Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy since Independence: A Small State From Order Taker to Order Maker (1991-2021)

Bakumbayev, Birzhan

https://doi.org/10.34737/w7xvq

Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy since Independence:

A Small State from Order Taker to Order Maker (1991-2021)

By

Birzhan Bakumbayev BA, MA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the award of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Westminster

November 2023

Abstract

The role of small states in international relations has been thought of as one of deference to great powers. In this view, great powers can create, maintain, and dictate behaviour, while small states must follow their lead. Small states are considered weak, vulnerable, lacking in power, and therefore as "takers". However, this thesis makes the argument that small states are also able to be "makers". While small states lack power in material terms, and not all of them even have so-called soft power, they can develop other forms of power that can help them sustain their independence and influence others. Kazakhstan is a crucial case in point. It has adopted a foreign policy that was uncommon during the Cold War. It faced Russia in the North and China in the East and simultaneously developed relations with the West. It has pursued a balanced multi-vector foreign policy, demonstrating the ability to manage and conduct such a policy in an environment of great power politics. Moreover, under such conditions, post-independent Kazakhstan has shown the ability to focus on regional integration and nuclear disarmament, considered an area of great power privilege. A small state like Kazakhstan demonstrates that order-making can be done in a specific issue area and the form of an issue corrector. Besides, post-independence behaviour does not conform to small state theory; rather, it is active and proactive and does not bandwagon or balance with threatening powers, as mainstream International Relations theories suggested. Instead, it shows the pattern of behaviour that reflects post-independent Kazakhstan as a "maker" rather than a "taker".

Contents

Abstract i

List of Abbreviations v

List of Tables vii

Acknowledgements viii

Author's Declaration ix

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

1.1. Problem Statement 1

1.2. Research aims, objectives, and methodology 4

1.3. Limitation 13

1.4. Thesis outline 14

Chapter 2. Conceptual Framework: International Relations, Small States and Order Making: A Critical View 17

2.1. Introduction 17

2.2. Small state studies 17

2.3. Cold War Small State Literature 19

2.4. Post-Cold War Small State Literature 27

2.5 Small State as Order Maker 39

2.5.1. Background: The Presence of great power 39

2.5.2. Precondition: From great power focus to issues 42

2.5.3. Order and Issue-Corrector 44

Conclusion **47**

Chapter 3. Domestic context of Post-Independent Kazakhstan: Smallness, Authoritarianism and Stability 51

3.1. Introduction 51

3.2. Smallness 53

3.3. Regime Stability and President Nazarbayev 54

3.4. Domestic Stability and Russian Question 59

Conclusion 79

Chapter 4. Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Review 81

4.1. Introduction 81

4.2. Managing Major Powers 82

4.3. Foreign Policy Priorities: Challenges to Multivector Foreign Policy 98

4.4. From Great Powers to Issues 103

4.4.1. Regional Order-Making Initiative: the Eurasian Union (EAU) 107

4.4.2. International Order-Making Initiative: a world free of nuclear weapons 108

Conclusion **110**
Chapter 5. The Eurasian Union Initiative and Regional Context 111
5.1. Introduction **111**
5.2. Precondition **111**
5.3. Order-Maker Moves **116**
5.3.1. Scenario One: The 1994 EAU Proposal – All in One at Once 116
5.3.2. Scenario Two: From 'All in One' to the Concept of Core 119
5.3.3. Scenario Three: the EAEU and Political Integration 121
5.4. Integration Issue Analysis **123**
5.4.1. Formation 123
5.4.2. Implementation 126
5.4.3. Control 128
5.4.4. Challenge 131
Conclusion **134**
Chapter 6. Anti-Nuclear Initiative and International Context 136
6.1. Introduction **136**
6.2. Precondition: Denuclearisation of post-independent Kazakhstan **137**
The Commonwealth of Independent States 137
The United States 138
Security Assurance 139
6.3. Kazakhstan as Order-Maker **141**
Epicentre of Peace: NPT and Problem Statement 141
Manifest Peace: XXI century 144
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures 145
6.4. Nuclear Issue Analysis **147**
6.4.1. Positioning 148
6.4.3. Moral Right 150
6.4.4. Actualisation 152
6.4.5. Consistency 154
Conclusion **157**
Chapter 7. Conclusion 159
7.1. Introduction 159
7.2. Key Findings 159
7.3. Contribution to Knowledge 164
7.4. Suggestions for Future Research 170

Bibliography 172
Appendices 226
Appendix 1. The concept of great power **226**
Appendix 2. Foreign Policy and Priorities **227**
Appendix 3. Kazakhstan's external engagement and initiatives **228**
Appendix 4. Eurasian Initiatives in Documents **230**
Appendix 5. Nuclear Initiatives in Documents **232**
Appendix 6. Major Pipelines and Shareholders **234**
Appendix 7. Kazakhstan's main trading partners: 10 countries with the largest turnover **235**
Appendix 8. The Evolution of the Legal base during Yeltsin and Putin era **236**

List of Abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APK	Assembly of People of Kazakhstan
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organisation
CAEU	Central Asian Economic Union
CCTC	Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries
CES	Common Economic Space
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
CU	Custom Union
EAU	Eurasian Union
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EADB	Eurasian Development Bank
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
EU	European Union
EURASEC	Eurasian Economic Community
EEC	Eurasian Economic Commission
FPI	Foreign policy initiatives
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
IR	International Relations
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
ODIHR	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OAPEC	Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OIC	Organisation for Islamic Conference

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTC	The Organization of Turkic States
MVFP	Multi-vector foreign policy
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NNS	Non-nuclear weapon states
NS	Nuclear states
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SES	Single Economic Space
SNTS	Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site
SU	Soviet Union
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN	United Nations

List of Tables

Table 1a: The Legal status of Kazakh and Russian Languages: The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995

Table 1b. The Legal status of Kazakh and Russian Languages: The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997

Table 2a: Oralman allocation in the North-East regions from 1991-2007

Table 2b: Oralman allocation in the West-South regions from 1991-2007

Table 3: Name of the regions and the percentage of Kazakh and Slavic populations before the merge.

Table 4. The region's border with Russia: Kazakhs and Russians in percentage in 2018

Table 5: Problem Statement: the EAU project content

Table 6: Proposed Solution Statement: the EAU project content

Table 7. The nuclear issue in foreign policy statements

Table 8. Five Actions (A) from Kazakhstan

Table 9. confidence-building measures from Kazakhstan

Table 10: Order Making Initiatives

Acknowledgements

I would like to say a special thank you to my supervisors, Professor Nitasha Kaul and Professor Dibyesh Anand. Their support, guidance and overall insights in the field of International Relations have made this an inspiring experience for me. I am extremely grateful to the Centre for the Study of Democracy and the University of Westminster for providing the right place and resources to complete my research project which emerged as an idea in 2013 and came to its end in 2022. I would also like to thank the friendly staff of the Bodleian Social Science Library in Oxford where I was a regular visitor. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me during the compilation of this dissertation.

Author’s Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.

One state emerged with the belief to lead
and for others to follow but for the rest to think

One state emerged with the hope to create
and for others to fit in but for the rest to think

One state emerged with the values to share
and for others to accept but for the rest to think

One state emerged with an order to impose
and for others to submit but for the rest to think

One state emerged to correct
and for others to respect and for the rest to think

---- Birzhan Bakumbayev (October 2022)

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Problem Statement

This thesis is about how a small state can behave as an order-maker. To call a small state an order maker means entering the area of great power privilege. In the theory of International Relations (IR), it is a great power that can create order through leadership, institution creation, setting rules and norms of behaviour, and maintaining order, while for other small states, it is to follow and obey to the rules of the game set by great powers (Morgenthau, 1948; Keohane, 1969; Krasner, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Bull, 1977) (see: Appendix 1 on great power concept). Second, downgrading small states in favour of great powers had a history of negative connotations. Such negative attitudes are present and dominant in International Relations theory. It starts from Thucydides, who famously wrote that 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept' (cited in Lobel *et al.,* 2009, p.4). This view continued by 20th-century IR scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, who have taken a similar view that 'strong states or great powers are in effect 'power-makers'; they can change the behaviour of other states, whereas weak states are in effect 'power-takers', having no choice but to follow the great powers' (cited in Hobson, 2000, p.23). In the 21st Century, it is still the same, with small states as 'order takers.' In contrast, more powerful states are 'order makers' from the point of view of liberal institutionalism (Ikenberry, 2011, p.28), as 'norm-takers' from the constructivist's school of thought (Bjorkdahl *et al*., 2015). It is how major IR theories position small states in their preoccupation with great power. Such attitude toward small states even influenced scholars on small states to acknowledge this: 'In external relations, the consequence of limited capability is exacerbated by power asymmetry, leaving small states to struggle with being price and policy takers' (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020). They are weak, passive, vulnerable, and dependent on external strength. As a result, small states in the various perspectives within IR have been given a lower value in their ability to act as a 'maker'. Thus, order-making has always been around great powers that formed the foundation for the conventional wisdom that great powers are order makers, while small states are order takers.

From the above, it has been clear that great powers hold the area of order-making as a privilege not achievable for small states. However, what if there is no great power or its relative absence? Let us consider that the collapse of the USSR facilitated order-making because no power emerged to order the post-soviet region at that time. Consider that a new post-Cold War facilitated order-making because great powers need others to share responsibility. Thus, this is

an open space for a small state to demonstrate its order-making. Kazakhstan is a perfect example for detecting that phenomenon. It captured the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore, post-independent Kazakhstan is an ideal case candidate for research as an order-maker. First, post-independent Kazakhstan emerged as weak, underdeveloped, and nuclear, with a large territory rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, a heavy industry built during the Soviet era, and a multi-ethnic population (Starr and Dawisha, 1997). Like other post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan in the 1990s faced challenges of state-building, economic and political adjustment to a new international environment, and, most importantly, acknowledging its independence. By the mid-2000s, Kazakhstan emerged as stable and more prosperous than other former Soviet Union states. It has become a visible and viable state in the international system. It became a reliable energy supplier to the world market, demonstrating political stability to foreign investors and showing itself as a viable country for trade and security cooperation. Second, after gaining independence, Kazakhstan adopted a rare foreign policy. It faces Russia in the north and China in the east, and at the same time has developed substantial relations with the Western states, including the USA. It has pursued a balanced multivector foreign policy, demonstrating the ability to manage and conduct such a policy in an environment of great power politics. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4 with a review of Kazakhstan's foreign policy, it differs in its behaviour towards regional powers, regional cooperation, and commitment to foreign policy principles. Kazakhstan has earned an image of balancing great powers due to its multi-vector foreign policy (Hug and Zhang, 2010). Balancing these powers had become a significant approach for Kazakhstan. This approach results from the understanding of its vulnerability and risk that small states consider being between great powers (Kaul, 2021, p.2). Third, Kazakhstan has avoided any move to antagonise major powers and turned them instead into strategic partners in its foreign policy strategy. While acknowledging their presence, Kazakhstan took leadership by proposing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAU) in 1994 and even engaging in nuclear disarmament after its denuclearisation. These two cases bring us back to the times of the USSR. For instance, the reorganisation of the Soviet Union within the framework of the new treaty did not materialise due to the collapse of the USSR, and a renewed attempt to organise into a new regional organisation has been a significant issue for post-soviet states. Denuclearisation also began during the Soviet Union, with the idea of closing the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test site in the still-existing USSR. While these issues and actions were within the USSR, they continued their importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The last thing to notice is the sense of

responsibility, which, after all, indicates signs of order-making reflected in the speech that President Nazarbayev expressed in 1994:

> The global regime has been determined by the relationship of the key players that make up the basic rules of the game. Therefore, it is difficult to talk about the international order as a system of global responsibility. Small countries did not have the opportunity to express their interests, thus it was difficult to talk about their responsibility. At this stage, the world is faced with new problems. In my opinion, the key one is the preservation of peace through the formation of a system of responsibility. This includes how the system works. I want to emphasise that the system of global responsibility was understood in a narrow military-political aspect. But now the world is trying to understand it as an absolute problem, covering all aspects of human existence. This sounds especially relevant in relation to the states ... the USSR. If during the Cold War it occupied its place in the collective security system and bore its own measure of responsibility, now this responsibility is divided to varying degrees between fifteen states. (Nazarbayev, 1994a, pp.24-25)

The main message of his statements is that great powers' presence as key order-makers is questionable, and it is time for small states like Kazakhstan to claim responsibility and act as order-makers. Consequently, it acted as an order-maker with the proposed Eurasian Union (EAU) project to ensure economic order in the post-Soviet region while restoring order in nuclear disarmament with a free world of nuclear weapons initiatives. These critical foreign policy initiatives directed towards the regional and international arena (FPI), as Kazakh officials call them, were used to describe its engagement with issues that concerned post-independent Kazakhstan the most. Kazakhstan scientists use foreign policy initiatives as a label to showcase Nazarbayev's leadership and Kazakhstan's role on the international stage (Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, 2010; Abuseitova, 2011; Rakhimzhanova *et al*., 2019). Although it has been acknowledged in academia (Akiner, 2011; Cummings, 2014; Burkhanov, Orazgaliyev and Araral, 2019; Anceschi, 2020), it is an understudied aspect of Kazakhstan's foreign policy area. They are essential for understanding Kazakhstan as an order-maker, as discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, content and meaning are crucial to understanding the FPI as a reflection of order-making in Kazakhstan's foreign policy construct. It is an independent variable directed towards a dependent post-soviet region and the international arena. These

foreign policy initiatives are inconsistent with the view of systemic theories of IR because Kazakhstan is a small state surrounded by great powers. (Legvold, 2003; Cornell, 2007; Cohen, 2008; Weitz, 2008; Cooley, 2012; Clarke, 2015) and 'initiating' belongs to great powers only (Brecher, 1972, pp.15-16). In the regional interaction, according to Breslin (2013, p.71), 'weak states 'bandwagon' in regional projects with dominant powers' and sees 'regionalism as a function of hegemonic preferences', while at the systemic level, the small state is system-ineffectual (Keohane, 1969). Thus, small states are marginalised at both levels. However, Kazakhstan shows an anomaly consistent with small-state studies that shed light on small states like Kazakhstan. As an extensive literature review in Chapter 2 shows, small-state scholars emphasise opportunities that emerged to influence and succeed in the new international context. In this case, Kazakhstan has also grasped this opportunity to succeed after independence. Therefore, two cases on the Eurasian Union (EAU) initiative and nuclear disarmament initiatives are unique to end the marginalisation of small states at the regional and international levels. Therefore, understanding these initiatives will lead us to position small states as order-makers and find out which regional or international context is better suited for small states to practise order-making. The overall research aims and objectives are followed below with a methodological approach I adapted to bring a new contribution to knowledge by conceptualising a small state as an order-maker.

1.2. Research aims, objectives, and methodology

This research aims to develop a better (conceptual) understanding of post-independent Kazakhstan as an order-maker. The following questions guide this inquiry: How can a small state like Kazakhstan behave as an order-maker, and in what context? This includes sub-questions such as: How has order-making been practised in regional and international contexts? To date, the commonly agreed view on small states is that they lack power, and therefore, small states will opt, in foreign policy, to be neutral or to align with greater power. In addition, they are weak, passive, vulnerable, and dependent on external strength. As a result, major IR theories have defined *small states* as passive 'takers'. The problem here is that by being preoccupied with great powers more and by adopting a general attitude that sees small states as 'takers', scholars have overlooked the 'viability' of small states in the international system and the possibility that less-powerful states might behave in the same way as great powers but in other issue areas. Moreover, the nature of power is changing and can no longer be understood solely as material power belonging to larger states. Small states could have found new power

sources based on something other than traditional hard or soft power. Power is usually associated with military and economic power and the ability of stronger states to exercise their power over smaller states. Well-known concepts like hard and soft power have developed (Nye, 2005) only from the experience of great powers and are of little use when adapted to small states' foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, we should consider other types of power that small states could adopt in opposition to hard and soft power, such as power over the issue. In asymmetrical relationships between larger and smaller states, power over the issue can mitigate uneasy situations for small states by not antagonising great powers. Under challenging circumstances, a small state could use a specific issue area to demonstrate order-making.

The key contention in this dissertation is that order-making occurs in a specific issue area and in the form of an issue-corrector. Thus, the transition to the specific issue area occurs when relations with major powers do not cause concern. The key idea here is that a small state focuses on issues that concern it more than on great powers' presence. As we will see in Chapter 4, Kazakhstan has made this transition after setting up strategic relationships with major powers, and only after that has Kazakhstan engaged in issues of regional integration and nuclear disarmament. As for the issue-corrector, the point is that it is designed not to confront great powers or challenge the existing regional and international order but to correct the course of specific issues towards the desired outcome, both in the regional and international context. Overall, this opportunity has appeared in the new international order. It was not the continuation of the Soviet system but an expansion of the US-led international order that formed after WWII. I especially pay attention to understanding that order in chapter 2. In this, I relied on small states' literature that indicates how the post-Cold War international context favours small states. The post-Cold War international order does provide such opportunities, and understanding its nature is essential. It is because a new international system is open and accessible, and great powers need others; therefore, order-making is shared between great powers and small states. Concerning regional and international issues, great powers cannot cover a range of issues that have been expanding after the Cold War, and they need others to join. It creates a possible condition for a small state to behave as an order maker. My objective, therefore, in this research is fourfold:

1. To review the literature on small-state foreign policy behaviour.
2. To provide background and develop a conceptual framework for exploring the conditions under which order-making is open for small states.

3. To make a unique empirical contribution to small state studies by bringing post-independent Kazakhstan and understanding its pattern of behaviour as an order-maker in the regional and international context.
4. To emphasize the importance of changes and factors favourable for order-making both in the regional and international context.

The intention for the study began even before I started formulating the research aim and purpose. It came from the belief that there is another reality behind Kazakhstan's proactive foreign policy behaviour. We may not know much about these actions, and small states like Kazakhstan may also behave as an order-maker like great powers. I was also informed by my intuition and observation of Kazakhstan's foreign policy regarding Eurasian integration and nuclear disarmament policies. It has been allied then with inconsistency with theories of IR that I studied previously. For me, it signalled that post-independent Kazakhstan entered into the area of great power privilege, and understanding it may bring new knowledge on how small states may behave as order-makers. An understanding of it inspired the study to adopt the interpretive position that emphasises understanding the experience rather than explanation; focusing on meaning is essential, which awaits its deconstruction by accessing the context-specific reality in order to empathetically uncover the reasons why a small state like Kazakhstan may act as an order maker (Marsh and Stoker, 2010; Lamont, 2015; Knotter, 2022). This position aligns with methods that share similar positions to understand the phenomenon in its own real-time and context. Therefore, a qualitative and case study approach was utilised to this end. The study valued words, not numbers, to arrive at a final research answer. Qualitative research is about meaning: it does not provide a single answer, treats context as important, can be experimental and critical, and uses all sorts of data (Virginia and Victoria, 2013, pp.20-21). It is also rich, diverse and complex (Madill and Cough, 2008). A case study method, according to Yin (2014), ‘is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context’ (Yin, 2014, p.16). Gerring (2017) argues that ‘a case study is highly focused, meaning that considerable time is spent by the researcher analysing, and subsequently presenting the chosen case, or cases, and the case is viewed as providing substantial evidence for the argument’ (Gerring, 2017, p28). The case study approach with an in-depth examination of the selected issue areas deepens our understanding of a particular concept and idea (Lamont, 2022, p.214). A data collection and analysis strategy are followed below to demonstrate how this study concluded.

Data Collection

The initial planning for fieldwork and research design had to be amended. It was due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown since February 2020. Thus, as it has summarised, 'the pandemic has made contingency planning a central part of our research design' (Krause et al., 2021). My research design has been adjusted since I stayed in the UK and the challenges created by the pandemic. I decided to adopt document analysis and take a critical approach to documents about Kazakhstan's regional integration proposal and denuclearisation in the 1990s and its nuclear policy afterwards. I found this helpful approach to understanding and explaining the regional integration failure and its sudden rise in Chapter 5 and also the post-denuclearisation behaviour of Kazakhstan in the nuclear issue area in Chapter 6. Due to evolving fieldwork risks, my engagement with the ethics process and clearance took a long time. I realised the high risks when one of my relatives from my dad's side passed away due to Covid-19, and my mom later was in hospital due to Covid-19. Then, the University announced a total restriction on travel. However, adjusting to the pandemic reality and considering what Acharya (2020) called a turn to more digital fieldwork did not affect my methodological positionality.

The study was conducted using primary sources of documentation: official documents, statements, published monographs, speeches and articles. At a time of complete lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic, digitised materials as primary data were my major focus. The documents that I have collected were primary 'stated foreign policy documents' between 1991 and 2022. They had mostly been produced in a critical time of disorder after the collapse of the Soviet Union and as a response to the negative changes it produced.

In the COVID lockdown, I have managed to prepare in advance, purchase a computer and ensure I can access the Internet. Apart from paying my rent on time and having no issues with food supply, I was confident to set the following task: to begin collecting official documents concerning the EAU project initiative published by Kazakh authorities and state institutions since 1994 and to collect data regarding nuclear weapons disarmament initiatives. The stated foreign policy document about Eurasian and nuclear policy since independence has been available on official state web pages and state-sponsored institutions. The documents were digitised and presented well. Two things were observed. First, it has been evident that the information regarding the EAU is in electronic form and open to the public to download. For instance, the Elbasy library web page lists books to download. In addition, Kazakhstan's Institute for Strategic Studies (KISI), a government think-tank, also has a webpage and links

to publication and search for others. Moreover, the data was collected also from electronic libraries such as the Kazakhstan National Electronic Library. In the search bar, if you type in Russian language ЕВРАЗИЙСКИЙ СОЮЗ (Eurasian Union), it will browse a list of books to see book publications in chronological order. So the researcher can track and see the record on the Eurasian integration topic. Second, the publications concerning both issues are open to public access. This is because the information regarding integration and nuclear issues is non-threatening and not against the regime. The Kazakh authorities are keen to open it to the public because they show the regime's successful foreign activities. For instance, I downloaded the book Eurasian Union: Ideas, Practice, Prospects 1994-1997. It is a historical account with a list of documents about the EAU project from 1994 to 1997. The same could be said about the nuclear issue. I have also downloaded the entire book, *The Epicentre of Peace*. It is where I found the initial account of the denuclearisation of Kazakhstan and the general view on nuclear disarmament and the future abolishing of nuclear weapons. Thus, the collection and access to these topics were not restricted but in the public domain and open to public view and download. Some documents may be restricted or need access depending on research purposes, but I found no such things during data collection regarding Eurasian integration and nuclear initiatives. In the table below, I have summarised the primary sources from where the documents were obtained between 2020 and 2021. It shows access status, availability and web link. In general, these links are to the collection of books published by President Nazarbayev as the primary author and links to electronic libraries and documents in the form of speeches and statements. The electronic version of the documents makes it easy for those outside of Kazakhstan to access, download or read. It is also the version of an archive in the current digital time. Thus, the Kazakh authority makes information on both issues accessible and open.

Access Status	**Web page address**
Open for public viewing no restriction	https://elbasylibrary.gov.kz/en/taxonomy/term/16 https://www.akorda.kz/en/archive https://elbasy.kz/en/books-publications
	https://elbasylibrary.gov.kz/en/node/78
Other	http://kazneb.kz/site?locale=en

Secondary data from the scholarly analysis was crucial to further understanding the initiatives in context. For instance, Professor Luca Anceschi drew upon Nazarbayev's Moscow speech in 1994 and built his research on this initial document (Anceschi, 2020). This is to point to the authenticity and credibility of the document that went through the eyes of scholars. The same applied to documents concerning nuclear issues; no signs of doubts were observed during the literature review and when document readings were conducted.

Data Analysis

Kazakhstan's views towards regional and international context are produced and reflected in documents. Specifically, I am interested in the content of those documents and what they tell about Kazakhstan's view on regional integration and position towards nuclear disarmament. Since the Eurasian initiative is an alternative idea for the new integration of post-Soviet states, I was interested in justifying it as an order-making initiative and how its content indicates how it intends to do this and, therefore, to look for the pattern of communication within both cases (Lamont, 2015, p. 91). Therefore, content analysis was applicable 'as a technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use' (Krippendorff, 2013, p.24); it requires extensive reading to identify text characteristics and extracting key passages and quotes from documents and categorization (Herman, 2008, p.151; Lamont, 2015; Tight, 2019). I did categorization inductively to identify particular categories during my reading. It allowed me to identify key documents, note order-making scenarios within both cases, code-labelling them accordingly, interpret findings, and conclude (Lamont, 2015, pp.89-90).

I began reading related texts with those with the EAU project. Analytically, I divided the process into two phases. In the first phase, a range of documents about the EAU project were identified after in-depth reading. For instance, scholar refers to Nazarbayev's Moscow speech in 1994, which I consider an 'Overview Document' towards regional integration and indicates how integration has been approached. However, I labelled the vital document signed by Nazarbayev on June 3 1994, as 'Scenario 1' with the title 'All in One at Once' since its core meaning calls for other former Soviet Union states to join his proposed EAU. During a further reading, I found the following document: a speech given on February 16, 1996, in Moscow that shows Nazarbayev's disinterest in his idea but proposes further order-making move, which I labelled as 'Scenario 2', which means a shift from 'All in One Scenario' to 'Core' only. Thus, Scenario 2 meant to begin integration with core states instead of calling others. The effect

followed as scholars observed a sudden rise in Eurasian integration since 2000. In further in-depth reading, I observed another text, an article published in 2011, where Nazarbayev called the Eurasian Union an open project. I labelled it as ‘Scenario 3’. Its meaning broadened the EAU idea to include other non-post-soviet states. Thus, in-depth reading, tracking of constancy, and theme extraction showed that documents emerge within the Eurasian integration initiative, and they are not static but reflect dynamics to correct the course of regional integration into a new regional project with different scenarios.

In the second part, I analysed all the scenarios by analysing the formation of the first scenario, implementation of the second scenario and control in the third scenario. With the question ‘why’, I intended to understand the formation of the EAU in 1994; while scholars indicated the staying ‘sovereign’ aspect, I found one aspect that explains why Nazarbayev’s Scenario One has failed. First, I returned to 1986 and found a dynamic of cooperation between Soviet republics to form a New Union. This dynamic cooperation between them formed a coalition of small soviet republics in opposition to the Centre. A power struggle eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This cooperative dynamic then continued to form the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, it did not satisfy the members of the CIS because it served other purposes. Thus, the dynamic of cooperative membership that has been present must accept Nazarbayev’s initiative, but it failed due to two crucial factors. The first is the lack of team dynamic that has successfully created a new Union Treaty and the CIS but failed to support the EAU project. The second factor is the absence of great power in the face of Russia. Russia did not propose a new integration model but instead adopted a 'near abroad' model, which alienated others. It is why Scenario Two emerged in 1996 when Nazarbayev announced a new path to integration focusing on core states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

In the same phase, the document analysis also focused on anti-nuclear initiatives' content and theme identification. While the Eurasian initiative contained three scenarios on how to order a post-soviet region, the anti-nuclear initiative had only one scenario: to eliminate nuclear weapons from international politics by constantly actualising the issue and Kazakhstan's stand on it. The initial anti-nuclear vision was found and expressed in the book 'Epicentre of Peace' which I have downloaded and read to get into the intentions and identify the themes from within the initiatives. The central theme, however, is that the presence of nuclear weapons cannot be considered a norm, but there is an abnormality of it from the small state position. It is the argumentative base Kazakhstani diplomats adopted to promote anti-

nuclear diplomacy and continued emphasis on it by President Nazarbayev. It reflects actions and measures that Kazakhstan produced and presented to the international audience. Thus, in-depth reading, track of constancy and theme extraction showed that anti-nuclear initiatives were non-static but reflected with dynamics to correct the course of nuclear disarmament to its total end. The document analysis led to forming a theme to better reflect on nuclear issue engagement through positioning regarding nuclear disarmament, legitimacy claim as a non-nuclear state, reference to moral right formed on three claims, actualisation of the nuclear-free world and its consequence, consistency of the anti-nuclear initiative with the general trend in anti-nuclear talk and with actions from an international community of those 'have-nots'. The core character of the anti-nuclear initiative is that it performed intelligently by not aggravating the relationship with the major nuclear powers but by 'correcting' nuclear issues based on morality and the nuclear powers' obligation to disarm.

The point of observation is that the content of the stated foreign policy documents is not threatening and challenging but more encouraging to correct the course of the regional and international issues to their final settings and into a preferable order to all of the satisfaction—the stated document regarding EAU, proposed on the apparent necessity to hold all former soviet states together. However, the content of the documents further shows that it has become less obvious even to Kazakhstan to adopt a new regional integration project. Therefore, a preferable order-making move was to focus on core states instead. This decision consequently led to the start of the Eurasian integration in 2000. The document's content concerning the international context slightly differs from the regional context. Correcting the significant international issue: the abolition of nuclear weapons is clear and straightforward. I considered pre-conditions such as post-1986 Soviet Kazakhstan and its standing towards a signing of the New Union before the collapse of the Soviet Union in chapter 5. The point was to show the team dynamic of Soviet small states about gaining more power from Moscow and further show its dynamic after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pre-condition was also essential to begin the analysis of the anti-nuclear initiatives, and it is about Soviet Kazakhstan and the post-independent denuclearisation of Kazakhstan in chapter 6. They added and formed Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear behaviour as a non-nuclear state. It is an act of revenge against those who deprived Kazakhstan of power and security. Therefore, each case chapter has begun with a precondition to highlight Kazakhstan within the context of the Soviet Union and post-independent denuclearisation. Since change began within the Soviet Union, its eventual collapse had a consequence on Kazakhstan’s view of the post-soviet region and broader international level.

There appeared to be a split of Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives towards regional integration and nuclear issues in an international context. The integration and nuclear issue areas are local from their origin. While Kazakhstan's Eurasian Union project was region-oriented, the nuclear policy initiatives had crossed the region and targeted an international audience. The project does not aim to compare both the regional and international contexts. Instead, the case selection for the Eurasian Union project and anti-nuclear policy presented both cases as order-making initiatives and then found which context is best for order-making behaviour.

The document analysis was still under the continued COVID lockdown and restrictions. All the collected data for analysis were stored on my computer desktop in two folders. Each is named as 'the EAU Docs' and 'Nuclear Disarmament Docs'. These two folders contained all related and target documents and note-taking files created during intensive reading and reviewing. During the document reading phase, I found two exciting elements concerning myself. The first is my hometown. In the Moscow speech document, I saw how Nazarbayev brought Ekibastuz, a small city in northeast Kazakhstan, to make his argument about how this small city is linked to the Russian city of Omsk. The linkage was in coal production in Ekibastuz and its export to Omsk. Nazarbayev's concern was not to disturb and continue this industrial relationship as a part of economic cooperation. I understand this because I remember working in one of the service companies between 1997 and 1999 as a train assistant and personally holding 'road and export documents' of coal to the Russian city of Omsk. I also remember how important it was to us and the people living in Ekibastuz to continue coal production and export to Russia during the economic crisis and wage shortage. The second is related to my family. My mother, Lyazzat Arynovna, was born and lived in the Semipalatinsk region between 1947 and 1970s. It was a period of intensive Soviet nuclear tests in the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Site (SNTS). What I heard from my mom in the 1990s was about how members of my mom's family were passing away due to illness caused by nuclear tests. I also remember how Mom collected documents to prove that she was from that region to receive the financial compensation that Kazakhstani official authorities had announced in the 1990s. However, as a research, the above historical part added more to the need for understanding both issues and conducting in-depth reading and rereading of documents.

Since all stated foreign policy documents are in Kazakh and Russian, it was not hard for me to read and translate them because I am fluent in Kazakh and Russian. Therefore, I put my effort into searching for the document, understanding the text, extracting the meaning and

analysing it. In addition, my perspective in understanding the case and pursuing a research project was critical. Kazakhstan's pattern of behaviour since independence is similar to people's experience. I was born in the Soviet Union; I clearly remember stability and significant change. It is a history of challenges through an understanding of changes around, adaptation to them and moving forward. It is my experience through post-1991, post-1990s and post-2000 realities.

1.3. Limitation

I did not interview people due to the pandemic. The situation was fluid, travel impossible, and the ethics process at the University could have been more helpful. Therefore, documents were obtained from official web pages and public domains. Documents were intentionally presented to the public to read and made downloadable. I acknowledge a range of different limitations I faced during the research process. Researchers in the field-work research face this, particularly in interviews, when a participant's response would be biased or not fully open to answers and even ignore some questions. In Kazakhstan, only some things are openly discussed and expressed critically, which would create difficulties in encouraging people to engage in interviews. I acknowledge that even being an 'insider' would present some difficulties even to me. However, finding other ways to cope with challenges during the research process, specifically under COVID restrictions, was needed to continue the research. In this situation, dealing with text and documents avoided the problems. However, the COVID lockdown and further restriction has made and put a limit to trips to Kazakhstan at a time of high risk of COVID-19 infection and death in Kazakhstan. Scholarly textbooks on methodology do not consider if there is a global lockdown like COVID-19; therefore, no methodology under lockdown conditions was offered. We have only realised that digital fieldwork has been a choice of the need. Moreover, the research was conducted during a challenging time. My research began in 2019 when Nazarbayev announced his resignation. Followed by COVID that lasted almost two years, and then a popular uprising in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The later events changed and brought new foreign policy challenges to President Tokaev rule, and this is why this study concerned only the period of Nazarbayev's official rule.

1.4. Thesis outline

Chapter 2 starts with a reflection on the International Relations and Areas Studies debate. It is to situate Small State Studies in the production of knowledge and understanding of the different dynamics that come from the proliferation of small states. A small state literature review followed it. The review shows that small state studies were preoccupied with the issue of survival, opportunities, and challenges rather than searching for order-maker incentives. Therefore, Kazakhstan's foreign policy is crucial to overcoming the neglected aspect of the possibility of small states behaving as order-makers. The chapter's conceptual framework is designed to solve the problem and open up an understanding of the post-Cold War with opportunities and responsibilities emerging to small states and behaving as order makers. I developed an understanding of a 'shared order making' where great powers share responsibility with others, small states. Those states who see the responsibility differently produce a behaviour that opposes and resists the international order. In contrast, others may accept and follow the order and produce a distinct behaviour opposing the former. Thus, the conceptual idea is about how a small state may behave as an order-maker in a specific issue area and as a 'corrector' without intending to oppose or challenge the regional and international order.

In **Chapter 3**, I begin with post-soviet Kazakhstan as a small state proliferated from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its initial and immediate feature is about weakness in the face of change and transition from one order to another. While weakness has been successfully overcome and Kazakhstan is the most robust economy among former Soviet republics, its relative smallness continues to define Kazakhstan as a small state due to the presence of great powers. However, it is also about the domestic order around Nazarbayev's governance and control of the domestic context. The critical point in the chapter is the stability of the system that Nazarbayev created since independence. The stability of the regime and domestic stability is the legacy of the Nazarbayev era. Therefore, two sections explored how stability was achieved within the domestic context. Regime stability rested on personalistic rule and authoritarianism. However, it is later development, while the domestic stability was threatened in the 1990s if Nazarbayev decided to manage the Russian Question not in a way that could not satisfy ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan and, importantly, neighbouring Russian Federation, then the stability of the regime and domestic stability would be assessed differently. Its effect on foreign policy would also be different. Therefore, understanding the stability of the Nazarbayev system means understanding the productivity and feasibility of foreign policy initiatives. Since he was the only foreign policy maker, the initiatives were under his control

and reached their realisation during the Nazarbayev era. It applied to the implementations of the EAU in 2014 and the signing of the TPNW in 2018. It is to lay down the initial understanding that order-making begins from a stable domestic context; if Nazarbayev left power in the 90s, then the initiatives might have taken a different direction and meaning. However, the point is that the initiatives were formed during his reign without distraction but with significant implications for Kazakhstan.

Chapter 4 followed with a literature review on Kazakhstan's foreign policy since independence to understand Kazakhstan's foreign policy construct. First, I examine Kazakhstan's MVFP as a construct that deals with the presence of major powers, and it has been successful. I conclude that section with a critical endpoint: Kazakhstan has managed its first layer of concern: managing major powers through strategic partnership and prioritisation. Then, I move to the second point, which is that since major powers are well-managed, and there is no need to be concerned, Kazakhstan has shifted to its second layer of concern, which is the issue of regional integration and nuclear disarmament. These issue areas were dealt with foreign policy initiatives (FPI). This aspect of the foreign policy construct is a key to order-making. Kazakhstan's FPI is understood as a reflection of order-maker behaviour in specific issue areas. Therefore, the section introduces two cases of order-making initiatives directed towards regional and international issues that Kazakhstan is concerned with most.

The two empirical chapters followed to begin with the regional integration initiative: the EAU proposal in **Chapter 5.** It shows how order-making has been achieved in the regional context. I begin with changes during the last years of the Soviet Union. Soviet Kazakhstan favoured preserving the Soviet Union and for a new Union treaty. However, the Soviet Union collapsed and opened the path to independence but with many challenges. In response to the post-Soviet disintegration, regional re-integration was on the agenda for post-independent Kazakhstan. The first attempt was with the expansion of the CIS in 1991. It later proposed the EAU project in 1994. To understand this, I have reviewed the period from 1986 to identify the team dynamic of soviet republics in dealing with the Centre to obtain more freedom within the Soviet Union. The point is that this dynamic was crucial to bringing the Soviet Union to its end and replacing it with the CIS. However, team dynamic within the CIS was not sustained further due to the lack of team dynamics between member states of the CIS that followed and the absence of great power in the face of Russia. Therefore, the result shows that the EAU project was in response to these developments. However, President Nazarbayev faced the same problem: others and Russia did not welcome the project. In further analysis, the result shows

how Nazarbayev responded to the neglect with adjustment to the project. The concept of core was introduced in 1996. It gave Kazakhstan control over Eurasian integration. The posture within the Eurasian integration process had also given the power to balance Russia but on a particular issue.

The following **Chapter 6** is an order-making initiative concerned with nuclear disarmament. I start with the denuclearization of Kazakhstan to understand how the disarming of Kazakhstan intended to limit its military capability by nuclear powers. Kazakhstan tried to preserve its nuclear status, but it was under the pressure of nuclear states and the power of the NPT. Kazakhstan has become a non-nuclear state (NNS). It is from this status that Kazakhstan began its nuclear policy with a clear emphasis on three claims (closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test, renouncing of nuclear weapons, and joining the NPT) as a base that had provided legitimacy and the right to voice for the abolishing of nuclear arms. The result section shows documents adopted by the UN, the intention to correct the biggest mistake of nuclear weapons and practical contributions to NPT. The analysis section points out that the success of the initiatives within the NPT was due to a team dynamic between members of the NPT for the complete end of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Kazakhstan adds significantly to this global effort. Having experienced a deliberate denuclearization process in the 1990s (Reiss, 1995, pp138-150), Kazakhstan, in reverse, uses the power of the NPT to disarm nuclear weapon states (NWS). It is analysed as balancing nuclear powers but on the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Both results conclude that Kazakhstan could be an order-maker in regional and international contexts. Moreover, therefore, the intention was to correct but not to challenge. Nevertheless, this must be conditioned by the team dynamics or lack thereof and with the presence or the absence of great power. The thesis concludes in **Chapter 7,** in which I review the journey of this inquiry, highlight its key findings and contribution to knowledge and suggest further research areas on small-state order-making.

Chapter 2. Conceptual Framework: International Relations, Small States and Order Making: A Critical View

2.1. Introduction

International Relations is the field of concentrated knowledge of the rise and fall of Western great powers. As a result, it faced a contested vision from non-Western scholars on the nature and dynamic of international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The one to challenge the primacy of the IR was the Global International Relations that called 'the need for the Non-West to both challenge the Western bias and get its histories into play within IR' (Acharya and Buzan, 2017). In addition to this, the area studies are also raising their voices and attention to the dynamic of regions, spaces, and regional powers (Hurrell, 2020). Small states studies, on the other hand, have also emerged to 'matter' small states in international relations. Nevertheless, what keeps them close to IR and makes them differ? They are close to IR because they focus on dynamics, but they differ in making a case for their unit of analysis. Small state studies focus on the proliferation of small states, while Area Studies and the Global IR emphasise regions and rising powers. Therefore, the focus on small-state literature and insights from a small-state perspective is relevant to the current study. This chapter will proceed first with an introduction to small states studies in section 2.2, followed by the literature review of the Cold War scholars in the next section, 2.3. Then, the review of the post-Cold War scholars will be followed in section 2.4 to contrast the small state survival in the new international context to detect the small states' ability to influence and the success of their foreign policies. It will then direct to section 2.5, where the alternative framework demonstrates the conditions for small-state order-making.

2.2. Small state studies

Small states' studies are a new area that is trying to find their niche in international relations. As the next part on small state literature review will show, small state scholars shed light on the emergence of categorisation and the reason why the small state has been neglected in international relations. They stress that 'small states started life as a residual category and under a different name' (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.236). The first reason, the category goes back to 19th century European great power politics and conferences after great wars such as the Congress of Vienna where great power signatories met other great powers and legalised their positions in treaties and documents, while excluding small states (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006,

p.237). The second reason is that great powers were more important than small states, and moreover scholars representing the great power camp monopolised great power studies while small states went unnoticed. They have pointed out assumptions that are still basic to a lot of thinking in International Relations (IR) 'states having powerful capabilities will inevitably use them and are thus the states most worthy of examination' (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.238).

The root of such neglect of small state studies according to them lies in several reasons. They argued that 'IR is an American discipline, the US is a great power, and so a great power perspective came to embed itself in the literature' (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.15). Most striking is that 'scholars studying small states often work in small states and publish in their own languages' (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.16). They also pointed out in the discipline's empirical slant 'writings on great-power politics have a certain inherent interest due to the importance of the subject, whereas writings on small states do not' (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.17). A recent comment on this issue has come from Kassimeris (2009, p.85) when he argued that 'despite the valuable contribution of authors to the study of small states' foreign policy, the under-representation of this type of states in IR literature persist: therefore, it is essential that IR scholars be more concerned with this subject'. Maass (2009, p.65) has also pointed out that 'small states exist in large numbers and are therefore not only prominent members of the international society but are also an empirically relevant unit of study for the discipline of international relations.' Steinmetz and Wivel (2010, p. 10) have provided three reasons why studying small states is important: they point to the unipolar character of the present world order which means that all states apart from the US are small states. Small states which traditionally faced challenges and dilemmas by now are faced by other states in the international system. Therefore, according to them the study of small states may serve as a source of information for all states that feel weak in an asymmetrical relationship. Their second reason is that small states play a more active role in international relations than in previous historical periods and there is a need to know how and why they do this. Their last point is that small states are on the rise and their majority is visible in the international system and in international organisations such as the United Nations, OECD, NATO and EU. While the small state literature has expanded, its core and literature base are Eurocentric. However, the recent contribution with a Handbook on the Politics of Small States has expanded small state studies into other regions. The book has covered the Middle East and Africa, Central and South America and the Caribbean, Asia, and the Pacific regions (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020). It is a valuable contribution that aims to identify the important characteristics, challenges, and

opportunities that small states face in today (2020, p.2). Maass in that volume has focused on proliferation and explored the small state's history from its death, survival, and proliferation through the 17th to 20th century (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020, p.20).

2.3. Cold War Small State Literature

Small state literature goes back to the post-World War II period, when a foundation was laid for research and discussion of the subject (Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; Rothstein, 1968). Small state literature has been trying to find its own niche in the International Relations (IR) field as it has been neglected for a long time. However, the changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War, including the emergence of small new states has added to the validity of Small State literature. There are two periods of structural change that sparked interest in small states: after World War II and after the Cold War. The significance of these periods for Small State Studies is important because it further facilitated an importance to focus on small states' survival in different periods. A thematic approach will be used to point scholarly attention to different issues of small states' behaviour and importantly finding a gap in the study of small states.

The issue of definition

The originators of Small State Studies have produced a body of work that raised the small state issue and sparked further research interest. The general discussion among small state scholars was an attempt to define what a small state is, what is common to small state behaviour and what specific foreign policy actions are available to small states in the international system. (Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; Rothstein, 1968). One of the initiators of and contributors to this trend was A.B. Fox (1959). In her work, the *Power of Small States*, she inquired into how the governments of small states such as Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Portugal avoided being drawn into World War II, while other small states such as Finland, Norway, Denmark and the Benelux countries failed to do the same. She places stress on a kind of power that small states were using in the context of World War II, namely a 'capacity to convince great powers that the use of coercive power against them would more than offset the gains' (Fox, 1959, p. 10). Followers to this were David Vital (1967) in his study *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* and *Alliance and Small Powers* by Robert Rothstein (1968) and *The Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics* by Robert Keohane (1969). Further contribution from R.P. Barston

(1973) in the study of *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. M.R. Singer (1972) with *Weak States in a World of Powers: the dynamic of international relations*, and M. I. Handel (1990) on *Weak States in the International System*. These are the founders and contributors to research investigating small states from the cold war period. The general discussion among small state scholars has been an attempt to define what is a small state. Keohane defines a small state as 'a state those leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system' (Keohane, 1969). A state which, due to its lack of power, is unable to achieve its own goal in relation to other states or due to its lack of military power 'cannot obtain security and therefore should rely on military aid and security from others'. Fox (1969, p.751 - 752) argues that 'we can think of small states as those whose leaders recognized that their own state's political weight is limited to a local area rather than to the global one,' and further claim that 'they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their security, and that their particular state's interests may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more great powers'. However, some approached this issue with a quantitative approach: Vital (1967, p.8), for instance, avoided any definition in his work. But he provided criteria based on population size whereby a state is defined as 'small' with a population under 10 – 15 million in case of economically advanced countries, and under 20 – 30 million for underdeveloped countries. For Barston (1973, p.15) on the other hand, a small state is defined as having a population with an upper limit of between 10 and 15 million. Decades later Rothstein (1968, p.13) in *Alliances and Small Powers* provided his own definition of a small state as 'a state which recognized that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so'. Keohane (1969, p.22) based on critiques of Rothstein's (1968) approach, developed his own definition of 'a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system'. According to Aron (1981, p.83) small state is a state which, due to its lack of power, is unable to achieve its own goal in relation to other states, or as Rothstein (1968, p.29) claim, due to its lack of military power 'cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities' and therefore should rely on 'in the aid of other states'. While Fox (1959) avoided clarification on the usage of small states in her earlier work, she did so in her following work entitled "Small States in the international system, 1919 – 1969". While she focused on the international system, she provided her thinking on Small States as those whose leaders recognized that 'their own state's political weight is limited to a local rather than global arena' (Fox, 1969, p.751-752). Bjol

(1971, p.2) goes further by stating that 'by itself the concept of the small state means nothing. A state is only small in relation to a greater one'. She pointed out other variables such as the structure of the international system and a state's geographic location and domestic political system as the determinants of a small state (Bjol, 1971, p.4). For instance, Rayemeker et al., (1974), in a study of nine European states, *Small Powers in Alignment*, argued that Vital's categorisation does not provide a clear point of distinction between advanced and underdeveloped countries. Rather, adopting Raymond Aron's approach he offers 'the states called 'small powers' generally have – can only have – defensive ambitions. They seek to survive as such, as seats of free decisions' (Rayemeker *et al*., p.18). While most case studies in earlier studies focused on Europe, the authors Charles E. Morison and Astri Suhrke in *Strategies of Survival: the foreign policy of smaller Asian states* focused on Asia. They did not attempt to define a definition of small state. Instead, they use a common-sense division approach 'the country analysed as obviously 'smaller' than the four large powers that are involved in the region – the US, the Soviet Union, China and Japan' (Morison and Suhrke, 1978, p.78). In addition, there is an issue where authors use small state to mean weak state or vice versa (Bjol, 1971; Singer, 1972; Handel, 1985; Lindell and Persson, 1986). Fox (1959), for instance, has used 'small' in the title of her book, used 'small powers' in the World War II context, and then 'weak state' to question how such relatively weak states could have survived while total war swept around them. Vital (1967) and Rothstein (1968) have also used 'small power' and 'weak state' interchangeably in their studies. The following scholars have done the same and made no definitional attempt in their analysis: Bjol (1971) in the study *The Power of the Weak*, Singer (1972) in the study *Weak States in World Politics* and Lindell and Persson (1986) in the study *The Paradox of Weak State Power*. Handel (1990, p. 10), on the other hand, came out with a clear point for using the term 'weak state' in his weak state theory. By pointing to and rejecting Vital and Rothstein's use of 'small power', he stressed that the main characteristic of weak states is their lack of power and strength and that therefore they are continuously preoccupied with the question of survival. The use of 'small state' should refer to a state with a small territory. Therefore, he adopted a notion of 'weak' instead of small, because it can be applied both to small countries and others with considerable area, but which are weak and vulnerable (Handel, 1990, p.11). This aspect has not been an obstacle for further research on small states, because they are all playing with words and the most important is the content of the weak or small states these authors have contributed. In addition, the titles with 'Small State' are more dominant in the literature than 'Weak State'. The researchers used 'small state'

more commonly than weak, it is obvious that researchers take case study with focus on particular state, and this state will be associated with a notion of 'Weak' just because it weak in one area but can be 'Strong' in another (Lindell and Persson, 1986). As shown above, scholars have added complexity by proposing definitions based on absolute and relational meanings. Thus, the problem of definition has been one of the trends among Small State scholars, though while some have tried to define, others have ignored or avoided, while yet others have adopted other approaches on how to look at small states in the post-World War II era.

On sources of power

Since World War II, the institutionalisation of international relations and the rise of the United Nations and other international and regional organisations has created an opportunity for small states to promote their survival in the world of great powers. Barston (1973, pp.22 - 26) has provided six propositions on small state power. First, he wrote on 'Bargaining power' whereby if a small state is weak in terms of its economy, military strength or is politically unstable, its weakness can in fact be played as a source of bargaining power. This can happen if a great power considers its geopolitical location to be of strategic importance. Second, the Bargaining Power of Small States, on the other hand, will be increased if there is a clear and overt commitment by both great powers to opposite sides.' The third proposition is concerned with a coalition of small states that has a degree of emphasis among them upon the implementation and formulation of common objectives and this emphasis is caused by fragile organisation, contested leadership roles, and by the presence of different political systems and ideologies. Fourthly, he argued 'a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a greater one', this can happen if a powerful state is concerned with the degree of threat and actions it can take in order to avoid negative effects among other states in the region. Fifthly, a small state can establish power by using international organisations to gather support by increasing the area of criticism and debate. Lastly, a small state will be able to resist collective non-military sanctions if it can obtain support from neighbouring states and if this sanction has not been universally applied by international organisations. What makes Barston's contribution crucial to Small State Studies is that it brings an analysis beyond the European context. All six propositions are based on non-European states' experiences with the international system. Barston (1973, pp.22-23) has also argued that small states with raw material orientation consider the same actions to improve their terms of trade. According to him these activities

have added to the importance of economic dimensions between small and strong states. He concluded by drawing attention to the oil-producing states in the Gulf, which have become economically stronger and possess bargaining powers on some issues but remain vulnerable in terms of security. Handel (1990, p.217) on the other hand with another non-European example, pointed out that the OAPEC (the organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) had successfully imposed an oil embargo on Western Europe, the US and Japan in 1973-74. Fox (1969, p.10) pointed out that international organisations for small states could better serve as a forum for successful collaboration than conducting bilateral contacts. She also emphasises that within international organisations small states 'can block great powers' initiatives but also have a chance to initiate by their own'. Stansfiled (1973, p.214) on the other hand, has pointed out that small states have been the victims of economic sanctions and pressures from great powers- for instance, the US sanctions against Cuba.

The literature on small states has covered not only foreign and security policies of small states, but also research on their economic aspects, such as vulnerability. Barston (1973, p.16) pointed out that small states have a low level of economic development but admitted that there are some small states with "developed economies" and they 'pursue active foreign policies on a number of issues beyond their own region'. However, the foreign policies of small states are concerned with questions of economic development. According to him the main problems they face are restructuring their economies, building up reserves and diversifying exports. For the resolution of these problems small states apply for help from international organisations for loans and bilateral agreement for investment (Barston, 1973, p.87). Katzenstein (1986, p.99) in his study *Small States in the World Market: industrial policy in Europe*, was the first to cover this aspect with case studies of seven small European states. He concluded that small European states are persistent champions of a liberal international trade regime, are much more liberal in their trade policies, and have economic processes much faster than those in larger states. According to him the strategy of small states has been to respond to the global system of changes by strengthening domestic structures. Thus, there is a common pattern based on the above analysis that geographic location can be a source of strength during particular periods of conflict; possession and control of natural resources can be a source of bargaining power and source of influence, good relations with other small neighbouring states and diplomacy are what small states can exercise. Singer (1972, p.54) argued for power as a relative term: in its positive sense power is the ability to 'influence others to behave in a manner desired by the one wielding the power'. In its negative sense, it is the ability 'to prevent others from exerting

influence on one's own behaviour'. Thus, power is the ability to make use of influence and the ability to avert influence from being used over oneself, and power is contextual: for Singer, 'the pen, or the purse, or the army is powerful only inasmuch as they are used in an appropriate context' (Singer, 1972, p.55). Lindell and Person (1986, p.93) argued that a state might be relatively weak in some areas of international conduct but stronger in others. For instance, Norway and Switzerland are both weak militarily but strong in their respective areas of international shipping and banking. This phenomenon, in their view, is called 'issue-specific power'. Krasner (1985) in his study, admits that small states in a group have issue-specific power but his analysis has been focused on the small state as a group who strives to change the rule of the game. In the other study, a similar concept has been applied in negotiation between Panama and the US where Panama had issue-specific power over possession of the Panama Canal (Habeeb, 1988). William Habeeb's suggestion is valuable to understand Kazakhstan's post-independence behaviour. He points to the role of 'issue-specific power' in strong-weak power negotiations. This 'issue-specific power' is concerned with an actor's capabilities and position towards another actor in terms of a specific common issue. According to him, the issue specific power is determined by three variables: alternative, commitment and control. Alternatives designate each actor's ability to achieve its preferred outcomes from a relationship other than that with the opposing actor. So, despite strong state possession of aggregate power, the weaker state may be able to reach outcomes in any special issue area if they can build alternative relationships with other actors where it can gain easily available outcomes. The possibility of alternatives may increase an actor's power by reducing its dependence on the other actor. Commitment refers to 'the extent and degree to which an actor desires and/or needs its preferred outcomes'. In most cases, a commitment based on aspiration (a self-generated motivation) is a source of issue-power strength, while commitment based on need (a form of dependence) is a source of issue-power weakness. Control is defined as 'the degree to which one side can unilaterally achieve its preferred outcome despite the cost involved in doing so' (Habeeb, 1988, p.22).

On foreign policy behaviour

East (1973) found in his study that small states prefer to minimise the cost of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions and by directing their attention toward joint or multiple target actors. Small states do not initiate verbal actions as much as large states, engage much more in conflictual nonverbal behaviour -particularly in high-risk areas, avoid ambiguity in

foreign policy behaviour, exhibit more specificity as to the issues at hand and the target being influenced, and frequently rely more on the economic techniques of statecraft than do large states. Barston (1973) in a study of *Weak States in the International System*, went further and identified a number of limitations that small states face. They have limited international involvement, remain vulnerable to external pressure as they do not have broad choices in implementing their foreign policy, possess limited machinery for conducting foreign policies, and are restricted in their freedom of manoeuvrability by their strategic location.

During the Cold War, most IR scholars emphasised that the international system and external forces are important determinants in explaining small state foreign policy behaviour. For instance, Vital (1971) has stressed that the external environment is more important than domestic conditions. Rothstein (1968) has also emphasised that small states are submissive to external factors. Keohane (1969) on the other hand has pointed out that the foreign policy can be understood by the ideas that some states form about themselves and the international system. During the cold war scholars focused on foreign policy alternatives or options for small states to compensate for their weakness and search for survival. Alignment or alliance policy with more powerful states has been a focus of scholars. Rothstein (1968) in his study has focused on the problem of achieving security through an alliance. Liska (1968), in another study that goes beyond Europe *Alliance and Third World* has provided clarification on the function of the alliance system itself. He identified three relevant functions: aggregation of power, interallied control, and international order or government. He stresses three motives behind small states' alliance with great powers: security, stability and status. He concludes that alliances in any form will certainly stay but they must undergo fine changes in both conception and implementation.

In the study, *Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, and Austria*, Nuechterlein (1969) questioned why small states prefer alliances with great powers but not non-alignment policies. The author shows seven factors that influence foreign policy decisions: geography, economy, history, external threats, military capability, internal security and susceptibility to foreign bases. He made four conclusions in his analysis. Firstly, the alliance of Iceland and Thailand with the US was mainly the result of their failed policies of neutrality. Secondly, he pointed out that the absence of past colonial history is a force that pushes states into alliances. Thirdly, common security threats between states can enhance alliances. Finally, he discussed the readiness of the defender to use military strength to meet an attack. In another study *Small Powers in Alignment*, Rayemeker *et al*., (1974) stressed two possible options: alignment and

nonalignment. While alignment occurs when a small state decides to ally to deter a potential threat and this can be done on bilateral or multilateral basis, nonalignment is the complete opposite occurs when a small state decides to stay out of an alliance system and rely on policies like neutralism or non-involvement. Khatri (1997) points out that nonalignment provides small states with a sense of diplomatic identity that distinguishes them from the two great power alliance networks which other small states have become a part of. According to Barston (1973, p.75) 'non-alignment is not a policy in itself but rather a means of establishing a diplomatic identity distinct from the great powers or other small states.' However, he stresses that neutral states like Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria should be differentiated from non-aligned states because of their active foreign policy on issues such as international peace and security in their region and beyond. Lindell and Persson (1986) provide two different cases where the non-European small state of Ghana adopted non-alignment policy for the sake of obtaining foreign aid from both powerful states, while in the case of European states the policy of non-alignment is concerned with the issue of security in order to keep the country outside of potential future conflict. And a key reason they should be seen as different is because they are not part of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). In a study of Kuwait and the Gulf by Hassan (1984, p.3) argued that the security and survival of small states like those in the Gulf region lies not in alliance or in other forms of association with powerful states but in the establishment of a community of states that seek security against both internal and external threats. For instance, the author shows this could be realised in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The last case from Fox (1959) showed how a small power like Turkey stayed neutral during World War II and used its strategic importance to great effect. The importance of Turkey was in its geopolitical location, potential power against Germans and possession of a near monopoly over such strategic raw materials as chrome. However, Turkey's role has been defined not by location and in possession of chrome but eventually was determined by the great powers' advances against Germany. In fact, the USSR played a crucial role as the course of the war changed in favour of the Soviets as Germany started to retreat from the Eastern Front. Turkey's role was reduced when a second front was arranged and opened in 1944. Turkey was important only in the beginning of the crisis but as a result of Allied, particularly Soviet, successes the whole game had been changed and Turkey was forced to declare war against Germans and abandon its neutrality. Moreover, the neutral position of other states like Belgium and the Netherlands did not last either. The point here I want to make is that 'neutrality' can be tested during a great power conflict. Thus, the above foreign policy options are the reflection of the

influence of the structure over small states. Therefore, it is needs to point out that the structure of the Cold war which was bipolar but it would importantly to point out on its content: on the one side there were the industrialised capitalist countries those who aligned with NATO and United States and opposed to the socialist Soviet Union known as 1st World, the 'Free world' or the 'Western World', on the other side those who belong to communist bloc of the Soviet Union and socialist countries known as 2nd World, and the so called 'Third World' states that not belong to above blocks. The reason I bring this up is that the post-cold war period is about multiple realities where small states are under and within the context of two different super-power dominance and competition has informed us about a foreign policy option. However, with the end of the Cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union has in fact left the word divided between those of the 'Third world' states and western world under the leadership of the sole superpower the US. The western international liberal order is the single reality that is open ruled based and progressive (Ikenberry, 2011, p.2). Those who have engaged could increase their relative power, find its place and role in that order but those who opposed can face isolation, sanction or invasion. Thus, this is a one of the changes that also influenced foreign policy behaviour of small states after the end of the Cold war. The realisation of the single world order which is global in nature. The following section is about small state foreign policy options in a new international context.

2.4. Post-Cold War Small State Literature

What have post-Cold War scholars inherited from the Cold War foundational scholars and their followers? This can be summarised as the ongoing problem of definition and how to solve it, continued search of small state power and foreign policy options in a new regional and international context.

The issue of definition

The problem of definition has been one of the trends among Small State scholars, though while some have tried to define, others have ignored or avoided, while yet others have adopted other approaches on how to look at small states in the post-World War II era. However, the originators of Small State Studies have left flexibility on how to define states as small in the post-Cold war period. There is a diverse definition of small states. The classical standard by which to define states as small has been based on criteria such as the size of their population, territory and economy (Benedict, 1967; Vital, 1967; Barston, 1973; Handel, 1990). However,

there are several problems with these definitions. First, Benedict (1957) argued that small territories define small state status. But, if we look beyond the European region, we will find that smallness defined by territory is not applicable. For instance, Afghanistan with a territory of 649,960 km2 would be considered a large power compared to the small Netherlands of 41,160 km2. Definition based on territory is not sufficient to use as a criterion. Moreover, if we take Kazakhstan and compare it to the United Kingdom, we will find that according to this definition the UK is a small state. Second, in terms of population, its relevance is also questionable, for instance, Vital (1967, p. 8) pointed to small populations and suggested a limit on 'a population of 10 -15 million in the case of economically advanced countries, and a population of 20 -30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries'. But he does not define his distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries. Population size cannot be seen as a decisive factor if we compare Pakistan's population of 182.1 million with Switzerland's population of 8 million. Some international institutions like the Commonwealth Secretariat define states as small if their population is 1.5 million and below (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003). It is clear again that neither population is sufficient to use as a criterion. Moreover, as the size of populations can rise, definitional thresholds can eventually be crossed by states. Pakistan in the 1960s had a population of 45 million, compared to the current 182.1 million. Third, Barston indicates economic capability or lack thereof as an additional indicator for state 'smallness'. In particular, definitions based on GDP (gross domestic product) are counted as $10 billion for small and $1 billion for mini states (1973, p10). For instance, the GDP of the east European state of Romania is USD199.950bn while Qatar's is USD 211.82bn. Both states cross Barston's line and therefore this also has little basis for being used as criterion since it is not relevant by now. It has been relevant in post-WW2 but since the GDP of most states is rising and it is questionable to use it to define a state as small. This is probably the reason why Kassimeris (2009, pp.84-101) stated that 'size should be dismissed altogether from the list of the potential features that define a small power'. According to him, regarding the above economic criteria, if California were an independent state it would be the 10th wealthiest country in the world. Fourth, Military power has always been one of the main criteria for state power, which reached its highest expression in possession of nuclear arms during the Cold War by the two superpowers. In this sense, all states of the world have become 'small states' except for those who managed to acquire such weapons. But, this could lead us to think of Germany as a small state that does not possess nuclear arms in relation to the nuclear power of the United Kingdom or even considering the United Kingdom as a small state compared to India.

Maass (2009, pp.65-83) points out that the problem of defining small states is in fact an advantage and can benefit scholars with its flexibility on how to approach this issue. For instance, Sweijs (2010) has questioned Vital's definition by arguing that it is time-bound, does not apply to centuries other than the 20th, and that the relationship between population size and national power is by no means unequivocal. For instance, Reeves (2014), in a study of Mongolian foreign policy toward China, has used quantitative and qualitative approaches to define Mongolia as a weak state in relation to China. For instance, Hey (2003, p.3) notes that 'much of the literature on small states spends a great deal of time on the problem of definition' and offers the concept of a small state based on the idea of perception. Hey developed her own approach based on Rothstein's view of a small power as a state which recognised that it cannot gain security by use of its own capabilities and should therefore rely on the aid of others, and on Keohane's view of 'a small power as a state whose leaders believe that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a considerable impact on the system' (1969, pp.210-291). Hey (2003, p.3) proposed her definition that 'if a state's people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states' people and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered'. On that basis, this definition has been applied to foreign policy behaviour of eight different countries such as Paraguay, Caribbean states, Panama, Luxemburg, Austria, Gambia, Jordan and Laos. To define a small state, other scholars have used criteria such as possession of votes in the Council of Ministers of the EU. She found that 19 out of 27 states fall into the category of small states (Panke, 2010). However, defining a state as small cannot be only assessed through material capability but can also be assessed through a state's relation to others. Bjol (1971, p.22) stated that the concept of small state means nothing, and a state is small only in relation to a greater one. In her example Belgium may be small in relation to France, but Luxemburg is small in relation to Belgium, and France itself is a small state in relation to the US. According to her, a small state should be considered 'a state in its relationship with greater states'. Knudsen (1998, p.9) also, in defence of small states pointed out that smallness is relative: 'Relative to Russia, Poland is a small state', but 'relative to Lithuania, Poland is in a position of a great power'. Goetschel (1998, p.14) writes that 'the concept of a small state has always been a relative term. The qualification of a state as small only makes sense in relation to large states.' Steinmetz and Wivel (2010, p.7) stress the same that 'smallness is defined through the relation between the state and its environment'. In a study, *Small States, and International Security: Europe and Beyond*, Archer et al., (2014, p.8) propose to move away from quantifiable power possession to qualitative and relational. They accept

that ‘rather than continue the search for universal characteristics of small states and their behaviour, the small state concept is best used as a ‘focusing device’ for highlighting the characteristic security problems and foreign policy dilemmas of the weaker actors in asymmetric power relationships’. They define a small state as ‘the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own, and it is tied to a specific spatio-temporal context’ (Archer *et al*., 2014, p.8). This definition, according to them ‘shifts the analytical focus from the power that states possess to the power that they exercise’ (Archer *et al.*, 2014, p.8).

Thus, defining a small state took up most of the discussions among small state scholars. They are all in fact reflecting on the problems on how to apply them. Quantitative criteria have become questionable when some states with small territories are economically successful (Qatar, Switzerland, Singapore), while others may have less success in economic terms but have a huge territorial possession (Mongolia). Since every state is keen and desirous to improve its condition, this will in fact make it more difficult to gauge on what criteria to focus. In the information age and globalisation era each country can develop resources which then could be used in relation to other states.

Search of Small State Power

Power is one of the most important concepts in world politics and it is mostly seen as the currency of international relations (Rostoks, 2010). The concept of power is considered as a starting point in international relations thinking. Morgenthau (1967, p.97) in his study of relationships between states discussed power over minds and actions of people. Kissinger (1977, p.57) wrote of power as an influence. Power in the international arena can be simply determined as the ability of the actor to force the other actor to do what it would never do voluntarily, and it can be carried out through persuasion, coercion, or use of military force (Cline, 1975, p. 8). We can imagine power ‘as the ability to persuade others to do something that they would not do otherwise’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.11). Power can be defined as a way of gaining desirable outcomes (Russel, 1965, p.25). Power in international relations is the possibility of the state to use its real or potential resources to influence the conditions and actions of other states (Stossinger, 1969, p.27). Bjol (1971, p.36) defines power as ‘power to persuade somebody to do something you want him to do, the power to dissuade someone from doing something you do not want him to do, and power not to do what somebody wants you to do’. Waltz (1979, p.192) offered the old and simple notion that ‘an agent is powerful to the

extent that he affects others more than they affect him. The weak understand this: the strong may not'. Carr (2010, p.120) points to other sources of power, namely 'power over opinion' which contains persuasion, rhetoric, and propaganda. Dahl (1957, pp.202-203) offers his own intuitive idea of power, when 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do'. Gilpin (1981, p.13) in his book refers to the power of the military, economic and technological capabilities of states. Waltz (1979, p.131) along the same lines, stresses population, territory, resources, military strength, economic power, and political stability. Kaufman (1956, p.242) pointed out two important resources such as population and wealth as they are the foundations for military power. Military power has always served as the main indicator of international actors' power and prestige. It is possible to claim it as necessary for carrying out a range of policies in the world arena and it is hard to imagine how international politics would develop without any influence of military power. The evolution of military power and the possession of nuclear arms after World War II by great powers could be considered as the highest level of military power. But the use of it has demonstrated the damage it could cause and served as an example of the consequence of such use. The possession of such military power is questionable when both superpowers have failed in local military operations, like the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the US in Vietnam and Korea. Keohane (2002), in a similar line, links power and wealth in terms of control over key national resources. Accessing, controlling, maintaining, and holding a competitive advantage in the market are the main elements of power in his analysis.

Now power and international influence are based more on economic and technological development. Internal economic and technical development in combination with international trade and foreign investments is represented more like a more effective means than imperialism and aggression in the realisation of national aims (Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, 1972, p.124). However, the opposite analysis on power persists while the above-mentioned sources of power remain important, possession of all of them is not easy. Rostoks (2010, p.89) points to the problem of linkage between all sources of power where states have failed to develop. North Korea, for instance, has developed significant military power but its totalitarian regime has prevented economic development. Nye (2011, p.21), on the other hand, argued that power sources that were valued in the past are not important today. He argued for the importance of 'soft power' within international politics. While he called the use of force, coercion, war, alliance, payments, sanctions, and other agenda-setting measures based on these as hard powers, agenda-setting through positive attraction and persuasion is termed soft power, which he argues

is ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes.’ The soft power of a state is based on three main resources: its culture, political values, and foreign policies (Nye, 2011, p.84). This soft power is an alternative to the concept of hard power which has been dominant for a long period. Since the meaning of power is changing due to the global information age, the use of soft power is more common among all states. Nevertheless, small states are generally the objects of soft power from great power. What soft power has in it, is the penetration effect while hard power in fact has a punching effect. In fact, his soft power concept is based on the great power experience of the US and is a concept for great powers. While it can be said that hard power has been used against small states, now the same can be said for soft power, with examples from Nye like Coke, Big Mac, Hollywood, and music (Nye, 2011, p.90). In addition, Nye (2011, p. xiv) added the concept of ‘smart power’. He explains that smart power is not just “Soft power 2.0” but ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power into effective strategies in different contexts.’ He further explains that smart power is also ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power into successful strategies’ (2017, p.2). While his conceptualization continues to focus on great powers, in this addition he pointed out that smart power is not limited to the US only and that ‘small states are often adept at smart power strategies’ (Nye, 2011, p.210). For instance, Singapore has invested a lot into military strength but combined this approach with diplomatic activity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Switzerland, well known for its mountainous geography and the combination of mandatory military service, has been attractive for its banking and commercial services. Qatar, while it permitted the use of its own territory for US military preparations for the invasion of Iraq, it sponsored Al Jazeera -the most popular television station in the region- for its criticism of the US invasion. Norway, while within the NATO structure, has developed its own overseas development assistance and peace mediation (Nye, 2011, p.210). Switzerland has developed its power in global banking (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006, p.8). It did find its own niche and feels satisfied within the European context. However, it did not limit to only the banking sector but also engaged in peacekeeping (Church, 2007). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia also has power but in the oil sector. But it seems not a satisfying country and used this power to promote the spread of Wahhabism (the Week, 2015). Goetschel (1998, p.15) points out that traditional resources such as military and economic power have lost importance and new resources have been developed. Small states may seek to compensate for their quantitative weaknesses by drawing attention to qualitative virtues through mediation, bridge-building, or through other non-coercive means.

Power, as she stresses 'may result out of processes and structures, i.e., processes of bargaining'. Such power is referred to as 'bargaining power' in the context of a specific issue area (Goetschel, 1998, p.15). Ingebritsen (2002, p.11) showed other types of power that small states can develop with positive aspects. She has focused on Scandinavian states as a group of militarily weak and economically dependent small states and on how they pursue what she termed as 'social power' by behaving as norm entrepreneurs in the international community.

Foreign Policy Options

In the post-cold war environment, the foreign policy of small states reflects continuity and change. The overemphasis on 'power' from a great power perspective has led small states to seek out external power to compensate their lack of power and influence in the international system; to establish what Rothstein (1968, p.37) described as 'policies to remove or isolate itself from power conflicts, or policies in which it chooses to draw on the strength of others to ensure its own security'.

To begin, neutrality has been foreign policy option for small states. Some states choose permanent neutrality, which is an internationally legally recognized state position, and mandates an obligation not to participate in any conflicts or wars, and refrain from actions capable of involving such states in war. In this regard, permanently neutral states do not take part in any military-political unions, refuse the presence of their territory of foreign military bases, oppose weapons of mass destruction, actively support efforts of the world community in the sphere of disarmament, confidence-building, and cooperation between states. Thus, permanent neutrality is carried out not only during war but also in peacetime. The status of constant neutrality does not deprive the state of the right to self-defence in case of attack. A. B. Fox in her work stresses how governments of small states of Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Finland, and Norway avoided World War II by staying neutral, while other small states failed to do the same (Fox, 1959). However, during the war their neutrality was changed in favour of the winning side of the Allies. Since some states are part of the NATO structure, the strategy for neutrality has not changed on the part of Sweden and Finland. Thus, the nature of neutrality in fact is to stay away from war-prone conflict through all means as shown by Fox's analysis. But structural pressures forced these states to change their position as their neutrality was not desired any more by the relevant great powers. At the current stage the neutrality is associated with five European states (Sloan, 2013). But this could be challenged and questioned by their association with the European Union and by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hauser

and Kernic, 2006). The neutrality will be tested only in times of conflict and crisis as has been mentioned above in the study of A. B. Fox (1959).

Strategic manoeuvring is another strategic option for small states. Mehdieva has argued that:

> the small state's ability to discern its attractive power and use it in ways that might enable it to align with a powerful state of its choice without antagonising the opposing great power to the point of a military conflict is what can be called strategic manoeuvring. (Mehdieva, 2011, p.10)

According to her, strategic manoeuvring requires the small state to be proactive, vigilant, and highly adjusted to its external environment. This type of option could become one of importance for small states since the end of the Cold War period has ended, when small states were in a new position of being able to make a choice. By now there is a different arrangement of polarity and manoeuvring within this will instead strengthen small states' positions on particular issues vis-a-vis great power. In the case of Kazakhstan, it faces the two potential threats of Russia and China as well as other external powers, therefore the policy of strategic manoeuvring between these poles has been adopted, but on the strategic and friendship base.

Alliance-Building is a following strategy that contains two options: bandwagoning and balancing. According to Walt (1987, pp.18-19) balancing is 'when states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions of states whose superior resources could pose a threat', bandwagoning on the other hand is an alignment with stronger forces. Rothstein (1968) claims that small states prefer alliances only to enhance their security. However, Vital (1967) stresses that small states should strive to avoid this condition. If we follow the Rothstein claim it means that small states would behave as order takers just because the opposing state is powerful enough to guarantee its own and others' security and therefore small states must enter alliances. On the other hand, we take Vital's claim that small states could behave autonomously because of the need for alliances for security purposes. Fox (1959, p.22) argues that 'small states tend to avoid balancing behaviour while maintaining a 'benevolent neutrality' toward the larger power they believe is on the 'winning side'. Handel (1990, p.10) concurs 'the risk for small states in choosing the losing side in a conflict outweighs the benefit of balancing and therefore weak states prefer neutrality'. Rothstein (1968, p.40) claims that 'small states purposefully engage in balancing behaviour to prevent a hegemony that could undermine the

existing balance of power'. Commonly agreed is the idea that 'small states will bandwagon rather than engage in balances of power'. Palmer and Morgan (2011, p.33) note this is because 'a small state desires to maintain the status quo'. Walt (1987, p.22) makes the point that 'the smaller the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon, balancing may seem unwise because one's allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough' and adds that 'States that are close to a country with large offensive capabilities may be forced to bandwagon because balancing is simply not viable'. Levy (2004, p.37) on the same side argued that:

> the hypothesis regarding balancing behaviour refers to the great powers more than to other states. Great powers balance against potential hegemons, whereas smaller states in the proximity of stronger states do what is necessary to survive, bandwagoning with the strong instead of balancing against them. (Levy, 2004, p.37)

The alliance building in the form of bandwagoning or balancing, on the other hand, lacks clarity. According to alliance theory, 'bandwagoning' prevailed more than 'balancing'. Because a small state chooses sides, and it leads to joining others to balance the threat. However, there is a need for clarity in terms of application of concepts in time of great power war or great power cooperation. In both instances 'bandwagoning' would mean joining the strongest to balance the threat, but in times of great power cooperation it would mean 'bandwagoning' on a particular issue but not balancing the threat. For instance, Kazakhstan may be bandwagoning with China to join One Belt One Road initiatives, but it is a clear indication of bandwagoning on economic issues only.

Recently, alliance building has been considered with shelter theory. Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018, p. 1) argues that the concept of shelter explicates small state alignment better than traditional International Relations theories because the latter missed to capture the nuanced alliance motivations and needs of small states. Thus, the shelter theory claims that 'small states need economic, political, and societal shelter in order to prosper' (Thorhallsson et al., 2018, p.539). However, both the alliance theory in the form of bandwagoning and balance, and shelter theory are problematic. The former lacks clarity, the latter applicability. The concept of shelter has been developed from the experience of Iceland. Iceland gained a variety of political, economic and societal shelter from the United States, the United Nation, NATO, IMF, and World Bank (Thorhallsson *et al*., 2018, p.540). However, if we elaborate this theory further and apply it to post-soviet region and to those that created the Commonwealth of

Independent States were not 'shelter seeking from', but instead being as a 'shelter-creators' seeking to re-order the post-soviet region collectively after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while naturally seeking shelter internationally. Thus, shelter theory may explain small state behaviour in one region but may not in another.

Back to Rothstein's (1968, p.37) second type of policies in which a small state 'chooses to draw on the strength of others to ensure its own security'. Multilateralism and institutions are an expression of this. For Persaud small states opt for multilateral diplomacy as it is a chance to interact with the international system through rules, norms, and principles (Persaud, 2001). Khatri (1997, p.5) points out that international and regional organisations can offer small states additional room for manoeuvrability. The institutions provide an opportunity to maintain international contacts with other small states and get support from like-minded regimes based on common national concerns. Keohane and Nye (1973) see multilateral international institutions as an opportunity to build coalitions and strengthen ties with other small states. They argue that international organisations are congenial institutions for small states. International organisations allow small states to pursue linkage strategies. For instance, in the debate regarding the New International Economic Order, developing states insisted on linking it to oil prices.

Ikenberry (2007, p.7) emphasises that small states will use multilateral international organisations to augment their positions within the international system. In his analysis, small states represent an objective for the leading states, as they aim to bring them into institutional arrangements, while small states on their side see an advantage in putting some limits and restraints on a leading state within an institution. For small states, participation represents an attempt on the one hand to raise concerns and engage with broader international issues through community-based interaction with other states, and on the other to exercise some kind of restriction over powerful states by institutionalising international norms and rules (Keohane, 1969, p.294). The United Nations is a good example where small states meet other small states. It has become a prime venue for small states to be involved in negotiation on major issues that concern all developing countries. Hong (1995, p.278) in the study *Small States in the United Nations* has pointed out the opportunity for small states to make changes in international organisations on such issues as reform or reorganisation of the UN and its component organisations since the end of the Cold War. He provides three reasons why small states have weight in international organisations and within the UN. In the first case, the large number of small states and their working together can make a change. In the second case, the presence of

small states would play a role in reminding others of the importance of sovereign equality despite size. In the third case, small states can work to prevent great powers from abusing the UN for their own interests.

Baille (1998, p.197) has conducted research on small state influence in the European Union with a case study on Luxemburg. The aim of the author was to present a model of small state influence within the European Union, and he concluded by providing three variables of influence. The first is concerned with historical context, the second with institutional frameworks such as norms, rules, principles, and procedures that serve as tools for small state interest, and the third is on conflict-avoidance behaviour in negotiations. Armstrong and Read (2002) focused on the implications of the accession of small states into the European Union such as Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, arguing for the negative effects of such a policy.

Knudsen, in *Small States and the Security Challenges in the New Europe,* examines the security of small states in post-1989 Europe. Knudsen (1996, p.20) gave a good view on small states' survival, arguing that the concept should be retained as a focusing device but not an analytical tool. He backed up his argument by pointing firstly to the proliferation of smaller units on the Eurasian continent and secondly to its link to security studies. His post-Cold War contribution consists of six key variables which influence smaller states' prospects for preserving autonomy: the strategic significance of the smaller state's geographic location to a great power, the degree of tension between great powers, the phase of the power cycle in which the nearest leading great power finds itself, the history of relations between the smaller state and the nearest great power, the policy towards the small state of other, rival, great powers and the existence of intergovernmental institutions in the security field.

Furthermore, small states' interests in regional organisations could turn into strategic cooperation due to the presence of powerful states within it, or alternatively it could turn into a difficult condition as when smaller members of the organisation are obliged to follow orders from powerful states, or the collective will of others. This was evident in the case of Kazakhstan following a collective order from the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation against the US military presence in Central Asia in 2005 (Sullivan, 2019, p.36). Another example would be the case with NATO's operation in Afghanistan in 2001, when most members followed the collective order of that organisation as well (Holtje and Kempin, 2013).

Opportunities and Responsibilities

A new international environment opened a new opportunity for small states. Henrikson (2001, p.10) wrote that 'decolonisation, the end of bipolarity, democratisation, trade liberalisation and the digital revolution are five factors that have given small states more freedom'. Hey (2003) pointed out the same trend that today small states enjoy more international prestige and visibility than in past history and the end of the Cold war means that small states are no longer pawns in the global competition for superpower dominance and no longer able to play the superpowers off against each other. In another study *Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's role in World Politics*, Ingebritsen (2002) focussed on other aspects of these states' behaviour and pointed out how Scandinavian states render influence in the international system by acting as 'norm entrepreneurs' in such areas as global welfare, environmental norms and multilateral security. She focussed on Scandinavian states as a group of militarily weak states and economically dependent small states, analysing how they pursue what she terms 'social power' by behaving as norm entrepreneurs in the international community. They act in three policy areas: the environment, international security, and global welfare. The notion of 'sustainable development' is a product of Scandinavian states, Norway used the UN to examine relationships between people, resources, the environment, and development on a global scale. Sweden hosted the United Nations conference on the Environment in 1972. The Helsinki Act, as a core of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was first developed in Finland. In addition, all Scandinavian states are leading donor countries. Thus, Christine Ingebritsen demonstrated that small states can act as 'makers' for the sake of peace in the international system through norm entrepreneurship but areas where great powers' minds would not reach.

Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) contributed to Small States Studies in contemporary Europe by showing that until World War II small states held autonomy in higher regard than influence and therefore small states pursued a strategy of hiding to avoid conflict. However, during the war this strategy did not work for most European states. The authors show that strategies of hiding have changed to strategies of binding. While the hiding strategy was to avoid conflict, the binding strategy has the aim to prevent such conflict by creating and strengthening governance of international affairs.

In summary, the above two sections showed how the survival of the small states was studied and how survival has changed. The later section of the small states' research shows more favourable conditions than the Cold War context. Thus, small-state studies implicitly bring us closer to understanding the international environment where small states are thriving

and successful despite the vulnerabilities and challenges they face. However, a better understanding suggests that small-state survival is not only linked to the presence of the great but to regional and international issues that concern small states, too. Therefore, in this following section, I present a conceptual framework derived from the literature. First, I developed a conceptual pathway for understanding small states' order-making: it is about overcoming the presence of great powers, and second, overcoming regional and international issues that concern small states too. Second, an understanding of the international order after the end of the Cold War provides a different context for small states in addressing and approaching regional and international issues that concern small states. Therefore, it is about 'shared order-making' that characterises a new international order. It further provides an opportunity for small states to enter into the areas of great power privilege and behave as an order-maker.

2.5 Small State as Order Maker

Section 2.5.1 below begins with preconditions, especially with an understanding of the presence of great power. The purpose is to highlight that small states must deal with the presence of great power in order to avoid instability and ensure stability by positively managing great power. The success of overcoming the presence of great power opens up a path to foreign policy engagement not limited to near-great power. In section 2.5.2, I shift to the second precondition to explain and offer that small states are not preoccupied with the presence of great power but also with issues that concern small states. At this level, if a small state is successful in dealing with near great power and with other powers beyond border and region, then focus on issues is the priority in small state order-making. I move, then to section 2.5.3, to understand an ‘order’ in IR and order in the post-Cold War context in order to situate small state interest in issues that concern small states within that order and explain its key characteristics that inform us about the possibilities for small state order-making.

2.5.1. Background: The Presence of great power

The above literature review shows that the study of small states during the Cold War and after has been informed with the presence of great power and small states’ response to it. The small-state literature, therefore, is rich with concepts and theories of small-state action throughout the Cold War period and especially in the post-Cold War period. Thus, conceptual and theoretical findings provide a picture of the actual position of small states in the new world

order. Since the number of small states is considerable, the findings were not limited to those proposed by realists with neutrality, bandwagoning or balancing. However, these conceptual findings were developed due to the presence of great powers next to small states. This tradition is present in small states literature since great power forces small states to "subordinate themselves to dominant states" and, therefore, choose between bandwagoning and balancing (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017). Due to the presence of great powers, small states seek a hiding strategy to avoid choosing sides in the struggle between great powers (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2018). Due to the presence of great power, small states also adopt shelter-seeking strategies to 'seek economic, military and societal shelter from great powers' (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2018). Despite, scholarly attention on how small-state practices influence the EU and in the EU context, Wivel (2013) found that 'political initiatives from small EU member states should avoid conflicting with existing EU initiatives or political proposals from any of the big EU member states' due to the presence of great power, and therefore, Wivel (2013) suggest that 'ideally, they should be presented as specific contributions to a general development, not as a change of policy or an attempt to slow it down' due to the presence of great power. However, the concept of binding, at least, shows how small states, through institutions and shared rule, can limit the action space of larger states (Wallace, 1999; Wivel, 2005), and this is due to the presence of great power. The worst is that small states may fear if the system collapses, again due to the presence of great powers. Schoeller (2022) found that 'small states benefiting from the existing system may fear that the hegemon will fail to keep the system stable'. In the end, all comes to the point that there could be the preferences and strategies of smaller states acting in the shadow of hegemony (Schoeller and Falkner, 2022).

The above relates to the topic that scientists call the relationship of a small state with a large one, so it is believed that within the framework of such relations, due to asymmetry, small states usually find themselves to be losers, while large states are to gain more from the asymmetrical relationship (Long, 2022). Therefore, according to Long (2022), relations with the near great power can lead to success or failure. For example, Long (2022) has shown this in the case of several countries, such as Djibouti, El Salvador, Bhutan and Estonia; they are all in the category of success states. In contrast, the failure category includes such countries as Gabon, Honduras, Nepal and Moldova. However, what makes them similar in facing common concerns is the proximity to and the presence of a near-great power, but they differ in the positions they occupy in relation to near-great power. For instance, Estonia took a conflicting position in relation to Russia. Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Estonia's actions to

seek NATO membership unfriendly, and this manifested itself in relation to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Others followed the same scenario: for example, Mali's in relation to France. It is necessary to consider those relations that have a colonial legacy. Long (2022) also showed this using the example of Mali's relationship with France. Here, even though France does not border Mali, it is the presence of French interests in the region that brings it closer to the African country from the outside. However, Mali took unfriendly behaviour towards France, for which it paid. The latter invaded due to instability in that country. Others, on the contrary, accepted the reality of the presence of a great power and created an atmosphere of friendly relations. So, Djibouti, Senegal, El Salvador, and Bhutan are successful cases dealing with near and outer powers. In general, they all acted in connection with the presence of large states. Nevertheless, this is not an asymmetry that leads to success or tragedy, but in fact, a choice between a friendly or unfriendly position and subsequent actions towards a large state. How it will be carried out in a friendly or unfriendly manner depends on her internal preferences and conditions. Stability or instability of the domestic context plays into the hands of regimes in different ways, so Rwanda, after the massacre in 1994, played on this for its benefit. Instability in Mali brought France, instability in Moldova favoured Russia, and instability in Nepal turned it towards India. Furthermore, ultimately, the country was successful because it considered the presence of a large state and tried not to aggravate relations with a large state. Therefore, small states must consider the consequences of forming positions on recognizing or not recognizing the interests of a great power. It is the terrible reality of relations between a small and a great power. Therefore, the path to exercise order-making depends on how small states restore order with the great powers. If everything is successful, there is a need to understand the following: This is the relationship with distant or outer powers. It means that relations with other states are not limited only to the neighbouring near power but, on the contrary, are aimed at diversifying relations. Here, Long (2022) again points out the successful attempts to pursue diversification and the failures of those who failed to achieve it. Ultimately, everything comes from how a state forms its relationship with a great power, on which it can justify its right to seek relations with other powers. For example, Djibouti, despite the presence of the United States military in the country, stationed both Japanese and Chinese military representatives on its territory. Of course, this was within the framework of the fight against piracy, and therefore, the vital location of Djibouti and its desire to get involved was the case. For example, Central Asian states, in the context of the fight against international terrorism, have located military bases on their territories as well. In contrast, India, at one time, also expressed its position towards Nepal;

the latter tried to build a relationship with China but paid for it when India intervened in the internal affairs of Nepal and applied economic sanctions (Long, 2022).

The presence of great powers beyond borders and regions is another realm that small states face. Radoman (2018), for instance, found that 'small states seek recognition from big powers by claiming their, albeit small, share in maintaining international peace and stability'. The presence of great power is so essential to those Western allies that small European states seek to bandwagon for status 'that helps them improve their status or consolidate their reputation as either loyal allies and partners' in the eyes of great power, the US (Pedersen, 2018, p.235). De Carvalho and Neumann (2015, p.2) demonstrate with a case on Norway how "status is a key driver in the policies of small states in everyday life in international society.' But, 'small states achieve status through making themselves useful to greater powers' (Carvalho and Neumann, 2015, p.2) especially to the US. Here is another interesting finding: Jakobsen and Moller (2012, p.108) found that Denmark's military engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya is "not to win wars or even battles but to support the right cause and the right allies in order to gain goodwill, prestige, security and influence" in the context of U.S-led wars. For instance, Central Asian states were able to reach the outer power and be helpful in the war against the Taliban. In addition, Thorhallsson (2018) argues that 'small states gain moral authority through helping the great power maintain the existing international order, such as through mediation service, peacekeeping and humanitarian mission'. Radoman (2018) reminds us that 'Small states are expected to leverage multinational frameworks for international security to enhance the power to meet their objectives; however, their agenda must match those of large states'. As we see, the presence of great power also takes place at the international level. Therefore, without considering this, one can end up on the list of potential countries for external invasion or various sanctions. The presence of the United States on the international stage has shown what happens to those who may ignore the US. Nevertheless, if relations with large states are restored positively, there will be a transition from focusing on large states to issues that concern small states most.

2.5.2. Precondition: From great power focus to issues

As we see, the potential candidate for order-making is those small states that restore relations with great power positively and strategically, then justify relations with other powers, and finally move on to important issues that do not concern only with the presence of great powers, but with regional and international issues that concern small-states. These are issues about

climate change and the environment, human rights, regional organisations and global public health (Long, 2022). First to note is that the issue area of 'climate change is a danger to all small states' (Ruwet *et al*., 2023). Rising sea level is the immediate threat rather than the presence of great power for Pacific Small Island States (PSIDS); as stated, 'Climate change is the gravest threat to the sustainable livelihoods, wellbeing, viability, security, and sovereignty of our respective countries' (UN, 2014). For instance, the Republic of Marshall Island has prioritised the issue of Climate change for its foreign policy; 'it has resorted to framing issues in a way that emphasises the moral urgency and imperative' (Ruwet *et al*., 2023). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) worked together to set the agenda for climate change and actions in their way (Long, 2022, pp.145-147). Thus, environmental issues are what concern small states. Indeed, there are large states there, but the nuance is that control over a specific issue area requires common approaches from both small and large states. However, the example of the alignment of small island states together means the relative absence of great power or no power in a particular issue area. In the area of Human Rights, small states are the leading advocates on the issue of human rights internationally; for instance, Chile, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Lebanon and Uruguay are significant contributors to this issue area (Long, 2022, p.152). The implication is that the issue of human rights is not an area of great power privilege, only like the US. Even in global public health, great powers were leveraged to face similar challenges as small states to resist COVID-19 and were initially absent from providing public goods (Long, 2022, p.167). Thus, the vital issue area, which must be the area of great power privilege, is shared with small states. The consequence for small states is that great powers must share order-making with small states. This reality of small states' interest in the various issue areas must consider the context of the new international order. The transition of small states to issues not related to the great power should see as an area where small states restore order and practise order-making. For some reason, the literature avoids explaining the nature of the new order; this is possible due to Euro-centricity and cases mostly from European countries. But the new world order is not natural but has been constructed. Mazarr *et al*., (2016, p. 12) explain that 'The version most in evidence today, however, is an elaborate and deeply institutionalised concept of order based on U.S. post–-World War II visions for world politics. It is typically referred to as liberal and rules-based'.

2.5.3. Order and Issue-Corrector

Order in I.R. has a special place as Hedley Bull and others have studied it, and their analysis of 'order' is diverse. As Cello (2019) put it, 'international order is a contested concept: hard to pin down to a single agreed-upon definition but nonetheless largely used in the field of International Relations (I.R.).' For instance, Bull (2012, pp.16-18) defines *international order* as a 'pattern of activity between and among states that sustains the fundamental goals of the society of states', which include (1) preservation of the system and society of states itself, (2) maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, (3) preserving peace, in terms of the absence of war, (4) general goals of social life (limitation of violence, keeping a promise, stability of possession). Mazarr *et al*., (2017, p. xiii) argue that 'the International Order is defined as the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations between the key players on the international stage'. Indeed, apart from the presence of great powers, it includes global institutions such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization and many other regional and international organisations. For Mazarr *et al*., (2016, p.9), order means 'as input is a structure or pattern created for a specific purpose, to achieve an effect'. Frankowski (2010, p.97) sees order as a 'vision promoted by different actions and to describe their efforts to establish a particular state of the world'. Ward (2019, p.3) 'The concept of the 'rules-based international order' refers today in its most general sense to arrangements to allow for cooperative efforts in addressing geopolitical, economic, and other global challenges, and to arbitrate disputes'. However, the rules-based international order is a 'shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities following agreed rules that evolve, such as international law, regional security arrangements, trade agreements, immigration protocols, and cultural arrangements' (UNAA, 2016). These assessments are not without a reason. The role of the United States has expanded globally to the status of the sole superpower in the post-Cold War period, but so has the United Nations. The role of the United Nations has also expanded because of the proliferation of the new small states after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Knudsen, 1996, p.4) and opened opportunities for small states to raise issues that concern them more and propose solutions to tackle a range of regional and international issues (Hong, 1995). Hong (1995, p. 281) admits that 'where both blocs once courted key states, benign neglect or a loss of attention is now the order of the day and small states now have to fend for themselves.' Ikenberry (2013, p.4) also considers that 'the changing dynamics of world politics has opened the door for smaller powers to play a greater role in the international community.' It is, indeed, due to its permissive rules-based liberal order small states use it to their advantage

(Baldacchino and Corbett, 2023). However, another reason considered, which gives more action space, is because 'The great powers are now unwilling to accept the heavy burdens of ….' responsibilities (Lake and Morgan, 1997, p.5). As has been noticed by Barston (1971, p.41), great powers have the ability 'on a wide [range] of issues.' But, not any more when it comes to specific issue areas; the element of the relative absence of great power, therefore, can be identified. First, Ikenberry (2011, p.80) claims that 'the United States has been reluctant to sponsor and participate in international agreements in areas as diverse as Security, Arms Control, human rights, and the environment'. Second, according to Nye (2011), 'The United States will also face an increasing number of issues in which solutions will require power with others [emphasis added] as much as power over others.' Daalder and Lindsay (2003) found how 'globalisation both limits and transforms America's capacity to use its power to influence events overseas'. They argue that 'the challenges and opportunities created by the forces of globalisation are not susceptible to America acting on its own' and according to them such issues as 'combating the spread of infectious diseases, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorism, securing access to open markets, protecting human rights, promoting democracy, and preserving the environment all require the cooperation of other countries'. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann (2019) also found that 'when it has come to expanding multilateral cooperation on environmental protection, sustainable development and human rights, leadership has often rested with countries other than the U.S.' Thus, the great power no longer has power over issues but has to share order-making with others. Thus, this brings great powers and small states together. As Rothstein (1968) noted, the opportunities are open to a small state in a specific systemic condition (1968, p.182). Indeed, the systemic condition of the post-Cold War international order gave small states new and more opportunities in the new international settings. Global issues must be tackled in cooperation with others, providing opportunities for small states to choose and develop their issue specialisation (Hong, 1995). It is, therefore, at this level where small states meet the absence of great power in a specific issue area. Therefore, the asymmetry may disappear due to the presence of issues against which small states work hard to solve while great power is absent. However, the opportunities may also be understood differently by other states; some may continue to benefit and seek close relationships with the US, while others may express their frustration and, therefore, may resist or oppose international order.

The current international order has begun to be questioned by others. Mazarr et al. (2017, p.100) argue that 'Frustration at being part of an order whose rules, norms, and

institutions are set by others is growing'. The significant evidence, according to Mazarr et al. (2017, p1.00), is that 'among aspiring great powers (China and Russia in particular) and rising regional or major powers (including Brazil, India, and Turkey), the degree of dissatisfaction with the rules and operation of the existing order is reaching a tipping point.' Brady (2019, p. 13) argues that 'the great powers China, Russia, USA - and some medium powers – increasingly ignore the international rules-based order. The world is seeing a return of both 'might is right' politics and the sphere of influence. But what about Kazakhstan? Its foreign policy action towards neighbouring post-soviet states was peaceful and cooperative. At the same time, its initial concerns focused on the presence of major powers in the region and internationally. Therefore, it has responded by formulating a multivector foreign policy and becoming a very active player in foreign policy terms, cooperating with major powers, Russia and China, and the US. Kazakhstan's international standing towards post-Cold War order has been through adaptation and acceptance of the international liberal order and integration into the United Nations agencies and international organisations globally (Kassenova, 2017). It is at this level that Kazakhstan prioritised foreign policy initiatives (FPI) such as nuclear disarmament that concerned Kazakhstan after its own denuclearisation. In contrast to the above cases of resistance and opposition, Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives towards reintegration and nuclear disarmament meant not to resist or oppose great powers and regional institutions. Thus, while other states tend to oppose or challenge the existing international order, Kazakhstan intends to correct the issue that concerns Kazakhstan the most. Thus, Kazakhstan's correction behaviour as an action from within tends to correct an issue that concerns Kazakhstan most but not to oppose or challenge the existing regional and international order. Kazakhstan's correction behaviour has been two dimensional directed towards the regional and international environment. It has been possible due to the post-Cold War global order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, it is the absence of great power in the post-soviet space; internationally, it is the relative decline of the US and the absence of it in specific issue areas. Thus, a 'corrector' is a behaviour aimed to target a specific aspect of the issue and correct it towards a preferred direction and purpose. It means that one aspect of a specific issue may cause a foreign policy concern, and it is followed by proposing initiatives. The state does it in a way not to challenge or oppose regional or international order. The outcome, therefore, would mean an ability to correct the course of a specific issue towards its preferable purpose.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the current situation of small-state literature by highlighting the main issues with which international relations scholars have engaged. The main contribution of this emerging field is that it points to a group of states that has been neglected in the mainstream of IR. They are different and essential for analysis. The review showed that small-state scholars have understood how small states survived differently in the Cold War and post-Cold War period and how these states can sustain their independence and sovereignty with their external environment. It showed different types of behaviour which small states can adopt on the one hand to reduce their weakness and on the other to influence externally. The Small State Studies are mainly case studies in the search for small state power and foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, the search for the power of the small state never stopped; instead, it continues. However, there is a knowledge gap on small states with Euro-centric attention only to European small states and the International Relations' great power-centric preoccupation. While IR' most focused theme is on the 'rise and fall of great powers', we witness the proliferation of small states in the system since the end of WW2, and therefore, bringing new cases will contribute to Small State Studies in finding its niche in the field of IR. Thus, the literature review has revealed a few important points. The first is that small state studies emerged during war and crisis. It is the dominant framework within which small states are regarded. By this, it means that small states have only been a subject of research interest due to their ability to survive in times of conflict between great powers, such as World War II and the Cold War. The presence of great powers and their interaction in war and confrontation were necessary external conditions within which small states formulated their foreign policies. Therefore, the contributions scholars have made in terms of concepts like neutrality, alliance formation or balancing and bandwagon are all the products of these structural conditions of war and crisis. Moreover, small states have been studied during a strongly bipolar international order defined by the presence of two superpowers and, importantly, by two political and economic systems. Therefore, the concepts and assumptions developed then were about this structural condition. However, it is essential to point out that since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, such conditions have moved toward cooperation and competition between major and new emerging powers. Therefore, the international condition for small states and their foreign policies is seen in the framework of great power cooperation and competition. How, then, could the Cold War-era understanding of small states' foreign policy behaviour be applied to the new international conditions? There is space to examine small-state foreign policy

behaviour by keeping and testing concepts and assumptions in the new international conditions. The second point is that small-state studies have been developing around the perception that small states are survivors and, therefore, the main priority for such states is only security. However, in the post-Cold War international environment, the meaning of survival and security could not be ascribed only to small states individually but should be seen collectively. There are international issues that cannot be dealt with by a single state, but collective awareness of emerging external threats is a concern for a community of states. By this, it means that there is no individual survival but collective survival, and there is no single security but collective security, for instance, in the face of international threats such as international terrorism, extremism, and ecological issues. The international community has recognized all these issues as a single threat to all humankind. Some small states use the language of collective security concerning such international issues. This results from a new international context that emerged since the end of the Cold War. The world is turning into more of an interconnected whole, and therefore, all problems that the international community faces must be collectively resolved. The third point is that Small State Studies was Eurocentric from its beginning and keeps its focus on European states. However, we should move forward and beyond European cases and adapt what has been developed by European scholars' concepts and assumptions. How are they applicable to other non-European small states? For instance, the small post-Soviet States, the Caucasus and the Central Asian region have demonstrated that it has also become an epicentre of great power politics. Therefore, the focus on small European states cannot dominate small-state studies, but there should be a shift of perspective toward small post-Soviet states like Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has yet to be studied from a small-state perspective. It represents a new approach to looking at a newly emerged state. Bringing in Kazakhstan as a case study will enrich this area and expand it further by including a non-European state from the post-Soviet region. In this region, the survival of newly independent states has always been questioned. However, they have survived, and one of them is Kazakhstan. Its foreign policy is entirely different, and such behaviour has yet to be mentioned or studied from a small-state perspective. Therefore, while it will contribute to small state studies, the research contributes more about its behaviour since independence. Kazakhstan responds with foreign policy initiatives (FPI) that target regional and international issues. Therefore, focusing on these issues will bring a new understanding of small-state foreign policy behaviour. It will challenge the small state's non-systemic role and general attitude, viewing the small state as an order taker. Therefore, this chapter concludes that the current research project aimed to capture before shifting to the

results sections. In this chapter, I found there is a reluctance in Small State Studies against seeing small states as order makers and, therefore, bringing new ideas. Small State Studies should challenge the general view of small states as only order-takers and move towards seeing small states as active and effective order-makers in the international system. The scholars from the two periods, however, have left some hints that will bring the research project close to its research objective. Therefore, by utilising insights from the Cold War and post-cold War scholars such as Lindell and Person (1986), Singer (1972), Goetschel (1998) and others, and equipped with general motivation from small state scholars, I will access the great powers' privilege area of order-making and make the following guiding solution to the general research problem:

> The international system is complex and is favourable to small states. Opportunities and responsibilities are found and expressed by small states since the vital character of the post-Cold War order is that it welcomes other states to share order-making in a globalised international order. The implication is that great power needs others to order the international system and maintain it. Hence, we can consider small state order-making by finding their niche in some issue areas where great powers are less able or unable to act. Of course, the presence of great powers and their role in the creation and maintenance of international order is hard to ignore. But order creation and maintenance do not only belong to great powers but contain a role for small states in between as 'correctors.' It is about the other reality in which small states are not only concerned with the presence of great power but also with issues that concern most small states. Their engagement in various issues means they have the legitimacy to question some aspects of international settings and offer solutions. Therefore, order-making from a small state like Kazakhstan will show that it is possible but in a specific issue-area and as an issue-corrector.

Before moving to the result sections, the domestic context will be discussed and analysed in the next chapter. It is to argue that the domestic order that Nazarbayev created and controlled was his creation, and he has been the ultimate order-maker in Kazakhstan's domestic context. Nevertheless, outside of domestic order, Kazakhstan is an order-taker due to its transition from one order to another due to the collapse of the Soviet Union system. It strategically absorbed what was needed and essential, benefiting from integrating into a new international order. Domestic stability provided a safe backing to conduct foreign policy initiatives without concerning domestic order. Therefore, the next chapter will analyse the aspect of 'stability'

associated with the Nazarbayev regime. Then, I will move to ‘the Russian Question’ to point out the presence of ethnic Russians and how Kazakhstan dealt with it in the domestic context of post-independent Kazakhstan was crucial for the regime and domestic stability, and essentially for the foreign policy engagement with regional and international issues. Thus, the stability of the Nazarbayev regime is a crucial factor behind the order-making behaviour of Kazakhstan since its independence.

Chapter 3. Domestic context of Post-Independent Kazakhstan: Smallness, Authoritarianism and Stability

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how internal developments in post-independent Kazakhstan implied order-making behaviour beyond the domestic context. The small states literature has focused on domestic conditions above external factors (Elman, 1995, p. 171). Mariam Elman argued that systemic factors do influence the decisions of states, but internal domestic institutions make choices. Her work has contributed to focus on domestic context and has interested other scholars on this trend (Zahariadis, 2005; Jesse,2006; Davies, 2008; Deets, 2009; Thorhallsson, 2000; Miles, 2005; Gvalia and Iashvili, 2011; Gvalia *et al*., 2013). For instance, Bhattarrai and Cirikiyasawa (2020) also argue that 'other factors, including the role of individuals, the bureaucracy and state politics, have at least as much influence on foreign policy behaviour as international security concerns.' In this case, Kazakhstan's domestic context formed around President Nazarbayev, and he was the ultimate order-maker in the Kazakhstani domestic settings since independence. The literature in the 1990s begins on Kazakhstan as a state in transition and expectation for transition to democracy. However, it did not happen because the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, chose the other direction and towards a personalistic rule of post-independent Kazakhstan from the day of the Declaration of Independence until his resignation in 2019. Thus, President Nazarbayev has caused conceptual innovations and knowledge production from scholars who studied Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev. For instance, President Nazarbayev in the literature has been identified as imperial president (Lee, 2009, p42), as a 'soft authoritarian regime' (Koch, 2013, p.42) or as 'neo-patrimonial' (Clarke, 2014, p.147; Hale, 2015), in another way as extremely presidential and personalised (Laruelle, 2015; Isaacs, 2022) and even a sort of 'traditional authoritarian' (Gallo, 2022, p. 566). Thus, the knowledge acquired from the case of post-independent Kazakhstan will be stored and filled as Kazakhstan during the Nazarbayev era. However, one of the characteristics of his domestic order is the system's stability. This assessment is joint among scholars who studied Kazakhstan. For instance, Ziegler (2010, p.796) noted that Kazakhstan is 'the most affluent and politically stable of the five post-communist Central Asian states,' or as Stronski (2016, p.2) assessed Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev before Nazarbayev's resignation, as 'an island of stability and prosperity in an increasingly troubled Eurasian landmass'. These reflections on stability are a product of internal domestic order; Kazakhstan defined as an

authoritarian state due to the personalistic figure of Nazarbayev (Isaacs, 2010; Hess, 2013; Ambrosio, 2015; Busygina, 2019), but thriving in making Kazakhstan stable under a different label such as authoritarian stability (Ibadildin and Pisareva, 2020), regime stability (Del Sorbi, 2016) and domestic stability (Ziegler, 2010; Yilmaz, 2017; Bohr *et al.*, 2019). However, stability came after a period of instability that many countries in the region have experienced. First, while all post-soviet states shared instability due to the transition from one collapsed order to another, Kazakhstan avoided what other post-soviet states were falling into after they declared independence; they met instability in different forms. For instance, Moldova has the problem of Transnistria separatism (Shoemaker, 2013, p.184), Georgia has two secessionist movements, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Shoemaker, 2013, p.231), Ukraine's conflict with Russia since 2014 and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Shoemaker, 2013, p.204). The above events of domestic instability had a profound effect on their relations with Russia and on regional integration. Thus, the foreign policy orientation was a concern among regional states, but two opposed lines, such as pro-western and away from Russia, and another keeping relations with Russia. As we can see, there is a profound pro-western or pro-Russian tilt that divides regional states into those who prefer cooperation with the West and others with Russia. These preferences were defined by internal decision-making. They were all regimes transitioning to democracy through revolution and regime change and to authoritarianism without revolution and change. While the former meant democracy through instability, the former meant authoritarianism through stability. Thus, the instability from within has defined most of the regime's decision-making on how to form foreign policy orientations.

Kazakhstan, in this case, has avoided what other post-soviet states faced since independence. Nazarbayev escaped coup attempts, assassination attempts (eight-car bomb explosions in Tashkent with the apparent target being President Karimov, Shoemaker, 2013, p.298), and even sudden death (President Niyazov died unexpectedly on December 21, 2006, Shoemaker, 2013, p.288), cross-border conflict 'colour revolutions' (like in Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus) and significantly did not worsen relations with the USA and EU (President Lukashenko, on the contrary, worsened relations with the United States and EU, Shoemaker, 2013, p.151). More generally, Nazarbayev had avoided civil war, border conflict, external intervention, secessionism, radical Islamic threat, internal enclave and, importantly, its Russian threat perception. Thinking about stability from an authoritarian perspective has also been different: Nazarbayev's authoritarian decision-making compared to other authoritarian leaders

was to escape any potential elements of instability; for instance, Askar Akayev's authoritarian decision-making led the country to instability in 2005 (Shoemaker, 2013, p.262) or Uzbekistan under Islam Karimov. This country faced instability due to Islamic militants' assassination attempts on Karimov and Andijan massacre in 2005 (Shoemaker, 2013, p.298). Although the event in Zhanaozen in 2011 was put down by force, it did not have a similar consequence for the Nazarbayev regime as Karimov's regime-based sanctions from the EU (Shoemaker, 2013, p.304). Consequently, domestic instability made countries weak inside and prone to other revolutions, in the case of Kyrgyzstan or the search for other powers to rely on since Western condemnation and sanctions had a profound effect on foreign policy change in the case of Uzbekistan. Thus, stability is a crucial condition for order-making engagement beyond the domestic context. This chapter, therefore, aims to explore how Nazarbayev restored domestic order in a time of instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It begins with section 3.2 to understand the smallness of post-independence Kazakhstan in relation to major powers. In the following section, 3.3, I explore regime stability under Nazarbayev rule and move to section 3.4 to further explore domestic stability in general and link it to the "Russian Question".

3.2. Smallness

Kazakhstan was among those proliferated post-soviet states. Its smallness was preceded by the post-soviet condition of transition from one order to another and self-perception of being a small state in relation to Russia, the USA and other major powers. Kazakhstan has emerged as weak and underdeveloped. It faced devasted economic decline due to its transition from the Soviet system to a Western one. At the same time, Kazakhstan has emerged with positive signs such as the possession of a territory of 2.7 million square kilometres (the ninth most extensive state in the world), oil reserves of 39.8 billion barrels (5.5 billion tons), and gas reserves of 105.9 trillion cubic feet (3 trillion cubic metres), the country's geopolitical location between the regions of Europe and Asia and between regional powers such as Russia and China. If compared, Kazakhstan, from a material point of view, is more powerful through possession of oil and gas than its Central Asian neighbours, except for Uzbekistan's higher population - 30 million compared to Kazakhstan's 17 million (in 2019). Compared to other post-Soviet states of the Caucasus and the Slavic states of Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan by population is above all of them except Ukraine, with its population of 43 million (in 2014). Kazakhstan, by territory, is second to Russia in the post-Soviet space. It might suggest that Kazakhstan is a powerful state and not a small state; in practice, it is merely powerful compared to other post-

Soviet states. Despite its relative economic successes compared to other neighbouring states, Kazakhstan's smallness is defined by its perception and the presence of major powers. It is Nazarbayev's self-perception of being a small state that adds to its smallness; it has been evident in his London speech in 1994 when Nazarbayev (1994a, pp.24-25) referred to small states' responsibility and how it must be shared between fifteen states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is Nazarbayev's view of the post-Cold War international order. The Nazarbayev self-perception tells about the presence of major powers, Russia and the USA and adds to its smallness in relations to these powers. Thus, its position in relation to dominant powers in the region and the global arena defines Kazakhstan's smallness. Hence, Kazakhstan is defined as a weak part in an asymmetrical relationship with Russia, the USA and other powers such as China, where it is tied to its regional context of an institutionalised relationship with regional organisations in which regional powers play a central role (Goetschel, 1998, p.14; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010, p.7; Archer *et al*., 2014, p.8). In material and relational terms, Kazakhstan is a small state in relation to these powers. Thus, a context of great power presence makes Kazakhstan a small state in relation to greater ones.

3.3. Regime Stability and President Nazarbayev

The presidential rule came in 1995 as the result of constitutional change. Ever since President Nazarbayev has been one of the longest-standing rulers in the post-Soviet space, his initial move was to clean up the old Soviet apparatus with a new post-soviet intelligentsia: a circle of state servants and business elites (Cummings, 2003). However, the birth of opposition and the November 2001 crisis ended the potential path to democracy, and instead, a super-presidency has formed. No opposition to his powerhouse has existed since that time. As a result, he transitioned to power as 'a smart authoritarian' in 2019 (Pistan, 2019). Thus, Nazarbayev's domestic order-making has been formed and based on authoritarianism. It is how he will file in the literature on Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev. However, his rule was associated with the stability of the regime.

Domestic legitimisation comes from the Soviet time (Olcott, 1996), and Nazarbayev emerged as 'the central figure responsible for guiding Kazakhstan' (Isaacs 2010, p.438); it gave Nazarbayev a right to order domestic context on dual policy actions: responding to ethnic diversity and seek legitimisation from them in response. For instance, Nazarbayev's internal policy of legitimation directed towards appointing locals and Kazakh people at a time of emigration of Slavic and German peoples from Kazakhstan during the 1990s (Cummings, 2005;

Goldman, 2009, p.37). Kazakh peoples from Mongolia and China were invited to fill this gap (Aleksandrov, 1999, p.101) and legitimise his power (Cummings, 2005). Moreover, the best response to the diverse population was and still in operation, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK). It was created to consolidate all ethnic people in one institution and give them a voice through representation at APK and in parliament (Sullivan, 2019, p.35), hence legitimising his power in the face of major ethnic communities in Kazakhstan.

When it comes to legitimacy from outside and foreign policy, Bukkvoll (2004, pp.646-647) found that close relations with Russia have been motivated by his desire for power and income; while alliance with Washington has not, it has boosted Kazakhstan's prestige and sense of self-legitimacy. Cummings (2004), for instance, has stressed that President Nazarbayev has relied on foreign policy initiatives such as the Eurasian Union to legitimise himself among the ethnic Russians. Laruelle (2015) has also drawn attention to foreign policy as a tool for political legitimacy. Smith (2012, p.119) has demonstrated that Kazakh foreign policy initiatives, and in particular the success of Kazakhstan in acquiring chairmanship at the OSCE, have been aimed 'to reinforce the leadership's claim to power'. While this initiative is directed at domestic consumption and regime legitimacy, it has also benefited the country's claim to regional leadership (Smith, 2012, p.121). Indeed, Nazarbayev's domestic orders were not significant obstacles for the West, which invested a lot in Kazakhstan and, in particular, in its energy sector, providing economic aid and technical support. Therefore, the legitimacy from outside guaranteed; as a result, Kazakhstan has conducted its foreign affairs with success (see Chapter 3 on foreign policy success), particularly with its bid for the OSCE in 2007 and hosting of the 2010 OSCE Summit in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (Akiner, 2011).

For the domestic state building, Nazarbayev put more effort into making the capital of Astana well-known among famous capitals worldwide, such as New York, London, Paris and Moscow. He moved the state capital of Almaty to the north of Akmola in 1997 and renamed it Astana, which means the capital in English. In 2010, Astana hosted the OSCE Summit. In 2011, the Asian Winter Games and, annually, Astana was a place for the Eurasia Media Forum, where world problems are discussed among world leaders, academics, and policymakers. Also, Astana has become a place to discuss the Syrian crisis and Iran's nuclear program. Thus, Astana has become a world capital for world leaders to visit (Akiner, 2011). There was a visible attempt by Nazarbayev to introduce Western standards in media and education: the Eurasia Media Forum attempted to copy Davos and provide a platform for politicians and analysts to express their views on global affairs and hot issues. For instance, in 2014, forum topics

included the "New World Order: The Global Crisis and its Impact on the Rest of the World", "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Winners and Losers?" and "The Middle East Tinderbox," focusing on the situation in Syria and stirring more debate on Ukraine (Hopkinson, 2014). The 2019 forum focused on '(De)-Globalisation: The World in Search of New Development Model' and touched on the issue of Artificial intelligence and humanity (Bruns, 2019). Overall, the forum covers international relations, the economy, the environment, and new technologies. Thus, Kazakhstan uses this platform to analyse the changing world order and to provide its vision of the future to the outside partners. Also, with permission from President Nazarbayev (Kudrenok, 2012), the new TV channel 24KZ was launched in 2012 aimed to produce world news and be an alternative to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or CNN (Tengrinews, 2012). In 2010, Nazarbayev launched the `Nazarbayev University' to create its educational institution as an alternative to leading world universities like Oxford University or Harvard University. Nazarbayev University 'will become a national brand of Kazakhstan that will combine the advantages of the national education system and the best of international research and education practice' said Nazarbayev at the school's opening ceremony (Guttman, 2013). To produce its top leaders, Kazakhstan has developed the `Bolashak' program. It has become an essential state-sponsored education program for the citizens of Kazakhstan. This program aims to educate people abroad and bring them back to use these skilled and educated people for Kazakhstan's development and management needs. Nazarbayev stated during the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolashak programme in November 2013, 'The Bolashak programme is a farsighted solution for a young country's post-independence hardships. At the dawn of independence, Kazakhstan needed highly qualified professionals capable of conducting further reforms to overcome obstacles' (Rutz, 2013). Moreover, to look like the West and be strong as a Western power is Kazakhstan's strategy. For instance, Strategy 2020, which sought to get the country into the list of the top 50 developed countries, was, according to the state, accomplished in 2012. Moreover, Strategy 2050 aims to get Kazakhstan into the top 30 developed countries by 2050 (Keene, 2013). A positive assessment from foreign institutions, such as the Doing Business 2013 Rating Report, recognized Kazakhstan' as having the most improved ease of doing business' across various areas (Astana Times, 2014). Kazakhstan’s way of development is to use Western approaches in all spheres of state development. Kazakhstan has adopted the English language policy by introducing a trilingual education system of Kazakh, Russian and English in Kazakhstan schools (Lee, 2015). However, Dariga Nazarbayeva, deputy prime minister at that time and daughter of the country’s president,

has signalled the need to learn Chinese in addition to Kazakh, Russian and English. The reason is apparent: she stated, ‘China is our friend, our trading partner and the biggest investor in the economy of our country’ (Farchy, 2016).

Civil Society

The relationship that Nazarbayev had with the general population can be approached with two distinct features: conformity and dissenters. This decision reflects how civil society can be viewed and analysed. While the former has been supportive and loyal since independence (Isaacs, 2010; Koch, 2013), the latter has been in rejection and demand for change since 2019. The Nazarbayev regime had popular support (Isaacs, 2010) and, therefore, was collectively receptive to Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan. His success in domestic order has created a dilemma for the population: Should they choose stability or change? Not surprisingly, they vastly prefer stability to the unknown changes and consequences of any post-Nazarbayev period. This support was also due to the country’s economic condition; the course has been set for modernisation of the economy with help from international financial institutions and attracting foreign investments into its energy sector. However, the most important external factor that merged oil reserves and great power interest was the high oil price since 2001. As a result, during the 2000s, Nazarbayev made Kazakhstan socially stable among all ethnic groups, economically successful thanks to its oil and gas resources by diversification of oil pipelines to leading oil suppliers and some liberal trade policies, and politically, grabbed most administrative powers and control over political developments, strengthening his position (Goldman, 2009, p. 51).

In parallel, however, we have seen the crackdown of the first democratic movement: the democratic choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), Kazakhstan, the death of opposition leader Sarsenbayev, the Rakhat Aliyev's exile and death in Vienna, and the protest in Zhanaozen (Lillis, 2019). However, scholars identified two different dynamics. For instance, Niyazbekov (2018) argues that protest dynamics between 2000 and 2009 were non-political and non-threatening to the Nazarbayev's regime. However, 'shocks' have followed since 2011, such as the workers' strike in Zhanaozen in 2011, the land protest in 2016, the popular protest in 2019 and Qantar in 2022 (Isaacs, 2022). Apart from two later events, all others took place before President Nazarbayev surprisingly resigned from the presidency in 2019 (Burkhanov, Orazgaliyev and Araral, 2019). Here, it is interesting that no Western sanction followed after; for instance, the Karimov regime was under Western sanctions after a harsh response against

the protesters in Andijan in 2005, and the Nazarbayev regime avoided such a consequence. After many years of silent support of the regime, a new generation is resistant with a message: 'We had enough, and all the Kazakhstani must wake up' in the civil movement that emerged after Nazarbayev's resignation, such as 'Oyan Kazakhstan', 'Respublica' and Qaharman (Scheik, 2022, p.274).

Foreign Policy Conduct

Kazakhstan's foreign policy is defined as 'successful' (discussed in Chapter 4), but it came from authoritarian decision-making. Since the end of the Cold War, the type of regime had to be democratic and, hence, liberal foreign policy. For instance, the US and Europe are the prime examples of democratic governance and liberal foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with the US's illiberal foreign policy practice. It is studied with such examples as 'the pursuit of global hegemony, launching of a preventive war, imposition of restrictions on civil liberties in the name of national security, and support for torture under certain circumstances' (Desch, 2008). In contrast, Kazakhstan's foreign policy was not intended to be a model for others, and no attempts to invade other countries. It differs from Kazakhstan's neighbouring countries like Russia and China; their foreign policy is authoritarian and consistent with domestic and foreign aspirations (Diamond et al., 2016). But, there is another case, and it is the relationship with authoritarian regimes that Kazakhstan has. It could be necessary, but it also came from authoritarian decision-making. At least, Kazakhstan's foreign policy doesn't have that element that other so-called authoritarian states have, and it is opposition to the existing international order: Russia and China (Diamond *et al*., 2016; Bettiza and Lewis, 2020), and does not promote authoritarianism abroad like Russia, Venezuela and Iran (Vanderhill, 2013).

Instead, Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been referred to as a success (Hanks, 2009) due to domestic regime stability (Del Sorbi, 2016). Therefore, the foreign policy success stems from the inside stability of the regime. Success is also about Kazakhstan's consistency with capitalism and consideration of great power presence. Kazakhstan successfully adapted to liberal capitalism, and foreign policy has also been according to the Western standards of practising: a friendship relationship with the West and openness to the world. Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan had served the purpose of neoliberalism. Adapted neo-capitalism and electoral elements of democracy. While the latter used to adapt Kazakhstan to the global economic order, the former has guaranteed to satisfy the West. Secondly, it served the interest of the West for not being a troubled nation in the region. It showed its cooperative strategy towards the Western

world and, at the same time, conducted its foreign policy initiatives under such a posture. However, stability of the regime and success of foreign policy wouldn't be possible if Kazakhstan chose to deal with the ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan in a way that could lead to conflict with its neighbour country: the Russian Federation. Therefore, the core of domestic stability was defined in the early 1990s. The following section of this chapter explores how the Nazarbayev regime dealt with the 'Russian Question' from within and its consequences afterwards.

3.4. Domestic Stability and Russian Question

Kazakhstan's external foreign policy engagement would not be so successful without stable domestic stability within Kazakhstan. Therefore, this section focuses on how ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan have created a 'Russian Question' for post-independence Kazakhstan in the 1990s and its return since 2014. This section has a key aim: dealing with the 'Russian Question' had two consequences: first, it meant internal stability of the regime and security within the domestic context, and second, this ultimately affected foreign policy conduct without focusing on internal problems. I start by briefly introducing the 'Russian Question' and its evolution. Following this, I turn to a review of the academic literature on Kazakhstan-Russia relations and outline the relevant similarities and differences between Kazakhstan and Russia. Next, I discuss how Kazakhstan has responded to the 'Russian Question'. I explore new ways of approaching the 'Russian Question' in light of the shifting context. Finally, I will make concluding remarks in the concluding section.

The Russian Question since Independence

The collapse of the Soviet Union left an ethnic Russian population of more than 25 million in all the former soviet states beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. The Kazakhstan Slavs, with nearly 50 % of the republic's population in the mid-90s, have been a cause for concern among the country's post-independence leadership (Shchipanov, 1994). While there was a migratory trend of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, others have claimed special treatment for the use of the Russian language and political representation. In addition, Russia has at various times asserted rights over ethnic Russians in other post-soviet republics, occasionally accompanied by threatening rhetoric from Russian politicians regarding territorial claims against Kazakhstan (Alexandrov, 1999). Therefore, the 'Russian Question' had a prominent place in the agenda between Kazakhstan and Russia in the 1990s. The domestic challenge

represented by the 'Russian Question' has implications for the country's integrity and security of the country and the political stability of the regime. Resolution of the 'Russian Question' was considered part of the rationale for the "Kazakhization" of the country and the strengthening of the personal power of President Nazarbayev. Promoting internal stability in such a way as to resolve the 'Russian Question' paid dividends in the form of enhancing Kazakhstan's international reputation, which in turn served the domestic interests of the regime in terms of attracting foreign investment and strengthening Nazarbayev's presidency. The chronology of the "Russian Question" can be divided into two broad periods. The 90s were a period of cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan based on the joint recognition that politicising the "Russian Question" would not benefit either state. The second period began in 2014 with Russia's takeover of Crimea and the political activation of the 'Russian Question'. In the '90s, the "Russian Question" was resolved between Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev based on consideration of mutual interests and the internal political situation in both countries. Yeltsin did not attempt to apply pressure concerning Kazakhstan's 'Russian Question' in light of the capacity of Nazarbayev to influence the possible separation and recognition of Tatarstan from Russia and the fact that Kazakhstan's support was urgently needed in the context of Russian efforts to integrate the post-soviet states (Alexandrov, 1999). In the 2000s, the "Russian Question" was of secondary importance. President Putin's interest lay in access to Kazakhstan's energy resources, ensuring its participation in regional organisations and integration, and commitment to previously signed agreements on military and political cooperation. Thus, from 1991 to 2014, strategic considerations around Kazakhstan superseded Russian interest in the Russian ethnos in Kazakhstan. During the same period, the leadership of Kazakhstan was able to domestically contain the 'Russian Question' by suppressing any signs of alienation of territories and other ethnic conflicts within the country by the ethnic Russian population in order to successfully avoid ethnic conflicts that could threaten the integrity of the state. Nevertheless, the 'Russian Question' renewed relevance in Kazakhstan after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. This is due to changes in Russia's official posture towards not only ethnic Russians but also Russian-speaking populations through the legal designation of such as 'Sootechestvenniki' or 'Compatriots' (Grigas, 2016). Such calls from Russia lie partly in claims on a common history in the defeat of Germany in the 'Great Patriotic War' (WWII). This is a powerful concept that is hard to deny and dangerous to accept and has emerged after the Russian annexation of Crime in 2014. From the Russian side, it is one of the ways to justify their action in Crimea and support Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine (Grigas, 2016). The

possibility of Kazakhstan's going similarly to Ukraine has been a subject of scholarly attention since 2014.

The issue of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan

Previous research into Kazakhstan-Russia relations has focused on Kazakhstan's status as a priority for Russian policy toward the post-Soviet space. Naumkin (2003, p.39) identified the reasons for this as 1) geographical, Russia and Kazakhstan share a 7,000-kilometre border; 2) strategic location, Kazakhstan is a gateway to the rest of Central Asia; 3) Kazakhstan's possession of oil in the Caspian Sea; 4) the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and 5) Kazakhstan's active participation with regional integration. Sultanov and Muzaparova (2003) have also identified economic interests, defence, security, the Caspian problem, and the ethnic Russian diaspora as essential issues between the two states. Sultanov and Muzaparova (2003, p189) quote President Nazarbayev's words to highlight that 'the most important and currently most powerful of all is Russia. Its choices will determine stability in the world and Eurasia'. Such a view of Russia has informed a policy mentality 'not to provoke Russia' (Le, 2010, p.46), 'not to aggravate Moscow' (Molchanov, 2015, pp.87–88), and to do 'to Moscow's satisfaction' (Goldman, 2009, p.36). However, while admitting Russia's primacy, things have not always been smooth between Russia and Kazakhstan. Aleksandrov's excellent 1999 work Uneasy Alliance: Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era, 1992-1997, illustrates the challenging start for both countries emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The choice of the title was not without reason. Russia and Kazakhstan understood the need to overcome the post-soviet transition to a market economy and stable political system. Both sides had experienced tensions and crises, but recognising shared needs and mutual importance helped overcome these difficulties. Touching on the significant issues that continue to impact relations between both countries, Alexandrov (1999) has presented four significant problems in Russian-Kazakh relations such as the ethnic Russian community, the attitudes of Russia and Kazakhstan toward economic and political integration of the post-soviet space, military issues, and Russia's energy policy towards Kazakhstan. He concludes, however, by arguing that 'after the conclusion of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, it became clear that *the issue of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan* [emphasis added] had become the greatest problem in Russian-Kazakh relations' (Alexandrov, 1999, p.99). The issue of Kazakhstan's ethnic Russian population has been further studied in stages starting from 1991. For instance, Zabortseva (2016) has identified four stages of a relationship from military

relations in the first period (1991-1994) to energy in the second (1995-1999) and security and regional cooperation in the following period (2000-2004). The fourth period shows the intensification of bilateral relations between 2005 and 2012, whereas the last period (2013-2015) featured the impact of the Ukrainian situation on both countries. During these periods, the 'Russian Question' was framed in terms of a minority under discrimination, their migration from Kazakhstan to Russia and the policies that Kazakhstan applied to solve the Russian question (Khazanov, 1995; Alexandrov, 1999; Zhardykhan, 2004; Peyrouse, 2007) and did not present an impediment to deepening strategic relations between Nazarbayev and Russia's Presidents in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the issue of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan has shifted scholarly attention to Kazakhstan and the attitudes of its authorities since Russia's annexation of Crimea and actions in Ukraine in the name of protecting ethnic Russians. This has involved a reappraisal of Kazakhstani Russians as potential separatists and speculations about a similar scenario to the Crimean model (Brletich, 2015; Diener, 2015; Baizakova and McDermott, 2015; Laruelle, 2018). According to Baizakova and McDermott (2015, p.6), 'Russians have the same rights and privileges', and there is no threat of a 'Maidan' due to policies by Kazakhstan's authorities to consolidate the country's multiethnic population through official efforts towards 'tolerance', 'bilingualism', 'multiculturalism'. Similarly, Brletich (2015, p.17) has stated that 'Russian separatist tendencies have largely dissolved due to policies of tolerance and inclusiveness', but he claims further that Russia could make moves towards intervention/annexation if the anti-Russian opposition in Kazakhstan and the desire to withdraw from Eurasian integration persists (Brletich, 2015, p.26). It is worth pointing out that while there is little public anti-Russian sentiment in Kazakhstan, the idea of leaving the Eurasian Economic Union if it threatens its independence has been mooted by President Nazarbayev (Grigas, 2016, p.178). In general, Kazakhstan, after Crimea, has been resisting any action that does not suit Kazakhstan's interest, refusing to follow Russia's lead in joining sanctions against the EU and recognizing Petro Poroshenko as President of Ukraine (Vanderhill *et al*., 2020, p.984). This opposition to Russia's actions is happening at a time when ethnic Russian separatism in Kazakhstan itself may appear again and can be seen in a different but broader context. Grigas (2016, p.22) has argued that 'the issue of separatism in Kazakhstan faces an imminent risk of an imperialization trajectory from Russia'. The author illustrates these re-imperialization trajectories through soft power, humanitarian policies, compatriot policies, information warfare, passportization, protection, and annexation. These policies were applied in some measure in other republics, but Kazakhstan has rejected passportization, calls

for protection, and separatist movements (Grigas, 2016, p.23). However, Kazakhstan remains at risk of challenges to its territorial integrity, and Grigas concludes that:

> this challenge is unlikely to emerge if Kazakhstan's foreign policy remains in line with Moscow's. Yet, if Kazakhstan were ever to shift its foreign policy, say, toward the West or to seek NATO membership, it could face increasing pressure from Moscow as have Ukraine, Georgia, and others. (Grigas, 2016, p.24)

While the states above, under Russian pressure, have passed the red line, Kazakhstan has tried not to cross but rather to commit to a multivector foreign policy. However, the above scholars have failed to capture the diverse ways Kazakhstan has engaged with the 'Russian Question'. The 'Russian Question' has had varying significance in the shifting Russian political context. Therefore, the 'Russian Question' has been addressed by Kazakhstan concerning the diversity of domestic (both within Russia and Kazakhstan) political views and considerations involved. Thus, my approach to the Russian Question aims to highlight the importance of the political systems in Kazakhstan and Russia and the influence of the regional and international dynamics during the Yeltsin and Putin Presidencies. There were similar challenges in the post-independence period for Kazakhstan and Russia, but each took a different path of state formation and political system. In addition, the power differential (in military, economic, and geographic terms) is a salient factor in the analysis and has always played a role in Kazakhstan's considerations. Kazakhstan's leadership has been conscious of its relative smallness and insecurity in any potential conflict but has been able to withstand pressure. Therefore, I turn to examine how the Russian Question was dealt with in the 1990s.

The 'Russian Question' in 1990s

When Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991, the multiethnic composition was evident, and among them, the ethnic Russians represented the highest population in Kazakhstan: 6.5 million Russians were living in Kazakhstan. The early data shows that the percentage of Russians and Kazakhs were almost equal: Russians 37.8% and Kazakhs 39.7% in 1989 (Alexandrov, 1999, p.24). However, by 1991, the proportion of Russians dropped to 30% (Sultanov and Muzaparova, 2003, p.195). However, a narrative continued to claim that Kazakhs are a minority in their own country. Cumming (2004, p.145) has combined the percentage of Ukrainians (5.4%), Belarussians (1,1%) with Russians (37.7%) into one category as 'Slavic'.

Adding to this, the so-called ‘Russified Germans’ (95.8%) give a total of 44.2 %. Thus, this has fuelled a scholarly narrative of the plurality of Russians in Kazakhstan. However, given that one could also combine other non-Slavic nationalities of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen Kazakh part to assert a larger ‘Turkic’ population, this narrative is an erroneous one (despite Kazakhstan’s authorities not emphasising Turkic identity). However, the above statistics reflect the immediate post-independence demographics situation. Therefore, the 2021 statistics favour ethnic Kazakhs at 70 % and ethnic Russians at 18% (The Economist, 2022).

'De-russification' (Alexandrov, 1999) and 'Kazakhization' (Zabortseva, 2016) have been observed as critical developments in the nation-building of post-independence Kazakhstan. However, whatever it was called, ultimately, Kazakhstan's authorities showed a clear intention not to allow the 'Russian Question' to be used by Russia against its internal interests. This has resulted in the following policies. There are many reasons why Russians decided to emigrate from Kazakhstan. The primary ones were economic decline and Kazakhstani Russians' perception of Kazakhstan's future condition. However, scholars have focused on 'Kazakhization' as a factor. Lee (2010, p.58) defines 'Kazakhization' as 'building Kazakhstan's identity based on the Kazakh people and Kazakh language'. For Alexandrov (1999), this and the following policies that may impact migration and the declining population of Kazakhstan’s Russians in the 1990s entailed a straightforward ‘de-russification’ process. Grigas (2016, p.178), on the other hand, argues that ‘national policies were never targeted against Russians specifically but against all minorities.’ However, national policies targeted satisfying the two major ethnic groups: the Kazakhs and Russians. First, due to the presence of the Russian minority, officials in Kazakhstan decided to give the Russian language the status of the language of multicultural communication and legally guarantee equal conditions for the Russian language with Kazakh. However, this has created a problem: the use of the Kazakh language is required at a state level. However, it has yet to be clearly defined at other levels. Tables 1a and 1b show the legal status of both the Kazakh and Russian languages.

Table 1a. The Legal status of Kazakh and Russian Languages: The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995

Paragraph 2, Article 7. Russian is officially used along with Kazakh

Table 1b. The Legal status of Kazakh and Russian Languages: The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997

Article 4: State language of the Republic of Kazakhstan: The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the Kazakh language. The state language is the language of public administration, legislation, legal proceedings, and office work, operating in all spheres of social relations throughout the state.
Article 5: Use of the Russian language: In government organisations and local self-government bodies, the Russian language is officially used along with the Kazakh language.
Article 6: State support for languages: Every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan has the right to use their native language, to freely choose the language of communication, education, training, and creativity.
Article 7: Inadmissibility of obstruction of the functioning of languages: In the Republic of Kazakhstan, infringement of the rights of citizens based on language is not allowed.
Article 8: Use of languages: The language of work and office work of state bodies, organisations and local self-government bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the state language, along with Kazakh, Russian is officially used. In the work of non-governmental organisations, the state and, if necessary, other languages are used.
Article 9: Language of acts of state bodies: Acts of state bodies are developed and adopted in the state language, if necessary, their development can be carried out in Russian with the provision, if possible, of translation into other languages.
Article 10: Language of documentation: Maintenance of accounting, statistical, financial, and technical documentation in the system of state bodies, organisations of the Republic of Kazakhstan, regardless of the form of ownership, is provided in the state and Russian languages.
Article 11: Language of responses to citizens' appeals: The answers of state and non-governmental organisations to citizens' appeals and other documents are given in the state language or in the language of the appeal.

Source: Adilet (1995); Adilet (1997).

As can be seen from the table above, both languages have an almost equal status. Each paragraph emphasises the Kazakh language as a state language, but it places Russian on the same level. For example, Article 5 clearly states that the Russian language should be used along with Kazakh; the same condition is in Article 8. Also, Article 6 ensures Kazakhstan's citizens' rights to use their native language. Article 7 emphasises that the infringement of the rights of citizens based on language is not allowed. Besides, in Articles 9 and 10, Russian languages have a right to be used among Kazakh in the state documentation and communication. Finally, Article 11 states that the language of response must be in the language of appeal. Thus, legally, the Russian language is the state language along with Kazakh. As a result, while the language policy was to some degree to satisfy the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, it seems it led to the discrimination of the Kazakh language and Kazakh-speaking population and not ethnic Russians, as many scholars are trying to claim (Alexandrov, 1999). In addition, the Kazakh-speaking Kazakh population faces challenges when searching for a job in Kazakhstan's northern or eastern part. The Russian language is often a requirement for work or service despite the Kazakh language's status as the state language. However, in the law, article 4 also emphasises that 'Every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan must master the state language, which is the most important factor in the consolidation of the people of Kazakhstan' (Zakon Kazakhstan, no date). This reveals another problem of the commitment to learning the state language. Zhardykhan (2004) observed that ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan lack 'knowledge and endeavour to learn' the Kazakh language. This is arguably due to its privileged status and protection in the law. The same applies to Russian-speaking Kazakhstanis who lack the incentive to learn Kazakh since Russian is also the state language. The Russian language has been supported by the state program for developing and functioning languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan from 2011 to 2020. The program aimed to increase the population that speaks Russian by 2020 to 90% (Adilet, 2012). Based on the decree dated 31 December 2019, the government has approved the "State Program for the Implementation of language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2025". Once again, the program aims to increase the functioning of the Russian language in the communicative and linguistic space (Adilet, 2020). The Russian language has a place in the three-language policy as well. The state announced in 2019 that the primary schools in Kazakhstan, specifically at levels 10 and 11, would be taught in three languages: Kazakh, English, and Russian. At first glance, the Kazakhstan government is working on how to convince the population to know the state language. However, at the same time, the government is arguing that knowing the state language (Kazakh) and others

(English and Russian) is an advantage. It is another policy to maintain tolerance and a multi-ethnic balance within Kazakhstan's domestic setting. Moreover, Kazakhstan's multi-linguistic makeup also attracts potential foreign investors. For instance, Kazakhstan sent a message to the international community that Kazakhstan offers a multilinguistic environment through advertisements on the Al-Jazeera TV channel. Kazakhstan's authorities said that knowing more than one language is an advantage. While Kazakhstan's authorities are engaged in a balancing policy to satisfy both Russians in Kazakhstan and Russian-speaking Kazakhs, activists and civil society movements do not support the above policies and have demanded a revision of the status of the Russian language. The recent petition from Kazakh activists has gathered 120,000 signatures to exclude the second paragraph of the 7th article from the Constitution that states that 'Russian is officially used along with Kazakh', and public figures had argued in an open letter to the government that the 2nd paragraph of the 7th article misleads the population in Kazakhstan (Zakon. Kazakhstan, no date, a). These activists do not represent any political party, but they are all ordinary Kazakhs who favour more privileges to the Kazakh language. Despite Kazakh activists' efforts to change the law, it is hard for them to find support from the Kazakh population because the Russian language is in everyday use among all populations in Kazakhstan and is often the exclusive language in the country's North. There is a saying in Kazakhstan that 'if you want to learn Kazakh, go to the south of Kazakhstan' – specifically to Shymkent, a city predominantly Kazakh-speaking located in the south of Kazakhstan. The second apparent reason for ethnic Russian emigration has been the return of ethnic Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan, the so-called 'Oralmans' ('expatriates'). In 1992, President Nazarbayev initiated the First Qurultay of Kazakhs, which led to the creation of the World Kazakh Association, the aim of which was to attract Kazakhs from around the world and assist their return to their homeland (Bonnenfant, 2012, pp31-44). Seven hundred thousand returned to Kazakhstan between 1991 and 2007. Two tables 2a and 2b below show the relocation of Oralmans to specific towns and regions.

Table 2a. Oralmans allocation in the North-East regions from 1991-2007

Akmola, 36.036	East Kazakhstan, 26.232	Kostanay, 20.543	North Kazakhstan, 27.808
Aqtobe, 29.734	Karaganda, 41.003	Pavlodar, 25.694	Astana city, 5045

Table 2b. Oralmans allocation in the west and the south of Kazakhstan from 1991-2007

Almaty, 94.810	Zhanbul, 66.401	Kyzylorda, 16.417	South Kazakhstan, 149,897
Atyrau, 12.604	West Kazakhstan, 13.008	Mangystau, 80.106	Almaty city, 5931

Source: Table 2a and 2b has been modified from the original data (Bonnenfant 2012, pp. 31-44) but for the clarity of amount and different location it has been divided into two tables.

Table 2b shows Oralmans relocated mainly in the west and the south of Kazakhstan. Table 2a shows that the number of Oralmans relocated in Kazakhstan's northern and eastern parts is less than in the north. All the cities in Table 2a are close to the border with Russia and predominantly inhabited by ethnic Russians. Table 2b shows that the population of Oralmans are high, and these cities are not close to the border with Russia. Thus, the highest number (493,174) of Oralmans were in the south and west Kazakhstan, 493.174 thousand people, while the number of Oralmans in the north and east Kazakhstan is less than 212,095 thousand. It undermines claims that the inflow of Oralmans is a factor behind ethnic Russian emigration. However, the movement of rural Kazakhs to urban areas must be considered. During the Soviet Union, Kazakhs predominantly lived in rural areas. According to Khazanov (1995), Kazakhs comprised 57% of the rural population and 26,6% of the urban population in 1989. The collapse of central planning and the transition to a market economy has compelled thousands of rural Kazakhs to migrate to big cities. It may have played a role in both putting migratory pressure on ethnic Russians and meeting local labour demands as Russians were leaving cities and towns. However, the Russian migration continued and even the Kazakhs are migrating from Kazakhstan. The reason now is related to economic conditions in Kazakhstan, which have been negatively affected by the fall of oil prices and Western sanctions against Russia, which have had downstream consequences for Kazakhstan. Thus, the issue of discrimination against Russians as a source of migration from Kazakhstan cannot find its place since ethnic Russians have legal and state support at all levels. Moreover, no data exist to support claims of ethnic conflict and sectarian division between Kazakhs and Russians from the 1990s to the present. Overall, the government’s language policy satisfied both Kazakhs and Russians at its early stages. However, the shifting demographic balance will likely affect future language policy since the popularisation of the Kazakh language, the return of Oralmans and the growth of the

Kazakh-speaking population shifted the balance towards replacing Russia and making Kazakhstan a Kazakh-speaking country. Besides national policies and general migration, Kazakhstan dealt with those who decided to stay in Kazakhstan and initiated secessionist movements in the 1990s. The following section will explore the history of ethnic Russian agitation for partitioning Kazakhstani territories. Between 1991 and 2000, there were several attempts at secession within Kazakhstan. For instance, Boris Suprunyuk, a leader of the Russian community in Petropavlovsk, was arrested (Mikhailova, 1994) after making a statement on Russian TV that the 'non-indigenous population in Kazakhstan is a victim of genocide, and human rights are massively abused there' (Nourzhanov and Saikal, 1994, p.227) and was later sentenced to two years in prison (Toguzbayev, 2016). Similarly, Nikolai Gunkin, the leader and Ataman of the Semerechye Cossaks, echoed statements about the 'genocide against ethnic Russians' (Zabortseva, 2016, p.91). He even organised a rally for the unification of Kazakhstan with Russia. He also demanded granting the Russian language status of a state language and later left Kazakhstan due to threats made against him (Bredikhin, 2020). Kazakhstani Cossacks were the main concern for national authorities. Zhardykhan (2004) claimed that the threats were originating from Cossacks in Russia and other organisations that supported the secessionist movement in Kazakhstan. In another case in 1999, Vladimir Kazimirchuk was detained with another 22 people (12 with Russian citizenship) (Zabortseva, 2016, p.92) for planning to establish a 'Russian Altai' Republic (Zhardykhan, 2004, p.72). In general, the Cossacks in Kazakhstan display more radicalism compared to ethnic Russian communities, and such Cossack organisations as the Union of Cossacks of the Gorki Line, the Association for the Support of Semirechye Cossacks, and the Ural Union of Cossacks have all had separatist inclinations (Zhardykhan, 2004, p.70). A clash almost occurred between Kazakh nationalists and a local Cossack when Urals Cossacks decided to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Cossack formation in the Ural region. This had been objected to by Kazakh nationalists who came from other cities in Kazakhstan and gathered in the city of Uralsk to show their opposition to such an event (Karabek, 2011). The above cases strongly influenced Nazarbayev to resist any attempts for autonomy. Therefore, he took several measures to limit any tendencies toward secessionist movements. First, Nazarbayev proposed the administrative division of regions within Kazakhstan and approved the law dated December 8, 1993, "On the administrative-territorial structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan ". According to law, the following measures have been taken: Kokchetav gave part of its territory to Akmola and North Kazakhstan, and the Kostanay region incorporated the Torgai region. Table 3 shows that

Kazakh populations represent the Semipalatinsk and the Zhezkazgan regions. Both have been incorporated separately into the East Kazakhstan region and Karaganda (Dave, 2007, p.122).

Table 3: Name of the regions and the percentage of Kazakh and Slavic population before regional merge

Names before merger	% of Kazakh and Slavic population	Current name after merger
The Semipalatinsk region	54% Kazakh	East Kazakhstan region
East Kazakhstan	67 % Slavic	
The Zhezkazgan region	49% Kazakh	Karaganda region
Karaganda	63% Slavic	

Source: Modified from Dave (2007).

Secondly, another decision was to move the capital from Almaty to Akmola. The decision to move capital has been justified for socio-economic reasons. It had a strategic location and other factors such as climate, environment, and seismic conditions (KazInform, 2020). However, it has been interpreted as a measure to bring official control and influence closer to the northern part of Kazakhstan that tends to separatism (Cornel, 2007, p.275; Ostrowski, 2010, p.62). Akmola was renamed Astana in 1998 before being renamed Nur-Sultan to honour Nazarbayev as he stood down from the Presidency (while retaining state power) in 2019. Third, Nazarbayev resisted the formation of political parties founded on ethnic representation and created the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK) in 1995, which consolidated all ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. As a result, four ethnic Russian organisations are represented in the APK; 'LAD', which once chose to join the opposition parties that Nazarbayev later repressed; 'Russkaia obshchina' (Russian Community), which chose loyalty to Kazakhstan's authorities from the start; and others such as the Coordinating Council of Russian, Slavic, and Cossack Organisations of Kazakhstan; and the Association of Russian, Slavic, and Cossack organisations (Laruelle, 2019, p.72). As George has observed:

> Russian groups with varying alliances are dispersed across the territory with little political solidarity. Without an administrative territorial structure serving as a political and ethnic unifier and legitimizer of special political rights for the titular ethnic group, the Russian population in Kazakhstan is dispersed and fragmented. (George, 2009, p.90)

Nazarbayev has offered these groups a voice through the APK and, in doing so, cemented their loyalty to the state. Indeed, Nazarbayev is the chair of the APK and has the power to control and appoint nine members of the APK to have seats in the national parliament. It is worth noting that Russia was not a silent bystander regarding the 'Russian Question' in Kazakhstan. While its activity has not gone beyond rhetoric, there have been threats and claims on Northern Kazakhstan expressed by political figures and other individuals. Hearings at the Russian Duma were regular in the 1990s: for instance, 'on the violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan' (Zabortseva, 2016, p.91). Even the Nobel Prize winner and former dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn stated that 'the future of Russia depends on the re-centralization of the Slavic core, and thus on the partition of Kazakhstan' (Roy, 2000, p.191). However, Russia did not take a harsh official approach towards Kazakhstan. Although Russia could apply the same scenarios as Transnistria in Moldova or South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia (Grigas, 2016), Russia maintained a specific attitude towards Kazakhstan that confined the response to rhetoric. Despite the sometimes-harsh tone, Kazakhstan showed its commitment to integration and alliance with Russia at the regional level, which Russia needs from neighbouring countries. Surrounding events in the region have also contributed to the importance of Kazakhstan for Russia. Thus, the following three external factors favoured Kazakhstan in the 1990s.

1. The political system and internal developments within Russia have been among the factors that Nazarbayev exploited. Post-Soviet Russia under Yeltsin was more liberal, democratic, and open to the West (Checkel, 1995; Valdez, 1995). The economic crisis and the rise of nationalism with the secessionist movements in the Caucasus led to the Chechen Wars in the 1990s (Mesbahi, 1995, p.229).
2. The regional factor has two dimensions: the regional integration process and the second one is ethnic and civil conflicts and interstate wars. Kazakhstan has played an essential role in the integration process and actively supports Russian regional projects (Stevens, 2020). Kazakhstan and Russia are both CIS, CSTO, and EAEU members. Kazakhstan has supported Russian peace-keeping missions and even sent the Kazakh military to Tajikistan during the country's civil war in the 1990s (Kassenov, 1995, p.279). Kazakhstan also participated in the negotiation meeting during the Karabakh conflict in the 1990s (O'Prey, 1995, p.52).

3. The international factor. Russia played a limited role in world affairs but cooperated with the US. The role of the US has expanded as the remaining Superpower after the end of the Soviet Union.

Thus, measures that Nazarbayev adopted in the 1990s successfully neutralised threats from secessionist movements. However, according to Ostrowski (2010, p.44), 'Nazarbayev left the issue of the north unresolved and has arguably created room for future tensions. This tension could emerge from within but also from Russia itself, where Putin's attitude to neighbouring countries and the status of ethnic Russians are different from that of Yeltsin. Putin's presidency has a different significance for Kazakhstan and the region. While Yeltsin condemned the Soviet past, Putin's view of the Soviet Past is about its reincarnation in a new form. Therefore, there is a link in the form of a narrative that Putin is trying to impose on Kazakhstani Russians and others. In this narrative, it is not only ethnicity that Kazakhstani Russians have in common with modern Russia but a shared history based in part on the unfair dissolution of the Soviet Union. This narrative has become a tool to influence ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet region. In this context, the 'Russian Question' in Kazakhstan may emerge again. Therefore, the next section will explore the view of Russians in Kazakhstan and some accompanying factors that may facilitate or prevent some version of the Russian Crimea scenario in Kazakhstan.

The 'Russian Question' in a new light

The issue of the Russian minority emerged when Kazakhstan declared independence. Nazarbayev rejected Russian pressure during Yeltsin's time, but it remains an issue around potential separatism and Russian claims on Northern Kazakhstan today. It is not implausible that events that occurred in Ukraine might be repeated in some form in Kazakhstan. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan have similar characteristics in terms of sharing a border with Russia, the presence of Russians, similar military agreements, security assurances, and friendship treaties, but both have a slightly different approach to the Russian Question. While both have refused Dual Citizenship, they differ in language status. Where Russia has legal equality in Kazakhstan, in Ukraine, such status has been refused. Both have acquired security guarantees according to the Budapest Memorandum with Russia in 1994, and both have a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Russia (Shoemaker, 2010, p. 154, 233). Unfortunately, in the case of Ukraine, the agreements above have been violated by Russia (Pifer, 2020). Thus, Russia is an unreliable partner, and the legal basis of the relationship is not a prerequisite for safety and guarantee of security in the event of circumstances that conflict with the interests of one

of the parties. Kazakhstan also has a legal basis that started in the Yeltsin era, which was confirmed and extended by Putin. The legal bases were concerned with the formation of economic relations and regional integration during the Yeltsin era. Since Putin came to power, the legal base was confirmed but shifted towards energy issues and the continuation of regional and security integration (Appendix 8) (Kazembassy, no date; Bidlack, 2015, p.262). Thus, the 'Russian Question' evolution in Kazakhstan has depended on being overshadowed by Russia's prioritisation of security, energy, and economic integration. Having a legal base between Kazakhstan and Russia is not a guarantee but an indicator of the thirty years of close relations between countries. However, as in Ukraine's case, the legal basis is contingent on Kazakhstan's behaviour. Although Nichol (2009, p.2) argues that the potential for separatism in northern Kazakhstan has appeared to diminish due to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians to Russia. The population of ethnic Russians is still well-represented in Kazakhstan. Grigas (2016, p.22) argues that the issue of separatism in Kazakhstan 'faces imminent risk of a re-imperialisation trajectory from Russia'. According to Grigas (2016, p.9), Russia will seek territorial gains based on the following three factors: 'the presence of a large population of ethnic Russians, borders with Russia and a population which is receptive to Russian influence through media and other means.' The population of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan is 30 % (post-2014), the largest of any non-Kazakh ethnicity (Bidlack, 2015, p.255). The status and use of the Russian language have a well-defined legal basis. However, the current concern is Kazakhstan's Russian view of the Russian takeover of Crimea and their attitude should the same scenario happen in northern Kazakhstan. Table 4 below demonstrates the seven regions that share a border with Russia and the percentage of Kazakhs and Russians living there.

Table 4. The regions border with Russia: Kazakhs and Russians in percentage in 2018

Regions	Kazakhs	Russians
Atyrau	92.4%	5.4%
West Kazakhstan	75.9%	10%
Aktobe	82.4%	10%
Kostanay	40.3%	41.3%
North Kazakhstan	34.7%	49.7%
Pavlodar	51.8%	35.9%
East Kazakhstan	60.0%	36.5%

Source: UNFPA (2019).

In the regions that do not border with Russia, the Akmola region, Kazakhs makeup 51.0%, and ethnic Russians are 33.1%; in the Karaganda region, Kazakhs are 51.3% and ethnic Russians are 35.8%. Of cities with a population over one million, in the capital of Nur-Sultan, Kazakhs make up 78.2% and ethnic Russians 10%; and in the southern cities of Shymkent, Kazakhs make up 66.0% and ethnic Russians 9.7%; in Almaty, Kazakhs make up 71.8% and ethnic Russians 10 %. Thus, in only two regions, Russians make up the majority of the population (Kostanay and North Kazakhstan), while in the other regions and cities, Russians are between 10 and 40%. Moreover, the demographic balance is projected to shift further in favour of Kazakhs since the Kazakh government announced in 2016 that the resettlement of Oralmans will continue in the seven regions referred to in the tables (Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, no date). However, what scholars have overlooked is the potential concerns around Russian-speaking Kazakhs as well as ethnic Russians, as they are also receptive to Russian influence.

The memories of WWII and the Soviet Union era are shared between Kazakhstan's Russians and most Kazakhs. Moreover, many Kazakhs also have positive memories of the Soviet Union, and these narratives associated with the Soviet Union are translated to the new generation in the form of respect and praise for previous generations. It is the context in which this population could be instrumentalized in the event of a crisis and could play well into Putin's glorification of the Soviet past and could translate into support for his actions in Ukraine by a 'neo-Fascist' regime in Ukraine and sympathy with his claim around the unfair transition of Crimea to Ukraine in 1953 (Grigas, 2016, p.13). Therefore, Russian-speaking Kazakhs and ethnic Russians living in the northern regions could be seen as ideologically well-prepared. Kazakhstan is a Russian-speaking post-soviet country, so such narratives have no linguistic barrier to cross. Russian justifications for the annexation of Crime are transmitted in the Russian language and by Russian media, which is well represented in Kazakhstan. The next section will discuss the consequences of Russian action in Crimea and its implications on Kazakhstani Russians and ethnic Kazakhs. After Crimea, the issue of separatism in northern Kazakhstan has increased again. Many ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan have sympathised with the Russian takeover of Crimea. There have been cases when ethnic Russians from northern Kazakhstan have expressed their support for Russian actions in Ukraine, and these narratives have referenced claims to ethnic Russian separatist claims to Northern Kazakhstan. For instance, Viacheslav Zolotnitskii, from Temirtau (a city in the Karaganda region), has spoken about Kazakhstan's accession to the Russian Federation and derogatively about the Kazakh

language. This was expressed during a conversation and online with a Ukrainian blogger, a video of which has been spread in Kazakhstan. However, Viacheslav Zolotnitskii later posted a video with an apology. No administrative action has been taken against him, but apparently, reprisals were taken against him by local nationalists. A similar incident occurred with another Kazakhstani Russian, Dmitry Goncharenko, from Kostanay (Kostanay region). He has also spoken about the support of Russia in case of war with Kazakhstan and his readiness to fight against Kazakhs. However, he later also posted a video of his apology. Local media did not cover both cases, but can be seen by local Kazakh internet bloggers on YouTube (Qazakh Inform, 2020). However, one Kazakhstani Russian, Kiril Bozhko, a resident of the city of Rudny (Kostanay region), has been sentenced to 2 years in prison after speaking disrespectfully about the Kazakh nation and its culture, as revealed during his conversation with another Ukrainian blogger (Sushko, 2020). Despite posting a video with an apology, he was convicted under Article 174, part 1 of the Criminal Code, for 'incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class or religious hatred' (Askhat, 2020). Thus, the above cases show the impact of outside influence from the Russian media and rhetoric from Russian officials that is broadcast throughout Kazakhstan. What can also be taken from the above cases is that the Kazakh authorities monitor video content on YouTube but are selective and careful about whom they respond to. In addition, Kazakhstan adopted a law in 2014 prohibiting calls for separatism in Kazakhstan. Further legal measures followed, and participation in foreign military combat outside of Kazakhstan and in separatist organisations is now an offence under Kazakh law. These strict official measures from Kazakhstan responded to the events in Ukraine and avoided reproducing a Crimean situation in northern Kazakhstan. The state, however, has refrained from renaming cities with Russian names like Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar.

The Russian political elite has always questioned Kazakhstan's independence and sovereignty and criticised Kazakhstan's policy on issues such as the ethnic Russian minority and Russian language, and recently, even on Kazakhstan's foreign policy. While the rhetoric during Yeltsin's time was open, it was only individuals or certain politicians. However, it generally occurs through the media, where political analysts criticise Kazakhstan. What is evident now is how party individuals, politicians, media, and Putin unite on how to see Kazakhstan. Therefore, the issue now is not about ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan itself but the extent to which their views reflect and are empowered by Russian official rhetoric, as shown by the above cases. In addition, President Putin stated regarding Nazarbayev in 2014 that 'he did a unique thing. He created a state on a territory where a state never existed. Kazakhs did

not have statehood' (Grigas, 2016, p.11). It was a mixed message on the authenticity of Kazakhstan's statehood and complementary to Nazarbayev. However, Putin's speech in Seliger is an example of how to please Nazarbayev and, at the same time, point out that Kazakhstan has never been a state. It comes from the general belief, common among Russian politicians, that Central Asian states are artificial creations (Grigas, 2016, p.185). Moreover, in another speech in 2020, Putin stated:

> When the Soviet Union was created, the right of withdrawal was spelled out in the agreement, and since the procedure was not spelled out, the question arises: if this or that republic became part of the Soviet Union but received in its baggage a huge amount of Russian lands, traditionally Russian historical territories, and then suddenly she decided to leave this Union, but at least then she left with what she came with. And I would not drag gifts from the Russian people with me. After all, none of this was spelled out. I am absolutely convinced that we are doing the right thing that we accept amendments to the current Constitution. (Tengrinews, 2020a)

The clear connection between what Putin and other Russian politicians said in 2014 and now has sparked tension and harsh reactions from Kazakhstan. For instance, Vyacheslav Nikonov, the Head of the State Duma Committee on Education and Science and member of the ruling faction' United Russia', has stated that '"Kazakhstan simply did not exist. North Kazakhstan was not inhabited at all. They existed, but much more to the south. Moreover, the territory of Kazakhstan is an excellent gift from Russia and the Soviet Union (Mamashuly, 2020). In response, Kazakhstan sent a diplomatic note of protest which states the following:

> The more frequent provocative attacks of some Russian politicians against Kazakhstan are causing serious damage to allied relations between our states. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan expects an adequate assessment by the Russian side of such statements and calls for measures to prevent future statements of this kind from statesmen of the Russian Federation. (Mamashuly, 2020)

An answer has yet to be received from Russian officials. However, another member of the ruling faction, 'United Russia' Evgeni Fedorov, took the opportunity to respond, clarify and even explain what Nikonov meant. Fedorov stressed that if Kazakhstan thinks it did not receive

a gift, then talk would be different. He clarified that it is all about the 'return of territories' and 'illegal decisions of 1991'. He referred to the document 'on the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of the Union Republic from the USSR' (Mamashuly, 2020). The Kazakh Foreign Minister, Mukhtar Tleuberdi has explained:

> As you know, our state border has been delimited at the legislative level. A bilateral agreement between our countries was signed at the legislative level. Now we are demarcating the state border. Due to the pandemic, this process has been suspended, so we will complete the demarcation within three years. A strategic partnership has been formed between the two states. This is clearly reflected in all bilateral documents, and therefore we will develop our relations with the Russian Federation on an international legal basis. (Tengrinews, 2020b)

The issue has been discussed on the Kazakhstani local TV show 'Bolshaya Nedelya' (Big Week), where guests were all critical and condemned the statements. The task of the TV show was to limit the above statements to their personal views and to 'attach importance' (Darimbet, 2020). The idea behind it was not to identify them with the official position of the Russian government. This may also be seen in the comments of the Kazakh Foreign Minister in his response: 'As foreign minister, I would like to say that, of course, the statement of a State Duma deputy does not correspond to the official position of the Russian Federation' (Konyrova, 2020). Rhetoric should be considered part of a general trend which is amplified through the Russian media, which plays a role in unifying all of those who are in Moscow and so-called 'compatriots' around the region, which is the core part of the Russian revival in the context of 're-imperialization' (Grigas, 2016). The Russian media has been criticised for portraying the West as the enemy of Russia and for its 24/7 live coverage of Ukraine and the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. Even in the UK, the regulator for the communication services Ofcom' has stated that Russian News Channel RT (Russia Today) 'broke TV impartiality rules in seven programs after the Salisbury nerve agent attacks' and 'considered imposing a statutory sanction' (BBC, 2018). Such action may not be possible in Kazakhstan because the presence of Russian media in Kazakhstan is ensured by the presence of Kazakhstan's Russians and the wide use of the Russian language. These factors make it easy for Russian media to keep ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Kazakhs within the Russian orbit. A poll conducted in 2014 showed that 50% of the population commonly watched Russian TV channels. Another poll run by the

Centre of Social and Political Research Strategy shows that 61% of respondents supported Russian policy in Ukraine, 5% supported Ukraine, and the remainder were unsure (Grigas, 2016, p.19). Kazakhstan then enacted a 50% restriction on non-Kazakh languages in mass media, and therefore, all programming must be in the Kazakh language (Zabortseva, 2016, p.96). In addition, the national authorities have increased financing for all media in Kazakhstan to $53 billion in 2016 (Laruelle, 2018). Thus, the Crimean case and how Russian media broadcasted it has divided Kazakhstanis between those who view Russian actions in Ukraine critically and those in support. However, the seriousness of the state language condition revealed through social media indicates the discrimination of those who demand service in the state language and neglect of the law regulating the use of state language in small business sectors. Kuat Akhmetov, who is a Kazakhstan citizen, activist, and YouTube blogger, has been posting videos from those who experienced discrimination and recorded to show how Kazakh-speaking customers are being refused to serve in a state language and being opposed to any mention of law that they do not follow and break. Indeed, according to Article 24 of the Law on Consumer Protection, the customer must be served in Kazakh and Russian. In addition, the article stresses that it is forbidden for the seller to restrict the rights of consumers regarding the use of photography and video filming. Also, Article 25 emphasises that the product information must be displayed in Kazakh and Russian (Consumer Protection Law, 2022). Despite this, it eventually brought to Russian Media attention and coverage in a usual form of misrepresentation and ladling such actions as a 'language police' (Orisbayev, 2021). The exciting part is that Kazakhstan reacted with a statement from Kazakh official Dauren Abayev, who commented that it manifested 'cave' nationalism (Sputnik, 2021). In Akhemetov's explanation, he only posted videos with a request from people to show language discrimination and the breaking of the law (Til Maydani, 2021). This has not been left without attention from the Russian Duma. It legislated to ban Mr Akhmetov's entrance to Russia for 50 years (Sputnik, 2021a). According to Akhmetov, Russia also ordered the Kazakh government to initiate a case against him. Afterwards, he left Kazakhstan and stayed in Ukraine, and then moved to Turkey, where he decided to intentionally continue to cover the issue of language discrimination and the tragedy of the state language in Kazakhstan. Thus, this entire story indeed shows many other aspects of the language condition in Kazakhstan when it comes to the state (Kazakh) language. It reveals that the Kazakh government policy was intentionally soft to control the use of state language and implementation of law in the service sector. The Russian language continues to be a crucial factor within the country, and the Kazakh government must be careful

not to aggravate and attract Russian attention. In addition to the separatist inclinations of Kazakhstan's Russians, there are so-called "Vatniki": a term to define people who sympathise with the Soviet Union, call for the need of Stalin and voice support for a return of the Soviet Union. This phenomenon is described by Grigas (2016, p.13) as 'Soviet Nostalgia'. Indeed, this is what Russian media has also been influencing: speaking pro-Russian Kazakhs. The so-called 'Mankurt' term is in use for those pro-Russian Kazakhs. Importantly, what unifies the entirety of the Russian-speaking community in Kazakhstan is the Russian reincarnation of the idea of Otechestvo (fatherland). This concept has its background in Russia's claim on ethnic Russians in the post-soviet region. The so-called 'near abroad policy' under Yeltsin time has been defined as protecting Russians in the post-Soviet republics. It has since evolved to include not only ethnic Russians but Russian-speaking populations in other states. Therefore, the idea of Otechestvo does not define a specific ethnic group. The core of this concept is World War 2. All Soviet people fought against Germany, which applies to the current populations around the region. It is powerful and challenging to resist the concept since most Kazakhs' ancestors took part in WW2 and are proud of it. This has been in solid evidence since Putin has proudly reincarnated the Soviet' Victory Day' parade shown every year on the 9th of May. Thus, the current broadcast agenda works toward Russian foreign policy objectives. Individuals and media organisations impose this idea of Otechestvo, a different perspective on the Crimea issue, and erode the distinctions between Kazakhstan and Russia in history and the role Kazakhs played in WW2. Thus, this section has demonstrated that the 'Russian Question' has been skillfully managed within the domestic context and was not an obstacle to engaging with external issues. Thus, the absolute control and internal settings of the power around Nazarbayev and his domestic policy responses through balancing between two ethnic groups have produced a stable and secure country in the region. Thereby, internal order setting regarding the 'Russian question' contributed to the domestic and regime stability and, therefore, an exercise of foreign policy initiative towards the regional and external environment.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered a review of Kazakhstan's domestic context. With specific reference to the personalistic figure of Nazarbayev as the only order-maker within domestic politics, the chapter developed around the stability that characterises the Nazarbayev regime since independence. Under his presence, post-independent Kazakhstan transitioned from being initially weak to being a stable and economically prosperous country. However, in section 3.2,

I showed that the smallness of significant power has not changed, and it defines its status as a small state. It continued the same stability along with Nazarbayev's presence in the domestic order. In section 3.3, I showed how President Nazarbayev created and maintained domestic order. He faced the initial instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under a new post-soviet reality, Nazarbayev was the only and ultimate decision-maker within its domestic context since independence. The three decades of personal rule went through the challenges of the 1990s to a relatively stable country. The regime's stability and the country's general stability will be one of the features of the Nazarbayev system that lasted till 2019. The relation with the neighbouring Russian Federation has also informed the system's longevity. In section 3.4, I showed how the Nazarbayev regime had to deal with the question of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan. Internal stability, therefore, was ensured with a language policy and the importance of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. It also served well for the foreign policy conduct, not preoccupied with the domestic challenges Nazarbayev conducted foreign policy initiatives, which ensured the patterns of strategic relationship with major powers. The one inference from the above is that internal stability was at the service of foreign policy. The next chapter, therefore, is on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.

Chapter 4. Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Review

4.1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in two distinct consequences for the international order - the emergence of the United States (USA) as the sole superpower and the proliferation of new states in the post-Soviet space. Kazakhstan was among them. Since independence, Kazakhstan has shown a positive dynamic in becoming a member of the international community and towards the surrounding international and regional environment. As a response, President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev has formulated a foreign policy that reflects multivectorism, pragmatism and balanced foreign policy. At the same time, Nazarbayev did not use the terms multi-vector, pragmatism, and balanced in his statement. It was only later in the 1990s that Nazarbayev clearly stated Kazakhstan's foreign policy during Foreign Affairs meeting on 14-15 September 1998 in Astana. Nazarbayev stated, 'Foreign policy today attaches a great importance to multi-vector diplomacy. It means the development of friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in world affairs and are of practical interest to Kazakhstan' (Latypova, 1998, p.2).

Various scholars have noticed Kazakhstan's visibility in the post-9/11 period. Kazakhstan is distinguished from others due to its political stability, economic growth, interaction with regional and international organisations, and strategic relationship with the regional powers of Russia and China and other major powers outside the region (Gleason, 2001; Legvold, 2003; Cummings, 2003a; Cornell, 2007; Cohen, 2008; Weitz, 2008; Hanks, 2009; Hug, 2011; Lee, 2010; Aris, 2013). The literature on Kazakhstan since independence is found in chapters, articles, and reports; no monograph was devoted to the country during the 1990s. The same applied to the first half of the subsequent decade. Many works emerged in the mid-2000s but are primarily descriptive, informative, and indicative.

The emergence of post-independent Kazakhstan as an oil-rich country has attracted the focus of scholars, its location between two regional powers, and, as a result, the type of foreign policy behaviour it has adopted. Therefore, there has been a considerable volume of literature on energy in Kazakhstan, its enthusiastic cooperation with regional organisations, and its balancing of external powers as part of its multi-vector foreign policy approach. This latter is one of the most striking features of the scholarly literature; therefore, much research on Kazakhstan's foreign policy has focused on its multivectorism. However, the purpose of the chapter is to overview the literature on Kazakhstan's foreign policy since independence to explore two concerning issues that post-independent Kazakhstan faced. The first one is the

presence of major powers, and the second is the issues such as regional integration and nuclear disarmament. For each issue I examine separately, section 4.2 will show multivector foreign policy construct as an answer to the presence of major powers. In the following section, 4.3, I explore the challenges of multivectorism to argue that we need to look at the inside to detect shifts from one power to another argument. Section 4.4 will shift focus from major powers to issues that concern Kazakhstan the most. After successfully managing major powers through multivectorism, Kazakhstan has moved to those issues with significant importance than the presence of major powers: regional integration and nuclear disarmament were issues of primary concern. Each issue area in sub-sections demonstrates the importance of those issues and how Kazakhstan approached them by tackling them with foreign policy initiatives such as the Eurasian Union (EAU) and nuclear disarmament initiatives.

4.2. Managing Major Powers

Kazakhstan's Multivector Foreign Policy (MVFP)

A great deal of research on Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been focused on its multivectorism, and the origin of such attention is the 1992 document called the 'Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State' (Nazarbayev, 1992). President Nazarbayev formulated his foreign policy vision in that document and showed that Kazakhstan aimed to develop relations with major powers and other regional states. President Nazarbayev did not use the term 'multivector' in that document but clearly stated the causes for the formation of such a policy. Nazarbayev writes:

> the lack of direct access to the open sea, remoteness from communication prevents the participation of the republic in international economic relations. Therefore, maintaining mutually beneficial friendly relations on the principles of full confidence with neighbouring states, especially with Russia and China, which are our gateways to world communications, is of utmost importance. Kazakhstan is ready for this. At the same time, we naturally favour the development of broad ties with all other countries on the basis of international justice and partnership. (1992, p.49)

This part of the statement shows a clear understanding of the landlocked condition and thus creates friendly relations with all states seen as the highest value. Thus, this is the origin of what President Nazarbayev has been pursuing as a multivector foreign policy since

independence. Nazarbayev was clear on their foreign policy vision and reasons in the documents, and so were the subsequent scholars in their analysis.

The following scholars are the most cited contributors. According to Cummings (2003, p.33), the Kazakh foreign policy 'is driven both by heterogeneity at home and the need, as a landlocked state, to secure multiple pipeline routes and markets abroad'. In the following study, Cummings (2004, p.140) pointed out that Kazakhstan's foreign policy 'output is not ideological, it is pragmatic' and stated that 'the non-ideological content of the foreign policy is manifested in various ways, particularly in the president's pragmatic statements.' Indeed, Nazarbayev's commitment to pragmatism is found in statements such as this, 'in difficult modern conditions, the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan requires adaptation and promotion of national interests on the principles of pragmatism' (Nazarbayev, 2018). Cummings (2004, p.141) also explained Kazakhstan's multilateralism in four ways: 'cooperation with states in all directions; relations with Russia over relations with other states; desire to join the international economic community, and to integrate itself in several security regimes, some regional and global'. There are four reasons for Kazakhstan's pragmatism: Russia's disengagement from Central Asia in the 1990s forced Kazakhstan to seek new international partners while keeping economic and military relations with Russia; the landlocked condition means that Kazakhstan must consider its neighbours, Russia and China, which means negotiating with countries that Kazakhstan could be against culturally or traditionally; the leadership's desire to create a new identity for itself in the international arena, such as the Eurasian Union and Almaty-based Asian security regime; the fourth is that Kazakhs have a "weak sense of self and statehood". Compared to Nasser's reference to the Pharaohs, Nehru's to Hindus or Mussolini's to the Roman empire, Cummings (2004, p.143) stresses that 'Nazarbayev has no such convincing unifying national symbols.' However, after 2014, the Nazarbayev regime focused on Nomadic culture concerning nomadism and the history of the Golden Horde (Library, no date). However, one thing must be addressed: Russia. Russia has returned to the region after 9/11 as a partner to the US to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and, at the same time, to oppose the presence of the US in Central Asia. Thus, the relationship with Russia once again became a priority and has been and always will be stressed in Nazarbayev's statements. Russia and China as neighbours were considered, resulting in a strategic relationship between both powers. However, The Eurasian Union came into existence in 2014, and the Asian-based security regime, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), has been institutionalised and is in full operation (Dongxiao, 2015).

Thus, Kazakhstan seems quite well adapted to them with a response. Ipek holds a similar view to Cummings regarding landlocked conditions and pragmatism (2007), who also shows how landlocked Kazakhstan tried to overcome its post-independence challenges of state-building and economic recovery. Kazakhstan was forced to adopt pragmatism in its foreign policy because it heavily depended on Russia in its early years. For instance, it received a supply of oil and gas from Russia and needed the Russian oil pipeline infrastructure. Many ethnic Russians were living in Kazakhstan, and Russia was required to protect the border with China. While geo-economically, Russia has always been important to Kazakhstan in terms of foreign policy priorities, it became acutely important with Putin's rule in Russia. According to Ipek (2007, p.1183), the case of demarcation of the Caspian Sea into national sectors is a good example to highlight pragmatism in Kazakh foreign policy in making efforts to 'pursue a Western orientation in its foreign policy' and its offshore territorial rights while accepting in general the dominance of Russia's position on that issue. Ipek (2007, p.1182) concludes that a 'pragmatic foreign policy to freely develop its offshore oil and gas resources with the active participation of Western oil firms and governments was crucial to overcoming the dual challenges of state-building and economic recovery in this landlocked country.' Hanks (2009, pp. 263-264) also supports and argues that Kazakh foreign policy is based on a pragmatic non-ideological foundation. The rationale behind multivectorism stems from a few main factors: the presence of Russia, the ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan, and the need for the country to exploit its hydrocarbon resources and build roads connecting these resources to the world market. In this study, Hanks (2009, p. 265) found that the multi-vector approach is a success story. It served Kazakhstan well as leverage in negotiating suitable terms with Western companies and governments opposed to Russian interests, and it has also successfully dealt with foreign investors and helped to renegotiate rights and profit-sharing arrangements with investors in the energy sector. With a similar stance, Idan and Shaffer (2013, p.252) pointed out that Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been influenced by its landlocked position, and its policies have been directed to address this challenge. These policies include a multi-directional foreign policy, multiple pipelines in its oil export policy, investments in transport and export infrastructure in transit states and ports, and a concession policy to transit states. They conclude that the main element in the foreign policy of this landlocked state is its distinctive attitude towards its transit states, such as Georgia, Turkey, and Iran. All of them have a port through which Kazakhstan sends its oil. Kazakhstan has invested in Georgia's Black Sea port to preserve its transit routes. Kazakhstan has made some concessions to transit states such as

Russia. For instance, Kazakhstan negotiated with Russia on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea on a long-term lease of the Baikonur space station and Semipalatinsk missile launch site in Kazakhstan. Thus, the landlocked condition adds to the above factors that must be considered when dealing with other states and powers such as Russia. To avoid complete dependence and subordination to Russia's interests, Kazakhstan has been developing a 'balancing act' to engage major and other powers in an essential sphere of internal development. The following section will bring Kazakhstan's approach to balancing the interests of great powers, which has also been one of the principles of Kazakhstan's foreign policy and scholarly attention.

Balancing and Multivector Foreign Policy

Since Kazakhstan has formulated its foreign policy vision as a multi-vector in creating a relationship with major powers to overcome its needs in its post-independence state-building, it has resulted in a great power's presence in such areas as energy, economy, and security. Thus, reality demanded the management of response to balance the interests of powers in the Caspian Sea, in the security area, and in regional organisations. Nazarbayev (Nazarbayev, 2012) has stated, 'The balance of our foreign policy means the development of friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in world affairs and are of practical interest to Kazakhstan'. Again, Nazarbayev (2012) explains, 'We must move ahead economically with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This will give us economic dividends and strengthen the balance of our foreign policy.' In a further statement, Nazarbayev (2005) reassured its strategy that 'Our priorities remain unchanged - an active, diverse and balanced foreign policy that can withstand the challenges of the 21st century and aimed at ensuring long-term national interests'. Thus, statements once again from Nazarbayev confirm his commitment to balanced foreign policy. However, the priorities were given specifically to three great powers: Russia, China, and the US (Legvold, 2003; Weitz, 2008; Cohen, 2008; Hug, 2011). Cohen (2008, p.249) argued that 'Kazakhstan's foreign policy will remain a triangulation exercise between three Great Powers: Russia, China, and the US'. While Russia under Yeltsin was slow to formulate its strategic, political, and ideological interest in the post-Soviet area, the Putin administration was more assertive, signalling Russia's return to the post-Soviet region. According to Cohen, Russian leadership thoughts of Kazakhstan were on the integration of Kazakhstan with Russia. So, that Russia would control its foreign relations and have access to its oil infrastructure. President Nazarbayev has always prioritised Russia, Cohen quotes Kazakhstan's ambassador to Russia Nurtay Abykayev who said in an interview to RIA Novosti:

> For our country, Russia is the closest neighbour, a country with which we have not only a common historical past, but also great potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in the present as well as in the future… President Nazarbayev has repeatedly stressed that relations with Russia are an important priority of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. (cited in Cohen, 2008, p. 254)

Nazarbayev prioritised Russia in almost all strategic documents (see Appendix 2). This understanding was clear in a yearly strategic document where Nazarbayev (1992, p.50) stated, 'Due to geographical, political, ethnic and other historical factors, relations with Russia are the most important issue for us.' Kimberly (2006) has drawn attention to the importance of Russian intentions in Kazakhstan's energy sector, as Russia has established ownership over its domestic energy sector and has driven out foreign investors. He is concerned that Russia could act similarly in the Kazakhstan energy sector, which it could do by influencing elections and backing a potential successor to Nazarbayev. However, despite Kazakhstan's attempts to follow its multivectorism, there are realities that Kazakhstan's relations with Russia have always been impossible to ignore. Kazakhstan still relies on Russian roads to deliver oil to the Western market: 60 % of Kazakh petroleum exports go to international markets through Russia (Molchanov, 2015, p. 87). According to Ipek (2007), due to Russian weakness and its failure to provide financial investment and technology to develop energy resources in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan has turned to the West and China. Ipek cites the Nazarbayev's statement:

> the investment potential of Kazakhstan is so large that it would require resources which are not available even to the highly developed countries. Thus, the requirement for a diversified set of investors that represents dozens of countries from Europe and Asia in addition to the US is an imperative in Kazakhstan's policy. (Ipek, 2007, p.1184)

Kazakhstan has also prioritised China in its 'balanced' strategy. China fits in Nazarbayev's strategy:

> The second part of our strategy is the creation of a pipeline system for the export of oil and gas. Only a large number of independent export routes can prevent our dependence on one neighbour and monopoly price dependence on one consumer. (Nazarbayev, 1997)

Cohen (2008) argues that China competes with Western and Russian companies to access Kazakh energy resources. As a result, since 2005, Kazakhstan has exported its oil to China through the Alashankou-Western China pipeline. According to Hug (2011), both sides signed a Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation in 2002; in 2005, Premier Hu visited Kazakhstan, where both sides signed a "Strategic Partnership" document. Moreover, China is a major trade partner in Kazakhstan (Clarke, 2014, p141). However, Molchanov (2015, p.12) has argued that China is taking advantage of Kazakhstan's energy sector. For instance, the Chinese state company CNPC beat Russian Lukoil in its takeover of PetroKazakhstan in 2005. The third crucial factor in Kazakhstan's balancing policy is the US. In the 1990s, Kazakhstan's relations with the US revolved around the nuclear armaments left in Kazakhstan following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US policy was not to allow the stationing of its nuclear warheads in Kazakhstan; eventually, the transfer of all nuclear warheads to Russia was agreed upon (Ham, 1994). However, the US-Kazakhstan relations later shifted to the energy issue: in particular, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil project became an alternative option for Kazakhstan to diversify its multiple-pipeline policy. There is also another external actor with whom Kazakhstan cooperates to enhance its balancing behaviour. The European Union appeared as one of the priorities in the 2005 state speech, 'Priority areas are the development of cooperation with Russia, China, the USA, and the European Union' (Nazarbayev, 2005). As Kassenova (2011, p.49) argued, 'the EU relations with Kazakhstan have been the most intensive in the region since the beginning'. There is a range of treaties that have been signed between the two sides, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding in Energy in 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding in Transport in 2006, and the EU Central Asia Strategy since 2007 (Hug, 2011). On January 20th, 2015, Kazakhstan initiated an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation agreement with the EU (International Crisis Group, 2015). Bilateral trade between the EU and Kazakhstan is more than €31 billion, of which the Kazakh export accounts for €24 billion (mostly from oil), and the EU export to Kazakhstan accounts for €7.5 billion (mostly manufactured goods, machinery, and equipment) (Press release, 2015). The desire to establish links with Kazakhstan has also come from individual states, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. There have been state visits to Kazakhstan from the prime minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, in 2013 (BBC News, 2013), the French President François Hollande in 2014 (RFI, 2014), and the prime minister of Italy, Matteo Renzi in 2014 (Orazgaliyeva, 2014). Thus, these state visits illustrate

Kazakhstan's importance, mainly from energy and trade perspectives. They can also be considered as showing a commitment from Western powers to the Kazakh regime for energy and trade purposes. As Cohen (2008, p.24) pointed out, 'multivector foreign policy should be understood as an attempt to reduce dependence on each power as much as possible, but also to increase autonomy by cooperating with each power'. This attention has been directed towards Kazakhstan's balancing act between three main great powers: Russia, China, and the US. Kazakhstan managed to send its oil to China without aggravating Russia and negotiated energy projects with the US. For instance, Appendix 6 shows the major oil pipelines and highlights pipeline shareholders. The strategy works in terms of diversification of the oil pipeline, which Nazarbayev was keen to realise. Thus, the situation in the Caspian Basin has allowed Kazakhstan to play an important role in leveraging this great power's share in its energy sector (Overland *et al*., 2010). This is because of peaceful competition between major powers that allowed Kazakhstan to settle down all oil pipeline directions and make it strategically important for all great powers. Also, in terms of trade, all major powers are among the top trade partners. However, it also shows the presence of other powers (Appendix 7). Thus, the diversity of trade partners was achieved successfully. Thus, the 'balancing act' has been evident in its energy sector and trade. Kazakhstan has tried to maximise its partners list as much as possible. It has worked due to Kazakhstan's adoption of a multivector foreign policy and the success of its implementation since independence (Hanks, 2009). However, the success of the balancing act has also been evident in the area where international organisations and regional institutions were present in Kazakhstan's multivectorism. The following section shows how Kazakhstan engaged with international and regional organisations that enforced its standing for multivectorism and dealing with major powers.

International Organisations and Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Kazakhstan's engagement with regional and international organisations is another element of its multi-vector and balanced foreign policy (See Appendix 2 and 3). It has engaged with Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), where Kazakhstan is the second largest contributor of troops after Russia. Both Russia and Kazakhstan have worked to strengthen the Customs Union (CU) and Single Economic Space (SES) and have recently created the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Molchanov, 2015). Relations with China have evolved from Shanghai Five to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); Kazakhstan and China are engaged in defence activities

through defence training and the military education of Kazakhstan officers in China. Aris (2011, p. 66) has judged that the SCO's economic agenda serves Astana's interests in two ways: fuelling its economic growth and establishing its role as a leader in the regional economy. As he points out, the SCO is an important tool in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Although it will not allow itself to be dominated by other members, it can develop relations with regional powers and connect Russia and China (p. 66). Kazakhstan sees SCO as a strategic framework for establishing its relationship with China. From the beginning, it served to solve border issues with China through the Shanghai Five in the 1990s. It served to address regional problems such as terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which are known as the 'Three Evils' by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was created in 2001 (Aris, 2009). The SCO has also served Kazakhstan's interests in the Energy Club, which Kazakhstan has supported since 2006 (Yesdauletova, 2009). However, in 2005, Kazakhstan joined Russia and China to announce that the US must end its military presence and leave the region during the SCO summit in Astana. This was the first test of Kazakhstan's multivectorism; thus, Kazakhstan has followed the collective order of the SCO. However, as part of its policy, Kazakhstan has not limited itself to the CSTO and SCO: it has also cooperated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since independence and joined the NATO Peace for Partnership Program (PfP) in 1994. Kazakhstan and NATO signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2006 (Marketos, 2009, p.36). Kazakhstan does not seek membership in NATO but is keen on military aid and cooperation. As Allison (2008, p.29) has argued, Kazakhstan's cooperation with NATO also seeks to leverage its relations with Russia. Omelicheva (2010) has noted the benefit of cooperation with NATO for Kazakhstan as a regional leader. While some point out that this can complicate the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia (Carlson, 2008, p.51), others have stressed that NATO is aware of Kazakhstan's close relations with Russia (Smith and Kavalski, 2010, p.42). Cooperation with NATO forms part of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, but at the same time, it sought to reassure Russia that its historical and geographic relations are more important (Dave, 2008, p.54). Thus, Kazakhstan's engagement with regional integration organisations has enabled it to tackle geopolitical challenges and successfully control relations with neighbouring regional powers (Molchanov, 2015). However, Kazakhstan's interest in regional organisations has not been limited to its region: it initiated the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries (CCTC) in 2006. Hug (2011, p. 4) commented on this action: 'Kazakhstan will continue to make its own way in the world, avoiding capture by any competing power'. This also bears on Kazakhstan's relations with

Islamic countries through the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) (Lee, 2010). Another aspect of Kazakhstan's interest in international organisations is its chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. Kazakhstan acquired this right in 2007, having previously tried in 2003 when the UK and the US rejected its application for failing to meet human rights standards (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.2). Indeed, Kazakhstan's track record on human rights has always been an issue for human rights organisations. However, Kazakhstan's eventual chairmanship was defined as a foreign policy success and a triumph for the president of Kazakhstan. According to Hug (2011, p.10), despite Kazakhstan's failure to meet certain standards on human rights issues, it successfully resisted Russia's attempts to control the summit to "neuter the work of ODIHR and other OSCE human rights related work'. It may have served a purpose for domestic consumption, but, as Adam has pointed out, it is through such means that a less-powerful state like Kazakhstan can exercise power over its strong northern neighbour Russia through the OSCE institution. Moreover, Kazakhstan has managed to bring this summit after its long silence and, more importantly, make it happen not in Europe but in the centre of Eurasia. One regional institution that has been most important for Kazakhstan is the Eurasian Economic Commission, Kazakhstan's first supranational agreement since the fall of the Soviet Union (Laruelle, 2015). Leading this organisation to its final incarnation as the Eurasian Economic Union had been on Kazakhstan's agenda since 1994. On May 29th, 2014, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) came into existence (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa, 2015, p.64). The role that Kazakhstan had been playing became evident on the day when Kazakhstan made clear to Armenia that its membership in the EAEU would be dependent on its border dispute with Azerbaijan (Michel, 2014). It seems that Kazakhstan achieved its aim of gaining specific power over membership issues within the Eurasian Economic Commission. Thus, the above engagement with regional and international organisations reflects pragmatic and balanced foreign policy. In addition, Kazakhstan has been contracting Eurasian identity, which has also attracted scholarly attention. The Eurasian idea would be considered another attempt and an additional element to maximising its independence and autonomy from specific power. The following section will discuss that aspect of behaviour.

Eurasianism in post-independent Kazakhstan

The term Eurasia and Eurasianism has been added to the post-Soviet academic language to mean the area that once was the Soviet Union. Thus, in the academic world, using Eurasia has become a trend. There are departments, schools, and research centres in the West with the word

'Eurasian' in their title. The notion of Eurasia has different aspects: a geographical meaning defining the landmass stretching from Western Europe to East Asia and a geopolitical one defining the post-Soviet space. Twining (1993) has used the first definition but without definition, and the book's authors: 'The Making of the Foreign Policy in Russia and New States of Eurasia' (Dawisha and Starr, 1995). However, Vinokurov and Libman (2012, pp.81-85) have offered three definitions of Eurasia, 'Eurasia' as the Post-Soviet Eurasian due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991'. The second definition is 'Eurasianism as an anti-Western ideology'. Its roots date back to1920s Russian émigrés such as Savitsky, and to modern Eurasionists like Gumilev, Dugin and Panarin. The main idea here is to differentiate Russia from Europe and Asia and to place it as a distinct Eurasian civilization or third continent. The third definition of Eurasia is 'Eurasia as a continent' due to interdependencies between both continents of Europe and Asia, which has been adopted more openly by Kazakhstan than by Russia. Vinokurov and Libman (2012a, p.25) point out that Kazakhstan's Eurasianism differs from Russian forms of Eurasianism because first, 'the Eurasianism of Nazarbayev does not aspire to become an intellectual movement', second, 'it is explicitly and unambiguously open to Europe', and third, 'Eurasianism in Kazakhstan is in no sense hostile to modernisation—on the contrary, it seems to be compatible with the economic liberalisation pursued by Kazakhstan for the last 20 years'. Schatz (2004, p.76), however, points towards the multi-ethnic composition of Kazakhstan and stresses Soviet-era internationalism and 'Homo sovieticus' in which Eurasianism was a central organising theme. He said, 'President Nazarbayev's notion of Eurasianism was designed to show the geographic centrality of Kazakhstan and the multi-ethnic population that occupied its territory'. 'Homo eurasiaticus', he believes, could become a reality only if Nazarbayev 'attended to the needs of all its ethnic groups' within the state (2004, p.77). Mostafa (2013, p.165) has argued that Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy is designed to serve multiple external and internal goals. In the former case, it is a policy of establishing good relations with Russia and other regional states and building a bridge between Europe and Asia. In the latter, it aims to create a successful multi-ethnic society; for Lee (2010), Kazakhstan's Eurasian Strategy means embracing a variety of International Organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC), and the SCO. As Vinokurov and Libman (2012, pp.81-83) also highlight, 'thinking Eurasia has long been part of official policy in post-independence Kazakhstan'. According to Molchanov (2015), Kazakhstan's Eurasianness has geopolitical, geographical, cultural, and ethnic dimensions. Official Eurasianism, according to him, means

embracing Russia, Asia, and the West all together without being dependent on only one. Molchanov (2015, p.20) concludes that 'the ethno-linguistic composition and the central landlocked location on the continent make Kazakhstan a quintessentially Eurasian country'. According to Schatz (2004, p.76), President Nazarbayev's reference to Eurasianism stems from Kazakhstan's geographic centrality and multi-ethnic population. This assessment is based loosely on the ideas of Soviet scholar Lev Gumilev, for whom Eurasianism was a celebration of the continent's multicultural heritage. Ancecshi (2020) concludes that Nazarbayev never clearly referenced Eurasianism. In fact, despite the reference to Eurasianist thinking and Gumilev, Kazakhstan's Eurasianism is on its own and with Nazarbayev 'as an author of the modern Eurasian thinking' (Mansurov, 2014, p.5). For instance, the reference to Eurasianist Tair Mansurov, who was a long-serving Kazakhstani diplomat (1994 – 2002) and former EurAsEC Secretary General (2007 – 2014), published a book in 2014 titled 'Implementation of the Eurasian Project of Nursultan Nazarbayev', applies Gumilev's 'etnogenez' and 'passionarnost' to explain the exceptionalism of Nazarbayev and his unique status rather than explaining a link between old Eurasian theory and Kazakhstan's Eurasian strategy. However, the Official stand on this is around 'practical Eurasianism' (Mansurov, 2014, p.89) or 'practical Neo Eurasianism' according to Kazakhstan's Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KISI, 2019, p. 6). Behind this is the renewed idea of Eurasianism, emphasising common territory, history and culture (KISIS, 2019, p.5). The practical side, according to Mansurov (2014, p.103), is about initiatives that have been implemented (CIS, CICA, SCO). But 'Eurasianism' was admitted later in 1994, while the commitment to Unionism was preserved since 1986 (A New Union Treaty) and applied further with the EAU project. Thus, Nazarbayev's Unionism with the Eurasian premise has been cultivated. This highlights that unionism in the form of 'All in One (the EAU project) has been a major foreign policy objective of post-independent Kazakhstan. This aspect will be further analysed and explained to understand Kazakhstan's Eurasian initiative in Chapter 5. The part of the Eurasian story is that Kazakhstan's idea of a Eurasian Union did not attract any attention from other post-Soviet states during the 1990s. As Olcott (1996, p.55) wrote in 1996, 'the prospects for this union are fading as time goes on', and this is due to those other Central Asian leaders viewed Nazarbayev's proposal as 'an unacceptable surrender of sovereignty' (Olcott, 1996, p.140). Rywkin (2006, p.23) emphasised that 'Eurasian integration, initially advocated by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev and subsequently endorsed by Russian President Putin, is a concept on paper only'. Gleason (2001) argued that Nazarbayev's main motive for

Eurasianism was preventing Russia's re-emergence in the region. Thus, Olcott and Rywkin were pessimistic, while Gleason pointed out the aim of counter-balancing Russia with an idea. However, as it turned out, this idea only became possible when Russia brought it into being. The reasons are as follows: Putin's 2011 Eurasian idea did attract more public and academic attention than Nazarbayev's in 1994. No academic record can be found on Russian interest in the Eurasian Union, mainly due to Yeltsin's pro-Western vision and ignorance of post-Soviet regions (Hancock, 2009, p.134). But since Putin came to power, its vision of 'near abroad' has turned Russia's interest to Eurasian Integration. Cohen (2008, p.4) raised concern over Putin's idea, 'The formation of a Eurasian Union is the next in a series of Russian initiatives to reassert control over the former Soviet Space'. In 1999, the Kazakh scholar Murat Laumulin noted the possibility of Russian interest in a Eurasian idea and suggested that 'Russia will attempt to intercept our weakening idea of integration. It is not excluded from the loan of Eurasian ideas, but in pro-Russian interpretation' (Laumulin, 1999, p.73). This happened in 2011 when Putin announced his desire for a Eurasian Union (Popescu, 2014, p.7). Popescu (2014, p.7) argues that Putin aims to integrate all post-Soviet states into a new round of post-Soviet reintegration and turn the Eurasian Union into one of the building blocks of the EU, NAFTA, APEC and ASEAN.

Kazakhstan's Eurasian idea in the 1990s looked unsupportive due to a lack of support from other post-soviet states and a lack of understanding from Russia. Therefore, Kazakhstan actively participated and welcomed Russian interest in that idea. However, Russian assertive power within the economic union requires unity in the political sphere, which Kazakhstan opposes. Nazarbayev states on this issue:

> We will continue to move towards a common goal, but I want to emphasise once again that the Eurasian integration, which is carried out on my personal initiative, has never been and will not be aimed at the reincarnation of any political union, especially since the former Soviet Union sunk into oblivion. (cited in Ibraimov, 2013)

At the same time, Nazarbayev avoided using Eurasian vision in most statements that categorised Eurasianism as a second strand and a multi-vector foreign policy. However, it would be important to note that the Eurasian idea was first presented to a Western audience and then in Moscow in 1994. Thus, Eurasian had been first on the agenda and then a multi-vector foreign policy strategy. The confirmation of this follows from Erland Idrisiov, a Minister

of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, during a meeting with President Nazarbayev had reported that 'Kazakhstan's foreign policy will continue to be geopolitically balanced with a focus on strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries. Also, one of the main priorities of foreign policy is Eurasian integration' (Akorda, 2013). However, another story is where Kazakhstan has tried to integrate Central Asian neighbours into distinct regional organisations. However, it failed due to its general weakness in playing as a great power and offering resources that would generate neighbouring states around Kazakhstan. There was such a dilemma between Central Asian and Eurasian identity. However, it showed that the Eurasian vision has prevailed over the Central Asian Union. Therefore, the following section will focus on Kazakhstan and Central Asian integration attempts.

Central Asia and Kazakhstan

The well-known American scholar and writer on Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Martha Brill Olcott, commented that the world community recognized that Kazakhstan exists and has a preeminent role in the Central Asian region (Olcott, 2002). Since independence, Kazakhstan has pursued an integrationist policy with Central Asian countries (Weitz, 2008). The early attempts at integration projects with Central Asian states were enthusiastically met by the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) but failed due to internal differences and unequal economic development within regional states. External factors, such as the presence of the US in Central Asia since 2001 and the Russian engagement in the region with a member of the CACO that later merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), contributed to its end. Kazakhstan failed to harmonise relations with Central Asia, partly because of its ambitious aim to lead the entire Eurasian continent with its initiatives, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA). Other reasons include diverse economic conditions, national interests, and disagreement over regional leadership. (Lee, 2010, p.61). Bohr (2004) stated that the Central Asian Union initiative for the Central Asia region has been one of Kazakhstan's agendas since its independence, but it failed for some reason. The first is that internal support was high between regional partners, but internal disagreement on economy and security led this organisation to merge with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2001. The second factor is the absence of a powerful state that could force this Central Asian Union initiative into action economically and politically. All the Central Asian states were weak, economically and politically unstable. The third factor is the US military action in Afghanistan and US bilateral cooperation with Central Asian republics

left this idea behind national interest for cooperation with US superpower. Kazakhstan initiated two regional integration projects: one with the Eurasian Union (EAU) in 1994 (Sengupta, 2016, p.102) and the other with the Central Asian Union in 1994 (Cohen, 2008). The first project meant to unite all post-Soviet republics and initially formed with the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in 2000. The second aimed to unite only the Central Asian states. The Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) was formed in 1998 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan joined in 1998), with the further transformation of the CAEC into the CACO in 2002 (Laruelle, 2019, p.397). Ultimately, the EEC formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014, and the CACO on its side then merged with the EEC (Laruelle, 2019, p.397). As Laruelle (2019) claims, it shows the preference for Kazakhstan toward Eurasian integration and away from the Central Asian vector. Thus, the Central Asian project failed due to the weaknesses of various regional states, but the Eurasian Union survived and developed with the Russian involvement in the project.

Kazakhstan's move towards association with Central Asia, and then a reversal towards Russia, is a good illustration of its search for power and reconciling with asymmetry of power. In 2005 Nazarbayev stated:

> We have a choice between remaining the supplier of raw materials to the global markets and wait patiently for the emergence of the next imperial master or to pursue genuine *economic integration of the Central Asian region. I chose the latter* [emphasis added]. (Nazarbayev, 2005)

As a result, in 2007, Kazakhstan again announced a project for the New Central Asian Union (Godehardt, 2014, p.109). It seems that Kazakhstan retains an unrealised dream about Central Asian unity. It has been argued that Kazakhstan's political stability and economic growth led President Nazarbayev to propose that the country's name be changed from Kazakhstan to 'Kazakh Eli' (Laruelle, 2019, p.403). But this has not happened. Instead, Nazarbayev left this issue to be discussed by the Kazakhstan people (Ford, 2014; Laruelle, 2019, p. 403). The above may illustrate that Kazakhstan does not want to associate with Central Asia's 'STANS' (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) and grouped with Afghanistan due to Kazakhstan is working hard to build a unique, recognizable and credible national brand (Saunders, 2010, p.116; Laruelle, 2019, p.404). However, the name changes and a call for Central Asian integration must be split in two because the country's name change does not fit

well with a dream about unity. First, the intention to change the country's name is an attempt not to distance itself from Central Asia but to bring the natural name. 'Kazak Eli' means 'the Nation of the Kazakhs', like 'England' means 'the land of the Angles' (Etymonline, no date). Thus, this is an attempt to remove STAN rather than the distance from Central Asian neighbours. The idea, however, had no support. If this idea is renewed again by considering the post-Crimea context, then it could be done. For instance, the name of capital has changed several times despite the financial input behind the idea. Second, the other aspect of relations with Central Asian countries is Kazakhstan's humanitarian engagement in Central Asia. This could also explain Kazakhstan's call for unity. Kazakhstan's economic and humanitarian aid to neighbouring countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Laruelle, 2019, p.400). For instance, Kazakhstan has intended to develop a humanitarian aid program (worth $ 11.6 million) aimed at Kyrgyzstan through SCO (Tengrinews, 2010). Humanitarian aid worth $ 128.6 million has also been sent to Tajikistan (Kursiv, 2017). On the security level, all central countries share common threats such as terrorism, transnational organised crime, drug trafficking and the situation in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the level of cooperation on security issues between them is mainly through regional cooperation, such as the CSTO and the SCO (Aben, 2019). However, recently, Kazakhstan initiated a consultative meeting of Central Asian presidents, which aimed to be an annual meeting to cover security issues. The first meeting was in Astana in 2018, and the second was to be held in Uzbekistan in 2019 (Hashimova, 2019). Thus, this behaviour is caused by the position and relative power gained since 2000 as a central Asian oil resource country. Kazakhstan's call for a new union is merely a tiny state attempt to transfer that power to the region. For instance, Anceschi (2020) points out the tension between Unionism and regionalism in Kazakhstan's Eurasian strategy. However, Kazakhstan's unionist stance has always been to avoid groupings within the post-soviet region. This has been evident with Kazakhstan's resistance to the Slavic Union with a strategic move to expand and include Central Asian republics and others into the CIS in December 1991. The obsession with unionism was further considered with the EAU project in 1994 and again in 2005 when the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) merged with EEC. The merge has proceeded peacefully and in an agreed manner to join two into one project. It indicates that Central Asian integration was not Kazakhstan's primary objective. There is no speech similar to Moscow's in Central Asian capitals, but instead, it proposed to capture all the former Soviet republics with the EAU project. Also, Kazakhstan's 'anti-imperial inclination' in the Eurasian initiative (Anceschi, 2020, p.108) rooted back when emerging small state sovereignties within the Soviet

Union collectively diminished Moscow's imperial status. After that, the unionism of the CIS needed to keep the mode of the absence of great power. But, since the team dynamic of CIS diminished, the pattern of great power rise has opened up for Russia. It has been Russian imperial ambition which others have not welcomed, but suspicion persisted. The integration of Russia has been vital, but not with its imperial inclination. Kazakhstan's innovative approach to the absence of great power has been with the idea of core states. While it solved the problem of the absence of great power, it gave a chance to Russia to expand its ambition according to near abroad policy. Therefore, balancing in the form of resistance has been evident since 2014 (this aspect is discussed in Chapter 5).

In summary, Kazakhstan's foreign policy shows change only in its evolution and adaptability. In contrast, the changes are evident in its structural condition, which shows a great power interaction from cooperation, competition, and conflict since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Kazakhstan's foreign policy can be seen through these three periods of great power interaction, specifically in its cooperative, competitive, and conflictual nature since 2014. First, Kazakhstan's foreign policy during great power cooperation: 1991-2001. This post-Soviet period is significant due to the peaceful and cooperative nature between major powers. For instance, the issue of nuclear heritage between the US and a new Russia has been peacefully solved and agreed which also affected Kazakhstan's decision to give up its nuclear arsenal. The following example of China's engagement with Russia and Central Asian states started with the Shanghai Five and resulted in the creation of the SCO. All these major events show a great power presence and cooperation. A new international environment and the presence of major powers have influenced Kazakhstan to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy since its independence. Therefore, this period is also significant for Kazakhstan in creating an image of a cooperative and Eurasian state. Second, Kazakhstan's foreign policy during the great power competition: 2001-2014. Kazakhstan's foreign policy in terms of balancing has shown indirect balancing. It has been demonstrated in the energy sector by finding alternative pipelines to bypass dependence on Russia and through international organisations to avoid Russian influence and dominance. In contrast to post-1991, the period shows a concentration of powers, resulting in a so-called great game or competition in Central Asia. The significance of this period for Kazakhstan can be seen from a balancing point of view by not limiting its relation to Russia and China but including other major powers, such as the US. Third, Kazakhstan's foreign policy during the great power conflict: 2014-ongoing. While the post-9/11 period was about great power competition, the Ukraine conflict has turned great powers into conflict.

These are the structural changes that Kazakhstan has been facing. However, the post-Crimea period has revealed that Kazakhstan is vulnerable in times of great power conflict. The proximity to Russia has led Kazakhstan to economic decline and security concerns. Kazakhstan has, however, responded with active "mediating' behaviour in such issues as Syria, Ukraine and tension between Russia and Turkey. Thus, the significance of the periods is essential in terms of how Kazakhstan's MVFP withstand structural pressure and changes. It can be concluded that MVFP has not been changed since its formation. Kazakhstan's response to the great power's presence is not similar to the conditions of small states during the Cold War. Multivector foreign policy was not standard for small states during that time. Therefore, Kazakhstan's adaptation of the multivector approach is an excellent case to contribute to small state studies. Considering the above subsection on Kazakhstan's MVFP, the following section will focus on understanding Kazakhstan's foreign policy priorities (FPP).

4.3. Foreign Policy Priorities: Challenges to Multivector Foreign Policy

According to scholars, various events in and outside the region have been considered challenges to Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy (Blank, 2005; Cornell, 2008; Weitz, 2008). Specifically, the 9/11 event led to the presence of the US in Afghanistan and Central Asia, which has resulted in competition in the region as Russia and China saw the US presence as a security concern. In contrast, it has been significant for Kazakhstan as it once again served for its balanced foreign policy. However, according to scholars, the post 9/11 structural changes towards a great power competition and other events such as the Iraq war, colour revolutions in the post-Soviet region, Andijan revolt in Uzbekistan, Russian war with Georgia, Syrian war, Russian and Turkish tension and Russia-Ukraine crisis since 2014, all have been a challenge and test for Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy. Blank (2005) has indicated Kazakhstan's 'displeasure with Bush's globalised democratic values' and how it pushed Kazakhstan towards Russia and China. Blank (2005) states that 'this drift intensified after the Ukrainian revolution in 2005' due to both Russia and Kazakhstan seeing the events in Ukraine as 'state-managed from abroad by the US'. The region witnessed the colour revolution in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (Blank, 2005). All these events have been happening in the context of US support of democracy. Cornell (2007) has a similar view: the colour revolution shocked Astana. However, the high visits of U.S. officials to Kazakhstan by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 and U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney in 2006 showed how Kazakhstan was important in terms of developing energy resources over democracy issues. Cornell (2007, p.294) concludes

that ‘reaching out to semi-authoritarian leaders in the region was now necessary to preserve U.S. presence in the region; Kazakhstan has been the major beneficiary of this understanding’. Over the last decades, Kazakhstan’s relations with the US have also depended on the regional environment. While Kazakhstan has built strategic relations with the US individually or bilaterally, its link with regional powers collectively makes Kazakhstan’s stand towards the US difficult. For instance, Kazakhstan is under pressure to follow the collective will of regional powers such as Russia and China through institutions like the SCO. Kazakhstan signed and followed the collective will against its approach to the US. Again, it acted similarly towards the US following the Caspian Littoral States Summit meeting in 2014, where member states stated against allowing foreign military force in the Caspian Sea (Weitz, 2014). However, according to Weitz, it does not concern the US as it recognises the importance of Kazakhstan in areas like the Central Asian direction, where Kazakhstan's foreign policy attention came to Afghanistan and when it announced joining an assistance program for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan. Moreover, Kazakh diplomacy involved the Iran issue by initiating talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers. Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed for the country to host an international bank of low-enriched uranium fuel under the IAEA auspices (Weitz, 2008). On the same issue, Smith (2012, p.3) has drawn attention to President Nazarbayev’s drift away from a multi-vector foreign policy towards Russia. This change arises from Nazarbayev’s concerns about Western interference in domestic affairs, like Russia's. As Smith (2012, p.4) continues, ‘the desire among Westerners, assumedly to use new media to spread ideas that impact the domestic political situation within other states and create protesters, is a threat to Kazakhstan and other countries.’ However, there is a reasonable shift; for instance, Laumulin (2011) has depicted the Kazakh–Russian relationship in the post-Soviet space as one of strategic partners and close allies. For instance, the strong institutional link with Russia is present through the CIS, the CSTO, the EEU and the SCO. These links reflect cooperative and collective work on regional issues (Laumulin, 2011). Stegan and Kusznir (2015) had a similar view and argued that Kazakhstan no longer pursues its multi-vector foreign policy. According to Stegan and Kusznir (2015), the share of Chinese investment in Kazakhstan has reached around 40%, bringing Kazakhstan’s multivectorism into question. Kazakhstan must prioritize China as well. The role of China in Kazakhstan is crucial, as Kazakhstan has recognised it since its independence. The first contact regarding border issues occurred in 1996 through the Shanghai Five Framework. Since the Shanghai framework extended to the SCO, their relationships have also extended to include energy cooperation and

fighting the three enemies of terrorism, extremism, and separatism (Aris, 2009). After independence, Kazakhstan was suspicious of China, using her only as an alternative oil supply and denying her entry. Relations with China are conducted on a bilateral level and through the SCO. However, Kazakhstan has recently changed its view of China, having witnessed the rise of China as an economic power due to its announcement of the One Belt One Road program in Astana, Kazakhstan, on September 7, 2013 (Wei et al., 2016, p.40). It has used this rising power to promote economic growth by allowing Chinese investments to help develop the Kazakh economy and counterbalance Russia. In 2014, both sides signed an 'all-round strategic partnership' agreement that shifted Kazakhstan's foreign policy in favour of China (Clark, 2014). Clarke (2015) also argued that 'Kazakhstan's 'multivectorism' is in danger of becoming irrelevant in a strategic environment of only two realistic vectors—alignment with Moscow or Beijing'. This statement resulted from the US's pivotal role in Asia and the regional projects of Russia and China, such as the Russian Eurasian Union and Chinese Silk Road Initiatives (Clark, 2015). Indeed, since the US left the region, Kazakhstan was keen to join. While the Eurasian economic union is about trade with Russia and other post-Soviet states, the "One Belt One Road Initiatives" is about infrastructure and investments, and this has been well welcomed by Nazarbayev, who aimed to link "A New Economic Policy Nurly Zhol" announced in 2014 with a Chinese "the One Belt, One Road initiative" (Adilet, no date). This seems clearly understood from the Chinese side; President Xi Jinping sent a telegram in honour of the birthday of President Nazarbayev: 'I highly appreciate .... and am ready together with you to further strengthen mutual support, deepen cooperation in conjunction with the Nurly Zhol (New Economic Policy) and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative' (Akorda, 2018). Thus, this shift, according to Sanat Kushkumbayev, a deputy director of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (KISI) under the President of Kazakhstan, is mainly due to internal development needs in response to Chinese needs to develop its grand strategy of the Silk Road and those in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan to develop transport communication (Kushkumbayev, 2015).

Foreign Policy Shift

External changes resulted from great power completion in the eastern part of the European continent. Great power play with Ukraine led this country to devastating conditions for the loss of part of its territory and war with pro-Russian militaries on its eastern border with Russia. Therefore, scholars have also paid careful attention to Kazakhstan's multivectorism after the

Russian annexation of Crimea, focusing on whether it is possible to maintain Kazakhstan's multivector foreign policy behaviour. The International Crisis Group Report reported that Kazakhstan is in a difficult situation, given the current relations between Russia and the West. Russian action in the Crimea affected neighbouring states like Belarus and Kazakhstan. It revealed a lot of issues for both countries. Both states are members of the integrationist project, the Eurasian Economic Union. International Crisis Group argued that the Ukrainian crisis had changed Kazakhstan's view of Russia. It increased its vulnerability to its economic growth due to international sanctions on Russia, falling oil prices and problems at the Kashagan oil field (International Crisis Group, 2015). It has created a sense that Kazakhstan may suffer the same fate as Ukraine due to the high number of Russians in the northern region of Kazakhstan. In the study "The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Kazakhstan's Multivector Foreign Policy", Roberts (2015, pp.3-5) has stated that for Kazakhstan, it will become impossible to maintain its 'multivector' position in three aspects such as international economic policies, position in regional cooperation and voting at the UN. He found that due to sanctions on Russia, a 'trade war' occurred between Russia and Kazakhstan by limiting imports from other countries. It also problematized Kazakhstan's position on regional and security cooperation. Russia's conflict with Ukraine has made it difficult for Kazakhstan to continue its policy of engaging all post-Soviet states in regional organisations such as CSTO and SCO. On voting issues at the UN, Kazakhstan has abstained from the March 2014 resolution on the 'territorial integrity of Ukraine'. Roberts (2015, p.5) concludes that 'the Ukraine conflict is the largest challenge to date Astana's "multivector" foreign policy' as conflict increases between Russia and the West, it is becoming impossible for Kazakhstan to maintain a balance between important international partners. However, Kazakhstan took a mediating role to bring all powers into resolving the Ukrainian crisis, not just between Russia and Ukraine but also between Russia and the European Union (Malashenko, 2015). The mediating role has also been evident in the Syrian conflict as well. Kazakhstan has offered Astana as an area for negotiations on the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties in Syria (Joly, 2021). While international diplomacy still refers to the Astana process, the huge problem is what to do with families and children left alone. Kazakhstan responded by not abandoning them but bringing them back. Two military operations have been conducted to bring the kids and wives of murdered Kazakhs to Syria. However, considering scholars' contribution to the foreign policy shift, I would argue that scholars' focus on Kazakhstan's priorities has misled them to conclude a shift from multi-vector foreign policy. It is a shift from within multi-vector foreign policy rather than from

MVFP. By this, I mean it is important to understand Kazakhstan's prioritisation within the MVFP. Shift towards specific great power appears only when national interest is required. And it does not change the whole concept of MVFP but changes the order in which powers have their place. Appendix 2 (see Priorities 1) shows Kazakhstan's commitment to pragmatic, balanced foreign policy and prioritising of significant powers. In 1999, Kazakhstan had placed Russia, China, and the US as major priorities. In 2002, the US took place as a significant priority. A drastic change and addition appeared in 2004, when Russia took priority, followed by the US and China. Central Asia is also a major priority after the major powers. In the following years, 2005, 2006, and 2007, Russia, China, and the US were major priorities. A slight change was evident in 2012, when Central Asia followed Russia, China and the US. Interestingly, the major priorities were Russia, Central Asia and China, followed by the US and other powers such as Turkey and Iran. Thus, the significant changes are within the MVFP but not from it. For instance, Kazakhstan's multivectorism has three significant components. The first component is vectors. All vectors are towards major and other powers, including regions and international organisations (see Appendix 2). The presence of vectors must be understood as the presence of alternatives. Thus, there is no reliance on a single power, but the presence of alternative power will cover the need. The following component is a priority. It reflects an ordering approach to primary and other powers. Kazakhstan prioritises vectors to specific powers. For instance, Russia has always been a priority since 1999. While China and the US have been sharing the second priority position only since 2004, China was always a second priority after Russia. Thus, each power has its place. The final component is commitment to multivectorism, which is crucial, and the prioritisation of actors pays back with security, investment, trade, and recognition. The commitment is understood as one-sided and must be based on mutual commitment. And therefore, both sides of Kazakhstan and other powers are following that component to show their commitment to their relationship with Kazakhstan. Thus, three central components are within the MVFP concepts that Kazakhstan has followed since independence. Therefore, the shift from MVFPR has not occurred, but the shift within priorities has been a change point. Since independence, Nazarbayev has managed to satisfy all significant powers with its strategic value to them. In the case of the US, it is energy and security engagement in Afghanistan; Kazakhstan has shifted its importance to the Afghanistan conflict above the democracy issue. Kazakhstan still considers Russia and China essential actors in the region. Both are following the non-interference in domestic affairs arrangement. So, Nazarbayev has been in the condition that he managed to create and make Kazakhstan a

strategically important actor to major great powers. Kazakhstan followed a multivector approach and did not show a change towards specific power but showed its commitment to pragmatic and balanced foreign policy. Thus, Kazakhstan's multivector foreign policy is a flexible framework based on a simple philosophy, which means autonomy of Kazakhstan in the engagement with all major powers without choosing one against the other while at the same time being responsive to shifting interests of major and other powers. The discussion of abandoning or shifting from multivectorism has been analysed and this section summarises that there is a shift from within rather than from multivectorism. Scholars misunderstood the internal foreign policy structure and it is due to a lack of subjective analysis, which resulted in neglecting to understand the internal settings and components of Kazakhstan's MVFP. Unfortunately, the same is visible with Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, the following section attempts to bring overlooked aspects of Kazakhstan's foreign policy to light.

4.4. From Great Powers to Issues

The above sections have demonstrated how post-independent Kazakhstan has managed the presence of great power by simply acknowledging them and turning them into benefits rather than neglecting them. The consequence of this is the stability of the regime and the economic benefit from the strategic partnerships with major powers. Thus, with a balanced multivector foreign policy, Kazakhstan has solved its first post-independence concern, the presence of great powers. Since they have been successfully managed, Kazakhstan has shifted to the issues it is most concerned about. The shift occurred when the presence of great powers was managed so that Kazakhstan could focus on regional and international issues as a second objective in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Therefore, this section aims to bring Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives that the current research project aims to focus on and argue that while successfully setting up its relations with major powers, Kazakhstan has been actively engaging in foreign policy initiatives (FPI).

Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Initiatives (FPI)

The FPI is an official description of foreign engagement on a range of issues at the regional and international levels. All the initiatives depicted by President Nazarbayev: Eurasian initiatives of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev (Sultanov, 2005), Foreign Policy Initiatives (Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, 2010), Initiatives directed to the world (Abuseitova, 2011) or Elbasy's initiatives (Rakhimzhanova *et al*., 2019). These are the titles

of the monographs from the local Kazakh scientists and the official research centres that collect all the foreign policy initiatives (speeches, articles and reports) in one book. Scholars from outside Kazakhstan are also aware of the initiatives (Akiner, 2011, pp.1-21; Cummings, 2014, p.488; Burkhanov, Orazgaliyev and Araral, 2019; Anceschi, 2020). However, the FPI is not studied from a small state perspective as a single concept that Kazakh officials place in foreign policy conduct. For instance, Kazakhstani scholars (Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, 2010, p.5) argue that foreign policy is 'the art of possible' but also 'the high art of striving for the potentially possible (and even, at first glance, the impossible!), then there is something that can only become a reality over time.' But, according to them, 'this means that promising ideas, formulas, and *initiatives* [emphasis added] that are ahead of their time and are aimed at the future.' The definition then follows with foreign policy initiatives linked to President Nazarbayev to show how Kazakhstan has achieved impossible through initiatives where the role of President Nazarbayev is impossible to imagine. It reflects the glorification of one person, and this is how they record foreign policy history. Documents, however, show the interaction with specific issues. Moreover, the official document 'Foreign Policy Concept: 2014 – 2020' published in 2014 clearly indicates the 'promotion of initiatives' (Foreign Policy Concept, 2014). Thus, Kazakhstan's foreign policy is complex. But with a strand of concepts within it: multivector, prioritisation and initiatives. They all come together to deal with the outside environment. Therefore, it is not only dealing with great powers but also with issues that concern Kazakhstan the most. First, Kazakhstan became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and intended to find an alternative to the disintegrated collapse of the Soviet Union. While three Slavic states intended this to happen between them, they allowed this to expand; later, Kazakhstan showed an alternative and expansion by proposing the creation of the CIS, announced on the 21st of December 1992 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Second, despite being poorly addressed in the literature, the impact of the Conference for Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) on the regional and international order is also essential. It was proposed in 1992 by President Nazarbayev at the General Assembly. It did not attract its attention since its creation, but eventually, Kazakh diplomacy managed to attract attention from most of the regional powers in the Eurasian continent. In 1992, Kazakhstan made its first appearance at the UN GA, where the country's first president announced his country's position in the international community. He acknowledged the problems inherited by the post-Cold War order from the Cold War and suggested his solution. He proposed the CICA, a conference (whose first summit was held in Almaty) directed towards addressing post-Cold War security

issues in Asia. It has been one of Kazakhstan's foreign policy areas of activity: it used diplomacy to convince other states to join the organisation and contribute to its rise. Kazakhstan has promoted the development of the CICA since 1992 through meetings and by hosting the first summit in 2002. The CICA regional security initiative could be in force as the US leaves the region, and it would also be a test for this organisation in terms of effectiveness and usability (Akiner,2011). China took the CICA seriously. Again, an idea from a small state can be achievable if major powers are interested in it. Currently, there are 27-member states. It includes prominent Asian regional actors such as Pakistan, Turkey, India, Russia and China. The high point in the development of this organisation happened in 2014 when the IV CICA Summit was held in China, where Nazarbayev stated, “It must be a healthy competitor to OSCE” (Khegai and Urazova, 2014). The president of Kazakhstan pointed out that the OSEC failed to bring peace and security and, therefore, that Asia needs its organisation. An alternative to the OSCE is emerging in Asia, and Kazakhstan stands behind this alternative. Third, it is also interesting to address Kazakhstan’s initiatives, such as the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. Kazakhstan hosted the First Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions summit in Almaty in 2002. The idea behind this was to highlight the role of religion in societies and respond to religious extremism. The forum has produced the Almaty Declaration, in which religious leaders announced joint actions for maintaining peace and stability in society. In Astana on September 12-13th, 2006, Kazakhstan hosted the Second Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. The forum's subject was "Religion, Society and International Security". The forum comprised two sections: one focused on "Religious Freedom and Respect to Followers of Other Religions", and the second concerned the "Role of Religious Leaders in the Strengthening of International Security". The congress continues to be held annually in Astana (Government of Kazakhstan, no date). The vision is an offer to go beyond the normal bounds of international relations, which conventionally does not study religion's role in international politics. What Kazakhstan has done by bringing the issue of religion into the discussion is to suggest that religion could be the solution to current international problems, where ethnic relations, religious freedom and religious extremism are playing essential roles in the relationship between countries. Such action has consequences for international relations and shows how Kazakhstan brings conservative approaches to current world politics. Thus, Kazakhstan’s idea of CIS, the CICA and the Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions a move to fill the gap or lack of order in the Eurasian region, to balance traditional security issues in Asia and emerging issues with religious tolerance and

the relationship between different religious groups. All this could be considered, in fact, as proposing alternative regional institutions to Western institutions like the OSCE. It seems like it has become Kazakhstan's own 'sphere of influence' directed to address the post-Cold War situation in Asia and the absence of Asia-centred security institutions. These initiatives only touch Eurasia, and Kazakhstan has no presence in the Latin American, African, and Southeast Asian regions as they have already developed regional security and economic orders based on their regional knowledge and dialogues. Thus, the above initiatives raise the question: Is this not an 'order maker' behaviour? It could be. All the above shows that Kazakhstan can behave as an 'order maker' through ideas and visions directed to the issues of economy and security in the Eurasian and broader Asian continent. Thus, Kazakhstan's foreign policy behaviour at the regional and international level can conceptualised through 'order taker' and 'order maker' behaviour as the only appropriate way for a small state in the world of great powers. Post-independence, as it underwent a dual political and economic transition, Kazakhstan behaved like an 'order taker' with little influence on the regional and international order surrounding it. This has changed, and Kazakhstan is now an 'order maker' that can shape its strategic environment. This section identifies Kazakhstan's foreign policy behaviour as an 'order taker' because of the structure of the international system that emerged after the end of the Cold War: Kazakhstan did accept the existing international order and was keen to fit into the US-led Western order (Kassenova, 2017). Due to the changing character of the structure of the international system from a unipolar to a multipolar world order, Kazakhstan has changed from 'order taker' behaviour in a time of relative stability of unipolarity towards 'order maker' behaviour directed to the region and international arena. This is evident in its activity in regional integration: The CIS, the CSTO, SCO and the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC). In the international arena, it is evident in its promotion of the Conference for Interaction and Confidence-building in Asia, in nuclear policy and involvement in nuclear negotiation over Iran's nuclear energy by hosting the P5+1 group in Almaty, and the assistance program to Afghanistan. Thus, Kazakhstan's foreign policy responds to these regional and international realities. The persistence of great and regional powers in its multivector foreign policy concept has been evident since its independence. Therefore, the constant assessment of international relations goes with admitting the existence of regional and global powers for pursuing their national interest in the regional and international arena. However, what makes Kazakhstan different is that it does not oppose or aim to challenge the existing international system but to

correct the issues that concern Kazakhstan. Therefore, the following two sections will lay down the justification and importance of two selected cases to answer the research question.

4.4.1. Regional Order-Making Initiative: the Eurasian Union (EAU)

Why the EAU initiative? The post-Soviet period has prevailed with the issue of reintegration projects within the CIS area. Among the competing regional integration groups such as CIS Custom Union, Russia-Belarus Union and GUUAM, Nazarbayev's Eurasian initiative has been added to fulfil an alternative approach to reintegration from Kazakhstan's side. If we follow the scholarly records, Kazakhstan's Eurasian proposal has been neglected (Olcott, 1996, p.70; Rumer and Zhukov, 2003, p.12). However, a recent contribution to this aspect of Eurasian integration by Luca Anceschi (2020) engages in the Eurasian rhetoric and narratives from President Nazarbayev that Kazakh officials were keen to use as part of propaganda to glorify Nazarbayev's role in rebuilding the post-soviet disintegration with a Eurasian idea. The regime-neo-Eurasianism the author applies is the best indicator that the Eurasian integration initiative has been a foreign policy objective pursued by the Nazarbayev regime since 1994. However, what did this rhetoric lead to, and how is it reflected if we put the propaganda aside? It will bring us to the point that the rhetorical content and meaning behind Kazakhstan's Eurasian initiative intends to influence the course of the post-soviet regional integration with the Eurasian Union project. It is important to put this case into an order-making investigation, which this research project aims to do in Chapter 5. In general, scholars referred to the post-Soviet integration as a failed attempt, but with sudden attention to its rise (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013; Moldashev and Hassan, 2017, p.225; Khitakhumov *et al*., 2017; Dragneva and Hartwell, 2021, p.208). The rise of Eurasian integration, which represents Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, has attracted the need for a systematic analysis of Eurasian integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013). Some have provided a view from within the Eurasian integration (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa, 2015). At the same time, scholarly work does make a significant contribution to understanding the post-2000 and 2015 integration tendency and admits the role of Kazakhstan. However, the focus on great powers projects, Eurasia and Eurasianism (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa, 2015) and also the economic institution itself (the ECU) (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013) overshadowed the actual Kazakhstan's efforts to advance the EAU project in the 1990s. Although, in both publications, Kazakhstan has been analysed in chapters by Kazakh scholars Sultanov (2015) and Kassenova (2013). They left the formation of the Eurasian Union proposal (EAU) unexplained, its implementation tactics in the 1990s, and its

success since 2000 unexplained. The EAU project as a foreign policy initiative is among the priorities. For instance, Erland Idrisov, a Kazakhstan Foreign Minister, addresses that 'one of the main priorities of the foreign policy course is Eurasian integration' (Akorda, 2013). The statement from the former Foreign Affairs Minister indicates that along with balanced multivectorism, there is another priority. Indeed, Eurasian integration has been an attempt to bring a new order in the disordered post-soviet region. Kazakhstan has been promoting this idea since 1994 as an alternative to a weak CIS. This idea was developed further by the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), which, under the first Kazakh appointer at the EEC, worked to realise the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). As a result, the Eurasian Economic Union came into existence on the 29th of May 2014 in Astana, Kazakhstan. However, all the above had important implications and consequences for Kazakhstan's Eurasian idea. While the CIS still functions and plays other roles, the EAEU has come into existence despite being rejected by Russia and other post-Soviet States. It came into existence in January 2015, having previously been agreed to by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia on May 20th, 2014, in Astana. This shows how Kazakhstan has managed to get its way. Now, Kazakhstan occupies a position where it can decide on issues such as the membership of other states willing to participate and the EAU's further development. However, Kazakhstan faces two issues. First is the US reaction to Eurasian integration: Hillary Clinton clearly stated and expressed concern that such an organisation is a move towards 'Re-Sovietization' (Besemeres, 2016, p.297). The second is Russia's opportunistic vision for the EAEU to control that organisation with hegemonic ambitions (Kirkham, 2016, p. 120). However, while these concerns are from the latest development of the Eurasian integration, the idea of the EAU has emerged in response to power gap and ideas that could bring order and stability in the disordered post-soviet region. The case brings us back to 1990s in order to understand how order-making incentive were formed and how order-making has been done.

4.4.2. International Order-Making Initiative: a world free of nuclear weapons

Why is the antinuclear initiative interesting? Anceschi (2020, p.148) found that between 2010 and 2018, Kazakhstan's reference to Eurasian integration, specifically to its locality as the centre of Eurasia, was missing in the speeches at the UN General Assembly: this could be due to Kazakhstan's shift to an antinuclear policy. Nuclear rhetoric and following policies must also be considered a power that Kazakhstan developed to make its antinuclear stance difficult for the international community not to agree with Kazakhstan. Subsequently, it was not easy to

reject either. Compared to the early neglect of the EAU proposal from Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan's antinuclear initiatives also lacked scholarly attention. As is expected, scholars have missed understanding the denuclearisation of the '90s as a core behind Kazakhstan's nuclear policy. As the previous sections have demonstrated, the scholarly focus is Kazakhstan's MVFP. At the same time, according to Nazarbayev's foreign policy vision, it is only the first security ring among the other two. Thus, the second case has a separate place and is defined as a second security ring in foreign policy thinking. Nazarbayev explains that:

> Our foreign policy is a policy of centre state in the Eurasian supercontinent. It is a policy of three rings of territorial security and forestalling external threats. The first security ring is a Multi-vector Policy. The second ring is participation in the treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The third ring is our participation in defence blocs and agreements with adjacent states. (Nazarbayev, 2001, p.284)

The statement explains that participation with the NPT has a distinct task and is separate from MVFP. Kazakhstan's interest in non-proliferation is another example of Kazakhstan's aim to bring its vision for a world free of nuclear weapons, which demonstrates the track of nuclear policy engagement by Kazakhstan (see Appendix 4). Kazakhstan has a right and claims to be actively involved in such an issue. The reason for such engagement is the Soviet legacy of a nuclear test in Soviet Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has inherited the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Site, which serves as an excuse for Kazakhstan's foreign policy actions in Non-Proliferation. Is Japan active in the Non-Proliferation issue? It might be on the Japanese foreign policy agenda to avoid ever again having such an experience by being the only country to experience a nuclear attack. However, it seems that Japan has been focusing on other issues, such as building the third-largest economy in the world. It seems the right decision to invest such efforts in creating a highly competitive economy. Kazakhstan shows a different pattern of behaviour. Kazakhstan has refused its nuclear arms and uses this as a justification to raise issues in the field of Nuclear Security. By having internal factors, Kazakhstan tries to fit them into external realities of non-proliferation and nuclear security. The internal conditions have allowed Kazakhstan to enter the politics of nuclear issues. Thus, Kazakhstan has been developing its power over the issue by referring to its non-nuclear status and claims (the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site and renouncing of nuclear weapons) that legitimise Kazakhstan's right to engage in nuclear disarmament. What is interesting, however, is that

while Kazakhstan's contribution to nuclear security follows in the wake of the interests of nuclear powers, Kazakhstan's initiative towards a world without nuclear weapons indeed does not correspond to the interests of nuclear powers since it is taboo. The idea of the absence of nuclear weapons is unthinkable until the nuclear powers themselves discuss this. However, Kazakhstan took the idea as its foreign policy objective to correct the course of the presence of nuclear weapons to its preferable outcome: the total elimination of nuclear weapons in world politics.

To summarise, thus, both cases are unique. Both cases contrast the issue and the context where Kazakhstan's FPI is applied. Thus, the FPI brings us to the core objective of the research project, which is to demonstrate the above cases as a pattern of behaviour that reflects order-making rather than order-taking. While the EAU initiative is concerned with regional behaviour, the anti-nuclear initiative is concerned with international behaviour, where in both cases, the immediate concern is post-soviet regional disorder and disorder in the non-proliferation issue area.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how post-independent Kazakhstan has managed its first layer of concern: the presence of great powers. Firstly, I have examined Kazakhstan's multivector foreign policy to understand how significant powers were organised and managed in its foreign policy construct. Secondly, I have examined the prioritisation of major powers and placed them according to their importance to Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev set the internal ordering principle for Kazakhstan's foreign policy but kept shifting powers within the MVFP construct by continued prioritisation. Thirdly, I have introduced two order-making initiatives directed towards the regional and international environment. I have shown that the focus on issues occurred after a successful response to the presence of great powers, and therefore, Kazakhstan focuses on issues that concern it most but not on powers. Thus, I have introduced foreign policy initiatives as another strand in the foreign policy construct. It has demonstrated an ability to understand the regional and outside environment, to view or review its condition, to see possibilities and opportunities, and then to offer its solution and vision. These order-making initiatives from a small state like Kazakhstan reflect the 'maker' rather than the 'taker'. Next, I will move to empirical chapters to demonstrate how order-making has been done and in what context it has been more successful in providing a final answer to a research question.

Chapter 5. The Eurasian Union Initiative and Regional Context

5.1. Introduction

This is the first case analysis of how order-making has been done at the regional level. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the post-soviet region without the power to lead and order the region. Even the US has been reluctant to engage and offer a kind of Marshal Plan for the region. However, instead, shock therapy has been offered, and there is an expectation for a transition to democracy in former Soviet republics. Thus, 'No great power' has offered leadership and engaged in order-making. Under this condition, Kazakhstan has formulated an order-making initiative: the Eurasian Union (EAU) proposed in 1994 in Moscow. The initiative was not meant to resist Russia or oppose the CIS, but instead, the initiative aimed to 'correct' the course of the post-soviet integration towards a new regional organisation. How it has been done will be scrutinised through the following sections. I begin with preconditions for order-making in section 5.2 to show Kazakhstan's stance on post-soviet integration and how it has changed to integration prioritisation. In section 5.3, I will show how order-making has been done with three case scenarios presented separately. In the following section, 5.4, I will analyse and interpret all three scenarios to provide further conceptual answers as to why such behaviour may occur and under what conditions. It will be explained through the following themes: formation, implementation, control, and challenge.

5.2. Precondition

Post-Independent Kazakhstan and Integration Issue

In 1992, Nazarbayev published his first foreign policy document titled 'Strategy for the formation and development of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state' (Nazarbayev, 1992). What is essential from that document is disinterest in integration but coordination instead. Nazarbayev states the following:

> Kazakhstan has always been ready for a joint way out of the crisis, persistently sought to implement it both by economic and political methods. However, unfortunately, our initiatives did not meet with support from the majority of partners in the CIS. Therefore, remaining sincere adherents of the unification of efforts, we are forced to look for an independent way out of the current situation, namely, to carry out the transition *from*

> *the policy of integration to the policy of coordination* [emphasis added] with the CIS countries. (Nazarbayev, 1992, p.41)

This statement shows the precondition to Nazarbayev's evolution to the Eurasian Union proposal in 1994. However, in a short period, Kazakhstan changed from a 'coordination' to an 'integration' position. The apparent reason lies in the post-soviet economic crisis and economic dependence on Russia (Mansurov, 2014, p.97; Anceschi, 2014, p.735). Consequently, since 1994, it has become clear that Eurasian integration has become a major foreign policy initiative. Therefore, the pattern of behaviour since that has been around bringing 'all in one' back again by proposing the Eurasian Union project in March 1994. However, before the official presentation, there is also a pattern of behaviour that needs to be recognized. For instance, Nazarbayev's view of the post-Soviet regional order and its criticism is found in the foreign policy speeches made in New York, London, and Moscow. The content of those speeches is essential to identifying Kazakhstan's interest in the specific issue area and the shape of intentions for correcting the course of post-Soviet integration towards a new regional grouping. They are presented below in order.

New York speech

The content of the New York speech reflects this intention in the speech made at Columbia University on February 16 1994. Nazarbayev stated:

> I have been and remain a supporter of the preservation of historically-established relations of friendship, cooperation, and understanding, all the best that connects our peoples for centuries with a common history. Kazakhstan consistently defends the idea of economic integration of the CIS member states, emphasising that without prejudice to the interests of its sovereign threads, with full respect for the principles of impartiality, engagement in internal affairs, and the rights of everyone people to determine the rules of their own social order must preserve the basis of our cooperation. Participation in the Commonwealth allows us to provide the necessary political and socio-economic conditions for the development of democracy, jointly develop and implement measures against emerging in one, then at another point of the CIS armed conflicts, provoked by nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia. (Nazarbayev, 1994, p.20)

Regarding the CIS, he further clarified:

> The CIS is not a state, not a national entity, but the normal mechanism of regional interaction in the current conditions, comparable to the European Union. The difference is that in Western Europe the idea of integration came to already mature states, and the CIS is an alternative, chosen by countries, each of which was part of an imperial state. And this alternative was chosen quite consciously, since it is impossible to instantly sever the common bonds of natural relations of people living in one state, whose daily worries are similar in many ways (Nazarbayev, 1994, p.24).

In this speech, Nazarbayev implicitly hints toward the immaturity of the CIS compared to Europe. However, the problem of the CIS was further exposed in the London speech.

London speech

The London speech was made during the visit to London on March 22 1994, where Nazarbayev made the following statements focusing on the post-Soviet region at Chatham House:

> The development of the post-Soviet space to date is determined by two trends: on the one hand, the formation of national statehood is taking place; and on the other, the tendency towards integration of the CIS countries is strengthening. The prospects for the development of the CIS towards greater integration, primarily economic integration, largely depends on the consent and readiness of its subjects to bring their geopolitical priorities closer together by limiting ethnopolitical aspirations. There is a need to reform the CIS itself, which would ensure the creation of a belt of stability and security in this region, increase the predictability of the political evolution, and the controllability of the post-Soviet space. In this case, the new community could play a real stabilising role in preventing and regulating possible conflicts in this zone. (Nazarbayev, 1994a, p.26)

But, the interesting part of his speech is that:

> The current conditions dictate the need to abandon *the desire to retain all states within the CIS* [emphasis added]. In our opinion, it is advisable to build a real working union

> of states on the basis of *the core of countries* [emphasis added] with the possible name "Euro-Asian Union" (Nazarbayev, 1994a, p.26).

Thus, the London speech provides a more detailed analytical vision by Nazarbayev. The above extract from the speech indicates that Nazarbayev understood that the re-integration of all post-Soviet states was not possible, and the solution in his vision was to focus on its core states instead. Nazarbayev explained why:

> The CIS has existed for its fourth year already. During this time, many constructive ideas were put forward, which were not implemented for various reasons. In my opinion, one of these is *the undeveloped system of responsibility* [emphasis added] for the fate of the Commonwealth, which adequately considers the changes in the interests of the participating states, on the one hand, and on the other, the dynamics of the development of the post-Soviet space as a whole. This is explained by the rapid disintegration of the USSR, following this euphoria of independence, and then by the realisation by most countries of the need for collective responsibility for survival in the new geopolitical conditions. An increase in the responsibility of each of the states leads to an increase in the controllability and controllability of the post-Soviet space within the CIS. Thus, each of these states contributes to the global system of responsibility. (Nazarbayev, 1994a, p.25)

Thus, the two above passages from the London speech indicate a lack of responsibility from other post-soviet states and may need to begin with core countries. However, more details were revealed in the Moscow speech.

Moscow speech 29 March 1994

After the London speech, he continued the integration issue in Moscow during his first official visit to Russia. The speech took place at the Moscow State University on 29 March 1994. Nazarbayev began a speech with a critical view on the CIS development. Nazarbayev stated that:

> Unfortunately, today the CIS does not fully meet the objective requirements of the time and does not ensure the integration of the participating countries, which our peoples so

> desperately need. From the moment the creation of the Commonwealth, its members do not converge but move further and further from each other. Although more than 400 cooperation documents have been accepted and signed, almost all of these are not yet valid. (Nazarbayev, 1994b, pp.32-33)

However, he moved further and proposed an order-making initiative:

> There is a need to move to a qualitatively new level of relations between our countries on the basis of a new interstate association formed on the principles of voluntariness and equality. The Eurasian Union (EAU) could become such an association. It should be based on principles other than the CIS, because the basis of the new association should be supranational bodies designed to solve two key tasks: the formation of a single economic space and the provision of a joint defence policy. (Nazarbayev, 1994b, pp.32-33)

Nazarbayev continued to clarify that:

> It is important to emphasise that all other questions concerning interests, sovereignty, internal state and political structure, and foreign policy activities of each participant remain inviolable and presuppose non-interference in each other's internal affairs. (Nazarbayev, 1994b, pp.32-33)

He continued with a major emphasis on core states that he mentioned in his London speech:

> The paradox is that in Western Europe, politicians are ahead in unification, and peoples are lagging behind, while here in the CIS it is the other way around: the peoples want unification, but politicians are lagging behind. Therefore, at the first stage, we could *start unification in the EAC from Kazakhstan and Russia* [emphasis added]. (Nazarbayev, 1994b, pp.32-33)

The above speeches, therefore, reveal why Nazarbayev wanted to see a new regional order and how he intended to bring about his version of that order. Thus, the EAU project as an order-

making initiative became an official Eurasian strategy. How he meant to implement is in the following section.

5.3. Order-Maker Moves

Nazarbayev envisioned three following scenarios to order the post-soviet region: the one intended to bring all states into one at once; the second intended to focus only on core states instead, and another one aimed to make it open for others. Therefore, the following three sections will bring us to order-making scenarios that Nazarbayev was keen to accommodate to preserve the old order of linkages and correct the course of regional integration towards a new regional integration.

5.3.1. Scenario One: The 1994 EAU Proposal – All in One at Once

Discontented by the development of the CIS but not challenging it, Nazarbayev made his initial order-making initiative by proposing the EAU project idea. Nazarbayev had signed the document "On the Formation of the Eurasian Union of States. Draft document, Almaty, June 3, 1994" (Nazarbayev, 1994c, pp.38-50). The document's content sets out a problem statement and proposed solution statement in two parts. In the problem statement part, Nazarbayev remarked:

> Considering the differences between countries in levels of development of the market economy and democratisation of political processes, we propose the formation of an *additional integration structure - the Eurasian Union* [emphasis added], combined with the activities of the CIS. At the same time, the multivariate of integration, different rates, heterogeneity and different vectors in the development of the CIS states are considered. This gives grounds to speak of *an urgent need for the formation of a new economic order in the CIS* [emphasis added]. The goal is the coordination of economic policy and the adoption required for implementation of joint programs of conducting economic reforms by the participating states. (Nazarbayev, 1994c, p.41)

Table 5 below shows the problem statement with issues (a) generated as the result of the socio-economic and political crisis that all the CIS states faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and showed the needed policy responses (b) to issues based on collective efforts that Nazarbayev is so keen to emphasise.

Table 5. Problem Statement: the EAU project content

a) Concerning Issues
'… against the background of the multinational composition of the population in almost all CIS states. ….. Interethnic tension is growing .... escalating into interstate conflicts.'
'Solution of issues of economic integration.'
'the process of disintegration in the field of science, culture, education.'
'at present, the post-Soviet space is a zone of instability, and is also affected by hotbeds of tension outside the CIS.'
'the problem of ecological security.'

b) **Policy responses**
… through joint efforts, it is necessary to develop mechanisms for containing, localising and settling conflicts of various types.
the need to create political institutions.
preservation and development of joint policy in the field of culture, education and science.
protection of external borders and stabilisation of the situation in conflict regions can only be carried out by joint efforts of all interested states.
required … joining the efforts of all states.

In the solution part below, Nazarbayev (1994c, p.38) revealed the content of the Eurasian Union project. First, it starts with the statement that 'Economic interests determine the basis for the rapprochement of independent states. The political institutions of the EAU should adequately reflect these interests and promote economic integration. Second, the content is summarised in Table 6 below. It shows five significant parts: first (A), concern with clear principles and mechanisms for forming the EAU, such as entry requirements and their conditions, participation in other integration institutions, and exit conditions. The primary emphasis, however, has been on the formation of supranational bodies and the coordination of joint policies (B).

Table 6. Proposed Solution Statement: the EAU project content

A) I. Principles of unification
the signing by the member states of the Treaty establishing the EAU on the basis of the principles of equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders
formation of supranational bodies
coordination of the laws of the participating countries
coordination of foreign policy
For the purpose of deeper coordination and efficiency of the activities of the EAU countries, it is advisable to create in each of them a State Committee on EAU affairs.
Free movement of citizens within the borders of the EAU requires coordination of external, in relation to third countries, visa policy.

B) Four Issue Areas	
II). Economy	With the purpose of creating a single economic space within the EAU, it is proposed to form a number of supranational coordinating structures.
III). Science, culture, education	maintaining the potential achieved over previous decades and strengthening integration in this area.
IV). Defence	The EAU proposes the creation of a single defence space to coordinate defence activities
V). Ecology	coordination of actions with international organisations to reduce the degree of environmental pollution.

After the publication, Nazarbayev moved to convince others and defend the idea of the project but faced a lack of support from other CIS member states. However, despite the others' reactions, Nazarbayev considered their comments and, in response, tried to clarify but stayed firm on significant aspects of the project. In an interview with Russian "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" on June 11, 1994, Nazarbayev stressed the following:

> I do not want to say that the CIS is not fulfilling its role at all and that it should be dissolved. But the CIS goes in one direction, and life in another. …….. I propose to have normal supranational coordinating bodies. Let them not be afraid that sovereignty will be lost and so on. It is believed that the general sovereignty is higher than the separate private sovereignty of each state, it is more useful. (Nazarbayev, 1994d, p.60)

To ease further concern, the Kazakh government organised a conference in Alma-Ata on September 20 1994, with the title "Eurasian Space: Integration Potential and its Implementation." Nazarbayev started with the criticism that 'during the existence of the Commonwealth, 400 documents were adopted, but no significant results have yet been achieved' and despite having commonality, 'we are fenced off from each other by borders and customs'. He claimed that 'the whole world today is striving for integration', such as the European Community or Arab League. Therefore, 'with a collective effort' and 'having a powerful unifying potential formed over decades' during the Soviet Union should make it easy to enter into the world community (Nazarbayev, 1994e, pp.94-95). He clarified that 'the EAU.... aims, ..., at solving economic problems in the Commonwealth space, including through the creation of supranational bodies that contribute to the implementation of agreements and treaties reached' (Nazarbayev, 1994e, p.96). In general, after publication, Nazarbayev engaged in clarifying, defending and convincing others about the EAU project in response to comments from others. However, since his EAU project did not go further than discussion, he was quick to move to advance an idea that he first started at Chatham House in March 1994. Nazarbayev considered that 'it is advisable to build a real working union based on the core of states' in which Kazakhstan is a core along with Russia (Nazarbayev, 1994a, p.26). Thus, Nazarbayev had to move to his second scenario to realise Eurasian integration based on a specific focus on core states in his Eurasian strategy. Therefore, the next section will cover the following action in a specific issue area of regional integration.

5.3.2. Scenario Two: From 'All in One' to the Concept of Core

Dissatisfied by the reaction and lack of support for the EAU project from CIS member states, Nazarbayev made the following move in order-making: the project implementation must begin with core states, and Kazakhstan and Russia are paramount. Nazarbayev during an interview with Interfax in February 1995, shared the following:

> I am convinced that if we form a true Customs Union of the three countries, we remove barriers, we will not charge duties for the transportation of goods through each other's territory, that is, we will create a normal market space. Everyone will see that it is profitable and that this is the path to follow. (Nazarbayev, 1995, p.170)

A new integration strategy February 16th, 1996.

However, in Moscow on February 16th, 1996, President Nazarbayev (1996, pp.42-44) presented the report 'Integrationism. Based on equality, voluntary and on pragmatic interest – This is a decent future for Eurasia ', in which was stated the following:

> Integration of all post-Soviet spaces into a more constructive formation than the Commonwealth in the nearest historical perspective is problematic. At present, the actual values were laid down two years ago in the EAC project of the ideas of two-speed and multi-tier integration. Although I suggest using another term - *"integration cores"* [emphasis added]. We are talking about adopting a different integration strategy - instead of one that is frontal, standardised, and doomed to failure - to move along a more local path in the geographical sense and more accentuated in the sense of choosing spheres of coordination policies. (Nazarbayev, 1996, pp.42-44)

He clarified further that:

> Today *the integration core* [emphasis added] can start to be formed precisely through the mechanism of the triple Customs Union. Here painstaking work is needed, in particular in terms of rapprochement of tax laws. From the politicised priorities, it is high time for us to switch to pragmatic priorities. A customs union that could become the basis of a new approach to integration cannot be expanded on the basis of political priorities alone. It should be based on *the economic interests* [emphasis added] of all its participants. (Nazarbayev, 1996, pp.42-44)

These two extracts above highlight the concept of core states and economic interests above political ones. In that speech, Nazarbayev (1996, p.44) also stressed the dangers of integration by calling for 'forced integration', but also called for a need for clear strategy and goals in integration and its 'recognition as a priority direction in the foreign policy of interaction states

of the Commonwealth' (Nazarbayev, 1996, p.47). On the other hand, Nazarbayev wondered about the choice of criteria for 'determining the content and direction of post-Soviet integration in the nearest historical perspective' and in this regard, according to Nazarbayev 'there is no common understanding today either' (Nazarbayev, 1996, p.47). Nazarbayev (1996, p.47) was also concerned that 'attempts at forced integration can drastically change the foreign policy orientations of our states and to direct the vector of integration efforts outside the CIS space'. Thus, this document sets out the second scenario that expands Kazakhstan's action level towards the Eurasian Union.

Since 2000

The February 1996 speech in Moscow followed attempts towards integration through Kazakhstan and Russia's signing of the Customs Union Treaty on January 20, 1995 (Kembayev, 2011). However, the Treaties on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space dated February 26 1999, were not working (Mansurov, 2014). However, it is only since 2000 that real integration has been forming. Five CIS member states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia) met in Astana on October 10, 2000, to create the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), an 'international organisation, having a clear functional structure, effective mechanisms of work, and clear and understandable goals: the creation of the Customs Union (CU) and the Common Economic Space (CES) and integration into the global trade and economic system' (Mansurov, 2014). In Nazarbayev's (2004, p.228) assessment, 'the EurAsEC is a viable, developing organisation. Cooperation between the countries of the "Eurasian Five" is constantly being adjusted, and new tasks are set for the transition to higher levels of interaction'. Indeed, interaction continued to shape the Custom Union and the Common Economic Space (KISI, 2019). Nazarbayev (2011a), in his annual 2011 state address, emphasised that 'Kazakhstan will remain committed to the rapid and efficient development of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus'. Moreover, the confidence and control within integration led Nazarbayev to state that 'our immediate goal is to create the Eurasian Economic Union' (Akorda, 2012).

5.3.3. Scenario Three: the EAEU and Political Integration

Finally satisfied by Eurasian integration with the core states of Belarus and Russia, Nazarbayev was quick to propose another order-making move. For instance, in an article published on 25 October 2011, Nazarbayev (2011), under the subsection of 'A New Reading of the Eurasian

Idea in the 21st Century', stated that 'we view the Eurasian Union as an open project. It cannot be imagined without broad cooperation, for example, with the European Union and other associations. Nazarbayev (2011) also highlighted that 'there is no "restoration" or "reincarnation" of the USSR and never will be. These are just phantoms of the past, speculation and speculation. And in this, our views completely coincide with the leadership of Russia, Belarus and other countries.' The EAU was scheduled to be signed in 2014, but Nazarbayev was determined to set the following order-making tasks. The Eurasian Union, according to Nazarbayev:

> should initially be created as a competitive global economic association.
> should be formed as a strong link linking the Euro-Atlantic and Asian areas of development.
> should be formed as a self-sufficient regional financial association, which will be part of the new global monetary and financial system. The geo-economic and, in the long term, geopolitical maturation of Eurasian integration should proceed exclusively in an evolutionary and voluntary way. (Nazarbayev, 2011)

However, as planned, Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union has implemented it with economic aspects only. It occurred in Astana when core members of the EEC met on May 29, 2014, to sign an agreement on creating the Eurasian Economic Union. While Nazarbayev had advanced his important task, launching the EAU had been a priority since 1994. Nazarbayev, after the inauguration of the EAEU, stated that 'if the rules that were established in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has every right to refuse membership in the Eurasian Union. Astana will never be part of organisations that pose a threat to Kazakhstan's independence' (Argynov, 2014). This statement followed the escalation of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia over the latter's annexation of Crimea (Olifan *et al*., 2015, p.15). It could be considered unexpected from Nazarbayev since such a statement has not been reflected in documents since 1994. Since then, Kazakhstan's behaviour has changed to correct the intention of the core member states of the EAEU. Russia aimed to turn an economic organisation into a political one, which, according to the above statement, is not Nazarbayev's objective. It is another form of behaviour that emerged after 2014 and will be explained in the following section. Thus, this section aimed to provide the conditions for order-making initiatives such as the EAU. It showed how he meant to order the region with three order-making scenarios since 1994. In the following section, why

such behaviour may have occurred and what Nazarbayev did to protect his achievements are analysed.

5.4. Integration Issue Analysis

The previous section was designed to show how Nazarbayev aimed to order the post-soviet region and how he did it. This section aims to focus on the root causes of such behaviour. Why order-making occurred? At first, Nazarbayev's EAU project went through failure, success, and challenges. Each stage, therefore, reflects particular behaviours and to understand the content of each stage, analytical themes of formation, implementation, control and challenge will be applied. It will further clarify why such behaviour may occur and what factors facilitated the order-taking initiative to emerge and came to be known as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014.

5.4.1. Formation

A critical development since 1986 has been considered crucial to understanding Nazarbayev's move towards regional integration initiatives. First, the way we understand the change in the late period of the Soviet Union relates to Gorbachev's policies of Perestroika (Restructuring) and Glasnost (Openness) and the struggle between Boris Yeltsin and Gorbachev (Brzezinski and Sullivan, 1997). However, change from the inside also began with how the republics teamed up to claim power and succeeded in securing achievements such as declarations of sovereignty and demands for negotiation of a new Union treaty (Brzezinski and Sullivan, 1997). The latter move created a 'great bargain' between Moscow and the Republics, such as a "Nine Plus One" framework. The success of the negotiation with Moscow was evident since the signing of the new Union Treaty was scheduled for August 22, 1991. Despite the August coup attempt on the same day ensuring that this did not happen, the team dynamic of republics for more freedom was not stopped or challenged by the Centre. The three Slavic states led and moved further to declare the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991. In addition, since the team dynamic was still fresh, it was easy for Nazarbayev to call the Soviet republics to meet again in Almaty on December 21 to put an end to the Soviet Union collectively and set up a new regional order with an expanded CIS structure and membership. Thus, the presence of team dynamism among the Republics and the presence of a collective agenda for more freedom made it easy for Nazarbayev to initiate his first order-making move with the creation of the CIS in Almaty after

the declaration of independence on December 16, 1991. Second, while the regime of bargaining between Moscow and the Union Republics took place within the Soviet Union, the post-1991 Almaty meeting formed a different post-Soviet regime in which no Centre existed (Shoemaker, 2005, p. 125) but relatively new and formally equal states were represented. They faced a new reality of the absence of power above them and freedom of action to form a new regional order. The collapse of the Soviet Union was an essential event of the 20th century that raised the question of whether to expect chaos or stability in the region (Dawisha and Parrot, 1994). The Yugoslavian scenario has been modelled, but it was avoided through a new regional association - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Degterev and Kurylev, 2019, p.1). The CIS has served its role as a mechanism to deal with the legacies of the USSR and laid the foundation for the further relationship between the Republics through the format that was agreed on December 21st, 1991 (Jackson, 2003). The bargaining process has remained in place so that the CIS structure is named as a framework for a civilised divorce (Brzezinski and Sullivan, 1997). Instability between and within the CIS member states has prevailed with other post-Soviet conditions, such as the transition from the Soviet system to a new political formation and the legacy of the Soviet past (Garthoff, 1997, pp.22-23). Thus, all these adverse developments deteriorated the team dynamics by developing what Nazarbayev identified as tendencies like the formation of different national interests and understandings of the importance of integration in republics (Moscow speech). Indeed, these factors affected the integration attitude of the Republics, and a split emerged due to diverse foreign policy orientations, interstate war, and civil conflict. Nazarbayev blamed Russia, Belarus and Ukraine for Eurocentrism, and as a result, they 'isolated from the general circle of interrelated problems of the Eurasian array' (Nazarbayev, 1997d, p.18). In the Caucasus, the interstate war between Armenia and Azerbaijan started over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgia was at war with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A civil war erupted in Tajikistan, while Uzbekistan faced an Islamic threat from within (Shoemaker, 2010, p.81). Mostafa and Mahmood (2018, p.163) assessed that 'the CIS was ultimately an ineffective and inefficient organisation amid regional wars, political and ideological tensions, and conflicts among its member states; it also faced a lack of mutual trust and commitment among those states'. This harsh assessment of the CIS led to a diminishing of the team dynamic that had carried common collectivism between the Republics since 1986. However, importantly, it also points to the absence of a great power in the form of Russia.

Russia and others

The track record of Russia since independence points to similar conditions experienced by all former Soviet states after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Dawisha and Starr, 1995). Cooper (2013, p.81) explains that 'During the 1990s, for Russia and the other new nations of the ex-Soviet Union, the principal concerns were post-communist transformation and state-building'. Under these conditions, Russia abandoned two critical instruments of Soviet financial leverage over others in the form of the Rouble Zone and energy supply (Dawisha and Parrot 1994, p.172). This Russian move pressured the other Republics to force economic reform and introduce national currencies (Schroeder, 1996, pp.37-38). Thus, Kazakhstan began an independent monetary policy by introducing its currency in November 1993 (Schroeder 1996, p.31; Nazarbayev 1996, p.165-168). In addition, this led to the independent energy policy of Kazakhstan and others, which aimed to reduce dependence on Russia (Hancock and Libman 2016, p.212). Moreover, in the case of creating the Free Trade Zone among CIS member states in 1994, Russia refused to ratify the plan (Mostafa and Mahmood, 2018). Russia, under a peacekeeping mission, was involved in 'hot spots' (Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997, p.59) but contributed instead to 'frozen conflicts' in the cases of Moldova and Georgia (Kazantsev *et al*., 2020). Even the Russian initiative for the creation of the CIS Collective Security Treaty in 1992 was part of collective efforts with others, while three other CIS member states had refused to join (Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) (Moldashev and Hassan, 2017, p.228). Thus, Russia was weak economically and faced the same post-independence problems of post-Soviet state-building and foreign policy orientation as other CIS states and could not act as a great power. Nazarbayev (1997c, pp. 198-199) pointed out that the lack of integration with others was because 'Russia cannot offer a clear integration programme'. The case of the Rouble Zone is another piece of evidence showing the absence of great power incentives from Russia to keep and expand the monetary system on which other republics depended and needed Russia (Brzezinski and Sullivan 1997, p.175). On this issue, Nazarbayev concludes that:

> I did everything possible and impossible to keep Kazakhstan in a single currency and technological space with Russia and other states of the Commonwealth. But the vector of Russia's development was set in the other direction. The Russian leadership missed the chance to become the centre, the core, the natural backbone of the Commonwealth. (Nazarbayev, 1997b, p.335)

Thus, the CIS did not satisfy the expectations of its members, even Kazakhstan. It was evident in Nazarbayev's speeches in foreign countries (New York, London and Moscow). Consequently, on June 3rd of 1994, President Nazarbayev signed and announced the document 'The Project of the Formation of the Eurasian Union of States' to CIS member states (Nazarbayev, 1994c, p.38). As has been shown in the previous Part, issues of concern were a starting point in the problem statement of the document (EAU project). In response to the above conditions, the document contains a proposed solution to coordinate the economy, science, culture, education, defence and ecology, but all under the condition of principles that Nazarbayev emphasised 'equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders' (EAU project). However, what Nazarbayev faced after was its implementation.

5.4.2. Implementation

Indeed, the implementation of the EAU project also depended on internal regional developments. While Nazarbayev succeeded in gathering other republics in Alma-Ata to create the CIS, he could not do it again with his Eurasian project. Despite Nazarbayev's attempts to convince others that the project was not meant to recreate the USSR, it was perceived as such. Thus, the project split CIS member states into those who supported and those who questioned the project's content. For instance, Nazarbayev stresses politics first to solve economic issues. President of Uzbekistan, Karimov, on the other hand, had reacted by pointing out that 'I have always said that politics is secondary, and economics is primary'. Specifically, Nazarbayev's proposal for a single parliament was questioned when Karimov asked, 'will Russia agree that this so-called single parliament should have an equal number of deputies from Kazakhstan and Russia? naturally, no' (Portnikov, 1994). On another occasion, Karimov even stated that 'Much is left unsaid when the term Euro-Asian is used. If this implies a single parliament, single suprastate structures and even single citizenship and a single constitution, it means the restoration of the old union, no matter what it is called' (Brzezinski and Sullivan, 1997, p.335). Niyazov, the President of Turkmenistan at that time, questioned whether the new interstate association would repeal the CIS but admitted the novelty of centralization and power of supranational bodies in the project (Azia, 1994). Armenian Foreign Minister Papazyan, on the other hand, stated that 'the idea of President Nazarbayev is being seriously studied in Armenia. We consider it as one of the options for further development of mutual relations between CIS members (Topchyan, 1994). The interesting position, however, is from the Russian side. For

instance, the Russian position demonstrated by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev concerning the idea stated that ‘at the same time, of course, we would like to avoid a situation in which the promotion and discussion of such ideas [Eurasian Union] would hinder, say, or divert attention from the solution of specific problems. However, it continued to suggest that ‘the initiative of N. Nazarbayev on the Eurasian Union should be viewed not as a distraction, but, on the contrary, as a focusing attention, a far-reaching promising idea, which is designed to focus attention on those specific issues that are now before us’ (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 1994). Behind the Kremlin's official stand were Yeltsin's priorities. Aleksandrov (1999, p.181) observed that 'Yeltsin could not accept someone other than himself as the author of an initiative as important and potentially historic as the Eurasian Union'. It is a sign that does not fit the perceived great power status that Russian officials are trying to apply. However, despite criticism of CIS and Russia, Nazarbayev's hope for Russia has always been optimistic since 'in the integration of our countries, the road can be Russia' (Nazarbayev, 1997a, p. 31). However, Russia was not ready, and the solution was to place Russia among other core states.

Nazarbayev and new approach

Nazarbayev had proposed a new integration strategy that brought the idea of core states from the ideas expressed in the London and Moscow speeches into practice to boost regional integration. While the EAU project was to bring all post-Soviet states into a new regional project, the concept of core states was to shift to core counties where Kazakhstan and Russia must start regional economic integration, and others would join later. The consequence of this new integration strategy was evident in its practical implementation. The concept has placed Kazakhstan at the core of regional integration since 2000.It brought great control of Eurasian integration to Kazakhstan and dynamism with the other Five (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) and later with the core ‘Troika’ (Three) countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (Libman and Vinokurov, 2012). These ‘three’ have been central to the core concept of continuing the team dynamic by forming the Customs Union in 2007, the Single Economic Space in 2012 and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014 (Kirkham 2016; Libman and Vinokurov, 2012). The concept, finally, served to bring Nazarbayev’s Eurasian project to its conclusion in 2014, and it has been possible due to Kazakhstan’s ability to control its path since 2000.

5.4.3. Control

Continuity of regional integration based on core states has provided Kazakhstan with a central position in the decision-making bodies of the EEC, CU and EAEU. It allowed Kazakhstan to control it as an institution designer, decision-maker and corrector of the content and future shape of Eurasian integration. Thus, the concept of core states within Eurasian integration since 2000 has provided Kazakhstan with equal power with other core member states of the EAEU. First, Nazarbayev referred to regional integration as a global trend by pointing to examples such as the European Community, the Arab League, and so on (Nazarbayev, 1997a, p. 95). His constant references to the EU model have been a method that could also be applied to the CIS region. According to Mansurov, a former Kazakh ambassador and former Secretary-General of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) from 2007 - to 2014, 'the EAU project is based on the classical integration model of American economist B [Bella]. Balassa. Who singled out five stages of international economic integration: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration (Mansurov, 2014, p.102). Mansurov (2014, p.103) also emphasises that 'the project on the creation of the EAC was envisaged to use the EU experience in the creation of the EEC, the CU and the SES, which made it possible to form and apply a number of new methodological solutions.' The institutional line of EEC, CU and SES had impressed as successful integration models compared to the 1990s (Dutkiewicz, and Sakwa, 2015).

Laruelle (2019, p.398) noticed that 'one of Nazarbayev's greatest victories was the launch of the EEC' and it happened when the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia met in the Kazakh capital, Astana, on October 10, 2000, and signed a treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). It emerged with the core states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. However, the core 'Three' has been central in the implementation of further Eurasian integration, which added another victory for Nazarbayev with the launch of the Customs Unions (CU) in 2007 with the core states of Belarus and Russia (Cooper, 2013, p.21). This core continued to form the Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012 and finally led to the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014 (Dutkiewicz and Sakwa, 2015). It goes according to what Nazarbayev envisioned in Moscow in 1994 (Kassenova, 2013, p.3) and his second scenario (Speech in February 1996). Thus, Nazarbayev's implementation of the EAU was done with a significant adjustment to focus on the regional economic order based on the core regional states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. First, this construction allowed Kazakhstan to control the path of integration from

within by being a core member of the EEC. It ensured its position vis-à-vis others as the principle of equality that Nazarbayev forcefully inserted into the EEC. It has been his powerful asset in controlling the organisational structure from the inside. For instance, the President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, has been chosen as the EEC's first president. In addition, from the Kazakhstan side, Tair Mansurov was appointed Secretary-General of the EEC in 2007 and held his position till 2014, when the EEC dissolved in favour of the EAEU (Cooper, 2013, p.21). The data acquired from the EEC webpage, which now serves as the official archive of the organisation since 2015, shows 36 meetings of the Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic Community and two summits (EEC, 2015). Kazakhstan organised and hosted seven meetings, following Russia's 21 hosted meetings, Belarus – 6, Tajikistan – 3 and Kyrgyzstan – 1 (EEC, 2015). Thus, summits were organised and hosted mainly in Kazakhstan and Russia.

Second, such activity is a consequence of the position that Kazakhstan took in the decision-making system. According to Vinokurov from the Eurasian Development Bank (EADB), the current EAEU contains three critical elements from Nazarbayev's speech (Moscow speech, 1994). These are the principles of voluntariness and equality, the prioritisation of economic policy, and the creation of a system of supranational bodies (Vinokurov and Nurseitova, 2020). Initially, the weighting system was formed in the decision-making body of the Customs Union Commission, where Russia dominated by 57% of the votes compared to 21.5% for Kazakhstan and Belarus (Kassenova 2012, p.25). However, this was not an obstacle for Kazakhstan to express its position on specific issues. For instance, Kazakhstan advocated for the title of the Eurasian Economic Union in response to Russia's proposal for the Eurasian Union (Popescu, 2014, p.21). On another issue, Belarusian President Lukashenko complained that the treaty on the transformation of the EEC has yet to be signed due to Kazakhstan's insistence on sticking to the agreed 2015 agenda (Newsru, 2012). The following example of how the EAEU treaty was discussed between the core states in its initial stage is revealing. Samat Ordabayev reported that 'First, a huge draft treaty was proposed, almost 2,000 pages long. An attempt was made to include in it such provisions that, in fact, regulate all aspects of the life of our states. First of all, attempts were made to include such issues as political cooperation, common citizenship, migration policy, visa policy issues, and security issues' (Tengrinews, 2014). This account reveals how Kazakh diplomats' standing regarding the treaty was significant in its initial stage to ensure that its content did not cross the line of economic integration. It also reveals how Russia was tempted to insert its agenda and the issues which Kazakhstan was trying to balance against. Thus, Kazakhstan succeeded in

defending its position in the first place, but continued attempts followed even after the treaty's signing and under the new decision-making model. The weighting system was abandoned when the CU Commission was replaced with the Eurasian Economic Commission to set the equal distribution of votes (Kassenova, 2012, p.25). On this issue, Nazarbayev, on state television, responded to domestic concern over the violation of Kazakhstan's interests in the EAEU and explained that:

> This is not true. When the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus gather and resolve issues, if one person is against, this decision is not made. This is called consensus. If I do not like their decision, then I will speak out against it, and it will not be accepted. This means that we all have the same rights. (Nazarbayev, 2014)

The consensus aspect is also stated on the web page of the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 'The Treaty on the EAEU contains a clear consensus mechanism for making strategically significant decisions at all levels, which excludes any possibility of domination by any state' (Government of Kazakhstan, no date). However, the consensus is not applied to other institutions, such as the Eurasian Economic Commission Collegium, where 'The formal equality coexists with informal means of influence' from Russia (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2017, p.13). Nazarbayev himself commented during the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in October 2013 that:

> I cannot fail to note that the Russian members of the Board take part in meetings of the Russian government and receive the appropriate instructions, although, according to our agreement, the Commission, the members of the Board are not accountable to any of our governments. (Nazarbayev, 2013)

Here is another remark from President Tokaev at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in May 2020, 'Representatives of the Commission recently announced the adoption of the strategy by the heads of state. This is an inappropriate jump ahead' (Tengrinews, 2020). These remarks from high officials such as Nazarbayev and Tokaev illustrate the continued Russian attempts to influence the content. At the same time, Kazakhstan shows a relative posture to internally correct issues that are not agreed upon and not acceptable in the framework of the EAEU. As it has been observed, Russia might assert its attitude toward the common

rules of the Union over the members of the EAEU. In the post-Ukrainian context, it continued to agitate even further (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2017, p.14). Thus, a rising challenge from within has been evident since 2014.

5.4.4. Challenge

The major challenge from within has appeared from another core member of the EAEU, and it has been from Russia. In this regard, Kazakhstan demonstrates a precise balancing of Russia on particular issues clearly stated by Kazakh officials, such as opposing the politicisation of the EAEU (Podberezkin and Podberezkina, 2015, p.57; Putz, 2021). In 2014, Nazarbayev made a warning statement that no one would expect from the President who had committed Kazakhstan to form and implement Eurasian integration:

> If the rules described in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has the right to withdraw from the EAEU. I have already said this, and I will repeat it again. Kazakhstan will not join organisations that threaten our independence. Independence is our most important wealth. (Nazarbayev, 2014)

There is a reason for such a statement. First, Russia under Putin was encouraged by Kazakhstan to become a core member in the Eurasian integration but not as a Great Power. As Libman (2018) has put it, ‘Russia is not the only force shaping the EAEU. The position of Kazakhstan is equally important, which, in many cases, leads the organisation in a different direction from that intended by Russia’. It is because Kazakhstan was ‘least dependent on Russia’, and therefore, ‘has been the most effective in shaping the EAEU along its interest’ (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2017, p.24). As a result, Kazakhstan’s commitment to forming supranational authorities turned out to be a challenge to Russia. For instance, in the post-Ukrainian context, Kazakhstan in 2014, ‘rejected the Russian proposal to exit the free trade agreement with Ukraine’ (Libman, 2017, p. 89). As shown in the previous chapter (Russian Question), Kazakhstan's standing on Russian actions in Crimea and afterwards has not supported Russia and has continued to show concern about the Russian views of the EAEU. Since 2014, it has become apparent that Russia's view of the EAEU differs from Kazakhstan's. According to Libman (2017, p.92), 'The EAEU can be seen as a commitment device, which precludes smaller states from signing association agreements with the EU', which Russia sees 'as a risk to its influence on the neighbouring countries of Eurasia'. In this regard, the EU's attempt to integrate

Ukraine into a partnership was incredibly frustrating to Putin. The Maidan in 2014 for Kyiv signalled integration with the West, and Putin's subsequent annexation of Crimea aggravated the regional order and was a direct challenge to Nazarbayev's Eurasian integration project. Vinokurov (2016), on the other hand, argues that Kazakhstan wants to become a 'power broker' in relations between Russia and China and make money on it. So far, he has succeeded so well that he even arouses admiration' (quoted in Bukeeva, 2016). Indeed, as has been shown in Chapter 1, the relationship with major powers is crucial in Nazarbayev's multivector foreign policy. In 2013, the Chinese premier Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and made statements about the One Belt One Road initiative. Nazarbayev welcomed this with the suggestion to join the Nurly Zhol state program with the Chinese initiative (Pieper, 2021). However, it is essential to point out that in scenarios one and two, China's role is absent since the EAU project was addressed only to post-Soviet republics, and even since 2000, China's role was not evident in the Eurasian integration project. China emerges only in the context of what Nazarbayev emphasises as greater Eurasia and the role of third states in their relationship with the EAUE. It is shown in the statement below made by Nazarbayev (2015) while speaking at the UN at the Summit on Sustainable Development: 'It is time to rally around the idea of Greater Eurasia, which will unite the Eurasian Economic Union, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the European Union into a single integration project of the 21st century'. On the following occasion, Nazarbayev, during the fifth meeting of the Astana Club on 13th November 2019, stated that:

> Pragmatic cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union, the European Union, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the Belt and Road Initiative will give a powerful impetus to *the formation of Greater Eurasia* [emphasis added], stabilising the entire political space of the largest continent in the world. I consider this an unacceptable situation, when a full-fledged dialogue between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is still not achieved. (Nazarbayev, 2019)

Thus, China in Nazarbayev's Eurasian strategy appears only in its later development. While Nazarbayev was keen to include China, Nazarbayev's concern from the above statement concludes with dissatisfaction over the EU's attitude to the EAEU. The second point below makes clear the EU's position on the EAEU and the Russian role within it.

Second, Russia's geopolitical view has affected the internal situation of the EAEU since Russia's attempts to insert ideas have crossed the agreed line of strictly economic objectives. For instance, Kazakh officials emphasised not politicising the EAEU integration. Heller (2019, p.132) noticed that 'Kazakhstan thwarted Russian ambitions of moving towards a political union'. Laruelle et al. (2019, p.216) have also noted that '… since the launch of the EAEU, Astana has also sent clear signals regarding the limits of integration'. According to Libman (2017, p. 91), Kazakhstan 'clearly tries to avoid excessive Russian influence through the EAEU – this factor was crucial for the entire evolution of the post-Soviet regionalism'. It is important to understand then that the EAEU itself has been a source of power for Kazakhstan to balance Russia from within. The crucial example of how Kazakh officials balance Russian attempts to insert issues unrelated to agreed economic content indicates specific behaviours from within the EAEU.

As a reminder, while Nazarbayev highlighted economic integration in his project, he also considered political integration (Moscow speech). However, this consideration was in his initial 1994 EAU project, which Russia was then reluctant to accede to. However, unlike Yeltsin, Putin envisioned moving towards political integration between the EAEU member states, discomfiting Kazakhstan. Since Russia's conflict with the West began in 2014, balancing the politicisation of the integration from within has been a significant position of Kazakhstan. In 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Kazakhstan's visa-free regime for US citizens should be revisited and 'coordinated' with the EAEU. In response, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry spokesman Anuar Zhainakov made clear that 'EAEU is not a political alliance, but a group created to tackle economic issues ... When they outlined the agreement on the creation of the EAEU, member states agreed that issues related to national sovereignty be excluded from the group's competence' (RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, 2018). This statement from a Kazakh official reveals two important relations between core members of the EAEU. First, continued attempts from Russia to agitate for what has not been agreed in the first place. Second: explicit balancing of Russia on particular issues on the part of Kazakhstan. In another case, the chairman of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, Erbolat Dosaev, responded to speculation about the single currency:

> The idea was to create an economic union, not a monetary union. Therefore, I understand that this issue is being discussed specifically in different forms and is being presented to me and in different formats. I say: the creation of a single currency union

> and a single currency is not provided for in the agreement (on the harmonisation of the legislation of the EAEU member states). The National Bank, as a regulator today and in the future, together with the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market, leaves absolutely full powers to conduct monetary policy, ensure financial stability, take the necessary anti-crisis measures, and so on. (Dosaev, 2019)

This statement shows that the only tool to balance Russia is to refer back to the agreement on the core ideas of economic union. Kazakhstan's balancing against 'hooks' or tactics from the Russian side involves throwing ideas for joint programs and waiting for a reaction. This was evident during a meeting when President Tokaev critically stated the following:

> The proposal in the strategy for "harmonisation and unification" of legislation, in terms of establishing legal responsibility - administrative and criminal, in a number of industries, we are talking about customs, technical regulation, consumer protection, in our opinion, do not yet meet the principle of reasonable sufficiency. And this will lead to the rejection of the strategy by national public opinion since the strategy will limit the sovereign rights of governments and parliament. (Tokaev, 2020a)

This statement balances a particular issue and is against any attempts or ploys from Russia that could lead to political integration. How long this balancing may last depend on Russia's behaviour towards other regional states like Belarus and Ukraine. Their resistance or acceptance of Russia will put further pressure on Kazakhstan, and therefore, balancing may be exhausted as a strategy against the Russian objective of full political integration.

Conclusion

This first case chapter has offered an account of how order-making has been done with a proposed EAU initiative in the regional context. In section 5.3, I have shown how it has been done in three scenarios. Scenario one meant to bring all former soviet states into one EAU project, scenario two meant to shift from all-in-one to Core states instead, and the last 3dt scenario aimed to open the EAU to all outside. In section 5.4, all the scenarios were analysed to understand under what conditions these scenarios were possible. The first explanation emerges from *a lack of team dynamics* due to the domestic particularities and diverse foreign policy orientations of almost all CIS states; a trend for deeper integration within the CIS was

impossible. Thus, due to a lack of team dynamic, the CIS states could not form a typical attitude to further integration among CIS states. It, of course, could not sustain the CIS as an institution that must solve regional problems and unite all. The second explanation followed with *an absence of a Great Power*: the pattern of behaviour of the Russian Federation right after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not towards facilitating regional integration. Instead, Russia can be seen as a disruptor rather than an order maker. It was Russia's initial disintegration and withdrawal from agreements such as the CIS military command, the Rouble Zone, and the absence of any regional ideas that made further integration in the old spirit impossible. The third explanation is *the concept of core:* the core concept aimed to address the two problems of the lack of team dynamism and the absence of Great Power. The concept would facilitate the team dynamic with core states and compensate for the absence of a Great Power.

The next chapter explores Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear initiative to understand how order-making has been done in an international context.

Chapter 6. Anti-Nuclear Initiative and International Context

6.1. Introduction

This is the second case analysis of how order-making has been done with anti-nuclear initiatives at the international level. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left nuclear arsenal in three former republics, and Kazakhstan has been one that inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Kazakhstan's changing attitude to nuclear issues from within has been informed by changes first within the USSR when Soviet Kazakhstan challenged Moscow to close the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site on its soil. Second, change followed when the Soviet Union Collapsed and the issue of nuclear possession under common control was discussed, but it failed with the denuclearisation of post-independent Kazakhstan. The desire for security left Kazakhstan insecure; it followed an order from great powers to denuclearise and join the NPT. It shows Kazakhstan as an order taker rather than an order maker. However, the nuclear issue and its disarmament have become central in Kazakhstan's post-denuclearisation period. Its critical stance on the possession of nuclear weapons as 'abnormal' has been formulated in the nuclear disarmament initiative. This initiative was not to resist nuclear power or openly oppose the NPT, but instead, the initiative aimed to 'correct' the course of nuclear disarmament towards its end in international politics. This initiative coincided with the trend to review the NPT and question nuclear powers' lack of commitment to denuclearise, as written in Article 6 of the NPT. The nuclear disarmament issue, in general, has been a silent issue, and even scholars in IR ignored it. For instance, while it was silent in IR, small-state scholars also do not take the nuclear disarmament issue from a small-state perspective seriously (Long, 2022). Therefore, in this chapter, I trace Kazakhstan’s nuclear disarmament initiatives and show how order-making has been done. I scrutinise this initiative through the following sections. I first begin with precondition in section 6.2; I explore Kazakhstan’s denuclearisation as a trigger and cause for anti-nuclear behaviour after renouncing nuclear weapons to Russia and signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994. Its search for security by attempting to keep nuclear weapons turned into insecurity, but the search for security continued under a new international status as a non-nuclear weapon state. The following section 6.3 on the key documents will show and indicate the ‘abnormality’ of the possession of nuclear weapons and the ways to limit the presence of nuclear weapons. Next, in section 6.4, the anti-nuclear initiative will be analysed to provide further conceptual clarity on why such behaviour may occur and under what conditions. It will be analysed through the following analytical themes: positioning, moral right, actualisation and consistency.

6.2. Precondition: Denuclearisation of post-independent Kazakhstan

In 1991, Kazakhstan became a nuclear power by default because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, until signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 and becoming a non-nuclear state (Laumulin, 1994). It has been argued that Nazarbayev was reluctant to renounce the nuclear arsenal on Kazakhstan's territory (Ayazbekov, 2014). As Nazarbayev (2001, p. 42) himself had stated, he had a "devil's temptation regarding nuclear weaponry, despite contemporary actions such as the prohibition of nuclear tests included in the declaration of sovereignty in October 1990 (Adilet, 1990) and the closing of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site on August 1991 (Kassenova, 2011b). However, these were unimportant under a different calculation and excuses in Nazarbayev's thinking. He had the option to choose between so-called supporters and opponents within Kazakhstan, but their stance for or against nuclear weaponry was unclear. Nazarbayev (2001, p. 35) wrote, 'I noticed that there was still no clear and unconditional commitment to nuclear status'. However, taking some ideas from supporters, he was considering 'the preservation of a small number of nuclear weapons without their modernization and build-up, which the Republic of Kazakhstan, despite the unfavourable situation in the economy, could well afford' (Nazarbayev, 2001, p. 40). On the other hand, Nazarbayev (2001, p. 40) hypothesised that if Kazakhstan became a nuclear power, 'an unjustified nuclear status would inevitably lead to a negative attitude of the world community and international isolation due to the demonstration of a clear disregard for the principles of non-possession, non-proliferation and non-deployment, declared by the NPT', admitting that 'keeping Kazakhstan's atomic arsenal would torpedo the nuclear non-proliferation system that had been developing for decades and could have extremely negative consequences for the republic' (Nazarbayev, 2001, p. 42). It is an essential consideration that Nazarbayev made, but he avoided mentioning the pressure in the follow-up of nuclear disarmament that Russia and the US imposed at the end (Park and Chung, 2022). However, two denuclearisation processes were identified: the first, within the CIS framework, and the second, international through involving the US.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

The initial denuclearisation started with the procedure agreed upon during the Alma-Ata meeting on December 25, 1991 (CIS DOC1, 1991). It has eight articles that state the following: nuclear weapons provide collective security [Article 1]; the non-use of nuclear weapons first

[Article 2]; jointly develop nuclear policy [Article 3]; also, not to transfer nuclear weapons, and not to help, encourage or induce to production or to purchase of nuclear weapons [Paragraph 2, Article 5], and promote the elimination of nuclear weapons [Article 6]. However, there is also clarification for Belarus and Ukraine only on the decision on the need for their use (nuclear weapons) before the final elimination [Article 4] and that 'The Republic of Belarus, Ukraine undertake to accede to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states and to conclude an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA' [Article 5]. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, was mentioned only in Article 6 with Belarus and Ukraine, which states that 'By July 1, 1992, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine will ensure the export of tactical nuclear weapons to the central pre-factory bases for their dismantling under joint control' (CIS DOC1, 1991). Later agreement between the states of the CIS on strategic forces dated December 30 1991, indicates that CIS member states 'recognize the need for unified command of strategic forces and for maintaining unified control over nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction of the armed forces of the former USSR' [Article 3], 'Until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the decision on the need to use them is made by the President of the Russian Federation in agreement with the heads of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, in consultation with the heads of other member states of the Commonwealth' [Article 4], and adds 'The process of destruction of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine is carried out with the participation of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine under the joint control of the Commonwealth states' (CISDOC2, 1991). Thus, Nazarbayev had managed not to be obligated to be a party to NPT in Article 5 and secured unified control over the nuclear arsenal. In the process, however, Kazakhstan was challenged when the agreed paragraph on joint command of the nuclear arsenal under the CIS Joint Armed Forces later failed due to Russian opposition (Deyermond, 2008, p. 63). Moreover, the nuclear issue involved the US with its nuclear agenda. Thus, Kazakhstan faced extended denuclearisation outside of the CIS framework.

The United States

While the nuclear issue agreed upon with a clear path to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan within the CIS framework, the US followed through on its commitment to stop the emergence of any new nuclear powers and promote its non-proliferation agenda (Deyermood, 2008, p. 67). The US was concerned about Kazakhstan's stance on renouncing its nuclear

arsenal and ‘promise to transfer’ or pledge to join the NPT (Reiss 1996, pp.140-141). The reason behind this was Nazarbayev's statements, such as 'as long as Russia has nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan will too' (Ayazbekov, 2014, p. 10). In addition, the pledge to join NPT was avoided in the CIS agreement. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Kazakhstan twice to explain what denuclearisation means and what Kazakhstan can get in return (Ayazbekov, 2014, p. 10). Ultimately, The US applied denuclearization initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar program, also known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), to Kazakhstan (Rubinstein, 1997, p. 57). It has been in operation since 1994 and was ‘designed to reduce the potential threat and contribute to the disarmament of nuclear weapons on land and sea’ (Feshbach, 1997, p. 382). It has been praised by Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov, who stated that ‘in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar program adopted in 1994 by the US Congress, with the financial assistance of the American side, dozens of projects were implemented to eliminate the infrastructure of weapons of mass destruction in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (Idrisov, 2015a). Thus, Kazakhstan understood the inevitability of its path to a non-nuclear weapon state and worked to get at least something in return. Kazakhstan managed to receive in return the two substantial gains of security assurance after renouncing its nuclear arsenal and financial aid to clean up nuclear waste.

Security Assurance

The presence of nuclear powers indicates the inevitable path to non-nuclear status, and Nazarbayev felt this. He wrote:

> I rightly pointed out that if some powers did not want to complicate their foreign nuclear policy due to the emergence of another nuclear power, then they should have provided us with the appropriate arguments in favour of a nuclear-free status. And most importantly, confirm these arguments by providing formal nuclear safety assurances. (Nazarbayev, 2001, pp. 125-126)

Thus, the initial managed gain is the security guarantee. During the Budapest Summit in 1994, all nuclear powers provided security assurance to Kazakhstan and access to the international community in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal. It is a precedent in international relations where a state negotiates security guarantees in exchange for renouncing its nuclear capability. As a condition, Kazakhstan fulfilled the requirements of nuclear powers and, thus,

following the request, committed to denuclearisation and joining the NPT as a non-nuclear state (Yost, 2015). In the following managed gain, Kazakhstan indeed negotiated to receive $70 million to dismantle its SS-18 silos and another $14 million to ensure the safety of the weapon (Brown, 1995, p. 242). In total, according to the US Ambassador to Kazakhstan, William Moser, the US spent over $840 million on nuclear non-proliferation issues in Kazakhstan (Aben, 2019a). But, the importance of the security guarantee was later shown by the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine to be only on paper (Allison, 2014; Yost, 2015). It was a clear violation of the Budapest agreements. The memorandum contains a commitment from Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. to the 'territorial integrity and 'existing borders' of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Yost 2015, p.506). However, it was a breach of commitments by the nuclear power signatories. While Russia violated the agreement, the other guarantees, such as the U.S., understood the agreement's content differently, and here is the problem with the Budapest memorandum itself. According to Pifer (2019), 'the Budapest Memorandum contains security 'assurances' not 'guarantees', and explains this as if it was a guarantee then the commitment of American military force would be on offer, but the US officials refrained from doing this. In addition, the document does not contain consequences for violating the Memorandum and no defence obligations (Budjeryn and Bunn, 2020). Moreover, it was not legally binding, and, in the end, this led to vulnerability rather than security in Kazakhstan (Temnychy, 2022). The consequence was understood by Ukrainian diplomat Andriy Melnyk, who warned that 'Kyiv may be forced to acquire nuclear weapons to safeguard the country's security if NATO does not accede to its membership demand amid spiralling tensions with neighbouring Russia' (Aljazeera, 2021). Nazarbayev, who made fun of his security advisors in his 'Epicentre of Peace' (Nazarbayev, 2001), might reconsider their predictions and posture on options to keep the nuclear arsenal in light of the current Russia and Ukraine crisis.

To summarise, since the emergence of the nuclear issue, Kazakhstan has been under the strong impact of the external structure of the complex international system of nuclear order, which was designed not to allow any state to emerge as a nuclear state. The denuclearisation of Kazakhstan was during what Walker (2000, p. 710) defined as a golden age of nuclear threat reduction between 1986 and 1995 when Gorbachev and the Reagan administration sought a nuclear reduction from both sides. Therefore, the entire negotiation period was not meant to be according to Kazakhstan's desire, but in fact, according to internationally agreed procedures of nuclear prevention and commitment afterwards. The case of Kazakhstan is unique because history has not seen the fall of a nuclear Great Power and the emergence of new nuclear states

after its dissolution. Thus, in the face of nuclear Great Powers, Kazakhstan has been seen as a small state with no power to hold and keep nuclear weapons but must follow orders from Great Powers. These are the conditions that have been applied to Kazakhstan, and no other issues close to allowing Kazakhstan to keep nuclear arms have been involved in the negotiation period. Complete disarmament and denuclearisation have been the agenda of the Great Powers on the negotiation table with Kazakhstan. Thus, Kazakhstan was disarmed because it faced a structurally complex nuclear order that originated during the Cold War and has been constructed against the emergence of other nuclear states. No matter how Nazarbayev tells his story of deciding to end its nuclear status, the one crucial and obvious factor was and still is the international nuclear order. However, under the new status of non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), Kazakhstan utilised its tragic past and denuclearisation experience to develop and pursue its nuclear policy within the NPT while committing to it. However, after denuclearisation, Kazakhstan was caught by events characterised by disorder rather than order-based ideas prevailing during the earlier 'Golden Age' of non-proliferation (Walker 2000, p.712). Kazakhstan, thus, was not the cause of that disorder but rather a state that intended to use the NPT regime and the UN to address the threat of nuclear weapons and to abolish them. How Kazakhstan aimed to achieve this is in the following section.

6.3. Kazakhstan as Order-Maker

This section proceeds further to present order-making initiatives in documents. The central theme is that the entire NPT regime is built on the view that it is normal to have a nuclear weapon for those who possess it but not normal for others. It reflects abnormalities favouring nuclear weapons states but not for Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear stand. The peculiarity of Kazakhstan's behaviour in order-making is that if the NPT limits Kazakhstan in possession of nuclear weapons, then it does not limit Kazakhstan in discussing nuclear issues and promoting the ideas of a world without nuclear weapons. Of course, this does not correspond to the interests of nuclear powers since the less they talk about a nuclear-free world, the better they are at maintaining the taboo on nuclear issues. However, Kazakhstan openly expresses the idea of a nuclear-free world in key documents I demonstrate below.

Epicentre of Peace: NPT and Problem Statement

The concern on nuclear issues has been developed and expressed by Nazarbayev in his book, The Epicentre of Peace, which asserts that after the tragic experience of its nuclear past and

renouncing of a nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan is a land of peace rather than war (Nazarbayev, 2001). It was published in 2001 and covers Kazakhstan's history of disarmament, showing core problems with the NPT and critiquing nuclear-armed states in international security. While the first of its two significant chapters account for Kazakhstan's path to a nonnuclear future, the second is on the nuclear issue in the new reality. Nazarbayev made two conclusions about the 1995 NPT review conference, which ended with the indefinite expansion of NPT. However, according to Nazarbayev, it revealed problems and issues that have not been resolved in the last 30 years. The targets are nuclear powers and NPT in general. On page 231, Nazarbayev (2001) summarises: 'Nuclear powers are not going to give up the possession of nuclear weapons and move towards their real destruction' and they, 'are not going to continue to give any clear and clear guarantees of the national security of non-nuclear states' and moreover, 'nuclear powers did not initiate any specific policy measures in relation to non-NPT signatories'. But they 'are going to use atomic weapons as a convincing argument in international issues and problems.' In fact, 'the nuclear states have thereby demonstrated a clear discriminatory policy towards states that are conscientious parties to the [NPT] Treaty that are not nuclear states' and 'being parties to the Treaty, remained presenting to themselves in the face of a possible nuclear threat from some newly emerging regional nuclear power.' After all, 'the NPT gives non-nuclear states guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against them only from the nuclear states parties to the [NPT] Treaty'. In general, 'the nuclear countries intend thereby to completely exclude non-nuclear countries from the negotiation process, finally assuming the role of extras watching the formation of new parities and the endless disarmament process without any guarantees of a constructive and successful completion of the negotiation processes.' At the end, 'Non-nuclear countries were asked not to interfere in the outlined new redistribution of the world on the basis of nuclear argumentation and in the process of nuclear rearmament at a higher quality level'.

The above suggests the following assessment concerning the universality of the NPT, non-proliferation, and disarmament. First, according to Nazarbayev (2001, pp.233-237), 'The universality of the NPT has not yet been achieved'. This is due to countries such as Israel, India, Pakistan and Cuba being non-signatories of the NPT. It is hard to speak about universality when five nuclear states are not restricted to sharing nuclear weapons while the other three nuclear powers are free to share nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is not about universality but parities, meaning that 'one-half of the nuclear powers participate in the non-proliferation regime, the other half of the nuclear countries do not participate in the regulated non-

proliferation process'. Second, Nazarbayev, on non-proliferation, asked whether significant progress was made in this direction over the past 30 years, and he responded that not. Nuclear weapons were spreading and continue to spread. The marks of nuclear weapons, according to the text, can be 'found all over the world in the form of additional possession and intention to possess and reached alarming proportions.' Third, 'the process of disarmament did not take place. Only the limitation of nuclear weapons development took place.' Ultimately, during the NPT's activity, 'the world did not disarm'. Considering the critical perspective on the 1995 NPT review conference from the text, it is clear that Kazakhstan understands the entire NPT issue area with its limitations and problems. The assessment in the book found its place in Kazakhstan's foreign policy towards the non-proliferation regime. Since Nazarbayev is the only decision-maker according to the constitution, his vision and view on the nuclear issue are expressed in Kazakhstan's nuclear diplomacy. The following statement is also indicative, 'renunciation of war and nuclear weapons would be an act of supreme wisdom of humanity in the 21st century' (Nazarbayev, 2017a). This statement was not only directed to nuclear powers and the international community but also presented a clear task for Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Thus, Nazarbayev set the path and tone for active engagement within the non-proliferation regime. Table 7 below shows how the nuclear issue is important in foreign policy documents.

Table 7. Nuclear issue in foreign policy statements

'It must be recognized that the NPT has become an asymmetric agreement. ... Sanctions only against non-nuclear states. .... Nuclear Powers ... becoming an example ... is not happening. Such injustice is an incentive for states .... '(Nazarbayev, 2001).
'…. the international nuclear security system, focused on the global confrontation of nuclear powers, is malfunctioning and is not able to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons' (Nazarbayev, 2001a, p. 148).
'It seems to me that in order to ensure global security, we must move along the path of complete nuclear disarmament, given that this type of weapon, like any other weapon of mass destruction, poses a direct threat to humanity' (Nazarbayev, 2006, p. 156).
'At present, none of the countries belonging to the club of nuclear powers expresses a firm desire to completely abandon nuclear weapons and does not propose to start negotiations on this issue' (Nazarbayev, 2006, p. 156).

Continued on the next page

‘The state of affairs in the sphere of non-proliferation is far from ideal, the hopes placed on it are unjustified, since it is asymmetric, assuming sanctions only to non-nuclear states. it does not contain clear-cut schemes of the IAEA and the UN response to the facts of states' evasion from access to nuclear facilities. All these circumstances only reduce the effectiveness and operation of the Treaty’ (Nazarbayev, 2010, p. 255).
‘At the same time, we are strongly convinced that the nuclear powers should not be left out of the disarmament process. They must demonstrate an example of goodwill by taking a more proactive position towards elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT’ (Statement, 2020).

Table 7 shows that documents touched on core issues within the non-proliferation regime. They revealed a core problem within the nuclear issue area in general. It also shows a clear indication of what Kazakhstan’s nuclear diplomacy is targeting. Thus, the context of the documents listed above is not threatening but aims to correct some aspects of the NPT regime that have been missed and not considered since its creation in 1968. From critique to practical implementation, the United Nations (UN) has become a platform where Kazakhstan has exercised its nuclear diplomacy within the non-proliferation regime. Thus, Kazakhstan did not limit itself to a commitment of obedience to the NPT without its criticism but was also keen to offer order-making initiatives for the effectiveness of the global nuclear order. However, Kazakhstan understands that order cannot be achieved by rhetoric only, and therefore, Kazakhstan utilises the UN and the UN Security Council. The evidence for this is in the two following documents below that have received the status of an official UN document (Shaukenova, 2018).

Manifest Peace: XXI century

In 2016, Kazakhstan participated in the 4th Nuclear Summit in Washington, D.C. Nazarbayev made the following statement:

> The discovery of the energy of atomic fission was a fruit of human genius. But using this discovery for military purposes is the result of the artful carelessness of people. We have a chance *to correct this mistake of the 20th century* [emphasis added]. (Nazarbayev, 2016a)

The manifesto comes during the summit, where Nazarbayev stated, 'I am proposing to adopt a comprehensive program 21st Century: A World Without War' (Manifesto, 2016). As Shaukenova (2018) explains, 'Its essence is to use the historical chance that we have - to start global demilitarisation'. According to Nazarbayev (Manifesto, 2016), this document should contain three principles of understanding as '… no winners in any modern war, … war will inevitably entail the use of WMD. ... peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations based on equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-interference into domestic affairs' as a tool in interstate disputes. In the document, he proposes the following five actions (A) in table 8 below.

Table 8. Five Actions from Kazakhstan

A1: 'gradual progress to a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction'
A2: 'build on and expand existing geographical initiatives to gradually eliminate war as a way of life'
A3: 'it is necessary to eliminate such relics of the Cold War as military blocs, which threaten global security and impede broader international cooperation'
A4: 'it is important to adapt the international disarmament process to the new historic conditions'
A5: 'a world without war requires primarily fair global competition in international trade, finance, and development'

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures

The following document, the 'Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures', was first presented during Kazakhstan's chairmanship as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Shaukenova, 2018). It gave Kazakhstan another opportunity to deliver its order-making intention and again propose the understanding and actions needed to bring order in the nuclear issue area. During the UN Security Council meeting, Nazarbayev (2017b) pointed out that 'the much-needed strengthening of the non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires profound mental changes, new multilateral political decisions.' According to Nazarbayev (2017b), 'confidence-building measures aimed at achieving the goals of peace and security play a key role in preventing conflicts and solving pressing global problems.' Nazarbayev (2017b) explains that 'confidence-building measures should remain on the agenda as an

essential element of maintaining the global security architecture and strengthening peace on a global scale'. Confidence-building, according to Nazarbayev, is important for the following reasons:

> confidence-building measures justified themselves in the process of preventing the threat of total destruction in the second half of the 20th century; … an atmosphere of mutual trust can contribute to the formation of a new model of international cooperation; Kazakhstan's nuclear-free path can become an example and serve as a practical guide for other countries; …. the current possibilities of scientific and technological progress and the realities of globalisation make the task of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a matter of human survival. (Nazarbayev, 2017b)

Table 9 below proposes the following measures (M) from the document to build confidence in the non-proliferation issue area.

Table 9. confidence-building measures

the need to complicate the withdrawal from the NPT
develop a really working mechanism for the application of tough measures against the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
The success or failure of the process of modernising the global security system directly depends on the ability of the world community to overcome militaristic anachronisms
return political trust and systemic dialogue to international life
consider the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons as one of the most effective means in combating the proliferation of WMD
there is a risk of a new wave of an arms race using scientific advances

Source: Nazarbayev, (2017b).

In the document, President Nazarbayev makes concluding remarks such as 'many conflicts can be prevented and effectively resolved if there is mutual understanding and mutual trust between the world's nuclear powers.' However, according to Nazarbayev (2017b), 'this does not mean that other countries should remain on the side-line, that little depends on them'. The confidence-building idea, for instance, has found its practical implementation in the Asian continent. In 1991, during a UN speech, Nazarbayev proposed a Conference on Interaction and

Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) security model. 'The Doctrine of Trust', as Nazarbayev states in the speech, has been formulated in the Declaration dated back to 1999 during a meeting of foreign ministers of participating states of the CICA in Almaty and laid down the following principles:

> respect for the sovereignty and rights of the participating States, preservation of territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, renunciation of the use of force, disarmament and arms control, cooperation in the social, trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres, respect for fundamental rights of a person in accordance with the principles of the UN and international law. (Nazarbayev, 2001a, p. 153)

The significance of the idea is that it brought three nuclear powers together in the framework of the CICA, an achievement that other great powers could not come up with an idea to bring these two Asian nuclear powers together with the CICA framework. It, at least, makes it possible to control the Asian nuclear powers outside the NPT.

In sum, this section showed the elements of order-making, so the Epicentre of Peace touches on nuclear issues and sets the pace and tasks for order-making in this area for Kazakhstan's nuclear diplomacy. The Manifesto, in turn, calls for correcting the mistake of the 20th century by introducing the idea of a world without nuclear weapons into the strategic thinking of nuclear powers. Meanwhile, the document "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures" brings order through confidence-building measures, which is essentially absent between nuclear powers.

6.4. Nuclear Issue Analysis

The above actions in the form of promoting the ideas of a world without nuclear weapons violate the very order, the so-called taboo and the normality of the presence of nuclear weapons in world politics. Below, I will delve further into the features - the cores that give Kazakhstan confidence in order-making, such as positioning against the presence of nuclear weapons, reference to moral right, actualization of the ideas of a nuclear-free world and, accordingly, it corresponds to and consistent with the dynamics where small states are increasingly persistently raising the issue of a complete ban on nuclear weapons in international politics.

6.4.1. Positioning

Kazakhstan experienced a deliberate denuclearisation and became a non-nuclear state by joining the NPT regime. The status has not been wasted but has added dimension to Kazakhstan's multivector foreign policy behaviour. Here is an essential indication from a Kazakhstani expert, Laumulin (1999, p. 155) stated that after 1995, 'Kazakhstan is moving into the stage of actively pursuing its line and forming its position on all major issues, in the first place - the fate of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. Indeed, its yearly record shows Kazakhstan's position on international security and disarmament in the 1990s. For instance, in a speech during a session on "New challenges and a new vision of the processes of disarmament and world security" at the UN conference on disarmament in Geneva on June 8th, 1995, Nazarbayev (1995a, p. 138) shared his analysis on disarmament and stated three problems of international security and disarmament. First, with a reference to the 1988 session on disarmament, Nazarbayev maintained that 'disarmament is not the exclusive responsibility of a few powerful countries, but a joint venture of all states.' According to Nazarbayev, this idea should be expanded and stated that 'the joint venture of all states is to build an effective global system of international security, and disarmament is one of the results of the work of such a 'global joint venture.' This statement is understood as having his own experience of nuclear disarmament after independence. Therefore, it should not be limited to small states like Kazakhstan but as a general framework involving powerful states. Concerning problems, Nazarbayev asked three questions: How effective are the existing international security systems and disarmament processes? What are the trends in the global conflict potential by the end of this century? And the problem of the participation of representatives of the Third World in the negotiations on disarmament. Nazarbayev (1995a, p. 142) then concludes with a specific focus on Eurasia:

> Analysis of security problems on the continent of Eurasia shows that Third World countries, or developing countries, should be included on an equal footing in all negotiation processes on disarmament. This will make it possible to get rid of the excessive ideologization of such processes inherent to big powers and may give a new vision of new challenges to international security and disarmament systems.

This statement of analysis was seemingly made on behalf of those non-nuclear NPT states in the international system. Kazakhstan, therefore, is not a separate and privileged state, but with those states that have not reached equality on the disarmament issue. Also, this statement marks a shift in position towards those in the Third World who demanded the denunciation of the

treaty or its change in the 1990s (Laumulin 1999, p.156), since Kazakhstan was a supporter of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 (Laumulin 1999, p.156).

The Epicentre of Peace

Consequently, the problem of the NPT is shown in Nazarbayev's book, "Epicentre of Peace", which asserts that after the tragic experience of its nuclear past and renunciation of a nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan is a land of peace rather than war (Nazarbayev, 2001). It was published in 2001 and covers Kazakhstan's history of disarmament, showing core problems with the NPT and critiquing nuclear-armed states in international security. While the first of its two significant chapters account for Kazakhstan's path to a nonnuclear future, the second is on the nuclear issue in the new reality. Nazarbayev made two conclusions in relation to the 1995 NPT review conference which ended with the indefinite expansion of NPT, although according to Nazarbayev, it revealed problems and issues that have not been resolved in the last 30 years. The targets are nuclear powers and NPT in general. Nazarbayev also touched on the strategic deterrence. In 2001, during a speech presented at the Institute of International Relations in Oslo on April 3, Nazarbayev (2001a, p. 152) stated the following:

> The principle of strategic deterrence based on nuclear forces can no longer serve as a guarantee of international security. Now critical military potential, including nuclear, is concentrated in more and more countries of the world. There is a high risk that weapons of mass destruction may no longer act as a limiter, but as a catalyst for conflicts. In these conditions, the principle of expanding trust between states should become the most important aspect of ensuring international security. It is the principle of trust that should replace the principle of military deterrence, which still prevails in the conflict regions.

The post-Nazarbayev President of Kazakhstan, Tokaev, has continued the line and stated that 'we stem from the firm conviction that nuclear weapons are no longer an asset but a danger to global peace and stability' (Tokaev, 2019). Tokaev (Mamysh, 2019) even went further and stated during the Valdai meeting in Russia that:

> the possession of nuclear weapons in the modern world is not a guarantee of security and especially economic prosperity. Sometimes it is better not to have nuclear weapons, but on the other hand, to attract more investment in its economy, to maintain and develop good, peaceful relations, which Kazakhstan does in practice.

In addition, the UN, has also been criticised. For instance, Nazarbayev (2006a, p. 249) stated, 'in recent years we saw that as agreements within the UN framework aimed at nuclear containment, non-proliferation and non-production of nuclear materials were not successful'. He continued, 'According to existing agreements in the world today some are allowed to have weapons and even modernise them, while others are forbidden from having them or even developing them. That is incorrect, disproportionate and unfair'. He concludes that 'within the UN, the covenant must be reviewed with a new view for global actions and responsibility of all countries, primarily nuclear ones, in terms of reducing nuclear weapons and gradual elimination of them'. Such open criticism is also from the position of being a non-nuclear weapon state. The status of non-Nuclear Weapon State, in fact, has provided a legitimacy and position within the NPT and at the UN system. In addition to its position in regard to nuclear problems and legitimacy provided by the NPT status, Kazakhstan has also developed its 'moral power' based on three claims.

6.4.3. Moral Right

The denuclearisation of Kazakhstan has been successfully implemented from outside. However, internal consideration of the tragic nuclear past with an emphasis on three claims, such as the closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS), renouncing nuclear weapons and becoming an NPT signatory, was skilfully used as a solid base for the position of Kazakhstan within the NPT regime and advance its nuclear diplomacy by turning the negative past to its positive future (Kassenova, 2014). Kazakhstan's emphasis on the consequences of the nuclear tests provided a form of leverage with others to claim a total elimination of nuclear weapons. On that basis, Kazakhstan claimed its moral right to speak out for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. When Kazakhstan bases its claim on those experiences, it is hard to deny and not easy to reject by the international community. Therefore, a moral right based on three claims lifts Kazakhstan over the nuclear disarmament issue.

The right to speak out about the tragedy of the nuclear past has not been restricted or censored by the NPT system. Therefore, Nazarbayev's message to nuclear states and the international community always started with the fact of three past accomplishments (closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS), renouncing nuclear weapons and becoming an NPT signatory), which gave Kazakhstan the right to express its opinion, as made evident by Nazarbayev:

> The aggregate yield of nuclear arsenals on the planet is 113,000 times higher than the bombs thrown on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, Kazakhstan, as you know, which suffered severely from nuclear weapon tests and decided to close its nuclear testing site and renounce its nuclear arsenal, has a moral right for this and it constantly stands for reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons. (2016b)

Certainly, the emphasis on the moral right gave Kazakhstan a voice to speak critically on issues such as this: on the responsibilities of the nuclear powers, on the ineffectiveness of the NPT, on the nuclear powers' gains with the indefinite expansion of NPT since 1995, on the fact that the Great Powers intended to secure the right to continue possession of nuclear weapons but not to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, on the fact that nuclear weapons are a threat and deterrence needs to be replaced with trust and confidence, that the universality of the NPT has not been reached, that non-proliferation has not been successful in the area of disarmament, that disarmament has not been even reached in the 30 years of NPT existence (Nazarbayev, 2001, pp.233 -236). In addition, Nazarbayev observed that 'the problem of general and global disarmament will be solved if and only if it will be solved not by the owners of nuclear weapons, but by the international community of all - both nuclear and non-nuclear states' (Nazarbayev, 2006a, p.251).

International Community

The non-nuclear community heard the voice of Kazakhstan. As Nazarbayev indicated in the book 'Epicentre of Peace', Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the international community, and these like-minded states provided support. A team dynamic was evident when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to call August 29 a Day Against Nuclear Weapons Testing, proposed by Kazakhstan in 2009. In 2015, the same body adopted Resolution 70/75 entitled 'Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World', proposed by Kazakhstan and supported by 130 states (Zharylgapova, 2021). The Kazak Foreign Office 'worked hard from 2010 to 2015 with all interested parties to solidify the text of the declaration', which has been co-authored by 35 states (Orazgalieva, 2015). In addition, a nominee from Kazakhstan, Director General of the National Nuclear Centre of Kazakhstan, Erlan Batyrbayev, has been elected as chairman of the Working Group B of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), among

other candidates such as Norway and Portugal (Kuandyk, 2021). For instance, on February 14, 2007, the Kazakhstan government approved a law "On Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan and the Preparatory Commission of the Organization for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" to develop five seismic monitoring stations in Kazakhstan. According to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Erzhan Kazykhanov, it showed effectiveness when a station in Makanchi transmitted data on Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 right to the headquarters of the Test Ban Treaty Organisation in Vienna (Kashkeeva, 2007). Thus, the positive side of the Soviet nuclear legacy is that Kazakhstan is part of the international seismic monitoring network for nuclear tests (Kazykhanov, 2011, p. 41). The example of enriched nuclear fuel would add to order-maker behaviour from the perspective of solving the problem within the non-proliferation regime. Erzhan Kaykhanov, an Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States of America, explained that 'one of the most significant practical implications of Kazakhstan's orchestrated efforts has been the establishment on its territory of a new $150 million facility—a reserve bank for low-enriched uranium (LEU) to discourage new countries from enriching nuclear fuel' (Kazykhanov, 2017). Nazarbayev (2016a) explains that 'it allows all countries wishing to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy to do so without violating the non-proliferation regime'. In this dynamic environment, Kazakhstan found a teammate in Japan with whom Kazakhstan co-chaired the 9th Conference on Assistance to the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2015. Erlan Idrisov, a Kazakhstan Foreign Minister, clarified that a common task in their teamwork was that 'Kazakhstan and Japan, as states that have suffered from the use and testing of nuclear weapons, intend to make serious efforts to achieve tangible progress on its entry into force, which, as you know, requires its signing and ratification by eight more states' (Idrisov, 2015). Nonetheless, this team dynamic helped to clarify Nazarbayev's anti-nuclear initiative and elaborate the general trend of questioning nuclear powers' responsibility and ending the possession of nuclear arms. Thus, a moral right with three claims has cemented Kazakhstan's position and legitimacy within the nuclear issue area; in addition, the correction initiatives in the form of 'actualisation' of the nuclear threat have been added to anti-nuclear behaviour.

6.4.4. Actualisation

The way Nazarbayev approached this task was mainly through the actualisation of the issue. From critique to practical implementation of his thoughts on the nuclear issue, the United Nations (UN) has been utilised as a platform where Kazakhstan has exercised its nuclear

diplomacy within the non-proliferation regime. The UN as a platform has been effectively used by Kazakh officials to remind others about the nuclear issue. On December 7, 2015, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, proposed by Kazakhstan. According to Shaukenova, 'The Universal Declaration to Achieve a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World calls for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use' (Shaukenova, 2020).

It has been evident through clear anti-nuclear messages such as the conference titled "The 21st Century, towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons" (Nazarbayev, 2001b, p.232); through published articles like 'Global Peace and Nuclear Security' (Nazarbayev, 2010, p.255); the conference of the 'Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism' (Akorda, 2010); the international forum 'For a nuclear-free world' (Zakon, 2011), the International Conference 'From Banning Nuclear Testing to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Akorda, 2012a), the International Conference on 'Building a world without nuclear weapons' on 29 August 2016 (Nazarbayev, 2016); the international platform 'the Global Alliance of Leaders for Nuclear Security and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons' (Tuleubayeva, 2019) and even the Nuclear-Free World photo exhibition in Seoul (Kumar, 2021). The above is not the only way of actualisation; the project ATOM (reads: Abolish Testing, Our Mission) has been a tool as well.

Kazakhstan developed an idea for the ATOM Project, which was introduced in 2012. This project is in addition to the correction and critical review of the entire non-proliferation issue that Kazakhstan aims to demonstrate to nuclear powers about the consequences of nuclear weapons. This project also adds to the humanitarian aspect of the campaign to free the world from nuclear weapons, and the ATOM project is designed for such a purpose. The project ATOM addresses the population to 'encourage the global community to speak out against nuclear weapons testing and, ultimately, against nuclear weapons' (Shaukenova, 2020). Shaukenova, an expert from Kazakhstan's think tank Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, explained the project idea thus: 'This is an international campaign to inform about the threats and consequences of nuclear weapons tests for the environment and humans, about the documented catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons tests … in Kazakhstan between 1949 and 1991' (Shaukenova, 2020). Experts (Kushkumbayev, 2020) from Kazakhstan's think tank believe that:

> There will be no winners in today's global war, and this threat must be eliminated. In fact, any conflict may eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons and everything will

end in mass suicide. Therefore, nuclear disarmament is the benchmark towards which modern politics should be directed.

The core of the project, however, is Karipbek Kuyukov, who led the project as an honorary ambassador and presented himself as a victim of nuclear tests in the Semipalatinsk region. He was born without hands but became a great artist. From childhood, he learned how to paint by holding a brush with his teeth or toes (Krastev, 2017). He shows the horrors of the Soviet past through painting, and August 29th was used as an opportunity to showcase and remind the world of the consequences of nuclear testing. His mission, supported by the Kazakhstan Minister of Foreign Affairs, is to promote the online petition and influence world leaders to ban nuclear testing (PNND, 2019). The actualisation of the nuclear threat and its consequences are compatible with the general trend of making nuclear weapons illegal. It is consistent with other non-nuclear NPT member states' initiatives in the following section.

6.4.5. Consistency

A recent dynamic can be seen in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on July 7, 2017, adding to the argument that 'nuclear weapons use is inconsistent with international humanitarian law' (Gibbons, 2019). It is an evident evolution within non-nuclear NPT states towards shifting the issue from small states to nuclear powers that took a privileged position to control the system and subordinate others (Craig and Ruzicka, 2013, pp.329-348). What is interesting is that it is a movement outside of the NPT (Nielsen, 2019, p.44; Dhanapala and Ruaf, 2017, p.2). This has been a result of the neglect of the humanitarian aspects of the UN (Nielsen 2019, p.38). As Ritchie and Kment (2021, p.72) describe, 'The TPNW and the humanitarian initiative emerged in response to the permanence of nuclear weapons in global politics, the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and the systemic risk of nuclear war this entails.' All this relates to the NWS's posture and commitment to the NPT agreements. According to Nielsen (2019, p.38), 'Many NPT non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain frustrated that the NPT has been unable to move the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) more quickly towards disarmament'.

They are right regarding the question of what was promised yearly in the 1970s and inserted into the document of NPT with the specific article VI wherein nuclear powers undertake nuclear disarmament (Craig and Ruzicka, 2013, p.330). Nuclear powers have not fulfilled this promise, and it does not satisfy the non-nuclear weapon states. Frustration may further develop since their reliance on nuclear weapons influenced the acquisition of nuclear

weapons by so-called ‘rogue states’ (Iraq, Iran, and N. Korea) (Hanson, 2022, p.87). Apart from these states, the U.S. itself is a concern, as the U.S. stations its nuclear weapons in the following ‘host’ states: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey (ICAN, 2022). In addition, there are also ‘progressive’ states among 20 NATO member states and so-called umbrella states (Austria, Finland, Japan and South Korea) (Nielsen, 2019, p.49). Therefore, the aim of the humanitarian initiative (HI) is ‘to shift the dominant discourse of nuclear weapons policy from one of state security and defence considerations to one of human security’ (Nielsen, 2019, p.39). Key drivers of the initiatives, such as Austria, Mexico and Norway, have advocated this alternative and side-lined approach. Each of these hosted international conferences to address the humanitarian issue in the nuclear issue area (Nielsen, 2019, p.39). The NWS, on their side, chose to ‘dismiss the humanitarian initiative’ (Nielsen, 2019, p.44) and even sent a message that ‘the United States calls on all states to reject unrealistic efforts to ban nuclear weapons’ (Nielsen, 2019, p.55). Their opposition to the HI (Dhanapala and Rauf, 2017, p.2) and further boycotting of the Oslo (Norway 2013) and Nayarit (Mexico 2014) conferences has demonstrated and led to the conclusion that ‘these states lost an opportunity to exercise constructive diplomacy and be seen as willing partners in a commitment to pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons’ (Nielsen, 2019, pp.44-48). Indeed, the initiative has been supported, and as a result, 127 countries adopted support for banning nuclear weapons (Nielsen, 2019, p.46).

Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear initiatives are compatible with Humanitarian Initiatives and support the TPNW. Kazakhstan was among 50 states when the Treaty entered into force on 22 January 2021 (ICAN, 2022a). Maitree (2019, p.9), for instance, pointed out Kazakhstan's hesitation with the signature of the Humanitarian pledge but also interpreted this through Kazakhstan's preference for consensus building, working with the UN and NWS, and its security arrangement with Russia. However, despite its security consideration with Russia, Kazakhstan's voting pattern shows disagreement with Russia when it comes to disarmament resolutions (Hansen, 2020, p.303), and was not an obstacle for Kazakhstan to sign and ratify the TPNW (Maitree, 2019, p.9). Japan's posture, for instance, Kazakhstan's soulmate, is nuanced by the relationship it has with the United States. Japan did not sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and was under US pressure not to do so (Barron *et al*., 2020, p.300).

Again, Kazakhstan, in contrast, while also sharing security relations with Russia as a member of the CSTO, was not deterred from signing the TPNW and ratifying it as quickly as

possible. This is important to consider in relation to Japan. Accordingly, as has been stated by Kazakh officials, 'As a country that has experienced all the disastrous consequences of nuclear explosions, we have fully supported the humanitarian pledge' (Sembayev, 2016). Thus, Kazakhstan's antinuclear policy adds to this recent evolution of correcting the course of non-proliferation towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As has been observed, the abolition of nuclear weapons is not the only concern of the Third World states, and Western countries are also joining with the same demand (Dhanapala and Rauf, 2017). However, NATO member states and even neighbouring Central Asian countries are reluctant and have no intention of correcting the course of the nuclear issue to its total absence (ICAN, 2023). While their relationship with the US conditions the former, the latter is also conditioned by their relationship with major nuclear states. This is important and highlights what it means to be an issue-corrector compared to them. Therefore, Kazakhstan's success was influenced by the team dynamic of those who sought to correct the course of nuclear weapons presence to its total absence. Thus, table 10 below shows the distinction between Kazakhstan's initial pattern of order-taker behaviour and order-maker initiatives since becoming a non-nuclear state.

Table 10: Order Making Initiatives

Order Taker of the Global Nuclear Order	Order Maker Initiatives
Signing the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms on 23 May 1992 14 February 1994, submitted documents on the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 5th December 1994, in Budapest, security assurance for Kazakhstan	Manifesto. The World. The 21st Century Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures G-Global Initiatives Conference organisation on nuclear issue ATOM project The International Day Against Nuclear Tests LEU Bank Central Asian Nuclear Free World CICA

The first column in Table 10 above intends to summarise that the entire 1990s was a period of yearly negotiation and complete denuclearisation of Kazakhstan by the end of 1999. The

second column summarises that since becoming a non-nuclear state, Kazakhstan's foreign policy towards the nuclear issue has shifted to a clear anti-nuclear policy. Here is the question: in what way these anti-nuclear initiatives have been done? This policy has not meant challenging the NWS but correcting the course of denuclearisation towards its complete elimination. It illustrates the key documents that tell the following: first, documents focusing on the nuclear issue area; second, the content addressing problems and the ways to correct the major international problem of nuclear weapons toward its total elimination. Thus, it does this in the form of correction since Kazakhstan did not challenge the NPT, unlike Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, but committed to NNWS status and acted from within rather than outside. In addition, Kazakhstan did not challenge nuclear weapon states (NWS). However, it accommodated them as a strategic partner in its multi-vector foreign policy instead while applying moral pressure around having nuclear weapons. Moreover, the evident team dynamic has also been a crucial factor in choosing the side of the majority (non-nuclear NPT member states) over the limited number of nuclear weapon states (NWS). Thus, the following inference is that the above actions to restore order occur carefully and tactfully. Kazakhstan adheres to the understanding of great powers' existence and their strategic relationship. Thus, Kazakhstan relies on the status as a non-nuclear state and as a legalized status on which it stands, on the moral right to which it refers, on the constant actualization of the topic of a nuclear-free world and, of course, the relevance of the ideas of a nuclear-free world with the external dynamics, according to which the idea of a nuclear-free world is an international topic and is on the agenda in many states. Finally, the actions towards promoting the ideas of a world without nuclear weapons do not violate the nuclear order, but, on the contrary, turn it towards a parallel non-nuclear order in the formation of not nuclear powers but small states.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to prove how a small state like Kazakhstan behaves as an order maker in the nuclear issue area. The trigger behind this is the collapse of the USSR and the nuclear legacy that ended up in post-independent Kazakhstan. In section 6.2, I have shown Kazakhstan's attempts to maintain nuclear weapons within the CIS, but Russia's position did not allow this to happen. In addition, Russia's alliance with the United States further made this impossible. As a consequence, Kazakhstan renounced its nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, Kazakhstan has been a responsible order taker by following and accepting an order from the structural condition of the presence of nuclear states and the NPT. However, not possessing

nuclear weapons should also be applied to nuclear-weapon states. It is this position that Kazakhstan began to adhere to after joining the NPT. Thus, it legitimizes itself with the right to voice its opinions on nuclear issues. In section 6.3, I have explored the abnormality of the nuclear weapons presence within the nuclear issue area and showed how Kazakhstan addresses it and aims to solve the problem. Kazakhstan sought to solve the problem with one scenario, and it was about the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This pattern of behaviour I examined in section 6.4 to explore under what condition an anti-nuclear initiative has been possible. I have found that the first condition is *the presence of Great Powers.* This pattern has been predated by the presence of nuclear powers and the imposed denuclearisation of Kazakhstan during the 1990s. This should be considered as an additional factor that influenced Kazakhstan to renounce its nuclear arsenal and later shaped Kazakhstan's foreign policy behaviour towards a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the accommodation of nuclear power in its nuclear policy has also been utilised since Kazakhstan understood that the nuclear issue has to include nuclear states. Therefore, denuclearisation must be solved delicately, and correction must be done smartly with others (non-nuclear weapon states) and including nuclear powers (nuclear weapon states). The second condition I found is a *team dynamic:* Apart from the presence of nuclear weapon states, the presence of the non-nuclear weapon states is a crucial force that generates a team dynamic on the issue of nuclear disarmament within the NPT regime and outside. It has greatly helped Kazakhstan to insert itself into the NPT structure and engage in a way that does not challenge but corrects the course of the nuclear weapon's presence towards its illegal status.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

This inquiry explored how a small state like Kazakhstan can behave as an order maker and in what context by investigating two order-making initiatives, such as the EAU project and anti-nuclear policies. This study concludes that, first, a small state can behave as an order-maker in specific issue areas such as regional integration and nuclear disarmament. Second, a small state's order-making mainly takes the form of issue-correction; in Kazakhstan's case, by correcting the course of the regional integration and nuclear disarmament towards its intended purpose, the EAU initiative has corrected the course of regional integration towards a new regional organisation. In contrast, the anti-nuclear initiatives have corrected the course of nuclear weapon presence towards its abnormality. Third, order-making behaviour may occur in regional and international issue areas but under different conditions in a given context. Thus, unfavourable factors such as the lack of dynamics and the absence of great power in the regional context turned out to be accompanying indicators and favourable for order-making. In the international context, factors differ from the regional, but also unfavourable in the early 90s that led post-independent Kazakhstan to denuclearize. Later, however, also turned out to be favourable and played into the hands of Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the later period. In this concluding chapter, I first define the key findings relating to the research question and objectives in section 7.2. In the next section, 7.3, I lay out the study's contributions to knowledge and suggest ideas for future research in the final section, 7.4.

7.2. Key Findings

By objectives, the critical review of the small-state literature reveals a drastic change in small-state foreign policy behaviour. Once a pawn in the Cold War context, small states are powers in a new international environment. It led to the argument that order-making does not belong to great powers; in the new international context, great powers tend to invite and share responsibility with others, mainly with small states. A shared order-making is a feature in the post-Cold War international order; those who accept may inspired to take responsibility without challenging or opposing that order, or others aimed to challenge that order. Focusing on Kazakhstan, it showed that accepting a new order is a needed strategy and being within benefited post-independent Kazakhstan by first recognising the presence of great powers and second not challenging them, but at the same time conducting its agency in response to changes

after the collapse of the USSR and by taking actions to correct the course of the regional order towards a new regional organisational structure within the post-soviet regional context, and also by taking actions to correct the course of the nuclear weapons presence towards its abnormality (Chapter 5 and 6). By engaging with order-making initiatives of the EAU project and nuclear disarmament initiatives, I identified scenarios of how Kazakhstan aimed to order the disintegrated region and scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. It follows that order-making is no longer be considered as an area of great power privilege alone; the study shows the elements of an absence of great power and lack of control from the side of great powers in specific issue areas. Therefore, order-making is an enterprise open to small states, too. Thus, the key findings of the study are as follows:

The core to understanding Kazakhstan's activism in regional and international contexts is Kazakhstan's posture within both issue areas. First, in the regional context, Kazakhstan was not considered a regional concern or troublemaker. It had avoided civil war within Kazakhstan, border conflicts with neighbouring states, and secured domestic stability. All of this has provided incentives for order-making initiatives toward regional integration. In the area of nuclear issues, Kazakhstan was considered an 'international concern' in its early stages. However, the development of Kazakhstan to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) status was accompanied by this order-making incentive, too. Second, order-making incentives in both cases meant not to challenge the system but to find a middle approach of order correcting in the context of being unable to create or maintain order. Kazakhstan chose and proposed the EAU project not to challenge Russia and the CIS but to correct the course of regional integration towards a new regional project in which Russia eventually was involved. In the international context, the nuclear issue has also aimed to correct the course of nuclear disarmament towards its total elimination. Thus, the above condition allowed Kazakhstan to form its posture as an integrationist in the regional context and a nuclear advocate in the international context. Being a source of order or disorder is essential when considering a state's eligibility for order-maker behaviour. Thus, Kazakhstan was considered an order maker in both cases because, in contrast to others, it did not appear as a problematic state for the region and the international community. Moreover, the stability of the domestic system is behind the active order-making behaviour; it contributed to order-making by giving Kazakhstan authority to form attention and focus on external issues of regional integration and nuclear disarmament instead. Thus, this posture in both contexts gave Kazakhstan the characteristics of an order-maker towards specific regional and international issues.

In both cases, it was evident that the issue of reintegration and nuclear disarmament had been a central foreign policy focus and was the object of order-making initiatives. First, Nazarbayev demonstrated his knowledge of regional integration regarding other regional projects, specifically the European experience. Second, knowledge applied to the post-Soviet region reflected an understanding of the need to re-order the region with an alternative solution. In contrast to the international context, knowledge comes from Nazarbayev's experience during the deliberate denuclearisation of Kazakhstan in the 1990s. This experience profoundly impacted the acknowledgement of the external systemic pressure and its relative weakness in achieving Kazakhstan's interests. However, knowledge learned during disarmament is used to tackle a significant international problem: the presence of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Kazakhstan has approached the integration and nuclear disarmament issue by identifying the problem and solution regarding both issues. On the side of the problem, Nazarbayev's focus on problems in the region was an obvious concern to prevent the complete disintegration of economic links between former Soviet republics. In the international context, the obvious concern was the presence of a nuclear arsenal and its humanitarian consequences. Consequently, Kazakhstan tried to justify its order-making initiative for the EAU based on claims of objective necessity and problems shared by former republics despite some refusing to support the project. The same objective for order-making intentions on the nuclear issue was possible only when Kazakhstan gained non-nuclear status. This status legitimised Kazakhstan's standing on the nuclear issue with a later strategy to join others to tackle the major international problem of nuclear weapons.

The team dynamic of Soviet republics to acquire more power was instrumental in bringing the Soviet Union to its end. Indeed, the most remarkable change in 1986 led to the emergence of small states from within. As a result, a team dynamic of small states (Soviet Union republics) led the declining great power (USSR) to its final collapse. However, the team dynamics have not succeeded in the post-Soviet setting. As has been shown, Nazarbayev's regional project has not been supported due to various reasons within CIS member states that influenced the general trend for team dynamic, and Nazarbayev's calls for Russia to play the role of a great power were not feasible due to a weak Russia. On the nuclear issue area, Kazakhstan has been confronted by the presence of nuclear powers and their team dynamic, compared to a lack of team dynamism between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Only in 2000, when Kazakhstan approached regional integration with the core concept, did regional integration see a shift to a

team dynamic between the core states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, thereby replacing the absence of a great power.

In the end, promoting Eurasian integration has given Kazakhstan power over regional integration issues in the absence of great power and lack of team dynamics. Concerning the international context, Kazakhstan faced the presence of a great power. During its denuclearisation period, the great power brought Kazakhstan to its non-nuclear weapon state status. Consideration of the presence of the great power has continued in Kazakhstan's nuclear policy. However, engagement with them was open and not aggressively opposing; instead, concerning its previous experience of nuclear tragedy and having three claims, Kazakhstan made an appealing argument that nuclear weapon states could not refuse, providing Kazakhstan with power over the nuclear disarmament issue. The role of Russia in the region must be considered among the causes for the lack of support for integration and team dynamics since it has been given special status among others. However, it lacked an excellent power capability to lead and be an attractive pole for others. Therefore, the findings indicate the absence of a great power as an element that invites small states for order-making. Therefore, the concept of the core has been practical in conditions without great power and regional team dynamics. Concerning the international context, Kazakhstan faced the presence of a great power. During its denuclearisation period, the great power brought Kazakhstan to its non-nuclear weapon state status. Consideration of the presence of the great power has continued in Kazakhstan's nuclear policy. However, engagement with them was open and not aggressively opposing; instead, with a reference to its previous experience of nuclear tragedy, Kazakhstan made an appealing argument that nuclear weapon states could not refuse, providing Kazakhstan with power over the issue in both cases.

The project implementation of the EAU has placed Kazakhstan in the centre of Eurasian integration with Belarus and Russia as core states and started a team dynamic towards forming the institutions of the EEC, CU, SES and EAEU. Centrality and being a core state within the CU and EAU provided Kazakhstan with power inside the decision-making bodies to influence the path and correct the content of the Eurasian integration. This power over integration issue has been central to emphasising the economic direction only and resisting the politicisation of the EAEU from within. In the international context, the three arguments of closure, renouncing and joining NPT provided incentives to actualise the world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue has been on Kazakhstan's foreign policy agenda, and the constant emphasis on a nuclear-free world ensured Kazakhstan's joining with other non-nuclear states to correct the

central nuclear issues on a global scale. Most states that tackle nuclear weapons are collectively more prominent than the five official nuclear states. Therefore, power over the nuclear issue places Kazakhstan on the side of the global international community. The nuclear powers, conversely, are marginal and losing influence over nuclear disarmament issues.

The active engagement and mode of behaviour in both issue areas demonstrate a slight difference in how Kazakhstan wants to bring order. In the regional context, Kazakhstan intends to correct the course of regional integration towards a new organisational grouping, and this has been achieved with the idea of core states. Meanwhile, in the international context, Kazakhstan aimed to correct the specific issue of nuclear disarmament towards its total elimination, and this has been achieved through actualisation and working with others. Thus, Kazakhstan has behaved as an order maker in its capacity as a core member of the Eurasian integration process since 1994. In contrast, Kazakhstan's order-maker behaviour in the international context has been conditioned by general trends and collectivism of small states that suit Kazakhstan's objectives on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Otherwise, Kazakhstan could not stand up on this issue alone against nuclear states. Therefore, in both contexts, Kazakhstan's issue-corrector behaviour is conditioned by the team dynamic of small states (regional and international) and the absence of great power or their presence (regional and international). Therefore, recent activism on the nuclear issue is an ability given to a small state to correct the course of nuclear possession towards its total elimination.

Since Kazakhstan could ensure its position inside the decision-making system, it secured a position to balance power over a specific issue. It has been demonstrated by Kazakhstan’s resistance to politicised integration while committing to economic integration only. Hence, Kazakhstan balances Russia on the particular issue of political union; on the international scene, Kazakhstan has continued its indirect balancing of Russia and positions itself against its possession of nuclear arms.

Finally, this thesis began with a line that the role of small states in international relations has been thought of as one of deference to great powers. Within this view, great powers can create, maintain and dictate behaviour, while small states should follow their lead and be ‘takers’, not ‘makers’. However, the findings from the study indicate that small states can also be "makers". It brings us to the point that while small states lack power in material terms, they can develop other forms of power that can help them sustain their independence and even practise order-making. Kazakhstan has used 'power over issues' to reach its goals in a manner that reflects the 'correction' rather than opposition or challenge. The multivectorism of

Kazakhstan and FPI is a crucial example for those surrounded by major powers, as Kazakhstan's foreign policy has demonstrated a model of flexibility and recalibration. Thus, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives (FPI) show that Kazakhstan can behave as an order maker but in a specific issue area and the form of an issue-corrector. This research outcome has clarified the research answer, and therefore, order-making in the form of correcting a specific issue area must be considered as a new direction for the future research agenda on small states and order-making.

7.3. Contribution to Knowledge

This study contributes to the production of knowledge in seven different ways. First, it argues that order-making does not belong to great powers only. Focusing on the post-Cold War context and the condition of small states in the new international order, this study offered to enter into the area of great power privilege and claim that small states can behave as order-makers.

Second, the study offers a new conceptual framework for understanding order-making as a shared activity between small and great powers. It allows for identifying the shift from great power focus to issues that concern small states most, identifying their intention about regional and international issues and contributing with specific concepts such as 'issue-corrector'.

Third, the study contributes to a knowledge gap that did not consider small states as order-makers. It is a new way of thinking about small states as an order-maker. It adds to IR theories to learn that there may be an absence of great power in the regional and its relative absence at the international context. It also adds to Small State Studies to learn that after the collapse of the great power, there is an opportunity for the small state to behave as an order-maker.

Fourth, the study offers a methodological contribution. While influenced by a pandemic, the study adapted existing research methods by focusing on documents and approaching known documents in a new way by analysing them with content and thematic analysis. The methodology contributes to how interaction with a primary source such as official documents can reveal and expand our knowledge on integration initiatives as an order-making effort to restore the post-soviet region by correcting the course of the regional integration towards a new regional organisation. More importantly, this methodological contribution led to achieving research objectives, discovering concepts, thinking analytically and explaining how a small state can behave as an order-maker.

Fifth, this study contributes to how we can think of small states. For instance, a small state's status may precede that of a great power for the same country. This is because many states

were initially small, and from a historical view, many smaller states grew to great power status before falling into decline (such as many European powers). This knowledge may be relevant to the discussion on defining a small state. This knowledge arises from the analysis of the post-soviet region. It is because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, no power emerged to order the region, and all former soviet states were initially weak and, therefore, small too.

Six, this study contributes with conceptual findings as a contribution to knowledge. Order-making is an effort that a small state can pursue through team dynamics of like-minded states or by forming a core state under the presence or absence of great power. It is an additional contribution to regional studies and the great power role. In the case of post-Soviet integration (Chapter 5), it has become evident that Kazakhstan has pursued its order-making behaviour in response to two crucial factors: the lack of team dynamism with others and the absence of great power. It meant that reintegration between the former Soviet states lost the momentum and team dynamics which had previously prevailed in their contest against Moscow when all fifteen republics interacted with each other to form a united front on the future of the Soviet Union. The negotiations on a new Union treaty between the Soviet Republics and the Centre indicated that the changes that Gorbachev brought set a common objective for republics to claim more power and independence from the Centre. As a result, the team dynamic of the Soviet republics put an end to the Soviet Union with a new organisational structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States, but without Soviet power. This reality continued through the 1990s with the absence of great power during the transition period to set and lead any regional order. This largely explains the failure of post-Soviet integration in the 1990s. Chapter 6 on the international context shows that the presence of great powers was a major obstacle to Kazakhstan's desire to keep its nuclear arsenal. However, Kazakhstan, under the status of a non-nuclear state aligned with team dynamics of other non-nuclear states, reveals the following: the absence of great power in holding and controlling the nuclear issue, now it involves others to correct the major international issue: eliminate nuclear weapons in international politics. While the possession of nuclear weapons has continued, the recent emphasis on humanitarian consequences challenges the silence of the issue. However, it adds greatly to small states' standing in the current nuclear discussion. It reveals that 'nuclear powers' are major trouble makers rather than order makers. Thus, the presence of nuclear weapons is more evident than the presence of great powers in the nuclear issue area. Thus, those scholars who emphasise the role of great powers in establishing and enforcing order should also consider the case if a great power is absent (regionally and internationally). Such considerations have been lacking in the

literature and ignored as a possibility. The case of the post-Soviet region, therefore, fills this gap with consideration of the overall conditions of team dynamics among regional states and the absence of a great power. Moreover, Nazarbayev's reconsideration of the reintegration strategy from 'All in One' to 'Core States' instead is another consideration to assert the value of the core concept as a response to the continued lack of team dynamics and the absence of a Great Power.

Seventh, the findings of the two case chapters show that a small state like Kazakhstan has developed its power over the issues of integration and nuclear disarmament. The two-case focus brings us to what I would call a power-over issue. The power over the issue is not about 'power over others.' (Dahl, 1957; Waltz, 1979; Nye, 2011, p. 204). The power over the issue is consistent with small-state scholars' assertions around small states' potential for issue-specific power. The case of Kazakhstan then confirms that the power over the issue significantly adds to an issue-specific power and is in line with small state scholars (Lindell and Person, 1986; Habeeb, 1989). This power consideration is from the Cold War-era scholars reviewed in Chapter 2. While Lindell and Person (1986, p. 93) emphasise that small states might be weak in one issue area, they may be stronger in others. Habeeb (1989) similarly emphasises issue-specific structural power in negotiation over the Panama Canal between Panama and the US. His approach has analytical value as it does not see small state behaviour from a hard and soft power perspective but from an issue-specific power perspective. It indicates that small states can have an advantage in negotiations with greater ones on a particular issue. On this level, a small state, without the use of hard power considerations, can approach its outcomes using issue-specific power. This form of power allows small states to reduce their dependence on greater ones, but at the same time, finding alternative partners also creates dependence. How long the commitment lasts also depends on the alternative actor. As a result, control also depends on the existence of an alternative. However, since his publication post-Cold War, Panama has developed a unique role in the international sea trade order. Thus, we can see that after the successful negotiation with the US, Panama currently has issue-specific power in a specific issue area, such as the Panama Canal, which is crucial for international maritime trade. Thus, Panama has power over the shipping industry and even shipbuilding. Moreover, possessing this type of power has attracted others to follow. For instance, Nicaragua has decided to build almost the same canal on its territory (Renwick, 2015). Thus, compared to Nye's concepts in which hard and soft power cross borders and go global, the issue-specific power is local and influenced from inside without crossing borders but sends

a global message about their position in the specific issue area. The significance of this power consideration can be applied then to identify issue-specific power in the following cases. For instance, oil-exporting states are weaker than the US and European countries but can have an issue-specific influence concerning energy production and consumption (Mitchell, 2010). This was evident when oil-producing states used this power to influence the Western States during the Arab-Israeli war in the 1970s (Rea and Wright, 1997). If we apply 'issue-specific power,' then the three issue-areas where the Scandinavian countries have developed their issue-specific power would change Walt's perception of small states as 'power takers' (Ingebritsen, 2002; Ingebritsen, 2006). Thus, we can see a difference in possession of issue-specific power due to the issue area being close to domestic consideration. The difference between these states and Kazakhstan is that their issue specialisation is more concerned with contemporary issues of development, conflict resolution, and aid. At the same time, Kazakhstan has emerged as a small and weak state with no experience in world affairs, and such issues as reintegration and dealing with nuclear issues have become major tasks for order-making. It could take the same path as the Scandinavian countries, but its prime foreign policy concern is security and integration with the outside world since independence. Like Scandinavia countries, Kazakhstan is a small state, but it could develop power in relational terms specific to a particular issue area where it can leverage itself. For that reason, Kazakhstan's foreign policy initiatives in some way represent and are directed towards regional and international issues where it is confident to make suggestions and not be powerless from an IR perspective. Thus, this research project further contributes and suggests that power can be issue-specific. I define issue-specific power as the ability of a state to act on its resources, hold onto what it possesses, and influence issues to achieve preferred outcomes involving correcting a specific issue area. Since there is a range of issue areas where each member of the international community can assert itself and express concern, this provides an opportunity for a small state to find its niche and issue specialisation in a specific issue area. However, this possibility depends on the state's internal experience, conditions and other factors. Kazakhstan, in this case, has skilfully used its 'negative nuclear past' to influence nuclear issues, and the domestic stability within Kazakhstan has facilitated Nazarbayev's influence on reintegration in the post-Soviet region and his nuclear policy. The other facilitating factor is that great powers cannot respond to international issues alone and need support from others. Thus, the area of great power privilege, where great powers are order makers, can be challenged by arguing that a small state in the above circumstance can possess power over the issue where great powers lack their presence. Possessing power over an issue

leads to two types of behaviour by contributing to small-state foreign policy behaviour: as an issue-corrector and balancing power on a particular issue.

The concept of issue-corrector contributes in the following way. A small state knows it has entered and accepted the international order. If the small state chooses not to challenge the existing order, it can behave as an 'issue-corrector' within the rule-based order. While such behaviour is also needed in the regional context, it may need to 'balance power on a particular issue'. The general understanding of 'power balance' requires specific reference to the particular issues or context. While its non-proliferation engagement reflects Kazakhstan's broader international interests, the relationship with Russia at the regional level reflects its immediate concern. It may reflect specific behaviour between 'balancing' or 'bandwagoning'. Both theories are problematic; however, for this reason, the findings show that small states do 'balance' great powers but on a particular issue. The classical claim follows the argument of Walt (1987, p. 22) that 'the smaller the state, the more likely it is to the bandwagon, balancing may seem unwise because one's allies may not be able to assist quickly enough. States close to a country with large offensive capabilities may be forced to bandwagon because balancing is simply not viable. According to Walt (1987, p. 22), 'small states' bandwagoning can occur when a great power should be geographically proximate, threatening and appeaseable.' Levy (2004, p. 37) makes a similar point: 'Great powers balance against potential hegemons, whereas smaller states in the proximity of stronger states do what is necessary to survive, bandwagoning with the strong instead of balancing against them'. However, 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning' are not the only options for small states, as shown in the two case chapters; by looking at Kazakhstan through Walt and Levy's assumption, Kazakhstan is a good candidate for bandwagoning with Russia. However, it argued in Chapter 5 that Russia could not play a great power role, and therefore, bandwagoning was absent due to the absence of a great power. It offers a counterpoint to Walt's theory, which does not consider that Kazakhstan could adopt multivectored strategies that do not exclusively favour bandwagoning or balancing. Walt's understanding of Small State behaviour comes from the Cold War period when mutual suspicion and threat perception were common sense. However, this condition was overtaken by the end of the Cold War, in which nobody saw each other as a mutual threat. As Chapter 4 showed, Kazakhstan constructed a multidirectional relationship with all states, particularly with the US, EU, and China and bandwagoning, therefore, has been difficult to apply. Moreover, there is a problem with both theories. In the case of the small state, balancing and bandwagoning are the same concepts. If the small state must choose between the two, the small

state will choose, for instance, ‘balance’ instead of ‘bandwagoning’. But is this not the same as ‘bandwagoning’? The answer would be yes because small states choose to ‘balance’ but, in fact ‘, bandwagon’ with others against power. In reverse, it would be the same small state that chooses to ‘bandwagon’ instead of ‘balancing’ but would still bandwagon with others to balance the power. Thus, both concepts have the same meaning. Along the same line, the sheltering alliance that has been developed as a new framework, if applied to Kazakhstan, is not applicable since Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states were co-founders of the CIS, CSTO and even the SCO, which includes China as well. It may explain what I have mentioned in Chapter 2 as ‘shelter creators’; hence, a ‘shelter alliance’ protects against common problems and threats. Understanding Kazakhstan as the co-founder is important since those left outside of the institution’s creation became shelter seekers, with Georgia and Ukraine both seeking shelter under the NATO security umbrella. Bandwagoning was evident with the further consequence of balancing Russia with NATO. Thus, whatever we call shelter leads to bandwagon/balancing. Since both concepts emerged during the Cold War, it is understandable that under the bipolar world order, small states were forced to choose between the two options available during that time, and this concept continued to influence scholars after the end of the Cold War. However, both concepts need to be reconsidered, considering Kazakhstan’s case and its relationship with Russia, in respect of which I would argue that both concepts lack clarity. In the case of Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, there is an example of balancing, but I would caveat this by pointing out that ‘balancing’ applies to a particular issue. As shown in Chapter 4, Kazakhstan’s case illustrates the importance of relations with Russia and other powers. Kazakhstan is closely linked with the regional powers of Russia and China; therefore, balancing and bandwagoning with Great Powers in Walt’s model is not the case with Kazakhstan. This is because Kazakhstan has developed strategic partnerships with all powers but not with threats. Only these institutional and bilateral strategic links with major powers (US, Russia, China) make Kazakhstan bandwagon or balance with a particular partner on ‘issues’ that emerge in their mutual relationship, but not against threats. We could think of bandwagoning with another actor or actors on issues important to Kazakhstan. However, if these do not align with Kazakhstan’s interests, it will balance not against the threat or power but issues. As shown in Chapter 5, Kazakhstan balances Russia on the issue of political integration while it commits to relations in other important issue areas. The same could be applied in an international context where Kazakhstan also balances nuclear powers with others on the particular issue of nuclear arms possession while considering all these powers as

strategic partners in Kazakhstan's multivector policy. However, balancing a particular issue could be applied in a different context. For instance, the issue of the US withdrawal from Central Asia created uncomfortable conditions for Kazakhstan in 2005 when the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation decided to set a deadline for the US withdrawal from Central Asia. This development was not in Kazakhstan's interests and was against its multi-vector policy. However, it did bandwagon with members of SCO to balance the US on that issue, but not against a threat. The 1992 foreign policy document, 'The Strategy for the Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State', stresses the importance of major powers as strategic partners but not as threats (Nazarbayev, 1992). Thus, it does show clarity on what specific issues Kazakhstan balance Russia's ambition while bandwagoning with Russia on other issues. Balancing power on a particular issue reflects the clarity and accuracy of applying these concepts concerning small states such as Kazakhstan and its relationship with Russia.

Overall, this study contributes to the critical understanding that order-making as an area of great power privilege is contested with a new thinking that order-making can be shared and, therefore, a small state is the best candidate if it manages its relations with major power in order to open its path to issues that concern small states most. More importantly, it contributes to the critical understanding of how and under what conditions small-state order-making has been done. The study articulates that order-making has been done with a Eurasian initiative in the regional context. In contrast, nuclear disarmament initiatives have been done in the international context; both order-making initiatives aimed to correct the course of the particular issue area towards its intended purpose.

This leads me to offer suggestions for future research on small-state order-making.

7.4. Suggestions for Future Research

Since this study opens a new research focus on small states as order makers, it must continue in future research. Small states as an order-maker must be a starting point, and the research question that I posed to answer may also be applied to other cases. By considering that small-state research enters into the area of great power privilege, it must focus on issues rather than on powers. The case selection must successfully manage the relationship with major powers and be stable internally, as it has been in the case of Kazakhstan. Of course, it is not final criteria, but initial indicative suggestions to consider.

The above finding could also be tested or expanded further to understand small-state order-making separately in a different regional or international context. Since research found

that a small state may behave as an order-maker in a regional and international context, future research may focus on separate regional or international contexts instead.

The study did not expect the global lockdown, and it seems even the literature on methodology lacks suggestions on what to do in such cases. Therefore, in case of another lockdown, I suggest engaging with the documents first since they do not change and preserve those experiences in written text, which may add to the area experts' deeper view of the issue under study. Focus on the document's content and theme extraction showed how concepts are emerging and provide a different reality; such concepts as the team dynamic and the absence of great power and others, as mentioned above, all emerged from document analysis under lockdown.

The conceptual framework may also be used as a model in future research. While the presence of great power is present, the conceptual idea says that they are not present in some issue areas, and therefore, how small states behave in other issue areas is open to future research. Also, remember that great powers need others, and therefore, they share order-making with small states. This will give a starting point to justify future research to understand further small states' behaviour within regional and international order. Finally, great powers usually rise and fall, but small states proliferate. What happens then is open for future research.

Bibliography

Aben D. (2019) Regional security in Central Asia: Addressing existing and potential threats and challenges, *Eurasian Research Journal*, 1 (1), pp. 51 – 65.

Aben, D. (2019a) Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula: Lessons from Kazakhstan, *Eurasian Research Institute*. Weekly E-Bulletin. Available at: https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula-lessons-from-kazakhstan/ (Accessed: 7 December 2021).

Abuseitova, M. Kh. (2011) *Initiatives directed to the world.* Almaty: Kazakh Encyclopaedia.

Acharya, A. (2020) Feature Interview with Amitav Acharya, *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): 215-222.

Acharya, A. (2016) Advancing Global IR, *International Studies Review* 18 (2016): pp. 4-15.

Adilet (no date) *On the signing of the Cooperation Plan for the interface of the New Economic Policy "Nurly Zhol" and the construction of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the People's Republic of China. Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated August 31, 2016 No. 518.* Available at: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1600000518

Adilet (1990) *On the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, Decree of the Supreme Council of the Kazakh SSR 25 October 1990 No. 307-XII.* Available at: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/B900001700_

Adilet (1995) *Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Information and legal system of normative legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/K950001000_ (Accessed: 7 March 2021).

Adilet (1997) *Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Information and legal system of normative legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z970000151 (Accessed: 7 March 2021).

Adilet (2012) *On the State Program for the Development and Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2020.* Information and legal system of normative legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Available at: http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1100000110 (Accessed: 10 January 2021).

Adilet (2020) *On approval of the State program for the implementation of language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2025. Information and legal system of normative legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1900001045 (Accessed: 4 January 2021).

Ahnlid, A. (1992) 'Free Riders or Force Riders? Small States in the international political economy: the example of Sweden', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 27(3), pp. 241-276.

Akiner, S. (2011) 'Evolution of Kazakhstan's foreign policy: 1991-2011', *OAKA*, 6 (2), pp. 1-21.

Akorda (no date) *Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/en/republic_of_kazakhstan/kazakhstan

Akorda (2010) *Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the Nuclear Security Summit*. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_speeches_and_addresses/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-na-sammite-po-yadernoi-bezopasnosti_1343044906 (Accessed: 9 June 2021).

Akorda (2012) *Message of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Leader of the Nation Nursultan Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan "Strategy "Kazakhstan-2050": a new political course of an established state*. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/en/events/astana_kazakhstan/participation_in_events/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-state-1 (Accessed: 3 October 2020).

Akorda (2012a) *Today, Head of State Nursultan Nazarbayev took part in the International Conference "From a nuclear test ban to a world free of nuclear weapons"*. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/astana_kazakhstan/participation_in_events/segodnya-glava-gosudarstva-nursultan-nazarbaev-prinyal-uchastie-v-mezhdunarodnoi-konferencii-ot-zapreta-yadernyh-ispytanii-k-miru-svobodnomu (Accessed: 8 June 2021).

Akorda (2013) *Head of State Nursultan Nazarbayev received Minister of Foreign Affairs Yerlan Idrisov.* Available at: http://www.president.kz./ru/events/akorda_news/meetings_and_receptions/glava-gosudarstva-nursultan-nazarbaev-prinyal-ministra-inostrannyh-del-erlana-idrisova-1?q=%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%20%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81%D0%B0 (Accessed: 10 September 2020).

Akorda (2016) *Participation of the State Secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan Gulshara Abdykalikova in the international scientific and practical conference "The Republic of*

Kazakhstan and the Eurasian space: modernity and development prospects", dedicated to the 25th anniversary of Independence of Kazakhstan. Available at: http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/akorda_news/akorda_other_events/uchastie-gosudarstvennogo-sekretarya-respubliki-kazahstan-gulshary-abdykalikovoi-v-mezhdunarodnoi-nauchno-prakticheskoi-konferencii-respubli?q=%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0 (Accessed: 10 September 2020).

Akorda (2018) *Congratulations of the heads of foreign states on the occasion of the birthday of the President of Kazakhstan', Akorda Events, 4 July. Official webpage of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: http://www.president.kz./ru/events/international_community/telegram_of_congratulations/pozdravleniya-glav-inostrannyh-gosudarstv-po-sluchayu-dnya-rozhdeniya-prezidenta-kazahstana-1?q=%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BB%D1%8B%20%D0%B6%D0%BE%D0%BB (Accessed: 10 September 2020).

Akorda (2020) *President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took part in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council.* Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/international_community/foreign_other_events/prezident-kasym-zhomart-tokaev-prinyal-uchastie-v-zasedanii-vysshego-evraziiskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soveta (Accessed: 3 March 2020).

Aleksandrov, M. (1999) *Uneasy Alliance Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet Era, 1997-1997*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Allison, R. (2008) 'Challenges for cooperation and prospects for interaction in the region between NATO, the SCO and the CSTO', in M. Shaykhutdinov (ed) *Problems of Security and Cooperation in the Central Asian-Caspian Region*. Almaty: Institute of World Economy and Politics, pp. 29-37.

Allison, R. (2014) 'Russian 'deniable' intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules', *International Affairs*, 90 (6), pp. 1255–1297.

Aljazeera (2021) 'Ukraine may seek nuclear weapons if left out of NATO: Diplomat', *ALJAZEERA*, 16 April. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/16/ukraine-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-if-left-out-of-nato-diplomat (Accessed: 8 March 2022).

Anceschi, L. (2014) 'Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan', *Nationalities Papers*, 42 (5), pp. 733-749.

Anceschi, L. (2020) *Analysing Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy.* New York: Routledge.

Arter, D. (2000). Small state influence within the EU. The case of Finland's Northern Dimension Initiative. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 38(5), pp. 677-97. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-5965.00260

Archer, C., Bailes, A.J.K. and Wivel, A. (2014) *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond.* New York: Routledge.

Argynov, B. (2014) 'Rumours about the collapse of the EAEU are greatly exaggerated', *Online Zakon KZ.* Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31596490&pos=3;-72#pos=3;-72 (Accessed: 2 September 2021).

Aris, S. (2009) The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?', *Europe-Asia Studies,* 61 (3), pp. 457-482. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09668130902753309?needAccess=true (Accessed: 21 September 2020).

Aris, S. (2011) *Eurasian regionalism: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Aris, S. (2013) The Foreign and Security policies of the Central Asian States. Interview with Stephen Aris. Interviewed by Stratford for *Worldview Stratford,* 5 August. Available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/foreign-and-security-policies-central-asian-states (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Armstrong, H. W, and Read, R. (1998) 'Trade and Growth in Small States: the impact of global trade liberalisation', *The World Economy,* 21(4), pp. 563-585.

Armstrong, H. W, and Read, R. (2002) Small States and the European Union: issues in the Political Economy of International Integration, *Current Politics of Europe,* 11(1), pp. 31-48.

Aron, A. (1981) *Peace and War: A theory of International Relations*. Malabar, Fla: Krieger.

Askhat, A. (2020) 'Resident of Rudny condemned for nationalistic statements', *Azattyq Ryhy,* 6 November. Available at: https://rus.azattyq-ruhy.kz/incidents/17204-za-natsionalisticheskie-vyskazyvaniia-osuzhden-zhitel-rudnogo (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (no date) *How many ethnic Kazakhs returned to their historical homeland.* Available at: https://assembly.kz/ru/media-centr/ank-v-tsifrakh-infografika/skolko-etnicheskikh-kazakhov-vernulis-na-istoricheskuyu-rodinu/ (Accessed: 21 January 2021).

Astana Times (2014) Kazakhstan Should Stay Focused on Progress in Global Business Rankings, *The Astana Times*, 25 February. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2014/02/kazakhstan-stay-focused-progress-global-business-rankings/ (Accessed: 3 February 2021).

Ayazbekov, A. (2014) Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making 1991-92, *The Non-Proliferation Review*, 21(2), pp. 149-168.

Azattyq (2019) I remain with you as a citizen. Nazarbayev announced his resignation, *Radio Azattyq*, 19 March. Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-resigns/29830312.html (Accessed: 19 November 2021).

Azia (1994) Turkmenbashi finds Eurasian Union project controversial, in N. Nazarbayev *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Fund for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 70-71.

Bailes, A., Thayer, B.A. and Thorhallson, B. (2016) 'Alliance theory and alliance 'Shelter': the complexities of small state alliance behaviour', *Third World Thematic: A TWQ Journal*, 1(1), pp. 9-26.

Baille, S. (1998) A Theory of Small State Influence in the European Union, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 1(3/4), pp. 195-219.

Baizakova, Z. and McDermott, R. (2015) *Threat Perception in Central Asia in Response to Russia–Ukraine: Kazakhstan Will Not Be Next. NATO-OTAN, Research Paper, 119*. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194293/rp_119.pdf (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

Baldacchino, G. and Corbett, J. (2023). Small state size is more than a capacity constraint, in Godfrey Baldacchino (ed) *The success of small states in international relations: mice that roar?* London: Routledge.

Baldacchino, G. and Wivel, A. (2020) *Handbook on the Politics of Small States.* United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.

Baldacchino, G. and Wivel, A. (2020). Small states: concepts and theories, in Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel (eds) *Handbook on the Politics of Small States*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Baltabayeva, K. (2019) The anti-nuclear movement "Nevada - Semey" is a brand of Kazakhstan, *Alumni Association.* Available at: https://av.kaznu.kz/ru/18892/news/one/13587/ (Accessed: on 3 September 2021).

Baron, J., Gibbons, R.D, and Herzog, S. (2020) ‘apanese Public Opinion, Political Persuasion, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 3(2), pp. 299-309.

Barston, R. P. (1971) The External Relations of Small States, in A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland (eds) *Small States in International Relations*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Barston, R. P. (1973) *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Batalden, S.K. and Batalden, S. L. (1997) *The Newly Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of Former Soviet Republics*. Phoenix: Oryx Press.

Bauwens, W., A. Clesse, O.F. and Knudsen, F. (1996) *Small States and Security Challenges in the New Europe.* London: Brassey’s.

BBC News (2013) ‘PM making historic Kazakhstan visit’, *BBC NEWS*, 30 June. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23120454 (Accessed: 5 November 2019).

BBC News (2018) Russian news channel RT broke TV impartiality rules, Ofcom says, *BBC NEWS*, 20 December. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-46633082 (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Benedict, B. (1967) *Problems of Small Territories.* London: Athlone Press.

Bettiza, G and Lewis, D. (2020) Authoritarian Powers and Norm Contestation in the Liberal International Order: Theorising the Power Politics of Ideas and Identity. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Volume 5, Issue 4, October 2020, Pages 559–577. Available at https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz075 (Accessed: 25 May 2023).

Besemeres, J. (2016) Putin’s re-Sovietisation project and the Ukrainian Jewel, in J. Besemeres (ed) *A Difficult Neighbouring: Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II.* ANU Press, pp. 297-303.

Bidlack, R. (2015) *Russia and Eurasia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bjol, E. (1971) The Small States in International Politics, in A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland (eds) *Small States in International Relations*. New York, London, Sydney: Wiley Interscience Division John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Björkdahl, A., Chaban, N., Leslie, J., and Masselot, A. (2015) *Importing EU Norms: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings.* Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

Blank, S. (2005) Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy in a Time of Turmoil, *Eurasianet*, 27 April. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-foreign-policy-in-a-time-of-turmoil (Accessed: 7 October 2020).

Bohr, A. (2004) Regionalism in Central Asia: new geopolitics, old regional order, *International Affairs*, 80 (3), pp. 485-502.

Bonnenfant, I. K. (2012) Constructing the homeland: Kazakhstan's discourse and policies surrounding its ethnic return-migration policy, *Central Asian Survey*, 31(1), pp. 31-44.

Börzel, A.A., Goltermann, L., Lohaus, M., Striebinger, K. (2012) *Roads to regionalism: genesis, design, and effects of regional organisations*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.

BP (2019) *Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.* Available at: https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Brady, A-M. (2019) *Small states and the changing global order: New Zealand face the future*. Springer Nature Switzerland.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2013) *Successful qualitative research: a practical guide for beginners*. Los Angeles, California: SAGE.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2023). Doing Reflexive Thematic Analysis: A Reflexive Account. In F. Meyer & K. Meissel (Eds.), (2023). *Research methods for education and the social disciplines in Aotearoa New Zealand*. NZCER Press. available at: https://www.nzcer.org.nz/nzcerpress/research-methods-education-and-social-disciplines (Accessed: 7 September 2023).

Brecher, M. (1972) *The Foreign Policy System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bredikhin, A. (2020) 'Semirechensk Cossacks in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: a modern aspect', *EADaily*, 25 May. Available at: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/05/25/semirechenskie-kazaki-v-kazahstane-i-kirgizii-sovremennyy-aspekt (Accessed: 9 November 2021).

Breslin, Sh. (2013) Regions and Regionalism, in M. Beeson. and N. Bisley (2013) *Issues in the 21st Century World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 60-79.

Brletich, S. (2015) The Crimea Model: Will Russia Annex the Northern Region of Kazakhstan?, *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 7(1), pp. 11–29.

Brown, B. A. (1995) National Security and Military Issues in Central Asia, in B. Parrott (ed) *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Bruns, O. (2019) Eurasian Media Forum: is artificial intelligence the renaissance of humanity, *Euronews.Next*, 31 May. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/30/eurasian-media-forum-is-artificial-intelligence-the-renaissance-of-humanity (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Brzezinski, Z. and Sullivan, P. (1997) *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, Data, and Analysis.* New York: Routledge.

Buckley, N. (2011) Putin's Eurasian push challenges west, *Financial Times*, 6 October. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/201515a4-ef4e-11e0-918b-00144feab49a (Accessed: 15 September 2020).

Budjeryn, M and Bunn, M. (2020) *Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future.* Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Available at: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/budapest-memorandum-25-between-past-and-future (Accessed: 4 June 2021).

Bueger, C. and Wivel, A. (2018) How Do Small Island States Maximise Influence? Creole Diplomacy and the Smart State Foreign Policy of the Seychelles. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region,* 14(2), pp.170-188.

Bukkvoll, T. (2004) Astana's privatised independence: private and national interests in the foreign policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev, *National Papers*, 32(3), pp. 631-650.

Bull, H. (2012) *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. Macmillan Press LTD.

Bukeeva, A. (2016) Own shirt. How the problems of the participating countries weaken the EAEU, *Forbes Kazakhstan,* 16 July. Available at: https://forbes.kz/process/economy/svoya_rubashka/ (Accessed: 10 November 2021).

Burkhanov, A., Orazgaliyev, S. and Araral, E. (2019) 'Culture and Power Transition: The Case of Kazakhstan', in J-F, Caron (ed) *Understanding Kazakhstan's 2019 political transition.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Burns, W. J. (2020). The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 July. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/14/united-states-needs-new-foreign-policy-pub-82295 (Accessed 7 March 2023).

Busygina, I. and Filippov, M (2020) 'Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation', *Problems of Post-Communism*, 68(6), pp. 477-486.

Carlson, B. G. (2008) Waving the Banner of Independence: Kazakhstan's Relations with Russia, China, and the United States, *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, 1, pp. 46-64.

Carr, E. H, (2010) *The Twenty years Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International relations.* Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carvalho, B and Neumann, I. (2015) *Small States and StatusSeekingNorway's Quest for Higher Standing*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group. London and New York.

Cello, L. (2019) *Order and Disorder in International Politics*. Marbella International University Centre, 27 August. Available at: https://miuc.org/order-and-disorder-in-international-politics/ (Accessed: 1 November 2020).

Chalmers, M. (2019) *Which Rules? Why There is No Single 'Rules-Based International System*. RUSI Occasional Paper. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Available at: https://static.rusi.org/201905_op_which_rules_why_there_is_no_single_rules_based_international_system_web.pdf (Accessed at: 9 November 2021).

Checkel, J. (1995) Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy, in A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds) *The making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 42-65.

Chong, A and Maass, M. (2010) 'Introduction: the foreign policy power of small states', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 23(3), pp. 381-382.

Church, C. H. (2007) *Switzerland and the European Union: A Close, Contradictory and Misunderstood Relationship*. United Kingdom: Routledge.

CIS DOC1 (1991) *AGREEMENT on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons.* Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30238740&pos=4;-106#pos=4;-106 (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

CIS DOC2 (1991) *AGREEMENT dated December 30, 1991, Between the States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces*. Available at: https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=30819 (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

Clarke, M. (2014) Kazakh Responses to the Rise of China: Between Elite Bandwagoning and Societal Ambivalence? in N. Horesh and E. Kavalski (eds) *Asian Thought on China's Changing International Relations*. Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 141 – 172.

Clarke, M. (2015) Kazakhstan's Multi-vector Foreign Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of Great Power "Pivots", *The Asan Forum*, 9 April. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/kazakhstans-multi-vector-foreign-policy-diminishing-returns-in-an-era-of-great-power-pivots/ (Accessed: 5 November 2019).

Clark, T., Foster, L. and Bryman, A. (2019) *How to do your social research project or dissertation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cline, R.S. (1975) *World Power Assessment 1977. A Calculus of Strategic Drift*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cohen, A. (2008) *Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence Energy Policy and the Birth of a Nation.* Washington, D.C: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Centre.

Cooley, A. (2012) *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*. Oxford University Press.

Cooper, J. (2013) 'The Development of Eurasian Economic Union', in R. Dragneva, and K. Wolczuk (eds) *Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics*. Cheltenham: Edwar Elgar, pp. 15 – 33.

Commonwealth Secretariat (2003) *Commonwealth Small States.* London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Available at: http://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/small-states (Accessed: 7 November 2019).

Consumer Protection Law (2022) *Law Republic of Kazakhstan On Consumer Protection.* Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30661723&show_di=1&pos=3;-106#pos=3;-106 (Accessed: 7 June 2022).

Cornell, S. E. (2007) 'Finding Balance: the foreign policies of central Asia's states', in A.J. Tellis and M. Wills (eds) *Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy*. The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 266-298.

Craig, C. and Ruzicka, J. (2013) 'The Nonproliferation Complex', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 27(3), pp. 329-348.

Creswell, J.W. (2013). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Cummings, S. N. (2003) Independent Kazakhstan: managing heterogeneity, in S. N. Cummings (ed) *Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia.* London: Routledge, pp. 25-35.

Cummings, S. N. (2004) Eurasian bridge or murky waters between east and west? Ideas, identity and output in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, in R. Fawn (ed) *Ideology and National*

Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies. London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 139-155.

Cummings, S. (2014) A Synthetic Approach to Foreign Security Relations and Policies in Central Asia, in S. M. Pekkanen, J. Ravenhill and R. Foot (eds) *Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481-502.

Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M. (2003). The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, *Brookings*, 1 January. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-of-politics-american-foreign-policy-for-a-new-century/ (Accessed: 28 September 2023).

Dahl, R, A. (1957) The Concept of Power. *Behavioural Science*, 2(3), pp. 201-215.

Darimbet, N. (2020) 'Big mistake of "Big week", *KZ. Media*, 29 December. Available at: https://kz.media/archives/37131 (Accessed: 28 January 2020).

Dave, B. (2007) *Kazakhstan – Ethnicity, Language and Power*. Oxon: Routledge.

Dave, B. (2008) The UE and Kazakhstan: is the pursuit of energy and security cooperation compatible with the promotion of human rights and democratic freedoms? in N. J. Melvin (ed) *The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia.* Centre for European Policy Studies. Brussels, pp. 43 – 67.

Davies, G. (2008) Inside Out or Outside In: Domestic and International Factors Affecting Iranian Foreign Policy Towards the United States 1990–2004, *Foreign Policy Analysis*,4, pp. 209–25.

Dawisha, K and Dawisha, A. (1995) *The Making of the Foreign Policy in Russia and New States of Eurasia*. M.E. Sharpe.

Dawisha, K. and Parrot, B. (1994) *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval.* Cambridge University Press.

Dawisha, K. and Starr, S.F. (1995) *Making of Foreign Policy and the New States of Eurasia.* Taylor and Francis Group.

Deets, S. (2009) Constituting Interests and Identities in a Two-Level Game: Understanding the Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Dam Conflict, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5 (1), pp. 37–56.

Degterev, D. and Kurylev, K. (2019) *Foreign Policies of the CIS States: A Comprehensive Reference.* USA: Lynne Rienner.

Destradi, S. (2010) Regional Powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership, *Review of international studies*, 36 (4), pp. 903-930.

Deyermood, R. (2008) *Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, London.

Delcour, L. (2016) *Shaping the Post-Soviet Space?* EU Policies and Approaches.

Desch, M. C. (2008) America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy. *International Security* (2008) 32 (3): pp. 7–43. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.7 (Accessed: 23 May 2023).

Dhanapala, J. and Rauf, T. (2017) *Reflection on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: review conferences and the future of the NPT.* SIPRI. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/reflections-treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons (Accessed: 23 November 2021).

Diener, A. C. (2015) Assessing potential Russian irredentism and separatism in Kazakhstan's northern oblasts, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 56 (5), pp. 469-492.

Diamond, L. Platter, M.F. and Walker, C. (2016) Authoritarianism Goes Global. John Hopkins University Press.

Doeser, F. (2011) Domestic politics and foreign policy change in small states: The fall of the Danish 'footnote policy', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46 (2), pp. 222-241.

Dongxiao, C. (2015) Prospects and Paths of CICA's Transformation, *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 1 (3), pp. 447–469.

Dosaev, E. (2019) Will there be a single currency in the EAEU - the answer of the National Bank, *Sputnik Kazakhstan*, 13 November. Available from https://ru.sputnik.kz/economy/20191113/12018770/eaes-edinaya-valyuta-natsbank-pozitsiya.html (Accessed: 8 September 2021).

Dosenrode-Linge, S.Z. (2015) *Limits to Regional Integration.* Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2013). *Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics.* UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2017) 'The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power', *Chatham House*, 2 May. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/05/eurasian-economic-union/4-eaeu-intentions-and-limitations (Accessed: 7 November 2021).

Dragneva, R. and Hartwell, C.A. (2021) The Eurasian Economic Union: integration without liberalisation? *Post-Communist Economies*, 33(2/3), pp. 200-221.

Dutkiewicz, P and Sakwa, R. (2015) *Eurasian Integration – the view from within*. London and New York: Routledge.

East, M. (1973) Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models, *World Politics*, 25 (4), pp. 556-576.

Eaton, M. (2001) 'Major trends in military expenditure and arms acquisitions by the states of the Caspian region', in G. Chufrin (ed) *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region.* SIPRI: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-118.

EEC (2015) *Chronicle of meetings of the Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic Community.* Available at: http://www.evrazes.com/mezhgossovet/chronicle (Accessed: 7 October 2021).

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. and Hofmann, S. (2020). Of the contemporary global order, crisis, and change, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27(7), pp. 1077-1089. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678665?needAccess=true (Accessed: 7 June 2023).

Elman, M. F. (1995) The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard, *British Journal of Political Science*, 25 (2), pp. 171–217.

Eriksson, M. (2010) Unintended consequences of targeted sanctions, in C. Daase and C. Friesendorf (eds) *Rethinking Security Governance: the problem of unintended consequences.* New York: Routledge, pp. 157 – 175.

Estrada, K. S. (2020). IR's Recourse to Area Studies: Siloization Anxiety and the Disruptive Promise of Exceptionalism. *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): 207-214.

Etymonline (no date) 'England', Online Etymology Dictionary. Available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/England (Accessed: 8 October 2021).

Eurasia.Expert (2021) The movement against nuclear tests "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" was formed, *Eurasia Expert,* 23 February. Available at: https://eurasia.expert/dvizhenie-protiv-yadernykh-ispytaniy-nevada-semipalatinsk/ (Accessed: on 4 November 2021).

Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998) *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations.* Penguin Books.

Fawcett, L. (2020). International Relations and the Middle East: Bringing Area Studies (Back) In. *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): 177-183.

Farchy, J. (2016) Kazakh language schools shift from English to Chinese, *Financial Times,* 9 May. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/6ce4a6ac-0c85-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f (Accessed: 16 September).

Feshbach, M. (1997) The Role of External Assistance on Environmental and Health Policies in Russia, in K. Dawisha (ed) *The International Dimension of post-communist transition in Russia and the new states of Eurasia.* New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe – Armonk, pp. 379-398.

Ford, M. (2014) Kazakhstan's President Is Tired of His Country's Name Ending in 'Stan, *The Atlantic*, February 7. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/kazakhstans-president-is-tired-of-his-countrys-name-ending-in-stan/283676/ (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

Foreign Policy Concept (2014) *Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014 – 2020*. Available from https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1400000741 (Accessed: 9 November 2021).

Fox, A. B. (1959) *The power of small states: Diplomacy in World War II.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Fox, A. B. (1969) The small state in the international system 1919-1969, *International Journal*, 24 (4), pp. 751 – 764.

Frankowski, P. (2010) One World – Many 'Others'? in S.F. Krishna-Hensel (ed) *Order and Disorder in the International System.* Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 97 – 114.

Freedom House (no date) *Kazakhstan is considered not free.* Available from https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan (Accessed: 7 March 2021).

Galloway, D. (2002) 'The Treaty of Nice and 'Small' Member States', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp. 11-30.

Calvert, P. (1986) *The Foreign Policy of New States*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Carr, E.H. (2001) *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 – 1939. An Introduction to the Study of International relations.* United Kingdom: Palgrave.

Garthoff, R. L. (1997) Western Efforts to Shape Post-Soviet Behaviour: Contemporary development in Historical Perspective, K. Dawisha (ed) *The International Dimension of post-communist transition in Russia and the new states of Eurasia.* New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe – Armonk, pp. 13-33.

George, J.A. (2009) Expecting ethnic conflict. The Soviet legacy and ethnic politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in A. E. Wooden and C. H. Stefes (eds) *The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Enduring legacies and emerging challenges*. Central Asian Studies. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 75-103.

Gerring, J. (2017) *Case study research: principles and practices. 2nd edition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, W. and Brown, A. (2009) Working with qualitative data. Los Angeles, Calif.; London: SAGE.

Gibbons, R. D. (2019) The Future of the Nuclear Order, *Arms Control Association*, April. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/features/future-nuclear-order (Accessed: 13 October 2021).

Gilpin. R. (1981) *War and Change in World Politics.* Cambridge University Press.

Gleason, G. (1997) *The Central Asian states: discovering independence*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Gleason, G. (2001) Foreign Policy and domestic reform in Central Asia, *Central Asian Survey*, 20 (2), pp. 167-182.

Godehardt, N. (2014) *The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions and Intertwined Actors in International Relations.* United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Goetschel, L. (1998) 'The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today's Europe', in L. Goetschel (ed) *Small States inside and Outside the European Union. Interests and Policies*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, pp. 13-31.

Golam, M. (2013) 'The concept of Eurasia: Kazakhstan's Eurasian Policy and its implications', *Journal of Eurasian studies*, 4 (2), pp. 160-170.

Goldman, M. F. (2009) *Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, and the war on terror.* Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger Security International.

Government of Kazakhstan (no date) *XIX Secretariat of the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.* Available at: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa-addis-ababa/press/article/details/61405?lang=en (Accessed: 29 January 2020).

Gregorio, D. and Angeli, A. (2017) *The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union: Moving Towards a Greater Understanding.* Amsterdam: Eleven International Publishing.

Griffiths, M and O'Callaghan, T. (2002) *International Relations: The Key Concepts.* London and New York: Routledge.

Griffiths, M., Roach, S. C. and Solomon, M. S. (2009) *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations.* London and New York: Routledge.

Grigas, A. (2016) *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.* Yale University Press: New Haven and London.

Gunter, M. M. (1977) What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem? *American Journal of International Law*, 71 (1), pp. 110-124.

Gustavsson, J. (1999) How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34 (1), pp. 73–95.

Guttman, R. (2013) Building a World Class University in Kazakhstan: Looking to America for Partners and Inspiration, *Transatlantic Magazine*, 3 November. Available at: http://transatlantic-magazine.com/building-a-world-class-university-in-kazakhstan-looking-to-america-for-partners-and-inspiration/ (Accessed: 11 December 2020).

Gvalia, G. and Iashvili, Z. (2011) *Political Elites, Ideas and Foreign Policy: explaining and understanding the international Behaviour of Small States in the Former Soviet Union*. Tbilisi: Ilia State University.

Gvalia, G., Iashvili, Z., Lebanidze, B. and Siroky, D. (2013) 'Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States', *Security Studies*, 22 (1), pp. 98-131.

Jakobsen, P. V. And Møller, K. J. (2012). Good News: Libya and the Danish Way of War, in N. Hvidt and H. Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS.

Joenniemi, P. (1998). From small to smart: reflections on the concept of small states. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 9, pp. 61-62.

Habeeb, W. M. (1988) *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations*. Baltimore: London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hall, T. H. (2020). I'll Tell You Something About China': Thoughts on the Specialist Study of the People's Republic of China. *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): 184-190.

Ham, P.V. (1994) *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics and Policies.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Hancock, K. J. (2009) *Regional integration: Choosing Plutocracy*. New York: Palgrave and Macmillan.

Hancock, K. J. and Libman, A. (2016) Eurasia, in T. A. Borzel and T. Risse (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, pp. 202 – 224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.11 (Accessed: 9 December 2021).

Handel, M. I. (1990) *Weak States in the International System.* London: Frank Class.

Hanf, K and Soetendorp, B. (1998) *Adapting to European Integration*. London and New York: Longman.

Hanks, R. R. (2009) Multi-vector politics' and Kazakhstan's emerging role as a geostrategic player in Central Asia, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern studies*,11(3), pp. 257-267.

Hansen, F. P. (2020) Small states in post-Soviet Central Asia: navigating between two great power neighbours, in G. Baldacchino and A. Wivel (eds) *Handbook on the Politics of Small States.* UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 294-311.

Hanson, M. (2022) Power to the have-nots? The NPT and the limits of a treaty hijacked by a "power-over" model, *Contemporary Security Policy,* 43 (1), pp. 80-105.

Harbert, J.R. (1976) The Behaviour of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972, *International Organisation*, 30 (1), pp. 109-127.

Harden, S. (1985) *Small is Dangerous: Microstates in a Macro World*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.

Harris, W. L. (1970) Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose, *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,* 9 (1), pp. 23-53.

Hashimova U. (2019) Central Asian Presidents' Second Consultative Meeting Zooms in on Water, Trade, and Regional Cooperation, *The Diplomat*, 2 December. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/central-asian-presidents-second-consultative-meeting-zooms-in-on-water-trade-and-regional-cooperation/ (Accessed: 17 September 2020).

Hassan, A. A-E. (1984) *Kuwait and the Gulf by Hassan: Small States and the International System.* Washington, DC: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Hauser, G. and Kernic, F. (2006) *European Security in Transition.* Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.

Heller, R. (2019) 'From community politics to the politicisation of community: the role of identity in Eurasian economic integration', *East European politics,* 35 (2), pp. 122-142.

Henrikson, A. K. (2001) 'A coming 'Magnesian' age? Small states, the global system, and the international community', *Geopolitics*, 6(3), pp. 49-86.

Herman (2008, p.151) Content Analysis. In Audie, K. and Deepa, P (eds.) Qualitative Methods in International Relations.

Hey, J. (2003) *Small States in World Politics: explaining foreign policy behaviour.* Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hobson, J. (2000) *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Holtje, M. and Kempin, R. (2013) The EU in Afghanistan: What role after NATO's withdrawal? *SWP Comments,* No. 38/2013, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin. Available at:

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/256266/1/2013C38.pdf (Accessed: 19 November 2021).

Hong, M. (1995) Small states in the United Nations, *International Social Science Journal*, 47(2), pp. 227-287.

Hopkinson, B. (2014) Eurasian Media Forum Stirs Debate on Ukraine, Global Affairs, *The Astana Times*, 25 April. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2014/04/eurasian-media-forum-stirs-debate-ukraine-global-affairs/ (Accessed: 8 October 2020).

Hug, A. (2011) *Kazakhstan at a Crossroads.* The Foreign Policy Centre. Available at: https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/1334.pdf (Accessed: 3 November 2019).

Hug, A. and Zhang, F. (2010) *Kazakhstan at a Crossroads: Kazakhstan and the World.* The Foreign Policy Centre. Available at: https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/1310.pdf (Accessed: 3 November 2019).

Hurrell, A. (2020) Why International Relations and Area Studies Need Each Other. *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): pp. 191-196.

Hurrell, A. (2005) Hegemony and Regional Governance in Americas, in L. Fawcett and M. Serrano (eds) *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas. Continental Drift*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 185 – 207.

Hurrell, A. (1995) Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics, *Review of International Studies*, 21, pp. 331-358.

Hutt, M. (2019) Area Studies and the importance of 'somewheres', *South East Asia Research*, 27:1, pp. 21-25.

Iakimets, V. and Suleimenov, O. (1992) 'New tests mean new nukes', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 48 (8), pp. 12-13.

Ibraimov, O. (2013) 'Nazarbayev will not allow the "reincarnation of the USSR', *Rus.Azattyk*, 29 January. Available at: https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_ibraimov/24886514.html (Accessed: 17 September 2020).

ICAN (2022) *The five states hosting U.S. nuclear weapons.* Available at: https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_arsenals (Accessed: 7 February 2022).

ICAN (2022a) *Kazakhstan*. Available at: https://www.icanw.org/kazakhstan (Accessed: 7 February 2022).

ICAN (2023) How is your country doing? Available at: https://www.icanw.org/how_is_your_country_doing (Accessed: 7 August 2022).

Idan, A. and Shaffer, B. (2011) 'The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 27 (3), pp. 241-268.

Idrisov, E. (2015) E. Idrisov outlined the approaches of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the priorities of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, *Kazinform*, 28 September. Available at: https://www.inform.kz/ru/e-idrisov-oboznachil-podhody-rk-k-prioritetam-70-y-sessii-ga-oon_a2822665 (Accessed: 10 October 2021).

Idrisov, E. (2015a) Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Yerlan Idrisov: Contribution of Kazakhstan to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament, *information System Paragraf.* Available from https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=37243202&pos=5;-106#pos=5;-106 (Accessed on 22 October 2021).

Ikenberry, G. J. (2007) State power and International institutions: America and the Logic of Economic and Security Multilateralism, in D. Bourantonis, K. Ifantis and P. Tsakonas, (eds) *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalisation*. London: Routledge, pp. 21-43.

Ikenberry, J. (2011) *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of American World Order.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inbar, E. and Sheffer, G. (2013) *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World.* London: Frank Cass.

Ingebritsen, C. (1998) *The Nordic States and European Unity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's role in World Politics, *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 37(1), pp. 11-23.

Ingebritsen, C. (2006) *Scandinavia in World Politics.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

International Crisis Group (2013) Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change, *Asia Report*, 250, 30 September 2013. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5249793b4.pdf (Accessed: 7 November 2021).

International Crisis Group (2015) Stress test for Kazakhstan, *Crisis Group and Central Asia Briefing, 74,* 13 May. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kazakhstan/stress-tests-kazakhstan (Accessed: 17 October 2020).

Ipek, P. (2007) The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan's foreign policy: Looking east or west? *Europe-Asia Studies,* 59 (7), pp. 1179-1199.

Isaacs, R. (2010) Papa' – Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Discourse of Charismatic Leadership and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism,* 10 (3), pp. 435-452.

Isaacs, R. (2020) Russia–Kazakhstan Relations and the Tokayev–Nazarbayev Tandem, *Russian Analytical Digest,* 248, 6 March. Available at: http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/id/eprint/40191/7/Russia%E2%80%93Kazakhstan%20Relations%20and%20the%20Tokayev%E2%80%93Nazarbayev%20Tandem%20%281%29.pdf (Accessed: 5 October 2021).

Isaacs, R. and Frigerio, A. (2019) Theorising Central Asian Politics. The State, Ideology and Power. Palgrave; Macmillan.

Jackson, N. J. (2003) *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: theories, debates and actions*. London and New York: Routledge.

Jesse, N. (2006) Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, *International Political Science Review*,27 (1), pp. 7–28.

Joly, J. (2021) Astana Peace process: 17th round of talks on Syria begin in Kazakhstan, *Euronews*, 21 December. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/21/astana-peace-process-17th-round-of-talks-on-syria-begin-in-kazakhstan (Accessed: 25 December 2021).

Jonson, L. (2009) *Tajikistan in the new Central Asia.* I.B. Tauris.

Junisbai, B. and Junisbai, A. (2019) Regime type versus patronal politics: a comparison of "ardent democrats" in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 35 (3), pp. 240 – 257.

Kahn, H. and Bruce-Briggs, b. (1972) *Things to Come. Thinking about the 70's and 80's*. New York: Macmillan.

Karabek, Y (2011) Ural events of 1991. The beginning of the conflict, *Radio Azattyk*, 7 September. Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/oral_okigasy_uralskie_sobytia_uralsk_events_1991/24320134.html (Accessed: 8 January 2021).

Kashkeeva, Zh. (2007) Kazakhstan Remains a Nuclear Power?, *Rus.Azattyq,* 17 February. Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/1180778.html (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

Kassenov, O. (1995) The Institutions and Conduct of the Foreign Policy of Post-communist Kazakhstan, in A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds) *The making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 263-285.

Kassenova, N. (2011) 'EU – Central Asian Bilateral Cooperation', in A. Warkotsch (ed) *The European Union and Central Asia.* New York: Routledge, pp. 48-62.

Kassenova, N. (2012) Kazakhstan and Eurasian economic integration: quick start, mixed results and uncertain future, *French Institute of International Relations, 14.* Available at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifrikassenovakazandeurasianintegrationengnov2012.pdf

Kassenova, N. (2017) A Young State in an Uncertain World, *Project Syndicate,* 30 November. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/kazakhstan-liberal-world-order-transformation-by-nargis-kassenova-2017-11 (Accessed: 7 November 2019).

Kassenova, T. (2009) The Lasting Toll of Semipalatinsk's Nuclear Testing, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* 28 September. Available at: https://thebulletin.org/2009/09/the-lasting-toll-of-semipalatinsks-nuclear-testing/#:~:text=At%20the%20very%20least%2C%20a,the%20period%20of%20atmospheric%20testing (Accessed: 9 October 2021).

Kassenova, T. (2009a) Kazakhstan's Nuclear Renaissance, *St Antony's International Review*, 4 (2), pp. 51-74.

Kassenova, T. (2011b) Semipalatinsk: From Nuclear Testing Site to Test Ban Support, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* 29 August. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/29/semipalatinsk-from-nuclear-testing-site-to-test-ban-treaty-support-pub-45434 (Accessed: 8 October 2021).

Kassenova, T. (2014) 'Kazakhstan and the Global Nuclear Order. Central Asian Affairs', 1 (2), pp. 273-286.

Kassenova, T. (2016) Banning nuclear testing: lessons from the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site, *The Nonproliferation Review*, 23 (3/4), pp. 329-344.

Kassenova, T. (2022) *Atomic Stepp: How Kazakhstan gave up the Bomb*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.

Kassimeris, C. (2009) The foreign policy of small powers, *International Politics*, 46 (1), pp. 84-101.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1986) *Small States in World Market: Industrial Policies in Europe.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kazykhanov, E. (2011) Kazakhstan sorry for efficiency and asymmetricity of the NPT, *Index of Security*, 1 (100), 18, pp. 37-46. Available at: http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/0/13406152680.pdf (Accessed: 25 October 2021).

Kazykhanov, E. (2017) Kazakhstan: Building a Nuclear-Safe World, *Council of American Ambassadors.* Available from https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/fall-2017/kazakhstan-building-a-nuclear-safe-world (Accessed: 2 October 2021).

Kaufman, W. (1956) *Military Policy and National Security.* London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.

Kaul, N. (2021) Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a Small State in International Relations, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 00, pp. 1–41.

Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia (1997) *President Nazarbayev Kazakhstan-Russian Relations: Reports, Speeches, articles 1991 – 1997*. M: Russian Rarity.

Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (1994) 'Russian Perspective on partnership', *Kazakhstanskaya Prtavda*, 95, 7 July 1994, in N. Nazarbayev (1997) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997,* pp. 67 - 69.

Kazantsev, A.A., Rutland, P., Medvedeva, S.M. and Safranchuk, I.A. (2020) 'Russia's Policy in the "frozen conflicts" of the post-Soviet space: from ethno-politics to geopolitics', *Caucasus Survey*, 8 (2), pp. 142–162.

Kazembassy (no date) *Treaties. Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation.* Available from https://kazembassy.ru/rus/sotrudnichestvo/dvustoronnee_sotrudnichestvo/dogovornaya_baza/?cid=8 (Accessed: 19 March 2020).

Kazembassy (1997) Interview to Novaya Gazeta, 15 November 1995, in the Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia (ed) *President Nazarbayev Kazakhstan-Russian Relations: Reports, Speeches, articles 1991 – 1997.* M, Russian Rarity, pp. 216-233.

KazInform (2020) Political scientist: The transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan is a management decision that has consolidated the course for the transformation of the country, *Kazinform*, 29 June. Available at: https://www.inform.kz/ru/politolog-perenos-stolicy-kazahstana-upravlencheskoe-reshenie-zakrepivshee-kurs-na-preobrazovanie-strany_a3667319 (Accessed: 15 January 2021).

Keene, E. (2013) Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy Leads to Government Restructuring, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* 21 February. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/21/kazakhstan-2050-strategy-leads-to-government-restructuring-pub-51010 (Accessed: 3 February 2020).

Kembayev, Zh. (2009) *Legal aspects of the regional integration processes in the post-Soviet area.* Berlin: Springer.

Kembayev, Zh. (2011) *Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia*. Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30945950&pos=4;-88#pos=4;-88 (Accessed: 3 July 2021).

Kembayev, Zh. (2016) The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: An Adequate Body for Facilitating Eurasian Integration? *Review of Central and East European Law*, 41 (3-4), pp. 342-367.

Kenedy, P. (1989). *The rise and fall of great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Vintage Books.

Keohane, R. (2002) *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World*. London: New York: Routledge.

Keohane, R. (1969) Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics, *International Organization*, 23(2), pp. 291-310.

Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977). *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Khan, S. A. (2018) Area Studies: Nature and Scope. Central Asia Journal No. 82, Summer 2018, pp. 131 – 142.

Khatri, S. K. (1997) Nepal in the international system: the limits of Power of a Small State, in A. Aditya (ed) *The Political Economy of Small States.* Kathmandu: Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Khazanov, A. M. (1995) The ethnic problems of contemporary Kazakhstan, *Central Asian Survey*, 14 (2), pp. 243-264.

Khegai, D. and Urazova, D. (2014) Asia should create its own OSCE: Nazarbayev, *English Tengrinews,* 21 May. Available at: https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/asia-should-create-its-own-osce-nazarbayev-253659/ (Accessed: 7 May 2020).

Khitakhunov, A., Mukhamediyev, B. and Pomfret, R. (2017) 'Eurasian Economic Union: present and future perspectives', *Econ Change Restruct*, 50, pp. 59-77.

Kimberly, M. (2006) Disrupting the Balance Russian Efforts to Control Kazakhstan's Oil,. *PONARS EURASIA*, Policy Memo No. 428. Available at: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/pm_0428.pdf (Accessed: 17 October 2020).

Kirkham, K. (2016) The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the Russian regional hegemony? *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 7 (2), pp. 111-128.

KISI (2010) *President N.A. Nazarbayev and Modern Kazakhstan. Collection of documents and materials in three volumes: Volume III N.A. Nazarbayev and Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan.* Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies.

KISI (2019) *25 years of the idea of Eurasian integration N.A. Nazarbayev (in estimates experts of KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan).* Nur-Sultan; Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic Kazakhstan.

Kissinger, H. (1977) *American Foreign Policy*. 3d Ed. New York: Norton.

Knotter, L. (2022) Interpretivism in international relations research. In R. Joseph Huddleston, Thomas Jamieson, and Patrick James (eds) Handbook of Research Methods in International Relations, 2022, p.629-650.

Knudsen, O. (1988) Of Lambs and Lions: Relations between Great Powers and their Smaller neighbours, *Cooperation and Conflict*, XXIII, pp. 111-122.

Koch, N. (2013) Sport and soft authoritarian nation-building, *Political Geography*, 32, pp. 42 – 51. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.11.006 (Accessed: 24 January 2021).

Konyrova, K. (2020) 'Kazakh Foreign Minister slams 'territorial claims' of Russian deputy', *Neweurope*, 23 December. Available at: https://www.neweurope.eu/article/kazakh-foreign-minister-slams-territorial-claims-of-russian-deputy/ (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Konyrov, B. (2013) In 2012 Kazakhstan reduced oil production, *Tengrinews*, 28 January. Available at: http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-2012-godu-kazahstan-sokratil-dobyichu-nefti--227450/ (Accessed: 18 October 2020).

Kosa, S and Ruzin, R. (2007) The Bridge between West and East Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan, *Altalanos.* Available at: http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00002/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2008_2_107-112.pdf (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Krasner, S. D. (1985) *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism.* London: University of California Press.

Krasner, S. D. (1978) *Defending the National Interest. Raw Material Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Krastev, N. (2017) 'The fate of the Kazakh artist is tragic evidence of the consequences of nuclear tests', *UN News*, 30 August. Available at: https://news.un.org/ru/audio/2017/08/1316442 (Accessed:7 March 2021).

Kraukhamer (2006) Unipolarity revisited. The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment, *International Security*, 31(2), pp. 7–41.

Krause, P. *et al.* (2021) 'COVID-19 and Fieldwork: Challenges and Solutions', *PS - Political Science and Politics*, 54 (2), pp. 1-6.

Krippendorff, K. (2019) *Content analysis and introduction to its methodology*. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Krishna, S. (2012). Decolonizing International Relations. Available at : https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/08/decolonizing-international-relations/ (Accessed: 1 May 2023).

Krug, K. (2001) An Overview of Oil and Gas Pipelines in Kazakhstan, *Kazakhstan Business magazine.* Available at: http://www.investkz.com/en/journals/28/315.html (Accessed: 19 October 2020).

Kuandyk, A. (2021) Kazakhstan Chairs Working Group of Preparatory Commission for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, *The Astana Times,* 26 March. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2021/03/kazakhstan-chairs-working-group-of-preparatory-commission-for-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/ (Accessed: 3 October 2021).

Kudaibergenova, D. and Shin, B. (2018) Authors and Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Failed Agency and Nationalising Authoritarianism in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, *Asian Studies Review,* 42(2), pp. 304-322.

Kudrenok, T. (2012) Kazakh Leader gives green light to test launch of 24.KZ TV channel, *Kazinform,* 3 July. Available at: https://www.inform.kz/en/kazakh-leader-gives-green-light-to-test-launch-of-24-kz-tv-channel_a2476898 (Accessed: 13 September 2020).

Kumar, S. (2021) 'Nuclear-Free World' photo exhibition opens in Seoul', *The Korean Herald,* 9 November. Available at: http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211109000925 (Accessed: 10 June 2021).

Kumenov, A. (2022) Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev to lose his place in constitution, *Eurasianet,* 5 May. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-to-lose-his-place-in-constitution (Accessed: 7 May 2022).

Kursiv (2017) 128.6 million tenge to allocate Kazakhstan for humanitarian aid to Tajikistan, *Kursive.Media,* 16 November. Available at: https://kursiv.kz/news/finansy/2017-11/1286-mln-tenge-vydelit-kazakhstan-na-gumanitarnuyu-pomosch-tadzhikistanu (Accessed: 19 October).

Kushkumbayev, S. (2015) Kazakhstan's Nurly Zhol and China's Economic Belt of the Silk Road: Confluence of Goals, *Astana Times,* 22 September. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2015/09/kazakhstans-nurly-zhol-and-chinas-economic-belt-of-the-silk-road-confluence-of-goals/ (Accessed: 1 November 2021).

Kushkumbayev, S. (2020) Peaceful Initiatives of Kazakhstan: consistency is the key to success, Interview with Sanat Kushkumbayev. Interviewed by Roman Ivanov for *365 Infor*, 15 July. Available at: https://365info.kz/2020/07/mirnye-initsiativy-kazahstana-posledovatelnost-zalog-uspeha-ekspert (Accessed: 26 September 2021).

Kushkumbayev, S. (2020a) Kazakhstan is one of the leaders of the world anti-nuclear movement, Interview with Sanat Kushkumbayev. Interviewed by Roman Ivanov for *365 Infor*, 29 October. Available at: https://365info.kz/2020/10/kazahstan-odin-iz-liderov-mirovogo-antiyadernogo-dvizheniya (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

Labs, E. (1992) Do weak states bandwagon? *Security Studies*, l1 (3), pp.383-416.

Lake, D. A, and Morgan, P.M. (1997) The new regionalism in security affairs, in D. Lake and P. Morgan (eds) *Regional Orders Building security in a new world.* The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Lake, D. A, and Morgan, P.M. (1997a) *Regional Orders Building security in a new world.* The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Lamont, C. (2015). Research Methods in International Relations. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Lane D. and Samokhvalov, V. L. (2015) *The Eurasian Project and Europe: Regional Discontinuities and Geopolitics.* Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Lane, D. (2017) *The Eurasian Project in Global Perspective.* London: Routledge.

Laruelle, M. (2021). Central Peripheries. Nationhood in Central Asia. UCLPress.

Laruelle, M. (2004) The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism, *Nationalities Papers,* 32(2), pp. 115–136.

Laruelle, M. (2015) Factoring the foreign policy goals of the Central Asian States, in D, B.H. Denoon *China, The United States, and the Future of Central Asia: U.S.-China Relations.* New York, NY: New York University Press, pp. 75-98.

Laruelle, M. (2015a) Kazakhstan's Posture in the Eurasian Union: In Search of Serene Sovereignty, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 165, 17 March. Available at: https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-165-7-10.pdf (Accessed: 2 November 2021).

Laruelle, M. (2018) Why No Kazakh Novorossiya? Kazakhstan's Russian Minority in a Post-Crimea World, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 65(1), pp. 65-78.

Laruelle, M., Royce, D. and Beysembayev, S. (2019) Untangling the puzzle of "Russia's influence" in Kazakhstan, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 60 (2), pp. 211-243.

Laruelle, M. (2019) Kazakhstan's Dilemma on Eurasian and Central Asian Integrations, in D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf (eds) *Central Asia in the Era of Sovereignty. The Return of Tamerlane?* London: Oxford University Press, pp.395-414.

Latypova, E. (1998) The President instructed the Foreign Ministry to strengthen the economic aspect in its activities, *Panorama*, 36, article number 302. Available at https://www.neweurasia.info/archive/archives/september/Vnp0079.htm (Accessed: 20 October 2020).

Laumulin, M. (1994) Nuclear Politics and the Future Security of Kazakhstan, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Winter, pp.61-65.

Laumulin, M. (1995) Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policy and the Control of Nuclear Weapons, in G. Quester (ed) *The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. M.E. Sharpe, London, England, pp. 181-211.

Laumulin, M. (1999) *Kazakhstan in contemporary international relations.* Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Laumulin, M. (2011) Some problems of Kazakhstan's current foreign policy, *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 12 (1), pp. 114-123.

Lee, J-E. (2010). Foreign Policy Formation of Authoritarian States in Central Asia Since 1991: Non-Institutional Domestic Factors in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 8(1), pp. 33-71. Available at https://www.kjis.org/journal/view.html?uid=38&page=&pn=mostread&sort=publish_Date%20DESC&spage=&vmd=Full (Accessed: 2 March 2021).

Lee, D. (2015) 'Experts Discuss Challenges of Introducing Trilingual Education System in Schools', *The Astana Times*, 13 October. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2015/10/experts-discuss-challenges-of-introducing-trilingual-education-system-in-schools/ (Accessed: 21 October 2020).

Legvold, R. (2003) *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*. Cambridge, Mass: London: American Academy of Arts and Sciences: MIT Press.

Lemke, D. (2016) 'Dimensions of Hard Power: Regional Leadership and Material Capabilities', in D. Flames (ed) *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers.* London: Routledge, pp. 31 – 30.

Leskina, N. and Sabzalieva, E. (2021) Constructing a Eurasian higher education region: Points of correspondence between Russia's Eurasian Economic Union and China's Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 62 (5/6), pp. 716-744.

Levy, J. S. (2004) What do Great Powers Balance Against and When? in T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann (eds) *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Libman, A. (2012) Post-Soviet Space, Central Asia and Eurasia, in A. Libman and E. Vinokurov (eds) Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 193 – 202.

Libman, A. (2017) Russian Power Politics and the Eurasian Economic Union: The Real and the Imagined, *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 2 (1), pp. 81-103.

Libman, A. (2018). Eurasian Economic Union: Between Perception and Reality. *New Eastern Europe,* 9 January. Available at: http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/01/09/8767/ (Accessed: 2 January 2022).

Libman, A. and Vinokurov, E. (2012) *Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Libman, A., and Vinokurov, E. (2018) Autocracies and Regional Integration: The Eurasian Case, *Post-communist economies,* 30 (3), pp.334-364. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2018.1442057

Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy (2020) *Lectures of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy N. A. Nazarbayeva in the leading universities of the world*. Nur-Sultan: Library of the First President of the Republic Kazakhstan – Elbasy.

Library (no date) *The Golden Horde is the Golden Cradle of Kazakh Statehood, The Library of the First President of the Republic Kazakhstan – Elbasy*. Available at: https://elbasylibrary.gov.kz/en/news/golden-horde-golden-cradle-kazakh-statehood

Lillis, J. (2010) Kazakhstan: OSCE Summit Set to Open in Astana, *Eurasianet,* 30 November. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-osce-summit-set-to-open-in-astana (Accessed: 21 October 2020).

Lillis, J. (2019) *Dark Shadows Inside the Secret World of Kazakhstan*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Lim, T-W., Chan, H., Tseng, K., and Lim, W.X. (2016). *China's One Belt One Road Initiative*. London: Imperial College Press.

Lindell, U. and Persson, S. (1986) 'The paradox of Weak State Power: A research and literature overview', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of Nordic international Studies Association*, 21(2), pp. 79-97.

Liska, G. (1968) *Alliances and Third World.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lloyd, P. (1986) *International Trade Problems of Small Nations.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Lobel, S. E., Ripsman, N. M. and Taliaferro, J. W. (2009) *Neoclassical Realism, the state and foreign policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Long, T. (2022). *A Small States's Guide to Influence in World Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Lopez-Aranda. (2018) 'The 21st – Century World Order', in B. Belli and F. Nasser (eds). *The Road Ahead. The 21st Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Planners.* Alexandre de Gusmao Foundation.

Lottholz, P. (2022) *Post-Liberal Statebuilding in Central Asia. Imaginaries, Discourses and Practices of Social Ordering*. Bristol University Press.

Luft, G. (2009) *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st century: a reference handbook*. Calif: Praeger Security International. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Maass, M. (2009) The elusive definition of the small state, *International Politics*, 46 (1), pp. 65-83.

Maass, M. (2020) Small states: Surviving, perishing, and proliferating through history, in G. Baldacchino and A. Wivel (eds) *Handbook on the Politics of Small States.* UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 20-38.

Madill, A. and Cough, B. (2008) Qualitative research and its place in psychological science, *Psychological methods*, 13, pp. 254-271.

Maitre, E. (2018) Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policy : an efficient niche diplomacy ? *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, Note no. 10/2018, pp. 1 – 12. Available at: https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/kazakhstans-nuclear-policy-efficient-niche-diplomacy-2018 (Accessed: 4 August 2020).

Malashenko, A. (2015) Nazarbayev as Mediator, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 21 January. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/57771 (Accessed: 21 October 2020).

Mamadshoev, M. (2022) Kazakhstan: Tokayev's Ascent to True Power, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 14 January. Available at: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kazakstan-tokayevs-ascent-true-power (Accessed: 20 January 2022).

Mamysh, Zh. (2019) Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan spoke about nuclear weapons, *Kursiv*, 16 October. Available at: https://kursiv.kz/news/geopolitika/2019-10/glava-mid-rk-rasskazal-pro-yadernoe-oruzhie (Accessed: 9 October 2021).

Mamashuly, A. (2020) A great gift. Statements of Russian deputies about the territory of Kazakhstan sparked outrage, *Radio Azattyk*, 15 December. Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstanis-reaction-to-the-statements-of-russian-deputies-about-the-kazakh-territory/31002411.html (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Manifesto (2016) Manifesto: The World. The 21st century, *Akorda*, Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_other_events/manifesto-the-world-the-21st-century (Accessed: 14 April 2021).

Mannik, E. (2002) 'EU and the Aspirations of Applicant Small States: Estonia and the evolving CESDP', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp. 77-90.

Mansurov, T. (2014) *About Eurasian Project. Plenary session "Dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations"*. Available at: https://www.lihachev.ru/pic/site/files/lihcht/2014_Sbornik/2014_Dokladi/2014_plen/2014_plen_024.pdf (Accessed: 22 October 2021).

Mansurov, T. (2013) *Implementation of the Eurasian Project of Nursultan Nazarbayev*. Moscow: Real-Press.

Marat, E. (2009) 'Kazakhstan's military reform and OSCE Chairmanship: Regional implications', *Security and Human Rights*, 1, pp. 83 – 87. Available at: file:///D:/2022%20May/1%20-%20Kazakhstan%20Foreign%20Policy/2009%20-%20Marat%20-%20OSCE%20and%20Kazakhstan%20shrs-article-p83_14.pdf (Accessed: 22 November 2021).

Mariager, R. and Wivel, A. (2019). Denmark at war: great power politics and domestic action space in the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, *Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies DUPIDOK*., pp.48-8.

Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (2010). *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. Palgrave: Macmillan.

Marketos, T.N. (2009) *China's Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia*. Routledge. New York.

Mathisen, T. (1971) *The Function of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Mazarr, M.J. Priebe, M. Radin, E. Cevallos, A.S. (2016) *Understanding the Current International Order*. RAND Corporation.

Mazarr, M.J., Priebe, M., Radin, E., Cevallos, A.S., Reedy, A., Rothenberg, A. D., Thompson, J.A. and Willcox, J. (2017) *Measuring the Health of the Liberal International Order*. RAND Corporation. Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085724.pdf (Accessed: 7 November 2021).

Medeubaeva, Zh. (2020) Assessment of the participation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the EAEU, *Russia and Eurasia*, *Strategic Survey*, 118(1), pp. 244-285,

Mehdieva, N. (2011) *Power Games in the Caucasus: Azerbaijan's Foreign and Energy Policy Towards the West, Russia and the Middle East*. London: New York: I. B. Tauris.

Mesbahi, M. (1995) 'Regional and Global Powers and the International Relations of Central Asia', in A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds) *The making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 215-245.

MFARK, (2011) *Building a Nuclear Safe World: the Kazakhstan Way*. Astana: Committee for International Information Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

MFA Republic of Kazakhstan, (2015) *Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions*. Available at: http://mfa.kz/en/content-view/s-ezd-liderov-mirovykh-i-traditsionnykh-religij (Accessed: 22 October 2020).

MFA Republic of Kazakhstan. (2019) *CICA. The Conference for Interaction and Confidence building in Asia.* Available at: http://mfa.kz/en/content-view/svmda (Accessed: 22 October 2020).

MFA KAZ, (2021) *Eurasian integration*. Available at: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/activities/7788?lang=en (Accessed: 15 November 2021).

Miles, L. (2002) Small States and European Union: Reflections, *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp. 91-98.

Miles, L. (2005) *Fusing with Europe? Sweden in the European Union.* Aldershot: Ashgate

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (no data) *Small states.* Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/International-Issues/Small-States#:~:text=In%201992%20in%20New%20York,of%20concern%20to%20small%20states (Accessed: 28 March 2021).

Michel, C. (2014) The Confusing Direction of the EEU, *The Diplomat*, 7 October. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-confusing-direction-of-the-eeu/ (Accessed: 23 October 2020).

Mikhailova, L (1994) The arrest of the leader of the Russian community of Kazakhstan, *Kommersant,* 16 April. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/76340 (Accessed: 5 January 2021).

Mininfor (2021) 30th Anniversary of Kazakhstan's Independence: April is held under the auspices of "Science and Technology", *The Ministry of Information and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan,* 6 April. Available at: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/qogam/press/news/details/182657?fbclid=IwAR3T917wiBDed0Lp7HYl3c9moQ3Y31oGIqSw7n4sB1iGOm2HOpj9TSyp9vc&lang=en (Accessed: 7 April 2021).

Mitchell, R. B. (2010) *International politics and the environment*. London: SAGE.

Molchanov, M. A. (2015) *Eurasian regionalisms and Russian foreign policy*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Moldashev, K. and Hassan, M.A.G. (2017) 'The Eurasian Union: actor in the making?', *Journal of International Relations and Development,* 20, pp. 215–237.

Morgenthau, H. (1967) *Politics among Nations: the struggle for power and peace*. 4th Ed. New York: Knopf.

Morison, C. E and Suhrke, A. (1978) *Strategies of Survival: the foreign policy dilemmas of Smaller Asian States.* St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press; Hemel Hempstead: Distributed by Prentice-Hall.

Moses, J. (2000) *Open states in the Global Economy: The Political Economy of Small-State Macroeconomic Management.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mostafa, G. and Mahmood, M. (2018) 'Eurasian Economic Union: Evolution, challenges and possible future directions', *Journal of Eurasian Studies,* 9, pp. 163-172.

Mostafa, G. (2013) 'The concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications', *Journal of Eurasian Studies,* 4, pp. 160-170.

Mullerson, R. (2007). *Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game*. London: Routledge.

Naumkin, V. V. (2003). Russian Policy Towards Kazakhstan. In: Legvold, R. *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*. The MIT Press.

Nazarbayev, N. (1990) 'Speech at the II session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR twelfth convocation "On the draft of a new Union Treaty", Alma-Ata, 16 October 1990', in M. Kasymbekov (ed) *First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. Chronicle of activity. 1990-1991*. Astana: Business World Astana, pp. 315 – 323.

Nazarbayev, N. (1991) ‘Statement to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in withdrawal from the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU’, in M. B. Kasymbekov, B. B. Temirbolat, J. K. Usembayeva, Y. A. Khasenov, and T. A. Temirkhanov (eds) *First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. Chronicle of activity. 1990–1991*. Astana: Delovoi Mir, p. 395.

Nazarbayev, N. (1991a) ‘Speech at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR. Moscow, August 26, 1991’, in M. B. Kasymbekov, B. B. Temirbolat, J. K. Usembayeva, Y. A. Khasenov, and T. A. Temirkhanov (eds) *First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. Chronicle of activity. 1990–1991*. Astana: Delovoi Mir, p. 396-404.

Nazarbayev, N. (1991b) ‘Speech at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 26 August 1991’, M. B. Kasymbekov, B. B. Temirbolat, J. K. Usembayeva, Y. A. Khasenov, and T. A. Temirkhanov (eds) *First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. Chronicle of activity. 1990–1991*. Astana: Delovoi Mir, pp. 404-407.

Nazarbayev, N. (1991c) ‘Lecture “Kazakhstan in a changing world” at Royal Institute of International Relations, Great Britain, London October 30, 1991’, in Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy. (2020) *Lectures of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy N. A. Nazarbayeva in the leading universities of the world*. Nur-Sultan: Library of the First President of the Republic Kazakhstan – Elbasy, p. 8-10.

Nazarbayev, N. (1992) *Strategy of Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state.* Almaty: Dauir.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994) ‘Lecture at Columbia University, New York, 16 February 1994’, in Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy. (2020) *Lectures of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy N. A. Nazarbayeva in the leading universities of the world*. Nur-Sultan: Library of the First President of the Republic Kazakhstan – Elbasy, pp. 11 – 23.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994a) ‘On the creation of a regional belt of stability’, in N. Nazarbayev (1997a) *The Eurasian Union; ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 23-31.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994b) ‘The Eurasian Union is necessary - we are simply doomed to trust each other’, in N, Nazarbayev (1997a) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 32-38.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994c) ‘On the formation of the Eurasian Union of States’, in N. Nazarbayev (1997a) *The Eurasian Union; ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 38-50.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994d) ‘Don't look for something that isn't there’. Interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev. Interview for *Nezavisimaya Gazeta.* In N. Nazarbayev. (1997a) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997.* Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 60-61.

Nazarbayev, N. (1994e) ‘Eurasian Space: Integration Potential. Conference Report’, in N, Nazarbayev (1997a) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 90 – 99.

Nazarbayev, N. (1995) ‘For strategic partnership with Russia’. Interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev. Interviewed by Terehov, V. for *INTERFAX-Exclusive,* February, in N. Nazarbayev. (1997a) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 169-180.

Nazarbayev, N. (1995a) ‘Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva at the conference UN Disarmament, Geneva, 8 June 1995’, in B. K. Sultanov (ed) President *N.A. Nazarbayev and modern Kazakhstan. Volume III. N. A. Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan's foreign policy: a collection of documents and materials in three volumes*. Almaty: KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, pp. 137-145.

Nazarbayev, N. (1996) ‘Integrationism. Based on equality, voluntary and on pragmatic interest – This is a decent future for Eurasia’, in Lectures of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy N.A. Nazarbayev in the leading universities of the world. - Nur-Sultan: Library of the First President of the Republic Kazakhstan - Elbasy, pp. 35 – 49.

Nazarbayev, N. (1996) *Five Years of Independence*. Almaty: Kazakhstan.

Nazarbayev, N. (1997) ‘Message of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan. October 1997’, *Akorda.* Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-na-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-oktyabr-1997-g (Accessed: 12 February 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (1997a) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997.* Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences.

Nazarbayev, N. (1997b) Russia could have become the core of the commonwealth, but it did not. Interview to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 January 1997’, In Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia

(1997) *President N. A. Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan – Russia relations. Reports, speeches and articles 1991 – 1997*. Moscow: Russian Raritet, pp. 331 – 344.

Nazarbayev, N. (1997c) 'A man who decided to remove the waiting belt from Eurasia', Interview to "Russia",35, 18-24 October 1995', in Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia (1997) *President N. A. Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan – Russia relations. Reports, speeches and articles 1991 – 1997*. Moscow: Russian Raritet, pp. 193-215.

Nazarbayev, N. (1997d) 'From an Imperial Alliance to a Commonwealth of Independent States', Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 10 March 1992, in Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia (1997) *President N. A. Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan – Russia relations. Reports, speeches and articles 1991 – 1997*. Moscow: Russian Raritet, pp. 7-21.

Nazarbayev, N. (2001) *Epicentre of Peace*. Almaty, Zhibekzoly.

Nazarbayev, N. (2001a) 'Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev in Norwegian Institute of International Relations, Oslo, April 3, 2001', in B. K. Sultanov (ed) *President N.A. Nazarbayev and modern Kazakhstan. Volume III. N.A. Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan's foreign policy: a collection of documents and materials in three volumes.* Almaty: KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, pp. 146-154.

Nazarbayev, N. (2001b) 'The 21st Century, towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons', in G, Nurymbetova and R. Kudaibergenov (eds) *Foreign Policy Initiatives of the President of the Republic Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. Historical and documentary research.* Almaty: Kazakh Encyclopedias, pp. 232 – 239.

Nazarbayev, N. (2003) 'Prosperity, Security, and Improvement of the Welfare of all Kazakhstan Message from the President of the country to the people of Kazakhstan 1997', in N. Nazarbayev *Strategy of Independence.* Almaty: Atamura, pp. 5 – 76.

Nazarbayev, N. (2005) 'Message of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan on the way of accelerated economic, social, and political modernization (5.3. About the situation in the region)', *Akorda Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, February.* Available at: http://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-na-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-fevral-2005-g (Accessed: 25 October 2020).

Nazarbayev, N. (2006) 'From the speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva at the G8 Summit, St. Petersburg, July 15, 2006', in B. K. Sultanov (ed) *President N.A. Nazarbayev and modern Kazakhstan. Volume III. ON. Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan's*

foreign policy: a collection of documents and materials in three volumes. Almaty: KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, pp. 155-157.

Nazarbayev, N. (2006a) 'Speech at the dinner on behalf of the Foundation "Nuclear Threat Initiative", Washington, September 28, 2006', in G. Nurymbetova, and R. Kudaibergenov (eds) *Foreign Policy Initiatives of the President of the Republic Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. Historical and documentary research*. Almaty: Kazakh Encyclopediasy, pp. 247-252.

Nazarbayev, N. (2010) 'Global Peace and Nuclear Security', in G. Nurymbetova and R. Kudaibergenov (eds) *Foreign Policy Initiatives of the President of the Republic Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. Historical and documentary research*. Almaty: Kazakh Encyclopediasy, pp. 255 – 259.

Nazarbayev, N. (2011) 'Eurasian Union: from idea to history of the future', *Izvestia*, 25 October. Available at: https://iz.ru/news/504908 (Accessed: 2 October 2020).

Nazarbayev, N. (2011a) 'State Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Building the future together', *Akorda Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 28 January. Available at: http://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-28-01-2011-g_1340624589 (Accessed: 24 October 2020).

Nazarbayev, N. (2012) 'Message of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Leader of the Nation Nursultan Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan "Strategy" Kazakhstan-2050 ": a new political course of the established state', *Akorda Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 14 December. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/astana_kazakhstan/participation_in_events/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-lidera-nacii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-strategiya-kazahstan-2050-novyi-politicheskii- (Accessed: 29 September 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2013) *Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council*. Available at: https://president.gov.by/ru/events/v-minske-sostojalos-zasedanie-vysshego-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soveta-7253 (Accessed: 9 April 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2014) 'Nazarbayev recalled Kazakhstan's right to withdraw from the EAEU', *Tengrinews*, 25 August. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-napomnil-o-prave-kazahstana-na-vyihod-iz-eaes-260719/ (Accessed: 2 November 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2015) Kazakhstan calls to "rally around the idea of Greater Eurasia", *UN News*, 27 September. Available at: https://news.un.org/ru/story/2015/09/1271561

Nazarbayev, N. (2016) 'Remarks by President of Kazakhstan Mr Nursultan Nazarbayev at Plenary Session of International Conference 'Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World', *Akorda Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 29 August. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/internal_political_affairs/in_speeches_and_addresses/remarks-by-president-of-kazakhstan-mr-nursultan-nazarbayev-at-plenary-session-of-international-conference-building-a-nuclear-weapon-free-wor (Accessed: 28 September 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2016a) *National Statement: Kazakhstan*. Nuclear Security Summit Washington 2016. Available at: http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/national-statement-kazakhstan (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2016b). 'Akorda: Topical issues of peace, security and global economy', *Information News Agency,* 2 March. Available at: https://www.inform.kz/en/akorda-topical-issues-of-peace-security-and-global-economy_a2877115 (Accessed: 8 July 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2017). *Era of Independence*. Astana.

Nazarbayev, N. (2017a) Cited in Kazykhanov, E. (2017) Kazakhstan: Building a Nuclear-Safe World. Available at: https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/fall-2017/kazakhstan-building-a-nuclear-safe-world (Accessed: 7 October 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2017b) Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev at the meeting of the UN Security Council "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_speeches_and_addresses/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-n-nazarbaeva-na-zasedanii-soveta-bezopasnosti-oon-nerasprostranenie-omu-mery-doveriya (Accessed: 22 September 2021).

Nazarbayev, N. (2018) *Speech from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan, October 5, 2018.* Available at: http://www.president.kz./ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-nnazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-5-oktyabrya-2018-g?q=%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC (Accessed: 26 October 2020).

Nazarbayev, N. (2019) Quote cited in A. Yergalieva 'Nazarbayev proposes way to create Greater Eurasia', *Astanatimes,* 13 November. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2019/11/nazarbayev-proposes-way-to-create-greater-eurasia/

Neumann, I. B. and Gstohl, S. (2006) 'Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?', in C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstohl and J. Beyer (eds) *Small States in International Relations.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 3-36.

Newsru (2012) Lukashenka: Kazakhstan slowed down the transformation of the EurAsEC, *News.ru,* 21 March. Available at: https://www.newsru.com/finance/21mar2012/lukashenko.html (Accessed: 5 November 2021).

Nuechterlein, D. E. (1969) Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, and Austria, in C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstohl and J. Beyer (eds) *Small States in International Relations*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 311.

Nichol. J. P. (2009). *Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U. S. Interests*. Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress.

Nicolaidis, K. (2020). Bringing Europe Back In: Global IR, Area Studies and the Decentring Agenda. *St Antony's International Review* 16 no. 1 (2020): 197-206.

Nielsen, J. (2019) 'The Humanitarian Initiative and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty', in J. E. Doyle (ed) *Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation. Achieving Security with Technology and Policy*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Butterworth-Heinemann, an imprint of Elsevier.

Niklasson, T. (2006) *Regime, Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956–1994.* Lund: Lund University Press.

Nikonorov, A. (2019) 'Kazakhstan's main trading partners: 10 countries with the largest turnover', *Inbusiness Kz,* 16 October. Available at: https://inbusiness.kz/ru/news/glavnye-torgovye-partnery-kazahstana-10-stran-s-naibolshim-tovarooborotom (Accessed: 20 October 2020).

Nourzhanov, K. and Saikal, A. (1994) 'The New Kazakhstan: Has Something Gone Wrong?', *The World Today,* 50 (12), pp. 225-229.

Nurymbetova, G. and Kudaibergenov, R. (2010) *Foreign Policy Initiatives of the President of the Republic Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. Historical and documentary research*. Almaty: Kazakh Encyclopediasy.

Nye, J. S. (1990) 'The Changing Nature of World Power', *Political Science Quarterly,* 105 (2), pp. 177-192.

Nye, J. S. (2003) *The Paradox of American Power: why the world's only superpower can't go it alone.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nye, J. S. (2004) *Soft Power: the means to success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, J. S. (2011) *The future of power*. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, J. (2017) Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea, *Foreign Affairs*, 12 December. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive (Accessed: 5 August 2023).

Nye, J. S. (2017) 'Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept', *Palgrave Communications*, 3, 17008, pp. 1-3. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms20178 (Accessed: 8 November 2021).

Olafsson, B. G. (1998) *Small States in the Global System: analysis and illustrations from the case of Iceland.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Olcott, M. B. (1996) *Central Asia's new states: independence, foreign policy, and regional security.* Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Olcott, M. B. (2002) *Kazakhstan*: *Unfulfilled Promise*. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Olcott, M.B. (2005) *Central Asia's Second Chance*. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Olcott, M. B. (2010) *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*? Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Olifan, K., Mills, S., Kampbel, S., Mariani, B., Paasiaro, M., and Ksiamin, T. (2015) *Central Asia at a crossroads the changing roles of Russia and China in the region and implications for peace and stability.* Saferworld: Central Asia at a crossroads. Preventing Violent Conflict. Building Safer Lives.

Omelicheva, M. Y. (2010) *Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia*. Central Asian Studies. New York: Routledge.

O'Prey, K. (1995) *Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia*. Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Orazgaliyeva, M. (2014) 'Energy, Industrial Cooperation Agreements Signed During Visit of Italian Prime Minister', *The Astana Times,* 13 June. Available from https://astanatimes.com/2014/06/energy-industrial-cooperation-agreements-signed-visit-italian-prime-minister/ (Accessed: 21 October 2020).

Orazgaliyeva, M. (2015) 'UN Adopts Nuclear-Weapons-Free World Declaration initiated by Kazakhstan', *The Astana Times,* 8 December. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2015/12/un-adopts-nuclear-weapons-free-world-declaration-initiated-by-kazakhstan/ (Accessed: 2 August 2021).

Orisbayev, Z. (2021) 'Kazakh language police trigger Russian politicians', *Eurasianet*, 16 August. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/kazakh-language-police-trigger-russian-politicians (Accessed: 4 March 2021).

Osgood, R. (1968) *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

Ostrowski, W. (2010) *Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan*. London and New York: Routledge.

Overland, I., Kjaernet, H. and Kendall-Taylor, A. (2010) *Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.* Central Asian Studies. USA and Canada: Routledge.

Oxford Analytica (2003) 'Kazakhstan Multi-vector foreign policy under pressure', *The Oxford Analitica Brief*, 10 December. Available from https://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB106155 (Accessed: 22 October 2020).

Palmer, G. and Morgan, T. C. (2011) *Theory of Foreign Policy.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Panke, D. (2010) *Small States influence in the European Union: Coping with Structural Disadvantages*. Farnham; Burlington, Vt: Ashgate.

Park, J-W, B. and Chung, D-H. (2022) 'Sovereignty and trading states: denuclearization in Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine', *International Relations*, 36 (3), pp. 480-503.

Pedersen, R. B. (2018). Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in theNordic States Status-seeking Strategies? *International Peacekeeping*, 25(2), pp.217–241. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1394792 (Accessed: 8 July 2023).

Pedi, R. and Sarri, K. (2019). From the 'Small but Smart State' to the 'Small and Entrepreneurial State': Introducing a Framework for Effective Small State Strategies within the EU and Beyond, *Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology*, 9(1, 26), pp. 1-17. Available at: https://intapi.sciendo.com/pdf/10.1515/bjes-2019-0001 (Accessed: 2 October 2023).

Persaud, R. B. (2001) *Counter-hegemony and foreign policy: the dialectics of marginalised and global forces in Jamaica*. New York: SUNY press.

Peyrouse, S. (2007) 'Nationhood and the minority question in Central Asia. The Russians in Kazakhstan', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59 (3), pp. 481-501.

Pieper, (2021) 'The linchpin of Eurasia: Kazakhstan and the Eurasian economic union between Russia's defensive regionalism and China's new Silk Roads', *International Politics*, 58, pp. 462-482.

Pifer, S. (2019) 'Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum', *Brooking,* 5 December. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/05/why-care-about-ukraine-and-the-budapest-memorandum/ (Accessed: 23 November 2020).

Pifer, S. (2020) 'Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation', *Brooking,* 17 March. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/ (Accessed: 15 January 2021.

Plischke, E. (1977) *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

PNND 2019 'Victim of Soviet nuclear tests made a trip to England and Scotland', *Parliamentarians for Non-proliferation and Abolition of Nuclear Weapons*, 9 December. Available at: http://www.pnnd.org/ru/article/zhertva-sovetskih-yadernyh-ispytaniy-sovershil-poezdku-v-angliyu-i-shotlandiyu (Accessed: 8 March 2021).

Podberezkin, A. and Podberezkina, O. (2015) 'Eurasianism as an idea, civilizational concept and integration challenge', in P. Dutkiewicz and R. Sakwa (eds). *Eurasian Integration - The View from Within.* London: Routledge, pp. 46-60.

Pomfret, R. (2019) *The Central Asian Economies in the Twenty-First Century: paving a new Silk Road.* Princeton University Press.

Popescu, N. (2014) *Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the likely.* Chaillot Papers, 132. EU Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_132.pdf (Accessed: 14 October 2021).

Portnikov, V. (1994) 'Islam Karimov about Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Islamic Ideological Expansion', in N. Nazarbayev (ed) *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Fund for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp.65-66.

Pourchot, G. (2008) *Eurasia rising: Democracy and Independence in the Post-Soviet Space*. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, London.

Press release (2015) *EU and Kazakhstan initial Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (no date) EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6182/press-release-eu-and-kazakhstan-initial-enhanced-partnership-and-cooperation-agreement_en (Accessed: 5 November 2019).

Primeminister (2019) *Forum of Interregional Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia: Trade increased by 3.5 times over 15 years.* Available at:

https://primeminister.kz/en/news/forum-mezhregionalnogo-sotrudnichestva-rk-i-rf-za-15-let-tovarooborot-vyros-v-3-5-raza Accessed: 27 March 2021).

Proedrou, F. (2010) 'Ukraine's foreign policy: accounting for Ukraine's indeterminate stance between Russia and the West', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 10 (4), pp. 443–456.

Putz, C. (2021) 'Kazakhstan: Please Don't 'Politicize' the Eurasian Economic Union. Let's keep to discussions about trade, okay?', *The Diplomat*, 9 June. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/kazakhstan-please-dont-politicize-the-eurasian-economic-union/ (Accessed: 3 October 2021).

Qazakh Inform (2020) 'Kustanai Joker', *Qazakh Inform Youtube Channel*, 13 February. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Xq3YXPM_HM (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Qoraboyev, I. (2010) 'From Central Asian regional integration to Eurasian integration space? The Changing dynamics of Post-Soviet Regionalism', in E. Vinokurov (ed) *Eurasian Integration Yearbook*. Almaty: Eurasian Development Bank, pp. 206-232.

Radoman, E. (2018). Small States in World Politics: State of the Art. *Journal of Regional Security* ,13(2), pp.179–200.

Rakhimzhanov, A. M. Kaipova, B.M. Musina, N.K. and Ramazanov, G.A. (2019) *On the way to a nuclear-free world: Elbasy's initiatives: scientific collection.* Nur-Sultan: Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy.

Ranov, Zh. (2017) 'The Eurasian Economic Union: Past, Present and Future', *Eurasian Research Institute*, 139, 21 December. Available at: https://eurasian-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Weekly-e-bulletin-21-11-2017-27-11-2017-No-139.pdf (Accessed: 4 October 2020).

Rayemeker, O., Andries, W., Crollen, L., De Fraye, H. and Govaerts, F. (1974) *Small powers in alignment.* Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Rea, T and Wright, J. (1997) *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Oxford University Press.

Reeves, J. (2014) 'Rethinking weak state behaviour: Mongolian's foreign policy toward China', *International Politics*, 51 (2), pp. 254-271.

Reid, G. L. (1974) *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Relations Behaviour of Microstates.* London: Sage.

Reiss, M. (1995) *Bridled ambition: why countries constrain their nuclear capabilities*. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.

Renwick, D. (2015) 'Nicaragua's Grand Canal', *Council on Foreign Relations.* Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nicaraguas-grand-canal

RFE/RL's Kazakh Service (2018) 'Astana Rejects Lavrov's Statement on Visa-Free Travel to Kazakhstan For Americans', *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 16 March. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/astana-rejects-lavrov-statement-visa-free-travel-americans/29104597.html#:~:text=Astana%20Rejects%20Lavrov's%20Statement%20On%20Visa%2DFree%20Travel%20To%20Kazakhstan%20For%20Americans,-March%2016%2C%202018&text=Kazakhstan's%20Foreign%20Ministry%20has%20rejected,free%20regime%20for%20U.S.%20citizens (Accessed: 10 October 2021).

RFI, (2014) 'Hollande in uranium-rich Kazakhstan to discuss contracts, relations with Russia', *RFI France,* 15 December. Available at: http://en.rfi.fr/asia-pacific/20141205-hollande-uranium-rich-kazakhstan-discuss-contracts-relations-russia (Accessed: 28 October 2020).

Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C.M. and Ormston, R. (2010) *Qualitative Research Practise a guide for social science students and researchers.* SAGE Publication ltd.

Ritchie, N. and Kmentt, A. (2021) 'Universalising the TPNW: Challenges and Opportunities', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 4 (1), pp. 70-93.

Roberts, S. R. (2015) *The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Kazakhstan's Multi-Vector Foreign Policy.* PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 388. Available at: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Pepm388_Roberts_Sept2015-8.pdf (Accessed: 15 February 2020).

Roberts, S. R. (2019) 'The Eurasian Economic Union: the geopolitics of authoritarian cooperation', in J. O'Loughlin and R.S. Clem (eds) *Political Geographies of the Post-Soviet Union.* London and New York: Routledge.

Rostoks, (2010) 'Small states, Power, International change and the Impact of Uncertainty', in R. Steinmetz and A. Wivel (eds) *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Farnham, England: Routledge.

Roth, A. (2019) 'Kazakhstan president Nazarbayev steps down after 30 years in power', *The Guardian,* 19 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/19/kazakhstan-president-nursultan-nazarbayev-steps-down-after-30-years-in-power (Accessed: 5 November 2019).

Rothstein, R. (1968) *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Roy, O. (2000) *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations*. New York University Press.

Rubinstein, A.Z (1997) 'The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy', in K. Dawisha (ed) *The International Dimension of post-communist transition in Russia and the new states of Eurasia*. New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe – Armonk.

Rumer, B. and Zhukov, S. (2003) *Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence*. Central Asian Studies. AAKAR Books.

Russel, B. (2004). *Power: A New Social Analysis*. London:

Russian Embassy in KZ (no data) '*Largest Companies', Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: http://www.rfembassy.kz/tm/russian_mission_in_kazakhstan/krupneishie_kompanii/?cid=0&page=1 (Accessed: 2 March 2021).

Rutz, J. (2013) 'Bolashak International Scholarship Programme Celebrates 20 Years', *The Astana Times,* 4 December. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2013/12/bolashak-international-scholarship-programme-celebrates-20-years/ (Accessed: 29 October 2020).

Ruwet, M. Corbett, J. Yi-Ching, X and Weller, P. (2023). Climate change multivectorism and small states. How the Marshall Islands rocked the boat at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in Godfrey Baldacchino (ed) *The success of small states in international relations: mice that roar?* London: Routledge.

Rywkin, M. (2006) 'Stability and Security in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan', *American Foreign Policy Interests,* 28 (6), pp. 451-458.

Sadykova, R. 2013 'Eurasian idea of N.A. Nazarbayev as the basis of modern integration', *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 89, pp. 377 – 386.

Sakal, H. B. (2015) 'Natural resource policies and standard of living in Kazakhstan', *Central Asian Survey,* 34(2), pp. 237–254.

Satpaev, D. (2015) 'Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic Union: The view from Astana. The EEU is President Nursultan Nazarbayev's pet project, but membership carries risks for Kazakhstan', *European Council on Foreign Relations,* 12 January. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kazakhstan_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_view_from_astana395/ (Accessed: 3 October 2021).

Saunders, R.A. (2010) *The Many Faces of Sacha Baron Cohen: Politics, Parody, and the Battle Over Borat.* London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Schatz, E. (2004) *Modern clan politics: the power of "blood" in Kazakhstan and beyond*. Seattle, Wash: University of Washington Press.

Schoeller, M. G. and Falkner, G. (2022). Acting in the Shadow of German Hegemony? The Role of Small States in the Economic and Monetary Union (Introduction to the Special Issue), *German Politics*, 31(2), pp.197-217. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2005028 (Accessed: 9 June 2023).

Schoeller, M. G. (2022). Centrifugal forces in a hegemonic environment: the rise of small-state coalitions in the Economic and Monetary Union. *European Political Science Review*, 14, pp.1–17. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773921000254 (Accessed: 9 July 2023).

Schmitz, A. (2013) 'The Political Economy of Kazakh foreign policy', in J. Ahrens and W. H. Herman (eds) *Institutional Reform in Central Asia: politico-economic challenges*. Routledge: London.

Schmidt, M. (2005) 'Is Putin pursuing a policy of Eurasianism?', *Demokratizatsiya (Democratisation)*, 13(1), pp. 200–205.

Schmitz, A. (2012) 'The political economy of Kazakh foreign policy', in J. Ahrens and H.W. Hoen (eds) *Institutional Reform in Central Asia Politico-Economic Challenges.* London: Routledge, pp. 111 – 128. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203094884

Schroeder, G. (1996) 'Economic Transformation in the Post-Soviet Republics: An Overview', in B. Kaminski (ed) Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 11-41.

Schou, A. and A.O. Brundtland, A. O. (1971) *Small States in International Relations*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Seidumanov, C.T. and Sultanov, B.K. (2011) *President Nazarbayev and Modern Kazakhstan. Part Three: Nursultan Nazarbayev and Foreign policy of Kazakhstan*. Astana: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Sembayev, Y. (2016) *Remarks by Mr. Yerbolat Sembayev, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament: May 12, 2016.* Available at: https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-ended_Working_Group_Advancing_Nuclear_Disarmament_Negotiations_(2016)/2016May%2BPanel%2BVI_Kazakhstan.pdf (Accessed: 5 September 2021).

Sengupta, A. (2016) *Symbols and the Image of the State in Eurasia.* Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, India.

Senggirbay, M. (2019) 'Ethnic Identity of Kazakhstani Russians: The Dynamics of Change and the Place of Russia as a Kin State', *Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics*, 13 (1), pp. 67- 89.

Shaffer, B. (2009) *Energy Politics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Shaukenova, Z. (2018) 'Kazakhstan – Participant in global decision-making process', *Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: http://kisi.kz/index.php/ru/biblioteka/publikatsii/25-shaukenova-zarema-kaukenovna/10-kazakhstan-uchastnik-protsessa-prinyatiya-globalnykh-reshenij (Accessed: 8 October 2021).

Shaukenova, Z. (2020) 'The way to a Nuclear-Free World: Initiatives of Elbasy', *Kazakhstan Insitute of Strategic Studies Undwer the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.* Available at: http://kisi.kz/index.php/ru/biblioteka/publikatsii/25-shaukenova-zarema-kaukenovna/6373-put-k-bez-yadernomu-miru-initsiativy-elbasy (Accessed: 7 October 2021).

Shchipanov, M. (1994) 'Nazarbayev Style and Handling of "Russian Question' ' Examined', in Z. Brzezinski, and P. Sullivan, (eds) *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, Data, and Analysis*. New York: Routledge, p. 182.

Shoemaker, M. W. (2005) *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent states*. 36th Edition. Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post Publications.

Shoemaker, M. W. (2010) *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent states*. 41st Edition. Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post Publications.

Singer, M.R. (1972) *Weak States in a World of Powers: the dynamic of international relations*. New York; London: The Free Press.

Sloan S, R. (2013) 'Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland. NATO's 'neutral' European partners: valuable contributors or free riders?', *NATO Review*, 23 April. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/partnerships-nato-2013/NATOs-neutral-European-partners/EN/index.htm (Accessed: 25 September 2021).

Slobodchioff, M. (2014) *Building Hegemonic Order – Russia's way*: *order, stability, and predictability in the post-Soviet space.* Lanham: Lexington Books.

Smaiyl, M. (2020) 'A hail of debris falls on our lands. Tokayev asked to close polygons', *Tengrinews*, 20 February. Available AT: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/grad-oblomkov-syipetsya-nashi-zemli-tokaeva-prosyat-zakryit-392175/ (Accessed: 11 January 2021).

Smith, M. G. (2012) 'Nazarbayev drift from "Multi-vector" foreign policy', *Central Asia and Caucasus Institute Analyst.* Available at: http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5763 (Accessed: 25 October 2019).

Smith, S. J. and Kavalski, E. (2010) 'NATO's Partnership with Central Asia: Cooperation a la carte', in E. Kavalski (ed) *The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors*. New Jersey: World Scientific Pub, pp. 29 – 48.

Sorbello, P. (2011) *The Role of Energy in Russian Foreign Policy toward Kazakhstan: Geopolitics, Economics, Law, and Technology in Central Asian Oil and Gas*. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbücken, Germany.

Sputnik (2021) 'Cave nationalism": Dauren Abaev responded to "language raids" in Kazakhstan', *Sputnik Kazakhstan,* 12 August. Available at: https://ru.sputnik.kz/20210812/peschernyy-natsionalizm-17846146.html (Accessed: 18 September 2021).

Sputnik (2021a) 'Til Maidana activist Kuat Akhmetov denied entry to Russia for 50 years', *Sputnik Kazakhstan,* 13 August. Available at: https://ru.sputnik.kz/20210813/Aktivistu-Tl-maydany-Kuatu-Akhmetovu-zapreschen-vezd-v-Rossiyu-17853131.html (Accessed: 21 September 2021).

Starr, F. and Daisha, K. (1997) *The International Politics of Eurasia: V.10: The International Dimension of post-Communist transitions in Russia and the new states of Eurasia.* London: Routledge.

Steinmetz, R and Wivel, A. (2010) *Small States in Europe: challenges and opportunities*. London and New York: Routledge.

Stegan, K. S and Kusznir, J. (2015) 'Outcomes and strategies in the 'New Great Game': China and the Caspian states emerge as winners', *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 6 (2), pp. 91-106.

Stevens, C.A. (2020) 'Russia–Kazakhstan Relations in the Early Post-Soviet Era: Explaining the Roots of Cooperation', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 72 (7), pp. 1153-1185.

Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. (2009) *Neoclassical Realism, The state and foreign policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stoessinger J.G. (1965). *The Might of Nations. World Politics in Our Time*. New York: Random House.

Statement (2020) *Statement by the delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the General debate of the Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Geneva, April 24, 2018. Available at: https://unrcpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Kazakhstan.pdf (Accessed: 7 March 2020).

Stansfield, D. (1973) 'The Foreign Policy of Cuba', in R.P. Barston (ed) *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 210-251.

Steinmetz, R and Wivel, A. (2010). *Small States in Europe: challenges and opportunities*. Farnham; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.

Steinsson, S. and Thorhallson, B. (2017) Small State Foreign Policy. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics. Available at: https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-484 (Accessed: 4 August 2023).

Suilleabhain, A. (2014) *Small States at the United Nations: Diverse Perspectives, Shared Opportunities.* International Peace Institute. Available at: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_small_states_at_un.pdf (Accessed: 25 September 2021).

Sullivan, C. J. (2019) 'End of Era? Kazakhstan and the fate of Multivectorism?', in J-F. Caron (ed) *Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Legacy: Between Continuity and Rupture*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 31-50.

Sultanov, B. (2015) 'Kazakhstan and Eurasian Integration', in P. Dutkiewicz, and R. Sakwa (eds) *Eurasian Integration - The View from Within*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 97-110.

Sultanov, B. (2010) *President Nazarbayev and Modern Kazakhstan. Part Three: Nursultan Nazarbayev and Foreign policy of Kazakhstan*. Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Sultanov, B. (2005) *Eurasian strategy of sovereign Kazakhstan*. Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Sultanov, B. and Muzaparova, L. (2003) 'Great power policies and interests in Kazakhstan', in R. Legvold (ed) *Thinking strategically: the major power, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian nexus.* Oxford, England: The MIT Press.

Sutton, P. (1999). What are the Priorities for Small States in the International System? The Round Table, 88:351, 397-402. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/003585399107938 (Accessed: 7 June 2023).

Sushko, A. (2020) 'A businessman from Rudny, who incited ethnic hatred, was sentenced to 2 years in prison', *Tobolinfo,* 5 November. Available at: https://tobolinfo.kz/k-2-godam-lishenija-svobody-prigovorile-predprinimatelja-iz-rudnogo-razzhigavshego-nacionalnuju-vrazhdu/ (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Sweijs, T. (2010) *The Role of Small Powers in the Outbreak of the Great Power War*. Occasional Paper, 1-2010. Centre for Small State Studies Publication Series University of Iceland. Available at: https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Sweijs-The-Role-of-Small-Powers-Sept-2010-1_0.pdf (Accessed: 20 September 2020).

Syroezhkin, K. (2011) 'China's Presence in Kazakhstan: Myth and Reality', *Central Asian and The Caucasus,* 12 (1), pp. 101-114.

Til Maydani (2021) *Kuat Akhmetov @Til Maydani on @TV channel Direct in the program @Taras Berezovets THE WEEK*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nB1rUKLDNTw (Accessed: 5 November 2021).

Temnychy, M. (2022) 'The Budapest Memorandum has done little to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty', *Emerging Europe*, 17 February. Available at: https://emerging-europe.com/voices/the-budapest-memorandum-has-done-little-to-guarantee-ukraines-sovereignty/ (Accessed: 5 September 2021).

Tengrinews (2010) 'Kazakhstan Allocates $ 11 Million Aid to Kyrgyzstan', Tengrinews, 20 July. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/news/kazahstan-vyidelil-kirgizii-11-millionov-dollarov-pomoschi-58380/ (Accessed: 30 October 2020).

Tengrinews (2012) 'Kazakhstan's 24/7 TV-channel started broadcasting on September 1', Tengrinews, 2 September. Available at: https://en.tengrinews.kz/cinema_and_music/kazakhstans-24-7-tv-channel-started-broadcasting-on-12599/ (Accessed: 15 September 2021).

Tengrinews (2014) 'Kazakhstan excludes general citizenship from EAEU treaty', *Tengrinews*, 26 May. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/kazahstan-isklyuchil-iz-dogovora-o-eaes-obschee-grajdanstvo-255918/ (Accessed: 2 November 2021).

Tengrinews. (2015) 'Russia handed over territory the size of Montenegro to Kazakhstan', *Tengrinews*, 16 April. available at: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/rossiya-peredala-kazahstanu-territoriyu-razmerom-273347/ (Accessed: 10 April 2020).

Tengrinews (2020) 'Tokayev spoke about the mandatory labelling of goods in the EAEU', *Tengrinews,* 19 May. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/tokaev-vyiskazalsya-obyazatelnoy-markirovke-tovarov-eaes-402762/ (Accessed: 3 February 2021).

Tengrinews (2020a) 'Putin recalled the "gifts of the Russian people" to the republics of the USSR', *Tengrinews,* 22 June. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/world_news/putin-napomnil-o-podarkah-russkogo-naroda-respublikam-sssr-406032/ (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

Tengrinews (2020b) 'Nonsense of a gray mare - the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan about the words of Russian deputies', *Tengrinews*, 23 December. Available at: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/bred-sivoy-kobyilyi-glava-mid-kazahstana-slovah-rossiyskih-423892/ (Accessed: 25 January 2021).

The Economist (2022) 'How Kazakhstan became more Kazakh', *the Economist*, January 29. Available at: https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/29/how-kazakhstan-became-more-kazakh (Accessed: 1 February 2022).

The Week. (2015) 'How Saudi Arabia exports radical Islam', *The Week*, 8 August. Available at: http://theweek.com/articles/570297/how-saudi-arabia-exports-radical-islam (Accessed: 2 November 2019).

Tight, M. (2019). Documentary research in the social sciences. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Thorhallsson, B. (2010) *The role of Small States in the European Union*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Thorhallsson, B. and Steinsson, S. (2018) 'The Theory of Shelter', *Research Project Policy Brief,* 1. 26 June. Available at: http://uni.hi.is/baldurt/files/2018/07/The-Theory-of-Shelter3909.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2020).

Thorhallsson, B., and Steinsson, S. (2017). Small State Foreign Policy. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics.

Thorhallsson, B., Steinsson, S. and Kristinsson, T. (2018) 'A Theory of Shelter: Iceland's American Period (1941-2006)', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 43 (4), pp. 539–563.

Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel, A. (2018). Brexit and small states in Europe: Hedging, Hiding or Seeking Shelter? In Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard and Ben Rosamond (eds) *The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.

Thorhallsson, B. (2000). *The Role of the Small States in the European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Toguzbayev, K. (2016) 'The life and fate of Boris Suprunyuk', *Radio Azattyk*, 14 December. Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-rossia-boris-suprunyuk/28168669.html (Accessed: 10 January 2021).

Tokaev, K. J. (2019) 'Kazakhstan continues to push for a nuclear-free world', *UN News,* 24 September. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047362 (Accessed: 8 October 2021).

Tokaev, T. (2011) *Foreign policy initiatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan*. Moscow: East-West.

Tokaev, K. J. (2020) 'Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 6, 2020 No. 280 "On the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030". Available at: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa-kiev/documents/details/23224?lang=ru

Tokaev, K. J. (2020a) President Kassym-Jomart Tokaev took part in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. Akorda, 19 May. Available at: https://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/international_community/foreign_other_events/prezident-kasym-zhomart-tokaev-prinyal-uchastie-v-zasedanii-vysshego-evraziiskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soveta (Accessed: 8 September 2020).

Topchyan, K. (1994) 'The idea of creating a Eurasian Union is being seriously studied in Armenia', in N. Nazarbayev *Eurasian Union - ideas, practice, perspectives 1994-1997*. Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, pp. 77-80.

Trenin, D. (2002) *The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalisation*. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Tuleubekova, A. (2019) 'A global alliance of leaders for nuclear-free weapons was proposed to be created at the site of the Astana Club', *Online.Zakon.Kz*. Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=33939185 (Accessed: 10 June 2021).

Twining, D. T. (1993) *The new Eurasia: a guide to the republics of the former Soviet Union*. Westport, Conn: London: Praeger.

UNAA (2016) *The United Nations and The Rules-Based International Order*. Australian Parliamentary Library. Available at: https://www.unaa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/UNAA_RulesBasedOrder_ARTweb3.pdf (Accessed: 3 October 2020).

UNDOC (2015) 'Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World : draft resolution / Kazakhstan', UN Digital Library. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/808671?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header

UN (2014). Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS). Available at: https://sdgs.un.org/statements/pacific-small-island-developing-states-psids-11452 (Accessed: 27 July 2023).

UNFPA (2019) *We Kazakhstan. Report. Analysis of the population situation in the republic of Kazakhstan.* United Nation Population Fund in Kazakhstan. Available at:

https://kazakhstan.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_FullReport_Eng_Final_0.pdf (Accessed: 22 January 2021).

Valdez, J. (1995). The Near Abroad, the West, and the National Identity in Russian Foreign Policy', in A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha (eds) *The making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Vanderhill, R., Joireman, S.F. and Tulepbayeva, R. (2020) 'Between the bear and the dragon: multivectorism in Kazakhstan as a model strategy for secondary powers', *International Affairs,* 96 (4), pp. 975–993.

Vanderhill, R. (2013) *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*. Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Vaus, D.A. (2001) *Research design in social research*. London: Sage.

Vllasi, G. (2023). Small States in Europe and the Changing International Order. Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 18 May. Available at: https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/small-states-europe-and-changing-international-order (Accessed: 12 September 2023).

Vinokurov, E and Libman, A. (2012) 'Eurasia and Eurasian integration: beyond the post-soviet borders', in E. Vinokurov (ed) *Eurasian Integration Yearbook.* Almaty: Eurasian Development Bank, pp. 80-95.

Vinokurov, E and Libman, A. (2012a) *Eurasian Integration: Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vinokurov, E. (2018) *Introduction to the Eurasian Economic Union*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vinokurov, E. (2017) 'Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results', *Russian Journal of Economics,* 3(1), pp. 50-70. Available at: https://rujec.org/article/27982/ (Accessed: 3 October 2020).

Vinokurov, E. and Nurseitova, T. (2020) The role of Kazakhstan as chairman of the EAEU is important for further integration. Available at: https://vinokurov.info/ru/rol-kazahstana-kak-predsedatelja-v-eajes-vazhna-dlja-dalnejshej-integracii/

Vital, D. (1967) *The inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vital, D. (1971). *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict*. London: Oxford University.

Vymyatnina, Y. and Antonova, D. (2014) *Creating a Eurasian Union: Economic Integration of the Former Soviet Republics.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walt, S. (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press.

Walker, W. (2000) 'Nuclear Order and Disorder', *International Affairs*, 76 (4), pp. 703-724.

Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Ward, A. (2019) 'Idea for modernising the rules-based international order. Chatham House Expert Perspectives', *Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs*. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-06-10-Expert-Perspectives.pdf (Accessed: 4 October 2020).

Weitz, R. (2014) '*Low-Key Caspian Sea Summit Has Far-Reaching Implications'*, *World Politics Review*, 30 September. Available at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14105/low-key-caspian-sea-summit-has-far-reaching-implications (Accessed: 25 October 2020).

Weitz, R. (2008) *Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia*. Central Asia Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. Washington: John Hopkins University-SAIS.

William, W. and Kaufman, W. W. (1956) *Power and International Relations. Military Policy and National Security*. New York: Princeton.

Wivel, A. (2013). From Small State to Smart State: Devising a Strategy for Influence in the European Union, in Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (eds) *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Wivel A. (2005). The security challenges of small EU member states: interests, identity and the development of the EU as a security actor. Journal of common market studies, 2005, Vol.43 (2), p.393-412.

Woehrel, S. (2011) *Belarus: Background and US Policy Concerns*. Congressional Research service. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL32534.pdf (Accessed: 4 November 2021).

World Bank (2003) *Small States*. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

World Bank (2019) *Small States Forum 2019*. World Bank. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2019/10/19/small-states-forum-2019 (Accessed: 28 March 2021).

Yesdauletova, A. (2009) Kazakhstan's energy policy: its evolution and tendencies', *Journal of US-China Public Administration*, 6 (4), pp. 31-39.

Yergaliyeva, A. (2019). Nazarbayev proposes a way to create Greater Eurasia. *The Astana Times*, 13 November. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2019/11/nazarbayev-proposes-way-to-create-greater-eurasia/ (Accessed 22 March 2021).

Yin, R. (2014) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* London: Sage.

Yin, R. (2009) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage.

Yost, D. (2015). The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine. *International Affairs,* 91 (3), pp. 505–538.

Yuneman, R. (2020) 'Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic Union from Integration to Political Hold-Up Strategy', *Russia in Global Affairs*, 18 (4), pp. 37-55.

Zabortseva, Y. N. (2016) *Russia's Relations with Kazakhstan: Rethinking Ex-Soviet Transitions in the post-soviet space*. Oxon: Routledge.

Zahariadis, N. (2005) *Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotions, Institutions & Greek Foreign Policy.* New York: Peter Lang.

Zakon Kazakhstan (no date) 'Law on languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 11, 1997 No 151-I', *Online.Zakon.Kz.* Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1008034&pos=5;-106#pos=5;-106 (Accessed: 4 June 2020).

Zakon Kazakhstan (no date, a) 'The official status of the Russian language was called into question: Opinions of public and political figures of Kazakhstan', *Online.Zakon.Kz*. Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31050013#pos=3;-116 (Accessed: 5 January 2021).

Zakon Kazakhstan (2011) 'Forum for a nuclear-free world began work in Astana', *Online.Zakon.KZ.* Available at: https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31065836 (Accessed: 7 June 2021).

Zardykhan, Z. (2004) 'Russians in Kazakhstan and demographic change: imperial legacy and the Kazakh way of nation building', *Asian Ethnicity,* 5(1), pp. 61-79.

Zharkenova, A. M. (2018) 'The multi-ethnic composition of the population of Northern Kazakhstan at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 21st centuries: historical features, modern trends, and prospects', *Vestnik KarGU*. Available at: https://articlekz.com/article/29631 (Accessed: 21 January 2021).

Zharylgapova, A. (2021) 'Kazakhstan is the Recognized Leader of World Anti-Nuclear Movement', *The Astana Times,* 20 July. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2021/07/kazakhstan-is-the-recognized-leader-of-world-anti-nuclear-movement/ (Accessed: 9 October 2021).

Zheutlin, P. (1990) 'Nuclear Testing: Nevada, U.S.S.R.', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* 46(2), pp. 10-12.

Appendices

Appendix 1. The concept of great power

The state is still the most important unit of analysis in all the mainstream theories of international relations. The state is like a coin in that it has two sides: the first side of this coin has attracted the vast majority of scholarly attention to the extent that International Relations (IR) has become known as the study of great powers. On the other side of the coin are the so-called small states which have been dismissed for a long time as an unimportant object within IR. The focus within IR on great powers is in some cases justified by looking at the international system during the cold war and since its conclusion. But, the concept has its history and legitimacy. The European powers for five centuries had assumed 'the mantle of great powers' (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002, p. 132), and the legitimacy through the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to institutionalise great power status in the United Nations (UN) by five states the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China (Evans and Newnham, 1998, pp. 209-10). When it comes to the definition of great power, it is clear and straightforward. Morgenthau claims that 'only the great powers determine the character of international politics at any one period of history' (cited in Griffiths *et al*., 2009, p. 52). Bull (2012, p. 196) claims 'great powers are power recognized by others to have, and conceived by their leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties'. But, on the other hand, what is important for this research project is that the definition of great power comes also from a comparative approach by downgrading small states. It is to claim that it is here where the definition of the small state originated and begins. For instance, 'Great Powers are distinguished from small states by criteria such as resources, economic development, military capability and the success of their foreign policies, pursued either alone or in association with others, on a wide range of issues' (Barston, 1971, p. 41). Krasner claims that 'while small states focus on preserving their territorial and political integrity and their narrow economic interests, only great powers will try to remake the world in their image' (cited in Griffiths et al., 2009, p. 45). Keohane (1969, p. 59) on the same claim great powers as 'system-determining states', while small states are 'system-ineffectual states' because their 'foreign policy is the adjustment to reality, not rearrangement of it'.

Appendix 2. Foreign Policy and Priorities

ANNUAL STATE ADDRESS	FOREIGN POLICY	PRIORITIES 1 Countries	PRIORITIES 2 Regions and IOs
1998	Multilateral diplomacy		
1999	-	Russia/China/USA	
2000	-	-	CSTO/SCO
2001	-	-	Eurasian and Central Asian integration/SCO/CSTO/Caspian region/CICA
2002	Multilateral and pragmatic	USA	EEC/SCO/CAC/ CICA/Europe/
2004	-	Russia/USA/China/Central Asia/	CICA/CSTO/EU/
2005	An active, diverse and balanced foreign policy	Russia/China/US/	/SCO/CIS/OSCE/CES EU/Asia/Middle East
2006	Balanced foreign policy	Russia/China/US/	EU/Central Asia/Muslim World
2007	Multi-vector foreign policy	Russia/China/US/	EU
2008	Unchanged	Russia/China/Central Asia/US	CICA/SCO/CSTO/ NATO/EU/
2010	An active, pragmatic and balanced foreign policy	-	Creation of a Customs Union with Russia and Belarus
2012a	Balanced foreign policy	-	
2012b	Pragmatic and balanced foreign policy	Russia/China/Central Asia/US/	EU/Asia
2014	Pragmatism	-	-
2018-	Pragmatism	Russia/ /Central/Asia/ China/US/Turkey/Iran/Middle east/Asia	EAEU/EU/CIS

Source: Akorda, speeches of the President of Kazakhstan. https://www.akorda.kz/kz/speeches?page=9&category=

Appendix 3. Kazakhstan's external engagement and initiatives

Regional Initiatives.	
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	The CIS came for the existence as the result of the meeting of post-soviet republics in Almaty, 21 December 1991
The Conference for Interaction and Confidence building measure in Asia (CICA)	The CICA idea has been presented at the UN GA in 1992 by President Nazarbayev
The Eurasian Union (EAU)	Eurasian Union idea has been presented at the Moscow State University in 1994 by President Nazarbayev
Central Asian Union (CAU)	The CAU has emerged as the result of the meeting of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1994
The Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions	This institution was set up in 2003 as the response to the growing issue of religion in the international arena.
The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (2009) – later – The Organization of Turkic States (2021)	Started in 1990s it has been transforming from cooperation to organisation between Turkic speaking states
SPECA program	The initiative for the adoption of UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia
The Eurasian Pact on Stability of Energy and Global Energy Environmental Strategies	On the development of the Eurasian Pact on Stability of Energy and Global Energy Environmental Strategies
The Eurasian Media Forum	The forum has been set up as a platform to address regional and global issues
The Astana Economic Forum	The Economic forum has been set up to address global economic issue and produce recommendations to financial institutions

International initiatives	
Afghanistan	Assistance Programme for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan
On Iran nuclear program and 6+2 Talk	KZ and hosting of two round talks on Iran's nuclear programme
The creation of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy	A UN Regional Centre with headquarters in Almaty to coordinate all UN agencies in the region
A food security office of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation	Establishing a food security office of the OIC in Astana
The adoption of a Universal Declaration for a Nuclear Weapon Free World	President Nazarbayev aims to take further actions to eliminate the nuclear threat

International Decade of the Rapprochement of Cultures	At the initiatives of Kazakhstan, the General Assembly proclaimed 2013-2022 as the International Decade of the Rapprochement of Cultures;
On Economic Crisis	The First World Anti-Crisis Conference, held as a part of the Astana Economic Forum in May 2013 in Astana; Outcome: the Astana Declaration; the recommendation of the Forum to G20 leaders and the main road map of the World Anti-Crisis Plan were adopted as outcome document
Path to Green Economy	Kazakhstan has also initiated the transition to a green economy in CA within the framework of the regional Intergovernmental Commission on Sustainable Development
Low-Enriched Uranium Bank	Kazakhstan was promoting International Nuclear Fuel Bank be located in Kazakhstan
Global Environment	The initiative to create the registry of global environmental problems
UN global conference for the landlocked states	Kazakhstan has taken initiatives to hold this conference in Almaty
63rd Session of the ECOSOC for the Asian and Pacific states.	The session has taken place in Almaty by the initiatives from Kazakhstan

Source: Abuseitova, (2011); Sultanov, (2010); Sultanov, (2015); KISI (2019); Rakhimzhanov et al., (2019); Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, (2010);

Leadership Exercise in regional institutions.	
Conference for Interaction and Confidence building in Asia (CICA)	Chairmanship at the CICA: 2002-2006: 2006-2010;
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)	Chairmanship at the SCO 2004-2005, 2010-2011
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	Chairmanship at the OSCE in 2010
Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	Chairmanship at the OIC in 2011
United Nation Security Council (UNSC)	Non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2017 – 2018.

Source: Akiner, S. (2011); Weitz, R. (2008); Abuseitova, (2011); Sultanov, (2010).

Appendix 4. Eurasian Initiatives in Documents

English translation	Original Version
Sovereign Kazakhstan within USSR	
Speech at the XVII Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan "For the unity of the party and the socialist choice, for the real sovereignty of Kazakhstan in the renewed Union of the USSR", Alma-Ata, June 7, 1990.	Выступление на XVII съезде Компартии Казахстана "За единство партии и социалистический выбор, за реальный суверенитет Казахстана в обновленном Союзе СССР", г. Алма-Ата, 7 июня 1990 года.
Speech at the II session of the Supreme Council of the Kazakh SSR of the twelfth convocation "On the Draft of a new Union Treaty", Alma-Ata, October 16, 1990.	Выступление на II сессии Верховного совета Казахской ССР двенадцатого созыва "О Проекте нового Союзного договора", г. Алма-Ата, 16 октября 1990 года.
Speech at the IV plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan "On the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan on the draft Union Treaty", Alma-Ata, July 20, 1991.	Выступление на IV пленуме ЦК Компартии Казахстана "О позиции ЦК Компартии Казахстана к проекту Союзного договора", г. Алма-Ата, 20 июля 1991 года.
After August Coup in 1991	
Speech at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR. Moscow, August 26, 1991.	Выступление на внеочередной сессии верховного совета СССР. Г. Москва, 26 августа 1991 года.
Speech at the meeting of heads of sovereign states, Alma-Ata, October 1, 1991.	Выступление на встрече глав суверенных государств, г. Алма-Ата, 1 октября 1991 года.
Speech at the solemn meeting on the occasion of the Republic Day, Alma-Ata, October 4, 1991.	Выступление на торжественном собрании по случаю дня республики, г. Алма-Ата, 4 октября 1991 года.
Speech at a meeting with voters in Alma-Ata and Alma-Ata region, Alma-Ata, November 15, 1991.	Выступление на встрече с избирателями г. Алма-Ата и Алма-Атинской области, г. Алма-Ата, 15 ноября 1991 года.
After Minsk meeting of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine on December 8, 1991	
Speech at the solemn meeting of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the twelfth convocation on the occasion of the official inauguration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata, December 10, 1991.	Выступление на торжественном заседании верховного совета Республики Казахстан двенадцатого созыва по случаю официального вступления в должность Президента Республики Казахстан, г. Алма-Ата, 10 декабря 1991 года.
Almaty Meeting on December 21, 1991	
Speech at the meeting of heads of sovereign states, Alma-Ata, December 21, 1991.	Выступление на встрече глав суверенных государств, г. Алма-Ата, 21 декабря 1991 года.

Speech at the VII session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the twelfth convocation. Almaty city, December 23, 1991.	Выступление на VII сессии Верховного совета Республики Казахстан двенадцатого созыва. Г. Алматы, 23 декабря 1991 года.
Lecture our peoples have lived together for centuries, and strengthening good-neighbourliness is in the vital interests of millions of people. Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. RF, Moscow, March 29, 1994.	Лекция наши народы жили веками вместе, и укрепление добрососедства отвечает кровным интересам миллионов людей. Московская государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова. РФ, Москва, 29 марта 1994.
Lecture peace, development and democracy. Columbia University. USA, New York, February 16, 1994.	Лекция мир, развитие и демократия. Колумбийский университет. США, Нью-Йорк, 16 февраля 1994.
On the formation of the Eurasian Union	Проект документа: о формировании Евразийского союза государств
Eurasian space: integration potential and its implementation	Евразийское пространство: интеграционный потенциал и его реализация
Eurasian Union: ideas and possibilities of integration	Евразийский союз идей проблемы перспективы
Eurasian Union: Ideas and Opportunities for Integration	Евразийский союз: идеи и возможности интеграции
Eurasian Union new frontiers of problems and prospects from the report at the session of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Russian Federation. Moscow, February 16, 1996.	Евразийский союз новые рубежи проблемы и перспективы из доклада на сессии Академии социальных наук РФ. Москва, 16 февраля 1996
Eurasia: integration and disintegration. From the book On the Threshold of the 21st Century.	Евразия: интеграция и дезинтеграция. Из книги На Пороге 21 века.

Source: Books and Publications, https://elbasy.kz/en/books-publications; Abuseitova, (2011); Sultanov, (2010); Sultanov, (2015); KISI (2019); Rakhimzhanov et al., (2019); Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, (2010).

Appendix 5. Nuclear Initiatives in Documents

English translation	Original Version
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva at the New York Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 23, 1992	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева в Нью-Йоркском совете по международным отношениям, Нью-Йорк, 23 мая 1992 г.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the International Anti-Nuclear Congress, Almaty, August 30, 1993	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева на Международном антиядерном конгрессе, Алматы, 30 августа 1993 г.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev on the topic: "Peace, development, democracy" in Columbia US University, New York, February 16, 1994	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева на тему: «Мир, развитие, демократия» в Колумбийском университете США, Нью-Йорк, 16 февраля 1994 г.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the conference UN Disarmament, Geneva, 8 June 1995	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева на конференции ООН по разоружению, Женева, 8 июня 1995 г.
From a speech at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan on. Astana, September 14, 1998.	Из выступления на расширенном заседании коллегии МИД Республики Казахстан на. Астана, 14 сентября 1998.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev in Norwegian Institute of International Relations, Oslo, April 3, 2001	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева в Норвежском институте международных отношений, Осло, 3 апреля 2001 г.
Speech at an international conference. XXI Century: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Almaty, 28 August 2001.	Выступление на международной конференции. «XXI век: навстречу миру, свободному от ядерного оружия». Алматы, 28 августа 2001.
Speech at the international symposium "Kazakhstan: strengthening international cooperation for peace and security." Ust-Kamenogorsk, October 8, 2005.	Выступление на международном симпозиуме «Казахстан: укрепление международного сотрудничество во имя мира и безопасности». Усть-Каменогорск, 8 октября 2005.
From the speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the G8 Summit, St. Petersburg, July 15, 2006	Из выступления Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева на Саммите группы «Большой восьмерки», Санкт-Петербург, 15 июля 2006 г.
Dinner address on behalf of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Foundation. Washington, September 28, 2006.	Выступление на ужине от имени Фонда «Инициатива по сокращению ядерной угрозы». Вашингтон, 28 сентября 2006.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayeva at a gala event dedicated to the 20th anniversary termination of	Выступление Президента РК Н.А. Назарбаева на торжественном мероприятии, посвященном 20-летию

tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear site, Semey, June 18, 2009	прекращения испытаний на Семипалатинском ядерном полигоне, Семей, 18 июня 2009 г.
An article: Potential of an Infectious Democracy. 8 September 2009.	Статья. Потенциал зарождающейся демократии. 8 сентября 2009.
Global Peace and Nuclear Security. April 2, 2010.	Статья. Глобальный мир и ядерная безопасность. 2 апреля 2010.
Speech at the Nuclear Security Summit. On the topic "National measures to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and ensure the safety of nuclear material." Washington, April 13, 2010.	Выступление на Саммите по ядерной безопасности. По теме «Национальные меры по снижению угрозы ядерного терроризма и обеспечению безопасности ядерного материала». Вашингтон, 13 апреля 2010.
Speech at the International Forum in Astana, “International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-World”	Выступление на Международном форуме в Астане, «Международный форум за мир, свободный от ядерного оружия».
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the International Conference "From Banning Nuclear Tests to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons". 29 august 2012.	Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А.Назарбаева на Международной конференции «От запрета ядерных испытаний к миру, свободному от ядерного оружия»ю 29 августа 2012 года.
Building a world without nuclear weapons "dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site.	Построение мира без ядерного оружия», посвященная 25-летию закрытия Семипалатинского полигона.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev 4th Nuclear Security Summit 1 April 2016	Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А.Назарбаева на IV Саммите по ядерной безопасности. 1 апреля 2016 г.
Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev 4th Nuclear Security Summit. 1 April 2016.	Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н. Назарбаева на заседании Совета Безопасности ООН «Нераспространение ОМУ: меры доверия». 19 января 2018.

Source: Akorda, speeches of the President of Kazakhstan. https://www.akorda.kz/kz/speeches?page=9&category=; Abuseitova, (2011); Sultanov, (2010); Sultanov, (2015); KISI (2019); Rakhimzhanov et al., (2019); Nurymbetova and Kudaibergenov, (2010);

Appendix 6. Major Pipelines and Shareholders

	Pipeline Name	Shareholders	Destination	In Operation
1	the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)	Caspian Pipeline Ventures, Mobil, Shell, British Petroleum, Oryx, British Gas, Agip, Lukarco BV, Rosneft-Shell, Caspian Ventures, Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC, Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company, Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, Agip International (NA) NV, BG Overseas Holding Limited, Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC, Rosneft, LUKOil of Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Sultanate of Oman.	Europe	2001
2	Uzen-Atyrau-Samara	Kazakhstan-Russia	Europe	1970
3	Atasu-Alashankou	Kazakhstan-China	China	2005
4	the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline	BP (30.1 per cent); AzBTC (25.00 per cent); Chevron (8.90 per cent); Equinor (8.71 per cent); TPAO (6.53 per cent); Eni (5.00 per cent); Total (5.00 per cent), ITOCHU (3.40 per cent); INPEX (2.50 per cent), ExxonMobil (2.50 per cent) and ONGC (BTC) Limited (2.36 per cent)	Europe	2005
5	Georgia's Batumi port	Kazakhstan	Europe	2008

Source: Krug, (2001); BP (2019).

Appendix 7. Kazakhstan's main trading partners: 10 countries with the largest turnover

	Country Name	
1	Russia	$12,25 млрд (+0,8%)
2	China	$9,21 млрд (+26,2%)
3	Italy	$6,78 млрд (-18,1%)
4	South Korea	$4,3 млрд (+88%)
5	France	$3,01 млрд (+7,9%)
6	Netherland	$2,86 млрд (-37,5%)
7	Turkey	$2,01 млрд (+63,6%)
8	Uzbekistan	$1,82 млрд (+1,4%)
9	Spain	$1,75 млрд (+20,8%)
10	Switzerland	$1,47 млрд (-24,2%)

Source: Nikonorov, (2019).

Appendix 8. The Evolution of the Legal base during Yeltsin and Putin era

Yeltsin era. 25-05-92: The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan
28-03-94: The Treaty on Further Strengthening of Economic Cooperation and Integration between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan
20-01-95: The agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the single procedure of foreign economic activity regulation"
6-07-98: The declaration of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan "On eternal friendship and alliance oriented towards the twenty-first century"
12-10-98: The treaty "On economic cooperation for 1998-2007"
Putin era. 2001: A ten-year agreement on cooperation in gas field development
2002: An agreement on oil transit through Russia
2004: Border delineation agreement
7-07-2012: The Protocol on Amendments to the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance of May 25, 1992

Source: Kazembassy (no date); Bidlack (2015, p.262).