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ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN:

THE ROLE OF HASAN TURABI

1989-2001

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PhD

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ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN:
THE ROLE OF HASAN TURABI
1989-2001

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Abstract

This research assesses the experiment of the Islamic movement in Sudan following the 1989 coup. The main question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan is the gap between theory and practice. Sudan is a complex country, with a diverse population encompassing different tribes, languages, religions and cultures, all impacting on the country’s history and future. Consequently, the Islamic movement was influenced by the nature of this society.

The Islamic movement in Sudan was established in the 1940s, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and to revivalists in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as al-Afghani, Mohammed ‘Abdu, Mawdudi, Hasan al-Turabi and Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The research assesses the theories of Turabi in Shura, democracy and issues of government. It critically evaluates the concepts of Tawhīd, the state in Islam, and human rights, minorities, women, etc., in the Islamic state.

This research established that gaps existed between the theory and practice of Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan. Their military coup represents the first violation of democracy. They possessed a clear human rights’ vision, but in practice violated them from the early days of the coup. They developed mature theories on power sharing, justice and equality, but have monopolised power since 1989.

Shura was implemented in the movement institutions, but remains to be enhanced in the State. In the first decade, Islamist succeeded in developing the economic sector, by exploring for oil, and establishing a free market, but with no mechanisms to mitigate its negative side-effects. In society, significant laws were developed, in favour of women, education, and media. One may argue that Islamists need to take further steps towards Shura and democracy on the practical level, and establish proper mechanisms.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Abdelwahab el-Affendi, the programme Director of Studies, who not only served as my supervisor, but also encouraged and challenged me throughout. He gave me the time and space I needed, and provided the necessary feedback to improve the study in all its stages. I would also like to thank Dr Maria Holt, my co-supervisor, for her constant support, guidance and encouragement. Throughout the thesis writing up, she showed endless enthusiasm and patience. Dr el-Affendi and Dr Holt provided me generously with their experience and expertise, which will have great impact on my future academic career. Thank you both for all the time you spent with me, and the great help in finalising my dissertation. I would like to thank Dr Dibyesh Anand, the independent assessor, for his constructive and valuable comments in the first year assessment.

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<tr>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFTU</td>
<td>General Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Islamic Front for Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILM</td>
<td>Islamic Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPFC</td>
<td>International People’s Friendship Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Islamic Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITM</td>
<td>Islamic Trend Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICF</td>
<td>Islamic Charter Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCHR</td>
<td>Lawyers Committee for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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NC    National Congress

NIF   National Islamic Front

PAIC  Popular Arab Islamic Congress

RCC   Revolutionary Command Council

SPLA/M Sudan Liberation Army/Movement

SCP   Sudanese Communist Party

UP    Ummah Party
Glossary

Al-Fitrah: literally means originating or creating a thing with an unchangeable natural constitution, in the case of human’s Fitrah thus signifies fixed or unchangeable natural constitution, the legacy of every created being.

Fatwa: Reasoned opinion or judgment based on Islamic doctrines or their interpretations.

Fiqh: Comprehension; knowledge; understanding: specifically jurisprudence in Islam.

Fuqahā’: Learned people in Islamic jurisprudence; singular: Faqīh.

Hākim: Ruler; governor; sovereign, judge.

Hākimiyah: Generally, dominion; rule; jurisdiction. Specifically: Sovereignty of God (Allah) or the people.

Ijtihād: Reasoning to establish a rule to allow or forbid a notion or an action in a manner consistent with Islamic teachings; more general in meaning than fatwa.

Ikhwan: Brothers; same as Ikhwā; singular: Akh.; Ikhwan Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood).

Jahiliyyah: Era before Islam; erroneously suggested to mean era of ignorance or age of barbarism.

Kāfir: Non-believer; plural: Kuffar, noun Kufr.

Murtad: A person who renounces Islam (apostate); noun Riddah.

Salafī: An Islamic trend that follows the perceived example of early Muslims (Salaf: predecessors).

Shari’a: Generally: law; specifically: Islamic law.
Shi’a: Generally, party; group; specifically: people who supported the right of Ali to succeed Muhammad; followers of the Shi‘i branch of Islam.

Shura: Literally, the Arabic word for ‘consultation’ – more widely associated with Islamic democracy and the associated democratic structure and procedures to run Islamic affairs.

Sufi: A broad Islamic sect, most of the time not involved in politics.

Sunnah: Generally: law; method; way; specifically: Prophet Muhammad’s statements, actions, and approval.

Sunni: Follower of the Sunnah; belongs to the Sunni branch of Islam.

Tajdīd: the Arabic word for renewal. In Islamic context, Tajdīd refers to the revival of Islam, in order to purify and reform society, to move it towards greater equity and justice. One who practices Tajdīd is a Mujadid.

Tawhīd: The term, ‘Tawhīd’, in the classical Islamic literature refers to the affirmation of the ‘Oneness of God’. Tawhīd (Monotheism), an axial doctrine of Islam, and at the core of religious experience, is the belief in God, with the profession of the Islamic faith (Shahadah), i.e. testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger.

‘Ulama: Generally, scientists, scholars; specifically, people learned in Islamic jurisprudence; singular: ‘Ālim.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.

Signed ______________________________ (Suhair A. S. Mohammed)

Date _________________________________
Introduction

In the last five decades, Islamists have established themselves as major political actors in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Arab World. The Islamic movement in Sudan is one such movement, which has experienced different stages of reform and transformation since its establishment in the late 1940s. In fact, there were significant turning points in 1964, 1976, 1985 and 1989, that impacted on the thought, methods and actions adopted by the movement at each stage. Since 1964, Hasan Abdallah al-Turabi has been the principal ideologist in the process of renewal, in line with the changing political and social situation in Sudan. The movement has always been characterised by independence, flexible organisation and adaptable fiqh (jurisprudence); indeed, it has adopted a pragmatic method of work. This was reflected in frequent constitutional and other changes; at important junctures, the movement reviewed its position and introduced structural and organisational changes in pace with changing times. However, the National Islamic Front (NIF) Shura Council, then the delegated executive office of NIF, planned and carried out a coup in June 1989. This qualified the Islamic movement in Sudan as an appropriate case study to be compared with other movements, theoretically and practically, to reach rational conclusions that explain the theoretical and practical performance of the movement.

Islamism: Definition of the concepts

We cannot avoid the question of how to label those Muslims who invoke Islam as the source of authority for all political and social actions. Should they be labelled Islamic or Muslim fundamentalists? Or are they better described as Islamists? It is common to
describe certain contemporary movements in the Muslim world as an expression of political Islam, Islamism, fundamentalism, or Khomeinism.

Historically, the term ‘Islamism’ developed through different periods of time, and in different fields, such as the academic, media and politics fields. It is notable that different terms emerged through history; and, during each period, terms gained different definitions. In the end, there are many definitions of the phenomena, where precise ones are rarely found in the academic literature. However, the media and politicians played a key role in creating these terms, while scholars tried to define and put them into a social, political and historical context.

Many commentators, such as Martin Kramer, argued that the term ‘Islamism’ is considered to have first begun to acquire its contemporary connotations in French academia during the late 1970s to the 1980s. However, it can be said that it was the Iranian revolution which inspired most Islamic movements in the world. More significantly, the 1980s were dominated by images of American embassies under siege, hostages and hijackings, while the 1990s were dominated by the decline of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1990. This brought predictions of insurgent movements in most of the Muslim world, i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, and Bosnia. The media headlines announced the possibility of a worldwide Islamic uprising, and a clash of civilisations, in which Islam could overwhelm the West. The writings of Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington alarmed the West, and in the academic field many conferences were held to study the phenomenon. The concern spanned all levels of policy and decision-making, national and international.

However, Versaille (1994) asserts that the term ‘fundamentalism’ began to migrate from the French language to the English language in the mid-1980s, and in recent years has largely displaced the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in academic work. The
International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that the concept of ‘political Islam’ first appeared in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution, with Shiite activism then viewed as the most worrying threat (ICG, March 2005). However, it would be linked to the suggestion of defining the term by some incident in the political field. The study by the ICG, in 2005, discovered that the concept of ‘political Islam’ and its definition as a problem only occurred when Islamic politics began to articulate anti-Western or, more specifically, anti-American attitudes. They explained that: “There has, therefore, been confusion between the implied notions that ‘political Islam’ represents the deviation from political norms ... in effect Islam was only seen as political when it was seen to be a threat” to the West (ICG, 2005). This definition is more politicised, but shows how some institutions define political Islam and analyse the actions of Islamists.

The term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in the last two decades was well-known in the media. It is inevitable that fundamentalism was not the only negative term used to describe the phenomenon and, as such, it was criticised by Islamists, scholars, journalists and observers. When the term ‘fundamentalism’ was used in the history of Christianity, it was used to define a rejection of church traditions in customs and social life. Burgat (1988, p.67) asserted that the term “developed throughout history to label those who literally interpret the religious text, and [they] were an obstacle for ‘Tajdīd’ renewal and ‘Ijtihād’”. It can be said that this term was developed in a historical context, different from the current context. Therefore, it cannot be applied to the phenomenon we are studying, i.e. Islamism or fundamentalism, unless we redefine and connect it directly to its cultural and historical context.

On the other hand, the issue has been the subject of heated debate for over two decades. For a while, many terms were coined by politicians and the media, such as fundamentalism, Islamism, etc. While both public and scholarly usage in America
accepted fundamentalism, the term was not accepted by Islamists themselves, for the reason mentioned above. Even those who accepted it, such as Turabi and Ghannouchi, redefine and isolate it from its historical context. They defined it as a term derived from ‘Usūl’, which literally means ‘origins’, referring to a return back to the original sources of Islam, i.e. the Qur’an and Sunnah (Turabi interviews, August 2007; 26 December 2010).

As for the term ‘Islamism’,

“it emerged in the late 1980s in French academia, and then crossed into English, where it eventually displaced Islamic fundamentalism in specialized contexts. More recently, the term, Islamism, has gained even wider currency, and since September 11, 2001, it may even have established itself as the preferred American usage. Still newer terminology may lie over the horizon” (Kramer, 2003, pp.65-77).

This debate shows that the terms were confusing and need to be defined carefully and clearly, to reflect the meaning intended by the researcher. Indeed, the term itself reflects the historical events that impact on its usage, and definition. It could be said that the term reflects the political situation and dominant schools of thought that are backed by political power; these schools have impact on the concept and its uses. As such, these definitions reflected interpretations of the actions of Islamic movements, including Islamists in Sudan, over the last two decades. Moreover, the media played the most significant role in conceptualising the term, when they used it to identify and define specific incidents and movements. However, there were two problems in their definition; first, it presupposes that Islam in itself is not political, whereas Islam is intrinsically combined with the assertion that Islam is not simply a religion, but a comprehensive way of life. Secondly, it presupposes that all forms of Islamism are unanimous or homogeneous, while there are different trends between radical and moderate groups, i.e. Islamism is heterogeneous, where even one group may accommodate different trends, such as the Islamic movement in Sudan. The study will
not discuss groups, such as *Ansar al-Sunnah*, and others, which are confined to missionary work in Sudan.

In some cases, the use of the term ‘Islamism’, was at first, “a marker for scholars more likely to sympathize with new Islamic movements” (Kramer, 2003, pp.65-77). However, as the term gained popularity, it became more specifically associated with political and militant groups. The term sometimes expresses a negative impression, and so some Islamists may not agree with all definitions here. I may argue that some Islamists are associated with political Islamic groups, which are not armed, and most of the time are political parties, such as NIF in Sudan, pressure groups or even Da’wa or charity organisations, such as in Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and some African movements. The study uses the term ‘Islamist’ to describe the Islamic movement in Sudan, which formed the NIF in 1985 and carried out the 1989 military coup.

El-Affendi (2003a) argued that, in the current discourse, Islamism refers to the cluster of movements which emerged in the 20th century, and which insist that religious values should play a decisive role in public life. These include a wide range of diverse groups, from the quasi-secular Refah and al-Nahda, to the very militant Islamic Jihad (Egypt), Hamas (Palestine) and the Armed Islamic Group AIG (Algeria) (el-Affendi, 2003a, pp.211-220).

However, regarding the term ‘Islamic movements’, el-Affendi (2003, p.7) asserts that some scholars prefer the term ‘fundamentalism’, which is translated from English, while others tend to use ‘Islamism’, which is derived from Islamist. He added that the term ‘Islamic movement’ is used to refer to those groups that are active in the political arena, and call for the application of Islamic values and laws in both the private and public spheres.
In addition, el-Affendi (2003) distinguished between the Islamic and the Sufi movements; he mentioned that the term ‘Islamic movements”’ is mostly used for movements that call themselves such, and which are active in the domain of politics. It is rare to see this term applied to Sufi movements that are not politically active. Moreover, he thinks that this description is not normally used for any of the following.

1. Traditional movements with an Islamic background, such as Hizb al-Istiqlal in Morocco, or Hizb al-Ummah in Sudan.

2. Regimes and movements that traditionally rule by Shari’a, as is the case in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example; while it is needed to describe the movements that oppose such regimes.

3. Parties and movements in Iran, though the regime depends on Islamic legitimacy; terms such as ‘reformers’ and ‘radicals’ are mostly used to label the political trends there.

4. Modern movements with partial or complete Islamic authority, such as Mujahidin khalq in Iran, or al-Hizb al-Jumhuri in Sudan that were set up by the late thinker, Mahmud Muhammed Taha.

5. Movements that call themselves Islamic, such as the Muslim League in Pakistan, notwithstanding its claim to being Islamic (el-Affendi, 2003. p.8).

However, what is an Islamist? According to Graham E. Fuller (2004, p.3), an Islamist is anyone who believes that the Qur’an and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, actions, and words) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement those principles in some way. It must be said that this definition embraces a broad spectrum that includes radical and moderate, violent and
peaceful, traditional and modern, democratic and anti-democratic trends. Rashid al-Ghannouchi (1939- ), when asked to define the Islamic movement, replied:

“a broad spectrum of groups and individuals, and even states fall under this concept; those who believe in Islam as a faith and way of life, of rituals and morals, religion and state, those who practice this in the private and public space, and until this perception prevails, as it is the final word of God, and optimal religion, and Straight path of guidance for its followers to happiness in this life and the Hereafter; the Almighty has enjoined on His slaves, and guided them to this. ... Everyone associated with this perception is part of what is known as the Islamic movement” (Ghannouchi interview, November 2006).

However, it can be suggested that the term ‘Islamist’ is defined here to include those individuals, groups, and States that actively seek to bring the political and social life of their nation into perfect accord with the sacred laws and norms of Shari‘a, whether abruptly or gradually, whether by social reform, political contest, or revolutionary takeover of the State. These groups understand Islam as a comprehensive religion that should be applied in all aspects of life, social, economic, political, and private. In other words, a Muslim is one who believes in Islam, while the term ‘Islamist’ indicates an active Muslim, who tries to apply Islamic values in his private and public life. This definition could be applied to the Islamic movement in Sudan.

**Research questions**

The central research questions are:

a- What are the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular respect to democracy?

b- How have these elements been made operational in his political action?

c- Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice?
That means the main question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan is the gap between theory and practice. Second, how is the Tawḥīd theory applied in Turabi’s work? The thesis critically analyses Turabi’s adoption of Tawḥīd to put forward the Tawḥīd theory, and its application to everyday politics. The thesis also seeks to assess Islamists’ experimentation with Shura, before and after 1989. The thesis also seeks to assess Islamists’ experimentation with Shura, before and after 1989 with an added emphasis on the period between 1989-2001 which corresponds to the period when Turabi held political office and therefore had a chance to implement his ideas.

The main claims to originality include: a) assessing the Islamists’ claims to practise Shura in the post-1989 period based on an evaluation of Turabi’s philosophy and actual implementation of his ideas during 1989-2001; b) offering new insights on the basis of recent original data collection. The thesis also examines the mechanisms used by Islamists in the application of Shura. In fact, the Islamic movement, as a political party or movement, adopted ‘Shura’, or what may be called a democratic structure and procedures to run its affairs. These procedures and methods are examined as well.

**Methodology**

The research is accomplished in several steps, through collecting, organising, and analysing data. The subject of the thesis is ‘Islamists and democracy in Sudan: the role of Hasan Turabi: 1989-2001’, with data collected from both primary and secondary sources.

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1 The term ‘Tawḥīd’, in the classical Islamic literature, refers to the affirmation of the ‘Oneness of God’. Tawḥīd (Monotheism), an axial doctrine of Islam, and at the core of religious experience, is the belief in God, with the profession of the Islamic faith (Shahadah), i.e. testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger.

2 Literally the Arabic word for ‘consultation’ – more widely associated with Islamic democracy and the associated democratic structure and procedures to run Islamic affairs.
sources. The most significant of the primary sources are in-depth interviews with Turabi, Ghannouchi, al-Mahboub, Abdelsalam Mustafa Osman Ismail, Elamin Mohammed Osman and Abdelmonem Abulfotuh and others, and official documents and statements from the leaders of the Islamic movement in Sudan. Secondary sources of importance are books, articles, journals, and newspapers, as well as authentic Internet sources used as needed.

The thesis is based on qualitative research. More precisely, it is a case study of one organisation, namely the Islamic movement in Sudan. The research limits itself to studying the Islamists in Sudan and democracy, Shura. The research examines the factors that have impacted on the political thought and debate among the Islamists. Historical and sociological variables are used to explain the context and background, but are not major factors in the study. As such, the methodology applied is historical and comparative, where comparative techniques are used to contrast how various sources have perceived the work of the Islamic movement in Sudan. Indeed, historical and comparative methods are widely used. The historical method offers more comprehensive understanding of the socio-economic, demographic and political conditions that influence the political performance of the Islamic movement in Sudan by exploring it throughout its history. The study utilises the comparative method that provides more comprehensive understanding of the response of each movement when it faced the same challenges, how each movement understands and interprets Islam, and how it applies it. The comparison of the theoretical and practical approaches of these movements presents a deep understanding of the behaviour of these movements and their responses. The comparative method is applied horizontally across the different movements in different countries, and vertically through time.

The research used original sources of information, namely the books and documents published by, and interviews done with, the key persons in the research, such as Turabi,
Ghannouchi, and Abdelsalam, and to some extent al-Banna and Qutb and other reformist scholars.

Interviews with Dr Turabi were conducted in both Arabic and English. I also asked him to interpret specific terms that I noticed he translated differently, such as state, and Hākimiyyah, etc. Moreover, I concentrated on the definitions of the concepts that he uses in a different way, such as fundamentalism and state. The three interviews with Dr Turabi were done in stages; the first comprised general discussion, the second was more specific to the research questions, during which notes were taken, while the third interview was recorded and went into detail, covering the gaps in the two previous interviews. Turabi was willing to do the interview in both Arabic and English, and was willing to translate his words, when asked (from or to either language). Each interview lasted two hours on average. It is important to say that I left the door open for any questions, and that he agreed to answer any question at any time. Al-Mahboub Abdelsalam was interviewed more than five times, two of them face-to-face, while the others were conducted by telephone over a total of more than ten hours. Moreover, Abdelsalam was willing to help obtain resources and to answer all my questions, clarifying information in his books and published papers. As for other interviewees, I met with Rashid Ghannouchi twice, in 2007 and 2011, at the University of Westminster, for a total of about one-and-a-half hours. I conducted two interviews, for a total of about two hours, with Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail in London. The interviews were recorded, and focused on international relations, given that he was the Foreign Minister in the 1990s-2000s. All the interviews, except for those with Turabi, were conducted in Arabic and then translated into English by me. Interviews provided original data, clarified the grey area for the researcher, and helped answer the main research question. Equally beneficial group discussions with a group of university lecturers were held twice in
Sudan in 2010, and discussed the different historical incidents, the nature of the movement, democracy and the movement.

Abbreviation is kept to a minimum in this work. Furthermore, the research defines the concepts used when needed, and explains the different uses of each concept, such as Tawhīd, Shura, Shari‘a, and ‘state’, which is used sometimes to indicate government instead of the state ‘which is the land, people, and authority’. In writing some Arabic names, it is notable that these are written differently in different sources; the research adopted the most common one, or may refer to how it is written by the person himself. For example, Ghannouchi, where in some references, it is written Ghannoushi, but he writes his name as ‘Ghannouchi’. Names such as Abdelsalam and Abdallah, which are familiar to the English reader, are spelled without the prefatory apostrophe; other proper nouns follow suit and omit the prefatory apostrophe. Others such as Shari‘a, Shi’a, Qur’an, and other select terms have been spelled according to their standard transliteration.

**Limitations of the study**

Although this research was carefully prepared, I am aware of its limitations. The research is conducted on the Islamic movement in Sudan, but does not cover other Islamic movements, such as Ansar al-Sunna, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (international organisation) and other small Islamic groups. Likewise, the case studies chosen were countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, while other movements were excluded from the study for methodological reasons. Despite these limitations, the study covers the key Islamic movements in Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia that have a direct impact on the political life there.
**Transliteration**

The thesis follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies’ (IJMES) system, as the standard transliteration system for writing names and Arabic words. Diacritical marks, i.e. áyn and hamzá, have been kept to the minimum. Most transliterated words are italicised at every appearance and some such as Ijtihād, Tawhīd, Shura, Shari‘a, sunna and Shi’a and the well-known terminology. In addition, the prefix, al-, on Arabic names is omitted except at first appearance except some names such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, for Ashura in IJMES the thesis uses Shura without the ‘A’, which indicates ‘al’, meaning ‘the’.

**Organisation of the study**

In order to achieve the research objectives, the thesis is divided into seven chapters: Chapter 1, titled ‘Historical Background’, critically evaluates the history of Sudan, and how it impacts on the movement. It concentrates on the political and social factors that reflected directly on the approach, attitudes and philosophy of the Islamist intellectuals in Sudan. The chapter is divided into six sections covering Sudan’s history and geography, the Ansar and Khatmiyyah Sufis, and the political parties. The first section demonstrates how the history and geography of Sudan (being an Arab African country), and the nature of Sudanese society (Sufism, multi-culturalism, and extended families) influences the practice and fiqh (jurisprudence) of the Islamic movement in Sudan. The research critically evaluates these factors, and analyses events accordingly.

Section 2, the Islamic movement’s historical background, seeks to critically evaluate the history of the Islamic movement in Sudan, its establishment, and the most important events that had an impact on the future of the movement, its organisation and ideology. Section 3 analyses the emergence of the Islamic Front for Constitution (IFC) as the first
broad Islamic umbrella body in Sudan, and evaluates the development of the movement during the Ibrahim Aboud regime (1959-1964) (the first military regime). Section 4 critically evaluates the movement during the second democracy (1964-1969). Section 5 covers the May regime (1969-1985), and the second democratic period (1985-1989). The section first evaluates the ideology of the May coup and its impact on the Islamic movement’s performance at that time, leading the movement to institute rapid changes in its methods, way of thinking and the fiqh as well. The research in this chapter evaluates and explores an important era of the movement’s history, i.e. the establishment of the NIF, the Islamist political party. At this stage, the movement developed economic and social institutions, and built up international relations that had powerful consequences on the relations of the state after the coup in 1989. In this period, the movement made the decision to carry out the national salvation coup. Section 6 explores the international relations of the movement, its historical context, relations with other movements and how it deals with the Sunni-Shi’a division.

Chapter 2, the ‘Literature Review’, critically evaluates the writings of the key scholars, who studied the Islamic movement in Sudan. The study compares and contrasts their different ways of analysing the same event and identifies the gaps in their work. Moreover, the study offers a new perspective from which to analyse the data. The chapter is divided into five sections that explain the important issues and concepts in the research.

Chapter 3, titled ‘Islamists and democracy’, is divided into five sections: the first and second cover the role of revivalists and how the movement was viewed by

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3 Such as Esposito, Tigani Abdalgadir, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Moussalli, Hasan Makki, or el-Affendi and others, they interviewed Turabi, and collected data, yet their research projects ended years ago, or were concerned with the issues current at that time. Therefore, in terms of data collection, there is now a good opportunity for more recent data that will be analysed from a different perspective; this represents an original contribution to knowledge.
governments. Section 3 deals with the theoretical approach of Islamists, while Section 4 critically evaluates Islamist experiments in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, which were chosen as case studies. Egypt witnessed an important experiment in its history, given that it is home to the main Ikhwan school, which spread its ideas all over the world. Moreover, it has long experience with dictatorial regimes, and has participated in the elections in Egypt many times and in different situations. The Islamic movement in Jordan has long experience as a moderate school of thought that has participated in different governments since the 1950s, and has been part of the democratic process in the last two decades. Tunisia is a unique experiment given the dictatorial nature of the last regime, yet the Islamic movement developed a comprehensive theoretical framework through its leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The research deals with each of these movements, how each of them developed its perspective on democracy, and how they practise it. The final section offers information about Salafi groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and democracy. This chapter is scene setting; it concentrates on comparison, and critically evaluates the theory and practice of the chosen Islamic movements. The chapter offers an opportunity for assessing the generalisability of research findings.

Chapter 4, the ‘Islamist experiment in Sudan 1989-2001’, critically evaluates the experiment of the Sudanese Islamic movement in the first decade of their government. The chapter is divided into five sections that evaluate the practice of the Islamist state in Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. Sections 1 and 2 investigate the preparation for the coup d’état and its objectives, and the empowerment plan. Section 3 illustrates how state institutions were built, including the constitution, political system or al-Tawali al-Siyasi, political consensus, and the economic institutions (Islamic banks and insurance companies). Section 4 covers the cultural (arts and music) sphere, education, justice, human rights and women’s participation, international relations, and the role of the society compared with the role of the state. Section 5 critically evaluates the human
rights’ record in Sudan during the period studied. This chapter evaluates the main question that needs to be answered with regard to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan, which is the gap between theory and practice.

Chapter 5, ‘Islamists in Sudan and International Relations’, is divided into two sections: the first evaluates how the Gulf War and the establishment of the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC) impacted on its relations with other countries. Moreover, it evaluates people’s diplomacy which was adopted by Islamists in Sudan. The second section investigates Sudan’s international relations, and foreign affairs principles, values and plan in the first decade (1989-2001). This covers Sudan’s relations with the United States (US) and European Union (EU), with the Horn of Africa, neighbouring and North African Countries, Asia, the Far East and China.

Chapter 6, titled ‘Islamists in Sudan and the State’, is divided into six sections, preceded by a theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s contribution to the questions of Islamists and the state, democracy, gender, and minorities. Section 1 critically evaluates the role of the state in Islamist political thought. Section 2 evaluates the role of society, Section 3 covers the distribution of wealth and power, and Section 4 deals with civil liberties and freedom of speech, elections, etc. Sections 5 and 6 evaluate the participation of women, ethnic minorities, and non-Muslims, no-party and multi-party systems, and international relations in an Islamic state. These are the issues that faced Islamists in Sudan and other countries. The chapter explores the theoretical frameworks proposed by Turabi and the important element of his theory compared to other revivalists in the second half of the last century, and the first decade of this century. It also reveals the foundations on which these scholars based their theories.

Chapter 7, or ‘Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory [unitarianism]’, is based on theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s philosophical contribution to the theory and how it related to
democracy or ‘Shura’ and the question of Islamists and the state, gender, and ethnic and religious minorities. It is divided into five sections. The first section examines and inspects the philosophical approach of the theory. The second section critically evaluates the concept (Tawhīd), which is the main pillar of the Tawhīdi theory. The third section is a critical evaluation of the pillars of the theory. The fourth section assesses Turabi’s democratic model, which deals with consultation and consensus, how he builds this model, and how it works. Section 5 concludes with a critical assessment of the whole theory, its concepts and other practical mechanisms, and how it is associated with all aspects of life. The principal conclusions and outcome of the critical evaluation of research are revealed in this conclusion. A summary of the results is presented, and points for further study discussion and research are suggested, along with other suggestions arising from the work.

Critical evaluation of the ideas and practice of Islamists in Sudan is the main work of the thesis. It critically assesses the Islamist exercise of governing on two levels. First, the practical level, focusing on the post-1989 experience and the extent that Shura is actually practised. This evaluation includes methodologies/mechanisms that have been implemented. Second, the theoretical level, evaluates Turabi’s discourse, which is related to this practice.

In conclusion, the research has a central focus on the Islamist movement in Sudan, which influenced and was influenced by Sudan’s socio-political conditions. It shapes and is shaped by Sudan’s local, regional, and international relations and complications, and indeed, inherited Sudan’s social, economic, and political complications.
Chapter 1: Historical Background

This chapter presents historical background on Sudan, in general, and the Islamic movement, in particular. It concentrates on crucial historical events, providing information to facilitate a deeper understanding of the Sudanese Islamic movement, and Turabi’s theories. The chapter is divided into six main sections, the first giving a brief introduction to Sudan, and its geography. Subsequently, a more detailed overview of the emergence and the historical development of the Sudanese Islamic movement is presented. The chapter focuses on the turning points that impacted on the theory and practice of the movement in Sudan throughout its history. The presentation includes the influence of Sudanese culture, tribal system and political history on the movement. It explores the different ways in which the Islamic movement has developed, and how it benefited from the domestic Sudanese environment.

Section 1. Geographic, Historical and Demographic Context

1.1 Sudan’s Historical and Geographical Context

Prior to 2011, Sudan was the largest country in Africa (after the separation of South Sudan, it is now the second largest after Algeria). Sudan is located in north-eastern Africa, bordered by nine countries, Egypt to the north, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south. The Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia, and the White Nile from Kenya and Uganda meet in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, and continue to Egypt as the River Nile. The country has extreme diversity in climate, soil, vegetation and natural resources, resulting in great potential for agriculture and energy, especially oil. Civil wars delayed the production of oil and the development of all other
fields, but the government is now able to concentrate on the development of these industries and activities due to the current peace processes.

The demographic situation of Sudan is complex, with a diverse population made up of different tribes, languages, religions and cultures, which all impact on the country’s history and future.

“... tribal identification and lineages classification that remains to date bed rock for Sudanese social structure. Sudanese people from family to tribe are still fond of preserving pedigrees and well attached to their traditions tribal based social setting” (Hamid, 1989, p.21).

This social structure is reflected in the political environment and structures in Sudan. In addition, the tribal system has significant influence on social and political culture, and axiomatically impacts on the religious schools, and the Sufi orders (*Tariqa*), with followers from different tribes and regions.

Consequently, this Sudanese context influences the thought processes, development, and ways of acting, nationally and internationally, of the Sudanese Islamic movement, including how it reacts to events and social change, and how it benefits from the nature of society.

Historically, Islam entered Sudan and was accepted voluntarily, after the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate. Tijani Abdalgadir Hamid argued that popular Islam that has no institutions represents strength, yet at the same time weakness (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.41). He asserts that the first rise of Islam was connected to the crusades against the Islamic world, and the long clash of civilisations over Palestine. Salah al-Dīn al-Ayyubi sent his brother, Toran Shah, to Sudan in 1269 (668 Hijri) (Abdalgadir, 1995, pp.41-42). Therefore, Sudan’s relations with the Islamic centres commenced with Egypt, Baghdad, al-Hijaz and Morocco. These relationships developed into social and economic associations that established Sudanese society, Sufi culture and social peace that continued for five centuries.
Before Turko-Egyptian rule, the Sudanese people did not constitute one nation. Indeed, the Sudan was divided politically into kingdoms ruled by sultans. The most important being the Sultans of al-Fonj in Eastern Sudan, Fur in the west, and the Nubians in the north (Amara, 2007, p.273).

The modern political history of Sudan during the past century can be divided into three main periods, namely Turko-Egyptian rule from February 1821, Anglo-Egyptian rule from 24 November 1899, and independence from January 1956. The first period began when the Ottoman Sultan’s Viceroy in Egypt, Mohammed Ali, entered Sudan in the early 1840s, and brought the northern region under his government. The Turko-Egyptian rule lasted for four decades, until the local Islamist, Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi, managed to end it in 1885. This revolution resulted in many changes in Sudanese social and political history. During this time, Sudan asserted significant social, political and economic power, and was later reflected in the country’s 20th century political life. Mahdi was “the leader of the revolution that united the Sudanese for the first time” (Amara, 2007, p.275). However, Mahdi was later defeated by British forces, and in 1899 an Anglo-Egyptian condominium was proclaimed over the entire Sudan. Half a century later, in December 1955, Britain and Egypt signed a formal agreement giving Sudan the right to self-determination, and the Sudanese Parliament proclaimed independence to take effect on 1 January 1956; both Britain and Egypt recognised Sudan’s new status (Hamid, 1989, p.46).

However, Abdalgadir (1995) asserts that the educational institutions prior to these periods did not build strong Islamic institutions in the political, economic, or military fields, which resulted in the aforementioned foreign intervention from 1821. Therefore, fundamentalists established small protest groups to stand against Sufi deviance, tribal leaders and foreign influence. In 1885, under Mahdi’s leadership, they led a revolution that drew the attention of Islamic and European countries.
However, this revolution faced many obstacles to its primary aim of ensuring an Islamic state. First, internally, Mahdism failed to transform the revolutionary forces into institutions to govern the state; moreover, some internal actors were supported by the British colonial process. Second, externally, the British interfered directly in Sudan in 1899, and became the only authority that organised society and established and governed a secular state. Axiomatically, the Sufi and religious leaders isolated themselves from public life, restricting themselves to Sufi practices in private.

It is well documented that the European colonisation process began rebuilding societies and states in Africa and Asia, according to the European experience, without considering local cultures and religions. In Sudan, the British replaced the traditional leaders with new cadres trained by them, mainly secular and Westernised. The impact was that Sudanese society became divided into many sections, which were diverse in both political and economic power resulting in different influences on the society.

1.2 The Ansar and Khatmiyyah: Sufis and political parties

The Ansar and Khatmiyyah⁴ are the two main Sufi orders in Sudan, and have influenced social and political life for the last century. The Khatmiyyah started as a Sufi group that came from Mecca and al-Taif in Hijaz, and became rooted in the Sudan. The Ansar started as a Sufi group, which developed into a Jihadist revolutionary movement, standing against secularism, imperialism and their local allies. This led to long conflict with the first Sufi group in Sudan, i.e. the ‘Khatmiyya’, which had aligned itself with the Turko-Egyptian (1821-1885) and the Anglo-Egyptian (1889-1956) rulers. These internecine struggles weakened the country, allowing it to fall to British colonial rule (1889-1956). The four trends, namely tribes, Sufi orders, societal divisions, and elites,

⁴ Sufi sector established by Mohammed Osman al-Merghani; this Tariga laid the bases in the south and west of the Arabian peninsula, and crossed into Sudan Egypt and Eretria.
influenced modern society in Sudan, and developed into the main political powers. Since both Ansar and Khatmiyyah were centres of political and social power for many decades, they still have sizeable followings in the country (al-Shahi, 1986, p.24). Many social, economic and political difficulties were created by this polarisation by the mid-1940s, the Mahdist-supporters (or Ansar) forming the Ummah party and its allies on the one hand, and an assortment of revivalist political groups united by support for some form of unity with Egypt on the other. The latter groups were backed by Khatmiyya, and the main party among them was the Ashiqqa party, led by Ismael al-Azhari, who was President of the Graduates Congress from 1942 (el-Affendi, 1991, p.36).

The family of al-Merghani (the Khatmiyya) inherited economic, social and political power. However, they did not have a vision of reforming and developing Sudan, politically or economically, and so could not formulate a drastic political programme to solve the social, economic or political problems in Sudan. On the other hand, the Ansar established the Ummah Party (UP), under the direction of ‘Abdurrahman al-Mahdi, whose sons later inherited the party. Al-Saddig al-Mahdi tried to change this, but faced his uncle, al-Hadi, over legal inheritance of the leadership. The leadership conflict, or what became known as the conflict of al-Imama (1966-1968) or conflict of political Imama, divided the party and weakened it.

These two Sufi groups and some secular elites controlled Sudanese politics for three decades or more (1954-1989) and participated in building Sudanese political culture. The Islamic movement also played some role during these three decades, and relied on the Sufi culture and traditional popular Islam to promote its pressure group or political party objectives (Mekki, 1999, p.204). Other Sufi groups, Tijania and al-Samania, also played a significant role in building the Sudanese personality, identity and culture. They were able to influence political values and political culture, which impacted on many events in Sudanese history and the thought, intellectual work and history of the Islamic
movement (Hamid, 1989, pp. 259-267; Mekki, 1999, pp.175-190). Compared to other Islamic movements in the region, it became more open, pragmatic, and moderate in its handling of religious and political issues.

The Islamic movement in Sudan has therefore been strongly influenced by these traditions, but significantly is not considered a Sufi movement. The Islamic movement in Sudan rejects mysticism, because Sufism, according to them, was not a part of the Prophet’s teaching in the early period of Islam (Niblock, 1991, p.254). I may say that the Islamist movement inherited some of the religious and educated people of the Ansar and Khatmiyya.

Section 2: Islamic Movement’s Historical Background

2.1 Establishment of the Islamic Movement in Sudan: 1946-1955

The Islamic movement in Sudan has experienced reform and renewal since its establishment in the late 1940s. It has always been characterised by independence, flexible organisation and adaptable fiqh (understanding); some scholars say it has a pragmatic method of work.

“This reflected in frequent constitutional changes, regular changes. Important turning points, the movement has reviewed its position and introduced structural and organisational changes in pace with changing times” (Hamdi, 1998, p.14).

The history of the Islamic movement in the Sudan is intrinsically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, four years after the decline of the Caliphate. El-Affendi states that:

“the focal institution that symbolised Muslim unity since the death of the Prophet in 632 CE was abolished in Turkey in 1924. This was a traumatic development for many Muslims, even though the Caliphate had by then become a purely symbolic institution” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.313).

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by a young charismatic school teacher, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in Ismailia. However, the first contact between the Brotherhood
movement in Egypt and the Sudanese was in 1937, as was stated by Hasan al-Banna; the first contact with the Sudanese was in Mohammed Osman el-Merghani’s mosque in Ismailia. In fact, it was individual contacts between Egyptian Muslim Brothers and some Sudanese. Hasan al-Banna, General Guide (al-Murshid al-‘Am) of the group (al-Jama’a), used to invite some Sudanese to meetings. This early stage of contact and membership impacted on the history of the Islamic movement. Some studies mentioned that the Sudanese Islamic movement was founded in 1944-45 (Mekki, 1998, p.3), while others claimed it was established in 1949.

However, while al-Ikhwan (Brotherhood) movement became an international movement, the Sudanese Islamic movement built its independent structural organisation. Yet, it was based on the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and other intellectual works of Egyptian Ikhwan and other movements, including Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan (Sayyid Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi) and other intellectuals, as mentioned later in this study.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, was banned in 1949, and its leader assassinated in February 1949 (it has been alleged that this was by government instigation). It was restored to legality following the military coup of July 1952, but soon fell into dispute with Egypt’s President, Jamal Abdul Nasser, and was banned again in 1955. However, the movement continued to expand and establish branches or offshoots in most other Arab countries and beyond.

The assassination of Hasan al-Banna in February 1949 was a turning point in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic movement in Sudan. His assassination encouraged the members to do more work for Da‘wah (propagation of the Islamic message) and increased the branches in Egypt and Sudan. Other major Islamist groups were influenced by this event, especially in Syria, Jordan and Iraq.
However, the emergence of the Islamic movement in Sudan was late compared to Syria and Palestine. Hasan Mekki asserts that “the British isolated Sudan from any Egyptian influence” (Mekki, 1982, p.11). However, Haydar Ibrahim Ali attributes this to

“the existence of traditional religious political parties which were close to peoples’ ‘traditional’ Islam and Sufism, these parties were very popular, so the Islamic movement never tried to face it at that time” (Ali, 2003, p.49).

The author asserts that, at that time, the movement did not introduce itself as a political party or group, as was done by Khatmiyyah and Ansar, but later it influenced their projects and recruited some of their followers.

2.1.1 The Islamic movement in Sudan: the three trends

*First:* the Egyptian trend, which started with the initial visit (1944-1945) by Egyptian lawyer, Salah Abdalsid and Jamal al-Din al-Sanhouri (a Sudanese who went to Egypt in the 1930s, and came back from Egypt to establish the first committee for Ikhwan). The next visit was made by Ibrahim al-Mofti, Badawi Mostafa and Ali Talballah, who were then followed by Awad Omer al-Imam. In 1946, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sent two members (‘Abdulhakim Abdin and Jamal al-Din al-Sanhouri), some of the members were already members of other parties, and all of them supported unity between Sudan and Egypt at that time. According to Hasan Mekki, the organisation was poor, and had no vision at that time, so they wasted most of their efforts (Mekki, 1982, pp.17-18).

The British noted the relation between Ikhwan in Egypt and Sudan, as both were opposed to the British colonisation, resulting in the first Ikhwan-led demonstration in Sudan in 1948. The British imposed sanctions on some of the main participants, including Mohammed Sadiq al-Karouri, Mohammed Nour, Mohammed Abdallah al-Zamzami, Abdaraziq al-Fadni and others who were involved; for example, they
deported Mohammed Aashour (Egyptian) back to Egypt, and Ali Talballah was jailed (Mekki, 1982, pp.17-18).

Second: the trend of Sudanese students in Egypt, which began with the first student Jamal al-Dīn al-Sanhouri, who joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Then Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid, Kamal Madani, Mohammed Ziyada Hamour and Jabr Abdarrahman became the first students who joined Sayyid Qutb’s assembly (Ali, 2003, p.54). When the group returned to Sudan, they started to contact students in secondary schools to disseminate their learning, but faced a conflict with the existence of “Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami” or the Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM), which is discussed below.

Under the influence of visiting Ikhwan activists from Egypt, the principal aim of this trend was to develop a Sudanese branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Whilst this group of Ikhwan found acceptance in the circles that favoured unity with Egypt, the movement later protested against such unity, because of Nasser’s stance towards Ikhwan in Egypt.

Third: the independent trend, known as Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami or ILM, was formed in response to the rise of the communist movement in schools and colleges. In 1949, in Hanotaub and Wadi Sayeidna secondary schools, it was suggested by Babikir Karrar and Mohammed Yousif to write a pamphlet under the name of Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM). They contacted Yousif Hasan Saied and al-Tayib Salih. They were influenced by the visit of Abdalhakeem Abdin and Jamal al-Dīn al-Sanhouri, but did not know anything about the Ikhwan organisation before that time (Mekki, 1982, pp.30-31). Therefore, it is clear that this movement emerged in the student community without

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5 The well-known writer and novelist, who worked at BBC Arabic in London in the 1970s-1980s; his famous novels are O’rs al-Zain, and the season of migration to the north, Domat wad Hamid. The first one was made as a film in the 1970s.
contact with the Ikhwan. One may argue that this is the reason why most sources claim that the Islamic movement in Sudan emerged in 1949.

El-Affendi argued that:

“... at first only Karrar was in contact with Talballah. But changes were taking place in Egypt, the effects of which were being felt in Sudan. The Wafdist government that replaced Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi’s anti-Ikhwan cabinet rehabilitated Ikhwan somewhat, and even the trials of Ikhwan cast them in a heroic light, revealing their contributions in the war in Palestine and their anti-British guerrilla activities in the Canal zone. Affiliation to Ikhwan thus became a source of pride, so that the ILM group no longer had to deny its relationship to Ikhwan. Banna’s rasail (messages) became an important part of members’ education in the Sudanese movement. Many students spent long nights making copies by hand, until some were learned by heart …” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.51).

This is evidence that whilst ILM had contact with the Ikhwan group it was only through Karrar, and was not denied by the members who followed Banna’s guidance. Consequently, the three elements of the ‘three trends’ notion are not completely independent from each other; el-Affendi criticised the notion and affirms that “... an atmosphere was created where the barriers between the various sectors of the movement no longer existed”. Many of those who joined ILM in this phase did not even hear about its original name, but considered themselves to be a part of Ikhwan, which brought the group closer to other strands of Ikhwan. Consequently, ILM members acted in coordination with the wider Ikhwan movement, especially since college students were in a better position to carry out the task of education and indoctrination of ordinary members. The college itself was a centre for Ikhwan cultural activities (el-Affendi, 1991, p.51), which is further evidence of the close coordination between the different strands of the Islamic movement.

Another point raised by el-Affendi confirms that these strands were not independent from each other:

“... in addition the majority of adherents remained students since the movement had not by that time made much headway outside student circles. The gradual and informal integration was assisted by the fact that ILM itself was amorphous, having no well-defined leadership. There appeared to have been little concern
about structures or leadership and more concern about the general and wider goals …” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.52).

These views were supported by Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir’s statement:

“… there was no direct connection between the establishment of ILM among the students in Khartoum and the Ikhwan movement in Egypt and even in Sudan; these students did not know about Ikhwan in Egypt. But after the activities extended to secondary school, a section for external relations was established, and connection with Ikhwan in Sudan started, then it extended to Egyptian Ikhwan; these connections were enhanced by the migration of some of the students to study in Egypt” (Abdalgadir, 1999, p.66-67).

In 1952, a delegation from the Egyptian Ikhwan led by Abdalbade’e Saqr, suggested that Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM) join the Ikhwan movement in Egypt. But the suggestion was rejected by Yousif Hasan Saeed, who pointed out that if they did not have a Sudanese movement distinct from Egyptian Ikhwan, then the movement would lose many of its supporters. Consequently, they chose not to join Egypt’s Ikhwan. According to what was mentioned previously, this did not mean that they were completely different from the other elements of the three trends, or that they would not cooperate with them.

However, the emerging movement was facing its first conflict. An internal conflict about the character of the movement, its goal and methods. In 1952, Karrar temporarily deserted the movement in protest against too close an identification with the Egyptian Ikhwan (el-Affendi, 1991, p.52).

The next year, in 1953, Babikir Karrar called for a meeting attended by 40 of the members (his followers). El-Affendi described it as a ‘coup’, as these members wanted to be distinct as Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami (ILM) from Ikhwan. However, in the end a compromise was reached until a general conference could be called to resolve the issue.

At that time, there were three groups (Mekki, 1982, pp.38-42):

1. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood: abbr. Ikhwan), its leader was Ali Talballah, it counted itself as a branch of Ikhwan in Egypt.
2. *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami* (ILM), a group that called for independence, authenticity, and the need to play a political role.

3. a group that called for borrowing the Egyptian Ikhwan experiment, whilst retaining some independence and concentrating on individual education.

In order to solve the problem of these three groups, the movement held its first conference, as described by Mekki.

> “Thus, the university student independent movement emerged, it was connected in concepts and ideas to Egyptian Ikhwan; it was moderate between the extreme of Babikir Karrar and inexpertise of Ali Talballah, this trend found a chance to grow up till these days” (Mekki, 1982, p.49).

I may say these three groups at the end had established the main stream of the movement that did not belong to any one group but inherited members of all three groups and benefited from the groups’ experience.

**2.2 Eid Conference 1954**

This conference, the ‘Eid Conference’, was held on 21 August 1954 in Omdurman Cultural Club; students, *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Islami* (ILM), and the people’s trend were invited. The Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood organisation was established during the conference, which would give the mainstream modern Islamic movement its shape.

The importance of this conference is that the name of the movement, ‘Ikhwan’, was adopted. They agreed that they should remain faithful to the same ideological principles, but, in terms of organisation, remain independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. They raised the issue of an Islamic constitution, and chose to work for *Da‘wah*, as a non-secret movement. It was clear that they tried to draw up the objectives of the movement, and concluded they were primarily concerned with explaining Islam

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6 It was known as the Eid Conference, because it was held in the second day of Eid al-Adhha (sacrifice Eid).

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to the people. It has since been known as *Nashr al-Da’wah*, which means propagation of the message; in fact this term is borrowed from the Egyptian experience. Turabi believes that this term did not reflect the true nature of this practice, which consisted mainly of recruiting individuals through personal contact, which in no way included public propagation of any message on a mass scale as the term implied (Turabi, 2008, p.31). Ali Talballah boycotted the conference, and ignored its resolutions. The conference elected new leaders, and Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir was elected as Secretary-General.

Moreover, other key objectives of the movement were agreed, i.e. liberating Sudan politically, economically, and socially, and building the society on the principles of Islam, participating in building Muslim society, developing national wealth, and achieving social justice. Another important decision was the intention to build an Islamic government that applies the teachings of Islam in ‘ruling’ public life. It was clear that these were broad ideas, and they did not know how to set out the details and build practical projects, and how to realise these practically.

Finally, the Secretary-General, Mohammed Khair Abdalgadir, was elected. However, Abdalgadir’s period in leadership continued to be a turbulent one. Even though only a tiny group supported either of the dissident factions, Abdalgadir was forced to resign within one year, after suffering harassment from Talballah, who kept up a relentless campaign of protest against the resolutions of the Eid congress. He was succeeded by Babikir Karrar (el-Affendi, 1991, p.53).

However, by announcing these resolutions, the movement had finished building its administrative body, achieved its unity, adopted the name of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Muslim Brotherhood), and decided that the movement should adopt an educational method (*Tarbiyyah*) with a comprehensive message of Islamic reform. The movement
inherited the Islamic activities and activism in the universities and schools but, at that time, it played a very limited political and social role.

The 1954 conference was drastic in many ways; most radicals in ILM, headed by Babikir Karrar, Abdalla Zakariyya, Merghani al-Nasri and Nasir al-Sayyid, left the organisation in protest against the adoption of the Ikhwan name. They formed their own group, “al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya”, which ended up as the Islamic Socialist Party (ISP) after the October revolution. ISP never gained roots in Sudan, though, surprisingly, it attracted the attention of Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, when he launched a successful military coup in 1969 (Hamid, 1989, p.100). Hasan Mekki asserts that Babikir Karrar, Abdalla Zakariyyah and Nasir al-Sayyid had a strong relationship with Qaddafi, and it was proved that they influenced his thought. He mentioned that Nasir al-Sayyid told him that he translated some chapters of “the Green Book”\(^7\) into the English language (Mekki, 1998, pp.121-124). Yet others think that they participated in drafting the “Green Book”. Abdalla Zakariyyah participated in the conferences on the political system, following the 1989 coup, with the same socialist ideas.

It could be concluded that, during this conference, the unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood organisation was established and the Ikhwan name was adopted; the mainstream modern Islamic movement thereby took its shape. They have remained faithful to the same ideological principles but, in terms of organisation, have remained independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

\(^7\) A book written by the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, first published in 1975, outlining his views on democracy and his political philosophy, which consists of three parts: The Solution of the Problem of Democracy, 'The Authority of the People'; The Solution of the Economic Problem: 'Socialism' and The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory.
2.3 The Movement Organisation and Ideology

During this period the movement was largely dependent on outside groups in its ideology and organisational model. The literature circulated to members consisted of the works produced by the Egyptian Ikhwan or the writing of Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A’la al-Mawdudi, the leader of Jama’a Islami in Pakistan. The simple organisational forms adopted were identical to those of the Egyptian Ikhwan (Turabi, 2008, p.31). At this stage, the basic organisational unit was the cell (Usra), but had limited functions. The group of cells in each defined area formed a branch (Shu’ba). The role of these cells and the members of the movement was to recruit new members and to run educational programmes for members. The nature of these activities was secret and closed. Turabi (2008, p.32) attributes this secrecy to two reasons.

- First: the closed nature of these programmes and the secrecy surrounding them was due to the alien origin of the new movement, and the unusual content of its message with regard to the Sudanese environment.

- Second: it was inspired by security worries, associated with the revival of the communist movement in consciousness of the experience of the Ikhwan in Egypt.

However, there was limited participation in public life at this stage.

“In public life, the movement adopted a stance only on limited number of issues, mostly issues of direct concern to it. For example, they supported the Egyptian Ikhwan against persecution by Nasser’s regime, and supported the 1953 agreement between the Egyptian government and the major Sudanese parties on self-determination. This agreement, which paved the way for independence, was strongly opposed by the communists” (Turabi, 2008, p.32).

The researcher argues that a limited role was natural for the movement at that time for it still needed to resolve its internal issues, for example its leadership was primitive in structure and incapable of responding effectively to issues or problems.
Section 3. Emergence of Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) 1956-1959

3.1 The establishment of the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC)

The new united movement expanded, forming branches all over the country. In this period, the pioneers of the student Islamic movement started to graduate and take their place in the society. Consequently, they were leading the people to join the movement. This period also witnessed the movement’s first recourse to mass communication, such as newspapers, rallies, public speeches, and general involvement in wider political debate; representing a turning point in the history of Sudan. Additionally, there was competition between the political parties, and different ideologies and leaders as discussed by Turabi.

“With independence in 1956, groups of educated elite entrenched themselves in positions of power and the country witnessed a period of intense political struggle in a democratic set-up, where the issue of liberation and the determination of the country’s foreign relations were debated” (Turabi, 2008, p.33).

The overriding issue was self-determination or the search for national identity. Turabi asserts that the major currents were either those in favour of an authentic national and political identity (expressed in union with Egypt or independently), or those favouring a new identity, “modelled after East or West” (Turabi, 2008, p.30). Axiomatically, the postures of each of the parties or groups had their impact on Sudan’s future foreign relationships, especially with Egypt. Moreover, they continue to affect the relationship between Egypt and each of the main political parties in Sudan, to the present day.

By late 1955, with the internal structures and procedures in place, and under the leadership of al-Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr, who had earlier shown a good grasp of political issues and a thirst for direct action, the Sudan Ikhwan moved to put some of their programmes into practice (el-Affendi, 1991, p.57). In this stage, the new leader of the movement reduced the Egyptian direct role. Many reasons lay behind this decision.
First, the movement started to transform its objectives into political objectives, so as to get ready to shift to an active political party. Second, the extreme dislike of Nasser towards Ikhwan for supporting the independence of Sudan, and not unity with Egypt. This meant that Ikhwan in the Sudan had changed their opinion towards unity with Egypt, based on Nasser’s policies towards Ikhwan in Egypt.

El-Affendi argued that:

“… in that period three major influences were shaping the movement’s perspectives: its anti-communism, its opposition to Nasser, and its ultimate goal of setting up an Islamic order” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.57).

There was significant development in the objectives and programmes of the movement at this stage including its call for an Islamic constitution. The movement mobilised other parties and individuals to support the idea. It was the first recourse to the method of mass communication.

However, after Sudan’s independence in 1956, there were proposals for the constitution, but it was a temporary constitution. The Ikhwan established the IFC, which was the first political umbrella for the movement in Sudan, and many Islamic groups joined it (the Islamic Charity Association in Khartoum, Jam‘iyyat al-Muhafaza ‘ala al-Qur’an in Omdurman and Shambat, and the Islamic cultural club Khartoum North, etc.) (Sheikoon, 2002, p.236). In the field of media, the Ikhwan newspaper was issued in June 1956, under the supervision of Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid, then al-Manar magazine issued by the Muslim sister’s branch, then the student Muslim sisters (Karrar, 1998, pp.150-151). In this phase:

“the movement was also pushed to develop its educational (Tarbiyyah) and recruitment functions to reflect its new role as a pressure group, and a movement for mass mobilisation. For this purpose, the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) was set up as a front for the movement, and also widen its appeal. The slogan of the Islamic constitution served as a mobilising call, while the movement maintained a strong popular campaign, which did not seek to transcend the existing parties, but attempted to pressurise and embarrass them into responding to its demands” (Turabi, 2008, p.33).
It was clear that, at this stage, the movement could not do more than a successful pressure group because it was still weak (most of its members were students or newly graduated). Moreover, it had no clear vision for the role of the movement and it was not a political party yet. In addition, the two traditional parties dominated most of the Sudanese scene. Later, the issue of whether the movement wanted to be a pressure group or a party seeking power was raised, and the movement defined itself not as a pressure group.

Hasan Mekki concluded the strategic plan for IFC in two points.

- **First**: to mobilise public opinion in different legal ways and means to call for an Islamic constitution.
- **Second**: to contact all organisations, leaders and individuals to support the IFC to call for the Islamic constitution (Mekki, 1982, p.74). The IFC succeeded in mobilising most of the elite leaders, organisations, and public opinion to support its objectives.


### 3.2 The Development of the Movement during Abboud’s Regime 1959-1964

This was the period of the first military coup in Sudan in November 1958, i.e. the: “first military dictatorship under General Ibrahim Abboud. The junta maintained a moderately conservative policy and did not apply excessive repression. The approach of the military was to some extent political, and they concentrated on development and pragmatic administration, making as little revolutionary or doctrinaire claims as possible” (Turabi, 2008, p.34).

Turabi asserts that it was an overreaction when the movement was pushed underground by itself. This was caused by comparison with the Egyptian example, as it faced little or
no oppression, and this excessive caution threatened to stifle it. The Abboud regime did not start attacking the movement, but the experience of the Egyptian movement with Nasser’s regime was one of the factors that pushed the movement to take this decision. However, the student wing rejected this approach, and carried on their activities in universities and schools; it continued to agitate incessantly and openly against the regime. This was the period of fast development of the student section of the movement. I think this happened because the student wing found a good chance to express its views among students in different issues, and so recruited many members. Some student leaders graduated, and supervised the work, and so most of the resources of the movement were directed to the active wing (student wing). Outside universities and colleges, activities were restricted to cultural activities. I believe that these cultural activities raised the awareness of the members of the movement to the importance of social and cultural activities as a way of direct communication and development of communities. This is why the movement succeeded in building different organisations in different fields in the future, and have expertise in the fields of youth, mothers and family, children, charities, education, and Da’wah.

In 1962, another conference was held in al-Elafoun (known as al-Elafoun Conference), where the movement’s 1954 constitution was modified, and Turabi was elected Secretary-General for the movement, and other leaders were elected with him.

“The period of stagnation caused the movement to be inward-looking, and provoked instances of self-examination and self-questioning. For the first time, a serious and systematic debate was organised around several issues. The issue of leadership was discussed, leading to a move towards collective leadership after criticisms of the style of the earlier leadership” (Turabi, 2008, p.34).

This was a significant step in the movement, by changing the style of leadership and electing collective leaders for the movement. This meant it practised Shura for the first time. Other questions were raised about the education, ‘Tarbiyyah’, the movement offered, its quality, aims and whether the Usra was an ideal vehicle for it. The nature of
the movement was also discussed, and the people asked if the movement wanted to be a pressure group or a party seeking power. Relations with other political forces were also discussed. In the end, these debates led to a revision of the movement’s constitution to incorporate the new suggestions agreed (Turabi, 2008, p.34). Turabi supported the idea of being a pressure group. I believe that these were the first steps in thinking systematically about the vision of the movement; members started to think critically about developing the movement structure, its role and objectives. The questions raised were core questions, and the answer to these questions led the movement to new roles and objectives.

Ten years later, after the first conference in 1954, “in 1964, the movement established a political organisation, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), which soon became a significant political force with proper diversified functions” (Hamdi, 1998, pp.14-15). The ICF included many Islamic groups, and was kept away from the main body of the movement, although the movement guided it. The ICF participated in the National Front that led the resistance against the Abboud regime.


This period in the history of Sudan witnessed significant changes, internally, regionally and internationally. The 1964 October Revolution toppled the Abboud regime, in which the movement played an essential role and led the masses. Regionally, the defeat of Egypt by Israel on 9 June 1967 was a significant event. These two events shaped most of the events in this period. Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoob, Prime Minister at that time, declared war on Israel. Following al-Mahjoob, Turabi announced freezing disagreements with Egypt, and mobilising all forces in the war to liberate Palestine (Mekki, 1999, p.22). Sudan’s government led a coalition to support Egypt, which
resulted in the Arab summit conference of 29 August 1967 in Khartoum. In the same year, a group within the army started their activities, and were able to come to power in a coup in May 1969.

“This phase which started with the October 1964 revolution in which the movement had taken the initiative, a factor which gave it confidence and momentum, this was the era of extended freedoms which opened the door wide for political debate and competition” (Turabi, 2008, p.35).

Turabi considered this an era of extensive popular mobilisation, which shook the traditional parties and posed the political issues in a radical fashion, transcending the tradition-bound styles of the older politicians, who were keen to perpetuate the system inherited from the colonial era.

“With the impetus gained from the revolutionary fervour and achievements, the movement moved ahead to develop its earlier plans for a broad Islamic front. Not content with spontaneous and erratic mobilisation of the masses, it decided that time has come for it to be the focus of an organised mass movement. For this end, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was established around a written charter produced by the movement and bringing together a number of individuals and groups in a unified political party. But the movement reserved for itself certain independence vis-à-vis the mass party it created” (Turabi, 2008, p.35-36).

Therefore on 16 December 1964, less than two months after the revolution, the ICF was established: “the movement established a political organisation called the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), which soon became a significant political force with proper diversified functions” (Hamdi, 1989, pp.14-15). “The main difference from its former structure was its enhanced and improved organisation and openness towards other political groups” (Hamdi, 1998, p.17-18). However, it is clear that the movement chose broad fronts (1955 and 1965) in all its phases, especially on national agendas. The establishment of these two fronts led to division in the movement between idealistic and pragmatic members. In the period 1965-1969, the ICF grew as a pressure group, campaigning for an Islamic constitution in Sudan. It presented a moderate draft of an Islamic constitution in 1969, which required defining Sudan as an Islamic state. Shari'a
should be the source of law, and any laws contradicting the Shari’a should not be applied, etc. (Shingiti, 2001, p.72). Both the Ansar and Khatmiyyah sects were supportive. However, the proposed constitutional changes where pre-empted by the military coup by Nimeiri and the Communist party in 1969.

Turabi believes that the leading role of the modern sector in the country’s affairs was enhanced by the role of the students in lighting the spark of the revolution. Equally important was the role of the trade unions, which responded to the student initiative by organising a political strike and demonstrations. An experience of the leading role in the revolution had increased the confidence of the movement. Consequently, the movement went on to establish other groups to act as a focus for mass action for the main sectors in the society, i.e. youth and women, in the form of the National Youth Organisation, the National Women’s Front and other trade union organisations. These organisations were mainly national organisations that played a social and political role, and acted as fronts for the movement’s activities.

Establishing these organisations in this period had an impact on the development of the movement on two aspects. First: the organisational aspect, where the movement began to establish a quasi-federal system to play different roles in different fields. I think it carried on using the same method to build the movement in the future. Second: the theoretical, where I believe that these organisations were supported by leaders who developed ideas, fiqh (understanding) and practice. On these ideas and fiqh, many organisations were built in the social, economic, development, and educational fields during the life of the movement. Moreover, it practically trained more members as cadres in different fields.
Section 5. May Coup

5.1 The Ideology of the Coup

The military coup of 25 May 1969 was the second coup in the history of Sudan. It was supported by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP). However, there were internal and external factors that played different roles in the success of the coup.

Hasan Mekki argues that Nasser was not happy with the Sudanese government, because it was calling for independence rather than unity with Egypt. He was also not happy with the Islamic trend, and the Ummah party. He therefore started thinking of gaining power over Sudan, and relieving himself of the three things that bothered him (democracy, Islam, and the Ummah party). Hasan Mekki affirms that Nasser supported the coup of the Nasserists, and leftists in coalition with the communists. Mekki considers the coup to have been under the direct supervision of Egyptian agents. He reasons that Nasser wanted to build a strong defensive front around Egypt in Sudan and Libya.

The 25 May 1969 coup led by Jaffer Mohammed Nimeiri was supported by the Communist party, Arab Nationalists (Nasserists), and democrats who wanted to establish a socialist system. The revolution was influenced by that of July 1952 in Egypt, and by the ideas of Nasser. They were also eager to eradicate Islam in its new forms, as a movement, and a political and intellectual orientation.

“Nimeiri did his utmost to stifle the Islamic movement, muzzling it and imprisoning its activists. Even after his erstwhile supporters, the communists, unsuccessfully tried to topple him in July 1971, leading him to adopt an anti-communist stance, he still continued to bear a grudge against the Islamic movement” (Turabi, 2008, p.38).

Nimeiri went on to establish a one-party state, maintaining a monopoly over political organisation, political activism and state organs. In January 1972, the first conference was held to establish the Sudanese Socialist Union Party (SSUP) (al-Itihad al-Ishtiraki)
to put the principles of the constitution of the Sudan (al-Booni, 1995, p.32-33). The SSUP was developed, and even the opposition parties joined it after 1976.

For the Ikhwan, however, the coup was clearly leftist, and supported by the Communist party. So they started resistance from the very first day, although Sadiq al-Mahdi tried to dissuade them, saying that Nimeiri is one of our sons, i.e. he is from an Ansar family. However, the Ikhwan resistance continued in alliance with the Ansar (Mahdists). They started military training for the Ansar in Aba Island, where hundreds of Ansar and Ikhwan were killed by Nimeiri in 1970, among them Mohammed Salih Omer and al-Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi. They were killed while they were leading the armed uprising against Nimeiri’s rule.

With Turabi and Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid in prison, and Jaffar Sheikh Idris and Osman Khalid in exile, the Ikhwan membership was left to backbenchers and young university graduates. Under this leadership (1969-1972), the Ikhwan were preoccupied with the question of survival rather than theory (Hamid, 1989, p.108). They soon controlled many of the student unions in schools and universities, and used these as a tool of resistance to the regime; students led the Sha’ban Revolution in 1973. Then Ikhwan and Ansar prepared for another military assault on the regime, launched from Libya, in 1976. However, none of these actions were successful.

“As a result, the Ikhwan revised their course of action. They shifted from opposing the regime to joining it and, when the older generation was released from prisons in 1977, Turabi’s way of operating, through manoeuvring and reconciliation, was already in progress. In the first meeting of Shura, Turabi was elected Secretary General, and the Musálaha (reconciliation) initiative was confirmed” (Hamid, 1989, p.108).

The reconciliation led to other divisions in the movement, as some Ikhwan did not agree to participate in Nimeiri’s regime; Jaffer Sheikh Idris and Sadiq Abdalla Abdalmajid refused to participate in constitution committees after being chosen by Turabi to
represent the movement. Under Turabi, Ikhwan worked within Nimeiri’s SSUP, and tried to inject their programmes, objectives and their Islamic model into it.

After the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime in 1977, Ikhwan resorted to a strategy of institutional Islamisation. This strategy had been based on forming autonomous cultural, economic and youth organisations, which offered direct services to the masses, as well as penetrating government institutions, influencing them so as not to adopt an anti-Islamic programme (Hamid, 1998, p.276). This experiment was not completely successful, but it was useful.

On the other hand, Tijani Abdalgadir argued that the experiment of penetration was very useful to the Ikhwan. It gave its leaders and followers a great opportunity to appreciate for themselves the distance between rhetoric and reality, how modern state bureaucracy is complicated, and how Sudanese politics and economics really are.

In addition, the Ikhwan succeeded in turning into a mass movement, which established important organisations, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamiyya, al-Wakala al-Islamiyya, Jam’iyyat al-Islah wa al-Muwasa, Jam’iyyat Ra’idat al-Nahda, Shabab al-Bina’, etc. (Mekki, 1999, p.123). Moreover, the movement established Islamic economic institutions, such as banks and companies. It mobilised the masses, and recruited more students, who were elected and led the student unions. They participated in state institutions as ministers and parliament members, and in the political party. The Islamic movement in this period adopted a federal system, and established new branches in the different regions of Sudan, and internationally in Europe, the United States, and supported Arab Islamic movements. They succeeded in weakening the secular Western influence.

In September 1983, Nimeiri surprised the Ikhwan by announcing and applying Shari’a law in Sudan. The Ikhwan supported his programme and led the masses to support the
programme. They called for a rally, and about two million people are claimed to have participated (some observers disagree with the estimated number). This aroused Nimeiri’s suspicions; he feared the power behind it, so he started to expel the Ikhwan from the government.

Sadiq al-Mahdi did not welcome these laws, and was jailed by Nimeiri’s authority. A new era of international pressure started, politically, militarily and through the media. Many internal and external incidents took place in that period. A drought struck western Sudan, and there were economic crises, so the student unions and trade unions began to strike, and the war in the south started. The United States and Egypt were not happy with Shari’a, so they pressured Nimeiri and asked him to dismantle the Islamic institutions and repeal Shari’a law.

Bowing to these pressures, on 10 March 1985, Nimeiri jailed most of the Ikhwan leaders. However, on 6 April 1985, with a wave of popular protests and civil disobedience sweeping the country, Nimeiri reached Cairo from the United States. Yet that same day, Army chief, ‘Abdurrahman Suwar al-Dahab, announced that the army had taken power as an institution, and announced their desire to act as a neutral arbiter.

5.2 National Islamic Front (NIF)

After this change, the movement thought of a new formula to suit the new democratic process. They proposed a formula that gathers all trends in one organisation that supported the Islamic programme. This was at the start of the transitional period, from May 1985 to April 1986. This was the movement’s moment of maturity, and reflected the advantage Ikhwan gained from their pragmatic strategy of cooperation with Nimeiri, and their successful mass mobilisation in that period. El-Affendi thinks that it represented the ultimate triumph of the pragmatist line advocated by Turabi since 1962,
and some of its rewards, while at the same time revealing the limitations of pragmatism (el-Affendi, 1991, p.131).

In May 1985:

“[t]he Islamist trend crystallised within the National Islamic Front (NIF), which was officially founded in a congress attended by some 3,000 delegates. The grouping was in effect a new name given to the broad alliance Ikhwan were busy forging during the later part of Nimeiri’s era. NIF, besides Ikhwan, the first congress included Sufis and Ulama, and supporters of the Shari‘a, tribal leaders and ex-army officers. There was also a significant presence of women and youth formulations, which Ikhwan had developed earlier. In addition, some 140 delegates represented southern Muslim groups” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.136).

NIF represented a new coalition between the Islamic movement and part of the society.

For Turabi and other observers, it was a number of tribal and popular figures who undertook to protect and preserve the achievement of the movement against the campaign by secular political parties and power groups to totally eradicate the Islamic legacy of Nimeiri’s regime.

Establishing NIF was a major turning point for the movement; in fact it was launched as a political party that emerged as the third largest bloc in parliament in 1986. According to Turabi, the NIF “was an advanced stage in the development of the Islamic movement … from a simple group to an integrated social organisation and from religious faction to a state institution” (Hamdi, 1998, p.6). Therefore, the NIF inherited all functions of the movement, unlike the 1964 Charter Front, which was no more than a political front reflecting the decision taken by other sections of the movement.

Turabi argued that this, finally, was the era when the theoretical foundations were laid down, and programmes were detailed for public action in such areas as public policy, external relations, security, the economy and the legal system. The movement was thus ideologically transformed from the level of slogan, principles and propagation to the level of actual programmes, practical suggestions, and detailed models applicable to the given reality (Turabi, 2008, p.44).
In the 1986 election, the progress achieved by the NIF was undeniable. The movement progressed from being a small group having five seats in the parliament, to a powerful third party with fifty-one seats, and 18.46% of the popular vote. Its powerful and skilled parliamentary members dictated the agenda for national debate. The “NIF leaders have argued that their gains, which occurred mainly within urban areas and among the educated, means that theirs was the ‘party of the future’” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.142). The NIF had now experienced practising democracy within the movement and within the state. From 1986 to 1989, the NIF participated in the government.

The result of the election did not allow any of the political parties to form a government by itself; the Ummah party gained 105 seats, the Democratic Unity Party (DUP) 63 seats, and 51 for NIF. Ikhwan knew from experience that gaining a foothold in government was vital to increase their influence.

Ikhwan’s relations with Sadiq al-Mahdi, who emerged as potential prime minister, were at a low ebb, because NIF and Ummah had exchanged bitter attacks during the election campaign. However, NIF signed a secret deal with DUP, in which it was agreed that neither party would accept an offer to join the coalition with the Ummah separately. However, Mahdi managed to woo DUP with favourable offers, and the latter reneged on its pledge to NIF, which was left to lead the opposition (el-Affendi, 1991, p.143). NIF was not able to join the coalition for many reasons relating to the two big traditional parties, Ummah and DUP. Some argued that this was because the other political parties rejected the participation of NIF in government. Sadiq al-Mahdi experienced pressure, and announced that he opposed the NIF because it still supported the existence of September laws (Shari’a law). Moreover, the Islamic programme or al-Sahwa programme adopted by the Ummah party rejected the September laws. In addition, the competition between the two traditional parties was over government posts, and so they
refused to let the NIF join them. Furthermore, the southern parties rejected the participation of NIF, because it supported Shari’a (Jadain, 1997, pp.109-121).

The NIF in that period, 1988, focused on, and succeeded in passing, Islamic law through the parliament. In November, the DUP signed an agreement with John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which became known as the Merghani-Garang agreement. This agreement froze any Islamic laws, and was opposed by the NIF. The effective opposition tactics employed by NIF increased its prestige and popularity considerably. For this reason, some leading figures opposed joining the government, although Turabi and others thought it better to join the government. His argument for joining was that the democratic system was too fragile, and too effective an opposition was likely to cause its collapse (el-Affendi, 1991, p.143). After initial opposition, for the second time, the NIF agreed to join the government in January 1989, with a power-sharing agreement of Ummah (12 ministries) and NIF (7 ministries), National Party and southern Parties (5 ministries). A memorandum was issued by the army, which was interpreted as opposing the participation of the NIF. The DUP, Ummah party and others formulated a new government, while the NIF led an extensive campaign against it. In June 1989, the NIF led a coup that ended the third democratic period in Sudan.

The NIF experienced great changes, in practice and in theory. It faced different challenges, both internally and externally. Internally, it practised Shura in its federal body and organisations. Externally, it examined its efficiency in ruling, and tried to practise what it called for. These experiences made them realise the difficulty of applying goals and objectives under internal and external pressure. Moreover, they understood that broad objectives need to be translated into practical projects. At the end, while the NIF was in the opposition, the Ikhwan were preparing for the coup. This
means they benefited from the situation in opposition, and while they were in the
government.

For international relations, as is mentioned in the relevant section, there was huge
expansion in international relations with governments and Islamic movements.

**Section 6. The Movement and International Relations**

**6.1 Historical Context**

Historically, the Sudanese Islamic Movement was influenced by changes in Sudan and
neighbouring countries, as well as wider regional and international factors. As was
mentioned before, Sudan’s history has had an impact on the movement’s development.
Mohammed Khier Abdalgadir mentioned in his study that the Islamic Movement in
Sudan was established and developed as a result of the interaction of the history and
influence of the colonial period. It had connections with the renewal movements in the
19th century, such as Mohammed Ibn Abdelwahab, Ahmed Ibn Idris and al-Senussiyyah
in Libya, Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani and Mohammed ‘Abdu and the Mahdi revolution. He
added it was influenced by the Jihad in Palestine, and the oppression of Ikhwan in
Egypt (Abdalgadir, 1990, pp.10-12). I think this history was created by Sudanese
culture, and its way of practising Islam; providing a distinct Sudanese mood to relations
with neighbouring countries, friends and enemies.

It is obvious that the establishment of the movement and its relations with Egyptian
Ikhwan allowed the movement to inherit pan-Islamist tendencies in ideology and
relations. However, the movement was established independently from the Egyptian
Ikhwan, and does not believe in the one global organisation, as adopted by the Egyptian
Ikhwan.
“Fellow-Muslims living in alien countries have to be supported, albeit never in contravention of any treaty obligation … The Islamic movement, already emancipated from nationalist ideology, was interacting more intensively across the world” (Turabi, April 1992).

Turabi many times emphasised the universal scope of Islam, both in his religious deliberations and in his political discourses. On top of that, he defines the concept of international relations, stating that:

“Islam is the religion transcending all geographic boundaries … Muslims must continuously strive to extend Islam in space, and disengage it from territorial or parochial confinement, towards a universal scope … final loyalty must be rendered to the Ummah [i.e.] the whole community of Muslims” (Turabi, 1992, p.49).

According to this ideal concept, the Ikhwan in Sudan contacted many Islamic movements and Muslim societies without distinction on the basis of school of thought (Madhab), method (Tariqah), or group (Firqa). They also contacted other religious people, even if they were not Muslims, because they call for the same values. They established relations with other nations, such as China. These broad relations reflect the flexibility and moderate way of thinking of the movement in Sudan.

6.2 Relations with other Movements

The movement in the Sudan had established its own way of dealing with other movements. It decided in the Eid conference to be an independent movement, and sought autonomy at an early stage. Although the movement seeks unity with other Islamic movements, they understand that this unity does not require a unified leadership. In the beginning, the primary aim for the Islamic movement was to work towards the establishment of an Islamic order within Sudan. However, although it was independent from the Egyptian movement, they supported Ikhwan through the media, and demonstrations in Sudan during their crisis with Nasser; “the Sudanese movement
supported Egyptian Ikhwan, many refugees finding sanctuary in Sudan” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145). So these crises enhanced ties between the two groups.

“Sudanese Ikhwan participated in attempts to set up a pan-Arab Ikhwan movement. The Sudanese later resisted a move to create a unified movement. A joint council established in Jeddah in 1961, operated until early 1969, but the Sudanese (supported by Iraqis) refused to accept its authority” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145).

I believe that the Sudanese movement thought of a cooperative body that deals with strategic issues that face the nation, but not an authoritative one. It is mentioned by el-Affendi that the only major operation the joint council undertook was the setting up of a military training camp in Jordan, but this folded in September 1970 to avoid embroilment in the Black September clashes between Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO).

The Sudanese Movement always advocated having a loose grouping of all Islamic movements, even non-Arab Islamic movements in countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Turkey. At that time, when they made a move towards these goals, they were faced by strong opposition from the pan-Arab Ikhwan leadership.

“Turabi was accused of sowing division, which brought out the struggle over the leadership of the pan-Islamic movement; [the] Egyptian Ikhwan claimed leadership as historical prerogative, whereas the Sudanese, seeing themselves as the most powerful and intellectually-advanced movement in the Islamic world, claimed leadership by merit, each wanting to model the new pan-Islamic grouping after its own image” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145).

The idea for this cooperative body was developed by the Sudanese Islamic Movement in 1992, while it was in power. So it established the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC). The conference was joined by most Islamic movements all over the world (including non-Arab), Arab nationalists and other activists. Because of the PAIC, the Sudanese government (and movement) faced regional and international pressure, so it folded in 1995, after two large gatherings in Khartoum. I believe this PAIC organisation
is one of the idealistic ways of thought that was put into practice without any real calculations of the political cost that they will pay.

However, the Sudanese movement developed relationships with liberation movements in Africa, and Arab and Asian countries. They supported Kwame Nkrumah,\(^8\) who called for establishing an Africa League, Kashmir activists, and they participated in Jihad\(^9\) in Palestine:

“… in 1956, they participated in establishing a liberation movement in Chad and the liberation movement in Eritrea, and accommodated some of their leaders. There was unlimited support for Palestine, and the Algerian revolution, and they demonstrated supporting the Mohammed 5th movement, and the Musadaq government in Iran; and they continually mention the Palestine and Kashmir issues in their festivals and forums” (Mekki, 1998, p.40).

Such kind of support can be counted as support in issues of public opinion.

To further shed light on the relationship between the movement in Sudan and Jamaat-e-Islami, Turabi says that the Pakistani movement’s “relations with other Islamic movements is very limited” (Hamdi, 1998, p.92). However, the movement started direct relationships with other movements through students unions and organisations in Europe, the US, and other countries, where there were Sudanese students. Most of the leaders of the Islamic movements, who had studied in these countries, had been working together as students, and when they return home they develop these relationships to cooperate together. Moreover, in the 1990s, the movement stood by the Bosnians and supported their stand through the media. The movement used all its means, students, women, and mosques to support Bosnia.

Moreover, there was a significant leap forward in the international relations of the movement, when they started working with Nimeiri after 1977. In that period, they

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\(^8\) Kwame Nkrumah (21 September 1909-27 April 1972) was the first president of Ghana. An influential 20\(^{th}\) century advocate of Pan-Africanism, he was a founding member of the organisation of African Unity.

\(^9\) Some members went to Palestine to fight with Palestinian people such as Mohammed Salih Omer who was a lecturer in the University of Khartoum.
started establishing social organisations, and economic relief, health and education institutions. Moreover, they started to strengthen their relationship with the Arab world and other movements.

However, after 1985, the NIF appeared as a political party, so it established its international relations as a political party, and started to contact some countries for strategic relationships, for example, China, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Comoros, and other countries and organisations. These relations were extended after the movement took over the government in June 1989, and were invested in extensively in building the country after the revolution, especially the strategic plans for oil investment and infrastructure; as such, a wide range of industrialisation programmes and economic reconstruction took place.

At all times, the movement maintained relationships with African countries and Islamic activists in Africa, even if they did not belong to the same Madhab or Tariqa. The movement supported African Muslims in the education and health fields. It tried to build good regional relations with Chad, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. These contacts reflected maturity and awareness of international relations, and how to approach these regional and international relations (Mekki, 1999, p.221). Turabi stated in a public lecture in Madrid in 1994: “I know every Islamic movement in the world, secret or public” (Turabi, 1994). This means that “he” as a leader of an Islamic movement has direct contact with Islamic movements, but this may not mean more than meeting each other, and talking about issues or experience without joint leadership, or even an organisation for cooperation.

However, few Islamic organisations have the will or the resources to prioritise international issues to the detriment of domestic issues. However, we can say that communications are more frequent with groups that are both regionally and
ideologically close to the Sudanese movement. The nature of relationships is mostly cooperative on broad international issues.

These relations reflected the pressure by international powers; Egypt especially feared any communications or coordination between the two movements, while the Soviet Union was not happy with the movement’s support for the Afghan Mujahidin. When the Ikhwan contacted Iran in 1979, Saudi Arabia feared that relationship and tried to talk to them about it. Yet the movement leaders solved this misunderstanding, and built a good relationship with the Saudi government and movement; the same happened with Kuwait and some other Arab countries.

Many Islamist activists from Pakistan, Malaysia, the US, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Arab countries, Muslim minorities, and other African countries visited Sudan on different occasions.

However, despite the complications, the movement gained good experience in building and maintaining international relations. They (Ikhwan) knew how to deal with Islamic movements, states, government, organisations and different schools of thought.

I hold a firm belief that there was a large shift in the fiqh of the movement in the political field, especially in dealing with the complications of state, mechanisms of building societies, theories of social change, Shura, and economic issues. In this context, many critical questions will be addressed in this thesis.

6.3 The Islamic Movement and the Sunni-Shi‘a Division

Although Sudan is classed as Sunni, it was not influenced by this classification in its relations with Shi‘a countries or movements. Historically there are no Shi‘a in Sudan or neighbouring countries. The Sudanese movement is part of the Sudanese social fabric, which means it holds the same nature of relationship. However, the Ikhwan understand
the differences between understanding Islam and creed (Aqidah) issues. El-Affendi (1991, p.146) mentioned that “the Sudanese Ikhwan had practically no links with Shi’a activists prior to the Iranian revolution.” In the Sudanese universities, the syllabus contains some studies about some Shi’a Firqah (sect) as a deviant group. In spite of all this, the Iranian revolution inspired the Ikhwan in Sudan.

“Like all Islamic activists, Ikhwan were elated at the Iranian success. Demonstrations were organised in support of Khomeini in the university and elsewhere, and many delegations were sent to Tehran”\(^\text{10}\) (el-Affendi, 1991, p.146).

This can be interpreted that the Islamic movements needed a significant event so as to inspire the Islamic world and activists. Some Shi’a thinkers were even inspiring the Ikhwan in some fields; for example ‘Our Economy’, the book written by Mohammed Baqhir Alsadr was a main reference for Islamic economics in Sudan. Other books were also referred to, including the book of Ali Shri’ati, “the philosophy of the pilgrimage” translated by al-Mahboub Abdelsalam, a Sudanese Ikhwan. This means that there was no history of direct conflict with Shi’a groups. In conclusion, we can say that Sudanese people were never influenced by the historical division that happened in Islamic political thought, and proceeded to develop a Sudanese school of thought. They love the family and relatives of the Prophet, i.e. ‘Ali, al-Hasan and al-Hussein or Al al-Bayt, and so the Sudanese do not have a bias towards either of the two schools, which emerged after the battle of Siffin between ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu‘awiyyah Ibn Abi Sufyan. Hasan Mekki refers this to the Sudanese culture, which combines rational Sufism and fiqh. Even Turabi introduced himself in Madrid in a lecture, in 1994, as a fundamentalist, who is neither Sunni nor Shi’a.

“Modern Islamic movements do not believe in schools of jurisprudence, they do not define themselves as Shi’a, or Sunna, or of this Sufi order or that Sufi order. They recognise this as quite a heritage and they can learn a lot from such history.

\(^{10}\) Al-Tigani Abu-Jidairi, and Osman Khalid Mudawi went to Tehran to congratulate the Imam Khomeini revolution. They were making good contacts and probably some friends within the new Iranian revolutionary Government.
They don't want to break with history altogether, but they want to go forward and develop” (Turabi, 1994).

Hasan Mekki predicted that the Sudanese movement will be qualified to play a role in dialogue between Sunni and Shi’a, “if the movement developed its political and intellectual tools” (Mekki, 1998, p.113). I think he was right in his prediction, because the movement in the 1990s played a role in Sunni and Shi’a dialogue, and tried to find a way for cooperation between the two schools on some issues.

However, to understand the phenomenon that produced such a philosophical approach, it is useful to consider the historical context of the issues that developed in each period. What needs to be noted is that the researcher tends to focus less on why Islamists have emerged at different moments in different places than on how Islamists seek and exercise power; the essential conception of Islam is combined with the assertion that Islam is not simply a religion, but a comprehensive way of life.

In conclusion, the history of Sudan has had an impact on the history and future of the Islamic Movement in Sudan. This chapter investigated and analysed the historical background of Sudan, and its impact on the Sudanese Islamic Movement. It reviewed Islam and political Islam, in the context of Sudan, focusing on the social and political developments, and the impact on the political thought of the Islamic movement, and its pragmatic approach and the development of different schools inside the movement, Salafi and Sufi. According to the above analysis, the Sudanese society throughout the Sudan history has influenced the development of the Islamic movement in different dimensions such as al-fiqh, methods of work and the flexibility in accepting others. According to this you can find many trends in the movement and they work together. It is noticed that the movement witnessed division with each new step towards participating in government or adopting new changes in its method or the nature of the organisation, e.g. ICF or NIF. On the other hand the movement developed a unique
international relations that appears as if it associated with contradictory movements and states; the movement developed and balanced its relation with the traditional and renewal schools, sufi, Salafi and Shi’i. Furthermore, the movement dealt with the Shi’a purely as another school of thought; it built a cooperative relationship with the different Islamic movements. This approach is different than the method adopted by the Ikhwan in Egypt who believe in one international organisation. However, in the relations at state level, the movement managed to link itself with Saudi Arabia and Iran, China and Malaysia etc. Throughout its history, the movement gained more experience and maturity to tackle the problems facing it, and developed a comprehensive theoretical framework and a theory of practising Shura. Despite the oppression faced at different times, democratic consultation (Shura) was adopted as a mechanism of decision making inside the movement structure. The movement before 1989 did not practise rule by itself; it was participating with others, as in the May regime after 1977 and in the democratic periods after 1964 and 1985. In each period the movement was an effective actor. These different experiences developed the movement’s approach at the practical and theoretical levels. The question is, to what extent were the theories of democracy that developed throughout its history practised after the 1989 coup, and what is the extent of the gap between theory and practice? This will be evaluated in the related chapters. However, according the above evaluation, it could be said that the movement was pragmatic when it comes to the participation in the government; it worked effectively as an opposition party or in the legislative body of the government.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The objective of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the literature on the Islamic Movement in Sudan, and build a theoretical framework for analysing and describing the Islamic Movement in Sudan, with special reference to Turabi. This chapter will cover the literature on Islam and democracy and the ideas of Turabi; how scholars, journalists, politicians and the academics understood his ideas; and how they criticised and interpreted them.

There are many questions posed by institutions, researchers, and others. These are questions concerning the details of how the Ikhwan think about Shari’a, its principles, and how to apply it.

The chapter is divided into five parts; each part covers what has been written on an issue of interest. Since the first chapter in this thesis already covered the historical background of the Islamic movement, and gave details of what has been written on the history of the Islamic movement, this chapter will not deal with those issues. Therefore, the first part of this chapter gives an introduction to Islam and state, with particular emphasis on Turabi’s views. The second part gives a brief introduction on Shura as a concept and practice from the Sudanese Islamic movement’s perspective and Turabi’s vision. The third part presents the important concepts that relate to the study. The fourth part covers the objectives of the Islamic movement in Sudan; and the fifth part deals with the access to power.

Section 1. Islam and State in Turabi’s Political Thought

This is one of the most important and controversial issues among scholars and Islamic leaders and movements. Some think that the Islamic state is the main objective of Islamic movements, while others think that it is just an instrument, not an objective in
itself. However, the most powerful political movements of contemporary Islam, al-Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and the Islamic Movement in Sudan, have devoted all their energies to this goal.

For Muslims, God is the Sovereign Ruler over the universe, and consequently the focal point of their belief system. Traditionally, a Muslim’s duty is obedience and submission to the will of God, not only to accept dogmas or rituals, but also to strive to realise God’s will in history; namely, to see that all men are obedient to Islamic rule under God’s law. However, God does not rule directly, and it is man’s task, as God’s vicegerent, to implement His rule on earth. This rule affects every part of life from prayer or fasting to politics and law (Esposito, 1983, pp.3-4). The discourse of state was influenced by the historical and political development of the Islamic world. So, in each period, we find the discourse influenced by political and social factors.

El-Affendi argues that Turabi gave much thought to the question of the state, and had much practical involvement in it. He approached the issue from a methodological angle, arguing that the state represented a central legislative principle in Islam, but so did popular consensus (el-Affendi, 2008, p.94). El-Affendi also discusses the matter of state generally in depth in his book, ‘Who needs an Islamic state?’.

Turabi rejects the traditional assumption that authoritative consensus meant the consensus of Ulama. This view is supported by el-Affendi (2008, p.94); he makes reference to Turabi (1982), who explains that binding consensus was that of the Muslim populace (or public opinion) at a given moment. Popular choice should be enlightened by experts, including the Ulama, but also including experts in other fields, such as economics, medicine, law, the social and exact sciences, etc. If we look to Islamic history, we find that the dominant schools of thought were selected by free popular will. The government should also be freely chosen to reflect the popular will. Once this
happened, then the elected government would have a religiously significant legislative role, and could arbitrate in differences on interpretation of Shari‘a. El-Affendi thinks that Turabi in one stroke elevated the state to the role of religious adjudicator, and subordinated it to popular will (el-Affendi, 2008, p.94).

However, there is no agreement among scholars on this point; el-Affendi (2008) compares Turabi’s opinion with Ghannouchi and Mawdudi; he found that Ghannouchi went further by limiting the role of the Islamic movement to just another actor within the liberal-democratic state. Meanwhile, even Turabi seemed to regard the Islamic movement as the guardian of Islamic morality within the state, a role that Islamists have assumed since the demise of the Islamic Caliphate (Khilafah), yet Ghannouchi rejected this idea. For him, the Islamic movement had neither a monopoly on the interpretation of Islam, nor in dictating morality. It was just another political party offering its programme to the people, and inviting them to decide freely between rivals. I firmly believe that Turabi will conclude with the same idea as Ghannouchi, after the failure of what was known as al-Tawali al-Siyasi. El-Affendi makes reference to Ghannouchi (1987) for the previous point, and adds that this could lead to the adoption of non-Islamic programmes, given the nature of the modern national state, as Mawdudi predicted. This did not seem to disturb him: as the movement was not a guardian over the people, all it could do was preach and attempt to persuade; what the people chose was their business. El-Affendi affirms that Hasan Turabi similarly regards the particular subdivision into nation-states as natural and valid. Just as the family is not incorporated into society by dissolving it, but by preserving it, so the individual state need not be abolished to form the Muslim world or the pan-Arab nation. They are incorporated as organic wholes into the overall formula, without losing their individuality.

11 Its literal meaning is ‘continuous succession’: it means people have the right to organise themselves for political, cultural, trade unions and academic purposes, and that should be done through proper legal regulations.
It is arguable that nationalism is a more difficult issue to handle. “There is general agreement among Islamic Movements that nationalism is an import from Europe that is different from Islamic political organisation” (Rosenthal, 1965, p.6). Enayat (1982, p.115) observes that most pioneers of Islamic modernism tended to oppose nationalism, since they considered it incompatible with Islamic universalism. This debate was occurring when the nationalist movement was at the top of the agenda of researchers and political leaders. However, the ideological controversy among Muslim intellectuals centres on:

“the basic contradiction between nationalism as a time-bound set of principles related to the qualities and needs of a particular group of human beings, and Islam as an eternal, universalist message, drawing no distinction between its adherents except on the criterion of their piety” (Enayat, 1982, p.112).

In Turabi’s own words:

“we do not believe in nationalist values that divided people on basis of colour, geography, or national interest. These are values fundamentally at odds with Islam … our firm belief is that mankind is one community, and people can cooperate in the field of science and knowledge and exchange ideas and achievements” (Hamdi, 1998, p.44).

At the time, Turabi was in power, and tried to open the country, Sudan, to all people, even without passports. In Hamdi’s book, Turabi confirmed his ideas:

“I am no longer a believer in divisions created by nationality, passports, and visas. These are symbols of backwardness and I hope that we can all get rid of them gradually until the whole world is open to every human being, free to move and exchange goods, knowledge, culture, and all other material and spiritual benefits” (Hamdi, 1998, p.48).

From my own perspective, this is an unrealistic idea, which is difficult to implement in real life within the political factors and the domination of different theories and powers. Morrison pointed out that “Turabi clearly rejects the nation-State and has strong allegiance to the Ummah, or community of Muslim believers” (Morrison, 2001, p.154). He rejects the nation state, but accepts it as a reality and calls for gradual unity, such as the EU, or Gulf states. The foundation of Turabi’s rejection of nationalism lies in the doctrine of Tawhīd and unity of human life, which we try to put under what we call the
Tawhīdi theory of Turabi that explains most of his views, and relate these to Tawhīd directly. There is no other research dealing directly with this issue, as raised in this thesis.

Most of these studies and comparisons were in the early 1990s, which means the 1989 coup was in its first year, so it was not evaluated. This study will offer in-depth evaluation for the experiment for one decade. Moreover, Turabi released his famous statement on issues of state and international relations. These statements and the practical experience of Turabi will be discussed in the thesis as part of the Islamists and democracy chapter, and Islamist and state in Sudan in another chapter, and Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory. Today, it is widely recognised that Turabi released many new books, and made statements in interviews to explain his understanding of the state in Islamic theory and his own theory.

Esposito argued that the NIF made some efforts to define an Islamic state in terms that could include a significant level of religious diversity, within a relatively decentralised political system (Esposito, 1996, p.97). Moreover, Esposito considered that there is a direct relationship between Turabi’s activities as a political leader in Sudan, and the specifics of his evolving definition of an Islamic state (Esposito, 2001, p.137). In evaluating Turabi’s work, Esposito notes that, in terms of theory and principle, Turabi was relatively consistent over the years on this issue (Esposito, 2001, p.137), i.e. that of state. His view is supported by the work of Hamdi (1998). However, there is no agreement among scholars; el-Affendi argued that Turabi always advocated dealing with reality. He complained that the main problem of modern Islamic movements was uncompromising idealism. They recognised only the absolute ideal, and did not map the way to it by defining intermediate stations leading towards it. In contrast, the Sudanese Islamists were realistic, and accepted making compromises, like the deal with the regime of former president Nimeiri, as a provisional step towards achieving an Islamic

“a corollary of Turabi’s methodology, and a substantive assumption behind it, is the recognition of reality not precisely in Hegel’s manner of accepting that ‘what is real is rational’, but rather on the line of Marx’s dynamic realise” (el-Affendi, 1990, pp.137-151).

It is interesting that Esposito reached the same conclusion, when he found that Turabi’s writing on the nature of the state reflected the pragmatic opportunities presented by changing political conditions in Sudan. During parliamentary eras, the general approach involved participation in politics and, at the same time, emphasising the need to Islamise society, before the achievement of an Islamic state. However, during the period of authoritarian rule by the military, when the rulers worked to implement state-imposed Islamisation (as happened in the early 1980s under Jaffar Nimeiri, and following the military coup in 1989), these rulers received the active support of Turabi and the Islamist movement (Esposito, 2001, p.138).

Many scholars, such as Eissa, believe that, according to Turabi, society is the basic Islamic institution and not the state (Eissa, 2005, p.321). Eissa makes specific reference to what was said by Turabi in Hiwarat; he argued that society is the basic institution and not the state. In fact, society represents the basis on which the state and the government are to be institutionalised. In Islam, civil society institutions could take good care of people’s needs. There was a time when the Islamic society developed its own health care and education systems, in addition to social welfare, by means of endowments, volunteerism and non-governmental action. This development took place when government became negligent and despotic. Therefore, government should confine its activities to what civil society and the private sector could not do well for members of society; hence, it has a limited role to play in terms of provision. The most important function of the state is to lead the society towards the achievement of the ideal Islamic
community (Hiwarat, 1992, pp.150-157); related ideas were presented by Rahal (2004) and Moussalli (2003; 2004). Rahal argued that Turabi had been focusing on the role of society in return for the role of the state since the 1970s. He considered that the most important features of the Islamic society are depriving the governor from the two important authorities, which have been used as weapons against the individual in the West, i.e. taxes and legislation. After 1990, when he became a part of the ruling regime, he stressed on the importance of reducing the authority of the state, and giving more space to society. As a result, he considers that the absolute state, which dominates the life of the people, is rejected by Islam. Islam is comprehensive, but does not end in a central state.

Related ideas were presented by Moussalli, who argued that Turabi, the leading powerful fundamentalist thinker of contemporary Islamic movements, deals with a number of taboos around the concept of the state. He removes a number of conditions in the nature of the institutions that may be established by the Islamic constitution and Islamic state, in a more comprehensive way than Hasan al-Banna. Turabi imposes Islamic limitations on the position of the state, which is very similar to the limits of the liberal state. For him, the Islamic state must not go beyond formulating general rules enabling society to organise its affairs. The legitimacy limits the authority of the state and emancipates society to the maximum, on the basis of ‘the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ (al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-na'ahy 'an al-munkar) as the work of the society, not the state (Turabi, Summer 1992, pp.52-54).

The explanation of Rashid Ghannouchi (2006) is that Turabi does not make Islam a condition for the post of president of an Islamic state, and makes reference to the Sudanese constitution, which was written mainly by Turabi. Ghannouchi attributes

Turabi’s stance to the situation in Sudan; a country diverse in religions, tribes and ethnic origins. Moreover, Sudan had experienced a long civil war. So, Turabi seeks unity and political stability, so as to strengthen the society, and enable it to play its role.

‘Abdullahi A. Gallab claimed that:

“insight developed from the Sudanese Islamists’ model of state and the entire Islamist discourse all illustrate the validity of such an observation’—meaning Mark Juergensmeyer’s observation that the Islamists’ are ‘concern[ed] not so much about political structure of the nation-state, as they are about the political ideology undergirding it’” (Gallab, 2007, p.16).

He concluded that:

“al-Turabi’s writings and speech about the state before and after 1989 clearly show a marked change in perspective. In 1983 al-Turabi wrote the ideological foundation of an Islamic state lies on the doctrine of Tawhīd—the unity of God and human life—as a comprehensive and exclusive programme of worship’. He maintained that the Islamic state is not secular, not nationalistic and not an absolute or sovereign entity. He claimed that the ‘Islamic state’ is not primordial because the primary institution in Islam is the Ummah, but after this charade of what the Islamic state is not, al-Turabi failed to indicate what the Islamic state is” (Gallab, 2007, p.16).


According to Moussalli:

“Theoretically, Turabi justifies the needs of al-tajdīd (renewing). He argued that the branches of this religion and its usul have developed in historical contexts, and is therefore subject to change, according to the requirements of society. The historic nature of these usul may not necessarily obtain the status of a constitution, as is the case with the text. Therefore, the replacement of usul and branches with other modern [ideas] is not a violation of religion. This replacement process, which depends on the basic texts, the Qur’an and the Sunna, should be built on the consensus of Muslims, based on the real choice of nation through a modern Shura” (Moussalli, 2004, p.97).

Moussalli (2004) argued that, therefore, according to Turabi’s view, the consideration of Shura and democracy out of its historical context makes the two ideas carry the same meaning. While he recognises that the supreme legitimacy is for Allah, the political and practical legitimacy is for the people (community, or Ummah). Shura never eradicates the collective public freedom, to determine the political, social and economic

It is significant that Moussalli (2004) relates the above and concludes that, therefore, Turabi has decided that the highest political reference is society, which has a covenant with the government on choosing to organise their affairs. The role of the ruler is no more than to execute the popular mandate to serve the interest of the community. Therefore, Turabi accepts the legitimacy of any system that is established on exchange of covenant, where the governor does not go beyond the individuals’ and groups’ freedom, as provided by the Holy Qur’an. Turabi imposed this condition, because he considers that the Qur’an addresses the people as a group and individuals, not the governors. Thus the real Islamic constitution must establish and protect public and individual freedom. Therefore, representative councils are needed to prevent the possibility of the government ruling unjustly (Moussalli, 2004, p.97). He concluded these points by arguing that, although Shari’a law plays a pivotal role in Turabi’s thought, it did not preclude institutions and non-Islamic principles, especially when the Muslim community needed these. Turabi urges Muslims to consider the purposes (Maqāsid) of Shari’a in the process of renewal (Tajdid). Justice, for example, has concepts that are different in each historical period; from this point of view, these concepts should be developed, but should not deviate from the text of the Qur’an or contradict it. It should be said that, on this point, Turabi calls for studying the concept in its historical context, so as to reach a real definition or meaning for it, and then build any opinion on that.

However, the ideology of political Islam is built upon a total system of existence, universally applicable to all times and places. There is no separation between the faith
(Dīn) and the state (Dawlah). Islam is the final truth and final revelation. The fundamental mission in life is to worship God and propagate Islam. This can only be done by a return to the ‘straight path’. One should go beyond the five pillars and commit oneself to a life of action in building the ideal community, the universal Ummah. This community is based on social justice, a central concept in Islamic ideology. Social, legal and international justice must replace all existing kinds of injustice. As such, the Islamic way of life is not a life of mystical contemplation (Dekmijan, 1995, pp.41-44). Morrison found that “… in fact, the justification for the Islamic state can be viewed as the combination of the political and the ethical aspects of tawhīd” (Morrison, 2001, p.154).

However, the Sudanese Islamists were more realistic, when they looked to their situation in a country like Sudan, with all its complex political instability and social diversity and all other weaknesses, in the economic field, and security threats from many neighbours. This is why they accepted many compromises, as provisional steps, in their long march towards achieving an Islamic state in Sudan.

Section 2. Islamists and Shura: The Sudanese Perspective

Many scholars, public opinion leaders, and politicians addressed the issue of Shura in Turabi’s political thought and fiqh (jurisprudence), which is built on his efforts in reforming the Islamic fiqh, and understanding the context of Qur’an and Sunna. These scholars referred to what has been said, or written and published by Turabi. The most important figures in this field are: Abdelwahab el-Affendi, Hasan Mekki, John L. Esposito, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Ahmed Moussalli, and ‘Abdullahi Gallab in the academic field, and many others in the fields of media or politics. The concept of Shura in Turabi’s thought was discussed by most of them.
2.1 Turabi’s Conception of Shura

Turabi developed a conception of Shura, when he defined it in a way that can be practised in the modern state, and by developing the mechanisms that make it work. Eissa notes that Turabi went on to illuminate the concept of Shura as a form of Islamic democracy, which is remarkably different from the Western form in its frame of reference. Shura is believed to be underpinned by basic Islamic beliefs comprising submission to God’s will as ordained in the Shari’a, whereby all aspects of life are seen as a form of worship, and Shura should be construed as a right conferred by Allah on people to exercise governance as his vicegerents on earth, and the right to participate in decision making by all Muslims. Shura should, therefore, permeate all activities of the Muslim society, such as the area of religion and politics (Essa, 2005, p.319). Eissa observes that the salient differences between the two concepts are not confined to their different frames of reference alone. According to Turabi, they can be usefully delineated as follows.

- Firstly, democracy originates either from secular or anti-religious convictions, whereas Shura is based on Islamic faith (Iman) and values, and workable only within the Islamic context.

- Secondly, while Shura is a total system of living that should permeate Islamic practice in all walks of life, democracy is confined to political systems.

- Thirdly, the Western perception of democracy confers sovereignty on the people, who should enjoy absolute authority and freedom of choice exercised rationally by their policy makers.
By way of contrast, Shura recognises governance and sovereignty as designations of God, the Absolute, but Muslims exercise them as His vicegerents on earth, while constrained by Shari‘a.

- Fourthly, liberal democracy gives absolute freedom to policy makers to use the means at their disposal to reach their goals, including the use of Machiavellian strategies and cut-throat political tactics, while in Shura such tactics are excluded and constrained by Islamic morality and Islamic Shari‘a.

- Finally, liberal democracy is based on majority rule, where the winner takes all, to the detriment of the minority, who must wait for another chance to secure a majority to win; meanwhile, Shura is based on consensus of members of the community, taking all viewpoints into account and incorporating all interests, including those of the minority (Kausar, 2005, p.319).

He makes specific reference to Turabi (2000a) in comparing Shura and democracy. Some Western scholars have compared Shura with Western-style concepts, and simply concluded that “political Islam is the opposite of democracy, personal freedom, equality human rights, and liberalism” (Entelis, 1997, p.18). Other scholars have said that, “while the West is based on secular materialism, scientific reason, and lack of moral philosophy, Islam is based on faith, patience, peace, and equilibrium” (Moussalli, 1999, pp.71-72). Morality is thus a main component in Islamic ideology. How to act and how to behave become important questions, and the only way to act and behave correctly is to follow Islamic law in an Islamic state. The existence of an absolute moral is for the fundamentalists an objective reality beyond reason (Moussalli, 1999, p.23).

However, strong effort was made by Turabi to clarify the concept of Shura and to push the movement to practise it in its institutions. Hamid argued that this blend of institutionalisation is certainly pushed by Turabi himself; he strongly believes that the
community (Jama’a) is the source of power and that this power should be distributed among constitutional bodies according to the wide process of Shura. This of course is the ideal, and there is nothing to suggest that it has been followed to the letter (Hamid, 1988, p.272).

Eissa argued that it should be pointed out that Turabi’s concept of Shura represents an original thesis based on fundamentals of Islam, in addition to borrowing the mechanisms of elections, referendums, and opinion surveys from Western thought. Hence, he made no claims that Shura was practised beyond the days of the Prophet and his four immediate successors, at which time it took the form of direct participation by all citizens; nevertheless, some versions of limited Shura were used by other Muslim governments. In contrast, he attributed the decline of the Islamic state and civilisation to the lack of Shura, tyrannical autocratic government, and intellectual stagnation resulting from the lack of Ijtihād. Thus, the revival of Islamic civilisation is possible only if the Shari’a is brought back into the lives and politics of Muslim communities, along with Shura, Ijtihād and intellectual freedom (Kausar, 2005, pp.320-321). The concept of Shura had been well-clarified by Turabi who put the concept in its historical context and conducted the principles that stand on it; moreover he accepted the mechanisms which were developed by the people throughout history, and these steps constructed the practicability of the concept.

Section 3. Important Conceptions

3.1 Tajdīd ‘Reforming’

Tajdīd in the literature is known under different terms, including ‘renewal’, ‘revival’, ‘reform’, ‘innovation’, etc.
The contemporary encounter between traditional, underdeveloped Muslim societies, and modern Western civilisation, and the ensuing responses interested academicians in various fields of research science at the turn of the last century. Among Muslim thinkers, probably no-one has highlighted the issue better than Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, and his disciple Mohammed ‘Abdu. For that reason, Afghani has been accredited with the title of Rā’id Madrasat al-Tajdīd al-Dīnī, or leader of school of religious reform (Hamid, 1988, p.255).

Turabi also developed his own independent ideas on Islamic jurisprudence and law. These ideas, based on critical analysis of Islamic sources, generally revolve around the concepts of Ijtihād and Tajdīd, or free inquiry and renewal, in an attempt to adapt the temporal to the eternal. In the intellectual venture of reformulating Islamic thought, Turabi brings to the fore a whole range of controversial issues; giving, thereby, extra ammunition to his opponents, who, by 1978, had formed their separate Ikhwan (Hamid, 1988, p.273). These ideas are supported by Esposito and el-Affendi’s arguments:

“the idea of necessity of renewal is fundamental to Turabi’s understanding of the history of the community of Muslim believers. From the ‘first generations’ Muslims have, in Turabi’s view, advocated that constant renewal in the professing of the faith is an obligation in all believers to participate in such renewal” (Esposito, 2001, p.126).

While el-Affendi expresses a similar view and suggests that “Tajdīd is Turabi’s most cherished idea, and as such it is the source of the most controversy he continues to generate. Tajdīd for Turabi takes revolutionary and very radical content” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.170), Haydar Ibrahim Ali argued that:

“the idea of tajdīd is based on a difficult equation, which needs to join between the constant and inconstant, eternal and historical, the ideal and reality, the relative and absolute, the divine and human. We find that Turabi in these views is closer to the theories of social science and manmade laws, where he puts religious thought under the condition of the reality and the social changes and experience, and what he calls trials (Ibtilā’)” (Ali, 1996, p.288).
Ali argued that “Turabi’s problem with these views is that Turabi did not define the concepts that he uses.” Ali notes that Turabi speaks about renewal of religion, or fiqh, or religious thought, or the renewal of the religion. However, he thinks that the words used by Turabi, ‘fikr meaning thought’, ‘fiqh meaning jurisprudence’, and ‘Dīn meaning religion’, have been used in a different context (Ali, 1996, p.289).

Ali (1996) went further by pointing out that there are two ways of Tajdīd: revival, and development. Moreover, he thinks that the way for revival and development is not constant, but has its turns, and ups and downs; this kind of analysis interprets the defeats in the history of the Muslim community and Ummah. He thinks that Turabi argued that the reasons for these defeats were the halt in Tajdīd, and not interacting with the eternal fundamentals (Usūl). He claimed that Turabi used the idea of Tajdīd as justification for his political position, and his pragmatic logic. Moreover, he thinks that Turabi concentrated his writing on political fiqh (Ali, 1996, p.290). In contrast, el-Affendi argued that Tajdīd for Turabi takes on a revolutionary and very radical content. In one of his first public expositions of the concept, Turabi said that Islam needs to be rethought radically (he means the fiqh of Islam); it is not true, he said, that it is eternal and cannot change. There are eternal principles in Islam, but fiqh, the classical exposition of religious law inherited from an earlier generation of Muslims, is a mere human endeavour, which represents the cumulative understanding of our forefathers of religious truths and commands, and can be re-evaluated freely by today’s Muslims (el-Affendi, 1991, p.170).

“It is interesting that Esposito relates the idea of the necessity of renewal as fundamental to “Turabi’s understanding of the history of the community of Muslim believers. He refers to Turabi’s words, ‘Tajdīd is the most necessary of the requirements of the faith of Islam’; when subsequent generations ceased to fulfil this obligation, ‘they bequeathed to us a kind of passive and stagnant profession of the faith’, and when the enterprise of the Muslim becomes stagnant with respect to their being Muslims, their Islam freezes and the history of their life takes a form that is not Islamic. In this way the history of Islamic civilisation
has been a tension between the forces of renewal (Tajdīd) and the forces of imitation of the past (Taqlīd)” (Esposito, 2001, pp.126-127).

Hence, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), for Turabi, depends on a continuous renewal of ideas to be able to provide answers to current problems, and he thus transforms religious jurisprudence into political doctrines (Moussalli, 1994, p.62).

It would be useful to consider el-Affendi’s argument that renewal or revival is an ongoing exercise, which needs to be undertaken continuously; it is the collective task of the Ummah, not individual reformers. It is not true, as is widely believed, that the community of the Prophet is the most perfect paradigm that can never be improved upon. It is possible, with the help of constant regeneration, to improve tremendously on the performance of that first generation. An example is the principle of Shura (consultation) expounded in the Qur’an and acted upon by them, which can be raised to higher levels by the advances in communications at our disposal (el-Affendi, 1991, p.170). These arguments show that renewal is a collective effort, and Turabi follows this method to induct his fiqh.

However, el-Affendi explains these ideas for more understanding of Turabi’s views:

“this does not mean that we will be better than earlier generations (or worse for that matter), because each is to be judged by the best use of resources and knowledge at its disposal. In fact many previous schools of thought have been transcended, not because they were unsuccessful in solving the problems of their age, but because they were too successful. Once they succeeded in solving the problems, which necessitated their rise in the first place, they became redundant. Renewal, therefore, is not transcendence of religion but a response to the demands of religion in an evolving situation” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.171).

The political ideology of Ikhwan in Sudan is based on Islamic law (Shari’a) and jurisprudence (fiqh), and the idea of an Islamic state, which means a Tawhīdi approach. However, this ideology is strongly influenced by Turabi’s ideas of reform and renewal.

First, on a practical level, it includes programmes for social change and human development. Second, on a theoretical level, it consists of a ‘non-traditional’ way of interpreting Islamic jurisprudence. Regarding the latter, traditional jurisprudence has,
according to Turabi, stagnated, and frozen and there is “a dire necessity not only to consider new answers to new problems, but also to reconsider how to revitalise the methodology (Usūl) of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.128). This new interpretation will be outlined below.

It is known that the resources of fiqh (Usūl al-Fiqh), or methodology of jurisprudence, is based on four pillars: the Qur’an, the Sunna, Ijma’, and Ijtihād.

However, we have seen above how the scholars deal with Turabi’s ideas. This part will examine how the scholars respond to Turabi’s Ijtihād, and his views about Ijma’, which are different from those of the traditional Ulama.

Turabi’s concept of the new Ulama, including experts in all fields, e.g. doctors, economists, etc., is crucial in this process of creating a new and comprehensive fiqh. Esposito points out that, in terms of specific methods, Turabi argues for a thorough re-examination of the fundamental sources of the Shari‘a. In this effort of reinterpretation, Turabi proposes a radical expansion of the traditional method of analysis (Esposito, 2001, p.130). Esposito explained that scholars developed many rules that narrowed the flexibility of specific legal reasoning by analogy, and this became a part of the rigid structure that Turabi rejects. Turabi proposed the replacement of the limited Qiyās by a new, broad analogical analysis of the fundamental sources. One area where Turabi outlines how this new approach would provide different perspectives is in the redefinition of the meaning of Shura (consultation) in the context of the modern world (Esposito, 2001, p.131); on this point Esposito makes reference to Turabi (1980).

Ijma’ for Turabi is a consensus of the community. For others, Ijma’ is the consensus of Ulama or religious leaders. For “Turabi, the Ulama may consist of people that are knowledgeable and educated, like engineers, doctors, and lawyers in addition to

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13 One of the major developments in the study and definition of Islamic law was the utilisation of ‘judicial reasoning by analogy’ or Qiyas.
religious leaders” (Niblock, 1991, pp.263-265). Thus, important public issues are decided by representatives of the people, and not solely by a religious authority. Traditionally Ijma’ is understood as the consensus of Ulama, or consensus of the traditional religious leaders. Esposito stated that Turabi’s departure from historical precedent is also shown in his insistence that renewal and necessary Ijtihād is the responsibility of the whole community rather than a small intellectual elite. The foundation for this is Turabi’s redefinition of the people of knowledge in the contemporary Islamic community. Historically, the ‘people of knowledge’ or the Ulama, represented a very small part of the whole community; as the learned elite, they were viewed as speaking for the community of believers as a whole. On the important issue of the validation of practice and legal traditions through the consensus (Ijma’) of the community, for example, it was accepted that legitimate consensus was the agreement of the Ulama. Interestingly, in Turabi’s thought about Ijma’ and Ijtihād is his emphasis on the role of the people.

When it comes to Ijtihād, Turabi’s contribution in the Tajdīd process, Turabi stresses that this should also be open to all Muslims; he says: “I believe that Ijtihād is open to every Muslim, no matter how ignorant he or she might be, everyone can exercise Ijtihād, even if only to make a small contribution” (Hamdi, 1998, p.45). Sidahmed has drawn attention to the fact that “this is not to say that all Muslims can authoritatively interpret Islamic law. For Turabi, people who are willing and competent to interpret Islamic law may coordinate their findings through regular consultations and hence come up with new ideas through consensus” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.129).

For Turabi, Ijma’ or ‘consensus’ is better than majority rule. However, every decision in consensus should be guided by the principles of Shari’a; as Moussalli says: “because the Qura’anic text, and not the people, is the ultimate founding power and standard applied in evaluating people’s actions, then the practices of the ruler, the legislative, and the
judiciary are finally bound by the Shari'a” (Moussalli, 1994, p.61); and in the process of Tajdid as mentioned before, Ijma’ is that of the community (Ijma’ al-Ummah) not the Ulama. However, this is a new approach that Turabi adopted, which will change the power distribution and the institutions (religion institutions) that monopolised the power.

3.2 Tawhīd

Tawhīd means monotheism, or the oneness of Allah (God), ‘the belief that there is but one God’. In Arabic, ‘Tawhīd of God’ is the doctrine of Oneness of God, also transliterated ‘Tawheed’ and ‘Tauheed’; Allah, in Arabic, is one (Wāhid) and unique (Ahad). The counterpart of Tawhīd is Shirk which translates as ‘polytheism’, but literally means sharing Allah’s attribute with others. Tawhīd is the very cornerstone of Islam, as it means maintaining the belief in true God without any equals or partners; Tawhīd literally means unification.

“The term originally referred in classical Islamic literature to the affirmation of unity of God, but is used by Turabi in its ambiguous sense, which means also unification. The corollary of accepting the unity of God is the realisation that everything in life must heed his commands. This is the classical Islamist demand for ordering life according to Shari’a, and this dimension of it was amply emphasized by Mawdudi and Qutb, … Turabi also uses the term to refer to the ‘union of the central divine commands with the changing conditions of human life’, or ‘the reuniting of the ideal with the actual’” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169).

The last point was criticised by Ali, who argued that:

“we can not find a comprehensive consistent thought with strict eternal logic that can be referred to when we need to judge the political and organisational attitudes of the movement” (Ali, 1996, p.291).

The belief in unity (Tawhīd) and sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral system propounded by the prophets. It is the very starting point of the Islamic political philosophy. The basic principle of Islam is that human beings must,

14 For more see; “http://www.pwhce.org/tawhid.html” www.pwhce.org/tawhid.html

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individually, surrender all rights, and collectively, surrender all rights of overlordship, legislation and exercising of authority over others (Donohue, 2007, p.263).

The work by Eissa shows that:

“for Turabi the point of departure for political thinking should be the fundamentals of basic Islamic doctrine. A Muslim should believe firmly in the unity of Allah; hence, he must believe in unity of all aspects of life and existence made by Him. Islam is a total way of life, so that all aspects of the life of the Muslims must be governed by their faith, in addition to their own ingenuity in improving their society and well-being” (Kausar, 2005, p.316).

El-Affendi asserts that the theme of the unity of Muslim life figures in another of Turabi’s prison books, entitled in translation: ‘Religious Belief, its Effects in the Life of Man’. He reports that a timid attempt to produce an ideological work was made by Turabi around 1972, when he published a book whose translated title is ‘Prayer, the Central Pillar of Religion’. Turabi used this discourse on prayer to tackle some wider ideological issues. He started by affirming the importance of prayer as a central and indispensable obligation for Muslims. The book:

“sheds light on the integral nature of the teaching of Islam, and the unity of meaning which runs through it, in order to reveal the harmony between prayer and all acts of worship, nay even between prayer and religious obligations in all walks of life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.168).

El-Affendi here makes reference to Turabi (1977). He found that the aims set for the book reveal the core of Turabi’s outlook. He argued that his main concern is ‘to bring religion to life’, by extracting the essence of religion and then putting it in touch with life (el-Affendi, 1991, pp.168-169). El-Affendi suggests that the rules that govern the leaders and those led in prayer are the same as those governing conduct in other aspects of public life, pointing to the unity and integrity of Islamic religious life. It could be said that realities of life could not be studied from the perspective of religious belief, since these are two separate fields. However, this is not true, because religion is not given in a vacuum. Religion is concerned mainly with life, and how to live it. The whole life is a theatre for expression of religious belief, and therefore the discussion of belief is
actually a discussion of the totality of human life. This latter point is also one that is
central to Turabi’s thought. He uses the term ‘Tawhīd’ (unification) to express this idea
the author asserts that there is a relationship between those two books; el-Affendi also
drew attention to them; both illuminate Turabi’s approach to Tawhīd (unification) in its
broad meanings.

El-Affendi concludes that Tawhīd is equally liberation from enslavement to one’s own
or others’ whims and desires. A true believer achieves complete liberation by not
allowing anything, be it his or her own desires, tradition, worldly authority, social
environment or material conditions, to cause him or her to deviate from the path
enjoined by God; Tawhīd is thus the ultimate liberation of man (el-Affendi, 1991,
p.170). Tawhīd is the dynamic principle that unites the material and the spiritual, the
real and the ideal, and subsumes the ever-changing reality under eternally valid
principles.

It is arguable that those two books paved the way to the Tawhīdi (unitarianism) theory
for Turabi, which defines and interprets all sorts of life’s activities as acts of worship,
and a part of the Tawhīd.

Other than el-Affendi’s contributions on the issue of Tawhīd in Turabi’s thought, there
are not many other specific contributions that examine Turabi’s vision about this issue.
Most of the writings are about the issue of Tawhīd as subordinate to other issues such as
Tajđīd, state, and others. Thus, more study is needed, and it is important for it to be
related to other issues that Turabi connected directly to Tawhīd.
Section 4. Objectives of the Islamic Movement in Sudan

Islamists in Sudan faced debates on objectives and strategy; should the group apply its ideological goals through the transformation of the state or society? If the former, should the transformation be rapid or gradual? From its inception, the movement was inward-looking, insisting that its primary aim was to work towards the establishment of an Islamic order within Sudan (el-Affendi, 1991, p.145).

According to Hasan Mekki, the objective of the Movement in the constitution was “to apply Islam in real life through establishment of a free Islamic republic, a sovereign state” (Mekki, 1998, p.34). It means that applying Islam in real life is the objective that cannot be achieved, except through the establishment of the Islamic state. It can therefore be understood that the main objective of the movement was to establish an Islamic state, as is mentioned in the definition of the Ikhwan movement:

“it is a movement of renewal and reform: education and politics are instruments for civilisation change. In other words, it is a social change movement that seeks political authority, to make the change through gradual reform or through revolution-Jihad” (Mekki, 1998, p.98).

Related ideas were presented by Mohammed Khier Abdalgadir, when he discussed the issue of the Islamic constitution (al-Dustūr al-Islāmi) (Abdalgadir, 1999, pp.109-116). These views are supported by el-Amin al-Haj Mohammed Ahmed, who argued that the main objective for the movement was to apply Shari‘a; moreover, they were convinced that there was no way to achieve that except through governing, as any ruler or governor who does not believe in Shari‘a law will never apply it, and any efforts for Da‘wah will fail (Ahmed, 1994, pp.63-64).

Morrison claims that the ultimate objective for the Islamic Movement in Sudan has been to establish an Islamic state on the principle of Shari‘a and the unity of Ummah (Morrison, 2001, p.154). However, Turabi himself has used numerous words and expressions to explain the aims of the Islamic movement. Generally, he says, the:
“sole aim of Islamic movements, in their early stages, has been to devote their resources to the general propagation of basic Islamic teachings in most walks of life. The main objective has been to restore people’s awareness of Islam instead of hankering after Western ideas and systems, which try to eliminate religion from public life altogether” (Hamdi, 1998, p.89).

It is clear from Turabi’s argument that the main objective is to put the people on the right path towards better understanding and practice of Islam; he did not mention the state as an objective. Morrison argued that the “justification for the Islamic state can be viewed as the combination of the political and the ethical aspects of tawhīd” (Morrison, 2001, p.145). From the above statements, the ultimate objective of most Islamic movements today is clear; namely, the establishment of an Islamic state and Islamic government, to emancipate the society and allow it to play its role.

Others, such as Moussalli, give a greater explanation; from a fundamentalist perspective, the Islamic movement means liberation from both authoritarian and unrepresentative regimes. An Islamic state is in opposition to capitalism and socialism, which are both rooted in economic interests. An Islamic state is supposed to eliminate paganism and lead people to self-sacrifice, love for humanity, and adherence to truth (Moussalli, 1999, p.58). Abdullahi A. Gallab argued that scholars agree that Islamists have been advocating a political ideology based on Islam, asserting the primacy of Islam, and calling for an Islamic order (Gallab, 2008, p.7).

On the other hand, Hamid argued that:

“their avowed objective was to emancipate Muslim individuals from blind allegiances to traditional Sudanese sectarianism and, thus, to create an independent power base that, cutting across traditional sectarianist parties, could establish a kind of modern Islamic state” (Hamid, 1989, p.266).

I do believe that to establish an Islamic state is not the real goal, but the strategic objective is to emancipate human beings, and achieve spiritual progress that guides people to more equality and justice, and freedom, except from being servants of Allah. Moussalli expresses a similar view, and suggests that “fundamentalists believe that the
Islamic state will lead to political and spiritual progress, since its religious method originates from the Divine” (Moussalli, 1999, p.50).

Ahmed Moussalli also writes “Islam’s main goal, from the fundamentalist perspective, is the unity of races, peoples and societies; it is necessary concomitant interests” (Moussalli, 1999, p.64). On the other hand, Emad al-Din Shahin argued that the objective of the Islamic movements is:

“not based on accelerating the process of development, nor on a desire to block ongoing changes taking place in society. On the contrary, they aim at redirecting the political orientation of their respective countries from secularism to Islamism” (Shahin, 1997, p.241).

From his perspective, Ghannouchi’s argument explains the idea that the state is an instrument through which Muslims can apply Shari’a.

“The establishment of the Islamic government is the short- or long-term goal of every Islamic group in order to implement Allah’s commandments; the Shari’a (Islamic Law) does not take into consideration the possibility that such a goal may be easily accomplished, and therefore an alternative is provided. Under exceptional circumstances, the Islamic group may forge alliances with non-Islamic groups, in order to establish a pluralistic government system with power held by the majority party” (Donohue, 2007, p.277).

According to Turabi, the ultimate goal should be the freedom to address the whole world through Islam without any restrictions whatsoever: “we are calling for a unified strategy of life for all humanity. This is our main task as Muslims today” (Hamdi, 1998, pp.44-45). Furthermore, Islamic movements “are committed to fighting secularism and establishing God’s order in society” (Hamdi, 1998, p.89).

The objective is clear: to establish an Islamic state to enhance the values of Islam. But what is Turabi’s concept of the Islamic state? Some of his views are in the above section. However, it must be recognised that he derives his understanding from the:

“teaching of the Qur’an as embedded in the political practice of the Prophet Muhammad and constitutes an eternal model that Muslims are bound to adopt as a perfect standard for all time” (Esposito, 1983, p.241).
Turabi (2008) describes this as a four-stage process, where at the initial stage the Islamic revival is a mere trend, with no defined organisational structure.

“This may be called the Da’wa stage, marked by spontaneous awareness of Islamic identity, and a need to express and promote it. This emerges in the form of small groups scattered here and there … The next stage is when that general trend is streamlined into an organised group aiming for greater self-education, solidarity and cooperation to represent and promote Islam … In the third stage, the small localised groups grow into an effective movement with tangible influence in society.” (Turabi, 2008, p.11)

It assumes a reformist role with political needs and priorities addressed to the society at large. It develops detailed programmes to uphold its beliefs, to mobilise social forces against corruption and anti-social activities, to promote good and constructive work, and to bring pressure to bear on powers that be.

“The fourth stage comes when the Islamic movement assumes the mantle of the political leadership of the society and takes charge of public policy, putting into action its programmes aimed at building a cleaner, freer, and better society, and raising its religious and material living standards. It will be called upon to put forward specific political, economic, social and cultural programmes, and comprehensive policy proposals for running society. It will have to cater for the international dimension towards the rest of the Muslim Ummah and the wider international community” (Hamdi, 1998, pp.109-110).

It seems to me that each of these stages is an objective at a specific time, but the ultimate objective remains the society and individual, and enhancing their chance to worship God freely, and to enjoy the spiritual and material life, in this life and the hereafter.

Section 5. Access to Power

However, according to the above discussion, questions may be raised: how can the movement achieve the mentioned objectives? what is the best way to achieve them? is it through military power, revolution or democratic mechanisms? Abd al-Salam Sidahmed in his study concluded that “Turabi has underlined three ways of access to power: revolution, as in the case of Iran, through the ‘military institution’ as in the case of
Sudan, and through the ballot box as in Algeria” (Sidahmed, 1992, p.18). Turabi actually endorsed all these examples as legitimate (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996, p.13). However, although Turabi thinks it is legitimate to come to power through the military institution in Sudan, he thinks it is not the best way to access power, but he reached this point after been deposed by his own students in the military and civilian sector. “He further looks to freedom to organise political institutions as a necessity for Islamic revival” (Moussalli, 1999, p.91). The work of el-Affendi indicates that the movement has taken the very significant step of making its primary goal the seizure of power in Sudan as soon as possible, rather than the more vague objective of working towards the setting up of an Islamic order (el-Affendi, 1991, p.184). El-Affendi reached this conclusion after tracking the objective of the movement at each phase of development of the movement, from pressure group to political party. He asked the question: to what goal are these tactics supposed to lead the movement? He then considered the entire step to reach that goal to be a tactic, and so concludes with the statement above. The difference between el-Affendi’s work and others, is that he understands that the establishment of the Islamic state is not an objective in itself, but an instrument for achieving higher goals (Tawhīd). El-Affendi shows concern for the fact that the movement drew a plan for the interim objective of working towards the setting up of an Islamic order for the reasons of freeing people, revolutionising society, and hastening economic development; this means material, and as well as spiritual interests, i.e. reaping the worldly benefits of religious belief. “Union of the eternal divine commands with the changing conditions of human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.170). It is important to say that the role of the state is stated by Turabi here: “The most important function of the state is to lead the society towards the achievement of the ideal Islamic community” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010).
However, the questions arise: is the national state primarily an entity in Turabi’s views? is it considered a transitional phase or an interim stage, after which it would be absorbed into the global Ummah state? El-Affendi found that:

“the unity Ikhwan seek is a decentralised arrangement, probably more like EEC than the USSR or the USA. This is perfectly in line with their position on the kind of unity that should exist between different Islamic groups” (el-Affendi 1999, p.178).

Turabi went further by stating that:

“National resources of different countries and regions of the world should be pooled, and by cooperation and sharing between the wealthy North and the poor South—the former with its financial wherewithal and the latter with its manpower—everyone will benefit” (Hamdi, 1998, p.44).

These ideas were interpreted by some scholars as a reflection of socialist influences. However, Enayat refutes that:

“In contrast some scholars argued that the Islamic movement in Sudan has been influenced by external ideologies like socialism and nationalism, the former has many similarities with Turabi’s ideology and thought, while the latter has been seen as a contradiction to the Islamic idea of the Ummah. Socialism comes close to Islam’s central summons for brotherhood, social harmony and egalitarianism. Islam and socialism are united in their high regard for collectivism, state control, and an equitable distribution of wealth” (Enayat, 1982, p.139).

However, the philosophical background of socialism and Islam are different, and what has been said by Turabi is based on Islamic ideas.

In Chapter 1—on historical background—the issue of the perspective of the Islamic Movement in Sudan on unity with other movements, and their views regarding national state unity was discussed. It is understood that they support a broad cooperative body.

The research will critically evaluate these views.

To conclude this chapter it could be said that theories developed during this chapter encompass the work of a number of scholars. In some situations, research is very specific on a particular idea and translating this to a different level may provide a different understanding of the Islamic movement’s concepts and objectives. However, in most cases, there are aspects of the researcher’s findings that can make positive
contributions to understanding the Islamic movement as a whole, and Turabi’s views in particular. There are some gaps in the conception, which this research will seek to fill. Another point is that most of the existing studies did not cover the implications of the application of the theories of the movement to different fields, such as socio-economics, art, ethnic minorities, women, international relations, and internal public policy, so as to answer the main questions of the research: what are the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular respect to democracy and how have these elements been made operational in his political action, and to examine if there is a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice.

As the Sudanese Movement defines itself as a reforming movement, the Ikhwan revised most of the traditional fiqh, and tried to create and adopt a new school of thought, especially in issues of state, public policy, ethnic and religious minorities, women, economics, culture, and all aspects of human life. Most scholars address these issues, but in isolation, each separated from the others. However, Turabi deals with them as one unit that cannot be divided into different fields. Most of what has been written about the Islamic movement is about its historical development.

In contrast to other scholars, this research will focus on building Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory as one philosophical entity. The majority of other scholars examine individual elements of Turabi’s theory, such as the state, economic issues, Shura, political issues, fiqh, prayer (Salah), charity (Zakat), or personal issues. This research will not isolate such issues, but will focus on Turabi’s theory as one unit, and examine the ways in which the different elements relate to the others in the context of Tawhīd.

There is not enough research in the practice of Shura after 1989 in Sudan. Indeed, Sudan is the first Sunni country to be governed by Islamists in this era. The research
will examine Islamists and democracy, in terms of Shura theory and practice in Sudan after 1989, and to what extent Islamists have applied what is claimed in their theory.
Chapter 3: Islamists and Democracy

This chapter critically evaluates Islamist discourse and practice of democracy. The chapter focuses on the experiments in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. It concentrates specifically on Islamic movements and their leaders. Moreover, it focuses on the political thought and practice of these movements.

Current events in the Muslim world, particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Turkey, Tunisia and Sudan, have produced political and academic discussions among Islamists themselves, and also among Islamists and others on the compatibility of Islamist discourses with democracy, human rights, pluralism and the new world order. These discussions influenced the vision of Islamists towards establishing an Islamic state. The criticisms they faced motivated development of their approach to political participation in government, or establishing their own state. According to the debate and practice, different schools of thought among Islamists emerged. It could be said that although they developed the theories they could not introduce any mechanisms for implementation, or practical steps towards applying the values of Islam in reality.

This chapter, therefore, aims to critically evaluate some of the important visions and practical experiences of Islamists in some countries.

Section 1. The Role of Revivalists and Movements

Throughout history, there were revivalists in the Islamic world. The most recent Islamist phenomenon began in the 19th century with reformist trends; in particular, the school of Sayyid Jamal el-Dīn al-Afghani (1839-1897) and his student Muhammad ʿAbduh (1879-1905). Their school of thought was influential in shaping the intellectual climate in which the first major Islamic group was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in the 1920s, followed by another major Islamist
group, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which was founded independently in India in 1941 by
journalist, Sayyid Abul A’la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979). The reformist ideas had a
significant impact on modern Islamic movements in the Muslim world, and different
schools of thought emerged according to their intellectual work, and actions. However,
Oliver Roy (1994, p.3) affirmed that “The Islamist movement, born about 1940, is a
product of the modern world, influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts about
revolutionary organisation.” Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an
‘ideology’, a neologism which they introduced, and which remains anathema to the
Ulama (the clerics or scholars).

It is arguable that the 20th century witnessed the colonial period for most of the Islamic
world, that had its impact on the political thought of any movement at that time, be it
Marxist-Leninist or Islamist; all were seeking to free their countries from colonial
occupation, so the revolutionary way of thinking, or any other attitude reflected this
fact. For Islamists, the decline of the caliphate was another factor that influenced their
methods of building their organisations. This factor shaped the vision of most of those
scholars, while they were searching for solutions for the Muslim world’s problems.
However, they were not thinking on a national level only, but approached the Ummah as
one, united nation. The approaches of the early revivalists towards political issues had
significant impact on the approaches of recent reformers.

There are many challenges facing Islamists: first, how to develop a comprehensive
theoretical and practical approach that addresses current issues; second, how to develop
a qualified and effective political system that fulfils the Islamic conditions and values in
the political system such as Shura (consultation), justice and human rights, and which is
not less than democratic models in developed countries. However, it must be said that
each generation of scholars tried to develop models that take account of Islamic values,
while at the same time using the mechanisms developed by human experience. Turabi,
Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, Khomeini, Amara, el-Awa and others scholars inspired Islamists in most Muslim countries, and became a frame of reference for most Islamic movements in practising ‘Shura’ democracy, and participating in government, as a step to a fully democratic ‘Shura’ system.

However, there is a wide range of Islamist discourse, from moderate to extreme radicalism; and, while some Islamists are pluralistic in terms of inter-Muslim relations and between Muslims and minorities, others are not. Turabi asserts that:

“I am pluralistic. It is possible to say that political parties have the right to be; diversity and difference is natural (Sunna of life); when the Prophet governed al-Madina, there were different religions, and ethnic, and political powers; there were Jews, non-believers, and Muslims, their rights were secured by him. Generally, what benefits the people will remain; the people have to choose the political party whose values they believe in” (Turabi, Interview 25 December 2010).

Moreover, it can be said that “while some Islamists [are] politically pluralistic, but theologically exclusive, others are accommodating in religion” (Moussalli 2003, in ECSSR, p.115). Most of the reformists influenced a wide range of Islamic movements and activists. However, Islamists in general believed that governments in their countries do not serve Muslim values, ideologically, politically, and economically, and at the same time serve the interests of the dominant world powers; a view held by Islamists in Egypt, Mauritania, Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia, for example.

However, in the current debate regarding democracy, what needs to be noted is that liberalisation, whether economic, political or cultural, as well as social justice, political freedom and democracy, are the major demands of moderate Islamist groups. Moreover, there is debate among Islamists themselves regarding the Islamic state, freedom of speech, ethnic and religious minorities, social development, community welfare, and to some extent international relations. Many Islamist scholars and theorists, politicians or movements proposed different methods of developing or establishing an Islamic state; the political system and basic ideology can provide us with indications to classify them,
whether they are pro-democracy or not, reformist or radical. However, radical trends among moderate Islamists are very small in number, and most of the time are by individuals. The pro-democratic groups were encouraged by inclusion in some governments that left room for Islamists to participate in political activities.

Section 2. Inclusion and Exclusion by Governments

Inclusion is seen as a mechanism for deflating radical opposition voices, promoting tolerance and pluralism, and perhaps even advancing the process of democratisation. But the inclusion moderation hypothesis is not unique to the transition paradigm. In fact large and varied bodies of literature deploy some version of the idea that inclusion produces moderation in behaviour, practice or belief (Schwedler, 2006, p.11).

As a result of national, regional, and international transformations, pressure for democratisation is increasing, and significant debates on the issue of democracy are carried out at national level in each country, within regional and international organisations, and in academia. El-Affendi argues that “[T]he debate over democracy has been one of the most important debates in the Muslim world this last century” (el-Affendi, 2010, p.31). One may agree with el-Affendi about this debate among Islamists, but there are other levels of debate inside regimes that fear democracy, and meanwhile faced pressure from internal opposition groups and also external pressures. However, different regimes reacted differently towards these pressures. In response to international pressures, some regimes made limited, artificial, controlled reform to avoid full-scale democratisation, while others warned of Western alienation, in that they claim that, if they adopted the described democratic process, this will bring Islamists into state legislation and executive institutions. According to John Voll:

“the whole discourse of modernisation and Westernisation has come into question. The rise of more populist movements affirming Islam and the global
pressures for democratisation combine to force a reconstructing of religion political discourse in North Africa. The result is contestation of the basic concepts of political life, with Islamic movements emerging as a significant factor, both in the political struggle and in the development of viable political conceptualisations for North Africa states and societies” (Voll, 1997, p.xii).

Some scholars, such as Anderson and Waterbury (1997), connected the need for social economic reform to political reform. Waterbury (1997) argued that:

“political economy of authoritarianism and democracy does not stop at a given country’s border, but is connected to the international market, sources of credit and arms, investment flow, strategic rents, and the instruments of international clientage and dependency” (Waterbury, 1997, p.145).

However, Islamists compromise most of the time, and agree to participate, if the regime agrees to be inclusive. Some regimes do compromise and accept limited controlled participation by the Islamic movement. John Voll (1997) argues that:

“[O]ne of the distinctive aspects of Islamic populist opposition to authoritarian regimes at present is that these often well-organised movements continue to be willing to operate within the existing political system to promote the democratisation process. This within the context where the regimes being opposed are less authoritarian than the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and are more willing to make some compromises. The process of democratisation assumes a different form under these conditions. Jordan provides an interesting example of a country in which activist Islamists challenged monarchical authoritarianism” (Voll, 1997, p.8).

Voll added that:

“[T]his did not produce a revolution. Instead it provided the impetus for the beginning of democratisation of the system in which the king opens the way for ‘Islamic activists’ participation in the elections and then within the resulting parliament” (Voll, 1997, p.8).

Eickelman argues that:

“politics as leviathan is thus decisively abandoned in favor of politics as decision makers, in spite of a faction of Western commentators with ‘Islamist’ discourse. This is a rising tide of Muslim moderates responding to what they see as a bankruptcy of traditional religious and political discourse” (Eickelman, 1997, p.xiii).

Islamists in these countries represent the main force for change, and not the Westernised groups; yet both call for democracy. Fergani concluded that:

“In countries where radical Islamic movements are forbidden, like Tunisia, Libya and Syria, all serous analysis considers that political Islam represents the
main force of opposition. Even if there is no legal political expression, its influence on society and in the field of the culture is such that the powers feel themselves compelled to adapt their discourse and political practice” (Fergani, 2006, pp.66-71).

Fergani’s analysis was borne out; after the revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, Islamists were the main force in political life in their countries.

In conclusion, national and international pressures were directed at democratising countries. Different countries reacted differently, where some carried out limited and controlled reform to include Islamists in the government, as a response to these national and international pressures. Some countries included Islamists in government as early as the 1950s, such as Jordan, while others were more intent on broadening the base of support for elites, rather than creating a truly democratic system or real participation. It is notable that the reasons for inclusion are diverse, and vary at different periods of time in different countries. However, the dictatorship, oppression, and controlled democracy led to revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

Section 3. Islamist Reformists and Democracy: A ‘theoretical approach’

Islamists across the Islamic world tried to develop philosophical frameworks to guide their movements to a better understanding of religion’s role in all aspects of life, specifically in those new issues that emerge in human life. These include political issues, which are related to practical needs, such as political participation, whether ‘Shura’ or ‘democracy’; how to rule; how to solve the problems of ethnic and religious minorities; and how to address economic development.

This part of the study will shed light on the contributions of those leaders or scholars, who produced theoretical or practical visions for the concepts that connected directly to the practice of Shura and state building, i.e. institutions such as the parliament, and modern economic and social institutions. In this case, a number of scholars, such as
Ghannouchi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Hasan al-Turabi, developed theoretical frameworks, which were also adopted by many other Islamists. The reformers mentioned are the most influential among recent leaders. These reformers’ objectives concentrated on solving Muslims’ problems in all aspects of life, without separating what is worldly from what is divine.

In contrast, some revolutionaries in the 19th century concentrated only on the hereafter, not worldly issues; for example, Mohammed al-Mahdi in Sudan, who summarised his vision succinctly: “I came to you with the destruction of the world and the building of the next.” El-Affendi asserts that:

“they were not concerned with playing a role in economic, political or social reform, except when it was religiously mandated and was the fulfilment of some values or teachings. The reformers did not think that the objective of their reform was the improvement of livelihood, the increase of welfare of Muslims, or similar mundane interest” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.14).

In this context, the modern Islamic movement understood that they came to guide people to practise religion in all aspects of life, which defines their approach to social, economic and political issues. Although they adopted the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’, they did not, as yet, propose a comprehensive practical plan to solve the problems that face the Muslim world. Even Islamists who won elections in some countries, such as Palestine, Kuwait, Algeria, and Sudan in 1985, did not possess the comprehensive solutions they spoke about.

However, in the last two decades, Islamists have experienced the practice of government, and faced many problems. In order to solve these problems, they held conferences to discuss those issues that needed religious or ‘fiqh’ opinion. It is notable that there was development in their approaches towards recent issues. As such, the reformers started to focus on improving the livelihood in their communities, and developed charitable organisations in health and education. In the economic field, they established banks and companies to implement Islamic values in formal institutions.
However, as education among Islamists and Muslims increased, the media and communication with the wider world has impacted on their vision of the world, and their internal problems. Hence, it is clear that most reformists have looked to other nations and learned from their experiences, but still they need to walk a long way to tackle their economic and social challenges.

El-Affendi refers the development in the reformists’ approach and the issues they addressed to the Muslims’ awareness;

“perhaps what really distinguished this new world was the Muslim awareness of the existence of another world, dimensions and visions that were different from those known by their predecessors. In addition they were affected by the new worlds and longed to participate in them. These were the worlds where the Islamic movements surfaced and began to take their form within new frameworks” (el-Affendi, 2003, p.17).

It could be said that communication with other nations raised Muslims’ awareness to the extent that the majority accepted the reformers’ new visions and opinions, which had not been accepted in the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, communication made it easy for new ideas to reach everywhere at the same time, and so be discussed in the media, and in academic and political spheres.

El-Affendi (2003) asserts that there is near consensus among analysts in this field on linking contemporary Islamic movements to the intellectual and reformist effort exerted by Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, and his disciple, Mohammad ‘Abdu (1849-1905). It is true that Afghani was one of the most distinguished reformers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who inspired most of the scholars and politicians in the 20th century. Afghani influenced a whole generation of Muslims in the different regions of the Muslim world that he visited, beginning with Iran through Afghanistan, India, Egypt and then Istanbul where he died (el-Affendi, 2003, p.19). It could be said that the countries he visited at that time were the most influential and powerful, culturally and politically. His influence also spread through his disciples, such as Mohammed ‘Abdu, who in turn
influenced a whole generation of thinkers and intellectuals in Egypt and Syria, and contributed to the reform of educational institutions, such as al-Azhar, and state institutions, like the courts. El-Affendi (2003) claims that this influence spread through Mohammed Rashid Rida and his journal, Manar, reaching the farthest corners of the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia. The general legacy of this intellectual school, such as establishing the basis of Shura and the reform of government, religious reform, and the renewal of reform, constitutes the basis for the emergence of the modern Islamic movements. These points show that the important contribution of this school of thought was noted in the Islamic world, and in the modern Islamic movement, and by reformists, such as Hasan al-Banna and then Ghannouchi, Turabi, Qaradawi, and Abassi Madani. Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi who established an Islamic group in India in 1940, like Banna, addressed public political issues related to his county. However, he criticised the national state, and believed that it contradicted the teachings of Islam. Mawdudi’s influence reached to the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Further support for this argument can be taken from the work of el-Affendi (2003), who found evidence to suggest the significant intellectual influence of the group and its founder, as Mawdudi might be one of the most widely-read Muslim thinkers in the world. Those thinkers agreed that Islam was in decline, and called for rebirth, and reinterpreting of the main source of Islam, the ‘Quran’. They were influenced by European power that had colonised their lands in the first half of the 20th century. Most revivalists at the time reinterpreted Islam as a world view, in answer to the question of government, or presented Islam as a force of resistance against Western hegemony.

15 Al-Azhar Mosque (359-361AH)/(970-975m) is one of the most important mosques in Egypt, most notably in the Muslim world. A mosque and university for more than a thousand years, it was established in the first Fatimid Caliph in Egypt: Al-Azhar mosque was completed in the month of Ramadan in the year 361AH = 972, and it is the first mosque established in the city of Cairo. It is the oldest existing impact of Fatimid Egypt. The historians have disagreed in the naming of it but most likely it is after the name of the daughter of Prophet Muhammad Fatima al-Zahraa.
However, these scholars also challenged the traditional institutions and their understanding of Islam.

Accordingly, a modern school of thought was born, the school of Ikhwan. This is the major school of thought in the Middle East established by Hasan al-Banna, and his disciple, Sayyid Qutb, who was an advocate for radical transformation of Muslim society. Qutb was an influential political philosopher, whose writings, especially his political writings, guided many trends inside the Islamic movement. According to Ahmed S. Moussalli:

“the theme that underlines Qutb’s political thought is that Islam accepts only virtuous and good society and demands absolute obedience to God’s teaching” (Moussalli, 1992, p.147).

This way of thinking created some trends among Islamists, believing that building the virtuous society is more important than participating in any government; moreover, it created militant Jihadist groups\(^\text{16}\) that believe in education and Da’wa activities as priorities. While it is generally agreed that those are the most influential thinkers in the last century, it is arguable that the latest generation of thinkers, such as Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, and other Islamist practitioners, address the issue of democracy directly, and have developed a theoretical and practical approach that has tried to answer the critical questions that face Muslim societies in politics, economics, social domains, and all other aspects of life.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, to understand the phenomenon that produced such a philosophical approach, it is useful to consider the historical context of the issues that developed in each period. What needs to be noted is that the researcher tends to focus less on why Islamists have emerged at different moments in different places, than on

\(^{16}\) It is not a part of the study; those groups do not believe in democracy. They are independent groups.
how Islamists seek and exercise power; the essential conception of Islam is combined with the assertion that Islam is not simply a religion, but a comprehensive way of life.

Mawdudi’s writings focused on detailing the ideal Islamic state, and the work that was needed for its establishment. In practice, the Islamic group in India finally participated in the politics of the national state, although in principle it rejected this orientation. Contrary to Banna, who accepted the centrality of nationhood in Egypt, and saw no contradiction between the call to Arab nationalism and the Islamic call, Mawdudi brought together the complete rejection of secularism and nationalism, as well as democracy (el-Affendi, 2003, p.33). For Mawdudi (1978), nationalism is the deification of national interests, while democracy is deification of man and making the desires of the majority the governing principle of the state. These principles may contradict the Islamic Shari'a principle that upholds the universalism of the call of Islam, and the principle of divine governance. In other words, the freedom of the majority is restricted to what God has revealed and the principle of submission to the authority of the almighty God over people’s life, both private and public. Thus, the objective of the Islamic nation must be the establishment of the divine caliphate based on worship of God in every aspect and domain (el-Affendi, 2003, p.33). However, this explanation raises the problem of the majority and minority in a democratic system, if adopted by Islamists, as to how to take into account the opinion of religious minorities. Later, Turabi tried to solve this problem by adopting what he called *al-Tawali al-Siyasi*, through which minorities’ opinion can be taken into account; this issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

Islamic thought includes many, varying, intellectual trends, such as secularism, socialism, nationalism, and others. However, two trends in modern Islamic thought are characterised by accepting Islam as the basis of civilisation, and as a fundamental foundation of knowledge and a repository of the principles of the constituent, the
political system and social reform, namely Islamic reformism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic reformists are represented by Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Muhammad Iqbal, and Islamic fundamentalism is represented by Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini, they differ primarily in their approaches of building knowledge and reaching it.

However, according to the above, Islamists are not one homogeneous group, but differ theoretically and practically; some are very extreme and others moderate accepting modern life within Islamic values. Most extremist or rejectionist movements were influenced by Qutb’s approach, especially his concept of Jāhiliyyah, which means ignorance, and rejecting others and treating them as infidels, even if they are Muslims. Others do not adopt Qutb’s approach, such as Shukry Mostafa,17 Omer ‘Abdurrahman (1938-)18 and Aboud al-Zumar,19 as they represented Takfiri trends in Egypt. However, all these groups rejected democracy, and counted it as Kufr; at the same time, they reject their governments, and any kind of contact with them (Esposito, 1996, p.179). According to this approach, they blame Ikhwan in Egypt, because they participated in the parliament. However, according to Abu Rumman (2007), in Jordan Ikhwan led the way in boycotting elections and political participation, after the government signed the ‘Wadi ‘Arba’ peace agreement with Israel on 26 October 1994, and changed the election law, similarly, in Algeria and other countries.

17 Born 1942, established Jam‘at altakfeer and al-Hijra, that think the society and the state are Kafir, and he concentrated on Hjra, which means ‘to stay away from this infidel society’.
18 He is a leader of al-Jama’a al-Islamia; he was a prisoner in USA on 24 June, 1993.
19 He is former military intelligence, a colonel in the Egyptian Army; he was the founder and the leader of a Jihad Group; he was sentenced to life imprisonment in Cairo for being implicated in the assassination of president Anwar Saldat in October 1981 (released from prison in March 2011).

95
3.1 Islamists and Democracy

There are famous scholars who developed a comprehensive approach and ideas about Islam, Shura and democracy. They concentrated on issues that answered today’s problems, such as political participation, human rights and international relations; for example, Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, el-Awa and Amara. While some movements and leaders went further in practice in the democratic process, and succeeded in adopting and playing a comprehensive role in developing ideas and practices for Islamists, other scholars tried to find a theoretical approach for the practice, through Ijtihād. Such scholars, like Turabi and Ghannouchi, take into account their own experiences. This study focuses on the most influential scholars, where it is notable that they tried to develop the ideas of Shura and democracy in Islam, generally, so that these can be applied anywhere.

3.1.1 Islamists and Democracy: General perspective

Esposito argued that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood under Hasan al-Banna had a leader-centric authority structure, mobilisational youth league, and paramilitary organisation, familiar from fascism (though Sufism was in fact the strongest influence on Banna) (Esposito, 1998, p.157). But, in decades, a noticeable change had happened to their stance; they started to accept partial participation in the democratic process in Egypt. However, internally, the movement is still centralised, and Shura is practised most of the time. The main trend in the movement accepts democracy as a tool for change. But other extreme movements in Egypt such as Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra and Hizb-ut-Tahrir did not accept democracy, nor changing society through it; they have been influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah’s, Mawdudi’s and Qutb’s schools of thought. However, the main trend of Islamists, the Ikhwan, reject violence,
and believe in gradual change through political participation and social activities. This trend of Ikhwan condemned the assassination of Sadat in 1981.

Not only in Egypt, but Islamists everywhere faced a particular debate over strategies. They raised an important question that showed their vision towards changes; should the group achieve its goals through gradual transformation of the state authority or through society?

It is arguable that Islamists may be divided into purely evolutionary Islamists, who see no active role for the state authority in purifying Muslim society, or democratic Islamists, who believe that the best means to institutionalise Shari’a is to peacefully convince a majority of citizens to assent to it over repeated elections. Indeed, one may say that the experiment in Turkey encouraged some scholars to reflect on the best way forward. In Sudan, Turabi and others have firsthand experience of using a military coup to take over the state and seek to change society. Surprisingly, they produced literature that supports the gradual transformation of society through repeated elections, and for a fact, Turabi admitted their mistake (Turabi interview, 26 December 2010). Ghannouchi went further, by accepting democracy and its process, and agreeing to the mechanisms as well. Islamists in Egypt faced the same questions, and developed their theories and practical experiment. “They believe that democracy is a peaceful way to achieve the goals of the movement” (Abu-al-Futouh, interview, 17 March, 2011, London).

However, the great majority of Islamists, quite unsurprisingly, see the state as a natural instrument to institute and execute Shari’a law. Judging by their literature, most Islamists also perceive their goals to be in tension, if not in conflict with various principles of liberal democracy, including popular sovereignty, separation of powers, the mutability of laws, and government multi-party contestation for power, and equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims, and women and men. In this case, Turabi and
Ghannouchi inserted and developed the concept of citizenship, and public freedoms into the Islamic state model.

Ghannouchi argued that, on a practical level, the Islamic trend demands political change with the objective of setting up Islamic democratic and consultative institutions, instead of the existing dictatorial and secularist ones. Likewise, it demands social, economic and cultural change and the establishment of all social activities on an Islamic basis (Ghannouchi, 2001, p.115). This argument shows that the Islamic trends wanted the state authority as a tool for social change, and to enhance religious values of freedom, peace and justice.

Refa'at al-Sayyid Ahmed (2005) argued that, in the years 2002-2003, in less than two months Islamic movements succeeded in parliamentary elections in four countries: Pakistan, Morocco, Bahrain and Turkey. However, this victory raised many questions about why Islamists were elected. He mentioned four reasons: first, it was a reaction to American terrorism against Muslims and the Islamic world; the second reason was Western support for dictatorship; the third reason was that the Islamic movements had gained good experience in the political field; fourth, was the spread of corruption and poverty in the Islamic world. These ideas may be supported by Ghannouchi’s argument that democratisation faces not only internal obstacles, but is hindered by massive and direct Western support for dictatorship (Kausar, 2003, p.343). Though these reasons are acceptable, some, in their influence, are stronger than others, at different times, and in different countries.

For Ghannouchi today, most Islamic parties have rejected the use of force to achieve political ends, and instead search for opportunities that would enable them to effect change through peaceful means (Ghannouchi, 2001, p.115). Ghannouchi argued that they are indeed well aware that it is possible to realise their objectives through the
creation of legally-recognised political parties and agencies, or by joining existing ones. It could be said that this is a realistic point of view that has been adopted by many Islamic movements, which established their own political parties, e.g. Sudan (NIF), Egypt (MB), Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Yemen, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Malaysia, Somalia, Mauritania, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Indonesia. However, in other countries, they have established organisations or other umbrella bodies to get in touch with the society seeking social change through individual change. This process took decades, and the Islamic movements gained gradually due to the practical experience and the continuance of debate in the field of political thought. 

The enormous shift achieved by the reformers, from Afghani, and Mohammed ‘Abdu to Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi and Turabi, during the last and the present century resulted in changes in the attitude and way of thinking among Islamists. However, Ghannouchi asserts that the combined effort of both the first group, official Islam, and the second, opposition Islam, has given considerable impetus to the call of reformist Islam, leading to the penetration of reformist ideas in all strata of society, and thereby representing the widest cultural and political currents in the Islamic world (Ghannouchi, 2001, p.115).

I may argue that a significant evolution in Islamist political thought and practice occurred in the last two decades; this evolution is due to internal and external factors. The internal factors could be attributed to the members of those movements educated in modern institutions in most countries; those students in the 1960s-1970s became leaders.

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20 In 1928, Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimūn) in Egypt following the "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution" 2011 Egyptian revolution, and on 5 June 2011, for the first time, they established a political party named al-Hurriyah wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice).
21 In 1981, Rashid al-Ghannouchi established Harakat Al-Itijah al- Islami (Islamic Trend Movement) then the Nahdha Party (Renascence Party).
22 In 1988, Abbasi Madani established the Salvation Islamic Front, and Abdallah Jab Allah established the Renascence movement.
23 In 1970, Arbakan established the National System in Turkey (al-Nizam al Watani, then al-Rafah).
in their countries. Therefore, modern education itself is another factor, which helped Islamists organise their movements in a modern way. It helped them build modern institutions in the social, economic, cultural and media fields. However, these institutions are part of the state structure. It increases the Islamist experience in leading societies, and answers the questions of ruling in modern societies, followed by other internal factors in that the rulers in some cases were in need of the support of Islamists, when they felt they were not popular anymore. Moreover, the awareness of the people of the importance of political participation put pressure on governments and, as a result, reforms were introduced in some countries. The external factors can be concluded in the democratic trend, which covered most of the Islamic world by virtue of the single superpower, and international organisations, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3.1.2 Islamists and political parties

In this part, the study explores the Islamist practice and theoretical approach to political parties. However, it must be said that Islam accepts different opinions, but not a division among nations. According to this opinion, some Islamists reject the idea of a multi-party system, while others accept the practice of political parties. Unless parties stand against Islam and reject Shari’a, they are still counted as another category of opinion. Turabi tried to solve this problem by establishing what he called al-Tawali al-Siyasi (political consensus or association). His theory is that of one party or umbrella within which different opinions or trends co-exist, but the final decision that comes out of it is obligatory or binding, ‘Mulzim’, for all members of the community. Al-Tawali was not a successful experiment, although theoretically it offers a comprehensive solution for diversity and unity issues. However, Sudan was not a suitable place to apply this theory at that time, because of the internal and external factors that stood as obstacles in the face of such an experiment; these will be examined in the next chapter. The theory itself
was faced by a campaign of criticism from Sudanese opposition parties, and Sudanese scholars, such as Gallab, Abdallah Ali Ibrahim, and others who thought that the concept was not clear. However, they judged the intention of the government not the theory itself.

Islamists dispute the philosophical basis of Shura and democracy, but accept democracy as a tool through which they can apply Shura. Yet they disagree on the concept of sovereignty (people are sovereign in democracy, while sovereignty is to Allah only, not the people; people are vicegerent (Khalifah) of Allah in His earth (to which He granted the honour of ruling themselves).

As mentioned before, Islamic movements started establishing political parties, but this was faced by criticism from other Islamists. Ghannouchi expresses similar views, and claims that there is no consensus among Muslims today on the most appropriate methodologies of change. Furthermore, the issue is not confined to differences about degree of legitimacy and propriety of using force as a means of change, nor to determining the legitimacy of existing Islamic states. Ghannouchi (2001) shows concern for the fact that, in the Islamic countries, when the idea of an Islamic party has become so established, there is at least one Islamic party in each country. He noted that some contemporary views rejected the idea of an Islamic party altogether, and others rejected the idea of a multi-party system. Ghannouchi asserted that the notion of a multi-party system, they argue, is essentially alien, and does not accord with the unitary concept of Tawhīd that proclaims the primacy of the Ummah and not the party as a focus for political work and loyalty. Ghannouchi noted that this criticism was shared by the ultra-traditionalist (Salafi) militant groups, which reject the concept of multi-party politics, and also those states founded on the idea of modern Islamism, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. He added that the same can also be said of certain scholars who enjoy a special relationship with their rulers. Ghannouchi (interview, November 2006.) and
Turabi (interview 25 December 2010) agreed on accepting the idea of a multi-party system, while Turabi went further by saying that even the party of the devil can be established and compete with others; he compared it with the Madina political system, in which non-Muslim groups existed, or played a role; yet some of them came to the Prophet to judge over their dispute. According to Sayyid Dusuqi Hasan (2001, p.116), the Islamic movement must be a reformist movement, which establishes its work upon social interaction and the awakening of man to construct, do good and display the Qur'anic values embedded in his being. This individual must also transform these values into a potent system in life. Islamists build their political parties in most countries, but in some countries they are not legal parties, because they are not registered. This claim is supported by Moussalli (2004), who asserts that “from 1984, the Ikhwan in Egypt and other similar movements, e.g. al-Nahda in Tunisia and Jabhat al-Inghaz al-Islamia (Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria, tried many times to enter the political field legally, and participated in NGOs.” In other words the problem was not the Islamists, but the regimes in those countries, which refused to recognise these political parties. However, nowadays in most Islamic countries there is one or more Islamic party and, in some cases, there is an Islamic community (Jama’a Islamiyyah). It could be said that, practically, Islamists went further than developing a theoretical approach only.

Section 4. Islamist Political Participation: The Practice of Democracy

4.1 Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn: abbr. Ikhwan) was founded in 1928. The Ikhwan movement had, as its main objective, Islamising individuals, families, society and then the state. They adopted a gradual approach to attain their goals (Tal, 2005, pp.16-18).
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the 20th century, and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements.” It is an activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensional spheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is severely constrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a production of earlier reform movements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of ‘reformist Islam’ (Shahin, 2007, p.1).

With regard to historical development, throughout the history of the movement there were many trends, moderate, extreme, and in between, because of the oppression during Nasser’s era (1954-1968). The execution of Qutb in 1966 was a turning point that led some Islamists to adopt Qutb’s political thought. As a consequence, the Jihadist generation emerged, and faced the Egyptian regime twice. First, in April 1974, in the state military education school (Ibrahim, 2003, p.3), and the second, with the assassination of President Sadat on 6 October 1981. Later, in the 1990s, the Jihad movement confronted the regime in limited military operations (Ibrahim, 2003, p.vii). As the impact of external and internal conflicts and crises the main trends of these movements, such as Ikhwan, followed the example of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, and reviewed their stances and rejected violence. Moreover, externally, revivalism in the Muslim countries and international factors played a role in developing the strategy of Ikhwan in Egypt. A study by Abd Kotob, and Sullivan (1999, p.12) concluded that:

“the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, while the more moderate groups, epitomised by Egyptian’s Muslim Brotherhood, call for gradual change to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses.”
4.1.1 Egyptian Ikhwan political thought

The political discourse of Ikhwan in Egypt has shown significant development since its establishment. The ideological political discourse of the founder of the movement of Muslim Brotherhood and the first leader, Hasan al-Banna, is the basis of the inclusive moderate perception of the concept of Hākimiyah or ‘governance of God’, and that of the verbal and political dimension. Although the concept of governance of God historically, and currently, was used to exclude what is not counted as Islamic, Hasan al-Banna counts it as a source of legitimacy and moderation (Moussalli, 2004, p.85). In other words, the moderate perception is original in Ikhwan political thought from the beginning.

However, Mohammed Amara asserts that the Khilafah debate in Egypt, for example, could not be isolated from ongoing contests over the status of the monarchy; given Egypt’s own transitional status following its separation from the Ottoman Empire and its quest for full independence from Britain, and the changing alignment of rival political and social forces (Amara, 1989, p.1). Mohamed Selim el-Awa confirms in his lectures that Hasan al-Banna was influenced by the decline of the Khilafah. Following continuous debate, political thought in Egypt was developed. Throughout history and across all political thought, Ikhwan were one of the important schools that extensively developed, specifically with regards to political thought. A key scholar, such as Mohammed Amara, wrote more than 180 books, most of which discuss the issues related to the state, political participation, reform and renewal of the religion, women’s status in the state, women’s emancipation, non-Muslim minority, governance, concept of freedom, etc. Amara asserted that:

24 Although Amara and al-Awa are not members of the MB, they played an influential role in shaping its thoughts, and the movement distributes their intellectual products, and publishes their publications on their websites, so they celebrate their intellectual production.
“we do not exaggerate, if we said that pluralism is a fruit of Islam, attached to the Islamic message and embodied in its civilisation, because pluralism is the standard of human civilisation, then we accept to live with others” (Amara, 1998, p.10).

Amara explains the notion of pluralism in Islam by referring to its doctrine. He asserts that:

“This global nation—meaning Muslims—was established on pluralism. He added pluralism is a condition to be global (international); global means inclusive, continually for whom he enters in the universal field for the nation; the unity of doctrine (Aqeedah), unity of Shari’a, unity of civilisation, and unity of state” (Amara, 1998, p.113).

In an interview with Muhammad Habib, the First Deputy of the General Guide of the Ikhwan on 18 August 2005, he argued that public freedoms are the basic foundation of Islamic law. He added that, if parliament is chosen democratically, and expresses the will of the people, then its legislation would not contradict the legislation and laws of Islam. He added that they would like to establish a political party, but the regime refused to accept their application (Sharif, 2005). In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, setting up a political party has never been a realistic alternative due to the Egyptian government’s constant refusal to legalise the Brotherhood, which remains a banned organisation (the government banned any religious political party) (Hamzawy, 2008, p.7). However, in the same interview, Habib added that public freedoms are the natural approach to Islamic law, and they could see no contradiction between the application of Islamic law and democracy, which to them, means a peaceful transfer of power and political pluralism; in other words, the nation and people are the source of authority. However, their project includes all spheres, whether cultural, social, political, economic, etc., and the people can accept or reject them on the basis of this programme (Sharif, 2005).

It is important to stress that the Ikhwan stand against proselytising in Egypt, while Hasan al-Banna disagreed about that, especially after he met one of the priests, and said
it is the duty of all religious people to stand against atheists (Moussalli, 2004, p.87); in other words, Coptic Christians and Muslims are equal Egyptian citizens. Regarding the current debate concerning the political discourse of Ikhwan, it is important to say that scholars, such as el-Awa, Amara, and Qaradawi, produced literature that discusses most of these political issues, and has opened debates within Ikhwan and with others. Tal (2005) and Zubaida (2000) argue that conservative Islam primarily seeks moral and social control of its citizens. The foremost representation of this type is in the Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia. The second type is best exemplified by the Egyptian Islamic groups, building on the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, that seek to overthrow unjust rulers. The third type, political Islam, differs from the two others by seeking to reform society and politics. Nevertheless, both second and third types have played a significant role in Egypt.

However, based on the theoretical framework discussed above, the study critically evaluates and analyses the experiment of Egyptian Islamists, who participated in government, and as an opposition group most recently.

4.1.2 Ikhwan’s political participation

In Egypt, Banna, was calling for political participation, and he himself was a candidate for the parliament twice, while other members of Ikhwan were members in Egyptian political parties (al-Saeed, 1986, pp.93-116). In other words, Ikhwan at the time did not think of having their own political party, thus some of them were members in other parties. In that period, the movement accepted the legitimacy of the government, and competed with al-Wafd and the Communist Party in elections. However, Banna criticised these political parties, not because they were ignoring religious factors and values, but because of corruption; more specifically their collaboration with the British (Banna, 1984, pp.60-84). In other words, his criticism was not about rejecting the
political parties, in principle, but for practical reasons. He considered that these political parties failed to solve problems, and needed redirection and rehabilitation.

However, Ikhwan in Egypt, in fact, thought about political participation in two ways: first, that they cannot change the regime in the country, so they have to adapt to the situation for the benefit of the movement; second that they would lose their purity if they participated in the government; in this case, they faced many problems. If they participated, they would be speaking two languages to their members, and will lose supporters, especially as they are a strict religious group. For example, what happened to Ikhwan in Kuwait, when they decided to support the political participation of women in the political process. In these cases, they had to practice Ijtihād and know how to balance between participating in, and criticising the government, at the same time. Moreover, they should think of how to satisfy the majority of members for the sake of the unity of the movement.

It is known that Banna was not a pure idealist, and was pragmatic; he believed that there is no ideal in politics, there is no absolute good and absolute evil, so he communicated with the leaders and was keen not to isolate himself and his movement from society and other ideologies, but tried to accommodate them. In contrast to this position, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) condemned the statutes at that time, and isolated the ideas from practice and confronted the regime. According to his ideas, the movement refused to normalise relations with Nasser in the 1960s-1970s, and their General Guide, Hasan al-Hudayibi, elected in October 1951 (Tal, 2005, p.23). He did not agree to participate in the government, unless the state was turned into an Islamic state completely. Zollner (2009) believes that he called for change in the society, because it was not aware of the political nature of the Islamic belief: “al-Hudhaybi refuted revolutionary overthrow instead of preaching gradual development from within” (Zollner, 2009, p.4). Hudhaybi clearly stated in an interview with the al-Jumhur al-Masri newspaper in 1951 that
Ikhwan were only interested in spiritual power, while material power was exclusively the domain of the government (A’shur, 2010, p.177). According to Tal (2005, p.23), Hudhaybi adopted a more moderate stance than his predecessor; Tal confirmed that he rejected violence. It must be noted that it was difficult to establish an Islamic state in Egypt at that time for the reason that Arab Nationalist and Communist ideology dominated the Arab region and Egypt.

Abd Kotob, and Sullivan (1999, p.59) concluded that “the brotherhood has accommodated itself to working within the established system, but in hopes of gradually enlightening the masses so that eventually the Islamic nation will be formed.” However, the same study noted that the group is not content with its de facto recognition by the state, which is by no means a legal recognition of its status as a political party, but the Brotherhood believed it is important that the state agrees to cooperate with it, so that misperceptions can be erased and society’s ills can be readdressed. In addition, it may be noted that Ikhwan had no comprehensive and ready project to apply. It might be said that one of the mistakes that Ikhwan understood lately was that they lost the opportunity to practise ruling with Nasser, so as to gain experience and protect themselves from the oppression of the regime. However, according to this orientation, during the 1970s and early 1980s, Ikhwan rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process. However, in recent years, they have revised their political strategies, making a clear departure, and focusing on rebuilding their organisation’s structures, in the form of health and education institutions, charities and Islamic banks (Tal, 2005, p.48). Some scholars claim that Ikhwan were avoiding confrontation with the regime that might have provoked repression of the movement.

However, according to Shahin, by the mid-1980s, they began to participate in the parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties, such as Wafd in 1984, and the Labour party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates, and
succeeded in gaining control over many of them later in the 1990s. After 2000, the Ikhwan adopted an increasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime, and a pragmatic reform agenda (Shahin, 2007, p.1). However, according to Hamzawy (2007), the Muslim brotherhood has shown an increased interest in participation in the political process since 2003. While the movement was intermittently active in electoral politics in the past, its recent participation has been more substantial, and far more successful; the result of considerable organisational and planning effort.

Shahin (2007) demonstrates that, in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood won almost 20% of the People’s Assembly, becoming the strongest opposition movement challenging Mubarak’s semi-authoritarian regime. It could be said that the cooperation with other political forces that did not share their ideological perspectives was a step towards reform, and was a new orientation for the movement against the long background of major revisions. Shahin (2007) affirms that revisions introduced gradually since 1994, i.e. its electoral programme of 1995, its reform initiative of 2004, and its electoral programme of 2005, are also reflected in a seemingly consistent vision among the movement’s leadership towards reform and the means to achieve it.

During the last decade, the movement published many documents with stated policies, such as the Muslim Brothers’ reform initiative of 3 March 2004. This document reasserts a commitment to the civic nature of political authority, reiterates their adherence to the principle of the Shari’a, and respect for the basic values and instruments of democracy; respect for public freedom; acceptance of pluralism; transfer of power through fair and true election; sovereignty of the people; separation of power; rejection of the use of violence, and adopting gradual and legal means to achieve reform; acceptance of citizenship as the basis for rights and responsibilities for Muslims and non-Muslims; and support for human rights, including those of women and Copts. Yet these developments cannot be isolated from regional and international factors, and
the scholars from other movements in the region, and the continuous discussions among Islamists, generally, during the 1980s, 1990s, until today.

It is important to focus on the developments inside the movement itself. On closer inspection, it is worth considering that, by the end of the 1980s, a relatively younger generation of Islamists with different political experience than the 1960s and 1970s, and a more proactive political culture joined the movement, and gradually managed to influence its orientations. One may agree with Tadros that these members represented different trends, which called for change, while the old generation, which were described as rigid, did not understand the need for change. According to these different views, the movement split into two; some of the young generation formed al-Wasat Party in 1995, for which they pursued recognition from the regime for more than a decade (Tadros, 2012, pp.9-13).

Hamzawy (2007) affirms that, despite the limited track record of Islamists as political actors, there is some evidence that they have respected the rules governing their participation in legal politics. Even in the cases where these rules are highly restrictive and unfair, such as in Egypt and Algeria, Islamist parties have chosen to adhere to them. It is important to emphasise the effectiveness of Ikhwan when they participated in parliament, because they were well-organised and qualified to play a significant political role. This point was verified by the study of Hamzawy (2007), who insisted that the Islamists have taken participation in the legislative bodies seriously, more so in fact than the ruling establishment and secular opposition parties.

4.2 Jordan

Ikhwan were established in 1946 in Jordan; Islamists in Jordan participated in the government in the 1950s. They built on the intellectual work of many moderate schools
of Ikhwan. Ibrahim Gharaiba (1997) asserted that Islamists in Jordan concentrated on the ideas of political participation from Hasan al-Banna, el-Hudhaybi, Abd-al-Halim Mahmoud, Mohamed Selim el-Awa, Essam al-Arian, Fathi Osman and, to some extent, Hasan al-Turabi, Ghannouchi and Yousuf al-Qaradawi; those are the most important references for Islamist reformists. However, as for all Islamists, the movement in Jordan counts Islam not only as a religion, but as an ethical scheme, which approaches economic, social, political and spiritual issues. The movement claims to seek social justice through applying Islamic principles and Shari’a to society. Moreover, the movement introduced itself as a peaceful religious and social movement, and enjoyed the support of Prince Abdallah in the 1940s, then King Hussein in the 1950s. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the Islamists did not support the government, because of political issues, such as the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A particular point of difference was the peace process with Israel, when the Jordanian government signed an agreement with Israel in Wadi Araba on 26 October 1994 (Abu Rumman, 2007).

4.2.1 Islamists in Jordan and democracy

Islamists in Jordan did not show acceptance or rejection of democracy, but applied it in practice. According to Ali Abdal-Karim al-Kazim in Hussein Abu Rumman (1997), some leaders of Ikhwan oppose democracy and count it as non-Islamic and a secular tool for governing; they reject it, and consider Shura as the alternative. This opposition led some to combine Shura and democracy. The fact is that they participated in most of the parliaments since the 1950s, which shows that they were involved in the democratic process, even though some members disagree on democracy as a concept and method of governing. However Abdalatif Arbiat, one of the intellectual leaders in Jordan with theoretical contributions regarding democracy and reform, argued that there is no conflict between the concept of Shura and democracy, even though they are not the
same. He added that Shura is more comprehensive than democracy, as it includes every aspect of life, while democracy is only a part of it:

“democracy solves a specific part of human life, the problem of those who argued that democracy is kufur (infidelity) is that they live under dictators, but we say democracy is the tool through which we can apply Shari‘a. Therefore, we put democracy on its level, and Shari‘a on its higher level; we use the tools to reach the goal” (Arabiat).

Another Jordanian Islamist, Yousuf al-Azm (Rashid, 1994) argued that democracy is a step in our contemporary society, which we should develop till we reach Shura: we cannot accept other than Shura; developing it comes through thought and dialogue, not sticks and stones. Yusuf al-Azm (in Rashid, 1994) added that Islamists had previously rejected democracy, but now accepted it; yet, which democracy is acceptable? Democracy that rejects atheism, and accepts what we agreed on. We take from democracy what benefits us and reject others. In light of these views, it can be argued that Islamists in Jordan follow the general trend in the Islamic world, and depend on the political thought of reformers like Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, Turabi and the broad international Muslim Brotherhood publications. This can be applied not only to Jordanian Islamists, but to most Islamic movements today. As such, the movement emerges as a global reformist one, focusing the vision of the human being towards the divine. It guides people to the Qur'an, so that they may extract its valuable treasures in every domain of life, enabling them to build their lives around systems. It is thus not an executive political movement. Further, it is the duty of the Islamic movement to send cadres into society possessing an array of leadership abilities; it should not imprison them within its ranks (Ghannouchi, 2001). This view shows us that the role of Islamists is to think globally, because Islam itself is global. Moreover, it shows that Islamists in Jordon benefited from reformist thought from all over the world.

However, in 1989, when the movement participated in elections, they won 34 out of 80 seats in the national parliament; yet the Islamic Action Front (IAF), established in 1992,
lost some seats in the 1993 election, in which they won only 16 seats, or a fifth of the parliament seats. In the 2007 election, Islamists achieved a humble result compared to previous results, and gained only 6 out of 110 seats. However, according to Abu Rumman:

“the humble electoral results achieved by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian parliamentarian elections of November 20, 2007 shocked most observers and analysts. The extent of the poor results was a surprise even to those who had predicted that the popularity of the Brotherhood was retreating. Even the most pessimistic estimates did not expect the limited amount of parliamentary seats that were gained by the Brotherhood” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.9).

However, it could be said that these election results were due to many reasons: the internal crisis within the party, their relationship with Hamas, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace agreement, which was signed between Jordan and Israel, the Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition, and the war against terrorism after 11 September 2001. These are some factors that impacted on Islamist unity, and their relationship with the government, and were reflected in the election results. It should also be mentioned that many observers, as well as trade unions and student organisations, announced that the election was not free and fair. We cannot read the results in isolation from all these factors, internal or external. However, in response to these factors, there were changes in the Ikhwan discourse and practice, some of them made a serious commitment to democracy, while others adopted an extreme and radical line. According to Abu Rumman (2007), “officials and others close to the government claim that the Brotherhood has taken a more fanatical and radical line in their political discourse and practice in this past period.” This claim can be explained in that some Ikhwan rejected the agreement, which was signed with Israel, and stand against the government. They used the trade unions and student unions in universities, which they controlled. However, the government never expected their allies to stand against them, so the state adopted policies that targeted Ikhwan, as well as the restriction on public freedoms that
undermined the efficacy of political participation. This pressure had its impact on the Ikhwan discourse and practice, weakening them. On the other hand, Abu Rumman (2007) claimed that their opinion is to the contrary, in that the Brotherhood has taken a more serious attitude and commitment to democracy, its prerequisites and its preconditions. Abu Rumman added “And contrary to the propaganda of the Arab regimes, the Brotherhood is actually paying a high price for their moderation” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.33). It could be said that both opinions are right, because there are two intellectual schools of thought each adopted by some leaders; the school of Sayyid Qutb and the other closer to the more pragmatic ‘realists’ in the movement.25 But it could be noted that the moderate school, which was influenced by the recent reformers has been dominant in recent years.

4.2.2 Evolution of the Jordanian Ikhwan political discourse

During the 1960s-1970s, Ikhwan political discourse focused on a limited set of political issues, of which democracy was not one. The movement was deeply influenced by the political environment in which Islamists operated in that period, and Sayyid Qutb’s school of thought was dominant. The early 1970s witnessed criticism of radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb in Egypt. As such, “this critical trend was reinforced by the publication of a book entitled ‘Preachers not Judges’ (Duʿāt lā Qudāḥ) by Hasan al-Hudaybi, former General Guide of the Brotherhood (al-Murshid al-ʿĀm). This book was followed and supported by other publications, written by Salem al-Bahnasawi” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.34). However, in Jordan, according to these critiques, two intellectual schools of thought emerged, and were competing to define the Ikhwan political discourse. Abu

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25 In the second half of the 1960s, a new Ideological school of thought began to appear within the Ikhwan in Jordan with the spread of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamic intellectual, his ideas represented a reflection of the mood which arose from the catastrophic outcome of the bloody confrontation between the Egyptian Ikhwan and the Nasserite regime in Egypt.
Rumman and other scholars classified them as ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’; he argued that the first school was closer in ideology and influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, while the second was closer to the more pragmatic ‘realists’ in the movement (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.33-34).

Yet, after more than two decades, Ikhwan in Jordan have debated the issue of democracy internally. These debates strengthened the division between the two schools of thought (Shahata, 2012, p.77). Abu Rumman claims that “the ideological school of ‘hawks’ did not accept the modern democracy in any of its forms, because it represents a Western system that gives power and rule of law to people and not to God”; it is the problem of Hākimīyāh, which we will discuss in the next chapter. Following this rationale, the hawks worked diligently to deconstruct the concept of democracy into a philosophy and into a set of instruments. The followers of the hawk ideology put forward the following logic: “we accept the mechanisms, but refuse the philosophy of democracy.” Therefore, in the choice between democracy and dictatorship, the hawks would choose democracy. However, between democracy and Islam, they would choose Islam (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.35). In other words, the equation supposed that the hawks viewed democracy as a transitional political form of the state, and Islam as the final. On the other hand, the rationalist trend or pragmatists accepted democratic values and political participation. Abu Rumman affirms that “the rationalist trend or pragmatists were influenced by the writings of Rashid al-Ghannouchi and Hasan al-Turabi”, and added that the Egyptian Sheikh, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in the 1990s, also played a large role in constructing the pragmatist trend (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.35). However, the competition between the two schools of thought continued under one movement until 2001, when some members left Ikhwan, either by choice or by expulsion, after the decision to boycott the election was made under the influence of the hawks; a group of
these members formed Hizb al-Wasat or the Islamic Moderation Party in 2001 (Hammerstein, 2010, p.49).

The pragmatists practically participated in the government in the 1970s, when Ishaq al-Farhan accepted to be a minister in the government. According to this decision, his membership in the movement was frozen for many years. On the other hand, in the 1990s, the pragmatist trend pushed Ikhwan to participate in the parliamentary elections, and subsequently in the cabinet of Muder Badran in 1991. Consequently, this step led to significant changes in the movement. This analysis is supported by Abu Rumman’s statement, when he affirms that:

“with the return of the parliamentary life, the pragmatist would re-impose their presence in the leadership of the Brotherhood and its various institutions. Six months after the 1990 parliamentary elections, the brotherhood executive office was made up mainly of moderate members from the pragmatic trend” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.35).

Although this ‘executive office’ resigned two years before its term, because of conflict within the movement, further reinforcement of the moderating trend in the movement was made.

4.2.3 Debate over participation in the government

According to these conflicts, further heated debates took place between the two trends: “the conflict was epitomised in a book published by one of the most prominent of the hawks, Dr Mohammed Abu Faris, entitled ‘Participation in the Jahilya System’s Government’ in which he refuted the arguments that the Brotherhood relied on in making their decision to participate in the government” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.36). Consequently, the pragmatists reacted to that book, and called on Dr Omer al-Ashkar to respond to Abu Faris’s claims in a book entitled ‘The ruling to participate in the cabinet and in municipal councils’. In his book, Ashkar refused Abu Faris’s Fatwa and accepted participation in the parliament and the cabinet. At the same time, he considered that “the
rule should be ‘not to allow participation in such a state’, with the exception of allowing participation based on the long-term strategic interests and aims of the Brotherhood” (Ashkar, 1992, pp.1-35). Surprisingly, that means both Ashkar and Faris consider that participation in the cabinet in such states (Arab states) is not legitimate, but the difference between their opinions is that Ashkar proposed some exceptional cases by allowing Ikhwan to participate based on the long-term strategic interests of the Islamic movement to take steps towards its end goal, which is establishing an Islamic state and applying Islamic values in society and government institutions. Later, Dr Ali al-Sawwa responded to both Abu Faris and Ashkar rejecting their main argument, and considered the *Fatwa* of ‘not legitimatising political participation’ as not valid, rejecting this *Fatwa* to be the foundation for Ikhwan to build upon (Gharayba, 1997, pp.109-112). This dispute increased confidence among Ikhwan that general opinion among them will not strongly resist the moderate stands of the movement, so they started to accept the pluralistic stance, and participated in national policy making. As a consequence, they started to participate in the national political agenda. Ishaq al-Farhan affirms that:

“in the early 1990s, the Brotherhood actively participated in drafting the National Charter, which was tantamount to a political document prepared by a core group of representatives from different Jordanian political parties or perspectives. The Charter announced the commencement of a new era in public politics in Jordan. It introduced many new political perceptions, which implied the Brotherhood’s acceptance, to a large extent of political and ideological plurality and other major aspects of human rights, public freedoms and other conditions of political modernity” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.56).

In conclusion, this debate enriched the Ikhwan alternatives, and drove them to reform their understanding of religion. Moreover, it raised the awareness of the members of the movement of the importance of contributions to policy making in the country, and participation in the parliament, and the government cabinet. Moreover, during the 1980s-1990s, public opinion in the Islamic world, specifically Islamist opinion, was inclined strongly towards political participation. This public opinion was mobilised by
many activities and debates among Islamists through regional conferences, the media and publications.

4.2.4 Building a political party

Ikhwan in Jordan existed as a charitable organisation, not as a political party. Although some members participated in the government, during the 1950s-1980s their organisation enjoyed the privilege of government support and being a part of it. However, Ikhwan supported the government all this period as well. On the other hand, the Ikhwan were registered with the Ministry of Social Development as a charitable society. Therefore, if they wanted to become an official political party, it would not be possible to work as a charity, and they may perhaps not be able to practise advocacy work. The Ikhwan with independent leaders, who adopted Islam as their state reference, had established their party following the experiment of the National Islamic Front in Sudan, which had been established by Islamists and independent national leaders, and even non-Muslims in 1985. “In 1992, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) was established by Ikhwan as a response to the new political climate in Jordan, especially after the enactment of the political parties law” (Abu Rumman, 1996, pp.50-54). The party faced many problems, and was never able to gain independence from the Ikhwan organisation (Hammerstein, 2010, p.48). However, the question is to what extent this political party believed in democracy, theoretically and practically. Indeed, the principles of the IAF confirm that the consolidation of national unity and democratic approach, ‘Shura’, are the main principles of the party. Moreover, defending dignity, human rights and freedom in general are important objectives. It could be said that building the party itself can be evidence of accepting democracy, and playing a role in establishing a pluralistic democratic system. As a result of the debates, a third trend started to appear on the horizon, and was enhanced and grew within the movement, and was later called al-
Wasatia, and later formed the Wasatia forum, which is characterised by the fact that its members agree with the doves’ political discourse in which:

“They accept democracy, they do not brand the government as an ‘infidel’ and they believe in political participation, contrary to the hawks. However, Ikhwan political discourse shows that the doves and al-Wasatia are more democratic than the hawks, but all the trends are involved in the political participation and democratic process” (Wasatia conference papers, 2008).

“al-Wasat committed to democratic process pluralism and rights of women” (Hammerstein, 2010, p.49).

In light of what has been discussed, it is important to say that Islamists confirm that the terms governing the nation-state are one of their significant concerns, and come from the following provision:

“Adopting Shura, principles and tools of democracy, including accepting the electoral process according to justice, law, transparent elections, and a peaceful rotation of executive power, as a constant approach in political life and practice” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.47).

In addition, in most Islamist documents, such as the ‘Vision for reform’, issued in 2005, they:

“reiterate the ideal of protecting freedoms, such as the right of assembly, freedom of expression and peaceful demonstration. They also guarantee the freedom of belief and religious practices for all citizens, as well as safeguarding the individual freedoms of citizens; for example, individual and personal privacy of citizens and with regard to women’s issues, the document states its support of the right of women to vote, to run in elections, to assume political offices and to join political parties” (Abu Rumman, 2007, p.47).

Although the Ikhwan discourse developed significantly during the last two decades, and was considered as a step forward to conformity within the tent of modern democracy, it does not approach all the issues that should be approached. Such discourse left many grey areas, especially those issues of regional and international relations, economics, and the political rights of minorities. On the other hand, there was a serious problem between their discourse, and the reality or practical implementation of their programme, which depended on altruistic demands, principles and values, without a plan of action or
practical steps to apply these values, and deal with challenges facing the state, or the alternatives in upcoming issues. However, Islamist political participation in Jordan was supported by the majority of the movement members, although some trends reject participation in the cabinet.

4.3 Tunisia

Tunisia is a North African, Arab country. It was colonised by the French between 1881 and 1956, after which Bourghiba became its first president (1957-1987), followed by Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011). Both men adopted a secular political system, although Islam is rooted in Tunisia; as in Algeria, it inspired the freedom fighters against colonialism (Borowiec, 1998, pp.xi-xii). According to Salwa Ismail, in the 1980s-1990s Algeria and Tunisia witnessed the rise of the Islamist movement (Ismail, 2006, p.5).

Rashid al-Ghanouchi is one of the influential modern Islamists; he was sentenced to 11 years for his political activities, and jailed in 1981, but released in 1984 under a presidential pardon. In June 1981, the Islamic Trend Movement (ITM) (*Harakat Al Itijah al-Islami*) was established. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987, but in the same year Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali replaced Bourghiba and released 608 prisoners; Ghannouchi was among them. In 1989, ITM was turned into *Hizb Harakat al-Nahda* (abbr. al-Nahda), which participated in the national election and won about 24%-30% of the vote. However, the government took tough measures against the movement, and many members were jailed. It could be said that the same historical context influenced most Islamists at that time.
4.3.1 Political discourse

It is important to explore the political discourse of Islamists in Tunisia: how it developed; to what extent it was influenced by the Ikhwan school; and how they renewed and built their approach towards a comprehensive theory of life. In this case, this study concentrates on their key theories and practice; in particular, exploring Ghannouchi, who did revolutionary work in the political, economic and social fields.

It must be said that Malek Bennabi (1905-1973) had a profound influence on Ghannouchi, who considered him a pillar of Islamic thought and a revivalist of Ibn Khuldūn's Islamic rationalism (Tamimi, 2005, p.31). Ghannouchi himself asserts that “Bennabi's methodology was different from what had been accepted in the orthodox Islamic text” (Kausar, 2005, p.338). It could be said that Bennabi's ideas were representative of the Arab Maghreb School that drew its inspiration from the reformist thought of Khayr al-Dīn al-Tunisi, Mohammed ‘Abdu, Ibn Badis, al-Tha’alibi and A’lal al-Fāsi (Kausar, 2005, p.347).

From this perspective, it could be said that Ghannouchi was influenced by Bennabi and Ibn Khuldūn, then went to Syria and Egypt, and started his activities in Tunisia. In 1970, Ghannouchi and Abdalfatah Moro established an Islamic movement for culture, education and Da’wa, ITM (Moussalli, 2004, p.239). However, in 1981, as Ghannouchi set up his political party, ITM, he applied for a licence, but never received a response. The ITM proclaimed itself as a “political movement based on Islam”. Abdelsalam asserts that Ghannouchi called for reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, and the acceptance of political pluralism and democracy (Kausar, 2005, p.340). It should be said that, in this period, Ghannouchi advocated a resurrection of Islamic life.

26 Or Malik Bin Nabi: he is a great thinker. Algerian Malik Bennabi was born in Constantine. Highly regarded as the most eminent scholar and thinker, and one of the foremost intellectuals of the modern Muslim world. Educated in Paris and Algeria in engineering, he later based himself in Cairo, where he spent much of his time toiling through fields of history, philosophy and sociology.
in his country, the renewal of Islamic thought, a return to moral and religious values, and limiting Westernisation. In addition, he confirmed the ITM's rejection of violence as a means of transforming society.

However, Abdelsalam asserts: “at that time, Ghannouchi’s espousal of democracy was unacceptable to many Islamic groups outside Tunisia, who interpreted it as imitation of the west” (Kausar, 2005, p.340). It must be said that this opinion shows the leading role of Ghannouchi and others, who encouraged Muslims to adopt or accept democracy as a way of changing towards Islam. This experience encouraged him to develop a theoretical approach to democracy, and he played a leading role among Islamists in reforming and renewing the issues of democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of association and human rights for ethnic and religious minorities, and the role of women. He shares this view with Turabi in Sudan, and to some extent el-Awa and Qaradawi in Egypt.

However, Ghannouchi and other Islamist ‘reformists’ supported the principles of a multi-party democratic system, and evidence supports the idea that this was not a tactic, especially since Ghannouchi and Turabi were persistently promoting these principles. Ghannouchi used to defend these principles, arguing:

“stop saying the concept of democracy is not a part of our culture ... Democracy is Islam. ... What can we say for those Islamists (political activists) who say democracy is an infidel concept? Is this only a language difference, so the problem is a mere formality (Ṣhakliyyah). Democracy is only a peaceful tool for political and intellectual conflicts. Is Islam a religion that does not include any restriction? It is obviously so in politics. Freedom is not expected to be a danger for Islam, as long as it represents its soul or core” (interview 26 November 2006, London).

There was a general development in the history of Islamists towards accepting democracy as a concept and as a tool.

“Four decades ago, writers within the mainstream Islamic political throughout treated democracy and pluralism as alien to Islam. This was typical of the position of writers affiliated with Sayyid Qutb who rejected the secular
foundation of not only democracy but also capitalism and communism” (Burgat, 2001, p.344).

Yet, by the mid-1980s, this trend started to lose its momentum with the rise of a new paradigm that treated democracy not as ideology or philosophy to be emulated by Muslims, but as a tool for electing, checking, and rotating political power and for protecting civil liberties and basic rights of citizens (Kausar, 2005, p.346). Ghannouchi is one of the revivalists, who participates in, crystallises, and advocates this vision. Moreover, Abdelsalam argues that Ghannouchi had been at the forefront of this new trend that advocated democracy and pluralism. He rejected the Western notion that secularism is essential for democracy, and insisted on the compatibility of some of the principles of democracy with Islam (Kausar, 2005, p.347).

It was during his detention in 1980-1984 that Ghannouchi evolved his ideas about the question of civil liberties and democracy. In prison, Ghannouchi started writing his renowned work, ‘Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Āma fī al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah’ (Public Liberties in the Islamic state), which represented his attempt to refute misconceptions, which portrayed Islam as a threat and grave danger to civilisation in its modern sense, and the freedoms of citizens, both civil and personal (Kausar, 2005, p.347). Ghannouchi agreed with Bennabi on the answer to the question: is democracy in Islam? He affirmed that Islam is a democratic ideology emphasising Muslim political and social rights to resist enslavement. In addition, he observed that democracy was practised in the first Islamic state. Abdelsalam argued that “Ghannouchi was profoundly inspired by ideas of Bennabi on democracy and found them more matured than those espoused by the school of Sayyid Qutb, which rejected democracy” (Kausar, 2005, p.347).

Azam Tamimi argued that:

“Ghannouchi drew a sharp distinction between the western and secular state, and the secular state in the Maghrib. In the former, there is recognition of power sharing, but in the latter there is no such recognition. To Ghannouchi, this model identifies more with fascist and communist models. The institutions of civil
society, mosques, endowments, religious schools, trade unions, political parties, charities and mass media have all been put under tight state control” (Kausar, 2005, p.46).

On the other hand, Abdelsalam asserts that Ghannouchi criticised two groups: first, the Arab secularists, who treated democracy as a set of sacred absolutes; and, second, the extremists, who would blindly reject everything that comes from the West. For Ghannouchi, more constructive and positive interaction with the West requires Muslims to borrow from the West what is compatible with Islam, and reject what is antithetical to Islam (Kausar, 2005, p.342).

However, to Ghannouchi, new generations of Muslim reformists educated in the West aspired to rebuild their society, applying modernity, but not necessarily Westernised, which can be operationalised by these reformists to mean liberty, dignity, and effective participation in government by all citizens, and not merely coping with the negative aspects of Western civilisation. Ghannouchi called this reformist trend: “the Islamic revival movement”, while Westerners referred to it as “fundamentalism”—a term which Ghannouchi characterised as derogatory, hence objectionable. In his paper, ‘Islam and the West’, Ghannouchi argues that this movement is similar in some ways to the Protestant reform movement of the Renaissance, inasmuch as it is characterised by vivid social, economic and political activity, intellectual revival, profound belief in liberty and political participation. This is the case, because these Islamists have accepted the values of modernity and democracy, but within the framework of the values of Islam (Ghannouchi, 2005, p.343).

The establishment of ITM in 1981 was a watershed in the political history of Islamic movements; it preceded the NIF, which was established in Sudan in 1985. Ghannouchi (1992) presented a paper about ‘The Islamic Concept of the State’; it was presented at the annual spring conference of the Young Muslim Association in London. In the paper, he pointed out that in time he had unequivocally given his full commitment to
democracy as a system of government, and as a method of change. Despite the criticism levelled against him and his movement by other Islamists, especially those from the Mashriq or ‘East’, Ghannouchi remained firm in his convictions on democracy and pluralism.

One of the important theoretical Islamist achievements was Ghannouchi’s book, *Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Āma fī al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah*. In it, Ghannouchi analysed a number of basic principles of his political scheme for a contemporary Islamic state. Foremost among these are: the concept of freedom, citizenship, citizenship rights, political rights and liberties, the inadequacy of Western democracy, the foundation of Islamic democracy, and the principles of an Islamic state; his book is a landmark in the history of revivalism. However, Ghannouchi’s moderate vision was criticised by the Tunisian Islamic Salvation Front, which adopted revolutionary military action and hard-line positions (Moussalli, 2004, p.211).

### 4.3.2 Political party

It is important to point out that Islamists in Tunisia could not establish a legitimate political party, because the government never issued a licence. Therefore, they turned into a secret movement that could not practise politics, except through the Tunisian student associations, and general labour union. In 1989, a new law prohibited political parties of a religious character. Consequently, the Islamists changed the name of the movement to *Harakat al-Nahda*, and changed the nature of its activities into political ones under the leadership of Ghannouchi and Moro. However, since the founding of the movement, the government began to take tough measures against the leaders and members of the movement. The confrontation culminated in massive arrests in 1987, the dismantling of most of the organisational structures of the movement, and the President, Habib Bourguiba, issuing death sentences on some of the leaders of the
movement, but Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, his Prime Minister, played a major role in removing him from power (Moussalli, 2004, pp.239-249). Ghannouchi went into exile in London, but returned to Tunisia in January 2011 to resume political activities after the revolution that removed Ben Ali.

In conclusion, it could be said that, in Tunisia, Ghannouchi contributed significantly in developing the concepts and theories related to democracy, as mentioned above. In practice, the Islamists tried to form a political party in 1984, to participate in legitimate political and civil society activities, but were confronted by a dictatorship, which jailed most of its members, while some members fled to Europe, the US and other countries. However, how Islamists practise democracy, participate in governments and parliaments, and compete with other parties in election processes could not be examined because they never had a chance to apply these theories. However, researchers can now observe their behaviour over the next few years, as Tunisia is now a democratic, pluralistic country, in which Islamists promise to participate in the political process, and to enhance the democratic experiment in Tunisia. Al-Nahda leaders returned from exile after the successful revolution in Tunisia in 2010 (described below), and the party was officially registered.

4.3.3 Islamists in Tunisia after the revolution

In a dramatic sequence of events on 17 December 2010, Tunisia kick-started the Arab Spring by overthrowing the dictatorship there, followed by Egypt and Yemen, and others. In Tunisia, what is known as the ‘Jasmine revolution’ began when a fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself alight in an act of public protest. The protests that began in Sidi Bouzid, his hometown, quickly spread to other parts of the country. This was the beginning of the revolution that removed Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011; he officially resigned after fleeing to Saudi Arabia, ending 23 years in
power. A new era began in Tunisia, where democracy and political participation was granted and political parties were legalised. Tunisia with many decades of secular government and traditions may be compared to Turkey, as a secular country ruled by Islamists. Elisabeth Fair (2011, p.41) believes that “Turkey has been cited thus far as a good example of a secular country ruled by an Islamist party; let us hope that Tunisia takes this example and fashions it as their [sic] own.” Once the Islamist political party, al-Nahda, was legalised, its leaders came back to Tunisia after 23 years of exile.

4.3.3.1 Islamist opposition to violence and the call for democracy

Ghannouchi is opposed to any change through violence. He agrees with Turabi that change may be achieved through reform. When Ghannouchi analysed the option of revolution, he confirmed that he opposed violence, and that dictatorial governments have forced people to adopt violence as a means of change. In this context, some Salafi groups chose the way of violence, and were jailed by the regime. Ghannouchi explains:

“this led to a situation of despair, people giving up on the idea that change can be through reform, and a lot of people called for violent means of change. They developed theories that change in the region was only possible through violence. We find, in Tunisia, thousands of young people, who are Salafis, jailed because of their violent ideas; some went to Iraq, to Afghanistan—and are also in European prisons” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 2011).

One may agree with Ghannouchi’s point of view, in that these trends emerged because the regime delegitimised moderate movements, such as al-Nahda, and so this situation was “created by the void that al-Nahda left when the regime decided to delegitimise al-Nahda and imprison its leaders” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 2011). In the same document, in his evaluations, Ghannouchi confirms that: “All alternatives to reforms – through violence – have failed, and all violent ways have failed. They did not produce a single case of success.” It is apparent that he came to this conclusion after evaluating
those cases where violence was adopted, and failed to achieve the goal of change. Indeed, it is his belief that reform is the best way to effect change.

4.3.3.2 Democracy: one of the reasons for the Arab revolutions

Many observers refer the basis for revolution to economic reasons, encompassing the rising rate of unemployment and the mounting social pressure. This may be true, yet others argue that the reasons are related to human dignity and liberty, more so than economic factors. In a lecture entitled ‘Islamists in power … economic challenges of transition’ delivered at the Carnegie Centre in Washington DC, Mondher Ben Ayed argued that:

“[t]here are two main slogans that were raised during the Tunisian revolution, which is [sic] liberty and dignity. So it is not the bread and food revolution. It is a revolution against dictatorship to regain freedom and dignity as well ... we need to keep that in mind” (Ayed, 5 April 2012).

However, in the same lecture, he confirms: “there were also some social economic problems that were, you know, developing in the society before the revolution.” It could be noted that this is no different from the reasons for the revolution in Egypt and other countries, which followed in the steps of the revolution in Tunisia. This raises the question of how Islamists will solve the economic and social problems, and the issues of human rights; how will they react to the issues raised by the revolution? As mentioned above, Ghannouchi’s political thought offers theoretical solutions, but has not been examined in practice yet.

4.3.3.3 Challenges facing al-Nahda

Al-Nahda is faced with challenges in the human rights, political and economic domains. It is notable that Ghannouchi reacted positively to the challenges related to the liberty of the people, and the freedom of religion, expression, and speech. The project for the
Nahda party is to establish a solid democratic system, and to solve the economic and social problems. In an interview with *Asharq al-Awsat* on 26 December 2011, Ghannouchi argues:

“politics is judged by words and actions, not intentions. Since the Nahda party came to the political arena in 1981, we have confirmed our commitment to grand principles such as democracy, human rights, [political] pluralism, rejection of violence and coups as mechanisms of [political] change, as well as our complete commitment to equality between the sexes. This is something that we have stressed in all of our speeches and rhetoric, and it is clear to anyone who has studied our statements in a scientific manner. We are committed to these principles, and this is something that we have repeated a thousand times.”

It is clear that he addresses these issues and tries to answer the people’s questions on how al-Nahda, as an Islamist party, will approach the issues of democracy, human rights, and the economic and social challenges existing in Tunisia. In further clarification, on 15 January 2011, Ghannouchi announced,

“we want an example of a democratic state; to strive for common values; for a society in which democracy is respected—we want to establish a religious base for democracy and human rights.”

This is in contrast to his preaching in the 1970s, in which he condemned the rise of secular ideas in his homeland, and the advances in women's rights. Indeed, Ghannouchi has said that Shari’a (Islamic law) had “no place in Tunisia” (al-Arabiya, 1 March 2011). Furthermore, on the al-Arabiya news channel on 19 October 2011, Ghannouchi confirmed, “We are ready to lead a government of national unity if the Tunisian people place their trust in us.” This was before the election, in which most observers predicted that al-Nahda would win most of the votes. When elections were held, Ghannouchi’s party, al-Nahda, emerged as the clear winner, with about 90 (42%) of the 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly, confirming predictions by observers and the Islamists themselves. It is noticeable that, during the election, al-Nahda was sending moderate messages to Tunisians, contrasting with the Salafi groups. This allowed them to win the hearts and minds of this percentage of the vote, and to be respected by other partners, who welcomed participating in the government with al-Nahda. It is important to
confirm that the movement succeeded in forming a government with partners from leftist political parties. Al-Nahda adopted an inclusive approach towards all the political parties and individuals. In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington on 30 November 2011, Ghannouchi asserted:

“The case in Tunisia was characterised by the fact that the Islamists and also the secular and leftist parties of the opposition came together in 2005, and they established a common platform between them; a platform that is agreed upon by all parties; that establishes a civil, democratic way of government, that recognises universal human rights, including the rights of women as defined by the Personal Status Code in Tunisia; that also defines a clear role between government and religion -- government, the state, whose role is not to impose any religion or to forbid any religion."

On examination, it is clear that Ghannouchi adopted the civil democratic way of government when al-Nahda won the election in October 2011. As for the gender issue, of the 90 members of the Party elected to the Constituent Assembly, 42 were women, a percentage more than in any other party.

The approach adopted by the movement is one of the main factors behind winning these first elections. In the same speech in Washington (at the Council on Foreign Relations on 30 November 2011), Ghannouchi explained why al-Nahda won the election. He asserted: persecuted

“Al-Nahda won the first elections in Tunisia because of two factors. The first factor is the capital of sympathy that it had with people, because it was the most persecuted in the past years, so -- and the second factor is because al-Nahda spoke a very easy language, a language that is very close to the people, to their understanding; and that it freed Islam so that Islam became a symbol of fraternity, a symbol of freedom, including the freedom of women's rights. And for that matter, even the practice illustrates that, since in the constitutional assembly there are 49 women today elected among 217, 42 of whom are from al-Nahda. And some of these al-Nahda women are -- have the headscarf; others do not.”

One may say that the first factor will not continue to be influential in the next election, as the people will judge the movement by what it has done and how it acted. The second factor led al-Nahda to be welcomed in Tunisian society and in the international community, as a moderate Islamic movement, but in fact it faces challenges inside the
movement itself, where some members think that it is too flexible and does not express their Islamic views. Although this group is a minority in the movement, it is important to reflect their existence. Indeed, it is important for the movement to engage in internal dialogue to minimise future division, if the expectations of this group become a wider trend in the movement.

4.3.3.4 Al-Nahda and the state

In this chapter, the study evaluated Ghannouchi’s theoretical approach on the issue of the state. In this context, the study evaluates how Ghannouchi and the Nahda party practised democracy, according to the theoretical approach explained above. After the revolution, elections were held, in which al-Nahda won 42% of seats in the parliament, which allowed them to form the government given the majority they won, along with two other secular parties. Ghannouchi did two things: first, he approached Tunisian society and political parties with messages to show that they were an inclusive, open, and democratic political party that respects others’ political opinion, personal privacy, and choices (human rights). Accordingly, al-Nahda approached all the political parties when they came to form the government. Ghannouchi explained that al-Nahda had a very open platform that was inclusive of most Tunisians. Second he sent messages to Tunisians that the government does not interfere in their personal religiosity, and that it had no business interfering in the people’s personal choices; for these reasons, they were keen to form a national unity government. On this point, Ghannouchi (30 November 2011) confirms:

“that is why we were keen on forming a national unity government, a national coalition that includes Islamists, but also includes secular parties, parties from the left, parties who are liberal, in order to say to the people that we want to unite and include, not divide, and that the debate is not between Islamist and non-Islamist or Islamist and secular. There are many kinds of secularism and many models for secularism.”
Ghannouchi not only approached the secular parties and groups, but also Salafi groups, and sent positive messages to them, through direct contact and the media. Ghannouchi (30 November 2011) asserted:

“the Salafists are part of the Tunisian people; they faced what all members of Tunisian society who confronted tyranny faced. This group faced the worst suppression – from the former regime – after the Nahda party; indeed their members have taken the place of the Nahda prisoners. They are our people, and we have been prevented from carrying out our duties towards them [during the previous era]. If some of them are known for extremism, this is a response to the state’s suppression, and the harsh laws, and so their reaction must be equal to the [original] action.”

Here, Ghannouchi recognised the sacrifices of the Salafis, and showed understanding of their reaction to the previous government’s suppression. These kinds of messages may lead Salafi groups to adopt a moderate approach towards political practice and Tunisian society, which will lead to a more tolerant society. In another interview with the Asharq al-Awsat newspaper, he argued that:

“[T]he Salafists in Tunisia are not a single party or trend, there are a number of Salafist trends, and we expect that, with the absence of suppression and the provision of an atmosphere of dialogue and freedom, the phenomenon of extremism will decrease, and that the Tunisian religious outlook, that is known for moderation, will prevail in the end, and that all political trends in society will exist within a compassionate national unity framework” (Asharq al-Awsat, 26 December 2011).

From this discourse, it is clear that Ghannouchi is trying to approach the challenges with practical methods that unite Tunisians to work together for Tunisia, and to minimise the difference between the major political and social forces in the country, and push them to come to an agreeable platform to govern the country and establish a solid democratic system that is respected by all the political powers and society. Ghannouchi (19 October 2011) on al-Arabiya TV insisted that his party’s main aim was the formation of an interim government “which unites all the parties with the participation of Tunisia’s state organs.” Radwan Masmudi evaluated the election in Tunisia, and affirmed that:

“al-Nahda in the end, emerged as the main political party in Tunisia. After 30 years of being systematically put down, it was finally recognised as a political party in February 2011. More importantly, it succeeded in portraying itself as
rooted in Islamic values, but simultaneously and deeply attached to democracy, human rights and dignity for all” (Masmudi, 13 December 2011).

However, one may agree with observers who believe that, at this stage, compromise and prioritising the nation's interests are essential ingredients for a successful transition to democracy.

The other issues, such as rights, citizenship, and women in the state, were confirmed by the leader of the party, and practical steps were taken in this regard. Ghannouchi on al-Jazeera TV, on 25 October 2011, declared that “We accept the notion of citizenship as the basis of rights, so all citizens are equal whether they are Islamist or not Islamist.” He also stressed that al-Nahda accepts gender equality, enshrined in Tunisia's Personal Status Code under Mr Ben Ali, as “an acceptable interpretation within Islam.” These are some of the most important points that concerned Tunisians, specifically gender issues and human rights. One of the leaders of the movement compared their movement with the Justice and Development Party in Turkey “In Turkey and Tunisia there was the same movement of reconciliation between Islam and modernity and we are the descendants of this movement” (al-Arabiya, 20 April 2012). The party declared that it respects state institutions, the independence of the judicial system, and human rights issues. Nur al-Dīn Beheiri, a member of the Political Bureau in the Nahda party confirms:

“We are with the reconstruction of constitutional institutions based on respect for the law and the independence of the judiciary, and respect for the rights of women, and even strengthened on the basis of equality among all citizens, regardless of creed, sex and body to which they belong” (BBC, 25 October 2011).

However, it is clear that the leaders of the party were very keen to achieve a united Tunisia, and to establish a solid democratic system that satisfies most of the community and is agreed upon. They pursued the consensus of the majority of political parties and, for these reasons, al-Nahda’s leaders confirmed that they abandoned the demand for inclusion of Shari‘a in the constitution, and were satisfied with the first chapter, which
states that “Tunisia is an Islamic state”. This reflects rational and pragmatic political decisions made by the Islamists. Nevertheless, these declarations were faced with criticism from some Islamists and secularists; the Islamists argued that al-Nahda abandoned its promises of establishing an Islamic state, and its Islamic objectives and values. On the other hand, the secularists argued that al-Nahda speaks two languages, and consider that the party has a secret agenda to impose hard-line Islam. In their view, al-Nahda adopted these ideas for internal reasons, such as seeking more supporters and votes, and external reasons, such as international pressure. On many occasions, the leaders of al-Nahda, unlike many Islamist groups in the region, declared that they have explicitly guaranteed to campaign for democratic values and women’s rights, yet secular groups and some Islamist groups still criticised them. However, it is still early to judge this short experiment, in a complicated situation, internally and externally.

4.3.3.5 The government

In the election held on 23 October 2011, al-Nahda won 90 out of 217 seats. The second party was the Congress for the Republic, a nationalist leftist party, led by scholar al-Moncef al-Marzouki (1945-), with 30 seats. The third party was the Democratic Bloc Party for Work and Freedom (Ettakatol), a moderate leftist party, under the leadership of Mustafa Ben Jaafar with 21 seats. In forming the government, Ghannouchi was aware of the challenges facing the country after a long period under dictatorship, as well as the different approaches adopted by the political parties to confront these challenges.

27 The Congress for the Republic (CPR) is under the leadership of al-Moncef al-Marzouki. The previously banned leftist, nationalist party promises a socialist approach: stronger control over the banks, redistribution of wealth, the creation of agricultural cooperatives, and lower VAT.
28 Born in 1945, from south Tunisia; he is a PhD holder in medicine, and has been a human rights’ activist for about two decades. He was teaching in a university in France.
29 Ettakatol is led by Mustapha Ben Jaafar, who has declared his presidential ambitions. The party seeks a stronger regulatory role for the state. It promised the creation of 100,000 jobs in 2012-2013, partly through expanded public works programmes. It has prioritised the eradication of regional differences between cities on the coast and the poorer, inland areas, long overlooked for investment by the state.
Therefore, he called for consensus and coalition between the political forces in the country, to participate in government and building the state. On this point, Ghannouchi declared:

“We seek a consensus with the other parties, because we believe that Tunisia must have a coalition government for the next five years, because the situation in the country cannot be handled by a single party” (Ghannouchi, 30 November 2011).

Moreover, Ghannouchi insisted that his party’s main aim was the formation of an interim government, “which unites all the parties with the participation of Tunisia’s state organs” (al-Arabiya, 19 October 2011). These declarations had significant positive influence on the political atmosphere in the country, and raised confidence in the Nahda party, which tried to allay the fears of secular groups, and women specifically. It could be said that these declarations encouraged the other political parties to participate in the coalition government. At the same time, it helped the international community to understand the new political leaders in Tunisia.

Al-Nahda formed the government; they built a coalition with the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Bloc Party for Work and Freedom; they chose al-Moncef al-Marzouki, the leader of the former party as President of Tunisia, and Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the leader of the Democratic Bloc Party for Work and Freedom, as President of the Constituent Assembly, while al-Nahda’s Secretary-General, Hamadi al-Jebali, was chosen as Prime Minister. This coalition governed Tunisia after the October 2011 election. They agreed on common ground to establish a democratic system that respects political pluralism, individual freedom, freedom of expression, and the equality and emancipation of women. Indeed, Ghannouchi said to the media in London before returning home from exile on 30 March 2011: “For many years we have agreed alongside the opposition parties on common ground, including approving freedom of conscience, political pluralism ... and we have agreed on a paper on gender equality”
Moreover, Nur al-Dīn Beheiri, a member of the Political Bureau in the Nahda party, confirmed his party’s commitment to “respect the rights of women and all the pledges of the Tunisian state” (BBC, 25 October 2011). For greater consensus in Tunisia’s political community, al-Nahda declared on 26 March 2012 that it opposed incorporating Shari‘a law into the new constitution, disappointing religious conservatives, including the third largest party in the Constituent Assembly, who have called in recent weeks for Shari‘a to be the main template for the document (al-Arabiya, 2 April 2012). This declaration attracted the attention of the media and politicians; the same declaration was published by The Times (9 April 2012), which stated:

“on 26 March 2012 al-Nahda said that the country’s post-revolution constitution would not mention Islamic law as a source of legislation, signalling a forceful break with ultraconservatives who had been demanding an Islamic state. Instead, a drafting committee will preserve language in Tunisia’s constitution that refers to Islam as the state’s religion and Arabic as its language, according to Said Ferjani, a member of the political bureau of al-Nahda.”

However, this step was criticised by both religious conservative groups and the opposition leftist groups, who considered that this declaration did not reflect the real agenda of the Nahda party. Moreover, some feminist groups have worried that Ghannouchi's return may signal a rise in political Islam that could endanger their hard-won rights; even though he has said that such concerns were “only based on ignorance” (al-Arabiya, 1 March 2011). He declared that the party respects women rights and will build on what has been gained under former regimes. The party also declared that it guarantees women’s equal rights to work and vote, and vows to “oppose any compulsion to adopt a specific pattern of dress.” It also seeks to allow women “to contribute to the development of society, free from the obstructions of decadence” (The Times, 29 October 2011). Despite all these declarations, there are still some feminist groups campaigning against al-Nahda, and the government faced the pressure of secular groups demanding a secular state. Moreover, several groupings, including the
Progressive Democratic Party of Ahmed Nejib Chebbi and the Modernist Democratic Pole,\textsuperscript{30} established a leftist alliance to counter the Islamists.

The Nahda party, concerning international relations and the international community, confirms its respect for all the commitments of the former governments. Ghannouchi confirmed “we are committed to respect all commitments of the Tunisian state, on security and international peace and security in the Mediterranean region” (al-Arabiya, 1 March 2011). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafik Abdessalam, confirms that, in international relations, Tunisia has adopted openness. He explained that Tunisia will make neighbouring countries and Africa its concern, and will develop the European relationship into a significant partnership. These relationships should consider the economic and political benefits for Tunisia, while the priority is to achieve cooperation with the Arab countries (Abdelsalam, 25 May 2012). On the other hand, they declare that they are seeking a good relationship with the EU and the international community. Tunisia is a member of the non-aligned movement, and the Arab league. It is committed to both regional and neighbouring countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafik Abdessalam, also added that they will state in the constitution that they will prohibit relations with Israel, and confirms that they will not establish a relationship with Israel, but this will not be written in the constitution (al-Jazeera, 2 February 2012) as some are pressuring the government to do.

In conclusion, Islamists until now have shown a good understanding of the situation in Tunisia, in approaching the issues of concern to the people. They have adopted a moderate way of tackling the challenges facing the country in different dimensions,\hfill

\textsuperscript{30} The Modernist Democratic Pole (PDM), a coalition of five leftist parties, and the Democratic Progressive Party (PDP), founded by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, are likely to form a common bloc of democratic liberals. Defenders of free expression and secularism, they have promised vigilance against any attempt to diminish civil liberties and minority rights. The PDP proposes a “modern vision of Islam” and wants an education system that will “purge” society of “obscure and oppressive practices.” The parties seek to boost economic growth by stimulating foreign investment.
such as human rights, gender issues, Shari‘a and writing the constitution. Indeed, they succeeded in forming a coalition government with two secular parties. Still, it is a long way for Islamists in Tunisia to practise their views, and to establish the democratic system that Ghannouchi has campaigned for over decades. Tunisia is an opportunity for Islamists to apply their theories on democracy, liberties, and human rights, which were developed by their leaders over the last three decades. However, many fear that, despite all the promises from al-Nahda to uphold democracy, they will impose a theocracy that would roll back all the hard-won gains, including women’s rights and secularism and rights. Others see this as an opportunity to bring a moderate form of political Islam into the Arab world, as a symbol following the successful governance of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. However, the greatest achievement for Tunisians is the coalition formed between the moderate Islamists and moderate secularists.

Section 5. Salafi Groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Democracy

A number of groups oppose democracy, such as Salafis and Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Liberation Party).31 These groups have a stated position vis-à-vis radical theorists, such as Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi and Qutb, whose views were evaluated and explained in the second chapter, and the above sections. These groups regard democracy as disbelief (Kufr); and, hence, their interpretation of Islamic values is different from the reformists introduced previously in this study. El-Affendi asserted that:

“one of the groups that are most vehemently opposed to democracy on principle is Hizb-ut-Tahrir, [who] advocate a full return to the khilafa system as it had been practised before its final collapse in Turkey in 1924” (el-Affendi, 2006, p.228).

31 Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1952 by Taqiuddin an-Nabahani (1909-1977). It is a political party with Islam as its ideology. Its objective is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic state that implements Islam and carries its message to the world.
Indeed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2001, p.52) declares in its official documents that “With western democratic models in ruins, the Muslim world must look to achieve accountability without democracy.” From its perspective, the concept of authority and its position in Islam has to be discussed in the context of Islamic law (Shari’a) (Hizb ut-Tahrir publications). In this sense, it rejects the idea of democracy, and seeks to re-establish the Islamic state (Khilafah). Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011, p.8) confirms that the state in Islam is not theocratic, nor is it secular; rather, its authority is gained from the Umma. While sovereignty is to the Shari’a, ruling and governing is by the Umma. As explained by Mawdudi (1967), the system of rule is based on popular (Umma) sovereignty, but limited by the divine law (Shari’a), and the men of authority, led by the supreme ruler (Khalifah), will determine what law is.

As cited in el-Affendi (2006), according to one theorist of this group, Zallum (1995), democracy promoted by the infidel West in the lands of Islam is a system of unbelief, with no relation to Islam whatsoever. It contradicts the rules of Islam absolutely, in generalities and particulars, in its source and its basic ideology, in the foundation on which it was established, and the ideas and systems it advocates. It is therefore absolutely unlawful for Muslims to accept it, implement it, or advocate it (Zallum, 1995, p.5). This means that these groups understand that democracy is a system of rule, where the state of reference is the people rather than any other authority from other sources. Therefore, the legislative and other authorities belong to, and are approved by, the people, who are free to choose whatever they agree on. El-Affendi (2006, p.229) explains:

“in order for the people to be really master of itself and select its rulers without pressure or coercion, certain freedoms have to be safeguarded for all individuals, including personal freedoms and freedom of belief, opinion and property.”

Zallum (1995) explained that this system originated in the rebellion of the people against the monarch, who claimed a divine right to rule, and oppressed people on this
pretext. As a result of this conflict, a compromise was reached, whereby religion would be banished from public life, and the clergy would have no direct political role (Zallum, 1995, p.8). Based on this understanding, these groups rejected democracy, and believe that “the secular state is not the choice of the Ummah” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, p.3). In their document, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011) discussed the issue of Islam and democracy, and interpreted the campaign by the West to promote democracy, as a conspiracy against the Muslim countries. They believe that the West wants to keep religion apart from public life in general, and the ruling system specifically. This interpretation of the process of democratisation led them to criticise reformist and moderate Islamists, such as Ghannouchi and Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They heavily criticised the Turkish model, and the acceptance of Islamists to participate and govern under a secular system. Moreover, they criticised the Arab revolutions, and the support of the Turkish government for these revolutions (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, pp.4-5). It is important to interpret their criticism of Ghannouchi and Erdogan as criticism of the moderate school of thought adopted by many Islamists. This confirms that they still maintain their stance of rejecting democracy, as cited by el-Affendi (2006):

“this shows that democracy is the antitheses of Islamic values, and Muslims are thus forbidden to ‘adopt it, advocate it, form political parties on this basis, accept it as a worldview, or implement it as a basis for constitution, law or education’” (Zallum, 1995, p.61).

They understand democracy as defined by Zallum:

“[as] a system developed by people to rule themselves, which means it is a human-made system that has no relations with religion. It is a Western concept and terminology, that means (rule of people by people) people are the owner of the sovereignty and they are the source of the authority ... democracy springs from the belief of the separation of the religion from the public life and state ... it is a capitalism idea ... This is the creed that separates the church from the public life and state” (Zallum, 1990, pp.2-3).
This uncompromising rejection of democracy by Hizb ut-Tahrir is also true of other radical Islamic groups, such as Salafis. In essence, el-Affendi asserted that:

“some objections to democracy by radical Islamic groups, though comparably strong, are more nuanced. According to one representative of the traditionalist Salafi trend, a distinction needs to be made between democracy as an actual practice, and democracy as a theory, ideology and idea” (el-Affendi, 2006, p.230).

This point is explained further by al-Faqih (2001):

“there are, among Salafi trends, two broad views on democracy in practice. The first regards participation in an existing democratic process [as] categorically unlawful, since it is tantamount to giving legitimacy to systems that do not implement Islamist values. The second, a more a cautious one, treats this matter in pragmatic rather than legal terms, arguing that Islamic groups could participate in the electoral process if this protects them from harassment and helps promote Islamic ideas. However, some within this latter camp have argued on the same pragmatic grounds that participation may be unhelpful, since it tends to give legitimacy to oppressive regimes that rig elections and contravene Islamic teachings.”

Although they differ in their views, on a practical level, one may agree with el-Affendi and Faqih that:

“[O]n the theoretical level there is more consensus among the Salafi trends, since all agree that there is fundamental contradiction between the bases of legitimacy of the democratic and Islamic systems ... Ideologically most Salafis reject democracy on philosophical grounds, since it is regarded as fundamentally secular, and as it values the democratic consensus above religious teachings” (Faqih, 2001, p.8).

However, some of these theoretical views represent some trends in the Ikhwan movement, as well.

On the other hand, Hizb ut-Tahrir (2011, pp.4-5), regards democracy as a Western cultural hegemony, with the objective of destroying the values of Islam under the name of “civil democratic Islam”, by those powers that call for democracy. It is a “new secular malignant garment, which was well planned”. Moreover, they criticised the terms used, such as ‘good governance’, and interpreted these as:

“soft terms that are designed to not provoke the Islamic emotions, and could be interpreted and construed positively not to contradict Islam, such as the terms
‘good governor’, ‘revivals’, ‘civil society’ and ‘civil state’ etc.” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, pp.5-6).

They believe that all these terms kept their ambiguity “and they make all these efforts to make the religion apart from life” (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2011, p.8). They differentiated between the Islamic constitution and the secular constitution in the issue of legitimacy. According to an-Nabahani (1953):

“in the constitution (not the Islamic one), the people are the source of the authority and the sovereignty is for the people, but [for] the Islamic constitution and law its source is the Qur’an and Sunna, no other ... the sovereignty is for Shari’a ... and Ijtihād is obligatory upon all Muslims, and some of them can do it, and the adoption of al-Ahkām al-Shari’a (Islamic rules) is a right of the khalifa only” (an-Nabahani, 1953, p.89).

Although Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects democracy, they do not object to establishing political parties for the accountability of the rulers, and to attempt to reach power using the Ummah. However, their condition is that such parties should be established on the Islamic creed (Aqeeda), and the adopted laws should be the rules of Shari’a, without need for permission to establish a political party (an-Nabahani, 1953, p.93). It could be noticed that, from the beginning, they did not reject political parties or their role. While they reject democracy, they do not object to using democratic methods to achieve their objectives.

It is important to mention that some Salafi groups in Egypt participated in the democratic process after the 25 January revolution, and established their own political party, the Alnour Party. In Yemen, the Salafis also established a political party on 13 March 2012 (Aljazeera TV). However, this is a new dimension in the Salafi movement, as it is the first time for them to establish a political party. In Yemen, the Salafis discussed many issues in their conference, such as their justification for political activities (i.e. the legitimacy of democracy), and their vision of democracy. These steps may show that Salafi groups have started to face the questions regarding the practical implications of political activities. It is believed that this step will lead them towards
compromise, and may lead some of them to adopt a practical approach instead of the theoretical approach that was adopted for decades. The Alnour Party’s political project shows a pragmatic approach, specifically in essential rights and public liberties, and confirms in their political project that:

“it is a necessity to achieve democracy within the framework of Shari’a (Islamic law), where by necessity the people exercise their right to freely form political parties, and guaranteeing the freedom of political parties to perform their activities, in light of commitment to the constitution, and the principles of the Ummah and its general system, and the peaceful transfer of power through free and fair direct election, as well as people’s freedom to choose their representatives (members of parliament) and rulers ... scrutinising and holding the government accountable, and to remove it if proved in deviation” (Alnour Party political project, the party publications).

This project is not different from the Ikhwan discourse, and shows the probability of accepting a moderate stance when it comes to the real practical experiment. This demonstrates the difference between forming theories without practical experiment, and adopting a practical project on the ground with the challenges of real political issues. However, through close evaluation of the discourse of the Salafi groups that formed political parties after the Arab spring, it is noticeable that they started a new phase of political vision, practice and language.

In conclusion, radical Islamic groups, such as Salafi groups and Hizb ut-Tahrir, reject democracy, categorically and unequivocally. But some trends distinguish between democracy as a practice and as a theory, where, ideologically, most Salafis reject democracy on its philosophical grounds. However, some of them are pragmatic, and participate in political activities, and the electoral process to protect their group. Others, however, reject this justification, and consider it as supporting oppressive regimes. Indeed, they regard democracy and the new accompanying terms, civil society, civil state etc., as Western cultural hegemony. However, some Salafi groups after the Arab revolutions formed political parties, such as in Yemen and Egypt, and participated actively in the electoral process.
It could be said that the dispute over political participation started in the 1970s, and escalated inside Islamist organisations despite the fact that some of them, such as in Jordan, participated in government and supported it during the 1950s. However, the reasons for these debates were national, regional and international challenges. Some of these reasons can be attributed to internal Jordanian government policies, and their policies towards Palestine and Middle Eastern issues. Other reasons are connected to revivalists’ influences, and their impact on Islamists’ attitudes and approaches towards political issues. There was a significant development in the approach of Ikhwan towards political jurisprudence, in general, and political participation and democracy, specifically. Thus, they focused on the modern issues, such as political participation, citizenship, freedom of expression, ethnic minorities and women. Other reasons were the global war on terrorism, and international trends towards implementing democracy in Middle Eastern and Third World countries. Despite all these obstacles, Jordan has seen considerable political evolution over the last three decades; most notably, the emergence of their political party, IAF. Ikhwan in Jordan have shifted significantly in their political view towards democracy, and political participation, which was deeply influenced by the political environment in which Islamists in Jordan operate. However, there is no doubt that there are trends among Ikhwan in Jordan, including high leadership positions, whose acceptance of democracy is genuine, and who believe that it does not need to clash with religious values, objectives and ideas. At the same time, there are others who reject the idea of democracy with its Western concepts, but do not present an alternative. In general, the moderate trend has been the majority in the movement, especially in recent years.

In conclusion, the cases studied are similar in many of their characteristics, and the approaches adopted. They are characterised by similar reactions in similar circumstances. It could be said that when these movements are compared in any of these
countries, the study finds that every movement has identical currents of radical and moderate groups. The study observed that these movements were all exposed to splits in different periods of history in Algeria and Tunisia, and recently the emergence of moderate trends, in the form of political parties in Jordan and Egypt.

Nevertheless, all these movements are distinguished by making Islam the frame of reference, and the Islamic state as their main objective. Moreover, they are fruits of Hasan al-Banna and his disciples’ schools of thought, inheriting the legacy of the previous century’s reformists, such as Afghani, ‘Abdu, Mawdudi and Bennabi. Similarly, almost all these movements were influenced by reformists in this century, most of whom are leaders in their movements, such as Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, el-Awa, Amara and many scholars.

It is important to recognise that the movements mentioned above accepted democracy, but were also affected by their circumstances. However, there are important and even essential differences in accepting democracy and its mechanisms. Although Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia accepted democracy with its mechanisms, in Algeria and Jordan they accepted the mechanisms and disputed over the values and ethics of democracy and its philosophical bases. In accord with what has been circulated by some analysts, in each of these countries there are those Islamists who reject democracy and believe that it is incompatible with Islam and Shura. This emphasised that, even in one movement, there are many trends, which compete with each other, or dispute, to develop a new approach.

However, since 1984, the Ikhwan in Egypt, and elsewhere and other similar movements, such as al-Nahda in Tunisia, have made several attempts to enter the political arena and engage civil society institutions. In Jordan, for example, Ikhwan participated in the government in the 1950s without establishing a political party. They have established a legal political party since the 1990s, and some of its members joined the government.
cabinet and parliament. Simultaneously, the landscape for Islamists in Egypt has changed significantly over the past two decades; the mainstream movement, ‘Ikhwan’, has undergone a significant transformation; Hizb al-Wasat (Islamist Centrist Party) has emerged and, for the last ten years, has been struggling to acquire official recognition.

In Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia, the radical movements have reassessed some of their methods and adopted a moderate approach towards modern issues.

The study argued that Islamists in Egypt and Jordan have taken participation in the legislative bodies seriously, more so in fact than the ruling establishment and other opposition parties. Whether in national parliaments or municipal councils, Islamist movements, even those not legally recognised as political parties, such as in Egypt, have been disciplined actors that used all available instruments to influence the outcome of the legislative process.
Chapter 4: The Islamist Experiment in Sudan (1989-2001)

Islamists came to power in Sudan through a military coup on 30 June 1989, i.e. a decade after the Iranian revolution. The outcome was described in the media as the first Islamist republic in the Sunni Muslim world. The Iranian revolution had been similarly described as the first Shi’a republic in the Muslim world. Although the revolution in Iran, led by the ‘Shi’a movement’, was a popular revolution, the one in Sudan involved a military coup supported by NIF members.

This chapter will focus on the Islamist experiment in Sudan in the period 1989-2001. It will explore several questions:

- How have the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular respect to democracy been made operational in his political action?
- Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice?
- Why have Islamists resorted to a military coup to assume power?
- How have Islamists applied their theory to the political system they adopted?
- How have they dealt with the constitution, power-sharing, ethnic minorities, women and religion, foreign and military affairs, and political culture and social development?

It will critically evaluate the practice of Islamists in different stages and fields: to what extent they applied their theory, and how this suits a country with a diverse ethnic and religious minority. Moreover, it will examine the relationship between Islamist theories and the practice of power.

The chapter will critically evaluate the experiment of the Sudanese Islamic Movement in the first decade of their government. The chapter is divided into five sections that review the practice of the Islamist state in Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. In this chapter, the preparation for the military coup, and its objectives, will be critically
evaluated. The empowerment plan, how state institutions were built, the constitution, political system (*al-Tawali al-Siyasi*), political consensus, the economic institutions (Islamic banks and insurance companies), the cultural aspect (art and music), education, justice, human rights, women’s participation, international relations, and the role of society compared with the role of the state, are also addressed in the chapter.

**Section 1. Sudan Before the Coup**

Sudan witnessed a popular revolution on 6 April 1985, ending President Nimeiri’s regime, which had come to power in the 1969 May Revolution. With the fall of Nimeiri’s regime, Islamists established their own political party, the NIF, and prepared themselves for elections. The revolutionary leaders in 1985 (the transitional leaders) promised the Sudanese that they would build a democratic system to elect the parliament and form a government within one year. They fulfilled their promises and organised elections in 1986. Peter Woodward (1990, p.206) believes that:

> “the holding of the election was a return not only to liberal democracy in principle, but also to the practice and behaviour of 1960, and that was continued once the elections were over.”

Serious competition ensued between the three major parties, the Ummah Party (UP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the NIF, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi from the UP was elected as Prime Minister. There were also other influential parties, such as the Sudanese Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party.

Earlier, Nimeiri had courted his ‘Islamist’ allies, but then imprisoned them on 10 March 1985:

> “at that time, the movement had picked the fruits of reconciliation and it strengthened its position in the state and the society by establishing institutions, and protected itself from being eliminated” (Abdelsalam, interview, 2011, London).
Nonetheless, arresting Islamists was not the end of the movement, but signalled the end of Nimeiri’s regime in April 1985.

Although Mahdi came to power as Prime Minister, the result of the election demonstrated that none of the political parties had the majority that qualified it to form the new government except in coalition with others.\(^{32}\) I believe the result of the election reflected in unstable government and it pushed the major three political parties to manoeuvre, as we will see in the next sections.

1.1 Unstable Government

Although Mahdi’s government was democratically elected, it was not stable and, within three years, Mahdi had formed five different governments. The NIF participated in two of these governments lasting for a total of about one year. The first government was that of reconciliation, or ‘al-Wifaq’, between UP, DUP and NIF, while the second was a bipartisan government formed by the UP and NIF. El-Affendi (1995, p.118) asserted that “this government agreed to Islamic laws to be adopted in the north only, with the exception of the south.” Conversely, this step provoked internal and external actors to take action. On the other hand, “the debate between the NIF and the other parties was heated, yet failed to reach common understanding in some issues; this forced al-Mahdi to exclude the NIF from the government” (Abdelsalam interview, 2011, London). It should be said that these issues included the war in the south of Sudan, where the rebels defeated the Sudanese army and overran many cities.\(^{33}\) At that point, the NIF asked the political parties to unite and prevent the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)

\(^{32}\) In the 1986 election, the UP, DUP, and NIF won 99, 66, and 51 seats respectively. The DUP and NIF signed an agreement that none of them would join with the Umma Party without the other. However, the DUP broke its promises, and the agreement ceased to be valid.

\(^{33}\) On 26 January 1989, the rebels took the southern city of Nasir. The Defence Minister, Abdelmajid Hamid Khalil, announced that foreign countries were involved in the war, pointing to Israel as one such country. On 2 February 1989, the SPLA/M rebels took the town of Kapoeta followed by Nimule, where the Sudanese army surrendered. In some references, 80% of the South was now under SPLA/M control.
rebels from achieving any more military successes. At the same time, the NIF called for the tribes in the areas of conflict to arm and defend themselves from the SPLA rebels, who used to attack them and take their cattle. Later, after the June 1989 coup, the Islamists implemented the idea, and formed a civilian militia known as the Popular Defence Forces (Quwāt al-Difā‘ al-Sha’bi).  

The performance of the political parties was very poor, and they were unable to manage the national problems. For over three years, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition governments had been incapable of governing effectively. This was illustrated by the reports on the last days of the parliament and accompanying political events. Mohammed al-Hasan Abdullah Yasin, a leading DUP member, asserted that “the performance of the parties was very weak; there were no regular meetings, which reflected on the performance of our governors and ministers” (Yasin, 1993, p.456). On the other hand, in the Sudan Studies official Newsletter, Charles Gurdon affirmed that:

“it is now almost eighteen months since the Islamic fundamentalism dictatorship of General Omer al-Bashir came to power in June 1989. Those analysts who thought that nothing could be worse than the democratically elected but corrupt and inefficient regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi have tragically been proved very wrong” (Gurdon, 1990, p.5).

One may agree with Peter Woodward that “the shortcomings of democracy in Sudan have led to disillusionment that has encouraged military intervention” (Woodward, 1990, p.12). These are some of the reasons that weaken the democratic experiment and encourage Islamists – which had the best organised and strongest political party – to carry out their coup.

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34 The Public Defence Forces were an idea introduced by the NIF. All persons over the age of 18 could volunteer to be trained, and participate in any war to defend the country. The idea was based on Islam, where Muslims in the Prophet’s time had trained and participated in war; then, there was no professional military force, but all the community participated, even women. The NIF proposed the idea following the successive rebel victories in the South, which threatened the North. The idea was implemented after the NIF came to power in 1989.
1.2 Security and Economic Problems

During Mahdi’s administration, there were huge security and economic problems. Many reports demonstrated that the government had failed to provide security at the level of citizens or the state. The SPLA/M rebels threatened the south of the country and most of the north. Many regions, such as Darfur and South Kordofan, and sometimes the capital Khartoum, faced the danger of armed bandits. The situation was further exacerbated by the aggressiveness of neighbouring countries, without an adequate response from the government. The breakdown in domestic security was highlighted by events, where:

“[i]n January 1988, Mahdi al-Hakim, an Iraqi opposition figure, was assassinated in the Khartoum Hilton Hotel; after a while, a Palestinian group attacked the Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club, killing four people—three of them were foreigners. Similarly, Ethiopia was publicly supporting the rebels with the assistance of Kenya and Uganda” (el-Affendi, 1995, p.50).

Moreover, the economic disorientation that plagued the state was a major undermining factor. In December 1990, Charles Gurdon reported that:

“within the past month there have been a number of reports which forecast that Sudan is facing a major famine, which will be worse than the one in 1984-1985. It is believed that about 159,000 people starved to death in the 1984/85 drought and famine, and that at least 250,000 died in 1988 as a result of the man-made famine in southern Sudan” (Gurdon, 1990, p.7).

Other factors threatened the government, and citizens as well, where:

“there were economic problems and scarcity in the essential needs of the citizens, such as sugar, wheat, petrol, electricity, cooking gas, and water” (Abdelsalam interview, 2011).

This was confirmed by al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005), who indicated that the war consumed significant economic resources. Indeed, the government could not provide for essential human needs like food and petrol. Moreover, it was unable to keep up debt repayment instalments and associated interest. This resulted in funding institutions refusing to deal with Sudan.

On the other hand, reports showed that the security situation in South Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains had deteriorated to its worst level ever. The activities of Yousif Kowa,
the SPLA/M leader in the Nuba Mountains, led to mobilisation of the Nuba people, such that the number of Nubians in the SPLA/M doubled. The rebels became strong enough to threaten the Sudanese army under al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government, as well as large cities, such as Kadugli, Dalang, and Lagawa, and the Eastern Mountains’ region. The danger in South Kordofan extended to the border area, with clashes between the Miseriya tribe and SPLA/M. Attacks continued in Almayram, Abyei, Muglad, and Babanousa, while the capital Khartoum was insecure, with clear signs of an impending military coup. There were more weapons in the hands of citizens, and people in different parts of Khartoum began to secure their local areas by themselves (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.87).

Political disorder led to economic complications, and the economic crisis led to security dilemmas; al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005) affirms that:

“The dispute between the political parties was not the only obstacle that faced the government; the coalition between the parties was facing a collapsing economy to the extent that moved the Finance Minister to describe it as horrendous. This was the result of three factors, namely slow production, expanded expenditure in the absence of real income sources, and the dependence on external sources of food supply in the context of supply and development.”

In addition, the government was busy facing the increasing pressure of trade unions. The situation was going from bad to worse, with no political stability, and no support for the government. Al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2005) determined that:

“there was no single comprehensive project to unite the elected government and the trade unions; ... what caused the situation to deteriorate, and reason for anxiety, was that trade union demands were unprecedented; al-Jazeera Farmers General Union announced a strike (they refused to plant cotton on its scheduled time), although the union was dominated by the DUP, which was one of the coalition parties.”

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35 Tribes live in south Kordofan in the south-west of Sudan the Nuba people are primarily farmers as well as herders who keep cattle, goats, chickens and other domestic animals. The majority of Nuba – those living in the east, west and northern parts of the mountain – are Muslims, while those living in the south are either Christians or practise traditional animistic religions.
It is clear that economic and security factors influence one other, and that some politicians used the economic crisis to undermine the government. Also, as was mentioned, the government was unable to fulfil its obligations to the military. A report evaluating the performance of the government discussed the Minister of Defence’s speech on 13 June 1988. The Minister admitted that the economic crises were a threat to internal security. He referred to particular social problems, such as crimes against public funds, abuse of political power, destruction of the national economy, illegal currency trading, crimes against persons, and monopolising essential goods. The Minister also commented on two incidents, the Mahdi al-Hakim assassination in the Khartoum Hilton, and the bombing of the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum. He asserted that these two incidents were associated with the complications of international terrorism, which could expose the country to more of these kinds of political crimes (Hamid, 2009, p.192). It could be concluded that a large body of evidence was provided by scholars and in daily newspaper reports, which confirmed the chaos, absence of security, and economic threats. The consequences were reflected in political action against the government. The economic and security conflicts created the best environment to carry out a military coup by any of the political powers, and to make the people accept it.

1.3 Internal and External Pressure for Removal of the NIF

1.3.1 Internal pressure

The NIF departure from government was preceded by a memorandum from the armed forces’ leadership on 20 February 1989. This asked the Prime Minister to support the

36 The memorandum referred to many issues, namely the threat to Sudanese national security, the deteriorating economic situation, widespread corruption, militias belonging to the political parties, the civil war’s impact on security in regions such as Darfur, and the weakness of the armed forces. It concluded that the armed forces were paying the price of the economic and media siege, and gave the Prime Minister one week to respond to demands and take effective steps. Many scholars consider this a clear threat.
military forces, and revise the government’s foreign policy. In addition, the memorandum demanded that government should move rapidly towards signing a peace agreement (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.83). It should be noted that the memorandum aimed to exclude the NIF. The reasons offered were that the government’s:

“foreign policy was unable to attract the international support because of the presence of the NIF and the Secretary-General, Hasan al-Turabi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. They referred the reason for delaying signing of the peace agreement to the alliance between the NIF and the UP, who stood together and voted against what was known as the al-Mirghani/Garang Convention, because the agreement rejected the Islamic laws; this led DUP ministers to resign from the cabinet on 29 December 1988” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.84).

Moreover, Mahdi, in many interviews, asserted that Fathi Ahmed Ali, Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Mahdi Babo Nimir from the High Command, came to see him and asked him to exclude the NIF from government, otherwise the army would act (Musa, 2009, p.41). On this issue, Turabi asserted that: “the army commanders came to al-Mahdi and said to him, if you do not exclude them [the NIF], we will exclude you” (Turabi interview, 25 December 2010). Suleiman Hamid (2009, p. 203) concluded in his study that: “[i]t was clear to observers and scholars that the Communist Party was behind this memorandum.” He added that “the General Federation of Trade Unions issued a statement supporting the demands in the armed forces’ memorandum; they advised the government to be committed to the deadline” (Hamid, 2009, p.203). It should be noted that the memorandum gave the Prime Minister one week to meet the demands, and that “the General Federation of Trade Unions was dominated by leftists at that time” (Abdelsalam, interview, 12 May 2011). However, not only was the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) against the coalition with the NIF, but some leftists within the Umma party also supported the GFTU; for example, Mohammed Ibrahim Khalil (1993, p.27), the Speaker of the Parliament, asserted that:
“what is related to the participation of NIF in the coalition was rejected by the party institutions—the party Political Bureau and the parliamentary group. It was completely rejected on the evening of the first session of parliament” (Hamid, 2009, p.249).

These incidents could refer to the competition between the political parties, more precisely between the leftist and the Islamists. Hamid (2009) added that the Southern Front, which opposed Shari‘a law, was one of the factors that exerted pressure on the Prime Minister. However, according to the Islamists’ version of events, matters did not stop at that point, but were more than what appeared on the surface. At the time, there were preparations for a number of military coups by distinct groups of army officers; the priority for some of these coups was to eliminate the Islamists. So the movement had no choice but to act quickly, and use force to avoid annihilation (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.165). Moreover, the memorandum was interpreted as a first step towards intervention by the armed forces in politics. Some Islamists considered this the same as the case of Turkey, where the military guarded a secular constitution. On the other hand, some scholars explained that:

“the armed forces were sure that the presence of the NIF in authority meant that the war would be prosecuted under the banner of Jihad, while they rejected any existence of military forces or other forces outside the military institution; this meant stopping any political party militia or the idea of popular defence forces” (Hamid, 2009, p.204).

The events demonstrated that, in fact, the conflict was between the Islamic trends in the community, represented by the NIF and some members of the two traditional political parties, UP and DUP, on the one hand, and secular groups represented by the Communist Party and some members of the UP and DUP, on the other. Moreover, the leftists, supported by other secular groups, tried to abolish Shari‘a law, and there was clear interference in the country’s internal affairs by foreign embassies, such as the

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37 Coups were being planned by the Umma party, and also leaders of the May revolution (supporters of former president Nimeiri); this latter group agreed to cooperate with the NIF and the Ba’th party, and was the most dangerous one, as the Arab nationalists had eliminated Islamists in the countries in which they took power, such as Egypt (Nassir), Syria (Assad), and Iraq (Saddam). The NIF leadership was fully informed of all this information.
Egyptian and American embassies; “they called, through the newspapers, for a military coup to be led by the former Minister of Defence, Abdelmajid Hamid Khalil” (Mekki, 2001, p.31). It could be concluded that the internal pressure was represented by the army, communists and leftists in general through their different umbrellas to pull NIF from any participation in the government. It is clear those trends were against the law which was supported by NIF.

1.3.2 External pressure

Islamists throughout history have faced external pressures, particularly when they were about to take power, or participate in any government. Turabi, in an interview in 2007 on al-Hiwar TV,38 asserted that:

“when we were a small Da’wa group, people did not care about us, and when we were about to assume rule, Bush [the father]—during Nimeiri’s regime—came to Nimeiri and asked him to throw us out, or you [Nimeiri] have no future; so he [Nimeiri] jailed us and went to the US.”

From that moment, the NIF leadership started thinking of the military as a means of achieving change. Turabi confirmed the same to the researcher in an interview on 25 September 2010. Earlier, the US ambassador lodged a protest with Nimeiri, asking “how he could put an important daily newspaper, such as ‘al-Ayam’ in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.26). The ambassador meant the editor of al-Ayam daily newspaper, Yasin Omer al-Imam, one of the movement’s leaders, and so Nimeiri sacked him. For me, these events demonstrate that the superpowers were opposed to any Islamist participation in any government, and at any level. Islamists understood that they had to find alternatives. Moreover, for more substantiation of the international pressure directed at driving out the NIF from government, Hasan Mekki asserts that:

38 All series available at YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mVzyuuQfig
“there is a lot of evidence for what has been claimed by the NIF; on 21 February 1989, one day after the memorandum was published, Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister, made a statement supporting the position taken by the armed forces. Also, because of the widening political crisis in Sudan, she delayed her visit to three African countries, including Sudan” (Mekki, 2001, p.31).

This position was interpreted by Hasan Mekki and others, as mentioned above, as support for the memorandum that called for expulsion of the NIF from Mahdi’s government. Given these pressures on the Prime Minister, the coalition between the UP and NIF collapsed. The NIF leadership understood that: “they will not let us rule alone or in coalition with others.” Turabi asserts, in his Madrid lecture on 2 August 1994, that:

“The West is democratic, but if democracy anywhere gave birth to an Islamic state, they would abort it immediately. Unfortunately, many Western powers do not believe that democracy is an absolute and universal value; there are other values as well, but if democracy breeds Islam, then let us frustrate it completely. This has happened time and again in Turkey and it happened in Algeria. I'm sure it will happen anywhere else.”

My observation shows that most Islamists also reached this conclusion, and it became their conviction. The same was said by Egyptian Islamic Movement leaders, and scholars, such as al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin, and Hasan Mekki. This belief was also shared by the mass of Islamists, specifically youth and student leaders. Finally, Turabi repeatedly affirms that there was internal and external pressure to throw the NIF out of power:

“this [the partial involvement in political power presenting renewed challenges to the movement …] went on until the movement was thrown out of power through internal and external pressures, which thought to embarrass the movement by scrapping its legislative programme. This was the second time this happened. The first was the external pressures that forced the May regime [Nimeiri] to water down the implementation of Shari’a and crack down on the Islamists. This was an important lesson about the relation between democracy, Islam and external actors. It appeared that no sooner had democracy given birth to an Islamic order through the free expression of the will of masses, than its alleged proponents hasten to abort and distort it through pressure from inside and outside” (Turabi, 2009, p.222).

It could be concluded that the movement never felt that it could take part in government without facing external and internal pressures, leading to a crackdown and the threat of being eliminated. This situation forced the movement to consider other solutions to
protect itself, its Islamic project, and members. This decision influenced its methods, doctrine, and priorities significantly.

1.4 The Coup Decision

The Sudanese Islamists began revealing the details of their coup plan, almost a decade later. An imperative part of the question is how they arrived at the decision, to what extent did they perform consultation or ‘Shura’, and how did they take the decision? However, “when Turabi was asked in 1982, in a newspaper interview, whether he would repeat the October Revolution if there was a chance to do so; would he encourage the people to revolt; he answered ‘no’ without hesitation” (el-Affendi, 1995, p.18). This meant that Turabi and the movement were opposed to any anarchy that could not be controlled and might cause bloodshed. However, given the reasons mentioned above, the Islamists proceeded all the way to a military coup. Leading up to a coup, the NIF Political Bureau was convened for consultation (Shura). Abdelsalam (2009, p.90) confirmed that:

“in this meeting, the opposing views confronted each other, and a deadlock was reached, such that some members left the meeting in anger. However, according to the NIF constitution, the Political Bureau has no right to make a decision; its role is to discuss and put forward a proposal to the upper level—the Executive Office and Shura Council, where decisions are made.”

Yet:

“Some months before the coup, there was a meeting of the NIF Shura Council to discuss political issues. It appeared to them that Sudan, at that moment, was at a crossroads. They expressed the view that they held no hope for reform by the political parties with structures based on sectarianism. These parties had come to power through a democratic system [meaning that they had a majority by virtue of votes], but were not qualified to rule in a complicated situation, such as in Sudan. The meeting considered that al-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, lacked the political will and decision-making skills, and had missed all the opportunities throughout his history, and should leave” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.86).
From the result of this meeting, it appeared as if they had not yet made the decision, since:

“in this Shura meeting, the leaders asked the Shura Council to delegate some of them [the Executive Office] to find a solution for the complicated social, economic, military and security situation in the country” (Abdelsalam, interview, 2011).

Other evidence demonstrates that the decision made to implement such a change was crystallised years before this meeting. The plan was initiated more than a decade before, where, according to Yasin Omer al-Imam, “we started preparation for change in the year 1977-78.” He added: “we had made a decision earlier [after the reconciliation with Nimeiri]” (Muhi al-Din, 2005, p.175). However, I could say that there is no contradiction between Abdelsalam’s and Imam’s arguments. The former demonstrates that the decision was made to implement the coup and to decide clear steps towards it, i.e. delegating the NIF Secretary-General and the Executive Office to pursue practical steps. On the other hand, Imam’s argument provides evidence of establishment of a strategic plan, revealed recently as the ‘empowerment strategy’. With regard to the research question about the Shura as a mechanism of decision making, a full Shura or democratic process was applied in making this decision. The most crucial point made so far, from the substantial evidence provided above, is that the movement started preparing for change long before this meeting of the NIF Shura Council. However, the change was definitely not a military one. More to the point is the fact that Imam emphasises that:

“we started to search for our people in the Armed Forces, and the Shura Council delegated the Executive Office to deal with the military issue, [and in turn] the Executive Office delegated the Secretary-General Hasan al-Turabi” (Muhi al-Din, 2005, p.167).

Abdelsalam asserted that the Shura Council understood the request for delegation by leaders, meaning that the instrument of change was ready. The leaders understood this from the Shura Council, after they presented reports from all regions of Sudan asking
for the country’s salvation, as soon as possible (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.87). According to this delegated authority, the leaders started to investigate their standing principle regarding military coups, and discussed this option. According to Abdelsalam (2009, p.88):

“In terms of political thought and state of reference, they [the leadership] discussed the issue, and the Shura Council concluded these points.

First: freedom is a fundamental principle ‘Asl’, of the faith, and comes before unity, in terms of priority, in the principles (Usūl) of the movement fiqh [jurisprudence] from its birth. This means it is an essential value, and not a subordinate one. A military coup will definitely take away freedom, even for some time.

Second: the Islamic movement in Sudan, and all over the world, had been the victim of military coups, but never committed them.

Third: the movement in all its speeches, including the speeches of the Secretary-General, at the major NIF conferences had confirmed that the Army should be kept away from practicing politics, and that adventure should not drive any political party or individual to commit prohibited deeds, i.e. a military coup. However, the issue of military involvement, even to protect the country from chaos, or by a loyal member, who will adhere to the movement steps of empowerment, needs more cautious and deep thinking.”

It is notable that all these points were against the involvement of the military forces in political change, for the principle reasons mentioned above. However, the argument still left room for strict, controlled change, through military force. With regard to the research question, we notice that Islamists, when they took the decision concerning the military coup, they made use of the notion of Shura; but the decision itself was not expected to be taken, according to Turabi’s theory of democracy. This means the gap between theory and practice had become apparent, although the Islamists tried to justify their decision.

1.5 Reasons for Choosing a Military Coup as a Method of Change

The fundamental question is: why did the Islamists go on to plan a military coup? As was mentioned, there were external and internal factors that forced the Islamists in
Sudan to choose a military coup as a method of change. However, the points above were only accepted by some members of the movement, and not others. Those supporting a military coup, as a method of change, claimed that:

First: in the powerful, dominant, and arrogant world, democracy is a value, and at the same time, civilisation is a value as well. However, civilisation has a higher value than democracy. Therefore, if democracy brings Islam, it threatens the higher valued ‘civilisation’. Islamic movements suffered humiliation all over the world, with silence from what is known as the free world; this confirmed that any democracy which brings Islam will be immediately eliminated, a point emphasised by Turabi (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010).

Second: democracy dominated the world after revolutions, violence, and civil wars. We want it to prevail through a white revolution, not a bloody one. In the Qur’an, Jihad was connected with the context of rule, and the believers, whenever they ruled, or nearly ruled, faced trials (challenges) requiring Jihad.

Third: The democratic period in Sudan, 1985-1989, was frustrated by the army’s memorandum, and the ultimatum, they [the military leadership] put as a condition on the Prime Minister. What had happened may be considered a military coup, breaking the army’s oath to stay out of politics and obey the Minister of Defence, who was the Prime Minister (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.88). Turabi repeatedly affirmed that there was internal and external pressure to remove the NIF from power (Turabi, 2009, p.222). In all these arguments, if you read them in their historical contexts, you may accept their excuses, but if you compare them to Turabi’s theory of democracy you will find a huge contradiction between theory and practice.

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39 Turabi used the term ‘trial’ (ibtila in Arabic) meaning challenge.
It could be argued that democracy needed more time to mature and be developed through more practice, not to be crossed out each time through a military coup, as happened in 1958, 1969 and 1989. The first point mentioned by Turabi is not an excuse for an Islamic movement that calls for Shura and more democracy in the political practice of the political parties. Turkey may serve as a good example for the movement. There, the movement respected the democratic process, and participated under the rule of law. They succeeded in securing the majority in the election, and the dominant power, the army, had to respect the people’s choice. However, for the second point it was a bloodless military coup, but in the first year, the government executed 28 army officers and two civilians. For the last point, the NIF at that time was strong enough to stop any military action and protect democracy, which was developing and the awareness that was increasing. Accordingly the gap between theory and practice could be clearly noticed, and later on it became clear that Turabi regretted in this decision.

However, given these arguments between both groups, Shura was applied and the Executive Office was delegated to take the decision to accomplish the mission with tremendously strict restrictions. It is important to point out that the delegated committee that prepared for the coup had started its work earlier, but was waiting for the Shura Council decision to be made, to start the practical steps. The reason is that these preparations required technical steps, needing greater security procedures. On the other hand, some would argue that the Islamists had planned for the coup well before the reasons they mention here. It may be agreed that they may not have continued until they found themselves under the pressure of systematic methods of driving them away from power, followed by eradication plans, especially since they had rejected the coup method, when it was suggested by al-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr in the 1960s. This means

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40 The 28 officers who carried out a military coup in 1990 were executed under military law. The two civilians were executed because of trade with foreign currency, which was not allowed at that time.
they found themselves in a situation where they had no choice other than to use this method to protect their existence and their project. In conclusion, all these factors played a significant role in driving the Islamists to adopt change through a military coup. Indeed, they still believed it was not the best choice, but were forced to take the risks. However, now, they admit that the method was not ideal, and regretted that they had used it.

At that time the movement was strong enough to win the election, and have the majority, allowing it to rule alone or in coalition with others, such as the traditional parties, UP and DUP, the NIF went on to plan its coup. However, to find the reasons for this decision, the statements of Islamists should be analysed, and the historical context of these statements should be taken into account. Adding to the above external and internal reasons, the study found that Turabi asserts that:

“the experiment of rule, which was established by the Islamic movement through a military coup, took the lesson from the clear Western precautions in aborting any Islamic revival coming through Western democracy because, to reject religion, specifically Islam, is more valuable to them than democracy as a principle” (Turabi, 2003, p.68).

In another interview, Turabi asserted that:

“all the doors were shut in our faces, depriving us [Islamists] from practising a political role. We were persecuted in Nimeiri’s [the former president] regime, we were expelled from the broad government, led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who later disclosed the pressure from the army to kick us out; … Nimeiri [also] admitted that there were international pressures on him to jail us” (al-Hayat, 19 December 1999).

Many observers view the Algerian experiment as evidence of Western rejection of rule by Islamists even through a democratic election. It was concluded by Turabi (2009, p.222) that:

“the partial involvement in political power continued to present renewed challenges to the movement and raised issues of rethinking touching on the movement’s unity or practice. This went on until the movement was thrown out of power through internal and external pressure, which sought to embarrass the

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41 Turabi speaks here about the revolution started by the military coup in June 1989.
movement by scrapping its legislative programme. This was the second time this happened. The first was when the external pressures forced the May regime [Nimeiri] to water down the implementation of Shari‘a laws, and crack down on Islamists. This was an important lesson on the relation between democracy, Islam, and external factors. It appeared that no sooner had democracy given birth to an Islamic order through the free expression of the will of the masses, than its alleged proponents hastened to abort and distort it through pressures from inside and outside.”

Finally, the decision was made, and:

“the Shura Council and then the Shura body was delegated; then the Secretary General chose six leaders. The seven members of the committee were delegated to take suitable political decisions that protected the country and empower the movement; the decision made by the movement’s institutions was a military coup to grab power” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.94).

Going back to the research question, it could be said that when Islamists found themselves in this situation they made the decision which was contradictory to their theories of democracy and chose a military coup as a method of change. However, the gap between theory and practice is noticeable and it is similar to the gap between theory and practice in the communist and socialist theories.

Section 2. Preparation for the Coup

The claim made by the Islamists is that the situation was alarming, and moved them to act so as to defend the country, protect its citizens, and prevent the economic and security meltdown. Unexpectedly, in the published discourse of Islamists in Sudan, there were no signs to indicate that they might resort to military force to take power, especially since they had been badly treated by successive military dictatorships, namely Aboud’s and Nimeiri’s regimes. It must be said that, a decade before the coup, there was no evidence in published literature to indicate that the Islamists in Sudan advocated any theory that justified taking power through a military coup. In this context, it is worthwhile to recall that they had rejected the idea when it was first

proposed by Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr in the 1960s. Yasin Omer el-Imam emphasised that “Turabi from the 1960s was against any military action” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.177). Abdelsalam confirms that “it was one of the options that they were ready for, but they never thought they may need to use it” (Abdelsalam, interview, May 2011). However, Mustafa Osman Ismail argued that “they started preparing for the coup after having a bad experience with the last democratic government (1985-1989)” (Ismail, interview, 11 April 2011). Controversially, Yasin Omer al-Imam asserted that:

> “the group that was planning for this change started in 1977-78; I was following it through— I and another seven brothers. Our decision was early; it was after the reconciliation in 1977. Our slogan was ‘the movement will not be beaten again, and no one of its leaders will be jailed again’; this was the principle of preparation” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.175).

He added:

> “we started searching for our members in the military forces, and the Shura Council delegated the Executive Office to take the responsibility for the military issues; the office delegated Turabi for this issue in 1982-1983.”

Moreover, Imam confirms that “some members rejected the idea of military involvement, such as Mohammed Yousif and al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin” (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.176). Imam also claimed that they were ready to take over in 1985 (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.177). In order to demonstrate these viewpoints, it is useful to consider Hamid’s study, which concluded that:


However, after the official Shura – consultation – in the Shura Council, Turabi also consulted other influential members of the movement:

> “the conclusion of the Secretary-General’s informal Shura—by asking the members who were not on the Shura Council—was positive; the Shura Council was investigating the consequence of a coup against a democratic regime; it demonstrates trepidation from those members, but the result was positive; most of the responses expressed that the framework of Sudanese politics was not democratic, and it threatened all the country and its unity” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.92).
Referring back to the question raised, evidence to date would appear to suggest that the movement was planning to protect itself following the reconciliation with Nimeiri. The plan was to establish a military section without using this tool, unless there was no other choice. For this reason, they did not use this military option in 1985, although they were ready. The decision would not be taken without referring to the movement institutions, and the decision was made by this means.

Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that:

“the special institutions received signals for … a coup at the beginning of the transitional year (1985-86); consequently, the NIF reformed its frameworks in the transformation from a movement working under the May dictatorship [Nimeiri’s] regime to a pluralistic political parties system.”

Abdelsalam asserts that: “In conclusion, the NIF was responsible for the security of the party and its leaders … In other words, the movement members—the committee—initiated steps towards the coup” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.92). In summary, Abdelsalam’s argument is that, through its members, the movement started to collect information to help the committee make the right decision at the right time; they started to share the work according to the final plan. On the other hand, the military groups were doing their job separately. Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein (2005) declared that they were connected with the civilians involved in the coup through members of the committee. However, he claimed that the coup was executed by the military alone, and no civilians participated in achieving it. He argued that the civilians’ role was only to provide information to help the military; some of them helped as guides to political leaders’ homes on the day of the coup (Muhi al-Din, 2005, p.168). Hussein’s argument is not accurate, because many civilians participated in all the steps leading up to the coup but, for secrecy, military and civilian groups did not know about each other’s role. Abdelsalam (2010) emphasises that the plan was for the coup to be fully under the military, i.e. the movement’s involvement would be concealed. In order to maintain the
deception, the Secretary-General, Turabi, and other leaders, such as Ahmed Abdurrahman Mohammed, would be detained with other political leaders and activists. In addition, one of the leaders, Ali al-Haj Mohammed, would be abroad, while two other leaders, of whom Ali Osman was one, would deal with the coup leader, el-Bashir. Abdelsalam’s words do not mean that the military achieved it alone, and that civilians did not participate. It could be concluded that the plan was executed by the movement, where both civilians and military personnel participated in all phases of the coup under the supervision of the movement’s Executive Office, which had been delegated by the Shura Council to pursue the practical steps towards executing the coup.

2.1 Empowerment Plan

The empowerment plan was designed by the Islamic Movement in Sudan, with the objective of coming to power through election or other means. In this plan, the movement aimed to increase its membership tenfold, and develop a theoretical approach addressing all aspects of life – economy, politics, arts, social and family issues, issues relating to ethnic and religious minorities, international relations, and education. The aim was also to develop social organisations that play a pivotal role in society. This was an important part of Turabi’s theory, which grants society a greater role than the government in state building. At the same time, it seeks to emancipate women in different fields, and support them to play political, economic, and social roles. The empowerment plan touched on all these issues, and tried to find solutions for them, in preparation for the day when the Islamists would rule Sudan (unpublished document, no date).

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43 Members of the movement, youth, and students etc.
2.1.1 Coups in movement plans and actions

The Islamists in Sudan rejected the idea of a military coup, when the Supreme Guide, Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr, suggested it in the 1960s. This rejection led to Rasheed al-Tahir Bakr stepping down. However:

“by the end of 1981, the movement leaders felt that Nimeiri may turn his back on them; and as a consequence would eliminate them. So they started to revise their strategies and plans, [and] started considering a coup as an alternative. But they felt that they needed other partners, as the movement could not take the responsibility alone. So they contacted the Vice President, at the time, Abdelmajid Hamid Khalil, encouraging him to lead a coup against Nimeiri, but he sacked him with others” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.91).

The idea of a coup was discussed, but the movement believed that it was not yet ready for such action; it still needed more time to prepare cadres and institutions (Abdelsalam interview, May 2011). The idea of a military coup was again raised, when Nimeiri turned against the movement, detained its leaders, and started trials aiming to execute its leaders, using the same excuses as those used to bring about the execution of Mahmoud Mohammed Taha. The movement leaders then considered staging a coup, and were about to proceed, but the revolution on 6 April 1985, known as ‘the April Intifada’, provided a timely exit (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.91). However, I argue that, while the movement was technically ready to execute a coup, it still needed greater qualification and experience to rule a country like Sudan. In addition, had the movement carried out a coup at that time, it would have faced diverse challenges, internationally, nationally, and also internally. The internal factors can be noted in the development of the movement after the establishment of the NIF in 1985. This is considered a significant evolution in the level of experience, and organisation of the movement. Its members gained experience in high-level posts in the government, and in parliament as an opposition

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44 Taha (1909-January 1985) he was educated as a civil engineer in a British-run university in the years before Sudan's independence. After working briefly for Sudan Railways he started his own engineering business. In 1945, he founded an anti-monarchical political group, the Republican Party, and was twice imprisoned by the British authorities. He was executed for apostasy at the age of 76 by the regime of Gaafar Nimeiri.
party, where they formed a shadow government. At the level of organisation, the movement reformed itself to be able to rise to the challenge of assuming state responsibilities; as Turabi stated “the pattern of evolution from improvisation to systematisation is not only apparent in theoretical and moral issues, but organisational reform as well” (Turabi, 2009, p.306). Moreover, the movement’s supporters increased significantly in number, turning it into a mass movement. It can be said that the movement benefited from the democratic experience to expand into all Sudan’s social sectors and institutions, and to train members to hold political and social responsibilities.

In the context of the military coup, the movement claimed that it took this decision as it had come to a dead end with its allies, the UP and UDP. Moreover, “NIF discovered the conspiracy being plotted against the rise of an Islamic party” (Turabi, interview 25 December 2010). Muhi al-Din (2006) asserts that, when al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government was in its weakened state, in an NIF meeting, Ahmed Suleiman encouraged the NIF to take power through a military coup; he literally said:

“the authority is falling to the ground ... We should take it before others do. I do not know about Islamists in the military, but I am sure that, when we did the coup, such as the Communist Party in May 1969, we were less in numbers and power [than the NIF at that time], so we should not hesitate in this matter” (Muhi al-din, 2006, p.165).

At the opposite end, Osman Khalid Modawi expressed his opposition to any military intervention in politics, whatever the reasons. He maintained that a military coup has more disadvantages than benefits, and that a democratic regime, whatever it is, is much better than any military regime (Muhi al-Din, 2006, p.165). However, what Muhi al-Din’s study demonstrates is that many movement leaders did not accept the idea of a

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Ahmed Suleiman (1924-April 2009), one of the Sudanese Communist Party leaders who turned to the Islamic movement; he was a lawyer, he was a minister of justice in the May regime, then he was the Ambassador of Sudan in Moscow and Washington and then a Sudan representative in the UN in 1992-1993.
coup, and even those who accepted it put restrictions on the matter. These different views in the movement demonstrated that not all members or leaders agreed on the coup as a method to reach power. Abdelsalam reached the same conclusion:

“the vision was that the change should be limited, and kept to the minimum that achieves the needed political changes to control the army HQ and army units in the capital and regions, and to detain a limited number of political and military leaders; the other ideas of bloody action were absolutely rejected” (Abdelsalam, 2010, p.94).

One may argue that at the beginning they tried to apply these points, and detain a limited number of politicians and negotiate with them. However, after some time, the regime turned into a military dictatorship similar to regimes in Africa or the Arab countries. These actions significantly show the huge gap between theory and practice in Islamist experiments in Sudan.

2.2 The Objective of the Coup

The above reasons show that the movement only thought of staging the coup after it felt that the movement and its programme were in danger of extinction, and threatened by internal and external forces. Interviews with Turabi, Abdelsalam and Mustafa Osman Ismail demonstrate that the main objective was to protect the country from economic and security collapse, and also to protect the Islamists from being eradicated by the military forces that threatened Prime Minister Mahdi. Moreover, the international powers had threatened Mahdi, and forced him to break the alliance with the NIF. Furthermore, the:

“Islamists received information that indicated that they will be erased from political life in Sudan, if any of the military coups planned by the leftist or anti-Islamist groups took power in Sudan” (Abdelsalam interview, 2011).

46 Referring to the suggestion by Turabi in the prison, he proposed a national government representing all the political parties.
As such, the NIF carried out its mobilisation programme, and activated community activities and societies, through youth, student and women organisations. This reached a peak in what was known as the Quran revolution (*Thawrat al-Masahif*) in Ramadan 1988. I may argue that the popularity of the movement at that time may have protected it from being eradicated; it may have faced difficulties, its leaders prosecuted, but it could not be eradicated. The researcher believes that this generation of leaders witnessed the military coups in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in Africa and the Arab world, and may have accepted it as a method of change. On the other hand, some leaders came from a communist background, and so were influenced by such ideas.

### 2.3 After the Coup d'état

It is important to shed light on the Sudan Charter, written in January 1987. The Charter represents an Islamist thesis, covering governance, social change, foreign affairs, and defence policies. It presented a comprehensive programme for a political party that planned to rebuild the state and society according to certain spiritual and cultural values. The Charter focused on the idea of citizenship in politics and governance, and the principles to be observed in consideration of dignity and unity, such that no-one would be deprived of holding a public position because of any religious or ethnic reasons:

> “respect for religious belief and for the right to express one’s religiousness in all aspects of life; there shall be no suppression of religion as such, and no exclusion thereof from any dimensions of life” (Sudan Charter, January 1987).

One may agree with Abdelsalam’s beliefs that this charter is a remarkable point that reflects the maturity of the Islamic thesis in ruling a country, such as Sudan, which is complex in its multi-ethnic background, multi-cultural character, and diverse religions and languages. He claims that the NIF in 1989 was better organised and had a better project for Sudan than all the other political parties, both leftist and traditional rightist,
who could not fill the existing vacuum in government (Abdelsalam 2009, p.84).

‘Abdullahi Gallab considers that:

“the significant feature of the charter is not that it promotes a platform for a political party competing for votes, but that it introduces a blueprint for a comprehensive program entailing radical change, and hence it foresees not only an alternative regime, but an alternative society” (Gallab, 2008, p.10).

While el-Affendi claimed that:

“the Charter was a culmination of Turabi’s drive to reformulate the movement’s thesis in the light of contention that Islam, as a universal religion, could not isolate itself from the world around it; it must seek a common ground with others, and address the world in the language it understands” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.176).

Subsequently, he criticised the contradictions that appeared in the practical application. He asserts that:

“obviously, the treatment of non-Muslims in this state is an important influence on how world opinion would regard Islam. The Sudan Charter is therefore meant to impress non-Muslims inside and outside the country, and that is precisely where it appears to have failed” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.176).

The Charter represents some of the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular reference to democracy. Turabi’s political thinking will be evaluated as well as how it was made operational in his political action. When we talk about the gap between theory and practice we usually refer to the fact that theory relies on idealisation and is therefore not representing reality accurately. This is the case about all man-made theories and conjectures about reality. They are and will always remain incomplete representation of reality that means the gap between theory and practice could be noticed in this case. Turabi in 2003 discussed the issue of ‘free choice’, locating it on the trajectory of evolution of Islamist doctrine, starting from the movement’s stance during the revival in the last century, arriving at the idea of people’s freedom in politics to make whatever choice, and to take turns to govern based on collective competition; the exception was a minority maintaining a conservative and traditional isolated position on this issue (he meant Sufis). Turabi continues his criticism to include even
those who adopted a forgiving and relaxed position in their Ijtihād, and opening up to
the idea of freedom to differ, and pluralism (the multi-party system), yet continue to
insist that this must submit to the condition of adherence to the unchanging principles of
Islam. He says in criticism:

“One is amazed; how could they impose a limit on the permission, applying
state authority, upon non-Muslims in society, hypocrites, or those who believe in
part of the Qur’an and disbelieve in the parts relating to politics, while the
evidence from the Qur’an and Sunna applied in Madinah are clear proof that this
is a right in the context of Da’wa and not matters of ruling authority, according
to the Shari’a of Islam” (Turabi, 2003, p.207).

He adds that:

“the freedom to differ on doctrine, and the alternation (Muwalah) in governing
based on that, through diverse parties, is indeed one of the fundamentals of
wisdom and government in Islam” (Turabi, 2003, p.207).

In other words “What Allah left for the people should not be monopolised” (Turabi,
2003, p.209). Turabi believes that the Islamic movement is only an instrument for social
and political change, with the aim of establishing the state. Yet, the state is a product of
social movement, and indeed one of its mechanisms. Therefore, the state and the
movement are not objectives in themselves, but a way to worship Allah, if built in the
right way. However, these are essential elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with
particular reference to democracy, e.g. freedom of religion, freedom of political choice,
and freedom of expression. Turabi, the theorist and the leader of the movement, believes
in the above, but when Islamists took power in 1989, they monopolised it. Yet lately, in
2001, Turabi apologised for this failure. As such, this Islamist experiment should be
studied and criticised according to its declared values.

2.3.1 Turabi’s search for consensus

Historically, in the late 1960s, a broad consensus emerged among most of the traditional
Sudanese political parties, UP, DUP, and MB or Islamists. This consensus was presented
in the report of the National Committee for the Constitution. However, in June 1989 after the coup, Turabi met the leaders of the same political parties in prison. He proposed that they come together, and adopt one programme – Islam. Abdelsalam confirmed that:

“the Secretary-General, Turabi, was in jail, where he met the two leaders, al-Mahdi and al-Merghani, and tried to encourage them to join together, and adopt a consensus to draw a new era in the history of Sudan, and to quit executive work, to show the new leaders and the Sudanese that they had now come together to apply Islam as a belief, and Shari‘a; one that approaches the socialists on the basis of Islam’s justice, and the nationalists on its Arab [roots] and [the] Africans as a neighbourhood” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.122).

The same words were used by Turabi in his interview with Hiwar TV on 14 November 2009. It is important to analyze these actions, since Turabi was trying to convince the two traditional leaders to join the revolution from the beginning. If they agreed, then they could form a national government that would stop the deterioration in the economic and security fields, and rebuild the political structure on a new solid doctrine, and a balanced equation of power distribution among the Sudanese elites, regions, and minorities. In fact, Turabi’s attitude indicates that this NIF objective, mentioned above, was on his mind when he was trying to talk with these leaders. Moreover, it could be said that he was trying to achieve these objectives at minimum cost. Hence, he contacted those leaders whose election manifesto was Islamic; an Islamic republic as advocated by the DUP, and Islamic Revival (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah) by the UP. In essence, he was seeking consensus on the project of Islam. The leaders of the political parties in prison rejected Turabi’s offer, because they were sure that the coup had been done by NIF. In the meantime, they (all except Turabi) started their opposition activities by signing an agreement that established the Democratic Alliance. Moreover, Abdelsalam (2009) affirms that the security forces did not spare any effort to obstruct the efforts of the Secretary General, Turabi, after the first release of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani from prison, to reconcile with these leaders. They humiliated Mahdi
badly, sending a message to him and his brother-in-law, Turabi, saying that the revolution was not ready to conciliate with the political parties. Moreover, the communists and leftists played a significant role in not giving any chance for the regime to meet the two leaders and reconcile with them, as intended by Turabi.

Section 3. Building the State Institutions

After the coup, Turabi and Islamists started building the state according to their plan. It was claimed that the main principle adopted was Shura, where the Islamists tried to encourage the Sudanese people to participate in building the political system, practise Shura, and advance the intellectual ideas and effort to build the country. A series of conferences was started, beginning with the ‘National Dialogue for Peace Issues’ conference held from 9 September to 21 October 1989. The decisions and recommendations of this conference shaped the peace process with the southern movements, where it proposed a presidential and federal system. Between 3 October and 30 November 1989, the ‘National Dialogue for Economic Salvation’ conference was held (Hamid, 2009, p.236). This was followed by the diplomatic conference that drew up the plan for Sudanese foreign policy. Then the women, trade union, displaced people, education, media, social development, and sport and youth conferences were convened (Hamid, 2009, p.237). It is important to mention that many experts participated in these conferences, and that most of them were not NIF members. In this context, Turabi (2009) asserted that everybody should participate in building the country; “Shura should be applied at every level and the people should participate in all levels of decision[-making]; because of that we adopted these kinds of conferences.”

Perhaps the most important conference was the ‘National Dialogue for the Political System’, which was held between 16 August and 20 October 1990 (Hamid, 2009,
p.338). This conference discussed the issues relevant to the political system in Sudan, where, at the conclusion, a federal system was proposed. The government adopted this proposal and, accordingly, later in 1994, the country was divided into 16 federal states in the North, and 10 in the South. Each state had its own government, ministers, and legislature, i.e. executive and legislative institutions. By the end of these conferences, a strategic plan had emerged. Experts in all fields had been invited, and most of them participated; yet some of the opposition’s leaders and active members did not. In the words of el-Affendi (1995, p.56), “most of the opposition did not participate in these conferences.” Abdelsalam (2009) believes that these conferences played a significant role as a public relations exercise that mobilised most of those leaders, who were not members of the movement. It was those leaders who were represented actively in the government executive body, and later they became leaders in ruling the National Congress (NC). It could be noticed that the strategic plan was significantly influenced by some elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular reference to democracy, the federal system, the women’s sector, culture etc., which could be regarded as a political action towards the application of the theory; but still the gap between theory and practice could be observed, although theory was turned into a project (the strategic plan).

3.1 The Constitution

Turabi is an expert in constitutions, and was involved in formulating the constitutions of Pakistan and some Gulf states. When the movement came to power, as head of the National Assembly (NA; Parliament), he proposed the 1998 constitution, which was ratified in March 1998.

47 It took four years to do the administrative job and many constitutional decrees to reach the peak in the last announcement of the 10th constitutional decree that announced Sudan as a federal state.
3.1.1 Doctrine and principles of the constitution

The 1989 coup d'état ended the third democracy in Sudan; the first constitutional decree after the coup stated that:

“the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the highest constitutional authority, legislative and executive in the country and is responsible for issuing declarations and constitutional amendments, and promulgation of laws and management of security and military affairs, and the appointing of ministers and supervision” (the President’s first speech, 30 June 1989).

This meant that the constitution and laws issued before that date were annulled. In addition, all the political leaders, including Turabi, Ibrahim al-Sanoussi, and Ahmed Abdulrahman from the NIF, were arrested and jailed in Kober prison in Khartoum North, along with other politicians. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) dissolved the media, and shut down newspapers, except for state radio and TV, and the weekly Armed Forces newspaper (al-Quwat al-Mussallahah). All these actions were contradicting Turabi’s theory of democracy, and could be a good example of the gap between theory and practice in the Islamist experiment in Sudan, regardless of whatever excuses they made.

3.1.2 Minorities in the constitution

The Sudanese are a diverse nation, and their society is recognised by its multiplicity of religious and cultural affiliations. Islamists in Sudan established the federal system of the government quite early, so as to address the problem of minorities, religion, and culture. This topic is discussed theoretically in Chapter 6 ‘Islamists and the state’.

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48 Social scientists had identified more than a hundred languages and dialects that are used by the Sudanese; this encompassed more than 50 ethnic groups and 600 tribes. In addition to common boundaries, Sudan is bound by complex racial and ethnic links to the countries of the region. For more information see: http://www.sudan-embassy.co.uk/infobook/people.php
Indeed, before the separation of South Sudan in 2011, Christians made up 17% of the population.

Esposito noted that:

“in general terms, the constitution tends to define a state of Muslims rather than an Islamic state, although there are distinctively Islamic provisions” (Esposito, 2001, p.143).

Esposito considered that the first provision defined the state in relatively inclusive terms:

“The state of Sudan is an embracing homeland, wherein races and cultures coalesce and religion conciliates. Islam is the religion of the majority of the populations. Christianity and customary creeds have considerable followers” (The Sudan Constitution, Article 1-1).

In addressing the problem of a majority Muslim population and the minorities, the 1998 constitution adopted a federal system. This had been proposed by the NIF in the 1987 Sudan Charter, and adopted by the relevant conferences held after the coup. The movement had previously proposed a federal system in the 1960s. Researchers noted that the official policy of NIF in the 1990s reflected the principles presented in the 1987 NIF Sudan Charter, for example:

“the effectiveness of some laws shall be subject to territorial limitations, considering the prevalence of certain religions or cultures in the areas of variance with the religion dominant in the country at large. … In these matters, exclusive local rules can be established in the area based on the local majority mandate ... Thus, the legislative authority of any region predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims can take exception to the general operation of the national law, with respect to any rule of criminal or penal nature derived directly and solely from a text in the Shari’a contrary to the local culture” (NIF Sudan Charter, 1987, B-8).

This advanced legislation was applied in some areas (the South) but was problematic in the North. It faced practical difficulties, including the awareness of young officers, who punished people outside the judicial system. This meant that some violations took place by officers who had not been trained and educated about the rights of citizens. Moreover, the judiciary was not playing its role effectively in this area.
3.1.3 Legislative authority

By the end of December 1991, the RCC issued the 5th decree establishing the Transitional National Assembly (TNA); with this act, the legislative authority passed from the RCC to this assembly. However, before 1997, the dialogue on political pluralism had begun between the opposition and the regime’s supporters, and included the independent elite as well. However, a trend inside the movement did not believe in political pluralism, but the majority did. Hamid (2009, p.290) asserted that:

“it was clear that the result of this dialogue would be reflected in the constitution … Its draft was in the hands of the National Assembly to be passed in 1998. This constitution would authorise political pluralism, according to the law, before this constitution is submitted to a public referendum”.

However, before the constitution had reached the stage of being submitted to popular referendum, the President dissolved the NA, and put Turabi under house arrest in 1999.

In March 1998, the constitution was passed, and article 26-2 states:

“freedom of political association is not constrained, except with the conditions of Shura and democracy in leading the association, and to use dialogue not force in the competition, and to be attached to the constitutions ... as organised by law” (Sudan Constitution, Article 26-2).

Based on the constitution, the law of freedom of association was issued in December 1998, and up to 22 political parties were subsequently registered. The law was amended in 2000, and renamed ‘the law of political parties and organisations’ (Hamid, 2009, p.294). Turabi evaluated the development of the political system, from military coup to the evolution of a constitution and laws that reflected its principles, and enhanced the freedom of expression and political association. These laws organised fair and free election of governors, and assured the continuity of the government system, posts, and institutions with checks and balances, without any monopolies or unfairness in authority. The constitution organised non-central legislative and public affairs, so as to balance the distribution of wealth and authority (Turabi, 2009, p.328).
In conclusion, the political system was based on political association (*al-Tawali al-Siyasi*). Moreover, the safeguards agreed upon in the peace accords of April 1997 had been enshrined in the constitution passed by the NA in March 1998, and which came into effect the following June. This development took care of the constitutional void mentioned above, and offered safeguards, in theory at least. Freedom of expression had been enhanced in theory and to some extent practice over the past decade, while the constitution conceded the freedom of association. The 1998 constitution did not end the period of authoritarian and totalitarian rule completely, or lift the oppressive restrictions imposed by the regime on people’s political views. However, it offered a chance for the political parties to approach supporters and organise their activities to face such oppressive measures, and offered freedom of expression and political association; because of this, Sudan had entered a new era. Back to the research question, this constitution illustrates most of the basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular reference to democracy. Despite these developments, both the judiciary and the government executive body were not able to cope with these changes. These institutions remained below standard in safeguarding the rights of the people, as individuals and as groups (political parties or NGOs, cultural organisations etc.).

### 3.2 The Structure of the Government

The first problem facing any military coup is the issue of legitimacy; the government, after the coup, started mobilising the people to participate actively in state building, and drew up plans for the future through a series of conferences. After the coup, the RCC had suspended both parliament and the executive institutions; it had detained government officials and leaders of the political parties, and imposed a state of

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49 These conferences included dialogue for peace, political system, economic issues, media, women, diplomacy, the native (*Ahli*) system, and the conference for the comprehensive strategic plan.
emergency. The RCC was composed of military officers, who came from different branches of the Armed Forces and different regions of Sudan; the RCC formed a cabinet, and in the process started ruling the country, meaning that the RCC exercised exclusive legislative and executive authority in the country. In essence, they monopolised power and practised a dictatorship; this practice contradicted Turabi’s theory of democracy.

The conference series, mentioned earlier, occupied the vacuum left by the dissolution of the legislative and executive institutions. This was then filled by new institutions based on the recommendations of these conferences, which counted as points of reference for the new regime. The RCC formed four committees, namely the security, political, economic, and media committees. The role of these committees was to assist in ruling the country, in the absence of the executive and legislative institutions (Turabi, 2003, p.366). The revolution in its first days was inclined towards decentralisation and federalism, which had been advocated by the Islamic movement. A conference held in Khartoum that brought together the northerners and southerners also agreed on federalism for all of Sudan. When the permanent constitution was developed, the government moved towards democracy, which was adopted by the movement as a call for freedom and Shura accessible to all. In the federal model for Sudan, 10 states (Wilayat) were established in the South and 15 in the North; all were established with elected legislative institutions and a state governor (Wāli) (Turabi, 2009, p.366). These steps were part of the movement’s plan, which they later claimed had been delayed by the military rulers, and some movement members who feared the democratic process. It is well-known that Islamists adopted a federal system, even in the structure of the movement itself. The plan was to move towards a legitimate regime through building institutions that enabled the people to participate in planning and decision making. The
RCC established the TNA\textsuperscript{50} in 1991, which continued until 1995. The TNA was designed to play a legislative and accountability role, but its main role was to build the political system, try to secure peace in the country, and to agree on the comprehensive national strategic plan. At this stage, the regime was planning to move towards institutional legitimacy by electing a NA to replace the appointed TNA. The newly elected NA was called to session in April 1996 with 400 members, including 120 from the ruling NC. This NA passed the 1998 Sudan constitution, but was dissolved by the President in 1999, before it had completed its term.

On the other hand, the RCC issued a temporary bill to establish the popular committees.\textsuperscript{51} The political system was built on these popular committees, which worked in the provinces, councils, and local areas, as well as at national level. President Omer Hasan Ahmed al-Bashir in the opening session of the ‘National Dialogue in the Political System’ conference declared that the political system was intended to avoid the weaknesses of the previous regimes, to avoid the ethical imperfection and inaccuracy of traditional elections that benefited political parties only (President’s speech, 6 August 1990). In the speech, the President asked the conference to explore the means to accommodate all people, organisations, fields and sectors. He added that laws should seek efficiency in performance, and in the role of mobilisation, Shura, and accountability and monitoring; all this should be adopted within the framework of federalism, where the conference would scrutinise how to delegate authority to the people. However, the real objective of the conferences system was to rally and unify the grassroots of the traditional political parties. Turabi adopted this system to bring the members of Islamic political parties (UP, DUP, NIF) into one structure or party.

\textsuperscript{50} It had 303 members, from all regions and fields, among them the RCC members after it was dissolved (except the President), the state governors (\textit{Wallis}) and the cabinet ministers, the RCC advisers, and the head of the popular committees.

\textsuperscript{51} These popular committees were similar to Libyan popular congresses, which started from the local areas to the counties, regions and then went on to the national level.
bypassing the leaders. The leaders of the political parties refused to participate in the NC, although the Islamists made great efforts to persuade them. With this hierarchical institution of popular committees, the popular system was established, and was called the National Congress. Hamad Omer Hawi concluded in his study titled ‘The nature of the state in Islam: Sudan’s example’ that:

“The NC was considered the political system not a political party, and it was announced that this system included the features of pluralism in its comprehensive conceptions, according to, first, the intellectual pluralism that enables the intellectual freedom of the individual [to have a voice] in the public issues through participating in the Congress and councils, and protects the political arena from the trends of alienation and conflict” (Hawi, 2004, pp.251-253).

According to Turabi’s consensus approach, it could be said that he proposed a structure for the NC that ensured diversity of opinion in the organisation. The organisation would uphold freedom of expression, intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach consensus, with decisions based on this political consensus. However, the organisation failed to achieve this objective: it is clear that it is not a realistic objective in a highly politicised society; moreover, they cannot dissolve the political parties and then ask their leaders to join them. The regime then adopted the concept of political association (al-Tawali al-Siyasi), or plurality of organisations; in other words, a multi-party system. However, al-Karouri (2000) attributes the failure of the popular conferences system to a number of factors. First, the system was elitist, complicated, and difficult for average people to understand. Second, the members of the Islamic movement did not actively promote and explain it; they had become complacent due to the absence of rivals within the political institutions challenging and forcing them to make the effort. Third, the Sudanese people were highly politicised by virtue of their environment, influenced by sectarian institutions and geographical loyalties. The pursuit of power was conducted competitively through challenge and rivalry. In this environment, Karouri (2000) believed that lively and credible elections could only be achieved through a direct race
for government. Subsequently, the regime considered other alternatives that were more active and expressed the dynamic of political activism. This resulted in greater openness by the regime towards other structures and political organisations, as well as the traditional opposition parties. Therefore, *al-Tawali al-Siyasi* (freedom of association) was included in the 1998 constitution (Karouri, 2000, p.163). The NC Secretary-General, Turabi, had proposed re-establishing the freedom of association and expression in Winter 1997. However, the fall of the towns of Kurmuk and Gisan to the SPLA, with support from Ethiopia, led to a delay in this proposal being ratified by the NC Shura Council. Turabi resubmitted his proposal to the NC Shura Council in 1997, where he argued that Islam establishes belief (*Īman*) based on the fundamentals of freedom and submission. He considered that the wisdom gained from recent years had shown the need to move towards freedom and de-centralisation. Although this petition came too late, it was a sincere call for real democracy. One may agree with Esposito, who affirms that:

“the constitution of 1998 is an important milestone in the evolution of his [Turabi’s] thinking, it contains many themes that have long been present in his writings. However, the multiparty federal system defined by the constitution is also a new phase” (Esposito, 2001, p.144).

In February 1998, the NC was announced as a political party, with President al-Bashir as its president, and Turabi as its Secretary-General. This made the NC the ruling party, with 22 other political parties on the political scene. This step came eight years late, but it is worthwhile examining the practice of real democracy as intended by the leaders at that time. Moreover, it is important to mention that these developments led to a split in the body of the movement. The evaluation of this experiment shows that there is a gap between the theory of democracy adopted by Turabi and the practice of Islam in Sudan, although he claims that he suffers from the obstacles made by the executives in the government. The relation between the thinkers and the army leaders and the executive ministers may cause this gap between the theory and practice, moreover the
complications between the two bodies (the movement as a party and the executives in the state) that controlled the country.

3.3 The Economic Institutions: Islamic banks and insurance companies

Historically, economic activity has been one of the movement’s key concerns since its establishment in the mid-1940s. It was considered vital to funding the movement at that time. After 1964, this interest expanded, parallel to the developments in ICF activities. Abdelsalam (2009) reported that the first ICF investment was in printing and publication (ICF printing). However, this venture was confiscated by the new government, following the May 1969 coup. After the reconciliation (al-Musalahah) with Nimeiri, the economic aspect witnessed a degree of development, where some movement members began to establish businesses. As was mentioned previously, the empowerment plan was set in motion in the 1970s. At the same time, Islamic banking had started to be established in the Arab world, and came to Sudan on 18 August 1976.52 According to Abdelsalam (2009), the establishment of Islamic banking brought questions over Islamic economics into prominence. This experiment started in the practical domain, guided by limited theoretical Ijtihād, and depending mostly on partial Fatwas that focused on eliminating usurious transactions that were necessarily connected to the capitalist world economy. Islamic banking revived Islamic economic transactions and sales, and applied fiqh models of Mudarabah, Murabahah, Muzara‘ah, and Salam.53 Turabi (2009) and Abdelsalam (2009) believe that the movement relied on practical experience as a guide to developing a theoretical framework through research committees, Fatwa councils, and trustee boards. However, the experiment was also criticised by Turabi, Abdelsalam and other members, who believed that the efforts of

53 These are Islamic formulae of transactions.
Ijtihād had not concentrated on developing macroeconomic issues. Yet, it is important to say that Islamists also established Islamic insurance companies in the 1980s. However, Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that the same group of people or, in his words, class, were concerned about the agricultural sector, and invited many Arabs to invest in this important sector. However, he added that the Islamist bourgeoisie could not lead freedom and renaissance initiatives, as well as intellectual and economic development, as the pioneering Europeans did. Yet, Abdelsalam’s claim is unfounded, as the agricultural sector in Sudan needed the infrastructure, which was very poor at that time, as well as political support and clear policies.

The national strategic plan proposed by the economic conference was based on four principles; first, it should be established on the principles of Islam, and national aspirations that lead to development, combating monopoly, and establishing a system founded on the values of fairness and justice, the significance of mercy, and the substance of fear of the Day of Judgement. Second, justice and equality should be observed, and firm steps taken to redistribute wealth, and adopt an economic programme that rewards those who work (intellectuals and labourers). Third, dependence on the country’s resources without isolating it from others and, at the same time, without reacting (negatively) to external pressures. Fourth, adopting a strategy of economic reform, which establishes a free market of the enhanced guided market form, and removes those laws and rules that destroy market mechanisms (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan (1992-2002), p.189). While the economic plan was established upon these principles, the National Salvation Revolution was unable to solve all the economic problems in Sudan. The strategic plan contained many values that were not implemented in any action plan. Moreover, no mechanisms were developed to enhance these values, while the civil war and international pressures wasted most of the efforts and resources that could be directed to treating the Sudanese economy.
In reality, the new government had inherited many problems, including the economy, low productivity, corruption in the civil service and poor infrastructure. The government failed to solve most of these problems, because of the centralised approach to tackling economic problems in the early days of the regime. El-Affendi asserts that:

“Even though the policy of economic liberalisation is fundamentally correct, yet the continuing inflation made such liberalisation result in huge price rises. The government was unable to reduce its spending to combat inflation, due to the war in the South, and the drying up of foreign aid. Thus, the government was forced to fund essential economic projects on deficit. For this reason, the government had no margin to raise workers’ salaries to meet inflation. The result was that economic liberalisation affected all aspects of life, except labour. By necessity, this led to the crushing of the middle class—the government’s main support, and tool for change—on the grindstone of poverty and need” (el-Affendi, 1995, p.166).

One may agree that the paradox in this situation is that the modern class, which was supposed to build the state and undertake modernisation, was the main loser from this economic reform. The other factor, or the civil service, faced huge change due to integration of NIF members into public institutions, and removing all those who were not pro-government. Moreover, huge restructuring of the banking sector took place in the first three years, included in the package of economic reform. This three-year economic reform programme was advocated by the Finance Minister, Abdelrahim Hamdi. Its principle was:

“the liberalisation of the economy, based on a free market of the enhanced guided market type, some services to be provided by the private sector rather than the government, and, in the industrial sector, shared stockholder companies encouraged” (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.190).

These steps were meant to establish a free and just market, which refers to the principles of Islamic economic theory as adopted and developed by the Islamists. These steps were criticised by both politicians and experts, such as el-Affendi, Haydar Ibrahim Ali, Tijani Abdalgadir Hamid, and Islamist political leaders, such as Hasan Mekki and Ghazi Salah al-Din; they all agreed that, although these were important steps, they should not be implemented in a hurry, and not without first establishing the structures and
mechanisms that would absorb the side-effects of privatisation and the free market. Abdelrahim Hamdi, the Finance Minister, asserted that the policy was successful, but had been slow given the weak structure of Sudan’s economy, and the effect of some social traditions (Hamdi TV interview, 2 September 2011). In addition, he criticised the agricultural and industrial sectors, which had delayed the growth of the national economy.

The strategic plans connected social development to references in terms of the values of Islam. Therefore, these plans encouraged Zakat and mutual social support between members of society. Hence, the law on Zakat was issued in 1990 (Madani, 2008, p.6), less than a year after the new regime took power. One of the objectives of the economic strategy was to increase GDP by up to 20 times, through investing in national resources, especially oil (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.191). Zakat was one of the economic issues that took prime place in the strategic plan. In general, Zakat has its own unique rules of collection and distribution; yet, the strategic plan indicated that Zakat should be part of the government’s budget, and should contribute to GDP. The plan added that the Zakat administration (Diwan al-Zakat) was responsible for distributing the Zakat funds to those legally entitled to receive them (al-Masarif al-Shar’iyyah). The plan called for supporting the Diwan to develop its capacity, so as to be able to cater for the large numbers of those in need (Comprehensive National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.195). The collection of Zakat was increasing significantly; it was SD 27.7 million in 1990, then SD 11.9 billion in 2000, and jumped to SD 31.4

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54 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam.
55 These are special categories of people defined in the Qur’an as the sole eligible recipients of Zakat. Zakat must be distributed in the channels prescribed by Shari’a , as set by Allah in the Qur’an: “Zakat is for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer it; for those whose hearts were (recently) reconciled (to Islam); for those in bondage and debtors; in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer: ordained by Allah, and Allah is Knower and Wise” [At-Tawbah: 60]. The categories specified in this glorious ayah are the people to whom Zakat must be paid, and it may not be paid to other than them according to the consensus of scholars. Therefore, Zakat may not be spent in any other channels designated by the Allah, of charitable projects, such as building mosques and schools, because the ayah is clear on that matter. The meaning is that Zakat is exclusively for the eight categories.
billion in 2006, where 64% of it was distributed to the poor and marginalised people in society to secure their essential needs, such as food, clothing, education, housing, and the productive family project. Of the collected Zakat, 14% was spent on the employees of the Diwan as prescribed by Shari’a (Madani, 2008, p.6). Diwan al-Zakat also paid a monthly allowance to poor people in the provinces and local areas. Despite the significant development in the Zakat sector, the government could not develop a mechanism to reach all those in need fairly and easily, and continued to apply the traditional way of distributing Zakat.

Islamic values have great potential to contribute to overall development in the Muslim world, only if they can be cultivated in practical ways, and taking into account the local socio-economic factors that impact on the development process. Such values minimise the after-effects of reforms, such as privatisation and free market economics, in a weak national economy. The Sudanese Islamists have criticised other movements in society, such as the Mahdiyyah movement, which concentrated only on Jihad, or Sufism that concentrated only on individual education. The Islamists argued that these movements had not included development of livelihood in their programmes; yet Islam is a comprehensive religion that concerns all aspects of life. The Islamists and Turabi were concerned about Zakat and its role in the society, so the Islamists did many research and workshops regarding Zakat so as to develop the theory and the practice, a noticeable development achieved in this sector.

3.4 Infrastructure Development and Oil

In August 1999, President Bashir witnessed a ceremony celebrating the start of oil exports from Sudan, at Port Basha’ir formerly Marsa Nimeiri – an oil terminal 15 miles south of Port Sudan. A Panamanian tanker was loaded with six million barrels of
Sudanese crude oil bound for Singapore. A second vessel, a South Korean tanker, was ready to load oil, destined for a refinery in South Korea. Port Basha’ir has a storage capacity of two million barrels of crude oil, which was set to increase to 3.2 million barrels. In addition, a billion dollar pipeline would be expanded to 450,000 bopd in four to seven years. Sudan had become an oil producer, and a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Burr, 2003, p.256). Oil extraction was beneficial to the Sudanese people; for example, bringing a reduction in cooking gas prices, where the government reduced the price of the unit LPG (Liquid Petrol Gas) cylinder from 25,000 to 13,000 SD.

It took five years of exploration and building of infrastructure before oil exports began. As such, the government started to receive oil revenues one decade after the revolution. Notable developments in the country’s infrastructure were achieved. Roads were extended between the regions, and inside towns, where the national highway network was extended for 11,000 km, with 34,021 km still under construction. Similarly, fifteen airports, and seven seaports were expanded and developed. According to figures from the Ministry of Information (2011, p.31), existing TV channels were modernised, and a new one was launched; these comprised one national, nineteen regional, and six privately-owned channels. The national channel, Sudan TV, was expanded to give global coverage for a worldwide audience; prior to 1989, it could barely cover parts of the national territory. In contrast to the boom in road construction, the government was unable to modernise Sudan’s railway infrastructure because of economic sanctions imposed by the US.

Turabi (2010, p.329) reflected on these developments, and referred to the success of the revolution in the communications sector to privatisation. Regarding Sudatel, the telecommunications provider, he said:
“It is the most modern communications company; Sudan is the first in Africa and second in the Middle East; the free market encouraged the private sector to participate in developing the country and drive the economy” (Turabi, 2010, p.329).

Agriculture: Sudan has about two hundred million acres of arable land, of which only 20% is cultivated. Free market economic policies were introduced to encourage investment in the agricultural sector, including removal of taxes and export levies on agricultural production, support for agricultural inputs, and reducing the financial costs of the sector; the agricultural sector was given an unlimited financial ceiling (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.51). The tax burden and rising prices of agricultural inputs, transport problems, primitive means of agriculture, and the challenge of raising the productivity of Sudanese farmers, have all led to higher food prices in the market (al-Jazeera Report, 3 January 2001). The government established Jiad – an industrial venture building tractors and agricultural machines – to meet the needs of agriculture. The Kenana Sugar Company and the White Nile Company were other important actors, both producing high quality sugar for export.

As incentives, the government provided the agricultural sector with 39% of the budget for the “Agricultural Renaissance”;56 with infrastructure development in the agricultural regions. Customs and taxes were removed in the sector, and the capital of the Agricultural Bank increased to fulfil the needs of this government project (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.52). The government worked to develop the agricultural sector, but many factors played a significant role in delaying the results of these efforts; some factors were related to government policies, while others were connected to failure of coordination with other sectors, such as finance, electricity, infrastructure, and civil service performance. It could be suggested that economic development was achieved, but many internal and external factors impacted on overall performance. Some of the

56 This was the name given to the government project aimed at developing the agricultural sector.
internal factors related to the war in the South, poor infrastructure, and the nature of Sudanese business, which is not collective and depends on individual investment, and the historical state centralisation in the country, specifically in the economic sector. Furthermore, the state owned most of the services, agricultural, and industrial sectors; as for external factors, economic sanctions, debt, and political pressures affected the economic sector. Yet, despite all these challenges:

“[the] World Bank has classified the Sudanese economy as one of the fastest recovering economies from the financial crisis in its estimates based on performance in the first quarter of 2010, in the Middle East and North Africa, it came after the state of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, its GDP was 5.5 in 2010 and 6.2 in 2011” (Ministry of Communications, 2011, p.12).

In conclusion, the Islamists succeeded to some extend in building infrastructure, and privatising the services and industrial sectors, and also attracting investors to the oil production, agricultural, and livestock sectors, and to industries, such as cane sugar, edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, Gum Arabic, and cement. However, the international economic crisis affected the prices of food and imported goods. The process of privatisation affected labourers and employees; in other words, the middle class and the poor people were affected more than the wealthy and business people. On the other hand, the sustainability of the economic project is questionable, given government policies, administrative weaknesses, and unskilled labour.

Section 4. The Role of Society

Society in Islam played a significant role in administering most activities and services. Turabi on 10 May 1992, when asked at South Florida University about the role of society and the state, stated that: “the society, not the state, is the first institution in Islam.” He then added “the society cannot be described as an Islamic society, unless it is motivated by itself to apply the teachings of the Qur’an to amend mistakes and to encourage the righteous.” The Islamists before the revolution had established social
organisations and charities that played a remarkable role in education, health, and relief aid.

The strategic plan for the first decade (1992-2002) was oriented to the concepts of the national culture of Sudan, and the diversity of Arab-African ethnicity. The objectives of the strategic plan were to lead a cultural revival, to contribute to a comprehensive cultural revolution leading to civilisation development, and to fulfil its objectives and long-term ends. It was directed towards the characteristics of the society, its cultural components, methods of performance, social behaviour, and the influence on all generations. The plan concentrated on arts and human science, where arts included painting, music and songs, theatre and folklore, children’s culture, documentaries on Sudanese life, and cinema and publishing (Strategic Plan, pp.123-127). The most important aspect of this strategic plan was to establish the infrastructure for arts, music, and cultural activities, such as theatres in the capital and regions, public libraries, colleges of music and drama, support for music and theatre groups, as well as establishing and supporting arts music and theatre magazines; on the other hand, issuing legislation that encourages artists to be more creative. Although the government built theatres in most cities and towns, and encouraged the people to participate in establishing cultural centres, there is no verified record quantifying the success of such actions. In addition, it established more radio stations alongside the veteran state broadcaster, Omdurman National Radio; so there were 16 regional and 14 private radio stations (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.31). These TV channels and radio stations played a notable role in promoting and developing arts and music movements, and other cultural activities. Moreover, the government contributed in the form of annual prizes for the arts and music, such as the Tayib Salih Prize for novelists. While the government made many efforts, there remained many problems in this field. These involved the practical application of these policies, such as financial and administrative
complications, as well as apathy from most governors, who did not regard this as a priority. Moreover, the government was also repressing and marginalising anti-government artists, which forced most of them to emigrate. Although Turabi confirms that “the society not the state is the first institution in Islam”, in Sudan, the state monopolised power and marginalised society.

4.1 The Role of Society in Charitable Fields

The society in Sudan played a significant role in the charitable fields, specifically the Islamists. El-Amin Mohammed Osman asserted that, in “the years of National Reconciliation with Nimeiri (1977-1985), there was room for freedom of Da’wa and charitable work that enabled Islamists to establish humanitarian and charitable work. An Islamic Da’wa organisation, the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), was established, followed by other agencies in child and maternal care, education and health organisations, and youth and student organisations for voluntary work in different fields (Interview Osman, London 2011). However, it is important to say that these organisations played a significant role in Sudan and Africa, in the health and education sectors.

The Centre of Strategic Studies published the strategic plan for the voluntary and charity sector for the first decade (1992-2002). The objective of the strategic plan was: first, to establish a comprehensive social renaissance inspired by well-established morals in religious and national heritage, the national culture, and effective human values; second, to develop voluntary work; third, for Sudan to be the best society in the world in cohesion and solidarity; and fourth, to be a society that depends on itself to meet most of its needs (Centre of Strategic Studies, 1992-2002, p.54). The plan divided voluntary and charitable work into three fields. First, reform, such as social care for
children, displaced people, delinquents, and anti-drug and harmful traditional practice campaigns. Second, preventive, such as public order police, civil defence, children and youth care, and environmental protection. Third, development and services, such as social enterprises, i.e. small businesses, workshops, bakeries, agricultural schemes, animal and plant nurseries, and human development programmes, and supporting productive families (Centre of Strategic Studies, 1992, p.55).

After the coup, the Islamists mobilised all their organisations to cover the shortfall in the state’s contribution to welfare, by helping refugees and displaced people, cleaning cities, hospitals, and public institutions, rebuilding schools, and helping poor people in different areas. There were 262 associations and organisations in the charitable field, but these were not able to achieve most of the planned goals. Moreover, they did not cover all the country, and most of the workers were incompetent, with no effective training and no monitoring of work. In contrast, foreign organisations covered most of the country, cooperated with each other, and benefited from regular international finance and support, which local organisations lacked. Despite these circumstances, local organisations played a crucial role in supporting the society during war, crises, and natural disasters. In order to address these shortcomings, the government issued the law in 1990 (Madani, 2008, p.5). On closer inspection, Diwan al-Zakat’s evaluation report showed that it played a remarkable role in supporting poor people, e.g. in 2006 about SD 31.4 billion (now pounds) were distributed to the poor and marginalised people to secure their essential needs, such as food, clothing, education, health care, and productive family schemes (Madani, 2008, p.6). The Regional Support Fund and Diwan al-Zakat provides monthly payments to the poor people at the level of councils. Moreover, civil society organisations supported boarding school students by providing breakfast meals. More significantly, however, in the field of health care, the Regional Support Fund covers the cost of surgery in government hospitals for poor people, it
provides free essential medicines, and free treatment for patients with kidney problems, heart disease, and cancer. The fund also provides health insurance for many sectors in the society, including students and labourers. In the education field, the Fund supports 250,000 students in primary schools, by providing books and classroom furniture in the poor states (Madani, 2008, pp.6-7). It could be said in this field the government exerted significant effort, but this was not focused on practical and sustainable projects. It is important to mention that organisations, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamia (an Islamic charitable and missionary organisation) and the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), were affected negatively by the Gulf war in the early 1990s, when financial resources were affected by Sudan’s political stance (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.456) and then the war on terror from 2001. Moreover, the government itself marginalised and minimised their role.

On the other hand, some organisations played an initiative role in solving some of the social problems, such as poverty. In 2006, Unique Wins consultancy (a Sudanese consultant company) published an article on the evolution and development of the micro-finance sector in Sudan. The article reported that “micro finance was not established in the beginning by Sudan Central Bank, but it was supported and adopted by the local civil society organisation[s]” (Unique Wins, 2006, p.17). A survey conducted by Unique Wins showed that 90% of these organisations started their projects after 1991, i.e. when free market policies were first implemented. It could be concluded that many of these funding institutions played a significant role, but poverty was still prevalent across all regions in Sudan. As such, more cooperation was required to advance the achievement of these organisations. It could be concluded that Turabi shows a great concern to the role of the society in the charitable field, and Islamists have developed considerable experiments in this regard.
4.2 The Role of Society in Security and Defence

When Islamists came to power in 1989, Sudan was engaged in a civil war, as well as conflicts with neighbours in the east, west and south, such as Chad, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda. The Islamists’ perspective in the military field was different. In their view, defence was the role of all citizens, not a specific group, contrasting with modern schools, which allocate defence work exclusively to the Armed Forces. However, Turabi explains that:

“we found the army had inherited the Western system, established on fighting at the ruler’s command and [dedicated to] his obedience; it was far from religion and the Sunna of Jihad. Specifically the Jihad, was the most prohibited – in the colonial period – because earlier they had been defeated by the Mujahideen ... dictatorial leadership does not know collective decision making, or control by the pious” (Turabi, 2009, p.433).

Islamists believe that they came to power to change the methods and doctrines of the armed forces in Sudan, so as to be more Islamic and pious, and observe the values of Islam. Islamists believe that the military’s role should be the duty of every citizen in the country. Hence, they began establishing what was known as the ‘Popular Defence Forces’. Training camps were opened for citizen volunteers over 18 years old. Tijani Abdalgadir evaluated the experiment, and asserted that:

“the Sudanese experiment displaced these models by reviving the Jihad concept, when homeland defence is a duty upon every Muslim who is able to fight. When the training camps were opened, tens of thousands came; some of them participated in real battles against the rebel army in South Sudan. It was confirmed by observers that the people who were fighting were a new asset that was added to the account of power in Sudan” (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.62).

Some Islamists consider that this project contributed to unifying the Sudanese; for example, Turabi asserted that:

“popular defence is one of the biggest projects that unified the Sudanese society, so as not to be separated into civil and military, or elites and the dregs of society, and those have their weight” (Turabi, 1995, p.168).

It could be concluded that society participated actively in the defence role. They believe that they participated in applying Islamic values in this field: students, labourers,
diplomats, doctors, and employers from all fields participated voluntarily, and some paid with their life for what they believed in. This part of the Islamist project was criticised by many groups, Western journalists, politicians, some country leaders and academics. Some of them regarded this project as being against their direct interest, specifically neighbouring countries such as Egypt. It is one of the projects that impacted negatively on the reputation of Sudan, and was used as an excuse for isolating and pressuring Sudan, claiming that these were terrorist activities. Yet this project played a significant role domestically in changing the society positively.57

4.3 The Role of Society in Art and Culture

Islamists in Sudan showed significant concern for all branches of art; in the 1970s, Turabi lectured young students on the dialogue between religion and art (Hiwar al-Dīn wa al-Fan); this lecture was published in a book in 1978. “Al-Turabi applied a new methodology to the relationship between religion and art” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.175). He criticised the traditional fiqh (jurisprudence), which had occupied Muslim schools of thought for many centuries. He made a radical change in understanding the message of art as a part of religion under the umbrella of Tawhīd (unification), where all the life of a human being should be in the worship of God. Turabi defines art as “a creation of beauty, it should be [a source of] power and a supreme gift from God that is to be enjoyed in gratitude” (Turabi, 1987, p.87).

Turabi believes that art occupies a significant area in modern life, and that the artist should enjoy social dimensions and contribute with cultural materials, and the worldly life should be one of beauty, as well as religious. Practically, the NIF, in the 1980s, established many groups in the field of theatre, especially in universities and youth

57 The project changed into a national service, which applied in other countries.
organisations, music such as the Namariq musical group, architecture, and painting. In the 1990s, they produced many TV programmes, documentaries, and children’s programmes. It is important to report that Turabi met with musicians and singers in his office in the early 1990s, and explained to them that they were playing a grand role in establishing the culture of society, and that their art could be worship of God, if their intention was directed in that way, and if they chose noble words and values. In the 2000s, the Islamists started cinema production.

However, serious debates on Turabi’s ideas were held by Islamists, during the 1990s, which led to a solid conclusion that art is part of worship, and is the heritage of human civilisation, which must continue to reflect that beauty and participate in human civilisation, such as what we see in Spain. The revolutionary work done by Turabi in this field led to protection of the artist, media, music and theatre, and enabled conservative society to accept these arts without objection. In this context, many youth and student organisations played a vital role in introducing the arts and music to society, within its values. The youth opened their headquarters and theatres to musicians, singers, and artists, and introduced many of them to society. Abdelsalam (2009) pointed out that the National Sudanese Youth Union in the 1990s led the dialogue in the field of arts, and impacted positively on actors, authors, and playwrights; the Union was open towards these sectors in all regions of Sudan, with regional associations of actors and artists. Abdelsalam (2009, p.456) evaluated the dialogue with those mentioned above, and considered that it was a success; artists felt that there were no contradictions between their stance towards the country, and the Islamic project of al-Inghaz (the Islamist Revolution). Conversely, unfortunately the state officers, security forces and some executives did not reach the understanding of the elites of the Islamists to accept and protect the freedom of art and artist. Conversely, unfortunately the state officers, security forces and some executives were not in the same waves-length as elites of the
Islamists with regard to accepting and protecting the freedom of art and artist. As a result of this schism, many artists were intimidated; their activities were restricted and the Islamists did not defend the right of those groups to practise their activities freely; because of these polices, many actors and artists migrated. This is one of the good examples of the huge gap between theories and practice; Islamists should create the rules and the mechanisms that protect these rights –the freedom of art and artist- and educate the officers and executives who deal with these cases.

4.4 Women’s Sector

Women participated in the 1989 revolution at all levels; the significant encouragement by Turabi and the movement was based on the belief in the important role of women in building the country in the different fields. Islamists went further in supporting women to achieve the most, from the level of policies, to the level of high executive posts. For the first time in Sudan, a woman became a state governor in 1991; in the parliament, there were 78 women parliament members, representing 25% of members. In the 2011 Cabinet, the Judiciary, and the Prosecutor-General’s office, there were 5 women ministers, 89 judges, and 284 consultants respectively. In the police force, the percentage reached 10%, in the army 15%, lawyers 41%, in higher education 67%, and in the diplomatic field about 7% (Ministry of Information, 2011, p.50). The most important achievement of Turabi was legislation in the form of the country’s constitution and law, such as giving women the right to pass citizenship to their children from a non-Sudanese father. Moreover, Turabi opened the ranks of the army, police and diplomatic service to women. Women gained the right to reach the top, and compete with men, on the basis of qualifications. This means that there is no legislation to prevent women from occupying public positions. Women even played a significant international role in non-governmental organisations; Burr (2003, p.22) argued “that he [Turabi] played an influential role in the creation of the International Organisation for
Muslim Women in November 1989.” Burr believes that Turabi had long been a champion of women’s equality.

Women participated in Jihad, and in business women’s groups; they led many important institutions in the government, in the finance, education, political, and social institutions. However, there have been some incidents to the contrary; for example, the decision made by Majzoob al-Khalifa, Khartoum State Governor, to prevent women from working in petrol stations, or promoting a law that asks women to obtain permission from the family to travel abroad. However, the General Union of Sudanese Women, which supports the government, stood against these decisions, and succeeded in winning the battle, after pressuring the government through the courts, media, and different women’s organisations. The study will discuss the theoretical framework relating to women in the next chapter but, as a general evaluation, it could be said that under Islamist law, and by the support of Turabi, women gained many rights and played a significant role in public life.

Section 5. Human Rights

This part of the thesis will look at the overall picture regarding the human rights’ situation in Sudan after June 1989. It will examine its relation to Islamic norms, and will then proceed to explore possible remedies. With the rise of Islamic movements in the last century, Western scholars, politicians, and the media often question the underlying compatibility of Islam with democracy, human rights, individual liberty, civil society, and limited government. “For many Muslims, the desire and even imperative for implementing an Islamic state with Shari'a as the basis for both law and ethics …” (Esposito, 1998, p.75).
In Sudan:

“the coup leaders witnessed the rise of the visions and the voices that call for good government established on human rights, particularly the right of expression, association and peaceful exchange of power, the rule of law and the consequent decline of the traditional concept of state sovereignty” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.338).

The strategic plan for the government for the first decade, 1992-2002, aimed:

“to fulfil and secure the rights of the children [and women] in all the Arab, Islamic and international human rights conventions” (National Strategic Plan, 1992-2002, p.33).

However:

“On the night of the coup, several hundred politicians, including leaders of political parties and ministers, as well as senior army officers, trade unionists, lawyers, journalists, and businessmen were detained, and all non-religious organisations were dissolved, newspapers were shut down, and only the state radio and TV stations and the weekly army newspaper, al-Quwat al-Musallahah were allowed to operate” (Gallab, 2008, p.3).

Indeed:

“The fact that the new regime targeted almost everybody – dissolving all political parties, banning all trade unions, closing all independent publications, etc., meant that it had few friends left and many enemies” (el-Affendi, 2001, p.482).

In this case, it could be said that revolutions everywhere act in the same way, whether Islamist or other. However, it could be added that Islamists were very keen to carry out the coup without any bloodshed, as stated by Turabi in the interview conducted by the researcher, and they succeeded in this point. Sudan avoided the slaughter and controlled the extreme actions typical of revolutions, yet some members mistreated the opposition, but the Islamists themselves criticised such actions. Despite the above arguments, each of these actions contradicts Turabi’s democratic theory, and shows how the gap between theory and practice could be noticed from the beginning.

Abdelsalam criticised the human rights’ situation in Sudan after the coup, and attributed this to “lack of fiqh (understanding or jurisprudence) and shortage of training.” He asserted that this fiqh offered by Islamic heritage books on Jihad, which had not been
practised in civil society and the modern state, opened the doors to a culture of power and impunity practised in the first era of the revolution; particularly since the revolution came through a military coup that suspended the constitution and laws, and tempted its supporters to act on varying pretexts, whether protecting the revolution, revenge, or simply citing the need to remove the pharaoh or despot. This was especially the case for:

“groups related to the technical executive (popular security forces) groups that played some role in the preparation for the revolution. They dealt with opposition activities, but lacked the skills and experience needed in this situation” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.262).

Evidence of human rights’ violations were uncovered, yet the regime leaders claimed that it was not the policy of the government. However, they did not act to stop these violations, and even the judicial system failed to address these violations and protect the victims.

However, theoretically, Moussalli (2003) demonstrates that the disagreement between Islam and democracy is more illusory than real. He offers as evidence the striking variety in Islamic thought that has been largely overlooked in contemporary scholarly and public policy debate. Reviewing Islamic texts and writings from some of the most important Islamic thinkers, he summarises classical theory as developed not by the philosophically-important thinkers, such as Ibn Rushd and al-Farabi, but rather by al-Mawardi and others. He demonstrated that the theoretical foundations of limited government, civil society, and individual liberty had been developed by Muslim philosophers, jurists, and theologians independently of Islamic regimes. Moving to more contemporary thinkers, he demonstrates the same for Banna, Turabi, Ghanouchi, and others. However, Turabi and Ghanouchi, as reformers and political leaders, tried to develop a theoretical framework for human rights in the Islamic state; Turabi expressed his ideas in his book (al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-Nuzum al-Sultaniyyah bayn al-Usūl
wa al-Waqi’) (Politics and governance: Ruling systems between principles and reality) and Ghanouchi in his renowned book (al-Huriyyat al-‘Amah fi al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah) (Public Freedoms in the Islamic state). This development on the theoretical level needs to be examined in practice. Turabi asserted:

“whatever happens, the ruler has no right to be coercive and order arrogantly, or ban, using his power to corrupt the free-will, which was created by Allah, whether he forces them—the people—to follow a specific religion, or doctrine, or to push them to act in a specific way, prevent them from seeing others, and humiliate them using terror and torture” (Turabi, 2003, p.142).

Despite this clear vision, in practical reality, the new regime humiliated, terrorised and tortured its opponents from the very first days.

According to Turabi, the individual has intrinsic rights, which the state ought to recognise and guarantee for better fulfilment of the religious ideal, including the right to physical existence, general social well-being, dignity, peace, privacy, education and freedom of religion and expression. Power must be held in check, and Turabi asserts that the judiciary plays an extremely important role as a check and balance (Turabi, 1997, p.133). This he confirmed again in the interview with the researcher on 26 December 2010 in Khartoum, adding that it must also supervise the executive closely. Therefore, he maintains that, to play this role effectively, the judicial authority must be independent. These theories should be examined, in Sudan – the case study – during the first decade of Islamist government.

Although Turabi’s theoretical framework is comprehensive, he could not apply it in the Sudan after 1989. El-Affendi (2001, p.502) asserted that the issue of human rights in Sudan has received enormous publicity, and has exercised international human rights’ organisations and the UN to levels unprecedented in modern history. The unanimity displayed in all international forums on the issue is also remarkable. It was for this reason that Sudan has been regarded by human rights’ groups worldwide in the early 1990s as a test case for the potency of the new international drive towards democracy.
and human rights. The situation of human rights was a controversial issue in Sudan after the military coup in 1989. Islamists themselves criticised the behaviour of the regime in the first days, and some were punished secretly by the authority, as mentioned by Abdelsalam (2009, p.418). In contrast, some members were active in the eviction of opposition party members from the civil service, actions labelled “a random slaughter” by Abdelsalam (2009). This behaviour in the early years was described by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR);

“the first years of the regime were characterised by gross human rights violations of a kind common to secular regimes worldwide, such as extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trial procedures and repressive security measures.”(LCHR, pp. 28-29)

These reports show the real gap between theory and practice of Islamist in Sudan, this human rights violations could be explained in terms of the absence of the accountability if we accept the government argument that such violations is not a government policy. Indeed, before the 1998 constitution, one of the main criticisms of the legal framework was that it lacked “an overarching constitutional framework to define the rights of individuals and establish the rule of law.” The 1998 constitution affirmed freedom of association, and the law permitting the formation of political parties came into effect in January 1999.

With regard to the Islamically-inspired legal provisions, the standard allegations levelled have been those of non-compliance with Sudan’s obligations under international law. The country is a signatory of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The intrusive nature of some legislation regulating private life, prejudice to the rights of women and non-Muslims, the vagueness of provisions, and the arbitrary way in which they were being enforced, were also subject to criticism (el-Affendi, 2001, p.484).
In the realm of practice, abuses have been alleged, with or without legal sanction. Between June 1989 and early 1995, Amnesty International estimated the number of political detainees, who were held at one time or other, all over the country at around 1,500 (Amnesty, 1995, p.13). Turabi, in the round table conference, Islam, Democracy and the West, held at Florida University, stated that:

“Yes, some people were tortured, in the first days, but this happened in the police stations not in prisons. I can confirm the prisoners were safe; when I was in prison, the detainees were about 200, but now the political detainees are not more that 20-30” (Turabi, 1995, p.140).

However, in 2001, Turabi was regretful, and published his book, ‘Ibrat al-Masīr, in which he criticised the regime, and described it as a dictatorship. Despite his regression, el-Affendi in the Arab newspaper, al-Quds al-‘Arabi, criticised the book saying that it was not enough criticism of a regime that was described by its main sponsor, Turabi, as an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, but that clear apologies were needed for the mistakes and violations; apologies to the Sudanese people (el-Affendi, 13 June 2001, p.19).

The actual number of detainees was always open to dispute, with the government maintaining it was low, and the opposition parties exaggerating the figure. However, Haydar Ibrahim Ali asserts that the position of the international community on human rights in the practice of the Sudanese Civilisation Project (al-Mashruʿal-Hadari al-Sudani) did not change. Yet the regime, in the period 1989-1998, had made many amendments and reversals, which brought it closer to international human rights’ concepts, and not the opposite (Ali, 2004, p.79). Another criticism is that due process guarantees are circumscribed by the existence of a “parallel justice system,” which allows special courts and the security apparatus to circumvent and bypass whatever guarantees existed. Vague legislation criminalising all sorts of private conduct had been passed, and were being implemented by Public Order Courts that employed summary
procedures. This, together with the immunity given to security officials, the lack of judicial supervision of pre-trial procedures, and the existence of the Special Courts’ system, through which “normal rules of procedure were suspended”, all add up to “structural flaws in the criminal justice system” (el-Affendi, 2001, p.483). Protests against this repression thus came from every political perspective, and from a wide array of civil society organisations. Sudan’s international isolation also helped to make these protests resonate around the globe. The combination of these factors explains why Sudan came to stand out as a symbol of the international community’s determination to stand up and be counted on human rights’ issues (el-Affendi, 2001, p.483). Based on the reports of Gaspar Biro, who was appointed as Special Rapporteur on Sudan in 1993, a resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 February 1994:

“The report criticised the failure of the Government of the Sudan to provide for a full impartial investigation of the killings of Sudanese nationals employed by foreign government relief organisations, despite the announcement by the government of its intention to convene an independent judicial commission of inquiry. However, most of the condemnation concentrated on violations of human rights in South Sudan, where there was a war. The main criticisms in the subsequent years’ reports were the same, but adding more issues, such as the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in South Kordofan. The Special Rapporteur’s conclusion was:

“that the abduction of persons, mainly women and children, belonging to ethnic and religious minorities from southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the
Ingessana Hills area, and their subjection to the slave trade, servitude and forced labour are taking place with the knowledge of the Government of the Sudan.”

However, a 1996 UN resolution welcomed the release of some political prisoners by the Government of the Sudan in August 1995. It noted the recent announcement of open, free, and fair elections in 1996, as well as the dialogues and contacts between non-governmental organisations and religious minorities in Sudan, aimed at developing a more balanced relationship between the government and religious minority groups. However, it expressed deep concern:

“at the serious, widespread and continuing human rights violations in the Sudan, including extrajudicial killings and summary executions; detentions without due process; forced displacement of persons; enforced or involuntary disappearances, torture and other forms of cruel and unusual punishment; slavery, practices similar to slavery and forced labour; and denial of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly” (UN General Assembly, 1996).

It could be said the criticism concentrated on the judicial system, the side-effects of war, and national security measures. However, UN resolutions in the next few years changed tone and began to praise the Sudanese government’s efforts and cooperation; for example:

“welcoming new practices regarding street children, which centre on rehabilitation and family reunification and the increasing involvement of the United Nations Children’s Fund in projects with the Government of the Sudan” (UN General Assembly, 1998).

Moreover, resolutions encouraged:

“the Government of the Sudan to work actively for the eradication of practices which are directed against and particularly violate the human rights of women and girls, especially in light of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women.” (UN, 1995)

The UN General Assembly also called for:

“visits to the Sudan by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and

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58 This conclusion has been reported in two documents the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Third Committee (A/48/632/Add.3)], situation of human rights in Sudan. And the ‘Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1994, Supplement No. 4 and corrigendum (E/1994/24 and Corr.1), chap. II.
expression and the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights, who have both been invited by the Government of the Sudan, and requests both to report to the Commission and to the General Assembly on their findings.” (UN, 3 March 1998)

At the same time, the General Assembly welcomed:

“the establishment by the Government of the Sudan of the Special Investigation Committee on Allegations of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and Reported Cases of Slavery.” (UN, 5 March 1997)

It is notable that the government began to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur after 1996. However, while the Rapporteur appreciated the efforts of the Sudanese government, his report contained the same allegations mentioned above. The report acknowledged that the Sudanese government reported the release of female detainees with children, and other activities designed to assist such persons. It encouraged the government to work actively for the eradication of practices directed against, and in particular, violated the human rights of women and girls. (UN, March 1997). However, there was a noticeable development in the human rights’ issues in Sudan, and the report’s tone changed after 1997, because the government signed a peace agreement with one group of southern rebels led by Riak Machar. This was followed by the acceptance of the Declaration of Principles as a basis for negotiations, and then the government announcement of a comprehensive ceasefire on 5 April 1999.

Although some accusations were still stated in reports between 1997-2001, a tone of remarkable appreciation appeared in the UN resolutions in 2000 and 2001, and in the many visits by high representatives of the UN Secretary-General, and towards the cooperation extended by the Sudanese government to the needs’ assessment mission of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which took place on 14-26 September 1999. The Government of the Sudan had extended an invitation for a fact-finding mission by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in September 1999. As such, the General Assembly expressed:

- “its firm belief that progress towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in southern Sudan within the peace initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development will greatly contribute to the creation of a better environment to encourage respect for human rights in the Sudan.” (UN, 29 February 2000)

Other important points stated in the report may explain the improvement in the situation.

- First, the stipulation of basic human rights and freedoms in the Constitution of the Sudan, which came into force on 1 July 1998.

- Second, the expressed commitment of the Government of the Sudan to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law, and its express commitment to a process of democratisation, with a view to establishing a representative and accountable government, reflecting the aspirations of the people of the Sudan.

- Third, the establishment of the Constitutional Court, which has been in operation since April 1999.

- Fourth, the creation of the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children as a constructive response on the part of the government, and the cooperation extended to the Committee by the local communities and the support of the international community and non-governmental organisations.

- Fifth, efforts to implement the right to education.

- Sixth, the commitments made by the Government of the Sudan to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, in particular the commitment not to use or recruit children under the age of 18 as
soldiers, although these children were recruited by the SPLA, as stated in the
General Assembly resolutions.

- Seventh, the efforts to address the problem of internally-displaced persons. (UN, 29
  February 2000)

However these changes were interpreted differently; while some refer these changes to
political and economic weakness, others believe them to be tactical responses focusing
on a new political message and public relations, without effect on the essential nature of
the regime. Even the US State Department also appears to concur in the view that the
decline in reports of abuses may be “due to the increased control of the NIF regime,”
which reduced the need to intimidate opposition groups. The same report also notes that
the government, after a period of non-cooperation, “began to implement international
conventions and basic human rights practices” (el-Affendi, 2001, p.485). It could also
be said that the government leaders had gained experience in the field, and learned to
speak the language. Turabi on many occasions confirmed that these steps had been
taken two years after the coup:

“previously, after any military coup, democracy resumes after three years, but in
this regime, it did not take more than two years; moreover, we went on applying
the federal system so as to distribute the power and responsibilities to the local
councils, e.g. we encouraged private sectors to be involved” (Turabi, May 1992,
p.84).

On human rights’ violations and pluralism, Turabi asserted that, in:

“human rights, I am not claiming that we have reached an ideal situation yet,
there should be a balance between the government and society, and freedom and
individual, because of the economic crisis and the security situations ... it is
difficult in the crisis to keep the balance between the regime and the individual
freedom; what do you expect from Sudan suffering from economic crisis and
living under a civil war for seven years; why are the Americans turning a blind
eye to the practice of some of Sudan’s neighbours” (Turabi, May 1992, p.128).

In another interview in Khartoum in October 1994, he asserted that “They [the
Americans] accuse us of breaching human rights, while political detention does not
exceed 1% of that in Egypt for example.” Although this is not an excuse, it could be interpreted as a tactic to reduce the pressure on the regime at that time, and also embarrass the Americans. Since 1997, the government took some significant steps towards complying with the 1998 constitution, which conceded the freedom of association and freedom of expression. These developments were assessed by el-Affendi (2001, p.485), who considered that:

“This development takes care of the constitutional void mentioned above and offers some safeguards, in theory at least. The freedom of expression had been enhanced in both theory and practice over the past three years, while the constitution concedes the freedom of association.”

This meant that the government prior to 1998 had not dealt with the allegations of abuse; el-Affendi (2001) believes that the absence of an effective constitutional system was not the only problem, nor the main cause, but refers this problem to the fact that “most alleged abuses in Sudan were not sanctioned by either law or constitution.” He considers the existence of credible constitutions and mechanisms to uphold the commitment to justice as being at the heart of the matter.

The fact that justice and the rule of law are the essence of any viable political system, whether Islamic or not, Turabi considered that “the priority duty for the government is to establish the rule of law” (Turabi, 2009, p.19). Turabi believed that he could not introduce and enhance institutions to establish the rule of law, while most of the violations were outside of these institutions. Moreover, Turabi (2009) confirmed the statement of el-Affendi (2001), that “the rule of law is more fundamental to a system that purports to be Islamic, since such a system is by definition one that is governed by Islamic law.” For both Turabi (2009) and el-Affendi (2001), for the rule of law to prevail, the judiciary must be independent and free from any political control or manipulation. Turabi (2009, p.299) added that the principles of Shari’a and its

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59 The safeguards agreed upon in the peace accords of April 1997 had been enshrined in the constitution passed by the NA in March 1998, and which came into effect the following June.
foundation of independence is granted by a procedure that complies with the precepts of justice.

According to Abdelsalam (2009, p.384), 1998 witnessed the most important domestic event, where the constitution was passed by the NA in March 1998. The leaders of the movement explained it to Western leaders and diplomats, who appreciated the freedom of expression and political association it allowed. However, el-Affendi (2001) and Abdelsalam (2009) agreed that opposition groups remained far from satisfied by the changes made by the government. They believed that these changes did not go far enough, and wanted the government to offer more guarantees. In particular, they believed that the hegemony over all aspects of political and economic life by government supporters made fair elections impossible.

Organisations, such as Amnesty International, criticised the situation of women and minorities; some of their concern was that the Shari’a provisions created an obstacle to maintaining equality for women and non-Muslims. However, LCHR found that “Sudanese law includes a variety of provisions which appear to guarantee equality of treatment for all Sudanese citizens.” LCHR also found “no systematic discrimination against female witnesses in criminal cases” and acknowledged that Shari’a was not applied in the South. Moreover, non-Muslims in the North had provisions protecting them from prosecution for acts that are not crimes for them, such as drinking alcohol. LCHR agreed with the Sudanese government that “the Sudanese people must be free to live in the social system of their choice.” But, at the same time, they stipulated the condition of international human rights’ standards. “This freedom, however, must be balanced with Sudan's obligations to uphold international human rights standards aimed at individuals.” (LCHR, 1996, p.84) The LCHR report admitted in the conclusion to “[T]he right of Sudanese citizens to the social and political system of their choice” but deprived the government of such rights; “[it] does not, however, grant the government
of Sudan the right to disregard basic freedoms guaranteed by the international human rights treaties that Sudan has signed.”

Shortly after the 1998 constitution came into effect, and the government took some significant steps towards normalisation, the Sudanese government started dialogue with Europe and the US; France continued its dialogue with the government, followed by Italy after Turabi’s visit to the Vatican, then Germany and subsequently the EU.

On the domestic level, some political leaders returned to Sudan and began rebuilding their political parties. Independent and political party newspapers began to be published. It is important to note that Mahdi, after years of exile, returned to Sudan on 23 November 2000. He has been gradually rebuilding his political party structure since then, and has spoken in conciliatory terms of the government. El-Affendi (2001) affirms that a combination of internal dissent within the ranks of the government, tentative political reform measures, political agreements with opponents, and improved foreign relations with neighbours and Western and regional powers has led to a toning down of criticism of human rights’ violations in Sudan.

In conclusion, this chapter critically evaluated the Islamist experiment in Sudan in the period 1989-2001. It explored why they chose the military coup as a method of change. It discussed the extent to which they applied their theories of state building, especially in terms of how they developed the constitution. It explored the status of ethnic and religious minorities in the constitution based on Turabi’s theory. The role of the society in different fields, i.e. culture, charity, and defence, and the role of women in the state and society according to Islamist theory were also presented.

The movement before the coup, represented by the NIF, had been strong enough to win elections with a majority, allowing it to rule in coalition with others, such as the traditional parties, UP and DUP. Why did they then choose a coup as a method of
change? The study found that there were internal and external factors that forced them to choose a military coup as a method of change. The main objective of the coup was to protect the country from economic and security collapse, and also to protect the Islamists from being eradicated by the forces within the military that threatened the Prime Minister, Mahdi, at the time. Moreover, the international powers had threatened Mahdi, and forced him to break the alliance with the NIF. Some members of the movement executed the coup plan, where both civilians and military personnel participated in all phases, under the supervision of the movement’s Executive Office, which had been delegated by the Shura Council to pursue the practical steps towards executing the coup. Accordingly, the Islamists in Sudan successfully carried out a bloodless military coup.

The study found that the Sudan Charter is an important document that represents the Islamist thesis, covering governance, social change, foreign affairs, and defence policies. It presented a comprehensive programme for a political party that planned to rebuild the state and society, according to certain spiritual and cultural values. It was a big challenge for the movement to reflect the maturity of the Islamic thesis in ruling a country, such as Sudan, which is complex in its multi-ethnic background, multi-cultural character, and diverse religions and languages. Indeed, the movement succeeded in developing a theoretical framework for its thesis, but failed to properly implement it to the satisfaction of its members and the Sudanese people.

However, after 1989, the movement developed the ideas of this charter further. The literature published subsequently illustrates that practical reality proved their theory solid and comprehensive, although they failed to put all of it into practice. After the coup, Turabi sought to achieve consensus with the leaders of the traditional political parties, Mahdi and al-Mirghani. However, his efforts were frustrated by the attitude of the security forces, and the efforts of leftist and communist parties, and did not succeed
in reaching any agreement. In any case, the government after the coup was in full control, with all the legislative and executive powers in the hands of RCC, which could be described as a military Junta. Islamists started building the state according to their plan. It was claimed that the main principle adopted was Shura, where Islamists tried to encourage the Sudanese people to participate in building the political system, to practise Shura, and advance the intellectual ideas and effort to build the country. A series of conferences was started, under the headings of peace, the economy, diplomatic strategy, political system, women, the media, and other important issues. These conferences formulated the national strategic plan for the first decade (1992-2002). Shura, which was practised in this conference, was limited since many of the opposition leaders and politicians did not participated in these conferences.

As in any other military coup, although it was bloodless, all the political leaders were arrested and jailed in Kober prison. The RCC dissolved the media, and shut down newspapers. Gradually, the RCC delegated authority, by December 1991, to the appointed TNC (1991-1995) then to the elected NA (1995-). Eight years later in 1997, the dialogue on achieving political pluralism had begun, between the opposition and the regime’s supporters. In March 1998, the constitution was passed and, according to that, the law of freedom of association was issued in December 1998, and up to 22 political parties were subsequently registered. The law was amended in 2000, and named the Law of Political Parties and Organisations. This development took care of the constitutional void, and offered safeguards, in theory at least. Freedom of expression had been enhanced in both theory and to some extent in practice over the past decade, while the constitution conceded the freedom of association. This constitution illustrates basic elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular reference to democracy. Turabi played a legislative role when he was the president of the NA, in March 1996. Turabi was elected as the chairman in the NA, where he served as speaker of the NA,
and had an executive role when he was the Secretary-General of NC before that. In the international dimension he was the Secretary-General for the PAIC from 1991-1994, but he was influential during the entire period between 1989-1999.

This study observed that the 1998 constitution did not end the period of authoritarian and totalitarian rule completely, nor the oppressive restrictions imposed by the authority on people’s political views. However, this constitution offered a chance for the political parties to freely approach their supporters and organise activities to confront oppression. The first provision defined the state in relatively inclusive terms by addressing the problem of a majority Muslim population and the minorities, where the 1998 constitution adopted a federal system. Researchers noted that official NIF policy in the 1990s reflected the principles presented in the 1987 NIF Sudan Charter, where the constitution and laws preserved the minorities’ rights.

The unique contribution of Turabi in the field of majority-minority relations is that he agrees to exempt the southern region – with the non-Muslim majority – from the application of the Shari‘a, and the individuals who live in the northern regions as well. This is a very advanced thesis in this field. In the South, the application did not face problems but, in the North, some officers committed mistakes against some people. This is due to their officers- lack of skills and awareness of the rights and duties of the exempted people. These are important elements in Turabi’s political thinking with particular reference to democracy.

For the government, Turabi proposed a structure for the NC that ensured diversity of opinion in the organisation. The organisation would uphold freedom of expression, intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach consensus, with decisions based on this political consensus. However, the organisation failed to achieve this objective, and the regime subsequently adopted the concept of political association (al-Tawali al-
Siyasi), or multi-party system. This political system is heavily criticised, the failure of the previous popular conferences system is attributed to a number of factors; the system had been elitist, complicated, and that the Sudanese people were highly politicised by virtue of their environment, and influenced by sectarian institutions and geographical loyalties. In this context, in February 1998, the NC was announced as a political party, whereby President Bashir became NC president, and Turabi Secretary-General. Thus, the NC was the ruling party competing with 22 other political parties.

The proposed national strategic plan was based on Islamic and national aspirations, which meant establishing a system founded on the values of fairness and justice, the significance of mercy, and the substance of fear of the Day of Judgement.

The government adopted a three-year economic reform project. While the economic plan was established upon these principles, the government was unable to solve most of the economic problems in Sudan. Moreover, no mechanisms were developed to enhance these values, while the civil war, and international pressures, wasted most of the efforts and resources that could be directed to treating the Sudanese economy.

In reality, the new government had inherited many problems, including a struggling economy, low productivity, corruption in the civil service, and poor infrastructure. The government failed to solve these problems, because of the centralised approach to tackling economic problems in the early days of the regime. Indeed, its economic performance was imbalanced: while the reform and changes made were quite important steps, they should not have been implemented hastily, and not without first establishing the structures and mechanisms that would absorb the side-effects of privatisation and the free market. These polices affected the middle class and the poor people who represent the majority of the population.
The policy of freemarket was successful, but had been slow to achieve its goals, given the weak structure of Sudan’s economy, and the effect of some social traditions. In addition, the agricultural and industrial sectors had delayed the growth of the national economy in this period. The law on Zakat was issued in 1990, and the regime developed the Zakat system to absorb the side-effects of its economic policies. Zakat played a remarkable role in social support for the poor family directly, by providing monthly allowances, and indirectly through supporting the education and health sectors, but it remains traditional and slow in facing the rapid economic challenges.

The oil sector witnessed considerable development and, by 1999, Sudan had started exporting oil. The government started to receive oil revenues one decade after the revolution. It built up an oil infrastructure, such as seaports on the Red Sea and pipelines. The Sudan had become an oil producer, and an OPEC member after one decade of the Islamist coup which indicated their serious efforts to develop this sector. Although the government paid attention to the agricultural sector, it was not developed compared to the other sectors. Islamists succeeded in building an infrastructure, privatising the services and industrial sectors, and also attracting investors to the oil production, agricultural, and livestock sectors, and to industries, such as cars, cane sugar, edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, Gum Arabic, and cement. In contrast to the boom in road construction, the government was unable to modernise Sudan’s railway infrastructure, because of economic sanctions imposed by the US. In addition, the international economic crisis affected the prices of food and imported goods. The process of privatisation affected labourers and employees; in other words, the middle class and poor people were affected more so than the wealthy and business people.

The study demonstrated that Turabi believes that the society, not the state, is the first institution in Islam. He considers that the society cannot be described as an Islamic society, unless it is self-motivated to apply the teachings of the Qur’an to amend
mistakes and to encourage righteousness. However, many efforts in this field were made and many projects adopted, but it was not sustainable and it was affected by the government approach of monopolising the power; another factor is the war, which affected the society significantly.

On another note, Turabi and Islamists in Sudan had shown significant concern for all branches of art since the 1970s, although the strategic plan for the first decade (1992-2002) was oriented to the concepts of the national culture of Sudan, and the diversity of Arab-African ethnicity. Despite the Islamist elites encouraging art and cultural activities, the officers and security forces intimidated the artist; this example shows the gap between theory and practice and proves that the elite only cannot build a state.

Sudanese society played a significant role in cultural projects, and government policies encouraged it to develop the art infrastructure and activities. However, policies were not turned into action plans, and faced problems, such as financial and administrative complications, while most officials did not regard them as a priority. The society participated actively in the charitable sector through organisations in the fields of education, health, and relief, and reports show the remarkable participation in these fields.

Turabi and Islamists in Sudan believe that defence is the role of all citizens, including women, not just a specific group, contrasting with modern schools of thought, which allocate defence work exclusively to the Armed Forces. This role is one of the important elements in Turabi’s political thinking, with particular respect to democracy and people participation. Based on this view, the society participated actively in the defence role, under what was known as ‘Popular Defence’. It participated in applying Islamic values in this field, where students, labourers, diplomats, doctors, and employers from all
fields, women and men, participated voluntarily, and some paid with their lives for what they believed in.

Women participated at all levels of the government; reports showed a significant increase in related legislation, and women’s participation in all fields and levels of the government, and other sectors, such as women’s Jihad and business groups. They led many important institutions in the government, in finance, education, and political and social institutions. Burr (2003, p.22) argues that Turabi had long been a champion of women’s equality; in this field it could be said that Islamists succeeded in implementing their political ideas in the level of laws and in practice. However, there have been some incidents to the contrary, with accusations of human rights’ abuses against women, caused by some executives in the government, or officers in the police. Despite all these incidents, general evaluation shows the women’s sector could be the winner in the Islamist project in Sudan.

Regarding the human rights’ record after 1989, it could be pointed out that there were considerable violations at different periods of time. The dispute between the government and the opposition activists shows that each part tried to win the battle in the international organisation. Yet it can be pointed out that the government faces more pressure from the West and international human rights’ organisations. Many human rights’ special rapporteurs were sent to Sudan, although their reports documented both positive and negative developments the pressure continued. However, there were some violations, but it was not a policy of the government. Incidents were attributed to isolated mistakes by individuals, but there was no accountability for those individuals. Indeed, the government claimed that activists were exaggerating and lying about the number and seriousness of incidents.
However, human rights’ violations occurred on different levels, particularly in the first days of the revolution: the constitution was suspended, the leaders of political parties were jailed, newspapers were closed, trade unions were banned, and opposition party members were expelled from the civil service, under the pretext of protecting the revolution. The Islamist regime, at this stage, behaved in the same way as a secular regime. Both peace agreements in 1997, approval of the constitution in 1998, a comprehensive ceasefire declared in 1999, and the signing of the CPA in 2005 impacted positively on the human rights’ issues, as most of them were connected to the war situations.

However, if the human rights’ situation in Sudan was judged on the declared principles of the Sudanese Islamists, it should be said that they fell far short of the expectations of their members, as well as the Sudanese people. On the other hand, the 1998 constitution confirmed the freedom of association, and forming political parties was legalised in January 1999. These developments on the constitutional domain offered some safeguards, in theory at least. In addition, the freedom of expression was enhanced, in both theory and practice, after the constitution conceded the freedom of association. These changes reflected positively, to some extent, on Sudan’s foreign relations.

To conclude, Turabi’s theory of democracy built a comprehensive theoretical frame of work that is compatible with the values of Islam, which were established on the freedom of choice, freedom of expression, dignity etc. but it failed to develop mechanisms that turned these values into practice. Turabi believes that any human invention belongs to all humanity, which means that the mechanisms used by the West could be adopted to apply these values. Despite these beliefs, Islamists failed to use these mechanisms effectively due to: first, the lack of skilled officers and executives; second the weak structure of the state in a country such as Sudan; third, the lack of the accountability; fourth, the political culture in Sudan. According to all these reasons mentioned in this
chapter, the evaluation shows that there is a huge gap between theory and practice in the political ideas of Turabi’s theory of democracy, and the elements of his theory could not make an effective operation in his political action.
Chapter 5: Islamists in Sudan and International Relations (1989-2001)

This chapter will focus on Sudan’s international relations in the period 1989-2001. It explores the principles adopted by Islamists and Turabi after the coup. The chapter will critically evaluate the practice of Islamists in different stages and fields. Moreover, it will examine the factors that shaped Sudan’s foreign affairs in 1989-2001, and to what extent international powers influenced the relations with Sudan’s neighbours, and also regional, and international relations.

Sudan’s international relations after the 1989 coup played an influential role on the Islamist project in Sudan; on the other hand Turabi and the Islamists had a significant impact on Sudan’s international relations. Although Turabi developed a broad general principle for international relations, in practice he influenced the Sudan foreign affairs significantly. Islamists came to power during a period that witnessed momentous changes in world relations, embodied first in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and second in the Gulf War. These two events had a critical impact on Islamist decisions and the future of their project. As such, Sudan has faced a complicated situation over the last three decades. The objective of this section is to investigate the nature of the communication and cooperation by Sudan’s Islamist government with external entities. Furthermore, it seeks to determine the extent to which the Islamists managed to cope with the significant international changes of the 1990s. These changes included the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the US as the sole superpower and the Gulf War. This period also witnessed the appearance of new dimensions in international relations, such as waves of democracy in the Third World, and the rise of ‘terrorism’ connected to some Islamic Jihadist groups paralleling the rise of the Islamist movement.
In this period, Islam came to prominence as a factor shaping international politics and relations.

Other challenges included civil wars in Africa, Asia and even Europe, causing great concern to international organisations and international powers. As a consequence of all these factors, the issue of human rights was one that also came to prominence as a necessary element in the new world order. However, some factors, internal, regional and international, influenced Sudan’s foreign relations, which must be placed within the context of surrounding local and international spheres of influence. The chapter will critically evaluate the experiment of the Sudanese Islamic Movement in the first decade of their government. The chapter is divided into three sections that assess the principles and practice of the Islamist state in Sudan, in light of Turabi’s political theory. The first section evaluates Sudan’s foreign affairs: principles, values and plan. The second section evaluates Sudan’s relations with the US and EU, the countries of the Horn of Africa, and relations with neighbouring and North African countries, Asia and the Far East, as well as Sudan-China relations, which were regarded as the most significant of Sudan’s relations in the last two decades. Section three comprises a general evaluation.

Section 1. Sudan Foreign Affairs: Principles, values and plan

The strategic perception of Islamists in Sudan, as stated in their documents, is derived from Islamic approaches, ethics and values that developed in Turabi’s political theory. Historically, the Sudanese Islamists’ perception of the world was influenced by the challenges they faced; yet the constant vision remained the pan-Islamic perception. In the years of communist dominance in Sudan and in the world, Islamists everywhere worked against worldwide communism, e.g. the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, while in the colonial period they opposed Western hegemony. The objective of the state’s foreign
policy strategic plan was established on clear Islamic values that emphasis justice. In
the words of Turabi:

“political international relations for Sudan are determined by its national
resolution, subject to the policies of other equally-sovereign governments and to
international law developed by treaties or conventions. World relations should
be based on peace; a fundamental Islamic principle against any initiation of use
of force with resort thereto against aggression. This is Jihad (struggle), which is
self-defence, but only to the limit of equal response and pious reserve” (Turabi,
14 July 2003, p.17).

Turabi’s words can be interpreted as follows: sovereign states are equal, no state should
be superior over others, international law and treaties signed by states are binding on
them, the principles of Islam should be observed, signifying that peace and fairness
between states should be the basis of any relations. Islamically, you are not allowed to
commence aggression, but you have the right to fight back, as Jihad in self-defence is
subject to the limit of using the force in equal response. This means not exceeding the
limit, and if you are fair then you are pious. It demonstrates that Turabi’s views are
established on the same principles of international law. Moreover, in the same
document, he reaffirmed that “human rights are to be recognised nationally and
internationally,” and stated that:

“honest regard for inter-state, international and universal institutions, based on
treaties is a tent of Islam, as well as the movement towards a closer association
and coordination of interests advancing future unity” (Turabi, 14 July 2003,
p.17).

On this point, Turabi always believes in pan-Islamic and regional and global unity: he
confirms the belief in a pan-Islamic or global unity, with an emphasis on fulfilling the
conditions of justice and freedom. He states “all political unity should maintain the
balance and equilibrate common government to order and freedom, or independence of
particular units”; for Turabi, “united countries should relate similarly to the level of
federated provinces, autonomous localities and down, fundamentally, to the individual.”
Sudan’s foreign relations were established on “independence and dignity and it is the
value that was confirmed by the Islamic Shari’a from the first days of the revolution” (Hamid, 2009, p.325).

However, it is important to reflect on the fundamentals guiding Sudan’s foreign affairs, as stated in unpublished documents. Briefly, it can be said that openness, strengthening neighbourly relations, non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, except by explicit request to help in solving a problem or mediate in a conflict, and respect for rights, freedoms, religion and culture of others (Foreign Affairs unpublished document).

The same principle and guidance is stated in the Strategic Plan 2002-2012.

Turabi and Islamists, when they came to power, claimed that they worked hard to build the nation, secure peace, and develop the country. At the same time, they attempted to realise universal goals, on the principle of Islamic values emphasising the unity of the Ummah. One of the most influential factors that played a significant role in shaping the image of Sudan in the West, and consequently in international organisations, was when President Bashir announced the application of Shari’a in the north of Sudan, and not the south, on 1 January 1990. This announcement is based on Turabi’s fiqh, which is discussed in this thesis. On the other hand, Turabi, on many occasions, emphasised his global scope; he stated that:

“Islam is a religion that transcends all geographic boundaries; Muslims have continuously striven to extend Islam in space, and disengage it from territorial confinement or parochial characterisation, towards a universal scope ... final loyalty must be rendered to the Ummah, the whole community of Muslims” (Turabi, 27 April 1992).

Islamists understand that the application of Shari’a, and other factors to be mentioned later are the main reasons for the complications in Sudan’s foreign relations. Some neighbours and Western nations interpreted Turabi’s vision expressed above as expansionist intentions of the new regime spreading its values, which they considered a
threat to their own. These interpretations led to complicated relations between these countries.

### 1.2 The Gulf War

In the 1990s, many important international events shaped Sudan’s relations with the US, the Arab region, and African countries. These included the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Sudan being classified as a fundamentalist state. Sudan faced pressure from the US, the sole superpower, and at the same time lost some Arab allies. Mustafa Osman Ismail explained that Sudan’s stance on the invasion of Kuwait was against American military intervention in the Arab world, and did not support Iraq. Rather, it called on Iraq to depart from Kuwait, through an Arab solution. However, this stance was interpreted in the media as though Sudan was supporting Iraq against Kuwait, and so it paid the price for more than a decade (Ismail, interview, May 2011).

In an interview with the International Crisis Group (ICG) on 11 October 1994, Turabi affirmed that:

“we said that before the Gulf war was on, that the so-called international intervention was not about Kuwait, they were not interested in only liberating Kuwait; I know that Iraq was going beyond the red line as far as advanced technology, including the military industry, was concerned. The UN determined that Iraq would never develop beyond the limit” (Mirak, 1994).

In this interview Turabi expresses the vision of the Islamic movement: it was counted as an official statement of the government; this kind of view impacted negatively on the Sudan relations. However, there were other reasons impacted negatively in Sudan relations such as the demonstration of the Sudanese people against the existence of the American troops in the Middle East. Ismail in the same interview claimed that US pressure was extended to neighbouring countries to isolate Sudan, and deepen the economic sanctions.
The Gulf War was crucial in Sudan’s international relations, because it resulted in the isolation of the country from its friends in the Arab world, Africa, and the Middle East, generally, and complicated its foreign affair situation, when it critically needed the support at that time. The daily newspaper, *al-Inghaz al-Watani* (15 January 1990) and *al-‘Ālam* magazine stated (15 August 1990, p.15) that:

“Sudan faced an extensive media attack based on its stance on the Gulf war … it was claimed that there were Iraqi missiles and weapons to attack Saudi Arabia from Sudan if the war started.”

However, these criticisms continued, and American pressure continued as well. The Sudanese Foreign Ministry revealed in a press release that “the US withdrew its ambassador from Sudan and most of its employees, claiming that there is a threat to their life from terrorism.” The US ambassador returned to Sudan on 12 March 1992, claiming that a new chapter in relations will be opened, and promised that the US would resume aid to Sudan. However, Ismail confirmed that they did not fulfil their promises, and it was understood to be a tactical step to put more pressure on Sudan.

### 1.3 People’s Diplomacy

The new regime tried to apply new methods and concepts, such as people’s diplomacy, to break the circle of sanctions and diplomatic isolation. They began to approach people through what was known as people’s diplomacy. The idea was that, while the diplomatic policy of other countries focused on isolating Sudan, the people of Sudan were reaching out wherever they wished. Tijani Abdalgadir gave reasons for adopting this kind of diplomacy:

“when the United States and Britain campaigned against Sudan, some Sudanese ambassadors applied for political refugee status preferring to stay in the US and Europe; this encouraged the regime to manipulate the concept of people’s diplomacy, as a tool for communication and direct understanding between the

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60 Not the official diplomacy, but building relations with individuals, organisations such as political parties, and other cultural, women’s, youth etc. organisations.
people, then intellectual, cultural, and economic delegations were coming to Khartoum from Iraq, Chad, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Japan, Britain, and other countries” (Abdalgadir, 1995, p.62).

The International People’s Friendship Council (IPFC) was established in 1991 to fulfil these objectives, and to motivate Sudan’s friends to support the new regime, and also reach out to the international media, decision-making centres, local, regional and international organisations, political parties and leaders, and public opinion in general (Ismail, interview, May 2011). The IPFC Secretary-General, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, later became Sudan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. I believe this is one of the inventive ideas of the Islamists in the Sudan; it resembles Turabi’s thought in the free relations between people on earth without borders or government intervention.

1.4 Popular Arab Islamic Conference

In the aftermath of the second Gulf War, the IPFC conference was held on 25-28 April 1991, to which eminent persons from the Arab and Islamic world were invited. The objective was to study the impact of the Gulf War, and to create cooperation between the Arab nationalist and Islamic movements. As a result, the PAIC was established. This idea was established over Turabi’s political theory that called the people to overcome their differences and to stand together against the evil in the world, for Muslims from different sects, Sunnah, Shi’a, Sufi, Jihadist etc., or different ideologies, Islamist, Arab Nationalist, communist etc. or different religious groups, Muslim, Christian or any other religion. The PAIC was described as a non-governmental organisation set up by various Arab Islamic groups. In this conference, for the first time, both Islamic and Arab nationalist trends overcame their differences and united on this common platform, as reported in *al-Inghaz al-Watani* newspaper (25 April 1991). Mustafa Osman Ismail, the IPFC Secretary-General at that time, stated in *al-Inghaz al-Watani* newspaper on 16 June 1991:
“the conference represents a mature step for the Islamic and nationalist intellectuals, who were wasting efforts in dispute. These trends are now united. This will advance the Ummah, and will be one of the steps towards Islamic Arab solidarity, at this time, when the official bodies were unable to find a solution to the Gulf war.”

Turabi, speaking to al-Inghaz al-Watani newspaper (25 April 1991) stated: “the PAIC will be the start for a new international order, and it will be a popular front that concerns the Umma.” The idea of the congress resembles Turabi’s political thought that unifies the Umma and crossed the ideological differences, sectors and religions. Internationally, the conference was classified as a terrorist conference, and a stage for Islamic and Arab opposition leaders. This impacted negatively on Sudan’s relations, both regionally and internationally. In this context, the conference was the only voice that opposed the actions of the US as a superpower, and leader of the New World Order (NWO).

In 1991, PAIC took the initiative to launch an inter-faith dialogue, which culminated in the first inter-faith conference, held in Khartoum in April 1993, and a second one on 8-10 October 1994. Both conferences gathered hundreds of people from 30 countries, and 50 churches and associations. The international conference for dialogue of religions, held in Khartoum, was described by Western media as: the most dangerous meeting between Islamic terrorist organisations (Burr, 2003, p.123). However, Shari’a Journal (10 October 1994, pp.26-27) conducted an interview with Turabi about the accommodation of both militant-armed Islamists and peaceful ones, adding to that representation from the Vatican. Turabi believed that: “there is a common problem. The Vatican, the Holy Pope and the Islamic movements are today standing to do battle over what is termed in Western civilisation, ‘religious principles’…” These statements could be counted against the interest groups in the NWO.

It is important to mention that the attendees at the conference were from different Islamist groups, and other religious groups and churches. In another interview with
Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) on 11 October 1994, when he was asked about the achievement of PAIC, Turabi asserted that:

“It has assembled Muslims from all over the world, America, Canada and the Caribbean, white and black, Japanese and Europeans, European stock and European nationalities, Asians, Africans and the Middle East – Arabs mostly. For the first time, from all over the world, we assembled one meeting after the other: we have overcome the international divisions, Shi’a-Sunna, differences in jurisprudence, or spiritual orders, they now speak together, the dialogue between Christianity and Islam, we were behind it, and trying to develop dialogue between governments in the Muslim countries and societies, whether in Algeria or other countries. Differences between Muslim countries, Iraq-Iran, what were formally known as Southern and Northern Yemen, and settlement of the problem in Afghanistan, and some African countries; Muslim minorities all over the world, and dealing with Christian minorities also. This is the first time in world history that Muslim societies have met, not at a diplomatic level, because the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is not representative of the people; it represents the governments, and is not active.”

However, these objectives that started to be achieved by PAIC attracted the attention and concern of the world; the US, in particular, treated it as dangerous steps by Islamists in Sudan to try and play an international role. These conferences were considered by the US as terrorist actions. A US state department publication in 1995 stated that:

“the government of Sudan provided safe haven and support for members of several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan. The regime also permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for Iranian-backed extremist groups ... The list of groups that maintain a presence or operate in Sudan is disturbing, and includes some of the world’s most violent organisations” (State Department publication, April 1995).

As a result, the Sudanese government faced significant pressure to halt these activities, and responded by subsequently cancelling the agreement to host the PAIC Headquarters, and informed Secretary-General Turabi (Abdelsalam interview, 2011).

According to Ismail, these serious allegations were picked up by the media, and Sudan was judged accordingly, even though there was no evidence that the government of Sudan carried out, or sponsored any terrorist actions. A document titled ‘Background note: Sudan’, by the Bureau of African Affairs in the US Department of State, stated the interests of US policy towards Sudan were in the areas of counter-terrorism, regional
stability, internal peace, protection of human rights, and humanitarian relief. In another
document, titled ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994’, the Department of State points
out that:

“while there is no evidence that the Government of Sudan conducted or
sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994, the regime provides a safe haven
and support for several members of international terrorist groups operating in
Sudan; some of Sudan’s neighbours have complained that insurgents in North
Africa have received training, funds, weapons, travel documents and indoctrination from Sudan. In December, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations
with Sudan for its support for subversive activities and hostile acts” (Wilcox Jr.,
1995).

Despite admitting that there is no evidence against the Government of the Sudan for
conducting or supporting terrorism, the Americans pressured the Sudanese government,
and each time they issued resolutions against it. On the other hand, Turabi asserted that:

“while the Sudanese movement and government developed closer ties with similar
regimes and governments, the US reaction was to put Sudan on the list of states that
sponsor terrorism” (Hamdi, 1998, p.29). The Sudanese government denied on every
occasion being a sponsor or supporter of terrorism (Ismail, interview, 11 May 2011).
Turabi denied all the allegations in all the conferences held in Khartoum, and in his
representatives all over the world also denied these allegations, especially as no
evidence was ever offered.

Section 2. Sudan’s Foreign Relations

2.1 US and EU Relations with Sudan

Following the military coup on 30 June 1989, al-Sudan al-Hadith newspaper (1 April
1990) reported that: “the US government had tried to establish a relationship with the
new regime, hoping to find a solution for the problems of the south of Sudan and
Sudan’s relations with Libya and Iran.”
In the democratic period, 1985-1989, relations between the US and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s regime had deteriorated sharply, because of the close relations with Gaddafi’s regime and Iran. However, in 1989, the US cautiously started relations with the new regime in Khartoum, despite invoking the 1989 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act – Sec 513 that blocked American aid to Sudan, because the new regime had overthrown a democratic one. Nevertheless, about one month after the coup, the new regime received the first American visitor, Mr Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as reported by Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He announced that the US could help Sudan, but on three conditions; one of them was to abandon Shari‘a. The same had happened in 1983, when Nimeiri applied Shari‘a, as reported in Majalat al-Mujtama‘ (a Kuwaiti news magazine) on 19 March 1985. The US stopped its aid to Sudan, and then asked Nimeiri to delay his annual visit to the US. The US government then sent some executives, such as Edward Kennedy, and experts from the IMF. The US Vice President then called on the Sudanese government to suspend Shari‘a,\(^{61}\) fulfill the conditions of the IMF, and unify the South under a Christian leadership.

As a consequence of all these events, Nimeiri detained the Islamists, and started a process of abandoning Shari'a (al-Kushi, 1986, p.299) but his regime fell before he could do that. Hence, Islamists understood that the West and the US would never allow them to apply their values in a political system. In any meeting with the Sudanese government, the US stressed the issue of Shari'a law. So the government concluded that the US would continue to pressure it to abandon Shari‘a, and would use the international organisations and the international community to punish Sudan. Abdallah (2009, p.171) concluded that the US antagonised Sudan. The EU to some extent followed the US in its plans and decisions, especially those related to human rights’ issues and economic sanctions on Sudan. After 1997, relations started to improve after

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\(^{61}\) For more details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports between February 1989-October 1992.
the government signed an agreement with Riek Machar, which was known as the Khartoum peace agreement (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.382).

Moreover, 1998 witnessed an important domestic event, where the 1998 Sudan constitution was passed by parliament. Abdelsalam argued that the constitution paved the way for freedom of association, expression, and political association, and opened the door to dialogue between Sudan and France, Germany, and Italy (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.384). He added that the American administration had attacked and destroyed al-Shifa Medicine Factory in Khartoum in August 1998 with missiles, claiming that it produced chemical weapons. As a consequence, the door of dialogue between Sudan and the Clinton administration was closed. It could be concluded that relations between Sudan and the US were not normalised, although Sudanese government ministers claimed that they had made many efforts to establish a healthy relationship with the US.

2.2 The Horn of Africa

Sudan’s relations with most of its African neighbours were similar. Historically, Sudan has border disputes with most of them, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda and Chad. The war in Somalia was one of the factors that added pressure on Sudan. Sudan considered the American presence in the Horn of Africa as aimed at subjugating the people in these countries. Hasan Mekki, in an interview with al-Inghaz al-Watani daily newspaper on 11 January 1994, opined that:

“the USA considers its presence in Somalia an easy gain of a military base, to secure influence all over the region and across the Gulf, overlooking the oil and trade route on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, watching Iraq, Iran, the Horn of Africa and Sudan, and fundamentalism in Somalia”.

This was also the understanding of the Sudanese government regarding international intervention in the Horn of African region. Al-Sudan al-Hadith newspaper on 14 December 1992 stated that “the Sudanese government continued to announce its
constant position of the necessity of solving the Somalia problem regionally, without any external intervention.” These were the principles governing the Sudanese government foreign affairs position, which rejected using the region’s crisis as a means to implicate Sudan. Bashir in an interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper on 5 January 1993 stated that, “when the international forces invaded Somalia under the flag of ‘Restore Hope’, Sudan believed that it was not for humanitarian reasons only.” In addition, the US supported General Ali Mahdi against General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, while the Sudanese government had great sympathy for the latter, and so opposed the American intervention in Somalia. As such, rumours spread everywhere saying that General Aidid, who was wanted by US forces, was present in Sudan; accordingly, the campaign against Sudan escalated. In this context and according to Abdallah (2009):

“the Americans boarded a Sudanese ship named ‘Yousr’, claiming that it was carrying weapons to Aidid, but they found nothing. Indeed, this was the second incident of its type, the first occurring during the Iraq War, when the US intercepted the Sudanese ship ‘Dongola’ claiming that it was carrying Iraqi weapons to Sudan, and found nothing.”

However, these are just examples of how the US mobilised the media and the international community against Sudan. In addition, on 18 August 1993, the American Embassy in Khartoum issued a press release that Sudan had been added to the list of countries supporting international terrorism (American Embassy, 18 August 1993). When Turabi was asked by the EIR on 11 October 1994 about what it is that conjured up such fears in the US Turabi affirmed that “it was lobbies.” He added that “Americans when they vote, know little about foreign policy, they are interested in their domestic economic policy.” He explained that “There are lobbies, which focus on Sudan being an Islamic country, and that is not representative of American society.” Moreover, he compared the Americans with the Europeans who had known Sudan for more than a century: “Not a single European has said that there is any terrorism in Sudan. The
Europeans know Sudan much better.” The current debate regarding this issue confirms Turabi’s claim; Abdallah (2009), Madmani (2008), Hoile (2008), Ismail (2010) and many newspapers and researchers emphasised that most of these allegations were not true, and that the Sudanese suffered from the consequences, including economic sanctions, and being on the list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Sudan started supporting the Eritrean revolutionaries against Ethiopia, while Ethiopia was supporting the SPLA rebels in South Sudan. Ethiopia made a connection between solving the problem of South Sudan and the Eritrean problem, while Sudan rejected this connection because of the different natures of each of the problems. Sudan’s government, with Arab help, supported the Ethiopian opposition groups till they overthrew the regime and established a new government in Ethiopia. The Sudanese government regarded this as a great victory that would help them defeat the SPLA, which had been supported by the Ethiopian government. The Sudanese government was supporting Assisi Afwerki, although he was a Christian. Moreover, it pushed the Islamists in Eritrea to work with him inside Eritrea, but they refused, claiming that he was a dictator, and would not allow them to work as an organisation (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, p.68).

In western Sudan, and according to Zain al-Abdin, the Chadian opposition, supported by Libya, was present in Darfur. The Sudanese government believed that the troubles in Darfur were caused by Chad, and so they supported the opposition until it overthrew the government in Chad in 1990 (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, pp.64-65). The Sudanese government was keen to solve the security problems on the border between Darfur and Chad because this was a tribal area and could cause a security disturbance that could be exploited by the opposition from the South or the North, which might be dangerous
Following the collapse of the Chadian government, and the establishment of a new government, *al-Isbu‘* magazine wrote:

“the Sudanese government sent aid to the new regime in the field of agriculture, and teaching the Arabic language, as well as support in international bodies; Sudan participated in strengthening peace and stability in Chad.”

This meant that the Sudanese government had supported regime change in two neighbouring countries, so as to secure its borders. However, Ismail (interview 11 May 2011) claimed that the government developed its relations with Central Africa and Zaire, and paid much effort to developing its relations with Kenya and Uganda. It is clear that the relationship between Uganda and Sudan was complicated, as Uganda supported and accommodated the SPLA, while Sudan supported the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). On the other hand, Kenya was supporting the SPLA but, in the end, it facilitated the negotiation between Sudan’s government and the SPLA, leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Although, Islamists in Sudan were seeking a good relationship and secure borders with neighbours according to the principle of their foreign relations, they could not manage to gain this objective easily.

### 2.3 Relations with Neighbouring and North African Countries

Sudan is surrounded by nine\(^{62}\) neighbouring countries, which complicates managing relations with neighbours, and indeed creates significant potential for conflict. Moreover, most of these countries suffer domestic conflicts, such as Uganda, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Zaire, Egypt and Libya. However, in terms of relations with neighbours, Abdelsalam (2009) asserted that Egypt was the first country to announce support for the new regime. Indeed, Egypt’s President Mubarak contacted other Arab countries and neighbours, and encouraged them to support the new

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\(^{62}\) Before 9 January 2011, when the new state – The South Sudan state – was announced after a referendum.
regime in Khartoum. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia released previously-frozen relief funds, Libya sent the first oil shipment to Sudan, Gulf countries opened their doors to Sudanese migrant labour, and Arab countries started to plan investment in agriculture in Sudan. However, Sudanese-Egyptian relations deteriorated after it became clear that the coup was carried out by the NIF, and the subsequent announcement of Shari‘a law. Unfortunately, the Sudanese-Egyptian relationship was also influenced by the Gulf War. The Egyptian government summoned the Sudanese ambassador in Cairo, and informed him of their anger at the pro-Iraq demonstrations in Sudan, and the Sudanese objection against the international coalition. Sudan also summoned the Egyptian ambassador in Khartoum, and protested about the Egyptian officials’ statements. The situation escalated between the two countries, when President Mubarak announced that: “Sudan is threatening Egyptian territory” (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, pp.52-53). However, the Sudanese government responded to this by confiscating Egyptian assets in Sudan, including the Cairo University branch in Khartoum, Egyptian schools, and the Egyptian Irrigation residences and offices from Khartoum to Juba; in turn, Egyptian forces moved into the disputed Halayib triangle.\(^63\) Moreover, Sudan was accused of supporting the Jihadist group that tried to assassinate Mubarak in 1995. This complicated the situation between Sudan and the US, where international organisations supported by lobbies accused Sudan of supporting terrorist groups.\(^64\) The coordinator for counter-terrorism at the US State Department, Kenneth R. McKuen (15 May 1997), asserted that:

> “the Sudan ... provided – and continues to provide – safe haven to terrorist groups. Although we do not have information that Sudan provides the level and type of assistance and active support for specific operations as do some countries in the state sponsor list, the type of hospitality Sudan grants to terrorist groups makes it easier for them to maintain their viability, to train and to carry

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\(^63\) Halayib is a border area between Sudan and Egypt. There is a historical dispute over this border area between the two countries, where each claims it as its own.

\(^64\) As stated by Machine, US Department of State on 15 March 1997: “United States meant that these groups should be expelled from the Sudanese soil, among those groups, Hamas, Hizbullah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Egyptian Islamic group, in addition to non-Islamic opposition groups from Algeria, Tunisia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.”
out terrorist actions – such as the June 1995 attack by *al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyyah* against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa.”

A new phase in Sudanese-Egyptian relations began, where cooperation was difficult, and clashes between the secular regime in Egypt and Islamic regime in Sudan have been numerous. Egypt has long accused Sudan of supporting and even setting up Islamic fundamentalist groups (Moussalli, 1998, p.9), and shares the US concerns about Sudan’s Islamist government: “as the current regime in Sudan resisted all the Western, including efforts to help end the civil war, its official line is Islamist, and constant reference is made to Sharia” (Jacqu, 2004, p.266). In fact, former US president, Jimmy Carter, in the Boston Globe on 8 December 1999, “… concluded that the US has been committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum, because of its Islamic orientation;” a view shared by many political analysts. This is supported by the opinion of a Middle East Affairs expert interviewed by *al-Mustaqilla* newspaper on 6 December 1996. He confirmed that:

“indeed, the increasing pressure on Sudan’s government reflects to a large extent the pressure that faced the Clinton administration from Egypt and Israel; both of them agreed on escalating the political and media war against Sudan.”

The expert added that:

“tightening the siege on Sudan was always one of the essential Egyptian demands of President Mubarak on all his visits to Washington. The Government of Egypt considered the Sudanese government a strategic danger to its political and security war against Islamists, both moderate or extremist.”

This attitude from Egypt could be interpreted as Mubarak not being happy about the participation of Turabi in the set of top leaders of the regime in Sudan and all his actions were against his participation. However, a significant positive development in Egypt-Sudan relations started after the dispute between President Bashir and Turabi, but it could not be described as a strong relationship. This is how Turabi’s leading role in the Sudan government influenced indirectly the relation of Sudan, and reacted on the neighbouring countries’ relations and regional and international relations of Sudan.
However, Egypt played a significant role at the level of media and intelligence agencies to isolate Sudan, and weaken the regime by supporting the Sudanese opposition parties based in Cairo, e.g. the NDA, and working with them to overthrow the regime. In conclusion, Sudanese-Egyptian relations deteriorated once the Islamists took power. Indeed, relations had not been very good during the democratic period, when Mahdi was Prime Minister. Consequently, the relationship between this northern neighbour and Sudan was unstable.

However, in the late 1990s, relations started to improve for many reasons: the first was the 1998 constitution, which opened new doors in Sudan’s relations with Europe, and the US. The second reason was the split among Islamists, where Turabi ended up with no influence in Sudanese politics, and founded his own political party on the opposition side.

Moussalli (1998) believes that:

“in addition to the US government, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and other states in the region, were also trying to propagate the notion of the existence of an international network of Islamic fundamentalist groups organised by the Sudanese fundamentalist state.”

In this respect, Tunisia recalled its ambassador, protesting against what it claimed was interference in its internal affairs, and accommodating an opposition group. The Sudanese government had issued a Sudanese passport to Rashid al-Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisian Islamic Movement (Hanafi, 1996, p.14). These governments argued that it was the influence of Turabi.

However, Sudan had always confirmed its intention to develop its relationship with Tunisia. On the other hand:

“Algeria, reduced the level of its diplomatic representation level to charge d’affaires, and Algeria voted against Sudan in the Third Committee of Human Rights, supporting the American decision on 13.12.1994” (Hanafi, 1996, p.15).
Yet Sudanese-Algerian relations did not resume until September 1994, on the initiative of the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi. Indeed, Turabi had mediated between the Algerian government and FIS in 1990. However, in 1993, he invited FIS to participate in the second PAIC conference in Khartoum. “The conflict between the FIS and the military government had further escalated, and Turabi once more tried to mediate between the parties” (Hamdi, 1998, p.54). Turabi stated: “we want Algeria to be united and stable as a part of our ambition to see a united Arab and Muslim world” (Hamdi, 1998, p.55). This meant that Turabi mediated between the Algerian government and FIS, because he wanted to see peace in neighbouring countries, where any cooperation between FIS and the Algerian government would reflect positively on the relationship between Algeria and Sudan.

Compared to all the previously mentioned countries, Moroccan-Sudanese relations were always developing, and were never affected, as were Sudan-Arab relations during the Gulf War. King Hasan II asserted to France Radio, as subsequently reported in *al-Sudan al-Hadith* daily newspaper on 2 May 1995, that “Sudan is not exporting extremism, confirming that the Sudan is under a civil war.” King Hasan II led mediation between Egypt and Sudan, after the Egyptians occupied the Halayib triangle, and then he mediated between Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995, p.5).65

Libyan relations with Sudan were an important factor on the Sudanese political scene. For over 42 years, no-one could predict what Gaddafi would do to any of his neighbours. At the beginning of the revolution, he supported the regime; he thought they were only a military junta, and not an ideological group:

“The relationship between Sudan and Libya was affected by the Gulf War, and after the PAIC conference, when Sudan’s government accommodated some Libyan Islamists. However, this did not appear on the surface of the relation, but

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65 For more information see, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, archive research, the relationship between Sudan and Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 1995.
in reality it was deteriorated and was surrounded by doubt from both sides. The problem of debt, which was more than half a billion dollars, and the Libyan security suspicions, which were dictated by the Egyptian security forces, reflected negatively on the relations between Sudan and Libya” (Hanafi, 1997, p.130).

In fact, Gaddafi had supported most rebellions in Sudan during Nimeiri’s regime (1969-1985). He had supported al-Jabha al-Watania, comprising the Islamist National Front, the Ummah party, and the DUP, in 1977, and then John Garang’s SPLA in 1983. He continued to support the SPLA during Bashir’s regime, throughout the 1990s, and then the Darfur rebels in the 2000s. Hence, Sudanese relations with the Libyan regime were never stable, and took unpredictable directions, because of Gaddafi’s shifting policies. It is difficult to draw any conclusion about constant or strategic cooperation between the regime in Sudan and Gaddafi.

However, it could be said that neighbouring countries fell under the influence of both the media and intelligence services, which claimed that Sudan’s government is fundamentalist, and supports extremists everywhere. Pateman claimed that:

“[T]here is considerable concern in neighbouring countries that Sudanese fundamentalists with Iranian support, may attempt to subvert their governments. Intelligence services in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Egypt are devoting efforts to counter this threat” (Pateman, 1995, p.68).

In another example, Maria do Ceo Pinto writes in her book ‘Political Islam’, about US foreign policy towards Islamic movements in the Middle East, that Sudan “has become one of the most dangerous terrorist regimes not only in Africa, but also in the entire Muslim world” (Pinto, 1999, p.258). Pinto’s argument was based on allegations extracted from US documents, and statements from the US Congress, US Department of State and two US newspapers. However, the terrorist organisations indicated in these reports were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Hizbollah, as is explained in the mentioned document. Along with US sources, another example of
allegations by the intelligence agencies of neighbouring countries was attributed to Egyptian intelligence by Michael S. Serrill in ‘Time International’ (19 February 1996):

“Egyptian intelligence has claimed that as many as 4,000 Islamic radicals are receiving military training in at least twenty Sudanese camps under the supervision of Iranian Revolutionary Guards.”

The Sudanese regime, confronted by these claims, strongly denied them, and offered any person the chance to visit wherever they choose. However, none of these allegations was approved by that intelligence. In this atmosphere, the Sudanese government was trying hard to build a healthy relationship with its neighbours.

2.4 Asia and the Far East

In Southeast Asia and the Far East, Sudan cooperated with Malaysia, China, Iran and Pakistan. The African Confidential, on 28 February 1997, reported that “In the mid-1990s, Malaysian authorities agreed to pay off some of Sudan’s US$1.7 billion arrears to the International Monetary Fund.” Shortly after, Malaysia and China started investment in Sudan’s oil sector. However, Sudanese-Iranian relations concentrated on trade. In the round table conference in Florida, Turabi asserted that:

“They [Iran] got a very good welcome in Sudan, there is an exchange of trade. The idea was to trade meat and oil, seeds and other Sudanese products for Iranian products, electrical manufactures and whatever” (Lowrie, 1993, p.71).

Sudanese-Iranian relations were developed and strengthened significantly under the regime, even though Iran defines itself as a Shi’a state and Sudan is Sunni, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 7; Turabi adopted the approach of unifying the Umma and encouraged Muslims to overcome the sectarianism.
2.5 Sudan’s Relations with the People's Republic of China

Bilateral relations between Sudan and China go back to the 1950s; Sudan established diplomatic relationships with China in 1959. The principle of reciprocal non-interference represents a key factor in this relationship between Sudan and China, even though Sudan’s regimes alternated between periods of parliamentary democracy and military rule. Many trade agreements were signed between the two countries during this period of bilateral relations. However, the relationship during the 1990s was of vital importance, because of China’s investments in oil and other essential industrial fields. The sanctions imposed by the US and some Western countries played a significant role in making Sudan rely on Chinese, Malaysian, and Canadian companies in oil prospecting and production after 1989. Chinese-Sudanese relations went even further, taking on political dimensions, as China supported Sudan at the UN and the Security Council, and also mediated between Sudan and its neighbours in some conflicts.

Historically, bilateral trade agreements underpinned relations with China in the early 1950s and the 1960s; cotton was exported to China in return for manufactured and capital goods, in a continuously increasing trend. China, for which sesame imports from Sudan represent about 5% of its imports of this commodity, is the world’s largest producer and supplier of sesame. Sudan comes in third place as a producer, but in first place as exporter, with China occupying the third place in the list of exporting countries (Ministry of Finance, 2007). In the 1970s, China’s investment in, and assistance to, Sudan concentrated on small-scale investments in the construction of roads, bridges and public buildings, such as hospitals and the landmark, Friendship Hall. Ali (2006)

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66 Another interesting issue is the salient economic position China now occupies in Sudan has been achieved comparatively recently but continues a longer history of ties. These are marked by the unique symbolic connection of ‘Chinese’ Gordon. After a career featuring service for the Qing Dynasty fighting Taiping rebels in China, as well as a period as Governor General of Sudan, Gordon was killed in Khartoum in 1885 but continues to be a common bond as the personification of shared colonial oppression.
asserted that “in the 1970s the two countries signed an Agreement in Economic and Technical Cooperation and a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol, which strengthened trade relations.”

However, after 1988, Islamists in Sudan cemented their relationship with China, when NIF Secretary-General Turabi and other leaders visited China and instituted the basis of a strong strategic relationship (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.70). It is believed that this relationship was further extended after the movement took over the government in June 1989. Such relations were of extensive benefit in building the country after the revolution, especially in executing strategic plans for oil investment and infrastructure, where a wide range of industrialisation programmes and economic reconstruction took place. Salah al-Din M.A. Karar (2012) explained that Turabi asserted that “the Islamic movement chose China as a superpower to seek refuge in when faced with the expected conflict with the West.”

Turabi believes that the relations between the people could be organised through covenant. Moreover, Turabi explains further why Islamists chose to cooperate with China. He concluded that this was for a number of reasons. First, China had been under colonial rule, and was not a colonial country. Second, it did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Third, Chinese experts were simple and adaptable people, who could work under any circumstances. Fourth, Sudan needed uncomplicated technology, which is found in China. Fifth, Sudan needed rapid economic achievement. Sixth, Turabi predicted that the West would isolate the revolution and describe it as fundamentalist. China was chosen as a strategic ally by Turabi and Islamists before the coup because of the reasons mentioned above.

Yet China faces criticism from some scholars asking, “how much is the behaviour of Chinese companies in Africa symptomatic of contemporary global capital flows in
general, and how much is down to norms and practices that are distinctively Chinese?” (Strauss & Saavedra, 2009, p.5). The Sudan-China relationship grew tremendously to the mutual benefit of both countries in the 1990s, when direct investment and aid witnessed a rapid increase. By the end of the 1990s, China had become Sudan’s main trading partner. A huge amount of direct investment had taken place in oil extraction, oil infrastructure, and imports of Sudanese oil by China. Although Chinese-Sudanese relations were regarded as strong since the 1950s, they became even more important during Sudan’s economic isolation in the 1990s.

Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Foreign Minister in the 1990s, concluded that:

“the relationship with China was significantly important specifically under the economic political, diplomatic and military sanctions that Sudan suffered; this relation is important because of the political and economic weight of China” (Ismail, 2010, p.360).

President el-Bashir visited China in November 1990, and then in 1995, and so relations were strengthened, with China supporting the economic and political relations between the two countries. “Analysts say China's most successful African energy investment has been in Sudan, which now sends 60 percent of its oil output to China” (Hanson, June 2008). Indeed, studies, such as Hanson (June 2008), regarded that this economic relationship reached unprecedented proportions in the 1990s, with China being the key player in the development of the oil sector. When President Omer el-Bashir visited China in 1995, the Chinese-Sudanese Friendship Society was formed, and joint ministerial committees were established for political coordination.

In addition, Sudan and China took practical steps towards partnership. Chris (2005) asserts that the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), in 1996, purchased the largest share (40%) of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and has used its technical expertise and links to other Chinese government enterprises to transform the industry into a major export earner for Khartoum. Industry analysts
characterised Sudan, said to be China’s largest overseas investment target to date, as China’s “premier off shore oil source” and a base for its own broader petroleum interests in the region. Sudan’s 6% share of China’s oil imports is set to increase sharply when new fields in the Melut basin go into production. Although the situation is now different, after Sudan separated into two countries, relations between China and Sudan remain strong. Other important projects currently being implemented by Chinese companies include the Merawe Dam, Khartoum International Airport, and other industrial projects.

It was challenging for China to stick to “the principles of non-interference ... where Beijing has had to exert pressure in Sudan to curb its militias and took the lead in winning Khartoum’s acceptance of a hybrid African Union-UN peace keeping force” (Strauss & Saavedra, 2009, p.18). This is an example of how China has interfered in Sudan’s domestic affairs, and participated in facilitating and helping the international community deal with Sudan.

2.5.1 Sudan and the China-Africa forum

As mentioned previously, during President Omer el-Bashir’s 1995 visit to China, the Chinese-Sudanese Friendship Society was formed, and joint ministerial committees were established for political coordination. Sudan sought to help China in strengthening the relationship between African countries and China, and convened the China-Africa Forum in 1997, bringing together China and the African countries. The forum’s objective was to enhance economic, political, social, and cultural relations between China and African nations. The forum served to bring China together with African countries and the Group of 77, which included the non-aligned countries (Ismail, 2010,
p.287). Therefore, China succeeded in expanding its relations in Africa between 2002 and 2005:

“Sudan was among the African countries which attended the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and again in 2006. Eighty-five percent of Africa’s exports to China come from five oil-rich countries (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan)” (Hanson, June 2008).

The topic of Chinese-African relations is beyond the scope of this study; however, its political, economic, and environmental dimensions were heavily criticised.

2.5.2 Sudan-China political issues

The US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997, which affected economic projects and development. This pushed Sudan to cooperate with alternative partners, such as China, Turkey and Malaysia; these countries have “no political interests and ambitions in the other countries” (Ismail, 2010, p.252). However, al-Tayib Zain al-A’abdin argued that:

“these countries participated in breaking the economic siege; they participated in the oil exploration, regarded as a strategic commodity and essential pillar of Sudan’s economy. Actually, Bashier Port received 16 million barrels from 1 September 1999 to 15 of January 2000 [bound] for China, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Italy, Australia and Singapore” (Zain al-Abdin, 2005, p.90).

It is known that China expanded its investment in Sudan after American sanctions were imposed: “China confronts foreign competition” said Chen Fengying, an expert at the China Contemporary International Relations Institute, based in Beijing, and affiliated with the state security system. “Chinese companies must go places for oil where American [and] European companies are not present. Sudan represents this strategy put into practice” (Goodman, 23 December 2004). On the other hand, Maglad (February 2008) believed that investment in the oil sector presented an opportunity for China to meet the demand for energy by its growing economy. Therefore, China sustained the political regime in Sudan, which was squeezed for foreign capital due to the boycott by
foreign donors, was politically isolated regionally and internationally, and declared uncooperative by multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF. Revenue from oil, the introduction of macro-economic reform policies, and liberalisation of trade and investment regimes in the beginning of the 1990s, induced foreign direct investment flows from rich oil countries in the Middle East. This relieved the government and helped it break away from the economic and political restrictions under which it was put. Accordingly, China faced pressure from the US; Mustafa Osman Ismail (2010, p.349) confirms that, in the US, “pressure groups called on Congress to put pressure on China, other big companies and individuals to stop their investments in Sudan.” Moreover, “one of the Congress members proposed a resolution for the United States to boycott the Olympics in China, because China is supporting the Sudan regime” (Ismail, 2010, p.351). These measures were intended to deprive Sudan from use of its resources, and so put more pressure on the government. In addition, they highlighted the extent of the competition for energy resources in Africa among the various economic and political powers. Hence, the wider aim was to force China to limit its activities on the African continent.

Large (2008) argues that:

“Today China is the most important external economic actor in northern Sudan, whose oil-fuelled economic boom saw real GDP growing officially by some 11.8 per cent in 2006 according to the IMF. China has played the leading role in the reorientation of Sudan’s foreign economic relations toward ‘Asia’, now Sudan’s leading regional block for trade and investment. According to the Bank of Sudan, the Asian – and particularly the Chinese – share of Sudan’s total imports and exports has increased appreciably since oil exports started in late 1999” (Large, 2008, p.94).

As in any other country, China’s foreign policy appears to be evolving, as it realises the need to protect its economic interests. For instance, it has altered its policy of blocking
UN Security Council resolutions authorising peacekeepers for Darfur\(^{67}\) and placed modest pressure on the Sudanese government to allow a UN peacekeeping deployment. Beijing’s recent handling of the situation in Sudan shows that it is learning the limitations of non-interference. However, much of that principle remains part of its official rhetoric. Then again, politically, Zain al-Abdin (2005) believes that Sudan is reliant on China to halt further punishments. On its part, Sudan has consistently supported the unity of Chinese land. It did not support Taiwan’s membership of the UN, and did not establish any kind of relationship with Taiwan.

In defending Sudan’s case, China has made many efforts both inside and outside the Security Council, such as blocking the decision for a no-fly zone in Sudan. Indeed, China did not vote in the Security Council for Resolution 1070 against Sudan. It is important to mention that China played a significant role in developing Sudan’s relations with Egypt and Algeria, which were poor most of the time in the 1990s. China expressed its reservations regarding wording that stated that Sudan supports terrorism, in UN Resolutions, pointing out that Sudan had made great efforts to comply with Resolutions 1044 and 1054. It should be said that more extensive cooperation took place on far more diverse levels than previously. In all these cases, China faced pressure from Sudanese opposition activist media and lobbies inside the United States.

Sudan turned to China to buy weapons after US sanctions, as an alternative to importing from the US and Britain. Sudan also imports textiles, furniture, cars, and electronics from China, while China imports 6% of its oil needs from Sudan.

However, in diplomatic discussions with African nations, China does make suggestions on issues of governance and intra-state affairs. What distinguishes Chinese suggestions from Western interventions is that they are provided in a friendly rather than coercive

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\(^{67}\) A region in the west of the Sudan that suffered a rebel conflict starting in 2003; the UN forced the Sudanese government to allow the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.
manner (Anshan, 2007, pp.69-73). It is known that China also insists on using influence without interference; they view respect as vital to finding solutions. Anshan (Summer 2007) asserted that China has used its ties with Sudan to persuade the Sudanese government to cooperate with the United Nations. Since China has sought to alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people with a solution agreeable to all parties, the Sudanese government trusts China. In 2007, the Sudanese government accepted the “hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur. The turning point for the political process resulted from negotiations with the Sudanese government based on equality, not coercion or the threat of sanctions.

Zweig and Jianhai (October 2005) explained that the Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, in the summer of 2004 confirmed that “Business is business”; “We try to separate politics from business”; he added: “I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.” Meanwhile, Beijing has deftly protected its oil interests there. Yet, he gives more details:

“in September 2004, China successfully watered down a UN resolution condemning Khartoum, undermining US efforts to threaten sanctions against Sudan’s oil industry. As if oblivious to the tensions created by Beijing’s manoeuvrings, those two Chinese professors argued that China’s assistance in turning Sudan into an oil-exporting state shows how China is raising standards of living in the developing world.”

However, after the Darfur crisis, China faced criticism and pressure from groups in the US, as well as non-governmental organisations with a human-rights’ orientation. These bodies will continue to be at the forefront of those castigating Chinese actions in Sudan. Increasingly, however, there is also criticism from African sources. Even in Sudan, public demonstrations were held to protest over Beijing’s failure to block UN Security Council resolutions critical of the government (Chris, 2005, pp.147-164). However, it could be said that China is protecting its interests in Sudan. At the same time, it plays a significant role in supporting Sudan and its people to realise their strategic projects.
However, China is aware that there are no other choices open to them, given the pressure of US economic and political sanctions. Nevertheless, some scholars have expressed reservations about the attitude of China regarding the environment in its ventures in Africa.

In conclusion, Sudanese-Chinese bilateral relations stretch back to the 1950s; the principle of reciprocal non-interference represents the key factor in this relationship. It is notable that, throughout Sudan’s history, China played a significant role in different development projects. The Islamists initiated their unique relationship with China in the late 1980s; NIF Secretary-General Turabi and others visited China in 1988. When they came to power in June 1989, they developed this relationship significantly. The Sudan-China relationship grew tremendously to the mutual benefit of both countries throughout the 1990s, when Chinese direct investment and aid witnessed a rapid rise.

By the end of the 1990s, China had become Sudan’s major trading partner, just as the US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997. The researcher believes that China is protecting its investments in Sudan to cover its needs for oil and other products. Indeed, Beijing supported Khartoum at the UN and the Security Council. However, China faces mounting pressures from human rights’ organisations and Western countries, specifically the US. They claim that Sudan is violating human rights in Darfur, while multilateral financial institutions, e.g. IMF, consider it an uncooperative country.

China put pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the UN and, accordingly, the Sudanese government accepted the “hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur. Furthermore, the turning point for the political process resulted from negotiations with the Sudanese government based on equality, and not coercion or the threat of sanctions. China has played a political role in cultivating Sudan’s relations with other countries, while Sudan
played a significant role in introducing China to some African countries. Although Sudan separated into two countries, Sudan-China relations continue to grow, with further investment poured into the country. In the end, China was chosen as a strategic ally by Turabi and the Islamists before the coup because of specific reasons explained by Turabi, and it played a significant role in Sudan’s economic and political dimensions.

**Section 3. General Evaluation**

The new revolution inherited an enormous network of international contacts from the Islamic movement; most movement members and leaders had studied in universities all over the world, and established different kinds of relations. These relationships included the traditional ones, of leaders with other Islamic movement leaders and scholars, such as Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi in India and Malik Bennabi in Algeria. They invited Malcolm X to Khartoum, and influenced the main trend of his movement. They also strengthened the relationship with Warith Deen Muhammad, the son of the late Nation of Islam leader, Elijah Muhammad. They connected with most Islamic movement leaders in the world, who visited Sudan in 1984, after Nimeiri applied Shari‘a in 1983. The movement also had members, resident in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Uganda, West Africa, Nigeria, North Africa, and Europe.

During the years after the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime (1977-1985), Islamists in Sudan started charitable work by establishing charitable organisations and associations. Relief agencies employed many students, whom they trained in this field, and whom became useful cadres at the beginning of the revolution. On the other hand, they were connected with the freedom fighters in Palestine, Eritrea, and other African countries. When the Jihad started in Afghanistan, they contacted the Mujahidin leaders, and
Secretary-General Turabi mediated between the Jihadists and the US during the Cold War (Abdelsalam, 2009, pp.232-235).

The philosophy of the regime was to consult the Sudanese people in the first years of the revolution through what was known as national dialogue conferences, starting with the national dialogue for peace. The government also called the people to what was known as the diplomatic conference. One of the objectives of this conference was to develop the policy, vision, and strategic plan, while another objective was to further develop the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, prior to the coup, according to Abdelsalam (2009, p.81):

“the NIF extended its relations with neighbouring countries, in the Arab region, Africa, Asia ... It is important to be connected through dialogue and relations with Europe, the leaders of the old world, and where most Islamist leaders studied and live, then with the US, which controlled the world at that time, and the Soviet Union which was changing.”

The NIF Secretary-General visited Egypt, Libya, the Gulf countries, China, Morocco, Nigeria, Uganda, and Algeria to establish relationships with these countries. This shows the extent of the influence of NIF as a political party. Moreover, it highlights the vision of the movement and its leader Turabi towards international relations.

In conclusion, this chapter focused on Sudan’s international relations after the coup in 1989 and the role of Turabi and the Islamists. The principles of Sudan’s international relations were established on the same principles relating to Islamic values and international law and human rights, which are recognised nationally and internationally. Sudan’s international relations were based on a belief in a pan-Islamic or global unity, but fulfilling the conditions of justice and freedom. The declared fundamentals guiding Sudan’s foreign affairs were openness, strengthening neighbourly relations, non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, except by explicit request, to help in
solving a problem or to mediate in a conflict, and respect for the rights, freedoms, religion, and culture of others; all these principles introduced by Turabi’s political thought are regarded as indispensable elements of his political thought.

There are many factors that shaped Sudan’s foreign affairs and its international relations. First, international factors, such as the dramatic change in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf war, 9/11, the war on terrorism, and unstable neighbouring countries. Second, internal factors, such as the war in the South, the East and Darfur, the application of Shari’a, the declared foreign policies of the government in supporting Islamic movements and accommodating their leaders, including Hamas, al-Nahda and others. The chapter evaluated Sudan’s relations with the US and EU, the countries of the Horn of Africa, relations with neighbouring and North African countries, Asia and the Far East and Sudanese relations with China. Based on these factors, Sudan’s relations were unstable with its neighbours, the Arab countries, the US, and Europe. This was reflected in economic sanctions imposed by the US, and international pressure on the government. It is well known that the 1989 National Salvation Revolution inherited an enormous network of international contacts from the Islamic movement represented by the NIF and its leader Turabi. This included relations with individual leaders, Islamic movements, political parties, states, and economic institutions. These relationships were beneficial in bringing support to the regime in international organisations, the media, and in the economic field.

China was chosen as a strategic ally by Turabi and the Islamists before the coup because of reasons explained above. According to this ally, the Sudan-China relationship grew tremendously to the mutual benefit of both countries throughout the 1990s, when direct investment and aid witnessed a rapid rise. By the end of the 1990s, China had become Sudan’s major trading partner, as the US imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997. This relation is counted as important for Sudan and it strengthened the regime.
politically when China provide political support at the UN and in the Security Council; and economically through the increasing investment in different sectors, specifically the oil sector. On the other hand, China is protecting its investments in Sudan to cover its needs of oil and other products.

Turabi and the Islamists were calling for a Pan-Islamic movement and they tried to apply this approach in the beginning of the revolution but it was attacked by the international emerging power after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Gulf War was one of the other factors that influenced negatively the Sudan relations internationally and regionally. The approach that Islamists adopted could be interpreted by others as if they have expansionist ambitions so they were being attacked by all neighbours with the help of the international powers. Sudan at that time was not strong enough to play such an expensive leading role.

Islamists, and specifically Turabi, tried to cross the borders between Islamists and other ideologies such as Arab nationalists and the Shi’a sector, and other trends inside Islamist groups such as Jihadist and Salafi, and to set a platform of dialogue between all these groups. This is a very important step but it needs to be applied gradually and all the communities should participate in this step, such as academic, media, social organisations, not only the political leaders.

Moreover, Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan tried to unify all the religious people in one front so they started dialogue with different churches and the Vatican. This step is very significant but it needs to be gradual and it needs international support. It is important to affirm that these efforts were done under close supervision and encouragement of Turabi, through different activities and coordination with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the other related bodies such as IPFC and PAIC, of which Turabi was the Secretary-General. These efforts were faced by severe attack regionally and internationally, from
lobbies, media and activists. The approach adopted in relations with some countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and other Far East countries was a pragmatic approach and it helped the country in different dimensions, specifically economic and political. Finally, despite all these efforts, it could be said that there is no comprehensive international relations theory but there are broad principles which they have tried to follow.
Chapter 6: Islamists in Sudan and the State

Establishing an Islamic state has been an important objective for most Islamic movements throughout history, yet the nature of that state remains a controversial issue among Islamists themselves. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 shocked Muslim thinkers, and they began to search for solutions, alternatives, and ways to restore the Caliphate. It could be said that they began to articulate a theory for the Islamic state, but only when the historical institution of the Caliphate was in decline, and colonial armies were at the gates of its constituencies. “The idea of ‘Islamic state’ dominated the recent Muslim history since the 1950s when most Muslim countries obtained their independence” (el-Affendi, 2008, p.17). After independence, intellectuals and elites advanced many theses about the nature of the state, which may be classified under two headings or schools: the secular and the Islamic.

Throughout history, Islamists have demanded the establishment of Islamic states in Muslim countries. Most of the powerful movements, such as Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al-Nahda in Tunisia, and NIF in Sudan, devoted all their energies to this goal. However, these movements faced tension between two competing approaches: one that advocated formal programmes of Islamisation of laws and society to be implemented by the state itself, and the other that saw an Islamic state as the final product of the Islamisation of society. Yet both schools still had to face the challenges of developing comprehensive and appropriate concepts and projects required to build an Islamic state, even though some have governed for decades, specifically Sudan and Iran. In other words, the theory is still under development, with the theoretical framework subject to contributions of reformers and intellectuals. Some of these reformers have played leading roles in their countries, such as Turabi in Sudan, while others only recently so, such as Ghannouchi in Tunisia in the
current Arab awakening. Indeed, Ghannouchi was a close observer of Sudan’s Islamist experiment, from which he learned valuable lessons, to try and avoid the mistakes committed by the Islamists in Sudan throughout their rule in the past two decades.

Historically, the issue of the state is one of the most controversial among scholars and Islamic movements leaders, in two respects. First, there is significant dispute on whether or not the establishment of the Islamic state is the main objective of Islamic movements; some believe it to be an objective in itself, while others consider it a mere tool to establish a pious society.\(^68\) Second, the nature of the state and its role is an area of further difference.

This chapter critically explores the development of the notion of the ‘Islamic state’ and its role. This includes the balance between the role of government and that of society in such a state, in the absence of a homogeneous example of an Islamic state, from the Madina state and the Caliphate (Khilafah), and is therefore challenging to envisage. This chapter is divided into seven sections; it provides a theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s contribution to the questions of Islamists and the state, democracy, gender, and minorities. It critically evaluates the role of the state in Islamist political thought. Moreover, it evaluates the role of society, the distribution of wealth and power, civil liberties and freedom of speech, elections, etc. It explores the participation of women, ethnic minorities, and non-Muslims, no-party and multi-party systems, and international relations in an Islamic state. These are the issues that faced Islamists in Sudan and other countries, specifically in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Far East.

The chapter explores the theoretical frameworks proposed by Turabi and other revivalists in the second half of the last century, and the two decades of this century. It will also reveal the foundations on which these scholars based themselves.

\(^68\) The society that plays its role in ‘the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice’. 

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**What is an Islamic state in Turabi’s thought?**

An Islamic state is not one model, nor any one form, but is to be established on permanent values. This perspective holds that the Caliphate was not the exclusive Islamic state, but an Islamic model only. Scholars in different periods tackled this subject, e.g. Mawardi (deceased 450 H), was the first systematic theorist, committing his ideas to a book, *al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah* (the Rules of High Authority), followed by early Muslim reformers, such as Sayyid Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani (1838-1897), Mohammed ‘Abdu (1849-1905), and Mawdudi (1903-1979), followed by the modern reformers, such as Turabi and Ghannouchi. These scholars considered the Madinah state, which was established by the Prophet, as the authentic Islamic state. It is important to draw attention to the conclusion of el-Affendi (2008), in which he criticised the current Islamist vision of the concept of the state. He stated that:

“the basic problem with the current Islamist vision of the state is that it accepts the modern concept of the state as a principle of restriction. This conflicts with the original Islamic vision of the polity as the principle of liberation and self-fulfilment” (el-Affendi, 2008, p.99).

However, questions remain unanswered about the Islamic state, and the limitations on the roles of state (government) and the community (people). El-Affendi (2008, p.99) considers that “modern Islamic thought has imported into the debate all the ambiguities and confusions of classical Islamic political theory.” The researcher believes that the role of reformers is to free the concepts from their historical context, and redefine them in the contemporary context. Moreover, they need to develop mechanisms through which Islamic values could be applied. Many reformers, such as Turabi and Ghannouchi, pay significant attention to these points; indeed, they focus on the issue of public freedoms in the Islamic state, and how to stop rulers becoming dictators.
Turabi defined the Muslim state as “a state where its population is predominantly by Muslims.” He considers the ‘Islamic state’ as:

“the state that is not only Islamic at its private level, but also at the level of public life; it means that politics is integrated into religion, economics is integrated into religion, and international relations are integrated into religion; all life—public life is integrated into religion; Islam is a comprehensive way of life” (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010).

Turabi in this statement provides an answer to the question ‘what is an Islamic state?’ but does not answer how politics, economic, etc. could be integrated into religion and how the rulers and society can integrate these activities into religion. It is clear that Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory is reflected in his definition of the Islamic state. However, in his written literature and speeches, Turabi uses the terms ‘state’, ‘government’, and ‘authority’ on several occasions; the term ‘state’ means government or authority, as is discussed in another part of this chapter. ‘An Islamic state’ may mean an Islamic socio-economic and political administration evolving from within individuals to their own family, society, state, and eventually to a global level. In this sense, an Islamic state does not necessarily come as a geographical entity. It evolves from below through the strengthening of individuals’ inner spiritual selves and rises upward to family, society, state and global levels. At each level, Islamic states with definitions of their own are established (Salleh, September 1999, pp.235-256).

In comparison, in his discussion of the Islamic concept of state, Ghannouchi begins with the elementary supposition that for humans to live in decency and security, they need to be part of a community. A community in turn requires some form of authority to organise relations and administer justice among individual members. When an authority derives its laws and regulations from Shari‘a, it is said to be Islamic (Tamimi, 2001, p.93).
The model of the Madinah state is the one that established a state of reference and vision for these Islamists. Turabi understands the administrative body of the state, and the model in general as:

“the exemplary model of the state of Islam in Madinah (the years 622-623) was a democratic federation, neither a theocracy (clerical) nor a plutocracy or autocracy. Religion, knowledge and wealth were free, and administration of the state was decentralised” (Turabi, 14 July 2003).

From the history, I believe that the model of the Madinah state was multi-religious and multi-cultural, as the society contained Muslims, Jews and others. Turabi explains that the:

“Jewish settlements, or suburbs were autonomous with separate religion, education, local peace and justice, and local public finances; where they interacted with other Muslim communities or with sovereign authorities outside Madinah, they were subject to the federal union authority presided over by the Prophet and organised according to a written accord. Each of the federal communities had its own law, although the legal affairs concerning the whole federation were within the scope of the federal power” (Turabi, 14 July 2003).

Turabi’s understanding of the Madinah state is reflected in his view of the federal system he applied in Sudan, and in the Islamic movement’s own structure. It was also adopted in the approach to work with other organisations and states, in that he believes in federation at the international level as well. However, it is important to explain that Turabi believes in applying the law federally. At the personal level, law is based on individual traditions, or a monogamous personal law. This is an advance in the theoretical framework, which, if Islamists apply it, will solve most of the problems of authorities in their countries. To explain the point of personal law, Turabi asserted that:

“it is personal law based on Christian traditions ... monogamous personal law, we allow non-Muslims to have their personal law, we consider that personal law is part of personal life; it is a part of your complete freedom; it is like your belief; it is like your ritual acts of worship; you are free to observe any value there; so the non-Muslim—we will ask him, what are your customs? Is he a pagan? ... You will never find this level of religious freedom in any country in the world, not even in the West” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994).

In other words, personal law means to apply the law according to personal beliefs, which means Shari’a is not applied to non-Muslims, even if they lived in the North of
Sudan. In addition, the government granted an exception to the southern regions of the country, where Muslims are a minority. It could be said that to apply this in reality is not easy, as it needs a solid system and skilled officers and clear separation of powers. Although Turabi has this clear vision, he failed to build it into a practical system and mechanisms in reality, and here the gap between theory and practice is noticed. Turabi wrote a key text on this debate, published in 2003, titled, *Al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-Nuzum al-Sultaniyyah bayn al-Usūl wa Sunan al-Waqi‘*, i.e. Politics and Rule: Systems of Authority between Principles and the Laws of Reality. It attempted to explain, in great depth and detail, the concepts relating to the issues of the state’s role and society’s role in theory relating to the Islamic state, and the checks and balance governing the ruler and those who are ruled.

**Section 1. The Role of the State in Turabi’s Thought**

The role of the state will be critically evaluated, as discussed and explained by Islamists from different points of view, where ‘state’ here means the authority or government rather than land, society, and authority. This section will compare Turabi’s opinion with other Islamists, such as Qutb, Amara, and Ghannouchi. M. Umar Chapra explains that the duty of the Islamic state is to ensure a respectable standard of living for every individual unable to take care of his own needs, and hence requiring assistance (Donohue and Esposito, 2007, p.242). However, Turabi confirms that this is part of the duty of both government and society, where the government’s role is to legislate for those rules that facilitate the role of society and the judicial authority. This will be explained in detail in this part.
Hasan al-Bana (1984, p.63) believes “the duty of the state is to support the ethics established in Shari'a through its executive and legislatives.” On the other hand, Mohammed Amara (1988, p.210) goes into more detail, and confirms that:

“there are some duties that cannot be established unless there is an Islamic state; these duties such as Zakat collection and distribution, justice and judiciary system, observing the Islamic interests, [and] establishing Shura.”

He then described that the role of the Prophet’s state in Madinah was in administration, education, foreign and economic affairs, judiciary, and defence. Turabi agrees with some of these details, and confirms that the government’s role should be limited to legislation, public policy, international affairs, the judicial system, and defence. However, the same leitmotif was sustained through the Turkish Welfare Party’s motto of ‘Just Order’. This political campaign was aimed at the rehabilitation of the Turkish political system based on the welfare state model, instead of radical transformation (Yildiz, 2006, p.47). In comparison, Qutb’s argument explains the role of the Islamic state, where:

“in the Islamic state, God is the supreme legislator and the ultimate source of governmental and legal authority. Government in Islam is thus specifically designed to implement Islamic law, that so, to administer justice in accordance with its decrees. Enforcing the law and facilitating its application requires Islam to function as religion and state. Although there is no place in the Islamic system for arbitrary rule by a single individual or group, there is always room for consultation [i.e.] Shura within the boundary of law” (Khatab, 2006, p.8).

These different opinions emanating from scholarly effort or Ijtihād show that scholars were influenced by local culture and their historical moment. Hence, these experiments were influenced by local situations, and so it is important to analyse these different opinions deeply, and demonstrate that it is a matter of time before they converge regarding the role of authority in the Islamic state. The role of the state is to protect people’s rights on its territory, and (regarding popular will) should follow the will of the people.
In the researcher’s interview with Turabi in Khartoum in 26 December 2010, he agrees that a state is a geographical entity, with power and society; in other words, Islamic socio-economic and political administrations prevailing in a land. Turabi believes that the role of the Islamic state is comprehensive, yet shared between government and society. For him, an “Islamic state is one that is not only Islamic on the private level, but also at the level of public life.” He explains this further, affirming that:

“politics is integrated into religion; economics and international relations are integrated not only in religion but all of life; and public life is integrated into religion: Islam is integrated into all aspects of life; Islam is a comprehensive way of life” (Turabi, 14 July 2003).

However, this does not mean that the government is centralised, but that the values of Islam prevail in every aspect of life, as mentioned above. Moreover, Turabi does not agree that such a state is theocratic, and argues that:

“the words ‘theocratic state’ in the Christian context is the state ruled by the church. God, of course, never intervenes directly in public life; the church always presented itself as the representative of God, and they dominated public life completely” (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010).

In a BBC interview (1994), he refers to the problem between the church and the ruler as the historical conflict between clerics and rulers. On this point, he asserts that:

“in Christianity, the conflict was not between religion and politics, it was between the churchmen and the other men who rule the state, revolutionary leaders or monarchs. The church was defeated as it was moved out, and the religion was moved completely outside” (BBC interview, 1994; Turabi, 2010, p.14).

In the same interview, he compares this to the situation in the case of Islam, where there are no church or clerics: “in Islam there is no church at all, everyone has to have his direct access to God; the Islamic state is the state where Muslims rule—the believers decide in it.” Here, he means individual rules and decisions, not as a divine institution or clerics. However, for Turabi, in all religions, a deviation in a historical moment happens to isolate religion from some aspects of life. Explaining this, he stated that:
“all the religions started containing high unification (Tawhīd), but faced by the challenges (Ibtilā`) in the political field, as in all other aspects of life, the polytheists entered the field of knowledge, economics and art; yet the disease of the political polytheists afflicted every religious society specifically; the symptoms of religious disease are the same” (Turabi, 2000, p.6).

Turabi deals with a number of taboos around the concept of the state, and most scholars agree that Turabi’s pragmatism on this issue can be explained by his direct involvement in political activities, as he is both an activist and thinker. However, Esposito (2001, p.137) considers that there is a direct relationship between Turabi’s activities as a political leader in Sudan, and the specifics of his evolving definition of an Islamic state. This point is supported by el-Affendi (1990) in his essay, ‘Long March for Democracy’. El-Affendi argues that Turabi always advocated dealing with reality, and complained that the main problem of the modern Islamic movement was its uncompromising idealism. It recognised only absolute ideals, and did not map the way to achieving them, by defining intermediate stations leading towards this. In contrast, the Sudanese Islamists were realistic, and so accepted compromise. I believe that the involvement of Turabi in politics and public life qualified him to develop a comprehensive approach or theory of Islamic practising in all aspects of life, but the Islamist experiment post-1989 was putting in front of him the question of the mechanisms through which Islamists could apply these values in the field of politics, economics, and all aspects of life; moreover, it showed to Turabi, the researchers and politicians how theories and practice could be deviated. According to el-Affendi (1990), a corollary of Turabi’s methodology and substantive assumption behind it is the regeneration of reality, not precisely in Hegel’s manner of accepting that “what is real rational” but rather on the line of Marx’s dynamic realism.

According to these experiments, Turabi rationally criticises some abstract conditions made by the Fugha. However, Moussalli (2004) argued that Turabi, as the leading,
powerful, fundamentalist thinker of contemporary Islamic movements, deals with several taboos attached to the concept of the state. Turabi removes a number of conditions in the nature of the institutions that were established according to Islamic constitutions and the Islamic state. In a more comprehensive way than Hasan al-Banna, Turabi imposes Islamic limitations on the role of the state, which are very similar to the limits of the liberal state (Moussalli, 2004, p.97).

El-Affendi agrees, when he confirms that Turabi rejected the traditional assumption of the authoritative consensus of the religious scholars (ulama). He added that Turabi explains that the binding consensus was that of the Muslim populace (or public opinion) at any given moment (including the whole member body of the society, men and women). Popular choice should be enlightened by experts, including the scholars (ulama), but also others in various fields, such as economics, medicine, law, the social and exact sciences, etc. I consider this Ijtihād is very important because it sets the people free from traditional assumption of the authoritative consensus of the religious scholars. However, the government should also be freely chosen to reflect the popular will. Once this has happened, then the elected government would have a religiously significant legislative role, and could arbitrate on differences in interpretation of Shari’a (el-Affendi, 2008, p.94). El-Affendi claims that Turabi in a single stroke elevated the state to the role of religious adjudicator and subordinated it to popular will. It is my contention that the relationship between religion, law, and politics is absolutely clear for Turabi. He affirms that Islam implies normative traditions and doctrine based on the Qur’an (the divine text) and the Prophet’s Sunna. But, he insists that the interpretation of the divine text is not divine.

This perspective can be understood from Turabi’s speeches on renewal, and his call to review the interpretations, which is important, because values are constant, but the
institutions or mechanisms to apply these values may be developed in time. Gudrun
Kimer asserted that:

“Both texts69 are considered by Muslims to be sacred and consequently
inviolable: in the present political climate it is deemed impossible, at least in the
Arab world, to engage in public discussions about the status of the Qur’an as
God’s word and, all the more so, to attempt to analyse it with the methods of
literary criticism. Attempts to treat the Sunna as a set of regulations (partially
mandatory in the legal sense) from the Prophet’s teachings and acts to be
followed by future generations are a little less taboo, though still not at all risk-
free” (Kimer, 2003, p.193).

It can be seen that Turabi removes a number of conditions defining the nature of the
institutions that may be established, following Islamic constitutions and the model
Islamic state. Turabi argued that “there is ambiguity in the qualification conditions for
authority and Shura.” He criticised Mawardi for his book, al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah,
(Rules of High Authority) for mentioning these ambiguous qualifications, and
concentrating on entrenching the status quo, and not on the scope open for Ijtihād, and
rendering justice, based on knowledge of people’s life and wisdom in public affairs. He
then explains the qualifications of the leader in Ibn Taymiyyah’s book, al-Siyasah al-
Shar‘iyyah, including knowledge, oratory skills, honesty, personal strength, and being a
role model, and then the description of the model of governance (Imarah). At some
point, scholars added lineage, as a powerful deciding element, to this list of
prerequisites, as was mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. On his part, we noticed that Turabi
criticised these opinions, and asserted that each one reflected the specific environment
and period of the individual scholar, and was influenced by the scholar’s doctrine
(Madhhab). He proposed that the wise course was to read these opinions within their
historical context, particularly since, at those times, systematic methods for choosing
the Sultan (ruler) were not available, leading to an individual monopoly (Turabi, 2003,
p.277). Turabi believes that these situations led to excessive focus on these conditions,

69 Qur’a’n and Sunnah.
which were driven by the traditional fiqh, establishing them as though divine rules in Shari’a. In this context, Turabi focused on the condition of lineage, i.e. belonging to Quraysh, the tribe, and also being a free male, not a slave. It is my contention that Turabi’s Ijtihād logically accepted these conditions which had been put by scholars because they addressed a specific geographical area and a particular historical moment; nowadays the Islamic world is extending from the East to the West, so it needs to renew its fiqh and accommodate these changes.

Indeed, Turabi (2003) discussed all these conditions, and concluded that they were not compatible with the values of Islam, and contradicted the verses of the Qur'an; this position clashed with the taboos mentioned by the above scholars. This is how Turabi deals with so-called ‘taboos’ surrounding the concept of the state.

However, in practical terms, Turabi in the Sudan experiment developed the constitutional doctrine, laws and even some conceptions, which are now widely accepted by Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Morocco and most moderate Islamists belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood school. On the other hand, Turabi (1983) limited the power of the state in taxation; he asserted that “Another area where government was severely limited was in its power to tax.” It is notable that he tries to limit the state role of the ruler to the minimum. Although he believes in that, he did not specify any mechanism/instruction as to how to legislate for the taxation system in the state; it could be suggested that one such mechanism could be parliament or referendum or their ilk.

1.1 Hākimiyah or ‘Sovereignty’ of the State

Hākimiyah is a term derived from the term, Hukm, which means to rule or govern. Hākimiyah is a controversial concept among Islamist scholars, as “it appears to have come into Arabic use in the writing of Mawdudi” (Esposito, 1983, p.89). However, to
Qutb, the term ‘Hākimīyyah’ designated divinity, as it was synonymous with ultimate sovereignty. For Turabi the profession of faith reiterated daily by Muslims:

“there is no God but Allah’, is a revolution against human sovereignty of any shape or form, whether that be of priests, tribal chiefs, princes, or governors --- in a matter of conscience, ritual wealth or justice” (Qutb, 1964, p.28).

From the above, it may be noted that Qutb idealises the concept rather than setting it into reality. He concentrated on the definition of the concept, rather than the practical steps needed to establish an Islamic state. It could be understood that, at that time, the Muslim community needed clarification of these concepts, which had been absent for a long time, in addition to the confusion and issues raised in the post-independence period. Therefore, Qutb argues that:

“There is no governance except for God, no legislation but from God, no sovereignty of one [person] over the other, because all sovereignty belongs to God” (Qutb, 1964, p.31).

In comparison, Turabi distinguished between ultimate sovereignty, which belongs exclusively to God, and the sovereignty or authority of the people. For him, ultimate sovereignty belongs to God, who has given man an open margin or latitude to ultimately choose how to rule a particular situation (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010). He illustrates that “God, of course, never intervenes directly in the public life” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994). Similarly Ghannouchi demonstrates that it “does not mean that God comes down and governs” (Tamimi, 2001, p.185). It means that people rule under the conditions laid down by the higher norms of Shari’a, which represent God's will. Politically, these rules are a form of abstraction, while legally they pave the way for the development of constitutional law, as a set of norms limiting state powers. This is Turabi’s understanding of how people can practise ruling.

Turabi (1983) demonstrates that the Islamic tradition of rules limiting the power of the sovereign is much older than the concept of constitutional law in the secular West. He argues that, because the Islamic state is not absolute, Muslims have known from the
outset that the rules of international law, which derive from the supreme Shari’a, bind the state in its relations with other states and peoples. However, the question of the theocratic state should be addressed and, as such, Turabi’s observation should be taken into account. He states that:

“the words ‘theocratic state’ mean a state ruled by the church ... the church always presented itself as a representative of God and they (churchmen) dominated the public life completely, and in Christianity the problem was not between religion and politics, it was between churchmen and the other men, who rule the state, revolutionary leaders or monarch. The Church was defeated, and religion was moved completely outside. In Islam there is no church at all; everyone has to have a direct access to God” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994).

According to these arguments the researcher believes that the Islamic state is not a theocratic state. Emphatically, it is a civil state, not ruled by clergy, but ruled by the people chosen by the community to serve it, and will be removed from, or reinstated in their position by that community.

In his book, al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm (Politics and Rule), Turabi discussed in detail the historical background of the church’s domination of power, and how it was removed by revolution. However, this is beyond the scope of this research and is only discussed here briefly. Indeed, on this point, Turabi agrees with Amara’s view that:

“al-Khilafah is not a theocratic state that repeals the authority of the nation, but it is a civil state chosen by the Ummah, authorised, monitored, prosecuted, and removed by the people, when appropriate. Bearing the authority of the Ummah under the rule of divine law, then the Ummah is the source of authority, on condition that he does not cross the limits representing borders of Halal and Haram, which were decided in the Shari’a by God, because Man (human being), or Ummah in the global Islamic vision, is the Khalifa of God [and] is only an agent; he is not the owner of the earth, but He [Allah] is the owner” (Amara, 2005, p.9).

On the same issue, Fathi Osman asserted that:

“However, the religious dimension in the Islamic ideology or plan, of individual and social, local and global reform, does not mean the establishment of a theocracy. There is no clergy in Islam; any intelligent human being who knows the language and the style can understand and interpret God’s message and no supernatural or metaphysical power can be required or claimed for such a work” (Osman, 1997, p.8).
It could be said that Amara (1998, p.46), Turabi (2003), Ghannouchi (2011), and Qaradawi (2011) believe that it is a duty to establish the Islamic state that guides the people by Islam, and protects the essence of the religion. At the same time, they reject the claims of a theocratic role for the ruler, and that the state is neither secular nor theocratic, but a civil one, which rules, and is ruled by Islamic Shari‘a.

1.2 Hākimayyah and Shura

Turabi argued that the words ‘Hakam’ and ‘Hākim’, from which Hākimayyah is derived, mean ‘arbitrator’ or ‘anyone who rules others’, respectively, while ‘Hukm’ means ‘rule’ and should be read in its context. Thus, the term ‘Hākimiyyat al-Sha‘b’ means the ‘authority of the people’, i.e. the people hold authority over their affairs, and may delegate it to anyone they choose, such as members of parliament to pass legislation, a judge in specific instances to resolve disputes, and to the administration in other instances, etc. (Turabi, interview, 26 December 2010). However, Turabi put Hākimiyyah in a practical context, and considered it on two levels: the first relates to absolute sovereignty, which belongs exclusively to God, while the second relates to people’s sovereignty (Hukm al-Sha‘b), exercised by the people. Therefore, the people consciously delegate their authority to a specific body (institution) for a specific mission, whether legislative, judicial, or administrative. Meanwhile, the people monitor their delegates, bodies or institutions, by imposing a system of checks and balances. At all times, the people maintain the right to take back the delegated authority by withdrawing the confidence.

Turabi stresses that people’s sovereignty (Hukm al-Sha‘b) means the end of the monopoly on power, wealth and knowledge, and represents real liberation of the people. Turabi affirms that, in these circumstances, holding a “political opinion is a religious
obligation ... to advise and practise Shura is a duty” (Turabi, 2003, p.178). This means that it is a religious obligation upon all the people in the country to practise Shura, voice their opinion, and advise the ruler, as acts of worship. It is my contention that what are the best mechanisms through which they can make their voice be heard, and how these obligations could be practised? Islamists need to develop effective mechanisms to put all these obligations into practice, whilst at the same time raising the awareness of the people about these duties and rights.

Turabi addresses the issue of knowledge on two dimensions; first, he agrees that the scholars (Ulama) have monopolised the interpretation of the Qur'an, and control religious knowledge; second, they isolated politics from knowledge, and treated politics as though lying outside the bounds of religion. He confirms that: “it is a fact that the freedom of speech and expressing opinion in public affairs is a duty upon all believers without permission and limits” (Turabi, 2003, p.178).

In other words, Turabi opposes the scholars’ (Ulama’s) monopoly on power and knowledge. He affirms that, “indeed, Muslims in repenting in the field of politics, and returning to the religion of Tawhīd, should restore authority to society (the community or people).” He believes that, in this case, society should make the effort (engage in Ijtihād) and speak out; the society should discuss and consult over (in a serious practice of Shura), their issues; if they all agree, in full consensus (Ijma‘) according to a written constitution or according to prevailing customs, then this is the supreme authority as exercised by the believers, and in turn emphasises the belief in the superiority of Shari‘a (Turabi, 2003, p.136). However, Shari‘a law, according to Muslim jurists, fulfils the criteria of justice and legitimacy, and binds governed and governor alike, because it is based on the rule of law, and thus deprives human beings of arbitrary authority over other human beings; in this sense, the community’s or people’s consensus, i.e. Ijma‘, is
superior to the agreement or juristic effort (Ijtihād) of the scholars. I agree with Fathi Osman’s statement:

“Shura means a serious and effective participation in making a decision, not merely a ceremonial procedure. The Qur’an addresses the Prophet who received divine revelation to rely on Shura in making decisions concerning common matters for which no specific revelation had come: ‘and take counsel with them in all matters of common concern; then, when you have made a decision (accordingly), place your trust in God’ (Qur’an 3:159)” (Osman, 2007, p.10).

From the above, the conclusion is that it is a religious obligation for believers to participate in Shura, and seriously discuss the issues and affairs of the community. The other important point is that the consensus (Ijma’) is that of all the people, not only the scholars (Ulama), where the scholars’ (Ulama’s) role is to help the people, in spreading knowledge by teaching society or community members. Moreover, the power of knowledge should not be monopolised, and used to dominate in rule or power.

Turabi shows that some experiments attempted to reach and practise the real values of Islam, in Iran and Sudan. In the case of Iran, he believes that the popular revolution in Iran pushed the people to be the source of authority. However, he recognised that the Shi’a sect, which is dominant in Iran, does not believe in ruling in the Sunni way. They are waiting for the absent Imam, and have applied ‘Wilayat al-Faqīh’ in the interim, i.e. until the Imam reappears one day. This approach limited the authority of the people, and extended the authority of the Mullahs or scholars (Ulama) (Turabi, 2003, pp.133-135).

On the other hand, for the experiment in Sudan, he points out that the military coup was carried out to establish a method of authority derived from Islam; as such, this ideal goal was delayed for a decade, until a constitution was established. This enshrined liberty and assigned the high legislative authority to society through direct referendum, or through electing members of parliament and a president, who practises authority under the scrutiny of the people. However, this ideal was not achieved in practice, as the

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70 Turabi defines scholars or Ulama not only in religion, but in any field they are called Ulama, and they should participate with their knowledge in society.
president and the army prevented people from practising real democracy (Turabi, 2003, p.135). Turabi’s statement shows a contradiction; in that what can essentially be described as a power grab, i.e. a military coup, they cannot be expected to apply the values of Islam, namely justice, freedom, and Shura. Therefore, the objective was not achieved, and democracy could not be practised.

In conclusion, Turabi explains that Hākimiyah in a practical manner, can be applied by the people. He understands it to mean that God is the absolute sovereign, and any other authority is derived from God. However, for Turabi, the people’s sovereignty (Hukm al-Sha’b) can be practised by the people, who delegate their authority to specific bodies, legislative, judicial or administrative. However, they continue to monitor these institutions through a system of checks and balance, and may withdraw their confidence in, and annul the authority of, these institutions. This explanation of al-Hākimiyah may help to understand that the people in the Islamic community have duties and rights, it is contractual obligation for them to delegate power, and they have the right to withdraw their allegiance. In this context, Turabi rejects the monopoly on power and knowledge by the scholars (Ulama), and confirms that legislative power and power of knowledge should be practised by the society – all society. This limits the ruler’s power, in that he plays an executive, more so than a legislative role. In these circumstances, the believers’ (men and women) duty is to express their opinion and advise the executive leaders.

In conclusion, the Islamic movement and Turabi look to the state as legislator, playing the role of policy maker, and not intervening in society’s affairs and the individual’s private life. However, this is one of the good examples of the gap between theory and practice of Islamists in Sudan because the state had monopolised the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities for some time, and intervened in the society affairs and individuals’ private life, as explained in Chapter 4.
Section 2. The Role of Society

The role of society in the Islamic state is essential; if the state is defined as a land, government and society, then society plays the key role in the administration, while the government’s role is limited, as explained by Turabi in most of his writings and speeches. The role of society in Turabi’s theory will be evaluated in detail in this section. In their experiment in Sudan, the Islamists adopted practical methods in implementing the values they believed in, and interacted with the society directly; “we started up where the community have ended, we interact with the society” as Turabi used to say. In the eyes of Islamists, the society in Sudan:

“is not the ‘ignorant’ as in Sayyid Qutb or al-Mawdudi’s theory, but it is a Muslim society with (Jahiliya) ignorant pockets and the Islamic movement is a comprehensive revival and renewal movement that unified the private life of the Muslim with the public life of the society” (Abdelsalam, 2009, p.22).

Turabi affirms that “Society is the fundamental, state is one of the dimensions of the society” (Turabi, interview 25 December 2010). Oliver Roy (1994, p.41) distinguished between radical and moderate Islamists; in the “disagreement between moderate and radical Islamists”, he believes that both: “acknowledge the necessity of controlling political power. The moderates are partisans of re-Islamisation from the bottom up while pressuring the leaders to promote Islamisation from the top.” For the purpose of re-Islamising the society, Islamists established socio-cultural movements, such as youth and women’s organisations, which can play the role of pressure groups, particularly, through political alliances with other groups, as ICF did when it defended the Islamic constitution in the 1960s. However, the most important role Islamists played is the social and developmental role, in covering the failure of the government in these fields.

However, Roy agrees with Abdelsalam that this is the notion of the founding fathers, Banna and Mawdudi, who accepted the notion of revolt, only if the state took a
revolutionary anti-Islamic stance, and if all means of peaceful protest had been exhausted: “If the government should become so alien as to transcend the Shari’a, then the [individual] has the right and obligation to revolt. This is the revolutionary element in Islam” (Roy, 1994, p.41).

In Turabi’s theory, it will become clear that he opposes any aggressive revolution and military action, specifically after his experiment with the army in Sudan in 1989. Meanwhile, the radicals consider that no compromise with current Muslim society is possible; they advocate political rupture and introduce the concept of revolution. Turabi counted this as another example of borrowing from the century’s progressive ideologies; with this he means Sayyid Qutb, the theoretician, who inspired the revolutionary groups in the 1970s and 1980s. It is noticeable that Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan may be categorised in both groups. They adopted the first group’s theory when they had less power, and were aligned with other traditional political parties having an Islamic background aiming to push the government towards an Islamic constitution. On the other hand, as mentioned by many leaders such as Abdelsalam (2009), they adopted the revolutionary line when they discovered that they would be eradicated, if any other political force executed a military coup before they did in 1989. However, this does not mean that they agreed with the whole concept articulated by Qutb. Indeed, Turabi counted this as an exceptional case, which they had been forced to adopt, as was mentioned in Chapter 4. However, the role of society in Turabi’s political thought is one of the most important points raised by most scholars. Turabi (2009, p.19) states:

“the first duty of the society is to reward or punish the Muslim, such as to remind him if he forgets and advise or punish him by words or enjoin him by words, if he strays or reward him by good words if he goes straight; the role of the society is to support the Muslim conscience first by advising and reminding him, then by rewards or punishments through the natural mechanism of the society.”
This statement is very important because it provides the societies and individuals with the freedom of choice and freedom of expression. In this case the society can play the role described above by Turabi, I believe this role includes arts music and cultural issues. However, the role of the state in Turabi’s thought is explained by Moussalli when he pointed out that Turabi argued for the Islamic state, and that it must not go beyond formulating general rules that enable society to organise its affairs. The legitimacy limits the authority of the state, and emancipates society to the maximum, on the basis that “the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice” is the work of society not the state (Moussalli, 2004, p.97). Moussalli’s view is supported by Eissa (2005, p.321), who argued that many scholars believe that, according to Turabi, society is the basic Islamic institution, and not the state. This point is central in Turabi’s views related to the state, and was confirmed by him in the interviews conducted by the researcher in Khartoum on 25 December 2010. He stated that “the society, not the state, is the important institution in Islam.” This point of view was established by him, when he was addressing his audience in South Florida University on 10 May 1993; he explained in detail that:

“Muslims were looking forward to limit[ing] the authority of the government … Muslims developed their education, health care and social systems far away from power, through Awqaf (endowments) and voluntary work.”

He gave the example of Andalusia, when the kings in their palaces were drowned in pleasures, they did not represent the Islamic model. However, they were a good example for the weakness of authority, which at the same time proves society’s ability to undertake the responsibilities, and to carry on its affairs (Turabi, 1995, p.42).

Public service in Turabi’s theory is a partnership between society and government. Turabi (2003) explains that public life is a partnership between the specific efforts of society and the public system of the government, e.g. the health sector. Society plays an essential role and holds a large share, as he illustrates that society should take the
initiative and show adequacy. He believes that this role is a part of worship, and should be perfected. In this context, it could be through bringing up children by the family, keeping them healthy, and teaching them their language and basic knowledge. Moreover, families care for the ill persons, and share knowledge about disease and treatments, but if relatives could not do this job, then it should be done by society voluntarily, through charitable organisations, which look after the elderly, children, orphans or the disabled, and those who do not have a carer; if these organisations are not able to respond, then it is the government’s duty (Turabi, 2003, pp.343-345).

However, in this context, the role of government is to formulate policies, and intervene when there is an epidemic that needs curtailing; the direct duty is to monitor contagious diseases, to control them, and develop preventive methods. On the other hand, the Sultan’s (government’s) duty is to formulate medicines and drugs policies and legislation (Turabi, interview, 25 December 2010). Moreover, the government should encourage and finance research in this field, adopt its results, and protect the rights of the people (Turabi, 2003, p.345). Ghannouchi agrees with Turabi, even in the details, as stated here:

“Ghannouchi insists, perhaps with the intention of Islamising the concept, that civil society is one in which power is not monopolised by the state, but rather shared between the government—the political authority—and the society, where the balance is in favor of the latter, and if it is one in which the state has no monopoly over the people’s sustenance, so that private ownership is guaranteed; initiatives, whether individual or collective, are free; and the state monopolised neither education, nor the rendering of social or cultural services, then this according to him is one of the characteristic features of an Islamic society” (Tamimi, 2001, p.134).

Turabi believes that the society guards values using its own means:

“they judge you; if you do good, they will respect you and you will be one of the figures in the society; everybody will respect you and visit you; your good reputation will be everywhere, [while] the opposite will happen if your attitude is contradicting the values of the society directly; they will isolate you; the
society has its own mechanisms to protect its values” (Turabi, interview, 26 December 2010).

However, one may ask the question: what are the limits of the government vis-a-vis society and the individual? Turabi argues that:

“on the whole, the aims and means and the government correspond to that of society, being related to religion and based on Shari’a. Furthermore, the individual was largely free because the lawmaking and financial power were limited; so there was not any intolerable oppression. Even though the particular Caliph might be a usurper, he was not a totalitarian, absolute dictator. Certainly where his security is threatened, he would impinge on freedom, but otherwise people were left alone” (Turabi, 1983, p.247).

In this case, if the society is free and not controlled by the government, then these mechanisms will work perfectly. However, if the government or authority intervenes in the society, and limits its freedom, then these mechanisms will be disturbed and will not work to protect society’s values. In the same interview, he gave the example of people’s dress, and confirms that, in Islam, the authority should not intervene or legislate for the way that people should dress, but should advise by encouraging the mechanisms of society to play this role. The means for the protection of the community’s values lie within the role of the society, and the government facilitates this role by giving more freedom to the society and the individual through the suitable mechanisms they choose.

**Section 3. Distribution of Wealth and Power**

Hasan al-Turabi as an Islamist thinker is significant, as he has developed the notion of a political system based on Shura. The concept of Shura has played a central role in Turabi’s political thinking, and his political activity in Sudan has required him to develop practical proposals about how Shura should be implemented. Shura itself is a method of preventing power from being monopolised by any group of people in society, whether they are scholars (Ulama), an ethnic group, social or political actors, or an economic class. This is because Shura is a duty upon everyone regardless of status in
society. People in their economic life are concerned with two purposes, namely the development in their livelihood to a better level, and applying justice in their transactions and distribution of wealth (Turabi, 1984, p.233).

Scholars, such as Tim Niblock, who is familiar with Sudan’s history and political development, evaluated Turabi’s work. In a foreword to a study done by Sulami, Niblock concluded that:

“the views expressed by Turabi are largely compatible with liberal democracy. Most of them mirror the rationale found in liberal democratic theory, while creating an Islamic justification which should help to give them more ready acceptance in the Islamic world” (Sulami, 2003, p.VI).

One may agree with Niblock’s observation that “the central dilemma in the promotion of democracy in Islamic countries, therefore, is one of practical politics and not of religious-based incompatibility” (Sulami, 2003, p.VI). Paradoxically, Turabi’s own career tends to bear this out. While he may claim that he was never in a strong enough political position in Sudan to implement his true political ideas, the gap between his pronounced ideas and the political practice of the Sudanese political system, over which he held such a powerful influence through most of the 1990s, is wide and deep (Sulami, 2003, p.VII). At the same time, when the struggle with Bashir’s government was revealed, in trying to apply these values, the circumstances changed, and re-evaluation is needed to explain why Turabi could not apply his ideal theory. The answer to this question is partially found in the previous two chapters.

Despite all this, this experiment with the military coup and the armed forces that rely on coercion matured the experience of Islamists in Sudan, theoretically and practically, and benefited other Islamists in the Arab countries currently witnessing revolutions to end dictatorial rule, in the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ which has been by and large a popular uprising, and is quite distinct from a military coup.
Qutb believes that the spirit of Islam, and its approach to governance, is far removed from that of well-known empires, in the past and present. Islam deems Muslims all over the world to be equal, and so opposes tribalism, nationalism and regionalism. In this spirit, it does not count the regions as colonised or monopolised by the centre. Every region is part of the Islamic world, and its people enjoy the same rights as the people in the centre. Therefore, if the governor (Wāli) is appointed from the centre, it is because of his qualities as a pious and capable Muslim, and not a coloniser. Indeed, “the monies collected are to be consumed in these regions first, and whatever remains may then be given to the centre” (Qutb, 1995, p.77). Qutb here, like Turabi, speaks of an ideal situation, knowing full well that practice was far removed from reality. It could be said here that Qutb was influenced by the Caliphate in his vision and suggested related solutions, although he lived in a nationalist era. If this is compared to Turabi’s views, then it is clear that Turabi does not believe in the nationalist view that “it is not an Islamic state”, but accepts that states do exist, and prefers the gradual approach to unity, as was the case in Europe and the Gulf. In short, Qutb means that Islam is a religion and state rolled into one and, to him, the state is not a vague, but a clearly-defined concept, characterised by sovereignty (Hākimiyah).

It is well known that, in Islam, the right to private ownership is legitimised, yet Islam strictly forbids exploitation, monopoly, and earning of wealth through other than lawful and legitimate means. Islam encourages and restricts people to seek wealth through lawful work. The rich people in the community have a social mission to help the poor, by fulfilling a religious duty in paying Zakat,\(^7\) such that wealth is redistributed. Zakat is

\(^7\) The word in the Arabic language means purification; the payment of Zakat is a religious act of purification. Zakat should be distributed to satisfy the needs of the poor within the locality, where it was collected, then any surplus sent to help the poor in other areas. It could also be used to meet community needs, such as building mosques, schools, or other categories of expenditure. Muslims with financial means (Nisab) are obliged to pay a certain percentage of their wealth (2.5% of net worth deducted annually.
one of the five pillars of Islam;\textsuperscript{72} within it are the concepts of philanthropy and charitable giving (\textit{Sadaqah}),\textsuperscript{73} which constitute the foundation of the Islamic social security system. This is one of the dimensions, in which Islam constructs this social and economic system. Turabi’s philosophy was established on these values and concepts, and his vision was explained in his books, \textit{al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm} (2003), and \textit{al-Fiqh al-Siyasi} (2009). Welfare, security, hunger and fear are connected, and hard work is part of the worship of Allah, contingent on the intention of the believer. Therefore, the believer relies on Allah, the Giver, and so feels safe and satisfied; if he suffers limited provisions for a time, he considers this as a trial or challenge (\textit{Ibtilā’}).\textsuperscript{74} The hoped-for outcome is social security, and minimal problems, reflected in a state of tranquillity, which leads to stability. The researcher believes that you cannot establish an Islamic state unless you have a well-established Islamic society. In Turabi’s words:

“the state is the only political expression of an Islamic society; you cannot have an Islamic state except in so far that you have an Islamic society. Any attempt at establishing a political order for the establishment of a genuine Islamic society would be the superimposition of laws over reluctant society” (Turabi, 1983, p.241).

Turabi establishes a clear sequence here, because the state is only an ‘expression’ of an Islamic society, as if the society comes first before the state, according to Turabi. This takes place in the course of a natural development process of Islamisation that constitutes the destiny of Muslim societies. For Turabi, states come and go (state here means government, as explained earlier in this research, when he criticises the translation of terms from English to Arabic and from Arabic to English); he believes that Islamic society can, and has, expanded without the structures of a state for centuries. He added that society is able to live religion in its integral comprehensive

\textsuperscript{72} The five pillars of Islam are: the declaration of faith (Shahadah), prayer (Salah), charity (Zakat), Fasting (Siyyam) and Pilgrimage (Hajj).

\textsuperscript{73} This is a voluntary charitable contribution, other than Zakat, which is obligatory.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibtilaa means God’s constant testing of the believers’ commitment and endurance in the face of worldly and spiritual challenges.
manner, but would have its political dimensions in a government that seeks to fulfil some of the purposes of religious life (Turabi, 1983, p.243).

Turabi’s works are essential for the study and practice of Islamic political thought, as his work is located in a new dimension and practice in the contemporary political scene, with its associated events, such as the practice of Islamists after the Arab awakening. Turabi provided a systematically focused and balanced explanation of political, economic, and social issues in the context of a variety of complex events, such as the ‘War on Terror’, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the superiority of one power, as well as the issues raised by the international community, such as human rights, justice, ethnic minorities, socio-economic development and international relations.

Turabi’s work is highly significant for a number of reasons; he is one of the prominent Muslim thinkers developing a systematic political, economic, social and moral reading of Islam. He was personally involved in political life in Sudan for more than five decades. He was leading and involved directly in a plan for socio-political reform in Sudan. He involved himself in a series of debates with Western intellectuals and politicians, and with Islamists from different schools and groups, then with politicians from different ideologies, conservatives, revolutionists, reformist leaders, the media and the general public. His works demonstrate his legacy as signposts along the way to apply and practise Shura, to renew and reform Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and advance the Tawhīd method. He saw Islam as a religion of Tawḥīd that concerns all aspects of life, based on sound universal principles of social cohesion, and as a religion that is inherently protective of both society and state. Turabi affirms that:

“wealth belongs to God, man is an agent only; normally, wealth belongs to some people; if we give it to the rulers as in the socialist system that means they will gather the two powers, economic power and authority, and these are the causes of tyranny” (Turabi, 2010, p.31).
He therefore calls for the distribution of these powers among the people through the means mentioned above.

Section 4. Liberty and Freedom of Speech

Freedom in Islam is one of the essential doctrines that springs directly from Tawhīd, as Islam itself is based on individual choice (he who wishes to believe ...). In the Islamic state, individual rights spring from the original doctrine of Islam.

“Islam establishes all life relationships on freedom and choice … the highest relation is the relation between the slave (man) and his God; the will to believe or not is a choice, it is not fixed by God” (Turabi, 2003, p.183).

This means that Allah created people not like any other creature that worships Him by nature, but He gave human beings the choice. Turabi (1983; 2009, p.60) believes that the freedom of the individual ultimately emanates from the doctrine of Tawhīd, which requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God exclusively. However, he explains that, where society, and those in power, are both inspired by the same principle, the collective endeavour is not one of hampering the liberty of the individual, but of cooperation towards the maximum achievement of this ideal. In order to promote this cooperation, the freedom of the individual is related to that of the general group.

The ultimate common aim of religious life unites the private and social spheres, and that the Shari'a provides an arbiter between social order and individual freedom. However, the relation between the state and society in Islam is clear in Islamic jurisprudence, in that the individual has the right to his physical existence, general social well-being, reputation, peace, privacy, education and a decent life. However, Turabi confirms that:

“these are the rights that the state ought to provide and guarantee for better fulfilment of the religious ideals of life. Freedom of religion and of expression should also be guaranteed and encouraged” (Turabi, 1983, p.248).
What is different here is that these are not only rights, but social obligations as well, where the individual should contribute to the political cohesion and well-being of the state. In other words, if the:

“state became so alien as to transcend the Shari‘a, he (the citizen) has the right and obligation to revolt; this is the revolutionary element in Islam. A Muslim’s ultimate obedience is to God alone” (Turabi, 1983, p.248).

It is noticeable that this is the only case for which Turabi advocates revolution; he always rejected the idea of revolution, and believes that revolution leads to anarchy, and the military coup leads to dictatorship.

For Turabi, all the religion is about confidence in human beings; it gives them freedom and liberates them from nature, society, government, to be devoted exclusively to God Almighty. It could be said that this is the essence of religion, which must be present in jurisprudence, and in organising the family, Islamic groups and state. Turabi’s book, *al-Ahkām al-Shar‘iyyah*, establishes the value of Shura, and advice, and not to enslave people.

### 4.1 Freedom and Apostasy (Riddah) in Turabi’s thought

Apostasy (*Riddah*) has been one of the controversial issues in Islamic jurisprudence throughout history. It is one of the issues on which Turabi disagrees with many scholars.

It is important to define the term ‘*Riddah*’ in Islamic literature. Apostasy (*Riddah*) in classical literature is defined as:

“the voluntary and conscious reversion to Kufr (disbelief) after having embraced Islam by means of denying any of its fundamentals, whether in the matter of Aqidah (faith), Shari‘a (law), or Shā‘irah (rite): an example of the first would be the denial of deity of the Prophethood; of the second, the licensing of prohibitions; and of the third, negation of the obligations” (Tamimi, 2001, p.78).

Turabi connects this concept with the original concept of freedom, where he explains:

“as for the freedom of thinking, choosing doctrine, and the freedom of expression, it should revive a religion believing by choice, not force. There is no
inherited or fixed acceptance of the religion, so whom he apostates from his religion, as ‘there is no compulsion in religion’. No one should be asked to repent or be punished through the authority; the onus is upon the believers to call him and debate with him, till he repents and becomes a true believer, not a hypocrite, and to be the one who fears the punishment in the Hereafter, not in the worldly life” (Turabi, 2003, p.176).

This is a very important statement: it declares clearly that the authority has nothing to do with the person’s belief; if he embraced Islam it is his choice and if he left it, it is also his choice. However, the society has a duty towards this person to invite him and debate with him, till he repents and becomes a true believer rather than a hypocrite.

Turabi criticised the traditional schools of jurisprudence for blocking Ijtihād, and added that:

“regarding the Hadith on killing the one who changes his religion; it is not lawful to kill a believer except ... one who left his religion, and separates himself from the community (Jama’a). He explains this Hadith by saying that this Hadith and the practical Sunna clarifies the Qur’an does not abrogate it ... if he is an apostate and fighting against Muslims, in this case, it is allowed to kill him and it is a defence in this case not because he is an apostate but because he is fighting Muslims” (Turabi, 2003, p.177).

This is an important Hadith which the scholars introduce as evidence for the punishment of the apostasy. This Hadith is explained by Turabi as above, and while his explanation is widely accepted; at the same time, it is rejected by many scholars.

According to Turabi’s argument, an apostate may remain as a subject under the Muslim government bound by a covenant of peace and citizenship, as was the case in the first years of Madinah. Moreover, he argues that the Prophet only fought three categories of people: those who were fighting him, those who betrayed him, and those who attacked the Muslims, excluding hypocrites and apostates. His argument is that the Prophet did not fight anyone because of apostasy, but because they belonged to one of the three categories mentioned; the fact that they were former Muslims was not an excuse to treat them differently from any other combatant. Turabi drew heavily from the Qur’an to support his view; for example (6; verse 135), (17; verse 84), (10; verse 19), (50; verse
Turabi pointed out that:

“freedom of opinion and freedom of expression is a religious duty upon the believer, without permission and without limitation, even if it is used excessively and harms the governor, as happened to the Prophet, who never oppressed anyone to be silent. However, the right is to answer and respond to falsehood, apostasy, and (fasiq\textsuperscript{75}) lecher by verbal words and writings; when it goes beyond that then the response should be the same” (Turabi, 2003, p.179).

It could be concluded that, from this freedom of faith, freedom of thought and expression emanate. Indeed, everybody is entitled to live freely and in peace, but those who violate the peace and take up arms should be confronted by force. Otherwise, it is a right to hold political opinion, and may, indeed, be a religious duty, in the context of promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, practising Shura and giving advice to the ruler; all the above are religious duties. Turabi’s contribution on this point is unique, and it lends great courage to other scholars to express their views on this controversial point in both the modern and traditional schools of fiqh (jurisprudence).

Section 5. Non-Muslims in the Islamic State

Religious minorities face the same dilemma all over the world, whether Muslim minorities in a non-Islamic state or non-Muslims in an Islamic state. The main concern is the struggle to achieve equality in every sphere of life. However, the issue of non-Muslims in an Islamic state is central to any discussion on political Islam, and among Muslim scholars. Non-Muslims should enjoy their freedom in an Islamic state, as was discussed above in the example of the first state in Madinah. Turabi (2003) affirms the right of other faiths (\textit{Millahs}) to exist. In such cases, the Qur’an prohibits Muslims from being racist or forcing and pressuring followers of other faiths using the power of government or any other. Islam forbids compulsion, as the Qur’an clearly states that

\textsuperscript{75} Anyone who commits major sins and has not repented, or insists on doing minor sins continuously.
“there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256). Indeed, religion compels the ruler of Muslims not to trespass on other faiths, and they should be left to freely observe their rituals, and be ruled by their faith. Furthermore, they are not to be subject to Islam’s Shari’a, which is applied to the rest of the community, i.e. the Muslims (Turabi, 2003, p.459). Turabi in this view refers to the verses of the Qur’an (5:42), (10:99) and (29:46), and is guided by the Prophet’s experiment in Madinah, where the community was multi-religious and multi-cultural, as was explained above in this chapter.

Turabi’s views were fiercely attacked by conservatives and liberals; a paper published by el-Affendi (2006) evaluated these attacks. This is exemplified by an article published in al-Ayyam daily on 30 June 1988, by Abdalla Fadallah Abdallah, in which he accused Turabi of defying Shari’a by propagating eccentric views not supported by any credible authority. He argued that Turabi’s ideas were erroneously being applied to adherents of “African creeds” in Sudan, saying that Turabi wanted to make them part of his “Islamic state”. He indicated that both modern and traditional authorities dispute Turabi’s view that non-Muslims occupied leading roles in Muslim polities in the past; writers like Abu A‘la al-Mawdudi demonstrated that non-Muslims have never occupied executive roles in Muslim polities, nor did they participate in electing the Caliph. Abdullah concluded that Turabi’s claim that non-Muslims have equal rights under Islamic law has no basis whatsoever in Shari’a (Abdullah, 30 June 1988).

Turabi stated clearly that the rules on issues, such as marriage, transactions, and atonement for certain obscene sins and conduct, are public provisions implemented voluntarily by Muslims, if not by the government. However, in the case of non-Muslims, Shari’a is not applied to them, even if they live as individuals among Muslims, unless they freely and voluntarily accept to come under its provisions, and are committed to it. Otherwise, it is an issue related to the traditions of their faith, which they address themselves. Hence, it is related to the sanctity of choice, satisfaction, and
contract between people. Muslims choose the rule of their law, and non-Muslims, if
y they wish, remain distinct under the rule of their faith (Turabi, 2003, p.64). I may agree
with these points of view, which do not contradict Islamic values, but also lead society
towards greater coherence and satisfaction. Turabi’s words may be understood to mean
that such rules should be established in a social contract, and a system of government.
This is the guidance of Islam on this issue of government, on organising rules in the
state. In this social contract, individual sanctity, freedom and equality should be
safeguarded.

However, it is important to explain that Turabi believes in applying a personal law
based on traditions, i.e. a monogamous personal law; he asserted that:

“It is personal law based on Christian traditions ... we allow non-Muslims to
have their personal law; we consider that personal law is a part of personal life;
it is a part of your complete freedom; it is like your belief; it is like your ritual
acts of worship; you are free to observe any value there; so the non-Muslim, we
will ask him what are your customs (he means in court, so as to be judged
according to them); you will never find this level of religious freedom in any
country in the world, not even in the West” (Turabi, BBC interview, 1994).

In other words, personal law means to apply the law according to the personal beliefs of
those involved. This means that Shari’a is not applied to non-Muslims, even if they live
within the Muslim community. This was applied in North Sudan, where, practically, the
government granted an exception to the southern regions of the country. Thus, this part
represents the conclusions arising from Turabi’s practical experiences in a multi-
religious, and multi-cultural community. Turabi went further, asserting that a non-
Muslim also has the right to be nominated as president, with the people free to choose
whomever they wanted.

“all human beings are equally related to the same origin. Those differences in
colour and language are some prejudices that human communities used against
each other. These should not be reasons for dispute, but rather mutual
acquaintance and cooperation among all human beings. Islam strongly
repudiates segregation and apartheid” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010).
On many occasions, Turabi emphasises the rich diversity of the Muslim community, in its different colours, cultures and languages. Turabi agrees with many scholars, such as Ghannouchi and Qutb, about the guaranteed rights in the Islamic state. First, protection from external threat, and second, protection from persecution, assault, violence or unlawful detention by any hostile party operating within the national boundaries. Moreover, Turabi gave non-Muslims the right to reject the contract of citizenship, and migrate to the place of their choice, and no authority or government could deprive them of this right (Turabi, interview 25 December 2010). In the same interview, he illustrated that non-Muslims have the right to choose when to have their holidays, whether Saturday or Sunday, and the right to their places of worship, schools, etc. Turabi believes that citizenship is embodied in a contract between the individual and the state. Therefore, citizens are free to go wherever they want, and change their citizenship if they so wished. The state had no right to stop them, if they wished to terminate this social contract.

As discussed in the previous chapter, many human rights’ violations occurred, even though Turabi was an influential and key person in the regime after the coup. The rights of individuals were violated on numerous occasions. Although there were national policies and laws protecting individual rights, the mechanisms to apply these laws were not effective enough. Those charged with upholding the law, officers and others, were primitive and arrogant most of the time, and the security forces operated with immunity, immune from any monitoring by the judiciary system.

Section 6. No-Party and Multi-Party Systems

In the traditional Islamic model of government, there are no political parties as in the modern conception and definition. However, a different opinion may have developed
due to the various trends within the Muslim nation (Ummah) or community. The natural development in the life of human beings created mechanisms through which people may express their viewpoints or opinions. Turabi believes that the ideal state model in history is Rome, and the Madinah model where “the source of legitimacy is the Muslim community” (Turabi, 2003, p.113). Here, he means all society without exception, i.e. men and women, specialists in all fields, and not only the religious scholars (Ulama); he believes that all are qualified, and all are included. However, the problem is that the Madinah state was small, and all its people could be assembled together. Nowadays, states are large, and their populations huge and, hence, cannot be gathered in one place. In these circumstances, what are the mechanisms that allow the people to express their views, participate in Shura, and give advice to the ruler, particularly, since it is a religious duty for them? On this point, Turabi explains that political parties in the Islamic world, in its modern version, have developed in history, during the colonial period, when “they were established as resistance movements,” which then evolved in most countries into political parties. He also discussed the trends and parties in the Madinah state during the Prophet Muhammed’s time. He divided the Madinah society into al-Muhajirūn—immigrants who came from Mecca, al-Ansār—the indigenous people of Madinah, al-Munafiqūn—the hypocrites and, finally, the Jews. This society was an example of social and political associations, the first two being the Muslims and the “Jews who differ from Muslims in the origin of the creed (Aqidah); they used to argue with Muslims on public policies” (Turabi, 2003, p.189). However, he explains that, “in politics, Muslims agree and associate in one party (Hizb Allah)” meaning the believers’ party, and the other, which opposes them, i.e. the non-believers’ party (Hizb al-Shaytan), and then “those in between, who did not belong to those (believers) or those (non-believers)” (Turabi, 2003, p.184). A further explanation is that:
“all these parties agreed to live in Madinah under one ruler as one Ummah that was mentioned in Sahifat al-Madinah76 (the Madinah document); despite the differentiations of the tribes, they accepted the Prophet as a ruler (commander-in-chief)” (Turabi, 2003 p.189).

It may be noted here that the use of the term ‘Ummah’ does not mean Muslims only; hence, Turabi asked us to read it in its context.

When it is impossible for all people to gather in one place to perform Shura, then the solution is to delegate representatives to present their views in appropriate institutions.

“The delegated (representative) rulers are commissioners; these commissioners are the second source of legitimacy after society—the first source ... Society chooses these people voluntarily, yet these commissioners have no authority over the people” (Turabi, 2003, p.126).

In the interview with the researcher in 25 December 2010 in Khartoum, Turabi confirms that he supports the multi-party system as a method of rule. In his writings, he affirms that:

“Islam has been emancipated in the earth as a government (in Madinah); though it was tolerant towards the pluralistic community, it reconciles between Muslims if tribal problems arise, and is patient towards the hypocrites or the people of the Book, even if they campaign against the government” (Turabi, 2003, p.189).

In conclusion, Turabi supports a multi-party system, on condition that it is not a rigid system. On this point, he affirms that:

“there is no legal bar to the development of different parties or to the freedom of opinion and debate. Such was the case in the constitutional practice of the caliph. A well-developed Islamic society, however, would probably not be conducive to the growth of rigid parties wherein one stands by one’s party whether it is wrong or right. This is a form of factionalism that can be very oppressive of individual freedom and divisive of the community, and it is therefore antithetical to a Muslim’s ultimate responsibility to Allah and to Ummah. While there may be a multiparty system, an Islamic government should function more as a consensus-oriented rather than a minority/majority system with political parties rigidly confronting each other over decisions. Parties should approach the decision-making process with an open mind and after a consensus adopt a mutually agreeable policy” (Turabi, 1987, p.5).

76 Or Dostour al-Madina (The Constitution al-Madina), Madina constitution regarded as the first written constitutions in the history.
In previous sections, the study explored the experiment of the one-party system, which the government adopted four years after the coup, and tried to develop, i.e. accommodating different opinions in a one-party system. However, the experiment could not be made to work. Therefore, the 1998 constitution, which was written mainly by Turabi, adopted the multi-party system. It could be said there is no Islamic objection for people to organise themselves into trends or parties to practise Shura, which is a duty upon them.

Section 7. Women’s Participation

In 1949, the first women joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) movement, and started public work with them. Fatima Talib (Mekki, 1998, p.39) was the first, followed by others, where they started al-Manar weekly magazine. The Muslim Sisters movement started as a limited movement for students and graduates, and was not a social, popular movement at that time.

“This was due to their inability to resist pressures from a society, which did not accept for young women to be ‘too religious’, to take an independent stance, or to deviate from the accepted norms and conventions governing the conduct of women” (Turabi, 2008, p.151).

At this stage, the movement was influenced by society, where women were keen to play any role in reforming society.

Hasan Mekki (1998) believes that the Islamists, in the early days, marginalised women in the movement, because they were influenced by Sudanese traditions and culture; in the 1940s and 1950s, the dominant culture in society was conservative. Furthermore, it could be said they had not developed the jurisprudence (fiqh) to deal with women’s issues, and depended on Egyptian literature. Additionally, women’s education in Sudan at that time was limited, and the Ikhwan movement was an educated people’s movement that was established in the universities and schools. Sudanese culture also isolated
women from public life, which influenced the Ikhwan movement for some time, and so women were excluded from executive office and public political activities. When the Ikhwan movement started women’s groups, these were separated from the movement’s mainstream, and so they did not develop in experience as much as their male counterparts at the time.

However, the movement started revising its stance in the new era of freedom following the 1964 October Revolution. Turabi referred this revision to external challenges, and not self-motivated rethinking:

“the main reason was the near total control of the women’s movement on the campuses by communists, a factor which worried Islamist activists, who were uneasy, because their scruples about contact with female students had led to this result, and it pained them to see that the vote of the female students constantly went against them, and was decisive in favouring their opponents” (Turabi, 2008, p.152).

Outside universities, matters were the same, where the communists led most women’s organisations and associations. Hence, they started to influence society in advocating the idea of women’s liberation according to their vision. At the same time, there was a Western trend influencing women in universities, schools and wider society. This situation forced the Islamic movement to seriously rethink the role of women within its comprehensive approach to Islam. At the beginning, this took the form of setting up a women’s organisation, named the Patriotic Women’s Front, headed by a small number of women members of the movement. It played a national role, where it is believed that it was influenced by the issues of that period, and other women’s organisations (advocating legal reforms, granting women political rights etc.) without referring issues to Islam directly.

At this stage, the movement began to realise that no social reform could be undertaken without women’s participation. Hence, women’s activities began under the supervision of men, in what was known as the Women Affairs section. Its members, elected at the
1954 Eid conference, were Ahmed Awad al-Kareem, Isa Mekki, Osman Azrag, and some students, such as Mudathir Abdalrahim and Dafa’ Allah al-Hajj Yousif. They started by establishing small study groups for teaching fiqh, Qur’an and general knowledge to the families of Ikhwan, and to warn them of the danger of the communists, who influenced society, using media and public lectures (Abdalgadir, 1999, pp.134-135). At this stage, the women’s movement in Sudan benefited from the literature published by the Egyptian Ikhwan, e.g. “The message of the family and society”.

However, after a few years, they achieved significant success with the support of influential leaders in the movement, and paved by Turabi’s fiqh.

“By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the movement achieved a degree of intellectual maturity and social awareness, which caused it to critically re-evaluate its past performance. Turabi issued a pamphlet about the message of women and, according to these ideas, the movement established its women’s fiqh, and developed the women’s sector according to Islam. Surprisingly, some Ikhwan rejected the idea of liberating women according to what was mentioned in the pamphlet ‘Message of Women’” (Imam, interview, 1998).

However, after some time, they accepted that Turabi had been right, and had led them in the right direction; this was the conclusion of Yassin Omer al-Imam (interview, 1998), as he evaluated some periods of the movement, and Turabi’s role in pushing these further through his efforts and initiatives, especially in this field.

In the 1980s, the movement achieved significant success in the mass mobilisation of women’s organisations in the social, education, and charity fields, across society. After 1983, when Nimeiri applied Shari’a, Ikhwan mobilised the youth and women’s sector to support the regime and establish their organisations. In 1985 they organised the largest rally seen in the country’s history, “Aman al-Sudan”, in which they gathered about one million supporters (by their estimates). At this stage, the movement recruited professionals, students, and women from all sectors, i.e. students, housewives, etc. This signalled a progressive shift in women’s organisations in all parts of the movement,
progressing from simplicity and naiveté to greater sophistication and complexity. With deeper involvement in the affairs of society, the organisation itself became more complex, as it was required to undertake ever new functions, coordinate increasing activities in various fields, increase its efficiency, and enhance its democratic character.

In this period, the movement established many women’s organisations, e.g. Rai’dat al-Nahda (women pioneers of the renaissance). Women participated in the body of the movement itself as effective members, while branches and affiliated groups were granted wide autonomy. Following the 1985 April Revolution, Nimeiri’s regime was overthrown, and the movement established the NIF. In this stage, women participated in movement conferences, at all levels of leadership, and in all areas of activism and struggle.

The role of women developed significantly in all fields, both national and international. By the 1990s, the Islamic movement went further in opening prominent and sensitive posts to women, allowing them to become diplomats, judges, army officers, members of parliament, etc. Hence, there was no ceiling regarding the role of women in Islam. The fiqh itself developed theoretically and practically. Turabi, in an interview with al-Arabiya TV, stated:

“I want women to participate in public life ... Allah prefers some of us more than the others (both men and women); Allah created us from one soul and created from it its partner” (al-Arabiya, 10 April 2006).

Turabi went further, in attacking the traditional fiqh by announcing his opinion on the position of Imam, leading a mixed congregation prayer. Turabi stated that:

“I never found anything to prevent her from leading the congregation prayer. If she is knowledgeable, she can lead. I only found one Hadith about Um
Waraqa,77 when the Prophet permitted her to lead the prayer and she could take a Mu’azzin (someone to call to prayer) and lead the prayer in her house (Dār).”

He explains that Dār refers to a large area (e.g. Darfur), and not only the limited meaning of ‘home’.

Among the political issues debated by scholars, there is great dispute on the issue of a woman becoming president. On this issue, Turabi confirmed that:

“she can be a leader of the country, if she is the best of all candidates; if she is the most capable of meeting the challenges of the country. The country may be in social, economic, or military difficulties; depending on the difficulties, I vote for this person or that; according to the current needs” (Arabiya, 10 April 2006).

It is important to mention that he voted for a woman candidate in elections in his constituency, which means he opposed most of the Ulama (scholars) who required the leader to be male. This is a real revolution in the field of jurisprudence that encourages others to follow in his footsteps.

In concluding this chapter, it may be said that establishing an Islamic state is the objective of most Islamic movements. The majority of revivalists agreed on the Madinah model as the Islamic state, with its federal, multi-cultural, and multi-religious system. For Turabi, any other experiment is just a model, and the Islamic state is the state that is not only Islamic on the level of private, but also public life. The state should be established on the values of Islam, namely justice, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. In Turabi’s political thought, sovereignty in the Islamic state is divided into two levels; absolute sovereignty, which belongs to God, and people’s sovereignty in ruling themselves according to the Shari’a; hence, the Islamic state is not a theocratic state. The government’s role is legislating, making policy, and applying the law, through legislative (parliament) and executive bodies (administration), and the judiciary. Society in the Islamic state plays a fundamental role in the education, healthcare, and economic

77 Um Waraga is a woman, who asked the Prophet to permit her to lead the prayer in her home. The Prophet used to visit her at home; the Prophet used to visit many of the female Companions, not for their husbands, but for them (women), because they hastened to believe and were more pious.
fields, by responding to the shortcomings of the government. Therefore, society guards the values of the people through its own means.

In the Islamic state, the right to private ownership is legitimised, but Islam strictly forbids exploitation, monopoly and earning of wealth other than through lawful and legitimate means. Islam restricts and encourages people to seek wealth lawfully and through hard work; work is a kind of worship that should be observed and the person will gain its rewards in the worldly life and in the hereafter. Rich people in the community have a social mission to help the poor by fulfilling the religious duty of Zakat and giving charity. Turabi sees no monopoly of knowledge by the Ulama (scholars, scientists) and no monopoly of power by the rulers. Shura is a religious duty, and should be practised by all people; Ulama are not only the religious scholars, but also the scientists and experts in all fields, and it is their duty to participate in advising the ruler. In this regard, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion are guaranteed, as well as other rights, i.e. to life, free movement, choice of work, etc.

People can express themselves through the Shura system. However, when it is impossible for all people to gather in one place to perform Shura, then the solution should be delegating representatives to express their views in institutions. The delegates (representatives) are commissioners, and are the second source of legitimacy after society – the first source. Turabi supports the multi-party system as a method of governance.

A wide group of women in Sudan, including the researcher and prominent women leaders in Sudan, such as Lubaba al-Fadl, Thuraya Yousif, Najwa Abdellatif, and Eman Mohammed Hussein, regard Turabi as a women’s liberator. This is because he adopted religious opinions favourable to women, although these sometimes opposed Sudanese
traditional customs. He also pushed women to participate in public activities, and found the religious support for his views, achieving significant success. By the 1990s and 2000s, the Islamic movement went further, by offering high posts to women. This paved the way for women diplomats, judges, army officers, members of parliament, and even for leading the country. As such, they proved that in practice there is no ceiling regarding the role of women in Islam.
Chapter 7: Turabi’s Tawhīdi Theory and Democratic Model

Tawhīd (Monotheism) is an axial doctrine of Islam, and at the core of religious experience is the belief in God, with the confession of the Islamic faith (Shahadah), i.e. testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger. The word ‘Allah’ is God’s name rendered in Arabic, which uniquely means ‘the God’, and occupies a central position in every Muslim place, action, and thought. The presence of God fills the Muslim’s consciousness at all times.

The term ‘Tawhīd’ in the classical Islamic literature refers to the affirmation of the ‘Oneness of God’. In modern science, the study of human behaviour calls for a more comprehensive approach, which studies the effects of human beliefs on human life. El-Affendi argued that:

“it could be said that realities of life could be studied from the perspective of religious belief, since these are two separate fields, but this is not true because religion is not given in a vacuum. Religion is concerned mainly with life and how to live it. The whole of life is a theatre for the expression of religious belief, and therefore the discussion of the totality of human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169).

As mentioned below, this is a central point of Turabi’s thought; he affirms in all his writings and oral articulations that Islam is a comprehensive religion, obliging that all the believer’s life be submitted to God. Therefore, in accepting the oneness of God, everything in life must heed His Command. Turabi approaches any aspect of life from the Tawhīd perspective. This chapter critically evaluates this approach, and articulates his Tawhīdi theory in general. It critically studies the philosophical approach of Turabi in general, and how it affected his Tawhīdi theory specifically, since it approaches all existence as one unit. This chapter evaluates an important part that has significant implications on Turabi’s method of interpreting and approaching some aspects of life he is concerned about, such as knowledge and language. This chapter critically evaluates the concepts and the Tawhīdi theory based on Tawhīd as a main pillar of faith (Īman).
and the approach to all aspects of life; the role of Tawhīd in Turabi’s political thinking will be explained more concisely. It is divided into five sections: the first section evaluates Turabi’s philosophical approach. Section 2 covers Turabi’s methodology, incorporating revolution. Section 3 illustrates Tawhīd and Tawhīdi (uniterianism) theory. Section 4 looks at Turabi’s democratic model; and section 5 explores the pillars of Turabi’s theory.

Section 1. Philosophical Approach

It is important to establish the philosophical base of Turabi’s thought through critical evaluation of his writings, speeches, and practice. However, Turabi’s philosophical approach is established on Tawhīd as a main pillar of his theory. Indeed, the whole idea of the Islamic experiment in his political thought is based on this concept of Tawhīd. In comparing the West to the experience of the Islamic world, Turabi (1984; 2003) confirms that the Islamic experiment is established on the unity and bond between earth and heaven, or this world and the Hereafter. Turabi (2003) demonstrated that modern Western civilisation was established, based on expelling religion from public life, more specifically political life. In contrast, the experience of the Islamic world was different, where its civilisation declined when public life was deprived of religion. Turabi (2003) addressed the problems arising from the Western experiment, when religious values were absent from politics and public life. Turabi (2003) observes that the: “Western rulers practiced exploitation of people when they were without religious values; they started to colonise other nations, misappropriate their resources, and enslave them to ensure development of the Western countries.”

Despite his criticism of the Western experiment regarding values, Turabi calls for sharing the human experience. This may be applied to the practice of freedom, justice,
and other human values, and adopting the mechanisms of consultation (Shura) and democracy. The aim is to raise the level and quality of practising ‘Shura’ and ‘providing advice’ by all individuals, at all levels of life, ranging from issues of family to those of government.

Traditionally and simply expressed, Tawhīd is the conviction, professed in pronouncing that “there is no god but Allah”; this seemingly negative statement, short to the limits of brevity, carries the greatest and richest meaning in the whole of Islam.

“Sometimes a whole culture, a whole civilisation, or a whole history lies compressed in one sentence. This is certainly the case of the pronouncement (Kalimah) or Shahadah of Islam. All the diversity and wealth of history, culture, learning, and wisdom, as well as civilisation of Islam is compressed in this shortest of sentences ‘la illaha illa Allah’ (al-Faruqi, 1992, p.9).

This short sentence means that every Muslim says ‘la ilaha illa Allah, Muhammad rasul Allah’, professing the fact that ‘there is no deity worthy of worship except God’ is the fundamental pillar of Islam as a religion. One must add to all this one’s denial of every other object of worship, which may be wealth, power, the ruler, family, fear, reliance, etc. Hence, it is not enough to worship Him, but to worship none beside Him. This is what Turabi affirms and reflects in his explanations of freedom of individual, in that they should not be slave to any but God. This concept of Tawhīd shaped the political thought of Turabi because freedom of individual is the pillar of Iman, and it is the base of Turabi’s political theory.

However, this explanation is an important platform for the philosophical ground of Tawhīd in Islam in general, and for Turabi in particular.

The work of Turabi on the Tawhīdi theory is based on this understanding of Tawhīd. His work allows people not only to look at this axial doctrine of Islam but, furthermore, to

78 Belief in God as the only creator and sustainer of everything that exists. Yet this was admitted even by the idolatrous Arabs before the advent of Muhammad, and is accepted by the majority of human beings all over the world; so, by itself, this does not make a person a believer in the sense in which all messengers of God wanted them to be. Moreover, belief that no-one other than God deserves to be worshipped.
understand doctrines from a number of different perspectives. These doctrines for him are not isolated from practical life, which he regarded as one unit. In the endeavour to explain the simple truths of his Tawhīdi doctrine, Turabi touches upon a specific understanding of the objective of the message of Islam, and the understanding of the concept of Tawhīd (Monotheism) itself, as a comprehensive concept. As such, his concept of Tawhīd is rich in the depth of its erudition, and abundant in its perceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps his work more than any other which reflects profound and original thought, as he articulates his Tawhīdi theory, and also explains the practical steps to put it into action.

He concentrates most of his work on the issues of public life. These are aspects that he believes were taken out of being part of the practice of Islam, and indeed were absent from the fiqh efforts of scholars in most historical contexts. He criticises those scholars, whom, at different periods of time, concentrated their efforts on some branches of Islam, such as personal worship (‘Ibādāt) and family issues, i.e. marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and did not connect these rituals of worship (‘Ibādāt) with the prime objective of establishing Tawhīd, and reflecting this in all aspects of life. Moreover, he criticises those scholars in that they did not cover public issues, like Shura, or public rights and duties in fiqh, mostly for political reasons and the ruler’s oppression. I may agree with the analysis of el-Affendi about the broad concept of Tawhīd, as did Sidahmed (1996), who quoted el-Affendi (1991):

“[o]f several pamphlets and books produced by Turabi in the past twenty years or so, two perhaps summarise his main philosophy and approach. The first is entitled ‘Religious belief: its effect on the life of man’, and the second, ‘Renovations of the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence’. The religious belief, or Iman for short, deals with the concept of religion, its place in this life, its impact on the believers, and the most suitable approach towards religion. The central theme in the Islamic religion, according to Turabi, is Tawhīd. Apart from its classical meaning as the unity [Oneness] of God, Turabi employed the concept in a broader manner to indicate the meeting point between religion, the word of God, and this word, the domain of man: ‘Tawhīd is a union of the eternal divine command with the changing conditions of human life’...”
Additionally, Turabi believes that:

“Tawhīd enriches life, giving every material worldly experience a spiritual otherworldly dimension. It is a dynamic principle which unites the material and the spiritual, the real and the ideal, and subsumes the ever changing reality under the eternally valid principles” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.188).

However, his books in the last decade confirm the same theme of Tawhīd, but concentrate on public life directly; his book, *al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm: al-Nuzum al-Sultaniyyah Bayn al-Usūl wa Sunan al-Waqi’* (2003) or ‘*al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm*’ for short, specifically explains Tawhīd in public life, in detail. Turabi approaches the details of ruling systems established on the Tawhīd, and explains how to apply the values of Islam in public life, how to unite religion and the exercise of government, religion and society, how to practise, and check and balance the relationships between the authorities, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. In the book, he approaches the issues of human rights, ethnic and religious minorities, individual freedom, freedom of expression, political parties, the constitution, international relations, and international law. Moreover, he discusses and explains the role of government in public safety, justice, health, education, energy issues, irrigation, agriculture, industry, and defence. He explains the relationship between the national state and the unity of the Ummah, and Tawhīd in both personal and public life. In these explanations, Tawhīd is playing a significant role in his political theory and public life in general. When he explains these issues, he critically evaluates their historical development in different areas at different times, and confirms that we should not ignore the wisdom of history and the stories told by the Qur’an. In this part he reminds us of the destiny of the previous nations when they deviated from Tawhīd. Ghannouchi, speaking at the launch of this book in London in 2004, and in an interview on al-Jazeera TV on 24 June 2003, asserted that “this book is no less important than *al-Muqaddimah* (Introduction) written by Ibn Khaldun.”

79 Abū Zayd ‘Abdu r-Rahmān bin Muhammad bin Khaldūn Al-Hadrami (May 27, 1332AD in Tunisia –
However, I may argue that the significant value of his contribution emerges here, because it comes after long political experience, given his participation in the first decade of the National Salvation Revolution regime in Sudan (1989-1999). It is noticeable that this practical experience matured his theories of government, and contributed considerably to isolating his conceptions from the idealistic initiatives that dominated much Islamist thought in the last century. His theories came as practical, realistic, and focused, even though he heavily criticises the experiment on the practical level in another book, ‘Ibrat al-Masīr (2001), in which he critically evaluated the practice of the movement in the period (1989-2001). This point is discussed in Chapter 4 in the evaluation of the Islamist experiment in Sudan from 1989 to 2001.

However, in his book, al-Sha‘ā’ir al-Dīniyyah wa Atharuhā ‘ala al-Hayat al-‘Āma, (Religious ritual and its effect on public life) (1974) he explains that “the sincere believer turns to Allah, and unifies the visible ritual with his interior” (Turabi, 2008, p.10). Moreover, he connects the practice of religious ritual (Sha‘ā’ir) and Tawhīd to all the believer’s actions, and considers that this helps and guides the believer to subordinate any action in his life to Allah. Therefore, he is able to confront difficulties with this faith (Īman), which leads to life’s unity (Turabi, 2008, p.44). Muslim society was established on unity and, as such, the practice of religious ritual (Sha‘ā’ir), such as ritual prayer (Salah), pilgrimage (Hajj) and obligatory tax on wealth (Zakat), leads to equality, and to real unification of the community. It is important to explain how Turabi connected acts of worship (‘Ībādat) with practical life; for example, in Salah, the followers of the Imam (leader) should obey and follow him in the steps of Salah, as long as he follows the rules. However, if he makes a mistake, they have to correct and

March 19, 1406AD in Cairo) was a Muslim historiographer and historian who is often viewed as one of the forerunners of modern historiography, sociology and economics. His famous book ‘Muqaddimah’ was an influential book in the 17th century – the Ottoman period. Later in the 19th century, Western scholars recognised him as one of the greatest philosophers to come out of the Muslim world.
advise him, but if he chooses not listen to them, then they are not obliged to obey him, and must choose another Imam. For Turabi, this symbolises the relationship between a ruler and his people. He explains this point of view in his book, *al-Salah ʿImad al-Dīn*, published in 1984; in the same way, he explains the other acts of ritual worship (*ʿIbādat*) and what they represent.

It could be concluded that his philosophical approach was established on Tawhīd as a main pillar, that articulates his political theory, as well as human experiences based on the values of Tawhīd, but put into practice. On the other hand, human values that do not contradict the values of Islam, such as justice, equality, and freedom, are regarded by Turabi as important pillars of the practical steps towards Tawhīd. In other words, a democratic process in all aspects of life, with Shura as a means of political participation and a decision-making process, which in public life is regarded as interpretation of Tawhīd into practical actions. Moreover, his practical experience over different periods of time, and more specifically after 1989, matured his theories and made them more realistic. Despite all this, Turabi failed to introduce a practical project and to develop comprehensive mechanisms that can turn these values from abstract theories into practical projects that were applicable, sustainable, and able to be checked; this is one of the weaknesses of his project.

### 1.1 Knowledge

For Turabi, knowledge should only be used for the sake of God; it should serve the objectives of Islam and guide people to Tawhīd through a renewal of jurisprudence (*Tajdīd al-Fiqh*). He discussed this issue in his book, *Tajdīd Usūl al-Fiqh al-Islami*, in the 1980s, and *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islami* (1978). However, Turabi (1978) explains that knowledge was expanded and influenced all aspects of life. Accordingly, he calls for
renewal (Tajdīd), and revision of the fundamentals of jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), as well as the methodology used to establish fiqh. On this point, he asserts that:

“human knowledge has expanded greatly: while the old fiqh was based on the knowledge that was restricted by the limitation of the nature and the facts of its historical context, it becomes imperative for us to adopt a new position of the new fiqh of Islam so that we can utilise all knowledge for the sake of worshipping God; this is a new construction which unites what exists in the transmitted traditions disciplines which are received, written or verbal, that means Qur’an or Sunnah [the revelation, and it is eternal], with the rational sciences, which are renewed every day, and which are completed by experiment and observation. With that achieved and unified knowledge, we can renew our fiqh for faith and what challenges it time after time in our contemporary life” (Turabi, 1978, p.69).

However, it could be argued that this text explains the reasons for renewal (Tajdīd), and part of the principles of his Tawhīdi theory in the knowledge dimension, as he calls for utilising knowledge to serve the objectives of Tawhīd. On the other hand, he argues that:

“these new changes need a new type of legal thinking, supplemented by the findings of the social sciences and the philosophy of sciences. New fiqh should concentrate on social rather than individual issues” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.36).

As mentioned in this chapter, he criticises the focus on individual issues, which have dominated for a long time, and tries to push for public issues using all human knowledge.

However, knowledge is another dimension of Tawhīd introduced by most scholars. Turabi (2009) believes that knowledge should not be monopolised by what he called religious ‘Ulama’ – moreover, he disagrees with the term. Rather, he believes that knowledge should be available and easily accessible to everyone, where they should share this knowledge with others, and no authority should limit or monopolise knowledge. In other words, a monopoly over knowledge means a monopoly over power, which leads to people’s oppression. He argues that:

“[t]he traditionalists who wanted to restrict new interpretations by demanding stringent qualifications for anyone deemed fit to pronounce independent opinion on religious matters, espouse safeguards and precautions that now conflict with the needs of Muslim society. They thus tend to divide Muslim society into a majority that was excluded from thinking about religion, and a clique, which
monopolised religious secrets. Timid modernisers, on the other hand, are still intimidated by ready accusations of heresy in presenting their new ideas, while all the time looking in ancient books for ideas that may remotely resemble theirs” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.37).

The relationship of power, knowledge, and freedom of people, with Tawhīd may be clearly noted from all these arguments. These elements lead directly to participation in public decision making and formulating legislation, which means that the Shura (democratic) process is compulsory at each step, ensuring there is no monopoly over power.

Moreover, Turabi broadens the concept of Ulama to include experts in all fields, as discussed in the interview with the researcher. Esposito affirms this point, stating:

“Turabi’s concept of the new Ulama, including experts in all fields become essential. Economists and physicists and others are crucial in this process of creating a new and comprehensive fiqh” (Esposito & Voll, 2001, p.130).

Hence, including experts from all fields of knowledge means that every individual specialist and expert in society has a religious role to play in his field, and participates in decision making and public life. Moreover, Turabi believes in experts’ role as scholars, whose knowledge is integrated with that of others, thus sharing out responsibility among more individuals in society and, hence, limiting the power held by any one group in society. Turabi asserted several times that “religion requires that we should use our minds and common sense to the best of our ability.” He also championed freedom of thought and affirmed that “freedom of belief is a fundamental right in the Qur’an.” Turabi’s aim is to create a:

“comprehensive programme based on indivisibility of human life … that life should be treated as a whole, rather than fragments; politics, economics, arts and literature, humanities and so on” (Elhacmi, 1998).

Human life is one unit and should be treated as one unit, this is Tawhīdi vision that interprets the political theory of Turabi that rejects the isolation of public life from the
religion. In this sense, it could be said that thought is an act of worship, and is obligatory upon every individual.

Human science itself has developed, where rational science is broader today than in the past. Therefore, when scholars (Ulma) seek to solve the problems of current times, the methods they use need to be developed to accommodate new issues, and new scientific methods. For this reason, Turabi (2003) believes that it is obligatory for us to utilise all knowledge to worship Allah and set a new method that unifies rational knowledge (‘Ulūm al-‘Aql), and divine knowledge (‘Ulūm al-Naql) or Qur’an and Sunnah. Indeed, rational knowledge is renewed and innovated every day, with integration between experiment and observation. With this unified knowledge, rational and divine, we may renew our fiqh and understanding of religion, and meet the changing needs of temporary or worldly life. Therefore, we need Tajdīd, and:

“[T]o achieve the require Tajdīd, Turabi suggested the necessity of Tajdīd, that is renewal of the faith in order to achieve the required harmony between ‘the eternal revelation’ and changing reality. At another level, renewal is necessitated by the dominance of Western civilisation and the challenges it poses to Muslim life and societies” (Sidahmed, 1996, p.188).

Tajdīd is important to achieve the objectives of religion and preserve its basic principles, mainly Tawhīd as explained above. Moreover, Turabi believes that practising Tajdīd is a role for the whole community, not only a designated group of Ulama; he argues that:

“it is the responsibility of the community as a whole, and should be undertaken in our time by a movement or a large group, since it has become a very complex task, which cannot be undertaken by individuals” (Elhacmi, 1998, p.173).

Tawhīd of scientific life is important, Shari’a and natural science are separate today. This separation referred to the historical conflict between science and church; accordingly, science was isolated from religion. According to Turabi, Muslims had earlier united all science. He explains that, lately, Muslims have separated the Shari‘a from the natural sciences, and have built universities and colleges for each. He confirms
that the scientific renaissance could not be implemented unless the values of faith were mobilised behind it. Furthermore, science should reach everybody, and should be harnessed to achieve justice and benefits for the people, and not for evil objectives (Turabi, 1995, p.13).

In conclusion, it is my contention that knowledge should only be sought for the sake of understating/knowing reality. Now, since according to believers God is the ultimate reality, a search for reality would inevitably take us to God. An impartial, objective search for reality should lead us to all aspects of reality. Whereas a search for ‘God’ does not necessarily shed fruitful light on reality since people may create their own conception of God and just explore those man-made conceptions. However, Turabi believes that knowledge should only be used for the sake of God; it should serve the objectives of Islam and guide people to Tawhīd. Science should serve all people, and knowledge should be accessible to everyone, because a monopoly on knowledge leads to a monopoly on power. Rational and divine knowledge should be unified, we must renew our fiqh and understanding of religion to meet the changing needs of temporary or worldly life. The responsibility for Tajdīd lies with the community and not the specific individuals, which requires practising Shura, where participation in decision making is obligatory upon the community.

1.2 Tawhīd and Religion

The term ‘religion’ (Dīn) is used in different conceptions; Turabi discussed the term ‘Dīn’ or religion, and its usage in the Qur'an. He found that its first use was to describe man’s submission, given he is a free entity in existence, and subsequently organises his relations with all existence. Turabi explained that religion is a vision and position for the believers with respect to existence, and also as a guide to knowing God, the Absolute,
while recognising the existence of the other creatures. In this context, the meaning of religion in Islam is submission to the Oneness of God, where nothing stands in life except His Decrees, and there is no rule except his Shari'a. The second explanation is that religion (Dīn) describes the relation between the slave (human-beeing) and his Lord (Allah); therefore, it is the message that has been sent by God to the people. Hence, humans should act according to this message (which explains both the seen and unseen worlds), and is an ideal and complete religion, as explained by Turabi. In this case, the term ‘religion’ (Dīn) is used in the Qur’an as an absolute to express integralty. Furthermore, it is connected to the position freely adopted by human beings, with respect to their relation with God (Allah); this is stated in the Qur’an:

“If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good)” Qur’an (3:85).

Turabi demonstrated that, for the term ‘religion’ (Dīn), the above three usages are in agreement, and emphasise that religion is Tawhīd. He explained the use of the term ‘Yawm al-Dīn’ or the Day of Judgment, when each individual receives his reward, either heaven or hellfire, and will be happy or sad in the Afterlife, based on his effort in this worldly life. He explains this as unifying the worldly life and the Afterlife, because the individual continues life, as existence is continuous (Turabi, 1987, p.111). However, the term ‘religion’ (Dīn) itself is also used to distinguish the religious from the worldly, i.e. in the Arabic, Dīn versus Dunya. This usage may appear to be in contradiction to the notion of unity of Muslim life; yet, if this were to happen, e.g. isolating any aspect of life from religious practice such as economics or politics, it would represent ‘Shirk’ or associating partners with Allah in worship, as Turabi explains. Indeed, this is the case in the European context, based on their historical experience with religion; they separated religion from political life, in a descriptive phrase, “Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's” (Turabi, 1987, pp.114-117). This means that they isolated the
Church (religion) from all aspects of life, and restricted its role to personal spiritual issues only. Some Muslims today believe in this isolation for the religion from public life, and this one of the diseases that afflicted religions.

Turabi (2003) also criticised the socialist approach, which considered religion as stagnant and, in their view, incapable of keeping up with the evolving human condition, and contrasting with a dynamic existence. These views may have been prompted by some religious views, which considered the existence as static and unchanging.

However, the Tawhīdi approach believes that:

“religion is both static and dynamic, because it connects the changing reality with the infinite permanent guidance. Therefore, the terms faith (Īman) and Islam (submission) are unified, as they concentrated on the outward and inward regarding religion” (Turabi, 1987, p.117).

Turabi (2000) in his book, Nazara fī al-Fiqh al-Siyasi (View into Political Jurisprudence – originally a lecture presented in 1981 in Doha), asserted “that the obvious creed of religion, Islam, is Tawhīd.” He explained how it unifies existence, and criticised the vision of some Muslims, who think of religion, only as a list of prohibitions, in that some people understand religion as limits and constraints, not as motives and objectives. If we evaluate his ideas during this period, I may agree to some extent with Esposito, when he confirms that Turabi was constant in his views. Moreover, I would argue that the book he wrote after the 1990s and 2000s is very detailed compared to most of his previous books. Previously, he focused on rituals and faith, but nowadays he concentrates more on issues of public life.

Furthermore, Turabi accommodates Qur’anic exegesis and context, in dealing with issues of politics and government, exploring legislative matters and the branches of law, shedding light on issues relating to society, culture and arts, in his understanding of the Arabic language. This is another aspect of the relationship between Turabi and the Qur’an, as revealed in his unique and innovative language and writings (Turabi, 2004,
Indeed, he applied Shura, even in Qur’an exegesis (Tafsīr), as explained by Abdelsalam in the introduction to Turabi’s book, al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi:

“the method of the Qur’an Tafsīr, verses and issues and objectives, he adopted Shura as a way and means … as he used to call for Shura in his revival Tawhīdi theory” (Turabi, 2004, p.10).

However, Shura is a significant element in Turabi’s political thought, Shura should be applied at all levels of life; on the personal level, such as on family issues, decisions inside the family should be taken through Shura or true consultation, including all members of the family, and at the public level, such as issues of government and administering public institutions. Adopting Shura to the personal level in family issues educates people and develops their skills and ability to participate in public life.

Abdelsalam in the introduction of al-Tafsīr al-Tawhīdi explains the Tawhīdi method of Turabi in interpreting the Qur’an, and connecting it to all aspects of Muslim life:

“One of the greatest motivators and reasons for the scholar of exegesis (Mufasir) to add a new book of Quranic exegesis (Tafsīr) to the many existing tomes, is the demand of his disciples, and protagonists, whom he meets with their diverse doctrines within Islam, or varied sects outside of it, of their need for a new reading of the Quran that helps them attain an understanding that unites its chapters (Surahs) and verses (Ayat) given their differences and branching topics, which connects all that to their modern lives and close knit and populous contemporary societies, with their advanced and multiple sciences. The believer links the abundant and disparate diversities of existence in the book of the universe, and unifies their verses in worship of Allah; he must unify the various verses (Ayat) in the revealed Book, and link them in an act of worship of Allah, as these are all from Allah, the One, the Unique” (Turabi, 2004, p.11).

This method explains his methodology and theory, and how it was reflected in the approach to life.

“Consultation (Shura) in the Tawhīdi theory of exegesis expands with the human, from the small setting of a family that manages its affairs through consultation, mutual agreement, and preparation of an individual, who is good for society and state, established on the authority of the nation (Ummah), its consensus (Ijma’), and consultation (Shura), in contract, choice, and election with liberty and justice” (Turabi, 2004, p.10).

However, in his book, ‘Shura and democracy’, he agrees that Shura and democracy are compatible in their values of consultation, participation in decision making, and the
accountability of the ruler. Shura is an important element in Turabi’s political theory and practice as explained in using this method in the Qur’an tafseer, and in any decision he made even to the family level.

1.3 Language

Turabi has great interest in language; he believes that it is the vehicle by which everybody introduces their ideas, and that “no civilisation could be built without language.” This statement was discussed in the interview with the researcher in Khartoum on 26 December 2010. Moreover, he confirms that “the decline of language leads to decline in all fields.”. For this reason, he uses all the power in the language to express his views. Indeed, he “uses the language of the Qur’an to interpret the Qur’an itself” (Turabi, 2004, p.16). He refers to the roots of the words to both understand and explain their exact meaning in their original context and time, and then express this meaning in today’s language. Moreover, he is concerned with the history of the language and the development of terminology, in how it deviates from its original meaning, how it could be loaded with new meanings during its development in specific social and historical contexts, and how new terminology emerges in each period of time according to the prevailing social, economic and political climate. He considers language to be like a living being, which is revived by the renascence of the Muslim nation (Umma). However, some terms die, while others emerge, and some terms that were wide become narrow and vice versa. In effect, conceptions may move from the general to the specific and from the specific to the general; this happens according to the socioeconomic and political environment. So this problem needs to be solved through a clear method of interpretation; this is what Turabi tries to do.
In addition, Turabi creates his own terms to express himself extensively. Ghannouchi in an interview with al-Jazeera TV on 24 June 2003 confirms this:

“He always has his own language when he talks to people, but when he wrote this book (al-Siyasah wa al-Hukm) he wrote it in prison; he was isolated. So he found a chance to care about the language … he was carving the stones.”

Nevertheless, he defines the concepts he uses. In an interview with the University of Pennsylvania, African Study Center in November 1994 Turabi criticises the misinterpretation of the term ‘Jihad’. He stated that:

“Jihad does not mean ‘holy war’ The word ‘holy’ does not appear in the word, nor does ‘war’. Jihad means literally ‘effort for effort’. If the other commits an effort against you, you have to respond with an effort. It means also dialogue, by the way. If the effort is an argument, respond by another argument. If it is by aggression or force, respond; don't turn the other cheek. Of course, you can turn the other cheek if it is only personal, you can forgive. But if it is an effort to destroy Islam altogether, to undermine it, respond by force. Literally, it means this. It's comprehensive; it doesn't mean fighting only.”

This misinterpretation of the terms causes misunderstanding and conflict between the people in different places. However, Turabi criticised the misinterpretation and definition of the term in the West. Moreover, he criticised the way of writing it in capital letters and in italic:

“But now the word is popular; it has been spread in the West in Arabic letters; it's a ‘foreign’ word; they write it big, J-I-H-A-D, instead of translating it. And it means now the new revival from below, from society, sometimes it turns against the use of force by government. Some governments are not democratic; they won't allow freedom of expression, freedom of organisation, representation of the popular social will. I don't think the word ‘Jihad’ would have become so popular otherwise” (Turabi, interview 26 December 2010).

As a result of this confusion, he calls for the clear definition of concepts used by media and scholars, and will not allow deviation from the true meaning. For these reasons, in 2000, he published a book, *al-Mustalahāt al-Siyasiyyah* (Political Terminology), defining the political terminology of Islam. In the book, he defines the important terms, and explains the historical development of each; for example, public life, politics, rule or government, sovereignty, kingship, state, Ummah, people, politics and religion, freedom, privacy and principle duties, Shari'a and the fundamental principles of
government, fiqh, political parties, Shura, Ijma’, customs and public opinion, covenant and social contract, reform and public issues. Al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin (2001), Professor of Political Science at the University of Khartoum, stated that “if Turabi did not write anything except this book it will be sufficient for him.” This means that it is an important book, which contributed significantly to establishing scientific definition in the Islamic political field, where it is important to justify the language and terms used.

Section 2. Turabi’s Methodology


“It is an even more determined effort to push the point that believer, qua believer, is equipped on balance to be better than anybody else, in every conceivable field; significantly, the arguments refer to the worldly benefits to the worldly belief.”

In order to understand how Turabi’s theory is a Tawhid theory, it is important to approach former philosophers’ responses and classification of the Islamic beliefs. El-Affendi classified these responses into three categories:

“the approach of theologians and philosophers who tried to defend Islamic beliefs against the challenge from heretics and followers of other religions; the approach of jurists who had a distance for the elaborations of theologians and were content to define the limits of belief and non-belief; and the approach of Sufis who were concern with the living reality of belief, beyond the forms of logic and the terms of jurisprudence, and tried to show how religious belief could be promoted and cultivated” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169).
Turabi’s approach is different than the three categories above, although he takes from all of them; the central point of his thought is what he calls Tawhīd (unification). When he defines the Islamic movement, he clearly rejects it being classified as Sufi, Salafi or any of the other classifications, but considers that it practically integrates all these trends, i.e. he is not rejectionist. Some criticised his stand and regarded it as opportunist, in wanting to keep concepts vague, while others claim that he calls for the unity of the Umma, and so does not recognise the divisions in the Umma, whether Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi or other sects. I believe that he looks back to the Prophet’s time when there is no Sunni, Shi’i or Sufi, so he calls for unification of Umma and rejects any kind of sectors which weaken the Umma.

Turabi has made significant contributions in the development of the methodology of revival and renewal of Islamic fundamental jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), in revising the methodology of medieval scholars. He argues that they made important contributions, but criticises their contributions as limited by the conditions of their era and the historical context. He stated that “the issues of fundamental sources of fiqh were considered abstractly in the literature, so that they became sterile theoretical discussions, which produced absolutely no fiqh at all” (Turabi, 1978, p.68). Turabi presents what he sees as the most effective methods for renewal in different areas in the fiqh domain, the reformulations of the discipline of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the implementation of Shari‘a and how it was developed. He built on these experiences, and developed fiqh as is explained in this chapter.

In his book, Usūl al-Fiqh al-Islami (1980), he critically evaluated fundamentals (Usūl) of fiqh, and called for developing new disciplines when he explained that “it becomes imperative for us to develop fundamental methodology (Manhaj Usūli) in thinking of the needs of the contemporary Islamic movement” (Turabi, 1978, p.68). It could be said that he is a pioneering contemporary revivalist, as he addresses this issue at this time.
Turabi contributed to the revival of fiqh in the last century, for the reasons mentioned in this chapter. He believes that both new and old methods should be adopted and developed. In order to explain this, it would be important to evaluate his statements and his methods of building his theory, and how he forms his views. However, Turabi studied human history generally, Muslim history specifically and then Sudanese history; he then reflects all these in his methodology, and so builds his theories over the lessons of nations. Yet, for further clarification of his method, he states that:

“the Islamic movements reacted to the challenges in different ways. Some people do not prefer to adopt and restrict themselves to one method but they stay free to choose from all resources. That means to compare and choose what suits the situation with commitment to the broad doctrines of Islam. ... Some people adopted a broad method departing from the soul of Islam and the broad objective” (Turabi, 1978, p.70).

Nevertheless, it is known that he prefers the adoption of broad methods that stand over the principles of Islam. In terms of specific methods, Esposito (2001, p.130) pointed out that:

“Turabi argues for a thorough re-examination of fundamental sources of the Shari’a. In this effort of reinterpretation Turabi proposes radical expansion of traditional methods of analysis. In the first centuries of Islam, it was recognised that the basic text did not deal with all of the specific situations which Muslims had to deal with. As a result one of the major developments in the study and definition of Islamic law was utilisation of ‘judicial reason by analogy’” (Qiyās).

However, one may agree with Esposito’s analysis of Turabi’s statements that:

“scholars developed many rules that narrowed the flexibility of specifically legal reasoning by analogy, and these became a part of the rigid structure that Turabi rejects. He proposes the replacement of the limited Qiyās by new, broad analogical analysis of the fundamental sources” (Esposito, 2001, p.131).

He then quoted Sidahmed (1996, p.82), in that:

“one area there Turabi outlines how this new approach would provide different perspectives is in the redefinition of the meaning of Shura (consultation) in the context of the modern world” (Esposito, 2001, p.131).
Turabi adopted another method, which is continuation of an established law *(al-Istishāb)*;\(^{80}\) he regards *al-Istishāb* as one of the broad methods in *Usūl al-Fiqh*. The objective of *al-Istishāb* could be explained in that when the religion was revealed, it did not establish a new life, but built on pre-existing values, accepting the relations built over these values; indeed, the religion came to redress the deviation away from these values. Therefore, when the Qur’an calls for ‘the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’, this means that these values were previously known. Moreover, when it calls for justice, this means observing the values of justice was known to humans, and deeply ingrained in society’s consciousness; these were then connected by the Qur’an and corrected through the divine Shari‘a; the same could be said for conceptions of good and bad, the family system, and ceremonials (Turabi, 1987, p.84). He concluded that, if we join the fundamentals (*Usūl*) of *al-Istishāb* with the fundamentals of public interests (*al-Masalih al-Mursalah*), we will obtain broad fundamental fiqh principles or *Usūl* for public life – the broad jurisprudence of public life. In this case, many conditions should be observed when anyone wants to perform juristic reasoning (*Ijtihād*): he should start with the source text (Qur’an and Sunnah) using the principles guiding interpretation, followed by the methods of *Masalih* (interests) and *al-Istishāb* (Turabi, 1978, p.84). It should be noted that fiqh is a human activity, while Shari‘a is the divine revelation. On the other hand, Turabi (1978) argues that the Ijtihād or juristic reasoning is a complicated process; the *Mujtahid* (the person doing it) will be influenced by reality, interests, and fiqh culture taken from the former scholars; he should read the texts in their historical social context, determine the practical reality existing at the time, and explore the reasons, reactions and interests specifically related to public life.

\(^{80}\) Part definition taken from: al Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1986), Toward Islamic English, Islamization of Knowledge Series No 3, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia, USA.
One may agree with the conclusions of Moussalli (1994) that Turabi dissociates the correct religious intellectual method from theorisation or abstract thinking about God and the universe, and links it to the production of practical solutions. He even marginalises traditional Islamic jurisprudence considering that its practicability has been exhausted; practical configurations oppose religious ideals, and historical marginalia act as a buffer to people’s direct understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Accordingly, he postulates the need for a new and free theoretical origination of Usūl, from the Qur’an and Sunnah (Turabi, 1992, pp.8-70).

Many scholars, such as Burr and Collins, Esposito, Moussalli, Tijani Abdalgadir, Mekki and el-Affendi, believe that he has courage to introduce new areas not addressed by the Ulama. However, as a revivalist, he opens the door for new issues to be discussed by Islamists all over the world; issues such as inter-religious dialogue to define common ground between Islam and Christianity and other religions and to defend the common values as believers, and organising activities for the purpose. “Turabi explained the conference was to introduce a dialogue (Hiwar) to close ‘the gap’ between Western and Arab Islamic civilisation” (Burr & Collins, 2003, p.164). In this statement, Turabi speaks about inter-religious dialogue in a conference (Hiwar al-Adyan) held in Khartoum in 1994. This conference was attended by different Muslim sects and Christian denominations. His approach was to reach out to everyone, as a human being, a Muslim, regardless of whether they are Sunni, Shi‘i, or any other.

Turabi in his work is interested in any human intellectual effort and practical experiment, and the extent to which it should be taken into account and revised to achieve the most perfect example to suit the situation at any specific moment. Turabi aims to reach this point, to free thinkers from what is known as the ‘divine’. In this sense, Turabi explained what is divine and what is not. He considered the Qur’an text and the authentic Sunnah only, as divine texts; however, the interpretations of the
Qur’an by people are not divine, and could be reinterpreted, revised and re-examined, while fiqh is also not divine. This Ijtihād sets the people free from the previous interpretations. Moussalli asserts that:

“Neither the phenomenon of Western intellectual power nor domination warrants, in al-Turabi’s opinion, a fundamental re-examination of any basic intellectual and structural Islamic framework” (Moussalli, 1994, p.52).

However, he criticises those methods of Qur'anic interpretation that take individual words of the Qur'an and the verses, isolated from the surrounding words. He does not agree on this method of interpretation, and for him, interpretation should aim to reach the wisdom and comprehensive meaning of the verses connected to other verses, determine the significance of its location, how it is connected to the other words in the verse, how each verse is connected to the adjacent verses, and how it is connected to our life today. He believes that the:

“methodology of the interpreters was influenced by Grecian Hellenic methods, which concentrate on the existence of specific things and their descriptions without concentrating on the general wisdom of incidents. This method brings the rules as details and on the branches; it never mentions its collective principles and its totality of wisdoms” (Turabi, 2004, p.19).

This study provides Salah as an example; Turabi postulates that Salah in the traditional fiqh is explained by counting its pillars, the voluntary and obligatory acts, the discouraged and commended actions, etc., without a profound look to the branches of Īman expressed in the ritual’s words and actions, and the extent that it purifies the religious demeanour, and how it is reflected in all aspects of life. The same could be said of exegesis of the Qur’an; by concentrating on the words, the sentence and the verses, the interpreter treats it as though isolated from its context (Turabi, 2004, p.19). Therefore, interpretations of Qur’an are not divine in Turabi’s view. One may agree with Moussalli that “Islamic thought is viewed by al-Turabi as no more than the composite socio-economic, political and historical experience of human attempts to interpret the divine text, i.e. Qur’an” (Moussalli, January 1994, p.52). For him, Islamic
thought is an interaction between the Muslim’s intelligence and the eternal rules of religion.

“It is the intellect that adapted with the rational knowledge and experience gained in each period of time, reacting to these situations with the guidance of the eternal guides (Qur’an) which has been explained by the Prophet (Sunnah)” (Turabi, 1978, p.9).

It is known that any thought should be translated into actions; in particular, the religion’s obligations need to be practised, as religion is not an abstract, but should be practised in reality:

“between the factors inside and outside the human being there is unity and interactions, the Iman intentions are not controlled by physical reality although influenced by it but not controlled by it as claimed by materialists” (Turabi, 1978, p.156).

According to the above arguments, the researcher may argue that Turabi adopted critical historical comparative methods for the analysis of the scholars’ output. On the other hand, he assumed the inability of those scholars to interpret the divine text in an eternal manner. This means that their interpretation is not divine or durable, but is for a specific period of time, addressing specific problems that belong to that historical moment. Agreeing with Moussalli in that:

“Islamic thought cannot constitute categorical interpretive exposition of quintessential Islam. Qur’anic exegeses are, then, tentative and subject to review. But the Qur’anic text functions, on the one hand, as a unifying standard of Muslim consciousness” (Moussalli, January 1994, p.53).

The above conclusions mean that Turabi calls for continuous revival, which should be done by the Ummah or the society that needs to solve its problems. If this revival or renewed interpretation of the divine text does not happen, and the Ummah relies on the interpretations inherited from earlier generations, then it is as if we raise human thought to be divine, and ignore the divine text (Qur’an). In Moussalli’s words:

“For this separation between the divine text and the human thought made the latter function as an absolute substitute for the former. This position constitutes for al-Turabi a tahaddi Ishraki (polytheistic challenge), represented mainly by upgrading the materialistic and economic factors and by downgrading the role of God” (Moussalli, January 1994, p.53).
He went further to set the minds free from past Ijtihād (interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence) that brought solutions specific to a previous period. He even regarded Ijma’ (consensus) as time limited, i.e. it is bound by history and is not eternal, but could be superseded by a new Ijma’ (Turabi interview, 26 December 2010). This could be explained in another way, in that the consensus (Ijma’) of the Ummah in a specific period of time is not binding on subsequent generations, and so they can form their own Ijma’, which is conditioned by their historical context. Turabi's call for continuous renewal and reform in the interpretation of the divine text, as any interpretation is time limited, is a very important issue. It frees each generation from the previous generations’ choices, and leads the new generation to build over the previous generations’ experiments and to take the wisdom from them.

2.1 Revolution and Change

People today have started to ask scholars about the best ways to govern society, and address administrative and economic issues, as well as other aspects of life. These questions were raised regarding issues of public life: how is it organised, and what is the guidance for individual behaviour in society. Turabi explains that:

“Islamists were faced by these questions, but were not qualified to answer these questions, because traditional fiqh does not cover these issues, which were not part of its concern. Moreover, life itself, including social life, has changed and developed, such that the rules of a past time are not appropriate to solve today’s problems” (Turabi, 1978, p.69).

However, Turabi advocates gradual change, as revolutionary change may cause anarchy, and the change may not come as it should, unless it is gradual (Turabi interview, 26 December 2010). Paradoxically, this point contradicts his adoption of a military coup as a tool of change. However, the Ijtihād is not a role for the elites only, but all society, where every individual has his share in performing Ijtihād and rendering advice. Therefore, Turabi objects to the role of religious institutions, such as a ‘church’, ‘Fatwa
councils’ or any other institution, which restrict issuing Fatwa to a specific group of people. For him, this will inhibit creativity and limit intellectual output. However, he agrees on the need for revolutionary work in fiqh, calling for radical changes. Moussalli quoted Turabi (1992):

“while traditional jurisprudence took a negative attitude towards radical reform and revolution, al-Turabi advocates unlimited political action in the pursuit of an Islamic state; for radicalism might be a necessity to break down resistance to reform and to uproot practical and theoretical indolence. And insofar as revolution seeks to eliminate backward and past residues, it must comprehensively strike a total political and theoretical renaissance” (Moussalli, 1994, p.55).

He believes in experiment as a method of developing the practical approach of his theory, standing over the broad values that are agreed upon, then to put it into practice, to elaborate it, and attract people into believing in it. He adopted practice and experiment to develop the practical and theoretical framework of his theory. Although this method is expensive in time and resources, he still believes in the theory of empowering society in developing the experiment itself. These methods explained how Islamists adopted democracy in the movement institutions. Turabi asserted that:

“one can thus say that democracy was a natural inclination within the Sudanese Islamic movement, which was only later given a theoretical grounding, becoming a conscious commitment to the religious obligation among the widest possible number to achieve consensus and then abide by this consensus” (Turabi, 2009, p.109).

In this case, he used the values of Sudanese society, which he then converted through the institutions of the movement. These values included consultation in traditional social institutions (tribes), and the Bedouin lifestyle. Turabi (2009) confirms that:

“democracy was never a matter of dispute within the Sudanese Islamic movement ... they were also the product of the Sudanese environment, with its traditions of freedom, conventions of nomad and rural life and the absence of the tradition of strong central authority ... The values of freedom and democracy remain intrusive aspects of Sudanese public life” (Turabi, 2009, p.107).
For him, this is evidence of the gradual change, which was established over the values of the society and religion. Turabi remains opposed to revolutionary changes in the political system in Sudan, as expressed in the interview with the researcher.

It is noticeable that he uses the term ‘democracy’ instead of ‘Shura’ in these statements without limiting conditions. His democratic model was established over religious values and society’s values. These values should not contradict each other, and it is important to build institutions through which these values can be applied. These institutions should be at the national level.

Section 3. Tawhīd in Turabi’s Theory

As explained above, the concept of Tawhīd is a central comprehensive concept in Turabi’s thought. Turabi believes that all human life is unified in worshipping Allah, the One; all the phenomena in the world, or whatever attracts us, are only signs, evidence, or lessons from Allah; indeed, all its enjoyment is only a means towards worshipping God (Turabi, 1987, p.86). He refers his interpretation to these verses of the Qur’an;

“Say (O Muhammad): "Verily, my Salah (prayer), my sacrifice, my living, and my dying are for Allah, the Lord of the ‘Âlamîn (mankind, jinn and all that exists). He has no partner. And of this I have been commanded, and I am the first of the Muslims” (Qur’an 6; 162-163).

This means that every single action in the life of a human being is linked to God, as explained in the previous chapters about politics, international relations, economics, social life, personal life, art, music, life and death. In other words, “the whole life is a theatre of expression of religious belief, and therefore the discussion of belief is a discussion of the totality of the human life” (el-Affendi, 1991, p.169). He tries to purify the human creeds from any kind of polytheism (Shirk). He believes that Shirk is one of the tests or challenges (Ibtilā’) facing Islam today. However, all aspects of life are challenged by Shirk, in the areas of economic, social, political, and even personal
beliefs, and in this point the role of Tawhīd in political thought appears as a significant element specifically in Turabi’s thought. The research focuses on this phenomenon in public life.

When Turabi interpreted the Qur’an, he explained the phenomenon that leads other nations to Shirk, whether economic, political or in creed. He does not fully agree with Qutb and Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi on their description of disbelief (Kufr) reigning in the societies that isolated religion from public life. They describe it as a disbelieving society using the term, Mujtama‘ Jahili (ignorant society). In this case, Turabi believes that such a society is not disbelieving (Kāfir), but polytheistic (Mushrik), because they still believe in Allah as a God and Mohammed as a prophet, but did not apply religion to all aspects of life. However, this view shows that Tawhīd interprets the action of the Muslim: when he rejects the religious views in the politics domain he is counted as a Mushrik not a Kafir. This point explains the role of Tawhīd in Turabi’s political thinking and clearly describes the relationship between Tawhīd and public domain in Turabi’s political theory.

We may agree with the ideas put forward by Moussalli in this part of his analysis, providing us with a simplified version of the divine governance (Hākimiyah) denuded from historical or theoretical precedents. Turabi loads individual conducts with creedal connotations and equates misbehaviour with creedal polytheism, as happened with the people of Ibrahim when they worshipped the idols, and Ibrahim called them to worship God (Allah). Thus, Pharaoh becomes a model for political and economic polytheism (Shirk), and so God sent Moses to call them to worship God (Allah). He provided other examples of Shirk in history (Turabi, 1978, p.12). Other similar phenomena in history were mentioned by Turabi to prove the call to Tawhīd by all religions, and that each prophet concentrated on the Ibtilā‘ (challenges) that faced his nation; for example, Prophet Shu‘ayb’s challenge was an economic one. Moussalli asserted that:
“his [Turabi] textual analysis of his topical figures and event replaces all preceding interpretations of Islam, or what Turabi thinks of as the first characteristic for failure of Islamic thought” (Moussalli, 1994, p.53).

However, Turabi illustrates that the Islamic doctrine of Tawhīd is the creedal basis that determines its religious nature. In elaborating this, he affirms that:

“public life in Islam is religious, being permitted by experience of the divine. Its function is to pursue the service of God as expressed in the concrete way in Shari’a” (Turabi, 1983, p.242).

Yet, it is clear that Turabi tried to institutionalise the concept of Tawhīd in the state institutions and, when he articulated the political goals of the government in state:

“those in service in the state and public life shall envisage the dedication thereof for the worship of God, wherein Muslims stick to the scripture and tradition, and all shall maintain religious motivation and give due regard to such spirit in plans, law, politics and official business in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields in order to prompt public life towards its objectives, and adjust them towards justice and up-rightness to be directed towards the grace of God in the Hereafter” (NIF Charter, 1987, part 1, p.18).

In conclusion, the concept of Tawhīd as explained above is as adopted by Turabi. However, it is clear that he added further explanation to the concepts of Tawhīd and Shirk; he regarded isolating the religion from any aspect of life as Shirk. His focus is on public life and practising Shura (democracy), and so cites Pharaoh as an example of political Shirk. This is an important part of Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory, which explains that all aspects of life should be united. It proposes that, for this reason, Allah sent prophets to redirect people to Tawhīd. Turabi connects the practising of Shura (democracy) as an obligatory action related directly to the highest value of belief (Tawhīd); this will be explained in the next section. As a final point, the Tawhīdi theory is a theory that explains the life as one unit, the religion plays a comprehensive role in all aspects of life, social, economic, politics etc.; any one of these aspects should not be isolated from religion doctrine. Each of these aspects is a kind of worship to God by practising His obligations. According to this understanding, isolating the religion from any one of these aspects of life will be counted as Shirk.
Section 4. Turabi’s Democratic Model

One of the important chapters of Turabi’s revolutionary reform work is on the fiqh of state, built over the values of Tawhīd and Shura (democratic participation). Turabi connects individual freedom directly to Tawhīd, as explained above; this freedom cannot be achieved except through democratic participation (Shura) in decision making. This democratic participation sets the individual free from the oppression of a specific group using political, economic, and social powers and, when one is free, he submits to God (Allah).

For Turabi, all the religion is about confidence in human beings; it gives them freedom, and liberates them from nature, society and government, to be devoted exclusively to God, Almighty. This is the essence of religion, which must be present in jurisprudence, and in organising the family, Islamic groups and state.

“Consultation (Shura) in the Tawhīd theory of exegesis expands with the human, from the small setting of a family that manages its affairs through consultation, mutual agreement, and preparation of an individual, who is good for society and state, established on the authority of the nation (Ummah), its consensus (Ijma‘), and consultation (Shura), in contract, choice, and election with liberty and justice” (Turabi, 2004, p.10).

Turabi’s book, al-Ahkām al-Shar‘iyyah, establishes the values of ‘Shura’, and ‘advice’, and not enslaving people. The other important book is al-Ahkām al-Sultaniyyah (2003), which explains in-depth the relationship between the democratic model and the freedom of human beings, and Tawhīd. This prevents rulers from being like gods over others through legislative and directive rights over them, as a result of the servitude of those who accord these gods the aspects of divinity. Each of these factors influences the other; in other words, if the people apply real Tawhīd in their life, then they will practise their rights to perform checks and balances in the state institutions through a Shura system (democracy). It could be concluded Shura (consultation) is a significant element in
Turabi’s democratic model when he connected it directly to the higher values such as Tawhīd. Though one of the weaknesses of the theory, it did not propose how these checks and balances could be applied and implemented in the practical level.

Moreover, Turabi agrees on applying the mechanisms developed by the people throughout history as mechanisms of applying Shura and governing the people through their real participation in public issues related to the state and their daily life. Turabi in discussing the mechanism of democracy asserted that “any human evolution or experiment belongs to all human beings and should be shared by them” (Turabi interview, 24 July 2007). Turabi declared this point clearly, while it is disputable for other Islamists, such as Jordanian Islamists, and this is one of the strengths of Turabi’s political theory. However, this model, established on freedom and political participation with its philosophical base, is connected to the higher religious value of Tawhīd. As discussed in Chapter 4, mechanisms developed by people through history, such as parliaments or any other method, should be used to apply Shura.

4.1 Turabi’s Democratic Model, Tawhīd and Freedom

Freedom is an important element in Islam, because it affects the creed of the individual, and is connected to the concept of Tawhīd. In Turabi’s understanding of the freedom of the individual, and how it is connected to Tawhīd, he regards freedom of the individual as the way towards achieving Tawhīd. He asserted that:

“freedom then, is means and a fruit of worship of the God, the absolute freedom requires a total human submission to Tawhīd (in practice of religion) and freedom from enslavement to any other kind of Shirk (human, materialist, political, economic) … that means he seeks refuge to the eternal God who never dies (Turabi, 1978, p.12).

I may agree with the conclusion of Esposito’s study:

“the freedom of individual ultimately emanates the doctrine of Tawhīd which requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God
exclusively. Society, and particularly those in powers, is inspired by the same principle and the collective endeavour is not one hampering the liberty of an individual but of cooperation toward the maximum achievement of this ideal. To promote this cooperation the freedom of one individual is related to that of a general group. The ultimate common aim of the religious life unites the private and the social perhaps; and the Shari’a provides an arbiter between social order and individual freedom” (Esposito, 1983, p.247).

In an article the ‘Principles of Governance, Freedom, and Responsibility in Islam’, published in ‘The American Journal of Islamic Sciences’, Turabi used the concept of Tawhīd as the core foundation to articulate his theory of liberation or freedom in Islam, which represents a fundamental part of his Tawhīdī theory which bonds all these parts together. According to Turabi:

“human submission to divine Tawhīd makes freedom meaningful and paves the way for individuals to liberate themselves from enslavement to others. Without Tawhīd, humankind has no superior doctrine to liberate it, since human liberating philosophy serves to free people from one ideology only to have them enslaved by another” (Turabi, 1987, pp.1-11).

Tawhīd liberates the individual from the power of fear, so their choice is freed, and the practice of Shura (consultation) will bring genuine opinions on public issues related to the rule and this will strengthen and develop the state; these are some of the elements of his democratic model. In the following statement, Turabi explains that the relationship between Man and God is established on being free from any worldly power.

“Islam establishes all life relationships on freedom and choice … the highest relation is the relation between the slave (Man) and his God: the will to believe or not is a choice, it is not fixed by God” (Turabi, 2003, p.183).

This means that Allah did not create people like any other creature that worships him by nature, but He gave the individual the choice; on this base Turabi established his political theory. Turabi believes that:

“the freedom of the individual ultimately emanates from the doctrine of Tawhīd, which requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God exclusively” (Turabi, 1983; 2009, p.60).

However, he explains that, where society, and those in power, are both inspired by the same principle, the collective enterprise is not one of obstructing the liberty of the
individual, but of collaboration towards the maximum achievement of this ideal. It could be said that freedom or liberation of the human being is a fundamental principle in Turabi’s democratic model, which emanates directly from Tawhīd practice; this point is explained more in the next part of this chapter.

4.2 Political Participation, ‘Shura’ and Tawhīd

According to the above statements, it is clear that the freedom of the individual is a core foundation of Tawhīd. Accordingly, if the freedom of choice is practised in the highest relation between the individual and his God, then it should be practised at the other levels of human life, such as choosing the ruler, husband and other family issues and public affairs. Hence, it is one system that should work on the same rule. Indeed, political participation, and practising Shura is obligatory upon believers, but all these practices are founded on freedom, which is related directly to Tawhīd. According to these arguments, the efficiency of any part depends on and affects the other parts; so all parts should work together as one unit, with checks and balances on their role.

However, Turabi agrees that, in Muslim society, the unity of the society is established over what he calls ‘preventive’ and congregational methods in decision-making procedures, which guarantees that the different opinions in fiqh, regardless of what happens, never lead to practical separation or division at the end (Turabi, 1978, p.70). Shura (democracy) and political participation, if practised, means no monopoly of power and wealth, and individuals are free to exercise their freedom; this ultimately springs from the doctrine of Tawhīd, which requires self-liberation of one from any worldly authority, in order to serve God exclusively. In other words, and according to Turabi’s arguments, if the individual is free and not oppressed by any power, he will express his views without fear. This means real Shura (consultation) is practised and
strong different opinions result. Such a process leads to self-satisfaction and different choices, where, in the end, the society will choose the most agreeable one, i.e. consensus can be reached by this society. Had this ideal theory been applied in Sudan, the country may never have witnessed the crisis of wealth and power sharing in the east, west and north. The gap between the theory and practice is noticeable in the experiment of Islamists in Sudan. The idealistic approach is one of the weaknesses of the theory as it should consider the human conflicts and antagonism and ambitions.

In summing up this part, it could be said that Muslims testified that there is no god other than Allah (God): this means that God is the exclusive possessor of divinity; the first characteristic of divinity is absolute rule. This rule is revealed through the prescribed values that represent the basis of the believer’s practical life; how to rule themselves, and how to practise Shura as the method decreed by Allah to legislate their affairs according to His Commands. Moreover, no-one has the right to legislate in addition to God: “They have taken them as lords”. In this case, they have ignored God's command concerning Tawhīd, and attributed partners to Him. This process would not be done unless all the Ummah participates in decision making, and real Shura is practised, with Ijma’ reached after that; this is a democratic process. In terms of mechanisms, Turabi agreed that any such mechanisms developed through human experiment, as mentioned above, were acceptable. The idealistic approach is one of the weaknesses of the theory as it should consider the human conflicts and antagonism and ambitions. The practical processes were discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

**Section 5. Pillars of Turabi’s Theory; its Relation to his Democratic Model**

One can never read any book or listen to a lecture by Turabi without it being based on the concept of Tawhīd. Whatever the topic he is dealing with, whether social, economic,
political, or relating to international relations, he approaches it as a part of a unified life. However, he regards Tawḥīd as a fundamental principle of the religion’s doctrines and practice; when he speaks about unity and freedom, he connects them directly to the concept of Tawḥīd: “The freedom on its creed framework is not for it is own sake, but only as a means towards worshipping God” (Turabi, 1978, p.12). Turabi regards freedom of the individual as the way towards Tawḥīd, as explained in the previous points. The “freedom of individual ultimately emanates the doctrine of Tawḥīd which requires self-liberation of man from any worldly authority in order to serve God exclusively” (Esposito, 1983, p.247). Turabi believes that:

“It is obligatory upon the Islamic movement to start revival of Tawḥīd in political life, till it sincerely becomes worship of Allah. It is not for the sake of authority and power only, and its objective is to secure public rights and build the authority’s relations on brotherhood, unity and justice, and not conflict” (Turabi 1995, p.12).

This means he advises Islamists to build relations in government on the values of brotherhood, unity and justice. In the same book, he calls for Tawḥīd in economic life, and confirms that the materialistic view dominates economics these days. In this respect, economic relations should not be built on selfishness, greediness, uncontrolled desire, and class struggle, but should be founded on brotherhood, sharing, and cooperation. People should be encouraged to pay charity and practise economic dealings based on the religion’s values.

However, social life should be established on values of participation in Shura for decision making, justice and freedom, which emanate from Tawḥīd, whereby the ethnicity that divides people should be removed. The divisions created by national states forced on us (our staes) by the West, sectarianism, and nationalism, should be overcome by the united Muslim Umma. However, the most dangerous social issue, due to loss of Tawḥīd, is the unjust treatment of women and their isolation from public life. Turabi compares the example of the Prophet’s time to the examples from other periods, and to
how women are being exploited in the West, and isolated from public life in Muslim countries. Moreover, he explains how women and men were created, and how they represent the unity of humanity, in being created from one soul, and how women and men are equal (Turabi, 1995, p.12). This means that the real Shura or democratic practice enhances the values of justice and freedom. The theory illustrates these important values but it needs to answer the question as to how we can apply these values in our life through institutions, law, and other mechanisms that strength these values in the societies. The failure of the theory to provide an answer to this question is one of the weaknesses of this theory.

According to Turabi (2003), other issues, such as Shura and public opinion, are fundamental principles in religion, and are significant doctrines in Tawhīd theory. He believes that it is important to introduce examples in other aspects of life, such as international relations, international law, and social science. Turabi argues that Muslims should contact each other and establish their renaissance (Nahda) on ‘Tawhīd’. According to the above, it is clear that all the pillars of this Muslim revival are connected to Tawhīd and its practice in Muslims’ life, specifically the political field where Shura (consultation, democracy) should be practised.

Ethics and moral issues are important pillars in Turabi’s theory. Turabi regards ethics as an important factor in politics, as it is in all aspects of life. Turabi confirms that ethics imposes controls on political and economic behaviour, which prevents politicians from committing injustice, and pushes them to do justice, and be kind to the people. For him, ethics is a very important value, when he evaluated Western civilisation. As mentioned above, the West expelled religion from public life, and politics specifically; this made them lose the values of religion. Consequently, they fell into huge historical mistakes and wars, and treated other nations with injustice, cruelty, and oppression (Turabi, 2003, p.107).
In terms of an Islamic constitution, the constitutional committee tasked with this outlined the basic characteristics and principles of the Islamic state and Islamic society, which requires justice and Shura, meaning democratic participation; all these values are founded on ethical values. Turabi was a member of the constitutional committee in 1967 that established the moral foundations in the proposed constitution.

“The system of rule of Islam stands on the foundation that the state is land, the people and the government, just as the case in its modern form. However, Islam sets up moral foundations and it is required that the state operates within this framework. This leaves open the freedom to build structure in accord with these general foundations, while leaving open the details and secondary matters. (Constitution Committee Memorandum, 1967, p.5).

In conclusion, ethics is regarded as one of the pillars of the political and social system in Islam. It keeps the balance, and through self-censorship controls the expected violations.

Tawhīd is practical, as is mentioned in the state model and its institutions. Purifying religious creed from political and economic Shirk, and renewing the fiqh at intervals of time, serve the objective of religion, which is Tawhīd.

Concluding this chapter, the term ‘Tawhīd’ (Monotheism) is a core concept in Islam and in Turabi’s intellectual work. The foundation of the philosophical approach of Turabi is fundamentally the concept of Tawhīd. This is reflected in his analysis of historical incidents, and the methods of past ‘religious scholars’, and their contributions. This chapter found that his work allows people not only to look at the axial doctrine of Islam, but further to understand doctrines from a number of different perspectives. These doctrines for him, as analysed in this chapter, are not isolated from practical life, which he regarded as one unit. In the endeavour to explain the simple truth of the doctrine of unity, Turabi touches upon the specific understanding of the objective of the message of Islam, and the understanding of the concept of Tawhīd (Monotheism) itself as a comprehensive concept related to all aspects of life. This chapter determined the
relationship between Tawhīd and freedom, as well as Turabi’s democratic model, which is established on freedom of the individual as an essential value that springs from the high value of Islam, i.e. Tawhīd. The chapter evaluated the important obligations in public life, such as Shura as a value and Tawhīd practice in the political field, and as one of the pillars of Tawhīdi theory in Turabi’s thought. In conclusion, Turabi explains that each of these concepts significantly affects Tawhīd. As such, his concept of Tawhīd is rich in the depth of its erudition, and abundant in its perceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps his work more than any other that reflects profound and original thought, when he articulates his Tawhīdi theory and democratic model which emanated to Tawhīd in practice. However, the Tawhīdi theory is a theory that explains the life as one unit, the religion plays a comprehensive role in all aspects of life, social, economic, politics etc.; any one of these should not be isolated from the religion doctrines. Each of these aspects is a kind of worship to God by practising His obligations. According to this understanding, isolating the religion from any aspect of life is Shirk. It could be said that Turabi’s theory is very idealistic and it approaches the elite thinkers, and scholars, although it should approach the public to encourage them to practise the values of Tawhīd, and this is one of the weaknesses of the theory. On the other hand the theory illustrates important values but it did not answer the question of how can we apply these values in our life through institutions, law, and other mechanisms that strengthen these values in the societies? This could be one of the weaknesses of this theory. The project adopted by the government in the 1990s to establish a “pious society”, and reveal the values of Tawhīd in the society, was primitive and not sustainable. One of the strengths of the theory is that it accepted and adopted the democratic mechanisms which have been developed by human experience throughout the history. Shura and freedom are significant elements in Turabi’s democratic model and these elements are connected directly to Tawhīd, the highest value of Islam.
Conclusion

This work studies Islamists and democracy in Sudan, particularly the role of Hasan Turabi. The central research questions are:

(a) What are the basic elements in Turabi’s Political thinking with particular respect with democracy?

(b) How have these elements been made operational in his political action?

(c) Is there a contradiction in his political ideas and his practice?

These questions refer to Turabi and the Islamists in Sudan and the gap between theory and practice. The study also explored and articulated Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory. In this work, historical and comparative methods are used in studying Islamists and democracy. The historical method offers a more comprehensive understanding of the socio-economic, demographic, and political conditions that influenced the political behaviour of the Islamic movement in Sudan. On the other hand, the comparative method provides a more comprehensive understanding of the response of the movement in different periods of time, and different movements, when faced with the same challenges, and how each movement understands, interprets, and applies Islam. The comparison of the theoretical and practical approaches of these movements presents a deep understanding of their behaviour and responses. In this respect, the comparative method was applied horizontally across the different movements in different countries, and vertically throughout their history. This comparative method offers a generalisation for some of the results of the thesis.

In this research, Islamists are defined as those individuals and groups actively seeking to bring the political and social life of their nation into perfect accord with the sacred laws and norms of Shari’a, whether abruptly or gradually, through social reform,
political contest, or revolutionary takeover of the state. These groups understand Islam as a comprehensive religion, which should be applied to all aspects of life – social, economic, political, and private. In other words, a Muslim is one who believes in Islam, while the term ‘Islamist’ indicates an active Muslim, who tries to apply Islamic values in private and public life; this definition may be applied to the Sudanese Islamists.

The establishment of the Islamic movement of Sudan in 1946 during the British colonial period, and its relationship with the Ikhwan in Egypt, are some of the factors that contributed to shaping its vision and project for the country.

The complex demographics, with the diverse population of tribes and large variety of languages, had an impact on Sudan’s history, national and international relations, peace and war, and economic and social development. Consequently, these factors had an impact on the behaviour of the Islamic movement in Sudan; specifically, as a Sudanese social-political movement, its context influenced its political strategies, tactics, and policies. Moreover, these factors greatly influenced its practice, jurisprudence (fiqh) and its intellectual output generally.

There were many decisive moments in the history of the movement in Sudan. First was the establishment of the ICF in 1956-1959, which represented the first shift for the movement towards becoming an active political actor. ICF symbolised the first activity of mobilising people publicly, coordinated with the two dominant traditional parties, which represent the two main sects in Sudan, i.e. the Ansar and Khatmiyyah. The most important factor in this period was that the relationship between the movement and Egypt as a neighbouring country was shaped according to the policies of the Egyptian government towards Ikhwan in Egypt. Indeed, the movement in Sudan supported union with Egypt, but changed position when the Egyptian government suppressed the Egyptian Ikhwan.
The second key historical period was represented by Abboud’s military regime (1959-1964). The third key event was the 1964 October Revolution, which was one of the most important turning points in the history of the movement, as Turabi, the movement’s leader, played a significant role in initiating the Revolution. Fourth, the period of Nimeiri’s May regime (May 1969-April 1985), witnessed two distinct stages; the first was the movement’s opposition to the regime with the suppression of Ikhwan. This continued until 1976, when the Sudanese Ikhwan, along with the UP and DUP, took up arms against the regime. However, after failing to overthrow the regime by force, they made peace with it, heralding the second stage. This period of peace with the regime allowed the introduction of radical changes in the movement’s strategies, policies, structure, and mechanisms. It could be said that this period also witnessed development of a unique relationship between the movement and the Armed Forces, as well as the establishment of economic institutions, and youth and women’s organisations.

Fifth, the second democratic period from April 1985 to June 1989 was when the movement reaped the fruits of the reconciliation with Nimeiri’s regime. In this respect, they established their own political party, the NIF, and competed effectively with the two traditional parties, the UP and DUP. This period was characterised by expansion in the Islamic movement’s international relationships, the growth of its economic institutions, the huge rise in the numbers of its supporters, and the demonstrable efficiency of its media and grassroots organisations.

Sixth, the military coup carried out by the movement in June 1989. This period witnessed revolutionary transformation in the movement on different dimensions, and was a real test in terms of putting its programmes and ideas into practice. The transformation consisted of significant change for the movement, moving from the
limited structure of a political party to the broad arena of state institutions, i.e. from a group with the objective of pressuring the government to impose an Islamic constitution in Sudan, to establishing an Islamic state. Thus, they faced the task of leading and governing the country, which had been at war since the first day of independence, with nine conflictive neighbours, and plagued by border problems, and tribal interactions with most, as well as internal problems of poverty, development, and mediocre state institutions.

Internationally, the movement faced the new world order, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the US; the superpower guarding this new world order. These unbalanced relations changed the factors and mechanisms of international politics. However, at the level of the movement itself, it was not sufficiently ready to bear all these responsibilities at that exceptional historical moment. These factors impacted negatively in the development of the country and affected the Sudan relations regionally and internationally, and put it under different pressures of the great powers and the international organisations controlled by these countries most of the time.

Indeed, some of the leaders and members of the movement agree that the decision to carry out a coup was not an intelligent one, and contradicted most of the movement’s principles, which upheld the Shura ‘democratic process’ as the choice method to rule the people. In this case, most of them agree that the movement ate from the forbidden tree, and committed the sin of the military coup; this group is growing in number with time.

The movement’s experience of government was evaluated by many scholars, and movement members, as well as Turabi, the movement’s leader. They agreed that the first mistake was staging the coup, despite the reasons that justified the venture. The
second mistake lay in the manner of exercising power, in carrying out purges, in which many qualified persons were dismissed from their jobs solely due to their political affiliations, inflicting repressive security measures, and the unrestrained behaviour of security forces towards opposition party members. This behaviour reduced the credibility of the movement and betrayed a contradiction between the movement’s theoretical position and practice.

In evaluating the objectives of the coup as put by Islamists, scholars and movement members agreed that Islamists had succeeded in some parts, and failed to reach their goals in others. In the economic sector, they succeeded to some extent in building infrastructure, privatising the service and industrial sectors, and also with much effort attracting investors to the oil and production, agricultural and livestock sector, such as cane sugar, edible oils, green forage, flour, leather, gum Arabic and cement, but it was limited compared to the needs of the country. On the other hand, privatisation affected the middle class and poor people. Yet, most of the criticisms could be directed to performance in the agriculture sector, which was expected to have been developed more. In addition, the oil revenue was not directed to the development and the people’s welfare, because of the government’s high expenditure and the war in the southern region. On the other hand, they failed to receive foreign aid from the IMF and other donors due to their internal and foreign policies that led to economic sanctions.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the southern rebels and Sudan’s government in 1997 was one of the significant achievements that brought peace to the country, in addition to another peace agreement in Eastern Sudan. Although the war stopped later, in 2005, in the south of Sudan, other groups rebelled in Western Sudan. The Western rebels were Islamists and were Turabi’s supporters, but they deny being part of his party. All these wars consume the resources of the country and have delayed the development of the country.
Sudanese society played a significant role in the first decade of Islamist rule, in its participation at all levels of activities, charitable organisations, security and defence, and art and culture. However, some groups were marginalised, specifically people belonging to opposition parties.

This dissertation questioned the human rights’ situation in the Islamist state in Sudan in the first decade. Regarding the human rights’ record in Sudan after 1989, there were considerable violations at different periods of time. Although this is subject of dispute between the government and opposition parties and activists, there were huge human rights’ violations in the first decade. The government argues that their record is far better than neighbouring countries, and complains of facing more pressure from the West and international human rights’ organisations than others; yet this is not an excuse, specifically for leaders who claimed to establish an Islamic state. Indeed, the government admits to some violations. However, human rights’ violations have occurred at different levels; in the first days of the revolution, the constitution was suspended, the leaders of political parties were jailed, newspapers were shut down, trade unions were banned, and opposition party members in the civil service were dismissed from their positions; all under the pretext of protecting the revolution, and so the Islamist regime, at this stage, had behaved like the common secular regimes. However, these actions show the gap between theory and practice in the experiment of Islamists in Sudan.

Many human rights’ special rapporteurs were sent to Sudan, and their reports documented many negative points, and some positive points that occurred only sporadically; for example, after both peace agreements in 1997, when the constitution was approved in 1998, and when the comprehensive ceasefire was announced in 1999.
By 2000, political parties started to rebuild, with political activism resuming in public, and political party newspapers being launched. However, if the human rights’ situation in Sudan was judged by the principles announced by the Sudanese Islamists, it should be said that they failed to achieve the expectations of their members and the Sudanese people in general.

On the international scene, before the coup, the movement developed relationships that benefited its government, specifically, with China, Malaysia, Iran and Iraq. These relations developed considerably after Islamists came to power, and were translated into political and economic cooperation in the form of large economic projects, such as oil, car manufacturing, sugar, and cement industries, as well as infrastructure, like roads, bridges, dams, electricity, communications, etc. An example of the political cooperation is the Sudanese-Chinese cooperation in the Security Council, when China supported Sudan.

Sudan’s Islamists, as mentioned above, came to power during a period that witnessed significant changes in the world’s balance of power. They faced complicated situations regarding international relations, and many challenges, including wars in Africa, Asia and Europe. The Islamists planned to establish their foreign relations’ policy on clear Islamic values that emphasise justice, respect for international law, openness in strengthening neighbourly relations, and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Relations with neighbouring countries were very complicated and difficult to manage – Sudan had nine neighbours at that time (in January 2011, South Sudan was born).

Some of Sudan’s neighbours supported the SPLA rebels at different times. Relations with Egypt, Uganda, and Libya were unstable most of the time, with hostility from Ethiopia and Chad, before their current governments, which came to power with the
support of the Islamist government in Sudan. The Gulf War was an important factor that shaped the relationship between Sudan and most Arab countries in the 1990s. Furthermore, the fact that PAIC was held, and established its headquarters in Khartoum, pitted most Arab and Western countries against the Sudanese government. These countries regarded PAIC as an Islamist and Arab nationalist organisation that supports terrorist groups, such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and other Islamist parties and opposition leaders from different Arab countries.

The Islamists faced many complications with the US and Europe, who maintained that they had come to power through a military coup, and were also very critical on the issue of human rights. Hence, Western nations applied a series of sanction regimes on the government of Sudan, and supported most opposition leaders, parties, and movements that were fighting the government; additionally, their parliaments and offices welcomed these opposition groups and figures. However, EU governments improved their relationship with the Sudanese government after the signing of the Khartoum peace agreements with the southern rebels in 1997.

The 1998 constitution, which paved the way for freedom of association, and freedom of expression and political association, was one of the factors that led to the normalising of relations between Sudan’s government and some European countries. The war on terror after 9/11 played a momentous role in the relations between Sudan and the West, in general, and the US, specifically. Sanctions imposed by the US destroyed vital sectors in Sudan’s economy, including Sudan’s railways, the national airline (Sudan Airways), its shipping company (Sudan Line), and academic institutions and universities. The sanctions made it difficult to fund most government projects.

The research enquiry also included Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. It evaluated Islamist discourse and practice in the field of democracy in these countries.
Many scholars in these countries had developed comprehensive approaches and concepts regarding Islam, Shura, and democracy. However, responding to inclusive overtures, many Islamic movements participated in democratic systems in their countries, such as Ikhwan in Sudan in the early 1980s, and movements in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Turkey, Kuwait, Pakistan and Mauritania. In Tunisia, Islamists were oppressed and persecuted and, in Algeria, they were suppressed by the military when they won the election in 1991.

In summary, the cases studied are similar in many of their characteristics, and the approaches adopted. They are characterised by similar reactions to similar circumstances. It could be said that, when these movements are compared in any of these countries, the study found that every movement has identical trends in terms of radical and moderate groups. The study observed that these movements were all exposed to splits at different periods in history, as in Tunisia and Sudan, and recently the emergence of moderate trends, in the form of political parties in Jordan and Egypt. Nevertheless, all these movements are distinguished by making Islam the frame of reference, and the Islamic state as their main objective. Moreover, they are fruits of Hasan al-Banna and his disciples’ schools of thought, inheriting the legacy of previous reformists, such as Afghani, ‘Abdu, Mawdudi, and Bennabi. Similarly, almost all these movements were influenced by reformists in this century, most of whom are leaders in their movements, such as Turabi, Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, el-Awa, Amara and many others.

It is important to recognise that the above-mentioned movements accepted democracy, but were also affected by their local circumstances. However, there are important and even essential differences in terms of accepting democracy and its mechanisms. Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia accepted democracy with its mechanisms, while in Jordan, they accepted the mechanisms and disputed over the values and ethics of
democracy and its philosophical bases. In accord with what has been circulated by some analysts, in each of these countries there are those Islamists who reject democracy and believe that it is incompatible with Islam and Shura. This emphasised that, even within one movement, there are many trends, which compete or dispute with each other, leading to a new approach developing.

Revivalists throughout history have played a significant role in each period of time, in different areas of the world. Their discourse varies widely, ranging from moderate to extreme radicalism; some Islamist reformists are pluralistic in terms of inter-Muslim relations and between Muslims and other nations and minorities, while others are not. Indeed, some are politically pluralistic, but then theologically exclusive, while others are accommodating. Revivalists have influenced a wide range of Islamic movements in different countries. In general, they believe that governments in their countries do not serve Muslim values, ideologically, politically, and economically, but serve the interests of the dominant world powers. This is the case, specifically, in Mauritania, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia; the last two witnessed change in what is known as the Arab Spring in 2012, with Islamists winning most of the parliamentary seats in both countries.

These revivalists developed theories that tried to answer the questions of state democracy, human rights, freedoms, women’s participation and rights, ethnic and religious minorities in the Muslim state, international relations, and international law. Most contemporary revivalists formulated a comprehensive theoretical framework for these issues; for example, Turabi, Ghannouchi, el-Awa, ‘Amara, and Qaradawi. Rich and significant studies critically evaluated their intellectual output, more discussion of their ideas ensued, and this contributed to querying and examining the validity of their discourse. However, the theory is still under development, and needs to be implemented and then examined again.
Establishing an Islamic state has been an important objective for most Islamic movements throughout history. Yet the nature of that state remains a controversial issue among Islamists themselves. However, two competing approaches emerged; one that advocated formal programmes of Islamisation of laws and society to be implemented by the state itself, and the other that saw an Islamic state as the final product of Islamisation of society.

The majority of revivalists agreed on the Madinah model as the Islamic state, with its federal, multi-cultural, and multi-religious system. For Turabi, any other experiment is just a model, and the Islamic state is the state that is not only Islamic on the level of private, but also public life. It should be established on the values of Islam, namely justice, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.

In Turabi’s political thought, sovereignty in the Islamic state is divided into two levels; absolute sovereignty, which belongs to God, and the people’s sovereignty in ruling themselves according to the Shari’a; hence, the Islamic state is not a theocratic state. The government’s role is legislative, making policy, and applying the law, through legislative (parliament) and executive bodies (administration), and the judiciary.

Society in the Islamic state in Turabi’s political thought plays a fundamental role in the education, healthcare, and economic fields, by responding to the shortcomings of the government. Therefore, society guards the values of the people through its own mechanisms.

The research provides a theoretical evaluation of Turabi’s contribution to the questions of Islamists and the state, democracy, gender, and minorities. It explained the role of the state in Islamist political thought in different periods of time and different scholars. It reached the conclusion that society played a central role in Islamic theory; justice in distributing power and wealth, civil liberties, and freedom of speech are important
principles in Turabi’s political theory. Women are essential in decision making, and there is no limit to their participation in any post in the state.

In Turabi’s political thought, ethnic minorities and non-Muslims should have the full right to choose their laws, and have the same right to public posts. Moreover, regions which are not occupied by Muslims should be exempted from the application of Shari‘a, e.g. South Sudan (prior to its independence), and individuals in majority Muslim regions were exempted as well and should be asked which law they want to be judged by; they enjoy full citizen’s rights in their country.

In the Islamic state, international relations and conventions that aim to achieve justice and peace, and are compatible with the values of Islam, are obligatory. In this context, Turabi calls for further studies and juristic effort (Ijtihād) in scrutinising the issues in international relations.

Turabi believes that, in the Islamic state, the right to private ownership is legitimised, but Islam strictly forbids exploitation, monopoly and earning of wealth other than through lawful and legitimate means. Turabi sees no monopoly of knowledge by the ‘Ulama (scholars, scientists) and no monopoly of power by the rulers.

Consultation (Shura) is a religious duty, and should be practised by all people; ‘Ulama are not only the religious scholars, but also the scientists and experts in all fields, and it is their duty to participate in advising the ruler. In this regard, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion are guaranteed, as well as other rights, i.e. to life, free movement, choice of work, etc. People can express themselves through the Shura system.

The foundation of Turabi’s philosophical approach is built on the concept of Tawhīd. This is reflected in his analysis, when he approaches historical incidents, and the methods advocated by past reformers. This study found that his work allows people not
only to look at the axial doctrine of Islam but, furthermore, to understand doctrines from a number of different perspectives. These doctrines for him are not isolated from practical life, which he regards as one consistent unit. In the endeavour to explain the simple truth of the doctrine of unity (Tawhīd), Turabi touches upon the specific understanding of the objectives of the message of Islam, and the understanding of the concept of Tawhīd itself, as a comprehensive concept related to all aspects of life.

The study determined the relationship between Tawhīd and freedom, Turabi’s democratic model, Shura and Tawhīd, and the pillars of Turabi’s Tawhīdi theory in Turabi’s thought. Turabi explains that each of these concepts significantly affects Tawhīd. As such, his concept of Tawhīd is rich in the depth of its erudition, and abundant in its perceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps his work more than any other that reflects the profound and original thought, which he articulates in his Tawhīdi theory, and which connects the abstract ideas.

The ideas and theories of Turabi have been heavily criticised epistemologically and politically by traditionalists and secularists on many theoretical and ethical grounds. This may be because he is politically active all the time, and does not present himself only as a theorist. Although his political activities award him much, they have cost him much as well. His political views, which are sometimes tactical, were faced with aggressive reactions from both Islamists and anti-Islamists in the media and politics, locally in Sudan and internationally; these political views have hindered proper understanding of his thought.

However, his high standard of theoretical level could not be applied in reality and there is a huge gap between theory and practice; the study found that experiment itself was not evaluated seriously by Islamist institutions so as to develop practice. The parliament was not effective as an independent legislative body, even when it was under Turabi’s
leadership. The judiciary was also not independent, and it did not play any serious role in evaluating the violations of human rights. The executive body of the government was the most influential and controlled power in the country. The presidential institution interfered most of the time, until the president dissolved the parliament in 1999.

Although Turabi, the theorist and the leader of the movement, believed in the above, Islamists monopolised it when they took power in 1989. Lately, in 2001, Turabi apologised for that, but it is still an Islamist experiment that should be studied, and criticised on its own values. In this context, the developments in the judicial system and the executive body of the government were not coping with these changes, and were not up to the standard to protect the rights of the people, as individuals and groups (political parties or NGOs, cultural organisations etc.)

However, it could be said that, despite the comprehensive theories about freedom, Shura and democracy, but governance under Turabi remained dictatorial, with little freedom and many human rights’ abuses. Although elections and real consultation (Shura) should be the means through which the nation (Umma) makes decisions, the government could not hold a free and fair election only after 2001. Indeed, the decision was made following limited consultation among the powerful groups inside the government, although they claimed the participation of the majority of the people.

Despite this clear vision of human rights’ issues, when it comes to practical application of these theories, humiliation, using terror and torture, happened from the early days of the military coup.

However, practical steps towards emancipating women were taken by the government, and it could be said that positive legislation was adopted and enhanced. However, violations occurred, and were monitored by women’s organisations with Turabi’s support. For the minorities, at the level of the constitution and laws, they were exempted
from Shari'a law (southern regions and individuals living in the northern regions). However, on the practical level, there were many violations from officers, who were not trained and educated about the rights of people as citizens. At the same time, the judicial system was not playing an effective role in this area.

In Turabi’s political theory, it could be said that he proposed a structure for the NC that ensured diversity of opinion in the organisation. The organisation would uphold freedom of expression, intellectual participation, and open discussion to reach consensus, with decisions based on this political consensus. However, the organisation failed to achieve this objective, and the regime then adopted the concept of political association (al-Tawali al-Siyasi), or plurality of organisations, in other words, a multi-party system.

Although the step towards democracy was eight years late, it was important to examine the real practice of democracy claimed to be intended by the leaders at that time. It is important to mention that it led to division in the body of the movement.

Social development in the strategic plan was ambitious, and the government made many efforts to incentivise society to play its role. However, theory proved far from practice, due to financial and administrative problems, while the priorities of the government changed each time. Despite the confirmation of Turabi that “the society not the state is the first institution in Islam”, the state monopolised power and marginalised the society; the government was restrictive and marginalised anti-government artists, which pushed most of them to migrate all over the world. Furthermore, important NGOs were constrained, such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamia. The government succeeded in developing the Zakat sector but it was not established on practical sustainable projects. Finally, the decision-making process and the applications of Shura mechanisms were not clear in the experiment of Islamists in Sudan.
The findings of this research point to the need for further study of some issues, specifically, the mechanisms of applying Shura. Indeed, there is still no comprehensive study in this field, as most of the studies concentrate on theoretical ideas, without suggesting any methods of application on the ground. The other field in which no comprehensive studies exist is that related to the Islamic state and international relations and international law, which requires more revivalist ideas and academic research. However, further discussion and critical evaluation is encouraged of the Islamist experiment of Sudan; especially, first, in the area of economic welfare projects and, second, in decision-making mechanisms and process. Discussion and comparative analysis of Islamic movements in Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey, Algeria, the Gulf, and Kuwait, on the theoretical and practical levels, should be encouraged. After the huge release of information on Sudan’s experiment recently, more research of this area in its different aspects is suggested.
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