Articulations of memory in Northern Cyprus: between Turkishness, Europeanness and Cypriotness.

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School of Media, Arts and Design

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ARTICULATIONS OF MEMORY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS:
BETWEEN TURKISHNESS, EUROPEANNESS AND CYPRIOTNESS

HEYCAN ERHÜRMAN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Westminster
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This research explores how memory and national identity have been articulated in the context of competing discourses after the presentation of the Annan Plan in Northern Cyprus. Focussing on key mechanisms of memory such as history textbooks, commemorations (national days, museums, monuments), traditions (flags, national anthem and myths) and the media (especially newspapers) the thesis explores the mobilization, articulation and construction of memory/ies in relation to national identity.

It is argued that the Annan Plan constitutes a turning point in Cypriot politics as it proposes a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the Cyprus problem is understood as the outcome of the clash between two antagonistic nationalisms which has caused the division of the island since 1974. Thus, the Annan Plan is the most serious step on the way to the reunification of the island since then and, as such, it has functioned as a catalyst and precipitated an intense competition between alternative, often opposing, discourses on Turkish Cypriot national identity.

The primary goal of this study is to open up the field of knowledge about the reconciliation of physically and/or mentally divided communities through a critical analysis of the ‘mechanisms of memory’, of how they construct and articulate the ‘past’, in the present, for the future. The theoretical framework of the research draws upon approaches from a variety of fields such as social psychology, sociology, history, politics and media studies, while the empirical investigation consists of in depth interviews. The analysis of the respondents’ narratives is informed by textual analysis and in particular ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (i.e Wodak, Fairclough). Furthermore, the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe are adopted in the examination of memories and their articulation, construction and transformation.
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<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRTK</td>
<td>Bayrak Radio and Television Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Turkish Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENOSIS</td>
<td>Hellenism and unification of the island to motherland Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National Cypriot Fighters Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>The Popular Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKSIM</td>
<td>The idea of the partition of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKP</td>
<td>The Communal Liberation Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Turkish Defence Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBP</td>
<td>National Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
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I dedicate this to the memory of my grandmother...
INTRODUCTION

Cyprus is one of the most controversial regions of the Mediterranean. Due to its geographical location, the island has been the focus of power struggles since ancient times; it has attracted many colonizing powers and been ruled by them in the past. Today it continues to be a field of power relations between Turkey and Greece because of their political interests in the island; these two countries also have historical and cultural connections with the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the natives, who therefore consider them to be their respective “motherland countries.” In addition, the United States, European Union countries and Russia are third parties involved in Cyprus for a variety of global, political and geographical reasons. These conflicting interests make Cyprus one of the most problematic areas of the world and create, reinforce and reproduce what is known as the ‘Cyprus problem’.

The Cyprus problem can be explained as the confrontation of two antagonistic Greek and Turkish nationalisms that led to the Cyprus war of 1974 and the division of the island that has continued since then. The Greek Cypriots, whose language is Greek, have been living since 1974 in the southern part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus; while the Turkish Cypriots, who speak Turkish, have been living in the northern part, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). This is an unrecognized state and therefore unable to participate independently in the European Union negotiations for a solution to the problem; however, European Union membership has been highly debated in the TRNC over the last few years because of the Annan Plan, a potential solution to the Cyprus problem, and the possible participation of the whole of Cyprus in the European Union following a solution.

Memory has been a central factor in the construction of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as a nation. Premised on the argument that memories are socially/discursively constructed, this research intends to explore how opposing discourses came to articulate memory after the presentation of the Annan Plan in Northern Cyprus. It will do so by focussing on the examination of some key “mechanisms of memory” – in particular the role of history textbooks, commemorations (national days, museums, mass graves, monuments, martyrdoms, graveyards), symbols of tradition (flags, national anthems, myths) and the media (especially newspapers) – as they are used
in the mobilization, articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus.

The research focuses on the period of the Annan Plan because the plan functioned as a catalyst and precipitated an intense contradiction and struggle between the discourses in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus. The Annan Plan, the first plan to propose possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem, was the most serious step taken towards unification of the island after its division. The plan was presented on 11th November 2002 and referenda on it were held simultaneously in the south and the north of Cyprus on 24th April 2004. In the referendum, the Turkish Cypriots in the north had to make a decision about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union within the framework of the Annan Plan. However, this decision meant a lot for the people living in Northern Cyprus, as it involved re-evaluating their identities and historical and cultural backgrounds. Their memories and re-evaluation of the past thus provided the context for a decision about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus.

In the process, dominant public memory mediated by the official mechanisms of memory (i.e. history textbooks, traditional symbols, commemorations), public memories mediated through alternative/counter narratives and autobiographical memories played a crucial role. This study examines the similarities, differences, parallels and inconsistencies amongst dominant/public and autobiographical memories and explores the impact of the interrelationship between them on the political views of the respondents regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. In this respect, the use of the term ‘memory’ in the thesis can be narrowed under these main subtitles (dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories). In the general sense, memory can be defined as the capacity/ability to retain and recall past experiences (Ferrante 2008: 91) or knowledge (Burns 2001:1). These past experiences mainly compose the autobiographical (private) memories which are the memories of those events that the individuals ‘experience’. However, as Carther and Hirschop (cited in Grainge 2003:3) argue, memory depends less on a conscious decision to record than an inability to forget, the negotiation of memory describes the echo and pressure of the past as it is configured in present based struggles over the meaning of lived experiences. In other words, our past experiences are not always the outcome of what is recorded consciously into our memories. Memories are the field of contestation and struggle and our past experiences are articulated in these power relations. Hence, experience can be evaluated as the interpretation that is articulated in the
social and political circumstances shaped by power relations. Thus, even the autobiographical memories that are conceived as the reflections of ‘personal’ and ‘private’ experiences are social and interpersonal.

Autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories that encompass the memory of small or large formations such as family, society, government and nation. Autobiographical memories give information about the self and thus, they are also related to the narrations of the individuals about their national identities. On the other hand, public memories are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single social individual (i.e society, nation and family). Public memories are highly crucial in the construction of national identities of the individuals as nobody can have a private national identity. Public memories articulate how we remember the ‘past’ in relation to our national identities in present for the future. In this case, ‘memory about national identity’ differs from ‘opinion about national identity’ because memory is about the ‘past’ and without a constructed past, it is not possible to talk about national identities. As Weil (1971 cited in Lowenthal 1985:44), suggests, "collectivity has its roots in the past".

In this respect, the ruling groups produce the official mechanisms of memory to construct the memories of the individuals about their national identities. The official mechanisms of memory that includes commemorations (museums, monuments, national days), traditional symbols (flags, national anthems, myths), and history textbooks play the primary role in the construction of the dominant public memory of past in relation to national identity. Therefore, the mechanisms compose the backbone of the national identity and nation. The official mechanisms construct the memories of the social individuals about themselves (their national identity) and the ‘others’ through the shared experiences (i.e performing and celebrating the commemorative acts, hanging flags and singing national anthems). Hence, the dominant public memory provides the necessary framework for the imagination of a nation. As Keren and Herwig suggest, (2009:169) the more a community is imagined, as in the case of the nation, the more ‘memory’ is necessary to it. Therefore, the articulation and construction of the memories in relation to national identity plays the primary role for the formation and survival of a nation.
Aims and Objectives

The aim of this research is to contribute to the debate in the academic field of communication by exploring ‘memory’ from a cultural studies perspective, providing an approach to the role of the ‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media) in mobilizing memories in relation to national identity. At present, there are few studies that focus on the complex functioning of history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media in the articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity. An examination of the production of the mechanisms of memory in power relations and their function in the mobilization, articulation and construction of memories in relation to identity could empower the formation of a critical understanding about memory/memories that are our primary sources of ‘information’.

The continuing division of the island since 1974 is created by and also creates a special historical and political situation in Northern Cyprus. Thus case studies of divided communities in Cyprus could contribute to opening up the field of knowledge regarding the reconciliation of physically and/or mentally divided communities in general, through a critical analysis of the ‘mechanisms of memory’, of the construction and reconstruction of the past on a public level and of personal narratives that provide information about the experiences of people living in divided communities. In the context of Cyprus and its recent historical, political and cultural circumstances, it is crucial to explore how memories of the past are constructed and articulated and to observe how respondents articulate the ‘information’ they provide. My research questions and hypothesis are therefore as follows,

Research Questions

1) What are the different or opposing discourses in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus and how do these discourses represent the memory of the past?

2) How do the ‘mechanisms of memory’ mobilize, articulate and construct these discourses in relation to national identity?

3) How do respondents articulate the ‘information’ they get in their everyday lives?
4) What are the similarities, parallels, inconsistencies and differences between dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories?

5) What is the impact of the interrelationship between dominant/alternative public memories and autobiographical memories on political discourses about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus?

**Hypothesis**

Autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories. The mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) mobilize, articulate and construct memories in relation to national identity in the context of changing power relations. They therefore have a crucial influence on the respondents’ political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus that both construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity.

**Methodology**

This research analyses respondents’ narratives about their memories in relation to national identity through textual analysis and in particular ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (i.e Wodak, Fairclough). I adopt the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe in the analysis of memories as the product of discourses. Foucault’s genealogical analysis, Laclau and Mouffe’s approaches on nodal points and master signifiers, the logics of equivalence and the logics of difference and antagonism, are the tools used for empirical analysis; and I also make use of Wodak’s three dimensions of analysis in the discursive construction of national identity. These three dimensions – ‘contents’, ‘strategies’ and ‘means and forms of realization’ – play the primary role in the analysis of the narratives of the respondents. In addition, I explore the memories of the respondents through in-depth interviews, as it is not possible to determine them by textual analysis: for the purposes of this research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 60 community residents of Northern Cyprus. The research involves the critical examination of the narratives of the respondents.
Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first four explore the conceptual/theoretical dimensions of my research project, and the next three focus on the analysis and discussion of the empirical material generated in the course of my ethnographic research. The last chapter reflects the findings of the research.

The thesis begins by examining the concept of ‘memory’ in the light of past and present approaches. The aim of the first chapter is to explain how the concept of memory is used throughout the thesis; thus it presents an analytical evaluation of descriptions of the concept of memory in various theoretical approaches during different time periods. This chapter constructs the framework of my research in three sections, each of which involves discussions, interpretations and explanations of the major concepts employed – i.e., dominant/public and autobiographical memories and narratives, identity, official history and historiography. In the first section, I define the past and present theoretical context for the re-evaluation of ‘memory’ in this study. The second section explains the interrelationship between memory and history and how politics is embedded in the construction of the official/history; here I examine ways in which the official history might be challenged by the alternative narratives that can be uncovered by the historiography. In the final section, I explain the interrelations between memory, narrative (i.e. ontological and public) and identity.

These theoretical considerations are expanded on in the second chapter, where the primary focus is on memory and national identity, showing how mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) function in the articulation and construction of national identity: In the first section of the chapter, I examine the role of dominant/alternative public (i.e narratives of commemorations, symbols of tradition, history textbooks, media, families, school education) and autobiographical narratives in the articulation of national identity during the socialization processes. The second section focusses on the mechanisms of memory, which include traditional symbols (flags, myths, national anthem), commemorations (museums, monuments, national days), history textbooks and the media; here I examine the role of each mechanism in the mobilization and articulation of memories in relation to national identity. The last section describes how the mechanisms articulate and construct each other and what the parallels and interconnections are amongst them; the analysis shows
how they function like a single body in the articulation and construction of national identity.

In chapter three I explain the theoretical and methodological framework and the ethnographic research conducted to examine how public memories are produced by the mechanisms of memory and how respondents articulate the ‘information’ provided by the mechanisms. The chapter shows how the respondents’ narratives can be analysed by adopting the theoretical and methodological approaches of Foucault, Fairclough, Laclau, Mouffe, Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart. I explain the techniques used in gathering information about the memories of the respondents through in-depth interviews, and discuss how the questionnaire was created, the questions of the in-depth interviews and the research sample. Finally, I talk about my personal experiences and methods during the research.

The fourth chapter presents an overview of the ‘history of Cyprus’ and of the functions of the mechanisms of memory (media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) within the society/culture of Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus’s history is examined under various headings: the colonization between 750 BC-1960, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Cyprus war and the division of the island from 1974 onwards. In the last part of the chapter, the Cyprus problem is examined within a broader political context that considers the role of external powers such as Turkey, Greece, the European Union and the United Nations, on the Cyprus problem.

Chapter five analyses how the official history that encompasses the official mechanisms – history textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, national anthem, myths) and commemorations (museums, monuments, national days) – mobilize, articulate and construct the respondents’ memories in relation to national identity. I show how the official mechanisms are articulated differently according to the dominant discourses during the Denktash presidency and UBP government (1974-2003) and during the period of the CTP government (2003-2009) in Northern Cyprus.

In the sixth chapter I focus on the function of the media in the articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity; this chapter expands the arguments concerning the mechanisms of memory that were developed in chapter five. The media’s (particularly the newspapers’) role is examined in the first section as one of the mechanisms in the mobilization of the political ideas that construct and are constructed by the respondents’ memories. The second section explores the different
functions of the mechanisms of memory – media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations – in the respondents’ memories.

Chapter seven shows the complex functioning of the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories in the articulation of the respondents’ political ideas regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. This last analytical chapter illustrates the constant articulation of the respondents’ memories about self-other relationships.

The concluding chapter brings together the theoretical approaches and ethnographic research and presents the research findings and conclusions in this context; it also discusses possibilities for further research.
CHAPTER 1: MEMORY- CONSTRUCTING THE FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

This chapter begins by exploring and defining the concept of memory in order to construct the framework of the study; the past and current theoretical context sheds light on the re-evaluation of memory. The second section looks at the role of history in the construction and articulation of memory in the political contexts shaped by power relations; the focus is on the interrelationships between memory, official/history and historiography. In the third section, memory is examined in relation to identity.

1.2 Section one: Memory- Theoretical and historical inquiry

The idea of ‘memory’ has always attracted considerable attention because memory is conceived as directly related to ourselves, emotions, beliefs and destinies. ‘We are what we remember’ (Fentress and Wickham 1992:7), because as Amery suggests, ‘no one can become what he cannot find in his memories’ (cited in Young 1993:1). Thus our memories construct and are constructed by what we know and believe. Our past, present and future are determined not by our destinies but by memories that are formed in cultural and social contexts.

For this reason the concept of ‘memory’ has been defined and evaluated with great interest from the earliest historical periods. However, the definition of memory can only be realized within the limits of ‘memory’ shaped by certain discourses of its time; in other words, the concept can only be defined through the recollections of social individuals constructed in social and cultural circumstances. As Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen and Kurzweil (1984:156) point out, cultural factors limit our thinking; time and space predetermine the social individual’s scope of thought and action. My aim in this chapter is therefore to interpret and narrate the concept of ‘memory’ in the light of ‘past’ and ‘present’ theories without the intention of presenting an ‘absolute’ or ‘objective’ definition, following Somers and Gibson (1994:62-63): ‘social researchers construct the concepts and explanations through conceptual narrativity that forms their analytical categories which are temporal and spatial’.
The conceptual narration of the concept of ‘memory’ is not fixed and stable, as it changes in different contexts; from ancient times to the present, the definition of ‘memory’ has been re-negotiated, re-articulated and re-shaped. Once conceived as a goddess by the ancient Greeks, ‘Memory’ has today been transformed into the ‘slave’ of discourse by new approaches and perspectives in social sciences. Changes and developments in the approaches of the fields of history, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies and post-structuralism significantly affect the understanding of ‘memory’ at different moments in history; an analytical evaluation of different theoretical approaches in their historical contexts is therefore the focus of this section.

The goddess of memory Mnemosyne, according to the ancient Greeks, was the mother of the muses, each of whom presided over literature, art and science (Bulfinch, Holme and Campbell 1981:32, Grant 1989). The ‘mother’ symbolised productivity, creativity and protection; and so the goddess of memory was conceived as necessary for the creation, existence and preservation of literature, art and science. Memory was thus accepted in early historical periods as the source of information and knowledge. In order to improve the capacity of memory and to deal with large quantities of information, Greeks invented ‘the art of memory,’ which entailed remembering through a technique of impressing ‘places’ and ‘images’ on the memory (Yates 1966); memory was perceived as a store of information that could be improved by training.

Studies related to memory became ‘science’ when they were examined systematically and the behavioural phenomena analysed. These studies sought to find answers to questions related to the general principles governing the mechanisms of memory that include its processing and capacity (Flaherty et al. 1977) by using formal experimental techniques in laboratories (Cohen 1989). However, in changing circumstances, the scope of memory was diverted toward different matters and the concept was re-examined and re-evaluated. Cognitive psychologists questioned the traditional laboratory experimental method and asked questions about the complex functioning of memory in everyday life. They were concerned with its operation in natural environments (Neisser 1982) and the ways in which individuals take in information from the outside world (Groome 1999:2).

Most cognitive psychologists conceive the function of memory as the encoding, storage and retrieval of information (Eysenck & Keane 2005:189, Groome et al. 1999:96) and talk about the familiar parallel between a computer and a human being (Ashcraft...
1994, Baddeley 1997:2, Groome et al. 1999:7, Neisser 1967): memory is treated as the retrieval of information and internal mental processes that store and fix information in the brain independent of social and communicative practices (Radley, 1990, Shotter, 1990). According to Ulric Neisser (1967), one of the founders of modern cognitive psychology, human behaviour and consciousness depend entirely on the activity of the brain in interaction with other physical systems. Thus remembering and thinking are also inner-directed.

However, human beings are social creatures and their memories are also social as they are largely delivered from symbolic communications. What we think, feel, know, remember and forget is largely the result of what we have experienced, shared and communicated with other people (Edwards & Middleton 1986); hence individual memories cannot be evaluated as independent of communicative and social activities. In ‘Remembering: A study in Experimental and Social Psychology’ (1932), Bartlett, one of the first theorists to consider the importance of social influences on remembering and perceiving, treats memory as a social activity of remembering and questions the approaches that define memory as a store of fixed and stable information. According to Bartlett, “remembering is not the re-excitation of fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative re-construction or construction” (1932:213). The construction of memories is never-ending, because when we communicate we constantly create, reproduce and transform certain modes of social relationships (Shotter, 1990). Thus, as historical, social and cultural factors are embedded in it, there cannot be any given, determined nature of memory.

Individuals are born into social formations that are constituted from small or large groups such as families, societies and nations; as such, social individuals are always connected to other social individuals with a shared understanding. Our memories are borrowed and inherited from our families, communities and nations as a result of communication and social interaction (Fentress and Wickham, 1992). As Maurice Halbwachs among the first theorists to look at memory beyond the individual level, noted (1980:23-24), ‘individuals can only be alone in physical appearance as their thoughts and actions even during the period that they are alone are only explained by their social being as a member of their social groups’. Halbwachs (1950 cited in Bodnar 1992:11) developed and popularized the concept of ‘collective memory’ as “…a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, for it retains from the past what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of groups keeping the memory
alive”. In other words, ‘collective memory’ takes its roots from a constructed past and keeps the memory of the past alive for the continuity of the recollection that binds group members to each other; for this reason Halbwachs emphasizes the role of social groups in the formation of a ‘collective memory’ among group members.

Halbwachs’s concept has been highly influential, as it has contributed to the development of the understanding that memories are not only ‘social’ but also ‘shared’: social individuals are united around a shared remembering that is established and mobilized through communication. This concept of ‘collective memory’ forms the basis of other concepts such as ‘social memory’, ‘cultural memory’, ‘public memory’, and ‘dominant memory’; and although there is no single agreed-on concept of ‘memory’ that implies the shared remembrance (Nerone and Wartella 1989:86), all of these concepts emphasize the communicative aspect of memory. Without transmission and communication, it is not possible to locate a shared remembering.

‘Cultural memory’ and ‘social memory’ are problematic concepts, because the classification of memories as ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ connotes the presence of memories that are not ‘cultural’ and ‘social’. However, as individuals are born into social frameworks and their memories are constructed in social formations, whether beyond the ‘individual’ level or not, memories are always ‘social’ and ‘cultural’. Thus, the concepts of ‘social memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ do not fully embrace the social and cultural aspect of ‘memory’ in the general sense.

Furthermore, the term ‘collective memory’ connotes the presence of a common memory shared by all the members of a unitary group or society. According to Halbwachs (1950 cited in Olick and Robbins 1998:109), memory is a matter of how minds work collectively in society and how their operations are structured by social arrangements. However, as Laclau (1990:90) suggests, any structural system is limited because it is always surrounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master. Thus, 'collective memory' as a unitary object which grounds its own partial processes is an impossibility because the permanent articulation and construction of memories prevent the total fixity and formation of collective memory under structural constraints. It is therefore not possible to locate a collective memory that binds all members of a social group together.

In the same way that social constructionist arguments challenge ‘essentialist’ accounts of collective identities that are based on some essence or set of core features shared by all members of the collectivity and no others (Calhoun 1994:13), it can be
argued that it is meaningless to talk about a ‘collective memory’ that is shared by all members of a social group. The social constructionist arguments reject the notion that social individuals can have singular, integral, altogether harmonious and unproblematic identities (ibid). From this perspective, it is not possible to locate collective, integral or harmonious memory because ‘memory is a contested territory’ (Schudson 1989:112) and different social individuals construct different memories at different times that prevent the total fixity of memory as ‘collective’ within their social frameworks.

In contrast to the essentialist accounts, the concept of ‘dominant memory’ locates ‘memory’ as a field of contestation, negotiation and struggle, which is therefore never fixed or altogether harmonious. The concepts of ‘public memory’ and ‘dominant memory’ complement each other and provide a fuller account of the complex functioning of ‘memory’ beyond the individual level. Public memory is embedded in cultural, social and institutional formations and encompasses the memory of small or large formations such as family, society, government and nation.

Public memory is a collection of signs, symbols and practices: memorial dates, commemorations, museums, language (Olick and Robbins 1998; Klein 2000) and general forms like tradition, myth and identity (Olick and Robbins 1998:106). According to Young (1993:ix), ‘public memory’ encompasses not just the memorials physically but also includes the activity and practices that brought them into being, the constant give and take between memorials and viewers. ‘Public memory presents a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public to understand both its past, present and by implication, its future’ (Bodnar 1992:15).

On the other hand, ‘dominant memory’ is the ‘public memory’ that ‘points to the power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics’ (Popular Memory Group 1982:207). Hence, public memory may transform into ‘dominant public memory’ if it acquires enough power through the pervasiveness of its dominance. Thus, the concepts of dominant memory and public memory are interrelated and complete each other. Both public memory and dominant memory are the outcome of the partial fixity of certain discourses in power relations.

The discourse theories of Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault provide crucial openings for evaluating and discussing the concept of ‘memory’. Although these theories of discourse have commonalities, their focus of study is different; hence in combination they provide a fuller account of the ways in which the concept of ‘memory’ can be explained
as the product of discourse that is changing, articulated and constructed in power relations that are shaped in historical, political and cultural circumstances.

Laclau and Mouffe develop a theoretical framework that is useful for examining the concept of ‘memory’ as a field of social practices which is constantly changing, negotiated and constructed through articulations. Although they do not focus on ‘memory’ as their field of study, their theories of ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ are highly applicable in developing approaches to ‘memory in relation to identity’. In addition, a Foucauldian approach provides the opportunity to focus on the importance of power relations in the construction of memory in historical and political contexts. The theories of Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault thus complement and enrich each other when they are combined, and provide an important framework for this research.

In the context of this study, one of the most significant contributions of Laclau and Mouffe is the concept of articulation. They note that ‘articulation is any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse’ (1985:105). In this sense, memory, which is the product of discourse, can be conceived as the result of articulatory practice; and the fixity of memory is temporal because the articulation of discourses is never-ending. The logic of articulation entails a continuous transformation, creation, change and reproduction of memory; so as a result, complete structures and closures of memories are impossible.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985:112) explain that, ‘any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixity, nodal points’. In this sense, in the discourse of ‘memory’, the ‘past’ functions as a nodal point as it partially fixes ‘memory’. According to Jorgensen and Philips (2002:26), ‘[a] nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point’. In this respect, other signs such as experience, history, commemorations and symbols of tradition acquire their meanings from their relationship to the nodal point (‘past’) in particular ways.

The ‘past’ moments are articulated to each other and form a consistent whole in our memories. They are conceived as lived realities and facts in a specific time and space. However, as Jorgensen and Philips (2002:5) suggest,
Reality is only accessible to us through categories, so our knowledge and representations of the world are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’ but rather are products of our ways of categorising the world, or, in discursive analytical terms, products of discourse.

Thus, our knowledge, representations and categorising of past moments should not be treated as ‘objective’ truths. They are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’ but rather are the products of our interpretations constructed by certain discourses that are constantly changing, negotiated and articulated through dynamic social interaction.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) strongly emphasize the importance of a dynamic process in the formation of discourses. From their perspective, the tension between interiority, which is related to the fixity of discourses, and exteriority, which is related to their non-fixity, is the main source of the dynamic social process. Laclau and Mouffe also discuss the interrelationship between ‘moments’ and ‘elements’ in a similar way. The differential positions as they appear articulated within a discourse are called moments. Moments can be conceived as the memories that sustain a particular discourse and are therefore attached to it. In contrast, an element is any difference that is not discursively articulated: elements are memories which are unattached and non-articulated; they are left over from the present discourse because they are different and thus they create inconsistencies. It should be noted that the elements (memories) that are not interior to the present discourse are potential threats to its partial fixity, as they provide alternatives and oppositions, and so constitute the surplus of meaning that creates the necessary conditions for the formation of new discourses. Laclau and Mouffe (ibid:111) explain the surplus of meaning as follows:

Discourse as a system only exists as a partial limitation of a ‘surplus of meaning’ which subverts it. ‘Surplus’ is inherent in every discursive situation and is necessary for the constitution of every social practice. It is called the field of discursivity’ (ibid: 111).

Surplus is thus excluded by discourse, as it is a threat to the structured totality. In this way, discourse as the partial fixity of meaning includes moments and excludes elements. However, the transition from elements to moments is always incomplete. Articulation plays the main role in the transformation from fixity to non-fixity and vice-versa; the tension between interiority and exteriority is the condition of any social practice. Thus “every social practice is articulatory” (ibid: 113).
Complementing this approach, Michel Foucault (1977d), who has had a huge influence upon the popularization of the concept of ‘discourse’, emphasizes the role of historical factors in the construction of discourses:

Discourse is a group of statements that belong to the same discursive formation. It is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that possesses a history. Hence, it is, from beginning to end, historical. (1972:117)

Thus discourses cannot be evaluated as independent of historical, social and political constraints that form their conditions of existence. Foucault rejects the approaches that treat discourse solely as a linguistic phenomenon; he is not interested in language as a communicative tool but rather in how language use is always articulated with other social and cultural practices that are shaped by power relations (Storey 2001:78). Likewise, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest that systems of social relations are not purely linguistic phenomena, because a discursive structure is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations. Hence, ‘speaking is a way of acting and not simply a way of reporting and describing what is done’ (Thompson 1984:6).

Thompson (ibid:2) takes ideology as something that emerges from and shapes language in everyday social life, from an ordinary encounter between friends and family members to the forums of political debate. Like Foucault, he emphasizes the importance of power relations in language: “the uses of language intersect with power, nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it” (ibid.). Thompson uses the term ‘ideology’, but Foucault prefers the term ‘discourse’ because in his view the term ‘ideology’ connotes the existence of an ideal sphere (Howkes, 2003): ‘ideology always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth’ (Foucault 1980:118). However, ‘truth’ is produced within discourse and located in language. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002:8-9) suggest, ‘our access to reality and truth is always through language. With language, we create representations of reality and truth that are never mere reflections but constructions’.

Discourses, which are the outcome of the partial fixity of meaning, naturalize some memories and make them seem like 'objective truths'. Roland Barthes (1974) addresses naturalization and legitimization through his concept of ‘myth’, understood as a system of communication. For Barthes (ibid: 143),
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: It abolishes the complexity of human acts… It organizes a world without contradictions. It establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.

In this respect, myth functions to naturalize and universalize dominant discourses and to present them as being for the good of all members of society (Storey, 1999). In other words, myth functions in such a way as to make historical events be conceived as natural and legitimate facts that cannot and should not be changed. This situation prevents antagonisms and conflicts because everything seems natural and factual and there is no need for struggle. In this way, according to Barthes (1974), myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things in memory. Memory is formed according to the ‘reality’ which is constructed by myth.

Barthes’s concept of myth is very close to that of ideology. Like ideology, myth is a body of ideas and practices which seek to defend the pervasiveness of the power of the dominant group (Storey 1999:65). Furthermore, like ideology, the concept of myth stems from the idea of a distorted ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. Both myth and ideology distort, convert and cover the ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ and present historical and political interests as naturally justified. Barthes formulates the concepts of connotation and denotation to explain the relationship and difference between plain and ideological expression: "denotation is the plane of expression or signifier of the second system connotation" (ibid.). However, discourse is always in process and there is no objective, factual or plain expression; meaning is an interpretation. As Storey (ibid.72) points out, ‘denotation is no longer a neutral level; it is no more than the last connotation. Denotation is just as ideological as connotation’.

Similarly, it is pointless to support the idea of ‘neutral’, ‘objective’ or ‘factual’ memory because, as Laclau (1990:28) points out, the 'objectivity' of the social would stem from the impossibility of managing a total fixity. Total fixity is not possible because discourses are never-ending articulations; ‘[a]rticulation is constant because discourses are in conflict with other discourses that set other guidelines for social thought and action’ (Jorgensen and Philips 2002:47), and this is the only way they can maintain their presence and dominance. As Foucault (1977b:214) argues, “each struggle develops around a particular source of power”. According to Foucault (1979 cited in Megill), Memory is
actually a very important factor in struggle… if one controls the memory of the people, one controls their dynamism… It is vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain. ‘Dominant memory’, which points to the winning consent through the pervasiveness of historical representations and their connections with dominant institutions, is produced in the course of these struggles. But this does not mean that conceptions of the past that acquire dominance in the field of public representations are ‘collectively’ believed or that they create a collective memory. Dominant memory is always open to contestation (Popular Memory Group, 1982) and contestation produces antagonism that prevents the establishment of a ‘collective memory’.

Antagonism has an ‘outside’ characteristic and it creates ambiguities, threatens the partial fixity of the social agents and prevents their permanent fixity. As Laclau (1990:17) suggests, "with antagonism, denial does not originate from the 'inside' but, in its most radical sense, from outside and the presence of the inherent negativity of a constitutive outside means that the social never manages to fully constitute itself as an objective order". Antagonism is a necessary step in the journey toward transformation and change; without it, it is impossible to change the domination of memory.

Antagonism is located in communication and social interaction. In the communication process, there is a certain give and take. What we forget (give) is as crucial as what we remember in the formation of memories through the communication process. Both forgetting and remembering are related to the selective and distorted feature of memories, and in this sense, what we remember and forget function in antagonistic relations. Thus the line between remembering and forgetting is the mystery of memory and provides the power to alter, reproduce or transform (Kaha, 1989). What we remember and forget is shaped in power relations that produce the dynamic for a change of dominant memory.

Foucault (1980:119) argues that discourses are inseparable from power relations: “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse”. Power is therefore not related to force and obligation, but to the discourses that construct knowledge, moral values, emotions and beliefs to verify, legitimate and naturalize the dominant memory. In this respect, as discussed above, dominant discourses produce the official history for the construction and reproduction of memory in order to maintain their dominance.
This theoretical framework provides crucial openings for me to reinterpret the concept of memory and to specify how it will be applied in the course of my research. In its most general sense, the concept of ‘memory’ encompasses the ‘past experiences’ of social individuals. In mainstream thinking, neither the past nor its experiences can be changed, as they have already been lived; however, my approach does not conceive past experiences as the outcome of static and fixed events, because social individuals are constantly reinterpreting and reevaluating the ‘past’ in changing historical, political and cultural circumstances shaped by power relations. Some of the past experiences are in harmony with each other and have dominance over the memories of the social individuals; on the other hand, there are alternative ‘past’ experiences that are inconsistent with the dominant memories. These alternative experiences are potential threats to the partial fixity of memories, as they can gain dominance in changing historical, political and cultural contexts. In this context, it is possible to talk about the constant reinterpretation and rearticulation of memories: the memories of social individuals about an event might change and be re-interpreted over time. What is important for the purposes of my research is to explore how the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media) that are examined in the following chapter are constructed by the ruling groups to sustain, transform and change memories in relation to national identity. This section therefore lays the foundation of the theoretical framework that explains memory.

1.3 Section two: memory – Official/history – historiography

In this section I explore the function of history in the construction and reproduction of memory in relation to the past. As Rusen notes (2005:129), ‘memory covers the entire field of dealing with the past, thus includes the realm of history as a mode of recalling the past into life of its representation in the cultural framework of human activities’. Beginning with an account of the relationships among memory, history and narrative, I then describe how politics is embedded in the construction of the official/history and examine ways in which this official history might be challenged by alternative narratives that can be uncovered by the historiography.

The approaches of Halbwachs (1950), Nora (1989), Benjamin (1999b) and Foucault (1980) provide a comprehensive understanding of memory and history. Although these thinkers share the understanding that history plays a crucial role in the
reproduction of memory, each conceives and presents a different relationship between memory and history. The differences between their conceptions raise important questions relating to dichotomy, interrelationship or similarity between memory and history and provide crucial openings for the evaluation of history in relation to memory.

According to Halbwachs (1980:78), history starts only when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up. Social memory appeals to history when its presence is in crisis; history shapes and keeps memory alive. Halbwachs classifies ‘memory’ as ‘social memory’, ‘historical memory’ and ‘collective memory’; collective memory incorporates both historical memory and social memory. Historical memory is our knowledge of the past and social memory is our lived experiences (Yekelchyk 2004:8). However, Halbwachs misses the point that these categories of memory are artificial because individual practices of remembering shape and articulate memory without any classification; it is not possible to locate memory as consisting of different segments that have fixed and stable locations in the brain. Yekelchyk’s (2004) argument on the internalization of historical knowledge by memory of social individuals points to the idea that, historical or not, knowledge is not an ‘objective’ or raw entity but the weave of memory that is internalized by social individuals. There is therefore no clear distinction between what Halbwachs classifies as ‘historical’, ‘social’ and ‘collective’, as these are all interwoven.

In the common understanding, history occupies a privileged position as the objective, systematic and accurate reflection of the memory of the past; thus Halbwachs (1980: 79), for example, argues that history is the record of past events and the objective reflection of memory. The historian’s intention is to be objective and impartial; however, memory, as a sequence of events, is based on the support of a group for only a specific time and space. Thus, although history is universal and objective, memory is not. Hence, Halbwachs argues, there is an ultimate opposition between memory and history. History is a kind of ‘true’ reflection of memory, and so it functions objectively to reflect memory.

On the other hand, according to Nora (1989), although history’s effort is to establish a “true” memory, its main mission is not to exalt but to suppress, destroy and annihilate memory, the actual phenomenon. From this point of view, history does not function to reflect a “true memory” but to reconstruct and represent the past. However autobiographical or public, memory is also not constituted from a ‘true’ and ‘objective’ reflection but through the reconstruction and re-articulation of the past. As Jeffrey and Edwall (1994) argue, historians rewrite history to fit different interests and interpretative
frameworks and social individuals similarly reshape their memories and make new sense out of past experiences. Therefore, as in the case of history, it is not possible to locate a fixed and factual memory.

Nora (1989) and Benjamin (1999b) share a common understanding regarding the subjectivity of historical writing; however, Benjamin does not support the idea of objective or factual memory as Nora does. According to Benjamin (1999b:97), memory manifests itself in a form quite different from the way it manifests itself in the story: memory is not an ‘actual phenomenon’ as Nora claims, but historical, as it is reshaped and constructed in stories. Benjamin (ibid) argues that memory creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening from generation to generation; in this way it constitutes a shared remembering among generations through narrative stories.

According to Benjamin (1999c:247), to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it the way it really was. History is not the reflection of ‘realities’ but the construction of them in power relations: ‘even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious’. In other words, the victor can even make use of the dead who conceived him as the enemy and reshape the past to maintain his power and dominance; hence the importance of historical narratives in legitimizing and verifying constructed ‘realities’.

Benjamin, in a discussion of ‘dialectical images’, suggests there is a dialectical relationship between past and present (Roberts, 1982, Osborne 1994): neither the past nor the present can represent only themselves. The relationship between images of past and present works like the montage technique of cinema: montage creates a third meaning by the juxtaposition of two images, rather than fixing the meaning of each image. In this sense, past and present function as thesis and antithesis in Benjamin’s ‘dialectical images’. The dialectical image transforms both the past and the present (Evans 2000).

For Benjamin (1999c:245-246), ‘there is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one’. The selected images of the past are embedded in political and historical factors and “every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably”. In this respect, the images of the past are selected according to how they harmonize with the political and historical circumstances of the present. What Benjamin is pointing to is a politics of memory, for which the character of the present and the future is determined by its relations to a series of specific pasts (Osborne 1994:89). However, the meaning of ‘past’ and ‘present’ is the result of interpretation and construction; as Brandwein (1999:209)
argues, frameworks are knowledge systems that are historical products; and the past is itself the practice of past ‘experiences’ and struggles: no sharp break can occur between ‘now’ and ‘then’.

According to Foucault (1977c:156-158), the validity of 'truth' is changeable according to the historical period:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned…the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980 cited in Hall 1997:49).

Foucault argues that knowledge and power are related to each other and knowledge can make itself 'true' by using power. In consequence, truth is not outside of power (Esbenshade 1989: 87).

Foucault (1972:6) refuses the division of historical periods into continuous, stable and unified entities in memory, arguing that ‘the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering more and more discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favor of stable structures’. He rejects the approach that conceives historical events as recurrent because according to him, it is not possible to locate historical events as homogeneous and identical. His argument is that "events and their consequences are not arranged in the same way. They do not have the same incidence and cannot be described in the same way at both levels. On each of the two levels, a different history is being written" (ibid: 4-5). Thus history is not linear and constant; in each period, it is being rewritten according to the dominant discourse of that time. In this way the ‘past’, ‘present’ and their interrelationships are constructed by discourse to maintain its power and dominance: history is in the service of dominant discourses and functions to reinforce and reproduce the dominant discourses.

Subsequent studies on memory have conceived the past as a social construction that represents the problems and concerns of the present (Schwartz 1996). Accordingly, memory that is articulated by dominant discourses is always in process and actively shaping the past in the present for the future. As Faulkner (cited in Samuel 1994) points out, “[t]he past is not dead. It is not even past yet”. The past is not gone because it is embedded in the present (Tonkin, 1992). It is still living and is influencing political
decisions in the present. In Lowenthal’s formulation (1985:26), “the past as we know it is partly a product of the present; we continually reshape memory, rewrite history, re-fashion relics”.

History is an influential process of constructing narratives of the past (Nerone 1989; Roberts 2001). As the construction of the past, present and future, it represents what to remember and ‘forget’ (Roth 1989). Because it permanently constructs and is constructed by memory that is changing according to the different political, cultural and social contexts of the present, it should not be evaluated as a passive record or reflection of the past that is fixed, universal and objective. Politics, the primary field of struggle, is highly influential in the administration and control of history. In political practices, history provides the necessary background for maintaining the fixity of social formations according to the ideals of dominant discourse; it plays a crucial role in providing the necessary substructure to ‘fill’ the lack of closure of the social. Although the full closure of the social is not realizable and unachievable in any actual society, its need does not disappear: societies are organized and centred on the basis of such (impossible) ideas (Laclau cited in Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis 2000:8) and history plays a crucial role in providing the necessary conditions by presenting the past according to the uses of present political ideals and exigencies.

It should be noted that all political activities involve a historical argument and definition which are the foundation of the construction of the past and even the future. Without historical definition it is not possible to locate political domination (Popular Memory Group 1982). This is why Koonz (1994: 258) describes official history as being related to the ‘organized oblivion’ that imposes a single narrative that vindicates the leaders’. Official history can be used by ruling groups to prevent possible alternative narratives of the past and to maintain their dominance. Official history that includes symbols of tradition (i.e., a national anthem, flags), history textbooks, commemorative sites (i.e., museums, monuments) and organizations that promote historical knowledge legitimizes itself through the history canon that is supposed to be the distilled version of the past. However, the history canon always changes radically over time (Barber 1994:23), and there has never been a single historical canon. Since the cultures they capture are forever in flux, canons cannot be canonical (ibid: 28).

Within the scope of this research, history textbooks, commemorations (national days, museums, monuments) and symbols of tradition (flags, national anthems, myths, public rituals) are explored as the ‘mechanisms of memory’ which play a crucial role in
the dissemination of the official history constructed by ruling groups. According to Thelen (1989:1120), ‘memory begins when something in the present stimulates an association that might be recognition of the context of the thing or recall of an image or emotion’. Commemorations, symbols of tradition, and history textbooks are explored as sites of memory, as they stimulate associations for remembering the ‘past’ in parallel to the official history in the present. They enter into the everyday lives of social individuals and construct and reproduce their memories. These mechanisms (which are examined in detail in the next chapter) are constructed to fix the ‘past’ in parallel to the discourse of the ruling groups, in order to promote uniformity and stability for the continuation of the dominant discourse. As Collins (2004:10) notes, ‘memory can be a tool in the hands of presidents, corporations, and others who seek to extend their domination by fixing the meaning of the past’. According to Gregory (1999:13), ‘recollection and reworking of the past through social practices of memory bring the meanings of the ‘past’ to bear on conditions in the present’. Thus, mechanisms of memory function to reproduce the ‘past’ according to the conditions of the present. In this sense, in a study of memory, the important question is not how accurately a recollection fits a past ‘reality’, but why and how certain memories are constructed in particular ways at particular times (Thelen 1989:1125).

In answering this question one might consider the cultural and political circumstances that are embedded in the construction of the official history, which might be challenged by alternative narratives of the ‘past’ such as the ontological narratives of the social individuals. In this respect, oral history – the interviewing of eye-witness participants in the events of the ‘past’ for the purposes of historical reconstruction – is a significant political and historical resource for history (Perks & Thomson 1998: ix). Oral interviews could uncover the experiences that are hidden from the official history (Thompson 1998:25); oral history can thus be very useful in the formation of knowledge for historiography, which can be defined as the history of history-writing (Deloria 2004:6). Oral history interviews enable historians to recover and explore particular aspects of historical experience which are rarely recorded in documentary sources, such as personal relationships and domestic life (Thompson 1998:25).

Historiography raises critical questions such as “how do people use their pasts to perceive ideas about cultural and social difference?” and it requires us to think about epistemology – how we know what we know – in complex ways (Deloria 2004:6). It therefore plays an important role in the formation of critical thinking about history and
history writing. However, as Benjamin (1999b:87) argues, the storyteller takes what he tells from experience – his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. Thus the historiographer, as a storyteller, uses his or her experiences and interpretations while writing the history of history.

Both official history and historiography stem from memory and articulate and construct the ‘record’ kept by it. In this sense, the history teller narrates the happenings according to his or her interpretation; and historiography constitutes the creative matrix of the various epic forms. Hence it shapes and reworks epic writing (the story and the novel) that can absorb the course of events only through a comprehensive memory (Benjamin, 1999b). According to Wohlfarth (1981), historiography exists neither wholly inside nor entirely outside the spectrum of epic forms because it is contained within epic. Historiography cannot therefore be located as transcendental or neutral, and it is not possible to argue that the historiographer presents much more ‘objective’ picture of the ‘past’ to the people than the writer of the official history.

1.4 Section three: Memory in relation to identity

This section highlights the interrelationship between memory, identity and narrative. The aim is to understand the interrelationship between the discourses of memory and identity and to synthesize both concepts in order to explain how they are constructed and articulated in order to create, transform and reproduce each other. After examining the relationship between the two concepts, I explore the role of the narratives in the combination of identity and memory to form a connected whole. Thus ‘memory in relation to identity’ is considered as it is constructed in narratives; as Anderson notes (1991: 204), “identity, which because it cannot be ‘remembered’, must be narrated”.

Stories related to identity are examined as both ontological and public narratives. This focus provides a fuller account of the construction and articulation of memory in relation to identity in cultural and social contexts. Narrative memory is categorized as ontological and public here not for the purpose of locating a fixed polar division of memory, but to provide a better understanding of the communicative aspect of memory. At the end of this section, ‘memory in relation to identity’ is explored as a discursive and narrative action and as a political practice that is constantly articulated and constructed in historical and social contexts.
Identity that is a construction (Laclau 1994:1) is closely interrelated with memory discourse. There is a mutual relationship between identity and memory, as they partially fix each other: identity depends on memory (Davis and Starn 1989:4) and without memory, it is not possible to locate a coherent identity. In the meantime, identity fixes memory to verify itself; since without a ‘stable’ memory, it is impossible to locate a coherent identity. However, the fixity of both memory and identity is partial, temporal and open to new articulations as we are constantly reinterpreting and renegotiating our memories and identities (Fentress & Wickham 1992; Middleton & Edwards 1986, 1987, 1990). According to Lowenthal (1985:199), “[t]he frequency with which we update and interpret our memory weakens coherent temporal identity”. Thus one cannot talk about fixed and stable memories and identities, because complete structures and closures of discourses are unrealizable; they change and are re-interpreted and re-explained through articulations (Berger 1963, Bhabha 1990, Laclau & Mouffe 1985, Middleton & Edwards 1990).

However, the impossibility of an ultimate fixity of memory and identity implies that there have to be partial fixities; otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning” (Howarth, Norval and Stravrakakis 2000: 21, Laclau 1990). Hence, without partial closure and fixity, it is not possible to address the nature of discourses relating to memory and identity.

‘Memory in relation to identity’ can only exist through narratives that are shaped by certain discourses. As Somers and Gibson (1994:58-59) suggest, “it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities”. Without narratives, it is not possible to locate ‘memory in relation to identity’. When we listen to a narrative story, memory is always there (Fentress and Wickham 1992) and it constructs and is constructed by the narrative: the relationship between narrative and ‘memory in relation to identity’ is mutually constitutive.

In order to grasp the complex functioning of memory, it is useful to examine the identity as it is constructed through ontological and public narratives. Ontological narratives provide a useful insight into autobiographical memories that are mainly related to the narratives of the subject. ‘Autobiographical memory is the memory for information related to the self” (Brewer 1986:26): these memories are acquired through a complex interrelationship between ontological and public narratives. On the other hand, public
narratives are attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single social individual like society, nation and family (Roberts 2001, Calhoun 1994). In this sense, while ontological narratives appear to be ‘interior’ because they are related to the narratives of the subject, public narratives seem to be ‘exterior’ because they are connected to cultural and institutional frameworks. However, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest (1985:111), “neither a total interiority nor a total exteriority is possible” because they are interrelated and they complete and transform each other.

In “Sources of the Self” (1989), Charles Taylor develops an important insight into ontological accounts (ontological narratives) and webs of interlocution (public narratives). Ontological narratives are used to define who we are (Somers and Gibson 1994:61). When we define ourselves, our identities are constructed through narratives, so ‘our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us and what is not’ (Taylor 1989:30). Hence, ‘no matter how much it feels like a discovery, both self identity and self knowledge are always constructions’ (Calhoun 1994:10) that form and are formed through narratives.

Our definition of who we are relies considerably on our autobiographical memory, which is the memory of those events that we ourselves ‘experience’ (Olick and Robbins, 1998:111), and we construct information related to ourselves out of this experience. Ontological narratives process these events into episodes (Calhoun 1994:59). Thus, our self-understanding incorporates narrative (Taylor 1989): the ‘events’ that we ‘experience’ are always embedded in and occur through narrative frames. There is therefore no primal, unmediated experience that can be recovered (Olick and Robbins 1998:110): we ‘experience’ the world because we understand and interpret it in certain ways, not vice versa” (Bakhursts & Sypnowich 1995 and Bruner 1989:19).

Similarly, we ‘experience’ events in certain ways as we remember, forget and narrate them accordingly. In his essay on ‘The image of Proust’, Benjamin (1999a:198) analyses the distinction between ‘experienced event’ and ‘remembered event’: although the experienced event is finite, the remembering event is not. The experienced event is confined to one sphere of experience in a specific time and place, whereas the remembering event is influential both before and after the event, as it is the weaving of memory. The way we remember the event is constructed by our memories, which are articulated by certain discourses. Hence our interpretations of an event are not the outcome of our ‘experiences’ but of a remembering that is embedded in social and cultural constraints. Thus, although autobiographical memories are mostly conceived as
the reflections of ‘personal’ and ‘private’ experiences, they are social and interpersonal. ‘Experience’ is the interpretation that is caused by inter-subjective exchange with others and embedded in social relations. As Thelen (1989:1122) points out, “people depend on others to help them decide which experiences to forget and which to remember and what interpretation to place on an experience. People develop a shared identity by identifying, exploring and agreeing on memories”.

According to the Popular Memory Group (1982), the authors of ontological narratives are social individuals who speak out of particular positions in the complex of social relations characteristic of particular societies in particular historical times. However, not only societies, but also other social formations and institutions such as families, nations, communities and media, play a crucial role in the construction and articulation of ontological narratives. The narratives of these social frameworks can be called public narratives because they are related to social and institutional formations that are larger than the single individual (Roberts 2001, Calhoun 1994). In this respect, it is not possible to locate ontological narratives as independent of public narratives. Our identities exist only within public narratives because one cannot form an identity on one’s own; identity can only be described with reference to those who surround it. From this perspective, ontological and public narratives look like different sides of the same coin; although they represent a different side, they complete each other and compose a single identity. However, this does not mean that memories specific to the social individual do not exist. Autobiographical memories that consist of those events that we ourselves experience are peculiar to us as individuals. Thus, although public narratives that encompass the narratives of families, connections, school education, official history (i.e history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) and media influence how we interpret the events that we experience alone, they can be defined as our public memories as they are mediated through the public narratives.

Moral values and beliefs also play a role in the articulation of identity that is constructed through the interrelationship between public and ontological narratives. Oyserman and Markus (1998:107) note that, ‘[a] cultural group’s shared ideas about “how to be” are reflected in culturally significant stories, sacred texts, proverbs, icons, and institutions, as well as lived in the everyday practices such as language, schooling, media, religious and workplace. According to Taylor (1989), to know who we are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good and bad, what has importance and what is trivial. The moral space is located within public
narratives that are the sources of our identity; moral values and beliefs function like the cement which fixes and constructs the structure. And without partial fixity, one cannot talk about the existence of the structure that forms the identity.

The dominant public memory of identity represents temporal fixity; it is connected with dominant institutions and is supported by public narratives that construct moral values and beliefs within a specific time period. Moral values and beliefs are effectively used by the dominant public memory for the continuation of its power. In this respect, as Foucault (cited in Clifford 2001) argues, ‘counter-memory’ liberates us from a particular mode of subjectivity, as it consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter memory. In this way, ‘counter-memory might evoke symbolic struggles over the meaning of events’ (Fowler 2005: 60).

Dominant discourses play a crucial role in the process of turning cultural and social practices into identities: identity is not natural, but historical and political. According to Gregory (1999:13), the social construction of identity or the ‘fixing’ of racialized, gendered, and other subject positions within a given social order is not only political, it is also the precondition of politics. Identity is constructed by politics to support and undermine particular relationships. As Leed (cited in Gillis 1994:4) points out, identities imply and mask a particular social relationship that is constructed and sustained through social and cultural practices constructed in power relations. In Foucault’s terms, there is no recourse to objective laws and no recourse to pure subjectivity. There are only the cultural practices which have made us what we are. To know what that is, we have to understand the history of the present and that politics is immanent in it (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). Cultural and social practices are thus the main source of our memory in relation to identity, which is constructed and articulated through political discourses formed under historical constraints. Without a structured identity, the field of politics would be indefinite and uncertain (Gregory 1999) as the construction of identity provides politics a means for retaining its control. From this perspective, in the next chapter, I examine memory in its relation to national identity and politics, exploring the ways in which ruling groups use the mechanisms of memory (symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks and media) to mobilize memories in the service of concepts of national identity that are parallel to their discourses.
CHAPTER 2: SYMBIOSIS- MECHANISMS OF MEMORY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter develops and expands the theoretical discussions of Chapter 1, focusing on the function of the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation and construction of national identity.

In the first section, on ‘articulation of memory in relation to national identity in the socialization processes’, I explore the role of dominant/alternative public and autobiographical narratives in the articulation of national identity during the socialization processes. Some narratives can be interpreted as dominant and others as alternative public narratives in the context of changing power relations. The focus of the second section is primarily on the mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity. However, it should be noted that national identity is worked out through the socialization processes; the separation of these two sections is only reasonable on the basis of an analytical purpose, which is to facilitate the examination of the function of the mechanisms of memory in different aspects. In the third section on ‘mediating mechanisms: sites of memory as a single body’, my aim is to explore how the mechanisms of memory work together like a single body to mobilize and articulate memories in relation to national identity.

2.2 Section one: Articulation of memory in relation to national identity in the socialization process

Memories in relation to national identity are articulated through communication and mediation, starting from childhood. According to Hermes (1999:71), ‘identity construction needs to be understood as a process of meaning making whereby individual identities are formed as a result of social interaction based on or making use of cultural sources of meaning production’. In this respect, the national identities of social individuals are constructed in many ways, which include the webs of social relations such as family and connections (Gillis 1994:35), official history that encompasses history
textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, public rituals, myths, national anthems) and commemorations (national days, museums, monuments), organizations that promote historical knowledge, media and compulsory and standardized public mass education systems through which state authorities hope to inculcate the social individuals with national devotion (Smith 1993:16-17).

Definitions of national identity provide the community with a sense of who belongs and who is differentiated, what is the norm and who is the ‘other’ (Price 1995:42). According to Connolly (1991:64-65), an identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not be possible for any identity to exist in its distinctiveness and solidity. Differences in race, language, religion, geographical location, cultural and historical background are generally represented as natural factors in the formation of a nation or a national identity; however, these are not natural, but historical (Wertsch 2002:68). “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (Connolly 1991: 64). Therefore the discourse of national identity is inevitably based on the assumption of the ‘other’. In the most general sense, the ‘other’ can be characterized as any person, group, or institution which is placed outside the system of normality or convention to which one belongs oneself (Goring, Hawthorn and Mitchell 2001). As Hall (1996:5) suggests, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, and to render ‘outside’, abjected. Paez, Taboada, Arrospide, Insua, Ayestaran (1998:228) note that groups in general view themselves as superior in comparison to other groups on the basis of those attributes which define them or which are typical of them, and tend to perceive outgroups as less variable or more homogeneous. In this way, the concept of national identity is reinforced by creating “imagined” friends and foes that construct the differentiation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Salecl 1994, Schlesinger 1999, Woodward 1997). Salecl (1994:211) comments:

As with all nationalisms, national identification with the nation (‘our kind’) is based on the fantasy of the enemy: an alien which has insinuated itself into our society and constantly threatens us with habits, rituals – indeed discourses – that are not of ‘our kind’. No matter what this other ‘does’, it threatens us with its existence.
Thus, the others are represented and narrated with negative terms and feelings. However, in the meantime, our feelings towards the ‘others’ are generally reinforced with the representations and narrations of negative feelings and attitudes of ‘others’ towards ‘us’. The ‘otherness’ in relation to national identity is supported through discourses on familiarity, security and unity that form the basis of nationalistic values and beliefs. Each discourse is like a different piece that completes the same puzzle; without the ‘other’ it is not possible to locate these discourses, because in order to feel the necessity of familiarity, security and unity, there should be an existing or potential threat. According to Morley (2000:4),

> There is a mutually dependent process of exclusion and identity construction, in relation to the domestic home, the neighbourhood and the nation as spaces of belonging. The other is continuously a threat to the integrity of those who share a common national identity and home.

National identity connects social individuals to the community or nation with a shared memory; and it is located in public narratives, as nobody can have a private national identity. As noted in Chapter 1, public narratives encompass the narratives of families, connections, school education, official history (i.e., history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition) and the media.

In the domestic environment, family narratives play the primary role in the construction of memories in relation to national identity. Fairbrother (2003:21-22) explains: ‘parents try to intentionally teach particular political attitudes’. Thus, family has an important role in inculcating basic political attachments, attitudes and loyalties such as patriotism. Family memories are internalized in a way that influences autobiographical memories (the memories of those events that we ourselves experience) and decisions of social individuals in their everyday lives. Hence, our ‘experiences’ that constitute our autobiographical memories are constructed and shaped in the social context of everyday life which is partly cultivated in the most private fields such as family and home. As Killoran (1998:167) notes, “a national identity constructed through the body as memory works to connect individuals to the imagined community by exploiting their sense of self located in the private realm of the home; family and the body”. However, families might provide alternative narratives opposing the dominant discourse that supports the nation. In these circumstances, the ideas of children might be articulated in parallel with the family narratives. Children are also unintentionally exposed to political education; youth can
sense their parents’ political attitudes from family discussions and their parents’ own political involvement’. As a result, as Gordon (2007:233-234) suggests, ‘family discourse can socialize children into the political beliefs of their parents. This situation reproduces political values and behaviours across generations of the same family. Hence, an individual’s political identity is a part of their family’s identity’.

In addition to families, schools as public spaces play a central role in the construction of national identity in modern-states (Danahay 1996:3). Fairbrother (2003:22) explains that schools teach or promote particular political values and attitudes. They influence students’ political attitudes by conveying knowledge through the curriculum and textbooks. Thus, courses such as citizenship education, national history and geography, national language and literature play a crucial role in transmitting knowledge about the nation and the political system. Schools might also prescribe attitudes through children’s participation in extracurricular and ritual activities such as ceremonies and the celebration of national days in schools. These activities that take place at school reinforce positive attitudes toward the nation. Some schools display the national flag, pictures and sayings of national heroes and leaders. Activities such as the raising of the flag, ceremonies, singing national anthem and patriotic songs emphasize the public nature of patriotism. The influence of teachers is also important in the construction of the political attitudes of students, as they may serve to reinforce the messages of the curriculum and extracurricular activities. However, they also have the potential to undercut the school’s intended socialization efforts if their political views are against the status quo (ibid: 23).

The media are another institution that plays a crucial role in the construction of memories in relation to national identity in the socialization process (Martinelli 2005). According to Cardiff and Scannell (1987:162), the press and broadcasting have replaced older institutions such as the school in linking individuals to an increasingly corporate, public and national process, as they are placed in close association with the centres of political, economic and cultural power and authority. The media therefore play a crucial role in the mobilization of the ideas of people in parallel with the dominant discourses in a society. As Uchida (1999:207) points out, ‘media have the power to influence and change the modes of thought and perception’. However, the media might use their power to disseminate alternative narratives that are against the dominant discourses.

In addition to the media, official history that encompasses the history textbooks, commemorations (national days, museums, and monuments) and symbols of
tradition (flags, public rituals, myths and national anthems) plays a substantial part in the socialization into national identity. History textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media that are explored as mechanisms of memory within the scope of this research construct the way social individuals remember and forget the ‘past’ in relation to national identity. Media, in the form of new twentieth-century technologies of narration (Tomasulo cited in Hoskins 2001) play an important role in the representation of the other mechanisms as well; however, although the mechanisms of history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations are produced directly by the ruling groups, it is not always possible to talk about an organic relationship between media institutions and the ruling groups.

Public narratives, including those of history textbooks, traditions, media, commemorations, family and school, are interrelated and they influence each other’s functions. As Fairbrother (2003:22) suggests, ‘the family for example, may exercise control over children’s exposure to the mass medium of television, which may be used by the state or other economic or political interests to convey particular political viewpoints’. Furthermore, school education may be the primary factor in constructing the ideas of children about the ‘past’, through history textbooks and ritual activities in schools such as the celebration of national days and commemoration of national heroes.

The mechanisms play a substantial part in the constitution of the moral conscience, which is necessary for the construction of a nation through the mobilization of people’s emotions and ideas regarding their national identities. As Renan (1990:20) states, ‘man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the direction taken by mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation’. However, this does not mean that national identities are fixed and stable. Mechanisms of memory constantly articulate national identity through its representations and narratives. In Hall’s (1996) terms, national identities are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation. Every statement or practice of identity changes our relationship to who we are. Thus, there is no definite way to specify who we are. When we talk or practice identity, we change or construct it (Handler 1994:30). Hence, narrative stories have a transformative dynamic, not only for the teller but also for the listener. In this respect, the narratives of the mechanisms of memory also transform the way individuals remember their own past (Trigeorgis 1998). Through these narratives, the mechanisms of memory provide the constant repetition that is necessary for the construction and re-construction
of national identity. And as Bellah (cited in Kitch 2005:4) points out, repetition plays a crucial role in the construction of social identity by the narratives because in order not to forget its past, a social group must retell its story, its constitutive narrative”.

The narratives of the mechanisms of memory have the ultimate role of articulating dominant public memory of the past, because when communication takes place the memory is carried a stage further – through its articulation (Fentress and Wickham 1992). Without communication and mediation, it is not possible to locate the memory of a ‘common past’ because an agreed version of the past can only be established by communication, and not by ‘private’ remembrance (Fentress and Wickham, 1992, Lowenthal, 1985). The articulation of the dominant memory of the past plays a crucial role in the construction of national identity because remembering the past is essential for our sense of national identity. As Lowenthal notes (1985:197), “to know what we were confirms who we are”.

In this sense, it is possible to talk about the role of the mechanisms of memory in the transformation of autobiographical memories into public memories. As Lowenthal (ibid: 196) puts it, ‘we need other people’s memories to confirm our own and to give them endurance. Sharing and validating memories sharpens them and promotes their recall’; memories produced and narrated by the mechanisms of memory may play a crucial role in legitimating and confirming our autobiographical memories, because the mechanisms of memory narrate the memories of the ‘public’ to us and thus construct our experiences. However, the confirmation of our individual memories occurs when they are consistent with public memories; thus, in the case of our autobiographical memories being inconsistent with public memories, they might lose their certainty and trustworthiness. In other words, autobiographical memories – the memories of those events that we ‘experience’ privately – might be forgotten after a period of time as there is no possibility of their repetition or/and mobilization by the public narratives. As Lowenthal argues (ibid), ‘events we alone know about are less certainly, less easily evoked’; so in the process of articulation, autobiographical memories may be revised to fit the past that is represented as publicly remembered, as they gradually lose their peculiarity. The past represented as publicly remembered may then become more dominant in the memories of social individuals. Similarly, the mechanisms of memory play a significant role in the transformation of ‘public memory’ into ‘dominant public memory’, because public memory can only be dominant through its pervasiveness, which is made possible by the mechanisms. The domination and pervasiveness of public
memory depend largely on the selective representation of the mechanisms, through which public memory is repeated and articulated; this is necessary for the emergence of a ‘dominant public memory’. The role of the mechanisms of memory in the construction and articulation of ‘dominant public memory’ is therefore primal.

‘Dominant public memory’ is formed in a complex relationship between mechanisms of memory and society. The mechanisms serve society/culture by constructing the ‘dominant public memory’, which is necessary for the partial closure of any society/culture. According to Stuart Hall (1980:134), ‘any society/culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its classification of the social, cultural and political world. These constitute a dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor uncontested’. In other words, partial closure is the precondition of every society/culture, as it constitutes and is constituted by political, social and cultural conditions. However, neither society/culture nor political, cultural and social conditions are fixed and stable.

Hall (1980) uses the term ‘dominant’ to explain that there exists a pattern of preferred meanings that are embedded in the institutional and political order. However, he emphasizes that the dominant cultural order is the outcome of a partial fixity that is always open to contestation. In his view, ‘dominant does not mean determined because it is always possible to decode an event within more than one “mapping”’ (ibid.). ‘Mapping’ provides a kind of liberty as social individuals choose which direction they want to follow in certain frameworks, but in the meantime it represents the boundaries and structural constraints, as there are pre-existed directions to be followed.

Hall’s arguments raise important questions regarding the interpretation of texts by the social individuals. His encoding/decoding model was central to the birth and development of the reception paradigm that emerged from within cultural studies (Corner 1996, Alasuutari 1999b, Stevenson 2002). However, according to Alasuutari (ibid: 2-4), Hall’s model is a way of explaining only certain societal and cultural frameworks in which texts are embedded. Thus this encoding/decoding model lacks the approach of the production process of texts. In addition, Hall focuses more on the psychological aspects of the interpretation of messages in his arguments about decoding (ibid: 3-14). Meanings are produced in social formations such as family, nation and community and individuals interpret the texts by using social and cultural codes constructed and articulated in these formations. It is therefore an oversimplification to evaluate the interpretations of the social individuals merely on the basis of cognitive and psychological reasons. As Ang (1996:142) suggests, what a critical ethnography of reception needs to discover is the
unrecognized, unconscious and contradictory effectiveness of hegemony and the relations of power that are inscribed within the very texture of media reception practices. Ang points to the importance of the historical, political, cultural and social contexts that are shaped by the power relations in audience interpretations and uses of media texts and technologies.

Although Hall’s encoding/decoding model is criticised because of his lack of focus on the social and cultural factors regarding the interpretation of agencies, the criticisms of his psychological and cognitive evaluations relating to interpretation provide important openings for the consideration of the interpretation as the product of social and cultural circumstances. His encoding/decoding model also forms the basis of concepts like resistance (Alasuutari 1999b:4-6) and negotiation. As Ang notes (1996:139), Hall’s encoding/decoding model opened up the space to examine the ways in which the media’s preferred meanings could be ‘negotiated’ or even occasionally subverted in audience readings.

The issues of remembering and forgetting are closely related to the negotiated readings of the audiences. Hence the examination of the influences of dominant/alternative public narratives on memory is a complex issue, because each of us remembers and forgets by using differing social and cultural codes; as a result of this process, there may be correlations and discrepancies between public memories partly mediated through mechanisms and the autobiographical memories of individuals, because, as Nerone (1989:91) suggests, ‘narratives can be interpreted by social individuals in different manners’. Thus, it is not possible to talk about a ‘collective memory of the past’ that is constructed by the mechanisms and absorbed by each member of a social group. In Friedman’s (1992:853) terms, ‘the past is always practiced in the present, not because the past imposes itself, but because subjects in the present, fashion the past in the practice of their social identity’.

The concepts of ‘negotiation’ and ‘resistance’ provide the possibility of encompassing the complicated ways of understanding the position of the social individuals. ‘Resistance’ is a substantial departure relating to the position of ‘agencies’ in the interpretation and consumption of texts in their everyday lives. In his research on children in schools, Spyrou (2006:131) describes how children did not absorb messages without reinterpreting them; they constructed and reworked meanings in ways that made sense to them. Spyrou (ibid) continues:
I have seen children on a number of occasions resisting – sometimes subtly, sometimes more directly – what the teacher said by bringing alternative knowledge into the classroom such as knowledge from parents, grandparents, the mass media or their own experiences which contradicted the official nationalistic discourse of the curriculum. Thus, children make sense in an active way, not by passively internalizing what is out there. In this way, they contribute to cultural production that is the production of new meanings and understandings by combining and recombining what they know in ways that make sense to them.

In an article entitled ‘Bombs, Bikinis and the Popes of Rock ‘N’ Roll’, Maddox (2001:276-279) describes three different events as examples of resistance in the affairs of

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1 The first event is narrated by Maddox (2001:276) as follows: “One summer morning in 1983, a garbageman in Aracena happened across a peculiar-looking box that had been deposited in the trash bin in front of the branch office of a national bank. The day before, a terrorist bomb had devastated another office of this bank in the Basque country, and the incident had been extensively reported on the television news. The trashman poked the box anxiously a few times and decided to call for the municipal police to investigate. As he waited, a group of about twenty people gathered and began to tease the increasingly embarrassed garbageman. Most of the jokes were about the unlikelihood of Aracena as a terrorist target. But despite the joking, when a police officer arrived on the scene, the crowd spontaneously backed up twenty feet or so, a distance that would have done little to protect them from the effects of an explosion.”

According to Maddox (ibid:279), “In the case of the imaginary bomb, it was not Basque terrorists but televised images of carnage and destruction that penetrated the community. These images, though fleeting and commonplace, were sufficiently strong to induce a state of nervousness that led to the anxious and startled reactions to the threat of the bomb, despite almost everyone’s conscious estimation that a terrorist act in Aracena was extremely unlikely.”

The second event that Maddox (ibid:277) describes is about a mother who had been widowed ten months earlier: “Despite the fact that she and her husband had been estranged for several years, she had been strict about observing the long period of mourning and confinement that local custom required. Recently, she had even refused to indulge in her great passion for bullfights, choosing not to attend the corrida celebrated in association with Aracena’s annual fair. However, she had persuaded her future son-in-law to make a home movie of the event, which she had watched in the privacy of her house; and in return for this favor, she had promised him that she would bring her period of seclusion to an end. When the moment of truth arrived, however, she dressed from head to toe in traditional black as she had been for months, declared that she was not going anywhere, because, as she said people would certainly talk. However, her son in law declared that he had a marvelous solution to the problem that would surely silence wagging tongues and still permit his mother in law to enjoy. With this statement, he reached into a bag that he had been carrying and pulled out a bikini bathing suit. As he stressed, the bikini was black and therefore was totally appropriate for the occasion. Even his mother smiled at this mock concession to tradition, she was more or less carted off to the beach. Nevertheless, once there, she kept on her mourning garb and also remained firmly tucked inside the car, saying that she preferred to stay there in her house.”

Maddox (ibid:279) argues that in the case of the black bikini, the home movie of the bullfight undermined the distinction between domestic and public domains, and the reference to it, as well as the sudden materialization of the black bikini itself, subverted the significance and coherence of traditional mourning customs.

The last incident that Maddox (ibid:278) describes is the concert of a nationally famous rock band in Aracena: “Most young people enthusiastically welcomed the concert. For weeks afterward, it seemed that every bar with a youthful clientele was constantly blaring the band’s songs into the streets – much to the annoyance of many of the town’s older inhabitants, who were almost equally vocal in expressing their disapproval of the whole affair. Antonio Vargas, a man whose opinions were consistent with those of his neighbours, was also enraged that the Socialist town council had officially sanctioned the concert. One of his more colorful speeches went like this: That is what happens in this so-called democracy. It is an abuse, and the fault is with the parents, the teachers, and the sons of whores on the town council... But let me tell you, better the Pope than these degenerates with respect for nothing.” Maddox (ibid:279) states that the local appearance of the popes of rock ‘n’ roll transformed a conventional folk fiesta into a performance of modernity and in so doing introduced a cleavage both within the community and within the ordinarily largely undifferentiated category of “popular culture”. Thus the ‘free’ flow of information – a phenomenon
daily life. In giving three different incidents as examples, Maddox (2001) emphasizes the importance of the comparative analysis of resistance which, he argues, enables us to observe particular forms of resistance, and which helps us to understand better why the strengths of one form of opposition and resistance are the weaknesses of another.

Maddox (ibid: 279) suggests that each of the incidents involved a sort of transgression of boundaries – of the body, the home, or the community – by a dominant power. He describes the public narratives and the representations of the media as being encompassed by the dominant power, and the re-articulation and re-construction of social, local and traditional values through the penetration of the dominant power into the domestic and public fields of everyday life such as body, home and community. The penetration can be realized through a news story, a home movie or a public concert. He also analyses the people’s different responses, interpretations and reactions to the experiences of penetration, transgression and violation; some responses might be strong, defiant or weak.

According to Maddox (ibid: 280) each incident can be interpreted as ‘resistance’ because “it reaffirmed local values in a way that opposed them to dominant tendencies in the larger society”. In his view there are two crucial matters that should be considered in the analysis of resistance. First, the motivations and modes of interpretation of people involved in a particular statement or act should be observed immediately, because it will be subjected to constant articulation and changes of interpretation. Secondly, it is necessary to examine and make some critical judgements about the extent to which the act or statement represents a way in which “difference” is incorporated within dominant tendencies. Without difference, it is not possible to locate resistance that causes the articulation and change of dominant tendencies. According to Maddox (2001), dominant regimes always allow some more or less limited forms of opposition and diversity. Thus, the existence of dominance arouses resistance and enables the individuals to negotiate meaning. However, as Gupta and Ferguson (2001:19) argue, ‘as a form of experience, the effects of resistance may be transformative. But it may equally result in contributing to maintaining the status quo’.

The term ‘negotiation’ further implies the process of discussion for an ‘agreement’ over the meaning of texts. However, to reach an agreement does not always mean to possess a definite and fixed conception of meaning. On the contrary, it is mostly related to
ambiguity, confusion, questioning and contradiction because the partial fixity of ‘agreement’ carries with it its possible oppositions. The debates on ‘negotiation’, ‘contestation’ or ‘resistance’ should not be conceived as the claim of the complete freedom or autonomy of the agencies in their choices, decisions, thoughts and beliefs about any issue; they refer to the dynamic interpretation of meaning by agencies, the ‘negotiations subjects’ (Ang 1996). The agencies are constrained by the web of relationships and structures which constitute them as social subjects (Ang 1996: 41). Therefore, the interpretations of social individuals should be evaluated by a consideration of societal and cultural circumstances that individuals pass through. Cultural factors play a major role in the constant articulation of narratives, as they cause the dynamic negotiation and contestation of meaning. As Ang (ibid: 2) suggests, ‘cultural pervades everyday life and... cultural meanings are not only constructed, but also subject to a constant contestation’. This situation prevents the permanent fixity of memories in relation to the national identity of the social individuals.

2. 3 Section two: Mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity

In ‘modern society’, the political character of memory functions for the purpose of maintenance of the modern nation-state (Uchida 1999:205) through the formation of symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks and media – the areas that are explored as the mechanisms of memory in this research. These mechanisms compose the backbone of the modern nation-state by reproducing national identity. Without them, the system of the nation-state cannot function properly. However, it is also possible to talk about the alternative narrations of history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media that produce and are produced by conflicting discourses about national and political issues.

The role of each mechanism in the mobilization and articulation of memories in relation to national identity is examined below. Although the mechanisms are examined under different subheadings, this does not mean that the function of each mechanism is independent from another. On the contrary, they are interconnected and complete each other. The purpose of their division under subheadings is not to emphasize the independence of the mechanisms from each other, but to create an opportunity to examine the theoretical framework of media, commemorations, symbols of tradition and history textbooks more clearly.
2.3.1 History textbooks

The nation, which is the product of narration, is legitimated and naturalized by history (Bhabba 1990, Anderson 1991). Official history that is disseminated by the ruling groups plays an essential role in the empowerment and reinforcement of the national identities as political discourses. One of the primary sources of official history is history textbooks. According to Kook (2002:109), “the process of writing the past, in the formal framework of history books, is perhaps the most direct way of constructing a national memory”. It is largely in this way that “textbooks convey the official or approved knowledge that the state aspires to transmit to the next generation” (Podeh 2002:8).

Schools and universities play the primary role in transmitting the ‘past’ that is constructed by the ruling groups, through history textbooks. As Hein and Selden (2000:3) suggest, “schools and textbooks are important vehicles through which contemporary societies transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and the promised future of the community”. In this sense, one can argue that history textbooks articulate the memories of the past in relation to national identity and shed light on the future. Therefore, as Soysal and Schissler (2005:2) suggest, “teaching history has been a priority for modern nation-states, since it carries the burden of the identity-building of citizens”.

Although textbooks pretend to teach neutral and legitimate knowledge, they are often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and naturalize an established political and social order (Podeh 2002). As Foster and Crawford (2006) suggest, history textbooks involve narratives and stories that nation states choose to tell about themselves and their relationships with other nations. “History textbooks bring certain events and set interpretations of these events to the process of remembrance” (Canefe 2004:92) and make them be conceived as lived ‘realities’. The textbook version of the past is rendered undeniable, infallible and future proof, because the language use in textbooks leaves no room for discussion or questioning (Stojanovic 2004:338). This situation legitimizes and naturalizes the ways in which the ‘information’ in the history textbooks is conceived as unquestioned realities.

This legitimization process can only function through the limitation of the creativity and imagination of the social individuals. However, the limitation does not involve any kind of pressure or compulsion. It works insidiously through the internalization of the political discourse. According to Kaes (1990 cited in Baer 2001:493), history is recreated in conventionalized fictional and nostalgic forms and
colonizes the individuals’ historical imagination instead of stimulating and liberating it. In this sense, history textbooks, which are the primary vehicles of historical ‘information’, limit the ‘liberation’ of the social individuals by presenting a sense of ‘reality’ about the ‘past’ which is in parallel to the political discourse of nation-state.

Emphasizing certain aspects of a nation’s history determines the identity of that nation (Kook 2002:109). Writing and rewriting history is therefore crucial. This is why public debates especially take place around new history textbooks. The fundamental issue in these debates is generally that of who is included in the nation’s history, and who is excluded. Controversies over textbook content often break out when prevailing domestic assumptions about national unity are challenged and when international relations change rapidly. People fight over textbook content because education is so obviously about the future, reaches so deeply into society and is directed by the state.

2.3.2 Symbols of Tradition (flags, myths, public rituals and national anthems)

Traditions give people a sense of continuity with what are believed to be precedents (Linstroth 2002). In the commonsense understanding, traditions are accepted as the ‘wisdom’ of generations. Accordingly, they are seen as the outcome of experience and knowledge that is developed and accumulated through generations and sheds light on the present and the future; traditions are generally represented as guides to be followed. This understanding justifies and naturalizes the present way of life, since it gives it a sense of continuity: traditions provide ready building-blocks (Sztompka 1993:64) for justifying the national identity. One justification is to invoke the early source or the author of some doctrine or creed; for example, “the Bible says so”, “Aristotle claimed that”, etc. (ibid). In a similar vein, it is possible to talk about the importance of the sayings of charismatic political leaders in the reproduction of national identities. Traditions may also provide blueprints for action and shed light on the idea of how to be: they produce role models to be emulated, such as heroes and leaders.

Traditions enter into the lives of social individuals through social practices and they are embedded in their behaviors. They provide persuasive symbols of ‘identity’, loyalties to nations, communities and groups and strengthen rootedness. Anthems, flags, mythology and public rituals are the primary symbols of national traditions (Sztompka 1993:65). These symbols, within the scope of this research, are explored as the mechanisms that play a crucial role in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation,
construction and reproduction of national identities. Recalling common heritage and cultural kinship, they provide a sense of continuity and belonging; as Smith (1993:16-17) suggests, traditions are the repertoires provided by the nations to provide a social bond between the individuals. With increased social attachment between individuals, the nation becomes a ‘faith-achievement’ group, able to surmount hardships; thus the state promotes rituals such as flag-raising ceremonies (Fairbrother 2003:21) and singing national anthems.

Flags, employed to identify groups and territories, are used to differentiate communities from each other and to visualize the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Elgenius 2007: 26). According to Amienyi (2005:42), “national flags function as the representations of a country’s history, culture, geography and sometimes hope for the future. The symbols, colours and shapes of each flag tell a different story about a nation and its people”. However, most flags are used to legitimize sovereignty and to illustrate distinctiveness. Moreover, “national flags become an instrument of political action and symbols of ‘independence’, ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’. They are available to all citizens and not exclusively to a small privileged group, or on special occasions” (Elgenius 2007:26), so they represent the unity of a nation in terms of a common heritage, cultural and historical kinship and the sense of comfort and belonging. According to Post and George (2004:163), “especially under stress, we cling more tightly to these symbols of our national, racial, ethnic or religious identity that have become psychologically incorporated as part of our self-concept. Thus, those who oppose the nation or desecrate the flag may threaten one’s sense of self”.

However, flags might also represent the divisiveness and oppressive policies of a ruling majority (Amienyi 2005:42) depending on the conceptions of different political groups in a society. As Kolsto (2006:679) points out, symbols that are rooted in a cultural past will more often than not be more divisive than unifying since different political groups often hark back to different pasts. Flags can communicate joy, sorrow, courage and bravery (Amienyi 2005:42); their interpretations can change according to ideas about the nation and its past. Furthermore, they can be subject to modification according to changing national goals or the means of achieving these altered goals (Elgenius 2007:26).

Flags can also be used as peaceful, banal and even childish displays (Eriksen 2007:11). In his book ‘Banal Nationalism’, Billig (1995:8) makes a distinction between waved and unwaved flags. According to him, the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not the flag which is being consciously waved with great passion but the flag hanging
unnoticed on a public building. The unwaved flag, which is so forgettable, is at least as important as the memorable moments of flag waving (ibid: 10) because it becomes a part of our everyday lives as we see it regularly in our streets, public buildings and institutions. In this way, living with unwaved flags without even noticing them becomes a habit. And habits are powerful, as they transform into internalized attitudes about our identities. As Billig argues, an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life, which include thinking and using language (ibid: 8).

Like flags, national anthems as symbols of tradition are potent stimuli for national identification. However, they have the potential to generate strong feelings of patriotism as they express the feelings of pride in one’s country, especially on appropriate occasions (Llobera 2005:36) such as national days. They are thus particularly relevant as carriers of national sentiments. As Amienyi (2005:44) notes, ‘every country has patriotic hymns and they express people’s love for their country. Most of them are composed in times of war or revolution to express hope, salvation or future expectations’. Both flags and national anthems are produced to mobilize the emotions of sense of belonging to a common heritage, nationality and historical and cultural background; they also operate as social practices in the everyday lives of the social individuals. Cerulo (1995:17) argues that just as anthems bind via performance, flags unify via usage. While national anthems unite citizens every time they are performed in patriotic communion, flag displays can link citizens in common adoration to the nation. In many nations, school children pledge their allegiance to the flag before starting the day’s activities. Similarly adults often join in such pledges during festivals and public meetings. No matter the task in which individuals are engaged, the raising of the flag halts all activity. In this way, flags make the community focus on a tangible expression of their collective self.

National traditions can best be seen as myths (Holy 1996:84) that are produced by nations in order to create, substantiate, and preserve national identity (Geraghty 2007:56). Holy (1996:84) explains that ‘a typical mythical narrative is a sequence of images which in their totality convey the meaning of the myth, a tradition condenses the narrative into a single simple and unambiguously meaningful image. What it shares with myth is that the truth of the meaning conveyed is taken as a dogma whether or not it corresponds to experienced reality’. In this way, myths present unquestionable ‘realities’ that in fact cannot be proved or disproved. According to Barton and Bowden (2005:129), a national myth is often the tradition of a small group which has been generalized and extended to cover the whole nation. As Geraghty (2007:56) notes, ‘myth serves as a mode
of national identity-making; a shared history common to those who have the power becomes myth when used to create a sense of ‘collective’ cultural capital’.

According to Sztompka (1993:64), traditions provide the selection of the fragments of the entire historical heritage that are found worthwhile. They thus serve to provide the fragments from the ‘past’ that are suitable to the conditions of the present. In this way, the past is constituted and constructed according to the uses of the present (Fentress and Wickham, 1992). Thelen (1989:1117) notes that cultures establish traditions from the past to guide the conduct of their members in the present. In this way, traditions function like a bridge between the ‘past’ and ‘present’. They sometimes prevent conflicts and struggles by presenting a ‘happier past’ that should be followed in present and even in the future. As they remove ambiguities and conflicts and seem like the best path to follow, traditions provide escape from the dissatisfaction and frustrations of life. The tradition of a ‘happier past’ promises it will be repeated in the future and provides the patience to endure the difficulties of the present; so traditions legitimize the existing ways of life by asserting that it has always been like that or that people have always believed so (Sztompka 1993:64). Hence, the idea of repetition of the past is the main source of tradition: repetition gives a sense of continuity and legitimates the ‘past’ through ‘truth’ claims.

However, it is not always possible to talk about traditions as the presentation of a ‘happier past’. As Ballinger (2003:5) notes,

Tradition understood as local rituals and practices, converges with the extensive literature on the politics of the past, yielding an account that illuminates both the (re)configurations of broad landscapes of memory shaped by war and other state-sponsored violence and as refracted through individual and family narratives.

Thus, traditions might involve the sorrows and pains of a war that are reproduced in relation to the politics of the ruling group and embedded in individual and family narratives. Whether the representations of a happier past or wars and sorrows, traditions endure for some time and may disappear when objects are abandoned and ideas are rejected or forgotten (ibid: 61) Hence they are not fixed and stagnant: they have been transformed and articulated because of disputes and negotiations arising from the meaning of the performance and changing discourses. According to Zerubavel (1994b:105-106), ‘when a society undergoes rapid developments that shatter its social and political order, its need to restructure the past is as great as its desire to set its future agenda’. These periods prompt the creation of new cultural forms that replace the
weakening older traditions. In this context, there is an ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983:1). According to Hobsbawm, traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented. He defines ‘invented tradition’ as a

[s]et of practices governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain rules and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. They normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past (ibid)

Traditions are produced within cultural and political contexts and they are subject to change. Hence, although the traditional symbols are produced by the ruling groups to promote a sense of national unity and loyalty to the nation, even the meanings of the same symbols might change in changing power relations. Symbols only have meaning if they have resonance for a population (Stephans 2006:47); and traditions appear at certain moments, when people define certain fragments of the past heritage as tradition and ignore others (Sztompka 1993:61).

### 2.3.3 Commemorations (national days, museums, monuments)

Generic forms of commemorations – monuments, inscriptions, national holidays (Carrier 2005:181), national days (Young 2003:237) and museums (Delanty and Rumford 2005:95) – mobilize meaning for the construction and reproduction of memory in relation to national identity. However, mobilization of meaning can only be realized by its fixity in the present. In this sense, as Savage (1994:127) points out, ‘commemoration is an effort to fix the meaning and purpose... (of national or religious events) in an enduring form’. Commemorations enter into the daily lives of social individuals through social practices and bring individuals into connection with memory and its associated norms (Assmann 1992 cited in Kirk, 2005) and narratives.

Through commemorative rituals, groups create, articulate and negotiate their shared memories of particular events (Zerubavel 1995:5). Thus, commemorations are festivals of remembering (Redfield 1994:333) and meaningful actions that are historically based, idealizing and mythologizing the past in the present through their continued practice (Linstroth, 2002). They are constructed and narrated to make the public remember events according to national or religious ideals and the political agenda (Young 1993; Kirk 2005). However, as Namer (1983 cited in Echabe and Castro 1998:96) argues, the most important aspect in commemorations is not the ‘event’ that happened as it was,
but the emotional significance attached to this memory. Commemorations are therefore formed to provide the public a shared understanding of the past by constructing and evoking emotions regarding national and religious ideals. In this respect, Gillis (1994:5) defines ‘commemorative activity as social and political because it involves the coordination of individual and group memories, the results of which may appear consensual, when in fact they are the product of processes of intense contest and struggle’. In other words, although commemorations are formed in complex political and social struggles and contradictions, they are represented as the product of a consensus related to national or religious ideals.

Commemorations are produced to create a ‘collective’ memory and a political consensus; however, as Lynn and McConkey (1998:337) point out, the influence of commemorations and rituals can only reach its full potential if it is approved by the surrounding, greater social, cultural and political context. Dominant discourses that are pervasive in the social context therefore play a crucial role in the creation of commemorations, the attachment of emotional significance to them and making commemorations influential in the social context. Similarly, commemorations contribute to the maintainance of dominant discourses, as they are constructed to mobilize meaning for the reproduction of memory that is in support of dominant discourses.

In this respect, according to James Young (1993:xi) it is not possible to locate any memorial’s “collective memory” because memory is not ‘collective’ but ‘collected’ for the reproduction of dominant memory; he prefers to use the concept of ‘collected memory’ instead of ‘collective memory’. Young (ibid.) explains “collected memory” as the many discrete memories gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned a common meaning to reproduce the dominant memory. He addresses the importance of both the physical and metaphysical qualities of the memorial texts and he calls them ‘the texture of memory’. Thus, not the ‘collective memory’ but a collective meaning passes down from one generation to the next in societies’ rituals and commemorations. If societies remember, it is because of their institutions that organize, shape and inspire their memories. In a similar vein, Schwartz (1982:374) talks about the ‘recollection of the past as an active, constructive process, not a simple matter of retrieving information: to remember is to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the present.’

Monuments and organized calendars are important components of commemorations. Monuments have pasts because human beings create narratives about
them; they function like signs placed in specific places in order to prevent forgetting regarding national or religious ‘events’. Similarly, calendars are organized according to commemorative concerns and activities (Kirk, 2005) such as national and religious days and holidays. Monuments and organized calendars bring body to the abstract national or religious events and make them concrete. They stand to prove that something happened in the past, it was ‘real’, important and should be remembered. However, similarly to traditions and history textbooks, commemorations are produced by the dominant discourses. They function to affirm and legitimize the nation and promote national integration. They are produced to increase people’s awareness and appreciation of the constructed ‘past’ and to lay a historical foundation for the future.

Commemorations are sites that carry abstract national ideas in a concrete structure. As Young (2003:237) points out, public monuments and shared calendars all work to create common loci around which a common national identity is forged. In this way, these mechanisms provide a naturalizing locus for memory, in which a state’s triumphs, martyrs, ideals and myths are cast as being as naturally true as the landscape in which they stand.

Periodic celebrations of national days and visits to public monuments and museums build new inter-cultural relationships, rekindle faded kinships and empower national awareness; they are ‘forms of concretisation of history’ (Augustin 2004:180) and children and adults use these moments to learn about their country’s history, founding fathers and patriots and the norms and values of the nation (Amienyi 2005:5-54). The ruling groups therefore try to put in place as many mechanisms as possible in order to mobilize the sentiments of social individuals about their national identities. As Bodnar points out (1994:78), ‘monuments would be placed in the centre of the city, where people would pass by it everyday and be reminded of ‘love of country’ and their duty to their ‘native land’. However, as Young argues (2003:237) ‘neither the monuments nor their meaning is everlasting. Both monuments and their significance are constructed in particular times and places and contingent on the political and historical contexts of the moment’.

Museums, one of the most crucial forms of commemorations, are created to store objects for later observation in order to provide evidence to support the narratives of the constructed past. However, as Adorno (cited in Kattago 2001:27) points out, objects lose their cultural and historical relevance during the process of museumization. Once an object is taken out of its historical context, a vital link between the pastness of that object
and the present of the observer is altered and possibly lost. In other words, when objects are taken from their actual locations and put into a museum, they lose the meaning that was constructed in a specific context and gain a new meaning in a new context produced by the dominant discourse.

Duncan (1995, 2006) discusses the general ritual features of art museums: as a result of the achievement of a liminal zone of time and space, visitors are removed from the concerns of their daily, practical lives and thus move beyond the psychic constraints of mundane experience, opening themselves to a different quality of experience by attaining new perspectives. Furthermore, the organization of the museum setting as a kind of script which visitors perform is the ritual feature of the museums. Bouquet (2004:195), in her discussion of art museums, notes that Duncan is influenced by Victor Turner’s concept of liminality. Liminality in the museum entails being outside of or betwixt and between the normal world, just as it does in ritual. According to Duncan (cited in Bouquet 2004:195), visitors directly experience values and beliefs related to social and political identity that are put on display for them by the museum.

Similarly to the museum visit, the commemoration of a national day can be conceived as a period of margin or ‘liminality’, as an interstructural situation. According to Turner (1967:97), transitional beings are neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere, and are at the very least “betwixt and between” all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification. In this way, they withdraw from the structural positions and from the values, norms and sentiments that are associated with those positions. During the liminal period, they are alternatively encouraged to think about their society, their cosmos, and the powers that generate and sustain them (ibid: 105). When the social individuals participate in commemorative activities, they are remote from the day-to-day activities and worries of social life in the process of transition. They are also withdrawn from structural classifications such as age and social and economic status; and they act together by sharing a common feeling such as grief, enthusiasm or sorrow depending on the content of the national day, which might be a commemorative celebration or rite associated with death and mourning.

Both commemorative celebrations (i.e., the establishment of nations, national independence days) that are welcomed with joy, happiness and enthusiasm and rites associated with death and mourning (i.e., commemoration of national heroes, the day of remembrance for war deaths) are crucial in the construction of nationalistic values and sentiments among the members of a nation. According to Robert Hertz (1907 cited in
Strange 2005:16) the rites associated with death and mourning are characterized by moving the status of the dead from the realm of the living into an afterlife. However, the identity of the deceased is not lost, but rather, reconstituted into something meaningful for the group. For example, in Northern Cyprus and Turkey, on November 10, the death of Atatürk\(^2\), the primary symbol of Turkishness, patriotism, heroism and courage, is commemorated with one minute’s silence. In this liminal period, the public is encouraged to think about Atatürk and mourn for him. Social individuals are thus mobilized to act together by sharing common national sentiments during the liminal period. This situation helps to reproduce and sustain the dominant discourse, which is Turkish nationalism, through the symbol of Atatürk that represents Turkishness and patriotism.

2.3.4 Media

With today’s developing technology, mass media content serves as a store of memory (McQuail 2005:7). Thus, in modern times, the media play a significant role in the production of memory in relation to national identity. Media produce and create a huge amount of ‘information’, preserve and transmit that ‘information’ to the public. However, they are not merely the store of memory that contains row or pure ‘information’; they are the source of representations that are constructed by certain discourses. Thus the media do not function like a ‘mirror’ that reflects the memories of others in actual ‘space’ and ‘time’ but by representing and constructing them. Hence, in this research, media are not conceived as a ‘neutral’ or an ‘objective’ source of ‘information’ because ‘meanings are constructed by using representational systems’ (Hall 1997:21) and as Nora (1989:11) points out, ‘representation proceeds by strategic highlighting, selecting samples and multiplying examples’. Thus, each medium might construct the ‘memory’ of an event by highlighting different aspects and support this ‘memory’ by showing a variety of evidence; it is more relevant to talk about the production and representation of ‘memories’, instead of about the ‘factual’ memories allowed to come forth by the media.

\(^2\) ‘Atatürk’s name literally translates as the very father of Turks’ (Papadakis 1998:73). Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal) was a Turkish soldier and a statesman (1881-1938). He was the founder and the first President of the Turkish Republic. ‘Atatürk who was the Turkish nationalist leader’ (Pollis 1998:96) represents Turkishness and he is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. Atatürk undertook a series of reforms to raise Turkey to the level of modern civilization which can be grouped under five titles: political, social, legal and economic forms and reforms in the fields of education and culture (Yale 2005:36-37).
It is important to consider media representations and discourses within the historical and contextual framework of the production processes that have given shape to contemporary media institutions – including primarily but not exclusively, issues of ownership and control over the production process. As Bommes and Wright (1982:256) argue, ‘inattention to the conditions of production of discourse treats discourses as if they were written on the wind’. The agenda of ‘the things to be done’ by the media institution, is shaped by the political discourse of the institution and it determines what part of the past and what kind of future will be brought into play for the production of public memories (Lang & Lang, 1989:126). Thus, the political and cultural constraints are embedded in media representations and discourses. Media reinforce, reproduce or contest the existing social relations through these representations and discourses.

The mass media – powerful contemporary tools for the production and circulation of ‘public memories’ – are constructed in historical, social and cultural constraints and cannot be evaluated as a separate entity. ‘Media is dependent on ’society', especially on the institutions of political and economic power’ (Mcquail 1994:2). There is an interrelationship amongst the economic, political and social factors as they constitute and are constituted by the media. As Garnham (2000:4) suggests, ‘Who can say what, in what form, to whom and for what purposes will be in part determined by and in part determine the structure of economic, political, and cultural power in a society’. Thus the media constrain or shape what should or should not be thought, said, written, remembered and forgotten according to certain social and political frameworks that are shaped in power relations.

The different types of possible control of a variety of media is important because control can influence the content of the media messages, which is closely related to the articulation and construction of ‘public memories’. Ownership and control constrain the production process of the media, which is best understood as the result of a continuing struggle over who gets to speak and whose version of ‘reality’ – ‘the product of discourse’ (Fiske 1996:54) – is legitimized. The historical desire to control the ‘dominant public memory’ continues in societies in the form of state, private and concentrated ownership of media institutions. It is therefore essential to consider the political, economic and cultural factors behind the media production.

The media function like a ‘memory machine’ and provide a great amount of ‘information’ shaped in certain social and cultural constraints. According to certain constructionist arguments, individuals’ media use is also articulated in social and cultural
contexts; so it is not possible to talk about ‘personal’ readings, because conception is not ‘privatized’. Individual differences in interpretation are caused not by ‘personal’ perception but by the social construction of remembering. Without the remembering and signification of certain cultural and social codes, one cannot interpret any situation.

Social and cultural codes are critical, not only because of their capability to constrain what we remember and forget, but because of their normalization function. Normalization is the most powerful and influential factor in the partial closure of any social structure. Media play a crucial role in the realization of normalization through persuasion; the media’s persuasive role is therefore constantly used by the dominant discourses for the continuation of its dominance. According to Ruddock (2001:122), persuasion is achieved not only through information, but also through controlling how people make sense of information. In this way, the mass media are persuasive in so far as they offer audiences seductive ‘knowledge positions’ that make sense of a chaotic world. In a similar vein, one can talk about the control of memory through its construction.

With the development of mass communication technologies, we have begun to live as a result of media penetration (Sreberny and Mohammadi 1994). We have been surrounded by media messages starting from the first day of our lives. The media is everywhere. As Livingstone (1996:319) argues, ‘media have permeated most if not all aspects of everyday life, and sources of symbolic culture are ever less separable from one another’. In this respect, it is also impossible to locate ‘memory’ as separate from the influences of the media. According to Scannell (1996:6), listening to the radio and watching television are part of the natural and ordinary things that we do in our daily lives, so it is difficult to notice their function and intentionality. Scannell (ibid.) suggests that this ordinariness and obviousness is the intended, achieved and accomplished influence of broadcast output. The situation naturalizes the role of the media in our daily lives and makes it even more influential.

The existence of media brings a different dimension to the analysis of human memory as we are different from our ancestors, who learned all they knew through face-to-face communication and social interaction. We cannot isolate the role of the media in culture, because the media are firmly anchored into the web of culture’ (Bird 2003:3). The development of mass communication technologies provides extensively mediated conditions of remembering through advances in the capture, preservation and transmission of ‘information’ and images (Hoskins 2001:334) in narrative stories. In this
way, memory is experienced, produced and conveyed through the media (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003:5).

The media as the primary means of communication and transmission (Mcquail, 1994) play a major role in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation of memories in relation to national identity (Ashuri 2007). Without the contribution of print and broadcast media, it is not possible to talk about the creation of a culture and identity in common (Morley and Robins 1995). As Zerubavel (1994a:73) notes, in today’s societies, journalists have more decisive roles than historians in shaping the popular images of the past, which are substantial in the construction of national identity as they enter into the daily lives of people through the media. In today’s societies, the media’s role is primal in the construction of self-other relationships; as Casalegno (2004:319-320) points out, ‘communication can built barriers or favour an exchange. New technologies can participate in both the creation and the destruction of the social tie’. In this respect, media might play a crucial role in the construction of a social unity between the social individuals within a group or community – and it might also cause its destruction through its representations and narratives.

Events gain and lose importance through the media; as Georgiou (2001:325) suggests, as soon as a story is not in the news anymore, the people stop caring. Thus, the media show us what is important and what is not and it functions to shape what we remember and forget relating to our national identities. The mass media invoke memory that reinforces political agendas serving particular ideas about the virtues of the nation, the family, or the current government (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003:5) through its narratives. According to Morley and Robins (1995:193), ‘media play a powerful role in the reproduction and reinforcement of the feelings of familiarity, security and unity by arousing fear, anxiety and violent emotions’. In this way, they help to provide the necessary context for the closure of community or nation by contextualizing our feelings and thoughts. Baer (2001:492) describes how television functions to reduce the world to an appearance, blocking all possible critical reflection and response; however, it is not only television which limits the ability to question. Print media also provide extensive ‘information’ about events and construct our knowledge of them through written texts. News articles serve to reduce possible alternative thinking about events: according to Bion (1987 cited in Morley and Robins 1995: 194), thinking is discomforting and disturbing because in thinking, there is the risk of finding out something you don’t want to know and, consequently, ‘most people want to closure off what they don’t want to see
or hear’. In this way, media replace our ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ and provide what we should see, hear, know and believe without thinking and questioning. Our national identities are also constructed in this narrative framework. National identity is conceived as a kind of ‘given’; it is part of our common sense as it flavours everyday life. As Alasuutari (1999a:87) notes, ‘[d]aily life is based on routinized, taken-for-granted lines of thought and action, and the media are part of this unquestioned environment’. Therefore, we hardly question or think of our national identities (Spillman 1977).

New communication technologies have also collapsed the temporal distance between the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. Today, we can see, hear and feel something from the past, present and future with the images and texts provided by the media: the media bring the past and future to the present and make them seem to happen right now (Tomasulo cited in Hoskins 2004). In Peters’ (1999:138) words, “the far could now speak to the near, and the dead could now speak to the living”. In his book ‘Speaking into the air’, Peters (ibid.) discusses the revolution of ‘time binding’ and ‘space binding’. ‘Time binding’ is the capturing of lost time through new communication technologies. Simultaneity across distances, first in writing, then in speech, sound and image, provide ‘space binding’. As Stier (2003) argues, through the media people can acquire memories of a past that have no geographical or biological connection. This is also the case for the memories of the present. The media show us how the past was, how the present is and what we should expect from the future. Almost everything we know about the past and present events is increasingly mediated through the media. Hence it can be claimed that most of our understanding of the past or present that is crucial in the construction and articulation of our national identities, is ‘manufactured’ rather than remembered (Hoskins 2001). In this context, Peters (1999:139) notes that every new medium is a kind of machine for the production of ghosts. By using the term ‘ghost’, he implies the absence of the body that transcends limitations in time and space.

In a similar vein, Scannell (1996:80) talks about the absence of the ‘event’: ‘in its own time and place any event creates and sustains its own being. In its extended, relayed, mediated form it simultaneously enters into other worlds and their ways of being’. Hence, according to Scannell, broadcasting does not create the event through transmission but when the broadcasting takes place, a new event – the event as broadcast – is created. The former is embedded in the latter and a new event is created that has its own conditions of existence. The event is ‘doubled’ when it is mediated and relayed through broadcasting; and the locales of the two events are radically different: each locale has its own
circumstances and involvements. In this sense, the media’s representation does not change the ‘events’ but manufactures new events through its articulations.

2.4 Section three- Mediating mechanisms: Sites of memory as a single body

Dominant mechanisms of memory are interconnected with each other and function together for a common goal, which is the mobilization of meaning for the reproduction and maintenance of the national identity. Although I examine the mechanisms of memory in the second section separately, the aim of this section is to explore how the mechanisms articulate and construct each other and what the parallelisms and interconnections are among them. In other words, this section looks at how the mechanisms function like a single body in the articulation and construction of national identity.

The mechanisms (commemorations, symbols of tradition, history textbooks and media) operate as the sites of memory in relation to national identity. As Nora (1989:22) points out, ‘memory attaches itself to sites. Sites of memory, both actual and virtual locations, provide a maximum amount of meaning in a minimum number of signs’. Rigney (2005:19) explains this as a principle of economy in ‘cultural’ memory, helping to reduce the proliferation of disparate memories and providing common frameworks for appropriating the past. In this way, the importance of the ‘mechanisms of memory’ lies in their function in the ‘conflation of memories’ – bringing memories together and making them operate as one. For example, the monument of a Turkish ‘hero’ can provide common frameworks by bringing together disparate memories of Turkish Cypriots about ‘how to be a Turk’. The stories told about certain events also provide a cultural framework for remembering and interpreting them, and just as actual locations serve to attract unrelated memories, so too certain narratives provide a cultural framework for other stories. For example, the narrations or stories that are told on 29th October about the founding of the Republic of Turkey have become an occasion for commemorating Turkish Cypriot casualties in various ways in Northern Cyprus.

Depending on the occasion – such as seeing a monument or a flag in a street, singing the national anthem, celebration of a national day, visitation to a museum or commemorating a political leader – two or more mechanisms of memory might function together to mobilize the memories in relation to national identity. For example, the monument of Atatürk, which is the symbol of Turkishness, might be connected not only to the history textbooks and commemorations but also to symbol of tradition and media.
As was emphasized above, a monument is one of the generic forms of commemorations that function to promote national integration. However, it is also related to the history textbooks, because textbooks are the primary sources of written information about Atatürk. Without historical knowledge, it is not possible to develop any understanding about the monument that represents the Turkish hero; and in the meantime, the monument of Atatürk operates as a tradition in providing a Turkish role model for action. Furthermore, the monument might be shown live in the media on national days or appear in a documentary program. Hence, although the mechanisms of memory have different functions, they work together in the mobilization of the ideas of individuals about their national identity by pervading their daily lives. As Cerulo (1995:18) suggests, ‘national heroes function to bond citizens as these figures are like civil deities with the power to bring members closer to one another’.

The narratives of the mechanisms of memory in relation to national identity are constructed in historical and political circumstances and shaped in power relations. According to Koresaar (2004:48), ‘the dominant narratives of a certain period play a crucial role in shaping what and how we experience’. The mechanisms are crucial in the construction of our experiences as they play a primal role in the dissemination of dominant narratives. As was emphasized in the first chapter, we ‘experience’ the world as we understand and interpret it according to certain discourses that are constructed by political and social circumstances. The mechanisms of memory play a functional role in the articulation and construction of our experiences in relation to our national identities. In fact, our interpretations of a national event may not be the outcome of what we lived, but of what we have experienced through social remembering, partly articulated through the mechanisms of memory. For example, in the case of Northern Cyprus, the interpretations by young Turkish Cypriots of the Cyprus war between the years 1960-1974 are not the outcome of what they lived, but of what they have experienced through social remembering that is partly constructed through mechanisms such as history textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, national anthems, myths), commemorations (monuments, museums, national days, national holidays) and media.

It should be noted here that mechanisms of memory function intentionally to construct experiences of the ‘past’ that are in harmony with the political discourses of the time. As Middleton (2002:79) argues, “monuments, memorials, historical narratives, commemorative ceremonies and traditions are the intentional representations of the past experience”. Dewey (1998:27) explains the principle of continuity of experience as being
related to the way every experience takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after. In modern societies, it is the narrations of the mechanisms of memory that construct our ‘past experience’ by making us remember some events when there is no possibility for us to physically have an access to them in specific time and space. In Casalegno’s (2004:318) terms, it is the narration that allows us to get the ‘experience’ back through overcoming ‘space’ and ‘time’ barriers. In this way, narrations compensates for the lack of a “co-presence in real time” and enable us to share a common ‘experience’ by being at the same place at the same time through overcoming limitations in ‘space’ and ‘time’.

The media bring a different dimension to the official history that is disseminated by the mechanisms of history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. As Baer (2001:491-492) argues, today, we are witnessing the proliferation of new forms shared outside official historical discourse and traditional institutions of socialization. These are linked to different cultural products such as films, books, newspapers, advertisements and television programs. According to Stier (2003:12), “the capacity of electronic mass communication to transcend time and space creates instability by disconnecting people from past traditions, but it also liberates people by making the past less determinate of experiences in the present”. The media do not disconnect people from the ‘past traditions’ or ‘official history’, but it might proliferate and transform their meanings: it is through the media that historical information, commemorations and symbols of tradition gain new cultural meanings. Furthermore, media do not liberate people by making the ‘past’ less determinate, but construct the ‘past’ in order to captivate people in present conditions. Thus the media might reproduce the dominant discourses in a society, but in the meantime, it might produce and disseminate alternative discourses, depending on the political standpoint of the media institution.

In the construction of memories in relation to national identity by the mechanisms of memory, emotions and sentiments play the primary role. In his book Banal Nationalism, Billig (1995:44-46) looks at the ‘dramatic psychology of emotions’ that is related to the emotions evoked in nation-states to explain identity. On occasions of nation-states such as national days, Independence Day parades, thanksgiving days and coronations, the ordinary and banal routines of private life are suspended. On these days, participants expect to have special feelings such as joy, sorrow or inebriation; these are the days when normal routines are put into abeyance and extra emotions should be enacted. These emotions remove us from the activities (Giddens 1985 cited in Billig
1995:44) and general anxieties and worries of daily life. Thus it could be argued that nationalism liberates us from the monotony and boredom of ordinary life and brings feelings of belonging, excitement and passion into our lives.

Mechanisms of memory that appear as commemorative acts, historical and traditional occasions and the representations of them in the media, are thus organized to evoke the emotions of joy, passion, excitement and sorrow by removing individuals from the routines of daily life through celebrating and performing the commemorative acts and historical and traditional occasions. Billig (1995:45) evaluates these occasions as the brief moments of the nationalist emotion that functions for longer periods of settled calm when there is no ground for nationalist feelings to emerge: modern nation-states arrange a yearly calendar to put these occasions on stage and to provide the necessary partial closure for the continuity of their dominance.

In modern nation-states, historical, commemorative and traditional occasions that are the crucial components of the official history mostly appear as ‘media events’. Understanding the function of ‘media events’ is therefore necessary for exploring the role of the media in the articulation of the official history. Dayan and Katz (1992:1-5) describe media events as historic occasions – mostly occasions of state – that are televised as they take place and transfix a nation. These events are specific events that are not routine. However, they intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and our lives. One of the most important features of media events is that they always occupy society’s “centre” for a while. No matter what has happened, the event has to go on. This situation brings with it a kind of protectiveness towards the event on the part of the media (ibid: 89); and it illustrates the role of media events in the formation of ‘dominant public memory’, because in any society, protectiveness causes the pervasiveness of the public memory that creates the necessary conditions for the construction of the ‘dominant public memory’.

Media events are generally represented by the majority of media institutions and they are mostly supported by the ruling group in a society. As Crain (2001:292) argues, ‘the domination proceeds through the appropriation of control of significations through the monopoly of the media code by the dominant elite groups’. Thus, it is crucial to note that, ‘media events’ are not only related to the political representations of the media institution but in a more general sense to the dominant discourse in any society: it is possible to talk about the parallelization of media events to the dominant discourse of the time which can be maintained through the fixity of the ‘dominant public memory’. The
domination of public memory can only be realized through the exercises of seduction; and thus media events play a crucial role in providing seductive ends.

These events are pre-planned, announced and advertised in advance. Although they are organized outside the media, this does not mean that the media’s role is merely functional in terms of transmission of media events; the media serve politically in providing the necessary framework for social integration through the representation of historical, traditional and commemorative events in parallel to the discourse of the nation-state. As Dayan and Katz (1992:9) argue, “these broadcasts integrate societies in a collective heartbeat and evoke a renewal of loyalty to the society and its legitimate authority”. In this way, it is possible to talk about the role of these events in the continuation of the status quo. However, Couldry (2003:64) criticises Dayan and Katz’s arguments about the role of the media events in the ‘integration of society’. According to him, there are many potential media events which do not necessarily help integrate society; instead, they might even cause conflict.

Couldry argues that, there is a myth about the role of the media in our daily lives (ibid: 2) that includes its assumed influence in the construction of our bonds with the society we live in (ibid: 65). According to this myth, there is a mediated ‘centre’ that media speaks for and thus we accept that centre’s position in our lives as legitimate. In this way, media events construct not only our sense of a social ‘centre’, but also the media’s privileged relation to that ‘centre’ (ibid: 56). Couldry claims that ‘media rituals’ are the key mechanisms that reproduce the assumed legitimacy, and explains the media rituals as follows (ibid.2),

Any action organized around key media related categories and boundaries, whose performance reinforces and helps to legitimate, the underlying value expressed in the idea that the media is our access point to our social centre.

The connection between media events and the ritual space of the media (ibid: 55) is described in his book ‘Media Rituals’: media rituals and media events work together to establish and maintain the social integration among society members. According to Couldry (ibid: 4) the term ‘media rituals’ has often been associated with claims that they produce and maintain social integration and ‘media events’ as large collections of actions across multiple locations, including the broadcast event, millions of viewing situations and the circulation of discourses around the broadcast event. In this respect, the connection between media events and media rituals is caused by the organization of the action-frame. Through the narrative frame of the media event, a social ‘collectivity’ is
affirmed, reinforced and maintained; and there is a close relationship between media events and a Durkheimian reading of media rituals in the affirmation of the social bond through the media (ibid:59-60). Although Couldry expresses his doubts regarding the role of the media events and rituals in the integration of society, the issue is not to measure the influence of the media events and rituals in the integration of society but to question the ‘myth of the media’ that gives a privileged position to the media in our daily lives.

According to Dayan and Katz (1992:17), the process of producing media events and telling their story is related to the arts of journalism and narration: the act of narration is fundamental to the negotiation, performance and celebration of media events. In their book ‘Media Events’, they emphasize the negotiation of the organizers, broadcasters and audiences, which they call the three partners of television events. These are free agents, independent from the others that negotiate over the meaning of media events from the beginning to the end (1992:55). Dayan and Katz (1992:19) reject the idea of political manipulation of media events because, according to them, broadcasters, journalists and audiences can sometimes say ‘no’ to the manipulative influence of media events. Thus, what we see and hear is the end product of political, aesthetic and financial interaction (ibid: 55).

In the negotiating process, all partners negotiate on the meaning of the media events. Organizers and broadcasters may differ among themselves on scripting (ibid: 54-55); and this situation might result in different representations of the official history. Every programme output has an intention because any programme that is transmitted has a complex prior history which makes the programme output deeply settled and ordered (Scannell 1996:1-8). This situation might even lead to contestation on the programme output and script. According to Hodgkin and Radstone (2003:1), ‘the focus of contestation is not a conflict on accounts of what actually happened in the past but the question of who or what is entitled to speak for the past in the present’. In this way, the different media institutions might produce alternative representations of the ‘past’.

In the negotiating process, audiences might also produce different readings. According to Scannell (1996:12), there are no enforceable sanctions over the behaviour of viewers and listeners. This is the reason that power in this relationship rests more with those on the receiving end than on the production process. Scannell (ibid) thus emphasizes that broadcasters must organize their programs according to the interest of listeners and viewers in order to take their attention. The reason is the inability of the broadcasters to control the behaviour of the audiences. Furthermore, according to Dayan
and Katz (1992:78-89), media do not only provide the representation of ‘media events’ but also the ‘festive experience’ by performing them. The performance of the ceremonies enables them to define themselves. However, the self-defining feature of ceremonies can only be realized through the ‘active’ partners in the reading of the event. As Cottle (2006:428-429) suggests,

*It is often through the media performance that mediatized ritual can come into being. But ritual only comes alive experientially, emotionally, subjectively, when actively read by audiences who are prepared to ‘participate’ within it as symbolically meaningful to them, and who are prepared to accept the imagined solidarities on offer.*

Ceremonies that can be commemorative, historical or traditional invite interpretation and encourage ‘hermeneutic pleasure’ in the decoding of signs and symbols. Dayan and Katz (ibid: 78-118) argue that these performances must not be approached as additions to the original ‘event’, but should be conceived as the transformations of public events. In other words, media events are transformed through the articulation of performances. The communal nature of the experience is stressed; however, consensus is portrayed as a process, as an overcoming of differences. Therefore not only unanimity, but also unanimity within diversity is emphasized (ibid.).

‘Celebrating’ media events also provides the opportunity to be actively involved in the incident presented by the media and to share a common spirit. While routine programs provide the opportunity to choose among a variety of programs by addressing the audience as a ‘family member’, ‘consumer’, ‘sensation seeker’ or ‘information user’, the ‘media events’ provide make it possible for the audience to actively be involved in the ritual ceremony. However, Dayan and Katz argue that television alone cannot provide this opportunity: it can be achieved through the national leaders, by social interaction with our friends and family members, by the newspapers, by the schools that declare a recess, by employers who permit viewing during work hours. In this way, celebrating media events is not only related to the television spectatorship but also to other aspects of social life (ibid: 119-120).

Although Dayan and Katz emphasize the active role of three partners of media by highlighting the importance of the negotiation of media events that is also embedded in performing and celebrating them, this does not mean that broadcasters, audiences and organizers are completely free in terms of social and cultural constraints and limitations: there is always a ‘glass mirror’ that looks transparent but prevents the complete freedom
of broadcasters, organizers and audiences. However, the metaphor of the ‘glass mirror’ is not used to imply the limitations that prevent us from seeing the ‘realities’; it connotes our internalized emotions and sentiments that prevent us from conceiving the constraints that are constructed by the ‘dominant public memory’. This chapter, which is based on the function of the mechanisms of memory (media, commemorations, symbols of tradition, history textbooks) in the articulation of the dominant public memory, represents a starting-point for considering the construction of internalized emotions in relation to national identities.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explain the theoretical and methodological framework adopted and ethnographic research conducted to examine how public memories are produced by the mechanisms of memory and how the respondents articulate the ‘information’ provided by the mechanisms. The concept of ‘memory’ is at the intersection point of the theoretical and empirical discussions and practices of the research. However, ‘memory’ is not simply deposited somewhere waiting for exploration, and it is not possible to locate a body of agreement about the memory of the past or the future. There is no common understanding of memory in relation to national identity; there are only different narratives, counter interpretations and discourses about it. It might therefore seem ironic to take memory, which is a ‘never-ending process’, as the basis of a research study, as though situating something at the centre of operations that in fact never stands there as it is constantly moving and changing its location, as though using something that that can never be found as a foundation. However, it is exactly this irony which motivated the curiosity about and interest in this research.

The examination of the production and construction of public memories through the narratives of the mechanisms of memory is more explicit than the exploration of the construction and articulation of memories of social individuals. The explicitness of the discourse of the mechanisms of memory is not caused by its simplicity but by the possibility of its fixity in a specific time span. Hence it is possible to locate a partial closure in order to analyse the narratives of the mechanisms of memory. On the other hand, the narratives of the respondents are fluid and constantly changing through the never-ending articulations of memory. According to Middleton and Edwards (1990:11), ‘people construct versions of events and their own mental processes within the practices of ordinary conversation’. Therefore, ‘the knowledge of the past and present is produced in the course of everyday life’ (Popular Memory Group 1982:210), and the memories of respondents are constantly changing, being articulated and constructed through their narratives.

‘Memory’ is constructed and articulated through its contestation, which prevents the durability of what individuals remember and forget; it is not possible to provide a
complete homogeneity among the memories of the individuals because remembering and forgetting are constantly changing through the articulation. Lang & Lang (1989) emphasise the importance of the mediation of events over time and the constant articulation of what respondents remember and forget. According to them (ibid: 124) “data from the study of a news event as-it happens cannot catch the influence of that event as reworked in ‘collective’ memory”. In other words, the interpretation of a news event by its audience is constantly changing according to the time lapse. This gradual redefinition and interpretation prevents observation of the influence of an event on the audience. Memories are contingent and changeable and this situation makes the cultural logic of ‘memory’ much harder and difficult to resolve. Although I seek to investigate the sources of memory, it is sometimes difficult to determine the source of ‘information’ in memory because the public and ontological narratives are highly intertwined. As Brown, Shevell, and Rips (1986:139) argue, ‘we experience the events disseminated by public narratives not only against a public backdrop but also within the compass of our own activities’.

In this research, memory is investigated as a discursive construct; the narratives of the mechanisms of memory and the respondents’ understanding of memories in relation to national identity are evaluated as the products of discourses, not as reflections of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ that are fixed and stable. Discourse analysis approaches are key to studying the discourses on memories in relation to national identity because, as Jorgensen and Philips point out (2002:.8-9), these approaches share the understanding that our access to reality is always through language. In other words, ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ are embedded in language that is constructed through social and cultural contexts. The aim is not to reveal the ‘truths’ or to question the ‘objectivity’ or ‘reality’ of the narratives of the mechanisms of memory and respondents, but to examine the use of language and analyse the narratives as the products of discourses formed under historical, cultural and political constraints.

The chapter mainly works in two dimensions. The first section is organized to present a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of the discourses on memory in relation to national identity through textual analysis, and in particular through ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ which has mostly been developed in the studies of Wodak and Fairclough (Wodak: 2001b: 4). Furthermore, the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe are used as the basis of the research. Foucault’s genealogical analysis and Laclau and Mouffe’s approaches on nodal points and master signifiers; the logics of
equivalence, the logics of difference and antagonism (one of the concepts employed in conflict analysis) are the tools used for empirical analysis (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). Wodak’s notion of the ‘discursive construction of national identity’ (1999) serves as a useful aid for explaining which discursive strategies and linguistic devices are employed in the construction of national identity in discourse.

The second section of this chapter looks at the ethnographic research that forms the basis of the fieldwork. It consists primarily of explanations of the in-depth interviews and how they were conducted; i.e., the techniques used in gathering information about the memories of the respondents. I also explain how the questionnaire was developed, the questions used in the in-depth interviews and my research sample. Finally, I talk about my personal experiences (i.e. the problems faced while on the fieldwork, possible solutions) and research methods.

3.2 Section one: Analysis of the discourses on memory in relation to national identity

This research relies on the assumption that history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations and media, which are the mechanisms for the articulation of memories in relation to national identity, play a significant role in shaping the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Memories in relation to national identity can be explained as the product of discourse that is changing, articulated and constructed in power relations shaped in historical, political and cultural circumstances. In the case of my research, the Annan Plan must be seen not as an individual, isolated occurrence, but as part of a broader corpus of memory and experience related to the identity of Turkish Cypriots. This assumption, and hence the necessary methodological framework, is supported by additional approaches from a variety of fields such as social psychology, sociology, history, politics and media studies.

Bartlett’s (1932) book ‘Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology’ and Halbwachs’s ‘The collective memory’ (1950) form the basis of a theoretical approach that conceives ‘memory’ as the product of social construction; thus, their theories of ‘memory’ underlie the research. Lowenthal (1985), Middleton & Edwards (1990) and Fentress & Wickham (1992) emphasize the communicative role of memory and provide the necessary framework connecting ‘memory’ with communication studies, which is of critical importance in the evaluation of memory as related to the mechanisms. The theoretical perspectives of Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig and
Homi Bhabha on the issues of nationalism and national identity also provide openings throughout the research. As was emphasized in detail in Chapter One, unification of the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe provides the theoretical framework for defining ‘memory in relation to national identity’ as the product of discourse that is changing, articulated and constructed in power relations, which are themselves determined by historical, political and cultural circumstances. While Laclau and Mouffe focus on permanent articulation, Foucault highlights the power relations shaped in historical, political and cultural contexts in the construction of discourses.

In this research, textual analysis, and in particular Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), provides the methodological framework for the description and analysis of identity and nation that are incorporated with the approaches on ‘memory’. CDA, as a method of textual analysis, deals with the use of language in social contexts (Seale 2004:368). According to Fairclough (2003:3), text analysis is seen as not only linguistic analysis; it also includes ‘interdiscursive analysis’ – that is, seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles that they draw upon and articulate together. Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality (Jorgensen and Philips 2002:73). Fairclough (1992:84) explains intertextuality as basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth. According to Barker and Galasinski (2001:69), “intertextuality signals the accumulation and generation of meaning across texts, where all meanings depend on other meanings”.

In this research, I consider memories as ‘texts’ and examine how the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories depend on each other in the articulation and construction of national identity. As Fairclough (1995: 14-15) notes, “in the intertextual analysis of a text, the objective is to describe its ‘intertextual configuration’, showing how several text types may simultaneously be drawn upon and combined”. Thus I observe how the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories are intertwined and combined with each other.

Power relations play a crucial role here, in the ways in which memories, that are the product of discourses, are combined and articulated; as was stated in Chapter One, discourses are in conflict with each other to maintain their dominance. CDA takes a particular interest in the relation between language and power (Wodak 2001b; Fairclough 1989, 1995, 1998, 2001). As Wodak (2001b:11) notes,
A defining feature of CDA is its concern with power as a central condition in social life, and its efforts to develop a theory of language which incorporates this as a major premise. Not only the notion of struggles for power and control, but also the intertextuality of competing discourses are closely intended to.

There is a close link between CDA and Foucault’s discourse theory in terms of their focus on power and knowledge. However, Foucault does not provide an analytical method for research. In this case, CDA plays the primary role in providing the necessary methodological framework for examining memories in relation to national identity as the product of discourses in power relations. Jager notes (2001:32-33) that

Central to a CDA based on Foucault’s discourse theory are issues such as, what knowledge (valid at a certain place at a certain time) consists of, how this valid knowledge evolves, how it is passed on, what function it has for the constitution of subjects and the shaping of society and what impact this knowledge has on the overall development of society.

Within the scope of my research, this understanding helps me to question how narratives are disseminated by the mechanisms of memory, how they function in the lives of the social individuals and what overall influence the narratives of the mechanisms have on Turkish Cypriot society. Narratives are realized through language that is embedded in power relations, and ‘Critical Discourse Analysis regards language as social practice. In this perspective, language is always a socially and historically situated mode of action’ (Scollon 2001). Wodak suggests (2001b:11) that ‘language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power’. Thus, language can be used to change or maintain the power relations within a society.

‘Discourse analysis pertains to everyday knowledge that is conveyed via the media, everyday communication, school and family’ (Jager 2001:33). It is therefore suitable for an analysis which encompasses the narratives of families, connections, school education, history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition and commemorations. In my analysis of respondents’ narratives on memory in relation to national identity, I follow theoretical approaches based on the idea of the discursive construction of identity. Identity is understood as processual and never completed: it takes place within and not outside of representation, hence it both produces and is produced through discourse practices (Miller 2003: 42). Similarly, ‘memory in relation to national identity’ is considered as discursively constructed and articulated.
The analytical working model for the research combines social science methodologies of data collection and fieldwork with the ‘discourse-historical’ approach developed by the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis (Wodak 1999:3). According to Wodak (1999, 2001a), “in investigating political topics, the discourse historical approach always attempts to integrate as much available information as possible on the historical background and the original historical sources in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded”. In the following chapter, I provide information about ‘Cyprus history and the mechanisms of memory’ (the national anthem, history textbooks, flags, monuments, museums, national days, national holidays, myths and Turkish Cypriot media) in order to understand the historical, cultural and political conditions under which dominant/public and autobiographical memories in relation to national identity are constructed in Northern Cyprus. Without historical knowledge, it is not possible to analyse the narratives of the mechanisms of memory and respondents through critical discourse analysis; as Meyer (2001:15) notes, “one important characteristic arises from the assumption of CDA that all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context”. Hence the ‘discourse historical approach’ provides the opportunity to integrate the historical dimension with discourse analysis and so enable an exploration of complex historical, political and social constraints in the analysis of the discourses.

Foucault’s genealogical approach (1977c) is also adopted in this research. Genealogy proceeds from the critical insight that history, which is constructed in power relations, is always written in the present; this why genealogy is also referred to as the history of the present (Kendall & Wickham 1999). In this research, I evaluate the mechanisms of memory and the narratives of respondents concerning history by considering the present historical, political and cultural contexts in which the narratives are embedded. This kind of analysis provides the opportunity to examine the role of changing power relations in the discourses of the mechanisms of memory and respondents; and helps us to see the dynamics among dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories as they are all related to the narration of the ‘past’ and history at present.

In their book ‘the Discursive Construction of National Identity’ Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:30) explain their methodological approach, which combines a plurality of methods. This approach distinguishes between three closely interwoven dimensions of analysis:
• Thematic content
• Strategies
• Means and forms of realization

The authors (ibid: 2) describe the ways in which they analyse the discursive construction of national identity with a primary focus on Austria. Although their theoretical and methodological approach is applicable to some research, it cannot be fully applicable to all because each type of research requires a re-evaluation of present theoretical and methodological frameworks according to its conditions of existence. In my research, I adopt Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s approach, considering the fact that it is not possible to follow exactly the same procedures in the analysis of my research. The three dimensions of analysis – ‘content’, ‘strategies’ and ‘means and forms of realization’ – are described below; I will then explain how I use them in my own research.

In this research, thematic content, one of the dimensions of analysis, is organized on the basis of the particular ways in which interviewees choose to articulate/organize their own discourse. In the organization, I used Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999:30) theoretical framework for thematic content, which is devised on the basis of a critical survey of the theoretical literature. The authors explain some of the major thematic areas, such as the linguistic construction of a common political past (founding myths, myths of origin, political successes, times of prosperity and stability, defeats and crises); a common present and future (citizenship, political achievements, current and future political problems, crisis and dangers, future political objectives and political virtues); and a common culture (language, religion, science and technology, everyday culture such as sport, eating and drinking habits and clothing; and art such as music, literature, theatre, architecture, painting). These topics are related to the discursive construction of ‘national’ identity which is based on the formation of sameness and difference (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:30-31).

Similarly, in this research I observe the linguistic construction of memories in relation to national identity through the articulation of a common and unshared political past, present, future and culture in the narratives of the respondents. However, I distinguish my thematic areas differently from Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart according to the ways in which the respondents define themselves and the ‘others’ (Turks or Greek Cypriots). I analysed the narratives on the common and unshared past between
Turkish Cypriots and Turks under two different topics: ‘origin’ and ‘Turks: saviours/occupiers’. Although some of the respondents believe in the racial similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and emphasize their common origin, some of them reject this idea and legitimate their ideas with arguments on the racial commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots by showing a variety of evidence.

Some of the respondents imply the common past between Turkish Cypriots and Turks by focusing on the Cyprus war. The Cyprus war is interpreted as the overcoming of a crisis by the Turks in the Happy Peace Operation in 1974; many respondents consider Turks as the ‘saviours’ who saved Turkish Cypriots from Greek cruelty in 1974. Their narrations about the role of Turks in the Happy Peace Operation are similar to those in the history textbooks that were used during the period of the President Denktaş and the government of UBP during 1974-2003. However, there are respondents who alternatively consider the operation as an occupation and the Turks as the occupiers. In these instances, it is not possible to talk about the common past of Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Furthermore, the thematic area of a common and unshared past with Greek Cypriots revolves around ‘peace with friends/conflict with enemies’. There are some respondents who talk about the good relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the past. They narrate how they lived happily together and thus, how they shared a common past. In these cases, the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together is narrated as the times of prosperity and stability. On the other hand, there are other respondents who talk about the eternal enmity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The thematic content of ‘common/unshared present’ is also formed according to the ways in which the respondents locate the ‘others’ in the present context. I therefore specified the topics as ‘Turks: Turkish citizens (insiders)/ aliens (outsiders)’ (narrations about Turks) and ‘no/problem’ (narrations about Greek Cypriots). Both topics are related to different interpretations of the respondents about citizenship, political achievements, current political problems, crisis and dangers in Northern Cyprus that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. Furthermore, the thematic content of ‘common/unshared future’ is explored in terms of different interpretations of the respondents of the current and future political problems, future political objectives and political virtues. It should be noted here that entry of Northern Cyprus into the European Union after a solution in the Cyprus problem is important for the transformation of the political present and future. I therefore specified the topics as ‘unification/separation’ in order to consider the future expectations of the respondents about the political
relationship between Turkey/Turks and the TRNC/Turkish Cypriots. Under the topic of ‘participation in the EU/division’, I analyse the interpretations of the respondents concerning the entry of the Turkish Cypriots into the European Union with the Greek Cypriots following the solution of the Cyprus problem.

In the construction of the thematic content of common/unshared culture, I consider the evaluations of the respondents regarding the concepts of religion, language, eating habits and life styles, in order to analyse their interpretations of the differences and similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. I also focus on the topics of language, clothing, traditions and life styles in the analysis of differences and similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks under the topic of migrants/settlers. The approach of Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart on different types of macro-strategies in the discursive formation of national identity helped me to specify how the dynamic strategies that are combined together articulate the national identity in Northern Cyprus. According to the authors, the strategies that are employed on the macro-level in the discursive formation of national identity are:

- construction
- perpetuation or justification
- transformation
- destructive or dismantling

According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, although analytically distinguishable from one another, these strategies occur more or less simultaneously and are interwoven in discursive acts. Constructive strategies attempt to construct a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity as well as differentiation. Emphasis on intra-national sameness/similarity, positive political continuity (at state/national level), national (positive) uniqueness, national autonomy and independence, international differences, difference between then and now, unifying common features/shared sorrows or worries, are some of the constructive strategies. Strategies of perpetuation attempt to maintain and reproduce a threatened national identity by preserving, supporting or protecting it. These strategies include positive self-presentation, portrayal in black and white, emphasis on positive political continuity, defence and avoidance. Moreover, the strategies of justification attempt to justify or relativise a societal status-quo by
emphasizing the legitimacy of past acts of the ‘own’ national ‘we’ group which have been put into question; that is, they restore, maintain and defend a common self-protection. Emphasis on the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, then and now, negative sameness or negative common features are some of the perpetuation strategies. On the other hand, strategies of transformation aim to transform a well-established national identity and its components into another identity. This is often affected by applying subtle rhetorical persuasion. Some of the strategies of transformation are: positive self-presentation; warning against the loss of national autonomy; emphasis on autonomy and independence; emphasis on a difference between then and now and emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future; the negative connotation of political continuation and the positive connotation of gradual or abrupt change. Dismantling or destructive strategies aim at dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide a new model to replace the old one (ibid:33). Some of these strategies are: negative presentation (of self-others), emphasis on extra-national dependence and /or heteronomy, emphasis on inter-national sameness/similarity/communality, emphasis on intra-national differences, and emphasis on discontinuity/disruptions.

During fieldwork, I observed the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) and (turkish) Cypriot identities with the dynamic combination of different strategies. As mentioned in Chapter Four, memories in relation to national identity carry the traces of both ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’ because of the peculiar historical, political and cultural circumstances in Northern Cyprus. Therefore, the usage of the concepts of ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’ alone does not embrace the complex formation of the memories in relation to the national identity of Turkish Cypriots; I find necessary to use the terms ‘(turkish) Cypriot identity/nationalism’ and ‘Turkish (cypriot) identity/nationalism’ in this thesis. As explained in detail in the next chapter, in the term ‘Turkish (cypriot) identity/nationalism’, the capital ‘T’ of ‘Turkish’, and the small letter ‘c’ of the ‘Cypriot’ in the parenthesis are used to imply the emphasis on Turkish identity. In contrast, in the term ‘(turkish) Cypriot identity/nationalism’ the minuscule ‘t’ of ‘turkish’ in the parenthesis and the capital ‘C’ of ‘Cypriot’ point to the emphasis on Cypriot identity. These terms are used solely to express the political standpoints of the ruling groups and respondents; in order to maintain my neutrality, I prefer to use the term ‘Turkish Cypriot’ instead of Turkish (cypriot) or (turkish) Cypriot throughout the thesis.
In the analysis, I explored how the constructive strategies construct Turkish (cypriot) identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots, and differentiation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In contrast, (turkish) Cypriot identity is constructed by promoting unification and solidarity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots as well as differentiation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. Moreover, I observed that while the strategies of perpetuation attempt to maintain the threatened national identity that is sometimes Turkish (cypriot) and (turkish) Cypriot identity, the strategies of justification function to justify the status quo in order to maintain the established identity. I also observed how the strategies of transformation aim to transform the established national identity, which was Turkish (cypriot) identity – within the scope of this research – into (turkish) Cypriot identity. And I examined how the dismantling or destructive strategies aim to dismantle a national identity that can be Turkish (cypriot) identity or (turkish) Cypriot identity without providing a new model to replace it.

In the strategies of means and forms of realisation Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:35) discuss lexical units and syntactic devices that serve to construct unification, unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy and heteronomy. The most important are: personal reference (such as personal pronouns), spatial reference (prepositional phrases such as with us, with them) and temporal reference (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, etc). These strategies are crucial in the analysis of the respondents’ narratives as they give clues as to how the respondents locate the self and others in their memories. Furthermore, the vagueness in referential or other expressions, euphemisms, linguistic hesitation and disruptions, linguistic slips, allusions and rhetorical questions are also useful clues in the analysis of the respondents’ narratives. Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (ibid: 35-45) also talk about the use of tropes of personification; I found the deictic ‘we’ to be useful for this particular research. The deictic expression ‘we’ is commonly used in the representation of the social actors as members of a national collectivity. The authors explain how linguistic studies distinguish between an addressee-inclusive and addressee-exclusive we, and between a speaker-inclusive and speaker exclusive ‘we’.

Although Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) present a methodological approach for the analysis of the construction of national identity in discourse, Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe do not provide a ‘method’ for the empirical analysis. However, their theories provide some useful tools for the analysis (Jorgensen & Philips 2002; Kendall &
Wickham 1999). In this research, the discourse theories of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe are used in the examination of ‘memory’ and ‘national identity’ as the product of discourse. Laclau and Mouffe’s focus on ‘articulation’ and Foucault’s on ‘power relations’ shaped in historical, political and cultural contexts constitute the main foundation for the assumption that emphasizes the dynamism of memory and national identity.

According to Laclau and Mouffe, as noted in Chapter One, the tension between interiority that is related to the partial fixity of discourses and exteriority which is related to the non-fixity of discourses, is the main source of the dynamism that plays the primary role in the formation of discourses through articulations. In parallel with their explanation of the relationship between interiority and exteriority, Laclau and Mouffe describe the interrelationship between elements and moments. Moments appear articulated to the discourse, while elements are differences that aren’t discursively articulated to the present discourse. In other words, elements are ‘free floating’ and thus they are unattached and non-articulated to the present discourse which is constructed by the power relations shaped in historical and cultural contexts. Within the scope of this research, moments can be defined as the memories that compose and sustain the discourse which can be defined either as Turkish (cypriot) or (turkish) Cypriot nationalism; and elements are the memories that function like surplus and threaten the present discourse. Moments and elements thus draw the boundaries between exteriority and interiority. However, it is important to know that discourses which are adopted by the respondents changing depending on power relations; it is therefore not possible to talk about the permanent fixity of discourses or memories. As noted in Chapter One, however, there have to be partial fixities – otherwise it would be impossible to talk about the existence of discourses and memories. It is in this context that Laclau and Mouffe talk about the nodal points and master signifiers as privileged signifiers, because they provide the partial fixity. In this research, ‘nodal points’ and ‘master signifiers’ are used as tools for exploring the partial fixities in the memories of the respondents.

Laclau and Mouffe utilize a number of terms in order to make better sense of the organization of discourse. They introduce the notions of nodal points, master signifiers and myths as the key signifiers in the organization of discourse. All key signifiers are empty signs which mean nothing by themselves until, through chains of equivalence, they are combined with other signs that fill them with meaning. According to Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points organize discourses, master signifiers organize identity, and myths
organize a social space (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). Nodal points are the privileged discursive points (ibid.) and they may help to explore the main themes in the analysis of discourses more easily. According to Zizek (1989:87), ‘the multitude of floating signifiers is structured into a unified field through the intervention of a certain nodal point (The Lacanian point de capiton) which ‘quilts’ them, stops their sliding and fixes their meaning’. Similarly, Lacan does not subscribe to the postmodern idea of an unending fluidity of meaning; for him, although each signification refers to another one and so on and so forth, and both metaphoric substitution and metonymic combination can be described as infinite, this endless movement of signification is stopped by the prominent role attributed to certain signifiers. Lacan calls these signifiers ‘points de capiton’: the point de capiton is the signifier which stops the otherwise endless movement of the signification. These signifiers fix the meaning of whole chains of signifiers (Stavrakakis 1999:60-61).

Furthermore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, ‘master signifiers intervene and constitute their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence (Torfing 1999:90). However, in order to be equivalent in one respect, it is necessary for them to be different in other respects. As Torfing (1999: 125-126) suggests,

All social identities are crossing-points between the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Neither the logic of equivalence nor the logic of difference will dominate completely. They mutually subvert each other. However the undecidable relation between the two logics can temporarily be fixed in a determinate hierarchy.

While the logic of equivalence functions by splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two antagonistic poles, the logic of difference consists in the expansion of a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000b :11; Howarth 1998). In other words, while the logics of equivalence highlight the common points by excluding differences, the logics of difference do exactly the opposite. Although the logic of equivalence seeks to divide into two opposed camps, the logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity.

Within the scope of this research, it is possible to examine how the logics of equivalence and difference function in the articulation of (turkish) Cypriot and Turkish
(cypriot) identities. In the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity the logics of
difference operate to weaken the antagonistic polarity between Turkish and Greek
Cypriots and the logics of equivalence highlight the common points between them (i.e
common past, life-styles, eating habits) by splitting a system of differences (i.e different
accent, life-styles) between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. On the other hand, in the
construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity, I observe how the logics of equivalence
highlight the common points (i.e common language and religion) between Turkish
Cypriots and Turks by composing a political frontier between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
through the emphasis on differences (i.e language and religion) between them. In the
meantime, the logics of difference operate in displacing the polarity between Turkish
Cypriots and Turks.

Identities are discursive articulations and constructions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985;
Hall 1996). They are descriptions of ourselves with which we identify and in which we
are emotionally invested (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 87). The logics of equivalence and
difference are connected with the discursive construction of identity. They are directly
related to the self-other relationships, and they play a primary role in the examination of
how the respondents describe themselves in terms of national identity and thus, how they
define the ‘others’. Laclau and Mouffe describe the mechanisms of identity formation by
introducing the concept of antagonism (Howarth 2000). The realm of discursive
differences becomes homogenized into a chain of equivalence vis-à-vis a purely negative
outside. In a situation of decreasing antagonism, the equivalential relation will be
transformed step by step back into an array of differences (Critchley and Marchart
2004:4).

Similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical concepts of the logics of equivalence
and difference are Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999:33) strategies of emphasis
or presupposition of sameness (strategies of assimilation), and strategies of emphasis or
presupposition of difference (strategies of dissimilation) that serve as discursive macro-
strategies. Strategies of assimilation aim linguistically to create temporal, interpersonal or
territorial similarity and homogeneity in reference to the various thematic dimensions.
According to their social macrofunctions, they may be constructive, destructive,
perpetuating or justifying. On the other hand, strategies of dissimilation create a temporal,
interpersonal or territorial difference and heterogeneity in reference to these same
dimensions. Like the strategies of assimilation, they may also be constructive, destructive,
transformatory or justifying.
3.3 Section two- Ethnographic research: Conducting in-depth interviews

In-depth interviews function to explore the memories of community residents on national identity issues in a way that textual analysis cannot. The aim is to gather information about interviewees’ autobiographical and public memories partly constructed through the mechanisms of memory. As one of the most-used methods of qualitative mass media research, in-depth interviewing (also known as unstructured, narrative and autobiographical interview) (Wimmer &Dominick 2003, Silverman 1997) serves to explore the thoughts, opinions and attitudes of the community residents.

In these interviews, the researcher plays little directive role in the responses of the interviewee because the questions are open-ended; there is no guidance to the answers and the informant is entirely free to express his/her ideas and feelings (Arksey &Knight 1999, Jones 1985). The main objective is to understand the ideas, feelings and behaviours of the interviewee without imposing any a priori categorization (Denzin &Lincoln 2003). According to Thompson (1988:199),

> The strongest argument for a free-flowing interview is when its main purpose is not to seek information or evidence of value in itself, but to make a ‘subjective’ record of how one man or woman looks back on their life as a whole, or part of it. Just how they speak about it, how they order it, what they emphasize, what they miss out, the words they choose, are important in understanding any interview; but for this purpose they became the essential text which will need to be examined.

In depth interviews provide the opportunity to gather a large amount of information about interviewees’ autobiographical and public memories. As Schroder et al. (2003) argue, in-depth interviews are excellent ways of eliciting people’s discursive repertoires about their media experiences because the one-to-one situation enables the researcher to ask much more detailed questions. Thus, through a series of in-depth interviews with respondents, this study explores how respondents articulate the ‘information’ they get in their everyday lives and examines the impact of the public and autobiographical memories on the political views of the respondents regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Without in-depth interviews, it is not possible to explore the memories in relation to national identity that construct and are constructed by the respondents’ political ideas; in-depth interviews enable me to examine the ways in which the respondents locate themselves in terms of political and national identity.
However, there are also disadvantages and difficulties associated with in-depth interviews. As Stacks (2002:86) notes, the major disadvantages to in-depth interviewing include heavy time commitments and difficulties in gaining access to the interviewee. A vast amount of historical research is also necessary to conduct a good in-depth interview. Thus the researcher should know that conducting in-depth interviews might require much more time than other forms of research. Open-ended in-depth interviews may generate more information than is needed or can be processed (Smith and Albaum 2005:187); however, without a long interview it might not be possible to obtain the necessary knowledge about the respondents’ memories that compose the base of this research.

3.3.1 The questionnaire and the selection of the sample

A questionnaire was prepared for the purpose of gathering basic information about the people in order to find the 60 interviewees who would be appropriate for the base of the research. I started my fieldwork in 2007 and delivered the questionnaires to my respondents in that year, within a four-month period from July to October. Although it is not possible to talk about any specific importance of this date, one can describe the time after 2004 as a historical period which was dominated by political uncertainties and inconsistencies in Northern Cyprus, because of the outcomes of the two referenda that were held in Cyprus on the Annan Plan. As was mentioned in the introduction, the Annan Plan, proposing a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union following a solution of the Cyprus problem, was presented in 2002. However, in the referenda over the Annan Plan in 2004, most of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ and a great number of Greek Cypriots said ‘no’ to it. The Annan plan was therefore abolished and Turkish Cypriots could not be a part of the European Union until some unspecified time. Uncertainties about the future of Northern Cyprus are the reason that Turkish Cypriots are still discussing and thinking about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. Doing interviews with Turkish Cypriots within this historical period gave me the opportunity to examine how the recent political developments (i.e. Annan Plan, referendum) mobilized their memories of the ‘past’ and future expectations regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus.

I gave a questionnaire to every potential interviewee and then decided whether or not to do the in-depth interview with them according to their answers to the questionnaire.
The questionnaires thus played a substantial role in the selection of the sample of 60 interviewees. At the beginning of the questionnaire there were some standard questions about the respondents’ name, age, sex, occupation, living situation, citizenship and education level. There were other questions relating to the special political situation in Northern Cyprus; here I asked how the respondents considered themselves in terms of national identity, if there were any martyrs\(^3\) in their families or close environment and whether they were refugees\(^4\) or not. Some other questions focussed on the respondents’ newspaper preferences and frequency of reading these newspapers. In the final question, I asked the respondent’s opinion about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union.

It should be noted here that for this research 80 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents. I used a certain criteria for the selection of those to be interviewed. As can be understood from the questions, in the selection of the sample my primary focus was the interviewees’ demographic features, ideas on the Annan Plan, the newspaper preferences, frequency in reading; and some special features related to the political situation in Northern Cyprus. Through the questionnaire, my aim was to find respondents with different sexes, ages, occupations, education levels and ideas on the Annan Plan in order to form the conditions needed to have a variation for a proper research. In this sense, my questions were devised to elicit particular answers that would be useful in selecting my sample. I was interested in finding people with different occupations and educational backgrounds, in order to hear as many alternative voices about political and national issues as possible. Furthermore, in the selection of the interviewees, I drew out different views on the subject of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union: there were 30 respondents in favour of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem and 30 respondents against it. I formed the sample according to people’s political beliefs as I wanted to examine the impact of the interrelationship between dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories on political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus.

\(^3\) A ‘martyr’ is a person who is believed to have been killed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus war. It is a common and legitimate term for Turkish Cypriots. Martyrdom is a highly sacred position in the Muslim religion and it articulated into the discourse of Turkish nationalism. It is also a common practice in Turkey to call people who died for their motherland ‘martyrs’.

\(^4\) After de-facto division of the island in 1974, Greek Cypriots living in the North and Turkish Cypriots living in the South forced to leave their homes, lands& properties and settle in ‘their’ respective parts of the island.
Because children and teenagers might not provide a sufficient evaluation of their political ideas and memories in relation to national identity as the research required, there were no children or teenage interviewees in this research; I excluded the age group 1-19. I conducted interviews with 30 interviewees (15 men and 15 women) between the ages of 20-33; and with 30 interviewees (15 men and 15 women) between the ages of 40-80. The interviewees between the ages of 20-33 were born after the division of the island in 1974; so they did not have any ‘personal’ memories with Greek Cypriots before the division of the island.

I examined the correlations and discrepancies between public narratives mediated through the mechanisms of memory and autobiographical narratives of the respondents by conducting interviews with the respondents between the ages of 40-80, as those interviewees generally have autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots. In the selection of the 40-80 age group, I considered the fact that younger people might not have ‘personal’ memories with Greek Cypriots as they were under seven years old before the division of the island. I formed the sample with the people who bought and read at least one of the selected national newspapers (Kıbrıs or Volkan) every day. In the questionnaire, I also asked respondents if there were any martyrs in their families or close environment and whether they were immigrants or not, in order to learn if they had any traumatic autobiographical memory that played a role in their political ideas and/or definition of national identity before the in-depth interview.

Before starting to do the in-depth interviews, I decided on locations where I thought I could find the appropriate people for my interviews. My knowledge of the gendered public space in Northern Cyprus helped me to choose strategies in order to find the right sex and age group in different locations: I went to some of the main public spaces that are frequented by elderly men between the ages 60-90, such as coffee houses and the Turkish Cypriot public associations and unions – e.g., Kardeş Ocağı (The Brotherhood Hearth), Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı Derneği (The Association of the Turkish Resistance Organization), Mücahitler Derneği (The Turkish Cypriot Soldiers’ Association) and Çiftçiler Birliği (The Farmers’ Association). The elderly men who go to these organisations are retired and spend time seeing their friends and reading newspapers; the organisations subscribe to all the newspapers published in Northern Cyprus and have special rooms for this purpose. However, the people who go there are generally opponents of the Annan Plan because of the political standpoint of the associations; this gave me the opportunity to find the opponents of the Annan Plan.
However, I also found elderly men with alternative views in these places because sometimes people go to the association without considering its political standpoint. I also determined other locations frequented by the supporters of the Annan Plan such as Kırılınç Kültür Evi (Swallow Cultural House).

In contrast to this group, in Northern Cyprus, housewives and elderly women between the ages 60-90 are associated with the domestic sphere; I therefore went to some old and popular settlement places like Belediye Evleri⁵ (municipality houses), public houses that were constructed by the government and labour or trade unions, and private houses, in order to find the housewives and elderly women; it is difficult to find them in the public sphere as one does men. There is no gendering of space for the age group around 20-59 in Northern Cyprus. The men and women around this age group are occasionally working during the day in public and private workplaces; for this group, I visited some private places of employment such as barbershops and clothing shops, and some public workplaces such as tourism agencies and hotels. To find the 20-25 age group, I went to the youth organizations of political parties, folk clubs, cafes and universities. I also found some of the interviewees in the 20-50 age group at a bookstore’s (Işık Kitabevi) book exhibition. During the in-depth interviews, I tried to create a relaxed social interaction and a friendly atmosphere with my interviewees: I did the interviews in familiar and natural settings where the respondents would feel more relaxed and free to talk. These settings were their homes, work places, or other locations such as coffee houses and universities where I had found them initially.

3.3.2 Questions in the in-depth interviews

In this research, in-depth interviews were conducted with 60 community residents of Northern Cyprus. In order to examine how the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) influenced the respondents’ political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity, I classified the questions of the in-depth interviews under three headlines. These headlines are ‘memories in relation to national identity’, ‘political ideas relating to the Cyprus Problem’ and ‘media’. As can

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⁵ Belediye evleri (municipality houses) are owned by the Nicosia municipality in Northern Cyprus. These houses were constructed during the British colonial period in Cyprus, and homeless people and/or people with low incomes were settled in them.
be understood from the headings, the aim of this classification is to embrace the different but interrelated parts of the research that is determined in parallel to the hypothesis stated above. In the in-depth interviews, there were eight questions about memories in relation to national identity, six about the political ideas relating to the Cyprus Problem, and fifteen about the media (see Appendix 1). I used the list of questions as a guiding list during the interviews.

For the interviews, two different question lists were prepared for each age group in the sample. As noted above, although the 40-80 age group generally have 'personal' memories with Greek Cypriots, the 20-33 age group do not have any autobiographical memory with them before the division of the island in 1974. Therefore the questions in the first part, about the ‘memories in relation to national identity’, were different in each list. In the question list prepared for the 40-80 age group, the questions were about the ‘personal’ memories of living with Greek Cypriots. However, in the question list for the 20-33 age group, the questions in the first part were mostly about public memories. In the second part, the questions were related to the political situation in Northern Cyprus; the focus was on the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and issues connected with the plan such as European Union membership, foreign powers and expectations regarding the future of Cyprus. Although most of the questions were related to the European Union membership of Northern Cyprus under the framework of the Annan Plan, the primary purpose of the research was not to get information about the Plan, but to explore the memories of the respondents concerning the Greek Cypriots (others). The questions were thus organized strategically to examine how the Annan Plan, which is about the possible future of Turkish Cypriots with Greek Cypriots, mobilized the memories of the respondents about the ‘others’. In the last section, my aim was to explore how the media (particularly newspapers) mobilized the memories of the respondents regarding their national identities and to observe how the respondents used the ‘information’ they get in their everyday lives.

At the end of the interviews, four photographs and four news articles with their photographs were shown to the interviewees in order to learn their interpretations of them. The photographs and the news articles were selected according to their particular meanings associated with the core theme of the research – ‘self-other relationships’. By showing the photographs and the news articles, my aim was to explore what particular meanings and values respondents associated with their nation and their national identity,
what they thought about their national celebrations and what they said for the commemorations.

In two of the photographs, there are monuments that represent the political discourse of the period of President Denktaş and the government of the Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP). According to Bodnar (1994:78), ‘monuments would be placed in the center of the city where people would pass by it everyday and be reminded of their “love of their country” and their duty to their ‘native land’. During the Denktaş and UBP period, the Turkish (cypriot) Nationalist discourse was dominant. In the construction of the Turkish (cypriot) identity, which is articulated by Turkish (cypriot) nationalist discourse, sameness between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and differences between Turkish and Greek Cypriots are promoted. In this respect, one of my photographs depicts the monument of the founder of Turkey “Atatürk”, and there is a sentence below the sculpture that reads: “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene” (‘How happy to say I am a Turk’). I chose the photograph of the monument because Atatürk is one of the most crucial symbols of Turkishness that is used in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. Furthermore, in the second photograph, there are flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ together; like the symbol of Atatürk, these two flags play an important role in the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity in Northern Cyprus. The third photograph is of a monument that symbolises a martyr (Turkish soldier) who was killed by Greeks and lies in his mother’s arms. The statement below the sculpture is: “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget). The photograph of this monument was chosen as it articulates national identity through the representation of the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) as savage people who killed innocent Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus war. In this way, the monument was placed to remind people of the ‘past’ that was constructed during the period of President Denktaş and the UBP government.

On the other hand, in the CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) period, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism was highlighted. Although Turkish (cypriot) nationalism is based on imagined ‘friends (Turks)’ and ‘enemies (Greek Cypriots)’, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism emphasizes the friendship and commonalities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. For this reason, some symbols representing the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were placed in the streets during the CTP period; in the last two photographs, there are symbols that represent the similar ways of life, traditions and political expectations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the fourth photograph, there are Sestas (flat baskets) placed in the street: these common, traditional items are made with
rushes and used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat food on; and this symbol represents the common ways of life of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Finally, in the fifth photograph, there is the peace cresset made by a famous Greek artist to symbolise the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum, as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan. Thus, the peace cresset represents the common expectations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots from the future – the unification of the island under European Union membership.

I also analyse the narratives of the respondents about the representations of the event “the partial opening of the crossings between the two parts of the island” in the news stories of Kıbrıs and Volkan newspapers. The partial opening of the crossings in 2003 was selected as a case study because it was the most radical development related to the Cyprus problem since 1974. After the division of the island in 1974, Greek Cypriots living in the North and Turkish Cypriots living in the South had to leave their homes; they were unable to see their former homes, Greek Cypriot acquaintances, friends and neighbours again till the opening of the crossings in 2003. After the partial opening of the crossings, Turkish and Greek Cypriots started to cross the boundaries for the first time after 1974 and they visited their former homes, places of employment or met those whom they had been apart from since 1974. The representation of this event through the media played a crucial role in the creation of dynamism for the articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity; this particular case study enabled me to explore how the media mobilize Turkish Cypriots to focus on their memories in relation to national identity and to rethink the ‘others’.

Case studies focus on a particular situation, event or phenomenon and provide detailed and specific information about it (Fiske 1994, Wimmer & Dominick 2003); they enable us to focus on certain special events and to analyse the news stories about them in a detailed way. In the examination of news stories, which are one of the sources of case study information (Tellis 1997), the cultural constraints that are embedded within the production process of news stories cannot be ignored. As Verschuren (2003:137) points out, “case study is suitable for studying phenomena that are embedded in their cultural context”. Thus, in the analysis of the narratives of the respondents, I also consider the cultural factors that play a role in the production of the news stories by the Kıbrıs and Volkan newspapers; and I explicate the ownership or/and control relationships of these two particular papers, their standpoints in the political spectrum within the period of the
analysis and the discourses that form their views about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union.

These newspapers do not have any organic relationships with any political parties in Northern Cyprus; however, their discourses are parallel to the political standpoints of certain political leaders or/ and political parties in Northern Cyprus. They allow access to a large readership as their circulation rates are high: Kibris newspaper has been chosen because it has the highest circulation among the national newspapers and it supports the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union through a solution under the framework of the Annan Plan; thus it has a European Unionist discourse within the period covered by this research. Kıbrıs highlights (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and it can be roughly classified as on the Left\(^6\) of the political spectrum. The paper is a privately owned commercial newspaper that was established by its owner Asil Nadir, a famous businessman, on 11\(^{th}\) July 1988. Within the period of this analysis, the discourse of the newspaper was parallel to the discourse of the CTP government that came to power in 2003. As was stated in chapter four, the CTP government is highly in favour of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union.

On the other hand, the newspaper Volkan has been chosen because it has the highest circulation among the newspapers that do not support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union. Volkan underlines the Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse and it can be classified as on the Right\(^7\) of the political spectrum. Although it belongs to no political party, it has supported the ideas of the first president, Denktaş, starting from its establishment. Hence, Kıbrıs and Volkan can be roughly

\(^6\)Together with the ideals of peace and freedom, the different attitudes of people towards the ideal of equality are the commonest criterion used to differentiate the Right from the Left. The best element is the notion of equalization that defines the doctrines that are assumed as the Left. Namely, the notion of equality is not the illusion of being a member of a community, in which everybody is equal, but to elevate the elements that render people equals, rather than the elements that render people different (Bobbio 1994:103). In a similar vein, Kıbrıs newspaper’s focus on (turkish) Cypriot nationalism is a kind of elevation of the elements that render Greek and Turkish Cypriots equals. Hence, the newspaper produces news stories that articulate the commonalities instead of the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

\(^7\) The Right is nothing as opposed to being within or without traditions and everything is within and for the traditions. If we are to specify different forms of the Right, this is closely related to various meanings of convention. According to Confrancesco, there are six different meanings of convention: as a model, as the approval of an era determined within the history of humanity, as loyalty to national values, as a unity of fate, as historical memory and as the conscience of the complexity of the reality (Bobbio 1994:89). The Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse of Volkan newspaper is parallel to the different forms of the Right, which are related to the different meanings of the convention: as loyalty to Turkish nationalistic values, as a unity of fate and as historical memory.
classified as respectively Right and Left$^8$ on the political spectrum. However, the discourses of these two newspapers are not static and thus are articulated and constructed through the changing historical and political circumstances. In this research, my objective is not to talk about the newspaper discourses that are permanently fixed and stable; however, it is possible to locate a partial closure to examine the media discourses that are produced and circulated within a specific time span.

In the examination of the news stories of Kıbrıs and Volkan, I explored how each newspaper constructs the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots according to its present political discourse. Thus, the past is constructed according to the present political standpoints of the newspapers about the Annan Plan, which is based on a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union in the future. In this way, after the opening of the crossings, each newspaper interprets an event about Greek Cypriots by referring to the past that they articulate in the present and for the future. Within the scope of this research, I chose three news stories with six photographs from Kıbrıs newspaper and one news story, also with six photographs, from Volkan newspaper. The partial opening of the crossings is represented as a way of going back to the ‘past’ (the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together) by both newspapers; however, depending on the political discourse of the newspaper, the ‘past’ is sometimes represented as a ‘happier past’ and sometimes as a period of time that is wished to have never existed. The ‘past’ and ‘present’ are articulated through the different representations of the newspapers about the ‘others’. In the news stories of Volkan, the others are represented as the eternal enemies who murdered many innocent Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus war and ruined the commemorative locations and sacred places of Turks after the division of the island in 1974. On the other hand, in the news stories of Kıbrıs, one sees how the others (Greek Cypriots) are transformed into Cypriots who share common experiences, sorrows and longings with Turkish Cypriots. The newspaper also emphasizes the present friendship, which is based on a common past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, since the opening of the crossings.

$^8$ The ‘Right’ and the ‘Left’ are always represented as opposites in terms of their political standpoints, world-views and objectives. These two terms are popularly used to classify and define the political standpoints of the parties, groups, institutions, politicians and newspapers. The Right and the Left mutually exclude and weaken each other because none of the tenets or political movements can be the supporter of both the Right and the Left. However, the meaning of the ‘Right’ and the ‘Left’ is always in process and subject to change (Bobbio 1994:47). Their meanings are constantly articulated, renegotiated and reconstructed. For this reason, it is not possible to locate a stable meaning either to the Left or to the Right. These two terms may carry different meanings in specific historical and political periods.
3.3.3 In depth interviews: Personal experiences and methods

During the in-depth interviews, I tried to follow the order of the questions in the question list. However, I sometimes asked additional questions that were not on the list of the in-depth interviews. This occurred depending on the course of the interview; the content of the answers of the interviewees was the main reason for further questions. Thus, I sometimes asked additional questions to clarify a subject, probe more and tease out information that was not provided by the respondents; a feeling that there was something more behind the given answers made me ask another question in order to learn more deeply about the related subject. Occasionally some questions were missed if the interviewee had given his or her answers in response to any former question; hence, I used the question list of the in-depth interviews in a flexible way.

Through the interviews, the respondents sometimes talked about unnecessary subjects that were not related to the nature of the research, such as one respondent’s detailed explanation of his educational background which was given while he was talking about the role of history teachers in providing information about the Cyprus Problem. In those instances, I preferred to let my respondents talk and finish their conversation in order to make them feel free and relaxed enough to express themselves; free expression constituted the essential part of this research as it is substantial in the narration of memories. It is sometimes difficult for people to talk about their past experiences, sorrows, worries, fears or happiness; and occasionally, it is not easy to remember immediately an event or a period of time like childhood. In such cases, a long conversation might help them remember. However, sometimes long conversations about unnecessary subjects caused digression from the main issue, and this created problems as the respondents lost their attention and interest in it. In these instances, it was difficult for me to take their attention back to the main issue again. I therefore generally asked the main question for the second time at the end of their explanation in order to get the answer to my question.

The conduct of the interviews presented a few practical problems and I tried to solve them without losing patience. One of these was caused by the audio recording device that I used to record the voices of my respondents. Some of the interviewees started to talk very abruptly and in political terms after I had started to record their voice. For example, Salime, a 68-year-old female retired teacher, answered many questions about ‘political ideas relating to the Cyprus problem’ in the second part of the question
list of the in-depth interviews as follows: “political leaders know what’s best about everything. I haven’t got any idea”. She also didn’t want to talk about her memories of living with Greek Cypriots, and gave very short ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to my questions about ‘memories in relation to national identity’. However, after I had stopped recording her voice, she started to talk about some unpleasant memories of Greek Cypriots that represented her fears and worries about them. In these instances, I listened to my respondents very carefully and took notes immediately after the interview in order to preserve the information.

Moreover, I faced problems with some of my respondents who focused more on my questions instead of their answers. For example, when I asked the question ‘do you think the island should remain divided or unified?’ Ahmet, a 60-year-old male barber, told me that this question was biased and continued: “Turkish Cypriots do not live in a divided country. Their country is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and they live in peace in their country with the support of their motherland Turkey”. Then he tried to learn about my own political ideas by asking questions and to convince me that his ideas reflected truths. In these instances, I tried to explain that what was important for me was to learn their opinions and my aim was not to support any ideas but to represent my respondents’ answers equally in my research.

Some of my respondents got bored and became angry when I tried to go into their deeper feelings and learn more. In particular, the ones who had ‘martyrs’ in their families were very angry and aggressive while they were talking about their family member’s death in the Cyprus war. Some of the respondents were also very aggressive while they were narrating their memories with Greek Cypriots. In these instances, I tried to calm them down by explaining that I didn’t want to make them feel sad by reminding them of their painful memories, and that I shared their pains and sorrows.

During my research, I adopted some specific ethical principles such as value awareness (Grinnell and Unrau 2008:451), informed consent and protection of confidentiality (Grinnell and Unrau 2008:451, Cievrzo and Keitel 1998:67, Brown 2003:46-53). According to Grinnell and Unrau (2008), ‘due to the subjective nature of qualitative research, it is essential that researchers demonstrate some value awareness and thus they should report any potential biases and how they may have affected the study’. In considering the ethical issue of value awareness, I should therefore make it clear that as a Turkish Cypriot researcher, I am embedded in the historical, political and cultural
contexts which are peculiar to Northern Cyprus and that these circumstances might indirectly influence my conceptions and interpretations regarding the Cyprus issue.

At the beginning of each in-depth interview, I gave my respondents brief information about the content of my PhD thesis and I obtained their informed consent. As Cievrzo and Keitel suggest (1998:67), ‘the principle of informed consent is that the researcher provides participants with sufficient information about the research so that they can make informed decisions regarding participation’. I therefore explained to my respondents the purpose of my research, my intention in doing interviews, what would be asked in the interview and why I wanted to record their voices. Cievrzo and Keitel (ibid) note that ‘informed consent indicates that participation is knowledgeable and voluntary and that participant can withdraw from the research at anytime’. Accordingly, at the beginning of the in-depth interviews, I explained to my respondents that I needed to record their voices as I would not be able to take notes of all they said, since generally in-depth interviews take approximately more than an hour; and I obtained permission from each of interviewee to record their voice with a tape recording device. I also told them that they could withdraw from the interview at any time they wished.

Before starting the in-depth interviews, I encouraged my respondents to ask questions if there was anything that they were wondering or if they had any worries about the interview. They generally asked if I would use their surnames in my research and if I would use the information and/or their recorded voice for other purposes. I explained that I would use any kind of information solely for my research; my intention was not to use the data for any media institution or for any other purposes. According to Becker and Boore (2008:130), ‘when reporting the case study, real names and personal identifiers that are enough to identify a person should not be used unless the individual has given explicit (written) permission to be identified’. In order to protect the confidentiality of my respondents, I removed my respondents’ names and surnames from the interview booklet after assuring myself that I did not need to re-contact them for any further information. I also replaced the real names of my respondents with nicknames after I had finished the draft chapters that were based on the interview data.
CHAPTER 4: ‘CYPRUS HISTORY’ AND THE MECHANISMS OF MEMORY

4.1 Introduction

In order to understand better the social-historical conditions in which public and autobiographical memories are constructed in Northern Cyprus, an overview of the ‘history of Cyprus’ and of the function of the mechanisms of memory (media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) within the society/culture of Turkish Cypriots is essential. This chapter provides historical information to lay the foundations of the necessary background knowledge and develop a better understanding regarding the mechanisms of memory and the narratives of the respondents that form the basis of the ethnographic research. Without such a background, a full understanding of the narratives of the respondents that are analysed in the following three chapters will not be possible.

Beginning with an account of the Cyprus problem, understood as the problem of antagonistic Greek and Turkish nationalisms that have resulted in the division of the island since 1974, I examine the past and recent relations of Cyprus with the European Union and the influence of these relations on the developments around the Cyprus problem. However, the focus is on the presentation in 2002 of the Annan Plan by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the most critical development in the relations between Cyprus and the European Union. Situating Cyprus in the broader regional context, especially over the past 50 years or so and moving on to the island’s move towards European Union membership and final accession, the chapter will seek to identify a number of key parameters in Cypriot history such as the antagonistic relationship between Greek and Turkish nationalisms and the proposed solution of the problem of the island’s division through the recent United Nations process and the Annan Plan.

To provide a clear perspective on these issues, the history of Cyprus is examined through different periods under these headings; ‘the colonization between 750 BC-1960’, ‘the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cyprus war 1960-1974’ and ‘the division of the island from 1974 onwards’. The last topic is examined in two different time periods: the period of the Denktaş presidency and the government of the National Unity Party (‘Ulusal Birlik Partisi’ or UBP) during 1974-2003; and the government of the
Republican Turkish Party (‘Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi’ or CTP) during 2003-2009. The content of this historical explanation has been determined according to the key issues that were explored through the in-depth interviews with the respondents. In the last part of the chapter, the relations between Cyprus and the European Union and the influence of this relationship on the Cyprus problem will be explored, with a primary focus on the Annan Plan that was proposed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2002. The aim is to examine the Cyprus problem within a broader political context that considers the role of external powers such as Turkey, Greece, the European Union and the United Nations in the Cyprus problem.

4.2 The Colonization Period between 750 BC - 1960

In the Mediterranean, Cyprus is the third largest island after Sicily and Sardinia, located 40 miles to the south of Turkey and 600 miles to the south-east of Greece (Sözen 1998:6). Due to its geographical location, the island has always been the focus of power struggles since ancient times: it attracted many colonizers and was ruled successively by the Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks and British (Joseph 1997:16). As a result, throughout history the identity of the residents of Cyprus has been rearticulated, reconstructed and represented within changing social, political and cultural circumstances.

Although many colonial powers have come and gone in Cyprus, the island is still a field of power relations, especially between Turkey and Greece. These two countries have had crucial influences on the island because of their political interests and historical and cultural connections with the natives of the island, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Because of their connections, Turkey and Greece are accepted as motherland countries by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively. In addition, the United States, European Union countries, and Russia are external powers that are closely interested in Cyprus for a variety of global, political and geographical reasons (Samani 1999). These conflicting interests over the island make Cyprus one of the most problematic areas of the world and create, reinforce and reproduce the Cyprus problem.

As these varieties of complex interests are intertwined with each other, it is not easy to explain the main reasons behind the Cyprus problem. According to Kızılyürek (2001:10), its causes can be classified on the basis of internal and external factors. The external factors are the interventions of colonial powers on the island, while the internal
factors are the historical and political changes that have occurred on the island since its invasion by the Ottomans in 1571. The historical and political changes that make up the internal factors, Kızılyürek argues, create the necessary conditions for the interventions of colonial powers which are the external factors; the internal and external factors influence each other.

When the Ottomans invaded Cyprus, they settled a limited number of Moslem Turks from different parts of Anatolia on the island. Until the arrival of the Ottomans, the population of the island had been predominantly Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox; Moslem Turks and Orthodox Greeks made up the traditional Ottoman society after this point. The Ottomans administered the island under the ‘millet’ system, whereby the communities were institutionalized, had specific rights and privileges and elected their own judicial and administrative officials (Necatigil 1993:1). According to Samani (1999:13), these two communities mostly lived together and established friendly relationships under the Ottoman administration approximately for three centuries. However, due to the Ottoman millet system of communal separation in areas such as culture, education and religion, the Christian and Muslim communities of Cyprus conducted their separate lives in parallel neighbourhoods of the towns and villages. As Joseph (1999:17) points out, the Ottoman millet administrative system distinguished the two communities on the basis of religion and ethnicity, and hence encouraged separate, private, social and political lives under different religious leaders. This was further encouraged during the period of British rule, when communal voting for separate councils was introduced in municipal elections; the British retained and developed the Ottoman system of separation (Tocci 2004:43). For this reason it is possible to talk about the transformation of the millet system into a system of ethnic differentiation that began with the influence of the politics of British colonization and with the entrance of Greek and Turkish nationalisms to the island.

One factor in the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was the influence of Turkish and Greek nationalisms. The projection of Greek nationalism in Cyprus was ‘Enosis’ – that is, the discourse of the unification of the island with the ‘motherland’, Greece. Through this discourse, the elites that believed they had been politically second-class citizens during the Ottoman period began to feel they were part of

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9 In many ways, Greek and Turkish nationalist projects are ‘parallel monologues’. Greece and Turkey have been historically posited as the ‘other’ in their respective nationalist imaginaries, each being seen, from the outset, as being at the antipodes of the survival of the other (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:2).
a privileged, ideal and powerful Greek nation (Samani 1999: 15). On the other hand, starting from the first years of British colonization, the local Ottoman intellectuals who were against the increasing desire of the Orthodox Greeks for Enosis, and were beginning to feel their social status was decreasing, were carrying the hope that the island would one day be given back to the previous owner, the Ottomans (ibid:22). Turkish nationalism in this sense mainly developed among Turkish intellectuals as a preventive measure against the collapse of the Ottoman Empire when the empire started to lose its power and authority (ibid: 19). The politics of British colonization was another contributing factor in the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It had a substantial influence on the formation of the ethnic differentiation between the two communities. British politics focused primarily on the maintenance of British sovereignty in colonial countries; protection of Britain’s control and authority over colonized societies was based on its classic ‘divide and rule strategies’ (Young 1994:225-231). During the British period in 1878, influenced by social, political and cultural contexts that were mostly formed as a result of these strategies, Greek and Turkish Cypriots\textsuperscript{10} began to fight with each other in order to gain dominance over the island.

In the beginning, the basis of their conflict was their focus on different religions; and later, differences in race, language, and cultural and historical backgrounds. Although the different religions of the two communities empowered the antagonistic relations between them, this situation was useful for the British as it facilitated the British administration’s rule on the island. The Turkish Cypriots, who identified themselves as a Moslem community, lived in peace with the British administration until the 1930s. At the beginning of the 1930s, with the influence of the currents of nationalism in the world and the empowerment of the Republic of Turkey\textsuperscript{11}, Turkish Cypriots strove to establish a national identity (Erhürman 2007:14). This time the focus of the Turkish Cypriot community was diverted towards the putative racial, historical and cultural differences that distinguished them from Greek Cypriots. The language, religion and historical background of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, constructed differently from each other, make up the main stones in the formation of their national identities.

\textsuperscript{10} Greek Cypriots speak Greek and identify themselves with the Greek nation and Greek culture. Almost all of them are members of the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots, all of whom are Moslems, speak Turkish and identified themselves first with the Ottomans and later with the Turkish nation and Turkish culture (Joseph 1997).

\textsuperscript{11} The Ottoman Empire was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey, which was officially proclaimed in 1923. The end of the Ottoman culture came with the secularization of Turkey after World War II along European models of government (Shaw and Shaw: 1987:373).
4.3 The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cyprus war 1960-1974

The second half of the 1950’s witnessed the Greek Cypriot struggle to drive the British colonial rulers out of Cyprus and gain independence in order to fulfil Enosis, their national desire to unite Cyprus with Greece (Sözen 1998:6-7). Resistance towards British colonization came mainly from the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie (Kızılyürek 2001:40-41). Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, EOKA, the (Greek) National Cypriot Fighters Organization, was established in 1952 and it began its actions for decolonization in 1955. The initial position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was to support the continuation of British rule, which was viewed as better than Enosis by the Turkish Cypriots at that time. As EOKA hit harder and harder on British military personnel, more and more British jobs were taken away from Greeks and given to Turks. An auxiliary police force was formed whose task was to control Greek riots and help the British army fight EOKA. In this way, British policy served to polarize the two communities (Stavrinides 1999:29). The function of the Legislative Council12 was also crucial in the promotion of the antagonism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots: Greek members used the council as a platform for making pro-Enosis demands and this drove the Turkish members to side with the British. Thus the system created a feeling that the task of Greek and Turkish politicians was to promote the interests of opposing groups of people (ibid: 19).

However, when the Turkish Cypriots understood that the British would eventually withdraw from the island, the leadership supported the idea of ‘Taksim’, the partition of the island between Turkey and Greece (Sözen 1998:7). Thus TMT, the Turkish Defence Organization, was established in opposition to EOKA in 1957 and tried to spread the thesis that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not live together (Kızılyürek 2001:54). EOKA and TMT struggled to reach different goals regarding their respective communities; while EOKA worked for the realization of Enosis, TMT worked for Taksim. Thus it is possible to talk about the polarization of the Cypriot society into two camps (ibid: 2001:53): on the one hand, there were Taksim and TMT and on the other, Enosis and EOKA; and the continuing interests of the Greek and Turkish bourgeoisies were formed as two contradictory opinions and world-views (Kızılyürek 2001:53).

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12 The Legislative Council was established in 1882. The council consisted of six British colonial officials and twelve elected Cypriot members, three ‘Moslems’ and nine ‘non-Moslems’ (Stravrinides 1999).
By the end of the 1950s, Britain had to end its colonization in Cyprus and the island was granted its independence with the agreements signed at London and Zurich in 1959. US policy played a crucial role in the formation of the necessary conditions on the way to the independence of the island. During this period, the United States supported the end of colonization in the international field, claiming that colonization was increasing communist developments (Kızılyürek 2001:58). The Republic of Cyprus as an independent, bi-communal state was finally established in 1960 under the guarantorship of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. According to its Constitution, “the State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being a Greek and the Vice President being a Turk elected by the Greek and Turkish Communities of Cyprus” (Stavrinides 1999:3). In the first elections, Archbishop Makarios was elected President, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected Vice President.

When the Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960, it acquired a flag but not a national anthem (Papadakis 2005:162). Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük welcomed the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus with the discourses of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ (Kızılyürek 2005:15). At that time, their political standpoint was strengthened by the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus. The flag was chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. According to the constitution, the Republic of Cyprus had to have its own flag of neutral design and colour. Thus, the flag could not have on it blue or red, the colours of Greece and Turkey (Hart 1990:144). A flag was selected with no cultural allusion to either community, drawing its symbolism from nature instead: yellow for copper, the shape of Cyprus and olive branches that symbolized the two communities coexisting peacefully, intertwined in the management of the new state (Papadakis 2005:162).

The Turkish Cypriot newspapers published during this period also supported the Republic. The weekly Cumhuriyet (The Republic) started its publication on 16 August 1960, the very day of the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus (Azgın 1998:652). As Azgın (1998:652-653) notes, the main policy of Cumhuriyet newspaper was to help preserve the new Republic, to encourage harmonious relations between the Turkish and Greek communities, and to avoid inter-communal conflicts. The owner of the newspaper was Ayhan Hikmet, a lawyer. The newspaper was privately owned, and because of its policy, Cumhuriyet quite often came into confrontation with the newspaper Nacak (1959).
that was owned by Rauf Denktaş\textsuperscript{13} (on behalf of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations); Nacak was supporting the nationalist discourse (Evre 2004:151). Cumhuriyet kept accusing Nacak of being chauvinistic and claiming that such an attitude might harm the whole island. In general, Nacak defended Dr. Küçük’s policies, but it stressed the tactical differences between the policies of Küçük and Denktaş (Azgün 1998:652). Similarly, the newspaper Akın (The Pioneer; 1962), which had no relations with any political party, struggled to defend the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus (ibid:653). During this period, Dr. Fazıl Küçük established Halkın Sesi newspaper, which he owned, and it became his voice. The newspaper, which he used to attack his political opponents, played a crucial role in Küçük’s leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community and during his time as the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus (Azgün 1998:649-650). Apart from the newspapers, Turkish Cypriots made use of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) for their radio and TV\textsuperscript{14} needs until the 1963 conflicts (Azgün 1998:657). CBC was under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus; however, there were only a few hours of Turkish programming every day on the radio, and once a week a TV programme was broadcast in Turkish (Azgün 1998:657). This situation made the newspapers the primary source of ‘information’ during this period.

The partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots lasted for only three years; a short time from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus disagreements began between Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük. On 30\textsuperscript{th} November 1963, President Makarios put forward a set of 13 proposals for amending the Republic’s Constitution (Oberling 1982:82-83). These are famously known as the “thirteen amendments” or “thirteen points” of the constitution of the 1960 Republic (Sözen 1998:9). According to Makarios, the constitution was unworkable and it was necessary to make some amendments to it for the proper function of the state (Kızılyürek 2001:73). He proposed that the vice-president of the Republic was to stand in for the president in case of the latter’s temporary absence, unified municipalities were to be established (according to the constitution, separate municipalities had to be created in the five largest towns of the Republic), the administration of justice was to be unified (according to the constitution, Turkish Cypriots were to be judged by Turkish judge and Greek Cypriots by Greek judge). These demands

\textsuperscript{13}Rauf R Denktaş, a Turkish nationalist, was the founder of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” in 1975 and the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983.

\textsuperscript{14}Cyprus Radio was established in 1951 and Cyprus Television was established in 1957 (Dedeçay 1989:25).
can be interpreted as reasonable and contributing to unity and confidence between the two communities.

Furthermore, according to the proposed amendments, the president and vice-president of the Republic were both to lose their veto power, the proportion of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service, the security forces and the army was to be modified in order to reflect the actual ethnic ratio of the Cypriot population, and all decisions of the Public Service Commission were to be taken by simple majority vote (Oberling 1982:82-83). As Greek Cypriots were the majority in the Cypriot community, these items were intensively criticised by Turkish politicians. According to them, the amendments would deprive the Turkish Cypriots of the status of ‘equal partner of the Republic’ and they would give the complete control over the administration to the Greek Cypriots, who were the majority.

The conflicting interpretations of the purpose of the proposed amendments by the political leaders of the two communities are highly significant, as they formed the basis of the contested narrations that are disseminated by the ‘mechanisms of memory’ of the two communities especially after the division of the island in 1974. These conflicting interpretations are mostly related to the fear of the ‘other’. In the case of the Greek Cypriots’ politics, the constitution favoured the Turkish minority. They supported this claim by arguing that the constitution had never been put to the test of popular opinion, but had been imposed by foreign powers on the Greek Cypriots; and therefore Greek Cypriots could not be bound to accept all its provisions. On the other hand, according to the Turkish/Cypriots’ politics, the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) were trying to usurp the rights of Turkish Cypriots and render them ‘minorities’; the main objective of the amendments was to reduce the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a minority, from the status of co-founder and politically equal partner of the Republic (Stavrinides 1999:42).

For this reason, the government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the Greek move. This was put forward as one of the primary reasons why, five days later, EOKA started the communal struggle and the two communities started fighting with each other. The Cyprus war had started. As Joseph (1999:30) explains, ‘constitutional crisis, political immobilization, ethnic passion, mutual mistrust, suspicion, fear, uncertainty and limited bicommunal interaction all paved the way for an open communal confrontation’. During the Cyprus war, TMT and EOKA played an active role. Soon afterwards, thousands of Turks left their homes in Greek or mixed areas and retreated into enclaves (Stavrinides 1999:5). During this period, the absence of direct
contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots caused their alienation from each other and empowered the role of EOKA and TMT. The lack of direct contact meant that nationalist speech-makers, many of whom were former EOKA and TMT members, and the mass media which reported the speeches and spread the propaganda of the ruling groups in their communities, had a substantial influence on the formation of popular attitudes and beliefs with regard to the other community (ibid:70).

The media were accusing the opposite side, especially the opposite side’s leaders. The conception of the Turks which the Greek side cultivated was that they were a minority of greedy people who owed their status to an Anglo-Turkish conspiracy. They had obtained a constitution that gave them super-privileges at the expense of the Greek majority and they resorted to armed rebellion when the Greeks made a firm stand on their legitimate democratic rights. On the Turkish side, the Greeks were represented as an unscrupulous and violent people, a part of the Greek nation that had long been the opponents of the Turkish nation, and who in their pursuit of Enosis, had used force to break up the established constitutional arrangements that implied co-operation and peaceful co-existence (Stavrinides 1999:57-58). In this way, Bayrak (Flag) radio\textsuperscript{15}, which was established during this period by the Turkish leadership, was conceived as the voice of Turkish Cypriots because it had a special importance as the symbol of the struggle of Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots. In 1966 Radio-2 was put into service (Azgin 1998: 657). The political standpoint of both Bayrak Radio and Radio 2 was extreme Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, as an indication of Turkish nationalistic sentiments, the first Atatürk\textsuperscript{16} monument was placed at the centre of the capital city Nicosia and it was opened to the public in 1963 on the national day of ‘29 October, the Founding of the Republic of Turkey’. The monument was a present from İş Bank, which had been established in 1924 by a directive of Atatürk (Shaw and Shaw 1994:390). Additional monuments for the commemoration of the martyrs, such as the Boğaz martyrs’ monument, were placed in various public spaces.

\textsuperscript{15} On 25 December 1963 the voice of Bayrak (Flag) radio was heard for the first time. It was a primitive station and its broadcasting could be heard only from within a few kilometres (Azgin 1998:652).

\textsuperscript{16} ‘Atatürk’s name literally translates as the very father of Turks’ (Papadakis 1998:73). Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal) was a Turkish soldier and statesman (1881-1938). The founder and first President of the Turkish Republic. ‘Atatürk who is the Turkish nationalist leader” (Pollis 1998:96) represents Turkishness and is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. Atatürk undertook a series of reforms to raise Turkey to the level of modern civilization which can be grouped in five areas: political, social, legal and economic forms and reforms in the fields of education and culture (Yale, 2005:36-37).
However, the leaders of each community were also criticised by their own communities and vice versa because of their policies. These criticisms were also represented in the Turkish Cypriot print media. Zafer (Victory; established 1965) was one of those newspapers that took on itself the duty of elevating Denktash and criticised the policies of Kucuk (Azgun 1998:653). Later, Savaş (Struggle; established 1968), published by the well-known poet Ozker Yasin, joined in the struggle against Kucuk, and polemics commenced between Savaş and Halkin Sesi – the voice of Dr. Fazil Kucuk (ibid: 654). Later, the intellectuals who had gathered around Savaş founded a new political party, the CTP (Republican Turkish Party), on 27th December 1970 under the leadership of Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu. Although Ozker Yasin was one of the founders of CTP, he supported Rauf Denktaş instead of Berberoğlu, at the vice presidential election in 1973. The last issue of Savaş newspaper carried the headline news that Denktaş had been elected vice-president. In these political conditions, a new newspaper Zaman (The Times) was published in 1973 and took over the role of Savaş. Zaman (1973) was under the ownership of Raif Denktaş, the son of Rauf Denktaş, and its political line was extreme nationalist (Azgun 1998:654). Zaman newspaper was like the forerunner of the increased antagonistic Turkish and Greek nationalisms that caused the division of the island in 1974.

The Republic of Cyprus did not unite the residents of Cyprus and did not bring peace to the island. However, as Sözên (1998:8) points out, “it is very difficult to find the real story of what really happened after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Each side has its own version of history and the events in these two separate histories have internal coherence that makes them logical within each version”. The years between 1963-1974 can be defined as the ‘dark years’ of Cyprus for two main reasons. Firstly, the term ‘dark’ connotes the terrible war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during this period. Secondly, it points to the hidden and mysterious side of the period; it is not possible to locate a clear explanation about what really happened during this period of time. The mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition and commemorations) of each community function to narrate this period strongly in an oppositional way. The opposition generally lies in each party’s accusations about the creators of the problems that caused the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus; it is also difficult to explain this specific historical period by using the main sources of information, which are the history books of the two communities.
Following a military coup that sought to depose President Makarios, encouraged and executed by Greek army officers loyal to the Athens military junta, on 20 July 1974 Turkey sent troops into the island (Mavratsas 2000:12). Makarios had had always problems with the governments of Greece during his political life; he had been criticised by the Greek government of the period when he tried to change the constitution of 1960 Republic (Kızılyürek 2005:110-111). This indicates that the “Greek-Cypriots” did not share one objective, one “identity” and one understanding of the Cyprus problem, neither did the Turkish Cypriots.

When Turkey sent troops into the island it claimed that it was trying to stop the bloodshed and the union of the island with Greece; in this way, the Turkish Cypriot community would regain their rights: “Turkey legitimised its move with reference to its rights as one of the three guarantor powers of the Cypriot constitution” (Diez 2002:1). However, the Greek Cypriots evaluated Turkey’s action as an invasion which they claimed it had been planning to actualize for a long time (Mavratsas 2000:12). Since then, in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have been living in completely separate zones (North and South) divided by the Green line. It should be noted here that the ‘Green line’ is interpreted differently by the ruling groups in Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities: although it signifies the salvation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots for the Turkish Cypriot authorities, it means the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey for the Greek Cypriot authorities.

In 1974, Cyprus was de facto divided into North and South as a result of the increased nationalistic discourses on both sides. Greek Cypriots living in the North and Turkish Cypriots living in the South had to leave their homes, lands/properties and settle in ‘their’ respective parts of the island. After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots first established the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975 and then the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983 under the leadership of Rauf R. Denktaş (Kızılyürek 2009:46). Although “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is universally considered as illegal, this does not prevent Turkish Cypriots from living in

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17 In 1971, President Makarios threatened to arrest the former head of EOKA, General Grivas, who took his orders from Greece for setting up armed bands and declared his opposition to the achievement of Enosis by violent means. On the other hand, Grivas denounced the President in an article in an Athens newspaper, calling for his resignation on the grounds that, by abandoning Enosis, the President had betrayed EOKA’s struggle for freedom (Day 2004:252-253). The political disputes between Makarios and Greek governments increased day after day and caused the Greek military coup on 15 July 1974 that sought to depose President Makarios (Kızılyürek 2005: 131).
their "imagined" state, as their unrecognized state is their home (land). The physical boundaries of the “imagined” state played a crucial role in the construction of the idea of ‘homeland’ by the ruling group. As Heidegger (cited in Bhabha 1994:1) points out “a boundary is not that at which something stops but, the boundary is that from which something begins its presenceing”. However, the boundary is not the line on the map but the ensemble of the military and it points to the restrictions on crossing to the ‘other’/others’ side. Hence, the boundaries have reinforced and reproduced the idea that Turks were and are different from Greeks. Therefore, as long as the boundaries remain, Turkish Cypriots will be secure because the boundaries protect them from the ‘others’. In this way, the boundary that separates Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots has been represented as a means of protecting Turkish Cypriots from the ‘others’.

Although Turkish Cypriots do not have any private remembrance regarding the existence of the boundary as it is forbidden to go near it, ‘it’ is out there and they already know that the boundary exists because of the ‘dominant public memory’ established by public narratives. However, not only physical boundaries but also mental boundaries play a role in the process of exclusion and identity construction of Turkish Cypriots; memory of the past is crucial in boundary maintenance. Turkish Cypriots’ memory of Greeks is as potent as their previous presence. Thus the boundary separating the North from the South does not merely separate the two communities. Memory erects boundaries more significant than the Green line; and in order to reproduce the memory of the ‘past’, the ‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbooks, media, symbols of tradition, and commemorations) have been constructed and used to great effect since the division of the island.

4.4 The division of the island (1974-onwards)

In this section, I will explain the ways in which the memories of the ‘past’ are articulated by the ruling parties according to their different discourses on national identity/nationalism. The section is divided into two main parts that explain two different periods: the period of the Denktash presidency and the government of the Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP) during 1974-2003 and the Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi (CTP) period during 2003-2009. I explain how the ruling groups constructed the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations, media) to mobilize and articulate their discourses on national identity/nationalism.
102
When I examined the narratives of the mechanisms of memory (history
textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) of these two periods, I
observed abrupt changes in the dominant discourse on national identity/nationalism in
Northern Cyprus. Thus, in the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish
(cypriot) nationalism. However, this situation changed when the CTP government came
to power in 2003. In the CTP period, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism became the dominant
discourse. However, it should be noted here that there were always alternative voices and
narratives in the two periods; this distinction unavoidably simplifies a more complex
reality in which there are different discourses functioning simultaneously. Although there
is no literature supporting my distinction between the (turkish) Cypriot and Turkish
(cypriot) nationalisms, this division will serve as a strategy to analyse the narratives in
more detail.
The discourses of the ruling groups carry traces of both ‘Turkishness’ and
‘Cypriotness’ because of the peculiar historical, political and cultural circumstances in
Northern Cyprus. However, while the UBP highlights Turkishness, the CTP focuses on
Cypriotness. In the term ‘Turkish (cypriot) nationalism’ my parenthesis is used to specify
the emphasis on Turkish identity in the Denktaş-UBP period. Thus the ‘T’ is capitalised
to imply the emphasis and the ‘c’ is small to imply the de-emphasis. The focus of the
Turkish (cypriot) identity is on the similarities between Turkish (cypriots) and Turks and
the differences between Turkish (cypriots) and Greek Cypriots. The discourse of
motherland Turkey and babyland TRNC, which represents the cultural kinship and
heritage between Turkish (cypriots) and Turks, is popularly used in the narratives of the
mechanisms of memory. (It should be noted here that the EU was mostly represented as
the supporter of Greek Cypriots and the union of Christianity by the ruling group during
this period). On the other hand, in the term ‘(turkish) Cypriot nationalism’ the parenthesis
is used to depict the focus on Cypriot identity by the CTP government. In a similar vein,
the capital ‘C’ of ‘Cypriot’ and minuscule ‘t’ of ‘turkish’ point to CTP’s emphasis and deemphasis. The Cypriot identity is based on stressing the similarities between Greek
Cypriots and (turkish) Cypriots. Parallel to their discourse of (turkish) Cypriot
nationalism, CTP supported the entry of (turkish) Cypriots and Greek Cypriots into the
European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan. In this way, ‘Europe was
represented as a ‘real mother country’ (İlter and Alankuş 2009:67) where Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would live together as “Cypriots”.


4.4.1 The period of President Denktaş and the government of UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) during 1974-2003

The discourse of President Denktaş and the UBP government constructed the ‘dominant public memory’ between the years 1974-2003. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established by under the leadership of Denktaş with the purpose of getting recognition so that Turkish Cypriots could represent themselves in the international platforms’ (Sözen 1998:37). However, it has been branded as an illegal state by UN Security Council Resolutions and is currently recognized as an independent state only by Turkey" (Alasya 1988). The official discourse of this period accused the other countries of supporting Greeks and Greek Cypriots because of their evaluation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as illegal. This situation helped the ruling group to empower their Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse.

In order to spread and maintain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism and reproduce the memory of the constructed ‘past’, the ‘mechanisms of memory’ – symbols of tradition, history textbooks, commemorations and media – were used very effectively by the ruling group. As the education system in schools is organized in parallel to the dominant discourse, the state intervened in the social life of the residents of Northern Cyprus. Like the arms of the octopus, the mechanisms surrounded the field of everyday lives of Turkish Cypriots. Monuments in the streets and squares, the flags of Turkey and of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in all formal institutions and schools, the national anthem, the celebrations of national days in the streets and some in schools, national holidays, museums, mass graves, martyrdoms, Turkish and Cyprus history textbooks, and the media, are some of the key forms and symbols of the mechanisms of memory explored through the in-depth interviews.

During this period, the mechanisms of memory were used by the ruling group to legitimize the discourse of the nation-state by improving solidarity and unity among the members of the TRNC. The state was conceived as a part of the great Turkish nation; and in the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", Turkish Cypriots had used the flag of Turkey as the symbol of their community. As noted in Chapter Two, flags as the symbols of traditions represent common heritage and cultural and historical kinship: Turkish Cypriots’ use of the Turkish flag indicates that they conceive themselves as part of the Turkish culture and heritage, and the use of the Turkish flag in the ‘TRNC’ represents the Turkish Cypriots’ commitment to the Turkish nation.
However, with the establishment of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a flag competition was organized in Northern Cyprus to find a new representative flag. The selected flag was the same as the Turkish flag except that the colours of the objects and background were reversed. The white background of the flag of the TRNC also has two red stripes at the top and bottom (Minahan 2002: 1394). The close similarity between the two flags depicts the new state’s Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse, that was shaped by the narratives based on the putative common heritage and cultural kinship between Turkish (cypriots) and Turks. In line with the discourse of the ruling group, the selected flag is officially regarded as the state flag, and the flag of Turkey as the national flag, of the ‘TRNC’. Similarly, the Greek Cypriots have flown the national flag of Greece along with the flag of the Republic of Cyprus (Mavratsas 2000: 88). As Anastasiou (2008:161) notes, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms have traditionally identified with the Greek and Turkish flags, since it was in relationship with their motherlands that the concept of national unity evolved historically in each community.

In addition, Turkish Cypriots have used the national anthem of the ‘motherland’ Turkey since the 1960s. The theme of the national anthem is affection for the Turkish homeland, freedom, and faith, of sacrifice for liberty, and of hope and devotion, explored through visual and tactile imagery as they relate to the flag, the human spirit and the soil of the homeland (DiPiazza 2005: 69). Thus, like the flags, the national anthem functions to reproduce feelings of commitment and a sense of belonging to the Turkish nation and identity. Since the establishment of the ‘TRNC’, the anthem has been heard regularly during state and military events and national days, sporting events and school ceremonies in Northern Cyprus. Similarly, after 1963, Greek Cypriots started to use the national anthem of their motherland Greece (Mavratsas 2000:88). Thus both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have in the recent past mostly relied on the anthems of their respective ‘motherlands’ (Papadakis 1995:55).

18 A white crescent and a five-pointed star are placed on a red background on the Turkish flag. There are several claims about the symbolic meaning of the Turkish flag. According to one idea the crescent represents the Islamic religion, the star represents Turkishness and the red colour represents blood (Lafferty 2008). According to another idea, the flag symbolises the reflection of the crescent and a star in a pool of a dying fighter’s blood (Papadakis 1995).

19 The İstiklal Marşı, or ‘Independence March’, is the Turkish national anthem. It was written by Mehmet Akif Ersoy and officially adopted on March 12, 1921. A nationwide competition was held to select the national anthem of the new-born Turkish Republic after the Turkish war of independence (DiPiazza 2005: 69)
The forms of commemorations (museums, monuments, martyrdoms, mass graves, national days, national holidays) played an important part in the construction of the new nation-state in Northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot administration accepted all Turkish national days as public national days and public holidays of Northern Cyprus. These national days include: 23 April, National Sovereignty and Children's day (23 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı); 19 May, Commemoration of Atatürk and Youth and Sports Day (19 Mayıs Atatürk'ü Anma Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı); 30 August, Victory Celebration (30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı); 29 October, the Founding of the Republic of Turkey (29 Ekim Cumhuriyet Bayramı); and 10 November, Commemoration of Atatürk (10 Kasım Atatürk’ü Anma Günü). Certain days – 20 July, Happy Peace Operation (20 Temmuz Mutlu Barış Harekatı); 15 November, Founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (15 Kasım Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nin Kuruluşu); and 21 December, the Week of Struggle and Remembrance.

The founder of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk, dedicated April 23 to the children of the country to emphasize that they were the future of the new nation. It was on April 23, 1920 during the Turkish War of Independence, that the Grand National Assembly met in Ankara and laid down the foundations of a new, independent, secular and modern republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire (Atillasoy 2002:7).

Atatürk dedicated May 19 to the youth of the country (Gregory 1983:67). The national day marks the 81st anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s landing in Anatolia from Istanbul to launch the Turkish War of Independence (Jung and Piccoli 2001: 65).

The victory on August 30, 1922, over the Greek military was the last major engagement between the two armies. The war began with the Greek invasion of İzmir in May 1919 after the end of the first World War with support from the allies, especially Great Britain. The defeated Ottoman Empire was too weak to resist the Greek forces, with initial resistance provided by irregular Turkish units called Kuvay-i Miliyi. The invasion generated a huge reaction in Anatolia and resulted in an independence movement led by officers of the disbanded Ottoman military. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who came to lead the officers, succeeded in stemming the Greek invasion and in August 1922 launched a strong counterattack. Victory in the Dumlupınar Battle on August 30 in the central Anatolian province of Kütahya destroyed the Greek army and Turkish forces entered İzmir. The battle brought an end to the war between Turkey and Greece, with Turkey declaring independence on October 29, 1923, after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. The date of August 30 has since been celebrated as “Victory Day”, with military marches and other official celebrations marking the Turkish victory (Zurcher 2005:155).

Commemoration of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Ayliffe 2003: 66).

Turks and Turkish Cypriots observe on each 10th November a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first president (Yale 2005:36).

Each year celebrations are held in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 20th July, which was the day of the “Happy Peace Operation”. Turkish Cypriot communities throughout the world organize festivities to commemorate the day. According to the dominant discourse, on 20th July, Turkish Cypriots gained their independence and survived ultimate extermination at the hand of Greek and Greek Cypriot armies determined to achieve Enosis (Mütercimler 1998: 137-142).

Turkish Cypriots commemorate 15th November 1983 as Independence Day, when they declared themselves as a state.
of the Martyrs\textsuperscript{27} (21 Aralık Milli Mücadele ve Şehitler Haftası) – are national days that are commemorated solely in the ‘TRNC’.

During 1974-2003, approximately fourteen national monuments that symbolize either Atatürk or martyrs of Northern Cyprus, and four martyrs’ cemeteries\textsuperscript{28} were set up; two mass graves\textsuperscript{29} and four museums were opened to the public. The museums are the Museum of Barbarism\textsuperscript{30} (Barbarlık Müzesi), National Struggle Museum\textsuperscript{31} (Milli Mücadele Müzesi), Peace and Freedom Museum\textsuperscript{32} (Barış ve Özgürlük Müzesi) and Dr. Fazıl Küçük Museum\textsuperscript{33}. The museums, mass graves, monuments and martyrdoms were produced as the sites of memory by the ruling group to perpetuate the dominance of the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism through the construction of ‘self’ and ‘others’. While the monuments of Atatürk were set up to mobilize emotions attached to the sense of belonging to the Turkish nation and Turkish identity; the mass graves, martyrdoms,

\textsuperscript{27} During December, a week is devoted to the period spanning 1963 to 1967, mourning those who died and became ‘martyrs’ in the Cyprus war that erupted around Christmas 1963 (Denktaş 1999:491).

\textsuperscript{28} Buried in the Boğaz and Karaoğlanoğlu Martyrs Cemeteries are the Turkish soldiers who died during the 20 July 1974 operation; in the Ortaköy Martyrs Cemetery, there are 1960 and 1964-65 martyrs; people who became martyrs during the 1963-1974 period are buried in the Lefkoşa Tekke Bahçesi Martyrs Cemetery (Altan 1998).

\textsuperscript{29} In the villages that are known as Muratağa, Sandallar-Atlılar there are mass graves of the Turkish Cypriots that were reported to have been murdered and buried by Greeks (Altan 1998:266).

\textsuperscript{30} The house of Dr. Nihat İlhan, who was a major serving in the Cyprus Turkish Contingent in 1963, has been converted into a museum. During the inter-communal troubles of December that year, the house was attacked by Greek Cypriot terrorists. Dr. İlhan’s wife and three children were murdered in the bathroom, where they had tried to hide (Rüstem, Duffy and Connell 1987:160). However, there are counter arguments about the event. According to these arguments, it was not Greek Cypriots but Turkish Cypriot soldiers who murdered the three children and their mother. The aim was to increase the nationalistic feelings of Turkish Cypriots.

\textsuperscript{31} The museum was opened to document the national struggle of the Cyprus Turkish community that started in 1955 and continues to today and to explain the reasons behind the struggle. In the museum, the historical events are exhibited under four different sections: 1955-1958, 1958-1963, 1963-1974 and 1974-onwards (Altan 1998:178).

\textsuperscript{32} The location where Turkish soldiers landed on the island on 20 July 1974 has been converted into a museum displaying pictures of the martyrs and the guns that were taken from Greeks. The building is preserved as it was, destroyed in the war. The armoured vehicles and guns that were used in the war are exhibited in the garden of the museum.

\textsuperscript{33} The museum of Dr. Fazıl Küçük was the first private museum of the TRNC. In the museum, there are gifts from Germany, India and Turkey that were given to Küçük, who was the first vice-president of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus. After qualifying as a general medical practitioner in Switzerland, he returned to work in Cyprus in 1938; thus, in the museum there are medicines that were produced in 1940 and the equipment that was used for inspection and for an operation by Küçük. There are also different objects that belonged to him on display, such as a Cyprus map with a crescent and star that was drawn with human blood, and Marshal Kazım Karabekir’s gift symbolising the salvation of Erzurum and Erzincan, two different cities in Turkey (Altan 1998:163-164).
monuments of the martyrs and some of the museums function to represent the others (Greek Cypriots) as barbarians and violent people.

School education is one of the most effective vehicles of the discourse of the ruling group, operating especially through history textbooks and extracurricular and ritual activities such as the ceremonies and celebrations of national days in schools. The education system of the Turkish Cypriots was run in parallel first, with the Ottoman Empire, and then with the Republic of Turkey (Feridun 2001:5). More than one mechanism can function in the school education of a student, and this situation makes the ‘dominant public memory’ more influential; as Bryant (1998:66) points out, ‘methods of education have helped define the relation of individuals and state’. For example, every Turkish Cypriot student who goes to the primary school sings the national anthem of Turkey at the beginning and end of the week in front of the monument of Atatürk and under the flags of Turkey and of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. Students do not go to school on some national days, as they are national holidays. However, on some national days like ‘23 April, National Sovereignty and Children’s Day’, they celebrate with various activities and dances at school. In secondary and high school, they celebrate another national day, the ‘19 May Commemoration of Atatürk and Youth and Sport Day’. The students also visit the Museum of Barbarism and the graveyards of the martyrs twice a year during school time without pre-announcement by the teacher. These visits are arranged by the Ministry of Education.

High-school students’ Turkish and Cyprus history lessons and national security lessons are taught by an officer from the Turkish army. In these lessons, they get a selective interpretation of history shaped by the official discourse. In the narratives of the history textbooks, Greeks and Greek Cypriots are described as the enemies of Turks; Greeks ruined the ‘Republic of Cyprus’34 in 1963 three years after its establishment. During these three years, they treated Turks as minority and tried to usurp all the rights they had under the agreements of the Republic. EOKA, a Greek terrorist organization, tried to use the Republic of Cyprus as a step on the way to ENOSIS; however, after they

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34 In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was established with the agreement of Turkey, Greece and Britain (Kizilyurek, 2002). The new state’s constitution, as defined by the Zurich and London agreements, explicitly recognized the two ethnic communities in Cyprus: the Greek Cypriot Community and the Turkish Cypriot Community. According to the constitution, Cyprus was to be bilingual, the two official languages being Greek and Turkish (Oberling, 1982). During the period from independence in 1960 to 1963 a series of disputes arose between the two communities over the implementation and interpretation of the agreements and constitution. Intercommunal fighting broke out in December 1963, thus bringing about the collapse of the unitary Greek-Turkish State of Cyprus (Stavrinides 1999:55).
understood that it would not be easy to reach their goals through the Republic of Cyprus, they ruined the Republic and decided to murder all the Turks in order to reach their ultimate aims quickly. In consequence, a lot of Turkish women and/or children were killed indiscriminately by Greeks in a barbarous way until the ‘1974 Happy Peace Operation’. During this period, TMT, which was established as a counter organization to EOKA, fought bravely against Greek cruelty (Serter 1979:106-110). According to the history textbooks, with the 1974 Happy Peace Operation, Turkish Cypriots were saved from being killed by the barbarian Greeks by the Turkish army (Serter 1982, Hasgüler 1998, Öymen 2002). In the textbooks as a whole, Greeks are represented as barbarians and Turks as the saviours and heroes of Turkish Cypriots (see Appendix 3).

Following the division of the island, nationalism functioned by creating an imagined enemy which could not be seen or communicated directly. Communication, mediated between the two communities through the mass media, was in support of the official discourse. During this period, the media as one of the mechanisms of memory was used effectively by the ruling group in order to establish and disseminate the Turkish official discourse; the official discourse about the ‘past’ entered the home, a primary symbol of everyday life, and politics was rooted and domesticated (Killoran 1998). In 1976, Bayrak TV (Bayrak Television) was put into service as a public TV channel run by the government. As it served to spread the discourses of the government, it was not possible to hear alternative voices or any negative reports about the Turkish Cypriot government through public television; and many people who wanted to hear alternative voices preferred to read the national newspapers35 (Dedeçay 1989:26). Another reason why people preferred to read national newspapers was that until 1997, Bayrak was the only TV station to broadcast only for a couple of hours in the evenings each day (Azgın 1998:657); people who were unable to watch television in this specific time span preferred to read newspapers to follow the daily news (Dedeçay 1989:26).

35 Twenty six national newspapers were published after the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" till 2002. However, most of these newspapers were short lived because of economic reasons and political pressures in Cyprus (İrvan 2006: 7). Thus, only nine national newspapers managed to survive till 2002. These were the commercial newspapers Kıbrıs (Cyprus), Kıbrıslı (Cypriot), Vatan (Motherland) Volkan (Volcano), Avrupa (Europe) and Halkın Sesi (The voice of the Public) and party political newspapers Yenidüzen (New Order), Ortam (The Medium) and Birlik (The Unity). These newspapers represent the views of their political parties in their news (Erhürman 2003).
During this period, Bayrak television’s and most of the national newspapers’ discourse about the ‘past’ ran parallel to the official discourse; the media reproduced the dominant discourse. The newspapers Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı, Vatan, Volkan and Halkın Sesi can be classified as being on the ‘right’ of the political spectrum; they supported the politics of the ruling group in their discourses during this period. There were only three papers, Yenidüzen, Ortam and Avrupa, on the ‘left’ of the political spectrum, and they presented alternative views that most of the time were against the politics of the ruling group (Hançer 2006). In general, however, “the Turkish Cypriot media tried to give the message to the world that Turkish Cypriots would continue to exist protected by the boundaries of their state; they strongly supported the ‘national case’, the struggle in the international arena to make the Turkish Cypriots live within their national boundaries as a separate and independent society” (Hançer 2006: 2). In 1994, another government radio channel, Bayrak FM³⁶ was put into service (Azgün 1998:657). Bayrak FM also supported the Turkish official discourse.

Parallel to their Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse, the ruling group encouraged migration from Turkey to the ‘TRNC’. The aim was to increase the Turkish population on the island with a settlement policy that was pursued by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities. As a result, since 1974 a substantial number of Turkish immigrants have settled in Northern Cyprus and been granted citizenship of the ‘TRNC’ (Hatay 2005:1). In order to encourage immigration, the government provided homes and employment to these people (Canefe 2007:282-283). Most of the Turks who settled in the TRNC were housed in the homes of Greek Cypriots who had had to leave their homes after the division of the island. In this way, the abandoned villages and towns were populated by Turkish settlers after the division of the island. There are also those, more substantial in number, who immigrated on an individual basis later or were born on the island to families in which either both parents are from mainland Turkey or one is from Turkey and the other is a Turkish Cypriot (Hatay 2005:5). Furthermore, there are non-citizen residents such as workers with/without work permits, students and lecturers, Turkish army personnel with families and conscripts (ibid:6). With the establishment of a new law at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkish people had the opportunity to come to Northern Cyprus using only their identity cards. According to the most recent TRNC

³⁶ Bayrak FM transmits its programmes mainly in Turkish, but there are also special programmes mainly in Greek and English (Azgün 1998:657).
census (conducted in 1996) there were 55,000 permanent and temporary residents of Turkish origin in the TRNC (ibid: 14).

There are some claims that by encouraging immigration from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot authorities and Turkey aimed to change the demographic balance on the island, to distort the demographic will of the ‘indigenous’ Turkish Cypriots and to strengthen the position of parties supporting the regime of Rauf Denktaş, who had no problems with sustained dependence on Turkey (ibid:1). As an unrecognized state, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ depends on Turkey in many areas, especially politically and economically; it is therefore not possible to talk about the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as an independent and autonomous state, because it is directly connected to Turkey. Beginning with the first elections that took place in 1976, political life in the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has always been shaped in parallel with the politics of Turkey. Thus, in the “1976 Turkish Cypriot Elections”, UBP, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) that supported the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism came to power and stayed in government until 2003. Compared to the other political parties, its political discourse was the closest discourse to Turkey’s politics at that time. Apart from UBP, the other political parties that competed with each other in the elections were the Halkçı Party or Popular Party (HP), the Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi or Communal Liberation Party (TKP), and the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi or Republican Turkish Party (CTP) (Azgün 1998:655). Although CTP and TKP were the parties that supported (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and the re-unification of the island, HP’s political discourse was close to that of UBP’s.

The political parties found that the best way to disseminate their ideas to the public was to set up and own newspapers: political party newspapers have played an important role in the Turkish Cypriot print media since the establishment of the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’37. Yenidüzen, the first party political newspaper in Northern Cyprus, began publishing in 1975, reflecting the policies of CTP. On the other hand, when the owner of Zaman newspaper (1973), Raif Denktaş, became a parliamentary deputy for UBP in the 1976 Turkish Cypriot elections, Zaman (The Times) became the organ of this party (Azgün 1998:654). Later, Ulus (Nation, established 1976) and Birlik

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37 When the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ was established in 1975, there officially existed only one political party, the CTP (Republican Turkish Party). However, after the declaration of the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’, new political parties were founded in the Northern part of the island. These parties were UBP (the National Unity Party), TKP (the Communal Liberation Party) and Halkçı Party (the Popular Party) (Azgün 1998:655).

The newspapers of the opposition parties provided an opportunity for the citizens to hear the alternative voices and counter discourses that challenged the official discourse. Thus, although the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism was dominant, there were always counter memories narrated by supporters of the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism during this period. As a matter of fact, these alternative voices were raised day by day, and they became the signs of the beginning of the new period that is examined below.

4.4.2 The period of the government of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) 2003-2009

Since the separation of the island in 1974, living in an unrecognized state possessing the last divided capital city in the world, and not being able to participate independently in the European Union negotiations for Cyprus, has created physical, social and mental boundaries and problems for the Turkish Cypriots, who live isolated and marginalized from the world. The economic and cultural embargoes and exclusion from direct international trade caused an inexorable and exclusive dependency-relation to Turkey (Anastasiou 2008:6) both economically and politically. However, in Northern Cyprus, European Union membership was debated vigorously during the years 2002-2004 because of the presentation of the Annan Plan and the possible solution to the Cyprus problem. Parallel to these political and cultural circumstances in Northern Cyprus, a new government (CTP) came to power in the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 2003 and the crossings that divide the island into south and north were partially opened in the same year. These historical circumstances and political and economic problems played a crucial role in the formation of a dynamic discussion process about the Annan Plan, the Cyprus Problem and the European Union.

With the policy change in Northern Cyprus, the dominant discourse has also changed. Before CTP came to power, the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. However, since the policy change, a (turkish) Cypriot nationalistic discourse has become dominant. Unlike the Turkish (cypriot) nationalist discourse, (turkish) Cypriot nationalism highlights the ‘similarities’ between Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots instead of emphasizing the ‘differences’. The changing socio-political and historical circumstances since the presentation of the Annan Plan have raised new questions and made Turkish Cypriots focus on their memories relating to national identity and the ‘past’.

During this period, the ruling group has not focussed on the ‘past’ that was constructed by the former government, but prefers instead to focus on the ‘future’. In the meantime, an alternative ‘past’ is being constructed by the new government: they highlight the common features of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to promote the dominant discourse, which is ‘(turkish) Cypriot nationalism’. Parallel to the dominant discourse of the period, the mechanisms of memory – history textbooks, media, commemorations and symbols of tradition – are being re-articulated and re-constructed.

The new government has changed the Cyprus history textbook used in the schools: in the new textbook that was published and became a part of the curriculum in 2004, there are new subjects that emphasize the social life of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (see Appendix 4), and also much more emphasis on British colonial rule between 1878 and 1960.

According to the textbook, in this period Cyprus became the problem of two antagonistic nationalisms born of two different ethnic and religious communities. British rule played a crucial role in the construction of the two nationalisms on the island, and the British colonial administration applied ‘divide and rule’ strategies to maintain its control and authority over the island. This reinforced the ethnic and religious differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the period (Uludağ and Billuroğlu 2004:59). The new textbook thus explains the reasons behind the two nationalisms, instead of creating a self-other relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (see Appendix 5).

There is not so much emphasis on the periods of 1963-1974, and there are no photographs of Turks murdered by Greeks. The conflicts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the reason for the division of the island are explained as caused by the increased nationalistic discourses between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The new government has also placed new sculptures in the streets that are not related to the 1963-1974 period. Some of these are the peace cresset, traditional jugs, sestas, tulips and folk dancers that are all peculiar to ‘Cypriots’. However, it should be noted here that it is not easy to deploy this new discourse as there are always alternative voices, mostly those of the supporters of the Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse who were once dominant and now want to regain their political power. Moreover, the new leadership is not totally
free to develop a completely new discourse as their discourse is always articulated in parallel to the policy in Turkey. And there is also inertia from the previous period, such as the idea that there are two peoples in Cyprus. The new ruling group emphasizes the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, such as religion and language; its administration especially highlights the cultural and social differences that have been constructed since the division of the island, such as the different national days and symbols of tradition of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For example, although the Turkish military offensive on 20th July 1974 is celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as the ‘20 July Happy Peace Operation’, it is a day of mourning for Greek Cypriots, who know it as the “anniversaries of the Treacherous Coup and the Barbaric Turkish invasion”. This situation is explained as indicating the differing political and cultural motivations and interests of the ‘two peoples’.

During this period, the media (especially the newspapers) were mobilized to enter the debate on European Union membership. Since the presentation of the Annan Plan, the subject of the European Union has been high-profile in the media of Northern Cyprus. However, it is difficult to separate the subject of the European Union from the Cyprus problem as they are closely related to each other. As mentioned earlier, without a solution to the Cyprus issue it is not possible for Northern Cyprus to participate in the European Union. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot media tend to present a strong relationship between the Cyprus problem and possible entry into the European Union.

At that time, there were eight daily national newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Kıbrıslı, Ortam, Afrika, Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Güneş and Vatan. However, it was not possible to see that variety in the television industry. In Northern Cyprus, there was only one national television channel (BRTK), run by the government, and there were five private regional television channels: Avrasya TV, Genç TV, Kıbrıs TV, Akdeniz TV and Kanal T. (The regional television channels do not broadcast to the whole country). There were also twenty four radio channels: five of them were under state control, five were the radio stations of the universities, two were under the control of the military and the others were private radio channels (Çatal 2006:1).

The Annan Plan precipitated an intense contradiction and struggle between the newspaper discourses relating to European Union. National newspapers were the most popular media of the referendum period, as there was an increase in the number of voices that were competing with one another in the newspaper industry. During this period, each national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’;
the newspapers played a crucial role in the construction and articulation of memories in relation to national identity, as their variety created a dynamic process which was necessary for the articulation of discourses.

Although each newspaper represented a different understanding about the Annan Plan and the European Union, it is possible to classify them roughly as supporters of the Annan Plan that produced a European Unionist discourse, and opponents of the Annan Plan that produced a Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse. Most of the newspapers, like Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Kıbrıslı, Ortam and Afrika, were in support of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union. These newspapers started to bring in the memories of coexistence with Greek Cypriots as a possible new citizenship of the European Union. However, only Volkan, Vatan and Güneş newspapers opposed the Annan Plan and they mostly brought in the memories of separation between Turks and Greeks. Apart from these newspapers, Halkın Sesi newspaper represented itself as being ‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ regarding the Annan Plan (Irvan 2006:14).

In the 2004 referenda, residents of Northern Cyprus made a decision as to whether or not to participate in the European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan; the Plan forced them to make a decision about their future. However, this decision was not about the future but also about the ‘past’. In order to make a decision for the future, the memories of the ‘past’ were reconstructed and rearticulated. In the referenda, the majority of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ and a greater number of the Greek Cypriots said ‘no’. Most of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated this political and cultural development as disappointing, and this situation caused the re-articulation of their memories in relation to national identity.

4.5 The Annan Plan and relations of Cyprus with the European Union

Relations between Cyprus and the European Union began with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The Republic of Cyprus obtained international legal standing and took its seat at the United Nations in 1960. Although the majority of Greek Cypriots wished for the union of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis) and the majority of Turkish Cypriots desired the partition of the island between Turks and Greeks (Taksim), a settlement orchestrated by the governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, the ‘guarantor powers’, brought this result (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002:75). However, when the physical violence started between Greek and Turkish Cypriots soon after 1960,
the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to Cyprus. The situation grew even worse in 1974 and the Turkish government decided to send the Turkish army to the Northern part of the island. Turkey legitimized its move with reference to its rights as one of the three guarantor powers of the Cypriot constitution (Diez 2002:1)

Turkey and Northern Cyprus therefore have a direct relationship regarding the European Union. Relations between Turkey and the European Union began in earnest with the Ankara agreement in 1963. However, Turkey’s relation with the European Union is directly connected with the Cyprus problem because of its position on the Northern part of the island. With the participation of England in the European Economic Community in 1973 and Greece in 1981, the Cyprus problem became an important issue for the European Union and a basic handicap for Turkey's participation in the European Union. When Turkey was accepted as an EU candidate country in Helsinki by the European Council in December 1999, it was stated: ‘the European Council underlines that Turkey should solve the Cyprus and the Aegean problems in four years in order to be a part of the European Union’ (Hasgüler 2000:128). This situation also played a crucial role in the political developments about the Cyprus problem.

It has to be reiterated here that “The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is an unrecognized state which has no direct relationship with the European Union. The issue of recognition is a serious obstacle for official inter-communal dialogue (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002:73); the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union can only be possible after the Cyprus problem is resolved. However, the solution of the Cyprus problem is closely connected with the relations between Turkey and the European Union, because Northern Cyprus depends on Turkey both economically and politically. In the meantime, Northern Cyprus is a handicap to Turkey's participation in the European Union.

On the other hand, the Republic of Cyprus applied independently for membership on behalf of the whole of Cyprus in July 1990 (Tamçelik 2001: 173). After the application of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, Northern Cyprus and Turkey signed an agreement, according to which Turkey would prevent any potential threat to the security and protect the interests of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. The political and economic cooperation between these two countries would also be increased (Pericleous 2009:71-72). These are the political and economic connections that make Turkish Cypriots even more dependent on Turkey; However, Turkish politics regarding Cyprus shifted over the following years with the change of government in
Turkey. In 2002, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of AKP, became the Prime Minister of Turkey in 2003. Erdoğan gave the message to the EU policy makers that giving Turkey a date for the commencement of accession negotiations would open the way to a settlement in Cyprus. His repeated declaration that ‘non-solution is no solution’ (Pericleous 2009:72) was the signal of a radical change in Turkish policy towards the Cyprus Problem. Up until the integration of Cyprus into the EU, the full potential of Greek-Turkish relations was dependent on the progress toward a resolution of the Cyprus problem (Anastasiou 2008:255); as a result, AKP’s initial attempts to revise the Cyprus policy were welcomed in Athens (Altunişik and Tür: 2005: 123).

Furthermore, according to the United Nations, an agreement had to be reached between the two communities and Cyprus as a whole would become a part of the European Union; as a result the island would become more secure and wealthier, especially benefiting the north side of the island which is economically underdeveloped and the Turkish Cypriots would have better economic conditions (Tamçelik 1997: 72).

The Annan Plan was the most serious step on the way to unification of the island after its division as it was the first plan which proposed a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Plan was presented on 11th November 2002 and two referenda were held in Cyprus over it on 24th April 2004. In the referenda, the members of two communities made a decision about the participation of the whole of Cyprus in the European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan. Although 65% of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’, 76% of Greek Cypriots said ‘no’ to a possible solution under the framework of the Annan Plan (Kızılyürek 2005:371). Therefore, the Annan Plan was abolished and Turkish Cypriots could not be a part of the European Union until some unspecified time. Meanwhile, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union in May 2004. As mentioned above, the rejection of the Annan Plan caused disappointment amongst the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the members of the Turkish Cypriot society. The Turkish Cypriots who had started to evaluate the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots more positively have now lost this new vision. However, it should be noted that the re-evaluation of the ‘past’ is never complete, as the cultural and political contexts are permanently changing.
CHAPTER 5: THE OFFICIAL MECHANISMS OF MEMORY – HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, SYMBOLS OF TRADITION AND COMMEMORATIONS AND THE DOMINANT/ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC MEMORIES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the various mechanisms of construction, maintenance and contestation of memory. As explained in the methodological chapter, for the analysis I adopt the approach of Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) on different types of macro-strategies in the discursive formation of national identity. I examine how the constructive and destructive strategies and strategies of justification, perpetuation and transformation function through the mechanisms of memory to justify, construct, perpetuate, destruct and transform the identity of the Turkish Cypriots. Flags, museums, martyrs’ cemeteries, mass graves, public rituals, myths, national days, monuments, history textbooks and the national anthem were used as constructive mechanisms in the period of President Denktaş and the government of UBP. These mechanisms functioned to mobilize and articulate the Turkish (cypriot) identity38 by promoting unification, identification and solidarity between ‘Turks’ from Turkey and the residents of Northern Cyprus, and differentiation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, during the period of the CTP government between 2003-2009, the strategies of transformation functioned to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity39. New history textbooks and public arts are the primary mechanisms that play a role as transformative mechanisms. Although the national anthem, flags, museums, monuments, public rituals or national days do not changed, the discourses carried through them are different in the period of the government of CTP. Thus, their meanings are articulated, renegotiated and re-constructed in the changing historical, political and cultural contexts.

38 In the term Turkish (cypriot) identity, the parenthesis, the capital ‘T’ and the small letter ‘c’ are written to specify the emphasis of the respondents and the ruling group (President Denktaş and the government of UBP between 1974-2003) on Turkish identity.

39 In the term (turkish) Cypriot identity, the parenthesis, the capital letter ‘C’ and the small letter ‘t’ are written to imply the emphasis of the respondents and the ruling group (the government of CTP between 2003-2009) on the Cypriot identity.
In this chapter, I examine how the official history that includes the history textbooks, commemorations and symbols of tradition, mobilize the Turkish Cypriots memories in relation to identity in changing power relations. Power relations do not provide a total stability or fixity for identity, but produce antagonism, resistance and conflict in any period. The official history might be challenged by alternative narratives of the ‘past’; these narratives that are about the memories and past experiences of the respondents are hidden from the official history and thus, they contribute to historiographical knowledge. Consideration of the correlations, differences, parallelisms and oppositions between dominant/alternative public memories allows me to examine the articulation and thus, dynamism of memories in relation to identity. Public memories in relation to identity are explored through the ontological narratives embedded and woven in historical, political and social constraints shaped by power relations. The role of the schools and respondents’ families (as the sources of public memories) in the signification of the history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations as related to a particular ‘past’ is also explored in the ontological narratives of the respondents. Although the focus here is on the dominant/alternative public memories, it is not possible to clearly separate them from the autobiographical memories, as they are closely intertwined with each other. This chapter thus also provides the opportunity to examine the complex relationship amongst dominant/ alternative public and autobiographical memories.

The narratives of the respondents are analysed in three interlinked chapters; this chapter is designed to provide the necessary ground for the analysis in the following two, as it brings out clues about the mobilization of respondents’ memories in relation to identity by the official mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations) that are produced by the ruling groups in changing power relations. Although media are another mechanism examined within the scope of this research, the focus here is only on the official mechanisms that are produced by the ruling groups. In the following chapter, I examine the function of the media as a mechanism in the mobilization of meaning for the articulation of memories, and analyse the narratives on political views that include the Cyprus problem, the European Union and the Annan Plan. The chapter also includes, in its second section, a consideration of the function of all the mechanisms together. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I examine the articulation of public and autobiographical memories that followed the presentation of the Annan Plan. Some narratives of the respondents can be used in the explanation of more than one subject;
however, in order to manage to focus on a particular issue, I had to limit my interpretations related to the content of the titles of the chapters, otherwise, it would not have been possible to explain any issue in detail. This does not mean, of course, that particular narratives can only be used in the explanation of particular issues.

The first section functions as a guide in the exploration of the ways in which the ruling groups have produced the history textbooks, commemorations and symbols of tradition to construct moral values, emotions and beliefs in relation to identity in Northern Cyprus. In the second section, I follow the traces of the mechanisms of memory in the everyday lives of the respondents and explore how they mobilize identity and thus, “otherness”.

5.2 Section one: Articulation of the dominant/alternative public memories in the historical and political contexts

After almost 30 years of a near monopoly of power by President Rauf Denktaş (1974-2003) and the political forces that supported him, politics in Northern Cyprus started to change. New parties, a new popular leader reflecting new social attitudes emerged and managed to break the Denktaş monopoly. During the monopoly of Denktaş, the ‘dominant public memory’ was anchored with the narratives that define Greek Cypriots as ‘others’. The ruling group strongly supported Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In order to perpetuate the dominant public memory, it produced the mechanisms of memory – history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. The existence of the boundaries that divide the island into North and South and the lack of face to face communication between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not stop the negative narratives about the Greek Cypriots, but on the contrary, caused their reproduction and perpetuation in a more powerful and subtle way through these mechanisms. After the presentation of the Annan Plan a new government, whose discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism, came into power within the changing political, cultural and social contexts. In this period, the official mechanisms were re-constructed in parallel to the discourse of the new government. Thus, two powerful opposing discourses became highly prominent in Northern Cyprus after the presentation of the Annan Plan.

These opposing discourses became dominant amongst other discourses and conflicted with each other in order to obtain the control of the ‘dominant public memory’. The life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the ‘past’ and the present is narrated by these
discourses in different ways in order to re-articulate memories in relation to identity. The ‘past’ is reconstructed in the conditions of the present, for the future, through the mechanisms of memory. Thus, after the presentation of the plan, most of the doubts of Turkish Cypriots were not about the Annan Plan but the ‘other’. As the Annan Plan was about a possible future of Turkish Cypriots with Greek Cypriots, it precipitated an intense contradiction and negotiation between the discourses in relation to identity. In this way, the presentation of the Plan allowed existing, marginal, different, resistant or even oppositional discourses to be articulated and synthesized and enter into a struggle over the ‘dominant public memory’. Hence, in 2004 when separate referenda were held in the south and north of Cyprus, the memory of the ‘past’ provided the context for a decision about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. The decision in the referenda meant a lot for the people living in Northern Cyprus as it involved re-evaluating their national identities and historical and cultural backgrounds connected with their ‘past’.

The presentation of the Annan Plan had major political and social significance, as it was the first plan that proposed a possible participation of the whole of Cyprus in the European Union after a solution to the Cyprus problem. It would be an oversimplification to evaluate the presentation of the Annan Plan either as the reason for the alternative voices or as the basis for the social and political changes in Northern Cyprus. As was stated in Chapter Four, before the presentation of the Plan a variety of complex social, political and historical factors prepared the necessary conditions for the re-evaluation of memories in relation to national identity in Northern Cyprus. These factors are numerous, with the most significant being the existence of a Turkish government that had seen the solution of the Cyprus problem as removing an obstacle towards its eventual European membership and the United Nations process that culminated in the Annan Plan. Thus, the political and cultural changes were not caused because of the presentation of the Annan Plan but were expressed with it.

The Annan Plan in itself provided an opportunity for visible changes in Turkish Cypriot society as it linked a reunification of the island and European Union membership. The prospect of membership (and of economic development) appealed to a large proportion of the Turkish Cypriot society that had experienced decades of isolation, and it gave new impetus to voices that had been challenging the existing official discourse. These historical, political and cultural circumstances caused a social dynamism that created a suitable environment for the re-articulation and a possible re-construction of memories in relation to national identity. In this way, the Annan Plan functioned as a
breaking point and caused the re-articulation of memories. Thus, the main importance of
the Plan lies in its function as a catalyst in the process of the re-articulation of memories
in relation to national identity. The issues surrounding the Annan Plan and the
respondents’ interpretations regarding the plan are examined in detail in Chapters Six and
Seven.

5.3 Section two: The official ‘mechanisms of memory’ in everyday life

In this section of the analysis, I follow the traces of the official mechanisms of memory –
history textbooks, commemorations (monuments, public arts, museums, martyrs’
cemeteries, mass graves and national days) and symbols of tradition (national anthem,
flags, public rituals and myths) – in the everyday lives of the respondents. As was noted
earlier, the mechanisms are constructed and produced to fix the ‘past’ that is articulated in
different ways in the Denktaş-UBP period during 1974-2003 and the CTP government
period, 2003-2009. Some of the mechanisms are located as dominant and some others as
alternative in changing power relations. The mechanisms are constructed through the
narratives about the ‘self’ and ‘other’ that are articulated in power relations. They enter
into the everyday lives of social individuals through social practices and bring the
meanings of the constructed ‘past’ into the conditions of the present. They are the
monuments, public arts and flags the respondents see in the streets, national days they
celebrate, museums, martyrs’ cemeteries and mass graves they visit, the history textbooks
they read and the national anthem they sing.

The respondents’ answers to the questions about memories in relation to
national identity (see the questions in Appendix 1) and their interpretations of the five
photographs shown in the last part of the in-depth interviews form the basis of this
section. These photographs depict the flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus’, the monument of Atatürk, the monument of the martyr and the public
arts – the sestas and the peace cresset. Detailed information on the reasons behind the
selection of these particular symbols was provided in Chapter Three. In the interview, I
asked the respondents what they could say about the photographs or/and what the first
thing was that came to their minds when they looked at the photographs.

I examine the mechanisms of memory under four different titles: the “flags of
Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’”, “museums, martyrs’ cemeteries
and mass graves”, “old monuments and new public arts” and “history textbooks and the
others/changing history textbooks changing the others”. However, when the respondents narrate their memories they sometimes talk about more than one mechanism; thus, ‘mechanisms of memory’ are generally not separated, but interwoven and interconnected with each other. For example, flags and national days can be used together to explain a particular memory.

This section includes the opposing narratives of the respondents about the mechanisms of memory. Their interpretations give clues as to how they consider themselves in terms of national identity, mostly whether as a Turkish (cypriot) or as a (turkish) Cypriot; and thus, how they define who is the other and who is not. In this way, it is possible to examine how the mechanisms mobilize the respondents’ memories about their identity. The ‘mobilization’ does not always bring the result that serves the interests of the ruling groups, but it may also cause the production of counter memories. Depending on the adopted discourse, whether Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism or (turkish) Cypriot nationalism, the meanings of the official mechanisms (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) are understood in different ways by the respondents. Thus, it is possible to argue that the discourses of Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism or (turkish) Cypriot nationalism are constructed in power relations and that they function as nodal points around which other signs, such as flags, national days, and monuments, acquire their meanings from their relationship to the nodal points in particular ways. As noted in Chapter One, nodal points are the privileged discursive points (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:112) and other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point (Jorgensen and Philips 2002:26). Nodal points thus operate as the ‘base’ of the respondents’ different interpretations about the mechanisms of memory in this particular historical and political context. The meaning of the flags, monuments and history textbooks may therefore change according to the nodal point that is adopted by the respondent; however, as was emphasized in Chapter One, memories are constantly changing through articulations, so it is not possible to locate the nodal points as permanent and constant.
5.3.1 The flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’

The photograph⁴⁰ above depicts the flags of Turkey (left) and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (right). These are the crucial symbols of tradition, and were especially prominent during the Denktas-UBP period (1974-2003). The two flags can easily be seen outside on an ordinary day if one travels even for a few miles in Northern Cyprus. They appear together in the courtyards of the public and private schools, near the institutional and public buildings, near the monuments and even on the mountains; and their existence in many places provided a continual background for the ruling group in sustaining their discourse which was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism.

As was mentioned in chapter two, flags as the symbols of tradition represent a common identity and the concepts of unity, independence, liberation and freedom of a nation promoted by the dominant groups. According to the official history that was produced in the Denktas-UBP period, the flag of the TRNC represents the freedom and independence of Turkish Cypriots gained with Turkey’s Happy Peace Operation in 1974; the existence of the flag of Turkey in Northern Cyprus represents the liberation of Turkish

⁴⁰The photograph was taken near a monument at the crossroads of Gönyeli that separates the capital city Nicosia from Kyrenia, the most touristic city of Northern Cyprus.
Cypriots from Greek cruelty by Turkey. Furthermore, the Turkish flag symbolises the unity and common identity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots). The official history thus addressed the flag of Turkey as the flag of the motherland, and the flag of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as the flag of the babyland.

The motherland/babyland argument functions as a moment articulated to the discourse of Turkish (Cypriot) nationalism. The argument signifies the common cultural kinship and heritage of Turkish (cypriots) and Turks. The discourse of motherland also provides a sense of continuity, as it locates Turks as the ancestors and protectors of Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). During the Denktaş-UBP period, the official history maintained the argument that since the division of the island in 1974, Turks and the Turkish soldiers have been the most crucial guarantee of the security of the Turkish (cypriots) on the island. On the other hand, the motherland/babyland dichotomy is always criticised by supporters of the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that articulates (turkish) Cypriot identity. The narratives of the official history play the primary role in the articulation of the memories of the respondents about the flags; however, in many interpretations, I also examined how the official history is challenged by the alternative narratives of the respondents. In actual fact, the flags remind different people of different relationships between the TRNC/Turkish Cypriots and Turkey/Turks.

Parallel to the narratives of the official history, I observed the traces of the discourse of motherland/babyland in the interpretations of many respondents about the flags. For many respondents, the flags of Turkey and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ complete each other as they represent the unity between Turks and the Turkish (cypriots):

Our flags…The flags of Turkey and the TRNC together prove the proverb that ‘A fingernail cannot be separated from the finger’\(^{41}\) (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer)

I am proud of them [i.e. the flags]. This is the flag of this country [points to the flag of the TRNC] and this is our Turkish flag\(^ {42}\) (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife)

The majority of the respondents, like Alican and Sevim, define the flag of Turkey (representing the Turks and Turkishness) and the flag of the TRNC (representing the

\(^{41}\) In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
\(^{42}\) In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007
Turkish Cypriots) as ‘our flags’. The expression ‘our flags’ creates a ‘we group’ that is based on emphasising the sameness between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:37) note, the emphasis on sameness and similarity function as a strategy of ‘inclusion, assimilation and continuation’ that is included in the constructive strategies. In this sense, the respondents construct a Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the sameness and unity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Many other respondents express their demand for the existence of Turks on the island as the defender of the Turkish (cypriots) from Greek Cypriots; they interpret the existence of the Turkish flag in Northern Cyprus as the representation of the security of Turkish (cypriots). This emphasis on the positive political continuity also functions as a strategy of ‘assimilation, inclusion and continuation’ (ibid) that constructs the Turkish (cypriot) identity based on the unity of Turkish Cypriots and Turks:

Their [the Turkish and TRNC flags’] separation creates problems. Turkey is the defender of the TRNC and as far as this flag continues to wave, Turkey will defend the TRNC43 (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter)

For me, both flags are ours. If the Turkish flag does not exist here the flag of the TRNC does not either44 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official)

We will be able to exist as long as Turkey exists in here45. (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist)

On the other hand, there are many respondents who emphasize the differences between the two flags. Their ideas about the flags give crucial clues as to how they consider themselves different from Turks and Turkish identity:

Our flag [the flag of the TRNC] is more beautiful… Do you know why? Because it is the flag of our country46 (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer)

These flags should not stand together. There should be either the Turkish flag or the flag of the TRNC. I mean, if the TRNC exists…for example; you cannot see the French flag in Italy. Thus, this situation presents a contradiction47 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, warehouseman)

43 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs TV, 15/8/2007
44 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour 30/7/2007
45 In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007
46 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007
47 In depth-interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic Parlour, 16/8/2007
Such comments depict the focus of the respondents on the (turkish) Cypriot identity by raising the issues of “uniqueness and superiority”, ‘common heritage’, ‘cultural kinship’ and ‘sense of belonging’. For example, Doğa distinguishes between the two flags by asking a rhetorical question: ‘the flag of the TRNC is more beautiful...Do you know why?’ This indicates that he conceives the flag of the TRNC (representing Turkish Cypriots) as superior in comparison to the Turkish flag (the flag of Turkey represents Turks). As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38) note, the emphasis on the national (positive) uniqueness that is supported with the argument of superiority functions as a strategy for the construction of identity. In this sense, Doğa’s argument on superiority that stems from his idea about the uniqueness of the TRNC flag functions as a constructive strategy for the construction of his (turkish) Cypriot identity. He also distinguishes the two flags as ‘our flag’ and ‘their flag’ and thus places Turks outside the system of convention to which (turkish) Cypriots belong. Moreover, Doğa’s argument, “it [the flag of the TRNC] is the flag of our country” is a very common comment and shows how the flag of the TRNC mobilizes the sense of belonging for these respondents.

On the other hand, like many respondents, Mustafa raises questions about ‘common heritage’ and ‘cultural kinship’ between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in his interpretation of the flags in his comparison of Italy and France with Turkey and the ‘TRNC’. With this example, he tries to explain that the similarity between Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ is like that between France and Italy; he implies that there is no common cultural heritage and kinship between Turks and the (turkish) Cypriots, in the same way that there is no such kinship between the French and Italians. The emphasis of the respondents on differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots functions as a strategy for dismantling that aims to disparage parts of the Turkish (cypriot) identity.

The opposing discourses about the flags as the representations of victory and violence become obvious in Ayten and Duyal’s interpretations, in which one can see how the narratives of the official history function to sustain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism and how it is challenged by the alternative narratives:

The flags represent the victories that we gained with our blood48 (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

I love neither of them... and for this reason I set aside these colours (red and white). Borders, fights and wars, the flags erected after the wars...The Turkish

48 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
flag is said to have been inspired by the reflection of the crescent moon and star on the pool of the blood of the martyrs....it reminds me of violence 49. (Ayten, female, aged 23, student)

The majority of respondents interpret the flags as the indication of a ‘victory’ that connotes the struggle, courage, sacrifice and power of Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Such responses depict the role of the official history in the articulation of the ideas of the respondents about the heroism and victories of Turks. Duyal’s interpretation for example, shows how flags mobilize the memories about a mythologized ‘past’ that is partly constructed through the narratives of the official history. In the mythologized ‘past’, terms such as ‘our victory’ which point to a common past and achievement, and ‘our blood’, which implies the common origin of Turkish Cypriots and Turks, are used frequently. The ‘blood of the martyrs’ is generally accepted as sacred and valuable. These terms function strategically to construct the unity and similarity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots).

On the other hand, for many respondents flags represent borders, wars and violence. As in Ayten’s comment above, in these interpretations the ‘blood of the martyrs’ is commonly seen as a representation of violence. Ayten also says that the Turkish flag reminds her of violence. In this way, like many respondents, she brings out some negative stereotypes about Turks as well. These stereotypes, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, locate Turks as dangerous and savage people and thus, as the others. The negative stereotypes of Turks thus operate as a strategy to dissolve the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is constructed through the putative similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Sovereignty and dependency are the other discourses that become obvious in the narratives of the respondents about the flags. These discourses point to one of the most crucial political issues, the position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus:

The flags represent the sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots 50 (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer)

We have never had a single flag... In fact, we are definitely dependent on Turkey. Therefore, the flags of Turkey and the TRNC are always together 51 (Mine, female, aged 28, customs and immigration officer)

49 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007
50 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007
51 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 4/9/2007
Most of the respondents evaluate the flag of Turkey in Northern Cyprus as an indication of Turkish Cypriots’ undesired dependency on Turkey. This evaluation suggests the loss of ‘national autonomy’ that operates as one of the strategies for transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999: 40) of the dominant discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism into the (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that emphasizes differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots. For example, when Mine says ‘we have never had a single flag...’ it is possible to hear her silent reproach for the absence of ‘a single flag’ that represents the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation of (turkish) Cypriots, who are different from Turks. In her and many other respondents’ understanding, the flag of Turkey that represents the Turkish nation and identity is conceived as a threat to the unity of (turkish) Cypriots who share a common identity, heritage, cultural and historical background. Mine’s desire to have a ‘single flag’ is one example of many that show respondents’ struggle to possess their (turkish) Cypriot identity by differentiating (turkish) Cypriots (a single flag) from the others (Turks/Turkish flag). These respondents place Turks outside the ‘nation’ to which (turkish) Cypriots belong.

On the other hand, Erdal says that “flags represent the sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots”. This response is very common and shows the evaluation of the two flags as equal in representing the sovereignty/independency of the Turkish (cypriots). The interpretations also depict the positive attitude of the respondents towards the political position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus. Here the emphasis on the positive political continuity (at state/national level) functions as a strategy (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999: 37) for the construction of the Turkish (cypriot) identity based on the unity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots). Thus, these kinds of conceptions about the two flags provide important clues about the respondents’ consideration of themselves as part of the Turkish nation and identity. In these cases, Turks are conceived as the members of the national collectivity.

In many interpretations of the flags, I observed how they mobilize different and sometimes opposing feelings (i.e. happiness, anger) according to the changing conceptions of the respondents about the sovereignty and dependency of the TRNC. In the most radical sense, the reason for the dependency is expressed by the respondents as Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus:
This makes me very happy [points to the TRNC flag]. It shows that my state is sovereign52 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher)

Makes me angry! [Laughs]. As for me, the presence of the Turkish flag makes me angry. If Turkey says that she hasn’t occupied this place, what is the Turkish flag doing here? If she claims that this is an independent country, if they say so, what is the Turkish flag doing here? If they call the TRNC a republic [points to the TRNC flag], it needs a flag.... may it have one... no objection! No53 (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student)

As was emphasized below, the flags are produced by the ruling groups to represent freedom and liberty. However, the interpretations of the individuals about the flags as representations of freedom and liberty vary according to their different conceptions of the nation and their national identity:

They remind me of myself as an entity. Seeing it waving makes me recall freedom54 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

Flags represent the borders and Turkish soldiers on the island55 (Berk, male aged 27, instructor)

Melek, for example, interprets the flags as a reminder of herself as an ‘entity’, which implies her national identity. In this sense, when she states that ‘waving flags’ recalls freedom, she means the ‘freedom’ to possess her ‘own’ identity as a Turkish (cypriot) in Northern Cyprus. For Berk on the other hand, flags represent ‘borders’ and ‘Turkish soldiers’ on the island; this brings out two important elements that are used strategically in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism. In the most radical sense, Turkish soldiers are considered as a threat to the reunification of the island in the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism. Soldiers are also conceived as the indication of and reason for the conflict and thus, for the ‘borders’ that prevent ‘Cypriots’ from living together. As with most of the respondents, the negative attitude of Berk towards ‘Turkish soldiers’ gives important clues as to how ‘Turks’ might be rendered as outside a (turkish) Cypriot identity.

On the other hand, many respondents who see themselves as part of the Turkish nation support Turkey’s position in the TRNC. They generally draw a positive picture of

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52 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007
53 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa, 1/9/2007
54 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
55 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC and the political situation in Northern Cyprus. Their commitment to the Turkish nation and identity, and their positive attitude towards the status quo, function as a strategy to justify the present situation. Their desire for the continuation of the status quo also provides clues about their negative attitude towards the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU with Greek Cypriots:

The flags show that the TRNC and Turkey are hand in hand (Ahmet, male, aged 60, barber)

The flags represent the freedom, democracy, struggle, power and confidence of Turks (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)

Such comments are very common and show how the flags have mobilized the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Ahmet for example, evaluates the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC in terms of cooperation and solidarity by saying that Turkey and the TRNC are hand in hand. Furthermore, according to Arif, flags represent the power, freedom, democracy and confidence of the Turks, and he suggests that ‘Turks’ are capable of surmounting obstacles and hardships on their own in the present situation; thus there is no need for Turkish (cypriots) to join the European Union.

The flags may also mobilize negative ideas about the status quo. Many respondents criticise the political and economic situation in Northern Cyprus when they talk about the flags, and therefore point to the need for a difference. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) note, ‘the emphasis on a necessary difference between then and now operates as a transformative strategy’.

What happened to us is because of this flag. After the establishment of the TRNC in 1983, we put the embargo on ourselves. We were not able to sell our products to Europe. Europe didn’t recognize us. The flags make me remember this situation (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher).

We see the flags everywhere. They represent weakness… I mean, people sometimes exaggerate themselves when they have complexes and we are doing the same thing by putting flags everywhere. No country has any idea about this flag

56 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: 24/07/2007
57 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/7/2007
58 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth , 23/7/2007
Like many respondents, Ergin criticises the status quo and even the establishment of the TRNC by pointing out the economic and political problems in Northern Cyprus. Deniz interprets the flagging as an indication of the complexes caused because of the weakness and incapability of the state. When she says “no country has any idea of this flag” she is pointing to the political problem that the TRNC is an ‘unrecognized state’, and this connotes the TRNC’s weakness and incapability in her understanding. Many respondents, like Deniz and Ergin, bring out elements such as political and economic problems that play a role in the articulation of the European Unionist discourse that is sustained by the (turkish) Cypriot nationalism, and was especially during the period of the CTP government. The interpretations of the respondents give important clues to their positive attitude towards the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union for the solution of the economic and political problems.

On the other hand, many respondents are against the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union; they conceive this situation as a threat for the Turkish (cypriot) identity and nationality. According to them, in the case of participation, Turkish Cypriots will live together with their ‘eternal enemies’ (Greek Cypriots). Ülkü’s interpretation of the flags shows how they have mobilized the respondents’ memories about their identity and the “others”:

The flag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is our flag. It represents our freedom and our nationality. If we joined the EU, our flag would change. That [new] flag would never be my flag. That flag does not express anything for me. When I was in primary school, our teachers made us hold the English flag but when I came back home from school, my father showed me the Turkish flag and said, "This is your flag”60 (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).

Like the memories of many respondents, Ülkü’s memory constructs and is constructed by her political idea about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. For example, when she sees the photograph of the flags, she remembers what her father told her when she was a little girl. This particular ‘past’ moment seems to be one of the elements that are articulated to each other and form a consistent whole in her memories, constructing and constructed by her ideas about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU. She

59 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
60 In depth-interview, Famagusta, 30/9/2007
therefore interprets this participation as a threat towards the identity and freedom of Turkish Cypriots because, in the case of participation, the national flag that represents the identity of the Turkish (cypriots) will change. However, like many other respondents, Ülkü’s political ideas about the EU and the Turkish flag are constructed by the fear of the others, who are Greek Cypriots in their case. As was noted above, in the case of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, Turkish Cypriots will share a common future with Greek Cypriots. The respondents’ arguments about the negative consequences of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU function as a strategy for perpetuating and maintaining the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the others – Greek Cypriots – in this event.

Many respondents also conceive the flags of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as two ‘Turkish’ flags and they say that Cyprus should have its ‘own’ flag. In these cases, it is the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is conceived as under threat. As Kemal a 51 year-old male tyre dealer expert says,

Our flags…..for me, there are two Turkish flags here….only one of them has a different colour. For me, there is no Cyprus flag here; there are two Turkish flags. This [points to the TRNC flag] is simply and totally another version of the Turkish flag. I mean we don’t have to deceive ourselves. In what shape could the Cyprus flag be… it [Cyprus] could have had its own flag if ever it were an independent state.

As for other respondents, ‘flag’ represents identity for Kemal. When he says that Cyprus should have its ‘own’ flag, he is expressing his desire to have an identity that is other than a Turkish identity (represented as Turkish flags). He believes these two flags do not represent his ‘real’ identity, which is (turkish) Cypriot in his case. When Kemal says “it [Cyprus] could have had its own flag if ever it were an independent state” he also means that the TRNC is not an independent state, and that is why it does not have a different flag. There is a silent criticism here about Turkish dominance and the status quo in Northern Cyprus. The negative connotation of political continuation and positive connotation of change function as a strategy for transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:41) in Kemal’s narrative like in many others. Hence, it is also possible to argue that Kemal and Ülkü’s ideas on flags show their different political standpoints regarding the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. Although Kemal’s ideas show his

61 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007
willingness towards the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, Ülkü clearly states that she is against it.

Some words that were used by the respondents when they were talking about the flags are depict in the table below. These specific words give crucial clues about what the flags represent for the respondents. The table includes the conflicting discourses of the respondents about the flags that have already been discussed. As noted earlier, the ideas of the respondents about the flags change according to the nodal points they adopt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(NodalPoints):</th>
<th>Turkish (cypriot) nationalism</th>
<th>(turkish) Cypriot nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our flag(s)</td>
<td>Their flag(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Borders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independency/sovereignty</td>
<td>Dependency/occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>Complexities/weakness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Economic problems/embargoes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.2 Old monuments and new public arts

Monuments are the crucial forms of commemorations in the Denktaş-UBP period. Photograph 1 shows the monument of Atatürk, the founder of Turkey. There is a statement below the monument as follows: “Ne Mutlu Türkçe diyene” (How happy to say I am a Turk’). In Photograph 2 there is the monument that symbolises a martyr (Turkish soldier) who was killed by Greeks and is lying in his mother’s arms. The statement below the monument is: “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget). In contrast, public artworks appeared during the period of the CTP government. Photograph 3 shows Sestas placed on the street. These are common, traditional items made from rushes and used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat food on. Photograph 4 depicts the peace cresset that was made by a famous Greek artist, Polyxene Kasda. The cresset symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan.
5.3.2.1 The monument of Atatürk

The monument above has particular importance as it was the first Atatürk monument placed at the centre of the capital, in the northern part of Nicosia in 1963 during the period of the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish communal assembly. As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was a present from the İş Bank, which was established in 1924 by a directive of Atatürk’s (Shaw and Shaw 1994:390). The monument was opened to the public on the national day of ‘29 October, The Founding Day of the Republic of Turkey’ and it has become the primary symbolic public place of the state authorities for laying wreathes on national days, since 1963. As in the case of flags, it is very common to see the monuments of Atatürk in many places, including streets, squares and the courtyards of schools. Atatürk is one of the main symbols of ‘Turkishness’, which is also used in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. He is represented as a ‘hero’ who is powerful, intelligent, brave, patriotic and diligent by the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. However, it should be noted that Atatürk has no connection with the Cyprus problem, as he died in 1938. His one statement regarding Cyprus was that “the island would need watching” (Karakoç and Kılıçoğlu 2003:4).

History textbooks, as one of the official mechanisms, play the primary role in the articulation of the ideas of the respondents about Atatürk. Nearly all of the
respondents said that they got their information about Atatürk from the history textbooks. As Yusuf and Alican comment,

Turkish Cypriots start to love Ataturk through the education they receive beginning in primary school. There are very few people who think contrarily and say, “I don’t like Atatürk”, because we were not told anything negative about Atatürk.\(^{62}\) (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).

I have never thought about what Atatürk means to me…These questions are really difficult. Really hard. What we read from our history textbooks…The principles of Atatürk, Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk is the man who saved Turks from extinction. Our ideas of Atatürk are formed with this information. So, Atatürk expresses Turkishness.\(^{63}\) (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).

As can be understood from the statement below the statue, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene” (How happy to say I am a Turk), the monument was set up to evoke the feelings of gratification and pride in being Turkish, and thus reinforce the commitment to the Turkish nation and identity. The symbol of Atatürk functions as a tradition in providing guidance about how to be a Turk, and thus, how a Turkish (cypriot) should be. The official history represents Atatürk as a ‘hero’ who is powerful, intelligent, brave, patriotic and diligent; parallel to the narratives of the official history, one can see how the symbol that operates as a Turkish role model mobilizes values and feelings such as bravery, courage, strength and self-confidence:

Atatürk is a great leader whom everybody should take as a model.\(^{64}\) (Alp, male, aged 29, optician)

This is it…When I look at the monument of Atatürk, I think that we [Turks and Turkish (cypriots)] are brave and courageous. I understand that we should trust ourselves.\(^{65}\) (Yusuf, male, aged 21, student).

He is a leader who sheds light and shows guidance with his principles. We [Turks and Turkish (cypriots)] still get power from him.\(^{66}\) (Nurten, female, aged 60, history teacher).

As the common symbol of the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot state, Atatürk played the primary role in the struggle for the survival of the Turkish nation. He is represented as the saviour

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\(^{62}\) In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007
\(^{63}\) In-depth interview, Arabahment: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
\(^{64}\) In-depth interview, Kermiya, 01/09/2007
\(^{65}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 30/07/2007
\(^{66}\) In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
of Turkey from the hand of ‘enemies’ by the official history. Although he has no connection with the Cyprus problem and thus, with the Cyprus war in 1974, many respondents conceive him as the defender and the symbol of survival of the Turkish Cypriots as well; it is interesting to observe that most of the respondents talk about Atatürk as if he had a significant role in Cyprus when they see the photograph of the monument. This situation depicts how the symbol of Atatürk leaks into everyday life and attaches to the political lives of the respondents through the monuments and other mechanisms. The monument which carries the symbol of Atatürk becomes ‘familiar, continual and thus, a habit’ (Billig 1995) as it enters into the social lives of the respondents. Moreover, the other mechanisms that carry the symbol of Atatürk enter into the social lives through social practices and narrations (i.e celebrating national days, hearing and singing the national anthem, seeing flags in the streets). In this sense, the mechanisms of memory mobilize meaning that articulates the idea that Atatürk has a strong connection with the Cyprus issue and the Turkish Cypriots. As noted in Chapter Two, habits are highly powerful as they transform into internalized attitudes about our identities. Below are the interpretations of the respondents that show how they relate Atatürk to the Cyprus issue:

He is our defender. I respect him. I am grateful to him. If it hadn’t been for him, we would hardly have been able to live these days\(^67\). (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife)

We get our power from Atatürk and have resisted the Greeks since 1955. We didn’t have any weapons. We resisted Greeks with sticks and shotguns. We get all our power from Atatürk\(^68\). (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

The greatness, the leader, our past, our history\(^69\). (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)

The monument of Atatürk shows that Turkish Cypriots are part of the Turkish nation. The monument shows the Turkish Cypriots’ love of Atatürk\(^70\). (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).

He saved Turks. If he hadn’t made the revolutions, we would not be here now\(^71\). (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).

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\(^67\) In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007
\(^68\) In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
\(^69\) In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party, 24/07/2007
\(^70\) In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/07/2007
\(^71\) In depth-interview, Girne: Domestic Parlour, 31/08/2007
If Atatürk were alive, the TRNC would never be like this. We would never live through these problems72 (Duyal, female, aged 21).

When they made this monument, Turkish Cypriots went and saluted Atatürk. But the British administration prohibited this. Atatürk enable us to reflect on our emotions of Turkishness and our spirit of belligerence73 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

The monument of Atatürk represents our loyalty and devotion to Atatürk74 (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor)

Well, here in question is our Ata [i.e. father], Atatürk... umm, as for me... his arms crossed [points to the posture of Atatürk in the photograph] … of course, those were the years of the war of independence. It was rather impossible to act in any way concerning Cyprus. His arms crossed... that is, so I think ... He was contemplating Cyprus’s future …he had some thoughts about Cyprus. As a matter of fact, his saying which begins and continues with, “keep an eye on Cyprus” is analogous with his posture. That is, this posture is absolutely meaningful [points to the posture of Atatürk in the photograph] … you can also interpret it in another way... we can also say that Atatürk had concerns for the security of Turkish Cypriot people75 (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist)

As can be understood from the interpretations of the respondents, Atatürk as the symbol of Turkishness appears articulated into the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. Thus the symbol plays a crucial role in the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on Turkish nationalism. However, there are also a variety of alternative narratives about Atatürk. These can be approached as different degrees of reworking the myth of Atatürk. In the narratives of some of the respondents, the symbol of Atatürk functions as a signifier in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity instead of Turkish (cypriot) identity. Hence, it is possible to explore the differences between the alternative narratives and the narratives of the official history (commemorations, history textbooks and symbols of tradition) about the signification of Atatürk in terms of identity. Although some of the respondents’ ideas about Atatürk as a ‘hero’ seem parallel to the official history (1974-2003), these respondents do not evaluate Atatürk as the symbol of Turkishness and thus they locate him as different from Turks. Furthermore, they establish a relationship between Atatürk and (turkish) Cypriot identity. In their view, Turkish Cypriots are more eager to adopt Atatürk’s principles of modernity than Turks are. This

72 In depth-interview, Girne: Girne Amerikan Universitesi, 15/08/2007
73 In-depth-interview, Köşkülüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
74 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
75 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 1/10/2007
situation makes (turkish) Cypriots closer to Atatürk than Turks; although the monument of Atatürk was put in place to strengthen the unity between Turks and Turkish (cypriots), it can function to mobilize the ideas on differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots:

He is the greatest Turk. He saved Turkey. Turkish Cypriots are also influenced by his revolutions. He abolished the çarşaf [the wrap or outer garment formerly worn by Turkish women]. He introduced the Latin letters [of the alphabet]. However, nobody told Turkish Cypriots to abolish the çarşaf or to use the Latin letters. Turkish Cypriots applied his principles in Cyprus on their own. But in Turkey, Atatürk struggled a lot to make Turkish people apply his principles. He even sentenced a number of people to death... This means that Turkish Cypriots love Atatürk. I love him as well. He created Turkey from nothing. When I see the picture of Atatürk, I remember this (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher)

İsmet: A worthy person, whom I respect.
Interviewer: How can you evaluate him from the point of view of the Turkish Cypriots?
İsmet: I think Turkish Cypriots are the members of a people who adopted his principles before the people of his native land did (male, aged 47, TV producer).

These responses indicate how the respondents adopt Atatürk’s principles of modernity and apply them as a sign of their closeness to him. Thus they claim that they are ‘the real sons and daughters’ of Atatürk. Their comparison of Turks and (turkish) Cypriots shows how they conceive (turkish) Cypriots as superior compared to Turks in that they adopted Atatürk’s principles before the Turks did. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) note, the positive self-presentation functions as a strategy for dissimilation. In this sense, the positive self-conception of the respondents about (turkish) Cypriots functions as a strategy to locate Turks as ‘them’ by composing a frontier between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots (us).

There are also respondents who completely reject establishing a connection between Atatürk and Cyprus or/and (turkish) Cypriots. In this way, they refuse the dominant public memory that locates Atatürk as the hero of (turkish) Cypriots. However, although these respondents do not take Atatürk as the hero of Turkish Cypriots, the myth still functions silently in preventing questioning of Atatürk. As Ezgi and Mustafa say in continuing,

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76 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 23/07/2007
This errm... comes as a bit strange to me... because Atatürk err.. is not our own hero. Atatürk was a good leader but um... but he has nothing to do with Cyprus... completely irrelevant for me... It doesn’t get on my nerves but [laughs]... He has nothing to do with us. At least, I suppose so78 (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student).

It reminds me of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. It doesn’t mean much for the Turkish Cypriots. When the Cyprus problem started to be in the interests of Turkey, Atatürk was no longer alive. The politician who was interested in Cyprus was Bülent Ecevit. When we were at school, we learned everything that the Turkish people had learned. Atatürk means a lot for Turks, the Turkish citizens, but it doesn’t have to have meaning for the Cypriots. Of course, I don’t intend to be disrespectful or exclude Atatürk79 (Mustafa, male, aged 68, accountant).

When Ezgi says ironically that Atatürk doesn’t get on his ‘nerves’ by referring to his previous interpretation about the Turkish flag, he expresses his hidden respect for Atatürk, who is mythologized through the narratives of the official history. His tactical re-interpretation makes Atatürk’s respectability unquestionable. In a similar vein, when Mustafa says “I don’t intend to be disrespectful or exclude Atatürk” after his explanation that Atatürk has no relation to Cyprus, this points to the indisputability of the symbol of Atatürk. It should also be noted here that in the counter narratives of a few respondents, Atatürk, the symbol of Turkishness, functions as an element that is not discursively articulated to their identity. Thus, these respondents approach Turkishness as a threat for their identity that is defined as (turkish) Cypriot. The concepts of ‘Atatürk’ and ‘Turkishness’ are not defined in positive terms like the interpretations of most of the respondents above. In the interpretations of these respondents, I examined how they label the symbol of Turkishness with negative terms such as the representation of militarism, violence and war. This shows how they exclude Turkishness in the construction of their identities.

I think the monument of Atatürk represents militarism80 (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

Ayten: If he (Atatürk) hadn’t been dead he would be the one to be killed.
Interviewer: Why?
Ayten: Um... I watched a movie related to the right of being elected for the Republican assembly...... when he was talking to a man, he said, “a lot of the people will lose their heads.” Rejecting war, he was trying to reach someplace

78 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007
79 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 16 August 2007
80 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
through war....his approach was violence. I think Turkish people, namely Turkey, believes in violence and they are aggressive people (female, aged 23, student)\textsuperscript{81}...

In the in-depth interviews, I explored how the conception of most of the respondents about Atatürk parallels the narratives of the official history that were produced especially during the Denktaş-UBP period. The history textbooks have a special importance in the construction of the memories of the respondents about Atatürk; the majority of the respondents said that they got their information about him from the history textbooks. Nearly all of the respondents conceive Atatürk as an idol, and the history textbooks play the main part in promoting the idolization of Atatürk. The symbol operates as a myth in the representation of an extraordinary human being – a kind of demigod. Thus, except for a few respondents, all of them interpreted Atatürk as a role model to be followed as a guide. The monument mobilizes feelings such as bravery, courage and self-confidence in the respondents, and these feelings play an important role in sustaining the Turkishness that supports the discourse of official history.

The monument of Atatürk and the Monument of the Martyr (below) can be read as two different texts that mobilize different discourses that articulate together. Although the Atatürk monument mobilizes meaning for the articulation of the ideas about ‘who the Turkish Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to construct the idea about ‘who the others are’. In this sense, the monuments operate as two different sides of the same coin.

\textsuperscript{81} In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007
5.3.2.2 The monument of the martyr

There are contested interpretations about the monument that symbolises a martyr (a Turkish soldier) who was killed by Greeks and is depicted lying in his mother’s arms in the Cyprus war. The monument was put in place to construct the ideas of Turkish Cypriots about Greeks, who are represented as the ‘others’ who mercilessly killed Turks. The statement below the monument, “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget), recalls the ‘past’ of the Cyprus war and thus, the Turkish people who died and/or suffered at that time. However, the term implies not only the ‘past’ but also the future, as it includes the promise of remembrance.

Many respondents interpret the monument as the true reflection of ‘past’ events. They believe that the monument is useful as it reminds them of the ‘past’; thus their interpretations are parallel to the narratives of the official history that was produced about the Greek Cypriots during the Denktas-UBP period during 1974-2003 (see Chapter Four). In this context, this particular monument functions as a mechanism that reproduces and rearticulates the constructed ‘past’.
It [the monument of the martyr] was erected in commemoration of the martyrs who fell during the 1963 struggles in the Kaymaklı area\textsuperscript{82} (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).

These very beautiful pictures tell us about the past\textsuperscript{83} (Ahmet, male, aged 60, barber).

Right, it represents the 1950’s and 1960’s\textsuperscript{84} (Alp, male, aged 29, optician).

The martyrs killed ruthlessly by the Greeks in 1963\textsuperscript{85} (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

These are images that reflect those days effectively\textsuperscript{86} (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

At least 2000 to 3000 Turkish soldiers lie in our cemetery. Well, we don’t forget what they have done\textsuperscript{87} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).

It [the monument of the martyr] was erected after the Happy Peace Operation. It was put in place for us not to forget\textsuperscript{88} (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor).

They tell me: “live today but do not forget the past\textsuperscript{89}” (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

This is the reflection of something that has happened. Please do remember that such events have taken place and whenever you see this, remember the past. Events like this have happened. What else might it mean… They try to tell this to people. Or when someone comes (a tourist) or if a child asks his father or mother what it is about, the mother or father may be able to tell them that some events have occurred like this\textsuperscript{90} (Göktn, aged 41, male machine engineer).

For most of the respondents, remembering the ‘past’ is a way to know their enemies and to protect themselves from them in the present and in the future; in order to defend themselves and their identity from the ‘others’ they ‘should’ not forget the past. According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) defence and avoidance are strategies that function to perpetuate a threatened identity. In this case, it is the Turkish (cypriots) and their identity that are conceived as threatened by the others (Greek Cypriots):

\textsuperscript{82} In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007
\textsuperscript{83} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: 24/07/2007
\textsuperscript{84} In- depth interview, Kermiya, 01/09/2007
\textsuperscript{85} In-depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
\textsuperscript{86} In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
\textsuperscript{87} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007
\textsuperscript{88} In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
\textsuperscript{89} In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
\textsuperscript{90} In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 14/10/2007
These are true. We will not forget them. The nations that do not learn from the lesson of the past are destined to extinction\(^91\) (Mustafa, male, aged 29, warehouseman).

A dead soldier, of course…. we shouldn’t forget whatever was done to us\(^92\) (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).

We’ll never forget, in order not to be in a situation like this and not to experience these things again. We should not forget in order not to let new monuments be erected alongside these ones. Not to experience them again\(^93\) (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist).

It recalls the 1974 intervention so that we don’t forget. Quite right! The days which were lived should not be forgotten. Our history is this, and we should set up the building on this foundation\(^94\) (Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor).

Comments such as ‘we shouldn’t forget whatever was done to us’, ‘we’ll never forget in order not to be in a situation like this and not to experience these things again’, ‘The nations that do not learn from the lesson of the past are destined to extinction’, ‘The days which were lived should not be forgotten’, ‘things have happened like this and we should act so that similar things won’t happen again’ show that it is necessary for the Turkish Cypriots to remember their ‘past’ in order to defend themselves and their identity from the ‘others’. Thus the normative-deontic modals (must, should) and constructions (it is necessary) that are included in the strategies of means of realization (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:40) function in the narratives of the respondents to support the strategies of defence and avoidance that operate to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity.

There are, on the other hand, many respondents who believe that the monument reflects events that happened in the ‘past’ but this should not be placed in a public space, because they would like to forget the offensive events of the ‘past’ in order to manage to achieve peace with Greek Cypriots in the future. Their desire to not remember the ‘past’ also shows their negative attitude towards the politics of the previous official discourse that produced its mechanisms such as the monument of the martyr to reinforce the constructed ‘past’ and the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism:

\(^{91}\) In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House cafe, 26/07/2007
\(^{92}\) In depth-interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007
\(^{93}\) In depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007
\(^{94}\) In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007
Of course what we have lived shouldn’t be forgotten, but it isn’t all right to declare these things by poking them into people’s eyes either. Take France and Germany for example. The wars between them… if they had kept this logic all the time, how would they have solved the problem? (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV producer).

Bad memories, of course…but they represent reality, because a war happened and this was experienced. But this didn’t happen only to our side, it happened to their [Greek Cypriots’] side as well. Bad things were experienced by both [Turkish and Greek Cypriots]. But the expression “we won’t forget” is so nasty… if no one’s going to forget, how we are going to achieve peace?95 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female beautician).

We won’t forget… (Sighs) bringing the fears of the past to the present…. The picture of not forgetting. That means unhappiness96 (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee).

The monument of the martyr: We won’t forget? I don’t like statues like this that remind us of the offensive events of the past97 (Emine, aged 52, female retired official).

Interpretations such as ‘if no one’s going to forget, how we are going to achieve peace’, ‘the picture [the photograph of the martyr] of not forgetting. That means unhappiness’ and ‘I don’t like statues like this that remind us of the offensive events of the past’, bring criticisms to the official discourse (1974-2003) that sustains Turkish (cypriot) nationalism through these kinds of monuments. These comments also point to the desire for a possible political transformation in Northern Cyprus; most of the respondents emphasize that they want peace in Northern Cyprus. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) point out, emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future functions as a strategy that aims to transform a well established identity into another identity. The transformative strategies function in the narratives of the respondents to transform the dominant Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. Nevruz’s argument that “bad things were experienced by both [Turkish and Greek Cypriots]” points to the ‘shared sorrow’ that functions as a constructive strategy (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:38). As noted above, (turkish) Cypriot identity is based on the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that emphasizes the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and points to the necessity of their unification.

95 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
96 In depth-interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007
97 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
The monument also mobilizes the alternative memories of the respondents that are completely against the official history:

The monument tells... let it go on like this; let someone else die in your lap. Or rather, you always remember. Similar to the vendetta cases in Turkey. Like waging vendetta\(^98\) (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

I don’t think that it [the monument of the martyr] reflects the past self-righteously. They [Greek Cypriots] treated us badly and we retaliated. They also have similar pictures at the Ledra Palace Crossing. If you hit me, I hit you back; it is something like that\(^99\) (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).

In some interpretations, Turks are criticised in different aspects; this shows that some of the respondents dissolve the existing chains of equivalence between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots in their memories. Ayten, for example, sees a similarity between the monument of the martyr and vendetta cases in Turkey. In this way, she expresses her negative attitude towards Turks and the monument of martyr which is one of the symbols of the official history (1974-2003) that sustains Turkish (cypriot) nationalism, and she constructs (turkish) Cypriot identity by excluding Turkishness. It is also sometimes possible to observe how the strategies of sameness function to create similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the narratives of the respondents. For example, when Eylem says ‘They have similar pictures at the Ledra Palace crossing’ she implies that Greek Cypriots also have martyrs and they display them in the same way as Turkish Cypriots do through the monuments. Such comments show that the monument of the martyr also mobilizes memories that are completely different from the discourse of the official history. However, most of the time the monument mobilizes negative emotions about the Greek Cypriots. The monument of the martyr also constructs the idea that the ‘others’ have negative feelings towards ‘us’:

This [the monument] reflects the hatred of the Greeks for me\(^100\) (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).

It [the monument] reflects the murdering of the people during the wars and the agony of the families of the people murdered\(^101\) (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter).

\(^98\) In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007
\(^99\) In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007
\(^100\) In depth-interview, Kyrenia: domestic parlour, 31/08/2007
\(^101\) In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
We will never forget. I am affected like all Turks when I watch documentaries about the massacres\(^\text{102}\) (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee).

I feel very close to the one who is buried there. I feel the sorrow. And the one who is standing is strong, powerful and someone noble; sad, but keeps his sorrow buried deep in his heart\(^\text{103}\) (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).

Well, they remind us of the massacres committed towards us. It [the monument] reminds us of the old and bitter past. I hope we do not go through those things again\(^\text{104}\) (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).

Although the symbol of Atatürk operates as a Turkish role model and brings together feelings such as courage, pride, self-confidence and bravery about the ‘self’, the monument of the martyr is highly influential in mobilizing emotions such as sorrow, pain and agony that have a crucial role in the construction of negative feelings such as hate, anger and grudge towards the ‘others’, who are supposed to have murdered so many innocent Turkish people. In this way, these two monuments sustain the discourse of the official history (1974-2003) in the construction of ‘who the Turkish (cypriots) are’ and who ‘the others are’. However, the monument of the ‘martyr’ and the ‘sestas’ that are analysed below operate to articulate the ‘others’ in a different way. These two symbols present different and sometimes opposing ‘pasts’ for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

\(^{102}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007

\(^{103}\) In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007

\(^{104}\) In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
5.3.2.3 Sestas

Figure 5.4

Some of the alternative memories and narratives that opposed the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism during the Denktaş-UBP period became dominant for a short time in the period of the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP). Although the previous official discourse had constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by producing a sharp antagonistic relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the subsequent government highlighted the (turkish) Cypriot identity and thus emphasized the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In order to disseminate its political discourse, the CTP government placed public artworks in the streets and squares to symbolize the items that are used in the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. One of these public artworks is Sestas, common, traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat food on.

Sestas signify the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they used to live together, especially in the 1950’s. Sestas is thus a public artwork that represents the ‘others’ from a different perspective for the first time since the division of the island. As was stated in Chapter Four, during the Denktaş-UBP period, a great number of monuments were placed in streets and squares, all representing the heroism of the Turks and Turkish martyrs of the Cyprus war. These monuments were a way of telling who the other was and was not. However, Sestas and public artworks similar to them bring an alternative ‘past’, which was about the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, into the present. The narratives of the respondents show that Sestas mobilize the alternative past, based on a united Cyprus and Cypriotness:
When I see Sestas, I remember Cyprus and stories I heard from my grandfather. Biddalar [thin layers of dough cooked on an iron plate], fasıllar [short music performances] and entertainment\textsuperscript{105}...(Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

Sestas represent Cypriotness. They remind me of my grandmother\textsuperscript{106} (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

They represent our [Turkish/Greek Cypriot] culture and Cypriotism so I like them a lot\textsuperscript{107} (Emine, female, aged 52, retired official).

For me, they are warm, nice items that remind me of our [Turkish/Greek Cypriot] culture. The sestas that my grandmother made pies on... erm... that warm family environment... well, my grandmothers were from villages; they make me feel this\textsuperscript{108} (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter).

On the other hand, according to some other interviewees, Sestas belong only to the Turkish Cypriot culture; these respondents reject establishing any similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as they conceive Greek Cypriots as ‘others’. In the words of Alp, a 29-year-old male optician and Yusuf, a 30-year-old male official:

Alp: Turkish Cypriots used to dry molehiya [a kind of plant that grows in Cyprus] on them. They would dry tarhana [a preparation of yogurt and flour dried in the sun]. [laughs]... they reflect Cyprus culture.

Interviewer: When you talk about Cyprus culture, does it comprise Greek Cypriots or only Turkish Cypriot culture?

Alp: Cyprus Turkish Culture\textsuperscript{109}.

Yusuf: Our customs and mores, I see our past in them.

Interviewer: Are there Greek Cypriots in them as well?

Yusuf: No. We inherited them from our grannies.

Most of the respondents, especially the ones opposed to the politics of the CTP government, evaluate Sestas as meaningless and artificial symbols. According to the respondents, it is not possible to talk about the common ‘past’ and common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; they argue that the symbol of Sestas does not represent the realities and actual feelings of the Turkish Cypriot community. In this way, they criticise the politics of the new government as they believe that it is trying to misrepresent the

\textsuperscript{105} In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007
\textsuperscript{106} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of CTP, 7/8/2007
\textsuperscript{107} In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
\textsuperscript{108} In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
\textsuperscript{109} In- depth interview, Kermiya, 01/09/2007
past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for political ends (i.e., for getting people’s votes, to impose its European Unionist discourse):

It is made of plaster and it is artificial. It has no meaning. They were used in homes as trays for drying molehiya, tarhana or nane [peppermint]. They were all made during the same period [the CTP period]. We look at them with respect to the modern city design. There are also similar handicrafts. I don’t approve of any of them. They have been completely artificial facets and they do not represent the feelings of the community. There’s a Bekri monument at Asmaaltı, there’s a vine tree and tulips covered in plastic at Dereboyu (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).

Sestas were placed there as a result of a political view. All these are the intrigues of the EU. As Turks and Greeks used to live together peacefully and would make sestas together; all these are meaningless (Ahmet, male, aged 60, barber).

In my opinion, it doesn’t have any meaning (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employer).

The sesta and the torch of peace: for me it means nothing… Visual objects just to hunt for people’s votes (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).

On the other hand, there are some respondents who think that the Sestas that symbolise the common way of lives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots represent the ‘past’ in a correct way. They also support the politics of the CTP government as they believe that it reflects the truths about the ‘past’. The respondents’ criticisms towards the monuments that were set up during the Denktaş-UBP period indicate that for them these monuments represent the war and death:

Blood, life and death… (points to the photographs of the monuments). Rather than saying “Greeks killed this or that” today’s government, by putting up such artefacts, is trying to put aside enmity towards Greeks and they are talking about the truths. We can do this even with the modifications in the history curriculum (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).

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110 Public artwork that represents Bekri Mustafa, a famous drinker. ‘Bekri’ is also the name of one of the folk dances of Cyprus. The dance symbolizes the famous drinker Bekri and is usually performed by young men.
111 Public artwork that represents the vine tree, one of the most popular trees in Cyprus.
112 Public artwork that represents a kind of tulip that is peculiar to Cyprus.
113 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Hearth, 20/8/2007
114 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: 24/07/2007
115 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007
116 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007
Sestas make us remember the friendship and peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is better to remember these good memories, instead of the negative things such as the war and the martyrs. I think the new government is trying to make us remember our past as Cypriots\textsuperscript{117} (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).

It should be noted here that the respondents’ different conceptions about the ‘past’ of Greek and Turkish Cypriots play the main role in their interpretations about Sestas. In other words, the memories about the ‘past’ functions as a nodal point around which Sestas that symbolises the common ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots acquire their meaning from their relationship to the ‘past’.

5.3.2.4 The peace cresset

Figure 5.5

The peace cresset that was made by the Greek artist Polyxene Kasda was placed at the road junction at Metehan\textsuperscript{118} in the CTP period before the referenda. The peace cresset symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an

\textsuperscript{117} In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
\textsuperscript{118} In the Metehan area, there is a border gate that was opened after the partial opening of the crossings. Greek and Turkish Cypriots use the Metehan road to cross to the ‘other’ side of the island by car.
affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan; and I examined how it mobilizes meaning which articulates the ‘peace’. Below are different evaluations of the respondents about the meaning of ‘peace’ and their expectations from the future regarding the political situation in Cyprus. Although some respondents evaluate ‘peace’ as the unification of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, others believe that ‘peace’ means the separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

The peace cresset shows the necessity of peace between the two communities, that can be realized with their common life\textsuperscript{119} (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

The Peace Cresset represents the expected peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus\textsuperscript{120} (Emine, female, aged 52, retired official).

The Peace Cresset is just another sculpture. It doesn’t mean much to me. Some people say that there is no peace. Is there a war? There isn’t a war either, because there’s a ceasefire. They say they are striving for peace in Cyprus, but I believe there is already peace in Cyprus and the 1974 peace operation brought peace for Turks as well as Greeks by preventing war… It brought an end to the clashes amongst the Greeks against EOKA; and transformed the war into peace even amongst them. These are the impacts of the peace operation\textsuperscript{121} (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).

Peace [stress] should be made like this; separate [stresses, angry] but let’s reconcile. I mean… Let them come to this side, and let’s go to the other side, but we had better live in two distinct states. Let’s make peace. There are also borders between Turkey and Greece. Why not between them and us? Let it be. Let it be, but in two separate parts. We’ll govern ourselves and they will govern themselves\textsuperscript{122} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).

It should be noted here that these responses were given after the results of the two referenda on the Annan Plan that proposed a possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem; the interpretations of the respondents about the peace cresset might have been different before the referenda. Thus the past was evaluated in the present context. The majority of Greek Cypriots said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan and most of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated this situation as disappointing; many respondents interpret the peace cresset as directly related to the outcome of the referenda that were held in North and South Cyprus. These respondents believe that, especially after the referenda, the peace cresset has lost its meaning because

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007}

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007}

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007}

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007}
of the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan. The peace cresset thus mobilizes the negative attitude of some of the respondents towards the Greek Cypriots:

After the referenda, I believe that we will see peace in such works, I am afraid not anywhere else\(^{123}\) (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).

This was placed here to give the message of a prospective future to both sides but I think it is impossible. If it had been possible, it would have been realized by now, but there’s neither peace nor any hope for it\(^{124}\) (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

After the referenda, this sculpture doesn’t have any more meaning than an image of a tasteless vase for me (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV producer).

The cresset, in which light was burning, later went ‘out of order’, in parallel with the reality in Cyprus\(^{125}\) (Mehmet, male, aged 20, student).

It represents tranquillity and peace. It was placed there before the referendum. When you look at it now, you don’t get the same message as at that time. Now you don’t even notice it. To tell you frankly, it’s lost its meaning. It was important then; it meant something, but not any more\(^{126}\) (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter).

However, some others still believe in the necessity of an agreement between the two communities after the referenda. Thus, the existence of the peace cresset represents their expectation, hope and desire for the peace, but at the same time, their silent fears of the future in the case of not achieving an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

As we haven’t reached an agreement, the monument preserves its validity there and our desire for peace still persists\(^{127}\) (Sevinc, female, aged 48, news speaker).

There must be peace [stress]. And this is one of the symbols of it\(^{128}\) (Ayşê, female, aged 31, instructor).

The peace cresset represents the need for peace and tranquillity. The need to pursue our life without living the same things, by taking lessons from our past history\(^{129}\) (Mustafa, male, aged 68, accountant).

\(^{123}\) In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007  
\(^{124}\) In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007  
\(^{125}\) In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House café, 30/08/2007  
\(^{126}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007  
\(^{127}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007  
\(^{128}\) In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007  
\(^{129}\) In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 16 August 2007
There are also respondents who criticise the politics of the new government (CTP) regarding the Cyprus issue and the reunification of the island; according to them, the politics of the new government does not represent the ideas of the Turkish Cypriot community. Many respondents criticise the government for erecting a public artwork made by a Greek artist and evaluate the peace cresset with negative expressions, such as ‘it doesn’t have a meaning’, ‘disgraceful’, ‘strange’ and ‘non-sensical’:

 Completely disgraceful [points to the peace cresset]. While there are lots of Turkish artists around, they had a Greek artist make it. This is trying to achieve unrest in the community rather than tranquillity. The expression is vague. Being at the road junction where the Turks and Greeks have been getting in touch after 1974, intended to make people recall re-uniting of the island, but it means nothing at all. Artificial works of art\textsuperscript{130} (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).

The peace cresset doesn’t have a meaning. I don’t believe that it will bring any result. They are similar to the bi-communal activities, and the festivals only represent a few people from both sides who are put together by CTP. They don’t represent the public\textsuperscript{131} (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee).

I don’t know what it means…. They [the new government] have erected some strange things lately. There are things like this in Famagusta, the meaning of which I do not understand. Is it modern art? I don’t know\textsuperscript{132}… (Alp, male, aged 29, optician).

There cannot be such nonsensical things in life. What has been done? It represents another political view. It won’t reflect the view of the whole of the people\textsuperscript{133} (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

The peace cresset and sestas are the two transformative mechanisms of the government of CTP that highlight (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and support the Annan Plan. The interpretations of the respondents about the transformative strategies of CTP give crucial clues about how they locate themselves in terms of national identity and what their political ideas are in terms of future prospects of Northern Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{130} In depth-interview, Nicosia: Brotherhood Unity, 20/8/2007
\textsuperscript{131} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007
\textsuperscript{132} In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007
\textsuperscript{133} In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
5.3.3 Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries

Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries are forms of commemorations that play a substantial role in the fixity of the constructed ‘past’. Like the other forms of mechanisms, these places carry the memory of the ‘past’. When I interviewed the respondents, nearly all of them talked about the museum of Barbarism that school teachers had taken them to when they were studying in the third year of the primary school. These experiences of the respondents are structured through a kind of ritual and they experience liminality when they visit this place. As was stated in Chapter Two, liminality in the museum entails being outside of or betwixt and between the normal world. Duncan (1995) who borrows the concept of liminality from Turner has analysed the art museum as a ‘ritual site’; she argues that the combination of place and objects has to be seen in its totality as a script or dramatic field (Bouquet 2004:195). In a similar vein, in this part of the thesis, I analyse how the Museum of Barbarism can be seen as a script written by the dominant discourse (1974-2003).

The house of Dr. Nihat İlhan, a major serving in the Cyprus Turkish Contingent in 1963, was converted into the museum of Barbarism in 1966. The museum was repaired in 1975 in the Denktaş-UBP period. It is argued by the official discourse that the house was attacked by the Greek Cypriot terrorists; İlhan’s wife and three children were murdered in the bathroom and the landlady in the toilet, where they had tried to hide during the inter-communal troubles in 1963. Below are some photographs that I took in the museum of barbarism to show how the objects were collected together to articulate the visitors’ ideas about the others (Greek Cypriots).
The first photograph depicts the house that was converted into a museum. This is an ordinary Turkish Cypriot house in Nicosia on Martyr Mürüvvet İlhan Street; the name of İlhan’s wife was later given to the street as ‘Martyr’ Mürüvvet İlhan. At the entrance there is a broken door (Photograph 2). On the door is written: ‘the door that was broken that night and has been kept in its original form since then’. Photograph 3 shows shoes and clothes that are supposed to have been worn that night by the children, their mother and the landlady. On the photos there is a text: ‘properties belonging to Mürüvvet İlhan, her children and landlady Feride (The stains on the clothes are blood)’. These are exhibited in the hall. The fourth photograph depicts the painted picture of the mother and her three children who were murdered, lying in the bathroom. The painted picture is on the wall next to their ‘properties’. Photograph 5 shows the actual bathroom of the house with the blood of the dead still kept on it for exhibition purposes. Finally, the photograph 6 shows the ceiling of the bathroom, covered with glass for protection and preservation. It is believed that there are pieces of the brains of the children and their mother stuck on the ceiling.

The museum being the actual house of the family, its sequenced spaces and arrangements, the objects (i.e., properties, the bathroom, the supposed pieces of brain, the broken door) and photographs (i.e., murdered young and old people and soldiers) on the walls of the house, provide both the stage set and script as in the ritual sites. It is organized to create the atmosphere that the visitors are actually in the house that night, although in fact they are not. This situation makes visitors experience liminality when they visit the museum. As was noted in Chapter Two, according to Turner, ‘transitional beings are neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere, and are at the very least ‘betwixt and between’” all the recognized fixed points in space-time”. The Museum of Barbarism is organized to carry the visitors to the constructed ‘past’ about the Greek
Cypriots, and it mobilizes their emotions, such as fear and agony, during the liminal period. As Bouquet (2004:195) points out, visitors directly or vividly experience values and beliefs (about political identity) put on display for them by the museum.

The liminal period becomes associated with the idea of ambiguity; that is, the liminal position is uncertain, as it lies outside any possible social categorization (Gallego 2002:146). Thus, when individuals go to the museum they might become remote from their daily lives for a while and experience the values of political identity/otherness. Furthermore, the museum, as one of the mechanisms of memory, mobilizes their feelings and emotions ‘when the individual, having completed the transition to his new status, returns to a relatively stable state’ (Kaplan 2002:160) with the ideas about the self (Turks) and others (Greeks). However, as Duncan (1995:13) argues, ‘people continually ‘misread’ or scramble or resist the museum’s cues to some extent. But then, the same is true of any situation in which a cultural product is performed or interpreted’.

When the respondents talk about the museum, it is interesting to see how the images of the ‘house’, ‘bathroom’, ‘brain pieces and the blood’ ‘photographs on the walls’, ‘properties of the children’ and ‘broken door’ appear in their narratives about the ‘others’. This situation shows how the objects that lose their historical relevance during the process of museumization gain a new meaning in the memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots. In the childhood memories of some of the respondents, Greek Cypriots are sometimes represented as ‘monstrous’ and ‘bad guys’. Thus Haluk, a 33 year-old male secondary school English teacher, Zehra, a 26 year-old female shop assistant and Selen, a 29 year-old female TV presenter express their feelings after they went to this particular museum:

In relation to the Museum of Barbarism, I mostly remember the pictures on the wall. They were the pictures of Turkish Cypriots who were shot and killed savagely. At that time, I don’t remember that I consciously thought about anything. I remember that I was terrified and shivered. Later, I created a monster in my imagination. I was in the third year [of school] and I didn’t know very much about Greeks. Moreover, as I hadn’t met any Greek people, I used to believe that they weren’t human beings but rather monstrous entities that were doing disastrous things and killing us. History textbooks also played a crucial role in forming my ideas about Greeks.  

I was influenced by the Museum of Barbarism very badly. I remember the terrible pictures on the wall, the brain pieces of the children on the ceiling of the bathroom

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134 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007
and the blood… I was 10 years old and after I went there, it’s funny, but I was thinking that all the bad guys are Greek Cypriots in the war films.135

When I was a child, I used to dream that the Greeks broke into our home. I sort of thought that the things that we read in the history book would take place again. Suddenly a war would break out again. The fighter planes would fly over our heads again and soon after this the Greeks would assault us. They would break open our doors and would shoot at us. Occasionally, when I entered the bathroom, I would shudder. I didn’t want to close my eyes, I sort of had a feeling that the Greeks would arrive and kill me in the bathroom. Sometimes, I would dream about the people I disliked as Greek attackers. For example, I would dream about one of my teachers whom I disliked as a Greek soldier who came to our home to kill us.137

The respondents narrated their memories of the ‘past’ in the present; in other words, they explained how they felt when they were 9 or 10 years old in the present contexts. The history textbook and the museum, which are the two mechanisms, work like a single body in the construction of negative feelings regarding Greek Cypriots; there is a consistent continuation of the narratives about Greek Cypriots from mechanism to mechanism. In this way, although these respondents never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before the division of the island, they had negative ideas and fears about them. Furthermore, some respondents talked about the martyrs’ cemeteries and mass graves that school teachers had taken them to. Like the museum of Barbarism, these places function to mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing their fears. This is illustrated when a 28 year-old female instructor, Melek, narrates her feelings on going to the Karaoğlanoğlu martyrs’ cemetery, and Ayşe explains what she thought when she went to the mass graves:

When I went to the cemetery of the martyrs at the beach where the Turkish troops landed, I saw the marks of the bullets here and there and this took me drifting back to those days; I felt like I was living those days. I was horrified and agonised.138

(Melek, female, aged 28, instructor)

When I went to the Muratağa, Sandallar-Atlılar mass graves… actually there isn’t so much to tell about those places. I remember the white stones and the names of the martyrs were written on them. However, there were a lot of names…I cannot imagine how a human being can kill so many innocent people and bury them in

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135 In depth-interview, Alsancak: Domestic parlour, 28/08/2007
137 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
138 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
the same place. At least, I know that Greeks can do that\(^{139}\)…(Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor)

I also examined the oppositions between the narratives that are disseminated by the official history and the alternative public memories that encompass the family and the media (especially the newspapers). The official discourse is often challenged by the alternative media and family narratives; according to some of the interviewees, the narrations of their families and/or the media about the Greek Cypriots are more influential than the experiences that they get through the official history. This shows that the official mechanisms do not always speak the language of the respondents, as the responses of Berk, a 27-year-old male university instructor and Emine, a 52-year-old female retired official illustrate:

Berk: I remember that when I was 10 years old, they took all third-year classes to the Museum of Barbarism. Girls were crying and I felt irritated by the pictures on the wall. However, I never thought that Greeks were bad because I always heard about the good memories of my family members with Greek Cypriots\(^{140}\).

Emine: After the 1963 event; the thing I remembered most was the slaughter of the children in the bath tub. They appeared on the newspapers in big pictures. But in our family conversations, I heard that such things had been over exaggerated. Furthermore, as students, they took us to the house which was converted into the Museum of Barbarism. They told us that the children’s brains were stuck on the ceiling. In fact there was something on the ceiling. I felt very sorry. For many years, when I heard the word brain, I felt as if I was going to vomit. I was affected very deeply. Later, I found out that all these were made-up stories because at the entrance, they showed us something supposed to be the brains, but the children were in the bathroom, so how could the brains be stuck on the ceiling of the living room?

Interviewer: How did you find out that they were made-up stories?

Emine: Later some news appeared in the newspapers. They wrote that it would be contrary to the facts, because the children were covered with a bed-cover, so how could the brains stick to the ceiling passing through the thick cloth?\(^{141}\).

\(^{139}\) In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007

\(^{140}\) In-depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007

\(^{141}\) In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
5.3.4 History textbooks and the ‘others’/changing history textbooks, changing the ‘others’

In this part, I will consider the respondents’ interpretations of history, especially of the different history textbooks used in the schools during the Denktası-UBP period (1974-2003) and the period of the CTP government (2003-2008). Although the history textbooks, as one of the mechanisms, are produced to fix the ‘past’, neither the ‘past’ nor the history textbooks are permanent. The textbooks that narrate the ‘other’ are constantly rewritten in changing power relations. In this way, the narrations about the ‘others’ are also articulated and constructed. However, as only six years have elapsed since the introduction of the new history textbook in the schools, it is not possible to examine how the new textbook mobilizes meaning that articulates the respondents’ definition of their identity (self) and the ‘other’ in their everyday lives.

School education is one of the critical factors in the formation of public memories in relation to identity. As Kearney points out (2003:91), ‘community schools are regarded as an important resource for many communities in terms of maintaining identity’. Generally, the respondent’s knowledge about the history comes from their school education. However, most of the respondents internalised the history-‘constructed past’ as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Thus, as Todorova (2004:5) states, “learning history itself is lived ‘experience’ that becomes part of memory”.

Through the interviews, it became clear that starting with the primary schools, the discourse of the ruling group during the years 1974-2003 became highly influential in the articulation of memories about the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) through the official history (i.e. history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition). As explained in Chapter Four, Greek Cypriots are mostly represented by the previous official history as the barbarians and murderers of a lot of Turks without any mercy in the 1963-1974 events; while Turks are represented as the saviours of Turkish Cypriots from their enemies, Greek Cypriots, in the ‘1974 Happy Peace Operation’:

When people speak of the 20th of July, it reminds me of the Turkish Cypriots attainment of peace. And that we are an independent country… that we live independently of the Greeks. That the motherland Turkey saved us142… (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

142 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
When we look in the history textbooks, we can see that if they [the Turks] hadn’t arrived, we would have been killed one by one. May be no one would be left behind.143 (Ayşe, female, aged 31, instructor).

We were saved as a result of the peace operation in 1974; therefore, 1974 is a turning point for the Turkish Cypriots144 (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter)

If we are alive today, we owe this to our motherland. If Turkey hadn’t come, we would have been in graves now like the people in the Muratağa and Sandallar graveyards. But fortunately we are alive and we have good life standards and salaries145 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).

The change of the ruling groups and the political system often bring with them the revision of textbook narratives. Sometimes history textbooks are revised to combat nationalism. In Northern Cyprus, the new government that came to power in 2003 changed the history textbooks to reconstruct the ‘past’ in parallel with their political standpoint. The CTP government supports the re-unification of the island and so the official history textbook is revised according to this political understanding. In this way, the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is represented more positively than in the previous history textbook, in order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. As mentioned earlier, in the new Cyprus history textbook, there is not so much emphasis on the periods of 1963-1974 and there are no photographs of Turks murdered by Greeks. The respondents’ ideas about the old and new history textbooks depict how they conceive the ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

I bought and read the current history books; I also read our history books when I was at high school. The history textbooks of today have nothing in common with the history books we used to read in our high-school years. In the previous history textbooks, there were things that you were really required to know and learn. My ideas can be different if I know the misconduct of the Greek Cypriots in 1963 or in 1974 towards my people, who are from my blood, my race and my nation. The past events were explained in a more detailed way in the previous history books. In the present history textbooks, they cover topics related to what Cypriots ate and drank before 1974 instead of the events that were lived by Turkish Cypriots. Ancient wedding ceremonies etc. are narrated. Of course these can be reflected, but the present history books are completely biased146 (Memduh, male, aged 23, student).

143 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007
144 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007
145 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007
146 In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of the Ulusal Birlik Party, 24/7/2007
Our present minister of Education used the Greek History books as a resource for the new history books and did not use the information of our historians. They teach our youth a lot of incorrect things.\(^{147}\) (Nurten, female, aged 60, retired history teacher).

In the new history textbook there is information about the common life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, such as their lifestyles; there is also geographical information about the island of Cyprus:

The new history books...Well they treat the Cyprus issue through mentioning the Second World War, the process of de-colonization, self-determination, India such and such... I mean, the new history book deals with the Cyprus issue with a broad perspective. In this way, the new history books are very good in giving us information about what really happened in Cyprus. They also give importance to the social and cultural history of Cyprus.\(^{148}\) (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

Our previous history books were really bad. The new books are better. They include the subjects about which we can say that they are part of the history of Cyprus. Such as the flowers that grow in Cyprus, the plants, the geography of Cyprus...I think this is the history of Cyprus.\(^{149}\) (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

Furthermore, it is possible to examine the influence of the memories of the ‘past’ that comes through the autobiographical and/or public memories partly constructed by the official history in the narration of a single social individual. This situation depicts the complex functioning of memory as a contested territory that includes the ‘contested pasts’. The dialogue with Berk who is a 27-year old male instructor illustrates:

Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did your family have any fears?

Berk: Not at all. In their village, some Turkish and Greek Cypriots went on sentry duty together to prevent some people (belonging to EOKA or TMT) from attacking them. Besides, my grandmother used to say that the reason why they left their village before 1963 was the attack of some people belonging to TMT.

Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears?

Berk: Of course they had. For a while; think about a group of people who were more than your population and shouting for ‘ENOSIS’.\(^{150}\)

\(^{147}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 21/09/2007  
\(^{148}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of CTP, 7/8/2007  
\(^{149}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007  
\(^{150}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of CTP, 7/08/2007
As Berk was born after the division of the island, it is not possible for him to answer these questions by using his autobiographical memory. Therefore, his memory of the ‘past’ is constructed through the official history and/or other public narratives (i.e close environment, family, media). In Berk’s answers to the first and second questions it is possible to see the contradictions in his memory about the ‘past’ of Greek and Turkish Cypriots that is articulated through different narratives. In his answer to the first question, the alternative public narratives (i.e family as one of the source of public memories) play a role in the articulation of his ideas about the ‘past’ of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus he says that his family had not had any fears of living with Greek Cypriots before 1974. However, when he answers the second question he says that Turkish Cypriots had fears as a community. Emine, a 52-year retired official, answers the question as follows:

Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family have any fears?

Emine: After 1963, we left Kaymaklı and settled in municipality houses. After that, we didn’t meet with the Greeks any more but when the barricades were lifted in 1967, my friend and I would go to the Greek sector of the city and do some shopping. Two girls, by ourselves, we didn’t feel any fear at all and went shopping. When I was 16 we would sometimes go to the disco with my fiancé. We thought we could always be friends with them, we could dance with them.

Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears?

Emine: The majority was afraid; I remember this from the newspapers. We also followed the Denktas–Makarios negotiations in the newspapers. After the 1963 event, the thing I remembered most was the slaughter of the children in the bathtub. They appeared in the newspapers in big pictures. But, in our family conversations, I heard that such things had been over exaggerated. Later some news appeared in the newspapers151.

In Emine’s narrative, a particular newspaper that was parallel to the official discourse in the period (1974-2003) articulates the memory of the past about Turkish Cypriots as a community. Also, her autobiographical memories and her family’s alternative narratives present a different version of the past. Tezcan, a 30 year-old male who works in a tourism agency, comments:

Tezcan: I used to view events as in the history books I read at middle school and high school. In addition my grandmother and grandfather would consider Greeks

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151 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri:Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
as inhumane. The elderly who survived the clashes and worried about their lives and future look at the Greeks through different glasses. When I grew up, I started to believe that it was not only the Greeks who were to blame but Turks as well. Media have played a crucial role in the transformation of my ideas.152

In Tezcan’s case, it is possible to see the parallel discourse of his family and the official history about the ‘past’ that narrates Greeks as ‘enemies’. However, Tezcan talks about his changing views about Greeks, which might show how the alternative public narratives can cause the articulation and transformation of his ideas about them. The dialogue with Hasan, a 60-year-old male retired teacher provides an additional perspective:

Interviewer: Is there any martyr in your family or close environment?

Hasan: Yes. My father.

Interviewer: What do you think about this situation?

Hasan: When my father died in the 1963 war and became a martyr, I never accused Greeks. I had evaluated this situation as a kind of job accident, and I said ‘yes’ in the referendum as I want peace in my country.153

Interviewer: Well…What about your family members…Your parents… What were they telling you about Greek Cypriots?

Hasan: My mother was a poet. She wrote love poems. In her poems, she generally depicted the Greek and Turkish lovers who weren’t able to come together as a result of the death of one of them.154

Although Hasan says that his father is a ‘martyr’155 he also says that he conceives his father’s death in the Cyprus war as a kind of job accident. Thus, he fills the meaning of ‘martyrdom’ in a completely different way from the official discourse. One can observe

152 In-depth interview, Saray Önü: Tourism office, 07/08/2007
153 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 23/09/2007
154 In-depth interview, Gişe: Domestic parlour, 23/09/2007
155 A ‘martyr’ is a person who is believed to have been killed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus war. It is a common and legitimate term for Turkish Cypriots and it is frequently used in history textbooks, especially during the 1974-2003 period of the official discourse. Martyrdom is a highly sacred position in the Muslim religion and it is articulated into the discourse of Turkish nationalism.
the role of the alternative public memories (i.e narratives of his family members) in the articulation of his ideas about Greek Cypriots.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter examines how the official history, which includes the official mechanisms (history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations) mobilizes, articulates and constructs the memories of the respondents in relation to national identity. The official mechanisms are articulated differently according to the dominant discourses in the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003) and in the period of the CTP government (2003-2009) in Northern Cyprus. In the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism/identity. On the other hand, in the period of the CTP government, the dominant discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism.

The interpretations of the respondents about the official mechanisms that were produced differently in two different periods depict how the official history sustains the discourses of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism/identity and (turkish) Cypriot nationalism/identity. However, I also show that the official histories are highly negotiated and challenged by the alternative narratives that are crucial for the historiographical knowledge; the official mechanisms do not always speak the language of the respondents. In this chapter, the approach of Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) on different types of macro-strategies (constructive and destructive strategies and strategies of justification, perpetuation and transformation) in the discursive formation of national identity played the main role in my analysis of the narratives of the respondents.

I also explored how the history textbooks, symbols of tradition (flags, myths, national anthem) and commemorations (monuments, museums, public arts, national days, martyrs cemeteries, mass graves) that were produced in the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003) function to mobilize, articulate and construct the memories of the respondents about Turkish (cypriot) identity. The flags of Turkey and the TRNC are the main symbols of tradition that sustain Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; they reproduce the argument of motherland (Turkey)/babyland (TRNC) that supports the similarity, unity and cooperation between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. According to the argument, Turkey as the motherland defends the TRNC, its babyland, from the others (Greek Cypriots). However, the interpretations of the respondents about the flags vary according to the nodal points they adopt.
The respondents who adopt the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism evaluate the flags as our ‘flags’ and conceive them as representations of the victory and confidence of Turks. According to these respondents, the flag of the TRNC represents the ‘freedom’ and independency/sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots that was gained with the support of the motherland Turkey; the two flags together represent the unity and cooperation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. In these expressions, the strategies of construction function to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity which is based on the similarities and unity between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, so the respondents support the argument that the continuation of the political unity of Turks and Turkish Cypriots is necessary for the security, freedom, independency and sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots. The respondents’ commitment to the Turkish nation and identity and their positive attitude towards the status quo function as a strategy to justify the present situation (the position of Turkey in Northern Cyprus).

On the other hand, the respondents who adopted the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism exclude the flags as ‘their’ (Turks) flags and conceive them as the representation of borders and thus, the division of the island, political and economic dependency on Turkey and Turkey’s occupation of the island, complexities/weakness (i.e., the TRNC’s being an unrecognized country, its isolation from the world), violence (i.e., flags were erected after the Cyprus war) and the economic problems /embargoes caused by the political situation in Northern Cyprus. The respondents’ emphasis on the problems in the TRNC points to their desire for a necessary difference between now and the future, that operates as a transformative strategy. This strategy functions to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity based on the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem. The flags also mobilize the ideas on the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks (i.e., differences on the common cultural heritage and kinship). The respondents’ emphasis on these differences is one of the strategies that operate to dismantle the Turkish (cypriot) identity based on the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Moreover, monuments that symbolize either Atatürk or martyrs of Northern Cyprus are the crucial forms of commemorations in the Denktas-UBP period. According to the official history of this period, Atatürk, the founder and the first President of the Turkish Republic, represents Turkishness and is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. The symbol of Atatürk plays a major role in the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. The statement below the monument is ‘How happy to say I am a Turk’;
parallel to this statement and the narratives of the official history, the symbol operates as a Turkish role model and mobilizes the respondents’ feelings of bravery, courage, strength and self-confidence. Hence the symbol of Atatürk functions as a tradition providing guidance about how to be a Turk and thus, how a Turkish (cypriot) should be. The other mechanisms also play a role in carrying the symbol of Atatürk by entering into social lives through social practices and narrations (i.e., celebrating national days, hearing and singing the national anthem, seeing flags in the streets). Although Atatürk has no connection with the Cyprus problem, many respondents conceive him as the defender and the symbol of survival of Turkish Cypriots. This shows how the symbol of Atatürk leaks into everyday lives and attaches itself to the political lives of the respondents through the mechanisms. However, there are also a variety of alternative narratives about Atatürk; except for a few narratives, these are different degrees of reworking of the myth of Atatürk.

Although the monument of Atatürk mobilizes ideas about ‘who the Turkish Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to construct the idea about ‘who the others are’. The statement below the monument, ‘we will never forget’, recalls the past that was about the Cyprus war and the people who died in the war. Many respondents interpret the monument as a true reflection of the past; according to them, remembering the ‘past’ is a way of knowing their enemies and protecting themselves. These interpretations show how this monument reproduces the ‘past’ that was constructed by the official history. In the narratives of the respondents, the strategies of defence and avoidance function to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the ‘others’. However, the monument also mobilizes counter memories: many respondents said that they want to forget these events that are reflected through the monuments, in order to achieve peace with Greek Cypriots. In these cases, the transformative strategies function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that focuses on the common future of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU. Furthermore, some of the respondents criticised Turks in relation to the martyrs. Their criticisms function as a strategy that dissolves the existing chains of equivalence between Turks and Turkish Cypriots for the articulation of (turkish) Cypriot identity that highlights the differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Similarly, in some of the narratives, the strategies of sameness function to create similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (i.e., the respondents’ emphasis on the common monuments and pictures of the two
communities about the martyrs). This strategy also functions to construct (turkish) Cypriot identity that focuses on the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The official discourse (1974-2003) constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by producing a sharply antagonistic relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, the government of CTP highlighted the (turkish) Cypriot identity and thus emphasized the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Sestas and the Peace Cresset are the public artworks that were placed in the CTP period. Sestas, symbolising common traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to dry, serve and eat on, represent the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they used to live together. In the narratives of the respondents, I showed that Sestas mobilize the alternative ‘past’ which is based on a united Cyprus and Cypriotness. However, there are some respondents who oppose the politics of the CTP government and evaluate Sestas as meaningless and artificial symbols. According to them, the government is trying to misrepresent the ‘past’, as it is not possible to talk about the common ‘past’ and common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the interpretations of the respondents, the memories about the ‘past’ function as a nodal point around which Sestas acquire their meaning from their relationship to the ‘past’.

Similarly, the peace cresset symbolises the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan. I illustrated how the peace cresset mobilizes the ideas of the respondents about the peace and how it articulates their expectations about the future regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus. Many respondents evaluate ‘peace’ as the unification of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, there are alternative narratives of the respondents about the ‘peace’; peace can mean the separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The peace cresset and sestas that are the transformative mechanisms of the CTP government operate to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that focuses on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. While Sestas signify the common past of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and thus the commonalities between them, the peace cresset mobilizes the ideas about a common future of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU under the framework of the Annan Plan.

Museums, mass graves and martyrs’ cemeteries are the other forms of commemorations that mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing their fears. Nearly all of the respondents talked about the museum of Barbarism that school teachers had taken them to. The museum can be seen as a script which is written
by the dominant discourse (1974-2003). In this part of the chapter, I examined how the objects in the museum lose their historical relevance during the process of museumisation and gain a new meaning in the memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots. I explored how the museum mobilizes the negative ideas and fears of the respondents who never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before the division of the island. However, the official discourse about the museum is often challenged by the alternative media and family narratives.

The history textbook is the other mechanism that narrates the ‘others’. History textbooks were rewritten in the period of the CTP government that supported the reunification of the island. In the subsequent textbook, the past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was represented more positively than in the previous history textbook in order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. Hence, the narrations about the ‘others’ were articulated and constructed in changing power relations. The respondents’ ideas about the old and new history textbooks show how they conceive the ‘truths’ about the past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. I showed that most of the respondents internalize the official history (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) that was produced between 1974-2003, as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Parallel to the official history, they narrate Greek Cypriots as the murderers of a lot of Turks without any mercy in the 1963-1974 events. At the same time, they narrate Turks as the saviours of Turkish Cypriots from their enemies (Greek Cypriots) in the ‘1974 Happy Peace Operation’. However, as only six years have elapsed since the introduction of the new history textbook, it is not possible to consider how the new textbook mobilises meaning that articulates the definitions of the respondents about the ‘others’. In this chapter, I also explored the inconsistencies in the memories of single social individuals about the same period of time in history. This situation shows that memory is a contested territory of autobiographical and public memories, partly constructed by the official history.
CHAPTER 6: SITES OF MEMORY − MEDIA, HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, SYMBOLS OF TRADITION AND COMMEMORATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The primary focus of this chapter is on the function of the media in the articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity. Media as one of the mechanisms of memory was not included in the previous chapter, which dealt with the official mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations and symbols of tradition). Thus, this chapter takes further the arguments developed in Chapter Five. The reason for my division of the examination of the mechanisms of memory into two separate chapters is the different role of the media from the official mechanisms analysed in the previous chapter. It is possible to differentiate the media’s function from the official mechanisms in two main aspects. Firstly, although history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations are produced by the ruling groups and it is not possible to talk about their alternatives within the period of the dominance of the ruling group, media are more independent in terms of their organic relationship with the ruling groups. However, this does not mean that media do not represent the dominant discourses within a society. As was stated in Chapter Two, most of the time media play a substantial role in the dissemination of the discourses of the ruling groups. Thus, they can be used by the ruling groups for their political ends. Another aspect which differentiates media from the official mechanisms is that they have a peculiar function in representing the official mechanisms − history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations. The representation of the media adds a different dimension to the function of these mechanisms. Generally, the mechanisms are represented in parallel with the political standpoints of the media institutions.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, I examine how the media (particularly the newspapers) as one of the mechanisms mobilize the political ideas of the respondents that construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. My aim is to explore how respondents use the ‘information’ provided by the media (particularly the newspapers) in their everyday lives. The media was the main source of information of the Turkish Cypriots about the Cyprus problem after the
division of the island in 1974, as there was no possibility of communicating with Greek Cypriots; communication between the two communities was established through the media after 1974. In the first part of this section, I observe the interrelationship between the newspaper reading habits and political views of the respondents; and in the second part I examine the interpretations of the respondents regarding the news stories in Kıbrıs and Volkan. As was noted in Chapter Three, I formed the sample with the individuals who buy and read at least one of the selected national newspapers (Kıbrıs or Volkan) every day. I explained the reasons behind my selection of these particular newspapers in Chapter Three. In the third part of this section I explore how the media mobilize the political ideas of the respondents about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union under the framework of the Annan Plan. When the Annan Plan was presented by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002, it was the media that provided information to the public about the Plan and the European Union as there was no possibility for the majority of the respondents to read the original English version, which runs to thousands of pages. Because of this situation, the majority of the respondents got their information about the Annan Plan through the media. It should be noted here that without the solution of the Cyprus problem, it is not possible for Northern Cyprus to join the European Union; the subjects of the Annan Plan, the European Union and the Cyprus problem are closely related to each other and therefore they are not analysed separately in the narratives of the respondents.

In the second section of the chapter, I explore the different functions of the mechanisms of memory − media, history textbooks, symbols of tradition and commemorations − in the memories of the respondents. Thus, in the first part, I observe how the mechanisms operate as a single body through the social practices and media events. In the second part, I examine how the narratives of the ‘past’ that are disseminated by the ‘mechanisms of memory’ are adapted to the uses of the present in the memories of the respondents. I observe the respondents’ struggle to overcome the inconsistencies that threaten the partial fixity of their memories which are parallel to the dominant public memory between 1974-2003; and I scrutinize the myths (one of the symbols of tradition) that are reproduced in the ontological narratives of the respondents in order to serve like a ‘shield’ for the total fixity of their memories.
6.2 Section one: Media and the ‘others’ – Narratives on the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the European Union

Narratives of the official mechanisms of memory, families, close environment and school education were the sources of knowledge/memory of the Turkish Cypriots about the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) from the division of the island in 1974 till the partial opening of the crossings in 2003. However, the media was the only mechanism through which the individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the European Union. In the first part, I explore the interrelationship amongst the reading habits, past experiences and political ideas of the respondents. In the second part, I examine how particular newspapers represent Greek Cypriots after the partial opening of the crossings; I observe how the newspapers articulate and construct the present information about Greek Cypriots through their representations of the ‘past’ for the future. In these two parts of the chapter, I focus on newspaper discourses. Because of their variety, newspapers were the most popular media of the period within the scope of this research. However, it was not possible to see that variety in the television industry. In Northern Cyprus, there is only one national television channel, run by the government, and there are five regional television channels. The regional television channels do not broadcast to the whole country. During the referendum period, each national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’. Hence, the newspapers played a crucial role in the construction and articulation of memories in relation to national identity, as their variety caused the creation of a dynamic process, which is necessary for the articulation of discourses. In the third part, I focus on the narratives of the respondents about the Cyprus Problem, the Annan Plan and the European Union.

6.2.1 Part one: Reading habits, past experiences and political ideas

At the beginning of this part of the analysis, I examine how respondents use and evaluate the newspaper information in their daily lives and what their reading habits are. Furthermore, I explore the role of their ‘past experiences’ in their decisions about the truthfulness of the ‘information’ given by the newspapers. Then I focus on the media’s function in bringing the ‘past’ and present information to the agenda according to their
political discourse and I examine how they mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the others (Greek Cypriots and/or Turks) through their representations.

When I asked the respondents what their favourite newspapers were and why they preferred to read these particular newspapers, most of them said that they preferred to buy and read the newspapers that were close to their political ideas. In this sense, most of the respondents define the newspapers that they prefer to read as more objective when compared to the other national newspapers. On the other hand, the respondents evaluate the newspapers that are not close to their political ideas as subjective and biased; these newspapers mostly ‘do not tell the truths’:

Nevruz: I don’t read Volkan newspaper because it looks biased to me. It is obvious what it is trying to achieve.
Interviewer: In your view, what is it trying to do?
Nevruz: well….ummm…it’s trying to impede the peace process. It tries to convince us that the Greeks are harmful. I mean, let there be no peace and let us not expand to the rest of the world. They stick to the philosophy that the ultimate friend of a Turk is another fellow Turkish man. I believe that anyone can be anyone’s friend. I don’t discriminate a Greek from a Turk. As my thoughts are in this direction, I get irritated when I read this newspaper.
Interviewer: Are there newspapers that offer distorted accounts of past and present; and disorient Turkish Cypriots?
Nevruz: Yes. Volkan newspaper is one of them\textsuperscript{156} (female, aged 22, female beautician).

I believe what the Volkan newspaper writes because it writes exactly parallel to what I hear in my close environment\textsuperscript{157} (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

The newspapers like Volkan, Vatan or Güneş distort the facts about the past. They all write to inflame enmity. In the end, the past remains in the past. It will bring no gains to anyone who tries to keep the past alive and instil enmity in people\textsuperscript{158} (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter).

I prefer to read Kıbrıs and Yenidüzen newspapers, as they are more close to my political ideas. Also, I believe that these newspapers are more objective\textsuperscript{159} (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

For me, Kıbrıs newspaper is biased. If we take the assumption that the Turks were attacked by the Greek side, I am sure that the newspaper does not publish this kind

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\textsuperscript{156} In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
\textsuperscript{157} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 24/7/2007
\textsuperscript{158} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007
\textsuperscript{159} In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
of news as it might harm the political party that it supports\textsuperscript{160} (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).

Kibris newspaper reflects the past as what it is. I mean as objective\textsuperscript{161} (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman).

Some events are published in newspapers intentionally to distort the truth. For example, Kibris newspaper published a statement that during the Turkish invasions some Turks were killed by their fellow fighters. They might have been killed by mistake. But to publish this in the newspapers on purpose is a big mistake. In all wars you can kill your own friend by mistake. But to reflect this wrongly or to say that this happened on purpose is quite erroneous\textsuperscript{162} (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist).

When I asked the respondents if they trusted the news media and how they determined if a news story represented truths or lies, most of them answered that they generally didn’t trust the news media and they determined if a news story represented truths or lies by reading as many newspapers as possible and/or comparing the information given by the news story with their ‘past experiences’:

I can’t say that I trust the newspapers. There are paraphrased pieces of news. Every newspaper writes according to its publishing policy. The newspapers that I read most are Kibris and Yenidüzen. I read them as these newspapers reflect two distinct views of the Turkish Cypriot community and I synthesize to reach the correct information\textsuperscript{163} (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee).

Newspapers comment on events according to their publishing policies. I evaluate whether they write the truths or lies by the experience I have gone through\textsuperscript{164} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired primary school teacher).

I decide upon the truth of a piece of news by listening to other channels and comparing with previous experiences of mine\textsuperscript{165} (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).

To decide if a piece of news is right or wrong, I take into consideration the events I experienced. If a newspaper publishes the events differently than I lived them, I lose faith in that newspaper\textsuperscript{166} (Emete, female, aged 54, retired official).

\textsuperscript{160} In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymakl: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007
\textsuperscript{161} In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 26/07/2007
\textsuperscript{162} In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 1/01/2007
\textsuperscript{163} In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007
\textsuperscript{164} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007
\textsuperscript{165} In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007
\textsuperscript{166} In-depth interview, Küçükkaymakl: Domestic parlour, 25 July 2007
Most of the time the respondents interpret what they read according to their ‘past experiences’. However, what is important here is to examine how the media narratives function and play the main role in the mobilization of memories as they bring up the ‘past experience’ that is selected according to the political discourse of the medium. These narratives allow the respondents to get the ‘experience’ back through overcoming ‘space’ and ‘time’ barriers. Thus the media play a functional role in bringing out the ‘past’ into the present and making it be remembered in parallel with its discourse that is shaped in power relations. In this process, the media empowers its discourse through the representation of the official history (i.e commemorations, symbols of tradition) paralleling its political standpoint. Media try to control the way respondents make sense of information through their selected representation of an event; they fill the gap between what is forgotten and what is remembered in parallel with their discourse. Thus, although the respondents interpret what is true and what is wrong according to their own memories and ‘past experiences’, the media they regularly follow provide the necessary elements for them to reproduce, strengthen or transform their memories. Thus for Esra, a 62-year-old female retired primary school teacher,

The Greeks try to convert everything to suit their own benefits. The other day, a man from Murataga village was in the Volkan newspaper mourning for his beloved ones. The event was reflected in a Greek newspaper in Greece as ‘The Greeks slaughtered by Turks’. They are distorting the facts. The man, in fact, was my uncle. I heard that about 23 days later, they apologised and said that it was the the Greeks that killed the Turks … in short, the Greeks try to distort facts to meet their needs.

The news story in Volkan about the Muratağa village, one of the commemorative locations, sustains the negative stereotypes about Greeks as untrustworthy and treacherous in Esra’s memories. Thus, although the Greek newspaper apologises for publishing the wrong news, Esra interprets that news story as the effort of Greeks to use everything for their advantage because of the selected ‘information’ provided by Volkan newspaper. However, in the memory of another respondent whose name is Sevinç, one can see how a particular newspaper provides an alternative narrative about the ‘Museum of Barbarism’, another commemorative location. This alternative narrative plays a role in

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167 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/7/2007
168 In Muratağa village there is one of the mass graves of Turkish Cypriots who are reported to have been murdered and buried by Greeks.
the transformation of Sevinç’s memory about Greek Cypriots that comes from her school education. According to Sevinç, a 48-year-old female news reader,

Sevinç: I remember we went to the Museum of Barbarism when we were at school. Then, I thought this was an evil act committed by the Greeks. But later I found out the reality. The event was acted out as a scenario. When I learned that the organised display of the corpses of the children in the bathtub was made by the Turkish fanatics, I felt no sentiment.

Interviewer: Where did you get this information?

Sevinç: I got this information from Afrika newspaper. However, in the history textbooks, we had learned that they were Turks that were killed by Greeks without any mercy.\textsuperscript{169}

It would be an oversimplification to claim that a sole news story changed Sevinç’s or any other respondent’s memory about Greek Cypriots or Turks. However, what is important here is to know that while the news story does not change Sevinç’s ideas about the Greek Cypriots, it might help in the formation of the elements that are necessary for dissolving the existing chains of equivalence between Turkish Cypriots and Turks that institute a political frontier between two antagonistic poles (Greek and Turkish Cypriots). In this respect, media narratives can play a crucial role in the construction of the social tie or antagonistic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish Cypriots.

Media narratives may arouse fear about Greek Cypriots or Turks by shaping the experiences of the respondents about the present events. Thus it can be claimed that most of the time, the respondents’ interpretations of the ‘others’ or a particular event are not the outcome of what the respondents personally lived, but what they experience through the social remembering that is partly constructed by the media:

We wouldn’t lock our doors even in the period when we lived together with the Greeks. On summer nights, we would sleep on the rooftops. But now, we take every possible precaution; there isn’t any single day or night without theft. The other day I read in the newspaper... That the majority of the prisoners are the Turkish citizens. Cypriots are about 80 people. The rest are Turkish Citizens. Cypriots’ offences are different in nature: petty crimes. But amongst the Turks, it’s killing, rape, and such... they irritate us more than the Greeks used to. They prevent us from moving freely in our homes or gardens\textsuperscript{170} (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).

\textsuperscript{169} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007
\textsuperscript{170} In-depth-interview, Yenişehir: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007
Most of the Turks who came from Turkey are the people who couldn’t even manage to live in their own country. They come here and work in the building sites; they do the robberies and kill people for money. We read such events in the newspapers every day\textsuperscript{171} (Ozen, female, aged 29, TV presenter).

Media mobilize meaning that articulates the discourse about Turks from Turkey as ‘others’ through its representations. The news stories about Turks as thieves and killers construct negative stereotypes about Turks as dangerous and savage people and thus locate them as a ‘threat’ to the security of Turkish Cypriots. Thus the media provide elements that function to divide Turks and Turkish Cypriots into two opposed camps. In a similar way, media function to mobilize meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a ‘threat’ for the security of Turkish Cypriots. However, this time the threat to security comes from the outside, not the inside of the society:

\begin{quote}
It is now well known that Greece keeps most of its military weapons on the Greek side of the island. The Greek side own very deadly weapons. We often read about these in the news. So long as these weapons are not cleaned out, it is not right for us to join the EU together with the Greeks\textsuperscript{172} (Ayşe, female, aged 31, university instructor).

If we join the EU, we can still have clashes between the Greek and the Turkish individuals. We watch these in the news anyway. For example, when it is 20th July we witness that the Greeks always go out on provocations. These things might happen again because the ground is not suitable for a lasting solution\textsuperscript{173} (Meltem, aged 22, housewife).

We always hear from the media that the Greeks want no agreement\textsuperscript{174} (Emine, female, aged 63, retired teacher).
\end{quote}

Ezgi: The Greeks’ enmity towards Turks surpasses our enmity towards them. In other words, there are more people among them that hate the Turks.
Interviewer: How you know this?
Ezgi: From the media\textsuperscript{175} (male, aged 20, student).

In the interpretations of the respondents above, it can be seen how the media reproduce the discourse of the public memory about Greeks/Greek Cypriots that was dominant in the Denktaş-UBP period. In this way, media mobilize meaning that sustains the

\textsuperscript{171} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs TV, 15/8/2007
\textsuperscript{172} In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Kyrenia American University, 28/07/2007
\textsuperscript{173} In-depth interview, Magusa: domestic parlour, 31/07/2007
\textsuperscript{174} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 30 September 2007
\textsuperscript{175} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa, 1/9/2007
‘constructed past’ about Greeks/Greek Cypriots through its selective representation of the present situation. When Ayşe says “The Greek side own very deadly weapons”, Emine Says “We always hear from the media that the Greeks want no agreement”, Meltem says “the Greeks always go out on provocations” and Ezgi says “there are more people among them (Greeks) that hate the Turks” one can hear the voice of the ‘constructed past’ that represents Greeks/Greek Cypriots as the enemies who pose a threat to the security of Turks. In this way, media representations arouse anxiety and fear about a possible recurrence of the Cyprus war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the news stories are framed to stimulate associations for remembering the constructed ‘past’ in the present. Thus it can be argued that most of the time, the ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus are shaped in the light of the present information; the ‘present information’ can function as an element in the articulation and construction of the political ideas of the respondents.

As the media play a role in providing elements that construct the ideas of the respondents about Greeks/Greek Cypriots, in the following part of this chapter my aim is to focus on particular news stories, in order to examine how they provide the elements that mobilize the emotions and ideas of the respondents about their national identity and thus, about the ‘others’.

6.2.2 Part two: Representation of memories in relation to national identity: The articulation of the ‘past’ in the present for the future

In this section, I analyse the narratives of the respondents about the news stories that were published in Kıbrıs and Volkan newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings on 23rd April 2003. The partial opening of the crossings was the first radical development on the way of unification of the island after the division in 1974. After the opening of the

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176 Kıbrıs newspaper supports the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union through a solution under the framework of the Annan Plan. The newspaper highlights the (turkish) Cypriot nationalism and it can be roughly classified as on the left of the political spectrum. Within the period of this analysis, the discourse of the newspaper was parallel to the discourse of the CTP government that came to power in 2003. The CTP government is strongly in favour of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union.

177 Volkan newspaper does not support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union. The newspaper underlines the Turkish (cypriot) nationalistic discourse and it can be classified as on the right of the political spectrum. Although the newspaper belongs to no political party, it has supported the ideas of the first president, Denktaş, starting from the establishment of the newspaper.
crossings, Turkish and Greek Cypriots obtained permission to cross the boundaries for the first time after 1974 and people had the chance to visit their former homes, places of employment, and commemorative locations or meet those from whom they had been apart since 1974. This radical development was represented in the newspapers to mobilize the memories of coexistence or/and separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The event of the ‘opening of the crossings’ did not only remove physical boundaries but raised crucial questions about memories in relation to national identity and thus, the ‘others’. Bhabha’s (1990:7) questions are useful for explaining the various questions in Turkish Cypriots’ memories during this period: “When did we become ‘a people’? When did we stop being one? Or are we in the process of becoming one? What do these big questions have to do with our intimate relationships with each other and with others?”

The event of the ‘opening of the crossings’ plays a key role between the past and present in that they both shed light on the future. Depending on the political discourse of the newspapers, the ‘past’ could be represented as a period of time that is longed for or a period that it is wished one never lived. As was stated in Chapter Two, media have a peculiar function in bringing the past and future to the present. Hence, they have the capacity to provide information about the ‘present’ by articulating the ‘past’ and ‘future’. The media appeal to the official and alternative histories in the construction of news stories; thus my aim here is to examine how the news stories and/ or news photographs mobilize meaning that construct and articulate ideas about the past, present and future.

In this section I analyse the respondents interpretations about the three news stories with six photographs from Kıbrıs newspaper and one news story with six photographs from Volkan newspaper. The selected news stories were published within two months after the opening of the crossings on 23rd April 2003. The news stories are about the visits of Turkish Cypriots to the South and Greek Cypriots to the North of Cyprus after the opening of the crossings. The newspapers do not cover the same events about the visits, because each newspaper tries to construct the past and present in parallel to its political discourse; each publishes a news story about a different event after the opening of the crossings.
6.2.2.1 Interpretations of the respondents about the news stories of Kıbrıs newspaper

The image above shows three short news stories and photographs on the same page in Kıbrıs newspaper that were published on the second and third days after the partial opening of the crossings. The headlines of the news stories are as follows: Headline one: “Kuzey’den Güney’e aile fotoğraflarıyla döndüler” (They returned from the North to the South with their family photographs); Headline two: “74 sonrası doğan Kullos ailesinin evini ziyaret etti” (Kullos who was born after 1974 visited her family’s home); Headline three: “Rum hemşire, 29 yıl sonra eski işyerinde” (The Greek nurse in her former place of employment after 29 years). In these news stories and photographs, Kıbrıs newspaper presents a nostalgic atmosphere following the ‘opening of the crossings’. The past is represented as a period of time that is longed for and the ‘opening of the crossings’ is a way back to the ‘past’. Kıbrıs thus supports its discourse towards the reunification of the island through its representation.

This newspaper prefers to represent the autobiographical memories of Greek Cypriots in the story through the signs of ‘private’ lives such as family photographs, former homes and work places. Thus, it is interesting to examine the focus of Kıbrıs on the autobiographical memories of Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots have been represented
as ‘others’ by the dominant discourse for a long period of time, especially starting from
the division of the island in 1974; as a result, Turkish Cypriots generally do not know
about the autobiographical memories of Greek Cypriots. Through the representation of
autobiographical memories of ‘them’, Kıbrıs newspaper strives to transform the ‘others’
into Cypriots who share common experiences, sorrows and remembrance with Turkish
Cypriots. This presentation functions as a strategy to establish empathy towards Greek
Cypriots; the formation of empathy is one of the steps in the transformation of ‘others’
into ‘selves’. The news stories mobilize the emotions that help the formation of empathy
towards the ‘others’. The respondents’ narratives about the first, second and third
photographs and news stories are as follows:

Selen: When I see this news story, I imagine the moment that these people left
their homes. I mean the time of war... to flee from their home to safety, unaware
of the fact that they will never return to their homes again. Leaving that home in a
hurry... stories are told about how they had to leave their homes while they were
trying to prepare food for supper... well, they remind me of these kinds of stories.

Interviewer: well, the characters in the stories that you heard were Turkish
Cypriots. However, in these news stories the characters are Greek Cypriots. What
would you say in relation to this?

Selen: Umm... of being Greek... oh, no, it won’t mean anything different. Those
people also experienced these sorts of events. What they experienced is not so
different from what we lived and experienced here [Northern Cyprus]. They are
pretty much the same human stories. In short, these sorts of things come to my
mind when I see these [photos]178 (female, aged 29, TV presenter).

When Turkish Cypriots entered the Greek houses, there were wedding pictures on
the walls of some Greek houses. For example, a friend of mine entered a Greek
house. On the walls of the house, there were the photos of the owner of that house.
My friend would say “I am sure one day I will meet this Greek fellow and give
him these photos. I wonder how much he was upset when he left these photos of
his”. And I would retort “where will you find him?”. After the opening of the
crossings, he telephoned me. He told me that the Greeks had come and got the
photos and thanked him. Just imagine, to be forced to leave everything behind and
go away and not to be able to show your child a wedding picture of yours. How
agonizing it is. How sorrowful it is. I kept this photo because “you should
experience just a little of a similar pain to be able to understand how much the
others feel of the same feeling in bulk” my friend would say179 (Emete, female,
aged 54, retired official).

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178 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
I wished I had photos of the owners of the house and could give their photos to them but I didn’t have any. Those who entered the house looted everything in it. Everywhere there was debris. Maybe if I had looked around for pictures, I would have been able to find a few. And now I regret that I didn’t look around and keep them for today and hand them in to the previous owners. How nice it would have been! When the owners of the house arrived, I gave them the vase which I had kept in case they returned one day. They were very delighted to receive the vase because it was a present from her mother when they first moved to the house.\footnote{In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Municipality houses, 30/7/2007}

(Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).

Even we feel touched when we pass by the house where our childhood passed. As for me, for people who have never been able to see their homes or work places for such a long time, it must revive deep emotional moments\footnote{In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007} (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).

Oh, just consider... still when I see the homes of the municipality where I was born and grown up, I become fully affected. I remember my childhood; I remember all that I experienced in that period. [A deep sigh.] Is it that simple? Of course not!\footnote{In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23 September 2007}

(Sevinç, female, aged 48, news speaker).

Most of the respondents talked about how Greek Cypriots went to their houses and took their properties (i.e., photographs and a vase) after the opening of the crossings. In this way, the memories which are narrated in the news stories play a crucial role in the mobilization and legitimization of the personal memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots. This situation operates in the construction of the memories of the respondents about the ‘others’. Furthermore, comments such as “just imagine, to be forced to leave everything behind and go away and not to be able to show your child a wedding picture of yours. How sorrowful it is”, “even we feel touched when we pass by the house where our childhood passed. As for me, for people who have never been able to see their homes, it must revive deep emotional moments” and “What they experienced is not so different from what we lived and experienced here” show how Kıbrıs newspaper mobilizes the feelings of empathy towards Greek Cypriots that function to transform the ‘others’ into ‘selves’. Furthermore, the news stories mobilize the positive feelings and memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots:

If I looked through their glasses, I would be startled. It must be very difficult for them. People who lived together… who were happy and who got along well with
one another… I would very often listen to stories of [Turkish and Greek Cypriots’] friendship from my grandfather. Unfortunately, these people who didn’t have any problems before were forced to be enemies and long for one another. Not only could they not see their home but they also lost their long-held friendships. When I see this news story, I remember these things and I feel sorry\textsuperscript{183} (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

It is nice for people to socialize. Willingly or unwillingly you get touched. I wish the entire border would be abolished completely. What inexplicable feelings they are… for example, this woman is not someone I know (the Greek nurse in the news story) but when I see her, I visualize my aunt; she was also a nurse. One might say, there were people whom they dined and shared shifts with for years. That’s your colleague. Either a Turk or a Greek, it won’t make a difference. When you look at these pictures you revive those days. You go back…You miss\textsuperscript{184}…(Nahide, female, aged 49, bookseller).

This news story tells us about the nurses. This is right. Because during British rule, Turks and Greeks, as usual, were living and working together. There was no turmoil in that period. Because there were both Greek and Turkish staff in the constabulary forces\textsuperscript{185} (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).

Comments such as ‘I would very often listen to stories of (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) friendship from my grandfather’, “there were people whom they dined and shared shifts with for years. When you look at these pictures you revive those days. You go back…You miss…” and “during the British rule, Turks and Greeks, as usual, were living and working together. There was no turmoil in that period” show how the news stories mobilize peculiar memories of the respondents about the past. However, all of the memories are about the ‘happier past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together.

In this respect, the signs of private lives such as family photographs, former homes and work places, function as elements in the construction of the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that is based on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These signs operate as the crucial factors in the articulation of the ‘others’ as ‘human beings’ and Cypriots who have family photographs, happy or sad memories about their former homes and work places similar to those of Turkish Cypriots. The news stories also mobilize the memories of a ‘happier past’ through their selective information about the ‘past’: Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together peacefully and freely in

\textsuperscript{183} In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007
\textsuperscript{184} In-depth interview, 23 July 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa
\textsuperscript{185} In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007
the ‘past’. In this respect, family photographs, former homes and work places function as evidence of a common life that was about a ‘happier past’. As was stated in Chapter One, traditions present a ‘happier past’ that should be followed in the present and even in the future. One can see how the news stories operate to keep the tradition of coexistence alive in order to mobilize the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus.

Although most of the respondents evaluate the news stories in parallel with the newspaper’s political discourse, there are also some alternative narratives about the news stories; the news stories can also mobilize the memories that oppose the political discourse of the newspaper. In these cases, it might be possible to talk about the dominance of the alternative autobiographical and/or public memories of the respondents:

This is a humanitarian issue. Anyone would act the same way. I wish I had found their pictures; they would rejoice a lot [ironical expression]... but no one has brought my brother’s pictures to me. They all burnt them. Everything turned to ashes. He has nothing left. They razed everything he owned, and that includes his house.186 (Veli, male, aged 69, retired teacher).

We, the Turks, are very well intentioned and friendly. Although we are from a martyr’s family, when they came to see their home, we gave them all the pictures in an envelope. When in peace, we neither swear nor give any harm. We want peace but unfortunately the Greeks do not. For example, they knew that my brother was a member of TMT [the Turkish Defence Organization]. Therefore, as soon as they left their homes, the houses were set on fire by spilling petrol on them. In short, they are so vengeful.187 (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).

In the narratives of Veli and Nurten, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are represented at two antagonistic poles: Turks are represented as kind, compassionate and peace-loving, while Greek Cypriots are represented as revengeful and dangerous. The ideas of the respondents about the ‘present’ situation are articulated according to their ‘past experiences’ about Greek Cypriots; in other words, their views about Greek Cypriots are mediated through their ‘past’ autobiographical and public memories.

186 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic parlour, 24/07/2007
187 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
Kıbrıs newspaper also emphasizes the old and new friendships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after the opening of the crossings. The two news stories above stress the friendships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The headline of the second news story is “Karpaz’da ilk vaftiz: Larnaka’da nostalji” (The first baptism in Karpaz: Nostalgia in Larnaka). In the news story, there are two photographs that depict the baptism in the Karpaz and the Turkish Cypriot family’s visit to Larnaka to see their former homes. The headline of the third news story is “Ayaküstü tanıtılar, 40 yıllık dost gibi oldular” (They just met and became friends as of 40 years). The lead is “Kuzey Kıbrıs ile Güney Kıbrıs’a geçişlerin serbest bırakılmasıyla her iki tarafta da birbirlerini hiç görmemiş insanlar arasında bile kısa sürede dostluklar kuruluyor” (After the opening of the crossings, on both sides of the island even the people who have never seen one another are becoming friends in a short time). These news stories mobilize meaning that reinforces the putative similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

Nostalgic moments have been witnessed after the opening of the crossings. This is fine. The Greeks who came to the north have also experienced the same feelings because we also received them warm heartedly. These photos show us that language, religion and race are of no importance. Some people do not attach importance to such differences. They attract electricity from the opposite side and they make friends with those people. I wish it were true in all circumstances. How nice it would be!188 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman).

As a matter of fact we are all Cypriots so we share similar feelings. It is a kind of electricity. You receive that current. Besides, they look similar to us. Now there

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188 In-depth interview, Köşklüciftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007
are a lot of common activities between the Greeks and the Turks. Bicommunal activities, choruses, songs etc. the youngsters…. Both sides constantly organize such activities. How nice!.... why not here [Cyprus]? In London, they go to the same schools, they are always together, why won’t it happen in Cyprus?\textsuperscript{189} (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).

As can be understood from the interpretations, some of the respondents emphasize the similarities and friendship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Kemal talks about the cultural and physical similarities, blood ties and chemistry between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The emphasis of the respondents on the putative similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots operates as the ‘strategies of inclusion and assimilation’ (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:37) and constructs their identity as (turkish) Cypriot. Although Mustafa talks about the existence of differences such as language, religion and race, these differences function as differential positions in his memories, and thus they do not attach to his discourse that can be defined as (turkish) Cypriot nationalism in his case. Like Kemal, Mustafa also emphasizes similarities, such as the common feelings of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

On the other hand, there are respondents who stress the putative differences such as origin, race, religion, language, feelings, personal attitudes, and cultural and historical backgrounds between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The respondents’ emphasis on national differences functions as the strategy of exclusion that is included in the constructive strategies. The emphasis on the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots plays a crucial role in establishing their Turkish (cypriot) identity that is constructed through the exclusion of Greek Cypriots.

Christening is a Greek religious ritual. Turkish Cypriots are not very devoted to their religion but unfortunately the Greeks are as faithful to their beliefs as Catholics. Although Akel is a communist party, even Akel members do not refrain from baptism or other rituals related to Christianity. There’s pressure on them and even though they are communists, they attend rituals at the churches\textsuperscript{190} (Mahmut, male, aged 41, doctor).

After the opening of the crossing, both parties displayed friendship for a short time but if war breaks out, they are the ones who will first intend to kill us. But the Turks will liberate their Greek friends if they are held captive. I mean, our feelings are completely different. In the first place, our roots are different; that’s why it is

\textsuperscript{189} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007
\textsuperscript{190} In depth-interview, Mağusa: Office, 23/07/2007
impossible to share the same feelings. With the Greeks you can never make friends (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).

Even the people who are the same race and share the same language and religion cannot become like friends of 40 years. So it is nonsense to talk about the friendship of Turks and Greeks who do not share any commonalities and who are also the eternal enemies (Fatoş, female, aged 25, shop assistant).

It is interesting to see that these news stories and photographs evoke the counter autobiographical and public memories about the ‘past’ that was constructed in the Denktas-UBP period:

These [photos], try to give the message that these were the facts in Cyprus. And similar things were lived in the past. And now we are going through such events: by looking at these photos, this means we can live together but this is not true. We cannot live intermingled. I cannot remember how many times the Turkish cars were damaged and Turkish Cypriots were mistreated. This is impossible. But we, Turks have a very bad attitude. We soon forget all the bad memories. How much we suffered! Turks were killed ruthlessly, they were forced to leave their vehicles and fired on. What a pity; even their children have forgotten all about these things. This is not possible; this is just for show (Sevinç, female, aged 48, news speaker).

It is rather difficult for people who do not know each other to make friends at first sight. Besides, the aim of the Greeks is to rule over Turks. They view themselves as the sole owners of the island and they regard the Turks here as a minority (Erdal, male, aged 67, civil engineer).

When Sevinç says, “How much we suffered! Turks were killed ruthlessly, they were forced to leave their vehicles and fired on” and Erdal says, “The aim of the Greeks is to rule over Turks. They view themselves the sole owners of the island and they regard the Turks here as a minority” one can observe the dominance in their memories of the public memory that was disseminated in the Denktas-UBP period. Since the respondents evaluate the present relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in parallel with their interpretations of the ‘past’, although Kıbrıs newspaper presents an alternative discourse about Greek Cypriots, the resistance of the respondents towards the discourse of the newspaper indirectly functions to sustain their memories. Contestation produces antagonisms which cause the articulation of memories; and in this respect, Sevinç and Erdal’s resistance to the political discourse of the newspaper functions to form the

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191 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 21/09/2007
192 In-depth interview, Girne: Domestic parlour, 17/08/2007
193 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007
194 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı (Brotherhood Hearth), 20/07/2007
elements that reinforce their memories that are parallel to the discourse of the Denktas-
UBP period.

Although the news stories also mobilize the alternative autobiographical memories, the memories that are narrated as autobiographical are indistinct, indefinite and based on generalizations about Greek Cypriots; the respondents did not talk about any particular events that were lived with Greek Cypriots. The weakness of their autobiographical memories might be an indication of the dominance of the Denktas-UBP public memory. Their memories function selectively in bringing out the ‘memories’ that were legitimized and confirmed by the public memory that was reinforced by the mechanisms of memory between 1974-2003:

We lived together with them. If you keep a social distance with the Greeks they are good friends, but if you mingle together, the friendship ends. They do not like us at all195 (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).

This photo does not reflect the reality. I lived with the Greeks when we used to live together with them. We had never been close friends. Since the 1958s … and now I go to the Greek side and see the Greeks there. But we have never had such closeness. We didn’t have it then, either. And I suppose these [points to the photo] are also fictitious. These visits… meetings… They cannot live together with us. They have been brainwashed since their childhood. Turks are their enemies. They cannot come together with the Turks. I have witnessed this for fifty years. And this will go on like this196 (Salime, female, aged 68, retired teacher).

After the division of the island, the official mechanisms of memory played the primary function in the dissemination of the narratives about Greek Cypriots. Because of this situation, the respondents’ autobiographical memories are indistinct and indefinite, as they stayed in the shadow of the public memory after 1974 and thus lost their peculiarity. As was noted in Chapter Two, shared memories become sharpened as they are constantly repeated by the mechanisms of memory. When Alican says, “If you keep a social distance with the Greeks, they are good friends but if you mingle together, the friendship ends. They do not like us at all” and Salime says, “They have been brainwashed since their childhood. Turks are their enemies. They cannot come together with the Turks” one can hear the stereotypes about Greek Cypriots based on the generalizations: Greek Cypriots perceive Turks as their enemies. Therefore, they don’t like Turks. These stereotypes were disseminated through the narratives of the official mechanisms of memory that were

195 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
196 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic Labour, 12 July 2007
produced during the Denktaş-UBP period: in this way the respondents attribute the impossibility of co-existence to the “other” and for them, the news stories of Kıbrıs do not represent the ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ and/or present.

6.2.2.2 Interpretations of the respondents about the news story of Volkan newspaper

In contrast, there is the Volkan news story shown above, in which there are six small photographs and their interpretations below the photographs made by newspaper’s reporter. The headline is “Güney’de bir gün…” (A day in the south…). These photographs were taken at different places in the South. From left to the right, the English translations of the original Turkish captions below the photographs are as follows:
Photograph 1: “The wall pictures\textsuperscript{197} that display hatred and enmity towards Turks are still kept on the walls of Ledra Palace Gate”;

Photograph 2: “The monument of Atatürk in the courtyard of the Limassol Turkish Hospital was destroyed and the base of the bust was there to reflect the monument of shame and Greek Barbarism;

Photograph 3: The quarter of Ayandon, which lies on the eastern side of the church, and where the Turks used to live was levelled, the road was widened and the area was converted into a car park.

Photograph 4: The marble coating of the monument of the martyrs at the Turkish Martyrs Cemetery was dislocated and heavily damaged.

Photograph 5: On the building at the entrance to the Limassol Park, there is a billboard which depicts the island of Cyprus being divided by a dagger and blood running all over and the expression follows “\textit{den xehno}” “we haven’t forgotten”. On the other side of the building, a Greek flag is waving. Here’s an image from the Greek side that is accepted as the member of the EU and an example which reflects the false image that it seeks peace.

Photograph 6: After the opening of the crossings, when the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery was flocked to by the Turkish Cypriot visitors, the Greek side hastily repaired the cemetery and gave it a facelift. However, the other side of the cemetery, which cannot be seen at the first instance, still remains untouched.

All of the photographs and their interpretations function as a single body in the construction of Turkishness and thus, the “others” (Greek Cypriots). However, the news stories and photographs of Volkan newspaper also mobilize the alternative public narratives. This suggests that news stories do not always mobilize meaning that is parallel to the discourse of the newspaper; they also evoke counter memories. This section also includes the counter narratives of the respondents.

\textsuperscript{197} On the notice board there are photographs of the Greek Cypriot who was murdered by the Turkish Security Forces as he tried to pull down the Turkish flag from the mast in a Derinya border action in 1996. Two of the photographs are wedding photos of the Greek Cypriot, whose name is Solomos Solomu, with his wife. The other photos depict the event when he was murdered.
The statements under the first and fifth photographs are about the Greek Cypriots’ perception of Turks; Greek Cypriots feel resentment and hatred towards Turks, and the newspaper reinforces the discourse that Greek Cypriots are the ‘others’:

I never go to the Greek side, but they told me this [points to Photograph 1]. It is said that at Ledra Palace, there are pictures of the Greeks who died in 1974 and they show these pictures to the foreigners who want to cross the border and they reflect us as barbarous to them. I do not believe that the Greeks have changed in any way. The Greeks are instilled with Turkish enmity by their families as soon as they are born\textsuperscript{198} (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).

It is not a nice thing that the Greeks show these kinds of photos. These are real-life events, but it is not nice to display them year after year. We feel depressed when we see these pictures while passing through the border. Then we start to wonder if it is possible to build a joint future with Greeks?\textsuperscript{199} (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee).

In photographs 2, 4 and 6, the newspaper represents the commemorative places that were ruined by the Greek Cypriots in the South of Cyprus: Greek Cypriots destroyed the monument of Atatürk which is the symbol of Turkishness, and ruined the monument of the martyrs and the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery, which are seen as sacred in Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In this way, through the depiction of the ruined commemorative places, Greek Cypriots are represented as barbarians and vandals who harm Turkish Cypriots, their values and sacred locations to take revenge:

I saw these [points to Photograph 6] on TV. They are completely destroyed. Our village is in the Paphos district and they flattened all the Turkish cemeteries there as well. When we went there we witnessed this. My brothers are buried there. On the 14th of July, the Greeks entered the Turkish sector of Paphos, massacred some of the Turks and fired on my brothers\textsuperscript{200} (Nurten, female, aged 60, retired history teacher).

All these things are true. Vandalising, etc… they kind of seem to take revenge on us by damaging the statues or the martyrs’ cemeteries. They reflect their hatred or enmity towards Turks by acting this way. I am completely opposed to such vandalising of the cemeteries or martyrs’ cemeteries\textsuperscript{201} (Emine, female, aged 63, retired geography teacher).

\textsuperscript{198} In-depth interview, Girne: Domestic Labour, 12/08/2007
\textsuperscript{199} In-depth interview, Kermiya: domestic parlour, 18/09/2007
\textsuperscript{200} In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
\textsuperscript{201} In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic Parlour, 30/09/2007
Atatürk is our leader; that’s why the Greeks want to pull the statues of Atatürk into pieces, for revenge (İclal, female, aged 81, retired nurse).

In the fifth photograph, there is the statement ‘we haven’t forgotten’, and it is stressed that a Greek flag is waving on a building. The statement continues with a reminder that the Greek side has been accepted in the EU. The newspaper’s stress on the Greek side’s acceptance into the EU mobilizes the ideas of the respondents about the EU as supporting Greeks and Greek Cypriots:

They shouldn’t have accepted the Greek side into the EU as the Republic of Cyprus, because there is no such entity as the Republic of Cyprus. Although the Annan plan was not approved by the Greek side, they were accepted into the EU and now both Greece and the Greek side, hand-in-hand are trying to block the Turkish membership in the EU by drawing attention to the Cyprus issue. This shows how the EU supports Greeks instead of us (Ali, male, aged 69, Restaurant manager)

The newspaper’s emphasis on a Greek flag waving on a building mobilizes meaning that articulates this flag as a ‘threat’ towards the Turkish (cypriot) identity on the island. As was noted in the previous chapter, for many respondents the flags of Turkey and the TRNC represent the freedom and sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots on the island. The flags are also the symbols of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism constructed through narratives based on the existence of the others (Greek Cypriots). The existence of the Greek flag that represents Greek identity and nationalism mobilizes the fears of many respondents about the ‘others’; according to most of the respondents, it connotes the Greek Cypriot’s rule over the island and the captivity of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots:

When the Greeks say ‘we haven’t forgotten’, they do not mean the war or the massacres committed to them. They are the ones who committed massacres in Limassol and Paphos. And now, they keep saying ‘we haven’t forgotten.’ What they haven’t forgotten is an Eternal Ideal! They aim to materialize it one day. Already, the Greek Commander of Greece who has a mandate in South Cyprus has said, ‘Surely, one day we will fly the Greek flag in Girne.’ (Nurten, female, aged 60, history teacher)

When I look at these pictures and read the explanations below..., for example, a Greek flag is waving on a building, for example, the expression “we have never

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202 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007
203 In-depth interview, Girne: Office, 12/07/2007
204 In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
forgotten”: hatred towards Turks… all these prove that the Turks and the Greeks are distinct and dissimilar entities. If you live together with the Greeks this is what you will experience. You will be ruled by the Greek Cypriots or you will be a captive under the Greek flag205 (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).

The third photograph depicts a car park in the South in Ayandon, an old Turkish neighbourhood; the newspaper implies that Greek Cypriots destroyed the homes, settlements and everything left by Turkish Cypriots, as they are against the existence of Turks on the island:

Unfortunately, all the Greeks have done up to this point is to wipe away whatever has been left by the Turks. They kind of want to display that Turks have never existed on this island206 (Arif, male, 86, retired counsellor).

We invested a lot in Greek properties. We renovated. We added value to them. However, they nullified the value of the Turkish properties by demolishing them207. (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

It is not nice for someone not to go and visit her place of birth. While someone coming from the south experienced nostalgia, the people [from the north] could not experience that nostalgia when they went and saw their homes demolished or converted into car parks208 (Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher).

Although most of the respondents’ interpretations are parallel to the political discourse of the newspaper, one can also talk about the mobilization of counter memories and narratives by the news stories. Some of the respondents talk about the properties and cemeteries of Greek Cypriots that were ruined by the Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus, supporting an alternative idea that Turkish Cypriots also damaged the properties of Greek Cypriots. The respondents also talk about the common attitudes of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (i.e they both wave the flag of their motherland country and committed massacres). These interpretations oppose the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that locates Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’ who are different from the Turkish Cypriots:

At least we found the place of the martyrs’ cemeteries in the Greek side only missing the marble. We, here, can’t show a single Greek cemetery. Is there anything of this kind here? No, there isn’t…209 (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert)

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205 In-depth interview, Girne: Office, 12/08/ 2007
206 In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20/07/2007
207 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
208 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı (Brotherhood Hearth), 23/07/2007
209 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007
In picture 2, it says the statue of Atatürk was broken into pieces. All right, have we left a single Greek cemetery undamaged in the North? How dare we get angry with them when we didn’t leave anything as it used to be? We demolished more then they did\(^{210}\) (Mehmet, male, aged 20, student).

They say that the Greeks flattened the Ayandon quarter; well on whose property have we constructed the Nicosia bus terminal? Hasn’t it been built on the land of a Greek owner?\(^{211}\) (Hasan, male, aged 60, retired teacher).

With respect to massacres, we did some and so did they. I don’t put the blame on the committers of the massacres but on the ones who gave the orders to commit them\(^ {212}\) (Hasan, male, aged 60, retired teacher).

That’s true. Although the Greek side has joined the EU, they still wave the Greek flag alongside the Cyprus flag. The same thing is done on this side as well. The Turkish flag flies beside the TRNC flag. We have flags on the mountains as well\(^ {213}\) (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).

The respondents’ counter memories − about the common features and attitudes of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (i.e. they both did massacres, gave harm to each others’ properties, wave their motherland’s flag) − function as a strategy of unification. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38) note, emphasis on the unifying common features (i.e., shared sorrows, attitudes) is included in the strategies of unification, one of the constructive strategies. Thus, these respondents construct (turkish) Cypriot identity that focuses on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

6.2.3 Part three: Narratives on the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and European Union

In this part, I focus on the narratives of the respondents about the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and European Union. My aim is to explore how the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to their national identity. As was noted above, the knowledge of the respondents about the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the EU are mostly articulated by the media. However, the respondents interpret this knowledge according to their memories of the ‘past’ and their conception of the ‘others’. Therefore, their

\(^{210}\) In depth-interview, Köşkülüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 30/08/2007  
\(^{211}\) In-depth interview, Öğretmen evleri: Domestic parlour, 23 September 2007  
\(^{212}\) In-depth interview, Öğretmen evleri: Domestic parlour, 23 September 2007  
\(^{213}\) In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
interpretations about the Annan Plan and the EU cannot be based on the information that comes solely through the media. As pointed out in Chapter One, memory is articulated through the complex combination of autobiographical and alternative/dominant public memories in power relations. Below are opposing interpretations of the respondents regarding some of the issues in the Annan Plan. These issues are related to the provisions in the Annan Plan; however, as mentioned earlier, there was no possibility for the majority of the respondents to read the original version of the Plan, which has thousands of pages. The respondents therefore do not know the exact details of the Plan or its provisions; their interpretations are based on abstract knowledge that is articulated by the public narratives partly constructed by the media:

6.2.3.1 Security: Safety/Threat

The Annan Plan was interpreted by many respondents as being full of objectionable arrangements that might cause danger and threats, such as the reduction of the number of Turkish soldiers on the island and deportation of some of the Turkish population that was settled in Northern Cyprus by its previous government. According to this assumption, Turkey would not be able to prevent a possible attack of Greek Cypriots if the number of Turkish soldiers on the island were reduced:

What makes us feel most relieved is knowing of the existence of 40-50 thousand Turkish soldiers on this island. But if the Turkish army is withdrawn from the island, no one can foresee what will happen next\(^{214}\) (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).

If we joined the EU, there would be a security problem because the Turkish armed forces would have to leave the island, or just a small number would be left behind within the framework of guarantorship and this would jeopardize the peace on the island\(^{215}\) (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

The Turkish guarantee should definitely continue. The Turkish army and our Turkish citizens should stay here. For the existence of the Turkish Cypriots; this is a must. Otherwise we will be wiped off the island. Already this is the fundamental aim of the Greeks and the Greek Church. To eventually forget Turkish identity and gradually annex Cyprus to Greece\(^{216}\) (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).

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\(^{214}\) In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
\(^{215}\) In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local banch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
\(^{216}\) In-depth interview, Kumsal:Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007
Even if we joined the EU together with the Greeks, the Greeks would still continue attacking the Turkish Cypriots. They never forget the past. The Akritas\textsuperscript{217} plan was engraved into their brains. They are very keen to re-establish the Great Hellenic Empire. After capturing Cyprus, their next target is İstanbul\textsuperscript{218} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

Such interpretations sustain the argument of motherland/babyland that attaches to the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism which is based on the unity of Turkish (cypriots) and Turks for the continuation of the Turkish (cypriot) identity and the survival of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. As was explained in the previous chapter, the motherland/babyland argument was constructed by the official discourse in the Denktaş-UBP period. The argument is based on the idea that Turkey and the Turkish army are the defenders of the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots; thus most of the respondents see the reduction of the Turkish soldiers on the island as a possible threat to the security of Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, a majority of them believe that Turkey and Turks are the guarantee of the Turkish (cypriot) identity on the island. When Arif says, “already this is the fundamental aim of the Greeks and the Greek Church. To eventually forget Turkish identity and gradually annex Cyprus to Greece” and Esra says “The Akritas plan was engraved into their (Greek Cypriots) brains. They are very keen to re-establish the Great Hellenic Empire”, one can hear the voice of the official history in their narrations. The official history that was produced in the Denktaş-UBP period represents Greek Cypriots as a threat to Turkish identity. According to this history, Greek Cypriots can harm Turkish Cypriots in order to reach their ultimate aim, which is the unification of Cyprus with their motherland Greece. The official history plays a crucial role in the memories of the respondents about the past: the majority evaluate the unification of the island under the framework of the Annan Plan as a threat towards the safety of Turkish Cypriots because they see this situation as leaving them open to a potential attack by the Greek Cypriots. This shows how the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots) construct their political ideas about the Annan Plan and the European Union. For many respondents, the European Union is seen as the supporter of Greek Cypriots; they do not believe that the EU will protect them in the event of a possible threat:

\textsuperscript{217} The Akritas Plan was formulated in 1963 and first revealed in 1966 in the Greek newspaper Patris. Its aim was to attain Enosis either through constitutional means as an independent state or through unilateral action accompanied by the forcible suppression of Turkish Cypriot resistance if necessary. However, the government never officially adopted the plan (Tocci 2004:51).

\textsuperscript{218} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
Even if there were clashes, I don’t think that the EU would be able to keep us safe. Because they didn’t protect us in the past.²¹⁹ (Salime, female, aged 68, retired teacher).

Even if we joined the EU, the Greeks would have pretexts to abolish the peace agreement. The Greeks would play tricks again. They would treat us like dirt. The EU would not intervene anyway. They don’t want to intervene. They always want to dominate the Turks.²²⁰ (Nurten, female, aged 60, history teacher).

According to the Annan Plan, a number of Turkish soldiers would be withdrawn. We don’t have a counterpart to take an initiative for peace. I hear on the news that they spend great sums of money on weaponry. We have settlers from Turkey and they also have settlers from Greece. What has the EU managed to stop so far? What has the UN done in Bosnia or Iraq, that we can expect it to take action in other places in the world?²²¹ (Memduh, male, aged 23, student)

If we joined the EU within the principles of the Annan plan, the EU would not be able to ward off a probable clash between the Greeks and the Turks. If it were able to, it would prevent the atrocities in Bosnia. It would prevent the ill-treatment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace in Greece. It would also prevent the events happening in Iraq, if they are such fiery human rights activists. They would manage these things. But they gain benefits from such things, so they don’t take any action.²²² (Alp, male, aged 29, optician).

For many respondents, the EU did not protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots in the past. They also support their arguments about the attitude of EU by showing other examples from different places of the world such as Bosnia and Western Thrace in Greece. This is the strategy of ‘transference of experiences’: the respondents transfer experiences belonging to the other parts of the world to themselves. In the narratives of these respondents, the EU and the Greek Cypriots are conceived as the ‘others’.

On the other hand, some Turkish Cypriots evaluate the European Union as the union of peace, justice and equality. These respondents interpret the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the European Union as a way of saving themselves from the unjust Turkish rule on the island. Their emphasis on a necessary difference between then and now functions as a strategy of transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:40) from Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. As was mentioned in Chapter Four, in the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism the real mother country is

²¹⁹ In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic Labour, 12 July 2007
²²⁰ In -depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
²²¹ In- depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party , 24/07/2007
²²² In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007
not the motherland Turkey, as it is in the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; it is Europe that represents the place where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will live together in peace as “Cypriots”. In these instances, it is the Turks who are represented as ‘them’ and the Greek Cypriots as ‘we’:

Interviewer: How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect the security of the Turkish Cypriots?
İclal: If we joined the EU, the other European Union countries would have to take responsibility. Then there wouldn’t be any threat concerning the Greeks. We [Greek and Turkish Cypriots] can live in peace like in the past”. Now we can rely neither on our army nor on our police. We are not in the EU. No country recognises us. Whom should we rely on?
Interviewer: Don’t you trust the Turkish army?
İclal: How should I trust them? I am not sure what their course of action is.
Interviewer: Do you know what the EU does?
İclal: They have laws to secure human rights. For example, you go to Great Britain and live there freely because their government offers them equal rights. Here, the Turkish citizens do not let us have any rights

So far, there hasn’t been a war amongst European countries. So I don’t believe that there will be a conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after we join the EU. For this reason, I didn’t have the slightest worry about the Annan Plan. As I said at the very beginning, we, the Cypriots, could live together peacefully but they, the Turks, have messed up everything

If we joined the EU we would lead a better life. They would recognize us as well. Then I believe there wouldn’t be any problems between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots because we could live together like we used to live. In any case, the EU would ward off the problems

I am in favour of the de-confrontation of the forces. As for me, when we join the EU, I do not believe that any problems will arise. I have confidence in the EU

If we join the EU, we will not be scared of wars any more because both sides will be disarmed. The EU represents peace

In the narratives of the respondents the logics of equivalence and difference function to construct the (turkish) Cypriot identity. While the logics of equivalence function to set up
a political frontier between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, the logics of difference operate to emphasize the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For example, Iclal locates Greek Cypriots as “we” when she says “we (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) can live in peace like in the past” and Turks as “them” when she says, “Here, the Turkish citizens do not let us have any rights”, “How should I trust them [Turks and the Turkish army]? I am not sure what their course of action is?” Similarly, when Kemal says “we, the Cypriots, could live together peacefully but they, the Turks, have messed up everything”, he emphasizes the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by labelling them as ‘we, the Cypriots’ and he differentiates Turks by accusing them for messing up everything. The conceptions of the respondents about the ‘others’ construct their political ideas about the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Thus in Europe, according to these respondents, Greek and Turkish Cypriots could live together in peace as ‘Cypriots’. Most of the time the respondents interpret the European Union in positive terms: “they have laws to secure human rights”, “when we join the EU, I do not believe that problems will arise”, “So far, there hasn’t been a war amongst European countries. So I don’t believe that there will be a conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after we join the EU.” and “the EU represents peace”.

6.2.3.2 Land and Properties: Regaining the land and properties, better conditions/losing of land and properties ,worse conditions

The articles about land and properties in the Annan Plan are related to one of the most complex issues of the Cyprus problem. The articles can be interpreted as regaining the land and properties lost after the division of the island, or as losing the land and properties, depending on the complex settlement procedures in Northern Cyprus.

After the division in 1974, most of the Turkish Cypriots had to leave their homes, lands and properties in the southern part of the island and moved to Northern Cyprus. The Annan Plan is therefore sometimes interpreted by the respondents as a way of regaining the land and properties. Furthermore, many respondents believe that Turkish Cypriots would be in better economic and social conditions in the EU. Most of the time, they criticise the present political and economic system by referring to Turkey’s wrong policies in Northern Cyprus. Thus, in the narratives of many respondents, Europe is represented as the real mother country that will save Turkish Cypriots from the existing
economic and political problems. The interpretations of the respondents about Turkey give clues to their conceptions of ‘others’, who are the Turks in these instances:

If we joined the EU, everyone would take possession of his property. Everyone would return to his home. New jobs would be provided. The European countries are well organized. Their police force is regular. Their army is regular. Everyone gets his own fair share.228 (İclal, female, aged 81, retired nurse).

If we joined the EU, we would be able to find an easier market for our products. Today, Turkish Cypriots’ production has been cut off. For me, this situation was realised intentionally by Turkey. Turkish Cypriots are conditioned, on purpose, not to produce but to consume. Therefore, joining the EU will make us improve economically.229 (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV programmer).

If we joined the EU, this would affect our economy tremendously. This is clear from the economic stability of the Greek side. Turkey couldn’t manage to improve our life standards in Northern Cyprus.230 (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female beautician).

If we joined the EU, we would be better off because of the EU aid, and we would be integrated with the rest of the world. It is not easy to live depending on Turkey both economically and politically in today’s world231 (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter).

However, some of the items in the Annan Plan were interpreted as losing the land and properties allocated to the Turkish Cypriots which once belonged to the Greek Cypriots. Because of the arrangements about the settlements in the Annan Plan, there are respondents who think that they will lose their land and properties, as some of the Greek Cypriots will return to their homes in the northern part of the island. There are also respondents who think that Greek Cypriots will also own the settlement places such as the town of Güzelyurt and thus, Turkish Cypriots will be displaced from their villages once again:

How many more times does the Turkish Community have to move? As for me, coming to a point after thirty years when you have to move your home again is dreadful. We do not want the inhabitants of 52 to 55 villages to be displaced again. In this plan 75% of the agricultural fields would be left to the Greeks.232 (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).

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228 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007
229 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007
230 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
231 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23/09/2007
232 In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
The Greeks always had overwhelming expectations. For example, they also wanted Güzelyurt back. Already most of the island belongs to them. Decreasing the number of soldiers on the island would also put us in an unsecured position\textsuperscript{233} (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

If we joined the EU, there would be a problem concerning ownership. The Turks would lose their properties and they would start from scratch again\textsuperscript{234} (Zehra, female, aged 26, shop assistant).

In the narratives of the respondents above, the strategies of justification function to justify the status quo that operates to maintain the Turkish (cypriot) identity that locates Greek Cypriots as the external threats. These respondents are against the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU as they believe that in the event of participation, Greek Cypriots will pose a threat to their life standards and land and properties. They articulate the ‘past’ and create threatening scenarios for the future in order to rationalize their political ideas. These threatening scenarios are about the Turkish Cypriots’ displacement, and losing their land and properties after the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union. Such fictitious (threatening) scenarios, which operate as the strategies of means of realisation, support the argument of the external threat to rationalise the status quo (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36).

6.2.3.3 Administration: Human rights, equality/Minority rights, inequality

Administration is another controversial issue in the Annan Plan. Most of the time the political ideas of the respondents about the administration are constructed according to their memories of the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together in the Republic of Cyprus. As was stated in Chapter Four, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as an independent, bi-communal state. Thus the respondents’ political ideas are articulated through their different conceptions of the ‘past’:

If we joined the EU, we would be the citizens of a recognized country. Turkish and Greeks Cypriots would be equal. But now the Greeks are recognized as an independent state. But we aren’t. We were equal to Greeks in the 1960 Republic Of Cyprus; we were already equal from the point of view of human rights or citizens or individuals. And the Annan Plan was more fulfilling than the 1960 constitution\textsuperscript{235} (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife).

\textsuperscript{233} In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
\textsuperscript{234} In depth-interview, Alsancak: Domestic parlour, 28/08/2007
\textsuperscript{235} In depth-interview, domestic parlour, 25/09/2007
If we joined the EU, we would have a connection with the world and we would be recognized. When foreigners asked us our nationality, we would say Cypriots and they would not think as if we are Greeks. They would know that Turkish Cypriots have a state as well. After the 1960 constitution, the Annan Plan is our last chance for being recognized\textsuperscript{236} (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).

For many respondents the Annan Plan provides equal opportunities for Turkish Cypriots to have a position in the administration of the island. Interpretations such as “if we joined the EU, we would be the citizens of a recognized country. Turkish and Greek Cypriots would be equal” and “if we joined the EU, we would have a connection with the world and we would be recognized” indicate how the respondents emphasize the necessary difference between now and the future, which is one of the strategies of transformation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36) from Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the common life of Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

On the other hand, there are many respondents who are intensely against the Annan Plan as they believe that it is unjust in not giving equal rights to Turkish Cypriots. According to them, the Plan takes away the autonomy of Turkish Cypriots and renders them minorities. They rationalise their political ideas by creating threatening scenarios in the event of the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU; and as noted earlier, “threatening scenarios that are based on an external threat function to maintain the status quo (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:36). In creating such scenarios about the possible future of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the respondents refer to the ‘Republic of Cyprus’:

The Turks of Western Thrace are in Europe but we know how they are treated. Turkish Cypriots have a disadvantage because of their population and in Europe they will be treated as a minority. There are similar examples of this in Europe. We also know how the Turkish Cypriots were treated as minorities in the Republic of Cyprus. We don’t want to live those days again\textsuperscript{237} (Alican, male, aged 49, farmer).

The Greeks do not intend to give us even the benefits of the 1960 republic. If we joined the EU, we would be second-class citizens. Today, even EU citizens are not happy about living in the EU\textsuperscript{238} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

According to many respondents, Turkish Cypriots were treated as minorities in the Republic of Cyprus and if they start to live with Greek Cypriots again under the

\textsuperscript{236} In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
\textsuperscript{237} In depth-interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
\textsuperscript{238} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
framework of the Annan Plan, they will be treated as second-class citizens again in the EU; the respondents’ political ideas in this way construct and are constructed by their memories of the ‘past’.

6.2.3.4 European Union: Impartial / Discriminative

The Annan Plan is a document made up of proposals for a resolution to the Cyprus Problem, and it includes proposals regarding relations with the European Union following accession of the whole of Cyprus to the EU. It is therefore difficult to separate the subject of the European Union from the Annan Plan. This is why in Cyprus, relations with the European Union are mostly defined in the light of the Plan; ideas about it play a significant role in evaluations of relations with the EU. Some of the respondents describe the EU as the Union of Christianity; they believe that in every situation the EU will support the Greek Cypriots because of their religion. In such interpretations, the respondents use the strategies of dissimilation through their emphasis on heterogeneity and the religious differences between Greeks/EU and Turks. Their memories about the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots and the EU in this case) sustain their political ideas about the EU; and they do not believe that there is democracy and impartiality in it. The strategies of dissimilation and sameness work together through comparisons: thus, while the strategies of dissimilation highlight the religious differences between Turks and the EU/Greeks, the strategies of sameness emphasize that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are both Moslem and not Christians in contrast to the Greek Cypriots, who are in the EU. In this way the strategies of sameness, like the strategies of dissimilation, work through the articulation of the ‘other’; they also equate Turks and Turkish Cypriots through expressions such as “we, the Turks”:

As the European Union is a community of Christians, I believe that when a problem arises the Union will be on the side of the Greeks; because of the church... if we [Turks and Turkish Cypriots] had a cross on the neck and went to church, we would have security of life; but as long as the mosques are here, I don’t believe that we will have security of life239 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

The EU is a community of Christianity, so the Muslims and Turks will be regarded from a different viewpoint. For example, for France or Germany the Hellenes are in the foreground because their roots go back to ancient Greeks.

239 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
Besides, the EU has added such problematic members that it can dissolve anytime\textsuperscript{240} (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

All the European countries treat Greece as if she were a real daughter, and Turkey like a step-daughter, because of its religion\textsuperscript{241} (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

On the other hand, there are some respondents who believe there is democracy and impartiality in the EU, as they support the idea that there, there is no discrimination on the basis of economic status, race, religion or language. These respondents use the strategies of sameness to create homogeneity by supporting the idea that in the EU everybody is equal; the EU is represented as the place where Greek and Turkish Cypriots can live in peace without considering any differences between them:

In the EU cultural and economic differences are minimized and the effects of the concept of the other are diminished because it is a union; there is no discrimination ideologically\textsuperscript{242} (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher).

In the EU neither languages or religions nor flags of the nations have any importance. You join the EU through digesting these differences. Therefore, I do not think that in the EU there will be any problems between Turkish and Greek Cypriots\textsuperscript{243} (Sevinç, female, aged 48, news speaker).

As can be understood from the opposing interpretations of the Annan Plan and the European Union, different respondents define the outcome of the Plan differently; it can thus be seen as a nodal point around which a variety of interpretations can be produced. These interpretations are linked to particular ways of understanding the Cyprus problem: different conceptions about the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are the reasons behind the different representations of the past, present and future that find their explanations with the Annan Plan. However, the worries are not openly diverted towards the ‘other’ but masked under the key issues of the Plan. The Plan is mainly about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus; however, the expectations of the respondents from the future are highly dependent on the memories of the ‘past’ and the conception of the ‘other’.

Respondents who adopt the discourse of a ‘happier past’ with Greek Cypriots favour the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, and vice versa. Furthermore, the respondents’ views about Turks and Turkey’s position in Northern

\textsuperscript{240} In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
\textsuperscript{241} In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
\textsuperscript{242} In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007
\textsuperscript{243} In depth-interview, Göçmenköy: BRT institution, 23/09/2007
Cyprus influence their political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. The Annan Plan is conceived as full of articles which are positive (for those who want Northern Cyprus’s EU participation) or negative (for those who want the status quo – Turkey’s rule on the island – to continue) depending on the memories of people about the ‘others’ and the ‘past’. The table below shows the opposing interpretations of the respondents regarding the Annan Plan.

**ANNAN PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporters</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety, protection</td>
<td>Danger, threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAND&amp;PROPERTIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regaining the land and properties,</td>
<td>Losing of land and properties,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better conditions</td>
<td>Worse conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights, equality</td>
<td>Minority rights, inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEAN UNION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic, impartial</td>
<td>Anti-democratic, discriminatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Section Two: Different functions of the mechanisms of memory

6.3.1 Part One: Mechanisms as a Single Body: Social Practices and Media Events

In this section, I examine how the mechanisms enter into the daily lives of social individuals through social practices and media events, and explore the different interactions of the respondents with particular mechanisms that are intertwined with each other. Through my interviews, I observe how the mechanisms are embedded in the behaviours of the respondents and how they are put into practice physically and emotionally. The military salutation, raising the flag, singing the national anthem, a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the monuments, and celebrating national days, are the social practices that are physically and/or emotionally practiced by the respondents. These practices remind them of the ‘past’ that is constructed by the ruling groups. The national days, as forms of commemorations,
sometimes also appear as media events. Melek a 28-year old female instructor explains her ‘memories in relation to national identity’ as follows,

Melek: In our youth, we were taught to embrace our own identity rather than enmity towards the other side. I mean, in our home.

Interviewer: How, for example?

Melek: For example, when a military vehicle passed by, my brother and I would give the soldiers a military salute. Or at least wave to them. But usually we gave them a military salute. When these things were talked about, we were not told that the Greeks were not bad, but rather, told that the Turks were good. In fact, we were not told that the Turks were good, but it was stressed that respect should be shown towards the soldiers. We were taught to respect the soldiers. Or rather... my mother would put up the Turkish flag on national days... but never, ever talked about the Greeks as enemies.\textsuperscript{244}

In Melek’s narration, the ‘soldier’s salute’ is practiced in her daily life, especially on national days. The ‘mechanisms of memory’ (national days and flags as intertwined) construct her ideas about the others (Greek Cypriots) through her family, which does not openly give the message that Greek Cypriots are the ‘others’; this is implied tacitly through the mechanisms of memory that construct ‘what should be remembered’ through social practices. In this case, the military vehicle, the Turkish soldiers and the Turkish flag are the moments articulated within the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. These moments bring individuals into connection with the ‘constructed past’, which is the memory of the Turkish Cypriots’ salvation from their ‘enemies’ in 1974 by the Turkish soldiers. The repetition of the salute provides continuity with this constructed ‘past’. Thus, it might not be Melek’s family but the moments of discourse, that tell who the enemy is and who is not through the mechanisms of memory.

In another example, provided by Nurten, a 60-year old female retired history teacher, putting up the Turkish flag is practiced to express aggressive reaction towards the ‘other’:

Nurten: Our memories with the Greeks have always been full of misfortune. Even before 1963, we would receive threats as my elder brothers were members of the TMT [Turkish Resistance Organisation]. At night they would be at our home. Once or twice, we witnessed them installing bombs; in short all the bad memories still remain. Or when we put up the flag on national days.... My mother was a nationalist.... We would put up the flag on Friday evenings and take it down on

\textsuperscript{244} In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
Sunday evenings. On a Saturday evening a few infidels [Greek Cypriots] came to our home to quietly pull down the Turkish flag in our garden. We all rushed out and ran after them. In retaliation, this time we left the flag on the pole for fifteen days. Our relations with the Greeks have always been like this245...

Putting up the Turkish flag and leaving it on the pole is understood by Nurten as an expression of their loyalty towards the Turkish nation/identity; they reacted to the ‘others’ when they tried to pull down the flag, because this attempt was seen as a threat towards the Turkish nation/identity. The act of putting up the flag and leaving it flying for fifteen days can thus be interpreted as a kind of aggressive reaction towards the ‘others’ who ‘attacked’ the Turkish flag, the symbol of the Turkish nation/identity in Cyprus. One can see the naturalization of Turkish nationalism in Nurten’s narrative when she talks about her family’s obsession with the Turkish flag and her mother’s being a nationalist as good and positive things. At the same time, she identifies Greek Cypriots as infidels and exceptionalizes their nationalism.

In the following example, the different forms of mechanisms appear in the narrative of Tezcan, when he explains his ideas about the monument of Atatürk:

As we also read in our history books, he is the greatest Turk. The founder of Turkey. I am affected a lot when I hear our national anthem on national days246 (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee).

The mechanisms of the traditional form of the national anthem, the national days and the monument of Atatürk, that are included in the commemorations and history textbooks, mobilize Tezcan’s memories about Atatürk, showing the intertextual relationship amongst the official mechanisms of memory. In this particular case, the mechanisms function like a single body for the reproduction of Turkish (cypriot) identity through the symbol of Atatürk. Similarly, in the following narration, different forms of mechanisms (the monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, national days and history textbooks) are intertwined with each other and work to inculcate by repetition certain norms of behaviour that automatically imply continuity with the constructed ‘past’. Selen, a 29-year old female TV presenter, narrates the first things that come to her mind on seeing the photograph of the monument of Atatürk:

245 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
246 In-depth-interview, Surlarıçi: Tourism agency, 7/08/2007
Selen: The symbol of Turkishness... I am not sure... The things that we read in the history text book. He saved Turkey from the enemies. The principles and revolutions of Atatürk... He is also adopted by the Turkish Cypriots. We shouldn’t stray from his path. If we digress from Atatürk’s path we will lose our way. I think these things underlie the symbol of Atatürk. Whenever I see the bust of Atatürk, I remember the national days because on those days, we always stood before the busts of Atatürk and observed one minute’s silence as respect for Atatürk. We sang the national anthem. As you know, wreaths were laid and parades were held and so forth. Throughout our education in elementary school, we stood before the bust of Atatürk and sang the national anthem out of respect for him and the martyrs. That was the first thing every Monday morning. And the last thing at the end of a week of education was the same. These are all the things that come to my mind.

It is interesting to observe that although Emine says she does not conceive the national anthem (one of the mechanisms) as a national event, the anthem still functions to mobilize her emotions about her identity. For Emine, a 52-year old retired official,

Emine: When we were children, we would be excited when the national anthem was sung but I wouldn’t see it as much of a national event. Because the national anthem was sung at the beginning of each week, I would regard it as an indicator of the beginning of the new week. When I was a young girl, I liked to hear the national anthem while we were on parade. I would walk better. I would feel excited.

Interviewer: Why did you feel excited?

Emine: We wouldn’t go so deeply into national emotions, but we would see it as a ceremony.

Although Emine says that she does not regard the national anthem as related to national sentiments, it still functions in her life as an internalized attitude about her identity. The reason why Emine liked to hear the national anthem, would walk better and would feel excited when she heard the national anthem, is that the national anthem carries the meaning of national sentiments. As Llobera (2005:37) notes, ‘music particularly in the form of songs is a powerful source of patriotic sentiment and the national anthem is a potent stimulus for national identification as it expresses the feelings of pride in one’s country’. The national anthem operates to fix certain norms of attitude by repetition; for example, when Emine says ‘I would regard it [the national anthem] as an indicator of the beginning of the new week’ she is approaching it as a habit. As Billig (1995:6) notes, ‘habits are highly crucial as they enable the nations to be reproduced’. Thus, although

247 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
248 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
Emine argues that she wouldn’t see the national anthem as much of a national event, she is continually reminded of her nation and national identity through the anthem, which is one of the mechanisms of memory.

One can also look at how the respondents practice singing the national anthem physically and emotionally with the media. Most of the respondents say that when they hear the national anthem being played in the media, they stand up and accompany the singing, and in doing so they feel themselves to be members of the Turkish nation. The media thus play a crucial role in carrying the official mechanisms into the homes and everyday lives of people. Media, as one of the mechanisms, sustains the dominant discourse through its representations of official mechanisms such as the national anthem. This can be seen in the cases of Ayşe, a 31-year old female instructor and Cemre, 22 years old and unemployed:

Ayşe: When we were at primary school, my elder brother and I did not have to go to bed early on weekends. That’s why we waited till midnight. At that hour, the national anthem was sung. We would accompany the singing and went to bed after that.

Interviewer: How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or TV?

Ayşe: When I sang it at home my nationalistic feelings increased. One of the reasons for it was that the singing on TV was performed by professional musicians. When I was singing the national anthem, I regarded myself as a member of the great Turkish nation. When we sang it at school, we wouldn’t sing it so seriously, as we sang it with our friends249.

Interviewer: How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or TV?

Cemre: It reminds me that I should stand up when the music starts. ..

Interviewer: why?

Cemre: Because we learned it like that. As you know, the national anthem is sacred. You must stand still when it is sung. If you move, it is regarded as irreverence. For everything... like betraying national values. We were taught it that way250.

In the following two examples, seeing the monument of Atatürk in the street functions as a social practice in the everyday lives of the respondents. The monument leaks into the autobiographical memories of the respondents and provides continuity with the constructed ‘past’. Kemal, a 51 year-old male, tyre marketing expert and Arif, a 86 year-

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249 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007
250 In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007
old retired counsellor narrate their memories after seeing the photograph that depicts the monument of Atatürk as follows:

Kemal: Atatürk is very valuable, not only for Turkish Cypriots and Turks but for the rest of the world. When I see this monument, I remember that the EOKA men had fired bullets at it; when I see it I remember this. Later, in the years 1973-1976, I remember the days when we were present before the monument of Atatürk, when we were soldiers... we were in the national days’ ceremony squad; it reminds me of those years²⁵¹.

Arif: When this statue was going to be erected, there were a lot of objections from the Greeks... a very beautiful statue... this one... It is the sign of our continuity. Kyrenia gate is a historical place. The existence of the statue, there is something very nice and beautiful... and holding the ceremonies there... National days used to be held there before... Later it moved to the fair area²⁵².

To observe the function of the ‘media events’ in the everyday lives of the respondents, I asked them what difference it made when they performed and celebrated the commemorative activities, either as personally involved or through the media. Most of the respondents say that there is not too much of a difference, as in any case they experience the feelings of enthusiasm, happiness, excitement, sorrow or pain depending on the content of the activity (i.e., celebration of the national days, commemoration of the martyrs). However, most of the respondents point to the fact that when they participate personally in the activities, they are more enthusiastic and emotional:

Sure, if you go to the live ceremonies, you get more impressed; but if you can’t, watching TV also lets you get the same feelings²⁵³ (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

I definitely feel more excited when I go to see the ceremonies, especially with my grandchild. I do feel deep enthusiasm in the ceremonies. However, sometimes I can’t go and I like to watch the ceremonies on TV. Media also provide the opportunity to follow the ceremonies at home²⁵⁴ (Ahmet, male, aged 50, farmer).

Thus, although media provide the opportunity for individuals to perform and celebrate the national events, it is not possible to give the media a privileged position. However, media as part of our daily lives provide us with an opportunity to follow the events that we might normally not be able to pursue; in the event that we cannot participate in national

²⁵¹ In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 21/9/2007
²⁵² In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic Parlour, 20 July 2007
²⁵³ In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 24/7/2007
²⁵⁴ In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic Parlour, 17 July 2007
celebrations, the media function to carry the event and its associated norms and values into our homes. Thus, media serve politically in providing the necessary framework for the reproduction of the Turkish (cypriot) nationalism through the representation of the media events. As was suggested in Chapter Two, media events intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and our lives and occupy society’s ‘centre’ for a while. Media events provide social integration by mobilizing emotions such as happiness, pride, sorrow and excitement:

When I watch the national days on TV, I feel that I am celebrating the event as a nation. I mean, I feel myself as a part of my nation. I am proud of being Turkish (Meltem, female, aged 22, housewife).

When I watch programs on national days I boil up; I feel the sorrows of that period. Have you ever been to Çanakkale?...If you went to Çanakkale you would get exhausted from crying. There are not only Turkish graves there, but also British and Anzac graves. The epitaphs on the gravestones make me deeply emotional and such days remind me of it (Emine, female, aged 63, retired teacher).

On the commemoration day of the martyrs, I feel rather gloomy and it lasts for days, because we have had martyrs in the family (Esg, female, aged 62, retired teacher)

On the national days, I feel very proud, happy and excited. As it is is our motherland, I feel very proud and excited on the 29th October on the foundation day of the Republic of Turkey. On 15th November I remember how we survived the 1958s, 1963s and 1974s and become happy when I watch the ceremonies. The day of the declaration of the TRNC makes me happy because we become aware that our soldiers haven’t fallen in vain. Having a separate state is wonderful, because the Greek statesmen ousted the Turks from the partnership state in 1963 (Makbule, female, aged 61, journalist)

Responses such as ‘the epitaphs on the gravestones make me deeply emotional and such days (national days) remind me of it (Çanakkale)’, ‘on the commemoration day of the martyrs, I feel rather gloomy and it lasts for days, because we have had martyrs in the family’ and ‘on 15th November, I remember how we survived the 1958s, 1963s and 1974s’, show how media events mobilize the respondents’ different memories and bring them together to operate as one in the reproduction of the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism.

255 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic parlour, 31/07/2007
256 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Labour, 30 September 2007
257 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
258 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Volkan Newspaper, 1/10/2007
6.3.2 Part two: Dominant public memory: Threat and safety

While the ‘mechanisms of memory’ are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of the ‘dominant public memory’, this does not mean that they provide a total fixity in the memories of individuals. Memories are constantly articulated and negotiated through the discourses shaped in power relations; memories of the social individuals are like a battlefield of antagonistic discourses. However, most of the time, social individuals try to prevent antagonisms by ignoring the alternative memories, which function like a ‘surplus’ that threatens the partial fixity of their memories. The surplus creates the necessary conditions for the articulation of memories. In the first section below, I focus on particular themes that function like ‘surpluses’ and threaten the perpetuation of the dominant public memory. In the second section, I explore how the respondents mythologize the past in order to provide safety for their memories that are parallel to the dominant public memory.

6.3.2.1 Threat to the “dominant public memory”: Internal contradictions and inconsistencies

6.3.2.1.1 Hatred, Resentment and Enmity

The memories of the social individuals involve internal contradictions and inconsistencies. Most of the time, the respondents overcome these contradictions through their intense support of the dominant public memory; in this way, they represent the truthfulness and consistency of their memories that are parallel to the dominant public memory by excluding alternative memories. However, the exclusion, rejection, ignorance or forgetting show their struggle for the total fixity of their memories. For instance, when we cross out a word (which implies the alternative memories in this example), this generally shows that we think the word is wrong, unnecessary and/or insignificant; thus, we exclude, reject or ignore the word. However, sometimes the word that is crossed out is not insignificant but the most important one – it might be the one that we want to ignore or forget as we don’t want to face it, because we need the total fixity of our memories. Total fixity is necessary for our peace of mind. It erases and prevents the possible questions, confusions, inconsistencies and ambiguities that make us uncomfortable. In this sense, the crossing out implies presence, not absence; it is the presence of the
inconsistencies. In this instance, the word (the alternative memories) is the ‘surplus’ that is excluded by the memory as it is a threat to the structured totality.

In his narration, a 29 year-old male optician, Alp, talks about his memories about Greek Cypriots. One can identify, in his narrated memory, the internal/ inherent complexities that are caused because of the antagonistic relationship between dominant/alternative public memories. One can also see traces of the official history and the media’s function in mediating it:

Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots, and how did you obtain this information?

Alp: I learned about Greek Cypriots especially in school, from our teachers. But their narratives never instilled hatred or resentment. They only said that Greek Cypriots did this and that. As a result, neither my friends nor I have felt hatred towards Greek Cypriots. Our teachers just narrated what Greek Cypriots did in order to make us conscious and make us think more logically for our nation and state.

Interviewer: Did you go to the Museum of Barbarism with your teachers as well?

Alp: Yes. I went there for the first time when I was 12.

Interviewer: How did you feel when you went there?

Alp: When I went to the Museum of Barbarism, I felt sad when I saw what they [Greek Cypriots] did to us. But I always think with common sense and I have never felt hatred. But I always tell people about their [Greek Cypriots’] intentions. Although we are pro-peace, they have negative feelings about us. For example, they recently celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans.

Interviewer: How did you get the information about their celebration?

Alp: I read in Volkan and I saw it on TV as well.

Interviewer: How did you feel about their celebration when you watched it on TV?

Alp: Their celebration shows that they don’t like us… that’s why they celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans.

On the surface, Alp’s memory of Greek Cypriots carries traces of the ‘dominant public memory’ constructed through the official history (his school education and history teachers, a particular museum and the mediation of a national day on TV mobilized Alp’s memories) that articulates Greek Cypriots as ‘them’ and Turks as ‘us’ during 1974-2003.

[^259]: In-depth interview, Kermiya, 01/09/2007
Cağrı identifies the Turkish Cypriots and Ottomans as ‘us’ and Greek Cypriots as ‘them’ when he says “Their celebration shows that they (Greek Cypriots) don’t like us… that’s why they celebrated their liberation from the Ottomans”.

Closer analysis enables us to hear a very low voice coming from the alternative public memories that criticise the ‘dominant public memory’ as full of ‘hatred’ and ‘resentment’ towards Greek Cypriots. This alternative public memory says that the feelings of hatred and resentment are negative feelings. This alternative public memory is hidden in Alp’s effort to ‘cross out’ the words ‘hatred’ and ‘resentment’. When he says “their (the history teachers’) narratives never instilled hatred or resentment. They only said that Greek Cypriots did this and that. Neither my friends nor I have felt hatred towards Greek Cypriots”, one can hear the voice of the alternative public memory which comes from behind and says the opposite. This low voice coming from behind functions as surplus and threatens the total fixity of Cağrı’s memory, which is mobilized through the mechanisms of memory. This is why he reacts to this threat with an intense and emphatic support of the ‘dominant public memory’ that is constructed by the mechanisms of memory. Another example appears in the response of Melek, a 28 year-old female:

Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots?

Melek: I know as much as our elders told us. At times there was friendship, and at other times there were eternal enmities. For example, my family’s neighbours were Greeks. They seemed friendly when we met them face-to-face, but in our absence they would talk about us as ‘the beasts, the Turks’. My mother told me all about this. My mother overheard this once. When my mother turned her back, they said this. But in our family, we were not taught to feel any enmity in any way.

Interviewer: What do you remember about the Greeks from the education you got when you were at school?

Melek: At school, in the Turkish history book, there was a lot of information. In Turkish Cypriot history, mostly we were taught that we were a minority in Cyprus and that we had suffered because of the Greek Cypriot atrocities. There weren’t any fascist expressions in the books, or I didn’t see it that way 260.

In Melek’s narrative, the public narratives (i.e., narratives of the mother, teachers, history textbook) work as a single body in the construction of her ideas about the Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’ who are untrustworthy (Melek’s mother says that Greek Cypriots seemed

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260 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
friendly when they met them face-to-face but they were not) and vicious (Melek remembers learning in school that Turkish Cypriots had suffered because of the Greek Cypriot atrocities). However, like Alp, Melek says that she was never taught to feel enmity/hatred by her family or in her school education; she crosses out the terms enmity/hatred as they threaten the total fixity of her memory. These terms represent negative feelings, and so Melek and Alp reject the belief that they have been taught to feel hatred by their close environment.

### 6.3.2.2 Safety for the “dominant public memory”: The partial fixity

#### 6.3.2.2.1 ‘Myths’ as the shield for the dominant public memory

In the memories of some respondents, the elements of hatred, enmity and grudge function as a surplus and threaten the partial fixity of their memories; however, in the memories of others, they function not as elements but as moments that appear articulated within the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In these instances, their mythologizing past functions like a ‘shield’ for the consistency of their memories and for the justification of the dominant public memory (1974-2003). In the mythologizing past, Greeks are transformed into ‘mythical beasts’ and Turks into ‘heroes’. This situation functions to naturalize and legitimize the feelings of hatred, resentment and enmity towards the Greek Cypriots; thus Greeks and Turks are like the good and evil in tales. Greek Cypriots/Greeks\(^{261}\) are mostly narrated as tyrannical, merciless, cowardly, treacherous, unjust, oppressive and selfish. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots/Turks carry the personal features of heroes as they are powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective. In the narratives below, one can see the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions that carry the features of the mythologies; for example, in the narration of Nurten, a 60 year-old female history teacher:

Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family have any fears?

\(^{261}\) The respondents use the terms ‘Greek’ (Rum) and ‘Greek Cypriot’ (Kıbrıslı Rum) with the same meaning. Thus, the term ‘Greek’ does not refer to the Greek people in Greece (Yunan) in the narratives of the respondents. The respondents might prefer to use the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ in order to emphasize the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Hence, the term ‘Cypriot’ might not be used intentionally to ignore the ‘similarities’ between the two communities. It should be noted here that there are no questions in the in-depth interviews about the people in Greece.
Nurten: Of course we did. We always thought that we would be killed by the Greeks... I also have a terrible memory of when I was a student. I would go to school by bike and as I was the sister of the Çakırs (the members of TMT), they intercepted my road and took away my bicycle by force. They tore apart the tyres, broke it into pieces and threw away the bicycle. Their families were watching the situation but they took no notice of it, they didn’t interrupt. They pushed me down on the ground. They insulted me. They insulted the Turks using terrible slang terms. I told my brothers all about them. Later on, we went to that Greek area. My elder brother called those Greek boys and they all gathered and stood in a line before us. They were so cowardly that they didn’t run away and they stood in line obediently. I described who did what. And my brother beat the children in front of their father and mother just because they misbehaved. He also told them to get my bicycle fixed. Later on, we went to pick up our bicycle, fixed and ready to ride.262

Nurten’s narrative dramatises her explanation of her and her brother’s relationship with Greek Cypriots in the ‘past’; she brings her childhood memory into the present in order to sustain her political views and her identity as a Turk, and her strict division between Turks and Greeks depicts how Turkish (cypriot) nationalism functions in her memory as a nodal point. The antagonistic poles between Greeks and Turks are very deeply rooted in Nurten’s memory: she uses rigid bipolar oppositions such as courageous/cowardly, good/evil, strong/weak and kind/rude to define ‘Turks as ‘we’ and ‘Greeks as ‘they’. Her narration of her experiences with Greek Cypriots has very clear implications: “They intercepted my road and took away my bicycle by force” (implies that Greek Cypriots are tyrannical); “They tore apart the tyres, broke it into pieces and threw away the bicycle”, “They pushed me to the ground” (implies their being merciless, pitiless and evil); “They insulted me. They insulted the Turks using terrible slang terms” (implies that Greek Cypriots don’t like Turks and they are rude and ill-mannered); “their families were watching the case but they took no notice of it, they didn’t interrupt” (represents the families of Greek Cypriots as accomplices; thus she implies that young or elderly, all Greek Cypriots are the same); “My elder brother called those Greek boys” (implies that Turks are fearless and courageous); “and they all gathered and stood in line before us. They were so cowardly that they didn’t run away and they stood in line obediently” (implies that Greek Cypriots are cowardly); “And my brother beat the children in front of their father and mother” (implies that Turks are powerful and strong and Greek Cypriots are weak); so even their parents couldn’t do anything to save them just because they mistreated his sister (implies that Turks are protective and kind).

262 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
Nurten continues:

Interviewer: What do you think the future will bring regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus?

Nurten: Like ours, I believe that one day, the dreams of the defenders of this nation will come true. And the sun will rise for our sake. I don’t want wars or bloodshed, but I am afraid the Greeks’ attitude will bring us to the brink of war again and then the sun will rise for our [Turkish Cypriots’] sake and we will no longer live through such dark days.

When Nurten narrates what the future will bring regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus, she dramatises the political situation in Northern Cyprus by using sentences such as “the sun will rise for our [Turkish Cypriots] sake”, “we will no longer live through such dark days”. Her exaggerated style of explanation is similar to that of mythological narrations; and in her narrative, the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are based on personal attitudes.

Yusuf, a 21 year-old male student, also focuses on the different political positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island:

Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots?

Yusuf: Our elderly would always tell us that we were right. They would tell us that as a common peaceful agreement seemed impossible, bloodshed was inevitable. Well, I think they were right. My grandfather said they had always been under oppression and when he heard that there would be clashes, he felt proud. He served in the army for eight years. A solution for such events would only be by bloodshed. My grandmother did not want my grandfather to stay in the army because they had nine children and they were all depended on him, but after worse came to worst, they agreed with his views. They said that the Greeks only thought about their benefits and claimed that they were the sole owners of the island. They said that the Greeks always believed that they were superior to the Turks.

Interviewer: What do you remember about Greeks Cypriots from your school education?

Yusuf: ...that in the 1960 republic, the Greeks were the majority and that the Turks’ voice was so feeble in the republican assembly. I remember that they were unjust towards the Turks. We witnessed that the Greeks held more rights than the Turks. We saw a lot of martyrs during the years of inter-communal clashes. They would show us the martyrs’ cemetery and massacres at Güzelyurt at the time of the Turkish intervention. They took us to the ‘Murataga and Sandallar’ mass graves twice. The man there, I mean the guide, was the father of some of the slaughtered children. I feel the same hatred even when I go there now. It is
impossible not to feel hatred when you see how those people can be so merciless and savage.\textsuperscript{263}

In Yusuf’s ontological narrative, parallels emerge between the narratives of his grandfather/mother (family members) in the first part; and the mechanisms of memory (history textbook, martyrs’ cemetery, mass graves, media) in the second part. These become clear when one focuses on the similar views and/or implications in his ontological narrative. In the first part, he says that his grandfather said that, ‘Greeks only thought about their benefits’ (implies that they are selfish); ‘they [Turkish Cypriots] had always been under oppression’; ‘they [Greek Cypriots] claimed that they were the sole owners of the island’ and ‘Greeks always believed that they were superior to the Turks’ (implies that they are unjust). These ideas function as moments that appear articulated to Turkish (cypriot) nationalism in Yusuf’s memory. Yusuf’s selective memory brings out the ideas from the history textbooks as follows: “Greeks were the majority and ... the Turks’ voice was so feeble in the republican assembly” (Turks were oppressed by Greeks); “They were unjust towards the Turks. We witnessed that the Greeks held more rights than the Turks” (implies that they are selfish). Yusuf implies that Greek Cypriots are oppressive, unjust and selfish; there might be different and opposing views that Yusuf knows regarding Greek Cypriots, but his selective memory does not bring this ‘information’ out as it is not in harmony with his political ideas about the Cyprus problem at this particular moment.

The ‘mechanisms of memory’ (history textbook, martyrs’ cemetery, mass graves and media) function to provide the necessary elements to sustain Yusuf’s memories in relation to identity. When he says, “I feel the same hatred even when I go there now. It is impossible not to feel hatred when you see how those people can be so merciless and savage”, he implies that it is natural, legitimate and even necessary for Turkish Cypriots to feel hatred, enmity and resentment towards Greeks because they are merciless and savage. Thus, in Yusuf’s narrative, the commemorative locations, the martyrs’ cemetery and mass graves in this case, function to mobilize his feelings of hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots. The representation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Turkish movies also provides elements that sustain his ideas of self and others. According to Yusuf, Greek Cypriots are represented as tyrannical, cowardly, weak and merciless and Turks as protective, kind and fearless, in the Turkish movies:

\textsuperscript{263} In -depth interview, Lefkoşa: Near East University, 30/07/2007
Interviewer: Have you ever watched the movies that narrate the war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots?

Yusuf: Yes. When I was a small child, on national days they would broadcast Turkish films based on the Turkish Cypriot liberation struggle.

Interviewer: Do you remember how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were represented in the movies?

Yusuf: Well... in these films, we saw the Greek soldiers breaking into Turkish homes and killing defenceless elderly people, women or children. So Turkish Cypriots were depicted as aggrieved and helpless, and as victims who were killed ruthlessly; and the Turkish soldiers were depicted as heroes and saviours.

Interviewer: How did you feel when you watched these movies?

Yusuf: When I saw these films, I was deeply affected. The image of the Greek breaking into homes and killing defenceless people, would become reinforced in my mind. Turkish forces came here and liberated the Turkish Cypriots. Everyone would clap hands waving Turkish flags at the road sides. When I saw these things, my hair would stand on end. I would feel excited. I sort of felt I lived that moment.

When Yusuf says “in these films, we saw the Greek soldiers breaking into Turkish homes and killing defenceless elderly people, women or children”, he signifies the Greek Cypriots as tyrannical, merciless people who attack the weak. He further implies that because Greek Cypriots do not have the courage and power to fight against Turkish soldiers, who are represented as strong and courageous, they attack women and children. When Yusuf says, “When I saw these things, my hair would stand on end. I would feel excited”, the media are mobilizing his emotions about his identity. His saying “I sort of felt I lived that moment” shows how he experiences a kind of liminal period as he becomes remote from his daily life and experiences those days, and with them, the political view of the self and others behind the movie. The interview continues:

Interviewer: What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think about them?

Yusuf: I know that a member of my family (my grandad is a ghazi264) has suffered from the Greeks, and this is the primary reason why I dislike Greeks. In short, I do not need to know more about them.

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264 According to the dominant discourse, a Ghazi is a man who has fought successfully against infidels.
It can be seen from Yusuf’s interpretation that his ideas about Greek Cypriots prevent the antagonisms and conflicts in his memories and provide a partial fixity, as for him, there is no need to question or know more about the ‘others’. In parallel with his ideas about Greek Cypriots, Yusuf brings in his grandfather’s words: “as a common peaceful agreement seemed impossible, bloodshed was inevitable”; in his memory, fighting against the ‘others’ and bloodshed are conceived as natural and necessary. Nurten and Yusuf’s mythologized past plays a crucial role in the naturalization and legitimization of feelings of hatred and enmity, and thus is necessary for the partial fixity of their memories.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the function of the media in the articulation and construction of memories in relation to national identity. The media was the only mechanism from which the individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the EU after the division of the island. The focus of the chapter has been on newspaper discourses, because the variety of newspapers made them the most popular media in the period that are within the scope of this research. During the referendum period, each national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together. However, it was not possible to see that variety in the television industry.

Most of the respondents prefer to buy and read the newspapers that are close to their political ideas and they define these newspapers as more objective when compared to the other newspapers. The respondents determine if a news story represents truths or lies by comparing the information given by the news story with their ‘past experiences’. In this chapter, I explored how media narratives mobilize memories by bringing the ‘past’ which is articulated according to the political discourse of the media institution, into the present. In this way, the media play a crucial role in the construction of the social tie or antagonistic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish Cypriots. My analysis shows that most of the time, the respondents’ interpretations about the ‘others’ are not the outcome of what they personally lived but of what they experience through the social remembering that is partly constructed by the media. The news stories about Turks as ‘thieves’ and ‘killers’ construct negative stereotypes of Turks as ‘dangerous’ and ‘savage’ people, and thus identify and locate them as a ‘threat’ to the security of Turkish Cypriots. In this way, the media provide elements that function to
divide Turks and Turkish Cypriots into two opposing camps. Similarly, media function to mobilize meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a threat to the security of Turkish Cypriots, by publishing negative news stories (i.e., Greeks want no agreement, they own deadly weapons) about Greek Cypriots.

In this chapter, I analysed the narratives of the respondents about the news stories that were published in Kıbrıs (supporting the Annan Plan) and Volkan (rejecting the Annan Plan) newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings. Depending on the political discourse of Kıbrıs newspaper, the ‘past’ with Greek Cypriots was represented as a period of time that is longed for and the opening of the crossings as a way back to the past. Kıbrıs newspaper supports the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that is based on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their common life; it therefore publishes news stories that are about the commonalities and friendships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots following the opening of the crossings. I also examined how news stories mobilize meaning that reinforces the putative similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The emphasis of the respondents on these similarities operates as strategies of ‘inclusion and assimilation’ and constructs their identities as (turkish) Cypriots. On the other hand, the same news stories also mobilize alternative memories based on the differences (i.e., language, feelings, personal attitudes) between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The respondents’ focus on the differences functions as the strategy of exclusion that constructs the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is articulated through the exclusion of Greek Cypriots.

In contrast, Volkan newspaper supports the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. In the Volkan news story there are six photographs, together with interpretations of them. The news story is in general about the ruined commemorative locations (i.e., the monument of Atatürk, the Turkish martyrs’ cemetery) by the Greek Cypriots. The interpretations of the photographs function as a single body in the representation of Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’. Although most of the respondents’ interpretations parallel the political discourse of the newspaper, the news story also mobilizes counter memories (i.e., similar attitudes of Turkish and Greek Cypriots). Emphasis on the unifying common features is a part of the strategies of unification that function to construct the (turkish) Cypriot identity which focuses on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

This chapter also focuses on the political ideas of the respondents. Their knowledge of the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the European Union is mostly
articulated by the media. However, their memories about the ‘past’ and the ‘others’ play a crucial role in their interpretations of ‘information’ about the Annan Plan and the EU. There are opposing interpretations regarding the provisions of the Annan Plan; however, the respondents’ interpretations of its provisions, which include the issues on security, land and properties, administration and the relationship with the European Union, are based on their abstract knowledge of the Plan. According to the opponents of the Annan Plan, the arrangements in the plan might cause danger/threat (i.e., reduction of the Turkish soldiers on the island) and loss of land and properties, minority rights and inequality. These respondents interpret the European Union as anti-democratic and discriminatory; in their narratives, the strategies of justification function to justify the status quo (i.e., the Turkish rule and division of the island) that operates to maintain the Turkish (cypriot) identity which locates or identifies Greek Cypriots as eternal threats. They are against the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, as they believe that in the event of participation, Greek Cypriots will pose a threat to their life standards, land and properties, and political rights, as was the case in the 1960s when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together. In the narratives of these respondents, the strategies of dissimilation function through emphasis on heterogeneity and religious differences between Greeks/the EU and Turks. Their memories about the ‘others’ sustain their political ideas about the EU; hence according to these opponents of the Plan, the EU will support the Greek Cypriots in every situation because of their common religion. These threatening scenarios that are based on the external threat (Greek Cypriots and Europe) function to maintain the status quo. The respondents’ comments reveal the traces of the official history (i.e., the argument of motherland/babyland, the discourse about the Republic of Cyprus) in their interpretations of the Annan Plan.

On the other hand, the supporters of the Annan Plan believe that it will bring safety/protection, human rights and equality; Turkish Cypriots will also regain their lost land and properties after the unification of the island. According to these respondents, the European Union is democratic and impartial; they see the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the European Union as a way of saving themselves from the unjust Turkish rule on the island. Their emphasis on a necessary difference between then and now functions as a strategy of transformation from Turkish (cypriot) identity into the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the common life of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU. The Annan Plan can be seen as a nodal point around which a variety of interpretations can be produced. The Plan, which proposes a possible participation of
Northern Cyprus in the European Union after a solution of the Cyprus problem, is mainly about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus; however, the expectations of the respondents from the future are highly dependent on their memories of the ‘past’ and their conception of the ‘other’.

In the last part of this chapter, I examined how the mechanisms enter into the daily lives of individuals through social practices and media events and thus are embedded in the respondents’ behaviours. The military salute, raising the flag, singing the national anthem, a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the monuments and celebrating the national days, are the social practices that are physically and/or emotionally practiced by the respondents. These social practices recall the ‘past’ that is articulated by the ruling groups. This chapter has also considered the intertextual relationship amongst the mechanisms of memory. Most of the time, the mechanisms function as a single body in the construction of discourses on national identity. The different forms of mechanisms (i.e., the monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, national days, history textbooks) are intertwined with each other and work to inculcate, by repetition, norms of behaviour that imply continuity with the constructed past. Furthermore, the media carry the official mechanisms (i.e., the national anthem, national days) into the homes and everyday lives of people. Most of the time the media events (celebration of national days, commemoration of the martyrs) provide social integration by mobilizing emotions such as happiness, pride, sorrow and excitement. Thus the media, as one of the mechanisms, can sustain the dominant discourse. Media as part of our daily lives provide the opportunity to follow events that we might not normally be able to pursue.

Although the mechanisms are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of the dominant public memory, they do not always provide a total fixity in the memories of the individuals. Memories are constantly articulated through the discourses constructed in power relations; the respondents’ memories thus resemble a battlefield of different discourses. However, individuals generally prevent antagonisms by ignoring alternative memories (i.e., negative feelings such as hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots). These alternative memories function like a surplus and threaten the partial fixity of the respondents’ memories about the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, there are many respondents who naturalize and legitimize their memories through mythologizing the past. In the mythologized past, Greeks/Greek Cypriots are transformed into ‘mythical beasts’ and Turks into ‘heroes’; Greeks/Greek Cypriots are narrated as tyrannical,
merciless, cowardly, treacherous, unjust, oppressive and selfish; while Turks/Turkish Cypriots are narrated as powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective. This situation functions to naturalize the feelings of hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots. At the end of this chapter, I examined the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions that carry the features of myths in the narratives of the respondents.
CHAPTER 7: ARTICULATION OF PUBLIC AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF THE ANNAN PLAN

7.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I examined how the mechanisms of memory (history textbooks, commemorations, symbols of tradition and media) mobilize, articulate and construct memories in relation to national identity in changing power relations. Although the mechanisms of memory play a crucial role in the articulation of memories, there have always been oppositional, alternative and conflicting public and autobiographical memories. In the present chapter, my focus is on the complex functioning of the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories in the articulation of political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. In the examination of memories, I use intertextual analysis to show how dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories are simultaneously drawn upon and combined together.

In the Denktaş-UBP period, the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism constructed through narratives that emphasize the sameness between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, this situation changed when a new government came to power in 2003. The new government highlighted a (turkish) Cypriot nationalism based on the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and identifying Turks as different from Turkish Cypriots. The politics of the new government regarding the identity issue was in line with their European Unionist discourse supporting the participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots together in the European Union after a solution to the Cyprus problem. Thus the identity of the residents of Northern Cyprus has been the crossing-point between the logic of equivalence and difference between Greek Cypriots and Turks, especially following the presentation of the Annan Plan. This chapter examines the constant articulation of memories in relation to identity as crossing points between the logics of inclusion and exclusion that sometimes identifies Turks and sometimes Greek Cypriots as ‘others’ in this period.

In Section One, on “the search for ‘fixity’ in relation to identity after the presentation of the Annan Plan”, I examine the articulation of memories in historical,
political and cultural contexts that are shaped in power relations following the presentation of the Annan Plan. Section Two, on ‘identity/otherness: commonalities and differences’, examines how the self-other relationships are articulated in the narratives of the respondents. In the final section of the chapter, on ‘dominant/public memories as autobiographical memories and vice versa’, I explore the interrelationships, parallels and differences between public and autobiographical memories.

7.2 Section one: The search for ‘fixity’ in relation to identity after the presentation of the Annan Plan

As shown in Chapter Five, from the division of the island in 1974 until 2003, constructive strategies were used by the ruling group to construct a Turkish (cypriot) identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots, as well as differentiation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots through the official mechanisms of memory. Although the dominant public memory (1974-2003) is highly influential in the memories of the respondents, there were always alternative narratives and contested pasts in Turkish Cypriot society during the Denktaş-UBP period. The political, social and economic problems in Northern Cyprus were attributed to the role of Turkey, and thus to Turks in Northern Cyprus for a long period of time by the alternative public narratives. The participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union was conceived as the only remedy for these problems.

The formation of political, cultural and societal conditions, such as the changing of the ruling group, and finally the proposal of the Annan Plan in 2002, led to the articulation of the discourses of ‘friendship’ (between Greek and Turkish Cypriots), ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘peace’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. After the opening of the crossings in 2003, Greek and Turkish Cypriots had the opportunity to communicate with each other for the first time since 1974. These present political and cultural circumstances have also created new dynamics for the re-articulation and re-evaluation of memories in relation to identity. After the opening of the crossings, most of the Turkish Cypriots crossed the borders for the first time since 1974 and embraced the ‘Others’ enthusiastically. It was interesting to see some Turkish Cypriots in the streets trying to communicate with each other compassionately, thinking that they were Greek Cypriots (Erhürman 2008).
As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:33) note, the strategies of transformation are often affected by applying subtle rhetorical persuasion. The atmosphere that was created after the presentation of the Annan Plan through the discourses of the new government was related to subtle rhetorical persuasion. In this context, suitable political and cultural conditions were created for the transformation of the dominant identity, which was Turkish (cypriot) identity, into a (turkish) Cypriot identity constructed through emphasis on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, in the referendums the majority of the Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ and the majority of the Greek Cypriots said ‘no’. Most Turkish Cypriots evaluated this political and cultural development as disappointing. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots, who had begun to talk about the good relationship and friendship of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the past and at present after the opening of the crossings, changed their positive views about the Greek Cypriots: many respondents evaluated the result of the referendum with comments such as “Greeks were untrustworthy, as in the ‘past’, they did what they were expected to do again…; the ‘past’ shed light on the present and thus, the sole friend of a Turk is a Turk”. This situation shows how the memories of most of the Turkish Cypriots are re-articulated and renegotiated depending on a variety of cultural and political circumstances.

These new conditions have created a time of uncertainty regarding the identities of Turkish Cypriots; hence it is important to consider the inconsistencies, ambiguities and complexities about memories in relation to identity that emerged within these conditions. This does not mean that all Turkish Cypriots are in the same position; the memories of some seem consistent about their identity and thus, about the ‘others’. However, it is interesting to examine how most of the Turkish Cypriot respondents have suffered, and thus struggled, to re-construct and partially fix their memories following the 2004 referenda over the Annan Plan. Uncertainty about the Cyprus problem has caused some of the Turkish Cypriots’ memory to move back and re-adhere to the discourses about Greek Cypriots that were once anchored by the narratives of the dominant public memory during the 1974-2003 period.

Although the memories of the respondents are constantly articulated and re-constructed, this does not mean that memories completely renew themselves through permanent articulation. Articulation does not function like the delete button of a computer and it is not about the complete transformation of memories; it points to the dynamism of
memories that are re-evaluated and reinterpreted in new political, historical and cultural contexts that are shaped in power relations. This re-evaluation could happen through the memory’s movement forward or backward. For example, when I say “I made a mistake by thinking like that…” , this statement shows that what I thought in the ‘past’ was wrong. The statement points to the fact that, what I thought before was exactly the opposite of what I am thinking now, at present. However, this statement looks like a fact to me only in the conditions of the present. In other words, I have evaluated the past in today’s conditions; and the past is articulated in the present.

In this respect, the most important question that should be asked after the referenda is this: were some of the Turkish Cypriots, those who interpret the ‘past’ with Greek Cypriots in a negative manner, thinking in the same way when they embraced the Greek Cypriots after the opening of the crossings, and when they said ‘yes’ to the Annan Plan? Clearly they were not. In the enthusiastic period after the presentation of the Annan Plan, most Turkish Cypriots forgot or chose not to remember some of the memories of the ‘past’ that were constructed during the Denktaş-UBP period. These forgotten memories provided them with the possibility of re-constructing the ‘past’ in present political and cultural conditions. ‘What we forget is as crucial as what we remember’ (Samuel 1994: x); forgetting and remembering are formed in antagonistic relations and they give us the power to transform, reproduce or change.

The thin line between what we remember and forget is formed in our selective memories and this makes our memories mysterious: the path to solving the mystery of the memories of Turkish Cypriots begins with understanding the enthusiastic period that was lived after the presentation of the Annan Plan. It should be noted here that this period could not be lived with the memories of the ‘past’ that was constructed with hostility, war and sorrow. As noted in Chapter One, memories are constantly re-articulated and re-constructed in power relations; and so our experiences and interpretations, which are formed according to our memories, are also changing. It is therefore critical for us to recognise the games that our memories play on us, or the games that are played on our memories, in order to be aware of how conditions are constructed for the fantasies that cause respondents to see Greek Cypriots sometimes as ‘enemies’ and sometimes as the best ‘friends’.
7.3 Section two: Identity/Otherness: Commonalities and differences

In this section, I adopt Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas in the ‘discursive construction of national identity’ (1999:30-31) in order to examine how the Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot identity are constructed in the narratives of the respondents. As pointed out in Chapter Three, these authors specified the thematic areas as the linguistic construction of a common political past, present, future and a common culture (ibid:30). In this context, I explore the commonalities and differences between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots; and Turkish Cypriots and Turks in the narrations of the respondents, by focusing on stereotypes of Greek Cypriots and Turks and major thematic areas, including the linguistic constructions of unshared/common past, present and future; and unshared/common culture that are necessary in the discursive articulation of identity.

Most of the time, the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus are articulated according to their memories of the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots/Turks). Thus, in this section, I consider the concepts of ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ and ‘Turk’ as master signifiers that gather free-floating elements/signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence. Statements related to the major thematic areas and stereotypes are explored as elements that operate in the organization of most of the respondents’ memories in relation to their identity; these elements (statements) fulfill the primary role in the construction of identities. They are formed through the complex relationship amongst dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories that are constructed in power relations; and they struggle to construct the master signifiers with a particular content.

Different statements by the respondents function as floating signifiers in their memories. In the sections below on “Turks as ‘us’ and ‘them’ ”, “Greek Cypriots as ‘us’ and ‘them’ ” and “ ‘Greek Cypriots/Turks as ‘us’ and/or ‘them’ ”, I explore some of the floating signifiers that are related to the unshared/common past, present, future and culture in parallel with the characteristics (stereotypes) attributed to Greek Cypriots and Turks. The statements have been selected because they represent the major themes in the discursive articulation of identity.

The positive and negative characteristics attributed to ‘Greek Cypriots’ and ‘Turks’ by the respondents are parallel to their conceptions of an unshared/common past, present, future and culture with them. I explore the negative stereotypes attributed to
Greek Cypriots as follows: untrustworthy, utilitarian, barbarian, selfish and treacherous; and the positive stereotypes as follows: Cypriots, friends, and siblings. On the other hand, the negative stereotypes attributed to ‘Turks’ are: dangerous, thief, murderer, savage, uneducated, crude; while the positive stereotypes are: saviour, defender, blood relative, and sibling. As Demeter (2007:133) argues, “Stereotypes by their nature – not needing to be based on facts, but on elements of perception and prejudice”. Although the respondents sometimes do not explicitly use these particular terms, they imply them in their narratives.

7.3.1 Turks as ‘us’ and ‘them’

In this part, my aim is to show how Turks that came from Turkey are articulated as ‘us’ or ‘them’ through the narratives of the respondents about an unshared/common past, present, future and culture. The respondents’ conception of Turks provides clues as to how they locate themselves in terms of identity. Statements of the respondents were mainly obtained in response to the questions regarding what they thought about the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” and about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974. They were also asked about their expectations from the future and their ideas about the division and unification of the island.

7.3.1.1 Unshared/common past, present, future and culture

7.3.1.1.1 Unshared/common past (myths of origin, political successes, defeats and crisis, times of prosperity and stability)

7.3.1.1.1.1 Common Origin

As stated in Chapter Two, race is generally represented as one of the natural factors in the formation of a national identity by the official discourse. Most of the Turkish Cypriots believe in the common origin of Turks and Turkish Cypriots; they emphasize the racial sameness between them. The emphasis on the sameness of Turkish Cypriots and Turks functions as a strategy in the construction of the Turkish (cypriot) identity:

We have common blood. In the end, we all are of Ottoman descent\textsuperscript{265} (Ayşe, female, aged 31, university instructor).

\textsuperscript{265} In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Kyrenia American University, 28/07/2007
We are the Turks who came here after the Ottomans conquered this island\textsuperscript{266} (Meltem, female, aged 22, housewife).

On the other hand, some respondents reject this idea and talk about a racial similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; they emphasize the commonalities between them. These alternative narratives oppose the official discourse that was produced during the Denktas-UBP period:

\begin{itemize}
  \item I do not believe that the Ottomans were our [Turkish Cypriots’] ancestors. I believe that the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the result of a more cosmopolitan structure\textsuperscript{267} (İsmet, aged 47, TV programmer).
  
  \item I read in a newspaper that the DNA of Greeks is the closest DNA to ours. In this case, maybe the races of Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the same\textsuperscript{268} (Sertan, male, aged 22, shop owner).
\end{itemize}

In these responses the racial similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is emphasized. Sertan, for example, supports his idea about the racial similarity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by citing a news story as a kind of evidence. According to this news story, the DNA of Turkish and Greek Cypriots is same. İsmet claims that Turkish and Greek Cypriots are the product of a more cosmopolitan structure. In this way, Sertan and İsmet highlight the homogeneity of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in their narratives. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart note (1999:33), ‘emphasis on similarity and homogeneity functions as a constructive strategy’. The respondents’ emphasis on the homogeneity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots functions to construct a (turkish) Cypriot identity that highlights the commonalities between the two groups. On the other hand, when İsmet says ‘I do not believe that the Ottomans were our (Turkish Cypriots) ancestors’, he is pointing to the racial dissimilarities between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The respondents’ emphasis on racial dissimilarities functions as the ‘strategy of dissimilation that aims to create difference and heterogeneity’ (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:33) between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In these cases, the strategies of similarity and difference function together in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity that identifies Turks as the ‘others’ who are different from the Turkish Cypriots.

\textsuperscript{266} In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: Domestic parlour, 31/07/2007
\textsuperscript{267} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007
\textsuperscript{268} In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007
7.3.1.1.2 Turks: Saviours /Occupiers

As was indicated in Chapter Five, although some of the respondents evaluate Turks as saviours, some interpret them as occupiers. The respondents who interpret ‘Turks’ as saviours generally evaluate the Cyprus war as a crisis that was overcome together with their ‘motherland’ Turkey, and thus with Turks in 1974. Here ‘the shared sorrows function as a strategy’ (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:38) in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the argument of the motherland. According to the formal discourse (1974-2003), Turks are the heroes and saviours, as they implemented the “20th July 1974 Happy Peace Operation” and saved the Turkish Cypriots. Similarly to the discourse of the ruling group during 1974-2003, most of the interviewees interpret 20th July 1974 as the day of salvation of the Turkish Cypriots from Greek ‘cruelty’ by their saviours, the Turks; the motherland Turkey brought peace to the island:

They have come and saved our lives. That’s why we are at ease\(^{269}\) (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).

In the period 1963-1974, the motherland Turkey always backed us. So we thought that the Greeks couldn’t give us any harm. The Greeks would play on their radio the song ‘bekledim de gelmedin’ [I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn up\(^{270}\)], which was broadcast in Turkish. On the other hand, the Turkish radio channels would air the song ‘ansızın bir gece gelebilirim’ [I may come one night without prior notice\(^{271}\)]. We always believed that Turkey would come one day and save us from the Greek oppression\(^{272}\) (Kemal, male, aged 51, tyre dealer expert).

Turkey brought peace and quiet here. If the Turkish soldiers hadn’t landed, Greek soldiers would have landed on the island. This was published in the newspapers\(^{273}\) (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

I view 20\(^{th}\) July as the day of salvation from Greek tyranny\(^{274}\) (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

\(^{269}\) In -depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007

\(^{270}\) ‘I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn up’ is a Turkish love song. The first lyrics of the song are as follows, “I waited for you in passion but you didn’t turn up. Didn’t you ever love me? You didn’t wipe away my tears. Tell me! Tell me! Didn’t you ever love me?”

\(^{271}\) ‘Don’t you call me so warm-heartedly’ is a Turkish love song. The song goes as follows: “Don’t you call me so warm-heartedly; I may come one night without prior notice, If you miss me, if you haven’t fallen asleep, I may die of joy at your doorstep.”

\(^{272}\) In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour , 21/9/2007

\(^{273}\) In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007

\(^{274}\) In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
Thank God that they arrived, otherwise that would have been the end of the Turks here. Maybe we would still be living, but not as Turks: as Greeks, and we would be speaking Greek. In other words, I am glad that the Turks arrived here because Turkey saved us and encouraged our people by increasing our population\textsuperscript{275} (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).

We, the Turkish Cypriots, escaped a great slaughter as a result of the arrival of Turkey\textsuperscript{276} (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor).

If Turkey hadn’t arrived on 20\textsuperscript{th} July, all the Turks here would have been slaughtered. For example, in Paphos, there were lots of ditches dug and men who had been slaughtered were buried there. The Greeks opened fire on our youth and people. Murataga and Sandallar are the foremost examples of massacres\textsuperscript{277} (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).

However, there are also respondents who alternatively interpret the “20 July 1974 Happy Peace Operation” as an occupation that was realized by the outsiders, the Turks. The respondents’ conception of Turks as outsiders points to the national differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots:

- Sometimes it is more difficult to save people from their saviours\textsuperscript{278} (Berk, male, aged 27, instructor).
- My grandfather always keeps saying that it is more difficult to save us from our saviours\textsuperscript{279} (Ayten, female, aged 23, student)
- Turkey came here in 1974 and she is still here; that is the indication that she has occupied this place\textsuperscript{280} (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife)

These responses show how the respondents exclude the Turks by labelling them as ‘occupiers’ who have a different culture and national identity from the Turkish Cypriots’. The emphasis on national differences functions as a strategy for dismantling (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:42) the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the national sameness and common past of Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

\textsuperscript{275}In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007
\textsuperscript{276}In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
\textsuperscript{277}In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
\textsuperscript{278}In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
\textsuperscript{279}In- depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 3/09/2007
\textsuperscript{280}In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic labour, 25/07/2007
7.3.1.1.2 Unshared/common present (citizenship, political achievements, current and future political problems, crisis and dangers)

7.3.1.1.1 Turks: Turkish Citizens (insiders) /Aliens (outsiders)

As noted in Chapter Four, during the Denktaş-UBP period, many Turks migrated to the island from Turkey. In order to encourage the migration, the government provided them with land and properties; the aim was to increase the numbers of the Turkish population on the island. Furthermore, with a law passed at the beginning of 1990s, Turkish people had the opportunity to come to Northern Cyprus using only their identity cards. Some of the respondents who consider themselves as part of the Turkish nation evaluate Turkish people that came from Turkey as ‘citizens’ that live in Northern Cyprus. For these respondents, the migration of Turks is a positive decision and a political achievement on the way to increasing the numbers of the Turkish population and developing the nation using Turkish productive power. According to them, this situation supports the national body. These respondents evaluate Turks as insiders; and the emphasis on positive political continuity is one of the strategies of inclusion and continuation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:37) that functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity:

Turks have reconstructed the state in many fields. If it weren’t for our Turkish citizens who came from the mainland Turkey, all sectors would collapse. For example, the construction sector would collapse\textsuperscript{281} (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).

If it weren’t for the Turkish citizens’ support, especially technical support, we would be facing a lot of difficulties\textsuperscript{282} (Aydın, male, aged 80, retired counsellor).

On the other hand, some respondents interpret Turks who live in Northern Cyprus as ‘aliens’ belonging to a foreign country (Turkey) but living in Northern Cyprus. According to them, Turks coming from Turkey are taking jobs and work opportunities away from the Turkish Cypriots. These respondents intensely criticise the politics of the 1974-2003 government which encouraged the immigration of Turks to the island. For them, Turks have benefited from unequal opportunities and prestige just because they immigrated to the island; with the immigration of Turks, Turkish Cypriots have become second-class citizens in their ‘own’ country:

\textsuperscript{281} In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20/07/2007
\textsuperscript{282} In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
I don’t believe that they like us very much. By coming here, they gained an undeserved prestige. They think a lot of themselves. They say they saved us and that if they hadn’t been here, we wouldn’t have been alive. In Cyprus, in practice, they have more rights than we do. As if they own Cyprus themselves. (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

The immigration of Turks from Turkey is more than you can estimate. I see this from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots as disadvantageous, because they have usurped our rights of employment. Since their arrival, Turkish Cypriots have been treated as second-class citizens (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

I feel that I have to share my bread and my opportunities with Turks that came from Turkey. I mean we are in a kind of competition with them. When we look at the managerial positions we see that they are all Turks. They are in the decision-making mechanisms. (Selen, female, aged 29, TV presenter)

These responses indicate how the respondents situate Turks as aliens and outsiders who have come to the island and become a problem for Turkish Cypriots. They do not see Turks as part of the ‘national body’ as the previous interviewees do. The respondents’ division of the population into ‘we’ and ‘Turks’ indicates how they conceive their identity as different from Turkish identity. Their complaints about the present situation function as a strategy for the transformation of Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart 1999:40 note, the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future function as a strategy for the transformation of a well established identity into another identity.

7.3.1.1.3 Unshared/common Future (current and future political problems, future political objectives, political virtues)

7.3.1.1.3.1 Unification/Separation

Some respondents support the idea that Turkish Cypriots are part of the Turkish nation and that therefore it is necessary for them to live under their state with the support of the ‘motherland’ Turkey; they evaluate the constant support of Turkey as essential for the security of the Turkish Cypriots on the island, and therefore support the status quo. The respondents’ emphasis on positive political continuity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots and their protection from a possible threat from Greek Cypriots function as strategies of ‘continuation and defence’ that operate to perpetuate the dominance of the

283 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007
284 In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
285 In-depth interview, Gönülçel: domestic parlour, 15/08/2007
Turkish (cypriot) identity that is sustained through negative narratives about the others (Greek Cypriots). These respondents therefore do not support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union after the solution of the Cyprus problem:

In my view, the island should stay divided, because we have peace. Our soldiers are nearby. When we go to bed, we lie in bed in peace \(^{286}\) (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

For me the island is not divided now. We live in our homeland with the support of our motherland Turkey. It is better for things to stay as they are. This is similar to living in peace, quiet and in unity with people who look like one another in their own boroughs in a big city \(^{287}\) (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).

Some of the respondents conceive Greek Cypriots as “Cypriots” and thus, their different conception of identity plays an important role in their imagination of a common future with Greek Cypriots on the island. These respondents also emphasize the necessity of political, cultural and economic independence of Turkish Cypriots from Turks, and thus, in the future, from Turkey:

I think what we need to do in future is to break our sick connection with Turkey in every aspect and find a way to live with Greek Cypriots on our island, as we are Cypriots and this island is ours \(^{288}\) (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).

I think the best solution is federation with Greek Cypriots. We can’t live dependent on Turkey forever. The discourse of motherland and babyland should be history. What I mean is that the baby is now an adult! (Laugh) \(^{289}\) (Fide, female, aged 26, business chair of the milk industry).

Interpretations such as “we are Cypriots”, “this island is ours” and “the discourse of motherland and babyland should be history” show how the respondents place Turks outside the system of convention to which (turkish) Cypriots belong. These responses also provide crucial clues about the future expectations of the respondents. Their desire to be independent from Turkey functions as a transformative strategy that aims to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. In Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart’s (1999:40) terms, the respondents’ emphasis on the ‘necessity of autonomy and independence functions as a transformative strategy’.

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\(^{286}\) In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007  
\(^{287}\) In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007  
\(^{288}\) In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007  
\(^{289}\) In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007
7.3.1.4 Unshared/common culture (language, religion, everyday culture such as eating and drinking habits and clothing)

7.3.1.4.1 Migrants/settlers

This part considers interpretations of the respondents obtained from their responses to questions about their ideas of Turks. Most of the respondents evaluate Turks as the ‘others’ and thus, as different from Turkish Cypriots. Most of the time, they emphasize the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks by classifying Turks as either ‘migrants’ or ‘settlers’. They define the migrants as the Turks who came from Turkey after the 1990s under the new rule, using only their identity cards; migrants may stay for short or long periods of time depending on their job arrangements in Northern Cyprus. On the other hand, settlers are the Turks who came to the island from Turkey after 1974 and have since raised their families in Northern Cyprus. According to some of the respondents, settlers who came to the island after 1974 harmonized better with Turkish Cypriot society than the migrants who came after the 1990s. The respondents thus see more similarities between themselves and settlers than between themselves and migrants. They generally emphasize cultural similarities such as language, lifestyles, eating habits and clothing. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents believe that migrants are the ones who have ruined the peace in Northern Cyprus; they are dangerous as they kill and assault people, and they are responsible for the increase in the number of burglaries in Northern Cyprus; they are described as completely different from Turkish Cypriots in their lifestyles and traditions. All the respondents got their information about the incidents of robberies and rapes from the national newspapers; thus, as was pointed out earlier, media play a primary role in the construction of Turks as ‘others’ by giving present information about them:

Alp: One can say the first comers [settlers] were systematically forced to immigrate here from various regions of Anatolia through an organised programme, This, in fact, was done to preserve the Turkish identity. Up to a certain point they had to do this, because at that time a large number of Turkish Cypriots had emigrated from the island.

Interviewer: What do you think about the ones who came after the 1990s?

290 In events such as robbery, killing and rape most of the national newspapers emphasize that it is Turks that came from Turkey who did the crimes. But the newspapers never emphasize it when Turkish Cypriots commit a crime.
Alp: [laughs]...the latecomers [migrants] – we see them in the newspapers every day anyway... the late comers are dissimilar... culturally the latecomers are different. For example, my brother-in-law is from Turkey but you cannot tell that he is. There is a famous Cypriot dish called Colocas, for instance. My brother-in-law loves it a lot [laughs]...you cannot tell that he comes from Turkey, either from his accent or clothing. Most of the time, he speaks like a Cypriot with his Turkish Cypriot friends. So nobody can tell that he is from Turkey291 (male, aged 29, male optician).

After 1974, Turkish people had to come to the island because the Turkish Cypriot society needed a new workforce and human resources. People who came after 1974 have already become Cypriots. They have been living here for 30 years. Their children were born here. However, because of misguided politics, later everyone was allowed to enter the TRNC, and as a result of this, there are a lot of murderers and thieves in the country. They couldn’t adapt here. People who couldn’t manage to make a living in their own countries came here292 (Tezcan, male, aged 30, tourism employee).

Those who came in 1974 are closer to us culturally and socially. Their way of life and clothes... the ones after 1995 have been rather problematic. They have a completely different culture. Some who are involved in theft or narcotics...in short, a number of people have come here who make Turkish Cypriots uncomfortable293 (Fide, female, aged 26, business chair of the milk industry).

There is a considerable difference between those that came just after 1974 [settlers] and the ones that have come recently [migrants]. The ones that came earlier were trustworthy. Those people you could call Turks. For example, a family who was from Istanbul and was born and brought up there. Who had good manners and who did not sabotage the peace and public order... we would sleep with our doors or windows open for many years, until the end of 1980’s. Our close friends were from Turkey. You wouldn’t bother to stress that you were Cypriot or Turkish. Because you knew everyone’s families. The ones who have come recently are nonentities. We have no peace or quiet294 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

Those who arrived after 1974 [settlers] are completely Cypriot. I have friends who can speak with a Cypriot accent better than I do. They never speak with the Turkish accent. They live and speak as we do. They benefit from whatever facilities we have. There are great differences between those who came soon after 1974 and those who have come recently [migrants]. Among the newcomers there are thieves, robbers or murderers. Illiterate people have come here. You cannot tell who they are; a Turk, a Kurd or an Arab295 (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).

291 In- depth interview, Kermiya , 01/09/2007
292 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: office, 7/08/2007
293 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007
294 In- depth interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
295 In- depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007
There are also respondents who do not distinguish between Turks as migrants from Turks as settlers; they strongly criticise the immigration of Turks to Northern Cyprus, as they evaluate them as being culturally different from Turkish Cypriots. These differences are interpreted in negative terms:

They [Turks] are completely different from us. They are uneducated and rude. They have different life styles and traditions.

We have nothing in common. Not in any subject. Neither in culture, nor in world views, nor in way of life nor further, in terms of customs or mores.

Culturally we have a lot of dissimilarities. Differences with regard to accent, clothing, way of life or communal views.

They are very different from us. Culturally, socially and in many other ways, they are very different. They have even altered some of our customs and mores. This is not good. We have started to do things we never did before. For example, in terms of shopping; we had the ‘arşın’ [a former unit of length], and it converted to a ‘metre’. After 1974, these changes started and they have spoiled the Turkish Cypriot culture. Measurement is a culture, shopping is a culture.

In my view, bringing the Turkish migrants here was the biggest wrongdoing committed towards the Turkish Cypriots. Because every Turk is not the same. Every man has his own culture as a result of the place he lives in. Our roots may be the same but I don’t believe that every Turk can live together with others harmoniously. For example, when I went and looked at the old city within the walls of Nicosia, I witnessed a dreadful scene. There were a lot of Turkish migrants. I felt like an outsider. As if they are the hosts and we are the guests. .. There is a serious cultural gap and lack of mutual confidence among us. We used to be able to sleep with our doors and windows open before the year 1974.

Before they [Turkish people] came, the island was more peaceful and safer to live in. We were living in peace. In the past, there wasn’t this cultural alienation. When we were on the street, the people around were similar to us. They were speaking, thinking and living like us, but now it is different. People from Turkey are different from us with their accent, clothing, and lifestyles and culture. The opposite to Turkish Cypriots, they aren’t cool and relaxed and they can’t harmonize with the place they live in. They don’t try to improve or change themselves in harmony with the environment they are living in. Because of this,

296 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
297 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRT, 23 September 2007
298 In-depth interview, Girne: Office room, 28/07/2007
299 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
300 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23/09/2007
Turkish Cypriots feel alienated in their homeland because the majority of people are from a different culture. We don’t feel like foreigners but we feel like a minority in our homeland301 (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher).

In these interpretations, the respondents locate Turks as the ‘others’ who are completely different from the Turkish Cypriots. Their comments — such as they (Turks) are uneducated, rude, opposite to Turkish Cypriots, they are not cool and relaxed and they have different lifestyles, traditions, accent, customs, mores, and clothing — function to exclude Turks as inferior compared to Turkish Cypriots. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38) point out, ‘exclusion is one of the constructive strategies’. The respondents’ exclusion of Turks plays a crucial role in the construction of (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. There are also many respondents who support the idea that before Turks came to Cyprus, the island was a safer place; in this way, they imply that Turks are dangerous and savage.

7.3.2 Greek Cypriots as ‘us’ and ‘them’

This part examines answers of the respondents in the 40-80 age group when asked if they had any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots; and the answers of the 20-33 age group when asked what they knew about life with the Greek Cypriots. There are also responses to general questions about their feelings about the Greek Cypriots and whether they thought they could be partners, sharing the same island/homeland with Turkish Cypriots. Additional questions were asked regarding whether things were better or worse before the division of the island, what they knew about the period before 1974, how they knew this, and how they got information about the Greek Cypriots and about what was happening in the South (see Appendix 1).

301 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007
7.3.2.1 Unshared/common past, present, future and culture

7.3.2.1.1 Unshared/common past (times of prosperity and stability, defeats and crisis)

7.3.2.1.1.1 Past: Peace with Friends/Conflict with Enemies

The respondents’ conceptions of Greek Cypriots are examined under the heading of ‘past: peace with friends/conflict with enemies’. Some respondents believe that Greek and Turkish Cypriots shared a common past together in good relationships, as friends. However, some reject this idea, as they see Greek and Turkish Cypriots as eternal enemies. The public narratives (primarily the narratives of the families, close environment, history textbooks and media) play a crucial role in the formation of social antagonisms that functions to divide Turkish and Greek Cypriots into two antagonistic poles, as enemies and friends.

Most of the respondents who conceive Greek Cypriots as enemies narrate the past by focussing on the 1963-1974 events as they appear in the history textbooks that were used for education in Denktash-UBP period. Similarly to the history textbooks, these interviewees talked about the negative attitude of Greeks towards the Turkish Cypriots’ rights, and the inequalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the history textbook of that period, in 1963 Greek Cypriots ruined the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and usurped all the rights of Turkish Cypriots; accordingly, the serious disagreements between Turkish and Greek Cypriots started on that date. The media function to mobilize meaning that sustains the constructed past in the memories of the respondents by providing present information about the Greek Cypriots:

I remember that we could never live together with them, and that they have always viewed us as an enemy. The Greeks have a notorious plan called the Akritas plan302 and they still follow that plan. You know what is written in their coffee houses? I myself haven’t witnessed it, but read it in the newspapers. And it is still kept, written on the walls: “Turks and Dogs cannot enter”; “the best Turk is a dead Turk”. Having learned this, it is next to impossible for us to live with them303 (Esra, female, aged 62, retired teacher).

302 According to the official discourse, ‘the main purpose of the Akritas plan, which was first published by a local Greek newspaper on 21st April 1966, was to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus in pre-determined stages and methods, to eliminate the Turkish Cypriot community and to bring about Enosis’ (Uslu 2003:16). The goal of the idea of Enosis is to unite Cyprus with mainland Greece.

303 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic Parlour, 23/07/2007
It is impossible to come to terms with people who see us as a minority, hate and alienate us (Arif, male, aged 86, retired counsellor).

I don’t trust the Greeks. They always put forward their national interests. The reason is that they can’t stand us on this island\textsuperscript{304} (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

Do you know how many people died in the Kaymakli district of Nicosia in the bloody events of 1963? They [Turkish Cypriots] went to the Greek-populated areas claiming that the Greeks were their friends and that they wouldn’t harm them. Some went to feed their hens, some went to buy clothes for the children, or for whatever reason, but they never returned. We don’t want to live such terrible events again; that’s why it is better like this in two distinct areas\textsuperscript{305} (Ülkü, female, aged 56, retired official).

There has been enmity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots since time immemorial\textsuperscript{306} (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).

In my view, they still think that Cyprus belongs to them. I do not trust them\textsuperscript{307} (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).

When Tuna says, “I don’t trust the Greeks. They always put forward their national interests. The reason is that they cannot stand us on this island”; Arif says “it is impossible to come to terms with people who see us as a minority, hate and alienate us”; Esra says, “The Greeks have a notorious plan called the Akritas plan”; and Ülkü asks ironically “Do you know how many people died in the Kaymakli district of Nicosia in the bloody events of 1963?”, one can see the complex functioning of the public narratives mobilizing meaning that articulates Greek Cypriots as a ‘constitutive outside’ which threatens the Turkish (cypriot) identity in the respondents’ memories. However, in the meantime, it is arguably the existence of the ‘constitutive outside’ which constitutes the Turkish (cypriot) identity and the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that functions as a nodal point in the memories of these respondents. The majority of the respondents use the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ in their narratives; as noted in the previous chapter, they may be using the term ‘Greek’ instead of ‘Greek Cypriot’ intentionally in order to emphasize the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

Below are excerpts from the narratives of the respondents who evaluate Greek Cypriots as ‘friends’; these respondents, who talk about the common past and friendship

\textsuperscript{304} In-depth-interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
\textsuperscript{305} In depth-interview, Famagusta, 30/9/2007
\textsuperscript{306} In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
\textsuperscript{307} In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, generally focus on their or their families’ good relationships in the past, and they emphasise the stability and prosperity in the period when Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together:

I heard from my family that they lived well in harmony with Greeks in the 1950s, and as they were neighbours in various places, they spent most of their time together; but starting from the 1960s, the intercommunal relations began to deteriorate and the Greeks acted cruelly and ruthlessly, and tormented Turks without discrimination, whether children or women\(^ {308}\) (Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).

I recall things that my grandmother or elderly people have narrated. I heard from them that they didn’t have any enmity in the 1950s and that they became enemies later on\(^ {309}\) (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman).

When I think about what I know about life with Greek Cypriots, I recall the year 1960 or the period before it. I recall what my father or grandfather has narrated. They lived with the Greeks for longer periods. Most of my grandfather’s friends are Greeks and he has a good command of Greek. I recall that there was no discrimination between the Greeks or Turks. Very close friendships. Living together in prosperity\(^ {310}\)…(Ezgi, male, aged 20, student)

When I was a child, our neighbours were Greeks. When I was five, I had a Greek friend. I have always heard good things about the Greeks. My grandmother had Greek neighbours, and she would take us to them. We loved them. And when we talk about them, we talk of good things about them\(^ {311}\) (Emine, aged 52, female retired official).

Although they narrate their and their families’ private memories that are based on good relationships with Greek Cypriots, these respondents’ narrations about the ‘happier pasts’ are generally over when they talk about the period ‘1963-1974’. As explained in Chapter Four, during 1963-1974 there was an internal war in Cyprus; and this period was subsequently narrated by the official mechanisms of memory that were constructed during the Denktas-UBP period (1974-2003) as the years of intense Greek attacks on Turkish Cypriots. According to the official history, during this period a lot of innocent Turkish Cypriot were killed by Greeks in a barbarous way until the ‘1974 Happy Peace Operation’ was realized by Turkey. Parallel to the official history (1974-2003), the respondents talk about how the Turkish and Greek Cypriots became enemies during this period and how the Greek Cypriots killed Turks; it can be argued that the respondents’

\(^{308}\) In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
\(^{309}\) In-depth interview, Köşkülüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007
\(^{310}\) In-depth interview, Köşkülüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007
\(^{311}\) In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
public memories are more dominant than their and their families’ autobiographical memories about this period.

7.3.2.1.2 Present: No/ Problem

In this part, I consider the respondents’ evaluations of the present political situation. Although some of the respondents talk about the economic, political and social problems in Northern Cyprus as being due to the Cyprus problem and the division of the island, according to other respondents there is no problem in Northern Cyprus; they support the continuation of the present political situation:

Today, as Turkish Cypriots, we are definitely in a better situation. We are living in security under our state with the support of our motherland. So we haven’t got any problems312 (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).

I think there is no problem. If I have my own flag, my own state and my own administration, this means that there is no problem. The problem will arise when these are going to be made null and void. How will this happen?…There are a number of plans for a solution.. Or should I say, so-called peace... For me, peace was brought about in 1974 by the motherland Turkey, and the solution was reached313 (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

We are living in an unrecognized country and we have lots of problems…Economic problems. The problems of isolation from the world, and most importantly, that we as Cypriots [Greek and Turkish] would not be able to live together because of the Cyprus problem314 (Abdullah, male, aged 65, retired teacher).

The opposing strategies of perpetuation and transformation function in the narratives of the respondents above. For example, in Abdullah’s narrative, the strategy of the necessary difference between now and the future functions to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity: thus, when he points to the economic and political problems in Northern Cyprus he implies that there should be a difference between now and the future. His political ideas construct and are constructed by his memories about his memory in relation to (turkish) Cypriot identity; he emphasises the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots by labelling them as ‘Cypriots’ and implying that he supports a possible future with Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, Sevim’s and Tuna’s emphasis

312 In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007
313 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
314 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: Greenhouse cafe, 21/08/2007
on positive political continuity operate as a strategy to perpetuate the status quo, and the unity between Turkish Cypriots and the motherland Turkey. In this way, the respondents sustain the Turkish (cypriot) identity through their narratives.

7.3.2.1.3 Future: Participation in the EU/Division

The respondents’ ideas on an unshared/common future are generally parallel to their evaluations about the present; in this part, I examine the expectations of Turkish Cypriots for the future regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus. The respondents’ expectations are related to how they define themselves in terms of identity and thus, to how they define the others; some interpret the division of the island as necessary for the peace and security of Turkish Cypriots, as they see Greek Cypriots as a threat to their security:

I think keeping the island divided is better, because when we lived with the Greeks we were always in horror. We always had nightmares: if the Greeks came.. or they would probably come... and so forth. I think we are better off now. More secure315 (Sevim, female, aged 70, housewife).

Living away from the Greeks is better. They are always treacherous and utilitarian. We can’t live together. Having experienced so many hard times with the Greeks, I think it is difficult to live together with them316 (Ahmet, male, aged 50, farmer).

On the other hand, some respondents support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, because they believe that this will bring political, economic and social progress. Depending on the social, political and economic contexts, the differential logic that functions to dissolve the existing chains of equivalence between Turkish Cypriots and Turks has become predominant in their memories; the idea of Greek Cypriots as enemies loses its ground, and this situation gives rise to the imagination of a possible future with Greek Cypriots in a united island:

The island should be unified for a solution at the roots between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and for the development of the Turkish Cypriot society317 (Özdemir, male, aged 24, unemployed).

315 In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Belediye Evleri, 30/7/2007
316 In-depth interview, Güzelyurt: domestic parlour, 17 July 2007
317 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007,
I want to join the European Union with the Greek Cypriots and have an identity, reach economic prosperity; to not live with the worries of war, to integrate with the world, to get rid of militaristic structures and pressures. If we don’t join the EU, the uncertainties will continue (Gül, female, aged 54, housewife).

The respondents’ interpretations show their desire for integration with the world, economic prosperity and the unification of the island. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) note, ‘the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future functions as the strategy of dissimilation which is one of the strategies of transformation’. The strategies of transformation function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into a (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the common future of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU.

7.3.2.1.4 Unshared/common culture

There are positive and negative interpretations about Greek Cypriots. Although some respondents emphasise the constructed differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots such as religion and language, others focus on the similarities between them, such as eating habits and lifestyles. Their focus on similarities displaces the differences of religion and language; and in these cases, the differential space is expanded and so the putative differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots lose their importance:

No bad feeling at all about Greek Cypriots. I feel like a Turkish Cypriot. Only our language and religion is different (Nevruz, female, aged 22, female beautician).

My grandfather always told us that in the same village on religious days, either theirs or ours, they would have joint celebrations. Or on New Year’s Eve, they would exchange boiled wheat [gollifa] (Fide, female, aged 26, marketing, statistic and business chair of the milk industry).

Everybody believes in something. One says ‘Allah’ the other says ‘God’. One reads the Bible, the other the Koran. Both have the same content (Eylem, female, aged 22, singer).

You cannot differentiate a Greek Cypriot from a Turkish Cypriot. Their eating habits or way of life is completely similar. But you can tell a Turkish Cypriot from a Turk (Ezgi, male, aged 20, student).

318 In depth-interview, Lefkoşa: Domestic labour, 25/07/2007
319 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
320 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007
321 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007
322 In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 07/10/2007
On the other hand, some respondents focus on differences of religion and language between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. They also attribute negative stereotypes to Greek Cypriots, such as enmity and selfishness:

I got the impression that the Greeks are not sincere towards the Turks. The Orthodox Church has never put aside the Enosis ideal\textsuperscript{323} (Aydın, male, aged 80, counsellor).

The Greek Cypriots are deeply devoted to the church. Each word of the priest is equal to an act of law. Because of the fundamental effect of the church, the friendship relations of the Greeks stay at a minimum level. Disregarding the church factor, there is a nation which has a different language. I can make friends with a Greek on the same conditions as with a Frenchman. Maybe I cannot reach that point of friendship because they feel long-lasting enmity towards us\textsuperscript{324} (Tuna, male, aged 26, student).

I view them as a community that have always practiced ruling others, been favoured and tolerated; and as a greedy community. I consider them a selfish nation devoid of the instinct of sharing\textsuperscript{325} (İsmet, male, aged 47, TV programmer).

In these responses, the strategies of construction function to construct Turkish (cypriot) identity by excluding Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’ who are selfish and insincere and who have a different religion and language. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:33) suggest, emphasis on the differences functions as the strategy of exclusion, one of the constructive strategies.

7.3.3 Greek Cypriots/Turks as us and/or them

In this part of the analysis, I observe the complexities, inconsistencies and ambiguities in the respondents’ memories in relation to identity following the referenda that were held in the Northern and Southern parts of the island. As explained above, the majority of Turkish Cypriots said ‘yes’ in the referendum through their re-evaluation of the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots). However, the results of the referenda created a period of uncertainty regarding the ideas related to the ‘others’, because many Turkish Cypriots hoped to enter the European Union as a community but were unable to do this in the end. Most of them intensely criticised the Greek Cypriots for their decision in the referendum.

\textsuperscript{322} In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007
\textsuperscript{323} In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
\textsuperscript{324} In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Local branch of the Democrat Party: Tourism agency, 26/07/2007
\textsuperscript{325} In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: BRTK, 23 September 2007
There is no consistent time-span for the re-partial fixity in relation to identity to take place; as memories are constantly articulated and negotiated during this period, it is rare to see Greek Cypriots or Turks categorised as solely ‘us’ or ‘them’ in the memory of a particular individual. This is why, in this part of the thesis, I analyse Greek Cypriots and Turks as us and/or them, in order to observe the constant articulation and negotiation of memories in relation to identity through the narratives of the respondents. The inconsistencies in the memories of the respondents do not necessarily reflect the outcome of the referenda voting. What is interesting is to examine the changing self-other relationships in the memories of single social individuals. Thus Mine, a 28-year-old female who said ‘yes’ in the referendum, explains her changing ideas about Greek Cypriots after she started to work as a customs and immigration officer for the United Nations a few months before the opening of the crossings:

Interviewer: What are your feelings about the Greek Cypriots?

Mine: Well… I have been working with them [Greek Cypriots] for four years. Generally, we work together as one Turk and one Greek, or two Turks and one Greek, or two Greeks and one Turk, in 12-hour shifts…and finally I understood that…Before I started to work there, I said ‘yes’ in the referendum. I started to work in 2003. Before I started working, I wanted peace very much. I always thought that we could live together as we were all Cypriots. But after getting the job in the UN, I started to believe that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together without thinking about their national identities, because I also feel like that. For example, when I am working with them, I don’t trust them that much. When I am with a Turk, I know that if there is a deficit s/he will meet the deficit, but when I am working with a Greek I am less comfortable.

Interviewer: Did you see something go wrong?

Mine: Yes. After some things happened, my ideas [about Greek Cypriots] started to change… Actually,… in my family, everybody supports the leftist parties [i.e., supporters of the unification of the island] and they want peace. However, after I started to work in this job, my ideas changed because, as I said before, I saw their different approaches.

Interviewer: Sometimes in work-places there might be problems with Turks as well. Don’t you think that this is a normal situation in a place of employment?

Mine: Of course there are times that problems might occur with Turks as well… In every nation, there is good and bad…But in my place of employment, I feel the separation [between Turks and Greeks]. To put it simply, during the first days of my job, there was a race shown on the television, and I saw that we were divided into two camps as Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as the supporters of the last two runners… I definitely supported the Turk. Maybe it was a kind of instinct. There
were also some things that happened, where I trusted them and then saw that they behaved differently when I turned my back.

Interviewer: What kind of things?

Mine: Little things... Like gestures, laughs... When I am with a Turk, I feel safer. I can take a nap and rest a bit in my shift hours. But when I am with a Greek, I am uncomfortable and worried. I cannot close my eyes as I don't trust them.

Interviewer: Has something bad happened between you and them?

Mine: No. But the stories that I’ve heard about the things that happened to Turkish Cypriots make me feel like that.

Interviewer: Do you think that the island should remain divided or be unified?

Mine: In my view, it is better for each community to have its own administration. Because, even in the working environment, we are divided into Turks or Greeks and we have different opinions. We don’t break away from each other in terms of thought, but in terms of nationality. After having worked with them, my views have changed a lot. In my family, everyone favours us living together, everyone votes for leftists parties; and I used to think that way myself. When you work there, it is completely different. I never thought that one day I would think this way. When I was working at university, I had two assistants, one from Pakistan and the other from China. I never discriminated between people, but here it is rather different. They are a lot more hostile towards us. I have had enough of these things. For example, a Turkish car arrives at the gate, my mother for instance; and my mother speaks neither English nor Greek. She tries hard to communicate with the Greek officer with a few English words that she remembers, and at last she is able to make herself understood. When a Greek man comes, he says: ‘I don’t want to speak English because this is a Greek land’ – but in fact it is a sovereign British base. Merely because I am a Turk, he doesn’t want to help me. And they consistently make us feel this. We, Turks, do our best to help them. Most of the Turks can speak Greek. The youngsters can speak English and communicate this way. In other words, Turks use every means – a few English, Greek or Turkish words or sign language – to make themselves understood. But when the Greek cars arrive, they do their best to create difficulties... “I want to speak Greek, speak Greek to me”... When we were first employed, we all bought Turkish-Greek, Greek-Turkish dictionaries and started to learn Greek. Later we noticed that, after six or seven months, the Greeks had not learned even a word of Turkish. When we went to their offices and they said ‘Galimera’ ['good morning’ in Greek], we said ‘galimera’; but when we absent-mindedly said ‘merhaba’ ['hello' in Turkish] to them, they did not say merhaba in response. Having seen these things, I do believe that we cannot live together with them. Therefore, maybe because of their education, maybe because of their devotion to their religion, or for other reasons, I think they bear a lot of enmity towards us.

326 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 4/9/2007
Mine’s narrative shows how the term ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ as a master signifier is articulated differently at different times in her memory. When she narrates her ideas about Greek Cypriots, she says that in the past, she used to think that Greek Cypriots were ‘Cypriots’ and that Turkish Cypriots could live together with them. Thus, in the beginning, Mine highlights the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by focusing on their ‘Cypriotness’; however, after she started to work with Greek Cypriots in the same place of employment, her ideas changed. It should be noted that when she narrates the period after she started to work, she uses the terms ‘Turks’ and ‘Greeks’ instead of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. This shows how she locates Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as two distinct entities in her narrative. Her narration of her experiences goes as follows: ‘When I am with a Greek, I feel uncomfortable and worried as I don’t trust them’ (implies their being untrustworthy); “When a Greek man comes he says: ‘I don’t want to speak English because this is a Greek land’ but in fact it is a sovereign British base. Merely because I am a Turk he doesn’t want to help me” (implies that they are selfish); ‘I saw that they behaved differently when I turned my back’ (implies their being treacherous); ‘Maybe because of their education, maybe because of their devotion to their religion or for other reasons, I think they bear a lot of enmity towards us’ (implies that they are the enemies). These experiences form Mine’s autobiographical memories about Greek Cypriots. However, as was pointed out in Chapter One, social individuals experience the events because they understand and interpret them in certain ways, and not vice versa.

In Mine’s narrative, one can see the constant articulation of her memories about Greek Cypriots. However, at this particular time, the moments that appear articulated to the dominant discourse about Greek Cypriots (Greeks are enemies, they are treacherous, selfish and untrustworthy) that was reproduced through the mechanisms of memory between 1974-2003, function to mobilize Mine’s memories. Thus, before she started to work with Greek Cypriots, the moments that appear articulated to the dominant discourse were functioning as floating signifiers in her memory. However, after she started to work with them, these floating signifiers came together within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence and filled the meaning of the master signifier (Greeks); although Mine has not experienced any serious incidents with Greek Cypriots, she interprets the events in parallel with the narratives of the dominant public memory (1974-2003). In other words, her autobiographical memories are mediated through the dominant public memory that is
constructed through the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that functions as a nodal point.

Like Mine, some other interviewees talk about the signification that they give to the gestures and behaviours of Greek Cypriots; these bring out the ‘hidden face’ of the Greek Cypriots. Zizek (cited in Butler 2005:39) talks about the reversal of meaning that can be approached in the examples of master signifiers. Thus, what at first sight seemed innocent and intimate becomes treacherous and untrustworthy. However, as Butler (2005:31) notes, “our descriptions do not naturally and immutably refer to things, but this is the defining feature of the symbolic order – things in retrospect begin to resemble their description. As soon as the facts are determined, we have already, whether we know it or not, made our choice”. That is, we are already within a discursive construction. In a similar vein, one can say that the gestures, laughter or behaviours of Greek Cypriots do not naturally or immutably refer to their being untrustworthy and treacherous. The respondents’ signification of Greek Cypriots’ gestures as the signs of their being untrustworthy and treacherous, resemble the narratives of the official discourse about Greek Cypriots that was disseminated by the official mechanisms of memory during 1974-2003. Although it is possible to accept that Mine lived some unpleasant events as she says, what is important here is that the master signifier constituted by the nodal point [Turkish (cypriot) nationalism] operates perfectly in gathering these few negative events, as it attracts them like a magnet. Similar to a magnet, which is a piece of iron and thus can only attract objects containing iron, the master signifier attracts only the elements that are similar to it. Thus, although Mine might have some positive experiences with Greek Cypriots she doesn’t talk about them, as they are the differences that are not discursively articulated to her discourse at this particular time.

A similar situation arises in the narration of another respondent, Göktan, a 41-year-old male mechanical engineer:

Interviewer: What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots?

Göktan: I was only eight years old. I used to live in the vicinity of Selimiye Mosque. So I didn’t live with the Greeks; that’s why I don’t have any idea of what it would be like to live with the Greeks. I had never seen any Greeks during that period. After the crossings were opened, we started to share some things. But I observed that we share a lot of good things with them, we eat and drink together, and we enjoy ourselves, but ummm… I don’t want to go into political matters because if I do, they clearly…. They want to live together with us but they want to be dominant. They make you feel who the boss is.
Interviewer: How?

Göktan: When we go into political subjects, you can clearly see that they regard themselves as a majority and as superior. .. I couldn't answer your questions very precisely [laughs] because there is nothing specific….

Interviewer: Can you explain what you mean more clearly?

Göktan: Well... when I go to the other side, they don’t give me that confidence. We get along well with one another. We chat together, laugh together, drink and entertain together, but I haven’t received that positive energy from them yet, because every now and then they say ‘this situation should be like this or that’. They say of course the peace can be brought about, but if only they are in power. Or they hint at it. That’s why I voted ‘No’ for the Annan plan. Because I don’t believe in their sincerity. Although at first I was not certain of this, later I found out that by voting ‘No’, I had done the right thing.

Interviewer: well…What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots?

Göktan: Oh dear me! I don’t feel anything. Err… When I go to the other side… Err… Irritation… Not exactly. But I don’t have good feelings. As I said, when we speak to them err… including me, we may say this situation is over and done with. We say we need peace. Of course, but who is clear about the meaning of peace? Aren’t we at peace now? Are we at war? We should think about this seriously. .. But I feel uncomfortable, one way or another, because there .....I feel that they do not see us as equal to them. I got the impression that they want to see us as second-class citizens. May be this is only my thoughts…. I am not sure…. But they make me feel this, one way or another….

Interviewer: How?

Göktan: I don’t know. .. Well, either the looks or expression in their faces make me feel that they see themselves as superior to us

Like many respondents, Mine and Göktan describe Greeks as treacherous, selfish and untrustworthy; Greeks are represented as the ‘others’ in their narratives.

However, there can be more than one ‘other’ in the narrative of many respondents. When I asked questions about Turks from Turkey I examined how the respondents might conceive Greeks as well as Turks as the ‘others’ at the same time. In these cases, it is much more difficult to talk about the function of the logics of inclusion and exclusion that provides clear-cut lines such as ‘friend-enemy’ or ‘us-them’. Below are Mine’s and Göktan’s interpretations about Turks who came from Turkey:

327 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: domestic parlour, 4/09/2007
Interviewer: What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel about it?

Mine: I think, if the Turkish army hadn’t landed in Cyprus, maybe none of us would be alive now. The Greeks would have killed us all. I mean, if we are alive, this is because of the motherland Turkey.

Interviewer: What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974?

Mine: If nothing had happened and they hadn’t left their homes, it would have been much better.

Interviewer: Why?

Mine: I don’t know. I am on the side of the idea that Cypriots live in Cyprus. They [Turkish people] are too many …. They have changed the order of our community, both socially and economically. They work here for much lower salaries. And Turkish Cypriots go to the Greek side to do the same job because the wages have gone down because of this cheap workforce. A Turk from the mainland can make a living with 700 YTL, but a Turkish Cypriot can’t manage it. Because of them, the balance in the market has changed.

Interviewer: How about socially?

Mine: For example, because of the Turks from the mainland, I cannot go to the harbour and walk there, or elsewhere. I get irritated to leave here to go to my aunt’s.

Interviewer: Why?

Mine: Everything is different with Turkish people. I believe that they violate the communal order. Their culture, education, life standards, social lives, are different. We didn’t use to hear of any cases of violence before. Now thefts, murders, rapes, and such … 90% of these are committed by Turkish immigrants.

Interviewer: Where did you get this information?

Mine: From the newspapers.

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Interviewer: What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel about it?

Göktan: It was fortunate that they [Turks] came…if we lead a peaceful life, it is because of the existence of Turkey. As our old people say, we do not live in fear.

Interviewer: What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974?
Göktan: Their arrival on the island has been a complete tragedy. Already no one thinks anything positive about them. They have wrecked our system, and social life. To put simply, when I went to Turkey on holiday, I had the opportunity to talk to a Turkish man, and the man asked me why the Cypriots do not like Turks from Turkey. In response, I asked him if he would like someone who came from abroad to rape, to rob, to take over his rights of employment. In the summer, my family and I would keep the doors and windows open, but now we double-check if the doors or windows are properly closed or locked for security. It is because of the negative effects of the Turks from Turkey. Even in the daily newspapers, these have become daily routine cases: the other day in a news story, it said that the percentage of the inmates in prison is 75% Turkish citizens.

Contradictions appear in these narratives about ‘Turks’; the master signifier ‘Turk’ is constantly articulated through the opposing narratives of the respondents. Thus, in their answers to the first question, Mine and Göktan locate Turks as the saviours of Turkish Cypriots from Greek cruelty; they classify Turks as ‘us’ when they talk about them in relation to the Happy Peace Operation that was realized in 1974. However, when they express their feelings about Turks who migrated to the island after 1974, they locate them ‘not as the saviours’ but as ‘thieves, killers and dangerous people’ and thus, as the ‘others’. This shows how the memories of the respondents may be articulated differently in the present historical and political contexts.

When Mine says, “If the Turkish army hadn’t landed in Cyprus, maybe none of us would be alive now. The Greeks would have killed us all”; and Göktan says “fortunately, they (Turks) have come …if we lead a peaceful life it is because of the existence of Turkey” it is clear that they see Turks as the defenders of Turkish Cypriots, as the saviours who saved Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). Here one can hear the voice of the public memory that was sustained by the official mechanisms of memory during the Denktas-UBP period. As was noted above, the narratives of the official mechanisms of memory represent the event ‘20 July Happy Peace Operation’ as the salvation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek cruelty by the Turkish soldiers.

However, in their answers to the second question, Mine and Göktan describe ‘Turks’ as dangerous and savage people, as aliens, thieves and killers. Hence the reversal that gives rise to a new master signifier (Turks) as aliens, thieves and killers is at work in their narratives. In the same way that Zizek says that all fears (of economic and moral degradation) are exchanged for the fear of the Jew in anti-Semitism, it can be argued that the Turkish Cypriots’ fear of economic degradation, political uncertainties and social problems are exchanged for the fear of the ‘Turk’. As was stated in Chapter Four, since
the separation of the island in 1974, Turkish Cypriots have been living in an unrecognized state, and this situation has caused social, political and economic problems for the Turkish Cypriots. As they are living isolated and marginalized from the world under economic and cultural embargoes, the TRNC is totally dependent on Turkey both economically and politically. However, after the presentation of the Annan Plan, a new TRNC government (CTP) that sees the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union as the solution of the economic and social problems came to power. Thus, within the changing political and social circumstances, the Turks who were once seen as ‘saviours’ and ‘defenders’, are being excluded as the ‘others’ by some Turkish Cypriots. When Mine says “I am on the side of the idea that Cypriots live in Cyprus”, “the balance on the market has changed because of them (Turks)”; and when Göktan says “the Turkish man asked me why the Cypriots do not like Turks. In response, I asked him if he would like someone who came from abroad to rape, to rob, to usurp his rights of employment”, one can observe how the respondents’ memories, in relation to identity, construct and are constructed by their political ideas, shaped by the social and economic problems. In this sense, Turkish people function as ‘constitutive outsiders’ that threaten the ‘Cypriot’ identity in the memories of the respondents at this particular moment.

Furthermore, negative stereotypes such as alien, dangerous, thief and murderer are attributed to Turks by the respondents. When Mine says “They (Turks) are too many… They changed the order of our community”, “everything is different with Turkish people. I believe that they violate the communal order”; and when Göktan says “Their arrival on the island has been a complete tragedy. Already no one thinks anything positive of them. They have wrecked our system, and social life”, they imply that Turks are aliens. Furthermore, when Mine says, “Their culture, education, life standard, social life is different (she emphasizes that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are different); “because of the Turks of the mainland, I cannot go to the harbour and walk there or else. I get irritated to leave here to go to my aunt’s”; and when Göktan says “In summer, my family and I would keep the doors and windows open but now we double-check if the doors or windows are properly closed or locked for security. It is because of the negative effects of the Turks”, they are implying that Turks are dangerous and savage. It should be noted here that when I asked the respondents where they got the information about Turks, the majority said that they got the information from the media and their close environment. As was noted above, in the events of robbery, killing and rape, most of the national newspapers emphasise that it is the Turks who came from Turkey that are doing these
things; the memories of the respondents about ‘Turks’ are mediated through the public narratives.

7.4 Section three: Dominant/public memories as autobiographical memories and vice versa

As was pointed out in Chapter One, public and autobiographical memories are intertwined and it is not possible to separate them with a strict line. In this section of the thesis, I explore the interrelationships, parallels and differences between public and autobiographical memories. As previously mentioned, in this particular research, in-depth interviews were conducted with two different age groups. The 20-33 age group was born after the division of the island in 1974; therefore they do not have any autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots prior to the division of the island. Public memories are highly important for this age group, since all they know about the ‘others’ is constructed by their public memories. On the other hand, the 40-80 age group are those interviewees who generally have autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots. However, it is interesting to examine the function of their autobiographical memories as public memories: their autobiographical memories have mostly remained in the shadow of the dominant/public memories. As explained in Chapter One, autobiographical memories are acquired through a complex interrelationship between ontological and public narratives; my objective is to examine this interrelationship between public and autobiographical memories.

7.4.1 Public memories as lived experiences

The 20-33 age group interviewees have no autobiographical memories of the period concerned, so their knowledge of the ‘past’ has been obtained through the public narratives which encompass the narratives of their families (i.e., father, mother, grandmother, and grandfather), school education (mostly from history textbooks and history teachers), close environment such as neighbours and sometimes friends, and the mechanisms of memory. When the borders were partially opened in 2003, Turkish Cypriots between the ages 20-33 crossed the boundaries to the south for the first time in their lives, and met and communicated with Greek Cypriots. Thus, their autobiographical memories with Greek Cypriots started to form only after 2003. When they narrate how
they felt when they first crossed the boundaries to the southern part of the island, they interpret their autobiographical memories in parallel with the dominant/public memories; their autobiographical memories are mediated through the dominant/public memories.

Some of the respondents say that they were tense and self-conscious in the South part of the island as they did not trust Greek Cypriots and felt that they might harm them because they were Turkish Cypriots. The dominant/public memories of the ‘past’ and the negative stereotypes that are attributed to Greek Cypriots such as their being ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘barbarian’, function as elements in the formation of their experiences. Furthermore, the respondents’ present knowledge about Greek Cypriots, which they got from the media, also helps in the formation of the elements that are parallel to the concept of ‘Greek Cypriot’ that operates as a master signifier in their memories. Most of the respondents explain the reason for their being tense when they first crossed the boundaries with their present knowledge about the negative attitudes of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots who go to the southern part:

When we first went to the Greek side, we were a group of friends. I didn’t feel insecure there. But when I went on my own, I felt the need to look to the left or right every now and then, as if I was being chased by murderers. When I cross to the other side, I try to be more careful. For example, I pay the utmost attention to where I should park my car because we hear from the media that the Greeks damage cars with Turkish registrations.328 (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).

When I first crossed the border, I was wearing a necklace with the crescent and a star [representing the Turkish flag]. So I sort of felt that they would curse and swear at me, abduct me or snatch the necklace off my neck.329 (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).

You feel alienated when you cross to the other side, and you feel irritated when you hear from the media how the Greeks treat Turks who go to the south.330 (Sertan, male, aged 22, shop owner).

In addition, nearly all of the respondents in the 20-33 age group, who crossed the boundaries for the first time in 2003, say that they felt they were not in their homeland but in a foreign country, as this was the first time that they had been in the southern part of the island. This shows the function of their public memories in constructing the idea of homeland and belonging to a particular place, Northern Cyprus; some of the respondents say that when they were in Southern Cyprus, they felt that they did not belong to that part.

328 In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007
329 In depth-interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
330 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007
This logic appears in the narrations of Haluk, a 33-year-old male English teacher, and Nevruz, a 22-year-old female beautician:

Haluk: South Cyprus is not my home. It is like a foreign country.
Interviewer: Why?
Haluk: The authority ruling there isn’t my government.
Interviewer: Ok... If you go to another country like England, would you feel the same as you feel in South Cyprus?
Haluk: Not at all, because I believe that the authority in England is just. On the other hand, I believe that the Greek Government isn’t legally competent enough and they don’t like Turkish Cypriots because they had a bad experience with us in the past. They perceive us as their enemy. According to them, Turkish Cypriots are a minority\textsuperscript{331}.

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Nevruz: Because I studied to specialize in beauty at a school in the Greek area, I went there every day in the morning and returned in the evening. Even so, I felt myself a stranger every time I went there. First of all, I didn’t understand their language. To communicate with them we had to speak English. I feel like a visitor there\textsuperscript{332}.

In these responses, the differences of geographical location and language play a crucial role in the formation of the ideas of the respondents about the homeland. As was stated in Chapter Two, differences such as geographical location and language are constructed as natural factors in the formation of a nation-state. According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:38), the respondents’ emphasis on the state-external differences function as a constructive strategy’. One can argue that some of the respondents’ emphasis on the state-external differences (i.e., geographical location and government in Haluk’s case) functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is articulated through the discourse about the others (Greek Cypriots). For example, Haluk says that Greek Cypriots perceive Turkish Cypriots as their enemies and see them as a minority, therefore he does not trust the Greek government, and south Cyprus is like a foreign country for him. Thus, like many respondents, Haluk’s idea about the ‘others’ plays a crucial role in the formation of his memories about the homeland.

\textsuperscript{331} In depth-interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007
\textsuperscript{332} In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
7.4.2 Autobiographical memories in the shadow of the dominant/public memories (The 40-80 age group)

When the interviewees in the 40-80 age group narrate their memories of living with Greek Cypriots, they mostly talk about the ‘dominant public memory’ disseminated by the ruling group (1974-2003) as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. Most of the time, their autobiographical memories are difficult to examine because the respondents do not perceive them as being real as dominant/public memories. Thus, these memories either come out after a deep conversation and/or after more subtle questions. This shows that the autobiographical memories of the respondents within this age group mostly stay in the shadow of the ‘dominant public memory’ that was sustained by the mechanisms of memory and produced during 1974-2003. As many years have passed since the division of the island, the autobiographical memories of the respondents have become blurred and broken off their connection with ‘reality’. Most of the time, as a result, the autobiographical memories of the respondents are uncertain and indefinite, as can be seen in the narration of Aydın, an 80-year-old male counsellor:

Interviewer: Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots?

Aydın: Enosis was always the aim of Greeks, and the London-Zurich agreements are the sign of Enosis. I never forget that in the year 1961, Makarios went to Panayia village in Baf and he made an announcement that Enosis could not be realized without expelling Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus.

Interviewer: Do you remember how you got the information about Makarios’s announcement?

Aydın: Well… At that time, I was reading Zaman newspaper. I got the information from Zaman.

Interviewer: How about your personal memories? Did you ever communicate with a Greek Cypriot?

Aydın: Yes.

Interviewer: How?

Aydın: We had Greek neighbours in our village.

Interviewer: How was your relationship with them?
Aydın: We had good relationships. I remember that we used to take them twisted dough cookies [simit] on Bayrams [religious holidays] and they used to bring us their traditional bread [pilavuna].

When I asked Aydin if he had any memories of living with Greek Cypriots, he revealed public memories that are articulated through the mechanisms (official history and media) instead of his autobiographical memories. This situation shows the predominance of the public narratives in his memory. When Aydn says, “Enosis was always the aim of Greeks and London-Zurich agreements are the sign of Enosis”, one can hear the voice of the official history that was sustained during the Denktaş-UBP period (1974-2003). He also brings out his memory about the announcement by Makarios that was published in the Zaman newspaper; it is interesting to observe how the ‘information’ that is provided by the official history and media functions as elements in the articulation of his memories about Greek Cypriots.

On the other hand, it was very difficult for Aydın to reveal his autobiographical memories. In order to bring these out, I had a deep conversation with him. He recalls that he had a good relationship with Greek Cypriots when he narrates his memory that they shared their twisted dough cookies and traditional breads. Here it is possible to follow the traces of an alternative past in Aydın’s in autobiographical memories, which is about common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, shared memories are sharper in Aydın’s memories; perhaps because shared memories are constantly repeated by the mechanisms of memory. On the other hand, his autobiographical memory, of things that he ‘experienced’ privately, is uncertain and hardly remembered. One can argue that the reason for this weakness and uncertainty might be that there is no possibility of its repetition or/and mobilization by the mechanisms; in consequence, it might lose its sharpness after a period of time.

On the other hand, the majority of the interviewees who talk about their autobiographical memories support the idea that individually they might live with Greek Cypriots, but they are against the idea that they can be partners sharing the same island/homeland because they believe that as a unity and as a nation, Greek Cypriots are untrustworthy, as could be seen especially when they said ‘no’ in the referendum. The media play a substantial role in their evaluation of Greek Cypriots as a community, because apart from the other public narratives, the media were the only way that they

333 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Brotherhood Hearth, 21/07/2007
could get information about Greek Cypriots as a community, especially after the division of the island in 1974. This can be seen in the narratives of Arif, a 86-year-old male retired counsellor, and Emine, a 52 year-old female retired official:

Arif: There are good individuals among them. But unfortunately, it is difficult to say that they are good as a community. It seems to be difficult to live with them at present. They want to assimilate us. The church is highly influential on them.

Interviewer: How do you get information about Greek Cypriots?
Arif: From the media of course.

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Emine: In the past, we had good Greek Cypriot neighbours and friends. There are very good individuals among them. We also established good relationships after the opening of the crossings. But I was sort of disappointed when they said ‘no’ to the referendum. I haven’t seen in them the eagerness, the kind of joy in making friends and the desire to build a common future as a community. I noticed among them that there was a selfish feeling – that they entered the EU and that they somehow saved themselves as a community. They lead a comfortable life and they’ve got used to it.

Interviewer: How do you get information about Greek Cypriots?
Emine: We always hear the speeches of their politicians through the media.

On the other hand, in the case of İclal, an 81-year-old female retired nurse, one can observe the role of public memories in the articulation of her memories about Greek Cypriots. In her narrative, the inconsistencies and parallelisms between public and autobiographical memories also emerge:

Interviewer: Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots? How was life then?
İclal: We would go to wedding ceremonies, for example we would go on excursions and sightseeing together, we would dine out together; and in short we were living together. We had good relations with the Greeks, we didn’t have any problems. Later, the war broke out and everything changed.

Interviewer: Well…what do you think about the reason for the war?
İclal: The politicians.

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334 In-depth interview, Kumsal: Domestic parlour, 20 July 2007
335 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/07/2007
Interviewer: How about Greek Cypriots?

İclal: They weren’t the reason. I know because I lived with them.

Interviewer: Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family have any fears?

İclal: We were not afraid at all because we got along well with each other then. There was no discrimination as Turk or Greek. Everyone was the same.

Interviewer: Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears?

İclal: Not at all. There was no fear at all.

In İclal’s autobiographical memories, the alternative past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is brought out: she thinks that the reason for the war was not the Greek Cypriots but the politicians. She also talks about the common daily lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots: they used to go to wedding ceremonies together, they dined together, etc.; and she says that there was no fear among Turkish Cypriots, as they got along well with the Greek Cypriots. According to İclal, there was no discrimination between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and thus, they were the same; in this way, she emphasizes the similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, in the following conversation with İclal, the narratives of the media and her close environment articulate and construct her memories in relation to national identity:

Interviewer: What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots?

İclal: Now, I feel that we cannot live together.

Interviewer: Why?

İclal: Because they started to become unfriendly. Then we became unfriendly. They killed...Then we killed…. This is it…

Interviewer: Can they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland?

İclal: I don’t think so.

Interviewer: You said you could get along well before, so why shouldn’t you be able to be on good terms again?

İclal: Because they have changed. Both they and we have changed.

Interviewer: How do you get information about them? How do you know that they have changed?
İclal: From around, newspapers… from the television. I can also speak Greek. I sometimes listen to the Greek news as well. They say that we are their enemies.

Interviewer: What do they say, for example?

İclal: They say that we are the reason for the problems on the island. And we say that it is because of them… their thoughts and our thoughts are different. And they say that we are their citizens but we don’t believe in that affection.

Interviewer: What do you hear within your environment?

İclal: They say that they [Greek Cypriots] are the reason that we lost our property. Our families, sons and daughters had to leave their homes behind and they emigrated.

Interviewer: Haven’t you heard anything positive from your environment?

İclal: They all say negative things. No one speaks positively. I myself have never heard anything in favour. In short, I have never heard that the Greeks are very nice people or anything of the sort. No one spoke ill of the Greeks before, but now this happens often.

It is interesting to observe the role of the ‘information’ provided by the public narratives in the formation of the elements that function to articulate İclal’s ideas about Greek Cypriots. When she says, “Now, I feel that we cannot live together. Because they have started to become unfriendly”, this is not related to what she personally experienced but is remembered through the public narratives partly constructed by the media. When she says, “Because they have changed. Both they and we have changed”, she is using the information provided by the public narratives; her close environment also reinforces the negative ideas about Greek Cypriots. However, it can also be argued that the dominance of the public narratives in İclal’s memory might play the primary role in her evaluations of the present information about Greek Cypriots. When she says, “I sometimes listen to the Greek news as well. They say that we are their enemies”, one can hear the voice of the public narratives that attribute negative stereotypes to Greek Cypriots, such as their being enemies. Although it is not possible for the Greek media channel to broadcast a direct statement such as “Turks are our enemies”, İclal evaluates what she hears from the Greek media channel according to the dominant public memory (1974-2003). It can therefore be argued that her ‘experiences’ are mediated through the public memories; in other words, she evaluates the public memories as her autobiographical memories. She continues:
Interviewer: Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a good or a bad thing?

İclal: In my view, it is better for the borders to be kept stable. Borders show that there is no reason for me to be afraid anymore. We got used to them. Now, they have opened the crossings, but we still...are not very keen to go to the other side. We get irritated when we go there.336

When İclal’s narrative is considered as a whole, one can observe how the strategies of emphasis of sameness and difference function in her memories. When I asked İclal at the beginning of the interview if she or her family had had any fears about living with Greek Cypriots before 1974, she said that they hadn’t been afraid because they (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) had got along well with each other, as there had been no discrimination between Turks and Greeks: everyone was the same. She also said that there had been no fear at all felt by the Turkish Cypriots as a community. İclal’s emphasis on the similarities, but not on the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, shows how the strategy of sameness operates to weaken and displace the antagonistic polarity between them in her memory regarding this period.

On the other hand, when she continues to narrate her memories, it is interesting to see how the public narratives transformed her ideas about Greek Cypriots after the division of the island: now, the borders that divide Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots mean security for her; she says that the borders show that there is no reason for her to be afraid any more. The strategies of dissimilation function to divide Greek and Turkish Cypriots into two opposed camps in her memories. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:33) suggest, ‘the strategies of dissimilation create a territorial difference and heterogeneity’. As stated in Chapter Four, the borders that represent the territorial difference reproduce the idea that Turks are different from Greeks; as long as the boundaries remain, Turkish Cypriots will be secure because the boundaries protect them from the ‘others’. In this way the public memories construct feelings of unity and security by arousing fear and anxiety about Greek Cypriots, and provide the necessary context for the reproduction of the nation by mobilizing the emotions of the respondents. Below, in the final part of this chapter, I analyse in detail the interpretations of the respondents about the ‘borders’, in order to see how the public narratives mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the others and thus, about the political situation in Cyprus.

336 In-depth interview, Belediye evleri: Domestic parlour, 17/07/2007
7.5 Section four: Borders - Division or unity?

Since the de facto division of the island in 1974, borders have become a part of the everyday lives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As explained above, the partial opening of the crossings in 2003 has brought out the issues of ‘division’ or ‘unity’ of the island, and raised questions about self-other relationships, the notion of homeland, and future expectations about the political situation in Cyprus. The statements of the respondents are classified according to their content in order to show the similarities and oppositions between them. Some of the answers of the respondents about the meaning of the borders are as follows:

‘Borders represent our captivity’337 (Fide, female, aged 26, business chair of the milk industry).
‘Frontiers that prevent my freedom’338 (Sertan, male, aged 22, shop owner).
‘Borders make me feel as if I am kept in a golden cage’339 (Melek, female, aged 28, instructor).
‘I don’t like the borders as they represent prohibitions’340 (Selda, female, aged 49, radio reporter)
‘Borders represent the division’341 (Mustafa, male, aged 29, Warehouseman)
‘Borders represent the separation. The separation of ideas, ideals...They are the lines that separate everything’342 (Ayça, male, aged 50, tourism employee)
‘Prevent the friendships between the two communities’343 (Ayten, female, aged 23, student).

The respondents’ negative expressions about the ‘borders’ as the representation of separation, division, captivity and prevention of friendships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, indicate their desire for the unification of the island, which is a possibility with the solution of the Cyprus problem. According to Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40), the emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future functions as a strategy of transformation. The respondents’ desire for the reunification of the island functions to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that highlights the friendships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots for the reunification of the island and for the solution of the economic and political restrictions (i.e., isolation, embargoes) that Turkish Cypriots have faced since the division of the island. Thus, when

337 In depth-interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 3/09/2007
338 In-depth interview, Küçükkaymaklı: Domestic parlour, 28 July 2007
339 In depth-interview, Karaoğlanoğlu: Kyrenia American University, 31/8/2007
341 In-depth interview, Köşkülüçiftlik: Green House Cafe, 26/07/2007
342 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 18/09/2007
343 In depth-interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 3/9/2007
the respondents see borders as an obstacle or as a prison, they imagine not only the other as not necessarily threatening or/and friendly, but they also perceive the self as restricted, not allowed to develop and flourish to its full potential.

On the other hand, there are many respondents who see the borders as necessary for the protection of Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). These respondents interpret the borders not as the representation of prohibitions, but as guaranteeing the security of their lives:

‘I like the borders that divide us from the Greeks because they don’t like us’ (Nurten, aged 60, retired history teacher).
‘Borders prevent a possible conflict’ (Yusuf, male, aged 30, official).
‘Prevent the danger’ (Doğa, male, aged 27, lawyer).
‘Borders represent security’ (Duyal, female, aged 21, student).
‘Show me where to be cautious’ (Haluk, male, aged 33, English teacher).

For these respondents, borders prevent the danger and a possible conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; one can see how the strategies of ‘defence and avoidance’ function in their narratives. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:40) suggest, ‘defence and avoidance are the strategies of perpetuation and they function to maintain and reproduce a threatened national identity’. In these cases, it is the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the ‘others’ (Greek Cypriots). As was noted in Chapter Two, the ‘otherness’ is supported through the discourses on security and unity: for many respondents, the existence of the borders removes fears and worries as they separate Turkish Cypriots from the ‘others’, Greek Cypriots who do not like Turkish Cypriots. In addition, the respondents’ interpretations about the necessity of the borders show their desire for the continuation of the status quo, that is, the division of the island. Emphasis on positive political continuity is another strategy of perpetuation (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999:39) that functions to maintain the threatened Turkish (cypriot) identity. As explained in Chapter Five, the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism is based on the argument of the ‘motherland’ that locates Turkey/Turks as the protector of the TRNC/Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). The motherland argument is also about the economic and political cooperation and unity between Turkey and the TRNC.

344 In-depth interview, Öğretmen Evleri: Domestic Parlour, 21/09/2007
345 In-depth interview, Küçük Kaymaklı: Domestic Parlour, 30/07/2007
346 In-depth interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 31/8/2007
347 In-depth interview, Famagusta: Near East University, 24/7/2007
348 In-depth interview, Gönyeli: Domestic parlour, 16/07/2007
These respondents support Turkish rule on the island for the survival and political and economic development of the TRNC; hence, when they understand borders as security from the ‘other’, they do not just narrate the ‘other’ as threatening; they also narrate the self. In this case, the only opportunity for full development is within the constraints of the borders.

As noted in Chapter Four, the physical boundaries of the “imagined” state play a crucial role in the construction of the idea of ‘homeland’. The existence of the ‘borders’ mobilizes meaning that articulates the sense of belonging; and thus, according to many respondents, borders are the frontiers of the homeland/native country:

‘The borders remind me that everyone has her/his own place to return to’  
(Deniz, female, aged 23, public relations).

‘The frontiers of the homeland’  
(Memduh, male, aged 23, student)

‘Borders show that we are sovereign within our frontiers and we have our own state’  
(Alican, male, aged 49, farmer)

‘Borders specify the native country’  
(Cemre, female, aged 22, unemployed)

‘Remind us that we have our own state’  
(Mine, female, aged 28, customs and immigration officer)

On the other hand, according to other respondents, borders divide their country and make it smaller; these respondents do not conceive the TRNC as their homeland/native country and therefore do not evaluate the borders as the indication of it as such. They also talk about the problems that are caused by the borders:

‘Make my country smaller and smaller’  
(Nevruz, female, aged 22, female beautician).

‘Borders are created by the parties that want privilege. No border means no privilege’  
(Ergin, male, aged 70, retired teacher)

‘The cause of our isolation from the world’  
(Berk, male, aged 27, instructor)

‘For me, the borders are a waste of time because you spend time in vain when you stand in a queue to get a visa’  
(Ezgi, male, aged 20, student)

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349 In depth-interview, Kyrenia: Domestic Parlour, 1/9/2007
350 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Ulusal Birlik Party, 24/07/2007
351 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Farmers Collective, 30/7/2007
352 In-depth interview, Göçmenköy: Domestic parlour, 27 August 2007
353 In-depth interview, Nicosia: Domestic parlour, 4/9/2007
354 In-depth interview, Kermiya: Domestic parlour, 21/08/2007
355 In-depth interview, Arabahmet: Kardeş Ocağı [Brotherhood Hearth], 23/07/2007
356 In-depth interview, Lefkoşa: The local branch of Cumnhuriyetçi Türk Party, 7/8/2007
357 In-depth interview, Köşklüçiftlik: Green House Café, 1/09/2007
These comments are about the issues (i.e., isolation of Turkish Cypriots from the world, formal procedures at the crossings, political privileges of the parties because of the Cyprus problem) that are caused by the division of the island and the political situation in Northern Cyprus. The respondents point to the necessity of the political transformation in Northern Cyprus, and thus criticise the status quo. As Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart (1999:41) note, ‘negative connotation of political continuation and positive connotation of change are the transformative strategies’. In these cases, the transformative strategies function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the reunification of the island under the framework of the Annan Plan, which proposes a possible participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU after the solution of the Cyprus problem.

The interpretations of the respondents about the ‘borders’ encapsulate the discourses about the other, and therefore the self. Thus the respondents develop different discourses of understanding belonging, and, of course, the future, for them and ‘their’ island; their evaluations about the borders give crucial clues to their political ideas, which construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the complex functioning of the dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories in the articulation of the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. I explored the constant articulation of memories in relation to identity as the crossing points between the logics of inclusion and exclusion that sometimes locates Turks and sometimes Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’. I adopted Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas (common past, present, future and culture) in the ‘discursive construction of national identity’, for the examination of the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot identity in the narratives of the respondents. I also examined how the autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories.

The respondents’ narratives about the ‘past’ with Turks can be separated under the titles of ‘common origin’ and ‘Turks: saviours/occupiers’. Most of the respondents emphasize the similarities between Turks and Turkish Cypriots by talking about their common origin. The emphasis on the racial similarity of Turks and Turkish Cypriots operates as a strategy in the construction of Turkish (cypriot) identity. On the other hand,
there are respondents who focus on the racial similarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; they construct (turkish) Cypriot identity by focussing on the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, when the respondents evaluate the common ‘past’ with Turks they locate them as saviours or occupiers. The respondents who locate Turks as ‘saviours’ evaluate the Cyprus war as a crisis that was overcome together with Turks through the “20 July 1974 Happy Peace Operation”; hence, they emphasize the shared sorrows of Turks and Turkish Cypriots, which is one of the strategies in the construction of a Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the argument of the motherland and the commonalities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks. However, there are also respondents who evaluate the “Happy Peace Operation” as an occupation that was realised by the outsiders. These respondents exclude Turks by labelling them as outsiders who have a different culture and national identity. Their narratives function to dismantle the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the sameness and common past of Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

In the narratives of the respondents about a common/unshared present, Turks are located as Turkish citizens (insiders) or aliens (outsiders). The respondents who support the common present of Turks and Turkish Cypriots evaluate the political decision of the government about the immigration of Turks from Turkey as a positive decision to increase the number of the Turkish population on the island. For them, this situation supports the national body. Their emphasis on positive political continuity is one of the strategies of inclusion and continuation that functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity. On the other hand, some respondents interpret Turks as ‘aliens’ belonging to a foreign country (Turkey) but living in Northern Cyprus. According to them, Turks have come from Turkey and taken away the jobs of Turkish Cypriots, who have become second-class citizens in their country. The respondents’ complaints about the present situation show their emphasis on a necessary difference between now and the future that functions as a transformative strategy. Moreover, according to many respondents, the constant support of Turkey is essential for the security of Turkish Cypriots on the island in the future; thus they support the status quo. Their emphasis on the positive political continuity between Turks and Turkish Cypriots and their protection from a possible Greek Cypriot threat function as strategies of continuation and defence that operate to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity which is sustained through the negative narratives about the others. On the other hand, some respondents conceive Greek Cypriots
as ‘Cypriots’ and their different conception of identity plays an important role in their imagination of a common future with Greek Cypriots.

The respondents also emphasize the cultural differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots by classifying them as migrants or settlers. They see more similarities between settlers and themselves than between migrants and themselves; and they generally emphasize cultural similarities such as language, lifestyle, eating habits and clothing. In contrast, the migrants are labelled as dangerous, as they kill, steal and assault people. Media play the main role in the construction of Turks as the ‘others’ because the respondents get their information about the incidents of crimes, robberies and rapes from the national newspapers. There are also many respondents who do not distinguish between Turkish migrants and settlers, and evaluate all the Turks as being culturally different from Turkish Cypriots. The Turks are labelled as uneducated, rude, dangerous and savage; they have different lifestyles, traditions, accents, customs, mores and clothing. Thus these respondents’ narratives function to exclude Turks as inferiors and this exclusion constructs the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots.

When the respondents talk about the ‘past’ with the Greek Cypriots, the past is represented either as peace with friends or conflict with enemies. Those who narrate the past as a conflict with enemies focus on the 1963-1974 events as in the official history (1974-2003) that was constructed in the Denktas-UBP period. On the other hand, those who talk about the common past and friendship of Greek and Turkish Cypriots generally focus on their or their families’ good relationships in the past; although their narratives about the ‘happier past’ are generally over when they talk about the 1963-1974 period. Thus it can be argued that the respondents’ public memories are more dominant than their and their families’ autobiographical memories about this period.

I also examined how the opposing strategies of justification and transformation function in the narratives of the respondents about their evaluations of the “present” in relation to Greek Cypriots. Many respondents points to the economic, political and social problems that are caused by the Cyprus problem in Northern Cyprus; and therefore they emphasize the necessary difference between now and the future that functions as a strategy in the transformation of Turkish (cypriot) identity into a (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the EU after the solution of the Cyprus problem. Since most of the time, these respondents emphasize the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, I explored how the political
ideas of the respondents construct and are constructed by their memories about the ‘others’. The respondents’ emphasis on positive political continuity operates as a strategy in the justification of the status quo (Turkish rule on the island); hence, they sustain the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the unity and cooperation of Turkish Cypriots and Turks through their narratives. Their ideas on the future are generally parallel to their evaluations of the present. Some respondents interpret the division of the island as necessary for the peace of Turkish Cypriots, seeing the Greek Cypriots as a threat to their security. On the other hand, there are respondents who support the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union, as they believe that this will bring them economic, social and political progress.

Moreover, most of the respondents focus on the constructed differences between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, such as religion and language. The emphasis on these differences functions to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that exclude Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’. However, many respondents focus on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, such as eating habits and lifestyles; this focus on the similarities displaces the differences of religion and language and constructs the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

I also considered how the result of the referenda on the Annan Plan that proposes the possible participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU, created a period of uncertainty about the ideas related to the ‘others’. I explored the changing self-other relationships in the memories of single social individuals, while they were answering the questions of the in-depth interview: The inconsistencies in their memories are not necessarily the outcome of the referenda voting, but of the complex functioning of their memories.

Another focus of this chapter was on how public memories function as lived experiences for the 20-33 age group respondents: when they narrate how they felt when they first crossed the boundaries to the southern part of the island, they interpret their private memories in parallel with the dominant/public memories. These memories of the constructed past (1974-2003) and the negative stereotypes attributed to Greek Cypriots, such as their being ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘barbarian’, function as elements in the formation of the respondents’ experiences. In addition, the respondents’ present knowledge that they got from the media about Greek Cypriots helps to form the elements that are parallel to the concept of ‘Greek Cypriot’ which operates as a master signifier in their memories. The autobiographical memories of the respondents in the 40-80 age group mostly stay in the shadow of the ‘dominant public memory’ that was sustained by the mechanisms of
memory produced during 1974-2003: most of the time, the autobiographical memories of respondents in this age group are uncertain and indefinite; the shared memories are sharpened as they are constantly repeated by the mechanisms of memory.

The interpretations of the respondents about the borders that divide the island into North and South raise questions about self-other relationships, the notion of homeland and future expectations regarding the political situation in Cyprus. Negative expressions about the borders as the representation of separation, division and captivity, point to the desire of some respondents for the unification of the island with the solution of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, many respondents see the borders as necessary for the protection of Turkish Cypriots from the others (Greek Cypriots). These respondents interpret the borders as security for their lives, because borders separate them from the ‘others’. The physical boundaries of the ‘imagined’ state play a crucial role in the construction of their idea of ‘homeland’; and the existence of the borders mobilizes meaning that articulates the sense of belonging. According to many respondents, borders are the frontiers of the homeland/native country. Thus they support the status quo (Turkish rule on the island) and do not favour the participation of Northern Cyprus in the EU.
CHAPTER 8: FINAL CONCLUSIONS

This research deals with the ‘politics of memory’ and how it is linked to the changing power relations in Northern Cyprus. It focuses on the period of the Annan Plan (proposing the possible participation of whole Cyprus in the EU after a solution in the Cyprus problem) because the plan precipitated an intense struggle between the discourses in relation to memory and national identity. The research explores how the mechanisms of memory (symbols of tradition, commemorations, history textbooks, media) mobilize, articulate and construct the memories in relation to national identity in changing power relations; how the respondents’ political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus construct and are constructed by their memories in relation to national identity. The mechanisms have a crucial influence on the respondents’ political ideas as they function to articulate the ‘past’ in the present for the future.

In Chapter Five, I examined how the official mechanisms of memory that encompass symbols of tradition (flags, national anthem, myths), commemorations (monuments, museums, mass graves, martyr’s cemeteries, national days) and history textbooks are articulated in changing power relations in Northern Cyprus. Two different ruling groups came to power in Northern Cyprus from the division of the island in 1974 to 2009. These were the President Denktas and the government of UBP (1974-2003), and the government of CTP (2003-2009). In the Denktas-UBP period the dominant discourse was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism. However, in the period of the CTP government, the dominant discourse was (turkish) Cypriot nationalism. Hence, the dominant discourse changes according to the historical and political context shaped in power relations.

In this research, I explored how the ruling groups produced and used the official mechanisms in order to spread their discourses. In the Denktaş-UBP period, the official mechanisms were articulated to sustain the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism that highlighted the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and thus supported the division and the status quo (Turkish rule on the island). The flag of Turkey and the flag of the TRNC, as crucial symbols of tradition are some of the official mechanisms analysed in this research. The two flags together reproduce the argument of motherland/babyland that was dominant in the Denktas-UBP period. The argument, based on the common past, heritage and identity of Turkish (cypriots) and Turks, was that there was a strong unity and cooperation between Turkey and the TRNC. Moreover, Turkey, as
the motherland, saved the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots with the Happy Peace Operation in 1974 and it continues to defend the babyland from the others (Greek Cypriots). Monuments that symbolise either Atatürk or Martyrs of Northern Cyprus are the main forms of commemorations of the Denktas-UBP period. According to the official history of this period, Atatürk, the founder and first President of the Turkish Republic, represents Turkishness and is the symbol of courage, patriotism and heroism. The statement below the monument of Atatürk, ‘How happy to say I am a Turk’, locates Atatürk as a role model. It is very common to see the monuments of Atatürk and the flags in many places including the streets, squares and courtyards of schools. The monument of the martyr symbolises a Turkish soldier who was killed by Greeks in the Cyprus war and is lying in his mother’s arms; this monument was set up to construct the ideas of Turkish Cypriots about Greeks, who are represented as ‘others’ who mercilessly killed Turks. The statement below the monument, “Unutmayacağız” (We will never forget), recalls a ‘past’ that is about the Cyprus war and thus, the Turkish people who died and/or suffered at that time. However, the term implies not only the ‘past’, but also the future, as it includes the promise of remembrance. Although the monument of Atatürk operates to mobilize the ideas about ‘who the Turkish Cypriots are’, the monument of the martyr functions to construct the idea about ‘who the others are’.

The official discourse (1974-2003) constructed Turkish (cypriot) identity by producing a sharp antagonistic relationship between Turks/Turkish and Greek Cypriots through the mechanisms. However, the CTP government highlighted the (Turkish) Cypriot identity based on similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their common life in the EU in the future. Sestas and the Peace Cresset, public artworks, were set up in the CTP period; the sestas (common, traditional items used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots) represent the similar ways of life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they used to live together, while the peace cresset is the symbol of the lighting of fires in the villages at the time of the referendum as an affirmation in favour of the Annan Plan.

Museums, mass graves and martyr’s cemeteries are the other forms of commemorations that mobilize the ideas of the respondents about the ‘others’ by arousing their fears. In the analysis of the experiences of the respondents about the commemorative locations, I adopted Turner’s concept of liminality. The experiences of the respondents are structured through a kind of ritual and thus they experience liminality when they visit these places; as was stated in Chapter Two, liminality in the museum entails being outside of or betwixt and between the normal world. The museum of Barbarism is one of the
crucial mechanisms, and it can be seen as a script written by the dominant discourse (1974-2003). I examined how the objects in the museum lose their historical relevance during the process of museumisation and gain a new meaning in the memories of the respondents about Greek Cypriots. The museum mobilizes the negative ideas and fears of the respondents who never communicated with a Greek Cypriot before the division of the island. This situation shows how autobiographical memories are mediated through public memories. However, the official discourse about the museum is often challenged by the alternative media and family narratives.

The history textbook is the other mechanism that narrates the ‘others’. History textbooks were rewritten in the period of the CTP government that supported the reunification of the island. In the subsequent textbook, the past between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was represented more positively than in the previous history textbook in order to prepare the ground for a possible reunification. Hence, the history textbooks are one of the most remarkable official mechanisms that show how narrations about the ‘others’ were articulated and constructed in changing power relations.

Although the official mechanisms are produced by the ruling groups and it is not possible to talk about their alternatives within the period of the dominance of the ruling group, the media as another mechanism are more independent in terms of their organic relationship with the ruling groups. Chapter Six explored the role of the media (particularly the newspapers) in the mobilization and articulation of the memories in relation to national identity. The media was the only mechanism through which individuals got ‘present’ information about the Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan and the EU after the division of the island; and I explored how the knowledge of the respondents about the political issues is mostly articulated by the media. However, the respondents’ memories about the ‘past’ and the ‘others’ play a crucial role in their interpretations of ‘information’ about the Annan Plan and the EU. Thus, the respondents’ political ideas about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus are constructed by their memories about the ‘others’.

The focus of this research was on newspaper discourses because the variety of the newspapers made them the most popular media of the period, within the scope of this research. During the referendum period, each national newspaper produced different and sometimes opposing ‘truths’ about the ‘past’ that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live together. Media narratives bring the ‘past’ which is articulated according to the political discourse of the media institution, into the present. In this way, the media play a crucial
role in the construction of the social tie or antagonistic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Turks and Turkish Cypriots.

In this research, I analysed the narratives of the respondents about the news stories that were published in Kıbrıs (supporting the Annan Plan) and Volkan (rejecting the Annan Plan) newspapers after the partial opening of the crossings. Depending on the political discourse of Kıbrıs, the ‘past’ with Greek Cypriots was represented as a period of time that was longed for and the opening of the crossings as a way back to the past. Kıbrıs supports the discourse of (turkish) Cypriot nationalism that is based on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their common life; hence it publishes news stories about the commonalities and friendships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots following the opening of the crossings. On the other hand, Volkan supports the discourse of Turkish (cypriot) nationalism; its news stories are about the commemorative locations (i.e. the monument of Atatürk, Turkish martyrs’ cemetery) ruined or destroyed by the Greek Cypriots. The interpretations of the photographs in these news stories function as a single body in the representation of Greek Cypriots as the ‘others’.

This research included approaches from a variety of fields such as social psychology, sociology, history, politics and media studies; therefore, a consistent methodology could not be applied throughout the analysis chapters. In the analysis of the narratives of the respondents about flags, monuments, public arts and the media discourses Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999), macro strategies (constructive and destructive strategies and the strategies of justification, perpetuation and transformation) in the discursive formation of national identity play the primary role. In the narratives of the respondents, I examined how strategies of justification function to justify the status quo (the division and the Turkish rule on the island), strategies of perpetuation function to perpetuate the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is threatened by the others (Greek Cypriots), and strategies of construction operate to construct the unity between Turkish Cypriots and Turks through the emphasis on the commonalities between them. These strategies function as a single body in the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Turks and the continuation of Turkish rule on the island for the security of Turkish Cypriots. The narratives of the respondents show how the mechanisms of memory function to mobilize the memories of the respondents in parallel with the official history that was produced during the Denktaş-UBP period. On the other hand, the strategies of transformation also function to transform the Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity based
on the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU for the solution of the economic and political problems in Northern Cyprus. Moreover, the strategies of construction operate to construct the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that articulate the (turkish) Cypriot identity.

The official mechanisms always carry the constructed past, that is shaped by the ruling groups, into the present. I explored how many respondents internalized the official history carried by the official mechanisms (history textbooks, symbols of tradition, commemorations) as the reflection of ‘truths’ and ‘realities’. In these instances, the ‘past’ functions as a ‘nodal point’ around which symbols of tradition, commemorations and history textbooks acquire their meaning from their relationship to the ‘past’. However, when respondents opposed the constructed past, I examined how the respondents’ resistance towards the meaning carried by the mechanisms was supported through alternative public memories (i.e the narratives of families, media) or autobiographical memories. It is not always possible to determine whether the memories of the respondents are parallel or alternative to the official history because there might be inconsistencies in the memories of single social individuals about the same period of time in history. This situation shows how the memory is a contested territory of autobiographical and public memories, partly constructed by the official history. It is also interesting to observe that the mechanisms can mobilize the counter memories that oppose the discourse carried by them.

In this research, I examined how the mechanisms enter into the daily lives of the individuals through social practices and media events, and thus are embedded in the respondents’ behaviours. The military salutation, raising the flag, singing the national anthem, a minute’s silence to commemorate the death of Atatürk, standing before the monuments, and celebrating the national days, are the social practices that are physically and/or emotionally practiced by the respondents. These social practices recall the ‘past’ that is articulated by the ruling groups. I also explored the intertextual relationship between the mechanisms of memory: most of the time the mechanisms function as a single body in the construction of discourses on national identity. The different forms of mechanisms (i.e the monument of Atatürk, the national anthem, national days, history textbooks) are intertwined with each other and work to inculcate norms of behaviour by repetition that implies continuity with the constructed past. Furthermore, media carry the official mechanisms (i.e., the national anthem, national days) into the homes and
everyday lives of people. Most of the time, the media events (celebration of national days, commemoration of the martyrs) provide social integration by mobilizing the emotions (i.e., happiness, pride, sorrow and excitement). Hence, media as one of the mechanisms can sustain the dominant discourse. Media as part of the respondents’ daily lives provide the opportunity to follow events that normally they might not be able to pursue.

Although the mechanisms are produced to fix the ‘past’ for the justification of the dominant public memory, they do not always provide a total fixity in the memories of the individuals. The memories are constantly articulated through the discourses constructed in power relations; the respondents’ memories therefore resemble a battlefield of different discourses. However, in general individuals prevent antagonisms by ignoring the alternative memories (i.e., hatred and grudge towards Greek Cypriots are negative feelings). These alternative memories function like a surplus and threaten the partial fixity of the respondents’ memories about the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, there are many respondents who naturalize and legitimize their memories through mythologizing the past. In the mythologizing past, Greeks/Greek Cypriots are transformed into ‘mythical beasts’ (i.e., tyrants, merciless, cowards, treacherous, unjust, oppressive, selfish) and Turks into ‘heroes’ (i.e., powerful, kind, clever, courageous and protective). This situation functions to naturalize the feelings of hatred and resentment towards Greek Cypriots. I also examined the exaggeration and the deeply rooted oppositions that carry the features of mythologies in the narratives of the respondents.

In examining the articulation of Turkish (cypriot) identity and (turkish) Cypriot identity, I also adopted Wodak, Cillia, Reisgl and Liebhart’s major thematic areas (common past, present, future and culture) in the ‘discursive construction of national identity’. In Chapter Seven, I consider the concepts of ‘Greek/Greek Cypriot’ and ‘Turk’ as master signifiers that gather free-floating elements/signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence. The statements are related to the major thematic areas, and stereotypes are explored as elements that operate in the organization of most of the respondents’ memories in relation to their identity. Thus the elements (statements) fulfill the primary role in the construction of the identities. These elements struggle to construct the master signifiers with a particular content, and are formed through the complex relationship amongst dominant/alternative public and autobiographical memories that are constructed in power relations.

In addition, I explored how the respondents’ emphasis on the common past, common present, common future and common culture between Turks and Turkish
Cypriots articulate the Turkish (cypriot) identity. On the other hand, respondents’ emphasis on the uncommon past, present, future and culture, function to exclude Turks. Their exclusion of Turks constructs the (turkish) Cypriot identity that is based on the differences between Turks and (turkish) Cypriots. In a similar vein, the respondents’ emphasis on the common past, present, future and culture between Turkish and Greek Cypriots articulate the (turkish) Cypriot identity. Their emphasis on the similarities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their desire for the difference between the present and the future (participation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU) function as transformative strategies that transform Turkish (cypriot) identity into (turkish) Cypriot identity. In this sense, the emphasis on the unshared past, present, future and culture operate to construct the Turkish (cypriot) identity that is based on the differences between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and on the necessity of continuing the status quo (Turkish rule on the island). This latter emphasis functions as a strategy of justification, an attempt to justify the present situation. However, I also examined the constant articulation of the memories in relation to identity as the crossing points between the logics of inclusion and exclusion that sometimes locate Turks, and sometimes Greek Cypriots, as the ‘others’. I explored the changing self-other relationships in the memories of single social individuals even while they were answering the questions of the in-depth interviews. Thus, the memories of the respondents were constantly articulated and constructed while they were talking.

In this research, I also examined how the autobiographical memories (individually peculiar to the social individuals) are mediated through public memories which encompass the narratives of families, school education, close environment, official mechanisms and media. Hence I was able to determine how the public memories function as lived experiences for the 20-33 age group (this age group has no personal memories with Greek Cypriots before the division of the island). On the other hand, the autobiographical memories of the respondents within the 40-80 age group are generally uncertain and indefinite. Thus, the shared memories are sharpened as they are constantly repeated by the mechanisms of memory. In this respect, most of the time, the respondents’ interpretations about the ‘others’ are not the outcome of what they personally lived but what they experience through the social remembering that is partly constructed by the mechanisms of memory.

The interpretations of the respondents about the mechanisms of memory enabled me to observe how the respondents locate themselves in terms of national identity.
and how they define the ‘others’. However, there are limitations to this research: First of all, it is difficult to study memory, especially in a conflict situation, as it is not always easy for the respondents to talk about the traumatic events of the past, the Cyprus war and the division of the island. It is also difficult for them to talk about their memories in relation to national identity because of the political situation in Northern Cyprus. One of the other difficulties of researching memory/memories is that when respondents think and talk about the mechanisms of memory, they re-construct their versions of ‘reality’ about their national identities: their memory is not a store of fixed and stable information and their memories are not deposited in their minds waiting for exploration. This situation makes this research problematic, as the respondents’ memories are constantly articulated, negotiated and constructed, making it impossible to reach a conclusive end result regarding their memories. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the primary source of ‘information’ that constructs the memories of the respondents about their identities and about the ‘others’, because memory/memories are articulated through the complex functioning of the autobiographical and public memories that are intertwined with each other.

Despite its limitations, this study managed to explore how the mechanisms of memory mobilize and articulate the respondents’ memories in relation to national identity. I examined the ways in which the mechanisms articulate not only the past but also the present and the future; they have a critical influence on the political ideas of the respondents about the future prospects of Northern Cyprus. I also examined how the autobiographical (private) memories are mediated through public memories (narratives of families, close environment, official history, media). Since we think of memories as our primary sources of ‘information’, it might be disturbing to see that their ‘reality’ and ‘truthfulness’ is highly questionable; nevertheless, this knowledge could help to form a critical understanding about memory/memories in relation to national identity.

This research represents a starting point for future comparative research exploring the mechanisms of memory in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot societies; it would be very useful to compare how these mechanisms articulate and construct the memories in relation to national identity and to examine the similarities and differences between the memories of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. A range of possibilities for future research is also opened up in this study, not only as regards Cyprus, but also for thinking and researching the articulation and construction of memory in other divided societies.
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APPENDIX 1

Questions used in the questionnaire and in-depth interviews

I. Questions used in the questionnaire

1) What is your sex?
   a) Male  b) Female

2) Where are you living now?

3) How old are you?

4) What is your education level?

5) Were you or a member of your family not born in Northern Cyprus? (Are you or any of your family members refugees?)

6) Do you have a job? What is your occupation?

7) How many family members do you have?

8) Is there any martyr in your family or close environment?

9) How do you consider yourself in terms of nationality?
   a) Turkish  b) Turkish Cypriot  c) Cypriot  d) Other

10) How often do you read a newspaper?

11) How often do you buy a newspaper?

12) What is your favourite newspaper? Why?

13) How do you feel about Northern Cyprus’ participating in the European Union?

II. Questions used in the in-depth interviews

Questions about memories in relation to national identity

a) Questions for interviewees between the ages 40-80

1) Do you have any memories of living with the Greek Cypriots? What was life like then? Do you have direct knowledge of this? How did you obtain that information? How did you get to know them (past-present)

2) Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did you or your family have any fears? Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears?
3) What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think about them? Can they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland? How do you get information about them? about what is happening in the South and what has happened in the past?

4) Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a good or a bad thing? What do the borders mean to you?

5) Do you think the island should remain divided or be unified? Why?

6) Were things better or worse before the division of the island into North and South? What do you know about the period before 1974? How do you know this?

7) What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel about it?

8) What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974?

b) Questions for interviewees between the ages 20-33

1) What do you know about life with the Greek Cypriots? How did you obtain this information? How did you get to know what you know about them?

2) Living with the Greek Cypriots before 1974, did your family have any fears? Did Turkish Cypriots as a community have any fears?

3) What are your feelings about Greek Cypriots? What do you think about them? Can they be our partners sharing the same island/homeland? How do you get information about them? about what is happening in the South and what has happened in the past?

4) Do you think that maintaining the borders that divide the island is a good or a bad thing? What do the borders mean to you?

5) Do you think the island should remain divided or be unified? Why?

6) Were things better or worse before the division of the island into North and South? What do you know about the period before 1974? How do you know this?

7) What do you think the “20 July Happy Peace Operation” achieved? How do you feel about it?

8) What do you think about the Turks who migrated to the island after 1974?

Questions about political ideas in relation to the Cyprus Problem

1) What is your view on the Cyprus problem? How would you describe it?

2) What do you think should be done?

3) How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect the security of the Turkish Cypriots?
4) How would EU membership for North Cyprus affect its economy, culture and politics? Do you feel there are going to be foreign influences on the Turkish Cypriots? What would they be?

5) Do you share the views of your preferred political party on the EU?

6) What do you think the future will bring regarding the political situation in Northern Cyprus? And what do you expect from the future?

Questions about media
(i.e., the role of the media (especially the newspapers) in everyday life, newspaper preferences, frequency in reading of newspapers, etc.)

1) How do you get information about the Cyprus problem?

2) Do you trust the news media? Do you feel the news stories are accurate, represent truth or lies? How do you determine this?

3) Do you think newspapers help the Turkish Cypriot community to remember and properly commemorate key instances of its past?

4) Are there newspapers that offer distorted accounts of past and present and disorient Turkish Cypriots? How?

5) What do you think about the role of the newspapers in the TRNC?

6) Do you think that the newspapers gave out sufficient information about the European Union by the time the referendum took place?

7) Does your favorite newspaper reflect your political standpoint about the EU?

8) What do these news stories tell us about the past? Do you feel news stories represent truth or lies?

9) What do you think when you read the news headlines?

10) What difference does it make when you see, perform and celebrate the commemorative activities, when you are personally involved and when you experience them through the media?

11) How do you feel when you hear the national anthem on the radio or TV? Is there any difference between when you hear it on the radio/TV and when you hear(d) it at school?

12) What do you remember about the Greek Cypriots from the media?

13) What do you remember from the media about Turkish people from Turkey?

14) Do you remember how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were represented in the movies?
APPENDIX 2

List of the in-depth interview respondents

Pros to the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union

Interviewers between the ages 20-33
1. Haluk (male), 16 July 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 70 minutes
   Age: 33
   Occupation: English teacher
   Education Level: University
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika

2. Mustafa (male), 26 July 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 56 minutes
   Age: 29
   Occupation: Warehouseman
   Education Level: High School
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs

3. Sertan (male), 28 July 2007, domestic parlour, Küçükkaymaklı, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 58 minutes
   Age: 33
   Occupation: Shop owner
   Education Level: University
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika

4. Berk (male), 7 August 2007, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 72 minutes
   Age: 27
   Occupation: University instructor
   Education Level: Post-Graduate
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

5. Tezcan (male), 7 August 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 55 minutes
   Age: 30
   Occupation: Tourism
   Education Level: University
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

6. Özdemir (male), 27 August 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 57 minutes
   Age: 24
   Occupation: Unemployed
   Education Level: University
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Halkın Sesi
7. Mehmet (male), 30 August 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 55 minutes
   Age: 20
   Occupation: Student
   Education Level: University student
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

8. Ezgi (male), 1 September 2007, Green House Cafe, Köşklüçiftlik, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 50 minutes
   Age: 20
   Occupation: Student
   Education Level: University student
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs

9. Selen (female), 15 August 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 85 minutes
   Age: 29
   Occupation: TV presenter
   Education Level: Post-graduate
   Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi

10. Nevruz (female), 21 August 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 55 minutes
    Age: 22
    Occupation: Beauty specialist
    Education Level: High school
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

11. Deniz (female), 1 September 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 58 minutes
    Age: 23
    Occupation: Public relations
    Education Level: University
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs

12. Fide (female), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 50 minutes
    Age: 26
    Occupation: employee in the milk industry
    Education Level: Post-graduate
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

13. Ayten (female), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Küçükkaymaklı, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 57 minutes
    Age: 23
    Occupation: Student
    Education Level: High school
    Favorite Newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika
14. Mine (female), 4 September 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 52 minutes
   Age: 28
   Occupation: Customs and immigration officer
   Education Level: University
   Favorite Newspapers: Kibris

15. Zehra Eylem (female), 7 October 2007, domestic parlour, Gönyeli, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 59 minutes
   Age: 22
   Occupation: Singer
   Education Level: High school
   Favorite Newspapers: Kibris, Star

**Interviewers between the ages 40-80**

1. Selda (female), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 49 minutes
   Age: 40
   Occupation: Radio reporter
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris

2. Ergin Sururi (male), 23 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 65 minutes
   Age: 70
   Occupation: Retired teacher
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Afrika, Halkın sesi

3. İclal (female), 17 July 2007, domestic parlour, Belediye Evleri, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 61 minutes
   Age: 81
   Occupation: Retired nurse
   Education Level: Primary school
   Favorite Newspapers: Kibris

4. Emine (female), 18 July 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 61 minutes
   Age: 52
   Occupation: Retired official
   Education Level: High school
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Yenidüzen

5. Sevim (female), 17 July 2007, housewife, Belediye evleri, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 67 minutes
   Age: 70
   Occupation: Housewife
   Education Level: Primary school
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

   Duration: 50 minutes
   Age: 54
   Occupation: Retired official
   Education Level: High school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

7. Mustafa (male), 16 August 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 95 minutes
   Age: 68
   Occupation: Accountant
   Education Level: high school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Afrika, Halkın sesi, Yenidüzen

8. Ayça (male), 18 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 61 minutes
   Age: 50
   Occupation: Tourism employee
   Education Level: Technical school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

9. Kemal (male), 21 September 2007, domestic parlour, Kermiya, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 45 minutes
   Age: 51
   Occupation: Tire marketing expert
   Education Level: Secondary school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

10. İsmet (male), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 50 minutes
    Age: 47
    Occupation: TV programmer
    Education Level: High school
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

11. Sevinç (female), 23 September 2007, BRT, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 55 minutes
    Age: 48
    Occupation: News speaker
    Education Level: High school
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen

12. Nahide (female), 23 July 2007, place of employment, Lefkoşa
    Duration: 60 minutes
    Age: 49
    Occupation: Book seller
    Education Level: University
    Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Afrika
13. Gül (female), 25 September 2007, domestic parlour  
   Duration: 62 minutes  
   Age: 54  
   Occupation: Housewife  
   Education Level: Primary school  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Yenidüzen

14. Abdullah (male), 21 August 2007, Green House Cafe  
   Duration: 58 minutes  
   Age: 65  
   Occupation: Retired teacher  
   Education Level: University  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Halkın Sesi, Yenidüzen

15. Hasan (male), 23 September 2007, domestic parlour  
   Duration: 50 minutes  
   Age: 60  
   Occupation: Retired teacher  
   Education Level: University  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Afrika

Cons to the participation of Northern Cyprus in the European Union

Interviewers between the ages 20-33

1. Ayşe (female), 28 July 2007, office room, Girne  
   Duration: 60 minutes  
   Age: 31  
   Occupation: University instructor  
   Education Level: Post-graduate  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Volkan, Kibrıslı, Afrika

2. Memduh (male), 24 July 2007, Ulusal Birlik Partisi, Lefkoşa  
   Duration: 62 minutes  
   Age: 23  
   Occupation: Student  
   Education Level: University  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Guneş, Volkan

3. Tuna (male), 26 July 2007, Demokrat Parti, Lefkoşa  
   Duration: 53 minutes  
   Age: 26  
   Occupation: Student  
   Education Level: University  
   Favorite newspapers: Kibris, Demokrat Bakış, Kibrıslı, Volkan

4. Yusuf (male), 30 July 2007, Domestic parlour, Lefkoşa
Duration: 60 minutes
Age: 30
Occupation: Official
Education Level: University
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Demokrat Baktı̇ş, Kıbrı̇slı, Volkan

5. Cemre (female), 27 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Lefkoşa, Göçmenköy
Duration: 35 minutes
Age: 22
Occupation: Unemployed
Education Level: University
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Star

6. Doğa (male), 31 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Girne
Duration: 46 minutes
Age: 27
Occupation: Lawyer
Education Level: University
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Volkan

7. Melek (female), 31 August 2007, Domestic parlour, Girne
Duration: 45 minutes
Age: 28
Occupation: University instructor
Education Level: Post-graduate
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Kıbrıs Star

8. Duyal (female), 15 August 2007, Office, Nicosia
Duration: 50 minutes
Age: 21
Occupation: Student
Education Level: High school
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

9. Yusuf (male), 15 August 2007, classroom, Lefkoşa
Duration: 30 minutes
Age: 21
Occupation: Student
Education Level: High School
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs

10. Fatoş (female), 17 August 2007, domestic parlour, Girne
Duration: 70 minutes
Age: 25
Occupation: Shop assistant
Education Level: High school
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi

11. Ferah (female), 19 August 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa
Duration: 56 minutes  
Age: 32  
Occupation: Air hostess  
Education Level: High School  
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs, Vatan

12. Alp (male), 1 September 2007, Optician, Lefkoşa  
Duration: 60 minutes  
Age: 29  
Occupation: Optician  
Education Level: High School  
Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Kıbrıs

13. Namık (male), 3 September 2007, domestic parlour, Girne  
Duration: 65 minutes  
Age: 29  
Occupation: Police  
Education Level: High School  
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Kıbrıs

14. Güliz (female), 31 August 2007, domestic parlour, Girne  
Duration: 40 minutes  
Age: 28  
Occupation: Housewife  
Education Level: High school  
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

15. Meltem (female), 31 July 2007, domestic parlour, Lefkoşa  
Duration: 54 minutes  
Age: 22  
Occupation: Housewife  
Education Level: Secondary school  
Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Kıbrıs

Interviewers between the ages 40-80

1. Nurten (female), 21 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa  
Duration: 45 minutes  
Age: 60  
Occupation: Retired history teacher  
Education Level: University  
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Kıbrıs

2. Aydın (male), 21 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa  
Duration: 65 minutes  
Age: 80  
Occupation: Retired Turkish teacher and counselor  
Education Level: University  
Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Kıbrıs
3. Erdal (male), 20 July 2007, Kardeş Ocağı, Arabahmet, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 63 minutes
   Age: 67
   Occupation: Civil engineer
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın sesi

4. Arif (male), 20 July 2007, Domestic parlour, Kumsal, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 84 Minutes
   Age: 86
   Occupation: Retired counsellor
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, Volkan

5. Ahmet (male), 24 July 2007, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 58 minutes
   Age: 60
   Occupation: Barber
   Education Level: Secondary school
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Vatan, Volkan

6. Alican Kabakçı (male), 30 July 2007, Çiftçiler Birliği, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 65 minutes
   Age: 49
   Occupation: Farmer
   Education Level: High school
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Volkan, Afrika

7. Esra (female), 23 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 49 minutes
   Age: 62
   Occupation: Retired teacher
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Vatan, Halkın Sesi, Volkan

8. Göktan (male), 14 October 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 45 minutes
   Age: 41
   Occupation: Mechanical engineer
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs

9. Makbule (female), 1 October 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 100 minutes
   Age: 61
   Occupation: Journalist
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Halkın Sesi

10. Emine (female), 30 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
Duration: 57 minutes
Age: 63
Occupation: Retired teacher
Education Level: University
Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Güneş, Halkın Sesi

11. Menekşe (female), 30 September 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 40 minutes
   Age: 55
   Occupation: Tailor
   Education Level: High School
   Favorite newspapers: Volkan, Halkın Sesi

12. Ülkü (female), 12 August 2007, Domestic Labour, Girne
   Duration: 68 minutes
   Age: 56
   Occupation: Retired official
   Education Level: High school
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs

13. Salime (female), 12 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 35 minutes
   Age: 68
   Occupation: Retired teacher
   Education Level: University
   Favorite newspapers: Halkın Sesi, Kıbrıs Postası

   Duration: 51 minutes
   Age: 69
   Occupation: Restaurant manager
   Education Level: Secondary school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs

15. Ahmet (male), 17 July 2007, Domestic Labour, Lefkoşa
   Duration: 51 minutes
   Age: 50
   Occupation: Farmer
   Education Level: Secondary school
   Favorite newspapers: Kıbrıs, Volkan, Vatan
APPENDIX 3

Photographs from the history textbook that was published in 1981 and used in schools during the period of President Denktaş and the UBP government.
APPENDIX 4

Examples of portrayals of the village and social life of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, from the history textbook that was published in 2004 and used in schools during the period of the CTP government.
3. 17-3 Nasıl Besleniyorlardı?

Kıbrıs'ın köylерinde yaşayanlar, ağırlık koşullarını karşılayabilmek için iyı beslenmeleri gerektiğini biliyordu. Zor savaş yılları, kuraklık, salgın hastalıklar döneminde halkın yoklaşma olması rağmen, tüketicileri yiyeceklerin önemli bölümünü köylere ve hatta evlere ürettiğini için, bu zor yılları az zorlukla atlatabiliyordu.


"Allahum sana şükürler olsun. Sofrumuz nitvesiz burakma"


Kaynak 3 Fotograf dikkatlice inceleyiniz. Fotograflarla esyaları tamına ve ne işle yaradığını tasvir tamaño çeşitlendirin.

Neler Yenirdi?

APPENDIX 5

Explanations of the British colonial administration and the reasons behind the Greek and Turkish nationalisms, as seen in the history textbook that was published in 2004 and used in schools during the period of the CTP government.
İngilizler'in Kıbrıs'ta EOKA eylemlerine karşı aldığı ilginç önlemlerden biri de Lefkoşa'da sırlar içinde bisiklet sürenin yasaklanmasıydı. Bu yasakın nedeni, İngiliz asker ve polislerini yaran EOKA'ların, kağıtken bisiklet kullamlarınıydı.

Kaynak 4
Dönemin en önemli şehir içi ulaşım araçlarından bir olan bisikletlerle ilgili alınan yasaklama kararından sonra Lefkoşa girişlerinde büyük bisiklet yuvarlakları oluşmaya başladı.


Kaynak 5

3.7 Yeni Anayasal Öneriler
1956 yılı İngiltere'nin Ortadoğu'daki çıkarlarını önemli ölçüde kaybettiği bir yıl oldu. Misr Süveyş Kanalı'nın milliştirdiği (yabancılarla birbirleri, devletin mali haline getirmek). Bunun üzerine İngilizere, Fransa ve İsrail tarafından Süveyş Kanalı'na ortaklaşa bir askeri harekat gerçekleştirdildi.
4. 10 Neden Bu Duruma Gelindi?

- Gizli olarak kurulan mücadele örgütlerinin faaliyetleri
- Siyasetçilerin deneçleri
- Olayların tek tarafından yansıyan basın
- Türkiye ve Yunanistan halklarından gelen milliyeti mesajları
- Soğuk Savaşı'nın Kıbrıs'a etkisi
- 1966 yılında kamuoyuna açıklanan Akritas Planı ile maçlananlar
- Milliyeti söylemlere sıkı sıkıya bağlı birçok Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rum'un birbirlerine karşı duydukları güvenizlik

Kaynak 5

Birlikte Çalışalım:

1. Kaynak 1'deki çizimi dikkatle inceleyiniz. Bu çizimden neler anlaymentınız? Çizim konuyla anlamamba kahtı sağladınız mı?
2. Kıbrıs Türk toplumun adına yönetim görevini üstlenen siz obsaydmız, Kıbrıslı Rumlarım anayasal değişiklik önerilerine nasıl bir cevap verirdiniz?
3. Cumhurbaşkanı Makarios'un önerdiği değişikliklerden hangisi/hangilerinin Kıbrıslı Türkler için tehlikeli olduğuna inanıyor musunuz?
4. Bağlantıszlar Hareketi, bazı devletlerin biraraya gelerek kurdukları bir örgütlenmedir. Günümüzde de var olan böyle devlet örgütlenmeleri biziye musunuz?
5. Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk dönemlerinde ortaya çıkan 'anayasal' sorunları, Kıbrıslı Türkler açısından taşıtimeofdayın inandığımız örnekler bakımından sıralayınız.