Construction of China and India's national interests: the Tibet question
Lee, S.

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CONSTRUCTION OF CHINA AND INDIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE TIBET QUESTION

S. LEE

PhD

2016
CONSTRUCTION OF CHINA AND INDIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE TIBET QUESTION

SEOKBAE LEE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2016
Declaration

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to examine China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet, and the ways in which these interests have been shaped and pursued. While drawing on the sizeable body of academic literature which already addresses this topic, this thesis contends that the conclusions which have been reached to date have tended to be arbitrary, insofar as studies have suffered from a lack of theoretical and conceptual clarity on ‘national interest’. The intention here is therefore to discuss the two countries’ stances using a more rigorous analytical framework based on explicit theoretical and conceptual foundations. From a rationalist and critical constructivist perspective in tandem, it attempts to identify and compare the rationales behind China and India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, and to examine the domestic processes of interest formation concerning the Tibet issue in elite discourse. To develop a rationalist account, content analysis is used to argue that both countries are primarily concerned about the security implications of the Tibetan question. For China, Tibet is a domestic issue, and symbolises internal integrity and the modernisation of the nation, especially with regard to minority areas. For India, Tibet remains a useful means of containing China, especially during negotiations over border disputes. To complement these findings, critical discourse analysis is used to develop a constructivist account examining the role of nationalism in the processes whereby elites have shaped, justified and pursued their national interests. This account suggests that the Communist Party of China has constructed a myth of Chinese nationhood partly in order to realise its interests vis-à-vis Tibet. The CPC has drawn on Han nationalism to fortify the concept of the Chinese nation, and on propaganda about development to neutralise Tibetan nationalism. In the case of India, the elite, while acknowledging their inability to contain China with the Tibet card, have attempted to boost nationalism by emphasising their generous, democratic and peaceful approach towards Tibet, and thereby comparing themselves favourably with China.

The thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in two main ways: it departs from the existing literature by taking a constructivist approach to China and India’s national interest with regard to Tibet; and it is the first empirical study in this research area to explore the role of nationalism as a strategic means of shaping and pursuing national interest.

Key words: National Interest, Nationalism, Rationalism, Constructivism, Critical Discourse Analysis, China-India Relations and Tibet
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Chapter I. Introduction

Introduction and Literature Review

International disputes can be interpreted as a conflict of interests. All attempts at conciliation, management or escalation of the conflict are actually the process of (re)balancing the interests between the stakeholders. Sometimes the interests are expressed and pursued explicitly, and at other times, implicitly. The story of China and India’s conflicts is not different. Especially, it seems that the two countries’ interests with regard to Tibet have been in the middle of their disputes. In this regard, investigating their national interests vis-à-vis Tibet can elicit a meaningful result that is helpful in understanding the nature of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. The primary purpose of this research is thus twofold: 1) to clarify issues in understanding of the concept of national interest and how the concept can be used as an analytical tool; and 2) to investigate China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet and its implications on their relations; and how the two countries’ national interests vis-à-vis Tibet have been defined, articulated and pursued.

The aim of this research is presented on the assumptions that 1) national interests of China and India are a core factor determining their policies and behaviours regarding the Tibet issue; and 2) different bureaucratic and political interests in the two countries are key variables shaping their conflicting national interests with regard to Tibet. Regarding the assumption 1), many scholars such as Burchill (2005), Drulák (2010), Garrison (2007), Kennan (1951), Morgenthau (1962), Nincic (1999) and Weldes (1999) emphasised that the concept of national interest is particularly significant to interpret international politics and the decision-making process in the sense that it can give the criteria for selecting and evaluating state actions to the interest parties such as policy makers and states officials. Concerning the assumption 2), according to Allison (1999), Barnett (2010), Burgess (2009), Halperin (2006), Lal (2006) and Weldes (1999), elite groups such as states officials and bureaucrats are key policy makers who shape the decision-making process and national interest. In particular, Lal (2006) and Weldes (1999) argued that in those countries like China and India where the power of government is strong, political elites and bureaucrats can wield strong influence over the formation process of national interest.

Before introducing the structure of this thesis, it is essential to review how the previous research has dealt with the Tibet issue in China-India relations and their national
interests in order to find out the main viewpoints and limitations in this research topic.

Today, diplomatic cooperation between China and India, the world’s two largest and fastest-growing economies, is gradually increasing. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s three-day official visit to India in 2014, China and India jointly announced that China will invest USD 20 billion in India’s infrastructure over five years (BBC, 2014; see also Pant, 2014). The two sides have also attempted to increase their bilateral trade in various areas such as tourism, films, healthcare, IT and logistics. Actually in 2010, during the former Chinese Prime Mister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, they already agreed to set a new bilateral trade target of USD 100 billion a year by 2015 (The Hindu, 2010), which touched around USD 70 billion in 2014 (Jha, 2014). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have had not only economic but also strategic purposes behind these visits. China, which is rearranging power relations in Asia with an eye toward potential conflict between the US and China, may have to politically neutralise India, a real Asian competitor with regard to political and economic power. India may also be in the process of acknowledging that there is little benefit in getting in trouble with China especially in terms of economic cooperation, considering that China is India’s largest trading partner (Iyengar, 2014; see also The Times of India, 2014).

Despite repeated efforts, many political issues such as the border dispute and military expansion between the two superpowers remain unresolved. As indicated above, Tibet may be in the middle of the sharpest conflicts (see Bhattacharya, 2007; Chellaney, 2014; Garver, 2011; Huchet, 2010; Jain, 2004; Kalha, 2012; Liu, 2011; Nadkarni, 2011; Norbu, 1997; Topgyal, 2011). Both countries consistently regard the presence in India of the Tibetan government-in-exile as one of the most politically sensitive issues (Shankar, 2010, p.13). Owing to each country’s own national interests in Tibet that might be derived from different bureaucratic and political interests (Barnett, 2010; see also, Lal, 2006), their negotiations over issues surrounding Tibet have made little progress. For India, Tibet issues can be a politically effective negotiation card against China. For the PRC, Tibet might have a huge significance in the senese that they could solidify the ‘One-China’ policy and occupy potential natural resources and a large regional barrier by possessing Tibet (Bhattacharya, 2007, pp.239-240; see also Norbu, 1997; Twining, 2009). Recently, tensions in that regard have entered a new phase due to the Dalai Lama’s retirement from political life. The political relations between the two countries could be heavily affected in any direction according to their stances concerning the changing circumstances in Tibet related to the Dalai Lama’s retirement and death (Nadkarni, 2011, pp.21-22; see also Bajpaee,
2010, p.4; Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258). In this way, due to issues surrounding Tibet, Sino-Indian relations have repeatedly, throughout the history of the two countries, seen subtle changes and periods of deadlock.

To date, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning China-India relations and Tibet; and the two superpowers’ interests in Tibet. Many scholars indicate that the Tibet issue is a crucial factor deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. Garver (2011) and Norbu (1997, p.1087) asserted that Tibet is a core issue in comprehending the PRC’s attitude concerning boundary disputes with India. China suspects that India has a hidden intention of weakening China’s control over Tibet. Garver (2011) also insisted that the PRC wants to continue the contentious mood caused by the territorial issue with India in order to keep India sober concerning Tibetans in India to engage in anti-China resistance movements among Tibetan exiles. By emphasising the Tibet issue as a centrepiece of the border dispute between China and India, Topgyal (2011) characterised Tibet as scapegoat of India’s moralistic idealism concerning China in the 1950s and a victim of India’s new realist policies toward China in the post-Cold War era. Chellaney (2014), Guruswamy and Singh (2009), Huchet (2010, 99), Jain (2004, p.263) and Norbu (1997, p.1093) argued that the Tibet issue still significantly affect their global policies and bilateral relations, although there have been their continuing efforts to relieve tensions between the two countries. Indian strategist Mohan (2008) emphasised the importance of Tibet in Sino-Indian relations, describing their relationship as follows: “When there is relative tranquility in Tibet, India and China have reasonably good relations. When Sino-Tibetan tensions rise, India’s relationship with China heads south.” Garver (2001, pp.1091-92) and Twining (2009) also argued that both countries can use the “Tibet card” as a bargaining tool to pressure each other in favour of their own national interests. Dr. Jagannath P. Panda, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) of India, during an interview dated 31st May 2013 with the author, claimed that:

I think no matter how much Indian experts and Government try to downplay the Tibet issue, I think Tibet is an issue that will always remain alive. This is not just for geographical reasons. Geography is just a small factor. I would argue that historical factor is becoming more important. It used to be a factor, but it has gained more importance… Now we know their [Tibet’s] cultural heritage in even Lhasa has been destroyed and that has been replaced by Chinese… I believe that the crash between Buddhism and Confucianism is going to be a major factor [for India and China relations as many Indian people cannot accept the China’s approach towards Tibetan Buddhism]. We know in China, there is the fact that religion does not exist… We have seen that the Tibetan problem has been linked
to India-China boundary problem. Now we have seen that we have water problem, we have Arunachal problem, Tawang problem, Chinese are playing with Tawang on the basis of historical connection with the 6th Dalai Lama. So all these factors, are going to affect India, China, even Pakistan and Tibet… I’m not agreeing the people who argue that Tibet does not exist as a factor in China and India relations. I think Tibet very much exists, and though Tibet as a political factor does not exist in India and China, but Tibet exists as a factor culturally, ethnically and regionally. (emphasis added)

Some analysts and scholars, however, disagree with the significance of Tibet for Sino-Indian relations. Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, said that because of the changed configuration of the world balance of power and the decreased possibility of the PRC’s internal collapse, the Dalai Lama and Tibet is no longer a bargaining chip for India to use against China; rather, the issue could be a thorn in Sino-Indian relations (The Hindu, 2009). Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior fellow of the IDSA, in his interview on 30th May 2013 with this researcher, maintained that:

There is no Indian Tibet policy. Tibet is not a factor in Sino-Indian relations. India considers Tibet to be an autonomous region. Whether the TAR is really autonomous or not is not our [India’] problem. It’s their [China’s] problem. But this has changed. In the year of 1954 and around that time, we used to say, Tibet is an autonomous part of China, but today we say, Tibet autonomous region is part of China. So this is change. So anyway there is no policy. There is policy for the Dalai Lama, as a religious host or guest. That is different. That is not political but spiritual and cultural… Tibetans are refugees. Tibetans are one of many refugees in India. So Tibet is not important in Sino-Indian relations. (emphasis added)

Despite the disagreement, it seems clear that the Tibet issue is still actively discussed when it comes to analysing China and India relations. That is to say, its importance can be evaluated differently, but it would be hardly thinkable to deal with Sino-Indian relations without reviewing the Tibet issue. Recently, as the two countries have reinforced their economic cooperation, scholars are tempted to try to examine whether the economic aspect can diminish their political tensions and remove the Tibet questions. Huang (2011, pp.115-21) and Stobdan (2008, pp.703-4) asserted that economic complementarities could ease their political conflicts, but if Tibet and Border issues are not solved, the influence of economic cooperation as a catalyst in relieving their political tensions might be limited. Gray (1995), Wang (1998) and Sautman (2002) stated that unlike the PRC’s belief that “only growth brings stability” and “economic development can solve our problems” (Brauchli, 1997), remarkable economic development in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
has not been able to bring peace and tranquillity in Tibet as well as relations with India. By maintaining that “Tibet is changing from barrier to a regional linking China and India [sic],” Yeo (2009) argued that Tibet’s rapid economic growth, engineered by China, has brought both economic opportunity and a considerable amount of stress to the Tibetan way of life. According to him, although there has been double-digit economic growth over the last fifteen years in Tibet, the economic performance of Tibetans falls behind that of the Han Chinese. The economic exchange between China and India through the Tibetan plateau, in this sense, will hardly be flourished in the near future owing to the mistrust and poor economic conditions of the Tibet areas. All these studies concentrate on the possibility that the economic cooperation between China and India can ease the ongoing tension related to Tibet. Many scholars are pessimistic over such possibility owing to the ceaseless mistrust between the two countries. It is fact that China and India have not been able to make an impressive progress in this matter by boosting the economic cooperation. Indeed, behind the economic cooperation, both states have had the “war of words” frequently especially on the territorial conflicts over Arunachal Pradesh which is called South Tibet in China (see Want China Times, 2014a).

A myriad of scholars is also concerned with the military aspects in TAR that could seriously increase tensions between China and India. China is expanding their military capabilities in Tibet rapidly (Pant, 2005, p.217; see also Aiyengar, 2010; Tellis, 2010; Ramachandran, 2008; Stobdan, 2006). In particular, their new Qinghai-Tibet Railway line opened in July 2006 makes PRC facilitate military expansion and control in Tibet (Patil 2008, p.296; see also Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258; Chansoria, 2010, pp.178-79; Clarke, 2011, p.19; Holslag, 2008a; 2008b; Jetly, 2010, pp.5-6; Khanduri, 2000; Samanta, 2008). The PRC also opened the airports in Tibet including Daocheng Yading and Qamdo Bamda airport, having a military purpose (Reuters, 2013). By describing Tibet as a militarized zone, Pant (2011) stated that because China already has modernised and huge transport infrastructure and military bases in Tibet, India is struggling to follow its pace, which increases their security concerns. Many Indian military strategists have also warned that the PRC will station new short-range missiles that have major Indian cities within their reach on the Tibetan plateaus (Bhasin, 2009, p.66; see also Jetly, 2010, p.5; Kumar 2007). India is concerned about the build-up of Chinese military force in Tibet because its border is directly connected to the Indian northeast border. This national security environment vis-à-vis China is quite sensitive for India given its bitter experience of the 1962 war with China (Garver, 2001).
Since Tibetan plateau is source of the riparian headwaters of the Himalayan Mountain range, only except for the Ganges River, and most of India’s river systems originate in Tibet, the dominance of China in Tibet could also trigger the river flow issue between the two countries (Nadkarni, 2011, pp.20-21; see also Bajpaee, 2010, pp.5-6; Barnett, 2010; Chellaney, 2006). Despite a number of MoUs on hydrological data sharing on River Brahmaputra / Yarlung Tsangpo whose headwater originates in Tibet, India is still demanding more data sharing; and China is still building more dams on the river – and possibly, China can divert the Tibet’s water to her mainland in the future (see Buckley 2015; see also Walker, 2015).

Close and longstanding relations between China and Tibet have occasioned confusion among Tibetans concerning their identity, further complicating Sino-Indian relations (Yeo, 2009). Both China and India have argued that Tibet is within their historical sphere of influence. A “Sinicised Tibet” may not be a welcome outcome for India. Shankar (2010, p.5) argued that the fact that China has failed to assimilate the Tibetans into the mainstream civilization is the main reason for China’s ambivalence towards India (see also Jetly, 2010, p.8). Regarding this issue, Norbu (2001) emphasised ethnic identity as the principal origin of the Tibetan uprising: “It seems to have more to do with ethnicity than with economics. Ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism—these are the etiology and dynamics of the conflict between the Han state and Tibetan ethnicity during the past 50 years” (p.349). Wang (1998) also stated that it is hard to believe that the development programmes in TAR will bring the ethnic peace in that area.

India’s granting of asylum to Dalai Lama has made the two countries’ relations complex as well. The PRC suspects that this is India’s intention to keep the Tibetan issue alive (Bhattacharya, 2007, p.258; Jetly, 2010, p.8; Norbu, 1997, pp.1091-92; see also Want China Times, 2014b). Liu (2011) indicated that embracing the Dalai Lama and hosting the Tibetan Exiles has proven to be a significant factor triggering mutual suspicion between the two countries. In order to resolve this difficulty, he argues for the indispensability of India’s acceptance that Tibet is an autonomous region of China, a position which implies that India may no longer use Tibet as a buffer zone between the two countries (Liu, 2011).

Around the Dalai Lama’s retirement from his political life and reincarnation issue, potential future relations between the two countries receive much attention from scholars as well. Nadkarni (2011, p.22) argues that the Tibetan leadership transition can be a starting point of new conflicts between China and India as younger Tibetans could take more extreme actions against the PRC to achieve their objective of political autonomy for
Tibet. In particular, any turmoil along the border near Tibetan exiles can worsen China and India relations more. Bajpaee (2010) and Barnett (2009) also asserted that issues surrounding reincarnation could deteriorate Sino-Indian relations. In an interview with Reuters, Padma Choling, the former Chinese-appointed governor of Tibet said that “it has to approve all reincarnations of living Buddhas, or senior religious figures in Tibetan Buddhism. And China has to sign off on the choosing of the next Dalai Lama” (Wee and Blanchard, 2011; see also Wei, 2015). Therefore, according to India’s response to the post-Dalai Lama, the issue of reincarnation can bring serious tensions between the two countries if the current Dalai Lama’s successor is chosen in the Tibetan exile in India (Sirki 2011, p.67; see also Wee, 2015).

All this being the case, it is reasonable to consider Tibet the centre of the considerable emotional gap and mutual distrust between the two countries. However, as Barnett (2010) indicated, scholars have given considerably less attention to China and India’s political and social interests that shape national interest with regard to Tibet even though the PRC has declared Tibet as a core interest since 2006. Also, many studies regarding Sino-Indian relations have restricted the Tibet variable to being a subject of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The question of how and why their national interests with regard to Tibet have been shaped has received little attention by the scholars. The fundamental assumption behind the logic of the existing literature is that the anthropomorphised states naturally seek security and economic benefits as it is a human nature, which is in accord with a realist account. Study of China and India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet that goes beyond a realist theoretical framework still remains a lacuna in this research field. In other words, attempts at examining China and India’s domestic process of interest formation regarding the Tibet issues have been frustrated by a paucity of reliable in-depth analysis, forcing analysts to rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. Most of all, even though the term national interest has extensively been used, very little research has been conducted on a rigorous conceptual framework for examining and interpreting the concept of national interest in this research field.

This research, thus, by establishing a persuasive conceptual framework on national interest, examines the process of the interest formation of the respective countries with regard to Tibet. Then it is essential to explore how scholars and theories in IR have attempted to understand the national interest. In the IR field, it can be argued that there are two theoretical bases when it comes to explaining the concept of national interest:
rationalism and constructivism (see Keohane, 1989; see also Smith, 2004). To briefly explain their approaches towards the concept of national interest, rationalists argue that national interest, mostly pursuing security and economic interests, is an exogenously fixed and predefined concept and any actors, here states, will naturally seek to maximise such interests. On the contrary to this, constructivists claim that national interest is a socially constructed concept and ideational factors such as norm and culture highly affect the formation process of national interest. This thesis, instead of a single framework, relies upon these two competing meta-frameworks and critically assesses China and India’s national interests especially with regard to Tibet, as fitting within each of these frameworks. As the ontological and methodological perspectives are different from each other, it could result in meaningful outcomes presenting varied interpretations and filling a gap of each framework. It may be possible to discover whether these frameworks can be in complementary relations as well.

Importantly, this research attempts to develop the constructivist accounts of national interest by focusing on the role of nationalism in the process of shaping, justifying and pursuing the national interests. It could be argued that nationalism, as a social construction, can be used to represent interests as defined and articulated by the actors as national interest. It is surprising that there has been little research conducted to particularly highlight the relationship between the two concepts in this research topic. The actors may need a certain level of social agreement to articulate the interests at the national level – though the process of collecting people’s opinions varies across regime types. Nationalism can act as an excellent foil to elicit such agreement. That is to say, it is through nationalism that the actors, usually government and state officials, could legitimise and justify their actions to reify and realise national interest. Thus, it may be reasonable to concentrate on how nationalism plays a role in defining and pursuing the national interest.

Lastly, this research strongly argues that examining the case of China and India’s interests in Tibet can help grasp the issues of understanding the concept of national interest and nationalism, because the way China and India pursue their interests with regard to Tibet is very different – the former is very explicit, strong and most of all, nationalistic; whereas the latter is implicit and passive. This aspect can give an excellent opportunity to compare patterns of states’ actions and discursive construction concerning the pursuit of national interests and use of nationalism as a political instrument.

1 This will be discussed in detail in chapter II, the concept of the national interest.
Chapter I. Introduction

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the research including an outline of the thesis. Chapter II is a conceptual framework for the concept of national interest. The purpose of this chapter is to review and analyse the existing literature on the concept of national interest in order to have my own position towards the concept for this research. In this chapter, this research mainly explores rationalist (realist and liberal) and constructivist (conventional and critical) accounts on national interest; and discuss how they understand a vague concept, national interest, as an analytical tool. This chapter especially highlights the usefulness of critical constructivism adopting the postmodernist sociolinguistics when it comes to understanding the concept of national interest – national interest is socially constructed and linguistically realised and represented. This means that rather than simply assuming that China and India’s interest in Tibet is a “natural” phenomenon, this research focuses on the way the ruling and intellectual elites of both countries have dealt with the Tibet issue as their national interest.

Chapter III concerns the theories of nationalism. As indicated above, this research focuses on the role of nationalism in defining and pursuing national interest. Thus, in this chapter, this research examines the main issues of nationalism – ontological and axiological debates – that have always been the subject of debates among scholars; and proposes how to see nationalism in this research. This research argues that nationalism is also a social construction that can be shaped either by elite or by the public. However, obviously, nationalism tends to be used, or abused by powerful actors (usually elite groups) in the pursuit of their own interests in the name of national interests. This chapter finally highlights the relationship between nationalism and national interest – nationalism as a means to shape and pursue national interest. As indicated above, this thesis assumes that elites in China and India have used and stimulated nationalism in the processes whereby they have shaped, justified and pursued their national interests.

In Chapter IV, this research discusses the methodology. Based on the conceptual frameworks in chapters II and III, this chapter presents the research questions, followed by the methods of analysis. This research has two sets of research questions, for the rationalist account and that of constructivist. It mainly deals with the textual analysis to be used in this research: qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Especially, reviewing the existing literature on discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, this
research tries to establish its own mode of critical discourse analysis. This chapter also
includes a discussion on the methods of interview as a tool for the purpose of collecting
data to be analysed.

Chapter V analyses China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet with a
rationalist perspective. The main purpose of this chapter is to find out the factors of Tibet
that are of interest to China and India. By examining economic and security / geopolitical
factors, this chapter attempts to discover the rationale behind the China and India’s pursuit
of interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It also indicates the limitations of the rationalist approach to the
topic and why alternative theoretical viewpoint, here, constructivism, is necessary.

In chapters VI and VII, with the proposed constructivist understanding on the
concept of national interest and nationalism, this research examines how China and India’s
national interests vis-à-vis Tibet have been constructed in elite discourse, focusing on
domestic political complexity. Each chapter gives the historical and socio-political context
surrounding the Tibet issue in the respective countries which is a background to the interest
formation. Especially, in these chapters, this study analyses the ways of discursive
construction of China and India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. Nationalism as a
strategic tool to pursue the national interest is also highlighted.

The final chapter, conclusion, reviews all the findings of this research and tackles
the research questions. This research argues that China and India’s national interest with
regard to Tibet is actually the product of elite discourse; and nationalism has been
generated, used and even manipulated in the discursive construction of national interest.

**Originality and Limitation of the Study**

The concept of national interest has been interpreted arbitrarily without adequate
theoretical and conceptual backgrounds even though there has been a preponderance of
discourse and use of the term, national interest, in many studies on this topic. Through
conceptualising national interest under rigorous theoretical foundations, it is expected for
this research to take a meaningful step to avoid arbitrary analysis. Most of all, this
research’s attempt at conceptualising national interest can be used and referenced for other
various empirical studies. Actually, studies that concentrate on the concept of national
interest have failed to give the way their explanations can be applied to varied empirical
research on international politics.
Studies in this field are also prone to overlook the domestic process of interest formation of China and India concerning the Tibet issue. It is worth mentioning that this thesis represents probably the first study that devotes considerable attention to constructivism in order to examine China and India’s national interest with regard to Tibet. Most of all, it has been no noticeable empirical research highlighting the relationship between national interest and nationalism that goes beyond the mere explanation that nationalism is a kind of political ideology to make people believe and pursue the national interest. This thesis genuinely the first attempt at expanding the discussion of the role of nationalism as a strategic tool when it comes to shaping and pursuing national interest in this research area. I hope that this research can be the foundation stone of the future studies on this topic.

This research, at the same time, has some limitations. One of the most challenging issues was to conduct the interviews. Especially it was not easy to have an interview with Chinese scholars, politicians and analysts. According to the criteria to select the potential interviewees, based on their topics and contents of publications related to the Tibet issue, I contacted 18 scholars, 2 politicians and 7 analysts (27 in total). I believed that I could generate meaningful raw material by conducting interviews with them as their publications contain, in my opinion, strong and even provocative arguments (vis-à-vis the Tibet issue) which may represent the interest of Chinese government and elites. However, unfortunately, I could receive only one response (with very broad and general content) from anonymous interviewee. Maybe due to the political sensitiveness, many potential interviewees ignored my interview requests; or refused to be interviewed. Of course no one wanted their names to be revealed in my thesis. Also, some of them, rather than accepting my interview request, merely “recommended” some particular books, articles and their own writings. I also attempted to approach a number of scholars whose research interest is related to contemporary Chinese politics whenever participating in academic conferences, in order to have an interview with them. However, their response to my request was rather disappointing. Most of them did not want to have a serious discussion on China-Tibet issue saying that it is no longer meaningful and contested topic when it comes to evaluating China’s national interest. This ignorance of the topic can also be a good source to be analysed, but the problem was, no one was willing to have a formal interview with me. These difficulties have arisen may be because 1) for Chinese, it would not be easy to discuss the Tibet issue explicitly with foreigners due to political sensitiveness; or 2) they may think that it is not necessary to discuss Tibet any more as the issue is already resolved.
Thus, via the method of interview, unfortunately it was impossible to generate a meaningful and fresh content for chapter VI. Constructing National Interests: China’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet.

Contacting Indian scholars and analysts was relatively easier. Actually, my initial plan was to visit some faculty members of the universities located in Delhi and analysts who seem to be interested in the Tibet issue. However, because of extremely hot weather and my illness, I could not easily arrange an interview with them. Especially, contacting the faculty members was not easy because majority of my requests were ignored and some of them did not allow me to visit them due to their busy schedule. In this reason, majority of my interviews were conducted in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), one of the biggest security policy think-tanks in India located in New Delhi, in which I had stayed during my filed trip to India. The interviewees include: 1) Col P K Gautam, research fellow of the IDSA; 2) Brigadier Mandip Singh; 3) Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior fellow of the IDSA; 4) Dr Jagnnath P. Panda, research fellow of the IDSA; and 5) Dr. R. N. Das, senior fellow of the IDSA. They were selected as an interviewee based on their publications dealing with the Tibet issues in India. Each interview lasted around 30-40 minutes and I could have very meaningful conversations with them for this research. All of them were very careful to answer the questions particularly with regard to Tibet’s role in India-China relations. Rather than focusing on the political implications of the Tibet issue in India, they all emphasised the cultural relationship between India and Tibet. In other words, it seemed that they were reluctant to explicitly express their concern and idea on the political aspects of the Tibet issue in India. This tendency and the data generated in the interviews are extensively discussed and analysed in chapter VII. Constructing National Interests: India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet.

However, there was a barrier as well. As explained above, thanks to my supervisor, Professor. Dibyesh Anand’s help, I could stay in the IDSA, for about 4 months. I wanted to conduct the interviews with Indian scholars and state officials there and attend conferences and seminars on China and India relations and Tibet, but it was impossible to do so. Basically, the institution did not allow me to attend any events whose topic is related to China. Even some people explicitly and implicitly suspected me of a Chinese spy. They wanted me to say something about South Korean politics only. Majority of the members of the institution were personally very kind to me and I enjoyed the stay in India very much, but academically, I felt a sense of frustration many times. Actually I regret that I could not have enough opportunities to develop my idea much more from there. Also, it was not easy
to find “objective” and reliable data related to this Topic. Especially, when I collected the data for chapter V, I realised that interested bodies and individuals related to the Tibet issue generate and use the different data on the same topic according to their political and social preferences / interests. Simply, there is no agreement and trust on the data available. This aspect hampers researchers in this field from conducting a reliable and productive research. I discussed this point in detail in chapter V.
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

— LORD PALMERSTON, Speech to the House of Commons

National Interest

“I went to Brussels with one objective, to protect Britain’s national interest. And that is what I did.” British Prime Minister David Cameron told lawmakers in the House of Commons on 12 December 2011. Many politicians and scholars have frequently used, or abused, the concept of the national interest to justify and assess a nation’s foreign policy and action. However, the concept is still vague and controversial even though there has been a great deal of attempts to define and analyse it. Its characteristics of ambiguity and vagueness are not because of a lack of research trying to define it but because of a myriad of such attempts that bring about many interpretations and controversies (Drulák, 2010, p.12).

There have been concepts that reflect the “interests” of rulers and elites such as “the will of the prince” of Machiavelli, “dynastic interests” of Henry VIII or “general will” of Rousseau. In this course of history, as the scope of the concept of interests was broadened and transferred to a modern state, the concept of the “national” interest emerged. Until the early 20th century, however, the research that attempts to conceptualise the national interest was rare though scholars and politicians used the term frequently in order to explain foreign policy and international politics (see Mowrer, 1924). Charles A. Beard (1934), in his publication The Idea of National Interest, was one of the first to contribute to developing the modern concept of the national interest. By distinguishing the national interest from the “public interest,” he argued that the economic interest is the most significant factor in shaping the national interest. According to Beard, as far as the national interest is concerned, the property owners’ interests cannot be ignored. Thus, he claimed that since interests and human motive and concern are inextricably related, there are no objective national interests that are permanent and fixed. His research is meaningful in that it raises awareness of the importance of the concept as a tool for analysis of foreign policy.
and international politics. However, his publication lacks theoretical foundation and over-relied on empirical and historical intuition. Moreover, he almost neglected other factors such as political power and culture that might affect the people’s behaviours and national interest. Thus, it seems reasonable to evaluate that his study fails not only to analyse how national interests are generally constructed but also to examine the concept of the national interest through a diverse and sophisticated spectrum of perspectives.

From Beard’s research on national interest, many scholars have attempted to clarify this overused concept itself more theoretically. Frankel (1970) gave more concrete shape to the concept. He categorised the concept of the national interest into two types: 1) objective national interests that are permanent and independent, for instance, those of geography, history and resources; and 2) subjective interests that are changeable and dependent on many factors such as the certain government’s preferences and a tendency of policy makers, for example, those of ideology and religion. His study contributes to the progress of the development of the concept in that he presented more specific and pragmatic criterion for the analysis of the national interest. However, as Kratochwil (1982) indicated, Frankel “fails to tell us why a given classification is sensible or fitting” (p.1). Also, boundary that he proposed between objective and subjective national interest may be debatable. Frankel indicated that the factor of neighbours is objective national interest which is independent of any form of government. However, much empirical evidence goes against his argument. For example, Conservative and Liberal governments in South Korea have very different attitudes and policies towards North Korea, the nearest neighbour; the former describes North Korean regime as the main enemy while the latter opposes this. They both argue that their stances accord with South Korea’s national interest. Their terms of national interest are rather highly subjective. Therefore, it is questionable whether this categorisation is a good way to analyse the concept of national interest.

By defining national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment,” Nuechterlein (1976) divided the national interest into four basic interests: Defence, Economic, World Order and Ideological interests (p.247, 248). With the case examples such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, US intervention in Vietnam in 1965 and the Korean War in 1950, he attempted to analyse how leaders make the decisions under his categorisation of national interest. Nuechterlein, however, only concentrated on the decision-making process of the elite and almost neglected domestic conflicts with regard to national interest. Also, the scope of each category of national
interest is too broad and oversimplified to apply to any other case studies. By highlighting the national interest as “a highly resilient concept,” Rochester (1978) claimed that two assumptions are embedded in the concept of national interest: 1) there exists an objectively determinable collective interest which all individual members within a given national society share equally; and 2) this collective interest transcends any interests that a particular subset of those individuals may share with individuals in other national societies (p.79). Her point in these assumptions is that “whatever the differences between various subnational groups in a national society, those groups have more interests in common with each other than they do with groups in other national societies” (p.80). However, there is no clear empirical-based evidence to support this argument; and her argument might not be enough to explain civil wars such as in 1970s and 1980s Lebanon or today’s Syria. Also, it may be necessary to explain how such interests in common in national societies can be shaped.

Though above studies that concentrate on the concept itself shed meaningful light on the way national interest can be understood and explained, there is a common tension among them. It is not clear how their explanations can be applied to varied empirical research on international politics. Apart from the controversies over metatheoretical and epistemological issues, it seems that they do not lend any clear explanations for the way one can identify whether there exists actual causality between the national interest and political phenomena in international relations.

Many empirical studies that use the term national interest also suffer from lack of theoretical clarity on the conceptualisation of the national interest (see Behrman, 1970; Casey 2003; Dosman, 1975; Gupta, 1956; Hayes, 1984; Horn, 2006; Johansen, 1980; McGee, 1989; Mediansky, 1988; Miklóssy, 2003; Nichols, 1987; Schonberg, 2003; Von Vorys, 1990). In these studies, national interest is interpreted arbitrarily in order to explain the phenomena of international politics. Their arguments are that foreign policies are established based on national interest, but they fail to explain why and how the specific national interest is important and defined. For them, it may be a series of commonly held views about national interest to regard economic power and security as “true” national interest without exception. Some could argue that these studies follow a rationalist viewpoint because they “affirm,” in spite of no clear mention about it, that promoting national security and acquisition of economic power are unchallengeable national interest. It is, however, difficult to evaluate that their research were derived from a rationalist approach because they do not present any metatheoretical ground, namely, ontological and
normative assumptions with regard to national interest. In short, their notions of national interest are too “oversimplified and wrongheadedly dogmatic” (Hoffmann, 1978, p.133).

Many scholars criticise such indiscriminate abuse of the concept and reveal a very sceptical view of the usefulness of the national interest as an analytical tool (Boulding, 1970; Crabb, 1975; Frankel, 1970; Hoffmann, 1978; Rosenau, 2006; Quigg, 1971; see also Clinton 1994). By arguing that the international relations theories are of no use to the study for the quest for the meaning of national interest, Frankel (1970) claimed that it is impossible to conceptualise the national interest theoretically. Similar to this, Rosenau (2006) also asserted that as an analytic concept, the national interest has “little future” (p.254). He also criticised that “the national interest has never fulfilled its early promise as an analytic tool” (p.248). He defined the national interest as two categories, objective and subjective, which is similar to Frankel’s perspective. However, for him, objective reality is “neither predictively nor retrospectively can its contents be clearly demonstrated” (p.250). Subjective one is also “hardly suitable to the description, explanation, and evaluation of foreign-policy goals due to its vagueness” (p.252). Clinton (1994) also indicated that “any defence of the national interest bears a heavy burden of proof” (p.21). The concept was also branded as “a sort of Rosetta Stone” (Quigg, 1971, p.107) and “a kind of incarnation or nostrum of foreign policy” (Crabb, 1975, p.226).

Such criticisms might result from the inherent ambiguity, vagueness and uncertainty of the concept of national interest. As many previous studies show, it may not be easy to completely overcome the limitations of the concept. However, as Kratochwil (1982) indicated, abandoning the concept of national interest “would probably cause embarrassment, since the notion of the national interest is part of our political reality and is integral to our discourse on public affairs” (p.2). Nuechterlein (1976) also claimed that “the term national interest is so deeply ingrained in the literature of international relations and diplomatic language that it is unlikely to be dismissed from our vocabulary simply because some scholars find it useless” (p.246). Drulák (2010) argued that even if it is difficult to identify clear national interest, “the focus on the national interest is still beneficial since it brings us to the question of why this is so, i.e. whether there are domestic or external reasons for not reaching a national interest” (p.182). In fact, some scholars have given a meaningful clue with regard to the way national interest can be used in empirical research in convincing manner (see Datta, 2005; Drulák, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; Hook 1995; Kabiraj, 2007; Krasner, 1978; Tumlir, 1978; Weldes, 1999; Yan, 1996). Though each researcher may have different ontological and normative assumptions and, of course,
limitations, there is the common denominator that needs to be considered. They attempt to conceptualise the concept of national interest more theoretically strictly and discover the causal relations between the national interest and political phenomena that they want to investigate. In other words, they focus on how national interest can be the criteria for specific political actions. Different from the research without any conceptualisation and convincing interpretation of national interest, studies by these scholars show how national interest can be interpreted in international politics.

Thus, it may be essential to explore how scholars and theories in the discipline of international relations have attempted to understand the national interest in order to establish a persuasive conceptual framework for the analysis of China and India’s national interest with regard to Tibet. In fact, there has been a preponderance of rationalist framework when it comes to much of the writing on China-India relations, to date. This may be because their remarkable economic development, growing power in international politics and boundary disputes are good enough to attract scholars to conduct their research regarding China-India relations under a rationalist framework, realist one, in particular (this will be discussed later). However, rationalist approaches may not provide an enough explanation for Sino-Indian relations with regard to Tibet because many other variables such as culture and identity should be involved in the process of shaping national interest when considering their history and actions surrounding this issue. Such variables may go beyond the mere range of security, economy and power, so different framework from previous research must be necessary not only to find the undiscovered and unperceived (but might be important) national interest of China and India with regard to Tibet but also to discover how such national interest can be shaped and linked to their actions towards each other and Tibet. This thesis would argue that social constructivism can result in meaningful research outcomes in that its ontological and methodological perspectives are different from those of rationalists and no empirical studies has been conducted under constructivist approaches to analyse China and India’s national interests. It may not be desirable, however, to ignore rationalist approaches for this research because it can still give an opportunity to discover important aspects that can explain the national interest of two countries in that writing on national interests of China and India is of relatively recent origin and remains a largely underdeveloped field for IR scholars. With two different frameworks, it may also be possible to discover whether these frameworks can be in complementary relations.
Chapter II. The Concept of the National Interest

Seokbae Lee

In summary, as stated in Introduction, instead of a single framework, this thesis will rely upon two competing meta frameworks (rationalist with realist and liberal strands and social constructivist), and critically assess China and India’s national interests especially with regard to Tibet, as fitting within each of these framework. It is expected for this thesis to offer a refreshing account with social constructivism as no researcher has used any version of constructivism in this field so far.

Approaches to the National Interest

1. Rationalist

Realism and liberalism have arguably dominated the discipline of international relations since the end of World War II. They are generally regarded as rationalist theories in the sense that “they are both constructed upon the choice-theoretic assumptions of microeconomic theory” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216). Rationalists assume that human beings are rational and self-interested; and the action “must be the best means of satisfying their desires, given their beliefs about the available options and their consequences” (Elster, 2007, p.193). The important aspect of their assumption is that actors’ interests and identities are fixed, exogenously given and defined. They argue that actors are independent of social structures; so they do not concentrate on the internal process of interest formation (see Waltz, 1979, pp. 91-92; see also Der Derian, 1995; Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216; Smith, 2004, p.502).

They also attach a deep significance to the concept of national interest when explaining a characteristic of international relations and state actions. Despite considerable disagreement about the way of interpreting the phenomena regarding international relations, they both argue that states are highly rational, self-interested and the most important actor (see Reus-Smit, 2009, p.214). For them, national interest as a concept is not contested in the sense that there are economic and political objective national interests that states always seek. They do not concentrate on interest formation, but strategic game where states are involved in according to their national interests (see Smith, 2004). Their explanation for correlation between national interest and state actions is thus relatively straightforward.

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2 I use that term “highly” because some liberals contend that states can also be irrational (see Simon, 1957). This will be explained in detail in the next section.
in empirical studies. For instance, the tensions between China and Japan over the disputed islands in East China Sea\(^3\) can be explained in the following manner: since the area in which the islands are located is resource-rich and of vital strategic importance, both states have asserted ownership of the islands. Two states rationally pursue their national interests, security maximisation and material forces. Other variables such as the history and culture of China and Japan might not be seriously considered in this logic.

This section explores two mainstream rationalist approaches, realism and liberalism, in order to discover how both realist and liberal are similar and how both are rationalist. This part also attempts to examine their strong and weak points with regard to their understanding of the concept of national interest when it comes to interpreting the phenomena of international relations.

**a. Realist**

Realists have mainly led the development of the concept of the national interest in spite of many harsh criticisms. They, regardless of the “category” such as the “classical-“ and “neo-,” regard the national interest as crucial factor in understanding of international politics (Weldes, 1999, p.5). The fundamental premise of the realist paradigm is “states can be treated as unified actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest” (Krasner, 1978, pp.12-13). Realists argue that in international politics, each nation state thinks and acts according to national interest to protect its fixed and eternal goals from an external milieu, for instance, promoting national security and preserving national territory.

Realist modern understanding of national interest conspicuously stems from Hans J. Morgenthau who conceives of the acquisition of economic and military power as the most crucial interest (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.345; see also Hoffmann, 2006, p.166; Landsberg, 2010, p.274). He claimed that national interests are permanent and fixed, and it, the concept of interest, must be “defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 2005, p.5). Morgenthau (1962, p.79), by arguing that “a theory of international politics must be focused on the concept of the national interest,” also insisted that foreign policy goals must be defined in terms of the national interest. Morgenthau clearly presents his perspective and understanding of the national interest by listing the “six principles of political realism.”

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\(^3\) The islands are known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The islands have been under valid control of Japan since early 1970s.
The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. … We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. … The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. … A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences. (Morgenthau, 2005, p.5, emphasis added)

For him, the national interest is an objective political reality, and this is not realised by “the whim of a man or the partisanship of party”, but a rational statesman. This argument is based on the assumption that the state acts like an amoral human being, so the behaviour of the anthropomorphised state can be predicted in that human nature has not changed since the earliest beginning of the philosophies of human nature. Morgenthau assumes that political leaders are rational actors who know what their national interests are and what they have to do in order to defend their national interests. With regard to this, he (2005) contended that “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place” (p.12). By emphasising that “any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation,” he also claimed that all nations must “protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations” (Morgenthau, 1952, p.972).

Through these arguments, Morgenthau attempts to make the concept of the national interest into a scientifically more concrete analytical tool (Kratochvíl, 2010). His definition of the national interest wielded strong influence over realism in academia, in particular, the classical realists (Clinton, 1994; Coicaud and Wheeler, 2008; Drulák, 2010; Kissinger, 1957; Landsberg, 2010; Weldes, 1999). George F. Kennan (1951) largely shares Morgenthau’s perspective on national interest and international politics. Kennan insisted that national interest based on power is more reliable guide to foreign policy than any other criteria. He agrees with the idea, in particular, that “universal moral principles cannot be
applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau, 2005, p.11). By criticising United States diplomacy as the “legalistic-moralistic” approach, he warned that some system of legal rules and restraints cannot be helpful in dealing with the conflict between different national interests of states in international politics. In a sentence, he contended that “there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles” (Kennan, 1979, p.43).

However, not every classical realist agrees with above perspectives on national interest and international politics. By claiming that “Realism becomes morally cynical or nihilistic when it assumes that the universal characteristic in human behavior must also be regarded as normative,” Niebuhr (1953, p.130; see also 1947, 1949), who is also regarded as a classical realist, criticised that realism excessively addresses the role and importance of national interest. According to him, the will-to-power of individuals and groups, which extends beyond the desires of the instinct of survival, becomes more amplified when such interested parties are involved in the common members of any national community. The main thrust of his argument is, as his title of book Moral Man and Immoral Society shows, man can be moral, but it is almost impossible for society to be moral. He insisted that the problems of society have to be solved not by ethics but by power and politics in that the reality can hardly change even if ethics and morality are much more emphasised. He also argued that such power has to be used for justice and a broad social interest, not self-interest of particular groups or individuals. Therefore, according to him, too much focus on national interest can exacerbate the characteristics of the international anarchy where there is a lack of the moral sense since it is difficult for a nation to be ethical in international politics. Niebuhr’s perspective on national interest may partly be different from that of Morgenthau in that the former more emphasises the role of morality and ethics as essential elements when explaining the interest of nation. He also denied the idea that the politicians are basically indifferent to morality, which is different from Morgenthau’s argument of the human nature. However, Niebuhr also indicates power as the most important element when it comes to explaining international politics and national interest as Morgenthau argues.

Carr (1939) also shows different understanding from Morgenthau’s concept of power. He contended that it is unrealistic to ignore a moral factor in terms of understanding the international order. According to him, though power is a very fundamental element for every government, “an international order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple
reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power” (p.235). Wolfers (1962) also claimed that it is impossible to explain the phenomena of international politics only through power, so other factors such as ideology and morality should be considered when investigating national interest and international politics.

Even though there is some disagreement among classical realists, they share the ideas: 1) the (anthropomorphised) state has its own interests like an individual; 2) the state behaves according to the interests as a rational actor; 3) state survival and maximisation of power are very significant elements that define the national interest; and 4) it may be naïve to believe that morality can manage the international disorder.

However, their perspective on the national interest has been challenged in many aspects. It may not be easy to objectively define and delineate the elements of power in international politics. Therefore, a judgement of interest defined according to power can be highly subjective, which is inconsistent with his argument. Most of all, Morgenthau’s distinction between objective and subjective components is not clear, and even what he defines as objective facts has to be subjectively defined and identified (Burchill, 2005). Donnelly (2000) also claims that Morgenthau fails to provide “theoretical account of when and why a state will chose one strategy over another” (p.46). This is because Morgenthau ignores historical and circumstantial variable aspects, especially those of independent of power, which may differ from time to time and nation to nation (Donnelly, 2000; see also Clinton, 1986; 1994; Kratochwil, 1982). The case of the Republic of Korea and United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) could be a good example. During the process of the treaty, they had to amend a negotiated agreement many times due to severe public opposition in both countries, which was unexpected circumstance for them. Morgenthau’s explanation may not be enough to discover this kind of domestic dynamics which affects state’s strategic choice. Thus, Morgenthau’s claim that national interest can be defined only by power cannot fully lend enough and adequate understanding of the concept of the national interest in terms of an analysis and interpretation of international politics.

Moreover, in classical realism, the concept of human nature in international politics is “constant,” not “variable,” so it is not easy to explain the differences between various types of interactions among nations. In other words, their notion of invariable pessimistic human nature can be helpful when it comes to explaining conflict between countries, but it might not be easy to understand peace and cooperation in international politics only with their perspective. To take an example, one can interpret conflicts between North and South Korea as struggle for power between two anthropomorphised
states having an amoral human nature, but one may have difficulties in explaining inter-Korean cooperation and South Korea’s Sunshine policy towards North Korea to eradicate the remnants of the Cold War.

The leading neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz (1979), who regards security maximisation as an objective and eternal law of international politics, develops realist understanding of the national interest more explicitly (Druilák, 2010, p.13; see also Davidson, 2009). Instead of focusing on human nature and ethics of statecraft, he attempts to offer a scientific explanation of international politics by concentrating the structure of the system, unlike Morgenthau (Jackson and Sørensen, 2006). According to Waltz, the national interest is given by the structure of the international system, not by political elites and leaders. He states that “structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them” (Waltz, 1979, p.117). Different from Morgenthau, he thought that human nature can either be selfish or altruistic. In short, he, neo-realist, asserts that the national interest can be shaped by anarchical international system. Waltz also insisted that the essence of international politics is not struggle for power that most classical realists argue, but struggle for security. He asserts that states seek the national interest that is defined by security. In fact, neo realists do not share a central idea of classical realism that power maximisation is the core national interest. They contend that security maximisation is the ultimate aim of states. They regard power as a useful tool for security maximisation in international politics.

It seems reasonable to evaluate that Waltz’s understanding of the national interest contributes to overcoming the ambiguous and contradictory perspectives of classical realists in that he brings “greater intellectual rigour and systematic understanding to the behaviour of states by analysing the issue in systemic rather than reductionist terms” (Burchill, 2005, p.61). However, both of classical and neo realists seem to have overlooked a domestic social complexion. It might be very difficult to be totally confident that a state’s foreign policy can really be autonomous from an internal situation. Their claim that security and state survival is a nation’s common interest, which allows the state to act free from other peripheral interests, is also problematic (Weldes, 1999; see also Davidson, 2009; Holsti, 1992; Keohane, 1986; Tucker, 1961; Sondermann, 1987). Separatist and minority groups, who struggle to achieve their own goals, independence, for instance, under the state’s strong control, may not share an interest in the state’s territorial security. Tibet case makes a striking example. Tibetan people have strived for their “genuine autonomy” from the PRC. Recent Tibetan self-immolation provides a microcosm of how
Tibetans react against the PRC’s rule and policy. Even the most casual glance at Tibet’s case, security issue in Chinese territory is not an interest of Tibetans. Thus, with only realist approaches to the national interest, it might not be easy to fully understand a certain international politics such as the Tibet issue above.

Also, there should be other national interests that go beyond those defined by power and security. Though realists have attempted to define the elements of the concept of power in various ways, they mostly regard military power as the main one. This might be because it is relatively easier to quantitatively (or objectively) evaluate and compare military strength among countries. This idea would be helpful in explaining the cases like the current arms race in Asian countries such as China, India and Pakistan. However, many empirical evidences are contrary to their perspective on national interest defined by power. We need to look no further than an example of the Lula government in Brazil. Brazil’s former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva actively introduced social welfare policies especially for the very poor people for the long-run interests of Brazil. No matter what the result and evaluation are, this case clearly demonstrates that states can pursue the national interest that is not defined by the realist concept of power. Also, turning to the case of an armament race among South Asian countries, Pakistan case in particular, it may be doubtful whether the recent growing military budget of Pakistan is desirable for their national interests even though they have been in economic crisis especially since 2008, the year Pakistan government accepts IMF conditions for financial aid. If their increasing military strength is interpreted as defensive actions towards external threats, how their domestic ruined economy can be explained. For Pakistan, are security issues more important than the economic crisis? If so, under what criteria and from whom such decision was made? Regardless of the fact that Pakistan’s approach is accordant to realist perspective on national interest, the picture, however, needs to be more specific in several ways. In other words, it seems hard to specify national interests of states only with realist ideas. Therefore, it should be necessary to take multidimensional approaches to the analysis of the national interest in order to avoid superficial understanding of international politics.

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4 Morgenthau (2005) classified national power into two categories: tangible elements (geography, natural resources, Industrial capacity, military preparedness and population) and intangible elements (national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government). However, he himself indicated that it may be hard to measure the concept of national power because the boundary among elements is not clear. Though he warned that military force is usually overemphasised when analysing national power, he often regards military power as the most crucial factor in the concept of power (see Morgenthau, 1952; 1960; 1962; 2005).
b. Liberals

Though much of progress of the analysis of the national interest has been conducted by Realists IR, their accounts of the national interest have been criticised harshly by liberals. Liberals deny the Realists’ top-down approaches to the national interest and claims that the concept of the national interest should be analysed by bottom-up perspectives (Drušák, 2010; Keohane 1982; Mitrany, 1966; Nye, 1988; Putnam, 1988). They argue that rational individuals can only have true objective interests. For them, subjective interests are almost always defined by dominant groups, and this obstructs the objective goals of foreign policy such as free trade and minimal state (Keohane, 1986; Nye, 1999; see also Burchill, 2005). In other words, according to liberal notion, “national interest is subject to change according to the preferences of domestic actors rather than being an atemporal reality waiting to be discovered by the statesman” (Drušák, 2010, p.13).

Liberals hypothesise that states can also be an irrational actor, and it is difficult for them to make a “rational” decision regarding national interest because of the conflicting interests between various irrational non-state actors and the bureaucrats. According to Simon (1957), humans can only have limited rationality in the decision making process, so under liberalism, it may be impossible for states to realise all possible consequences of the proposed national interest, which could make them irrational. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) also criticised classical realists who too much obsess the concepts of national interest, power and balance of power in order to explain international politics since such concepts are hard to empirically be defined. They argued that it is necessary to know how decision makers define or interpret the internal and external situations in order to understand the actions and interests of states. Thus, it can be evaluated that they attach importance to human dimension, not to anthropomorphised states.

Liberals also challenge realist notion that anarchical international system cultivates conflict and competition between states. They assert that international institutions help states cooperate each other. They believe that interdependence between countries, transnational interdependence and international institutions can bring new definition of the concept of interest (Grieco, 1988). That is, liberals are interested in how interdependence between states and international institutions change the way national interest is defined. Keohane and Nye (1987, p.741) emphasised the importance of “characteristics of international institutions, domestic politics and learning by elites and shifts in relative power capabilities” to explain the nature of international regimes or changes among them. According to them, characteristics of international institutions and domestic structure affect
each other. Therefore, in order to understand the way state preferences and national interest change, liberals insist that it is essential to investigate domestic politics and structure. They also argue that “economic and technological forces” play a crucial role in bringing political interdependence among countries as an important form of power (McGrew, 1992, p.20).

Furthermore, liberals refute the concept of “balance of power” that has been mostly studied and defended by realist scholars. They assert that balance of power is product of collusion among elites for arrangement of international relations in order to meet their interests (Kauppi and Viotti, 1992). Liberals regard the way great powers seek their economic and political interests at the expense of weak powers as injustice and violation of international law. For them, the pursuit of peace should be the priority of the national interest with collective security arrangements, not with balance of power diplomacy (Nye, 1999; see also Burchill, 2005). Realists, however, refute this liberal criticism of the concept. They claim that preserving international peace is not the main function of the balance of power. For realists, preserving the states system is the principal function of the concept. Even they argue that smaller powers can be absorbed during the process of war to retain international order as the necessary cost (Bull, 1977). Settling aside an evaluation of the concept of balance of power, liberal perspective on the national interest in international politics seems somewhat idealistic. As Howard (1978, p.132) states, “a degree of mutual confidence, a homogeneity of values and a coincidence of perceived interests” are required for a collective security system. However, it may be difficult to find these conditions in the current competitive and suspicious atmosphere of international system.

Again, liberals do not share the idea that the national interest is basically pursued by a state itself. Liberals think that the concept of the national interest is incompatible with the liberal notion of an unregulated single global economy and a united human community. They also believe that human beings are now on a line towards a “better future” where liberal democracy and genuine democracy are strongly settled. However, it seems hard for liberals to answer the questions about “the unequal benefits of globalisation and why its victims would share a common interest in the pursuit of free trade and unfettered foreign investment” (Buchill, 2005, p.210; see also Nye, 1999). With liberal accounts on the national interest, it might be hard to explain the situations and circumstances that international politics have been experienced. Though there have been a lot of conflicts triggered by power struggle and wealth, they too much underestimate such inevitable disputes. Liberals also do not clearly state that which domestic and external factors can
affect the actions of states and national interest. Their understanding of the national interest is too broad to explain how a certain interest can be shaped and shared as well.

So far, this thesis has examined rationalist perspectives, that is, two mainstream approaches in IR, realist and liberal approaches, towards the concept of national interest. Realists and liberals share three assumptions as a rationalist: 1) political actors – be they individuals or states – are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational; 2) actors’ interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction; 3) society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined interests (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.216). They also argue that “whatever actors want (and this is canonically to maximize utility), they choose what they believe to be the best means available to attain it” (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003, p.12). Actors’ decisions can be regarded as a rational choice under the name of national interest which is fixed and permanent. Though, as indicated above, there are some limitations to explain and analyse the concept of national interest, rationalist approaches can be particularly helpful in examining visible phenomena of international politics with regard to content of interests that is usually regarded as material forces. As Elster (1989) stated, “when faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome” (p.22), rationalism also gives great theoretical parsimony regarding behaviours of actors and agents. Checkel (1998) also claimed that “when interests were stable, rationalism might be the right method” (p.346).

Thus, this thesis, under a rationalist framework, examines how China and India approach the issues surrounding Tibet, focusing on power, security and economic interests. With this, it is expected to discover their coherent actions towards objective national interests that is fixed, and fundamental logic to evaluate their interests with regard to Tibet.

2. Constructivist

a. Constructivism and National interest

Constructivists reject the idea that the national interest is fixed, given and permanent, which is realist basic understanding of the concept. They also deny the argument that true objective interest determined by material forces can be realised only by self-regarding individuals whose rationality is exogenously given, which is liberal notion of interest. Constructivists basically share the idea that “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and the identities and
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). That is to say, according to constructivism, the social world and national interest is not exogenously given, but endogenously constructed. What they disagree with rationalist account on the concept of national interest can be encapsulated in four points: 1) national interests are social constructions; 2) Identities of actors who are involved in the process of shaping national interests are socially constructed and crucial to interpreting the phenomena in international politics in the sense that “identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt, 1992, p.398; see also Reus-Smit, 2009); 3) National interests are culturally produced and reproduced; 4) National interest are changing and contested.

They criticise that dominant approaches in international relations academia usually assume interests and preferences without attempt at explanation of those interests and preferences (Chafetz et al, 1999). As indicated before, rationalists assume that actors are pre-social and not interested in identities and interests formation but in strategic game. For constructivist, where and how interests are shaped is a core point to examine a characteristic of international relations. Constructivists maintain that interests are endogenously shaped in social interaction “as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learnt through processes of communication, reflection on experience, and role enactment” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.223). By highlighting that “states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations,” Martha Finnemore (1996, p.2) claimed that identities and interests are shaped and defined by international social structure and international forces, not by objective criteria, that is, power. It might be debatable that international organisations play a crucial role in defining interest and identities, but the most important point of her argument here is that actors (states) are socialised in the process of accepting new identities and interests. Hopf (1998) also claimed that “by making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not only how particular interests come to be, but also why many interests do not” (p.176). He noticed identity formation process in terms of interest construction. That is, he indicates social interaction, understanding of identity and interest are significant factors when it comes to differentiating constructivists and rationalists.

Neorealism and constructivism share fundamental concerns with the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the nature of power, and the prospects for change. They disagree fundamentally, however, on each concern. Contra neorealism, constructivism assumes that actors and structures mutually
constitute each other; anarchy must be interpreted to have meaning; state interests are part of
the process of identity construction; power is both material and discursive; and change in
world politics is both possible and difficult. (Hopf, 1998, p.181, emphasis added.)

Alexander Wendt (1999), a leading scholar in the field of constructivism, stated that “I
define the national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting
of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-
esteeem” (p.198).5 By describing neo-realism and neo-liberalism’s understanding that
interests and identities of agents (states) are exogenously given as a mistake, he also
asserted that:

Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of being.
Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain behavior. (I
say “help” because behaviour also depends on beliefs about how to realize interests in a given
context.) Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it
knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests.
(Wendt, 1999, p.231, emphasis added)

His argument that interests are constituted either by material forces and ideational factors,
plays a significant role in differentiating his notion of national interest from that of
rationalist. However, according to him, this notion has been largely ignored because there
is the material bias in IR theory when it comes to explaining the concept of national
interests due to the dominance of realist hypothesis of national interests.

Constructivists also emphasise the role of culture. According to Weldes (1999),
“national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the inter-
subjective and culturally established meanings within which the world, particularly the
international system and the place of the state in it, is understood” (p.10). She also argued
that through “articulation” and “interpellation” process, concrete elements of the imaginary
can be constructed, which shapes the national interest. By indicating that “culture is not a
sector or sphere of society distinct from the economy or polity, but present wherever
shared knowledge is found,” Wendt (1999, p.142) also argued that concern with culture “in

5 This argument seems controversial because this may indicate that he accepts a realist approach that there is
fixed objective interests for state survival though he should have different epistemological and ontological
different positions from rationalism towards this issue. Such problems have not been persuasively tackled by
Wendt, and early constructivists. Criticism surrounding a constructivist approach will be discussed later.
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the form of discourse, norms, and ideology has been at the heart of their (constructivists) work form the start.” For rationalists, culture is just a mere variable when it comes to explaining national interest because they argue that national interests are permanent and fixed; so there is little room for culture to be involved in interest formation. However, it may be difficult to say that the recognition of interest is all the same in every states and people. Even it might not be easy to evaluate that meaning and idea of material forces are the same among every actor in world politics as well. That is why constructivists pay attention to cultural variables to explain the concept of interest in the sense that interest is shaped and reshaped in “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences, and make sense of their lives” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.7). In other words, it can be said that cultural variable such as ideas and norms mutually affect identity and national interest.

Furthermore, while rationalists contend that national interest is permanent and not disputable, constructivists argue that national interest is changing and contested. According to Hobson (2000), interests and identities “constantly mould and re-mould states through subtle processes of socialisation” (p.146). Rationalists claim that all states rationally pursue maximisation of material forces under the name of national interest, and such interest has not changed in human history. They almost neglect social interaction where interests can be shaped. Constructivist, however, argue that interests are endogenous to social interaction “as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned though processes of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 199). That is to say, national interest can be contested among actors even in a domestic scale, and change according to abnormal historical and circumstantial aspects.

Despite many disagreements among the different constructivist school, it seems clear that they all regard the national interest as a constructed product of shared ideas, national identity, inter-subjectivity and normative practices. Thus, constructivist approaches about the national interest contain questions such as: 1) How do people express their interests and think these interests should be expressed by their representatives? 2) What do they think they have in common with fellow nationals and conversely how do they think their interests diverge and separate from outsiders? 3) How do people want their beliefs, prejudices, values, traditions and history to be translated into political institutions and diplomatic behaviour? (Burchill, 2005, p.197). Though constructivists agree with the idea that national interest is a social construction, there still remains a question that how such national interest can be analysed under what criteria. There are epistemological and
methodological disagreements among constructivists, which may affect their methods of analysis and approaches to the concept. Therefore, reviewing the main strands of constructivism and their features should be preceded before establishing a framework for the analysis of the concept of national interest.

b. Problems of Constructivism
Constructivism has become an important paradigm in the field of international relations since the late 1980s. “The social construction of …” is no longer unfamiliar phrase in this discipline (Guzzini, 2000, p.147). After Nicholas Onuf (1989) used the term constructivism in his publication, World of Our Making, a constructivist approach gained vitality in international relations theory. Wendt, with his article, Anarchy is What States Make of It, then contributed to spreading constructivism in the discipline of international relations (see Ruggie, 1998, p.11; Zehfuss, 2002, p.10-11). The advent of a constructivist approach can be regarded as the challenge to positivism that can be represented by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Hopf (1998) described this emergence as “constructivism is regarded with a great deal of skepticism by mainstream scholars” (p.171).

Constructivist understanding of inter-subjective relations between structure and agent, norm and identity as well as idea and actors gives many researchers insight into international politics which can be interpreted beyond materialistic view. Scholars such as Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf led the development of early stage of constructivism, and the increasing number of scholars accumulates empirical research findings in the field of constructivism. Since constructivist theories in IR have various theoretical foundations in the areas of ontology, epistemology and methodology, there categorisation, namely, typology, is also diverse. However, it might be difficult to categorise constructivists according to specific criteria due to their uncertain positions of theoretical backgrounds. Palan (2000) even criticised that “…yet, for a theory that is so obviously dependent upon a rigorous working of the relationship between social theory and its IR variant, it is curious that, with one or two exceptions, IR constructivists often advance positions that conventionally are viewed as either incompatible or at least highly debatable” (p.577). Zehfuss (2002) also indicated that “we still lack clarity on what constructivism is” (p.6). However, it seems reasonable to classify constructivist theories regarding their applications of positivism. This is because such categorisation is relatively clear in terms of epistemological and theoretical aspects (see Adler, 2002; Carlsnaes, 2002; Checkel, 2004; Hobson, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Palan, 2000; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Reus-Smit, 2005;
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2009; Ruggie, 1998; Sterling-Folker, 2000; Wendt, 1999). To be specific, if a theory acknowledges positivist conventions epistemologically and methodologically, it could be evaluated that the theory is under “Conventional” constructivism, not that of “Critical” (though there is a different use of terminology among constructivists). The following table summarises how constructivists categorise constructivist theories according to above criterion.

[Table. 1] Category of Constructivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Scholar</th>
<th>Conventional, Modern</th>
<th>Critical, Postmodern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price &amp; Reus-Smit (1998)</td>
<td>Systemic (Wendt)</td>
<td>Holistic (Kratochwil, Ruggie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendt (1999)</td>
<td>Thinner Constructivism (Kratochwil, Ruggie)</td>
<td>World School (Bull, Dunne)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Wendt’s (1999, p.39) argument might be helpful to understand this. “Given my idealist ontological commitments, therefore, one might think that I should be firmly on the post-positivist side of this divide, talking about discourse and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing and objective reality. Yet, in fact, when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry I am a strong believer in science - a pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for “Understanding,” but science just the same. I am a “positivist”.

7 Song (2006, p.315) summarises the content of the table in more detail.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Soft Constructivism</th>
<th>Hard Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reus-Smit (2005)</td>
<td>Sociological Institutionalism</td>
<td>Communicative action Theory (Habermasian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge and Power (Foucauldian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above table divides their theoretical backgrounds into two categories: Conventional/Modern and Critical/Postmodern. The former is more closely linked to mainstream “rationalistic” international theory, and the latter does that of “reflective”⁸ that challenges rationalism. Though constructivist scholars use varied terms and categorisation, it seems clear that they all regard epistemological and theoretical positions against positivism as a significant criterion for their classification.⁹ The terms in social theories such as Postmodernism, Critical Theory and Feminism have been used to explain critical strands of constructivism as they share an anti-positivist view (see Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; see also Campbell, 1998; Tickner, 1992). Hopf (1998) clearly compared two main strands of constructivism, concentrating on epistemological and ontological relations between constructivism and critical theory.

To the degree that constructivism creates theoretical and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes “conventional” constructivism. Although constructivism shares many of the foundational elements of critical theory, it also resolves some issues by adopting defensible rules of thumb, or conventions, rather than following critical theory all the way up the postmodern critical path. (Hopf, 1998, p.181, emphasis added)

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⁸ About this, see Keohane (1989). International Institutions and State Power, 161-174. According to him, reflective scholars all “emphasize the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics” (p.161). Wendt (1992, p.393), in his article, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, replaced the term “reflectivist” with constructivist.

⁹ Although to date, many scholars except for those whose names are found in the table above have attempted to develop constructivism, it seems that there is little notable accounts that go beyond the categorisation given here.
He argued that conventional constructivism seeks to present a middle ground between mainstream international relations theory such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, while critical constructivism tends to be more close to critical social theory and criticises existing theories (see also Campbell, 1998; Der Derian, 1987; Tickner, 1992; Walker, 1993).

[Table. 2] Conventional Constructivism versus Critical Constructivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Conventional Constructivism</th>
<th>Critical Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodology &amp; Epistemology</td>
<td>- does not use “any special interpretivist methodology.”</td>
<td>- against positivism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- does not depart from “normal science.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of Identity</td>
<td>- wishes to discover identities and their associated reproductive social practices, and then offer an account of how those identities imply certain actions.</td>
<td>- also wishes to surface identities, but to elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of a naturalized truth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors and Observers</td>
<td>- The observer never becomes a subject of the same self-reflective critical inquiry.</td>
<td>- The actor and observer can never be separated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Origins of Identity</td>
<td>- accommodates a cognitive account for identity, or offer no account at all.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- accepts the existence of identities and wants to understand their reproduction and effects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- accepts the assumption: the need for others to construct oneself.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions about Power</td>
<td>- remains “analytically neutral” on the issue of power relations.</td>
<td>- Power being exercised in every social exchange, and there is always a dominant actor in that exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- shares the idea that power is everywhere, because social practices reproduce underlying power relations, but is not necessarily interested in interrogating those relations.</td>
<td>- Unmasking these power relations is a large part of critical theory’s substantive agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Agenda</td>
<td>- the production of new knowledge and insight based on novel understandings</td>
<td>- analyses social constraints and cultural understandings from a supreme human interest in enlightenment and emancipation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Theoretical Fundamentals</td>
<td>- Both aim to “denaturalize” the social world, that is, to empirically discover and reveal how the institutions and practices and identities that people take as natural, given, or matter of fact, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of social construction.</td>
<td>- believe that intersubjective reality and meanings are critical data for understanding the social world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Katzenstein et al. (1999) contended that though conventional constructivists ontologically very differ from rationalists, it is difficult to find any significant differences between conventional constructivists and rationalists in terms of epistemological and methodological aspects. They also summarised the characteristic of critical constructivism:

1) In rejecting rationalist conceptions of human nature, critical constructivists agree with conventional constructivists on the issue of ontology;
2) Like conventional constructivists, they are interested in how actors and systems are constituted and coevolve;
3) Their research program focuses on identity issues that include, besides nationalism, subjects such as race, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality;
4) Critical constructivists also accept the possibility of social scientific knowledge based on empirical research. They are, however, deeply skeptical of the possibility of formulating general covering laws, and they are pluralistic about appropriate research methodologies;
5) Institutional arrangements, norms, and identities are embedded in specific historical contexts that can vary so dramatically that they can only be investigated through an ideographic rather than a nomothetic approach;
6) Emphasis is placed on the detailed study of texts to understand the symbolic systems that govern actors’ discourses, rather than on an analysis of a large number of cases;
7) Critical constructivists insist that scholars’ work has normative consequences;
8) Critical constructivists are developing a research program that is generating new and significant insights on important issues in world politics for which rationalist analysis has lacked compelling answers (p.676-677).

Checkel (2004) claimed that conventional constructivists are “largely positivist in epistemological orientation” (p.230). By indicating linguistic approaches as “key sources of theoretical inspiration of interpretative and critical constructivists,” (p.231) he argued that they all emphasise the importance of discourse-theoretical methods. According to him, critical constructivists, however, attach more importance to the power and domination inherent in language. Devine (2007, p.2) also stated that “critical social constructivism can be distinguished from conventional social constructivism (and neoliberalism) through its anti-essentialist ontology and qualified-foundationalist epistemology, the use of
poststructuralist approaches and a concern with ‘omitted variable bias’ in mainstream IR theorizing and the consideration of ‘identity’ as a driver of foreign policy.”

To date, conventional constructivism has dominated empirical studies adopting a constructivist approach, maybe because this strand has much contributed to developing constructivism to become a new IR theory. However, it has faced strong criticisms from the outside and even inside of theoretical schools in many aspects. Such controversies should be examined in order to discover a potential method of overcoming the problems.

Many recent studies adopting constructivist perspective are prone to fall into state-oriented approach. Though they, especially conventional constructivists, appreciate the importance of non-stats actors, it seems that such scholars too much emphasise the role of states as the dominant actors in the process of social interaction in which national interest is defined. This means that they mealy define states as a basic agent in international politics. Wendt (1994), in his publication, Collective Identity Formation and The International State, affirmed that “states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory” (p.385). He (1999) also insisted that “since states are the dominant form of subjectivity in contemporary world politics this means that they should be the primary unit of analysis for thinking about the global regulation of violence” (p.9). This idea has been widely shared among constructivists. Ruggie (1998) also claimed that “at the level of individual actors constructivism seeks, first of all, to problematize the identities and interests of states and to show how they have been socially constructed” (p.196, emphasis added). Regarding this issue, Weldes (1999, p.9) indicated that “Wendt’s “anthropomorphized” understanding of state continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary actors with a single identity and a single set of interests.” She also argued that “the political and historical context in which national interests are fashioned, the collective meanings that define state identities and interests, cannot arbitrarily be restricted to those meanings produced only in interstate relations.” It may not be necessary for constructivists to define states as the principal units of analysis. According to constructivist basic notion, the agents that constitute international politics are not fixed or given, but socially constructed. Therefore, if constructivists continuously obsess about state-oriented approach, their arguments could contradict the key thrust of constructivism, that is to say, agent itself is also socially constructed.

Recently, many researchers have indicated that constructivist scholars tend to overemphasise ideational (or liberal-idealist) factors and deemphasise material variables (Barkin, 2003, p.335; Ham, 2010, p.22; Noguchi, 2011, p.77; Shiping, 2008, p.145; see
also Steele, 2007). Ham (2010) clearly highlighted this issue: “All too often, constructivist scholars overemphasize the underlying normative structures of international politics, by focusing on ideas and identities to the detriment of material power resources. Due to their focus on ideas and the desire to juxtapose their arguments to Realist notions of power, ideational theories often neglect the fact that normative structures are frequently, if not always, themselves infused by power” (p.22). Along the lines of this argument, Sterling-Folker (2000) criticised constructivists’ understanding of normative structure of international politics. She contended that constructivism tends to have the similar, in other words, almost the same, perspectives on international politics compared to that of neoliberal institutionalists.

Yet in emphasizing their differences with neoliberal institutionalism, constructivists have made far too much of what are relatively small distinctions in the metatheoretical scheme of things. Not only do constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists rely on the same functional-institutional logic to explain social change, they actually share the same ontology so that neoliberal institutionalism is “rationalist” only to a point. Ultimately constructivism makes explicit an assumed but unexplored step in situationally strategic liberal arguments which accounts for the maintenance of cooperation. Thus when the metatheoretical commitments made by constructivists and neoliberal institutionalists are closely compared, one discovers that the epistemological and ontological differences disappear, and they turn out to be complementary theories within the larger framework of liberal IR theory. (Sterling-Folker, 2000, p.100, emphasis added)

Zehfuss (2002) also indicated the liberal tendency of constructivists: “Wendt claims an affinity to ‘strong’ liberal scholarship which addresses complex learning and therefore changes of identities and interests. He aims ‘to build a bridge’ between the liberal and the constructivist tradition and as a consequence ‘between the realist-liberal and rationalist-reflectivist debates’” (p.13). Barkin (2003) contended that the idea that intersubjective norms affect definitions of interest is liberal-idealist, “in the sense that these norms are accepted largely uncritically as good ones, as are the elements of international civil society involved in spreading these norms” (p.335). By criticising that Constructivism “has tended to replicate liberal arguments” and “fails to offer a paradigmatic alternative to liberal IR theory and neoliberal institutionalism,” Sterling-Folker (2002, p.99) insisted that “conventional” constructivists have been “far from agnostic about change in world
politics,” when it has been used for causal explanation because they have the same causal mechanism as neoliberal institutionalism does. Thus, according to her argument, they should attain the similar conclusions regarding social change.

Wendt’s conception of collective identity formation cannot avoid these criticisms. He indicated “Cultural (Structural) change in international politics involves collective identity formation,” and “interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint” as four “master variable” that affect the process of collective identity formation (Wendt, 1999, p.44). His argument is based on the assumption that all involved actors maintain a cooperative relationship, which is in accord with a liberal approach. It seems obvious that, however, our world is not always in such a friendly atmosphere and collective identity may not be shaped only in mutually favourable relations. With Wendt’s assumption, it might not be easy to interpret cooperative relations between China and India under ongoing conflicts surrounding border and Tibet issues; and coexistence between India-Pakistan and South-North Korea with harsh conflicts. Therefore, it may be crucial to overcoming above issues of constructivism, overemphasis on ideational variables and excessive affinity to liberalism.

Zehfuss (2002) gives a critical hint for overcoming above issues. In her book Constructivism in International Relations, she reviewed Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf’s approaches towards Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)’s participation in international military operations. She argued that their understandings and theoretical frameworks have a problem in terms of explaining how the reality is constructed. According to her, their processes of shaping reality in their studies lack discuss of the politics: “Using Derrida’s thought, I argue that the treatment of reality in constructivism and in politics are not two separate issues but rather two manifestations of the same problem” (p.36). She also asserted that reality that human beings can recognise is the reality that is linguistically reconstructed. Thus, if researchers do not explore linguistic processes in reality, it would be impossible to realise a genuinely constructed reality. Since this process is very political, discourse in politics should be analysed in order to define the “real” (p.246). The implication in her study is that considering a specific factor such as “politics” and utilising postmodernist epistemological method can diminish the vagueness of the way constructivist analyses real international politics.

Guzzini (2000) emphasised the importance of intersubjective power analysis in order to understand the reflexive link between the two levels of observation and action (p.147). For him, knowledge and actions are both constructed and interconnected, and a
key for this interconnection is power. Thus, it may be important to analyse how knowledge of the agents is intersubjectively shaped in certain political power relationships and how certain agents having the knowledge establish and change the social power. He also argued that “constructivism is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the (social) construction of the social world” (p.174). Guzzini’s argument can lend an important clue to this research in that he gives more concrete criterion, that is, constructed power, for constructivist analysis.

Mattern (2001) also presents a meaningful argument that may allow constructivists to avoid abstract analysis and a strong liberal tendency. She did not deny that realist analysis of international politics according to power and economic factor. However, she argued that power and force are meaningful in terms of not only physical aspects but also discursive and representational dimensions.

Force is a kind of power that actors wield through blunt, nonnegotiable and self-interested strategies in order to radically limit the options of their victim. International Relations scholarship has tended to focus on the physical aspects of force but force also has discursive or representational dimensions. Wielded through language, representational force enables a perpetrator to bluntly, self-interestedly and nonnegotably compel his victim to abide by his version of some contested story. It accomplishes this by brandishing a threat, which traps the victim with no real option but to comply. In this sense, representational force works like coercion but without using physical or material threats. (Mattern, 2001, p.351, emphasis added)

Mattern named this phenomenon “a power politics of identity.” In this arena, the powerful identity can wield strong forces to adversarial identities.

When representational force is applied to the ‘we’ to hold it together in this manner, it amounts to a power politics of identity. This form of power politics is quite different from traditional power politics, but it is power politics nevertheless. Whereas traditional power politics wield coercive threats of physical force to trap physical adversaries into acquiescence, the power politics of identity wield coercive threats of representational force to trap adversarial identities into acquiescence. (Mattern, 2001, p.351, emphasis added)

Mattern’s understanding can be helpful in interpreting India’s position on China in terms of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Even though India, with Tibetan Exile, has no material
and economic force against China, they can have representational force. Behind the formal recognition that the area known as the Tibetan autonomous region is part of the PRC, they have allowed Tibetan exiles to stay in their area, and say “Dalai Lama is an important guest of India.” It seems clear that this action is intentionally designed by India in order to retain the Tibetan exile as a bargaining chip against the PRC. Thus, India, without any physical force and cost, can make the PRC, at least, irritated. It can be evaluated that this situation is one practical example of representational force under a power politics of identity.

These scholars attempt to overcome the limitations of early constructivist approaches such as a state oriented tendency, overemphasis on ideational aspects and a close affinity to liberalism. They regard linguistically reconstructed reality as the reality itself (see also Weldes el al., 1999). In this regard, they believe that postmodernist sociolinguistics can allow constructivists to overcome vague and abstract analysis in that the reality exists in a form of linguistic representation, which can be regarded as a critical constructivist perspective. As Adler (2002, p.149) stated, “why constructivists and postmodernists cannot hold a fruitful and constructive debate, aiming to achieve not supremacy of one approach over the other, but mutual learning.” Weldes (1999) also argued that the language of the national interest is rhetorically constructed. This clearly indicates that with language of the national interests, we can conjecture the real content and meaning of the national interest.

The language of the national interest is the content and meaning of the national interest. It is in this language that objects, threats, and relations are understood and persuasively presented as real and that warrants for drawing political conclusions from that reality are provided. Maintaining a rigid distinction between rhetoric and reality, far from helping us to understand the content of the national interest and thus state action, actually precludes the systematic examination of the construction of national interests. National interests truly are saturated with rhetoric, but, as I have tried to argue here, there is nothing “mere” about their rhetorical character. (Weldes, 1999, p.118, emphasis added)

They also pay attention to the concept of power that is specified and interconnected during the process of linguistic representation of the reality. Wendt and early constructivist usually ignore the aspect of power and force, which is generally studied by realist scholars (Sterling-Folker, 2002). However, scholars, who focus on a strategy of the agent producing discourse and linguistic representation, attempt to highlight the process of power politics
and ideational shift in order to analyse international politics more specifically and avoid liberal tendency.

So far, this section has examined 1) constructivist recognition of the concept of national interest; 2) two main strands of constructivism; 3) criticisms over conventional constructivism; and 4) attempts at overcoming such issues. All things considered, I would argue that a critical constructivist approach can help overcome the limitations of a conventional constructivist approach. Therefore, according to the notion of critical constructivism, it is this study’s assumption that national interest is socially constructed, and linguistically realised and represented. I would also emphasise the important role of politics and power, as well as culture and representations in order to analyse how national interest is intersubjectively constructed in linguistically represented power politics structure.

However, there are some tensions in this notion. If we overemphasise the role of power and politics to overcome liberal tendency, this can be evaluated as we, unintentionally, accept power orientation of human nature, which may be similar to realist conception. To take an example, only with such notion, it might not be easy to explain the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru’s favourable attitude towards China. Reviewing his writings before 1947, it is clear that Nehru wanted to establish mutually beneficial relationship with China. He may regard China as a progressive anti-imperialist who fights Western imperialism and feudal remnants (Guha, 2011). The construction of political reality shaped by Nehru’s rhetoric could not be adequately explained by selfish orientation of human nature.

Also, it may not be easy to ascertain that how much power politics can be free from material forces and how much it can explain certain phenomena regardless of a distribution of material capabilities. This issue, actually, can also be applicable to conventional constructivism. Constructivists emphasise that identity and interest are not directly defined by the distribution of material forces, but by the content and distribution of ideas (see Wendt, 1999). However, they have struggled to clarify whether such normative structure is related to the material forces, and if so, how they become intertwined. For instance, it might be uncertain whether and how much India’s excessive economic dependence on China affects their process of linguistic representation of the power.

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11 About his remarks and statement, see Chung (1998).
12 According to Sen (2011), “China could account for 75% of India's manufacturing in the next five years, up from the present 26%.”
politics, with regard to Tibet issue, in particular. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the relations between linguistic representation of the power politics and politics during the process of the distribution of material capabilities, in order to overcome constructivism’s ambiguous treatment of the ideational problem.

I argue that focusing on “culture” can help overcome above issues. That is to say, I assume that national interests are cultural productions in the sense that “the structures of human association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena” (Wendt, 1999, p.193; see also Weldes, 1999). According to fundamental notion of constructivism, cultural variables, ideas, and norms for instance, and identity are inseparably related (see Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996); and “identities inform interests and, in turn, actions” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.221). In fact, it seems that critical constructivists have not deeply investigated the long-term construction processes of identity, which is significant topic of conventional constructivists. However, if we deny the argument that political reality and structure are externally given and fixed, and follow constructivism, it would be indispensable to examine the role of socially established identity to discover how such identity and the structure of power politics are mutually constituted. Therefore, this thesis attempts to highlight how the cultural production of the identities and interests are shaped and implicated in actors’ actions.

With this assumption, we could explain China and India’s ambivalent political relations in spite of huge economic cooperation. Even though they frequently express the importance of economic and political cooperation, there are, in reality, still many unresolved tensions between two countries such as the expansion of armaments in border areas. Many scholars have indicated that this may result from mutual mistrust and suspicion because they were in a situation of War in 1962 and have had harsh conflicts over the issues surrounding territorial disputes and Tibet. It is though culture that it would be possible to understand anomalous political phenomena in their relations. This is because in doing so, we could realise how identities and interests of actors such as state officials and elites in two countries have been established and how such cultural production of the identities and interests affect their relations. It may also allow us to grasp why their national interests against each other have continuously changed. Thus, considering culture can fill the gaps of a critical constructivist approach towards power politics where national interest is intersubjectively constituted.

However, culture is a highly broad and vague concept. The term can be used in various subjects in different ways. Thus, it is necessary to explain how the concept of
national interest can be interpreted as a cultural phenomenon. As discussed above, I argue that the formation of national interest is cultural as it is defined and shared in “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences, and make sense of their lives” (Tomlinson, 1991, p.7). Here, this research focuses on “context.” It is not easy to grasp if a certain phenomenon is consistent; contingent; or abnormal if context is not taken into consideration. The way and intent of language use can change according to a particular situation – the situation here is, context. Therefore, this research, before analysing the discursive constructions, examines the historical and socio-political context that have affected the linguistic practices. This will be discussed in detail in the methodology chapter.

In summary, for the second reflectivist framework, 1) I adopt a critical constructivist approach that emphasises postmodernist sociolinguistics to explain the linguistically represented reality; 2) I assume that national interests are social constructions which are linguistically represented and realised; 3) I focus on intersubjective politics and power that are interconnected during the process of linguistic representation of the reality, under the assumption that recognition and knowledge of interests and identities of the agents can be intersubjectively defined and delivered in structure of power politics; and 4) I claim that the formation of national interest is cultural and culture produces and reproduces the structure of power politics and may be mutually constituted as well.

As discussed earlier, the PRC and the Indian government have not been able to make an agreement on the Tibet issue since the late 1940s. There must be a conflict of interests which has been changed or reinforced by elites in both countries. With the critical constructivist account, it is expected that this research can find out how their interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been shaped, changed and even manipulated by intentionally designed elites’ discourses.
Chapter III. Nationalism and National Interest

Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.
— ROBERT FROST, The Death of the Hired Man

I wanted to live outside the history that empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost subjects. I never wished it for the barbarians that they should have the history of Empire laid upon them. How can I believe that that is cause for shame?’
— JOHN MAXWELL COETZEE, Waiting For the Barbarians

“Raise our national flag, and love our motherland.”13 This is a slogan from a CCTV public service announcement on TV. This message has been delivered to the world several times a day since the early 2000s. If the latter part of the slogan, “gong ai yi ge jia” is literally translated, it means that “love one home together.” It could be interpreted that regardless of ethnic, religious or other social status, all 56 ethnic groups living in China and overseas Chinese, must be united in the name of China. This slogan might be highly related to the concept of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s “the great family of the Chinese nation.”14 The term, great family, may signify that the existing ethnic groups share the same national consciousness. The concept reflects the CCP’s willingness to unite all 56 recognised ethnic groups in China in unanimity (see Yoon, 2006). Why does CCP have emphasised such concept and slogan and how can we interpret this situation? Actually it paradoxically implies what Chinese government is struggling with. As is widely known, some minorities, the people in Tibet and Xinjiang in particular, rarely appreciate Chinese rule. However, for the CCP, as they continuously declare, minorities and their assimilation with the nation of China are its core interest that is not negotiable and reconcilable. Thus, the CCP’s obsession with such concept and slogan could be interpreted as a strategic choice – awaking and stimulating dormant nationalism – to instill the sense of unity into people’s minds.

The government and state officials may need a certain level of social consensus

14 Zhōnghuá mínzú dàjiātíng (中华民族大家庭). This concept may be closely connected and influenced by Fei’s theory on “diversity in unity of the Chinese nation” (Zhōnghuá mínzú duōyuán yītīlùn, 中华民族多元一体论), About this, see Fei, X. (1988).
to articulate the interests at the national level.\textsuperscript{15} Nationalism can act as an excellent foil to elicit such agreement. Since nationalism is more sentimental than rational and concentrates more on must-do than why-do, it may easily be liable to be combusted and ignited (see Margalit, 2001, p.155). It may be difficult to find a more effective and highly contagious tool to unite people in a common bond in that nationalism provides people having different interests with the reason that they must unite and work towards a common interest for the nation. That is to say, it is through nationalism that the government and state officials could legitimise and justify their actions to articulate and realise the national interest.\textsuperscript{16} This may be the reason why politicians and elites overuse the word that could stimulate nationalist sentiment – framing the nationalism narrative. The above example clearly represents this aspect.

However, nationalism may not always be driven, used and even manipulated by the states, bureaucrats or elites.\textsuperscript{17} The public also can urge their state to take some policies and actions in defence of the interests of the nation.\textsuperscript{18} Today’s anti-Japan protests in China over island row may provide a microcosm of this aspect. The protests can be evaluated as an outburst of nationalist sentiment. Then, is it possible to explain this nationalist psyche of the Chinese people only under a top-down approach? It would be neither appropriate nor desirable. The protests from the public appeared before and regardless of the CCP’s official response to Japan’s islands purchase. Furthermore, though Chinese Government strongly accused Japan, they may not totally welcome protesters radical actions such as attacking Japanese companies and embassy because establishing amicable economic relationship with Japan might be China’s one of the important long-term national interests considering the trade volume between two countries (see Huang, 2012; Voigt, 2012; Wassener, 2012).\textsuperscript{19} Even seriously radicalised nationalism could put Chinese Government in trouble dealing with conflicts at home and abroad. Domestically, in the strong nationalistic atmosphere, different opinions are

\textsuperscript{15} The question may arise in this argument: how about a dictatorship? An authoritarian regime may compel the public to follow and support what the state is doing. In other words, the state might force people to agree its decision. Though the process of collecting people’s opinions varies across regime types, the state anyway needs people’s consent to operate the system in the sense that the labour force and funds positively necessary to put an idea into practice.

\textsuperscript{16} Anand (2010) insisted that “Nationalism is the primary ideology through which the state seeks to gain internal sovereignty” (p.280).

\textsuperscript{17} The question of the origin of nationalism is a different debate. Here, the point is how it is expressed and used by different actors.

\textsuperscript{18} About this, Connor (1990, p.95) claimed that “nationalism is a mass, not an elite phenomenon.” On the other hand, Smith (2002) refuted his idea as nations are not necessarily “mass phenomenon” (pp.9-10).

\textsuperscript{19} Total trade between China and Japan reached $345 billion in 2011. About this, see BBC (2012a).
usually passed with silence, which can hamper the verification process of the situation. Internationally, neighbouring countries may feel uncomfortable with the Chinese people’s strong behaviour toward a contentious issue, which could invigorate so-called the China-threat theory.20 Neither of the situations might be favourable to Chinese government. Instances like this are all too common in today’s world. We have observed the Tibetan self-immolations, Arab spring, Greece protest against austerity plan, Belfast city hall flag protests and so on.21 Though there may be different reasons for the actions in the respective situations, such movements may have one thing in common: they try to achieve their goals that may be against the current rule by the states – they believe that the goals are national interests.22 In this regard, it can be claimed that nationalism does not always go along with the intention of the states or elites. That is, nationalism can also have a negative impact on the government’s pursuit of national interest.

Regardless of whether nationalism is used by elites or forced by the public, it seems obvious that nationalism can play a significant role in the process of defining and pursuing national interest. Seton-Watson (1965) insisted that “nationalist movements aim to realize the interests of the nation at the expense of its enemies” (p.5). However, the picture is not a simple diagram as he drew. We could ask ourselves: how on earth can nationalism mobilise people and even make them die for the national interest? One thing that has to be addressed is that the national interest is a quite tricky concept. Whose interests? Because in a society, there are various kinds of groups and individuals, it is difficult to judge that which interests are truly national. This may be one of the reasons that rationalists limit national interests to very broad concepts such as security and material forces, largely assuming that every actor puts the same value to such variables, which could be less controversial in the society. Then why nationalism works for such unclear interests of the nations? Marxists asserted that the ruling classes define national interests for their own sake, especially for their economic interests, and indoctrinate nationalism to the people in order to make them equate “the interests of the sheep” with those of “butcher” (Özcan, 2005, p.180; see also Glenn, 1997). However, as indicated above, nationalism also could stem from “grass-roots” level. It might be

20 About the China-threat theory, see Gries (1999). See also Hoffman (2012); Yang (2010).
21 About the Tibetan self-immolations, see Buffetrille and Robin eds. (2012); About the Arab Spring, see BBC (2012b); About Greece protest against austerity plan, see Kitsantonis and Donald (2012); About Belfast city hall flag protests and its background information, see Devenport (2013).
22 Their actions for the goals are not always generally accepted and even cause controversy sometimes. As a notable example, see Anand (2011a).
undesirable to describe people who have devoted their lives for their nations only as the brainwashed public or scapegoats for the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, how does the ruling classes’ nationalism be shaped then? Only by their economic interests? It may not be adequate explanation. The aspect of social interaction among members of society is imprudently neglected. Elites are not those who live in a completely isolated island. There have been many elites who work for their nations regardless of any interests. Were they victims of elite of elites? Where is the zenith of the ruling class?

Actually, despite a great deal of discussion about nationalism and nations, the subject is still up for severe debate and so is the national interest. Even scholars have failed to have an agreement on “the definitions of key concepts” and “the fundamental theoretical objectives” (Smith, 1998, p.221). Thus, there might not be much room for bringing the concept of the national interest to the research area of nationalism to examine their relations and vice versa – scholars are busy having a fundamental theoretical debate on the concepts. Naturally, it has been no noticeable research highlighting the relationship between the two abstract concepts that goes beyond the explanation that nationalism is a kind of political ideology to make people believe and pursue the national interest. However, abandoning the profound research on a correlation between the two concepts that overcomes the existing superficial explanation must be needed considering a flood of nationalist discourse around us. Whether or not it is intangible and difficult to examine, it is obvious that the national interest is inside an impenetrable fortress enclosed by ramparts of nationalism.

The discourse seeking national interest inevitably accompanies the nationalist sentiment and such discourse strongly stirs the domestic as well as international politics in today’s world. About a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, UK Prime Minister David Cameron argued that it is for the national interest, while the former Labour leader Mr Miliband claimed that it is the party interest and nothing to do with the national interest.23 On the contentious South China Sea territorial issue, a collision of nationalist sentiments and strong words among the countries involved is becoming more severe. Many Tibetans in China and Baluchis in Pakistan are shouting out the name of their nations for the national interests.

In this chapter, this study explores the central issues of nationalism that have been the subject of much debate among scholars; and indicates the problems of their

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23 About this issue, see Hunt (2013). See also BBC (2013).
interpretations and analyses. This thesis then proposes how nationalism can properly be explained and interpreted by giving ontological and epistemological stances towards nationalism. Most of all, this chapter attempts to highlight the relations between nationalism and national interest, especially, the role of nationalism in defining national interest.

**Problems with Nationalism**

“Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” In their book, *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p.29) gave a question to us. For them, a nation is the “capitalist axiomatic” (ibid., p.184) in which “the people are missing” (Deleuze, 1989, p.216). More specifically, a nation is social production that is “purely and simply desiring-production itself” under the conditions of capitalism (1983, p.29). In such a socially produced entity, the voice of majority must be heard and the sacrifice and subordination of minorities is the last bastion of majority supremacy. Even people could shout out “More taxes! Less bread!” (ibid., p.29) for their nations.

Even though there is no explicit mention of nationalism and its problems, Deleuze may implicitly leave the issues regarding nationalism that need consideration – those of ontology and axiology. To condense his argument into a single sentence, people are suffering from the manipulated entity necessarily and voluntarily. He may criticise nationalism as a means of forbidding the people to escape from invisible and forged community, that is, a nation. Thus, it can be argued that he may regard a nation as an aeriform entity and nationalism as irrational momentum to support it.

His ontological and axiological arguments on nationalism may provide a microcosm of the recent debates on nations and nationalism in the past few decades.\(^{24}\) The questions about the origins and values of nations and nationalism have always been the centre themes in this field of study. Ontologically, there are rival opinions on whether nations and nationalism are pre-modern or modern\(^{25}\); and whether nationalism

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\(^{24}\) Studies on nationalism naturally and generally accompany the theoretical review of nations and vice versa. It has been disputed over whether nations are prior to nationalism or nationalism did to nations. This topic may go beyond the scope of this research. In this chapter, the focus is to highlight the relationship between nationalism and national interest. The concepts of nations and nationalism are thus dealt with at the same time as highly intertwined social phenomena.

\(^{25}\) I regard this debate as ontological one because the controversy always accompanies with the question whether nations and nationalism are real. This will be discussed later with the argument that this dispute may arise due to the different epistemological perspectives; and about pre-modern and modern divisions,
is a death rattle or not. When it comes to the value debates, it has been discussed over whether nationalism is a bad and irrational thing that must be eradicated; and what sorts of nationalism are “good” and which types are “bad” (see Liebman, 2007, p.348).

Researchers have usually been poles apart in their opinions with regard to these questions, which may be due to their different focus on critical junctures in history and the interpretation on them. I would argue that this is an unhelpful polarity. It seems that scholarships in this area are caught in a reductionist trap, namely, that of various typologies of nationalism such as primordialism, perennialism, ethno-symbolism and modernism. It is true that all the attempts to categorise the research groups and phenomena of nationalism have greatly contributed to the studies in this area as it vouchsafes a clear guidance and theoretical parsimony to understand diverse social and political phenomena. However, as Hall (1993) maintained, “no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse so too must be our concepts” (p.1). Thus, to more critically examine the above long-lasting controversies over nationalism, it should be essential to avoid an excessive obsession with a particular theoretical paradigm – an attempt at diagnosing the problem in the way the scholarship on nationalism perceives the different viewpoints on nationalism should be carried out.

This chapter makes a dive at the centre of this extreme controversy by giving the following two questions: “if it is invisible, does it not exist?” And “if it is cognised, does it truly exist?” These questions imply this chapter’s message to point out the problem that the scholarship has shown. The scholars of nationalism have obsessed with the matter of “reality” of nations and nationalism. To be specific, the disputes over ontological issues are actually about those of the nature of nationalism. Scholars like Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, who are usually regarded as modernists, ignited the intense debate. They claimed that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena that are “invented” (see Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; see also Gellner, 1983) or

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26 This is a widely used category of theoretical paradigms on nations and nationalism presented by Anthony Smith. About this, please see Smith (1998). Özkirimli (2000) well summarised this: “The common denominator of the modernists is their conviction in the modernity of nations and nationalism; that of the ethno-symbolists is the stress they lay in their explanations on ethnic pasts and cultures; finally, that of the primordialists is their belief in the antiquity and naturalness of nations. Beyond these common denominators, the theories developed by the scholars of each category exhibit a bewildering diversity” (p.64).

27 It goes without saying, there are different opinions on the way nations and nationalism are shaped among modernists, especially about how does modernity link with nationalism. However, they have concurred with each other in the view that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena.
“imagined” (see Anderson, 1991) in the process of modernization (see also Breuilly, 1993; Kedourie, 1993). This argument is unacceptable for those who emphasise the role of “primordial ties” (see Geertz, 1963, p.107) such as social custom, kinship, language, race, region, religion and territorial roots to account for the origins of nations and nationalism as objective natural existence (see also Connor, 1994; Grosby, 1995; Hearn, 2006; Obidinski, 1978; Storey, 2011). In other words, the former emphasises “subjective” factors while the latter, primordialists, stresses those of “objective.”

The crux of this ontological issue here is, again, they are actually arguing with each other about whether nations and nationalism are a mirage or not. Since modernists have claimed that nations and nationalism are modern “artefacts” (see Gellner, 1983, p.7) that should be imagined and made, they have been asked to answer the question: are nations and nationalism not “actual things” if they are psychologically processed products in modern times? This may be a sensitive issue especially to the people of weak powers, struggling for liberation or independence from big powers. It might be difficult for them, for instance, the Tibetans having self-immolated, to welcome the idea that they are dying for the communities that exist only in their brains. Moreover, in some countries like China, Korea and Japan, whose history is long and primordial ties may be vivid, there might be disputes over the idea of nationalism as “a radically novel mode of consciousness” (see Duara, 1999, p.131; see also Fei, 1999; Shimazono, 2004; Shin, 2006; Trauzettel, 1975). Those who disagree with the modernist view also criticise that modernists have failed to explain causality between nationalism and the necessary factors for modernisation, especially “industrial society” of Gellner and “print capitalism” of Anderson (see Chatterjee, 1993, p.21). Even Breuilly (1993), who calls himself modernist, stated that “A major concern of modern social thought is the problem of community, of how common identity and a sentiment of solidarity can be created in the face of impersonal, abstract, ‘rational’ relationships based upon instrumental considerations” (p.415). Also, it may be controversial to apply the

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28 Similar to this, so-called perennialists also disagree with the modernists’ understanding of nationalism as a modern creation. They argue that though nationalist sentiments in the modern world are more discernible and perhaps stronger, such sentiments have always been traceable in human history. About the difference between primordialism and perennialism, perennialists are generally not very keen on ahistorical approach, focusing on a biological aspect, to nationalism. Greenfeld and Eastwood (2007) maintained that “It is hard to see precisely what separates perennialism from primordialism, or, rather, the difference seems to be merely a matter of degree” (p.263).

29 About this, see Smith (2001). He argued that “Definitions of the concept of the nation range from those that stress ‘objective’ factors, such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments (p.11).
modernists’ ontological understanding to explain nationalism in many African and Asian countries, in which the Western experience of modernisation is absent.

In terms of this ontological issue, one could argue that modernists have not provided an explicit answer that clearly overcomes Marx’s materialist approach to nationalism: since it is impossible to find out tangible and material grounds, nations and nationalism are an illusion made by the ruling classes in the period of industrialization (see Marx, 1978, pp. 482-484; see also Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1990). They do not concede the status of nationalism as a natural form that has always been with us for a long time. In other words, modernists almost ignore the pre-modern (or primordial) social elements such as cultural sentiments and ethnic ties that could be interpreted as the basis of nations and nationalism.

This evaluation, however, could be too harsh in the sense that they have dealt with some possible pre-modern connections with modern nations and nationalism. Hobsbawm (1990) may show the most notable example.

... why, having lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type of replacement. One reason may be that, in many parts of the world, states and national movements could mobilize certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations. I shall call these bonds ‘proto-national’. (p.46, emphasis added)

By indicating that “there is no reason to deny proto-national feelings to pre-nineteenth-century” (p.75), he maintained that some elements such as language, ethnicity and religion can be linked closely with today’s national consciousness. It seems that he admitted the possibility of pre-modern aspects of nations and nationalism, but actually he did not. He claimed that the continuities between proto-nationalism and modern sentiments may be quite “factitious” and there is “no historical continuity” (p.76). What Hobsbawm really wanted to say is that “proto-nationalism alone is clearly not enough to form nationalities, nations, let alone states” (p.77). Therefore, it seems obvious that he strongly (but perhaps not completely) denies the idea that pre-modern elements affect and constitute nations and nationalism.

Gellner (1996) also attempted to respond to the criticism that he conveniently ignores the pre-modern variables. In the 1995 Warwick debates with Anthony Smith, he described pre-modern ethnic and cultural national communities as the “navel,” link
between primordial elements and modern nationalism, and, however, claimed that “some nations have it and some don’t and in any case it’s inessential” (p.367, emphasis added). In other words, “there is a certain amount of navel about but not everywhere and on the whole it’s not important” (p.369). Basically, he does not think that the navel plays a crucial role in shaping nations and nationalism. For him, in any case, the process of modernisation is crucial for “invention” of nations and nationalism. According to him, “the modernists have a greater sense of the kind of navel invention as opposed to the sense of continuity of navel” (p.370). Thus, like Hobsbawm, his naval story seldom, if ever, gives a different account from his early argument about nations and nationalism as modern invention.

Considering all these into account, it seems that there is not much room for reconciliation between the contested arguments in the ontological issue on nationalism. However, this chapter would argue that the dispute can be compromised in that it is actually derived from the misunderstanding about the modernist perception of nations and nationalism. In other words, I claim that the ontological debates and criticisms have resulted from the different epistemological perspectives among the scholars of nationalism. It may be inappropriately radical to evaluate that modernists deny the actual existence of nations and nationalism like Marxists, if they insist that nations and nationalism are imagined and invented in the process of modernisation. Actually, modernists have not negated the fact that nations and nationalism as “social things” around us, but rather, the modernists like Gellner have claimed that nations and nationalism are “real” sociological phenomena (see Smith, 1996, p.358).31 Anderson’s expression, an “imagined political community,” may play a big part in widening this epistemological gap due to the literal meaning of the word, “imagined” (see Anderson, 1991). However, in his research, there are no explicit clues to evaluate him as a pessimist who is totally against the reality of nations and nationalism, in spite of the use of the term “imagined.” His point was about how nations and nationalism are shaped, not about whether nations and nationalism are real or not. Tamir (1995) clearly

30 As indicated before, though modernists and marxists share the idea that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena and by-products of modernisation, marxists more clearly deny the real existence of nations and nationalism because of lack of the tangible evidence. Modernists, however, do not totally deny the substance of nations and nationalism in general.
31 In the 1995 Warwick debates, Smith, Gellner’s student, stated this. One could argue that this is controversial because Gellner (1971), in his book Thought and Change, asserted that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (p.169). This statement could be interpreted in various ways due to different epistemological perspectives. This will be discussed later.
indicated this: “If real is taken to mean “existing as a fact” then, as every realist in international relations will attest, the existence of imagined communities is a social fact. The term *imagined* communities is therefore not to be used synonymously with *imaginary* ones” (p.423).\(^{32}\) What modernists really do not accept is that nations and nationalism are the naturally given existence with objective criteria that are prerequisite elements for national consciousness. They are more focusing on the process of social change that could stimulate the circumstances in which nations and nationalism can be defined.

When discussing something about hierarchy, legitimacy, racism and security, not many people would be passionate to prove the substantial reality of such concepts even though they are not physically tangible and expressed, as is nationalism. The topics on them are usually about what constitutes them; and how they can be interpreted and perceived; not about whether or not they are real. If someone is excessively obsessed with the primitive ontological debates on the above topics, he or she could be regarded as a person who is falling into the epistemological fallacy. It goes without saying, invisibility and intangibility do not mean that something is not real. In this regard, it could be maintained that the scholars of nationalism, who criticise modernists as they do not admit the existence of nations and nationalism, are those who are caught in a trap of the epistemological fallacy – I would call this a trap of radical materialist evidentialism.\(^{33}\) It is highly doubtful that the obsession with reification of nations and nationalism as natural things is a very productive way for the research area of nationalism.

As indicated above, researchers who insist that nationalism is natural existence which is permanent emphasise the role of primordial attachments that are natural and “given” (see Geertz, 1973, p.259; see also Armstrong, 1982; Van den Berghe, 1978). For them, “there exist objective entities with inherent features such as territory, language, recognizable membership, and even a common mentality” (Tishkov, 1997, p.1). The explanation seems plausible in that history textbooks usually date back to even prehistoric times to find the origin of nations. Some countries like China are very proud of a rich history of the nations. The elements of the historical ties are regarded as objective variables to prove such long-lasting natural existence of nations and nationalism.

\(^{32}\) Balibar (1991) also asserted that “Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary… only imaginary communities are real” (p.93). This may be a more radial interpretation.

\(^{33}\) Or, in other words, it is a strict positivist view.
However, the fact that such objective factors for nations and nationalism are genuinely objective is questionable. It is no doubt that every nation has different primordial ties – in some nations, language and ethnicity may be very important; and in some other nations, religion, territory and even culture might be crucial. Then, what is a necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the status of nations and national consciousness? No nation would have exactly the same characteristics with others and everything can be interpreted differently by scholars. This is rather highly subjective. Applying the same yardstick is impossible to measure the sufficient requirements for nations and nationalism. We can easily realise that London’s the Shard (310m) is higher than the Great Pyramid of Giza (147m), but what are enough and essential criteria for judging the fact that “something is high”?

Even it could be contested that the primordial elements adequately account for the phenomena of nations and nationalism as well. To take an example, the case of the two Koreas can be counter-evidence against the argument of absolute role of primordial ties. The two Koreas share the same language, ethnicity, culture as well as history and territory until the division in 1945. However, today’s two Koreas show a different complexion on nationalism though there are still common nationalist sentiments such as their uncomfortable feelings towards Japan. In South Korea, it may not be easy to observe extreme anti-Americanism that is dominant national sentiment in North Korea. North Korean style socialism and the military first policy could not touch South Koreans’ souls. Thus, it seems undesirable to evaluate that their features of nations and nationalism are the same or similar “enough” according to the natural objective aspects that they are still sharing or had shared for a long time.

Smith (1998) may take a moderate position towards this contested issue. By describing his perspective as ethnosymbolism, he admitted that nationalism and nations are generally modern phenomena, but kept distance from the modernist viewpoints by emphasising the role of the cultural aspects such as symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions (see also Smith, 1991; Hutchinson, 2005; Roshwald, 2006). Importantly, he understands nations and nationalism as sociological reality in that there was no nationalism before the eighteenth century and it is rare to find nations before the modern

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34 About the Shard, see The Shard (n.d); and about The Great Pyramid of Giza, see Great Pyramid: Earth’s Largest (n.d).
35 Smith (2003, p.361), himself stated that “Ethnosymbolism may stand ‘in-between’ perennialism and modernism.”
age (see 1996). However, for him, it is impossible to understand modern political nationalisms without the pre-modern elements stated above. Especially, he proposed the term *ethnie* that means “a human population with shared myths of ancestry, common historical memories, one or more elements of culture, a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (Smith, 2003, p.359). According to him, *ethnies* are primordial and may persist regardless of time and place through “an intense nostalgia and spiritual attachment” (1991, p.23). What he claimed here may be that nations and nationalism are not merely formed by modernity, but strongly affected by ethnic ties and cultural sentiments. However, Smith did not blame modernists as they deny real status of nations and nationalism. He maintained that modernists, especially Anderson and Hobsbawm, would not regard nations and nationalism as totally imagined existence. He also indicated that what modernists have done is to refute the idea of primordial and perennial characteristics of nations and nationalism (see Smith, 1996).

His studies greatly contribute to the research field of nationalism and lend the persuasive account of the origins of nations and nationalism, but there is also an issue that has to be tackled. He may attempt to find a kind of causality between pre-modern (or primordial) and modern phenomena. However, he may fail to find a consistent mechanism to explain the reasons why some *ethnies* show different nationalism and form different nations though they share the same or very similar cultural background; and how some *ethnies* shaped nationalism and nations in the process of modernisation whereas others could not do so. Even it is not clear how we can realise the boundaries between *ethnies* and who can be included and who should be excluded in a certain *ethnie*. For instance, today’s China and Taiwan undoubtedly share pre-modern roots considerably. However, it may be difficult to evaluate that their nationalism always shows striking similarities, but rather, the topic of political status of Taiwan has always led huge conflicts between the two countries and they also have visibly different national sentiments towards Japan. What is more, why did Taiwanese aborigines, who can be regarded as *ethnies*, fail to shape modern nations based on strong nationalism?; and why they were excluded in the process of establishment of Taiwan? Actually, as history tells us, it is not very cultural, but political.\(^{36}\) In this case, the concept of *ethnie*

\(^{36}\) This does not mean that smith and ethnosymbolists totally ignore the political aspects when it comes to explaining nations and nationalism. They focus on how the ethno-symbolic elements have been rediscovered during the process of shaping nationalism and nations. This process should be political. About this, see Guibernau (2004).
may not adequately shed light on the origins of the two countries’ nationalism due to a lack of enough investigation of political causality between ethnies and modern nationalism and nations. 

At this point, we need to recall the questions previously given: “if it is invisible, does it not exist?” And “if it is cognised, does it truly exist?” When it comes to nationalism, my answers to these questions are in the “negative.” As has been discussed, the former question may arise from the epistemological fallacy based on radical materialist evidentialism, and the latter one may be due to overconfidence about “objective” factors. I would argue that nationalism is a social construction. For me, regardless of whether nationalism is modern or pre-modern, nationalism cannot be shaped without a certain kind of social process. The momentum of the social processes varies – it can be more cultural, political or economic. Surely, there is no quintessence of nationalism in that the timing and the process are all different. It is not necessarily Western-style industrialization as well. Primordial and natural elements can be the potent factors in forming nationalism in many cases, but they, themselves are neither necessary condition nor that of sufficient. It can be claimed that such long-lasting cultural aspects can naturally lead national consciousness, and it could be true. However, I assert that such national consciousness is like “pottery before firing.” Without any social motives and événements, it is highly unlikely that such national consciousness, by itself, leads or turns into nationalism that is enough to mobilise the social norms into one point. Thus, the focus should be the social and political process, not the natural elements.

So far, this chapter has examined the ontological debate on nationalism as real and natural existence. Next ontological issue is about whether nationalism is in decline or not. It may be natural to think nationalism is neither stronger nor appropriate concept anymore in the sense that the world becomes more and more integrated and globalised. Obviously, the digital and ICT revolutions have allowed people to be interacted much easier and faster. This is the age when more than 1.2 billion people all around world are watching Gangnam Style music video and dancing the horse riding dance together

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37 Similar to this, Eriksen (1993) criticise ethnie as “it would be misleading to claim that there is an unbroken continuity from the pre-modern communities or ‘cultures’ to the national ones (p.107). He took the case of Norway as an example to refute the Smith’s idea that “nationalisms have identifiable ‘objective’ cultural roots.” He asserted that modern ethnic identity in Norway was constructed by “political circumstances” (p.93).

38 The term ICT here refers to information and communications technology.
regardless of their ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds.\textsuperscript{39}

By quoting Hegel’s owl of Minerva, Hobsbawm (1990, p.192) insisted that “‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone to analyse, the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described by these words.” He expressed his argument metaphorically as “The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom… flies out at dusk” (p.192). Even Wendt (2003), in his article \textit{Why a World State is Inevitable}, anticipated that “more new states – ‘more anarchy’ – may be created” because of continuing “nationalist struggles for recognition” (p. 526). According to him, 

\ldots the rise of nationalism can actually be seen as evidence for my argument, because it is about the struggle for recognition. In 1945 a majority of the world’s population lived in empires that did not recognize them as full subjects. As a result they struggled for self-determination and eventually won it. In that sense nationalism has made it possible for previously unrecognized actors to participate in the system, and even contemplate binding themselves to supranational institutions. Any such constraints they accept will be consensual and correspondingly stable. (p.526, emphasis added)

This may be a unique interpretation of the relationship between nationalism and supranational system in that he indicated nationalism as a driving force for the world state construction (see also Kleingeld, 1999).\textsuperscript{40} However, anyway he did not disagree with the idea that nationalism is expected to weaken and dissipate. Thus, it may be clear that there is a strong opinion that the more the world is globalised, the less nationalism can be seen. My aim is to refute the idea that nationalism is a death rattle by giving theoretical and empirical evidence that nationalism is still strong and will not vanish in the near future.

By indicating that “we live in an age of insecurity,” Webster, Lambert and Beziudenhout (2008), asserted that “Faced with insecurity, persons tend to retreat into the familiar – their country, their neighbourhood, their home, their family – and sometimes their ‘race’” (preface, para.1-2). This argument seems plausible considering today’s myriad of international conflicts. Despite the extreme difficulties, why have

\textsuperscript{39} About the song and dance, see YouTube video, PSY - \textit{GANGNAM STYLE (강남스타일)} M/V (2012).

\textsuperscript{40} As a counterargument to this, see Lechner and Boli eds. (2011). They argued that nationalism will not disappear owing to globalisation in the sense that globalisation and growing similarity will rather stimulate reactions against them.
many Tibetan people tried to flee to Dharamsala in which the Tibetan Government in Exile is located? Also, why have many people around the world participated protests against the big multinational corporations in order to keep the domestic companies? It is through nationalism that we may be able to understand these kinds of desires for belonging and protection (see Smith, 1991; Lechner and Boli, 2011). In other words, nationalism may allow the people to regain their mental security. When on earth can we totally escape from this world being filled with the innumerable conflicts? It is certainly impossible for us to grasp the opportunity in the near future—in practice, currency wars are still underway, and protectionism based on selfishness is becoming more prevalent in the current global economic crisis. Aside from the economic situations, there is also a myriad of political and religious conflicts such as the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Germany-Greece tension and China-Japan island dispute. Taking a casual glance at the circumstances, nationalism is still alive and continuing.

One could assert that nationalism is dying, with the evidence of multiculturalism. Obviously, a lot of people are moving to other countries for various purposes and intermarriage is no longer special case for many people. However, behind this scene, it seems that the tension is growing with regard to multiculturalism considering the negative discourses about multiculturalism from the leaders in European countries. By indicating that “we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity,” the Prime Minister of the UK David Cameron, at a security conference in Munich in 2011, said that “we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home… we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism” (Cameron, 2011). The German chancellor, Angela Merkel mentioned that “Germans should also talk about their values and their increasing alienation from religion, in order to affirm their sense of country and society.” Even she also argued that their attempts to create a multicultural society have “utterly failed” (Hall, 2010). The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy insisted that the concept of multiculturalism “had failed.” He also claimed that “We have been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the country that was receiving him” (The Telegraph, 2011). These remarks may imply that

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41 About this, see Stewart (2013).
42 About protectionism, see Plummer (2012).
43 It does not mean that nationalism is always an evil force. This will be discussed later.
even though many people have moved to other countries, they have strongly kept their original identities and rituals and this could make the natives feel nervous and even generate tensions. Regardless of whether this is genuinely serious or not, the situations may represent the collision of different identities and nationalist sentiments.

This issue is actually very sensitive and controversial, but it seems that multiculturalism, at least to date, has not made nationalism completely obsolete, but rather it could stimulate dormant nationalism in certain respects. Many scholars have attempted to investigate their causal relations and seek the way the two concepts can be peacefully integrated, but the conclusions were almost the same: it still has a long way to go (see Aleinikoff, 2001; Holtug, Lippert-Rasmussen and Lægaard, 2009; Kernerman, 2005; Kymlicka, 2001; Miller, 2000). Wehler’s case may clearly make a good example for this issue. He believed that nationalism will vanish if peace persists for a long time and other alternatives mostly derived from the Western experience of modernisation replace the role of nationalism as a basis of legitimation and justification, and it must be realised (see Benes, 2005; see also Wehler, 2001). However, by maintaining that “Regarding its geographical location, historical past, religion, culture, and mentality, Turkey is not a part of Europe,” he insisted that “this Muslim country [Turkey] should never join the EU, as a Muslim state a deep cultural boundary separates this country [Germany] from Europe.” He also claimed that “Turks would destroy the historical character of the [European] Union” and “multiculturalists” were weakening Europe with Christian tradition (Wehler, cited in Huggan and Law, 2009, p.105; see also Eberhard, Lübke and Benthin 2010; Eley, 2007; Küçük, 2011). It is surprising that these nationalistic, exclusive and Eurocentric remarks are from Wehler who emphasised the future welfare state without nationalism. Ironically, he himself showed a strong sense of nationalist sentiment. Paradoxically, the future he dreamed, in the light of his attitude, seems still highly unimaginable.

Like this, nationalism still wields strong influence to people, to a greater or lesser extent. Though it is expressed differently depending on the situation, nationalism can be deeply ingrained in people’s minds involuntarily and unconsciously. By introducing the term “banal nationalism” as “the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced,” Billig (1995, p.6) critically indicated that “these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed.”

44 About this, Anand (2010), though he may take a negative view on nationalism, asserted that “There is no doubt that nationalism matters in global politics” (p.281).
Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the *endemic condition*… Because the concept of nationalism has been restricted to exotic and passionate exemplars, *the routine and familiar forms of nationalism have been overlooked.* In this case, ‘our’ nationalism slips from attention. There is a growing body of opinion that nation-states are declining. Nationalism, or so it is said, is no longer a major force: globalization is the order of the day. But a reminder is necessary. *Nationhood is still being reproduced:* it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are flagged. (Billig, 1995, pp.6-8, emphasis added)

His argument clearly highlights the reason why people are under the illusion that nationalism is in decline. People do not have an intense feeling of nationalism not because it is fading away, but because it is too common. Very simple examples could illustrate this. People are rooting for their national teams in international sports events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup; people are celebrating their national memorial day; and people are singing their national anthems as well as waving the national flags. Civilians killed in the war on terror are largely ignored and media gave prominent coverage on the news that Prince Harry’s killing Taliban fighters in Afghanistan as it is worthy of praise. These kinds of things are usually regarded as the sacrifice of the lesser for the greater – or liberation of the people; and or revenge for justice. Instances like this are all too common and natural in today’s society. Putting aside the disputes over ethical and political issues, if nationalism is excluded, what can make the explanation for these situations?

All things considered, I cannot agree with the idea that nationalism is being enfeebled, but rather it is still potent and deeply entrenched in people’s minds. As the recent cases of South Sudan, Palestine and Scotland show, attempts and desires to be a sovereign state still continue.\(^\text{45}\) The high-handedness of Multinational corporations agitates for forming the new cartel of nationalism. Scholars come on to “online/cyber nationalism” (see Shen and Breslin, 2010; see also Bagchi, 2011).\(^\text{46}\) Smith (1991, p.x) claimed that “national identity and nationalism are likely to remain powerful and proliferating forces in the foreseeable future” as it renders “the sole vision and rationale of political solidarity today” (p.176; see also Greenfeld, 1992; Brubaker, 1996). This

\(^{45}\) About South Sudan independence, see Rice (2011); About Palestinian case, see MacAskill and McGreal (2012); About Scottish independence referendum, see Black (2013).

\(^{46}\) They focused on the phenomena that people show very strong nationalist sentiments on the web, and such online interaction could consolidate nationalism.
moment might be inside his foreseeable future and could last far into another future.

Controversies over the endurance of nationalism are usually in company with the moral debates on nationalism. For the critics of nationalism, their focus is not just that nationalism is in decline, but that it must be eradicated due to its irrational, exclusive and violent characteristics. Nationalism is harshly criticised as “one of the most serious causes now of violence and war” (Popper, 1997, p.39); “fearful of the others” and “arrogant” (Keane, 1995, p.194); “the starkest political shame of the twentieth century” (Dunn, 1979, p.57); “extremely difficult” to be reconciled with “political liberties” (Kedourie, 1993, p.107); “a move to create, awaken and strengthen a masculinist-nationalist body, which is always already vulnerable to the exposure of the masculine as non-masculine” (Anand, 2008, p.175); as well as “the pathology of modern developmental history” (Nairn, 2003, p.347). Obviously, we have witnessed numerous situations that nationalism is abused and expressed in irrational, extreme and exclusive ways. Sometimes, it has been manipulated by powerful individuals or groups to maintain their vested interests; and at others, it has been misused by dominant groups as a means of oppressing social, ethnic and religious minority groups around the world. However, if we agree with the idea that nationalism is socially constructed, can we stigmatise nationalism as a sheer evil force? Is the social process always concluded in a negative direction? I do not agree with this. It is true that nationalism has played a crucial role in oppressive and expansionist momentum, but it is also true that nationalism has provided emotional stability for those who are living in dangerous and tough lives (see Greenfeld, 2005).


> Collective identity, privileges of political membership, and the entitlement to social benefits are no longer bundled together within a unified institution of national citizenship. They are disaggregated and come under the purview of different rights regimes and multiple, nested sovereignties. Yet disaggregated citizenship is not cosmopolitan citizenship. The developments it describes may be driving the worldwide mobility of peoples without democratic attachments and civic commitments, leading to the formation of a world proletariat, participating in global markets but lacking a demos. (p.23, emphasis added)
She critically indicated that cosmopolitanism can result in the creation of another form of unequal and oppressive political community and membership. “Universal principles” under the current neoliberalism have not always led the liberation of the oppressed people – they have made people economically and politically more marginalised as well. Nationalism can offer an emotional shelter to those who are uncomfortable with such universalism, and arguably, in spite of the limitations, nation-states are one of the most significant actors to moderate any kind of radical tendency of this aspect. Berlin (2003) emphasised wanting to belong and feeling at home to explain this aspect of nationalist sentiments. As a Zionist, he strongly believed that Jews need a home in Israel to relieve their sense of social unease. For him, “a sense of home” rightly means “a sense of freedom” in that people can be mentally emancipated from social and political pressure from external forces (see also Margalit, 2001, p.164). Apart from the territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine, his idea clearly shows how nationalism could positively affect people’s feeling of safe and comfort.

By highlighting the collapse of nation-state Europe as one of the most important factors to bring out totalitarianism, Arendt (1976) indicated that stateless people cannot have the “right to have rights,” and “people without their own national government” could be “deprived of human rights” (p.272).

The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective... They [people deprived of human rights] are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion... We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation. The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any “uncivilized” spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have really started to live in One World (pp.296-297, emphasis added).

Her notions of “a right to have rights” and “a right to belong” plainly shed light on the important role of nationalism in this globalised and competitive international society.
That is to say, nationalism can be the fundamental basis for human equality with a right not to be politically and socially excluded.\textsuperscript{47} Smith, by maintaining that “Nationalism may not be responsible for the many instances of reform and democratization of tyrannical regimes,” also asserted that nationalism “is a frequent accompanying motive, a source of pride for downtrodden peoples and the recognized mode for joining or rejoining ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization’” (1990, p.176). In these regards, it may not be desirable to totally inculpate a certain kind of nationalist solidarity as the primary cause of today’s international conflicts. In fact, it is questionable whether nationalism is completely responsible for the problems that international society is undergoing. According to Anand (2010), the state “may come up with a majoritarian nationalism that excludes minorities within.” This “then may lead to minority nationalisms and sometimes violent resistance to the existing state and demand for a new state” (p.281). This logic may be true in international politics as well. Needless to say, many weak states are forced to follow “global standards” by the great powers. This also may provoke a storm of protest against such standards that ignore the values of the minor states. Then, what is the fundamental cause of the problems? Nationalism of the weak powers or that of great powers? Who are the great powers? Are they really directly involved in the situation? Then, is it really a matter of nationalism? It may be more appropriate to evaluate that these problems are the matter of violence of universalism and cosmopolitanism. It may be difficult to blame those who withdraw to their nations in order to avoid such one-sided global principles as well.

It seems that scholars are prone to easily attribute the negative issues to nationalism. Nationalism has generally accused of resulting in racism, violence, gender inequality and even irrational form of communism (see Miles, 1987; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Kedourie, 1993; Popper, 1997). Their studies are absolutely fine and fruitful to understand nationalism as a negative force. However, even so, it might be dangerous to generalise that nationalism is always maleficence. Actually, there is no strict logical evidence and absolute causality between nationalism and the negative concepts. It is highly contingent in history and depends on interpretation. To take an example, Mosse (1995) claimed that nationalism is being condemned “without distinction, or identifying it automatically with racism, deprives us of any chance to humanize an ideology whose

\textsuperscript{47} However, she criticised ethnically based nationalism. What she advocated in terms of nationalism is about so-called “civic” nationalism, especially that of French model (see Rensmann, 2006). The types of nationalism, civic and ethnic nationalism in particular, will be discussed later.
time, far from being over, seems to have arrived once more” (p.168). This means that racism and nationalism may not have a direct correlation. Like this, there is always room for different interpretations and of course there is a myriad of other irrational and morbid phenomena that are not necessarily connected with nationalism. There are a lot of conflicts related to religious beliefs. Then, should we totally denounce religion itself? There must be positive sides that religion contributes, so it is more productive to take a balanced approach to elicit more objective and unbiased results.

Actually nationalism can have a positive effect on many circumstances. Scholars like Yael Tamir (1995) even argued that “nationalism is not the pathology of the modern age but an answer to its malaise – to the neurosis, alienation, and meaninglessness characteristic of modern times” (p.432). In practice, nationalism has played a pivotal role in anticolonialism in many cases such as China, India and Korea. For some minorities like Tibetans and Balochis, nationalism is what holds the people together, which allows the nations to be sustained. It also acts as a defense mechanism to protect domestic markets against invasion of big multinational corporations. These kinds of minor or marginalised interests (if it is viewed in international level) could easily be discarded if nationalism is absent in that it seems that the role of global ethics and humanism is still very limited. International organisations such as UN and WTO are struggling to solve the tensions around the world, and we have observed the situations how the treaty of the UNFCCC\(^{48}\) and the Kyoto Protocol have frequently been negated (See Boer, 2012). In other words, in international level, a dilemma of “the tragedy of the commons” (see Hardin, 1968) has not been impressively relieved yet. One could argue that this has been caused by selfish nationalism as well. It may be true. However, the point which claims our attention is that the international agendas are usually set by the great powers and obviously and unfortunately there is not enough room for the weak nations to be involved in the decision-making process. Their positions and interests may not be dealt with as a matter of cardinal importance, regardless of the value and rationality. Nationalism may help such unsung interests not to be given up by the weak nations themselves even in very difficult circumstances. If we predicate that nationalism is completely bad and dangerous, the pursuit of such interests and attempts at survival can be interpreted as always unethical and irrational movements, which may be unfair evaluation and the violent logic of the powerful.

\(^{48}\) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
These sorts of different instances and interpretations may lead the discussions on which types of nationalism are good, or bad. Many typologies on this topic have been proposed by scholars, which has strongly affected the studies in this filed. Usually nationalism has been classified by a dichotomous way. From Friedrich Meinecke’s (see 1970) attempt at distinguishing between the “Kulturnation” (cultural nations) and the “Staatsnation” (political nations), the dichotomous framework has been commonly adopted to explain the types of nationalism. Hans Kohn might present the most notable theoretical dichotomous typology (see Shulman, 2002, p.555). He (1944) classified nationalism into two types: Western and Eastern nationalism. For him, the former is “a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future,” while the latter “was basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal society” (p. 574). His idea may be the foundation of the analytical distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism (see Shulman, 2002, p.556; Schnapper, 1995; see also Breton, 1988; Greenfeld, 2000; Smith, 1986). Though there are more or less different interpretations on the issue among the scholars, it is a largely held view that civil nationalism is political, which usually accompanies liberty, democracy, universality and civilization, represented by the experiences of England, France and the United States (see Buckley, 2000; Delahunty, 2012), while ethnic nationalism is cultural, which is usually associated with irrationality, inefficiency and undemocratic aspects, generally found in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (see Heisler, 1990; Held and McGrew, 2003; Horowitz, 1985; see also Lecours, 2000).

Leaving aside its Eurocentric bias, it is doubtful about how effective this dichotomous framework actually is, when it comes to distinguishing between good and bad nationalism. Does really nationalism has such a fixed characteristics? Geertz (1973) stated that “There is, in such matter, no simple progression from “traditional” to “modern,” but a twisting, spasmodic, unmethodical movement which turns as often toward repossessing the emotions of the past as disowning them” (p.319). Nationalism must be selectively recognised and differently reconstituted in history as well. It is almost impossible to accurately demarcate civic and ethnic; Western and non-Western; as well as modern and pre-modern. Thus, there are no naturally given characteristics of nationalism, but rather, it is the matter of interpretation and implementation, which is historically contingent process. Actually, many scholars have indicated that civic nationalism is not necessarily beneficial concept. By indicating that “banal

... some forms of nationalism, most notably movements for national liberation from colonialism, tend to be classed as positive, whilst others, such as fascist movements, belong to the shadowed half. *It would be wrong to assume that ‘banal nationalism’ is ‘benign’ because it seems to possess a reassuring normality, or because it appears to lack the violent passions of the extreme right... In the case of Western nation-states, banal nationalism can hardly be innocent: it is reproducing institutions which possess vast armaments. As the Gulf and Falklands Wars indicated, forces can be mobilized without lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments are primed, ready for use in battle. And the national populations appear also to be primed, ready to support the use of those armaments* (p.7, emphasis added).

His argument implies that it is dangerous to conclude that banal or civic nationalism is always a positive force. Every nationalism is actually ready for a change depending on the different situations. Similar to this, Brubaker (1999), by claiming that “all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive,” he maintained that “what varies [between civic and ethnic nationalism] is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (p.64). He critically examined the exclusive characteristics of civic understanding of nationalism.

... citizenship itself, by its very nature, is an exclusive as well as an inclusive status. On a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure... Access to citizenship is *everywhere limited*; and even if it is open, in principle, to persons regardless of ethnicity, this is small consolation to those excluded from citizenship, and even from the possibility of applying for citizenship, by being excluded from the territory of the state. *This «civic» mode of exclusion is exceptionally powerful*. On a global scale, it is probably far more important, in shaping life chances and sustaining massive and morally arbitrary inequalities, than is any kind of exclusion based on putative ethnicity. But it is largely invisible, because we take it for granted (1999, p.64, emphasis added).

This clearly demonstrates the fact that the exclusive feature of nationalism is not reserved just for ethnic nationalism. Therefore, considering the above arguments, there
are no originally and absolutely good or bad types of nationalism. It must be interpreted and evaluated in the frame of the social and historical context. Obviously, Western concept of nationalism has also been shaped through the mechanism of disputes, conflicts, exclusion, invasions and colonialism. Ethnic, gender, racial and cultural minorities were, or are, suffering from harsh discrimination. As an example, how can we interpret the citizenship process for “green-card soldiers” of the US? A lot of illegal immigrants mostly from Latin America have joined the wars to get a US citizenship (see Krikorian, 2003). Is this “civic-way” of shaping nationalism? Furthermore, the numerous unsung heroes of the “just-war” are remembered, but how about the innocent unnamed war dead on the battlefields? Are their dignity truly respected in civic and Western societies?

**Nationalism and National Interest: Nationalism as a Strategy**

So far, we have examined the contested issues on nationalism and attempted to find out how nationalism can be properly interpreted. To summarise, I argue that nationalism is a social construct that can be driven either by the states or the public. There is no objective *sine qua non* for the process of defining nationalism, which can be applicable to every case. Nationalism is still alive and kicking, and it must be interpreted and understood in the social and historical context. It is difficult to evaluate that nationalism is always an evil force, and there are no sheer good or bad types of nationalism.

I do not think that nationalism claims any particular new prominence, value and vision for the future. It has not given any special and clear doctrines to be achieved. In history, nationalism has been used as a strong driving force to pursue hope, desire and purpose of the nations, that is, the national interests. This may be the reason why nationalism has been found in any ideological regimes, namely, liberal states and communist states as a tool for mobilising the people to realise the ideological goals (see Delahunty, 2012, p.18). Different from other broad concepts such as liberalism, communism, socialism and capitalism, nationalism is simple. It does not need to give the actors any specific justifications or reasons for the pursuit of nations’ interests in the sense that nationalism is operated by feelings and sentiments, not by the rationale behind the actions. Anyway, it is obvious that nationalism matters in the pursuit of national interests since the national interest is the ultimate place in which nationalism is
expressed and realised.

To examine China and India’s National interest vis-à-vis Tibet, this research especially concentrates on nationalism as a strategy to pursue national interest. As discussed above, some scholars, Marxists, in particular, argued that elites shape and use nationalism to mobilise people to pursue their own interests. So-called instrumentalists who focus on the instrumental nature of nationalism agree with this idea. They explain “the genesis of and continuing support for nationalism by the interests it is alleged to serve. In this view, ethnic and national identities become convenient tools at the hands of competing elites for generating mass support in the universal struggle for wealth, power and prestige” (Özkirimli, 2000, p.88). For them, nationalism is a creation of elites who sell interests defined by them as national interests.

As politics is usually dominated by the elites, one can say that nationalism as a strategy is the preserve of elites. However, as it is indicated, nationalism can be generated and evolved by the public as well. Even such nationalism can go against elite defined national interest. In this regard, I challenge the idea that nationalism is “always” an elites’ creation – however, I do agree with the opinion that nationalism can be used by actors as a political strategy to define and realise national interests. For me, the relationship between nationalism; and the formation and pursuit of national interest is a kind of socially, politically or culturally constructed contract. Sometimes it is relatively easier to complete the deal – for example, the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s use of Han nationalism; and other times it is difficult to even have a negotiation – for instance, the CPC’s nationalistic approach towards the Tibetan people within the PRC boundary. The contract is discussed and made in the structure of power politics; and delivered and shared via various discourses.

The linguistic practices inside the discursive structures are not always based on rigorous and logical rationality. They are based on feelings, emotions and sentiments. These feelings can sometimes become extreme, and lead to abnormal contracts such as Nazi Germany and China’s Cultural Revolution. The “terms and conditions” of nationalism in the contract is unclear and unwritten. The contract is always exposed to the possibility of manipulation and deception. Actors who want to benefit from the contract can abuse this aspect. Such actors usually provoke majoritarianism. In a society, there is a tendency of “Normative social influence,” which leads to the willingness of conformity. It is “where people follow group norms. This influence arises from people’s desire for approval and acceptance, and their anxiety and discomfort about the
possibility of being ostracized or ridiculed, or simply being seen as impolite” (Stainton Rogers, 2011, p.357). In other words, social forces can alter the people’s opinions or make people just follow majoritarian perspectives even if such viewpoints are against their beliefs. Thus, once the majoritarian nationalism is set, it is difficult for someone who can challenge it. This situation can help the immoral actors facilitate the pursuit of their own interests in the name of national interests.

It goes without saying that the contract would not necessarily be negative, but there is a risk in the nationalism-national interest deal. Especially in the countries like China and India where the tendency of majoritarianism (ethnic and religious, respectively) is vivid, there must be always possibility that nationalism can be strategically abused in the process of pursuit of “forged” national interests. This research, keeping this in mind, attempts to find out if nationalism is used, or abused, as a strategy to define and realise the two countries’ national interests vis-à-vis Tibet, through the examination of language practices – the CPC may have drawn on Han nationalism to fortify the concept of the Chinese nation, and on propaganda about development to neutralise Tibetan nationalism. In the case of India, the elite, while acknowledging their inability to contain China with the Tibet card, have attempted to boost nationalism by emphasising their generous, democratic and peaceful approach towards Tibet, and thereby comparing themselves favourably with China. This will be dealt with in the chapter VI and VII in more detail.

All in all, in today’s world, it seems that there are a lot of leviathans who pursue its interests. Nationalism, on the one hand, could be abused by the unethical leviathans as momentum for irrational absolute power; on the other hand, it could be worked as insurance against such irrational actors. It may not be easy to anticipate whether nationalism will be a giant wall that should be broken by Nomads (see Deleuze, 1994) for survival, or will provide them with comfortable shelter. However, it seems obvious that if each nation continuously tries to define and realise their national interests, nationalism would not easily disappear in the sense that the pursuit of the national interests can be justified in the name of nationalism.


Chapter IV. Methodology

We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher. The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour.

— MICHEL FOUCAULT, The order of Discourse

Research Questions

The primary purpose of this research is to investigate how China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet has been defined, articulated and pursued. As previous chapter indicated, this study will be conducted under the two theoretical bases: rationalism and constructivism. In so far as rationalists understand the concept of national interest, it is exogenously given and fixed, as well as independent of any different circumstance and situation. That is to say, interest itself is predefined, and it is natural for various actors, whatever they are states or individuals, to pursue the interest as it is inherent human nature. Importantly, objective variables such as material forces and security are of the utmost importance to shape the national interest, which determines “true” interest. In view of rationalist account, this thesis presents the following questions:

Q 1-1: Are there objectively significant factors in Tibet inducing China and India’s interests?

Q 1-2: Are the objectively important aspects of Tibet the leading cause of defining China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet?

Q 1-3: Are the two countries’ conflicts and tensions about the Tibet issue a power and strategic game, pursuing the objective interests that they have vis-à-vis Tibet?

As seen in the questions above, it is a key to discover the objective factors which may lead China and India to the strategic game over the Tibet issue. Thus, the presented questions may be none other than the following questions: “what issues and themes can be significant to define and explain China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet?” and “what is evidence that such issues and themes matter when it comes to
explaining their national interests?” Questions about “how” and “why” such national interests have been shaped are not the main concern for rationalists as the process of interest formation is not an epistemologically and ontologically significant theme for them.

Constructivist approach, however, has a different story. For constructivists, how the national interest has been shaped is an important issue. They put great importance on ideational factors that are not significantly dealt with in rationalist approach when it comes to explaining the process of defining the interest. As already discussed in the previous chapter, this study argues that the national interest is socially constructed and linguistically realised and represented. This thesis particularly highlights the role of the two countries’ nationalism in the process of shaping, justifying and pursuing the national interests. Considering the conceptual frameworks with regard to national interest and nationalism provided, this research poses the following questions:

Q 2-1: Is it through a domestic, cultural and political complexity of causal factors that China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet have been shaped and pursued?

Q 2-2: Are China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet driven (originated and defined) by the elites\(^{49}\) in general?

Q 2-3: In China and India, does nationalism play an instrumental role in the process of defining, pursuing and justifying (legitimising) the national interests with regard to Tibet?

The questions of “how,” “who” and “why” are the basis of the research questions above. That is to say, the focus here is to examine the internal process of interest formation. To find out this, it may be necessary to understand the social, historical, political and cultural contexts in which the defining and pursuing process of China and India’s interests with regard to Tibet has taken place. It means that this thesis attempts to delve into the conditions, situations and backgrounds of the dynamics of interest-defining processes in China and India under the assumption that such domestic circumstances have significant implications for interpretation of their interests vis-à-vis Tibet. Then,

\(^{49}\) In this paper, the term “elites” would mean those who can have a large impact on the social agenda, for example, politicians, state officials, scholars and other influential figures, namely, dominant people, groups and institutions. This will be dealt with in the next relevant chapters in more detail.
how to understand and analyse the contexts is a crucial issue. As already discussed in the previous chapter, this research takes the epistemological position that people recognise and understand reality through language. Thus, investigating the linguistic process in the reality concerning the national interest is imperative to discover the contexts in which relevant parties and people interpret and understand the situation that they are involved in.

Methods of Analysis

1. Textual Analysis: Content Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis

To examine all the presented research questions, this thesis employs qualitative research methods. Quantitative approach may not be adequate to meet the methodological needs of this research because the aim of this thesis is not to prove the general tendency and causality that can universally be applicable to the situations regarding the relationship between China and India according to their interests vis-à-vis Tibet, but the complicated phenomena that the two countries are undergoing. Also, owing to the complexity of the concepts of interest and nationalism, it may be difficult not only to control the meaningful or insignificant variables but to generate the quantified data as well.

To return, basically, textual analysis is used to analyse the data. As stated before, the purpose of this study, in brief, is to tackle the questions of what attracts China and India’s interests vis-à-vis Tibet (for the rationalist framework) and how and why such interests have been defined and pursued (for the constructivist framework). To approach the former research question, that of the rationalist framework, this study adopts content analysis. Content analysis is helpful in revealing “recurrent instances of items of themes” (Julien, 2008, p.121). That is to say, it is through content analysis that this research expects to identify the main themes that have been dealt with in the various primary and secondary sources about the China and India’s conflict of interests with regard to Tibet. That is to say, this process would allow this study to discover the significant aspects and factors that may be of interest China and India.

Actually, content analysis has widely been used in quantitative research, media and communication studies in particular (see Berelson, 1952). According to Bryman (2008), content analysis is “an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that
seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (p.274, emphasis added). Quantitative content analysis focuses not heavily on the implication of contents, but on “the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p.263). Frequency of intensity of certain words or visual images is the basic ground for the analysis, as this method, epistemologically, assumes that counting the occurrence may mean measuring the significance (see Rose, 2001). It may be inappropriate to maintain that quantitative content analysis is merely dependent on the frequency and deductive manner, but it is true that the method is usually prone to use various kinds of numerical analysis that inevitably accompanies quantifying process based on the frequency of certain data (see Winkler and Kozeluh, 2005).

This study, however, may need to consider latent elements of content that are beyond the frequencies. In other words, this thesis claims that more frequencies do not necessarily mean more importance and interest. To take an example, it may be difficult to evaluate whether China’s national interest with regard to Tibet has been increased or decreased on the basis that the frequency of use of the term Tibet in their historical defence white papers. In the white papers, China’s National Defence in 2008 and 2010, “Tibet” appears only once and twice respectively, but in the report of the Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces published in 2013 (defence white paper in 2013), the word is used four times. However, the Tibet has long been regarded as China’s one of the most important core interests, and there is no significant sign to conjecture that China’s interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been declining since 2008. Actually, while the 2013 paper concentrates on the social infrastructure in terms of the Tibet issue, the 2008 and 2010 papers have a stronger voice about Tibet with the sentences that “Tibet independence pose threats to China’s unity and security” in 2008 and “Tibet independence have inflicted serious damage on national security and social stability” in 2010. Thus, the frequency of quantified data cannot be enough element to analyse the phenomena related to the topic of this research. This may be why Krippendorff (2004, p.16) indicated, “[U]ltimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, even when certain characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers.” Julien (2008, p.120) also indicated that “[I]n qualitative research, content analysis is interpretive, involving close reading of text,” and “text is open to subjective interpretation, reflects multiple meanings, and is context dependent.”

Therefore, it may be undesirable for this research to confine the method of
content analysis to the epistemology of quantitative approach. Rather, this study actively attempts to interpret the varied contents of the primary and secondary sources in order to find out the two countries’ rationale behind their consistent and coherent behaviours defining and pursuing the interests concerning Tibet. Again, under the rationalist framework, to demystify the behaviours of the two “rational” actors, namely, Chinese and Indian states, it is essential to delve into objectively attractive factors of Tibet that could satisfy the desires and interests of the two countries. The factors comprise material objects and security concern, which transcends time and space and independent of beliefs and ideas about them. Naturally, the contents related to economy, security and geopolitics can be major data sources to be contemplated. This thesis, thus, categorises the contents from the primary and secondary sources into these three themes: economy, security and geopolitics. From the primary sources, it is expected to get the point of what the actors have articulated and done about Tibet. Reviewing these sources would help grasp the priority of their interests at the time as well as coherent actions towards the objective interests. By examining the secondary sources, this study could gain the idea that what actually and potentially drives them to jump into the strategic game vis-à-vis Tibet. Not only do these sources analyse and interpret the actions done by the actors, but they provide the diverse significant economic and strategic aspects upon Tibet that may provoke the appetite of China and India. Through the analysis of these contents, we can understand what China is interested in, and what India is interested in with regard to Tibet, as rational actors who seek economic and political objective national interests. Based on the findings from the content analysis, this research also attempts to highlight the elements that significantly cause a conflict of interests between China and India vis-à-vis Tibet.

Content analysis, however, has some limits to be applied to the constructivist framework presented by this research. Ontologically, content analysis takes the ideas that there is objective reality and interest is given and fixed. Content analysis also adopts a positivist approach, which is incompatible with the epistemological position of this research (see Herrera and Braumoeller, 2004; see also Kassarjian, 2001). A qualitative approach to content analysis could be used in the constructivist studies to a certain extent as it leaves us more room for interpretive forms of analysis than quantitative work. However, due to the different position towards relations between text (language) and reality, it is doubtful whether content analysis can provide the constructivist framework with a proper analytical tool or not. Especially, content
analysis cannot meet the methodological rigor in terms of interpreting context. As indicated above, it is vital to understand various contexts that are the certain setting in which the actors’ interests, intentions and experiences are inextricably interwoven and mutually affected. Content analysis is not very concerned with those contexts in the sense that it “focuses on the text abstracted from its contexts” (Hardy, Harley and Phillips, 2004, p.19). Even if content analysis can be context dependent if there is less obvious content, the method denies the perspective that cultural or historical contexts comprising ideational factors and going beyond the text would significantly affect the behaviours of the rational actors who pursue their interests.

Therefore, to analyse the sources under the constructivist framework, this thesis may need a different mode of analysis. Usually, discourse analysis (DA) is largely used in the constructivist studies. DA takes the position that reality is the intersubjective construction, that is, social construct. It also assumes that the reality is linguistically recognised and there are strong relations between context and text. While content analysis seeks the coherent logic of the consistent pursuit of interests according to the objective factors that are taken for granted, DA postulates that meaning and implication of interests can change according to the various situations and circumstances, namely, contexts and structure. It goes without saying, analysing text is also the important theme of DA, but it is more concerned with the structural context shaped by social, historical as well as discursive strategy. Thus, DA can satisfy the methodological demand of this research as it shares ontological and epistemological positions towards the viewpoint on reality and interest.

Actually, there is no generally and universally accepted definition and method of DA. It varies depending on the different approaches towards discourse and reality. Among the varied subfields of discourse analysis, this thesis adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA). Not only does CDA investigate language but it examines “the discursive conditions, components and consequences” of power relations, ideologies and discursive strategies (Van Dijk, 1995, p.24; see also Fairclough, 1989; Wodak 1996). Wodak and Meyer (2009) argued that the difference between DA and CDA is that CDA is “not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach” (p.2). They also indicated the principles that CDA scholarship shares: 1) “all approaches are problem-oriented” and “necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic”; and 2) scholars in this field have “the common interests
in de-mystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)” (p.3).

CDA is basically originated from sociolinguistics, semiotics, Gramsci’s hegemony theory, Harbermas’ colonisation of discourse and Foucault’s theory of power (see Fairclough, 1995). CDA scholars selectively combine those theories and concepts to establish a CDA framework. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.12) propose the basic theoretical premise of CDA.

1) Language is not a reflection of a pre-existing reality.
2) Language is structured in patterns or discourses – there is not just one general system of meaning as in Saussurian structuralism but a series of systems or discourses, whereby meanings change from discourse to discourse.
3) These discursive patterns are maintained and transformed in discursive practices.
4) The maintenance and transformation of the patterns should therefore be explored through analysis of the specific contexts in which language is in action.

According to the above theoretical basis, CDA researchers have proposed different interpretation and understanding of discourse and reality depending on their epistemological position. According to Howarth and Torfing (2005), “discourse can be defined as a relational ensemble of signifying sequences that weaves together semantic aspects of language and pragmatics aspects of action” (p.14). Wodak and Meyer (2009) claim that “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a Lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se” (p.3). Mills (1997) highlights that “we have to apprehend reality through discourse and discursive structures” (p.54). Among these kinds of various attempts at defining CDA, Fairclough and Wodak (1997)’s definition is largely accepted and quoted by CDA scholars.

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions(s) and social structure(s), which frame it… the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to
transforming it. Since discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects (p.258)

What we may need to pay attention to here is that CDA assumes that discourse shapes world, namely, culture and society, and discourse is also shaped by them, that is, discourse constitutes society and culture. Thus, discourse, for CDA school, is not a mere medium conveying and delivering ideas, but a creature having its own structure and order. As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) indicated, not only does discourse contribute to sustaining and reproducing the existing condition but also it transforms the present state. CDA does not simply see and observe such social phenomena, but “critically” interpret it. In other words, it is not descriptive and merely explanatory, but interpretative and critical. Especially, CDA concerns heavily about how discourse functions and is involved in the process of the social phenomena, that is to say, social (re)production and transformation, by focusing on power, ideology and hegemony. During the process of the (re)production and transformation of society, discursive practices and strategies supported by and related to power relations can be hidden, opaque and even manipulated. One of the most important aims of CDA is to make such ambiguous and abstract characteristics of discourse clear and transparent.

Actually, CDA is highly interested in critically examining power abuse, inequality, bias and discrimination. Scholars in this field try to find if there are discursive strategies that justify improper and irrational behaviours done by dominant and majority groups. It means that they keen on explaining “discourse and its functions in society, and the ways society, and especially forms of inequality, are expressed, represented, legitimated or reproduced in text and talk.” The subjects to be considered can be “patterns of access and control over contexts, genres, text and talk, their properties, as well as the discursive strategies of mind control” (Van Dijk, 1995, p.24). As Habermas (1967) indicated, “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power” (p.259).

This can especially be true when it comes to defining national interest and nationalism by the states. States could announce that “something is our nation’s interest, so we have to protect it.” Then, any forms of pursuit of that national interest may easily be justified and legitimised by the states as well as the public even if the general people do not have enough information on it. It goes without saying, the words like “our” and “nations” are very sensitive, nationalistic and difficult to resist it in most cases. Even
states could claim that “against it directly means damage to our national interests.” It is highly possible that the interest defined by the states can actually be those for the dominant groups. In any case, the people cannot help in taking a passive position—states and dominant groups conveniently control over talk and text. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities can make a striking example. The government of North Korea argues that having nuclear weapons are our national pride and national interest. Regardless of whether the argument is right or not, how much nuclear capabilities can help North Korean people is questionable, considering the fact that North Korea is still suffering from poverty and developing nuclear capabilities could add an excessive financial burden to North Korea. Is it really national interest and pride for the general people in North Korea? It might depend on the different circumstances, but in view of the current situation that North Korea is undergoing, not many people could totally agree with what the North Korea government announces.

CDA seeks the reasons why these kinds of social problem and imbalance are caused in the concepts of ideology, hegemony and power. As indicated in the constructivist framework part, this thesis especially focuses on power. Many CDA scholars highlight the role of power and power abuse, “in the way discourse (re)produces social domination” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.9). According to Van Dijk (1995), “[P]atterns of discourse control and access are indeed closely associated with social power” (p.20). Obviously and undoubtedly, Foucault provides CDA scholarships with the theoretical foundation in terms of the concept of power. His epistemological concern was how language is used and how the use of language is related to social and cultural behaviours (see Foucault, 1972; 1978; 1980; 1990). Important aspect is that according to him, discourse and discursive structure pre-define what can be said about the given topic. It means that there is truth defined by discursive structures, and the truth generates power. He (1980, p.93) argued that “[W]e are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” In other words, the process of production of truth, that is, discursive formation, is medium of exercising power and vice versa.

Especially he highlighted the relations between knowledge and power. Foucault (1990) indicated that “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (p.100). This can be interpreted that there is no knowledge without (pre)existence or formation of power relations, and discourse is not just about active exercise of communication, but something creates knowledge. This clearly shows that the
relationship between knowledge and power relations that constitute the knowledge is discursive. About this, Foucault (1979, p.27-28) summarised it in the following manner:

...power produces knowledge... power and knowledge directly imply one another... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations.

Important thing related to this theme is that Foucault did not think of power as necessarily negative force unlike many CDA scholars do today. Actually researchers in this area usually regard power as driving force behind social inequalities (see Van Dijk, 2009; see also Billig, 2008). Foucault was, however, wary of the idea that power is recklessly described as negative terms such as exclusion, repression and manipulation (see Foucault, 1979). He argued that “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (p.194). The “truth” here is not universal and eternal truth. It is dependent on how discourse makes it true. Once the constructed truth is believed, it becomes legitimised and justified truth in a certain place (see storey, 2009). Foucault also claimed that it is true that discourse creates, transmits and bolsters power, but it is also true that discourse challenges, distributes and subverts power (Foucault, 2009). His notion of power is in accord with the constructivist framework of this research. National interest and nationalism are defined and delivered within the power structure and believed as true interests and positive things through discursive practices; the concepts are not necessarily negative forces that restrict flow of people’s ideas and actions; and the concepts can be discarded as well if they are regarded as obsolete.

So far, this study has reviewed theoretical understanding of CDA and its notion of power. Then, it is necessary to have an analytical strategy based on the theoretical premise we have explored. This research adopts discourse-historical approach (DHA) which “has made the systematic analysis of context and its dialectical relationship to meaning-making one of its priori ties” (see Wodak, 2011, p.627; see also Wodak and Reisigl, 2001; 2009). According to Wodak (2009),
DHA provides a vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potentials in agents, because it integrates and triangulates knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded. Moreover, the DHA distinguishes between three dimensions which constitute textual meanings and structures: the topics which are spoken/written about; the discursive strategies employed; and the linguistic means that are drawn upon to realize both topics and strategies. (p.38, emphasis added)

DHA assumes that discourses are historical, and can only be understood by examining the contexts with the extralinguistic factors such as culture, society and power (see Wodak and Meyer, 2009). DHA tries to analyse historical dimension of discursive practices by examining various genres of discourse which can be changed in history. It seems that DHA adopts the idea that history and historical context are discursive production, which is in accord with the understanding of theorists such as Foucault, Derrida, Barthes and Lyotard (see Park, p.180). DHA could find out consistent, contingent and abnormal tendencies and language use of particular situations and events that the researchers are interested in. All the change and consistency within the particular timescale can be subjects to be contemplated. During the course of history, discursive formations and practices may affect and shape the actors’ perception of the events and ideas. Especially so far as the concept of relations concerned, through historical conflicting narratives and languages between the plural actors, it may be possible to grasp the discursive construction process of their conflicts.

This thesis, following Wodak’s idea, analyse China and India’s historical discourses on their national interests vis-à-vis Tibet by examining three dimensions of analytical framework: topics, socio-cultural practice and discursive strategies. In the analysis of Topics, this thesis attempts to find agenda that is deal with when it comes to defining and articulating the national interest with regard to Tibet. This would highlight what aspects were significantly regarded at the time and how it has been changed or consistent. Second part is socio-cultural practice. Wodak (2009), one of the founders of DHA approach, proposed linguistic means as stated before. This study, however, replaces this into socio-cultural practice that Fairclough suggested (see Fairclough, 1995). This thesis more focuses on macro-level analysis having fairly large timescale. It

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A genre is a particular usage of language which participates in, and constitutes, part of a particular social practice, for example, an interview genre, a news genre or an advertising genre (Fairclough, 1995, p.56). It can be interpreted as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity” (p.14).
seems that *linguistic means* can particularly be helpful in analysing short-term consecutive events in the sense that it more concentrates on micro-level analysis that delves into specific use of oral and written forms of words. Thus, *linguistic means* may not meet the analytical needs for this research. *Socio-cultural practice* is, however, can greatly help understand various contexts about the research topic. Since *socio-cultural practice* rightly accompanies examination of social and cultural structures, it would be helpful in discovering social and cultural background, situations and circumstances in which discursive practices and formations take place. Especially, examining cultural structure and practice can play an instrumental role in understanding latent meanings and actions in the long-term processes of defining and pursuing interests in the sense that it can highlight the long-term construction processes of identity. As indicated in the previous chapter on constructivist framework, “identities inform interests and, in turn, actions” (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.221). Therefore, it would allow this study to grasp how much cultural practices influence the pursuit of national interest. Historical and socio-political context will be dealt with to grasp cultural structure and practice because: 1) history gives background knowledge (cultural structure) to understand actor’s own rationality behind its behaviour; and 2) such behaviour and discursive interaction happen in the structure of power politics.

Last thing is *discursive strategies*. This would mean the strategies to facilitate consensus building (see Wodak et al., 2011). This research particularly focuses on the role of nationalism here. The actors, namely, China and India can take a strategy to awaken dormant nationalism to legitimise their interest-defining and pursuing activities. Even it can be used as momentum to “deal with” the conflicts that they face. How nationalism is shaped (produced) and delivered (consumed) in relation to the concept of national interest, who does and why it happens are key themes to be analysed.

The reference period for the analysis adopting DHA is from 1904 to 2015, given that 1904 was the point at which the Chinese foreign ministry firstly claimed their sovereign over Tibet in response to British invasions of Tibet. Lastly, the sources to be analysed here are the published volumes of each of the governments involved, as well as those of scholars, and the coverage of the countries in various media. Basically each framework shares the material, but primary sources, for instance, White Papers, journals, newspaper and magazine articles and original interviews, are more actively utilized for tackling the research questions in constructivist framework to avoid unintentional bias affected by the interpretations of secondary sources that deal with the content of raw
Chapter IV. Methodology

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material. Conversely, with the rationalist framework, along with first-hand material, various secondary sources including article, book and literary reviews and biographies are widely used to find out themes and issues of the given topic.

2. Interviews

Interview is a method to produce knowledge through a conversational practice between interviewer and interviewee in qualitative research. It has become one of the most common modes of collecting qualitative research data (Brinkmann, 2008, p.470). This thesis also conducts interviews in order to gather research data to be extensively used and analysed in chapters VI and VII. There are many different types of interviews such as structured and unstructured interviews – and among them, this research uses semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interview is “a qualitative data collection strategy in which the researcher asks informants a series of predetermined but open-ended questions” (Ayres, 2008, p.810). This means that it is with “room for the respondent’s more spontaneous descriptions and narratives” (Brinkmann, 2008, p.470).

This thesis believes that semi-structured interview is the best method for this research, because 1) the interviewees are experts in the field of China-India relations and Tibet, so during the interview, the contents and opinions that need to be deeply discussed more can be presented; and 2) the purpose of this interview is to enhance validity and reliability of the interpretation and analysis made before the interview. To have a reflexive and active discussion on the analysis, open-ended questions are necessary. About the interview modes used, face-to-face interviews are preferred in this research for more active interactions between interviewer and interviewee; but in the case where face-to-face interview is not available, online interviews via email, Skype, and instant messaging are conducted under the mutual agreement.

Validating interview data is also one of the key issues of interviewing. Indeed, it is possible that respondents do not honestly say what they think; do not have enough (or desired) knowledge; or do not want to discuss their opinion (see Flinders, 1997, pp.287-288). To overcome these issues, with the consent, it may be necessary to have

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51 This process is usually called triangulation. It is usually regarded as a means of improving the reliability and validity of research by giving the combination of multiple methodological approaches and theoretical foundations About this please see Denzin, 1970; Mathison, 1988; Thurmond, 2001; see also Adeniyi, 2008; Jick, 1979; Kimchi et al., 1991).
multiple meetings (formally and informally) with the same interviewee asking the same or similar questions each time to check consistency (Griffee, 2005, p.37). Most of all, the transcript of the interview will be immediately shared with the respondent for cross-checking. From the interviews, it is expected that not only does this thesis improve the validity of analysis, but it gains a fresh account on the research topic.

**Conclusion**

Research methodology is a crucial part of research design as it gives guideline on the analysis of research questions. This thesis has three and four research questions for the rationalist framework and the constructivist framework, respectively. To tackle the questions, this study employs two qualitative methods: qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Qualitative content analysis is adopted to approach the research questions of rationalism and its primary purpose is to find out the various themes that have been dealt with in this research topic. The contents are analysed by categorising the data into three dimensions: economy, security and geopolitics, as the category is concerned with objective factors that are of interest China and India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. With the attempt at overcoming the quantitative approach to content analysis focusing on frequencies, this research tries to interpret the data actively in order to discover the consistent tendency of the pursuit of national interest of China and India with regard to the Tibet issue.

To approach the constructivist research questions, this study adopts critical discourse analysis. The viewpoints of CDA may be in accord with this thesis’s understanding of the role of discourse and reality. CDA would clearly support the basic assumption of this research that national interest is social construction that can be realised and represented linguistically. CDA group, especially influenced by Foucault, regards “language as social practice,” and considers “context of language use” to be crucial (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.5). They also believe that in the social rule and order shaped by discourse, the way of people’s thinking is determined (Van Dijk, 1997). Under the given theoretical basis that “discourses produce knowledge and knowledge is always a weapon of power” (Storey, 2009, p.130), this thesis uses discourse-historical approach. DHA in this research has three dimensions of analytical framework: *topics, socio-cultural practice* and *discursive strategies*. Especially in *discursive strategies* part,
nationalism is dealt with in order to understand the relationship between national interest and nationalism.

Semi-structured interview is used for collecting and generating data to be used and analysed mostly in chapters VI and VII. It is expected that semi-structured interview elicits reflective and productive data.
Chapter V. China and India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet: A Rationalist Perspective

What are the factors that affect China and India’s interests with regard to Tibet? If China and India are rational actors who try to maximise their interests, it can be assumed that Tibet has significant aspects that are of interest to the two countries, considering their ongoing tension over the Tibet issues. This chapter attempts to find out such intriguing points that attract China and India’s interests and how such factors lead to a conflict of interest between China and India, in order to draw a picture of their relations over Tibet from a rationalist perspective. This chapter also examines if this picture can give an adequate description of the courses of action of China and India towards Tibet and each other.

Economic Factors

From a rationalist viewpoint, as already indicated in Chapter 2, economic factors are generally regarded as objective inducement to arouse actors’ interests. In this regard, examining Tibet’s economic value can elicit meaningful clues concerning China and India’s pursuit of interests with regard to Tibet. However, since China controls most of the Tibetan Plateau, it can be argued that India does neither enjoy any significant economic benefits from Tibet nor can have direct interests in it. This assumption, however, can be rejected if the economic assets generated by Tibetan people and culture are also considered as part of Tibet. India is the host to the largest Tibetan refugee population estimated around 94,000-110,000 (see Planning Commission of the Central Tibetan Administration, 2010; see also United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2003). Of course holding such big refugee population may incur expenses, but at the same time, the presence of Tibetan refugees can economically contribute to India – for instance, many people have visited India to listen to the Dalai Lama’s teaching and experience Tibetan Buddhism through different religious leaders and institutions. Therefore, it may not be desirable to underestimate India’s economic gain from Tibet even if it might be less than that of China. In this respect, not only tangible economic assets in the Tibetan Plateau but also potential intangible properties
are included in the analysis of the two countries’ economic interests vis-à-vis Tibet. Also, again, it should be noted that the focus here is not to just find out whose interest is bigger than whom; or what points of Tibet attract the two countries. Rather, this chapter attempts to examine how their interests in economic value of Tibet influence on their relations; and how and why rationalist accounts on this issue is circumscribed to explicate the complicated relationship between China and India, which has received far less rigorous analysis.

Many studies and reports have highlighted the mineral resources of Tibet. There are many different data and estimates about them, but the data from China’s Ministry of Land and Resources, whose survey began in 1999, have widely been referenced even though it is largely based on speculations and is not fully reliable. According to the report released by the ministry in 2007, the Qinghai-Tibet plateau has deposits of 102-126 types of mineral, including around 30-40 million tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead and zinc and billions of tons of high-grade iron, with an estimated USD 100-128 billion. It is also reported to hold large reserves of coal, lithium, chromite, borax and uranium (see also Xinhua 2007; The Times of India, 2010). If this survey is reliable, while India does not possess any significant portion of the reserves owing to lack of control over the territory, it can be assumed that the PRC, undoubtedly, can benefit from these mineral resources as it can substantially contribute to reducing China’s mineral imports.

Indeed, it is one of the greatest future challenges for the PRC to secure the mineral resources – China’s mineral consumption has increased exponentially over the past decade as its economy has been growing at a rapid pace (see Tse, 2013; see also Drysdale and Hurst, 2012). In this circumstance, Tibet’s potentially abundant reserves of precious minerals are enough to attract the PRC’s interest. Especially, Tibet’s copper can ease the surprisingly strong Chinese copper demand. Copper is the most extensively used industrial mineral commodity, found in sectors ranging from manufacturing companies to construction industries (see Ng, 2014). In fact, China became the largest consumer of refined copper by 2012, with usage of around 8.8 million tonnes (ICSG, 2013, p.6). It also dominated the world copper smelter output with a 32 % market share in the world (ICSG, 2013, p.17).

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52 This aspect will be discussed in the last section, Problems of Rationalist Approach to China and India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet.
53 International Copper Study Group
The important issue here is that China’s imports of copper are increasing day by day as its requirements of copper in infrastructure facilities are continuously rising (see Day and Shumsky, 2014). Actually current domestic copper mines of China supply less than 30% of its demands for copper concentrates (Tse, 2013, p.8.6). It means that around two thirds of the raw materials used in China’s copper industry are covered by imports (Hammer and Jones, 2012). Considering the recent upward trends in world copper price as shown in Fig.2, it could be an effective long-term strategy for China to increase domestic copper production.

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54 Data and Diagram Source: ICSG (2013, p.17).

55 Tse (2013) indicates that in 2012, China imported 22.8% more coppers than 2011. Also, according to SMM (Shanghai Metal Market) (2013), China’s total copper metal unit imports shows the highest record in January of 855 kilo tons (Kt), surpassing the previous high of 808Kt in September 2013.

56 Data and Diagram Source: ICSG (2013, p.33).
As indicated above, the Tibet Autonomous Region potentially has huge veins of copper and given that the area is relatively unexploited than any other regions, developing the area could help China reduce the burden of the excessive copper imports. In fact, according to NBSC (2012), copper mine production in Tibet accounts for an insignificant percentage of the total production, even though the data from the same body shows that basic reserve of copper in Tibet consists of around 8% of the total reserve of copper in China. Thus, it can be argued that it is the PRC’s interest that exploiting the mineral resources in Tibet to meet its future demand for important mineral commodities.

The TAR is also known as a rich repository of natural energy resources. This aspect can help China set the future energy supply and demand plan. As Fig.3 and Fig.4 illustrate, China’s energy use is constantly growing, reached at 2,029 kg and its Fossil Fuel dependency was 88.3% of total in 2011, drawing upward trend. Currently, coal consists of around 70% of total primary consumption (oil 18% and gas 4% each), and non-fossil, namely, renewable energy such as hydro, solar and wind power accounts for about 8% (US Commercial Service, 2013; see also IEA, 2013). As China’s electric power consumption has increased (see Fig.5), its coal consumption has also soared to generate electric power. Around 50% of China’s total coal output has recently been used by power industry, and this coal-generated electric power occupies two-thirds of China’s total electricity (Tse, 2013, p.8.10). Not only can this huge coal consumption harm environment by generating carbon dioxide emissions, but also it can exacerbate China’s coal trade dependency on foreign countries.

57 National Bureau of Statistics of China
58 International Energy Agency
59 Actually China is the largest coal producer in the world, but its increasing demand for coal made China become a net coal importing country (see Tse, 2013). And despite potential risks in excessive using coals, its domestic coal demand will not be decreased in a short period of time due to its high profitability and advancement of clean coal technology. Still, there is technological limitation to generate enough electric power to meet the demand by the alternative sources as well (see Tu, 2011).
To overcome this situation, in its 12th Five-Year Plan for 2011-2015 (2011), China set the aim of increasing the share of primary energy consumption from non-fossil fuel resources to 11.4 % by 2015 and 15 % by 2020. In fact, it seems that this goal can be achievable in that China today is already at the second of a renewable energy ranking in RECAI index\textsuperscript{62} conducted by EY (EY, 2014; see also Morales, 2014).\textsuperscript{63} Harnessing

\textsuperscript{60} Except Hong Kong and Macao SAR (Special administrative region)

\textsuperscript{61} Data and Diagram Source of Fig.3-5: World Bank (2014, a;b;c).

\textsuperscript{62} Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index

\textsuperscript{63} China scored 73.1 out of 100, following 74.4 of the US.
natural energy resource of Tibet could contribute to achieving this goal more, while there is little evidence that Tibet’s coal reserves are big enough to significantly relieve the China’s demand for coal (see Li, et al., 2013).

Tibet has ample solar energy resources. Its average sunlight is around 3,000 hours (ranging from 1,600 to 3,400 hours), and the average annual intensity is about 6,000 to 8,000 Mj/m², second greatest amount in the world following Sahara (Wang and Qiu, 2009, p.2182). In fact, Tibet started using solar energy in the 1980s and it has the most solar power generators than any other provinces in China (CNTV, 2012; see also Li, 2011). Recently, in Shigatse / Xigaze, one of the biggest solar photovoltaic power generation bases has been built as well (Xinhua, 2012; see also Duggan, 2014). The PRC government also has a plan to construct more solar energy power stations in Tibet, according to its recent Five-Year Plan.

Tibet is also rich in wind energy. In general, it is estimated that Tibet’s annual wind energy reserves are between 77.3 and 93 billion kilowatt hours (Wang and Qiu, 2009; see also Xinhua, 2013a). Actually, China is already the world’s biggest generating and consuming wind energy country, sharing 26.7 % of the world total wind power capacity followed by the US with 21.2 % (GWEC64, 2012). Considering that China has recently completed installing World’s highest wind farm built in Tibet with five wind turbines (29 more turbines planned) (Xinhua, 2013b), China will continuously develop wind energy in the TAR.

Hydropower in Tibet may be in the PRC’s greatest interest among the natural energy resources of the region. Tibet has abundant water resources with good quality, and serves as the headwaters of many of Asia’s rivers – Tsangpo / Brahmaputra, Mekong, Salween, Huang He / Yellow and Yangtze. According to Survey conducted by the Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC, the TAR has around 448.2 billion cubic meters of surface water resources that are the highest amount in China (People’s Daily Online, 2011a). A former officer of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Li (2005)’s book title Tibet’s waters will Save China shows the PRC’s interest in Tibet’s water sources very well. Even its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011, emphasis added) clearly states that “Develop hydropower actively on the precondition of proper ecological conservation and resettlement, focus on the construction of large-sized hydropower stations in southwestern China, develop medium and small river waterpower resources

64 Global Wind Energy Council
based on local conditions, and plan and construct pumped storage power stations scientifically.” The plan also indicates that the PRC will “construct large-sized hydropower stations in key watersheds, such as those of the Jinsha and Yalong Rivers, and commence the construction of hydropower projects with a total installed capacity of 120 million kW.” Actually, to gain electricity from Tibet’s high altitude water, China has already been damming the rivers on the plateau, represented by Dam projects at the Yarlung Tsangpo river (known as the Brahmaputra in India) basin, in particular, Zangmu Dam. Even though dam construction in this region always generates the severe tension with its neighbouring countries, especially with India, the PRC government has explicitly and implicitly expressed its desire to construct more dams in the various rivers originated from Tibet to secure the hydropower.

Not only does the PRC seek electricity from Tibet’s water resources but it wants to resolve the water scarcity problem in China. China is facing severe drought and desertification problems. It is reported that in China, about 27.46 % land is desertified (Yao, 2013; see also Patience, 2011) and the average annual economic loss triggered by water scarcity is continuously rising, reached at USD 52.52 billion in 1994 and rose to USD 87.5 billion in 2000 (Wang, 2006; see also Tudela, 2012). Especially the water shortage in arid northern China is severe (see Tay, 2014; see also Lee, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basin</th>
<th>Mean Annual Surface Runoff (km², %)</th>
<th>Groundwater (%), %)</th>
<th>Total Annual water Resources (km², %)</th>
<th>Population (millions, %)</th>
<th>Arable Land (million hectares, %)</th>
<th>Annual per Capita Water Resources (m³)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>North</td>
<td>334.3 (12.3)</td>
<td>168.9 (20.3)</td>
<td>405.4 (14.4)</td>
<td>520.5 (44.4)</td>
<td>57.4 (59.5)</td>
<td>778.9</td>
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<td>Song-Liao</td>
<td>165.3 (6.1)</td>
<td>62.5 (7.5)</td>
<td>192.8 (6.9)</td>
<td>113.2 (9.6)</td>
<td>19.5 (20.2)</td>
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<td>Hai-Luan</td>
<td>28.8 (1.1)</td>
<td>26.5 (3.2)</td>
<td>42.1 (1.5)</td>
<td>117.6 (10.0)</td>
<td>10.8 (11.2)</td>
<td>358.0</td>
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<td>Huai</td>
<td>74.1 (2.7)</td>
<td>39.3 (4.7)</td>
<td>96.1 (3.4)</td>
<td>190.5 (16.2)</td>
<td>14.7 (15.2)</td>
<td>504.5</td>
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<td>40.6 (4.9)</td>
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<td>99.2 (8.4)</td>
<td>12.4 (12.9)</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<td>591.7 (69.3)</td>
<td>2276.6 (80.9)</td>
<td>627.4 (53.5)</td>
<td>33.5 (34.8)</td>
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<td>961.3 (34.2)</td>
<td>402.5 (34.3)</td>
<td>22.9 (23.8)</td>
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<td>Pearl</td>
<td>468.5 (17.3)</td>
<td>111.6 (13.5)</td>
<td>470.8 (16.7)</td>
<td>141.5 (12.1)</td>
<td>6.5 (6.7)</td>
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<td>Southeastern</td>
<td>255.7 (9.4)</td>
<td>61.3 (7.4)</td>
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<td>65.1 (5.6)</td>
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<td>1.7 (1.8)</td>
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<td>Inland</td>
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<td>86.2 (10.4)</td>
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<td>24.7 (2.1)</td>
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<td>828.8 (100)</td>
<td>2812.4 (100)</td>
<td>1172.6 (100)</td>
<td>96.4 (100)</td>
<td>2398.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65 Table source: Xie, 2009, p.46.
As Table.3 indicates, a gap between North and South, in terms of water resources, is significantly wide. Given that there are many mega-cities including Beijing in northern China, it may be crucial for the PRC to resolve this issue to retain the pace of economic growth in that varied strategic industries such as mining, refining, steel and high-tech industries are located in northern China. To do so, China has adopted so-called South-North Water Transfer Project.

The project aims to build three artificial canals, namely, central, eastern and western routes, to divert water from the Yangzi River to northern part of China. Tibet’s water is the subject of western route project planned to be completed by 2050. Despite huge controversies over project feasibility, environmental issue and international conflict.

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66 Especially, it is reported that around 62% of total coal reserves are located in northern China (Veeck, 2011, p.277).
68 For more details, see Office of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Commission of the State Council.
69 A cost estimate for the western route is around USD 36 billion, more than double the cost for the other two projects (pearce, 2007, p.220), and owing to this economic issue as well as technical difficulty, there have been severe controversies over the western project. China’s neighbouring countries such as India and Bangladesh have expressed serious concerns over this project because of potential reduced water flows as well (see Freeman, 2010).
the PRC is showing firm willingness to continue this project. Zhang Jiyao, former Director of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Commission Office, expressed that “Western route of water transfer project very much possible” (He, 2012). This clearly shows that how much China is interested in, or obsessed with Tibet’s water resources to keep its socio-economic development in northern part.

Unlike the mineral and other natural resources, water resources in Tibet are greatly of interest to India because its northeastern region, which is densely populated, depends on the Brahmaputra River whose origin is in southwestern Tibet. As Chellaney (2007) argues, “[W]ater shortages in much of Asia are beginning to threaten rapid economic modernization.” To secure water resources, India, like China, also has conducted various water projects such as building dams and reservoirs in throughout the Brahmaputra River (see Vidal, 2013). Indeed, New Delhi is very ambitious to build dams on India’s future powerhouse, the Brahmaputra – to date, more than 160 big and small dams have been planned, which is expected to generate around 60,000 MW of electricity (Cooke, 2014). Tibet’s water resources are a matter of utmost importance to plan and operate such projects in that Tibet is the origin of the harnessed waters. India is particularly concerned about China’s actions and plans to build dams in Tibet as these kinds of massive dam projects can seriously reduce water flows in the Yarlung Tsangpo / Brahmaputra and harm ecological environment of downstream areas (see Denyer, 2013). In early 2013, Chinese government announced that they will construct three more dams (Dagu, Jiacha and Jiexu) on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra River in Tibet (see Krishnan, 2013; see also The Economic Times, 2013a). As Pomeranz (2009) claimed, “[T]he potential for such a project (damming the rivers) to create conflicts between China and India… is gigantic.” Even though China and India have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Trans-border Rivers every five years since 2002, the mistrust and tension on this issue between the two countries remain unresolved. India wants more data and information on China’s plans on the rivers (See Gupta, 2013), China manifests dissatisfaction with India as it regards “[I]ndian threat-mongering over water resource disputes” as “dangerous fantasy” (Zhifei, 2013, see also Hussain, 2013). In 2010, in spite of India’s opposition, China pushed ahead with the construction of the Zangmu dam though the MoU in 2008 was still in effect. Also, the two countries renewed the MoU in October 2013, but it is still nonbinding and the agreed points are not specific at all but very broad and equivocal.
Both sides agreed that cooperation on trans-border rivers will further enhance mutual strategic trust and communication as well as strengthen the strategic and cooperative partnership.

The Chinese side agreed to extend the data provision period of the Yarlung Tsangpo / Brahmaputra River… The two sides shall implement this in accordance with related Implementation Plan. The Indian side expressed appreciation to the Chinese side in this regard.

The two sides agreed to further strengthen cooperation on trans-border rivers, cooperate through the existing Expert Level Mechanism on provision of flood-season hydrological data and emergency management, and exchange views on other issues of mutual interest.

(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (MEA), 2013, emphasis added)

Above is part of the MoU between China and India in 2013. There are no specific details and definitions about the terms such as “data provision” and “emergency management.” These terms can be interpreted differently depending on the circumstances and actors. Also, this MoU lacks detailed plans and concrete measures to achieve the goals that the two countries agreed, for example, “enhancing mutual strategic trust and communication”; “strengthening the strategic and cooperative partnership”; and “exchanging views on the issues of mutual interest.” These are all about a pure political spin. Considering the fact that the disputes over this issue between the two governments have been intensified since 2002, the year their first MoU was agreed, it is questionable for India if this MoU can be a substantive legal basis upon which to prevent China’s dam projects. However, India’s pursuit of interest in Tibet’s water resources will continue as it is not just only a matter of economic interest but also that of survival.

Tibet’s tourist resources can also draw China and India’s interest. Especially, China’s investment on tourism business in Tibet seems to be very aggressive. Even recently, China opened Duocheng Yading airport in the TAR, world’s highest airport, to promote for tourism (The Guardian, 2013). Indeed, the PRC promotes its achievement in tourism business in Tibet very actively.

70 Full content of the MoU is available at MEA, 2013.
## [Table. 4] Number of Tourists and Foreign Earnings in Tibet (China)\(^71\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Tourists</th>
<th>Number of Overseas visitors Arrivals</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Number of Civil Tourists</th>
<th>Total Tourism Revenue (10,000 yuan)</th>
<th>Foreign Exchange Earnings (USD 10,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 1981</td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>6,568</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 1986</td>
<td>87,968</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>29,553</td>
<td>56,968</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 1987</td>
<td>127,554</td>
<td>108,750</td>
<td>42,889</td>
<td>18,804</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 1988</td>
<td>103,255</td>
<td>56,293</td>
<td>21,835</td>
<td>46,962</td>
<td>6,229</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 1989</td>
<td>29,833</td>
<td>8,287</td>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>21,546</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 1990</td>
<td>23,954</td>
<td>6,654</td>
<td>9,842</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 1991</td>
<td>117,169</td>
<td>38,286</td>
<td>14,768</td>
<td>78,883</td>
<td>5,069</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 2007</td>
<td>4,029,438</td>
<td>365,370</td>
<td>338,744</td>
<td>3,664,068</td>
<td>485,160</td>
<td>13,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) 2008</td>
<td>2,246,447</td>
<td>67,997</td>
<td>62,934</td>
<td>2,178,450</td>
<td>225,865</td>
<td>3,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) 2009</td>
<td>5,610,630</td>
<td>174,910</td>
<td>162,458</td>
<td>5,435,720</td>
<td>559,870</td>
<td>7,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) 2011</td>
<td>8,697,605</td>
<td>270,785</td>
<td>249,026</td>
<td>8,426,820</td>
<td>970,568</td>
<td>12,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) 2012</td>
<td>10,583,869</td>
<td>194,933</td>
<td>174,631</td>
<td>10,388,936</td>
<td>1,264,778</td>
<td>10,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) 2013 (estimate)</td>
<td>12.91 million</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.51 billion yuan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on statistical data conducted by government-controlled bureau, China emphasises the increasing number of tourists and infrastructure development in Tibet. Indeed, as shown in the lines (1) to (12), the number of total visitors in Tibet has gradually been increasing and so has been tourism income year by year.\(^72\) Estimates for the year 2013 also indicate that the total number of visitors jumped around 22 % from 2012, and the total revenues increased by 30.6 % from 2012 as well (Xinhua 2014). The data and China’s promotion on tourism in Tibet may show that China is interested in fostering tourism in the region. Also, aside from Tibet’s historical and cultural assets to attract domestic and foreign tourists, China, in its 12th Five-year Plan, states that “[W]e will comprehensively develop domestic tourism… we will comprehensively promote eco-tourism, encourage in-depth development of cultural tourism…” Given that Tibet is one of the most eco-friendly sites within the Chinese-controlled areas, Tibet can be the best option for the PRC to bring the expected results.

India also benefits from cultural and religious tourism related to Tibet. By holding the biggest Tibetan refugee population and the Dalai Lama, India attracts many domestic and international visitors as indicated before. It is even very difficult to

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\(^{71}\) Data Source: Lines (1)-(12) are from Tibet Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics & Tibet General Term of Investigation under the NBS, 2013; and National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013. Line (13) is from Xinhua, 2014.

\(^{72}\) The years of 1989 and 2008 show a downward tendency, maybe because of Tibetan unrest.
calculate exactly how many people visit India to go to Dharamsala and other Tibet-related Buddhist holy places. Whatever the purposes are, namely tourism, research, study or meditation, it is clear that significant number of people visit India and spend their money in the land of India. Given that one of the biggest industries of India is tourism, Tibetans certainly contributes to India’s economy to some extent (see Hurber, 2008).

In view of Tibet’s economic factors, it is undeniable that the PRC has bigger interest in Tibet than India as it shares majority of the Tibetan Plateau. In terms of mineral resources and other natural energy resources such as solar and wind energy, India cannot take any actions to take them other than invasion of the region, which will hardly occur – it is difficult to argue that Tibet has such a big economic asset to drive India to bring on war with China; and it is also doubtful if India has enough capacity to break the present order of the region, where there are many other stakeholders such as Pakistan and the U.S. are involved.

However, water resources of Tibet are different. As stated above, it seems clear that water resources are one of the critical matters affecting their relations. With the waters, both countries eager to generate electricity as well as resolve water shortage problem. China obviously has the initiative in the negotiations over the water resources as it holds the source / upstream of the rivers, especially that of Yarlung Tsangpo / Brahmaputra, flowing into India. Yet, India has not presented practical solution and plan to secure the waters from China. MoUs between China and India are not legally binding, lacking concrete and detailed regulations of enforcement. To date, India’s concern about the water resources from Tibet has been a matter of anxiety. However, this can change into threat if the negotiation over the Tibet’s waters cannot result in any practical and concrete outcomes. That is to say, this aspect can be the biggest thorn in the future of the Sino-Indian relations.

Tibet, however, could also give an opportunity to build amicable economic relations between the two countries. Developing the trade routes that traverse Tibet between China and India can boost their economic cooperation (see Karackattu, 2013). Since China and India have modernised transportation system throughout the region, new overland trade market can become more viable. Actually China and India, in 1954, signed the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region” and the trade

73 According to The World Travel & Tourism Council (2014, p.1), India’s total contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP was INR 6,631.6bn (6.2% of GDP) in 2013 and is forecast to rise by 7.3% in 2014.
agencies and banks of both parties were established (see MEA, 1954). However, after 1962 China-India border conflict, the majority of trade routes including the Nathu La pass\(^{74}\) which runs between India’s Sikkim and Yadong county in TAR were blocked, until the “Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade” was signed on 1st July 1992 (see Lintner, 2015, p.251). And eventually, in 2006, based on the Memorandum signed in 2003 (see MEA, 2003), reopening of the Nathu La pass was agreed by the both parties (Zhigang, 2006). According to the two governments, the trade volume will reach USD 100 billion by 2015 (Patranobis, 2015). And aside from the economic aspect, it is also expected that the pass will act as a symbol of cultural and religious exchanges between the two countries (see The Hindu, 2015; see also NDTV, 2014). However, still limited products (29 items from India and 15 goods from China) have been allowed as a registered trade (see Karackattu, 2013, p.697; see also Patranobis, 2015) and both countries suspect each other that the routes can be abused for impure purposes (see Bhaumik, 2013). Also, especially, India is concerned about an influx of Tibetan refugee through the Nathu La pass. Pushpita Das (2006), associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) of India, indicated that:

> The people of Sikkim are also apprehensive that opening of the border pass would lead to a massive influx of Tibetan refugees. There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans... Since the Tibetans were better educated compared to the local Bhutias, they were able to grab top positions in government as well as in other economic and social spheres... A substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Sikkim is a small state... Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter’s list can alter the political destiny of the state... Complacency in guarding the borders can cost us dearly... India should be prepared to meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically sensitive border regions. (emphasis added)

Without establishing the mutual trust, Tibet as a new place for the major trade between China and India will not be developed and realised in the near future.

\(^{74}\) There is no accurate statistics, but it is believed that around 80 per cent of China-India border trade happened through the Nathu La pass.
Security and Geopolitical Factors

China and India share a border in Tibet, and yet, there are no definite national boundaries that are mutually agreed. Each side draws different lines – while New Delhi claims that disputed border between China and India covers around 4,000 km, Beijing argues that there is only 2,000 km shared land border (The Economic Times, 2013b; see also Zhang and Li, 2013, p.2).

Even though old concept of Tibet as an independent buffer state may be no longer meaningful as the PRC’s control over the region is becoming more stable, Tibet’s geographic location and ongoing security and geopolitical issues are still, or more strongly, attracting both states’ interests. In this part, Tibet’s security and geopolitical implications for China and India that affect their relations are explored.

When it comes to explaining Tibet’s geographic implications, an average elevation of the Tibetan Plateau must be discussed.

75 Diagram source: Curtis and Cheng, 2011.
With an average elevation of 4,000-5,000 m, the Plateau itself is a formidable buffer vis-à-vis any external forces. Major infantry troops cannot easily cross this terrain and securing a supply route is never easy. The PRC, who controls the region, can benefit from this aspect. Tibet shares four international borders with Bhutan, India, Myanmar and Nepal. From a military standpoint, possessing Tibet is highly advantageous to defend the own territory from these neighbouring countries. The Tibetan Plateau offers highly effective natural concealment and obstacles to prevent or delay military movement. Given that the PRC already secures and develops key terrains on the Plateau by placing military bases and constructing rails, roads and airports, it is very difficult for the other forces to attack China via the Tibetan Plateau.

This relatively stable condition can also allow the PRC to focus on the other border areas. China has 14 land borders and 5 maritime borders (see China Briefing, 2014). Especially, tensions surrounding the maritime borders have seriously increased. China already has had territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the countries including Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Senkaku / Diaoyu islands dispute is becoming more contentious, and China’s imposition of new air defence zone has made another conflict with Japan and South Korea who are strong U.S. allies (see Harlan, 2013). Defending maritime borders and coastal areas is obviously one of the greatest defence priorities of China in the sense that China’s economy is highly dependent on relatively prosperous coastal regions.

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76 Diagram source: Yin, 2006.
77 About the military aspects of terrain and Military Terrain Analysis, see Department of the Army, 2003.
78 China shares land borders with Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. It shares maritime borders with two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan and Philippines.
As shown in the Table 5, coastal regions such as Guangdong (57067.9), Jiangsu (54058.2), Shandong (50013.2) and Zhejiang (34606.3) show far higher figures in GDP than those of the Western provinces including Tibet (695.6), Qinghai (1884.5), Gansu (5650.2) and Xinjiang (7466.3). Also, industries of eastern China generally consist of
those of secondary and Tertiary that are usually regarded as a high value-added business. In this regard, it can be argued that security of these coastal areas is China’s core interest. This situation may be one of the important reasons for China’s rising military spending. The PRC government recently revealed its plans to increase defence budget by 12.2% to around USD 132 billion 2014, which is the highest growth rate since 2011 (Zhu, 2014; see also Martina and Torode, 2014). Under this circumstance, Tibet’s “great wall” obviously lessens China’s strategic as well as financial burdens. Tibet’s terrain allows China to deploy a missile defence system effectively, and it may be enough to contain its neighbours, especially India. Since China already has the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and airports in Tibet, there is no serious problem in military logistics as well.

Tibet also can serve as a buffer zone between eastern China and its southwestern adjacent powers. The social and economic gap between China’s east and west is very wide. Even though annual growth of the western regions is about 12%, which is higher than the national average thanks to the PRC government’s aggressive investment, it is mostly state-owned companies who benefit from such development and investment (Richburg, 2010; see also Xinhua, 2010). As indicated in Table 6 below, still western China is far behind than the east in which the capital city, Beijing, is located and important infrastructures and facilities are concentrated. While eastern provinces account for 51.3% of the China’s total GDP, Western regions only share 19.8% by 2012. By possessing the large and high Tibetan Plateau, the PRC government can maintain security of eastern China from the other countries of China’s southwest, such as India, Nepal and Vietnam.

[Table 6] GDP Comparison between Eastern and Western China in 2012^80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>(1) Eastern 10 Provinces and Cities</th>
<th>(2) Western 12 Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Region)</td>
<td>Proportion of the Total GDP in China</td>
<td>Proportion of the Total GDP in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295665.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>113914.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Eastern provinces (municipalities) include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan. (2) Western provinces (Regions and municipalities) include Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.

India actually cannot get many advantages from the Tibet’s terrain and geography discussed so far, as it does not control any significant parts of the Tibetan Plateau. India may certainly recognise its disadvantages with the presence of Chinese power at higher altitude in the Tibetan Plateau (see Chaudhury, 2013). To overcome the difficulties, New Delhi even built three major military airports close to the Tibetan Plateau in 2008 (see Chang, 2008). However, despite such effort, it seems that India is still struggling to deal with China’s occasional *incursions* through the Tibet (see The Times of India, 2014b, 2014c; see also BBC, 2013b; Loiwal, 2013; The Hindu, 2013). In this situation, discussion on India’s soft power and security of Himalayan border region has surfaced.

As India hosts the largest Tibetan diaspora community and Dalai Lama, it has obtained good, at least better, image compared to China domestically as well as internationally. Also, one important point is that Dalai Lama’s presence means the flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism. According to Gautam, et al. (2012),

> After the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, it is possible that the movement will fizzle out or splinter. It may lack the charismatic leadership of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, but Buddhism will certainly survive. This suggests that *instead of treating it as a leadership issue, we need to reinforce the institutionalisation of the faith*. A Tibet with its indigenous people provides *greater security to India than Hanised Tibet*. (pp.13-14, emphasis added)

This means that Tibetan Buddhism can contribute to securing a stable imagined border by promoting religious faith and power to Buddhists as well as religious people living in Himalayan (Tibetan) border area. This argument seems plausible in that people cannot fully enjoy religious freedom in China. Furthermore, it should be noted that 14th Dalai Lama is considered as the symbol of the non-violence by international communities. China’s hard line policy against Dalai Lama worries many people in India and other countries. India obviously benefits from this concern as it has provided Dalai Lama with shelter, which has enhanced its soft power.

Actually the concept of soft power was developed by Joseph Nye (see Nye, 2011; see also 2005). He argued that “on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-first century, war is not the ultimate arbiter” (p.9). He also claimed that “outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins but also by whose story wins” (p.19). It can be

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81 India has accused China of launching an incursion in Indian territories many times, but China has denied such military actions (see BBC, 2013c).
argued that India’s stories with Tibet certainly enough to shape and improve India’s soft power vis-à-vis China. With the soft power, India expects security improvement in Himalayan border regions especially in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Ladakh thanks to pro-India Tibetan exiles and residents of those areas (see Moynihan, 2014; see also Dellios and Ferguson, 2011). Anand (2013) clearly argues this aspect:

India cannot retract its recognition of Tibet as part of China’s sovereignty. But India should recognise the importance of Tibetans for India’s security. Security in the Himalayan borderlands does not come only from only a military build-up in which India cannot surpass China, or new border infrastructure, but also from the pro-India sentiments of its inhabitants. That pro-India sentiment arises from the significance of India for Tibetans. India must closely study the uncertainties of the post-Dalai Lama scenario while continuing to support and provide hospitable space to all Tibetan Buddhist leaders. (Anand, 2013, emphasis added)

Thus, for India, promoting soft power can be an effective long-term strategy to improve security situation in border area touching the Tibetan Plateau. As the issues on Tibet obviously contribute to enhancing India’s soft power, it is reasonable to conclude that Tibet is in India’s security interest.

It is India’s interest to boost its soft power to secure its Himalayan border area by giving space to Tibetan exiles and Dalai Lama, and at the same time, it is China’s interest to strengthen domestic social integrity by possessing Tibet. The PRC is trying to (re) unify its 56 ethnic groups including Han and Tibetan to realise “one-China” policy. Although China’s control over those minority regions is fairly stable despite frequent unrest situations, minorities on the periphery, especially those in peripheral regions such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang resist the Han PRC’s rule. Not only can the disintegration of these areas threaten China’s physical security, losing geographical barriers, but also it would harm internal integrity. Given that federalism based on full regional sovereignty is not an option for the PRC as it is contradictory to its philosophy and practice of one-China policy, it may need coherent social integrity with other effective ways of control over those areas, that is, consolidating Han dominance and control power.

Strong nationalistic Han Chinese help the PRC consolidate control power in minority areas. Actually, many Han Chinese are already living in those regions and a
large number of Han Chinese continuously migrates to those places – many of them are encouraged by Chinese government.

[Table. 7] Population by Selected Nationalities in TAR, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual Number</td>
<td>Ratio (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>3,002,165</td>
<td>245,263</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>21,815,815</td>
<td>8,829,994</td>
<td>40.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>24,706,291</td>
<td>19,650,665</td>
<td>79.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places.*

Table.7 shows that in Xinjiang, the number of Han Chinese is almost the same with that of Uyghur, whose people are mostly living in Xinjiang Autonomous region. Inner Mongolian case is more astonishing. Mongolians only account for 17.11 % which is far lower than Han population ratio with 79.54 % – even they worry that their nation will vanish in the near future because of the ceaseless Han migration (Patience, 2014). Interestingly, Han population in the TAR accounts for 8.17 %, far lower than the other autonomous regions. The reason for this may vary – omission of the number of seasonal residents (see Fischer, 2008); intended or unintended data error (see Sehgal, 2014); and poor living standard and harsh environment. It also can be assumed that China’s interest vis-à-vis Tibet is less than that in Xinjiang and Inner-Mongolia. In particular, economically, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, for the PRC, could be more appealing than Tibet as both areas are known as a huge verified repository of high-value mineral resources, especially coal that is China’s most needed commodity, hardly found at Tibet (see Aden, Fridley and Zheng, 2009). Xinjiang is also a gateway of China’s gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asia countries including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan producing around 28.2 % of the world’s gas by 2012 (see BP, 2013).

However, when it comes to Han dominance and the PRC’s control power in the TAR, the above assumption can be rejected if population distribution and economic structure are considered.

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82 Data source: Population Census Office under the State Council, 2010, Table 1-6.
83 For the detailed information on this Han domination phenomenon in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, see Fischer, 2008.
84 Potential data manipulation issue will be discussed later.
Chapter V. China and India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet: A Rationalist Perspective
Seokbae Lee

[Table. 8] Urban-Rural Distribution of the Population in TAR, 2010\(^85\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% (T)</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% (T)</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
<th>Rural Areas</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% (T)</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>(a) 99,084</td>
<td>36.38</td>
<td>40.40</td>
<td>(b) 99,683</td>
<td>24.42</td>
<td>40.64</td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) 46,496</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>(d) 165,778</td>
<td>60.88</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>(e) 297,719</td>
<td>72.92</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) 2,252,891</td>
<td>97.04</td>
<td>82.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>18.41</td>
<td>10,865</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>26.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,189</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>54.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>272,322</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>408,267</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,321,576</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places.
(1) Total Han population in the TAR= 245,263 (a+b+c).
(2) Total Tibetan population in the TAR = 2,716,388 (d+e+f).

At a glance, Tibetans in the TAR are majority in every sector. Thus, it can be argued that Han domination in the TAR is not strong enough (see Hao, 2000). However, this may not be true. As it is shown in the Table.8, majority of Han people in the TAR, more than 81 % of the total, is living in urban (cities and towns) areas. Only around 19 % of Han Chinese is in rural areas. On the contrary of this, around 83 % of Tibetans are rural residents, and only around 17 % is in urban areas. Even Tibetan presence in urban areas is concentrated in towns than in cities. Actually, this tendency has been being continued since 2000.

[Table. 9] Urban-Rural Distribution of the Population by Han and Tibetans in TAR, 2000\(^86\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>69,799</td>
<td>44.02</td>
<td>141,551</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>56,270</td>
<td>35.48</td>
<td>227,606</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>32,501</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>2,058,011</td>
<td>84.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>158,570</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,427,168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

※ Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. Total population of the TAR in 2000 is 2,616,329. Ratio of Han of the total is 6.06 %, that of Tibetan is 92.77 %.

It seems that there has been no major change in terms of urban-rural distribution, but the data clearly show that between 2000 and 2010, urban population of Han Chinese in the TAR has increased by around 1.5 %, whereas Tibetan urban population has decreased by 1.8 %. Most notably, the 2010 figure represents an increase of 29,285 Han People

\(^85\) Data source: Population Census Office under the State Council, 2010, Table 1-6b, c, d.
\(^86\) Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000, Table 1-6b, c, d.
and 24,227 Tibetans in cities since 2000, respectively. The total Tibetan population in cities heavily outnumbers than Han population, but the pace of increasing population of Tibetan is rather slower than that of Han. This tendency is only found in the case of cities. That is to say, there must be a big influx of Han people into Tibetan cities from outside. Actually there has been a great deal of reports on economic dominance of Han people in urban areas of the TAR – Han businesspeople occupy a large portion of secondary and tertiary industries, in particular (see Wong, 2010). According to Table.9 above, Tibet’s composition of GDP is highly concentrated in tertiary industries with 53.7% of total. This figure is the third-highest ratio in China, following Beijing 76.4% and Shanghai with 60%. It is surprising that more than half share of industrial outcomes results from tertiary businesses considering Tibet’s economic backwardness. Without a state-planned initial big investment, this phenomenon can hardly happen in such physically harsh areas. Actually, a large share of investment of the TAR, 66.62% (see Table.10), is being used in the state-owned units.

[Table. 10] Total Investment in Fixed Assets in TAR, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>State-owned Units</th>
<th>Collective owned Units</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Other Types of Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment</strong></td>
<td>7,099,822</td>
<td>4,730,059</td>
<td>147,424</td>
<td>320,375</td>
<td>1,901,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66.62</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>26.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Ratio (%): Rounding off the numbers to three decimal places. Other types of ownership refer to the types of ownership other than state-owned units, collective-owned units and individuals, including joint-owned economic units, shareholding economic units, foreign-funded economic units, economic units funded by the entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, etc.

These things clearly indicate that Tibet’s economy is mostly driven by government-supported Han Chinese who control majority of secondary and tertiary sectors; and of course generally pro-government as well. Therefore, it is evident that no matter what the actual number of population is, Han dominance and the strong PRC’s influence undoubtedly exist in the TAR.

This dominance does not simply mean economic dominance. It should be interpreted as the PRC’s intention of bolstering social and political stability with dominant Han people. As indicated above, presence of nationalistic and pro-government Han Chinese greatly supports the PRC’s control over the region. Even though there

87 Tibet Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics & Tibet General Term of Investigation under the NBS, 2013
might not be many Han Chinese outnumbering Tibetans, the control power of the PRC is very vivid thanks to the growing subordination of the Tibetan economy to that of Han. In this regard, it can be argued that the PRC is highly interested in consolidating stable status of Tibet.

Security and geopolitical concerns between China and India are mostly related Tibet as they share land borders in the Tibetan Plateau. Tibet is also related to their internal security affairs as well. After the Dalai Lama’s exile and the Sino-Indian war in 1962, Tibet had been regarded as an India’s bargaining chip vis-à-vis China. It is, however, questionable whether this aspect is still meaningful to explain the relations between Beijing and New Delhi considering India’s trade dependency on China and surging economic and military influence of China on the Tibetan Plateau. India virtually cannot take any strong actions vis-à-vis the PRC with Tibet card physically and politically. India’s military build-up surrounding the region can hardly overtake that of China given their overall economic gap and military budget. India also has a similar question to China – Kashmir. India would not be willing to have a zero-sum game (from a state perspective) with the PRC, criticising or blaming each other for human rights and minority issues. This may be why many analysts and scholars emphasise the importance of soft power strengthened by Tibetan and Buddhist settlements in India. In the circumstance that the possibility of a war between China and India is significantly low as their priority seems economic development, enhancing soft power for securing Himalayan border area can be a great strategy for India in that it could help overcome its military inferiority to China and allow New Delhi to get more international recognition and respect.

Tibet also greatly helps the PRC draw up a security and geopolitical plan as the TAR itself is an excellent line of defence of China’s southwestern border. Also, by increasing military armaments and having military drills (see China Military, 2010; see also The Times of India, 2013), the PRC is reinforcing the security of the border areas in the Tibetan Plateau much more. Presence of Pakistan, India’s enemy state, near Tibet also helps China contain India’s any kinds of potential military provocations in the region. In this regard, even if China could face local and limited war with India in the region due to the unsettled border areas, major warfare in the Tibetan Plateau between the two countries can hardly occur. Actually, China’s anxiety and suspicion vis-à-vis India with the Tibet issues mostly come from Dalai Lama’s presence in India. At the same, or higher, level with the physical security issue, the PRC is concerned about
Tibet’s implication on its domestic integrity. China’s perception of India and Dalai Lama might be: without India’s help, Dalai Lama cannot freely spread his middle way approach internationally. This means that while China is confident about its physical security affairs *vis-à-vis* India to a large extent, it cannot get rid of doubt and suspicion about India with regard to the Tibet issues, especially those related to Dalai Lama. As a method to weaken such potential India’s strategy to use Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles; and secure domestic integrity that is expected to be hardly swayed, the PRC has attempted to strengthen its control power in the TAR by supporting state-owned businesses controlled by Han Chinese. The PRC would believe that in the long term, the TAR will be much more stabilised thanks to Han dominance in the economic and political sectors.

**Problems of Rationalist Approach to China and India’s National Interest *vis-à-vis* Tibet**

So far, this chapter has examined Tibet’s various factors that can attract China and India’s interests and how such interests affect their relations. Rationalist perspective on this issue greatly helps draw overall and clear picture by focusing on visible aspects – economy, security and geopolitics. Thanks to its theoretical parsimony assuming that seeking such objective variables are natural, rationalism lends a clear framework to analyse China and India’s actions and attitude towards the Tibet issues. However, it should be noted that fundamental rationalist assumption on the rationale behind the actors’ behaviours to seek and maximise the interests has its own weak points (see chapter 2). Also, the situation has usually been oversimplified and few differences have been found among the analyses of this topic. The most importantly, little has been done to reflect on the potential problems and counter-evidence that can refute long-used and trusted data as well as assumptions. Here, this chapter attempts to refute the above rationalist analysis of China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet and their relations.

First thing that must be dealt with is that there are not enough detailed and concrete data on this issue. Evidence that can explain actors’ rationality to maximise what they believe to be the best interests is usually weak. To take an example, data on Tibet’s mineral resources are vague, just depending on the estimates. Actually exact data
on proved reserves of minerals in Tibet are hardly found, whereas estimated amount of mineral deposits shows fairly high figures. As indicated above, when it comes to Tibet’s mineral resources, survey data conducted by China’s Ministry of Land and Resources are used in general. However, even though the survey began in 1999 and presented the broad estimates in 2007, further survey data that go beyond such estimates have not been published by the ministry yet. Also, it is almost impossible to realise if the estimated reserves have enough economic feasibility (Kim, et al., 2008). To date, there has been little significant commercial production in this sector as well (Reuters, 2008). Most studies in this topic have depended on this kind of potential for high value minerals of Tibet. Considering the vagueness of the data, it is highly questionable whether it is a right approach to conjecture and evaluate the actors’, especially China’s, pursuit of interests with regard to Tibet depending on the current data of Tibet’s mineral resources.

Relate to the problem of specific data shortages, scholars in this field also have overly depended on speculation when it comes to analysing China and India’s interests. Argument on India’s Himalayan belt security and soft power cannot be free from this criticism. The beliefs of soft power and Himalayan belt secured by Tibetan Buddhism suffer from lack of practical evidence. It is still a mere speculation at best. Researches on how those who are living in the regions think of the Tibet issue and Buddhism are quantitatively and qualitatively very weak. Many questions remain unanswered: how many people in those areas have knowledge about the Tibet issue?; how much are they sensitive to the issue?; and how much has the issue is significantly discussed by those who actually reside in Himalayan border areas? Actually, explanation on India’s interest in this issue is purely from the state perspective and oversimplified. The research on how discourse on Himalayan belt security potentially strengthened by Tibetan culture and Buddhism can be formed and developed into the concept of interest has to be conducted.

Furthermore, for India, to boost the security situation in Himalayan border areas, it may be difficult to give any preferential treatment to Tibetans considering the fact that there are many other refugees and similar issues in India. This means that there is a possibility of causing fairness problem. Given that there is no visible cooperation, mutual understanding and emotional sympathy among refugee groups in India, if a particular minority group receives a better treatment or elicit a meaningful policy implication, other minority groups would not just welcome and congratulate the
minority on that success. India might be concerned about the potential situation that other minorities, especially Kashmiri people, become more active to take a better position. In this regard, the relationship between Himalayan border security and Tibet could not be regarded as clear outcome of India’s pursuit of interest in Tibet, but speculative mirage, until now.

Analysis of Tibet’s ample solar and wind energy, with exaggeration, may be speculative as well. The picture that the PRC is surely interested in Tibet’s natural energy resources needs to be more specific. Due to Tibet’s high-altitude terrain and harsh environment, still around 30% of the wind and solar power has not been connected to the grid yet (see Lee, et al., 2011; see also Duggan, 2014). Despite China’s effort and investment, the pace of the connection has slowed down. In his interview with Bloomberg, Guo Yanheng, the deputy director of the National Renewable Energy Engineering Information Management Center, said that “The nation is approving projects in more proper areas and withdrew those where grids are unable to meet conditions” (Bloomberg News, 2013). Actually, in China’s major project of seven wind power bases to be completed by 2020, Tibet is not included in the planned areas (see 21st Century Media Report, 2010, p.28; see also International Energy Agency, 2011). This means that Tibet is not one of the prioritised strategic areas in the PRC’s renewable energy policy. Indeed, it must be very costly to connect between Tibet’s renewable power stations to the grid due to the geographic characteristics, which means that economic profitability in the business is not very appealing to the PRC. Therefore, it is a hasty generalisation to argue that Tibet’s natural energy resources provoke the PRC’s appetite. Rather, the reason for prevailing discourse on development of Tibet’s abundant natural energy resources may be more important to seek China’s true interest behind this scene.

China’s interests in tourism income from Tibet also have to be carefully examined. It seems that China’s recent Tibet tourism has been very successful as discussed above. However, foreign tourists of Tibet only accounted for 1.73% in 2013 and majority of tourists are from inside China, whose number is even far more than Han population of the TAR (see Table.4 and 7). Domestic tourists are also important to boost tourism business, but actually this kind of increasing number of Chinese tourists is seen in every province of China. Thus, when it comes to evaluating China’s tourism market,

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88 The areas include: Hami, Jiuquan, Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu, east and west Inner Mongolia.
the number of foreign visitors is an obviously important yardstick. In this regard, China’s interest in Tibet tourism does not seem to be very high in the sense that foreign tourists, when they travel the TAR, are still required to get special permit from Tibet Tourism Bureau (TTB) (see China Tibet Train, 2014) along with Chinese visa, which is far from attracting foreign tourists. Also, considering the fact that the PRC has frequently imposed travel restriction on tourists to Tibet (see BBC 2011), it should be careful to evaluate that China is highly interested in tourism revenues from Tibet – it may be an ancillary cause of China’s interest in Tibet, at best, regardless of the PRC’s coherent argument that “there is no question that tourism is highly significant to Tibet’s development” (see People’s Daily Online, 2011b).

A paucity of reliable data is also one of the major problems that rationalists are suffering from. Owing to China’s control over Tibet, majority data is from the Chinese side. It does not necessarily mean that Chinese-provided data are always unreliable or wrong. However, a cross-validation analysis of the data is hardly possible, and most of all, it is questionable that the PRC would openly reveal every information on Tibet, the most sensitive topic of China. Actually Chinese figures especially in economic sector have been questioned by international communities in many times (see Cary, 2013; Koch-Weser, 2013; Yueh, 2013) – the PRC has been suspected of manipulating the data to fit its interest. Of course technical problems can bring out some errors, but here, the concern is political interference. As Tibet is internationally recognised issue and China has been criticised for human rights and exploitation issues of the TAR, the PRC has always promoted their efforts to develop the areas to defend its rule over Tibet. The information and data presented by the PRC mostly represent an optimistic picture. However, it seems that the doubt has not been resolved yet. As an example of the potentially manipulated information, the data of Tibet’s population, especially those of Han Chinese, are highly suspicious whether the data are true. As shown in Table.7, Han population of the TAR only accounts for 8.17 % of the total. The word only may be properly used here if the Han population of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions is considered. All three regions are politically sensitive and the PRC’s economic and social influences are strong enough to dominate the areas. However, while Xinjiang with 40.48 % and Inner Mongolia with 79.54 % show a huge number of Han people, Tibet’s Han population remains around 8 %. If Tibet’s economic situations and living standards have been improved / are improving like Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as the PRC promotes, it would actually be very difficult to find the clear reasons for Tibet’s
stagnant trend of the growing number of Han people.

As discussed so far, it seems that there are critical problems in analysing China and India’s interests with regard to Tibet from a rationalist perspective – a scarcity of detailed data; data credibility issue; and unhealthy controversies, merely arguing who is right, caused by interpretation and analysis of such quantitatively and qualitatively weak data. In other words, there are not enough specific and accurate data available on this topic, and this aspect can result in arbitrary interpretation on China and India’s interests with regard to Tibet, which is far from analytical advantages of rationalism, presenting concise and logical picture.

Actually, aside from these issues, fundamentally, there is a theoretical problem when it comes to tackling the research questions – the problem of objectivity. The main task of this chapter is the search for Tibet’s objective factors that are of interest to China and India. However, evaluating objectivity is not easy. Every actor has different criteria for judging objectivity and rational choice. According to Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003), rationalists believe that “whatever actors want (and this is canonically to maximize utility), they choose what they believe to be the best means available to attain it” (p.12). With a rationalist account, we only can “conjecture” that a particular factor (security, material power, or both) drives actors to make their own rational choice. However, actually it is difficult to find out a real cause (that goes beyond above three aspects) of such choice that are believed to be rational. What is more important is that the belief can be subjective, rather than objective – it is questionable whether it is possible for any actors to have a belief which is totally exogenous to social interaction.

To overcome these problems, the research on this topic needs to escape from focusing on factors per se that are regarded as fixed and pre-defined by rationalists. Instead, it is necessary to concentrate on how the various factors have been interpreted and used by the actors to shape and share the concept of interest. No matter what the data are true or not, in China as well as India, there have been varied attempts at legitimising and justifying the course of action to shape the national interests with regard to Tibet. Examining this aspect may greatly help grasp how and why the two countries’ relations have been affected by their interests with regard to Tibet. In short, analysing the process of constructing national interest of China and India can give a fresh account on Sino-Indian relations, which can become seminal for the development of this research area.
Chapter VI. Constructing National Interest: China’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

This chapter examines how China’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been constructed in discourse, focusing on domestic political complexity. As indicated in previous chapters, this thesis assumes that national interest is a discursive construction; and the discourses and actions of the elites in power have a great impact on such process of construction. This research especially focuses on elites’ use of nationalism as a tool for representing and justifying their interests as those of nation. Before examining the process of discursive construction, this research reviews historical and socio-political context that can help understand the background to the interest formation. The historical context explains the controversies between China and Tibet over the Tibet issues in history. The socio-political context examines the philosophy and rationale behind its attitudes towards minorities and Tibet. In the last section this chapter examines the discursive patterns and strategy of the CPC to realise its national interest vis-à-vis Tibet.

Historical Context

1. Late Qing Dynasty

Expansion and invasion of Western imperialist powers, that is, the British and Russian imperialists, rocked the relations between the Qing dynasty and Tibet (see Addy, 1994). When the British government of India invaded Tibet in 1888 and 1904, the Qing did not send reinforcements. Actually during this period, the Qing dynasty was mentally and physically unable to support Tibet against the British owing to her defeat in the First (1839-1842) and Second (1856-1860) Opium Wars (Kim, 2008, p.48). The Thirteenth Dalai Lama could not help signing the Treaty of Lhasa on 7th September 1904, failing to get any substantial help from the Qing China as well as Russia. The British India’s invasions of Tibet forced the Qing China to reset the relations with Tibet and generated the complicated relationship between China-India-Tibet (ibid., p.49).

After the Treaty of Lhasa, the Qing Empire attempted to strengthen her
influence over Tibet by adopting the “Xinzheng”\textsuperscript{89} (see Reynolds, 1993; see also Shi and Reynolds, 1995, p.137; Gabbiani, 2003) and “Gaituguiliu”\textsuperscript{90} policy (Yang and Tamney, 2011, p.212). The purpose of such policies was to secure its sovereignty over Tibet by making the Dalai Lama as a religious leader without political powers, which was against the position of the 13th Dalai Lama. In 1905, the Qing also tried to bring the French to contain the British, promising a grant of land to the French Catholic priests and a reduction of the number of monks in Batang. They, for the next twenty years, prohibited the recruitment of monks as well (Goldstein, 1991, p.46). These efforts were not successful, but rather, triggered a revolt led by monks which was pacified in 1908 by Zhao Erfeng, the last amban\textsuperscript{91} in Tibet.

In the winter of 1909, the Qing eventually sent troops to Lhasa, resulting in the 13th Dalai Lama’s flight to India in February 1910. The Qing dynasty unilaterally deposed him, which incurred Tibetan people’s anger. The Qing did not have enough power or ability to appease their resentment and to make matters worse, “the Xinhai Revolution” broke out in 1911 that led the dynasty to collapse. With the outbreak of the Revolution, Tibetan soldiers rose in arms and by April 1912, they surrendered about 3,000 Chinese soldiers and officers. The Tibetans forced them to withdraw from Tibet via India in late 1912 (see Lin, 2006, p.9; see also Goldstein, 1999, p.29). The 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in January 1913 and expelled remaining Chinese officials and Han Chinese. This means that at that time, Tibet became free from Chinese control, that is to say, they enjoyed de facto independence.

The de facto independence implies that the Tibetans had a different sense of national identity to that of the Manchu empire as well as Republicans who replaced the Qing dynasty (see Kim, 2008, p.49; Goldstein, 1999). The Tibetans wanted to retain their identity as a Buddhist nation and stay independent from foreigners. 13th Dalai Lama’s declaration of the independence of Tibet around that time well shows this aspect:

During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Ch’ing Dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and

\textsuperscript{89} 新政. Also known as the New Policies or Xinzheng reforms.

\textsuperscript{90} 改土归流. According to Xinhua (2009), the policy means “appropriating the governing power of local hereditary aboriginal chieftains and setting up the system of appointment of local administrators by the central government in the minority areas.” For more details, see Arcones (2012); Hostetler (2001); Su and Teo (2009).

\textsuperscript{91} Amban literally means “high official,” or “counselors” (see Wakeman, 1985, p.54).
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priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of policing the trade marts… Meanwhile, the Manchu empire collapsed. The Tibetans were encouraged to expel the Chinese from central Tibet… Now, the Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky… Peace and happiness in this world can only be maintained by preserving the faith of Buddhism… To keep up with the rest of the world, we must defend our country. (Shakabpa, 1967, pp.246-248, emphasis added)

By 1912, many institutions and Buddhist ties between China and Tibet almost perished. The Qing dynasty pressurised and insulted Tibet; and even occupied Tibet by military force. These courses of action just brought about the Tibetans’ anti-Qing and China sentiments and reinforced the willingness for independence.

2. Republican Period

The new Republic of China (ROC) did not give up control over Tibet. They attempted to annex Tibet to the administrative structure of China. On 15th February 1912, the first President Yuan Shikai proclaimed that the new Republic of China will take over all former periphery territories under Qing rule and suzerainty, including Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang (O’Neill, 1987, p.57; see also Swaine and Tellis, 2000). On 22nd June 1912, Republicans discussed the establishment of an administrative centre in Tibet, but this plan evoked a strong opposition by Tibet as well as the British. After this, even though three countries, China, Tibet and Britain had talks in Simla in 1913 and 1914 to discuss the status of Tibet, the ROC finally rejected the accord because they did not agree over the border line, indicating that the ROC will lose their control of strategically important areas, for example, Chamdo (Goldstein, 1991, p.75). Anyway, the ROC could not gain any substantial benefits from the convention – the ability of the ROC was too weak to achieve its ambition of securing the Tibetan areas (see Swaine and Tellis, 2000, p.35).

During this period, the ROC could not exercise sovereign power over Tibetan headquarters, and at the same time, Tibet also did not have the power to control over Kham and Amdo in which many Tibetan groups resided (ibid., p.35). Hostilities between the two countries continued especially around Kham areas. One of the crucial factors of the conflict between the ROC and Tibet was their different national goal and
identity (see Kim, 2008). As indicated above, Tibet dreamed of building a Buddhist country based on Tibetan Buddhism. Spiritual as well as political power became largely concentrated in the hands of the Dalai Lama (Shakabpa, 1967). On the contrary to this, even though the ROC’s control over Tibet was very limited, they had a clear framework for understanding its ethnic issues, namely, “one nation and one leadership.” Republican intellectuals promoted the concept of “Zhonghua Minzu,”92 “Chinese nation,” in English, which meant that five nationalities93 surrounding China proper, Han, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans actually have the same origin (see Barabantseva, 2013, p.155). The ROC argued that to resist the Western challenge, Chinese national cohesion should be achieved.

At the same period of time, the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, endeavored to gain the support from the minority groups to defeat the Kuomintang of China (KMT). By claiming that the minority nationalities should possess the right of self-determination allowing them to establish their own nations (see Ma, 2010, p.17), the CPC tried to appease and conciliate the minority groups. Initially, the CPC proposed a federal system. In November 1931, they declared that the minorities in China can decide whether to join the CPC-led federation.94 However, after the second Sino-Japanese War, the CPC abolished the federal system and adopted the system of regional autonomy that did not allow minorities to withdraw from CPC-led nation. This change meant that the CPC’s minority policy became eventually in line with that of KMT, indicating that Tibet is part of China (see Kim, 2008; see also Swaine and Tellis, 2000).

3. After establishment of the People’s Republic of China

The CPC almost defeated the KMT in the Chinese civil War in 1949, and on 1st October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC’s Tibet Policy was not very different from that of the KMT in the Republican period as both claimed sovereignty over Tibet. Right after the establishment, radio Beijing even announced that “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must liberate...

92 中华民族. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.
93 In this period, actually Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the ROC between 1928 and 1975, considered these minority groups as tribes of the Chinese nation, not nationalities or nation (Ma, 2010, p.16).
94 At that time, Chinese Soviet Republic was established by CPC leader Mao Zedong and General Zhu De.
all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan” (Lal, 2008, p.115; see also Roberts, 2009, p.8). However, different from the KMT, the PRC enjoyed more secure domestic and international circumstances to aggressively pressure Tibet. On 2nd November 1949, the Tibetan government, grasping the situation, dispatched a delegation to Mao for resolving the territorial problem between China and Tibet. They also sent India, Britain and the US a copy of the diplomatic document which was sent to Mao to ask for support. However, the PRC’s response was not favourable to Tibet. The PRC’s requirements were to cede military power; and to recognise that Tibet is part of China, which could not be acceptable for the Tibet government (Goldstein, 1991).

On 25th June 1950, Korean War broke out and it gave the PRC a good opportunity to invade Tibet, as the Allied Powers, especially the US and Britain, did not have capacity for caring about the Tibetan issues. The PLA, on 7th October 1950, attacked Tibet and on 25th, it occupied Chamdo where the majority of Tibetan soldiers defended the borders. The PRC tried to diplomatically isolate Tibet as well. Especially, the Chinese government was sensitive to India’s involvement, or interference, in the Tibet issue as the memory of the British India’s strategy vis-à-vis Tibet remained – keeping Tibet as a buffer state under the “weak” suzerainty of China; and it seemed obvious that Tibet purchased weapons from India (ibid., pp.667-676). On 30th October, the PRC gave a note to India that Tibet is an integral part of China and no foreign interference would be tolerated as it is the domestic affair (see Sali, 1998, p.74; see also Schoettli, 2011, p.133; Tripathy, 2012). On 16th November 1950 again sent a document explaining China’s minority policies to the Indian government. Meanwhile, the Tibetan government sent a letter to the UN secretary-general to ask for the international community’s intervention on China-Tibet conflict. However, the US and Britain were reluctant to approve the Tibet’s request because they did not want the war with China in the Korean peninsula to be expanded to Tibet. India also strongly addressed the need of a peaceful solution between China and Tibet in order to avoid the unwanted conflict with China. The Tibetan government, on 8th December 1950, again appealed to the UN secretary-general to intervene, but the result was the same (see Lal, 2008, p.117). All these situations made the Tibetan government and Dalai Lama send a delegation to Beijing in April 1951, and on 23th May 1951, Beijing and Lhasa signed “the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”95 The agreement was finally

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95 About the full content of the agreement, see <http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china3.html>.
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confirmed by Dalai Lama on 24th October 1950, and the PLA advanced on Lhasa immediately.

Not only did the PRC justify their invasion of Tibet as an integral part of China in history, but also it had socialist cause for invading Tibet to liberate the ordinary Tibetans from a feudal theocracy (see Norbu, 2001, p.195). By using mass meetings, dramas and films, the PLA propagated “unity of nationalities against class exploiters and foreign imperialists” (Smith, 1994, p.63; see also Goldstein, 2009, p.38). Actually, during this time, the PRC did not totally exclude the Tibetan elites as well as the Dalai Lama in politics, but rather, Beijing tried to justify the rule over Tibet by using them. On 22nd April 1956, a “Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet” (PCART) was formally established to achieve democratic reform in Tibet and the PRC appointed the Dalai Lama as a chairman. However, he was nominally the leader – the CPC actually ran the committee. The Chinese government had virtually all authority over human resources and Tibet did not have their own discretion (Marcello, 2012, p.82; see also Shakya, 2000), which was against the 4th point of the 17-point agreement, “The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.”

Also, despite the 11th point that “In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities,” the CPC imposed the agricultural collectivization on Amdo and Kham in 1956. They also forced nomadic herdsmen into settling for facilitating socialist construction, which provoked an angry backlash among Tibetan nomads who made up the majority of the Tibetan population (Smith, 1994, pp.64-65). This was, for Tibetans, also not accord with the promise that “the people’s [Tibetans] livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet,” 10th point of the agreement.

All these situations caused armed conflict between the PLA and Tibetan rebels around Amdo and eastern Kham, in the summer of 1956 when the CPC introduced “Democratic Reforms” (Kim, 2008). The PLA responded by a military crackdown on the armed resistance. The Tibetans also re-organised their scattered guerrilla bands, mainly from the areas of eastern Tibet, into a single resistance army, “Chushi

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The Tibetan Government in Exile has claimed that the agreement is legally invalid since the Tibetan delegation signed the document under duress.

96 Also known as “the high-tide of collectivisation.” About this, see Walker (1966).

97 in which Amdo and Kham located
Gangdruk\textsuperscript{98} on 16th July 1958 (see Norbu, 1994, p.194; see also Alpi, 2012, p.65). In 1956, the Chinese government attempted to conciliate the Tibetans with a pledge that reforms should not be carried out within 6 years, followed by Mao Zedong’s remark in January 1957 that “The reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided by the great majority of the people of Tibet and their leading figures when they consider it practicable, and one should not be impatient” (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO), 2009). However, the armed coercion continued and unlike Mao’s promise, reforms were recommenced in Eastern Tibet and Chamdo (Smith, 1994, p.66). Tibetan’s hostility to the PRC rule had been continued, or exacerbated, and the guerrilla warfare was also ceaseless.

Meanwhile, in early March 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama was invited to the PLA-led theatrical performance planned on 10th March. According to the Dalai Lama, he was asked not to bring any bodyguards, which made him and his advisors suspect the real intention behind the invitation of the Chinese government (Dalai Lama, 2008, p. 132). On 10th March, thousands of Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer palace to prevent him from attending the performance. Finally, on 17th March, the Dalai Lama fled to India and established the Central Tibetan Administration\textsuperscript{99} on 28th April 1959. The PLA began to shell the palace and suppress the uprising on 19th March and on 28th of the same month, the state council dissolved the government of Tibet and the PCART turned into the main governing body in the Tibetan areas (Norbu, 2001, pp.224-227; see also Harrer, 2000).

The situation in Tibet did not become normalised after the Dalai Lama’s flight. In the aftermath of “the Great Leap Forward” (1958-1961), Tibetans suffered from the famine from 1960 to 1962. Tibetan harvests during that period were sent to Han Chinese in Tibet; the provinces close to Tibet; the PLA; and Chinese cadres in Tibet, which brought about a severe scarcity of food in Tibet. The Chinese government explained that Tibetans should share the responsibility and fate as part of China (Smith, 1994, p.68). In such turbulence times, the PRC, on 1st September 1965, eventually declared the creation of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This meant that the Tibetan area under the Dalai Lama’s control from 1951 to 1959 became incorporated within China’s

\textsuperscript{98} Four Rivers, Six Ranges of the Faith Volunteer Army. Not only did Chushi Gangdruk fight against the PLA but also they played a pivotal role in the 14th Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959. For more details, see Arpi, (2012).

\textsuperscript{99} Also known as the Tibetan Government in Exile.
administrative units. The chairman of the TAR was a Tibetan, but the Tibetan regional Communist Party actually had the power in the region. In addition to this, the “Cultural Revolution” from 1966 also fostered anti-Chinese sentiment in Tibet. Many precious contents of monasteries were looted and the majority of temples including Jokhang temple that is regarded as the most sacred one by Tibetans were destroyed. This caused an armed revolt in 20 of the 70 counties of the TAR in 1968. The revolt was not suppressed easily – even until the spring of 1970, the PLA could not regain the control in some areas in Tibet (Smith, 2008, p.128).

Despite Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy” after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the situation Tibet was not very changed. Notably, the 1987-1989 Tibetan unrest brought international attention on Tibet (Schwartz, 1995, p.6). On 21st September 1987, the Dalai Lama proposed a “Five Point Peace Plan” for Tibet at the United States Congressional Human Rights Caucus that was immediately rejected by the PRC, criticising the Dalai Lama for trying to split China. The enraged Tibetans held anti-China demonstration on 27th September 1987 in Lhasa, but soon the Chinese police began to suppress the protest. On 15th June 1988, the Dalai Lama, in his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, elaborated his plan by proposing that “The Government of the People’s Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy” to have negotiations with the Chinese government. This was the first attempt at acknowledging that Tibet could accept Chinese sovereignty, but the Chinese government again rejected the proposal because they still suspected that the Dalai Lama was yet to give up the idea of independence (see Smith, 2008, p.218; see also Mingxu and Feng, 2005, pp.308-309). The situation in Tibet was getting worse. On 28th January 1989, the sudden death of the Panchen Lama of Tibet caused a massive demonstration as not only did many Tibetans suspect that the Panchen Lama was murdered by the PRC but they became furious that China tried to interfere in the reincarnation process as well.

Eventually, on 7th March 1989, martial law was issued in Lhasa by the state council and

100 1) transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; 2) abandonment of China’s population transfer policy; 3) respect the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 4) protection of the Tibet’s natural environment and abandonment of the use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; 5) and earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet. For more details, see Central Tibetan Administration, <http://tibet.net/important-issues/sino-tibetan-dialogue/an-overview-of-sino-tibetan-dialogue/sino-tibetan-dialogue-a-row-over-the-internationalisation-of-the-tibet-issue-1987-1990>.

all foreigners including journalists and tourists were expelled (see Sapii, 2010, p.45).102 After the three-year unrest, in December 1989, the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Peace Prize for his peaceful approach towards liberation of Tibet, which aroused China’s anger as well as made it more sensitive to the West’s intention to contain China.

Since 1997, “the Middle Way” approach that pursues genuine autonomy within China, not independence (according to the Dalai Lama), has been the official position of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). This change of direction – from independence to genuine autonomy – has happened maybe because of China’s surging influence all over the world. Indeed, during the 2008 Tibetan unrest, practical support from international community was very limited. The Dalai Lama again claimed that Tibet does not seek the separation of Tibet at that time (CNN, 2008). However, the PRC did not change its position on the Dalai Lama and his middle way policy which could be against China’s interest in Tibet. Rather, the Chinese government has accused of the Dalai Lama of encouraging a self-immolation protest by the Tibetan people (see The Telegraph, 2012); and warned foreign leaders that meeting the Dalai Lama in any form is tantamount to encroaching on China’s core interest (see Mengwei, 2015). Even the Dalai Lama and the CPC are having an argument on Tibet’s reincarnation system after the Dalai Lama’s remark that the tradition could end when he dies. The CPC claims that the tradition has to continue and they will approve the next Dalai Lama whereas Dalai Lama criticises the CPC for its arrogance by saying that “The Chinese Communist Party is pretending that they know more about the reincarnation system than the Dalai Lama” (Wee, 2015). Reviewing the history, there is little sign that the Chinese government will change their attitude and position vis-à-vis Tibet. To understand this situation, its philosophical and political intent over the Tibet issues must be examined.

Socio-Political Context

1. Theoretical Foundations on New Chinese Nation

After defeats in the First and Second Opium wars, Chinese elite in the late Qing dynasty attempted to reform the country. “The Self-Strengthening Movement” (1861-1895) is one of those efforts. Some officials such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong and Sheng

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102 The martial law continued until 1st May 1990.
Xuanhuai claimed that in order to compete the West and strengthen the dynasty itself, it is essential to adopt and use Western technological knowledge. Even though it is usually evaluated that the movement had failed as the elite only focused on economic and military reforms, which may meet their own interests (see Fairbank, 1980, pp. 167-176), it had some meaningful impacts on the society. One of the noticeable results of the Self-Strengthening Movement was that China was beginning to accept the modern Western philosophical concepts from the Western countries and Japan. The concept of nation, in particular, strongly influenced Chinese elite groups (see, Jo, 2010).

In the history of Chinese empires until then, there had been many concepts related to patriotism (or nationalism), chauvinism and racism. The root of those concepts were not mere loyalty to the states or ethnicities, but culture. Under such culturalism, in other words, view point on “Tianxia,” Chinese people, Han, in particular, regarded the Chinese culture as the most advanced and the only civilisation in the universal (see Levenson, 1953). According to their belief, even if other aliens, especially Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing, changes the states by military forces, they cannot subvert the cultural superiority of Han – however, if they accept the values and teachings of Chinese culture, the aliens also can be incorporated within the cultural boundary (see Zhao, 2004, p.16).

This idea was, however, challenged by a massive influx of strong external forces. Advanced technologies and flood of different ideas of Western powers demanded a fundamental change in Chinese people’s perspective on the Tianxia (see Song, 2005). They needed a new conceptual framework to reformulate their identity and nation state; and the concept of nation and nationalism from the West and Japan greatly helped re-examine the traditional and old ideas. A number of Chinese intellectuals tried to overcome the crisis of identity by actively adopting and reshaping such concept of nation and nationalism. Even though the scholars have one thing in common that they all attempted to overcome the national crisis by achieving modern nation-building, they disagreed over the way they reach the goal. Intellectuals who advocated constitutional monarchy such as Liang Qichao aimed at building a nation based on equality among

103 Levenson (1953; 1968) argued that this moment was the dramatic disjuncture between traditional China, Tianxia, and the modern nation-state demanding new identity. Therefore, there was no modern concept of nation of nationalism in the Chinese empires in history. However, Duara (1996) opposed this radical idea as he maintained that the traditional culturalism also includes the idea on ethnicity that is one of the elements of modern nationalism. However, they both claimed that there was a feeling of crisis in identity among Chinese people and need of change of traditional culturalism.
different ethnicities (or nations); and equal rights and duties among members of a constitutional society (Song, 2005). Especially, Liang’s idea of “Da Minzu Zhuyi,” “great (or broad) nationalism,” well represents his notion of nation that embraces various ethnicities (see Zhao, 2004; see also Bulag, 2002). Although he also emphasised the central role of Han people and their cultural assimilative power, Liang, when it comes to a form of nation, did not exclude other ethnic groups, especially the Manchu people who had failed in defending the country from outer threats. Also, it was Liang Qichao who first used the term Zhonghua Minzu, Chinese nation, implying that various ethnicities surrounding China has shared the same history in competition (see Jo, 2010).

On the contrary to this, Revolutionary intellectuals, for example, Zhang Binglin and Wang Jingwei took an anti-Manchu stance in the Sino-centric and Han-centric context. They highlighted the importance of a racial revolution (see Dikötter, 1997). For them, ethnic conflicts are inevitable as each group has its own interest; so a country with diverse ethnicities cannot last long owing to political turmoil. In this sense, if ethnic conflicts are not resolved, any kinds of political problems could not be solved. With this logic, they aimed at establishing a nation with a single ethnic group (see Crossley, 2002, p.352). Importantly, they actually did not totally deny the concept of assimilation of ethnic groups that was argued by Liang Qichao. However, the difference between the two was while constitutional monarchists believed that different ethnic groups can constitute a nation, and the assimilation (into Han) will occur spontaneously as time goes by, revolutionaries claimed that the assimilation and having a unified ethnic group is a prerequisite for nation-building (see Kenji, 1990). In other words, they, revolutionaries, maintained that the nation state should consist of a single ethnicity. In this respect, it can be argued that revolutionaries’ concept of nation was based on ethnic nationalism of Han, rejecting the coexistence of people from other ethnic groups (see Jo, 2010, pp.196-197; see also Crosseley 2002; Song, 2005).

Initially, it seemed that revolutionaries took the initiative in the philosophical competition as they succeeded in overthrowing Qing dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution. However, their concept of nation had to be revised because revolutionaries confronted a problem of controlling the territories under the Qing influence.
Independence movements from the minority areas such as Tibet and Mongolia revealed the weakness of Revolutionaries’ Han centric nation concept. New nationalism after the fall of the Qing could not be shared by non-Han people (Park, 2005). Eventually, their ideas on nation and nationalism were replaced with Sun Yat-sen’s discourse on “Five Races under One Union.” Sun emphasised the integration of the five major ethnic groups in China, Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans, under one nation. Actually he was also indulged in the anti-Manchuism and ethnocentrism of the Han (see Sun, 1973, p.118). Sun changed his stance after the Xinhai Revolution because he also recognised that anti-Manchuism and political strategy to retain all Qing territories are incompatible (Bovingdon, 2010, pp.34). He justified this change by arguing that the target of Revolutionary before the fall of the Qing dynasty was actually not whole Manchu people, but the Qing government who suppressed other ethnicities and caused severe ethnic and political inequalities. He also maintained that now the inequality problems are solved thanks to the success of the Revolution, so the five ethnicities now should protect the country together. He eventually claimed that we, five ethnic groups share a common responsibility to make China the most advanced country (Sun, 1982, pp.438-439).

In 1920, Sun Yat-sen developed his idea once more by highlighting the term Zhonghua minzu. By adopting Liang Qichao’s notion, he emphasised the importance of “ronghe”, “fusion” in English, of all ethnic groups in China. His model was the US, the strongest nation in which people from the varied European nations are fused (Sun, 1985, pp.473-474). However, the Han hegemony was still vivid in his ideas. In 1921, he mentioned that Manchu, Mongolia and Tibet try to depend on the foreign countries because they are incapable of ruling their own nations by themselves – therefore we, Han has to help them rely on us. The way he proposed to do so was “tonghua,” “assimilation” into the Han (Sun, 1985, p.474). In this regard, it can be evaluated that his concept of Zhonghua minzu was not based on real equality among the ethnicities – but another name of the “Great Han” (see Song 2005, p.23; see also Kim, 2008). This Han-centric ethno nationalism has never vanished even until today (Lee, 2008; see also, Yoon, 2006).

One clear common thing found among the above ideas is statism (see Park,
2005). The intellectuals emphasised the role of states and it has shaped the tendency where personal and individual rights and voices can be easily neglected. This statism forms one of the notable characteristics of today’s Chinese nationalism (Duara, 1995). However, a sense of popular sovereignty and civil society did not totally disappear during this period. Indeed, one of the biggest reasons for the CPC’s success at that time was to politicise the issue of popular sovereignty to compete with the KMT. The KMT was, on the contrary to this, a self-conceived elitist party and arrogant in approaching civil society and minorities (see Cheng and Lin, 1998, p.225). However, as discussed in the previous section, the CPC also shifted their position once they took over power – they have focused on ideological control over the people and tried to form a stronger central government since then. All these ideas and practices provided theoretical foundations with the CPC who established the PRC in 1949, and have been merged with the CPC’s political socialism (see Lee, 2008, pp.11-14).

2. The Communist Party of China’s Philosophy on Chinese Nation and Tibet

According to Marxism-Leninism, a nation is a historical product which exists in a certain stage in human development. There are different forms of nations in each stage, that is, slave society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism – however, nations will necessarily become extinct once the development of society reaches a stage where every class vanishes. Especially Lenin, who put great importance on revolutionary practice, discussed the right of self-determination for all oppressed nations (see Stalin, 1924). Mao, when he fought against KMT, adopted this idea that is federation and guarantee of self-determination, to attract minorities and ordinary people, as indicated in the previous section.

The CPC describes China as a unified multi-ethnic country. Before establishing the PRC, the CPC formed the Anti-Japanese National United Front with the people from the diverse ethnic groups against Japan. After the establishment of the PRC, those ethnic groups were not integrated into the party voluntarily, but rather, the CPC had to “control” them with an effective method. Shaping and giving a new identity as a member of the PRC to the minorities was one of the most important tasks to stabilise

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109 Duara (1995) defined this situation as “a weak state and a strong statist discourse” (p.170).
the new state (see, Lee, 2008, pp.14-16). This situation led the CPC to adopting Joseph Stalin’s theory of nations as Stalin also experienced the similar ethnic conflicts in a socialist country (see Yan, 1992, pp.17-20).

Stalin (1913) defined a nation as “an historically constituted, stable community of people, united by community of language, of territory, of economic life, and of psychological make-up, which expresses itself in community of culture” (cited in Davis, 1967, p.163). According to him, following Marxism-Leninism, each nation is not wholly assimilated or absorbed in socialist countries, but if socialist world system reaches the final stage of the period of world “dictatorship of the proletariat,”\textsuperscript{110} “national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations” (Stalin, 1929). Stalin named this new form of common entity “modern nation” where “every demand of a nation may be made compatible with the interests of the proletariat” (Stalin, 1913).

Broadly, two forms of nations are found in Stalin’s concept of nation (see Kubálková and Cruickshank, 1989, pp.57-58). One is a naturally developed nation based on common cultural and social basis. This includes various minorities in the Soviet Union, sharing common characteristics. The other is modern nation where people realise their identity as a member of the Soviet Union. It is a superordinate concept of the naturally shaped nation. Through the dialectical approach, the former type of nation becomes the latter as “the world socialist system of economy becomes sufficiently consolidated; and socialism becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples” (Stalin, 1929). Through the concept of modern nation as a higher level of ordinary nation, Stalin tried to theoretically solve the problems regarding the ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union; as well as provide other socialist countries with a formula to solve minority problems successfully (Kubálková and Cruickshank, 1989).

CPC’s approach towards nations which is based on Marxist, Leninist and Stalinist theories of nation and nationalism can be explained as follows. Firstly, like the Soviet Union, soon after the establishment of the PRC, the CPC needed a framework to embrace many different ethnic groups (Lee, 2008, p.14). They acknowledged the existence of a transitional form of nations in a post-revolutionary society. The

\textsuperscript{110} Simply, rule by the proletariat, working class. Marxists argue that in capitalist society, bourgeoisie, capitalists, seize political power in a country. During the transition period towards the establishment of communism, the proletariat is to destroy the bourgeoisie-controlled production system under capitalism and participate in the political process. This phase is called, dictatorship of proletariat. For more details, see Ollman (1977).
government of the PRC, by conducting the identification of the nationalities of the PRC, declared that there are 56 ethnic groups in China that are categorised as the naturally occurring nations. They did not attempt to radically assimilate them initially (ibid., p.14-15; Park, 2008, p.124-125).

Secondly, the CPC claims that such ethnic groups, through the stage of a fusion of nations, will be fused into Zhonghua minzu eventually, and any ethnic problems caused by inequality and suppression between them will be solved as well (Choi, 2009, p.277). Before the last stage, it is possible for every ethnic group to coexist peacefully, preserving their own cultural identity. Sudden socialist transformation of whole nation is virtually impossible because each ethnic group with the distinct characteristics has its own time and pace to reach the final stage where every class is emancipated.

Lastly, the CPC’s concept of fusion, ronghe, is a Chinese version of Stalin’s modern nation (ibid., p.279). To set the last destination, the CPC has adopted and developed the concept of Zhonghua minzu. Thus, if every ethnic group goes through the revolutionary stage in socialist nation, everyone will become Zhonghua minzu identifying themselves as a member of the PRC (see Yoon, 2005). As briefly introduced in the previous chapter, Fei’s Plurality and Unity well supports and represents the CPC’s idea. He argued that “The Chinese term for Chinese people is Zhonghua Minzu; that for any of the fifty-odd ethnic groups also is “Minzu,” but they are Minzu on different levels” (Fei, 1988, p.217, emphasis added). Fei also indicated that “The future will be marked by a still higher level of the configuration of plurality and unity of the Chinese people, a level on which China will be like a gigantic flowerbed blossoming with greater vitality than ever before” (ibid., p.220, emphasis added). By dividing level of Minzu, he clearly claimed that Zhonghua Minzu is a superordinate concept to each minority nation, and the scope of Zhonghua Minzu will be expanded.

Considering all these, it can be claimed that the ultimate goal of the CPC’s policy on nations is the extinction of every respective ethnic group and birth of new Chinese nation (see Lee, 2008). However, even though the subject of extinction and fusion includes every nation including Han theoretically, actually 55 minorities are a real target for assimilation (Choi, 2009, p.280). In other words, the subjects to be fused into Chinese nation is not Han, but other ethnic minorities. The role of Han is specified in many ways. For instance, in the Chinese Government’s white paper on “National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China,” it is mentioned that:
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the state has spared no effort to promote the common development and progress of all ethnic groups. In accordance with the actual conditions in the ethnic minority areas, the state has worked out and adopted a series of policies and measures to assist these areas in developing their economies, and mobilize and organize the developed areas where Han people live to support them. (SCIO, 2000, emphasis added)

Fei (1988) also pointed out Han’ role as a main body of the nation.

In history there are cases where the groups with more advanced levels of economics and culture were integrated into other groups with less advanced levels of economics and culture. The integration of the Han into other groups which had less advanced economies is a good example… The Hans during their process of development have absorbed a lot from other groups, and meanwhile they have also contributed to these other groups. (p.198, emphasis added)

In view of the facts that 92 per cent of the total population is Han and majority of leaders of the PRC is also Han, it seems almost impossible that Han and other minorities can be integrated and fused in an equal relationship and position. Therefore, it can be argued that for the minorities in China, the meaning of any national minority policies and concepts proposed and implemented by the CPC is nothing but assimilation into the Han Chinese (Choi, 2009, pp.292-293).

As discussed so far, the CPC may think that the PRC today is in the transitional period. If it is applied to the Tibet case, Tibetans are also a subject to be Zhonghua Minzu in the future. In other words, for the CPC, the Tibetan people will become a member of the PRC and Tibet as a separate nation will vanish while going through the stages of integration and fusion (Kim, 2008, p.73). The extinction of the nation of Tibet means that the common possession of principal characteristics of nation, as Stalin (1929) argued, “a common language”; “a common territory”; “a common economic life”; and “a common psychological make-up” (national culture) are replaced with a new form of the common possession designed by the CPC (see Choi, 2009, p.281).

Then, the important thing is CPC’s recognition of Tibet’s stage. That is to say, it can be said that theoretically, the CPC’s attitude and policy implementation is dependent on how they perceive the status of Tibet. If it is evaluated that Tibet is still in a pre-revolutionary period, the PRC may take a moderate pace in the assimilation process as the development of the revolution is not enough to organise the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao’s remark on the CPC’s Tibet policy in 1952 makes a striking example
As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can start for at least two or three years… While several hundred thousand Han people live in Xinjiang, there are hardly any in Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different minority nationality area… We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai [Lama] and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years. (Mao, 1952, translated and transcribed by the Maoist Documentation Project, emphasis added)

Conversely, if the CPC thinks that Tibet is ready to move to the next stage where the fusion of nations is possible, relatively a radical policy line can be implemented. One more crucial point here is the contents of the CPC’s Tibet policy to complete the socialist revolution. Again, the CPC, according to Marxism-Leninism, regards its Tibet minority national issue as part of the class struggle of the proletariat. The CPC initially, as a method of solving the class struggle, emphasised the need of destroying the feudal system inside Tibet. However, after the Chinese economic reform, the CPC has more highlighted the Tibet’s economic development; relationship with the central government; and patriotism (see The Guardian, 2015). This may imply that the CPC is currently taking a radical assimilation policy thinking that Tibet is now approaching the final stage of fusion into Chinese nation under the CPC rule (see Lee, 2008; Park 2008; Choi 2009). For the CPC, if the project becomes successful, the Tibet case, the most well-known and sensitive issue, can be an excellent model of their achievement of socialist development.

**Discursive Construction: China’s National Interest in Tibet**

1. **Topics of the discursive construction and discursive strategy**

Reviewing the historical and socio-political context, this research examines the pattern of the discursive construction found at the Chinese government documents and elite discourses particularly since 1959, point at which the 14th Dalai Lama’s flight and the Tibetan uprising occurred. From that moment, the CPC’s policies towards Tibet became more aggressive. Even though to date, there have been varying degrees of their attitudes vis-à-vis the Tibet issue according to the historical context, but generally the CPC has
Chapter VI. Constructing National Interest: China’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

Seokbae Lee

This research distinguishes between three semantic macro-areas related to the discursive construction of China’s interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It should be noted that each process of discursive construction in the matrix is interdependent.

1) the discursive construction of Chinese nation: Creating a myth
2) the discursive construction of an anti-Chinese separatist: Searching for scapegoats
3) the discursive construction of a collective present and future\textsuperscript{111}: Justification of rule

This research also focuses on the strategies involved in the discursive construction. As discussed in socio-political context, it seems obvious that nationalism is at the centre of the CPC’s strategies in their discursive constructions to realise the national interest. This paper distinguishes between three types of strategies: 1) strategy of generating nationalism; 2) strategy of stimulating nationalism; 3) strategy of neutralising nationalism. Each strategy may not be used independently – it is also interdependent.

2. Discursive construction of Chinese nation: Creating a myth

About the discursive construction of Chinese nation, it is necessary to understand how the CPC describes its minority issues. In the white papers related to the ethnic minority groups, they mention that “The People’s Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic state founded jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups... China has been a united multi-ethnic country since ancient times” (SCIO, 2000). They also claim that: “The people of all ethnic groups fought unswervingly and succeeded in safeguarding national unity against acts aimed at splitting the country, which went counter to the historical trend and the will of the Chinese nation, including plots for the ‘independence of Tibet’... hatched or engineered by a few ethnic separatists with the support of imperialist invaders” (SCIO, 2000). As indicated above, the CPC’s policy towards minorities is based on the theory of unity of pluralistic society of Chinese nation. Actually the concept, Chinese nation, does not merely mean aggregation of ethnic groups – it clearly contains the meaning that every society must be integrated in the name of motherland, China.

\textsuperscript{111} This research hires this area of discursive construction from Cillia et al. (1999). This aspect includes the topics of “citizenship, political achievement, present and future political problems, prospective political aims and political virtues/values.”
Following statement can prove this idea: “Regional autonomy for ethnic minorities in China means that, under the unified leadership of the state, regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of ethnic minorities live in compact communities” (SCIO, 2005). It goes without saying that the centre of the unified leadership of the state has always been monopolised by Han people. In this regard, as it is indicated, seemingly, the PRC emphasises the aim of co-existence, but actually, its policy towards minorities intends to achieve the assimilation of minority ethnic groups into Han, in the long run.

The position of the CPC on Tibet is, of course, in line with this. Its white papers related to the Tibet issue contain the statements that “Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times”; “So-called ‘Tibet independence’ was part of imperialist aggressors’ attempt to carve up China”; “The Liberation of Tibet was an important part of the cause of the Chinese people’s liberation” (SCIO, 2011). Elite discourses on this matter are not different, even stronger. Former President Hu Jintao, in the annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in 2008, said that “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland” (Xinhua, 2008). In an interview with Xinhua in 1991, Li Peng also indicated that “We have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is inalienable part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling. The central government has always expressed its willingness to have contact with the Dalai Lama… All matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed” (Ram, 2007).

The headings of “unification,” “motherland,” “part of China,” “history” and “liberation” have been extensively used in such discourses to construct the status / notion of China’s Tibet and Chinese nation. These terms may serve to mythologise new Chinese nation under the rule of CPC. The CPC has continuously tried to instill this constructed myth into their ethnic minorities including Tibetans. Deng Xiaoping, with the interview with AP correspondents in 1978, mentioned that “[T]he Dalai Lama may return, but only as a citizen of China… we have but one demand, patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late” (SCIO, 1992, emphasis added). This remark may provide a microcosm of the CPC’s approaches towards the minority groups to nourish the new Chinese nation – they have tried to generate a new form of nationalism, designed to embrace (or assimilate) the minorities.

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112 Until 2014, they have published 92 white papers on the various issues since its establishment, and 10 of them are related to Tibet issue. It is more than 10% of the total publications.
However, unlike many other minority groups, their attempts to impose this nationalism on Tibet may have not succeeded in making a soft landing. Still many Tibetans are struggling against China’s rule over Tibet and the 14th Dalai Lama, who is regarded as a separatist by the CPC, is leading an active life as a spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. The CPC may have realised that they need a different strategy that goes beyond just generating and imposing the nationalism. This is a starting point of CPC’s attempts at setting the discursive construction of an anti-Chinese separatist.

3. Discursive construction of anti-Chinese separatists: Searching for scapegoats

After / while constructing the myth of the Chinese nation, the CPC needs to fortify the imagined castle. They have done strong antagonising and exclusionary discursive practices to achieve this goal. Indeed, creating a common enemy, or othering, could help strengthen the majoritarian unity. Insofar as Tibet is concerned, the Target has usually been the 14th Dalai Lama. It is not surprising anymore to see that Chinese leaders criticise and smear the Dalai Lama. Xi Jinping said that “We should thoroughly fight against separatist activities by the Dalai clique by firmly relying on all ethnic groups... and completely smash any plot to destroy stability in Tibet and jeopardise national unity” (BBC, 2011). Hu Jintao also once stated that “As long as the Dalai side stops activities splitting the motherland, stops activities scheming and instigating violence... we are ready to continue contacts and talks with him at any time” (Xinhua, 2008). Jia Xiudong, senior research fellow at the China Institute of international studies, in his interview with BBC, said that “He [Dalai Lama] doesn’t use the word ‘independence’, he says the ‘highest autonomy’, but to the ears of people here in China, when they look at the specific demands by the Dalai Lama, people believe that actually behind all those words of ‘highest autonomy’ it actually means ‘independence’. So that is the problem” (BBC, 2015). Zhu Weiqun, the Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC, has taken a more aggressive position.

After he ran away to India he organized a puppet government and declared a puppet constitution. All of his behaviour demonstrates he had already separated himself from the motherland and its people. This political situation persists today. In 1995, the central government, considering the

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113 For more details on this concept, see Said (2003).
separatist activities of the Dalai over the years, awarded him ‘four hats’: the head of the political body *embarking on separatism* in order to achieve ‘Tibetan independence’ and becoming the loyal tool of the international *anti-China force*, the general purpose being to provoke social instability in Tibet and the biggest impediment to Tibetan Buddhism maintaining normal social order. Since then, the Dalai has successively proven that the ‘four hats’ exactly match his head, by his words and behaviour. (Aiming, 2011, pp.7-8, emphasis added)

He also said “Their [The Dalai Lama’s side] false assumption regarding the alleged bankruptcy of the CPC and collapse of the Chinese government was due to their misunderstanding of the circumstances in Beijing after the turmoil of 1989... However, it was rather unfortunate for the Dalai Lama because China did not collapse at all” (China’s Tibet, 2010). Most recently, about the reincarnation issue briefly dealt with above, he mentioned that “Politically speaking, he has betrayed his homeland… Religiously speaking, he has betrayed Tibetan Buddhism and the succession system of the Dalai Lama which requires strict religious rituals… Now the Dalai Lama has to tout his own religious title to gain attention, which has no future” (Xinhua, 2015a; see also Buckley, 2015). He criticise the Dalai Lama not only for betrayal of the PRC but for that of the Tibetan people. The keywords of these kinds of remarks are “separatist,” “violence,” “instability,” “betrayal” and “anti-China.”

The CPC needs to consolidate the internal integrity for establishing new Chinese nation. Exceptional cases would not be acceptable to achieve this goal – the 2014 Hong Kong protests\footnote{About the protests, see BBC (2014a).} may convince the CPC of this idea. Protesters opposed the Hong Kong electoral reform proposed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) that the chief executive candidates have to love the country and love Hong Kong (see Woo, 2015), which implies that anyone who is against the central government cannot be a candidate (see Mitchell and Sevastopulo, 2014; see also Cheung and Chong, 2013). Many Hong Kong people still keep the memory of the time they sought refuge from political turmoil on the mainland including Cultural Revolution; and the experience of different system to the mainland China until 1997. They still suspect that the CPC will restrict Hong Kong’s autonomy and finally annex Hong Kong by force. Indeed, the CPC has confronted with difficulties in dealing with “one country two systems” (see Mckirdy, 2014) – in this regard, for the CPC, accepting the Dalai Lama’s concept, genuine autonomy, is unthinkable for fear that Tibet can be
another Hong Kong, which is a big obstacle to continuing her long-term project, building new Chinese nation under the CPC leadership.

Many analysts argue that the CPC is highly concerned about the situation that losing single minority can bring the domino effect. Indeed, except special administrative regions, that is, Hong Kong and Macau, no minority has been allowed to have high degree of autonomy. Behind the Beijing’s offering minority welfare scheme like a quota subsidy system (SCIO, 2005), its attitude towards any voices and actions on sensitive topics such as autonomy and separation is extremely aggressive. In this situation, internationally well-known Tibet burdens the CPC to keep enforcing the minority policies. Even though many foreign countries including the U.S. cannot practically pressurise the CPC, continuing Tibetan people and Dalai Lama’s movements on the genuine autonomy or free Tibet can harm China’s international image and its discourse on Chinese nation and peaceful rise. The recent CPC’s reaction against Obama and Dalai Lama’s “spiritual” meeting115 well represent this aspect.

Issues regarding Tibet concern China’s core interests and national sentiments. Beijing has long made it clear that the Dalai Lama, who has for decades tried to separate Tibet from China, should never be hosted by leaders of other countries… Frankly speaking, Obama needs the Dalai Lama not because the latter is respectful, as Obama claimed, but because the Dalai Lama is useful. For one thing, he is a separatist. For another, he comes from China and is against his own motherland… In essence, the Dalai Lama is just a handy tool for Obama to scramble for short-term gains, show off his moral clarity and score easy points at home. (Dongdong, 2015, emphasis added)

This burden, however, can ironically help the CPC secure more domestic integrity. Here, it may be necessary to see the CPC’s strategy of stimulating nationalism. Obviously any separate movements (from the CPC’s perspective) and international concerns can awaken and stimulate dormant nationalism of Han people who account for around 92% of the total population of China. New powerful Chinese nation under the CPC rule and the experiences of Century of Humiliation may have made Han Chinese sensitive to international (Western, especially) voices on China and any actions regarded as a separatist movement. Actually international concerns and pressures on minority issues have not had any serious influences on the PRC’s policies and actions, defended by the saying, interference in China’s domestic affairs; and this kind of discourse seems to be strongly supported by Han Chinese in general (Wang, 2012). The PRC’s accusation of

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115 About this event, see BBC (2015).
separatist movements of Dalai Lama can be interpreted as part of such discourse to stimulate Han Chinese nationalism. That is to say, the most sensitive Tibet can be the biggest burden for the PRC, but at the same time, it is the most powerful tool to unite majority people in China, which is China’s key interest (Beijing Review, 2013). As the spiral of silence theory\textsuperscript{116} indicates, minorities could lose the opportunities or willingness (even feel threatened) to express their opinions against dominant views in this situation — it can be argued that this is the path towards assimilation.

4. Discursive construction of a collective present and future: Justification of rule

Not only has CPC accused separatists of a trickster who threatens the development, integration and security of Chinese nation, but also they have propagated the development plan (especially on economy) designed for the minority areas to resolve dissatisfaction of the minority groups and to emphasise common prosperity. Here, again, the role and contribution of the central government are underlined. In the white paper on ethnic policy, it is stated that “the CPC and the Chinese government have carved out a path for the successful solution to ethnic issues with Chinese characteristics, exercised the ethnic policy featuring equality, unity, regional ethnic autonomy, and common prosperity for all ethnic groups” (SCIO, 2009). Especially, the economic development and improvement of living standards of the minority-dominated areas are usually highlighted to justify the CPC’s control over the regions, indicating that “This correct ethnic policy in line with China’s actual situation has fostered the unity and harmonious coexistence of all ethnic groups who are striving with one mind for economic development, political stability, cultural prosperity and social harmony” (SCIO, 2009, emphasis added). Statements on the Tibet case are not different. Following is one of many statements on the development of Tibet, related to economic growth in particular.

Following the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Central Government has always given top priority to helping Tibet develop its economy, enhance its people's living standards, and change its impoverished and backward situation. It has issued a series of favorable policies, and made great achievements in promoting Tibet's economy. Currently a relatively complete socialist market system has been established in the region, and historical leapfrog development has been realized in

\textsuperscript{116} About the theory, see Noelle-Neumann (1974). According to him, people tend to follow the view of the majority for fear of being isolated from society or group.
Almost all such statements include the role of the central government. The logic is simple: without motherland China (and CPC), without prosperous ethnic minorities and most of all, Chinese nation.

According to this logic, China’s leaders promote a success story of their attempts at developing Tibet. Xi Jinping mentioned that “The extraordinary development of Tibet over the past 60 years points to an irrefutable truth: Without the Chinese Communist Party, there would have been no new China, no new Tibet” (BBC, 2011). Li Keqiang, the current Premier of the State Council of the PRC, also said that “Efforts should be given to the development of agriculture and animal husbandry and related processing business, making Tibet an important tourism destination in the world, and promoting commerce and trade with South Asia to boost the Tibetan economy” (Xinhua, 2015b). Wen Jiabao, to defend the Chinese government’s hard-line policies towards Tibet, argued that “The situation in Tibet is on the whole peaceful and stable. The Tibetan people hope to work in peace and stability… Tibet’s economic development in recent years proves the policies we have adopted are right” (Bodden, 2009). Zhu Weiqun also stated that:

Since the opening-up, the central government has cared a great deal about the development of Tibet as one of the provinces of China and in succession held Tibetan works conferences five times. To my knowledge, Tibet is the only province given such special care by the central government… Not only does the central government give it special attention, but so also do all the people in our nation. That is why the central government has a special policy of caring about Tibet and the whole nation supports Tibet... and vice verse [sic]… We believe the 3 million people in Tibet, while they are receiving care and help from the people of the whole nation, are supporting the nation in return. (Aiming, 2011, pp.10-11, emphasis added)

Not only do all these remarks legitimise the CPC’s control over Tibet by highlighting the economic growth, but they also describe such development as the common achievement of Chinese nation. In other words, the CPC’s argument is that we (as Chinese nation) have achieved the same goal and will share the same prospective aim – common prosperity led by the CPC. This means that by providing Tibetans with a clear vision, development, The CPC tries to stabilise the status of Tibet. They would not
expect Tibetans to become ardent patriots to wave the Chinese flag in a short period of time – they may need silent followers to conform to the rule of CPC at present. In this sense, the purpose of CPC’s conciliatory policy of development is nothing more than neutralisation of existing nationalism of Tibetans in order to make them ready to adapt to new Chinese nation.

Conclusion

Considering all discursive practices and strategies so far, the CPC is not just interested in Tibet per se. They are also interested in Tibet as a tool to gain momentum to design and strengthen new Chinese nation under the CPC rule. Some scholars and analysts have described Beijing’s approach towards Tibet and Dalai Lama as irrational paranoia. This research, however, would argue that it is well-calculated paranoia to provoke Han nationalism. At the same time, the CPC attempts to neutralise the existing nationalism of Tibetans in China by emphasising the development agenda. In the short run, the purpose of such attempt may be to make silent followers – in the long run, it would be the path towards assimilation as it is de-mythologising existing identity of Tibetans in China, which may be the CPC’s real interest that has long been pursued and shaped.

It seems clear that the CPC evaluates that Tibet is reaching the last stage of the socialist development. Indeed, different from what the CPC has propagated, its aim of any practices in Tibet is heading for the path towards assimilation. To take an example, the CPC argues that their policy on regional national autonomy has been designed and implemented to guarantee that each minority can keep its own cultural identity during the transitional period. However, actually this may be also designed for the fusion of the minorities into Zhonghua Minzu because: 1) anyway the autonomous regions are part of the PRC’s administrative structure; 2) any political activities in the regional level must be approved by the CPC; 3) Han migration is recommended and implemented by the central government; 4) the minority cadres are trained and appointed by the CPC, and they usually play a role in conveying and executing the central government’s policies (see Potter, 2011, pp.78-82). The PRC’s national minority education also contributes to completing the socialist development in Tibet. Xi, in the meeting on the work of southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, addressed that “efforts should also be made to incorporate education on socialist core values into courses in schools at various
levels, popularize the *national commonly-used language and script*, and strive to foster *Party-loving and patriotic builders and successors of the socialist cause*” (Xinhua, 2015b, emphasis added). In addition to this, recently, the CPC announced that every monk and nun has to be tested for their patriotism forcing them to install national flags, telephone connections, newspapers and reading rooms in monasteries (Guardian, 2015). All things considered, the real interest and intention of the PRC’s Tibet policies and attitudes is to destroy the existing identity as a Tibetan and integrate it into Han dominated Chinese nation according to its unique socialist nation theory.

Lastly, before completing the chapter, one question may still remain: then how has India affected the internal process of China’s interest formation in Tibet? As the historical context section indicates, it was British India who made the Qing re-examine the Tibet issues with a modern nation state concept. Also, it seems that Tibet still remains a sensitive issue when it comes to Sino-Indian relations. However, so far as the domestic interest formation of the PRC is concerned, this research would argue that India is not one of the major variables affecting the PRC’s interest formation mechanism in the domestic level. Of course it is obvious that for the PRC, India can potentially be (or has been) one of the biggest threats who can harm the PRC’s interests *vis-à-vis* Tibet as India has been the host to the Dalai Lama and the largest exile Tibetans since 1959; and was the enemy in the Sino-Indian War in 1962. This, however, does not necessarily mean that India has direct impact on the PRC’s internal interest formation. Whatever India takes any actions, the PRC would pursue what it believes to be necessary to achieve the socialist development of Tibet; and realise Chinese nation. If there is no Indian variable, would the CPC’s policy line and attitude towards Tibet be different? Hardly thinkable. What India can touch is already shaped / defined interest, not by them, but by the needs of the CPC. Actually it is very different from the case of India. India’s pursuit of interest *vis-à-vis* Tibet has been highly concerned with her relations with China. This aspect will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Chapter VII. Constructing National Interest: 
India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

This chapter examines how India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet has been constructed in discourse. Unlike the case of China, India’s domestic interest formation vis-à-vis Tibet is deeply concerned with her relations with China. It was British India who initially included Tibet in their one of the strategic national interests to counter the potential Russia’s influence on Tibet that had a direct border with British India. They argued with the Chinese governments on the status of Tibet and border demarcation; and failed to have an agreement on such issues. British India’s position towards Tibet remained ambivalent – and this ambivalence was inherited by the independent India and their pursuit of interest with regard to Tibet has become “weak reactionary behaviours” vis-à-vis China, losing the substantial control over Tibet. This situation still remains the same. This chapter first briefly reviews British India’s concept of national interest with regard to Tibet and its legacy; and examines the discursive practices of Indian elites in order to find out how they are currently formulating national interest with regard to the Tibet issue. It is worth mentioning that in this chapter, the data generated from the interviews held by the researcher are extensively used.

Historical and Socio-Political Context

Initially, India’s political relations with Tibet were materialised by frontier British officials such as Charles Bell, Basil Gould and Hugh Richardson in the late 19th and early 20th century. Until then, there was little connection between mainland India and Tibet (Anand, 2012). It was also British India who initially tried to define the national interest with regard to Tibet. The British invasion of Tibet under the leadership of Sir Francis Younghusband in 1903-1904 forced Tibet to rectify its ambiguous political status (Anand, 2012). At that time, the primary purpose of this invasion was to check the Russian advance towards British Indian territories. The end of the Qing dynasty, there was a power vacuum in Tibet, which gave Tibet an opportunity to be de facto independence. The new Chinese government was too weak to restore imperial authority in Tibet. In the Simla conference in 1914, British, China and Tibet failed to reach a
consensus over the boundary alignment between Inner Tibet under Chinese suzerainty and outer Tibet with practically total autonomy. McMahon who supported the concept of buffer status of Tibet, proposed the new border line, so-called McMahon Line, but it was not accepted by any Chinese governments from then on. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) transformed the situation totally – as reviewed in the previous chapter, in 1951, Beijing and Lhasa signed the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, and since then, Tibet has been under the PRC control. In 1954, India and China signed “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and it was the first time for India to accept Tibet as part of China. However, the flight of 14th Dalai Lama to India and the Tibetan uprising in 1959 exacerbated the relation between India and China. China soon after required the renewal of 1954 treaty, but India refused to sign it again. This was one of the causes of 1962 Sino-Indian War, and India was harshly defeated, and from then on, India has not been able to restore any substantial control power over the Tibetan plateau. It was 2003, the year in which India officially signed the declaration that Tibet is an autonomous region of China. And most recently, the Prime Minister Modi, reaffirm that Tibet is part of China (Panda, 2014). During this course of history, unlike China, India has not had any clear framework to pursue their interest with regard to Tibet since the independence.Actually after independence they still sought the advice from Britain (see IOR/L/PS/12/1433; see also IOR/L/PS/12/4232). Then it is important to review how British India defined her interests with regard to Tibet. Below table is a summary of the British India’s position and interest with regard to Tibet since 1912 to 1950.

[Table. 11] British India’s Interests with regard to Tibet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>The fall of the Qing Dynasty</td>
<td>It will be remembered that in the preamble of the Anglo-Russian Convention the special interest of Great Britain in the maintenance of the Status Quo in the external relations of Tibet was admitted… Desire of government to see internal autonomy in Tibet under Chinese suzerainty but without Chinese interference and maintenance of cordial relations between Tibet and India. (IOR/L/PS/11/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>The 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty was jointly renounced by Russian and</td>
<td>The northern frontier of India will fall under Japanese, as well as under Chinese, influence. Will the new India, autonomous or semi-autonomous, be able to protect adequately fifteen hundred miles of such a frontier? Surely not. She will be weaker, rather than stronger, as regards external defence. In any case she will no longer have what is</td>
</tr>
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### Chapter VII. Constructing National Interest: India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

Seokbae Lee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event/Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>perhaps the best land frontier in the world, the lofty plateau of Northern Tibet. Fifteen hundred miles from east to west, four or five hundred miles from north to south, never less than sixteen thousand feet above the sea and almost uninhabited, this inhospitable table-land is the real barrier of India to the north… Finally, we should recognise India’s vital interests in this problem and the dangers that threaten her in our present policy of inaction. (Mss Eur F80/202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Age of 14th Dalai Lama began: Our interests in Tibet are maintenance there of an autonomous state under a stable and friendly government, able to preserve order and keep the peace beyond the northern frontier of India, and the exclusion from Tibet of any influence hostile to ourselves, such as that of the Soviet Union. It follows that the exclusion of Chinese administration is also desirable, because its unpopularity and inefficiency would lead to disorder, and because of the possibility that at some time in the future the Government of China, and hence Tibet, might fall under Soviet or Japanese control. The policy hitherto pursued by the Tibetan Government of discouraging the entry of Europeans into their country also accords – generally speaking – with our interests. (IOR/L/PS/18/B448A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>World War II: The behavior of the Chinese between 1904 and 1910 and in particular their activities in Nepal, Bhutan and the tribal areas of Assam, made it evident that the chief value to India of good relations with Tibet lay in the preservation of a friendly buffer state, so far as possible in political isolation. From this aspect, the maintenance of a friendly Tibetan Government sufficiently strong to defend itself, and the establishment of a satisfactory and accepted Indo-Tibetan frontier, in case the first line of policy were to break down, are the main objects of British policy towards Tibet. (Mss Eur F288/64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Independent India: It follows that while the Government of India are glad to recognise and wish to see Tibetan autonomy maintained, they are not prepared to do more than encourage this in a friendly manner and are certainly not disposed to take any initiative which might bring India into conflict with China on this issue. (IOR/L/PS/12/4210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Independent India: For in spite of changes within India, the same dangers threaten without, only more intensified, with increased Russian expansionalism. As before, Tibet serves India as a unique buffer. With the progress of science the world has grown smaller, and we have been told that militarily Tibet has not the same value as was thought before. But some military experts at least disagree; and we cannot foresee the values that others may assign to this large area with reference to scientific developments of the future. In any case Tibet’s value remains as a political and social buffer… the preservation of Tibetan integrity and of Tibetan friendship is essential to India. (Mss Eur D998/39)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The establishment of PRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The establishment of PRC</td>
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</table>

It is very much in the interests of the security of India (and hence of the whole of Southern Asia) that Tibet should not fall under Communist influence. I am pretty confident that there is no risk at all of an indigenous Communist movement in Tibet and the danger consequently comes from the possibility of a Chinese reconquest of Tibet or the Tibetans becoming sufficiently frightened of the Chinese as to take orders from the Chinese Mission in Lhasa, in its turn taking its orders from a Communist Government in China. It is therefore in India’s interests (and indirectly in our interest that the Chinese Mission should be closed down. (IOR/L/PS/12/4232)

Considering all the contents in the above table, British India and early Indian government desired Tibet as a buffer state against Russians and Chinese. However, post-colonial India’s attitudes towards the Tibet issue was somewhat passive, depending on Nehru’s idealism (see Topgyal, 2011) and British, since Simla conference, had never been sincere in resolving the Tibet question (see Anand, 2012) – and after India’s independence, they tried to avoid the responsibility for a derivative of their activities, such as McMahon line. As indicated above, this tendency of ambiguity has continued without clear India’s Tibet policy and interest. Then, considering this background information, this research examines how today’s Indian elites define and pursue the national interest with regard to Tibet.

**Discursive Construction: India’s National Interest in Tibet**

**1. Topics of the discursive construction and discursive strategy**

Unlike the Chinese case, it is not easy to discover a distinct discursive framework in India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. The languages on the Tibet issues tend to be selected and practiced very cautiously and implicitly as well. However, it seems clear that the Tibet issue is still in one of the important categories in Indian elites’ discourses especially when it comes to dealing with her relations with China. This research attempts to distinguish between two semantic macro-fields related to the discursive construction of India’s national interest with regard to Tibet. Each process of discursive construction in the matrix is interdependent.
1) the discursive construction of passivity: “What can we do?”

2) the discursive construction of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation: “We are different”

As discussed in the previous chapter, there is clear sign of the CPC’s attempts at shaping and using nationalism as a strategic tool to realise their interests. However, in the case of India, regarding the India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, nationalistic strategy in discourse as a momentum to gain the public supports is not very vivid. However, it does not mean that there is no such attempt. Especially in the second process of the discursive construction, this research finds out the evidence where the elite groups of India have tried to build and stimulate nationalism via the Tibet issue. This will be addressed in detail later on.

2. Discursive construction of passivity: “What can we do?”

As China’s rule over the Tibetan plateau has become more stable and the economic cooperation between China and India has significantly expanded, the elite’s use of discourse related to the Tibet issue may have become more discreet. Also, there must be a strategic calculation that India would not benefit from worsening the relations with China; or keeping the Tibet issue alive silently. The tendency of this “acknowledgement of reality” is easily seen in the elite discourse in India. By arguing that “Tibet is not important in Sino-Indian relations,” during his interview on 30th May 2013 with this researcher, Ambassador Phunchok Stobdan, senior fellow of the IDSA opined that:

There is no public support for Tibet… What can we do for Tibet? What does the world want India to do in Tibet? We [India] cannot do anything for Tibet. We cannot feed all people. We liberated Bangladesh, but what did we get? What can we get from Tibet liberation? Nothing. Maybe Americans will come and see Tibet once it becomes independent? Or Tibet will fight with India? [It is possible] because the Tibetan’s minds will be able to be despoiled by Americans, Russians, Chinese or Japanese. You see, Chinese do not claim too much land. Tibet would claim more land. If China is controlling Tibet, they will not claim more territories of India because they are sitting on Tibet. But if Tibet is independent, they will claim Ladakh, they will claim Sikkim, they will claim Bhutan and so on. [Currently] Part of Tibet is China, and part of Tibet is India. If it [Tibet] becomes independent, then India also has to sacrifice. Our territory will go. (emphasis added)
The “no public support for Tibet” used in this quotation is clearly an attempt at justifying the idea that Tibet is not “national” interest. Actually the term “public” is conveniently singularised to describe Indian people as being different from the Tibetans. “We” used here may not include the Tibetans as he postulates that Tibet can demand the India’s “sacrifice,” which is against India’s pursuit of national interest. Similar to this argument, during his interview on 31st May 2013 with the author, Dr. Jagannath P. Panda, Research Fellow at the IDSA opined that:

I think if we [India] try to see the Tibetan community, I don’t think the Indian Government can do much for the Tibetans. Because we have constitutional constraints. First, the Tibetans are considered as refugees. Refugees are kind of a guest. India is a democratic country, so Tibetans are anyway welcomed for political reasons, but nothing more than that. But I have interviewed many Tibetan people, and they think that the Indian Government should do something for the Tibetan people. And I have also met some high level officials. Now the discussion is going on. The discussion is that we will make the limited citizenship, or partial citizenship to the Tibetans… It will take much time although Tibetans are part of Indian community. (emphasis added)

Even though he did not exclude the Tibetan people from the boundary of Indian community, his argument is also in line with the Stobdan’s idea as both may agree that India cannot do much for Tibetans – obviously Stobdan’s argument is more strong and aggressive, claiming that there is no need to do so. This kind of passive tendency is found in the discourses on the controversial issues between China and India as well. Especially on the issue of China’s construction of dams on the Tibet’s rivers, Brigadier of the Indian Army, Mandip Singh, during an interview dated 30th May 2013 with the author of this thesis said that:

It will become an issue… the practical solution would be to highlight the international level of commitment and treaty… we are aware of the water shortage problems in China. The point is that diverting water [in Tibet] is different from harnessing the water. We [India] have no objection that China harnesses the waters, but we definitely have a concern on diverting waters. If they divert waters permanently, lower riparian countries like India and Bangladesh will have a serious problem in irrigation in particular. They have to ensure a certain commitment… and the data regarding the water issues should be shared. But currently, we can’t do anything which is practical at the moment. (emphasis added)

By saying that Tibet as a bargaining chip is neither effective nor helpful in establishing a
peaceful atmosphere between China and India, R. N. Das, senior fellow at IDSA (interviewed at his office at New Delhi on 1st June 2013), gave a similar viewpoint.

Tibet issue is important, but not very much in Sino-Indian relations… The mutual understanding on border and water issue has much been improved. Tibet is culturally strongly connected to India, so it is very important guest for India, but China is also important neighbor, and in reality it is much more important… Dam issue is indeed a sensitive matter in Sino-Indian relations, but there has been a positive gesture from Chinese side and the both countries have made an improvement in dealing with the water issues together… and realistically, what else we can do? We have to wait and we have to continuously persuade China to solve this issue together. (emphasis added)

Stobdan also argued that “recently Chinese prime minister agreed to have joint mechanism to monitor the water data and they will inform us what is happening there, so there has been some progress on that. Some progress. [The idea that China can stop or divert water] is speculation. At the moment, nobody knows. It’s only a concern at the moment, not a problem.” During the interviews, the above interviewees continuously emphasised the progress that India has made in terms of the water data sharing with China. However, actually what the Indian government has gained from the diplomatic discussion with China has been to have promise that the CPC “will share” more data in the near future. Interestingly, the span of the “near future” has been extended year by year. The interviewees acknowledged this point, but they repeated the importance of making progress.

About possibly more sensitive issue, China’s military expansion in Tibet, while expressing a deep concern, their attitudes remain the same. Singh mentioned that “It is a sensitive issue, and the Indian Armed Forces have also prepared ourselves for the potential conflicts with China. But there is huge gap in the military budge between the two countries… And it is my belief that it’s not necessary to have any battles with China. There is no benefit.” Stobdan asked in return, “China is doing that everywhere. For military point of view, it is important, but what can we do on it?”

The two interviewees also expressed a pessimistic view on the existence and usefulness of India’s soft power vis-à-vis China. As indicated in chapter V, currently many scholars in India have highlighted the link between the Tibetan Buddhism and India’s soft power. Those who emphasise this relationship argue that Buddhist heritage of Tibet can promote India’s soft power to international community. In particular, they believe that thanks to the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans, India can secure her
border areas vis-à-vis China by possessing those who are Buddhist and pro-Tibet and pro-“generous India” surrounding so-called Himalayan belt (see Anand, 2013; see also Moynihan, 2014). However, Singh, as indicated above, took a cautious approach to the issue by saying that:

Yes, to some extent [soft power thanks to legacy of Tibetan Buddhism can help India secure their Himalayan border areas]. Tibet has contributed to secure [sic] the Himalayan border area by enhancing India’s soft power. Especially in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have a predominant Buddhist population. However, we can’t use it explicitly in national level vis-à-vis China. If we do so, it can create unnecessary tensions [between India and China]. It couldn’t be a national strategy of India… We have to think about other important issues. Having a good relationship with China is one of them. (emphasis added)

Stobdan directly refuted the idea of the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and soft power of India.

... Korea, there is Buddhism, Japan, there is Buddhism and even China, there is Buddhism. Buddhism is also not state religion of Tibet. Then our [Indian] polices towards Japan, Korea, China and Tibet related to religion are all the same. Why only Tibetan Buddhism has different something? Sri Lanka and Thailand are also a Buddhist country. India is not a religious country, it is a secular country. Yes, there are cultural relationship since Tibet has border with India, Assam, so there has been people to people contact, maybe, but India itself is not Buddhist. How can it support other Buddhist? It is a country for Muslims and Hindus. Many people do not know anything about Buddhism… There is some general idea about Buddhism and the Dalai Lama. But there are one thousand, two thousand and one million people in India who are religious. The Dalai Lama is also one of them. The Dalai Lama is more recognised because of Western creation, media creation, Western media creation. So-called American project to contain China, or CIA project. (emphasis added)

The degree of disagreement is different but their approaches towards the Tibet issues and relations with China are heading the same direction. However, not every elite group in India takes the passive attitudes with regard to the India’s relations with China and the Tibet issue. The discourses on Tibet and China practiced by India’s two right wing Hindu-nationalist organisations, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) make a striking example. By criticising Jawaharlal Nehru as he “offered Tibet on a platter to China,” which has brought out the situation where India is “under the direct threat from China” (India Today, 2003), the former
International President of VHP Ashok Singhal argued that “We can liberate Tibet and Pak [Pakistan]-occupied-Kashmir if people unite against atrocities committed against them” (Friends of Tibet, 2003) and “India should tell China to free Tibet and the Dalai Lama should rule there” (Singhal, 2009 cited Phayul, 2009). RSS leader, Indresh Kumar, also maintained that “Government of India should review the policy for Tibetans living in India, so that they can live with ease and reach their goal of independent Tibet” (Kumar 2012 cited in Business Standard, 2012). By pointing out that “Tibet was never part of China,” he also claimed that India’s accepting Tibet as part of China was “the diplomatic, political and humanitarian crime” (Kumar, 2008, cited in Ramesh, 2008).

Some Indian scholars also criticised the Indian Government for its passive attitudes towards Tibet and China. Chellaney (2015), by criticising the current India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi for having “resumed doing what the ‘weakling’ Manmohan Singh had halted since 2010, referring to Tibet as part of China in joint statements with Beijing,” claimed that:

_Tibet is India’s only important instrument of leverage against a muscular China_ bent upon altering the territorial, river-waters and geopolitical status quo and fomenting terrorism in India’s northeast… Tibet, ever since China eliminated it as a buffer, has been at the heart of the India-China divide. It will remain so until Beijing pursues reconciliation and healing there. Modi, given his dynamic, forward-looking foreign policy, must work to gradually reclaim the Tibet leverage against a China that _openly challenges India’s territorial integrity by claiming Indian areas on the basis of their alleged ecclesial or tutelary links with annexed Tibet_. China’s attempt at expanding annexation draws encouragement from _India’s imprudent acceptance since the Nehruvian era of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The Dalai Lama is India’s strategic asset and ultimate trump card_. If India is to safeguard its Tibet leverage for use, it must plan to act as a pivot in the Tibetan process to find, appoint and shield the next Dalai Lama. (emphasis added.)

Unlike Stobdan and Singh’s discreet approaches towards China and the Tibet issues, Chellaney actively demands the Indian Government’s stronger voice _vis-à-vis_ China with the Tibet card. He also maintained that “_India must not shy away from urging China_ to begin a process of reconciliation and healing in Tibet in its own interest and in the interest of stable Sino-Indian relations. China’s hydro-engineering projects are another reminder that Tibet is at the heart of the India-China divide and why India must regain leverage over the Tibet issue” (Chellaney, 2014, emphasis added). It seems that such hardline position, however, is not largely accepted by the elite groups in India.
Also, in view of the Indian government’s attitudes towards Tibet, anti-China discourse is not shared by the mainstream politicians. Indeed, the organisations that support Tibet to contain China are supported neither by other elite groups nor by the public as they are prone to be indulged in far-right approaches towards domestic and international affairs based on excessive Hindu nationalism (see Anand, 2011b). For example, by saying that Pakistan and Bangladesh are also Hindu nations, RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat claimed that “we need to stick to this belief [India is Hindu nation]. We can change ourselves in other areas, but the belief that India is Hindu nation cannot be discarded at any cost” (Srivastava, 2015). Singhal also stated that “I was at the Sai Baba Ashram117 where Sai Baba told me by 2020 the entire country will be Hindu and 2030 the entire world will be Hindu. I feel that revolution has started” (The Indian Express, 2015). If they firmly exclude non-Hindus in India, their ideas could not be widely shared and supported by the public. And most of all, it seems that there is tendency for Indian elites to avoid showing hardline attitudes vis-à-vis China and the Tibet issue explicitly, regardless of their actual practices. This tendency of passiveness and silence may have to be justified to gain the public supports in the name of strategic ambivalence, showing off their “well-calculated prudence.” This is the reason for their discursive practices saying, “We are different from China,” the discursive construction of difference, positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

3. Discursive construction of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation: “We are different”

Maybe because of the deep power imbalances, the passive voices are prevalent among Indian elites as seen in the above. However, at the same time, aside from the political question on Tibet, they actively promote India’s democratic and humanitarian value to the public as well as international community. This is why India has enjoyed the image of “better than China,” in spite of the huge inequalities in its society and a lot of human right issues, which is actually never better than China. Tibet, of course contributes to such better image and the elite groups in India use the Tibet issue to differentiate India from China. Basically they try to explain their passivity vis-à-vis China by comparing the culture and philosophy between India and China. Singh argued that:

117 Ashram is a monastery in Hinduism. Sai Baba was an Indian spiritual master.
I think it [passive attitude] is from a certain culture of the ruling elites, which is so-called Nehrubian culture… Nehru was idealistic and had democratic background, so he believed that the use of diplomacy is more important than the use of military. This culture still affects Indian elites… that is a part of problem of democracy. Decision-making in democracy is slow and the Nehrubian culture is added in Indian case. I think this is a basic reason why India has taken a bit passive attitude vis-à-vis China… because of this passivity, actually we [India] have lost Nepal, we have lost the rule over Sri Lanka and we have lost the control over Bangladesh. It is only because of the passivity… However, personally I believe that India’s democracy and culture is more sustainable and stable. We could accept and still have the Tibetan refugees thanks to this aspects… Many people say China’s collapse, but no one says India’s collapse. (emphasis added)

In his statement, the role of culture is emphasised. It is claimed that in India, there is less violent culture thanks to the legacy of Nehru’s idealism. Even though he opined that due to the passive approach towards the international politics, India has lost many political interests – however, he concluded his remark by pursuing positive self-presentation with his opinion on the democracy of India which is hardly seen in China. He also highlighted that India’s acceptance of the Tibetan refugees has been possible thanks to India’s democratic and idealistic culture. Stobdan also explained India’s passivity with the cultural perspective.

*India is a soft state*, India’s concept of security is not military. *Indian concept of security is peace.* If you have security, not necessarily you have peace. *Tibetans could come to India not just because of the distance but because of this kind of culture*… Security does not guarantee peace. But if you have peace, security is guaranteed. India’s philosophy is based on peace. Indian security is based on peace. We don’t have any military doctrine. Because they believe peace gives you security. Not military gives you security… Chinese philosophy [on security] is derived from communism, which is Western. Russian Stalinism, Leninism, it is Western philosophy. But originally Chinese philosophy was based on peace. But after communism, they changed. Whether it is Liberal philosophy or communist philosophy, they are all from Europe. (emphasis added)

In the bottom of the excerpt, negative other-presentation is seen without an explicit explanation on the reason why Western philosophy and communism are necessarily anti-peace; and the way India has been free from the Western influence in their peace-oriented concept of security. Anyway, he also claimed that India’s philosophy and approach towards the concept of security are different from those of China – and this difference has allowed India to accommodate the Tibetan refugees.
On the question of India and China’s nationalism and its role in shaping the national interests with regard to Tibet, the discursive strategy of positive self; and negative other-presentation is widely used. Col P K Gautam, research fellow of the IDSA, during an interview dated 1st May 2013 with the author mentioned that “Nationalism is necessary to shape the interests, but not violently or negatively, which China is now doing. India’s nationalism regarding the Tibet issue will never take that way” Singh opined that “In India, nationalism also matters in shaping the national interest vis-à-vis Tibet and China. But different thing from China is, Chinese nationalism is tempered by the CPC, and the CPC has extensively used nationalistic and emotional appeal, which India has never done” (emphasis added). By claiming that “India’s passive reaction against China is originated from cultural background,” Das also maintained that “We [India] are a peace-loving country. We are different from China who has materialistic and nationalistic position vis-à-vis other countries and Tibet… China uses nationalism to pursue their interests and sometimes it can make other countries uncomfortable… Indian public is also very nationalistic in terms of China issue and how they deal with the Tibetan people.” Panda even though he disagreed the idea that there is nationalism factor in India affecting the Tibet question, opined that:

What I believe is that we anticipate that there will be a different kind of nationalism. If China’s constant provocation continues, probably there will be growth of nationalism in India. In that context, I think Indian nationalism would like to welcome the Tibetan community… the Chinese nationalism always tries to destroy the Tibetan community, but the Indian nationalism will likely to play as a big brother, to protect the Tibetans. So there is cultural difference. It is partly because India is a democratic country. In a democratic country, you really become a considerate society. You don’t become an aggressive society all the time. When it comes to China and Tibet issue, the discourse on Tibet in India is quite accommodative. (emphasis added)

Interestingly, their emphasis of differences between India and China concerning the Tibet question always contains the negative and debasing aspect of China. Self-reflective discourses are hardly found in this topic. This tendency is also found at my interview with Gautam. He is an author of the book Tibet and India’s Security: Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-Indian Relations, and expertised in Tibetan Buddhism and culture. It is worth reviewing the part of my conversation with him as it contains full of the pursuit of positive self; and negative other-presentation.
Chapter VII. Constructing National Interest: India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

Seokbae Lee

(1) A = Author; G = Gautam

[G]: … There is very important issue, self-determination. This is important because India is also having the same problem of nation building, either integration or assimilation. So, we India says it’s integration, that is, national integration, not national assimilation.

[A]: Can you explain it more? How is it different?

[G]: Yes, it [what China’s concept of assimilation] is unnatural. Assimilation is what you swallow them up. I don’t think assimilation is possible. From that point of view, the whole society and culture [of India] are different from China. There is moral issue also. You can’t suppress people like that. Politicisation and Culturalisation doesn’t work by force though I agree with [China’s] conception of motherland and sovereignty [over Tibet] but no country is supporting Tibet because of Geopolitics and the most of all, there is no income. Anyway morality is important.

(2)

[A]: Is India’s approach towards her minorities especially Tibet different from that of China?

[G]: Yes, even though India is also having difficult problems about that issue and trying hard to solve it using various affirmative actions, it’s not very brutal [like China] and there are many refugees in India, although we haven’t signed refugee convention. And some of them are richer than me. That’s all right… we’re still in nation building. Probably some people are jealous of them but it’s very local tension, it’s not national tension at all. I don’t think so.

(3)

[A]: Is helping the Tibetan people India’s national interest?

[G]: Yes, because people support it. Tibetans are connected to India. More than Han Chinese. People in Arunachal and Ladakh are almost the same as Tibetans... India can give Tibet not just materialistic something but cultural contribution as well… Therefore, what China is doing in Tibet is uncomfortable… China’s violence towards Tibet is uncomfortable for most Indians.

(4)

[A]: What leads to a conflict of interest vis-à-vis Tibet between China and India?

[G]: They wouldn’t convert grass lands into some other things, they wouldn’t be making huge dams. Supposing Tibetan society is accepted, they would have managed the natural environment. Chinese are now dictating that we are greater than nature. That is the problem. And it is too sensitive. There is link between Buddhism and ecology, I do think so… Surely amount water is decreasing and pollution is becoming more severe. There is limit. Developing that area in this manner is creating problems… They [China] are very powerful. There is huge military presence in Tibet – military itself is not enough, but if they are changing Tibet like Inner Mongolia, so after one hundred years, it could be said that there will be no Tibetans and environment will be damaged much more… India is different. There is University of Sarnath,
Buddhist University, and they are financed by the ministry of culture. *India is doing many things to preserve Tibetan culture*, even though Tibetan language studies by Indians are on the decline. We should study more.

(5)  
[A]: How about the dam issues on Brahmaputra River? It could be a huge issue.  
[G]: Yes. India should have a Brahmaputra commission. Bangladesh, India and China. But they [China] are not interested in it. They are not interested because they are upper riparian and keep saying “don’t worry, don’t worry.” Because of dams, flood system in Indian side is broken already… ecology in that area will be destroyed because of divert of water… *It causes distrust*. About this sort of thing, I think *Chinese are very foolish. This causes a big distrust.*

(6)  
[A]: If the Dalai Lama is died, how do you expect the Indian Government’s attitude towards the Tibetan people? Could it be brutal?  
[G]: No, how can it be brutal? I think 90 per cent of them would like to be Indians. Technically they are Indians actually.

(7)  
[A]: Some scholars argue that the Tibetan refugees should not apply for the Indian citizenship.  
[G]: I agree. The Government as well as I don’t recommend the citizenship. They can lose their identity. If we [India] give the citizenship, they [Tibetans] will be happier and easier to get more human security, but *their nation will be in threat*. And still there is nationalism among Tibetans, which is very natural… Anyway after the Dalai Lama’s death, more Tibetan refugees would apply for the citizenship because of identity crisis.

(8)  
[A]: Who or which groups in India have perhaps shaped the national interest vis-à-vis Tibet?  
[G]: Government, started from Nehru and now BJP and even ruling congress. But anyway India is a very big country. It is difficult to say.  
[A]: Then how about the role of the public? Especially if culture matters according to you?  
[G]: Indian elites and liberals, they are very clear. *They put importance on Tibetan Buddhism and Indian culture*. There is no doubt that the relationship between the two is important. *They have played an important role in shaping Indian national interests in Tibet.*

In excerpts (1) and (2), Gautam compares India and China’s approach towards their minorities. While criticising China for her “brutal” way of assimilation, Gautam describes India’s problem as local “tension.” In examples (3) and (6), he emphasises the cultural connection between India and Tibet and public support for Tibet. Here, he uses
the terms of “most” Indians; and “almost the same” as Tibetans; and “90 per cent” of them [Tibetans]. These imaginary referent groups are conveniently used to represent India who is somehow different from China. In conversation (4) and (5), he highlights the implications of Tibetan culture especially for environmental issues. In his logic, China who does not embrace the Tibetan culture is destroying the natural environment of the Tibetan plateau, whereas India who is trying to protect the Tibetan culture does not feel comfortable with China. Especially in excerpt (5), Gautam describes China as “foolish” causing a great dispute and distrust. In the conversation (8), he again pursues positive self-presentation by emphasising a deep affinity between the Indian liberal elites and Tibetans. All things are considered, it seems that the cultural bond and understanding between India and Tibet; and China’s wrong doings are emphasised. It is also claimed that culturally, there is less distance between India and Tibet as compared to that between China and Tibet.

In view of all discourses on positive self; and negative other-presentation, it seems clear that by using Tibet, Indian elites attempt to improve the image of India domestically and internationally. In many aspects – economy, military and global power, India actually lags far behind China. However, so far as the Tibet issue is concerned, India obviously has an initiative in promoting their generous and peaceful culture. Such discursive practices – criticising China and praising India for the Tibet question – also generate or stimulate a new form of Indian nationalism vis-à-vis China. Perhaps Indian elites are dreaming that in the future, their pursuit of interests vis-à-vis Tibet and China is firmly supported by the majority of Indian people – as the Chinese government has got from the Han people.

**Conclusion**

British India could not completely define and pursue its interest with regard to Tibet. Independent India has been following this vacillating attitude without clear framework to formulate the policy on Tibet. This is why India’s process of discursive construction for her national interest vis-à-vis Tibet is not very noticeable. It seems that the elites of India take a two-track strategy in their discursive construction. One is to express their inability to help Tibet taking a passive attitude vis-à-vis the Tibet question. The other is to show off their generous culture that can embrace Tibet in a peaceful way, which has
not happened in China. Regardless of the real intentions behind such discursive practices, it seems clear that Tibet is used as a means of promoting the bright side of India in elite discourse. The discursive frame, “we are different [from China]” is overly used in the pursuit of positive self; and negative other-presentation, in order to shape “better than China” image. It should be noted that their negative other-presentation, as seen above, is not necessarily softer than CPC’s accusing the 14th Dalai Lama of a separatist. Also, given that India also has numerous social problems including the Kashmir issue which is similar to the Tibet case, the Indian elites’ claim that “we are [positively] different” is not very persuasive. Thus, I would call, India’s pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet, “Narcissism of small differences” (Freud, 1982, p.243).
Chapter VIII. Conclusion

This research has explored how the concept of national interest can be understood and utilised as an analytical tool, in order to examine China and India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet. The concept of national interest is indeed vague and difficult to define. Many studies in this topic have suffered from arbitrary analysis owing to the inherent vagueness and uncertainty of the concept of national interest. Many scholars have profoundly discussed the concept in order to avoid such ambiguity. As indicated in chapter II, there are broadly two strands of thought in IR when it comes to understanding national interest: rationalism and constructivism. In chapter V, this study reviewed the factors of Tibet that can be of interest to China and India through the rationalist lens. Chapters VI and VII, through the critical constructivist viewpoint, examined China and India’s discursive construction of their national interests with regard to Tibet. This research also highlighted how nationalism is involved in the process of discursive construction.

About the theoretical and conceptual research findings, two dominant strands of international relations, realism and liberalism, are generally regarded as rationalist theories as they assume that actors always try to make a rational choice based on what they believe to be the best interests. The rationalists epistemologically assume that national interest is exogenously predefined and fixed, which cannot be contested because there are always objective interests that states pursue – the content of the “objective” interests consists of material forces and security matters in general that transcend time and place. Rationalist approach is particularly helpful in interpreting the dynamics of international relations where the strategic and economic interests are clear. It is also advantageous to elicit concise and visible results as it usually excludes complex and highly subjective variables such as culture and identity. Being applied to examine the case study, rationalist account helped identify the clear logic behind China and India’s pursuit of interest vis-à-vis Tibet. It is “natural” for them to be interested in Tibet due to Tibet’s known and potential economic and geopolitical values.

However, since rationalists are not seriously concerned about interest formation which can be regarded as “subjective” process, there are some limitations to analyse the international situations and circumstances in which different interests collide with each other. Indeed, their account on national interest tends to be too oversimplified to grasp
how the interest is shaped and shared. To overcome this aspect, this research adopted a critical constructivist approach arguing that national interest is a social construct which is linguistically realised and represented in power politics structure. Hiring postmodernist’s epistemological viewpoint, critical constructivists argue that national interest exists in a form of linguistic representation. Thus, this thesis attempted to find out the way China and India’s national interest concerning Tibet is constructed and shared in discourses. With this framework, this research found out patterns of discursive practices done by elites in both countries when it comes to shaping and pursuing national interest. In other words, the critical constructivist approach helped understand the reasons for actions in Chinese and Indian elites’ discourses related to national interest vis-à-vis Tibet.

One more thing that should be noted is that this research assumed that such discursive practices commonly accompany nationalism. Nationalism is also socially constructed and can be a tool for justifying and reinforcing elites’ logic on national interest. It is not easy to handle nationalism as it is potentially very volatile force, but at the same time, it can be one of the strongest ways to mobilise and unite people. Indeed, in Chinese and Indian elites’ discourses on Tibet, nationalism is strategically used and stimulated to make people accept and support elite-driven national interest. As indicated in Chapter III, this research claims that nationalism can be used by the powerful as a political strategy to define and realise national interests. The strategy is implemented in many ways especially through structured and well-designed discourse. Without touching national sentiment, it would be difficult for elite to define and articulate national interest. In this regard, for the future research focusing on the concept of national interest, this thesis argues that it is necessary to explore how nationalism is stimulated and used in elite discourses when it comes to examining the processes of pursuing and justifying national interest.

All in all, about the theoretical foundations for analysing the concept of national interest, it would not be desirable to evaluate that rationalism and critical constructivism are two “competing” meta theoretical bases. Rationalism helps researchers draw a “big picture” that actors – states – are in rivalry to maximise their national interests which consist of material power and security; and critical constructivism helps scholars understand the processes of interest formation as a form of language practice which is highly affected by ideational factors and historical/political context. In this sense, it can be argued that these two meta frameworks for analysis of national interest are actually
in complementary relations. By having these two theoretical foundations, it could be possible for researchers to answer the questions about “what” national interest is, “how” and “why” national interest is defined and shared – and most of all, “how” it leads to the situation where different interests collide with each other.

Concerning the research findings in the case study, I will summarise them by tackling the research questions given in chapter IV, methodology. There are two sets of research questions – one is for the rationalist approach; and the other is that for the constructivist. The first question of the former is “are there objectively significant factors in Tibet inducing China and India’s interests?” It is difficult to refute the argument that there are such points in Tibet. Especially China is obviously enjoying Tibet’s geographical advantages and abundant water resources. If we take a rationalist viewpoint, it can be claimed that no state would give up such benefits if there is a chance to take them. India is also desperately interested in Tibet’s waters although practically she cannot touch the origin of water resources which is located in the Tibetan plateau. However, it would be too early to evaluate that Tibet has a huge economic potential. Due to the high altitude and severe environmental circumstances, it is extremely difficult to harness the natural resources in Tibet. Also, even though there have been some “estimates” on the amount of mineral resources given by the Chinese government, it is difficult to exactly check the types, quantity and quality of the mineral resources in Tibet owing to a lack of clear and detailed data, unlike the cases of China’s other autonomous regions such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.

Moving to the second question, “are the objectively important aspects of Tibet the leading cause of defining China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet?” Perhaps. If we review the Chinese propaganda on Tibet, this aspect can be understood. Aside from physical security implications, Tibet, domestically and internationally, also has a symbolic value regarding China’s “paternalistic” approaches towards Tibet’s development and modernisation. Securing domestic integrity and boosting benign image abroad are one of the biggest “objective” interests of China for the sustainable development and peaceful rise. This kind of factor would drive China to define and pursue national interest with regard to Tibet. By providing the Tibetan refugees and Dalai Lama with a shelter, India also can get a better image than China as a superpower, which can enhance its soft power. As it seems that the PRC is still concerned with the possibility of India’s use of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in order to harm China’s image and social integrity, India still can emotionally pressurise the PRC with
the Tibet card as well. In this logic, it would be a better choice for India to keep the Tibet issue alive.

The last question is “are the two countries’ conflicts and tensions about the Tibet issue a power and strategic game, pursuing the objective interests that they have vis-à-vis Tibet?” It is possible to evaluate that it is a power and strategic game over the objective interests. For example, the two countries have had severe border disputes in Arunachal Pradesh, South Tibet in China, and many analysts have suspected that India can use Tibet and the Dalai Lama as a means of claiming over Arunachal Pradesh (see Want China Times, 2014b). At the same time, it has also been reported that China has continuously used border incursion via Tibet to make India more defensive (see BBC, 2014b). China also has not shared full data on the water flow, dam construction and other plans for the rivers in Tibet which are connected to India’s rivers, the Brahmaputtra, in particular. Physically and mentally, the Tibet card has been used by both countries to achieve their national goals, mainly related to the security issues.

Considering the findings above, with the rationalist accounts, it can be concluded that both countries are mainly concerned about the security implications of the issues concerning Tibet. For China, Tibet is a domestic and symbolic issue with regard to China’s internal integrity and modernisation of the nation, especially minority areas. For India, Tibet is still a useful means of emotionally containing China especially when it comes to dealing with the negotiations over the border disputes, whereas practically she cannot do anything vis-à-vis the PRC’s military expansion and water projects in TAR. It seems that this picture is plausible and easy to understand, but there are some critical issues in this logic that need to be examined. As indicated above, a lack of reliable and concrete data could make researchers depend on speculation in their analysis on the topic. Also, the explanation tends to be oversimplified, so it could restrict the scope of further and reflective research on the same topic. Thus, this research gave an alternative option by adopting critical constructivist’s idea on the concept of national interest.

The first research question under the constructivist framework is “is it through a domestic, cultural and political complexity of causal factors that China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet have been shaped and pursued?” This research gave historical and socio-political context to tackle this question. China needed a new theoretical framework for their nation-building in late 19th century and early 20th century. There were two strands of newly-developed Chinese version of theories of
nation and nationalism. So-called constitutional monarchists argued that new Chinese nation should embrace all the minorities based on the idea of natural assimilation into the Han. The other group, revolutionaries, being indulged in anti-Manchuism and ethnocentrism of Han, emphasised the importance of the establishment of nation with a single ethnic group. However, the latter’s idea was rectified after the fall of the Qing dynasty, because they faced the situation where they had to secure the territories under the Qing influence. It finally led Sun Yat-sen to developing the concept of Zhonghua minzu, initially proposed by Liang Qichao, arguing that Han and minorities surrounding the mainland China actually share the same history. This idea was accepted and implemented by the CPC when they established the PRC. The concept of Zhonghua minzu has been merged with the CPC’s socialism – and this newly-developed concept has been used for justifying the CPC’s actions towards the minorities including Tibet. They have “liberated” and “developed” Tibet under this theoretical basis as a core interest of the PRC without enough consultation with the Tibetan people. This domestic complexity has always been the reasons behind the current CPC’ pursuit of national interest vis-à-vis Tibet.

India’s national interest vis-à-vis Tibet was initially defined by the British India, who wanted to keep Tibet as a neutral buffer state under Chinese suzerainty to protect British Indian territories especially against Russia. No Chinese ruling powers including the Qing dynasty, the KMT and the CPC accepted this concept. British India, China and Tibet failed to elicit a meaningful result and agreement on the status of Tibet and British India’s position towards Tibet remained uncertain. India did not have any clear vision with regard to Tibet even after the independence – India still sought the “advice” from Britain and mostly depended on and followed the leader’s personal decision in spite of the disagreement among elite groups. No clear vision, no clear policy and no clear framework for understanding the Tibet issues have made India have passive and reluctant attitudes towards Tibet. In India, thus, the issues on Tibet have always been dealt with in the context of her relations with China as reactionary and defensive behaviours since the independence.

The second question is “are China and India’s national interests vis-à-vis Tibet driven (originated and defined) by the elites in general? In both China and India, after the establishment of the current regimes in respective countries, they have been in the nation-building process. To build a postcolonial nation-state, the elite groups in both countries have played a leading role in shaping the new philosophies and policies.
Realistically, for the general public in both countries right after the establishment of the current states, it may not be easy to understand the situation with regard to Tibet. As seen in the discursive practices on Tibet, elite groups in China and India have attempted to define the national interest with regard to Tibet; and share their ideas with the public. It goes without saying that it is not an easy task – this is why elite groups have tried to generate and use nationalism as a means of the pursuit of elite-defined interests and justification of their behaviours. This aspect is related to the question three, “in China and India, does nationalism play an instrumental role in the process of defining, pursuing and justifying (legitimising) the national interests with regard to Tibet?”

As examined in chapters VI and VII, it seems obvious that the intention behind the elite discursive practices is to stimulate the nationalistic sentiments. The CPC has actively attempted to generate and use nationalism to achieve their national goal, building new Chinese nation. The problem is, the nationalism here, sometimes, or many times, can become an irrational collectivist doctrine, manipulated by a small number of elite groups – we have often seen the dark side of China’s Han majoritarianism vis-à-vis Tibet in many aspects. Any different or alternative viewpoints on the Tibet question could not be proposed and realised in this situation. Those who are against the CPC’s decision on the Tibet issues can be regarded as a betrayer of the nation. Many people in China, who are in groups called minorities, cannot benefit from such majoritarian rule; or suffer from mental and even physical threats. In this regard, Han majoritarianism cannot be rational nationalism and their interests cannot represent those of nation. The case of India is not different. Many Indian elites argue that India is different from China as they are more democratic and generous by using the Tibet and Dalai Lama case. It is an attempt at boosting nationalism by diminishing others, here, China. However, actually the Tibetan refugees are often excluded from the political and social protections in India. Here, it is worth recalling the statement of one of the Indian scholars in chapter V:

There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans… A substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter’s list can alter the political destiny of the state… India should be prepared to meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically sensitive border regions. (Das, 2006, emphasis added)

In my field trip in India, it was not difficult to listen to this kind of argument. In such
discourses, Tibetans are often regarded as an actor who harms India’s national interests and causes social conflicts in India. Therefore, according to this logic, it can be argued that protecting the rights of Tibetans are not highly concerned with India’s national interest – but using the Tibet issues is clearly included in the sphere of the national interest of India.

This research, using qualitative content analysis; critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach in particular; and semi-structured interviews, attempted to find out China and India’s national interests with regard to Tibet and their domestic process of interest formation in discourse. In completing this discussion, I would make some suggestion for further research. During the last four years of conducting this research, I have found out that in the international and domestic political arena, there is a deluge of discourse on national interest. Because the concept has always been around us, many scholars are prone to ignore the conceptual or theoretical discussions on national interest. I hope that this study is not treated as one of such studies. Rather, it would be great if this research can contribute to discussions on methodological approaches towards the concept of national interest. Many studies in this field usually focus on the powerful actors’ behaviours and pursuit of interests. I have to confess that this research is also part of it. Also it should be noted that many people are spontaneously or forcibly sacrificing their interests for national interests. It is common that the rights of the oppressed and the weak are frequently sacrificed in the name of national interest – however, sacrificing for what for whom? This point has received little attention from academia, remaining as a non-mainstream subject. Once such studies are accumulated enough, then we, as a researcher, can properly discuss the concept of “genuine national interest.”
Appendices

Appendix I. Participation Information Sheet and Consent Form

Interview on China and India’s National Interest vis-à-vis Tibet

Dear Madam/Sir

My name is Seokbae Lee, a doctoral researcher at the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Westminster in London. I am presently doing a project on “China and India’s National Interests vis-à-vis Tibet”. The purpose of this interview is to obtain your valuable perspective on Sino-Indian relations with regard to their interests on the Tibet issue.

This interview will be conducted in a semi-structured interview format. You have the right to ask the researcher any question regarding this project. You also have the right to refuse to answer questions. You may withdraw from this research any time you wish. This may take 30-60 minutes of your time.

All information obtained from this interview will be stored confidentially. Only researcher will have access to view any data collected during this research. The research intends to cause no physical or psychological harm or offence and to abide by all commonly acknowledged ethical codes.

- Interview Details -

1. Date and Place:

2. Interviewee Information
   - Name:
   - Occupation / Position:

3. Signature: I have read the information in the Participation Information Sheet, and I am willing to act as a participant/interviewee in the above research study.

   Interviewee  Interviewer

※ If you want to give this interview on condition of anonymity, please tick the box. ☐
Appendix II. Interview Questions

1. Does the Tibet issue significantly matter when it comes to explaining Sino-Indian relations?
   - If “Yes,”
     1-1) how important is it? Most or medium or less? (please go to question 2)
   - If “No,”
     1-1) Why do you think Tibet is no longer (or has never been) important?
     1-2) What are the important issues other than Tibet which significantly affect their relationship? and What are conflicting interests between China and India that have generated the tensions?
     1-3) Who (or which group) has had a leading role in defining such interests?

2. Could you expand more about especially what aspects and issues with regard to Tibet are of interest India (and China, respectively)?

3. Then, Could you explain what probably leads to a conflict of interest vis-à-vis Tibet between the two countries?
   3-1) mainly about security (border issue, in particular)?
   3-2) economic and resources?
   3-2) any cultural and historical factors?
   3-3) geopolitical factors, say the role of USA?

4. Who or which groups in India (and China respectively) have perhaps played a leading role in defining and pursuing “the national interest” with regard to Tibet?
   4-1) Is it mainly government driven? Which actors shape government’s ideas?
4-2) Is there any room for the public significantly to be involved and played in the process of defining the interests about Tibet?

5. About Tibet’s contribution to India, do you think Tibet has contributed to India domestically and internationally? Some researchers argue that Tibet is particularly important as it has played an important role in securing Himalayan belt (related to the influence of Tibetan Buddhism), attracting tourists and enhancing soft power in India. Do you agree with this argument?

6. In your view, does Indian nationalism shape India’s national interest toward Tibet and China?

6-1) Then, how about Chinese nationalism that affects their national interest vis-à-vis Tibet? Do you think nationalism matters when it comes to explaining China’s national interest with regard to Tibet?

7. Are there any other important issues on this topic that may need to be examined? or do you have any comments for this research?
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