lasted barely six tumultuous years; the second, four years of wholesale and high-end corruption, and the third, though elected in 1993, it never took off. Failure of elected civil governments to govern well always gave the military needed excuses to intervene in

governance; it led to the first military *coup d'état* in 1966, and the fourth in 1983. Over time, leadership and governance became a revolving door for successions of military rulers and dictators with only a brief interlude of one civilian administration. Thus, in the first 39 years (1960-1999) of Nigeria's existence, the military ruled for nearly 30 years. What then was the role of the press before and after independence?

## **2.4.0 POLITICS, PRESS, AND NIGERIA**

### **2.4.1 The Pre-Independence Press and the Anti-Colonial Struggle**

This section deals with historical sketches of the evolution of early newspaper-press in Nigeria. But more significantly, it traces the origins of politicisation of ethnicity and the role of the press in the development. The newspaper-press existed when the territory that would later be called Nigeria was littered with scattered trading posts of the British Royal Niger Company, hedged in some place between the two British Colonies of Calabar and Lagos (Coleman, 1958) in the Gulf of Guinea off the West African Coast. By 1914, when the Southern and Northern protectorates were forged to become one political entity, the press was already in existence for 55 years of unbroken, even if erratic and hyperactive, service in parts of the country. According to Omu (1978), between 1859 and 1914, Nigeria witnessed the rise and fall of over 40 press publications, long before the name *Nigeria*, was even imagined. Before the 1914 amalgamation, there were newspapers that already carried the name Nigeria in their mastheads such as the *Nigerian Times*, several years before amalgamation (Omu, 1978).

During this period, newspapers in the protectorates had “constituted themselves into a potent opposition to the British administration of

the West Coast of Africa, particularly Nigeria” (Sobowale, 1985, p29) as the “Indigenous African newspapers were almost unavoidably highly critical of the colonial administration” (Omu, 1968, p279). An emerging educated elite established newspapers, for use in questioning colonialism and demanding self-rule. Soon enough, a national press emerged, which in direct response to the political exigencies of the time grew to “become a plague to colonialism” (Nwankwo *et al.*, 1993, p2).

Kopytoff (1965) explains: “the newspapers of this period were often filled with ‘vitriolic comments’ on the policies and actions of the British colonial administrations” (cited in Ajibade, 2010, p252). According to Sobowale (1985), the contents of the newspapers were so critical that the opening decades of the twentieth century marked the beginning of government’s regulation of the newspaper industry through various laws that were enacted “to stem the growing power and popularity of the press” (1985, p29) as “colonial administrators sought to control them” (Omu, 1968, p298). In Sobowale’s view, the journalists and the nationalist press were very influential because “they were able to appeal to the political instinct of the people” (1985, p30) and they were the “most effective constitutional weapon for ventilating grievances and influencing the trend of events” (Omu, 1968, p279).

#### **2.4.2 Politics, Ethnicity, and the Press**

Somewhere between the late 1920s and 1930s, the Nigerian press began to shed its ‘Black Englishman’s’ ownership image. The *Black Englishmen* were mostly freed slaves from Liberia, the United Kingdom, Jamaica and other places in the then British Empire, trying to establish themselves as the bourgeoisie of the emerging Nigerian state. Natives or indigenous Nigerians began to own and operate newspaper houses. As stated in the previous chapter, this was about the period when older and former influential papers like the *Lagos*



*Weekly Record* and the *Lagos Daily News* went out of circulation; more recently established papers like the *Daily Times* and the *Daily Service* were barely surviving. It was also the era in which two great publishers died – Horatio Jackson, who had co-published the *Lagos Weekly Record* with his father died, and Herbert Macaulay, publisher of the *Daily News*.

Then came, in 1937, the *West African Pilot* and Nnamdi Azikiwe its publisher; Azikiwe set a new tone for the press and for politics. The arrival of the *West African Pilot* also marked the “transition from the society of...‘black Englishmen’ to that of educated Nigerians who had no roots in British guardianship” (Omu, 2000, p60). The replacement new owners/operators were native born who had little or no umbilical connection to England except for their sound English or American Education.

Journalists of the nationalist period (1920-1940) were consumed by one driving ambition – gain independence from the British. Enahoro (2000) noted that:

Colonialism...and Nationalism had great influences in shaping early Nigerian journalism... the educated elite used the press as a means of propaganda. Journalism became a political weapon, a social force that championed the people’s rights and liberties. Nationalism and Journalism became synonymous. The [more prominent] journalists were also the leading nationalists...Herbert Macaulay...Azikiwe...Awolowo (p18).

The origins and wobbly substructure of ethnic politics in Nigeria, and the enlistment of the press as an ally in ethno-regional political warfare began to be publicly exhibited in the early 1940s, after a short but purposeful nationalist era. Political elite began to use the press to openly mobilise based on ethnic ideology. In this regard, the press became complicit in helping politicians to achieve their “demagogic

ends, to manipulate one section or interest against another” (Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991, p22).

### **2.4.3 Elective Democracy and the Press: Origins**

In 1922, Governor Hugh Clifford reconstituted the Legislative Council and modified it to include a minority of four (4) elected seats out of a 46 member Council. The marginal change may have seemed palliative at the time, and it was. In essence, the Council was still guided by the Lugardian worldview; it was “so carefully composed that nothing startling or unexpected could ever happen in it or to it” (Enahoro, 1965, p64). However, the effect of the Clifford Constitution was that it opened the Pandora’s Box concerning elections and political participation actively stimulating the formation of political organisations. Clifford stirred up a voracious appetite for elective office in Nigeria. However, the operation of the new Constitution was limited to the South, in an amalgamated Nigeria of eight years. And it would remain so for 25 more years in the new nation that was still governed by the Lugardian ‘dual mandate’ policies which effectively was, two systems of government in one country where “the twain did not meet” (Enahoro, 1965, p64).

As the elected members of the Council grew in political sophistication, they became ingenious, always finding ways to amplify their voices through their use of the press. These marginal African elected officials established a liaison with the press so that questions in the Council became merely a means of obtaining information upon which debates followed on the pages of newspapers. Thus, “the press was in the vanguard of the progressive movement in Nigeria, leading rather than reflecting public opinion and moulding rather than reporting political developments” (Enahoro, 1965, p65).

#### 2.4.4 The Origins of Ethno-Tribal Politics of Exclusion versus Inclusion

The indigenous elites of Lagos in the 1930s were somewhat a clearly defined homogenous elite group. Ige (1995), noted “newspapers published in Lagos before Zik (Azikiwe) started the *West African Pilot* hardly ever mentioned the ethnic origins of whoever they reported on” (Ige, 1995, p27). There was hardly anyone outside of the city elite worth reporting on; most people in the social and political world were British expatriates, ‘Westernised’ Yorubas and émigrés from other places like Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Brazil, and the United Kingdom. The rest of the people were mostly ordinary Lagosians of Yoruba origin, who were largely ignored by the press.

All began to change, beginning in the late 1930s into the 1940s: the demography of non-Yoruba residents and an educated middle class of other ethnic groups grew rapidly; with the growth, came ethnic and class tension. Significantly affected was the relationship between the old Lagos Yoruba residents on the one hand, and the newcomers comprising of Igbos and other ethnic entities, including Yorubas from the hinterland. Most of the new comers were professionals educated abroad, people like, Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, the first Igbo doctor; Louis Mbanefo, the first Igbo lawyer, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, whom Sklar (1963) described as the “the first great Igbo leader of the twentieth century” (p55). In addition, “an ever-increasing number of industrious Igbos from the densely populated East had settled in quest of economic opportunities” (Sklar, 1963, p54).

The new arrivals demanded inclusion and a footing in the narrow political space from the more established occupiers; it was the genesis of overtly political ethnic tensions, which was played out on the pages of the press. Ige posits that the press, particularly the *West African Pilot*, began what seemed at first, a harmless ethnic contention, when it began to overtly celebrate news about the first so-and-so from Igbo land, and excluding achievements of other tribes, particularly the

Yoruba. According to Ige, Azikiwe and those who opposed him dragged everything about Nigeria into a deep quagmire of chauvinistic “tribal or ethnic politics and the stench has covered this country ever since” (Ige, 1995, p28).

The 1941 intra-party candidates' selection process of the Nigerian Youth Movement may very well be the genesis of the ethnicisation of the electoral process in Nigeria, and the press played an active supportive role. Enahoro said political pundits of the time assumed that the process, which preceded the Legislative Council election of 1941, would be “a mere ritual, with a predictable result” (Enahoro, 1965). But it became, perhaps, the crisis point in time in which ethnicity, as a complication-inducing factor, began to corrode the nascent foundations of the Nigerian body politic. The press of the day, particularly the *Daily Service* and the *West African Pilot*, the two leading political papers took firm and opposite end positions in the ethnic and personality divide that ensued.

The irony is that many modern-day narratives celebrate the event, viewing the era as one in which Nigerian politics was ‘detrified’ and free of overt ethnic considerations. This view is understandable: the two candidates – Samuel Akisanya and Ernest Ikoli – received support across ethnic lines (Chief Awolowo, a Yoruba by tribe, backed Ikoli, a non-Yoruba from Eastern Nigeria and Dr Azikiwe, an Igbo man backed Akisanya, a non-Igbo from Western Nigeria). The *West African Pilot* and the *Daily Service* went to town across ethnic divide in the effort to build support for their respective candidates; Azikiwe’s *Pilot* for Akisanya, and Awolowo’s *Daily Service* for Ikoli (Ige, 1995).

According to Ige (1995), the Yoruba elite of Lagos began “to unite and fight Zik” (p29). Using the *Pilot* as his bully pulpit, Azikiwe fought back and began to champion the cause of the Igbo, whom he said, “God had not created to be a slave to anyone” (Ige, 1995, p29). *West African Pilot* encouraged the formation and active promotion of town

and tribal unions (Ige, 1995) including the Ibibio State Union, the Igbo State Union, but most vehemently opposed the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*. According to Ige, this opposition to *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* by Azikiwe and his paper “alienated Yorubas” (p29). “Inside Stuff”, Azikiwe’s newspaper column was written twice a week. It treated the Nigerian reading public to what Sklar (1963) called, “pungent, incisive, sometimes malevolent, but always informed commentaries on Nigerian and world affairs” (p51).

#### 2.4.5 Death of a Promising Start

One notable and immediate consequence of Akisanya’s loss was that Azikiwe with his fellow Igbos in tow, and Akisanya with his ethnic group of *Ijebu* supporters walked out of the Youth Movement. The struggle “was fatal to the Youth Movement”; it never recovered to contest another election as one united party (Sklar, 1963, p54). Alayande (2010) said the NYM was a promising beginning but “internal divisions in which ethnic loyalties emerged triumphant” (p104) stopped it short. The breakup set an unsteady foundation for ethnic and tribal politics in Nigeria, in which “party lines were sharply drawn on the basis of ethnicity and regionalism” (Alayande, 2010, p107).

Out of the ashes of the Nigerian Youth Movement, ethno-regional splinter parties emerged. Thus, alignments of tribal or ethnic support behind political leaders became one of the cardinal legacies. Hereafter, the ethnic factor became a permanent feature of disproportionate significance in the Nigerian electoral process. The conflict birthed two ethnic-based Southern political movements, which became the basis of the two parties that emerged from the Western and Eastern regions eventually. Ige (1995) records that the crisis of 1941 was a factor and part of “the genesis of tribal politics in Nigeria” (p27). According to Sklar, Azikiwe’s role virtually destroyed the multi-tribal character of

the Movement. And he succeeded because of *West African Pilot* (1963), with active contributions from other newspapers of the time.

### 2.5.0 SIGNIFICANT PERIODS IN THE NIGERIAN PRESS

This section focuses on the genesis of the press in Nigeria through six time periods. These include: 1) the Early Press, 1859-1920; 2) the Nationalist Press, 1920-1944; 3) the pre-Independent Political Press, 1944-1960; 4) the post-Independent Partisan Press 1960-1966; 5) the Military Press, 1966-1979; 1983-1999 and 6) the Post-Military Press, 1999-2011. Though these time demarcations are my own creation for expediency, the beginning and ending of each era are tied to particular historical events, which affected the character and nature of the press. These delineations, notwithstanding, it is important to post a note that the timelines, as with most historical segmentations, are not as cast in stone as they might appear.

#### 2.5.1 The Early Press (1859-1920)

In the period between 1890 and 1930, émigrés or returnee freed slaves from the UK, the Caribbean, Brazil, and Sierra Leone dominated the press as owners and journalists. The early period of Nigerian journalism is marked by two distinct phases - the era of religious press, when the press was used mainly for the propagation of the Gospel and for literacy, and the phase of pioneers, which marked a major shift from the era of religious press. In the second phase, the press took on the role of political opposition, policy critics, advocates, a crucial information source, and educator.

Some of the great names in journalism of this period were John Payne Jackson, and his son, Thomas Horatio Jackson, who, like a tag-team, for 40 years published the *Lagos Weekly Record* from 1890 to 1930 (Omu, 1978). Others were Ernest Ikoli, publisher of the *African*

*Messenger*, who in 1926 became the founding editor of the legendary *Daily Times*; and Herbert Macaulay who published the *Lagos Daily News*. Horatio Jackson and Macaulay took the nation's press combative tradition to new levels. They used their firebrand journalism to vehemently oppose the colonial authorities and passionately supported an indigenous political agenda (Omu, 1978; Duyile, 2009). According to Duyile (2009), the Jackson's *Weekly Record* was by far the best paper in West Africa in its time; and on account of its uncompromising editorials, it was denied even the British expatriate non-government business advertisements. For Ernest Ikoli, a contemporary of Jackson's, the newspaper's popularity was often measured by the intensity of its assault on the colonial government. Jackson's "pungent criticisms expressed in lengthy editorials always hung on the edge of sedition" (Coleman, 1958, p184). It is obvious from the above that the early press took a strong stand against established colonial political structures and government.

### **2.5.2 The Nationalist Press (1920-1944)**

From the 1920s and up until the mid-1940s, indigenous or native-born owners and publishers began to step to the plate. The tone changed: they were demanding for new political arrangements – for participation in electoral politics. This new brand of journalism was on a warpath against the British colonial establishment, and anyone who was deemed to collaborate with them in the economic exploitation, social and political domination of the land and people. New papers were born as quickly as others were dying off. It was also a period of growth in the newspaper management and production technology, which enabled the first set of daily papers to be established in the country.

The genesis of organised politics in Nigeria also signified the beginning of a new era in newspaper journalism in the country. As earlier noted, press initiative and vigorous campaign for "elective

franchise” forced the hand of Governor Clifford to enact Nigeria’s first Constitution in 1922. Newspaper journalists, rather quickly, organised to take advantage of the new era dawning, as initiators and promoters of the first two political parties in Nigeria, one of which was the NNNDP. As a result, newspapers became “outlets for electoral policies and propaganda” (Omu, 1978, p 60).

Thomas Jackson, the publisher of the *Weekly Record*, and Herbert Macaulay, publisher of *Lagos News* became the brains behind the formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNNDP), arguably the most prominent political party in its time. And according to Omu (1978), two newspapers, the *Nigerian Spectator* of Dr. Richard Akinwande Savage and the *Nigerian Advocate* of S. H. Braithwaite, were founded purposely as electioneering newspapers.

The Clifford Constitution provided for the election of four (non-appointed) members of the Legislative Council – three were from Lagos and one from Calabar (Ezera, 1960). This first Constitution opened the door to partisan politics and, therefore, election coverage by newspapers. The first Nigerian daily newspaper, the *Lagos Daily News* became “the stormy mouthpiece” of Macaulay, easily the most prominent politician in the first era of electoral politics in Nigeria (Omu, 1978, p64).

The journalists of this era did not really see a discernible distinction between their roles as journalists and their calling as politicians. According to Dare (2000), they wanted to use journalism “to change society and advance their own political fortunes” (p15). Media scholars, Golding and Elliot (1979), in their much-referenced statement, captured the inter-dependent relationship between the media and politics. They observed that the Nigerian Press was born of “anti-colonial protests, baptised in the waters of nationalist’s propaganda and matured into party politics” (p31), though many will dispute that the work of the nationalists was mere propaganda.



Many members of the educated elite were nationalist-politicians, journalists, and newspaper proprietors; and in some cases, these roles were combined in one person. They used “their newspapers to articulate anti-colonial positions and mobilise the people and public opinion against the colonial authority” (Oso, Odunlami and Adaja, 2011, p3). One success story from this era was the *Daily Times*, established in 1926 as the second daily newspaper in Nigeria. Choosing to be non-partisan in politics and independent in outlook, many regarded it as an establishment paper from inception. The paper raised the professional standard of journalism and introduced market-driven innovations in production technology, marketing and distribution, and general management to the newspaper industry in Nigeria. The *Daily Times'* rapid expansion and impact redefined professionalism in the journalism industry. It grew to become the paper of record and the paper that served as the point of reference in matters of news.

This period may be sub-divided into two broad phases: before, and after the Second World War. Before the Second World War, there were agitations by politicians for inclusion as co-participants in governance, and for non-whites to be treated with dignity, fairness and some respect. Galadima and Enighe (2001), observed that the period was perhaps “the most intensive, radical and militant media onslaught on colonialism” (p27). Another feature of this era was direct ownership of newspapers by political parties or politicians.

Of the four noteworthy newspapers that formed the foundation of modern Nigerian press, three were directly affiliated with one political party or another. First, the *Daily Times*, which viewed itself as an “independent” paper, was seen by some others as sympathetic to the colonial administration. The paper was founded in 1926 with Ernest Ikoli as the founding editor; he later became a leading political figure. Second, *West African Pilot* (1937) unarguably the most influential paper of the time, whose founder and Editor-In-Chief was Dr Nnamdi

Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC Party and first president of independent Nigeria. The *Pilot*, established in 1937 became the undisputed star nationalist paper of the period. The paper was unsurpassed and unsparing in its criticism of colonial rule (Nwankwo *et al.*, 1993). Its popularity was extraordinary among the growing elite and others, such that by the 1940s it had reached an unprecedented daily circulation of 30,000 (Nwankwo, 1993)

Third, there was the *Daily News*, (founded in 1925), which served as the powerful unequivocal political voice of the Nigerian National Democratic Party owned by Herbert Macaulay; it lasted up till about 1948. And lastly, there was the *Daily Service*, (founded in 1933), which became the significant mouthpiece of the Nigerian Youth Movement; its influence was gradually eclipsed by the arrival of Azikiwe's *West African Pilot*. In 1949, it was rested to make way for the formation of the *Nigerian Tribune*, a paper steeped in the politics of the Western Region in Nigeria. Of all the papers, it is only the *Tribune* that is still in circulation today, 68 years after it was founded. The *Tribune* remains the oldest Nigerian daily paper to have been in circulation for that long.

After the Second World War, the language and tone of journalists changed: the demand was for outright independence and self-rule. It was the period of migration from a nationalist press to political newspapers and as Coleman (1955) notes, "a territorial nationalist movement progressively takes on the attributes of a territorial political party" (p102). From a historical point of view, the political landscape of the late 1930s and 1940s was the most nationalistic in which the emerging leaders were perhaps most united. The press of the time and the politicians had one objective – to rid Nigeria of colonial rulers as Aimufua (2007) puts it, "the history of the struggle to realise a Nigerian State free from colonial oppression was mainly expressed through the Nigerian press" (p70). However, with the gradual institutionalisation of political associations and processes, and along

with a changing political landscape, the character and tone of the press began to change also.

### **2.5.3 The Pre-Independence Political Press (1944-1960)**

The third significant era of the Nigerian press is the overtly political and partisan press. Most of the daily and weekly newspapers in the country before and shortly after independence were private newspapers, and politicians owned them (Abati, 2000; Ajibade 2010; Tador, 1996). As party publications, the papers expressed “a great deal of enthusiasm and support for particular political parties” (Edeani, 1985 cited in Ajibade, 2010, p253). While political papers provided some form of needed plurality of choices, they were unable to rise above ethnic jingoism in their coverage (Abati, 2000). Their unbridled advocacy for ethnic interests coupled with their style of combativeness not only had negative effects on the nation's political and social development, it also created persistent tensions or a semblance of war in the nation (Abati, 2000).

Regional, individual, or party-based ownership structure reflected ethnic segmentation and sympathies in coverage and patronage, serving a constant, but unhealthy menu of “vitriolic vituperations against the groups' opponents (often with) little or no consideration for the merits of the issues involved” (Folarin, 1998, p36). The result was that most of these newspapers were unable to see or promote national interests or a united nation (Tador, 1996, p48). In character, Omu (1978) noted that newspapers of this period “provided a remarkable example of over-zealous and irresponsible partisanship and recklessness” (p248).

Whereas there may be nothing wrong with politicians or political parties owning papers, what made the Nigerian case peculiar was that virtually all the available papers were segregated along party, region,

or ethnic interests (Sobowale, 1985, p31 cited in Ajibade, 2010). With the exception of the *Daily Times*, partisan papers almost entirely dominated the journalism space. There was hardly any other independent newspaper of note that was not party-owned or aligned in the significant middle ground. This trend of extremities denied discerning readers a pluralism of views and opinions.

Newspapers began to freely affiliate with political parties, as they were being established, from the mid-1940s. The *West African Pilot* had been an unabashed nationalist paper but, as Azikiwe became less a journalist-publisher and more a politician, the paper became more and more the voice of his political party. After the formation of the NCNC in 1944, many began to see the *Pilot* more in terms of a party, or an ethnic, or a regional paper. From the North, came *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*, edited by Mallam Abubakar Iman. *Gaskiya* was published in Hausa language; it began publication in 1939. The other Northern paper, a weekly from the North was *Nigerian Citizen*, which began publication in English much later. Chief Awolowo established the *Tribune* in 1949 to amplify his political voice and extend his reach. There were other papers, like the *Daily Times*, the only acknowledged non-partisan paper, even though it was often suspected of, and accused of being pro-government (Duyile, 1989).

In pursuance of their political dreams, Azikiwe and Awolowo began to establish newspapers in key Nigerian cities – Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Warri, Enugu, Onitsha, Calabar, and Jos. Most papers in this era were owned or strongly affiliated to one political party or another. Apart from Azikiwe and Awolowo, many other notable journalists from this era went on to play prominent political roles, including Anthony Enahoro, Lateef Jakande, Bisi Onabanjo, MCK Ajuluchukwu, and several others.

#### 2.5.4 The Post-Independence Partisan Press (1960-1966)

The fourth significant period is the period after independence, leading up to the civil unrest in various parts of the country and the Civil War. After Britain, the perceived common enemy had departed,

the Nigerian journalist was faced with new problems of adjustment to the new situation... There was the need to change the tempo of criticism and agitation to the chorus of nation building, which is a more complicating song (Enahoro, 2000, p18).

This period saw the beginning of government-funded media institutions, newspapers being paramount. In 1961, the Federal Government established the *Morning Post* as a daily, and the *Sunday Post*, as a weekly. Regional Governments followed suit by establishing their own newspapers. Eastern Region established the *Eastern Nigeria Outlook*, Western Region, the *Daily Sketch*, and the Northern Regional government acquired the *Nigerian Citizen* and completely rebranded it as the *New Nigerian*.

As governments and political parties' ownership patterns of the press dominated the media; professional lines began to blur. Journalists who could not toe the party or government lines left the profession altogether. Those who remained, Dare noted, failed to clearly separate their professional roles from the demands of their affiliated political parties or governments; "for all practical purposes, they were party organs financed by the public" (Dare, 2000, p20).

So intense was the rivalry and the bitterness among the contending political groups that editors and the staffers working on newspapers of different political persuasions, were hardly on speaking terms (Omu, 1978). The duties of the press as Bisi Onabanjo, one of the leading journalists of the era put it was, "to carry out as far as it is possible the policy" of their principals (Jose, 1987, p52). The high degree of professional breaches in the media was well catalogued by U.A. James (1984), manifesting through "character assassinations, false accusations, blackmail and misinterpretation of facts... to the extent

that facts were muzzled and whole media organs became megaphones and machineries for propaganda to political parties and vested interests” (p33). This pattern of journalism practice would return during the post military civilian politics civil rule, indicative of the fact that journalism had become a firm tool in the hand of political elite or subjugation of opponents.

### **2.5.5 The Military and the Press (1966-1979; 1983-1999)**

The relationship between the military and the press was a troubled relationship. With time, “prodemocracy journalists and their newspapers and newsmagazines became the strongest opposition force to the military regimes” (Adebanwi, 2011, p49). From the first Military Head of State, General Ironsi, to the last one in 1999, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, military relationship with the press was tense. The press “became the pivot on which the larger opposition to military rule and the emergent civil society rotated” (Adebanwi, 2011, p49) and they “kept alive the commitment to democracy and sought to establish some kind of accountability during periods of authoritarian rule” (Diamond, 1990, p1).

Military governments are oppressive by nature, but the press became the mouthpiece of the oppressed people in their call for democracy and a return of the military to their barracks. As Diamond (1990), also notes, the press held the military accountable for their actions while in government; they played their role as the fourth estate of the realm, even while under military dictatorship. Of all the eight military regimes that ruled the country, hardly any had it easy with the press.

When General Ironsi came to power by a coup in 1966, the nation was already on the verge of disintegration. One of Ironsi’s greatest problems was media communication, a problem that “plagued him throughout his tenure of office” (Olayiwola, 1991, p37). His short-lived

regime of six months marked the beginning of a tense and turbulent military-press relationship that lasted through every military regime. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon became the second military head of state following the Northern officers-led counter coup; General Ironsi was assassinated. The nation was now even closer to disintegration, the direct result of full-scale bloody ethnic conflicts that birthed a pogrom of the Igbos in the Northern Region; the situation plummeted the nation directly into a civil war within the next year.

The Gowon administration did relatively better than Ironsi's; he "experienced much of cooperation from the press in its nascent stage, and during the civil war" (Alimi, 2011, p51). However, when by 1974 he kept shifting the date of returning power to civilians, the press and politicians became impatient with him and his military cohorts; a third successful coup in the history of Nigeria unseated General Gowon in 1975. The regime of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo, on taking power, immediately set a date for the return of government to civilians, but military tension with the press continued. As Olayiwola (1991) puts it, "The first major step taken by the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime regarding the Nigerian press and political communications was the acquisition of 60 per cent of the shares in the *Daily Times* and the total takeover (ownership) of the *New Nigerian* by 31 August, 1975" (p37). In addition, the regime also enacted laws to gag the press (Olayiwola, 1991).

Shehu Shagari's government to which General Obasanjo handed over power in 1979 lasted for only four years in office. The military sacked President Shagari's elected civilian government in December of 1983. The new Head of State was another northerner, General Muhammadu Buhari who declared a massive onslaught against the press. His government "made it clear that, like all previous regimes, it had no intention of letting itself be held accountable" (Diamond, 1991, p75). The Buhari regime could be described as a black period for the Nigerian press as several of the activist journalists were jailed and the

press was persecuted. Abdulraheem and Olukoshi (1986), report that during the Buhari regime,

Journalists were arrested for publishing things the regime did not like. Scores of noted journalists, Haroun Adamu, Tunde Thompson, Rufai Ibrahim, Nduka Irabor and Tai Solarin were among those who were imprisoned (p78).

General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari's regime and installed himself in power for eight years as president, albeit a self-declared unelected military president. Babangida's era was another bitter tale of press-government relations: he also introduced several measures in order to tame the press including the "promulgation of decrees to gag the press" (Olayiwola, 1991, p37). Under his leadership, "journalists were imprisoned, newspapers/magazines were proscribed" (Olayiwola, 1991, p38). Larry Diamond (1991), summed up the Babangida regime's lack of concern for accountability and its persecution of press critics as tragic for the nation.

General Sani Abacha unseated an ambiguous interim political arrangement that General Babangida had made when his own eight-year rule became more and more politically untenable. General Abacha, perhaps, had the worst relationship with the press; his position was not at all disguised; he "warned journalists to be careful what they report and write" (Adeyemi, 1995, p7). Under his regime, being a journalist or a newspaper publisher critical of his regime became a matter of life or death. According to Olukotun (2002), "a section of the media located mainly in the South West area of the country, drawing on a tradition of activism, even militancy, dating back to the colonial days, invented a guerrilla strategy to oppose the military" (p318). As Abacha handled the press, so the press handled his regime until his sudden death.

General Abdulsalami Abubakar became the Nigerian military head of state, following the sudden but unexplained death of General Abacha



in June of 1998. General Abubakar's relationship with the press could best be described as the most cordial any military head of state had with the Nigerian press. This is understandable; his tenure was brief, just about one year, and he had one main agenda: return power back to an elected democratic government, which the press applauded. In spite of the relatively good relationship that General Abubakar seemed to have had with the press, some of his economic policies negatively affected the press. His "imposition of 5 [five] per cent Value Added Tax on newspapers in the 1999 budget stiffened further the climate in which many newspapers found themselves" (Olukotun, 2000, p34).

The military in most parts of the world have little patience or regard for news peddling journalists. In the case of Nigeria, there was a regional, if not an ethnic twist to an already toxic relationship under a normal situation. Because most of the military rulers in Nigeria were from the North, and the press had a greater presence in the South West, some people read the endless battle between the military and the press as a battle between the North and the South in another form. Thus, the sour relationship between the military and the press was given an ethnic colouration.

#### **2.5.6 The Press and the Fourth Republic (1999-2011)**

In the years leading up to 1999, the Nigerian press had basically transformed into an activist (anti-military, pro-democracy) press. The newspaper and magazine press led the onslaught against the military dictatorship in Nigeria. It is important to point out that governments – the States and Federal - still predominantly owned and controlled other media platforms - radio and television systems. The few fledgling private radio and television stations were dependent on government patronage and licences to run their businesses.

After 1999, hard-hitting magazine-press had lost their lustre and many of "the main newspapers are those established by politicians" (Oso,

2012, p29). With news now gradually available on demand, the fate of weekly news magazines was sealed. In the Fourth Republic, no political parties directly owned newspapers, but according to Oso, “the political sympathies of the main national newspapers are quite evident,” and their owners served as their links to the political parties. As such, in the new millennium, most papers’ political partisanship was vaguely disguised but only to the uninitiated reader: they intensely shadowed the partisan political and business interests of their owners.

However, by 2011, a worldwide media revolution was on-going and Nigeria was not immune to it. The gathering, presentation, and dissemination of news had changed considerably, and an array of new forms of mass and multiple media systems had also emerged. The assortment of new media platforms was bewildering: it was textual, auditory, and visual; and it was mobile – all at the same time. The new platform was not limiting but flexible: it could be presented in hard print or in e-format on mobile hand-held devices, on tablets as well as laptops and on screens of all shapes and sizes in real time. Text, especially in-depth news-text, was no longer the exclusive monopoly of the newspaper-press. By 2011, a hugely different media environment emerged: more fragmented and flexible; the voices more opinionated and more vociferous; the goal more to entertain than to educate or even inform.

Consequently for Nigeria, the strong voice of direction that the press once provided was lost in the new media mayhem. As news became more and more multi-sourced; the newspaper-press became weaker in its ability to influence and provide much needed thought-leadership, as it once did. The press, as a single medium and all by itself, could no longer determine popular will; it must now depend on other media forms to do so, in a convergent environment. While the press may not have entirely lost its power to influence government policy, its ability to affect decision-making has been reduced considerably. Although,

according to Oso (2011), journalists have continued to be critical of “the policies and wrongdoings by state officials” (p30), it was no longer possessed the strong voice that once took on the mighty British Empire or the massive military hegemony.

As the influence and power of traditional media diminishes and that of the social media increases, the frequency of state-directed attacks on the press has reduced when compared with the earlier years under military or even in the Second Republic. Oso (2011), reports that the relationship between the press and the state “has relatively improved since 1999, Nigerian journalists are still subjected to intimidation, harassment brutalisation and arbitrary arrest and detention” (p45). The new media forms have begun to play important roles “in the monitoring of how transparent the Nigerian elections are. This happened in 2011 (Adelaja, 2013). Nigerians, according to Campbell (2013), have begun to use social media “to counter blatant election abuse. The enthusiastic engagement of young people and women who hitherto had played lesser roles in Nigerian elections was a positive sign of change” (pp123–124). While this assertion may be true comparative with the past, the reality is that the level of usage and engagement is still significantly low to have any serious impact.

### **2.6.0 THE MEDIA IN NIGERIA: SCOPE AND CHARACTER**

Since its early history, the Nigerian Press, now well over one hundred and fifty years old, has had close affinity with the political class, and been almost exclusively captured by the elites, whether political, military or the business elites. Even today as a presidential democracy, Nigeria’s colonial past and long years of military rule have left deep markers, which have made social inequality more evident and more difficult to eradicate.

However, the overwhelming control of, or authority over the media, particularly the traditional media, has come from politicians and

governments. Vibrant as Nigeria's media have been acclaimed to be, their main preoccupation until lately has been partisan politics, of both civil and military, in government or out of it. Of late, the character of the media has shifted to strong commercial orientation, moving more in the direction of entertainment even though politics continues to occupy a significant portion of its engagement. Nigeria's main media export attests to this fact in *Nollywood*, the nation's homegrown film and video industry. *Nollywood* bestows on Nigeria, a strong inter-African and black diaspora media presence.

Survival imperatives have joined politics as key motivators that animate the Nigerian media. Elite domination of the industry inadvertently alienates the so-called common man as subject and consumer of media products. Their role as owners, objects of focus, participants, and primary consumers of media products has meant that media coverage and content target middle class and urban dwellers, almost exclusively. The centrality of elites' role and involvement in media has also meant that the choice of language and (urban) location are determined in relations to elites' needs.

A new form of commercial motivation now directly erodes the media's erstwhile public service orientation. Because it is now more profit oriented and focused, content production and dissemination have become more urban-driven. Technically, and in the more pervasive usage of the concept, Nigeria does not have "community media"; it has been deeply politicised. Whereas in the past, civic interests, expressed through various forms of public service broadcasting, were central to the mission of the government-funded media organisations, this has changed gradually since the *commercialisation* of state-owned media enterprises, which had been dominant in the nation's media space up until about twenty years ago.

### 2.6.1 Media Ownership

The rate of failure of, particularly, newspaper titles in Nigeria is alarming. According to Agbaje (1992),

newspapers which were not published in English, did not have strong political affiliations to the major political parties, did not seek to influence national politics or which did not belong to one government or the other, to have very short life-spans, (152).

Setting up newspapers has become almost the exclusive preserve of the rich and deep pocket politicians. Listed below are 15 of the leading Nigerian newspaper titles; of which politicians own at least 60%, while the rest are owned by rich elites with varying degrees of political affiliation or leanings.

*Table 2.1: Some Nigerian Newspaper Titles*

The Guardian	Daily Trust	Tribune*
The Punch	Independent*	National Mirror*
Vanguard	Champion*	Leadership*
Thisday	Nation*	Daily Telegraph*
The Sun*	Compass**	Westerner**

\*Newspapers with direct political affiliations

\*\*The Compass and the Westerner were both owned by one politician who became a state governor. Not long after he left office, the Westerner ceased to exist and the Compass became an on line publication.

As most governments have significantly reduced their investments in newspaper publishing business, commercial interests have stepped in. And as media have become more engrossed as business or commercial ventures, their capacity to be watchdogs over governments and big businesses in their communities has diminished. Yet, for a nation of over 180 million people, the circulation figures of most average newspapers are abysmally low. There are few local language newspapers, many of which are obscure and irregular at newsstands.

### 2.6.2 Newspapers and Magazine Publications in Nigeria (Including Online Papers)

The Nigerian Press Council (NPC), in 2013 conducted an inventory of Newspapers and Magazines in the 36 states and FCT in which it recorded 267 newspapers and 128 magazines, making a total of 395 print media in Nigeria. But since the last review was carried out five years ago, it was necessary to verify which of the newspapers still exist. The meticulous verification proved useful as many of the publications listed by the NPC in 2013 have either gone online or have altogether ceased to exist. Table 2.2 shows the ones verified. Please see Appendix 8 for details.

*Table 2.2: Newspaper and Magazine Publications*

S/N	PUBLICATION	NUMBER OF TITLES	FREQUENCY	LANGUAGE
1.	Daily Newspapers	33	Daily	English
2.	Online Papers	17	Daily/ Real Time	English
3.	Community, State/Ethnic Newspapers	40	Mostly Twice Weekly/Monthly	English
4.	Monthly and Quarterly Publications	58	Monthly and Quarterly	English
5.	Publications in Indigenous Languages	25	Indeterminate Frequencies but mostly Fortnightly and Monthly	Hausa (12) Yoruba (9) Ibo (2) Igala (1) Tiv (1)
6.	Other Publications	79	Indeterminate Frequencies	English
	<b>Total Press Publications</b>	<b>252</b>		

Some of the language publications above are magazines, while others are papers; most of them are monthly publications. There are other publications with indeterminate appearances on the newsstand. Some are irregular and we imagine there are 79 of other publications; many

of them are community papers mostly published in English like *Izon Link*, *Anioma Trust*, *Okun People Magazine*, *Bakatsiniya*, e.t.c. Many of the daily newspapers above have weekend publications on Saturday and Sunday.

### 2.6.3 Radio

Radio is perhaps the most accessible medium to the non-elite Nigerian. The broadcast media was in the exclusive control of governments (Federal and States) until 1993 when broadcasting was deregulated, meaning the private sector could now participate. In the 20 years since, the number of private stations has exceeded those of government. In spite of this development, the rural dwellers and the urban poor are still grossly underserved because the private stations are interested in producing content that generates advertising income mainly, and the more state-owned stations are put under intense pressure to generate their own income, the less they pay attention to public service programming. In addition, most of the urban-located stations broadcast in English, with very few broadcasting exclusively in local languages or pidgin (creole) or bi or multi-lingual programming.

*Table 2.3: Summary of Radio Stations in Nigeria's Six Geo-Political Zones*

S/N	GEOPOLITICAL ZONE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS	TOTAL
1	North Central	21	28	8	57
2	North East	14	7	1	22
3	North West	25	22	4	51
4	South West	23	54	13	90
5	South East	13	24	15	52
6	South South	15	33	8	56
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>328</b>

### 2.6.4 Television

After over two decades since the deregulation of the broadcasting industry in Nigeria, the state and federal government owned stations still own and control a lion share of the television broadcasting stations in Nigeria. In the private sector, six licenced operators own 44 networked stations of which one operator, the African Independent Television (AIT) owns a network of about 26 stations across the nation with 14 stations in the North and 12 in the South; the North is mostly underserved by private TV stations. In terms of programming, most of the private stations devote a large portion of their airtime to entertainment while government stations are also chasing the commercialisation route to supplement their dwindling government funding support. Of the licenced private operators, most lean towards general programming with a lion share of airtime devoted to entertainment. Only Channels Television broadcasts exclusively news programmes. Silverbird Television on the other hand, broadcasts exclusively entertainment content. All the others are general programming; one of the stations broadcasts solely in Yoruba; three stations in mixed languages of Hausa/English, Yoruba/English, and Pidgin/ English.

*Table 2.4: Summary of Television Stations*

<i>S/N</i>	<i>OWNERSHIP</i>	<i>NUMBER OF STATIONS</i>	<i>BROADCAST FOCUS</i>	<i>LANGUAGE</i>
1.	Federal Government Owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA)	55	General	English
2.	State Government Owned Stations	38	General	English
3.	Private Television Stations	53	Mostly entertainment	Mostly English
4.	Cable/Satellite Television Stations	27	Various, but mostly entertainment	English



## 2.7.0 THE PRESS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL (DIS)INTEGRATION

### 2.7.1 The Militarisation of Politics in Nigeria

The incursion of the Nigerian military into the Nigerian political system began on January 15, 1966 when, as a result of a military coup, General J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi took over power as the first military head of state. It was the first Nigerian military *coup d'état*, which put an end to the First Republic that started with the elections of 1959. Five more successful and several unsuccessful coups would follow. The First Republic “was marked by widespread corruption” (Ogbeidi, 2012, p6) and “inter-ethnic rivalry in allocation of resources” (Onwuka, 2011, p31). Issues of corruption and interplay of tribal politics “provided the pretext for a group of young middle-rank army officers to sack the Nigerian First Republic politicians from power” (Ogbeidi, 2012, p6).

The first military rule lasted for 13 years (1966-1979), until “General Olusegun Obasanjo handed power over to an elected civilian successor” (Joseph, 1981, p78). Barely four years after, the military gave themselves a reason to return to power as “General Muhammadu Buhari forced an elected civilian government out of power at the beginning of 1984, with a strong popular mandate to attack political corruption” (Diamond, 1991, p74).

Through self-succession, the military lasted for another 16 years, from one coup *d'état* to the next. In May 1999, General Abubakar handed over to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the former military leader who, 20 years earlier, had handed power to an elected civilian government (George, Amujo and Cornelius, 2012). This marked the end of the journey of about 30 summative years of military rule in Nigeria. By this period, aspects of military culture had been injected into the Nigerian body politic in a definite manner.

### 2.7.2 National Integration and Belonging

In their incursions into the Nigerian political landscape, the military were obsessed with issues of unity, ethnicity, national integration, and belonging. Yet, six of the eight military heads of state that ruled Nigeria from 1966 to 1999 were from the North, running the country for over 25 of the 40 cumulative years of military rule. The other two were one each from the West and the East; but none was from any of the minority ethnic groups of the South. While the military were in power for all those years, there was an absence of a viable opposition in national politics, consequently, a vocal section of the press constituted itself into a veritable opposition group.

Excesses of an extremely ethnicised and corrupt political culture were the reasons advanced for the first military takeover of power in Nigeria. As Ojo (2012) submitted, “ethnicity was the hallmark of Nigerian politics up till the time Ironsi assumed office” (p15). Ironically, even the coup, which was purported to correct the situation, became embroiled in the ethnic politics of exclusion. Onwuka (2011) noted that the northern-led remedial coup only “succeeded in deepening the division which had already existed in the Army” (p31). The mastermind of the January 1966 coup, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, was an Igbo by tribe; General Aguiyi Ironsi, who became the first military head of state, as a result of the coup was also an Igbo man, both men from the Eastern Region of Nigeria. To compound issues, the victims of the January 1966 coup were mostly from the Northern Region. This led some northern military officers to believe that the 'purging' of the Nigerian political system as claimed by the military was actually the purging of northerners from governance. Ojo (2012) noted that what “exacerbated northern anger” was that the coup “annihilated the ranks of the civil and military leadership of the North”, and its planners were seen as heroes by many Igbo people (p15). According to Onwuka (2011), General Ironsi’s regime only further deepened the ethnic division that was already entrenched in the Nigerian army.

As a result, the people of the Northern Region saw the appointments in General Ironsi's government and many of his policies as against overall Northern regional interest. For example, barely four months in office, in April 1966, General Ironsi promoted military officers from Majors to Lt. Colonels: 18 out of the 21 officers promoted were of Igbo extraction (Ojo, 2012). By design or otherwise, "Ironsi's appointments tilted too much in favour of the Igbo" (Ojo 2012, p14), and this "aggravated ethnic suspicions" (p15). His government was accused of promoting an eastern regional agenda. Most of his policies were met with protests from the Northern Region; the "Hausa-Fulani abhorred some of the policies of the Ironsi regime" (Ojo, 2012, p16). Unsurprisingly, the interplay of ethnicity in the Nigerian military became so intense that it led to a second military coup in one year – 29 July 1966, in which General Ironsi was assassinated. Mostly army officers of northern extraction carried out this second coup, and they installed Lt. Col. Gowon, a northerner as the second military head of state (Ojo, 2012).

Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu was the military governor of the Eastern Region during General Ironsi's short-lived regime. He objected to the installation of Lt. Col. Gowon, a northern officer, as the military head of state. According to him, Gowon was not the most senior officer at that time; the military officer in line for that position was Brigadier-General Babafemi Ogundipe, of the Yoruba ethnic extraction. For Ojukwu, installing a junior officer as Commander-in-Chief would be going against ordinances of the military, anywhere. But Gowon remained as the head of state and Ojukwu refused to acknowledge him in that position. Another round of tension and tussle between the East and the North began and eventually resulted in an attempted secession by the Eastern Region from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Failure at the Aburi (Ghana) negotiation table to persuade them to remain in the union led to the Nigerian Civil War of 1967; it lasted nearly three years and claimed the death of about two million people (Uzokwe, 2003).

The Biafran War of secession, according to Jega and Farris (2010), became “an important factor that combined to push the nationalistic drive exhibited by the Gowon regime” (p141). To whittle down on the excessive powers of regions, Gowon dissolved the four ethnically conceived regions of the country and created twelve states in their stead – six states in the North and six states in the South. This singular move, according to Osaghae and Suberu (2005) “contributed crucially to the collapse of the Igbo secessionist campaign” (p20). It also helped in the process of national integration, and in the “relative stabilization of post-war Nigeria, and to the prevention of any further major secessionist conflict in the federation” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p20).

After the Civil War, and after the regime of General Gowon, all subsequent military heads of state and one civilian president were of Northern origin, except General Olusegun Obasanjo, whose rise to power many saw as accidental, considering the circumstance of his ascension. (General Obasanjo became the head of state following the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in a failed coup attempt in February 1976. Obasanjo, as Chief of General Staff, Supreme Headquarters, had been Mohammed’s deputy.)

The heads of state that ruled Nigeria thereafter were seen in the light of trying to promote and protect a “northern” agenda. According to Orji (2008), General Buhari’s regime was accused of favouring northern hegemony. It is still regarded as “one of the most narrowly-based Northern leadership” (p176). From one military dictatorship to another, the leaders surrounded themselves with aides that were close and of the same ethnic backgrounds. According to Tamuno, “many within the southern political elite read the Buhari coup as a further narrowing of the base of political power to a core Hausa-Fulani oligarchy” (Tamuno, 1999, cited in Ibrahim, 1999, p13). Military intervention in politics did not solve the ethnic and national unity problems, it intensified them.

*MAPS OF NIGERIA BY YEARS AND SEASONS*

*Figure 2.1: 1959 - 3 REGIONS*



Figure 2.2: 1963 - 4 REGIONS



Figure 2.3: 1967 - 12 STATES






Figure 2.4: 1976 - 19 STATES





## CHAPTER 2

*Figure 2.5: 1987 - 21 STATES*




## CHAPTER 2

Figure 2.6: 1991 - 30 STATES



Figure 2.7: 1996 - 36 STATES



### 2.8.0 THE SIX FEDERAL ELECTIONS

In this section I looked at the six federal elections in the study. Structurally, the elections have evolved in scope and administrations: the 1959 election was conducted under three regions, but the 1964/65 one was conducted under four regions. By 1979, the nation had moved from regional to state structures, as such 1979 and 1983, unlike 1965 were conducted under the 19 states structure; while the 1999 and 2011 were under 36 states formation. The first two elections were conducted under parliamentary system, but that of 1979 and subsequent ones under an American type presidential system.

*Table 2.5: Changing Political Structure and Election Supervisor*

YEAR OF ELECTION	NUMBER OF REGIONS	NUMBER OF STATES	TYPE OF GOVERNMENT	ELECTION SUPERVISION
1959	3		Parliamentary	Colonial
1964/65	4		Parliamentary	Civilian
1979		19	Presidential	Military
1983		19	Presidential	Civilian
1999		36	Presidential	Military
2011		36	Presidential	Civilian

These changes in geopolitical structures, however, did not significantly reduce the influences of ethnicity on politics. They may indeed have exacerbated such differences as more ethnic groups began to agitate for states that reflected their own tribal or ethnic compositions.

#### 2.8.1 The Federal Elections of 1959

The 1959 elections were the first (multi-party and national) elections to be held in Nigeria based on a Westminster-Parliamentary system of government, adopted without any adaptation to suit the Nigerian

cultural and political environment. For the first time, a special electoral management body, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN), was established by the colonial administration (Ogbeidi, 2010). The main registered political parties were regional or ethnic in composition, underscored by their regional identity-reflecting names: Northern People's Congress (NPC), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), Borno Youth Movement (BYM), and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) (Horowitz, 1985). The three most prominent parties in 1959 were the northern-based Northern People's Congress (NPC), led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Action Group (AG), led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo led and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The elections were held on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December 1959, with three major ethnic affiliated regional political parties as the main contestants and “each of the parties proved its strength in its home region, particularly in the ethnic area of its leadership, and none was able to break into the national arena” (Ibodje and Dode, 2007, p131). All these goes to prove the point made by numerous researchers that British intensions were not always in the interest of the Nigerian nation-state.

There were scattered pre-election clashes between supporters of rival political parties, but these did not mar the relatively peaceful state of the nation during the elections as Kenneth Post (1964), cited in Orji and Uzodi (2012, pp292, 345) noted in his assessment of the 1959 elections. The electorates were highly optimistic, but the campaigns were marked by a singular absence of serious electoral issue. Rather, the campaigns were characterised by “vituperative personal condemnations, hateful ethnic recriminations, official intimidation and obstruction, and physical violence by party thugs” (Diamond, 1983, p477), which completely drowned out the substance of party programs and proposals. According to Ojo (2012), “from about 1951, ethnicity became the hallmark of Nigerian politics” (p15).

*Table 2.6: Voting patterns of the regions in the 1959 Federal Elections*

<i>PARTY</i>	<i>NORTH</i>	<i>WEST</i>	<i>EAST</i>	<i>LAGOS</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
<b>NPC</b>	134	0	0	0	134
<b>NCNC/NEPU</b>	8	21	58	2	89
<b>AG</b>	25	33	14	1	73
<b>OTHERS</b>	7	8	1	-	16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>312</b>

Source: Ngou, C.M., (1989). The 1959 Elections and Formation of the Independence Government. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) *Politics and Constitutions*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, pp. 80 - 105

The 1959 election results in Table 1 reflect the ethnic strongholds of the regional parties even though the AG and the NCNC, through alliances, made inroads into the Northern Region.


Also commonly reported was widespread electoral fraud; in some parts of the country, there was the issue of women showing up in voting booths, “pregnant” with already marked ballot papers. The press election coverage focused on personalities, ethnicity, and region. The newspapers, established by the politicians, avidly supported the ambitions of their owners. According to Fred Omu (1978)

old antagonisms were intensified and the atmosphere of politics and the press seethed with bitter rivalry and enmity... the newspapers were completely immersed in the vortex of partisan politics and were in no position to prepare the people for the challenges of independence and national unity.(p247)

In the elections results, all the parties won the majority of their seats in their respective regions, but the AG and the NCNC also recorded marginal victories outside their respective regions having formed alliances with minor parties in the regions outside their own. “Generally, then no party emerged sufficiently strong in all the regions

to qualify as a national party. The ensuing government of 1960 thus had to be a coalition government” (Ngou, 1989, p100).

*Figure 2.8: Distribution of majority votes in the 1959 Parliamentary elections by regions on the Nigerian map*



### **2.8.1.1 A Significant British Coup**

Following the elections, two Southern parties, the Action Group and NCNC were in negotiations to form a coalition government when the British Governor-General, Sir James Robertson invited Balewa of the NPC to form a government. The move pre-empted the coalition talks by other parties. According to Professor Itse Sagay's commentary on Sir Olaniwun Ajayi's book, *Nigeria: Africa's Failed Asset*, Balewa's NPC "was a minority...against...the other two parties. Immediately this happened, the NCNC party of the East abandoned negotiation with the Action Group to form a coalition with the Northern NPC" (Sagay, 2012, p10).

The British feared that the North would not agree to independence, "if they did not control the federal government, or were not, at the very least, part of it" (Osaghae, 2015, p33). According to Adebani (2008), "The NPC, as the senior partner, and the NCNC, as the junior partner, entered into an alliance which subsequently formed the federal government under a parliamentary system at independence in 1960" (p422).

For southern politicians, who were vastly read and knowledgeable about British colonial empire politics, they were distrustful of their colonial administrators. The Indian-Pakistan experience was common knowledge in the current affairs of the 1940s and 1950s. When the Colonial British administrators broke virtually all their own rules about electoral democracy, it was generally not a surprise among the Nigerian elite, given Britain's reputation in Europe before the First World War, as *Perfidious Albion*, a phrase, which according to Keith Somerville (2006) was "much used to describe Britain's reputation for bad faith, renegeing on agreements and to back up accusations of outright treachery in her diplomacy and treaty-making" (par 2).



### 2.8.2 The Federal Elections of 1964/65

The coalition between northern-dominated NPC and eastern-led NCNC that formed the independence government of 1960 in which Tafawa Balewa became Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe became President of the new Federation lasted for barely two years (Ngou, 1989). The alliance began to untangle with the controversy over the 1962 census, the first for Nigeria as an independent nation. The Southern politicians had hoped to use the census to correct arbitrary allotment of census figures by the colonial administration, in which they felt the North was unduly favoured. They wanted to use what they hoped would be new census figures to break the domination of the North at the federal level.

However, the first national census as an independent nation only made matters worse: it produced controversy upon controversy. By the election year of 1964, the partnership between the Northern NPC and the Eastern NCNC had broken down irretrievably. "Elite conflict over the census polarized" the two members of the 1959 coalition government of the NPC and NCNC; the division "in turn shaped the year-long struggle around the 1964 federal election" (Diamond, 1983, p485). This led to two new alliances, in the election year of 1964. According to Dudley (1982), "Two broad coalitions, the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA), made up of the NPC and the NNDP, and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC and the AG, emerged to contest the 1964 federal elections" (p67). To fight the election, the ethnic card became the dominant ticket.

In what Diamond calls blatant and vicious ethnic tones, the NNA, an alliance between the Northern NPC and Western NNDP, fought with fury and crudity, they attacked the Igbo leaders of the NCNC, accusing them of "ethnic imperialism" and raising fears about Igbo domination, if UPGA, the AG-NCNC alliance should win. Various configurations of ethnic fears gripped the land during the election period. The NCNC politicians, on the other hand, declared the Igbo,

“embattled people”, and urged their voters and those of their alliance partners, the Action Group urged voters throughout the South to end the domination of the Hausa-Fulani and the unfair share of development resources they were appropriating to the North (Diamond, 1983, p485).

It is not a surprise therefore, that first, the elections had to be conducted two times. The first one held on December 30, 1964 was inconclusive; it was boycotted by the NCNC of the East. It took three months to persuade them to go to the polls, which eventually held on March 18 1965. However, the acrimony continued even after the election results were declared in favour of the NPC. According to Dare (1989),

Nigerian political parties failed to build bridges across ethnic and linguistic lines and instead reinforced existing societal cleavages. They could not perform the integrative functions, which political parties must perform if the federal experiment is to succeed (p121).

**Table 2.7: Voting patterns of the regions in the 1964/1965 Federal Elections**


PARTY	NORTH	WEST	MID WEST	EAST	LAGOS	TOTAL
NPC	162	0	0	0	0	162
NNDP	0	36	0	0	0	36
NCNC	0	5	14	64	1	84
AG	0	15	0	4	2	21
NPF	4	0	0	0	0	4
INDS.	1	1	0	2	1	5
TOTAL	167	57	14	70	4	312

Source: Dare, L., (1989). The 1964 Elections and the Collapse of the First Republic. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) *Politics and Constitutions*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, pp. 106 - 122

Table 2 adequately illustrates the ethnic influences in voting patterns during the 1964/65 elections. No southern-based party won even one seat in the north, which was dominated by the NPC. On the other hand, the NPC did not win a single seat in the East or West except for seats won by its alliance member in the West.

Going by the manner politicians carried on, an imminent falling apart was predictable, without a political soothsayer. The system collapsed within eighteen months of the general election, war followed and the military came and hugged power for a cumulative period of nearly 30 years.

Figure 2.9: Distribution of majority votes in the 1964/1965 Parliamentary elections by regions on the Nigerian map



### 2.8.3 The Federal Elections of 1979

The 1979 presidential election conducted under a new Constitution was held on August 11, after 13 years of military rule (1966-1979). Significant about this election is the change from a parliamentary system of government to an American-styled presidential system (Ogbeidi, 2010). INEC Report (2008) states: the political parties “were re-incarnations of the old regionally based parties of the First Republic with new names but about the same leadership” (p89) and still organised around ethnic and regional tables. Many of the politicians were also veterans of previous ethnic-based politics: Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN); Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP); Mallam Aminu Kano of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP); Adisa Akinloye, and Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN); and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim of the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP).

However from a structural and geographical standpoint, there were fundamental changes; the geographical compositions of the federating units had been redefined since the election of 1964/65 when the nation had four regions, then 12 states in 1967. In 1979, there were 19 States in the federation. Thus, states replaced regions in Nigeria’s political lexicon: “The growth of state consciousness played a major role in altering the parameters of political orientation” (Ollawa, 1989, p129). This, though significant, structural change did not necessarily drastically alter ethnically influenced voting patterns.

The elections were relatively peaceful because the military played a strong oversight role demanding the candidates to desist from personal attacks on one another, or making statements that would encourage violence. Issues of electoral fraud and corruption dogged the voting process. Daramola (2013) observes that the 1979 election saw the establishment of many election newspapers, which were focused on personalities and confined themselves to promoting their

owners' preferred candidates. The scenarios in the 1959 and 1964 elections played themselves out again as the voting pattern of the 1979 elections reflected ethnic affiliations. In the result analysis of Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and Okebugwu (2014) of the 1979 elections, they “showed remarkable parallels between the parties, their candidates, and their ethnic affiliations. Not surprisingly “the UPN won in all the Yoruba states, the NPP won the Igbo states of Anambra & Imo while the NPN won a good proportion of the Hausa/Fulani states. This is a repeat of the 1959 scenario” (p164). Shehu Shagari’s NPN was declared winner, but his victory was hotly contested by two of the parties - Awolowo’s UPN and Waziri Ibrahim’s GNPP – they lost (Agbaje, 1990).

*Table 2.4: Percentage share of votes in the 1979 Presidential elections*

REGIONS	NPN NO. OF VOTES (%)	UPN NO. OF VOTES (%)	NPP NO. OF VOTES (%)	GNPP NO. OF VOTES (%)	PRP NO. OF VOTES (%)
<b>NORTH</b>	3,914,951 (48.18)	530,917 (6.53)	512,603 (6.31)	1,488,766 (18.32)	1,678,948 (20.66)
<b>WEST</b>	281,718 (8.02)	3,182,304 (90.64)	21,827 (0.62)	15,564 (0.44)	9,651 (0.27)
<b>MID WEST (BENDEL)</b>	242,320 (36.19)	356,381 (53.23)	57,629 (8.61)	8,242 (1.23)	4,939 (0.74)
<b>EAST</b>	1,190,341 (32.07)	165,287 (4.45)	2,151,144 (57.96)	169,974 (4.58)	34,701 (0.94)
<b>LAGOS</b>	59,515 (7.18)	681,762 (82.30)	79,320 (9.57)	3,943 (0.48)	3,874 (0.47)

*Source: Compiled/computed from Ollawa, P.E., (1989). The 1979 Elections. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 139.*

Not surprisingly, Table 3 demonstrates again that the strength of each of the regional parties was in their ethnic areas of influence. The two southern parties performed poorly in the North, each scoring below 7% of votes cast in the North. But NPN with an Igbo VP scored surprisingly high in the East but the UPN held on strongly to the West, Mid West and Lagos.


In the aftermath of the elections, at least two politically controlled newspapers from the South West – the *Tribune* and the *Sketch* – declared Shagari’s federal government illegitimate, and refused to acknowledge his presidency. According to Agbaje (1990), it took the intervention of Awolowo, owner of the *Tribune* and leader of the UPN, for the position to be reversed.

According to Osaghae (2015), “the results confirmed the sectional character of the political parties. As in the First Republic, each secured control of its ethno-regional (or state) base” (p126). Reflecting on ethnic alignments of the parties 10 years later, General Obasanjo who as Head of States midwived the elections noted,

...the 1979 elections indicated that the ethnic allegiances and bases of the First Republic parties merely laid in waiting to be resuscitated. The nature of political competition and voting pattern merely followed the same old pattern by and large exploring and exploiting ethnic differences along the way (1989, p79).

These developments, in no small measures, compounded the problems and derailed the attempts at national integration and development.

**Figure 2:10: Distribution of majority votes in the 1979 Presidential elections by states on the Nigerian map**



*Source: Compiled/computed from Ollawa, P.E., (1989). The 1979 Elections. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 139.*



### 2.8.4 The Federal Elections of 1983

The 1983 elections were held on August 6, 1983. Like other elections, rioting, arson, assassination, vandalism, and hooliganism marked the campaign that preceded the election. These acts exacerbated ethnic distrust and antagonism. One distinguishing feature in this election was the role played by the media. Olayiwola (1991) noted,

“It was difficult to distinguish between the political parties and the mass media under them. Each political party made use of its own press; personalities were attacked while the real campaign issues and principles were ignored” (p40).

The political parties in the 1983 federal elections were the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in South Western Region, the Nigeria People’s Party (NPP) in South Eastern Region; Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP) in the North Eastern Region; National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the North Western Region and a collection of minority ethnicities reacting against the dominant groups in their region; and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) a populist party based in the North. Some of the key personalities were Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the nation’s President, seeking re-election as the NPN presidential candidate; Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Presidential Candidate of the NPP), Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Presidential Candidate of the UPN), Waziri Ibrahim (Presidential Candidate, GNPP), and Hassan Yusuf (PRP).

The political parties were believed to have widely rigged the elections in their various areas of political influence. According to the *Guardian* Newspaper in an editorial, “There [was] sufficient evidence of brazen and cynical rigging of the votes, to suggest that...[all parties] approached the elections without much faith in either themselves or in the electorate” (cited in Osaghae, 2015, p150). As such, parties traded accusations freely, pointing accusing fingers at one another. At the

federal level, “the party with control over the electoral and security apparatus, and the resources to out-ribe the other parties – the NPN - won the elections” (Osaghae, 2015, p150).


Notwithstanding, the fraud that was the hallmark of the elections and perpetrated by all parties, or maybe as a result of it, the parties retained power in their various areas of ethnic controls. “The NPP won in the Igbo-dominated states”, the NPN won in parts of the Hausa-Fulani North as well as in the minority ethnic areas of the South, and UPN maintained its “position in the Yoruba-dominated states of the West including Lagos” (Nnadozie, 2007, p66). However, within three months of the election, the mismanagement of the elections and the notion of fraud and rigging provided the military a perfect reason to take over the government again in the nation’s fourth military coup.

*Table 2.5: Percentage share of votes in the 1983 Presidential elections*

REGION	NPN NO. OF VOTES (%)	UPN NO. OF VOTES (%)	NPP NO. OF VOTES (%)	GNPP NO. OF VOTES (%)	PRP NO. OF VOTES (%)	NAP NO. OF VOTES (%)
NORTH	7,644,156 (65.07)	1,138,438 (9.69)	1,365,742 (11.62)	464,027 (3.95)	954,909 (8.13)	181,023 (1.54)
WEST	1,295,163 (23.81)	4,006,798 (73.65)	60,214 (1.11)	34,235 (0.63)	20,675 (0.38)	23,319 (0.43)
MID- WEST (BENDEL)	452,776 (41.17)	566,035 (51.46)	53,306 (4.85)	11,723 (1.07)	7,358 (0.67)	8,653 (0.79)
EAST	2,402,016 (44.56)	805,254 (14.94)	1,931,760 (35.83)	118,092 (2.19)	47,328 (0.88)	86,233 (1.60)
LAGOS	126,165 (7.69)	1,367,807 (83.38)	119,455 (7.28)	11,748 (0.72)	6,570 (0.40)	8,636 (0.53)
FCT	127,372 (94.11)	1,102 (0.81)	4,156 (3.07)	1,103 (0.81)	641 (0.47)	977 (0.72)

*Source: Compiled/Computed from Oyediran, O., (1989). The 1983 Elections. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 176.*

*Fig. 2.11: Distribution of votes in the 1983 Presidential elections by states on the Nigerian map*



### 2.8.5 The Federal Elections of 1999

The 1999 elections ended 16 years of military rule (1983-1999); the Presidential election was held on February 27, 1999. The press and other civil society organisations played crucial roles by their persistent call for the military to return power to an elected government.

The leaders and key personalities, in the build-up to the elections, included a handful of politicians from the previous elections but an important factor in these elections, was a strong show of retired military generals, including: Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma, Major-General Mohammed Gusau, Lt. General I. Wushishi, General I.B. Babangida, Rear Admiral Ndubusi Kanu, General Alani Akinrinade, and Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe. It was not surprising therefore that General Olusegun Obasanjo, former Military Head of State, who handed over power to an elected civilian government in 1979, emerged as the preferred candidate.

The outgoing military government registered only three political parties for the 1999 elections – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), and Alliance for Democracy (AD). The PDP turned out to be a party for retired military and police officers, buccaneer capitalists, old politicians of the conservative NPN stock and former technocrats. The AD was led by remnants of the UPN, who were mostly ethnic ideologues and erstwhile pro-democracy activists; and the ANPP on the other hand, had its origins and support base in the north (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p35).

Of these three, according to Ubani (2014), only the PDP managed a national footprint; the ANPP tried but created a semi-national image, but the AD held on firmly to its regional position in the South West. A two-party alliance formed too late in the day between AD and APP failed to stop the PDP candidate, former General, now Chief Obasanjo. However, an interesting twist was that the leadership of the Yoruba

nation, his own ethnic group, neither endorsed nor supported him; rather the Yoruba fielded their own presidential candidate, Chief Olu Falae, and proceeded to campaign against Obasanjo.

The election was unique in that it was the first overt display of elite leadership recruitment in action. The retired generals prodded Olusegun Obasanjo and united behind him as presidential candidate for the leading political party, the PDP. His candidacy was presented to the public as a way to compensate the Yoruba ethnic group of South West Nigeria whose candidate had won the annulled Presidential election of 1993. In a manner unprecedented, the main parties all agreed to cede the presidential ticket for that year and election, to the South West zone. Not surprising, therefore, and unlike most previous elections, voting patterns did not reflect ethnic affiliations. As a result of this agreement, the two leading candidates were not only from the same geo-political zone-the South West - but also from the same ethnic group - the Yoruba (Nnadozie, 2007). "The eventual winner of the election did not even win in his own state but rode to victory with votes from other parts of the country" (Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and Okebugwu, 2014, p164).

According to Akubo and Yakubu (2014) citing Prof. Abubakar Momoh (2006), real issues did not drive the election "political parties lacked well thought-out programmes and manifestos..." (p86). All the candidates promised to fight corruption, which had become a dominant social-economic matter. "Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt nation by Transparency International" (Letjolare, Nawaigo, and Rocca 2010, p6). Corruption coupled with an authoritarian military culture had produced weak political institutions. According to INEC (2008),

By 1999, Nigeria had been ruled by military regimes for 29 of its first 39 years of independence. The years of military rule impeded the development of democratic institutions and


leaders, and hampered the emergence of a democratic culture (p3).

However, the press played its role as the fourth estate of the realm; “it kept the authorities on their toes and prevented the programme from derailing or tolerating gross abuses that could delegitimize the entire exercise” (Olukotun, 2000, p39).

*Table 2.6: Percentage share of votes in the 1999 Presidential elections*

STATE	APP/AD NO. OF VOTES (%)	PDP NO. OF VOTES (%)
NORTH WEST	1,684,934 (30.25)	3,884,536 (69.75)
NORTH EAST	1,412,426 (28.45)	3,552,354 (71.55)
NORTH CENTRAL	1,461,840 (28.46)	3,675,027 (71.54)
SOUTH WEST	4,366,993 (80.00)	1,092,216 (20.00)
SOUTH EAST	978,997 (29.79)	2,307,712 (70.21)
SOUTH SOUTH	1,205,087 (22.19)	4,226,330 (77.81)

Fig. 2.12: Distribution of votes in the 1999 Presidential elections by states on the Nigerian map



### 2.8.6 The Federal Elections of 2011

Of the six elections in the study, the 2011 election remains easily the least comparable to any other, among other reasons, for being the most violent; hundreds, perhaps thousands of people died in the post-election violence. “Following the April 2011 presidential election, which Jonathan (a southern minority Christian) won with almost 59 per cent of the vote, widespread rioting in northern states led to much loss of life and property” (Joseph, 2014, pp71–72).

President Umaru Yar’Adua, a Northern Muslim, elected into office in 2007, died midway through his tenure; the Vice-President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnic minority from the South, became the president. When Jonathan then decided to run for the office, according to Alli and Kwaja (2014), some politicians, mostly from the North, opposed him on the grounds that another northerner should complete the Yar’Adua eight-year tenure. This view though loudly canvassed by some northerners had no constitutional backing; most of the press stood with the Constitution. The campaign on both sides reopened deep old tribal wounds in a manner only vaguely analogous to the 1964 elections.

Social media and other Internet platforms were ablaze with divisive ethno-religious vituperations. The setting of the entire election took on the North vs. South and Buhari vs. Jonathan outlook. “The anti-Jonathan rhetoric in the North hardened the stance of many Southerners against Buhari, setting up an inevitable clash between [the] followers” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p15). The political tension increased with each day nearer the election, across the nation. “In the weeks preceding the presidential election, Nigeria experienced a wave of violent incidents ranging from communal unrest to bombings” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p8). At about the same time, Amnesty International reported many people had already been killed in “politically motivated, communal and sectarian violence across Nigeria ahead of



presidential and parliamentary polls” (cited in Gberie, 2011, p11). These attacks almost crippled the electioneering process.

*Table 2.7: Percentage share of votes in the 2011 Presidential elections*

STATE	PDP NO. OF VOTES (%)	CPC NO. OF VOTES (%)	ACN NO. OF VOTES (%)	ANPP NO. OF VOTES (%)	OTHER PARTIES NO. OF VOTES (%)
NORTH WEST	3,395,724 (31.44)	6,453,437 (59.75)	146,216 (1.35)	612,541 (5.67)	192,157 (1.78)
NORTH EAST	1,832,622 (31.45)	3,624,919 (62.21)	84,273 (1.45)	198,837 (3.41)	85,994 (1.48)
NORTH CENTRAL	3,376,570 (60.87)	1,744, 575 (31.45)	309,011 (5.57)	43,345 (0.78)	73,649 (1.33)
SOUTH WEST	2,786,417 (60.39)	321,609 (6.97)	1,369, 943 (29.69)	30,906 (0.67)	104,837 (2.27)
SOUTH EAST	4,985,246 (98.28)	20,335 (0.40)	25,517 (0.50)	20,357 (0.40)	20,866 (0.41)
SOUTH SOUTH	6,118,608 (96.34)	49,978 (0.79)	144,141 (2.27)	11,026 (0.17)	27,363 (0.43)


*Source: Nigeria's Critical Election, 2011 G - Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series by John A. A. Ayoade, Adeoye A. Akinsanya. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013*

Isola (2014) notes that many newspapers dedicated special pages to the coverage of the elections. In reporting events leading to the elections, the papers tried to be as neutral as was possible. Nevertheless, the press was accused of partisanship and of "fanning the already inflamed discourse by reporting partisan stories with sensational headlines" (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p15). But according to a 2011 report of the European Union Election Observation Mission to Nigeria (2011), the "print media offered a profound analysis and an equitable political discourse with a slight preference towards PDP and the incumbent President.... The tone in the print media was mainly positive or neutral towards candidates until the week before the Presidential Polls (p34).

One major irony of the 2011 elections is that against the backdrop of being the most divisive and violent, it was also adjudged by “observers and analysts as the most credible election in the series of elections organized since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p6). The United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Terence McCulley, ECOWAS, and EU election observation missions, all praised the conduct and results of the elections. “The ECOWAS mission described it as ‘fair and transparent’ (ICG, 2011 cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p7). And the EU Mission said, “the 2011 general elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain” (EU EOM, 2011, p1)).

As soon as the results were declared, violence followed in the North until the 2011 election became known for being the one with the most violent post-elections violence in Nigeria. All these elections prove a pattern - most political parties are heavily dependent on their ethno regional roots for success at the polls and political relevance.

*Fig. 2.13: Distribution of votes in the 2011 Presidential elections by states on the Nigerian map*



Source: <http://www.oecd.org/swac/presidentialelectioninnigeria-16april2011.htm>

### 2.9.0 CONCLUSION: ALL AGAINST ALL

This chapter looked at the various defining environmental factors and influences that have formed the ‘character’ of the Nigerian press since 1859, when the first newspaper, *Iwe Irohin* was established. At the beginning, the quest for national independence, as a central pursuit naturally unified the nationalists, who were predominantly southern politicians among whom many were journalists. The press’ struggle against colonialism was also a political struggle against perceived enslavement in one's own country (Enahoro, 1965).

The Colonial administration’s regionalisation of politics inadvertently led to the regionalisation of journalism, as well. Inherent in the Nigerian brand of federalism was an unhealthy craving for political domination of other ethnic groups. The contrived federal state became a platform for tribal rivalry, which spilled into every facet of social interaction, but most manifest, perhaps, in politics, the press and later the military. The resultant regionalised press provided platforms, which amplified the voices of regional politicians on the national stage (Folarin, 1998; Duyile, 1989). The structure set a new tone for politics as well as journalism far beyond the early independence years; and notably, it characterised the press. With time, journalists lined up behind their owners, who were invariably leading regional politicians “in a war of all against all” (Williams, 2011, p35).

In this chapter the role of the military in politics and their cold-hot adversarial relationship with the press was also highlighted. Their need to conquer and dominate all within their area of control proved their limited knowledge of civil politics. Their long incursions into politics and media ownership damaged the media’s perception in more ways than any other group of elites who ruled Nigeria in the past.

In the years between 1959 and 2011, the role of the press has diminished. The 1950s epitomised the age of the press in all its power – the age prior to the popularisation of radio, and advent of television. Newspaper press was the main mass communication medium. By 2011, however, the face and character of the media, and the newspaper-press in particular had changed with the arrival of new forms of mass and multiple media systems. There has been a systematic move away from a largely text-based press-media to text, audio-visual forms of media. A hugely different media environment emerged – more fragmented, more opinionated, with more vociferous voices. In the arena of politics and ethnic relations, the new media environment reflected in definite colours what has always been known: a deeply divided and conflicted nation. However, among the elite, the old press has not completely diminished – many decision makers still want the physical copy of a daily paper.

In this chapter, the focus has been on the trifocal nature of this study being anchored on the nation-building relationships between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging in a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria. Essentially, this chapter highlights press dealings with the inevitably derived issues familiar with most postcolonial states, which are also the issues that have combined to create the modern Nigerian-state. The chapter also dealt with the symbiotic relationship between press and politics, and it concluded with a survey of the selected elections covered in the study, centring on how today's political culture has evolved over the years.

In the next chapter, I shall be looking at conceptual thinking on press, electoral democracy, and the politics of belonging, in the context of newspaper-press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial states where the newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon.

## SECTION 2

This section contains Chapters 3 and 4, the theoretical and methodological chapters of the study. In Chapter 3, I further examined contextual theories such as the post-colonial state, positionality, and elite theory.

Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter. It is wrapped around contextualised philosophical concepts that under guard the research framework and the choice of methods for the study.

## CHAPTER 3

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### 3.1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter surveys, reviews, and assesses conceptual thinking on press, electoral democracy, and the politics of belonging. The review examines relevant and related theories in the context of newspaper-press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial states where the newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon. In this regard, the chapter examines the multi-dimensional dynamics of electoral democracy in Nigeria, with particular regard to the roles and effects of press under military dictatorship, where the elite dominate ownership and control. To arrive at a theoretical framework in line with the objective of the study, in the concluding section, I examined aggregative and deliberative models with particular interest in the agonistic framework.

### 3.1.1 Theoretical Perspectives

At the risk of overextending a concept, it is safe to say that all theories are underpinned by defined philosophical perspectives; and perspectives are usually tied to localities – culturally, politically and sociologically. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, it is necessary to highlight the peculiar contexts of this study of nation-states emerging from the shadows of colonialism, struggling with self-discovery and self-definition. Typically, these are nations where the concept of democracy is alien and/or nascent; where knowledge is a scarce commodity, paper-thin and superficial; and where the (mass) newspaper-press is a novel phenomenon. These nations cannot be placed on the same theoretical scale, bearing in mind the dissimilar historical backgrounds, experiences, and realities, with older nations. In these settings, wholesale adoption and application of Western political theories, concepts, and models, without an understanding of the context, is likely to yield a distorted picture. The chapter, therefore, begins by providing a perspective on the current absence of a situation-specific theoretical philosophy.

To begin with, Paolo Mancini makes the point that journalism and the structures that support them do not grow in a vacuum. “They are born and developed within a network of interactions and negotiations with a number of other social system and factors, most of all with economic and politics” (Mancini, 2005, p234). McQuail (2010) reflected the same view when he noted that even though media and communication institutions display what he called,

apparent similarities, they are affected by differences of culture at the level of individual, subgroup, nation, etc. The production and use of mass media are cultural practices that resist the universalizing tendencies of the technology and the mass-produced content (p8).

Although Mancini and McQuail may not have made the point directly about philosophies and theories in the above submissions, Baran and Davis (2008) did, when they posit that theories are “more or less relevant to a given medium, audience, time, condition and theorist... Mass communication theory can be personalised; it is ever-evolving; it is dynamic” (p18). This nails the point that it is difficult to pigeonhole theories into one size that fits all situations.

### **3.1.2 Communication and Theories**

Baran and Davis (2008) pushed the point further: “all theory is a human construction, an active effort by communities of scholars to make sense of their social world” (p40). But they also noted that scholarly communities have different objectives and goals for “the theories they build and champion” (Baran and Davis, 2008, p40). To make their point, they cite Katherine Miller (2005), who states “Different schools of thought will define theory in different ways depending on the needs of the theorist and on beliefs about the social world and the nature of knowledge” (Baran and Davis, 2009, p11). Because of these differences in objectives and goals, communication theories are plentiful. Thus,

An important reality of communication and mass communication theories [is that] there are a lot of them, the questions they produce are testable to varying degrees, they are situationally based, and they sometimes seem contradictory and chaotic (Baran and Davis, 2009, p11).



Baran and Davis make it safe to propose that situationality of media or press theories directly negates the attempts to universalise theories and research methods by many Western scholars. On this issue, James Curran and Myung-Jin Park (2005) note an undisguised

self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory. It has become routine for universalistic observation about the media to be advanced in English-language books on the basis of evidence derived from a tiny handful of countries... The universe is changing in a way that makes this narrowness transparently absurd (p2).

Curran and Park (2005) then post hopeful signs to suggest, “many western media scholars are now recognising these absurdities”, which they noted, started in the 1950s “when *Four Theories* tradition saw the universe only through Western eyes, followed in the 1960s by a theory which assumed the developing world should imitate the West” (p3). Recognising an absurdity is only one half of the problem solved; doing something about it is the other half. That the absurdity has endured is no longer entirely the fault of non-African theorists; African researchers also need to step up and take responsibility for defining their own environment.

All theories are local to a specific study and personal to the theorist. They can only be universalised after due adjustments to accommodate local sensitivities.

Thirty years ago, Charles Okigbo (1987) made the point that Baran and Davis would later make in 2009, that most theories are founded on the philosophical position of the culture or the environment of the theorist. Okigbo contended that Africa needed “a philosophy in communication...to give meaning and direction to African communication research” Okigbo (1987, p18). According to him,

most research efforts in African communication are episodic, casual, serendipitous, and non-systematic. Most tragically, these efforts are not informed by any identifiable philosophies, be they indigenous or foreign (p26).

Okigbo (1987) further contends that though philosophy as an orientation is not alien to Africa, the absence of its application in African research has relegated the field to copycatism.

What makes Okigbo's point still pertinent, about three decades after, is that in 2015, Ghanaian researchers, Eshun, Zakaria, and Segbefia are still making the point, as several others have. They critiqued the dominance of particular categories of research perspectives in the African social research space, citing Bryce *et al.* (2015, p579), who posited that social research, in nations with post-colonial history, continues to be "largely filtered through Western institutional lenses" (Eshun, Zakaria, and Segbefia, 2015, p3). African scholars are trapped in what these researchers called 'Afro-pessimism' in their thinking. African scholars, they contest, should not borrow "Northern theories' in their research without contesting their appropriateness and relevance to African situations" (2015, p4).

### **3.1.3 Journalism: Representation and the Production of Ideologies**

The point made by Okigbo and Eshun, *et al.* is all the more important because, according to Stuart Hall (2003), "The media's main sphere of operation is the production and transformation of ideologies" (p89). For his purpose, Hall (2003) defined ideology as "those images, concepts, and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent interpret, understand and make sense of some aspect of social existence" (p89).

In a unique way, perhaps more than any other institution involved in the production of ideology, which inevitably benefits the transformation efforts, the press as part of the media serves as a convergent first point of call for reflecting or defining reality, and propagating information and knowledge. In these functions, the press not only helps to create and to construct realities, knowledge, and meaning, it also helps in the preservation of memories. In the view of Stuart Hall (1986), "What we know of society depends on how things are represented to us and the knowledge, in turn, informs what we do" (p9). The media provide us with reports or reflections of this reality, "with varying degree of accuracy, completeness or dependability" (McQuail, 2000, p8).

With the foregoing, it is important to examine the principal role of the press within the backdrop of ideology formation and creation of meaning and "the principal

democratic role of the media according to traditional liberal theory is to act as a check on the state... and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority” (Curran, 2002, p217). The fact that Curran’s proposal is limited in application to “traditional liberal theory” is a significant redeeming feature. It is a far cry from the prescriptive position to globalise a small selection of Western philosophy in media research, for, according to Colin Sparks (2005), some authors have no “qualms in making it clear to their readers that the American way was better” (p30).

What is obvious is that what may be good and applicable in the West may not be so in many non-Western democracies where governments fund the media and demand loyalty of service, not to the people but the government in power. Needless to assert that there are significant system differences between the press in the West, and those that operate in non-Western worlds. In most other parts of the world, under authoritarian or totalitarian governments with superficial democracies, media operate under constraints of fragile and distorted institutional structures; whereas in most parts, the Western press operates in affluent, liberal democracies, under conditions that are in stark contrast to what obtains in the global South. While it is important to understand the basic state of things, the one starting point is a recall to the past.

### **3.2.0 POST-COLONIALISM AS AN AFRICAN REALITY**

Bearing in mind that all realities are constructed, one must note that no situation is static; if the colonial experience had not created the current African reality some other factors would have, albeit differently. According to Peter Ekeh (1975), “Our post-colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics” (p111). Ekeh’s argument is that colonialism has produced a distortion in the political mind-set, ethics, and structures of post-colonial states in Africa. Also, in the view of Edward Said (1994), the struggle against colonialism and for independence not only produced new states and new boundaries, the immediate consequences were calamitous for people who found themselves trapped between the old African empires and new states as

homeless wanderers, nomads, and vagrants, unassimilated to the emerging structures of institutional power, rejected by the established order for their intransigence and obdurate rebelliousness... their condition articulates the tensions, irresolution, and contradictions in the overlapping territories shown on the cultural map of imperialism (p332).

In the advent of the colonial-state in Africa, therefore, various ethnic nationalities and traditional political societies have had to negotiate their relationships with each other, and with a new centre organised around an alien political system, culture and process. “They then had to engage not only with ‘modernity’” but “with the new ‘rules of the game’ that colonial conquest imposed.” And these “negotiation processes occurred, against the backdrop of outright violence, coercion and exploitation on the part of the colonizing powers” (Hagmann and P’ eclard, 2010, p557). These multi-level dynamics in various degrees have combined to create African post-colonial reality.

Taken from the above perspective, Peter Ekeh (1975) suggests that a fundamental consequence of colonialism was the inadvertent creation of two publics, in contrast with the West where only one public exists. “Many of Africa's political problems are due to the dialectical relationships between the two publics” (Ekeh, 1975, p91). He calls the first the primordial public; an imperative developed to meet the welfare needs of the people that were denied by the colonial state. Then there is the civic public, which he said “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the primordial public” (Ekeh, 1975, p92). Ekeh further postulates that, “the most outstanding characteristic of African politics is that the same political actors simultaneously operate in the primordial and the civic publics” (pp92-93). Agreeing with Ekeh's concept of *two publics*, Ukiwo (2015) states “ethnicity has flourished because the Nigerian elite who inherited the colonial state have conceptualised development as transferring resources from the civic public to the primordial public” (p9).

Ekeh’s two publics illustrate Said’s point about the tension between the old empires and the new states, but that tension goes further; it exists in the different types of moral linkages between the civic public, historically associated with colonialism, and the private realms of the primordial public, more associated with the traditional

Africa (Ekeh, 1975). To understand post-colonialism, therefore, it is essential to understand the substance of colonialism, for colonial law, in a place like Nigeria made “cultural identity the basis for political identity, it inevitably turns ethnicity into a political identity” (Mamdani, 2005, p13). It is easy to see why in most African post-colonial states, “the premium on power is exceptionally high, and the institutional mechanisms for moderating political competition are (unsurprisingly) lacking. As a result, political competition tends to assume the character of warfare. So absorbing (intense) is the struggle for power that everything else... is marginalized” (Ake, 1996, p16).

From the foregoing, it is clear that colonialism and its inevitable aftermath – post-colonialism together create the complex historical context of most of Africa’s political cosmos. Understanding this context is essential to understanding African nationalism as well. There is a euro-centrism in the prevalent literature on nationalism, which, with little thought sets up European nationalism as the norm. This is all the more important because African nationalism is different from European or other forms of nationalism. In order to understand African nationalism, it is necessary to understand the role played by the African elite, as well as the ethnic-nations that gave the elite a political relevance and foothold, under a colonial and a post colonial setting.

### **3.2.1 Nigeria and Elite-Led Democracy**

In 2008, nearly ten years into Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, researcher Henry Kifordu (2011a) undertook a public perception survey on the state of democracy in Nigeria. His finding showed that about 78 per cent of people had a positive disposition towards democracy, but only 42 per cent were “satisfied with the country’s democratic governance and an even lower 32 per cent could perceive democracy extensively in their respective experiences” (p16) Compared with neighbouring Ghana, the story was different – “83 per cent was able to perceive the extensiveness of democracy, while 78 per cent supported it and 80 per cent felt satisfied with Ghana’s democratic governance” (p16).

To what extent is what Kifordu calls, “the cumulative effect on elite rotation on Nigeria’s power structure and regime type”, responsible for this poor report card on democracy? (2011a, p.17). Collier and Mahon (cited in Kifordu, 2011a) argued that mere *electoral* democracy, typically manipulated by the elite, weakens democracy, and is not necessarily its true form. Their point is that a competitive election requires more than just the act, but rather, institutions as well as continuous practice that build experience. These essential components are what new democracies like Nigeria lack in adequate quantities, and sufficient quality. The Nigerian political regime, as led by the elites, Kifordu further submits,

is characterized by a typical hybrid pattern of incomplete liberalization, lack of inclusiveness and deficient application of the rule of law. These conditions strengthen the power of the political elite but weaken the very fabric of democratic governance (2011a p29).

Kifordu’s point proved the gross deficiencies of elite driven democracy. It is neither in the interest of the grand nation -state nor in the interest of the mass of the people. It is obvious that while much attention has been drawn to the issue of colonialism and ethnicity, not much attention has been devoted to home-grown problems created by elite-centred democracies: a government of the elite, by the elite for the sole benefit of the elite.

### 3.2.1.1 The Elite

Osaghae (1991a) borrows from Vilfredo Pareto who commodified social values like knowledge, power, and riches saying that those who score highest on these are the elite. Osaghae then goes on to define elites as

those who occupy leading positions and roles in all facets of society - the political leaders, top civil servants and bureaucrats, top military officers and academicians, leading professionals, businessmen and other top members of the merchant class (p45).

On his part, Diamond (1988) suggests that “ethnically divided societies with low levels of socioeconomic development but relatively large state sectors” are typical of conditions under which elite mobilisation of ethnicity thrive and their roles magnify.

Although Kifordu (2011) submits that political elite began to emerge in the early 1960s, there is evidence to indicate that their origin dates further back to the late 1930s and early 1960 with the advent and exploits of the NYM and the NNDP political parties and the events of the Lagos Council of 1941. It is therefore safe to state that the Nigerian political elite began to emerge during this period, and their early membership that Kifordu described as an assemblage of mostly “low-skilled professionals” (Kifordu, 2011a, p29), would only apply to 1940s, and not the 1960s as he suggests. What began with such a lowly background grew in number, networks, and improved skills. Since the early period, however, the system that produced them has barely changed from an essentially oligarchic disposition that reflects its perfect post-colonial nature. The system has now matured into layers of networks of self-serving interest groups that admits civilian and military leaders into an elite club of privileged few.

### **3.2.1.2 Ethnicity: Serving Elite Political Interests**

According to Osaghae (1991a), “one of the most popular perspectives in the study of ethnicity is the perspective which posits that ethnicity is an ideology employed by the elites to further their constitutive interests” (p43). Indeed, Sklar (1967) calls ethnicity “a mask for class privilege” (p6). Nnoli (1978) also sees ethnicity as an ideology. But he contends that it is an ideology that was developed, nurtured, and reinforced by the advent of colonialism, when the African was uprooted from his familiar “setting which had valid meaning for him, in which history had effectively and organically related him to his local environment and culture had produced salutary patterns of interactions with others” (Nnoli, cited in Ukiwo, 2005, p8).

Beyond ideology, Osaghae (1991a) suggests that ethnicity is also “an effective strategy and major manipulative tool in the competition for societal resources,” employed by the elite to further their constitutive interests (p43). To drive home this point, he uses Awolowo’s position about his own leadership of the Yorubas to illustrate the notion of ethnic strategy as a viable and pragmatic route to the centre stage of national politics. Says Awolowo (1981) as cited by Osaghae:

I pity the ignorance of those who believe that I can become a leader of Nigeria only if I renounce my leadership of the Yorubas. I could not become a leader of the country if I were rejected by those among whom I was born. What would be my credentials for ruling the whole country if I failed with a small group? (Osaghae, 1991a, p51).

Nnoli blames colonialism for political standpoints typical of the one taken by Awolowo above. He argues that the “colonial administration deliberately promoted ethnicity through policies of indirect rule, categorization of Africans by ‘tribe’, and promotion of separate settlements between natives and settlers of urban centres” (cited in Ukiwo, 2005, p8). Nnoli extends this position and argues that, in the bid to survive with the limited socio-economic opportunities and inadequate socio-political resources, which were themselves the result of a situation created by the colonisers, the African began to see other ethnic groups as competitors. This new competitive spirit gave birth to a new antagonistic form of ethnicity.

### **3.2.1.3 Mobilising the Masses through the Press**

There has been much attention paid to ethnicity as an elite strategy, but less attention to a similarly important mobilisation strategy through the press particularly in the earlier years, and without which the ethnic strategy would have failed or been severely stunted, given that (even ethnic) nations are imagined. As typical with elite groups everywhere, Nigerian elites have managed to construct their interest as tantamount to the interest of the larger group whose interest they claim to represent. And they have used the press effectively to mobilise the groups, to propagate their narrow agenda, sold as the people’s but which often, do not reflect the people’s real need.

According to Osaghae (1991a), “the elites succeed in recruiting the masses by promoting the elite interest as the common interest” (p45). One key detail, which has often been overlooked, is that the elite depend upon the press, perhaps, just as much as they do on ethnicity, to achieve their objective of hegemonic domination. In the view of van Dijk (1993) “many discourse types and communicative events (are) controlled by the elites” (p9).



Mobilisation is a key function of the elite, for which the press is a necessity used to activate and maintain ethnic consciousness, and foster internal group unity. According to van Dijk (1993), elite groups control and dominate “forms of public discourse” (p289), including the “communicative conditions” necessary for the formation of the popular mind that leads to the ethnic consensus (p10). In order to constantly antagonise rival out-groups to sharpen “ethnic consciousness and differentiation – the 'us' vs 'they'”, elites need the loud, far-reaching voice of the media (Osaghae, 1991a, p51).

Elite’s deliberate and intentional capture of the press and media is not unique to Nigeria. It is a common occurrence in most post colonial states, but it manifests in various forms, as this comparative examination of post colonial media in India, Brazil and South Africa demonstrates.

### **3.3.0 ELITE MEDIA CAPTURE IN THREE POSTCOLONIAL NATIONS OF BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA**

All nations with colonial experiences do not necessary follow the same postcolonial trajectory, in part, because the practice of colonial system by nature is usually very dissimilar from place to place. Some of the dissimilarities are often reflected in how the media, including the newspaper-press, are organised. Greffrath (2016) makes an additional but highly perceptive point that though there is routinely strong emphasis on

civic nationalism during independence struggles as a means to unite disparate ethnicities towards the goal of national self-determination and prevent tribalist tendencies, [...] such civic nationalism rarely proved durable in the post-colony (Greffrath, 2016, p168).

Greffrath’s point proves that civic national unity under a colonial system is usually not difficult to attain; but it disintegrates rather quickly, the result of entrenched patterns of postcolonial ethnic nationalism, under the strong influences of interested elites. Sectional elite interests invariably undermine attempts at national unity. Although civic nationalism under most postcolonial governments enjoys lip services as an ideal, it lasts only but for a season, and usually cannot withstand the onslaught

of ethnic or tribal nationalism. Forrest (2006), as cited in Greffrath (2016) refers to this process as a

degeneration of civic nationalist unity in the wake of parochial, ‘ethnic-nation protecting’ political claimants, while narrowly based patrimonial regimes cling to power by relying on a praetorian, centralist, and exclusivist pattern of rule (Greffrath, 2016, pp 168-169).

However, in virtually all cases, the elites occupy the front row seats in politics, economy or commerce, and media. While variations in experiences exist, an apparent hegemonic contest dominates press and politics, in most places thereby unsettling nations.

*Table 3.1: COMPARATIVE MEDIA POLITICAL & MEDIA INDICATORS IN THREE BRICS NATIONS AND NIGERIA*

COUNTRY	POPULATION (MILLION)	GDP (\$TRILLION)	SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT	MEDIA SYSTEM	NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE TITLES	INTERNET PENETRATION, % OF POPULATION	MAIN GLOBAL PRESENCE
Brazil	203	2.2	Presidential democracy, Colonial history, Deep social inequality	Commercial, Limited public service, Abundant community media	11,000	52	Telenovelas
India	1, 236	1.9	Parliamentary democracy, Colonial history, Deep social inequality	Commercial, Strong public-service, Multi-lingual	94,000	20*	Bollywood
South Africa	48	0.3	Parliamentary democracy, Colonial history and apartheid, Deep social inequality	Commercial, Strong public-service with community media, Multi-lingual	1,000	49	Entertainment, mainly in Africa
**Nigeria	180	0.51	Presidential democracy, Colonial history with long years of military rule, Deep social inequality	Commercial, Limited/weak public service, lacks community media	395	43*	Nollywood

\*Figure for 2014, all other figures for 2013.

Main source: Mapping BRICS Media (2015). Edited by Kaarle Nodenstreng and Daya Kishan Thussu.

\*\*Nigerian Figures compiled from various sources.

### 3.3.1 Three BRICS Nations and Nigeria

Wilmsen, Dubow, and Sharp (1994) hold the view that processes of ethnicisation are “diverse in different parts of the world under varying kinds of stimuli”, but they also maintained that subsequent trajectories were not uniform (p347). However, whatever the trajectory, the media play a significant role. Without doubt democracy has made a difference in the nations of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Patrick Heller calls the three nations “the most successful cases of consolidated democracy in the developing world” (2009, p2). The relative democratic progress in these nations has been made against many odds, and

achieved against a social backdrop of extreme social exclusions (the caste system in India) and the worst maldistribution of wealth in the world (South Africa and Brazil) only underscores the achievements (Heller, 2009, p4)

All told, since 1947, India has enjoyed a longer period as an established democracy. Brazil’s current democratic experiment emerged from long periods of military rule in 2000, and South Africa in 1994 finally became a democracy, emerging from an apartheid system, which had succeeded a British colonial system (Sparks, 2015). As such there are substantial differences in the paths that led each to becoming a democratic nation even though, in all cases, “there is strong evidence of interchange between political, economic and media power at other levels” (Sparks, 2015, p51). It is also important to reflect the fact that the three nations are still struggling to incorporate other sub-groups outside the elite classes of whatever sub-groups they claim to represent. As such, they are still “characterized by deep and durable social inequalities that have limited the effective political incorporation of subordinate groups” (Heller, 2009, p2).

### 3.3.2 India

In the case of India, which Homi Bhabha (1994) called “the original symbol of colonial authority”, (p186), elite politics and people politics were organised differently. Whereas elite politics

tended to be relatively more legalistic and constitutional in orientation, [people politics on the other hand,] depended on [...] traditional organization of kinship and territoriality or on class consciousness depending on the level of the consciousness of the people involved. They tended to be more violent than elite politics (Chakrabarty, 2000, pp15 – 16)

Further on India, Guha (1982) states, “Indian nationalism has for a long time been dominated by elitism — colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism” (p1). What is obvious from the foregoing is that in most postcolonial nations, the elite by necessity stepped into the leadership vacuum created at independence, eager to serve, but they usually arrived at the service posts with undisguised elite-centred interests and usually did not hesitate to apply the same questionable means or methods did the colonialists to suppress their people, in order to maintain their hold on power.

Nordenstreng and Thussu, (2015), underscore the fact that with nearly 300 round-the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of English language journalism, Indian media are as vast as they are diverse and complex. Jain (2015) further makes the point that the nation has “more newspapers and 24 hour television news channels than any other country” (p150). In the early decades of independence, the Indian press remained an integral part of the nation-building project even as they espoused a watchdog role of the media. Newspapers understood their role to be one that incorporated development journalism. Public radio and television “were expressly mandated to perform a positive social role” (Jain, 2015, p149). It is hard not to see the value of the press in Indian politics even if, at times, the voices on the face value, might appear divisive.

### **3.3.3 Brazil**

At the end of colonialism in Brazil, in what would later be known as internal colonialism, oligarchic elites effectively replaced the former colonialists by creating a patrimonial system. This network of relationships among close-knit families or groups controlled and consolidated power among a small group of elites. Partimonialism, as a characteristic is common to media systems in democratic countries with a recent history of dictatorships and authoritarian rule. According to

Colin Sparks (2015), “the direct benefits of this type of close ties between the media and the ruling groups have long been evident” (p52).

In Brazil, a handful of family-owned media groups control the mainstream press, mostly concentrated in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. They usually reaffirm their commitment to classic Western liberal journalistic values like the watchdog role and the Fourth Estate model, but in practice their behaviour differs from the liberal tradition of journalism in many significant ways. Although these same media conglomerates have championed democratisation of politics, and played a crucial role for the democratic transition in Brazilian politics, they have paradoxically resisted the democratisation of the media system itself (Sodré (1999) cited in Paiva, Sodré and Custódio, 2015, p 117).

### **3.3.4 South Africa**

The postcolonial/apartheid South African press was organised around ethno-linguistic frames of a dominant English-language press; the Afrikaans-language press, which became an important political force, and the Black press, of which “systematic persecution by the South African government kept it from developing” (Albuquerque, 2016, p3048). But wanting to correct the wrongs of the past, the “architects of the post-apartheid constitution envisioned a media that could function within the overlapping models of libertarian theory, social responsibility theory and development theory” By this they committed to “freedom of expression, including media freedom, and the right of access to information and the independence of broadcasting legislation” (Milton and Fourie, 2015, pp181-82).

However, the consequences of segregation and systematic underdevelopment of the majority of South Africans, which started under British colonial rule, has continued to impact the South African media in many ways. As a result, “while the media landscape may be characterised by the availability of a wide range of media, accessibility remains an impediment as there are many people in remote” (Milton and Fourie, 2015, pp182). This is no doubt another characteristic of the press in most postcolonial nations – the neglect of the rural and urban poor in the communication grid. In Nigeria, there is an unmistakable absence of community

and rural media as well as an erosion of public service media, the consequences of poor funding.

### **3.3.5 Elite (Minority) Media Capture**

Among other factors, media capture by the elite and their containment of civil societies made social inequalities possible. In South Africa, for example, civil societies that were successful in the anti-apartheid struggle, now struggle to impact political society (Heller, 2009). This is understandable as both the new political class and the reformed civil society groups are from the same old anti-apartheid trenches. The result is that civil society groups are effectively contained as the press is in Nigeria. Also as in Nigeria, “containerization of civil society is in turn fuelling class polarisation in South Africa. The three countries have experienced deeply entrenched practices of social exclusions that have resulted in different manifestations of social inequality; these have obstructed the “path to democratic deepening” (Heller, 2009, p7).

In most postcolonial nations, there exists a perennial conflict between media and society with varying intensity, almost always traceable to a colonial past. Albuquerque (2016) notes that in the particular cases of Brazil and South Africa, “the societies are ethnically diverse and have a westernized white minority that has enjoyed dominance since these nations’ independence” (p3045).

As with most postcolonial nations, what is common to these nations and Nigeria is the emergence of an elite-oriented mainstream press, characterised by low circulation, high elite readership, and strategic political positioning. An advantaged political position allows them to cultivate close relationships with governments, which, in turn provide them with “economic advantages and political influence, often at the expense of journalistic independence” (Albuquerque, 2016, p3048). Dijk (1993), corroborates this assertion; reporting on his own research, as well as studies done by others on the representation of ethnic affairs in the media, van Dijk submits that the media is participatory “in the elite consensus of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (p288). The above comparative glimpses from

India, Brazil and South Africa make the issue almost universal as it affects nations with colonial histories.

Reporting on his research, as well as other studies of the representation of ethnic affairs in the media, van Dijk (1993) confirms the media as participatory “in the elite consensus of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (p288). The consequences of elite manipulations of the media and ethnicity are far reaching, often beyond even their own imagination. These consequences usually end up defining and midwifing a national culture and the ethos of politics in an imagined and emerging nation. They also form the foundations of belonging – of who is included or excluded in the emerging grand nation.

### 3.4.0 NATIONALISM, BELONGING, AND NATION-STATE

Nationalism has its origins in nationhood, whether of ethnic nationalities or of nation-states. Gellner (1978) and other researchers demonstrate that there is not one sure-proof route to modern state formation (Lagerspetz, 2000; Anderson, 2006). Also obvious from these propositions is that nationalism is intrinsically tied to the existence of a nation.

In defining nationalism, Calhoun (1993) suggests that it goes beyond ethnic similarity, submitting that, “the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is complex” (p235). For him, it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from ethnicity, but he notes that it is equally “impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity” (Calhoun, 1993, p235). He makes the claim that, “nationalism, involves a distinctive new form of group identity or membership. It is a new rhetoric of belonging to large-scale collectivities” (Calhoun, 1993, p229). However, the notion of a national identity cannot exist in the absence of a nation. Scholars also generally agreed that a cluster of ethno-cultural groups by themselves, or a geographical space by itself, does not necessarily make a nation (Gellner, 1983; Miller, 1995; Miscevic, 2000). What this suggests is that it may be impossible to create an identity for a nation-state, where a *nation* in the original conception did not exist.

The conception of nationalism, with roots in ethnic primordial loyalties, is vastly different from a more constructivist perspective of the same notion for the nation-state. And modern nationalism, viewed particularly in the light of an across-the-continent colonial experience, is only partly explained by Calhoun's "new rhetoric of belonging". Using Ekeh's concept of two publics as basis, one might say that the civic public is constructed while the primordial public is an integral part of the ethnic nation from time. The tension between the two publics, the constructed and the primordial, exacerbates the post-colonial nation's already complicated ontological problem. Whereas in the West, the problem has a single dimension, in Africa, it is not the case: the same reality would have multiple dimensions. It may be easier for a theorist, who may not have experienced the debilitating consequences of post-colonialism, to view nationalism as an "excuse used to start wars and foment ethnic strife in the modern era" (Anju, 2013, p558). Others, still, may view nationalism as "obsolete in a 21<sup>st</sup> century globalized world, in which cosmopolitanism should be the order of the day" (Anju, 2013, p558). But in Africa, ethnic nationalism is a cause for perpetual trans-national ethnic conflicts, but not of the peripheral type.

It is therefore important to note that both nationalism and ethnicity, according to Calhoun (1993), are part of a "set of categorical identities invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles" (p235). For example, Anju (2013) demonstrates the uses of nationalism "by both individuals and states as a means of self-definition (and) as a way of constructing and categorizing in-groups and out-groups" (p558). In other words, ethnicity and nationalism have two sides: one side pushes for modern democracy against global inequities; the other side constructs and categorises the in-groups and the out-groups.

It is obvious then that ethnic-based nationalism may have served either purpose. In most of Africa, Nigeria inclusive, creating those that belong as against those that do not qualify to belong, and discriminating against such, is a prevailing occurrence. Osaghae's (1991) perspective is this: "Ethnicity only occurs in situations involving more than one ethnic group or identity with a clear 'us' and 'they' differentiation" (p44). Central to the character of ethnicity as a phenomenon is that it "is conflictual rather than consensual. In fact, it has been found to be positively correlated with political instability" (Osaghae, 1991, p44). For Aimufua (2007) therefore, "Nigeria is



not effectively a nation-state”, yet. And he gives his reason: “ethnic nationalism and therefore, regional, religious or cultural sentiments take precedence over what should be the pan-national objectives” (p174). The idea that ethnicity is conflictual is a central assumptive position in this study, in the search of what role the press has played in the resolution of conflictual dynamics.

### **3.4.1 Ethnicity and the Search to Belong in Modern African Nations**

In recent years, and in most African nations, according to Nyamnjoh (2005), ethnic citizenship and belonging have failed to disappear in favour of a single political and legal citizenship. He observes that there has been a “resurgence of identity politics and overt tensions over belonging, as various groups seek equity, better representation and to have access to national resources and opportunities” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19). The question then arises: are there African states or nations? The argument can be made that African states are not nations yet because ethnic-based identities, and loyalties to ethnic, racial, religious and regional groups are often stronger than those to the collective nation-state. This phenomenon of multiple identity tension is not peculiar to Africa where it has often been attributed variously to:

- a. The ‘artificiality’ of the state and inorganic nature as a colonial creation;
- b. The state’s irrelevance, due to its inability to provide for the material well-being of its citizens; and
- c. A nation-state’s general “inability to satisfy the imperatives of statehood” (Osaghae, 1999 cited in Osaghae, 2006, p4).

In other words, “the process of nation building entails reversing the order to make national identity and loyalty attractive and stronger than those to the sub-national groups” (Palmberg, 1999 cited in Osaghae, 2006, p4). Some forms of multiple identities exist in all nations. The key problems with most African identities is that the identity of the grand nation is made subject to those of the ethnic identities,

causing unprofitable friction and crisis. And the media are active agents in the process of role-reversal.

### 3.4.2 The Press, Imagined Communities, and Nation-Building

In the political and structural evolution of Nigeria, control of the press became a significant necessity, a “part of the struggle for the control of the political space and the mind of the society” (Abati, 1999, p70). It was Hagerstrand (1976), who inferred that all “human activities take place in the crossfire of information flow and communication” (Cited in Nwosu, 1990, p87). In most theories and practice of nation building, communication occupies a prime position. Bogdanor (1991), also suggested that the dominant provider and/or source of political communication in the mass media of which the press is an integral part, eventually becomes the definer of what is significant in the politics of any given society at the time (cited in Adebani, 2004, p763). Over the years, media scholars have posited that

communication is the most vital factor in building or developing an organised, united and progressive nation; without it, there will be no national entity and no effective solution to national problems (Nwosu, 1990, p87).

Others have argued that the media have capacity to impact on society – to influence, change, or to maintain (Abati, 1999; Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991).

In his work on *Imagined Communities*, Anderson (2006) lists the newspaper and the novel as central to nation-state formation. He further acknowledges the crucial role of the press in nation-state formation. These two forms of imagining (the newspaper press and the novel) “provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (p25). Anderson (2006) further notes that, in the case of a nation in formation with several ethnic groups, the platform of the newspaper, along with other print formats, creates

the bases for national consciousness...[and] unified fields of exchange and communication... speakers of a variety of (languages) became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field... fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed... the embryo of the nationally imagined community (p44).

Corroborating Anderson's point, Calhoun (1993) states that nationalism and nation formation depend on a distinctive new form of "group identity or membership...a new rhetoric of belonging to large-scale collectivities" (p229). The rhetoric itself depends on "new forms of collective imagination, and also on communications capacities and social organizational conditions that encourage a sense of identity with large populations of distant and largely anonymous others" (Calhoun, 1993, pp229–230).

In a nation in the state of formation, therefore, the press becomes a veritable vehicle that brings cohesion to the cultural narratives and historic myths to help legitimise the imagined nation into reality. As Anderson (2006) puts it, this process "helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation" (p44). He summarises the crucial role of the press in the politics of belonging as that of creating the "possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation" (Anderson, 2006, p46).

Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) referenced Anderson's work on nationalism to say, "the emerging reading public shared a narrative cosmos and soon imagined itself as a national community of common origin and future political destiny" (p768). It could then be argued that the press contributed to the sharing of narratives for a nation in formation through the use of common language understood by all. Thus, the press made individuals begin to imagine their homelands and recognise them as their nations and nation-states, as the case may be. This is a fundamental role for the press – to help generate a new form of collective imagination, a new rhetoric of belonging or a new form of group identity or membership. Deutsch (1966) proposes in his Social Communication Concept that intra-nation communication holds nations together from within. In Deutsch's view, although the nation-state remains the chief political instrument for getting things done, people are "held together from within by (a) communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities

acquired by their members” (p98). What this implies, is that a lack of communicative efficiency or poor communicative facilities or bad communicative motives can have disastrous effects on the formation or even maintenance of the state. He referenced the example of the misuse, but effective communication principles in the nationalism in Nazism. Deutsch further submits that in industrial economy, social mobilisation and national integration are essential, and that communication is central for these roles (Deutsch, 1996).

### **3.5.0 WHEN A NATION IS AN ASPIRATION: THE WORKS OF OMU, AGBAJE, AND ADEBANWI**

Alfred Omu’s work is an impressive industry study of the early Nigerian press, which spans its first six decades. He called the newspaper enterprise a complex social and political organ, and he sets out “to place the rise of the newspaper industry in historical context” and examine what drives or influences them, among other objectives (Omu, 1978, ppvii). He is clear-minded that Nigeria’s early press was a political press, and he sketches out “the part, which the newspapers played in cultural nationalism and in resistance to imperialism” (Omu, 1978, p100). According to Omu, this early press “attracted many people of intellectual competence and quality”, and it “provided the most distinguished intellectual forum in Nigerian history” (Omu, 1978, p69). They “laid a good foundation for the new epoch of nationalism” which began later (Omu, 1978, p166).

In his quest, Adigun Agbaje (1992) set out to investigate the role of modern mass media which he calls, “bearers of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic symbols” (p27), in which the press constructs, distributes, and mirrors a society’s common sense in its politics, everyday, over consent and dissent. Adebaniwi (2016) also makes the point that “the nation exists in and through its narratives” (p18), and that, importantly, there exists what he terms a “media-nation interface”, the understanding of which is “critical to the analysis of the crisis of nationhood in postcolonial states” (p7). In the particular case of Nigeria, he states that no account of the nation’s evolution is adequate without an examination of press narratives. Adebaniwi’s position is in tandem with Agbaje and Omu’s, and also with my own findings – that the “Nigerian press has influenced—both positively and negatively—

the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities” (Adebanwi, 2016, p20). In this, Adebanwi establishes clearly, as did Omu (1978) and Agbaje (1992), the prime place of the newspaper press in understanding Nigeria and its politics, noting that the crisis of nationhood is reflected and contested in the press. To Adebanwi (2016), therefore, “Print media narratives constitute one of the most powerful means of constructing, mobilizing, and contesting meaning in the service of power” (p25). These three, in their propositions and findings, confirm my own finding that the press has helped to define and establish the culture of politics in Nigeria.

### **3.5.1 On Elites in Politics**

Omu posits that early journalists were successful in their trade. Their success elevated the press industry to “the centre of the stage” (Omu 1978, p166), making it “an important instrument of resistance to foreign domination (p129). As the nation evolved and the power of the press grew, “certain people” (p233), otherwise known as the political elite, began to establish newspapers essentially to serve their ethno-political ambitions. These brands of newspapers seethed with bitter rivalry and enmity, and introduced vehemence and antagonism into politics (Omu, 1978,).

Omu laments this development as one of the tragedies of Nigerian history in that in the crucial period leading to independence, newspapers were engulfed “in the vortex of partisan politics” and could not in any way prepare the people for the challenges of a post independent nation (Omu, 1978, p247).

In every major crisis that visited the nation in its post independent years, the press was at hand either to ignite or provide further fuel for an already raging fire. Omu’s verdict: “the newspaper press provided a remarkable example of over-zealous and irresponsible partisanship and recklessness” (1978, p248). What Omu proved is that the newspaper press were instrumental from the beginning of organised politics in forming the type of politics we inherited, particularly in the manner that the political elite took capture of the press, thus validating my findings, as very little has changed since the days of Omu’s investigation.

The political elites, as Omu implies, are the architects of Nigeria's incoherent, fragmented, and divisive politics. Yet, journalists and media researchers seemed to always see political society as the predator, and the press and the people together as victims of an autocratic state. While this may be true to some extent, Agbaje's (1992) amorphous and all-inclusive definition of the civil society produced a distorted picture of who the other predators might be. Pointedly, the elites whose undisguised motivation is dictated by strong hegemonic interests have held the press captive from the beginning, being owners.

On the part of the press, there is a pervasive assumption in which media are portrayed as if they speak for all and to all. Most elite, including journalists and researchers, fall victim of this assumption: they imagine that since the press speaks *to* them, it must speak to and for all. My findings indicate that this is not always the case; the press in Nigeria is an elite press, and it mostly speaks to and for the elite. For example, Agbaje (1992) found that government and the elite form the main sources of news reported in the press. The urban poor, the rural areas, women, and other non-elite are generally marginalised "except in instances where such sources are seen as adjuncts to more powerful social and political interests" (Agbaje, 1992, pp32 -33). This study confirms this also, even though the press continues to imagine that it serves the people.

Both Adebaniwi and Agbaje's works reflect the tense relationship between the press and the state, in the contest for hegemonic space. Adebaniwi, for instance speaks of how the press "renders itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations" (Adebaniwi, 2016, p223). This study finds agreement with Adebaniwi's position that "the Nigerian press mobilises "the nation" for the strategic interest of whatever power the various newspapers and newsmagazines serve" (2016, p287). However, his work and Agbaje's fail to specifically identify a glaring collusion between the media and political elites, and as such, the *power* that is served remains in the shadows, unidentified.

The fact that the Nigerian press desires to build and affirm the grand nation is not in doubt; but a tendency or a desire remains nothing but a wish with weak wings if such desire cannot be actualised against the stronger current of elite paymasters and their

allies in the political society. Press power is power held in trust, but in the case of Nigeria, not for the people but a small elite group. This oligarchy is what I find that the two scholars did not give prominence to in their work, rather they focused on the institutions that that elite groups owned, controlled, and manipulated to serve their purposes.

### 3.5.2 On Issues of Ideology

Adebanwi correctly posits that “ideology functions *only* as a kind of ‘social cement’; a type of glue that binds people in collectively shared values and norms” (Adebanwi, 2016, p287). But he also states that “ideology can function [...] as a tool for dividing people into separate communities of shared values and norms” (Adebanwi, 2016, p287). His position that “ideology” when it is not uniting under the aegis of one grand nation, divides, may be true, but I suggest, only in limited cases that it may not be representative of the essence or nature of ideology, as applied to a multi-ethnic postcolonial state. I propose, instead, that by its very nature, an ideology is a tool for uniting not separating; but ethno-regional ideologues can, and do manipulate ideologies to subvert the supra-ideology of a grand nation.

While not entirely in disagreement with his and Agbaje’s positions on ideology, my findings raise more questions, in the light of their positions. For example, must there always be only one overarching ideology serving all? In the situations where there exist a grand-nation and ethno-nationalities in the same geographical space, can there be multiple ideologies in the form of a grand-national ideology side-by-side with ethno-national ideologies? Does the existence of one subtract from or entirely eliminate the other?

Omu deals with historical roots of relationship between press and politics. Adebanwi and Agbaje deal with how meaning is mobilised through press narratives, and to what consequence. This study centres on who mobilises meaning and to some extent, why and to what consequences. This study goes a little further to attempt to propose what may be done about it.

Whereas they see institutions, I see a group of people, the elite, using institutions, including the press to defend and promote the interests of a few. And the press, mostly underfunded and financially dependent, is powerless, acquiescing and serving the narrow ethno-political interests of its ownership elite rather than the interests of all the people. The result is that all of Nigeria remains poorly served and divided, as long as the press serves mostly the interests of one elite group over the interests of another elite group, to the neglect of the people in general, a salient point, which I believe neither Agbaje nor Adebaniwa's works directly addressed.

### **3.6.0 MUTABILITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS A THEORETICAL CONCEPT**

Democracy is a concept that is key to this study, since well-conducted elections are essential for successful democracy. According to Birch (1993), the Greeks gave the world the word and the concept of democracy, but they did not “provide a model” (p45). For them, democracy was vaguely defined as a system of governance, which literally means a rule by the people, through elected representatives or more directly (Birch, 1993). As such, the lack of a model for proper or standard application seemed to have created large room and latitude for different interpretations and adaptations in various societies and nations. What then is democracy?

Larry Diamond (1997) rather than define it, posits, “democracy generally emerges in different ‘parts’ or stages through many different paths and degrees in different countries” (p22). In other words, wherever democracy has been practiced, it has been adapted to fit or reflect the objectives of its advocates, in varying degrees. This notion implies that the concept of democracy may not command a universal definition. As a result, several theories of democracy have been propounded to meet the different needs of those claiming the practice of democracy.

#### **3.6.1 Election and Democracy**

Katz (1997), says elections are “the defining institutions of modern democracy” (p3). The election process allows people to exercise their right of choice of who represents or governs them. Elections are central to democracy, and as Adejumo (2000)



submits, they “constitute perhaps the most important element in the conception and practice of liberal democracy” (p61). Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006) further posit that, “in liberal democratic theory, an election is a viable mechanism for consummating representative government. Apart from facilitating leadership succession, it promotes political accountability, citizens’ participation and gives voice and power to the people (p26). Fawole (2005) finds agreement with these views, and notes that “elections in themselves... are not democracy in its full ramifications” (p153). In other words, important as they are, elections alone do not make a nation democratic; though central to a functioning democratic state, an electoral process does not by itself confer a liberal democratic status on a system.

To Diamond (1997), the spectrum of democratic practice is elastic, making it possible for elections to also be “illiberal, abusive, corrupt, exclusive, narrow, unresponsive, and unaccountable—i.e., less democratic” (p22). He then submits that for the democratic process to be truly meaningful, elections must be free and fair. The extent to which an election is free and fair is the core principle or essence of electoral and liberal democracy. The difference between a true liberal democracy and a mere electoral democracy lies in their 'freeness' and 'fairness' and as Kurfi (1983) says, with regards to elections as a factor, “a truly representative system of government absolutely depends upon the integrity of elections” (p259).

However, the practice of liberal democracy seems to be fading across the world and as Diamond (1996) notes, “Liberal democracy has stopped expanding in the world, and so has political freedom, more generally” (p31). Ake (2000) as cited by Agbaje and Adejumobi, (2006), argues further that liberal democracy is in crisis in many countries, developed and developing. Elections in today’s context “are a perversion of democracy because they connote popular but not delegated power” (p27).

Diamond (1996), notes that, though there has been a rise in variations of electoral democracy, competition and participation have not been meaningful because of the low levels “of civil freedom” (p21). Even in the United States of America, former President, Jimmy Carter, said in a television interview, “we've become now an oligarchy instead of a democracy. And I think that's been the worst damage to the basic moral and ethical standards of the American political system that I've ever seen

in my life” (Winfrey, 2015). President Carter was indeed reflecting a position that had been validated by research only a year earlier.

Gilens and Page (2014), two researchers from Princeton University and Northwestern University, in an analytical research found

substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy (p565).

They posit that in America, “the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes” (Gilens and Page, 2014, p564). In their opinion, “Economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” (Gilens and Page, 2014, p565).

What the foregoing suggests strongly is that democracy has no real roots anywhere; no one can claim exclusive interpretation of what it is like to be democratic, not even in the United States anymore – it manifests in the colour of choice of the leaders of wherever it is practised. In Africa, for example, it is defined by the singular event of periodic elections, which makes it an event rather than a process. And once the event is concluded, things return to normal – an elected autocracy without accountability to the people.

### **3.6.2 Failure of Electoral Democracy in Africa**

In the African context, elections have become what Adejumobi (2000) called “a shadow of democracy” (cited in Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p27). For Ake (1993), “the familiar political assumptions and political arrangements of liberal democracy make little sense in Africa” (p243). There is adoption of some forms of electoral democratic processes, but hardly the spirit or substance of genuine liberal democracy. According to Ake (1993), what has been foisted on Africans in the name of democracy is

a version of *liberal democracy* reduced to the crude simplicity of multi-party elections... (and) voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is potently spurious, and political equality which disguises higher unequal power relations (cited in Fawole, 2005, p149).

Most elections that take place in African countries are “riddled with tension, conflicts, crises and fraud such that it is difficult to use them as a barometer of the people’s choice” (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p27). This is so because

yesterday’s icons who led civil society in the struggles for democratic renewal have been transformed into the images of those against whom they fought. They have assumed dictatorial postures; they manipulate elections and tend towards sit-tight regimes (p27)

As Ake (1993) notes, single member constituencies taken for granted in liberal democracy “are hardly suitable for societies that are still federations of ethnic groups and nationalities” (p243). Africa, and indeed Nigeria, has made attempts at practising liberal democracy. Sandbrook (1988) notes that, Nigeria's attempts at practising liberal democracy in the first two republics (1960 and 1979) were a failure. However, Diamond (1983) suggests,

the failure...must be understood in light of the distinctive interaction among ethnicity, in an ethnically plural and modernizing society; class action, in a dependent and highly underdeveloped economy; and political competition, in a democratic polity in which elite competition required mass mobilization (p460).

### 3.6.3 Pseudo-Democracy: Half Full and Half Empty

Some scholars have suggested that what is practiced in some parts of Africa is not electoral or liberal democracy, but pseudo-democracy (Sandbrook, 2000; Diamond, 1996; Amenta *et al.*, 2012). As the name implies, *pseudo-democracy* is a half-full, half-empty type of democracy, though the people that practise it, paint the picture that it is the real thing. Sandbrook (2000), defines pseudo-democracy as “the sort of political regime that occupies the hazy terrain between genuine representative or multiparty democracy, on the one hand, and authoritarianism, on the other” (p25). In pseudo-democracy, there is nothing like fairness in the electoral process as the

ruling party manipulates the electoral process to make the outcome as they had designed it – in their favour. Pseudo-democracy kills the real essence and spirit of democratic representation.

Diamond (1996), says pseudo-democracy falls between ‘electoral’ and ‘liberal’ democracy. According to him, pseudo-democracy “allow(s) for considerable restriction of citizenship rights” (p25). Examples of what may constitute the practice of pseudo-democracy abound all over the African political space. There was the case of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt; he led Egypt for several years as an ex-military leader who was kept in power by the military, under the guise of a populist electoral system, which was nothing but a façade. Other examples include Equatorial Guinea under Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo; Angola, under José Eduardo dos Santos; Uganda, under Yoweri Museveni; Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, and Cameroun under Paul Biya (Joseph, 2008; Joseph, 2014). Between 1996 and 1997, Nigeria’s military ruler, General Sani Abacha tried to transmute from a ruler in military uniform into a civilian dictator, but he died in office while still in the process of self and systems transformation (Agbaje, Akande and Ojo, 2009).

According to Amenta *et. al.*, (2012), in pseudo-democracy, “the mass of the people is effectively excluded from power and influence despite the formal exercise of vote” (p127) and Diamond (1996) says, pseudo-democracies “have legal opposition parties and perhaps many other constitutional features of electoral democracy, but fail to meet one of its crucial requirements: a sufficiently fair arena of contestation to allow the ruling party to be turned out of power” (p25). In a democratic continuum, pseudo-democracies “fall well below the standard of liberal democracy, but they vary significantly in their repressiveness and in their proximity to the threshold of electoral democracy” (Diamond, 1997, p18). As democracy evolves in a number of African states “where former one-party dictators engineered their re-election under pseudo-democratic conditions, these democratic fragments are pressing out the boundaries of what is politically possible, and may eventually generate breakthroughs to electoral democracy” (Diamond, 1996, p25).

### 3.7.0 LIBERTARIAN PRESS UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Though most governments in Nigeria are authoritarian, for the most part, Nigerian press conceived its role in the mode and tradition of Libertarian System, asserting “the right to publish anything...without fear of censorship or constraints... completely free from government control” (Firdaus, 2012, pp6-7). The refusal to align, extracted a heavy toll on the newspaper press in particular. According to Siebert *et. al.* (1956), the underlying purpose of the Libertarian press model is “to help discover truth, to assist in the process of solving political and social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and opinions as the basis for decisions. The essential characteristic of this process was its freedom from government controls or domination” (p51). In its classical tradition, the press

serves as *watchdog* of the government, particularly in the absence of a viable political opposition, under the various military governments. One significant requirement of the Libertarian model is that the press serves as a check on government, a watchdog of society (Obijiofor and Hanusch, 2011, p15).

Firdaus (2012) also says that, “freedom of expression is a highly valued principle that allows the media to gather and disseminate information without interference of censorship, or contamination of propaganda, from the government” (p7).

#### 3.7.1 Consensus without Conflict or Opposition

Conflict and consensus are essential elements in democratic politics, and the press provides a platform where opposing views can find expressions. Diamond (1982) notes that, “democratic politics embraces, inevitably and inescapably, an uneasy tension between conflict and consensus” (p629). Since liberal democracy by necessity involves a regular competition for power and position, it will be fair to assert that democracy cannot exist without some sort of conflict, and as Ake (1973) posits, “politics entails conflict of claims, of values, of interest, and of goals; if there is no conflict there can be no politics” (p352). However, without the press serving as a public square where differing voices can be articulated, resolution would be near impossible. Military rulers in most parts did not understand this peculiar role of the

press; their goal was to use autocracy in the “containment of political conflict within certain boundaries of behavioural restraint...” (Diamond, 1982, p629). Five years after the bloody Civil War in Nigeria (July 1967 to January 1970), the military government began the process of terminating parliamentary democracy, a colonial legacy, the practice of which they considered as being responsible for the perennial political violence that led to the War. In 1975, Nigeria’s Military Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, charged a new Constitution Drafting Committee to pay special attention to federalism, an executive presidency, a free and fair electoral system, and, a party system that would be national in scope and “discourage institutionalized opposition to the government in power, and, instead develop a consensus politics”. (*Daily Times* October 19, 1975) It was obvious that the military thought that a nation could have consensus without conflict or opposition. They also believed that the American Presidential system would provide such an opposition free consensus in Nigeria.

### **3.7.2 A Press with a Mission**

The function of the media is “to inform, to discuss, to mirror, to bind, to campaign, to challenge, to entertain and to judge – these are the important functions of the media in any free country” (Seaton and Curran, 2010, p357). The Nigerian Press was formed in the furnace of libertarian press model but for most of its existence it has operated under an autocratic and authoritarian political system. Over time, journalists and publishers have basically followed the crusading tradition of Rev. Henry Townsend, the crusading founding father of Nigerian journalism (Omu, 1978). Journalists “used their newspapers to articulate anti-colonial positions and mobilise the people and public opinion against the colonial authority” (Oso, Odunlami and Adaja, 2011, p3).

Politicians by nature tend to want to exploit and use press power to achieve group and individual ends. According to Abati (1999), the role of the Nigerian press as the “epicentre of national politics” began in the 1950s (p70). Thus, the success or failure of the Nigerian nation-state as a united and equitable nation may be the reflection of how effective or ineffective the press has been in midwifing fraternal relationships among disparate communities within the imagined entity. In Africa, according to

Nyamnjoh (2005), “there are varying degrees of certainty about the extent to which mass media influence audiences” (p1). However, McQuail (2010) sees the press as “both barometer of influence and lever of power...always in a complex relationship with sources of power and the political system” (p523).

The high tension and challenge therefore was for the press to prove itself “an agency of information and debate which facilitate[s] the functioning of democracy” (Curran, 2002, p225). The first newspaper published in Nigeria in 1859 proved that a newspaper could extend itself to lead in a community’s political emancipation and transformation. The Rev. Henry Townsend, a British Missionary, published *Iwe Irohin* successfully for seven years. Historian Saburi Biobaku had unique “access to the bound numbers of the paper’s issues from January 1860 to October 1867” (*The Media in Democracy - Africa Leadership*, 1991, p15). Biobaku (2000) outlined the profound effect of Townsend and his bi-lingual paper in transforming and shaping the history of the pre-colonial Egba people (p67), the immediate community in which Townsend published.

A nation’s structural cohesion comes through social communication and this affects systems, institutions and social cultural interactions (Schlesinger, 2000). There is little doubt that the press has been an important mobilising institution in the unfolding of democratic history of Nigeria. Although Hallin and Mancini (2004) posit that political systems and media systems in a given environment, are not static but homogeneous, possessing similar philosophical cores, the Nigerian system has not exactly followed that path. In Nigeria, there are two distinct press systems: the one established and controlled by governments, and the private press. The government-controlled media functions in tandem with Hallin and Mancini’s proposition of a common core philosophical position. The private press has always tried to function outside the immediate orbit of governments. For that reason, the relationship between political systems and media systems must be seen in co-evolutionary terms.

According to Nyamnjoh (2005), there is an assumption that “the press not only reflect but also shapes society” (p20). Because of its significant role in the process of shaping public opinion, journalism served as the arrowhead in the nationalist’s cause

(Hoffman *et al.*, 2007). There was therefore a drive by political elites and military rulers to own or control the press. The rush to own, or control the press also confirms, in an ironic way, the belief by politicians and military rulers alike, in the power and influence of the press – to mobilise the electorate or to disrupt governance, if it so chooses.

### 3.7.3 Between Autocratic Military Control and Libertarian Press

Cumulatively, the military in successive governments ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 years (1966-1979; 1983-1999), out of 39 years (1960-1999). They placed a high priority on the control of the media, particularly the newspaper-press. Regime after regime, the military enacted draconian decrees (laws) to take over existing media houses or to control those they could not directly own. According to Olayiwola (1991), military regimes in Nigeria seem to be of the mind that “uncontrolled newspapers constitute a danger to government” (p36). As a result, press-military relationship was uneasy, at the best of times, and danger-filled most of the time.

As soon as Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo unseated General Gowon in the third successful military coup, the new regime straight away acquired, by fiat, 60 per cent of the shares in the most widely circulated *Daily Times* and full ownership of the North-based and dominated *New Nigerian* on August 31, 1975. Not too long after, the regime promulgated the *Public Officers Protection Against False Accusations Decree Number 11 of 1976* with retroactive effect from 29 July 1975, purposely to gag the press. The fourth military government of General Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985), which overthrew an elected Second Republic government in 1983, also enacted stringent laws against the media (Diamond, 1991). An example was the Decree Number 4 of 1984 (Alimi, 2011), which most media practitioners considered particularly obnoxious (Olayiwola, 1991). The law sent many media men and women to jail. General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari, and he abrogated Decree Number 4, but introduced his own decrees; and introduced other measures like intermittent closures of numerous media houses for prolonged periods to keep the press controlled (Olayiwola, 1991). These laws, however, were firmly resisted; rather than stop criticism of government, they provoked louder press commentaries



on many of the wrongdoings under the military. The press refused to be gagged, in spite of the powers that tried to stop them from doing their job.

### 3.7.4 The Authoritarian Press

Military regimes, which, by nature usurp power through force, usually maintain control through intimidation to mute opposition voices and suppress views they considered inimical to government's set objectives. At the same time, they relied on propaganda and the mobilising power of the press to help establish legitimacy, and promote consensus and national unity. Thus, virtually all the military regimes instituted and enforced an Authoritarian Press System, "characterized by media subordination to government" (Firdaus, 2012, p6).

Under Authoritarian Press Systems, the press are subjected to "the support and advance" of "the policies of the government in power" (Siebert *et. al*, 1956, p18). Under the military, journalists could not publish whatever was deemed to have capacity to undermine the government in any way or form (Firdaus, 2012). The various military governments controlled the press through various means: by decrees, forms of regulations, denial of patronage, and through violence (closures, arrests, or even assassinations). "In the authoritarian theory, the press was used to inform people what their rulers felt they should know and the policies the rulers wanted the people to support" (Obijiofor and Hanusch, 2011, p15).

Authoritarian Press Systems normally operate under an autocratic political system in which media is "usually owned by a ruling dictator, or party, or powerful private individuals" (Firdaus, 2012, p6). In the case of Nigeria, under the military, federal or state governments owned most newspaper press, and governments owned all electronic forms of communication. Although radio and television broadcasting were deregulated in 1993, federal and state governments continued to own and control most electronic media organisations across the nation. However, it should be noted that Authoritarian Press Systems, as Firdaus (2012) pointed out, "exist not only under repressive and dictatorial governments, but to a certain extent, in more democratic societies as well. Even when a government officially subscribes to a different press model, elements of the authoritarian system may exist since it is in

the state's interest to maintain control over the press" (p6). In other words, to identify an authoritarian system, one would need to scale over the rhetoric of what governments professed to the reality of experience. Most Nigerian governments, military and non-military, have been essentially authoritarian in their relationships with the press.

### **3.7.5 Media Effects**

According to McCombs and Gilbert (1986), there is considerable research evidence that "has accumulated since 1972 that journalists play a key role in shaping our picture of the world as they go about their daily task of selecting and reporting the news" (p3). The news, they assert, impacts many facets of our daily lives! [from] how we dress for work... [to] our concerns about the issues of the day, all are influenced by the daily news" (McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p1). Riding upon the forgoing, the goal of the vast majority of media research, according to Rubin, is the attempt to measure or "explain the impact of mass communication" (McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p281). However, some researchers are cautious about assigning roles such as a blanket effect on the audience solely to the media. However, McCombs and Gilbert (1986) make the salient point: "The most enduring and sustained line of scholarly research on mass communication traces the influence of the news media on voter behaviour (p1). This assertion acknowledges that there is some form of impact, whether or not such impact is limited or mediated "by a host of social and psychological factors" (Rubin, 1986, p281).

Consequently, McCombs and Gilbert (1986) believe that the news media are powerful; journalism, they believe, routinely "provides a structured account of the environment, a background, and setting in which a few objects and selected attributes are highlighted" (p3). Furthermore, Schudson, who shares the view that the news media are powerful, suggests that news media power is twofold: "in its power to declare things to be true, [and] in its power to provide the form in which the declaration appears" (cited in McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p3). This ability of the news media to structure audience cognition and organise the world for us, is labelled the agenda-setting functions of mass communication. It is "the creation of

awareness and arousal of public concerns”, and Combs and Gilbert (1986) consider this to be the most important effect of the mass media (p413). They further explain:

Through their routine structuring of social and political reality, the news media influence the agenda of public issues around which political campaigns and voters’ decision[s] are organised... Newspapers clearly state the journalistic salience of an item through its page placement, headline, and length (McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p413).

While none may argue against these evidence-based positions advanced by McCombs and Gilbert, the truth is that agenda setting goes beyond page placement and headlines; the essence of the theory resides in the meaning propositions that press agendas set forth through narratives.

### **3.7.5.1 *The Press: Setting Agendas in Narratives***

What stories the press tells us about ourselves and about others are important. These narratives inform our concepts and sense of self and imagining of other identities, be they community, ethno-regional or national. Aimufua (2007) set out to investigate how “the press promote and reinforce a hybrid of cultures and interests without necessarily promoting disintegration within a multicultural state like Nigeria and consequently promote a Nigerian national identity...” (pp3-4). Implicit in Aimufua’s objective is that the press does promote and reinforce hybridity of cultures and interests, more or less agreeing with McCombs and Gilbert that the press routinely structures reality. Perhaps more than other forms of narratives, media narratives, but more specifically, newspaper-press narratives, were the bases for the construction of identities or images of self and national mythologies – the basis for unity or disunity in a multi-ethnic, postcolonial nation-state. Although the advent of social media has severely curtailed the power, influence and relevance of the traditional hard copy press, as we knew it, social media have not uprooted the seeds planted in the years and decades of sole dominance of the press in social-political affairs of the nation. As Aimufua notes, “...one of the criticisms against the Nigerian press is that because it promotes sectionalism or nationality interests, it destroys any sense of national identity in the different nationality groups within the Nigerian state” (pp301 – 302).

Adebanwi (2002, 2016) also undertook a similar, but more comprehensive, investigation on the same phenomenon of press narratives, and wonders:

How do the competing narratives of the multiple nations within the grand nation clash and contend with one another? How is meaning mobilized to sustain or contain the relations of power and domination within the grand narrative? How are different narratives constructed and elaborated in the struggles and tensions over single nationhood? What implications do these narratives have for relations among the ethnic nationalities (constructed as nations) within contemporary postcolonial polities? (Adebanwi, 2016, p6)

These questions among others form the starting plate for Adebanwi's quest. The temptation, as it is often the case, is to be satisfied with what he called a "single nation" narrative. In order to avoid this common trap, he set out a more authentic approach, to examine and analyse all narrative strands in a nation's narrative highway. He admits that there is a "constant divisive narratives that present, defend, and contest the diverse and sometimes contradictory interests of Nigeria's many ethno-regional, ethnic nationalist, or ethno-religious groups..." (Adebanwi, 2016, p5). But he also admits that there is an underlining assumption (in the press) that the Nigerian nation-state, which he termed "Nigerian grand nation...surpasses or subsumes the many nations forced to live together within the Nigerian federation" (Adebanwi, 2016, p5).

Beyond and in spite of the constant divisive narratives, therefore, it is Adebanwi's position that "the Nigerian press has influenced—both positively and negatively—the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities in Nigeria" (Adebanwi, 2016, p20). As such, he argues that it is not just about a single or unified narrative, (nor for that matter is it about disembodied voices) but one grand narrative that, though superseding other narratives, makes allowance for those other voices, as it were, to be heard in a *mélange*, captured "as a grand narrative in which meaning discursively defines the relations of power" (Adebanwi, 2016, p27). His main objective is to link "narratives and nation in the African postcolonial context in order to elucidate the mobilization of meaning in the service and disservice of power within a grand narrative" (Adebanwi, 2016, p27). What Adebanwi advocates is the opening of all doors, and windows if need be, to admit in all shades of narration in

evidence, rather than a single-nation narrative that is meant to placate and promote the notion of a non-existent ‘unity’ that does not really unite. This ground-breaking approach made an allowance for “voices of marginal [minority] groups” and “the transfer of marginal discourses to the mainstream” to produce, “a cultural politics of difference, struggles around difference, and the reproduction of new identities” (Adebanwi, 2016, p279). It is this power to produce or reproduce meaning and identities that gives the press its allure for politicians.

### **3.7.6 Democracy, the Press, and Agenda Setting**

Politicians, as well as military rulers, arising from different motivations, believe in the power of the press. The military, which ruled Nigeria for three-quarters of the time in its first 40 years, was generally nervous about the influence of the press. On the other hand, the politicians and elite alike eagerly embraced the press as a powerful tool to mobilise people and influence policies. As a result, ownership or control of the press was usually quite high on the agenda of military juntas at taking power. And from the early days of journalism in Nigeria, front line Nigerian politicians and governments, whether colonial, civilian or military, believed in the power of the press. Ownership of the press became an unwritten requirement for high-level entry into politics, for mobilisation, and unmitigated influence. Inadvertently, this esteem of the press became an eloquent testimony to the power of the press as a noteworthy institution of influence spreading. The list over time is long: Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, M.K.O. Abiola, Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Nda Sam-Isaiah, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Orji Uzor Kalu, etc., at various times, to own a daily newspaper as a mouthpiece was a basic political necessity. These military and civilian leaders saw in the press an unusual power to set agenda and influence policy and public discourse. This behaviour has been validated since as far back as 1966, when Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (1966) declare that:

The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have feelings about... The information in the mass media becomes the only contact many have with politics (cited in McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p177).

Okigbo (1987) defines agenda setting as “a media-effects theory that seeks to explain the impact of the media on audiences cognition” (p23). The concept of agenda setting was first proposed when in a study by McCombs and Shaw (1972), they discovered “a very strong relationship between the emphasis placed on different campaign issues by the media [reflecting to a considerable degree the emphasis by candidates]” (p181). The theory deals with “mass media’s ability to influence the perception of its audience and what they consider the most important issue of the day” (Nwokefor and Okunoye, 2013, p8). In the view of Lang and Lang as cited by McCombs and Shaw (1972), campaign promises, reported in newspaper stories, invariably become “much of the information upon which a voting decision has to be made. Most of what people know comes to them from the mass media...” (p177).

Prior to 1960, the newspaper was the main mass medium source of information; radio, the other medium, was yet to command a significant audience footprint. Politicians and their parties were dominant features in the news during the election campaigns. According to Nwokefor and Okunoye (2013), newspapers front-pages were understandably popular with politicians; they reported their statements and actions as well as published their photos.

In this period, the journalist moved from an earlier position of an independent professional to that of a subordinated affiliate of the politician, who founded and funded enterprises. As it was the case in Britain, at a point in time, when “journalists sought to be, and frequently were, the confidants of politicians, cabinet ministers, and even prime ministers” (Boyce, 2013, p97), Nigerian journalists followed the same path under civilian as well as military governments. Also similar to the British experience, press power began to be equated with partisan political power: newspaper influence grew – an indispensable platform for mobilisation and a voice like no other (Boyce, 2013).

### 3.8.0 THE SEARCH FOR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The objective of this section is to consider democratic models and begin the proposal of a model that may serve as a fit for a conflict-prone pluralistic political environment with a role for the press. As noted earlier, in section 3.6.0 of this chapter, the concept of democracy defies easy definition, both in theory and application; there are divergences between and within models. A nation is most served when it defines and designs her democracy to meet her own peculiar needs. It is important to note that no off-the-shelf model can form a single, tidy stand-alone, ready-to-use framework by itself. Usually, a new framework is a combination of conceptual frames all within an overall democratic scheme that is intentionally designed to meet certain objectives, and then applied to a given situation. The focus of this section therefore is not on conflict; it is on consensus, and how the press can provide a basis to manage and promote a non-paternalistic consensus, based on mutual respects so that everyone can feel belonged. As a result, even though the emphasis of Mouffe's work is on the tension created by conflictual relationships in politics, this work pushes to find ways to negotiate those conflictual tensions in the village square of the press to create a sense of belonging for all.

#### 3.8.1 A Post-Colonial Model for a Post-Colonial State

Electoral and participatory models of democracy are conflict prone, especially in postcolonial nations, which are also tension-filled. What the Nigerian military failed to realise in their search for an acceptable model, (see section 3.5.3) was that it was not possible to legislate national unity, which seemed to have been their core motivation for changing from the British parliamentary system of government to the American presidential system. The military failed to realise that external uniformity is not necessarily the same thing as internalised organic union or unity. It is important to understand that, "The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is...the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which characterizes most liberal-democratic societies" (Mouffe, 2009, p96). Unity that is organic requires certain conditions to flourish and those conditions must be created to facilitate it. The conceptual error in the military's approach to midwifing democracy is in their expectation that there could be a pluralistic, multi-ethnic

community where there would be no opposition voices. The military saw things in black and white; they expected people to be *reasonable*, and were for the most part impatient and uncomfortable with the inherently obtuse nature of politics in a post-colonial state.

### 3.8.2 Forging and Forcing National Unity

In 1975, the Nigerian Military Government, under the leadership of General Murtala Mohammed decided to replace parliamentary democracy, which the military regarded as a form of opposition politics that breeds conflicts and violence with an American presidential system. General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was then Mohammed's deputy, justified the fundamental shift:

In most Nigerian languages, the word for opposition is the same word for 'enemy'. And what do you do with an enemy? Of course, you crush him. And if you have to crush your enemy you do not spare anything. The opposition too, sees itself as being on nothing but on [a] warpath, and taking the position of being at war against the government. I think these are some of the ills of past constitution that we should try and remove (*Daily Times* 27 Oct. 1975).

The Nigerian military was generally of the persuasion that for national peace and unity to exist in a democratic Nigeria, conflict and opposition in politics must be rooted out at all costs. Hence, as Orji (2010) notes, the public sphere in multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria is "an arena of conflicts where cultural and ideological contests or negotiations among a variety of groups take place" (p165). Yet, what the Nigerian military rulers aspired towards in their search for a suitable democratic model was, perhaps, a model with an aversion for confrontations and conflicts; what they created inadvertently was one with a propensity for conflict, intolerant of the 'other', and prone to violent confrontations. According to Mouffe, "Stability and order were more likely to result from compromise among interests than from mobilizing people towards an illusory consensus on the common good" (Mouffe, 2009, p82).

The failure of leadership to confront issues of conflicts with open minds has made it hard to hold one another accountable. This rigid approach to statecraft has given birth to a blame-filled culture of fault finding in others.



### 3.8.3 Aggregative and Deliberative Models: Between Promise and Reality

Warren (2012) produced a list of democratic theories, which contained participatory models, including aggregative, agonistic, and deliberative. These models from Warren's list are of unique relevance and suited for the purposes of my research as perhaps no other theories are, because of their approach to conflict and tension in democratic states. According to Kies (2010), "the aggregative model of democracy is presented as a process of aggregation of citizens' preferences in choosing political officials and policies" (p27). This implies a form of election by which the citizens choices are "considered as a given element and are valued" (Kies, 2010, p27). On deliberative democracy, John Rawls (1997) posits that, "the definitive idea for a deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself" (p772). He further explains:

when citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or non-political interests (p772).

Contrasting the aggregative and the deliberative model, Guttman and Thompson (2004) say that while the deliberative model

considers the reasons that citizens and their representatives give for their expressed preferences, [the aggregative model] takes the preferences as given [and] requires no justification for the preferences themselves, but seeks only to combine them in various ways that are efficient and fair (p13).

Mouffe (2009) also contrasts the models: "the aggregative model sees political actors as being moved by the pursuit of their interests, and, the deliberative one stresses the role of reason and moral considerations" (p8). But Kies (2010) posits that the deliberative is more suitable "solving the conflicts and disagreements that are increasingly likely to arise in our plural/complex societies" (p29). While Kies has a point, it needs to be said that not all deliberative models have made provisions for conflict beyond theoretical propositions. Erman contrasts the two deliberative models of Habermas and Mouffe and advances the notion that whereas Mouffe's

agonism made provision for conflict, Habermas' concept does not. This distinction is important because, conflict, as Mouffe notes, is the core of politics, and Erman agrees. Habermas' focus on consensus ignores the central role of ethical conflict in politics (Erman, 2009, p1039).

According to Erman (2009), Chantal Mouffe takes the position that social consensus is not just a utopian idea, but that it is a dangerous idea, for it promises what it cannot deliver. She believes that in politics, ethical conflicts are fundamentally irreconcilable (p1040). Mouffe criticises advocates of the aggregative and deliberative models; they fail to consider the fact that people are emotional and full of passion for what they hold dear. Mouffe's position is that the objective goal "of democratic politics is to transform *antagonism* into *agonism*." She defined *antagonism* as the "struggle between enemies", and *agonism* as the "struggle between adversaries" (Mouffe, 2009, pp102-103).

Antagonism in politics is not possible without the full cooperation of the media; likewise agonism – either way, the press and media hold the keys to making politics more a collaborative work rather than a winner-takes-all game.

#### **3.8.4 Chantal Mouffe's Agonistic Pluralism**

Agonism as a general concept exists in a variety of disciplines outside politics. Deborah Tannen (2002) locates its conceptual application in various other areas, including journalism, law, medicine and the academe. Tannen (2012) who extracts her own version of the concept from Walter Ong's definition as a "programmed contentiousness" or "ceremonial combat" (2012, p215), views agonism as ritualised opposition, almost similar to a debate in which contestants are assigned opposing positions. In the academic sphere, Tannen (2012) posits that most arguments do not focus "attention on the greatest gain", and therefore are unable to "move beyond the critique in its narrow sense" (p220). She depicted the effects of destructive academic argument, which, she said, "is not the best path to truth and knowledge [but] corrosive" (Tannen, 2012, p220). Robin (2004) also contends that there is a metaphoric bloodletting that accompanies academic disputes reflecting a "subculture trapped and disfigured by compulsive contentious disorders" (p22). He calls it a

perversion of academic discourse, the result of an argument culture, “in which an attack-dog-criticism appears to garner greater reward than civil discussion” (Robin, 2004, p22). Robin cites Tannen stating that much of academic discourse is driven by,

ideological assumption that intellectual inquiries is a metaphorical battle [and that] the best way to demonstrate intellectual prowess is by aggressive and unrelenting litigation and a scorched-earth mentality which disregards all issues and future well-being... all in the quest for victory (cited in Robin, 2004, p22).

In politics, Mouffe suggests that political agonism ought to be a contest of adversaries not a fight to the death of political antagonists. She also states that agonism should be embraced because when people see themselves as agonists (adversaries) rather than antagonists (enemies); it reduces the likelihood of elections being violent. She adds:

...too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues, which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility (Mouffe, 2000, pp16-17).

In a conflict prone nation-state like the Nigerian state, where politics is in a state of perpetual antagonism amongst ethnic nationalities, agonistic pluralism holds out a certain attraction, if not yet a promise. On a normal political day, Nigerian politics is served with an admixture of vexing religious, the amoral and the secular in disproportionate measures without any common basis. And worse still, common aggregative democratic models advocate forms of winner-takes-all politics but make little provision for conflicts that result therefrom (Erman, 2009). According to Chantal Mouffe, passion plays a “central role in the creation of collective political identities”, and she argues that, rather than push people's deep emotional attachments aside, they should be allowed to express them (Mouffe, 2009, p8). Her agonistic approach recognises divergences and conflicts, but insists that conflicts should not necessarily lead to a ‘clash of civilizations’.

### 3.8.5 Agonistic Pluralism in Africa

Although Mouffe writes mostly within the context of the European experience and study, she did identify how agonism may be applicable within the African context. She correctly identifies the key issues in African politics:

- Conditions in many African countries are the consequence of the inadequate political system that was bequeathed to them by their former colonizers
- Independence left them not as stable national states, but as a patchwork of ethnic fiefdoms
- They are burdened with parliaments based on those of the former colonial power
- With so many ethnicities, languages, customs and cultures, multi-party democracy has led to fragmentation and bitterly divided politics. (Mouffe, 2009, p103)

By nature and experience, the African's fierce passion and loyalty toward his or her village or ethnic group makes it clear that merely aggregative 'rational' liberal democracy, in which the winner takes all, does little to capture the African heart. Mouffe suggests that the best way to avoid frequent political meltdown is by the

establishment of a multipolar institutional framework that would create the conditions for conflicts to manifest themselves as agonistic confrontations between adversaries, instead of taking the form of antagonistic struggles between enemies (Mouffe, 2013, p41).

### 3.8.6 The Press, *Face-Powder* Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism

The advocacy for a system of democracy that suits the African temperament and society, and more perfectly meets their political need is reflected in Nyamnjoh's proposal that, "face-powder democracy must give way to a real democratic culture where ordinary Africans can do more than vote, and where democracy means more than the occasional election of leaders who excel in callous indifference to the predicaments of their people" (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p24). For Claude Ake (1993), "in order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy" (p241). Ake also posits that, "democracy has to be recreated in the context of the given realities and in political arrangements which fit

the cultural context, but without sacrificing its values and inherent principles” (p244).

According to Nyamnjoh (2005), the success of democracy is largely dependent on the recognition of the fact that:

most Africans are primarily patriotic to their home village, to which state and country in the modern sense are only secondary. It is in acknowledging and providing for the reality of individuals who straddle different forms of identity and belonging, and who are willing or forced to be both 'citizens' and 'subjects', that democracy stands its greatest chance in Africa (p26).

Mouffe presents the agonistic model of democracy as a suitable alternative for a pluralist society. As noted earlier, it is her view that “Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries” (Mouffe, 2000, p16). Balaton-Chrimes (2015) says that, “agonistic politics seeks to avoid *the hegemonic and incontestable* domination of the will or interests of one group over others” (p143). Mouffe posits that, in democratic politics, there are indeed opponents, but rather than see or treat these opponents as enemies, they should be seen and treated as adversaries and she went further to say that,

an important difference with the model of “deliberative democracy”, is that for “agonistic pluralism”, the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs (Mouffe, 2000, p16).

With reference to the peculiar nature of the African society, Balaton-Chrimes (2015) says that,

in communities of significant diversity, consensus is neither possible nor desirable. What is required in these contexts is sufficient space for *dissensus*, but sufficient limits to keep conflict on the side of agonism (managed disagreement), rather than antagonism or violence (p143).

Also, in multi-ethnic societies such as are typical in most African nation-states, agonistic inter-ethnic politics “requires a threshold level of interpersonal and inter-

group respect in interactions” and it “recognises and allows for the fact that different ethnic groups may have irreconcilably different or conflicting interests” (Balaton-Chrimes, 2015, pp143-144).

In agonism, politics is likened to a sport in which the press provides the village square for engagement and interaction, ensuring that politics is indeed viewed with a passion but not a battle to the death of enemies. Sports is supposed to be fair to all, the press should treat the various sides with fairness. For elections to be fair, the press should be unbiased in their reportage and should give different competing sides the platform to tell the electorates about their vision. According to Nyamnjoh (2005),

the politics of belonging is thus central to understanding democracy in Africa and the role of the media in promoting it. The predicament faced by the media in this regard emphasises the need for more domesticated understandings of democracy as mediated by the quest for conviviality between individual and community interests (p3).

### **3.9.0 CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, being the conceptual chapter of the study, it was necessary to first explore and establish the philosophical and ontological contexts of the study in order not to embark on a wild goose chase, but to provide an appropriate context, beyond mere theoretical pursuits. Colonial addiction is a reality in new nation-states immersed in postcoloniality; the academia is not immune to postcolonial propensity for mimicry. In the chapter, I suggested that the same scale of measurement cannot be applied in two situations with dissimilar realities, backgrounds, and experiences. For this reason, application of theories cannot be done indiscriminately, but contextually with situational sensitivity.

In the chapter, I reviewed various conceptual thinking on press, nations, and the politics of belonging and electoral democracy. I also examined the uses of ethnicity by the elite, first as an ideology, and then as a strategic inter-ethnic negotiation tool, with the press serving as an elevation platform. Looking at the particular case of

Nigeria, matters of equity, if not equality, are central to understanding its contentious electoral politics that determine who belongs and who does not.

After over half a century of modern political experimentations in Africa, it is obvious that the 'winner-takes-all' approach to democracy may not work. The African mind's propensity for inclusiveness and fairness has failed to fully appreciate the demands of liberal Western models of democracy. Unfortunately, even the African press has played a significant role in helping to propagate versions of unworkable democratic models. The innate sense of the African is that governing must be inclusive. All voices must not only be heard, but all hands must be allowed to participate, particularly in a situation where, as in most African states, there is a shortage of talented minds, and made worse even as a divided people.

## CHAPTER 4

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### 4.1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains and justifies the overall research design and methods employed to drive the process of data collection, organisation, and analysis. The chapter also discusses mixed methods of elite semi-structured, in-depth interviews and content analysis, which were my preferred methods for this study. To provide a background to these choices, it is important to foreground the choices with a philosophical paradigm and in particular, the peculiarities of the African research cosmos. In this respect, the chapter is divided into seven sections as follows: 1) The Paradigm: philosophical perspective; 2) Contextualising methodology in African Enquiry; 3) The Study Design; 4) Sampling Concepts and Procedure; 5) Newspapers as Data Generating Documents; 6) Interviews as a Method; 7) Conclusion.

### 4.2.0 THE PARADIGM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK

The study design structure underscores the basic research paradigm from a philosophical perspective in order to contextualise the study. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), paradigms “are human constructions. They define the world view of the researcher” (p91) by providing a philosophical foundation almost entirely from the researcher’s perspective. The implication of this is apparent: if a paradigm is a construct, and a construct is relative, what factors determine the extent of its relative application? And how do these factors limit or expand the effect of the nation-state in the construct of identities, whether national or ethnic?

In this respect, every nation’s press is directly influenced by political, social, economic, and cultural factors. In the case of Nigeria, these factors, according to Ajibade (2010), “have shaped the ‘character’ of the Nigerian press since 1859, when the first newspaper, *Iwe Irohin*, was established” (p248). Though affected and ‘shaped’ by numerous factors, external and internal, the newspaper-press also maintains a prime position as reporter, reflector and the most pervasive platform for



the generation and dissemination of knowledge among the elite class. As a result, it remains central to a researcher's quest on the ways people learn and know.

### **4.2.1 Research Methodology Taxonomy**

From an epistemological point of view, Gerianne Merrigan and Carole Huston (2009), in their work, referenced the views of Charles S. Peirce to explain four basic ways people acquire and accept what they know. These are tenacity, authority, a priori, and the method of science. Merrigan and Huston (2009) provide an insight, in that knowledge through the method of science, unlike other approaches, "requires establishing standards by which any claim can be tested for its reasonableness" (p7). Also, in the opinion of Arksey and Knight (1999), the means and methods of testing knowledge validity and reasonableness have led to scores of debates, particularly over the relationship between what is scientific and what is regarded to be less so; renewing interest in not just epistemology of the work but also in the methodological approach.

As a way of studying social realities, research methodology provides the researcher with a framework or a blueprint to serve as a road map and helps the reader to see and understand the totality of the study. A research is only as valid (and as valuable) as the methodology upon which it is based. According to Aborishade (1997), methodology provides the basis for establishing a study's validity. Beyond establishing validity, Murray (2008), posits that methodology not only provides the reader with the framework but it provides a basis so that a "judgement can be made as to how appropriate they are, given the objectives of the research" (p148).

In the particular instance of the press or media studies, a methodological approach has to be empirical. A non-empirical approach will not provide the essential element of experience, for as Murray (2008), has stated, empiricism in research assumes that knowledge originates in experience; it is concerned with a world that is knowable and potentially measurable. Therefore, the heart of empirical research is situated "in the collection of data through experimentation or fieldwork" and the subsequent analysis of the freshly generated data (p149).

However, “there exist different ideas about the extent to which empirical research can tell us anything meaningful and about how it might do this” (Mason, 2002, p3). Irrespective of whether the process is qualitative or quantitative, acquisition of knowledge or truth through research is highly dependent on the attention the researcher pays to the environment. The questions then, are what is the role of the environment among the other factors of influence? How does a researcher construct a realistic framework without sacrificing the integrity and validity of the quest because of the interference of environmental factors?

### **4.3.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPLICATION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT**

Every research environment is different. While certain aspects of research concepts and principles may be constant, they both require certain levels of contextualisation in order to make meaningful contributions to knowledge, particularly in unique situations like Africa’s. From this perspective, the complex socio-political environment in Nigeria and most of Africa is unlike any other in Western societies, where the tools for scientific research were invented; and from where they were adopted with little adaptation, if any.

#### **4.3.1 Record Keeping, Data Preservation Culture**

A common reality about research in Africa is the acute lack of record keeping culture and particularly of archival records. Most archives are poorly organised, and documents unsystematically classified, while documents like newspapers are piled or scattered in no particular order. At two research centres affiliated to two leading Nigerian universities, one in the North, the other in the South West, the process of retrieving their mostly unorganised piles of newspapers is a far cry from the British Library, London where the processes are not only digitalised, but uncomplicated and stress-free. At the British Library, I could easily locate whole editions – news, features, adverts, and all – of many Nigerian newspapers of 60 years ago and beyond, in microfilm formats; I could have pages of selected editions photo-copied in the library or have PDF copies sent directly to my email address. In Nigeria, locating one relevant edition, which might have been incomplete, was equal to a full day’s

work. I put in a lot of effort and spent a great deal of time, and resources travelling between different archives and newspaper libraries; in one newspaper house, they did not even have complete copies of their own past editions.

### 4.3.2 The Researcher's Positionality

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the adoption of methodological approaches in research is inescapably intertwined with the issue of positionality. Positionality of the researcher includes his or her “financial status, institutional and educational affiliation, race and personal values of the researcher among others” (Eshun, Zakaria and Segbefia, 2015, p8). According to Admire Chereni, cited in Eshun, Zakaria and Segbefia (2015), the debates on positionality are not different from the notions of researchers as being either emic or etic. While an emic researcher refers to who has gained a personal and first-hand experience of a society, the etic researcher denotes the researcher who lacks the lived experience of the culture and society under study. When measured against these concepts, my positionality as a researcher would tend more on the side of an emic researcher.

Because one of the methods was elite interviews with highly placed individuals, it would usually be very difficult to get many of them to sit down for 30 minutes to two hours of interviews. But because of the level of my previous relationships and connections with many of the interview participants, I was granted ease of access, and the atmosphere of most of the interviews was quite relaxed. One offered me dinner, which I declined; another offered me breakfast, which I accepted, having left home very early to catch a morning flight in order to meet a 9:00 am appointment. Though I had this level of access, I was still faced with quite a few obstacles: I chased after four of them relentlessly; with two of them I never was able to get an appointment; for the other two I travelled to distant cities only to be informed that the appointments had been cancelled; I was able to reschedule one of them for a future date, the other never agreed to reschedule. With the serving vice president, and the former military president, they were extremely busy, and understandably so. I had to re-schedule my appointments, after waiting for a considerable period. In the end, I logged in several hours on road and air trips across Nigeria, and I dare say that

this level of access would have been extremely difficult for someone who lacked extensive and long-term personal contacts.

#### 4.4.0 DESIGN OF THE STUDY

What became clear to me in the earlier stage of the study was that in order to capture the dynamic political cosmos defined by the tensions of ethnic relations (usually accentuated at election periods), certain methods may limit the scope of enquiry and, therefore, the robustness of research outcomes. For an example, as Thies (2002) and Murray (2008) have observed, the demands of quantitative protocols of operationalising certain concepts according to fixed sets of rules that assign a meaningful numeric representation to the phenomenon of identity politics may be difficult, if not impossible, for such a work as mine.

Overall, a research design should drive the process of data collection, data organisation, and data analysis to produce the best result. This led me to conclude that qualitative methods offered me freedom and flexibility to, according to Thies (2002), examine the presence or absence of certain attributes in my area of interest. Thies also notes that the method is more amenable to labelling by words rather than numbers, thus allowing the measurement of the degree to which certain attributes are present.

From an empirical standpoint, the investigation, occasioned by my research questions, I have endeavoured to design a study that is open-ended and emergent. One of my primary assumptions from a design point of view, therefore, is that the narratives of (certain kinds or groups of) people are important; that their experiences and understanding possess the capacity to shed light on key questions posed by my research. In a typical qualitative approach, the researcher primarily adopts a constructivist perspective, which Creswell (2003) explains as,

the multiple meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or pattern... The researcher collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data (p18).

This approach allows room for innovation, which enables the researcher work more within a somewhat flexible framework, within defined procedural boundaries. Creswell also notes that qualitative research is useful in so far as it is exploratory, particularly when a concept needs to be better understood, and when the important variables are not easy to discern for thorough examination by other forms of enquiry (Creswell, 2003). It is obvious from the foregoing that the qualitative research approach would be more suited for my research requirements. For one, this approach supports the narratives route, particularly the narratives of those who matter to the subject or theme of my enquiry. In order to achieve objectives of the study, therefore, I employed qualitative research procedures, using examination of public documents in the form of newspapers, and in-depth semi-structured interviews as two (2) complementary methods for the research.

#### **4.4.1 Data Collection Methods**

The data collection methods that I have adopted for this research are in-depth semi-structured elite interviews and content analysis. After a review of my research questions, I found these as the most applicable methods that would allow me achieve the objective of the research.

It is important to note that research literature has made a clear distinction between methods and methodology. While methodology has a philosophical connotation, often referring to the paradigm or worldview that underpins the research, the term method conveys, principally, the tools or techniques of data collection. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) hold the view that “all methods are flawed” (p15) and in any case, only partially objective accounts of the world can be produced. This, they argue, perhaps accounts for an increased use of qualitative techniques in order to be able to verify the validity.

Marshall and Rossman (2010) list four methods as the typical methods most often relied upon for data collection by qualitative researchers, labelling them as core to qualitative enquiry. These include in-depth interviews, document review, participation in the setting and direct observation. On interviews, the two researchers note: “qualitative researchers rely extensively on in-depth interviews”

because the method “allows a researcher to uncover and describe the participants’ perspective on events” (Marshall and Rossman, 2010, p146).

Archival data may be used to further supplement other qualitative data gathering methods. Documents review allows the researcher to establish history and context around the object of research. According to Marshall and Rossman (2006), “Researchers supplement participant observation, interviewing, and observation with gathering and analyzing documents produced in the course of everyday events or constructed specifically for the research at hand” (p107). As a method, document review is unobtrusive.

#### **4.4.2 The Research Questions Revisited**

- Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria’s political culture and national identity?
- Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”?
- Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?
- Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?

#### **4.4.3 The Concept of Mixed Methods**

As earlier stated, this research is based on a mixture of methods approach for data collection and analysis. Methodological triangulation, also sometimes referred to as mixed methods, is the use of a research design that draws on a “variety of methods to collect and interpret data” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p23). Bogdan and Biklen (2006) describe triangulation as a procedure used to ensure validity of data through the use of two or more sources. Further justifying the necessity, Denzin (1978) states, “no single method can ever completely capture all the relevant features of that

reality” (p15). Atkinson *et al.* (2007) agree with Denzin, declaring triangulation as a research imperative, “checking everything so that evidence does not rely on a single voice, so that data can become embedded in their contexts, so that data can be compared” (p35).

The concept, according to Paulette Rothbauer (2008), originates “from navigational and land surveying techniques that determine a single point in space with the convergence of measurements... Triangulation is most commonly used in data collection and analysis techniques” (p892). Denzin (1978; 2006) identified four types of triangulation to include, data, investigation, theory, and methodological, which involves more than one method to gather data.

Mixing methods brings better understanding to the research problem, biases inherent in one method are neutralised by the biases of another, and “results from one can help develop or inform the other” (p16). Furthermore, the use of multiple methods raises the researcher “above the personalistic biases that stem from single methodologies. By combining methods...in the same study, observers can partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator and/or one method” (Denzin, 1978, p294).

To accentuate the point, Newman and Benz (1998) called triangulation “a reliability check” and noted that more sources give a more “complete perception of the phenomenon” (p52). It must be stated though that triangulation is not an end in itself; it serves the two main purposes of validation and completeness (Arksey and Knight, 1999).

Bearing the above in mind, one must point out that the mixture was not haphazard, but purposeful. The two methods are the elite interviews with acknowledged experts, and content analysis of newspapers. It is important to note that each research method has its individual strengths and limitations, hence the necessity to use both methods to draw the strength in each in order to minimise their limitations. The interviews according to Tim May (2011) serve the purpose of obtaining and relying “on people’s account[s] of their actions as representing something beyond the interview situation....” (p158). However, content analysis helps to give context: “thus

a fuller understanding can be achieved only by witnessing the context of the event or circumstances to which people refer” (May, 2011, p158).

The elite/expert participants in the interviews have been central, not marginal participants, in the course of designing the Nigeria we now have – as military rulers, as press leaders and as academics who study the nation. On the choice of what parts of the newspapers to analyse, I chose the front pages and editorials. This choice was informed by the knowledge that the elites are avid readers of front-page news reports and editorials of papers, being by inclination more concerned with current and topical issues in the news (Johansson, 2007). It was therefore appropriate that the choice of secondary method was content analysing front pages and editorials of newspapers. This selection was also intrinsically linked with the language of the publications. There was not even a contest on this point: whereas in a place like India there are indigenous languages press, in Nigeria, they are very marginal and they do not speak to or for the elite. The English language remains the language of the elite; it allows communication across ethnic boundaries, unlike no other language in Nigeria. Publications in indigenous languages in Nigeria are almost non-existent.

#### **4.4.4 The Elites Call Leadership to Take Responsibility for Nigeria**

One of the few points of complete unanimity in this study is the agreement by all that political elites ethnicised politics, and that they also politicised religion and the press; used them as mobilising tools, or offensive weapons, even. Ethnicisation of politics and religion has remained an attractive route to power because it is easy when used in a double combination with the press to gain political relevance. The press is a critical tool in the kit; it provided visibility and bestowed unearned prestige as a result of the status conferral power. Adesina speaks of “massive exploitation of the media”; Pate speaks of the elite exploitation of the ethnic card, not only in the inter-ethnic or regional fights, but also in the intra-ethnic elite battles. And ethnicity delivers: “Oh yes!” says Osinbajo, “I think political elites have [found] it’s the easiest way to rally the troops, appealing to those kinds of sentiments.”

The interview respondents surprisingly and, again, in unanimity, placed the blame of Nigeria’s comatose political situation at the doorsteps of the nation’s leadership elite.



Surprising because the interviewees are all part of the leadership elite group that they hold responsible. Says Babangida, “The political elites capitalised on their leadership a lot, to try and create friction amongst some ethnic groups, thus fostering ethnicisation”. Somehow, the elites feel quite justified to blame others while exonerating individual selves from the near wholesale failure of the Nigerian system.

#### **4.4.5 Reflectivity, Data Validity, and Reliability**

Most Nigerian federal elections are fought and won with obvious strong ethnic exclusionist or inclusionist overtones, if not agitations. In my design framework, I have chosen to do content analysis of newspapers during key federal election periods, from across the time spectrum of over 50 years (1959-2011). In order to ensure data validity, it is important to understand my own journey and interest in the work. Prejudices, preferences, and predispositions create selection problems for all researchers. In particular, according to Thies (2002), qualitative researchers are forced to “constantly defend their data against claims of bias” (p369).

Therefore, before I discuss my design approaches further, it is important to acknowledge my own interests and background including my values and biases, for indeed as Creswell (2003) has observed, reflexivity typifies qualitative research today, because, the personal-self is no longer separable from the researcher-self. Steedman, as cited in Alvesson and Kaj Sköldbberg (2009), has also advanced the notion that knowledge can no longer be separated from the knower. Alvesson and Sköldbberg also suggest that social reality is not merely represented by the researcher; it is constructed. And usually, the construct would have direct input by the researcher, and the result, a melange of what the researcher observed in the field of study, past experiences, and his or her point of view. Creswell borrowed Mertens’ views in stating that

The qualitative researcher systematically reflects on who he or she is in the inquiry and is sensitive to his or her personal biography and how it shapes the study... It also represents honesty and openness to research, acknowledging that all inquiry is laden with values (Mertens, 2003 cited in Creswell, 2003, p182).

This said, my own journey informed my interest in the research topic. I have been in active media-related business for about 40 years; as such I can lay claim to some measure of knowledge and expertise in the field. At different times in my media career, I have served as policy adviser at the Ministry of Information and Culture; as special adviser to the vice president, under a military government; as a public communications specialist to private and public-sector organisations; as a reporter and writer in noted media houses, and as commentator on public affairs on radio and television programmes.

#### **4.4.6 Research Motivation**

In all these roles I have often wondered, given the power attributed to the media, why unity has eluded Nigeria as a nation, and why a sense of belonging has equally eluded most Nigerians as members of the nation-state. Why has the media not been able to deploy its power of influence to help forge a sense of oneness, and make everyone feel part of the larger nation? Nigeria's ethnic identity crisis has led to scores of bloody communal conflicts leading to deaths in millions over the lifespan of the nation.

This topic is also of particular interest because I belong to a minority ethnic group in the mid-southern part of Nigeria. Given the domination of the majority tribes and the general discriminative treatment meted out to minority ethnic groups, I often wondered if the press were not presumably complicit, but did more to foster national unity, people like me would not feel so stateless. I feel that if in a nation, everyone has a common sense of identity and belonging without necessarily losing ethnic identities, the nation-state will fare better than it does right now under the current acrimonious conflict-prone situation.

The preceding paragraphs convey my motivation for the research; but it is my life as a media professional with four decades of experience that granted me access to people and places that ordinarily would have been far beyond me. In the process of selection of newspapers and interviewees, and election dates, I leaned extensively on my experience in the media, my knowledge and contacts gained from years of position and presence in public office. Relationships formed across the country

helped me know who to select, and granted me the access to many of them. In selecting the interviewees, therefore, I had to ensure, as much as possible, regional and ethnic representation. Of the 22 interviewees, six persons each are from the North and West and five persons each from the East and the Mid West. This brings me to the issue of sampling.

#### **4.5.0 SAMPLING CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURE**

The very nature of this study imposes three areas of selection decisions on me: 1) which election years to include; 2) which editions of newspapers in those election periods to include; and 3) who to interview as subjects to fulfil the demands of a typical phenomenological enquiry. This section explains the selection approaches of election years, newspapers, interview participants, their backgrounds, and ethnic spread or geographical location. The sampling method used for the selection of interview subject, years and elections to research, and which newspapers to include in the content analysis was done through purposive sampling or what Aborisade calls judgement sampling. According to him, a researcher carefully considers and “chooses his sample under the consideration of typical cases which are most likely to provide him with requisite data or information” (Aborisade, 1997, p90).

Researchers use sampling procedures, usually designed to generate a respectable representative sample size from a larger group, to provide answers to research questions. Such a select sample must, as closely as possible, represent the larger group within a population size. According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), there are two types of sampling procedures in the social and behavioural sciences – these are probability and non-probability procedures. Probability sampling aims to accurately achieve representation of a specified population, which is the degree to which the sample represents the entire population.


A non-probability sampling on the other hand, is a technique in which each unit in a population does not have a specifiable probability of being selected. In other words, in non-probability sampling, the researcher does not select his or her units from the population in a mathematically random way. As a result, non-probability sampling typically produce samples that are not necessarily exact representations of the

population. This also means that the ability to generalise from them is limited (Teddlie and Yu, 2007).

One advantage of sampling procedure, according to Mason (2002), is that it allows the researcher to manipulate “analysis, theory and sampling activities to much greater extent than in statistical sampling” (pp136-137). That said, however, non-probability techniques, sometimes referred to as purposive sampling, is not a procedural *carte blanche* to choose any group or persons as the researcher pleases. Rather, such freedom of choice must align to a transparent process. Silverman (2013) insists, purposive sampling demands that we think critically about the parameters of the population we are studying and choose our sample case carefully on this basis” (p148). Corroborating this view, Denzin and Lincoln (2011), stated that purposive sampling is not arbitrary, in other words, the researcher is still confined to “seek out groups, settings and individuals where the processes being studied are most likely to occur” (cited in Silverman, 2013, p148). Bearing this in mind, therefore, a non-probability or purposive sampling technique best serves the purpose of my study.

This technique (also sometimes referred to as qualitative sampling because it is widely used among researchers doing qualitative studies) has a number of variations. These include haphazard or convenience sampling, quota sampling, snowball sampling, and purposive sampling. When compared with other types, purposive sampling is the generally more acceptable kind of sampling for qualitative research. It uses the judgment of an expert in the selection with specific purpose in mind. According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), purposive sampling is used most often when a difficult-to-reach population is involved. However, the technique is not random or haphazard; it is purposeful and intentional, used to select units (individuals, groups of individuals, institutions) based on specific purposes associated with answering a research study’s questions (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). As Maxwell (1997) put it, purposive sampling type has been found to be very useful when “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (p87). It is for the above reasons that I used purposive sampling to select elite participants in the interviews as active experts in the field.

Figure 4.1: FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA 1959-2015 (Elections years covered in this study are shaded)



### 4.5.1 Selections of Federal Elections

There are nine federal elections in Nigeria's history between 1959 and 2011; of these, six elections are used in this study. The selected elections were designed to contrast in two distinct categories of three elections each. The two classifications are *transition* and *consolidation* elections. This was necessary in order to investigate the role of the press and the promotion of ethnically slanted narratives in reporting and commentary of newspapers, particularly at election periods.

*Table 4.1 Election Types*

<i>TRANSITION ELECTIONS</i>	<i>CONSOLIDATION ELECTIONS</i>
<b>1959</b>	1964/1965
<b>1979</b>	1983
<b>1999</b>	2011

A transition election is an election where power is transferred from one type of government to another, whereas a consolidation election is one in which a ruling party vies to retain its position and hold on to power. Researchers (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006; Orji and Uzodi, 2012) have found that a transition election, as against a consolidation election, has greater possibility of being peaceful, though not always, when violence is used to measure the relative peace between parties and their ethnic dispositions. According to Mackenzie and Robinson (1960), available records show that “transition elections are relatively more peaceful than the consolidation elections” (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p17). All other factors considered, it was therefore not totally surprising that the 1959, 1979, and 1999 elections, relatively speaking, were “devoid of large-scale violence” (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960 cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p17). When contrasted with transition elections, Orji and Uzodi (2012) note that in consolidation elections, ruling parties tend to exhibit deliberate attempts to contrive and monopolise electoral space and manipulate election results, noting that politicians

engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch deliberate plots to move the process in their favour. This pattern is reflected in ‘simulated

landslide' victories recorded by the ruling parties in the 1964/65, 1983, 2003, and 2007 elections (p19).

It is important to note that all the election years cited in the preceding quote were consolidation elections. Consolidation elections,

are more complicated to manage in Nigeria. This is because the interests and forces with a stake in the consolidation process are more diverse, with some of them controlling the election machinery (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p37).

Consistent with this proposition is that the (ethnic motivated) violence, which erupted following the consolidation elections of 1964/65 paved the way for the first military coup. The coup was so bloody and divisive that it eventually led to a 30-month civil war. Also, the winning party in the 1983 elections lasted for only three months in office before it was overthrown by the fourth successful military coup. And it is on record that the violence that followed the 2011 consolidation election was the bloodiest in the history of election violence in Nigeria. Thus, for this study, 1959 is contrasted with 1964/65; 1979 is contrasted with 1983; and 1999 with 2011 in order to measure and investigate dynamics of ethnically charged narratives during the election year.

**Table 4.2: Election Dates and Research Periods**

TRANSITION ELECTIONS		CONSOLIDATION ELECTIONS	
ELECTION DATE	RESEARCH PERIOD	ELECTION DATE	RESEARCH PERIOD
<b>December 12, 1959</b>	November 18 - December 20	December 30, 1964 - March 18, 1965	December 10, 1964 - January 6, 1965  February 25, 1965 - March 26, 1965
<b>August 11, 1979</b>	July 20 - Aug 18	August 6, 1983	July 16 - August 13, 1983
<b>February 27, 1999</b>	February 6 - March 5	April 16, 2011	March 25 - April 24, 2011
<p><b>Period: 4 weeks (3 weeks before and 1 (one) week after the election).</b></p> <p><b>Pages: Only Front Pages and Editorial Pages.</b></p>			

### 4.5.2 The Case for 2011 Federal Election

After due consideration, I chose not to pair 1999 with 2003, or even 2007 as the matching consolidation election year; instead I chose 2011. Here is the argument behind the choice: Among other reasons, as at 2003, the democratic experiment was still quite nascent. There were very few tested, bigwig politicians with any modicum of experience and pedigree, as in the previous elections. The few and a growing league of retired military officers with deep pockets, all beat the path into one political party – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The other parties were regional, fragmented, weak, and uncoordinated; the political terrain was thus dominated by the PDP. With all serious contenders for power all under its political roof and control, the need to recourse to ethnic politics was notably curtailed. The deep pockets of hugely self-centred personalities aligned to regional or ethnic positions became the drivers in the political arena rather than issues of any national significance. As a result, open inter-ethnic and inter-party power struggles were appreciably reduced. Appeals to ethnic sentiments were replaced by *moneybag* politics of cash-and-carry where power or office was allotted to the highest bidder.



The same scenario played out in 2007; however by 2011, the floor of the house of the PDP, bedevilled with political heavyweights, had caved in; opposition's voice had become stronger, louder, and more vociferous. The old inter-ethnic and inter-regional politics had been firmed up, and Nigeria's ethnic politicians were back in the trenches of battle for hegemonic relevance power.

#### **4.6.0 NEWSPAPERS SELECTION AS DATA GENERATING DOCUMENTS**

In his work on nations' formation, Anderson (2006) presents a case for the role of the press in nation-state formation. According to him, two forms of imagining (the novel and the newspaper), "provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (p25). Anderson further notes that in nation-states made up of multiple ethnic nationalities, print-languages provided "the bases for national consciousness...they created unified fields of exchange and communication...among speakers of the huge variety of (languages)..." (Anderson, 2006, p44).

And since language is a fundamental characteristic of a nation in formation, Anderson (2006) views the press as a veritable vehicle that brings cohesion to cultural narratives and historic myths to help legitimise the imagined nation into reality. He puts it this way: "Print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which... helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation" (p44).

In Nigeria, the newspaper was the dominant mass media form from pre-colonial period up until early 1990s when the broadcast sector was deregulated and exclusive state ownership of radio and television was finally abrogated. Thus, the newspaper and the English language combined to provide the essential socialising platform: the vehicular instrument for constructing the new nation-state's structures and ethos. However, as the English language strove to unite the nation under one tongue through the media and the classroom, indigenous languages, particularly the three major ones of the Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba ethnic groups, provided the basis for continuous strong contentions among ethnocentric identities.

In this regard, the choice of newspaper as one of the two sources generating data for investigation is self-evident being central to the topic and themes. According to Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) “the newspaper is... a major source of political information about issues and parties...” (p423) and noting that newspaper reading and attention are two strongest predictors of party-issue differences. Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) cited some research studies to back their claim:

One survey during the 1992 campaign, for example, found that newspaper reading and attention were the two strongest predictors of party-issue differences, in an analysis that included television news and advertising, viewing of debates and party conventions, radio news, and news magazine reading (p423).

Similar results were found in campaign surveys in 1976 and 1980 (Chaffee and Tims, 1982; Patterson, 1980 cited in Chaffee and Kanihan, 1997, p423).

#### **4.6.1 Negating Bias in the Selection of Newspapers**

Bias and selectivity are “problems for both quantitative and qualitative researchers to consider” (Thies, 2002, p369). In particular, qualitative researchers must “constantly defend their data against claims of selectivity and bias” (Thies, 2002, p369). On the choice of particular newspaper publications, I have depended on my four decades in media practice and specific knowledge of the newspaper industry to choose papers regarded as leading papers in any particular year of choice. Even then, I have been careful to select leading (national and regional or ethnic) newspapers in the period of the various elections. Also, since this study is more or less tangentially an elite-oriented discourse, the newspaper becomes even more an obvious choice for the study. According to Olayiwola (1991), “...the political affiliation of media ownership determined, to a large extent”, their ‘editorial direction’ and “in their coverage of political parties and the campaigns” (p43).

The newspapers selected spread fairly across the nation, overlapping with a spread in the selection of the interviewees; and covering major ethnic representation - Igbo – Eastern Nigeria; Yoruba – Western Nigeria; Hausa/Fulani – Northern Nigeria; and Southern minorities, who tend to dominate media ownership. On ownership and

operation, there are government, as well as private newspapers. Of the nine papers in the study, three – the *Nigerian Citizen*, the *New Nigerian* and the *Daily Times* – were owned by governments. The *Citizen* and the *New Nigerian* were established and funded by a regional government while the *Daily Times* which was established as a private paper in 1926 by a team of British and Nigerian businessmen, was on the newsstand for 50 years before it was forcibly taken over by the Federal Military Government in 1976.

The newspapers selected reflect regional representation as follows:

- **Western Region/Yoruba Ethnic Group:-** The *Tribune* and The *Punch* are both private newspapers. While the motivation for establishing the *Tribune* was purely political, the motivation for the *Punch* was ostensibly business, but the paper has not shied away from taking positions in the interest of the South West Region. The Western Region is the home of most newspapers in Nigeria, and most of the newspaper market is in the region, commanding over 65-70 per cent of the market.
- **Northern Region/Hausa and Fulani Ethnic Group:-** The *Nigerian Citizen* (Northern Government); *New Nigerian* (Northern/Federal Government); *Daily Trust* (Private, but strongly represents and defends “Northern interests”). Until the last 15 years, Northern states or regional governments funded most dominant Northern regional newspapers. Since then, privately owned newspapers like the *Daily Trust* and *Leadership* have dominated the market.
- **Eastern Region/Igbo Ethnic Group:-** *West African Pilot* (Private). The East has produced great journalists but not many national journalism institutions since the Civil War. And virtually all the papers from the region have been established for political objectives, and published outside the region.
- **National Papers with Minorities Ethnic Ownership Interests:-** *ThisDay* and the *Guardian* are both private newspapers. The motivation for establishing *ThisDay* was perhaps for business and political influence trading, whilst apparently the motivation for the *Guardian* was business.

**Table 4.3: Newspaper Selection by Years**

YEAR	NEWSPAPERS		ELECTION TYPE
1959	The Nigerian Tribune	The West African Pilot	Transition
1964	The Nigerian Citizen	The West African Pilot	Consolidation
1979	The New Nigerian	The Daily Times	Transition
1983	The New Nigerian	The Daily Times	Consolidation
1999	The Guardian	The Punch	Transition
2011	ThisDay	The Daily Trust	Consolidation

The life span of newspapers in Nigeria is rather short. Even when they last, they wane in influence and reach rather quickly with time and political seasons. Of the nine papers, three are now defunct; two exist in names only, caricatures of their former reach and influence. Of the rest, the *Daily Trust* at barely 15 years old in the market is the most recent with a success story commercially. As a result, it was difficult to find newspapers that would span the entire period of the study. On the positive side, this freed me to select two newspapers for each election period that I consider the leading papers for the period. I had initially included the *Tribune* in all the six election years, being the only newspaper that spans the period, but I soon discovered that it did not add any significant value to the quality of investigation result.

#### **4.6.2 Method of Newspaper Analysis**

The primary data for this study are collected from front-page news reports, editorials, and commentaries in the three weeks preceding the elections and one week immediately following.

##### **4.6.2.1 Generating Data from Newspapers for the Research Content Analysis**

From the foregoing, I decided to use Content Analysis of selected newspapers as my other data gathering and analysis method. The method is “used to study a broad

range of ‘texts’ from transcripts” (including) “content of newspapers and magazines” (Macnamara, 2003, p1). It differs from other methods, say, surveys, in that it is more manageable; it can be conducted on a regular basis for an assigned period, whereas large scale audience research can be expensive in terms of resources and time allocation.

#### **4.6.2.2 Choice of Content Analysis**

There are several types of content analysis techniques, but “studies comparing different techniques have generally found that results are nearly identical” (Windhauser and Stempel, 1979, p148). Laswell *et al.* (1942) also “found that varying coding and context units had only a moderate effect on results” (cited in Windhauser and Stempel, 1979, p148). Content analysis as a method is flexible, capable of being employed within a qualitative as well as quantitative environment.

According to Macnamara (2003), “the ultimate goal of analysing media content is to understand their deeper meanings and likely interpretations by audiences” (p5). Whereas quantitative content analysis may readily conform to the scientific method and produce reliable findings, qualitative content analysis is difficult and may be impossible to do with scientific reliability. However, the latter relies on the ability of the researcher to understand and interpret texts; it examines the relationship between the text and its audience, paying particular attention to meaning and context (Macnamara, 2003).

In the particular area of contemporary media studies, Larsen (1991) posits that “qualitative content analysis continues to play major role... less as an end in itself but as a constituent of other qualitative procedures” (p133). For Macnamara (2003), an advantage that media content analysis has, as a specialised sub-set, is that it is “a non-intrusive research method that allows examination of a wide range of data over an extensive period to identify popular discourses and their likely meanings” (p6).

However, for Kerlinger (1973), content analysis provides a “method of studying and analysing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to measure variables” (p525). It is Kerlinger’s opinion that most of content analysis has been used simply “to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various

communication phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1973, p525). The implication of this is that the method is much more robust than that.

#### **4.7.0 INTERVIEWS AS A METHOD**

One research method is not fundamentally superior to another, according to Arksey and Knight (1999). Rather, a method exists to best serve the purpose of the research. Interview formats vary as mentioned earlier, there are three common or frequently used formats: the structured, semi-structured, or unstructured. Of these, the structured interview is not commonly used for qualitative research because of what Merrigan and Huston (2009) referred to as having strict “protocols or schedules that dictate what questions to ask when” (p113). The less formal formats of unstructured and the semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, are more frequently used for qualitative data gathering. They are more malleable in helping to provide a full picture of an interviewee’s views or experiences.

Of the two techniques, the semi-structured format is located midpoint between the structured and the unstructured formats; it is less formal than the structured technique but not as much an unbound format as the unstructured. Its diverse applicability, perhaps, explains its wide acceptance as a qualitative data gathering method, according to Arksey and Knight (1999). The semi-structured format allows for measured interaction with interviewees and when well deployed, requires “respondents to reflect on an experience or a concept (that) focuses on the participants’ understanding or meaning of a particular concept or experience” (Merrigan and Huston, 2009, p114).

#### **4.7.1 In-depth Interviews**

In applying the semi-structured format, my approach had to be in-depth interview, which is useful when a researcher wants detailed information about the respondent’s views, or needs to explore issues in depth. My interview participants fit into the group which Boyce and Neale (2006) identified as those that may not be comfortable talking in a group setting, or when a researcher is desirous of distinguishing

individual opinion, which was the case in my work, in order to highlight ethnic or regional predispositions, if any.

As such, in-depth interviews may be used to provide context to other data (from other methods), to offer a more complete picture of the phenomenon of investigation. According to Boyce and Neale (2006), the in-depth interviews

provide much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys. They also may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information—people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with you about their program as opposed to filling out a survey (p3).

Considering the above and the high level calibre of interview subjects, interviews provided a much more robust and productive instrument for data gathering, while one is mindful of its short-comings as a method.

#### **4.7.2.1 *Selecting Participants***

According to Lindlof (1995), interviews are important if a researcher needs to understand a social actor's perspective on an event. As such, only persons whose experiences are central to the research problem in some form or another may be interviewed. Merrigan and Huston (2009) believe that the objective of face-to-face interviews is to probe interviewees for information about themselves and others or events relevant to the essence of the study. In principle, therefore, a researcher should recruit interview participants for their expert views or because

they represent a certain status or category or because of the critical events in which they participated. The researcher expects the special nature of what they have experienced to result in a special articulation: words that can be expressed only by someone who has 'been there' (Lindlof, 1995, p167).

For my purpose, therefore, and in line with my operationalisation of the topic, I selected my participants based on three broad categories of (a) press leaders, (b) key players and leaders in politics and governance, and (c) academicians in the field of media/communication, ethnic studies or politics. In all, I interviewed 22 subjects – eight political leaders, eight press leaders, and six academicians.

In choosing participants, I had to consider those “that best represent the diverse stakeholders and opinions of those stakeholders” (Boyce and Neale, 2006, p7). My interview subjects include the serving vice president, three former heads of government, among the politicians; a former Minister of Information, two press/media advisers to the current and immediate past presidents, current and former owners and/or C.E.Os. of press or media houses, among the press leaders, and noted academics who are acknowledged experts in their disciplines.

In the period of this study (1959 to 2011), Nigeria had 14 heads of state or presidents (Obasanjo ruled twice as military head of state and as elected civilian president). Of these 8 are alive, of which 3 stand out as leaders who have managed transition or consolidation elections, and two of them have participated in elections as candidates. I interviewed all three – Obasanjo, Babangida, and Abubakar for the study. 1) General Obasanjo ruled Nigeria as both an unelected military head and as a democratically elected president. He managed the first military to civilian transition of power in 1979, participated as a presidential candidate in the military to civilian transition elections of 1999, and won the second term re-election, in the consolidation election of 2003. He also successfully transferred power to a successor in 2007. 2) General Abubakar successfully managed the 1999 transition elections and, 3) General Babangida made several attempts at transfer of power to civilian governments in the early 1990s, and he failed (Table 4.4 and Appendix 2 contain the list, short profiles, areas of interest, and geographical or ethnic representations of all the interview subjects).

*Table 4.4: Interviewees, Region, and Positions Held*

	<i>INTERVIEWEES</i>	<i>REGIONS</i>	<i>POSITIONS HELD</i>
1	Abdulsalami Abubakar	North	Former Military Head of State
2	Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo	North	Former Senior Special Adviser to Vice-President. Former CEO of Media House. Former aspirant to a governorship position in his home state of Kogi. An Academic
3	Ibrahim Babangida	North	Former Military Head of State. Ruled Nigeria for



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	<i>INTERVIEWEES</i>	<i>REGIONS</i>	<i>POSITIONS HELD</i>
			eight years
4	T.Y Danjuma	North	Former Military Leader
5	Umaru Pate	North	Academic. Media Studies. Dean Department of Mass Communication Bayero University
6	Mohammed Haruna	North	Former CEO of Media Houses Former Chief Press Secretary to a Military Head of State
7	Anya O. Anya	East	Academic. Business Leader. Ethno-Cultural Leader
8	Dr. P. Dele Cole	East	Former CEO of Media House. Former Nigerian Ambassador to Brazil
9	Mr John Irem	East	Media/Politics. Elections Specialist
10	Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli	East	Academic. Political Scientist
11	Prof. Pat Utomi	East	Academic. Former Presidential Aspirant. Social Activist
12	Prof. Emevwo Biakolo	South South	Academic. Media Studies. Faculty. Ex-Dean, School of Media and Communication
13	Prof. Abubakar Momoh	South South	Academic. Political Scientist. Director, National Electoral Institute.
14	Prince Tony Momoh	South South	Former Federal Minister of Information. Former Political Party Chairman. Politician.
15	Prof Eghosa Osaghae	South South	Academic. Political Scientist Vice Chancellor Igbenedion University, Okada, Edo State
16	Mr Odia Ofeimun	South South	Writer. Political Activist. Politician.
17	Dr. Reuben Abati	West	Immediate past Special Adviser to the President. Former Chairman, Editorial Board, the <i>Guardian</i> Newspapers

	<i>INTERVIEWEES</i>	<i>REGIONS</i>	<i>POSITIONS HELD</i>
18	Mr Femi Adesina	West	Current Special Adviser to the President. Former President of the Nigerian Guild of Editors
19	Prof. Adigun Agbaje	West	Academic. Political Scientist. Former Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic, University of Ibadan
20	Dr. Christopher Kolade	West	Former Nigerian High Commissioner to the U.K. Business Leader Academic.
21	General Olusegun Obasanjo	West	Former Elected President Former Military Head of State
22	Professor Yemi Osinbajo	West	Vice-President, Academic, Lawyer

### 4.7.3 Methods of Analysis

In line with the research questions, I have used a cluster of themes rather than a chronological approach in analysis. Subsequently, this approach allows the exploration of factors that are interrelated, and vital to finding answers to the questions the research is raising. In the long run, I expect it will aid analysis and report writing.

#### 4.8.0 CONCLUSION

The main thrust of this chapter has been the presentation of the study design and justification for methods employed to drive data collection. And beginning with a philosophical framework, the chapter explains that consequent upon colonialism the old African paradigm gave way to a hybrid of a new worldview – neither fully Western nor purely traditional African. To design a study in such an environment requires an appreciation for the demand of the evolving situation, outside the strictures imposed by universalised Western research philosophies, and methodologies. Understanding these requirements, therefore, was central to the sampling procedures adopted and the choice of methods for data collection.

The chapter discusses the combination of two methods, which, I considered to be relevant and most suited to deliver on the research objectives. The first is in-depth elite interviews of key players in politics, academia, and the press. Interview subjects include the current Nigerian vice-president, three former heads of government under military regimes; noted politicians; owners, and former managing directors of newspaper houses and notable journalists; and academics in politics and media studies. The second method of choice is content analysis of selected newspaper publications around election periods of the selected election years of study.

The chapter also explains the sampling/selection procedure of newspapers, and justifies the approach in terms of participants, their backgrounds, ethnic spread, or geographical location. This approach should, in the subsequent chapters, ease data organisation and data analysis to which the aim is to produce the best outcomes.

## SECTION 3

**Mixed-Method Approach**

This section contains two Chapters, 5 and 6. My objective in using the two methods, as it is usual in a mixed-method study, is for the data collected to play complementary roles and validate. The in-depth elite interviews serve as my main method and source of data that explains the variables in the research questions. In contemporary media studies, Larsen (1999) posits “content analysis continues to play (a) major role... less as an end in itself but as a constituent of other qualitative procedures” (p133). The intention, therefore, is not to use the quantitative data obtained here to directly answer my research questions. Rather, I have used the findings in content analysis to provide further explanation, give contexts, and validate or dispute the research objectives. It is important to note that because of the particular manner, in which the research questions were framed, with multiple variables in each question, the quantitative data can only be used to provide further explanation and to validate the findings produced by the in-depth interviews.

## CHAPTER 5

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### 5.1.0 INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the analysed data. As stated in Chapter 4, this study follows a mixed-method design, using the two methods of in-depth elite interviews and content analysis. In this chapter, I present the qualitative part of the data, obtained through in-depth interviews. The specific objectives of this chapter are to analyse the collected data, develop themes, and display data results, all in preparation for the interpretation and discussion of the data result in Chapter 7. It is important to state early in this chapter that the approach adopted for analysis is sequential – that is, a separation of my management of data from their interpretations and discussion. As such, this chapter will deal with only the management of data to arrive at analysed results. The interpretation and discussion of data leading to the production of a report, will be treated in Chapter 7 solely devoted to that purpose, using the data results, themes, and key concepts derived from this chapter and Chapter 6, which is the chapter dealing with the newspaper content analysis.

### 5.1.1 The Nature of Data Analysis

The volume of data collected from semi-structured, in-depth interviews can be daunting after transcription. According to Marshall and Rossman (2010), “Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and interpretation to the mass of collected data.... (It) is a search for general statement(s) about relationships [among categories of data]...” (p207) And Silverman and Marvasti, (2008), citing Coffey and Atkinson (1996), posit that data analysis is a

*pervasive* activity throughout the life of a research project. Analysis is not simply one of the later stages of research to be followed by an equally separate phase of writing up results (p190).

Miles and Huberman (1994) propose three approaches to qualitative data analysis as interpretive, social anthropology, and collaborative social research. Of these three,

the one most appropriate to this work is the interpretive. According to Marshall and Rossman (2006)

The interpretive act ...is the process of bringing meaning to raw, inexpressive data... [through] rich description of ordinary events. Raw data have no inherent meaning; the interpretive act brings meaning to those data and displays that meaning to the reader through the written report (p157).

The nature of qualitative data demands that in order for the collected data to bring anticipated value and result, such data must be made manageable for ease of interpretation. In addition, massive data in themselves may cause a loss of essence if there is no interaction between the data and the researcher. As a result, the interpretive approach allows the researcher to obtain value from data in a most practical way by bringing to reflect the totality of the researcher's experience to the process. The researcher must, therefore, find a way of conceptualising and making sense of the large volumes of data.

### **5.1.2 Positionality**

The researcher's positionality affects field data collection, as was noted in Chapter 4. In Africa, in particular, "positionality is often an aggregation of factors such as economic status, educational level, age, gender, marital status and ethnicity (Eshun, Zakaria and Segbefia, 2015, pp8-9). The effects or influence of these factors are not limited to field work, but also the way he or she relates with and interacts with the collected data for interpretation. In this light, the researcher is not detached from the object of study. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), "Researchers have their own understanding, their own convictions, (and) their own conceptual orientations; they, too, are members of a particular culture at a specific historical moment" (p8). Positionality makes it imperative that the researcher is aware of his or her own biases and standpoints, aside from the study's limitation and delimitations discussed in Chapter 1.

Conducting and analysing interviews, therefore, becomes an act of collaboration on the part of both the researcher and the interview participants, and not just a function

of one party (the interviewer) in isolation of the other (the respondent) (Miles and Huberman, 1994). As a result, it is difficult to draw a clear line between received external data and data as internalised and adapted by the researcher, who structures the study in the processes of reduction, selection or coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994). From the foregoing, qualitative data create analytical problems for the researcher, who is forced by the peculiar landscape of each research to design his or her analytical procedures.

### **5.1.3 Ethical issues in Data Collection**

There are two broad types of data: primary and secondary data. Data in collection for the first time are primary data while those that may have been previously collected and analysed by (an)other researcher(s) would be regarded as secondary data. In this respect, data from both categories of my methods – from in-depth interviews and archived newspapers – qualify as primary. Cameron Thies (2002) considers primary as those “sources that are as close to the event in time and places as possible” (p356). Primary data sources include transcripts of interviews conducted for the purpose, chronicles, memoirs, diaries, memos, letters, newspapers, and official government documents (Thies, 2002). Locating and obtaining primary data sources usually poses an ethical problem for most researchers. However, data collection through interviews and content analysis of newspapers did not pose any ethical issues to either me, or the participants in my interviews. I took the trouble to understand what constitutes ethical violation on the part of the researcher from the University guidelines on ethical research. I committed myself to uphold the requirements of the guidelines, and signed off on the ethics forms before I embarked on field research. The nature of my research did not pose a threat or harm to any person or animals.

For my content analysis data, discussed in the next chapter, I collected half of my newspaper data (1959, 1964/65, 1979, and part of 1983) from the British Library in London, after due process of necessary permissions, being a registered member of the library. The library staff were quite helpful. The rest of the newspaper materials (part of 1983, 1999, and 2011) were collected in Nigeria, through the national

archives at the University of Ibadan, and some directly from the libraries of the newspapers that I could not get from the national archives.

The interviewees were quite willing to participate; indeed many commended the research initiative and the topic of research; they thought it was an area in need of much scholarly searchlight; some thought that the outcome would potentially prove helpful to Nigeria. To avoid putting any form of pressure on the potential participants, I wrote to all of them before I left the UK for my field trip to Nigeria. My supervisor also endorsed a separate letter to all of them. I followed up with telephone calls once I arrived in Lagos to book and confirm dates of interviews. One or two responded in writing agreeing to the interview(s), and many in the subsequent telephone follow-ups. Along with the letters, I also forwarded a list of likely questions, 14 in all, so they would all be aware of the nature of the information I was seeking; nothing I did took them by surprise. They understood why the information was being sought and for what purpose it would be utilised.

During the interview sessions, I obtained verbal consent before recording, and none of them objected being recorded. At no point did I offer any incentive to any of the participants, rather, they offered voluntarily to refer me to other possible participants, acknowledging the importance of the subject matter of the research. At least three of the academicians, two of the political leaders and one press leader offered me books or pamphlets they thought would be useful in my work. It is my belief that the data collection period did not cause any form of harassment or anxiety to any of them. A few invited me back for more detailed discussions on the state of Nigeria, after my work, including a former head of the country.

There is, however, the issue of non-inclusion of female participants among the interviewees; but not for lack of effort. To begin with, there are demographically far fewer women in leadership positions in press and politics. But I made efforts to reach at least two of them: notably Senator (Mrs) Chris Anyanwu, a former journalist and magazine publisher, and Ms Comfort Obi, also a publisher. I made several attempts to reach Mrs Anyanwu, who was quite agreeable to be interviewed; understandably, she was not able to accommodate the request in her very busy senate seat re-election campaign period. Ms Obi, on the other hand, had to unavoidably postpone each



interview she had agreed to; June 5<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, and 26<sup>th</sup>. My first contact with her was on the 4<sup>th</sup> of June and we actually met to fix the interview for the day after. She later explained that she was involved with monitoring the Police Service Commission, of which she is a member, conduct interviews for the recruitment of 10,000 new police officers. Her involvement meant that she had to travel frequently, sometimes at short notices, between Abuja, Enugu, and Lagos.

#### **5.1.4 The Interviews as a Primary Data Source**

As noted in Chapter 4, the interview is a resource for “understanding how individuals make sense of their social world and act within it” (May, 2011, p157). The main objective of interviews is to generate data from people on a specific topic or a range of topics. The product of a good interview is “data in the form of words –... language in the form of extended text...[based on interviews] carried out in close proximity to a local setting for sustained period of time” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p9). This foists certain freedoms as well as constraints on the researcher: he must use his knowledge and understanding to extract data from long-winded discussions.

Done sensibly and sensitively, interviews yield a large quantity of high quality data, yielding “rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values aspirations, attitudes, and feelings” (May, 2011, p131), a form of strength, no doubt. But buried inside the strength lies a subsequent weakness in that “in-depth qualitative interviewing with a large number of people is both expensive and time consuming”, to analyse (May, 2011, p158). My experience was the high likelihood for a “good interviewer” to overrun because the interviewer is enjoying the discussion and had failed to keep the discussion within the limits of the scope of the study.

Mindful of the above, a good interview must still produce hardy data. The actual interview engagement, therefore, must be structured to allow interviewees to answer robustly “than the standardised interview permits, and it provide(s) a greater structure for comparability over that of the focused interview” (May, 2002, p135). This fact makes it imperative for the researcher to possess a control skill that allows him to extract the most within a self-imposed limited time period, being aware that a

larger volume of data requires a huge amount of time in order to make sense out of such large volumes.

The researcher must therefore provide for a study-specific designed scheme or technique for processing large volumes of textual materials into forms of acceptable data. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “(d)ata [from interviews] are not usually immediately accessible for analysis, but require processing” (p9). Such processing includes transcribing and correction before developing themes.

### **5.2.0 DESIGNING TOOLS TO MANAGE TEXTUAL DATA**

With regards to designing analytical tools, it is important to restate that there are what Robert Walker (1985) called, “Fundamental differences between the natural and social worlds (that) rule out the possibility of using the techniques of natural science to study social science phenomena” (p11). In designing analytical process, therefore it was crucial that one was guided by the knowledge of these differences. Walker further stated that it is inappropriate to ape natural science methods. Citing J. Hughes (1976), he concluded that the experiences of men and women “are not particles acted upon by exogenous forces; they are purposeful, goal seeking, feeling, meaning attributing and meaning responding creatures” (Walker, 1985, p12). Some qualitative researchers have often allowed themselves to get carried away with trying to tick all the boxes of natural science in doing their research, and thus overextend themselves and still possess a jaundiced result.

#### **5.2.1 Data Analysis Activity Flow**

Data analysis is a process that pervades the entire research process from data selection and up to the final analysis and drawing of conclusions. Nevertheless, there are specific activity flows that guide analysis in order for it not to become muddled up in a clueless dead end.

### **5.2.1.1 *Procedures: A theme-based approach to qualitative data analysis***

The central objectives of data management are to re-order large text in order to make the facts, as they relate to the study, accessible; an additional objective is to reduce large volume of text in order to use them to answer the essential research questions. In my case, I chose a theme-based approach for the interview text analysis, and a case-based approach for the content analysis in the next chapter. Using different approaches allowed me make the most of the data generated through each research method.

The theme-based approach made it possible for me to reduce large data through summaries and syntheses and manage data in a competent way. My data went through several stages of processing in order to bring over five hundred pages of transcribed interviews text to a manageable size for interpretation, discussion, and report writing.

### **5.2.1.2 *Organising Data: Transcribing and Editing***

This is the first step in converting audio files to text; for me it was certainly one of the most expensive parts of the work, in terms of time and efforts required for a rather boring process of transcribing all of 22 long interview sessions, averaging 60-90 minutes. This was all the more so that I chose to transcribe everything instead of only particular aspects of the interviews. Correcting, editing, and general cleaning up of textual data followed the process of transcription. The general process includes “proof reading of data to correct errors and to allow for consistency” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p347).

### **5.2.1.3 *Data Reduction Themes-based Approach***

In order to achieve a desirable degree of data reduction through condensing and abstraction of transcripts to manageable and usable forms, I had to listen repeatedly to the interview audios, read through transcribed text several times, and spend a great deal of time to ponder on them. Qualitative data involves “sorting and sifting through interviews texts to identify relationships, differences, patterns, distinctions and themes between sub-groups” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p9).

Reading and thinking through generated data while bearing in mind the overall research objectives helped to produce the initial broad scope and theme mapping. According to Marshall and Rossman (2010), “This process entails uncovering patterns, themes and categories” (p215). I followed through by operationalising the research topic in relation to the research questions, using the “research questions and the related literature...[to provide] guidelines for data analysis” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p209).

This process allowed me to arrive at broad, but key concepts that were important to the eventual results. Words and concepts like: ***The Press, Elections, Politics, Belonging, and Nigeria***, informed the first basic units of my analysis. I then clustered the words and phrases with similar meanings or intents to form themes, as guided by the research and interview questions. This grouping of words and phrases to form themes is sometimes referred to as closed coding; it allowed me use the research questions and objectives in more specific ways – as driving tools for interrogating the interview responses to search out commonalities, differences, and patterns.

**Key Words, Phrases, and Derivatives from the Topic, Research Questions, and Research Objectives**

*Table 5.1: Key Words and Phrases from the Interviews*

<i>BELONGING</i>	<i>ELITE LEADERSHIP</i>	<i>NATIONAL IDENTITY</i>	<i>POLITICS OF BELONGING</i>
British Colonialism	Ethnicity	Nation-Building	Post-Colonialism
Democracy	Ethnicisation (of politics)	National Unity	Press (Role of)
Electoral Democracy	Ideology	Nationalism	Press Reportage
Elite Politics	Values	Nation-State	Press Ownership
Electoral Violence	Identity Politics	Nigeria	Regionalism/Unity
Federalism	Military	Political Culture	Regional Politics
Federal Elections	Minority (Politics)	Press' Effect/Influence	Unitary System

As can be easily observed from the above, these key words, and their derivatives are not only reflective of the research topic, objectives, and questions, they are also exhaustive. The final phase was coming up with acceptable themes that reflect the objectives of the study through clustering of these words around the five key words that came out of operationalising the topic, viz: *The Press, Elections, Politics, Belonging, and Nigeria*. The results are the sub-themes below around which the data of the interview responses will be discussed:

*Table 5.2: Themes and Sub Themes*

<i>THEME</i>	<i>SUB-THEME</i>
<b>Introduction</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Colonialism (Pre/Post-Colonial Politics)</li> <li>b. Ideology/Values</li> </ul>
<b>1. Nigerian Nation-state</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The Nigerian Nation State and the Press</li> <li>b. Elections and National Unity: lines of tension in the press</li> <li>c. Regionalism &amp; Regional cohesion</li> </ul>
<b>2. Press</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Role/Influence/Effect of</li> <li>b. Ownership &amp; Control of</li> <li>c. Elections Reportage &amp; Commentary</li> </ul>
<b>3. Politics</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Political Culture &amp; Ethnicisation (of Politics)</li> <li>b. Elite, Elite Politics &amp; Military</li> <li>c. Federalism vs. Unitary System</li> <li>d. Electoral Democracy &amp; Federal Elections</li> </ul>
<b>4. Belonging</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Identity Politics &amp; Politics of Belonging</li> <li>2. Ethnicity &amp; Minority Politics</li> </ul>

### **5.3.0 CATEGORISATION OF PARTICIPANTS AND DISPLAY**

The selection of a number of “people with specific characteristics, behaviour or experience” (Walker, 1985, p30) as discussed in the last chapter is done “to facilitate broad comparisons between certain groups that the researcher thinks are important” (Walker, 1985, p30). This is also done to facilitate analysis, in the long run. In the case of this research, the participants are clustered into three composite sub-groups ensuring that each group is relatively homogeneous in some ways and yet diverse in others. With regard to occupation and life experiences as well as track records, each group is somewhat homogeneous. However, to provide geographical spread, in order for the various parts of the country to be represented, they were diverse.

I conducted a total of 22 in-depth interviews. The interview participants are notable leaders; nearly all are household names in Nigeria. I had set out to conduct at least

15 interviews and a maximum of 25. Because the prospective participants were mostly very busy people, I was not sure I would get all of them within the time limit that I had for the fieldwork. But the response to the request for the interviews was far more positive than I had anticipated. I was able to get most of the people on my initial list, and more. I categorised the 22 leaders into three broad categories: the press, academics, and political spheres.

### **5.3.1 Data Presentation**

Categorisation and clustering of participants also assists with the display of interview data. Finding ways in which data are presented and displayed was a challenge; and because my form of data was qualitative and textual, not involving matrices, frequency counts, etc., displaying them posed a bit of a challenge. What I chose to do was to use the four research questions to compress interview responses into manageable answers that allowed the display in short text forms in which one does not lose the essence. However, in interpretation and discussion of findings, I exhaustively used additional data from the interview to develop and categorise themes arising from the questions. I also used the three categories of respondents to cluster their answers in order to permit and generate easy comparisons in their responses.

#### **5.3.1.1 Political Leadership**

There are eight persons in the Political Leaders category, which includes former President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Heads of State General Ibrahim Babangida and General Abdulsalami Abubakar, General T.Y. Danjuma, Professor Anya. O. Anya, Professor Pat Utomi, Mr. Odia Ofeimun, and current Vice President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo.

#### **5.3.1.2 Academic Leadership**

The Academic Leaders category had the following six persons: Professors Abubakar Momoh, Adigun Agbaje, Eghosa Osaghae, Umaru Pate, Okwudiba Nnoli, and Emevwo Biakolo.

### 5.3.1.3 Press Leadership

The Press Leaders category contained another eight persons. The group has Dr. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, Mal. Mohammed Haruna, Dr. Patrick Dele Cole, Mr. John Irem, Prince Tony Momoh, Dr. Reuben Abati, Dr. Christopher Kolade, and Mr. Femi Adesina, the current Presidential Spokesman.

### 5.3.2 Intersectionality of Interviewees

The categorisations in the last section hold true for each of the participants, but it is important to highlight the fact that they are also active or have been quite active in other areas of our national life. For example, 14 of the 22 participants have been high-level public servants in the course of their careers, i.e. Femi Adesina, Mohammed Haruna, and Reuben Abati; even though they are known all over the country as media leaders, they have been presidential spokespersons for different governments, military as well as civilian. Prince Tony Momoh, a quintessential newspaper editor and manager, has served as Federal Information Minister and also as a political party chairman. Dr. Christopher Kolade and Dr. Patrick Dele Cole have served as the nation's ambassadors to Great Britain and Brazil respectively; these are just a few examples.

*Table 5.3: Function/Role Dynamics*

<i>S/N</i>	<i>OF 22</i>	<i>OFFICE HELD OR FUNCTIONED IN</i>
1	14 of 22	Public Servants
2	11 of 22	Academics
3	10 of 22	Leadership Position in Media
4	9 of 22	Leadership in Party Politics
5	5 of 22	Sought Elective Political Office
6	4 of 22	Highly Placed Military Leaders
7	4 of 22	Heads of Government/President/Vice

The analysis of the interviews is presented in this section. The data is presented qualitatively and applied to each of the research questions in order to bring out the



findings. Four research questions were formulated for this study and all the 22 interviewees were asked relevant variables that would answer the research questions. Nvivo-11 was used to analyse the interviews.

#### 5.4.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS

The first research question examines whether reporting and commentary of the press during both transitional and consolidation elections helped to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity. The findings and their interpretations are presented after the excerpts. The quotes in the response column below are direct (edited) quotes of the interview participants; they are not paraphrased summaries. In the key concept column, I tried to extract the driving theme or keynote in the discourse.

#### 5.4.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1

**Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity?**

##### 5.4.1.1 *Political Leaders*

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSES	KEY CONCEPTS
Abdulsalami Abubakar	In a way, reporting and commentary have tried to describe the political culture, but portrayed ethnicity. In Nigeria, we have both the government press and the private press, so it depends on which side the reporter is but definitely it played a role in bringing out ethnicity in the country.	Reportage portrayed ethnicity. Ownership: Government vs. Private
Anya O. Anya	It is an issue of value because, if the national identity is as it were, defined by the values that you share and accept, and those values actually will influence and affect how the press will handle issues, it becomes a roadmap for even the press.	Absence of values is a problem. Values are road maps.
Ibrahim Babangida	The press has helped, in no small measure, both under colonial regime, after independence, and during the War; the press helped a lot in trying to get this country to remain as one. By and large, on the whole concept of Nigerian	The Press has helped to unite Nigeria and provide knowledge.

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PARTICIPANT	RESPONSES	KEY CONCEPTS
	nationhood, credit will go to the press for enlightening the people.	
<b>T.Y. Danjuma</b>	Now, the press is a mirror of the society, whereas in the colonial days, it was the official opposition to the colonial authority, it spoke in many languages, but the target was always the colonial administration.	The Press mirrors the society.
<b>Olusegun Obasanjo</b>	The press was one of the main instruments used by our fathers who fought for independence; the press was one of the main tools or main weapons, so the Nigerian press, therefore, had developed an anti-government culture, seeing government in a particular type of light. So we had the press that had developed the culture of antagonism. When the government became our own, we had two type of press: the antagonistic and the subservient.	An instrument of self-liberation.  Learned to be antagonistic from colonial period.
<b>Odia Ofeimun</b>	In a lot of ways, I will say yes, the press helped to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity. Whether you begin from 1859 or any of the days thereafter, you would have to consider that the elites; those who read newspapers, were actually prime movers in the system. And that the ideas they shared within themselves were usually very well reflected in the newspapers they read.	The Press defined and constructed culture and identity.  An elite medium.
<b>Yemi Osinbajo</b>	I look at the press and what I have seen is that, it presents itself as a platform for several ideas. It is almost a parliament of sorts and that has allowed for a free enough exchange of ideas, but then there were also situations where you found that the press, especially in the early days, took clearly ethnic positions. In fact, several, after a while, began to promote ethnic positions along the lines of the thinking of the political parties or the ideology of the party.	A parliament, an ideas forum.  Promoted ethnic positions.  Reflected ideologies of political owners.
<b>Pat Utomi</b>	In many ways, it is impossible to think of the narrative of any election season without the role of the press, but as traditional studies of media show clearly, sometimes the influence of the press can be exaggerated and there are so many intermediating factors and all that, but you cannot rule out the fact that, the press, in their reporting, were highly critical in setting the agenda in images.	Its role is crucial during election seasons.  Sets agenda.

### 5.4.1.2 Academic Leaders

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPT
<b>Abubakar</b>	Well, it is hard to tell, the press in the country	The press has been

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPT</i>
<b>Momoh</b>	has been very professional but have also been very political and ideological. The professionalism of the press is intercepted, framed, or coloured by ideology and politics in such a way that, no matter what the bend of the press is, some of those ethical issues that border on code of ethics and practice are often not maintained to the letter, you often see a bend.	professional, political, and ideological. Not ethical enough.
<b>Emevwo Biakolo</b>	I will suggest that the press, being one of a range of cultural institutions, certainly can be seen as participating in defining the nature of political culture, political sensibilities, and political mindsets.	Helps to define political culture.
<b>Eghosa Osaghae</b>	Well, in a variety of ways. But I think, most interestingly, that it has done so in a paradoxical, if not contradictory way. I would say yes, the press is there to promote ethnicity and regionalism questions as central to election success.	Influence of the press has been paradoxical and contradictory.
<b>Okwudiba Nnoli</b>	Yes, the press reporting did. Initially, the reporting didn't have any ethnic bias until 1951, when the political situation developed between Awolowo and Azikiwe and from my own point of view, Awolowo was looking for political space, which at that time was dominated by Zik... the only way that he could find a space was to use the ethnic question as he couldn't use the class or anti-colonialism question.	Political elite used the ethnic question to find relevance (with the aid of the press).
<b>Umaru Pate</b>	Yes! You cannot divorce the happenings on the political scene from the performance of the media. Coming from that perspective and also looking at the performance of the media, definitely the various fault lines that we talk about in Nigeria are clearly captured and reflected in the Nigerian media system.	Politics and media are linked. (But media may be a reflector).
<b>Adigun Agbaje</b>	I will say it has been a two-way relationship but the reporting and commentary of the press have helped to define, and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity.	Influence is both ways. It's a symbiotic relationship.

#### 5.4.1.3 *Press Leaders*

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPT</i>
<b>Reuben Abati</b>	Certainly yes, if you look at the history of the Nigerian press since 1859, we have been lucky to have a press that is a crusading one, a press that sees itself as a champion of the interest of the downtrodden, of the voiceless, a press that considers itself committed to truth for the advancement of the people's interests.	A crusading press. Committed champion of the voiceless masses' interests.

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<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPT</i>
<b>Femi Adesina</b>	Yes, I think there is every reason to agree that the reporting of the press helped to construct that culture, whatever that culture is. Because it's also quite debatable whether we have the kind of what you can call a political culture. The reporting by the press has helped in a great deal to construct it.	Press has helped to construct a political culture. (But culture must be defined).
<b>Mohammed Haruna</b>	Yes! Of course it did, because the whole essence of reporting is like the mirror. Initially people were more like Nigeria first, then my ethnic identity next. That was how Zik's NCNC, for instance, was started as a Pan-African thing and Zik inspired a lot of politicians that came along; that's why you could have a Hausa man become a mayor in Enugu, so you had all that, initially. But of course with time, as independence came with the competition for power, people began to withdraw into their shells and the press began to reflect that.	Yes. But it changed with the changing political structures and circumstances.
<b>John Irem</b>	I will quickly say yes, it did. The Nigerian press as it were, was born in adversity and (hence) it had its major focus on agitation. It was an instrument for agitation by the nationalists, and so the Nigerian press had always seen the situation as a 'we' versus 'them' one.	The Press was born in adversity and has maintained its adversarial roots.
<b>Christopher Kolade</b>	The reporting and commentary of the press certainly had a big influence on the shape that things took for some important reasons.	A big influence on how Nigeria turned out.
<b>Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo</b>	Yes. I believe so, but of course it has to be qualified. The press has not directly helped to fashion a national identity, but it has reflected the views of an ownership and the ownership is often concerned with group interest. That group could be ethnic, political, religious, business, or economic. The first level of identity is often a group, in most times, ethnic groups, and then other groups before the nation.	Yes. But it was mainly concerned with (elite) ownership and group interests.
<b>Tony Momoh</b>	Very minimally. We had well organised parties in the Regions, the Action Group in the Western Region, the NCNC in the Eastern Region, NPC in the Northern Region, and these political leaders had a lot of following, and the parties were very well organised and the impact of ethnicity was very visible. The political leaders themselves were very strong and because of the low level of literacy that time, their word of mouth, like the town criers, had more impacts than newspapers.	Role and influence of the press has been very minimal. (Elite leadership had direct contact with the grassroots).

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPT
P.D. Cole	Yes, I would think so...truthfully, yes, we have a nation, but we are different peoples, and we want to preserve that identity; the press has been able to drive both ideologies, but not to the level of extreme where one is ousting the other. I do not believe that we have a press for example that would favour a particular small identity over the national identity if the question is posed in terms of “what should we do?” But once you begin to think in terms of these two antipodes, then you’ve already introduced tension within the system and it is that tension and how to manage it, that is the job of the politicians and of the press.	Yes, and the press has helped to manage the tension of two ideological antipodes well enough to preserve both ideologies that must coexist for the nation to survive.

#### 5.4.1.4 Findings on Research Question 1

The views given across the three groups (with varying emphasis on different touch points) indicate that the press has helped to define and construct Nigeria’s political culture and national identity. In other words, Nigeria has a political culture; it is just that it may not be the helpful type. Prince Tony Momoh, however, believes that effect of reportage and commentary, if any, was minimal. Other interviewees, irrespective of their positions or ethnic statuses, agreed that the press reflects Nigeria’s political culture, if any; but that it has also managed to navigate the careful balance between the ethnic or regional identity and the national identity.

Certain trends emerged from what was said: The first was that the promise of independence played a part by changing the ideological focus of the press from national to regional. Secondly, at independence, the focus changed again to ownership and group interests. But through all the changes, the press has managed a balanced tension between these interests and that of the nation. Thus, though lacking in what can be termed some central national values to which all must subscribe, the press has provided a platform for exchange of regional ideas or interests, within the boundaries of an ill-defined national political culture and identity. The outcomes of these views answer the first research question.

## 5.4.2 THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION

The second research question focused on the self-identities of the component ethnic groups that make up the nation. It was posed to examine whether the press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflects or affects the identities of the constituent ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”. The responses given and their interpretations are presented below.

### **Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”?**

#### **5.4.2.1 Political Leaders**

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSES</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPTS</i>
<b>Abdulsalami Abubakar</b>	In some instances, I would say press reportage and commentary do more damage than unifying because they bring our ethnicity and tribal differences to the forefront and also bring a split in the country, so to speak. I don't think Nigeria is a nation yet; we are collections of different ethnic-nationalities.	Yes. The press has highlighted cleavages, what divides us, to the detriment of what unites the nation.
<b>Anya O. Anya</b>	The press did not have its own voice, they responded to what was happening and reported what was happening, and basically, much of our elections have tended to be driven by sectional interests which was reflected in the press.	Yes. The press only reflected the reality of a divided nation to the nation.
<b>Yemi Osinbajo</b>	I think generally, there is very little effort not to ethnicise partisan politics, and sometimes, it's clear what the ethnic message is. It happens all the time and I think it's true. Again the press today is one that has many platforms and ownership issues still manage to project some ethnic biases; also, the major players are given a platform to ethnicise politics, so yes, the press reportage reflects or affects this self-identity that we are talking about.	Yes. The press did not fight the inclination to be partisan or ethnicise.
<b>Pat Utomi</b>	Many times, the impression can be that the press has shaped this narrative, whereas the press is basically a reflection of the narrative that has been constructed by political actors.	Yes, but the press does not shape the narratives, it only reflects existing ones.

5.4.2.2 *Academic Leaders*

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Abubakar Momoh</b>	Yes the press has. They cut across, in some they turn out as ethnic, in others, as regional. Because you see, the six geopolitical zone thing comes out as religion and all that. So it's a multifaceted, intersectional way of viewing identity politics, it expresses itself in various forms and ways and ethnicity is just one of them.	Yes. The press reflects the intersectional and multiple faces of identity politics.
<b>Emevwo Biakolo</b>	I have to say certainly, press reportage reflected self-identity, particularly the earlier elections. From the first one in '59 right until about '79, if you look at the nature of the press for instance and its structure in terms of ownership and in terms of the kind of press we had in those days, you would see that to some extent, though I don't know how considerable an extent.	Yes, but mainly from an ownership and a structural perspectives.
<b>Eghosa Osaghae</b>	Yes! They are slanted reports. A great number of the press is partisan. But when you consider the regional, the ethnic, the state lenses from which issues are reported or even analysed, one can say that the press has contributed to the issue of ethnicity. Sometimes when push has come to shove, they don't have pretensions at all.	Yes. The press, because it is partisan, had little choice but to reflect its essence.
<b>Okwudiba Nnoli</b>	Yes, in Nigeria, right from the struggle for the constitution, began the question of who is going to be the leader of the country and if our choice does not emerge, then let's have a regional arrangement so that we can look after ourselves, so that was when the press really changed gear.	Yes. It only reflected the structural changes in the nation.
<b>Umaru Pate</b>	Yes! Our elections are certainly some kind of precipitating factors to conflicts and the press, unfortunately, played along the same line. If you care to do some content analysis on how the media behaved during elections, mostly the media focused on petty issues, on personalities, on the same common faults of ideology, of religion and so on.	Yes. Not robust enough in depth of thought. Too preoccupied with low-end narratives.
<b>Adigun Agbaje</b>	Yes, it reflected self-identity because the so-called federal arrangement actually arose from regional considerations.	Yes. But it only tows the federal structural arrangements.

5.4.2.3 *Press Leaders*

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Reuben Abati</b>	Well in the 1959 and 1964 elections, certainly yes, because by then, there was a lot of competition among the Regions. There was also competition within the Regions, and so people set up newspapers to serve their own political interests and even columnists became very partisan.	Yes. Partisanship in the press only mirrored inter- regional competition.
<b>Femi Adesina</b>	This is coming at a very good time, with the 2015 elections still recent, all the features in the country were reflected in how that election was reported and conducted. You will see that the press also stood on different sides, depending on ownership and depending on other influences. So, I will say the press and the reportage of the elections, particularly those last ones, left a lot more to be desired in Nigeria. There definitely was a play up of those fault lines.	Yes. The position of the press was determined by ownership, “other influences”, and partisan politics.
<b>Mohammed Haruna</b>	I will say the manner in which the first post-independence elections were reported portrayed a lot of ethnicity and regionalism.	Yes, the press portrayed ethnicity and regionalism.
<b>John Irem</b>	Of course press reportage affected self-identity, and that has been the trend over the years. When it is not election season, there is a little bit of fairness, a little bit of balance in the reportage, but whenever it is time for elections or it’s getting to the time of elections, the slant can easily be discerned.	Yes. Partisanship is more strongly discernible during election years.
<b>Christopher Kolade</b>	Yes! You see the press reportage had to start from somewhere and even today, we can see that the press can have its own position. From the beginning, we should remember that the press was not an autonomous institution; people who had certain interests built it up and because they had those interests, the manifestation of the press to start with, had to reflect the fact that these were institutions that were being established by people with peculiar interests.	Yes, but ownership interest was at play. (The Press had little choice).
<b>Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo</b>	I will say to a large extent yes, because if you look at press ownership now, there are very powerful political actors who own press organisations. They use those press to advance their own interests and perhaps advance the interest of the groups to which they belong.	Yes. But powerful political interests also owned the press.
<b>Tony Momoh</b>	I think the effect of what we as media men and women report is exaggerated. If you look at all that, one can say that to the extent that, there is that large extension of media,	No. The effect is exaggerated. If any, it is minimal.



PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
	then there is that impact, but if you look at reportage with respect of newspaper, I can say it's minimal, it is exaggerated.	
P.D. Cole	No I don't think so. I think that the politicians use ethnic identities as a sort of a road to power, not in opposition. In other words, not up till the Civil War did the sentiments that being from one part of the country itself is an existential threat to that part by the way in which the other parts regarded that part (come to the fore); that was what the Civil War was about.	No. Politicians, not the press, are the ones who use ethnic identities as a road to power.

#### 5.4.2.4 Findings on Research Question 2

The responses given here show that press reportage and commentary at federal election seasons reflected or affected the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong” in Nigeria. However, the opinions of the two former highly placed newspaper managers, Prince Tony Momoh and Dr. P. Dele Cole, were different from the rest (Momoh was the Editor, and Dr. Dele Cole, MD/CEO, of the highly influential *Daily Times* newspaper, in its heydays). Cole did not think the press reportage and commentary reflected or affected the issue of self-identity among the ethnic nationalities; Momoh believed if such a thing ever occurred, it was exaggerated and the impact minimal. Apart from the contrary views held by the two press leaders, most of the leaders across the three groups believed that press reportage and commentary at federal election seasons reflect or affect the self-identity of the component ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”. Despite the mostly across the board agreement, they each gave different reasons why election reportage mirrors ethnic cleavages and identities.

#### 5.4.3 THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION

The third research question examined whether the political elite fostered ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism. Opinions of interviewees are presented.

## Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?

### 5.4.3.1 Political Leaders

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
Abdulsalami Abubakar	When you are conducting election(s) in the state, you find ethnicity comes more into play. Nigeria is a conglomeration of tribes in all the states. Anywhere you go, you will find the dominant tribe in the state and the minority, but ethnicity is less evident in the federal for somebody who is looking for (the) presidency, of course he dares not play the ethnicity card, because he is seen to be the symbol of Nigeria.	The ethnic card is not relevant at the federal level; only at the state levels.
Anya O. Anya	I would say yes and the reason is simple. The quality of what you call the political elites in Nigeria has been unfortunate, it has not been our best educated, it has not been our best achievers, it has not been our hardest thinkers that have populated the political elites.	Yes, because the quality of elite is poorly sourced.
Ibrahim Babangida	Yes! I will say so, because the political elites capitalised on their leadership a lot, to try and create friction amongst some ethnic groups, thus fostering ethnicisation.	Yes. The elite create frictions that foster ethnicisation
T.Y. Danjuma	Surprisingly, the dialogue among the political elite in the colonial days was good and at that time, religion, which is one of the crosses that this country will continue to bear, was not as virulent as it is today. But partisan politics began and the press also joined in tribal views. The political elite fostered this ethnicisation.	Yes, but it was not so at the beginning. The press was a joiner to the elite's project.
Olusegun Obasanjo	They did! To the <i>Tribune</i> for instance, there was nothing that Awolowo could do that could be wrong and there was nothing that Sardauna could do that could be right, <i>Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo</i> was to project and propel Sardauna and the North and nothing good could come from the South.	Yes. The press was a tool of the elite to fight political battles, in ethnic frames.
Odia Ofeimun	Yes, the political elite fostered ethnicisation of politics. I mean once you became the leader of the Western Region, and you could not break into other Regions to determine policy, you had to defend your own. Zik owned a newspaper, Awolowo learned from Zik how to own a newspaper, but once he owned his newspaper, he could bring up issues of competence and the rest of it.	Yes. The press was a partisan tool in the hands of political elite.

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<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPTS</i>
<b>Yemi Osinbajo</b>	Oh yes! I think political elites certainly have, it's the easiest way to rally the troops, appealing to those kinds of sentiments.	Yes. The elite used the press to rally troops.
<b>Pat Utomi</b>	Absolutely! That's the position I hold; in fact, most media were set up to project the political ambitions of particular elite and the elite used something that the British gave us, 'divide and rule', and so deliberately polarised the polity using media.	Yes. The press was set up to project elite's political goals.

### 5.4.3.2 Academic Leaders

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Abubakar Momoh</b>	Yes, to a large extent.	
<b>Emevwo Biakolo</b>	Even though the federal and state governments owned these organs, the fact that the audience and the readership came from certain geographies, and therefore certain ethnic configurations, made the press tend to play to the tune of the audience.	Yes. Location of operations and audience also influence roles played by the press.
<b>Eghosa Osaghae</b>	The decision of who occupies a political office is usually taken from an ethnic point of view rather than a political party point of view. Political parties don't have the kind of hold that the more generic ethnic and regional organisations have. If you wanted to be relevant, you first had to become an integral part of ethnic-based movements like the Arewa, Oodua and the likes.	Ethnicity is a political currency; it buys relevance.
<b>Okwudiba Nnoli</b>	Yes. Awolowo was able to gain leadership in the West; even though Zik got elected in the West, he was prevented from being the leader of opposition in the West, so he was now forced to go to the East and become Premier and it was just a complete mess as far as ethnicity was concerned, and it was fuelled by the press.	Yes. The first generation politicians planted the seed of ethnicity in politics.
<b>Umaru Pate</b>	Yes! And not only that, they also exploited the press for their own intra-elite clashes and fights. It became a tussle between the elites of the different regions of the country at that time and that led to the first military coup.	Yes. The political elite exploited ethnicity using the press.
<b>Adigun Agbaje</b>	Yes. I would say definitely yes, the fact that both the leadership and key press ownership converged was quite toxic to Nigeria's early political history. They were owners, publishers, and they converted to manage the media empires [which] were tied towards their political fortunes	Yes. Press ownership and political leadership convergence was toxic to early history

5.4.3.3 *Press Leaders*

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Reuben Abati</b>	Newspaper is an instrument of power and because it's an instrument of power, you cannot delink it from politics. When a man sets up a newspaper, he has his own agenda, it was the case that during the First Republic, those newspapers were almost directly linked to political parties and because they were linked to political parties, their owners had no qualms about using those newspapers to pursue their political interests.	Yes, but the newspaper is an instrument of power; it must serve elite's ownership and political interests.
<b>Femi Adesina</b>	The political elites exploited their press ownership positions very massively because they believe you must first seize your own immediate background and environment and then, from there you can launch out. In fact, it's a dictum. The more you can ethnicise politics, the better for you.	Yes. The elite exploited the press to drive ethnic-based political agendas.
<b>Mohammed Haruna</b>	Oh! They absolutely did. There is no doubt about that. The political elites realised that the colonialists had decided to leave, so they used the easiest instrument to us - the primordial one! They did this because it's a lot of hard work to convince somebody who is not from your ethnic group, or of the same faith.	Yes. Primordial ethnic route to political was the easiest.
<b>John Irem</b>	Yes, and to their own advantage. In most cases, Nigeria has witnessed this promotion of some primordial interests, by the political elites, especially where the candidates realise that, they may not be popular enough to rationally emerge as winning candidates. So they retreat to either ethnic or religious inclinations to whip up sentiments and then, ride on the crests of those sentiments to be able to get endorsed.	Yes. Whipping up ethnic sentiments served as an easy route to political power.
<b>Christopher Kolade</b>	Yes, the political elite definitely did. And it arose from the fact that trying to come away from colonial governance, they felt that they had to have strong platforms on which they could hopefully achieve what they were trying to do, therefore it was natural for them to try to first build their own base within their ethnic grouping.	Yes. It was natural for them to build from their own ethnic bases first.

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPTS</i>
<b>Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo</b>	They tend to, they used to. Ethnicity becomes a refuge that some of the political elites run into, especially when they have cases to answer. They tend to rally people around them. Ethnicity becomes a ready refuge at the time of crisis. But, the grip of ethnicity is loosening. Right now, you hardly see ethnicity being advanced or promoted by the Nigerian press.	Yes, but that was in the past. It is no longer the.. case.
<b>Tony Momoh</b>	In fact, they caused it (not to foster), they caused it, the political elite caused it. And they were the owners of most newspapers. And newspapers brought their own form of ethnicisation and control.	Yes. The elite ethnicised politics through their press ownership.
<b>P.D. Cole</b>	Oh yes! Absolutely! I think the template which the politicians used in Nigeria is the same that they've always used, other people have also used, but basically, a person who wants to become a political leader believes that he has to own a press or sets about trying to influence it or manage it or whatever.	Yes. A proven template using ownership to control the press for political goals.

#### **5.4.3.4 Findings on Research Question 3**

When it comes to the issue of whether the political elite fostered ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism, most of the interviewees were in agreement that political elite actually fostered ethnicisation during the nation's elections, but they advanced different arguments for why this is the case. However, former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Eghosa Osaghae, and Adigun Agbaje neither agreed nor disagreed. Abubakar felt that the issue of ethnicisation was only possible at the state level and not federal. Osaghae saw ethnicisation as a basic political currency required at the entry point. Agbaje took the same neutral position. Apart from the three neutral positions, all other interviewees believed that political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism.

#### 5.4.4 THE FOURTH RESEARCH QUESTION

The last research question follows below. The question investigated the effect of the press, whether beneficial or harmful, to the notion of nation-building and national unity, and the practice of democracy, and federalism. The interviewees provided the answers below:

**Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation-building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy, and federalism?**

##### 5.4.4.1 Political Leaders

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Abdulsalami Abubakar</b>	I think the press, under the circumstances, is doing what they can, but more could be done, more balanced reporting, more balanced educating, in order to have a true democracy that will add to this country and to practice true federalism that will stop all these agitations we have today.	The press is doing its best to preserve democracy.
<b>Anya O. Anya</b>	Generally yes, you cannot ignore the role of the press, as it has been beneficial to nation-building and national unity. I mean the mere fact that the world is now a global village, much of the external values are influencing our press, and to that extent, we are having the benefits of modernity through the press.	The role of the press has been beneficial to nation building and unity.
<b>Ibrahim Babangida</b>	It all depends on how one looks at it, on whether the press has helped to unite or create more division, particularly in the practice of democracy. I think you can easily align the press now, you can pick up any newspaper today, and when you read it, you know where it stands, its position.	Sometimes it is beneficial, sometimes it is not.
<b>T.Y. Danjuma</b>	Yes. All in all, the effect of the press has been beneficial, but it is the duty of the press to apply caution and self-censorship when it comes to the image of the nation to the outside world.	Yes, the effect of the press has been beneficial.
<b>Odia Ofeimun</b>	On nation building, you can say to a very large extent, the press nationalised Nigerian opinion. In a lot of ways, they succeeded, even when they were based on disagreements, national opinion engaged every area of Nigerian life.	Yes, it has been beneficial for nation building.

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPTS</i>
<b>Yemi Osinbajo</b>	I think the press has been helpful to nation-building on the balance. You know obviously, where the press may have failed is in encouraging or reinforcing the stereotypes that have kept us down, namely the ethnicisation and all of those kinds of things. On national unity, if there is ethnicisation and it's not reflected in a positive way, it's meant to cause disunity amongst the people and the press presents the platform for it, if it doesn't overtly support their point of view.	Yes it has been helpful to nation-building. But it has failed in encouraging ethnicised stereotypes.
<b>Pat Utomi</b>	I think the press has generally been beneficial to the democratic process. In trying to advise, you could say that they could do more by raising issues and not frivolities, which have dominated our public space, in that sense the value of the democratic process has been watered down.	Yes. It has been beneficial to democratic process.

#### 5.4.4.2 Academic Leaders

<i>PARTICIPANT</i>	<i>RESPONSE</i>	<i>KEY CONCEPTS</i>
<b>Abubakar Momoh</b>	In fairness, the press in this country has always been critical about military rule and they never run away from that responsibility. But also, I am saying that the press was not homogenous, but heavily divided - different press houses and journalists took differing perspectives on nation building, national unity, federalism and democracy. There was nobody who outrightly said that military rule must remain in perpetuity, but you found journalists who were writing and defending military leaders.	The press has represented various shades of views.
<b>Emevwo Biakolo</b>	I don't think it was beneficial to national unity.	No. It has not been beneficial.
<b>Eghosa Osaghae</b>	Yes and no. This is because the press has always functioned like some kind of political party, representing constituencies of interests, whether ethnic or not.	Beneficial in some ways and harmful in others.
<b>Okwudiba Nnoli</b>	The press has contributed to increase centrifugal forces in the society like every other political element because of the system. It is a systemic thing; you cannot single out only the press, because the politicians are also there.	Harmful in some ways, but the press is not alone.
<b>Umaru Pate</b>	It is both ways.	Beneficial in some ways and harmful in others.
<b>Adigun Agbaje</b>	I think it was beneficial, but the problem I see is that we still have not seen practise of democracy,	It has been beneficial, but it's a work-in-progress.



PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
	and we still have not seen what to call nation building actually coming to significant profile. But it is ongoing; it is always a work-in-progress, and to that extent, I will say that generally, the press has been beneficial.	

#### 5.4.4.3 Press Leaders

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
<b>Reuben Abati</b>	There are people who still believe what they read in the newspapers, and who are influenced by those things. The dangerous thing is that, those people that were influenced are people in positions of authority, policy makers, and they are conscientised to see Nigeria first from their own ethnic prism.	The press has been harmful in influence.
<b>Femi Adesina</b>	On the notion of nation-building and national unity, I will say it is mixed in Nigeria. It's easy to accuse the press and rightly so, of pandering to some primordial loyalties. But then, when it also comes to Nigeria, the press stands up to be counted in this country. So that's why I said it's a mixed fad. I will say the press oscillates between the primordial and nationalistic loyalties.	It's a mixed bag: between harmful and beneficial; between the primordial and nationalistic loyalties.
<b>Mohammed Haruna</b>	The effect of the press was less beneficial to the notion of nation-building. On national unity, they were reflecting the divisiveness and even reinforcing it, and it follows that since they were doing that, they didn't help much. Of course, they helped a lot to get the power, to get the colonialists to go, but once they left, the primordial issues became dominant and they reinforced and played them up.	Not altogether beneficial.
<b>John Irem</b>	On the notion of nation-building, I will say yes and no. Yes, in the sense that, for the press, which the nationalists used to sensitise and mobilise the people against colonial authorities, their struggle would have been in vain. On the downside, in 1959/1964, some people might believe that the best candidate never really won, but once elections are conducted, lost, and won, the focus should shift to governance, and not politics. You discover that the press was still focusing on some ethnic kind of politics, even after 1959.	Yes and no. More on the 'no' side
<b>Christopher Kolade</b>	If I were to answer that question with one first, I would say beneficial. Beneficial	Yes, but it could have done more.

PARTICIPANT	RESPONSE	KEY CONCEPTS
	because, every time you allow discussion and interaction in an open arena, the ultimate result is an airing of positions, but in terms of democracy and federalism, my major perception of the press is that the press has missed many golden opportunities that they had, to strengthen democracy and federalism.	
<b>Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo</b>	On the notion of nation-building and national unity, I think the Nigerian press generally has been very nationalistic. On democracy and federalism, I think the press has been beneficial. And in cases where they have not done so, it is not because they don't want to do it or that they don't see it as their role; it is because they don't have the capacity to.	Mostly beneficial. Where they have fallen short, it has been because they lack capacity.
<b>Tony Momoh</b>	On the notion of nation-building and national unity, I will say, harmful, very harmful!	Harmful. Very harmful
<b>P.D. Cole</b>	On the notion of nation-building and national unity, it is dangerous to even consider the press as a unipolar institution. I think that even in the worst excesses of regional nationalism or ethnic nationalism, the press has never been unwilling to see a larger picture. To that extent, the press has been a major supporter in the creation of the Nigerian enterprise. The nature of the press is to be controversial; it is to raise uncomfortable issues.	Beneficial. The press is not a unipolar body, but it supports the national project.

#### 5.4.4.4 Findings on Research Question 4

On whether the effect of the press was beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation-building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism, the views were mixed. The political leaders are of the view that on nation-building, the press has been beneficial; but on national unity, the press has been harmful. The academic leaders expressed the mixed bag view differently; they say the problem is rooted in the system, as encapsulated by the view of Okwudiba Nnoli: the press is not a lone ranger; it acts in concert with other member-institutions of the society. It is the system that will determine the effect of the press. Picking up from there, the Press Leaders group also present a mixed bag of press effect, but Dr. Cole thinks it is dangerous to consider the press as a unipolar institution; even when it raises

uncomfortable questions, for it is in the nature of the press to do so...those uncomfortable questions eventually serve the overall national interest.

### **5.5.0 CONCLUSION**

The focus of this chapter has been the presentation of the results and analysis of fieldwork data obtained in Nigeria. The data was acquired through in-depth elite interviews of 22 subjects divided for ease of analysis into three categories of press leaders, political leaders, and academics. Their general position is, while acknowledging that the press has done much to unite the nation, it could have done more, even while also noting the limiting influence of ownership. This chapter also looked at the issues of positionality of the researcher, particularly as it applies in an interview situation. From these results, specific themes were derived for discussion in Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER 6

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### 6.1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the press coverage of six selected presidential elections in Nigeria between 1959 and 2011. As explained in Chapter One, content analysis was employed to gather the data, which are analysed in this chapter to establish the nature and patterns of press coverage over the six selected election periods. The goal of this approach is to avoid confusion of data, which sometimes happens when demand is made on two different data obtaining methods to provide answers to one research question. Such confusion occurs, not because the conflicting answers are wrong in themselves, but because of the multiplicity of variables in the research questions, which may be difficult for a quantitative method to capture. According to Fred Kerlinger (1973), content analysis provides a “method of studying and analyzing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to measure variables” (p525).

Archival documents like newspapers provide insights into the construction of histories and identities; reliance on elite interviews alone will not have given the breadth as well as depth required to fully investigate the subject matter of this research, which the use of both methods now provides, complimenting each other.

### 6.1.1 Content Analysing the Press: The Process

The data analysed in this chapter were gathered from nine newspapers through content analysis method. The analysed newspaper contents were four weeks of front page news stories and editorial opinions of the papers during the federal election periods of 1959, 1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, and 2011. As explained in Chapters One and Four, election seasons usually provide a robust period for powerful and public inter-ethnic exchanges, particularly in the press. One of the advantages of media content analysis, a specialised sub-set of content analysis, is that it “allows examination of a wide range of data over an extensive period to identify popular

discourses and their likely meanings” (Macnamara 2003, p6). The six selected elections were categorised into two types – *transition elections* and *consolidation elections*, with each category containing three elections.

This approach generated a lot of newspaper data because of the number of papers and weeks of tracking, which is four weeks for each election period - three weeks before and one week after each election. This was done to capture the most intense periods of the elections and the immediate week following the voting which includes the announcement of the election results. I also thought that the four-week period would provide adequate data – not too much and not too little, taking into account that one of the papers was published only twice a week. In the end, a total of 606 newspaper editions were content analysed, with each newspaper contributing about 67 editions. In these editions, only political stories relating to the pending elections, on the front page, and editorials about the same, were content analysed. A total of 1,243 political stories on the front page and political-based editorials were found and analysed. The part of the data that was found relevant was taken from the coding instrument and applied to the research objective, and broadly to questions.

### **6.2.0 CODING TRAINING, PROCESS, AND PROCEDURE**

The coding process started with my preparation of a codebook consisting of 18 categories. On a review of the code categories with my supervisors, the original list was significantly reduced to a third, when it became apparent that most of the categories would not be relevant to the essence of the study. (Please see Appendix 6 for the final code guide). Because of my limitation in statistical issues in general and in the use of the SPSS statistical software in particular, I engaged the assistance of a friend, a fellow lecturer, who guided me and also assisted me to train two assistants in the process of using the coding guide and a code sheet designed for the purpose of capturing the necessary data. Because of the extensive nature of the study and the voluminous data generated from the newspapers, it was necessary to use the two assistants for manual coding to generate an initial database that was subsequently computer analysed.

However, in order to ascertain the level of agreement between the trained coding assistants, I conducted an inter-coder reliability test using Cohen's kappa, with the assistance of my lecturer friend. The result was that the kappa coefficient showed the coders achieved a high level of agreement. For analysis, the generated codes were then transferred into SPSS. The frequency and cross tabulation analyses were done at univariate and bivariate levels. The data is presented quantitatively, with illustrations like charts/graphs and tables.

### 6.2.1 The Newspapers

The nine newspapers used in this study are *Daily Times* (Est. 1926), now mostly an online paper and a shadow of its former glory; the *West African Pilot* (Est. 1937) defunct in 1967; the *Nigerian Tribune* (Est. 1949) still operating as a private paper; the *Nigerian Citizen* (Est. 1948) defunct in 1966; the *New Nigerian* (Est. 1966), now a shadow of its former self; The *Punch* (Est. 1971), the most highly circulated paper in Nigeria today; the *Guardian* (Est. 1983), still a strong and authoritative voice; *ThisDay* (Est. 1995), an influential paper; the *Daily Trust* (Est. 1998) a privately owned but strong Northern voice, in the tradition of the *New Nigerian*, though it is trying to recast itself as a national paper. See appendix for further details.

### 6.2.2 Coverage Analysis

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind, as earlier noted, that though the study period for each of the election years covered only a four week period around each election, the 1964/65 election proved an exception to this. The election period that year was inconclusive; it was postponed and later concluded in March 1965. As a result, ethnic issues and other election debates on the pages of the newspapers dragged on for a period of over four months, during which verbal and physical violence were freely traded. The 2011 election was also different in that most of the violence took place *after* the election; usually, election violence was used as a weapon of intimidation, but in the case of 2011, there were violent reprisal attacks against those who won by those disappointed with the election results. So much of the reporting of the subsequent crisis, was not captured in this study. Secondly, it is important to

note, as highlighted in Chapter Four, that different newspapers were used for different periods of the elections. Comparison across the over 50-year period of the study was made with this in mind, noting that the study is on the press in Nigeria and not on particular newspapers. Since the 1950s, of all Nigerian newspapers, only the *Nigerian Tribune* has lasted through to today, the period of the study, inclusive. Thirdly, in making the analysis, I used my knowledge of the press industry and politics as a backdrop to interpret notable trends and findings.

### 6.3.0 PRESENTATIONS

In these presentations, content analysis findings are first presented in table and figure illustrative formats to give an across the six-year holistic picture of each issue category being examined in the election year in focus. This approach provides an immediate comparative visual positioning of issues year by election year. It also provides for an independent interrogation of each election by year; allowing trends and patterns to be detectable for observation, and room for ease of analysis before conclusions are reached.

### 6.4.0 CATEGORY 1: NEWS AND EDITORIAL COVERAGE

*Table 6.1: Frequency of News Coverage*

	<b>Frequency</b>
News stories	86.70% (1987)
Editorials	13.30% (305)
Total	100% (2292)

**Figure . 6.1: Frequency of News Coverage**





Table 6.1 above presents the editorial items published on the front page and editorial by the newspapers used for this study. The table shows that the newspapers published a total of 2,292 of news reports on the front pages and editorials. Expectedly, most of the stories published were news (86.70%) while the remaining items were editorials (13.30%).

**Table 6.2: Editorial Items, Front-page News Stories, and Editorials**

<i>EDITORIAL ITEMS</i>	<i>FRONT-PAGE NEWS STORIES</i>	<i>EDITORIALS</i>
Political %	56% (1103)	46% (140)
Non-political %	44% (884)	54%(165)
Total Number	100% (1987)	100% (305)



**Figure 6.2: Editorial Items**

In Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 above, the breakdown of the front page stories and editorials into political and non-political also shows that of the front page stories published by the newspapers in the periods under review, more than half of them were political (56%). Similarly, more than half of the editorials published, which constitute the majority, were non-political (54%).

**Table 6.3: Breakdown of the Published Stories by Years**

EDITORIAL ITEMS	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
Front Page News	90.30% (602)	88.80% (556)	92.8% (168)	84.5% (272)	88.1% (282)	62.5% (110)
Editorials	9.7% (65)	11.2% (70)	7.2% (13)	15.5% (50)	11.9% (38)	37.5% (66)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(667)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(626)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(181)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(322)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(320)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(176)</b>


**Figure 6.3: Published Stories by Years**

Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 show the breakdown by year, of editorials and news stories published by the newspapers in election years under investigation. As the table shows, the newspapers published more stories on their front page in 1959 and 1979 than other election years. Similarly, by ratio of news to editorial, the 1983 and 2011 election years posted higher percentage values than the other election years.

### 6.5.0 CATEGORY 2. *GENRE/TYPE* (FRONT PAGE POLITICAL NEWS STORIES AND POLITICALLY RELATED EDITORIALS)

**Table 6.4. Genre/Type: An Across the Six Election Years Perspective**

GENRE	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
News	91.70%	86.60%	90.30%	74.20%	85.40%	84.20%
Editorial	8.30%	13.40%	9.70%	25.80%	14.60%	15.80%
Total	100% (347)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)


### 6.5.1 Findings

Noticeable, particularly in the 1983, 1999 and 2011 election years, is the fluctuating but steady drop in the number of front-page election news stories and editorials – 128 and 101, compared with the first three elections of the study, for example. There is about a five percentage point rise, and fall in the number of politically related news stories and editorial items in the transitional elections of 1959 and consolidation elections of 1964/65. By 1979, editorials accounted for one in about ten news stories. But by 1983, the spike was significant, the highest in the study. The year also recorded the lowest published news stories and editorials.

### 6.5.2 Comments

Compared with 1979 (9.7%) the use of editorials spiked considerably by 1983 to one editorial in every four news stories. You might call this abuse of ownership positions of the government papers analysed for this period. In 1983, the NPN government was desperate to continue in power, so every organ was deployed to convince the electorate to choose the party over others. Also of note is the steady drop in the number of published news stories from 1959 and 1983, the lowest being 1983.

**Figure 6.4: Genre/Type**



One notable trend across the election years from 1959 to 2011 is the decline in the number of news stories, the sharpest drop being in 1983 already partly explained in the comment above. Newspaper-press was gradually losing grip as the sole source of news for the elite. The electronic media firmly under the governments' control were now attracting audiences. As expected, most stories on the elections are reported via the news genre, rather than editorials, which accounts for a fraction of election news contents over the period, except for 1983 when there was a significantly upward spike.

### 6.6.0 CATEGORY 3: ILLUSTRATION OF FRONTPAGE NEWS REPORTS

(Use of Photos and Cartoons to highlight or enhance a story, or as standalones)

*Table 6.5: Illustration of Front page News Reports by Election Year*

ILLUSTRATION	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
No Illustration	84.20%	75.20%	71.80%	67.00%	79.70%	67.30%
Black & White Photo	15.80%	24.80%	28.20%	33.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Colour Photo	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.30%	32.70%
Total	100% (329)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)


#### 6.6.1 Findings

The 1959 and 1964/65 election period witnessed a rise in the number of photos and illustrations between the two election years. Understandably, there was no colour photography for newspapers yet in this time period in Nigeria. In 1999, colour photography is used for the first time in elections coverage, having been introduced about seven years earlier. Black and white photos are still used on the inside pages of most newspapers. The total number of news stories on elections continues to drop. In the 1959 and 1964/65 election period, there was a reduction of the relatively high dependence on mainly textual display of content.

#### 6.6.2 Comments

A point to note is that the reading public was mostly the urban elite with a lot of time to spare as radio and television were not yet popular news and information sources. Newspaper texts were characteristically long-winded. Until 1983, there was a steady rise in the number of illustrations and photos; this was clearly before the advent of coloured photography in newspapers. Then followed a noticeable, over 38% drop in the use of illustrations between 1983 and 1999, accounted for by several factors. Some of these include the higher cost of colour production, the newsprint crisis and rising cost of newspaper production, which caused a cut down in the number of copies in circulation and the number of pages printed.

Figure 6.5: Illustration of Front page News Reports by Election Year



A singular noticeable trend through the study is the rise in the use of photos and illustrations in front pages. In early elections and up until 1983, black and white photos accompanied stories. But as photography technology advanced, newspapers started telling election stories in coloured photographs from 1999.

### 6.7.0 CATEGORY 4: DIRECTION OF REPORTS AND EDITORIALS

(Direction is derived from tone and language used in news stories and editorials. Positive stories are hyped stories about the party or candidate; negative stories are usually mostly about the candidate or the opposing party; and neutral stories are balanced independent reporting by the press; they also include a dose of government press releases on the elections, announcements, and public enlightenment stories.)

*Table 6.6: News stories and Editorial Direction: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011*

<i>DIRECTION</i>	<i>1959</i>	<i>1964/65</i>	<i>1979</i>	<i>1983</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2011</i>
Positive	41.60%	3.30%	33.10%	21.60%	10.00%	12.00%
Negative	55.90%	82.70%	58.50%	72.20%	61.70%	68.50%
Neutral	2.40%	14.00%	8.10%	6.20%	28.30%	19.50%
Total	100% (387)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)

#### 6.7.1 Findings

There is a steep drop in positive stories from 41.60% in 1959 to a mere 3.30% in 1964. At the same time, negative stories rose by over 27.8 percent point from 55.90% to 82.70%. Politically neutral stories seem almost impossible to find in 1959; the year had the lowest at 2.40%. It is significant, but not surprising, that the election period of 1964/65, which marked the lowest point in positive stories was also alarmingly high in negative stories (82.70%). Given the high level of corrosive politics, it is not a surprise that the bloody Nigerian Civil War followed within two years.

Comparing 1979 election period with 1983's, the positive news stories and editorials decline while the negative stories climbed from 58.50% to 72.20%. Neutral stories remained marginal. Through the entire six elections, 1964/65 and 1983 recorded the highest number of negative political stories of 82.70% and 72.20% respectively.

### 6.7.2 Comments


In 1979, the percentage number of negative stories at 58.50% is the second lowest in the study; this represents a notable decline from the last election of 1964 at 82.70%. On the surface, the trend appears good, but it mainly demonstrated how successful the military were at getting the politicians to behave under the threats of arrest or the whole exercise cancelled.

Compared with all other elections, neutral stories in the two years are higher than others. In 1999 they almost tripled the positive reports, and nearly half of negative stories. Negative stories remain high for both years.

Several suppositions can be deduced from these unusually high negative and neutral stories: the military government's struggle to convince a doubting populace of its genuine desire to return the country to civil rule. To record only 10.00% in 1999 of positive stories reflects political weariness of the press and the populace after a series of disappointing transitions of power, and highly acrimonious and negative campaign periods.



**Figure 6.6: News stories and Editorial Direction: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011**



Consistent with consolidation election practices, negative stories were highest in 1964/65, 1983, and 2011. The same is also true when comparison is made within the paired election years; the numbers of positive reports were higher each time in the transition, as against a consolidation election. As the table also shows, in the elections in focus, the 1964/65 elections, closely followed by 2011, were perhaps the most divisive, and the findings pointed in that direction. A key deduction that could be made from these findings is that political stakes are higher during consolidation elections than during transition elections.

### 6.8.0 CATEGORY 5: ETHNIC REFERENCES IN THE PRESS. (Reference to parties' ethnic affiliations and politicians' ethnic background in news and editorials)

*Table 6.7: Ethnic Portrayal: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011*

ETHNIC PORTRAYAL	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
Yoruba	18.20%	26.70%	21.00%	13.40%	17.80%	7.00%
Hausa	22.5%	16.8%	17.3%	25.8%	5.0%	14.9%
Igbo	20.4%	14.9%	9.7%	12.4%	8.9%	8.0%
Minority ethnic groups	4.0%	7.5%	2.8%	4.1%	16.4%	54.3%
None (News stories without ethnic slant)	35.0%	34.2%	49.2%	44.3%	51.9%	15.8%
Total	100% (387)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)

#### 6.8.1 Findings

Mentions of minority ethnic groups in the 1959 and 1964/65 election years were quite marginal. Ethnically neutral stories were higher at both elections. All three major tribes got near equal/even mentions in both years, with Hausa-Fulani a nudge ahead in 1959, and Yoruba much more mentioned in 1964/65.

Ethnic neutral stories got the lion share in the findings during this period. This is driven by the high volume of informational content put out by government agencies and elections administrators, most of which usually make no reference to ethnic relations. However, from the rest of the data, one can deduce that the focal point of the 1959 elections was the large Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of the Northern Region. In 1964/65, the Yoruba of Western Region led in press mentions. Press mentions of the Igbo dropped to a significant 12-percentage points lower than the Yoruba, as did the Hausa-Fulani who were about 10-percentage points lower. It is important to note that minority ethnic groups were not in the press equation at all in 1959, and only moved up slightly in press mentions during the 1964/65 elections.


In the 1979 and 1983 election periods, non-mention of any ethnic group remains high; nearly half of all the lead news stories and editorials in 1979 were devoid of ethnic mentions. Almost the same could have been said of 1983 with 44.3 percentage point. In the rest of the stories, the Yoruba led in press mentions in 1979 while the Hausa-Fulani led during the following election of 1983.

### **6.8.2 Comments**

The 1979 elections were contentious; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the mainly Western Region-based, Yoruba-led party disputed strongly with the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of the North. The Eastern Region, which had failed in an attempted to secede from Nigeria leading to the Civil War, played a back fiddle in both elections. Minority groups fared far less as most of them were subsumed into the bigger ethnic based parties of the North and West.

The values for two of the three leading ethnic groups were lower than 10 percentage points in 1999, and for the first time, of the minorities notched up to 16.40%, the second highest among the ethnic groups. In 2011, the minority groups led in election related stories by a whopping 54.30%. 1999 was an unusual but significantly interesting election year; the value of ethnically neutral news reports peaked at 51.9%. There is one major reason for this: the two leading candidates of the two leading parties – General Olusegun Obasanjo for Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Chief Olu Falae for Alliance for Democracy (AD), were both Yoruba. As a result, inter-ethnic fights were not big on the tickets.

**Figure 6.7: Ethnic Portrayal: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011**



The figure shows an across the election years perspective. On the face value, the figure indicates that during an election period, majority of the time, it may be easy to reach the conclusion ethnic issues may not have been big in the scheme of things. The point has already been made that there was a significant number of election related stories pushed by government agencies on public enlightenment platforms. The second is that outside the front pages, there were lots of election stories in the inside pages including highly contentious columns.

An additional point to note is the gradual focus of the election stories on minority ethnic issues over the period.

### 6.9.0 CATEGORY 6: PURPOSE OF THE STORIES

*Table 6.8: Purpose of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011*

PURPOSE OF STORIES	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
Awareness/education <i>Programme of Party &amp; Candidate</i>	20.8%	18.9%	7.7%	24.7%	10.0%	5.5%
Persuade ( <i>Vote for my party or vote for me, don't vote for them</i> )	33.7%	13.0%	54.0%	20.8%	8.6%	10.0%
Propaganda ( <i>Use of unverifiable information on program promotion</i> )	10.7%	11.8%	11.7%	15.5%	41.4%	34.0%
Castigate and bring to disrepute	34.7%	56.3%	26.6%	39.0%	40.0%	50.5%
Total	100% (329)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)

#### 6.9.1 Findings

Stories on persuasion dropped from 33.7% in 1959 to a mere 13% in 1964. On the other hand, stories that reflect castigation and bring to disrepute rose from 34.7% in 1959 to 56.3% in 1964/65.

The 1964/65 was a bare-knuckle campaign, when compared with that of 1959, arising from the much controversial population census of 1961. Whereas there were efforts to 'persuade' in the earlier election, but in 1964/65, the overriding need was to castigate and bring to disrepute. In this, a key problem with consolidation elections is highlighted in these findings, where the need to retain power by all means collided with the drive to gain power by means fair and foul.

Patterns from previous years are repeated in the 1979 and 1983 election years: Attempt to persuade is high in 1979; it is low in 1983. The need to castigate and bring others to disrepute is low in 1979; it is high in 1983.


The number of news stories that attempt to persuade is highest in 1979 for the entire period of study; castigation at 26.6%, was also lowest in that same year. However, in the 1983 elections, awareness rose, persuasion stories dropped by over half, and propaganda rose again, all consistent with assumptions about consolidation elections.

Whereas in 1999, a near equal effort is placed on propaganda (41.4%) and castigation (40%), in 2011 more effort is shifted from propaganda (34%) to castigation. Over half of the election news stories (50.5%) in the period were purposed to castigate and bring to disrepute. Awareness generating stories and news stories designed to persuade were scanty.

### **6.9.2 Comments**

The contest for the Presidential Villa in 2011 was a fierce battle, unlike any other. The circumstances that paved the way for Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to enter the race were vigorously disputed and detested by a component of Northern elite. There was therefore a huge spike in news stories that castigate, 50.5%, the second highest in the study. It is not surprising therefore that there was massive violence in the weeks and months after the elections.

Figure 6.8: Purpose of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959 - 2011



The figure presents the purpose of the stories published by the newspapers in all the election years. The findings implied that issues dominated the 1959 election and as such, persuasion and awareness/education strategy were employed more to woo voters. However, in 1964/65, with 56.3%, and 2011 with 50.5%, there is an overt indication that the elections were fought bitterly and politicians went all out to bring themselves into disrepute. Overall, propaganda and castigation peaked considerably in the last two election years. They were lowest during the transitional elections of 1959 and 1979. It is noteworthy that even at the lowest point in 1979, divisive stories of castigation still commanded over a quarter of election stories.

**6.10.0 CATEGORY 7: OBJECTIVITY** (on the part of the press, this includes fairness in reporting, adequately representing all the parties and shades of opinion as reasonably possible.)

*Table 6.9: Objectivity of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011*

OBJECTIVITY	1959	1964/65	1979	1983	1999	2011
<i>Mostly objective</i>	22.8%	3.0%	48.4%	10.5%	19.0%	24.2%
<i>Mostly subjective</i>	74.8%	80.2%	51.6%	76.8%	79.0%	60.0%
<i>I can't say</i>	2.4%	16.8%	0.0%	12.7%	2.0%	15.8%
<i>Total</i>	100% (329)	100% (322)	100% (248)	100% (97)	100% (128)	100% (101)

### 6.10.1 Findings

Objectivity in reporting political stories plummeted from 22.8% in 1959 to a mere 3% in 1964/65. In the same period, subjectivity rose from 74.8% to 80.2%. Objectivity continues to suffer during consolidation elections: i.e. 1979, the gap between objective and subjective stories is narrower (3.2%) than the gap depicted four years later in 1983 (66.3%). As a result of military governments' ownership interests, 'objective' reports amount to nearly half of the stories in print in 1979. However, this percentage share dropped significantly to a mere 10.5% by 1983. These figures are also consistent with the patterns that shape differences between transition and consolidation elections. The 2011 election presents a slight deviation from the norm: there is a rise in the number of objective stories from 1999, and subjective stories are actually lower than those of the previous election.

### 6.10.2 Comments


What the situation in 1959 and 1964/65 election years reflects is ownership ties between papers' newsrooms and the ethnicised political parties. During election seasons, all pretences to objectivity seem to be suspended. One observable trait is a developing trend in the dynamics of consolidation election where there exist more proclivities for subjectivity.

As earlier mentioned, the two gladiators in the 1999 elections were of the same Yoruba ethnic group. What differentiated them was that one was an imposition by the retired military oligarchy while the other was the candidate of the ethnic-based



party dominated by the Yoruba. The press battle before and after the poll was mostly centred within the one ethnic group of the Yorubas. However in 2011, the entrance of a minority candidate seemed to have made the press a little more objective compared with earlier elections.

**Figure 6.9: Objectivity of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959 - 2011**



The figure presents the level of objectivity the press displayed in the coverage of the presidential elections in Nigeria starting from 1959. The figure indicates that across all the elections since 1959, the press was always mostly subjective. Objectivity suffered gravely in the reported stories during the 1964/65 and 1983 elections. The closest it came to achieving objectivity was in 1979, and this was discussed in the comments above. Going by the reasons already advanced, subjective stories were consistently high throughout the period of study. These findings indicate that press almost always took sides, which, perhaps, is related to ownership's interests.

### 6.11.0 CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter dealt with content analysis of data obtained from selected archival newspaper materials for the designated six election periods, spanning 52 years, (1959 and 2011). The objective in using content analysis is to establish the nature and patterns of press coverage over the extended election periods.

## SECTION 4

### Discussion

This section is devoted to Chapters 7 and 8.

**Chapter 7** is in four parts. Part One is a discussion of the interviews; Part Two is a discussion of the newspaper findings; and Part Three is a synthesis of the findings in Parts 1 and 2, while Part Four revisits the research objectives and the research questions in order to review the findings.

**Chapter 8** deals with a summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

# CHAPTER 7

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## THE DISCUSSION

### 7.1.0 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to build on the analyses and findings of Chapters 5 and 6 of this study to further discuss their findings, against the backdrop of the research objectives and the research questions. The approach is to use extracted themes from the findings in the two chapters to form the basis, as well as guiding instrument of the discussion. The chapter is in four parts: Part One discusses findings from the interviews; Part Two discusses the newspaper findings; Part Three combines major thematic findings and some conclusions; and Part Four summarises the findings of the research questions.

### ***PART 1***

Part One of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the six broad themes of findings in the interview chapter (Chapter 5). The sections are as follows: a) Contextualising Colonialism; b) Ideology, Values Orientation, and a Nation's Identity, c) The Nigerian Nation-state and the Press; d) Elite & Elite Politics; e) Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Citizenships and Identity.

### 7.2.0 CONTEXTUALISING COLONIAL ROOTS: THE PRE-CONDITION FOR UNDERSTANDING POST-COLONIAL NIGERIAN STATE

Of the numerous factors that combine to define the modern Nigerian state, none stands out as prominently and as often, a source of vigorous disputations, as the British colonial rule and as Ekeh (1975) stated, "Our post-colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics" (p111). The average Nigerian elite strains hindsight to credit or fault colonial governance as being

responsible for the design of the system that birthed the post-colonial Nigerian state with its merits and demerits.

As Nigeria continues to flounder, the question will continue to form the basis for contentious disputations: What type of democratic structure and culture did the British colonial rulers establish for Nigeria, and how have these continued to define its sense of nationhood and of belonging? Utomi<sup>2</sup> doubts the usefulness of what he termed a *unicausal* analysis. He is of the view that applying a single factor causal analysis “gets pretty shaky in these kinds of complexity”. In other words, colonial rule, as a singular factor may not provide an adequate explanation for the state of Nigeria today. In agreement with Diamond (1988) that Nigeria was “clumsily carved for colonial convenience” (p14), Utomi concedes that Britain, in her national interest ensured that Nigeria remained unsettled so that it would remain dependent and open to British influence. The strategy of finding ways to maintain a stronghold on former colonial outposts by the British, says Utomi, was not peculiar to Nigeria;

when you go to Malaysia, you will see how the British divided up the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians.... I think that, at the heart of all [our problems] is leadership – We lack strong, good and decent leadership (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos on June 7, 2016)

This is quite in tandem with what Joseph (2014) finds missing in the Nigerian equation, a “political leadership that puts nation above ethnicity, religious tolerance above violent crusades, a capable state above prebendal spoliation, and values-based governance above global parading” (p73).

Abati<sup>3</sup> is one of the many who share Utomi’s position. He says, “I think we’ve had more than 50 years of independence, it’s too late in the day for us be saying, the colonialists created Nigeria in a particular manner”. “Moreover,” says Pate<sup>4</sup>, “other

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<sup>2</sup>Prof. Pat Utomi is a former academic and a politician.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Reuben Abati is a former Spokesman of President Goodluck Jonathan, former Editorial Board Chairman, and acclaimed syndicated newspaper columnist.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Umaru Pate is Dean of Department of Mass Communication, Bayero University, Kano.

nations also colonised by the British have put the burden of colonialism behind them and moved on". And Biakolo<sup>5</sup>, says:

the British exploited our differences for their own interests, playing one group against the other to ensure their continued dominance. And our leaders, being so short sighted, have followed the same route to power through...exploitation of differences. I think our politicians have been more responsible for our current state than any outsider (Biakolo, interviewed in Lagos on May 20, 2016).

Without disputing the import of the above views of Biakolo, Abati, Utomi, and others, it remains a fact that modern Nigeria is the direct recipient of a flawed but deeply rooted legacy of the British colonial system. Many of the interview respondents including Obasanjo, Adesina, Abubakar Momoh, Danjuma, Osaghae, Ofeimun, Nnoli, and Agbaje agree that leaders since independence share in the blame of how the nation has arrived where it is. However, they also insist that colonial rule set the trajectory for modern Nigeria in key areas: a faulty structural foundation; a disruptive administrative exemplar with in-built inter-ethnic distrust; and a dysfunctional democratic model with an enduring template in election rigging. Obasanjo<sup>6</sup> argues that anyone who desires to understand the genesis of Nigeria's problems must enquire at the nation's colonial beginnings. Adesina<sup>7</sup> agrees, and states that the nation was built on defective structures.

Danjuma<sup>8</sup> recalls his school days in the north when school children were forbidden to read newspapers from the South; the British banned the *West African Pilot* newspaper from circulation in the North. According to Danjuma,

They were telling us that northernisation policy was good for us and we must not permit southerners to come and take over our civil

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<sup>5</sup> Prof. Emevwo Biakolo is former Dean and now Director of PhD Programme, School of Media and Communication, Pan-Atlantic University Lagos.

<sup>6</sup> Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired General of the Nigerian Army, is a former Military Head of State, and two-time elected president of Nigeria.

<sup>7</sup> Mr. Femi Adesina is a former Managing Director of the Sun Newspaper, former President of the Guild of Editors and current Presidential Spokesperson.

<sup>8</sup> General T. Y. Danjuma is a retired Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

service, but they were protecting their own interests (Danjuma, interviewed in Lagos on May 11, 2016).

The system destroyed existing traditional social-political structures, and substituted them with strange hybrids like “indirect rule” in parts of the country. Danjuma recalls how they contrived and created traditional rulers in places where none existed before.

Osaghae<sup>9</sup> corroborates the point that the British created political and other structures to serve their purpose (citing anthropologist Raymond Apthorpe) even to the point of creating whole ethnic groups. One example is the *traditional* Tor Tiv kingship of the Tiv people of Benue State in the Middle Belt Region, which was an arbitral and sole creation of the British colonial system in the 1940s to serve their *indirect rule* system. An ironic turn of events, according to Osaghae, was that the first person that was going to be made the Tor Tiv (King of the Tiv Ethnic group) turned out to be a Yoruba man, a retired warrant officer (from the Western Region!) a veteran from the Second World War.

Still on the distortion of the nation’s geo-political structures, Ofeimun<sup>10</sup> recalls how the British divided up the smaller South but left the larger North intact, thus creating a tripartite struggle in which the larger undivided North would dominate and be able to play the two Southern Regions against each other. Says Ofeimun, “It was perfect British; after what they did in Asia, they only needed to apply similar policies in Nigeria, which, to a large extent, actually worsened the ethnic relations.” And these ethnic relations, according to Osaghae (2015), are “the product of the uneven development and rivalry which British colonial administration fostered among the different segments” (p25).

Also, according to Nnoli<sup>11</sup>, the British introduced electoral fraud into the Nigerian electoral system. They blatantly rigged election on behalf of whomever they wanted. For example, he said, British District Officers were issued written instructions on

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<sup>9</sup> Prof. Eghosa Osaghae is Vice Chancellor of Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State.

<sup>10</sup> Odia Ofeimun is a writer and a politician.

<sup>11</sup> Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli is a retired Professor of political science.

how to prevent NEPU, a northern political party, and its leader, Aminu Kano from winning any elections in the north. NEPU's crime was that had entered into an alliance with a southern political party. Ofeimun maintains that British colonial rulers wrote the original codebook on electoral malpractices in Nigeria. For an example, in 1959 when the major parties realised that none of the ethno-regional parties could form a government, they started working out alliances. But the British truncated the process, brazenly and openly by inviting the northern NPC party to form a government, against the demands of their own parliamentary roles and regulations.

Abubakar Momoh<sup>12</sup> explains why, beyond mere historical references, the rule of the British is still relevant today; he posits that inherited colonial state apparatus, legacies, as well as social structures have never been destroyed, adding,

They've only mutated after they were inherited by the political elite, reconstituted and used against our own people, in the same way the colonial rulers used them. This was what led to the fall of the first republic, this was what led to the rise of the military, and this was what led to the divisions in the press along ethnic divisions and so on (Abubakar Momoh, interviewed in Abuja on April 18, 2016).

Peter Ekeh (1975) shares Momoh's point of view; he submits, "Modern African politics are in large measure a product of the colonial experience" as "the colonial experience itself has had a massive impact on modern Africa" (p93).

The faulty foundation and decades of broken systems and flawed leadership have combined to exact continuous disastrous influences on Nigeria. Colonial rule may not be solely responsible for the state of the nation today; however, its contributions are central and cannot be ignored.

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<sup>12</sup> Prof. Abubakar Momoh, a political scientist was the Director of Electoral Institute at INEC.

### 7.3.0 IDEOLOGY, VALUES ORIENTATION AND A NATION'S IDENTITY: CONSTRUCTING OF A NIGERIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

Aimufua (2007) postulates that the press used, “its coverage of specific issues and events to foster a collective Nigerian national identity” (p1), however, construction of modern Nigeria, according to Agbaje<sup>13</sup>, cannot be attributed entirely to just one institution or group. A significant number of the constraining issues were outside the control of the press. Indeed, the construct of a nation is the work of cohorts of individuals, institutions, systems, and frameworks.

Many of the interview respondents felt that the Nigerian press, at the beginning, was eager to construct an overarching national identity, over and above all other regional and ethnic considerations. But it never quite succeeded, and as Adebani (2016) notes, “on a few critical occasions, the Nigerian press renders itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations” (p223). For example, during the nationalist period,

in the period before 1947, political culture and evolving identity were hardly reflective of ethnic and religious and regional sentiments; that was because the political structure, the evolving system of that time did not encourage focusing on ethnic, religious or regional considerations (Agbaje, interviewed in Ibadan on June 1, 2016).

Yet, the press is only a part of the broad range of cultural institutions that work together to establish political culture, by creating across-nation sensibilities and mind-sets. Its role is nonetheless critical in the formation of mind-sets for a culture to thrive. The element of *culture* – a consistent and generally agreed, or acceptable way of doing something – has not been firmly established due to absence of a mobilising ideology. But ideologies are not plucked from the air, they are intentionally designed to fit a context.

On this concept of ideology, Thompson (1984) explains that it is necessary to view it within the context of the general social theory, meaning there must be a healthy fit

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<sup>13</sup> Prof. Adigun Agbaje is a Political Scientist and former Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of Ibadan. (interviewed in Ibadan on...)



between a society and its belief system. This approach, Thompson argues, allows full exploration of “the relations between action, institutions, power and domination” (p127). The explored relations provide clarity within the belief system of a given community, and such relationship dynamics could be used to examine the one between a nation-state and its component federating units. Again in all these dynamics, the role of communicative mechanism of which the press is an important part, is crucial.

### 7.3.1 Ideological Vacuum and Absence of Value Orientation

Crucial, then, to the issue of nation-state construction are the joint issues of ideology and value orientation, which together provide a sense of being, identity, and a guiding roadmap that define a nation’s political culture among other defining characteristics. All told, the ideology of a society must derive from its value system. Anya<sup>14</sup> laments Nigeria’s lack of a value-based ideological guide:

The primary problem is the absence of a guiding value system; a national identity is, as it were, defined by the values that you share in common, and all accept. Those values will actually influence and affect how the press handles issues; they become a roadmap. But because there are no such agreed values, the result is that, our press imitate the press in Britain and in the US without regard to our context (Anya, interviewed in Lagos on June 14, 2016).

The problem with borrowed values is that they lack affinity, and have no foundations in the belief systems of the host society. This point by Anya resonates with Osinbajo<sup>15</sup>, who says, “personally I think we need a big idea. I think we need something that unites us and brings us together and ... around which we can rally” (Osinbajo, interviewed in Abuja on June 23, 2016).

According to Anya, this absence of a *national* value orientation pulls people away from the centre, and towards ethnic based alternatives, and as Mamdani (2005) points out that, “every ethnic group in Nigeria is compelled sooner or later to seek its

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<sup>14</sup> Prof. Anya O. Anya is a retired professor and former Director-General of the Nigeria Economic Summit Group.

<sup>15</sup> Prof. Yemi Osinbajo is the nation’s Vice-President, and a former law professor

own ethnic home, its own native authority, its own state in the Nigerian federation” (p13). Further highlighting the uniqueness of the Nigerian situation Anya says:

...societies that show diversity are not new, but they emphasize not the things that divide them, but the things that unite them. It means, despite the diversity, they start cooperating more and more and you get to the point where there is a greater level of cooperation, because there is a greater level of sharing of values than before (Anya, interviewed in Lagos).

Anya understandably focuses on value system, which is the bedrock of sustaining an ideology. And ideology, notes Eagleton (1991), involves “questions of power”, explaining that it is propagated to assist in “legitimizing the power of a dominant social group or class.” (p3) Along this line of argument, Thompson (1984) states, “To study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination” (p4). Thompson’s definition, puts ideology in the services of dominant power as a tool for self-legitimation, and directly relates it to manipulation of power to serve mainly elite’s hegemonic interests. In the case of Nigeria, the argument is that there is no unifying national ideology that serves the “federal” centre. Rather, the elites have substituted the centre with ethnic ascendancy which, acting as centrifugal forces, suck power and relevance away to the federating ethnic units; the result is a lopsided federation, where the power has been hijacked by ethno-regional elites.

Anya’s strong case for values tallies with Abubakar Momoh’s, who submits that the Nigerian press have also become captives of the elites’ regional political ideological positions, more or less, vindicating Eagleton’s position. The consequence, according to Momoh, is that when press or media “professionalism is intercepted, framed or coloured by ideology and politics” that are almost exclusively regional or ethnic, ethical issues are often compromised, implying a subordination of professional standards to political influences.

### 7.3.2 Surviving on Dual Ideology

Nigeria may be a victim of multiple ideologies in which one ideology seeks the subjugation of others. However, Cole<sup>16</sup> does not see such subjugation. To him, the press does not operate in ideological monotones, nor does it need to choose between ethnic ideology and national ideology. The Nigerian press survives on a dual ideology, as it should – national and ethnic – because, according to Cole, the press is a stabilising institution, it cannot choose one ideology above the other. Says Cole:

The press has been able, to drive both ideologies, but not to the level of extreme where one is ousting the other. I think that we must always remember that we are a federation. Whatever forced us into that particular model of governance demands a combination of both – a national identity as well as having a particular identity, with the belief that the particular [ethnic] identity is not lost in the mainstream of the national identity (Cole, interviewed in Lagos on May 26, 2016).

The question then is what ethos or principles guide the press, and from where does it derive such principles and guiding policies? An obvious answer to the posed question about Nigeria's media philosophy is that it is borrowed. Adesanoye (1990) suggests strongly that there is need for “a serious rethinking of Nigeria's entire communication philosophy” (p73). According to him, much of Western journalism models (on which the Nigerian model is based) are mostly concerned with the unusual – the *outré*; as such, what constitutes news in the Western world may not necessarily apply automatically in Nigeria. Concepts and models must fit needs. For Adesanoye, therefore, there ought to be a “purposeful attempt to domesticate journalism practice rather than ape, slavishly, the 'journalism of exception' that constitutes, in essence, the basis of our received journalistic practice” (p69). What then is the role of a national press, torn between ideological antipodes and without strong thought-leaders in a post-colonial state?

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<sup>16</sup> Dr. P. D. Cole is a politician. He is also Nigeria's former Ambassador to Brazil, a former Managing Director of the *Daily Times* of Nigeria.

### 7.4.0 THE PRESS AND THE NIGERIAN NATION-STATE

What then is the role of the press in the political system of a nation? The interview respondents present an array of expectations. In Osaghae's opinion, "enlightenment is key, people must be informed, they must know; what is going on is invaluable" but for Nnoli, it is to put emphasis on the "commonalities rather than differences between people of different ethnicities". For Pate, the press must provide national direction. While Danjuma says the press' role is to monitor and make governance more accountable, Obasanjo locates press' role as sustenance of democracy in which the welfare, interest, and the will of the people are paramount. And Ofeimun caps off the catalogue of expectations of an ideal press, and states:

the press is to ensure that people interact at the level of opinion, so that they can interact at other levels. The primary duty is to make sure that people understand the societies in which they live. The press should be a presenter of self to self, where the society presents itself to itself by looking at representations on a daily basis (Ofeimun, interviewed in Lagos on May 20, 2016).

Babangida<sup>17</sup> acknowledges that the press has "helped in no small measure to get this country to remain as one" (Babangida, interviewed in Minna). That notwithstanding, Utomi said, "the nature and effects of the press has been changing over the years, sometimes really more for bad" (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos). Osaghae puts the reality in context saying, "...the press in Nigeria is highly partisan and that already puts a ring on its supposed role whether in constructing or not constructing" (Osaghae, interviewed in Okada, Edo State on May 4, 2016). The partisan nature of the press was also reflected by Aimufua (2007) as he notes that, "the newspapers are tools which their owners use to promote sundry selfish interests...irrespective of the damages that such might cause to issues of national integration and unity" (p300).

The nature of press partisanship is still so glaring that, for Babangida, one can easily align any newspaper with a political party even today, and "when you read it, you know where it stands, its position." This ability to so easily detect the political leaning of a newspaper is not surprising to Osaghae, who says, "the press has always

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<sup>17</sup> General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida is a former Military President of Nigeria.

functioned like some kind of political party, representing constituencies of interests, whether ethnic or not. And in that respect, according to Pate: “the various fault lines that we talk about in Nigeria are clearly captured and reflected in the Nigerian media system”. And the result is that it has “contributed to increase centrifugal forces in the society like every other political element because of the system” (Nnoli, interviewed in Enugu on May 24, 2016).

#### 7.4.1 Press: The Report Card

Further interrogating Nnoli’s position, does the regular output of the press pull inward to unite, or outward to divide? The views are as divergent as the respondents: Adinoyi-Ojo<sup>18</sup>, says the Nigerian press, generally has been very nationalistic. But Haruna<sup>19</sup> disagrees; he thinks that the effect of the press has not been as beneficial in nation building, as some claim. Abubakar<sup>20</sup> also disagrees with Adinoyi-Ojo, and says:

In some instances, I would say press reportage and commentary have done more damage than unifying the nation because they bring out our ethnic and tribal differences to the forefront, so to speak. I don’t think Nigeria is a nation yet; we are collections of different ethnic-nationalities (Abubakar, interviewed in Minna on June 16, 2016).

But Osinbajo, says,

“Though the press may have been helpful to nation-building, on the balance, where the press may have failed in encouraging or reinforcing the stereotypes that have kept us down, namely the ethnicisation” (Osinbajo, interviewed in Abuja).

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<sup>18</sup> Late Dr. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo was a politician and an academic, a former Managing Director of the Daily Times and former government spokesman in the office of the vice President.

<sup>19</sup> Mallam Mohammed Haruna is a syndicated columnist, a former Managing Director of the New Nigerian Newspaper and former spokesman for a Military Head of State.

<sup>20</sup> General Abdulsalami Abubakar is a retired Army General and former Military Head of State.

Adebanwi (2016) says this of the Nigerian press, that they have “influenced—both positively and negatively—the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities in Nigeria before and since the 1914 amalgamation” (p20).

And Cole stoutly defends the press: It is in the nature of the press, he says, to raise uncomfortable issues and, if necessary, to be controversial. He therefore thinks it is dangerous to consider the press, he says, as a unipolar institution. On the notion of nation-building and national unity, he says, “the press has never been unwilling to see a larger picture”. In that sense, the press has been a major promoter in the creation of the Nigerian enterprise (Cole, interviewed in Lagos).

Ofeimun aligns with Cole and says, “to a very large extent, the press has helped to nationalise the Nigerian opinion; and in a lot of ways, they succeeded. Even when they were based on disagreements, national opinion engaged every area of Nigerian life (Ofeimun, interviewed in Lagos).

#### **7.4.2 Ownership Rules: Serving the Elite Agenda**

The question then arises – Whose voice is the press? Whose position does it represent? Does it merely re-echo the contentious voices of the political elite? Does the press have its own voice different from that of the ownership paymaster? Kolade<sup>21</sup> provides a basis for this and says that from the beginning the press was not set up to be autonomous; people who had certain interests established them to serve those interests. Aimufua (2007) submits that, “ownership control of the Nigerian press” to a large extent determines “the nature and character of the press and therefore its editorial direction” (p300). And Agbaje proffers a similar view:

The way the press was constructed socially, physically and economically, it could not have played a role significantly different from the role defined by their owners who unfortunately were partisan...the fact that both (political) leadership and key press ownership converged was quite toxic to Nigeria’s early political history; they were publishers, they were owners, they also recruited

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<sup>21</sup> Dr. Christopher Kolade is former Nigerian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, a former Chairman/Managing Director of Cadbury Nigeria Plc, and former Pro-Chancellor of the Pan-Atlantic University.

and they converted to manage the press (Agbaje, interviewed in Ibadan).

### 7.4.3 The Piper's Many Tunes: Ownership, Ethnic, and Regional Pulls

There is little doubt that the Nigerian Press has a rich history of successful political battles, and with combat scars to prove victories. Indeed, as Abati notes, “the newspaper is an instrument of power, and because it’s an instrument of power, you cannot delink it from politics.” Questions abound: But power to what end? Does the press have to be homogenous in a pluralistic society? Can it? Should it? Abati posits that most newspapers mainly speak to regional interests “even though they all pretend to be national. The average newspaper does not have the luxury of choice on issues that are of consequence, without a deep consideration that is dictated by ownership objectives.” Adebani (2016) says, “the Nigerian press renders itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations” (p223). Says Abati:

No matter how nationalistic a newspaper claims to be, they end up getting a label in terms of the identity of the owner. You can identify newspapers in terms of the regional interest that they defend (Abati, interviewed in Lagos on May 11, 2016).

Adesina is of the same view as Abati’s with some modifications. He is of the view that the approach of the press has been mixed: their interests oscillate between national and regional or ethnic antipodes, on issue-by-issue basis, cross-checking with the pulse of its primary constituencies, driven by whatever is in line with ownership interests. Occasionally, says Adesina, the press stand together across the nation to fight a national cause, but they would retreat as quickly to their regional enclaves whenever a perceived threat to regional or ethnic positions arises. He illustrates his view, with the annulled presidential election of 1993, which became known as the *June-12* protests, of which he says:

The *June-12* struggle began as a national struggle. Later, after General Sani Abacha had taken over, it became a regional and an ethnic matter. So, while the press in one part of the country became very lukewarm on the issue, in the other part, the matter was still a front-page issue. However, when it came to campaigning against the military government and for the return to democratic government, all the press came back together (Adesina, interviewed in Abuja on April 19, 2016).

Kolade's concern is excessive loyalty to regional agenda over that of the nation that still exists in some newsrooms, but Tony Momoh<sup>22</sup> explains why this is the case: no one sets up a press to undermine his or her own personal or group interests. Says Momoh, the press will always work for the ownership interest, and it does not matter whether the ownership is private or government; or whether such interests are political, ethnic, regional, religious, or economic. In Tony Momoh's view, every news organisation is most influenced by the singular factor of ownership.

Momoh's notable point is supported by Aimufua whose investigation on the role of the press in promoting national identity found that because of ownership's "sundry selfish interests... journalists have to toe the proprietors' line, irrespective of the damages that such might cause to issues of national integration and unity" (Aimufua, 2007, p. 300). However, both Momoh and Aimufua must make room for Adebani (2016) who believes, and after an exhaustive and extensive investigation affirms that "the Nigerian press has influenced - both positively and negatively - the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities in Nigeria" (p20).

Certainly, ownership's role is crucial but, as Haruna observes, even within the restrictions of ownership, there is some wiggle room for journalists to take professional stands against bad policies or poor judgements. In a pluralistic media environment, journalists can achieve more, if only they are willing to challenge the status quo. Says Haruna:

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<sup>22</sup> Prince Tony Momoh is a politician. He is also a former Federal Minister of Information and Culture, and former General Manager and Editor of the *Daily Times* of Nigeria.



I blame us (journalists); we don't stand up enough for the ethics of our profession. Once you make up your mind to do something, you should know that sacrifices come with the territory – that you may even lose your job. I always see the plurality in media as a help to us. The media really should have exploited the advantages of plurality more (Haruna, interviewed in Kano on June 23, 2016).

Haruna's position is quite in consonance with Aimufua's submission that, the press "exhibit negative tendencies that run counter to their professional ethics and therefore act as a hindrance to their role in the Nigerian society" (Aimufua, 2007, p208)

Still on aligning professional, ownership, or group interests with the nation's, Biakolo is not persuaded that Nigerian press worked seriously enough for national unity. His view is that the press tended to pursue and defend the perceived ethno-political interests of their audience or readership. While this is understandable from a business sustainability point of view, Biakolo is in tandem with Haruna's view; he thinks there was always room for the press to have asserted its professional self more:

I think history will not be very kind in judging the Nigerian press in terms of this overriding promotion of the ethnic interests, being therefore interest of their consumers to the detriment of wider agenda of national cohesion (Biakolo, interviewed in Lagos).

#### **7.4.4 The Press: National Agenda Setter or Broker of Influence?**

It is generally acknowledged that agenda-setting responsibilities belong to the press; the press shapes narratives and it selects or deselects issues in the exercise of this responsibility. According to Utomi, narratives constructed in the press have shaped every election cycle in Nigeria. However, such associative powers of influence exercised over time have not always or altogether been constructive or in the interest of the nation as an entity.

In more recent times, the media has been (though you can't use one tar to paint everybody) significantly a broker, a contractor of influence. This newspaper (*picks up a newspaper, during the interview to*

*illustrate his point*) is a classic example of a newspaper as a broker of influence (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos).

But generally, Utomi believes that the influence of the press can be exaggerated because there are so many other intermediating factors. It is necessary to consider how the press sees its role, as against how those who set up the press see its role: the two views are often different. This is the central point earlier made by Tony Momoh. Expanding on the point, Abati says:

When a man sets up a newspaper, he has an agenda – that was the case during the First Republic. Those newspapers were almost all directly linked to political parties; their owners had no qualms about using the newspapers to pursue their political agenda(s) and interests (Abati, interviewed in Lagos).

In other words, much as the press can and does influence views and opinions, there are forces at work *influencing* the press itself, often not with the best motivation, or outcomes. According to Joseph Stiglitz, ownership of newspapers by wealthy individuals and corporations is more than another business proposition; it is “to advance their political philosophies. Many purchase newspapers because of the possibility that the media give them to influence thinking, perception of events, and therefore politics itself” (Stiglitz, 2017, p12). However, Agbaje sees such influence in the press as a two-way relationship. According to him, while news reports and commentary help to define and construct Nigeria’s political culture; politicians and the evolved culture also exact influence on the way the press reports and comments (Agbaje, interviewed in Ibadan).

#### **7.4.5 Rethinking an Alien Media Model**

However, for Tony Momoh, it is political leaders and their parties that create political cultures, with “very minimal” input from the press, noting “their word of mouth like the town criers had more impacts than newspaper” (T. Momoh, interviewed in Abuja).

Momoh’s point is plain: circulation figures are very low comparative to population size; most newspapers are urban-based, limiting their reach in the hinterland. This is

also Adesanoye's (1990) argument: that mass communication does not exist in Nigeria, since in reality communication excludes a large majority of Nigerians. What does exist, he says, is 'massive incommunication'. Adesanoye cites Ndegwa's work in 1985, which found that about 79% of those living in rural areas are excluded in the communication process, and states:

if communication is to be viewed as a process of sharing and participation by everybody concerned...then (in Nigeria) it is misdirected, unproductive and, therefore, irrelevant to the development efforts of the country (Adesanoye, 1990, p62).

Adesanoye further posits that the language of Nigerian newspapers is by and large too sophisticated to effectively communicate with the average Nigerian reader. His view is that newspapers are published for the tiny minority of elite urban dwellers. And he concludes, "It is elite communication *par excellence*, both in conception and practice" (Adesanoye, 1990, p65). It is of little wonder, then, that there is not a single Nigerian mass circulating newspaper in existence. This is dismal performance in a country of over 180 million people. Anya fully shares Adesanoye's views; he sees the press as part of the national elite that takes part in, curates, and manages the national dialogue. As such, Anya says the press cannot be viewed in isolation; they are part and parcel of an elite system.

### **7.5.0 THE ELITE: ETHNICISATION OF POLITICS AND POLITICISATION OF THE PRESS**

The elite of a nation are usually the leaders – articulators, producers, and custodians of the nation's ideology and values. This leadership category incorporates politicians and the military, press owners, academics, and other thought leaders. In the case of Nigeria, according to Anya,

The quality of what you call the political elites in Nigeria has been unfortunate, it has not been our best educated, it has not been our best achievers, (and) it has not been our hardest thinkers that have populated the political elites (Anya, interviewed in Lagos).

The quality of the Nigerian elite no doubt accounts for the absence of an articulated original body of values native to the nation, only borrowed values dressed in ill-fitting foreign ideological garments. Osinbajo also agrees that the quality of thought-leadership is poor, and he assigns culpability to the nation's thinkers and intellectual elite.

I don't even think there is much introspection... Our elites are individualistic; there is no sense of community, no sense of how the community should be organised. No sense of that. So basically, people are promoting very, very narrow selfish interest and use all manner of platforms and ideas to do so...the same elites will use ethnicity when it's convenient, they will use religion when it's convenient...to serve narrow, very, very narrow selfish cause[s].

### **7.5.1 Elite Political Armoury: Weaponised Press and Ethnic Strategies**

Arising from the colonial circumstance of its origins, the Nigerian press has variously been characterised as a tool, an instrument, and a weapon. Obasanjo, for example, categorised it as either subservient or antagonistic towards government, depending on its ownership. Embedded in this depiction is the notion that the Nigerian press has not been able to move beyond its age-old colonial and reactive "opposition-to-government" mode, fixed, as it were as an antagonistic weapon. Obasanjo explains:

The press in the Nigerian context has not really been friendly with government, and that is understandable. It was one of the main tools or weapons used by our fathers who fought for independence; the press, therefore, developed an anti-government culture, always seeing government in a particular type of light. So, we had the press that had developed the culture of antagonism. When the government became our own, we had two type of press: the antagonistic and the subservient (Obasanjo, interviewed in Abeokuta on May 12 and June 15, 2016).

Seen in this light, it is understandable why some view the press in Nigeria as combative, or acquiescent whether against the colonial powers or the military and to a limited extent, the politicians. According to Obasanjo, the press has formed "an anti-government culture." What happens when the national press perpetually

evinces and projects the images of an antagonism and seen as a weapon of war? Has Nigeria's antagonistic press produced an antagonistic political culture?

### 7.5.2 Elite Press and the Politics of Exclusion

Adesanoye's position is that by the deliberate wish of those in authority, the media in Nigeria were designed to cater for the elite and exclude the mass of the people. His position is in tandem with that of John Merrill (1974) whose view it is that when a nation's media only mobilises a few privileged citizens, instead of all citizens towards defined objectives, such media should be adjudged of failure "in one of its most important roles: as an agent of change" (p47). In some societies, Merrill (1974) contends that true *mass* media do not exist; what exist and prosper are "specialized or elite media... elite lines of communication; from elite to elite within the power structure" (p47). The elite press exist to serve elites' needs to preserve its hold on power.

For the press, this age-worn role in Nigeria's brand of democracy is constitutive, according to Agbaje, who thinks that "the press whether they are aware or not have a defining role to play, as we try to build a democracy, because I don't think we are a democracy yet" (Agbaje). In this regard, Kolade agrees that the press "still has a lot of work to do to get people to understand that a national identity must take pride of place over whatever ethnic tendencies we have."

### 7.6.0 THE POLITICS OF BELONGING

Nigeria is nothing if not a patchwork of ethnic cross-stitches. According to General Abdulsalami Abubakar, "Nigeria is a conglomeration of tribes...anywhere you go, you will find a dominant tribe, and the minority tribes".

Many chorused the fact that while there is nothing wrong with ethnic groups as units of political formations, ethnicity as an ideology pushed by an elite class, has formed the bedrock of political divisiveness, as amply demonstrated in the 2011 elections. Babangida makes the point that "ethnicity in Nigeria is a means by which politicians or elites try to place themselves in the scheme of things". Part of the problem as

Osinbajo notes is that ethnicity is “not reflected in a positive way.” Negative perception about ethnicity is the direct consequence of how ethnicity has been used by the elite as a device “to cause disunity amongst the people, and the press presents the platform for it” (Osinbajo).

According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2011), symbolic boundaries sketched by the politics of belonging are more enduring and more divisive, and they “separate the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p3). What the elite has done is not just to forge these “symbolic boundaries”, but to also to take advantage of them in order to extract relevance and different forms of advancements. In Abati’s views, there is nothing wrong with a person proclaiming where he or she originates from; what is wrong is when one stands on that pedestal to oppress or exclude others who do not belong to their subgroup. Anya agrees and says no one can wish away ethnicity, but that no one should feel justified to use it to create conditions of the oppression. From the views of most of the other interviewees, ethnicity is a reality for which leaders need to find more positive and inclusive uses for in Nigeria’s democracy.

### **7.6.1 Ethnicity and the Construct of Common National Identity**

Some have proposed that ethnic identities precede the construct of a national identity; Adinoyi-Ojo calls the ethnic group the first level or sketches of identity, before the construct of the nation-state, however, its provision of a sanctuary of belonging does not and should not supersede that of the nation-state. The enjoyment of a higher preference over the nation is foundational to the tension. As Osaghae (2006) states, referencing, Ihonvbere (1994) and Osaghae (1999):

African states are not nations yet because identities and loyalties to ethnic, religious, regional and racial groups are stronger than those to the state, something that has been attributed variously to the ‘artificiality’ of the state as a colonial creation, its irrelevance to the material well-being of citizens, and its inability to satisfy the imperatives of statehood (p4).

Adinoyi-Ojo, however, is optimistic that ethnic politics was pervasive only in the First and Second Republics and will soon be out of vogue; it no longer has a place.

The pull to ethnicise politics, which was stronger among the older generation of politicians, persisted only because, according to him, the press had not helped to fashion a needed overarching national identity. Instead the press reflected the view of ownership, which was preoccupied with various (ethnic, political, religious, business, or economic) group interests (Adinoyi-Ojo).

While Adinoyi-Ojo's optimism is welcome, the reality is this: there is still the absence of a strong, value-oriented, and acceptable national identity, and people still tend to revert to primordial identities. Also, when there is a crisis, and a high level of uncertainty, the need to retreat into the non-threatening comfort of primary sub-groups identities is even higher. "You know", says Utomi, "when people don't know what to do; the last refuge is to the clan, ethnicity is always the last refuge of the confused" (Utomi).

### **7.6.2 Multiplicities of Citzenships or Multiple Citzenships**

Essentially therefore, the politics of belonging is negotiative and constructed in that they tend to "include struggles around the determination of what is involved in being a member of... a community" (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p3). In a world defined by 'us' and 'them', the politics of belonging within the ethnic space:

Involve(s) not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers (within and outside the community) but also their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents (Yuval-Davis , 2011, p3).

Yuval-Davis' argument here is that recognised citizenship, as it were, should not be limited to only state citizenship. In fact, she argues that it is only possible to understand a nation-state citizenship when "the multi-layered structures of people's citizenships... of sub, cross and supra-state political communities" (p4) are analysed. This she refers to as intersectionality; the concept attempts to decipher the multidimensional nature of communities that form modern states. Everyone in the modern state, according to Yuval-Davis (2007), belongs to and are defined or shaped by their intersectional memberships of "local, ethnic, religious, national, regional,

transnational and international political communities” (p562). She further argues that people of ethnic minority are “affected by this multiplicity of citizenships even more than those of people who belong to hegemonic majorities” (p562).

In Nigeria, multiplicity of “citizenships” through the sub-group is a reality, and identity, while it is important, valid and even valuable, it should not subvert the catholic, pan-national identity. According to Abati, tied to that sense of each unique identity are other important items, such as “culture, relationship with other people, a sense of history, and values.” Obasanjo’s observation becomes relevant here, that, it is not being born an Igbo man or a Yoruba man or an Edo man that is the issue, “it’s how your ethnic identity is used against the nation or other ethnic groups that is the problem” (Obasanjo). In other words, distinctive identity must not become a vehicle of conflict and violence that is used as an oppressive instrument against other less powerful groups within the state.



## ***PART 2. NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION***

In Part Two of Chapter 7, I will discuss the findings earlier presented in Chapter 6, along the lines of the seven themes that emanated from the coding categories. These are: 1) The Newspapers, 2) The News Genres, 3) Illustrations of News Reports, 4) Direction of News Reports and Editorials, 5) Ethnic References, 6) Purpose of the Stories, and 7) Level of Objectivity.

### **7.7.0 THE NEWSPAPERS: THREE ERAS AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE PRESS**

The findings in the study showed that in structure and character, the Nigerian press has changed over the period of the study. However, in motivation and purpose, the consequence of elites ownership stronghold of the press has not changed. Combative ethnocentric promotional language of the early 1960s has given way to a subtler and more restrained approach; without given up on the broad ethnocentric objectives or missions.

A closer look at the research period (1959-2011), highlights three eras of newspaper history, each era reflecting a different characteristic of the press. Political changes in each era affected the character of the press. The three post-colonial eras are: The (post-independent) political press of the First Republic; the military era press, and the post-military era press.

#### **7.7.1 The (post-colonial/independent) political press of the First Republic**

In this period, defined by the two elections of 1959 and 1964, virtually all the prominent newspapers were directly connected to the prominent political parties or personalities, as well as bearing strong ethnic affinity. Many influential journalists of this period were ideologues and disciples of the parties their newspapers represented. They were not paid hacks; as such, they were able to represent the ideological positions of the political parties without undue apologies. Bombastic language use was common; they were not shy to be abusive if they thought insults

were called for; they wrote whatever they thought was necessary to mobilise the troupe behind the party's cause. As extensions and mouthpieces of the respective political parties, they were able to cast headlines with little professional subtleties. Here are a few examples like:

- “Balewa is now touring with thugs.” *Tribune*, November 17, 1959 FP.
- “Movement of AG Hooligans.” *Pilot*, November 24, 1959.
- “To Vote NCNC is to Vote for Slavery.” *Tribune*, December 1, 1959.
- “To the NPC, We Are But Dogs.” *Tribune*, December 10, 1959.
- “Dr Azikiwe Must Resign – Let Heavens Fall.” *Citizen Ed.*, March 10, 1964.

This navel string tie of politicians with journalists is indicative of the relationship the journalist had with politician, a carry-over from the nationalist era when they fought side-by-side to end colonial rule.

### 7.7.2 The Military Era Press

The years after the Civil War, from 1970s into 1990s marked a significant period in which the military state invested huge sums of money in the media business, the newspaper-press inclusive. It also marked a shift in the profession of journalism, as government employed a majority of working journalists in one capacity or another. Establishment of (none overtly political) private media houses began with the founding of the *Punch*, the *Guardian* and numerous weekly news magazines in the late 1970s and 1980s, but they were few and mostly urban-based. The period produced a mass of acquiescent ‘public sector’ journalists, but also, more importantly, an effective group of subversive guerrilla journalists, led by weekly news magazines that fought the military establishment like caged lions. However, state-owned media dominated the era, in which the military legislated harmony and unity producing inorganic and forced unanimity among political parties; and tepid, truce-seeking headlines like:

- “Talks On Alliance Flopped, Says Azikiwe” *Daily Times*, August 4, 1979 FP.
- “No One Will Step Down – Waziri” with a rider: “No Accord Yet, Says, Awo” *Daily Times*, July 31, 1979 FP.

Though government-controlled, many newspapers still managed to reflect, advocate or defend primary ethnic and regional interests. The era produced careful ethnic or personality-laced front-page headlines like these:

- “I Can’t Step Down For Shagari – Azikiwe” *Daily Times*, August 8, 1979.
- “Do Not Threaten Nigeria’s Existence” *The New Nigerian*, July 15, 1983.
- “My Victory Ends Tribal Politics – President Shagari *New Nigerian*, August 12, 1983.
- “Give Peace a Chance” *Daily Times* Ed., August 10, 1983.

During this period, the press was indeed a tool in the control of government but, gradually, private, non-political papers began to be more assertive.

### 7.7.3 The Post-military Press

By 1999, most state-owned newspapers were spent, perhaps occasioned by excessive demand by officials of state for journalists to be everything else except journalists. State-owned papers appeared at newsstands less regularly and their content was almost irrelevant. More private independent newspapers stepped into the vacuum. While none was owned outrightly by any political party as in the first era, ownership of quite a few had their fortunes tied directly to some political interests, or individuals who were party bigwigs. The headlines were not as combative or as docile as the two previous eras.

- “I Was Betrayed Like Awo...Ige Speaks on Falae’s Nomination.” *The Punch*, February 15, 1999.
- “We’ve Been Cheated – Yoruba Leaders” *The Punch*, February 19, 1999.
- “Accept Poll Results...Yoruba *Parapo* tells Falae” *The Punch*, March 3, 1999.
- “Jonathan: I’m in Best Position to fix Nigeria” *ThisDay*, March 27, 2011.
- “Lamido: Northerners Have Voted against Sectionalism.” *ThisDay*, April 12, 2011.
- “ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP” *ThisDay*, April 18, 2011.

Some other newspapers of the era went to bed with who ever paid the bidding price: peddling influence became normal business but still keen on defending sectarian and

ethnic nationality interests. Odiya Ofeimun labelled the press of the period, “contractor press” and Utomi referred to some of them as “brokers” and “contractors of influence”. For the most part, many of them could be described as ethnic, but pragmatists, nonetheless.

### 7.8.0 GENRE: NEWSPAPER AS WEAPON OF WAR

The study found that newspaper editorials and front-page news stories were heavily used to support party politics. The voice of the press was viewed as a required necessity to advocate political positions. Obviously, politicians place a high premium on the power of the press to extend their voice and ideas and to help magnify their public image in order to influence the electorate. The press is also viewed as a suitable weapon for wounding an opponent that could be an opposing political party, a fellow politician, or the ‘other’ ethnic group.

Below are two examples of editorials: one from 1959, the other from 2011. Editorials are the voice of the newspapers; they express the ideological position of the paper and the stand of the paper on a given issue. The two papers are privately-owned papers, one was more manifest in party politics; their use of language, approach, and tone were different, but their stout defence of ethno-regional interest was not disguised. (Note that the *Nigerian Tribune* is a southern newspaper, critical of a northern political party, the NPC; while the *Daily Trust* is a northern newspaper, critical of a southern presidential candidate, Goodluck Jonathan).

“NPC Malady” *Nigerian Tribune*, November 17, 1959 Front Page Ed.

The present behaviour of the NPC party in Nigerian politics could be likened to the cowardly resort of a boxer who has been trying to fight gamely for sometime, but suddenly sensing defeat takes to scooping up dust and throwing it in the other man’s eyes hoping to win the fight by launching fresh attack with his teeth while the other man is temporarily blinded.”

“Jonathan’s Challenge”, *Daily Trust* Editorial, April 27, 2011.

In times like these when the chasms in our ethnic, religious and regional fault lines seem to have been deepened by the acrimony that attended, first the PDP's primaries and then the violence that followed the outcome of the presidential election in many Northern states, the president is expected to be more measured in his public utterances. For instance, while the post-election violence in some states in Northern Nigeria is condemnable, it was an error of judgment on the part of the president to have likened it to the circumstances that led to the civil war. Such analogies can also worsen the regional, ethnic, and religious dimensions of the crisis (p36).

The results also firmly demonstrate the grip of ownership to strongly push the ethnic card, whether that ownership stock is state-owned (under the military or civilian) or privately-held. Virtually all the privately-owned papers endorsed and supported candidates who shared regional or ethnic affinity with paper ownership.

#### **7.9.0 ILLUSTRATIONS OF (FRONT-PAGE) NEWS REPORTS: MOVE FROM (ELITIST) TEXTUAL DOMINANCE**

The findings revealed an attempt by newspapers to gradually move away from heavy dependence on textual materials, and use photos and other forms of illustrations in front page news stories. This shift, though gradual, is significant in the sense that the dependence on text in the early period further attests to the fact that the main audience of newspapers was still largely urban and elitist in orientation.

With time, several factors forced newspapers to seek a bigger market, a larger reading audience: a) new titles like the *Punch*, *National Concord* and the *Guardian*, entered the newspaper market. The new entries were more profit-oriented, they needed more mass readership to break even, unlike government or party-supported newspapers; b) technology made it easier to use photos and other illustrations to tell stories. Up until 1992, colour photography was not in use in newspapers. The *Sunray* weekly newspaper in June of 1992 became the first newspaper publication to introduce colour prints in newspaper business in Nigeria (Anim, 2006); c) competition from television meant that the newspaper-press no longer had exclusive monopoly on media audience – this made it necessary for newspapers to also *show*, and not just *tell*.

In spite of the drive to be increasingly populist and grow circulation figures, the newspaper-press still remained largely urban and elitist in orientation.

### **7.10.0 DIRECTION OF NEWS REPORTS OR EDITORIALS: ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND DIVISIVENESS, A CONSTANT.**

The findings showed that the direction of news reports and editorials, as revealed by tone and language choice, remained consistently divisive. News treatment over the period also showed a changing trend – an observable toning down in the use of caustic language; however, the pursuit of the goal to promote ethno-regional interest was not in any significant way diminished.

Stories were hyped to give a positive twist about favoured party, candidate, or party members. On the other hand selected news items about the opposition party and their candidates were hardly ever positive, or even neutral, but mostly negative stories. Occasionally, whenever there occurs a dip in the number of negative stories, (from 82.7% in 1964 to 58.5% in 1979) it is usually indicative of a strong election umpire threatening fire and brimstone as it was in the case of the 1979 elections. The military in government then, mounted steady pressure on the press to keep divisive stories out of the press, which by 1979, were mainly state-owned.

Another significant trend in the study is that consolidation elections (1964/65, 1983, and 2011), raked up the highest points in negative and divisive stories, in terms of ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages. A key point to note is that they were each followed by a period of bloody political crisis. The aftermath of unrest and mayhem of the 1964 elections directly led to the Civil War; the 1983 winners were overthrown in a military coup within three months of being in office; and the aftermath of the 2011 elections was a series of bloody clashes, which have tagged the year's election now the bloodiest in Nigeria's history.

- “Only AG Can do the Job” *Nigerian Tribune*, December 1, 1959.
- “A Program of lies (2)” *Nigerian Tribune*, December 2, 1959 FP Ed.
- “Why You Must Reject AG 24” *West African Pilot*, December 1, 1959.

- “Police Round Up AG Top Men For Alleged Fraud” *West African Pilot*, 04/12/1959 FP.

Contrast the above front-page headlines with election period headers during the highly controlled press of the military era (1979), which was also carried over to the Second Republic (1983).

- “Join Hands To Build A United Nigeria – Shagari” *The New Nigerian*, December 18, 1979.
- “Do Not Threaten Nigeria’s Existence” *The New Nigerian*, August 15, 1983 FP.
- “Give Peace a Chance” *Daily Times*, August 10, 1983 FP Ed.

During the third era, (which includes 1999 & 2011) the press had been delivered from the military, but it was neither fully professional nor totally delivered from strong ethnic and regional political interests; see below:

- “We’ve Been Cheated – Yoruba Leaders” *The Punch*, February 19, 1999 FP.
- “ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP” *ThisDay*, April 18, 2011 FP.
- Sule Lamido, “Lamido: Northerners Have Voted Against Sectionalism,” *ThisDay*, April 12, 2011.

### **7.11.0 ETHNIC REFERENCES IN THE PRESS: THE ETHNIC CARD LOOMS LARGE**

From the findings, election news stories about ethnic minority groups spiked in 2011 at 54.3%. Up until then, news reports on minority ethnic groups were marginal; the three major ethnic groups dominated election news stories. However in 2011, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, a minority from the Niger Delta Region, was propelled by circumstances to run for the office, supported by a loose coalition of southern minority ethnic groups. In the background, the three leading ethnic groups jostled for position of kingmaker or chief spoiler. (A point to note: ethnically neutral stories got the lion share of stories during most elections. This could be misleading, but it should not come as a surprise; numerous government information service stories designed to educate people, got front-page placements).

Interestingly, after Jonathan won the election, dominant Northern and Western regions felt a need to explain how or why this ‘unusual’ candidate won. Sule Lamido, Governor of northern state of Jigawa put a spin on the election result:

“Northerners Have Voted Against Sectionalism  
- Lamido.” ThisDay, April 12, 2011.

And a few days later, the Western Region dominated ACN party felt a need to explain why the region voted in the way it voted:

“ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP”.  
ThisDay, April 18, 2011.

These headlines and news reports betrayed the fact that political elites in the majority ethnic groups felt they had made a big concession by allowing an ethnic minority candidate to run and win. These reports, among others, helped to unveil the trend of elite consensus and recruitment that had been prevalent in Nigerian politics from time.

### 7.11.1 Elite Consensus and Recruitment

The election year of 1999 was unusual but significantly interesting. For the first time an electoral gladiatorial fight became non-ethnic, but intra-ethnic, inter party and personality centred. The two leading candidates of the two leading parties – Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (former Military Head of State, 1976-1979) for Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Chief Olu Falae for Alliance for Democracy (AD), were both of the Yoruba ethnic group, as a result, inter-ethnic conflicts were rested for the season. The military and political elites reached a consensus that the candidate for the 1999 election should come from the South Western Yoruba Region; they also determined who the candidate should be, in the person of Obasanjo. And he won.

This trend of elite consensus and recruitment, with active support of the press, the study found is consistent with every transition election since 1959, when the British more or less hand-picked NPC and Balewa; in 1979, the military, led by then General Olusegun Obasanjo, determined to hand power to the northern dominated National



Party of Nigeria (NPN). On the 1979 elections I had the following exchange with Chief Obasanjo:

**Richard Ikiebe:** So why did you decide to hand power to a particular part of the country after you in 1979?

**Chief Olusegun Obasanjo:** No, not a particular part of the country, a particular individual.

**Ikiebe:** Really?

**Obasanjo:** Come of it. A particular individual!

**Ikiebe:** And why was that...?

**Obasanjo:** Because I looked at the individuals that came up as candidates, and from their backgrounds that I knew, and all of what I saw...

**Ikiebe:** Looking back do you think that view was justified?

**Obasanjo:** Absolutely!

**Ikiebe:** But his government didn't last...

**Obasanjo:** Well, the fact that he didn't last does not mean that the view was not justified; the fact that he did not last did not mean that I did not give good account... alright?

Examples of elite recruitment and consensus candidates are common occurrences in Nigeria's negotiated democracy, where election rituals results matter little. The election processes and the press helped to make everything look legitimate, normal, acceptable, and respectable. In 1999, the two Yoruba candidates were imposed; the difference is that one was an imposition by the serving and retired military oligarchy, while the other was imposed on his party's elite, both voiding true and essential internal party and national democratic processes.

### **7.12.0 PURPOSE OF THE STORIES: ETHNIC FAULT LINES IN BARE-KNUCKLE ELECTIONS**

Consistently, findings show that elections were fought bitterly along regional and ethnic fault-lines; they represented bare-knuckle dogfights, with overriding need to

castigate and bring others into public ridicule and disrepute. Even in 1979, with strong military oversight, divisive stories of castigation still commanded over a quarter of election stories. As a direct consequence, violence attended most elections.

The scorecards for the 1964 and 2011 elections mudslinging campaigns produced two of the lowest needs to ‘persuade’ anyone; stories with castigation intent were at their highest. The candidature of Goodluck Jonathan, in particular, was strongly detested by a strong component of Northern elite, but supported across party by southern politicians.

These findings also highlighted a key problem with consolidation elections, where the need to retain power by all means often collided with the drive to gain power by means fair and foul.

### 7.13.0 OBJECTIVITY: WHERE SUBJECTIVITY RULES

The findings produced a pattern to indicate that in national elections since 1959, the press was mostly subjective. The closest the press came to achieving a high rating in objectivity was 1979, when the military, through exacting ownership control, regulations, as well as threats and intimidation, kept a lid on vitriolic political disputations and on the types of stories the newspapers could report. Objectivity, which includes fairness in reporting, adequately representing all the parties, and shades of opinion as reasonably possible, was difficult for most papers as they were aligned very closely to political parties. And in the latter years when most papers had decoupled themselves from political parties’ apron strings, cash-and-carry politics did not allow objectivity to thrive.

With headlines like these:

- “To vote NCNC is to vote slavery” *Nigerian Tribune* December 1, 1959
- “Police Round up AG top men for Alleged Fraud” *West African Pilot* December 4, 1959
- “Enemies of Unity” a Front page editorial by *Nigerian Citizen* March 10, 1964

- “Yorubas Now Stink: SLA Prostrated to The IBOS?” *Nigerian Tribune* December 28, 1964

The findings indicate that press almost always took sides, which, perhaps, is related to ownership's interests. What the findings reflect is ownership ties between papers' newsrooms, and the ethnicised political parties. During election seasons, all pretences to objectivity seem to be suspended. One observable trait is that there are more proclivities for subjectivity in the dynamics of consolidation election.

### 7.14.0 PART THREE

From the discussions so far in the first two parts of this chapter, the following deductions and their implications can be safely made:

#### 7.14.1 Contextualising Colonialism

- That while it may be an inadequate (or lazy) argument to heap all culpabilities for the current woes of Nigeria on the colonial (or even the military rulers for that matter), the reality of the consequences of the foundation laid by colonial rulers cannot be dismissed perfunctorily. It is crucial to establish these as important causal factors that form essential parts of the genesis of the larger Nigerian social-political definition.
- That colonialism is a historical reality, and the essential sponsor of postcolonialism; searching either for clues must be elevated above a fault-finding scheme, or a mere search for whom to blame. The interrogation of history should be about finding solutions, and about understanding the magnitude and complexity of a problem, which begins with a clear appreciation for the origins of the problem.
- That colonialism remains the enduring burden of a post-colonial state. The political elites that inherited governance from the colonial rulers were inexperienced and ill prepared for democratic government in general, and federalism in particular. For many, democracy was a process of getting elected into office; thereafter, one did as he pleased, with minimal democratic procedural signposts here and there. As a result, they were imperceptive of the need to, and ignorant about how to dismantle the colonial apparatus; they used the system that birthed the suffocating post-colonial conditions and its mind-set to run the alien parliamentary system, without thinking.

#### 7.14.2 Ideology and Values

- That an ideological vacuum occasioned by an absence of a national value orientation exists. Common values and nation-specific ideology based on

communal experience are essential navigational components that enable all members of the imagined nation-state to pull in the same general direction.

- That to be driven by, and allow matters to be determined solely on ethno – regional ideological basis precludes the considerations of *other* - inclusive national discourse. A value-free society is a potential recipe for an all-comer dumping ground for all kinds of values and ideologies.
- Evolve organically and codified OR formally discussed and enshrined in the nation’s statute book i.e. constitution.

### 7.14.3 The Nation-State and the Press

- That the press cannot be expected to be homogeneous in a non-homogeneous, multi-ethnic society, or be faithful to a non-existent ideology or poorly defined national goals. The role of the press is to report and mirror society back to itself in an unfettered and open village-square dialogue of all to all. To demand a single and unified voice on all matters under present circumstances is a call for uniformity of position that can only be achieved under an authoritarian system.
- That in spite of ownership exaction, economic pressure, or government intimidation, the press has, on balance, managed tension between several interest groups and that of the nation. Thus, though lacking in the guidance that central national values orientation could have provided, the press has provided a national platform for exchange of ideas, within the boundaries of an ill defined, or an unstructured political culture.
- That the press operates a Martian media model blindly imitative of alien press systems, without the barest local makeover. The consequence is that the adopted structures and processes have neither roots in the community, nor relevance in the society, with many protocols, practices, and conventions that are mostly bereft of meaning to the people. It is not a wonder, therefore, that no Nigerian daily newspaper (daily or weekly) can openly state its circulation figures without feeling embarrassed in a nation of an estimated 180 million people.
- That the failure of the press to genuinely decouple itself from the political elite indeed made transparent in participatory democratisation difficult. The Nigerian press became a “vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes,

ideologies, and orthodoxies... that blunt critical awareness” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p2). The press, according to Olatunji Dare, “operated primarily to strengthen the grip of (political) leaders over their followers, and thereby the fragmentation of the country” (2000, p. 15).

#### **7.14.4 The Captured Media or Owned Press is a Weaponised Battle-Axe**

- That the newspaper-press is weaponised; a battle-axe to fight in elites’ inter-ethnic wars, in equal measure the same way they used the instrument of ethnicity to advance their political power-grabbing objective.
- That the press is a victim, often misused by the political elite. It lost its effectiveness and power to cause change when it became as polarised and as divided along the same political and ethnic fault lines that divided the politicians and the nation.
- That the coalition of convenience between press and political elite in the pursuit of non-integrative ethno-cultural interests produced a detrimental political culture, serving the mainly parochial, and often personal purpose of the political elite.
- That journalists are under the illusion that they operate a libertarian press system when in fact they have been firmly captured – knowingly or unknowingly by state or private authoritarian ownership system. A newspaper bears the image of its paymaster, (ruling/government, political or economic elite) no matter how heavily disguised (One sign of capture is the glaring absence of investigative stories in a state rife with stories of power abuse waiting to be told)
- That an owner will always have more power to overrule the journalist’s professional judgement, even when such controls are not often exercised. Support for ownership’s ethno-regional interests, economic interests, or political cause is expected, even when such support is not overtly demanded.

### 7.14.5 Elites and Elite Politics

- That the Nigerian press is urban-based and produced for the elite. It is elite-inspired in its orientation, and elite-driven in character and performance, as the journalist is a strong member of the elite class. This accounts for the low circulation, its choice of language and location.
- That the elite intra and inter-ethnic consensus and recruitment of political office candidates have proved more important than the actual electoral process of casting votes; this is explained by the godfather syndrome.
- That the power and control over an ethnic or regional group is a negotiative currency that is worth its political weight in gold. And equally that a newspaper platform is a mobilising tool like no other.
- That while research attention may have been given to elite manipulation of ethnic affiliations to enhance and advance political careers and personal livelihoods rather than nation-building, not as much research attention has been accorded to the fact that the newspaper-press in particular, and the media in general were also victims of the elite manipulations.
- That the newspaper-press was a formidable weapon of offence and defence; an indispensable tool for ethnic mobilisation; and vocal instrument of negotiating the treacherous political terrain.

### 7.14.6 Belonging

- That the crisis of identity created by the need to choose between the grand nation and the ethnic nationality is an elite construct to force differentiations between ‘us’ and ‘them’. That disputes over loyalty to the nation or the ethnic groups need not exist, as loyalty to both can co-exist. This point is proved by Aimufua who avers “the press that is sectional and able to represent nationality perspectives, can indeed still promote a sense of national identity amongst different groups within any socio-political context” (Aimufua, 2007, pp301–302).
- That while ownership types, structures, and tones of some newspapers may have changed, ethno-regional agenda of the political elite has remained constant and consistent throughout the period of the study, even in the eras when papers are no longer overtly owned by the politically partisan.





## 7.15.0 PART FOUR

### *Findings from the Research Questions*

Having discussed the thematic findings to give robustness to the outcomes of the study in the last section, I shall now proceed further to the findings as presented in Chapter 5 to discuss more directly and specifically, the findings in relation to the study research questions. This study was designed to investigate what contributions the press has made (outside the commonly acknowledged agitative nationalist role) to the forging of culturally divergent multi-ethnic nationalities, into the post-colonial, democratic Nigerian state.

My quest was to better understand the contribution of the press in the promotion of identity and *belonging* or inclusion in the multi-ethnic commonwealth of Nigeria. As stated in Chapters 1 and 4, the study was conducted under four composite research questions, which provided framework for investigation into the subject matter as follows. A discussion of the findings against each of the question follows after.

1. Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity?
2. Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in "the search to belong"?
3. Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?
4. Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?

### 7.15.1 Research Question 1:

#### ***Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity?***

The evidence and findings from the presented data demonstrated that the press did help to define and shape ethnic/tribal identities, but this is not a claim the press can make directly, or boast about because the press on its own did not will it, the press

was a tool, a weapon in the hands of owners of the press, whether state-owned under military or civilian government, or privately held by political elite. The views among the interview participants (with varying degrees of emphasis on different touch points) indicate that the press has helped to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity. The direct effect of reportage and commentary, if any, was minimal among the mass of Nigerians, but was magnified among the elites. Consequently the press mainly reflects Nigeria's political culture, as constructed by the political elite.

### 7.15.2 Research Question 2:

***Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”?***

The study found that press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflected or affected the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in the search to belong. Despite the mostly across the board agreement, on the main proposition, different reasons were adduced on why election reportage mirrors ethnic cleavages and identities.

### 7.15.3 Research Question 3:

***Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?***

The surprising consensus of the interview participants was that the press and political elites exploited their positions to foster ethnicisation of electoral politics. This finding confirmed earlier studies (Nnoli, 2003, Osaghae, 2006) that ethnicisation is a basic political currency required at the entry point. Tony Momoh was emphatic, that the elite did not just foster ethnicisation of politics, “They caused it!” he said. The surprising thing about this finding is that they were all members of the elite class.

#### 7.15.4 Research Question 4:

***Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?***

The findings from this question state that the press is not a lone ranger; it acts in concert with other institutions of the society to effect any change. The findings also highlight the power of ownership, whether state-owned or private, the effect is the same; ownership interests often override the professional judgement of the journalists. That said, it must be borne in mind that the press is not a unipolar institution. Cole considers it dangerous to even contemplate its role in that manner. Even when the press raises uncomfortable questions, it is in the nature of the press to do so...those uncomfortable questions eventually serve the overall interest of the nation.

#### 7.15.5 Conclusion: Single vs. Multiple Citizenships

Overall, this study has found that in the period of focus (1959-2011), there was a resurgence of elite-driven, ethnic-based identity politics, due to the failure of, what Nyamnjuh called, “a single political and legal citizenship” to take root after so many decades of independence (Nyamnjuh, 2005, p19). Nyamnjuh’s implied position is that a single citizenship is preferred, but contrary to this view, the study found that there are, in reality, layers of overlapping citizenships. In plural, multi-ethnic intersections of any imagined post-colonial nation-state, insistence on a single political citizenship would be hard to realise, and perhaps harmful, as it has been in Nigeria. For most people, there are other legitimate identities outside that of the new state.

What the insistence on a single legal citizenship does is to cast identity or belonging as a single item issue, which further intensifies the passion in the competition for that single space. The study found that if values are streamlined, and used to design a common ideological roadmap, the toxic tension between a single political citizenship and other variants of multiple citizenships would cease to exist, or to matter, and the need to explain other expressions of identity would cease.

In addition, the study found that the thick clouds of ethno-centric political culture that have enfolded the land were not the sole making of the press, but rather the disguised hand of the elites bearing the false hand of the press, which, as a dutiful messenger, merely proclaims the paymaster's wishes.

The study also found that the press and politicians have been willing bed mates from time; both are beneficiaries, though unequal partners. At the beginning of their collaboration (1959-1966), they both believed in the ethno-regional cause, the press requiring no extra inducement, matching the politicians' zeal as ideologues. Later (1967-1998) the role changed, the press became, not entirely an unwilling collaborator, facilitating the legitimisation of military rule, and latterly a rebel against the same military. The last stage (1999 - date) is the era when the press learned how to commodify its position and the platforms, the era of commercialisation of media access and profit from influence.

## CHAPTER 8

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*“There is no peaceful way out of anybody getting out of Nigeria, Nigerians must find a peaceful way of living together”.*

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo

### 8.1.0 INTRODUCTION

When I set out on this quest, the objective was to unravel the role of the press in the politics of identity and belonging, in the tottering, post-colonial, multi-ethnic Nigerian nation-state. In this chapter, I try to outline the summary of the work, how it was executed, and its main findings as well as draw some conclusions while pointing out areas where future work needs to be done.

The study itself mainly focused on the trifocal nature of the nation-building relationships between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging. In looking at identity politics in the unique ethno-regional federation of Nigeria, contentions over fairness and equity, if not equality and size, are central to understanding election politics, and the dependency on ethnicity as an ideology, and as a strategic inter-ethnic negotiation tool. According to Osaghae (2006) “historical inequalities and imbalances... have historically fed ethnic mobilisation in adversarial characterisation” (p17).

It was Ernest Renan, who in 1882, according to Ernest Gellner, stated that nations are made by human will. Gellner (1987) used Renan’s claim to further his own argument in order to “deny any naturalistic determinism of the boundaries of nations” (p8). While not entirely discarding the role of language, geography, race, and religion in nations creation or formation, Gellner’s own position is that it takes a more purposeful determination on the part of any nation’s founding fathers to deliberately create what is imagined into an entity called a nation (cited in Martin Thom, 1990, p.23). If, indeed, Renan is right that nations’ creation resides with the will of the founding nationalists, it then means that perhaps, it is in purposeful deterministic approach to a nation’s construct, that Nigeria was most short-change.

### **8.1.1 The Press in the Construct of Realities in a Post-colonial State**

In Chapter 3 I established the notion that a paradigm is a construct, and that a construct is relative to a given situation or location. The question then arises, how does the press simultaneously participate in the construct of dual or multiple identities (ethnic, religious, as well as national all at the same time) in a post-colonial state? What this study found is that the role of the press has become rather complicated since a newspaper must report, reflect, and comment on everyday realities within its readership community. This poses an ontological dilemma for the press more so in situations where inter-ethnic political relationships are toxic.

It is important to restate that in order to form historic and contextual perspectives, the study re-examined colonialism, and post-colonialism theories, among others, to help to explain and provide understanding for sequencing past events and their consequences on present events. Therefore, central to this study as backgrounds are some significant political actors, historical events, and factors that led to the creation of Nigeria. In the context, therefore, colonialism served as a backgrounding concept, while post-colonialism becomes the new reality immersed in fixtures of perennial ethnic tensions and conflicts, as a result of the former. The objective was not to blame the past, but to explore additional clues as to how the nation has arrived where it is.

### **8.2.0 WHAT THE STUDY SET OUT TO DO AND WHAT WAS DONE**

All theories are underpinned by defined philosophical paradigms. To provide an appropriate setting for the study I first explored and established its ontological and epistemological contexts; I then engaged in a theoretical and methodological review to provide a basis for the construction of conceptual understanding to develop a foundation that would sustain the work. In this context I examined the pros and cons of wholesale transferrals of Western political thought on democracy and press models. Several researchers have, in the past, advocated the urgent need to counter Euro-centrism in African academia by probing the motivation, methods, and audience for the production of knowledge (Eshun, Zakaria and Segbefia, 2015).

Noting that academia in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa is not immune to post-colonial academic propensity for mimicry, the study found that the same scale of measurement cannot be applied in two situations with dissimilar histories and realities. For this reason, application of theories cannot be done indiscriminately, but contextually with a situational sensitivity. According to Okigbo (1987), a philosophy must impact significantly on people's lives. And in order to do so, the people's experiences and reality must count, and significantly too.

In this respect, I examined a collage of theoretical perspectives, works that I regarded as germane to the research: for example, the idea of new state formation in a multi-cultural setting within a post-colonial environment. I also examined an array of conceptual perspectives on nations and nation-states, nationalism and ethnicity, elites, the press, and elections research - to provide an overview and understanding. What became clear is that conceptual understanding and practice, African and Nigerian democracy is essentially an event not a goal-oriented process engaged to achieve certain beneficial objectives for the entire nation. A type of nominal electoral democracy which some have called pseudo-democracy.

Also, the heart of the work are concepts of the press in society and politics, which provided the scope on which to sufficiently investigate electoral democracy. In this respect, the study looked at issues emanating from the incursion of the military into politics, press ownership and control, and how long military rule has redefined both press and politics. In focusing on issues of election/democracy in post-military states, and military authoritarianism, what the study found is instability, perpetual conflict, and political unrest; all arising from different notions of power, politics, and relations. Essentially, military governance culture is about conquering, command, and control, not inclusion, an essential element of democracy. As a result even civilian administrations have adopted military authoritarianism with its forced harmony and order, two concepts that are strangers to genuine democracy.

Within the scope of politics and media, the study pulls in the works by Chantal Mouffe on agonistic pluralism conceived from the position that society by nature is inherently conflictual. Mouffe acknowledges that it is impossible to eradicate antagonistic politics, but that it can be significantly mitigated by agonistic approach

– a process of open and continuous mediation. However, the military’s understanding of “opposition politics” is beyond mere disagreement on issues. In 1975 as explained in Chapter 3, General Obasanjo as military head of state strongly believed that under the parliamentary system, *opposition politics* was nothing short of a call to arms for political parties who regarded each other as *enemies* that needed to be “crushed”. This mind-set is what makes agonism particularly attractive and relevant to the African and Nigerian situations; it provides a practical and functional framework for legitimising confrontations without drawing blood in an open forum. Mouffe, though essentially Western and Eurocentric in her work, seems to understand the problems of Africa, for according to her,

the conditions existing in many African countries are the consequence of the inadequate political system that was bequeathed to them by their former colonizers. Often, independence left them not as stable national states, but as a patchwork of ethnic fiefdoms, burdened with parliaments based on those of the former colonial power. In countries with so many ethnicities, languages, customs and cultures, multi-party democracy has led to fragmentation and bitterly divided politics (Mouffe, 2013, pp38-39).

African states need to re-confront and reconsider postcolonialism with a fresh mind-set. Rather than point accusing fingers at the past as scapegoats for the failure of the present, the past must be confronted to give us the liberty to dismantle the mind-set and excuses prone, blame opportunity and fault-finding.

### **8.2.1 Methodology and Research Design**

I began by providing a foreground on the choice of methods with an examination of the peculiarities of the African research cosmos. The study discussed the mixed methods choices of semi-structured, elite in-depth interviews; and content analysis, both of which I found most suited for meeting the objective requirements of the research. Equally, I found the two methods most suitable to drive the process of data collection, organisation, and analysis. In-depth elite interviews were conducted with 22 key personalities in politics, academia, and the press; selected nine newspaper publications during election periods of the study were content analysed.



### 8.3.0 FINDINGS

Findings of this study were discussed in the last chapter. However, it is important to highlight some key findings, which may not have been exhaustively discussed.

#### 8.3.1 Appearance of, and the Sameness of Change

As far as the interrelationships between the press, politics, and belonging are concerned, nothing has substantially changed in over half a century on how the press represents and presents ethnic issues. And particularly, ethnic issues have become more complex, their militia have multiplied and have become more violent. Splinter ethnic groups have increased, become bolder and more vocal, leaving big old ethnic groups more segregated.

After barely 5 years of independence in 1965, the *Nigerian Tribune* in an editorial wrote that,

The country's press, unfortunately and inexplicably too, have pitched up their tents with this or that tribal war crier. Principle of national unity has been sacrificed on the altar of petty tribal gods (*The Nigerian Tribune*, 1965, p1).

More than 50 years after the editorial, this study affirms that not much has changed. Osaghae and Agbaje, among other scholars, attest that Nigeria may actually be worse off than it was in 1959. Osaghae, however, notes that though press is still openly and politically partisan, it is also “still conscious of its national role as a civil society constituent”. This paradox runs through the study revealing the complexity of the Nigerian situation. Agbaje is not surprised that the newspaper press became an important political partisan element. He avers that it was in the nature of multi-party political systems for the newspaper-press

at one point or another to affect and reflect partisan considerations, [however] what jeopardises such a political system... is when the pursuit of partisan considerations becomes, for the press, the *raison d'etre*” (Agbaje, 1990, p224).

As long as the press is unable to uncouple itself from the political elite, and regards its main reason for being the service to politics, so long does the jeopardy remain. As noted in the beginning chapter, the situation has reduced the press to “a vehicle for uncritical assumptions...that blunt critical awareness and make participatory democratisation difficult” (Nyamnjoh, 2005 p2). The study shows that elite owners, who have strong ethnic, regional or political affiliation, almost exclusively manipulate the press.

Regarding this finding, it is important to highlight Colin Sparks’ (2007) position that some may not be sufficiently “sensitive to the nature of the pressures and constraints on news production arising from the economic and political realities of capitalist democracy” (p68). According to him, most ordinary journalists are not necessarily willing collaborators or allies with the elites; rather, they remain “potentially allies of those who wish to build a different and better world” (p68). He submits that most behind the scene contestations between owners and journalists remain low-key newsroom disagreements until “times of intense class struggle (when) the social distance between the owners (and journalists) becomes an obvious, unbridgeable, social and political ‘chasm’” (p.83). Colin’s position is an important point, for indeed, there are many collaborative stories in the Nigerian newsroom experiences to prove it (Ikiebe, 2012).

### **8.3.2 The Press in an un-Imagined Ethno-Regional Federation**

According to Cooper (2002), the British designed ethno-regional federation had the perverse effect of encouraging first a winner-takes-all quest for electoral power *within* each of the three regions, and then competition *between* the regions for power at the federal level (p69).

Thus, the British institutionalised a type of nominal electoral democracy, where the structures of state were deliberately designed and tilted to serve the interests of some better than others. The balance of power between the three arms of government is an extension of a much more crucial equilibrium of power between the centre and the federating units.

The British did not make any pretensions to create, let alone preserve a balance of power. According to Lynn (2006), they were more worried about letting a particular section of the nation down. In the process, they contrived a power centre away from the federal centre around which they designed the rest of the nation to revolve. As with most things British, the ethno-regional creation (sired by veiled intentions and motives) was dubiously christened in familiar political labels and acceptable *federal* vestments.

The result is that virtually every election since 1959 has been carefully choreographed along ethno-regional lines by the leadership elites, and sold to the people through the press. Not many people dispute the success of the Nigerian press in the campaign against colonialism, authoritarian military, and autocratic politicians trying to bend the constitution to accommodate their unconstitutional ambition for a third term in office.

However, the tripartite relationships between press owners, journalists, and those in power have remained complex and defy easy explanations. The British, and later the political elite, created opportunistic structures that mostly favoured those already in the driver's seat, or those who had access to them. A key point this study also reveals is that the elites used the press, just as they used ethnicity, and every other means – foul or fair – to acquire, maintain, and retain power – nothing was too sacred; not even religion. Indeed, the study found uses of the press to be central to the elites' mobilisation agenda. This is not entirely a surprise since leading newspapers, from the early days, were purposefully established as political papers (Omu, 1978), and politics continues to serve as a strong motivation to own a newspaper even in these days.

### **8.3.3 A Homogeneous Press in a Pluralistic State**

The results of this study reveal that there are those who think that the role of the press is solely to unite the nation with a singularly homogeneous narrative. The group imagines that the press does the nation a disservice by taking any ethno-regional position on national issues. There is another group that thinks the press should be able to tell all the stories in the imagined community, so that the nation

can dialogue with itself. And then there is the group that imagines that the press ought to provide a value template upon which the ideological direction of Nigeria can be scripted and action taken, and monitored. For each of these positions, a strong case could be made; however, those who expect the press to be homogenous forget that the society itself is not homogenous. Homogeneity of voice defeats the spirit of dialogue and debate. Likewise, divergent voices do not necessarily imply disunity or divisiveness.

What these findings have revealed is that the press may not have adequately provided a supportive intellectual base for across ethnic-dialogues; rather, it has joined in the jingoism of the average politician. Thus, the press is perceived to have been divisive in the way it has lent voice to the elite as a tool to promote negative ethnic politics. It is therefore not surprising that the study found a consensus that the effects of the press have been material to the nation's present state. However, the point must still be made that it is difficult to measure or evaluate press performance in a heavily ethnicised pseudo-democracy.

### **8.3.4 Ethnicity, Elite, and the Politics of Belonging**

Elites' manipulation of ethnicity and deployment of the press to serve their parochial and partisan political interests are at the heart of this study, and this misuse of ethnicity is perhaps responsible for the uncontested negative perception that most people now have about ethnicity. Thus, to understand ethnicity, it is important to understand the role of the elite, hence one of the more popular "perspectives in the study of ethnicity is the elite perspective which posits that ethnicity is an ideology employed by the elites to further their constitutive interests" (Osaghae, 1991, p43).

The study found that, virtually all sectors have become tainted with negative perceptions about ethnicity and politics. The pestilential features of ethnicity, which have been on the display for far too long made it easy to see ethnicity as an obstruction to national unity. Thus tainted, the value of ethnicity in a federal system, as an asset or a resource, is lost. It is important nevertheless, to restate the fact that there are unharnessed, positive sides to the issues of ethnicity and belonging, particularly under a federal system of government. Ofeimun believes Nigerians have

been frightened into the view that ethnicity is dangerous to nation building; he does not see it as negative or evil. Under the right conditions, ethnic groups are assets, which cannot be dismantled since they form part of the existing national social-political fabric.

### **8.3.5 Consequences of Elites' Ethnicisation of Politics**

The study also found that consequences of ethnicisation are multitudinous, and that they account for the deep divisions and distrusts from which the nation suffers. (It is important to note that deliberate ethnicisation of politics is different from ethnic-based politics).

- Ethnicisation encourages elite consensus, a form of groupthink along with compromises that have produced for Nigeria, a non merit-based political system. The decision of who occupies a political office is taken from an ethnic point of view rather than in the national interest.
- Unequivocally, the study found that negative ethnicisation, as manipulated by the elites, has been detrimental to building a stable and united nation. Elections or appointments to official positions have become a non-competitive, non-competency driven regime in which virtually all positions are politically negotiated.
- Ethnic interests take precedence over national interests: as strong ethnic-politico base becomes a more valued political currency, it has become more needed for national leadership position, than requisite competencies and capabilities of the individual.
- Leadership wise, ethnicity has robbed Nigeria and national politics of the best and the brightest minds, since elite consensus invariably leads to elite recruitment of candidates into key elected and non-elected political positions, making democracy a deceptive cover for grand nepotism in which the press is a supportive apparatus used to manipulate ethnic sentiments. Power gained in this manner is used to advance group and personal interests; thus, it leads to the corruption of the system and of the individual.

## **8.4.0 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE**

### **8.4.1 Intersectional and Antipodal Forces on the Press**

One significant contribution to knowledge of this study is that the press is seldom driven by a single interest at any point in time, not even its own self-assigned nation-salvaging mission. Many interests – ownership, economic, ethnic, national, and of course, its own professional ethos – govern press pursuits. Despite the often critical appraisal of the Nigerian press, it must be acknowledged that press, has over the years succeeded in negotiating the tight ropewalk between, not two, but several antipodes – national, regional, ethnic, and professional; this relative or limited success has often been overlooked or undermined. The average journalist also is governed by his own multiple identities; for example, he has a professional identity, civic national identity, ethnic (or regional) identity, and in many cases, a religious identity. Whichever of these identities is strongest determines his worldview on given issues.

These factors, in different combinations, the study found, act in concert to make the press powerful or weak, effective or ineffective, a failure or a success. However, of these layers of intersections of contending interests, the elite ownership interest (with its wedded relationship with ethnicity and politics) has been most dominant. Being an intersectional institution itself, with many masters, the press has managed to maintain a minimal equilibrium. The nation consists of even more intersections and the press has been able to navigate these multiple intersects and maintain a sense of identity, even if blurred, for the imagined nation.

### **8.4.2 The Press and Ethnicity: Weaponised Products of the Elite**

This study also revealed that the press, as well as ethnicity, are products of the elite weaponisation in their quest for political power. The press is used, as the study indicates, to mobilise or manipulate ethnic groups for the purpose of politics. In past studies, rather little understanding is usually provided on the direct links between the press and ethnicity. What this study has done is to situate the press as the critical

legitimation, mobilisation, and propaganda arm of the elites in their opportunistic march towards their political power-grabbing objective. Indeed, according to Osaghae (1991), the unmobilised ethnic group is an ethnic group in hibernation (p45).

### **8.4.3 Contestable Press System**

Many take for granted that Nigeria has a press system; I used to think so also. But this study has brought home to me the fact that Nigeria may not have a home-grown functional press system, after all. What the nation appears to have is a system that mimics the liberal Western press, the tenets of which may not be fully applicable functionally in a place like Nigeria, because of the autocratic nature of governments and the overbearing influence of business elite on media income. This study showed the several contradictions that exist: for example, the press is mainly urban-based and monolingual, yet it regards itself to be populist, pursuing the interest of the common man; it is elite-controlled and in the pockets of big businesses, yet it perceives itself to be the freest crusading press in Africa; its values are Western and it claims to be liberal, yet it is obtuse in its pro-establishment stance. Anya sums it up, “We pretend that we are speaking for all; you cannot be speaking for people whose values you do not share” (Interviewed in Lagos).

### **8.4.4 The Press/Media as Thought Leaders**

One consistent contributive idea that permeated the study is the desirability of a guiding philosophy, or ideology, or a value bank from which the press and political elite can draw for common inspiration and guidance. The study demonstrated that when intellectual leadership is absent in any area, knowledge and idea production in that area become severely limited, shallow, and mostly self-serving. There is the notion that Nigerian intellectual elites, particularly in communication, may have failed to produce an ideological guide and thought-leadership, leadership in the sciences, in the arts, and in technology for the nation. According to the Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo, the intellectual elites have not lived up to expectations

(Interviewed in Abuja). Prof. Charles Okigbo made the same point in 1987, and advocated for an African communication philosophy that would aid,

systematic investigation of communication phenomena and situations in Africa. Without this important element, African communication research will continue to be mostly like shots in the dark. Sometimes we might hit the bull's eye, but we cannot know even when we do (p21).

## **8.5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH WORK**

### **8.5.1 Intellectual Elite Contribution to Knowledge Production**

There is the notion that Nigerian media and other intellectual elites, may have failed to contribute grounding knowledge ideas to form a basis for an ideological guide for the field, and for the nation. If Okigbo raised the matter 30 years ago, and it still maintains currency to this day such that the vice president flags it as a key deficiency, then it requires serious investigation.

### **8.5.2 The Press System**

When held against other media systems around the world, the media system in Nigeria presents a liberal façade under the clutches of one authoritarian regime or another. Just as every nation needs a guiding ideology, every nation's press system needs a guiding philosophy. The non-discriminatory adoption of other people's press philosophies and ideologies without thorough domestication makes them superficial and impracticable with a drastically reduced chance of having a meaningful impact.

As this study has revealed, if there is any philosophy now, it is in orientation clearly a pro-establishment elite press, geared towards providing service for the urban elite's political access and communication needs. The current system, therefore, needs a further and thorough investigation. It suffers from what may be considered as significant contradictions in how the press perceives itself and how others perceive it, particularly its owners, as against how it actually performs. These suppositions need further and more thorough investigations.



Also, as an inherited system, basically, with attendant post-colonial burdens in an ethno-regional federation, more work, preferably a policy change oriented research, is needed to: a) investigate what Nigeria's media and communication philosophy is, if it ever existed; b) define where we ought to be, need to be; c) investigate what needs to change from where it is now and why; and d) propose bold policy changes.

### **8.5.3 The Paymaster, the Piper, and the Tune**

The nature and character of the relationship between the pro-establishment elite press and their owners has featured prominently in this study. Whereas much research attention has been devoted to the dynamics of elite/ethnic group relationships (Nnoli, 2003, Mamdani, 2005, Osaghae, 2006, Kifordu, 2011, etc.), there has been no commensurate extensive research attention paid to similar trend of elites' manipulation of the press. Yet, as this study has shown, ownership interests (often politically aligned) remain a huge influence on the final decision on important stories in the newsroom. Clearly, elite media capture reflects in the paymaster/piper relationship between elite ownership and professional journalists. Apart from owners, another group that has significant influence over what gets published in the press is big businesses, particularly those in the financial industry, energy, and telecommunication. These 2 key areas of politics and commerce that have captured the media and press have escaped the scholarly searchlight of researchers commensurate with their level of influence and control.

### **8.5.4 Ethnicisation of Politics vs. Ethnic-based Politics**

This study has provided direct links between the press, the elite, and the success of ethnic politics. It has also hinted at differences between ethnicised politics and ethnic-based politics. The negativism that has long been associated with ethnicised politics has made it difficult to see the positives of ethnic-based politics. What the study has done is to highlight the fact that ethnic groups can become assets and resources as federated units to democratically move the nation forward. Thus, the study opens new ways to begin the investigation of ethnic-based politics as against ethnicised politics currently in practice.

There is therefore a strong need for such an investigative research: to re-evaluate “ethnicisation of politics” as different from “ethnic-based politics”. The subject matter could be explored from a comparative studies perspective, with nations like Ethiopia or Somalia where ethnic/clan-based politics has been institutionalised. The outcome of such a study will help to de-stigmatise ethnicity and engage the press in the mission to de-contaminate ethnicity from partisan politics.

## **8.6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **8.6.1 Constructing a Unified National Identity**

Augustus Adebayo (1986) was the regional head of the civil service in the old Western Region during the First Republic. He tells the story of a firsthand experience at a cabinet meeting in the First Republic to illustrate inter-regional antipathy and antagonism: During one cabinet meeting in 1964, the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, presented a memo proposing the location of an iron and steel industry somewhere in his home region of the North. A prolonged and heated debate ensued: each region presented a strong argument to justify why the industry ought to be sited in their respective territories. After a long acrimonious debate Balewa withdrew the memo. Adebayo’s telling observation: “Members who a moment ago were at daggers drawn, sat back with a look of satisfaction, everyone beaming with smiles” (Adebayo, 1986, p45). Nothing was ever heard of the project again until the Military took over power.

For democracy to succeed, several factors need to align. What has become plain in this study is that the form of democracy currently practised in Nigeria and most other African nations has lacked alignment of key factors, no roots in the culture and experiences of the people. As earlier noted, Mouffe traced Africa’s postcolonial political problems to its colonial roots, as this study has confirmed.

Adebayo’s eyewitness account of the cabinet meeting ostensibly links elite distrusts to what Larry Diamond (1988) calls, “the failure of political integration ... of flawed institutional arrangements, regional disparities, and a restricted political process”

(p15); these reflect a chronic lack of alignment of people and structures at perhaps the most strategic levels. The interplay between cabinet members, perhaps, the pinnacle of the leadership elite, demonstrates the exact opposite of Mouffe's agonistic encounter, which she defined as

a confrontation where the aim is neither the annihilation nor the assimilation of the other, and where the tensions between the different approaches contribute to enhancing the pluralism that characterizes a multipolar world (Mouffe, 2013, p41).

History and contemporary experiences, as documented in this thesis, demonstrate that much of the repetitive toxic features in the contemporary narratives have their origins buried in certain events and in specific historical experiences. These, perhaps, more than face-value understanding of today's news headlines, are responsible for Nigeria's longstanding challenges to nationhood. It is my belief that now is the time for the nation to engage in a much needed, but long neglected historical understanding of these events and national experiences through the eyes of the press and media.

### **8.6.2 Belonging: Constructing an All-Inclusive Sense of Belonging**

In the period of this study, which spans six selected elections in a little over 50 years, Nigeria's political history consistently painted a picture of a troubled postcolonial nation-state threatened by complete democratic failure. The nation seemed perpetually at war with itself, the very epitome of the unending adversarial relationships, but what makes a person feel belonged and earns the nation, its citizens' loyalty? Belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home' and, it is about feeling 'safe' (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p4). It is central to how the citizens of a nation identify and define themselves. The identity that emanates from a sense of belonging is at the heart of the concept of nationhood.

A sign of a politically distressed state, evident in Adebayo's narration from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', is the obvious display of battle zone antagonism in which the opposition is an enemy to be annihilated. Nigeria must now identify middle grounds and compromises. According to Mouffe, "the aim of democratic

politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed” (Mouffe, 2009, pp101-102). She explains that,

agonistic encounter is a confrontation where the aim is neither the annihilation nor the assimilation of the other, and where the tensions between the different approaches contribute to enhancing the pluralism that characterizes a multipolar world” (Mouffe, 2013, p41).

The features that bind must be made stronger and more rewarding than the features that divide, and winning ethnically motivated political points must be made to seem less attractive alternatives to genuinely all-inclusive projects. If Nigeria must reinvent itself into a nation with a future, the elite must pledge themselves and commit to a common national destiny in which the hegemonic interests of ones ethnic group are not above those of the nation and the other groups.

### **8.6.3 The Press: Providing Agonistic Forum for Re-imagined Post-colonial Nation-state**

In modern democracies, contentions in politics are not unexpected or inexplicable. As noted earlier, Walter Ong defines agonism as “programmed contentiousness” or “ceremonial combat”, that allows a gamely discussion rather than an acrimonious *do or die*, scorched earth debate that promotes only the “defects and weaknesses of opponents”. Ong posits that what is needed is a “believing game” in which we look for strengths rather than weaknesses (Ong, 2012, p215). According to Diamond, the stability of a democracy depends on “its capacity to resolve crises and conflicts effectively” (Diamond, 1988, p18). This approach calls for a new and complete orientation on the part of both the press and their elite owners.

In an imagined nation, Enahoro states the obvious, saying, “Our knowledge of public affairs comes from the journalists” (1990, p22). The giving and receiving of nation-nurturing information is the oxygen of democracy, especially in an imagined nation. Of all the functions of the press in a democracy, the *forum function* is, perhaps, the most dominant, though mostly unacknowledged used responsibly, it acts as guarantor for a successful democracy. Robert Hutchins author of the 1947 Hutchins Commission Report listed five key roles for the press in a modern liberal democracy:

first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching every member of the society by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies (Cited in Kwame Karikari, 2005, p12).

This explains why the press, as an institution, oscillates between the hall of fame and that of infamy, praised, or vilified when political systems succeed or fail. According to Adebani, “the narratives in the press are not tangential but critical. And by critical I mean that the narratives are fundamental or indispensable and even potentially dangerous” (Adebani, 2016, p5). The indispensability of press narratives is all the more reason its forum function should be taken more seriously by journalists themselves and academics, equally.

As Tom Rosenstiel and Bill Kovach (2001) also stated, constructive forum functions of the press provide enabling and ennobling environment for democracy to thrive even in a large, diverse country (cited in Giles, 2001, p22). Measured against Hutchinson’s forum function, the Nigerian press, as this study demonstrates, may have been promoting what Rosenstiel and Kovach have called “the argument culture” which turns politics into an antagonistic, acrimonious, and divisive engagement (cited in Giles, 2001, p22).

In imagined communities, communication and other forms of information exchange, which give every segment equal opportunity to speak and be heard, create a feeling of belonging, a sense of common identity, which make fraternal relationships possible. They are the means by which a community dialogues with itself, defines *self*, and maintains the defined identity. As such, the role of the press in mobilising to unite ethnic fragments to build and shape a nation, imagined or not, becomes almost indispensable to the creation, nurture and survival of that community.

For democracy to work, it

requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary (Mouffe, 2009, p103).

These channels are what the press represents.

#### **8.6.4 Towards an Equitable and Inclusive Society**

Over half a century after independence, there is no agreement among Nigerians about a most basic concept – federalism, or the structure that informs the Nigerian version. There are divisive conversations about everything; and everywhere there is widespread political upheaval. There is a general mistrust and suspicion for ethnicity. Yet there is room for optimism, for deep down most Nigerians desire a fairer, more equitable nation. After all has been said, democracy, however defined or interpreted, is an ideal that rests on the tripod of equality, fairness, and consensus, the same tripod that makes a citizen loyal and feel belonged to a nation, values that have only been selectively fostered by the press, when and if they serve an ulterior agenda.

What can be deduced from this study is that while the press may have done a lot in defending the nation against colonialism and militarism, not enough has been done about building across ethnic national cohesion. The press may have fought against excessive state control, but it has not entirely been free from the control and manipulations of its elite owners, who surreptitiously use the press to perpetuate ethnic rivalry and division. The press may have proved independent of military captivity, but it has also become a captive of sectional loyalties and of business moguls; it has not taken advantage of occasions to push the boundaries of independence when there was room to do so; it has not engaged in the articulation of domesticated ideology for itself, it has failed to invite the nation into a dialogue with itself in a non-partisan agonistic forum.

This study has revealed that a nation's press system ought *not* to mimic or measure itself against textbook standards based on foreign philosophies, whose authors have little notion about the nation's people and ethnic compositions, its culture, and informational needs. What is required are homegrown press models, and "forms of democracy more adapted to African customs" (Mouffe, 2013, p39).

In order for an inclusive nation-state where all groups feel belonged to emerge, the elites need to reconcile themselves to the fact that all voices, not sanctioned homogeneous narratives emanating from one source, need to be heard. What this suggests is that the press and other media forms should champion inclusive and integrative national discourses in which all sub-groups can feel belonged, without necessarily losing touch with the nation's ethnic centres.

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# APPENDIX 1

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## THE NEWSPAPERS

### 1. Daily Times Established 1<sup>st</sup> of June, 1926.

The *Daily Times* “for long Nigeria’s most successful newspaper”, was established in 1926 by four businessmen – three British and a Nigerian. From a modest 1,500 copies daily circulation in 1926 (Omu, 1978, p261), the *Daily Times* at the height its publishing history, “enjoyed a circulation of over 500,000 copies in the 1970s” (Olukotun, 2004, p28). Though its first Editor, Ernest S. Ikoli, went from journalism to become one of the political figures of the era the paper itself, “charted a remarkably independent course and therefore maintained its credibility...”. “*TheDaily Times*, (Ibelema, 2008, p14) *West African Newspapers Limited, (1936 – 1948)* (Omu, 1978, p253)

The paper’s editorial policy claim to be liberal, with “...a strong sense of sane nationalism.” However, Fred Omu (1978) called it a ‘distinctly conservative’ paper (p239). In fact, it started out as a pro-establishment paper, with a promise to be detached from local politics which the paper says has never “risen above petty personal squabbles”. Further it stated:

The bigger problems which affect Nigeria as a whole will be our immediate concern and these will provide for a long time to come, enough outlets for our energies”

(*Nigerian Daily Times*, 1 June 1926 cited in Adesoji, A.O. & Hahn, H.P., (2011, p190).

Over time, most Nigerians considered the Daily Times a conservative national paper.

### 2. West African Pilot Established 22<sup>nd</sup> of November, 1937

The *West African Pilot* came in at a “period of great opportunity provided by absence of serious and respectable political newspapers” (Omu, 1978, p239). The period was also the time of “emergence of the new epoch of Nigerian politics and nationalism

symbolised by the rise of the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1938” (Omu, 1978, p240). The promoter and sole owner of the paper was the recently returned Nnamdi Azikiwe from studies in United States of America (Omu, 1978, p254).

The motto of the *Pilot* was “Show the light and the people will find the way” (Sklar, 1963, p51) and the mission was to become the “sentinel of popular liberty and guardian of civilization” (Omu, 1978, p69). In its maiden edition, the *West African Pilot* stated that it believes in “genuine cooperation between the Government and the governed” promising to be “independent in all things and neutral in nothing which affects the destiny of Africa...” (West African Pilot, 22 November 1937 cited in Adesoji & Hahn, 2011, p186). It regarded its role as that of an instrument for the crystallization of social and economic security to the nationals and residents under the aegis of that state’s territorial sovereignty. It further stated:

we shall not claim to be pro-this or anti-that. ... it will be our supreme task, as a sentinel of popular liberty and guardian of civilization, to make our assertion in non-ambiguous terms

(West African Pilot, 22 November 1937 cited in Adesoji & Hahn, 2011, p186).

By 1939, within two years of its establishment, the paper reached a circulation of 10,000 (King & Kilson, 1999, p147) and “the circulation of the Pilot in the last quarter of 1966 was 40,000” (Azikiwe, 1970, p390).

The paper started out as a nationalistic newspaper; it became partisan in the emergence of modern political parties in early 1950s, and it became the flagship and mouthpiece of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Omu, 1978). Key staff of the *West African Pilot* held strategic positions in the NCNC; Sklar (1963) reports that, Mr. Blankson, Editor-in-Chief of the *West African Pilot* and Mr. F.S. McEwen, National Secretary of the NCNC, held cross positions in paper and political party. Earlier perceived as a national paper, it gradually began to be seen as an NCNC paper. Gradually, the paper lost its professional purpose, and huge followership as it became more and more partisan. It ceased publishing just before the civil war.

### **3. The Tribune. Established November 16, 1949**

The *Nigerian Tribune* was founded and owned by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1949, at the height of nationalism, and it is the only paper from that era that has survived, still in publication – the oldest continuous daily paper in Nigeria. The policy of the *Tribune* leaned more in the direction of progressive populism with occasional attempt at radicalism, almost always against the dominant interests of the national core elite and largely independent of the state. There is little doubt about the political and ethnic affiliation of the newspaper. The paper predated Chief Awolowo's political parties: Action Group (AG) party in the 1950s and 1960s; and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the 1970s and 1980s. From the beginning, therefore, the *Tribune* was sympathetic towards the cause of ethnocentric politics of Western Nigeria.

In the 1950s and in the early years of independence, the *Nigerian Tribune*, was basically in the political mobilisation wing of the AG, and “its fundamental aim was to represent the interest of the Yoruba (ethnic) group in the Nigerian equation” (Aimufua, 2007, p178). Most people perceived it as a paper with strong regional, ethnic and partisan political interest.

When Chief Obafemi Awolowo formed the Action Group in 1951, the paper became the mouthpiece of the party.

### **4. New Nigerian. Established January 1, 1966**

When the regional government of northern Nigeria established the *New Nigerian* newspaper in 1966, the political atmosphere in the country was already tense and toxic. (Aimufua, 2007, pp90 - 91). And barely two weeks after the newspaper was launched, Nigeria witnessed its first military coup d'état (January 1966), in which the Prime Minister, the regional premier and several others in the political leadership of the North were killed. The events that followed subsequently led to the outbreak of the civil war, which threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian State” (Aimufua, 2007, p92)

The main promoter of the newspaper was Premier of the Northern Regional government, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and its owner was the regional government.

(Aimufua, 2007, p91) The Federal military government of Nigeria in 1976 acquired the newspaper. (Aimufua, 2007, p90). The paper unapologetically considers itself “a Northern newspaper”, which seeks to identify itself with the North, its peoples, interests and aspirations. But it also claims to “oppose the evil extremes of tribalism, all forms of racialism and discrimination...” considering itself a “champion the vital need for national unity”. The paper in its stated mission acknowledges that without national unity, and the trust and mutual respect that go with it, Nigeria will never find its rightful place in the sun.

The *New Nigerian* fiercely defended the interests of Northern Nigeria and Islam and the interests of the federal government of Nigeria, when they align with northern interests. Its Editorial outlook was conservative. (Maiden edition, *New Nigerian*, January 1, 1966:1, cited in Aimufua, 2007, p91)

### **5. The Punch 1971**

The *Punch* newspaper was promoted and established by two friends, late James Olu Aboderin and Sam Amuka, the former an accountant, and the later a professional journalist. The *Punch* is a general-interest, liberal newspaper, with no overt political party affiliation, other than unstated sympathies with the interests of people who claim to be politically progressives. The *Punch* is perceived a national tabloid with little political inhibitions. After a period of tribulations with the military government, the paper matured and became perhaps the most commercially successful paper in the country. It now claims the title of the highest circulating newspaper in Nigeria.

### **6. Guardian - Established February 27, 1983 became daily on the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, 1983**

According to Omu, the *Guardian*, established int 1983, was “the first newspaper in Nigerian history to have been set up purely in response to Nigeria’s economic and socio-political environment” (Omu, 1996, p11). Main promoters and owners: Established by Chief Alex Ibru (owned by him) with Dele Cole and Stanley Macebuh, with Ibru retaining the controlling shares of the company.

The *Guardian* claims to be

“an independent newspaper, established for the purpose of presenting balanced coverage of events, and of promoting the best interests of Nigeria. It owes allegiance to no political party, ethnic community, religious or other interest group. Its primary commitment is to the integrity and sovereignty of the Federation of Nigeria.”

The Guardian considers itself “a liberal newspaper, committed to the best tradition and ideals of republican democracy...(and) committed to the principle of individual liberty and freedom, but believes that all citizens have duties as well as rights”. The Guardian is widely respected and it is considered a national paper.

#### **7. This Day Established January 22, 1995 (Started as a weekly)**

Mr. Nduka Obaigbena established *Thisday* newspaper as its Editor-in-chief, publisher and chairman of the board. Owned and published by his company Leaders & Company Ltd, *Thisday* is promoted as a liberal paper in support of free enterprise. The public perceives the paper as a national newspaper.

#### **8. Daily Trust Est. March 1998 as *Weekly Trust*, became daily on January 15, 2001**

The *Daily Trust* is published by Media Trust Ltd, a company established in 1998 by Mallam Kabiru Yusuf, a journalist and a former university lecturer. First in its stable was the *Weekly Trust*, which first hit the streets in March 1998 and was joined by *Daily Trust* in January of 2001. The Abuja base Media Trust group of papers has become the most successful and longest surviving private newspaper from Northern Nigeria. The vision of the group is to be a world class media company that earns public trust. The newspaper is perceived as a regional and conservative paper, which, according to Jide Jimoh (2014), is “known to rise in defence of Northern and Muslim interests in its reportage and analysis of issues” (p78).

#### **9. The Nigerian Citizens Est. 1948**

The *Nigerian Citizen* was established in 1948 more or less an English edition of the Hausa newspaper, established in 1939. It was published three times a week. Both the *Gaskiya* and the *Citizen* were preceded by a quarterly bulletin, *Jaridar Nijeriyaa Ta Arewa* (Northern Nigerian Newspaper), put out by the office of the Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria at the time. The papers were designed and established as Government public relations organs. This was plainly stated in the very first edition of *Gaskiya* on 1<sup>st</sup> January, 1939.

The *Citizens* was targeted at the non-Hausa speaking Northerners as a counter-propaganda organ against southern-based papers and the Kano-based *Comet*. According to Mamman Daura, Northern Nigerian Government was “locked in the most fierce competition with the two other regions of the Nigerian Federation... The Government was displeased and dissatisfied with the press coverage its activities received from other newspapers, the *Comet*, in particular believing it was set up to export and propagate programmes of the non-northern political party – National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The *Nigerian Citizen* and its successor, the *New Nigerian* were considered necessary to propagate the views of the northern regional Government, and to fight for Northern interest in all disputes at the federal level. The paper, which according to Turi Muhammadu funded by the British Commonwealth Development Corporation to spearhead a concerted drive against wide spread illiteracy in English and Hausa, became the official organ of the Northern People’s Congress

Charles Sharp, a Briton, was the first editor of the *Nigerian Citizen* while late Bisi Onabanjo, a Yoruba from Western Nigeria, was the first indigenous editor.

## APPENDIX 2

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### THE PROFILE OF THE INTERVIEWEES

#### ***MEDIA LEADERS***

**1. MR. REUBEN ABATI**

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Current:** Columnist/Journalist, Lawyer

**Previous:** Chairman, The *Guardian* Newspaper Editorial Board; Special Adviser on media & publicity to former president, Goodluck Jonathan.

**2. MR. FEMI ADESINA**

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Current:** Special Adviser (Media) to President Muhammadu Buhari (2015 - )

**Previous:** Executive Director (Publications), Sun Newspapers; Deputy Editor-in-Chief/Deputy Managing Director, Sun Newspapers; Managing Director and Editor-in-Chief, Sun Newspapers; President, Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE).

**Awards:** The Editor of the Year by the Nigeria Media Merit Award.

**3. DR. ONUKABA ADINOYI-OJO**

**Geopolitical Region:** North Central (NC)

**Political antecedent:** Gubernatorial Aspirant, 2015 Kogi State elections.

**Previous:** Journalist, Playwright and Teacher, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria; Information officer, Division of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); Adjunct Professor, Mass Communication, School of New Resources. College of New Rochelle, New York; Press Officer, Department of Public Information, United Nations (New York); Managing Director, *Daily Times* of Nigeria Plc, Lagos, Nigeria; Spokesman, Office of the Vice President, Nigeria.



**4. MR. JOHN IREM**

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS) Region (A group of Southern Minority States)

**Current:** Director, Special Duties/Public Affairs at Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigeria.

**5. MALLAM MOHAMMED HARUNA**

**Geopolitical Region:** North Central (NC)

**Current:** Columnist with *Daily Trust*

**Previous:** Managing Director, New Nigerian Newspapers; Managing Director/Editor in Chief, the *Citizen Magazine*; Chief Press Secretary, to the Head of State; Senior Lecturer, Department of Mass Communication, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria.

**6. DR. CHRISTOPHER KOLADE**

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Previous:** His career has spanned Education, Broadcasting, Business, and Diplomacy; as Director-General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation; Chairman, Managing Director of Cadbury; Nigeria High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of the Governing Council of the Pan-Atlantic University.

**7. PRINCE TONY MOMOH**

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Chieftain, All Progressive Congress (2013- )

**Previous:** President, Nigerian Guild of Editors; Editor/Deputy Managing Director of *Daily Times*; Minister of Information and Culture; Chairman of the African Conference of Information Ministers; Director of the Alex Ekwueme Presidential Campaign Organization (1999); Chairman, All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) Campaign Organisation (2003 and 2007 elections); Chairman of the Political Committee of the Muhammadu Buhari Organisation; Chairman of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).

**8. ODIA OFEIMUN****Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)**Current:** Poet, Writer. Politician**Previous:** President, the Association of Nigerian Authors; Private (Political) Secretary to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria; Editorial Board of *The Guardian* Newspapers, Lagos; Editorial board of *A.M.News*, *The News* and *Tempo* magazines.**POLITICAL LEADERS****9. GENERAL ABDUSALAMI ABUBAKAR****Geopolitical Region:** North Central (NC);**Previous:** Military Head of State (1998–1999) Chief of Defence Staff; Commander of the 3rd Mechanized Brigade, Kano; United Nations Peacekeeping Force, Lebanon; Military Secretary; General Officer Commanding, the 82nd Division. Successfully oversaw the transition that birthed the fourth republic and handed over to a civilian president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.**10. PROFESSOR ANYA OKO ANYA****Geopolitical Region:** South East (SE)**Current:** Chartered Biologist; Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of the Governing Council of the Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umuahia; Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Alpha Institute for Research in Science, Economics and Development.**Previous:** President of Ndigbo; Vice President & President, Nigerian Academy of Science; President, Union of African Biologists; Founding CEO of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group; Chairman of the Governing Board of the Nigerian National Merit Award; Fellow, Nigerian Academic of Science; Fellow, Cambridge Philosophical Society.**11. GENERAL IBRAHIM BADAMOSI BABANGIDA****Geopolitical Region:** North Central (NC)

**Previous:** Military Head of State; Chief of Army Staff.

**Political affiliation:** He attempted to be a presidential nominee under the platform of the PDP towards the 2007 and 2011 elections.

## 12. DR. PATRICK DELE COLE

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Chairman, Airlines Services & Logistics PLC (ASL), Member of Guardian Newspapers and Chairman, Tabod Nig. Ltd.

**Previous:** Managing Director of Daily Times Nigeria Limited; Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to Brazil; Deputy National Chairman, People's Democratic Party of Nigeria, and Special Adviser on International Relations to the President, Federal Republic of Nigeria.

## 13. GENERAL THEOPHILUS Y. DANJUMA

**Geopolitical Region:** North East (NE)

**Current:** Founder/Chairman, the South Atlantic Petroleum Limited (SAPETRO); TY Danjuma Foundation.

**Previous:** Federal Minister of Defence; Chief of Army Staff; Founder, Nigeria-America Line (NAL); Founder; COMET Shipping Agencies Nigeria Ltd; Chairman of Agip Africa; Chairman of the NatCom Development & Investment Limited (ntel).

## 14. CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Previous:** President of Nigeria (1999-2007); Head of State 1976-1979, the first military leader to hand power to civilian administration; Federal Minister of Petroleum; Federal Minister of Works and Housing; Chief of Staff (military Vice President). Founder and Chairman, African Leadership Forum; Chairman, African Leadership Foundation Inc., New York. The Olaf Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security). Member WHO Committee of experts on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons; Co-Chairman, Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on South Africa; Chairman, Advisory Council, Transparency International

(TI); Advisory Council, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts; UNDP Human Development Ambassador.

#### 15. PROFESSOR YEMI OSINBAJO

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Current:** Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

**Previous:** Senior lecturer of Law at the University of Lagos; Adviser (legal advice and litigation) to the Federal Attorney-General and Minister of Justice; Professor of Law and Head of Department of Public Law, University of Lagos; Member of Cabinet, and Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Lagos State; Professor of Law, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos; Senior Partner, Simmons Cooper Partners (Barristers and Solicitors).

#### 16. PROFESSOR PAT UTOMI

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Founder/CEO, Centre For Values In Leadership; Professor, Lagos Business School, Pan Atlantic University; Social/Political Activist of Various Courses.

**Previous:** Presidential Aspirant, 2007 & 2011 Federal Elections; Vice-chairman, Platinum–Habib Bank; Director of The Centre For Applied Economics at the Lagos Business School; Adviser to the President of Nigeria; Chief Operating Officer for Volkswagen of Nigeria; Scholar-in-residence, American University, Washington DC, USA; Research Associate, the Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA. Visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advance International Studies (SAIS).

### ACADEMICIANS

#### 17. PROFESSOR ADIGUN AGBAJE

**Geopolitical Region:** South West (SW)

**Current:** Professor, University of Ibadan

**Previous:** News Agency of Nigeria; Political Correspondent, The *Guardian* Newspaper Nigeria; Director-General, Obafemi Awolowo Institute of Government and Public Policy, , Lagos. Researcher, Social Science Council of Nigeria/Ford

Foundation; ACU/CSCUK Fellowship, University of Oxford; USAID/Hoover Institution.

#### **18. PROFESSOR EMEVWO BIAKOLO**

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Professor of Communication, School of Media and Communication, Pan-Atlantic University, Lagos, Nigeria

**Previous:** Dean of the School of Media and Communication, Pan Atlantic University. Lecturer, University of Ibadan; Editorial Board, *The Guardian* Newspapers; Senior Lecturer, University of Botswana; Director of Publications and Media of Black Accents Communications; Director, Centre for Media and Communication, Pan-Atlantic University, Lagos.

#### **19. PROFESSOR ABUBAKAR MOMOH**

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Professor of Political Science; and Director-General, The Electoral Institute, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

**Previous:** Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Lagos State University; Boards of the Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD, and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA); Vice President of African Association of Political Science (AAPS); Visiting Researcher, University of London; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Open University, England; Post Graduate Research Supervisor, Bielefeld University, German, among others. He has also been on several technical teams of the African Union Commission (AUC), and helped in designing the Elections Bench-marking for the African Union. He has served as election Observer to several African and European countries.

#### **20. PROFESSOR OKWUDIBA NNOLI**

**Geopolitical Region:** South East (SE)

Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Author of Several Books which includes *Ethnic Politics in Africa*, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria* and *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa: Intervening Variables*

**21. PROFESSOR EGHOSA OSAGHAE**

**Geopolitical Region:** South South (SS)

**Current:** Professor of Comparative Politics and Vice Chancellor of Igbinedion University, Okada, Nigeria.

**Previous:** Leader of the Ford Foundation-funded Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies; Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Ibadan, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Transkei, South Africa (1994-1998); Visiting Professor/Fellow/Distinguished Senior Scholar at the Carter Centre of Emory University USA (1989)

**22. PROFESSOR UMARU PATE**

**Geopolitical Region:** North East (NE)

**Current:** Dean, Faculty Of Media, Communication and Film Studies, Bayero University, Kano

**Previous:** Head of the Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri; Vice President of the Communication Association of Nigeria, CANI

## APPENDIX 3

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### THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria's political culture and national identity? (*Newspaper Content Analysis*)
- Did press reportage and commentary at federal election\_season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”? (*Newspaper Content Analysis*)
- Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism? (*In-depth Interviews*)
- Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism? (*In-depth Interviews*)

## APPENDIX 4

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### THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Has the press contributed to the issue of ethnicity and self-identity through their reportage of, and comments on elections in Nigeria? How has the press contributed?
2. Would you say that during election, political elite use the press to promote ethnicity and regionalism and uses ethnicity or regionalism as a consideration for deciding on who occupies political offices?
3. In your opinion, has the press, in the process of reporting elections, fostered ethnicity and regionalism questions as central to election success in the country?
4. Generally, who would you hold responsible for the state of the politics of belonging among ethnic nationalities in Nigeria –the colonial masters, the press, the politician or the military?
5. In your assessment, has the Nigerian press worked more for regional cohesion or for national unity?
6. What is your view about ethnicity and self-identity in Nigeria?
7. Have issues of ethnicity and self-identity affected the practice of democracy in Nigeria since independence? If so, how do you think they have affected the practice of democracy?
8. What would you say is the central role of the press in a democracy like Nigeria's?
9. Would you say the press has played such role during federal elections in Nigeria?
10. How has the role of the press during federal elections affected the political culture in Nigeria?



## APPENDIX 5

## THE DATES AND VENUES OF THE INTERVIEWS

	<i>INTERVIEWEE</i>	<i>LOCATION</i>	<i>DATE</i>
1	Prince Tony Momoh	Abuja	18th April, 2016
2	Mr John Irem	Abuja	18th April, 2016
3	Prof. Abubakar Momoh	Abuja	18th April, 2016
4	Mr Femi Adesina	Abuja	19th April, 2016
5	Dr. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo	Abuja	19th April, 2016
6	Prof. Eghosa Osaghae	Okada, Edo State	4th May, 2016
7	Dr. Christopher Kolade	Lagos	9th May, 2016
8	Lt-Gen. T. Y. Danjuma	Lagos	11th May, 2016
9	Dr Reuben Abati	Lagos	11th May, 2016
10	General Olusegun Obasanjo	Abeokuta	12th May and 5th June, 2016
11	Prof. Emevwo Biakolo	Lagos	20th May, 2016
12	Mr Odia Ofeimun	Lagos	20th May, 2016
13	Prof. Nnoli Okwudiba	Enugu	24th May, 2016
14	Dr. Patrick Dele Cole	Lagos	26th May, 2016
15	Prof. Adigun Agbaje	Ibadan	1st June, 2016
16	Prof. Pat Utomi	Lagos	7th June, 2016
17	Prof. Anya O. Anya	Lagos	14th June, 2016
18	General Abdulsalami Abubakar	Minna	16th June, 2016
19	General Ibrahim Babangida	Minna	21st June, 2016
20	Mal. Mohammed Haruna	Kano	23rd June, 2016
21	Prof. Yemi Osinbajo	Abuja	23rd June, 2016
22	Prof. Umaru Pate	Kano	29th June, 2016

# APPENDIX 6

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## CODING GUIDE

### *The Press and The Politics of Belonging in Nigerian*

For each individual unit of analysis (i.e. editorial content in the newspaper), coders will use this list of eight (8) descriptive variables (content categories) to document information on an Excel spreadsheet.

#### **Story ID:**

Serial numbers- Each unit of analysis (editorial content to be coded) is assigned one ID number starting from 1 and ending with the last story. The default: Excel Spreadsheet assigns numbers automatically.

**Category 1- The Newspaper:** editorial items published on the front page and editorial by the newspapers used for this study

Each of the Nine (9) newspapers has been assigned a unique ID number starting from 1 for Daily Times to 9 for Nigerian Citizen, as follows:

1. Daily Times (1).
2. West African Pilot (2)
3. Nigerian Tribune (3)
4. New Nigeria (4)
5. Guardian (5)
6. Punch (6)
7. Thisday (7)
8. Daily Trust (8)
9. Nigerian Citizen (9)

**Category 2- Genre/Type:** Front page political news stories and politically related editorials. The type of story content

1. News
2. Editorial

**Category 3 -Illustration:** Is the story illustrated or not, and how?

0. No illustration/photo
1. B&W Photo
2. Colour Photo

**Category 4 – Direction** Is the story/content positive, negative, or neutral?

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

**Category 5 – Ethnicity/tribal identities of political actors**

Is the tribal affiliation mentioned?

1. Yoruba
2. Hausa
3. Igbo
4. Minority ethnic group
5. None

**Category 6 - Purpose of Story**

What is the main purpose of the story/content?

1. Awareness/education
2. Persuade (positive influence)
3. Propaganda (negative Influence)
4. Castigate and bring to disrepute

**Category 8- Objectivity**

Does the story/content appear mostly objective or mostly subjective?

1. Mostly objective – use of evidence and verifiable facts
2. Mostly subjective – use of emotions and no evidence or verifiable facts
3. Can't say (appears balanced)

# APPENDIX 7

## Newspaper Front-Pages/News Reports



show its light and the people will find the way.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1959

PRICE: TWO PENCE

### 17 Teachers In West School Sacked

The strike teachers of the West African Pilot School, who were sacked by the school authorities, were yesterday reinstated by the school board.

The school board, which was constituted by the school authorities, has decided to reinstate the 17 teachers who were sacked by the school authorities on November 17, 1959.

## POLICE ROUND UP AG TOP MEN FOR ALLEGED FRAUD

### 3 Chiefs With 592 Cards In Custody

THE Police have broken up a conspiracy by the Action Group to defraud the federal elections at Abeokuta and Ogbomoshos constituencies.

AT OGBOMOSHOS, two Assistant Registrars, three Chiefs and one Action Group Organising Secretary have been arrested and placed under custody following the discovery of 592 registration cards in possession of three Chiefs.

The three Chiefs are Chief Oluwole, Chief Oluwalana and Chief Oluwalade. They were arrested by the police at Abeokuta on Thursday.

The police also seized 592 registration cards from the three Chiefs. The cards were found in the possession of the three Chiefs at their homes in Abeokuta.

### Dr Bassir Lectures On Trade Unions Today

Dr Bassir, who is the Director of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, will lecture on the subject of 'Trade Unions in Nigeria' today at the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, Lagos.

The lecture will be held at the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, Lagos, at 7.30 p.m. today.

### Ibo Union Protests

The Ibo Union, which is a union of Ibo workers in Lagos, has protested against the sack of the 17 teachers of the West African Pilot School.

The Ibo Union, which is a union of Ibo workers in Lagos, has protested against the sack of the 17 teachers of the West African Pilot School.

## Labour Ministry Intervenes: No More Lights Out

The Federal Ministry of Labour has intervened in the strike by the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the Electrical Workers Union of Nigeria.

The Ministry has intervened in the strike by the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the Electrical Workers Union of Nigeria.

### AG CAN'T CREATE STATES: Osadebay

The Chairman of the Mid-West State Movement and the leader of the Action Group, Chief Oluwole, has said that the Action Group cannot create states.

Chief Oluwole, the Chairman of the Mid-West State Movement and the leader of the Action Group, has said that the Action Group cannot create states.

### East, South News, Reject Ubanu Okoma

The Eastern and Southern States have rejected the proposal to appoint Ubanu Okoma as the Governor of the Eastern State.

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### Met. Strike Planned For Dec. 10

The Meteorological Department has announced that a strike will be held on December 10.

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### Mboya Plans Bigger African Voice AICTU

Mr. J. Mboya, the Secretary of the African Independent Congress, has announced that he will launch a bigger African Voice.

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Chief Oluwole, the Chairman of the Mid-West State Movement and the leader of the Action Group, has said that the Action Group cannot create states.

### ECN STRIKE:

The Electrical Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) has announced that it will go on strike.

The Electrical Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) has announced that it will go on strike.

### Domestic Work Parley To

The Nigerian Trade Union Congress has announced that it will hold a parley with the Government.

The Nigerian Trade Union Congress has announced that it will hold a parley with the Government.

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West African Pilot, December 4, 1959

# NIGERIAN TRIBUNE

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1959

MOON TO ADVENTURES  
Adventure your goods  
and to meet the TRIBUNE

FOR CORAL, RUBY AND DIAMOND  
PRINTING JOB  
SPECIAL PRESS SERVICE

## Comment

### NPC malady

THE present behaviour of the NPC party in Nigeria will be used to illustrate the cowardly nature of a leader who has been trying to fight bravely for some time, but suddenly turning back, taking to himself the credit and glory for the victory which he has won. It is not enough that the supporters of opposition parties in Nigeria, Nigeria should be beaten by NPC but things on the order of party congresses of NPC party congresses. It is not enough that men who have the courage to speak their party congresses should be mercilessly discriminated against and denied the freedom of speech and assembly. It is not enough that men should be whipped and gagged without trial, but now their very choice for the federal election must be the next victim.

We refer specially to the news published in this newspaper yesterday that two candidates of the Action Group for the federal election in Lagos—Kaito and Sabo-Kaito in Lagos Province, have been suspended and locked up. The Lagos-Kaito candidate, and Adam Garuba Gede, it was alleged, had committed a crime because he dared to disagree with the NPC and the Northern Nigeria Government in the view which views are perfectly within his rights as a human being.

There is a logical conclusion to that is that the NPC is creating a precedent. The members of the North have now seen the great whomever of the Action Group party machinery, clearly but easily crushing along and laying low all opposition, repression and evil practices of human degradation in their wake. The NPC have good cause to be so afraid. As a matter of fact, they need to think hard of by-ways and by means of creating victory at the forthcoming federal elections; but do they need to resort to indiscriminate arrests, this time out of opposition party supporters, but of their candidates in order to solve their election dilemma?

Arrest of candidates on flimsy grounds certainly is not the way to go. The NPC malady, what the party leaders need do is to overhaul their political belief, especially those dealing with human beings like themselves. First they have got to learn that all men are created equal, with certain inalienable rights, that they learn this, maybe it would be easy for them to concede to others those things like firing, speaking and whipping in freedom, which they themselves as the self-appointed rulers of the people of present enjoy. Maybe the human will have a thought for them then.

# 'That letter is forgery, send it to police' ADISA WRITES TO WEST SPEAKER

**Chiefs deplore attack on Owa**  
Lagos, Nov. 16.—The attack on the Owa people by the Western House of Assembly, Lagos, has been deplored by the chiefs of the Owa people. The Owa people, who are the traditional rulers of the Owa area, have written a letter to the Speaker of the Western House of Assembly, Lagos, in which they have demanded that the letter which was alleged to have been sent resigning his seat in the Legislature, be the subject of an investigation.



MR. ADESOSI ADISA, leader of the Mabo-Ige Grand Alliance, has urged the Speaker of the Western House of Assembly, Lagos, to investigate the letter which he was alleged to have sent resigning his seat in the Legislature.

# 'Imperative you alter your order'

Mr. Adesoji Adisa, leader of the Mabo-Ige Grand Alliance, has urged the Speaker of the Western House of Assembly, Lagos, to investigate the letter which he was alleged to have sent resigning his seat in the Legislature, in the Lagos for "all necessary action."

At a letter forwarded to the Speaker yesterday, Mr. Adisa said, "I am again referring you through this medium and with all the emphasis of my responsibility that all the circumstances and particularly the manner of the late 'Ish Babalola, FFR' on the alleged letter, indicate forgery."

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## 'Balewa is now touring with thugs'

—Ighina appeal to police

Ighina, Nov. 16.—The Ighina people have appealed to the police to take action against the thugs who are now touring the area with Balewa. The Ighina people have written a letter to the police in which they have demanded that the thugs be arrested and punished.

## Awori DC wants LG Police post

Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Awori District Council has asked the Lagos State Government to create a police post in the district. The council has written a letter to the government in which it has requested that a police station be established in the district.

## Katsina chief sued for £300

—he assaults AG supporter

Lagos, Nov. 16.—A Katsina chief has been sued for £300 for assaulting a supporter of the Action Group. The case was filed in the Lagos State High Court.

## No retreat in nominations

—says Electoral Commission

Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Electoral Commission has announced that there will be no retreat in the nominations for the federal election.

## Remove this man

—Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Lagos State Government has asked the Federal Government to remove a certain man from the Lagos State Government.

## £1,000 clinic for children

—Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Lagos State Government has announced that it will spend £1,000 on a clinic for children.

## Now Available

Grandeur Oil  
Consult: L. A. SHYMONO  
At: Vian Young & Reed Ltd.  
No. 1, New Court Rd.,  
Lagos, Nigeria.

## Free fight at Ede

COSHOLO, Nov. 16.—A free fight took place at Ede between two candidates of the Action Group for the federal election.

## Murder: all five have case to answer

Lagos, Nov. 16.—Five men have been charged with the murder of a man in Lagos. They are to stand trial in the Lagos State High Court.

## IDC fixes bride price

Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Lagos State Government has fixed the bride price for the federal election.

## Assault: NPC men convicted

Lagos, Nov. 16.—Three men have been convicted of assaulting a man in Lagos. They were sentenced to prison.

## Court moves into chambers

Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Lagos State High Court has moved into its new chambers.

## Committed ONKORO, Monday

Lagos, Nov. 16.—A man has been committed to prison for a crime.

## Assault: NPC men convicted

Lagos, Nov. 16.—Three men have been convicted of assaulting a man in Lagos. They were sentenced to prison.



Portrait of a man, likely related to the Katsina chief article.

## Osoba is docked for £35,000

Lagos, Nov. 16.—A man has been docked for £35,000 for a crime.

## Remove this man

Lagos, Nov. 16.—The Lagos State Government has asked the Federal Government to remove a certain man from the Lagos State Government.

## £1,000 clinic for children

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**30**  
**Nigerian**  
**CITIZEN**  
 AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

No. 1,321  
 Wednesday, March 24, 1965

**FORCE UPGA TO OPPOSITION**

**—NPC, EAST**  
 THE Eastern Peoples Congress, an ally of the N.N.A., have demanded the expulsion of the UPGA from the Federal Cabinet. The place for the UPGA in the Parliament is opposition bench, the party added. Chief V.C. Okwosa, President of the party, told our Lagos City Editor that stability and democracy could not be achieved in Nigeria with the UPGA participating in the Federal Parliament. He said the Prime Minister to ignore the compromise and to have been reached between him and the President. Dr. Awolowo, during the constitutional crisis of last January, over the formation of a broad-based Government. Chief Okwosa went on to say that the political situation created the Federal Government. One of them was a clear majority while the other had declared they shall vote if not there to create a new unity in Nigeria in which there will be enough for all and not enough money in the bank for all and enough job for all.

He pointed out that it was indisputably true that the present Federal Government was N.N.A. controlled and agreed that it was entering in the presence of the N.N.A. to appoint who were of blood into the Parliament.

Any UPGA M.P. wishing to be appointed a Minister under Sir Abubakar Ali, Okwosa said, should first quit the UPGA and declare for the victorious

**STATE OF PARTIES**

The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) has maintained its commanding position in the House of Representatives after the victory of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) at last week's State elections in parts.

(Continued on Page 17)

**FRONT PAGE COMMENTS**

**DR. AZIKIWE MUST RESIGN—LET HEAVENS FALL**

We demand without reservation, the resignation of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This is because he has let himself and the nation flatly down in seeking outlet or Ven-detta in a foreign paper, an American Quarterly Magazine, to express his political views as reported in the Daily Times, Morning Post and the Pilot of 18th March, 1965. For we are shocked. As an acclaimed African Nationalist, it is a disgrace to express his political views on the constitution of his own motherland through a foreign medium or journal. If it is the question of reviewing our Constitution, it is for the masses of our people and their political parties to decide and not for the President who is supposed to uphold the constitution. He can, of course, express his views as an individual or as the first citizen of Nigeria only by obtaining permission and clearance with the Federal Government and the Prime Minister.

As Head of State, he must be above politics; failing so woefully, we only crave his indulgence in politics and let him plunge into it with his newly growing feathers. There is always room for him in the tribulation NCNC. We have appealed to him dozens of times to keep out of politics. But, perhaps, it is in his blood and therefore he should not waste time in walking out of the State House.

If he fails to comply with the wishes of millions of people who are behind the 'Citizen', we will be

compelled, and it is only imperative, to demand our right on the Prime Minister to move a vote of no confidence in the President during today's Budget Session of the House of Representatives and, we are certain, such a vote must be passed with an alarming majority.

We must remind all concerned that we still have fresh in our minds the past International Tribunals which found some of our Southern political leaders guilty of misconduct by mismanaging and misdirecting public funds and finances. We hail African Nationalist leaders like President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to mention but only three, who had suffered various terms of imprisonments and physical torture in the hands of our former imperial masters and were never found to be wanting in public spirit or national devotion, and not interested in building up themselves into an immovable wealthy leaders or tycoons.

We could not care less to have a President with full executive powers provided he is a devoted nationalist with real public spirit and sacrifice, who could maintain the high standards of conduct and morality expected of the office of the President. We shall, of course, ask all our women to come out and vote loyally for any popularly elected President.



Mr. S. Igoe, Captain of Lagos team (left) receiving the coveted trophy from Abaji Usman Babara, North's Minister of Social Welfare and Co-operatives.

**East boycott A.A.A., North is angry**

**E**ASTERN Nigeria has boycotted this year's Inter Regional Athletic Competition organized by the Northern Nigeria Association of the Amateur Athletic Association of Nigeria and held at the fabulous Africa Stadium in Lagos over the weekend.

Reliable sources disclosed that the East team for the 1965 athletic competition was divided into two contingents—one to travel by air and the other by road to Kaduna. But an ultimatum from the Northern Nigeria Association of the Amateur Athletic Association of Nigeria was to each contingent stating that they must travel to the East.

The sportsmen from the East, however, have refused to do so. They have instead travelled to Kaduna by road and are now in the city. The East team will be competing in the athletic competition at the 'A.A.A.' in Kaduna.

The Northern Nigeria Association of the Amateur Athletic Association of Nigeria has threatened to discontinue its participation in the competition if the East team does not comply with its ultimatum. The association has also threatened to discontinue its participation in the competition if the East team does not comply with its ultimatum.

The sportsmen from the East, however, have refused to do so. They have instead travelled to Kaduna by road and are now in the city. The East team will be competing in the athletic competition at the 'A.A.A.' in Kaduna.

**PAKISTAN DAY—PAGES 8, 9, 10 and 11**

# Daily Times

THE INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER  
No. 22,223 Monday, July 23, 1979 106

## POLITICAL ALLIANCES NORMAL-ZIK

It is the normal practice for political parties in Nigeria to form alliances when they go to the polls. The NPP has done this in the past and it is expected that it will do so again in the next election.

The NPP has not been asked to form an alliance with any other party yet. It is expected that it will do so in the next election.

The NPP has not been asked to form an alliance with any other party yet. It is expected that it will do so in the next election.

### Obasanjo resumes tour

General Obasanjo will today resume his "thank you" tour with a visit to Bendel State.



# VOTING PATTERN IS THE SAME CANDIDATE HELD

## Parties keep their strongholds

RESULTS of last Saturday's elections in the 19 state House of Assembly show that the voting pattern remains what it has been since voting began three weeks ago.

The loyalty of the voters has not shifted significantly from its parochial position. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) retains its grip on Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Lagos and Bendel states.

The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) holds sway in Kwara, Kogi and Cross River states while the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) dominates in Anambra.



PHOTOGRAPHERS and other photographers were seen at the scene of the election in Lagos State.

### So far, so fair—Obasanjo

General Obasanjo has done a good job in the 19 state House of Assembly. He has shown that he is a fair and honest leader. He has also shown that he is a leader who is committed to the people of Nigeria.

### Confidence

The confidence of the voters in the NPP has not been shaken. The voters are confident that the NPP will continue to lead Nigeria to a better future.

A lot is going on our clothes line this season.





ADVERTISING	1-10
CLASSIFIED	11-15
LEGAL	16-18
POSTAL	19-20
REPRINTS	21-22
STATIONERY	23-24
TELEPHONE	25-26
TRAVEL	27-28
WATER	29-30
WIRELESS	31-32
YOUTH	33-34
ZOO	35-36

**EDITORIAL**

**A President in sight?**

A MAJOR aspect of operating the presidential system in a country such as ours is the electability of the chief executive. To govern effectively he needs to command sufficient electoral support all over the country to acquire the necessary moral and political legitimacy. To secure the necessary legislation to support his programmes he needs an effective base of support in the legislature from his party as well as other parties who may trust him more than they would trust any of the other contenders.

It is in this respect that sceptics had doubted whether the elections we are holding could produce such a person. It is in this same respect that we in the New Nigerian believe that Nigeria's first Mr. President is indeed in sight. Of the elections held so far, the senatorial contest is the most reliable indication of who is likely to win. This is because, like gubernatorial elections, the senatorial one concentrates the choice of voters by narrowing the range of alternatives. This means that it is most likely to produce the nearest congruence with the choice by voters of which man and which party to support.

The result of the senatorial contest has made one thing clear. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) has outscored its rivals by far in both the size of its share of the total votes cast and the territorial spread of the base of its support in the Nigerian political community. By our reckoning, the NPN received more than half the total number of votes scored by its nearest rival and has the highest number of candidates elected to the Senate. In addition it won seats in 12 states of the federation and in more than 12 states its share of votes exceeds the 25 per cent required by the constitution to vote its candidate into the presidency.

The bandwagon effect will surely tilt the electorate towards voting for the candidate of the NPN for the highest office granted that no other party appears to be even within shouting distance of winning the presidential election.

The results of the elections to the House of Representatives, the state Assemblies and the gubernatorial results have confirmed the position of the NPN as the highest scorer. They have also demonstrated the territorial spread of its base of support the more.

The bandwagon effect will become more evident when the presidential election takes place. By that election the NPN and its candidate would have been more clearly established as the party and candidate most Nigerians from most parts of the federation would prefer to trust. It is certainly the one party in which Nigerians from most parts of the country effectively belong. It is also more than likely, if not absolutely certain, that the Nigerian public will recoil from the naked hatred against the party shown by two unlikely winners. The backlash predicted will tip voters in its direction. It is certainly the only party whose control of government will not be based on an alliance of a hodge-podge of widely diverging and bitterly antagonistic political groups. Stability and not conflict is what Nigeria needs most.

Malam Aminu (centre) of president's press conference, flanked by PRP's National Secretary S. G. Oba (right) and the Government of Kano State, Alhaji Mohammed Abubakar (left). Picture by OLUBOLA NUSA.



**PRP SIGNED NO PACT WITH ANY PARTY—Aminu**

From JAMES JOURNEY, News Staff

MALAM Aminu Kano, leader and presidential candidate of the People's Redemption Party (PRP), has clearly stated that there was no pact between the PRP and any other political party in the country.

Malam Aminu, who addressed a press conference in Lagos yesterday, said the intimation that Dr. Abacha, Minister of the NPP had been authorised by him to negotiate with other political parties on PRP's behalf was wrong.

He also dismissed the inference by political observers that he signed a pact of cooperation with Dr. Abacha after their meeting in Kano last week Friday.

"All we did was to have a joint communique on our talks on that day", Malam Aminu explained.

He strongly repudiated what he termed as "malicious inference" that the PRP was simply being sewed.

See Page 9 Col. 1

**Alliance:**

**SHAGARI FLAYS 'COWBOYS'**

**Congratulates party men**

From JOE GODEK, News Staff

THE presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Alhaji Shehu Shagari, has described the alliance moves among some of his political opponents as a display of their talents in wanting to frustrate the wishes of the people.

Alhaji Shehu described these opponents as old tribal leaders and gave the motive behind such moves as their miserable failure in the past four elections.

He declared: "I believe that the threats of these midnight political cowboys will not materialise, because the wisdom of the totality of Nigerians shall not permit a rehearsing of the follies and tragedies of the last two decades".

The presidential candidate's comments were

See Page 9 Col. 1

**GUBERNATORIAL SHARE-OUT**

NPN	7
Dauha, Benue, Cross River, Kwara, Niger, Rivers and Sokoto.	
UPN	5
Bendul, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo.	
NPP	3
Anambra, Imo and Plateau.	
PRP	2
Kaduna and Kano.	
CNPP	2
Sokoto and West Africa.	

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- \*POULTRY EQUIPMENT-
- \*POULTRY DRUGS
- \*VETERINARY EQUIPMENT
- \*VETERINARY DRUGS
- \*AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS
- \*AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT &
- \*INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS

WRITE OR CALL AT 18 AHMADU BELLO WAY, P.O. BOX 708, KADUNA. PHONE 210834 OR 51A ABADIE STREET, OPPOSITE COMMONWEALTH HOTEL, SABON GARI, KANO. ALSO SALES REPRESENTATIVE BASED IN JOS, BAUCHI AND GONGOLA. FARM NOW TO FEED OUR COUNTRY, CONTACT BOLAX THE FARMING EXPERTS.



GUARDIAN LIBRARY

# THE PUNCH

\*\*TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1999 VOL. 17 NO. 17,620 - N35.00\*\*

**Inside today**

Who gets AFP's nod? - Page 11

Antics of oil pipeline vandals - Page 22



Beautiful world of leather - Page 24

## My fears for transition - Ade-Ajayi

• Says it can't guarantee democracy

Duro Ajewole, Ifeoluwa

**RENOWNED** historian and Professor Emeritus, I. F. Ade Ajayi, warned the ongoing transition on Monday and cautioned that there is no guarantee for its success, because many things are still flimsy with the process.

Speaking in an interview in Ifeoluwa, Professor Ade Ajayi stated that there is no constitution on which the programme is based, adding that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is supposed to be an impartial umpire, had become inconsistent and seemed to be bending the rules to suit the powers - that be.

The former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lagos, who spoke in his office, said: "Take a

see how we can have democracy with the kind of power structure that we have now."

He also lamented that the atmosphere in the country did not suggest any seriousness on the part of the government to put a firm democracy in place. He lamented that the absence of the constitution, with which the country would be ruled, was a direct pointer to the fear.

It will be difficult to have an election that is free and fair under this atmosphere. Where is the constitution that is guiding the transition? Due to the absence of such a constitution, the

INEC has been amending rules. It is now a question which rule will favour which claim of the INEC to a free fair election is beginning to be in doubt," he said.

The professor said even if transition should proceed, a civilian president, the regime may not be able to solve the problems of the country, which he said is being overlooked in the transition process.

He identified the main problem as that of over-representation of 1998 politicians pointed out that the decision of power is the only

*Continued on Page 2*



*The Chairman of the All Peoples Party (APP), Abaji Mahmud Waziri (right), presidential appointee, Chief Bola Ojo (middle) and the Vice Chairman, Chief Alimi Baidale, at a meeting of the party's executive council, in Abuja... on Monday. Photo: Mike Agada.*

### Transition: FG appeals against boycott

**H**ADJI of State, General Abdulsalam Abdulkadir, has expressed concern over the boycott of the ongoing transition programme by one of the political parties and called for a more serious handling of the programme by the

The appeal was contained in an address delivered on his behalf by the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Vice-Admiral Othman Akhigbe, at a meeting with the leaders of the three political parties at the State House, Abuja on Monday.

At Monday's meeting, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) formally complained about the boycott of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the party's planned alliance with the All Peoples Party (APP). General Mahmud Waziri, APP Chairman, said the party is ready to work with the INEC.

Speaking on behalf of the two parties at the inauguration, he said:

*Continued on Page 2*

### Handover panel set up

### Parties, INEC trade blames

**AD, APP insist on alliance**

**Bataji Adedokun and Olayinka Ojo, Abaji**

**T**HE Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the All Peoples Party (APP) in Ifeoluwa reaffirmed their determination to work closely with the

*Continued on Page 2*



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The Punch Newspaper, February 9, 1999

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# SUNDAY TRUST

March 27, 2011      TRUST IS A BURDEN      Vol. 5 No. 35      N200  
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## PDP Can't Win First Round in Presidential Poll - Campbell

Pg 3

## 2011 PRESIDENCY

# Final Battle Underway

- Atiku, IBB, Gusau Search for 'Northern Candidate'
- Jonathan Devises Fresh Strategies to Capture North, South
- Obasanjo: Zoning Still Alive in PDP

**By** *Thompson Akhah & Suliman M. Saidu*

**F**ollowing the collapse of talks between President Goodluck Jonathan and the G15, consisting mainly of members of the Northern Political Leaders Forum, the three former presidential aspirants have commenced serious alliance talks with principal actors in the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and those of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). *Sunday Trust* can report.

Except there are last minute changes. *Sunday Trust* learnt that former President Ibrahim Babangida, who chairs the G15, will today host the pillar of the ACN, Ahmed Bola

Tinubu, in Minna, Niger State. The source also disclosed that Fola Adeola, the running mate of the ACN presidential candidate Nuhu Ribadu, had 'useful discussions' with the chairman of the nine-man technical committee of the G15 in Abuja last week.

*Sunday Trust* learnt that the nine-member committee had been instructed to hold talks with any interested presidential candidate, apart from Jonathan.

These are preliminary talks that will open the way for formal talks between the two groups (ACN and G15) in the coming days and we expect to conclude the talks before the commencement of elections," the source said.

The source also confirmed that those who call the shots in Buhari's CPC have had talks with members of the G15 towards an alliance in the election.

"I can confirm to you that we have been talking to several groups representing other presidential candidates and we are certain that we will find a common ground," the source said.

When asked whether the talks were also leading towards a consensus arrangement among the three candidates from the north, General Muhammadu Buhari, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau and Malam Nuhu Ribadu, the source said "it is part of it."



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- ✓ Patiently wait for results to be announced on the spot.

### Buhari: Facing the Challenge of His Life

Pg 4



*Can't on page 2*

### Jang Suspends LG Chairmen

Pg 7

Daily Trust March 27, 2011





# ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP

The South-west pro-political view of the country voted for Goodluck Jonathan and not necessarily his political party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Chairman of the State chapter of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Chief Jide Awo, has said.

**•Presidency: It's a pan-Nigeria victory •Extend hand of fellowship, Umar tells winners**

*By Collins Edumartua*  
But the Presidency has described the vote Jonathan got at last Sunday's presidential election as "a pan-Nigeria mandate" devoid of religious and ethnic character and connotations.

Awo in a statement yesterday, advised the PDP not to see the voting pattern adopted in the election by the electorate as an endorsement of the party.

He said the votes for the PDP in Ekiti, Ogun, Lagos, Oyo and Ondo should not form its endorsement or a compromise, adding that the progressives would go back to the basics during the governmentship and state assembly elections in the region.

He also said in the statement that after the merger talks between the ACN and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) broke down, the next best thing to do was to look at the future of Nigeria and vote for Jonathan.

"The voting pattern we all witnessed on Saturday was not an endorsement of the PDP but rather a development which occurred as a result of the breakdown in negotiations between the ACN and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Awo said. Speaking with some journalists in Abuja last night, the Special Adviser (Strategy, Research and Documentation) continued on Pg 8

Monday, April 18, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 5838, Price: N150 [www.thisday.ng](http://www.thisday.ng)



NIGERIA'S FESTIVAL OF DEMOCRACY (DAY 10)...

# Jonathan Cruises to Victory, Reaches out to Opponents

**•PDP, CPC rivalry continues at the collation centre**

Goodluck Jonathan is the president-elect only in a technical sense, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) today, going by the results that were announced yesterday by the Presidential Electoral Commission (PEC) in the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

**From Chukwu Okeke in Abuja**  
2,088,791. The total valid votes are 37,716,842 out of 73 million registered voters, representing about 50 per cent voter turn-out.

Jonathan polled 59.64 per cent of the votes cast. Mal. Gen., Muhammadu Buhari (CPC) 32.38 per cent; Mallam Nuhu Ribadu (ACN) 5.54; and Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau (ANPP) 2.43 per cent. The law requires a simple majority or 24 per cent.

Jonathan won in 23 states, including 16 out of the 17 Southern states and seven Northern states — Kwara, Kogi, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa and Taraba — and FCT. He also scored 25 per cent or more in 32 states and FCT, surpassing the constitutional requirement of at least a quarter of the voters cast in at least 24 states. The spread is national.

## ALL THE RESULTS...

STATE	Jonathan	Buhari	Ribadu	Shekarau
ABIA	1,175,954	7,658	4,136	1,450
ADAMAWA	508,314	344,028	32,596	2,708
AKRON (SON)	1,165,879	5,349	14,148	8,777
ANAMBRA	1,143,189	4,223	3,427	373
BAYELSA	564,811	691	310	138
BAYELSA	298,404	1,315,209	216,374	4,277
BENUE	894,718	109,680	223,007	7,705
BORNO	207,026	300,783	2,531	33,270
CROSS RIVER	703,382	4,002	5,833	2,561
DELTA	1,378,851	8,860	13,110	2,748
EBONYI	480,582	1,075	1,102	14,296
EDO	540,173	17,795	34,247	3,174
EKITI	1,35,009	2,838	118,981	1,482
ENUGU	802,144	3,753	1,920	2,331
FCT	253,444	151,576	2,323	3,171
GOMBE	290,347	400,956	2,420	436
IMO	1,281,357	7,591	14,625	2,527
JIGAWA	1,09,222	943,898	17,555	7,827
KADUNA	1,530,179	1,324,244	11,273	17,307
KANO	460,058	2,628,154	42,533	320,710
KATSINA	428,320	1,163,813	13,840	8,347
KEBBI	305,198	507,832	36,121	3,294
KOGI	369,515	172,371	8,213	1,840
KWARA	2,018,243	183,323	82,402	3,827
LAGOS	1,581,683	181,361	293,711	5,347
NASSARAWA	402,960	278,336	7,204	1,041
NIGER	521,829	627,174	11,374	7,139
OGEA	208,572	12,804	388,800	2,048
OGUN	361,353	11,540	14,262	6,143
OSUN	132,839	8,307	427,200	3,817
OYO	434,713	82,736	262,330	7,176
PLATEAU	1,225,989	208,378	10,533	4,276
RIVERS	1,317,792	13,110	14,262	4,443
SOKOTO	39,681	740,776	20,946	2,819
TARABA	47,334	257,306	17,740	1,373
YAKI	315,749	102,387	10,000	1,823
ZAMFARA	225,280	624,619	17,870	48,514
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62,466,157</b>	<b>62,214,519</b>	<b>2,006,791</b>	<b>107,320</b>

## HOW THEY FARED

**JONATHAN**  
Went to 23 states, including 16 out of 17 southern states and seven northern states (Plateau, Kogi, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa and Taraba), and FCT. Polling highest votes in Rivers (1,471,745).

**BUNARI**  
Went to 12 states — all in the North (Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Zamfara, Gombe, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Akwa Ibom and Imo). Polling highest votes in Kano (2,628,154).

**RIBADU**  
Went to 1 state (Kogi). Polling highest votes in Kogi (1,165,879).

**SHEKARAU**  
Went to 2 states (Imo and Kebbi). Polling highest votes in Imo (320,710).

YOGA WEATHER: Abuja: partly Temp: 22-30°C. Lagos: Cloudy, light rain, Temp: 20-27°C. Kano: Very sunny Temp: 20-32°C. Lagos: Sunny, Cloudy Temp: 24-32°C. Abuja: Sunny, Cloudy Temp: 23-32°C.

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This Day, April 18, 2011

## APPENDIX 8

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### INVENTORY OF NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

The Nigerian Press Council (NPC), during its 2013 Inventory of Newspapers and Magazines in the 36 states and FCT recorded 267 newspapers and 128 magazines, making a total of 395 print media in Nigeria. But since the last review was carried out about five years ago, we had to verify which of the newspapers are still alive.

After weeks of meticulous research, these are the ones we can verify. In our research, we noticed that some of the newspapers published by the NPC have either gone strictly online or are no longer being published.

#### *NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE*

S/N	DAILIES (PRINT)	NON-DAILIES (PRINT)	ONLINE
1.	The Punch	Desert Herald	Nigeria Standard
2.	The Guardian	The Leader	Sahara Reporters
3.	Thisday	The Advocate	Premium Times
4.	Daily Trust	The Abuja Inquirer	The Cable
5.	Leadership Daily	National Express	National Daily
6.	Orient Daily	New Statesman	The Will
7.	National Light	Century Newsfront	National Accord
8.	Vanguard	The Pioneer	YNaija
9.	Business Day	National Newsbreak	The Trent
10.	The Champion	Announcer Express Newspaper	Pulse NG
11.	Nigerian Tribune	Nigerian Horn	Daily Post
12.	The Nation	National Network	The News



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13.	Daily Independent		The News Journal
14.	New Telegraph		The Nigerian Times
15.	Daily Sun		News Express
16.	P.M. News		The Herald
17.	The National Mirror		The News Chronicle
18.	The Tide		
19.	The Pointer		
20.	Citizens' Advocate		
21.	The Nigerian Observer		
22.	Osun Defender		
23.	The Truth		
24.	Newsday		
25.	Peoples Daily		
26.	Nigerian Pilot		
27.	Blue Print		
28.	The Authority		
29.	Metro Sports		
30.	Soccer Star		
31.	Sporting Life		
32.	Daily Times		
33.	Complete Sports		

Many of the daily newspapers above have weekend publications on Saturday and Sunday.

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*INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED IN INDETERMINATE FREQUENCY*

<i>1. S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>LANGUAGE</i>
2.	Bauchi Lokoci Ya Yi	Hausa
3.	Rariya	Hausa
4.	Taurararuwa	Hausa
5.	Aminiya	Hausa
6.	Leadership Hausa	Hausa
7.	Gaskiya	Hausa
8.	Hukumar Kula Da Ma'aikatan Kananan Hukomomi Ta Jihar Katsina	Hausa
9.	Alheri	Hausa
10.	Jigawa A Yau	Hausa
11.	Manharga Arewa	Hausa
12.	Rigar Zamani	Hausa
13.	Matasa Kashin Bayan Al'umma	Hausa
14.	Obakwu	Ibo
15.	Ka O Di Taa	Ibo
16.	Okakachi Igala	Igala
17.	Ikpamkor	Tiv
18.	Iroyin Owuro	Yoruba
19.	Akede Agbaye	Yoruba
20.	Alariya	Yoruba
21.	Alore	Yoruba
22.	Alangba Oodua	Yoruba
23.	Ojutoye	Yoruba
24.	Bojuri	Yoruba
25.	Alaroye	Yoruba
26.	Iwe Iroyin	Yoruba

**Some of the language publications above are magazines, while others are papers; most of them are monthly publications.**

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**COMMUNITY MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>
1.	Bakatsiniya	21.	Obanta newscday
2.	Kogi Echo	22.	Ogun Update
3.	Esan Now	23.	Ugbu News Xtra
4.	Community Outreach Newspaper	24.	Isoko Mirror
5.	Ebira Aview	25.	Urhobo Voice
6.	Weekly Ibom Voice	26.	Kogi Express
7.	Izon Times	27.	Katsina State Local Government News
8.	Kogi Affairs	28.	Igbo Life
9.	Okun Parrot	29.	Arise Igala
10.	Ibadan Newspaper	30.	Kogivatch Magazine
11.	Izon Link	31.	Urhobo Times
12.	Kogi Express	32.	Afenmai Heritage
13.	Ounko People Voice	33.	Anioma Trust
14.	Eggonnews	34.	Okun People Magazine
15.	Ekinigbo Watch	35.	South South International Magazine
16.	Oke Ogun News	36.	Ekiti Link
17.	Izon Apia	37.	Jigawa State Newsletter
18.	Ijaw News	38.	Lekki Times
19.	Agege Pulse	39.	The Prestige
20.	Kano Chronicle	40.	Oriwu Sun

There are other publications with indeterminate appearances on the newsstand. Some are irregular and we imagine there are x number of other publications; many of them are community papers mostly published in English like *Izon Link*, *Anioma Trust*, *Okun People Magazine*, *Bakatsiniya*, e.t.c.



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**FORTNIGHTLY PUBLICATIONS**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>
1.	Democracy News	9.	AM Times
2.	National Investigator	10.	Banner News
3.	Mein Express	11.	Independent Recorder
4.	Global Overseer	12.	The Navigator
5.	Readers' Opinion	13.	The Forum
6.	The Light	14.	The Projector
7.	Golden Pen	15.	Forthright
8.	The New Agenda		

**QUARTERLY AND MONTHLY PUBLICATIONS**

1	News Hawk	23	The Hope Newspaper
2	The Northern Star	24	Vision Update
3	Eagle Eye	25	Gateway Footprints
4	Living Hope	26	Glimmer
5	News Research	27	Deepstory Synergy
6	News Point	28	Rural Front
7	Nation Trumpet	29	Gateway Echo
8	Reflection Newspaper	30	The Zion Nationale
9	The investigator	31	The Royal Heritage
10	Benchmark	32	The Jewel News
11	Our Nation	33	Gateway News Update
12	Urban News	34	Equity Newspaper

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1	News Hawk	23	The Hope Newspaper
13	Easterner Pilot	35	Confluence Times
14	Dateline	36	News Crest
15	The Intellect	37	Confluence Tide
16	Donac Pilot	38	The Thinker
17	National Calvary	39	Nigerian Prime (Prime News)
18	State Graphics	40	The Courage
19	The Vigilant Watchman	41	The Orator
20	World Link	42	The Informer
21	Kunav Times	43	The Tower
22	First Awareness Newspaper		

**OTHER PUBLICATIONS INCLUDING NEWSMAGAZINES PUBLISHED WEEKLY,**

*BI-MONTHLY, MONTHLY, QUARTERLY AND ANNUALLY IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE*

<i>1</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>
2	Allure Vanguard	41.	Metropole
3	Boss	42.	Motherhood in Style
4	4Bravo	43.	National Image Magazine
5	Busines5s Insurance	44.	National Infinity
6	Cele6brities	45.	National Standard
7	City E7xpress	46.	News of the People
8	City P8eople	47.	Newswatch
9	Complete9 Fashion	48.	Newsweek
10	Consumer Watch	49.	Newswire Magazine
11	Eagle Eye International	50.	Picture This

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<i>1</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>
12	Echo	51.	Pilot Property
13	Economic Confidential	52.	Pleasures
14	Educational Radiance	53.	Real Estate Environment
15	Effizzie Model	54.	Royalty International
16	Encomium	55.	Simple
17	Event and Party	56.	Style Nania
18	Exceed	57.	Super Smart Magazine
19	Exquisite	58.	Tambari
20	Fabulous	59.	Tell
21	Ferina	60.	The Insight
22	Finance and Investment	61.	The Politico
23	Fortune	62.	The Public
24	Genevieve	63.	The Smash
25	Glam and Essence	64.	The Source
26	Glendora Review	65.	The South South
27	Global Excellence	66.	The Target
28	Global News	67.	The Trumpet Magazine
29	Hello	68.	Today's Woman
30	High Society	69.	Top Celebrities
31	Hip Hop World	70.	Top Elegance
32	Insight	71.	Ultimate fashion
33	Islanders	72.	Verbatim
34	Ivy Interior	73.	Vibe.ng
35	Jemima	74.	Vogue Afrique
36	Kilimanjaro	75.	Voice of the Sahel
37	Life	76.	Watchman
38	Living Etcetera	77.	Wedding Planner
39	Lolly Fashion	78.	Wow

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<i>1</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>
40	Media Review	79.	Yes International
41	Media Trust		

*Summary of Newspapers and Magazine Publications in Nigeria (Including Online Papers)*

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLICATION</i>	<i>NUMBER OF TITLES</i>	<i>FREQUENCY</i>	<i>LANGUAGE</i>
1	Daily Newspapers	33	Daily	English
2	Online Papers	17	Daily/ Real Time	English
3	Community, State/Ethnic Newspapers	40	Mostly Twice Weekly/Monthly	English
4	Monthly and Quarterly Publications	58	Monthly and Quarterly	English
5	Publications in Indigenous Languages	25	Indeterminate Frequencies but mostly Fortnightly and Monthly	Hausa (12) Yoruba (9) Ibo (2) Igala (1) Tiv (1)
6	Other Publications	79	Indeterminate Frequencies	English

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## APPENDIX 9

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### Public Television Stations in Nigeria

	<i>TV STATIONS (FG OWNED)</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
1	The Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Channel 6, Aba	Abia
2	NTA Umuahia	Abia
3	NTA Yola	Adamawa
4	NTA Uyo	Akwa-Ibom
5	NTA Awka	Anambra
6	NTA Channel 35 Onitsha	Anambra
7	NTA Bauchi	Bauchi
8	NTA Yenagoa	Bayelsa
9	NTA Makurdi Zonal Network Centre	Benue
10	NTA Zonal Network Centre Maiduguri	Borno
11	NTA Calabar	Cross-River
12	NTA Asaba	Delta
13	NTA Sapele	Delta
14	NTA Warri	Delta
15	NTA Abakaliki	Ebonyi
16	NTA Auchi	Edo
17	NTA Benin Zonal Network Center	Edo
18	NTA Irukekpen	Edo

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	<i>TV STATIONS (FG OWNED)</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
19	NTA Ado-Ekiti	Ekiti
20	NTA Enugu Zonal Network Center	Enugu
21	NTA Abuja	FCT
22	NTA PLUS, Garki, Abuja	FCT
23	NTA Gombe	Gombe
24	NTA Owerri	Imo
25	NTA Channel 10 Dutse	Jigawa
26	NTA Kaduna Zonal Network Center	Kaduna
27	NTA Channel 5 Kano	Kano
28	NTA Channel 8 Katsina	Katsina
29	NTA Kebbi	Kebbi
30	NTA Lokoja	Kogi
31	NTA Patigi	Kwara
32	NTA Ilorin	Kwara
33	NTA-2 Channel 5, and Lagos Network Centre	Lagos
34	NTA Lagos	Lagos
35	NTA Lafia	Nassarawa
36	NTA New Bussa	Niger
37	NTA Minna	Niger
38	NTA CHANNEL 12, Abeokuta	Ogun
39	NTA Ijebu-Ode	Ogun
40	NTA Imeko	Ogun

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	<i>TV STATIONS (FG OWNED)</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
41	NTA Akure	Ondo
42	NTA Okitipupa	Ondo
43	NTA Ikare	Osun
44	NTA Ile-Ife	Osun
45	NTA Osogbo	Osun
46	NTA Ibadan Zonal Network Center	Oyo
47	NTA Ogbomosho	Oyo
48	NTA Oyo	Oyo
49	NTA Saki	Oyo
50	NTA Jos	Plateau
51	NTA Port Harcourt Network Centre	Rivers
52	NTA Zonal Network Centre Sokoto	Sokoto
53	NTA Jalingo	Taraba
54	NTA Damaturu	Yobe
55	NTA Gusau	Zamfara
	<i>STATE GOVERNMENT OWNED</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
1	Broadcasting Corporation of Abia (BCA) TV, Umuahia	Abia
2	Adamawa Television (ATV), Yola	Adamawa
3	Akwa-Ibom Broadcasting Corporation (AKBC)	Akwa-Ibom
4	Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) TV, Awka	Anambra
5	Bauchi Television (BATV)	Bauchi
6	Bayelsa State Broadcasting, Niger Delta TV	Bayelsa



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	<i>TV STATIONS (FG OWNED)</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
7	Benue TV	Benue
8	Borno Radio Television (BRTV), Maiduguri	Borno
9	Cross-River Broadcasting Corporation (CRBC), Calabar	Cross-River
10	Delta Broadcasting Service Warri TV	Delta
11	Delta Broadcasting Service TV, Asaba	Delta
12	Ebonyi State Broadcasting Service TV	Ebonyi
13	Edo State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Benin	Edo
14	Ekiti State Television	Ekiti
15	Enugu Broadcasting Service TV	Enugu
16	Gombe State Government TV	Gombe
17	Imo Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) Orient TV, Owerri	Imo
18	Jigawa Broadcasting Corporation TV, Dutse	Jigawa
19	Kaduna State Television (Capital TV)	Kaduna
20	Kano State Television (CTV-67)	Kano
21	Abubakar Rimi Television (ARTV)	Kano
22	Katsina Broadcasting TV	Katsina
23	Kebbi Broadcasting Service, Birnin Kebbi	Kebbi
24	Kwara State Broadcasting Corporation	Kwara
25	Lagos State TV	Lagos
26	Nassarawa State Broadcasting Service TV	Nassarawa
27	Niger State Media Corporation	Niger
28	Gateway Television	Ogun

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	<i>TV STATIONS (FG OWNED)</i>	<i>LOCATION (STATE)</i>
29	Ondo Radiovision Corporation TV	Ondo
30	Osun State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Osogbo	Osun
31	New Dawn Television (NDTV), Ibokun	Osun
32	Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS), Ibadan	Oyo
33	Plateau Radio Television (PRTV), Jos	Plateau
34	Rivers State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Port-Harcourt	Rivers
35	Sokoto State (Rima TV)	Sokoto
36	Taraba Television Corporation	Taraba
37	Yobe Broadcasting Corporation (YBC)	Yobe
38	Zamfara State TV	Zamfara

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**PRIVATE TV STATIONS IN NIGERIA**

<p>AIT (26 Stations, with 14 Stations in the North and 12 in the South)</p>	<p>FCT Lagos Akure, Ondo Borno Edo Kebbi Gombe Kano Kwara Jigawa Katsina Kaduna Oyo Plateau Bayelsa Enugu Rivers Osun Adamawa Benue Bauchi Sokoto Abia Anambra Imo Delta</p>	<p>English</p>	<p>General Entertainment and News</p>
<p>Channels TV (4 Stations)</p>	<p>Lagos Abuja Kano Benin, Edo</p>	<p>English</p>	<p>News</p>
<p>Silverbird TV (7 Stations)</p>	<p>Lagos FCT, Abuja Jos, Plateau Awka, Anambra Port Harcourt, Rivers Yenegoa, Bayelsa Benin Edo</p>	<p>English</p>	<p>Entertainment</p>

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Galaxi TV (3 Stations)	Lagos Ibadan, Oyo Akure, Ondo	English Yoruba Yoruba/ English	General
Murhi International Television (MITV)	Lagos Ibadan		General
Minaj Broadcasting International	Lagos	English	General
Desmims Independent TV (DITV)	Kaduna	Hausa	General
Gotel TV	Adamawa	English/Hausa	General
Independent Television (ITV)	FCT Abuja	English	General
Galaxy TV	Lagos	English	General
ONTV	Lagos	English	Entertainment
Superscreen	Lagos	English	Entertainment
TV Continental (TVC)	Lagos	English	General
Degue Broadcasting Network (DBN)	Lagos	English	General
Independent television (ITV)	Benin, Edo	English/ Pidgin English	General

**SOME PRIVATE TV STATIONS RESTRICTED TO CABLE SATELLITES ALONE**

S/N	NAME	LOCATION	LANGUAGE	BROADCAST FOCUS
1	Wazobia TV	Lagos Port Harcourt Abuja	Pidgin English	Movie & Other Entertainment
2	Wazobia Max	Lagos Port Harcourt Abuja	Pidgin English	Family Entertainment
3	TV Continental News	Lagos	English	News
4	Cool TV	Lagos	English	Music

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S/N	NAME	LOCATION	LANGUAGE	BROADCAST FOCUS
5	Rave TV	Lagos	English	Family Entertainment
6	Tiwa n Tiwa	Lagos	Yoruba	Musical & Life Style
7	Soundcity TV	Lagos	English	Music & Entertainment
8	Dasalam Television Network (DTN)	Abuja	English	Documentary & Entertainment
9	Arewa24 TV	Kano	Hausa	General Entertainment and Lifestyle
10	Liberty TV	Kaduna	70% Hausa, 30% English	News and Currents Affairs
11	MYTV Yoruba		Yoruba	Movie & Other Entertainment
12	Dove TV	Ogun	English	Christian Gospel
13	Farin Wata		Hausa	Documentary & Entertainment
14	Nigezie	Lagos	English	Music, Entertainment & Lifestyle
15	Wale Adenuga Productions (WAP) TV	Lagos	English	Family Entertainment
16	Orisun	Lagos	Yoruba	Movie & Entertainment
17	TVC Hausa		Hausa	Promotion of Hausa Language & Culture
18	Mount Zion TV	Ibadan, Oyo State		Christian Gospel Movies
19	Yoruba Swaga	Lagos	Yoruba	Music & Total Entertainment
20	Trace Naija	Lagos	English	Afrobeat Music
21	Awa TV	Lagos	Yoruba & Pidgin English	Entertainment

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S/N	NAME	LOCATION	LANGUAGE	BROADCAST FOCUS
22	Pidgin TV	Lagos	Pidgin English	Entertainment
23	Trybe TV	Lagos	Yoruba and English	Movies & Entertainment
24	STAR Dadin Kowa	Abuja	Hausa	Entertainment
25	African Christian Broadcasting Network Television (ACBN TV)	Lagos	English	Gospel
254	Mercy TV	Delta	English	Gospel
26	HIP TV	Lagos	English	Entertainment

## APPENDIX 10

## SUMMARY TABLE OF RADIO STATION BY STATES

S/N	NORTH CENTRAL	NORTH EAST	NORTH WEST	SOUTH WEST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH SOUTH
1	Fed. Capital Territory (16)	Adamawa State (4)	Jigawa State (5)	Ekiti State (3)	Abia State (10)	Akwa Ibom State (7)
2	Benue State (5)	Bauchi State (3)	Kaduna State (18)	Lagos State (31)	Anambra State (18)	Bayelsa State (5)
3	Kogi State (4)	Borno State (5)	Kano State (14)	Ogun State (10)	Ebonyi State (2)	Cross River State (5)
4	Kwara State (8)	Gombe State (5)	Katsina State (4)	Ondo State (12)	Enugu State (13)	Delta State (12)
5	Nasarawa State (7)	Taraba State (2)	Kebbi State (4)	Osun State (10)	Imo State (9)	Edo State (11)
6	Niger State (6)	Yobe State (3)	Sokoto State (4)	Oyo State (24)		Rivers State (16)
7	Plateau State (11)		Zamfara State (2)			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>

**NORTH CENTRAL****FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (FCT)**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1	92.9 - Kapital FM (FRCN), Abuja	88.5 - Zuma FM, Abuja
2	107.7 - Armed Forces Radio, Mogadishu Cantonment, Asokoro, Abuja.	88.9 - Brilla FM, Abuja - Sports
3	909KHz on 303MW Band, FRCN	94.7 - Rhythm FM, Abuja
4	93.5 - Aso FM, Garki Abuja	96.9 - Cool FM, Abuja
5		99.5 - Wazobia FM, Abuja
6		100.5 - Ray power FM, Abuja
7		92.1 - Vision FM, Abuja
8		95.1 - Nigeria Info, Abuja
9		98.3 - Hot FM, Abuja
10		99.9 - Kiss FM, Abuja
11		104.5 - Love FM, Abuja
12		106.3 - WE FM
<b>TOTAL (16)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>

**BENUE STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	95.0 - Radio Benue, Makurdi	96.5 - Joy FM, Otukpo
2.	103.5 - Harvest FM, FRCN Makurdi	99.9 - Ashiwaves FM, Katsina-Ala
<b>TOTAL (4)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>



**KOGI STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	94.0 FM - Kogi Broadcasting Corporation (Confluence FM, Lokoja)	95.5 - Grace FM, Lokoja
2.	101.5 - Prime FM Radio Nigeria, Lokoja	101.9 - TAO FM, Okene
<b>TOTAL (4)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

**KWARA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	99.0 - Midland FM (Radio Kwara), Ilorin	95.1 - Royal FM, Ilorin
2.	103.5 - Harmony FM FRCN (Radio Nigeria), Idofian	101.9 - SOBI FM, Ilorin
3.	612.8 Khz- Radio Kwara, Ilorin	106.5 - Raypower FM, Ilorin
4.		105.7 Okin FM, Offa
<b>TOTAL(7)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

**NASARAWA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	102.5 - Precious FM (Lafia, FRCN)	95.9 - Maloney FM, Keffi
2.	97.1 FM - Nasarawa Broadcasting Service (Lafia)	91.1 - Platinum Radio, Keffi
3.	92.3 - Option FM (Akwanga)	
4.	92.5 - Solid FM, Nasarawa	
<b>TOTAL (6)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>

**NIGER STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	91.3 - Crystal Radio, Minna	
2.	91.7, Prestige FM, Minna	
3.	100.5 - Radio Nigeria Power FM, Bida - FRCN	
<b>TOTAL (3)</b>	3	-

**PLATEAU STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	88.60 – Radio Plateau, Jos	101.9 – Jay FM, Jos
2.	101.5 – Highland FM, Radio Nigeria	93.7 – Rhythm FM, Jos
3.	90.5 – Peace FM, Jos Broadcasting Radio Station	100.5 – Raypower FM, Jos
4.		93.3- Unity FM, Jos
5.		103.9 - KT FM, Jos
6.		104.3 – Tin City FM, Jos
<b>TOTAL (9)</b>	3	6

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-Central region**

Public Radio Stations – 21

Private Radio Stations – 28

**Total – 49**

**NORTH EAST****ADAMAWA STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	95.7 - Adamawa Broadcasting Corporation 1 (ABC), Yola	917 kHz - AM Radio 91.1 - FM Gotel Yola
2.	101.5 FM - Lighthouse FM, Yola	92.3 - Pulaaku FM, Yola.
<b>TOTAL (4)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

**BAUCHI STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	94.6 - Bauchi Radio Corporation (BRC) 2 FM, Bauchi	95.7 - Ray Power FM, Bauchi
2.	98.5 - Globe FM (FRCN), Bauchi	
<b>TOTAL (3)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

**BORNO STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	94.5 Borno Radio Television (BRTV), Maiduguri	99.5 Freedom Radio Maiduguri
2.	95.3 Borno Radio Television (BRTV) Metropolitan FM Maiduguri	
3.	102.5 Peace FM (FRCN), Maiduguri	
<b>TOTAL (4)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

**GOMBE STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	91.9 - Gombe FM	97.3 Progress Radio
2.	103.5- Jewel FM, Radio Nigeria, Gombe	Ray Power 93.1 FM
3.		98.1 Amana FM
<b>TOTAL (5)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>

**TARABA STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	90.6 - Solid FM, Taraba State Broadcast Service (TSBS)Radio, Jalingo	
2.	104.5 FM - Gift FM, Radio Nigeria, Jalingo	
<b>TOTAL (2)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>

**YOBE STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	801 KHz Yobe Broadcasting Corporation	
2.	89.5 FM pride of the Sahel Damaturu	
3.	104.5 - Sunshine FM, Radio Nigeria, Damaturu	
<b>TOTAL (3)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-</b>

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-East region**

Public Radio Stations – 14

Private Radio Stations – 7

**Total – 21**

**NORTH WEST*****JIGAWA STATE***

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	1026MW - Radio Jigawa AM	99.9 FM - Freedom Radio, Dutse
2.	93.5 - FM Andaza	
3.	95.5 - Dutse New world FM	
4.	100.5 - Horizon FM, Radio Nigeria, Dutse	
<b>TOTAL (5)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>

***KADUNA STATE***

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	89.9 - Rockside FM, KSMC, Kaduna	88.9 - Brilla FM
2.	90.9 - Capital Sounds FM, KSMC, Kaduna	91.7 - Liberty Radio (English) Kaduna
3.	92.1 - Karama FM, Kaduna (FRCN)	103.1 - Liberty Radio (Hausa) Kaduna
4.	96.1 - Supreme FM, Kaduna (FRCN)	92.9 - Freedom Radio FM, Kaduna
5.	594 AM - FRCN (Hausa), Kaduna	97.7 - Alheri Radio FM, Kaduna (HAUSA)
6.	1107 AM- FRCN (English), Kaduna	106.5 - Ray Power FM Kaduna
7.	94.1 - KSMC Queen FM	747 kHz MW - Nagarta Radio
8.	639 kHz MW - Kada 1	
<b>TOTAL (15)</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>

**KANO STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	729 MW - Radio Kano I AM.	88.5 - Dala FM, Kano.
2.	89.3 - Radio Kano II FM.	90.3 - Express Radio FM, Lamido Crescent, Kano.
3.	103.5 - FRCN Pyramid FM, Madobi, Kano.	93.1 - Arewa Radio FM, Farm Centre, Kano.
4.	94.4 FM, Kano State Radio	95.1 - Wazobia FM, Farm Centre, Kano.
5.	101.1 - Abubakar Rimi Television (ARTV) FM, Maiduguri Road, Kano.	96.9 - Cool FM, Farm Centre, Kano.
6.		97.3 - Rahma FM, Kano.
7.		99.5 - Freedom Radio FM, Kano.
8.		106.5 - Ray Power FM, Kano
<b>TOTAL (13)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>

**KATSINA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	104.5 - Radio Nigeria Companion FM, Katsina	106.5 - Ray Power FM, Katsina
2.	9772 kHz AM- Katsina State Radio Service	92.1 - Vision FM Katsina
<b>TOTAL (4)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

**KEBBI STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	95.5 - Kebbi State Radio, Birnin Kebbi	Vision 92.1 FM, Birnin-Kebbi, Kebbi
2.	945.801 MHz - Kebbi Broadcasting Corporation (Radio)	
3.	103.5 - Equity FM, Radio Nigeria, Birnin Kebbi	

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S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
TOTAL (4)	3	1

**SOKOTO STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	97.1 - Rima FM, Sokoto State Media Corporation	92.1- Vision FM
2.	101.5 - Royal FM, Radio Nigeria	99.5 - Freedom FM
TOTAL (4)	2	2

**ZAMFARA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	102.5 Pride FM Radio Nigeria, Gusau	Raypower 100.5 FM, Gusau, Zamfara
TOTAL (2)	1	1

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-West region**

Public Radio Stations – 25

Private Radio Stations – 22

**Total – 47**

**SOUTH WEST****EKITI STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	100.5 - Progress FM, Radio Nigeria, Ado Ekiti	89.9 - Voice FM
2.	91.5FM - Golden voice of Ekiti, Broadcasting Service of Ekiti State	
<b>TOTAL (3)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

**LAGOS**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	89.7 - Eko FM, Ikeja	88.9 - Brilla FM - Sports Broadcast only
2.	92.9 - Bond FM, FRCN, Lagos	90.9 - Top Radio FM
3.	96.1 - Lagos Traffic radio	91.3 - Lagos Talks FM
4.	97.7 - Metro FM - FRCN	92.3 - Inspiration FM
5.	103.5 FM - Radio One FRCN	93.7 - Rhythm FM
6.	Radio 107.5 FM. Tiwantiwa- Ikeja, Lagos, (Also of Eko FM)	95.1 - Wazobia FM, Lagos
7.		Urban 96.5 FM, Lagos
8.		Cool 96.9 FM, Lagos
9.		97.3 - Classic FM
10.		98.1 - Smooth FM, Lagos
11.		98.5 - Soundcity FM, Lagos
12.		98.9 - Kiss FM, Lagos
13.		99.3 - Nigeria Info
14.		99.9 - The Beat FM, Ikoyi Lagos
15.		RayPower 100.5 FM, Alagbado, Lagos



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16.		101.5 - Star FM, Ikeja
17.		Max 102.3 FM - Ikosi Ketu, Lagos
18.		102.7 - Naija FM
19.		104.1 - Kennis FM, Lagos
20.		104.9 - SMA FM, Lagos
21.		105.1 - City FM, Oregun, Lagos
22.		106.5 - Faaji FM (Also of Raypower FM)
<b>TOTAL (28)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>

**OGUN STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	94.5 - Paramount FM, Radio Nigeria, Abeokuta	94.1 - Rainbow FM
2.	90.5 - Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation (OGBC FM, Abeokuta)	101.9 - Rockcity FM, Abeokuta
3.		91.7 - Women FM (first Women's Radio Station) Arepo, Isheri, Ogun State
4.		107.1 - Sweet FM, Ibadan-Abeokuta Expressway, Abeokuta.
5.		88.5 - Family FM Radio kalka investment building Abeokuta
<b>TOTAL (7)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>

**ONDO STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	96.5 - Ondo State Radiovision Corporation (OSRC FM, Orita-Obele, Akure)	88.9 - Adaba FM, Ilara-Mokin via Akure
2.	102.5 - Positive FM (FRCN), Akure	91.9 - Breez FM, Akure
3.	94.5 - Orange FM, OSRC, Akure	96.1 - Raypower FM, Oba-Ile, Akure
4.		101.9 - Sun City Radio, Ondo City.

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5.		106.5 - Music & Culture FM, Ondo City
<b>TOTAL (8)</b>	3	5

**OSUN STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	95.5 - Gold FM, Radio Nigeria, Iloko-ljesa road, Ilesa	91.7 - Rave FM, Oroki Estate, Osogbo
2.	89.5 - OSBC Orisun FM, Ile-Ife	95.1 - Raypower FM, Oke Pupa, Osogbo
3.	96.3 - Odidere FM, Reality Radio-Vision Service (RRS), Iwo.	90.9 - Oodua FM, Toll Gate, Ile-Ife
4.	104.5 - OSBC Living Spring FM, Ile-Awiye, Oke Baale, Osogbo.	101.5 - Crown FM, Eleyele, Ile Ife
5.		103.1 - Uniq FM, Ara Station, Okesa, Ilesa
<b>TOTAL (9)</b>	4	5

**OYO STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	92.1 - Ajilete FM, Gambari, Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State, BCOS, Ogbomoso	90.1 - Space FM, 136, Liberty Road, Ibadan (1st Trilingual Radio Station in Nigeria)
2.	93.5 - Premier FM (FRCN), Ibadan	91.5 - Star FM, Secretariat, Ibadan
3.	96.3 - Oke-Ogun FM, Alaga	92.5 - Impact Business Radio, Akobo, Ibadan (Nigeria's first Business Radio)
4.	98.5 FM, Oluyole FM - BCOS, Ibadan	92.9 - Royal Root FM, Jericho Area, Ibadan
5.	99.1 - Amuludun FM, Moniya, Ibadan	94.9 - Thirty-Two FM, cocoa house Dugbe, Ibadan
6.	756 kHz - Radio O.Y.O Ile-Akade Orita Bashorun (Radio AM)	95.1 - Raypower FM, Cocoa house Dugbe Ibadan
7.		96.7 - Lagelu FM, Ibadan
8.		97.9 - Beat FM, Bodija, Ibadan
9.		100.1 - Jamz FM, Lagelu Estate, Felele Area, Ibadan

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<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
10.		101.1- Parrot FM, Ogbomosho
11.		100.5 - Inspiration FM
12.		102.3 - Petals FM, Old Bodija, Ibadan
13.		102.7 - Naija FM, Bodija, Ibadan
14.		105.5 - Splash FM, Felele, Ibadan
15.		105.9 - Fresh FM, Ibadan
16.		106.3 - Lead Radio, Ibadan.
<b>TOTAL (22)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-West region**

Public Radio Stations – 23

Private Radio Stations – 54

**Total – 77**

**SOUTH EAST**

**ABIA**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	88.1 - Broadcasting Corporation, Umuahia	89.7 - Buzz FM, Aba
2.	103.5 - Pacesetter FM FRCN, Amakanma old Umuahia	94.9 - Flo FM, Umuahia
3.		102.9 - MAGIC FM Aba
4.		103.9 - Love FM, Aguiyi Ironsi layout, Umuahia
5.		104.1 - Vision Africa FM, Umuahia
<b>TOTAL (7)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>

**ANAMBRA STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	90.7 - Anambra Broadcasting Service, Onitsha	88.9 - Brilla FM, Onitsha - Sports
2.	88.5 - Anambra Broadcasting Service, Awka	89.4- Minaj FM Obosi
3.	102.5 - Purity FM, Radio Nigeria, Awka	89.7- City Radio, Onitsha
4.		91.5 - Blaze FM, Oraifite
5.		95.3 - Radio Sapientia FM, Onitsha
6.		95.7 - Rhythm FM, Awka
7.		98.3 - Ogene FM, Awka
8.		99.1 - Odenigbo FM, Obosi
9.		103.5 - Gist FM, Ogidi
10.		106.5- Alpha FM Nnobi
11.		90.1- Lumen FM, Uga
<b>TOTAL (14)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>

**EBONYI STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	98.1 - Salt FM, Ebonyi Broadcasting Service FM (EBBS)	
2.	101.5 - Unity FM, Abakaliki	
<b>TOTAL (2)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>

**ENUGU STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	92.9 - Coal City FM (FRCN)	92.5 - Dream FM, Enugu
2.	96.1 - Sunrise FM, Enugu State Broadcasting Service	100.9 - Solid FM, Enugu
3.	96.7 - Voice FM, Nsukka (FRCN)	94.5 - Urban Radio, Enugu

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S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
4.	828 - Radio Nigeria 1 Enugu	
TOTAL (7)	4	3

**IMO STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	94.4 - IBC Orient FM, Owerri.	99.5 - Hot FM, Owerri.
2.	100.5 - Heartland FM, Radio Nigeria, Owerri	101.1 FM - My Radio FM Owerri
3.		105.7 - Zanders FM, Owerri
4.		97.3 - Megaband FM, Owerri
5.		107.3-Darling FM Owerri
TOTAL (7)	2	5

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-East region**

Public Radio Stations – 13

Private Radio Stations – 24

**Total – 37**

**SOUTH SOUTH**

**AKWA IBOM STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	90.5 - Akwa Ibom Broadcasting Corporation (AKBC)	95.1 - Comfort FM
2.	104.5 - Atlantic FM Radio Nigeria	101.1 - Planet FM
3.		105.9 - Inspiration FM
TOTAL (5)	2	3

**BAYELSA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	97.1 - Bayelsa State Broadcasting Corporation (BSBC) Glory FM, Radio Bayelsa, Ekeki Yenagoa	94.7 - Silverbird Rhythm FM, Oxbow Lake Swali, Yenagoa
2.	106.5 - Creek FM, Radio Nigeria, Yenagoa	95.5 - Royal FM, Yenagoa
3.		102.5 - Ray Power FM, Elebele, Yenagoa
<b>TOTAL (5)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>

**CROSS RIVER STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	89.9 - Ikom FM, CRBC	93.1 FAD FM, Calabar
2.	105.5 FM - Cross River Broadcasting Corporation (CRBC)	95.9 Hit FM, Calabar
3.	99.5 Radio Nigeria Canaan City, Calabar	
<b>TOTAL (5)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>

**DELTA STATE**

S/N	PUBLIC	PRIVATE
1.	88.6 - Melody FM, Delta State Broadcasting Service, Warri	89.9 - Crown FM, Effurun
2.	97.9 FM, Voice of Delta Radio, Asaba	93.1 - Quest FM, Ughelli-Patani Road, Ogor
3.	104.4 - Charity FM Radio Nigeria, Asaba	96.1 - Ray power FM, Oghara
4.		98.7 - Bridge Radio, Asaba.
5.		100.5 - Kpoko FM, Warri (Pidgin Broadcast)
6.		100.9 - Trend FM, Asaba
7.		106.7 - Rize FM, Warri

APPENDIX 10

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
8.		96.5 - Hot FM, Asaba
<b>TOTAL (11)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>

**EDO STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	95.775 - Edo State Broadcasting Service, Aduwawa	92.3 FM - Independent Radio, Benin city
2.	101.5 - Radio Nigeria Bronze FM, Benin	92.7 K-U FM, Benin-Auchi road, Enyea bypass Benin city-Edo state.
3.		93.7 - SilverBird Rhythm FM, Ugbowo, Benin city.
4.		96.9 - Speed FM, Benin City
5.		97.3 - Vibes FM, Benin city
6.		105.5 - RayPower FM, Ikhuen Niro, Benin city.
<b>TOTAL (8)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

**RIVERS STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>PUBLIC</i>	<i>PRIVATE</i>
1.	89.9 - Garden City FM Rivers State Broadcasting Service Corporation (RSBC)	Classic FM 91.1
2.	98.5 - Treasure FM Radio Nigeria	91.7 - Wave FM
3.	99.1 - Radio Rivers	92.3 - Nigeria Info
4.		Naija FM 92.7
5.		93.7 - Rhythm FM
6.		94.1 - Wazobia FM, Port-Harcourt
7.		95.1 - Today FM
8.		95.9 - Cool FM, Port-Harcourt
9.		97.7 - Love FM (Family Station)
10.		The Beat 99.9FM

11.		106.5 - RayPower FM
TOTAL (14)	3	11

**Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-South region**

Public Radio Stations – 15

Private Radio Stations – 33

**Total – 48**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS**

Public Radio Stations – 111

Private Radio Stations – 168

**Total – 279**

**NOTES**

1. There are a couple of Internet radio stations in Lagos, Abuja and a few other states in Nigeria.
2. Data of radio stations compiled from the NBC website (which gave about 98 radio stations on their website) and other sources.



**NORTH-CENTRAL****BENUE STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	89.9 Benue State University, BSU FM, Makurdi
TOTAL	1

**KWARA STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	89.3 - University of Ilorin, Unilorin FM
TOTAL	1

**NASARAWA STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	101.1 - Nasarawa State University Mass Communication Dept. FM
TOTAL	1

**NIGER STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	92.3 - Search FM, Minna (Federal University of Technology, Minna)
2.	103.9 - Ultimate FM (College of Education) Minna
3.	89.1 - Click FM (Ibrahim Babangida University, Lapai)
TOTAL	3

**PLATEAU STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	96.1 - University of Jos Campus Radio

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S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
2.	98.9 - Plateau State Polytechnic, Rock FM
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2</b>

Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-Central region -8

## NORTH-EAST

### *BORNO STATE*

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	University of Maiduguri Radio, Kanem FM
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1</b>

Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-East region - 1

## NORTH-WEST

### *KADUNA STATE*

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	98.5 - KASU FM (Kaduna State University Radio)
2.	102.5 - Teachers Radio (Nigeria Institute of Teachers NIT)
3.	Samaru FM, Ahmadu Bello University Radio
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>

### *KANO STATE*

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	98.9 - BUK FM, Kano (Bayero University Kano FM)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1</b>

Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-West region – 4

**SOUTH WEST****LAGOS**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	95.7 - LASU Radio (Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos)
2.	103.1 - Unilag FM (University of Lagos)
3.	105.9 - NOUN FM (National Open University of Nigeria) Victoria Island
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>

**OGUN STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	89.1 - Hope FM (Babcock University Radio station, Ilisan-Remo)
2.	95.9 - Hebron FM (Covenant University Radio Station, Ota)
3.	92.1 - OOU FM (Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>

**ONDO STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	93.1 - FUTA FM (Federal University of Technology, Akure)
2.	100.9- Eki FM, Ondo city
3.	100.1 - Kakaki Ondo Community Radio, Ondo City (First Community Radio in Southern Nigeria)
4.	107.3 - Varsity Radio (Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>

**OSUN STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	94.5 - Great FM, Obafemi Awolowo University, OAU Ile-Ife
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1</b>

**OYO STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	89.1 - Lead City University Campus Radio FM, Ibadan
2.	101.1 - Diamond FM, University of Ibadan, Ibadan
TOTAL	2

Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-West region - 13

**SOUTH-EAST****ABIA**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	101.9 - Abia State University FM, Uturu
2.	107.1 - Green FM, (MOUUAU), Umudike
3.	93.3 FM -Rhema University Radio, Aba
TOTAL	3

**ANAMBRA STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	93.3 - Madonna Radio (Madonna University) FM, Okija
2.	94.1 - Unizik (Nnamdi Azikiwe University) FM, Awka
3.	107.1 - Tansian Radio (Tansian University) FM, Umuaya
4.	106.1 COOU FM, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University
TOTAL	4

**ENUGU STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	91.1 - Lion FM, University of Nigeria Nsukka
2.	98.7 - Caritas University FM Radio

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S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
3.	106.9 - Gouni FM (Godfrey Okoye University) Radio, Enugu
4.	106.5 - Stallion FM (Federal College of Education, Ehu-Amufu)
5.	106.5 - ESUT RADIO, Enugu
6.	107.2 - IMT RADIO, Enugu
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6</b>

**IMO STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	103.2 - Federal Polytechnic, Owerri FM
2.	90.90 - Imo State University STAR FM
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2</b>

Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-East region - 15

**SOUTH-SOUTH**

**AKWA IBOM STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	100.7 - UNIUYO FM (University of Uyo)
2.	104.9 - Heritage FM (Heritage Polytechnic, Eket)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2</b>

**DELTA STATE**

S/N	COMMUNITY/CAMPUS
1.	103.7 - Delta State University (Delsu FM), Abraka
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1</b>

**EDO STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	90.5 - Okada Wonderland FM, (Igbinedion University Radio) Okada
2.	94.1 - Hillside FM (Auchi Polytechnic Radio), Auchi
3.	100.1 - Uniben FM (University of Benin Radio), Benin city
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>

**RIVERS STATE**

<i>S/N</i>	<i>COMMUNITY/CAMPUS</i>
1.	88.5 - Uniport Unique FM (University of Port Harcourt)
2.	103.7 - Radio UST FM (University of Science and Technology)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2</b>

**Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-South region – 8**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF COMMUNITY/CAMPUS RADIO STATIONS IN NIGERIA – 49**