Eco-cities: technological showcases or public spaces?
Cowley, Robert

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Eco-Cities: Technological Showcases or Public Spaces?

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Robert Cowley

January 2016
Abstract

A growing body of critical literature seeks to identify conceptual and practical problems accompanying the realisation of mainstream ‘eco-city’ initiatives around the world. However, little attention has been paid to the status of the ‘city’ itself within the broader discourse. If eco-cities are to be more than experimental ‘technological showcases’, and aim to transform urban life more generally, the question of what types of ‘cityness’ will ensue is of considerable importance. To effect a more significant sustainability transition, eco-city plans and policies may need somehow to encompass a more nuanced conceptualisation of cities as complex, unpredictable, and emergent spaces. The incompatibility of such a conceptualisation with liberal-modernist modes of planning means that radically innovative new approaches to eco-city development may need to be found.

This thesis considers whether the eco-city, theorised as a multiple process of real-world experimentation, may shed some light on how ‘cityness’ might better be planned for in future. To do so, it conceptualises cityness through the lens of ‘publicness’. It makes an original contribution to knowledge by developing a new theoretical model of publicness as an ‘assemblage’ of space and behaviour, with an ‘emergent’ and ‘civic’ modality. It thereby extends recent debates over the idea of ‘urban assemblage’, and makes innovative links between theories of planning and of the public. This model informs the analysis of original empirical research, investigating the conceptualisation of the public in an international sample of official eco-city documents, and exploring the publicness of two implemented initiatives, in Portland, Oregon (US) and newly built Sejong City (South Korea).

The research finds that publicness tends to be poorly articulated in mainstream eco-city plans and policies, with potentially negative implications for sustainability in the ‘urban age’. However, it also argues that state institution-led planning – even when experimental ‘governance’ approaches are adopted – may inevitably be limited in its ability to encompass the emergent public life of the city. The thesis concludes by considering the prospects for overcoming or more productively acknowledging these limits in future.
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Notes on the Presentation of Findings

Photographs

All photographs used in the thesis were taken by the author, except where otherwise stated.

Quoted text

Italicised text within quotations is present in the original text, except where otherwise stated.

The quotations from eco-city documentation in Chapter Five, and verbatim comments from interview participants in Chapters Six and Seven, have been left unedited. Thus, in these cases, any unusual uses of English were also present in the original document or spoken comment.

In-text references

The in-text referencing systems used for comments made by research participants in the qualitative interviews are explained in Table 4.5 (Portland) and Table 4.6 (South Korea).

The in-text referencing system used for the 12 documents analysed in Chapter Five is explained in Table 4.3.

Transliteration of Korean names

All Korean names are transliterated using the Revised Romanization of Korean system, except in the cases of names which conventionally retain alternative spellings when romanised (e.g. Park).
I would like to begin by thanking the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, both for funding my project and for providing such a welcoming environment in which to develop as a researcher. I am deeply grateful for being given the chance to spend the last four years in this way. It would be futile to attempt to list out all the stimulating conversations I have had with staff and fellow PhD students, both in academic settings and informally, and the friendships I have made. Wells Street, and the cafés and pubs around it, are filled with the fondest memories.

The overall experience has been such a positive one in no small part due to the marvellous supervision I have received from Simon Joss and Dan Greenwood, who have motivated, inspired and supported me at every stage. I truly appreciate their professionalism, reliability and individual warmth; it would be difficult to imagine a better supervisory team. While both have repeatedly facilitated my involvement in academic activities outside my own project, I am especially grateful to Simon for the ongoing opportunities to provide research assistance in the International Eco-Cities Initiative.

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And I dedicate this thesis to my own father, long gone but much missed by us all.
Statement of Authorship

I hereby declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. All sources used in its preparation are suitably referenced.
Chapter One

Introduction: The Problem of Planning the Eco-City

This thesis contributes to a growing body of critical literature which seeks to identify conceptual and practical problems accompanying the realisation of ‘eco-city’ initiatives around the world. The term ‘eco-city’ is used here as an umbrella label to describe a broad range of contemporary urban-scale initiatives aiming in various ways to further the goal of sustainable development. The focus here is on initiatives in which policy-makers play at least an enabling role. Such initiatives are worthy of study precisely because they have become increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ into policy-making internationally since the turn of the century (Joss, 2011a; Joss, Cowley & Tomozeiu, 2013). In this sense, as a global body of discourse and practice backed by considerable financial and political resources, the eco-city represents a potent collective hope for the future of human society.

The significance of the contemporary eco-city is, however, ambiguous. The real-world policies and practices which it encompasses have historical links with, but should be distinguished from, the originally radical normative concept of the eco-city, minimally defined by Richard Register three decades ago as an “ecologically healthy city” (Register, 1987:3). Despite the normalisation of this aspirational idea over time, and its apparent acceptance at different levels of government, it would still be difficult to contradict Register’s accompanying assertion that “no such city exists” (ibid). In referring to eco-city initiatives, then, the intention is not to suggest that any particular existing urban settlements are in fact ‘sustainable’ in an absolute sense, but rather to indicate an unfurling process of ongoing experimental practices. In an optimistic light, any given eco-city initiative, particularly when accompanied by critical reflection and knowledge-sharing, might be welcomed more pragmatically as “just...a step in a much more ambitious undertaking towards less-wasteful lifestyles in built environments,
more sustainably in tune with their broader context and future needs” (Ryser, 2014:123). Conversely, however, contemporary outcomes may invite the more cynical conclusion that the eco-city’s transformative potential has largely been compromised as its practices have emerged through existing political institutions and market structures. Depending on one’s perspective, then, the case might be made that eco-city initiatives, individually or collectively, represent a constructively incremental approach to a series of pressing global problems; or that they have come to serve little more than ‘business as usual’.

At this stage, a preliminary demarcation of the empirical subject matter may be useful. In particular, the focus on urban sustainability initiatives recognised in official policy-making requires further justification. If more radically transformative sustainability ideas and practices are sought, it may be tempting to reject ‘mainstream’ activity on the grounds of the probability of its conservative orientation. Whitehead contrasts the “rhetorical commitments” of policy-makers with what Krueger and Agyeman (2005) call ‘actually existing sustainabilities’ in cities, which “occur outside of officially sanctioned programmes for sustainability” (Whitehead, 2012:29). Arguably, it is in ‘grassroots’ initiatives, taking place outside state institutions (Feola & Nunes, 2014), that more innovative challenges to the status quo might be found (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:366).

This approach, however, carries with it some risk of romanticising the import of ‘bottom-up’ or ‘community-led’ initiatives. With reference to the relevant literature, Feola and Nunes (2014) outline a series of impediments often faced by grassroots organisations which seek to effect societal change. These include: their reliance on actors with limited funding and personal influence; a lack of continuity due to reliance on voluntary participation; a lack of visibility; and the possibility that they are demographically or attitudinally untypical of the communities which they seek to represent. Feola and Nunes suggest that commentators have tended to focus on apparently successful examples, without considering the reasons for the failure of others. Perhaps more importantly, unless grassroots initiatives have revolutionary impact, their transformative effects will arise through negotiations with the wider world; grassroots initiatives are by definition those which have not yet been ‘translated’ (Smith, 2007)
into their broader context. The focus here on the mainstream, then, is not in denial of the agency or influence of grassroots urban sustainability initiatives (Seyfang & Smith, 2007); but the history of the eco-city, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, is precisely one in which earlier countercultural grassroots ideas, originally tested in peripheral (and even non-urban) ‘niches’, have grown in their scope and scalar ambition, and come to be actively promoted by official institutions in the so-called ‘urban age’. Contemporary eco-cities, moreover, may remain locally situated and constrained, but are also enabled by global networks of practice and discourse (Späth & Rohracher, 2012) which are reproduced within policy-making at different levels. The international dimensions of this enabling discourse appear to provide favourable conditions for the ongoing global proliferation of the individual eco-city initiatives with which it is co-constituted. To understand why this proliferation has not translated into a more convincing shift towards urban sustainability, it seems sensible to question the mainstream policy discourse itself.

Nevertheless, the thesis aims to avoid falling into a trap identified by Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) in relation to ‘climate change experiments’: that of reading the eco-city exclusively through the lens of institutional policy. The practices of the eco-city exceed that which is institutionally recognised, promoted or directly regulated; the policy and planning mechanisms supporting contemporary initiatives more typically enable or reflect ‘hybrid’ governance arrangements involving a wide variety and combination of non-state actors (Joss et al., 2013). And even those initiatives which adopt more obviously ‘top-down’ approaches, and are built on ‘greenfield’ sites, will be shaped as cities by the people that come to live in them. It makes little sense in any case to draw a binary distinction between plans and their socio-political contexts; from an alternative perspective, plans are technologies which form only one aspect of a dynamic process of development. The real-world eco-city, in short, cannot be directly inferred from the institutionally intended one; rather, it is the negotiated hybridity of eco-cities which allows them potentially to function as “new political spaces for experimentation” (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:368). And while institutional backing may be a significant factor in shaping the outcomes of such experiments, the relationship between this and the urban space
which results is not straightforward. Exploring this relationship is one of the key concerns of the thesis.

The eco-city, in the sense outlined above, has been critiqued from a variety of angles in recent years. The empirical concerns and analytical perspectives adopted in this literature vary, including, for example: the connections and disconnections between eco-city developments and their wider urban context (e.g. Hodson & Marvin, 2010; Joss & Molella, 2013; Caprotti, 2014; Caprotti et al., 2015); the processes through which exported eco-city plans are translated into local contexts (e.g. Chang & Sheppard, 2013; Hult, 2013; Rapoport, 2015); the governance processes through which initiatives are realised (e.g. Joss, 2011b; 2015); the foregrounding of economic considerations over others (e.g. Romero Lankao, 2007; Datta, 2012; Cugurullo, 2013a; 2013b); and the potential consequences of framing sustainability in strongly technological terms (e.g. Yigitcanlar & Lee, 2013; Hult, 2013; Shwayri, 2013; Carvalho, 2014; Caprotti, 2015). This thesis draws on such critical perspectives and others, but its original contribution lies in a shift of primary focus onto the nature of the city as envisaged in, and resulting from, related plans and policies. This ‘cityness’ is analysed from the perspective of its ‘publicness’. The central claim of the thesis is that the city is poorly conceptualised within mainstream eco-city discourse, and that this has problematic implications for the ambition of furthering the broader goal of sustainable development.

This introductory chapter aims to locate the ensuing discussion of the eco-city within a set of broader unresolved contemporary questions, in order further to justify its significance as an object of critical enquiry. It then outlines a series of more specific questions which guide the discussion and the methods adopted to answer these, and provides an overview of the thesis structure.

1.1 The Rise of the (Eco-)City

A variety of conditions appear to have enabled, or overdetermined, the emergence of eco-city thinking and practices. First, environmental concerns of different types have increasingly informed policy-making and shaped public debate since the 1980s, most significantly through the spread of the idea of ‘sustainable
development’, and most recently in the shape of concerns over ‘climate change’ (see Chapter Two). In the Global South, eco-city thinking offers potentially constructive solutions to socially and environmentally problematic forms of urbanisation (Joss, 2010); in the North, it may appeal as an imaginative transformational direction for cities in the post-industrial age (ibid). Cities more generally have increasingly become the focus for contemporary insecurities (Caprotti, 2015); although many environmental, social, political, and economic contemporary crises appear to be definitively “diffuse and systemic”, cities are the stages on which they are visibly played out (ibid:4). The new understanding that such crises are no longer contained within state boundaries chimes with the so-called ‘hollowing out’ (Jessop, 1994:264) of the nation state, with cities and city regions adopting a more vocal role, and imagined as more powerful economic agents, in the global political and economic arena. All this is set against the background of the widespread assertion that we now live in the ‘urban age’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2014; Joss, 2015): according to the United Nations (UN, 2008), the majority of humans now live in urban areas. If, then, the city appears to have become an increasingly dominant spatial frame through which solutions to global problems are envisaged, the eco-city in particular purports to represent a holistic solution to what Jordan and Huitema (2014:715–716) call the “many complex ‘mega trends’ that are rapidly changing the world – population growth, rapidly intensifying resource use – and their associated ‘wicked’ policy problems, not least climate change”. It may be no exaggeration to claim that “debates over the shape of ecocities of the future look more and more like debates over the city of the future” (Caprotti, 2015:90–91).

Just a few decades ago, however, the idea of investing hope for the future in cities would have struck many observers as peculiar. This is not to deny the significant influence of many historical attempts to improve urban environments (Kargon & Molella, 2008; Joss, 2010; 2015); there is some continuity over time in the understanding of the city as the locus where ecological, social, and economic problems become manifest (Caprotti, 2015). Rather, what distinguishes mainstream contemporary discourse about cities from that of, say, the 1970s (as will be discussed in Chapter Two) is the reversal of the conclusion that large cities were outmoded, or at least that their abandonment in favour of smaller settlements would indicate a
resolution of the problems which they were thought to cause. Older assumptions that growth necessarily takes place at the expense of the environment (Meadowcroft, 2000:371) have been supplanted by understandings that cities are potentially advantageous in terms of lower \textit{per caput} resource consumption as a result of density, offer democratic and cultural benefits in their tendency towards social diversity and inclusion, and exhibit efficient economies of agglomeration. The city no longer primarily represents a series of social and environmental problems, but is also often eulogistically presented as the solution to these problems, and urban transformation has come to be promoted as the key to a sustainable global future.

The close links between the elevation of the ideal of ‘sustainable development’ (SD) to the status of an international consensus concept (Blowers, 1997; Adger & Jordan, 2009b; Dobson, 2009; Cuthill, 2010; Cochrane, 2010) and the growth of the eco-city phenomenon are explored in Chapter Two. Since it would seem eccentric to refute the desirability of a sustainable global future, on its own terms at least, the notion of SD explicitly positions us as responsible towards this future. By implication, then, actions which undermine this possibility are positioned as irresponsible. In the case of governmental action, the obligation clearly arises to act in ways which are at least informed by the intention to shape a more sustainable future. Rather than being a “spontaneous social product”, SD implies “goal-directed intervention by governments and other actors” (Meadowcroft, 2007:302). In this sense, the eco-city might be interpreted as not only representing our hopes for the future, but also describing contemporary approaches to the intentional \textit{planning} of this future.

1.2 The Problem with ‘Planning’

Problematically, however, SD’s rise to prominence in recent decades has coincided with an ongoing collapse of faith in our ability to ‘plan’ things in a traditional sense. Our contemporary sensibility renders ‘planning’ itself hubristic (van Assche & Verschraegen, 2008); the

\footnote{The terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ are used interchangeably in the thesis (see footnote 10 in Chapter Two).}
world seems increasingly complex, uncertain, and non-linear (Rosenau, 2000; Chandler, 2014a). Following the arguments made by social theorists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), Healey characterises this sensibility in terms of an “anxiety” caused partly “because we know so much about what is happening all over the place in our knowledge-rich worlds”, and partly from the sense that “we live in worlds of multiple forces, over which we have limited control” (Healey, 1997:3). In broad terms, Mol (2002:165) suggests that the older philosophical quest to establish certainty (“how can we be sure?”) has been usurped by the question of how we can or should act in the face of an “undetermined world, where doubt can always be raised” (“how can we live with doubt?”).

If the goal of planning has always been the “rational mastery of the irrational” (Mannheim, 1940; cited in Healey, 1997:9), our confidence that we can achieve mastery over the world is challenged by a growing awareness of its irrationality. The long-term nature of the demands of SD only exacerbates this challenge. Policy-makers are hampered from meeting the challenge not only by short-term electoral cycles, but also by the evident impossibility of certainty in long-term predictions (Paterson, 2007:518), with SD in particular characterised by uncertain knowledge (Voß et al., 2007; Grunwald, 2007), ambiguities in its concrete goals (Voß et al., 2007, Walker & Shove, 2007), and the likelihood of non-linear feedback loops and unexpected consequences (Voß et al., 2007). The problem of planning in the face of such uncertainty is in fact recognised within Agenda 21, the implementational planning document arising from the very influential ‘Rio Summit’ in 1992 (see Chapter Two), as a justification for a ‘precautionary principle’ within SD:

“In the face of threats of irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific understanding should not be an excuse for postponing actions which are justified in their own right. The precautionary approach could provide a basis for policies relating to complex systems that are not yet fully understood and whose consequences of disturbances cannot yet be predicted” (UNDESA, 1992:35.3).

This is not to imply the existence of a previous era in which policy-makers and planners of different types operated in conditions of full certainty. Rather, as Luhmann observed in the 1980s, planning
“has for decades had to deal with the problem of complexity” (Luhmann, 1997: 41, cited in van Assche and Verschraegen, 2008:264). However, there was an older hope at least that it might “find better solutions using an approximate method of building models or simulations, by a slow adaptation of society to planning” (ibid). By the time Luhmann was diagnosing the “desolate state” (ibid) of planning, it had already gained a negative reputation through its association with centralised, often authoritarian approaches to post-WWII reconstruction (Giddens, 2009:95). The practical failure of older approaches to “cope with the complexities of a developed economic system” (Giddens, 2009:95) was further evidenced by the collapse of the Soviet system, such that “the very word ‘planning’ came under a shadow” (ibid) in its wake. And yet, Giddens argues, “whenever we think about the future in a systematic way, in the sense of attempting to shape or guide it, planning of some sort is inevitable” (ibid). Similarly, in commenting on Luhmann’s “dismal diagnosis” that the “hope of a reconciliation between planning and society is now lost”, van Assche and Verschraegen (2008:264) reject the inference that contemporary society no longer needs planning: rather, it remains “difficult, almost impossible, to abandon the notion of steering and to let the future come as it comes” (Luhmann, 1997:41, cited in van Assche and Verschraegen, 2008:264).

Following on from this, one conclusion might be that new modes of planning are required, possibly involving conceptual shifts of agency, new vocabularies, and new ambitions. Or, less radically, that planning’s ‘problem’ is in part a reputational one; even if its past failures describe attempts to plan the unplannable, there may still be a role for strong governmental involvement in certain realms of life – and particularly in those cases where catastrophe is unlikely to be averted through unguided collective agency. If climate change poses a significant threat to mankind, and this threat appears only to have grown over time, the case might be made for stronger governmental involvement in facing up to it. Giddens (2009) is among those who adopt this position: “Unregulated markets”, he argues, are unsuited to the task of tackling problems such as climate change precisely because they have “no long-term perspective” (Giddens, 2009:128). Either way, it remains unclear what a revived form of plan-making, better equipped to deal with the global problems faced by the contemporary world, might take.
Theorists of urban planning more specifically are no strangers to this dilemma. On the one hand, an older faith in the emancipatory potential of rational decision-making, based on scientific knowledge (Beauregard, 1989; Hillier, 2002), has ceded ground since the 1970s to the understanding that town planners typically have to deal with what Rittel & Webber (1973) labelled ‘wicked’ problems (Hartmann, 2012). Such problems cannot be definitively formulated, and may themselves be symptoms of other problems; the success of any urban interventions undertaken to address wicked problems can only ever be assessed from different perspectives, rather than in an absolute or consensual way (*ibid*). While cities and the built environment have been extensively theorised by urbanists as spatial phenomena expressing “complex processes” (Karadimitriou, 2010:425), the social sciences which once offered the promise of ordering this environment now too tend to theorise their broader subject matter as comprising “complex adaptive systems, self-organising, self-referential, autopoietic, and thus with their own strategies and expectations, with intertwining processes of emergence and adaption” (Geyer & van der Zouwen, 2001:11). Insofar as urban development has been expanded conceptually to embrace socio-economic and environmental considerations more explicitly, there is no longer an expectation that it can “be ‘planned’ by governmental action in a linear way, from intention, to plan, to outcome as planned” (Healey, 2006:3). Rather than aspiring to certainty about outcomes, urban policy-makers are therefore forced to work on the basis of guesswork about the future and incremental experimentalism (*ibid*).

Older approaches to planning as a technical exercise which was at the time “not seen as politically contentious” (Taylor, 1998:35) have been reinterpreted as value-laden (Thomas, 1994) and flawed in their assumption of the singularity of ‘public interest’ (Taylor, 1998:34). The historic reliance of urban planning on representational diagrams and the legal codification of space has been retheorised as a process of selective truth creation rather than neutral description (Murdoch, 2006:132); not only will the real “complex, teeming metropolis” (Taylor, 1998:36) always exceed the horizon of such representations, but the methods and processes of planning are thus problematically performative: they “enact” (Law & Urry, 2004) particular normative orderings onto disordered, heterogeneous urban space. Concurrently,
urban planning is “no longer seen as a generic, discrete activity separate from political processes”, but rather “as part of such processes. Rationality in planning is now embedded within such processes” (Allmendinger, 2002:42), and there is widespread acknowledgement of the significance of different types of power in shaping planning outcomes (see eg Flyvbjerg, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998; Hillier, 2002). Faith in the authority of plans has been undermined by the very awareness that their content is not inevitable, but arises out of multiple possibilities and is shaped by contingent political processes (Hillier, 2002).

While, then, traditional ‘top-down’ urban planning, based on hierarchy and positivism, is no longer seen as effective or desirable in many western countries (Friedmann, 2005:190–192), its broader applicability as a mode of development has been further undermined by a theoretical refocusing on the Global South in recent years among urban scholars (see eg Robinson, 2006; Yiftachel, 2006; Shatkin, 2007; Watson, 2009a; Parnell & Robinson, 2012). Based on such studies, it has been widely argued that informality and extra- legality is or has become the norm for urban life and development across large parts of the world (see eg: Al-Sayyad & Roy, 2003; Watson, 2009b; Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014a; Singh, 2014; Eskemose Andersen et al, 2015). In what have been called ‘informal hypergrowth’ cities, large proportions of the urban population have "built their own city without any reference whatsoever to the whole bureaucratic apparatus of planning and control in the formal city next door" (Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000, cited in Roy, 2005:148). Even if it is acknowledged that traditional urban planning may achieve some of its aims in the developing world, it still tends to have limited reach, and may actively create problems (Rakodi, 2001). The question of how to direct sustainable urban development through institutional plans and policies, in other words, only appears to be more pressing when a more global view of urban life is taken. Given its global ambitions, the eco-city potentially brings the contours of this dilemma into sharp relief. It would seem unclear how its ambitions might be achieved intentionally by policy-makers if planning appears to

2 While developing cities have thus been characterised as exhibiting a “complex continuum of legality and illegality” (Roy, 2005:149), McFarlane and Waibel (2012) argue that the interface between informal and formal processes in western planning systems is also rather more significant than has traditionally been appreciated.
function internationally as only a minor factor among many others in shaping urban space, and when urbanisation most typically proceeds in the absence of, or as a result of the unintended consequences of, planning undertaken by state authorities.

At the same time, this theoretical crisis of urban planning has not translated into its practical abandonment. It is unclear to what extent practitioners share the same concerns as theorists, or actively turn to theory for guidance (Campbell & Marshall, 1998; Sanyal, 2002; Binder, 2012; Harrison, 2014). Despite local inflections and changes over time, the practices of planning continue fundamentally to provide “a simple and highly structured view of the world and how to act in the face of inherent complexity” (Allmendinger, 2002:42), adhering to the “quintessentially modernist notion that socio-spatial phenomena are amenable to some form of monitoring and control” (Karadimitriou, 2010:425).

The suggestion that practitioners’ aspiration to respectability as ‘scientific’ professionals (Allmendinger, 2002:42) may partly account for their adherence to this worldview need not imply that planners are delusional, nor that their intentions are dangerously misguided. Rather, planners continue to act despite being “confused as to their roles and responsibilities” (Watson, 2009b:158), since there remains “a degree of benign social control…at the heart of any public planning activity because a total lack of societal control and order may result in chaos and anarchy. Planning provides a response to that possibility” (Yiftachel, 1998:395–396). Again, then, the desire to shape a better future, or a sense of responsibility to do so, is in tension with, but has not been undermined by, the theorised and empirically observed difficulties inherent in this responsibility.

To argue that planning retains “quintessentially modernist” (Karadimitriou, 2010:425) underpinnings, furthermore, is not to refute that a broad shift over time can be identified in planning processes, towards flexibility and wider inclusion, in the turn to so-called ‘communicative’ planning (related to the broader rise of ‘governance’ approaches (Rydin, 2013:5), which will be discussed further below). This shift is an uneven one – particularly outside the the Global North, Watson (2009b:154) notes, older ‘masterplanning’ approaches have “persisted to a remarkable degree” – but has tended
to reposition planners as no longer the “sole agents responsible for managing land and urban development (under a Keynesian mandate)”, but instead “just one of a range of players in shaping the city” (Watson, 2009b:158). It is as a response to, rather than in ignorance of, the crisis of faith in scientific rationalism as a basis for diagnosing problems and identifying solutions to socio-spatial issues, and in acknowledgement of the role of contingent power in planning processes, that communicative planning approaches were first advanced in the 1970s (Healey, 1997). Communicative planning theorists have departed from a positivist position to argue that better planning decisions – in the sense of these being more “robust, feasible, and just” (Innes & Booher, 2015:198) – result from collaborative efforts among networks of actors (ibid); that these should be underpinned not by neutral analysis conducted by government experts, but rather by “pragmatic joint inquiry” (ibid). In such approaches, then, relevant values and interests are not so much given as revealed through context-specific discursive interactions; the power of communication (ibid) is embraced, rather than the assumption that governmental actors represent, or should be empowered to represent, a pre-given public interest.

The assumptions underlying this tendency include the ideas that all forms of knowledge (including scientific knowledge) are socially constructed; that “rational systemic analysis” is only one of many forms of knowledge; that individual preferences are derived from social contexts rather than autonomously; and that there is no single identifiable public interest so much as a diversity of interests and expectations (Healey, 1997:29). By extension, emphasis is placed on the need to achieve consensus in a given, contingent context, and on the need for accountability “to all those with a ‘stake’ in a place” (ibid), with the role of the planner idealised as that of the ‘process manager’ (Versteeg & Hajer, 2010:168). While, then, planning perhaps inevitably continues to rely on ‘closure’ (Allmendinger, 2002:180), this does not imply an ongoing ideal of absolute scientific truth and knowability, so much as it sits in uneasy tension with a more pragmatic relativism. The shift towards the discursive, context-specific legitimisation of decision-making still leaves intact the constraints imposed by particular institutional, political and economic contexts.
Murdoch conceptualises the shift in planning practices over time explicitly as an attempt to embrace emergent complexity and heterogeneity, but comments that “there are few signposts available showing how planning might reach its new destination” (Murdoch, 2006:157). He relates this specifically to the challenge of how to reconceptualise the space of planning: away from a ‘smooth’ Euclidean space into which orderly entities will be placed, towards a more open-ended, heterogeneous conceptual spatiality. Other writers who argue for ‘Non-Euclidean planning’ or ‘postmodern’ urban planning of different types (see Chapter Five) similarly prefer to make the case for these as a broad direction, but do not provide clear guidance as to how they could be institutionalised. In any case, there appears to be little evidence in the case of the eco-city, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, of a new progressive conception of spatiality; rather, space is mobilised rhetorically in plans and policies to justify particular normative agendas.

More optimistically, it might be argued that experimental approaches continue to evolve, and a process of ongoing “social learning” (Friedmann, 2005:214) is possible if these experiments are accompanied by critical reflection both among planners and “relevant publics” (ibid). Joss (2015) has recently argued that the future of sustainable city depends in large part on the nature of the public debate surrounding it. This argument sets out a direction, but need not imply the possibility of devising a specific prescription for elevating planning practice from its current status as “a (relatively weak) restraint on market forces in the physical development of cities and regions” (Friedmann, 2005:214) to become a more vibrant, open-ended social learning process. Arguably, the challenge is not to determine this outcome in advance so much as to discover it through close observation of novel modes of organisation which emerge from the processes of development themselves.

Given the wide variety of political, environmental, economic and cultural contexts through which eco-cities are implemented, and – accordingly – the variety of deliverance mechanisms and types of actors involved, the eco-city would seem a potentially rich source of clues for how the ‘problem of planning’ might be resolved in future. Its modes of implementation range from apparently very traditional top-down modernist planning through to attempts to bring bottom-
up place-specific thinking and problem-solving into the heart of the institutional process, more clearly aligned with ‘communicative’ approaches to urban planning. The eco-city phenomenon, in this sense, is just as much an experiment in city management as it is in ‘eco’ technology.

In equal measure, then the eco-city represents a collective hope for the future of humanity, and attests to a collective uncertainty about how to realise this hope. But the ‘problem of planning’ which it illustrates is located within a still wider set of debates and questions, relating to what might be called an ongoing crisis of liberal modernity. This thesis at least implicitly intervenes in these debates, even though they do not form its main target. They are outlined below because they constitute an important contextual backdrop for the discussion and analytical mobilisation of ‘publicness’ later in the thesis. Another key concern of the thesis, as mentioned earlier, is to test the idea that in some ways the eco-city may be serving, as a result of the process of mainstreaming, to reproduce the structural conditions of unsustainable ‘business as usual’. Since these dominant structural conditions are widely labelled as ‘neoliberal’ in character, the broader intended sense of this term, and its relationship to classical liberalism, is outlined below.

1.3 Liberal Modernity, Neoliberalism, and Beyond

The growth of the liberal state is generally understood as being tied up with that of secularity, commerce and bourgeois property ownership from the seventeenth century onwards (Crouch, 2011). Its fundamental commitments are to “civil liberties and criticism of any political power exercised by organised religion” (ibid:3), such that “any form of liberalism must be concerned with the freedom of the individual” (Graham, 1992:150), with a concomitant desire to maintain “various separations of state from economy; of church from polity; of all of these…from moral judgements over how individuals conducted their lives” (ibid:4). Associated elaborate legal and institutional mechanisms arose largely in order to “protect the autonomy of the private property owner” (Habermas, 1989:79). The defining feature of liberalism relevant to this thesis is, then, its central concern to establish a clear division between the remit of the
state and the ‘private’ (individual and economic) world beyond. If the sanctity of ‘privacy’ is thereby the primary concern of liberalism, the governability or otherwise of this private world falls outside the remit of the ideal liberal state.

‘Modernity’ is associated with liberalism if only because of its contemporaneity; Giddens offers a ‘first approximation’ of modernity as referring to “modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence” (Giddens, 1991:1). In broad terms, modernity is associated with rationalising Enlightenment thought and the accumulation of secular knowledge as a means to emancipate humans from older feudal forms of social organisation (Habermas, 1983; Harvey, 1990:12–13). The “modern notion of self-determination” opposed the “traditional teleological cosmic order” (Bielskis, 2005:8) with the promise of the possibility of projecting “human values and desires on the world through scientific instrumental rationality, enabling the active intervention into and exploitation of nature” (ibid). Such ambitions are central to traditional conceptualisations of ‘planning’ in the sense that they promote “the value of scientific knowledge, empirical enquiry and acting in the world to improve it” (Healey, 1997:8). From the late eighteenth century onwards, the possibility arose that “rather than being perpetually vulnerable to the volatility of the markets, or the power of big capitalist companies”, it might be possible to plan “the trajectory of the future” (Healey, 1997:9) through the scientific management of both the natural environment (Barry, 2007:43) and the “socio-spatial relations unfolding within states and cities” (Healey, 1997:9).

If “liberalism is the political theory, ideology, and institutional practice/order of modernity” (Bielskis, 2005:9), then the ‘boundary work’ of liberalism referred to above also seems well attuned to modernity in the light of Bauman’s (1991) interpretation of the latter as an ongoing – though finally, in his view, futile and pernicious – attempt to delineate an orderly ‘inside’ from a chaotic ‘outside’. Such practices of rational delineation are reflected in the codification of civil law which, for Habermas (1989:74–81), played a key role in both the liberalisation of the market, and the demarcation of an autonomous ‘public sphere’, idealised as lying between the state and
the private sphere, and whose emancipatory promise lay in critical, rational discussion made possible by the existence of ‘civil society’, in contradistinction to the domination and coercion characterising older modes of social organisation.

If, then, classical liberalism sought to protect personal and economic life from state interference, ‘neoliberalism’ is widely interpreted as a reaction to the model of social democracy which arose following the second world war, including what Jessop (2002) calls the ‘Keynesian welfare national state’ (KWNS). The nineteenth century liberal laissez-faire model had appeared to lead to cycles of boom and bust, with disastrous social consequences internationally; KWNS aimed to curb these excesses by expanding the role of the state, so as to guide the development of society and the economy on the basis of rational planning (ibid). The period was marked by a general consensus that state intervention in market processes was necessary to ensure the welfare of citizens, with fiscal and monetary policies in particular aiming to “dampen business cycles and ensure full employment” (Harvey, 2007:10). Indicatively, this was the heyday of deterministic ‘top-down’ urban planning in western cities, marked by a “highly ordered” normative view of urban structure, and aiming to be “comprehensive” in its scope (Taylor, 1998:22–27). The post-WWII phase of ‘liberal modernity’ might therefore be understood as one in which the rationalising tendencies of modernity were valorised over the boundaries idealised by liberalism.

By the 1970s, many centralised approaches to social and economic organisation had attracted widespread criticism. While Keynesianism was understood as having led to inflationary crises in the West (Crouch, 2011:1; Harvey, 2007:12), the ongoing economic collapse of the Soviet bloc might be interpreted as having illustrated dramatically the problematic implications of state encroachment into the private spheres of the individual and the market. A growing

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3 A distinction has been drawn between the state-official Soviet ideology in which all personal interests were subordinated to the collective, and a reality from the 1950s onwards of the growing importance of essentially private networks of influence and economic activity, amounting in their totality to what has been called an ‘informal public sphere’ (for a review, see Zdravomyslova & Voronkov, 2002). Although not officially acknowledged at the time, the systemic significance of private associational groups and informal systems of economic exchange in Soviet Russia has increasingly come to be documented since the 1990s (see eg Bertaux et al., 2005).
sense of ecological crisis also came to be interpreted as “Enlightenment gone wrong” (Gare, 1995:5). The methodological and practical promise offered by modernity, that society might be both understood and directed on the basis of rationality, for the benefit of all, was questioned by the neoliberal assertion that “the knowledge necessary for policy interventions in complex life was not of the type acquired under the modernist social sciences with their assumptions of universal regularities of cause and effect” (Chandler, 2014b:52). Since “liberal modernist ‘top-down’ understandings of government” were flawed in their reliance on such assumptions, neoliberal theorists proposed that society might instead be more efficiently governed “from the ‘bottom-up’” (Chandler, 2014b:48).

The application of such ideas to policy-making, associated particularly with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s (Harvey, 2006a; Crouch, 2011), involved ‘shrinking’ the state, in order to facilitate the workings of the ‘distributed intelligence’ of the unfettered market – an idea usually associated with Friedrich Hayek (1945). The ‘roll-back’ (Healey, 1997:208; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2013:15) of the state that this entailed was not, however, predicated on the idea of the state’s redundancy; rather, that states should create “conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals is given the best scope so that they can plan most successfully” (Hayek, 2001:37). The state, relatedly, might “legitimately use coercion to enforce operation of the free market” (Low, 1991:181). Hayek saw urban planning as conceptually problematic if its goal was to counter the negative social side-effects of market-based competition (Low, 1991:171–175); instead, in his view, “planning and competition can only be combined by planning for competition, but not by planning against competition” (Hayek, 2001:43). Neoliberalism as understood in this thesis therefore follows the liberal tradition in respecting the sanctity of the private sphere, but also elevates this to a primary role in society’s collective decision-making processes; the role of the state is to set preconditions for private markets to work efficiently, but without interfering in the markets themselves.

Questions have been raised, however, about the ways in which states have remained “selectively active” (Connolly, 2013:21) as neoliberal ideas have been applied internationally. States have
continued to ‘plan’ in the sense that they have intentionally taken “a very active role in creating, maintaining, and protecting the preconditions of market self-regulation” (ibid). But this intervention has been criticised for its unevenness, on the basis that it has consistently benefitted certain groups more than others (see eg Crouch, 2011). Indeed, the term ‘neoliberalism’ has come to be used more or less interchangeably with the idea of ‘the interests of big business’, or to suggest the ideological work done to conceal these interests: Hartwich (2009) argues that it has become little more than a ‘political swear word’, the contemporary targets of which almost never identify themselves as neoliberal.

Thus, the status of the label ‘neoliberal’ has shifted from one describing a body of theory seeking to rescue liberalism from the path it took in the mid-twentieth century, to a term of abuse. Whatever evaluation is made either of its theories and practices, or of the coherence of critiques of these, its negative contemporary connotations serve at least to reflect a questioning of the practical effectiveness of dominant modes of government since the end of the twentieth century. These challenges appear only to have grown stronger following the global economic turmoil of the late 2000s (see eg Altvater, 2009; Peck et al., 2010; Crouch, 2011:vii; Aalbers, 2013) – in tandem with a growing unease that social and economic inequality have increased, and the lack of resolution to a looming sense of ecological catastrophe (see eg Brand & Görg, 2008; Brand, 2009; Brie, 2009; McCarthy, 2012). The perceived failure of neoliberalism in this sense represents the latest manifestation of an ongoing crisis of the liberal ideal. There is at least a theoretical call for new paradigms of governance to be advanced, wherein liberal modernity’s “constructed world of cause and effect and reductionist binaries” (Chandler, 2014a:12) is now understood as “a barrier to be overcome through new ways of conceiving the world that is to be governed” (ibid).

If, at this time of renewed crisis in liberal modernity, the eco-city is at the vanguard of experimental attempts to further the ambition of shaping a more sustainable global future, again the sheer variety of the ways in which these experiments are managed would seem to suggest its potential for furthering our understanding of what some revitalised, and possibly ‘post-liberal’, mode of planning might entail.
Two cases are studied in detail in this thesis, chosen partly because they represent opposite ends of a spectrum ranging from modernist to experimental planning processes (Chapter Four provides a fuller explanation of why these cases were selected). Sejong City in South Korea is currently being built by state mandate and at central government’s expense, having been meticulously planned by government officials. The role of the state in Portland’s EcoDistrict pilot initiative, conversely, only extended to a process of facilitation, whereby it was hoped local communities would decide on their own priorities for development and on the means of funding and delivering these.

These two cases were approached with an open mind. Given contemporary suspicions about modernist planning, it may be tempting to reject the possibility of Sejong City furthering the goal of urban sustainability. It might be dismissed as a model for planning a sustainable future more generally, since its modus operandi may necessarily tend to impose an order reflective of an unsustainable status quo. Insofar as this status quo is a structurally neoliberal one, it may be possible to conclude that Sejong exemplifies what Whitehead (2013) has called ‘neoliberal urban environmentalism’. Those looking for lessons of one sort or another for how planning for sustainability might move beyond the liberal-modern tradition may be inclined instead to seek inspiration from cutting-edge experiments such as the EcoDistricts initiative.

And yet the status of the EcoDistricts initiative, as an experimental planning approach, should also not be prejudged as necessarily progressive purely on the basis of its apparent innovativeness. In fact, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, it has a more ambiguous nature, which relates in large part to it being an example of a ‘governance’ approach to sustainability. Such approaches, as Joss (2011b; 2015) observes, are typical of many contemporary eco-cities; elsewhere, sustainability more generally has been interpreted as in large part a question of governance (Adger & Jordan, 2009a). The ambiguity of this tendency, in the light of the previous discussion, is briefly outlined below.

‘Governance’ has been described as having become a “buzz-concept” since the 1990s (Levi-Faur, 2012:6). Its intended meaning
here refers to an “apparently broad consensus [which] has developed around the idea that government is actually not the cockpit from which society is governed” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000:136) or “the turning point of all movements in society” (Kickert, 1997:736). The hierarchical ‘logic of command’ (Gualini, 2010:59) implied by a “legally based, centralised, sovereign state authority, formally elected and possessing constitutional powers” (Gray, 2005:2, cited in Griffin, 2010a:365) has given way to an ontology in which government is “itself...part of society...merely one of the co-directing actors in a market of societal traffic among various social actors” (Kickert, 1997:736), with policy-making processes understood as “an interplay among various actors” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000:136). The government retains a central coordinatory role within practices of governance (Wheale, 2009; Rydin, 2010:48), but this is conceptualised less in terms of “planned steering” (Kickert, 1997:736) than with mediating the outcomes of “informally based, decentralised, shared, collective and inclusive decision-making structures” (Gray, 2005:2, cited in Griffin, 2010a:365). The agency of government is thus dispersed within “a mode of policy-making that is constitutively multi-actor and multi-level, stressing interconnected (strategic, ad-hoc)...patterns of relations” (Gualini, 2010:59). Its role is not so much to determine these relations as to play an active role in facilitating their ‘emergence’ (ibid) in a given setting. These interrelationships are understood both to legitimise policy-making, as well as enable its more effective implementation (Rydin, 2013:4).

This approach to decision-making is productively ambivalent within the concerns of the current thesis. Gualini (2010:60) observes that two broad positions can be identified with regard to its significance. One of these considers governance in terms of “the emergence of new modes of policy-making lying at the very core of the state” (ibid). The central tenets of liberalism would certainly seem challenged if, as Gualini (2010:77) suggests, governance in this sense points towards a ‘cooperative state’, in which the “distinction between the subject and object of regulation begins to blur”. It also indicates a tension which Rhodes (1996:667) theorised as problematic for political institutions insofar as governance networks pose a “challenge to governability because they become autonomous and resist central guidance”. They therefore at least imply the possibility of “governing without Government” (ibid).
Even if this potential is acknowledged, the question arises of whether radical new approaches to sustainability will ever realistically be permitted to emerge through governance processes directed by existing liberal institutions. While such institutions may value incremental change, it seems unlikely that they will consciously seek to plot their own structural demise. This interpretation is more closely aligned with the second type of position on governance identified by Gualini: this uses the theoretical prism of neoliberalism to conceptualise governance as fundamentally a “‘retreat’ or ‘withdrawal’ of the state” (Gualini, 2010:61). From this perspective, the governance approaches typical of contemporary eco-city development might once again be criticised for reproducing unsustainability while adopting the rhetoric of radical change. Or, at least, it might be argued that the eco-city offers no guarantee of transformations which are more than superficial in the short term. In Chapter Six, the explanatory value of both of Gualini’s positions (hereafter referred to as the ‘post-liberal thesis’, and the ‘neo-liberal thesis’) is evaluated with reference to the EcoDistricts initiative. The former would predict the possibility that it offers useful lessons for the future by pointing towards some form of ‘post-liberal’ societal organisation. The latter would anticipate that it exemplifies the neoliberalisation of urban governance.

If governance approaches are typical of contemporary urban planning more generally, Gualini’s neoliberal thesis chimes with Marxist critiques of the latter’s incrementalism and pragmatism as blind to the “deeper forces and structuring influences in society” (Allmendinger, 2002:124). Communicative planning more specifically has been repeatedly criticised for overestimating the ability of planners to “make much difference in the face of structures of domination in society” (Innes & Booher, 2015:198). In advocating action based on decisions emerging from specific contexts, governance may echo what Harrison (2014) understands as urban planning’s retreat from materiality into an ‘anti-realist’ ontology, in which truths are only recognised as locally embedded and discursive. If we are persuaded that threats such as climate change call instead for urgent action, it would seem rash to dismiss the potential for state-centric planning to deliver large-scale solutions. For those who claim that it is in fact possible to predefine certain goals as being
indisputably in the public interest, top-down planning might at least produce more ‘efficient’ (Innes & Booher, 2015:198) outcomes. The case of sustainability, at least, may be one such goal, given its concerns for the survival of human society as a whole. If there is no guarantee that communicative governance processes will lead to outcomes furthering this goal, then these may waste resources at best, and be dangerous at worst. The possibility that top-down planning, albeit applicable only in particular circumstances, might lead to better, even if imperfect, sustainability outcomes, is explored with reference to Sejong City, in Chapter Seven.

Sejong might nevertheless be criticised as limited in its transformational ambitions: one of its key *raisons d’être*, as will be discussed, is to consolidate South Korea’s position within global circuits of commerce. And yet the charge that it thereby exemplifies the neoliberalisation of the eco-city is problematic. Gualini’s ‘neoliberal’ critiques of governance, first of all, cannot be applied because of Sejong’s top-down approach. More importantly, the concept of neoliberalism implies a Eurocentric conceptual framework of liberal modernity, which may have less explanatory force in this Asian context. Potentially, then, Sejong holds a rather different set of lessons about how top-down planning might in some ways, and in certain non-western contexts, play a role in furthering the broader goal of sustainability; it bypasses the ‘problem of planning’ outlined at the beginning of this chapter insofar as that problem is framed by a western liberal set of parameters. If such an approach can be seen as desirable in certain contexts only, there are clear limits to its replicability. But this, in turn, may suggest that the ideal of replicability is underscored by an unrealistic expectation of the coherency of the ‘sustainable city’ as a global vision. If Sejong is shaped by – and perhaps can only be meaningfully evaluated in relation to – its own specific context, its successes and failures may teach us particular types of lessons about the significance of context in furthering the goal of a global sustainable future.

In its totality, then, the eco-city illustrates in stark form a series of unresolved tensions within governmental attempts to plan the future at the current time. In the more immediate sense upon which the current thesis focuses, these tensions are manifest in the ambition of planning the ‘city’. If in fact the city is poorly conceptualised within
plans, it may appear to be more of a rhetorical construct which conceals other more specific agendas which attempt to impose a particular (possibly unsustainable) order on the city. At the same time, the ongoing search for new modes of planning, which may have been catalysed by the shift towards governance, potentially paves the way for new conceptualisations of city space upon which a more rounded urbanity might be founded. An alternative possibility, however, is that the ‘problem of planning’ is unresolvable in the case of the city (as perhaps elsewhere), leaving only the hope that a revised, but still essentially modernist, mode of planning represents the best hope for substantial sustainability-oriented urban transformation looking forwards.

1.4 Analytical Framework: ‘Publicness’

An analysis of the ‘types of city’ envisioned in or resulting from eco-city plans risks being an unfocused or impressionistic endeavour. If, moreover, the real city exceeds the planned one, it may equally exceed any particular analytical framework. To tame the subject matter, this thesis therefore focuses on what is here called the ‘publicness’ of the eco-city. Publicness is not necessarily the only way of studying the qualities of ‘cityness’ associated with the eco-city (or any other body of urban development). However, it is argued (in Chapter Three) that publicness is of fundamental importance to the quality of cityness. Simultaneously, questions about the maintenance or blurring of boundaries between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ are clearly relevant to those of whether the eco-city is best understood as reproducing an essentially liberal status quo, or challenging this in some way. Since cities are spatialised entities, it is suggested that cities can be essentially understood as ‘public spaces’. Special emphasis is given in the thesis to the open spaces of the city; these are not presented as the only locations where publicness occurs, but nevertheless as particularly important ones. It is suggested that the evaluation of eco-cities as models of, or sources of inspiration for, urban life in the future should pay attention not only to their work as testing grounds or showcases for different types of technology, but also to their qualities as public spaces.
To this end, the thesis introduces a new theoretical model of publicness as an ‘assemblage’ of spatiality and behaviour (see Chapter Three). It is argued that the idea of assemblage allows for a more rounded conception of the public qualities of the city than dominant accounts of public space permit. Publicness thus conceptualised has two modalities: the ‘civic’ and the ‘emergent’. Civic publicness describes a more constructed, compliant type of collective performance more closely aligned with the intended uses of space; emergent publicness is defined by challenges to spatial constraints and norms of different types, and is therefore more unpredictable and open-ended. The publicness of a particular space may oscillate between the two over time, and both may even be present in the same location. This variable quality of publicness is understood as an important indicator of the qualities of cityness envisioned and resulting in particular urban settings. It encompasses both what is planned and what takes place in spite of, or without regard to, what is planned for the city. Neither the civic nor emergent modality is elevated over the other in terms of desirability – real cities are characterised, rather, by both of these.

This conception of publicness works as an analytical tool for exploring the problematic relationship between planning and urban sustainability, and its implications for the future. It focuses particular attention on the question of whether emergent publicness can or should be planned for, and informs the analysis of the two case studies in Chapters Six and Seven in particular. While the thesis does not propose a definitive resolution to the ‘problem of planning’ understood in this way, the research findings enable a discussion in the concluding chapter on the merits of three possible positions on the relationship between planning and publicness, as follows:

1. **Realistically, since the emergent publicness of city space can never be planned for, eco-city initiatives can only ever be ‘technological showcases’**. Eco-city policy-makers and practitioners should therefore focus on developing experimental technologies, without concerning themselves unduly with the qualities of cityness which might result.

2. **While emergent publicness cannot be planned for, it can be planned against. Consequently, there is a potential for the dominant mode of eco-city policy-making and practice to be anti-urban.**
3. There is no reason to reject the possibility that some contemporary or future approaches to ‘planning’ the eco-city might take better account of emergent ‘cityness’

Overall, the thesis argues that the ‘city’ rhetorically conjured up in eulogistic pro-urban sustainability policies is problematic because it obscures not only the relations between the planned and the real city, but also a series of specific agendas which offer only limited potential for transformative change. Challenging this rhetoric may allow us to reclaim the practices of eco-city development as a more modest, but potentially more democratic, process of experimentation. Simultaneously, it may be a mistake to submit too readily to the idea that state-centric planning is poorly placed to grapple with urban sustainability because of the complexities involved; in the concluding chapter, it is argued that our theorised inability to plan in the face of uncertainty might be interpreted as a type of story which itself reinforces the so-called ‘neoliberal’ agendas obscured by eco-city rhetoric, and that this story may not in any case have universal resonance. If we do nevertheless need to find more effective ways of planning the eco-city, and possibly ones not essentially framed by liberal modernity, then the model of publicness advanced here may be a useful conceptual tool with which to observe innovative forms of governance emerging as part of the broader experimental process of the eco-city.

1.5 Central Research Questions

The central question guiding the discussion is as follows: In what ways can eco-cities be characterised as ‘public’? Accordingly, the following grounded assumption is tested with regard to the envisionment of the eco-city:

In many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official documents related to the planning and description of eco-city initiatives.

The analysis of implemented eco-cities is then guided by the following question:
Chapter One

*How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its conceptualisation in official documentation?*

To explore the possibility that plans for eco-cities are not in fact plans for truly public spaces, but rather driven by more limited, rhetorically obscured, agendas, the following question is posed:

*Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ status quo?*

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter Two serves to define the empirical subject matter, drawing on the academic literature on urban sustainability. It outlines the historical and contemporary characteristics of the eco-city, and locates these within a wider context of policies and ideas, with particular reference to the concept of sustainable development. Chapter Three draws on a different set of literatures (related to urban theory, publics, and space) to question the nature of the ‘city’ which is the stated focus of these ambitions. It proposes that the quality of ‘cityness’ may be usefully approached through the lens of ‘publicness’, and introduces the new model of publicness, which will be used to analyse the envisioned and actual publicness of eco-city initiatives later in the thesis. At the end of this chapter, the research questions above are reintroduced and discussed; Chapter Four then describes and justifies the methods adopted to explore them.

The findings from the empirical research thus conducted are presented and discussed in Chapters Five to Seven. Chapter Five analyses the conceptualisation of publicness in a sample of eco-city documents from around the world. The following two chapters explore the relationship between planned publicness and the actual publicness which assembles in urban settings where eco-city plans and policies have been implemented. They do so by focusing on two rather different ‘critical’ case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The first of these, in Chapter Six, analyses an example of ‘bottom-up’ governance, in Portland, Oregon (USA). In contrast, Chapter Seven studies the effects of adopting a more traditional, government-centric ‘top-down’ planning approach, using the case study of Sejong City (South Korea).
The concluding chapter begins by summarising the main findings and argument. It then returns to the three speculative propositions outlined above, to outline some of the key lessons that might be learnt from the contemporary eco-city about how we might more effectively plan a sustainable future.

1.7 Overview of Methodology

Following an initial literature review, empirical research was conducted in two phases. First, to understand the conceptualisation of eco-city publicness, discourse analysis was conducted on documentation from a sample of 12 initiatives of different types from around the world. Second, to explore the performed publicness which results from eco-city plans, the two case studies of implemented initiatives were selected for analysis from these 12. For both, further desk research was conducted into the context of the initiative, followed by in-situ fieldwork consisting of qualitative interviewing with key actors involved, and observation work in a sample of open spaces. In Portland, additionally, a short on-street survey was conducted among residents of the Gateway district (on which the fieldwork had a special focus). Chapter Four provides the rationale for the choice of methods, as well as further details of how the documentation was chosen, a more detailed justification for the case study selection, and the precise methods used to gather and analyse data.
Chapter Two

Defining the Eco-City

This chapter traces the international rise of a body of discourses and practices which are gathered together under the umbrella label of the ‘eco-city’. The narrative serves two purposes: it enables the eco-city to be coherently defined as an object of study; and it begins to open up a series of unanswered critical questions to explored later in the thesis. These questions relate to the nature of the ‘cityness’ which the eco-city envisions and produces, and are developed more fully in Chapter Three.

The use of the label ‘eco-city’ is not intended to capture or privilege any one established set of goals and practices. Rather, it covers a diffuse set of concepts, policy discourses, and practices which collectively attempt to respond to a series of contemporary agendas. Its contemporary multiplicity may be interpreted as reflecting a historical layering; the variously appearing tendencies, or ‘dimensions’, of the eco-city which Roseland (1997) laid out in the 1990s have not been displaced so much as augmented by newer approaches shaped by a changing discursive context. The definitional work which this chapter undertakes is therefore supported by a review of the key shifts in the broader context of environmental thought and policy-making over the last few decades.

The historical narrative makes repeated reference to Joss, Tomozeiu and Cowley’s (2011) global survey of eco-city initiatives4 (hereafter referred to as the Survey), among other sources. The Survey might more accurately be described as a ‘census’, since it aimed to profile all internationally reported eco-city initiatives (as defined by a particular set of criteria) which were currently at least at the planning or pilot stage. However, the Survey seeks neither to define the semantic boundaries of the ‘eco-city’ label by presenting the full breadth of its various historical and geographical uses, nor to

4 The Survey dataset is analysed in Joss et al. (2013).
illustrate a pre-existing and widely accepted definition of the eco-city. Existing definitions, either of the normative prescriptive type,\(^5\) or which take the form of performance indicators, have not converged into a single international standard (Gunawansa, 2011; Joss, 2012; Rapoport, 2014; Joss et al., 2015). The Survey necessarily therefore lays out its own conceptual boundaries. This is limiting insofar as different boundaries would logically result in a different list of cases being included. In particular, the focus on widely publicised initiatives with policy status carries some risk that less mainstream urban sustainability initiatives are under-represented. Its coverage is nevertheless aligned with (though does not define) the main focus of the current thesis: the endeavour of furthering the goal of sustainability through urban scale interventions which are supported or led by institutional policies and plans.

To be included in the Survey, initiatives needed to meet the following criteria: to operate at a scale ranging from at least the neighbourhood level to that of the broader city-region; to encompass multiple sectors (such as urban transport, energy, and housing); and to have policy significance, defined as “policy status through, for example, municipal initiatives, national programmes or international co-operation agreements” (Joss et al., 2011:2). Use of the label ‘eco-city’ was not a key criterion for inclusion; those adopting other cognate or closely related terms (for example, ‘low carbon city’ or ‘sustainable city’ or ‘hi-tech eco-town’)\(^6\) also qualified if they otherwise met the criteria for inclusion, and had been reported on internationally as ‘environmentally friendly’ urban developments.

Three important limitations of the Survey as a source of data should be acknowledged. First, the criteria for inclusion are partly qualitative, with a corresponding risk that inclusion will have depended in some cases on subjective judgements; this undermines the survey’s replicability, with implications for data reliability (Burnham et al., 2004). Second, it focuses mainly on initiatives in specific locations, rather than on international frameworks which facilitate these. Third, it has not been updated since 2011. These reservations aside, the systematic nature of its compilation and the

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\(^5\) Examples of normative prescriptive theorists include Engwicht (1992), Register (2006), and Downton (2009).

\(^6\) See the Global Survey (Joss et al., 2011:4) for a glossary of common cognate terms, and de Jong et al (2015) for a discussion of conceptual overlaps and differences.
comprehensiveness of its coverage make the Survey a valuable document for the purposes of identifying broad diachronic trends and synchronic patterns in the discussion below.

**2.1 The Pioneers of the Eco-City (pre-1992)**

Joss (2010) identifies a preliminary eco-city ‘phase’ preceding the 1992 United Nations *Earth Summit* in Rio de Janeiro, when the idea remained a “(normatively prescriptive) concept…with practical examples relatively few and far between”. Only 8 of the 178 initiatives profiled in the Survey were launched before 1992 (Joss, Cowley & Tomozeiu, 2013). Elsewhere, Rapoport (2010:3) typifies this early period with reference to ‘eco-villages’; echoing Barton and Kleiner (2000), she describes this as a category of settlement dating back to the 1970s, and taking the form of “small scale new communities” founded on principles of collaboration, self-sufficiency and environmental preservation. Lovell (2008:617) understands the early 1970s ‘sustainable housing movement’ as driven by an “upsurge in radical deep green environmentalism”, with technological innovation fulfilling a “desire for autonomy from modern society”. Dawson (2006) suggests that eco-villages have certain common characteristics: they are established by private citizens, based on a strong communitarian impulse and strong shared values, act as “centres of research, demonstration and (in most cases) training” (36), and aim to “win back some measure of control over community resources” (*ibid*) in the face of economic and cultural globalisation. Rapoport (2010) places in this same tradition the recent international *Transition Towns* movement, which aims to enhance local communities’ ability to withstand the effects of expected climate change and fossil fuel shortages (Barry & Quilley, 2008; Smith, 2011; Taylor, 2012). Eco-villages, then, issue a challenge to established hierarchies of political organisation and human settlement, and networks of resource distribution. Even if they come to be recognised in institutional policies, they are fundamentally ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, drawing on a philosophy of experimental autonomy.

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7 The earliest explicit reference found by the author to the concept of an ‘eco-city’ is in a 1982 UNESCO publication related to the *Man and Biosphere Programme*, initiated by UNESCO in the early 1970s (Yanitsky, 1982).
It would be inappropriate to include most such experiments under the ‘eco-city’ umbrella, however. Eco-villages sit outside not because of their disconnection from institutional frameworks (though this excludes all but a few examples from the main concerns of the present thesis, and from the dataset of the Survey), but rather of their essentially anti-urban conceptual orientation. The label ‘village’ itself might be interpreted as a rejection of urbanity – except in the rather different sense of ‘urban village/district’ (examples from the Survey include Green Village Philadelphia and Greenwich Millennium Village). The earliest eco-city thinking, as will be discussed below, was significant and innovative precisely because it reversed an assumption of urban life’s incompatibility with the furtherance of ecological and social goals. At the same time, the break from earlier ecological thinking was not a clean one: ‘eco-village’ thinking continues to feed into certain types of eco-city development, alongside other discursive influences. The contemporary eco-city, moreover, has retained certain utopian characteristics which might be historically traced back to its immediate predecessor (even if, as will be discussed, these now serve different functions).

Although writers such as Pepper (1996) and Bramwell (1989; 1994) trace contemporary tendencies within environmental thought back to earlier paradigmatic world views, the notion of the ‘environment’ as currently understood was constructed in the 1960s (Dryzek, 2005). Pugh (1996) dates its introduction into the UN agenda to 1962, when it reflected concerns over conditions specifically in industrialised countries. For the purposes of contextualising the anti-establishment stance of the ‘eco-village’, two foundational elements of this early environmentalism are particularly significant. First, the radicalisation of grass-roots politics beginning in the 1960s, which has been variously interpreted as part of the broader questioning of anthropocentric Enlightenment principles of ‘progress’ and the separation of ‘society’ from ‘nature’ (Latour, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Torgerson, 1999), and a reaction against technocracy (Feenberg, 1999; Torgerson, 1999). Second, the popularisation of neo-Malthusian ‘limits discourses’ through publications including Hardin’s Tragedy of

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8 Taylor (2000:23) suggests that “the idea of the village, as a physical place and a social community, has exercised something of a hypnotic attraction for town planning theorists ever since the industrial revolution” (ibid.23).
Chapter Two

*the Commons* (1968), Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* (1968) and the *Limits to Growth* report (Meadows et al., 1972) – with concerns over the finiteness of resources only exacerbated by the early 1970s oil crisis (Bramwell, 1989; Pugh, 1996).

Hajer (1995) observes that the *Limits to Growth* report was in fact rejected by many radical environmentalists precisely because it was rooted in the technocratic tradition: it “formed the basis for a coalition of forces that saw a further integration and co-ordination among the dominant social powers as the logical solution” (86). Thus, alongside grass-roots environmentalism, the 1970s was also characterised by the development of “new vocabularies of environmental policy making” taking place in the “relatively concealed sphere of secondary policy-making institutes – such as the OECD, the IUCN, or the UNEP” (90). Yet *Limits to Growth* still had significance for grass-roots politics since “as a discursive power-practice [it] was perhaps effective precisely because it concentrated on the *definition* of the problem” (83, italics added). It constructed the problem for the first time as a “global crisis” and a “world threatening collapse” (*ibid*). Early 1970s environmentalists responded to this construction with solutions which tended to be anti-establishment, critical of economic development, and peripheral to mainstream politics (Dryzek, 2005). These responses ranged from ‘preservationism’ in terms of critical natural resources (Haughton, 1999) to strong ecocentrism (Pepper, 1996), and were marked by an underlying ideal of ‘steady state’ ecology (Dryzek, 2005).

The seminal environmental texts of this period, however, contained very little discussion of urban issues (Brand & Thomas, 2005). Brown’s (1981) *Building a Sustainable Society*, to take one example, is clearly framed by ‘limits to growth’ discourse, aiming for overall ‘stabilization’, with economic activity “more diffuse and less centralized” (9). Where Brown mentions the city at all, it is parasitical, constructed in opposition to a vulnerable rural world: “Each year, urban sprawl, village expansion, and highway construction claim several million acres of prime cropland, while land hungry farmers push cultivation onto ever more fragile soils” (*ibid*:5). In combining a strong commitment to environmental preservation with an “implicit rejection of economic growth” (Rapoport, 2010:7), the ‘eco-village’ clearly reflects this body of thought.
Just as 1970s environmentalism was founded on a broad rejection of modernism (Cosgrove, 1990; Pepper, 1996), the modern city specifically was portrayed in a negative light in related contemporary popular texts. In Callenbach’s fictional *Ecotopia*, existing cities are relegated to the “barbarian past”, to be replaced by ‘minicities’, interconnected but nevertheless “each one a self contained community” (Callenbach, 1975:30). Haughton (1999) sees in *Ecotopia* an example of what he calls the ‘self-reliant city’ model of urban sustainability, in which the dispersion of the built form is closely related to goals of social and participatory equity, with the notion of ‘progress’ rejected in favour of an environmental and economic ‘steady state’. Schumacher’s *Small is Beautiful* describes the growth of the modern city as “pathological”, and asserts that “probably the order of magnitude of 500,000 inhabitants could be looked upon as the upper limit”, beyond which “human degradation” is inevitable (Schumacher, 1973:50). Haughton identifies an “early 1970s boom in ‘urban crisis’ literature”, often interested in defining the ‘optimum city size’, and which “wrongly foresaw the implosion of mega-cities such as New York and London”, as well as an ongoing “distinct tendency for people to assume that the good life is one which is best lived in smaller communities” (Haughton, 2007:278).

Goodwin and Taylor (1982) identify a ‘communitarian branch’ of utopian thinking which is closely aligned with these tendencies – they suggest that it is typified by hostility to powerful nation-states, enthusiasm for local self-government, and a broad philosophy that ‘small is beautiful’. They suggest that communitarian experimentation is typically viewed at least by the British establishment as “not worthy of serious study” (183), its perceived failure to deliver results flowing from its rejection of conventional channels of influence. Goodwin and Taylor propose, however, that communes should be understood in a more positive light, as “small-scale schemes of experimentation” (*ibid*:182). Dawson understands eco-villages as “small, dense and rich concentrations of activity whose aim is to transform the nature of that which surrounds them” (Dawson, 2006:66). As utopian projects, they may represent a “useful source of socio-political truths and inspiration” (Goodwin & Taylor, 1982:221), since they “relativize the present, allowing for objective judgements which we could not pass if it were viewed as an absolute” (*ibid*:28). Pepper (2005:4) is suspicious that utopianism may tend
towards “escapist daydreams”, yet also draws on Sargisson (2000a; 2000b) to valorise its potential for creating “‘free spaces’…in which we can carry out thought and practical experiments.” Sargisson (2000a) discusses *Findhorn* eco-village as an example of an ‘ecological intentional community’ underpinned by a philosophy of ‘transgressive utopianism’. She understands utopias as “spaces in which we can be different”; they are transgressive in that they allow us to “break significantly with confining traditions of thought and behaviour” (*ibid*:140). Painted in this light, as intentionally bounded space where unconventional modes of living are trialled, in the hope of wider application, the eco-village chimes with the notion that certain eco-cities function as protected experimental ‘niches’ (Geels, 2002b), as discussed in section 2.4 below.

To label an eco-village as ‘utopian’ makes no claims about its practical application as a fully worked-out model of human habitation. Rather, it emphasises its potential as an open-ended (and often temporary (Goodwin & Taylor, 1982)) experiment attempting to “shift…the way that we think about our relationship to our environment” (Sargisson, 2000a). In contrast, the contemporary eco-city claims to present unmediated practical solutions to the question of how we should live; it is concerned with the development or transformation of actual cities. It may be seem problematic, then, if the contemporary ‘sustainability movement’, as Vallance *et al.* (2011:346) argue, retains ‘[u]topian underpinnings’ which go unacknowledged. The denial of utopianism in understandings of sustainability as “simply, or at least mainly, a matter of bio-physical environmental integrity” (*ibid*) may mean that the possibility of tension between ‘technological fixes’ and established social structures, preferences and practices goes unaddressed. While utopian visions of the ‘good society’ have since antiquity been spatialised as “the quest for the good city” (Cugurullo, 2013b:68), their adoption by institutional actors rather than by marginalised groups or thinkers seeking to change the institutional status quo (*ibid*:78) may raise questions about these actors’ motivations. In the case of *Masdar City* in the United Arab Emirates, Cugurullo (2013a; 2013b) argues that this unacknowledged utopianism in practice serves the interest of the ruling classes, while the city’s contribution
to a future ‘sustainable’ society remains unclear. If, more generally, state-driven utopian ‘grand visions’ are greeted with suspicion, and associated with the modernist excesses of the twentieth century (Pinder, 2002), the nature and implications of the eco-city’s rhetorical utopianism merit closer investigation (these are the focus of Chapter Five of this thesis, and are reconsidered in the concluding chapter).

The ‘unacknowledged utopianism’ in contemporary manifestations of the eco-city may invite critical questions, then, but is genealogically linked to earlier radical discourses rejecting existing urban models in favour of smaller self-sufficient utopian communities. These formed the immediate historical context to the first significant use of the label ‘eco-city’ itself. This use is dated by Roseland (1997) to the publication of Richard Register’s Ecocity Berkeley in 1987. Register presented a normative vision, whose opening words evoke Bloch’s (1986) notion of a ‘concrete utopia’ – a wilful hope for positive change rooted in what is currently possible and which “simultaneously anticipate[s] and influence[s] the future” (Ganjavie, 2015:95). Bloch defines this in opposition to ‘abstract’ utopianism which takes the form of “compensatory” counterfactual imaginative visions which carry no expectation of being realised (ibid):

“An ecocity is an ecologically healthy city. No such city exists. There are bits and pieces of the ecocity scattered about in present day cities and through history, but the concept – and hopefully the reality – is just beginning to germinate”

(Register, 1987:3).

Register’s idea was promoted over the next decade by Urban Ecology, an NGO of which Register was a founding member in 1975 – most notably via the organisation of three International Eco-city Conferences during the 1990s (Roseland, 1997). Roseland also cites David Engwicht’s (1992) Towards an Eco-City as a seminal text; Engwicht’s promotion of the city as a ‘fragile ecology’ of social exchanges, and his vilification of the private automobile, complement Register’s more environment-focused philosophy of

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9 Koch (2012) nevertheless alerts us to the risks of too readily accusing non-Western urban development projects of ‘utopianism’, arguing that the term may perform “highly political bordering practice[s]” (2445) through which ‘real’ Western modernity is discursively defined in opposition to its ‘imaginary’ or ‘false’ Oriental other.
‘ecologically healthy cities’, biodiversity, density and reduced energy use (Register, 2006). The Green City Program for the San Francisco Bay Area & Beyond (Berg et al., 1990) illustrates this new conceptualisation of the urban in relation to environmental problems. Rather than rejecting the idea of urban living, it advocates bringing nature back into the city, the use of renewable energy and public transport, and celebrates social diversity, as ways of making cities more ‘liveable’. Rather than framing the problem of increasing urbanisation in terms of the ‘overpopulated city’, it decries the lack of suitable plans to accommodate this extra population (ibid:xiii). Against a background in which the city had long been constructed as what Hinchliffe (1999:145) calls “the antithesis of environmentally sustainable futures, green living and the survival of ‘nature’”, either taming or being threatened by nature, its ‘other’ (Kaika, 2005), the concept of the eco-city was provocatively oxymoronic.

Despite this novelty, however, early eco-city thinking was derivative in other respects. Its concordance with environmental thinking of the 1960s and 1970s is indicated by Roseland’s (1997) observation that the nascent 1980s eco-city discourse conflated a variety of pre-existing concepts; the disparate examples he gives – including bioregionalism, ecofeminism, appropriate technology, environmental justice, the steady state, and the Gaia hypothesis – tend to have an anti-establishment, grass-roots bias, with a critical stance towards existing models of capitalist development. The Green City Program (Berg et al., 1990), for example, is explicitly developed within a bioregional framework, seeking to encourage small and cooperative businesses, barter and work-exchange schemes, and underpinned by a goal of ‘life-place vitality’. The presence of such countercultural discourses in contemporary eco-city thinking might therefore be understood as a continuation of earlier tendencies rather than as exceptional or anachronistic.

An attempt to draw boundaries round the eco-city concept, beyond identifying its first use as a label, is problematised further by Roseland’s (1997:198) observation that the early eco-city drew on a “long line of thinkers and writers whose ideas were precursors to these concepts many decades ago”. Joss similarly aligns the eco-city with the Garden City movement, the ‘Techno-City’ (Kargon & Molella, 2008), and the UK’s ‘New Towns’ as attempts to “reinvent
the city” (Joss, 2010:240). The eco-city’s novelty does not, therefore, lie in the ambition of intervening in the built environment to achieve social, economic, or environmental outcomes (Joss, 2010). Rather, it constitutes a “new genre in urban planning and policy” (Joss, 2011b:331) to the extent that it addresses specifically contemporary agendas. This reflects Whitehead’s suggestion that the sustainable city might usefully be thought of as “a strategy designed to address the traditional social and economic regulatory problems of urban areas, in and through a new set of environmental priorities and ecological practices” (Whitehead, 2003:1190). There is little reason to suppose that the early eco-city did not embrace older imaginations of the potentials of the city, but it was also in direct dialogue with what Meadowcroft (2000:371) calls the “‘growth versus environment’ polarity which typified environmental debate during the 1970s and early 1980s”. It was defined by the contemporary dilemmas which it attempted to solve, and these dilemmas were constructed on the basis of a historically contingent ontology.

2.2 Phase Two: Rio and Beyond (1992-2005)

The later stages of the ‘pioneer’ eco-city phase were marked by the relative mainstreaming of green politics through the 1980s in Northern Europe if not elsewhere, still informed largely through the lens of the ‘limits’ discourse (O’Riordan, 1989). The ‘green’ agenda increasingly related to cross-national issues - including acid rain, and ozone layer depletion (Pugh, 1996). In parallel, environmental issues were linked to those of international equity (Meadowcroft, 2000) including the degradation of rural areas (Pepper, 1996) and the growth of squatter settlements (Pugh, 1996) in developing countries. These developments set the stage for the international embrace of the notion of ‘sustainable development’ (SD) in the United Nations’ Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987).

Earlier uses of the term ‘sustainable development’ have been identified with regard to fisheries (Dryzek, 2005), and in the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN et al., 1980) (Hopwood et al., 2005), but these focused specifically on environmental issues, without elaborating on their connections to socio-economic ones. According to Dryzek (2005), the two words had occasionally been joined together since the early 1970s in radical third-world discourse; Pezzoli (1997) observes that the term ‘sustainable development’ was used at UN conferences in the early 1970s in a way which clearly looked forward to the Brundtland Report. Grober (2012) suggests that the current interests in
SD attempted to break with previous dialectical oppositions by suggesting that “ecology and economy are becoming ever more interwoven locally, regionally, nationally, and globally” (WCED, 1987:Overview/15), combining concerns for both in its often-quoted definition as meeting “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (ibid:Chapter 2/1).

The ensuing 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit is widely recognised as pivotal moment when “awareness of the global dimension of the ecological crisis was ‘finally’ accepted and confronted politically around the world” (Fischer & Hajer, 1999:1) alongside issues of inter- and intra-generational environmental justice (Haughton, 1999; Ehresman & Stevis, 2011).

Over the course of the decade, SD came to be discussed around the ‘three pillars’ of the economy, environment, and society (Kates et al., 2005).

SD has continued to have the status of a ‘consensus concept’ since the 1990s (Blowers, 1997; Dobson, 2009; Cuthill, 2010), and may have become the “common sense of the contemporary age” (Cochrane, 2010:373). Despite its global spread, however, the presence of voices dissenting from this consensus mark it out as a historically contingent policy discourse rather than necessarily “the ‘climax’ of environmental discourse per se” (Fischer & Hajer, 1999:2). Some of the boundaries of this discourse are therefore outlined below to sustainability draw on a rather longer history; he credits Saxon Administrator Hans Carl von Carlowitz with the first conceptualisation of the ‘three pillars’ of sustainability (‘nachhalten’) with reference to intergenerational equity, in 1713.

However, while such identifications of conceptual antecedents (or terminological similarities in other fields) may be useful in analysing the historical shaping of the current body of discourse and practice, there is no strong argument for bracketing them within it. Thus, while Wheeler (2000) suggests that the earliest use of the adjective ‘sustainable’ to refer to patterns of human development may have been in the Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972), he concurs with other commentators that the ‘sustainable development’ concept only entered mainstream discourse following the Brundtland Report and Rio Summit.

Jacobs (1999) suggests that, despite earlier distinctions made between the terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ (for example, that the former has a narrower environmental meaning – see Lélé (1991) and Dobson (1991)), in practice the two terms are used interchangeably (with ‘sustainability’ an abbreviation of ‘sustainable development’). Nor does it appear to be generally held that the two terms have diverged in meaning since then: Seghezzo (2009) comments that sustainability is “considered a synonym” of SD. In this thesis, following Jacobs, no analytical distinction is made between the two terms.
differentiate it from other types of environmental thinking. However, it should be noted that the term ‘sustainable city’ is used interchangeably with ‘eco-city’ elsewhere in this thesis (and ‘urban sustainability’ or ‘sustainable urban development’ interchangeably with the ‘eco-city’ when considered as a body of thought and practice). All these terms are intended as umbrella labels which cover the phenomenon in all its variety. The eco-city (or sustainable city) in short, is not presented as coterminous with the discourse of SD strictly defined.

‘Deep ecologists’ have challenged SD’s explicitly anthropocentric character (Lee, 2000; Williams & Millington, 2004; Dryzek, 2005; Keil, 2007) as “continuing the technocratic orientation to nature of Western civilisation and of capitalism” (Gare, 1995:86–87). Gare (1995) proposes the category of Marxist environmentalism, which aims to demonstrate the “virtual impossibility of solving environmental problems through the simple devices proposed by the environmental economists” (83), since “the creation of environmental problems is a product of the dominant mode of production in the world today” (Johnston, 1989:199). Elsewhere, SD is characterised as a “spatio-institutional fix” (While et al., 2004:551) and a “smokescreen” (Jacobs, 1999:22) serving the interests of business at the expense of the environment and global equity, and accused of having “‘bracketed’ the essence of the socio-political order” (Fischer & Hajer, 1999:5). Despite its claim to accommodate cultural pluralism, SD attracts criticism as a ‘top down’ imposition by the UN on the global south (Kates et al., 2005), which “protect[s] the economic hegemony of the industrialised states and assuage[s] the environmental consciences of rich customers” (Meadowcroft, 2000). On this view, its institutionalisation has been accompanied by a sidelining of issues of north-south equity (Jacobs, 1999; Meadowcroft, 2000). These may be old debates but, as will be discussed further in Chapter Five in

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12 Other recent research has teased out some of the differences in usage between these (and other cognate) labels. Moir et al. (2014) suggest the term ‘eco-city’ has a narrower frame of reference, having come to be associated with particular types of development in Asia. De Jong et al. (2015) analyse overlaps and connections in the academic literature.

13 Such arguments display parallels with Myllylä and Kuvaja’s (2005) questioning of SD’s technocratic mode of implementation in cities in the developing world – but Myllylä and Kuvaja advocate a more place-specific modality of SD; they are not promoting a radical alternative to SD and are therefore arguing from within its discursive arena.
particular, remain relevant if SD continues to serve the rhetorical purpose of pre-empting or deflecting critical debate about resulting practices (Adams, 2010). As a “political strategy and technology of governance” (Cochrane, 2010:373), it has been reproached for smoothing the passage of particular neoliberal agendas (Swyngedouw, 2010), since it is “impossible to argue in any convincing way for a programme committed to being unsustainable” (Cochrane, 2010:372).

Far from being a neutral frame, then, to the extent that it closes down the possibility of debate rather than opens up a discursive space, SD may be critiqued as closely aligned with what Crouch (2004) sees as ‘post-democratic’ tendencies in contemporary societies. Its institutional implications are also questioned from the quite different perspective of ‘free-market environmentalism’: here, SD’s faith in governmental intervention is the target, in that centralised bodies are thought poorly placed to resolve such an inherently complex problem as the global environment (Anderson & Leal, 2001; Pennington, 2008). From a ‘liberal institutionalist’ perspective, SD’s reliance on government perpetuates the authoritarian traditions of the limits discourse – with arguments being put forward instead for polycentric governance networks (Paterson, 2009).

At the same time, SD’s remains unclearly defined by its own adherents. Despite agreement over its broad goals, the means of their attainment have remained contested (Meadowcroft, 2000), with little consensus over how they might best be “structured” or “combined” (Joss, 2012:2), or translated into specific societal goals (Connelly, 2007). This lack of agreement has caused “frustration or irritation” for those approaching SD from a ‘policy-technocratic’ standpoint (Jacobs, 1999). There are no universally accepted criteria – in the form of indicators or standards – for monitoring SD’s progress, either generally (Hezri & Dovers, 2006) or for urban sustainability more specifically (Maclaren, 1996; Bell & Morse, 1999; Joss, 2012; Joss et al., 2012); the possibility and utility of such standardisation remains questionable (Lyytimäki & Rosenström, 2008; Joss et al., 2015). Specific assessment approaches such as ‘ecological footprinting’ (Wackernagel & Rees, 1997) may have gained international currency (see, for example: WWF, 2005; Global Footprint Network, 2010), and – in the case of urban sustainability – a wide range of certification
schemes now compete for acceptance at local, national, and international levels (Joss et al., 2015). However, individual eco-cities remain free to set their own targets and publish achievements selectively (Joss, 2010).

This definitional looseness (or multiplicity), which also raises problems for attempts to survey the eco-city phenomenon, is exemplified well by the case of China. Since the State Environmental Planning Agency’s landmark policy document in 1996 Guidelines for the Building of Eco-Communities 1996-2050, a series of national policies have been introduced to encourage eco-city development, often in the form of funding competitions (Yip, 2008). However, there is still no generally agreed central government guidance as to what constitutes an eco-city (Wu, 2012). The Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Rural Development, for example, use different criteria (World Bank, 2009), and have run separate urban sustainability award schemes since the late 1990s (Zhao, 2011). These and other factors make it difficult to provide a definitive total number of current eco-city projects in China; the Survey profiled 25 substantial initiatives which had been reported on internationally, but also noted that the Chinese Society for Urban Studies had recently identified as many as 259 declaring the intention to become eco-cities (Joss et al., 2011:1/footnote 2; see also Yu, 2014:78). Elsewhere, Wu (2012) counts “more than 100” municipal governments planning to build eco-cities or eco-towns; while Ren (2013:112) claims that, as of 2011, “more than 1,000 cities and counties had announced plans and timetables to achieve eco-city or eco-county status”.

More optimistically, SD’s ambiguity may have enabled “the first global discourse-coalition in environmental politics. A coalition that shares a way of talking about environmental matters but includes members with widely differing social and cognitive commitments” (Hajer, 1995:14). Its open-endedness facilitates global dialogue (Kates et al., 2005) and, at the micro-policy level, allows potentially conflictual political priorities to be negotiated and become “assembled around particular concerns without necessarily ever being fully integrated into some overarching unified set of understandings” (Cochrane, 2010:371–372). Even the suspicion that it is an infinitely ‘malleable’ (Kates et al., 2005) sum of its own changing
parts does not refute its agency as a discursive space: “Despite (or exactly because of) the lack of a fixed core meaning, such an ‘empty’ concept may become politically and intellectually hegemonic” (Offe, 2009:561, footnote 23).

Before Rio, as noted earlier, “few sustainability advocates focused on cities or patterns of urban development” (Wheeler, 2000:134). However, eco-city practices were discursively enabled by widespread adoption of the *Agenda 21* (UNDESA, 1992) implementational programme at local authority level (Joss, 2010). Curitiba (Brazil), for example, was internationally lauded in the 1990s as an example of eco-city thinking. Curitiba had first began improving its public transport system in the 1970s (McKibben, 2003; Macedo, 2004), while pedestrianising its city centre and constructing a series of green parks both as recreational and environmental amenities and to mitigate flooding (McKibben, 2003). Its urban improvements were driven by local practical needs, such as litter collection from unplanned settlements, with a strong overall emphasis on social inclusion. Joss also highlights *Waitakere* in New Zealand, which announced itself as an eco-city in 1993 on adopting a local *Agenda 21* programme. It too prioritised social inclusion, and its resource management principles were based on Maori cultural values (Laituri, 1996). Additionally, often within local *Agenda 21* programmes, different civil society actors across Austria, Germany and Switzerland declared their towns *Ökostädte*, in order to introduce various principles of environmental management and sustainable development (Joss *et al.*, 2011; Damm, 2015). Nevertheless, Mitlin and Satterthwaite were still able in 1996 to suggest that cities were only rarely mentioned in SD-related literature, perhaps since writers on environmental issues had “long regarded cities with disdain, even if they live in cities” (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996:30). This ongoing legacy of anti-urban sentiment was soon to change:

“In the late 1960s and 1970s the word most likely to be associated with cities was ‘crisis’, both political and economic. From the protests and riots of the 1960s to the difficult fiscal states of cities in the late 1970s, cities were where society’s ills were most visible. Thus it is hardly surprising they were viewed negatively; cities equal problems. Go forward a couple of decades and it is all change; cities are seen as solutions”
Research and policy discourse over (ex-)industrial European cities, previously dominated by notions of decline, instead began promoting cities as “sites of renewed economic dynamism and engines of national prosperity” (Turok & Mykhnenko, 2007:165). Urban “attributes of size, density and diversity” were mobilised to establish their “credentials as centres of growth and innovation” (Docherty et al., 2004:446). The “dearth of strategic thinking about the future of cities” in the 1970s and 1980s (Moir et al., 2014:11) gave way to a surge of interest in the early 1990s (ibid:13), with cities now understood as playing an “extraordinarily important role in the reflexive relationship between the global and the local” (Brandtner, 2011:75). Relatedly, processes of globalisation since the 1970s appeared to have “hollowed out” (Jessop, 1994:264) the nation state, resulting in the “need for supranational coordination” (ibid) but also opening up space for a ‘subnational resurgence’, manifested in a “stronger role for regional and local states” (Jessop, 1994:271) and a thickening of horizontal transnational links between local authorities (ibid). The wealthiest ‘world cities’, at least, came to be likened to city states whose networked relations were in many ways effectively unmediated by their national settings (Appadurai, 2001). This change occurred in tandem with a re-imagining and repackaging of the post-industrial city as a site of consumption and spectacle (O’Connor & Wynne, 1996; Benton-Short & Short, 2008), as reflected in a wide range of land-use regeneration schemes internationally, often on ex-industrial sites such as waterfronts (Brownill et al., 2013), while it had become increasingly common for cities to market themselves competitively, attempting to construct distinctive identities around particular cultural and economic advantages to attract investment and tourism (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Ward, 1998; Stevenson, 2003:98–100; Kavaratzis, 2009; Sager, 2011). Thus, strategic urban policies variously mobilised instrumentally or encouraged a newfound civic pride. This repositioning of the city in policy was accompanied by increased urban residential growth rates in many western countries; many of Britain’s larger cities, for example, began in the 1990s to reverse population declines (Champion, 2014), and support for urban densification grew internationally. Since the

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14 Since this period, the (variously defined) notion of the ‘compact city’ has become commonplace internationally – even if its claimed social and
millennium, many cities across North America and Europe have been repopulated (Rae, 2013:95) at least partly because of a new common understanding that “urban economic viability is predicated upon the existence of dynamic, liveable and populated city centres” (ibid).

Echoing the growth of this multifaceted pro-urban discourse (in western cities at least), Myllylä and Kuvaja (2005) suggest that the 1996 UN Habitat II (City Summit) in Istanbul marked the first official recognition of the importance of cities for the global environmental agenda. Alongside an understanding of cities as problematic sources of pollution and sites of environmental degradation, the idea that they contained the key to the solution of global environmental problems (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996; Whitehead, 2012) slowly gained currency. Although only 20 of the 178 eco-cities profiled in the Survey were launched – mostly in Europe – during the period 1992-2000 (Joss et al., 2013), by 2003 the ‘sustainable city’ was described as having become a “hegemonic paradigm of metropolitan development” (Whitehead, 2003:1187). Layered on top of the spread of SD, the growing appeal of city-level implementation beyond North America and Europe was evidenced by the appearance of various Asian eco-cities in the early 2000s, including Songdo International Business District (South Korea), Tajimi (Japan), Rizhao (China), Suzhou Industrial Park (China), and Xiamen (China) Guiyang (China), and the announcement of six pilot eco-city schemes by the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests (Joss et al., 2013).

If the period between the Rio Summit and the mid-2000s laid the foundation for the acceleration of the eco-city phenomenon in more recent years, one final set of criticisms directed at SD is worth highlighting. Commentators have repeatedly suggested that environmental and economic issues tend to be foregrounded in environmental advantages are contested (Burton, 2000). Similarly, the ideal of ‘smart growth’, which claims local and global environmental benefits, as well as a better quality of life, has been promoted at national level in the US (USEPA, 2011). Herschell (2013) sees such ‘smartness’ as a mechanism for reconciling potential conflicts at the city-region scale between the rather different agendas, institutional dynamics and sectoral spatialities of policies related to economic competitiveness and sustainability. These and similar concepts are promoted as an alternative to suburban ‘sprawl’ (see, for example: Jenks et al., 1996; Freilich & Peshoff, 1997; Handy, 2005; Arku, 2009), while Lees likens the status of urban densification in mainstream sustainability discourses to a “magic cure-all” (Lees, 2003:75).
debates and policy-making around SD, leaving its social aspects rather less well understood (Littig & Grießler, 2005; Parés & Saurí, 2007; Wheeler & Beatley, 2009; Cuthill, 2010; Dempsey et al., 2011); social sustainability has remained in a state of “conceptual chaos” (Vallance et al., 2011). Giddings et al. (2002) suggest that its social dimensions have been neglected because they raise difficult questions about underlying power structures. Arguably, this confusion makes actors less accountable for the social implications of their behaviour than for their environmental and economic achievements. While, for example, businesses have often claimed to engage with goals of social justice under the banner of SD, such claims have often remained unmatched by substantive changes of behaviour (Redclift, 2005). The undertheorisation of social sustainability would appear to be particularly problematic for urban sustainability, in that it sits uncomfortably with the tradition of sociological enquiry into the city, which has long constituted a “primary context for thinking about questions of social justice, citizenship, and social cohesion” (Tonkiss, 2002:591). The accelerating practical implementation of eco-city ideas in the new millennium has generated a growing body of critical scholarship in its wake; many eco-cities may be interpreted as essentially “technical experiments where the social is an afterthought” (Caprotti, 2015:15).

2.3 ‘Ubiquitisation’ (2005 Onwards)

In their study of urban governance responses to climate change, Bulkeley and Betsill (2013) characterise the late 1990s and early 2000s as a period of pioneering ‘municipal voluntarism’. This consisted of initiatives often led by individuals in mainly small- and medium-sized city authorities originally in North America and Europe, linked by international networks such as ICLEI, whose activities were “reminiscent of social movements with their focus on gathering intentions, knowledge and purpose towards common goals” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013:139). Global environmental concerns were appended to existing policy issues such as air pollution, health and congestion (Betsill, 2001). This “piecemeal and opportunistic approach” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013:140) has since been overlaid with a ‘strategic urbanism’, exhibiting greater geographical global reach, whereby “climate change became integral to the pursuit of wider
urban agendas” (ibid). The spread of this more integrated urban environmental policy-making finds an echo in the Survey’s dataset (which only includes schemes operating across multiple policy areas): as many as 121 of the 178 initiatives included had been launched since the mid-2000s (Joss et al., 2013:11). Again echoing Bulkeley and Betsill’s findings, this new wave of eco-cities is increasingly international: the continent on which most eco-cities were launched during this period is Asia, and a further seven in Africa.

Alongside this ‘globalisation’, the eco-city has been increasingly mainstreamed into government policies (Joss, 2011a). Much of the acceleration of its growth is accounted for by governmental initiatives whereby a block of proposed eco-cities are simultaneously announced. Examples include: the UK’s four eco-towns (ODPM, 2005); France’s nationwide programme of ÉcoCités proposed within its national Urban Sustainability Plan (MEEDDAT, 2008); a series of ‘eco-friendly’ cities planned along the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (Asahi Shimbun, 2010); and the Japanese government’s selection of 13 eco-model cities (JETRO, undated). Furthermore, various transnational ‘umbrella’ initiatives have been launched since 2005, including the US-based Clinton Climate Initiative’s Climate Positive Development Program, supporting urban development projects across six continents (C40-CCI Cities, undated), and the World Bank’s Eco² Cities programme: a “broad platform that will provide practical and scalable, analytical and operational support for cities in developing countries to achieve ecological and economic sustainability” (World Bank, 2010a:4). The United Nations has more recently declared that “The key to sustainability lies in the concept of ‘green cities’ or ‘eco cities’” (UNEP, 2012:vi, cited in Joss, 2015:15). The international institutionalisation of what was once a radical idea promoted by peripheral non-governmental actors does not, however, imply that its contemporary backers have thereby become radicalised. Rather, we might expect the converse to be true if Roy is right that

“the international frontier of planning is saturated with power and hegemony such that it is rarely a space of counter-hegemonic thought and action. Indeed, the globalization of planning at different historical moments…has reinforced the most conservative dimensions of planning”

(Roy, 2008:92).
Some of the tendencies distinguishing the more recent wave of eco-cities from their predecessors are outlined below. Insofar as these suggest an increasing alignment with the interests of powerful actors, they resonate with the critical perspective that SD has failed to effect significant structural change.

Joss et al. (2013) describe a general drift over time towards ‘green growth’ policy making, associated with the discourse of ‘ecological modernisation’ (EM). EM departs from the ‘three-pillared’ conceptualisation of SD in the duality of its main focus on economic growth and environmental protection. EM advocates argue that, given the right policy framework, economic growth and efficiencies and innovation achieved through markets facilitate the development of cleaner technology (Redclift, 2005), and environmental protection is beneficial for business profitability (Dryzek, 2005:161). The ability of governments to mandate environmental improvement is questioned; a more ‘enabling’ governmental role is promoted, with regulatory frameworks developed in partnership with business and industrial actors (Davoudi, 2000), in reflection of the broader shift towards societal management through ‘governance’ as outlined in Chapter One.

Although a ‘strong’ version of ecological modernisation has been identified, foregrounding the need for radical institutional change at different scales (Christoff, 1996; Mol & Spaargaren, 2000; Barry & Paterson, 2004), a weaker ‘techno-corporatist’ approach is more widely adopted by policy-makers (Dryzek, 2005), displaying “much less concern for equity, justice or human well-being” (Hopwood et al., 2005). Hence, for example, Haughton and Counsell (2004:55) described the UK Labour Party’s policies as an “almost archetypal ‘ecological modernisation’ approach to sustainable development”. Critics argue that EM is unconcerned with intra- or inter-

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15 EM is discussed variously as a strand within SD discourse (Davoudi, 2000; Redclift, 2005; Hulme, 2009), or as predating it (Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Mol & Spaargaren, 2000; Jänicke, 2009); Langhelle (2000) sees EM as a necessary but not sufficient condition for SD – arguing against the conflation of the two, however, on the grounds that EM has a narrower scope, leading to different policy priorities. They have a “family resemblance” for Dryzek (2005:169), in that both are acceptable to the political mainstream in their promotion of economic growth and the possibility of environmentally benign human progress.
generational social justice (Langhelle, 2000), and the “direct antipode” of environmental justice, interpreting it “in its hegemonic form” as “a politics of neoliberalization” (Keil, 2007:60). It is positioned as indicative of a broader context in which “market mechanisms...have...become the policy orthodoxy in relation to environmental governance” to “facilitate a particular type of capitalist development” (Paterson, 2009:108). Indicatively, the €1bn allocated for the French ÉcoCités scheme is drawn from a large investment loan (‘Le grand emprunt’) taken out by the government in 2010 (Caisse des Dépôts, 2009). Whatever the ‘eco’ credentials or social benefits of the ensuing projects, the initiative is thus fundamentally driven by a desire for economic growth; the possibility that a more sustainable development path might depend on deeper structural or social changes is excluded from the policy documentation. Meanwhile, EM’s applicability to developing economies has been challenged (Mol & Spaargaren, 2000). Its focus on “technological approaches supported by market mechanisms to curb carbon emissions” (Romero Lankao, 2007:159) may not resonate in southern cities which contribute relatively little to global carbon emissions (ibid) or have more pressing economic priorities (Redclift, 2005:217).

Just as Rapoport (2010) finds evidence of the increasing commercialisation of the eco-city since 2005, Joss et al. (2013) observe that large international firms now often play significant roles in its development and management. This change correlates at least with the rise of EM policy discourse, which affords centrality to technology companies. And while the technocratic tendencies outlined above invite parallels with mid-twentieth century modernist planning, their current alliance with the interests of private business concerns suggests a contrast, in that modernist planning was state-led and underscored by an ideology of equality and the ‘public good’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001). This contrast, however, is not a straightforward one: governments have retained a strong role in eco-city development, and private firms operate within regulatory and policy frameworks. More typically, different forms of ‘hybrid’ public-private partnerships are in evidence (Joss et al., 2013); the more general global tendency towards governance for environmental sustainability through partnership (Bäckstrand, 2010:159) fits well with the primacy of private technology companies
in EM discourse. Such arrangements may be legitimised through their promises of public accountability and private sector efficiency, but have been criticised in practice for their lack of transparency relative to traditional public agencies, and for their privileging of profitability over other policy goals (Bäckstrand, 2010; Book et al., 2010). Where the goal of such developments is the sustainability of an entire city, questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability, it might be argued, are all the more pertinent.

Joss et al. (2013) identify a series of further interrelated qualitative developments closely associated with the current phase of the eco-city. They propose that these collectively constitute a ‘ubiquitisation’ of the eco-city, even if not all of the tendencies are evident in any given initiative. The first of these reinforces an understanding of the eco-city as a response to contingent historical conditions: it is increasingly promoted as a solution to unprecedently rapid levels of urbanisation. The Eco2 Cities programme, for example, takes the “massive rate of urbanization” (World Bank, 2010b:1) in developing countries as its starting point. The second tendency is also a response to a specifically contemporary agenda: related plans and policies focus increasingly on ‘climate change’, and particularly the reduction of CO₂ and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Climate Positive Development Program mentioned above exemplifies this tendency well: it stipulates an overall ‘climate positive’ emissions target (C40-CCI Cities, undated), without mandating the means of reaching this. Within eco-city thinking, it seems possible that the ‘carbon agenda’ has become what Hajer calls an ‘emblematic issue’ just as the problem of ‘acid rain’ was constructed in the 1980s through “all sorts of discursive practices” to render it “manageable for the structures of industrial society” (Hajer, 1995:276). Global environmental problems more generally have come be conceptualised around this agenda, such that:

“The ubiquity of climate change as a discourse ensures that it is attached to a range of different projects, from flood protection to tree planting schemes, which may previously have existed outside of the climate arena”
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:363).

16 This is reflected in a body of cognate terms (including ‘low carbon, ‘zero carbon, ‘zero energy’, etc) which have been used in collocation with, or in the place of, the ‘eco’ label since the mid-2000s. For more details, see Joss et al. (2011:5).
While et al. suggest that the years 2005/6 represent a “tipping point” in the “shift to the new politics of carbon control” (While et al., 2010:83). GHG emissions are an appealing target for policy-making as apparently measurable, and therefore manageable, phenomena (While et al., 2010). However, some observers suggest that this reduces the conceptualisation of environmental sustainability to a narrow set of technical considerations; in casting the ‘problem’ as society’s oil-dependence, and the solution as state regulation, this approach is agnostic about the need for structural political or economic change (ibid). Swyngedouw (2011a:77) interprets the growth of carbon discourse as indicative of “a particular process of de-politicization” – a “post-political consensus” (ibid) in which “politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social administration” (Žižek, 2005:117). The growing prominence of the carbon agenda is to be welcomed to the extent that it reflects a consensus (among scientists and more generally) that the effects of climate change are among the most significant threats to the global environment and to cities more specifically (Bulkeley, 2012). But this tendency may be diminishing the experimental variety of the eco-city by crowding out a wider range of ecological concerns and socio-political questions.

Third, the ‘eco-city’ label is widely used as a form of ‘cultural branding’ – building on the existing trend for cities to market themselves distinctively, as mentioned earlier – with evidence of inter-urban rivalry to appear as the ‘greenest city’. Thus, Copenhagen’s Eco-Metropolis 2015 policy document envisions that “the environment will be pivotal for Copenhagen’s…identity” as “the environmental capital of Europe” (City of Copenhagen, 2007:3). For Vancouver, “[t]he race to become the Greenest City in the world is both a friendly and fierce competition” (City of Vancouver, 2012:6). ‘Green’ external branding is one manifestation of more general pattern of place marketing, which at least since the 1990s has become “an integral part” of city planning in Europe (Gustavsson & Elander, 2012:773) and North America (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990), and has been widely interpreted in the academic literature as indicating a neoliberal, entrepreneurial approach to urban policy (Sager, 2011).
Fourth, the role of information technology has become more prominent, reflecting the rise of the ‘smart city’ concept. Construction began in 2011, for example, on the Neapolis development in Cyprus, which its developers hope will become the “Prototype ‘Smart EcoCity’ within the EU”, employing a “single Intelligence Platform which will accommodate new ‘green technologies’, latest digital applications and sustainable town infrastructure solutions” (Neapolis, 2012). Living PlanIT, a private company working to deliver “technologies and platforms to improve efficiencies and accelerate change in cities and urban spaces” (Living PlanIT, undated), plans to build a hi-tech eco-city, with backing from national government, on a greenfield site near Porto. The company’s Executive Vice President Thierry Martens (2011) describes this city as the company’s “R&D centre”, a proving ground for a transferable “urban operating system”. The discourse of the ‘smart’ “has captured the imaginations of governments and industries around the world” (Strengers, 2013:1). In the popular literature, smart cities are defined as “places where information technology is combined with infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to address social, economic and environmental problems” (Townsend, 2013:15). While there is no reason to conflate the smart city ideal with that of urban sustainability – and the smart city itself has multiple definitions (Caprotti, 2015:90; Hollands, 2015) – such visions often encompass ecological principles: it at least overlaps with the discourse of the eco-city (de Jong et al., 2015), and many smart cities can be interpreted as “basically re-iterations of current eco-city definitions” (Caprotti, 2015:90).

As well as being promoted primarily by private sector actors, smart cities appear to display many of the other tendencies highlighted above as characteristic of the latest wave of eco-cities. The idea of the ‘smart’, according to Strengers “constitutes a distinctive ontology in which smart technologies perform and establish a highly rational and rationalising form of social order” (ibid:2). He calls this vision a ‘Smart Utopia’, “which resonates with and repackages technological utopias and ideals from the past” (ibid:2). In addition to being a technocratic, utopian notion, Strengers suggests, the discourse tends towards technological determinism: indicatively, “[i]n many smart studies, people are entirely absent” (ibid:5). As corporate ‘quick-fix’ solutions, for Hollands (2015), they
fail to address the complexity of environmental, political and social problems associated with urban areas; their policy scope may be very limited (Glasmeier & Christopherson, 2015:6). They echo EM in their envisionment of “a world in which social disharmony and environmental problems are eradicated through new technology, without compromising the current ways of life” (ibid:23), and in assuming synergetic environmental improvements and economic development (Gabrys, 2014:30–31). In line with the broader move towards ‘partnership’ in eco-city development, they entail “modes of governance that are not located exclusively within the jurisdiction of ‘public’ authorities but may also extend to technology companies that own, manage and use urban data” (ibid:44).

Söderström et al. (2014) review recent critical literature on smart urbanism. This literature has castigated the smart city as urban entrepreneurialism (Hollands, 2008), a retreat into high modernism (Greenfield, 2013), carrying risks of technocracy and surveillance (Kitchin, 2014), and tending to privilege measurable phenomena in its conceptualisation of the city (Bell, 2011). They describe smart urbanism as an “ideological construct” used to strengthen the market position of the corporate actors involved (Söderström et al., 2014:309), a type of ‘storytelling’ which “mobilizes and recycles two long-standing tropes: the city conceived as a system of systems, and a utopian discourse exposing urban pathologies and their cure” (ibid:308). They challenge the use of systems thinking in urban discourse in its implication that “cities are no longer made of different – and to a large extent incommensurable – socio-technical worlds (education, business, safety and the like) but as data within systemic processes” (ibid: 314). The social ‘flatness’ of the utopian tendency in urban sustainability thinking more generally, and the way that this is constructed ideologically through ‘story telling’ in plans and policies, is explored further in Chapter Five.

Finally, a different ‘flattening’ effect might be ascribed to the growing association of the eco-city with knowledge transfer of different types, between international quasi-governmental bodies, NGOs, academics, and private companies. The involvement of European firms of various types in eco-city projects in developing countries particularly has risen markedly since the mid-2000s (Joss et al., 2013). Within a process of ‘ubiquitisation’, this arguably
contributes to a privileging of non-place specific practice and discourse. This would seem to echo a broader pattern of what has been called ‘fast policy transfer’ between cities (Peck & Theodore, 2001:429), differing from the past in its geographical scope, speed of circulation and “technocratic-managerial-entrepreneurial context” (Clarke, 2012:25,38). An emerging de facto standardisation of ‘best practice’ primarily conceived around universally applicable technologies (infrastructure, IT, green-tech and modes of governance) carries the risk that local socio-political factors are underconceptualised in eco-city ambitions.

2.4 Theorising the Eco-City as a Coherent Entity

The historical narrative above has served to identify several aggregated long-term changes in the nature of the eco-city, and to relate it to a broader, shifting socio-political context. However, these changes simultaneously raise questions about the coherence of the subject matter – especially since the eco-city also appears to be continuous with other phenomena (such as the smart city), overlaps with, rather than defines itself against, earlier visions for human settlements (ranging from the Garden City to the ‘ecovillage’), and employs a wide variety of labels. A case might be made that an exercise such as the Survey performatively constructs its own field of enquiry, rather than describes a clearly predefinable phenomenon. Further work is therefore required at this stage to justify the coherence of the eco-city as a field of enquiry. An additional problem arises with the aggregative nature of the observed changes; in privileging synchronic similarities on the one hand, and diachronic differences on the other, the narrative may oversimplify the eco-city’s variety. In reduced form, the story-line set out above concludes with an apparent global convergence of eco-city practices in recent years, which may be working to reinforce a ‘neoliberal’ status quo. As part of a more satisfactorily coherent theorisation of the eco-city, this conclusion needs qualifying in various ways.

Osborne and Rose outline some of the generally accepted indicators of neoliberalism in urban policy-making, including
“downsizing the state, decentralising decisionmaking, devolving power to intermediate bodies such as trusts or associations, privatising many functions previously part of the state machinery and opening them up to commercial pressures and business styles of management, [and] introducing managerialism and competitive pressures into the residual state apparatus” (Osborne & Rose, 1999:751).

However, it may be misleading to see the ‘neoliberalisation’ of cities more generally as a singular and homogeneous global process. Objecting to the “linear, aspatial geography of neoliberalism” (Hackworth, 2007:11) evident in some accounts, Hackworth observes that neoliberalism is a “highly contingent process that manifests itself, and is experienced differently, across space”, which “occurs alongside and in combination with many other processes that affect urbanisation” (ibid). In analysing particular policy and institutional outcomes, the concept of neoliberalism is of limited analytical value if it downplays the significance of local context (Sager, 2011:149). In each location, this process unfurls across an existing “cluttered and contested institutional landscape”, and thus leads to contingent “unforeseen and often highly unstable layerings of political economic space” (Peck et al., 2009:57); we should therefore expect it to be manifested in “incomplete, hybrid modalities” (Brenner et al., 2010:332) rather than as a fully formed and readily identifiable “regulatory whole” (ibid). But nor is there consensus about, or consistency in, the specification of neoliberalism at an abstract level (Larner, 2004; Peck, 2004; Barnett, 2005). Springer (2012:135) proposes that neoliberalism is better understood in discursive terms, as a “mutable, inconsistent, and variegated process that circulates through the discourses it constructs, justifies and defends”, facilitated and reproduced as much by ‘bottom-up’ agency as imposed ‘from above’ or as a hegemonic ideology.

Relatedly, the idea of the ‘globalisation’ of the eco-city may obscure significant localised inflections. It has been observed that the activity of urban planning, for example, does not have a homogeneous international professional ‘culture’ to the extent that is observable in, for example, the field of civil engineering (Friedmann, 2005:184). Rapoport (2011) examines the masterplanning of the Gia Lam ‘environment-friendly new town’ project in Vietnam, arguing
that it can best be understood as the result of interactions between global and local agents. Chang and Sheppard (2013:61) relate Dongtan and Chongming eco-cities in China to the “global diffusion of urban sustainability initiatives”, but equally interpret them as “embedded in and layered onto pre-existing socioeconomic institutions and cultural contexts”. In becoming locally embedded in plans, policy documents or promotional literature, the ‘global’ dimensions of eco-city which might be postulated thereby undergo a translation. The planned development, furthermore, should be distinguished from the actual city space which evolves following or during its implementation. Shwayri’s (2013) study of Songdo, for example, points to a gradual ‘Koreanization’ of the city over time, which departs from its planned ‘westernness’.

Second, the typification of the current phase in terms of ‘ubiquity’ (Joss et al., 2013), or ‘masterplanning’ (Cugurullo, 2013b:67) with a commercial orientation (Rapoport, 2010), further diverts attention away from its actual practical diversity. Based on the Survey data – almost four in ten eco-city initiatives launched since 2005 have taken the form of ‘retro-fits’ of existing cities, typically directed by local authorities rather than private concerns. Both Rapoport (2010) and Joss (2010) identify the ‘retro-fit’ as a distinct category of eco-city – which Rapoport suggests has intellectual roots in the 1980s.

Finally, contemporary diversity is also observable at the conceptual level (Joss, 2011a). The postulation of a dominant conceptual discourse does not preclude the existence of other parallel discourses: as outlined above, earlier modes of eco-city thinking and practice have not simply been displaced, and initiatives launched before 2005 (such as those in Freiburg and South London’s BedZed) continue to be held up as ‘best practice’ (see, eg: Späth & Rohracher, 2011; and Rydin, 2011:84 respectively). Rather than treating the eco-city as an “ontologically pre-given object” (Whitehead, 2003:1187), it might be better understood as a process of ongoing “complex discursive processes and socio-political struggles” (ibid).

Some of the resulting variety can be illustrated using Dryzek’s (2005) framework of environmental discourses. This framework is used here heuristically to illustrate the fact of this variety, even if Dryzek’s particular categorisation might be contested. However, it
has relevance to the current discussion since its historical framing is similar to that used in the narrative above (evidence is drawn from the beginnings of environmental consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s although ends in the mid-2000s), and links environmental thought to broader social and political trends. He identifies nine discursive tendencies, grouped into four main categories, each underpinned by a ‘storyline’ as glossed in Table 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Key ‘storyline’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Global Limits’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• survivalism</td>
<td>Continued economic growth is impossible, given finite limits of planet’s resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prometheanism</td>
<td>Growth is good; humans, left to their own devices, will generate solutions to problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Problem solving’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• administrative rationalism</td>
<td>Governments should manage the environment rationally in the service of public interest, with the help of expert advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• democratic pragmatism</td>
<td>Decentralised, interactive communicative processes are the best way to approach public problems like the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• economic rationalism</td>
<td>Smoothly operating markets and well-defined private property rights are the solutions to environmental problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Sustainability’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• sustainable development</td>
<td>Economic growth is possible in ways which are environmentally benign and socially just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ecological modernisation</td>
<td>With some restructuring, the capitalist system will be able to deliver both economic development and environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Green radicalism’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• green consciousness</td>
<td>Industrial society induces in humans a warped conception of their place in the world, so new human sensibilities are required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• green politics</td>
<td>Complex socio-environmental can only be solved through political action and structural change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: discourses of the environment (adapted from Dryzek, 2005)

One example of an ongoing scheme conceptually far removed from the dominant EM discourse is provided by the Green City Blue Lake Initiative (originally established in 1992 as the Eco City Cleveland project). This appears most obviously aligned with Dryzek’s category
of ‘green consciousness’, often associated with spirituality rather than a desire to engage in institutional politics (Dryzek, 2005). One of its posters, for example, expresses a sense of reverence towards, and spiritual connection with, the wider region: “This is our home, this territory on the shore of a Great Lake where glaciers have come and gone. We feel the sacred resonance of this place” (GCBL, undated). Auroville (India), similarly, aims to be “a site of material and spiritual researches [sic] for a living embodiment of an actual human unity”, and advises that “to live in Auroville, one must be a willing servitor of the divine consciousness” (Auroville Foundation, 2014).

Evidence of a variety of discourses can, moreover, be observed within individual eco-cities’ documents and policies. This selective interweaving does not imply self-contradiction, since “[d]iscourses are not closed systems. A discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings”, potentially “altering or translating” their meanings (Hall, 1992b:292). The One Planet Living development framework is promoted by Bioregional, a UK-based organisation involved with eco-cities internationally. Among its ten organising principles, the prominence given to social dimensions alongside environmental and economic ones clearly reveals a strong ‘sustainable development’ discursive colouring. At the same time, the framework is rooted in ‘ecological footprinting’, pointing towards ‘survivalist’ discourse. The new city of Sejong in South Korea, discussed in Chapter Seven, exhibits ‘administrative rationalism’ as a top-down state-led initiative, but is also closely tied up with national ‘green growth’ policies which relate to EM. Portland, Oregon (USA), as discussed in Chapter Six, has a strong focus on ‘equity’ and social issues in its strategic plan, suggesting an explicit ‘sustainable development’ discourse, while its EcoDistricts initiative provides a good example of a ‘democratic pragmatist’ approach. The parallel presence and varying combinations of different discourses across contemporary eco-city initiatives support Dryzek’s (2005) argument that environmental concepts are conceptually fluid over time; there is no clear trajectory moving from ignorance towards “environmental enlightenment... What we see instead is that these matters are subject to continuing dispute between people who think in sharply different ways” (ibid:6).

In relation to urban planning theory, Allmendinger (2002) suggests that, while broad shifts in theory can be observed over time,
this has not led so much to a series of paradigm shifts as resulted in “a cluttered landscape of ideas and theories” (29). The idea of cluttering allows for the theorisation of the eco-city as an ongoing multiple experimental process. If we conceptualise the phenomenon as a whole as an intended ‘technological transition’ – and, more specifically, a ‘sustainability transition’ (Geels, 2011) – it potentially fits well into a ‘multi-level perspective’ (MLP) model (Geels, 2002a). Caprotti (2015:9) suggests that cities have become key sites for transition strategies, as transition theories have been spatialised. Thus, eco-cities constitute ‘niches’ or “protected spaces” where “special conditions created through subsidies and an alignment between various actors” aim to develop new technologies (Geels, 2002b:365–367). Technology developed in these niches may or may not break through into – and thereby alter – the prevailing ‘socio-technical regime’. In their study of ‘urban energy and climate governance’, Späth and Rohracher (2011:99–100) attribute the success of ‘eco-city activities’ in Freiburg and Graz to successful mediation between the ‘niche’ and ‘regime’ levels: “much of the work of actors within the city consists of embedding and stabilizing these changes in a broader regime context by, for example, aligning actors and facilitating institutional changes at a province or national level”.

While regimes are constrained and enabled by their broader discursive, political and economic ‘landscape’ (Geels, 2002a), changes at the regime level may, in certain circumstances, affect the landscape. What might elsewhere be called a ‘structural’ transition therefore describes changes in the (relatively fixed) landscape. From this perspective, the rise of the eco-city is not simply readable as a linear diffusion of technical advances, nor in itself as a significant change in the landscape. Rather, it describes a proliferation of individual practices, each tied up with place-bound structures of knowledge, practice, symbolic meaning, and governance (Geels, 2002a). In a “(quasi) evolutionary” process of selection (Hegger et al., 2007:730), only some of these practices will “break through” (ibid) to affect the regimes and landscape in which they are ‘nested’ (ibid). The appearance of eco-city discourse within international policy-making may reflect the relative alignment of contemporary tendencies in eco-city practice with the existing landscape more than it suggests a fundamental structural change.
To the extent that eco-cities function as protected niches, they may alternatively be likened to laboratories where ‘secluded research’ takes place (Callon et al., 2009). This seclusion, however, may hamper the commonly desired goal of ‘replicability’ (Hodson & Marvin, 2009b), when attempts are made to ‘translate’ (Callon et al., 2009) their achievements back into urban contexts elsewhere. Indeed, the goal of replicability may lead actors to downplay the significance of place-specific historical, social, political and cultural factors for marketing purposes, presenting a “techno-economic paradigm” (Rydin, 2011:131) for universal consumption. Within this paradigm, the ‘urban’ generally and the characteristics of individual cities may become “obscured in a thicket of bio-physical environmental issues and concerns” (Vallance et al., 2012:1701), in which human inhabitants are barely discernible (Vallance et al., 2011). Hodson & Marvin (2009a) suggest that eco-cities are often constructed as passive “sites for demonstration and showcasing of technologies” (525) in response to “neo-liberal pressures for increased ‘competitiveness’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘innovation’” (519).

There is some evidence, however, that the denial of context may undermine their implementability in the first place. In the case of China, for example, Pow and Neo (2013:2256) argue that “the lack of an ‘actually existing’ or successfully implemented eco-city” indicates the “considerable amount of resistance and difficulties (in terms of planning, politics, economic costs, etc) that the concept encounters in practice”; and that a focus on design and physical form may obscure the possibility that the “deeper normative tenets of building an eco-city are surprisingly ignored”.

Reifying normative visions of an urban future which focus on particular experimental technologies may, arguably, be relatively simple to achieve in countries with a less open democratic tradition, given suitable funding and political will. Nevertheless, questions still arise in such cases over the ability of such cities to adapt to ongoing technological change in future, and the extent to which such technologies will be adopted compliantly by bodies of citizens who have little say in their planning (Caprotti, 2015). Meanwhile, in countries with a history of public democratic input into the planning process, implementational frictions may be more obviously visible. The UK’s eco-town initiative, for example, met with widespread local opposition. In the case of the proposed Whitehill-Bordon development,
activists complain that the political and commercial actors involved have ignored public opinion (Bordon Area Action Group, undated), describing the scheme as a “bare-faced, politically driven process...This local community now positively rejects it, because it threatens their values and their way of life” (Bordon Area Action Group, 2009). The eco-town initiative was, furthermore, vulnerable to a change of government: following national elections in 2010, the policy framework was abandoned and the local projects have progressed very little (Tomozeiu & Joss, 2014).

The possibility, however, that eco-city development might in fact be more efficiently progressed through a ‘technological showcase’ approach is not rejected in this thesis (and is explored further in Chapter Seven). Rather, a continuum of eco-city initiatives is proposed. Those towards the ‘technological showcase’ end of this continuum, better understood as proxies for real cities, are aligned with Callon’s secluded ‘laboratories’. In extreme cases, these may exhibit a modernist ‘assumed consensus’ (Taylor, 1998) of objectives. As Evans and Karvonen (2014:416) note, the concept of the urban laboratory is “odd because it implies that the real world can function as a laboratory”, and, rather than being “hermetically sealed off from the world”, cities are “messy, multivariate, open systems”. Necessarily, then, the aspects of the city to which they apply must be selectively defined. The same authors highlight Hodson and Marvin’s (2007) argument that the language of ‘testing’ indicates the desire to trial predetermined new technologies, rather than to develop new ideas in an open-ended way and learn from these. This clearly predefined focus and bounded scope, however, need not mean that the experiments which they enact will not yield useful lessons for our collective understanding of urban sustainability. Those at the other end of the continuum – typified by emergent ‘grass roots’ initiatives – are characterised in terms of ‘research in the wild’ (Callon et al., 2009). Such research in the wild extends beyond the eco-city; it is guided by laypersons rather than technical specialists, emerging through and progressing within conditions of actual urban complexity.

The experimental nature of different eco-cities does not only relate to different types of infrastructural or environmental technology, but may also be aligned with a broader pattern of ‘governance
experimentation’ at urban level (Hoffmann, 2012; Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:364). ‘Climate change experiments’ led by municipalities very often involve actors outside traditional political institutions (Bulkeley, 2005), just as eco-cities are increasingly characterised by the involvement of partnerships between different public sector, private sector and civil society actors (Joss et al., 2013). When governance is taken into account, the EcoDistricts initiative in Portland, as described in Chapter Six, may be interpreted as appearing to sit closer to the ‘research in the wild’ end of the continuum proposed above. While instigated by the city council, it aimed to enable the agency of non-state actors at local level, without prescribing the precise actions that they would take, or how they should govern themselves. The other main case study, Sejong City (see Chapter Seven), sits towards the ‘technological showcase’ end of the continuum: defined, mandated and delivered ‘from above’.

In an optimistic reading, this variety (cutting across the eco-city’s formal and conceptual variety) reinforces the theorisation of the eco-city as a multiple experimental process, in which individual eco-city ‘failures’ are to be expected, and from which unpredictable lessons of various types might be learnt. Sustainability’s lack of clear definition makes it a goal characterised by uncertainty; it is a complex problem whose resolution requires its simultaneous definition. If ‘climate change’ – which has increasingly moved centre stage in urban sustainability policies and practices – is a global problem, it is also a diffuse, systemic one (Caprotti, 2015:4). Ostrom argues that a global problem of this type calls not for a single global solution, but rather that ‘collective action’ is best realised polycentrically: “Polycentric approaches facilitate achieving benefits at multiple scales as well as experimentation and learning from experience with diverse policies” (Ostrom, 2010:550). In the face of uncertainty, Callon et al. (2009) similarly argue that a ‘precautionary’ response is required, in the form of polycentric, adaptive, pragmatic, reflexive experimentation. This would appear to describe well the nature of the eco-city, as a body of non-standardised practices tested in widely divergent contexts, characterised by knowledge sharing, flexibility over time, and unconstrained by a particular centralised governing body.

More sceptically, however, it might be observed that the wider field of experimentation is an uneven one. Interpreting this field
through a ‘quasi-evolutionary’ (Hegger et al., 2007:730; Späth & Rohracher, 2012:466) lens, which valorises both successes and failures primarily in terms of their potential contribution to ‘learning’ (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:366), may pay insufficient attention to the “political economy of experimentation” (ibid). Callon characterises ‘research in the wild’ as operating at the mercy of the “logic of relations of force, [allowing] the reproduction...or the exclusion of the weakest” (Callon et al., 2009); even if it is less likely to suffer from problems of ‘translation’ when it succeeds, the process of research itself may be at a disadvantage when compared with that taking place in a well-funded ‘laboratory’.

The field of urban sustainability, then, is not monopolised by the eco-city: as Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013:365) observe, experimental niches need not be created by institutional or powerful commercial actors; they may equally take the form of ‘bottom-up experiments by NGOs or groups of other individuals (Hegger et al., 2007). But it is reasonable to assume that an evolutionary process may be skewed when some species are less well protected than others. As discussed in Chapter One, the smallest grassroots initiatives may lack the resources to gain visibility, attract support, and maintain momentum over time, relative to eco-city schemes which may be instigated from the beginning by high-level policy and commercial backing. In an MLP framing, furthermore, it is logical that those initiatives which already conform to the regime and landscape status quo (and are not in fact innovative), or only promise to alter it incrementally, should have a better chance of succeeding on their own practical terms. If the global institutionalisation of the eco-city has also been accompanied by its ‘laboratorisation’, then its accelerated proliferation allows us to suppose that the eco-city in its (multiple) dominant form has come to constitute a means for the reproduction of already powerful institutional and commercial actors. This proliferation, though, is no guarantee of its broader applicability. In parallel, it remains unclear whether its tendency in many cases towards ‘governance’ in the mode of its delivery should be understood as constructively catalytic of innovation or, as discussed in Chapter One, primarily indicative of a neoliberalisation of urban sustainability.
2.5 Conclusions

It is argued above that the history of the eco-city concept has been closely linked to broader developments in environmental thinking since the 1960s – and in particular to the growth of sustainability discourse since the early 1990s, with much recent growth associated with EM discourse more specifically and – relatedly – the growing involvement of commercial concerns. The eco-city has been conceptualised as a multiple process of experimentation which collectively addresses itself at a series of contemporary agendas related to the long-term future of the planet. From an optimistic perspective, its institutionalisation and integration into markets gives this experimentation a pragmatic character, allowing us potentially to learn lessons about what types of solutions are feasible in the real world, and how we might better define the problems themselves. Its decentralised nature, in combination with its multiplicity across various dimensions, makes it well placed to tackle complex problems which are not amenable to ‘top down’ modernist solutions – and of which climate change, upon which eco-city plans have increasingly come to focus, is a paradigmatic example (Jordan & Huitema, 2014:716). From a pessimistic perspective, its mainstreaming describes a concomitant watering down of its transformative potential. The lack of standardisation plays to the advantage of actors who are already more powerfully placed, and may thereby tend to reproduce structural inequalities. Equally, there may be a tendency for the newer wave of mainstreamed eco-cities to take the form of ‘technological showcases’, primarily serving commercial or institutional goals, but whose socio-political dimensions remain underconceptualised. This may have negative consequences for their implementability in real urban space, and for their replicability.

Some contextual reasons why environmental thinking has come to settle on the city as a target for intervention were also outlined above. In individual cases, this may respond to the need to resolve specific (often localised) problems such as post-industrial decline, poor air quality, or housing shortages, or to concerns over long-term resource security. In claims to provide a solution to more global sustainability concerns, however, the privileging of the city may relate more to questions of scale; the involvement of local authorities in particular may reflect a sense – among some cities at least – of a newly found
agency in a world where nation states appear unable to resolve environmental problems. It may simultaneously relate to the formal characteristics of cities: current mainstream environmental thinking is clearly pro-urban in its advocacy of dense habitations where economies of scale and proximity are understood as having environmental, economic and social advantages. We are told on the highest authority that cities produce most of the world’s carbon emissions (see eg IEA, 2008:180; World Bank, 2010b:15; UN-Habitat, 2011:16), and that therefore “if a change has to happen, it has to be first and foremost an urban change” (Cugurullo, 2013b:67).

But has the city somehow become fetishised in this new way of thinking? The spatial framing of the city as the key generative locus of these problems, first, has been questioned: “The functioning of cities cannot be understood without understanding the multiple connections to other people and places in their surrounds and nearby, and often to ‘distant elsewheres’” (Satterthwaite, 2008:546). It seems possible that the instrumentalisation of the city as a tool (or technology, or rhetorical device) for catalysing global sustainability may have diverted attention from questions about the nature of the envisaged city itself. Where plans aim to build or transform entire cities, it would seem potentially problematic that socio-political considerations appear in some cases to be bracketed. If the aspiration is one of a sustainable future in a world where most humans live in some form of city, then it is germane to ask questions about the nature of the ‘cityness’ of planned and built eco-cities.

Approaching this question requires a preliminary working definition of ‘cityness’. The next chapter therefore draws on a broad range of relevant literature to construct a conceptual framework within which ‘cityness’ or ‘urbanity’ is more generally theorised.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} The concepts of ‘the urban’ and ‘the city’ (and derivatives of each) are used interchangeably in this thesis.
Chapter Three

Cities as Public Spaces

The previous chapter suggested that the institutional and commercial goals of much mainstream eco-city development may leave the socio-political dimensions of urban sustainability relatively unconsidered. Relatedly, it was suggested that the ‘city’ itself may have remained poorly conceptualised, particularly in initiatives which are intended to function more as ‘technological showcases’. But what is a city? And how might the ‘city’ envisioned in eco-city plans and policies depart from this? This chapter argues that the quality of publicness is a particularly important dimension of urbanity, and proposes that conceptualising publicness may be enabled or constrained by the understanding of city space which underpins it. The argument is made with reference to a set of literatures which variously theorise the urban, the public, and space. These literatures are thereby linked to the urban sustainability ‘problem of planning’, even though their primary concerns typically lie elsewhere. The discussion lays the groundwork for the analysis of eco-city documentation in Chapter Five, where space is shown to be mobilised as a rhetorical device which potentially serves to normalise particular agendas rather than satisfactorily describe the ‘public city’. Chapters Six and Seven will then further explore the significance of publicness for urban sustainability, by analysing the publicness of two implemented eco-city initiatives.

The first section offers a theorisation of the city which draws on recent theories of ‘urban assemblage’, so as to avoid bounded, territorial ‘scale’ thinking – such as that implied by the ‘urban age’ thesis – on the one hand, and non-spatialised abstract notions of ‘cityness’ on the other. Assemblage theory allows us makes the case that a city is a particular type of entity, which is (unevenly) obdurate in space, but also incoherent and dynamically constituted as much by external relations as by what it ‘contains’. Although the quality of ‘cityness’ is understood as a tendency rather than as an absolute category, its particularity lies in the presence of different ‘spheres’:
the institutional, the commercial, and the social. These spheres are mutually constitutive but relatively autonomous and ontologically distinct; their interplay leads to particular, variously durable assemblages across city space. Publicness is understood as a distinctively urban type of assemblage which results.

The chapter continues by reviewing various theories of the ‘public’ to suggest that the social urban sphere has a fragmented, hidden aspect (the ‘personal’), but that this may interact with the city’s other spheres to form visible assemblages of ‘publicness’. Publicness thus assembled is presented as a necessary characteristic of urbanity; in this sense, the city is, abstractly, a ‘public space’, and the space of actual cities may be conceptualised as unevenly public.

Crucially, this publicness has two modalities: the ‘civic’ and the ‘emergent’. Partly because of the importance of visibility in the theory of publicness advanced here, it is argued that the open spaces of a city are particularly important sites for the assemblage of publicness. Finally, Lefebvre’s model of ‘socially produced’ space is used to illustrate the possibility that the conceptualisation of space prevalent in fields such as urban planning, and implicit in the notion of the ‘urban scale’, forms an unsatisfactory basis on which to conceptualise publicness. Their treatment of space as a neutral geometric grid, or ‘container’, denies both the ways in which the materiality of the city is dynamically co-produced by publicness, and its ongoing role in assembling publicness variously across the city. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the implications of this discussion for empirical research into the publicness of the eco-city.

3.1 What is a City?

The limitations of scale and territory

The justification for intervention at city level, as a means to secure a sustainable global future, rests partly on the proposition that we now live in the ‘Urban Age’ (Joss, 2015). Brenner and Schmid (2014:731) observe that: “[a]cross otherwise diverse discursive, ideological and locational contexts, the urban age thesis has become a form of doxic common sense around which questions regarding the contemporary
global urban condition are framed”. Ongoing urban growth, once seen as a barrier to economic growth and social justice, is now understood as relatively advantageous in these regards (Balbo, 2014). The oft-repeated claim, based on UN estimates and projections, that man is for the first time in history predominantly and increasingly an urban creature (Figure 3.1), when combined with the understanding that pollutants generally and GHGs in particular are produced in urban locations (see Chapter Two), form the basis of the evidently persuasive case that change in cities should be prioritised in sustainability-related policy-making.

The logic of this line of thought may be appealing. However, it relies on a reductive definition of the city as a bounded geographical unit: the urban lying within its boundaries; the rural without. The

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18 For examples of the range of texts of which the ‘urban age’ idea forms a foundational component, see Brenner and Schmid (2014). They comment that the urban age “appears…to have become a de rigueur framing device or reference point for nearly anyone concerned to justify the importance of cities as sites of research, policy intervention, planning/design practice, investment or community activism. Much like the notion of modernization in the 1960s and that of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s, the thesis of an urban age appears to have become such an all-pervasive metanarrative that early twenty-first century readers and audiences can only nod in recognition as they are confronted with yet another incantation of its basic elements” (Brenner & Schmid, 2014:734).
UN determines these boundaries by adopting or combining geographical units constructed by each country for administrative or statistical purposes (for details of the method used, see UN, 2008:13–61). The criteria used to define the ‘urban’ areas on which the calculation is based differ in each country (Brenner & Schmid, 2014); they may variously relate to, for example, the presence of government institutions, types of economic activity, levels of infrastructure, and in many cases – somewhat tautologically – the number of inhabitants (see eg UN, 2008:13–61). To the extent that this territorial definition fails to conceptualise the city satisfactorily, the conclusion that ‘cities’ should be the target for intervention may be problematic.

The direct link between population size and the quality of ‘cityness’ was already implicitly challenged by Aristotle in his observation that “a great [polis] and a populous one are not the same” (Aristotle, 1992:403). Similarly, in his seminal Urbanism paper, Wirth (1938:4) argues that characterising a community as ‘urban’ on the basis of quantitative threshold variables is “arbitrary” if only because “the city, statistically speaking, is always an administrative concept in that the corporate limits play a decisive role in delineating the urban area”. Nevertheless, Wirth concedes that “some characteristics of cities will be more significant in conditioning the nature of urban life than others” (ibid:7), and thus “the fact that the urban community is distinguished by a large aggregation and relatively dense concentration of population can scarcely be left out of account in a definition of the city” (Wirth, 1938:6). Population size, then, at least correlates with, and may shape, ‘cityness’, but in itself tells us very little about what the city might be.

Other variables have been employed in the production of various ‘league tables’ of cities in recent years; Kitchin et al. (2015:7) suggest that tendency to benchmark and compare cities’ performance on various criteria using quantitative indicators has been particularly marked since the millennium. These widely publicised ranking schemes may frame their concerns in particular ways. Examples include the annual survey conducted by international consultancy

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19 Relatedly, the last few years have seen a proliferation of frameworks of indicators which variously certify, endorse and compare existing urban areas and new developments in terms of urban sustainability; the majority of these have been launched since 2008 (see Joss, 2015:Chapter Six; Joss et al, 2015).
company Mercer which rates cities on their ‘quality of living’ (see eg: Mercer, 2015); the annual Global Green Economy Index conducted by consulting company Dual Citizen which most recently compared 70 cities worldwide (Dual Citizen, 2014); and the regular ‘city rankings’ produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit across five categories of Economy, Market Opportunities, Labour Market, Infrastructure and Environment, which are combined to give an overall ‘liveability’ score (for an overview of the methodology, see EIU, undated). Such exercises seek to promote the idea that certain types of cities are ‘leaders’ in various ways – and the leaders are usually large cities in the developed world. To take just one example, in the consultancy group Arcadis’ (2015) Sustainable Cities Index (whose three broad criteria of ‘People’, ‘Planet’, and ‘Profits’ clearly map onto the three pillars of sustainability), seven of the ‘top ten’ sustainable cities are to be found in Europe, while all of the developing cities assessed appear in the bottom half of the league table.

A further set of ranking systems explicitly aim to construct hierarchies with ‘global’ or ‘world’ cities at their apex, deemed to display particularly urban characteristics across a variety of fields (Beaverstock et al., 1999; Magnusson, 2005; Moonen & Clark, 2013). These ‘world city’ league tables are derived through algorithms using a mixture of ‘hard’ variables (describing, for example, economic performance and connectivity) and quantitatively categorised assessments of political influence, infrastructure and cultural characteristics. Yet it would seem unsatisfactory to turn to such indices for a definition of ‘cityness’. The recent move to ‘decentre’ urban studies away from the paradigm of the large city in the western world (see Chapter One) may alert us to the possibility that what is being measured here is a particular sense of cityness; that a simple hierarchy fails to capture many qualitative differences between cities (Hill, 2004); that both the variables selected and their mode of combination are arbitrary insofar as they reflect norms which may be explicitly declared or go unquestioned. At best, such criteria might be understood as selective proxies for the city itself, which remains a “messy and elusive object” (Farías, 2010:13).

The idea of a league table nevertheless opens up the possibility of thinking about the city as a series of tendencies, rather than in absolute terms. Wirth similarly indicated this possibility in his
“minimal definition” of the city as “a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of heterogeneous individuals” (Wirth, 1938:8, italics added). He proposes a continuum of actual cities running between two ‘ideal types’ of society: the “urban industrial” and its binary opposite, “rural folk” (ibid:3). “[A]ll human settlements tend to arrange themselves”, he contends, between these “poles of reference” (ibid). Tuan (1978), similarly, defines the city in terms of its relative ‘distance from nature’:

“Cities…may be ranked according to how far they depart from farm life...At one end of the scale we have the village subordinate to nature; at the other, the city that does not know how it is fed, that comes alive in winter and slightes the daily course of the sun” (Tuan, 1978:1).

For Wirth and Tuan, then, rurality is semantically embedded in the signifier ‘city’ (as its implied opposite). Williams (1975:9–10) suggests the discursive nature of this rural-urban opposition by distinguishing between on the one hand the “powerful feelings” which have “gathered and been generalised” on “the country” and “the city”, and on the other the “real history” in which “both have been astonishingly varied” with a contemporary reality consisting of “a wide range of settlements between the traditional poles of country and city: suburb, dormitory town, shanty town, industrial estate”. He suggests that this discursive contrast between country and city “as fundamental ways of life, reaches back into classical times” (ibid:9); relatedly, Lees (1985) sees an “implicitly critical response to city life” in the pastoral tendency in Latin literature and the bucolic poets of the Hellenistic world.

Accordingly, a long tradition of writing on cities constructs a wide variety of fields with an ‘urban’ and a ‘rural’ pole. These fields include: the proximity of people and knowledge (Glaeser, 2011); cultural achievement (Hall, 1998); the possession of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984); significance as a site of religious worship (Moholy-Nagy, 1969; Lynch, 1981; Short, 2002); and the presence of monumental buildings (Childe, 1950; Kostof, 1991). Over a century ago, Howard (1902) used a series of postulated ‘town’ versus ‘country’ binary opposites to define the problem which his Garden City was intended to resolve. Again, though, the identification of such a spectrum does not amount to a satisfactory description of
what cityness consists of in itself – beyond the self-referential fact of its opposition to a similarly undefined ‘ruralness’. Shields suggests that defining the ‘urban’ with reference to the ‘rural’ may exemplify Derrida’s notion of ‘différance’: “In this system of meaning, the definition of terms and concepts ultimately is circular” (Shields, 1996:232). A stable definition of cityness itself, in other words, is thus always deferred. Magnusson (2005) concludes that:

“Rather than thinking of the urban spatially (as in the distinction between city and countryside) or temporally (as in our oft-told stories of an evolution from hunter-gatherer to agrarian and then to urban-industrial societies), we may find it more useful to conceive of it ontologically” (Magnusson, 2005:100).

He challenges us to theorise what Wirth calls ‘urbanism’ as a transhistorical “distinctive way of life with characteristic features” (Magnusson, 2005:98). Thus, “urbanity – or, in another language, ‘civilisation’ – [is] an ever-present feature of human life” (Magnusson, 2005:107). This search for a distinctive urban subjectivity is of use in that it moves us away from purely descriptive or material accounts of the ‘city’. But such an approach may be just as problematically partial as the territorial definition adopted by the UN: in decoupling this hypothesised subjectivity from the spatiality of the city, it makes the opposite mistake by ignoring the significance of the latter. Even if the materiality of a city is contingent, its relationship to a less tangible urban ‘way of life’ needs to be accounted for.

Weintraub (1997) provides a useful starting point in thinking about this relationship. He mobilises the distinction between the city as urbs (the physical city) and as civitas (a collectivity of citizens). On this basis, a satisfactory account of a city would encompass its properties both as a physical space constituted by an array of technologies and other tangible entities, and as a dynamic nexus of social relations. Isin uses this same distinction to launch a critique on ‘scalar thought’ – such as that evident in ‘Urban Age’ eco-city discourse – which represents cities and nations

“as though all exist in actual spaces as such at a given scale of representation. Just because these bodies can be represented by scale in cartographic terms, the assumption is that these bodies exist in the form in which
they are represented. Scalar thought conceals the difference between actual (physical and material) and virtual (symbolic, imaginary and ideal) states in which bodies politic exist” (Isin, 2007:211).

Isin contends that the *urbs-*civitas distinction is “as old as the city itself”, but refines it such that the *urbs* describes “actual bodies and things”, while the *civitas* is “virtual in the sense that it is an association that exists beyond the actual bodies and things that constitute it” (Isin, 2007:212). The *civitas* thus describes the relations between the component parts of the *urbs*, which exceed the materiality of the city. It points to the existence of ‘society’, which “does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of the relations within which individuals stand” (Marx, 1973:265, cited in Bhaskar, 1998:26). While an account of the ‘characteristic features’ of the city, then, needs to encompass its spatialised material dimensions (the city as technology, and the technologies within it), this should not amount to a crude fetishisation of the urban scale, which, in presenting the social as having no ontological depth, represents a depoliticised conceptualisation of the city.

The difficulty of definitively theorising the nature of the relationship between the materiality of the city and its social dimensions is signalled by the scholarly disagreements about this over time. Some of these are outlined below. Nevertheless, in its totality, this ongoing debate does outline certain minimal ‘components’ of the ‘urban way of life’. These are interrelated in a more open-ended – and less predictive – way below through a consideration of the city in terms of ‘assemblage’.

**Urban technology and urban society**

If we are to identify any essential features of the urban, these would need to be sufficiently abstract to have relevance across time and space to cityness as a tendency, rather than to be induced from particular types of cities (such as ‘world cities’) – and yet sufficiently specific to distinguish the city from other types of entity. One efficient way of establishing a minimal definition of this type may be to consider how the historical emergence and subsequent development of cities – in contradistinction to earlier villages or other forms of rural life – has been explained.
In earlier theorisations, the *urbs* tended to be causationally prior to the *civitas*: the first cities were social phenomena driven by technological change. Childe was insistent on technology’s effect of “moulding and determining social systems and economic organization” (Childe, 1966:8), having developed the notion of the ‘Urban Revolution’ as a process by which settled agricultural communities underwent a change in their “economic structure and social organisation that caused, or was accompanied by, a dramatic increase in the population” during the late fourth millennium BC (Childe, 1950:3). Chant (1999) provides evidence of other mid-century writers on early cities taking a similarly deterministic line, including White (1959), who acknowledged the influence of Childe, and Wittfogel (1957), who argued that urbanisation in ancient Mesopotamia was fundamentally driven by the need to reorganise and centrally manage water supplies. For Childe, the distinctively urban social world resulted from the adoption of new technologies, and differed from its non-urban antecedents particularly in terms of social stratification, relating to the specialisation of labour and the existence of a ruling class or bureaucracy, and the creation of social surpluses used for the importation of produce and artefacts not locally available. This new form of social organisation, then, was defined by its institutional life and the presence of commerce.

If these two novelties distinguish the city from other types of settlement, the linear causality of such explanations, in which the social characteristics of urbanity derive from technological changes, was increasingly challenged from the 1960s onwards (Chant, 1999). Technology has come to be understood as socially shaped to varying degrees: “[t]echnologies are fashioned to reflect and extend human interests, activities, and social arrangements, which are, in turn, conditioned, structured, and transformed by technological systems” (Kaplan, 2003:168). Feenburg (1999) reads this shift as a reaction originally against the technocratic governance structures of the 1960s. He argues against the separation of the ‘social’ and ‘technical’, contending that technologies “include their contexts as these are embodied in design and social insertion” (*ibid:*xiii). Feenburg accepts Pinch and Bijker’s (1989) broad thesis that technology is adopted not because of its intrinsic technical or economic efficiency, but rather because it fits the “interests and beliefs of the various social groups
that influence the design process” (p.79). He tempers this constructivist position, however, by insisting that technology should not consequently be seen as an outcome of a social process, but rather as a “site of social struggle” (p.83).

Other writers refuse to reject the agency of technology entirely. Marx and Smith (1994), for example, see technological innovation as neither the primary determinant of social change, nor as merely socially constructed, but rather as having the status of a “second-order agent of history” (xiv). Heilbroner (1967) argues that the explanatory force of technological determinism varies for different historical epochs. Misa (1994) suggests that technological determinism makes more sense in macro-level analyses, but is typically undermined in micro-level ones. Winner (1999) argues that artefacts can be understood as having political agency in two senses. In the first of these, the choice of a particular technology represents a “way of settling an issue in a particular community” (ibid:29), but the implemented technology has ongoing political effects. She exemplifies this process with reference to Robert Moses’ road and bridge building programme in New York, which had the effect of privileging the automobile, and excluding the public transport-using poorer social classes. At the macro urban scale, technologies may thereby “embody a systematic social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people that, after a time, becomes just another part of the landscape” (Winner, 1999:31), and as such have ideological force (Cosgrove, 1998). Her second sense in which technologies may have political agency is in the case of “man-made systems that appear to require, or to be strongly compatible with, particular kinds of political relationships” (Winner, 1999:30). Her examples include the case of solar energy which, she contends, will tend towards technical and political decentralisation compared with fossil-fuel and nuclear based energy production. Thus, choosing one technology over another has not only environmental and economic effects but also “important consequences for the form and quality of human associations” (Winner, 1999:34).

Other claims still have been made about the ways in which technology can be meaningfully understood as affecting society, but which steer clear of determinism. To the extent that it creates ‘path dependence’ (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999), and that its social effects
may not be predictable, in what Bimber (1994) labels the ‘Unintended Consequences’ account of technology, it displays social agency which extends beyond that expressed in the human actors’ choice to use it. Hughes (1994) similarly promotes the idea of ‘technological momentum’, suggesting that younger technological systems are more open to sociocultural influences, while mature systems tend to be more independent and therefore more deterministic. But if a ‘hard’ technological deterministic perspective has been declared untenable within academic circles, it may still continue to inform popular opinion (Smith & Marx, 1994) as the ‘dominant account’ of technology in the mass media (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999:3). As the dominant popular account, determinism might be expected to have some influence on governmental policies affecting the built environment in a democracy, or in other relevant documents designed to appeal to public opinion. If determinism can in fact be detected in policies and key documents relating to eco-cities, it will be sensible to question whether their social characteristics have been meaningfully articulated: in other words, whether the urbs has been prioritised over the civitas.

This debate as a whole leaves us with an understanding that technology and society – in the case of cities or more generally – are “mutually constitutive” (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999:23). Urban society, in other words, has a certain autonomy as a field which exceeds the materiality of the urbs, even if the two cannot be disentangled. At this point, we can bring Childe et al. back into the picture, to define this society as urban insofar as it is constituted not only by relations between individuals but also by an interrelated institutional or regulatory sphere, as well as a commercial one.

The tendency for cities to be characterised by the presence of an institutional sphere, such that urbanity has always been associated with the existence of bureaucratised regulatory codes (Johns, 1903; Childe, 1950), is related to what Short (2002) labels the discourse of the ‘Authoritarian City’. In this authoritarian discourse, cities impose structures on people; they “have authority embedded in them”, they impose a “discipline of space and time”, and are “places of compunction” (ibid:18-19). Yet this discourse is not necessarily in conflict with the ‘emancipatory’ precept that “cities equal civilization” (Short, 2002:19); institutional authority is also potentially
emancipatory as a “form of social contract to protect against the excesses of the more powerful”  (*ibid*): it mandates a certain type of order which enables as much as it constrains. Short nevertheless rejects assumptions of a “hermetically sealed connection between order and consent…change does occur and it takes place when people interact…and this takes place most palpably in cities”  (*ibid*:21). At the same time, the (changeable) ordering function of this institutional sphere is potentially problematic as a marker of contemporary urbanity. The reach of the modern nation state is such that the presence of institutional codification may not help us in practice to distinguish the urban from the non-urban; it may allow us to distinguish a city from, say, a pond, but no longer marks out the ‘city’ from a supposedly anarchic hinterland.

Similar considerations apply to the ‘commercial’ sphere of urban life. Its identification by Childe as foundational to urbanity, and further elaboration by Jane Jacobs (1970), allows us to conceptualise it as mutually constitutive of a city’s institutional life, but to be defined against this insofar as institutions seek to regulate or enable markets. It seems reasonable to propose that, like the institutional sphere, commercial dynamics may variously oppress or emancipate individuals, and may shape (though not fully determine) interpersonal relations; commerce is constrained by, but also shapes, the material form of the city. However, it would be perverse to suggest that contemporary rural communities operate outside market forces; the type of clear-cut distinction evident in, for example, medieval western European, between cities wherein trading occurred and a rural hinterland operating along feudal lines (Pirenne, 1969) no longer obtains – in fact, the clarity of this distinction has long been disputed (see eg Ewan, 1990; Nicholas, 1997). Rather, as discussed below, a more convincingly distinctive urban characteristic lies in the tendency for the ‘personal’ sphere (which otherwise remains relatively hidden) to become visible: this characteristic is one of publicness, and the processes through which it becomes visible in particular contexts are here conceptualised as ones of variegated ‘assemblage’.

**Assemblage theory**

An emerging body of work which theorises the urban in terms of ‘assemblages’ draws on DeLanda’s (2006) broader project to
conceptualise “a wide range of social entities, from persons to nation-states” as constructed through “very specific historical processes” (DeLanda, 2006:3). The recent use of assemblage theory in urban studies has been facilitated by ‘actor-network theory’ in which “assemblage refers to the immanent effect of the association of heterogeneous elements (humans, organizations, tools, objects, technologies, texts, organisms, other cities)” (Jacobs, 2012:416). DeLanda distances his ‘realist social ontology’ from social constructivism in that “language plays an important but not a constitutive role” in the process of assemblage (ibid); discourses are understood as real-world phenomena which contribute to assemblages. Accordingly, “the city is not socially constructed, but enacted into being in networks of bodies, materialities, technologies, objects, natures and humans” (Farías, 2010:13).

This focus on enactment suggests the possibility of theorising the ways that cities are ‘performed’, but which avoids prescribing any particular artefacts or socio-political formations which result as necessary markers of cityness. For example, while empirical observation might suggest that monumental architecture is clearly correlated with cityness; assemblage theory shifts the emphasis onto the processes through which such architecture comes to be built in varied but particular contexts, and away from the resulting buildings themselves. The idea of assemblage is therefore adopted here to theorise coherently (rather than describe) what happens in ‘real cities’ as opposed to envisioned ones, but without defining the city with reference to specific formal outcomes.

Traditional approaches conceiving of the city as somehow a “bounded unit and a stable object: a spatial form, an economic-political entity; a cultural formation” (Farías, 2010:12) are contested from an assemblage perspective as implying “a kind of homogeneous unity, an implication that contradicts all modern urban experience and ignores all its fissures and fractures” (Bender, 2010:304). While DeLanda does attempt to grasp the city in its entirety as an assemblage, Bender refutes the implication that we might therefore start with an “assumption that the city is some kind of whole, a totality, represented as a bounded or at least an identifiable territorial space that gives shape to social relations” (ibid); the aim is to think about it as “not a whole, but a composite entity”
Assemblages, in another definition, are “never fully stable and well-bounded entities; they do not have an essence, but exist in a state of continual transformation and emergence” (Ureta, 2014:232), defined as much by the relations between their components as their “relations of exteriority” (DeLanda, 2006:10). This non-bounded sense of the city chimes with a wide range of other theorisations of the city during the last two decades which emphasise their relational nature, and understand contemporary cities as increasingly “intensely embedded in global networks of connectivity, be they economic, cultural or political” (Jacobs, 2012:412). The ontology of this ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996) is such that questions of “[w]here cities end and rurality begins” become redundant (Jacobs, 2012:412). Instead, “city effects pulse outwards drawing in rural-based lives and spaces, creating hybrid urbanisms and new types of conjoined city regions” (ibid).

From this perspective, the notion of urban ‘scale’ which arose in geography as a way of linking the city’s internal space to the ‘national’ and ‘global’ (Latham & McCormack, 2010; Smith, 2010) can only be interpreted as a social construction; it has risen to prominence partly in response to processes of globalisation (Purcell, 2008:9). The extent to which scale is a “material thing which can be ‘seen’ in the landscape” or “an...arbitrary mental device” has been hotly debated over the last few decades (Herod & Wright, 2002:5). Delaney and Leitner, for example, argue that scale is rhetorically “implicated in the constitution of social, economic and political processes” (1997:93). Marston interprets scale as both the outcome of “everyday life and macro-level social structures” but also having material consequences (2000:221). If, as suggested earlier, scale has depoliticising effects insofar as it is presented as a “neutral container that exists outside politics” (Purcell, 2008:9–10), the ‘urban scale’ might be better understood as a strategy which “flow[s] from the agendas of the actors empowered by the strategy” (ibid:101). Instead of thinking in terms of scale and territory, we are encouraged by assemblage theorists to develop a “sense of urban complexity, or the unities and disunities, of the stabilities and instabilities, and especially the complex and heterogeneous networks of connection and association out of which the city as a social and as a physical entity is formed and sustained (Bender, 2010:317).”

"The actual city"
then, “exists only in concrete assemblages and provides no encompassing form for its multiple enactments” (Farias, 2010:15).

Rather than privileging either the civitas or the urbs, “assemblage distributes agency across the social and the material, and in doing so draws attention to the agency of the materials themselves as processes within assemblages” (McFarlane, 2011a). But this too may be limiting if it leads us back to thinking of the city as too ontologically ‘flat’: “This apparent levelling of responsibility in an…analysis of causation worries me, for it seems to remove ethics and politics from social analysis” (Bender, 2010:305). Just as Allen (2011) is concerned that the concept of assemblage may itself fall into the trap of generating little more than open-ended and contestable description, Bender argues that it fails more specifically to account for the importance of institutional power as a definitively urban phenomenon. Brenner et al. (2011) express related concerns that by rejecting structural explanations in favour of a ‘naïve objectivism’, assemblage approaches are impoverished in their ability to account for the broader context of capitalism. However, the possibility of assemblage theory being used in future to focus more directly on hierarchical relations which may be somehow typical of city life – as writers such as Childe (1950) and Adams (1966) proposed of the earliest cities – is suggested by McFarlane (2011a:222): “As a relational process of composition, assemblage signals the emergence, labour and sociomateriality of the city, and the ways in which this process becomes structured and hierarchical through inequalities of power, resource and knowledge”. Meanwhile, the very open-endedness of the idea of ‘assemblage’ makes it a suitable way of conceptualising publicness as theorised in the following section, allowing us to posit its precise nature in different contexts as variously imagined (or discursive) but also spatialised and having concrete effects on the world.

Assemblage thinking does not aim to “separate out the cultural, material, political, economic, and ecological” (McFarlane, 2011b:652), but rather “seeks to attend to why and how multiple bits-and-pieces accrete and align over time to enable particular forms of urbanism over others in ways that cut across these domains” (ibid). While these ‘particular forms’ are subject to “transformation and destruction, reconstruction and decay” (Bender, 2010:316), or “disassembly and
reassembly through unequal relations of power and resource” (McFarlane, 2011b:652), and are contested on a continual basis, the ontology thus imagined need not be one of shapeless flux, for two reasons. First, the emergent multiplicity of the city, while unpredictable, does not imply that the nature of the city is entirely open-ended: a forest, or a pond, is similarly composed of shifting assemblages, and yet it is unlikely that either would be confused with a city. It allows, in other words, for the possibility that certain commonalities can be highlighted in the ways that cities – as opposed to other phenomena – are ‘assembled’. Based on the previous discussion, it is proposed that the process of city assemblage describes the interaction of the different ‘spheres’ of urban life. The word ‘sphere’ here does not connote a fixed entity, but rather a particular ontological dimension of urban life; the concrete manifestations of these spheres which are coproduced with their contexts, and the interactions between the resulting assemblages, will differ from city to city, ‘within’ cities themselves (whether or not a territorial boundary is constructed), and over time.

Second, the precise form of urban assemblages may be in continual flux, but some will exhibit relative fixity – or obduracy (Hommels, 2005; 2010). The material dimensions of the urbs – particularly in the form of infrastructure – become relatively fixed after being assembled (Hommels, 2010) even if these attract different meanings and have different implications for the city over time, as they “come to be related to new entities and react to them” (Ureta, 2014:245). Thus, cities concentrate “stabilised networks” which emerge historically as assemblages but – in an echo of some of the theories referred to above taking intermediate positions between technological determinism and social constructivism – are then also a “potential actant in a subsequent phase of urban development” (Bender, 2010:310).

The same might be said for specific institutions (which are assembled in contingent ways to describe the interaction of the institutional sphere with its material environment, economic conditions, and social context). Regulatory institutions, in Dewey’s (1989:31) formulation, are oriented towards fixity rather than flexibility or responsiveness to ongoing change. The commercial sphere, for its part, can be distinguished from markets themselves,
which are assembled (and often spatially consolidated) over time in contingent ways (DeLanda, 2006:32). Assemblages which encompass the commercial sphere may achieve obduracy as what Callon (1991) calls ‘techno-economic networks’ with ongoing – though shifting – implications for the city, though may be threatened or contested over time.

We are encouraged by the constructivist objections to Childe et al. to conceptualise the civitas as exceeding the institutional and commercial life of the city; it is this excess more specifically which is henceforth called the social sphere. A specifically urban sense of this social sphere is suggested by theorists who evoke a field of collective sociability with a negative rural pole. Mitchell (2003), for example, follows Lefebvre in contrasting the urban with the rural as a place of essentially private, isolated individuals. For Mumford (1938), the city can be read as a “related collection of primary groups and purposive associations: the first, like family and neighbourhood, are common to all communities, while the second are especially characteristic of city life” (ibid:480). The city, then, is distinguished from the rural in the degree to which it provides “differentiated opportunities for a common life and a significant collective drama” (ibid:481). On this view, the fragmentated domain of domestic, personal and intimate (henceforth referred to as ‘personal’) activities and relations, which evolve in seclusion, also forms part of urban life, but it is not a definitive part of it. At different times, elements of this personal domain may emerge into the public sphere, while other visible public assemblages may retreat into the ‘hidden’ personal sphere. While the two, then, are intimately related, it is more precisely the visible ‘public’ aspect of the social sphere which is understood in this thesis as associated with urbanity. The following section reviews various traditions of conceptualising publicness to define more closely the way this label is used in the following chapters.

3.2 Rethinking the Public

Weintraub (1997) argues that the notion of ‘public’ can only be understood as part of a binary pair with ‘private’. He suggests that it shares across its various definitions an idea of visibility (that which is
open, revealed and accessible), and *collectivity* (as opposed to individuality). Beyond this, however:

The public/private distinction is not...unitary, but protean. It comprises, not a simple opposition, but a complex family of them, neither mutually reducible nor wholly unrelated *(ibid:2)*.

Similarly, in discussing the definitional complexity of ‘publicness’, Newman and Clarke (2009) suggest that the quality of ‘publicness’ is “historically and socially variable”, quoting Warner’s (2002:28) observation that “almost every cultural change – from Christianity to printing to psycho-analysis – has left a new sedimentary layer in the meaning of the public and the private”. Nevertheless, Weintraub (1997) proposes that the types of public-private distinction mobilised in debates over contemporary society fall into four categories, which are discussed in turn below:

1. ‘public’ and ‘private’ used to indicate the state and the market economy respectively;
2. the use of ‘private’ referring to family life, with that of ‘public’ indicating a wider economic and social order;
3. ‘public’ denoting a political community separate from that of the market economy, the household, and the administrative apparatus of the state; and
4. ‘public’ evoking an arena of informal, pluralist co-presence.

The first typically appears in policy analysis and everyday political debate related to jurisdiction and a normatively liberal sense of the demarcation of state authority (Weintraub, 1997). The distinction is signalled by the terms ‘public sector’ / ‘private sector’ or ‘publicly owned’/’privately owned’ in this thesis. The ‘public’ here indicates an “apparatus of rule...that stands above society and governs it...on behalf of a society of private...individuals” (Weintraub, 1995:291); it closely maps onto the idea of the institutional sphere proposed earlier.

Weintraub’s second public:private distinction above is most obviously related to the nature of the social sphere proposed above. He observes that this distinction has been questioned by cultural commentators, and especially feminist writers, who have argued that
the binary is a patriarchal construction.\textsuperscript{20} It is challenged from a political perspective by Scott (1990), who observes that that formation of political opinions exceeds the often “calm surface of political life” (ibid:17) in the ‘public domain’. Scott uses theatrical metaphors to liken the public domain to a stage where the “effects of power relations are most manifest” (ibid:4) such that performances between different social groups most often follow ‘official transcripts’. This appearance, he argues, may belie underlying tensions, whose ‘hidden transcripts’ are developed in sequestered, or ‘private’, places; such tensions may reemerge into the public domain at “those rare moments of political electricity when, often for the first time in memory, the hidden transcript is spoken directly and publicly in the face of power” (ibid:xiii). Dean (2001), similarly, suggests that the ‘secret’ is a “generator of the public”, expressing discomfort with the idea that ‘publicity’ is often presented uncritically within contemporary society as democratically benign, and indeed appears to be the “governing concept of the information age”, such that “[i]f something isn’t public(ized), it doesn’t seem to exist at all”. In acknowledgement of the contingency and ideological force of this binary as it is mobilised, this thesis similarly conceives of the city’s ‘hidden’ social sphere and its public life as fundamentally interconnected; the two remain analytically separate, however, since the latter constitutes the visible aspect of the former.

A third, in-between category is proposed by Lofland (1998): the ‘parochial’ realm, or communal world of acquaintances and neighbours, as distinct both from the private (the intimate or domestic), and the public (essentially, ‘the world of strangers’). He differentiates cities, which “routinely and persistently” (ibid:12) contain all three realms, from other settlements, which lack a significant public life. In his view, the pre-industrial city was particularly closely associated with ‘public’ life, whereas developments in technology – particularly of communications and transport – have allowed ever more city dwellers to “spend their lives entirely in the private and/or parochial realms” (ibid:18). In similar vein, Kohn (2004) argues that the rhetoric of ‘community’ is fundamentally anti-urban (and more closely associated with suburban gated communities than

\textsuperscript{20} As Bondi and Domosh (1998), among others, point out, the “doctrine of separate spheres” as developed in western modernity has spatial as well as ideological dimensions, with the home gendered as a “woman’s space” (Bondi & Domosh, 1998:270), and ‘public space’ associated with masculinity.
the ideal of urban public space proper); in promising to “provide the pleasures of sociability without the discomforts of the unfamiliar” (Kohn, 2004:193), it appeals as a “substitute for public life” (Kohn, 2011:186). Community thus relates more to an extended type of intimacy, related to homogeneous in-groups of neighbours, friends and other associates. Neither Lofland nor Kohn therefore disrupt the conception of the public in this thesis; their notions of the parochial (or ‘community’) are subsumed within the ‘personal’ sphere.

The pseudo-public nature of ‘community’ has further significance for this thesis given the role community is increasingly assigned in contemporary practices of governance (Rose, 1999:167). Rose interprets it as having a paradoxical quality, being valorised as, on the one hand, as a “kind of natural, extra-political zone of human relations” (ibid:167-168); and, on the other, as “a crucial element in particular styles of political government” (ibid:168). In terms of the argument that will be developed later (see Chapter Six in particular), this might be interpreted as part of a wider endeavour to bring the private realm, traditionally marked as ‘outside’ the purview of the state, into its formal institutional processes.

The third usage that Weintraub identifies, following Habermas (1989) in particular, delineates the ‘public’ as a political community separate from that of the market economy, the household, and the administrative apparatus of the state; a “distinctive field of action that can emerge whenever human beings act and deliberate in concert” (Weintraub, 1997:11). Certain definitions of ‘civil society’ are closely aligned with this third meaning of the public. Kaldor (2003) identifies an ‘activist’ perspective on civil society, which she suggests grew out of grass-roots political opposition in 1970s and 1980s Central Europe. This is associated with the actions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); NGO CIVICUS, for example, defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests” (CIVICUS, undated). In its separation from the formal political structures of the state, it may understand itself as “a global public sphere – a global space where non-instrumental communication can take place” (Kaldor, 2003:8). Crouch explains that “not only in social philosophy but also in common parlance, ‘civil society’ usually denotes those organizations and informal groupings that concern
themselves with public affairs, but which operate outside the power of both state and firm” (Crouch, 2011:153). Part of Kocka’s definition of the term ‘civil society’ – in its current international usage – is that of “a social space related to, but distinguished from, government, business, and the private sphere” (Kocka, 2004:69).

This ‘civil society’ sense of the public does not describe a singular body of people or actions; rather, it is constituted by “plurality and tension” (ibid). It thereby points towards Weintraub’s (1997) fourth definition, whereby cultural critics in the tradition of, for example, Jacobs (1961) and Sennett (1974) portray the public as a realm of “fluid and polymorphous” (Weintraub, 1997:xii) informal sociability, as a stage where heterogeneous others appear before us. Weintraub sees this as a vision of public life as “physical proximity coexisting with social distance” (ibid:25); spontaneous intercourse rather than self-conscious collective action; an idealisation of the cosmopolis of everyday pluralist co-presence and tolerance. Soja (1996), correspondingly, sees the idea of ‘Cosmopolis’ as one of the dominant discourses about the ‘postmodern city’, relating it to broader discourses of the globalisation of capital, labour and culture.

Such theorisations of the public as multiple enrich our understanding of the public sphere in the third sense above; rather than a ‘single’ sphere, it may display a tendency towards antagonism and exclusion (Mouffe, 1999). For Fraser (1990), the ideal of a single public sphere compromises that of participatory parity. She valorises instead “arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics”, acknowledging the role of subaltern counterpublics which “emerge in response to exclusions within dominant publics” and serve to “expand discursive space”. We are therefore encouraged to consider the relations between “multiple, intersecting and heterogeneous publics” (Calhoun, 1997:84). While ensuing frictions are customarily thought of in negative terms as “features of instability in the urban ‘order’” (Grimaldi & Sulis, 2009:259), they might thus be reinterpreted as “basic elements that can define a public domain”. The physical spaces of cities, meanwhile, have always been “infused with complex combinations of social, gender, ethnic and geographical inclusion and exclusion” (Aurigi & Graham, 1998:57). Similarly, contemporary policy making has departed from a conception of the public as a singular entity
“bounded by formal representation” or politically constituted through collective presence and deliberation in a public sphere (Chandler, 2014b:145). Instead, it is “conceived as a plural and fluid actor which reveals its associational power through the emergence of issues or ‘matters of concern’, usually highlighted by a shocking or surprising event” (ibid).

Publicness has, then, come to be understood as variously enacted rather than describing a uniform social practice. The emergent, multiple quality of this enactment echoes Dewey’s (1989) theorisation of the public, which Marres understands as referring to a “particular modality of being implicated in inherently dynamic formations, which stand out first and foremost for the requirement of some kind of collective action upon them” (Marres, 2012:44). The Deweyan ‘public’ is, according to Bennett (2010:100), “a contingent and temporary formation existing alongside many other publics, protopublics, and residual or postpublics. Problems come and go, and so, too, do publics: at any given moment, many different publics are in the process of crystallizing and dissolving”. ‘Publicness’ in this sense describes a problematic mode of engagement or material entanglement, but Bennett’s use of the term ‘protopublic’ opens up a gap between the conditions of frustrating entanglement and the public expression of this frustration. The emergent publicness theorised by Dewey and Marres is understood in this thesis as also implying visible expression, beyond a personal sense of being problematically entangled. Dewey’s concern, conversely, was to describe the problem faced by individuals or groups who had no means of voicing their frustrations.

Two modalities of assembled publicness

The ‘emergent’ publicness outlined above is only one of two possible modalities. The other, here labelled ‘civic’ publicness, describes visible social behaviour assembled in compliance with constraints of different types – institutional and other. There may be no explicit compulsion for individuals to behave in a civic manner; the relevant norms may, rather, have been internalised. Emergent publicness, on the other hand, assembles itself as a reaction to material conditions, economic circumstances, and/or institutional constraints. It is associated with the challenging (and blurring) of boundaries. Civic
publicness thus reproduces a particular definition of the ‘common
good’; emergent publicness questions this definition.

Similarly labelled public assemblages may exhibit either modality –
a point analogically illustrated by Canetti’s (1984) differentiation
between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ crowds. Canetti characterises an open
crowd as ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’, it forms and disintegrates
unpredictably, and there are “no limits to its growth” (ibid:16). A
closed crowd, however, is defined by its boundary, and tends
towards fixity (ibid:17). Emergent publicness, like the open crowd, is
self-organising, evanescent, unpredictable, reactive, and unbounded.
It assembles spatially without deference to, or in spite of, dominant
norms and constraints, which co-constitute it only in a negative
relational sense. Civic publicness however, like the closed crowd, is
regulated, exclusive, bounded, and more oriented towards obduracy.

The visibility fundamental to this model of publicness is
important in a more subtle sense, relating to the challenge which
emergent publicness issues to spatial norms. This touches on
questions of legality: if civic publicness assembles in line with what
is ‘legal’, emergent publicness does not constitute illegality so much
as ‘a-legality’ (Lindahl, 2013). If the assemblage is classified as illegal
by the state, or otherwise deemed worthy of censorship, it may be
rendered invisible (punished, repressed, or forced into the personal
sphere). Emergent behaviour is only public, then, up to the point
where it is excluded. It exists in the grey area between what is
explicitly permitted or encouraged within institutional or material
constraints and what must be removed from sight.

The implied distinction here, between the emergent agency of
social actors and their structural (institutional, commercial, or spatial)
constraints, becomes less clear when the constrictive role played by
cultural norms is considered. As suggested in the following section,
such norms display considerable flexibility, shifting from space to
space, and from time to time. Again, assemblage theory may be
illuminating in that it specifically attempts to disrupt the traditional
‘agency versus structure’ problematic within social theory, reframing
the problem of how to link the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of society
by suggesting that “the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ should not be
associated with two fixed levels of scale”, but rather that at
intermediate scales any given assemblage may be ‘micro’ relative to some assemblages but ‘macro’ to others (DeLanda, 2006:32). Accordingly, cultural norms may have themselves emerged from behaviours – it has been argued that the overall “complex order of the city” as a ‘superorganism’ is founded on the totality of low level interactions (Johnson, 2002:94–96) – but emergent orderings themselves come to have a structuring effect on individuals’ behaviours. We might also therefore expect different assemblages of cultural norms to coexist. They might be analytically distinguished from institutional regulation, but are understood here as having a volatile status: not only being variously complied with or transgressed, but also – in certain places and at certain times – themselves being transgressive of a wider frame of norms or regulations.

Emergent publicness has been associated thus far with the visible expression of problematic entanglement. But it is also possible to imagine its assemblage without reference to the ‘problems’ predicated by the purpose of theorisations such as Dewey’s, which focus on processes of explicit political claim making. In practice, and although it constitutes an act of spatial rebellion, emergent publicness need not be driven by a conscious desire to effect political change. Its assemblage may, alternatively relate, for example, to hedonism, or countercultural activities. And even within activities with an explicit ‘political agenda’, we might expect to find a range of motives, from those relating to a postulated common good through to those which assert the preferences of a particular interest group with little reference to broader social questions. The commonalities running through all this emergent public behaviour are its visibility and its subversion of a dominant, relatively obdurate, assemblage of spatialised norms.

Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the emergent public life of a city describes the realm of visible everyday ‘politics’, as distinguished from institutional political life (Offe, 1985). It is precisely the transgressive orientation of emergent publicness that distinguishes it from its civic modality, which does not challenge the status quo. Some of the problems associated with urban policies promoting civic publicness at the expense of the ‘political’ city are implicit in other commentaries: Mitchell (2003) aligns the expectation
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of ‘civility’ with that of the city as aesthetic spectacle, arguing that both have negative implications for justice and the public sphere: he is uncomfortable that the removal of homeless people from the streets of US cities is indicative of “a highly sanitized city and a fully deracinated politics – a politics that elevates the importance of aesthetics over the needs of some people simply to survive” (ibid:9).

Plans which conceptualise the city’s public life only in civic terms thus ignore the possibility of public dissent, effectively equating the political life of the city with its institutions, as “something that takes place, safely, within the formal planning process” (Roy, 2009:9). This outcome may be an inevitable result of planning having remained an essentially ‘liberal’ project, whose conceptualisation of the ‘public interest’ “has been for the most part a moral, rather than political, exercise”, a restraining set of “moral guides for dialogue and process” (Roy, 2008:97). In its crudest form, this may result in the creation and protection of a “bounded [civic] public sphere, what we might interpret as ‘bourgeois governmentality’” (ibid:95). Roy calls for the injection of a ‘post-liberal’ form of critical theory and radical practice which recognises the “surplus of meaning, that which cannot be contained by the logic of liberalism and that which contradicts and fragments liberalism from within” (ibid). Recognising the significance of emergent publicness as a defining aspect of urban life, on this view, would highlight “the ‘radical impossibility’ of liberal planning, the surplus within liberalism that must be unearthed and acknowledged” (ibid:97). The question, however, of precisely how current practices of urban planning might be adapted to embrace emergent publicness remains unanswered.

3.3 The Publicness of Open Spaces

One possible reason why plans for cities may fail to account fully for publicness is the more general undertheorisation of the relationship between a city’s publicness and its space (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004:152; Low & Smith, 2006:7). Democratic theories, first, tend to lack a “spatial imagination” such that “democratic politics are imagined to take place in an abstract terrain” (Purcell, 2008:76). In one tradition, public ‘space’ has metaphorical meaning only; it appears primarily to describe a mode of communication rather than
derive its definition from any physical locations – though these may become associated with it in practice. Taylor (2011) conceptualises the public sphere as a collectively imagined “space of discussion”; following Habermas (1989), he understands this as forged as much through mediated communication (in the 18th century, taking the form of printed pamphlets, books and newspapers) as by proximate interpersonal exchanges. Although Hénaff and Strong (2001:35) suggest that

“In the tradition of Western thought, the very idea of democracy is inseparable from that of public space. Public space is citizen and civic space of the common good; it stands in opposition to private space of special interests”,

they contrast its literal meaning, derived from the ancient Greek agora, with the contemporary absence of “a single and privileged stage specific to the political realm” (ibid:23). Staeheli (1996, cited in Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004:152), similarly, contends that “public and private spaces should not be conflated with public and private actions”. Based on an argument similar to those of Scott (1998) and Dean (2001), as described earlier, that political life does not only takes place ‘publicly’, Kilian (1998) argues that particular spaces should not be reified as “public” or “private” since “publicity and privacy are not characteristics of space…Rather, they are expressions of power relationships in space and, hence, both exist in every space” (ibid:115-6). Such perspectives are categorisable as ‘performative’ definitions of ‘public space’, as distinct from ‘topographical’ approaches focusing on formal characteristics (Iveson, 2007). Their rejection of spatialisation is problematic, however, if we accept Purcell’s (2008:76) argument that “spatial relations are deeply and inescapably intertwined with political, social and economic relations”, and therefore “[a]ny project to democratize cities must take account of the importance of democracy’s spatial and urban dimensions”. They fail if nothing else to account for the observable fact that “material spaces are often recurrent: the same spaces are used for different political activities through time” (Leontidou, 2012:303).

Equally, it may be the case that “the main seat of the spatial consciousness in western culture today still lies in the plastic arts”, which have “far weaker analytical traditions” behind them (Harvey,
Parkinson (2012) more recently suggests that urban practitioners’ and theorists’ interest in questions of inclusion and equity falls far short of a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the materiality of different city spaces and the democratic process. In a more sympathetic reading, it is not unreasonable that different disciplines should “tend to focus only on one aspect of public value at a time” (Barnett, 2013:449), but there is at least a risk that urban development policy-making and practice is compromised to the extent that its social and political theoretical underpinning is weak. The “larger field of urban design” has, accordingly, been criticised as thereby furthering the status quo rather than offering the possibility of radical societal transformation:

“a tool of neoliberalism, a movement without social content, …value free, …even the hand-maiden of global capitalism. This for a discipline that…aims at the creation of useful, attractive, safe, environmentally sustainable, economically successful and socially equitable places” (Carmona, 2014:2).

While a full theorisation of the spatiality of publicness is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is proposed that open urban spaces – streets, squares and parks – represent particularly importance sites where publicness is assembled. The common understanding that such spaces are the ‘physical manifestation’ of the public sphere (Mehta, 2014:53) – as reflected in the default tendency, in English at least, to refer to open urban space as ‘public space’ – need not imply that publicness is only assembled in the open air. Nor should it lead us to privilege open gathering-spaces simplistically as ‘public’ (Iveson, 2007). Thinking exclusively in terms of physical spaces, furthermore, limits our imagination of the wider range of practices and media through which publics come about (Sheller & Urry, 2003; Barnett, 2004). Nevertheless, it is significant that open spaces are assigned a “cherished place in the lexicon of urbanism” (Keith, 1995:297) generally. In a broad sense, they are understood to play a key role in the ‘cityness’ of places. Jane Jacobs was famously interested in the significance of street-life in shaping perceptions of a city as a whole:

“Think of a city and what comes to mind? Its streets. If a city’s streets look interesting, the city looks interesting; if they look dull, the city looks dull…if a city’s streets
safe from barbarism and fear, the city is thereby tolerably safe from barbarism and fear”
(Jacobs, 1961:39).

More recently, UN-Habitat Executive Director Joan Clos has recognised the significance of streets as the most important ‘public spaces’ of a city (UN-Habitat, 2013:3), claiming that public spaces are “[w]hat defines a character of a city” (ibid:10). Normative treatments of ‘streetlife’ are often infused with an approach to publicness captured in Weintraub’s (1997) fourth sense of the public – the ‘cosmopolis’ of spontaneous social interaction and unpredictable diversity, which contributes significantly to the “fulfilling gregarious life” promised by cities (Jacobs, 1995:314), with a uniquely urban type of cooperative, patterned interaction with strangers (Lofland, 1998). Fyfe (1998:1) suggests this widespread interest reflects an understanding that city streets “manifest broader social and cultural processes”, illuminating discussions about “wide theoretical questions about the interplay between society and space”.

A well-established body of literature laments both the piecemeal erosion of publicly owned space in western cities (eg Davies, 1990; Loukaitou-Sideris & Banerjee, 1998; Mitchell, 2003; Mean & Tims, 2005) and the global proliferation of privately owned gated enclaves (Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Atkinson & Blandy, 2010). Such literature seeks to outline various negative implications of a move away from public ownership of the parts of the city lying between its privately owned buildings. Privatisation, it is argued, may lead to restrictions on access and behaviour, with urban ‘securitisation’ implicated in a process of neoliberalisation, and the resulting exclusionary character of open urban spaces having profound consequences for social cohesion and the quality of democracy. Parkinson (2012:67) argues that physical spaces “in which one can encounter the demos in all its variety have an important democratic function – they help us see and recognize others and make us more willing to take their right to make claims on us seriously when we encounter them in political debate”. The underpinnings of this line of argument are not new: John Stuart Mill deemed it

“hardly possible to overrate the value…of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with
which they are familiar...Such communication has always been...one of the primary sources of progress” (Mill, 2004:174).

Thus, there is little disagreement that the collective spaces of the city are variously important for the well-being of the citizenry. And yet their definition as ‘public’ based on ownership may be unenlightening. Viewed through Weintraub’s (1997) framework, this amounts to a privileging of one sense of publicness only (the first of his four). The significance of ownership as an analytical category of space is questionable, in that it does not necessarily determine access (Light & Smith, 1998): the general public is excluded from some publicly-owned space (such as military encampments), but has effectively free access to other private-sector owned spaces (Kohn, 2004; Parkinson, 2012:58). While Chiodelli and Moroni (2014) argue that ownership is of central importance in discussing the uses made of space, they reject a simple ‘private property’ and ‘public property’ binary which makes no further distinctions. In their proposed typology, the defining analytical variables relate to use and access; ownership itself plays a background, explanatory role. 21 Luk (2009) highlights the legal concept of ‘Privately Owned Public Space’, introduced in New York in the 1960s, to describe land owned by private parties who grant access to the public; the land is therefore understood as ‘public space’ insofar as the public have access to it (dependent though this may be on the private owner’s permission), even if it remains ‘private property’. The assumption that privately owned space necessarily leads to diminished social interactions or an impoverished civic life has been directly questioned by Kirby (2008), who notes that the social benefits of private spaces are commonly overlooked in the literature. Chiodelli and Moroni (2015:3) question

21 Chiodelli and Moroni (2014:169) propose six categories: ‘simple private spaces’ (usually for individual/domestic activity); ‘complex private spaces’ (used by, for example, associations and clubs); ‘privately owned collective spaces’ (including, for example, restaurants, cinemas, and shopping centres); ‘privately run public spaces’ (which are publicly owned but leased to private individuals, for example street markets); ‘special public spaces’ (publicly owned but assigned a special use function, including hospitals, libraries, schools and cemeteries); and ‘stricto sensu public spaces’ (for general use, usually connective and open, including streets and public squares). Ownership (or change of ownership), then, has significant implications for access to, and uses made of, a space; but it is to these implications, rather than ownership itself, that a productive analysis of urban space must turn its direct attention.
the conceptualisation of “publicity” as a zero-sum game which, given certain privatisation processes that take place in contemporary cities, is necessarily equated with a progressive decline in publicness”. Privately owned commercial centres, they argue, do not necessarily replace publicly owned ones, and may engender certain types of public interaction as part of a broader mosaic of types of space in a city (ibid). They observe that “[s]hopping malls probably have one of the highest levels of openness among all private spaces”, and that “this level of openness is also higher than that of some public spaces” (ibid:6). Others have found, accordingly, that the securitised nature of some privately owned space may even make it more attractive for certain groups who feel excluded from other ‘public’ spaces for safety reasons; this quality of shopping malls, for example, adds to their appeal for teenage girls in the UK (Pearce, 1996; Watt & Stenson, 1998; Matthews et al., 2000).

The expectation that urban space can be neatly divided into that which is privately and municipally owned, furthermore, has been interpreted as historically and geographically anomalous, associated with the emergence of the representative bourgeois state (Low & Smith, 2006) and twentieth-century western cities more particularly (Body-Gendrot et al., 2008). Hogan et al. (2012) warn against the tendency towards a ‘dystopianism’ which fails to question an assumption that urban space is somehow a priori ‘public’ until it is colonised. Rather, they observe that

The periods during which conceptions of public space were normalized to western liberal contexts are historically specific, notably in the form of the Keynesian national welfare state of the 1960s… [They] were actively produced as a collective historical achievement that is subject to renegotiation and deconstruction (Hogan et al., 2012:61).

This recognition is of particular significance for the study of non-western cities: “In much of urban Asia, there has often not been anything public to undergo privatization through neoliberalization” (Hogan et al., 2012:61). Drawing on Pow’s (2007) discussion of Shanghai’s gated developments, they suggest that new private housing markets might be understood more positively as enclaves which provide autonomy and freedom away from authoritarian state
control. The ‘privacy’ against which publicness is constructed may have entirely different meanings in traditional Asian societies (Hogan et al., 2012). Hou observes that in many Asian cities, ‘public’ spaces are “synonymous with spaces that are representing and controlled by the state. In contrast, the everyday and more vibrant urban life tends to occur in the back streets and alleyways, away from the official public domain” (Hou, 2010:2). Questions of ownership, in other words, might usefully form part of an account of the publicness of urban space (Parkinson, 2012) – but there is no compelling case for this to be a primary analytical variable, and its significance may vary across time and space.

In a more precise formulation, then, open spaces are important sites for the assemblage of publicness insofar as access to them is unrestricted. But whether or not the ‘laments’ referred to earlier are misguided in focusing on questions of ownership, Parkinson takes issue with them for focusing overly on “sociological” questions of inclusion, sociability and “unscripted encounters with strangers” (Parkinson, 2012:299). Although ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches position streetlife as a precondition of healthy democracy, Parkinson (2012) calls for a more nuanced analysis of the more precise mechanisms whereby different open spaces allow different types of political claim-making to occur. In the terms of this thesis, then, he is calling both for a stronger focus on the emergent modality of publicness, and for a sensibility of the way that the physical space is a co-constitutive element of the assemblage of publicness.

Accounts of open space which more explicitly frame it as a “staging ground” for politics (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004:149) – in line with Weintraub’s (1987) third sense of the public as a relatively autonomous realm of visible self-expression – may only refer to this space in a generic sense. Nevertheless, such approaches clearly contrast with more ‘sociological’ ones in their clearer conceptualisation of the emergent modality of publicness and emphasis on the unusual importance of open spaces in this respect. For Kohn (2004:4), the face-to-face interaction which they facilitate differentiates them from interactions via email or the mass media, and, crucially “the politics of public space requires few resources and therefore allows marginal viewpoints to be expressed, debated, and, perhaps, refuted”. Publicly owned streets, pavements and squares, as
relatively accessible sites of political interaction and civilian collectivity, are “practically the only remaining sites for unscripted political activity” (ibid). Short (2002) observes that in a city’s most dramatic moments, its open spaces are among the key arenas where the process of reframing the parameters of political debate – or re-politicization – literally ‘takes place’. There is no reason, furthermore, to suppose that their function as an arena of political contestation is limited to western cities. Significant institutional changes have been achieved or intended through street protests in recent years in the Arab spring and by the ‘Occupy’ movement. In the case of South Korea, explored further in Chapter Seven, street protests have long been a dominant mode of political expression (Kim, 2009:3).

When considered as sites of political contestation, occupation, and visibility expressed dissent, urban open spaces are often referred to synecdochally as ‘the street(s)’. Thus, Swyngedouw (2011b) comments on the “retaking of the streets” during 2011 in demonstrations across European and North African cities. Purcell (2008) describes the protests against the third Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999, in which activists succeeded in breaching a ‘no protest zone’ declared by the City of Seattle. He interprets their cries during their ensuing detention of “[t]his is what democracy looks like” as an assertion that democracy is partly constituted through:

- political struggle in the streets of the city. It demands a right to be present in the city, to inhabit it, to occupy it, and to use it as a political forum. From their perspective, nothing is more anti-democratic than a no-protest zone in the heart of the city (Purcell, 2008:75–76).

Thus, the virtual – emergent – ‘street’ serves an enabling political role and is defined by an implicit opposition to institutional politics (Figure 3.2).
For Kallianos, “there is a non-material notion of the street...In this idea, the street is connected with public space as an active political agent” (Kallianos, 2013:549). In his discussion of political protests in Athens, he describes the street as not only a “carrier of history” but also “an active determiner of political practice which greatly shapes the regular daily pathways and routes in Athens since they have been predominantly charged with memories of collective action” (ibid). Thus, out of the regulated civic streets of everyday practice are produced ‘streets’ of counter-institutional political activity, and this subversive transformation is facilitated by the space, partly due to the memories it ‘holds’: the streets are understood by Athenians as, historically, an arena giving visibility to political claims which contest the status quo. In the transformation to which Kallianos refers, particular spaces appear to display different public modalities at different times, or simultaneously; their space becomes differently enfolded into different assemblages of publicness.

As was argued earlier, however, emergent publicness need not be equated exclusively with political claim-making. Although Parkinson’s stated interests lie in the latter, he effectively acknowledges that emergent publicness has a broader scope by accepting Stevens’ (2007) contention that “the purposes of public space are not just political” (Parkinson, 2012:86). For Stevens (2007), more ‘ludic’ activities may also constitute a challenge to the status quo, as he has more recently elaborated:
“Urban skateboarders and picknicking immigrant housekeepers in Hong Kong also...constitute publics and sites of publicness, by expressively performing social differences, and negotiating their inclusion through practice, rather than through discussion and policy” (Stevens, 2013:453).

Arguing that spaces become ‘public’ when particular groups act consciously for purposes of visibility or political representation, then, privileges only one register of the emergent modality of publicness (and implies that more ‘civic’ spaces are somehow less public). Lees (2008:237) argues that emphasising the emancipatory possibilities of the street as the “site and symbol of democratic protest and politics” carries the risk of romanticism. Rather, acts of conscious public rebellion may be relatively rare. Lefebvre makes this point with reference to the street life of Mediterranean cities: “In the city, public life organises itself around all kinds of exchange: material and non-material, objects and words, signs and products...it seems that the life of the city seldom has a political objective – except in times of revolt” (Lefebvre & Régulier, 2004:92). There is a more general sense, then, in which public spaces “are also spaces for social and cultural discourses in which the community’s diversity may manifest itself in an open way” (Parés & Saurí, 2007:170). A wide variety of activities taking place in open space are neither instrumental nor transgressive. With the exception of ‘political expression’, the examples of such behaviour which Franck and Stevens’ (2006) provide to explain their notion of ‘loose space’ may exceed, but do not amount to a challenge to, the official coding of space:

“Many of the activities that generate loose space are neither productive (like traveling to work) nor reproductive (like buying necessities), being instead a matter of entertainment, self-expression or political expression, reflection and social interaction – all outside the daily routine and the world of fixed functions and schedules” (Franck & Stevens, 2006:3).

In analysing assembled publicness, however, this thesis adopts a narrower conception of ‘loose space’ (in Chapters Six and Seven) to describe non-instrumental activities which nevertheless accord with a permissible use of the space: and are therefore ‘civic’ in their
modality. Activities which issue a challenge to the civic norms of the space are classified instead as emergent.

The expectation is that publicness will be assembled differently in different locations within a city. Lees (1998:251) argues that “public space is not a homogeneous entity. Public spaces differ depending on their social, cultural, economic and symbolic functions, and perhaps more importantly, depending on the meanings, contested and negotiated though they are, that different publics bring to them”. The nature of any assemblage of publicness therefore describes the result of contingent interactions between the materiality of space and the institutional, commercial and personal spheres of the city. Furthermore, reflecting scholarly agreement that “an unconditional universal access to public space is almost impossible” (Mehta, 2014:54), and that space may be differently exclusive for different social groups and by time of day or night (Valentine, 1990; Watson, 2002; Williams, 2008), we should expect the way that publicness is assembled to vary at different times.

Being alert to the varying publicness of such assemblages does not imply an abandonment of an ideal of the ‘open city’ where “open public space is accessible to all” (Caldeira, 1999:126) – the promise often made by the sustainable city (as discussed in Chapter Five). Rather, it repositions this ideal as analogous with the “fiction of a social contract among equal and free people” in the “modern liberal-democratic polity”, in that both represent a “promise of incorporation” (ibid). Both offer a promise radically opposed to previous hierarchical and feudal urban orderings – but both have only ever remained an ideal. Similarly, Deutsche (1996) suggests that narratives of loss lamenting the fragmented contemporary city of exclusive spaces construct a dubious ‘golden age’ of inclusive publicness; she argues instead that urban space has always been “the product of conflict”: it results from ongoing negotiations between different social groups; it is not simply ‘designed’ by the authorities, but shaped by multiple everyday practices (Deutsche, 1996:278). In real cities, the publicness of space, in other words, describes its multiplicity, and the frictions and emergent possibilities that these imply, as much as the presence of a civic harmony.
Acknowledging the unpredictability of open spaces may sit uncomfortably with the goals of planning, since it marks a recognition of “public space as uncontrolled space, as a space in which civilization is exceptionally fragile” (Mitchell, 2003:13). Mitchell (2003) suggests that such discomfort has been amplified (in US cities) following the 2001 terrorist attacks, and is concerned that bourgeois notions of ‘order’ and ‘civility’ have tended to trump the notion of the right of access to publicly owned space in the modern city, and that debates about urban injustices and inequalities are being increasingly displaced. He argues that city life should “necessarily retain some tolerance for risk and danger. It must be taken for granted that at least some level of “fear” will always be present” (Mitchell, 2003:5).

The envisionment of ‘civil’ behaviour to which Mitchell refers is also itself problematic insofar as its focus on the appearance of harmonious coexistence may ignore the underlying frustrations and tensions which remain hidden in the personal sphere. In fact, “those who hold prejudiced views and values can nonetheless willingly exchange civilities in public space with individuals who are members of groups for whom they have negative feelings” (Valentine & Sadgrove, 2012:2050). Civility, Bannister and Kearns argue, is how ‘tolerance’ is performed: it enables us to “negotiate encounters with difference”, thus allowing for “peaceful co-existence in space” (Bannister and Kearns, 2013:2706). Tolerance, in turn, constitutes a “deliberate choice not to interfere with conduct or beliefs with which one disapproves” (Hancock & Matthews, 2001:99), and “occurs when dislike and disapproval are overcome in the name of some other reasons that are recognized as stronger” (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014b:167). In other words, civility is an act of suppression. If there is no disapproval, there is no need to choose to be tolerant. Thus, the tolerance underlying civility in fact indicates an unwilling acceptance of “relative powerlessness” (Bannister and Kearns, 2013:2708).

In practice, then, there is a thin line between civic and emergent publicness; even while the former is assembled in line with the dominant coding of urban space, it may contain the seeds of emergent rebellion. Planning for space simply to be fully inclusive and harmonious is utopian; the static, apolitical vision thus imposed onto space denotes a limited conceptualisation of the nature of
publicness even in a civic sense. Its rhetorical appeal conceals the possibility that it serves to naturalise a particular ordering of space. In this sense, it may be considered an act of ‘appropriation’ (Lefort, 1986:279) potentially at odds with the ways in which publicness is assembled in the real city. This chapter’s final section suggests that this attempted ‘appropriation’ of publicness derives partly from the (perhaps necessarily) limited conceptualisation of space itself in the liberal tradition of planning and policy-making.

3.4 The Significance of Space

Thinking about publicness as a spatial assemblage, rather than as either a quality of space itself, or as a performance whose setting is incidental, implies that space is not a neutral backdrop to publicness (or city life more generally) so much as a quasi-agentive property of the city, itself in its turn shaped and given meaning through assemblage. The implications of such an understanding of space may be better grasped if we refer to Lefebvre’s (1991) ideas about space being ‘socially produced’. Lefebvre’s model is usefully aligned with an assemblage in that the latter focuses our attention on “what it means to consider the city as a place that is not just inhabited but which is produced through that inhabiting” (McFarlane, 2011b:651). Lefebvre provides a framework in which space is understood as having three simultaneous dimensions, which he labels ‘representations of space’ (or the ‘conceived’), ‘spatial practice’ (the ‘perceived’), and ‘representational space’ (the ‘lived’). Each of these in discussed in turn below.

Representations of space (conceived)

Lefebvre took issue with the intellectual construction of ‘space’ as a geometric grid, “generally accompanied by some such epithet as ‘Euclidean’, ‘isotropic’, or ‘infinite’” (Lefebvre, 1991:1), understood in terms of “relations of proximity between points or elements” (Foucault, 1986:23). Cartographers’ attempts to represent space as a grid have, further, reflected a parallel tradition in which space is understood as the opposite of time. Massey (2005:37) sees structuralism as exhibiting a similar foundation, such that

22 The interpretation of Lefebvre’s framework here draws heavily on David Harvey (2006a), Mark Purcell (2008), and Chris Butler (2012).
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“[s]tructure and process were read as space and time. Space was conceived...to be the absolute negation of time”; the aim was to represent society as a synchronic structure forming a “totally interconnected closed system” (ibid:41). Drawing on Laclau (1990), Massey argues that the exclusion of temporality from this representation constitutes a form of ideological closure denying the existence of social processes and uneven change; society cannot be adequately represented by models that construct an institutional stasis which excludes ‘politics’, which Laclau understands in terms of ‘moments of dislocation’, where “dislocation is the source of freedom” (Laclau, 1990:60). Massey interprets what Laclau calls the ‘crisis of all spatiality’ (Laclau, 1990:78) as describing the impossibility of representing the social world, precisely because “traces of temporality corrupt all space” (Massey, 2005:45). A representation of space can only ever be utopian in character since it necessarily “involves a ‘suspension of the political’” (Stavrakakis, 2007:149).23

The case that representation is necessarily ideological is made by Fowler:

Events and ideas are not communicated neutrally, in their natural structure, as it were. They could not be, because they have to be transmitted through some medium with its own structural features, and these structural features are already impregnated with social values which make up a potential perspective on events (Fowler, 1991:25).

Accordingly, “representation must be recognised as constitutive rather than mimetic; the space of the world, far from being equivalent to representation, must be unrepresentable in that latter, mimetic sense” (Massey, 2005:28). Like Massey, Lefebvre (1991) argues that ‘scientific’ representation has dominated traditional understandings of space, and that the various social aspects of space – its production through, and role in reproducing, social actions – are suppressed through the imagination of space as an atemporal grid. More precisely, he argues that the Euclidean sense of space has been informed by two influences, which in combination promote the conflation of the representation of space with space itself, and serve to obscure its social dimensions. First, while space is commonly

understood to have physical dimensions, it appears as an “empty vessel existing prior to the matter that fills it” (Butler, 2012:38). Simultaneously, it is reduced to an “abstract, mental construction” (Butler, 2012:38).

Such apparently neutral ‘representations of space’, however, have generative force. Their “conceptualized space” is “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers” (Lefebvre, 1991:38). The privileging of this ‘conceived’ space in contemporary capitalist society “with its rational-technical reduction of space to a Cartesian grid...facilitates the marketization of space, the reduction of space to a measurable entity to be valued as property” (Purcell, 2008:93). Thus, as McCann (1999:164) puts it, this is a view of space promoted by “elite social groups as homogeneous, instrumental and ahistorical in order to facilitate the exercise of state power and the free flow of capital”. Poovey (1995, cited in Rose, 1999:37-38) suggests that a formal, isotropic view of space as a grid of “reproducible products; interchangeable places, behaviors and activities” became common from the seventeenth century onwards”. These types of imagined space are “dominated by visuality”, and come to “stand in, in thought, for that which they realize” (ibid). If this was associated with the rise of cartography, it reflects a realisation that “[t]o govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999:36).

The technologies developed in early urban planning practices which allowed planners to ‘see’ the city as a collective whole effectively served to ‘tame’ space, as a topographical backdrop and downplaying its emergent qualities (Murdoch, 2006:136); the focus on geometry prioritised the physical over the social dimensions of the city (ibid). And while any conceptualisation of space within institutional attempts to govern city land use generates its own “truths about the city” (Osborne & Rose, 1999:739), it also has tangible effects as it attempts to enact these truths into physical space (Law & Urry, 2004).

The “pronounced visual character” (Lefebvre, 1991:75) of space as a representation – as is evident, for example, in masterplanning documents – works to create an “illusion of transparency” (Lefebvre, 1991:27), which is further instrumental in obscuring its social characteristics. Although Lefebvre was writing in the 1960s, Graham
and Healey (1999:627) argue that urban planning has continued to treat space as an “immovable frame of reference inside which events and places occur”, rather than as “effectively produced and created through social actions within and between places”. Rather than seeking to highlight the relational nature of space, urban plans purport to offer single, objective, representations of urban space in Euclidean terms. The city is thus depicted as a ‘jigsaw’ of adjacent, contiguous land use parcels, tied together with infrastructure networks and laid out within a bounded, Euclidean, gridded plain (Graham & Healey, 1999:626).

Shields argues that representations of a city in planning documents can tend to “replace or stand in for the city”, describing them as “treacherous metaphors, summarizing the complexity of the city in an elegant model” (Shields, 1996:229). Lefebvre argues instead for a more relational understanding of space as also “bound up together with everyday life, with social relations, and with political struggle…Producing and reproducing urban space, for Lefebvre, necessarily involves reproducing the social relations that are bound up in it. The production of urban space therefore entails much more than just planning and developing the material space of the city. It involves producing (and reproducing) all aspects of urban life” (Purcell, 2008:93).

Spatial practice (perceived)

Lefebvre distinguishes representations of space from what he labels ‘spatial practice’, which relates to space as perceived by its inhabitants. Harvey clarifies the difference between the two by aligning spatial practice with the “world of tactile and sensual interaction with matter, it is the space of experience. How we represent this world is an entirely different matter” (Harvey, 2006a:131). This perceived, experiential dimension of space is constituted by a multiplicity of unpredictable and often conflicting events and processes, which are acted out in space, and therefore produce it. This aspect of (social) space is far from a ‘flat’ Euclidean grid, or a static closed system. Rather, our attention is drawn to the fact that spatial practice makes the political possible. Massey makes a similar point in her argument against traditional ‘static’ conceptualisations of space:
“its juxtaposition, its happenstance arrangement-in-relation-to-each-other, of previously unconnected narratives/temporalities; its openness and its condition of always being made. It is this crucial characteristic of ‘the spatial’ which constitutes it as one of the vital moments in the production of those dislocations which are necessary to the existence of the political” (Massey, 2005:39).

This thesis understands ‘place’ as constituted by spatial practice: the perceived materiality of space, which is fundamentally dynamic. By extension, place does not relate to boundaries or permanence (Cresswell, 2004:39); it is produced – or assembled – partly through the interaction of unpredictable influences from ‘elsewhere’. This unpredictability does not, however, mean that a given place is entirely unstable; rather, the idea that place is assembled predicts that some of its characteristics will be obdurate over time. Collectively, we will perceive the materiality of a place in a similar way, and in this it will meaningfully differ from other places.

This notion of place departs from the one developed by humanist geographers in the 1970s as a reaction to the spatial preoccupations of ‘scientific’ geography (Cresswell, 2004). Writers such as Tuan (1974) and Relph (1976) asserted that ‘place’ has positive significance in that it describes our emotional and perceptual relationship with the world; we construct and are conscious of ‘places in the world’, while space is “amorphous and intangible and not an entity that can be directly described and analysed” (Relph, 1976:8). For Relph, space is an abstraction which “provides the context for places but derives its meaning from particular places” (ibid). More recently, the notion of place has come to have increasing “totemic resonance” (Massey, 2005:5) and is “endlessly mobilised in political argument” (ibid). It appears variously as “the sphere of the everyday, of real and valued practices, the geographical source of meaning, vital to hold on to as ‘the global’ spins its ever more powerful and alienating webs” (ibid). Activists may therefore advocate a ‘retreat to place’ in the face of environmental or economic threats; such calls to action might be likened to “a protective pulling-up of drawbridges and a building of walls against the new invasions” (ibid).
Representational space (lived)

Lefebvre identifies a third aspect of space, which he calls ‘representational space’. This reflects the fact that “we do not live as material atoms floating around in a materialist world; we also have imaginations, fears, emotions, psychologies, fantasies and dreams” (Harvey, 2006a:131). Representational space, then, is produced through individuals’ interpretations and schematisations of the complexities of spatial practice. Lefebvre refers to it as ‘lived’ space: those aspects of space whose reality consists in our subjective interpretation of it, and the ways in which space is shaped – in other words, assembled – partly through the interplay of subjectivities.

In a broader sense, this is to say that “[c]ities are imaginary as well as real spaces; they are constituted by dreams and desires, conscious and unconscious longings and fears, along with material developments and practices” (Pinder, 2002:233). If the physicality of space, and the cumulative activities which produce physical space, relate to ‘spatial practice’, then ‘representational space’ points to the less tangible, subjective dimensions of space as “directly lived, occupied and transformed” during its inhabitation (Cenzatti, 2008:80). This subjectivity is not posterior to ‘objective’ space, but may be assembled with it into an ‘urban imaginary’ (Bender, 2010:318); in this sense, “[u]rban assemblages encompass different ways of imagining the city – alternative possibilities for how it has been and will be” (McFarlane, 2011a; 2011b).

However, since this imagined city is subjective, it is alternately sustained and disrupted by unfolding experiences (Bender, 2010:319). This ‘instability’ means that there is always potential for innovation, an eventful differentiation” (Jacobs, 2012:416). It describes the way that the city is subjectively assembled in multiple ways which are “never fixed or stable, but always in a process of making or unmaking” (ibid). Tensions between space thus imagined and the unfolding experience of space may be generative, it follows, of assemblages of unpredictable emergent publicness. The alignment of representational space with emergent publicness is implied by Lefebvre’s definition of “the urban as a place where conflicts are expressed” (Lefebvre, 2003:175) in opposition to a ‘civic’ conception where “expression disappears,...silence reigns, [and] the signs of separation are established” (Lefebvre, 2003:176).
Insofar as it therefore incorporates the idea of individual meanings being attached to locations, representational space is aligned with the humanist geographers’ (and ‘activist’) notion of the affective sense of ‘place’ outlined above. Lefebvre further associates this type of space with the “clandestine or underground” (1991:33) and those types of artistic work which disrupt dominant ‘representations of space’. Harvey comments that “[w]e may also seek to represent the way [representational] space is emotively and affectively as well as materially lived by means of poetic images, photographic compositions, artistic reconstructions” (Harvey, 2006a:131). Thus, representational spaces

“form part of the social imaginary of ‘inhabitants and users’ of space, in which complex symbols are linked to non-hegemonic forms of creative practice and social resistance…They are the sites of resistance and counter-discourses that have escaped the purview of bureaucratic power or manifest a refusal to acknowledge its authority” (Butler, 2012:41).

If representational space describes the way we *variously* interpret spatial practice, or the “imaginary geographies of the city” which are “central to the continuing production of and struggle over the public spaces of the city” (McCann, 1999:177), it is, accordingly, a radically open space of political contestation. To ignore representational space in plans for urban development, it would seem, is to ignore – or even attempt to suppress – the emergent dimensions of the urban.

The representational dimensions of a space may be inscribed on its materiality by individuals or countercultural collectivities who appropriate it in different ways. Graffiti, for example, seems particularly significant in this respect. As Stewart (1987:168) contends, “graffiti is considered a threat to the surface on which it applied; it is considered a threat to the entire system of meanings by which such surfaces acquire value, integrity and significance”. She notes, further, that in typically targetting institutionally owned property, graffiti writers “espouse an anti-monumental politics, contrasting to the monument’s abstraction and stasis the signature’s personality,

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24 Harvey translates Lefebvre’s term ‘l’espace de représentation’ as ‘spaces of representation’, rather than as ‘representational spaces’ (the term which appears in Nicholson-Smith’s standard translation of the work (Lefebvre, 1991)). Here, Nicholson-Smith’s translation is adopted.
mobility, and vernacular, localized audience” (Stewart, 1987:169). Graffiti writing has been interpreted as a visible challenge to imposed order, in tension with a supposed ‘militarisation’ of urban space (Iveson, 2010); graffiti writers have been likened by authorities to terrorists (Iveson, 2010); and described by authorities as ‘anti-social’ (Halsey & Young, 2006:276); it asserts its own geographies of meaning (Iveson, 2010). Its construction within legislation as disrupting the order of ‘clean’ or ‘blank’ spaces (Halsey & Young, 2006:299) serves to deny the existing ideological content of those spaces, and their representational status as sites of contested meanings. The recent rise in ‘DIY urbanism’ and ‘guerilla urbanism’ (Hou, 2010; Lydon, 2011; Deslandes, 2013; Iveson, 2013; Finn, 2014; Talen, 2015) might similarly be interpreted as making the representational dimension of urban spaces visible. And yet this does not simply represent an assertion of agency over space; rather, the results are co-assembled by individuals and the space: “the characteristics of the physical space give shape and even impose limits on what kind of [representational spaces] can be produced there” (Cenzatti, 2008:80).

3.5 Conclusions

As discussed in Chapter One, the question of whether a city can ever fully be planned is not a new one. It may be the case that design of the built environment necessarily “militates against an autonomous public life” (Scott, 1998:127), since “[d]esigned or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order” (Scott, 1998:6). Criticisms have been made of the modernist ‘imaginary’ of urban planning as an instrument of social change, specifically because it attempts to plan “without contradiction, without conflict...It fails to include as constituent elements of planning the conflict, ambiguity and indeterminacy characteristic of actual social life” (Holston, 1999:165). Put more simply, “the idea of a ‘plan’ and the reality of ‘pluralism’” are “diametrically opposed” (Talen, 2006:234), and actual assemblages of publicness will always exceed the institutional plan.

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25 Cenzatti (2008) also uses Harvey’s term ‘space of representation’ to refer to Lefebvre’s notion of ‘espace de représentation’ (see footnote 23).
Calls for a possible ‘post-modernist’ mode of planning – some of which are discussed at the end of Chapter Five – have not coalesced into a coherent alternative. If Lefebvre’s tripartite model presaged a wider body of more recent social theory which has moved away from positivist understandings of space, this has not been embraced or operationalised by urban planning professionals (Graham & Healey, 1999). If accordingly, eco-city plans fail to account for emergent publicness, and are predicated on a modernist approach to space as a depoliticised ‘container’ or ‘backdrop’ to the social and the political, as is implied by the replicable notion of the ‘urban scale’, then perhaps they are little more than metaphors for the real city. Rather than convincingly heralding a radically transformed urban future, the alluring ‘sustainable city’ may have rhetorical force which obscures the fact of its more limited objectives in each case, which relate to the application of a contingent set of political agendas within a particular socio-material context.

A critique of the eco-city launched on the basis of this argument would first require the case to be made that its planned cityness does not in fact escape a modernist imaginary of urban space. Following on from this, it would seem constructive to identify the more limited specific agendas of individual initiatives – precisely because these may be partially obscured – and particularly if these appear to be more aligned with ‘business as usual’ than with significant transformation in the direction of sustainability. And yet the fact of these particular agendas being rhetorically ‘obscured’ should not simply be asserted: moving from speculative critique to a more specific diagnosis will involve a close exploration of whether and precisely how this obscuring is enabled in actual eco-city planning and policy documents.

Perhaps even more importantly, the significance of the findings from such an investigation will be far from straightforward. Equating a plan with its promised outcome only makes sense from within the linear logic of a plan itself; but rejecting this equivalence is not the same as denying the causal entanglement of plans with the external reality which they represent and seek to alter. The status of eco-city plans in the world, in other words, is contestable: it seems important to understand how they have come about in particular contexts, what specifically have they given rise to, and in what ways,
if at all, this might be problematic for urban sustainability. Meanwhile, if the goal is to resolve the urban sustainability ‘problem of planning’ (as outlined in Chapter One) through the creation of a new type of planning, which goes beyond static representation to encompass the city’s emergent as well as civic qualities, it is far from clear whether or how this will be achievable. Thinking all this through will entail questioning not only the publicness constructed within plans and policies, but also the relationship between this and the actual assemblages of publicness in the urban space which results. The empirical methods used to approach these questions are described in the following chapter.
Chapter Four

Methodology

The previous chapter raised the possibility that contemporary plans and policies aimed at furthering the goal of sustainability in the urban age may be flawed since they do not – or perhaps cannot – properly account for the urban. The civic norms of traditional modernist planning, at least, would appear to be normatively incompatible with the emergent assemblages of publicness characteristic of real urban space. The argument might be made that if, indeed, plans cannot encompass emergent publicness, then perhaps they should not try to. This being the case, however, the stated ambition of urban transformation might be seen as in some ways misguided. The alluring promise of the ‘sustainable city’ may divert our attention away from the more concrete agendas underpinning particular initiatives; these agendas may sometimes be narrow in their scope, and only questionably aligned with the goal of furthering sustainability. In promoting development based on a limited conceptualisation of the public city, furthermore, they may work actively against cityness itself.

None of these possibilities can simply be assumed to be the case; the status of eco-city plans and policies in the world merits closer investigation. The aim should be to understand better not only the nature of the publicness promoted within official eco-city plans and policies, and that of the publicness which assembles in the actual city space which results, but also the relationship between the two. It is hoped that studying this relationship will hold some clues for how the ‘problem of planning’ for urban sustainability might be more constructively addressed. This chapter outlines the ways in which the current research attempted to address these aims, through documentary analysis and in-situ fieldwork, guided by the following overall research question:

In what ways can eco-cities be characterised as ‘public’?
4.1 Analysis of Eco-City Documentation

As discussed in Chapter Two, one defining feature of the eco-city phenomenon is its globalised nature: its geographical spread; the increasing involvement of international practitioners and policy-makers; and the claimed global relevance of individual initiatives for mankind’s future. While limiting the investigation to any particular country or region would therefore compromise its value, the variety of practical and policy approaches encompassed by the eco-city also prompts the inclusion of a wide range of initiatives. As will be further explained in section 4.2, the decision was made to choose two ‘paradigmatic’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) cases for in-depth analysis, which appeared to represent different ends of a spectrum from modernist ‘technological showcase’ to governance-based ‘research in the wild’ approaches to eco-city planning, and which had been implemented in disparate geographical locations. The aim was not to provide a comprehensive picture of the eco-city’s current manifestations; given further time and budget, the findings might be further enriched through replication of the approach elsewhere. Rather, it was hoped that the analysis and comparison of two extreme cases might allow for better understanding of the limits of the conceptualisation of publicness in the contemporary eco-city, and its relationship with the assemblage of publicness in the actual city space to which plans relate. Nevertheless, to counter at least partially the concern that any conclusions thereby drawn would have limited resonance, preliminary desk-based analysis was also conducted of published documents relating to a wider cross-section of eco-city initiatives. This broader preliminary exercise aimed to test the grounded assumption that:

\[\text{in many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official documents related to the planning and description of eco-city initiatives.}\]

This sample of documents was not analysed in lieu of a study of real eco-city spaces; as discussed in the previous chapter, no equivalence should be drawn between what is envisaged in and results from a plan. Nor, as will be discussed further below, was it assumed that official published documents constitute reliable representations of the full breadth of opinion held by those involved in (and excluded from) the negotiatory processes through which they
are forged. Nevertheless, such documentation was still deemed a worthwhile object of study, precisely because it is institutionally ratified, and therefore potentially backed by significant financial and/or political resources. It would seem uncontroversial to contend that the discursive framings and concrete prescriptions of such documents play significant roles in shaping practical eco-city development internationally.

The selection method for the sample of documents, and the analytical approach taken, are outlined below, followed by a summary of methods adopted for the two in-depth case studies.

**Sample selection**

Twelve examples of eco-city initiatives from around the world were selected for preliminary documentary analysis. No claims are made about the final sample’s statistical representativeness of the phenomenon as a whole; such a claim would be spurious since, given the lack of an agreed definition, the sampling criteria applied would be arbitrary. The guiding principle behind the selection method was, rather, to facilitate the inclusion of a wide variety of practices, policies, and contexts.

It was decided that a total of 12 cases would allow for extensive geographical coverage, and for the inclusion of more than one example of each eco-city ‘type’ identified in the Survey (Joss et al., 2011) referred to in Chapter Two. As the most complete general reference document of current significant eco-city initiatives around the world, the Survey was used as the basis for sampling. Additionally, to ensure fuller coverage of the broader body of eco-city thinking, it was decided that the sample should encompass a small number of international frameworks, which are excluded from the Survey due to their scale.26

While the sample was not, then, intended to be quantitatively representative of the phenomenon as a whole, there was some risk of the transferability of the findings being undermined if the sample was recognisably skewed in any particular direction. To mitigate against this risk, quotas based on geography and – following the

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26 The Survey only includes initiatives which range from the “neighbourhood/district level” to that of the “city-region” (Joss et al., 2011:2).
Survey typology – ‘development type’ were set, to reflect the distribution of the 178 Survey cases. These were first divided up geographically, giving the following totals: 73 in Europe; 70 in Asia/Australasia; 35 elsewhere. Similarly, they were categorised by development type (24 ‘new builds’; 76 ‘urban expansions/in-fills’; 78 ‘retro-fits’). Based loosely on these totals, quotas were set as shown in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. to reflect actual geographical spread</th>
<th>2. to reflect type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 4 in Europe</td>
<td>• 1-3 ‘new builds’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 4 in Asia/Australasia</td>
<td>• 3-5 ‘urban expansions’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2 elsewhere</td>
<td>• 3-5 ‘retro-fits’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (and 2 ‘international’ schemes)</td>
<td>• (and 2 ‘international’ schemes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: quotas for documentation analysis sample

Within each geographical area, individual initiatives were chosen at random, and accepted or rejected based on whether the quota for its ‘type’ was already filled, and following preliminary assessment of their publicly available documentation, which aimed to ensure that this was sufficiently substantial to allow close relevant textual analysis. While this required subjective judgment, a minimum criterion was that one document should be available outlining plans for, or describing retrospectively, the development of the initiative across various sectors. Additionally, cases were excluded whose content been produced by third parties (for example, journalists or academics), since the aim was to analyse the conceptualisation of urban sustainability promoted by key actors within the process, rather than to understand reactions to the documents or their implementation.

Finally, documentation was excluded where the foreign language posed too great a barrier for a sensitive analysis to be conducted. In all but one case, English language texts were selected. While this potentially limits the wider relevance of the findings by omitting substantial schemes which have only been locally reported, the author has not discovered evidence in the wider literature of
significant distinctive trends in urban sustainability being ignored in English-language documentation. Extra research would be required to justify this assumption; radically different approaches may well find a more natural home in relatively unpublicised local or ‘countercultural’ initiatives. Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter One, the current research deliberately focuses on mainstream initiatives, since that mainstreaming might be expected to reflect and facilitate a greater degree of practical influence on urban development.

This process was repeated until the quotas were filled, yielding the final sample of initiatives for documentary analysis shown in Table 4.2. The twelve cases selected display considerable geographical and practical variety, thus realising the overall goal of the sampling approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New build</th>
<th>Urban expansion/ in-fill</th>
<th>Retro-fit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Almere (Netherlands)</td>
<td>Freiburg (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Whitehill &amp; Bordon (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ecociudad Valdespartera (Spain)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Australasia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sejong (South Korea)</td>
<td>Sydney (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Auroville (India)</td>
<td>Huaibei (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greensburg Green Town (USA)</td>
<td>Portland EcoDistricts (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td>OECD Green Cities</td>
<td>Eco2 Cities (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: case studies selected for documentary analysis

Documents consulted

The precise documentation consulted in each case appears in Table 4.3. The nature and status of these documents necessarily varied, given their divergent functions and scalar coverage. More positively, it was hoped that the inclusion of different types of documentation
would actively contribute to the overall goal of capturing the variety of eco-city conceptualisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Initiative (as referred to in thesis text)</th>
<th>Type of Document</th>
<th>Title of Document</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almere</td>
<td>Draft ‘Vision’ statement to guide the expansion of the city, published by city authorities (46 pages)</td>
<td>Summary, Draft Structural Vision Almere 2.0</td>
<td>(Almere, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auroville</td>
<td>Masterplan looking forwards to 2025, to guide the expansion of the city, approved by central government (39 online pages)</td>
<td>The Auroville Universal Township Master Plan (Perspective: 2025)</td>
<td>(Auroville Foundation, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco2 Cities</td>
<td>Book published by the World Bank describing the principles and practical implementation of the framework, with a focus on the developing world (382 pages)</td>
<td>Eco2 Cities: Ecological Cities as Economic Cities</td>
<td>(Suzuki et al., 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdespartera</td>
<td>Book describing the history of the Valdespartera urban expansion, with different sections written by key actors in the developmental process (415 pages)</td>
<td>Urbanismo y desarrollo sostenible en Zaragoza: La Ecocuidad Valdespartera</td>
<td>(de Miguel-González, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiburg</td>
<td>Charter outlining guiding principles of sustainable urbanism based on Freiburg’s experience, produced in collaboration with Freiburg authorities (35 pages)</td>
<td>The Freiburg Charter for Sustainable Urbanism</td>
<td>(Academy of Urbanism, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensburg</td>
<td>Masterplan to guide reconstruction of city over 20 year period, approved by the City Administration (151 pages)</td>
<td>Greensburg Sustainable Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>(BNIM, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huaibei</td>
<td>Masterplan to retrofit city, developed by architects in conjunction with local authorities (90 pages)</td>
<td>Huaibei Eco-City Masterplan &amp; Huaibei Mining Subsided Area Eco-Restoration Plan (2010-2025+)</td>
<td>(Robert Edson Swain, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Working Paper published by OECD, building the case for a programme of initiatives, outlining key challenges, policy tools and research questions (141 pages)</td>
<td>Cities and Green Growth: A Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>(Hammer et al., 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>Framework outlining principles and objectives of initiative to guide development of growing network of local projects in Portland Metro area (17 pages)</td>
<td>The Portland Metro EcoDistricts Initiative: Integrating Environmental Performance and District Scale Development</td>
<td>(PoSi, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejong</td>
<td>Brochure published by Agency responsible for construction of new city, summarising progress to date and looking forwards to 2030 (37 pages).</td>
<td>Happy City Sejong</td>
<td>(MACCA, 2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: main documents consulted for 12 case studies
Thus, the sample includes seven planning documents (masterplans and ‘visions’) relating to specific initiatives, four framework documents, and one retrospective description, published by a variety of types of actors involved in planning and implementing urban sustainability. Their geographical scope ranged from local to global. The specific developments covered include a mixture of new-build projects, retro-fits, and urban expansions, and encompass a wide range of international locations. They include not only metropolitan initiatives such as Sydney, but also suburban developments such as Valdespartera, and the “rural town” of Greensburg (BNIM, 2008). A brief description of each initiative appears in Appendix A.

**Rationale for including a variety of text types**

The implications of including a disparate collection of text types require further discussion. These documents were created by various types of actors, for different purposes. The identification of any commonalities, through the process of analysis, does not in itself justify their being grouped together as a coherent target for analysis. However, Fairclough’s (1989) framework for analysing discourse provides one rationale for doing so. He uses Foucault’s (1971) notion of ‘orders of discourse’ to distinguish between those evident ‘in’ a text and those ‘behind’ it. He understands texts – spoken and written language, and associated visual imagery – as a “form of action” (Fairclough, 1989:9), such that discourse is one form of ‘social practice’, shaped in turn by broader ‘social structures’: “[t]he whole is society, and language is one strand of the social” (ibid:23).

Any actual practice can, on this view, be typologised and understood as partially determined by, but also constituting, higher ‘social orders’ – and finally an overall societal order. Thus, Fairclough uses the term ‘social order’ to “refer to…a structuring of a particular social ‘space’ into various domains associated with various types of practice” (ibid:29). Accordingly, the notion of an ‘order of discourse’ relates to the structuring of social space into different ‘types’ of discourse (ibid). Any ‘actual discourse’ – an actual text – can therefore potentially be understood as exemplifying a ‘type’. The differing natures of these ‘types’ are structured by the higher orders of discourse. In relation to the eco-city, Fairclough’s framework yields the structural model shown in Table 4.4:
Fairclough does not define, or problematise the coherence of, the notion of ‘a society’. Nor does he discuss the possibility that ‘orders’ of practice and discourse within one ‘society’ might be influenced by those of another, or whether a higher level social order need coincide with a national order. The social practice of eco-city development, as discussed in Chapter Two, is characterised increasingly by cross-country cooperative learning, and may be shaped by horizontal networks of local actors in spite of, or in the absence of, national direction. There is a case, then, to interpret Fairclough’s model as potentially facilitating the notion of an international social order of practice and discourse. Within this, more specific social orders might be posited – including those appearing at the ‘national’ and ‘regional’ level (differentiated by, for example, legal and political frameworks) – though no attempt is made here to define these or identify their structuring effects on ‘lower’ orders in relation to the cases studied. Rather, it is accepted that a wide variety of ‘social orders of eco-city discourse’ might potentially be constructed, with different geographies, but the fact of their mutual influence allows us at least to hypothesise a collective ‘international social order of eco-city discourse’ shaping the conceptualisation of urban sustainability across a wide variety of text types and geographical locations. The hypothetical construction of this international order of discourse is justified to the extent that the international phenomenon of eco-city social practice displays coherence, as outlined in Chapter Two.

Fairclough’s (1989) framework also predicts horizontal variety, as much as it assumes consistency, across texts within a given social order; higher orders of discourse constrain lower orders but do not fully determine them. A ‘discourse type’ (for example a ‘masterplan’) may reproduce itself through a set of fixed rules governing its practice. However, these constraints are generative, since “[t]he individual is only able to act in so far as there are social conventions...
to act within" (*ibid*:28). Thus, constraints are not so much proscriptions as “precondition[s] for being enabled” (*ibid*:39); the creativity of action is defined with reference to its constraints. Fairclough prefers to see discourse types as a “resource for subjects”, such that “the activity of combining them in ways that meet the ever-changing demands and contradictions of real social situations is a creative one” (*ibid*). The postulation of a common higher order of discourse is therefore justified, even if it is inconsistently realised in actual texts since these constitute acts of creativity within contingent social contexts.

An order of discourse is characterisable in terms of an ‘underlying storyline’ manifested across individual texts (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2005). Fischer (2009:192) comments on the value of examining storylines in official documentation:

> “When we examine communications in the everyday realm of politics and policymaking, we find people largely explaining things by telling stories. This is not to say that policies are simply storylines; they are presented more formally as rules and regulations. But the rules and regulations rest on narrative explanations. They reflect particular narrative stories about how the society works, and what sort of measures are needed to make it work that way.”

Even if planners are not consciously engaging in storytelling, their documentation may nevertheless “act as part of some larger story” (Throgmorton, 2003:129). The inference of discursive commonalities across planning documents, however, need not mean that the aggregated storyline is a fixed one. Rather, the process of ongoing multiple story-telling is itself “a process of innovation” (van Hulst, 2012:136), whereby “new stories are built on top of older ones and new understandings emerge along the way” (*ibid*: 299). In this sense, the eco-city storyline forms part of its broader ‘experimental’ character.

The potential ideological force of such storylines is discussed below. However, the presence of a discursive storyline, either within given text, or in broader discourse ‘types’ or ‘orders’ (Fairclough, 1989), does not imply that audiences will necessarily accept their explanatory aspects uncritically; the actual reader may not coincide
with an idealised ‘implied’ one (Iser, 1974). What Stuart Hall calls the
‘encoding’ of reality into a particular discursive representation does
not determine the way it is ‘decoded’ by an audience (Hall, 1992a);
‘meaning’ also lies in “what the various readers bring to the texts”
(Throgmorton, 2003:129). Storytelling is “typically facilitated by the
fact that people share a wide range of commonly accepted
assumptions that seldom have to be called into question” (Fischer,
2009:201), but credibility may be undermined by contradictions with
accepted norms or empirical facts, and by internal incoherence
(ibid:198). The imagined reception of an official document by its
audiences – within and outside the organisation – may affect the
choices shaping the contents (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:163–164).
Building consensus for action therefore hinges on the intended
persuasiveness of the storytelling (Throgmorton, 2003:130; van Hulst,
2012:310), and it should not be assumed that authors are blind to
documents’ discursive nature (Dryzek, 2005). Particular storylines
may, indeed, be consciously chosen to further particular agendas.

The identification of a discourse, then, does not necessarily
demonstrate its deterministic ideological power to affect behaviour
and thought. Nonetheless, it remains possible to characterise certain
discourses as more ideologically powerful than others if we accept an
understanding of the ‘power’ of ideology as “determined by the
number and nature of its subscription base as much as by some
notion of ‘explanatory force’” (Locke, 1984:33). Evidence, then, of a
discourse’s wide reproduction in society – and, particularly, when
the agents of its reproduction have significant influence and
resources – may indicate the ideological power of its underlying
agendas to shape thoughts and social actions. To the extent that the
eco-city phenomenon represents a coherent body of internationally
mainstreamed social practice, the identification of an underlying
storyline would therefore suggest that as a body of discourse it has
had considerable ideological effects.

Discursive storylines: actants and causality

Dryzek (2005:17) suggests that reconstructing a storyline should
involve identifying the text’s ‘ontology’, defined as the basic actors or
agents recognised or constructed, and, by extension, which are
absent. Such actors may be individuals or collectivities. Dryzek’s
definition might usefully be expanded to include the possibility of
non-human entities (including, for example, natural forces, flows of commerce and information, physical man-made structures, or geological formations) playing active roles in the plot. To indicate the possibility that agency within a storyline may extend beyond the human, the term ‘actant’ is borrowed here from Latour (2004), to indicate that “an actant can be human or not, or…a combination of both” (Bennett, 2010:9).

Crucially, however, the nature of the agency ascribed to a ‘narrated’ actant might be expected to differ from that of an actant identified within a Latourian actor-network analysis. Bennett describes Latour’s actant as:

“neither an object nor a subject but an ‘intervener’, akin to the Deleuzean ‘quasi-causal operator’. An operator is that which, by virtue of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time, makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event” (Bennett, 2010:9).

A narrated ‘world’, however, is necessarily more delineated than the ‘real’ world, with only some of its internal connectivity foregrounded for the purpose of plot; rather than revealing an open-ended network of quasi-operants, it defines its own frame of causality. Fischer comments that:

“Connecting actions and events into understandable patterns, the narrative is a cognitive scheme…Like the scientific mode of knowing, the narrative has its own distinctive ways of ordering experience and constructing reality. Instead of focusing on empirically based causal connections between events, the narrative form orders experience in terms of social purposes, human values, and the intentions and motivations of the participants” (Fischer, 2009:194)

Relatedly, Abbott argues that humans “are made in such a way that we continually look for the causes of things. The inevitable linearity of story makes narrative a powerful means of gratifying this need” (Abbott, 2008:41). The storyline in an explicitly fictional text might be likened to a controlled scientific experiment, constructing a simplified model of reality where certain ideas and possibilities are
tested. Just as “[n]ovels, plays, and films from classical tragedy to
comics provide a vast playground to rehearse accounts of what
makes us act” (Latour, 2005:55), it has been argued that “scientists,
conducting their experiments, are trying to write narratives that are
so uncluttered by competing elements that cause and effect are
genuinely demonstrable in the stories they tell” (Abbott, 2008:43–44).
However, whether or not a “‘real’ causal sequence” coincides with a
narrated one, the two should not be conflated: the order of the latter
is “the product of discursive forces, but we treat it as a given, as the
ture order” (Culler, 1981:183). Thus, the “impression of causation”
(Abbott, 2008:40) is rhetorical in its effect; it is one aspect of the
‘narrative coherence’ which normalises certain representations of the
empirical world; in gratifying “our need for order” (ibid:42), it has
ideological power. A storyline, then, understood as lending
coherence to a text, is itself rhetorical; the representation of reality
which it supports is inherently normative rather than mimetic.

As well as identifying the key ‘actants’ populating storylines, it is
important to consider the causal agency assigned to those actants; a
narrated actant may be positioned as having agency within itself.
While it may map onto, and be offered as objectively representing, an
actant in the external world, the factors causing its real-world
counterpart to ‘catalyse’ events – placing it in the “right place at the
right time” (Bennett, 2010:9) – may be left undiscussed,
unquestioningly absent, or even deliberately excluded from, the
ontology. Such positioning may serve to ‘fetishise’ the actant – in
Swyngedouw’s (2010:220) sense of the “reification of complex
processes to a thing-like object-cause”. The need – or conscious
attempt – to divert the reader’s attention from complex contextual
factors, for the purposes of narrating a coherent story, may
simultaneously obfuscate these factors.

The differing ‘motives’ explicitly assigned to narrated actants
within a plot (Dryzek, 2005) serve to reinforce this predefined chain
of causality. These motivations enjoin the reader to adopt what
Davies and Harré (1990) call a ‘subject position’ with reference to
these actants. Thus, for example, “[i]n one discourse we may find
benign and public-spirited expert administrators. Another discourse
might portray the same people as selfish bureaucrats” (Dryzek,
2005:18). Analysis of the causal relations between actants in a
storyline should therefore include the identification of explicit or implicit evaluations made of these actants.

**The ideological effect of metaphor in discursive storylines**

The necessary simplification of reality for the purpose of discursive storytelling is achieved partly, then, through selectivity in the choice of actants, authorial evaluation of their actions, and the predefinition of their causal interrelations. Yet the fact of this selectivity is concealed through various rhetorical tactics – and particularly through metaphorical imagery (Dryzek, 2005). Metaphor is widely theorised as a key element of rhetoric (Culler, 1981), and no longer simplistically understood as “the substitution of a literal term for a concept with a non-literal one” (Semino, 2008:9). Older ‘substitution’ theory emphasised the creative uses of metaphor in particular oratorial and literary contexts (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Chilton, 2004). More recently, however, linguists have argued that metaphor has much wider significance in everyday cognitive processes allowing humans to “consolidate and extend their ideas about themselves, their relationships and their knowledge of the world” (Cameron & Low, 1999:xii), such that our “ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:3).

When a substituted, literal term relates to an “abstract, complex, subjective and/or poorly delineated [area] of experience”, its metaphorical replacement will typically relate to “concrete, simpler, physical and/or better delineated areas of experience” (Semino, 2008:30). Metaphorical processes thereby have the effect of “making confusing issues more intelligible” (Charteris-Black, 2006:565). Consequently, metaphors have rhetorical force, in their ability to “persuade, reason, evaluate, explain, theorize, offer new conceptualizations of reality and so on” (Semino, 2008:31). Their widespread use in plans, policies, and diagnoses of social problems (and in the political domain more widely) serves to delineate domains of reality which would otherwise remain highly complex or abstract (Semino, 2008:91). Thus, they rhetorically reinforce various ‘calls for action’; they are “deployed to convince listeners or readers by putting a situation in a particular light” (Dryzek, 2005:18).

In doing so, however, they also necessarily obscure other aspects of that situation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Semino, 2008).
(1997:113) describes metaphor as having a “hiding-as-it-reveals quality”, quoting Paivio’s likening of it to "a solar eclipse. It hides the object of study and at the same time reveals some of its most salient and interesting characteristics when viewed through the right telescope" (Paivio et al., 1993:150). If, furthermore, “particular uses of metaphor become the dominant way of talking about a particular aspect of reality within a particular discourse” (Semino, 2008:33), these metaphors may come to “represent the ‘commonsense’ or ‘natural’ view of things” (ibid.) within a particular social group. The naturalisation of a wide variety of ‘conventional metaphors’ in everyday language renders users unaware of their ‘metaphoricity’ (Semino, 2008).

This naturalisation may be further enabled by the ability of certain metaphors to “resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at the unconscious level” (Mio, 1997:130), and thus bypass logical thinking (Charteris-Black, 2006:565). Dryzek gives the example of the metaphor of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which in evoking the “grazing commons of a medieval village” (2005:18) may appeal to “deeper pasts, such as pastoral…idylls, as a way to criticize the industrial present” (ibid:19). Metaphors, then, have ideological force, insofar as they naturalise particular presuppositions which “frame the dominant terrain for social action”, serving as “reference points for what is politically and socially ‘possible’” (Bartling, 2008:99).

The ideological effects of metaphor become more apparent when it is recognised that metaphors do not typically exist in isolation but form discernible patterns (Semino, 2008). Lakoff & Johnson (1980) suggest that groups of related ‘systematically’ used conventional metaphors point to underlying ‘conceptual metaphors’, with a ‘source domain’ and a ‘target domain’. In the case of the conceptual metaphor ‘time is money’, for example, ‘time’ is the target domain, onto which the source domain ‘money’ is ‘mapped’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:9). This conceptual metaphor is realised in a wide variety of expressions such as ‘spend time’, or ‘invest time’ – yet the conceptual metaphor ‘time is money’ does not exist in all cultures. Thus, “the most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture” (ibid:22). The systematic presence of conceptual metaphors, then, indicates the particular conventional ways of
conceptualising reality in a given cultural, or subcultural, group. The
users of these metaphors, furthermore, may not be conscious of their
metaphoricity; their conventionality indicates their naturalisation.27

This systematic patterning of metaphor may lend coherence to an
individual text (where related expressions deriving from the same
‘source’ domain are used in relation to a particular ‘target’ domain),
or may be observable at an intertextual level (Semino, 2008). The
recognisably similar metaphorical mobilisation of source domains
across different texts, it is argued, points to a commonality of
perspective – and when a given metaphorical system becomes
dominant in a given field, the particularity of its conceptual
perspective will tend to be obscured through naturalisation. Metaphor,
then, “can provide a conceptual structure for a
systematized ideology” (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002:29).

Accordingly, it might be expected that particular ‘orders’
(Fairclough, 1989) of discourse will be characterised by the consistent
use of distinctive types and combinations of metaphorical imagery
(Dryzek, 2005) across texts with a related ‘target domain’. Cameron
(1999) develops this idea by identifying three levels of metaphoric
‘systematicity’. He distinguishes the recurrence of particular source
domains in an individual text (which he calls ‘local systematicity’) from ‘discourse systematicity’, where the intertextual use of
particular metaphors characterises the language used by “specific

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27 While it may be easy to recognise the metaphoricity of a “freshly coined metaphor” (Croft & Cruse, 2004:205), over time a “process of semantic drift” may occur, such that the expression may eventually become “no different from a literal expression” (ibid). It may be the case, furthermore, that the usage of the word to refer to the source domain becomes obsolete. Semino (2008) gives the example of ‘progress’, where the source domain (the concept of physically moving forwards) is mapped onto various target domains of experience to indicate ‘positive change’. However, the use of the word ‘progress’ to indicate literal forward movement has become relatively rare, usually associated only with more elevated textual styles; over time, the notion of ‘positive change’ has become the main (and therefore literal) meaning of ‘progress’. It might be observed that the noun ‘sustainability’ represents a more extreme case, when used in expressions such as ‘urban sustainability’. Here the word ‘sustainability’ is derived from the verb ‘sustain’, which conveys the meaning “cause to continue in a certain state; maintain at the proper level or standard” (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993:3163). Since the more literal, physical sense of “hold upright or in position” became obsolete in the mid-eighteenth century (ibid.), the extent to which this contemporary use of ‘sustainability’ might be characterised as metaphorical is unclear.
discourse communities” (ibid:16) – in other words, associated with a particular type of social practice. The particular metaphors characterising a given discourse system need not be exclusive to that discourse community; they may appear in a wider range of genres and discourses, and indeed form part of the conventional use of a language (which constitutes Cameron’s third level, of ‘global systematicity’). Yet the choice and combination of particular types of metaphors from within this wider ‘global’ system distinguishes one discourse community from another.

If, then, it is possible to conceptualise the ‘eco-city’ as a coherent phenomenon and, accordingly, to postulate an ‘international ‘order’ of eco-city discourse, then a degree of ‘discourse systematicity’ should be evident in the uses of metaphor across individual documents through which initiatives are conceptualised and planned. The ‘generative’ effects (Schön, 1993) of this system, it might be concluded, would be to frame the problematic of urban sustainability in a particular way. The analysis of the documentation conducted here therefore sought to identify intra-textual and inter-textual patterning, using these data to construct the overall storyline which characterises this order of discourse. The dominance of particular metaphorical ‘source domains’ in the storyline’s various realisations might thus be interpreted as indicative of its ideological force, enabling the presentation of particular solutions as inevitable and uncontroversial, while obscuring the partiality of their exposition.

Spatial metaphors

Special attention was paid to the spatial metaphors mobilised within eco-city documentation, since they stood out as particularly common. This eventuality is predicted by Stavrakakis’ contention that “space has been and still is the fundamental metaphor in socio-political thought and practice” (Stavrakakis, 2007:148). Chilton similarly suggests that close attention should be paid to the metaphorical presentation of space within political discourse: “Spatial representations, including metaphorical ones, take on an important aspect in political discourse. If politics is about cooperation and conflict over allocation of resources, such resources are frequently of a spatial, that is, geographical or territorial, kind” (Chilton, 2004:57). It is unsurprising, then, if texts such as policy and planning documents rely on metaphors of space – especially those specifically
aiming to describe or promote particular forms of urban development, which rely significantly on textual or diagrammatic representations of spatial order. We should be alerted to the possibility that these constructions of space have rhetorical force exceeding their explanatory value.

**Summary of analytical approach**

The analysis proceeded in two stages. First, a descriptive analysis of each document was undertaken, to identify the key actants, the chains of causality between them, the motives ascribed to them, and the key metaphorical imagery employed. This information was used to reconstruct an underlying ‘storyline’ in each case. Within this, and reflecting the grounded assumption (that the public is unsatisfactorily conceptualised in such documents), special attention was paid to: the role – or absence – of the ‘public’ within the storyline; the ways in which this public was conceptualised; and the envisaged ‘publicness’ of the city’s open spaces. Second, a transversal comparison was made, to identify commonalities across these preliminary findings. While significant inter-textual differences in this respect are highlighted in the next chapter, the main aim was to identify, if possible, commonalities in the conceptualisation of the public.

**Presentation of the findings**

The prevalence of spatial metaphors was such that they were used to develop an overall conceptual framework, described in Chapter Five, which served as an organisational structure for the presentation of the detailed findings. The approach was therefore partially ‘grounded’, since the spatial framework emerged only after the preliminary analysis of the documentation. The preliminary descriptive analysis, however, was directed by Dryzek’s (2005) categories of textual markers whose identification allows for a discursive storyline to be reconstructed, as discussed above.

The key discussion points are evidenced with reference to the documents. For the sake of brevity, each document is referenced using the label in column one of Table 4.3, with page numbers referring to the documents listed in column three. Where the analysis draws on additional documents, full in-text references are provided.
The selection of verbatim comments is not intended as an exhaustive list of occasions on which a particular textual phenomenon occurs; systematic quantitative content analysis to identify, for example, the frequency with which different expressions appear, was not conducted since the aims of the analysis were qualitative in nature. It is acknowledged that this approach potentially lays the research open to the accusation of ‘self-determination’; that selective evidence was used to bolster a pre-existing argument, while counter-evidence was overlooked. To counter this risk, efforts were made to highlight not only intertextual commonalities, but also significant exceptions to these. Additionally, the imposition of specific selection criteria (as discussed above), it was hoped, would mitigate the risk of sample selection bias towards cases appearing to lend weight to a desired conclusion. The identification of commonalities does not imply a quantitative claim about the entirety of the eco-city phenomenon, then, but is intended as a strong indication of the possibility that certain consistent tendencies are apparent across its different manifestations.

In many of the documents consulted, the main text is accompanied by quotations from different actors involved with the plans, or from a wider body of writers and thinkers. Various conventions are used to distinguish these quotations from the main text: they may appear in separate text boxes, often accompanying speakers’ photographs; within quotation marks; or as stand-alone sections. These interventions serve the purpose of legitimation: some plans are preceded by endorsements from higher authorities (such as the mayor), or from ‘experts’ of different kinds. Equally, they may facilitate the appearance of alignment with the desires of local residents or other interest groups. Additionally, they may evoke a process of polyphonic, inclusive democratic debate. It was assumed, however, that such comments would have been carefully selected and edited for inclusion, so as to reinforce the ‘call to action’. Indeed, it was empirically observed during the process of analysis that the comments thus presented did not significantly disrupt the normative thrust of any of the documents. The fact of mediation through the editorial process, in short, justifies the treatment of such quotations as integral to the rhetorical construction of the storyline, rather than as somehow representing a full range of opinions on the subject.
matter. For analytical purposes, they were not distinguished from the main body of text, and their provenance (beyond the page number on which they appear) is therefore not discussed in the findings.

Finally, some reference is made to the visual imagery (photographs, diagrams, architects’ impressions) in the documents. However, no systematic analysis was made of this imagery per se, again on the basis of the grounded assumption that its inclusion was intended to support, rather than to call into question, the ontology and storyline of the discourse. While further research might usefully focus specifically on differences between visual and textual imagery in terms of their rhetorical function in eco-city documentation, this was not an aim of the present research.

4.2 In-Depth Case Studies

As discussed above, while plans, visions and policies may provide clues to the nature of a postulated international ‘order’ of eco-city discourse, and be of importance in directing what is enacted, it is problematic to reduce any given eco-city initiative to its official documentation. Rather than reifying documents, we might more profitably understand them as assembled in particular ways which “embody the political processes by which they are produced” (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:164–165), and therefore as having exterior relationality, and potentially “excluding the unwanted and complex demands of an unruly public” (Abram, 2002, quoted in Freeman & Maybin, 2011:165). Their smooth surfaces, and appearance as “inert extra-temporal blobs of meaning” (Smith, 1993:3), then, may belie a complex process of emergent publicness in their development, even while they provide a “point of entry and orientation for investigation” (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:165) of this emergence.

Importantly, documents may also have an ongoing “dynamic property” which “cannot be grasped by a focus on attributes, or content alone” (Prior, 2008:832). Insofar as they constitute a “means to make and maintain social groups, not just the means to deliver information” (Brown & Duguid, 1996), they carry an intention to construct publicness, yet they may simultaneously be subjected to emergent contestation (Brown and Duguid, 1996), and generative of
further documents (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:161). A policy document does not, then, merely subsume public agency through an act of neutral representation which is fully predictive of practice; rather, its ‘public life’ extends beyond content into ongoing context – a point which may be missed in a discourse analysis which itself might be understood as a sort of (text-bound) story-telling which “strip[s] the document of the practices surrounding it” (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:159).

So as to look beyond the documentation, two of the twelve cases examined in Chapter Five were selected for more in-depth analysis: the EcoDistricts initiative in Portland, Oregon (USA), and Sejong City (South Korea). Portland is an existing city; Sejong is partly inhabited, although its development is ongoing. In both cases, urban sustainability goals are orchestrated by institutional policies, reflecting the main thesis concerns. Based on the desk research for Chapter Five, each potentially represented a ‘paradigmatic’ case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) at either end of the spectrum of planned eco-city development proposed in Chapter Two. Sejong appeared to fit into the ‘technological showcase’ category, as a ‘top-down’, technocratic exercise, enabled and heavily protected by state policies and funding, and aiming to broadcast messages to various audiences internally and internationally. Portland, however, was closer to the ‘research in the wild’ end of the spectrum, while still being shaped by institutional policy: the EcoDistricts initiative in particular had the appearance of a guided ‘bottom-up’ approach to urban sustainability, potentially paradigmatic of a decentred, unbounded, pragmatic approach to governance.

While Portland arguably represents the typical European and North American model of intervention within, or extension of, existing cities, Sejong exemplifies the contemporary wave of ‘new build’ large-scale developments in Asia. Examined through Dryzek’s (2005) framework of environmental discourses, Portland’s strategic plan displays, on preliminary inspection, a ‘three-pillared’ approach to sustainability, organised around the concept of ‘equity’ (see Chapter Six), while Sejong is explicitly tied into national ‘green growth’ policies. Additionally, both cases operate within a very different cultural context. The selection of these cases was based, therefore, on their divergence; it was not intended as an
‘experimental’ comparative case study (Lijphart, 1971; Burnham et al., 2004:59–62) in which secondary variables are controlled or held constant. By deliberately choosing two such disparate cases, it was hoped that something approaching the full extent of mainstream urban sustainability could be captured: if the findings regarding ‘publicness’ were similar in both cases, there would be some reason to suppose they might also hold true elsewhere. Given the degree to which the contemporary eco-city is increasingly marked by international knowledge sharing (see Chapter Two), there were good grounds to expect some commonalities to emerge.

As Flyvbjerg (2006) observes, the successful choice of paradigmatic cases can never be guaranteed in advance of the study itself. There was no assumption, therefore, that each case would, on closer examination, reveal itself to be truly paradigmatic; rather than force a categorisation on each case through which to interpret the findings, a more grounded approach was adopted, whereby each city was expected to be uniquely shaped by its particular context. Thus, the significance of their contextual circumstances is explored in some detail. Overall, the intention was to use each as a ‘spatial frame’ through which, individually and cross-comparatively, some of the nuances of publicness might be further explored with reference to, rather than in denial of, contingent context (since the assemblage of publicness is understood as including context of various kinds), and the broader implications of this for urban sustainability planning might be drawn out.

One further crucial reason for choosing these two cases was that each appeared to represent what Flyvbjerg (2006) calls a ‘critical case’. EcoDistricts, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, represents an extreme case of active institutional willingness to facilitate emergent publicness; it might be interpreted as an experiment which attempts to go beyond liberal-modernist planning. It is critical in that its demonstrable failure to do so would leave the dilemma of planning ‘cityness’ intact. We might therefore reasonably ask what is in fact being planned, if this is not the city itself. Sejong, on the other hand, represents an extreme case of meticulous top-down planning in the modernist tradition. It is therefore a critical test of whether emergent publicness will occur irrespectively. If it does not, then the hypothesis that some aspects of cityness can actively be suppressed
by plans remains unchallenged. But if the publicness of Sejong does in fact display a strong emergent modality, despite – or as a reaction to – top down planning, then we might conclude that the partial conceptualisation of cityness in eco-city plans is not necessarily problematic: that there is no reason why a technological showcase might not also become a fully public space.

The key research questions guiding this phase of the research are stated below. These questions are discussed in more detail in the conclusions section of Chapter Five, in the light of the preliminary documentary analysis.

1. how does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its conceptualisation in official documentation?
2. Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ status quo?

The approach included three key elements:

- desk research into the broader social and political context of each case
- interviews with residents and key stakeholders in the planning or implementation of the initiative
- observational research in open spaces

The local interviews and the observational element in particular required an in situ approach. As mentioned above, project timings and budgetary considerations meant that it was only possible to cover two cases in depth. While repeating the research in a wider set of locations would no doubt enrich the findings, the aspiration, as in the preliminary documentational analysis, was not to make definitive claims about the eco-city phenomenon as a whole so much as to identify potential pitfalls in its conceived and actual publicness.

**Qualitative interviews**

In-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with a range of actors involved in developing and/or implementing each initiative. Potential respondents were identified initially through recommendations from existing contacts (either those whom the
author met during preliminary visits to Portland in October 2013 and to Sejong in November 2014, or those connected with the University of Westminster International Eco-Cities Initiative), or through recommendations from other research participants. All were approached first by email, with a brief description of the nature of the research. Following their agreement to participate, further information was provided in advance of the interview. This gave reassurances that any verbatim comments or other findings appearing in the thesis or related publications would not be personally attributable to the respondents, along with a consent form, and a list of possible areas to be covered in the interview. Copies of this information, meeting the requirements of the University of Westminster’s (2013) ethical regulations are provided in Appendix B. Interviews were audio recorded with each respondent’s written consent. These recordings were then transcribed for analysis purposes. The author has retained copies of all correspondence and signed consent forms.

Portland

The sample was designed to yield a variety of perspectives on the EcoDistricts initiative as a whole, and its context within Portland’s broader sustainability planning. It includes policy makers in both the city’s Bureau of Sustainability and Planning and the regional Metro organisation, as well as relevant project managers at the Portland Development Commission (PDC, the city’s urban renewal agency), and staff at Portland Sustainability Initiative (PoSI), which was funded by PDC to steer the pilot scheme (see Chapter Six). To provide wider perspective on the city’s sustainability agendas, interviews were also conducted with an academic working in the field of sustainability planning, two staff members of Portland State University with close knowledge of the EcoDistricts initiative, an economic development officer working in the Portland Metro area, and a key downtown property developer involved in sustainable development projects. An interview with the Mayor of Portland was also sought, but he was unavailable during the fieldwork period.

The number of actors involved directly or indirectly with the EcoDistricts initiative is large, and examining all its local activities across the city would have been impractical. It was decided to focus in depth on one scheme only. The Growing Gateway (GG) initiative
was selected (see Figure 4.1), partly because, along with the *Foster Green*\(^{28}\) scheme (see Chapter Six), its immediate goals were more obviously social in nature rather than technical, and – unlike the three pilot schemes in inner Portland – it is primarily dependent on local engagement and volunteering rather than capital investment from businesses and large property developers. In other words, it appeared to be far removed from a ‘top down’ initiative; closer to the ‘research in the wild’ end of the spectrum proposed in Chapter Two – though still guided by institutional policy. Gateway was also of particular interest since open spaces featured strongly in its planned projects, and because city policies are oriented in different ways towards greater ‘urbanisation’ of this area (see Chapter Six). It was potentially interesting to explore the conceptualisation of ‘urbane’ in the goals of the Gateway EcoDistrict, and the extent to which this might be compromised by the aspirations of its current suburban residents. As discussed in Chapter Six, the ‘urbanisation’ of Gateway is not necessarily welcomed by all of its residents.

A formal interview was conducted with only one local resident from the Gateway area, but this was complemented with a wider quantitative on-street survey of local residents (see below). Since the possible future gentrification of the Gateway area was discussed in several interviews, it was decided to conduct a further interview with a resident of the gentrified Concordia area in North East Portland. This interviewee had herself moved from the Gateway area in 1997, and remained knowledgeable about it. She was one of the original wave of gentrifiers in Concordia, works in the creative industries, has long been active in local politics, and has a close knowledge of politics generally in the Portland area.\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\) *Foster Green* EcoDistrict was originally known as *Lents*.

\(^{29}\) The author’s background knowledge was further enriched by informal discussions with: Kathryn Harrington, Metro Councillor; Ric Stephens, urban planner in the Portland area and lecturer at the University of Oregon; and Jim Murphy, Head of the Rosepark Neighbourhood Association in the Gateway area. The author attended the Portland State University’s 2013 Annual Sustainability Celebration, at which Mayor Charlie Hayles delivered a speech, and various students presented work on the various *EcoDistricts*. Additionally, the author was present at a meeting between several of the *Growing Gateway* Board members and a representative from the Portland Development Commission, and at a neighbourhood meeting in the Foster Green area, where the public was invited to comment on various plans for the area related to the local EcoDistrict initiative.
All interviews were conducted face-to-face between 23 May and 7 June 2013, except for the representative from PoSI/EcoDistricts, who was interviewed by telephone the following week. Interview lengths ranged from 40-133 minutes. While most interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, 2 were conducted in pairs (L2 & L3; C5 & C6), and 2 as a triad (C8, P2, & P3; C2, C3 & C4), thus giving a total of 17 interviews as summarised in Table 4.5 overleaf.
Table 4.5: summary of qualitative interviews conducted in Portland

Sejong

As was the case in Portland, a ‘nodal’ approach was adopted whereby key groups of actors were identified, with at least one from each group to be interviewed. The groups chosen were: planners from City Hall; staff at the government agency – the Multifunctional Administrative City Construction Agency (MACCA) – responsible for the delivery of the project; academics in South Korea with a knowledge of Sejong; local teachers (given the importance of educational choices in Korean parents’ decision to live in certain places, as discussed in Chapter Seven); commercial actors in the property sector; and local residents. The Mayor of Sejong City was
also approached through a local contact, but was unavailable for interview. The state-owned construction company Korea Land & Housing Corporation offered an interview in Korean, but this was received too late in the fieldwork period to arrange. Approaches were made either directly by email to suitable participants, or through ‘snowballing’ before or during the main fieldwork trip.

In total, 16 interviews were achieved (Table 4.6), all conducted face-to-face, in English, on a one-to-one basis. The interviews lasted between 35 and 95 minutes, and took place between 3-16 June 2014 in Sejong (interviews SM1-4; SP1; SE1; SR1-2; SR4-5), JoChiWon (SC1; SA3; SR3), Daejeon (SA1; SA2), and Seoul (SA4), at venues chosen by each respondent. All agreed to have audio recordings made of their interviews, and these were later transcribed for analysis.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details of respondent</th>
<th>In-text reference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Strategic Planner</td>
<td>SC1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACCA</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Team</td>
<td>SM1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Green Urban Environment Division</td>
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<td>Spokesperson’s Office</td>
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<td>Academic</td>
<td>Professor at KAIST</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Professor at Korea University</td>
<td>SA3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor at Soongsil University</td>
<td>SA4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Property</td>
<td>Owner of local estate agency</td>
<td>SP1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Headmaster of local ‘smart’ elementary school</td>
<td>SE1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>Civil servant, male, in late 40s, married with 3 children</td>
<td>SR1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil servant, female, in early 30s, unmarried, no children</td>
<td>SR2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community organiser, male, married with 2 children</td>
<td>SR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housewife, in 40s, married with 3 children</td>
<td>SR4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University student, male, early 20s, unmarried, no children</td>
<td>SR5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: summary of qualitative interviews conducted in South Korea

An interpreter was present in four cases (SC1; SM1; SM2; and SM3), either to translate the whole interview, or to help in case of particular difficulties. It is acknowledged therefore that the sample is biased towards English speakers, who may possibly have had different perspectives on the city to monolingual participants – the presence or absence of any such perspectival bias being difficult to
assess. Since a professionally qualified interpreter was used, it was assumed that interviewees’ original comments were faithfully translated into English.

As was the case in Portland, all participants received a guarantee that their names would not be used in any publication relating to the research. All agreed, however, to anonymised verbatim quotations being used as part of the research findings. Grammatical and vocabulary errors in respondents’ English have been left uncorrected in the comments quoted in Chapter Seven.

Assessing the publicness of open spaces

A series of observations of open spaces was also conducted. In each case, a variety of types of urban space was chosen, partly in the light of Parkinson’s (2012) concern to explore the roles of different forms of urban space in shaping different aspects of a city’s public life. The aim was to understand the publicness of these spaces, based on a mixture of objective and subjective criteria as described later in this section. In addition, the wider contexts of the spaces were considered (using relevant published information, the research interviewee’s observations, and the author’s own impressions). In Portland, three locations in Gateway were selected along with ten comparator locations elsewhere in the city; in Sejong, four locations were chosen, and compared with five locations in Seoul.

Choice of observation locations – Portland

Drawing on the first depth interviews, along with analysis of GG documentation and local maps, three specific observation locations in Gateway were chosen on the basis that they were earmarked for improvements within the GG initiative: Halsey Street (the main retail thoroughfare near the transit station); a patch of parkland adjacent to Halsey Street, here referred to as ‘PDC park’ since the land is owned by PDC; and the pedestrian path forming the main access to the transit station from the Gateway retail centre and its car parks (referred to here as ‘Oregon Clinic’, after the building which it runs beside). GG were keen for improvements to be made to Halsey’s retail and entertainment establishments, and pedestrian environment, to encourage more street life. While the redevelopment of PDC park has been promised, to make it a key local destination for pedestrians,
it is essentially waste land at present – although it has hosted occasional community events (with GG’s involvement). The area in the vicinity of the transit station is currently perceived as forbidding in the evening (when the large adjoining car parks are no longer in use), and GG hoped to introduce signage to welcome visitors, among other environmental improvements.

To contextualise the Gateway findings, several comparator locations were chosen elsewhere in Portland. The choice of these was to some extent arbitrary, although they were clustered into a small number of study areas, and the choice was informed by the urban design typology underlying the Portland Plan (Figure 4.2). This divides the city into the ‘Central City’, ‘Western Neighbourhoods’, ‘Inner Neighbourhoods’, ‘Eastern Neighbourhoods’ (which includes Gateway), and ‘Industrial Districts’ (City of Portland, undated).

![Figure 4.2: urban design typology used in Portland Plan; Gateway lies to the east of the I-205 freeway which marks the boundary between the ‘Inner’ and ‘Eastern’ neighbourhoods (Source: City of Portland (undated))](image)

However, this typology was modified in two ways. First, ‘Industrial Districts’ were excluded as less directly relevant to the research concerns. Second, in place of a ‘Western Neighbourhood’
within the city limits, contextual reference is made in the analysis to ‘Highland Heights’ a residential district in the city of Beaverton (to the immediate west of Portland, but within the Metro area), where the author spent two days at the beginning of the fieldwork period. In the analysis in Chapter Six, this is categorised as an ‘Outer Suburb’: an ‘ideal type’ defined by a lack of publicness, and therefore no observations were conducted here. Concordia was selected as a typifying a (gentrified) ‘Inner Neighbourhood’ following preliminary enquiries among research interviewees.

On this basis, a series of thoroughfares, open spaces closely connected to transit hubs, and local parks were chosen as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study area</th>
<th>Area type</th>
<th>Type of space</th>
<th>Thoroughfares</th>
<th>Key open spaces near transit hubs</th>
<th>Smaller/green parks &amp; squares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gateway</td>
<td>Eastern Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Halsey St, Oregon Clinic</td>
<td>Halsey St</td>
<td>Oregon Clinic</td>
<td>PDC Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downtown</td>
<td>Central City</td>
<td>SW 2nd Ave, Pioneer Courthouse Square, Urban Plaza†, South Waterfront streetcar terminus*</td>
<td>SW 2nd Ave</td>
<td>Pioneer Courthouse Square</td>
<td>Director Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Plaza†</td>
<td>Pettygrove Park†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Waterfront riverside walk*</td>
<td>South Waterfront pocket park*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordia</td>
<td>Inner Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Alberta St, n/a</td>
<td>Alberta St</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Alberta Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland Heights (Beaverton))</td>
<td>(Western Neighbourhoods)</td>
<td>n/a, n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: summary of Portland study areas and observation locations
† also part of SoMa ED area
* also part of South Waterfront ED area

140
Further contextual information about each location, along with the dates on which observations took place, and the precise vantage point from which pedestrians were counted, is provided in Appendix C.

Choice of observation locations – Sejong and Seoul

Four observation locations were selected in Sejong: a pedestrianised thoroughfare adjacent to the built-up Hansol neighbourhood’s central park, and near the main transport terminus; a section of its main shopping street (Noeul Sam-ro); a communal area with seating and children’s play facilities located between residential blocks (at its south-western edge); and a walkway beside the Sejong branch of the National Library, which links the library entrance and parking facilities with the park and lake behind. Because the first three are located in the fully built and inhabited Hansol district, there is good reason to suppose they will not become significantly busier in future. They were chosen following preliminary exploration because they appeared to be fairly typical for the open spaces in the neighbourhood. The library, however, located near the government complex, will serve a considerably larger population when Sejong is fully developed. This location was included because the library and the adjacent lake park were universally praised by residents as one of
the great successes of the city so far; in this sense, it may serve to indicate the type of cityness to which residents aspire.

To contextualise the publicness of Sejong as a South Korean city, and because its development is so closely connected to the goal of decongesting Seoul, a series of comparator locations were selected in Seoul, following preliminary explorations. One was on Jongno Sa-ga, selected as a fairly representative city centre thoroughfare, neither particularly busy nor particularly unused by pedestrians. A pedestrianised street in Myeongdong, one of Seoul’s main retail areas, was also chosen as a contrasting example of congested Seoul space. A communal area in the centre of Hwigyeongdong, a middle income residential complex in the Gangbuk area west of the city centre, provided a comparator for the residential communal space in Sejong. Just as Sejong residents are particularly proud of the library and lake park as ‘public spaces’ in Sejong, the Cheonggyecheon\(^\text{30}\) river park was selected in Seoul as a ‘showpiece’ open space. This river was artificially reconstructed following the removal of a main road, is flanked by pedestrian paths, and is internationally celebrated as a ‘best practice’ example of urban regeneration. Finally, the ‘alternative’ area of Hongdae was selected since it displayed very representational characteristics on a preliminary visit. While untypical of Seoul, it was intended to exemplify emergent publicness possible in a Korean context.

The observation locations chosen are summarised in Table 4.8. Further contextual information about each of these locations, along with the dates on which each observation took place, and the precise vantage point from which pedestrians were counted in each location, is provided in Appendix C.

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\(^{30}\) Often spelt in English language texts as ‘Chunggyecheon’. ‘Cheon’ means ‘stream’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Type of Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thoroughfares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Noeul Sam-ro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>• Jongo Sa-ga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: summary of observation locations in Sejong and Seoul

The locations of the chosen areas in Sejong and Seoul are indicated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.

Figure 4.4: overview of observation locations in Sejong (author’s own map)
Criteria for observations

It was argued in Chapter Three that publicness might usefully be understood as a type of assemblage closely associated with the urban. The notion of assemblage moves away from either a ‘topographical’ account of the publicness of space (which focuses on the formal qualities of a space) or a ‘performative’ one (in which space itself is incidental). Instead, publicness is understood as an outcome co-constituted by space, subjectivity, and other regulatory, economic and social factors. In the civic modality of publicness, dominant codings of space are incorporated positively into, and reproduced by, this assemblage. In its emergent modality, dominant codings are incorporated negatively, as the status quo against which the publicness defines itself.

If, as proposed in Chapter Three, publicness also entails visibility, it should be possible to observe its manifestation. Ideally, an exhaustive analysis of any particular assemblage of publicness in a given space would also encompass detailed information about the formal qualities of the space (its material features, institutional
regulations, the role of commercial activity, and relation to surrounding spaces), as well as the observable behaviour of people in that space. However, this would potentially result in a highly complex and open-ended analysis – and, as Allen (2011) warns, one where the actual processes of assemblage remained obscure since not all the components of the assemblage could readily be identified, and the varied subjectivities which form part of its composition are not directly ‘visible’. What was attempted here, instead, was the identification of certain key indicators of emergent publicness. Although in Chapters Six and Seven the publicness thus observed is related back to the formal qualities of the spaces, and comparisons are made with other urban spaces, the final goal of the analysis was not to understand the qualities of these specific spaces (since, necessarily, the choice of these spaces is to some extent arbitrary and it would be impractical to analyse the publicness of all open space in a city), but rather to draw out broader implications for the nature of publicness in each eco-city initiative.

Procedurally, the method of assessment was influenced by Mehta’s (2014) approach to evaluating public space, which mixes counts, observations of material qualities, and subjective judgments. The criteria used to assess the publicness of different spaces were as follows. First, as Lofland (1998:150) argues, it is only possible to talk of physical spaces containing ‘realms’ (public or otherwise) if people are present in them. If publicness draws partly on unpredictable intersubjectivity, moreover, it is understood as an urban phenomenon precisely because it depends on the propinquity of a large mass of people (Gehl, 2001). Counts were therefore made of the volume of pedestrian users of each space. However, since de jure open accessibility does not guarantee de facto inclusivity, an attempt was also made to record the actual social diversity among users, based on gender and approximate age. (Apparent ethnicity was also recorded in the first observation shifts, but this proved impractical in Portland, where ethnicity was not immediately obvious to the author in many cases, and irrelevant in Korea, where almost no users of any space observed had a non-East Asian appearance.)

Although immigration from other Asian nations has grown in recent years (Hwang, 2010:277; Kim & Han, 2012) and ethnic diversity in South Korea is increasing (Kim, 2010), the number of registered foreigners in the country remains very small; only 2.4 per cent of the population in 2010 according to Kim (ibid:497).
In parallel, a subjective rating for observable ‘emergent publicness’ was recorded. This described a challenge of some sort made to the dominant coding of the space. Such challenges included evidence of non-mainstream or countercultural activities taking place during the observation period or at other times during the fieldwork period (including, for example, busking, examples of unsanctioned, bottom-up ‘guerilla’, ‘DIY’ or ‘tactical’ urban interventions (see Section 3.4 in Chapter Three) serving an artistic or functional purpose, evidence of recent political protest, or other types of ‘occupation’ where the intended use of the space has been subverted). This was often revealed in alterations to the fabric of the space (thus effectively issuing a challenge to its intended physicality) – including the presence of graffiti, fly posters, stickers, litter etc. Such alterations were treated as disruptive signifiers of the ‘representational’ (Lefebvre, 1991) dimensions of the space, whereby the reappropriation of space “may leave traces in the built environment and change the physical space. The traces can then be as light as a few pieces of paper or some placards on the ground, or increasingly permanent, such as a traffic diversion at certain times, fixed stalls, or tags on walls, if the spatial appropriation becomes repetitive or permanent” (Cenzatti, 2008:81). In the absence of emergent publicness, the space was understood to be characterised by civic (compliant) publicness.

Second, the occurrence of ‘loose space’ activity (Franck & Stevens, 2006) was also noted, to describe behaviour not directly subservient to the functional, economic, ‘official’ life of the city. This might include, for example, everyday conversation, romantic behaviour, skateboarding, dog-walking, street chess, or children’s games. The notion of loose space is closely related to what Walzer (1995) calls ‘open-minded’ space, which he contrasts with ‘single-minded space’, these two qualities being epitomised by ‘hurrying’ and ‘loitering’ respectively: “[t]he square or piazza is the epitome of open-mindedness” (ibid:323). While Franck and Stevens (2006) align loose space activity with Lefebvre’s ‘representationality’, loose space is here understood as more characterised by leisure activity and often associated with consumption (for example, in the case of people conversing informally at a café). While civic in nature, this was recorded in case it appeared to be linked to emergent publicness (perhaps as a precondition or enabler in some way).
Third, since the challenging, and boundary-blurring character of emergent behaviour serves to disrupt the dominant sense of order, a subjective rating was recorded to describe the author’s own sense of security in the space. The aim here was – impressionistically – to capture whether the space was characterised by ‘edginess’. This was used as an indicator of ‘friction’ in the generative sense outlined by Byerley and Bylund (2012) as a significant component of public life: “Finding ways to deal with friction zones in public spaces…is highly pertinent for both urban democracy and urban sustainability. Some friction is central to genuine democracy, whereas too little or too much is not”. Simultaneously, a sense of insecurity may have an excluding effect, serving to close down the possibility of civic publicness, if we agree with Parkinson that “[f]or public space to be genuinely accessible to all, there must be rules that regulate interactions between individuals, a freedom for each consistent with a like freedom for all…not individualistic anarchy” (Parkinson, 2012:26). While assessing the sense of security was problematic as a variable constructed on the basis of the author’s own subjectivity within the assemblage itself, it was hoped that nevertheless some meaningful comparisons might be made between the spaces since the observer was the same person in each case.

The analysis also refers in places to the intended uses of the spaces using Jones’ et al. (2007) distinction between ‘links’ and ‘places’ (closely echoing Gehl’s et al. (2006) distinction between ‘movement spaces’ and ‘staying spaces’). For Jones, space works primarily as a ‘link’ when people use it simply to get from one place to another; a ‘place’ also works as a destination in itself. Questions of rights of access (see Chapter Three) did not inform the analysis, since the observation locations were chosen as open spaces which did not operate a de jure exclusionary entrance policy.

Ratings scales used during observations

User Volume

Based on the observation counts, a simple arithmetical scale was devised to reflect the mean number of pedestrians over the two counts:
5 = more than 100 people
4 = 76-100
3 = 51-75
2 = 26-50
1 = 0-25

Social Diversity

For each user of the space, gender and approximate age was recorded. The following age bands were used: over 65; 50-65; 30-49; 18-29; 12-17; under 12; with a note also made of whether under 18s were accompanied by adults.

Loose Space

The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and rated such that 5 = abundant loose space activity, and 1 = instrumental activity only.

Emergent Publicness

The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and rated on a 5-point scale such that 5 = abundant evidence of representational space, and 1 = no obvious ‘DIY’ challenges to the physical environment.

Sense of Security

The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and rated on a 5-point scale such that 5 = no evidence of anti-social behaviour or sense of threat, and 1 = clear evidence of potentially intimidating behaviour and a sense of threat.

Counting method

In most locations, during two separate 15-minute periods, the author recorded the number of people crossing an imaginary line, along with the gender and approximate age of each passer-by. An observation point was chosen in clear sight of this line, ideally such that the author would not draw attention to himself. In the case of
spaces such as squares with several entrance points, the ‘imaginary line’ method was not used, since it would have failed to capture the total number of people entering the space. In quieter locations, therefore, the space as a whole was observed; in busier locations, the total using one of the entrances was multiplied by the number of entrances to estimate the overall total entering the space. (Appendix C contains the precise details of the procedure for each location.) In busier locations, it also proved impractical simultaneously to record the volume of users as well as their age and gender. In such cases, records were made in subsequent separate exercises where every third or fourth passer-by was observed. A copy of the sheets used for the counts and demographic profiling is provided in Appendix D.

In each case, a count was made on two separate days: once during the week, and once on a Saturday (all between 24 May and 8 June 2013 in Portland; and 31 May and 21 June 2014 in Korea). The weather was similar for all observational shifts (typically between 20 and 25 centigrade, with no shifts taking place on rainy days), to make comparisons between locations more reliable. Since the temperature earlier in the afternoon in Korea was higher and may have deterred people from using the space in certain ways, to allow for a fairer comparison, in Portland, all shifts took place between 12pm and 3pm; in Korea between 4pm and 7pm. The precise dates of each observation shift are included in Appendix C.

Several weaknesses of this approach are acknowledged. First, that limited time and resources meant that it was only practical to conduct two counts in each location. Second, that the total numbers of pedestrians counted, and their characteristics, may have differed if slightly different times were chosen. Third, estimating people’s age, and in some cases their gender, was often challenging – especially when pedestrians were passing by hurriedly. The count findings are therefore presented only as indicative in absolute terms, but still gathered with sufficient consistency (and by the same investigator) for meaningful comparisons and contrasts between different locations to remain possible.

Presentation of findings

The key observational data are summarised graphically, and complemented with information provided by interviewees and from
published documents, along with photographs\textsuperscript{32}, to provide a fuller picture of each space and study area. Although using different types of data and method provided a degree of valuable ‘methodological triangulation’ (Guion, 2002), it is acknowledged that analysis required a degree of subjective judgement on the author’s part (raising questions about its replicability). The approach would ideally have been improved through ‘investigator triangulation’, with validity more firmly established through the concordance of findings arrived at by different evaluators (ibid).

**On-street survey of residents in Gateway area**

A short survey of 50 Gateway residents was conducted on Saturday 1 June 2013 between 11am and 5pm. All interviews were with pedestrians on Halsey Street, the area’s main retail thoroughfare. Loose quotas were set on age, gender and ethnicity to match aggregated demographic data from the 2010 US Census for the following tracts: Multnomah 80.1, Multnomah 81, and Multnomah 82.01. Table 4.9 compares the composition of the achieved sample with the quotas set. The very small number of pedestrians using Halsey Street (see observational findings in Chapter Six) meant that it was possible to invite every passer-by to participate.

The survey covered perceived problems with the local area, and awareness of GG. The questions asked were as follows (a copy of the questionnaire appears in Appendix E):

- Which two or three things would you most liked to see improved in the Gateway area? (unprompted)
- Are you aware of any local initiatives or schemes which aim to improve the area?
- (If ‘yes’): which are these?
- Have you heard of the Growing Gateway EcoDistrict initiative?

Gender, age and ethnicity were recorded (based on the author’s subjective judgement) but not asked. Respondents were given an information slip following the interview, which outlined the nature of the research (see Appendix F).

\textsuperscript{32} Except where otherwise stated, all photographs in this thesis were taken by the author.
Chapter Four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Census data* (%)</th>
<th>Quota bands for survey (n.)</th>
<th>Achieved interviews (n.)</th>
<th>Achieved interviews (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>23-27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>23-27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>70.0</td>
<td>33-37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>13-17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9: structure of achieved street interview sample compared with actual Gateway population profile

* Source: 2010 US Census (aggregated data from Multnomah 80.1, Multnomah 81, and Multnomah 82.01 tracts)

† for reasons of research ethics, under 18s were excluded from the survey and Census data used (in reality, under 18s represent 21.1% of the population)

** ‘White’ in the Census data was taken from the ‘white alone’ Census category.

Several methodological shortcomings should be acknowledged. First, Gateway’s domination by car use (and low pedestrian footfall – see Chapter Six) may mean the views of pedestrians alone are unrepresentative of typical local residents’ views. Second, elderly respondents were underrepresented in the sample, since very few were present in the interviewing location – perhaps confirming PoSI’s observation that “[w]alking can be particularly dangerous for the older adults in and around Gateway” (DistrictLab, 2010:19). Third, the validity of the results is also compromised by the small sample size (due to time and budget restrictions), and the use of only one sampling point. The findings are nevertheless included as broadly indicative if not scientifically representative of local opinion. The exercise also allowed the author to talk informally with a wide variety of local residents, thus enriching his understanding.
Because the author did not speak Korean, the exercise was not replicated in Sejong (in any case, the main goal of testing awareness of the local EcoDistrict was specific to the Portland case). Nevertheless, the author was concerned that speaking to such a large number of local residents in one case study only (during the formal interview itself and informal conversation afterwards in many cases) might lead to them having undue influence on his impressions of Gateway, when compared with those of Sejong. In the hope of compensating to some extent for any such possible ensuing imbalance, a larger number of residents were interviewed in the qualitative interviews in Sejong (as described earlier).
Chapter Five

Conceptualisations of the Public in Eco-City Documentation

In Chapter Three, it was argued that planning approaches which follow in the modernist tradition may necessarily mobilise a limited conceptualisation of the city as a public space. It was proposed that to develop more effective modes of governing for urban sustainability in future, we may need to understand better the relationship between eco-city plans and the real city in which they are causally implicated. To provide a basis for the exploration of this relationship in the remainder of the thesis, the current chapter examines a sample of documents which conceptualise different types of eco-cities, following the approach outlined in Chapter Four. The analysis aims to test the grounded assumption that:

\[ \text{in many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official documents related to the planning and description of eco-city initiatives.} \]

It is argued that a recognisably similar discursive ‘storyline’ is constructed across the sample of documents. This storyline is given coherence through the rhetorical use of metaphor, which produces particular types of narrative space. This constructed space, in line with the tendency within traditional modernist planning, excludes the city’s emergent public dimensions. These rhetorical mobilisations of space also have ideological effects in serving to ‘naturalise’ more specific underlying agendas. In at least some cases, these agendas appear to be aligned with wider trends related to what has been described as the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the city.

The chapter ends by considering some of the implications of these findings for the case studies of implemented eco-city initiatives in the following two chapters.
5.1 The Space of the Eco-City Storyline

Since, as discussed in Chapter Three, static texts can only ever represent space in particular ways, these documents were not read in the expectation that they would somehow contain ‘full’ descriptions of urban space. At the same time, the analysis did not close off the possibility ab initio that evidence would be found of the documents having escaped the modernist frame of traditional planning. The main aims were to identify more precisely the ways in which the public city may remain uncaptured, and the rhetorical means by which this partiality is obscured.

To this end, Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) ‘trialectic’ model of space – as discussed in Chapter Three – was used as a foil to highlight the partial, metaphorical nature of the space discursively constructed in the documents. To recap, Lefebvre’s model has three dimensions. First, ‘representations of space’, which relate to a socially flat, abstract notion of spatiality which he saw as dominant in contemporary (or ‘neo-capitalist’) society. Second, ‘spatial practice’, pertaining to the material perceived aspects of space. Spatial practice is here aligned with the peculiarity of ‘place’: the tangible qualities of space dynamically produced through and shaping social practices. Third, ‘representational space’, here interpreted as realised through the subjective interpretation of space by individuals, whereby a multiplicity of perspectives, claims and challenges emerge and in turn fashion space unpredictably. Representational space is therefore a radically open space of political contestation, and closely connected to the assemblage of emergent publicness in the city.

The argument develops the original concept of ‘traitjective space’ to describe the narrated reconstruction of representational space within eco-city documentation. Trajective space superficially mimics interactions between different actants in space, but denies the emergent dimensions of these interactions. It is not a political space produced through or giving rise to unpredictable interplay between heterogeneous opinions and interpretations. Rather, it is an imaginary space where a finite set of actants are ascribed particular motives and different degrees of agency within a singular and predetermined linear ‘plot’ acted out in space and over time.
In place of the potential for radical political heterogeneity between the various actants, trajective space is characterised by what Boundas (1996:21) calls “discrete differences” which describe “distinct entities”. In this simulated heterogeneity, differences are presented in terms of various identifiable ‘types of stakeholder’ or ‘demographic groups’ – with ‘the public’ or ‘the community’ often appearing as a univocal collectivity. While plans may not explicitly refute the possibility of dissent within such collectivity, the ontology of the storyline serves to delimit the variety, complexity and implications of such dissent – typically taking the need for, and possibility of, ‘consensus’ as its starting point; and this consensus is reductively equated with universal agreement. The rhetorical representation of the city’s ‘lived’ (Lefebvre, 1991) space in these trajective terms obscures the possibility that space might be shaped otherwise in future.

It is further suggested that discursive storylines in visions of urban sustainability tend to ‘set the scene’ through a conceptualisation of particular urban locations as ‘defensible space’. Certain types of fetishised (and typically nominalised) ‘threats’ to a bounded ‘place’ are identified, while a unanimous desire on the part of ‘the citizens’ to be defended from these is asserted. The ‘hero’ of the story (in the form, for example, of the city authorities, or a private developer) is therefore presented as acting in accordance with the wishes of ‘the community’ – facilitating the realisation of these wishes. Flowing logically from this portrayal of defensible space, a trajectory is envisaged in which various actants (presented as definable demographic and stakeholder groups, institutional authorities, and various technological aspects of the physical city) will develop the ‘plot’ in a particular fashion.

The goal of this predetermined trajectory, whose inevitability results from the characteristics of the defensible space, is the creation of a ‘utopian space’. This utopian space is a particular type of ‘representation of space’. It is an apparently mimetic description of the future (the illusion of transparency furthered by the visual diagrams with which it is typically accompanied – in the form of masterplans and architects’ impression), but which actually conceals a particular normative vision of a static, utopian, closed system, characterised as ‘sustainable’ in terms of harmony, peace and equity.
As a social space, this utopia is metaphorically flat, characterised by unrestricted flows and equality of access to its abundant resources. It contains no radical dissent or social exclusion; as a spatial outcome it is presented as the logical result of actions driven by consensus decisions, rather than derived from the public interplay of actants positioned differently in various hierarchies of power; in this sense it promotes a non-political – even fundamentally *non-urban* – vision of sustainability.

The characteristics of the spaces of the eco-city storyline are described in more detail in the next section. Table 5.1 summarises and contrasts these with Lefebvre’s model of social space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of space</th>
<th>Lefebvrian social space</th>
<th>Space as typically mobilised within discursive eco-city storylines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Place’</td>
<td>Spatial Practice (Perceived)</td>
<td>Defensible Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dynamically constituted by and constituting the interrelations and unpredictable interactions between multiple actants, but varyingly obdurate mundane, complex rhythms of everyday life as perceived by inhabitants</td>
<td>bounded locations with a singular ‘meaning’ which is determined by the author; ‘the local’ to be defended against the ‘Other’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicness</td>
<td>Representational Space (Lived)</td>
<td>Trajective Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the space produced by the interplay between heterogeneous subjective/discursive constructions of the significance and structures of spatial practice fluid, multiple, and open the space of political contestation and countercultural art potential for emergent publicness</td>
<td>the space produced by a singular, predetermined ‘plot’ in which a finite set of fetishised actants are ascribed particular motives and different degrees of agency human actants as definable groups (often demographically delineated, or spatialised as belonging to certain parts of the city) civic publicness only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat Space</td>
<td>Representations of Space (Conceived)</td>
<td>Utopian Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an intellectual construct of space as an ‘empty vessel’ allowing concrete forms and flows to be taxonomised (‘located’ and formally specified relative to one another) ‘bird’s eye’ representation, with emphasis on form and aesthetics</td>
<td>an apparently mimetic description of the future which conceals a normative vision of a static, utopian, closed system flat space of equity (and, in some cases, of an unfettered free market)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: summary of ideological mobilisations of space in eco-city documentation
'Place' as defensible space rather than spatial practice

The threat

A series of threats to the city in question (or to cities generally) are typically identified. These threats, usually emanating from ‘elsewhere’, constitute one of the key types of narrated actant. Greensburg, already flattened by a tornado, is further threatened by rising fuel prices, and the possible effects of climate change on agricultural capacity. Freiburg was historically imperilled by the oil crisis and planned imposition of a nuclear power plant on the region in the 1970s, and the effects of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Almere’s plans respond to the government’s decision to expand its population; Whitehill & Bordon’s threat similarly emanates from central government, in the shape of the Ministry of Defence’s decision to decommission the local army barracks: “when the army leaves there will be a dip in the local economy and a loss of jobs” (22), potentially exposing it to “piecemeal” (8) development, which has historically resulted in a lack of “adequate facilities and infrastructure” (20).

It is significant that, in many cases, these threats are nominalised. Through nominalisation, “a process is expressed as a noun, as if it were an entity”, and thus “causality is unspecified” (Fairclough, 1989:51). More formally, nominalisation is “a transformation which reduces a whole clause to its nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a noun” (Fowler et al., 1979:39, in Billig, 2008). Fowler sees this transformation as “inherently, potentially mystificatory” (Fowler, 1991:80): it is similar to passivisation in its effect of “(i) deleting agency; (ii) reifying; (iii) positing reified concepts as agents; and (iv) maintaining unequal power relations” when used in formal, scientific or technical language (Billig, 2008:785). Nominalisation and the passive voice “especially when used by official speakers/writers, len[d] themselves to ideological uses” (Billig, 2008:786). Thus, OECD paints a picture of ‘the global recession’ (8), ‘the global crisis’ (11), ‘climate change’ (8), ‘urbanisation rates’ (66), and risks of ‘coastal flooding’ (27). Sydney confronts “a host of challenges generated by external forces – from economic globalisation to climate change, from petrol price fluctuations to competition for enterprises and creative

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33 For an explanation of the referencing system used for the 12 documents, see Table 4.3
talent” (11). Eco2 Cities is concerned with “urbanization’s effects of climate change, pollution, congestion, and the rapid growth of cities” (xv); “an increasingly global context characterised by many new fluctuating, interlinked and uncontrollable variables” (1). Freiburg faced an “invasion” of motor cars (6). Portland points to “[g]lobal challenges like climate change, resource scarcity and urbanization threaten the stability of life in metropolitan regions” (2). The case of Sejong, as a greenfield development, is somewhat different. Here, it is Seoul which faces an external nominalised threat in the form of “excessive concentration in the capital” (8), causing various social problems and undermining national competitiveness. In Huaiabei’s case, a threat is identified, but it is an internal one related to its legacy of coal mining: the city is sinking, and its water supply has become contaminated.

The ‘threat’ is not always a key actant in the plot. It does not appear in Auroville – except perhaps in the urgency of the call to action: “Now that a critical mass has been achieved, the population is expected to expand rapidly” (1.6.4), and in the more general reflection that “Sri Aurobindo and the Mother have diagnosed the contemporary crisis of humanity as an evolutionary crisis” (Preface). In Valdespartera (perhaps since the document is not a ‘call to action’), defensible space generally is not strongly evoked – except possibly through the threats posed by the historic lack of affordable housing, and climate change, implied by references to the Kyoto protocol.

Place bounded by inherent meaning

The presence of an external threat evokes a sense of the city as a place with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. This boundedness is reinforced by the assumption that the place has (or can be given) a singular ‘meaning’ or ‘identity’. Almere therefore desires to “preserve and reinforce the original qualities” (2) of the city as it grows. Greensburg is proud of its “rural quality” (6), and postulates the existence of “common Kansas values” at “[t]he root of sustainability” (10). Huaiabei suggests that “[t]he first step in Eco-City Design is always to look, explore and listen deeply to the place” (2); the city is now “undertaking a powerful transformation, and one that embraces its history, its culture, its truth” (2). In contending that it will “find its unique artistic voice and its song will be beautiful” (29), Huaiabei presumes that this singular ‘voice’ exists, and can be found.
Huaibei explicitly aligns its inherent ‘identity’ with that which is ‘inside’: it has “defined urban growth boundaries” (6:9) in order to realise the “natural, cultural, creative and economic benefits of a Place” (6:9).

The value of identifying this ‘inherent meaning’ is also evident in Eco2 Cities’ aims to “emphasize the importance of the incorporation of the unique aspects of place” (3). For Freiburg, “[t]he protection of a city’s identity is a precondition for sustainable urban planning and development” (12) – ‘identity’ thereby being presented not only as singular and pre-existing, but also definable and preservable. Such assertions, paradoxically, may highlight the constructed nature of this meaning, in that it needs to be defined and fixed. Greensburg aims to take an “inventory of the cultural qualities that made the town special” (13). Sejong feels the need to establish a foundation to encourage “cultural protection and realizing a historic identity of the city” (30). Huaibei’s reason for “understand[ing] the inherent character” (17) of the city is to achieve “branding for Huaibei as a whole” (17) and thereby attract new residents. Each of Huaibei’s villages, similarly, “must be encouraged to have its own identity, famous for a particular spa, farm, park, hiking trail…food type of other unique service” (81). Portland hopes in each EcoDistrict that “branding for the community will be achieved” (14).

In such cases, ‘branding’ describes the external projection of an imposed meaning. The purpose of this projection is explicitly one of economic competitiveness. For OECD, the ‘place’ quality of cities is considered purely in economic terms; economic growth “does not occur in the abstract; it is a place-based phenomenon” (18). OECD’s discussion of the distinctive qualities of cities relates to their advantageous economic “agglomeration effects” (18) – advantages, however, which may be undermined by negative externalities including suburban sprawl, whose implications include traffic congestion, lower productivity, and health costs (20). Significantly, the city’s ‘placeness’ is thus constructed as threatened when its boundaries become porous.
Metaphors of rebirth

The case for defending this bounded, identifiable space is often reinforced through a secondary set of metaphors which relate to ‘rebirth’. This source domain may have a particular ability to “resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at the unconscious level” (Mio, 1997:130), given Furbey’s (1999) observation that the idea of ‘regeneration’ resonates with many religious and spiritual traditions as a “signifier of profound change” (Furbey, 1999:419). Lees (2003) discusses Furbey’s observation with reference to UK national urban policies, pointing to the conceptual interchangeability of ‘urban sustainability’ with ‘urban renaissance’ and ‘urban regeneration’ within these.

The ‘rebirth’ source domain is ‘extended’ (Semino, 2008) in the documents analysed here, such that images of ailing and recovering bodies, or related to springtime and regrowth, are mapped onto the target domain of the city. In Huaibei, even “technologies and service industries will blossom” (30). Sydney in particular has a focus on the ‘rebirth’ of open space. Currently, its “heart is congested, choking on the noise and fumes of the internal combustion engine” (15), and “[h]ealing Sydney’s scars” by reclaiming spaces for pedestrians (23) is a priority. The Western Distributor road currently “throttles Darling Harbour and cuts it off from the life blood of the City” (15), but “[f]reed from its constrictive bands, the City Centre will breathe again” (16). Whitehill & Bordon uses similar circulatory metaphors: “[t]he movement of people to, through, and within towns provides a life blood for successful and vibrant places” (108); it needs “a new town centre or ‘heart’” (78). Greensburg asserts that a “community is like an organism and all the parts must work together in order to sustain the City’s future” (3).

Almere’s central image extends the ‘rebirth’ source domain, while also drawing on the conventional conceptual metaphor ‘Life is a Journey’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980): the city is described as being on a ‘journey to adulthood’. It has the overall aim of “expanding to a mature city” (9), and the vision document “provides a sound basis for developing a mature, healthy and sustainable city” (2). The resonance of the repeated rebirth metaphor in the Huaibei document is reinforced through explicit reference to mythology: “Huaibei is...an erupting nascent consciousness...Huaibei awakens...”
Fenghuang, the mythical Phoenix, in union with the Dragon, thus rediscovering the potency of living in harmony, an Ecopolis in the making” (2). The concept of the ‘phoenix’ may also have been deliberately mapped onto the literal ‘ashes’ of the declining mining industry: Huaibei seeks to transform itself from a ‘Mining City’ into a “beautiful ‘Water City’” (27).

According to DeLanda (2006:8–9), the metaphorical description of social entities in terms of “bodily organs that work together for the organism as a whole” is centuries old, and problematically conceptualises wholes as possessing “an inextricable unity in which there is a strict reciprocal determination between parts”. In other words, it promotes a norm of a bounded whole dependent on harmonious interrelations. Tensions and conflicts, conversely, and disruptions due to networks of relations to elsewhere, are positioned as divergences from this norm rather than descriptive characteristics of city life. The ‘sick city’ (Söderström et al., 2014:315), is an example of the use of medical metaphor, which, according to Choay “articulates a discourse that expounds scientific intentions...with a set of utopian features” (Choay, 1997:261). The prescriptions of strategic planning more generally are often rhetorically justified through the metaphor of the sick city which needs to be healed (Gunder & Hillier, 2007). Utopian thinking has, since Thomas More’s Utopia, begun with a diagnosis of urban problems; against this ‘corrupt past’, a set of universally valid solutions is proposed. Such ‘utopian storytelling’ works to normalise particular models of society as “ideal and universally valid” and “constituted by rational spatial form” (Söderström et al., 2014:315).

**Publicness: trajective space rather than representational space**

*Time metaphorically constructed as linear space*

The label ‘trajective space’ is used here to describe the conceptualisation of change in city space as predictable rather than shaped by contestation. Most fundamentally, trajective space is constructed through metaphors presenting future time as a movement through space. ‘Time as space’ has been labelled a “globally systematic” conventional metaphor in the English language (Semino, 2008). Chilton suggests that “[p]olitical concepts involving leadership and political action” are often “conceptualised by
movement or journey metaphors”, such as “coming to a crossroads, moving ahead towards a better future, overcoming obstacles on the way, not deviating from its plans, and so forth” (Chilton, 2004:52). Sydney, for example, describes itself as “forward-looking” (10). Freiburg advocates “consistent planning as a unifying vision that refers back to the city’s past and projects forwards several decades” (27). Freiburg has “maintain[ed] its momentum to become an extremely liveable environment” (2), and Whitehill & Bordon will “build on the momentum developed through the masterplan engagement process” (135).

The force of these metaphors is to construct a singular, linear view of history; the ‘correct’ and inevitable path to the city’s future rebirth. Auroville tells of how “the entire area was identified as a backward area” (1.3.2); the development of the town has therefore allowed it to move ‘forwards’. (Mythological references here further reinforce this sense of inevitability, in the shape of the legend of Kaluveli Siddhar’s prophecy that “the region would become green and prosper some time in the future” (1.4.4).) In a more recent brochure, Sejong argues that “advanced” (MACCA, 2010a:6) countries are often characterised by successful decentralisation. Elsewhere, proposed interventions are located within a historical ‘grand narrative’. Sydney asserts that “just as the Industrial revolution transformed the world in the 19th century, a new revolution is set to transform the 21st century” (10). Freiburg presents the history of cities generally, marked by a shift from “agrarian life” during the industrial revolution, and followed by the ‘invasion’ of motor vehicles (6). Auroville is “a testing ground…for the next step in human evolution” (1.2.5).

Change as continuity

The notion of ‘continuity’ plays a central justificatory role in the construction of this trajectory, flowing logically from the idea that space has a particular ‘meaning’. Sejong pledges a “living historical environment” (37); Huaibei’s “renovated and renewed historic district around Shi Ban Je will articulate the distinctive character and history of Huaibei” (20), and “a special form of recycling that honors past, present and posterity” (29). Freiburg explicitly asserts “the importance of continuity” (5), without problematizing the question of what should be continued. For Almere, the desired path to the
future is partially justified by the metaphor of the city’s “path to adulthood” (2), as discussed above. Specific proposed spatial changes are explicitly framed as continuations of its history: “There is a good reason why we want to make this leap in scale. There is a fundamental coherent vision on...the existing city and the past, present and future” (8); “When it comes to the design of Almere, results achieved in the past and present will provide guarantees for the future” (11). HuaiBei uses the spatial metaphor of a river to illustrate the inevitable success of its proposals: “HuaiBei will be a beautiful “Water City” that, at its critical moment flowed with the Current of Change and moved gracefully into the future with the power of the entire River” (27).

Having thus communicated the inevitability of these projections, several of the documents include ‘timelines’ for action. Indicatively, these too are described in spatial terms in the cases of Portland’s “robust roadmap” (3) and Whitehill & Bordon’s “next steps” (126). HuaiBei feels able to end its masterplan with a series of detailed timelines, despite its earlier claim that analysis of the ‘place’ opened up “an infinite spectrum of potentialities” (2).

The role of ‘culture’

This ‘trajective’ perspective on the production of space is, then, fundamentally not one in which space is produced through (political) negotiation and dissent involving ongoing emergent publicness. Its production follows the path of a singular history and destiny (which often defines the ‘culture’ of the space), rather than the interaction between differently empowered actants. The idea of countercultural dissent is accordingly absent. Valdespartera comes closest to a Lefebvrian idea of representational space in this respect: it claims to privilege “a public urbanism, ownership of the urban space by the new residents, without which this venture would not only not make sense but the ecocity would be devoid of spirit” (10); “In constructing the ecocity, we paid attention as much to its physical construction...as to its social construction based on the concepts of appropriation, identification and the use of public space” (11). It even refers to Lefebvre (211), and one of the four chapters is entitled “Urban Rights”, possibly in a conscious echo of Lefebvre’s (1968) influential idea of the ‘Right to the City’. And yet these claims are not further developed in terms of cultural tensions; instead, the artistic
dimensions of the space are described in terms of open-air sculptures and a thematic emphasis on Spanish cinema: civic art provided by the establishment rather a source of resistance to it.

Instead, cultural activity serves two trajective purposes. The first of these subsumes this activity into the ‘creative industries’, which facilitate economic competitiveness. This is most clearly evident in the plans for Sydney:

“As cities all over the world are recognising the importance of the role of culture, what should Sydney do to secure a distinctive place as one of the world’s great cities in 2030? The creative aspect of the city will be fundamental to the prosperity of Sydney in 2030” (25)

“A city that fosters creative learning and involves artists at the core of its activities is a city that looks to the future. And who knows, by 2030, we may just have the edge over London” (25)

One comment in the Sydney document stands out as uniquely disconnected to the conceptualisation of artistic culture elsewhere in the text. A member of the public is quoted as wanting a Sydney which is “creative, edgy and gritty” (119). However, the reasons why ‘edginess’ and ‘grittiness’ might be desirable remain unexplored.

Second, cultural activity is often valued for its ‘improving’ qualities, or has a formal institutional presence (with no reference to it having an ‘underground’ existence). Sejong, for example, will “[d]evelop cultural environment which enriches and improves life” (12), with “dignified and abundant cultural facilities” (26), and “first-class cultural activities….museums, theatres and libraries” (26). For Huaibei, “[a] liveable city has quality culture (entertainment, speeches, arts, etc) and a high quality university” (12). The Sri Aurobinto Auditorium in Auroville offers “[w]orkshops and recitals of both traditional and modern dance, drama and music…cultural events based on community and environmental awareness programmes” (1.9.17). Whitehill & Bordon makes one claim which hints at the representational dimensions of the production of space: “Art and culture needs to have a prominent role in shaping the future regeneration of the town” (85) – and yet proposes that this need will be met in the form of a theatre, local history museum, and
a new ‘heritage centre’. Rather than being a source of productive tension, then, art is merely the source of well-being and harmony; in Auroville: “[a]rtistic beauty in all its forms, painting, sculpture, music, literature will be equally available to all” (1.2.3).

Key actants in the trajective plot

The key actants within the eco-city plot might be summarised as follows: on one side, the external threat (as discussed earlier); on the other, different forms of technology, and the ‘community’, the whole of which is comprised of different ‘stakeholder groups’, including the ‘leadership’ and ‘public’. This community in its totality, which will defeat the external threat as it forges the trajective space, is populated by various co-operative factions sharing a common ambition. Freiburg argues for “the creation of long-term partnerships between the community and the public and private sectors” (7), and that “[c]ommunities must work continuously on their collective vision” (28). In Huaibei, “we are all stakeholders and share a common goal for Huaibei’s success” (2). Portland defines its EcoDistricts fundamentally as “communities of shared interest” (6).

This conceptualisation illustrates Swyngedouw’s contention that much sustainability-related policy-making is characterised by “populist tactics” which “do not identify a privileged subject of change (like the proletariat for Marx, women for feminists...), but instead invoke...the need for common action, mutual collaboration and co-operation. There are no internal social tensions or generative internal conflicts” (Swyngedouw, 2011a:79). This populism normatively assumes a political process in which

“‘the people know best’ (although the latter category remains often empty, unnamed), supported by an assumedly neutral scientific technocracy, and it advocates a direct relationship between people and political participation. It is assumed that this will lead to a good, if not optimal solution” (ibid).

Simultaneously, this populist approach reinforces existing power structures; it “calls on the elites to undertake action such that nothing has to change” (Swyngedouw, 2011a:80). Accordingly, within the eco-city ‘community’, a special role is allotted to the elites – the city
authorities, for example, or the masterplanning team. These unquestioned representatives take their cue from, and enable collective action based on, the citizenry’s wishes. The Mayor of Portland has created a Sustainability Institute (with responsibility for developing the EcoDistrict programme) which “responds to growing public awareness and broad government and business engagement” (3). Sejong’s masterplan “has been established by collecting opinions from the nation” (7). For Freiburg, “[a] citywide concept, with principles of consensus, creates the proper environment within which all the participants in urban development can act with equal rights” (31). As saviours of the city, meanwhile, these actants are sometimes evaluated in a heroic light. In Whitehill & Bordon, “there is…a danger of decline and decay if the task of regeneration is not handled with skill and determination” (3). Almere claims to be following in the footsteps of its “first inhabitants – real pioneers” and “founding fathers” (2). Huaibei refers to the “wisdom of the Huaibei leadership” (2) generally, and in particular to Mayor Yu Chongxin “for his vision and commitment to the project…Persevering through project challenges, he offered clear instructions” (ii).

In guiding the community as a whole to its consensual goals, these ‘heroes’ will arm the community with various technologies to counter the external threat. These include, variously: specific green technology; transport and other infrastructure; urban design; the open spaces which result from urban design; and various regulatory and procedural ‘technologies of government’ (Rose, 1999:52; Rose, 2000). OECD includes a 17-page section (72-88) on possible ‘policy instruments’, and a 25-page section (47-71) outlining the economic, environmental, and social benefits which different technologies have brought to various cities. The primary agency given to technology here points towards a conceptualisation of the city which underemphasises the importance of the civitas, and may tend towards technological determinism – a risk identified by Joss et al. (2013) in their review of recent eco-city developments around the world.

The value of these technological interventions is reinforced further through the metaphorical mapping of various ‘model’ or ‘laboratory’ concepts onto the city. The function of narrative as a type of controlled experiment, as discussed in Chapter Four, is germane to
this particular mapping; the full complexity of the real-life context being suppressed for the purpose of the experiment. The possibility of ‘replicating’ the model elsewhere (whether for the general good of mankind, or for economic gain) is often invoked, with little discussion of the possibility that contingent place-specific factors may undermine its replication. Thus, Huaibei will be “a model of a livable, sustainable green city” (21). Freiburg is already “a model for cities and communities across the globe” (12); Auroville is “a good model for emulation in other towns and cities” (Foreword) and “a testing ground and laboratory for the next step in human evolution” (1.2.5). Almere is set to become a “national experimental laboratory in the area of sustainability” (8); Greensburg both a “Replicable Model” and a “laboratory for research on sustainable design and community development” (13); and Valdespartera “a grand scale laboratory to investigate and perfect models of construction which respect the environment” (13). The result is sometimes described as a ‘showcase’: Portland aims for its EcoDistricts to “showcase new strategies...Through their success, such projects can be replicated with less research, risk and hesitation” (12). Huaibei’s ‘Innovation Park’ areas will “provide a showcase to potential investors” (55), and its new Huajia Lake Eco-Community will “showcase proper land use, future-focused planning, environmental standards and provide sustainable education opportunities and training” (67), while a new Biomass Power Plant “showcases the commitment of Huaibei to a green and sustainable future” (80).

The eco-city storyline as archetypal plot

The notion of ‘threatened’ urban space is not peculiar to the eco-city storyline. Baeten (2007) points to a long tradition of urban dystopian imagination, emphasising “the possible environmental, economic and moral collapse of the city” (Baeten, 2007:54). Swyngedouw sees the construction of ‘apocalyptic’ external threats, including “globalization, non-competitiveness and uncontrolled immigration” (Swyngedouw, 2007:66), as symptomatically neoliberal, ‘post-political’ governance tactics; such threats include the ‘spectre of climate change’ which “presents a clear and present danger to civilization as we know it unless urgent and immediate remedial action is undertaken” (Swyngedouw, 2010:214). The eco-city thus reflects wider discursive trends in urban policy where a “threatening intruder, or more usually a group of intruders...have corrupted the
system” and “require dealing with if a new urbanity is to be attained” (ibid., p.67).

The ‘storyline’ underlying the eco-city discursive order therefore has wider resonance. Significantly, it would appear to be closely aligned with what Booker (2004) calls one of the seven ‘basic plots’ – indeed, he suggests that this may be the “most basic of all the plots” (Booker, 2004:219) around which narrative fiction is structured, and which he calls ‘Overcoming the Monster’:

“The essence of the ‘Overcoming the Monster’ story is simple. [We] are made aware of the existence of some superhuman embodiment of evil power. This monster…is always deadly, threatening destruction to those who cross its path or fall into its clutches. Often it is threatening an entire community or kingdom, even mankind and the world in general. But the monster also has in its clutches some great prize, a priceless treasure, or a beautiful ‘Princess’.

So powerful is the presence of this figure, so great the threat which emanates from it, that the only thing which matters to us as we follow the story is that it should be killed and its dark power overthrown” (Booker, 2004:23).

If eco-city documents resonate with this archetypal plot, the reader may be unsurprised to find that the threats they contain are sometimes given ‘monstrous’ qualities, or as unstoppable ‘forces of nature’: Freiburg suggests that the motor car needs to be “tamed” (17); Eco2 Cities aims to “absorb this powerful wave of urbanization” (1). The call to action is reinforced by a sense of urgency; the hero emerges ‘just in time’. The Eco2 Cities initiative “appears at a critical historical juncture” (xv), and “the correct time is now./It is in the urgent interest of helping cities systematically capture this value, while the window of opportunity is still open to them” (18). For OECD, “further delay is not an option” (13). Whitehill & Bordon has a “once-in-a-lifetime chance to ensure the sustainable regeneration of the town” (3). HuaiBei will flow with the “Current of Change” at its “critical moment” (27). Greensburg positions itself “on the precipice of a shift toward the recovery of small town vitality” (65). The role of technological actants in the eco-city storyline also has a correlate in the ‘Overcoming the Monster’ plot. Booker (2004) observes that the
monster’s final overthrow is typically achieved through the use of various ‘magic weapons’; the reader of a text structured by this plot therefore expects its resolution to include a strong technological element.

In Booker’s examples (ranging from the ancient Sumerian myth of *Gilgamesh*, and *Beowulf*, to the 1962 *Dr No* James Bond film), a human society – and often a particular settlement – is threatened by a mysterious external force disrupting its comfortable status quo. Out of the collectively threatened community, a hero arises to confront the distant evil, and thereby restores the settlement to a new status quo. Booker suggests that any story which can “make such a leap across the whole of recorded human history must have some profound symbolic significance in the inner life of mankind” (Booker, 2004:22). There are grounds, then, to suspect that narratives structured around this plot have persuasive potential independent of their ability to describe external reality.

*The consensual public*

Distinctions between different groups of ‘stakeholder groups’ (the ‘people’ and others), and between factions or individuals within each group, are eroded through the use of collective terms such as ‘the people’ and ‘the community’, portrayed as able to speak and think collectively. Thus, we read, for example, that “the community is proud of the rural quality of Greensburg” (6), while “[t]he people of Huaibei have made a commitment to sustainable development” (ii). OECD even implies a global singular public opinion in asserting that “people understand that these challenges must be overcome if we are to reach our environmental, social and economic goals” (92). Auroville posits the need for development guidelines, so as to “encourage development without violating the principles of planning for the common good” (3.1); it assumes that a singular ‘common good’ exists and can be defined through these guidelines.

These singular opinions and ambitions are presented as having been revealed through various *deliberative* processes. Theorists advocating deliberation draw on Habermas’ notions of ‘communicative rationality’, in opposition to the self-interested ‘instrumental rationality’ encouraged by liberal democratic institutions, to promote the development of institutionalised
procedures which create the conditions for “rational argumentation and intersubjective understanding, not coercion or domination” as the “basis for decision-making” (Purcell, 2008:46). The general rise of deliberative theory since the 1990s (Dryzek, 2000) has been reflected in urban planning more specifically, within the shift towards ‘communicative’ or ‘collaborative’ governance approaches (Purcell, 2008) outlined in Chapter One. Positioned against liberal democracy, deliberative democracy clearly has an emphatic ‘public’ aspect, in that it advocates accountable, visible, intersubjective debate. Conversely, the individual’s right to express opinions in private, with ‘public opinion’ understood as the ‘aggregation’ of privately expressed voting preferences, is not thought a sufficient condition for effective or legitimate democratic practice (Cohen, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004).

However, the ‘publicness’ of deliberative approaches has been criticised by agonistic theorists as a politically circumscribed one. According to Haug and Teune (2008:12) scholars characterise deliberative debate essentially in terms of “cooperative behaviour”: “consensus, the common good/common ground, constructiveness and (willingness for a) transformation of preferences” (ibid). To position this common denominator as a normative presupposition, they contrast it with the importance placed by agonistic critics on “the importance of struggle and competition between different political positions” (ibid). From an agonistic perspective, then, “a cooperative discourse always implies an a priori consensus amongst the participants which limits the scope of positions to be debated in the discussion, thus excluding certain political actors and their opinions” (ibid). The agonistic perspective, conversely, “does not dream of mastering, or eliminating undecidability, for it realises that it is the very condition of possibility of decision and therefore of freedom and pluralism” (Mouffe, 2000:34). Relatedly, Sørensen (2014:152) suggests that governance theory and planning theory “share a tendency to overlook the role of conflicts in coordination processes or view them as a disruptive force that must be mollified or neutralized”; “[i]n effect, little attention has been given to the productive role of conflicts in promoting coordination” (ibid:154). Such concerns appear only to have grown over time among planning theorists, such that the notion of ‘postpolitics’ in planning, with particular reference to participatory approaches, has become a
“generic shorthand for our understanding…in the sense that there is not much room for divergent or radically different things to happen” (Bylund, 2012:322).

No conclusions are drawn here about the relative merits of an aggregative, deliberative, agonistic, or any other particular approach to democratic decision making. Indeed, the construction of categories such as ‘agonistic’ and ‘deliberative’ itself serves to obscure differences within each category, and theoretical developments within these over time. Deliberative thinkers, for example, have sought to address agonistic criticisms directly; Dryzek (2000) thus promotes what he calls a ‘discursive’ version of deliberative democracy, which aims to be “pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference” (3). Instead, two simple observations are made. First, insofar as the category of ‘deliberation’ has analytical value, it indicates a particular, and historically contingent, set of tendencies in the conceptualisation the process of decision-making. Second, that the simple assertion of inclusive deliberation should not necessarily be equated with an ideal implementational outcome, either on its own terms or on those of its critics. We should therefore be suspicious of its unqualified presentation as an approach which will self-evidently produce a transparent reflection of ‘public opinion’.

In this sense, an agonistic perspective is useful as a foil to an unquestioned consensus-based approach; in postulating the limits of deliberation, it facilitates the possibility that its promotion actually serves a particular agenda. With regard to the exclusion of the public, the notion of ‘post-political’ social ordering is of relevance in this respect. For Swyngedouw, the conceptualisation of a “consensual and apparently inclusive order – since it only contains those who have voice, who are counted, and named” is fundamental to the “post-political condition” (Swyngedouw, 2007:64). From the post-political perspective, “conflicts of interest and opinion” (ibid) are acknowledged, but can be reconciled by “assumedly neutral scientific” (ibid:67) technocratic means. Stavrakakis similarly points to an underlying assumption that “‘technocratic’ solutions are able to calm every crisis, resolve in an impartial manner every antagonism, satisfy all social grievances and abort political explosions” (Stavrakakis, 2007:144). Thus, the post-political approach “involves a
significant *repression* through its attempt to reduce every moment of radical heterogeneity to a technical/administrative issue that the power/knowledge apparatus should be able to resolve and neutralize” (Stavrakakis, 2007:148).

The deliberative governance orientation within eco-city plans, then, may not embrace emergent publicness so much as draw on post-political discursive norms. The possible exclusionary effects of deliberation, at least, are almost entirely invisible within the documents consulted here. Since processes of consultation are presented as fully inclusive, the consensus achieved is equated with a singularity of opinion within the community in its entirety. Portland claims that “[a]ll Portlanders and communities fully participate in and influence decision-making” (4); in its summary brochure, Whitehill & Bordon quotes the independent chairman of the Delivery Board as saying “[t]his is the most inclusive governance structure I have ever seen” (Whitehill & Bordon Eco-town, 2012:33). In Sejong, “great effort has been put to collect broad extent of opinions from every sector of society” (7); Freiburg mandates that “all parts of a city’s population must be invited to participate, cooperate and engage through appropriate modes of communication” (28). Valdespartera’s progress was founded on unanimous agreement “across the political spectrum, local unions, employers and neighbourhood associations” (11): “this spirit is always desirable for stability and success in large urban projects” (11). The City of Sydney’s consultation exercise was “the most extensive in the City of Sydney’s history” (197), such that “[p]eople from all walks of life, across generations and an extensive range of organisations have given ideas and suggestions to inform the Vision” (13).

Where differences within this body of people are acknowledged, they are conceived in terms of various definable demographic groups - tending in this sense towards Boundas’ concept of ‘discrete differences’ describing “distinct entities” (Boundas, 1996:21), rather than radical heterogeneity. Thus, Whitehill & Bordon refers to representatives of different ‘faith communities’ with whom “discussions were held” during the consultation process (86). Sejong will create “housing supply to meet demands from different classes” (16). Sydney “is made up of diverse communities, with diverse lifestyles, interests and needs” (100), including “the City’s worker,
student and visitor communities” (96), and it is necessary to recognise “minority group needs” (103). Sydney is not alone in overlaying spatiality onto this notion of discrete difference: “the city is made up of a ‘City of Villages’ of different character” (100); just as Auroville’s description of 96 ‘communities’ relates to their spatial differentiation (1.5.3b), and elsewhere analyses the make-up of its population demographically (1.6). Within Eco2 Cities’ “bottom up” ‘City-Based Approach’, the basic building blocks are “particular neighbourhoods” (45) – in other words, spatially bounded collectivities.

Any differences between these ‘distinct entities’ are not a source of ongoing, open-ended productive or destructive tension, so much as temporary problems to be resolved deliberatively in the process of reaching the desired consensus. For Auroville, diversity is even subsumed within unity: the city is “a unique example of the manifestation of human unity in diversity” (foreword). Although Frieburg urges the “encouragement of cultural diversity and distinctiveness” (7), its overriding desire is the “integration of all strands of society irrespective of ethnicity, gender or age” (11). Eco2 Cities warns of “the tendency for all stakeholders to act in their own immediate interests”, which is a “barrier to the potential for positive synergies and optimum solutions” (34).

Differences, then, are presented as inevitably resolvable, rather than as a source of creative tension as Lefebvre’s notion of representational space envisages. Social cohesion is forged out of a marriage of these differences; it is constituted by them unidirectionally. Thus, Auroville’s ‘Residents Assembly’ merely serves “the purpose of cohesion integration [sic] of Auroville” (1.10.3). Eco2 Cities valorises networks of social capital within the public, which “support an efficient and cohesive society” through “social and intellectual interactions” (95): while entertaining the positive implications of ‘interaction’, the emphasis here is on the possible ‘cohesion’ which will result. Greensburg reflects that “[o]f course there were differing opinions and life-perspectives on many issues, but often the disagreements and challenges lifted the dialogue to a more thorough evaluation” (6). Almere mobilises ‘diversity’ as a means to flatten out (spatialised) differences: “[v]arious districts of the current adolescent city are still imbalanced, both in types of
dwelling, urban amenities, natural resources, population composition and employment. In expanding towards a more mature city, the ecological, social and economic diversity must increase” (9).

Syntactically, the public is often assigned a passive role in this trajective space. This is again achieved through nominalisation – the nominalisations themselves often being the passive objects of verbs. The subjects of these verbs may be the ‘leadership’ or different types of technology. Greensburg suggests that “[h]ousing design affects community interaction and walkability” (103). In Almere, “a wide range of living and working milieus will be built” (21). Individuals may, furthermore, be functionally, or even biologically, represented, such that they form part of a systemic whole. Sydney envisages a “City that is attractive for pedestrian movement and cycling” (90). Sejong’s more recent brochure claims to reflect the idea that “going forward a more human-oriented and environment-friendly city is widely sought and desired by people around the globe” (MACCA, 2010a:2). (Here – as was the case for OECD, as noted earlier – the global public appears as a singularity.) A similar effect is achieved through the use of the expression ‘human-oriented technology’ (MACCA, 2010a:22). People appear only as ‘customers’ in Eco2 Cities’ diagram demonstrating the value of ‘layered maps’ (8); these layers represent the ‘real world’, ‘land use’, ‘elevation’, ‘parcels’, ‘streets’, and ‘customers’.

The passivity of this constructed public is further emphasised in various assertions of their need to be educated – an assertion which, paradoxically, undermines the storyline by revealing that the authorities are in fact influencing public opinion and behaviour in certain directions, rather than merely ‘responding’ to it. Whitehill & Bordon feels the need to “encourage uptake of allotments and healthy food choices” (44). In Portland, research will be used to identify “how to influence human behavioural change” (13), while “[e]ngagement of the community through civic events” (13) is planned. Auroville operates “community and environmental awareness programmes” (1.9.17). OECD advocates policies to “encourage eco-innovation” (46). Eco2 Cities’ approach works to “assess and reward the performance of all stakeholders” (5); it recommends “conduct[ing] a fluency campaign” to help decision makers (50) speak a common language. This is explained elsewhere
through the assertion that “many local decision makers operate under a series of myths and false assumptions” (30), which need correcting.

**Utopian space: the ‘sustainable’ goal**

What is here termed the ‘utopian’ space at the end of the trajectory has three key characteristics. First, it tends towards visualised and ‘bird’s eye’ presentations of space. Second, it contains surface markers which explicitly mark it out as a location of timeless abundance. Third, it is metaphorically flat. These three characteristics are dealt with in turn below.

**Utopian space as visual space**

Of ‘utopian’ space’s three characteristics, its ‘visual’ ones are most easily illustrated with reference to the presence of masterplan diagrams and aerial photographs in the documents. References to ‘landscape’ similarly point to a ‘bird’s eye’ perspective: Sejong will be a “cityscape where nature and artifacts are in harmony” (12); Huaibei will be developed “in accordance with the natural landscape” (20); in Greensburg, a “streetscape with [various features] will provide a welcome atmosphere for pedestrians” (33). Indicatively, pedestrians are noticeably absent from the architect’s impression of Greensburg’s ‘downtown streetscape’ (43) (Figure 5.1).

![Figure 5.1: architect’s impressions of Greensburg’s ‘downtown streetscape’](image)
Space is aestheticised in other more subtle ways. In Almere, for example, “[t]he view of [the lake of] Ijmeer and Amsterdam” will lend a “metropolitan aura” (29) to a planned new district – the ‘metropolitan’ thus being defined in visual terms. For Sydney, the cosmopolitanism of Newtown is a useful asset in its “role as a regional attraction” (100); this cosmopolitanism is not, then, considered as a spatially productive source of unpredictable social or political tension – rather, as an aesthetic quality which appeals to the outsider.

Utopian space as abundance

The ‘abundance’ which the space yields for its inhabitants is variously described in terms of health, safety, riches, employment, and recreational opportunities. Almere will be “liveable and healthy…a vital community with a wide diversity of living and working possibilities, in a salutary abundance of space, water, nature and cultural landscapes” (8); Sejong will be “a welcoming environment, abundant green land” (13), and provide “health care to ensure the quality of life” (9:26); Portland a “Healthy Connected City” (14); Whitehill & Bordon will “ensure people have opportunities to interact with nature, encourage recreation, sports and healthier lifestyles” (37). This abundance is only ever portrayed as inclusive: Freiburg’s open spaces are safe because they “attract a broad variety and age-range of people” (10); in Huaibei, “neighbourhoods will appeal to every person young and old” (4); Sejong will provide “a foundation for culture and welfare open to all” (27). Unqualified positive descriptors reinforce this universally accessible abundance. For example, Almere’s residents will lead “pleasant lives” (8); Huaibei will enable “the good life for all” (6:4); Sejong will be “the beautiful and the clean” (25). There is little discussion, finally, of this agreeable stasis ever being interrupted by ongoing or unpredictable threats and changes. Thus, for example, OECD’s recommendations will “ensur[e] high quality of life over the long run” (28); Sejong will be “a safe city prepared for disasters” (12); and Auroville is “a place of…a youth that never ages” (1.2.7).

Utopian space as flat space

The third quality of this utopian space – its flatness – is rhetorically constructed in various ways. First, as a social and functional space, it
contains no distortions, contradictions, instabilities or tensions: rather, it is defined using words such as ‘balance’, ‘integration’, ‘synthesis’ and ‘harmony’. Almere will constitute a “synthesis of ecological, social, economic and spatial strategy” (3). Auroville will be “a place of peace, concord and harmony…where all human beings of goodwill…could live freely…obeying one single authority, that of the supreme Truth” (I.2.1). Freiburg’s ‘charter’ aims at “the assurance of social harmony” (7), with a “balance of people and uses” (10), and a “balanced age and social profile within functioning neighbourhoods” (11); population growth will occur in Huaibei, but in a “balanced” way (21), with the city embracing “the potency of living in harmony” (2). Notions of ‘completeness’ and ‘integration’ further this sense of harmonic unity: on becoming a “sustainable” city, Almere will also be “complete” (7); Eco2 Cities advocates a “one-system approach that enables cities to realize the benefits of integration by planning, designing and managing the whole urban system” (xviii); Portland will create “complete and vibrant neighbourhood centres” (14); Freiburg’s ‘City of the Future’ is one of “social and functional integration” (10).

The goal of infinite accessibility is explicitly expressed, in Sydney’s intention, for example, to “ensur[e] equitable distribution and access to social infrastructure” (100), and in Sejong’s promise to “make the administrative buildings highly accessible, friendly and open to the citizens” (19). Accordingly, metaphors related to the levelling of impediments and the filling of holes are mapped onto the trajectory leading to the utopian destination; the resulting space will be one of unhindered interconnections and unimpeded flow. Thus, OECD portrays problems with existing networks as ‘gaps’ which “impede policy or programmatic activity” and therefore need to be “bridged” (94). The ideal is a city free of “institutional, regulatory and financing resource barriers” (9). OECD points to the need to create horizontal and transnational networks of governance in addition to integrating governance vertically (93). In idealising decentralisation (12), Freiburg’s implicitly positions hierarchy as a vertical ‘barrier’. Sejong will overcome the socio-economic “gaps between regions obstacles [sic] in national development” (MCT, 2006:15). For Almere “the mutual reaction between region and Almere can only take place via optimum connections” (18). Relatedly, the source domain of ‘fabric’ is metaphorically mapped onto the city to evoke an uninterrupted
surface. Almere aims “to interlace more and more with the social and cultural structures of the [Randstad] metropolis” (16). Eco2 Cities promotes an “action-oriented approach that knits together cities, their senior or national governments, and their supporters at all levels” (44). So as to “link” its cultural landmarks, Sydney will create a harbourside walking trail, which it describes as a “Cultural Ribbon” (156); Huaibei’s plan “seamlessly integrates residential, commercial, park and recreation” (62).

This flatness extends beyond the city itself; the possibility of an external threat is neutralised by the erosion of an inside-outside distinction. Thus, Sejong aims for “functional interconnection within the metropolitan area” (34); Almere will become “physically, socially and economically embedded in the surrounding area” (19); for OECD, “cities and regions would function in a collaborative network with other institutions and actors” (14); and Eco2 Cities prescribes “[c]ollaboration at the scale of the entire urban area or region” (4). The dichotomy between (externally threatening) ‘nature’ and the city is similarly erased by collapsing the distinctions between the two in the spatial vision. Auroville is “a human settlement in harmony with nature” (1.4.5); Sejong will exhibit “lively urban space in harmony with beautiful scenery” (22); for Almere, “the city and its environs” are “a single unit” (37); Huaibei will achieve “the integration of farming, industry and tourism” (77). Simultaneously, the natural world will be brought into the city space. Eco2 Cities endorses the idea of “nature integrated into a city” (44); Sydney promotes ‘green networks’; Huaibei will be a “living urban garden” (30) where “agriculture will infuse the city” (30); in Whitehill & Bordon “[t]he countryside is brought into the town” (102). Even the threatening characteristics of the night (which might elsewhere be understood as a temporal interruption to this utopian space) are sometimes countered by an erosion of the distinction between the two. Sejong will “supply high-density residential land united with commercial and operational functions to maintain vitality at night”. Freiburg will ensure ‘safety’ by making key locations “active throughout the day and late into the evening” (10).

This eco-city space is reminiscent of Stavrakakis’ characterisation of a ‘neoliberal’ urban ideal of “utopia, order and flow of consumerist enjoyment” (Stavrakakis, 2007:145), where “all the
divisions are bridged at last, all the traumas healed: city/country, labor/leisure, capitalism/activism” (Stavrakakis, 2007:146). Stavrakakis sees this “holistic ideal of fun and enjoyment” as problematic:

“isn’t something missing from all that? Where is decision, pluralism, the choice between real alternatives, power, antagonism? Can it really be taken for granted that business and recreation, labor and leisure are so easily compatible? For how many of us and who exactly? How? Is it really so obvious that the ‘tribes of the city’ will coexist harmoniously, that their priorities and orientations are compatible? Do all of them have the same access to this appealing utopia? Is there no exclusion?” (Stavrakakis, 2007:146)

For Stavrakakis, this utopianism functions in what Barthes (2007) calls a ‘mythological’ way: “not as something that ‘hides’ reality, but as something that ‘depoliticizes’ it” (Stavrakakis, 2007:145). If Stavrakakis is right to identify a broader policy discourse of the city whose ontology excludes the possibility of politics and the generative potential of social conflict, then this would seem to be reproduced in the mainstream conceptualisation of the eco-city more specifically.

5.2 The Open Spaces of Utopia

Utopian space is closely aligned with Lefebvre’s ‘representations of space’ in its limited conceptualisation of the social dimensions of space. It is imagined on the basis both of an initial diagnosis which, in framing space as ‘defensible’, ignores the role of spatial practice in its production, and of an ensuing prescription of trajective space, which ignores the emergent public life of the city. It would be surprising, then, if this spatial storyline was disrupted by a more rounded normative presentation of the publicness of open spaces. While the open spaces of the city are not mentioned at all in the OECD framework, they do play a significant role in most of the other cases studied here – yet their publicness is never defined as socially produced; the public is imagined as civically complying with the intended use of the space; its character is not to be assembled through emergent publicness.
In some cases, the emphasis placed on formal, aesthetic qualities clearly draws on the visual aspects of ‘representations of space’. Hence, Whitehill & Bordon will include “attractive” public space (7); Huaibei prescribes “high quality public spaces and public parks” (4); for Freiburg, ‘public spaces’ “form the public face of a city” (24). Sydney envisages (93) “vibrant public space” but this, along with “an inviting streetscape”, is valorised as a means of maintaining the city’s “international iconic status”. When Sydney suggests that “[t]here is room, too, for great public art” (16), this is not a countercultural conception of art, so much as one imposed by institutional decisions onto the ‘streetscape’.

Elsewhere, other instrumental benefits are emphasised. Open spaces serve an ecological purpose for Eco2 Cities: ‘pedestrian pathways’ will keep the city cool and absorb rainwater (71), while increasing “physical and mental well-being” (37). Often, they are locations of leisure and healthy exercise: Sejong’s citizens can “come to enjoy the massive green space” (11); Whitehill & Bordon emphasises “[t]he potential for these spaces to provide a number of different services involving health, sport, art and culture” (46). Their benefits are often described in terms of ‘liveability’: in Freiburg, for example, “a great variety of liveable public spaces everywhere in the city has been achieved” (14). The word ‘liveable’ implies that such spaces exist prior to the public that may ‘live’ in them.

Potential economic or place-marketing benefits are also often highlighted. In Huaibei, a “new Water Park City, of Disneyland quality…will provide crowd pleasing entertainment designed for high densities of people” (76) and communicate environmental educational messages “granting it a unique branding as resounding and sustaining as Disney” (76). Whitehill & Bordon’s green spaces were “highly regarded” by participants of the consultation process and will therefore become a key “selling point” for the city (31). For Sydney, the “liveability of the City Centre is of critical importance to achieving the future economic growth targets of the Metropolitan Plan for Sydney and the Sustainable Sydney 2030 Vision” (40).

Most typically, the role of open spaces as key arenas where public life may develop is hinted at; accordingly, they are typically referred
to as ‘public spaces’. Huaibei’s downtown, for example, will be a “second living room and gathering place for people from the region” (4); it contends that “[l]ivable cities are reflected in the street life as created by the people who live, work and visit an area” (ibid). And yet, in place of complex ‘representational space’, or ‘spatial practice’ we find utopian notions of ‘cohesion’ and ‘community’ being created by this space; they result from it – and in this sense, this space is given agency as a technological narrative actant. Thus, for Greensburg, “[c]ommunity is created when people can meet up and relate to each other in public spaces” (37). In the Eco2 Cities scheme, ‘city green areas’ are “a source of community” (37). In Greensburg, “[g]reat park and open space networks enrich the activities of everyday life” (128). Auroville’s communal ‘Matrimandir’ is the “spiritual and physical centre of Auroville” (1.5.6), its development reflecting the “increasing perfection of Auroville as a whole” (1.9.19). Freiburg asserts that: “All users of public space must respect the activities of others” (14); the possibility of disrespect, of social tension, is thereby constructed as ‘out of place’ in these spaces. The publicness envisioned as assembling in these spaces is exclusively civic in its modality.

The open spaces of the city, then, are given primary agency as actants in the realisation of this utopia: they produce community. Their nature as places produced by the public life of the city remain undiscussed. Sydney, for example, claims to recognise the “role of streets, parks and squares in public life” (15), asking us to “watch what will happen” as a result of its central thoroughfare being closed to vehicles: “[t]here will be human life along the whole length of it” (16). Even Valdespartera, with its claimed focus – as noted earlier – on the ‘social construction’ of the city, and the public ‘appropriation’ of space, open spaces are considered in terms of their “quality” as sites of “basic neighbourly relations, cooperation, civic participation; in other words, social cohesion fostered by their spatial configuration, in terms of density, shape and multifunctionality” (143). The leisure, amenity and art facilitated by these spaces will “strengthen the identity of the new neighbourhood and generate an urban culture” (298). Thus, despite the professed concern to “consolidate [Valdespartera’s] urbanity” (6), this urbanity is understood as a type of social cohesion generated by the formal aspects of its space, rather than as a space produced by its public life.
5.3 Conclusions

The tripartite conceptualisation of the city’s space, then, is constructed through a complex system of metaphorical mappings, which collectively work to provide an apparent explanation of the current and future characteristics of this space. In highlighting certain aspects of the space, however, they conceal others. This is a rhetorical strategy, empowered by the resonance of the storyline with an archetypal plot, which works ideologically to reinforce a call for action.

Since the documents consulted here constitute a cross-section of international eco-city conceptualisations, reflecting the variety of the phenomenon if not statistically representing its substance, and including a variety of textual types, there is a strong suggestion that the storyline identified underlies the eco-city order of discourse as a whole. It is unsurprising that this storyline is not consistently realised in every document, since the coherency of the eco-city order of social practice, as discussed in Chapter Two, is definable only in terms of tendencies rather than absolute criteria. However, the similarities across all 12 documents, in terms both of the storyline, and of the rhetorical means of its construction, are more striking than their inconsistencies.

This partiality of the storyline’s ontology is revealed when its three spatial dimensions are compared with a model of space such as Lefebvre’s. Instead of socially produced dynamic ‘place’, we find bounded ‘defensible space’; instead of politically contested and multiple ‘representational space’, we encounter linear trajective space shaped by various narrative actants in predetermined, collaborative ways. The utopian space of the storyline’s destination has similarities with Lefebvre’s ‘representations of space’ – a conceptualisation of space characteristic of modernity and which, in terms of the concerns of this thesis, has the effect of obscuring the emergent public modality of urban space.

Implications for case study research

The implications of these conclusions for research into implemented eco-city initiatives are discussed below, with reference to the two questions guiding the analysis in the following two chapters.
1. **How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its conceptualisation in official documentation?**

From one perspective, the charge that planning documents and policies fail to account for unpredictable emergent publicness may be misdirected. It may be the case that consistency and singularity of purpose are necessary conditions for a ‘call to action’. Accordingly, planning will necessarily aim to bridge rather than stimulate or emphasise differences:

“[in] striving to affect reconciliation, the planner must perforce resort to the potentiality for harmonious balance in society. And it is on this fundamental notion of social harmony that the ideology of planning is built”

(Harvey, 1985:176).

In positioning planning for unpredictable multiplicity as essentially oxymoronic, this perspective highlights the ‘problem of planning’ identified in Chapter One. Simultaneously, however, it need not imply that its resolution through alternative approaches is impossible in future. Allmendinger comments that while the planning system in Britain continues to aspire to be ‘apolitical’ and professional, it

“has not tackled the root causes of urban problems because it was never meant to…Planning exists to help the market and support capitalism, not challenge and supplant it…The whole apparatus of planning was built around the notion of a benevolent elite working towards common goals”

(Allmendinger, 2001:1–2).

While the “current favoured paradigm, collaborative planning, is based on a revised modernist notion of consensus” (*ibid*:4), it may not be an inevitable one. Indeed, planning has survived as a profession precisely because it has remained “flexible and amorphous” (*ibid*:4).

As noted in Chapter One, planning *theory* at least has shifted in the direction of relativism, in rejection of the modernist ideal of objective description and scientific prescription. Truths mattering for the purpose of action are now theorised as arising pragmatically from contextually embedded constructions of reality (Harrison, 2014). And
‘postmodern’ normative theorists have explicitly called for alternative approaches which attempt to embrace more fully the pluralities of urban life. Postmodern planning theorists emphasise

“decentralised, plural, community-led, fluid and reflective thinking which has a number of implications not only on planning but also on such issues as voting, community identification, freedom of information and, fundamentally, whether we need a planning system at all”
(Allmendinger, 2001:228).

Friedman, for example, argues for a decentred ‘Non-Euclidean Mode of Planning’ which “operates in real time by linking knowledge and action into a tightly looped process” (Friedmann, 1993:484) rather than being exclusively concerned with an “imagined future” (ibid:482). In order to escape the ‘dead-end’ of the “dualism erected between urban representations and the ‘real city’”, Shields proposes “multi-dimensional analyses which, rather than imposing monological coherence and closure, allow parallel and conflicting representations to coexist in analysis” (Shields, 1996:245). Without claiming to foresee the types of ‘knowledge technology’ through which planning will be implemented in future, Richards (1991:8) rejects ‘rationalistic’ or consensus-oriented processes, since “conflict and disagreement are essential to the continuously creative dynamics of the dialogic process”; the aim would be that “desirable systems emerge, where desirability is itself in continual flux”.

Elsewhere, however, criticism has been levelled at planning and architecture theorists who “advance an extreme ‘postmodernist’ position of epistemological relativism” (Taylor, 1998:165). Allmendinger remains sceptical of relativistic approaches to planning, since planning is fundamentally “about closure – there can only be one decision about whether a development can proceed” (Allmendinger, 2002:180). Taylor distinguishes the goal of ‘comprehensiveness’ in planning, which experience has shown to be “undesirable and unrealistic”, from the “pursuit of rationality” (ibid), without which plans cannot be made; advocating the envisionment of planning styles which are rational and yet proceed in “more piecemeal, incremental and ‘organic’ ways” (ibid). Bridge (2005) is similarly troubled by postmodern planning’s “endless openness” (146) and therefore promotes a form of ‘planning as argumentation’ grounded in “situational specific socio-spatial contexts” (145). He
promotes this as a ‘post-postmodern’ means of approaching change. This ‘dissensus’-based planning would still aim to provide outcomes leading to change, but assumes that change is normally ongoing and unpredictable, resulting from the accommodation of differences through situated argumentation, rather than from universal agreement achieved through rational discussion. This represents a shift of emphasis away from “bringing enquiry to a close” towards “exploring the dimensions of oppositions” (143); decisions about action, he suggests, should emerge from within the process of continually ‘expanding enquiry’ through agonistic communication, rather than only be seen as valid once the goal of progressively “narrowing down of argument to truth or agreement” (144) has been achieved.

Bridge is therefore advocating a pragmatic, incremental, situated philosophy of planning. However, leaving aside the question of implementability, his interest here relates to the processes of decision-making rather than to the plans resulting from these. He explicitly dodges the problematic possibility that the plan itself will always constitute an act of ideological closure, however arrived at. From this perspective, it might be argued that a plan’s failure to depict polyphony might instead be seen as a success on its own terms. This ‘failure’, moreover, does not exclude the possibility that a pluralist, emergent public life will assemble itself in the actual performance of the city. This possibility presents a less pessimistic perspective on the ability of contemporary mainstream plans to deliver truly urban development, yet it still fails to guarantee the environmental, social, and economic sustainability of what will result.

Official documents in themselves may therefore be poor guides to the ‘publicness’ of the eco-city. Holston (1989) describes the unexpected uses of the planned modernist space of Brasilia by its inhabitants. Bridge (2005:129) sees Holston’s study as an example of how the ‘abstractions’ evident in certain modes of planning can be “at odds with the lifeworld orientations of ordinary residents and also how space can, in some small degree, be reappropriated by those without power”. The reappropriation of space as it is ‘performed’, moreover, may not only relate to its post-implementational publicness; it may also describe the results of institutional and commercial tensions during the process of
implementation. Shwayri’s (2013) recent study describes the ‘Koreanization’ of Songdo, an eco-city under construction in Korea. While Songdo was originally designed to attract international residents, with “visual attributes of familiar western models” (49), its “implementation has been bogged down repeatedly by local politics, and regional and global economic crises (49)”. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Four, the ‘smooth surface’ of published documents ratified through institutional procedures may belie a rather more contested process of negotiation leading to their publication. The suppression of dissent in a final document, then, need not be interpreted as evidence that such dissent does not exist. Exploring this possibility may require in-depth research into the specific motivations of the various actors involved in each individual case. If emergent publicness is assembled into a singularity within plans, rather than merely ignored by them, there is no reason to suppose that emergent publicness will not continue to shape their implementation in future.

As well as studying the publicness of urban space which results from eco-city plans being implemented, the following two chapters therefore also pay close attention to the context in which the plans were devised. To see plans and policies as existing outside this context would itself be to impose a modernist framing on the analysis. Rather, they too are understood as emerging from their local context, shaped by an interaction between the international discourse of the eco-city and contingent local conditions; they do not so much direct the development of the eco-city ‘from above’ as form part of its broader experimental process.

2. *Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ status quo?*

In studying official documentation, as previously discussed, no equivalence is assumed between what is envisioned in a plan and the actual urban sustainability outcomes of the plan’s implementation. Nevertheless, as products of their context and enablers of change, plans – particularly those backed by significant institutional and/or commercial resources – may perform a catalytic role. They may have agentive force in drawing together particular agendas and actors, in shaping debate by making certain issues and framings more visible than others, and by directing funding in certain directions rather
than others. If, thereby, they are serving particular agendas – concealed though these may be through various rhetorical tactics and even by the appealing yet nebulous goal of ‘sustainability’ itself – then it becomes important to identify what those particular agendas might be. The goal of real-world urban sustainability may be compromised by a rhetorical ideal of urban sustainability which conceals agendas that are rather less than transformative in intent. Identifying the rhetorical patterning evident in eco-city documents themselves – as this chapter has attempted to do – may provide an antidote to its potentially blinding effects. In turn, this should allow for a more constructive debate about the intended and actual effects of plans, without using the evaluative criteria of the utopian rhetoric itself.

As a framework for thinking about the effects of the more specific content of eco-city plans on the real world, the idea of the ‘neoliberal’ eco-city is tested here. This is justified by the assumption that eco-cities will not be immune to wider tendencies within urban governance – particularly since they are so often driven by local authorities themselves – which have been critically described as evidencing the ‘neoliberalisation’ of urban governance. Indeed, the phenomenon of ‘neoliberal urban environmentalism’ has recently been identified, in which “contemporary adaptation policies are being framed by neoliberal practices of market-oriented governance, enhanced privatisation and urban environmental entrepreneurialism” (Whitehead, 2013:1348). Rather than pointing the way forwards to a post-liberal mode of societal organisation, in which the problem of planning for urban sustainability is resolved through an embrace of emergent publicness, dominant modes of eco-city planning may in fact serve to reproduce existing institutional and economic structures in response to an ongoing crisis of liberalism. Again, the question of whether and how this neoliberalisation is actually realised, beyond its postulated performative presence in plans themselves (and the extent to which this perspective has explanatory force or critical value), requires analysis of individual cases.

34 A sizeable literature exists on the neoliberalisation of environmental governance more generally (see eg McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Heynen et al., 2007; Castree, 2008a; 2008b; Himley, 2008; Bakker, 2009; Mansfield, 2008; Castree, 2011).
In Chapter Two, a series of characteristics distinguishing the most recent wave of eco-city initiatives from their predecessors were outlined. Many of these might be interpreted as indicators of neoliberalism, with potentially problematic implications for the goal of sustainability. First, the widespread adoption since the mid-2000s of the ‘carbon agenda’ – focusing on climate change and CO₂ emissions. This has been described elsewhere as having largely “overwritten” the 1990s urban SD agenda (Bulkeley et al., 2012:113), and as a type of ‘fetishisation’ (Swyngedouw, 2010a) allowing earlier socially radical models of sustainability to be usurped by ones “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute” (ibid:219). On this view, current mainstream urban sustainability policy typifies the neoliberal ‘post-political’ situation, failing to question or address the underlying structural causes of non-sustainability.

Second, from the perspective of Gualini’s ‘neoliberal thesis’ (see Chapter One), the growth of newer ‘hybrid’ forms of governance exemplifies the ‘roll-back’ of the state. The wider trend towards the delivery and management of urban development through public-private partnerships has often been aligned with the neoliberalisation of the city (see, for example: Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2006a; Haughton & McManus, 2011; Crouch, 2011; Sager, 2011). For Purcell, this poses a challenge to democracy, in that “[o]ligarchic institutions like public-private partnerships, appointed councils, and quasi-public agencies are increasingly making decisions that were formerly made by officials directly elected by the public” (Purcell, 2008:27). To the extent that this assessment is a valid one, it is difficult to reconcile with the ideal of ‘procedural equity’ being a central principle of sustainability, such that “participation is central to achieving effective and sustainable processes of regeneration, owned and mobilized by the general public as well as state authorities” (Haughton, 1999:236). The growing linkage of SD to “more negotiated or co-operative approaches” (Meadowcroft, 2000:377) does not guarantee greater political ‘legitimacy’, which Adger et al. (2003:1096) see as one of the “key integrative elements for examining environmental decisionmaking” if the public is excluded from, or only tokenistically represented in, the governance process:

“the current post-political condition, which combines dystopian visions with a hegemonic consensual neoliberal
view of social ordering, constitutes one particular fiction – one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the possibility of a different future” (Swyngedouw, 2007:71).

Third, it would seem difficult to dissociate the eco-city from circuits of international trade, both in terms of individual cities’ desire to attract investment, and of their technology suppliers’ desire to replicate successes elsewhere. The growing involvement of international engineering and consultancy firms describes a globalisation of the processes of eco-city development. Insofar as such firms are involved with defining urban sustainability in each location – in particular, through frameworks of sustainability indicators (Joss et al., 2012) – there is some risk that their definitions will exhibit technological determinism (and thus conceive of the public as passive), since the primary remit of these actors is to provide enabling technology. Definitions may, furthermore, come to be shaped to a greater extent by commercial considerations which reflect global as much as local economic constraints and opportunities. There is no obvious sense in which the growing focus on IT-related innovation, in the form of the so-called ‘smart city’, is likely to buck this trend. Hollands calls for a more progressive version of the smart city, suggesting that in its dominant understanding, it appears to be a “high-tech variant” of the “entrepreneurial city”, whose promise of an infrastructural IT-driven harmonious future belies a “more limited political agenda” which ignores power relations and induces further social inequality (Hollands, 2008:314–5).

Finally, the foregrounding of commercially driven technological ‘fixes’ is suggestive of a ‘green growth’ or ‘ecological modernisation’ agenda. In its weaker variants, the latter rests on assumptions that “with relatively minor technical and regulatory reforms, business as usual is possible under existing capitalist structures” rather than through recourse to radical societal transformation (Haughton, 2007:282); dissenting ecological discourses which critique industrial society itself are excluded or deflected (Dryzek, 2005:179), and little consideration is given to the strengthening of the democratic dimensions of environmental policy through greater public participation (Barry & Paterson, 2004). If the implementation of a technology-focused approach effectively ignores the agency and
relevance of existing social and institutional realities, it reflects a
tendency which Gill (1995) identifies within neoliberal ideology
whereby local societal norms are not understood as part of the
process but written off as ‘xenophobic’ barriers to progress. But
while the significance of place-specific context is underplayed in the
presentation of technology’s ability to effect a transition to
sustainability, a more essentialist notion of place – as evidenced in
the ‘defensive space’ of the eco-city documentation analysed above –
is mobilised for branding purposes. Other commentators characterise
the rise of ‘place branding’ as neoliberal in its alignment with the
ideal of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Hackworth,
2007; Greenburg, 2008; Sager, 2011).

In more simple terms, the case can be made that this latest wave of
urban sustainability initiatives subsumes the ‘environmental’ pillar
of sustainability within the ‘economic’, and prioritises both over the
‘social’ (particularly if this are conceptualised in terms of equity).
Even if such initiatives are consistently promoted primarily in
environmental terms, this may itself be read as a tactic within the
‘project’ of neoliberalisation, as Brand (2007) argues. He suggests that
the ‘environment’ has become increasingly incorporated “as an
object of governmentality” such that it is

“employed as a means of constructing citizens’ sense of
themselves and their obligations, in a manner perfectly
attuned to the individualizing demands of neoliberal
urban transformation...Neoliberal urban governance, I
argue, has been a key part of the repoliticization of the
Environment”
(Brand, 2007:268).

In Brand’s view, “the progressive and libertarian aspirations of
much early environmental thought have been subtly converted into a
new form of subjection to the strategic requirements and political
conveniences of neoliberal city administrations” (ibid:616). Gibbs et al.
(2013:2151) argue that “[n]ew ‘sustainable’ urban imaginaries are
increasingly taking root in cities and regions around the world”
characterised by a growing “discourse of market triumphalism” in
which “[s]tates – local, regional and national – seem to be rolling
back their own authority and rolling out market-based approaches to
urban development”.
It may nevertheless be misleading to theorise processes of urban neoliberalisation as inevitable ‘organic shifts’ occurring in the absence of other alternatives (Hackworth, 2007:17). Macro-level, aggregated ideological shifts might best be understood as intellectual constructs; in practice they translate into location-specific processes of negotiation and experimentation. Nor does the observation of such tendencies, as discussed in Chapter Two, imply that eco-cities are universally underscored by agendas characterisable as neoliberal. Understanding the nature of this uneven neoliberalisation therefore requires going beyond the identification of macro trends, to look at the detailed context in which its practical implications are reproduced or resisted in particular contexts.

The analytical task, then, simultaneously involves interrogating the usefulness of the ‘neoliberal’ framework. The broader question of whether there is a “concordance or tension between capitalist accumulation and sustainability” (Rosol, 2013:2239) remains unanswered. Gibbs et al. (2013) outline an alternative position to that which constructs ‘sustainability’ as a noble goal which is being compromised or undermined by neoliberal approaches to urban governance; from a different perspective, the sustainability agenda may “[a]t the very least…imply a departure from, or at least some compromise of, a market-fundamentalist neoliberal urban landscape and its vernacular (While et al., 2010)” (Gibbs et al., 2013, p.2152). Nevertheless, they contend that the theoretical tensions between new sustainable urban imaginaries and ‘neoliberal urbanism’ tend to be overlooked in the search for practical design and economic solutions; the market-based approach remains fundamentally unquestioned even following the recent economic crisis.

The question of whether the eco-city currently serves to reproduce a neoliberal status quo therefore has heuristic value. In asking it, however, no assumption is made about this necessarily being the most constructive angle from which to launch a critique. Rather, the possibility is also entertained that it may be unsatisfactory to focus only on the neoliberal dimensions of the governance models adopted; that instead they somehow point beyond liberal-modern notions of ‘planning’, providing clues about how we might more constructively shape cities of the future in the face of uncertainty and emergent
complexity. While this possibility seems more obviously worth testing in the case of Portland’s EcoDistricts initiative (Chapter Six), it is also unclear whether the framework of ‘neoliberalism’ will be revealing in the case of a society such as that of South Korea (Chapter Seven), since the notion of liberalism which it implies is essentially Eurocentric.

The following chapters, then, look more closely at two particular cases, with consideration given to the contexts and actors which enabled their planning and implementation, the extent to which ‘neoliberal’ goals were supported or opposed through these processes, and the publicness of the space which has resulted – with a special focus on the open spaces of the city.
Chapter Six

Co-opting the Emergent Public? Case Study of Portland’s EcoDistricts

It was argued in Chapter Five that the public dimensions of the city are poorly conceptualised in mainstream eco-city plans and policies. As technologies attempting to fix specific outcomes of decision-making processes, such documents promote or justify particular desired developmental trajectories. They promote a static, utopian vision of ‘civic’ publicness, in denial of urban tensions. Their ideological force works to obscure the particularity of their underlying agendas, raising questions about both their transferability and the sustainability of the solutions they propose. As representations of the urban, they constitute a form of ideological closure at odds with an open-ended ‘emergent’ concept of the public.

The idea that emergent publicness might be ‘planned’ may appear oxymoronic, insofar as it is essentially unpredictable. Nevertheless, while plans cannot determine emergent publicness, it seems possible that they might still work to facilitate or hinder it in various ways. There is therefore good reason to look beyond the documentation, to explore the publicness of urban sustainability in practice. To this end, the following research question was proposed in the previous chapter:

*How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its conceptualisation in official documentation?*

In exploring this question, the eco-city is considered in terms of what results from the implementation of policies, and the real-world context through which these policies are developed. The documents themselves, as discussed in the previous chapter, are here thought of as forming part of, rather than standing outside, the dynamic experimental process of the eco-city.
Additionally, it was suggested that the particular agendas concealed by the utopian goal of sustainability are variously reflective of a broader so-called neoliberalisation of urban governance. From this perspective, rather than offering a satisfactory solution to the ‘problem of planning’ for sustainability (see Chapter One) which takes better account of the emergent city, the eco-city may currently tend to reproduce the structural causes of unsustainability. To explore this possibility, the following question has also been set:

Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ status quo?

This chapter examines the case of the EcoDistricts (henceforth usually ‘ED’35) initiative in Portland, Oregon (USA), with particular reference to its implementation in the Gateway district of outer eastern Portland. ED was chosen as a ‘critical case’ (as discussed in Chapter Four) since – as will be discussed – Portland more generally prides itself on encouraging what is labelled emergent publicness in this thesis. When considered in its broader context, then, might it provide some clues to the possible nature of a ‘post-liberal’ governance approach to urban sustainability? If it is interpreted as exemplifying neoliberal urban sustainability, how is this interpretation useful as a basis for critical commentary?

The chapter begins by describing the initiative overall, before focusing on Gateway. The reasons for the relative failure of Gateway Green (GG) are explored, with reference to Gateway’s political and attitudinal distance from the dominant ‘Portland discourse’ informing the city’s strategic policies, and to the formal qualities of its space which hindered the initiative’s attempt to construct a ‘Gateway public’ in the way envisaged. If ED has been realised more successfully in locations where it will most directly serve the city’s economic goals, by ‘showcasing’ its achievements, it has served to reinforce rather than challenge the structural status quo. However, in the final section, the conclusion that ED is thereby working to catalyse a process of neoliberalisation is problematised. Equally, as a ‘post-liberal’ attempt to shape sustainable ‘cityness’, it was flawed.

35 In the text, ‘ED’ (in italics) indicates the EcoDistricts initiative as a whole, while ‘ED’ (not in italics) indicates a particular district of the city where the initiative was piloted.
precisely because of its institutional framing. As an experimental governance approach to sustainability, then, ED challenges both of the governance theses outlined by Gualini (2010) as discussed in Chapter One.

6.1 The EcoDistricts Initiative: Main Characteristics

Overview

The ED pilot initiative was initiated in 2009 by Mayor Sam Adams of Portland, Oregon (USA) – a city with a long history of progressive urban policy-making, and a reputation for leading innovation in environmental matters (see Section 6.2 below). ED aimed to explore the potential for furthering urban sustainability at the district-wide scale. In describing Portland as a “laboratory for testing strategies” (DistrictLab, 2010:7), the focus was on real-world experimentation rather than testing predetermined solutions in an artificial environment. The intention was to tap into local knowledge and priorities, encouraging development strategies to emerge within contingent place-specific constraints “to determine what approaches are feasible in a developed urban context” (ibid). Rather than imposing solutions from above, a reflexive process of learning was envisaged, whereby the city authorities hoped to take their cue from the successes and failures of specific projects. The district scale was envisaged as a stepping stone between Portland’s acknowledged success at constructing individual sustainable buildings and the (as yet insufficiently understood) goal of achieving city-wide sustainability (DistrictLab, 2010:7).

Mayor Adams instructed PDC to fund the Portland Sustainability Institute (PoSI) to establish a series of pilot schemes, with technical input from Portland’s Bureau of Planning and Sustainability (BPS). The mayor had established PoSI as an organisation “at the nexus of Portland sustainability efforts” (P4); ED was to be PoSI’s “bread and butter” (P4).36 Five districts were then chosen, the city-level research interviewees explained, according to the following principles. First, all were to be located in existing Urban Renewal Areas, so that

36 The in-text referencing system used for research interviewees is explained in Table 4.5.
potential funding mechanisms would be in place along with a body
of actors interested in local regeneration. Second, that the likely focus
of the specific projects undertaken should differ. Third, following
selection of three EDs in the urban core, it was decided that others
should be chosen in outlying districts, to provide geographical
diversity (Figure 6.1). PoSI assisted local organisers in determining
their own priority actions. Reflecting the variety of district
characteristics and stakeholders involved in each ED, it was expected
that different governance structures might emerge, and these were
deliberately not imposed. The outcomes of this decentralised process
of diverse experimentation, it was hoped, would enable the
identification of “generalisable principles that we can apply across
the whole city” (P1).

Figure 6.1: location of Portland’s five official EcoDistricts
(source: adapted from map provided by Stamen 37)

The city recognised all five pilot EDs as ‘Official Organizations’ in
November 2012 following the appointment of new mayor Charlie
Hayles. This recognition instructed PDC and BPS to maintain a
relationship with the EDs, without defining this relationship (C6).
However, the period of PDC funding, and PoSI’s convening
responsibilities, ended in June 2013. PDC interviewees explained

37 maps.stamen.com (accessed 12 September 2013)
that money may be available in future for specific projects, but not to facilitate governance processes. PoSI retained specific funding to work with the Clinton Climate Initiative Climate Positive programme in the South Waterfront ED, but otherwise individual EDs were expected to seek funding from elsewhere. In May 2013, towards the end of the pilot scheme, PoSI decided to adopt a national (and potentially international) focus, changing its name to EcoDistricts,\(^{38}\) aiming to provide consultancy and training to help implement EDs elsewhere, and disseminate best practice (EcoDistricts, 2013a). The reformed, self-funding organisation appears to have distanced itself from the pilot scheme; its ‘Protocol’ framework (EcoDistricts, 2014) only briefly mentions a “successful pilot program launched in the City of Portland in 2008, and extended across North America in 2014” (EcoDistricts, 2014:4), listing the five EDs without commentary in an endnote. Its first annual report makes only passing reference to pilot initiative – though one ED (Lloyd), significantly, is singled out for special attention (EcoDistricts, 2013b:9).

Despite the diversity of the five pilot EDs, research interviewees generally concurred about their overall typology. The three in or adjacent to downtown were bracketed as having a more technical focus, and being backed by well-resourced developers, with a only small number of landowners involved. The other two, in outer East Portland, managed by local volunteers, were described as directed more towards building community capacity. Taken as a whole, they exhibit a wide range of characteristics of the eco-city phenomenon generally, as discussed in Chapter Two.\(^{39}\) The Lloyd ED – arguably,
the most successful – is described briefly below to exemplify the inner EDs, and special attention is then given to GG, to exemplify the ‘outer’ EDs. GG is of particular interest for the current research, in terms of its actual and desired publicness, because of its ambivalent urban status, and its concern with open spaces.

**Inner EcoDistricts: Focus on Lloyd**

The *Lloyd* ED, which aims to become the “most sustainable business district in North America” (PoSI, 2012b:5; Figure 6.2), covers over 400 acres on the west bank of the Willamette River opposite Portland’s central business district. It has historically lacked a strong identity (C4) and vitality outside office hours – partly because little of its land use (less than 10%) is currently residential (PoSI, 2010:15). Following preliminary research and consultation, PoSI created a detailed ‘Roadmap’ for the district in November 2012, with input and advice from the local ED Board, various city bureaus, and representatives from large local employers and attractions such as the Oregon Convention Center and nearby hotels (PoSI, 2012b:2). The Roadmap sets out four categories of specific goals for 2035 (PoSI, 2012b). ‘Prosperous’ goals include a programme of dense commercial and residential building, and a better ‘sense of place’ with a ‘green
branding’, to create 10,000 new jobs. ‘Biophilic’ goals include green infrastructure corridors, street planting, and new parkland. ‘Connected’ goals include creating pedestrian/cycle bridges over the I-5 and I-84 freeways, and redeveloping commercial streets. It gives particular emphasis to its ‘efficient’ goals, including retrofitting, LEED Gold accreditation of new buildings, on-site renewable energy, district energy, a district water utility, LED streetlights, and a zero waste target. To accompany the Roadmap, a ‘Project Playbook’ (PoSL, 2012c) outlines various possible activities, with timelines, costings and partners (usually ED Board, City Agencies, and private sector property developers and owners). Those interviewees familiar with it had high expectations of its relative success, due to its governance structure (involving only a small number of enthusiastic property owners, and the pre-existing coordinatory Management Association), and because it is well resourced, allowing for a full-time salaried member of staff to oversee progress.

Following the pilot’s end, the initiative continues to receive substantial institutional recognition and support. The Portland Development Commission (the city’s urban renewal agency) heralds the district’s “$160 million LEED Platinum four-block redevelopment” as a “showcase of the newest technology in energy, water, waste and stormwater green networks” (PDC, 2013) – though, perhaps significantly, without referring to it as an EcoDistrict. The Portland Tribune reports that Lloyd will “receive $100,000 annually for 10 years, with a 2 percent increase per year, after the Portland City Council approved a plan by businesses in the district to tax themselves in November” (Hogue, 2014) – an outcome which Lloyd’s executive director describes as a “tremendous vote of confidence” (ibid). The Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability has reported that Lloyd’s newly published, and PDC-funded, five-year Energy Action Plan (Lloyd EcoDistrict, 2014) is aligned with the “goals set in the City of Portland / Multnomah County Climate Action Plan” (BPS, 2014). Portland Monthly (a local property magazine) lauds it as a forthcoming “ecotopia” such that “[w]ith a new lush public plaza and major face-lift for the aging mall, Portland’s first ‘ecodistrict’ will be a lean, green, sustainable machine” (Gragg, 2014).
Although the most successful of the three inner EDs, Lloyd resembles South Waterfront (Box 6.1) and SoMa (Box 6.2) in its focus on technical and infrastructural fixes, the limited number of large landowners involved, and as an initiative to which the city is keen to direct external attention.

**Box 6.1: South Waterfront EcoDistrict**

*South Waterfront* (SW) ED, on the bank of the Willamette River, is located immediately south of downtown, connected to it by tram. A former industrial area whose regeneration was first discussed in the 1980s, it became the North Macadam Urban Renewal Area in 1999, and was renamed as South Waterfront in 2002 (PDC, 2003). Around a third of the land has been built out; development stalled following the economic crisis in 2008. Existing buildings are mostly residential high-density blocks. The current population is, in PoSt’s estimation (PoSt, 2010:36), younger than average for the city, with relatively few families and more professionals, many of whom work at the nearby Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU), to which it is connected by cable car. OHSU plans to build a new campus extension inside the ED.

SW is often shown to visiting dignitaries as demonstrating potential district-wide sustainability (C2). Before being labelled as an ED, it already had a variety of environmentally friendly features, including a stormwater system, transport links, high building density, and “the most LEED residential towers of any neighbourhood in the nation” (SWCR, undated). The *South Waterfront Climate Positive Roadmap* is currently being prepared in partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative Climate Positive programme, aiming for future buildings to produce more energy than they consume. Other plans include the introduction and restoration of wildlife habitat in bioswales, ecoroofs, gardens and parks, and improved plant cover along the riverbank. The local Neighbourhood Association (South Waterfront Community Relations), funded through local taxation, partnered with PoSt to devise the ED goals. Hoping to “build" community to create a sense of place” (PoSt, 2011:3), the NA organises local events including music and film showings in the park, and a regular farmers’ market. Undeveloped land is rented out as allotments. Nevertheless, in one interviewee’s opinion, the area retains a “Chinese new city feel” (C7), with insufficient 'third places’. Another interviewee characterised it as “almost like a removed pocket...it’s kind of this island almost” (PL). As well as being used by the city as a ‘showcase’, then, it might be seen as displaying some of the characteristics of what Hodson and Marvin (2010) call a ‘premium ecological enclave’.
Box 6.2: South of Market (SoMa) EcoDistrict

Originally called the ‘University’ ED, due to its location around Portland State University (PSU), SoMa was renamed when the steering committee formed in 2011. Possibly reflecting the definitional imprecision of the initiative generally, the possibility of dropping its ‘EcoDistrict’ branding was discussed in recent committee meetings (P2; CS). It covers approximately 90 blocks (9 of which are parkland), and is dominated by the University (with almost 30,000 students, compared with a non-student population of 10,000 during office hours, and only 4,000 residents (PoSl, 2012b)). SoMa currently fails to attract large numbers of visitors (except on Sunday, when it hosts Portland’s largest farmers’ market): it has a limited retail and entertainment offering, with the lack of evening venues in particular seen as unusual for a university area (P2).

The steering committee is largely comprised of a small number of local property owners, who—according to the interviewees familiar with this ED—almost unanimously strongly support its development, because of both the ‘marketability’ of sustainable buildings and infrastructure, and the positive effect on property prices if the area becomes more lively. Priorities identified in 2011 include expanding the existing PSU district energy system, introducing green streets (partly to manage stormwater more effectively), retrofitting buildings, providing support for start-up businesses, a new bicycle lane, and a composting programme. Its pre-existing green infrastructure (including 10 LEED certified buildings and excellent public transport links) along with research support from PSU, and various ongoing small-scale student-led sustainability initiatives, make it a good potential ‘showcase’ for the ED initiative as a whole, according to an interviewee closely involved with it (P2); PSU provides a map which allows visitors to take themselves on a ‘sustainability walking tour’ of its campus.

Outer EcoDistricts: Focus on Growing Gateway

“its identity is undefined. Gateway remains an idea, a potential-filled location that is consistently pointed to as a place where growth should occur...Gateway needs a stronger image” (DistrictLab, 2010:19).

In contrast to the bright future envisaged for the Lloyd district, a photo-essay in the regional Oregonian newspaper recently lamented the “failed vision for East Portland’s Gateway” (Boyd, 2013). Its verdict was that “[m]any feel Gateway could be much more and that its attributes have been squandered by inattention of leaders”, and that “[t]he center is a sterile, unwelcoming place, not the vibrant hub of happy activity predicted by visions for the district” (ibid).
Chapter Six

GG covers a series of middle- and lower-income (PoSI, 2010:26;44) neighbourhoods at some remove (approximately 8.5 km) from the urban core. Like Foster Green, it differs from the inner EDs in having an established residential community: South Waterfront was previously an industrial area (Box 6.1), most users of SoMa district live elsewhere (Box 6.2), and very little land in Lloyd is residential (see above). However, it has excellent public transportation connections to the wider Metro region, has long been marked as a future “node for intense development” (Abbott, 1983:259), and remains the only ‘Regional Center’ in Multnomah County.\(^{40}\) The city authorities continue to see Gateway as underperforming in various ways relative to more central districts; in this sense, it is constructed as problematic in its relative lack of urbanity. East Portland generally is characterised as “transitioning from its once suburban and semi-rural form into an increasingly urban community” (City of Portland, 2009:1). Similarly, a city-level interviewee asserted that Gateway:

“is going to be a place that becomes more and more urban over time. Right now, you could argue that it’s not very urban – that it’s very suburban… So we’re definitely implying that there’s a growth aspect…we’re trying to make that place more of a city from what had been more of a suburban mall” (C7).

Built up significantly first in the 1950s, it exemplifies the ‘Eastern Neighbourhoods’ characterised as automobile-centric in the city’s urban design typology: “Commercial areas are in the form of automobile-oriented strip commercial areas located on multi-lane streets”; “Most residential streets, and some major streets, lack sidewalks” (City of Portland, undated). Larger plots make it less densely populated than ‘streetcar neighbourhoods’, and houses rarely have porches. The Portland Plan positions the underdevelopment of East Portland’s infrastructure and services, relative to its ongoing population growth, as a key obstacle “stand[ing] in the way of East Portland’s long-term success and vibrancy” (Portland City Council, 2012:96).

\(^{40}\) The Metro government’s 50-year growth management strategy includes a hierarchy of urban centres: ‘Central City’ (ie Downtown Portland); ‘Regional Centers’, defined as “centers of commerce and local government services serving a market area of hundreds of thousands of people”); and ‘Town Centers’ providing “localized services to tens of thousands of people within a two- to three-mile radius” (Metro, 2000:10).
A preliminary baseline study led by PoSI (DistrictLab, 2010) included analyses of local land uses, connectivity, resource consumption, air quality, water management, infrastructure and amenities, and a consultation process to identify ‘community priorities’. This involved two “discussion circles”, “numerous one-on-one interviews”, and a local exhibition; with input from residents, Neighbourhood Association (NA) leaders, local businesses, health care providers, built environment professionals, developers and landowners (ibid:16). The area’s current problems, as defined through the site analysis and consultations, included: “a visible absence of parks and public spaces” (DistrictLab, 2010:27); high levels of automobile use (ibid:31); a poor pedestrian environment due to a shortage of pavements; insufficient street trees; very long block lengths (ibid); a weak local identity (“There’s no ‘there’ there” (ibid:19)); excessive stormwater run-off (ibid:29); anti-social and criminal behaviour; and the need for aesthetic improvements (ibid: 20-21). The report comments that

“When the EcoDistrict concept was well received, environmental performance was not the highest community priority. Enthusiasm was high for discussions about economic development and physical neighborhood improvements. Greater opportunities for social interaction, investments in education, and economic development were consistently identified as critical issues” (DistrictLab, 2010:2).

One consultee is quoted as saying “Don’t talk to me about bioswales and green streets when there are people being shot at over here” (DistrictLab, 2010:21). The report also identified 17 local ‘assets’, including good local schools, an existing local business association, and various potential physical interventions in the locations observed in the current research: Halsey Street, which “has historical quality as Gateway’s ‘Main Street’”; the PDC-owned neighbourhood park as an “[o]portunity to create a new civic space.,[to]..increase connectivity, walkability, and habitat within the district”; and the vicinity of the Transit Center, where environmental improvements could create a “multi-modal corridor” linking to the main shopping streets – as well as nearby waste land which could be developed as ‘Gateway Green’, a “future neighbourhood/regional
greenway” (DistrictLab, 2010:23). The report proposes a series of ‘catalyst projects’, but notes that “it is widely understood that both public funding and ability to pay among private property owners is lacking” (ibid:19-20). The question of how to fund and govern future activities is left unanswered (ibid:67).

Subsequently, a steering committee was established with assistance from PoSI, staffed by volunteers from local non-profit-making and neighbourhood organisations, professionals, and employers. It accepted an offer of rent-free office space, and worked to raise awareness of the ED through targeted outreach and community events. Meanwhile, PoSI developed a technical ongoing assessment framework (2011) on behalf of PDC, setting specific goals across nine areas, defining indicators for each with specific targets, timeframes, baselines, and specific strategic recommendations (without specifying actions). Its integrative analysis suggested that particular attention should be paid to developing

“more high quality public (or quasi-public) space and parks...in the district. This strategy benefits every Performance Area, therefore showing the most synergy across goals and proving to be a beneficial strategy with which to move forward”


The local and city-level interviewees broadly agreed that the paucity of open and ‘third’ spaces’, and non-pedestrian friendly environment, undermine community cohesion in Gateway. Board members concurred with the strategy of focusing on well-chosen interventions to catalyse a wider process of change. One of the key outcomes hoped for was greater intersubjectivity among pedestrians, to build social capital and a sense of collectivity to facilitate later district-wide collaborative actions. Aesthetic improvements, they anticipated, would attract attention and investment, raise property prices, and constitute a visible “symbol of rebirth, and a symbol of the community we’re going to get there” (L1). For Gateway specifically, this catalytic or symbolic potential may be unrealised because such “civic spaces” (C7) fall between the geographical areas on which NAs focus (P1), but overall GG is similar to the other outer ED, Foster Green (henceforth ‘FG’), in its socio-economic focus, small-scale projects, and reliance on local volunteers (Box 6.3).
Despite their agreement with some of PoSI’s conclusions, GG’s board members described the baseline reports as disproportionately technical and extensive relative to the very limited range of activities which might realistically be considered at that stage. Further irritation was expressed that PoSI had now rebranded itself as ‘EcoDistricts’ to market itself nationally:

“PoSI should capitalise on the strengths of their own EcoDistricts and the work that’s been done…to make a difference before they go out and brand themselves as EcoDistricts?” (L2).

“They tout themselves as having all these great EcoDistricts, but we’re not a functioning EcoDistrict” (L3).

There are mismatches, in other words, both between the ambitions developed in PoSI’s documentation and the GG participants’ own sense of what might realistically be achieved; and between the public experience of the pilot scheme and the construction of the ED concept in ongoing documentation.

### Box 6.3: Foster Green EcoDistrict

Foster Green (FG) covers six low-income neighbourhoods in SE Portland along the Foster Road corridor; its north-western tip lies just over 1km from the edge of gentrified Portlandia, as defined by interviewee P1 (see Figure 6.10). While the three EDs described above are characterised by the involvement of large property owners and an interest in green infrastructure, FG, according to one city-level interviewee, is “at the other end of the spectrum…a very low income community without resources, and their version of it is much more about grassroots action, and governance structure” (C7). The interviewee from its steering committee commented:

“We need to be really focusing on the people there first. But also we want to build off the existing businesses…We have a lot of automobile-oriented businesses…so who am I to say…we want something sexier to come in here – no, let’s build off that. Maybe they’ll have a green solution to the way they want to do it” (L1).

For him, FG was primarily a community building tool; he saw the process of consensus building as “probably more important than the outcome” (L1).

PoSI’s (2012a:126) baseline assessment of the district concluded that feasible strategies most clearly aligned with ED performance goals should encompass ‘urban form and parks and recreation’, ‘multi-modal transportation systems’, ‘economic development’, and ‘flood mitigation and floodplain restoration’. Specific projects actually being undertaken are on a small scale, relating to the revitalisation of local alley spaces, and enhancements to a local park. FG also supports other relevant local initiatives, including a planned Latino street market.

In practice, GG began implementing only one project, ‘Reenergising Gateway’ (which departed from PoSI’s recommendations), to help elderly residents improve household
energy efficiency (and thereby lower utility bills). Plans for a second project, ‘Wayfinding’, aiming to improve local pedestrian and bicycle signage – especially at the transit hub – were not finalised and funding was not found. Board members were also keen for unused land off the main thoroughfare (Halsey Street), owned by PDC, to be developed as a community park, as recommended by PoSI, but no immediate funding for this was available. Finally, the development of ‘Gateway Green’, as recommended by PoSI, is proceeding, but this project is only tangentially connected to the ED initiative. It is using ‘crowdsourced’ funds to create a recreational and cycling park on a large unused open space near the transit station. When interviewed, GG board members remained optimistic about the ED’s long-term potential, but the chair has since resigned and its activities have ceased; its website and offices are no longer operational.

The fact of GG’s limited achievement does not imply that the ED concept more generally is flawed; a ‘pilot’ scheme is justified to the extent that it reveals implementational and conceptual shortcomings. Indeed, the city-level interviewees did not expect all five EDs to be equally successful; any ‘best practice’ lessons were intended to be unpredictable, and one thought it “probably reasonable...that a couple of them will ultimately fail or just fizzle out” (C4). But it is instructive to reflect further on the reasons why the outer EDs such as GG have seen less progress than their city centre counterparts such as Lloyd. These reasons, discussed below, are linked to further questions about the relation of Gateway to the rest of Portland and its broader region.

**Reasons for the failure of Growing Gateway**

The immediate practical reason for GG’s failure was a lack of funding. Several interviewees felt the initiative was constrained by having no salaried staff members (unlike Lloyd in particular). Unable even to afford to apply for charitable ‘501(c)(3)’ status (G1; G6), it relied on a fiscal sponsorship arrangement with a local NGO. While hoping its first successes in the ‘Reenergising Gateway’ project might attract further sponsorship, it lacked the seed capital to extend the scheme beyond a small number of household refurbishments (G1). It has struggled to promote itself locally, relying on unpaid assistance from local professionals to design materials (G1). Reflecting this, the street survey provided very little evidence of familiarity: of the 50
people asked, none could name any ‘local initiatives or schemes which aim to improve the local area’. On prompting with GG’s name, only 2 of the 50 claimed any recognition (though this was non-committal: “maybe” and “sounds familiar”). One board member commented: “we’re just a seedling – we’re an EcoDistrict that’s struggling to get started” (L3). Several board members expressed disappointment with the city in this respect – particularly because no usable business plan had been created (as originally envisaged) before PoSI’s withdrawal in June 2013, with available funding spent on the technical baseline studies mentioned above.

One lesson implied by the story of GG is the possibility that some intended experimental ‘niche[s] will fail not so much because of wider ‘regime’ constraints (Geels, 2002), as because the preconditions for experimentation to occur within them are unsatisfactory. As a ‘niche’, GG might be described as poorly ‘protected’; and one city-level interviewee acknowledged that GG and FG had been “underempowered” (C5). The greater progress of city centre EDs, conversely, appears to be largely facilitated by powerful actors. The PDC interviewees considered the city centre EDs more likely to qualify for future financial support. Their infrastructural focus makes them more suitable as ‘showcases’ for the city to bolster its desired reputation for expertise in exportable green technology. Thus, a supposedly open-ended process of experimentation, ostensibly in the service of sustainability and social equity, and based on emergent public priorities, has in practice been shaped primarily by, and may lead to the further empowerment of, those actors best placed to deliver economic benefits to the city.

It is not unreasonable that the city should provide greater support for projects furthering its own goals, but this reveals the initiative to be rather less ‘bottom up’ than first appearances suggest. The project remains innovative as a type of ‘research in the wild’ insofar as the city is reacting to the solutions developed by local actors, rather than testing predefined solutions. However, in combination, the underfunding of GG and the ongoing support for Lloyd significantly skewed the outcome. In fact, the details of the process, as visualised in PoSI’s Pilot Study (Figure 6.4), explicitly envisage a ‘filtering’ process. Whether or not ideas could be captured which had genuinely emerged from the ‘community’ itself, their representation
was to be framed by the local ‘site conditions’ as constructed by the city, and their translation into projects and strategies was to be accomplished with reference to ‘Plans for Future Growth and Development’. In this sense, a “bounded form of collaboration” (Parker et al., 2015: 519) was in evidence: the institutionalised nature of the process would seem likely to exclude any emergent ideas which conflicted with the city’s existing policies and priorities (as outlined in the following section). Progress in the inner EDs may have been facilitated not only by the pre-existence of management structures, but also because the interests of the actors involved were more attuned to the dominant developmental agenda.

![Figure 6.4: visualisation of the “multiple components” which “informed the recommendations for EcoDistrict pilot projects” (DistrictLab, 2010:14)](image)

While expressing genuine support for an open-ended goal of sustainability, several city-level interviewees justified ED in instrumental terms with explicit reference to institutional goals. Its official recognition in 2012 was interpreted as reflecting its perceived value as a means of implementing the Portland Plan (C5; C6). One BPS interviewee described the city’s main interest as relating to one of the three ‘Integrated Strategies’ around which the Portland Plan is structured: 41

> “From the city’s perspective and what we are truly invested in is this notion of a ‘Healthy Connected City’, and EcoDistricts is a conceptual tool, and it’s an

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implementational tool, and if it’s the vehicle that needs to get used, then it will exist” (C6).

By implication, then, the city has lent support to ED to the extent that it helps realise a particular strand of its developmental strategy.

More specifically, it is understood to have particular potential value as a “community development tool” (C6); “for me, the whole notion of the EcoDistricts is just a systematic way of prioritising what the community wants” (P1). This understanding might appear to distance ED from a ‘technological showcase’ model of development, and overturned several interviewees’ earlier expectations of a more direct focus on infrastructural and environmental issues. A discursive logic was apparent in the claim that ED thereby constituted “just the newest version” of Portland’s “long-standing tradition” of public participation (C4), as a “natural evolution of the culture that’s inherent in the city” (C2). One PDC interviewee queried the nature of this ‘evolution’, however: “if it’s more of a neighbourhood system”, then “why didn’t we just work through the NAs?” (C4). One answer may lie in a planner’s comment that the district scale represented a deliberate attempt to temper the negative implications of the “fiefdoms of power” enscribed on the city by the geography of the NA system (C7). This, in turn, reflects the innovative spatiality of the Portland Plan’s ‘Healthy Connected City’ concept – which “was threatening to some associated with the neighbourhood system, because they perceived it as an attack on their power” (C7). On this view, the stated desire to empower local communities masks a strategy to disrupt existing formations of civic power, in order to facilitate the implementation of the Portland Plan.

Downtown perceptions of Gateway as underperforming, however, are not necessarily reflected in its residents’ own assessments. In the street survey (see Table 6.1), the most top-of-mind desired improvements – to the PDC park on Halsey Street, crime and safety, a pedestrian environment, and the retail offer – echoed GG’s understanding. And yet these were mentioned only by minorities: most commonly, respondents were unable to think of any particular improvement. Although a street survey of this type allows little time for participants to consider their responses, the findings provide no evidence that GG is tapping into an existing groundswell of active resident desire to become ‘more urban’.
Table 6.1: residents’ top-of-mind desired improvements to Gateway area

If, rather than dissatisfaction, these findings indicate a degree of apathy, this is partly explainable by the geography of the ED. Like the Portland Plan, it might be interpreted as consciously disrupting existing political imaginations – it covers 13 NAs.42 The attempt to build social capacity may be undermined by the weak identity of the envisaged ‘district’ as a geographical unit; its incoherence was recognised both by city-level and local interviewees. One city-level interviewee called Gateway a “planner’s construct” (C1), originally named after the (now removed) arches outside the Fred Meyer supermarket opened in the 1950s.43 The research interviewees generally agreed that residents more strongly identify with their own neighbourhood than with Gateway as a whole. The task of improving the district, then, was partly one of constructing the district in the image of GG; of calling a ‘Gateway public’ into being.

Rather than drawing on and learning from emergent publicness, then, the initiative attempted to assemble publicness in a particular way. The city attempted unsuccessfully to impose a particular

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42 The ‘strapline’ on the GG website (Figure 6.3), ‘Creating a Healthy Community’ appears to speak to the Portland Plan ‘Healthy Connected City’ strategy, whose consciously disruptive geography was discussed earlier.

43 The Gateway arch appears on the GG logo (Figure 6.3).
ontology of Gateway, resting on an artificial geographical bounding of an envisioned self-identifying public sharing the city’s broader developmental goals, and sought to represent the views of this summoned public through a predetermined framework of categories. In this sense, and looking beyond practical funding issues, the failure of GG describes the outcome of a discursive mismatch: a dominant institutional discourse of Portland in intractable tension with the emergent public discourses in this part of the city. The following section therefore posits the existence of a dominant ‘story’ told about Portland, organised around the idea of Portland’s ‘difference’ from other cities, and reflected in institutional policies. This story, it is argued, has limited resonance in Gateway, which is distanced from the city centre not only geographically, but also politically, culturally and socially.


Fragmentary evidence from the representation of Portland across a wide range of channels is collated here to infer a broadly cohesive body of discourse eulogising the city’s ‘difference’. The discursive nature of this difference is signalled both by the way it is typically evidenced through reference to external perceptions of Portland, and by the limitations of its descriptive scope. The metaphorical ‘Portland’ thus constructed evidently has clarificatory power, since it appeared to shape interviewees’ own interpretation of their city – although, significantly, this held less true in the outer district of Gateway. Its presence within city policies, furthermore, implies its official – though selective – acceptance in the service of particular developmental goals. The ideological potency of the discourse, then, is suggested by both its widespread currency and its backing by powerful resources (Locke, 1984). It also, however, obscures various contradictory aspects of Portland’s reality, some of which are identified in the critical academic literature. The five interrelated key strands of this discourse – its ‘liveability’, ‘weirdness’, ‘well-plannedness’, ‘greenness’, and ‘civic engagement’ – are discussed in turn below.
‘Liveability’

Descriptions of Portland often refer to the way it is imagined elsewhere in the US. Ozawa’s (2004:4) claim, for example, about its ‘quality of life’ is supported by reference to the “attention lavished upon the region by the national press”. Elsewhere, we read of Portland’s consistently high rankings as a ‘liveable’ city (Abbott, 1983; 2011; Flood, 2010) where Americans would like to live (Mayer & Provo, 2004). This reputational evidence is complemented by selective reference to cultural and leisure-related phenomena, positioned as untypical for the US. These include its wealth of independent restaurant, coffee and microbrewing establishments (Flood, 2010); varied street-food outlets (Newman & Burnett, 2013); bicycle culture (Abbott, 2011); many accessible ‘natural areas’ (Peirce & Guskind, 1993; Poracsky & Houck, 1994); farmers markets and urban agriculture (Flood, 2010); and long-established vibrant arts (Abbott, 2011) and independent music (Flood, 2010) scenes. Collectively, such features construct Portland as unusually able to resist the “forces of economic integration, copycat commercialism, and cultural homogeneity” (Sussman & Estes, 2004:136), and a ‘Mecca’ for well-educated young people attracted by values of “idealism, risk-taking, and action” (Flood, 2010).

Portland’s reputation for liveability was already established in the 1980s (Abbott, 1983), but appears to have been reinforced by its subsequent economic growth. Interviewees recalled Portland in the 1980s as having significant socio-economic problems; Inner North and North-East Portland were known as the ‘meth lab’ capital of America (L5). By the early 1990s, however, the same neighbourhoods were gentrifying: “upscale restaurants and retail establishments rooted and flourished in Portland’s oldest commercial districts” (Witt, 2004:97). The 1990s saw an overall growth of manufacturing jobs untypical for US cities at the time (Mayer & Provo, 2004), often created in high-tech sectors including semiconductor manufacturing (Mayer & Provo, 2004) in synergy with the so-called ‘Silicon Forest’ in nearby Washington County (Gibson & Abbott, 2002). Accompanying this regional economic growth, the four-county population grew by 68% between 1980 and 2010 (Abbott, 2011).

Nevertheless, Portland’s economy is not without problems; these are clearly acknowledged in policy documents and the academic
literature (and were highlighted by interviewees) – and constitute a counterstrand within the otherwise eulogistic discourse. Unemployment has remained high relative to the national average (Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Flood, 2010; Portland City Council, 2012); Portland’s population has expanded faster than its job market (PDC, 2015:4), with the city itself creating only five per cent of job growth in its ‘Metropolitan Statistical Region’ between 2000 and 2008 (Portland City Council, 2012:46); the metro area underperforms in terms of employment rates and *per caput* personal income relative to population size (Value of Jobs, 2011:5); educational attainment lags behind that of ‘closest competitor metros” (PDC, 2015:4); and personal income has grown more slowly than in “cities our region traditionally likes to compare itself to such as Seattle, Minneapolis and Denver” (Value of Jobs, 2011:5). Problems with unemployment, especially among younger residents, are reflected in a humorous saying mentioned by two interviewees (P2; R2): “Portland: the place where young people come to retire”. Meanwhile, declining housing affordability has long been identified as a pressing regional problem (Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Portland City Council, 2012).

The core strategic priorities informing the current *Portland Plan* (City of Portland, 2012:3) are summarised as ‘Prosperity’, ‘Education’, ‘Health’ and ‘Equity’. The last of these is assigned a coordinatory role, with the Plan defined overall as a ‘Framework for Equity’: “Advancing equity must be at the core of our plans for the future” (Portland City Council, 2012:4). The three integrated strategies structuring the Plan – ‘Thriving Educated Youth’, ‘Healthy Connected City’, and ‘Economic Prosperity and Affordability’ – and their associated dimensions, are presented as emanating from this core (see Figure 6.5). Accordingly, the strategic importance of economic growth is justified using statistical evidence to construct relative economic shortcomings as a problem of inequality (see, for example, p.15). And yet the assumption that economic growth should necessarily constitute a strategy for alleviating this inequality goes unquestioned. In this respect, Portland’s institutional construction of sustainability is clearly distanced from ‘green radicalism’ (Dryzek, 2005). Despite Portland’s reputation for alternative thinking and progressive politics – discussed below – there is no sense, for example, in which policy documents aspire to Callenbach’s (1975) west coast vision of *Ecotopia*. 

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‘Weirdness’

“everyone looking to make a new life migrates west, across America to the Pacific Ocean. Once there, the cheapest city where they can live is Portland. This gives us the cracked of the crackpots. The misfits among the misfits.”

(Palahniuk, 2004:14)

A second aspect of Portland’s discursive construction, reflected in popular culture, and mentioned consistently across the research interviews, though not explicitly highlighted in city policies, concerns the eccentricities of its inhabitants (Flood, 2010). This embrace of eccentricity is emblematised by the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ slogan, which residents appear to have adopted enthusiastically. According to Long (2013), the ‘Keep ____ Weird’ phenomenon originated in Austin, Texas. He identifies a “growing number of self-
proclaimed ‘weird’ campaigns across North America—a trend that presents an opportunity to explore place-based expressions of resistance in the larger context of an evolving and pervasive period of neoliberalism” (Long, 2013:53). The author observed stickers with the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ logo on bumpers and in shop windows repeatedly during fieldwork (Figure 6.6) – and parodies thereof (also predicted by Long, 2013) (Figures 6.7 and 6.8).

Figure 6.6: bumper sticker, for sale in city centre shops

Figures 6.7 and 6.8: car window sticker (seen in Gateway), parodying the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ slogan, and official city slogan of ‘Portland: The City that Works’ which it appears to be subverting (here on the side of a municipal street-cleaning vehicle, downtown).

The opening sequence of the popular, internationally broadcast Portlandia television series, which satirises the city’s eccentricities, includes the mural shown in Figure 6.9 along with various portraits of ‘alternative’ local characters, juxtaposed with images of city landmarks. Thus, the television show – understood by interviewees as contributing to Portland’s external mythologisation – implicitly positions ‘weirdness’ as a defining asset.
Echtner and Ritchie (2003) argue that general media reports contribute significantly to the formation of preliminary images of possible tourist destinations. Accordingly, texts in mass-market publications outlining reasons to visit particular places also contribute to outsiders’ understanding of their distinctive characteristics, or ‘unique aura’ (Echtner & Ritchie, 2003). It is significant, therefore, that the list of ‘10 Things to Do’ in Time magazine’s online travel guide to Portland (Brooks, undated) seems closely attuned to the ‘liveable’ and ‘weird’ strands of Portland’s discourse of difference. Echoing some of the specific ‘liveable’ features mentioned above, it includes three green open spaces, Portland’s cycling culture, independently owned Powells bookshop, and four unusual food and drink experiences (independent microbreweries, ‘movie brewpubs’, food carts, and the Voodoo Doughnuts outlet). The last of these is described as epitomising the city’s defining ‘weirdness’: “If there ever was a business that captured the kooky essence of Portland, it’s Voodoo”. Portland’s strip clubs are included partly on the grounds of weirdness: “this town has an abundance of eccentric and very naked establishments”. The weird, liveable and green strands of the discourse, along with a sense of political difference, are intertwined in the text accompanying one recommendation: “Portland has a reputation for being a republic of tree huggers”. Similarly, in the introductory text
of the popular Lonely Planet travel guide to the city, Portland’s implied eccentricity is woven into the other strands of the discourse described in this chapter:

“It’s a city with a vibrant downtown, pretty residential neighborhoods, ultragreen ambitions and zany characters. Here liberal idealists outnumber conservative stogies, Gortex jackets are acceptable in fine restaurants and everyone supports countless brewpubs, coffeehouses, knitting circles, lesbian potlucks and book clubs” (Bao, 2011:200).

These representations, however, ignore the uneven distribution of ‘weirdness’ across the city. Lonely Planet’s claim that “everyone” in Portland enjoys the activities listed may be lighthearted, but insofar as it has explanatory force as a caricature, the fact of its limited reference may be obfuscated. As one (academic) interviewee commented: “There’s a part of Portland you never hear about” (P1). As a spatial analyst, he had identified a particular “geographically isolated” part of Portland corresponding to the Portlandia lifestyle, illustrated in Figure 6.10.44 Two other city-level respondents (C5; C6) concurred; describing ‘East Portland’, as “east of 82nd”, suggesting that from the perspective of the residents of “Portlandia Portland, it’s very different” (C5). Outer Eastern districts such as Gateway and Foster Green, another commented, are more like “anywhere USA” than Portlandia (R2). Goodling et al. (2015:508) similarly observe that “[o]ver the last two decades, 82nd Avenue has become a symbolic and material demarcation between a world-renowned sustainability mecca and its devalued hinterland”.

Gateway’s cultural distance from inner Portland is reflected in some metropolitan snobbery towards it, reported by the Concordia interviewee: “We call them the sneaker crowd. Because they always have bright white sneakers on and they still cut their hair in the mullet style of the 70s and 80s…they wear sweatpants and think that’s dressed up” (C1). There is a long history, according to one GG board member, of Portlanders referring to the “great unwashed East Side” – and “the further east you go, the more the image is lower

44 In his words: “about 39th Street and into Downtown, going down to Powell boulevard – maybe up to Holgate, to Killingsworth…When you get out to 82nd avenue, it’s exactly like Houston or Atlanta – cities that you would consider the opposite of sustainability in the conventional sense”.

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class” (L7). One city-level respondent spoke of a “cultural chasm” between this and inner neighbourhoods (C1).

Interviewees were ambivalent about the economic implications of this reputed ‘weirdness’; while branding the city as unique, it may lessen its appeal for corporate employers. This problem was understood as exacerbated by the image of ‘liveable’ Portland, in that “people who want to spend a lot of time skiing and surfing and so on...are not perceived to be so much the American work ethic of working 70 or 80 hours a week” (R2). Nevertheless, Portland’s low wages relative to other large West Coast cities were understood as appealing to some large employers (R2). Even though venture capital for entrepreneurial activity may be in shorter supply than in

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45 Large corporations in the Metro area include Nike’s global headquarters and Intel’s “largest and most complex site in the world, a global center of semiconductor research and manufacturing, and the largest private employer in the state” (Intel, undated). Major downtown employers include Portland State University (PSU) and the Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU).
“competitor cities” (PDC, 2015:4), there was general agreement about its appeal for ‘start up’ companies. A PDC interviewee suggested that weirdness “attracts a certain generation who are creating the next businesses…it’s a place for them to start, to experiment, like the city experiments, and to expand with little risk” (C4).

In Abbott’s observation of “perhaps an overly self-conscious hipster style plus lots of small entrepreneurs and artisans building upscale bicycles, designing clothing, brewing beer, or roasting coffee” (Abbott, 2011:174), the elision of ‘weirdness’ with commercial activity seems significant. One interviewee (C1) differentiated Portland’s ‘hipsters’ (“the young urban professional, you know sort of metrosexual person that’s sort of polished and edgy”) from its ‘hippies’ (“more Grenola…dreadlocks, Grateful Dead”). This distinction suggests Portland is characterised as much by what Lloyd (2010) calls ‘neo-Bohemianism’ as by its anti-establishment tendencies. Its economically productive ‘hipster’ class might provide evidence to support Florida’s (2002) thesis about the instrumental economic benefit of attracting the ‘creative classes’. Peck (2005:767–8), however, sees the “cult of urban creativity” espoused by Florida as a “form of soft law/lore for a hypercompetitive age”, leading to strategies which “subtly canalize and constrain urban-political agency”. Lloyd (2010:xii–xiii) similarly questions the “leveraging of artistic energies”: while “enriching the cultural landscape”, it also “[abets] the neoliberal tendencies toward cutthroat interurban competition and the promotion of gentrification”. Echoing Lloyd’s turn of phrase, one of the Portland Plan’s ‘Guiding Policies’ is to “leverage our arts and culture community to drive innovation and economic growth” (Portland City Council, 2012:54). The 2012 annual report published by the newly renamed EcoDistricts frames its discussion explicitly in terms of Florida’s thinking, describing him as a “visionary” (Figure 6.11).

Portland’s weirdness may, then, be implicitly embraced by city-level actors, but only insofar as it serves the city’s goal of improving Portland’s economic competitiveness. Since non-conformist self-expression potentially extends beyond the neo-bohemian characteristics of the ‘hipster’ into more radical social and political ways of being, its explicit encouragement within policy would potentially have an unstabilising effect.
Figure 6.11: opening text from main section of EcoDistricts 2012 report (EcoDistricts, 2013b:4)

‘Well-plannedness’ and ‘greenness’

Portland is also discursively positioned as practising exemplary urban planning. This overlaps with its reputation for cutting-edge ‘green’ innovation, with the former understood as uniquely accommodating towards the latter. The story told is one of integration across different levels of governance, geographical scales, sectors, and across time.

As is the case for its liveability, the sense that Portland is ‘well planned’ is often evidenced with reference to external reputation, as the “poster child for regional planning, growth management, and other innovative urban planning policies” (Mayer & Provo, 2004:9), the “urban planners’ Mecca” (Chapman & Lund, 2004:208), or an “example of innovative planning for the rest of the country” (Abbott, 1983:8), attracting the “accolades of planners seeking to emulate its innovations” (Goodling et al., 2015:504). Long-term admiration is reported for the relative vitality of both its urban core (Abbott, 1983; Mayer & Provo, 2004) and architecturally “intact neighbourhoods” (Sussman & Estes, 2004:136) which “boast a strong sense of

As writer and visionary Richard Florida says, cities are our greatest invention and the key social and economic organizing units of our time.

Of course, cities have to be designed in the right way to generate wealth, improve living standards, and enable the interactions necessary to drive creativity and productivity. With the right design and planning, cities can be engines of innovation full of talented and creative people who accelerate economic growth. And without the proper planning, they can’t.

At the dawn of the 20th century, just 14 percent of people lived in cities. Today, cities held more than half the world’s population. By 2050, more than five billion people (six out of every 10 people) will live in cities and urban centers. The question of our time is: How do we create the cities we want – and need – to serve billions of people?

We believe that EcoDistricts are one of the key comprehensive tools available to citymakers for unlocking the full potential of cities. That’s why we’ve launched Target Cities, a two-year immersion program for leading cities that wish to integrate our pioneering EcoDistricts Framework into neighborhood development and revitalization projects.

The Framework provides a practical template to build support, drive projects and measure results through four action areas: 1) District Organization: organizational formation, building alliances, and setting goals; 2) District Assessment: creating a performance-based neighborhood sustainability roadmap that addresses the eight EcoDistrict performance areas; 3) Project Development: launching catalytic district-scale sustainability projects; and 4) District Management: developing district governance to guide long-term project implementation.

The Target Cities program is designed to help cities innovate, to embed performance metrics into projects, and to apply sustainability to a range of neighborhoods, including low-income communities that are often left out of sustainable development planning and development.
community” (Flood, 2010). This discursive ‘well plannedness’ is structured chronologically by a succession of local and state policy initiatives dating back to the 1970s. Chief among these was its 1972 Downtown Plan, reversing previous policies favouring car use and freeway construction (Abbott, 2011). Envisioned features included a waterfront park, pedestrian-oriented design, high-density retail, office corridors, and a car-free transit mall. It also entailed a “complementary effort to revitalize neighbourhoods” to “avoid the flight of middle-class families to the suburbs” (Mayer & Provo, 2004:19). The Downtown Plan was implemented under Mayor Goldschmidt (1973–79), who also organised funding to rehabilitate older residential areas, at first to the immediate west of downtown.

Infrastructural improvements through the 1980s also contribute to this ‘back story’. These are significant, according to Abbott (2011), because they were achieved in spite of the city’s concurrent industrial and economic decline (Hagerman, 2007). Construction of Pioneer Courthouse Square (now Portland’s central open space), on the site of a proposed multi-storey carpark, was completed in 1984. Portland’s light-rail system, gradually expanded since 1986, has brought about “high-density, mixed-use communities in close proximity to the stations” (Mayer & Provo, 2004:22). At the same time, the city’s 1980 ‘Industrial Sanctuary’ policy helped preserve light-industrial land uses near the urban core (Gibson & Abbott, 2002:428) and support social diversity elsewhere by ensuring “wider access to middle-income jobs” (Seattle Industry, 2007). Ozawa and Yeakley’s (2004:257–258) observation that “[v]oters in the Portland metropolitan region…consistently list the protection of natural resources, parks and open spaces as among their highest priorities” implies the continuous democratic legitimacy of environmental policy-making over time. Less problematically than in the case of Portland’s economic prospects, Portland’s ‘weirdness’ was understood by city-level interviewees as an enabling factor in its relative ability to implement such initiatives. Thus, its ‘weird’ and ‘green’ images are “two sides of the same coin” (C4), with the former facilitating experimentation in sustainability: “Portland is more willing to take a run at things than any other city I’ve been at” (C4). The conclusion is drawn that Portland merits praise for its successful “long-term development of a coalition of interests that provides the
necessary political backing” (Wheeler, 2000:138) for ongoing innovation, and for its consistently long-term strategising:

“the results on the ground in Portland can be traced to a 50-year effort at planning, policy-making, and implementation…This is not a story of a single initiative or programme or ribbon-cutting” (Cotugno & Seltzer, 2011:304).

Its credentials as a “standard bearer for sustainability” (Goodling et al., 2015:520) are further discursively justified with reference to its wider regional embedment. As a state, we read, Oregon has been associated with ‘progressive’ politics (Clucas & Henkels, 2005) for several decades – particularly those relating to environmental protection (Knaap & Nelson, 1992; Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Ozawa & Yeakley, 2004; Steel & Lach, 2005). The ‘Urban Growth Boundary’ surrounding Portland’s metropolitan area, introduced in 1979 following state legislation in 1973 (Seltzer, 2004; Abbott, 2011; Metro, undated a), and contrary to standard practice in the US (Knaap & Nelson, 1992), was spontaneously mentioned across the research interviews as a defining characteristic of the Portland area.46 However, Abbott (2011:173) suggests that this progressive image belies growing geographical polarization on many issues since the 1990s, with western Multnomah County significantly more liberal than elsewhere. Clucas and Henkels’ (2005:5) analysis of the political geography of Oregon as a whole also suggests that residents of eastern, more rural areas are significantly more conservative (ibid:2-3). This unevenness is reflected in PoSI’s finding that environmental projects failed to inspire enthusiasm in GG (DistrictLab, 2010), as echoed by the Gateway resident interviewee’s opinion that support for “the green thing, the recycling…encouragement to use public transportation” was diluted in outer Portland generally (L8), and by

46 The success of Portland’s growth management strategies in reducing sprawl is not universally accepted in the academic literature (Chapman & Lund, 2004:208). The officially recognised problem of housing affordability (Portland City Council, 2012) has been blamed on the UGB – even if causal links between the two have not convincingly been demonstrated (Seltzer, 2004:57). Dong and Zhu (2015) argue that evaluating the success of the UGB (and Portland’s other ‘smart growth’ policies) is problematic since the assessment will vary depending on the criteria used, and warn that drawing causal links too readily between particular land-use policies and observable outcomes may tend towards spatial determinism.
one city-level interviewee’s (C1) concern that the ‘eco’ aspect of the *EcoDistrict* label may not resonate in areas such as Gateway. It also finds an echo in PDC’s suggestion (PDC, 2015:4) that the “wide disparities in quality of life, access to services and employment, and quality of infrastructure across Portland neighborhoods” constitute a key challenge facing the city, with poverty being concentrated in its eastern districts.

Portland’s image as ‘well-planned’ is closely articulated with its ‘green’ credentials particularly in the understanding that economic growth has not compromised the natural environment. In practice, one urban designer interviewee suggested, Portland’s environmental policies may not be uniquely innovative; its experimental spirit may be a “west coast thing generally” (L1). Yet Abbott (2011:158) describes a discursive consensus such that “[o]verall, many experts believe that the Portland area is among the nation’s most successful in balancing economic growth and environmental protection”. Flood (2010) implies an envisaged synergy between these two goals, in that Portland “places a great deal of its economic hopes on being the greenest city in the nation”. When the *Portland Plan* asserts, with reference to its green infrastructure, that “Portland enjoys the position of being one of the most fully functional urban laboratories for innovation in sustainability” (Portland City Council, 2012:54), this is within a discussion of its commercial competitiveness: “Portland’s focus on sustainability is an economic asset and an advantage over peer cities” (ibid). City ranking exercises are again cited to illustrate Portland’s lead in high-tech and green-tech industrial production and adoption (Mayer & Provo, 2004; Abbott, 2011). In these terms, Portland’s approach exemplifies the classic assumptions of EM theory:

> “that environmental degradation can be addressed through foresight, planning, and economic regulation; in particular, new technologies can be developed and utilised to enhance economic growth while simultaneously curtailing waste”  

Just as, following the discussion in Chapter Two, this EM approach may be in tension with the centrality of ‘equity’ visualised in the *Portland Plan*, others argue that Portland’s approach to sustainability rests on particular unacknowledged principles and
assumptions. Rutland and Aylett (2008) suggest that its ‘common sense’ worldview has been constructed based on selective environmental criteria and an arbitrary municipal spatial framing. The consensus constructed in Portland may allow city policy to obviate the possible need for more radical lifestyle changes (ibid). Relatedly, Hagerman (2007:286) traces the “shifting social constructions of nature implied by references to green values” within the ‘liveability discourses’ circulating in Portland, which depend on unstable combinations of arbitrary “imaginaries of post-industrial economies, ecologies and urban citizenship” (287). As predicted in Chapter Two, then, closer inspection of broad environmental claims reveals a contingent interpretation of sustainability, resting on certain discursive assumptions, and reflecting specific agendas. This has implications for the transferability of Portland’s distinctive approach to sustainability: the ideological potency of its discursive storylines may be diluted in other settings.

One (academic) interviewee’s (P1) comments reconstitute the received version of Portland’s planning history as a rhetorical construct serving to reinforce the discourse of its ‘difference’ as a sustainable city. He suggested that selective aspects of Portland’s legacy of historical urban planning had been coarticulated in a storyline projected through the lens of contemporary policy agendas, and thus ‘repackaged’ to become internalised within Portland’s ‘green’ discourse. Portland’s current reputation for being sustainable, on this view, rests on historical good fortune rather than intentionality. He gave the example of the UGB: “that just happens to have been something in 1972 – the stars aligned – and now Portland is considered sustainable because of that 40 year-old act”; it was established originally to protect farmland (Mayer & Provo, 2004). Similarly, cycle lanes were implemented, P1 suggested, due to a particular combination of economic constraints and political actors: “there was very little money for a lot of alternative infrastructure, so bike lanes were put in. There were some champions in the city who moved that forward. And now that’s been folded into the sustainability effort”.

Taking this argument further, even the foundational work of the 1970s might be interpreted as largely dependent on favourable preconditions. Portland’s topography, first, “deserves a share of the
credit for preserving the streetcar city in the age of the automobile”; the hills west of downtown and the Columbia river to the north provided natural barriers to sprawl (Abbott, 1983:3). Additionally, the pre-existence of relatively small blocks in the urban centre (Abbott, 2011) may have served to promote pedestrian vitality – an enabling relationship generally accepted in urban design theory, following Jacobs (1961). One city-level interviewee (C8) similarly thought it serendipitous that “the original founding fathers laid out the downtown grid in a 200 x 200 [foot] block system, where most major cities are 400 x 400”. Meanwhile, Portland’s relatively slow suburbanisation may have been historically fortuitous (Mayer & Provo, 2004); even its oldest neighbourhoods had not suffered the “full cycle of deterioration” by the late 1960s (Abbott, 1983:3). The long-term ‘front porch’ culture of these neighbourhoods has now been bundled into what is now called a ‘liveability’ agenda (R2).

A critical historiographical argument of this type, in its implicit call for revisionism, acknowledges the existence of a dominant narrative; it does not deny the enabling role of this narrative for the circulation of current discourse, and therefore the effects that this discourse has on the world. The received narrative of Portland’s planning history, in other words, however partial or deterministic it seems, may itself function as an important precondition for the implementation of the city’s contemporary sustainability policies. To the extent, meanwhile, that such criticism is unconvincing in its attempts to deconstruct the causality of the narrative, the contextual significance of these historical enabling relationships needs to be accounted for in a description of the present. Either way, a particular context (real or imagined) can be identified as shaping and enabling Portland’s current approach to sustainability. This problematises the transferability of ED more specifically – in terms of technologies, policies, governance processes, and democratic legitimacy – insofar as it too is enabled by its context. Not only may it have limited applicability for other cities, but also for those parts of Portland itself where the dominant discursive construction more obviously departs from the way the city is imagined by local residents.

Civic engagement

The reputed ‘difference’ of Portland’s governance practices also encompasses the unusual political engagement of its citizenry,
considered a significant influence on the city’s development since
neighbourhood conservation and issue-based activism first
flourished in the late 1960s (Abbott, 2011). Evidence provided for
early successful civic activism includes the protests leading to the
replacement of the Harbor Drive multi-lane expressway with
Riverfront Park, and to the cancellation of the proposed Mount Hood
freeway, which would have destroyed several communities in
Southeast Portland – its funding channelled instead into the MAX
(Metropolitan Area Express) light rail system. Johnson links this
engagement directly to Portland’s discursive construction as ‘well
planned’ and ‘liveable’:

“the exceptionalism of Portland’s civic life is one
significant reason for the city’s reputation as a well-
planned city with a lively downtown and a strong creative
community…It is widely accepted that Portland is a city of
engaged citizens and that government agencies routinely
involve citizens in public policy debates”

(Johnson, 2004:102, italics added).

But if, as Taylor (1998:89) suggests, the feasibility and desirability of
participation has, since Plato, formed “part of a more general
philosophical debate about democracy”, then the precise nature of
Portland’s ‘citizen engagement’ merits closer attention.

The claimed exceptionalism of Portland’s civic life is typically
framed less by the efficacy of anti-establishment protest than by City
Hall’s unusual willingness to listen to citizens’ views. As one city-
level interviewee claimed: “Portland has such a long history of
empowering its neighbourhoods and communities more broadly –
we can’t not do it!” (C6). Evidence for this historic willingness is not
difficult to find. Already in 1976, a study commissioned by the
mayor described citizen participation as “part of Portland’s
‘equilibrium’ – it is beyond dismantling” (Witt, 2004:99). In its
introductory ‘Citizen Goals’ section, the 1972 Downtown Plan is
positioned as a citizen-led framework for decision-making:

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47 The author did not have access to the source of this observation, which Witt
In private document collection of Carl Abbott, Portland State University” (Witt,
“The Downtown Plan is an opportunity for the citizens of Portland to say: Let’s first decide how we want to use our Downtown and then determine what tools are necessary to achieve our land use decisions”
(City of Portland, 1972:2).

This broke with conventional practice in its rejection of “transitional land use determinants” which hinder the achievement of goals, in favour of “alternative implementation methods” (ibid). The move away from ‘top-down’ planning was further institutionalised in 1974, when mayor Goldschmidt’s established an office to fund and assist NAs across the city (Mayer & Provo, 2004:19). Putnam et al. (2003:241) differentiate Portland from other cities not so much in its level of civic activism in the early 1970s, as in its maintenance through to the 1980s, while participation generally declined elsewhere. In a study from the early 1990s (Berry et al., 1993), researchers found an “unprecedented level of commitment to citizen involvement by comparison with other cities nationwide” (Witt, 2004:84).

Cotugno and Seltzer (2011) position the ‘Metro’ government as a key enabling factor in such achievements, particularly in its ability to coordinate actions across individual municipalities (Figure 6.12). As the nation’s only directly elected regional government (Abbott, 2011:150), Metro was formed following voter approval in 1978; its region-wide responsibilities include land use, solid waste disposal, visitor attractions, transportation planning, and parks. The development of Metro’s Region 2040 Growth Concept 50-year ‘long-range plan’, adopted in 1995, is presented as having entailed outreach (Mayer & Provo, 2004) among “thousands of Oregonians in the 1990s” (Metro, undated b). Collectively, such commentaries construct a sense of regional consensus and inclusive civic participation, where the state, as far as possible, directly reflects the collective views of the public.
While, however, the public has had a well documented shaping role in Portland’s institutions and policy-making, its voice has been mediated through particular institutional processes. Claims such as Abbott’s in the early 1980s, that public action is a key factor in producing “the sense of Portland as a very specific place” (Abbott, 1983:5), do not indicate the presence of direct democracy, or that the space of Portland should be understood primarily as a Lefebvrian ‘representational’ space produced through emergent public contestation and expression. Rather, a set of particular technologies of governance are employed to assemble and represent the public.

The nature of the processes through which public engagement should take place is highly contested. As discussed in Chapter Five, dominant norms of practice, drawing on an ideal of communicative rationality, and oriented towards a goal of variously defined ‘consensus’, have been critically interpreted as suppressing the ‘political’. Emphasising rational dialogue in deliberative forums in order to ‘bracket’ social inequalities

“means proceeding as if they don't exist when they do, this does not foster participatory parity. On the contrary, such bracketing usually works to the advantage of dominant groups in society and to the disadvantage of subordinates”

(Fraser, 1990:64).

Cochrane (2007) examines current participatory practices within urban policy making specifically, arguing that the possibility of
radical disagreement is excluded to the extent that the participation takes place on the government’s own terms. Choices about these terms, accordingly, are choices over how publics should be assembled through processes of active governance. Barry (2013:98) outlines a series of technologies, including town hall meetings, stakeholder forums, consultation processes, and opinion polls which construct publics in that they are employed “both to assemble and to speak on behalf of specific publics” (Barry, 2013:97).

In encouraging widespread engagement in decision-making processes, the state folds its own self-interest into questions of the common good. The value of such engagement is summarised by Seltzer (2004:55): it offers “cover and legitimacy” to planners and decision-makers; increases the “range of ideas at the table”; and “makes ownership of the results, the plan, widespread, particularly over the years and decades that it takes to act on plans”. Since similar points were made by many of the research interviewees, a coherent view might be inferred on the potential benefits of citizen engagement as practised in Portland. But to equate the extensiveness of engagement with the realisation of such benefits obscures the mediating effects of particular techniques of public assemblage. Such effects describe the gap between the ambition of representing the public in all its emergent variety, and the inevitable limitations of the state’s ability to do so in practice.

First, there is no guarantee of all social groups being represented equally – or at all – in such processes. In Portland, according to one city-level interviewee, “it tends to be very white upper-income controlled and so we’ve got an unrepresentative system” (C7); Witt (2004:96) describes the involvement of younger residents, African Americans and ethnic immigrants as “nominal”. One (academic) interviewee cited research showing that the Portlanders most likely to engage with neighbourhood-related city politics are long-term homeowners, who identify more strongly with their neighbourhood (P1). The relative apathy which, conversely, correlates with transience may have been exaggerated by displacements following inner neighbourhood gentrification; PDC (2015:4) presents the “[l]ack of affordability in close-in neighborhoods, resulting in gentrification, displacement and concentration of poverty in East Portland” as one of the key strategic challenges facing the city over the next five years.
East Portland is “now home to the city’s least affluent and most diverse population” (Goodling et al., 2015:520); the current Portland Plan notes that ethnic diversity decreased between 2000 and 2010 in inner North and Northeast districts, but “significantly increased in East Portland”, where incomers additionally tend to be less wealthy (Portland City Council, 2012:109). Abbott (2011:162) cites Parkrose neighbourhood – in Gateway – specifically as exemplifying a suburb becoming “increasingly cosmopolitan” as lower-income households are “pushed” there.

Second, a system rewarding participation may tend towards an inequitable outcome if, as Broady (1968:47) suggests, “the activity of responsible social criticism is not congenial to more than a minority”. When, consequently, the system is “hijacked by cliques and those with…time and power” (Allmendinger, 2002:207), it may serve to reproduce existing power structures (Ellis, 2004). These possibilities were borne out in one interviewee’s observation that “the more politically powerful [NAs] have actually got their own war chests” (C8) for contesting unwelcome decisions.

Third, the voices of self-interested parties may drown out more civic-minded ones (see eg Dear, 1992; Hillier, 2003; Innes & Booher, 2004). One city-level interviewee commented that “the unfortunate thing about really strong local governance structures is that they don’t always choose the enlightened path…they tend to go with the status quo…we’ve got some neighbourhood associations that actively resist change” (C7). Over a decade ago, Putnam et al. (2003:267) suggested that the older civic activism of 1970s had been replaced by NIMBYism, and civic participation by increasingly self-interested groups. Johnson (2004:116), similarly, identified a trend from “collective vision” to more “divisive tactics of special-interest-group politics”, with local politics gradually polarising since the late 1960s. The problem of self-interested participation also disrupts the narrative of consensual decision making across the Metro region overall. Gibson and Abbott (2002) describe regional growth management policies as having repeatedly been resisted, both by wealthier suburban residents with a preference for low-density residential land use, and by others fearing gentrification. One regional-level interviewee commented that “there has been some
pushback over the need to protect single-family residential neighbourhoods” (R1).

Finally, the flexibility of any specific technology of engagement may be constrained by institutional capacity. Despite optimism that wide engagement both indicates and facilitates democratic legitimacy (R2; C2), and coordinates diverse actors’ efforts “to accomplish something they couldn’t do alone” (P4), interviewees were aware that capacity is uneven across the broader region. One regional-level interviewee explained Portland’s willingness to engage as more related to funding levels than unwillingness elsewhere: “the city of Portland gets maybe 2-3 times as much money per resident as [my city] does” (R2). In Portland itself, public involvement has often led to considerable expense and frustration for city authorities (Johnson, 2004:102). Reflecting Putnam’s et al. (2003:249) observation that “[p]olitics in Portland isn’t placid or cuddly”, the downtown property developer interviewed referred to Portland’s nickname of “Little Beirut” (C8). One city-level interviewee reflected that: “the best thing about Portland is we offer everybody a voice. And the worst thing we do is offer everybody a voice because it slows us down” (C2). Open-ended engagement, in other words, conflicts with the practical need to reach ‘closure’ (Allmendinger, 2002) in policy decisions.

The potential for engagement to hinder the efficient implementation of policy is reflected in the status of PDC, which has played a significant role in Portland’s development since its establishment in 1958 (Gibson & Abbott, 2002). PDC is “legally structured so that it can move faster than the typical bureaucracy” (Gibson, 2004:65), accountable only to the mayor and his governing board, and many Portlanders have viewed it as “arrogant”, “closed”, “autocratic” (Gibson, 2004:62), and a “threat to proper planning” (Abbott, 1983:176), associating it with the displacement of communities during the 1970s urban clearance programmes (ibid). Gibson (2004:74) refers to the “incredible mistrust” of PDC in outer Southeast Portland. One interviewee joked that PDC’s historical role was less about ‘placemaking’ than ‘displacemaking’ (L7). Since the late 1990s, according to Gibson (2004), PDC has become more accountable following pressure from elected officials and neighbourhood activists, but is unchanged in its retention of
“technical expertise and funds to engage in big redevelopment projects that privilege established market actors. Decision making remains in their hands” (Gibson, 2004:81).48

The pride expressed by the city-level research interviewees in Portland’s strong and institutionalised system of NAs need not imply that institutional actors themselves believe that local political processes are – or could ever be – fully inclusive in practice. Innes and Booher (2004) suggest, referring to Schumpeter (1942), that public officials may simultaneously believe in democracy and be sceptical about participation. Equally, a desire for more inclusive participation is not necessarily incompatible with apprehension about its practical implications; there is no guarantee of a particular administration’s policy agenda being strengthened through greater civic engagement. Indeed, Aars and Christensen (2013) found the opposite outcome in Norway, where residents of municipalities with “a high density of local voluntary associations...tend to be less approving of their local councillors” (Aars & Christensen, 2013:383).

Gateway specifically is characterised by its estrangement from City Hall. Perhaps reflecting the relative transience and lower income (and therefore time-poverty) of the local population, residents are relatively politically unengaged (P1); city officials have historically ascribed underinvestment in Gateway to residents’ failure to make their voices heard (L5). Electoral participation levels, according to regional advocacy group Coalition for a Livable Future (undated), are noticeably lower than in gentrified inner NE Portland. Its relatively recent annexation (in the 1980s) was locally opposed due to ensuing increased taxation (C4), and its legality later questioned (L3). Several interviewees described a lingering suspicion of the city authorities:

“a feeling of disenfranchisement from the very beginning when it was annexed out here, there was a lot of promises made, a lot of things were supposed to happen out here but the city has never followed through...There’s a lot of frustration with City Hall, a lot of distrust” (L7).

48 Following the recent economic recession, according to the PDC interviewees, the organisation has turned its focus more towards economic development and human capital rather than physical urban interventions (C1; C4).
One expressed a sense of injustice, claiming ‘a study’ had shown that investment in public projects in Gateway was low relative to the tax gathered from the area, and to spending downtown (L5). Another argued that public money spent in Gateway often served politicians’ interests (such as meeting low-income housing targets) without strengthening the tax increment base of the local Urban Renewal Area (L6). City-level interviewees acknowledged Gateway residents’ distrust of municipal authorities, seeing it as a possible barrier to implementation of the ED (C4).

**Implications**

The discussion above has outlined a multidimensional image of Portland, characterised by consensual inclusive decision making, liveability, acceptance of difference, environmental sustainability, and democratic vibrancy, all reinforced through their embedment within a wider regional and historic context. This discursive Portland is a very public city in both a ‘civic’ sense – as an inclusive space of tolerance and collaboration – and in a ‘emergent’ sense whereby the political both expresses itself, and is allowed to shape, urban space. As an image with broad appeal, the metaphorical Portland is mobilised as a structuring device for the city’s developmental goals.

However, the ideological force of this metaphor simultaneously obscures the more particular agendas which underpin it, as well as the actual unevenness of Portland’s ‘difference’, socially and spatially. This unevenness might be understood as a type of friction. In particular, the various strands of the discourse appear more obviously at odds with the reality of East Portland. To the extent, then, that ED is aligned with mainstream policy, it too might be expected to arouse less enthusiasm in Gateway. On one level, then, its failure describes an inability to assemble the ‘Gateway public’ in an intended way; as a process, it did not support the expression of a genuine emergent publicness, and failed to further significantly its civic public life.

The following section explores further the possibility that ED was somehow misaligned with Gateway’s publicness, by comparing the assemblage of publicness in different parts of the city, using the criteria outlined in Chapter Four. The problematic nature of Gateway’s publicness, it is argued, is constitutive of the other
implementational difficulties which the GG initiative has faced to date.

6.3 The Publicness of Portland’s Space

Spaces of ‘civic’ publicness

The four downtown observation spaces (Figure 6.13) can be bracketed together as highly regulated and clearly bounded, displaying very civic publicness more oriented towards consumption than transgression. All were busier than the average for the locations in Portland, with a strong sense of safety; Pioneer Square (Figure 6.15) was patrolled by security guards. Posted regulations serve to demarcate these spaces from their surroundings (Figures 6.15 & 6.17). Loose space activity was much in evidence – for example, people were gathered around a game of giant chess in Pioneer Square; mothers interacted while their children played in Director Park’s water feature; people ate lunch in Pettygrove park and sat at cafés elsewhere. There was no evidence of emergent publicness.

Figure 6.13: Urban Plaza (Portland)
Figure 6.14: publicness ratings for downtown Portland locations
Figure 6.15: Pioneer Courthouse Square with regulations (Portland)

Figure 6.16: Director Park (Portland)
The ‘programmed’ nature of much of Portland’s downtown has been commented on elsewhere: Abbott (2004:166) interprets a comment by journalist Robert Kaplan (1998) as ‘typical’: “With its neat trolley lines, geometric parks, rustic flower-pots beside polymer-and-glass buildings, crowded sidewalk benches…Portland exudes a stagy perfection”. The “systematic programming of activities” by Pioneer’s Square’s management committee is in fact a deliberate tactic to deter “derelicts and spike-haired teenagers” (Abbott, 2004:174).
The three locations observed in South Waterfront (Figure 6.18) also sit well within the ‘civic’ space type, with a strong sense of security, exhibiting loose space rather than emergence. While the streetcar terminus was relatively busy and diverse, only local residents appeared to be using the pocket park and riverside walk.

Figure 6.18 publicness ratings for South Waterfront locations (Portland)
Figure 6.19: South Waterfront pocket park

Figure 6.20: South Waterfront riverside pathway

Figure 6.21: South Waterfront streetcar terminus
While not in the downtown area, Alberta Park (Figure 6.22) also sits well in this cluster of ‘civic’ spaces. This resembled Pettygrove Park in its level of use, sense of security, and loose space activity (with dog walkers opening conversations with others, and parents talking while their children played, for example). The types of emergent publicness resulting from territorial tensions highlighted in other studies of green parks (eg Byerley & Bylund, 2012) were not evident to the author in these cases.

**Alberta Park**

![Figure 6.22 publicness ratings for Alberta Park, Concordia (Portland)](image)

Downtown fringe: highly visible space of emergent publicness

2nd Avenue in Old Town (Figure 6.24) had a similar volume of use to other downtown spaces. It differed from them, however, in its ‘edginess’: street beggars were present, along with some rowdy behaviour among pedestrians (during the late afternoon); the streets are less well cleaned than in the urban core. The area is less obviously securitised than the other downtown spaces, with a countercultural atmosphere, evidenced in graffiti and political
stickers. Indicatively, the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ mural depicted in Figure 6.9 is located nearby – both a celebration of alternative behaviour and itself a non-institutional intervention in the urban fabric. While the centrality of Old Town makes it, like the main urban core, a well-frequented and highly visible area, it simultaneously sits uncomfortably with downtown since it feels less secure and its publicness is more emergent; it is therefore typologised separately here, as the ‘downtown fringe’.

![Old Town Diagram](image)

**Fig. 6.24 publicness ratings for SW 2nd Ave, Old Town (Portland)**

![Figure 6.25: SW 2nd Avenue (Old Town)](image)

Conscious decisions made by the city authorities may partly explain the differences in publicness between Old Town and the main urban core. It has effectively been designated as a space of less regulated and non-mainstream behaviour. Current policies promote it as an ‘entertainment district’ (Theen, 2013); homeless shelters and other social services are concentrated here, following tacit agreements made during negotiations between City Hall and investors over downtown redevelopment since the 1980s (Abbott,
2004:174). Old Town is characterised internally by various types of boundary blurring, reflecting its emergent qualities. Significantly, the ‘R2D2’ homeless encampment is located on Old Town’s main thoroughfare (Figure 6.26). As a squat, its legality is fiercely contested by its occupiers, the city, and the landowner. Symbolically, its physical boundaries are marked by artistic and political messages, including some directly questioning the nature of private property ownership, with a call to ‘disturb the comfortable’ (top right on Figure 6.26). Indicatively, the author observed a policewoman attempting to prevent a group of young people from smoking cannabis; they acquiesced only temporarily, after challenging her authority. This marked an instance of ‘a- legality’ (Lindahl, 2013): the right of the establishment to regulate behaviour was tested rather than clearly upheld or transgressed. Boundary blurring was also evident in a symbiotic enmeshment of commercial activity and emergent publicness; the area’s self-consciously countercultural retail establishments are perhaps best typified by ‘Voodoo Doughnut’, a well-established ‘weird’ visitor attraction.

Figure 6.26: ‘R2D2’ encampment on Burnside in Old Town
Gentrified neighbourhoods: local spaces of emergent publicness

Alberta Street (Figure 6.27), in the gentrified Concordia neighbourhood, like 2nd Ave, was characterised by considerable loose space activity (pedestrians strolling, window shopping, romantic activity, skateboarding, dog walking, etc). As part of a residential neighbourhood, however, it was less busy than the downtown locations (more similar to South Waterfront). While lacking the ‘edginess’ of 2nd Avenue, several cases of low-level anti-social behaviour were observed by the author (begging, drunkenness, cars driving past with loud music).

![Alberta Street](image)

Figure 6.27 publicness ratings for Alberta Street, Concordia (Portland)

![Alberta Street](image)

Figure 6.28: Alberta Street, Concordia (Portland)
Alberta Street stood out most characteristically among all 13 locations, however, for its emergent publicness. Many walls display artistic murals, and municipal infrastructure is covered with graffiti, stickers and posters, containing political messages and promoting subcultural or artistic events (Figure 6.29); children make colourful chalk markings on the streets and pavements (Figure 6.30). To some extent, the authorities encourage its ‘artistic’ appearance: its municipal wastebins, for example, are unusually decorated with recycled road signs (Figure 6.31); Portland’s official tourism organisation promotes a monthly open-air arts festival here (Travel Portland, undated).

Various types of ‘spherical blurring’ are evident in the vicinity of Alberta Street, where municipal art, DIY art on municipal property,
artistic objects displayed on residences, and commercial art are all mutually derivative (Figures 6.32 and 6.33).\(^49\) Simultaneously, in the wide variety of signs and symbols (Figure 6.34) displayed outside residential properties nearby, there is evidence of personal sentiments publicly emerging.\(^50\) Some of these have artistic and/or political content; others publicise rather intimate sentiments. Significantly, while most interviewees began by mentioning ‘showpiece’ downtown open spaces or publicly-owned infrastructure and institutions, several then qualified this with reference to the more immediate vicinity of their home – for example:

“This really public spaces are...the sidewalk in front of your house and in front of your neighbour’s house...in the Portland way, I think that really the most public of spaces is everybody’s front yard public space” (P1).

The same respondent evoked a sense of publicness having different modalities when commenting that “downtown...there’s clearly more public-private delineation than there is at the neighbourhood scale...But in [Portland’s older] neighbourhoods there’s a little bit of a different sense of what’s public” (P1).

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\(^{49}\) In his discussion of political claim making in public spaces, Iveson similarly observes a “marriage between graffiti writers and commerce” in Sydney, such that shop-fronts, packaging, advertising, and commodities all use “graffiti styles to attach a ‘street’ aesthetic to their products” (Iveson, 2007:133).

\(^{50}\) This was also the case in other gentrified residential parts of the city which the author visited.
‘Outer suburbs’: the defence of the personal sphere

To characterise more clearly the categories of Portland space proposed above, it may be useful to contrast them with the (wealthy) outer suburbs of the Metro area. The author gained some insight into this type of space during a two-day stay in ‘Highland Heights’, a residential area of the city of Beaverton, immediately west of Portland (Figure 6.35). The author’s main impression was the non-urban ‘feel’ resulting from the zoned exclusion of commercial land. Although children played outside, and neighbours conversed informally, this appeared to evidence what Lofland (1998) calls the ‘parochial’ sphere – an extension of the personal sphere rather than true publicness (see Chapter Three). One of the interviewees discussed Beaverton specifically, caricaturing it as an example of somewhere that people live because:

“the urban experience isn’t important for you. If home is your focus…There aren’t as many annoyances. Everything’s tidy and orderly. You put your residential here and you put your commercial there and you have your green spaces, and a lot of the people around are very similar to you” (L1).

As an ‘ideal type’, then, the outer suburb is at least imagined as a fundamentally non-public space, lacking social and functional heterogeneity, and characterised by harmony rather than tension. It is not a civic space of tolerance, since there is little ‘otherness’ to tolerate; nor, in its homogeneity and lack of friction, is there
significant reason for emergent publicness to be assembled. Zoning, which leads to land being occupied exclusively by residential properties and the roads leading to them, means that publicness even in its civic modality is effectively designed out by the space’s formal qualities.

Figure 6.35: Highland Heights: monozoned outer suburban residential space (photographs by June Stephens)

‘Urban suburbs’: potentially emergent, but formally personal space

Several interviewees emphasised the importance of ‘porchlife’ in facilitating social intercourse in Portland’s older neighbourhoods, where homes are “outward facing” and “engaged with the street” (P1). If Chapman and Lund (2004:214), in their study of Portland’s densification policies, are right to “include in public space the public-private transition in residential areas that includes front porches, sidewalks, and planting strips”, then it may be significant that outer Portland neighbourhoods typically lack all three of these ambiguously public features. The formal qualities of Gateway reflect those of an ‘outer suburb’: it is clearly zoned, car-centric, and its architectural and urban and design practices are oriented primarily towards defending the personal sphere (Figures 6.36 and 6.37).
While, indicatively, PDC promotes Gateway externally on its own terms rather than as a “Portland-style place” (C1), since the ‘Portland brand’ is not considered relevant to its likelihood to attract investment, Gateway diverges markedly from the ‘outer suburb’ ideal type. Its ambivalence was reflected in research interviewees’ general unwillingness to classify Gateway as either urban or
suburban. Its characteristics as a socially diverse, relatively low income area traditionally marked by dissatisfaction with the institutional expectation of its residents being problematically ‘entangled’ (Marres, 2012) with the different spheres of city life. In other words, Gateway displays the preconditions of emergent publicness. Barnet and Bridge (2013:1035) understand the urban partly as “a complex of issues, problems, and objects that generate contention”; but also as a “field where the diversity and interconnectedness of effects operates as a seedbed for issue recognition”. If, as suggested here, the formal qualities of Gateway serve to ‘design out’ public life, then the possibility of the assemblage and visibility, or recognition, of emergent publicness is denied.

Due to the unwelcoming environment for pedestrians, even civic publicness is formally impeded in Gateway’s open spaces (Figure 6.38). Very few pedestrians were observed on its main thoroughfare, Halsey Street (Figure 6.39); retail customers mostly arrived by car (plentiful parking space being available). The ‘PDC Park’ adjoining Halsey was almost entirely unused, except by a small number of street drinkers (Figure 6.42). This no doubt reflects the fact that it has been left undeveloped – but also echoes the lack of pedestrians in its vicinity. A vicious circle may have emerged, where underuse adds to its appeal for street drinkers (Jacobs, 1961); the resulting sense of insecurity repels others from the space (Byerley & Bylund, 2012) and its vicinity. The transit station approach (next to Oregon Clinic), finally, had a higher pedestrian volume than the other two spaces, and did exhibit limited loose space activity (for example, skateboarding), but few people lingered here (reflecting its clear intended function as a ‘link’ rather than a ‘place’) and there was no evidence of emergent publicness.
Figure 6.38 publicness ratings for Gateway (Portland)
Figure 6.39: Halsey Street, Gateway (Portland)

Figure 6.40: main pedestrian access path to Gateway Transit Hub (visible in the distance), in front of Oregon Clinic (Portland)
Figure 6.41: first impressions of Gateway on leaving the transit hub: ‘big box’ retail and extensive car parking facilities

Figure 6.42: views across PDC park towards Halsey Street in Gateway – currently used only by the destitute
Various local interviewees emphasised that neighbour interactions were very common in Gateway, pointing again to a parochial (rather than public) intersubjectivity. Several mentioned that another local park does attract a wide variety of users, but that nevertheless little obvious mixing between social groups occurs:

“I think everybody in this neighbourhood’s really friendly – we’ve shared our garden produce with the Russian neighbours down the street. But then I go to the park and I see that different groups do really stick together, and it would be difficult to break that” (L8).

This observation problematises the assumption of an unmet desire in outer residential areas for ‘mixity’ with diverse others. In downtown spaces, differences and tensions are highly regulated, resulting in a civic type of intersubjectivity. In residential areas such as Gateway, however, differences may be managed through self-segregation at the public level. This marks another potential departure, culturally, from the norms of the Portland discourse. As discussed earlier, the city and GG board members understood some of Gateway’s formal characteristics as obstacles to its economic and social development. Its lack of open spaces and non-pedestrian friendly environment are thought to impede a collective life – expressed variously in terms of ‘vibrancy’ and ‘community cohesion’. But the ED’s ability to further sustainability goals is predicated on a degree of collective engagement. Attracting interest from private investors, so as to catalyse the process, has proven difficult given Gateway’s existing negative image. A ‘chicken and egg’ situation has thus emerged.

Nor can GG turn to the city to fund interventions with diffuse aims such as ‘walkability’ – described by one PDC interviewee (C1) as “incredibly expensive”. Following PoSI’s withdrawal, and recent budget cuts to PDC, funds will only be available to support projects with quantifiable forecasted economic benefits, rather than for open-ended experimental purposes. PDC will tend to invest “where there’s already interest” (C4), and has no incentive to fund process: “What I get measured on is capital investments – not how many neighbourhood meetings take place” (C4).

GG’s capacity to shape Gateway’s development is therefore directly constrained by the city’s economic priorities, which are
aligned with the goals of the Portland Plan. Gateway’s political, social, and economic distance from the inner city, described by the mismatch between the dominant Portland discourse and the reality of East Portland, suggests that a rather different ‘bottom-up’ vision might otherwise emerge. Certainly, the developmental model of Portland’s gentrified neighbourhoods had little appeal for interviewees, either culturally (“We don’t want boutiques – we’re not boutiquery people” (L4)) or socially: ideally GG board members hoped for a “mixed-income” rather than an upmarket future (L5). Even if funds were available, however, it is also questionable whether encouraging an emergent type of publicness in Gateway would lead to the city’s goals being furthered (unlike in the Portlandia areas, which constitute ‘neo-bohemian’ enclaves). The constructed, civic publicness of the downtown ‘showcase’ was untransferable to the specific context of Gateway not only because its formal qualities mitigated against this, but perhaps also because of significant political and cultural resistance to becoming a ‘second downtown’.

6.4 Discussion

Portland, according to the dominant discourse, is a paradigm of public space. This discursive publicness has a civic modality, in the city’s ‘liveability’, and an emergent one, both in its fêted visible ‘weirdness’ and its residents’ intense involvement in political decision-making. Portland appears in this discourse as a Lefebvrian ‘representational space’, significantly shaped by emergent publicness. Supposedly, its progress as a relatively sustainable city has been enabled by the unusual extent to which the city’s decision-making processes give expression to emergent publicness.

In reality, however, publicness is assembled unevenly across Portland, with the city centre most obviously characterisable as civic, and gentrified neighbourhoods such as Concordia most emergent. The gentrified enclaves are characterised by widespread polemical civic engagement, and a history – through the process of gentrification itself – of a ‘DIY’ reshaping of the material environment; the results are aligned with (and constitutive of) mainstream Portland discourse, and easily assimilated into
institutional policies, since they are considered economically beneficial. There may be little motivation to encourage emergent publicness in Gateway because it will not obviously serve this purpose. Instead, a civic sense of publicness is envisaged, by city-level ED actors, and in the local plans which have been allowed to emerge, as an aspiration for Gateway. This type of publicness, however, was unrealisable since Gateway retains the spatial characteristics of a suburban residential neighbourhood; the expense of intervening into its material space to achieve these cannot be justified by the city, which prioritises visible infrastructural fixes, to ‘showcase’ the city’s environmental and economic aspirations, over facilitating ‘social cohesion’ among a group distanced from the dominant discourse.

The ED initiative as a whole appears to have appealed to City Hall for two reasons. First, it could be piloted at little cost to the public purse at a time when funding for infrastructural projects was restricted. Second, it inspired genuine enthusiasm as an innovative experimental approach to developing ideas for the city’s development; faced with the uncertainty of how to further sustainability in the complex, open system of a city, the ambition of letting solutions emerge from the system itself had a beguiling logic. Both reasons are illustrative of broader trends in governance, and are discussed in turn below.

The first, along with the goal of delivering social change in collaboration with private sector actors, would appear to lend weight to the ‘neoliberal’ governance thesis (Gualini, 2010), as discussed in Chapter One. Portland clearly exhibits some of the ‘surface markers’ of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ discussed in Chapter Five. It consciously brands itself competitively with a focus on sustainability; City Hall is keen to export its private sector sustainability expertise; it prioritises technological innovation; its economic aspirations appear to draw on a discourse of EM. While its policies are not primarily structured around a ‘carbon agenda’, reducing emissions remains a key ‘measure of success’ (Portland City Council, 2012:125); its Climate Action Plan describes climate change as “the defining challenge of the 21st century” (BPS, 2009:7), and boasts about Portland’s history of supporting “ambitious carbon-reduction efforts” (ibid). Its acceptance of hybrid governance models is indicated in
ED’s claim to be “a new model of public-private partnership” (EcoDistricts, 2013c:3). Similarly, the Portland Plan repeatedly brings the public and private sector together: it elides the two in aiming to “support public and private innovation” (Portland City Council, 2012:45); its “universities and businesses are active in research and development and the commercialization of new technologies” (ibid:54). In admitting “limited public resources for business assistance” (ibid:52), it distances its governance role from that of providing direct subsidies or operating a ‘command’ economic model; it looks to private businesses to implement these aspects of the plan. Its devolution of traditional municipal responsibilities to NGOs and individual residents may be symptomatic of neoliberal disciplinary ‘terror’ (Savitch & Kantor, 2002; Purcell, 2008) – the result of competitive pressure on municipal authorities to reduce services funded through taxation. From a critical perspective, then, Portland’s policies appear to be in the service of neoliberal urbanism; and ED appears as a neoliberalising initiative insofar as public opinion has been assembled in line with these policies. The broader neoliberal context has meant that economic competitiveness is privileged over other considerations, serving in effect to filter out local activities which do not obviously serve this goal. This all appears to bolster an argument that Portland’s policies are catalytic of neoliberalism rather than, as its discursive construction insists, resistant to it.

This argument is problematic, however, in that the label ‘neoliberal’ is not neutrally descriptive. Rather, as discussed in Chapter Five, it has a heavy normative charge; it coarticulates various political and economic tendencies as inter-related and posing a multivalent threat to a valorised ideal of ‘social democracy’. Its use by European commentators rests on a critical stance towards “an American “pull” on other cities” (Savitch & Kantor, 2002:307). If it thereby represents a charge of ‘Americanisation’, it is of limited analytical help in understanding American cities themselves, which have their own “particular setting” (Savitch & Kantor, 2002:283) and internal divisions. For the actors in Portland, indeed, the accusation misses its target. While an academic interviewee recognised the validity of the accusation of neoliberalism, he also countered that:
“another interpretation, which has to coexist, is that when people feel connected to their place and have some ownership of that place, they’re going to be more inclined to care for that place...The notion of ownership and having a voice in public decision making is a powerful one” (P1).

Portland’s city-level interviewees did not express the strong reservations about devolution which the notion of ‘terror’ might imply. More typically, it was described in positive terms, as a pragmatic response to inherited problems:

“it’s a simple response to filling the gap. The resources aren’t there, not slated for future development. So there’s a clearly defined community and they’re taking it up and moving forward” (P4).

Gateway residents themselves were unambiguously welcoming towards devolution of power, given their previous negative experience of City Hall: “by having us initiate it and do it as volunteers, we have a lot more to say about what they do” (L4). The ED was embraced as better attuned to an imagined regional culture of “incredible citizen engagement...something of a participatory democracy approach – Oregon is strong on that” (L7), where “engaged citizens, informed, speak their voice, and their representatives choose to listen or not listen at their peril” (L3).

From one perspective, these attitudes may suggest a ‘normalisation’ of neoliberalisation. As Miraftab (2009:33) argues: “neoliberalism, as a strongly ideological project, relies on legitimation and citizen’s perception of inclusion to achieve hegemonic power...the neoliberal technology of rule does not rely primarily on coercion and military force”. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that one interviewee explicitly presented devolution as a precondition for sustainability:

“We have more infrastructure in the ground than we can maintain. And in general the government is out beyond its means. And so we’re looking for ways to reallocate responsibility for some of these things to a level which is more sustainable” (C7).
Nevertheless, the accusation of neoliberalism fails to capture the possibility that Portland’s policies are relatively progressive in its context; in assembling publics in line with these policies, it is protecting their status as a progressive departure (Gibbs et al., 2013) from North American norms. Although forced to compete economically in this context, Portland’s chosen strategy is to remain distinctively progressive relative to its competitors. In this light, even if local actors are understood as victims or conduits of their neoliberal context, they also have an agentive role in shaping its implementation. As Springer (2010) observes, urban neoliberalisation is an ‘uneven’ process, variously accepted or resisted within existing institutional landscapes, rather than a singular phenomenon (Peck et al., 2009).

One way in which ‘conformity’ to neoliberal agendas may be encouraged is proposed by Swyngedouw’s critical position (as outlined in Chapter Two) that contemporary interpretations of SD tend to depoliticise decision-making. But this position is challenged by the case of Portland. The evidence here appears, rather, to support Cochrane’s alternative conclusion that SD, when mobilised by the state as a framing device for neo-liberal projects, tends not to lead towards passive post-political acquiescence so much as “generate a contested political space in which the political meaning of sustainability becomes the focus of argument, debate and negotiation” (Cochrane, 2010:378). The ‘smooth surface’ of published ED documentation, then, may belie ongoing contestation, but is also potentially actively generative of emergent publicness – frustrated though this may have been in Gateway.

In a more nuanced reading, then, ED enacts a progressive modification of a neoliberal status quo; while constrained by its wider political and economic context, Portland seeks to change this on its own terms. In subordinating emergent publicness to its policy goals, it has protected this progressive position. Nevertheless, the particular implementational outcomes of the initiative to date highlight the significant shaping role played by contingent economic and political geographies of power at different scales. Such considerations raise further questions about its straightforward transferability to other settings. Such questions are not addressed, however, in the newly reworked Framework document, which
merely proclaims a “replicable model for cities to accelerate neighborhood sustainability” (EcoDistricts, 2013c:3).

The second reason for its appeal – its innovative experimental nature – may align it closely with broader international trends towards what Chandler (2014b) calls ‘post-liberal’ governance, implicitly claiming to embrace uncertainty and complexity. **ED** is illustrative of newer, adaptive, feedback-based “forms of governance that abandon the Modernist dream of total control, acknowledging the inherently unpredictable and unplannable nature of cities” (Evans, 2011). One explicit motivation for **ED** was the desire to learn what sustainability might mean at a city-wide scale; the process of real-world bottom-up experimentation, or ‘research in the wild’ (Callon et al., 2009) in the face of uncertainty, it was hoped, might fulfil this desire. Aiming to learn both from successes and expected failures, **ED** emphasised post-hoc reflexivity rather than modernist ‘problem solving’. Solutions were to be induced from, rather than to determine, practice. It attempted to tap into place-specific knowledge so as to “enable complex life to govern through its own mechanisms of creative problem solving” (Chandler, 2014b:35).

In practice, however, it appears to demonstrate a paradox which may be inherent in all such attempts at ‘post-liberal’ governance: the transformative power of emergent publicness was constrained precisely to the extent that it was institutionalised. Mahony (2010) observes a similar confusion within other state-organised ‘public making projects’: although state actors promise to allow the public to organise itself, they “also [affiliate] and thereby [align] these processes to particular pre-existing organisations, institutions and sets of already established political aims and projects” (Mahony, 2010:19). This produces a tension between “two contradictory ideas of the public” (ibid:18). While one GG interviewee described PoSI as having “put five seeds in the ground, and they’re all going to bloom on their own, and then we’re going to be able to cull the best practices from each” (L5), in fact the initiative was never aimed at self-organising public autonomy; rather, the state would inevitably play a crucial ‘gardening’ role (Bauman, 1989). In this particular case, at least, the short-term evidence does not support the interpretation of governance as issuing a fundamental challenge to the liberal state (Gualini, 2010).
6.5 Conclusions

The conditions in those areas of Portland where ED currently appears to be successful include: (a) more obvious alignment with a longer-term legacy of enabling discursive and political factors; (b) backing by powerful resources; and (c) relatively simple governance arrangements which do not involve intensive engagement with a diverse public. If ED is microcosmic of the experimental nature of the eco-city worldwide, the phenomenon is likely to reproduce existing power structures (since these provide more benign laboratory conditions), to favour a very civic form of publicness, and to be relatively untransferable from the privileged niches in which it succeeds. Emergent publicness may only be encouraged in enclaves where it is likely to serve the predefined goals of institutional authorities. The processes of active governance through which eco-cities are implemented may tend to exclude more radical, contrary, or contradictory positions, because of the need, institutionally, to impose ideological closure. Governing for and through dynamic unpredictable complex plurality remains a self-contradictory ambition, and even in this most public of cities, emergent publicness remains fundamentally at odds with representation.

This critical case suggests that the broader problematic of planning for urban sustainability as outlined in Chapter One is not necessarily resolved by the state’s adoption of progressive governance techniques; and that this impasse is reflected in the apparently oxymoronic nature of the endeavour of planning ‘cityness’. If this endeavour is indeed a futile one, then a case might be made that the role of policy-makers need not encompass emergent publicness. Perhaps a more modernist approach to urban transformation may more successfully effect technological change, while emergent publicness itself will self-assemble around this to produce the ‘city’. This possibility is explored in the following chapter, using the case of Sejong in South Korea.
Chapter Seven

Assembling the Civic Public: Case Study of Sejong City

“The utopian city for everyone”  
(The City of Happiness Sejong brochure, MACCA, 2012a:6–7)

The case of Portland suggests that the aim of harnessing emergent public life for planning purposes is self-contradictory; that the constructive force of institutional policy making and the emergent modality of public life pull in opposite directions; that the latter will only be enfolded into the former on a selective basis, precisely because any institution will tend to seek to reproduce itself; that institutions are predicated on static representation while emergent publicness is constituted through representational space. But what becomes of a city whose plans pay no regard to emergent publicness? In a city for which a very civic form of publicness is envisioned, in whose plans the social only appears as a type of ‘harmony’ and ‘happiness’ determined by the city’s form and technologies, is the oppressive potential of planning merely intensified, or will an emergent dimension of public life appear of its own accord? If the latter occurs, then there may be a case for eco-city planners to concern themselves only with technologies; for a consciously ‘utopian’ mode of planning which ignores social and political context since it can exert no influence on these. The eco-city as technological showcase, in short, may be a more efficient way of introducing and testing sustainable technologies. This chapter tests the proposition that emergent publicness might assemble even in a meticulously planned, ‘top-down’ eco-city initiative such as Sejong City in South Korea, studied as a ‘critical case’ in the sense outlined in Chapter Four.

The chapter begins with a scene-setting description of Sejong’s formal characteristics, including its governance structure and ‘eco’
credentials. However, the question of its performance in environmental terms is largely bracketed, partly because the city is incomplete, and partly because no standard way of measuring this exists (as noted in Chapter Three); the aim, rather, is to demonstrate how Sejong has been enabled by a particular political, cultural and historical context. This is important not only because it raises questions about the replicability of Sejong as a model of urban sustainability – and illustrates well the contestations which lie behind the ‘smooth surface’ of official documents – but also because it has significant implications for the nature of the publicness which is envisaged and performed. The chapter continues by looking at the types of observable publicness which have resulted, which are interpreted as being aligned with the plans. The apparent success of the development on its own terms, however, does not necessarily qualify Sejong as a transferable model of transformative sustainable urbanity.

7.1 Sejong City: Main Characteristics

Sejong is located in the centre of the Republic of Korea (‘South Korea’, hereafter referred to as ‘Korea’), approximately 75 miles south of Seoul (Figure 7.1). The city forms part of the new ‘Sejong Special Autonomous City’ region,\(^5\) which is approximately 70% the size of the municipal Seoul area (Cho, 2013). The City Region borders the metropolitan region of Korea’s fifth most populous city, Daejeon, to its south. While the new city itself has an area of just under 73 km\(^2\), the City Region extends over approximately 465 km\(^2\), with South Chungcheong Province (‘Chungcheongnam-do’) to its west and North Chungcheong Province (‘Chungcheongbuk-do’) to its east (Figure 7.2).

\(^5\) In this thesis, ‘Sejong’ is used to indicate the new ‘Multifunctional Administrative City’ currently under construction; the ‘City Region’ refers to the broader ‘Special Autonomous City’ area which encompasses the new city as well as the town of Jochiwon and other surrounding settlements.
Figure 7.1: South Korea’s five largest cities and Sejong
(source: MACCA, undated a)
The City Region approximately maps onto what used to be called Yeongi County at the eastern edge of South Chungcheong Province, and incorporates the previous county capital town of Jochiwon. Yeongi County was a largely rural area; approximately 20,000 residents and farmers were evicted to accommodate the new development. The older settlements within the city limits have mostly been demolished, although one, in Sejong’s central park, will be restored as a ‘history park’ (Hong, 2013). Sejong City Hall, established in Jochiwon along with the City Region in 2012, should relocate to Sejong in summer 2015.

The national government will spend a projected ₩22.5 trillion (£15 billion) on developing Sejong (Mundy, 2013). Development is being managed by the Multifunctional Administrative City Construction Agency (MACCA), a governmental organisation formed in 2006 and accountable to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. The implementation of the current plans, based on the winning design from an international competition held in 2006, is guaranteed by law until 2030.
The first residents moved into the ‘Chonmaeul’ (first village) complex in December 2011 and the city was officially opened in July 2012. On completion in 2030, Sejong is designed to accommodate up to 500,000 residents (with a target of 800,000 in the broader City Region – compared with c.92,000 in 2010). As of June 2014, only one residential neighbourhood (Hansol, containing Chonmaeul) was fully built and occupied, with around 30,000 residents. The rapid pace of construction, however, means that 150,000 are expected as soon as 2015 (Shin et al., 2011). The state Board of Audit and Inspection has recently questioned the feasibility of the population projections (Power, 2012), and according to one MACCA interviewee population targets had not been met (SM4). Nevertheless, both the estate agent and the MACCA interviewees contended that interest in residential and commercial property in the new city (speculative and in terms of actual offers made) remains strong. While, nationally, the cost of land has been relatively stable for last 6 years, Sejong City saw a large increase for “second consecutive year, with 5.5 percent growth in 2013” (Joo, 2014).

Land preparation, infrastructural development, and the construction of the first residential complexes, has been executed by state construction agency Korea Land & Housing Corporation (‘LH’). The government commissioned LH to purchase the necessary land, and LH will retain the profits from property sales. Most of Sejong’s ongoing residential building work has been contracted to private development companies. According to the MACCA research interviewees, no significant problems have been encountered with the private developers’ willingness to comply with the city plans, beyond normal negotiations over prices, though this may be a significant test of the city’s success looking forward (SM2).

Following the completion of the new Government Complex in Sejong in November 2013, most of the government’s ministries and sub-agencies relocated to Sejong, largely from the Seoul metropolitan area, between 2013 and 2014. Some key state organisations (such as the Presidential Office, the National Assembly, and the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence), will remain in Seoul; the Prime Minister’s Office is among those relocated, however. A total of

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52 The in-text referencing systems for research interviewees is explained in Table 4.6.
approximately 13,000 civil servants across 36 organisations have been mandatorily transferred to Sejong (KOCIS, 2013). The unwillingness of many to move has been widely reported in the press, along with problems associated with family separation (see eg: Korea Times, 2011; Korea Herald, 2012b; 2013a; Mundy, 2013), and ongoing concerns over inefficiencies due to staff making regular journeys between Seoul and Sejong (see eg: Korea Herald, 2012a; 2013b; Kim & Choi, 2013; Mundy, 2013).

MACCA claims that Sejong will be “one of the world’s greenest cities” (MACCA, undated b), and “Asia’s Green Metropolis of the Future” (MACCA, undated a). This claim relates in part to its “goal of reducing CO$_2$ emissions by 70% and raising renewable energy ratio up to 15% before the year of 2030” (MACCA, 2010b). The reduction of emissions is to be achieved both by increasing the uptake of CO$_2$ through the provision of urban green space and surrounding forest (with 40 million trees to be planted), and through “environmentally friendly urban planning, energy efficient building design, and renewable energy use during the planning phase” (Shin et al., 2011:1). Electricity is provided from a central waste to energy plant, solar panels, and a hydroelectric plant on the river Geum, which runs through the city. As part of the national Four Rivers Restoration Project, the river’s wetland has been expanded by 50% (to 1,200,000 m$^2$), to provide “the most biologically diverse of all ecosystems in Sejong” (MACCA, undated a:10).

Surface parking spaces are limited in the city, but residential blocks contain large underground parking lots – in line with national minimum standards for new developments (SM2; SM4); the land devoted to road surface is deliberately restricted to encourage use of alternative transport (SM2). However, workers and residents have already complained about the lack of surface parking and road congestion (Kim & Choi, 2013; SM4). According to a research interviewee from MACCA (SM1), a balance was struck between a realistic appreciation of people’s desire to own and drive cars, and provision of alternatives. Hence, a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) service will run around the city on dedicated lanes, along with regular local bus services running through neighbourhoods and linking these to surrounding towns and villages, and 220 miles of bicycle paths will be constructed (MACCA, undated a:8). The BRT service currently
connects Sejong with Daejeon’s underground metro network to the north and Osong railway station to the south (which has a high-speed rail link to Seoul), and will be extended to Cheongju International Airport to the east in future. In the absence of a direct train service, regular inter-city buses connect the city to Seoul.

In more recent promotional material, the city’s ‘greenness’ is more obviously related to quality of life: it promises to be “a pleasant city where humans live in harmony with nature” (MACCA, 2012a:12). Related features include riverside bicycle lanes and hiking trails and a “double-layered green belt that provides the most pleasant environment” (MACCA, 2012a:12); peripheral green spaces will be connected by green corridors to a large park in the centre, which includes hills, forested areas, a national arboretum, and a lake. ‘Eco-bridges’ allow the green corridors to remain unbroken. All residences will therefore be within a short walk of open green space, with parks and green space accounting for 52% of the overall land. 500 rentable allotments have been provided within walking distance of the First Town (MACCA, 2012b). Communal gardens and exercise areas are located next to residential complexes; these are open to all, reflecting the aim of creating an inclusive, uncluttered, “human-friendly” environment “without utility poles, trash cans, concrete walls, advertisement billboards” (MACCA, 2012a:23). This is intended to contrast with Seoul’s cramped pedestrian environment, where the general public is often excluded from open spaces and the recreational facilities in residential complexes [SM4].

Sejong will boast the ‘world’s first ring-shaped urban form’ (MACCA, 2012a:12) around the central park. Although more than one research interviewee drew an analogy with Central Park in Manhattan, and the influence of Howard’s ‘Garden City’ plans might be inferred, this design is novel not because it includes a park in its centre, but rather because there will be no city centre; the city is divided into six functional areas, dispersed around the ring, with residential and retail properties interspersed throughout (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). Frequent BRT services around this ring will allow residents to travel anywhere in the city within 20 minutes without using a car. Building density is mixed but high by western standards, with the tallest (often 25-storey) residential buildings located nearer to the BRT line. In theory, then, the overall design will provide all the
advantages of the ‘compact city’ in terms of access to facilities, but without reproducing the Seoul-like congestion against which – as discussed in the following section – the new city defines itself.

![Figure 7.3: rendering of Sejong showing ‘ring-shaped’ layout](source: Korea.net, 2012)

Figure 7.4: the six functional areas of Sejong  
(Source: MACCA, 2012)

The early residents of the new city are, according to one MACCA interviewee, typically couples in their 30s and 40s with small children (SM4). This is reflected in data collected by Statistics Korea (MSCT, undated) which show significant shifts in the demographic profile of the City Region as a whole since the first residents arrived. Overall, the population increased by 27% (from approximately 92,000 to 117,000) between 2010 and 2013. Within this, the population aged
65 and over increased by only 7%, compared with an increase of 29% among people of working age (15-64). The number of household units increased by 33%, and the number of schoolchildren by 39%. Meanwhile, the number of residents working in the agricultural sector dropped by 7.5%. Of the first 300 residents of Sejong, 32% were in their 30s, and 25% in their 40s, thus making the town “young and vibrant” (MACCA, 2011); this compares with c.17% of the population for each age group in Seoul, based on 2013 data (Chosun Ilbo, 2014). In part, this age profile may be explained by the influx of civil servants (of working age), and may therefore be expected to change over time. One MACCA interviewee, however, expressed concerns that the social sustainability of the city may be compromised due to the likelihood that income levels will be unrepresentative, with few poor people or very rich people, and with education levels higher than the national average (SM1).

This expectation that residents will be highly educated reflects the government’s designation of Sejong as a “center of research, education, and high-tech industry” (MACCA, undated b). One academic interviewee (SA3) expected Sejong to be functionally distinct from other Korean cities as a “centre of information making”, both in terms of government activity, and interactions through international conferences. Joss (2015) uses Sejong as an example of a ‘knowledge city’, identifying this as a key discourse underpinning many contemporary approaches to urban sustainability. He observes that the city’s shape has literally been conceptualised around knowledge, in that the five functional zones around the central park are “variously designated knowledge centres” (ibid:239). Reflecting its hi-tech ‘knowledge city’ credentials, all buildings provide free wireless broadband internet, and residents have access to a wide range of digital services (discussed in the following section). Given the various government research facilities, university branches, hospitals, and IT, biotech, and green-tech companies which the city hopes to attract, Sejong has been designated part of the ‘International Science Business Belt’ incorporating the nearby cities of Daejeon, Cheongwon and Cheonan (MACCA, 2012a:9). This is intended to form an R&D cluster, as a pole of attraction away from Seoul (SA3).

Attracting businesses to the city was acknowledged by MACCA interviewees as one of the biggest challenges in the middle term. As
is the case with universities, which, according to one MACCA interviewee (SM4) “want to be here but do not want to start first”, a ‘chicken and egg’ situation has emerged. Since some of the city is inhabited, more attention will now be turned to this goal (SM1). Problematically, however, financial incentivisation from central government is likely to be limited due to complaints from other urban and regional authorities, “so it’s not easy to get the political support as far as the economic privilege is concerned” (SM1). As of August 2013, five universities had submitted business plans to locate branches in Sejong (of which two would be selected) (MACCA, 2013b). Sejong’s library – one of its landmark pieces of architecture – and the National Library’s only regional branch (MACCA, 2013a), was universally cited by research interviewees as among the city’s great successes. More broadly, the promotion of the city’s “world-class education environment” (MACCA, 2012a:14) reflects Korean people’s priorities in choosing a place of residence. What Shin (2012:221) describes as an “obsession with ‘a good educational background’” was reflected in the views of residents interviewed. According to one academic, Koreans’ future prospects are strongly shaped by their choice of university (SA4).

The city already boasts a high-tech elementary school “designated as a pilot school for Smart Education” (Jang, 2012), with a total of 25 smart elementary and secondary schools planned (Bae, 2013; Ser & Chun, 2013). The school has attracted considerable international attention; the headmaster devotes one afternoon most weeks to receiving guests from Korea and abroad. Nevertheless, press reports claim that civil servants remain concerned about Sejong’s education infrastructure (see eg: Kim & Choi, 2013). One resident explained that such concerns relate particularly to the lack of private after-school tuition for teenagers, seen as vital for obtaining a good university place (SR4). In Korea’s competitive educational environment, this is in her view the “number one reason” for people’s reticence to move their families here (SR4). Private tuition at secondary school level is very widespread in Korea, and has become what a spokesperson from the Korea Education and Research Information Service calls a “necessary evil” (Jang, 2012).

The overall story, however, is that infrastructure and building construction is on schedule, and – according to the MACCA research
interviewees – the plans have not been significantly compromised or altered since being finalised. It would therefore seem reasonable to credit Sejong with being well-planned and successfully implemented. The next section, however, outlines the particular conditions through which the final plans were assembled, and in so doing marks Sejong out as more specifically a product of its contingent context than necessarily a model of urban sustainability which can easily be transferred to other settings. These conditions include a series of national policy agendas (relating to the environment, ‘balanced national development’, a history of ‘new towns’ and other mega-projects, and the idea of the ‘ubiquitous city’), which themselves have particular histories, as well as a decade of directly related fervent political disputation.

7.2 Enabling Context: Policies, State, and Society

Environmental policies

While Sejong describes itself as “one of the greenest cities in the world” (MACCA, undated:8), its ‘greenness’ takes a particular context-specific form. National environmental policies explicitly oriented towards economic goals, announced during Sejong’s evolution, have at least a strong shaping role in this aspect of its aspirations. Although Korea’s first national environmental policy was introduced in the 1960s (Moon, 2009), environmental issues were considered low priority during the following decades relative to the need for economic growth (Moon, 2010). Local Agenda 21 was adopted in many municipalities in the early 1990s, but was only loosely implemented (Moon, 2009). A Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development was established in 2000, leading to the adoption in 2006 of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD), which identified a variety of negative trends in resource use, waste generation, and GHG emissions, among other problems (Moon, 2009). According to the OECD, South Korea’s GHG emissions nearly doubled between 1990 and 2005, representing the highest increase in the OECD area (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:19); urban air quality was poor relative to other OECD nations (OECD, 2006; Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011), and energy, water, pesticide and fertiliser use among the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2006:8).
Against this background of internationally observed environmental problems, President MyungBak Lee announced a *Low Carbon, Green Growth* strategy in 2008, to guide national development over six decades (Moon, 2010). This included targets for renewable energy production, development of ‘green homes’ and eco-friendly vehicles, and a doubling of investment in green technology (*ibid*). This strategy was promoted as a “new locomotive of national economic growth”, with economic and environmental improvements working together in a “virtuous cycle” (Lee et al., 2012:4). Various climate change-related targets introduced since the millennium have been interpreted as augmenting growth-oriented policies devised in the 1980s to encourage science technology and research (Shapiro, 2009). The economic focus is apparent in the announcement of the *Green New Deal* in 2009 in response to economic recession. This provided US$38.1 billion of economic stimulus, 80% of which was earmarked for environmental projects (Moon, 2010), including the controversial *Four Major Rivers Restoration Project* (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011). It was extended into a five-year *Green Growth Plan* later that year, setting out specific targets (Lee et al., 2012) and allocating US$83.6 billion to specific policy initiatives, as part of a *National Strategy for Green Growth* up to 2050 (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011). Funding has been controlled by central government, leading to competition rather than cooperation between local and regional authorities (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:75–76).

The plans for Sejong have echoed these recent policy developments. In fact, while the 2005 Act envisaged an “environmentally friendly setting in general” (Shin et al., 2011:8), it would be misleading to describe Sejong as primarily an exercise in environmental sustainability; its eco-credentials gained prominence as the plans developed. The goal of creating a ‘Carbon-Neutral Sejong’ by 2030 was announced in 2008; it was not part of the original special law of 2005 (Shin et al., 2011:8). Further carbon emission and renewable energy policies were announced in 2010 with the aim, according to MACCA, that Sejong should “take the lead in President Lee’s low carbon & green growth scheme” (MACCA, 2010b). Given the challenges issued within Korea towards its *Green Growth* policies, Sejong’s alignment with them suggests that its sustainability credentials are at least contestable. Critics variously claim these policies display an excessive focus on industrial
economic growth and faith in science and technology at the expense of social considerations, oppose their top-down management for excluding local actors from active participation, provide evidence of actual detrimental effects on local environments, and question whether certain elements, such as nuclear power, should be included (Moon, 2010). While accepting that the Green Growth policies represent a “positive start”, Moon concludes that “green growth policy protects the environment only when it is economically beneficial to do so. On the contrary, SD develops the economy within the limits of environmental capacity” (Moon, 2010:411). Cho (2010) is equally sceptical, contrasting the ‘deep ecology’ espoused by 1990s civil society groups with the more recent adoption of the environment as “the main policy agenda for neo-liberal metropolitan restructuring which favors an entrepreneurial leadership in urban institutional politics” (Cho, 2010:164).

Balanced national development

As mentioned above, Sejong’s original raison d’être was not primarily related to environmental policies. The key stated aims of the 2005 Special Act on the Multifunctional Administrative City were: (1) “eliminating urban sprawl of the capital region”; (2) “strengthening the national competitiveness”; and (3) “balancing national development”. Korea’s Special Act on Balanced National Development had been enacted in 2004, under President Roh, envisaging Sejong as one of four key projects, along with the dispersal of smaller government agencies to the regions, an ‘enterprise cities’ initiative to boost industry, research and tourism in six smaller cities, and an ‘innovation cluster’ initiative to encourage cooperation between industry and academia (MACCA, 2006a). The Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA), encompassing Seoul itself, the port city of Incheon, and the surrounding province of Gyonggi, represents c.12% of Korea’s territory, but houses around half its population (MACCA, 2006a; Kim & Han, 2012:143) and contributed almost half of national GDP in 2009 (Kamal-Chaouki et al., 2011:12). MACCA’s Chairman asserts that “Seoul doesn’t have much room for further growth considering its density. For further growth of the nation, we need another city” (Lee, 2013). Despite these ambitions, however, there is no evidence so far of a significant residential exodus from the SMA to Sejong. According to the local estate agent interviewed (SP1), most interest in new property comes from local towns such as Gongju, Jochiwon, and
Daejeon. One of the MACCA interviewees suggested that, realistically, Sejong is unlikely to create an immediate “revolution” in the Korea’s developmental balance, but may make people “start to think differently” – with the possibility that this new “mindset” will influence policies since policy makers themselves will be living in Sejong (SM2). For now, continuing opposition to Sejong draws both on cultural snobbery (SA2) and recalcitrance among those wishing to retain the “control and privileges that they’ve enjoyed in the capital area” (SM2). Nevertheless, Sejong’s future seems relatively immune to political interference, given the protection of the long-term plan by special legal frameworks until 2030 (SM2).

While it is too soon to assess Sejong’s implications for the balance of national development, its effects on the immediate region are being keenly observed by the authorities. There appears to have been little local opposition to the way the new city has developed; as discussed later in this section, residents of North and South Chungcheong province consistently supported it during the early planning stages. The consensus among research interviewees was that the eviction of existing residents was not acrimonious, though one interviewee recalled reading about complaints from farmers several years ago (SA4). Residents were offered financial compensation (above market prices), options to purchase land elsewhere at a reduced tax rate – for agricultural purposes or to build a new house – and career training for several years beforehand (SM3). 1,000 social housing units have been provided within Sejong itself (with priority given to families receiving less financial compensation) (SM3), and further low-rent housing is being developed in Jochiuron to cater for displaced residents (SC1).

Sejong’s official status as a “self-sufficient city” belies the consideration which has been put into its relationship with other nearby towns – including its contribution to the creation of an ‘International Science Business Belt’ (see earlier this chapter). S.-B. Kim (2006) posits the long-term risk of Sejong eventually becoming part of Seoul’s sprawl, and therefore argues that it should be considered an extension of Daejeon. The City Hall interviewee (SC1), however, was keen to emphasise its functional separateness from Daejeon, such that the two should complement each other. Indeed, one reason for not extending the Daejeon to Sejong, according to the
same interviewee, was to discourage people from commuting from Daejeon rather than living in Sejong (SC1).

Some tensions were reported between Sejong and the older county capital Jochiwon. One academic interviewee suggested that imbalances between the two, economically, demographically, and in terms of residents’ facilities, have become the “main issue in City Hall” (SA3). One interviewee had recently moved to Sejong specifically because Jochiwon “felt like an old place, not for young people…Old and poor people – sorry to speak like that – but in the construction city I feel they are young and with more money” (SR2). Furthermore, some envisaged infrastructural development outside the new city – including the upgrade of the road to Jochiwon – has not materialised (SC1). The provision of ‘smart’ school facilities, whose initial and ongoing maintenance costs are unusually high (SE1), has been questioned by schools and parents elsewhere in the region who suffer from large class sizes and insufficient equipment (SA3). Nevertheless, City Hall and MACCA were generally understood to have a constructive relationship; it is seen as advantageous for this relationship that the new mayor (as of July 2014) is an ex-Chairman of MACCA (SC1; SM4). In short, it would be difficult to conclude, based on the available evidence, that widespread local public or institutional discord has emerged during the city’s development, but Sejong’s relationship with Seoul remains ambivalent.

**New Towns and other mega-projects**

Since the 1960s, Korea has regularly undertaken large construction projects, mandated by central government (Park, 2011). Driven primarily by national economic considerations, these reflect Korea’s characterisation as a ‘Developmental State’, a concept glossed by Woo-Cummings (1999:1) as:

“shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures life in capitalist Northeast Asia. This state form originated as the region’s idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West, and despite many problems associated with it, such as corruption and inefficiency, today state policies continue to be justified by the need to hone the nation’s economic
competitiveness and by a residual nationalism (even in the contemporary context of globalization).”

It seems reasonable to suggest that this history of economically motivated “state-led mega projects” (Kim, 2011:192) was an enabling factor in the emergence of plans for Sejong. Significantly, such projects have traditionally been shaped by the need to mobilise support from local political leaders and voters (Park, 2011); they are tied into electoral tactics as much as intended to promote national development.

More specifically, Sejong continues a tradition of new city development in Korea. A series of ‘industrial new cities’ were built in the 1960s and 1970s, with Gwacheon (in the SMA) in 1979 (Seo, 2013) marking a precedent for government ministry relocation. Large-scale housing developments since the 1980s around Seoul have sought to meet rising housing demand and stabilise land prices (ibid; Kim & Han, 2012). Simultaneously, the 1980s were marked by state-led programmes, relying on Korea’s “highly speculative” (Shin & Kim, 2015:2) property market, to replace informal settlements with new high-density accommodation (Shin, 2009; Shin & Kim, 2015). Sejong is not the first large project to adopt environmentally friendly principles; this is typical of housing developments since 2000, according to Seo, who gives the example of Dongtan in Gyeonggi Province, developed as “a high-tech driven green city” (ibid). The new town agenda has recently addressed more specific purposes, with projects including the eco-city of Songdo linked to ‘free economic zones’, and various other “innovation cities nationwide where public organizations, including state-run companies, will be relocated” (ibid). Sejong’s evolution as a ‘mega-project’, then, is not an isolated phenomenon.

The environmental credentials of Korea’s mega-projects generally have been challenged. President Lee’s government was criticised for focusing excessively on “land development and construction projects” (Park, 2011:186). In promoting mega-projects, the government has emphasised “the preservation and value of the environment, but in reality it promotes development, and we call this neo-developmentalism” (Cho, 2003:50, translated in Park, 2011:187). Elsewhere, questions have been raised about the social and economic effects of Korean mega-projects historically:
“The proliferation of huge projects requires massive investment of public funds that could otherwise have been devoted to social and economic fields, such as social welfare and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, which would have been a more effective form of job creation. Moreover, the development of mega-projects and the resulting expansion of the state sector take place at the expense of social plurality and civil society” (Choi, 2010:16).

Korea may not be untypical in this respect: according to Flyvbjerg (2003:7), the governance of mega-projects internationally tends to display a relative lack of commitment to deliberative ideals, with civil society involvement minimised since it is “seen as counterproductive to getting processes started” (2003:5). Conversely, business lobby groups are overinvolved (ibid:91), resulting in a “lack of accountability induced by project promoters whose main ambition is to build projects for private gain, economic or political” (ibid:142). The genesis of mega-projects in politicians’ ambitions and power struggles appears to be more demonstrable than their economic or environmental benefits (ibid:4). Conversely, this may imply that mega-projects are more feasible in countries with weaker traditions of democratic engagement (as discussed later in this section), where public objections are less often incorporated into the democratic process. One academic interviewed suggested that in Korea’s city-building projects, including Sejong, “the city becomes the game of the government to attract foreign capital, reinforce their political powers, and also to make some money” (SA4). If this assessment is fair, it seems sensible to question the social characteristics of the cities which result.

Sejong in particular draws on a history of “plans that proposed an administrative and political centre in a place safe from any North Korean threats” since the country’s division in the 1950s (Kim, 2011:191). According to MACCA officials, the idea of relocation can be traced even further back, to the beginning of the twentieth century (SM1; SM4). Most notably, for authoritarian president ChungHee Park, planning a new capital was an “obsession” (Kim, 2011:193), though he was assassinated in 1979 before the plans were completed. Park’s new capital was justified not only in terms of national security,
but also by the need to limit Seoul’s population growth (ibid:192) – a concern which has only grown over time, as discussed above – and, implicitly, through its symbolic features. In particular, moving the capital has historically been associated with the beginning of new eras in the Korean state (SA4). The choice of location took into account the need for the new city to be “quite detached from any existing town” so as to “gain symbolic power” (SA4). Pung su – the Korean version of Chinese Feng Shui (SA4) – was furthermore a “vital criterion for site selection” (Kim, 2011:196).

While pung su is no longer used as an explicit government decision-making tool, and rational justifications may have become more important in democratic Korea, this historical legacy has ongoing significance since detailed research conducted into the site in the 1970s, based on pung su, formed an important resource informing Roh’s more recent plans to move the capital (SA4). Nor is Sejong’s contemporary justification devoid of symbolic and nationalistic dimensions. MACCA explains that, following a competition in 2006, “[t]he commission named the city after the greatest king in Korean history for having secured the dignity of the nation” (MACCA, 2006b). The winning proposal, reproduced on MACCA’s website, brings geographical considerations into this nationalist discourse: “The image of the king also suggests being at the center of the nation. Three mountains resemble a crown” (ibid). It is promoted as the “most innovative and traditional city” which “honours the Korean spirit and creativity of King Sejong” (MACCA, 2012a:11). Elsewhere, the people and the government are elided as ‘the nation’: “The Multifunctional Administrative City Construction Agency is working together with citizens to build the nation’s proud city” (MACCA, 2012a:12). Conscious attempts are being made to promote a sense of historical cohesion – including the restored village described earlier, and a park exhibiting Baekje-era tombs found in Hansol – such that “[v]isitors and residents would see a comprehensive and time-transcending realization of being Korean” (MACCA, undated a:12). The continuities between the older plans and the current ones may, then, be as much discursive as practical, just as earlier spatial interventions in Portland have discursively enabled more recent ones despite originally being unrelated to the sustainability agenda as currently understood.
Ubiquitous eco-city

In describing itself as a ‘smart city’, Sejong boasts an array of so-called ‘ubiquitous’ internet-based services (Figure 7.5) which will provide citizens with “convenience and high technology” (MACCA, 2012a:21).

The notion of the ‘Ubiquitous City’ (or ‘U-city’) contributes to the Ministry of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs’ action plan for greening cities (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:53). The label refers to ‘ubiquitous computing’, a term first coined by R&D company Xerox PARC in 1991 (Yigitcanlar & Lee, 2014). As of 2011, 35 local authorities had implemented specific u-city projects (Yigitcanlar & Lee, 2014:54), aimed variously at improving quality of life and economic competitiveness (Kim, 2015). In Yigitcanlar and Lee’s (2014:6) definition, a u-city is one where

“any citizen can access any u-service anywhere and anytime through any digital network and devices. This concept is evolved from the earlier informational and ICT-driven digital city concepts. A u-city is also a high-tech city with an increased quality of life and strengthened urban competitiveness”.

More recently, the model has been adapted “to include a greater focus on ecological technology, in the U-eco city model” (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:54). Yigitcanlar and Lee (2014:6) suggest this recent fusion “lays emphasis on the connection between technological innovation, behavioural change, and education driven
by local community initiatives...to provide citizens with higher level [sic] of sustainable living and democratic governance”. However, they interpret the relabeling as a ‘patch’, “perhaps to gain more recognition internationally...[M]any so-called u-eco-city projects from Korea...are still referred to as u-city at the promotion materials including official websites” (ibid:12). They also observe that both the U-city and U-eco-city concepts were forged in the wake of financial crises (in 1997 and 2008 respectively), such that the stated goals of citizen empowerment (including the possibilities of ‘e-democracy’) may be constrained by the economic ambitions which they embody. They propose that the u-eco-city represents a “new way of building functionally sophisticated sustainable enclaves into society, mainly serving to high income groups”, and is thus “more likely to increase social polarisation and urban segregation” (ibid:12). The main benefits, they suggest, may accrue to construction and technology companies; ordinary people “are made to adjust to a new technologically mediated mode of urban life without much room for choices of their own” (ibid).

The emphasis on high technology may tap into a more general “way of life, a lifestyle, a dream” in Korea; a discourse of technology – but which is “not so much technology, it’s perhaps a kind of consumerism” (SA2). Joss et al. (2013) use the label ‘ubiquitous eco-city’, in conscious reference to Korean policies, to denote a broader international trend, potentially problematic in its tendency towards technological determinism and relative insensitivity to local political, social and cultural contexts (ibid: 73). Insofar as the non-place specificity of the adjective ‘ubiquitous’ resonates with the idea of ‘utopia’, which always entails a “suspension of the political” (Jameson, 2004, cited in Stavrakakis, 2007:149), the stated objectives of enhanced democracy and sustainability may appear to be compromised. Place-specific conditions, moreover, are likely to undermine the efficacy of U-city technologies if, as David Harvey suggests, utopian projects inevitably “get perverted from their noble objectives by having to compromise with the social processes they are meant to control...materialized utopias of the social process have to negotiate with spatiality and the geography of place, and in doing so they also lose their ideal character, producing results that are in many instances exactly the opposite of those intended”
Political machinations

Whether we interpret Sejong’s claim to be the ‘utopian city for everybody’ as harmless promotional aggrandisement, or as indicative of deeper conceptual neglect of political and social considerations, its implicit characterisation as a ubiquitously replicable ‘ideal city’ seems less convincing than its explication as a particular urban development whose existence and precise form depends on a very particular context. But nor should it be understood as having flowed smoothly from this context.

The current plans for Sejong are on display in the Sejong City Information Centre, along with timelines from the city’s history and future. As a travel writer affiliated with the Asian Correspondent news service observes, however:

“Presented is the politically neutral version of the history…You won’t see any mention of who was behind or opposed to the city’s formation, for example, nor will you garner who was opposed to the concept” (Backe, 2012).

This would seem a good example of outwardly facing plans having a ‘smooth surface’ which belies a history of contestation. In fact, the plans have a turbulent history which “generated sharp conflicts between the parties and polarised public opinion” (Choi, 2010:16). Thus, they form part of a dynamic emergent history, and may in future give rise to as yet unpredictable assemblages of publicness.

The current plans for Sejong, then, describe the outcome of a particular trajectory of political machinations shaped by a mixture of personal political ambitions and tactical electoral considerations, folding public opinion into the plans as well as attempting to construct it. The current city was first envisaged by President Roh (2003-2008), in an echo of Park’s earlier intentions, as a relocation of the national capital. His motivation appears partly to have been a desire to woo voters in South Chungcheong and North Chungcheong (Korea Times, 2011) – both traditionally ‘swing-voting’ provinces (SA1). However, in what Hwang (2010:280) calls Roh’s
“biggest failure” as president, the relocation was ruled unconstitutional in 2004. The city was then reenvisioned as an administrative centre housing various government ministries and agencies (Jackson, 2010). More conservative MyungBak Lee, who had supported for Roh’s revised proposals while campaigning for the presidency, attempted to downgrade the plans significantly after being elected in 2008. The new plan, involving significantly less state expenditure (Kim, 2010) envisioned a hub of industry, research and education (Jackson, 2010). The revision was supported on balance by voters across the country, though opposed in the Chungcheong Provinces (Na, 2010a; 2010b; Kang, 2010). This local opposition was very vocal, including a “mass head-shaving in front of the National Assembly” (Jackson, 2010). The Korea Times reported in 2009 a “widespread popular suspicion...that Lee wants to leave his own legacy in major projects that change the surface of the national land rather than inheriting his predecessor’s original pledge made to the people” (Korea Times, 2009). In a retrospective article, it judged the plan as “a typical case of populism and deep-rooted regional antagonism exploited by political leaders to garner votes” (Korea Times, 2011).

Lee’s revision was also opposed by other political parties, and even by the chairwoman of his own Grand National Party (GNP), GeunHye Park (T.-H. Lee, 2009). Park proclaimed the new plan a “violation of the people’s trust”, since the GNP had voted in favour of the special law on Sejong in 2005 (Jackson, 2010). It has been observed, however, that GNP support of Roh’s plan in 2005 was based on political calculations (awareness of the project’s popularity among voters) rather than on principles (Jackson, 2010). According to professor of politics BungKwon Song (quoted in Kim & Kim, 2013), Park’s motivation for backing the plan at this stage was the “strategic value of Chungcheong”; it was likely to be represented by extra seats in the National Assembly in future due to its rapidly growing population. With Korea’s largest corporations reportedly unwilling to commit to investment due to political insecurity (T.-H. Lee, 2009; Kim, 2010), and lacking the support of Park (J.-C. Kim, 2009), Lee’s plans were rejected by a parliamentary committee in June 2010 (Chosun Ilbo, 2010; Korea Herald, 2012b). On completion of Lee’s five-year term in office, Park was elected president, and continued to support the new city, which had opened in July 2012.
One MACCA interviewee regretted this political turmoil since energy had been diverted from creative thinking about Sejong’s implementation; equally, he saw the final result as more legitimate since a variety of opinions had been tested (SM2). Either way, Sejong’s political history demonstrates the contingency of its evolution, shaped by and shaping national government institutions. It is significant, however, that active public participation in this process consisted of political protest and voting, rather than institutionalised deliberation. This point is explored further in the following section.

State and society

Using broad generalisations to characterise a given social group, or a society as a whole, may problematically contribute to an ‘essentialisation’ of culture. In Werbner’s definition, to essentialise is to:

“impute a fundamental, absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious community, or nation. It is to posit falsely a timeless continuity, a discreteness or boundedness in space, and an organic unity. It is to imply an internal sameness and external difference or otherness”

(Werbner, 1997:228).

This process tends to “homogenize and stereotype people’s identities” (Carrim & Soudien, 1999:170). Nevertheless, aggregated assessments may facilitate useful macro-level comparisons, as is the case with Hofstede’s (2003:215) multinational index of ‘individualism’, which places South Korea and the US at opposite ends of the spectrum. The author’s own impressions as a western visitor to Korea chimed with the collectivism which Hofstede found. The author observed orderly behaviour on the street; almost no graffiti or litter; a conformist, modest dress-code; default deference to elders (within the school visited and elsewhere); and a reticence to express strong personal opinions, political or otherwise, to anybody but close friends and relatives. The accuracy of such impressions as characteristic of everyday life was confirmed by interviewees when prompted; they at least reflect interviewees’ own imagined sense of ‘Koreanness’. In the terms of this thesis, they point to a strong tendency to obey legal
and social codes rather than to assert one’s own will, and thus to a public life very civic in its orientation.

Simultaneously, however, Korea’s history of regular and very visible social protest is widely documented (Choi, 2010:19; S.-H. Kim, 2009:1), and has strongly influenced the democratisation and ongoing democratic consolidation of Korea since the 1960s (Armstrong, 2002; Cumings, 2002; Hwang, 2010), playing a critical role in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in the late 1980s (Cumings, 2002; Oh, 2012). Protests are “so ubiquitous in South Korean politics that major newspapers in South Korea casually label their nation a ‘Republic of Demonstrations’” (S.-H. Kim, 2009:3). Since the democratic reforms of 1987, the number, variety, and dynamism of associations “independent from and often critical of the ruling government” (Armstrong, 2002:1) have proliferated. Departing from earlier aims of democratic reform and national reunification, the causes espoused are now more fragmented and typically critical of particular policies (H.-W. Lee, 2009:523; Armstrong, 2002:5). Examples of motivations include local political autonomy, religious agendas, farmers’ interests (Armstrong, 2002:2–3), fair elections, healthcare reform, workers’ rights (Oh, 2012:259), women’s rights (Kim, 2012:558), and environmental protection (Armstrong, 2002:2; Oh, 2012:529). The groups espousing these causes constitute “what many Koreans called ‘civil society’ (simin sahoe)” (Armstrong, 2002:1). To contextualise Sejong’s publicness, it seems important to reconcile the characterisation of Korean society as “highly homogeneous, pliant” and managed by a “paternalist” state (Koo, 1993a:2) with the emergent publicness at the heart of the modern republic’s democracy.

The research interviews provided some insight into how this dual characterisation might cohere. First, the discontinuity may only be superficial. One academic (SA1) observed that everyday compliance with regulations does not necessarily reflect an unqualified active acceptance of a social contract. Another suggested that Koreans are in fact often “unhappy or angry” about issues, but tend to “refrain themselves from showing it” (SA2). The civility of Korean public life, then, does not imply a lack of problematic entanglement. As predicted in Chapter Three, the enactment of civility more accurately describes suppressed frustrations (and is thus distinguished from
emergent publicness in which frustrations are given voice). Individual Koreans’ anger may remain hidden until “some kind of critical mass” of similarly discontented people becomes evident (SA2). In one resident’s words: “we obey many times...follow the majority system, the ruling system. But when really bad things happen, then yes, we react, we resist” (SR4). The need for a critical mass of fellow protestors to be identified suggests Korean protest itself is related to collectivism.

According to Kim and Park (2013:328), Koreans tend to define themselves less in terms of individual attributes than in terms of “relationships and their roles in those relationships”, so as to “contribute to social harmony and order” – a tendency which the authors interpret as rooted in Confucian ideals. Confucianism is often understood as underpinning the “social stability and successful capitalist development in the absence of democratic politics” in East Asia (Armstrong, 2002:15); it is sometimes assumed that “a basic social consensus, derived from deep-seated cultural norms often associated with "Confucian" historical legacies...mitigated against Western democracy and favored authoritarian governments" (Armstrong, 2002:3). Korea has been described as traditionally the most ‘Confucianized’ state in Asia (ibid; Choe et al., 2006:293). U.-C. Kim accepts that Confucianism “must have been an important factor in Korea’s modern transformation” (2006:221), and can usefully be understood as a cultural force “similar to Weber’s Protestantism in the rise of Western capitalism” (ibid:223), enabling the “strengthening of collectivity in its enterprise of modernization” (ibid: 226). He also, however, suggests that its role was not a straightforwardly causal one, given its “oblique or negative character in relation to what it takes to become a modern nation” (ibid:223); the intentional modernisation of Korea might, then, equally be defined in terms of opposition to Confucianism. Its probable contribution to the “enhancement of the authoritarian character of development” would not in itself explain the emergence of democracy (226).

The Confucianism underpinning Korean collectivism nevertheless suggests a sense of relational societal emplacement qualitatively different from the demarcation between the ‘private’ and ‘public’

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53 This departs from earlier understandings of Confucianism as an "impediment to the development of capitalism" (Armstrong, 2002: 9, footnote 15).
sphere in western liberal thought, whereby citizens imagine themselves as private individuals and as collective publics in structural contradistinction to the ‘state’ (Geuss, 2001). Koo (1993b:238), similarly, interprets the “separation of society and state, and the importance given to the sphere of social life as distinct from the state” as deriving “essentially from…nineteenth-century Western liberal political thought”. One Sejong resident, having lived in America, viewed “the concept of country, the state, the nation, the government” as differing from America’s, with Koreans more likely to “identify government with the nation itself...we never separate us from the country, we are always the member, or the subject of government...we always really respect the country, the nation. But in America, especially the Republicans think that the government should be small, and shouldn’t interfere in business life” (SR4). A discursive sense of ‘homogeneity’ appears to feed into the collectivism flavouring this imagined sense of national community (Anderson, 1983).

The same resident asserted that “most Korean people, we are very homogeneous, we are relatively educated to achieve an agreement, better than American people, they are very heterogeneous society” (SR4). The ideal emphasised, of the nation seamlessly co-constituted by the public and the state, is one of unity; the ideal is not one where private life is uncompromised by state interference. Protests, it would appear, may occur when this sense of unity is breached.

These differences do not translate, however, into Korean ambivalence about the principles of liberal democracy; Kim et al. (2002:1) found strong support, in their survey-based comparison of Danish and Korean citizens, for “basic ideas...such as the right to vote, to participate in political organisations, to gather and demonstrate, to be fully informed of government activities, to freedom of speech, and to criticise government”. While the public in both nations “also supported...harmonious family life, harmonious social relations, and governmental welfare programs” (ibid), Korean voters differed in their deep suspicion of state institutions and “a high degree of political alienation” (Kim et al., 2002:1). In democratic Korea, it has become problematic that the Confucian legacy has left the state with an “unusual degree of...power”, such that “[h]ardly

54 Korea has been shown to display strong ethnic homogeneity relative to other nations (Kuznets, 2006:95).
anything socially consequential...is left untouched by the regulatory actions of the state, and few groups or organizations in society exist without some kind of state attention” (Koo, 1993a:2); the state remains actively engaged in preventing political protest and freedom of association (Cho, 2002; Choi, 2010). Nevertheless, Koo argues against the assumption that a weak society is a “logical correlate of a strong state” such that an “‘overdeveloped’ state structure necessarily produces an underdeveloped civil society” (Koo, 1993a:4). Older studies of East Asian economic development, he argues, tended to overstress “the independent role of the state at the expense of societal forces”, and downplay the way that “the state is embedded in society and draws its essential characteristics from society itself” (Koo, 1993a:5). He prefers the formulation that Korea displays both a ‘strong state’ and a ‘contentious’ civil society (Koo, 1993b).

Others stop short of interpreting publicly tolerated mass social protests too straightforwardly as evidence of a ‘strong’ civil society (Choi, 2010:19; S.-H. Kim, 2009:1); protests have more typically had little effect on structural relations between citizens and the state, or on policymaking (Choi, 2010:19; Oh, 2012:529). Their dominance as forms of political expression (S.-H. Kim, 2009:3) may reflect the paucity of options for participation in the democratic process, other than the ballot box (Choi, 2010:19). Thus, “mass mobilization against government policies” reflects exclusion from the policymaking process (Oh, 2012:529), and impotence in the face of the state (Choi, 2010:21–22), while “[d]eliberative and public reasoning are completely absent or perfunctory at best, both in the legislative body and in civil society” (Choi, 2010:12). Civil protest marks what Lee (2009:499) categorises as a form of ‘unconventional’ political participation, chosen by an individual who “experiences disappointment and frustration” with ‘conventional’ participation which “pertain[s] to the existing political system”.

According to S.-H. Kim (2009:17), one reason for “the persistence of protest politics lies in the underdevelopment and underinstitutionalization of an effective political party system in South Korea...South Korean parties are notorious for their frequent alignment and realignment, integration and disintegration”. The lack of entrenched affiliation with political parties, a strong
unaccountable bureaucracy, the powerful lobbying power of large corporations (Choi, 2010:9) in a system of state patronage (Lie, 2006), and a lack of localised civic or institutional participation in centralised decision-making (SA1), finally, are combined with a “highly personalized”, presidency (Choi, 2010:5). This results in policy-making as “a makeshift, short-sighted, and improvised process influenced by the president’s immediate policy concerns” (Choi, 2010:12). Choi (2010:17) characterises the history of Sejong’s plans as indicative of “instantaneous politics and the personalisation of presidential power”, in turn reflecting “the multiple combinations of a strong state, weak civil society, strong presidency, and weak party system”.

The relationship between the public and the state which forms the context for Sejong differs from that of Portland not only in terms of the possibilities for conventional participation, but also in the Korean public’s apparently differing levels of trust between, on the one hand, politicians – and, by extension, the state’s bureaucratic-administrative structure (Choi, 2010:5) – and, on the other, the technical abilities of individual civil servants. One academic commented that “unlike in European countries, the trust in the bureaucratic expert is quite high…people consider them as very intellectual and very enlightened minds. So once they decide, there is a certain trust in their technocratic decisions” (SA4); they are revered as an “elite group” well qualified to guide practical endeavours (SM1). Accordingly, despite the decade of contention over the broad shape of Sejong, MACCA interviewees claimed there was little public objection to the details of the masterplan: this was seen as a “technical matter” (SM1). Despite earlier promotional claims (MACCA, 2007:7) that “great effort has been put to collect broad extent of opinions from every sector of society”, and that the masterplan had been “established by collecting opinions from the nation”, this process is not mentioned in the current main brochure (MACCA, 2012a), and interviewees had little recollection of how such consultation was conducted. This marks a clear contrast with urban planning in Portland, where the details of proposed developments are often closely scrutinised and hotly contested (see Chapter Six). The successful planning and implementation of the plans for Sejong may not, then, imply active public approval so much as a default faith in planners’ technical expertise. It seems unclear whether this technocratic process should
be seen as less well inoculated to resistant emergent publicness in
the long term, or as enabling more efficient development of a city
which is at least relatively sustainable since it draws on accumulated
practical experience from around the world.

7.3 The Publicness of Sejong’s Space

Sejong’s publicness might be usefully contextualised through a
comparison with Seoul, against which – as discussed earlier – it
defines itself. The publicness observed in a series of locations in
Seoul is therefore first discussed below, to provide context of a
specifically Korean cityness. The same criteria were used as in
Portland (see previous chapter).

It is helpful at this stage to ‘de-essentialise’ the notion of Korean
collectivism, by assuming that its character will have changed over
time, varies among social groups, and is spatially differentiated. One
academic (SA1) interviewee contended that younger Koreans are
more likely to display individualism, while older Koreans tend to
respect the letter of the law; that teenagers and students now behave
in public in ways “unthinkable” twenty years ago – for example
kissing in public; with coloured hair no longer having the power to
shock. Within Seoul, more individualistic or transgressive behaviour
may be restricted to certain areas such as Gangnam (with a relatively
wealthy and educated population), Hongdae (an ‘artistic’ student
area – and one of the observation locations described below), and
Daehek-ro (a theatre district). Cho (2002:429) likens Seoul to a
changing “mosaic of civic spaces, each representing the identity of a
group of people”: in contrast to “traditional street parks where the
older generations gather”, areas like Hongdae attract young people
who are “individualist, consumerist and sensitive to commodities
like brands, images and codes”, and are characterised by “a mix of
commercial and cultural establishments, allowing for a lot of
engagement and conversation, and cultural performances in a
vibrant setting” (ibid). The present research has only yielded an
impressionistic caricature of a small part of this variegated ‘mosaic’
of spaces; rather than producing a detailed or representative analysis,
it aimed to outline at least some of this variety, so as to relate
Sejong’s publicness to its domestic context.
Two characteristics applied to all the spaces observed in Seoul. First, compared with Portland, Seoul’s open spaces generally have a high volume of pedestrian users, reflecting the higher density of the urban environment, and possibly its larger metropolitan population; as described in Chapter Four, the simple fact of people using shared space is understood in this thesis as a precondition of publicness (without people, publicness cannot be assembled). Second, the behaviour in all of the spaces was characterised by civility (and this held true elsewhere in the city as experienced by the author – including late at night when many restaurants, bars and other entertainment establishments were busy). An objective affirmation of the author’s sense of a lack of threat to personal security was arguably provided by the high proportions of women visible in open spaces at all hours. During the observation shifts, the pedestrian profiles were noticeably skewed towards women, unlike in Portland. This finding seems more reflective of a tendency towards civility than to be predicted by gender equality more generally in Korea. While in recent decades women in Korea have gained more formal rights (Kim, 2012), and traditional views on gender roles have softened (Choe, 2006:305), South Korean women continue to lag behind other countries with formal related rights and institutions in terms of gender equality and empowerment (Kim, 2012), and the employment rate for women has remained “one of the lowest among all OECD countries” (Brinton & Choi, 2006:310). One of the MACCA interviewees (SM4) agreed that women face little everyday harassment on streets in Korea. Significantly, however, when quizzed about the stated aim of making Sejong a ‘City for Women’s Happiness’ (MACCA, 2008:7), she related this to the provision of facilities for housewives and children; the city’s plans therefore envisage the continuation of existing gender roles.

The Cheonggyecheon river (Figure 7.6), flanked by walkways, is a showpiece of urban regeneration in Seoul, widely praised both within Korea and internationally as exemplifying best practice in the use of urban open space. There was strong evidence here of loose space activity (for example, young couples and groups of elderly people strolling, children enjoying crossing the stones across the water, people seated and reading newspapers or playing games on telephones), but no indications of emergent publicness. The
environment is very well maintained, and explicitly policed by security guards positioned on bridges. The author observed two cases of these guards blowing whistles at people smoking cigarettes on the walkway in contravention of posted regulations.

![Figure 7.6: publicness ratings for Cheonggyecheon River (Seoul)](image)

**Figure 7.6: publicness ratings for Cheonggyecheon River (Seoul)**

Publicness here is assembled in accordance, then, with explicit regulation, and in line with its institutionally intended uses. While Cheonggyecheon thereby displays parallels with the civic publicness of Portland’s Pioneer Square as a regulated downtown ‘showpiece’ space, the representationality (Lefebvre, 1991) of Portland’s
gentrified neighbourhoods was not echoed in the observed space of Hwigyeongdong, a typical residential area of Seoul (Figure 7.8). Hwigyeongdong was, similarly, a highly regulated environment with only civic publicness in evidence. Many of its users appeared to be behaving in an instrumental way, walking through the space to other destinations, but some loose space activity was evident (people stopping to converse, and families playing on nearby sport courts).

The two thoroughfares observed in Seoul (Figure 7.10) were similarly marked primarily by civic behaviour. Pedestrians on Jongno Sa-ga appeared to be rather more instrumental in their activity, whereas...
the pedestrianized street in Myeongdong was better characterised by loose space activity – with more social interaction, pausing, window shopping, and people consuming food and drink. Nevertheless, there was some evidence of emergent publicness near the observation location on Jongno Sa-ga: some fly posters, drunken elderly people, and a small number of illegal street stalls. A large group of police was posted during both observation shifts outside nearby Pagoda Park, a traditional venue for political protests (Cho, 2002). The observations took place during a pre-election period, and the police, according to a passer-by, aimed to pre-empt protest in this space. The tense atmosphere (as well as the drunken elderly people) undermined the sense of security in this location. The police presence also enacted an intentional suppression of emergent publicness; as argued above, a civic appearance does not straightforwardly indicate a harmonious social whole.

Figure 7.10: publicness ratings for two thoroughfares in central Seoul
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Figure 7.11: Jongno Sa-ga (Seoul)

Figure 7.12: Myeongdong (Seoul)
Even if emergent publicness is effectively excluded from many parts of central Seoul (forbidden by unwritten social codes, or suppressed by institutional authorities), the observed space of Hongdae (Figure 7.13) disrupts the idea that Korean society is universally characterised by compliance to legal codes and collective social norms. Hongdae stood out among all the Seoul locations for its strongly emergent publicness. In contrast to the rest of central Seoul, the visitor is immediately struck by the presence of buskers and other street performers (Figure 7.15), stickers and posters advertising countercultural events, litter, and graffiti on municipal furniture and advertisements (Figure 7.16). Perhaps significantly, like Old Town in Portland, Hongdae is located on the periphery of the city centre; it is central enough to attract a large number of people and be ‘visible’, and yet its publicness is rather less ‘policed’. While the area may thus, in its totality, constitute a challenge to the ordering of space elsewhere in the city, this challenge is effectively ‘contained’ and spatially marginalised. Perhaps relatedly, the age profile of its pedestrian users was abnormal for Seoul: the vast majority appeared to be of university age or slightly older, and thus peripheral to the social mainstream.

![Figure 7.13: publicness ratings for Hongdae (Seoul)](image-url)
The hypothesis that emergent publicness is necessarily linked to a poor sense of security was, however, undermined by the case of Hongdae, where the atmosphere was more one of playfulness than threat – in the author’s eyes at least. Despite the untypical concentration of ‘traces’ of representational space, the appropriation of space by street performers, and a higher frequency of ‘alternative’ styles of appearance, the behaviour of the vast majority of pedestrians was entirely ‘civil’. The feeling of safety – relative to Portland at least – was true of all observation locations in Korea, suggesting that if ‘edginess’ correlates with cityness, it is not a universal feature so much as a possible side-effect of emergent publicness.
Figure 7.15: street performers in Hongdae (Seoul)
Figure 7.16: graffiti, litter and flyposters in Hongdae (Seoul)
A consideration, then, of just a small number of Seoul’s open spaces disrupts a simple characterisation of Korean society as devoid of emergent publicness. The cultural tendency towards collectivism works in tandem with institutional regulation to produce a norm of civility. However, at its edge, literally and figuratively, the representational space of Hongdae demonstrates the presence of a playful type of emergent publicness, just as the history of street protest evidences the frustrations lying underneath the civil surface. While, within its mosaic of spaces, Seoul accommodates different modalities of publicness, the goal of constructing a city where only civic publicness is envisaged may therefore seem unfeasible. It may also be unsustainable insofar as it constitutes an act of repression, which, as Stavrakakis (2007:147) reminds us, “always entails the return of the repressed”.

Sejong’s open spaces (Figure 7.17) are rather more easily summarisable than those of Seoul: no evidence of emergent publicness was observed in any of the four. One very significant difference from Seoul was the large number of children playing, cycling and walking around, more often than not unaccompanied by adults. Clearly, residents consider Sejong a safe place for children – no doubt partly because cars are excluded from much of the space.

Figure 7.17: Central Park, Hansol, near BRT stop (Sejong)
Figure 7.18: Publicness ratings for Sejong
Figure 7.19: Noeul Sam-ro (Sejong)

Figure 7.20: beside the National Library (Sejong)

Figure 7.21: local residential open space, Hansol (Sejong)
In line with the discussion earlier, the objection might be made that the appearance of civic publicness, while reflecting a cultural preference for collectivism, may belie repressed discontent. Such repressed frustration might be indicative of problems in the long term for Sejong’s ‘harmonious’ current envisionment, only becoming clear when they emerge in the form of protest. To this end, it is important to acknowledge that the very civic nature of Sejong’s open spaces was rooted in strong approval by residents, who variously praised the greenery, peace, provision of seating facilities, exercise machines and sports courts (Figure 7.22), high quality landscaping, overall variety, fresh air, the lack of cars, and freedom of movement. Even the youngest (22-year-old) resident interviewed, who was frustrated by the lack of facilities for young adults, thought it a suitable place to live when married with children (SR5). Its “pro-family” (SC1) credentials in this respect are very much intentional, as a counterpoint to Seoul’s limited open space in residential areas.

One of the MACCA interviewees (SM2) was candid about the possibility that Sejong would not appeal to all; without offering all the “fancy and cultural aspects” of a large metropolis, it offers in his view “a good city in terms of living environment, like a liveable city, with our parks and everything” – and this is “a very natural thing in
our democratic society” (SM2). His point here is significant in terms of the need for urban sustainability initiatives to appeal to actual and potential residents; it seems reasonable to suggest that the promise of ‘liveability’ should form a key part of any attempt to persuade the public of the benefits of living in an environmentally friendly city. It has been argued that the UK’s eco-town initiative’s failure to inspire public enthusiasm was partly due to its overemphasis on green technology rather than on ‘community’ (Hubbard, 2012). However, the differential appeal of cities may be more problematic for questions of social equity if it describes demographic rather than merely attitudinal differences. Sejong’s actual population profile to date, skewed towards well-educated professional families, suggests the possibility of the future city being a wealthy enclave (possibly with nearby Jochiwon as its poorer relative) – even if City Hall is actively working against this eventuality (SC1). The limits of its appeal, furthermore, imply the limits of its transferability.

Sejong’s civic nature does not imply that residents have inhabited it in a purely passive sense to date. While the broad mood among those spoken to during fieldwork was one of optimism, a variety of complaints were voiced, and had been expressed to the authorities. One MACCA interviewee (SM1) gave some examples including the limited parking spaces, retail variety, and the lack of a hospital. However, despite early press reports which constructed a ‘ghost town’ narrative (see eg Korea Times, 2011; Mundy, 2013), the overall mood among residents with whom the author spoke was one of optimism. Sejong may lack various services for the time being, but residents have responded by engaging with neighbourhood forums which collectively voice concerns to the authorities. This may appear to evidence an emergent public life taking shape beyond the limits of what has been formally planned in the city. However, such comments refer largely to public opinions expressed through official channels (including formally arranged meetings with residents’ groups and through the residents’ forum pages on the MACCA website), and are therefore selectively constructed to the extent that their expression is enabled and framed by those channels. One MACCA interviewee’s suggestion that the local population is more than averagely interested in local politics and development plans specifically because they have white-collar jobs and therefore “professional opinions” (SM3) implies that no radical dissent has
been expressed through these channels. Formal channels may embody a genuine desire to listen to such opinions “to make the city more convenient to live” (SM3), but are intended to capture suggested improvements to the status quo, rather than to foster more open-ended debate.

Given its ring shape, the new city may lack an obvious ‘ritual space of public protest’ (Parkinson, 2012:147). This contrasts with Seoul where – although street demonstrations require official permission to take place – certain particular spaces, such as the plaza in front of City Hall, are effectively reserved for such activities (SA1). At least in the short term, one resident suggested, political demonstration in Sejong seems unthinkable, if only because so many current residents are government officials (SR4). Indicatively, public access to the rooftop gardens running for two miles above the government complex, originally intended as a showpiece open space, has now been heavily restricted – at least partly because of the risk of political protests, including suicide attempts (SM3). While some demonstrations have taken place in Sejong, they have been small-scale and tokenistic: “they just want to make trace that they were here to say something to the government” (SM3). There has been “nothing like violent protests” (SM3), partly because “also we have police who are like the government building guards, who are working to safeguard this place. And they are around here all the time” (SM3).

At the same time, one MACCA interviewee, who had paid close attention to the uses made of Sejong’s open spaces, commented that these were very often sites where public opinions coalesced:

“we interestingly found out without any expectation…that at the first village there are many people in small parks there, and also people come to there and organise their own little concerts and also organise their own clean-up activities of the neighbourhood, and it’s all organised at the small parks” (SM3).

The same MACCA interviewee commented that such ‘neighbourhood activities’, along with self-forming ‘hobby clubs’ (eg cycling, tennis), are relatively rare in other Korean cities (sports
activities, for example, are typically organised in complexes provided by local authorities (SR4)). The adoption of ‘best practice’ urban design from abroad, along with the dislocation of residents from existing social structures, does appear, then to have catalysed an intersubjective public life – even though this remains largely related to sociability than to emergence; the clean-up activities, for example, would seem to be less of a ‘DIY’ appropriation of space, or characterised by critical political discourse, than a mark of approval of what has already been provided.

One academic (SA1) commented that: “there is a great deal of artificiality here, a prearranged or predesigned mapping of our civic life which is conformist, the normal, the efficient”. Even if in the future what he called the “real city which is dirty and has a dark side, with drinking places” may come about, for the time being Sejong will be more like “living in a garden” (SA1). Another academic (SA2) suggested that Koreans tended to have a preference for explicitly artificial landscapes (Figure 7.23).

Echoing the way the city’s greenness is publicised in official brochures, local residents interviewed seemed less interested in the ecological dimensions of the city’s open spaces than in their contribution to ‘liveability’. When asked if residents were interested in the relationship between their city and global environmental issues, one MACCA interviewee commented, “I don’t think they care too much – they care about how expensive it is and how the
environment is round here” (SM1). The following exchange typified several which the author had in research interviews and other informal conversations in Sejong:

*The houses are very environmentally friendly; they don’t use much energy and so on – are things like that important to you?*

SR2: Environmentally is very important for me because yesterday I went to Sejong Lake Park to walk – I feel very satisfied with living in Sejong City, but I didn’t feel anything in Jochiwon because it’s quite an old city

*But what about environmental issues like saving the planet or climate change?*

SR2: I don’t really think about climate change

*So what is good about living in the new house?*

SR2: Well, I feel like an IT person – how can I say? I’m very comfortable with cutting-edge technology, so I feel like I’m a young person living in a good environment

For residents, in short, environmental questions seem rather more obviously related to quality of life in terms of both physical landscape – and the novelty value of technology – than to broader questions of sustainability. However, the same MACCA interviewee (SM1) did not see this as undermining Sejong’s ecological credentials: a lack of public interest in, and of desire by big companies to prioritise, broader ecological issues, he argued, obliges the government to adopt a steering role. In time, he suggested, the experience of living in Sejong may alter awareness of broader environmental issues. If the ‘eco’ goals of the city have to be translated into ‘liveability’ ones for public consumption, this reflects the fact that expectations of the reactions of a given audience have had a shaping effect on the documents produced (as predicted in Chapter Four).

### 7.4 Discussion

Despite the utopian rhetoric of Sejong’s documented envisionment, its promotional materials and plans have been assembled such that
they “embody the political processes by which they are produced” (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:164–165), and have ongoing agency within only partly predictable processes of urban assemblage in a particular location, which is in turn enmeshed in a broader shifting context. Its green credentials, as presented in this documentation, are shaped by four key interrelated factors. First, the city is closely tied to national ‘green growth’ policies (which, in turn, flow from economic development agendas). Second, these credentials potentially serve an image-building role for Korea generally, and as such are aimed at a disparate international audience of policy-makers, opinion formers and urban practitioners; Sejong is a ‘showcase’ in this respect. Third, they more instrumentally address an audience of (hi-tech) businesses from within Korea and internationally, whose investment they seek to attract. Finally, in their domestic public-facing aspect, they are translated into questions of ‘liveability’ (the environment equated with pleasant surroundings) and possibly exploit a rather consumerist love of novel technologies. Rather than reifying the documentation as a detached design for a neutral environmental ‘laboratory’, we should understand it as having external relations with a series of real and imagined audiences, public and otherwise. Its ability to deliver a ‘sustainable city’ is subordinate to its need to satisfy these various audiences.

The combination of the first three factors above may convincingly frame Sejong as an example of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ if this is read off the surface markers outlined in Chapter Five. It explicitly serves to further an ecological modernisation agenda, its future success is predicated on the involvement of high-tech industry, its genesis cannot be explained without reference to increasing economic competitiveness. Even if its story exceeds this ‘neoliberal’ framing, it would be difficult to contend that it represents a radically transformative vision of the urban future. Nevertheless, such a critique may do little more than demonstrate the logical eventuality that urban sustainability, when implemented by state authorities, will be delivered through the processes of a particular regime rather than in opposition to these. It is enabled as much as constrained by these institutionally embedded processes. An optimistic interpretation of an eco-city initiative such as Sejong would assess it not by the yardstick of its own utopian rhetoric, or by evaluating the resulting sustainability in absolute terms, but in terms of whether it
offers sustainable solutions *relative* to its context. Both Sejong and Portland may, then, offer particular lessons with regard to real-world implementation, to be inferred through critical reflection encompassing broader contexts – and in particular how or whether any successes might be transferable to other settings.

Given the constraints of its context, then, what lessons might Sejong offer for the ‘urban age’? The smooth implementation to date may mark Sejong out as a success in its own terms, but does not make the overall developmental model easily transferable: its planning and implementation has been managed by a group of actors (MACCA’s ‘technical experts’) accorded great respect in Korean society, and whose actions would not immediately be met with distrust, and the entire project has been funded by the state. It would be difficult to replicate these enabling conditions elsewhere. Nevertheless, if we deem it a successful example of experimental eco-city practice, in relative if not in absolute terms, then it may be instructive that its technological success has depended on a strong state governing role.

Looking beyond technology, we might ask what it teaches us about the ‘cityness’ of the sustainable city. Its envisioned publicness has been successfully realised; as intended, a civic public life has been assembled which – particularly in the freedom afforded to children, and family-friendliness – may be regarded as more inclusive in some respects than typical Korean urban environments. It has succeeded in becoming a particular type of city and – assuming it continues to attract employers and residents – may come to be seen as a best practice example of new town development. If, in practice, all cities are variously exclusive and have limited appeal, the reticence of many Seoulites to move to Sejong is not necessarily problematic: an urban sustainable future might be built on the collective contribution of a wide range of city types, ranging from the most civic to the most emergent, appealing more or less broadly and to different types of people.

Judging a place as overly civic may imply a stance that cities *should* display emergent publicness – but this normative position is problematic in several ways. The ability to express views and issue challenges – whether through official channels, or through a-legal
reappropriation of space or civil protest – is self-evidently to be welcomed in a democratic society. But the problematic entanglement which gives rise to emergent expression is not itself a condition we can easily imagine most people aspiring to. The idea of governments explicitly planning problems, furthermore, makes little sense. Indeed, valorising problematic urban tensions may amount to an aestheticisation of the city – and this perspective may have little to do with benign governance. The extreme manifestation of the aesthetic view of the city is the flâneur – a fundamentally irresponsible figure (Parkhurst Ferguson, 1994); an amoral spectator “free from the constraints and demands of human interaction” (Kern, 1996:35–36). Relatedly, Lees (1985) describes a series of writers at the turn of the twentieth century for whom the urban milieu was reduced to a “stimulating spectacle for sensitive observers who lived there” (p.206). His examples include August Endell, for whom Berlin was a “fascinating feast”, a “brilliant panorama” made more interesting by the presence of sickness and despair (ibid, p.207). Lees comments that “Endell clearly echoed Charles Baudelaire and the fin de siècle decadents, as he transmuted the social hardship of the many into the aesthetic pleasure of the few” (Lees, 1985:207). Less dramatically, aestheticisation has been associated with a ‘gentrifier’ worldview celebrating social diversity from a position of relative social comfort (Ley, 1980; Butler, 1997; Lees, 2003). Butler’s (2003) study of gentrifiers in North London found that “difference, diversity and multiculturalism” were much valued, but primarily “as a kind of social wallpaper”. For the purposes of the governance of social sustainability at least, then, cityness qua problematic entanglements and social and political tensions is better apprehended as a descriptive theorisation rather than a necessary normative ideal.

An outcome in which Sejong is not entirely inclusive or diverse does not detract from these qualities being mobilised as aspirations; it would be peculiar for a city governed in accordance with principles of democracy and sustainability (rather than, say, apartheid) to mandate exclusion or to offer de jure privileges to one social group over all others. Any de facto exclusion which results across different city spaces does not itself mark out these aspirations as problematic. Talen summarises the literature suggesting that a degree of segregation and partitioning is inevitable in cities, including that of Suttles (1972), who “found that social homogeneity...
can strengthen social support networks, help protect against
discrimination, and help to preserve cultural heritage” (Talen,
2006:235). Similarly, although it is difficult to imagine individual
citizens desiring to be regulated out of particular spaces, not all
citizens will necessarily choose to live a ‘cosmopolitan’ public life (as
discussed in Chapter Three). There is no guarantee in practice,
furthermore, that “contact with others necessarily translates into
respect for difference” (Valentine, 2008). Valentine traces this
‘cosmopolitanism’ norm back to Gordon Allport’s (1954) influential
‘contact hypothesis’ through which he sought to understand whether
bringing different groups together is “the best way to reduce
prejudice and promote social integration” (Valentine, 2008). In fact,
however, Allport (1954) argued that casual and superficial forms of
contact tend to fuel prejudice and suspicion. Relatedly, Valentine
wonders if:

“not everyone sees themselves as part of this
cosmopolitanism or will choose to participate in
interactions with people different from themselves.
Spatial proximity can actually breed defensiveness
and the bounding of identities and communities”
(Valentine, 2008:326).

Sejong might nevertheless be criticised as ‘too civic’ if the criterion
is one of transferability. Civic publicness, as discussed in Chapter
Three, is not simply an imposition but is assembled partly through
social acquiescence. The Korean cultural norm of collectivism makes
civic publicness a more likely outcome in this case. It may also be
significant that Sejong – rather like Lloyd and South Waterfront
EcoDistricts – is a new development; it does not have to contend
with an existing landscape of variously assembled publicness. In this
sense, the relevance of Sejong’s achievements for existing cities is
diminished; in Chapter Six it was argued that GG’s difficulties
reflected the difficulty of facilitating civic publicness in a formal
landscape which mitigated against it, and the failure of a new
imagined civic geography to disrupt the entrenched geography of
more emergent NA public power. Since individual citizens are
involved in the coproduction of publicness, the normative
envisionment of civic publicness should not be equated with its
actual assemblage; its appearance, on the other hand, may not
indicate state oppression so much as a democratic consensus. The
outcome will be fundamentally place-specific.
7.5 Conclusions

While a full conceptualisation of ‘cityness’ would encompass the hidden ‘personal’ sphere, as well as the public one in its emergent and civic modalities, it is difficult to conceive how governance norms might extend beyond civic publicness. The personal sphere is defended by, though outside the reach of, liberal government; in an attempt at ‘post-liberal’ governance approach such as that practiced in the *Eco-Districts* initiative, the attempt to govern through emergence appeared to be self-contradictory. But what takes place outside the public arena is in fact central to the way the public is assembled in practice. There may well be a risk that policies with nothing to say about emergence will effectively serve to suppress the city’s emergent potential. But even if this is the case in Sejong, it may not indicate the city’s ‘failure’, insofar as its residents actively value the type of civic publicness which it offers.

Simultaneously, however, the fact that the city is brand new means that there have been fewer obstacles to the realisation of the city’s vision; although incoming residents have imported cultural norms from elsewhere, there was no pre-existing spatially assembled publicness to act as source of friction. Such friction, it might be expected, will only grow in future as the internal variety of the city grows through its inhabitation, and ongoing processes of differentiation between different social groups become established. A similar model of envisioned civic publicness may be oppressive for cities elsewhere (in Korea and abroad), carrying at least the risk that civic goals themselves are subverted as new cities are inhabited, and constituting at worst a form of authoritarianism in pre-existing cities. Useful lessons might be learnt from Sejong as an example of experimental practice. But just as the subordination of environmental goals to economic considerations raises questions about Sejong’s ‘eco’ dimensions, it also falls far short of showcasing a global blueprint for the ‘city’ of the future.
Chapter Eight

Conclusions: Reclaiming the Publicness of the Eco-City

This thesis has aimed to make an original diagnostic intervention into the eco-city phenomenon by exploring the nature of the ‘city’ in planned and implemented eco-city initiatives. It has considered the possibility that if the eco-city is to effect a more significant sustainability transition in ‘urban’ spaces, it may need somehow to encompass a more nuanced conceptualisation of cities as complex, unpredictable, and emergent spaces. The incompatibility of such a conceptualisation with liberal-modernist modes of planning may imply the need for what might be labelled ‘post-liberal’ modes of urban sustainability planning and governance. But since it remains unclear what such modes of planning might entail, the tendency for the sustainability agenda to have become increasingly focused on the urban is potentially problematic in several ways. First, the unpredictable, emergent qualities of the city are likely to undermine the implementation of plans for sustainability in many contexts. Second, the envisioned ‘city’ may be chimerical in the sense that it is a rhetorical construct; the promise of radical transformation in the ‘urban age’ belies the rather more limited concrete scope of eco-city plans and policies. Third, the agendas thus rhetorically concealed may benefit already powerful state institutions and commercial actors. From a pessimistic perspective, rather than heralding a ‘post-liberal’ sustainable future, the eco-city may be serving to reproduce the unsustainable, and so-called ‘neoliberal’, status quo.

At the same time, it has been suggested that the characterisation of eco-city planning as reflecting or catalysing a process of neoliberalisation is over-simplistic. The thesis has not reduced the eco-city phenomenon to a readily delineable set of aspirations or processes: rather, its multiplicity as a process of real-world experimentation has been emphasised. This multiplicity raises the expectation that the eco-city will exceed any generalised narrative constructed around it. At least in the two main case studies, the
neoliberal interpretation of the eco-city appeared to have only limited explanatory value. In a more optimistic reading, then, ongoing close analysis of its varied manifestations in specific contexts may yield some clues as to how more convincingly sustainable urban outcomes might be achieved in future.

It exploring the prospects for this to be achieved, the thesis has considered the quality of cityness through the lens of ‘publicness’, with the discussion guided by the following central research question: *In what ways can eco-cities be characterised as ‘public’?* Exploring this question has involved considering the nature of the publicness envisioned in eco-city plans and official documentation, the types of publicness that result in implemented eco-city initiatives, and the relationship between the two.

The thesis makes original contributions to knowledge on both an empirical and theoretical level. Empirically, it has included an original analysis of mainstream urban sustainability documentation from the perspective of its conceptualisation of the public (also allowing for the idea of ‘trajective space’ to be introduced); and presented the findings from primary research into Portland’s EcoDistricts initiative and Sejong City, both of which have attracted relatively little attention in the academic literature. Theoretically, it has made innovative links between planning theory and theories of the public; it has extended recent debates over the idea of ‘urban assemblage’ by proposing the relevance of assemblage to the concept of the public; and it has developed a new model of publicness which obviates the partiality of dominant theoretical approaches to public space.

This final chapter attempts to draw some conclusions from the analysis of the eco-city from the perspective of publicness, with regard to the broader question of how we might better plan for urban sustainability. It begins by summarising the main argument and the findings of the investigation. Since these findings in some ways call into question the practical and theoretical reasons for focusing on the cityness of the eco-city, these reasons are then revisited and refined in the light of the research. It is argued that they are justified even though the utopian tendencies in urban sustainability planning are here reinterpreted more positively as
reflecting the eco-city’s generative effects as a conceptual ‘boundary object’. This justification permits an ensuing discussion of the three positions introduced in Chapter One and revisited below, each of which asserts a particular relationship between planning and emergent publicness. The three positions are not mutually exclusive; rather, the discussion of each in turn leads to a set of complementary conclusions relating to the realistic expectations that we might have of the eco-city, and the possibilities for ongoing research to contribute constructively to its future evolution.

In the spirit of encouraging an open-minded approach to the eco-city, the final section then steps back from the direct concerns of the thesis to question the universal relevance of the ‘problem of planning’ in which these concerns have been located. Here, with reference to the eco-city, it is speculatively argued that the discourse of the ‘wicked problem’ underlying this theoretical problem may itself be implicated in the rise of neoliberalism, and that the ‘problem of planning’ may therefore be to some extent parochial rather than inescapable. Future research which acknowledges this possibility, alongside the significance of both civic and emergent publicness, may play a useful role in mitigating the potentially negative outcomes that contemporary eco-city policies and practices may engender.

8.1 Summary of Main Findings and Argument

Chapter One introduced the subject matter by suggesting that the eco-city phenomenon describes an aggregation of future-oriented governance experiments as much as a collection of attempts to test or encourage new ‘green’ technologies. To the extent that it marks a coherent body of international discourse and practice, the eco-city may be theorised as a collective attempt to tackle the problematic question of how we might plan for sustainability. This question is problematic since, on the one hand, the goal of sustainability implores us to take responsibility for the future; on the other, the endeavour of ‘planning’ appears to be misaligned with a contemporary tendency towards constructing the world as complex, non-linear, and characterised increasingly by ‘wicked problems’. This tension within the ambition of planning for sustainability has
only been intensified by the increasing focus of the agenda on the quintessentially complex and unpredictable space of the city. While the limitations of traditional top-down linear planning methods, applied through liberal institutions and framed by modernist assumptions, have long been apparent, it remains unclear whether newer ‘governance’ approaches will resolve the problematic: while some claim that these sow the seeds of as yet unimagined ‘post-liberal’ modes of societal organisation, others more sceptically interpret them as catalysing a broader process of neoliberalisation. In this context, the broad variety of forms that eco-city initiatives take, and of contexts in which they are planned and implemented, potentially make the phenomenon a rich source of lessons for how the goal of sustainability might be better served.

Chapter Two provided more detailed contextualisation of the empirical subject matter, locating the eco-city within a broader historical context of policy-making and environmental discourse. Its contemporary variety was partly explained by the layering of historical discourses which it exhibits. The eco-city phenomenon as a whole displays coherence as a polycentric process of experimentation, underpinned by an international body of discourse and shared learning, while individual initiatives are best understood as limited real-world experiments. These experiments display considerable variety, in terms of: geographical spread; the combinations of actors involved; environmental, economic, cultural, social, and political contexts; and modes of implementation, ranging from the strongly state-centric to those seeking to enable ‘bottom-up’ innovation. The metaphor of the ‘technological showcase’ was invoked to describe those experiments functioning as rather modernist ‘laboratories’ in deliberately protected ‘niches’; initiatives at the other end of the spectrum more closely resemble what Callon (2009) calls ‘research in the wild’.

From an optimistic perspective, the very multiplicity, and incremental, reflexive nature of the eco-city process makes it well placed to address the ‘wicked problems’ in its sights. Alternatively, it seems possible that its dominant contemporary forms are reproducing, rather than leading to a substantial transformation of, the currently unsustainable structural status quo. This outcome may be enabled by the utopian rhetoric surrounding eco-city initiatives,
which obfuscates their more contingent institutional and economic agendas. In this context, the socio-political dimensions of urban sustainability may have remained relatively unconsidered. Relatedly, it was suggested that the ‘city’ itself remains poorly conceptualised, particularly in initiatives intended to function more as ‘technological showcases’, whose purpose may be partly related to municipal or national branding geared towards attracting investment, or whose technologies are designed by large engineering and IT companies in the hope of profitable replication elsewhere.

It was suggested that the ‘rise of the eco-city’ has been enabled by the spread of a broader pro-urban discourse, in which the city is primarily a rhetorical construct. Furthering the goal of sustainability in the ‘urban age’ may therefore require a more satisfactory conceptualisation of ‘cityness’, better encompassing the complexity and unpredictability of real urban space, if the eco-city is to be more than a collection of experimental technological showcases. Building on various traditions which conceptualise the ‘public’ as a definitively urban quality, Chapter Three proposed that the quality of cityness might be analysed in terms of ‘publicness’. As a spatialised entity, a real, lived city is in a fundamental sense a varyingly ‘public space’; and open spaces are particularly important arenas for a city’s publicness. A new theoretical model of publicness was then advanced for the purposes of analysing the publicness of city space. This model obviates the partiality of dominant approaches to public space by conceptualising publicness as an ‘assemblage’ with a civic and emergent modality. With reference to Lefebvre’s model of social space, the inability of mainstream planning to capture the emergent modality of publicness was related to the ‘Euclidean’ conceptualisation of space in traditional planning approaches.

Chapter Four outlined a series of research questions which would guide the empirical research into the publicness of the eco-city, and described and justified the methods to be applied. These methods included discourse analysis to investigate the conceptualisation of the city’s publicness in formal eco-city documentation, a particular mobilisation of the new model of publicness to analyse the city space where eco-city initiatives have been implemented, and personal
interviews with key actors in the two case study locations to augment desk research into their context and detailed progress.

The following three chapters presented the findings of the primary empirical research. First, in Chapter Five, an analysis of a sample of official documents from different types of eco-city initiatives around the world was presented. Across these, it was argued, a coherent ‘storyline’ is evident, structured around spatial metaphors. In place of the contestation and tension of real urban space suggested by Lefebvre’s notion of ‘representational space’, such documents construct a ‘trajective space’ evoking a sense of consensual progress towards a utopian goal. Both this trajective space and the resulting utopian space are typically implied by a diagnosis whereby existing urban space is constructed as bounded and threatened by external, fetishised forces. The overall effect is to valorise a very civic sense of publicness; the possibility of emergent publicness disrupting this static vision goes unconsidered. Insofar as real urban space is characterised by both emergent and civic publicness, however, the possibility of such disruption raises various questions about the sustainability of the goals envisioned.

Such questions do not, however, assume a straightforward relationship between the planned publicness of a city and of the space which results. To the extent that institutionally-led plans rely on ideological closure as a basis for action, the civicness of the planned city may be an inevitable necessary fiction. If – in the near future at least – it seems unclear whether plans can encompass emergent publicness, then the practical case can be made that they should not attempt to. An alternative conclusion would be that ‘civic’ plans are unsatisfactory not so much in their failure to promote emergence, as in their potential to oppress it. A third possibility is that, despite the smooth civic surface of plans and policies, it may nevertheless be possible to discern in the eco-city experimental process some indications of innovative methods of governance which meaningfully enfold emergent publicness into their conceptual and practical configuration. The cogency and import of each of these three positions are debated later in this chapter.

To explore further the relationship between planned and actually assembled publicness, Chapters Six and Seven explored two ‘critical
cases’ where eco-city plans had been implemented. The progressive governance approach adopted by the first of these consciously attempted to tap into bottom-up thinking. The context for this experiment – the city of Portland, Oregon, widely feted for its active citizen engagement – might be seen as providing optimal conditions for emergent publicness to be incorporated into institutionally-led planning. The second, Sejong City, was being realised through a comprehensive, top-down planning process. If, in spite of Sejong’s particularly ‘civic’ approach, emergent publicness still assembled itself, then the case might be made that – in certain contexts at least – the ‘technological showcase’ approach to eco-city development may more efficiently bring about a sustainability transition.

The analysis of the governance approach adopted by Portland’s EcoDistricts pilot initiative highlighted the paradox that emergent publicness will not be permitted to emerge through governance approaches to the extent that these are directed by state institutions. Rather than enabling radical urban transformation, then, Portland might be described as displaying the surface indicators and structural characteristics of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ in its policy-making. And yet this label was also seen to be limited in its explanatory power: the initiative was, simultaneously, genuinely welcomed by local actors as potentially empowering; and if its broader political and economic context is treated as a pre-existing condition, an alternative assessment would highlight its relatively progressive nature within this context.

The analysis of the publicness of Portland’s open spaces divided them into three broad categories. First, those in and near the downtown area were characterised by their civicism. A less obviously policed area on the downtown fringe, however, along with one of the city’s gentrified districts, were strongly characterised by emergent publicness of different types. If Portland’s city centre is its traditional ‘showpiece’, and has historically been subjected to a broad range of sustainability-related policies, this may imply that its emergent public life has to some extent been suppressed by the regulatory implications of these policies. Significantly, these civic observation sites also encompassed two of the more successful EDs: South Waterfront and SoMa. In the Growing Gateway ED, boasting fewer tangible achievements and located further from the city centre,
the observed open spaces fell into a rather different third category. A more emergent public life, resembling that of the city’s gentrified neighbourhoods, was explicitly rejected by the Gateway research participants, and – like the city centre EDs – plans for the area’s revitalisation were couched in civic terms. However, even civic publicness had not assembled, since the formal qualities of the (semi-suburban) car-centric space proved too great an obstacle while the initiative remained under-resourced; there was little observable pedestrian activity of any sort. It was, furthermore, far from clear that local residents would support an intensification of streetlife; Gateway has traditionally defined itself culturally and politically in opposition to inner Portland. The question therefore arises of whether the cultivation of cityness (even in its civic modality) constitutes an anti-democratic imposition on suburban spaces of this type. While policy-makers deem civic publicness to be a desirable or necessary characteristic of urban sustainability, we might speculate that in certain spaces its assemblage is only achievable as a ‘top-down’ imposition, with the backing of powerful resources.

In Sejong, meanwhile, a differently ambivalent picture emerged. On the one hand, a reasonable case can be made that its civic planning is serving to oppress potential emergent publicness. On the other, there was no strong sense that current local residents desire much beyond civic publicness. The potential for oppression became evident through comparisons with the parallel analysis of a selection of open spaces in Seoul, where some assemblages of emergent publicness could be detected. And yet, even in Seoul, most of the observed spaces were more definitively characterised by civic compliance – despite the significantly larger numbers of pedestrians almost everywhere in comparison with Portland.

The overall civicness of these Korean spaces (as envisioned in plans, as observed in real space, and as a culturally desirable norm) highlights some limitations of ‘performative’ approaches to public space which celebrate emergent publicness. Whether or not planning can encompass emergence, it might be argued that radically emergent behaviour is relatively infrequent in everyday life. A general sense of civic order may be actively desired by many citizens – especially in relatively homogeneous and collective societies, as was observed in the case of Sejong. But even in the heartlands of
western liberalism, a normative privileging of civic publicness need not only be interpreted (negatively) as the imposition of one conception of order onto the multiple actual and potential orderings of the ‘real’ city; it might instead be more positively aligned with the liberal principle of civility, enacted through tolerance, which serves to enable social differences to coexist in space. While, then, the tendency towards overly civic imaginations of public space in regeneration programmes and urban policies generally has been pejoratively described as gentrification or ‘Disneyfication’, a concomitant glorification of emergent publicness would seem equally questionable. If the former tendency may in certain circumstances oppress the public life of the city, the latter stance may not constitute an emancipatory goal so much as a denial of the public’s desire for everyday functional order. If, furthermore, emergent publicness often constitutes the visible expression of frustrations due to problematic entanglement, then the idea of planning for it has an absurd quality: it is reasonable to expect institutional plans to have as their stated aim the resolution, rather than encouragement, of problems for citizens.

Since this summary of the analysis of the research findings calls into question both the possibility and desirability of planning for cityness (in its emergent, but even also in its civic modality), it may be useful at this stage to revisit the case for doing so. Remaking this case involves first acknowledging that the utopian – arguably even anti-urban – rhetoric of the eco-city may in fact have served a useful enabling role historically by encouraging collaboration among disparate groups of actors.

8.2 The Usefulness of the Rhetorical City

Although some effort was made in previous chapters to argue that the city is often weakly conceptualised in eco-city discourse, there may be good practical reasons to welcome the alignment of the sustainability agenda with an apparently vague notion of urbanity. The discursive rise of the city, as outlined in Chapters Two and Three, may suggest that it has become a conceptual ‘boundary object’ (Star & Grieserner, 1989). Boundary objects were originally defined in relation to scientific practices, as entities which “both inhabit
intersecting social worlds...and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them” (Star & Grieserner, 1989:393). They may be abstract or concrete, but “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to retain a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in individual use” (ibid). In Mol’s account, boundary objects are shared among different ‘social worlds’ which

“each have their own codes, habits, instruments, and ways of making sense...The specific meanings each of them attaches to this object are different. But as long as nobody stresses these differences, the boundary object doesn’t seem to be two or three different objects. It remains fuzzy enough to absorb the possible tensions” (Mol, 2002:138).

The ‘fuzzy’ city thus permits communication between different ‘communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991), as well as leverages the power of a broader shared pro-urban discourse. The overdetermination of the ‘rise of the city’, as outlined in Chapter Two, suggests that many different communities of practice have an interest in advocating the ‘city’ as a beneficial entity. As a boundary object, the city may allow an apparent consensus of goals to emerge between, for example, community activists and free-market economists, private sector property developers and local authority actors, NGOs in the developing world and entrepreneurial mayors in the West, between gentrifiers, flâneurs, and journalists, between followers of counter-culture and tourism development boards. Such consensus is encouraged by eco-city documentation which, if read literally, as discussed in Chapter Five, typically assumes that this can be, or claims that it has been, reached through inclusive participation processes. Leaving to one side questions over how inclusive such consensus can be, and whose interests it represents, the key point is that its construction as a foundation for decision-making and action is enabled by the boundary object of the city, even while the various types of actors involved may each frame this city rather differently.

It would seem that considerable work has gone into the construction of the city as boundary object over time; the history of the eco-city may be interpreted as reflecting the progress of this construction. As noted in Chapter Two, cities were not centre-stage
in the first definitions of sustainable development; environmental thinking had previously tended to be anti-urban. The conceptual rise of the eco-city thus describes a process whereby earlier environmental goals have become discursively linked, through the boundary object of the city, to a series of other agendas (relating, for example, to economic policies, urban regeneration programmes, and coping strategies for rapid urbanisation in developing countries). From this perspective, the ‘eco-city’ concept is a variant on the city-as-boundary-object, functioning as a framing device for multiple different plans and visions, at both the macro level and locally within each initiative; it is neither fully coherent in its totality, nor incompatibly heterogeneous in its particular manifestations. Its fuzziness, like that of sustainability itself (Kates et al., 2005), is enabling in that it permits communication between the different social worlds of the actors involved.

The work of translation that the (eco-)city performs as a boundary object may be welcomed insofar as it has enabled a multi-faceted embrace of urban sustainability to emerge. The conceptual simplification of the city which it entails might be reinterpreted as a necessary condition for integrated sustainability initiatives to proceed. Even if, as argued in Chapter Five, striking similarities are observable internationally between the storylines underpinning eco-city initiatives, and if this collective storyline only embraces cityness in a shallow manner, this too might be seen as rhetorically necessary. The implementation of the eco-city entails a process whereby a rhetorically singular and simplistic vision is translated in particular contexts into heterogeneous practices by contingent, hybrid networks of actors. In practice, then, for all the observable similarities across eco-city plans and policies, there is no reason to expect homogeneity across the urban environments which result. Despite the internationalisation of eco-city discourse, related contemporary plans are implemented (and devised) in particular places, and would therefore appear self-evidently to reflect the real-world urban contexts which they attempt to transform. To this extent, the contemporary eco-city cannot be detached from the ‘real’ city. What results in each case is tautologically ‘urban’ insofar as it takes place in city space (even if it fails to substantially transform this space). And if, furthermore, we accept the discursive assertion that humans now live in the ‘urban age’, then the city tends in any case to lose its
significance as a distinctive category of human settlement; it is always implicit.

In short, the rhetorical and even utopian dimensions of the eco-city may be interpreted in a positive light, as inspiring action and collaboration. Although no ‘eco-city’ meets the absolute (or impossible) criterion of having realised the utopia which it promises, ‘eco-city initiatives’ can still usefully be evaluated as relatively minor interventions in urban space. Rapoport (2014:137) similarly advocates critical engagement with eco-cities as “sites of experimentation and innovation” which may help “drive broader socio-technical transitions”, rather than as failing in the utopian ambitions with which they are marketed. Even in cases where whole new cities are constructed, these cities have to coexist with their local and regional surroundings, and are constrained by real-world economic, political, social and cultural structures. Accordingly, there is good reason to welcome eco-city initiatives on less grandiose terms, as limited practical experiments which – as a result either of their failures or successes – may yield useful lessons, and thereby potentially further the goal of urban sustainability. On this view, they are not lessened so much as enabled by the rhetoric which accompanies them. It may remain important to acknowledge that the city thus declared is a rhetorical construct; but this observation in itself provides no constructive guidance for how the process of eco-city experimentation might more effectively proceed.

While the utopian rhetoric of the eco-city is in some ways, then, a ‘straw man’, there still remain good reasons to observe critically the practices which it obscures. Apprehending the eco-city simply as a set of increasingly common and globally distributed variegated experimental practices risks missing the point that the story of implemented ‘eco’ urban development is also one of increasing scale. Over time, tentative initial experiments focusing on individual streets or collections of buildings, as in the case of the 1990s Ökostädte in Germany and Austria (Damm, 2015), have given way to more holistic visions of ‘city-wide systems’ (Joss, 2015). In parallel, there has been a tendency for sustainability certification frameworks to evolve from considering individual buildings to urban neighbourhoods (Joss et al., 2015), alongside a recent proliferation of assessment schemes which benchmark and compare entire urban
areas (*ibid*). Retro-fitting policies often apply to whole local authority areas; in Asia, as exemplified by Sejong, sizeable new cities are being built with sustainability principles in mind. Even if, as argued in Chapter Three, cityness is not exclusively determined by, and should not be conflated with, scale, the overall upward trend in scalar ambition suggests that the nature of the cityness of the eco-city is only likely to become more important over time. The eco-city has our ‘urban future’ as its target.

Portland’s *EcoDistricts* is one example of an initiative which at least implicitly recognises that urban transformation going beyond bounded experimentation potentially raises a series of as yet unformulated questions. As described in Chapter Six, a lack of understanding of what it would mean for a whole city to be sustainable was an explicit motivation for the initiative’s focus on the neighbourhood, as an intermediate scale of experimentation. While this may seem an appealing solution, it equally – in fact, deliberately – serves to defer the question of cityness, and such schemes arguably risk failing to the extent that they encounter it. If, already, or at some point in future, cities as a whole are the targets for sustainability, the question of the cityness of the eco-city may need to be more directly addressed, even if questions of whether or how this can be ‘planned’ remain unclear. And while this thesis has aimed primarily to explore the interface between planning and the emergent qualities of cities, the case of Gateway also flags up the further complication – a rather obvious point which is nevertheless suppressed by the blanket notion of an urban age – that there is no clear-cut distinction between the urban and the rural. As discussed in Chapter Three, cityness is not an absolute quality, but rather a tendency which differs in its intensity (and shifts in its modality) within nominally urban areas.

### 8.3 Planning for (Public) Cityness

There are important reasons, then, to question the planned and actual cityness of the eco-city, and how the one affects the other. Utopian rhetoric may facilitate the construction of the eco-city as a

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55 Tadashi Matsumoto, the leading actor in the OECD’s urban *Green Growth* programme, recently observed that urban sustainability frameworks may in future need to encompass not only the city-wide scale but also that of polycentric metropolitan regions as a whole (Matsumoto, 2015).
generative boundary object, but the civic publicness thus conceptualised may limit the transformative capabilities of the resulting practices. This section therefore considers the prospects for overcoming or more productively acknowledging these limits within the broader urban sustainability discourse. It draws further on the research findings to interrogate three positions which might reasonably be taken on the relationship between planning and emergent publicness. The three conclusions then reached can be summarised as follows:

- implementing plans for ‘technological showcase’ eco-cities need not be detrimental to the public city, so long as plans and policies themselves are treated as contingent, experimental, and fundamentally temporary;

- the apparent inevitability that existing modes of planning cannot encompass emergent publicness need not be problematic if both the civic and emergent modalities of publicness are borne in mind while evaluating and learning from their outcomes in real city space;

- furthering the goal of sustainability in urban contexts entails recognising (and encouraging) the openness of the eco-city as a field of experimentation. This includes acknowledging the possibility that truly ‘post-liberal’ approaches to planning the future may necessarily come to light outside the sphere of state institution-directed planning.

Recognising the temporary nature of the ‘technological showcase’

While this thesis has located the question of how we should plan for ‘cityness’ within a wider set of problems around planning in the face of uncertainty and complexity, there is no particular reason to expect a solution to these problems to be forthcoming. Since we lack a consistent, coherent vision of the form that ‘post-liberal’ societal organisation might take, our tools for planning the future may necessarily remain wedded to liberal modernity, and such planning seems only able to promote a civic modality of publicness. The case of Portland’s EcoDistricts appeared to demonstrate the vested interests of existing liberal institutions in constraining the outcomes even of initiatives which explicitly attempt to embrace the emergent
public life of a city. For practical purposes, then, it is worth entertaining the possibility that planning for emergent publicness will only remain oxymoronic, at least in the short term. By extension, it will be futile for contemporary eco-city planners to concern themselves overly with the concept of ‘cityness’; the emergent city describes what takes place in spite of, or without regard, to their plans. From this line of argument, a coherent position might be derived that progress should entail first acknowledging that the ‘technological showcase’ approach to eco-city development is the only one at our disposal. This position might be expressed as follows:

Realistically, since the emergent publicness of city space can never be planned for, eco-city initiatives can only ever be ‘technological showcases’. Eco-city policy-makers and practitioners should therefore focus on developing experimental technologies, without concerning themselves unduly with the qualities of cityness which might result.

From this perspective, it is unproblematic that formal eco-city plans, policies and promotional documents consistently display a conceptualisation of publicness in very civic terms; that their vision of the city extends only to its compliant daily life. Accordingly, it would be perverse to accuse eco-city planning of being deliberately oppressive in its elevation of the civic; this outcome reflects no more than the inevitability of ideological closure in all institutional planning as currently conceived. The claim is not that the linearity of urban development documentation should be equated with the messy, multiple, contested urban reality onto which it maps. Rather, in Lefebvrian (1991) terms, that mainstream documents of this type are ‘representations of space’, and their horizons will always be exceeded by the emergent ‘representational space’ of the city itself. If, furthermore, as witnessed by the global spread of the eco-city phenomenon, the goals of such plans have popular appeal, this may be a positive thing given the practical need for policy-makers to tell ‘stories’ in persuasive ways (Throgmorton, 2003; van Hulst, 2012).

Nevertheless, the question again arises of how such plans might cope with emergent public behaviour which disrupts or undermines the rather static urban goals which they promote. In two senses, this matters little. First, if a scheme fails on its own terms, then useful lessons might still be learnt through critical reflection, and
adjustments might be made. A process of learning of this type is anticipated by the philosophy of iterative design embedded in the discourse of the ‘wicked problem’, as discussed in Chapter One, and aligned with contemporary tendencies to valorise the “situatedness, change-orientation and contingency” (Karvonen & van Heur, 2014:379) of urban experimentation. From this perspective, it is only through processes of trial and error that the logics and contours of a problem become visible. Second, plans themselves are shaped partly by unpredictable processes which often involve emergent publicness; the decisions which they embody should not be confused with the decision-making processes leading up to them (or ongoing contestation following their publication). Since, in practice, plans may change and be replaced over time, they might be better understood as describing temporary agreements, as only “punctuation points” (Innes & Booher, 2015:206), in the sense that “a solution is for now, but it soon creates the conditions that require new deliberations among new players” (ibid).

At this point, however, the position faces a challenge. For Innes and Booher, the danger lies not so much in individual plans’ linearity as in the possibility that “temporary agreements may become part of the structure of domination and become fixed rather than adaptive. The antidote is to continue to surface and address conflict creatively” (ibid). This danger resonates with the eco-city if, as this thesis has suggested, the potential multiplicity of the field of urban sustainability has to some extent coalesced in the mainstream into a superficially singular normative vision, presented as an inevitable consensus vision, while its actual contingency is concealed through the use of rhetoric and persuasive story-telling. The rhetorical singularity of the eco-city is problematic only if it goes unchecked by ongoing reflexive and external criticism, including the acknowledgement of contingency and conflict.

In other words, this first position potentially underplays the significance of the institutional and economic conditions which enable a ‘technological showcase’ to be realised, and may thereby ignore the eco-city’s own role in replicating these conditions. Its implicit valorisation of the eco-city phenomenon as a technical process characterised by productively open-ended, self-generating experimentation might be countered by the observation that
associated policies and practices have undergone changes over time in particular directions. Among the clear tendencies distinguishing the latest wave of eco-cities from earlier incarnations, as described in Chapter Three, are the increasing involvement of international firms, and the growing importance of the ‘green growth’ agenda. Either this outcome might be evaluated as an efficient, pragmatic one, or it implies that the conditions under which experimentation takes place are not equal everywhere; that it is no coincidence that the dominant mode of eco-city development has come to be one which is supported by, and will potentially reproduce, existing structures of power.

All of which is not to argue that the eco-city as ‘technological showcase’ is in itself a flawed approach – particularly if the goal of planning for emergent publicness is indeed an unachievable one. The problem, rather, arises if the process of experimentation takes place without the types of ongoing adjustments that critical commentary can encourage. Such commentary should not only continue to identify specific failures and successes and the reasons for these, but also seek better to understand the role of emergent publicness in all of this.

**Recognising the importance of both civic and emergent publicness**

The assumption that emergent publicness is outside the purview of liberal-modern planning is not incompatible with an expectation that the normativity of the latter may be problematic. This expectation is reasonable since, whether an eco-city initiative has a whole city or a small part of it in its sights, the desired transformation describes a particular reordering, whereby a new envisioned urban space replaces what is currently imagined to be unsatisfactory. The ‘laboratory’, in other words, is never normatively neutral. In encouraging certain assemblages of publicness, even temporarily, it at least potentially suppresses others. This matters both in terms of the potential disruption noted above (the suppressed may return to undermine the normative ideal), but also in its potential for various types of exclusions, with longer-term implications for social sustainability. The essence of this position might be summarised as follows:
While emergent publicness cannot be planned for, it can be planned against. Consequently, there is a potential for the dominant mode of eco-city policy-making and practice to be anti-urban.

This potential may be countered to some extent again through critical commentary, seeking to identify the particular types of civic norms imposed, and the possible and actual exclusions that result. But at the same time, as noted above, emphasising the importance of emergent publicness also carries certain risks. If the civic and emergent modalities of publicness are the targets of, respectively, the ‘topographical’ and ‘performative’ approaches to public space (Iveson, 2007), both are problematically partial in their concerns. Because of their normative incompatibility, moreover, this partiality cannot be overcome simply by adopting both approaches simultaneously. The attempt to bridge the two in this thesis, so as to arrive at a more rounded conceptualisation of publicness, has therefore involved a shift of register away from normativity and onto the descriptive plane, with publicness theorised as a type of urban assemblage. The model of ‘publicness’ thus advanced as a basis for analysis provides no explicit prescriptions for how a new type of planning, taking better account of emergent city life, might or should be institutionalised or otherwise accomplished. Analyses of the eco-city’s publicness which draw on assemblage theory may, however, help enable more open acknowledgement of the status of fixed plans as simultaneously necessary but temporary, as advocated above. Equally, if every description is inevitably prescriptive in some senses (Goldmann, 2001:6), the model embodies a hope that its more integrative analytical approach to publicness may provide a firmer foundation for diagnosing problematic normative urban theorising in future, and for a mode of urban sustainability planning which better accounts for unpredictable change in the city qua public space.

Recognising the openness of the future

The scope of the current research is limited in two important ways: it has examined only a small number of eco-city schemes in any depth, and has privileged those enabled by official policies. Based on this research alone, it would be wrong to assert that seminal, radical new approaches to planning, which better encompass emergent publicness, are not being trialled at the moment, or may appear in
future. Accordingly, a third position might be adopted which partly contradicts the previous two:

*There is no reason to reject the possibility that some contemporary or future approaches to ‘planning’ the eco-city might take better account of emergent ‘cityness’.*

The two main cases studied in this thesis did not actively support this possibility. To the extent that they represent two ends of a spectrum of contemporary institutional urban sustainability planning, they provide no evidence that the ‘mainstreamed’ eco-city has convincingly escaped its liberal framing. The planning and development of Sejong, first, was not intended to be progressive in a radical sense. Whether or not Korea’s governmental institutions should be described as liberal in form, the planning of Sejong City consciously imported conventional international ‘best practice’ in urban design, and the state has asserted a dominant agentive role in its top-down approach. In the case of Portland’s EcoDistricts, the state-driven attempt to allow solutions to emerge from ‘below’ was fundamentally paradoxical: the emergent dimensions of the city were co-opted into predefined policy frames; only those actions that fitted this frame were allowed to emerge. The implications of Gualini’s (2010) ‘post-liberal’ governance thesis, then, have not been fully played out in the empirical cases studied in this research; the mainstream eco-city shows little sign of enabling some form of “governing without Government” (Rhodes, 1996:667). If, however, the incrementalism of the eco-city is welcomed rather than criticised in terms of sustainability, with some possibility that small changes may escape from their ‘niche’ to effect change in the broader landscape, it still remains possible that in future its variegated experimental character will lead unexpectedly to innovative modes of future-oriented planning which adopt a more rounded approach to publicness. As was argued at the beginning of the thesis, the governance of the eco-city should not be thought of as lying outside its sustainability-related concerns, but rather as constituting one of the areas of technology towards which its experimentation is directed.

If, furthermore, the ambition relates to the idea of somehow transcending the state as traditionally conceived, then grass-roots
approaches to urban sustainable development may constitute more fertile ground for its realisation. For the reasons outlined in Chapter One, this thesis has deliberately focused on initiatives which are embedded within institutional policy-making. In considering questions of publicness, however, it is significant that what Smith (2007, cited in Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013) calls ‘green niches’ may be established specifically to oppose “incumbent regimes” (Smith, 2007:436). Such initiatives both embody emergent publicness, as potentially “grist in the urban mill” (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:367), and more intentionally encourage it by “creating conflict, sparking controversy, offering the basis for contested new regimes of practice” (ibid:367-8). The current research might, then, be usefully complemented by a study of the publicness envisioned and realised in initiatives operating outside conventional regulatory apparatuses. Existing and future research into informality and participatory approaches to urban sustainability in the developing world, for example, might provide a useful starting point for this.

The task for commentators, then, is to study closely what emerges from these technologies of governance in different contexts, and how the arrangement of actors and differential agency shifts as a result. An expectation of thereby uncovering a universally applicable, innovative mode of shaping the urban future may turn out to be misguided. But there remains a danger of dysfunctionality in the iterative experimental process if the future evolution of the field is shaped disproportionately by already powerful commercial and political actors whose actions are not tempered by critical analysis and commentary.

8.4 Limitations of the Present Research

The conclusions offered above rest on a particular investigation into the eco-city phenomenon. This investigation does not constitute an exhaustive analysis of the subject matter, and might have been conducted otherwise: the discussion has been guided by certain questions and concerns, has focused on specific cases, and has been refracted through particular methodological lenses. While this does not mean that the approach taken has been an arbitrary one, there has been no intention to prescribe any one mode of ongoing critical
enquiry into the eco-city over any other. And yet, the argument that the eco-city is a multiple, fuzzy and contestable phenomenon – as made in this thesis – may imply that that any analytical account of it will only be a partial one. Rather than denying such partiality, it would seem important that the conclusions should be accompanied by open acknowledgement of the limitations of the approach adopted. While the practical limitations of the various methods deployed were noted and discussed as part of their descriptions in Chapter Four, this section therefore reflects further on the methods used and on the conceptual framing of the research, and the implications of their limitations for our understanding of the eco-city.

The argument developed has drawn significantly on a conceptual distinction between the civic and emergent modalities of publicness. It has been proposed that this distinction should provide a useful basis on which to analyse eco-city experiments without normatively privileging either modality, with the advantage of being applicable in a wide variety of international contexts. Nevertheless, its development was shaped by the requirements of a particular set of research questions. In this sense, it is as much an outcome of the research as a starting point for the investigation. It is therefore hoped that the tool itself might be further refined through the process of application to different cases in future.

In particular, it may be possible to draw a sharper conceptual distinction between the two modalities of publicness if more ambiguous processes of public assemblage are examined. In considering the adoption or rejection of new technologies of different types, various challenges might be imagined to the current preliminary iteration of the model, in terms of the feasibility of drawing a clear distinction between civic and emergent publicness. For example, where public contention or non-compliance coalesces around new technologies introduced by state authorities, the argument might be made that this publicness does not emerge autonomously, since its characteristics are shaped, whether positively or negatively, by the technology itself. In other words, where emergent behaviour and technology are thus co-assembled, the former might be understood to be interpellated by the latter. Equally problematically, attempting to distinguish between publicness emerging from ‘below’ and constructed from ‘above’
excludes the possibility that seemingly civic publicness may constitute a ‘horizontal’ reaction to other assemblages of publicness. A scenario might be imagined in which public compliance with a new technology (such as, for example, recycling facilities) has the appearance of civicness, while in fact describing a deliberate performative act of departure from a social norm (for example, of indifferent wastefulness). Equally, if questions of agency underpin distinctions between emergence and civicness, analytical problems may arise in situations where new regulations or technologies are introduced by state authorities specifically in response to emergent democratic pressures of one sort or another. The recognition that the distinctions between civic and emergent publicness need further theoretical clarification and empirical testing need not in itself, however, refute the broad analytical potential of the model in future research.

In the current thesis specifically, the accusation might be made that the model’s application has been methodologically problematic in its reliance on the direct observation of space. In pointing towards a positivist approach to knowledge, the ambition of neutrally observing or objectively characterising eco-city spaces disrupts the broader discussion in which the eco-city is treated as a multiple phenomenon, partly constructed through divergent discourses, and elsewhere analysed through a more interpretive approach privileging differences of perspective. A related charge of epistemological inconsistency might be levelled at the narrative descriptions of the contexts of the two main case studies. These draw on a mixture of ‘facts’ (for example, historical events), as if to imply that singular contexts can be identified, and of interviewees’ divergent interpretations of these contexts. One partial response to such charges, following Evans and Marvin (2006) and Donaldson et al. (2010), is that since the study of (urban) sustainability necessarily tends towards interdisciplinarity, and a concomitant degree of epistemological ‘mess’ is unavoidable. In studying eco-cities, the risk of uncomfortable epistemological incompatibility might be offset against the possibility that such difficulties will inevitably arise as the field develops (Abott, 2001, cited in Donaldson et al, 2010:1534). This risk, indeed, may apply to the study of social phenomena more generally as they are mapped out and interlinked. Bhaskar (1998:45) observes that the “objects of social scientific inquiry...only ever
manifest themselves in open systems; that is, in systems where invariant empirical regularities do not obtain. For social systems are not spontaneously, and cannot be experimentally, closed.” This, he argues, places an epistemological limit on positivism; ‘social’ phenomena remain varyingly impervious to the natural scientific method. Mess, from this perspective, is a starting point, rather than an outcome indicating lack of methodological rigour.

If, furthermore, the eco-city itself is better understood as a multiple ‘boundary object’, then the key issue is not that we can only ever know the eco-city in different ways, but rather that the subject matter is ontologically messy (Donaldson et al., 2010). Mixed-method research which leads to ‘messy’ (Law, 2004) research outcomes may appear unjustifiable from a positivist perspective, since it confounds an expectation that the object of enquiry is ontologically stable and, in principle at least, knowable as a singularity. If social phenomena are nevertheless deemed worthy of study, it would seem important to acknowledge ontological uncertainty explicitly within social research design: to recognise that the phenomena being considered are contextually embedded, difficult to delineate, dynamic, and characterised by complexity and multiplicity. Less defensively, the case can be made that the messiness with which the social sciences construct the objects of their enquiry forms a useful counterpoint to the traditional ‘scientific’ method (Law, 2004) in a context of increasing acceptance that scientific knowledge does not emerge neutrally from a self-governing ‘republic of science’ (Polyani, 1962), but is rather shaped and constrained by a wide variety of social factors (Hulme, 2009).

Acknowledging ontological uncertainty need not imply that all social phenomena are equally difficult to delineate. If social scientists consistently or selectively espouse a positivist philosophy, it would seem unclear whether this describes a default aspiration to meet a socially imposed natural scientific ‘gold standard’, or a premise that some social phenomena are at least superficially observable or countable, and that ‘hard’ data may serve useful research purposes even while failing to describe social phenomena exhaustively. If we understand social phenomena as varyingly amenable to positivist research methods, though rarely knowable as ‘experimentally closed’ scientific objects, but still deem them worthy of study, then a mix of
methods would seem more justifiable, depending on the overall goal of the investigation. In the current research, the overall goal was not to analyse the component parts of the eco-city as scientific objects constructed as consistently amenable to measurement and testing. As ontologically heterogeneous objects of enquiry, the cases of Portland and Sejong, the observed spaces within these, and the documentation analysed in Chapter Five, all called for different methods of data collection. Crucially, furthermore, these data were not the final targets of enquiry. They have not constituted ends in themselves so much as ‘tools for thinking’ within a broader exploratory investigation of questions relating to the future of ‘planning’ a more sustainable future.

By extension, as noted above, no claims are made that the approaches adopted are the only ones possible. Our understanding of the eco-city as a multiple entity will be enriched rather than diminished through complementary approaches being applied in future. This argument, that the study of the eco-city invites a wide variety of methodological approaches, however, is not to refute the possibility or desirability of critical reflection on the effectiveness of methods used in specific cases. Rather, as the field develops, it places a greater onus on the individual researcher – and on the audience of the research outcomes – to identify the ways in which investigations have succeeded or failed, both on their own terms and more broadly in generating new theoretical and empirical knowledge. In this spirit, it may be instructive to note that the promise of the critical case study method adopted here was not fully realised. The presupposed ‘criticality’ of the two cases was diminished since analysis highlighted the primary significance of context as a critical factor, rather than of their divergent modes of governance considered in an abstract sense. Nevertheless, the framing of each as critical still enabled useful – and unexpected – broad conclusions to be reached. First, although the case of Sejong was originally approached based on the author’s proposition that planning processes might be enhanced by better encompassing emergent publicness, its study enabled the rather different conclusion that civic publicness is itself also a valid goal of planning. Second, if the two cases do indeed fall at either end of a spectrum of eco-city governance approaches, then the investigation at least justifies two hypotheses to be tested in future: that eco-city planning has not in fact exceeded its civic limits;
and that even in its more experimental, innovative manifestations, strong ‘bounded rationalities’ are necessarily at work in the civic engagement processes involved.

Further research which expands the conceptual framework of publicness advanced here, and knowledge of the eco-city phenomenon more generally, should only benefit from the inclusion of a wider range of cases – including, as suggested earlier in this chapter, those which are more obviously emergent in the sense of arising without direct reliance on the institutions of the state. Different research questions might be answered, adding further understanding, through more straightforwardly ‘comparative’ approaches to cases displaying a wider range of similar contextual variables. Such research might focus, for example, on initiatives yielding different outcomes of publicness despite close geographical proximity or cultural and economic comparability. Finally, rather than observing spaces, alternative methods of detecting emergent publicness might be employed. One example might be the study of textual protests created by public groups opposed to particular eco-city developments. If different methods lead to different conclusions, this can only help define the epistemological and ontological contours of the subject matter in what is still an emergent field of enquiry, and indeed usefully call into question its deeper assumptions, as discussed speculatively in the final section below.

8.5 Towards a Less Uncertain Future?

In banal terms, the conclusions reached in this chapter deter us from seeking a single approach to urban sustainability, and remind us that the possibility of replicating apparently successful urban sustainability processes and practices depends on contextual as well as technological factors. But for researchers to adopt a truly open-minded approach to learning from the eco-city as a process of decentred experimentation, in which the open-ended plurality of this process is valorised, it may also be necessary to decentre the research agenda itself by challenging its deeper assumptions. In this spirit, this final section steps outside the main concerns of the current thesis to suggest that its broader framing – the ‘problem of planning’
outlined in the opening chapter – might itself be productively questioned for the purposes of future research.

Up to this point, Gualini’s (2010) ‘neoliberal thesis’ on governance has been questioned with regard to the eco-city, on the grounds that its normative concerns may also yield only a partial set of insights. The argument that the communicative governance approaches adopted in Portland constitute ‘neoliberalism in disguise’ was problematic in that it turned attention onto the broader experimental conditions and away from the EcoDistricts initiative itself, which was progressive relative to this context, and welcomed by local actors in Gateway specifically because it would potentially give voice to a frustrated public. In an attempt to understand global phenomena, and as illustrated by the case of Sejong, analyses framed by debates around neoliberalism may furthermore confuse rather than illuminate the nature of urban policy in settings with no tradition of (western) liberalism. Nevertheless, the ‘neoliberal thesis’ was defended insofar as it provided an antidote to eco-city rhetoric which conceals agendas aligned with the reproduction of the status quo. It is suggested here, additionally, that a consideration of the cases of Portland and Sejong in tandem, from the perspective of neoliberalism, raises questions about the diagnosis of the contemporary world as beset by an increasing number of ‘wicked’ problems and, relatedly, the assertion that humanity now lives in a post-modern era characterised in part by a sensibility of the world’s complexity.

In this worldview, the objects of planning are seen as non-linear, underdetermined and uncertain; consequently, it entails a rejection of the possibility that given problems (and therefore the solutions to those problems) can be readily demarcated and neutrally defined. This understanding paves the way for more iterative modes of action and reflection, whereby pragmatic knowledge emerges incrementally from experimental applications of ideas in real-world contexts. In non-linear problem-solving, the problem and the solution define each other mutually through ongoing practice. As expressed in the ideal of governance, decisions about what practice should consist of, then, cannot logically be made ‘from above’, but should themselves emerge from real-world networks of contextually embedded actors. In short, then, pragmatic, reflexive modes of dispersed governance
are offered up as promising an alternative to hubristic ‘modernist’ linearity.

And yet this way of thinking itself exhibits linearity at a theoretical level, even while aspiring to obviate it at a practical one. As discussed in Chapter One, it defines a problem (that of non-linearity) to which there is a solution, in the form of iterative processes of practice and reflection which emerge through contextually embedded networks of governance. But its own normative logic of dynamic iteration (whereby problems and solutions are dynamically co-constitutional) also implies that the diagnosis of non-linearity might itself be conjured up by its own process of resolution. If this is the case, then a tautological nexus arises in which non-linearity and non-linear solutions mutually reinforce each other’s discursive validity. This possibility need not invalidate empirical evidence which indicates that the world has indeed in some important ways become increasingly characterised by seemingly intractable, wicked problems; but it does imply that the interpretation of such evidence is overlayed with a particular discursive assemblage of ambitions, norms and practices. ‘Wickedness’ is only one particular story that might be told about the world. It has a recent history, and different stories will no doubt be told in future.

It may therefore be constructive to ask why this story has gained currency at this particular time; doing so may yield insights with corrective force. One reason for doing so is presented by the story’s own iterative logic: since this implies a dynamic rather than unidirectional sense of causality, the heightened sensibility of the world’s complexity is as much an outcome as it is a ‘root cause’ or starting point. As well as following the line of causality taking us from the diagnosis of wickedness and uncertainty to the solution of governance, we are implored by the logic of the story itself simultaneously to seek out causality further still in the opposite direction. If, in the reverse direction, this sensibility is partly constructed by the ideal or practices of governance (perhaps in a justificatory role), then might there be some other real-world conditions which in turn ‘cause’ (and are caused by) governance?
The ‘neoliberal’ interpretation of governance – as embodying a ‘roll-back’ of the state – may provide us with one such condition. Rather than being epistemologically excluded, as a modernist, structural explanation, from the discourse of the ‘wicked problem’, the condition of neoliberalism may comfortably be accommodated within the iterative logic of that discourse. Accordingly, the discourse of the wicked problem might be considered a neoliberal construct as much as a useful way of understanding the world.

The case of Portland’s EcoDistricts may lend some weight to this conclusion, if it is indicative of a broader tendency to seek solutions which are variously ‘crowdsourced’. Such approaches may tend to exclude normativity, since their ontology replaces notions of the ‘public good’ with what is efficient, or innovative. As was evident in Portland, however, the reality of such a process, when convened by formal institutions, may necessarily fail to live up to this ambition; only certain solutions will be allowed to emerge. In practice, then, contemporary governance is rather more normative than its rhetorical ideal might suggest, and these norms can be described as neoliberal to the extent that this descriptor has explanatory value.

Even this conclusion, though, does not allow us to reject the governance approach to the eco-city on the grounds of hidden normativity. From a pragmatic perspective, if practices of governance describe the real-world outcomes of a dynamic arrangement of economic structural forces and discursive legitimation, then they might instead be welcomed as an emergent, negotiated mode of societal management specifically well suited to contemporary assumptions about the nature of the world. Criticism of this outcome might itself be accused of utopianism; governance might be justified on the grounds that its emergence demonstrates its own relevance. And this embrace of pragmatism need not be irresponsibly fatalistic: the proposition that governance is implicated in a mutual interdependence between neoliberalism and the discourse of the wicked problem does not imply the permanence of this state of affairs, nor does it exclude the agency of actors within the eco-city process to change it. It is not incompatible with the ‘post-liberal’ thesis which points to the open-ended implications of governance: to the possibility that the decentring of power which it entails may pave the way towards a different though as yet unclear
future. The nexus of non-linearity and governance, in other words, may be causally related to neoliberalism, but the future, in which governance might undermine this ‘cause’, is open.

A parallel challenge to the non-linear ‘wicked problem’ discourse is presented by the case of Sejong City. If, as suggested here, this discourse has a culturally specific discursive baggage in excess of its scientific explanatory force, and which is associated with a particular phase of western liberalism, the question also arises of its relevance to cultural contexts which have not arisen out of liberalism. While Sejong might be interpreted as a neoliberal project insofar as it constitutes an attempt to improve Korea’s competitiveness within the global economy, its top-down approach excludes it from the concerns of the neoliberal thesis, and might suggest that a rather different set of cultural traditions are at play internally – some of which, no doubt, might be usefully categorised as Confucian. It may, indeed, be the case that the sensibility of uncertainty is a far from universal one; in other cultures, different stories may hold sway or sit alongside varying ‘scientific’ understandings of uncertainty. Elsewhere – and perhaps particularly in the developing world – an understanding of the world as uncertain and non-linear may always have been the norm; for most people, there may be no ‘illusion’ of modernity to dispel. The argument might even be made that the story-telling process of the neoliberal wicked problem has exaggerated the extent to which the liberal West has traditionally been characterised by a sense of modernist certainty. While, then, governance approaches may well yield unexpected breakthroughs in our understanding of how society might be arranged in novel ways in future, there would seem to be no firm case to argue that they are necessarily aligned with the goal of sustainability in all contexts.

This all has important implications for research into the eco-city in future. First, it vindicates the critical attention paid to the rise of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’, both in the prosaic sense of an outcome in which a business-as-usual agenda mobilises the appealing rhetoric of both sustainability and the ‘city’, and in the more subtle way that neoliberalism may be legitimised through the promotion of supposedly progressive governance-based decision-making processes. The potential outcome is one in which the structural conditions of unsustainability are maintained, and in
which governance processes serve to close down rather than open up the global ‘dialogue’ (Kates et al., 2005) of sustainability.

Second, it suggests that furthering the goal of urban sustainability need not only mean choosing between an outmoded modernism on the one hand, and ambiguous governance underpinned by theories of communicative planning on the other. While this thesis has explored some of the problems presented by this choice, in reflection of its significance for contemporary eco-city practices and policies, it remains important to allow that different theoretical framings of the debate may lead to more productive outcomes. Whether or not it makes sense to construct uncertainty and ‘wickedness’ as the problem, and governance as the solution, these are not necessarily the only starting points from which experimentation and learning might proceed. Indeed, the discursive orientation of contemporary notions of governance, according to Rydin (2014), already faces significant theoretical challenges from the broader ‘material turn’ evident across the social sciences. The ‘flat’ ontologies characteristic of this material turn – exemplified by the idea of assemblage – signal a more “realist sensibility” (ibid: 590) at odds with the social constructivism at the heart of communicative planning (ibid). While the future of planning theory and practice cannot be predicted, questioning the centrality of governance to the debate may permit the possibility that, in certain contexts, more hierarchical modes of governing – and, equally, less state-centric modes of organisation – may have a useful role to play, and researchers should seek to identify where and why this is the case.

The search for innovative urban sustainability processes which better encompass the emergent dimensions of the city demands engagement with questions around the potential for planning to escape the constraints of liberal modernity, to the extent that this has contemporary relevance as a theoretical and practical problem. However, such engagement should simultaneously acknowledge the possibility that apparently ‘post-liberal’ or ‘post-modern’ governance solutions may in fact oppress the public life of the city, and that the identification of more convincingly urban sustainable solutions in future may depend on alternative framings of the problematic.
Appendix A

Summary Descriptions of Initiatives Analysed in Chapter Five

Some background information is provided below on the 12 initiatives whose documentation is analysed in Chapter Five (see Table 4.3 for a list of these documents). The descriptive text in boxes A1-A12 below is quoted directly from the profiles in Joss’ et al. (2011) global Survey of eco-city initiatives, except in the cases of Eco2 Cities and the OECD Green Cities programmes, which were not profiled in the Survey. The text for Portland and Whitehill & Bordon was also updated to reflect changes between the publication of the Survey and the period when the desk research took place for Chapter Four. Further information about Portland and Sejong is provided in the case studies of each in Chapters Six and Seven respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box A.1</th>
<th>Almere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Urban expansion/in-fill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almere is Holland’s newest city, established in 1976 on land reclaimed from the sea. Current plans for its population to grow from 190,000 to 350,000 by 2030 are based on the seven Almere Principles, which include: cultivating ecological, social and economic diversity; connecting place to context; empowering citizens; and supporting ongoing technical innovation. They build on the city’s history of innovative environmental and technical projects, which the council describes as ‘catalysts for others to follow’. In 2002-3, the city built its own broadband infrastructure, rented out to commercial internet providers. In 2007, it completed in-fill development of a high-density mixed-use city centre. Almere Solar Island provides 10% of the heating requirements of the Noorderplassen West district (the rest comes from residual heat from a co-generation plant). 500 houses in the Columbuskwartier district are either fitted with photovoltaic systems or have been built using the ‘Passive House’ concept. The council announced plans in 2011 to build a new carbon neutral district, Nobelhorst, over the next decade, in partnership with Ymere Housing Association. This will include 4,300 new homes (30% affordable or for social rent), 10 acres of office space, and an ecological education centre. On-site renewable energy sources will include windmills and photovoltaic cells.
### Box A.2  Auroville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>New Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Tamil Nadu, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This self-styled ‘universal city in the making’ focuses on bringing together people from different countries and backgrounds to live in an ecologically friendly and harmonious way. Initiated in the 1960s by a group of volunteers inspired by Indian scholar Sri Aurobindo, Auroville has been endorsed by UNESCO and the Indian Government. The development consists of a series of small settlements where sustainable farming is practiced. Auroville has also participated in several reforestation campaigns in the region. The project has, however, been criticised by some for relying on a polluting, private transport system for goods and people. To date, 400 houses are run solely on solar energy. Auroville is looking to expand the use of electric vehicles, in order to reduce car pollution.

### Box A.3  Eco2 Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Global (though focused on developing countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Eco2 Cities initiative was launched in 2009 as part of the World Bank’s Urban and Local Government Strategy, and is aimed at cities in the developing world. Its approach was shaped by an analysis of ‘best practice’ urban sustainability initiatives around the world (including Curitiba, Stockholm and Yokohama). The initiative currently supports a series of ‘catalyst’ pilot projects in Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, with the intention that these can be scaled up to city-wide level. It focuses on a comprehensive integrated sustainable urban development framework – rather than prescribing specific technology or policy solutions – which seeks to encourage synergy between economic and ecological sustainability. It assists local stakeholders in defining priorities in each case, following which indicators are introduced, with cities choosing these as required.

(Source: text adapted from Joss, 2012)
**Box A.4  Ecociudad Valdespartera**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Urban expansion/in-fill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Zaragoza, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ecociudad Valdespartera was initiated in 2001 through a co-operation between the municipal and regional authorities of Zaragoza with the aim to convert decommissioned military barracks into social housing and public facilities. The new district of Zaragoza is designed to meet current Spanish sustainable building criteria. The design incorporates the features of the surrounding environment. Buildings are oriented towards the sun to optimise natural heating and to allow the use of solar panels; grey water is used to water gardens; and vertical wind shields protect from prevailing winds. Green spaces containing native species have been interspersed with the dense network of streets. The first residents moved into the new district in 2004. Several green spaces/ecological corridors have been created within the city, to improve both the microclimate and water conservation. A new tram line opened in 2011, between Valdespartera and the centre of Zaragoza.

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**Box A.5  Freiburg**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Retro-fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the 1970s, Freiburg has developed a reputation as Germany’s ‘ecological capital’. In 1986, the city adopted a master plan for a sustainable city based on environmentally sustainable energy supply, resulting in advanced (solar technology based) energy efficiency and public transport programmes. In 1996, Freiburg passed its *Climate Protection Protocol* aimed at reducing CO₂ emissions by 25% below 1992 levels by 2010. (In 2007, this was increased to 40% for 2030.) Over the first ten year period, CO₂ emissions were reduced by more than 10% per capita. There has been a 100% increase in public transport use, with up to 35% of residents being non-car owners. Several neighbourhoods are experimenting with passive energy houses using specially designed insulation and air-flow systems.
Box A.6  
**Greensburg GreenTown**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>New Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Kansas, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After a large part of Greensburg, Kansas was destroyed by a Tornado in 2007, the local population decided to rebuild the area as a sustainable eco town. This is a grassroots community effort bringing funds from outside the community to support innovative programmes that involve sustainable development. In addition, the local city council passed a resolution calling for all city buildings to be built to LEED standards, with several public buildings already having achieved LEED ‘Platinum’ standard. The entrance of Greensburg boosts a wind farm of 10 turbines, providing electricity for the town. A ‘chain of eco homes’ contest was organized, resulting in twelve model homes being built at different prices, sizes, and energy efficiency features to demonstrate different green living options. The town also seeks to grow its eco-tourism industry.

Box A.7  
**Huaibei**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Retro-fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Anhui Province, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fifty years of coal mining in and around Huaibei in Anhui province have caused significant environmental problems. In addition to suffering from poor air and ground water quality, the city has lost more than 100 km² of land to subsidence. From being known as ‘coal city’, its 2008 eco-city masterplan aims to rebrand it as ‘water city’. The subsided areas will be reclaimed for new developments and recreational areas, or turned into lakes and wetlands. The city plans to build on its industrial heritage by diversifying into alternative energy, building a new ‘Alternative Energy Park’. Projects to help develop its tourism industry include a new eco-friendly golf course, a reforestation programme, and restoration of canals and nearby villages. Urban agriculture will be encouraged, as well as improvements to the local transport network (including new light railway lines). Energy efficiency standards have been put in place for all new builds, with waste mining products being converted into building materials.
Box A.8  OECD Green Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD) adopted ‘Green Growth’ as a strategic pillar in 2009. Its Green Cities programme, initiated at the 2010 Roundtable of OECD Mayors and Ministries, aimed to understand the concept and potential of green growth for cities, and advise policy makers on urban sustainability ‘best practice’. A preliminary report outlining the programme’s conceptual framework, was published in 2011. Its final ‘Green Growth in Cities’ report was published in 2013, based on further in-depth comparative international research. This included a series of high level recommendations relating to the financing and governance of green growth at city level, as well as how this can best be supported through national policies, and proposes a ‘preliminary’ set of indicators to monitor cities’ socio-economic growth, environmental impact, economic opportunities, and policy responses.

(Sources: Hammer et al., 2011; OECD, 2013)

Box A.9  Portland EcoDistricts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Retro-fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Oregon, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For many years, Portland has been ranked as one of the greenest US cities. Early achievements include an integrated public transport system and the pedestrianisation of the city centre. The city established an integrated planning and sustainability office with focus on key areas including energy efficiency, waste management, and green building design. New buildings have to comply with strict regulations concerning building materials and greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in the largest number of LEED certified buildings among US cities. The city and regional authorities are noted for their strong land-use planning, including establishing substantial green zones in and around the city to control urban expansion.

In 2009, the new Portland Sustainability Institute launched its EcoDistricts initiative in partnership with the City of Portland and five neighbourhoods (Gateway, Foster Green, Lloyd District, SoMa, and South Waterfront). The five pilot initiatives aim to promote sustainable neighbourhood development across different parts of the city. In addition, the Oregon Sustainability Center is planned as a model for sustainable urban high-rise construction and a hub for sustainable practices, research and entrepreneurship. Each of five initiatives were officially recognised formally recognised by the city as an ‘Official Organization’ in November 2012.
**Box A.10  Sejong**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>New Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sejong, a new city approximately 100 miles from Seoul, was originally chosen to be the new national capital city of South Korea. Following the plan’s rejection by the Constitutional Court of Korea in 2004, the government decided to continue building it as a major administrative centre. Its 2007 masterplan envisaged a sustainable city, with schemes in place for water and waste management, energy efficiency, recycling, and urban agriculture, with provision made for large open areas and green roofs. These plans were amended in turn, with Sejong to become a ‘high-tech eco-friendly city’ instead. Finally, however, the large corporations backing the hi-tech plan pulled out after it was voted down by the South Korean Parliament in 2010. Construction is continuing on Sejong as an eco-city with a strong administrative function, amid ongoing political controversy.

**Box A.11  Sustainable Sydney 2030**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Retrofit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>New South Wales, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Australasia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on two successive local government acts (1993; 1999), Sydney has embarked on a concerted sustainability programme addressing environmental, social and economic issues. Using various sustainability indicators, the city’s use of resources is closely monitored. An environmental partnership between the city authorities and civil society groups was established; an extensive public information campaign on conservation and sustainability was put in place; and a household energy savings programme was launched. More recently work on White Bay, a new neighbourhood, has begun using strict environmental norms. There, local transport will be based on a new system of stackable electric minicars. Sydney’s overall vision is contained within the *Sustainable Sydney 2030* plan, published in 2009. This covers social and cultural sustainability as well as the physical environment. It aims to reduce GHG emissions by 70% compared with 2006.
In 2009, the UK government announced plans for the first four in a series of new eco-towns across England to address the national shortage of housing. The decision to build four new towns (from originally twelve selected sites) followed a lengthy and at times controversial public consultation process. The new eco-towns were to be built on either brown- or green-field sites in Cornwall (St Austell), Hampshire (Whitehill & Bordon), Norfolk (Rackheath) and Oxfordshire (North West Bicester). The bulk of the funding (£60m spread across the four developments) is being provided by the Department for Communities and Local Government, with a further £2.5m from the Department for Children, Schools and Families set aside for the construction of a demonstration zero-carbon school in each town. Overall, the aim is to provide homes for around 30,000 inhabitants within a period of five years, and to create 2,000 additional jobs. The new eco-towns are mostly new-builds, although in some cases they will also incorporate some refurbished buildings. They are located in the proximity of nearby towns, in order to take advantage of existing public transport networks and amenities. The building process is supposed to involve 30% less greenhouse gas emissions than traditional building processes. The towns will incorporate renewable (wind/solar) energy production and transport systems (e.g., electric vehicles).

The planned Whitehill & Bordon carbon-neutral development originally made provision for up to 5,500 new houses, and two new schools, to be built mostly on the 230-hectare site of decommissioned military barracks in this garrison town (this land is expected to be released in 2015). The project is to be developed through a public-private partnership, with completion expected by 2026-2028, assuming suitable private investors are found. Retro-fitting of existing buildings is also taking place at present. Following public consultation between October and December 2011, amid ongoing local opposition from the Bordon Area Action Group, a revised masterplan was published in May 2012, in which the proposed number of new houses was reduced to 4,000.
Appendix B

Information Sent to Qualitative Interviewees

Using the following template, a letter was sent to all interviewees following their agreement to participate, along with the respondent information and consent form shown overleaf. The letter and interview information were tailored for individual participants.

Dear

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my PhD research project ‘Eco-Cities: Technological Showcases or Social Places’.

The research interview with you will take place on [date, time, place].

Enclosed with this letter are some further information about the nature of the research and your participation in it, and an outline of the proposed interview topics. If you have time, please read these before the interview. However, there is no need for you to prepare anything in advance.

Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to let me know.

I look forward to our meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Rob Cowley

Email: robert.cowley@my.westminster.ac.uk
Mobile: +44 XXX XXX XXXXX

Enclosed:
Participant Information Document
Interview Topics
Participant Information

Eco-Cities: Technological Showcases or Social Places

You are invited to participate in a research interview about urban sustainability in [Portland/Sejong], with a special focus on the current EcoDistricts initiative.

You were selected as a possible participant because [completed as relevant].

I would ask you to read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to participate in the research.

The interview will be conducted by the project’s Principal Investigator, Rob Cowley, Doctoral Student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, London (UK). The research project of which this interview forms a part is being supervised by Professor Simon Joss, University of Westminster, and Dr Daniel Greenwood, University of Westminster.

Background Information

The broader purpose of this research is to understand the socio-political dimensions of contemporary urban sustainability (or ‘eco-city’) initiatives around the globe. It has a special focus on the conceptualisation and role of the ‘public’ in such initiatives, and the spatiality of the eco-city. [Portland/Sejong] is one of two locations which have been selected for more in-depth case study analysis.

Procedures

If you agree to take part in this research, the interview will entail answering a series of questions for 30-45 minutes. I would also like to ask for your permission to audio record the interview for subsequent transcription and analysis.

Confidentiality

I would like to assure you that all notes taken during the interview, and the audio recording, will be treated as strictly confidential and only used for the purposes of analysis. All records of this interview will be stored securely in line with University of Westminster policy. Only the Principal Investigator (Rob Cowley) will have access to these records.

The analysis of the interview will be used to inform the findings of the final PhD thesis. It is possible that some of the comments you make during the interview will be quoted verbatim in this thesis. No such quoted comments (in the thesis or any other academic publication related to the thesis) will be attributed to you personally.

Compensation

You will not receive payment for participation in the research.
Voluntary Nature of the Research

Participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University of Westminster. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question, or withdraw at any time, or withdraw any information offered or opinions expressed during the interview, without affecting those relationships.

If you feel, during the interview, that some of the interview questions are too sensitive and you do not feel comfortable in answering them, you may of course choose not to answer such questions or not to disclose information.

Contacts and Questions
The researcher conducting this interview is Rob Cowley, who is being supervised by Prof Simon Joss and Dr Daniel Greenwood. If you have any questions at this stage or later, you are encouraged to contact Rob Cowley or either of the supervisors at:

Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Westminster
32-38 Wells Street,
London W1T 3UW, UK

Rob Cowley: Robert.cowley@my.westminster.ac.uk
Simon Joss: Joss@westminster.ac.uk
Daniel Greenwood: D.Greenwood2@westminster.ac.uk

If you would prefer to talk to someone outside the research team about any questions or concerns regarding this research, you are encouraged to contact Huzma Kelly, Secretary to the Research Ethics sub-Committee at the following address:
University of Westminster Research Office, 101 New Cavendish Street,
London W1W 6XH, UK.
Email: h.kelly01@westminster.ac.uk

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent
I have read the above information. I hereby consent to participate in the research, and grant my permission for an audio recording to be made of the interview.

Signature of Interview Participant: _________________ Date: __________
Interview Participant:

Signature of Investigator: _________________________ Date: __________
Investigator:
Interview Topics (Portland Version)

This is an outline of the topics which the interview will cover. It may be helpful for you to read these before the interview, but it is not necessary, and no specific preparation is required on your part.

The precise questions asked will vary according to your own areas of involvement and expertise.

The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes.

Yourself

- Brief overview of your job role and current projects

‘Publicness’

- Which aspects of city life do you see as ‘public’?
- Which types of places are the most ‘public’? In what ways?

Portland

- Your views on what makes Portland different to other cities
- Key challenges that Portland faces in future

Your Involvement in Urban Sustainability

- Brief overview of your involvement, if any, in the development and implementation of the 2012 Portland Plan
- Brief overview of your involvement, if any, in the development and implementation of the EcoDistricts initiative

Goals and Constraints

- Balance between overall goal of equity, environmental concerns, and economic development
- Governance functions of sustainability planning in Portland – including external city ‘image’
- Factors which were key in bringing the EcoDistricts initiative to the point of official recognition and funding, and barriers
- Can the EcoDistricts initiative make a wider difference, given the context of the existing city? And in the context of existing cities elsewhere?

Public Engagement

- How inclusive was the public consultation process of the 2012 Portland Plan?
- How controversial was it? What opposition was there to it?
- Has the EcoDistricts initiative mirrored planning more generally in Portland in these respects, or has it departed from the norm?
• To what extent has the EcoDistricts initiative been shaped by the mayor’s office, and to what extent by local people in each area?

The Publicness of Open Space in Portland

• How important are the open spaces of the city in Portland’s sustainability planning? In what ways? Have plans and policies changed the way they are used?
• How important are open spaces in the EcoDistricts initiative? In what ways? Has the initiative already changed the way they are used?

Implementation

• Ongoing implementational successes and difficulties of Portland Plan and EcoDistricts initiative
• Public reactions to EcoDistricts initiative

Could you recommend anybody else that it might be useful for me to speak to for the purposes of this research?

Interview Topics (Sejong Version)

The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes, and will take the form of a conversation rather than a fixed series of questions and answers. However, as a guide, my intention is to ask you about the topics listed below.

It may be helpful for you to read these before the interview, but it is not necessary, and no specific preparation is required on your part.

• please tell me a little about your job role
• what would you say are the most successful aspects of the MAC to date?
• what would you say are the least successful aspects of the MAC to date?
• in your view, on what criteria might the long-term success of the MAC project be assessed?
• what are the main opportunities and threats to its success in the long term?
• how inclusive was the public consultation process when the new city was being planned?
• is there any ongoing opposition to the final plans? Who from?
• what effects will the new city have on the broader region?
• to what extent will the new city contribute to achieving the goal of national decentralisation?
• will a balance between economic, environmental, and social sustainability be achievable?
• how 'citylike' will the finished development be?
• how will it most differ from other cities in Korea?
• how do people who already live and work here feel about it?
• what is the importance of public spaces in the new city?
• to what extent can the MAC work as a model for other new developments in Korea?
• could you recommend anybody else that it might be useful for me to speak to for the purposes of this research?
Appendix C

Open Space Observation Locations: Details

As described in Chapter Three, observations were conducted in a series of open spaces for each of the two in-depth case studies. In each location, pedestrians were counted on two occasions over a period of 15 minutes, on the dates shown in Table A.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PORTLAND</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Weekday (4-7pm)</th>
<th>Saturday (4-7pm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gateway</td>
<td>Halsey Street</td>
<td>3 June 2013</td>
<td>1 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon Clinic</td>
<td>5 June 2013</td>
<td>1 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDC Park</td>
<td>5 June 2013</td>
<td>1 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central City</td>
<td>Old Town</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
<td>1 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pioneer Square</td>
<td>7 June 2013</td>
<td>1 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Plaza</td>
<td>7 June 2013</td>
<td>25 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Waterfront streetcar terminus</td>
<td>6 June 2013</td>
<td>25 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director Park</td>
<td>7 June 2013</td>
<td>8 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pettygrove Park</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
<td>8 June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Waterfront riverside walk</td>
<td>6 June 2013</td>
<td>25 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Waterfront pocket park</td>
<td>6 June 2013</td>
<td>25 May 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hwigyeongdong</td>
<td>18 June 2014</td>
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Table A.1: dates of observation shifts in Portland and Korea
Some further contextual details about each location are provided below, along with more information about the precise vantage point from which counting took place. For Portland, Figures A.1-13 show the precise observational locations (marked ‘X’) on maps and satellite pictures, along with street level photographs of the immediate vicinity. All maps of the observational locations in Portland are shown at the same scale (with north facing upwards) and were sourced from Portland Maps, the City of Portland’s online map service. For Sejong and Seoul, Figures A.14-22 similarly indicate the precise observational point for each area with an ‘X’. Satellite images are not included for Sejong and Seoul, since up-to-date ones are not publicly available for all locations. The Sejong and Seoul maps are also shown at the same scale, with north facing upward, and are the author’s own, adapted from base maps of Seoul from OpenStreetMap and street maps displayed publicly in Sejong.

**Gateway Observation Locations**

*Halsey Street*

Along with parallel NE Weidler Street, Halsey is lined with mostly single-storey buildings occupied by small businesses and retail establishments serving practical local needs, and a small number of restaurants and cafes. PoSI describes it as having “historical quality as Gateway’s ‘Main Street’ venue for parades and civic events” (DistrictLab, 2010:23). PoSI’s Pilot Study for GG envisaged changes to make it more pedestrian-friendly, along with water management features, to improve local connectivity and “support existing community assets through environmental improvements” (DistrictLab, 2010:49). It is flanked with residential streets.

Observations took place at a key node along NE Halsey Street: the intersection with 111th Avenue. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in front of the author were counted, in either direction.
Figure A.1: observation location on Halsey Street (Portland)
Oregon Clinic

The footpath between the Oregon Clinic building and its parking area provides the main pedestrian access between Gateway’s ‘Transit Center’ and its main retail centre (clustered around the Gateway Fred Meyer supermarket). The immediate area is described by Abbott (1983:238) as an example of “the typical retail landscape of the early 1960s suburbs…essentially retailing strips set behind great, grey parking lots”. The path also provides the main access to an area of unused land between the two freeways, earmarked to become the new Gateway Green park (see Chapter Five). Several local interviewees suggested the broader area would ideally make a central civic focus point, and PoSI’s Pilot Study Report for GG (DistrictLab, 2010) identified the potential for improvements here to contribute to pedestrian connectivity in Gateway generally. However, it currently contains no formal seating or other features obviously designed to encourage people to linger.

All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line outside the clinic, in both directions, were counted during the observations, from a vantage point in the car park beside Oregon Clinic.
Figure A.2: observation location outside Oregon Clinic (Portland)
PDC Park

This open space (approximately 1.6 hectares), the site of an old factory, is owned by PDC. It is intended that a quarter of the land will be sold for private development; PDC will use the profits to develop the remainder as a community park. It is unclear when this might happen, however, or precisely what facilities it will offer. Meanwhile, it remains an open field, used for occasional community events (some of which are organised by GG volunteers). It was repeatedly identified by interviewees as a locus of anti-social behaviour (attracting street drinkers during the daytime, and typically avoided at night). PoSI’s 2010 Pilot Study (DistrictLab, 2010:23) presents it as an opportunity to “create a new civic space; destination and anchor for both Transit Center/Gateway Shopping Center and Halsey-Weidler couplet. Will increase connectivity, walkability, and habitat within the district”. Other than on its Halsey Street border, it is surrounded by residential streets of single-storey houses.

The park was observed from a vantage point on its eastern side, such that all pedestrians entering the space could be counted.
Figure A.3: observation location by the PDC park (Portland)
Comparator Observation Locations Elsewhere in Portland

*Old Town*

Portland City Council has designated Old Town, to the immediate north of the main urban core, as an ‘entertainment district’. The area is characterised by its historic architecture, with most buildings three or more storeys high. Along with its many eating and drinking establishments and street markets, it accommodates a large number of homeless shelters, whose patrons are clearly in evidence on the streets. SW 2nd Avenue, where the observations were conducted, functions as more of a ‘link’ than a ‘place’, even though the ‘entertainment district’ as a whole is partly intended to have strong ‘place’ characteristics as a visitor destination.

The observation point selected here was on the west side of SW 2nd Ave, one of the main roads through the area, between the junctions with SW Pine Street and SW Ash Street. Counts were made of the pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in front of the author.
Figure A.4: observation location in Old Town (Portland)
Pioneer Square

Pioneer Square (more formally ‘Pioneer Courthouse Square’), opened in 1984, is often described as ‘Portland’s Living Room’. It occupies a full city block within the central ‘transit mall’ (SW 5th and SW 6th Avenues), and is surrounded by municipal, retail, and office establishments. It contains a wide variety of seating types (benches, stairs, walls, and those associated with cafés). According to its Administrative Office, it hosts “more than 300 programmed events each year” (Pioneer Courthouse Square, undated). Many of the buildings in its immediate vicinity are over ten storeys tall.

The space was observed from the stairs on its southern side. A count was made of people entering the square, either walking past the author or through any of the other entrances. The large volume of people made it impractical to keep accurate simultaneous records of the demographic characteristics of users; these were estimated based on separate subsequent 15-minute counts which took into account one in every four users entering the square, with the totals being multiplied by four.
Figure A.5: observation location on Pioneer Square (Portland)
Urban Plaza

Urban Plaza is located between various Portland State University buildings, within Portland’s central ‘transit mall’ and crossed by streetcar tracks. It include various types of seating (including those attached to cafés and restaurants), a water feature, and a memorial clock tower. Other than some restaurants and cafés, only a limited number of small retail establishments operate in its vicinity. Buildings in the immediate vicinity are generally between three and seven storeys high. Urban Plaza is located within the SoMa EcoDistrict (see Box 6.2 for more information).

All pedestrians entering the space were counted from a vantage point on the stairs south of the streetcar tracks.
Figure A.6: observation location at Urban Plaza (Portland)
South Waterfront streetcar terminus

This open space, on SW Bond Avenue at the northern edge of the built-up portion of South Waterfront, contains the terminus for streetcars to the downtown area, and provides access to the ‘tram’ (cable car) for the Oregon Health and Science University campus. A limited amount of seating is provided, including at the streetcar terminus shelter itself. There are no retail facilities in or directly adjoining the space. The land to the south and east of this space has not been built on, and is partly used for car parking. The building which marks the western border of the space is approximately 14 storeys tall. More information about the South Waterfront EcoDistrict is provided in Box 6.1.

The area observed was the open space around the streetcar terminus. Counts were made of all pedestrians crossing an imaginary line two metres to the south of the passenger shelter, in either direction.
Figure A.7: observation location at South Waterfront streetcar terminus (Portland)
**Director Park**

This space occupies a city block between SW Yamhill Street and Park Street in Portland’s downtown area, covering an underground parking garage, and is flanked by retail and office land uses. It contains little vegetation, though offers various seating options, an accessible fountain and paddling pool, a street chess set, and a café. The City Council describes it as “[d]esigned in the style of a European piazza” (Portland Parks & Recreation, undated). The immediate vicinity of the space contains a variety of historic and modern buildings, of varying heights.

The number of people entering the space from the south side was recorded from a vantage point nearby inside. Since it can be accessed from three of its sides, the result was multiplied by three to estimate the total number of people entering.
Figure A.8: observation location at Director Park (Portland)
Pettygrove Park

Pettygrove Park, located three blocks to the east of Urban Plaza, is surrounded by tall office and residential buildings, and contains mature trees, pathways, planted areas and a series of grassy mounds. At the time of fieldwork, a restoration project was being planned (publicised on a noticeboard in the park) which aimed among other things to repair the park’s stormwater drainage system, replace some of the older trees, and increase the amount of sunlight in the park as well as improve lighting. It includes various types of seating (benches, walls and steps) and a water feature. It is connected to several other small nearby recreational spaces via pedestrian walkways; together they form the so-called ‘Portland Open Space Sequence’. It is not home to any commercial establishments. The buildings in the vicinity of the park are of varying heights, though some are over 20 storeys tall. Pettygrove Park is located within the SoMa EcoDistrict (see Box 6.2 for more information).

All people entering the park during the observational shifts were counted from a vantage point on one of the grassy mounds in the centre of the park.
Figure A.9: observation location at Pettygrove Park (Portland)
South Waterfront riverside walk

This pathway runs along the full length of the built-up portion of the South Waterfront area, and is flanked by benches. A local resident suggested to the author that it currently constituted the most sociable open space in South Waterfront. The land at the southern end of the walk has not yet been built on, and was used at the time of fieldwork as a temporary ‘community garden’ (allotment area). It is not directly connected with any commercial establishments. The residential blocks on its west side range in height up to approximately 20 storeys. More information about the South Waterfront EcoDistrict is provided in Box 6.1.

The observations were conducted from one of the benches on the southern side of the walkway. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in front of the author were counted.
Figure A.10: observation location on South Waterfront riverside walk (Portland)
South Waterfront pocket park

This small park, occupying half a block, appears to have no official name. While the land is privately owned, it is openly accessible to the public. It is located at the southern end of existing development, and surrounded by tall residential blocks (approximately 25 storeys) and other smaller (four-storey) buildings, many of which have service and retail facilities on ground floor. Part of the open space here contains planted vegetation, paths and benches. A second more open segment contains a water feature with a wall at the edge providing seating. More information about the South Waterfront district is provided in Box 6.1.

The observations were conducted from one of the benches in the south-eastern corner of the space. All pedestrians entering the space were counted.

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56 The author originally intended to observe Elizabeth Caruthers Park – South Waterfront’s main open space (2.12 acres, between SW Moody Avenue and SW Bond Avenue), but this was closed for renovations during the fieldwork period. Instead, two smaller open spaces (the pocket park and the riverside walkway) were observed.
Figure A.11: observation location at South Waterfront pocket park (Portland)
Alberta Street

Alberta Street is the main retail street in Concordia, one of Portland’s original ‘streetcar neighbourhoods’ dating from the 1920s. According to the local resident interviewed, Concordia was characterised in the 1990s by its high crime levels, with the majority of premises on Alberta Street boarded up. It became significantly gentrified in the 2000s – later than many other inner Portland districts (Abbott, 2011). It has been described as “emblematic” of Portland’s image as a ‘creative’, ‘bohemian’ and ‘diverse’ city (Sullivan & Shaw, 2011), is currently well known for its “artsy” (Abbott, 2011) atmosphere, and contains a large number of independently owned boutiques, food outlets and pubs. The buildings on Alberta Street (mostly retail establishments) are typically two storeys high. The surrounding streets contain mostly detached residential properties with front porches. Each residential property owner is responsible for a small strip of land between the publicly owned sidewalk and the road. These are planted with a variety of vegetation, ranging from grass to trees and organic vegetables.

Observations were conducted on the northeastern corner of the intersection between Alberta Street and NE 27th Avenue. Counts were made of the pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in front of the author, on the northern side of the street in either direction.
Figure A.12: observation location on Alberta Street (Portland)
Alberta Park

Approximately 1km north of Alberta Street, this neighbourhood park covers 4 blocks, surrounded exclusively by residential buildings. Acquired in 1921 (when most of the neighbourhood was first being developed), it is covered with mature trees and grass, with various sports and children’s play facilities, and a ‘dog off-leash’ area. It hosts summertime open-air film screenings, free to the public.

A vantage point outside the southern gate was chosen for the pedestrian counts. This appeared to be neither the most nor least used park entrance. The number of people entering through this gate was recorded and multiplied by four to estimate the total number of people entering the park.
Figure A.13: observation location at Alberta Park (Portland)
Noeul Sam-ro

Noeul Sam-ro is the main retail street at the centre of the Hansol district, with a variety of shops, cafés and restaurants, and a local community centre. Though not pedestrianised, it has wide pavements on both sides, and a small amount of seating, as well as tables outside some of the food and drink establishments. It is located close to a hilly green park containing tombs from Korea’s Baekje dynasty, which is promoted as a heritage site. It has a large water feature at its southern end, and a tunnel beneath a ‘green bridge’, in which local residents organise bring-and-buy sales and a weekly ‘farmers’ market’.

The vantage point selected for the observation of the space was a table outside a café on a side road. This allowed the author to count all pedestrians walking on the eastern side of the road in both directions.
National library

The Sejong branch of the National Library of Korea opened in November 2013. It is located in the centre of the city, to the east of the Government Complex, immediately next to the central lake park. Entry to the library is unrestricted, and membership is free for all. It includes a café, convenience shop, and two restaurants. The basement children’s space, which includes a small cinema room, leads out to a play area behind the building. Building work has not yet been completed on the land around the library, so it is currently isolated in the urban fabric. While no buses stopped directly outside the library at the time of fieldwork, it has facilities for both cycle and car parking. Research interviewees and other local residents in informal conversation were unanimous in their praise of the library, and the lake park behind it, as one of the successes of Sejong to date, claiming in most cases to visit either it or the park behind on a regular basis.

All pedestrians going up and down the steps between the eastern side of the building and the library car park were counted from a vantage point on the far side of an adjacent water feature.
Central Park (Hansol)

This open space in Hansol (the first fully built-out part of Sejong) is located close to the area’s main transport facilities (a BRT stop, the terminus for coaches from Seoul, and a taxi rank). The pedestrian road which leads to it is surrounded by local shops and restaurants. It includes exercise machines, recycling facilities, various areas of greenery, a number of benches, and an elevated stage. Chamsaem ‘Smart’ school lies to its immediate south-west. The buildings next to the space are up to 25 storeys high.

The space was observed from a bench at the edge of the green area, next to the pedestrian road. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line across the road were counted, in both directions.

Figure A.16: observation location on pedestrianized thoroughfare next to the Hansol central park (Sejong)
Local residential space (Hansol)

This open space is surrounded by nine residential buildings, each approximately 25 storeys high. It contains a mixture of planted green areas and paved pedestrian space. It has a water feature and an artistically designed seating area on its southeastern side, and a variety of benches. The space can be directly entered from the main road on the north-eastern side, on which a variety of retail establishments, local services, and local bus stops are situated.

The vantage point for the observations was a bench in the centre of the space. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line stretching across the width of the space from the observation point were counted, in both directions.

Figure A.17: observation location in open space between residential buildings (Sejong)
Seoul Observation Locations

Jongno Sa-ga

Jongno, one of the main thoroughfares in the central traditional business district of Seoul, runs east to west from the southern end of the ceremonial space to the south of Gyeongbokgung Palace to Dongdaemun metro station. It carries a heavy volume of traffic, running in 4 lanes in each direction, and is served by several metro stations. It is flanked by a mixture of 4-5 storey office and retail buildings, and high-rise office blocks. Two recreational spaces – Tapgol (Pagoda) park and Jongmyo park – are located to its immediate north, with the traditional markets of Gwangjang and Dongdaemun on its southern side towards the eastern end. There are very few formal seating places along its length.

The observation vantage point was at the side of the pavement on the northern side, just to the east of the junction with Changgyyeonggung-no, and opposite Gwangjang food market. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line immediately in front of the author were counted in both directions, on the northern side of the road only.

Figure A.18: observation location on Jongno Sa-ga (Seoul)
Cheonggyecheon

The restored Cheonggyecheon river, which runs for several miles from east to west through the traditional business district of central Seoul, is renowned as “the most successful example of public policy in recent Korea” (Cho, 2010:163). The river was previously covered over, with an elevated urban motorway following its course. In the 1990s, however, concerns were raised about the safety of the structure, and because the surrounding area had “degenerated into a zone of urban decay” (Cho, 2010:150). The decision was therefore taken to remove the overpass and restore the covered natural stream so as to encourage urban regeneration. The renovated river, with pedestrian walkways on both sides, and crossed by 22 vehicle and pedestrian bridges, was first opened to public in 2005 (Cho, 2010). The ‘linear park’ along its length has created “a landmark and a focus for leisure and tourism” (Marianaldi, 2007:61). It is “one of the most popular places in Seoul. Intense social activity occurs here: walking, strolling, meeting, lingering, resting, and playing” (ibid:65), used by more than 60,000 visitors per day on average (Landscape Architecture Foundation, 2011), with a wide variety of landscaping features along its length, including waterfalls, areas of vegetation, sculptures and stepping stones. Cho (2010) describes it as a civic space “decorated to the theme of nature” (158), rather than a natural river, and an “artificial spectacle” (161); its waterway relies on 120,000 tons of water per day being pumped from the Han river (ibid).

According to a series of studies, the project has had several positive effects on the local environment, significantly lowering the ‘urban heat island effect’, improving air quality, and increasing biodiversity, and has also increased public transport use and benefited local businesses (Landscape Architecture Foundation, 2011).

Pedestrians were observed from a vantage point on the northern side of the river, between the Samildae-ro and Namdaemun-ro road bridges. All those crossing, in either direction, an imaginary line immediately in front of the author on the northern side were counted.
Myeongdong

Myeongdong is the main ‘western-style’ commercial district in the centre of Seoul, and is a significant tourist attraction in the city. It takes the form of a lattice of pedestrianized streets bordered by four streets: Eulji-ro to the north, Samil-ro to the east, Toegye-ro to the south, and Namdaemun-ro to the west, with traditional Namdaemun market located to its immediate south-west. Typical buildings in the area contain approximately 5 storeys, but many are considerably higher than this. Its brightly lit upmarket shops and department stores are interspersed with restaurants, cafes and street-food stalls. Many of Seoul’s key financial institutions are also located in or near the area.

Pedestrians were observed from a vantage point on the southern side of Myeongdong 8ga-gil, a pedestrian street running parallel to Toegye-ro and near Myeongdong metro station, between the junctions with Myeongdong 8-gil and Myeongdong 10-gil. Since the space observed was very busy, counting took place in two stages. First, a record was made of the total number of pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in across the street in front of the author, in either direction. During a subsequent 15-minute observation, the demographic characteristics of one in every ten were noted, and the totals multiplied by ten.
Hongdae

Hongdae is located approximately six kilometres to the east of the city centre in the Mapo ‘gu’ (borough) of the city, between Hongik University metro station to the north and Sangsu and Hapjeong metro stations to the south. Several universities are located in or near the area. It has a large number of retail establishments as well as art galleries, bars, nightclubs, restaurants and cafes, and many of its roads are pedestrianised. Cho (2002:429) uses Hongdae to exemplify those areas of Seoul whose open spaces largely attract “young urban dwellers, who are individualistic, consumerist and sensitive to commodities like brands, images and codes. For the most part, such civic spaces are located in streets or districts that exhibit a mix of commercial and cultural establishments, allowing for a lot of engagement and conversation, and cultural performance in a vibrant setting”. He contrasts it with “traditional street parks where older generations gather” (ibid), such as Pagoda Park off Jongno (see above). Nolita park, a small patch of open space in the middle of the area, hosts performances from local bands and singers in the evening, as well as a large number street vendors selling food and handmade goods. The majority of buildings in the area do not exceed five storeys in height.

The observation point chosen was on the eastern side of Eoulmadang-ro, the main (pedestrianised) street that runs through the area, approximately 100 metres to the south of the junction with Hongik-ro. Eoulmadang-ro has retail, eating and drinking
establishments on either side, and street stalls in the central partition. Pedestrians were counted who crossed an imaginary line, in both directions, between the author and Eoulmagang-ro central partition. Because of the large number of pedestrians, age and gender profiling information was gathered in a second 15-minute count during each observation, where the details of one in every ten passers-by was recorded (and the totals multiplied by ten).

Figure A.21: observation location in Hongdae district (Seoul)
Hwigyeongdong

Hwigyeongdong is a middle-income area on the eastern side of the Gangbuk ‘gu’ (borough) of Seoul, approximately 8 kilometres east of the city centre. The observation took place in an open space inside the Hwigyeong Jugong housing complex, built at the turn of the century. Its residential tower blocks (mostly over twenty storeys high) offer a variety of local facilities at ground level, including a kindergarten, book exchange, schools, and old people’s centre. All its open spaces are publicly accessible, and include a series of recreational sports courts and planted areas. The southern edge of the estate immediately adjoins local retail facilities.

The precise vantage point for the observations was on the southern side of a pagoda in an open space accessible by a broad walkway leading from the main pedestrian entrance on the southern side. All pedestrians entering this walkway in either direction were counted.
Appendix D

Tally sheet used for counting pedestrians in observation locations

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Good afternoon, I am conducting a short survey about local residents’ views on this area. Would you have a couple of minutes to answer a few questions?

**Screening question:** Could I just check, do you normally live in the Gateway area?
- IF NO OR UNSURE, TERMINATE INTERVIEW
- CONTINUE IF YES

**Ask age if in doubt:** And could I check that you are aged 18 or over?
- IF NO, TERMINATE INTERVIEW
- CONTINUE IF YES (ie 18+)

**Ask all**
Q1: Thinking about your own experiences as a resident area, which two or three things, if any, would you most liked to see improved in the Gateway area?

*Do not prompt. Probe further if respondent only has one answer:* What else would you like to see improved?

WRITE IN ANSWER ON GRID (INCLUDING ‘NOTHING’/’DON’T KNOW’/ETC)

**Ask all**
Q2: Are you aware of any local initiatives, schemes or voluntary organisations which aim to improve the area? *Do not prompt.*

ANSWER CODES: Y = YES; N= NO/DON’T KNOW

**Ask Q3 if ‘Yes’ at Q2**
Q3: What is it, or are they, called? *Do not prompt.*

WRITE IN ANSWER ON GRID (OR ‘NOTHING’/’DON’T KNOW’/ETC)

**Ask all**
Q4: Have you heard of the Growing Gateway EcoDistrict initiative?

ANSWER CODES: Y = YES; N= NO; RECORD OTHER ANSWERS (EG DON’T KNOW)

**Record closest description following end of interview, but do not ask:**

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(Continued on further sheets)
Appendix F

Information slip provided at end of street interviews in Gateway

Thank you for taking part in this short research interview. The findings will inform a doctoral research project conducted by Rob Cowley, from the University of Westminster, London (UK). The research explores different aspects of urban sustainability initiatives around the world. The responses you gave to the interview will be treated in the strictest confidence. They will be presented in aggregate form along with the results from other similar interviews in the areas, so that you will not be identifiable as an individual. If you have any questions about this interview, or would like to see a summary of the findings, you are encouraged to contact Rob Cowley (Robert.cowley@my.westminster.ac.uk) or either of his supervisors: Simon Joss (Josss@westminster.ac.uk) or Daniel Greenwood: (D.Greenwood2@westminster.ac.uk). If you would prefer to talk to someone outside the research team about aspect of this research, you are encouraged to contact Huzma Kelly, University of Westminster Research Ethics sub-Committee: h.kelly01@westminster.ac.uk.

Robert Cowley


