Media Consumption and the Construction of Diasporic Identities of Youth of Pakistani Origin in Britain

Rizvi, S.

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Media Consumption and the Construction of Diasporic Identities of Youth of Pakistani Origin in Britain

Syeda Sultana Rizvi

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. I have taken every care to respect copy rights and avoid plagiarism.
ABSTRACT

The topic of this thesis is ‘Media Consumption and the Construction of Diasporic Identities of Youth of Pakistani Origin in Britain’. This research aims to investigate interplay between consumption of media and the construction of identity of young people of Pakistani heritage born and brought up in Britain, known as British-Pakistanis. Role of media has been recognized as a part of social institutions that contribute to formation of identity. The overpowering presence of media in everyday life and penetration of digital media into personal lives relate in many ways to the construction and expression of identities including those of diasporas. The interactive nature of digital media has transformed the character of media consumers from passive receivers to producers as well, which also invokes reflexivity leading to discovery and construction of various facets of identity. The identity of Pakistani diaspora, predominantly Muslim, came into focus in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 because of involvement of young Muslim men in these incidences, which led to association of terrorism with the Muslims and gave rise to phenomenon of ‘Islamophobia’ in which media also played a significant role by portraying Muslims in a peculiar way. The research was carried out in two cities London and Bradford. Choosing qualitative method suitable to such research, 20 focus groups were conducted with total of 160 participants in the categories of age groups 18-24 and 25-30 with subcategories of Male only, Female only and Mixed groups. Besides this a questionnaire was also circulated to collect some quantitative data about the consumption pattern in terms of type of media and content accessed. Data was analysed in the light of theories about media and diasporas in globalized world and emergence of Islam and Muslims as security threat to the West in physical as well as ideological sense.
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Overlapping Terms

Some of the terms have been used interchangeably, in this dissertation, due to their connotations. The reasons for using interchangeable terms are explained below:

1. Pakistanis and Muslims:

   Majority of Pakistanis (95% of entire population) are Muslims. Similarly Pakistani diaspora in Britain is also pre-dominantly Muslim. After 9/11 and 7/7 the tendency to represent Muslims, including Pakistanis, as a homogenous group increased. This identification overshadows other facets of identity of British-Pakistanis. In many instances particularly the media reports and research studies on Muslims, in the context of identity and integration issues in the Western countries, people of Pakistani heritage are also included in the broad category of Muslim diaspora.

   References to such studies have been made to explain identity issues of Pakistanis keeping in view the common issues of representation faced by Pakistanis with other Muslims. Thus, at times, terms Muslims and Pakistanis have been used interchangeably depending on the context of discussion and reference to studies.

2. Britain, Europe and the West:

   The abstract concept of ‘West’ is used differently in diverse contexts like ideology, economy, political system, religion, history of imperialism and cultural dominance. The connotation of West representing geographical entities inhabited by white race sharing a world view based on modern, liberal, democratic and capitalist values and systems applies to Western Europe including the United Kingdom; North America and Australia (though not in the West geographically). After 9/11 and 7/7, a particular narrative about Muslims resonates in the public discourse in all these regions and countries.

   The broad divide between ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ enunciated by Edward Said (1978) and Clash of Civilizations thesis of Samuel Huntington (1993), reflect this notion. Muslims may face similar issues in the Western countries including the United Kingdom. Various studies on Muslims talk about Muslims as a threat to Western values including those of Europe and the UK. Thus, West, Europe and Britain may be used interchangeably while referring to such studies in the broader context of Western/ European societies and values.
3. **British and Western Media**

Similarly, the Western media including the British media are considered to have an influence over narratives in the world and tend to have similarity of approach while representing Islam and Muslims, particularly after 9/11 and 7/7. Hence media may be referred to as Western/European/British, depending on the context.

4. **Diaspora and Migrants:**

Migration from one land to another remains a prerequisite for any diaspora. Communities of diaspora settled for generations may also be referred to as migrants by the host societies. The younger people with diverse heritage who are born and brought up in Britain may experience categorization as migrants. So these terms may also be used interchangeably.

5. **Digital and Social Media**

Digital and social media can be used interchangeably with reference to context of consumption/pro-sumption and usage/prod-usage. Many studies on social media employ the term digital media to stand for social media and vice versa. While referring to such studies and discussing these concepts in different contexts, these terms may be used interchangeably in this study.
Introduction

There is a long history of presence of diaspora communities of various ethnic and religious heritages in the United Kingdom. As in many other European countries, migration to Great Britain took place for a variety of reasons, so a diversity of both roots and routes of diasporas can be found. The presence of diaspora communities also gave rise to issues of identity and integration.

Representation of collective identity in public discourse plays a significant role in creating perceptions of different communities. In the case of diaspora communities of diverse backgrounds, representation in a peculiar manner may create stereotypes, causing an impact on interaction with groups in the host society and giving rise to issues of integration. Media, being powerful social resources, have a role in social construction of identities of various ethnic and religious groups through representation.

This study aims to investigate the construction of the diasporic identity of youth of Pakistani heritage living in Britain, also known as British-Pakistanis, through their consumption of media, including digital media. It investigates how a representative sample of British-Pakistanis perceive their representation in media based on ethnicity, religion and socioeconomic position, how this representation affects the ways they are perceived by and integrated into the host society, and the strategies they may adopt to create their own narrative.

Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom, like immigrants from other countries, face issues of identity for reasons including their religion (majority being Muslims), South-Asian ethnicity and those embedded in the history of colonialism and post-colonial migration. In the period following decolonisation migrants from the former colonies of the British Empire, mainly consisted of labourers, came to work in the factories, one of the vital components of the British economy, where manpower was required due to the loss of young men in the Second World War coupled with the emigration of many British people to Australia.

When the British economy gained diversification in the 1980s, its dependence on the factory workers began to decline. As a result, the factory workers became redundant. They were seen as backward people, misfits in British society, and a strain on the economy. These developments coincided with racial conflict and clashes with the host society and within ethnic minorities.
Diasporas, usually referred to as migrants or ethnic minorities by the mainstream British society, have triggered political and social debates since the beginning of the influx of non-White working-class migrants from the former colonies of the British Empire. The perceptions of incompatibility of various immigrant groups with mainstream British society resulted in different streams of responses. The immigrants felt discriminated against by the White majority based on race, ethnicity and, in some cases, religion. Mainstream society perceived them as ‘incompatible others’ who were not trying to integrate into British culture and society.

The issues of identity and integration of Pakistani diaspora may be linked to their ethnic identity as migrants from South Asia, a region that remained under British colonial rule, and thus to issues of power relations. Religion plays a significant role in the construction and expression of identities too. Identity issues of Muslims living in Western countries, including Pakistani diaspora in Britain, came into the spotlight at the turn of this century due to catalytic events like 9/11 in USA in 2001 and 7/7 in the UK in 2005. The involvement of young Muslim males in these incidents raised questions not only about the loyalties of Muslim immigrants to their host societies in Europe and America but also about policies of multiculturalism.

Poole (2011) refers to 9/11 as a context that has shaped the way Muslims have been constructed in public discourse by linking them to security threats. Huysmans (2006), Mandaville (2011) and Mavelli (2013) have pointed out that securitisation of Muslims (treating Muslims as security threats) has deeply affected lives of Muslims in Western countries, including the United Kingdom.

The juxtaposition of 9/11 and 7/7 with Islam by the media led to phenomenon, of homogenizing Muslims from all regions of world, including those following different schools of thought, into one monolithic identity of ‘Muslims’, characterised by stereotypes such as terrorists, extremists and fundamentalists, implying not only securitisation aspect of the presence of Muslims in Western societies but also a clash of Islam with Western values.

Media also played a key role in creating perceptions of Muslims as terrorists and highlighting the presence of Muslims, particularly young males, as security threats to Western societies and values. As Cottle suggests, “Through various kinds of media representations, audience can be variously incited to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are in relation to who ‘we’ are not, whether as ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’, ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’, ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’, ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’” (2000, p2).
The overpowering presence of the media, particularly the penetration of digital media into people’s everyday lives, relates in many ways to the construction and expression of identities, including those of diasporas. The media have evolved both from local to global and from print and electronic to digital. The interactive and participatory nature of digital media platforms has transformed media consumers from passive receivers to active audience and offers them opportunities to become producers if they desire. Terms like ‘prod-users’ and ‘pro-sumers’ are gaining currency, besides media consumers and audiences.

Studies have revealed that representation and misrepresentation of groups based on race, ethnicity and religion in the mainstream Western media have led to certain perceptions and misperceptions of these groups, often resulting in stereotypes. The power of the media can represent groups in certain manners through techniques of framing, priming and agenda-setting (Entman, 2007, Poole, 2011 and Van Dijk, 1995).

Interactive engagement with digital media both as consumers and producers has its own dynamics in the construction and manifestation of individual, cultural, ethnic, national and global identity at micro, meso, macro and meta levels. As a social institution, media may also contribute to construction and characterisation of communities. Anderson (2006) asserts that mass media and media technologies are often related to the creation of coherent imagined community.

These formations of communities on different grids have influence on the identities of diasporas, which may be influenced by changing environments at the local and global levels. The media revolution has created a state of hyper-communication, enabling modern diasporas to forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement (Basch et al.,1994).

“The transmission of events ‘live as they happen’ and the possibilities for ‘contemporaneity and synchronicity’ enable ‘coexistence’ and ‘experiencing together’ by dispersed populations” (Tsagarousianou, 2004, p56). For diasporas, this also means an opportunity to create virtual communities through elaborate media trajectories extending beyond geographical boundaries (Appadurai 1996).

Hyper-communication through the use of a variety of media including digital platforms helps diasporic communities connect to their homelands and reinforce their sense of collective identity. Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) highlight utilisation of internet and mobile technologies by diaspora communities to communicate, interact and maintain identity, portraying the internet as an antidote for the assumed disjuncture or dislocation. resulting from spatial and temporal distance between diasporas and their homelands.
Significance of this research

The presence of nearly 1.7 million Pakistani diaspora, the majority of them Muslims, evokes the significance of identity and positioning of young people of Pakistani origin in the social, political and security context of post-9/11 and 7/7 Britain, which led to questions on policies of multiculturalism and loyalty of migrants. Muslims, including Pakistanis, began to feel targeted and victims of suspicion, increased racism, and discrimination. In the era of globalisation, the identity issues of migrants and their progeny gained significance because of an increase in migration from less developed to developed countries, including the UK. This led to controversies about the impact of migration on economic and social resources and social and cultural conflicts.

This study aims to investigate how consumption of media relates to the identity construction of young people of Pakistani origin living in the UK, and how their social representation leads to perceptions affecting interaction with other groups and integration into mainstream society. It covers the issues of the counternarrative, and access to media.

There is growing worldwide interest from academics and policymakers in migration and diasporic cultures. The reasons pertain to issues and challenges posed by massive transnational migrations and concerns of host countries, particularly in the West¹, regarding the integration of diasporas into mainstream societies. Diasporas in Europe and America have become the focus of investigation in several streams of studies such as race relations, ethnicity, diversity, multiculturalism, cultural and migration studies, but there are very few studies on diasporic identity from the perspective of the media.

Studies on Pakistani diaspora mainly remain focused on socio-economic and political aspects. Representation through media plays a considerable role in the construction of identity and much-debated issues of integration and multiculturalism. Studies are still needed to explore the construction of identities of Pakistani youth, particularly in relation to the role of media as a social resource and an instrument that can build up perceptions socially. In recent years, youth identity has acquired more significance through the discontent of youth with socioeconomic conditions. Young people in Britain have expressed their concerns, sometimes through violent behaviour. For example, riots in 2011 brought young people into the limelight.

¹ The West as geographical entity comprising of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand has ideological, political and economic connotation and cultural influence over other parts of the world with notions of occidental versus oriental and as us and others (McNeill, 1998; Said, 1978 and 1994) and difference in the sense of clash of civilization (Huntington, 1993).
It was important to carry out research focused on youth of Pakistani origin in Britain, because their identity matters in the context of issues such as securitisation of Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 and the strain on economic and other resources caused by the influx of migrants. For young British-Pakistanis, questions of adaptation, integration and loyalty to the host country became pertinent both in terms of media portrayals of these factors and their representation by the mainstream media.

Prior to 9/11 and 7/7, identity perceptions of Pakistani diaspora were more focused on class and power relations about the migration of working-class people from South Asia. Due to securitisation of Muslims after these events, they turned more towards religious identity, as Pakistanis are perceived, more or less, interchangeably with Muslims, particularly with reference to securitisation and Islamophobia.

Since diasporic identity is a manifestation of the collective cultural and ethnic identity of a community, constructed and positioned in social context, the identity of British-Pakistanis needs to be seen in light of these developments. The study takes into account variations within Pakistani diaspora. Participants were chosen from two cities: cosmopolitan London, with Pakistanis of diverse backgrounds, and Bradford, with a concentration of Pakistani diaspora with low socio-economic indicators.

The developments in media make this study significant. It assesses the usage of media and, in the light of dynamics of new media, the prod-usage and pro-sumption. As the new media serve as an instrument of performance of identity helping to narrativize and represent oneself, British-Pakistani youth may utilize digital media as a resource to construct or express identity through media activity and participation.

**Hypothesis, questions and structure of dissertation**

A hypothesis and research questions were framed based on preliminary readings and interactions with British-Pakistani youth.

Hypothesis: “Young British-Pakistanis develop strategies and practices of media usage that constitute at least partly in response to the dominant representation of their communities. Through these, they attempt to construct their own distinct identities”.

Research questions, discussed in detail in the methodology chapter, were formulated in the light of this hypothesis. The first broad question deals with young British-Pakistanis’ perceptions of their dominant representation in media and their response in terms of attitudes and strategies of media consumption and practices. The question revolves around the perceptions of the diaspora of media representation and the perceptions created in society.
Subsequent questions explore how these perceptions contribute to construction of various aspects of identity of young British-Pakistanis at different levels and what strategies of media consumption they may adopt in response to their representation in media.

Additional questions include whether these processes are gendered and, if so, what the differences in male/female media consumption and identity formation are and if there is a correlation between class and the representation and perceptions of Pakistani origin youth about their identities. Further questions probe the participants’ perceptions in a particular social and political context to find out how young British-Pakistanis interpret meanings from media messages and how they may utilise media for self-representation. The structure of the dissertation is based on hypothesis and research questions, consisting of seven chapters and the abstract, introduction, and the conclusion.

The first chapter is a literature review encompassing an analysis of literature and debates on the concepts of diaspora, diasporic identities and youth issues, and theories and models about representation through media and ensuing perceptions. The chapter elucidates how the concept of diaspora has been defined through various approaches based on the causes of migration, the myth of ‘home’, construction of communities and cultural boundaries within the host country. It includes a discussion of the process of hybridity and common cultural spaces with references to works of Cohen, 1985; Hobsbawm, 1990; Clifford, 1994; Morley and Robins, 1995; Anderson, 1996; Brah, 1996; Modood and Werbner, 1997; and Shaffer, 2003.

The chapter covers concepts and theories about media, representation, identity and youth to establish a nexus among them in the context of globalisation. The role of media in construction and expression of individual and group identity through representation and activity has been supported by various studies. The works of Miles, 1989; Williams, 1992; Scannell, 1996; Cottle, 2000; Poole, 2001; Ross, 2003 and McQuail, 2010 are particularly considered important in this connection.

To understand the interplay of media and identity in the context of the present positioning of Pakistani diaspora it is important to have an idea of the evolution and transformation of the position of Pakistani diaspora in Britain in terms of socioeconomic status, power relations and their representation in mainstream discourse and the social positioning and representation inherited historically by young British-Pakistanis. Chapter 2 deals with the historical context, evolution and positioning of young Pakistani diaspora in the current political milieu.
The chapter covers the factors that led to migration from Pakistan, and the context of politics of multiculturalism in Britain. The chapter deals with the position and identity issues of Pakistani-origin youth in historical, socio-economic and religious contexts. Beginning with the causes of migration and class of early migrants, the discussion navigates through the arguments on construction of race and class in the colonial and post-colonial era and the role of culture and religion in the lives of Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom.

The socio-political environment of the host country can be considered important with regard to the positioning of diaspora. In Britain, cultures and diasporic identities of migrant communities have come into focus in the wake of debates on multiculturalism and Britishness. Added to these are new concerns about Muslim diaspora after the incidents of 9/11 and 7/7 where Muslims were involved. The chapter covers multiculturalism in Britain with reference to British-Pakistanis in the sense of Muslims and South-Asians.

Research methods and approaches are explained in Chapter 3, along with reasons for selecting qualitative approach and method of focus groups and interviews. It covers discussion on various schools of thoughts about conducting research into media and communications and methods for studying group dynamics. This chapter highlights strengths and weaknesses of the focus-group method and challenges met and tackled in the field.

In chapters 4 and 5 patterns of media consumed by British-Pakistani youth are analysed in the light of Uses and Gratifications Theory (UGT), based on interpretation of qualitative and quantitative data gathered through focus-group discussions and questionnaires. The focus of Chapter 4 remains on choices of media sources in terms of preferred categories like traditional or new media, television, newspapers, British or ethnic media or other international TV channels. The chapter also looks into consumption of media by British-Pakistani youth in light of active audience and participatory cultures, which have become more important with the onset of digital media, as media users and consumers may also become producers, as prod-users and pro-sumers.

Chapter 5 deals with the consumption of content by young British-Pakistanis. The chapter covers the range of content preferred by them, and how the consumption of particular content relates to contours of identity and the formation or expression of various traits. Chapter 6 analyses the perceptions of British-Pakistani youth of their representation in media, meta views of mainstream society, how it perceives them through media representations and its impact on their identity and integration in the host society. A discussion of perceived stereotyping based on religion and ethnicity in the context of representation of Muslims in post-9/11 and 7/7 is included in the chapter.
This chapter also deals with the question of ‘Voice’ and ‘Control’ over words and media, which remain important in terms of representation and formation of narratives in the context of diaspora or ethnic minorities and the situations of unequal power relations between groups, as in the case of British-Pakistani diaspora and the history of colonisation by the British Empire. The chapter includes discussion of whether digital media have a role in giving voice to marginalised groups.

Chapter 7 contains analyses of the media strategy of young British-Pakistanis in forming their own narrative of identity through digital media. The discussion includes analyses of shared content, both existing and produced by them in connection with identity narratives. Analysis of their views on agency of digital media and portable smart devices for connectivity with different entities in real and virtual space that count towards the construction of identity are covered in the chapter.

The chapter includes a synthesis of findings on the relationship of diasporic identity of young British-Pakistanis, with the representation of ethnic minorities and their cultures through media, ensuing perceptions, and how these are narrativized in the process of construction of identity. It covers their strategies for positioning and repositioning of self as part of particular group in the given social and political environment of the host society and its impact on intercommunity relations. The analyses covers whether those processes are gendered, whether there is a link to class, and if so, what the differences in male/female media consumption and identity formation processes are.

Complexity and scope of the study

The research is interdisciplinary in nature as it involves concepts and theories from diverse disciplines such as media and communications, journalism, anthropology, sociology, psychology, history and politics in relation with media consumption, representation, diaspora, migration, identity, youth, globalisation and multiculturalism. The grid of concepts and their applications is multifaceted and dynamic, with ongoing rapid developments in all these fields.

One of the main subject areas in this research is ‘media consumption’, which has developed constantly and rapidly in the first two decades of this century. Media consumption has seen a major transformation with developments in digital media, which provide potential for audiences to assume the role of producers – prod-users and pro-sumers – so discussions on media refers to both these audience roles. The roles of audience or media consumers may oscillate between these spheres, which makes consumption patterns and their assessment quite complex.
The use of digital media has been rising constantly, as reflected by Ofcom reports. New applications and social media platforms have been increasing, leading to expansion or shifts in preferences of users and prod-users. The level of audience activity, the expansion of communication-driven media and the speed, scale, scope, and space of media have raised the level of communication to that of hyper-communication. Online versions of print media and TV channels defused the boundaries of digital and traditional media. Now the means of access may be digital, while the content may be from print or electronic media like newspapers or TV channels. Discussions of consumption and prosumption of media are also vulnerable to this overlap.

The concept of diaspora has evolved over time. Construction of virtual diaspora communities using digital media, trans-local and transnational connections and actual interactions make diasporic identity more dynamic and multidimensional. This scenario applies to the process of hybridity. In addition to actual interaction of distinct cultures, influences through traditional and new media make hybridity a complicated process. Individuals and groups may at times not adopt characteristics of the host society but through virtual interactions become hybrids of distant cultures.

These developments have led to even greater complexity of cultures and society. British society is already multicultural and there are hybrids of different ethnic groups. Hybrids may further be hybridised by cultures transmitted through media, even more so through digital media and participation in virtual communities. The levels of complexities of culture and society have also advanced and may be considered as ultracomplex.

The postmodernist approach describes identity as multiple and fluid projects, but increased input from social institutions, including media and ever-growing challenges to aspects of identity, increases the multiplicity and fluidity of identity, making it, in a way, superfluid. Similarly, multiplicity exists at various levels and layers.

The building blocks of identity in terms of religion, race, and ethnicity at levels both vertical (individual and group, including national and global, i.e., micro, meso, macro and meta) and horizontal (age, gender and class) may be open to further multiplicity. The building blocks of identity may experience relative fluidity and multiplicity, meaning one block may not be changing at one time, while one or more other blocks are going through transformations.

Pakistani diaspora in Britain is perceived as a part of a homogenous Muslim global community. Pakistanis are perceived as synonymous to Muslims. Though the majority of Pakistanis are Muslims, there are also Christian and Ahmedi Pakistanis. Within Muslims there
are also sects and schools of thought like Shia, Deobandi and Barelvi Muslims. Social and media representation portrays all Pakistanis as an entity homogenous with Muslims from different countries. Even the ethnic differences among Pakistanis may appear to submerge under a Muslim identity. This ‘Muslim’ identity of young Pakistanis may predominate in public discourse and social representation.

Bearing in mind the vast and complex scope of research, it was necessary to figure out strict boundaries. Because the religious aspect of identity of British-Pakistanis has been challenged more than any other aspect since 9/11, the major emphasis of this study is on religious identity in the context of their image formed through media. Discussions on youth subculture and other aspects of collective identity will be limited.

The data reflect consumption patterns and perceptions of the participants of this study, which is by no means a generalisation. The analysis is based on the views of participants expressed during empirical research in the light of context and theories and models about media and diaspora. There was no attempt to judging whether their perceptions were right or wrong, realistic or unrealistic. Discussion of theories and models of media, media effects, media consumption and pro-sumptions, representation, culture and identity have been limited to their relevance for interpretations of responses.
Chapter 1. Nexus of Diaspora, Identity and Media

This chapter is based on a review of the literature regarding various aspects of this study, which include media consumption, diaspora, youth, and construction of identity. The past few decades have seen a growing academic interest in the study of diasporic cultures and identities, due to issues and challenges posed by massive transnational migration and the concerns of host societies about the integration of diasporas into the mainstream.

The study of the construction of diasporic identity of Pakistani-origin youth in the UK through consumption of media necessitates an understanding of concepts and theories about media and representation; perceptions; diaspora, as defined in classical and modern terms; culture and ethnicity; youth culture; construction of individual and group identity; and the context of globalization, digitalization, and multiculturalism.

An overview of theories about the construction of identity, particularly youth identity, and approaches to dynamics of cultural and social identity are discussed in this chapter, as the construction of the diasporic identity of British-Pakistani youth within various frames of reference needs to be explored in the dynamics of a multicultural society.

The role of media in creating perceptions about various entities through representation remains pivotal to the line of inquiry of this thesis. Therefore, a discussion of theories particularly those about the representation of ethnic groups in the context of the UK, is included. Insights into various theories about the role and power of media and have been included in this chapter, as media consumption occupies a central position in this study.

Digital media have emerged as important resources in the connectivity, construction and expression of individual and group identities. Digital media offers users the opportunity to become producers of content, defined as prod-usage. This may be significant in the construction of identity, more so in connection with youth identity and the evolution of virtual communities of diaspora.

The transnational connectivity of diaspora in a globalized world has increased through access to media, more significantly through digital devices, which invites attention to the operational side of processes and concepts of transnational, translocal, and global media spaces and scape. The literature about these concepts and processes is discussed in this chapter.
1.1 Diaspora: the concept and characteristics

Diaspora is a complex concept, but in simple and general terms, as Durham (1999) suggests, the notion of diaspora pertains to the dislocation of groups of people for similar reasons from the nation or geographical location of origin and relocation to one or more nation-states, territories, or countries at a particular time. With its roots in ancient times, the concept and process of the diaspora have evolved through the centuries, from reference to the exile of the Jews around the third century BC to a more inclusive one that caters for various dimensions associated with processes of migration and settling in new places in various periods.

On an operational level, in addition to the physical movement of people from one place to another, diasporas can be influenced by virtual transnational forces and factors during the process of crystallization as a community. In processes of settling into host societies, diasporas are more than just dislocated people. “Migrants are not just individuals that happen to be out of place, they are part of much more complex processes, they constitute part of, and institute transnational relationships, networks, communities, economies and movement and set in motion processes of imagination of themselves as transnational communities, as diaspora” (Tsagarousianou, 2004, p3).

The etymology of the term and its historical perspective offer an understanding of the evolution of the concept and an understanding of diasporic identity and culture. The word ‘Diaspora’ is derived from the Greek term “speiro = to sow, dia = over.” Scheffer (2003) states that at a very early period the term was applied to the Jewish and the Greek diaspora that were established outside of their homelands as a result of both voluntary and forced migrations.

Classical diasporas date back to ancient times. The Greek term ‘diaspora’ (diesperian, “to sow” or “to scatter”) refers to the dispersal of any population from its original land and its settlement in one or more territories. It originally had positive connotations but was later redefined to include the collective expulsion of Jews from the Holy Land and a traumatic and coerced departure implying collective trauma and victimization.

The Jewish experience became the blueprint for interpreting diaspora as a concept. Reis (2004) describes how these elements were applied to experiences of other groups such as the movement of Africans as the result of slavery and that of Armenians as the result of genocide in 1911. The notion of contemporary diaspora which departed from the Jewish paradigm refers to the diaspora in the post-World War II period, more pertinent to dynamics of economic compulsions in the postcolonial period and new realities.
The complex concept and process of becoming ‘diaspora’ have been defined and redefined through various approaches, which include dynamics associated with the processes of migration, settlement, identity formation and dilemmas of maintaining a cultural identity on the one hand and compulsions for integration in the new homeland (the host country) on the other. In this connection, Braziel and Mannur (2011) refer to the diaspora as the naming of the other, which was historically applied to displaced communities of people dislocated from their native homeland through movements of migration or exile.

Thus, the complexity of diaspora communities is embedded in both the conscious and the unconscious processes of making diasporas by forming and transforming into communities, networks and identities, implying thereby social action and cultural change or resistance or negotiation. How migrants construct meaning, develop subjectivities and identities and embark on action are central to the understanding of the notion of diaspora (Tsagarousianou, 2007).

Discussing the need of reconceptualizing the term diaspora, Georgiou (2006) asserts that diaspora can be described as decentralized relation to ethnicity, implying real or imagined relations among scattered people who sustain a sense of community through various forms of communications and contact and who do not depend on returning to a distant homeland. Therefore, there is a need to reconceptualize diaspora “to address the global, transnational experiences of diasporic groups and individuals who construct new and hybrid belongings concerning the country of origin, the country of settlement and through the routes of their journey” (ibid, p4).

Theorizing diaspora offers critical space for thinking about the discontent movements of modernity, the massive migrations from the late colonial period through the decolonization era into the twenty-first century, which can not be divorced from historical and cultural specificities. (Braziel and Mannur 2011; Cohen, 1997; Laguerre, 1998)

Attempts to theorize diasporas have led to categorization and characterization in terms of time frame, causes of migration, and behavioural manifestations like longing for the land of origin and maintaining connectivity (Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010; Brah, 1996; Braziel and Mannur, 2011; Cohen, 1985; Esman, 2009; Scheffer, 2006), thus situating diasporas into time frames like the classical, pre-colonial, modern, postcolonial, global and digital eras.
The causes and routes of migration can be seen in various frames of reference. Cohen (1997) divides diasporas into five broad categories of victims (Jews, Armenians, Africans, Irish, and Palestinians), labour (Indians, Chinese, Sikhs and Italians), trade (Venetians and Lebanese), imperial (British, Spanish, and Dutch) and cultural (Caribbean).

Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) suggest that the broad focus of most of the theories of migration tends to be on three interlinked and non-mutually exclusive levels: macro, meso and micro. The macro-level rests on structural, political, and economic conditions that “push” and “pull” individuals to migrate (e.g., neoclassic theories, dual labour market theory and world system theories). The meso level theories deal with social relations and network (e.g., social network and institutional theory), while the micro-level explores the decision-making of individuals (e.g., rational choice).

With the evolution of the concept, the characteristics of diasporas found a place in the debate. Schaffer describes modern diasporas as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins, residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with the countries of their origin” (1986, p3). Among the common conditions associated with diaspora are collective migrations and settlements in the form of communities rather than a process of migrations or exiles of individuals, and permanent or longer periods of settlement of communities rather than short-term visits or transits. (Fazal and Tsagarousianou, 2007).

The experience of contemporary diasporas is further diversified as they exist in an era of globalization and digital media (Braziel and Mannur, 2011; Tololyan and Alfonso, 2004; Tsagarousianou, 2007;). Among other agents, diasporas now use the internet for fostering cybercommunities among individuals of the same ethnic provenance who happen to be scattered geographically (Esman, 2009). Digital diasporas are seen as sustaining solidarity among their participants, facilitating dialogue, identifying areas of agreement and discord, and making it possible to interact with the people of their origin within and outside the homeland in a coordinated way.

Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) point out that using distance and time shrinking telecommunications technologies like email, mobile phones and the internet, diasporas share similar concerns, anxieties, hopes and desires, which to a certain extent go unnoticed by both their host societies and countries of origin. The internet has enabled diasporas to maintain instantaneous and inexpensive communication with families, friends and business associates in their homeland. Now they have experience of transnational existence, especially the immigrant generation.
Diasporas have been observed and studied based on characteristics that they maintain while living as communities in lands other than those of their origin. Typologies have been developed both along the lines of causes of migration and the way they operate and form relationships with the host countries and countries of origin. However, not all the characteristics may apply to diasporas with different roots, routes, and situations in the host country. The typologies may become restrictive as, depending on requirements, the manifestation of characteristics may vary.

Essential characteristics of ‘diaspora’ have been discussed by various scholars. William Safran (1991, p83-4) points out the following:

- **Dispersal from a homeland** to other countries
- Having bonds of common vision, memory, or myth about their homeland from disparate geographical locations
- Seeking the development of their autonomous cultural and social needs against the sense of possible rejection by the host societies
- **Hope for eventual return** to their homeland
- **Commitment to the maintenance** or restoration of the homeland
- **Consciousness and solidarity**

Certain features of the contemporary diaspora are similar to those that typify diasporas established in earlier periods. Schaffer (2007, p185) states:

- All diasporas have been created as a result of voluntary or imposed migration.
- In most cases, decisions to join or establish diasporic entities have been made only after migrants have settled in their host countries.
- Diasporas have been determined to maintain their ethnic identities and have been capable of doing so. Those identities have been important bases for promoting solidarity within diasporic entities.
- Most diasporas have established intricate support organizations in their host countries.
They have been involved not only in economic activities in their host countries but also in significant cultural and political exchanges with their homelands and other diasporic entities of the same national origin.

They have maintained contact with their homelands and other dispersed segments of the same nation.

In some cases, blatant hostility and discrimination have forced individuals and groups to join or set up ethnonational diaspora organizations.

These characteristics are not all-inclusive and different diaspora communities, particularly younger generations, may not demonstrate all these characteristics. Keeping in view the dynamic and evolving nature of diasporic cultures, Clifford (1994) cautions against the construction of a definition of the term based on an ‘ideal type’ of diaspora with the consequence that groups become identified as more or less diasporic, having only two, or three, or four of the basic features but retaining the central features of displacement and migrancy.

With their links to the homeland and compulsions to integrate into the host countries, diasporas may experience evolution of distinct diasporic identities beyond static nature and restrictive definitions. The requirement of expanding characteristics has been described by Mandaville (2001), as he points out that more recent notions of diaspora, like the types engendered by late modern transnational migration, and the transnational Islamic Umma, challenge the restricted definitions.

1.1.1 Back home and transnational connectivity

Since migration and displacement remain central to the experience of diaspora, an essential element pertinent to this characteristic is the concept of ‘home,’ which influences diasporic identities and cultures (Brah, 1996; Mandaville, 2001). Like all other diasporas, the British-Pakistani diaspora experiences the special place of homeland or back home. It is relevant to go through various points of view regarding the navigation between the two homes.

Those generations of the diaspora who are born and brought up in the host country may not have a longing for ‘homeland,’ but a sense of ‘back home’ persists in their thinking. As diasporas settle down in a land that is different from the land of their ethnic origin or nationhood, the concept of homeland and the dichotomy of the home remain pivotal to characteristics of diaspora.
Diasporas are grafted onto the life of the place of settlement but retain strong social, psychological, spiritual, and emotional links with their ‘homeland,’ which may become a ground of contestation for affiliation with the host country. Place of origin or ‘home’ may remain as a signifier of identity. “Home connotes a sense of belonging to an imagined community and social and psychic geography of space, which includes a network of families, kin, friends, colleagues and various other significant others. This ‘home’ is a place with which we remain intimate, even in moments of intense alienation. It is a sense of ‘feeling at home’.” (Brah, 1996, p4).

The significance of emotional connection with the homeland is endorsed by Esman as he states that “the homeland that diasporas continue to regard with affection is usually the country from which they emigrated, more specifically, the village or province they have left behind with their family and relatives” (2009, p6).

As the homeland occupies a position of a distant parent for the diaspora, it constructs its collective subjectivity. Diasporas, therefore, tend to take the form of the nation of their place of origin. Cohen (1985) holds the view that diaspora communities share a common identity, not only with the homeland but also with their kindred communities in other countries.

This common identity is complemented by the establishment of diasporic communicative networks and spaces (Fazal and Tsagarousianou, 2002). In a globalized world, both places could be home simultaneously. “The link between diasporas and countries of origin is often fraught with tensions and ambivalence because of the juxtaposition of diasporic subjects to definitions of themselves derived from the country of origin.” (Tsagarousianou, 2001, p37).

As the connection with homeland continues to exist in the memory of diaspora communities, they construct their transnational communities and networks while depending on the resources of the host country they migrate to. They derive cultural features from which their identity and character are defined and usually see the nation of their homeland as an anchor to which they remain tied, psychologically, and culturally.

One of the fallouts of dichotomies of transnational phenomena is that at times they call into question the philosophical boundaries of the state of which they are citizens. This quest for maintaining a distinct ‘own identity’ may lead to resisting homogenization into a nation-state. This does not only relate to the home country that constitutes the scape of transnational connectivity; diaspora communities living in other countries are also components of this architecture.
In this context of transnational connectivity, the construction of diasporic identities is influenced by several planes of reference. Esman (2009) explains that diasporas function in a trilateral set of relationships involving:

1) Their country of origin, homeland, its government, political movements, mass media, sources of information, their extended family and friends.

2) Their host country, its government, and the economic, political, educational, and informational institutions that affect the survival, wellbeing, and adaptation of the diaspora to its new and often less friendly environment.

3) The diaspora itself and its many linkages with the homeland, host country, and segments of the diaspora in other countries and other cities in its host country.

Diaspora communities are the product not just of social interaction but also of virtual connections through media. In the view of Lowe (2003), the construction of ethnic minorities and the evolution of identity depend on diasporic imaginaries and communication infrastructures, media, and cultural spaces upon which multiple and diverse processes of identity and community are constructed and transformed, and the production of narratives and discourses that reproduce and sustain relevant frames of self-identification and collective action.

1.1.2. Global connectivity and virtual communities

With multiple frames of reference, diasporas are situated in contemporary global flows which criss-cross the artificial boundaries of national territories. It is in this context that Appadurai (1996) introduces the concept of ‘scapes’ to express the web of intersecting global processes in which cultural formations are nurtured through five scapes.

Ethnoscapes, referring to the landscape of moving groups of people who constitute the shifting world of today including tourists, immigrants, refugees and others; mediascapes, the worldwide distribution of electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information and the images of the world which the media create; technoscapes, the global configuration of ever-changing technology, moving at high speed across boundaries; financescapes, involving currency markets, stock exchanges, and commodity speculation moving money across the world; and ideoscapes, movement of ideas and images, or ideological movements seeking power (Appadurai, 1996, pp296-301).
This representation of the complex interrelationships in contemporary global processes provides an integrated infrastructural web of interconnections in which diasporas are situated as dynamic transnational networks, rather than merely as groups of displaced people. Further expanding on the transnational complex, Tsagarousianou (2007) calls transnational architecture innovative and brings forward the operative side of complex scenarios and the role of media in tangibly building diasporic imaginaries. She explains that these scapes are translated into diasporic imaginaries, partly through representation and narrativization achieved through relevant mediascapes.

Similarly, Nina Glick Schiller (2005) delineates three different contexts: transnational social fields that migrants establish to connect their homeland to the new land; transborder networks of social relationships and communications that connect migrants to multiple states; and local citizenship and its transborder ramifications.

Schiller defines the ‘social field’ as an unbounded terrain of multiple interlocking networks and uses the concept of social spaces to refer to how social relations are structured by power. According to her, transnational social spaces can be conceived of as flows of human interactivity where relationships are free-floating, in contrast to transnational social fields in which relations are more structured and less ‘fluid.’

The decade of the 1990s saw the rise of global 24-hour television news and the spread of the internet, but by the turn of the century, the rise of social media – Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and other virtual forums – had enabled greater global interactions, leading to the emergence of global networks in which to create, share and exchange images, videos, information and ideas, appealing to virtual communities who can mobilise for action.

Before digital media had penetrated everyone’s life, studies on diaspora focused on access to and use of television channels and TV programmes from the country of origin. Often a connection was inferred between high usage of these channels and low degree of integration into society (Anderson and Thoresen, 2012), implying that the consumption of transnational media undermined TV channels of the host country as integrating agents for the nation of residence (Christiansen, 2004).

This scenario changed after the growth of new digital media, as now the studies show that the internet is the major source of information and entertainment from the countries of origin of various diasporas. Despite the accessibility of digital media, diaspora, including the younger generations, may use old and traditional media. (Eide et al., 2014).
The connection between the construction of coherent imagined communities can be found with mass media and media technology (Anderson, 2006). In recent years, due to the development of new digital media, more multi-centred and fluid media usage has found the way (Erikson, 2012) and new mass media are now organized to transcend territorial frameworks such as the nation-state (Christiansen, 2004).

According to Morley and Robins (1995), the powerful global media are responsible for the creation of a universal electronic cultural space with ever-advancing technologies that are transforming the formative processes of diasporas and creating new ways in which such phenomena are conceived and experienced. Contemporary diasporas differ from earlier ones in a significant sense due to the development of new and faster communications technologies which facilitate temporal and spatial compression.

In his work on imagined communities, Anderson (1983) suggests that “communities” can be “imagined” around shared cultural practices beyond a historical and geographic characterization. For modern diaspora “imagined communities” such as virtual communities with shared language and systems of meaning, may crystalize into communities that do not need geographic closeness (Rheingold, 1993).

Michel Laguerre (2010) states that ‘virtual diaspora’ refers to the use of cyberspace by immigrants or descendants of an immigrant group to participate or engage in online interactional transitions. Such virtual interactions can be with members of the diasporic group living in the same foreign country or other countries, with individuals or entities in the homeland or with members of the group in the host land or elsewhere.

He emphasizes the uses of IT connectivity to participate in virtual networks of contacts for a variety of political, economic, social, religious, and communicational purposes that may concern either the homeland, the host land or both, including its trajectory abroad. He states that the virtual diasporic community is a cyber-expansion and the other façade of the community of residence. “For this reason, I conceive of the digital diaspora as the interweaving of the virtual and the real in the hybrid production of everyday life in an emigrant enclave.” (Laguerre 2010, p51).

Similar views are held by other researchers as well. Andrew Feenberg and Maria Bakardjieva (2004), state that digital media are not just another voice added to the world of media; their significance rests on the fact that digital devices construct a virtual social world with remarkable similarities to the world of face-to-face communications. Communities can assemble online anytime, anywhere, without the obstruction of time and space, which leads to universal interconnectedness.
1.1.3 Boundaries and hybridity

When communities are formed, particularly in the context of diasporas, the issues of *boundaries* and *hybridity* become inevitable. The processes of settlement of diasporas in the host societies and their interactions with other groups involve numerous dynamics and lead to various possibilities. The diasporas try to preserve their group culture and strengthen solidarity by defining boundaries, but at the same time in the course of interactions, some aspects of the cultural identity are modified and take new forms.

In the present day, not only physical interaction but also communication through media and interactions in virtual space lead to hybridity. Virtual spaces and transnational connectivity serve as additional spaces for construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of boundaries and induce cultural hybridity irrespective of physical presence and dislocation. The societies where the diasporas originated and where they settled may be subject to hybridization. Thus, the interaction of cultures combining both traits and traditions which are preserved and the ones which are already hybridized may lead to the emergence of cultures and societies which are not only complex but ultra-complex.

In the context of migration from former colonies of the Western countries, debate and literature on cultural boundedness and hybridity has emerged, particularly from the 1980s onwards. The concept of boundaries is important in understanding diasporic identities. Discussing the functions of boundaries, Werbner (1997) explains that diasporas as translocal communities mostly have to bear social and economic hardships, and they draw on culturally constituted resources of sociality and mutual aid for survival.

Boundaries can be inclusive or exclusive depending on how they are perceived. An exclusive boundary arises, for example, when a person adopts a marker that imposes restrictions on the behaviour of others. Geertz (1993) cautions that proximity could even prompt strengthening of group identity and differences, thus strengthening boundaries.

Diasporas actively construct ‘community’ to shield them from racist rejections and to compete for honour, to have fun, to worship, and to celebrate – together – collective rites of passage or ceremonies. Modood (1997) explains that diasporas draw boundaries as buttresses against what they perceive to be dangerous incursions and deliberate, external, transgressive hybridity. The boundaries and hybridity work simultaneously in the situation of cultural interactions of two or more distinct ethnic groups. Werbner (2016) explains that despite the illusion of boundedness, cultures evolve historically through unreflective borrowings, mimetic appropriations, exchanges, and inventions, asserting that there is no culture in and of itself.
Harvey (1980) recognizes that when distinct cultures come into proximity, on the one hand, social and cultural boundaries may be reinforced while on the other hand, shared cultural spaces are created. Reinforcing the postmodern approach, Modood (2015) states that ethnic identities are not pure or static, but they change in new circumstances through interaction and sharing spaces with other heritages and influences. Regarding Muslims in Britain, Modood points out that identities of the diaspora are not only the product of cultural origins outside Britain but also have contributions from British life. They influence the cultures of the host societies as well.

The cultural fluidity and cross-fertilization of cultures through interactions lead to hybridity. Clifford (1992) introduces the notion of *travelling culture*. According to him, the migration of people always entails ‘travelling cultures’. The migrants may be considered as receptacles or embodiments of previous cultural experience which is brought into new environments where mutation continues. Hence, they are alike and yet different from their kindred in the homeland, thus a paradox of sameness and difference.

Bhabha (1994) advocates a departure from ‘originary and initial subjectivities’ to a focus on the ‘spaces’ between cultures as the terrain where new signs of identity and collaboration and contestation are produced. It brings out the notion of “negotiation” of space where hegemonic discourses homogenize culture and society. For Bhabha, negotiation is a constant endeavour that seeks to authorize cultural hybridity that emerge in moments of historical transformation (Ibid, p12).

The construction of diasporic identities of British-Pakistanis emerges at the intersection of local and global dynamics. As Clifford (1994) argues, diasporas think globally but live locally. Diasporic identity requires navigation through complex loyalties. Anthias (2001) holds the view that even where individuals adopt some of the cultural traits of the ‘new’ society, they may remain marginalized and be seen as strangers.

Discussing the role of hybridity and imaginary home in the context of British-Asian youth regarding contextualization of identity, Fletcher invokes the concept of ‘biculturalism,’ saying that “diasporic communities should be conceived of as being ‘cultural navigators’ able to switch between several cultural ‘codes’ without experiencing disorientation” (2011, p33).

The interaction of ethnic cultures with the culture of the host society and a need to preserve identity create a scenario of simultaneous co-existence of both cultural change and resistance to change in ethnic or migrant groups and nation-states. As the postcolonial diasporas are marked by the development of hybrid cultures, Hall suggests that the
tensions created by the contradictory tendencies between globalization and localization entail cultural processes and argues “the emerging cultural identities are transitional and dynamic, drawing upon a variety of traditions and synthesizing them into new forms” (1992, p314).

“Diaspora experience is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew.” (Hall, 1990, p235).

1.2 Diasporic and youth identity

After surveying the concepts of boundaries and hybridity, this section reviews the literature on the construction of identity in general and with particular reference to diasporas and young people. Identity is a wide and multifaceted concept that ranges from levels of the inner core of self through social interaction of an individual’s private and public identity to levels of the group, communal, institutional, and national identity which may be referred to as micro, meso, macro and meta-levels.

With its roots in the Latin word idem, meaning “the same,” the term implies a relationship with a broader collective or social group of the same kind, yet unique individual identities. Identities are multifaceted, including nationality, culture, ethnicity, religion, class, and gender, which implies that identity is partly a matter of what individuals share with other people. “We identify with others whom we assume are similar to us, at least in some significant way. Identity is developed by the individual, but it has to be recognized and confirmed by others” Buckingham (2008, p137).

Identity is made evident through the use of markers such as language, dress, behaviour and choice of space, whose effects depend on their recognition by other social beings. Markers help to create the boundaries that define similarities or differences between the marker wearer and those who perceive the markers, implying a shared understanding of meanings. In a social context, misunderstandings can arise due to a misinterpretation of the significance of specific markers.

A wide array of studies is available to explore the complex phenomenon of construction of identity, covering various aspects including how people categorize or label ‘themselves’ and ‘others’; how they identify as members of a particular group; how a sense of group belonging, or “community,” is developed and maintained; how groups discriminate against outsiders; how the boundaries between groups operate; how groups relate to each other; and how institutions define and organize identities.
1.2.1 Multiple, fragmented and fluid identities

Contrary to assumptions of sociologists and psychologists about identities as solid structures complexly built from a variety of ‘building blocks’, the postmodern approaches to identity suggest identities in the postmodern era are multiple, fractured and fragmented, and constructed across different discourse practices and positions.

Fragmentation of identity is attributed to factors including the rapid pace of change in late modern societies, the growth of new social movements, the rise of identity politics, the impact of feminism, the effects of globalization, and a revolution in media. Bauman (1996) explains that individuals’ identities are now regarded as decentred, as they do not have an essential or fixed core on which to locate themselves.

Bhabha (1994), proposes that the departure from singularities of class and gender as primary conceptual and organizational categories has resulted in the awareness of a multiplicity of subject positions such as race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical locale, and sexual orientation which constitute modern identities. Hall (1996) treats identity as a process and suggests taking into account the reality of diverse and ever-changing social experiences.

“Identities are constantly in the process of change and transformation in which individuals no longer have a unified, singular sense of self, but rather consist of several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved, identities” (Hall and du Gay, 1996, p 277). The postmodernist view of identity as plural, fluid, and hybrid constructions helps explain the construction of diasporic identities as they interact within their communities and with host societies in given class, ethnic, cultural, and religious categories (Alcoff, 2003, cited in Castello et al., 2009).

For the postmodern subject, identity becomes a moveable feast: formed and transformed continuously concerning how an individual’s identity is represented in the cultural systems. Identity is simultaneously subjective and social and is constituted in and through culture. Hall explains that identity is formed in ‘interaction’ between self and society.

“Social identity bridges the gap between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – between the personal and the public worlds.” (1992, p276). The social construction of an individual’s sense of self is achieved by personal choices regarding their attachments in terms of who and what to associate with.
The formation of one's identity occurs through one's identifications with significant others, primarily with parents and other individuals during one’s biographical experiences, and with 'groups' as they are perceived. This leads to the meta-perspective of self, which revolves around the self’s perception of the other’s view of self. It relates to an individual’s perception of how he or she is perceived by others (Saunderson and O’Kane, 2005). It relates to the contextual nature of identity that a person may not refer to ‘me’ in the same way in all situations.

An individual may speak of ‘this’ identity or ‘that’ identity, changing from situation to situation. This could be referred to as an oscillation of identity between various selves depending on the situation. The individual, faced with a variety of encounters, each of which may require different forms of proper conduct, may sensitively adjust his or her behaviour to suit each context of interaction. Thus, recontextualization steps in as a strategic response to situation (Giddens, 1991; Radhakrishnan, 2003).

As diasporas organize themselves and consider themselves as part of a different community, they sometimes look upon themselves as different nations. Diasporic identity is characterized by a tension between relations of belonging to some kind of ‘original homeland’ left behind by the members of diaspora or their parents or even generations before them and the relations to the place of settlement and the larger national community found there (Clifford, 1997).

Since diasporas belong to a different group than the host society, the subjective nature of identity plays a significant role. Erikson describes it as “a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity and ‘a process’ located in the core of an individual and in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities” (1968, p22).

Regarding the construction of diasporic identity, it is worth mentioning that the diaspora community draws upon a notion of ethnic bonds revolving around the centrality of ‘origin.’ In many cases, the privileging of origin is central in constructing identity and solidarity, with an underpinning of the fundamental paradox of similarity within the group and difference with others. Mandaville (2001) states that multiplicity of identity and community is a key dynamic of diaspora.

Proponents of the “instrumentalist” approach argue that members of diaspora maintain group cultural identities because of practical calculation, as maintenance of collective identity may be useful for achieving practical individual and group goals (Cohen, 1969). Diasporic identity can be understood from the perspective of the social interaction of a
group with other groups in the host country. It is a manifestation of cultural, ethnic and racial identities in conjunction with class and political positions of groups in mainstream society, that includes solidarity based on commonalities like origin, history, shared characteristics or ideals. It involves the marking of symbolic boundaries and powers of inclusion and exclusion (Cohen, 1997; Friedman, 1994; Hall, 1990; Hall and du Gay, 1996; Morley and Robins, 2000).

1.2.2 Youth identity

To study the construction of identity of Pakistani-origin youth in Britain, it is pertinent to understand issues peculiar to youth identity as part of a subculture of mainstream culture. The psychological and sociological approaches to studying youth explain how young people are gradually prepared or prepare themselves to assume their allotted roles in adult life.

The multiplicity of identity plays a key role in the identity and identification issues of young generations of diasporas. As young people, they belong on the one hand to the youth subculture and on the other hand to their ethnic culture. Identities of members of diaspora may not revolve around, either only the reproduction of cultures of countries of origin within new settings, or the adoption of new ones. Sayyid, (2006) suggests that diasporic identities must be viewed as being fluid, syncretic and hybrid. He refers to the lives of young British-Asians as grounded through a combination of the South-Asian culture of their parents and the culture and social practices of Britain.

It may be inferred that the identities of British – Pakistanis result from combinations of characteristics peculiar to Pakistani, South-Asian and Muslim cultures inherited from their parents, culture of Britain and that of particular localities and cities where they live. And in addition, the cultures of virtual communities acquired through interactions in digital spaces.

The phenomenon of youth culture or the structural concept of a subculture of youth has been debated over the decades in British society, particularly in the post-war era. Clarke et al. (1993) see the relationship between the parent or dominant culture and the subordinate culture as a class struggle. Subcultures, including youth culture, function to resolve the structural problems. Cohen (1955) sees the use of subculture as a collective solution to commonly experienced problems. “Each generation attempts to resolve collectively experienced structural problems and youth can respond to its subcultural history. Youth experience gaps between what is happening and what they have been led to believe should happen” (Brake 1985, p27).
In terms of youth identity, sociologists acknowledge the significance of social context, particularly concerning factors such as social class, gender, and ethnicity. In his book *New Ethnicities and Urban Cultures* (1996), Les Back adopts a sociological approach to study youth from the perspective of politics of race. In the context of the relationship between racism and urban multicultural society as a way of understanding their social position by the youth of diverse cultures, Back explains that cultural differences are constituted within the interstices of socio-political and economic relations. In the same way, social groups with differential access to wealth, power and privilege are ranked in relation to one another, so are the cultures.

Youth is often described as a ‘problem,’ and particularly those in marginalized or subordinate social groups are frequently constructed as a “social problem” or “risk.” Sociologists understand these phenomena in terms of social factors such as poverty and inequality. The works of Hebdige (1979), Cohen (1985), Hall (1992), Clarke (1993) and Webster and Mitchell (2008) provide insight into the historical, political, economic, and social perspectives of evolution and politicization of youth culture in Britain.

Youth identity and culture can be seen through the lens of class struggle. Like ethnic minorities, youth identity in a way is subject to ‘identity politics,’ a concept that refers to movements of struggle to resist oppressive accounts of their identities constructed by others who hold power over them. Identity politics asserts the recognition of aspects of identity that have previously been denied, marginalized, or stigmatized.

### 1.3 Media consumption and representation

As this research focusses on interplay of media and identity it was important to explore about the role of dynamics of media consumption/prosumption in the construction of identity. There are several theories regarding the consumption of media, among which the Uses and Gratifications Theory (UGT) proposed by Bulmer and Katz (1974) seems to be relevant to this study. This theory takes into account the needs, motives and gratifications of media users.

In the scenario of technological advancements and the emergence of new media, UGT has relevance as a tool for understanding how individuals connect with the technologies around them, which range from the internet to mobile phones. Personal identity is one of the reasons for using media. Similarly, integration and social interaction, which are among the sought-after gratifications, revolve around the ability of media products to produce a topic of conversation between people. The uses and gratifications theory focuses on *Why* people use media and *What* they use them for.
There is a wide array of academic research on the vital role played by the media in the construction and evolution of identities. In the case of diasporic and youth identities, this function becomes more complex. Diasporas live in many frames of reference of identities, as they try to preserve their association with the countries of their origin and retain their cultural values and may have transnational connections, besides living in the reality of the culture of the host country.

Halloran (1998) asserts that ideally media should not be seen in isolation but as part of a set of social institutions, interacting with other institutions within the wider social system. Media do not work in isolation but in and through a nexus of mediating factors. Sufficient evidence exists of a relationship between patterns of media consumption and media representation with the construction of identity at several levels.

A complex interaction of media and diaspora communities is evident from the fact that in the quest to maintain identities the ethnic communities try to seek information from the ethnic and other international media, in addition to the media of the country of their residence. More importantly, through digital media, they not only communicate but may also become producers of information.

Diasporas may use digital media and satellite transmissions as part of their transnational experience, a concept that stresses continuing forms of connections through social relationships and other factors and the impact of distant social fields upon each other (Tsagarousianou, 2007). The widespread use of telecommunication and digital technology enables diasporic communities to connect to their homelands while reinforcing their sense of collective identity (Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010).

To find a connection of the interplay of media to the identities of British-Pakistani youth at micro, meso, macro and meta levels, it is pertinent to understand the role of media concerning the social construction of identity and identity politics. Media acts as an institution in combination with other social institutions vis-a-vis the representation and construction of identities, including those of diasporas and youth (Hall, 1996).

The debate around identity politics suggests some ways of understanding young people’s relationships with digital media. For instance, the internet may provide significant opportunities for exploring facets of identity that might previously have been denied or stigmatized. Digital media can be used as a means of expressing or even discovering aspects of one’s true self. Stern (2008) states that young people’s online authorship of blogs and homepages provides important opportunities for self-reflection and self-realization and for expressing some of the conflicts and crises that characterize this period.
Young people tend to engage with digital media more than with conventional means for gathering information and due to the interactive nature of digital media may become the producers of information and share among their digital networks or with general public through various social media platforms. For many young people, digital media are significant modalities through which they seek, consciously or unconsciously, the answers to their identity questions.

In terms of engagement of young people with digital media, Buckingham (2008) states that access to digital media and how they are used is partly dependent upon differences to do with factors such as social class, gender, and ethnicity. On the other hand, these media provide young people with symbolic resources for constructing or expressing their own identities.

Young people’s relationship with technologies, including media technologies, is one place to look at the determinants of identity formation, as technology is frequently held to be transforming social relationships and many areas of public and private life. “One of the ways in which media production contributes to the construction of identities is through the facilitation of reflexivity.” (Weber and Mitchell, 2008, p41). The expression and construction of identities through digital media production usually relies heavily on the visual content which may induce more critical reflexivity.

Webber and Mitchell explain three dimensions of process of reflexivity. Firstly, by engaging in media production young people can look at themselves with new eyes which provide feedback for further modification of their self-representation. Secondly, due to the transparency of modes and materials of media production and choices and processes, they use them to identify themselves in ways that they might not even be aware of. Thirdly, through audience response, media production invites other people’s feedback and readings, sparking a dialectic that is inherent in mediating and reshaping how we see ourselves and how we think others see us.

The significance of difference in identity construction is as much a recurrent theme as commonalities. This idea is described by Weeks (1990) as “what you have in common with some and what differentiates you from others” (p88). “Without outsiders, there are no insiders” (Papastergiadis, 1998, p30). The formation of identity often involves a process of stereotyping or cognitive simplification that allows people to distinguish easily between self and other, and to define themselves and their group in a certain way.
1.3.1 Media representation and stereotyping

Representation, portrayal and stereotyping have a key role in establishing the role of media with regard to identity. Any discussion on diasporas automatically brings into focus the discourse about mainstream society and minority ethnic groups of migrants. The way diverse groups are represented through media contributes to creating perceptions. It relates to how media messages are produced, communicated, received, and interpreted. Media representations can negatively affect the perception of ethnic minorities in social reality.

Research shows a relationship between the representation of ethnic minorities and the given infrastructure of communications with their collective identities. Lowe (2003) states that within ethnic minorities the construction and evolution of identity depend on diasporic imaginaries and communication infrastructures; media and cultural spaces upon which multiple and diverse processes of identity and community are constructed and transformed; and the production of narratives and discourses that reproduce and sustain relevant frames of self-identification and collective action.

Miles (1989) asserts the significance of the process of representing or making sense of ‘others’ as a set of processes through which communities are constructed and various forms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are created in the context of ethnic identity and causes of racism. Representation of others can either lead to discrimination or produce a situation where there is no recognized ‘race’ problem. “Identities are produced, consumed and regulated within culture, creating meanings through symbolic systems of representation about the identity positions which we might adopt” (Woodward, 1997, p52).

The media, as a key transmitter of representations and as a major source of information within society, has the power to control and shape attitudes and beliefs held in the popular imagination (e.g. Cohen and Gardener, 1982; Ferguson, 1998). This is of relevance regarding attitudes, beliefs and understandings concerning ‘race’. For example, research by Karen Ross (1992) on White perceptions of ethnic minorities on television show that attitudes of Whites towards non-Whites are influenced by media representation.

Her study revealed that although the White participants acknowledged stereotypical representations of ethnic minorities on television, they continued to attribute negative characteristics to ethnic minorities in real life. Ross therefore concludes that for most of White people who do not have direct experience of culture of ethnic group in question, their attitudes will be grounded exclusively on media representations.
The participants of Ross’s study felt that the home life of ethnic minority characters did not acknowledge cultural authenticity and felt that multiculturalism continued to circulate stereotypical portrayals homogenizing Blackness. “Multicultural has come to mean cultural homogeneity, a proliferation of uni-cultures into which all their disparate and diverse voices, interests, views, identifications and practices dissolve into a formless mass of stereotypical essences” (Ross, 1992, p12).

Ross and Playdon (2001) note that different representations vary in their ‘accuracy’ and maintain that all representations are culturally constructed and positioned in a specific historical context. The images of ethnic minorities do not represent the social reality rather they position society and communities into a way of thinking about certain groups.

With reference to role of media, Christiansen (2004) explains that the whole communication process involves those who provide media content (broadcasting organizations, broadcasters, producers), what is provided (the nature of the content), who receives what is provided (audience) and society at large. In the view of McQuail (2010) the entire study of mass communications is based on the assumption that the media have significant effects on attitudes, behaviour and public opinion.

The cultural effects theory seeks to understand the broader impact of the media on what we think about, how we understand society and how we collectively think (Williams, 1992). Expanding on the issue of the media’s determination of representations, Oscar Gandy (1998) proposes that the mass media are understood to be the most important shaper of contemporary society, he adds the media themselves do not have unlimited control over representation, as media products must comply with the requirements of advertisers, policy makers and the audience. He claims, therefore, that media images of ‘race’ do not reflect an accurate portrayal of the spectrum of black culture, and that these representations are those which comply with dominant ideological and economic imperatives.

1.3.2 Political economy of media

To understand the role of media in creating social representations and perpetuation of hegemonic cultures the concept of the political economy of communications and media is important. It relates to an interplay of media, as an economic and commercial entity, with the dynamics of power relations, resources, ownership and control of media, which may shape and influence the communication of information from the media to its publics, in the context of particular social, economic and political aspects of society.
Among various approaches of the political economy of communications and media, the liberal pluralist and radical Marxist approaches represent two broad points of view. Both the neoliberal and radical approaches agree on reducing state control and censorship of media but differ on the functions of market processes. Neoliberals view the market as an engine of freedom, whereas for radicals it is a system of control. The neoliberal political economy of media is based on the argument that the free market guarantees the independence, diversity and accountability of commercial media (Murdoch, 1989).

As, a free market ensures that the media are independent of government, it will lead to a diverse media system with freedom to publish. A competitive market causes media enterprises to respond to their audiences’ concerns. According to Thomas Hardy (2014), the pluralists’ approach looks at media organizations as enjoying considerable autonomy from the state, political parties and institutionalised pressure groups. Control of the media is seen to be in the hands of an autonomous managerial elite who allow flexibility to media professionals.

In the Marxists’ view, the capitalist society is characterized by class domination, with media as part of an ideological arena in which various class views are fought out, although within the context of the dominance of certain classes. This approach suggests that ultimate control is increasingly concentrated in the monopoly of capital. The media relay interpretative frameworks compatible with the interests of the dominant classes. European Marxist thinkers like, Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci proposed that certain social institutions, most prominently schools and the media, help to reproduce capitalist structures (Richter and Graf, 2015).

Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony was a significant step forward in line with the critical theory of the first Frankfurt School, which described cultural production as part of the capitalist economy (Sennett, 1998, cited in Richter and Graf 2015, p28). Dallas Smythe, in his pioneering work in 1960, proposed to consider communication as a vital component of the economy and to understand it as an economic entity. He defined the approach as the study of the influence of interrelations of political policies and economic processes, on social institutions (Smythe, 1960, cited in Wasko, 2005, p29).

Smythe argued that the main product of media was audiences who were sold by media to advertisers, in other words, media programming was a “free lunch” and of little significance, while maintaining audiences’ exposure to advertising should be considered labour which added value to the audience commodity (Wasko, 2005).
In line with the critical theory approach, Nicholas Garnham explained that media must be seen “first as economic entities with both a direct economic role as creators of surplus value through commodity production and exchange and an indirect role, through advertising, in the creation of surplus value within other sectors” (1979, p132).

The notion of media organizations as economic and commercial entities was strengthened by British theorists Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, who proposed that “the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities” (Murdock and Golding, 1974, pp205-206). They emphasized studying communication and media as commodities produced by capitalist industries and established a basic model by focusing on the consolidation, concentration (including integration and diversification), and internationalization of media institutions, thus provided a conceptual map for a political-economic analysis of the media.

Hardy (2014) holds the view that the influence of the neoliberal political economy on British media gave rise to free press through the dismantling of state controls in the form of an end to press licensing in 1694, the liberalization of seditious libel and defamation laws in 1792 and 1843, and the abolition of press taxes in the 1850s, along with capitalist development of the press. He mentions that increased sales of newspapers and revenues through advertisements served as crucial factors in rendering newspapers independent of government and party subsidies.

The radical political economy approach takes a different view, that the free market can actively subvert media independence as media moguls may collude with governments based on shared agendas and mutual benefits from cooperation (Weisbord, 2000). Media-government collusion can occur in democratic countries, as in Britain during the Thatcherite era, when right-wing moguls entered an informal coalition with the government (Curran and Seaton, 2010). Markets can generate incentives for media companies, with extensive economic interests, to get into power.

For radical Marxists, the growing dependence of the mainstream press on advertising after the reduction of cover prices inhibited radical journalism because some advertisers discriminated for political or economic reasons against radical publications. Partly as a consequence of these structural economic changes, it is claimed, the press retained close links to the power structure of society.

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, in their book ‘Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media’ (1988), deconstructed the myth of pluralist and free media in democracies by showing how the dominance of profit orientation in the media
and their close connection to the advertising industry creates pressure for filtering information to cover only that which is deemed favourable to capitalist social structures (Hardy, 2014). For Herman and Chomsky, the media mobilise support for the special interests of the most powerful groups in society and in doing so purvey a systematic bias in coverage. This occurs not just in what is said and reported, but in what is omitted, distorted or marginalized.

This brings in the notion of media’s influence through discursive, access and resource power. Street (2011) states that discursive power operates through the way the media construct forms of reality in certain ways by privileging certain discourse, through agenda-setting, framing and selection of a certain type of content as most common means. Access power of media is concerned with whose voices, identities and interests are heard in the public media.

Resource power refers to how those who own and control the media can affect the actions of state authorities. Media power is explained by Street (2011) through two distinguishable categories: the first is the power of social actors over media to influence the discursive power of the media over what to show and report. The second is the power of the media to shape meanings and affect change, in other words, what gets changed by the media.

Referring to the compromised state of the media in the UK due to reliance on public relations firms’ sources for profit-making, Davis (2002) points out that journalists, working in under-resourced and understaffed newsrooms, increasingly rely on PR sources for editorial copy in return for access to editorial columns for PR stories. This has led to the rise of the ‘trading’ relationship model where journalists and sources are inextricably linked, working in complementary (if not collusive) ways since each has professional ambitions, interests and needs that can be achieved most readily if they can win the cooperation of the other.

The drive for profit maximisation thereby compromises the independence of the press. The line between journalism and public relations, between factual reporting and the partisan narrative, becomes blurred. Gandy (1982) argues that PR practitioners and other suppliers of pre-packaged news offer a subsidy to news organizations through press releases, press conferences, video news releases, press briefings, lobbying and special reports. “These subsidies reflect efforts by policy actors to increase the consumption of persuasive messages by reducing their costs” (ibid, p74). These subsidies assist news organizations to maintain profitability through cost-cutting (Franklin, 2006).
Online concentration has extended major news organizations’ hegemony across technologies (Curran et al., 2012). With the expansion of digital technology, participatory journalism or the trend of user-generated content (UGC) became a major source for media organizations. Regarding the economic motivations behind participatory journalism, a study by Vujnovic et al. (2010) revealed branding (particularly as a means of generating newspaper consumer loyalty), building traffic and keeping up with or beating the competition as three main reasons.

The mutual interactions of politics, economy and media can shape structures and practices and may influence not only national media systems but also transregional mediascape. The rise of global media, as Herman and McChesney (2003) argue, must be seen as an export and expansion of capitalist business models with the help of state policies and regulations.

The political economy of Pakistani media can be viewed in the light of developments in media industry and expansion of liberal ideology. In the context of the theory of political economy of communication, Gul et al. (2017) assert that Pakistan adopted liberal and deregulated policies because of the popular economic model based on the neoliberal agenda of developed nations on whom it was dependent for aid and assistance. The liberalization of media brought problems with it. The media in Pakistan saw a boom in the market in which the number of television channels increased from three to ninety within one decade, simultaneously giving birth to the five big media moguls who own major media outlets (PEMRA Report, 2016).

Until 2002, Pakistan’s electronic media had been under state control. The state had a monopoly over television and radio broadcasting and was thus a gatekeeper controlling the information flow. In 2002, the media were liberalized under the dictatorial regime of General Pervez Musharraf. This concentration of ownership brought problems of unequal distribution of wealth, disparities, uninformed citizenry, commodification and marginalization of minorities, which became a challenge for the democratic norms of the society.

Media in Pakistan also thrives on advertisements and produce content that is popular among the public and improves ratings for advertisements. Pakistani media may not be inclusive and lacks in content for Pakistani diaspora in other countries. Further discussion on the political economies of British and Pakistani media follows in the relevant chapters on media consumption and representation.
1.3.3 Hegemonic model

Regarding the connection of media with the construction of identity, it is important to look at the audience approach and models of coding and decoding which elucidate how the audience, as active recipients, interpret meanings from the message in their way rather than, as passive recipients, accepting the meaning intended by the media producers. The model developed by Hall (1973) differentiates between three hypothetical positions from which television messages might be decoded by the audience: the ‘dominant,’ ‘negotiated,’ and ‘oppositional’ codes.

This model elucidates how through the media, as an institutionalised cultural production system, ‘preferred meanings’ which tend to support prevailing economic, political and social power relations are encoded into the structure of texts, and how these messages either dominate or are negotiated or rejected by the audiences as consumers of media. The role of media in creating perceptions is ascribed to hegemonic processes established through encoding and decoding, whereby certain ideas, views, and opinions take precedence over others. Hall takes into account the complexities of modern society: the various symbols and definitional struggles and the various power asymmetries.

Hall divides the process of mediated communication into production, circulation, and reception of media messages. Hall’s approach borrows the concept of hegemony from the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who maintained that hegemonic cultures (referring to capitalism), would continue their dominance for as long as they control common-sense understandings. Gramsci established those cultural aspects, are much more directly implicated in sustaining capitalism.

This elevation of the significance of culture is shared by all cultural theorists, for whom the media exert their power precisely because they are involved in the reproduction of hegemonic cultural ideas. In these terms, Hall views the relationship between media and cultural diversity as one caught up in hegemony.

The media make use of dominant codes and frames of reference, reproducing the ideas and discourses that contribute to the domination of certain ethnocultural groups. Dominant classes dominate precisely because they have somehow managed to “usurp” common sense so that it justifies and naturalizes their position. Hegemony (leadership or domination) is not exercised through outright coercion but through a consensus based on dominant common-sense understandings.
“If most media products are inscribed with the same set of cultural assumptions (and prejudices) because their producers share the same cultural experiences, then those underlying norms and values which may well be hidden but nonetheless exist, are transmitted as an un-self-conscious truth.” (Ross and Playdon, 2001, p xii). Thus, suggesting that media representations are neither objective nor democratic, as not all groups in society are equally represented. Ethnic minorities, in particular, are marginalised by a white ideology that naturalises itself as ‘common sense’ and the norm.

1.3.4 Interpretation of message and audience research

In his essay titled “Encoding/Decoding” Hall argued that message constitutes a discursive form, which is comprised of certain codes. These codes that form a discursive message might be seen as existing in a suspended state because the message is “encoded,” that is, put together based on certain codes shared by those who produce the media content. These codes may include professional codes and conventions and understandings of the world based on media workers’ educational and class backgrounds.

While these codes in a sense determine the message that will be circulated, they do not predetermine its reception. Rather, at the receiving end, the codes inscribed in the message may be rejected, negotiated, or fully accepted as a function of the codes shared by those decoding the message. Hall’s conceptualization of how communities, cultures, and media constitute each other revolves around the notion of circuitry. He uses the term within a broader argument to elucidate the reproduction of culture through media. Hall sees circulation as both technological and hermeneutical processes through which meaning and/or ideology move into and out of discursive form (Bodker, 2016).

At the same time, hegemony can never be total: there is always room for alternative views, however marginalized these may be. Ethnic minorities groups have their codes of reference and frameworks of knowledge, which lead them to reject and resist dominant meanings and discourses while they contribute to the creation of alternative networks of mediated communication themselves, participating in a parallel communication circuit.

This is precisely why several theorists have highlighted the importance of minority media (Husband, 2000; Georgiou and Silverstone, 2005): they allow the (re)creation, circulation, and representation of alternative discourses on cultural diversity, which in turn help sustain the cultural and moral integrity of marginalized groups. Audience-centred approaches affirm the autonomy and choice of the audiences, portraying them not as victims but as creative users of media content.
Such approaches emphasize what people do with the media rather than what the media do to people. The proponents of this approach (Morley, 1992; Curran, 2002) recognize that people with differing predispositions generated different understandings of the messages, that individuals were not passive receivers of communication.

Hall’s essay on encoding and decoding led to a shift from studying media texts towards studying audience reception. The model was adapted by Morley in his research carried out in the late 1970s and early 1980s on the audience’s decoding response for BBC’s programme ‘Nationwide’. Morley tested the premises of the model by showing a BBC program called ‘Nationwide’ to different audience groups separated in terms of class, education, and race.

The research found that the construction of meanings was influenced by the social and discourse positions of audiences. It has been argued that the social production and reproduction of meaning involved in the cultural process is a matter of signification as much as it is a matter of power (Grossberg, 1983).

The research demonstrates that intervening variables that mediate various understandings include the structure of the text, the social context in which it is read, the culture of the reader, and how predispositions, reading competencies, likes and dislikes and opportunities are influenced by cultural factors (Boyd-Barrett, 1995, p499).

The way media messages are interpreted relates to identity. Poole’s (2001) study of British Muslims and the British press aimed to explore how British Muslims constructed meanings from press reports on Islam. Her study revealed that British Muslims took an oppositional stance to negative portrayals of Islam, seeing these as ideologically motivated, while more sympathetic portrayals were assimilated into their common-sense perspective. Thus, ethnically and culturally diverse audiences may produce their readings of media messages.

At the same time, mainstream audiences do not buy wholesale representations of cultural diversity; in other words, viewing racist or problematic portrayals of diversity does not mean that audiences agree with them completely. Thus, active audience may interpret meanings in a way different from the intended message. Similarly different audiences would interpret messages according to their background.
Summary

In this chapter theories and approaches regarding the concept of diaspora and construction of identity in an interplay with media have been explored in the context of developments in media technologies, translocal connectivity and on the international scene, including globalization. The major themes that emerged from the literature review were the historical background of concept and characterization of diasporas; the centrality of home or place of origin in the imagined communities; the role of boundaries and hybridity in the construction of diasporic identities and culture; the power of media regarding the representation of identities; the role of digital media in the formation of virtual communities and identities; and the dynamics of production and reception of media content, including the coding, decoding and political economy of communications.

Attempts to theorize diasporas have led to categorization and characterization in terms of time frame, causes of migration, and behavioural manifestations like longing for the land of origin and maintaining connectivity (Alonso and Oiarzabal, 2010; Brah, 1996; Braziel and Mannur, 2011; Cohen, 1997; Esman, 2009; Sheffer, 2006). The literature suggests that central to the concept is a notion of dislocation from the geographical location of origin and relocation in one or more nation-states, territories, or countries, combined with the notions of distinct identity, culture and otherness in the process of construction and existence of diasporic communities (Braziel and Mannur, 2011; Durham, 1999).

Regarding operational aspects, migrants are seen as part of complex processes in interplay with transnational networks, communities, economies and movements (Tsagaroussianou, 2007). As migration and displacement remain central to the experience of diaspora, the concept of ‘home’ influences diasporic identities and cultures (Brah, 1996; Mandaville, 2001). Diasporas function in a trilateral set of relationships: their country of origin, their host country and the diaspora itself and its many linkages with the homeland, host country, and segments of the diaspora in other countries (Esman, 2009). The transnational connection is explained by Appadurai (1996) through the concept of ‘scapes’ to express the web of intersecting global processes.

An analysis of studies on the construction of diasporic identity reveals that diasporic identities may be superfluid these days due to the addition of virtual resources of construction of identity, boundaries, and cultural hybridity. The identities of the diaspora are highly contextualized and can shift between various frames of reference, so they could be characterized as constantly oscillating.
The literature on youth identity considers it a critical period of identity formation and identity crises, in which fundamental dilemmas have to be resolved. Several researchers have dealt with the historical, political, economic and social perspectives of evolution and politicization of youth culture (Cohen, 1985; Hall, 1992; Hebdige, 1979; Webster and Mitchell, 2008).

The literature on the role of media in the construction of identities reveals the value of media as one of the social institutions (Hall, 1996). Media have significant effects on attitudes, behaviour and public opinion (McQuail, 2010; Williams, 1992). Studies on media representation of ethnic minorities explain biases perceived by minorities in Europe, including the bias against Muslims (Cottle, 2000; Poole, 2001; Ross, 2001).

Due to the development of new and faster communications technologies which facilitate temporal and spatial compression, virtual and digital social networks incorporate new diasporic experiences, new types of communication and solidarity, new channels of expression, and new ways to understand social roles in the country of emigration and immigration (Bernal, 2010; Bustamante, 2010; Laguerre, 2010).

As young people engage with digital media, it facilitates their expression and reflexivity, providing them more choices for interactions to construct their identities. The hegemonic model and political economy of media establish the prevalence of dominant discourse and point of view through the power of advertisements.
Chapter 2. Pakistani diaspora in Multicultural Britain

An overview from a historical, social and economic perspective of the Pakistani diaspora is important to provide a context for the construction of the identity of British Pakistani youth through media consumption. This chapter attempts to locate the identity of British Pakistani youth vis-à-vis their positioning in the society in the context of the history of migration of the previous generations to the UK and the contours of multiculturalism in the host society. To understand how the Pakistani diaspora is positioned in Britain in terms of socio-economic class, the ethnic and religious heritage and power relations of the colonisers and the colonised, a discussion of British multiculturalism in the perspective of the challenges of racism and discrimination may be helpful.

Since collective identities are constructed through long historical processes, an account of the history of migration of early immigrants from Pakistan and their subsequent consolidation as a community in the British society are discussed in this chapter. An analysis of the construction of identity also entails the concept of meta-identity, that is, how an individual or group is perceived by other groups or individuals. These perceptions may come into interplay with social interactions and the construction of identity at the micro, meso and macro levels.

The issues pertaining to the immigration of non-White and in some cases non-Christian migrants from the former colonies gave rise to debate on multiculturalism, thus an understanding of British multiculturalism in the context of the immigration of non-White and non-Christian working-class people from the former colonies of the British empire was essential. To comprehend the present-day experience of the youth of Pakistani heritage in Britain, a discussion of history of migration and multiculturalism in Britain has been included in this chapter while taking into account the causes of segregation.

The social and political response of British society to the diverse non-White working-class immigrants is considered by the immigrants including British-Pakistanis as characterized by racism and discrimination, leading to the marginalisation of various groups. This chapter covers an analysis of the group dynamics of British-Pakistanis and their perceptions about ‘marginalisation’ as South Asians and Muslims in the context of multiculturalism and securitization of Muslim youth.
2.1 Non-White immigrants and multiculturalism

To understand the identity issues of the British-Pakistani diaspora, an overview of the context is necessary. In this regard, multiculturalism in Britain has significant relevance with the identity issues of the young British-Pakistani diaspora in connection with social and political dynamics of diversity. Diasporas may have different race, ethnicity, culture and religion and live as distinct communities, this may lead to the issue of acceptance by the host society. The response of the society in the country of adoption and government policies may play vital role in the settlement and integration of immigrants.

It is important to know the difference between the concepts of *multicultural* and *multiculturalism*. The term multicultural describes the social characteristics and problems of governance posed by any society with different cultural communities living together and attempting to build a common life while retaining something of their “original” identity, whereas multiculturalism refers to the strategies and policies adopted to govern or manage the problems of diversity encountered by the multicultural societies (Hall, 2000).

Multiculturalism in present day Britain refers to immigration mainly from Africa, Asia and some Caribbean countries (former colonies of the British empire), in the post World War II period. There had been a presence of Africans in the United Kingdom since the sixteenth century and of Asians since the eighteenth, but the type and scale of immigration that took place in the post-colonial period were perceived as a serious challenge to the settled notion of British identity giving rise to ‘the multicultural question’.

The influx of migrants with diverse backgrounds significantly altered the contours of the host society from one that was overwhelmingly White, Christian and British to one of diversified creeds, cultures and communities from various parts of the globe. Mass immigration and settlement of ethnic minorities in Britain led to debates about not only the position of different ethnicities in Britain but also about British identity: ‘the meaning of being British’ (Modood, 2011).

In this scenario the concerns of ‘multiculturalism’ expanded from mere demographic issues encompassing ethnicities and races, to the intersecting political, legal and theoretical debates over how to respond to the situation (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2018). Immigration from the former colonies involved sociological, cultural, political, and economic aspects (Modood, 2011). This situation had implications for public opinion, political decisions and legislation. It also triggered a debate on the identity of diverse groups as well as the definition of an overarching British identity that could serve as a benchmark for different ethnic and religious groups to conform to.
The sociological side was implicit in the settling of the immigrants and the political aspect was involved in the form of policy response. The economy was a major pull factor and the emergence of ethnic and cultural diversity were inevitable due to immigration from diverse areas. This led to the rise of identity issues of the immigrants and how they were perceived by mainstream society. Thus, issues pertaining to multiculturalism and approaches to dealing with it started to surface in the early period of post Second World War immigration from the former British colonies. In the UK, the policy of multiculturalism was 'tacit' rather than explicit, in contrast to the formal declarations in countries such as Canada and Australia, and it tended to focus on living with ethnic otherness by using multiple language formats and interpreters for services (Bloch et. al, 2013).

In contemporary Britain, multiculturalism is multifaceted. It is at the heart of a wide range of contemporary areas, including modes of dressing, language policy, race relations, religious freedom, education policy, court procedures and immigration. Perceptions about immigrant populations as different, and who did not assimilate into the mainstream, but rather continued their distinct cultural identities, lies at the root of multiculturalism. Modood (2011) discusses how in multiculturalism, the processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as involving groups and individuals and working differently for distinct groups. In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template.

The ethnic groups that migrated to Britain in the post-colonial period do not have monolithic characteristics. They are diverse, for example, some identify with a ‘colour’ identity such as ‘Black’; for others, factors like national origin (e.g. Turkish), or a regional heritage (e.g. Berber), or religious identity (e.g. Muslim) may be more meaningful for expressing forms of community and ethnic pride that are struggling for recognition.

Additionally, these minority identities interact with wider, societal identities – woman, working-class, Londoner, British – in differing ways, expressing the different experiences, locations and aspirations of different groups. In most cases, it is the combination of different identities: racial, ethnic, religious and wider socio-economic class. Multiculturalism encompasses both the models of diversity and ethnoreligious communitarianism, viewed as complementary to each other (Modood, 1998).

The recognition of ethnic or religious groups involves legal, civic, political, institutional and policy dimensions, and discursive representations. This is especially concerning the changing discourse of national identity, which among other aspects demands that minority communities be given distinctive rights including the protection of their
languages and special representation. This creates a need for special policies and programmes from the government. Going further, it can also be considered a desire for societal recognition of the existence and value of minority cultures through adjustments on the part of the majority (Taylor, 1992).

The concept of multiculturalism also involves the expectation to tolerate behaviours that deviate from the norms widely accepted by the majority. The presence of different racial, ethnic, religious and cultural groups or minorities may also give rise to intolerance and uncomfortable relationships between the majority and minorities, thus cases of discrimination and marginalisation. In Britain, this uncomfortable relationship between the White majority and non-White minorities began with the influx of migrants and has remained visible until today. Weatherall (2008) refers to this experience of migrants as one of ghettoisation. Successive political parties took different approaches vis-à-vis multiculturalism and Britishness, leading to various policy initiatives. The approaches to settling down with the diverse non-White working-class immigrants emerged as a divisive issue during the late 1960s.

In response to racial conflicts, the Race Relations Act (1965) was the first legislation in the United Kingdom to address racial discrimination. In 1967 a major turn in multiculturalism came in the form of a statement by the Labour Party’s Roy Jenkins, then Home Secretary, who defined integration not as a flattening process of assimilation, but as an equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance (Fleras, 2009). The Race Relations Act was amended in 1968, outlawing discrimination on the "grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins" in public places in the United Kingdom.

At the same time opposition to multiculturalism began to emerge, particularly from the Conservative Party, on the grounds of risks of victimisation of the White majority at the hands of a non-White minority. An example is Conservative politician Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968, in which he claimed, quoting one of his constituents, that “in fifteen to twenty years the Black man will have the whip hand over the White man” (Modood, 2011, p65). From a Conservative perspective, therefore, multiculturalism ends up victimising the silent majority, the “white man,” who becomes marginalised and whose needs are considered no longer relevant. Right-wing politicians and commentators sowed the seeds of continued violence and loss of unity in multiculturalism.
2.1.1 Contested multiculturalism

“Since the 1970s multiculturalism emerged as a term increasingly called upon in parliamentary debates and political party manifestos” (Vertovec, 1996, p50). As the debate on multiculturalism, race relations and British identity continued the Conservatives expressed concerns about immigration’s negative implications on British identity. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher was of the view that “Britishness was being undermined from within by the ‘permissive society’ and immigration (Gamble, 1998). Concerns of the Conservatives about multiculturalism and integration of immigrants of diverse backgrounds into British society continued to grow, leading to questions about their loyalty.

Due to their belonging to two homes, one of ‘origin’ and the other of ‘adoption’, the loyalties of the diaspora often come into question. In April 1990, Conservative politician Norman Tebbit raised the issue of the loyalty of immigrants through his ‘cricket test’ statement. To deal with diversity and an understanding of British identity, the approach adopted by the Labour party was to express more respect for diversity, telling the British people that ‘every colour is a good colour’ (Blair, 1997). The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB)\(^2\) was set up in 1998 under Blair’s government. Similarly, the Race Relations Act was again amended in 2000. However, Uberoi and Modood (2013) argue that Blair was more concerned with updating Britain’s image.

Under the governments of the Labour party from 1997 to 2010, the concept of civic versus ethnic identity became pertinent in the debate. Leading Labour figures including Gordon Brown hoped to make Britishness more inclusive by turning it into what can be described as a civic multicultural national identity in which Britain’s political features and accommodating diversity are defining factors. Though multiculturalism remained contested in Britain, for various reasons, the events of 9/11 and the securitisation of Muslims led to unprecedented attacks on multiculturalism, both in numbers and ferocity.

The climate of fear created by 9/11 raised concerns over the presence of immigrants, particularly Muslims, as a segment not integrated into society, thus not loyal to the host country. Critics began to attribute this situation to the failure of multiculturalism. The problematising of multiculturalism had been explicit and sustained. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron in a speech in 2011 specifically attributed terrorist acts to policy of multiculturalism asserting that the ethnic minority who failed to become properly

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\(^2\) An independent think-tank devoted to the cause of promoting racial justice in Britain was established in 1998. Chaired by political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, the CFMEB made several recommendations in order to counter racial discrimination.
British felt a need to commit such acts (Ali, 2014). The speech declared state multicultu-
realism as ‘a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results’ such as fostering 
division by allowing diverse cultures to live separate lives (BBC, 2011).

Efforts were made to analyse causes for the apparent failure of state multiculturalism. 
Georgiou and Siapera (2006) attribute three sets of reasons: firstly, the failures of exist-
ing policies to deliver equality and justice for all social groups; secondly, the pressures 
of neoliberal globalisation, and finally, the post-9/11 geopolitical situation, which prior-
itised questions of security over all other issues. “Thus, multiculturalism was accused of 
causing socio-economic failure, residential segregation, and the production of home-
grown terrorists” (Craig, 2014, p22). The views emerged that as the policy of multicultu-
realism was recognised as a mistake by many, it led to a retreat or at least a substantial 
revision on the matter of immigrant multicultural policy in the UK (Siapera, 2010).

Governmental efforts to foster commonality, to cultivate cohesion in British society, 
have been perceived as the retreat of multiculturalism (Vasta, 2007), but refuted by other 
scholars (Uberoi and Modood 2013 and Mathieu 2017), through their studies establish-
ing that criticism of multiculturalism has not prevented leading politicians from intro-
ducing measures to make Britishness more inclusive.

In Britain, the practice of American-style naturalisation ceremonies has also been initi-
at ed as a condition for the granting of nationality, which was criticised as contrary to 
multiculturalism (Joppke, 2010). But was supported by, for example, Meer et al. (2011), 
who referred to the documents of the Home Office that indicate ‘the tests aim at integra-
tion, but without this meaning complete assimilation” (Home Office, 2004, p14).

To deal with multicultural issues, continuous efforts were also made in the education 
system. Since the 1970s the British educational system effectively recognised the plural 
routes and differentiated identities of its pupils (Gill, 1993). In 1985 the Swann Report 
‘Education for All’ was published, which explicitly argued for a multicultural education 
within the general curriculum. In response to the Swann Report, the UK government 
implemented its Education Reforms Act (1988), dedicated to ‘cultural pluralism’, for a 
‘multicultural cross-curricular dimension’. In the realm of the media, the 1983 report 
‘Ethnic Minority Broadcasting’, of the Commission for Racial Equality, showed that the 
UK has a long history of encouraging its networks to reflect within media content on the 
dictates that the Office of Communications must have regard to promoting different eth-
nic communities within the United Kingdom.
In addition, Section 2 (1)(4) of the Equality Act 2010 (United Kingdom, Equality Act, 2010) stipulates that the public sector – including public broadcasters – must work to counter any discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or belief. Moreover, the major public broadcaster, the BBC, mentions as one of its core principles the aim of reflecting within its contents the ethnic and racial diversity of British society (BBC, 2014).

Multiculturalism in Britain is criticised as a policy that masks social inequalities among groups, particularly economic inequalities, and tolerates cultural practices which undermine rights of minorities. Such policies resulted in a superficial multiculturalism, in that engendering systemic change in the living circumstances of those whom it sought to affect was not its primary intention or outcome (Triandafyllidou, 2012).

“The emphasis of policy in the UK was on a weak form of multiculturalism which failed to go beyond a celebration of diversity and neglected to tackle the origins of ethnic discrimination and social justice” (Herbert et al., 2006, p3). This, according to Ginsburg (2014), resulted in a long and continuing struggle to establish the social rights of the 'new' minority ethnic groups in the face of direct and institutionalised racism.

Problems of ethnicity and continued marginalisation and segregation of groups have questioned the notion of multiculturalism. For example Kenan Malik (2001), in an article written for a Commission for Racial Equality publication, claimed that multiculturalism had helped segregate communities far more effectively than racism. Hugo Young (2001) voiced his criticisms more explicitly, stating “multiculturalism can now be seen as a useful Bible for any Muslim who insists that his religio-cultural priorities, including the defence of jihad against America, overrides his civic duties of loyalty, tolerance, justice and respect for democracy” (p12).

More relevant to British-Pakistanis is the contestation of multiculturalism regarding Muslims. This very concern appeared in Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on the occasion of the Security Conference in Munich in February 2011, where, speaking in the context of terrorism and foreign policy, he blamed the failure of the doctrine of ‘State Multiculturalism’ in Britain as one of the causes for creating extremism within segregated Muslim communities.

Cameron denounced multiculturalism for encouraging different cultures to live separate lives, failing to confront horrors such as forced marriage, and being the root cause of radicalisation, which can lead to terrorism. He stated that Britain needs to tackle the home-grown causes of extremist ideology. “We have failed to provide a vision of society (to young Muslims) to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated
segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values. This leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless and the search for something to belong to, which can lead them to extremist ideology” (Cameron reported by BBC, 5 Feb 2011).

In the view of Parekh (2009), multiculturalism was used as an instrument to express concerns about Muslims. “Many influential circles in Western Europe widely believe that the presence of nearly 15 million Muslims poses a serious political and cultural threat. Some say this openly attacks multiculturalism, which is often a coded word for Muslims” (ibid, p51).

Parallel to criticism of multiculturalism, concepts such as ‘Britishness’, ‘defence of Christian values’ and assertion of ‘Christianity’ also emerged on the horizon of British politics as the coalition government tried to assert the Christian identity of Britain. On the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible, then Prime Minister David Cameron called for a revival of traditional Christian values to counter Britain's moral collapse. “The UK is a Christian country, and we should not be afraid to say so” (BBC, 2011). In 2014 again Cameron asserted himself for Christian values, and the stance was supported by then Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg who said it was "obvious" that Christianity is integral to the UK's identity. Attorney General Dominic Grieve and Iain Duncan Smith, Work and Pensions Secretary also supported this stance, saying modern Britain had a "Christian heritage". (BBC, 2014)

This position was questioned by the Labour Party and others. A group of 40 humanists including academics, authors and philosophers such as author Philip Pullman, comedian Tim Minchin and philosopher AC Grayling had contested this view on the website of Humanists UK on 20 April 2014, and in a letter published in The Daily Telegraph on 14 April 2014. They said that claiming that Britain was a religious society fosters alienation and division in which they said Mr. Cameron’s description of Britain as a Christian country had negative consequences for politics and society (The Guardian, 2014).

Such a political scenario was seen by them as seeking to curtail multiculturalism in favour of integration under the umbrella of ‘Britishness’ – a period in which perceptions and understandings of identities, particularly ethnic identities, had become a fraught issue. Statements against Muslims had been seen as posing a challenge to Muslim identity. This situation put the identity of Pakistani youth in question as well, as Mercer (1990) claims that identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty.
2.2 Historical and social perspective

In the context of contested multiculturalism, the paradigm of social interactions of any ethnic or racial group with others in the host country combined with socio-political and economic positioning embedded in historical processes may be considered among some of the crucial factors for the construction of diasporic identities. This section deals with the historical perspective of migration and the settlement of the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, in the context of the social and political dynamics of the society, with a particular focus on multiculturalism in relation with dynamics of construction of identity. In the postmodern world multiplicity and fragmentation of identity have surfaced as important concepts (Bhabha, 1994; Braziel and Mannur, 2011; Hall, 1992; Schaffer, 2003) therefore, a variety of facets such as culture, class and gender occupy an important place in the construction of identity.

The positioning of the young British-Pakistani diaspora may also be affected by the perceptions of the history of socio-economic standing of the Pakistani diaspora in the perspective of economic migration within the dynamics of power relations embedded in the colonial and post-colonial relationships. Though the history of migration from undivided India3 can be traced back to the 19th century, the influx of economic migrants from Pakistan began after 1947 with the decolonisation of the sub-continent and its division into two independent countries, Pakistan and India. The waves of economic migration continued until the 1960s. Economic migrants of the post-colonial period from the region of Kashmir in the north of Pakistan and their generations constitute the biggest component of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK.

2.2.1 Power and class

In terms of causes and routes of migration, according to framework by Cohen (1997), migration may be rooted into five broad categories: Victims (Jews, Armenians, Irish, Palestinians, and Africans); Labour (Indians, Chinese, Sikhs and Italians); Traders (Venetians and Lebanese); Imperial (Ancient Greek, British, Spanish, and Dutch) and Cultural (Caribbean). According to this framework, early migrants from Pakistan belonged to the category of labour. The main reason for economic migration, after World War II, was the demand for labour in the wake of shortages of manpower due to loss of lives in the World War II and emigration to Australia and Canada (Anwer, 1975).

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3 Pakistan was part of undivided India until 1947, when at the time of independence from the British colonial rule it emerged as a separate country.
Another significant factor for emigration from the Kashmir region was the Pakistan Government’s decision to build the hydroelectric dam at Mangla, which submerged nearly 250 villages of Mirpur, one of the three districts of the Azad Kashmir region in Pakistan, resulting in the displacement of nearly one hundred thousand people. Though later a new Mirpur city was built on the shore of the lake, the situation functioned as an impetus for many people to emigrate to Britain (Taylor, 1976; Anwar, 1998). As a result, majority of those who constituted the working classes came from Mirpur, (Shaw, 2001).

In the post WWII period migrants from Pakistan came on the invitation and under agreements of the British Government with the government of Pakistan (Allen, 1971; Taylor, 1976). Like immigrants from other Asian countries, most of the early migrant workers from Pakistan were only young males, who worked in industrial cities such as Bradford, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool (Shaw, 1988; Werbner, 1990).

The majority, up to 85 percent of the early immigrants from Pakistan came as labourers and settled in the Midlands and the North of England, while the remainder (Richardson and Wood, 2004). The educated class of Pakistani immigrants is constituted of professionals, especially doctors, who could find good jobs in the UK and Ireland, or students who stayed in the UK after studying in the institutions of higher education. Many highly educated and skilled Pakistanis also migrated under the Highly Skilled Manpower Programme (HSMP) in early 2000.

Though early migration from Pakistan was for economic reasons, in later years, other reasons included victimisation on the grounds of religion and political persecution. Ahmadis started to migrate from Pakistan when they were declared non-Muslims in the late 1970s. After the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 by the military dictator Zia ul-Haq, followers of Christianity and the Ahmadiyya faith continued to seek asylum as some of the Islamic laws imposed by him were misused by people against minorities and women.

Majority of the early immigrants from Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s belonged to a disadvantaged class, socially and economically, due to poverty and low levels of literacy and education in the region they migrated from (Khan, 1979). Many of those who originated from Mirpur came from families who were farmers or landless labourers, and nearly one-third of them had served in the armed forces or merchant navy (Lewis, 1994).

While discussing theories of migration, Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) mention structural, political and economic conditions that ‘push’ and ‘pull’ individuals to migrate. In the case of migration from Pakistan, strong ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors as identified by Anwar
(1998) were there in the form of the conditions back home and opportunities arising in the post-war period in Britain. In the post-war period, Britain continued to face acute labour shortages combined with a massive backlog of industrial projects to be completed, along with the rebuilding of public facilities destroyed during the war.

The early migration of Pakistanis is often considered as an ‘impelled flight. As Peterson (1958, cited in Din, 2006, p20) suggests, on the one hand, this may have been forced migration but on the other, it was opportunist in terms of the benefits to be gained in coming to the United Kingdom. Some studies have shown the desire among Asian or Pakistani migrants to return ‘home’ after they secured their financial position (Dahya, 1974; Khan, 1974; Anwar, 1979). However, for most rural Pakistanis, Britain, was a great land of ‘dreams’, which supplanted the idea of going back (Din, 2006).

2.2.2. Chain migration and segregation

Early immigrants from Pakistan encouraged their relatives and friends in villages back home to join them, and a process of chain migrations ensued. To those who had relatives or kinsmen already settled in the UK, employment opportunities proved to be a deciding factor to emigrate. Another motivation, as discussed by Kannon (1978), was free English education, which was seen by those belonging to low castes as an opportunity to improve social status.

Regardless of their caste and past occupations, the majority of Pakistani male immigrants began their work-life in factories and other manual jobs such as restaurants, driving taxis and public transport (Modood, 1997). Since the majority of them had been used to manual labour, they adapted to the same working environment in Britain and were absorbed in jobs such as textile factories and foundries, particularly in night shifts. Those who were qualified had no guarantee of obtaining employment commensurate with their qualifications (Tomlinson, 1985).

Strong bonds with relatives back home (the Biradri system4) and opportunities to sponsor and patronise them to emigrate to Britain contributed to the chain migration of Pakistanis from Azad Kashmir and the establishment of closely-knit communities in Britain. The pattern of early migrations from Pakistan was dependent on the system of sponsorship and patronage Din (2006) suggests that as they started forming communities, the early immigrants in many ways established traditions from back home, including hospitality and support systems.

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4 Solidarity among the people of same clan.
Providing accommodation, food and helping their kinsmen obtain jobs were considered as a kind of obligation by the early immigrants from Pakistan. In 1961, when the UK government began to restrict migrant workers through the Commonwealth Immigration Act, there was a gap of eighteen months between the passing of the Act and its enforcement. This provided time for early settlers to decide if they wanted to go back or stay and make Britain their home. The vast majority opted for the latter.

With the arrival of families, communities began to develop. Immigrants who came to be joined by their families formed communities with their distinct lifestyles. Andrews (1991) states that family unity, caste network, religion and social cohesion and the belief in mutual help among early immigrants were all necessary for social stability and economic success (Andrews, 1961, cited in Din, 2006, p26). Closely-knit communities began to grow because migration was closely linked with village and kinship networks. Holmes (1991) reveals that as they lived in similar cities it led to the aggregation of communities of, at times, nearly one hundred households. These internally strong bonds which ultimately affected the need to mix with other communities.

This community cohesion could be explained by “instrumentalist” approach pointed out by Cohen (1969) that the members of diaspora groups maintain group cultural identities because of practical calculations such as affiliation into ethnic groups, as the maintenance of that collective identity is useful for achieving practical individual and group goals. This bonding can further be explained by the functions of boundaries, as Werbner (1997) explains that diasporas as translocal communities mostly have to bear social and economic hardships. In this situation, they draw on culturally constituted resources and mutual aid for survival and social life. The ‘community’ thus constructed has functions to shield them from racist rejections, but also to compete for honour, to have fun, to worship, and to celebrate – together – collective rites of passage or ceremonies.

As the majority of Pakistani immigrants came from the same area and worked largely in the same factories, mostly in the night shifts as a group, this resulted in minimal contact with White society and the English language. Islam as a religion and South Asian culture as a way of life plays a significant role in the lives of Pakistanis and determines their needs for traditional food and dress. Affinity from back home and peculiar needs in terms of food, dress, religious and cultural customs and values, different from the host community, resulted in early Pakistani immigrants forming a community distinct from the mainstream British society, on various accounts.
Demand for commodities compatible with religious and cultural requirements led to entrepreneurship opportunities and developing businesses. The period following early settlement saw a rise of Pakistani-owned shops serving their own community, because White shops did not stock ‘Asian’ or ‘Halal’ food nor could they cater for diverse ethnic tastes. Pakistani entrepreneurs, like other Asians, took off with the help of families and kinship networks, filling the gap by selling a wide range of products including halal meat, chapatti flour, lentils and spices. This was made possible by the help of links in Pakistan; as Appadurai (1996) indicates, ethnoscapes and financial scapes help in sustaining relations and businesses back home. Early migrants from Pakistan were able to establish a sustained infrastructure of importers, wholesalers and retailers (Din, 2006).

In post-colonial migration, distinct cultures were brought into the boundaries of Britain and intimate proximity with British culture, thus upsetting the ‘us-here/ them-there’ paradigm, the subjects being no longer ‘over there’ but rather ‘over here’, as Geertz (1993) indicates. When people of one cultural background migrate to a society with a different culture this physical proximity does not generate a common culture, it may prompt strengthening of group identity and the maintenance of deep differences, thus strengthening boundaries. In such situations, diasporas may draw boundaries that become buttresses against what they perceive to be dangerous incursions and deliberate, external, transgressive hybridity (Modood, 1997).

Unless the diaspora community is replenished by fresh arrivals, it may gradually be absorbed through acculturation and intermarriages into the host society and over a few generations may disappear as a recognisable entity. The migration through marriages and chain migration by sponsoring relatives back home provided replenishment to the Pakistani diaspora in the UK and it continued to receive replenishment both by sponsoring relatives (even though the British government had changed the policy of inviting unskilled manpower in 1964) and also through marriages back home and sponsoring spouses. Due to marriages back home the second generation was half first and half second, and so on. The Biradari system helped in the expansion of the community as well as maintaining contact with home.

There is a view that diasporas that are reinforced by a separate religious tradition are likely to prove more long-lasting, even when their members have been fully acculturated to the local mainstream and participate actively in mainstream institutions (Esman, 2009). The Pakistani community maintained its attachment to Islam, which helped sustain an identity distinct from the host society and other Asian migrants and kept solidarity within the community much stronger.
Greater interaction with other Muslims and holding on to religious traditions, quite different from the host society, might have contributed towards segregation. Since the post 9/11 and 7/7 period, when Muslim identity came under question and began to be equated with extremism and terrorism, the segregation of Muslims in the name of multiculturalism has become a concern. The boundaries constructed by the Pakistani community which led to segregation later gave rise to criticism in multicultural debate.

As multiculturalism began to face criticism, the Ritchie report on the city of Oldham (2001) found that the degree of difference undoubtedly made the challenge of achieving an acceptable level of integration harder. The report further revealed that integration has not been achieved and the progress over the last 40 years has been unacceptably low. Richardson and Wood (2004) maintained that there were broad similarities between Oldham and several other cities in the UK where migrants of Pakistani heritage are settled, so the findings of these reports can be applied to Pakistani communities in other cities and towns as well.

2.3 ‘Paki’ racialisation and marginalisation

This section discusses the relationship of socio-economic class, ethnicity, race and religion on the positioning of the Pakistani diaspora. The majority of Pakistanis who migrated as a workforce were able to get unskilled jobs in the rejuvenating economy after WWII. Their transformation from farmers in Mirpur to labourers in the factories of Britain did not bring any acquisition of new skills. In later years, as the industrial boom began to subside, unskilled manpower started to become redundant. Employment opportunities became scarce, and levels of unemployment increased in 1980s. So, most of them either became self-employed in sectors such as taxi driving or shops and restaurants, or unemployed, surviving on state benefits.

This situation led to the poverty trap. Statistics from various sources such as Labour Force Survey and Local Education Authorities (quoted in Richardson and Wood, 2004) show that Pakistani heritage families and households are disproportionately affected by poverty and social exclusion. For example, by the turn of the century, 40 percent of all Pakistani heritage learners in secondary schools were affected by poverty, compared with a national average of fewer than 20 percent.

Unemployment, low-paid jobs and poverty could be attributed to several causes. One of the reasons could be that the employment of a high proportion of Asian workers, in the earlier phase of migration, was in the manufacturing sector where they survived with a level of skills that were vulnerable to decline, especially in the context of the
restructuring of the world economies. Brah (1996), however, asserts that these factors by themselves do not provide an adequate explanation for the disproportionately high level of Asian unemployment unless the effects of racism and racial discrimination on these populations are fully taken on board.

The studies carried out on the socio-economic status of the Pakistani diaspora indicate low levels of achievement. Cesari (2004) discusses the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, in the broader perspective of Muslims in Europe, indicating that the connection between race, religion and poverty is a socially dangerous equation whose destabilising effects are visible everywhere in the UK. For example, she points out that in England, it is particularly in the northern cities, hit hard by the end of the industrial economy, that the conflation of race, Islam, and social poverty is at its strongest. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis comprise part of the very poorest ethnic groups, gathered in the heart of England’s larger cities: London, Bradford, Manchester, and Birmingham.

Quoting statistics, Cesari reveals that in 1991, the rate of unemployment among people of Pakistani origin aged between 16 and 24 years was almost 36 percent, whereas for Whites it was below 15 percent. And while in 1998 the unemployment rate fell to only 21 percent among Pakistanis, this number remained considerably higher than the White unemployment rate of the same year (estimated at 5 percent). The rate of unemployment among young Muslims continues to be twice as high as that of young Whites. This discrepancy also extends to more prestigious professions, such as medicine or teaching.

The peculiar class and culture structure of Pakistani immigrants was influenced not only by the transformation from farmerhood in Kashmir to labourerhood in British factories, basically a class with low skills, but also by the role of their understanding of religious ethos as well as the racial positioning embedded in colonisation. Saggar (1992) describes an implicit assumption about the socially undesirable nature of continued migration in the post-war period as an attitude based on a centuries-old value system about race that prevailed in British society.

Culturally, the Pakistani diaspora is homogenized as the category of ‘Asians’, a category of ‘others’ which in the British context refers to people from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with connotations of poor, segregated groups of inferior races. They are all grouped together as ‘Pakis’, a derogatory term usually used in racist encounters. Brah (1996) has dealt with the construction of these terms as inferiorised ‘Others’ from the perspective of power relations and has explained aspects of the ‘experience’ of implications of the construction of ‘Asian’ in Britain, with reference to formation of the ‘Asian’
subject in the context of economic and social conditions marking Asian experience and the interplay of state policy, political and polar discourse as well as other institutional practices in the construction of ‘Asian as post-colonial’ other.

The discourse of ‘Paki’ as a racialised insider/outsider, according to Brah, constitutes a post-colonial subject constructed and marked by everyday practices at the heart of the metropolis. She asserts that the discourse of ‘Paki’ echoes colonial encounters. But it was not a narrative about the ‘natives out there’, as it had been during the British Raj, but rather it signified the inferiorised ‘Other’ right here at the fountainhead of ‘Britishness’. “The term ‘Paki’ reiterates an inferiorised collective subject through individual Asians” (Brah, 1996, p20). The term ‘Paki’ emerged as a derogatory term and the stigma was associated not only with Pakistanis but other South Asians as well. “What stigmatises the group stigmatises its individual members as well and leaves the residue of bitterness.” (Esman, 2009, p10). Racialisation of groups among other factors also causes exclusion and segregation.

The broader categories of reference to the identity of young British Pakistanis are South Asians and Muslims, both groups prone to perceptions of problematic ‘Others’ who do not integrate well with mainstream British society. South Asians remain associated with a lower socio-economic class constructed within the racialised power politics of the colonial and post-colonial eras. Muslim identity became an issue much bigger than being South Asian, since 9/11.

Regarding the representation of Muslim identity, Sofos and Tsagarousianou (2013) state that over the past decade, Islam has been represented and understood as equivalent to, or conducive to, cultural and religious fundamentalism, political extremism and terrorism, a perception that has posited Muslim communities as the antipodes of Western culture and values of liberal democracy, thus seen as religion and culture that hinders the cultural and social integration of Muslims in European societies.

2.3.1 Struggles of the younger generation

The younger generations of diasporas experience inter-generational differences which add to the complexity of identity evolving in different real and imagined cultures and cultural boundaries. The second generation born and raised in Britain and who would like to think of Britain as their primary home, are caught up in identity struggles in which their parents’ generation’s fixation with the original homeland and the wider society’s discourses on immigrants, are a frequent reminder of their different history, origin or even race, and a constant tension and conflict of identity.
This rift between the two different reference systems has been explained by Bustamante (2010) that even second generations of diasporas find it difficult to develop an integrated identity in their host country because the cultural references, beyond the prevailing cultural expressions, like culture at home, serve as resources to be employed in the construction of identity and refers to this identity as a modulation matrix of cultural references inherited from their parents or acquired in their host country.

Growing up in transnational households, it is not uncommon for the second generations of immigrants to be exposed to the food, dress, music, values, belief system and family structures of the country of origin while at the same time getting exposed to values, belief, and culture of the place where they grow up. Many are caught up in marginalised positions while growing up with hyphenated identities or pulled in the direction of mainstream culture but are usually drawn back by the culture of their parents (Plaza, 2010).

This situation is explained by Brake (1985) as he points out that westernisation is a problem for South Asian youth, who inhabit a quite different world at school from home. They have been stereotyped either as passive, withdrawing into their own culture, or else suffering from generational conflict. The multiple group identities of young people of Pakistani heritage could be attributed to the fact that as a group belonging to a diaspora, they share common features of the Pakistani culture, which is a confluence of two broad paradigms: South Asian and Muslim, as the operating concepts around group identity include solidarity based on commonalities including origin, history, shared characteristics or ideals.

The group identity operates across differences, involves the marking of symbolic boundaries, and powers of inclusion and exclusion (Cohen, 1997; Friedman, 1994; Hall, 1990; Hall and du Gay, 1996; Morley and Robins, 2000). “The minute a categorization takes affect and people are identified as belonging to one group rather than another, they take up an identity in their own eyes and in the eyes of others” (Wetherell, 2004, p213).

These social categorizations create social identities which also change self-definitions and create a value system. Brake (1985) argues that the subcultures arise as attempts to resolve collectively experienced problems resulting from contradictions in social structure and that they generate a form of collective identity from which an individual identity can be achieved outside the one ascribed by class, education and occupation. Youth experience gaps between what is happening and what they have been led to believe should happen. Brake states that “each generation attempts to resolve collectively experienced structural problems” (1985, p27).
Youth, particularly in marginalised or subordinate social groups, are frequently constructed as a “social problem” or “at risk”. Sociologists generally understand these phenomena in terms of social factors such as poverty and inequality rather than as physical or psychological. The socio-economic background of early migrants combined with the positioning of power inherited from the colonial period contributed to situating the young members of Pakistani diaspora in a tense position. The Pakistani diaspora faced this situation and encountered racism which dates back to the 1970s.

2.3.2 Frustrations and frictions

Social identity forms an important basis of self-esteem and is vital in self-evaluation. In many social situations the answer to the question “What particular groups do I belong to and how are these valued?” is crucial for sorting out the evaluation you put on yourself and other people. Power positioning may be important for determining value of social identity and combined with discrimination may generate conflicts within the host country and diaspora communities.

Esman (2009) elaborates that exclusion and discrimination create grievances that result in disaffected communities. He argues that if the local society is resistant to accepting a particular ethnic group or culture, there diaspora is likely to respond to this rejection by falling back on its traditions and the determination of the diaspora to remain separate is strengthened when the local opportunity structure is revealed as hostile. This hostility can take various forms, such as discrimination against them, blocking their access to education, employment, business opportunities, and political participation. It could also be a demonstration of contempt or disrespect for the culture of an immigrant community.

In such cases, the dominant class equates racial and cultural differences with inferiority. Lee Jasper, a Black pupil in Oldham in 1980s described teachers as ‘unreconstructed racists’ no different in their attitudes from foul-mouthed police officers. “Those teachers regarded having to teach Black and Asian pupils as an insult both to their professional standing and to their notion of Empire” (Richardson and Wood, 2004, p3).

The hostile situations may further aggravate by the perceptions that the immigrants are competing unfairly with native sons for scarce housing and jobs, and with local businesses by employing sharp and unscrupulous tactics. The response of young, locally born and locally educated members of the diaspora may be violent at times due to frustrations. This affects not only relations between the immigrants and their host countries but also intra-community relations of different diasporas competing for the same resources of the host country.
For example, violent outbreaks by young members of the Afro-Caribbean diaspora, back in the 1970s and 1980s in various cities of Britain who protested against flagrant discrimination in employment and housing and abusive treatment by government agencies, notably the police, manifest this behaviour. In response, the government instituted programmes to accommodate these demands. As an unanticipated consequence of this policy, Pakistani immigrants complained that government agencies disseminate information against them in favour of Afro-Caribbeans. Paki-bashing has long been a form of attack by White youth, but when Asian youth organised themselves in Bradford against racism they were charged with conspiracy in 1981 (Din, 2006).

The post-war history of Britain is not devoid of racial and youth riots often gaining impetus in times of economic downturns or security problems. During the spring and summer of 2001, a number of disturbances broke out in towns and cities across northern England involving White and Asian youths in conflict with each other and the police. These clashes, provoked by racist mobilisations of the neo-fascist British National Party, first took place at Easter in Bradford, spreading to Oldham (26-28 May) which experienced ‘the worst race riots in Britain for 15 years’; Leeds (5 June); Burnley (23-24 June); Bradford (7 July) and Stoke-on-Trent (14 July) leading to such areas being designated as ‘racial hotspots’ (Harris, 2001).

In October 2005 two nights of violent encounters in Birmingham manifested increased frictions between these groups (Din, 2006). In the situations where two diaspora communities compete for the same turf and economic opportunities, their young male members may clash violently. Similarly, during the outburst of youth riots in July 2011, three young men of Pakistani origin, while defending their territory, were killed by Afro-Caribbean young males (The Guardian, 10 August 2011).

While many attributed the causes of these disturbances to deprivation, poverty, high unemployment and racism, the official government enquiry into the ‘riots’, the Cantle report (Home Office, 2001), suggested that self-segregation by White and ethnic minority communities was the main factor behind this unrest. Community cohesion was considered a strategy for fostering respect and understanding of different communities as well as establishing a greater sense of British citizenship based on shared values, achieved through encouraging interaction between communities.

Although these proposals were not intrinsically problematic, some disturbing inferences were drawn. Farzana Shain (2003) points out that the implication is that racism is caused by segregation rather than causing it. The notion of ‘polarity’ between the communities
was brought to the surface by the Cantle report as it noted that segregation between different communities has always existed, but the polarity between cultures within the northern towns and cities of England was a fundamental cause for concern. However, Riaz Ahmed – then deputy mayor of Oldham – maintained that the causes of such segregation were far more complex, stating that, “Asian people find themselves in extreme poverty and deprivation. They have no mechanism to fight out of that poverty and they end up in ghettos” *(BBC Online, 2001, cited in Awan, 2008, p4).*

**2.4 Muslims as a ‘problem’**

The majority of the Pakistani diaspora members follow Islam as their religion, and their Muslim identity may dominate at the meta-level where perception by others is involved. Islam as a religious identity of Muslims including those of Pakistani heritage has become a matter of concern after 9/11 in Western countries such as Britain. To analyse identity of British-Pakistan and its representation and perception in the backdrop of issues of Islamic extremism, it is important to understand the context of 1950s and 1960s. When the families of early immigrants began to settle down, there was a desire among them to impart religious education by teaching the basic beliefs and practices of Islam. Mosques – the places of communal worship – were needed to sustain religious traditions. In the beginning, certain houses in each neighbourhood were dedicated to holding prayers and teaching children. Later, buildings were converted into mosques and purpose-built mosques were also erected. Before 1964 there were only seven registered mosques in the whole of Britain. In 1964 alone seven more mosques were registered. From 1974 onwards there were 25-30 new registrations per year (Lewis, 1994). The number of mosques reached 613 in 1996 and 1,500 according to the National Census of 2011.

Research by the Policy Studies Institute in the mid-1990s asked a wide range of British people about the importance of religion in their lives. About three-quarters of Muslim respondents were reported to have said that religion is important for them and four in five Muslim men over the age of 35 visited the mosque at least once every week. Muslims – even if they are living in Muslim majority countries – consider their Muslim identity above nationality and ethnicity. The strategic response of Muslims to their position in non-Muslim countries also varies in degree and dimension, as Bennett (2005) identifies three strategies that Muslims in the diaspora adopt vis-à-vis their attitude towards the countries where they reside, which are: assimilationist/pluralist; separatist/siege syndrome, and confrontational.
Those who believe in an assimilation strategy think that Islam is a progressive religion that can adapt to diverse cultural contexts, and Muslims can be faithful citizens of non-Muslim countries and can collaborate with people of good will to pursue ethical and social goals. On the other hand, followers of separatist thought, for example the Islamic Party of Britain, believe that Muslims should set up their own institutions and negotiate recognition of their distinct identity and personal law by the legal establishment of their rights to cultural and religious freedom and to self-determination as a minority community. On the far-right extreme confrontationists assert that the only purpose for Muslims to live in the West is to bring about its submission to Islam not only in religious terms but as a political system.

In the European context, being Muslim is a complex term within itself that expounds not only on religious affiliations but also enfolds cultural, political and ideological instrumentalism. Sofos and Tsagarousianou (2013), while explaining many facets and degrees of Muslim affiliation and religiosity, state that “faith finds itself alongside a more diffused sense of cultural heritage or of political exigency or ideology in the face of adversity and prejudice and all these factors give rise to a complex constellation of attitudes, motivations and practices that contest, redefine and constitute European Islam and Muslims” (2013, p63).

Like other Muslims, British Pakistanis may also remain attached to the cultural aspects of Islam besides its religious values and tend to mix up Arab and indigenous traditions with religion. Esman (2009) suggests that most Europeans regard the Muslim culture of South Asian, North African and Turkish diaspora as inferior to their own, thus not entitled to respect. Islam may be perceived by Europeans as a religion in opposition to the Western value system. In terms of locating the identities of young Pakistanis in Britain, it is important to look at the adherence to religion they inherited historically from the previous generations, combined with their own affiliation with religion and the contested position of Islam in the wake of Islamophobia, post 9/11 and 7/7.

For the last few decades, Muslim identity has become an issue in Britain in line with European thought. Sofos and Tsagarousianou (2013) assert that discourse on Islam and European Muslims is coupled with the highly emotional and xenophobic politics of terrorism and migration and has cast Muslims as external to all things European. Islam may be perceived by Europeans as a religion in opposition to the Western value system. Modood (1997) points out that Muslims are seen as the critical ‘other’ in various nationalist discourses in the European Union.
The anti-Muslim discourses are not only prevalent where there is historical antipathy to Islam of a crusader or colonial sort, but also in some regions where there is no history of encounters with Muslims, such as the Scandinavian countries. “In Europe, Islam became the focus of “racist” hostility, evidenced in the indiscriminate description of Muslims as “fundamentalists”. This hostility rests on attitudes ‘shared not merely by minorities of racists but by commentators in the quality media and many social scientists” (Rex, 1996, p86). The events of 9/11 and then 7/7 have added the dimension of ‘security’ and ‘threat’ to the factors of ‘otherness’ of Muslims. An otherness that, hitherto, was based on simple cultural aspects like dress, language and food has been overshadowed by an element of mutual ‘threat’ and ‘fear’ between the mainstream host communities and Muslim communities, respectively.

Parekh (2009) describes how the terrorist attacks by Islamic militants in New York, Madrid and London left a traumatic effect on Europeans. Before these attacks, most Europeans had seen the Muslim presence as culturally threatening but manageable, but after 9/11, it is seen as an internal enemy, leading to deep fears about Muslims, even though European Muslims have a good record as a law-abiding community, and are loyal to host countries.

The war on terrorism triggered by 9/11 became instrumental in centring world attention on Muslim culture and communities, and subsequent portrayals of Islam as an ‘uncivilised threat’ to global security provided a rationalisation for the war itself. As such, many researchers argue (e.g., Poole, 2002; Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004; Abbas, 2005; Modood, 2005) this situation has resulted in the demonisation of Muslims worldwide.

However, although British Muslims approached media texts with their own interpretative frameworks, they believed that negative media coverage of Islam resulted in negative attitudes towards them by the mainstream communities who experienced fear and even hatred towards Muslims, based on the perceived threat of religious extremism and terrorism. The Muslim minorities fear the risk of being looked upon through the lens of terrorism. Jilani (2009) brings forward the psychological implications of experiencing this fear in her Urdu novel, stating that even if you were not an extremist or terrorist but were a member of a particular community or dressed in a particular manner you might be misperceived as a terrorist, which may lead to severe psychological conditions, as happened to the main character of this novel, who ends up in a psychiatric ward.
The effects of media representation have been felt to promote negative, limited portrayals that deny diversity within ethnic minorities while simultaneously promoting the belief in whiteness as the norm and a unitary identity. However, whiteness is not a homogeneous culture, but a discourse that has been constructed and through which it exercises and naturalises its power (Dyer, 1988; Gabriel, 2000, cited in Awan, 2008, p7).

Baroness Warsi, a former British cabinet minister and chairperson of the Conservative Party, expressed her concerns about bigotry against faith and religion in her Sternberg Lecture Speech on 20 January 2011 and said, “Controversial stories are inflated by the media, detracting from serious faith-based debate and leaving us with a situation where instead of philosophy, we’re fed anti-faith phobias”.

Discussing the extent of unfounded suspicions of all Muslims she argued that “it seems to me that Islamophobia has now crossed the threshold of middle-class respectability … and for far too many people, Islamophobia is seen as a legitimate – even commendable – thing. You could even say that Islamophobia has now passed the dinner-table test.” Warsi referred to Polly Toynbee saying, “I am an Islamophobe and proud of it” and Rod Liddle: “Islamophobia? Count me in” (Warsi, 2013).

The portrayal of Muslims by the media came to be criticised by Warsi in her speech at an event organised by Faith Matters, a charity for tackling the spreading of negative stories about Islam. She argued that the media must share the blame for a rise in hate crimes against Muslims and fueling Islamophobia. She pointed out that Research by Dr. Chris Allen shows that 74% of people claim that they know ‘nothing or next to nothing about Islam’, while 64% say what they do know is solely acquired through the media (Warsi, 2013).

The majority of young British Pakistanis are Muslim and face Islamophobia which positions their identity in a contested frame of reference. Islamophobia gives a name to what is perceived to be a multifaceted phenomenon, at once visible in negative images of Islam portrayed in the Western media but having far-reaching historical roots stretching in an unbroken chain from the Crusades through the inquisition to imperialism and Zionism (Zebiri, 1997).

Some Western political observers such as Huntington (1993) suggest that with the demise of the Soviet Union, international Islamism is now the most ominous threat. The Western discourse of a violent and threatening Islam is inverted in a growing discourse of victimisation on the part of Muslims, who see in international political events ongoing evidence of inveterate Western hostility to Islam.
Summary

To establish the context of the construction of the identity of British-Pakistani youth through contemporary media consumption, it was pertinent to have an overview of the positioning of the Pakistani diaspora in the perspective of the history of migration and British multiculturalism. This chapter covered the dynamics of the construction of the social identity of British Pakistanis in terms of the broader South-Asian and Muslim heritage, and more specifically a distinct Pakistani identity.

The discussion encompasses how the representation of British Pakistanis evolved in the mainstream society and the public discourse historically, with implications on shaping perceptions about Pakistanis which continue to affect the positioning of the younger generation even today. It also looks at domination of Muslim identity over South-Asian cultural and ethnic identity which added the dimension of securitisation to the one of cultural incompatibility after the incidents of 9/11 and 7/7.

It was necessary to assess politics and debate on multiculturalism which revealed that the strategies and approaches of British multiculturalism emerged mainly in reaction to the migration of not only non-White but also non-Christian working-class people from the former colonies in the post-colonial period. The multicultural policy thus remained focused on dealing with racial, religious, ethnic and cultural differences as the debates on discrimination, segregation, conflicts and rights of ethnic minorities continued.

The multicultural policy of Britain came under severe criticism in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, particularly under the coalition government of David Cameron, for being an approach that failed to integrate the diasporas and also for its failure to inculcate loyalty for Britain in the absence of a common vision of Britishness, which led to home-grown terrorism. This indicated steps towards a retreat of multiculturalism.

However, Modood and Uberoi (2013) argue that multiculturalism has not retreated, it has rather become more inclusive by taking into its loop civic and political values which are the same for every citizen irrespective of race, religion, ethnicity, culture and class in what they define as an act of civic rebalancing. The majority of young British-Pakistanis are descendants of early Pakistani migrants who originated from a few districts of the region of Azad Kashmir where the education level was low. They migrated to Britain as a labour class. This manpower who came to rejuvenate the industrial economy became redundant with the transformation of the British economy from industrial to service, further adding to the perceptions of their burden on resources.
Socially, the early communities of the Pakistani diaspora were internally cohesive due to their belonging to the same region and class in Pakistan. They faced problems of communications due to a lack of knowledge of English. These factors, combined with the power relations of colonial rule that established the supremacy of White people, constrained their interaction with the White population. To protect their religious and cultural values they built up boundaries, which affected their integration into society.

On the civic side, the British Pakistani diaspora adopted British values in the sense that they obeyed the laws and shared the values of democracy and modernisation, but on the cultural side they maintained their own religious and ethnic heritage. Racial discrimination is attributed as one of the major factors for the segregation of Asians and Muslims and the high unemployment among them (Brah, 1996; Cesari, 2004). Several studies have shown that there was a perception in British society that migrants were not integrating into mainstream culture, whereas the diaspora pointed to racism based on colour, culture and religion as a cause of the segregation of these groups.

The coining of the derogatory term ‘Paki’ by the White people to connote all the South-Asians as groups of low achievers and inferior cultures contributed to forming negative perceptions and stigmatising not only Pakistanis but also other South-Asians. The manpower from Pakistan that was invited by the British government to support the economy was now portrayed in the public discourse as competitors for economic resources.

The present representation of social identity and the position of British Pakistani youth is derived from the historical background of migration and interactions of diverse groups in the UK. It is constructed in the framework of marginalised and racialised class, perceived as segregated and not well integrated into mainstream society. British-Pakistani youth perceive themselves as stigmatised on many counts, i.e. based on race, class, culture, ethnicity, age group, and above all religion.

British Pakistanis experience further stereotyping on account of being Muslims, as the portrayal of Islam and Muslims by the media tend to build up perceptions about Muslims as synonymous with extremists and terrorists. Studies reflect bias or at least perceived bias about media portrayals of Muslims (Ross, 2000; Poole, 2001). In the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, due to securitisation, the Muslim identity has emerged as a greater problem and threat as compared to race, class, culture and ethnicity. The identities of young Muslims, particularly males, have become the focus of debate in the political environment of host countries.
Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter deals with the research design of this study from the perspective of epistemological approaches and rationale for the selection of methodology deemed compatible with the objectives, hypothesis and research questions. The scope and complexity of the issues to be investigated need an assessment of approaches and methods to make a research design suitable for gathering data through the most suitable methods. In the following sections, the discussion revolves around the objectives of the study, the scope, the hypothesis, the research questions and finally the methodology and methods.

The main focus of the chapter is the rationale for using a qualitative approach for this study and the method of in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions for gathering data as suitable tools to ascertain information about experiences and perceptions of British-Pakistani youth about media consumption and its interplay with the construction of their identities. Discussion of field and sample covers the scope and challenges, which among other factors involve diversity within the Pakistani diaspora and challenges such as establishing a relationship of trust with the participants.

This study is interdisciplinary in nature and besides media and communications as main area of research it involves the disciplines of anthropology; sociology; psychology and cultural studies. Research in media and communications is often considered to be complex in the sense that it is multifaceted and provides opportunities for measuring both quantifiable variables and qualitative aspects such as perceptions and behaviour of individuals and groups. Therefore, one of the main challenges regarding the research design was that of coherently incorporating approaches of different disciplines.

3.1 Goals, hypothesis and research questions

Prior to the discussion of methodology, it is important to discuss the goals and objectives of this research. According to Hammersley (1992), research goals shape the descriptions, interpretations and theories, a researcher may come up with. The main goal of this study, which is scholarly in nature, is to contribute towards research on young British-Pakistanis from the perspective of media consumption and construction of their diasporic identity. Issues pertaining to the identity of British-Pakistani youth have become increasingly important due to developments in political, economic and social context within the UK which relate to many global factors.
In the context of construction of identities of youth of Pakistani heritage, questions surrounding consumption of media become pertinent, keeping in view the ever-increasing role of media in creating perceptions about identities of individuals and groups through social representation. This evokes a need to investigate how they perceive the impact of media on their identities, which further unfolds queries on issues like their interactions with other groups and integration into the host society.

The major objective of this research is to investigate the interplay of media and communications with the construction of identity of young British-Pakistanis at various levels: micro, meso, macro and meta. The study explores how they perceive narratives about their identity and strategise consumption of media to construct their distinct identities as members of the diaspora and as young people. The study encompasses the context and background of their positioning, inherited historically and within the present-day reality of hyper-communications and ultracomplex cultures and societies.

Though studies have been conducted on the Pakistani diaspora, they mainly deal with the socioeconomic and political aspects. Identity issues particularly pertaining to youth are vital to much-debated questions of integration and assimilation, yet there is a lack of research dealing exclusively with the construction of identities of Pakistani youth.

Existing studies deal with Pakistanis as part of either the Muslim or the South Asian communities. The Muslim identity of British-Pakistanis came into the spotlight after 9/11 and 7/7, particularly through media representation. Investigation of the role of media in the construction of stereotypes as perceived by them and their response in the form of strategies of media consumption and constructing their own narrative was required.

Based on a literature review and preliminary observations and interactions with British-Pakistani youth, a hypothesis was framed:

“Young British-Pakistanis develop strategies and practices of media usage constituted at least partly in response to the dominant representation of their communities and, through these, they attempt to construct their own distinct identities.”

In the light of this hypothesis, research questions were formulated. Research questions occupy a central position in any research by defining what a researcher specifically wants to understand through undertaking the study. “They are the one component that directly links to all the other components of the design” (Maxwell, 2005, p65). For Miles and Huberman (1994), research questions explain what the study will attempt to learn or understand and help in focusing through their relationship to the goals and conceptual framework.
This research was conducted around the following preliminary questions.

RQ1: How do young Pakistanis perceive dominant representations of their communities and themselves?

RQ2: What is their response to these in terms of

   a. Attitudes
   b. Strategies of media consumption/practices

RQ3: How do these strategies/practices relate to the construction of their identities and self-representation?

RQ 4: Are these processes gendered, and if yes, what are the differences in male/female media consumption and identity formation processes?

RQ 5: Is there a relationship of class with the representation and perceptions of Pakistani origin youth about their identities?

Keeping in view the usefulness of research questions, Weiss (1994) states, “in framing the study, questions guide decisions about methods and influencing conceptual framework” (cited in Maxwell, 2005, p65).

3.2 The field and my role as researcher

To investigate these questions in the proper context, an understanding of field and sample population was essential. To gather quality data, my concern was not only to choose a suitable approach and methods but also to tackle challenges posed by the field, the participants and my own limitations. The objective was to obtain correct information within an environment of trust between me as a researcher and the participants.

Two cities were selected for field work: London and Bradford. The purpose of selecting two cities was to find out different views of young Pakistani diaspora members in two cities with distinctive characteristics, London being more cosmopolitan and Bradford having a large population of Pakistanis.

The city of Bradford has been surrounded by negative perceptions and is considered a marginalised entity (detailed discussion in Chapter 6) because the Pakistani community residing in large numbers there has a history of settlement in the city as factory workers, who became redundant when traditional industry closed down. The city is perceived by mainstream population as trapped in poverty, unsafe and backward (Din 2006).
Participants in both cities were suspicious of strangers, including researchers, even if they were Muslims, because of the high level of monitoring by intelligence agencies in the wake of the securitisation of Muslims against the backdrop of Islamophobia that emerged after 9/11 and 7/7. The security agencies of the UK were keeping surveillance on Muslims, particularly young males, to intercept terrorism plots. In the mainstream media there were stories of the use of websites and social media by extremists and terrorists to recruit Muslim youth. Such a situation made potential participants of the study suspicious of anyone trying to learn about their lives, identities and practices of media consumption and accessing information.

One of the challenges was to bring together young people to form focus groups, as they were reluctant to disclose information about themselves and their activities, particularly if the interviews were being recorded. They were not comfortable with revealing what kind of media they were using, particularly digital media and websites. Male participants were more conscious and suspicious. They referred to stories about how intelligence agencies would spy on Muslim youth to gather information on their activities.

To deal with the challenge of suspicion and mistrust, community leaders and interlocutors were approached, and issues were discussed to gather information about sensitivities of the youth, their families and their community as a whole. With the help of trusted community leaders who were known to the community, it was possible to organise groups of young people in the required numbers. The purpose of the study, explained in the information sheet and the accompanying consent form, and the right to withdraw from the study at any time also helped.

Consent was obtained for audio recording as an alternative to taking notes by hand but still some of the participants, particularly males, were reluctant for their voices to be recorded. While conducting focus group discussions, the strategy was adopted to melt the ice through engaging questions dealing with a subject of interest to young people, besides showing empathy to problems faced by young people in general, which helped to create feelings of affinity.

The field was complex due to trans-local and transnational connectivity. The identity of participants was not located only in socio-economic, cultural and political dynamics of geographic entities like cities and countries but also in the domain of virtual networks operating through media. The virtual component of communities required a multifaceted approach to gauge the dynamics arising out of the complex environment.
The participants were living in families with typical cultural characteristics of the Pakistani diaspora. Young Pakistanis were faced with different cultural norms in the family in comparison to public spheres. Media consumption was both voluntary and involuntary because at home either parents or spouses (who came to the UK after getting married) would be interested in Pakistani media, particularly TV channels that were of no interest to second or third-generation British Pakistanis. Some mothers would not send their daughters alone to the venues of focus group and would escort them. Sometimes this provided an opportunity to obtain parents’ views on the issues related to young people in a broader sense.

The power dynamics between researcher and participants may have bearings on interactions and the investigation as a whole. I had been working as a diplomat in the High Commission for Pakistan. Some of the participants would mistake the position of civil servant of the Government of Pakistan for somebody working with the British Government and thought the research was being conducted to fulfil some purpose of British Government. This impression was neutralised by a clear explanation of the role of an employee of the Government of Pakistan. I connected to them as a Pakistani rather than an officer of the Government of Pakistan. This position helped me gain access to the community and create a candid environment of interaction.

In my interactions with Pakistanis of different faiths, I always showed respect for them and their religion and shared with them my experiences of having friends from different faiths. I included Christians and Ahmadiya community members in the focus groups to look into the role of media in building stereotypes where Pakistanis of different faiths were facing problems similar to those faced by Muslim Pakistanis.

3.3 Sample

Participants of focus groups were selected from the cities of London and Bradford for 20 groups; 10 in each city comprising eight participants per group. In each city, five groups of 18-to-24-year-olds and five groups of 25-to-30-year-olds were selected. In each category two male-only, two female-only and one mixed group were constituted.

The preferred manner of sample selection for qualitative research is neither probability sampling nor convenience setting; rather it is purposeful or criterion-based selection (Light et al.1990, cited in Maxwell, 2005, p88).

In this strategy, particular settings, persons or activities are deliberately selected to elicit information which cannot be provided by any other choices. People who are uniquely able to provide information are the most important consideration in qualitative selection
(Weiss, 1994). Purposive sampling is one of the methods whereby researchers handpick the cases to be included in the sample group based on their judgment of the participants’ typicality. According to Mason (1996), with purposive sampling strategy, whether or not the sampling is big enough to be specifically representative of a total population is not a major concern.

The Pakistani diaspora in the UK is not a completely homogenous community; it is diverse in many ways. Though the majority of them are Sunni Muslims; there are followers of other sects and faiths, including Shia, Ahmedis and Christians. As minorities in Pakistan, their representation in Britain is small. Similarly, there are variations based on area of belonging back home and education levels.

The majority of young British-Pakistanis are descendants of those who came to the UK in the post-WWII period after decolonisation, mainly from the Kashmir region where both Sunni and Shia population reside. They include members of both sects, but the majority are Sunni. The Pakistani diaspora includes those who migrated to seek asylum due to risks of religious or political prosecution, including Christians, Shias and Ahmedis. Those who migrated because of political or religious persecution have better socio-economic backgrounds and are mostly well educated.

Since it was important to include the voices of diverse segments within the Pakistani diaspora, care was taken to select a sample based on a cross-section of the diaspora. Shias, Ahmedis and Christians were included in the focus groups in line with purposive selection. To analyse gender-specific views, an effort was made to give equal participation to male and female members of the diaspora.

Similarly, keeping in view the roots and routes of the Pakistani diaspora, the selection of participants was made from London and Bradford. It is easy to find a more diverse representation of the Pakistani diaspora in London, who migrated for a variety of reasons from different areas of Pakistan with variations in levels of education and professions. In Bradford the majority are from Kashmir and migrated for economic reasons as unskilled workers, though many in the younger generations are achieving better in higher education and professions.

### 3.4 Investigation beyond cause and effect

Based on the aforementioned goals and research questions and the complexity of the field, attention was paid to the philosophical framework and use of methods to help extract much deeper and wider meanings as perceived by the participants. An in-depth view of perceptions of young members of the Pakistani diaspora about how and why
media consumption may affect contours of their identity could be obtained only through an approach which could help investigation beyond a simple cause and effect relationship among a few variables.

Investigation of media consumption, identity of diaspora members with variations and their perceptions posed complexities, which could only be properly grasped within the context of everyday life rather than a limiting setting as in positivist approach. Deacon et al. (1999) assert that instead of conducting experiments in the artificial setting of a laboratory or asking people narrowly-based questions, researchers need to examine the dynamics of different phenomena in natural settings and explore the roles played by media imagery in forming the identities that people bring to these settings.

Construction of identity and perceptions about media are not simple propositions, particularly in the context of a diaspora, where various fields and forces within the host country and from outside act on the individuals. The trajectories of media in the case of diasporas are complicated networks. If we consider media as a social institution (Hall, 1996), the mutual interaction with the individual has various facets, which lead to construction of meanings in both subjective and collective sense.

This requires understanding of the context of ethnic and race relations. The individuals were to be seen as part of the Pakistani diaspora, a group with distinct social identity different from the mainstream, because, as Merrigan and Huston (2004) state, reality is best understood as multiple constructions of the experiences that individuals have in interaction.

In this scenario, constructivism or social constructivism could be helpful in understanding complexities associated with the construction of identities and formation of perceptions of individuals and groups. It explains that individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work and develop subjective meanings of their experiences which are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into few categories or ideas.

Constructivist research helps in interpreting the meanings others may construct about the world (Creswell, 2014), so rather than starting with the application of theory it attempts to generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning. “Believing that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (Geertz 1973, cited in Deacon et al. 1999, p8).
To understand the meanings of construction of identity as understood by the young British-Pakistanis and their perceptions about these processes and outcomes, an approach with the capacity to tackle issues in more detail was required. It was decided to adopt qualitative research and analysis as the major approach for this research. Subjective meanings are often negotiated socially and historically and are formed through interactions with others and historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives. Qualitative methods have the capacity for addressing the processes of interaction among individuals and contexts in which people live and work (Morrigan and Huston, 2004).

Analyses of perceptions demand methods that, rather than establishing relations of cause and effect, provide insights into meanings. To understand perceptions of British-Pakistanis it was essential to analyse conversations with them and understand how they make sense of their social world and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style, and social rituals.

Research on Pakistani diaspora involves the question of marginalisation and asymmetric power relations. Members of a marginalised group tend to face psychological, social, and ideological threats. The first of these is the definition of one’s identity by others: the ideological definition of one’s marginalised identity in the interest of the dominant groups in society.

The transformative world view appears relevant in the context of the Pakistani diaspora. It holds that post-positivist assumptions imposed structural laws and theories that did not fit marginalised individuals in our society or issues of power and social justice, discrimination and oppression that needed to be addressed (Merton, 2010).

With an emphasis on important social issues such as empowerment, inequality, suppression, oppression, domination, and alienation, in studying diverse groups, transformative research focuses on inequalities based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic class that result in asymmetric power relationships.

For understanding complex issues such as media and identity, a pragmatic worldview provides sufficient flexibility for interpretations from different angles, as it arises out of actions, situations and consequences rather than antecedent conditions (Patton, 1990). With a pragmatist approach, instead of focusing on methods, researchers emphasise the research problem and use all approaches that may be relevant to understand the problem.

The pragmatic approach agrees on the existence of external reality and recognises an external world independent of our minds but on the other hand denies that “truth can be determined once and for all or one explanation of reality is better than another” (Cherry
Holmes 1992, cited in Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p28). In terms of causal relationships, pragmatists believe that causal relationships may exist but cannot be pinned down completely. This position differs from post-positivist and constructionist approaches. The former believes in some lawful, reasonable relationships among social phenomena that may be known imperfectly or in probabilistic terms, whereas the latter believe that all entities simultaneously shape each other and that it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects. Ontological relativism implies that the multiple social realities are products of human intellects and that may change as their constructors change (Lincoln and Guba, 1994).

Benefit can be taken from a pragmatic paradigm in complex studies, which associate with different research methods because of what they try to achieve from the research. The positivist paradigm relies on quantitative methods, whereas the constructivist paradigm underlies qualitative methods. A pragmatic orientation relies on “mixed methods” or mixed methodology which contains elements of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).

### 3.5 Qualitative approach

Marshall & Rossman (2011) state that examining a specific setting or set of individuals needs to be connected with a larger phenomenon. This research has been linked to theories of media, diaspora and identity. By linking the specific research questions to larger theoretical constructs or to important policy issues, an attempt has been made to show that the particulars of this study serve to illuminate larger issues and therefore hold significance for that field.

Empirical research of this study mainly relies on a qualitative approach. However, quantitative methods were used in small proportions to find out the types of media used by the participants and the amount of time spent by them on the use of different media. As the qualitative method was the major tool of investigation in this study, it is essential to discuss the efficacy of this method to investigate the research questions of this study.

Qualitative research methodologies have become an increasingly important mode of inquiry for the social sciences and applied fields due to limitations of quantitative methods for in-depth analysis of complex issues (Poovey, 1995). The strengths of qualitative research derive primarily from the inductive approach, its focus on specific situations or people, and its emphasis on words rather than numbers. Qualitative research can be seen as pragmatic, interpretative and grounded in the lived experiences of people (Maxwell, 2005).
The intellectual goals for which qualitative methods are suited include understanding the meanings of what participants try to say, and also situations, experiences and actions and the particular context within which the participants act, identifying unanticipated phenomena and influences; understanding the process by which events and actions take place; and developing causal explanations (ibid).

Qualitative research is considered suitable for interpretation of complexity of social interactions expressed in daily life and of the meanings the participants themselves attribute to those interactions (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). This research required understanding of meanings given by the diaspora youth to several issues such as representation in media, and how they construct these meanings in their particular environment. Qualitative data can be used for gathering information on naturally occurring ordinary events in natural settings by taking into account the influence of local context. Miles and Huberman (1994) hold the view that there are a variety of experiences and opinions that come from the vivid and real context of settings in the study. “Data collected through interviews can be meaningful and closely related to the real life” (Mason, 1994, p4).

Data in a qualitative study can include virtually anything that the researcher see or hear, or that is otherwise communicated, while conducting the study, Maxwell (2005) suggests. He recommends using whatever informal data-gathering strategies are feasible, including hanging out, casual conversations, and incidental observations. This is particularly important in an interview study where such information can provide important contextual insights. In the view of Punch (1998), interview data may have a much wider range of possible empirical materials than quantitative data.

While choosing research methods to investigate perceptions of Pakistani diaspora youth, many factors had to be considered, including the specific context and issues and considering components like the theoretical framework and validity issues. Studying diaspora youth required understanding not only the context in which they lived in Britain but also their connections beyond geographical boundaries. The question of contested and negotiated identity demanded elaborate discussions rather than simply relying on close-ended questions. In addition, the meta identity - perception of identity through the eyes of others -was involved, which needed techniques for multidimensional understanding, investigation and analysis.

Qualitative interviewing, either focus group discussions or in-depth one-to-one interviews, is a popular methodological choice in qualitative research in the fields of media and communications. Scholars in media research emphasise the active role of audiences

3.5.1. Interviews and focus groups for deeper insight

The method of interviews, both individual and group, was selected for empirical research in this study, with focus groups as the major tool supplemented by some individual interviews and minor use of quantification, discussed in detail in a subsequent section. During the course of the research, besides focus groups, informal discussions with the young people and their families emerged as helpful in revealing their inner feelings. Similarly, visits to homes helped in understanding the home environment, as younger generations of diaspora struggle in remarkably different environments at home than those at public places.

Interviews are considered to be one of the main data collection tools in the qualitative approach (Punch, 1998). Interviews can range from informal incidental sources of data to the primary source of information (Anderson, 1996). In qualitative research, interviews may be unstructured or semi-structured. Interviews help in gathering useful information when it is not possible to observe respondents directly, but respondents are ready to share detailed information.

Open-ended interviews are a powerful method of data collection because they provide one-to-one interaction between the researcher and the individual and apply to small sample groups, i.e. focus groups (Kruege,1998). “Open-ended interviews result in copious information about issues. Such information might lead to conceptualization of the issues in ways totally different from what you anticipated” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p102). The interview can be employed as an explanatory device to identify variables and relationships (Cohen and Manion, 1995). Moreover, as Anderson (1996) asserts, people are more easily engaged in an interview than when completing a questionnaire.

Interviews may take any form, such as one-on-one, focus groups, telephone and email interviews. Focus groups can be used to collect shared understanding from several individuals and to get views from individuals within a group setting. Focus groups have the advantage of interaction among the respondents, which leads to useful information, especially when the respondents cooperate with each other (ibid).

The focus group method was used as a major source to gather data for this study, where samples were selected based on criteria defined in section on sample selection. In focus groups, participants are interviewed collectively, with a focus on a preselected
centralised topic moderated by the researcher (Gentikow, 2005). Focus groups are composed of participants who share one or more characteristics or common interests relevant to the topic of discussion. The shared point of reference helps generate an expression of collective experiences and attitudes.

Agar and MacDonald (1995, cited in Sim and Waterfield, 2019, p3004) suggest that a focus group lies somewhere between a meeting and a conversation. Like a meeting, it is specifically organised in advance and has a structure. Like a conversation, its discussions rely on spontaneity, with individuals picking up on one another’s contributions.

Participants for focus groups are recruited according to requirements depending on the topic, research question and/or hypotheses. Samples for focus groups are chosen strategically in the parameters of certain criteria but may not be necessarily representative, since only a limited number of people participate. Ideally, one focus group should have six to eight participants. The researcher is required to consider demographics in terms of age, sex, gender, and socio-economic status, among other factors (Herman, 2017).

The main objective of focus groups is not to reach consensus among the participants or to engage in debate, but to encourage each participant to share his or her perspective on the topic or related multiple topics under discussion. The focus groups intend to promote self-disclosure among participants. In the view of Krueger and Casey (2009), researchers want to know what people really think and feel. For some individuals self-disclosure comes easily, but for others it is difficult and requires trust, effort and courage.

In focus group discussions the researcher takes on a less dominating role to encourage respondents to comment on the areas they think are most important. Participants may reveal more information if they feel safe and comfortable among people like themselves. Focus groups work on the principle that people self-disclose and say what they really think and feel in a comfortable, permissive and non-judgmental environment.

In the view of Herman (2017), focus groups capitalise on the discussion generated among participants by encouraging them to respond not only to the moderator but also to the anecdotes conveyed by other participants and to engage in further reflection of personal experiences as others speak in a naturally occurring discourse. Data gathered through focus groups are considered rich because they are descriptive and elaborate and go beyond superficial explanations. Instead, the data are representative of genuine attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and justifications of perspectives. Focus groups may present researchers with access that other methods cannot attain.
The focus group method is considered an effective way of gaining access to people’s perceptions, meanings and definitions of situations and construction of realities. It allows for greater depth as compared to other methods of data collection. It helps the interviewees to expand on what they see as priorities in the situation (Radnor, 1994). Focus groups are employed to gain rich insight into attitudes and behaviours through descriptive data, which may help researchers to understand and meaningfully explain certain communication phenomena. The method is gaining recognition in the field of communications, including media effects on consumers (Herman, 2017).

Focus groups and interviews have some drawbacks and disadvantages. It is a time-consuming and expensive method. Only a small number of interviews can be conducted for dissertation research without external financial support. Considering the disadvantages of interviews, Creswell (2002) is of the view that the information from respondents might be distorted by the views of the researcher. Interview data may be deceptive and merely provide the perspective that the respondents want the researcher to hear.

One of the weaknesses of the focus group approach is that while a group situation may stimulate the production of arguments and interpretations as it often happens in everyday conversations, group pressure may silence some participants of the conversation, for instance those holding atypical views, and their position may remain unvoiced. Some ethical issues may arise while conducting focus groups, which may relate to disclosure, consent, confidentiality, anonymity, and risk of harm. Information is provided to potential participants for the sake of consent as an informed decision to participate or not.

One potentially problematic issue relating to consent in focus groups stems from the degree of disclosure that is possible, due to the inductive nature of qualitative research, making it hard to provide fine-grained detail on what will occur in a study (Wiles, 2013). Moreover, in focus group research what takes place in the group depends in part upon other participants, who may spontaneously raise issues not necessarily intended, or predicted, by the moderator.

Confidentiality and anonymity refer to the use and attribution of information, respectively, whereas privacy is concerned with initial access to information. In the context of focus groups, Warwick (1982) warns that risks include social or psychological harm in case of breach of confidentiality and/or anonymity. Some sensitive information, if disclosed, may lead to embarrassment, shame, stigmatisation, discrimination, disruption of existing social relationships, or adverse employment consequences, and in some cases participants may face legal action as a result of information that is made public.
These issues can be dealt with proper strategies during all the stages and processes of the focus group, which involve framing of questions, information prior to consent, briefing, conduct of the focus group, debriefing, storage and presentation of data. Carey and Asbury (2012) suggest that at the consent stage, besides explaining the purpose of the focus group, the researcher may explain explicitly through an information sheet what kind of questions may be asked, where the data will be used, how it will be stored and processed, and the steps for confidentiality, anonymity and privacy.

Tolich (2016) holds the view that ethical assurances should be communicated to the potential participant in the recruitment phase of the research with such transparency that they allow the research participant to read in advance how the researcher plans to contend with the issues of confidentiality and consent in focus group research, besides an honest statement on the limitations of any ethical assurances, as they may be exercised in only those aspects where the researcher has control and influence, given the public nature of the focus group.

Clarity in briefings immediately prior to the start of discussion, also referred to as ground rules, may help deal with the concerns of participants. Krueger (1998) suggests that the researcher can emphasise the public nature of a focus group and the need for confidentiality and anonymity, besides providing guidance on subjects that might be felt unsuitable to be raised during the discussion. The briefing may help in managing participants’ expectations, for example pointing out that the group seeks to discuss a particular problem, not to provide a solution to such a problem.

Proper moderation can help in dealing with sensitive and potentially distressing issues that arise—perhaps unpredictably—through the dynamics of the interaction within the focus group. Though focus group interviewing benefits from being open to what people have to say in a non-judgmental environment, Longhurst (2016), cautions that if participants express racist or other discriminatory views, the researcher should handle such a situation tactfully, as allowing such views to go unchallenged may suggest complicity.

Debriefing is important for reassuring ethical aspects. After the focus group has finished, and its content is summarised to participants, the moderator can reiterate key messages around confidentiality and anonymity and clarify or comment upon any potentially sensitive or problematic issues that were raised during the discussion (Smith, 1995, cited in Sim and Waterfield, 2019, p3017).
3.5.2 Protocols and questions

Qualitative interviewing is usually characterised by an in-depth, semi-structured, or loosely structured form. For the focus groups of this study semi-structured questions were framed. Semi-structured interviews yield information that gives reasons and provides the depth of information required to answer the research questions (Bell, 1996). To ensure the essential elements of clarity, comprehensiveness and acceptability as suggested by Rea and Parker (1997), questions were developed from the conceptual framework and were piloted with four focus groups. Some adaptations were made to assure that the questions generated answers corresponding to the intended research questions.

The semi-structured focus group discussions were conducted using pre-set interview questions. The focus group questions covered three aspects: the perception of British-Pakistani youth about their identities; the perceived role of the media in the construction of these identities; and the strategies they deployed to sustain their identities and tackle negative perceptions associated with them.

Questions were designed to cover four major areas:

1. Consumption of media, both type and content.
2. Meaning of identity, how the young people define their diasporic identity and how they perceive the projection of identities of the Pakistani diaspora in the media.
3. What strategies they apply to deal with perceptions and misperceptions.
4. How empowering they find the effect of new media in dealing with challenges to their identity. (Detailed questions in Annex 1).

Herman (2017) suggests dividing questions into four categories: engagement, exploration, probing, and exit questions. Engagement questions permit participants to develop comfort with and comprehension of the topic. These questions are relatively simple to answer and do not ask participants to disclose intimate information. Exploration inquiries obtain more elaborate responses regarding participants’ beliefs or attitudes on the topic and inner feelings of the participants.

Exploration questions, or open-ended questions, allow group members to respond freely without much constraint. Probing questions are added, when required, to seek additional feedback from participants to clarify a response or draw out more description. Exit questions are typically asked toward the end of the focus group session. The intent is to ask if participants have any final thoughts regarding the topic.
Questions for this study were framed along these categories and all other protocols were followed during the research. At the beginning of each session, I introduced myself to the participants as a researcher and explained the purpose of the study and the significance of the respondents in the research. Then I circulated the information sheet containing the objectives of the study and rights of the participants.

Informed consent forms were signed by the participants and after these were returned, the focus group interviews were conducted. At the beginning of each focus group the process of discussion, the audio taping and the consent form were fully explained to the respondents. The participants were informed about confidentiality and protection of personal data.

Anonymity was maintained throughout data processing. Each group lasted for 60 to 90 minutes. The discussion was tape-recorded and later transcribed. Personal data on the participants was collected via a proforma covering demographic information including age, gender, generation of diaspora, status of employment and education. Participants were pseudonymised for the sake of protection of identity. All information was handled with confidentiality and transcribed data was stored in zipped files.

To analyse media consumption and pro-sumption it was important to prepare a profile depicting the kind of media being used by the young British-Pakistanis and the duration of engagement with traditional media and different digital media platforms, involving presentation in numbers. For this purpose a questionnaire of quantitative nature with closed-end questions and multiple choices was used for charting out media consumption and pro-sumption patterns, covering both traditional and digital media.

The questions were about media consumption patterns of Pakistani origin youth: including media access, frequency of media exposure, preferred type of media, consumption of digital devices and choice of content. The questionnaires were distributed, and participants were asked to fill them out and returned before the commencement of the focus group discussion.

The questionnaire was developed as a supplement to qualitative research with a view to making a sketch of media choice and content, as detailed discussion of media consumption was included in focus groups. One of the advantages of a questionnaire is that if anonymous, it encourages greater honesty (Cohen and Mannion, 1995).
3.6 Reliability and validity

The traditional concepts of reliability and validity may pose difficulties for qualitative research (Wiersman, 1995). This happens because qualitative research occurs in natural settings. For individual or group interviews, the most practical way of achieving greater validity is to minimise bias as much as possible. The sources of bias are the characteristics of the interviewer, the characteristics of interviewees, and the substantive content of the questions. A well-organised, complete presentation of procedures and results helps enhance external reliability (Cohen and Manion, 1995).

As with any method, validity concerns may arise about focus groups. Herman (2017) points out two types of validity concerns. Firstly, scepticism may surface from the naturalness of the conversation. For example, a participant might be less inclined to disclose an opinion he or she thinks may not be liked by other group members. Instead, he or she might either modify the statement to be consistent with the group or withhold true feelings. This limitation may hinder the objectives of focus group, as the true essence of the focus group methodology is not to facilitate discussion of a standardised option, but to discuss nuanced perspectives.

A second validity concern constitutes researcher bias seeping into data analysis. The descriptive data generated through focus group discussions are usually analysed based on themes which may lead to subjective, instead of objective, data analysis. For example, researchers may create themes that further their personal agendas. The validity of the qualitative approach can be established on a logical basis. “Validity is not a commodity that can be purchased with techniques” state Brimberg and McGrath (1985), (cited in Maxwell, 2005, p105).

The concept of an observer-independent “gold standard” to which comparison of accounts can be made to see if they are valid does not apply in qualitative research. Maxwell identifies researcher’s bias and reactivity as the two most common threats to validity. Researcher’s bias refers to the selection of data that fit the existing theory or preconceptions and the selection of data that stand out to the researcher, both of which involve the subjectivity of the researcher (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p263).
Summary

The complexity of this study arising due to its interdisciplinary nature and the involvement of multiple concepts and factors required a research design carefully crafted to blend various approaches to achieve the goals of collection and analysis of insightful data reflecting the true feelings and perceptions of participants about the issues of their identity and representation through media consumption and pro-sumption.

In this chapter an effort has been made to establish the merits of qualitative methods for this type of research, which tends to go beyond looking into cause and effect, as in strict terms of positivism. In line with a constructivist approach, it rather explores deeper meanings as socially constructed.

The scope of research embraces concepts from various disciplines, while media and communications and diaspora and cultural studies remain central. Thus, complexity and scope of such research required inquiry from different angles. Communication is a complex field whose diversity encourages multiple and competing claims about its identity (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) and could be tackled through adopting pragmatic approach.

Semi-structured individual interviews and focus groups emerged as the most suitable methods for the empirical research of this study. For ascertaining data on patterns of media consumption/pro-sumption, quantification was used as a supplementary tool to a small extent. Analysis of the methods of sample selection revealed that criteria based/purposive selection with respondents possessing some desirable traits was most appropriate for the study.

Regarding issues of reliability, validity and ethical challenges, the chapter contains a discussion of the need to adopt effective strategies, such as well-informed consent, pre-session briefings and careful moderation to protect confidentiality, anonymity and privacy to avoid risks of harm.
Chapter 4. Media consumption profile

This chapter aims to present a profile of media consumption and pro-sumption by young British-Pakistanis, on the premise of a nexus between media consumption and construction of diasporic and youth identity. It probes into the interplay of identity with the type of media consumed in the light of Uses and Gratifications Theory (UGT) and notions of active audience and participatory culture in the wake of widespread use of digital media platforms. In this chapter ‘type of media’ refers to the channels of communications rather than the content. The analysis is based on data gathered through the questionnaire filled up by the participants before the start of the focus groups and supplemented with detailed responses of participants during focus group discussions.

The chapter covers the engagement of young British-Pakistanis with media in terms of preferences for traditional vs digital media and ethnic vs British and other international media. It also investigates the preferences for social media platforms and time spent on them. The consumption of the type of media channels may be considered important in the construction of identity. Discussion of content will be covered in Chapter 5.

Identity relates to type of media in two ways. Existing identity may become a factor in determining the choice of media in terms of needs and their gratification and in return use of particular type of media may impact several contours of identity. An overview of Uses and Gratifications Theory will not be out of place in understanding the dynamics of media consumption and pro-sumption of young British-Pakistanis. This theory proposes that audience use media according to their needs, which may be determined by their background, such as education, interests, experience and social situation. Media consumers are aware of their own motives and gratifications for using different media in terms of what they want from media and which media best meet their needs.

The theory rests on models of classifications of needs. According to an initial model proposed by McQuail et al. (1972), media gratifications can be classified into four categories: Diversion, Personal relationships, Personal identity and Surveillance. Katz et al. (1973) developed an elaborate model of 35 needs based on social and psychological functions of mass media, grouped into five major categories. McQuail (1983) further developed a classification of common reasons for media use along similar lines and identified four major needs as information, personal identity, integration and social interaction and entertainment.
4.1 Preferred media: old or new

As Uses and Gratifications Theory aims at understanding needs of media and communications from psychological and sociological perspectives, it emphasises motives and the self-perceived needs of the audience for using certain media. Diaspora members may have a wider scope of needs and media consumption when compared to other people of their age group, in the sense that they may also have access to media from the country of their heritage, besides the need for connectivity to their relatives back home or in other parts of the world. As British citizens they may also need to know about what is happening in Britain and may have a liking for various programmes. Following is an example of the scope of media pro-sumption by a 19-year-old British-Pakistani woman:

“I love to watch National Geographics, British sitcoms and also Pakistani dramas with my mother on TV, but social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram are more important. When there were floods in Pakistan in 2010, I launched an appeal on my Facebook page to help people in the village, of my mother, back home and that’s how we were able to help our people in Pakistan. Talking to my Khala (maternal aunt) on Skype helps me a lot in getting information about the well-being of other relatives. Not only that, I also know about the latest fashions in Pakistan. I find it so easy to explain to my aunt what kind of Shalwar Kameez (traditional Pakistani clothes), I actually need because she can immediately show me pictures via video call on WhatsApp.” (Jameela, 19 years, Female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

This example of consumption and pro-sumption of type of media by young British-Pakistanis reveals how various elements of Pakistani identity, in combination with their hybrid identity, may determine the consumption of a particular type of media and determine media activity and cultural participation, in an era when digital media platforms and applications have become an agency for the interactivity and activity of their audience, enabling the audience to become producers in addition to users or recipients of linear communication, transforming media users and consumers into prod-users or pro-sumers. The discussion includes the concept of voluntary and involuntary media consumption, especially regarding television in the home setting, as at times, the content parents want to watch may not be the choice of young family members.
To analyse the trends of media consumption among young British-Pakistanis, an important aspect was to know about their preferences for traditional verses new media. Traditional or old media is for the most part mass media, comprised of newspapers, magazines, television and radio. It is usually considered non-interactive and offers what the media house or producer wants to present. Traditional media is more content driven and based on linear communication. New or digital media is communication driven mainly by internet connectivity. It involves activity on the part of users, with the flexibility of becoming active producers of content and information. It may be in the form of sending an email or using internet collaboration tools. The users can be referred to as prod-users or pro-sumers to account for the sizeable extent of their creative and interactive online activity (Bruns, 2008; Fenton, 2012).

This involves participatory culture through shared social practice. Jenkins (2016) describes the interpretation of content, production, curation and circulation as strongly linked meaningful forms of participatory culture marked by low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement. This brings a sense of empowerment to members of a participatory culture who believe their contributions matter and feel social connection with one another.

Digital media derives the power of participatory culture mainly through social media platforms and various applications, which serve as tools of participatory community. In fact, these are not digital media gadgets that are participatory, as technologies may not be participatory, whereas cultures as shared social practices may provide opportunities for participation. Thus, digital media platforms create affinity spaces for people, which may also serve as useful tools for diaspora members, enabling them to contribute to matters of interest to the physical and virtual communities they belong to.

Another strength of digital media is to facilitate the telling side or the voice of the audience. Whenever anyone posts photographs on Facebook or Instagram, discusses the latest film on WhatsApp or Facebook, or alerts people about something on Twitter or in a WhatsApp group, there may be a sense of participation in something that is going on out there. Rather than being told what to do or what to think through the linear provision of information, as in the case of traditional media, pro-sumers or prod-users of digital media can join in the telling side of digital social communication.

This kind of participation through communicative activity may have a purpose ranging from personal to public, social, political or cultural, or any or all of these at once (Papacharissi, 2010). Communicative involvement is the primary motivation, intending to
perform the self anywhere at any time, on whatever mode the sender decrees. Social networking is seemed to be derived from the importance of the need to feel at once connected and in control of one’s forms of interaction and means of self-expression and, ultimately, the creative promotion of self. The other side of participation in the telling side is about the audience to whom you are telling something. As Fenton puts it, “what matters is that who is communicating what to whom because prod-usage of social media is highly uneven amongst participants and much content is dominated by a small percentage of people” (2012, p129).

The scope, scale, and space of new media is wide and large, and its speed is high. It comprises social media, online publications, blogs, streaming video, and podcasts so there is an element of freedom to choose content, interactivity and activity and empowerment to become producer and audience at the same time. New media enshrine interactivity, which incorporates two-way communication. Its popularity is also derived from the fact that it is easily processed, stored, transformed, retrieved, hyperlinked, searched for and accessed (Logan, 2010). To analyse media consumption and pro-sumption patterns it is also important to understand the capability of digital media to bring the content of traditional media into its fold.

“The internet has altered the structural relations among traditional media such as print and broadcast and unites them around the defining technologies of computer and satellite” (Carey, 1998, p34). Digital media have empowered traditional media, including newspapers, television and radio, with digital distribution of content on devices such as computers, tablets and mobile phones (Neese, 2016). Internet and the cloud have allowed the storage and processing of huge amounts of content. The content of newspapers, magazines, TV and radio can be accessed on digital devices, thus making them closer to new media.

With its various advantages, consumption of digital media, particularly by young people, has been rising in Britain, as shown by Ofcom’s Media Use and Attitudes Reports (2015, 2016, 2017). The time spent by British-Pakistani youth on digital media may not be different from other British youth.

“It is easy to find news on Twitter or online newspapers. I can easily access them on my mobile phone which is always in my pocket. More than anything it is the matter of easy access of information that makes digital media more important to us.” (Nasir, 18 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).
This statement by Nasir reflects some of the reasons for the preference of digital media by young people. This helps in understanding why and how digital media, particularly smartphones, have become a significant component of media consumption among youth. It is not only the typical function of information gathering and entertainment that is being served by digital media, but social interactions and virtual communities are also being created through technology.

While analysing the choices of British-Pakistani youth it is important to keep in mind that they live in Britain and are influenced by trends in this country. Ofcom’s 2015 Report on media consumption habits of 1,890 adults aged 16 and over reveals that the use of digital media and the internet increased significantly between 2005 and 2014, with substantial increases every year. With the increasing use of smartphones, tablets and other digital devices, people now spend more time on the internet. By the year 2014 young people aged between 16 and 24 were spending, on average, more than 27 hours a week on the internet, as compared to 10 hours in 2005.

As part of a society experiencing shifts in trends of media consumption, young British-Pakistani diaspora members may also use digital media more keenly. Social media remain among the strongest aspects of digital media, with the ability to share content massively with friends, families, peers, and public at large. This not only adds a social aspect to content consumption but also leads to exposure to the content that a media user might not otherwise be interested in.

The trend for consumption and pro-sumption of digital media was more or less similar among the participants from London and Bradford and both genders. Digital media remains cost-effective by providing news and entertainment free of cost, besides facilitating telephonic conversations through various free apps like Skype and WhatsApp. This makes digital media more popular among youth, particularly students, who do not have much money to spend on print media.

“We (students) usually don’t buy mainstream newspapers, firstly we can’t afford them, secondly there are not many news and articles of much interest to us. As far as print media is concerned, we prefer to pick up free newspapers like the Metro but mostly we access many news websites like MSN and websites of newspapers and magazines which are great source of news and articles.” (Ahsan, 20 years, male, London, Males Group, FG2).
Young British-Pakistanis, like other young people in Britain, may use digital media as their main source of information, entertainment and connectivity. Digital media may serve various functions, including those pertaining to their specific needs in terms of youth and diasporic identity. During the focus group discussions, the young people revealed that the flow of news and information from across the globe keeps them connected to people from their country of origin, including Pakistani diaspora members living in other countries, and at a broader level, even Muslim diaspora members from various regions of the world. Real-time information and connectivity may also relate to emotional aspects.

“Media particularly digital devices and television keep us so well connected to Pakistanis living outside Britain that we actually feel part of the Pakistani communities living in different parts of the world.” (Riaz, 27 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 16).

The formation of virtual communities is an important concept in diaspora studies and the construction of identities. For modern diaspora members, imagined communities, including virtual communities, may not need geographic closeness, but shared language and systems of meaning serve as means to the creation of communities (Rheingold, 1993). The concepts of imagined communities and virtual diaspora are part and parcel of the modern diaspora in a globalised world (Anderson, 1983; Braziel and Manuur, 2011, Esman, 2009). Young British-Pakistanis associate their virtual connections with culture and emotions too.

“I, at times, feel belonging to virtual communities and share so much with those who are connected to me on the Facebook. These global connections and experiences help in building up emotional and cultural association and affect our actions and personality.” (Ammar, 22 years, male, London, Males Group, FG1).

Such views of young British-Pakistanis about virtual communities, recorded during the focus group discussions, seem to endorse the views of Morley and Robins (1995) that powerful global media are responsible for the creation of a universal electronic cultural space with ever-advancing technologies that are transforming the formative processes of diasporas and creating new ways in which such phenomena are experienced. Young British-Pakistanis further revealed that blogs, websites, social media platforms and mobile phone applications, including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Viber, remain significant in their experience of media consumption. In line with UGT, they find
these applications serve different functions. Such aspects generate greater interest for
digital media as compared to traditional media. Today’s young members of the diaspora
differ significantly from earlier generations due to the development of faster communi-
cations technologies, which facilitate temporal and spatial compression. Real-time shar-
ing of events is an important factor in connectivity. This is reflected in a statement by a
Bradford based British-Pakistani female:

“My grandmother died in Pakistan, it was not possible for all of us to
travel for the funeral, but our uncles showed us on Skype the face of our
grandmother and all the proceedings of funeral. I felt as if I was there.
Back in the days it was unthinkable. If someone died and you were not
able to reach, you regretted it all your life.” (Bano, 26 years, female,
Bradford, Females Group, FG18).

As members of the diaspora, young British-Pakistanis may also feel a lack in traditional
mainstream media, which do not give space to issues and achievements of Pakistanis
and young people. Young people access media to look for material of interest to them
in a wide range of spheres. They feel that issues pertaining to them are not sufficiently
covered in newspapers, magazines TV and radio programmes, neither from the angle of
diaspora nor as youth.

“The newspapers don’t carry much material of interest to youth. Proba-
bly that is the reason the young people are switching over to online
sources. Most of the times I find news on Twitter because there you are
connected with other young people as well. There are news and other
material in the social media on the aspects of life that attract young peo-
ple.” (Ulfat 18 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

Such views were endorsed by other participants of the focus groups, who shared the
views of their peers. The majority of the young British-Pakistanis who participated in
the focus groups saw traditional print media as less responsive to their needs because
they do not give adequate space to the issues of young people.

“With broadsheet newspapers like the Telegraph and the Guardian there
is not much space for young people. I have not seen an article written by
a 16-year-old in any of these newspapers. So we find very little to relate
to. I would say social media remains the most popular because you find
young people expressing themselves more through, say, Facebook.”
(Maleeha, 19 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 10).
The human impulse to have the power to access information, entertainment and connectivity whenever and wherever young people want has made digital media, particularly smartphones, the most popular way to consume media content. Mobile technology provides the ability to act on impulse to find the content of one’s choice instantly. This capability of digital media to serve various functions more efficiently and cost-effectively may be seen as a factor in the sharp rise in the use of digital technology, particularly mobile phones.

“Unlike mainstream mass media, new media provides opportunities for active choices by such attributes as interactivity, demassification, and asynchronies, besides the most obvious characteristics like time efficiency and vast variety of content to choose from” (Carey, 1998, p34). So active choice can be another factor contributing to younger people’s preference for digital media.

The interactive nature of new media serves as a strong pull factor. “It signifies the degree to which participants in the communication process have control over and can exchange roles in their mutual discourse” (Williams, et al. 1988, p10). The five dimensions of Interactivity as pointed out by Ha and James (1998) include playfulness, choice, connectedness, information collection, and reciprocal communication.

Audiences’ activity as prod-users and pro-sumers allows them to enter the realm of production with low barriers, may provide them with a sense of empowerment and may fulfil gratification for self-expression and reflexivity. Thus, digital media become more relevant in the construction and expression of identity at the micro and meso levels, besides endorsement of macro and meta identities. The freedom of individual connectivity and joining of small or large groups on various social media platforms and apps may work as social institutions of varying scales to feed into contours of identity. The consumption, production and sharing of content with ethnic and national themes reinforce and endorse ethnic, racial, religious and national characteristics.

New media provide more flexibility to pick and choose and mix and match content from different sources, which fulfils various functions for users of digital media. For task-oriented users, the connectedness dimension fulfils information needs. For expressive users, the information collection and reciprocal communication dimensions allow them to initiate communication. For “self-indulgers” and “Web surfers,” the playfulness and choice dimensions of interactivity fulfil self-communication and entertainment needs (Ha and James, 1998). Explaining the wide-ranging functions of social media, one young British-Pakistani male said:
“Social media has become a big source of information as well as entertainment. Young people have moved far ahead with advancements in technology. In my parents’ times newspapers and television were prime sources of information. Now, younger people rely more on digital media because the stuff you generate there is more of your interest, and it is very easy to access. All I need is to take out my mobile phone from pocket.” (Danish, 19 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG7).

These views demonstrate the level of advancement, scale, scope and speed that characterises new media, which could be described as an era of hyper communication. Smartphones and computers remain the most-used devices for accessing online content. According to Ofcom Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes Report 2017, two-thirds of adults now regularly use a smartphone, particularly for activities such as watching video clips online, playing games and instant messaging. Social media have driven growth in mobile internet use in the UK. The report reveals that the mobile phone was the device adults overall said they would miss the most: 74% of 16-24s and 60% of 25-34s reported that they would miss a mobile phone the most, while 16-24s are eight times more likely to say they would miss a mobile phone more than any other device.

For young British-Pakistanis, like other people of their age group, the use of digital media, particularly smartphones, serves to gratify a number of needs. The use of mobile phones on buses, cars, and trains or in malls and restaurants is strongly linked to mobility and immediate access gratifications. Immediate access to content, sociability, entertainment, psychological reassurance, and fashion is among the major functions of smartphones identified by Leung (2000).

“On digital media we share mostly the things that other young people would do. I have friends with different backgrounds like British, Asians and Pakistanis. I have a connection with many people here and also those living outside UK.” (Ammar, 19 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

These functions indicate a deep connection of digital media with day-to-day life, where the identity as an individual and also as part of small groups such as classmates or relatives or ethnic or religious groups, shapes the particular contours of identity through sharing and reassurance. Fashions, styles and choice of food and restaurants may receive approval or rejection through digital media.
4.1.1 Activity on social media

The activity of participants on social media was gauged through a questionnaire which was circulated before the start of focus group discussions. In the section on social media a list of various social media platforms was provided, and participants were asked to check those they used and write those which were not in the list in the section labelled ‘Other’. Different social media platforms are not mutually exclusive, so most of the participants revealed using more than one. For this reason, the analysis of preferences (figures below) shows overlapping numbers, as the majority of respondents were using more than one social media platform (Tables 1 and 2).

The questionnaire helped gather data on the individual choices of each participant; these supplemented the information gathered through focus group discussion, which was more about the reasons for using various platforms. Data gathered through the questionnaire and in-depth information from focus group discussions were used for interpretation, and the analysis revealed quite substantial engagement with social media platforms. Facebook, YouTube and Instagram were most popular among both genders and the cities.

The use of various social media platforms gratified different needs. Keeping in view the aims of this study, during the focus group discussions the emphasis was given to finding out how engagement with social media interplayed with construction and expression of identity by young British-Pakistanis, both as Pakistani and Muslim diaspora members, and as youth facing different expectations in the public sphere of mainstream British society and at home, where Pakistani and Muslim cultural values dominated.

In the analysis, male-only, female-only and mixed groups were dealt with separately in the two broad categories of age groups 18-24 and 25-30 years. Quantification of aggregates of groups revealed that of 17 males in two focus groups of 18-24-year-olds in London, 14 of them used Facebook; in addition to Facebook, nine also used Twitter; 15 used YouTube and nine also used other platforms like Instagram or WhatsApp.

For the same age group in Bradford, YouTube appeared to be slightly more popular. Preferences for 16 male participants were: Facebook - 13, Twitter - six, YouTube - 16 and others two. For the age group 25-30, in London, out of 16 male participants 10 preferred YouTube and six preferred Facebook as well as YouTube, nine preferred Twitter and eight others, mostly preferring Instagram and WhatsApp. In Bradford for this age group, preferences for 16 males were: Facebook eight, Twitter five, YouTube nine and others seven.
Analysis indicates social media may gratify identity needs of young British-Pakistanis, both as youth and as diaspora members. Other facets like information and entertainment may also feed into the construction and expression of identity. During the focus group discussions it was ascertained that the use of digital media served as an agency in strengthening the South Asian as well as Muslim identity of young Pakistanis.

“If I want to listen to Desi music\(^5\), YouTube is the best source. Similarly I am also able to find lectures of my favourite religious scholars on YouTube and can listen to them as many times as I want and at the time of my choice.” (Hasan, 23 years, male, Bradford, Males Group. FG 7).

The participants revealed using Facebook for sharing their day-to-day experiences, where they contributed material and used it more actively and interactively. They used YouTube to watch already uploaded material. Hardly any of them reported running their own channel, but they found it a good source of finding Pakistani origin music, videos of touristic areas of Pakistan and religious lectures and poetry. They found media as a big source of gratifying their needs to enjoy cultural aspects of their lives particularly music and films which could be accessed through YouTube channels.

Accessing such content may help in keeping the roots of the land of their ancestors alive and connections with bigger transnational entities active. For 17 female participants of two groups in London aged 18-24, the results were not very different, as the majority of them (15) were on Facebook, 12 were using Twitter as well, 12 were using YouTube and eight reported using other platforms. In Bradford, for the same age group, the preferences of 16 female participants were 14, five, 14 and seven.

In the age group 25-30, out of 15 female participants in London, preferences were Facebook 13, Twitter four, YouTube 11 and six others. For 17 females in Bradford, the preferences were 16, two, 14 and three. Out of eight participants in the mixed group 18-24 in London, preferences were six - Facebook, three - Twitter, five - YouTube, and four - others. Out of eight mixed group participants in Bradford, the preferences were six, two, eight and three. For the age group 25-30 in the mixed group of six in London, they were four, two, six and four. In Bradford for the mixed group of nine they were eight, three, seven and three.

\(^5\) Desi Music refers to South Asian music of areas constituting Pakistan. The term is derived from the word ‘Des’ meaning homeland, and it refers to the country of origin in the context of diaspora. The term can be used to signify other things also like food, dress and overall culture.
### Table 1

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<tr>
<th>Social Media Preference</th>
<th>18-24-year-old Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>YouTube</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
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### Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Social Media Preference</th>
<th>25-30-year-old Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Lon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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By looking at the figures above it can be ascertained that Facebook appears to be one of the most popular social media platforms. The reasons given by the respondents were that Facebook helps in creating new friendships and sustaining old ones. For female participants it served as a good source of connectivity with cousins and friends.

“On Facebook I am connected with my friends which include British, Pakistanis, my cousins in Pakistan or elsewhere and my friends both Pakistani and other nationalities. The good thing about Facebook is that you instantly share text and photos.” (Ghazal, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

Besides gratifying the need for connectivity, female participants reported the usefulness of Facebook for other needs, like fashion, make-up and cooking recipes. Accessibility and affordability remain strong factors in using social media.

“Facebook is a wonderful source of connection for us. We remain connected to our friends and cousins here as well as in Pakistan and other countries. Now we don’t have to pay huge phone bills. Many of us share informative newspaper and magazine articles and video links.” (Bano, 26 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 18).

YouTube is popular due to the flexibility of watching the entertainment content of one’s own choice. Besides information and entertainment, the platform serves as a good source of religious content On Instagram everybody added their original photos. In both cities, the males of age group 25-30 were less inclined to use social media platforms.

4.1.2 Time spent on digital media

The use of digital media has propelled societies into a mode of hyper communication, the younger generation more so, by catering to the needs of information gathering, entertainment, sports, creativity, expression of identity and worldwide connectivity in a time-efficient and cost-effective manner. With this, the time spent by people on digital media has also increased. The findings of Ofcom’s ‘Media Use and Attitudes Report 2015’ suggest that, in total, the average adult spends more than 20 hours a week online, which includes time spent on the internet at work. At the same time there has been an increase in time spent away from their home, work or place of study. The average person now spends 2.5 hours every week online while on the move, which is a five-fold increase from 2005, when the figure was just 30 minutes. Meanwhile, instant messaging use has increased from 38 percent of mobile phone users in 2013 to 42 percent in 2014, driven by services such as WhatsApp and Messenger.
Similarly, British-Pakistani youth spend a substantial length of time on digital media. The analysis of information gathered from the groups who participated in this research indicates a pattern of considerable engagement with digital media. The engagement of participants was ascertained on the scale of less than 7 hour a week; 7 to 14 hours a week, 15 to 21 hours a week and more than 21 hours. This included time spent on digital media while travelling by train or bus, or while walking. Mobile phones are valued by the young people for providing this facility.

Tables 3 and 4 show the time spent on digital media by the participants of different focus groups. The charts are for age groups 18-24 and 25-30 respectively; each chart is divided according to the gender of participants and cities. In the age group 18-24, out of 17 males in London, one reported using digital media for less than 7 hours, two reported using it 7 to 14 hours a week, 12 used digital media between 15 and 21 hours and two reported spending more than 21 hours.

For females of the same age group in London, out of 17 participants, two reported using digital media less than 7 hours a week, four between 7 and 14 hours and 11 reported 15 to 21 hours. In the mixed group of eight, two reported accessing digital media for less than 7 hours a week and six reported 15 to 21 hours. The majority of the participants in this age group, both male and female, used digital media between 13 and 18 hours, the higher end of the spectrum.

Most of these participants were students and also worked part-time. They reported preferring digital media for reasons of ease and low cost of use. For them accessing and sharing information on digital media was easy. They said it was convenient and free for reading newspapers and acquiring the latest news from the websites of news channels. With the ever-increasing functions of mobile phones, data use (either actual or anticipated) is becoming an important factor when choosing mobile phone packages. Many of the participants said they would pay a little bit extra to get more data or unlimited internet and saw this as a necessity.

The participants of this study reported using computers and mobile phones daily for several hours for communications, entertainment, social media, playing video games, educational or professional matters, news and information gathering. On digital media they could get news instantly. For them, the news about Britain, Pakistan and the Islamic world constitutes a vital component of media consumption besides programmes about Islam, news about celebrities, film, music and sports was important (detailed discussion on choice of content in Chapter 5).
Table 3

Table 4
Young Christian British-Pakistani participants also said that they find digital media important. Despite their different religion, their cultural, racial and ethnic identities are the same. For religious reasons they may be using different social media groups, but their need for news and other information were more or less similar to that of other young British-Pakistanis. One of the Christian participants was of this view:

“The good thing about my smart phone is that it keeps me updated about news anywhere in the world, not only the news generated in authentic newspapers like the Guardian but also many people share exclusive news on Facebook which you don’t find in any of the newspapers and magazines. I have many friends in.” (Michael, 23 years, male, London, Males Group FG 2).

The female participants were more inclined to connect with their relatives like aunts and cousins. They may use social media to express their young identities through sharing content on fashion and lifestyle. Chatting with classmates and sharing of selfies were reported more among female participants.

In Bradford for the age group 18-24, responses for 16 male participants were that none used digital media for less than 7 hours a week. Four participants reported consuming digital media between 7 and 14 hours a week, 12 between 15 and 21 hours and none more than 21 hours. The majority of them used digital media for approximately 2 hours daily. Of the 16 female participants, five spend 7 to 14 hours on digital media, and 11 spend between 15 and 21 hours a week. Of eight mixed group participants, one reported spending less than 7 hours a week, two reported 7 to 14 hours and five 15 to 21 hours.

In Bradford, the majority of the young participants reported using digital media between 15 and 21 hours. They showed more interest in using digital platforms for cultural and social activities. For young men, it is mostly the news and connectivity with friends. Among other reasons mentioned were religious content, information on various issues shared through social media friends and groups, music and entertainment.

For the age group of 25 to 30 years, out of 16 male participants in London, nine reported using digital media between 7 and 14 hours a week and seven between 15 and 21 hours per week. Out of 15 female participants, two consumed digital media for less than 7 hours; two reported 7 to 14, reported 15 to 21 hours and five reported using digital media for more than 21 hours. In the mixed group of six participants, two reported using digital media for less than 7 hours and four reported 15 to 21 hours a week.
In this age group, female participants were using digital media more than males. The majority of males were using digital media between 7 and 14 hours, whereas the majority of females used them for 15 to 21 hours and five of them more than 21 hours. In the groups of 25-to-30-year-olds, the majority of the participants were in professions. As far as women are concerned many of them were housewives thus more time for social media. For male participants time constraint was a big factor:

“It is very important to remain connected with family and friends and gather information on important issues, but again this is also a matter of time. Job and then travelling time. The advantage of internet is that if I get seat while travelling in Tube, I can surf the internet for news and have a look at Facebook and Twitter.” (Tariq, 28 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 12).

In Bradford for the age group of 25 to 30 years, out of 16 males, nine spent less than 7 hours and seven spent 7 to 14 hours on digital media. Out of 17 females, two spent less than 7 hours; two spent 7 to 12 hours; 11 spent 15 to 21 hours and two spent more than 21 hours a week.

In the mixed group of nine participants, two utilised digital media less than 7 hours, another two between 7 and 14, and five between 15 to 21 hours a week. In Bradford as in London, males in this age group used digital media much less than females, as the majority of female participants were using digital media 15 to 21 hours.

“I have many friends on Facebook from the Pakistani community in Britain but also my friends from my class and work, with whom I mainly share things about life, some good clips or sayings and also photos of our trips to various places. I also surf the internet to find good recipes of food either on YouTube or Facebook.” (Feroza, 27 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 19).

In Pakistani family structures, male members have more responsibility in terms of earning a livelihood and shopping for the family, whereas raising children and household tasks including cooking remain the prime responsibility of women. For male participants there was less availability of time due to full-time jobs and businesses and looking after family affairs. Many women did not work or worked part-time, so they had more time available for social media platforms.
4.2 Old media: British Vs ethnic

Though digital media is significant for British-Pakistani youth, the mainstream and ethnic media also constitute an important part of their media consumption. They can access a variety of media and a wide range of messages originating from various parts of the world. Besides digital media connecting them to websites and search engines around the world, the media accessible to British-Pakistanis include British mainstream media, international news channels, ethnic media originating from Pakistan, ethnic media based in the UK, and religious channels based in the UK, Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

Before analysing the responses of participants about their preferences for British vs ethnic media, it is important to highlight a few facts:

1. The circulation of ethnic print media is negligible, and the young people born and brought up in the UK reported the constraint of not being able to read the Urdu language.

2. In the absence of any radio and TV broadcasts in English for members of the diaspora living in English-speaking countries, the BBC remained the most accessible option for the diaspora in the UK.

3. Preferences for TV channels between ethnic, British and other international media were recorded in the questionnaire and discussed in the focus groups.

4. The majority of the participants were engaged in one way or another with a variety of channels. For instance, many participants checked British media as their preference but in addition other media like ethnic (Geo, ARY, Venus, etc.) or other international media (RT, Al Jazeera, etc.), or all three.

5. More or less everyone watches British television for the news and other programmes as well, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

6. Some of them watch ethnic channels along with British channels by choice and majority because those channels are being watched by the parents or grandparents at home.

7. Exposure to other international media is through TV and digital devices.

8. Mainstream print and electronic media relate more to national and cultural identity as a group, and relate more to meso and macro levels of identity.
News, entertainment and religious channels from around the world, including mainstream channels of the UK, USA, and other Western countries and those originating from Pakistan, can be considered as some of the components of the mediascape of the youth of Pakistani heritage in the UK. Their preferences for certain kinds of media depend on the relevance of content to them and access to a particular type of media.

Language also plays an important role when it comes to print media and even television programmes. In Britain, there are many ethnic television channels available, including satellite transmissions of channels from Pakistan and some ethnic channels operating from within Britain. Several religious channels are based in the UK, including some for Shias, Sunnis, Ahmediya and Christians.

At the time of field research between 2013 and 2015, the ethnic and religious channels available in the UK consisted of Urdu TV channels originating from Pakistan, namely: Aaj, ARY, Capital, Duniya, Dawn, Geo, Samaa and Waqt, and the international channel of national television PTV Global. Urdu channels originating from the UK included Prime, Venus and religious channels for Muslims and other religions Islamic channels were further specialised for sects like Noor (Sunnī), Madni (Barelvi Sunnī), Ahle Bait (Shia), Hidayat (Shia) and MTA (Ahmmediya) and Glory (Christian). Channels in regional languages of Pakistan like KTN (in Kashmiri dialect) were also based in the UK. Radio stations from Pakistan were not listened to, but few radio stations in Urdu based in the UK had a localised audience. BBC also broadcasts TV and radio news and programmes in Urdu.

4.2.1 Electronic media

In London, all 17 males of age group 18-24 said they prefer to watch British channels; none of them preferred only ethnic media. Three participants said they watch ethnic channels as well, mainly news and religious programmes, by choice and 14 because those channels were being watched on family TV by their elders. Fifteen of them reported watching other international media like RT, Al Jazeera and CNN, either on television or on computers or mobile phones. Of 17 female participants of the same age group in London, all of them watched British media by choice. Fifteen of them watched ethnic media as well, 8 reported watching drama channels and other entertainment programmes by choice, and nine reported watching because ethnic channels were being watched at home anyway. Ten of them watched other international channels. In the mixed group of 8, all were interested in British media. All of them watched ethnic media involuntary and six watched other international channels.
Table 5

Table 6
The participants in London were more inclined towards national and international politics. Both males and females mainly relied on British media but also accessed other sources. The growing trend to use other international media can be attributed to the search for more credible sources and other perspectives, particularly about Muslims.

“When it comes to the news regarding Pakistan or Muslims we find British media biased and try to look for other sources of information which give the other side of story too.” (Baqar, 22 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

The participants were of the view that on British media mostly one point of view is projected, while it was important to know other perspectives also. For instance, many thought that RT provided an entirely different view which was sometimes more sympathetic towards Muslims and criticised the policies of the West. Such views are supported by audience research on the representation of Muslims, like that of Poole (2001), which revealed that Muslims tend to pick news which they find favourable to them.

“RT gives a point of view which differs from British media. British media tends to paint everything with the same brush whereas RT takes up issues very differently and then also there are sources on internet which provide views different than that of Western media and have a sympathetic point of view towards Muslims.” (Zeba, 19 years, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

In Bradford for the age group of 18-24, all 16 male participants preferred British media; only four of them reported watching some programmes on ethnic media by choice, and only five watched other international media in addition to British media. Out of 16 female participants in Bradford, all preferred British media, seven watched ethnic channels voluntarily and nine involuntarily, and only three accessed other international media. Out of eight mixed group participants, all preferred British media, three watched ethnic channels voluntarily, and two reported watching other international media as well.

The main interest of young participants in Bradford was either entertainment or religious channels; seeking out news from other international channels was not important. British channels remained favourites due to their understanding of the language. Young people watched sitcoms, soap operas and music programmes, if they were not indoctrinated towards religion. Otherwise, they used electronic and digital media for religious programmes as well.
Religion plays a significant role in the lives of young people of Pakistani heritage. They constantly seek out information on religion through television programmes and websites. A large number of religious television channels, both UK-based and from abroad on satellites, are important sources of information and strengthening religious identities.

The age group 25-30 in London revealed that all 16 male participants preferred British media, 6 watched ethnic media voluntarily and seven would come across them involuntarily in addition to British media particularly for news; and 13 watched other international channels as well. Of 15 female participants, all of them liked to watch British channels, 11 liked ethnic media as well and five watched other international channels. In the mixed group of six, all of them liked British media, 5 watched ethnic channels and five accessed other international media as well.

This analysis reveals that in the higher age group, more participants tend to watch ethnic media in addition to British media, but their first preference remains British media. The concerns of this age group were mostly with the politics of Pakistan and its peace and security. In London, where most of the participants were educated and were in professions-recognized as well respected by the society, there was more interest in the happenings in Pakistan.

Ahmer, a 28-year-old chartered accountant, said he was interested in the economy of Pakistan. He had elaborate knowledge of business, trade and overall economic conditions. He believed that in order to gather in-depth information on Pakistan he needs to listen to Pakistani channels and read online articles.

In Bradford in this age group, out of 16 males all 16 preferred British media, 12 watched ethnic media voluntarily and seven also watched international media. For females, all 17 preferred British media, 12 also watched ethnic channels and four reported watching other international media. Similar responses were given by the mixed group. Out of nine, all of them consumed British electronic media; three watched ethnic channels voluntarily, five involuntarily, and two also watched other international media.

These analyses reveal that the first preference for young British-Pakistanis in both age groups remains British media. They describe it as national mainstream media which is available easily 24/7 and a source of keeping them in touch with the news and happenings in their home country, but there is also some sense of lack of trust in the British media which pushes them to depend on Pakistani and other international electronic and digital media, particularly the TV channels.
Their British identity is contested by their Pakistani and Muslim identity. The result is a quest for other sources of credible information about Pakistanis and Muslims through Pakistani and Islamic channels and, in the case of Christian Pakistanis, Christian channels in the Urdu language like Glory TV. Muslims further strengthen sectarian ideas by watching channels dedicated to particular sects, like Sunni, Shia, or Ahmadiya channels.

### 4.2.2 Print media

Despite growing engagement with digital media and availability of satellite television, print media (including online versions of leading newspapers and magazines) has its own importance, as it may have a considerable role in the representation of various groups and issues and forming perceptions and public opinion. Besides the obvious presence of British and other international publications, print editions of a few ethnic papers available in the UK. Some of them are European versions of mainstream papers in Pakistan, like dailies Jang and Ausaf. Others originate from the UK, like Urdu Times, UK Times, and The Nation.

As in the case of digital and electronic media, the Uses and Gratifications approach applies in the case of print media. The newspapers may cover all walks of life and there are magazines which cover specialised topics. Free papers like Metro could be considered a big source of engagement with print media, especially for young people who travel by public transport. Ethnic print media is mostly in Urdu and covers mainly politics and some community news, even items with a political angle.

In terms of print media, consumption of ethnic media was negligible. In London, all 17 participants in the males-only group aged 18-24 preferred only British papers and magazines. Two also read ethnic and four other international print media. For females of same age group in London, out of 17 participants 15 preferred only British media, one ethnic media and none preferred international print media. In the mixed group of 8, British print media was preferred by six and two liked both British and international media.

In Bradford for the 18-24-year-old age group, out of 16 male participants, nine were interested in British print media and four in both British and international media, while three said they do not access print media at all. Of 16 female participants, six preferred only British print media and the remainder expressed no interest in any print media. Out of 8 participants in the mixed group, three expressed interest in only British media and three in both British and international media, whereas two expressed interest in none.
Table 7

Traditional Media - Print
18-24-year-old Groups

Table 8

Traditional Media - Print
25-30-year-old Groups
For the age group 25-30 in London, all 16 male participants preferred British print media. Seven were interested in other international newspapers and magazines in addition to British media and also reported occasionally accessing ethnic print media, mainly the bilingual newspapers or the free papers (half in English and half in Urdu) published in London. Out of 15 female participants, 10 preferred only British print media, four were interested in British and other international print media as well, four had access to Pakistani ethnic media and five reported not accessing any print media. Out of six participants in the mixed group, all six accessed British media, whereas two preferred British and other international media.

In Bradford for this age group, out of 16 males, 11 preferred British print media and five other and ethnic media. Of 17 female participants, eight preferred only British whereas four read both English and ethnic media and five read none. In the mixed group of nine participants, seven preferred only British print media and two British and also ethnic media.

British-Pakistani diaspora members, followers of sects and faiths other than the majority Sunni Muslims perceive a similar kind of discrimination and bias. Christian, Ahmedis and Shias have the same feelings towards British and Western media. When it comes to religious content, they prefer ethnic religious and sectarian channels. British-Pakistani youth exist on various cultural planes and in various frames of reference of identity. Their choices of types of media reflect the needs and aspirations arising due to their existence on several planes of reference. These needs determine the selection and consumption of certain types of media.

The use of particular types of media creates an impact on the construction of identity through the interpretation of messages in accordance with previous cultural and religious conditioning. As active audiences these young people interpret meanings of messages filtered through their religious, ethnic, cultural and age group affiliations, so they remain sceptical of British media in terms of objectivity towards Muslims, South-Asians and youth.

An analysis of consumption of media type by British-Pakistani youth reflects interplay with various aspects of identity at micro, meso and macro levels. In a multicultural context, the interplay of hypermedia with multiple and superfluid identity was analysed, taking into the loop various aspects of identity: Pakistani and South Asian ethnicity, British citizenship, religious inclination, age factor, gender and class in the perspective of both inherited and hybrid traits.
The consumption of different types of media depends on the access to and the content available in those media, according to needs and choice of the audience. Young British-Pakistanis use media for the gratification of their needs both as young people and as diaspora members. Their need to seek information, particularly about Muslims and Islam on the one hand and about entertainment and sports on the other remains a prime factor in determining the kind of media they would like to consume/prosume.

The majority of the respondents, irrespective of gender and city, were more inclined towards British and other international media rather than ethnic media, particularly print media. The major reason for this is the non-availability of ethnic newspapers in the English language and the young people’s lack of ability to read the Urdu language. In the case of TV channels, they would still understand Urdu, and TV channels are watched at home anyway. Listening to ethnic radio was completely non-existent.

The analysis reveals that print media were becoming less important for the young people, despite their influence in society, the reason being that online versions of newspapers and magazines are also available. British-Pakistanis may not find that ethnic print media gratify their needs. The charts above appear to reflect a preference for British newspapers, but in the light of focus group discussions, it could be inferred that this was only a preference, not necessarily reflecting the scale of consumption, because most of the participants said their engagement with print media was either with free newspapers like Metro or other mainstream newspapers in libraries.

4.3 Decoding and choices

The choices for sources or channels may depend upon how the consumers/prosumers perceive them depending on how they decode and interpret messages. The participants would prefer media depending on the gratification of needs. They preferred media in English language but regarding the news about Muslims and Pakistan they would not trust British mainstream media and decode messages as biased and unsympathetic so reject them. They may find channels like Al Jazeera and RT more sympathetic towards Muslims and prefer them for news.

Such views are supported by audience research on the representation of Muslims, like that of Poole (2001), which revealed that Muslims tend to pick news which they find favourable to them. As audience are not passive and decode and interpret messages according to their ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The participants informed that they may watch ethnic media for cultural and religious content but would not trust Pakistani channels in terms of news.
“Pakistani media may not be a credible source of information about Pakistan either. I find it filled with negative happenings in Pakistan. But generations of our parents value Pakistani media due to the extensive coverage of happenings in Pakistan and most of the time we are drawn into watching Pakistani channels as they are watched by parents or grandparents at home.” (Aamir, 21 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

As far as ethnic print media is concerned, only two Pakistani origin newspapers, publish London editions in Urdu. Daily Jang is published in Urdu, with two pages in English under the name The News. Ausaf London is an Urdu paper with two English pages under the name Asia. Three UK-based weekly newspapers, The Nation, the Urdu Times and the UK Times, are published in Urdu with only two pages in English. In addition to these papers, many free newspapers that thrive mainly on advertisements are widely circulated in London and other cities of the UK are also published in Urdu.

The majority of the young Pakistanis in Bradford, born and brought up in the UK, are not fluent in Urdu because at home they learn the Punjabi, Potohari or Kashmiri languages. They cannot read Urdu either, so there is lack of interest in ethnic media, particularly the print media. Participants expressed their concerns about this situation:

“There are no Pakistani newspapers and TV channels in English, it’s hard for us to understand Urdu. Although my mother is from Pakistan (not born in the UK but migrated after marriage) and keeps watching Pakistani channels in which I have no interest, nor do I understand them properly.” (Ali, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

Lack of understanding of Urdu language and under-representation of Pakistani diaspora, in the TV channels originating from Pakistan, were described, by the participants of the research, among the reasons for low level of their interest in ethnic media. Most of the Pakistani channels are news and current affairs channels which thrive on advertisement based on ratings. Due to compulsions of political economy, the focus of Pakistani media remains on sensational news and political talk shows, thus, ignoring production of programmes on specific needs of young members of diaspora communities.

“Even if I am able to understand a little bit of Urdu I don’t find any programmes which address issues faced by the community here. So I don’t feel very interested in ethnic channels.” (Huma, 20 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).
The tables above may reflect preferences only in terms of numbers but not the feelings and attitudes of the participants about media consumption, which is why the interpretation is supported by qualitative data. For instance, voluntary viewership of ethnic media by female participants may be due to dramas which they watch with their mothers. In the graphs, it may appear that they also watch ethnic channels, but that may be confined to gratification of one need only, and it is concerned with the micro level of identity.

British media may appear to be the preferred media, but the reason may not be the trust in British channels. It is more about accessibility and about being British citizens with a need to know about happenings in Britain and around the world. The media mix of British-Pakistani youth may be influenced by their needs and the way they decode messages.

**Summary**

This chapter presents a profile of the trend of media engagement among British-Pakistani youth in the dimensions of traditional vs new media and British vs ethnic. Uses and Gratifications Theory helps explain what kind of media is preferred by the participants of this study, as it rests on the proposition that people use media to gratify their needs and make a conscious choice according to their needs. Like other young people, the preference of British-Pakistani youth for digital media platforms involves the approach of participatory cultures and active audience. The usage of the new terms ‘prod-users’ and ‘pro-sumers’ for media users and consumers defines the new roles of active audience with the ability to produce content in the current global regime of hyper communications and hyper connectivity.

In respect to traditional vs new media, British-Pakistani youth prefer new media in terms of fast and easy access to content of their choice, ability to share content and flexibility to express their identities and raise their voice. The availability of online editions of print media and TV and radio channels is a big advantage for shifting to digital media. British-Pakistani youth are more comfortable with digital media, as they perceive them not to be hegemonic like newspapers, magazines, TV and radio.

Due to lower barriers to participation, content of digital media can be contributed by ordinary people, irrespective of age or status, and may include young people’s views. In this scenario, some superfluid aspects of their identities, which exist almost in a gaseous state in trajectories of global networks and translocal connections, crystalise on virtual platforms through association with various groups.
As far as preferences for British, ethnic and other international media are concerned, British-Pakistani youth feel more comfortable with British media although there is a whole range of ethnic channels of news, religious and entertainment content available in Britain. Their level of comfort with British media is higher, firstly because they live in Britain and want to remain abreast of the happenings in the country, and secondly because they understand the English language and culture much better.

With their Muslim identity they remain concerned about news pertaining to Muslims. For the sake of authenticity and credibility, they seek perspectives other than the ones from British media and may watch other international channels in English like Al Jazeera and RT. Due to their Pakistani heritage, young British-Pakistanis also seek out news pertaining to Pakistan and Pakistanis. They do not rely on ethnic media, to be more precise on Pakistani media, because there are none in the English language and they cannot read the Urdu language. Pakistani ethnic media in Britain, like British media, do not contain content of their choice. Viewership of ethnic media is mostly forced rather than voluntary, as these channels are watched by grandparents or parents at home.
Chapter 5. Media content: the message

The previous chapter dealt with the types of media consumed and pro-sumed by the participants of this study in terms of the channels of the message. This chapter will focus on the preference for content: the message itself. The main question asks: What motivates young British-Pakistanis to engage with the kind of content they consume and pro-sume? The chapter explores whether the quest for certain content is determined by particular needs and functions.

It also covers how engagement with certain kinds of content relates to the construction of various aspects of identity. The analysis of the previous chapter revealed that digital media has gained significance for young people in Britain, including British-Pakistanis, so engagement with the media also refers to contributions created by sharing and producing the content.

The analysis in this chapter revolves around discussions with the participants of the focus groups regarding their preferences for particular kinds of content in the light of the fulfilment of various needs and gratifications. In the interconnected world, where globalization is not only physical but also virtual, it is important to see what factors lead to acquiring and exchanging information about current affairs, politics, entertainment, education and religion, and how media consumption in all these areas relates to different kinds of interactions, including virtual, with reference to various frames of reference of diasporic and youth identity.

The questions would be discussed in the light of various approaches (Appadurai, 1996; Esman, 2009 and Tsagarousianou, 2007) that explain various dimensions of media, connectivity and virtual connectivity with particular reference to diasporas, (discussed in detail in Ch.1). The uses and gratifications theory (UGT) remains pertinent in analyzing consumption and pro-sumption of content as something well beyond the choice of channels of communications. Keeping in view the interpretation by McQuail (2010), the theory focuses on Why people use media and What they use them for. It assumes that the media consumers choose what they find gratifies their different needs, including information, education and entertainment.
5.1 News and connectivity within and outside Britain

Information is considered one of the most important needs by young British-Pakistanis according to participants of the focus groups. It covers finding out about relevant events and conditions in the immediate surroundings, society and the world. For diasporas, this need may be more elaborate as they exist in many frames of reference (Esman, 2009). Young British-Pakistani diaspora in the UK may exist on various planes of reference: British citizenship, Pakistani South-Asian ethnicity and culture at home; religion (the majority being Muslim, with few Christians); educational institutions and workplaces, as well as gender, class and personal disposition. All these frames of reference may also have transnational and virtual connectivity (Braziel and Mannur, 2011).

Thus, another frame of reference is a virtual existence beyond the geographical boundaries of the United Kingdom. In this way, events in other places connected through virtual world may also concern them. Studies have revealed a higher rate of media usage by young people in general (Kober-nagal, et al. 2011; Livingstone and Bovill, 2001) and may be even higher among diaspora youth. A survey in Denmark revealed that immigrant youth had a higher average use of news media than youth with a Danish family background (Drotner, 2011). The survey further revealed that the youth of migrant background also read more newspapers, used new digital devices much more frequently to stay informed, and were more active users of social media.

The need for gathering more information, including from the news, may be stronger due to the complexity of connectivity of the diaspora. Like young members of their diaspora in other Western countries, the British-Pakistani youth may also consume media more extensively. Besides acquiring news from television, radio and newspapers, young British-Pakistanis may also share this information on social media platforms.

As identities are multi-faceted and complex in the super complex societies of today, the consumption of media and content is also complex. In the case of British-Pakistanis, it may include British mass media, ethnic media originating from Britain and also TV channels from Pakistan, as well as Islamic TV channels based in Britain and those transmitted via satellite from other Muslim countries. The broad and complex mediascape of young British-Pakistanis is described by one participant as follows:

“You can’t imagine the scale of media consumption by me if you are not from the diaspora yourself. If you are only British, you are concerned with what is happening in Britain and, on the global scene, things with ramifications for Britain. If you are a Pakistani living in Pakistan, your
main concerns would be about Pakistan and global issues related to Pakistan. But if you are a British-Pakistani, you’ve got to be worried about both countries. In addition to that, if you happen to be a Muslim, issues of Ummah are also a matter of concern. Then, if you are young, you are also using media for reasons other young people use them. You have groups of class fellows and sports clubs and subscriptions to employment agencies, and so on. My list of reasons for using media is too long.” (Adil, 19 years male, Bradford, Males Group FG 7).

News, both national and international, pertaining to the UK, Pakistan and Muslim countries remain important for British-Pakistanis because their lives are affected by the events occurring in all these areas in numerous ways. For instance, what happens in the Muslim world concerns the British-Pakistani diasporic youth due to their religious affiliations. The events in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan, are important due to their racial and ethnic heritage. The presentations of the situation of Muslims in various contexts and their circulation on social media may have relevance for identity issues.

“TV, radio and online news are an important part of our lives. We live in Britain, so the news about what’s happening here is important to us because of our connections here but, at the same time, we also have connections to other parts of the world because of family and religious affiliations. So, news about different parts of the world also become important to keep us updated about happenings around the world, many of which can be of interest to and affect us.” (Kamran, 25 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 11).

For young British-Pakistanis acquiring and sharing news serve the function of maintaining connectivity with various frames of reference of their identity. The news about Britain is about their connection with the country and society. News about Muslims has several levels of connectivity with the Muslim community living in Britain and the virtual community of the Muslims from around the world. Most British-Pakistanis are concerned with their countries of residence and origin.

“My first and foremost concern is with the country where I live. As a British national, whatever is happening on the national scene affects me. It is also important to remain in touch with the news in the British media about Pakistan, the country of my origin, to know how we are represented here.” (Donia, 21 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).
The media, including news channels, may also be important for finding out how different communities are represented and projected through the news reports on various issues. A majority of the participants were of the view that the news plays an important role in defining their identities as Pakistanis, South-Asians and Muslims to its audience. For example, in news reports about crime, the mention of the origin of the criminals if they are from a non-white background or the projection of Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 are perceived by them as attempts to purposefully represent different communities in a bad light (detailed discussion in Chapter 6).

The news in the mainstream media has a deep relationship with their macro and meta identities, both in terms of perception by the subject group and also by others. It also leads to the consolidation of groups in solidarity or opposition, as may be the case. At the time of the field research for this study, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine and the issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were very much present in the news. Muslim countries and young Muslims, particularly men, were often in the news, regarding stories of recruitment for Jihad.

In this scenario, as in other Western media, the news and current affairs programmes in Britain also highlighted the ‘secularization’ of Muslims and, at the same time, excited the fears of other groups, giving rise to Islamophobia and criticism of the multicultural policies of Britain. The British-Pakistani youth, being predominantly Muslim, were also concerned about these issues, and so were their families.

“Spectacular events take place in the world all the time to draw our attention and many happenings directly relate to us and can have an impact on our country (Britain), the country of our heritage (Pakistan) and on the Muslim world. As Muslims and British-Pakistanis, we cannot ignore this news and, obviously, cannot live in isolation. So, it’s important to have information on current affairs through the news.” (Ahmed 26 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 16).

The young men had a great interest in national and international politics and sought more information and news on several issues. There was also a tendency among them to rely more on digital media and to counter check the news and facts. Though the authenticity of social media was in question, it was considered an influential source.

“Although I would like to know about what’s happening in Britain and the outside world, I find news in the mainstream British media very biased and not representing the Muslims and Pakistanis properly.
That’s why I have lost interest in the news on television. But on my mobile phone, I do read news circulated on WhatsApp or Facebook. I find this news more interesting and relevant as it is shared by my friends who think like me. (Ahsan, 19 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

Thus, the motivation to seek news relates to micro and meso levels of identity in the form of the need for information as an individual and as part of a group. It involves unique individual choices besides group belonging which, in turn, also feeds into the construction and expression of individual identities. Similarly, in the spiral of the interplay between media and identity, the kind of information and news consumed may feed into the strengthening, or otherwise, of the contours of identity.

The participants of the study were informed that for acquiring news they could watch TV, follow online broadcasts of TV and radio and read online versions of newspapers. Watching news on the television in the family setting would also constitute a part of their media consumption. Free newspapers, like Metro, news from the national and international media, as well as that shared on social media platforms, could also be considered to be active sources of news.

Despite the availability of news on digital media, television remains an important source of news for the British-Pakistani youth as Pakistani families still watch TV together in the evenings. Here, they also get to see the news from Pakistani channels as their parents and grandparents watch these. The study on youths of Pakistani origin in Norway by Eide et.al. (2014) shows that the usage of media by the young diaspora depends on the places where they spend their time. In the case of British-Pakistanis, while at home, they may watch Pakistani TV channels in the family setting, where parents or grandparents may be keen on Pakistani-style content.

On their own, the British-Pakistani youth may find the British media, including radio, television and newspapers, as the most accessible sources of news because of its availability and their understanding of the English language. Additionally, they may also consume alternative news sources, like RT and Aljazeera, which they consider to be more reliable with respect to the coverage of issues pertaining to Muslims. They may also share news in virtual groups with mutual interests, serving the function of connectivity. Many of the participants were of the view that the responses and comments they received about an item of news shared by them may affect aspects of their identity.
“Once, I shared a news story about the rate of unemployment among South-Asian youths. Some of my friends responded to it by saying that yes, they do discriminate and there is a bias against the recruitment of South-Asians. This led me to think of myself as being victimized because of my colour.” (Edward, 22 years, male, London, Mix Group, FG 5).

During the discussions triggered by this point, many of the participants pointed out that sometimes news can induce feelings of victimization. The participants of the focus groups informed that when they come across news about bombings of Muslims in conflict zones like the Middle East, it immediately reminds them of aggression backed by the Western countries, leading to an element of victimization in their identity.

In the case of news about any survey showing the concerns of the local population about immigrants, that may remind them of alienation in society due to their different heritage and the migration of previous generations, thus leading to an identity of belonging to a community that is not welcomed in the host country.

“The kind of news about Muslims, particularly that on television, has an impact on the lives of Muslim people everywhere in the world, and the way in which Muslims are portrayed also affects inter-community relations in the countries where we live.” (Zeba, 21 years, female, London, Mix Group, FG 5).

It is not only Muslim British-Pakistanis but also those of other faiths who feel marginalized and victimized because of the representation of Pakistan and Pakistanis in the media, because South-Asian communities have also come under criticism in the politics of race and identity. The Christian British-Pakistani participants too were concerned with the representation of Pakistan in the British media.

“Though we are Christians, here, we are seen only as Pakistanis, with a presumption that we are also Muslims. News about Pakistan and its representation in the media is a matter of great concern to all of us. We think that the way a country is depicted in the mainstream media affects the relations of its diaspora with other groups in the host country.” (Albert, 19 years, male, London, Males Group, FG1).

As the news from the print media and TV channels is also available digitally, there is also a trend of sharing it with other friends and groups. The sharing of news on social media platforms is also one of the components in the formation of imagined virtual communities.
Peter Mandaville (2001), in his book Transnational Muslim Politics, discusses the role of the digital media in the formation of the virtual community of Muslims. For young British-Pakistanis, the news, particularly about the Muslim world, may occupy an important place. They would access news about the Muslim world because they are Muslims but they also share the news with other Muslims because they think they share common aspirations as part of the Muslim Ummah. This process of sharing news involves reflexivity and reinforces the identity of belonging to the Muslim Ummah. A young female in London was of the view:

“I am a Pakistani and I am also a Muslim, so any news about Muslims in other parts of the world concerns me. The war in the Middle East and the news of the killing of young children really concerns me.” (Beena, 22 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

News and current affairs programmes are strongly related to macro and meta identity as they have the power to create perceptions at the national and at global levels. When individuals access news, they are concerned about the ethnic and national identities involved, and how they are perceived. These perceptions trickle down to meso and micro levels, i.e., to levels of smaller groups and individuals.

5.1.1 Beyond the British media

Young British-Pakistanis may seek news from sources other than the British media for various reasons, including their perceptions of credibility. One of the reasons they provided was that mainstream media follows its own agenda and carries content according to its set policies. As the model given by Hall (1973) elucidates, it is through the media, as an institutionalized cultural production system, that ‘preferred meanings’, which tend to support prevailing economic, political and social power relations, are encoded into the structure of texts, and these messages either dominate or are negotiated or rejected by the audiences as consumers.

The participants of the study held the view that the British media disseminates messages aimed at maligning Muslims and Pakistanis and lacked representation by and the voice of the diaspora. While discussing levels of trust on different channels and newspapers, the participants felt that the British and other Western media expressed bias against Muslims. In their opinion, channels like BBC and CNN carried the news that tended to build up negative perceptions of Muslims. For the reasons mentioned above, they considered Al Jazeera, Press TV and RT to be sources more sympathetic or, at least, neutral towards Muslims. believed that these channels covered more news about Muslims.
“I find Al Jazeera more credible when it comes to news about Muslims and Islam because they have better views about the issues of Muslims.”

(Javed, 26 years old male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 16).

The young British-Pakistanis who participated in the research expressed an interest in news sources other than the mainstream Western media. For instance, RT was considered to be a good source of international news and it was seen as a source that challenged the Western worldview and followed its own independent line. In their view, the Russian network covered many of the same stories as the traditional Western news media but presented it through a different lens.

Between 2015 and 2017, RT’s TV audience grew by a third, and in 2018, it became the most popular global news network on YouTube, with around 7 billion online views across its English, Spanish and Arabic language channels. This significant rise in numbers shows that RT may be seen as a source of alternative opinions, especially in digital space (RT’s Official Website, 2018).

Diasporas may rely on such alternative channels for the sake of alternative opinions or because they are the ones that they like to listen to. A study conducted in Norway in 2014 on how young Pakistani, Afghani and Tamil members of the diaspora followed the news on war and conflict in their ancestral countries revealed the frustration of participants with the coverage given by the Norwegian media about their countries of origin. They found media other than Norwegian more trustworthy. According to this study, the young Pakistani diaspora relied on Al Jazeera as one of their major news sources, seeing it as an international channel not presenting a Western perspective (Eide, et al. 2014).

Using media presenting an alternative narrative manifests a constant assessment of the credibility of the British mainstream media, on the one hand, and the repositioning of strategies concerning the access of information, on the other. As Esman (2009) points out, the divided loyalty of diasporas remains a perceived issue in the host countries, a notion that is becoming stronger. British-Pakistanis may perceive the mainstream narrative as a deliberate attempt to portray them with a question mark against their loyalty to the host country.

This introduces the role of an active audience, who may not receive the hegemonic communication as it is. While decoding, they may reject the narrative about Muslims given in the mainstream media. The need to know about them objectively may motivate young British-Pakistanis to consume content from alternative sources, including web editions of media outlets and other platforms.
There are also Christian Pakistanis residing in the UK who do not associate themselves with the Muslim world but who do associate themselves with Pakistan. For them, news about Pakistan is important for giving them awareness about the country of their heritage in general and reassuring them of the wellbeing of their relatives in Pakistan as many incidents of violence against Christians have taken place in the past few years.

“News is important for me from around the world but more so from Pakistan, where all my relatives live. We feel concerned about the state of Christians in Pakistan as a minority group. But, to be honest, we find the Western media biased in news reports and opinions even about Christians in Pakistan.” (Jenifer, 21 years, female, London, Mix Group, FG 5).

Jenifer was sharing her perception that stories about Christians where there was an element of violence and sensationalism were highlighted by the Western media, but there were no reports about the way forward. The British-Pakistani Christian participants of the study shared their perceptions of the Western media’s bias against Pakistan not only in terms of the broader context of misrepresentation of Muslims but, even them. In a mixed group discussion, the young Christian Pakistanis informed that, though they were Christians, by being Pakistanis, they had to bear the misrepresentations in the media and society as any other Pakistani would.

Regarding the news in the Western media about Christians or other minorities in Pakistan, the participants were of the view that positive news about Pakistani Christians is rarely broadcast. They are always shown in a situation of social conflict. The majority of participants agreed that there were violent incidents against Christians in Pakistan, but these were exaggerated by the Western media which tries to implicate the Pakistan government and put the entire blame on the state, which may not be the case.

“Whenever there is an incident of violence against any Christian or, for that matter, any religious minority in Pakistan, that is picked up immediately by the Western media and is usually presented, out of proportion.” (Michael, 23 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

5.1.2 News from the ethnic media and political economy

There is the presence of a transnational ethnic media of Pakistani origin in the UK. The ethnic media is of two types. First, there are TV channels based in Pakistan and watched in the UK via satellite or internet, like Geo, ARY and Duniya, etc. Then, there are Pakistani newspapers and magazines which are published in Pakistan but can be accessed online. There are also print and online London editions of the popular Pakistani
newspapers, like the Jang and Ausaf. Second, there are TV channels which are based in the UK, like Venus and Prime TV. There are also newspapers in the Urdu language which originate from the UK, like UK Times; Urdu Times and The Nation.

Ethnic news channels and newspapers hold less importance for young British-Pakistanis who have grown up in the UK, (the reasons are discussed in detail in Chapter 4). They find the Pakistani media loud, violent and more a noise than a credible source of news. Many second and third-generation young Pakistanis, particularly in Bradford, are not proficient in Urdu (the national language of Pakistan and the language of ethnic print and electronic media).

The participants of this study expressed concerns about how Pakistan was being portrayed in the ethnic media as an economically backward country, full of violence and social conflict. They referred to their personal observations during visits to the country. Most of them said that when they visited Pakistan, they had not observed the kinds of situations as were usually portrayed on the Pakistani media.

“The sad thing is that even the Pakistani media, Geo or ARY News, are full of negativity about the country. There may be many positive things happening in Pakistan, but I don’t understand why the Pakistani media picks up and shows negative things and creates negative perceptions about Pakistan.” (Hussain, 18 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

Young British-Pakistanis may be well aware of Pakistani TV channels, and some of them know about newspapers as well, but they choose not to watch Pakistani channels. Their exposure to ethnic media would be involuntary because, due to closely-knit family structures, sitting around television still is a ritual. Their parents and grandparents watch Pakistani news, current affairs programmes and talk shows, so they are bound to watch Pakistani content with the family.

For the British-Pakistani youth, the reason for not engaging voluntarily with Pakistani media is that a very large proportion of its broadcasts, in terms of news and current affairs, are dedicated to internal politics. Even the news channels at prime time are filled with political content. The Pakistani media has a certain style when reporting various issues; it is very critical of the government and of society. Most of the time, the news and programmes are not about positive events or developments, rather they cover such things as fake medicines, unclean restaurants, etc.

The political economy of the news in Pakistan is also a big factor in this regard. From its independence in 1947 until 2002, the radio and television were under the control of
the state and there was only one radio and one TV channel. During the era of the military dictator General Parvez Musharraf, liberalization of the media began in 2002, leading to a boom in private media (Gul, 2017). TV and FM radio licences were issued to various private media outlets, resulting in an increase in the number of private television channels to almost ninety, and radio channels to more than one hundred.

As Croteau and Hoynes (2006) point out, liberalization may also bring problems, and in the case of Pakistan, it brought a concentration of ownership and the fulfilment of private over public interests. Though liberalization is often known for lower prices, service expansion, and innovation, its critics accuse it of encouraging private oligopolies, where the prices, services and innovation mandates advance the agenda of oligopoly cartels and their privileged customers (Mosco, 1996).

In 2003, the government of Pakistan allowed cross-media ownership in the major newspaper groups, such as Jang, Nawa-I-Waqt, Khabrain, the Business Recorder, and the Daily Times (Riaz, 2003). This led to the emergence of media moguls. According to the International Media Support Report (2009), initially, there were three dominant media moguls who established their influence in the politics and society of Pakistan through their dominance in both the print and broadcast industries.

Now, five media giants own the leading media, creating a huge impact on the provision of information to the public. In Pakistan, media groups compete for advertisements and, somehow, get enhanced ratings from political and negative news. In addition, Pakistani TV channels do not air programmes in English nor do they produce special programmes for overseas Pakistani communities.

The use of media for news is significant in the construction of the identity of British-Pakistanis at various levels. At the global or meta-level, it’s the news about Muslims that gives them a feeling of the entire Muslim world vs everyone else. Such a portrayal of Muslims, the meta identity, makes them feel part of a global Muslim identity which is portrayed by the Western media as being terrorist. In their own perceptions, they are victimized and marginalized group, at both the meso and micro levels.

At the macro level, it poses the question of belonging to a nation. It gives rise to such questions in their minds of whether they are British Nationals in the truest sense. Why do the media refer to the identity of their heritage in all the negative news? At the meso level, this affects intercommunal relations as their identity as Muslims and Pakistanis, both with negative connotations, pushes them into more isolation rather than integrating them at the individual or micro-level.
5.2 Religious content

Religion is an important element of South-Asian societies and cultures. It is not that only Muslims give a special place to religion in their lives, but Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists may consider religion as an important component of their cultural identity. Christians living in Pakistan or abroad continue to remain connected with religious beliefs and practices. Muslims are composed of several sects: Sunni, Shia, Barelvi and Deobandi. In addition to these sects are the Ahmredis, who claim themselves to be Muslims but whom Muslims do not accept as Muslims because of their belief in another prophet after Prophet Mohammad.

The consumption of religious material is important for the Pakistani diaspora because religion is an important element of identity among young British-Pakistanis. There are many reasons for this. First of all, Pakistan is an ideological state and its inception was based on a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. It is not a theological state but religion occupies a very important place in Pakistan. The majority of Pakistan’s population (95 percent) is Muslim.

Another important reason may be that the families of early settlers from Pakistan relied on religion for conserving traditional culture and values. For them, maintaining religious values served as a defence mechanism to protect their children from the onslaught of Western culture. Similarly, Christian Pakistanis in Britain also tend to stick to religious values for the sake of preserving their traditions.

British-Pakistani youth are not a monolithic community; they have different shades of understanding, interpreting and practising Islam. One section of this group is comprised of those who are very religious-minded and whose religious content appeals to them. Others are not very religious-minded and avoid the onslaught of religious programmes. There is yet another category of those who are somewhere in between: neither extremely religious nor completely devoid of religion. They would not seek out religious content themselves but would watch religious programmes being watched by the family.

“For me, it is not important to listen to Islamic content all the time. I occasionally listen to Islamic programmes on TV, like during the month of Muharram, when there are more programmes about the sacrifices of the family of the holy prophet. Otherwise no, ……., I don’t have much time to watch religious programmes, although I am a practising Muslim.”

(Shafeeq, 27 years, male, Bradford, Males group, FG17).
Reading the Holy Quran in Arabic is considered an essential component of religious practices. British-Pakistanis may consider programmes on learning how to read the Holy Quran in Arabic, both on television and the internet, useful for the young people who wanted to learn the Quran at home. The practice of going to the mosque to learn how to read the Quran is being fast replaced by online teaching.

“These days, it is common to take lessons in learning the Holy Quran online; you don’t necessarily have to go to the mosque for religious education. There are many people from Pakistan who are teaching the Quran online”(Aneela, 18 years, female, London, Females Group, FG3).

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several religious channels and websites that operate within the UK. Many of them broadcast specific programmes for various sects and schools of thought. The majority of the religious-minded young British-Pakistanis follow Islamic preachers like Zakir Naek and listen to their lectures. Although Zakir Naek is an Indian Muslim, British-Pakistanis may find his lectures enlightening and based on moderate version of Islam. They find his style engaging and clear.

“My parents want us (siblings) to watch religious programmes as it is important to learn about our religion. These days, there are lectures on television that are very informative. It’s not only that, one can also find religious programmes on the internet.” (Duriya 18 years, female, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG10).

So, the media may gratify the need for religious knowledge as well. During the focus group discussions, the participants agreed that the diaspora finds the religious component on TV useful in several ways. There are several religious channels that, keeping in mind the young audience, also produce religious content in English. One of the reasons why young British-Pakistanis seek religious content on media is the perception of Islam as a political force. It may not necessarily be about the teachings of Islam but may be more so about what is happening in the Muslim world. The clash of civilisations, the wars between Muslims and non-Muslims, the conflict between various regions and its impact on Muslims, like the destruction of countries and creation of refugee may be reasons for interest by young Muslims.

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6 Zakir Naek is a Muslim preacher based in India who gives lecture on Islam and has following all over the world.
“I don’t like to watch music programmes. I like to see Nasheed\(^7\) (religious singing) and lectures on various topics. This makes my belief stronger.” (Nabeel, 25 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 16)

The political identity of these young Muslims is influenced by the rebound effect of the social representation and media portrayal of them. In the perspective of contextualized identities, people tend to assert their identity more when it is challenged (Weinreich and Saunderson, 2003). Young Pakistanis, the majority of them being Muslims, may also take refuge under the umbrella of a universal Muslim identity and solidarity, which they consider more powerful, at least in terms of numbers.

“I am not very religious and may not follow all rituals, I do have a sense of belonging to Muslims, which compels me to look for anything that relates to Muslims.” (Ali, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

Sectarian beliefs may play a role in media consumption and the type of content sought by the young British-Pakistanis. Followers of various sects and schools of thought within Islam, like Shia, Sunni, Deobandi and Barelvi, may be inclined to consume content on exclusively sectarian channels available in the UK, which may strengthen sectarianism and cause divisions within the diaspora settled here.

5.2.1 Sects and faiths

Thus, religious content, on the one hand, gratifies the need for knowledge about religion and enhances a sense of belonging to the Muslim nation, including its global connotations but, on the other hand, it can also create cleavages among the diaspora along the lines of sects and various schools of thought.

“It is very interesting that here in the UK, you find TV channels and websites representing nearly all the sects. These channels are also highly polarized, pushing forward the views of particular schools of thoughts.” (Naseema, 25 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 13).

The sectarian channels are impacting the identities in two ways. First, various sectarian groups have found them as a source of solidarity and a way of conserving their belief. On the other hand, they can lead to conflict between Muslims and within the Pakistani community, as well as with the religion of the host society if the programmes on these channels, instead of emphasizing interfaith harmony, highlight the differences.

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\(^7\) Singing of religious poetry particularly paying tributes to Holy Prophet Muhammad.
“When we are among other Muslims, often we indulge in heated debate about different schools of thought or a sect. As a follower of the Shia sect, sometimes I get targeted by Sunni friends, who speak against the Shia sect and quote Sunni scholars that they have listened to on a TV channel.” (Bareen, 18 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

Shia Muslims celebrate the first month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram, with great religious fervour to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussain, grandson of the Holy Prophet Mohammad, who was martyred in this month. Shia channels like Hidayat and Ahelu Ibait telecast Majalis (sermons peculiar to the martyrdom of Imam Hussain) and religious singing, Noha and Marsia (special religious singing for mourning), which narrates the story of the martyrdom. These channels telecast religious programmes particularly on Shia philosophy and other issues throughout the year. Thus, a strong sectarian identity develops at the micro and meso levels.

Through the consumption of religious content, the British-Pakistani youth associate themselves with the umbrella Muslim identity, which is political and global in nature, facilitated by the availability of Pakistani, UK-based and other international satellite channels and online platforms. It is not just the Muslim identity in the broader sense but also other layers of identity, on a comparatively narrow scale, like sectarian identity or belonging to cults and schools of thought, that also get endorsed through the consumption and sharing of content related to these subjects. Such channels gratify needs of British-Pakistani youth in terms of school of thought that they follow and help them in further consolidating feelings of solidarity among the followers of similar sects. They may also remain connected with the followers of their sect via digital media platforms. At the same time it may cause differences within the Muslim community.

5.2.1.1 Ahmediya Community

The religious identity of Ahmadis is contested in many ways. As explained above, they follow all the rituals of Islam and the same book, the Holy Quran, except for one basic principle, the finality of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him). But, due to a decree in 1973 stating that anyone who does not believe in the finality will be treated as a non-Muslim, they are not recognized as Muslims by the constitution of Pakistan. However, they themselves claim to be the Ahmadiya Muslim Community. Ahmadis moved in large numbers from Pakistan to Western countries in the late 1970s and 1980s and their spiritual head, known as Khalifa, established his headquarters in London. From here, he operates an international television channel by the name Muslim Television Ahmadiya (MTA), which is the main source for religious content for the sect.
The Ahmadiya community is characterized as being very strict in following religious rituals and for acquiring knowledge about their religion. At the same time, they also receive training in being tolerant to other religions and cultures and in showing respect to other communities. Young Pakistani Ahmadies find MTA a great source of learning.

“For me, MTA is a great source of learning as you can listen to the views of Hazoor (a title of respect for the spiritual head or Khalifa) from his mouth. It is the most authentic source of getting spiritual guidance. My beliefs get strengthened by watching programmes on MTA.” (Umair, 28 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 17).

The Ahmadiya youth also like to listen to some content from other Muslim channels, but only rarely. Their main source of inspiration and consolidation as a community is MTA. The channel also carries programmes on the development and welfare work being carried out by Ahmadiya missionaries across the world, including various schemes in African countries. These programmes help the sect to identify with a greater community internationally and to inculcate the good values of giving to society. The TV also provides a platform for the expression of their views.

“I think it is very important to contribute to the wellbeing of the people and society where you live and also where you see people in need. We have friends who do volunteer work and do charity work for the needy people here in Britain also, as this is the country which has given us protection.” (Uzma, 20 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

5.2.1.2 Christians

The majority of the Pakistani Christian diaspora moved to the UK and other Western countries for fear of prosecution in the aftermath of martial law imposed by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. This brought a drive for Islamization in Pakistan and imposed strict laws, including the colonial law of blasphemy, a legacy of the British criminal justice system during the period of colonization. The blasphemy law was used to settle other scores and it was easy to criminalize Christians by accusing them of acts of blasphemy against the Holy Quran or the Holy Prophet Mohammad.

For the Pakistani Christian diaspora, channels like Glory TV, a UK-based satellite TV, the Pakistan-based Isaac Channel, and a host of other channels from around the world, most of which are available online besides satellite, are important to maintain their Christian Pakistani identity. These channels offer programmes in Urdu and Punjabi, languages easily understood by South-Asian Christians.
“You know there are not many programmes on Christianity in Pakistan, here (in the UK) in addition to English channels dedicated to Christianity, we also have TV channels that produce programmes in Urdu and Punjabi so the majority of the South-Asian Christians can understand them, like my parents, who are not very well versed in English. They find it convenient to connect to Christians through programmes on these channels.” (Irene, 19 years, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

Isaac TV is an international channel from Pakistan, available both on satellite networks and online, teaches the gospel in English, Urdu, Punjabi and several other South-Asian languages. Glory TV, founded by a couple of Indian origin who converted from Sikhism to Christianity, caters to Christians from Pakistan and India, alike. Many Pakistani Christians also present programmes on Glory TV and find it a platform for the expression of their Christian identity. In the United Kingdom, the political identity of Christians has also become stronger. As they left Pakistan due to fear of religious prosecution, here they looked for solidarity with other Christians and to work for their rights.

“It is important to highlight issues faced by Christians in Pakistan, India and anywhere else, and these TV channels and websites have been playing an important role in projecting the problems with a greater freedom of expression.” (Michael, 23 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

The Christian channels and websites also help in encouraging the Pakistani Christian diaspora to better integrate into the society that has provided them with protection from the threat of persecution back home. The British-Pakistani Christian organization arranges charity and other events for the British communities in general, as a gesture of goodwill. The online Christian channels which are based in different countries, just like the Islamic channels, help in organizing the Christian diaspora into online communities, across the globe.

The engagement of individuals with the Christian channels and websites contributes to their identity as faithful Christians at the micro-level. At the meso level, the crystallization of South-Asian Christians as a distinct group and, further, the formation of digital communities around the globe. They may use media platforms to harness support from Western countries to put pressure on the government of Pakistan to provide more protection to Christians.
5.3 Entertainment and sports

This section deals with the consumption of media for entertainment purposes and how it helps in sustaining cultural connections. As with many other young people, music and sitcoms may be among the sources of entertainment for young British-Pakistanis. Similarly, sharing jokes and funny videos on social media platforms; playing video games, and watching movies and songs of their choice on television and YouTube are among the elements that constitute consumption of media for entertainment.

Music is considered to be an important component of entertainment and identity formation as it provides an opportunity for the expression of identity, and it can facilitate the reproduction and transformation of established social identities (Rice, 2013). This view is further endorsed by Jung (2014), who claims that music not only functions to express and maintain pre-existing identities, it also provides resources for contesting and negotiating identities and constructing new ones (Kyker, 2013; Stokes, 2004).

Besides the religious music, the traditional music and dances mainly comprise a few genres. First, there is the folk music based on local instruments and lyrics from different regions, like Bhangra from Punjab. Second, classical music which historically speaking originated in the times before the independence of Pakistan, is sung using complicated compositions called raags, and is accompanied by string instruments like the sitar, veena and a percussion instrument called the tabla. The Sufi music, popular genre in Pakistan and in the UK, is mainly based on religious messages and praise for the prophets and saints. It is called Qawwali and sung in a special way by a group of singers.

In addition to these genres, there are popular film songs and pop music (highly influenced by Western music) and these are performed by various groups in concerts and on television. Pakistanis, including the diaspora, are fond of listening to different genres of music, including folk, Sufi and pop. Singing and dancing are considered an important part of celebrations and happy occasions, such as weddings.

5.3.1 Music and hybridity

The traditional music of Pakistan has roots in the music of the sub-continent in the times before its division into two independent countries, so there are commonalities with Indian music. The folk music of this area is also referred to as desi music, and it includes Qawwali and dance music, like Bhangra. It remains popular among British-Pakistanis in traditional forms, as well as in modern versions with the fusion of Western music.
The popular Bhangra’ dance and music from Punjab (a geographical and ethnic entity existing in both India and Pakistan) gained popularity in the UK in the 1980s, not only through its performance by artists visiting from those countries but also through the performances of original genre and fusions by the artists of South-Asian heritage living in the UK. The music was shown by music channels and recorded and released by recording companies in the form of cassettes, CDs, and is now available on MP3 and MP4.

In addition to the traditional and fusion desi music, film music from Pakistan and India remains popular with the British-Pakistani diaspora. Pakistani films used to be a significant source of music until the 1970s. Numbers from feature films used to be the biggest source of popular music. During the following three decades, the industry remained sluggish. Neither movies of quality were being produced nor were there any efforts to market the films; thus, film music became almost dormant. However, Pakistani music continued to flourish through the emerging trend of live concerts of various singers and bands and the production of their albums.

Many Pakistani singers also found the huge Indian film industry as a platform and started singing for Indian movies, which are well marketed in Western countries. Through popular Indian movies, Pakistani singers gained recognition internationally, including among British-Pakistanis, who could listen to Pakistani singers via Indian entertainment channels like Star Plus and B4music, which are international entertainment channels for Indian movies and music. These channels remain popular among people who understand Urdu and Punjabi (two languages spoken both in Pakistan and India). British-Pakistanis now mostly come to know about Pakistani singers and actors by watching programmes on the Indian channels.

“I like Pakistani music and love Rahat Fateh Ali Khan\(^8\) (a Pakistani Qawwali singer) but you don’t get to see musical and entertaining programmes on Pakistani channels, not even on national television of Pakistan. This is sad, that I know about Pakistani singers from Indian movies and TV channels and YouTube rather than Pakistani channels.” (Raza 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).

For most of the young people of Pakistani heritage, music in Urdu and Punjabi, even if it comes from Indian sources, appeals to them as something of ‘their’ own heritage, irrespective of the country of production. Being a constitutive part of any culture, music

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\(^8\) Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan was a Qawwali singer of world fame who blended South-Asian classical music with modern music.
can serve as one of the resources for individual and social identity formation. “The role of music in forming social identity is further strengthened by its function to draw boundaries between groups. Music can be used as a symbolic identifier of a social group, both by the group's members but also by the non-members.” (Rice, 2013, p72).

From the discussions with the young British-Pakistanis, it could be inferred that the music also plays a role in hybridity and the mixing of ideas. It is also a source of making friendships and comfort interactions at the micro and meso levels. The appreciation of South-Asian music by the audience in host countries brings pride to the diaspora and builds up affinity between various ethnic groups. Boundaries between the Pakistani and Indian diaspora with different religious backgrounds also soften due to the shared tradition of music. Thus, the South-Asian meta identity of young British-Pakistanis gets strengthened. At the same time, we also see the hybridity of desi with Western music.

“Pakistani singers and music make me feel that we have our distinct culture, we have our own music, songs and singers, too. We (friends) discuss Pakistani singers like Aatif Aslam⁹ and try to go to his concert when he performs here” (Lubna, 18 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

This feeling of having a distinct cultural identity experienced by the British-Pakistani youth can be seen as serving to bind group members together so that they understand themselves as belonging to each other. “It helps to develop emotional social, and cognitive ties implying the construction and enactment of a social identity and a social memory where the individual and social are linked”. (Sheleman, 2006, cited in Lidskog 2017, p65) Bhangra, a genre of folk dance and music, and Qawwali, a genre of Sufi music, may be the most popular forms of Pakistani music in Western countries, not only among the Pakistani and Indian diaspora but also among the audiences of White heritage. Popular Bhangra songs are sung by bands based in the UK in fusion with Western music (Bennett, 1997).

This kind of music is very popular among the Pakistani youth, who either buy CDs or listen to music channels on television and YouTube. Music may serve as a source of positive connection with the culture of country of origin as well as with other young people including South-Asians. It gratifies their need for entertainment and social integration culturally.

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⁹ A famous Pakistani pop singer who sings both in India and Pakistan and performs the world over.
“We love to listen to Qawwalis and Bhangra. Our Indian friends also understand this music and speak and understand the same language and share traditions of music that evolved during the Mughal period. So it is very common that Indians attend concerts by Pakistani singers and vice versa. Moreover, since many Pakistani singers have started singing for Indian movies, they are popular on both sides.” (Fareeha, 27 years, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 15).

The cultural identity of British-Pakistani youth is also influenced by the globalization processes as, with the flows of ideas, people and products, hybridizations are continuously arising between cultural identities, practices and belongings (Ong, 1999; Robinson, 2013). This also applies to music, where the global spread of musical genres provides opportunities for musical hybridity, which may influence identity formation.

The fusion of folk and traditional music with Western music, rendered by Pakistani and Indian singers, may also remain popular among British-Pakistanis. As Bailey (2006) puts it, ethnic groups sometimes, instead of tracing their roots by connecting to traditional music, invent hybrid forms of music, entailing a westernisation of the repertoire. This hybridization results not only in the composition of new songs but in new performance styles (including the use of the keyboard, electric guitar, bass guitar and drums).

Digital media may play a big role in enabling access to music, art and culture. YouTube serves as a source of entertainment by providing music, movies and dramas of choice, and also in terms of flexibility of time and space. Young British-Pakistanis can access Pakistani and English, as well as Indian, songs and movies on YouTube.

On social media platforms, there is also content produced and uploaded by the diaspora itself. The participants informed us about accessing YouTube channels and Facebook pages, particularly sharing funny messages. There are groups like Pakistani Vines through which young people share jokes and funny videos. One famous video series on a YouTube channel is Diary of a Bad Man by Hamza Arshad, a satire on the habits of the diaspora living in the UK. Such habits include the overly controlling behaviour of Asian parents.

Such videos also aim at educating about moral values and the positive concepts of Islam. The participants of the focus groups expressed appreciation for the work of Hamza Arshad. Although none of them had ever produced such elaborate videos, they liked watching content produced by someone living here because it reflects many of their experiences as well.
“I like Diary of a Bad Man very much. It shows the kind of things that we experience in our homes but in a funny way. The good thing about Hamza is that he tries to highlight good values too; for instance, respect for mothers.” (Ghazal, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 3).

For young Pakistanis such content is a good source of expression of their hybrid identities and they find it a phenomenological experience where producer may have gone through situations which they can relate to as their own experiences. They may understand and enjoy humour in these videos which is based on situations peculiar to Pakistanis living in Britain.

5.3.2 Women’s engagement with Pakistani TV dramas

Young British-Pakistani women may find TV dramas a big source of entertainment. The majority of the female participants were well aware of the drama channels and drama series on ethnic channels. Urdu TV drama channel Hum (English meaning: ‘us’) was quoted by a number of female participants as their favourite ethnic channel. This is also supported by quantitative evidence which reflects that the engagement of female participants with ethnic media was higher than male participants and one of the reasons may be interest of females in Pakistani dramas.

Watching dramas is significant in adding to identity contours at micro and meso levels in terms of gender and cultural identity. British-Pakistani women find dramas a source of knowing Pakistani culture and maintaining their cultural links. Most of the young women watch dramas with their mothers. This was most common in the families where the mother came to the UK after getting married, so her ties to Pakistan were stronger. Hence, such women had more interest in Pakistani dramas which generally show the lives of common Pakistani families, including aspects like relationships between in-laws, the social exploitation of women, and family politics. Watching dramas with mothers also strengthens the ties between the female members of the family. Pakistani dramas are easily accessible as many Pakistani channels with landing rights in the UK show TV dramas.

“My father watches the news and my mother is always interested in dramas, but my sisters and I like to watch dramas sitting beside our mother. They are entertaining and realistic, and we learn much about Pakistani culture from these dramas.” (Reema, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).
Watching Pakistani dramas could be seen as a source of solace as the women’s issues are shown in a perspective different from the Western narrative. Women of Pakistani origin would feel that they were not being criticized. This could also be looked upon as a way of resistance and the preservation of connections to the values of their country of heritage. Watching Pakistani dramas also serves as point of discussion for women when they speak to their relatives and friends.

“For me, watching Pakistani dramas is like watching real life and also knowing about issues being faced by Pakistani women and other people back home. It is like very much my own life kind of thing. Most of my (Pakistani) friends in the UK and cousins back home watch these dramas and we like to discuss them also.” (Shaheen, 25 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 18).

Male participants on the other hand preferred watching British sitcoms, including satires on British-Pakistanis, like Citizen Khan. The main sources of entertainment vary based on gender and age group, and include British, American, Pakistani and Indian media comprising of radio, television, magazines, and digital media. Television is one of the biggest sources of family entertainment, and digital media is for individual.

One of the reasons for the familiarity with Pakistani entertainment programmes can be attributed to the influence of the family because, in most of the cases, one of the parents (or a spouse, in the case of married people) was not born in the UK and brought Pakistani tastes with them when they moved to Britain after getting married. The majority of the participants in the focus groups in both age categories knew the names of famous Pakistani singers and their songs.

5.4 Sports: Cricket and solidarity with Pakistan

Watching sports was also expressed as one of the reasons by the participants for consuming media. They may watch a variety of sports on television but cricket remains the most important in connection with the construction of their diasporic identities. Cricket occupies a very prominent position, not only for Pakistani but in other South-Asian and Caribbean diaspora, the result of having inherited cricket from British people as a colonial legacy. To understand the interplay of watching cricket on media with the construction of diasporic identities of young British-Pakistanis, it is important to understand what cricket means to Pakistanis.
Though the national game of Pakistan is hockey, cricket remains the most popular game for Pakistanis everywhere in the world. In a way, cricket is second to religion, with a big fandom, role models and heroes. Thus, the Pakistani diaspora abroad associates themselves deeply with cricket. Watching cricket enhances the feeling of nationalism and of a distinct Pakistani identity. Cricket reflects and also strengthens, the element of attachment to Pakistan as the country of their origin. In the case of a match between Pakistan and the host country, the diaspora supports the Pakistani team. Television, especially smart TV sets, and computers have made it possible to access matches via the internet, delivering very popular entertainment as well engendering a source of family cohesion and solidarity with Pakistan.

“Watching cricket on television when Pakistan is playing is a great feeling that I can’t explain. Born here, I think of myself as British first, but when it comes to taking sides, I will go for the Pakistani team, even if it is playing with Britain.” (Haroon, 18 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).

These feelings, expressed by a young British-Pakistani during a focus group discussion, may reflect the special position of cricket in the lives of the Pakistani diaspora. Media serves to gratify the needs of the diaspora in terms of their special connections with their country of heritage through entertainment, including through sports. The British-Pakistani youth may enjoy sports like other young people, making it one of the shared features of their youth identity with people of their age group. For them, cricket is more than a mere sport; it is, rather, a source of maintaining a positive connection to the country of their origin.

Watching cricket when Pakistan is playing is more or less a ritual whereby families and sometimes friends and relatives watch the matches together, particularly semi-finals and finals or if it is a match against India (the arch-rival). It is like a festivity or cultural ritual with the consciousness of a distinct Pakistani identity associated with it. Though playing cricket is considered to be a men’s sport by the diaspora, women watch cricket matches keenly on TV. Young women spoke about their heroes in Pakistani cricket team and their interest in watching matches.

“Whenever there are cricket matches, my sister and I watch the game on TV with our parents and brother. It is exciting and brings a lot of thrills.” (Meena, 19 years, female, London, Female Group, FG 4).
In the current era of hyper-communications, when digital media and individual consumption is becoming more important than watching television, cricket serves as a cohesive factor that brings families and friends together to watch TV collectively.

“We like to watch cricket with families and friends when Pakistan is playing. It gives us a feeling of a kind of festival or celebration.” (Javed, 19 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

For young British-Pakistanis, cricket becomes a resource for honour and fun. In Pakistan, cricket may be one of those things that unites the nation, and this trend is observed among the Pakistani diaspora in the UK as well.

“We support the Pakistani team because we have our roots in Pakistan. As Pakistanis, we own our team, and we are proud of it. We love watching cricket when the Pakistani team is playing on television or actually in a stadium, and we feel proud of it.” (Daniyal, 22 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).

British-Pakistani youth may view cricket not only as a sport to be enjoyed but also as a positive connection with Pakistan, which contributes to positive self-esteem. In their view, the media, both Western and ethnic, offer negative news from Pakistan but the achievements of Pakistan in cricket stand out as an exception.

“I take pride in Pakistan’s achievements in cricket. It’s my only positive connection with Pakistan. Many things shown on TV and carried in newspapers about Pakistan are not positive and not pleasant to remember, but cricket is something that is a matter of great pride and joy to every Pakistani.” (Hamid, 26 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 12).

Cricket, like other sports, plays a role at the micro and meso levels in terms of building the self-esteem of the Pakistani youth. When you watch your team perform well, it is a source of great pride. For young British-Pakistanis, watching sports on the media is both a reflection of their association with the mainstream youth, as well as a way to reinforce their distinct Pakistani identity. There are several views proposing that sports can also help in constituting identities that would help in social cohesion among different ethnic groups in a multicultural society.

Stephen Chan (1998) proposes that sports also acts as a bridge to help ethnic youth relate more with the mainstream cultural identity and achieve acceptance by the mainstream culture. For the young Pakistani diaspora, it is also a common point of interest to share.
with the mainstream youth. A knowledge of sports popular among other young people also helps in identifying with the groups of young people of the host country. Young British Pakistanis may connect with other popular sports like football and tennis as sports of their choice but also as trends with other young people, and to be able to discuss and associate themselves with people of their age group, considering it a way of integration with mainstream society.

“I participate in sports like cricket and football and also watch sports channels with great . Through sports, I feel connected with my fellow students and young people in my area better than anything else.”

(Abid, 19 years, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

The role of sports in integration through raising self-esteem has been highlighted by Taub and Blinde (1992) when pointing out the significance of sports in raising the self-esteem of minority groups who, otherwise, face different kinds of discrimination, stereotyping and rejection.

“When we watch sports on television, it brings excitement and happy feelings, and when we play cricket here, it brings a sense of achievement.”

(Tabish, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

The participants informed that for the British-Pakistani youth, watching cricket is not only a source of entertainment but also an expression of solidarity with their country of heritage. On the one hand, sports can be seen as a facilitator of social cohesion, while on the other, they may enhance nationalism. Scourfield et al. (2006) note that sport is often an important resource for people’s sense of national identity. It is seen as one of the few social activities where nationality comes to the fore. Involvement in cricket by watching it on the media may enhance Pakistani nationalism among young British-Pakistanis. This may be the case with other South-Asian and Caribbean diaspora, leading to a perception of conflict of loyalty for the country of origin against that of settlement.

Supporting cricket teams of countries of their origin by people of different ethnic backgrounds invokes questions about multiculturalism and the integration of migrants of different backgrounds into British society, leading to questions about their loyalty. In April 1990, the Conservative politician Norman Tebbit suggested that those immigrants who support their native countries, rather than England, at the sport of cricket were not sufficiently integrated into the United Kingdom (Modood, 2011). “The Tibet ‘cricket test’ is more a reflection of the politics of race in Britain than an indication of British Asians’ subjective sense of their own Britishness” (Anthias, 1998).
Support for cricket by Pakistani and other Asian diaspora has been a politically controversial issue on many occasions. In 2001, on the occasion of a cricket match between England and Pakistan at Edgbaston, the England players were taunted in the practice nets by young British Asian fans who greeted the Pakistani team with enthusiasm in the ground (Campbell, 2004). This event questioned tacit assumptions about British citizenship and divided loyalties.

The difference between cheering for your team and booing the opposition captured headlines because the scenes were interpreted by many as a lack of patriotism shown towards England by British Asian communities and, subsequently, were used to challenge their level of British citizenship. Such perceptions about loyalties have been confronted by many scholars on several grounds, such as being British and Asian are not mutually exclusive. “The Tibet ‘cricket test’ is more a reflection of the politics of race in Britain than an indication of British Asians’ subjective sense of their own Britishness” (Anthias, 1998).

The discussions have highlighted the role of hybridity and the imaginary home in the construction, expression and contextualization of identity. An argument by Parekh refutes allegations regarding the loyalty of diasporas based on accepting the multiple identities of the diaspora: “A multicultural society should not question the divided loyalties of people within the ‘home’ nation, as they should have the power and right to embrace dual and even multiple identifications” (Parekh, 2000, p205).

When young British-Pakistanis support the Pakistani cricket team on their tour to England, that does not mean their loyalties to Britain are questionable; it is rather the expression of ethnic bonds and attachment to symbols of national belonging passed on to them through generations. Anthias (1998) explains that diasporic identities are based on ethnic bonds revolving around the centrality of ‘origin’. The notion of origin, or common heritage in many cases, becomes central in constructing identity and solidarity.

The multiple, fractured, fluid and hybrid identities of a diaspora may oscillate between the different associations within various entities (discussed in Chapter1). Support for the Pakistani cricket team by the young British-Pakistanis can be taken as an expression of this oscillating context. Fletcher (2011) refers to the contextualized identity of a British-Pakistani supporter of the Pakistani cricket team as an expression of dual ethnicity and endorses the concept of ‘biculturalism’ given by Ballard which implies:“Diasporic communities should be conceived as being ‘cultural navigators’, able to switch between several cultural ‘codes’ without experiencing disorientation” (1994, pp 30–33).
Fletcher further endorses the explanation given by Brah (1996), that this ‘diasporic consciousness’, as expressed through cricket, may be understood as reflecting a ‘homing desire’; that is, an identity rooted in the history of a geographic origin rather than a desire to return to a ‘homeland’. This balancing act is frequently understood in terms of being ‘caught between cultures’. Fletcher explains this state through the example of a young British-Pakistani, “We (British Asians) may embrace Englishness, wear the national team shirt with pride, paint the cross of St George on our cheek but when we attend cricket or football games and hear chants such as ‘I’d rather be a Paki than a Turk’, witness mass Nazi salutes, are spat on, and, at worst, are assaulted, it tends to make it difficult to cheer England, the country of our birth” (2011, p627).

Criticism of supporting the team of a country of origin demonstrates, as Fletcher asserts, a lack of sensitivity to the concepts of diaspora, hybridity and multiple identities. By implication, British Asians are expected to identify as either British or Asian which, however, represents an essentialist interpretation of both ‘Asianness’ and ‘Britishness’. For many British-Pakistanis, to support England and to be British depends on their experience of racism and wider marginalization that deters them from identifying with the England team. Young British-Pakistanis may gratify their needs for integration and social integration through involvement in sport, both by accessing it through the media and playing sport in real life, which may help in integration through raising self-esteem.

**5.5 Socialization**

Another need that may be gratified through media is that of socialization, for which digital media serves as an instrument. The participants of this research shared the experience of social interactions and connectivity through features peculiar to digital media, including multi-directional and multi-level interactivity, as well as instant and real-time connectivity. In the context of ultra-complex societies and cultures emerging in the wake of globalization, both physical and virtual consumption of digital media has added a new dimension to diasporic identities through hyper-communication.

The British-Pakistani youth form and maintain multi-stranded social relations that link together their society of origin and settlement. These are facilitated through various processes; for example, as Dayan and Katz (1992) point out, the transmission of events live as they happen. Thus, the possibilities of “contemporaneity and synchronicity, a convergence that enables ‘coexistence’ and ‘experiencing together’, by dispersed populations” (Tsagarousianou, 2004, p62).
“Whenever there is an important event in the family back home and we cannot go there physically, our relatives show us the videos and pictures instantly via mobile phones, and we can make video calls. It’s just like being there. A good way to share moments of joy and grief. We feel like part of our extended families back home.” (Junaid, 27 years, male, London, Males Group, FG12).

This social interaction is not limited to individuals and families at the micro and meso levels of identity but it expands to broader and higher levels of ethnicity, race and religion. Through social media platforms, groups are formed in which you may not personally know the participants but they become your new friends in the virtual communities and virtual spaces.

A complex interaction of media and diaspora communities, including the younger generations, as elucidated by Tsagarousianou (2007), is evident from the fact that in the quest to maintain identities, the ethnic communities try to seek information from the ethnic and other international media, in addition to the media of the country of their residence, thus living in the plane of transnationalism, a concept which stresses continuing forms of connections through social relationships and other factors, and the impact of distant social fields upon each other. For the British-Pakistani youth, Pakistan and the Muslim world, besides Britain may be important in the broad mediascape.

“The social media platforms are very useful for me firstly to remain connected with my class fellows and other friends, but also with a larger scape of friendship, with other young people, including Muslims, who share views on several matters that are of interest to me.” (Abrar, 21 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

The reasons for consuming the media are multiple for the British-Pakistani youth, and they traverse various aspects of identity formation. During the focus group discussions, most of the young people of Pakistani heritage expressed the advantages of having social media in their lives. Social networking sites have had a phenomenal impact on the social interactions of individuals and groups, particularly the younger generations. Information technologies have a deep influence on the diaspora communities as the internet has enabled diasporas to maintain instantaneous and inexpensive communication with families and friends and business associates in their homelands. Now, they have immediate access to net editions of newspapers and journals, enabling them to follow social, political and sports events back home. Thus, they can experience transnational existence.
“My connection with friends, including my relatives, in other countries is very active; either through Facebook or WhatsApp groups, I find some information on a daily basis. Particularly, Facebook gives a good general view of what’s happening in Pakistan and the Muslim world, and in the extended families.” (Khaula, 27 years, Bradford, Mixed Group FG 20).

The British-Pakistani youth may use media for social interactions, including forming and maintaining friendships; for acquiring and sharing news and information; accessing religious content and for their entertainment. The circles may include friends at school, college, university and work and also relatives from their country of origin. The availability of a vast array of choices allows the youth to choose the platform, like Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, that best fits their needs and preferences (as discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Chats with friends on Facebook and WhatsApp were reported as popular platforms by both genders. Facebook was reported by the participants as having the advantage of allowing more elaborate interactions with more emphasis on pictures and a better space to express one’s feelings and emotions.

“I find Facebook an easy and interesting way to remain connected to my relatives and friends and, at the same time, to know what’s going on in the lives of other acquaintances, without even writing to them directly. A lot of information can be found quickly by looking at their Facebook pages and photos and comments posted on their timelines.” (Afshan, 20 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

An analysis of gratifications met by Facebook conducted by Hasse and Young (2014) revealed six key dimensions, which include: pastimes, affection, fashion, sharing problems, sociability, and social information. The authors’ comparative analysis revealed that Facebook is about having fun and knowing about the social activities occurring in one’s social network, whereas instant messaging is geared more toward relationship maintenance and development.

In the focus group discussions for this research, both genders explained how they found Facebook a better platform for branding themselves in the way they wanted to be and to showcase gainful activities in life: the moments of joy and grief and anything they may like from day-to-day activities. Many of the participants informed us that the content shared on social media takes on social authority, one of the most powerful endorsements possible.
Cost-effectiveness is another factor that makes digital media and social media platforms important tools of connectivity between diasporas and their relatives and friends, as well as to broader community networks, including the ones scattered around the globe and which are converged through such platforms. These interactions may not be restricted only to finding out about the wellbeing of relatives but may also be used to discuss a whole range of day-to-day issues.

“WhatsApp, Skype and Viber help a lot in maintaining connectivity overseas as you don’t have to pay an extra cost, which was normally the case when my parents used to call back home using phone cards. If my family had not been using Skype, it would not have been possible to talk to our relatives that often.” (Nida, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG3).

Women were found to be more comfortable connecting with relatives back home and maintaining relations. Male participants, on the other hand, reported feeling uncomfortable while talking to relatives on Skype, Viber or WhatsApp. When we talk about the youth of Pakistani descent, connectivity through social media platforms serves to strengthen their Pakistani identity. The circulation of religious messages on Facebook and WhatsApp also strengthens religious identity.

WhatsApp and Facebook groups may help in developing an affinity with people holding similar views. Interactions on social media lead to the formation of virtual communities by providing platforms of expression, construction and recognition of identities. Members can express themselves by designing their profile page to reflect their personality and can share their interests with other like-minded members by joining groups.

The concept of the digital diaspora by Esman refers to “diasporas that are organized and sustained through the internet, fostering cyber-communities among individuals of the same ethnic provenance who happen to be scattered geographically” (2009, p20). Digital diaspora communities can sustain solidarity among their participants, facilitate dialogue, identify areas of agreement and discord, and make it possible for them to interact with their homeland, its government and society in a coordinated way. According to Arnett (2007), socializing through the media differs from socializing through school, the community, the family, and other social situations. This proposition may hold true in the case of religious ceremonies, sports and political events or live broadcasts, in which diasporas may feel they are active members of those activities.
5.6 Content consumption: gender and city

The content consumption patterns can also be analysed based on gender and city. There is a wide range of content available to media consumers, particularly with the ever-increasing use of digital media. But here, the focus will be on only a few elements that were deemed pertinent to the identity issues of British-Pakistanis in the context of multicultural Britain. The aim was to find out that what were their needs regarding the content, and how they were satisfied. It was also limited to what the participants were ready to discuss. The analysis includes news, entertainment, sports, religion and socialization.

Table 9

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<tr>
<th>Type of Content</th>
<th>Male London</th>
<th>Female London</th>
<th>Male Bradford</th>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Content</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
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<td>Sports</td>
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<td>Socialization</td>
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Table 10

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<th>Type of Content</th>
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<th>Male Bradford</th>
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<td>Religious Content</td>
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The pattern of consumption of content does not reveal striking differences in terms of cities and gender except for few things. News and information may be among the top priorities of all the participants but ranks highest among the male participants from London, in both the age groups. The male participants’ preference for news in both groups was more than female participants.

Except for males in London in both the age groups consumption of religious content appears consistent for all other groups in both the cities Whereas social interaction appears high among the female participants of both the cities in both the age groups and so is entertainment. Dramas and music can be attributed to bigger blocks on bar charts.

The female participants in both the cities and in both the age groups had a greater preference for entertainment. During the focus group discussions, the female participants expressed an interest in Pakistani dramas. Sports, especially cricket, occupied a significant space for males. And in this category, the numbers were higher in London. The need for socialization and social integration was more or less similar in all the categories. Religious content was more preferred by the groups in Bradford, with the highest rate being among the women of the age category 18-24.

**Summary**

The media consumption and scope of content used by the British-Pakistani diaspora youth has a wide spectrum. The availability and access to different media and choice of content help meet the various needs of young British-Pakistanis in terms of the different aspects of their multiple identities in a multicultural society. Their needs of seeking information, news, religious content, entertainment and socialization remain pivotal in determining patterns of consumption in terms of content.

As a diaspora, they exist in an ultra-complex cultural and social environment, where they have exposure and access to a wide range of media and gadgets in an era of hyper-communications in terms of speed, scale, scope and space. As a majority of the Pakistani young people live in families, they may watch the content of their choice in an individual capacity. However, in the family situation, they tend to watch television, including ethnic channels from Pakistan as well as those originating in the UK.

Information and news pertaining to Muslims and Pakistan remain a matter of great concern to the British-Pakistani youth. The use of the media for news is significant in the construction of the identity of British-Pakistanis at various levels. At the global level, it is the news about Muslims that gives them a feeling of the entire Muslim world vs
everyone else, especially in the context of Islamophobia. Religious content fulfils the need of seeking knowledge about religion, both as a faith and as a political force, and helps in sustaining their religious identities.

The political economy of the news and media also plays a role in providing a particular kind of content in various media outlets. The participants of the study revealed that they did not trust the British media regarding news about Pakistan and Muslims, and prefer to look to other international outlets, like Al Jazeera and RT. They did not trust the Pakistani ethnic media either and found it showing only the negative side of Pakistan.

Programmes on learning how to read the Holy Quran in Arabic, both on the television and internet, are seen as being very useful for young people who want to learn the Quran at home. The Christian Pakistani diaspora youth also had access to Christian television channels and websites for study of the Bible. The Pakistani diaspora is further divided into several religions, sects and schools of thought. There are media outlets to cater for the sectarian needs of these groups, which may cause conflict within the diaspora.

The participants ranked consumption of media for sports. The participants informed that cricket creates a positive connection with their country of origin and may strengthen their solidarity with Pakistan. Sports can play a significant role in building self-esteem when watching your team perform well. The involvement in popular sports helps in identifying with other young people in the host society.

In the politics of multiculturalism in Britain, support for the Pakistani cricket team against a British team may raise doubts over their loyalty toward the host country. This allegation has been contradicted by scholars based on it being a contextualized expression of identity and the ability of diasporas to be loyal to both the country of residence and that of their origin.

Social interactions and connectivity through digital media may have a strong influence on the formation of the diasporic identity of young British-Pakistanis. The inherent advantage of digital media in providing a real-time experience of events and multi-directional interactions may lead to virtual communities which, on the one hand, build strong connections with entities outside of the geographical boundaries of the host countries and, on the other, may lead to hybridity with the cultures being transmitted through virtual spaces.
Chapter 6. Representation and perceptions

This chapter focuses on the analysis of perceptions of British-Pakistani youth about their representation in the mainstream media in the context of the interplay of media consumption and the construction of identity. Concerning the question of how young Pakistanis in the UK perceive dominant representations of their community and themselves, this chapter explores the way media narratives can shape representation of any group, which may affect perceptions about the identity of that group in the society, in this case, the British-Pakistani diaspora.

The question is discussed in light of the meta perspective of identity, i.e. the view from the prevailing dominant perception in the society of how others may look at you (Sanderson and O’Kane, 2005). It analyses the impact of meta perceptions of identity at the micro, meso and macro levels, which are individual, group and national identities.

The chapter explores how social representation relates to the construction of identity at various levels and the implications it may have for interactions of communities in a multicultural society. It analysis the significance of media in the social construction of identity concerning issues of representation, misrepresentation, underrepresentation, stereotyping and framing.

Media may have the power to construct representation through narratives, which lead to the creation of perceptions. The chapter discusses how and why certain narratives may proliferate and become an agency for creating perceptions about ethnic, racial or religious groups. Questions like ‘whose’ narrative dominates and ‘why’, have been dealt with in light of notions of ‘voice,’ particularly with reference to the works of Couldry and Spivak concerning hegemony of mainstream British media.

The main themes pertinent to this topic are narrative, representation and perceptions in context of historical socio-economic positioning of Pakistani diaspora and rise of term ‘Paki’ connoting inferiority in terms of class and unequal power relations. This representation exist at local level in the UK. There is a pan-Western representation of Muslims as extremists and terrorists, which includes incompatibility of Muslims with the value system of Britain and threats of proliferation of Islam and the Muslim population outnumbering the indigenous population.
The status of women and minority religions in Muslim societies like Pakistan were among the factors seen to be incompatible with the liberal values of Western societies. The role of media in presenting them in a certain manner was also a pertinent theme to explore. Issues of dress codes of Muslim women and killings in the name of honour are usually over-represented and create stereotypes about Muslims leading to misperceptions in the mainstream society. In the nexus of media and identity of ethnic minorities representation plays a key role in creating perceptions and construction of identity.

6.1 Representation in media and dominant perceptions

“Media representation refers to the ways in which the media portrays particular groups, communities, experiences, ideas, or topics from a particular ideological or value perspective and this phenomenon is interconnected with social representations which constitute a network of collective beliefs, practices, values, ideas of groups.” (Moscovici 2000, p153). Representation particularly through media can play a significant role in creating perceptions about different entities including diaspora communities. Before going into a detailed discussion, a look at the statement by one of the participants may be pertinent.

“Why is it that every time a South-Asian or a Muslim (even one born and brought up in Britain) is involved in a crime, British media mention the heritage, the religion, the country of origin, and when a British-Pakistani like boxer Aamir Khan wins a gold medal, he is only referred to as British? The news and programmes on ‘us’ (the Muslims) in the mainstream media often associate us with terrorism, crime and backwardness. As a result, if anything bad happens people start to look at Muslims or Pakistanis with distrust. I and many of my Pakistani friends have personally experienced the anger of White people towards us after incidences such as the murder of army drummer Lee Rigby.” (Bilal, 18 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

These views of a young student of Pakistani heritage reflect his concerns about the representation of British-Pakistani young people in the British mainstream media. This is an example of views expressed by many participants of this study during focus group discussions and interviews.

Manovich (2001) states that everything appearing in media is a representation of something. It is a construction of people, events and ideas. Representation in mainstream media may lead to popular perceptions about members of the British-Pakistani diaspora.
Despite the proliferation of digital media and the presence of ethnic media, the mainstream newspapers, television and radio channels still retain the power to build up narratives and create perceptions about various groups and issues.

It is important to bear in mind that not only the words but also the images and headlines of British newspapers play a significant role in representing ‘others’ and subsequently construction of peculiar narratives through the media. Herbert (2005) in his book *Media Audiences* highlights that the British media, through the use of powerful headlines, overly influence its mainstream British audiences on many critical issues.

“The headlines of British newspapers are worded in such a way that it always creates an impression of Pakistanis and Muslims being on the wrong side: for instance, in the event of a robbery by a Pakistani in Tooting, the headline would be ‘Pakistani thief robs the shop’; if it were a White British, you may find something like ‘Shop looted in Tooting’. I think headlines count a lot. Most impressions of people are formed by looking at headlines, so, naturally, the narratives about Pakistanis and Muslims are not realistic. They are biased against us” (Zubair, 28 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 12).

Identities are mobilised and to a significant extent shaped by interaction with media and communications as tools for learning to be citizens and as reminders of the limitations and boundaries of citizenship and belonging (Stevenson, 2002; Couldry, 2012). This relates to the understanding of social groups, and media have a role to play as a social institution in how social groups understand themselves and are understood by others. Ethnic minorities often experience underrepresentation or misrepresentation as they are rarely represented in media or are depicted stereotypically. Georgiou points out that “media doesn’t simply reflect or mirror ‘reality’, but media representations serve to ‘represent’ or to actually create a new reality” (2014, p86).

In the context of British-Pakistani youth, it is important to trace roots of representation and narrative about South-Asians, Muslims and particularly Pakistanis because distinct Pakistani identity overlaps first with geographical and cultural belonging to the region of South Asia. Secondly, the majority of Pakistanis, being Muslims, share the religious identity of Muslims under the umbrella of Muslim nationhood, which may be referred to as a kind of Muslim political-religious identity (generally recognised as Ummah). The third reason is being youth. Narratives and perceptions of these elements of identity remain highly relevant for the construction of the identity of British-Pakistani youth.
6.1.1 Local narrative of inferior Pakis

Various narratives about British-Pakistanis run in parallel with their identities as South-Asians, Muslims and youth. In this section perceptions about their South-Asian background are discussed. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the narrative of the supremacy of White men over people of colour is embedded in the history of colonisation, having a connection with power relations in racial and ethnic terms.

The narrative of the superiority of the White race over the colonised nations of colour was constructed and remained prevalent through literature and media during the era of colonisation and continued in the postcolonial period. It is combined with the factor of class, as the migrants in the postcolonial era were mainly from the labour class and thus of low socioeconomic status. In Hall’s view, class remains the main locator of social position, which organises our understanding of the main grid and group relations between social groups. “They provided the codes through which we understood each others’ languages” (1991, p67).

In the postcolonial period, people from former colonies were represented peculiarly through social discourse. According to Kabir (2007), in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the British media (at that time mainly comprised of newspapers, radio and then television, as digital media were not prevalent during those decades) took every opportunity to express mainstream British superiority in the divide between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’.

As discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2, representation of factors such as colonial relationship and the class of migrant workers that came from South Asia led to a perception about Pakistanis and working-class people from other countries of South Asia, which was expressed through just one word: ‘Paki’, a derogatory racist term to represent migrants belonging to the low socioeconomic working class who remained unintegrated in the mainstream society and associated with conflict and unpleasantness. “The term ‘Paki’ reiterates an inferiorised collective subject through individual Asians” (Brah, 1996, p20).

“I grew up facing the ‘Paki’ label, a derogatory term which was used by White children in the classroom and on streets to bully Pakistanis and to express hatred towards us. I fail to understand the fact that I was born and brought up in Britain and consider myself British first then why I was being given this constant reminder of being someone not British”.

(Shazia, 28 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 18).
This statement reflects that how at the local level in Britain, members of the British-Pakistani diaspora were perceived and reminded of an identity that was not British, and at the same time belonging to a group that was inferior to real British people: the White and Christians.

This power- and class-based narrative continued in the following decades. In a study of 2,700 British newspaper articles on ethnic issues written in the period 1985-86, Van Dijk (1991) analyses the impact of unequal power relations on society (reduced power relations associated with ethnicity), media content, audience attitudes and beliefs. The study explained how ‘White-in groups’ members expressed and communicated their ethnic and racial attitudes within the group which radiated into the wider society through media. He noted that even some newspaper editorials conformed to the right-wing ideology about ethnic issues.

An example of analysis of an editorial published in the Mail newspaper (28 November 1985) identifies certain themes which according to Van Dijk emerged not only from the editorial but are also implicit in a sizeable proportion of media content. Firstly, the editorial presupposes, “We (British) are hospitable and tolerant” and secondly the editorial employs several euphemisms when applied to how we should deal with immigrants. “We the tolerant and hospitable British must be brisk, ‘in saying no,’ ‘in showing the door’” (Van Dijk, 1991, 176-7, cited in Devereux 2003, p130).

As young British-Pakistanis decode these messages, they perceive them as attempts to represent an identity of Pakistanis that is not only inferior in class but associated with bad things in society. This projected identity creates a meta identity of Pakistanis at the local level in Britain which may lead to troubled social relations. As media serves to create new realities, race relations and multiculturalism are affected by the representation of cultures and ethnicities. The identities of cultural groups represented by media tend to create actions and reactions from micro to macro level.

“It’s not only ‘us’ who are school dropouts, many White people living in poverty experience the same thing. It has to do with social policy but somehow ‘we’ are seen as the only ones not ready to change” (Meera, 19 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

By being selective about stories, media can project communities in certain ways leading to particular types of perceptions and stereotypes about them. In Britain, the Pakistani community is usually associated with traits such as backwardness, low education, suppression of women, and economic identities such as labour class, taxi drivers and
shopkeepers. During the focus group discussions, the young British-Pakistanis shared the feeling that somehow they are expected to behave in a particular way, according to an established image of identity of the Pakistani community perpetuated by the media.

“I don’t know why the representation of Pakistanis is fixed on traits which are not very well respected in the society. Pakistanis are always portrayed in media as the people who came here for economic gains, but never presented as those who also helped build up the British economy in the post-World War II period” (Javeria, 29 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 14).

The meta identity of diasporas may be constructed through misrepresentations at various levels, covering even the cities of residence and countries of origin. These are not only people but also places that are stigmatised by the media. For instance, cities like Bradford and Birmingham, where early Pakistani migrants had settled, are portrayed by the media as underachievers and backward. Pakistan as a country is shown in the light of terrorism. According to Sajjad, manager of a community centre in Bradford:

“You have seen Bradford. It is not as bad as portrayed by the media. Just go to the city centre and you will find people from diverse backgrounds out there. The University of Bradford offers one of the world’s best programmes in management and a large number of Chinese and Japanese students come here to study, but somehow the city bears a bad reputation. We tried to make a documentary about Bradford to show the real face of the city to people, but that was discouraged” (Sajjad, 40 years, male, Manager Community Centre, interviewed in Bradford on 12th May 2014).

Another theme that came up in discussions was young British-Pakistanis’ concern about how the country of their origin was represented in British media. Most of the participants were of the view that showing only negative news and images from Pakistan endorses and strengthens negative stereotypes about the Pakistani diaspora as well.

“Media have a big role in creating misperceptions about Pakistan. The country is not as poor or insecure as the media show. They never show how developed and cultured cities like Karachi and Lahore are. We never get to see the rich culture and diversity of Pakistan. The only thing we see about Pakistan is its association with terrorism and incidences of bomb blasts” (Mansoor, 25 years, male, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 20).
“Media representations may dictate how audiences perceive an issue, even though this may contradict ‘informed’ opinion and observations based on personal experience” (Eldridge et al.199, p163). The participants of the research perceived negative bias in print, electronic and online Western media, including that of Britain, at various levels. It is Pakistan as a country: its people, its government policies, its army, its society and culture, and the Pakistani community in the UK were all being targeted in different ways.

“I listen to British radio stations and watch British television. What I find most of the time is that any negative news where a Pakistani or Muslim is involved is repeated time and again. The images and terminology used in those news reports can ignite hatred among the people of the host society. The same is with newspapers. Any time there is a bomb blast in Pakistan it is on the front page. That makes people think that Pakistan is only about terrorism, bomb blasts, harnessing of terrorists and nothing more. Pakistan behind bombs and smoke is not visible even through Pakistani media” (Suhail, 26 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 11).

News about Pakistan, South Asia and the Muslim world remains a matter of great interest to British-Pakistani youth, which they gather from various media sources. For them, negative news about Pakistan from British and other Western media contributes to creating negative perceptions about the identity of Pakistan and its people, including people of Pakistani origin settled in other countries.

British-Pakistani youth in this age of hyper-communication rely on several sources for gathering news and information on the areas of their concern. They perceive news and views about Pakistan and Muslims emanating from British and other Western media as a deliberate attempt to malign the identity of Muslims, with effects on multiculturalism.

6.1.2 Pan-Western perceptions of extremist Muslims

The perceptions built through representation in British media may prevail in Britain and may also contribute to international perceptions due to the global outreach and influence of British media. The news and analysis carried by the British media are quoted in various publications around the world. For the young British-Pakistanis, religion is an important aspect of their identity. The majority of them being Muslims, the role of religion in defining their meta identity by others, and construction and expression of identity at the micro, meso and macro levels, has become more important.
By the turn of the century, due to the emergence of Islamophobia after 9/11, Western media unleashed a narrative about Islam that led to the labelling of Muslims as terrorists. For British-Pakistanis this has been in addition to the narrative of the inferior and mal-adjusted Pakis. The notion of ‘terrorism’ has been associated with Pakistanis for being Muslims since 9/11, although none of the men involved in the incident was Pakistani.

“After 9/11, being Muslim is more of a problem than being a Pakistani. Concerning your Pakistani identity, people might look down upon you as backward, low achievers and not a well-integrated group, but as a Muslim, you have to face the situation where you are perceived as a security risk to the society” (Wadood, 27 years old, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 16).

Just like ‘Paki,’ a single term representing all South-Asians as coloured, working-class, backward migrants with problems of integration, the word ‘terrorist’ emerged as a blanket term to represent ‘Muslims’ and securitisation of Muslims in the Western countries, including Great Britain. The words ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ became derogatory terms associated in many ways with ‘problem’ and ‘threat’.

The ‘Paki’ representation was innate and local to Britain and referred to South-Asians only, whereas ‘Muslim terrorists’ emerged all over the West simultaneously, including the British Isles, Continental Europe and the United States of America. This global representation appeared to take into its fold Muslims all over the world, irrespective of their origin. The significant increase in discrimination can be related to the worldwide politicisation of Islam (Richardson, 1999). Researchers like Modood et al. (1997) point out that multiculturalism focused on biological racism rather than cultural differentialism ignores this religious dimension.

In his book Covering Islam, Said (1997) observed that despite many troubling incidences associated with the Muslim world, when the Western mass media apply a blanket label of ‘Islam’ to an event it is a form of attack against the Islamic world. Portraying all Muslims as fundamentalists in the media might lead to an image that is generally recognised and accepted.

“First it was racism based on our colour and social status. We were seen as ‘Pakis’, the uneducated labour class. Now added to our colour and class is our religion, as media show Islam and Muslims as a problem. Even on social media, you find Muslims shown as something to be afraid of” (Seema, 27 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 19).
The situation for Pakistani Muslims further deteriorated with the London bomb blasts in July 2005, in which a Pakistani was involved. The participants of focus group discussions were of the view that the news and other programmes deliberately and repeatedly show images that portray Muslims as barbaric and enemies of White people.

“When drummer Lee Rigby was assassinated by a Black man, who claimed himself a Muslim, the media continued to show him holding a blood-soaked knife in his hand shouting ‘Allah O Akbar,’ which invoked hatred of people towards Muslims. Although Rigby was not assassinated by a Pakistani, the very next day my friend and I were passing through a park and a White man was sitting on a bench and he shouted using the ‘F-word’, ‘oh you F…….* Pakis, killers of Rigby’. We just walked away. For a few weeks, I heard of many such incidents experienced by my friends” (Ammar, 19 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

Pakistanis, whether they are Muslims or not, are perceived as Muslims. Any kind of representation about Islam and any narrative built on that affect every Pakistani living in the UK. The effects of media representation have been perceived to promote negative and limited portrayals that deny diversity within ethnic minorities while promoting the belief in Whiteness as the norm and a unitary identity (Dyer, 1988; Gabriel, 2000).

The concept of Muslim Ummah (nationhood) is important in this scenario. On the one hand, the non-Muslim host societies see Muslim nationhood as an easy way of defining Muslims from different countries as part of one monolithic group. On the other hand, Castells (1997) points out that only in the Ummah can the individual feel fully himself/herself, as part of the fraternity of believers, a basic equalising mechanism that provides mutual support, solidarity, and shared meanings.

Representation of Muslims in the mainstream media suggests a single, homogenous Muslim community in Britain, fundamentally positioned as ‘other.’ It does not reflect the multi-layered and varied ways in which British Muslims may construct hybrid and bicultural identities. Europeans have for many decades treated all Muslims as a homogenous group and seen them as the “other” and the “exotic” (Said, 1978) but since 9/11 they are also seen as a security threat. In this way followers of one religion, irrespective of their other traits, become an identity group. After 9/11, Islam entered a new era of presentation by the media.
These questions were discussed with the participants of focus groups, who pointed out how due to representation of Muslims in a particular way they suffered from problems of perception caused by stereotyping of Muslims. Through various kinds of media representations, the audience can be variously incited to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are in contrast to who ‘we’ are not. (Mercer, 1989, p2).

In her 2012 Channel 4 *Dispatches* survey documentary *What Muslims Want*, Naheed Afrose Kabir observes that respondents of her study frequently invoked media stereotypes to define themselves, for example, that ‘we’ (the Muslims) are detested by ‘them’, (the British media). Thus the British media induced the Muslim interviewees to think as a collective group: though they were ethnically diverse, they viewed themselves as ‘we’, as ‘Muslims’.

A large number of Muslims believe that the way you are portrayed in media is so important that it defines what you think you are, and what you tell others who you are. Such situations highlight the contribution of mainstream media in shaping identities. David Gauntlett (2002) supports this point of view that the mainstream media shapes self-identities in contemporary Western societies. British-Pakistani youth also recognise the role of media in presenting their identities.

“Because of being Muslims, we, the British-Pakistanis are seen here as a cause of terrorism and a problem. Our very existence is seen as a security threat. I think this is because of the way mainstream media depict us”

(Asim, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

Research has shown that media representations of Muslims are only likely to exacerbate such perceptions and make it potentially harder for Muslims living in Britain to perceive themselves as part of a multicultural British identity. A study by Elizabeth Poole (2001) on British Muslims and the British press aimed to explore how British Muslims constructed meanings from press reports on Islam.

Her study revealed that the British Muslims took an oppositional stance to negative portrayals of Islam, seeing these as ideologically motivated, while more sympathetic portrayals were assimilated into their common-sense perspective. Although British Muslims approached media texts with their interpretative frameworks, the participants believed that negative media coverage of Islam results in negative attitudes towards them by non-Muslims.
“You see, these days media emphasise two things about us. First, our Muslim identity, where, we are portrayed as extremists, terrorists, irrational and suppressive to women. Secondly, being descendants of Pakistani migrants, we are also being put into the category of migrants who are a threat to the resources of White British people. We never migrated, we were born and brought up here, we are British, but we are associated with everything which appears to be a threat to them (White, Christian British).” (Kausar, 22 years old, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

In another study, ‘Change and Continuity of Representation of British Muslims Before and After 9/11: The UK context’, Poole (2015) points out that representation of British Muslims in the British press spanning 15 years shows a continuation of a process that became more visible following 9/11, resulting in the predominance of a “cultural clash” framework as Muslims became the focus of anxieties about living in an increasingly globalised world.

“The image of Islam has been deliberately tarnished. Only those aspects of Islam are highlighted which clash with Western values. Even the politicians are now talking about the place of Muslims in British society, questioning tolerance by the White people” (Nadir, 22 years, male, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 10).

Hall’s work on representational practices, which looks at ‘stereotyping’ of the ‘other,’ argues that the work of representation is a complex business, especially when dealing with ‘difference’ as it “engages feelings, attitudes and emotions and it mobilises fears and anxieties” (1996, p226). The participants of the study expressed experiencing fears about their identity. Muslims are represented as ‘terrorists’ with images of uncivilised demeanour as an emerging threat right on British soil. Religion being a dominant component of the identity of the Pakistani diaspora, they are associated with this kind of image of Islam even if they may not be extremist or even practising Muslims.

Many of the participants explained that these days they feel that Pakistanis, particularly young males, were perceived as extremists and terrorists. British mainstream media carries stories about the involvement of young Pakistani males in jihad. South-Asian Muslim youth, in general, were portrayed as falling prey to jihad. The social expectation from their meta identity projected through the media is one of extremism. Many of the Pakistani Muslims may not be very religious, but just by being Pakistani, they may be perceived as extremists.
“I am a very liberal Muslim and don’t follow religious rituals strictly and have lots of respect for other religions, but the way media shows Muslims has built up such perceptions that whenever I tell anyone that I am a Muslim, they start to ask questions implying that maybe I also believe in extremism” (Ayaz, 26 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 17).

There is also a peculiar narrative regarding media consumption by Muslims. In terms of digital media, there is a strong allegation that young Muslims use extremist and terrorist websites and are recruited by such websites by proscribed terrorist organisations like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Hazb e Tehrir and go to other countries to wage jihad. Various news reports were carried by media showing young South-Asians particularly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage going to join Jihad.

“There were many White young people who joined organisations like ISIS and got involved in jihad, but the story that became most popular through British TV channels was that of a teenage Bangladeshi girl Shamima Begum and how she dodged her family and found a way to go to Iraq via Turkey all by herself” (Sana, 18 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 3).

The story of Shamima Begum was seen by many as a deliberate effort to malign young Muslims. They asked if everything was being filmed, why the girls were not stopped. Commentators including politicians, policymakers, academics and members of the media have propagated the cultural image of radical Islamism to be violent, backward, insular, anti-secular and anti-modern. Terminology, demographic factors, and cultural themes used in the media after 9/11 represent Islam as a fundamentalist religion, leading to the affirmation of broad-brushed references to Islam and Muslims in large sections of the media.

“It is very disturbing to see that due to media portrayals we are experiencing feelings of getting alienated more and more in the British society. Nowadays there are questions everywhere about our loyalties to Britain. All the British-Pakistanis are seen as extremists, which is not true. It only enhances distance between different groups. Sometimes I question my identity if I am British or not. Are people around me afraid of me?” (Sidra, 26 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 14).
The perceptions of young British-Pakistanis about the representation of Islam and Muslims as fundamentalists have been supported by several researchers. Sundas Ali (2007) analysed newspaper articles from the *New York Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Observer*; a TV entertainment serial, *The West Wing*; a TV documentary, *Power of Nightmares*; and a TV news report, *Rehabilitating Jihadists*. Based on her research findings she argues that human intervention – of which one form is the Western media – especially since 9/11, has had considerable influence on defining the notion of Islamic fundamentalism by putting forward its ideas, values, and beliefs, thus contributing towards a socially constructed reality of fundamentalist Islam.

6.2 Clash with British identity and culture

The perceptions about British-Pakistanis may also revolve around a clash with the identity and value system of Britain. The representation of Muslims in media with the rise of Islamophobia led to various narratives about Islam and Muslims not only restricted to the security aspect associated with terrorism but also other aspects.

In research comparing anti-Muslim narratives in seven European countries including the United Kingdom, Elsa Mescoli (2018) analysed that Islamophobic narratives against Muslims in different national contexts in discursive environments which are not neutral and which impact how anti-Muslim attacks take place, leading to various categories of concepts and words used in different countries. Mescoli categorises them into Threat to security, Unassimilable, Demographic threat, Theocracy, Threat to identity, Gender inequality, Innate violence, Incomplete citizenship and Homophobia.

The participants of the focus groups spoke about their perceptions that in British media Islam is represented as a religion that does not allow freedom of speech and modern scientific thought as Western civilisation does (hence, Muslims are not led by rational decision-making), thus implicating religion Islam and Muslim culture as being alien to the European value system. The participants felt that this is combined with narratives of the threat of proselytisation that the Muslims were trying to proliferate theocracy.

“In a BBC programme, Jean Corbin visited a Muslim community and showed a cleric who, to prevent a divorce between a couple, was making arbitration between husband and wife. This alternative method was shown as a challenge to the British system of justice, although the cleric was making a sincere effort to stop the breakup of a family by counselling the couple” (Attiya, 26 years, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 15).
The participants shared their perceptions that in the West the Muslim community is increasingly seen as an identity group with an emphasis on an ‘us and them’ approach. The language used in media can lead to the creation of categories such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ which in turn can give rise to discourses that ‘they’ (Islamic fundamentalists) pose a clear threat to ‘our’ (the democratic West’s) way of life.

“We become conscious and feel aloof when Muslims are portrayed as not integrated into society. Media has made us think we are not meant to be here, as we are just struggling to be here” (Sarmad, 25 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 17).

Concerning this phenomenon of ‘us’ and ‘them’ Cohen regards “the ‘other’ as embodying different ways of thinking, reasoning, judging and behaving that were discontinuous with ‘our own’ and acted as an alternative to ‘us’.” (1997, p134). This approach was justified by the distances and cultural differences, with the implicit conception of cultural boundedness and wholeness. Migration and the creation of diasporas eliminated that distance and brought cultures into intimate proximity, upsetting the ‘us-here/them-there’ paradigm, the subjects being no longer ‘over there’ but rather ‘over here.’

This brings up the question of belonging to religion or nation, though the two are not mutually exclusive. Kabir (2012) found out that on the question of ‘Belonging to Britain vs belonging to Islam’, two in five Muslims in Britain (38 per cent) indicated that nation and religion were not mutually exclusive, as they felt they belonged ‘very strongly’ to both Britain and Islam.

Among the participants of this study nearly 90% believed that they were both British and Pakistani and treat Britain as their country. They claimed to be loyal to Britain but at the same time respect the country of their parents and based on their heritage considered themselves to be Pakistanis as well. Contrary to this, the media portrayed Muslims in a way that puts a question mark on their loyalty to British society. The participants of this research perceived that the presence of Muslims was being narrativised as an onslaught on the value system and local traditions of Britain.

“All time you look at an image of a Muslim appearing in a newspaper, it is that of someone in a clash with British values. Where are people like me who are serving my community members alike, irrespective of their orientations based on religion, race, gender or class?” (Meena, 28 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG18).
Meena, who is a medical doctor by profession, expressed that she felt hurt by such representation of Muslims in the media. Though a Muslim of Pakistani heritage, she considers herself British first. She feels herself part of this community but felt uncomfortable that the positive contribution of British-Pakistanis was never reflected in any kind of media. “We are always shown as underachievers, backward and not adapted to the British values. And now after 9/11 all of us are painted with just one brush as if all of us are Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists,” she added.

Islam is portrayed in media as a religion contrary to ‘Britishness’ and ‘Fundamental British Values.’ There is a common perception that Muslims are unassimilable, do not integrate into Western society and are rather a threat to internal democracy. Failure to integrate Muslims into mainstream society is often attributed to failed multiculturalism, calling for revitalising British identity (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).

“It is very common to hear or read about Muslims as extremists who are barbaric in nature and uncivilised. These days Pakistanis are seen through the lens of Islam first, which is perceived in Britain as a religion of intolerance, extremism and discrimination against women. I was born here and learnt British values at school. Media tells stories of only those Muslims who are extremists, but what about others who are not?” (Moeed, 24 years, male, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 10).

This statement raises the question of ownership by the British society, that even those British-Pakistanis who were not extremists are looked upon with suspicion. The young British-Pakistanis may believe that through the media a narrative of demographic threat was being constructed, as mostly Muslim families have more children and were seen to be a threat to the local population. Media reports show statistics of demographic shifts in a few decades: if Muslims in Europe continue to multiply at the same rate they may outnumber White Christians. This was also seen as some kind of threat.

The presence of the Muslim population has been encapsulated in the overall issue of migration during the last few decades with the influx of workers from Eastern Europe with the opening of borders after its inclusion in the European Union. The tug of war for resources brought every migrant into the limelight, with the Muslims and Pakistanis settled in the UK for a long time and contributing to the British economy and even the young people who are even born in the UK all seen through the same lens.
“I have seen many television programmes about social services such as housing and health on mainstream media like the BBC showing immigrants, particularly Muslims and South-Asians with big families who enjoy facilities, as the beneficiaries of taxpayers’ money and public resources, whereas White people are shown as having to deal with negative effects on their lives due to the influx of migrants. Thus, immigrants including people of Pakistani descent born in Britain are shown in media as parasites” (Qadir, 27 years old, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 15).

British-Pakistanis perceive such a situation as a deliberate attempt to malign Muslims and migrants. In the focus group discussions, they expressed that they were being projected as backward, extremists, uneducated and unwanted people.

6.3 Gender

The perceptions about Muslims as incompatible with British and Western value systems in a broader sense include discrimination based on gender. Young British-Pakistanis may see a role of media in highlighting these aspects. Sidra, a female university student in Bradford, was of the view that media usually presents, or rather over-represents, Muslim women as wearing scarves and being suppressed. As a result, the identity of Muslim women is that of a suppressed entity behind the veil. If any Muslim woman wears a skirt, they (White British) ask, “Aren’t you a Muslim?”

“Dress is not about personality, you can be a good Muslim but can wear Western dress,” Sidra said; adding further that in the mainstream society, the perception of Muslim women, created to a large extent by representation in media, is that they have no say in their lives. The media usually portray that Muslim women are forced to wear scarves, not that they wear them by choice, whereas many young women wear scarves to assert their Muslim identity and to express solidarity with other Muslims in times of rejection.

“Muslim women wearing the Hijab (headscarf) are placed with the news where the headscarf has nothing to do with the story. The appearance of Muslim women in the news is usually in connection with issues where they appear to be suffering at the hands of men, for instance, violence in the name of honour.” (Irfana, 26 years, female, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 20).
Many young British-Pakistanis may believe that the image of women of Pakistani origin as backward and low achievers is so strong that the high achievers are received with surprise and disbelief. The stereotyping of Muslim women including the Pakistani women, plays a significant role in creating such perceptions.

“When I tell them (White British) that I am studying at university, many of them express astonishment and question how my parents would allow me to study at university. They don’t perceive us as well educated and capable of achieving” (Fatima, 22 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

The way migrant ethnic groups or the ‘others’ are portrayed in the media of the host country builds up expectations about the roles and behaviour of the diaspora. These expectations influence their understanding of self and their identity development and affect intergroup relations. This holds in terms of gender roles as well.

“There are many Muslim women who are making strides in politics, media and various professions. Some of them are very high achievers but even then, you never hear anything about their positive contribution to the community. But if there is an incident of violence against women and the family happens to be Muslim, you will find reference to Muslim traditions and culture again and again” (Amina, 20 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 3).

Gender inequality constitutes an important element in the narrative about British-Pakistanis. With the assumption that Islam legitimises extreme forms of women oppression. Muslims are seen as segregationists and associated with misogyny and perversion. The issue of forced marriages and honour killings are highlighted in British media, through the news and documentaries.

“No doubt honour killing is the worst kind of crime, but it is not an Islamic tradition. Some cases of honour killings took place in the UK where Muslims were involved; the media reports associate it with Islam. Such stories are repeatedly publicised by the mainstream media and thus by overrepresentation create stereotypes about Muslim women” (Bushra, 18 years old, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).
The participants felt that Muslim women are always portrayed as suppressed. Stories of forced marriages and honour killings shown on TV, which are also exaggerated at times, create a negative association with Muslims. Every time a woman in the Pakistani or Muslim community faces a gender-related issue it is blown out of proportion. The concern of young British-Pakistanis with their representation in British media is about several layers of negativity: first for being young, second for being Pakistani and third for being Muslims. Although there are also Christians in Pakistan, since the majority are Muslims, Pakistanis, no matter what religion they belong to, are perceived as Muslims.

6.4 Other religions and sects

The Pakistani diaspora in the UK is not a homogenous Sunni Muslim community. As discussed in previous chapters, they represent multiple religions: Christians, Sikhs, the Ahmediya community and sects and schools of thought like Shia, Barelvi, and Deobandi. Being a Muslim majority country and due to its role in the Afghan war, where extremist Muslims played a major part, Pakistan is equated with extremist or Salafist stream of Islam and even the Pakistani Christians, who came to Britain as asylum seekers due to religious prosecution, face similar representation. The identities of Pakistani Christians are also wrapped up in the broader Pakistani identity.

“I am a Christian, but every time I introduce myself as a Pakistani to anyone, they presume I am a Muslim. When I explain to them about my religion and tell them about Christians in Pakistan, I usually observe disbelief and confusion on their faces. I get the same kind of treatment as any Muslim Pakistani would” (Edward, 22 years, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

The Christian Pakistani diaspora feels that Pakistan is not represented accurately in mainstream British media. They are of the view that some incidences of violence which take place against different religions and sects in Pakistan are instantly picked up by the British media and shown as acts of violence against suppressed minorities of Pakistan.

“Some incidences of discrimination and violence may indeed take place against non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, but these are not only religious minorities but also Muslim sects or other groups who may face such incidents where the state has no role. But whenever any such incidence occurs, British media show it prominently, bringing out the angle of social conflict and victimisation of Christians in an extremist Muslim Society” (Isaac, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).
The Christian Pakistani diaspora is of the view that such incidents of violence against Christians take place in India and other countries also, but British media does not carry these stories. It never shows victimisation of Christians in India, whereas every time such an incident takes in Pakistan, reports depicting the country as intolerant and extremist find space in the media.

In terms of ‘otherness’ and issues of integration, the Christian participants held the view that it was not only religion that might be looked upon as conflicting with Western values; it includes ethnicity and culture as well. The culture of Pakistani Christians is more or less like that of Muslim Pakistanis. The family structures and values, dress, food and the majority of names are like those of Muslims. So, in Britain, they are perceived like other Pakistanis and face the same kind of problems in their social interactions.

The Ahmediya community shared more or less the same views. They practice a different version of Islam but have a history of facing prosecution in Pakistan. Similarly, whenever there is an incident of violence against the Ahmediya community in Pakistan, the Western media maligns the government of Pakistan.

Members of the Ahmediya diaspora consider Britain as a country that has sheltered them and try to contribute positively towards society and may work as volunteers. But their love for Pakistan is deeply rooted and they do not feel happy about the misrepresentation of Pakistan and Pakistanis in the British and other Western media.

“Our loyalties are with Britain, and we try to make a positive contribution to British society, but Pakistan is the country of our origin. Not everyone in Pakistan is an extremist. It is due to very few people that minorities have faced problems. Such problems are faced by other Muslim sects as well, and at times not on religious grounds. When it comes to misrepresentation of Pakistan we find it unfair” (Hina, 20 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

The diaspora members belonging to the Shia sect were of the view that British media does not usually carry any reports of violence against Shias in Pakistan.

“Usually the incidences of violence against Shias are not carried by the British media, which does not bother us because we would not like our country to be seen in a bad light. However, it is disturbing for us to see that Pakistan and Pakistanis were being associated with wrong things only. This affects our identity, and our relations with other people in the society” (Raza, 19 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).
6.5 Issues of voice and own narrative

Although the Communications Act 2003 and Section 2 (1)(4) of the Equality Act 2010 calls upon media, including public broadcasters, to promote the different ethnic communities and counter any discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or belief within the United Kingdom, British-Pakistani youth perceive discrimination and stereotyping against South Asians and Muslims, through news and programmes like Citizen Khan. When media represents any phenomena in one way or another, it is framing the world according to a certain context.

According to Hay (2002), there is no external reality independent of our knowledge and perceptions of it. Concerning ethnic groups and minorities in the multicultural society, media can play a significant role in creating perceptions. The mainstream media particularly becomes important due to greater control over voice and the power of reaching out to a large audience.

The hegemony of voice of mainstream British media had been playing a crucial role in this context, by representing the Pakistani diaspora the way it wants to represent them instead of the way they want to represent themselves. Spivak (1998) wrote about the representation of people and groups while taking into account their aspirations and described it in terms of the position of the subaltern concerning the hegemony of voice. “The question is not only ‘Who should speak?’ but more crucial is ‘Who will listen?’” (Spivak, 1998, p594).

“Most of the British people get news about Pakistanis living here and Pakistan as a country itself from the British media, including online versions of major TV channels and newspapers. So, whatever is shown about Pakistanis and Pakistan in the mainstream British media creates perceptions about the identity of Pakistanis living here. In most cases, it is associated with international conflicts like Afghanistan. Internally, mostly it is a conflict of values of Pakistanis with White British and being Muslims as a threat to the security of society” (Faheem, 25 years, male, London, Males Group, FG11).

The participants of the study shared their perception that the voice of young people was not there in mainstream media and ethnic minorities were not given the chance to talk about the issues and express their views. British-Pakistani youth have little control over how they are portrayed in media. They can contest or reject these representations but cannot control the impact of these representations on how other people think about them.
“Most of the time you hear bad things about young people in general. What you watch on media about youth is mostly negative, such as issues of unemployment, violence and drugs. There are rarely good things on media about young people’s achievements, more so about marginalised youth. The British media defines Pakistani youth as extremist Muslims and jihadists. They never give us chance to clarify our position” (Uneeza, 21 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

This perception of not being allowed to speak about themselves and be listened to by a greater audience relates to the concept of ‘Voice of a Subaltern’ as enunciated by Spivak (1998). The subaltern is the social group that is politically, socially and often geographically outside of hegemonic discourse, usually in terms of colonialism. A subaltern is excluded from a society’s established structures for political representation, through which people have a voice in their society. It is the British media that describe Pakistanis, without giving them a chance to describe themselves or to talk about their aspirations. During the focus group discussions, the young British-Pakistanis explained that the people of Pakistani heritage who were born and brought up here considered themselves as ‘British first,’ but this thinking is never highlighted in the mainstream media.

White British people may not consider them to be British; they would always refer to them as Pakistanis. On official documents which require a statement of ethnicity, they are explicitly British-Pakistanis. For young British-Pakistanis, it may be a matter of concern that in society even their identity is defined by others. Even how they would be referred to or introduced, i.e. as British-Pakistani, may be defined by others. For them, the hyphenated identity given by the British government is a constant reminder. Pakistanis are not British in the real sense, even nearly seven decades after migrants from Pakistan started to settle here and three generations have been born and brought up in Britain.

“British-Pakistani is not the name given by us, but by the British government. When we fill up any forms, we are asked to fill up a column of ethnicity. It used to be only Asians and it used to cover everything. Now it is British-Pakistani, which for me is an upgraded form of Paki…Nobody talks about our problems, like difficulties in getting spouse visas for those marrying outside Britain, because it is not seen as politically correct. You believe in marriage by choice but choice where you tell them” (Tabinda, 29 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 14).
Describing this dependency on someone else, Spivak (1998) asserts that the subaltern depends upon Western intellectuals to speak for them. Instead of being allowed to speak for themselves, they are spoken for. They are treated as a group with a collective cultural identity: the identity of being dispossessed. This situation, Spivak argues, reinscribes their subordinate position in society, because if they were not subordinate, there would be no need to speak as a collective group or to be spoken for in the first place.

Spivak sees this academic understanding of the subaltern, that of a unified group that needs to be spoken for, as a form of epistemic approach continuing the ethnocentric Western imperialist domination of the world that does not take into account the heterogeneity of the colonised body politic. Thus, speaking for the dispossessed, one risks reinscribing their marginalisation. Representation of a certain group in media depends on who controls the media. For the Pakistani diaspora, which is marginalised in many ways, representation in mainstream media remains questionable.

While discussing the representation of diasporas in media as minority social groups or communities, Georgiou (2014) holds that media can reveal the position of minorities in society – especially through their representation, or lack of, in the media – feeding back into familial and private articulations of the sense of self, community, and the nation. The diversification of the media means that minorities including diasporas not only see themselves on the receiving side of a singular mainstream media system but can also increasingly become engaged with multiple systems, many of which are interactive.

On digital media, though, there is an opportunity to say what you want to say but ‘Who listens to it’ remains an issue, as most of the views and feelings are shared by people in their groups. Spivak argues if you are subaltern, no one will listen to you, and if they do, you are not subaltern anymore. It seems there is no way whatsoever that the subaltern can be heard. Neither subalters can speak for themselves nor can anyone else speak for them without reinscribing their marginalisation.

With no power and resources to construct their original narrative, the narrative of the British-Pakistani diaspora is only a reaction. They feel that narratives given by British media are a source of creating tensions and conflicts in society. This attitude is strong towards Muslims in general and specially Pakistanis being bracketed as ‘Muslims.’

The British-Pakistani youth perceive such narratives as unfair. Many of them think their grandparents or great-grandparents made an immense contribution to the defence of the British Empire as soldiers in World War II and boosted the British economy afterwards, but this contribution is never acknowledged in the mainstream British discourse.
“We never get to see any documentary on the mainstream media about the contributions of South-Asians as soldiers of British Empire or to the British economy. The only thing that we see on mainstream media about Pakistan is its image of fostering terrorists and training them. When we look at negative things about Pakistan we feel we are being put down”
(Sameer, 19 years, male, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 10).

Voice or power and control over the content is not only about people but also places inhabited by marginalised groups that are not given a chance to be presented and suffer from negative portrayal and stereotyping.

The manager of Karmand Community Centre in Bradford, Haseeb, said in an interview that Bradford is a very good city in many ways, but the city is always portrayed negatively as an unsafe and backward place with the presence of large numbers of Pakistanis. He said they approached BBC to make a documentary about developments in the city, but the proposal was declined.

“Bradford is portrayed as a backward and unsafe city just because of Pakistanis living here. It is a diverse city and as safe as any other city in Britain. There are thriving educational institutions with international students coming from various parts of the world, but none of these things about Bradford is ever shown on media. We put in a proposal to BBC to make a documentary on positive developments in the city, but that proposal was rejected” (Interview conducted on 5th April 2014 in Bradford).

The British mainstream media would not make any programme on positive developments in such areas. Instead, you get to see programmes like ‘Making Bradford British,’ in which the point of view of British-Pakistanis is shown the way the English producer wanted to show it. They showed Pakistani men as noncooperative and averse to the idea of mingling with British people.

The hegemony of mainstream British media in terms of its voice reaching a large audience worldwide is perceived by young British-Pakistanis as a perpetuation of misrepresentation at several levels ranging from individuals to groups, cities, countries and nations and transnational quasi-nations like Muslim Ummah. This in return affects the identities at several levels from the micro level of individuals to the global and may lead to the branding of groups with such labels as ‘terrorists’ on the Muslims.
The perception of British-Pakistani youth of not having a voice in mainstream discourse and not being listened to, leads to a feeling of deprivation and strengthens the attitude of rejecting the hegemonic discourse and turning to alternative media. Most of them were of the view that the mainstream media never gave the Muslims the chance to speak for themselves and express their views about how they felt about terrorist incidents.

The majority of the Muslims living in Britain were against such happenings. The media never gave them a chance to present their point of view. It somehow paints the picture that all Muslims agree with terrorism. The views of the participants of the focus groups reflect their perceptions that British mainstream media overrepresents negative points about Pakistanis and Muslims and does not present any positive contributions of generations of Pakistanis.

Concerning Pakistani ethnic media, the issue of voice and control was not in terms of Western dominance but had a different dimension. In their perceptions, there was a negligible representation of the Pakistani diaspora in the Pakistani media. If there is any coverage, it is restricted to the UK and Europe editions of newspapers and channels. Further, the community is not presented as they would like.

Young British-Pakistanis may find it hard to associate with the narrative about Pakistan given by Pakistani media. Their perception of British mainstream media is that Pakistan and Pakistanis, being Muslims, are deliberately misrepresented as an ethnic group, as part of a religious group, besides being ‘Paki’ as a whole through misrepresentation of the country of their origin. They feel that these frames of reference are all being misrepresented at different levels and on different grounds.

**Summary**

Media representations of ethnic and cultural groups play a significant role in the construction of identities. The stereotypes of diasporas created through media representation about their ethnicity, culture, religion and the country of their origin construct a meta identity of that group, which in turn may shape perceptions about that particular group in the mainstream society, leading to a particular kind of narrative about that group. The media representation and subsequent perceptions may affect the construction of identity of individuals and groups and their positioning, which may impact inter-community relations and the process of integration of diasporas with groups of different racial, ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds in the multicultural society. If the meta identity of a group is perceived to be in conflict with the mainstream society, then the process of integration becomes difficult.
Media can play an instrumental role in the construction of narrative and representation and may create stereotypes about different groups, including the diaspora. Social representation and meta perspective act on the identities of minority groups like diasporas through a spiral of perceptions and reactions generated by them. Perceptions of mainstream society formed through media representation of minority groups may generate reactions and create a feeling of othering, especially if a group is presented as, one possessing values in conflict with the dominant values of mainstream society.

On the other hand, when a minority group perceives mainstream society’s negative perception of them, they may also react. Sometimes these reactions result in strategies to assert the aspects of identity that are challenged. In the case of young members of the British-Pakistani diaspora, their identity may be influenced by representation in mainstream British media, international media, and Pakistani ethnic media.

Due to their hegemony, the British mainstream and Western media may have the power to determine narratives about ethnic minorities. The issue of voice becomes important, because with its control over voice and audience, the mainstream media define narrative and identity of minority groups, which remain influential due to outreach to a bigger audience as they also use digital platforms and their generally accepted credibility.

The British-Pakistani youth perceive their representation as unfair. They hold the view that negative aspects of their culture, religion, race and country of origin are overrepresented and blown out of proportion, whereas positive aspects remain underrepresented. As an ethnic group and as young people they never get a chance to define themselves. British-Pakistani youth perceive traditional media as having a negative bias against the Pakistanis and the Muslims and deliberately misrepresenting the Pakistani diaspora, the people of Pakistan and the country itself. The combination of being young, South-Asian and Muslim keeps them at a triple disadvantage.

Politics of communications also come into play in this scenario, as information and news about Pakistan are transmitted through British and other international media in a manner that suits the agenda of power players and those who control the voice. Pakistan is equated with Islam, which in turn is represented as a fundamentalist ideology breeding terrorism. Even non-Muslim Pakistanis are perceived by mainstream society as Muslims. Pakistanis are seen as Muslims with a culture and value system highly incompatible with British identity and society. Their presence is seen as a threat to British society in terms of security and clashing with the British value system.
Not only individual members of the Pakistani diaspora and their community in Britain are misrepresented, but also the cities where they live and their country of origin, Pakistan. Young women feel that the issues of gender equality and freedom are also portrayed out of proportion, creating an image of suppression of women in Muslim culture. The incidences of honour killing, forced marriage, low achievement are overly presented. Female participants feel that the achievements and contributions of Pakistani women or Muslim women were never highlighted.

Representation of socio-economic class is also perceived as biased. The young British-Pakistani professionals were of the view that Pakistanis are always depicted as parasites on the nation’s resources. They regret the fact that British media never show the contribution of Pakistanis and other South-Asians as soldiers for the defence of the British Empire and their contribution in revitalising the British economy in the post-World War II period. Presently there are many highly respected businessmen and young professionals of Pakistani origin living in Britain, who remain unrepresented.

Members of the British-Pakistani diaspora may perceive it as a deliberate and multi-layered misrepresentation through mainstream media. Although they criticise Pakistani media for projecting Pakistan negatively, these media do not target Islam and Muslims, so their impact on negative stereotyping of Pakistan remains small. Such representations through media affect the identity at micro and macro levels, in other words, individual and social identities, and have ramifications for the interaction of the Pakistani diaspora with the host country.

The ‘otherness’ induced through media and feeling of insecurity created by Islamophobia has resulted in social tensions which in turn cause challenges for multiculturism. In the loop of representation, perceptions, narrative, identity and alienation or integration, a multicultural society like that of Britain can be seen as ultracomplex entity within a web of interplay of identities, hybrid identities and identities formed under the influence of transnational virtual narratives through local and translocal mediascapes in the environment of hyper-communication.
Chapter 7. Narrative of identity

The previous chapter focussed on how the narrative and representation through media functions as a factor in creating certain perceptions about the identity of a minority group in the mainstream society. Misrepresentation and under or overrepresentation of any facet of identity of the group in question – British-Pakistanis in this case – may impact the identity of members of that group. This process may take place in the chain of events accentuated with reflexivity, that is, how that group may be perceived by others, and in return how that group receive the perceptions of others: the meta identity.

This chapter is based on the research question about the response of British-Pakistani youth in terms of their attitudes and strategies of media consumption, to the dominant representation of their communities. It aims to analyse how British-Pakistanis may decode and interpret the narrative and representations generated by the media and how they perceive the ways mainstream society looks at them due to media representations. The chapter investigates the response of young British-Pakistanis to their perceived representation in mainstream society and their need for self-representation. This entails a discussion of the strategies and any proactive actions on their part in the parameters of the relevance of these strategies to the construction of their identities and self-representation, including any significance of gender and class in these processes.

The interplay of media, perceptions and identities may be seen as a spiral process of actions and reactions, constituted around various traits of media and facets of identity. Media processes such as coding, decoding and compulsions of political economy, and peculiar characteristics of digital media like participatory culture are among the important concepts in this connection. The facets of identity include nationality, religion, culture, ethnicity, socio-economic positioning, gender and age.

The preceding chapter dealt with the narration of the identity of young British-Pakistani diaspora members by others, in this case, the mainstream media. This chapter deals with their response, which may evoke a need to counter the dominant set of perceptions and construct their narrative and representation. The response may be attributed to a meta construction of their identity depicting them as an inferior and securitized group, hence invoking notion of ‘identity politics’ (discussed in Chapter 1).
7.1 Need for own narrative of identity

The analysis and discussion in this chapter revolve around the importance of narration and media representation in the construction of identity, resting on Hall’s (1991) proposition that identity is always in part a narrative and in part a representation. He asserts that identity is that which is narrated in one’s self and it is always within representation, not something that is formed outside, which we then tell stories about.

The notion of identity politics refers to movements of struggle to resist oppressive accounts for group identities (race, class, gender, age) constructed by others who hold power over them (Foster and Herzog, 1994; Gutmann, 1994). Thus the group in question may assert for recognition of aspects of identity that have been denied, marginalized, or stigmatized and entails issues of representation, such as who has the right to represent or to speak, and for whom, involving Spivak’s notion of the voice of the subaltern (discussed in Chapter 6).

The construction of identity of British-Pakistani youth is located in the context of multiculturalism (discussed in Chapter 2), where a struggle persists for accommodating diverse racial and ethnic groups who are British citizens by birth but continue to be perceived as migrants, outsiders and others, by the mainstream society. Perceived on the one hand by diaspora members as discrimination and exclusion of ethnic minorities, and on the other hand by British mainstream society as racial, ethnic and cultural incompatibility and lack of integration, these conflicting perceptions can be linked to representation through media and how they were interpreted by different groups based on their socio-economic and cultural background and position in the society.

The interplay of media and communications with processes of construction of identity and establishing identification at various levels constitutes a three-stranded spiral of actions and reactions between media, mainstream society and minority groups like the diaspora, with interwoven strings of attitudes and strategies.

As the theory of social constructivism claims that “reality” is constructed through the language of social actors, which makes those in control of words extremely powerful, the unique position of media in interpreting events and in constructing “reality” may result in a massive amount of influence over construction and manifestation of identity. The issues of adjustment and integration pertaining to migrants, ethnic minorities, races and religions as dealt with by media may affect the inclusiveness of British society.
“The mainstream media, both TV and newspapers, give views of a tolerant British society and migrants as the cause of problems. South-Asian migrants are portrayed as having migrated for economic gain, without giving background information that they were needed in Britain to run the economy in the post-World War II period. I think there was a need to correct the history and we Pakistanis in Britain should work on it” (Afzal, 25 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 12).

As British citizens with a sense of belonging to mainstream society and culture, British-Pakistani youth may pro-sume media, as mainstream youth would, such as in matters like political affiliations and employment and more personal interests like sports, fashion, food or entertainment, where aspects of their cultural identities may coincide with those of other young people.

In addition to this, with their connection to Pakistan and Pakistani culture and linkages with Pakistani diaspora members around the world, a narrative of international positioning constructed through actual and virtual interactions may lead to their media pro-usage or pro-sumption in a distinct manner.

7.2 Decoding of messages and reflexivity

Reflexivity is an important element of identity along with multiplicity and fluidity, inherent in the project of the self, which involves constant monitoring of one’s routine activities and a reflection on various lifestyle options. Individuals may revise their regular practices in the light of added information. Media particularly digital media serves as an agency in evoking reflexivity among young people.

The young British-Pakistanis tend to assume that media portrayals promote the ‘incompatibility’ and ‘otherness’ of the diaspora with mainstream society, rather than touching upon complementarities in social and economic life. The participants spoke about difference on the basis of physical features like colour and other obvious markers. The discussions reflected their awareness about markers of identity like race, ethnicity, language, religion, food, festivals and various physical and cultural facets that distinguish them from mainstream society.

The participants mentioned that skin colour may make it obvious that you were not of the same origin. It goes without saying. The participants were of the view that your nationality is associated with your place of birth; you receive your passport and rights from the state but your Britishness may not be recognized due to obvious natural factors.
“There is something in me, probably my skin colour, culture or whatever, that I don’t feel that I am only British and likewise the British people don’t feel that I am British in a real sense” (Farheen, 20 years, female, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 10).

The sense of difference of heritage continues to exist as a key factor even among those who were born and brought up in Britain. A young male from London was of the view that saying ‘what you are’ does not define you.

“We are different from British people in many ways, but the kind of distancing created by media really puts forth your identity as incompatible. Saying that I am British first does not make a difference in bridging the differences highlighted by media” (Burhan, 21 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 2).

As race, ethnicity, culture and religion are clear markers of difference and a state of being at least appearing to be ‘others,’ Pakistani diaspora members living in the UK often face the question ‘Where are you from?’ both verbally and through body language.

“I was in a British-dominated school with hardly any Pakistani or other ethnicities. If I introduced myself that I am in year seven they always asked me but where are you from? They always asked me about my origin and used to be very curious” (Robert, 18 years, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

According to Brah, “There is something we ‘recognize’ in ourselves and in others which we call ‘me’ and ‘you’ and ‘we’ and “them”’ (1996, p4). These others may be benign such that one aspires to their characteristics, values and beliefs, leading to a process of idealistic-identification, or they may be malign when one wishes to dissociate from their characteristics- a process of defensive contra-identification (Weinrich and Saunderson 2003, p 61).

“There are so many cases in Europe when Muslim women were not allowed to sit in class wearing hijab, or a Sikh was not allowed to drive a taxi with a turban. But this exclusion pushes towards greater solidarity with the group of your origin, having a similar culture. I do have friends in class and on Facebook who follow other religions and would face discrimination, so at least we share such things on social media and get connected on issues similar to us” (Adeela, 18 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).
The impact of such representation on identity may be that the target group starts assuming the identity that prevails in social discourse through media narrative and representations. Mercer (1989) states that various media representations can incite the audience to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are in relation to who ‘we’ are not.

“If the media targets one particular group through constant derogatory depictions in reporting, images and headlines, that group feels marginalized” (Kabir, 2012, p113). This may lead to the use of stereotypical categories by the marginalized group, who start seeing themselves from another perspective. For example, after 9/11, the majority of Pakistanis, being Muslims, were seen as a part of a homogenous Muslim identity, and they started to think in terms of ‘we’ the Muslims and ‘they’ the mainstream society.

Kabir asserts that respondents of her study frequently invoked media stereotypes to define themselves, for example, that ‘we’ (the Muslims) are detested by ‘them,’ (the British media). The British media has induced the Muslim interviewees to think as a collective group (though they were ethnically diverse): ‘we’ as ‘Muslims.’

The attacks on Paki representation shifted to the Muslim terrorists. Now Muslims may be the significant incompatible ‘others’ in Britain, and it is the integration of Muslims that is a problem in multicultural Britain as proclaimed even on political platforms, discussed in Chapter 2, in the section on contested multiculturalism.

The need for counter-narratives by the young British-Pakistanis may pertain to a representation of incompatible others based on their South-Asian and Muslim heritage in terms of culture and religion. The majority of Pakistanis, including diaspora members, are Muslims. Islam is not only their religion but also one of the most essential components of their culture and becomes a dominating signifier of their group identity.

The Muslim identity may play a key role in their identification, even if they are not practising Muslims in the strict sense of the word. Particularly after 9/11 and then 7/7, when their South-Asian identity seems to have submerged into the broader connotation of Muslims, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, may be framed and stigmatized as being incompatible with Western values and associated with extremism, terrorism, suppression of women and other traits in conflict with British society. This meta-perspective induces a need to clarify the position that not all Muslims were extremists and that not all the members of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK were under achievers. In the spiral of linkages between media, representation, society and identity, media plays a key role in defining the contours of identity in a social sense.
It offers an array of characterizations that associate different identity groups with various ways to be a person (i.e. how to act or behave) in the given society. These representations typically reflect and reify stereotypes of groups (Kim 2001). Ideas about identity available in the mass media function as cultural resources through which individuals can conceptualise their self-identities (Gauntlett, 2010).

The securitization of Muslims raised questions of multiculturalism and their loyalty to the host country. “It is the politics of recognizing that all of us are composed of multiple social identities, not of one. That we are all complexly constructed through different categories, of different antagonisms, and these may have the effect of locating us socially in multiple positions of marginality and subordination” (Hall, 1991, p78).

“I sometimes feel that Pakistanis living here in Britain are made to think through so many gestures that they are not part of the mainstream society. They are always reminded of back home. This reminder of back home strengthens my affiliation with Pakistan and I search for videos of touristic places in Pakistan, share them with my other cousins in Canada” (Danish, 19 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).

The interplay of identity with communications, representations, narratives and perceptions about certain groups can affect an individual’s own perceptions regarding their position in society and may affect intercommunity relations. During the focus group discussions, young British-Pakistanis revealed that by looking at their representations in media they can easily infer that religiosity or extremist religious ideology shrouded all other characteristics of their identity.

“These days, if you look at the news and other programmes, you can only see images of Muslim women in scarves. News about Pakistan mainly revolves around training of Islamic terrorists in madrassas (religious schools) both in Pakistan and in the UK and young British-Pakistanis joining wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East ” (Deeba, 19 years, female, London, Mixed Group, FG 10).

The study by Knott, Poole and Tiara (2013) indicate a dominant role of print and electronic media in creating perceptions about religions. They point out that there was a significant increase in coverage of Islam in media after 9/11, mostly associated with terrorist and extremist aspects of Islam in both the global and local perspectives, and this stereotyping induced fear in society.
7.2.1 Sense of belonging and loyalties

Young British-Pakistanis who participated in the focus groups discussed about multiplicity of identity and issue loyalties. The majority held the view that you can be British, Pakistani and Muslim at the same time because one is your nationality and citizenship, whereas the other two are your ethnicity and religion.

“I have respect and a sense of belonging to both Britain and Pakistan. I will say I am from England, and I am also Muslim and South-Asian, and my relatives live back home.” (Farwa, 19 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

Esman (2009) explains this sense of multiple belongings by saying that diaspora members function in multiple sets of relationships which include the country of their origin, the host country and the diaspora itself and its linkages with the homeland, host country, and segments of the diaspora in other countries (detailed discussion in Chapter 1). Young British-Pakistanis recognize various planes of their existence.

“This is a reality that I was born and raised in the UK. As an educated person I am well settled in my job and enjoy good relations with my colleagues. I am not very religious either, but the fact remains that I have distinct cultural values. At home, my culture is entirely different. The strong connection of my parents with Pakistan makes me think that my roots are in another country. So I get connected with Pakistan by watching Pakistani TV and also through social media. Though I would never like to go back and settle in Pakistan, but it influences my life in many ways” (Saleem, 26 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 11).

People of Pakistani heritage who are born and brought up here consider Britain their home and do not want to go back to Pakistan. They may have affiliations with other groups, such as Muslims in a broader sense, and association with virtual communities as a source of strength.

“Britain is my home, but I consider myself both British and Pakistani. A British because I was born here and a British citizen; a Pakistani because of my heritage; and I look towards the larger Muslim community as an umbrella for the sake of solidarity and strength. Muslim communities settled in the UK and in other countries are kind of source of strength to me” (Khurram, 28 years, male, Bradford, Mixed Group. FG 20).
Schaffer (2003) discusses the complex patterns of divided and dual authority and loyalty, that members of diaspora communities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups that may lead to perceptions of contested authority and loyalty in the host society.

“I am part Pakistani and part British. My parents are from Pakistan, and I was born and brought up here. So I usually say my parents are Pakistani and I was born here. Usually, I consider myself both Pakistani and British, but here I am questioned about my origin and heritage all the time” (Fahad, 20 years, male, London, Males Group, FG2).

Mainstream society perceives this sense of belonging to various mutually exclusive strands as split loyalty that may impact integration in the adopted country. This constant questioning about belonging may induce reflexivity among British-Pakistanis in terms of a sense of belonging and nationality. Participants said they sometimes ask themselves: “Am I really British?” because they were born here but are not sure if they are considered truly British by mainstream society. Young people want to belong to both places equally but often are not fully accepted by either.

“When I go to Pakistan, people say oh, you are from England, you are English; here, no you are not English, you are Pakistani. It is just how people look at you in different ways in different societies. You are the same person, but you are being looked upon differently in different places. On the internet, I also have several contexts, but the good thing about digital media is that you may reveal your identity or chose to hide it, but you can make many friends with different interests in life” (Ethel, 21 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

Giddens observes “the reflexive project of the self, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems…the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options.” (1991, p5). It is this reflexive process that plays a key role in the lives of the British-Pakistani diaspora to adopt various strategies and position themselves according to the situation.

A spiral process appears to be in place, where the local and mainstream media represent British-Pakistanis in a particular way that triggers reflexivity leading to the repositioning of group identity as a strategy to feel protected and to deal with misperceptions.
7.2.2 Homogenization and political positioning

However, when Muslims revert to solidarity among themselves in response to attacks on identity, mainstream society may perceive this as further hardening of Muslims as a group or a mini nation within the nation. This may trigger further attacks on Muslims, and the spiral of reactions goes on.

Dominant among the themes inferred from the focus groups discussions was young British-Pakistanis’ feeling that their representation as a group was not realistic, but based on an intimidating image, through their identification with terrorists and extremists. The participants said that this narrative and perception needed changing, for better intercommunity relations.

If mass media can affect individuals’ perceptions of other individuals and events, it indirectly affects their interaction with other groups, a critical issue in multicultural Britain. The focus group participants reflected their cognizance of this scenario and expressed these concerns during the discussions, for example, the following statement by a 21-year-old male:

“Media can negatively affect our social interactions. When people come to know that you are a Pakistani they immediately equate you with Muslims and then with terrorism, based on what media shows about us”

(Salman, 21 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

This statement reflects the factor of fear and mistrust created by media in society concerning Muslims. As identity operates in relation to others, by taking note of their representation in mainstream society, young British-Pakistanis may construct and communicate their narrative in reaction to their perceptions of politicized narratives by the media about them which penetrate the mainstream society as a meta-perspective.

This challenges their identity and resulting in their identification with stereotyped connotations like Paki, terrorists, extremists, migrants, parasites, incompatible with British values and threats to British security. Both young men and young women may strategize media consumption and prosumptions, as prod-users and pro-sumers, consciously or unconsciously, to put forth their narrative.

For young British-Pakistanis the rise of Islamophobia in Britain coincides with the rise of xenophobia due to an increase in migrations from all over the world, including the Eastern European countries under the policies of the European Union. They would perceive this as associating them with a burden on the resources of Britain. In this scenario,
the media highlighted the presence of Muslims as a burden on economic resources, blurring the distinction between those who were born and brought up here as British citizens but belong to a different heritage, and the newly arriving migrants coming in search of economic opportunities, who were seen by the participants as associating Muslims with the problems existing in the society.

“It is the agenda of the entire Western media to malign Muslims the world over. This causes a feeling of taking sides with the Muslims. When Muslims are shown negatively, each one of us feels we are being attacked. This makes us think that we should be doing something to clarify that not all Muslims are the same. There is a difference in the approaches of Muslims towards life. We sometimes talk about different shades of Muslims on social media” (Urooj, 28 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 18).

Out of 160 participants of various focus groups, 124 expressed serious concerns about their representation in Western media, reflecting an understanding of the manipulative nature of media. They sometimes expressed their views about misrepresentation in media even before they were asked questions on representation: a trend of rejecting the narrative of Western media about the Muslims, South-Asians and Pakistanis.

The majority of young British-Pakistanis who participated in this research perceived that deliberate misrepresentations about their collective identity, particularly as Muslims, were created through media at a meta-level. They may perceive a widening gap in the personal interactions with the mainstream society, which at the same time was looking for a revival of the Christian values against secular ones and Britishness against multiculturalism. According to Roy (2004), a common feature of Christianity and Islam in the West is that the religious community is increasingly seen as an identity group, emphasising the “us and them” approach. Besides religious practice, faith itself becomes an identity.

Media representations of Muslims have strong bearings on the social and community relations of young British-Pakistanis. As inferred from focus group discussions and interviews, participants perceived that the misrepresentation of the key elements of their identity (Muslims, South-Asians, young people, and Pakistan as a country), may affect how they see themselves and are seen by others, which in turn has an impact on their social interactions and engagement with media.
Cesari (2007) asserts that Muslim identity in Europe should be understood in terms of a process rather than a static structure. She talks of Muslim identification instead of identity. In her view, the forms of identifying oneself as Muslim are profoundly influenced by a narrative (active from the local to the international level) that puts into circulation a whole series of images and stereotypes which make Islam seem religiously, culturally and politically backward.

In recent decades it is the Muslim identity of British-Pakistanis that becomes the target of attacks from quarters including the mainstream media. As discussed in the section on identity in Chapter 1, that identity operates in relation to others and becomes assertive when challenged. The views of participants were that Muslims were following religion as a cultural and hereditary practice, but the constant portrayal on media of Muslims as extremists might push them to associate with ‘political’ Islam, a binding force for them.

7.3 Media and identity politics

National and ethnic minorities can find spaces of expression in digital media away from the constraints of mass media. New media are seen as liberating for minorities but at the same time as threatening to the nation’s cohesion. Minorities either turn away or against the nation through their distinct uses of digital platforms.

“We are a generation of transition. Everything is changing around us. We are being raised in environments different from previous generations. The media that we use and the way we look at ourselves are changing considerably. We watch TV and listen to the radio but access to the internet has opened new avenues of communications reaching far beyond geographical boundaries” (Edward, 22 years, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).

Digital media provides a platform for self-expression. During the focus group discussions, the participants revealed that by using social media they feel much more a part of mainstream youth and they share those things on social media as other young people.

“On social media, we share everything that a young person would be sharing. Selfies, pictures, what you bought, what you ate, where you have been. …Social media has minimized the need for face-to-face contact, so as young people we spend more time on smartphones” (Adil, 19 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).
The young British-Pakistanis think that the use of digital media has added new dimensions to their way of thinking about themselves. Digital media are a means of expressing or discovering aspects of their true self and putting forth both personal narratives and those of community and broader configurations as Pakistanis, Muslims and South- Asians. They find social media instrumental to communicate something positive about themselves, at least to their small groups.

They may share versatile content, including that about Muslims from various parts of the world. This sharing of perspectives, trauma, and resources instils a sense of belonging to a greater Muslim community in the form of a virtual community extended beyond the geographical boundaries of a nation. Within the perspective of globalization, the notion of Muslim Ummah is globalized.

The identity strategies of ethnic minority youth can be related to the extent to which they identify with both the majority and minority groups since identity with each of these groups can be dichotomized, high or low, (Hutnik 1991). In connection with the concept of self-identification, the dichotomous model elucidates that conceptualising self-identification as an option between two identities is simplistic. People may consider themselves to be members of two or more groups, e.g. British and Muslim, in which case a single identity label would be insufficient (Hutnik, 1991; Verkuyten, 1992).

Focus group discussions revealed that the British-Pakistani youth may see themselves both as British citizens and as belonging to Pakistani culture and Muslim religion. In terms of civic values and culture, they identify themselves with the British value system, whereas in terms of cultural identity they identify with family and community culture. Their identification with youth culture is very much there. The issues of education and employment and interests in sports and entertainment are all facets that they share with British youth.

Young people may not be confined at home; they go to educational institutions and to work, where they are part of mainstream civic and political culture and are bound to obey the laws and regulations of the country and share the social-political resources. They are already integrated into the value system of society. By maintaining political affiliations and supporting and voting for political parties they participate in the political culture. Similarly, by joining youth activism and movements for rights they participate in the greater civic and political culture.
With multiple layers and multiple aspects of identity, young people tend to engage with media in multiple ways and to fulfil multiple gratifications. Digital media can help in identity and identification of young British-Pakistanis with other young people, including sharing of problems and the aspirations of young people and contextualization and repositioning of their identities.

“I spent most of my time with people of my age group, physically in the university and virtually on social media. I have to communicate with teams for class projects. Then there are social media groups of societies and that I am a member of. So my interaction and activities relate not only to British youth but also to my class fellows from other countries who are studying here. Then I also share my content, posting pictures and text” (Tehreem, 21 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

As digital media facilitates sharing of thoughts and ideas and cultural artefacts both physical and abstract at individual and group levels, the cultural experience from around the world creates multiple hybridity among young people. On the one hand, Black pop singers from the United States influence British-Pakistani youth, who would follow their fashion and style. On the other hand, they may dress like mainstream youth but with a mix of their style.

“My mother covers her head with a dupatta (Pakistani-style straight scarf), but I wear hijab, an international style of covering the head to express my affiliation with Muslims at a broader level. My mother wears shalwar kameez (a traditional Pakistani dress). I may wear blouses from Next, True Religion Jeans and Nike shoes, which are trends among people of my age. So obviously, when we discuss clothes on Facebook with class fellows it’s about Western trends, but when I talk to my relatives back home it is about trends in Pakistan as I need Pakistani clothes for occasions and festivals” (Ainee, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

For young people, digital media is integrated into the cultural fabric of learning, play, and social communication, and the same goes for the young British-Pakistanis. For them, it is the expression of identity by sharing selfies, pictures, messages on Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Instagram. As discussed in Chapter 4, digital media remain the source of news, information, religious education and entertainment including music.
Digital media remains instrumental in connectivity with friends, colleagues and relatives within local geographical boundaries and transnational networks through the use of Skype, Viber and WhatsApp. As for all other young people, social media can be important for British-Pakistani youth for sharing pictures for the sake of approvals and endorsements of recreation and fun activities; dining out; new clothes and shoes.

“Social media can be very inspiring and enables young people to put forth their image the way they want to project themselves and provide opportunities to show the positive side. Social media also empower young people by providing space to raise awareness about issues of concern to young people, which newspapers and television don’t. I find social media a means to express myself and build connections with both my Pakistani origins and British young people who are part of my circle” (Taniya, 20 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 9).

7.4 Gender and class

In terms of identity, sociologists acknowledge the significance of social context, particularly concerning factors such as social class, gender and ethnicity. Les Back (1996) states that cultural differences are constituted within the interstices of socio-political and economic relations. Just as social groups with differential access to wealth, power and privilege are ranked in relation to one another, so are cultures.

Gender and class may influence the narratives of identity. In the context of young British-Pakistanis, women have seen debates about head cover (hijab) on media as one of the stimuli to reflect upon their identities as Muslim women. In Pakistani culture, there is a tradition of covering the head with a dupatta (long scarf) among women, particularly those of older age. Women in the Pakistani diaspora had been following those traditions and customs. The traditional dress code (long tunic and shalwar – a kind of trousers) for women did not come under criticism for decades. It was usual and acceptable to wear these clothes in public in the UK.

In the post-9/11 era, head covering by Muslim women came into focus as a symbol of their identity. It became an object of debate and contest in Western culture. Increased consciousness about the scarf generated a tug of war. Western societies began forbidding the wearing of scarves; many Muslim women resisted this and started wearing a scarf as a symbol of the defence of cultural ethos and the Muslim way of living. The usual image of a Muslim woman in Western media shows her wearing a headscarf, and that of a man shows him with a beard and a gun.
The images of Muslim women with headscarves in a way served as a resource to further strengthen this identity. Focus group participants often said that they wear scarves to define boundaries and limits.

“I wear a scarf as a symbol of Muslim women. It is to assert that others know I am a Muslim woman, and they should know their limits. In the newspapers and magazines, I have seen images of very dynamic women wearing scarves, who are kind of role models for me. I also post my pictures with a scarf on my Facebook page without any hesitation or fear” (Ruby, 18 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 3).

The female participants expressed views that the image of Muslim women with scarves as shown in media may create perceptions of extremism and may create barriers in social interaction with others, because people usually judge each other by appearances.

“My relations with my clients do get affected by the way Pakistanis as Muslims were being portrayed in the media, particularly on niqab and hijab issues. People do face prejudice at workplaces and in educational institutions. There is a lot of confusion about Islam and our culture. I really don’t know how to change thinking about our culture. If I ever post anything it is circulated among those friends only who already have thoughts similar to mine” (Zeenat, 26 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG18).

In his book ‘Media, Gender and Identity,’ David Gauntlett (2002) explores the role of mainstream media within people’s everyday lives to examine how media use in contemporary Western societies shapes self-identities. Significantly, his analysis highlights that in such societies widely held conceptions of the ‘self’ have changed, now recognizing identity as a more fluid and malleable phenomenon than previously conceived. “Within a capitalist context, popular media facilitates ‘the desire to create new modes of life,’ and, in doing so, demonstrates a disregard for tradition by encouraging individuals to formulate their identities beyond the confines of orthodox norms” (Ibid, p 248).

British-Pakistani women may get influenced by the programmes in media on Islam or through social media about importance of scarf regarding the identity of Muslim women. Although their lifestyle change to wearing scarves can be seen as a form of diversity, it is negatively seen as disrespect for Western values. Eriksen (1993) proposes that the study of identity must oscillate between the poles of disconnected singularity and globalizing unity.
Hijab has surfaced as a globalized movement among Muslim women as an expression of solidarity and resistance against curbing right to dress up the way one wants. With reference to securitization, niqab and burqa are seen as security threats because faces cannot be seen in the security checks, resulting in the banning of covering the face in France and other countries and bringing Muslim women living in Western countries into a confrontation with governments.

“Now we hear stories of pulling women’s scarves and niqab on the streets, combined with derogatory remarks to the women. This creates fears among Muslim women” (Maham, 19 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

The media portray stories of suppression of women. The stories of violence by Muslim men and honour killings bring out conflict with Western values on the one hand and the image of Muslim women as oppressed and men as their oppressors on the other, which positions males as not respecting the values of the host country.

“If there is a report of domestic violence, forced marriages and honour killings by Muslim and Pakistani men, it is repeated again and again. Usually, you see follow-ups of such stories for years. One or two incidences are repeated so many times that people start feeling that brutalities in Muslim families are frequent. The very concept of a Muslim family is maligned” (Kamran, 25 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 11).

Mainstream society perceives Pakistanis as belonging to a lower socio-economic class, but differences appeared between the two cities selected for this study. In Bradford, the parents were mostly uneducated and were into small businesses or on unemployment benefits, whereas in London the level of education was higher among the parents and young people. More of them were in well-respected professions.

A comparison of views from both cities revealed that when it comes to the Muslim identity there was not much difference. Both the young men and the young women were conscious of deliberate misrepresentation of Muslims as a homogenous community through consistent stereotypes. In Bradford ‘Paki’ identity dominates the representation of the Pakistani community as whole as well as the city itself. Bradford is perceived as a city of backward people and problems. Areas of the city with big concentrations of Pakistanis, such as BD4, have a perception of ghettos. This ghettoization adds more to securitization because these areas are considered hubs of drug trafficking and violence.
“Through media, I came to know that there are areas in Bradford where there are gangs and young people who don’t listen to their parents and teenagers are often into drugs. I feel worried about my brother as well because many bad incidents have taken place in the areas around our home” (Beena, 22 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

In London the British-Pakistani diaspora is more versatile and young people are better placed in terms of education and professions. There are no widespread perceptions of ghettos and gangs as in the case of Bradford. In both the cities the need for counter narrative was derived from the misrepresentation in mainstream media.

7.5 Oppositional response and defensive collective identity

The coding and decoding model and notion of active audience (Hall, 1973, Morley 1981) suggests distinct groups interpret media representations through their filters. Media representations are communicated through messages determined by the codes prescribed by the producers. At the receiving end, these codes inscribed in the message may be rejected, negotiated, or fully accepted by the audience, depending on the background and context of the receivers. Varying responses may have an impact on strengthening or weakening certain aspects of identity.

“We (young British-Pakistanis) don’t accept everything that the media tell, because we can judge from everyday life that many of the things shown in the media are not true. So we have to be really careful about the information given to us. For instance, showing Islam as an intolerant religion is not really what I learnt from Islam.” (Uzma, 20 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

British-Pakistani youth tends to take oppositional response to British mainstream media which may vary on levels from micro and meso to macro, and an overarching meta-representation, as the process of identity formation and maintenance spans from the inner core of self to social interactions of an individual’s private and public identity to levels of group, communal, institutional, and national domains with cross-cutting facets like gender, ethnicity, race, culture and class.

“When we watch the news on channels like Al Jazeera and Russia Today or get alternative views from the information circulated through digital media, we find policies of Western countries suppressive towards Muslims. I do share such information with others on digital media” (Hasan, 23 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).
Due to their perceived misrepresentation in the mainstream British media young members of Pakistani diaspora tend to accept the information gathered from sources having sympathetic views towards Muslims. They may regard themselves as victims of religious, racial, class, and cultural discrimination. The majority of the focus group participants reported that in their view the mainstream narratives were about targeting the Muslims and Asians unnecessarily.

Blocking of identification with the mainstream group, leading to exclusion and isolation, may initiate a reflexive process through which the subject may try to look for a revival of original identity or search for their roots. Hall defines it as a “crucial moment that leads people to find other roots on which to stand” (1991, p276). In such a scenario identity politics may lead to constitution of a defensive collective identity against the perceived racism.

This may apply to British-Pakistanis when they look towards Islam as a global political entity to which they may associate. In a context where their meta perception (how they were perceived by others) is that of inferior in power relations, of the migrant working class and followers of an extremist religion directly in conflict with Western values, it compels them to strategize positioning of their identity in response to narratives created by local British media and the translocal Western media.

Relocation of identity as part of greater Muslim political entity may emerge as a strategy by Muslims in the context of ‘Muslim’ minority against ‘Christian’ majority. Ummah is seen as a political assertion of Muslim identity. Castells (1997) argues that only in the Ummah can the individual be fully himself/herself, as part of the confraternity of believers, a basic equalising mechanism that provides mutual support, and shared meaning.

“For me, it is more important to be Muslim than British or Pakistani, because ultimately this is the real binding force. I am a British national, but my Pakistani heritage implies I am not completely British as a white British would be. ‘They’ can never accept me as British. But whether or not I practise the religion I am accepted as Muslim. Being Muslim is consistent” (Hasan, 23 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG7).

Representation and portrayal of Muslims in Western media may have strong bearings on the meta identity of young British-Pakistanis: how they see themselves being seen by others. In response to this, they form strategies of consumption of media and associating their identities with strong entities. Studies on identity reveal that when faced with threat identity tries to reassert itself.
Radhakrishnan (2003) endorses the notion of context and positioning and repositioning of identity: identities and ethnicities are not a matter of fixed or stable selves and are always open to change and recontextualizations and strategic response to shifting sense of time and space. British-Pakistanis have developed strategies of invoking various aspects of identity in different interactions and may sense how they are perceived in different situations.

Consumption and pro-sumption of media induces reflexivity and may lead to repositioning and recontextualization of identities. Studies on identities have revealed the significance of recontextualization and strategic response in accordance with different encounters and given social contexts (Giddens, 1991; Radhakrishnan, 2003).

The questions on loyalty and integration of Muslims into the mainstream society in the post-9/11 period began further to block the identification of Muslims with the mainstream society. In line with imaginary political reidentification and counter politics (Hall, 1991) British-Pakistani youth tend to associate themselves with rising greater collective social identity in the form of rediscovery of Islam as counter politics to Islamophobia, emerging as a political category and a signifier. Digital translocal connectivity and communications, with the availability of online resources and sharing of common grievances, facilitate this reidentification.

The images of atrocities by Western countries and their allies in Muslim countries, like the invasion of Iraq, attacks on Syria and images of young children, shared on a real-time basis may generate sympathies among the British-Pakistani diaspora leading to possibilities of mobilization of identity based on Muslim unity. In this way they see themselves identifying with an imaginary global Muslim nation, crystallized through political Islam, in the sense that Anderson (1995) defines a nation as an imagined political community.

“Yes, I really get disturbed when Western governments invade Muslim countries. My friends and I think that the policies of the government towards Muslims generate anger in the younger generation. We feel helpless and insecure because after 9/11 and 7/7 each one of us thinks we are being scrutinised and judged by the government and society. So by watching these things on media and sharing them we build up solidarity” (Kausar, 22 years female, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).
In the wake of Muslim identity becoming the target of criticism and negative projection in Western media and Muslims around the world suffering wars and conflict, young British-Pakistanis find social media as a means of catharsis and sharing of traumatic experiences of other Muslims. They share pictures and stories of atrocities committed against Muslims, and sharing such material invokes sympathetic feelings. It is one of shared trauma of ‘us’ in response to atrocities committed by ‘others,’ the West.

“Whenever I come across articles and moving images of the Muslims in war zones, I feel like sharing them with my friends on Facebook. I do not create anything myself, but by sharing such things on my wall (Facebook) I find an outlet for my emotions and grief. I look at this as making other people think about these issues by informing them about these situations” (Muhammad, 27 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG12).

Since this research is about British-Pakistani youth as a diaspora group, collective identity concerning multiple aspects remains the focus of analysis. Hall’s point of view is that long-range historical processes form and stabilize collective social identities, which appear as large-scale, all-encompassing, homogenous, unified collective identities.

“These great collective social identities usually are spoken about almost as if they were singular actors in their own right, indeed placed, positioned, stabilized, and allowed us to understand and read, almost like a code, the imperatives of the individual self: the great collective social identities of class, race, nation, gender, and the West” (1991, p70).

### 7.6 Response, strategies, negotiation and digital media

Consumption/pro-sumption of media may invoke reflexivity among British-Pakistani youth, particularly among those who interact on digital media and lead to identifying themselves more with other Muslims, not only with Muslims within the UK but also at the international level, thus manifesting connectivity beyond the local boundaries and even beyond those of the country of origin. The individual experiences of threats and insecurity as Muslim diaspora members, living in a society that is uncomfortable with Muslims, may push individuals to take refuge under the broader umbrella of Islam to acquire a sense of security and feeling of strength. For example, explaining her fears, a female participant said:

“When I was growing up, headscarves never used to be a matter of concern to most Muslim women. Now the scarf has been shown so much on media as a symbol of Muslim women that we started adopting it to assert our solidarity and identity with other Muslims. Now many women who
became conscious of threats to Muslim ways of life wear headscarves to express solidarity with their way of living” (Lubna, 26 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 18).

Access to alternative and digital media contributes to consolidating group identity through connectivity and real-time sharing of incidents and narratives, particularly concerning happenings in the Muslim world. It empowers individuals and groups to express identity and represent themselves in their way.

The affinity of UK-based diaspora members for Muslims beyond the geographic boundaries is facilitated by transnational connectivity in an increasingly globalized world of hyper-communications. This interaction is central to a shift from the more static geography of the locality to the fluid topography of the transnational landscapes (Appadurai, 1996). It may contribute to the construction of imagined worlds, that is, the translocal and transnational bonds constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe (Anderson, 1983).

Though religion remains one of the core elements of Pakistani identity (Islam for the majority of them). Before 9/11 and the rise of Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations, the British-Pakistani diaspora treated religion as something hereditary and considered themselves Muslims because they were born in Muslim families. The rise of the narrative of the clash of civilizations at the global level and 9/11 has an impact on the construction of the group identity of British-Pakistanis as Muslims.

7.6.1 Digital media and translocal connections

The global narrative may affect identity but at the same time trigger globalized strategies for positioning and repositioning of identity. Locality is not static, and its boundaries are not impermeable; it is integrated into the global flows making up the complex array of institutions and practices that Appadurai (1996) refers to as diasporic mediascapes, ethносcape, ideoscapes, finanscapes and technoscapes.

In the view of Thompson (1995), increased accessibility to ‘non-local knowledge’ and a greater array of symbolic materials facilitated by media enhances the reflexive project of the self. As individuals’ horizons of understanding are broadened; they are no longer limited by patterns of face-to-face interaction but are shaped increasingly by the expanding networks of mediated communication. When this mediated information reaches transnational horizons through real-time sharing of happenings on digital media, the enhanced reflexive processes in diaspora communities evolve in response.
“Now pictures and messages are shared in huge amounts via Instagram and WhatsApp and it’s easier to circulate them by sharing. Sometimes I receive messages about the victimization of Muslims in other countries that arouse sympathy about Muslims and trigger my reflexivity to think in terms of ‘Look what they are doing to us,’ which sometimes may lead to anger towards Western powers, and I often overlook the good things British society has done for me and start thinking in terms of belonging to a victimized and discriminated class” (Hafeez, 27 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 17).

Tsagarousianou (2016) ascribes a significant role to digital media in the formation and dissemination of narratives of the Muslim diaspora in Europe. Muslims may find it convenient to form and share narratives about Muslim identity through digital media, as in the quest to maintain identities, the ethnic communities try to seek information from the ethnic and other international media in addition to media of the country of their residence. She asserts that this concept of transnationalism relates to continuing forms of connections through social relationships and other factors and the impact of distant social fields upon each other.

“The news and pictures related to the Muslims, which otherwise you don’t see on mainstream media, gave me a sense of things which I otherwise would not have thought about. For instance, to the images of young children wounded in bombings, my response is usually a comment on such pictures and sharing them further. But I also think about realities when I come across such pictures on social media” (Irum, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 4).

The translocal trajectories of young British-Pakistanis may contribute to the reflexive process regarding their identity based on religion. For the majority, being Muslims, the sharing of perceptions about their misrepresentation in media and traumatic images of Muslim victims of wars may help in instigating greater solidarity.

The processes of exchanging and accessing information from various local and translocal contexts, especially connections to learn about other Muslims ‘like them,’ facilitate this solidarity. This process of access and exchange of information does not constitute an end in itself. In this process, the community members consistently build a common repository of experience. In other words, they tend to relate the information they acquire about other Muslims to their own experiences.
Referring to Muslims in Europe, including the Pakistani diaspora, Tsagarousianou states; “It is this intersection of the complex connectivity that underpins the translocal and transnational field that European Muslims inhabit and of the processes of cultural reinvention and reconstruction that European Muslims are engaged in, that effectively renders communication and the media technologies crucial vehicles for the reproduction and transformation of European Muslim identities” (2016, p15). This assertion holds in the case of British-Pakistanis as Muslims.

Both local and translocal interactions play significant roles; particularly in the context of media and communications, British-Pakistanis share identity issues with the Muslims in other European countries. They incorporate symbolic materials from the local and translocal media, both mainstream and alternative. Due to the traditionally universalist character of Islam, Muslim communities in Europe have developed both translocal and transnational connections and potent transnational imaginaries.

Based on the findings of 735 interviews with Muslims in five Western European countries, including Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, Tsagarousianou identifies two key areas to explain how European Muslims inhabit transnational spaces and engage in the formation of their cultures and identities. The first is the construction of translocal and transnational phenomenological geographies (place and place-based communities) through the practices of social individuals and the second is the construction and dissemination of shared narratives.

“European Muslims draw upon the opportunities provided by the various forms of collective action and cultural creativity available to them to engage in practices of meaning creation, drawing upon diverse life histories and social-historical backgrounds. In doing so, they often arrive at shared interpretations of social reality and narratives of identity” (Tsagarousianou 2016, p4). Streams of media content and media activities influence the construction of meanings by the young British-Pakistanis.

7.6.2 Negotiating identity through digital media

The British-Pakistani youth tend to believe that their narrative never finds a place in the mainstream media and the best channel for their narrative is either word of mouth or digital media. The interactive nature of digital media, with features enabling users or consumers to become producers at the same time in the form of a new category of pro-users or pro-sumers, may function as a helpful tool to communicate the narratives through various trajectories.
“If we want to present our narrative about ‘us’ and explain how ‘we’ understand what is said by ‘others’ about us and what ‘we’ want the ‘others’ to understand about us, there is simply no way to put it in the British papers, international publications and TV channels. Even the letters to the editors written by us don’t get published. Not everyone is given space in newspapers or on TV or radio. There are very few Pakistani writers and presenters, but they also don’t write about our point of view because they usually follow the agenda of the organizations they work for. The only channels left to us are either through word of mouth or through digital media” (Adnan, 26 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 11).

In the view of young British-Pakistanis, social networking sites may have the ability to put limited powers into the hands of users like ethnic minorities. Identity politics entails issues of representation about who has the right to represent or to speak, and for whom. Digital media may appear as a strategy to cope with negative social identities (Fenton, 2012). The participants of the study realize the significance of digital media to counter the narratives, at least on small scale, but very few of them take recourse to digital media to utilize its power proactively in the form of a consistent campaign or to initiate enough to be effective, because of their limited outreach and resources.

Many factors make digital media networks compatible with young people’s aspirations. They do not conform to legislative models of governance or a representative model of elections, which partly makes them attractive to young people: they are different from conventional state-bound politics and the young people embrace this difference.

The digital networks can galvanise local campaigning and facilitate transnational political movements. These activities combine collective action and individual subjectivities, mixing personal expressions of political allegiance with public debate in an online context that may enable the spaces of action and debate to expand from local and national configurations and terrestrial media to ‘global’ counter-summits (Fenton, 2012).

The narrative can be the meanings that both individuals and groups make out of different elements and construct and reconstruct in the spiral of actions and reactions. Participants of focus groups revealed that they construct and communicate their narratives in two ways. One is to pass on their narrative, and another, more common, one is to share the content they receive and consider it as reflecting their point of view and depicting the feelings of a collective entity of belonging, like South-Asian friends or Muslim
community, sharing the content that shows Muslims, South-Asians or Pakistanis as victims of aggression of the West and the media wars.

“I don’t need to write a story of myself and facets of my relations in society, but sharing the views of others through Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp which I think reflect my point of view helps in putting forth one’s narratives. These days we find and receive photos and small video clips of what is happening around the world which I forward to other friends (Nida, 20 years, Female, London, FG 4).

Engagement with digital media, both as a consumer and as a producer in the form of prod-users and pro-sumers, may empower diasporas for building social networks and virtual communities beyond the territorial boundaries. Digital media have become important in the construction of belonging to expanded cultural groups. It relates to the process of constructing and positioning diasporic identities by constituting transnational networks and virtual communities which help to sustain and redefine group identities.

“I find digital media very useful to connect to Islam as a global entity and Muslims as a group all over the world. The content about Muslims gets circulated across the boundaries. What my cousins share with me from Canada, I may pass that on to other people in Pakistan or the USA. If I find relevant material here in the UK, I post it on my Facebook page, which may be shared further by my Facebook friends” (Fahad, 20 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 7).

Similarly, young British-Pakistanis have media trajectories of receiving information from British and other international media, necessitated by cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious compulsions. With the use of digital media, these trajectories are not one-way; they are multi-directional and oscillate communications back and forth. The communications exchanged between two people can reach multiple individuals when shared in groups.

The participants of focus group discussions said that when the Western media projects any narrative about them, the tendency is to share the links of the stories or views trending on social media. Sharing of content does not endorse it but is a way to alert and inform others about the negative propaganda of the West. The narrative that arises from the West is perceived by the British-Pakistani youth as a narrative that makes people think about them as extremists.
The trajectories of digital media may serve to give meaning to information and knowledge and carry forward the narrative of identity, both as understood and given by others, and by the British-Pakistani youth themselves. One of the important roles of digital media is the possibility of instant and widespread sharing of any point of view, which leads to the proliferation of any narrative.

As discussed in Chapter 4 in the section on media consumption, the mediascape of the British-Pakistani diaspora may be comprised of engagement with digital and alternative local and translocal media and of consumption of local mainstream and traditional mass media like television, radio, newspapers and magazines. The representation of diaspora members is not limited to the national media of the host country but appears beyond its geographical boundaries. The process of representation has moved beyond the traditional media and entered into an era of self-mass media.

“With the diffusion of the internet, a new form of interactive communication has emerged, characterized by the capacity of sending messages from many to many, in real time or chosen time, and with the possibility of using point-to-point communication, narrowcasting or broadcasting, depending on the purpose and characteristics of the intended communication practice” (Castells, 2009, p55).

“In the days of Muharram10, we can watch Majalis11 (religious gatherings) on YouTube that take place in Karachi12. I post the links on my Facebook and WhatsApp groups, thus the message reaches many people in different parts of the world” (Ali, 20 years old, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).

Thus a close connection with diaspora around the world and religious identity beyond the physical boundaries of the UK may be maintained by the British-Pakistanis youth. Castells calls this historically new form of communication ‘mass self-communication.’ It is mass communication because it can potentially reach a global audience, as in the posting of a video on YouTube, a blog with RSS links to web sources, or a message to a massive e-mail list. At the same time, it is self-communication because the production of the message is self-generated.

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10 A month of mourning for the martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the grandson of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).
11 Religious gatherings organized by Muslims of the Shia sect to mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussain.
12 A city in Pakistan.
7.6.3 New media and old limitations

Though digital media may help the audience to be on the telling side, the hearing side may be either limited or broad, depending on the outreach and tactics. The major question that comes up is whom you are telling to. Fenton (2012) asserts that what matters is who is communicating what to whom because prod-usage of social media is highly uneven amongst participants, and only a few people dominate the content.

A survey by the Harvard Business School (Heil and Piskorski, 2009) found that 10 percent of Twitter users generate more than 90 percent of content, and these users are dominated by celebrities or mainstream media corporations such as CNN. On the other hand, 2010 statistics of Infographic show that 97 percent of Twitterers have fewer than 100 followers, while celebrities likes of Britney Spears attracting 4.7 million. In this way, domination on the telling side of participation remains the preserve of a few.

Research suggests that, far from broadening our communicational horizons and deliberative understandings, social media work to reinforce already existing social hierarchies and further strengthen close communities. British-Pakistani youth realize the power and importance of digital media; at the same time, they are cognizant of the constraints of outreach of social media.

“Hardly a few hundred people see what is shared on social media by insignificant groups like us, whereas the BBC news is watched by millions. On such small scale, you can’t change perceptions” (Aleema, 25 years, female, Bradford, Mixed Group, FG 20).

British-Pakistanis realize the significance of digital media to counter the narratives on small scale, but because of low visibility very few of them take recourse to digital media to utilize its power proactively. The participants informed of having no clear strategy about generating a counter narrative to reach out to the mainstream society. Neither they demonstrated an understanding of organized social media campaigns.

“The response of the Muslim community to the cartoon of the Holy Prophet was violence in their countries. Whereas people should have utilized digital media to offset that portrayal, we probably would not act because of limitation of our outreach” (Bilal, 18 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 1).
Very few of them try to build a counter-narrative and correct perceptions by making use of various forums including digital media, although they realize that it was important to communicate to society, explaining their point of view and placing it on the internet as well: even if their outreach is limited, taking action is necessary.

“I have arranged a few events in my college. We invite our neighbours and try to explain to them about Islam and Pakistan. I also write my blog that aims at correcting misperceptions about us, although hardly 40 people would read my blog” (Uneeza, 21 years, female, Bradford, Females Group, FG 8).

Digital media may be helpful to young British-Pakistanis on the side of production and presentation if they want to present themselves as they like, but viewership might be small, as it is the number of followers that matters in digital media and not everyone has large numbers of followers.

“We may use digital media to share views among ourselves, but here we don’t need to remove any misperceptions as we already know each other. If we want to communicate to others it’s hard” (Hamid, 26 years, male, London, Males Group, FG 12).

Discussing the constrained role of digital media, participants said that though digital media provide them with an opportunity of outreach for their messages, this is limited because they can reach only those circles connected to them or following them on social media, not beyond. Their efforts to represent themselves correctly may not reach the audience where misrepresentation needs to be corrected. Participants reported that as Pakistanis and as Muslims they felt that social media could correct misperceptions, but outreach and accessibility to those with whom they aimed to communicate was an issue.

“The question is, do the people we really want to communicate our concerns listen to us? Secondly, careful use of social media means self-imposed control and then there are pressures of judgment by others. You are going to be judged, anyway. On Facebook sometimes I put Islamic content without realizing that non-Muslims would also be reading those things, which sometimes invoke reactions from others. Like one of my class fellows said that all the British-Pakistanis should go back to their country.” (Abid, 19 years, male, London, Mixed Group, FG 5).
Many participants used social media for spreading their ideas but at the same time they pointed out the need to exercise caution when using social media while discussing various issues including those of security, not wanting to be misunderstood by the monitoring bodies of the state. Participants pointed out that when it comes to putting forth their views about Pakistan in reply to negative criticism, they cannot fully express their views.

Recognizing that their voices may be constrained by barriers and cannot reach society at large through mass media, either traditional or digital, young Pakistani diaspora members sometimes rely on very basic methods of communication and try to communicate their point of view through word of mouth. They realize the need to clarify misperceptions about them disseminated by the Western media. When asked what actions they take when they perceive misrepresentation in media, 80 percent of them reported relying on word of mouth.

“When we interact with people at educational institutions and workplaces, it is important for us to communicate to people that not all Muslims or Pakistanis are the same. Not everyone is a terrorist or backward, and they do understand our point of view. Their views change when we explain to them about ourselves” (Iffat, 28 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 14).

While changes take place across the media industries, sometimes those complement the power of the dominant players in the media market (Garnham, 2011; Fuchs, 2011). At the same time, while new media might open up new spaces for communication and information exchange, they can often adopt old media systems of representations (Hassan, 2008; Fuchs, 2011).

Empirical evidence shows that traditional media persist while new media grow. For example, television remains the most popular medium across generations in the United Kingdom (Ofcom, 2010) and access to television on different platforms sustains its popularity across diverse audiences. As mass a medium, television has the power to create perceptions.

This is the case, for example, with online news media that reproduce news agendas and language familiar to audiences through print media. In this scenario representation of the Pakistani diaspora, who are predominantly Muslim, depends heavily on old media. Whatever narrative old media generates shapes the perceptions of society, in general and about the diaspora.
The narrative given by both local and translocal mainstream Western media shows the British-Pakistanis as ‘they,’ as extremist Muslims. The participants did not see themselves successful in countering this narrative, in rectifying its misperceptions or creating new narratives. A change of narrative through mainstream traditional British media may appear an impossible task to them

“What difference would this make? Even if I write letters to editors, they are never carried by the British press. Even if they carry this, how many people will read it? It won’t be repeated as many times as the news stories on prominent pages may be” (Anees, 18 years, male, Bradford, Males Group, FG 6).

Though digital media is an empowering tool due to its architecture that enables ordinary people to become producers and share their narrative and content, young British-Pakistanis may find themselves constrained from getting their narrative through to mainstream society, because the way social media works requires following by others, or visibility in cyberspace, that they may not be able to achieve.

“Social media works by the system of ‘followings.’ Famous journalists and opinion leaders have followers in millions. If they tweet or post something on Facebook or write a blog, their narrative will reach millions of people instantly. Their point of view will be readily available on search engines on the internet. But if I try to communicate something via the internet or social media to society at large, I won’t be able to do so. My following is limited to my friends and relatives and their circles and my voice would never be able to cross the barrier to reach the other side of the fence” (Nida, 19 years, female, London, Females Group, FG 3).

Besides the number of followers on social media, there is the question of understanding the use of strategies and tactics. The barriers of cultural participation and becoming a producer in the realm of digital media may be low, but their effective use requires pro-activity, competence, expertise and resources to invest in various techniques due to growing reliance on non-organic methods for running successful social media campaigns, which sometimes even stoop to misinformation and disinformation.

Studies on the use of social media reveal that these free platforms provide space for expressing an opinion to the marginalized groups, but at the same time become an agency in creating and endorsing negative discourse such as hate speech against
Muslims and endorsing stereotypes about their identity. Through such platforms, the opposing groups may win in the end by deploying organic and non-organic methods.

On social media, identities are often articulated around shared opinions. The term “opinion-based groups” refers to identities that are based on social opinion in a way that entails being for or against a specific issue within broad social categories. Guenther et al. (2020), point out that in the context of social movements, which may be about promoting a counter-narrative of identity, problematic relationships between mass media and such movements, lead to seeking alternative channels of communications to spread the information about the movements and applying strategic framing to gain public recognition and approval to define the identity in question.

One of the strategies to promote a narrative through media is strategic framing. The need to generate a counter-narrative of their identity through digital media may require British-Pakistanis to deploy strategic framing. In their study on narratives of activists and counter-narratives of opposing groups, Giraud, and Poole (2021) say that providing alternative frames is one of the key strategies for digital activists to proliferate counter-narratives. They point out the role of networked counter-publics in shifting mainstream debates about racial politics using collective power in the form of ‘network framing.’

The discursive strategies used by activists include retweeting posts in line with their ideologies to ‘crowd out’ alternative views. Efforts of groups trying to build a narrative, such as minority groups, may be thwarted by the opposing side, such as members of mainstream society, by using similar techniques, and through mobilization of more resources to manipulate free social media.

Giraud and Poole quote example of #stopIslam movement, where the activists were able to counter hegemonic opinions to an extent, but populist groups used similar tactics and were more successful. They point out that this had the paradoxical effect of the counter-narratives contributing to the greater circulation of the hate speech they sought to contest, and the effort to counter-narrative was ‘hijacked’ by the populists, to reinscribe representational inequalities.

In the war of narratives, strategies, resources to invest, numbers and consistency, framing and non-organic tactics like the use of trolls and bots, may count. In the episode of #stopIslam, the frequency of response from the populists was higher than the counter-narratives by Muslims. The hypermediated character of internet exchanges may play an important role in this context (Evolvi, 2018).
Referring to Twitter she points out that hashtags may become an agency to proliferate content available on other media, and help in mobilizing and converging social media networks of like-minded people. Twitter can be an effective tool for promoting the narrative of one group. Tweets and retweets can include links, videos, and pictures, can follow pages and can quote other users (via “@username”).

The use of hashtags (“#”) can be instrumental in crystalizing networked discourses by marking concepts to be emphasised as keywords. This facilitates finding tweets about the same topic and setting trends, helping to create networked discourse spontaneously by drawing mass attention to specific trends (Naaman, Becker and Gravano, 2011; Wilkinson and Thelwall, 2012).

The participants of this study did not demonstrate an understanding of strategic use of digital media, although studies show that the accessibility and affordability of platforms like Twitter may help to amplify voices belonging to Muslims and other marginalized groups. For example, Muslim women created the hashtag #MuslimWomenDay to share their first-hand experiences and fight Islamophobic prejudices on Twitter (Pennington 2018, cited in Evolvi 2018, p398).

But due to various factors it may not be possible for young British-Pakistanis to mobilize such platforms effectively. Due to homophily, mainstream society may side with the opposing group, suppressing the voice of minority groups. Twitter can promote hate speech or negative attitudes against various groups and has been identified as a fertile venue for creating anti-Muslim discourses (Magdy, Darwish and Abokhodair, 2015).

The association Tell Mama (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) reported that the majority of anti-Muslim acts in 2015 in the UK took place online, with more than half (57 percent) taking place on Twitter (Littler and Feldman, 2015) and a spike in hate crimes against Muslims after the British referendum, which the association says had a lasting impact on faith-based and racially aggravated crimes.

Keeping in view these dynamics of digital media, it could be inferred that for young British-Pakistanis digital media may only facilitate in constructing narratives of day-to-day lives and circulate them to small groups of followers and friends. It is hard to achieve the construction and circulation of narratives on larger issues and aimed at a wider audience, as Fenton (2012) asserts that the internet encourages pervasive communication and an ever-connected online presence, with social networking sites extending neoliberal ideology rather than contesting it.
Summary

Representation of groups through media may have implications for the construction and expression of identity. In a multistranded spiral of the interplay of media engagement, construction of narrative, representation, perceptions and construction of identity, media representation may impact various facets of the identity of British-Pakistani youth and invoke a need to construct and assert their narrative. British-Pakistani youth may perceive their representation in the mainstream media as misrepresentation, which may result in the creation of misperceptions and stereotypes about them in mainstream society.

The participants of the study, who were selected as a sample of British-Pakistani youth, informed during focus group discussions that their engagement with media may be determined by multiple aspects of their identities, such as young British citizens and diaspora, together with their response to perceived misrepresentation. The young British-Pakistanis, the majority of them Muslims, may be identified by media with extremism, terrorism and a set of characteristics which may be considered by mainstream society as opposed to Western values, besides an already existing stigmatized ‘Paki’ identity of backward South Asians.

The major theme of this chapter revolved around British-Pakistani youths’ perceptions about their identity as constructed in a nexus of interplay with media, covering both sides, i.e. how they perceive this mediated representation, their perceptions about how society might perceive them, and as a response, how they may reflexively engage with media to find solace and solidarity with likeminded people and to convey their narrative.

The research questions investigated in this chapter pertained to their media consumption practices and strategies in response to their perceptions of misrepresentations of their communities and themselves. The questions were investigated concerning the construction of their identities and self-representation while taking into consideration aspects of gender and class.

The broader theme was derived from the subthemes, including the representation of British-Pakistanis in the mainstream media; the impact of representation on identity; and functions of media engagement such as solidarity, solace and putting forward their identity narrative. In terms of representation by the media, the subthemes, derived from analysis of discussions with participants, reflect misrepresentation in mainstream media as a broad category of homogenized Muslims. This includes stereotypes such as extremists;
terrorists; disloyal to the host society; British/Western value systems; homogenized migrants who are a burden on the economy and other resources; and backward South Asians who remain segregated, not integrating into the culture of the host society.

Regarding the representation of British-Pakistani women, some of the important points that contributed to subthemes were media content on suppression of women by male figures in their families and overrepresentation of horrific incidences like honour killing. Further important points were objections to women’s styles of dressing such as covering the head and the perceptions that Muslim women may not be expected to go into higher education or professions. There were no obvious differences regarding class, as all the British-Pakistanis were represented as a community of underachievers in a lower socio-economic class. Even Christians of Pakistani origin living in the UK may be homogenized with other Pakistanis. Similar problems of perceptions exist for them too.

In connection with the construction of identity and identification, a contrast in perceptions by the society, the meta identity and those of individuals and groups at the micro and meso levels emerged during the discussions. The subthemes reflected an oppositional view of British-Pakistanis to such representations. The participants reported that they considered themselves as a marginalized group alienated by society and as victims of class, racial and religious discrimination. In their view, Muslims in other parts of the world are victims who have been suffering from Western countries’ policies of interventions and aggression, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. They identified the media narrative as a deliberate attempt to create Islamophobia and xenophobia in society, targeting Muslims and South Asians.

Narratives about their categorization as ‘others’ with doubts about their loyalty to the country of residence were rejected by the participants as well. The majority indicated self-consciousness about being different in terms of physical appearances and cultural orientation but stated that they considered themselves British first. In their view, it is the society that imposes on them a hyphenated identification as a constant reminder of not being really British.

The participants spoke about their perceptions of not being welcomed by mainstream society, despite being born and brought up in the UK. They shared feelings that they were being treated as migrants with expectations of stereotyped roles. In their view, diasporas settled in the UK for generations were being equated and identified with fresh migrants, including those from Eastern European countries.
They reported seeking identification with an imagined homogenized Muslim nationhood, the Ummah (a political identity), for psychological security, as a reaction to the securitization of Muslims as a homogenized entity with doubts about their loyalty to the host country. A spiral process appears to be in a place where the local and mainstream media represent British-Pakistanis in a particular way that triggers reflexivity leading to a repositioning of group identity as a strategy to deal with misperceptions. As young British-Pakistanis strategize their identity position under the umbrella of Islam, women assert the Muslim way of life through religious symbols such as headscarves.

The situation where identity is stigmatized and challenged and loyalty is contested may lead to a strengthening of boundaries for the sake of solidarity. The participants of the study reported that stereotypes about Muslims may push them towards translocal connectivity with Pakistanis and Muslims across the globe, facilitated by advancements in media technology and the process of globalization itself. Raising boundaries in the place of their geographical presence and lowering boundaries in virtual space may lead to a process of hybridization and possibilities of cultural and ideological synthesis through interaction with culture back home and international aspects of the culture of groups sharing similar ethos through transnational connectivity.

An oppositional approach in decoding the messages of Western mainstream media including digital versions of mainstream papers and channels and social media campaigns from anti-Muslim and anti-immigration groups dominated the subthemes regarding the reception of media messages by the British-Pakistanis as an ethnic minority group. In addition to this, they spoke of their reliance on alternative sources and other international media like Russia Today and Al-Jazeera, which they perceived as giving sympathetic views about Muslims. In a way, participants attached stereotypes of maligning Muslims with Western media.

With their perception of themselves as ‘others’ who are victims of misrepresentation and stigmatization, the participants of the study spoke about pro-sumption media in search of content that may bring solace. The subtheme of pro-sumption of digital media and social media platforms included such functions as sharing of common anxieties as a marginalized and stigmatized minority, a catharsis of feelings of victimization on racial and religious grounds, and sharing of content, resulting in a common repository of ideas.

The participants of the study realized the need to correct their identification with the perception of their identity as homogenized Muslim extremists and terrorists and to assert the point of view that not all Muslims were either of these. The need to construct
and communicate their narrative of identity in reaction to narratives in media brought in the notion of imbalance in power over voice. In terms of strategies, participants indicated no conscious efforts to counter the dominant narrative in the mainstream media and society. They found this difficult because they perceived mainstream mass media as powerful entities that were not inclusive of diverse views, operating in line with the agenda set by those who pull the strings in the context of the political economy of media.

The participants expressed the view that digital media may have the power to create virtual communities and shared platforms where everyone can speak. At the same time, they manifested awareness of the limitations of their outreach. They found it difficult to communicate to society at large because messages through social media platforms reach the audience through a system of audience followers, where already famous people have more followers and can reach out to a wider audience.

The participants expressed concerns that due to the dynamics of digital media it is hard for their voice to reach British mainstream society. So, in a way, they found themselves voiceless even on digital media, unable to further their narrative. They did not even try to create trends on Twitter as they thought it needed concerted effort and resources. Neither did they find themselves competent enough to use several techniques of outreach through social media.

There is a spiral of interaction between the media and identity. The perception of British-Pakistani youth may be that the mainstream media contributes to labelling them as ‘others’ incompatible with British society. In reaction, translocal connectivity through digital connectivity crystalizes the feeling of solidarity. In the post-9/11 period, the religious component of their identity has become an overarching feature. They perceive Western media misrepresenting all Muslims as extremists and terrorists. In response, they may seek refuge in Muslim Ummah as a source of strength.

Access to alternative and digital media may contribute to consolidating their group identity through connectivity. British-Pakistanis may realize the significance of digital media in constructing counternarratives, at least on small scale, but would not take recourse to utilize its power proactively due to constraining factors such as the number of followers or use of inorganic methods of outreach which may require investments beyond their means and capacity.
Conclusion

The aim of this research was to investigate the dynamics of the interplay of media consumption with the construction of identity of young people of Pakistani heritage living in Britain as diaspora, known as British-Pakistanis. The study was based on the perceptions of British-Pakistani youth, ascertained through focus group discussions with 160 participants and in-depth interviews with some informers. In the context of the questions raised on the identity of British-Pakistanis and multiculturalism in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, the study investigated how British-Pakistani youth perceive the representation of their identity through media in an environment of globalization and proliferation of digital media which has unleashed trans-local and virtual connectivity.

With insights from models of audience research, views of young members of Pakistani diaspora were ascertained from the communities in London and Bradford ensuring representation of, males, females and followers of different religions and sects. Interpretations were made in the light of the influence of political economy of media.

In the broad premises of the role of media as a social resource, a major source of information, a key transmitter of representations and having the power to control and shape attitudes and beliefs held in the popular imagination (Cohen and Gardener, 1982; Ferguson, 1998; Hall, 1990), the research investigated the media engagement practices of young British-Pakistanis driven by gratification of their needs and an interplay of these practices with construction and positioning of various contours of identity.

Some of the main questions investigated were how media representations may be perceived by British-Pakistani youth and affect the construction of their identity through creating narratives and perceptions. How they may perceive themselves and how others perceive them; whether the mediated narrative and representation invoke any reactions and whether they need to put forward their narrative with the help of peculiar practices and strategies as reflexive responses.

The hypothesis of the research was that “British-Pakistani youth develop strategies and practices of media usage that constitute at least partly in response to the dominant representation of their communities, and, through these, they attempt to construct their own distinct identities.” Research questions were developed based on this hypothesis (see Chapter 3), and questions for participants were framed to gather information pertaining to the research questions. The analysis of replies led to codes that constituted sub-themes and themes that emerged from this research.
The research focused on eliciting the views of youth of Pakistani heritage living in Britain about their representation through media, in their own voice, as they may confront identity issues in different frames of reference peculiar to diaspora communities and young people, with further cross-cutting strands of identity like ethnicity, class, race and religion. The majority of Pakistanis being Muslim, after 9/11 and 7/7, face challenges like the media presenting a homogenized identity of them as extremists and terrorists and broadcasting narratives that might be rooted in the history of migration and settlement, politics of multiculturalism, perpetuating misperceptions in the society.

The interpretation and analysis were carried out against the backdrop of the power of media to shape perceptions and attitudes in society at various levels and the influence of the political economy of media. Insights from the models of the hegemony of dominant ideology and coding and decoding by the producers and users of content were used for constructing meanings, keeping in view the politics of multiculturalism in Britain and the contested multiculturalism in the wake of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era caused by the securitization of Muslims.

Regarding diaspora, the interplay of media and identity can be seen in the light of the dynamics of minority social groups existing in a mainstream majority society. The identity of minority groups with a difference is judged against that of the majority, which is considered as the normal, standard benchmark. The construction of social identity is represented by narratives that contribute to creating perceptions and misperceptions.

Media with its power to control and shape perceptions, attitudes and beliefs may contribute to the construction of identity and identification through representation and may even contribute to misrepresentations and under or overrepresentation of various facets of the identity of minority groups at various levels ranging from micro to meta and global perspective, for various reasons including the political economy of media and communications and ideological compulsions. Influential media with global outreach (Western/British) may have the power to create and affect perceptions widely even globally.

“The mass media are understood to be the most important shaper of contemporary society, usurping the role previously held by church, state and school, as directors of public understanding, thus becoming society’s primary socialising agents” (Gandy, 1998, p24). The media themselves do not have unlimited control over representation, as media products must comply with the requirements of advertisers, policymakers and the audience, Gandy adds. Therefore, media images of ‘race’ comply with dominant ideological and economic imperatives.
The strands in the chain of narrativization; representation; perception; construction of identity and identification; and reorientation of media consumption and pro-sumption may interplay in the form of a multistranded spiral taking along both the mainstream society and the minority group in question. This process in turn may influence the use and prod-usage of media to express identity and to identify with other groups that may share similar anxieties and concerns and, in an attempt, to rectify narratives, representations and perceptions about them, which may be considered among factors that define and determine needs for media consumption and pro-sumption.

**Key Findings**

The key findings were ascertained through the sub-themes and themes emerging from the interpretation and analysis of responses of participants in a paradigm of a spiral of the interplay of identity and media, leading to three mainstreams of themes: consumption and pro-sumption of media, construction and positioning of identity, and reactions, reflexivity and strategies, each discussed with subthemes in the following sections.

**Consumption and pro-sumption of media**

**Diaspora’s wider needs of consumption and pro-sumption**

To find the answers to the research questions (discussed in Chapter 3), it was first necessary to ascertain the media engagement practices of the sample representing the young British-Pakistanis (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). Given the proliferation of digital media, aspects of engagement with media as both consumers and pro-sumers were investigated in the framework of uses and gratifications theory (UGT) propounded and developed by McQuail, Blumer and Katz, which focuses on *Why* people use media and *What* they use them for. Media engagement was analysed in terms of the channels of communications, the devices and the content.

The analysis of participants’ responses revealed that media consumption and pro-sumption of young British-Pakistanis in terms of gratification of needs of information, entertainment, personal and social integration could be influenced by their various frames of reference, which include their existence as British citizens, as youth and as diaspora of Pakistani origin with Muslim and South-Asian heritage and their links with people in the country of origin, connections with diaspora in other countries and affinity with broader umbrella entities like the Muslim Ummah.

The media trajectories of the British-Pakistani diaspora have a wide scope that includes British mainstream, ethnic, international and digital media. In terms of channels of
communications, pro-sumption and prod-usage of digital media covering online editions of newspapers, radio and TV channels and social media platforms emerged as the preferred media practice. Accessibility may be an important factor in determining media consumption and pro-sumption. Cost-effectiveness, convenience and flexibility of digital media may be among the reasons for reliance on digital media in addition to its ability to provide translocal and transnational connectivity, an important need of diasporas.

Participants reported that digital media served the needs of both social integration and expression of identity. Members of the diaspora engage with media in several frames of reference and their needs and gratifications may be more than people belonging to just one nationality or cultural heritage. The multiple identities of diaspora may have many more facets than those of a single culture. For instance, belonging to ‘home’, both real and imaginary, plays an important role in media consumption practices of diasporas.

The young British-Pakistanis who have grown up in Britain consider themselves British citizens first and prefer British and other English language international media to ethnic media, contrary to the understanding that members of the diaspora engage with ethnic media. Ethnic media may not gratify their needs, firstly because they live in Britain and want to remain abreast with the happenings in the country and secondly because they understand the English language and culture much better.

**Apathy toward consumption of ethnic media**

Another subtheme that emerged was the involuntary consumption of ethnic media, particularly viewership of ethnic television channels originating from Pakistan and the UK. The participants expressed disinterest in the ethnic media except for religious programmes, music and dramas by female participants.

**Oppositional decoding of messages about Muslims and Pakistanis**

Regarding trust in British and other Western media, participants of the study informed that the young British-Pakistanis, majority following Islam as their religion, may look at the coverage of Muslims in the perspective of international positioning of Islam and consider news and reports by Western media as part of a Western conspiracy to malign Muslims. They may be sceptical of British media in terms of objectivity towards Muslims. Concerning news and other programmes about Muslims, they would take content emanating from the British media as misrepresentation of Muslims. For authenticity and credibility, they may seek perspectives of other international channels in English like Al Jazeera and RT, which they consider objective in terms of reporting on Muslims.
The construction of meanings by different audiences plays an important role in creating the impact of media on the construction of identity. The same message may be interpreted differently by the different sets of audience. Research by Morley (1980) found that the social and discourse positions of audiences influence the construction of meanings. “Intervening variables that mediate various understandings include the structure of the text, the social context in which it is read, the culture of the reader, reading competencies, likes and dislikes and opportunities.” (Boyd-Barrett, 199, p499).

According to Poole (2001), individuals tend to receive information that is sympathetic to them, and people decode meanings according to their social context. From the perspective of group dynamics of mainstream society and minority groups, media representations of the same phenomenon can be understood differently by different groups. This may give rise to different perceptions and eliciting different responses in terms of construction, expression and performance of identity.

For example, based on their representation in British media, Muslims may be perceived by mainstream British society as a group that lacks integration and loyalty to the host society, thus a potential threat to the security of the society. Such perceptions may invoke a response to reassess the multicultural policy. Muslims, on the other hand, may perceive it as a deliberate attempt to portray Muslims as extremists and terrorists to create discrimination and otherness. Response to this understanding may be a feeling of victimization and alienation or associating with a more benign identity group.

The participants reported that besides individuals and communities, geographic entities were misrepresented too. Pakistan as a country and localities in Britain where Pakistani diaspora dwell in large numbers, for instance, Bradford, may be shown in a negative light by the British mainstream media. Such representations, through media, may affect identity and identification at micro, meso and macro levels with ramifications for group interactions. The Pakistani diaspora youth expressed concerns that an incompatible ‘otherness’ and an atmosphere of fear and insecurity created by Islamophobia have led to rising tensions between various groups in society.

British-Pakistanis tend to take an oppositional view to even Pakistani media. Due to their Pakistani heritage, they may need to seek out news about Pakistan and Pakistanis but not only through ethnic media. The participants said they may find news on Pakistani channels loaded with negative stories about Pakistan like bomb blasts, crimes accidents and killings, which they perceived as an unbalanced representation of Pakistan.
Varied interpretation of representation: securitization vs Islamophobia

As the coding and decoding depend on the background of the producers and receivers, the representation of British-Pakistanis in a certain way may create different perceptions for the mainstream society and British-Pakistanis themselves. The producers, usually of White British background, may produce reports about the radicalization of Muslims in Britain or the allocation of government housing for big South-Asian families amidst new waves of the influx of economic migrants from various parts of the world, particularly Eastern Europe, creating strain on resources.

These reports may be matters of real concern to mainstream society, who would accept these reports and perceive them as threats by the British-Pakistanis. On the other hand, British-Pakistanis, may perceive such reports as an over-representation of negative points about the ethnic and religious groups they belong to. Such content is likely to be accepted by the mainstream society. Political economy of media and the dominant ideology may compel media organizations to produce and propagate such content.

The audiences perceive and construct meanings from the message based on their socio-economic position and cultural background in the given situation of time and space (Hall, 1973; Morley, 1992). The participants reported that they may not accept the news and other programmes like documentaries on Islam and Muslims in the environment of Islamophobia and the historical positioning of British-Pakistanis as inferior. Their experience of discrimination and stereotyping may lead them not to believe everything that British media shows. The participants were of the view that as British citizens they would prefer British newspapers and channels rather than ethnic media, but when it comes to news about Pakistan and Muslims they may question the credibility and impartiality of British media and seek to access other international media such as Al-Jazeera and Russia Today because of their empathy towards Muslims.

Perpetuation of an inaccurate narrative of the history of migration

In Britain, the Pakistani diaspora is perceived as a low-class, backward group of economic migrants who came here in search of economic gains. As the collective identities are constructed through various processes including history, it was necessary to look into the history of migration of the Pakistani diaspora, which revealed that labourers from the villages of Azad Kashmir had come on the invitation of the British government to fulfil the demand of manpower caused by the killings of men in the World War II and emigration of many Britishers to other countries.
The hegemonic discourse portrayed this post-colonial migration as a one-sided push in search of economic gains. This discourse continues even today rather than showing the complementary nature of the migrants to the economic revival of the post-war economy. This narrative promoted a perception of the Pakistani diaspora as parasitic. The media continued to represent this identity of Pakistani migrants, while not all Pakistanis are from the labour class. Highly qualified Pakistani professionals and businessmen contribute positively to the British economy and society but never find a space in mainstream British media. If a high achiever of Pakistani descent is shown at all they are presented as a ‘British’, rather than a ‘British-Pakistani.’

**Construction and positioning of identity**

**Affinity, solidarity and sustenance of religious and cultural heritage**

The members of the British-Pakistani diaspora navigate between different frames of reference. Through media consumption and pro-sumption different aspects of identity are reinforced or constructed. Content on current affairs, religion, entertainment and sports may serve to maintain affinity and solidarity with Pakistan, South Asia and Muslims.

When distinct cultures come into proximity, on the one hand, shared cultural spaces are created which causes hybridization. But on the other hand, this may reinforce social and cultural boundaries (Geertz, 1993; Harvey, 1989; Modood, 1997). Historically, when Pakistani diaspora communities were in the process of consolidation during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, religious rituals and places of religious worship like mosques played a role in sustaining ethnic and cultural affinity (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).

Now the digital media offer virtual space for religious programmes like learning of Holy Quran and lectures by religious scholars, which may help to sustain religious identity. Religious programmes may serve as social resources and institutions in the construction of aspects of Muslim identity. Learning to read Holy Quran in Arabic and its interpretation in the language of daily conversation both on television and the internet may be seen as a useful resource for young people who wanted to learn Holy Quran at home.

Apart from Islamic channels of the Sunni school of thought, channels for followers of other schools of thought and faiths like Shia, Barelvi, Christianity and Ahmediya cater for followers of diverse belief systems within the Pakistani community. Media serves as a resource for sustaining religious and sectarian identities. Participants were of the view that not only religious content but also music, drama and sports play an important role in reinforcing affinity and solidarity with Pakistan.
Consumption of sports on media by the British-Pakistani youth may be seen as a reflection of aspects of identity well integrated with some aspects of mainstream society and youth culture in general. Cricket, which is the most popular sport for Pakistanis, including the diaspora, may be seen as a positive connection and identification with the country of origin. Watching cricket with family and friends is like a ritual and helps to sustain close connections with families. The participants said that Pakistanis would always take the side of the Pakistani cricket team even if it is playing against Britain, which may raise doubts about their loyalty to the host country.

Watching cricket matches on television and the internet may gratify the entertainment needs of young British-Pakistanis, but at the same time, it strengthens their solidarity with Pakistan. Sports may play an important role at the micro and meso levels of identity in terms of building the self-esteem of Pakistani identity when they watch their team perform well.

Among women, Urdu dramas may be popular and help to sustain connections with the traditions and values of Pakistan. Usually, young women watch dramas with their mothers, which again is an act of maintaining closeness among family members.

**Oscillating identities and careful performance on digital media**

Digital media may be instrumental in the construction and expression of the identity of British-Pakistani youth. Like young people of the mainstream culture, they tend to curate and present various facets of their identity on digital media. Esman (2009) explains a trilateral set of relationships for diaspora: the country of origin, the host country and the diaspora itself, with its many linkages.

Diasporic identities oscillate between the cultures of the country of origin and the host country; private life at home and in the public sphere; and loyalty to the host country and back home. They re-contextualize constantly according to the situation and reposition according to needs sometimes as response to representation at others to serve functions of multiple aspects of identity.

The participants of the study said that they consider themselves British but may not be accepted as ‘British’ in the true sense of the word by mainstream society. They may support the Pakistani cricket team playing in Britain but would support the British football team. These multiple affiliations may require recontextualization and oscillation of identity between different loyalties according to the context of the situation.
According to McEwan (2013), identities are perceived, in a cyclic process, whereby aspects of the self are selected, presented, and adjusted to meet the gaze of a specific audience as identity is a combination of self, audience and or network in the case of digital interactions. The participants of the study reported performing different features of their identities in different situations: Female participants discuss Pakistani dresses and cuisines on the WhatsApp groups of their folks back home, while with their university friends in the UK their chats may be around ‘The X Factor.’

Many of the participants reported exercising great caution regarding performance on social media platforms to avoid unwanted objections and conflicts from various audiences. Many participants reported negative reactions to their posts or pictures from members of their online networks in Pakistan and Britain. For instance, a female participant reported receiving criticism from her aunt in Pakistan when she posted her photo in a sleeveless blouse on Facebook. Similarly, a young man had to delete a quote by a Muslim cleric that he had posted when he was criticized by a British Facebook friend.

**Superfluid identities and multiple hybridity in the context of hyper-communications and ultracomplex societies**

Phenomenal developments have taken place in media and communications in terms of speed, scale, scope and space, which could be referred to as a paradigm of hyper-communications. These advancements have rendered new dimensions to the studies on diaspora and youth because of the close connection of media engagement with the construction of identities of members of the diaspora and their efforts to put forward their representations and narratives at individual and collective levels.

The literature on the characterization of diaspora and diasporic identity reflects cognizance of the role of communications in the translocal and transnational connectivity of diasporas and the formation of virtual communities. The phenomena of online participatory culture, online activity and interactions and the formation of virtual communities have a strong role to play in the process of construction of diasporic and youth identity.

Cyberspace, with its characteristics of openness, spread and penetration into the lives of individuals, has afforded the construction of imaginative entities of belonging, difference, multiple cultural interactions and the confluence of aspects of identities. The dynamics of the interplay of multiple layers of identities with hyper-communications may contribute to the process of hybridity rendering a state of superfluidity to identity. At the same time, it may contribute to enhancing boundaries under the influence of virtual communities and affinities.
In these complex and multifaceted interactions, hybridity has become a complicated process. Besides hybridization in physical spaces of interactions, various aspects of individual and cultural identities may be hybridized through interactions on virtual planes. For example, young Pakistani diaspora may adopt Western styles of dressing but in terms of religion they may incorporate political philosophy of pan-Islamic movements shared either in places of worship or in digital space. Such practices may be different from what is practised by Pakistanis back home or the practices of their parents.

In this way, hybridization may not be restricted to the culture of host societies but may include the cultures outside or in a clash with mainstream culture. Through media consumption and pro-sumption, hybridization can be seen as an amalgamation of diversified hybridized blocks of identity. When translated into cultural terms, it may give rise to ultracomplex cultures. Similarly, multicultural British society has become an ultracomplex society due to a combination of diversity within the migrants based on race, ethnicity and religion and the hybrids of multiple hybridized blocks of identity.

**Assuming otherness through media representation**

Another finding that emerged from the analysis of data was the participants’ perception, created by the media, of a feeling of otherness from the mainstream society. It can create otherness in both the sense that mainstream society starts to perceive the minority ethnic group as others and that the group itself start to talk in the same manner and treat themselves as others. As Kabir (2012) points out from her study of British-Pakistani Muslims, the feeling of otherness can be induced or reinforced through constant reminders of otherness. The participants of her study used terminology similar to that of media: ‘us’ for themselves and ‘they’ for British mainstream society and British media (discussed in detail in Chapter 7).

From the analysis of responses of participants of this study, it could be inferred that by showing South-Asians and Muslims as an embodiment of traits incompatible with the Western system of values the mainstream media build up the processes of multifaceted and multi-layered otherness. The connotation of being other is different from that of diversity and difference. In the context of culture and the history of colonialism, it implies the inferiority of non-White people and cultures.

The perceptions of the research participants about the role of media were that media created misrepresentations and stereotypes about Muslims as a homogenous monolithic group of terrorists and extremists posing a threat to the security and value system of the West. Homogenization of British-Pakistanis as part of a bigger identity group of
Muslims overlooked the followers of other religions and sects of Pakistani heritage residing in Britain. The shift of emphasis on otherness from the one based on South-Asian backward immigrants working class ‘the Pakis’ to extremist Muslims submerged all other facets of the identity of British Muslims, including their civic British identity, into one monolithic identification with extremist Islam.

The blanket attribution by the mainstream media to group all Muslims, irrespective of regional, national, linguistic and sectarian variations, may be perceived by the young British-Pakistanis as a projection of the notion of otherness within British society, where perceptions about Muslims as a group incompatible with British identity were being generated. At the macro level, it poses the question of belonging to an imagined nation. Such a portrayal of Muslims may be seen by British-Pakistanis as a deliberate attempt to alienate Muslims from mainstream society, which induces a sense of victimization and marginalisation. These perceptions of British-Pakistani youth may be endorsed and explained through the findings of research studies on othering through representation. (Hall,1990; Ross,1992; Ross and Playdon, 2001; discussed in detail in Chapter1).

Though these studies were carried out regarding Black identities, they provide models of understanding the processes that deal with othering not only in terms of positioning but also of making the target group realize and conform to the dominant ideology and start seeing themselves as others.

These processes can be attributed to the political economy of media. Ross and Playdon (2001) maintain that all representations are culturally constructed and positioned in a specific historical context. They note that media representations are neither objective nor democratic, as not all groups in society are equally represented. Ethnic minorities may be marginalised by a White ideology that prevails as ‘common sense’ through the scheme of coding by the producers, who share a similar outlook of the dominant culture. Images of ethnic minorities may not represent the social reality of the group in question; rather they serve to position society and the group into a way of thinking about otherness.

**Reactions, reflexivity and strategies**

**Alignment with an imagined global Muslim nation**

The media representations of British-Pakistanis may be perceived by them as factors for creating alienation and segregation. When identity is rejected the reaction may be a struggle for acceptability in mainstream society or a look towards more benign references. The aspects of identity that are challenged may initiate a struggle for assertion. Similarly, when the Muslim identity of British-Pakistanis is challenged, securitized and
stigmatized they may feel like victims and experience fear. In such a situation they would associate themselves with collective Muslim political identity for psychological security. The participants reported seeking identification with an imagined homogenized Muslim nationhood, the Ummah (a political identity), as a reaction to the securitization of Muslims as a homogenized entity. The spiral of interplay ensues reflexivity, leading to a repositioning of group identity as a strategy for dealing with misperceptions. The process of repositioning may influence the use of media as well.

As they tend to align themselves with the bigger entity under the umbrella of political Islam, the consumption and pro-sumption of media may be reoriented. The consumption of religious content would fulfil the need to seek knowledge about religion both as a faith and as a political force and help to assert an identity belonging to a global imagined Muslim nation. For news about Muslims, they rely on media that may be perceived as not maligning Muslims, for instance, TV channels like Russia Today and Al Jazeera. Similarly, pro-sumption of social media platforms may be oriented for such functions as sharing common anxieties as a marginalized and stigmatized minority, a catharsis of feelings of victimization on racial and religious grounds and sharing content for building a common repository of ideas.

**Own voice for self-representation and narrative**

The participants perceived a negative impact of misrepresentations of their identities on the perceptions of the mainstream society about Pakistanis and Muslims, leading to effects on social interactions as many of them reported experiencing the anger of White people towards Muslims after incidents where harm was inflicted. Research by Ross (1992) on perceptions of White people regarding ethnic minorities shows that media representation may have a strong influence on attitudes of Whites towards other groups. Because a majority of White people do not have direct experience of interaction with other people, their attitudes would be grounded on media representations. Ross’ study revealed that although the White participants of the research acknowledged stereotypical representations of ethnic minorities on media, they continued to attribute negative characteristics to ethnic minorities in real life. The hegemony of British media and dominant ideology determines the narrative about ethnic minorities.

The participants of this study revealed that young people of Pakistani heritage may perceive mainstream British print and electronic media as having a negative bias against Pakistanis, both as South-Asians and as Muslims, and against Pakistan as a country. They expressed the opinion that media deliberately misrepresent the Pakistani diaspora,
the people of Pakistan and the country itself. The combination of being young, South-Asian and Muslim make young British-Pakistani diaspora members targets of misrepresentation in multiple ways. In the participants’ view, their representation through media may not be realistic as it comprises overrepresentation of negative aspects and underrepresentation of positive aspects.

The issue of voice becomes important in this respect as it is the mainstream narrative that defines the identity of young British-Pakistanis, who never get a chance to define their identity themselves at the national level. They may see themselves in the position of a subaltern. Describing this dependency on someone else, Spivak (1998) asserts that a subaltern depends upon Western intellectuals to “speak for” them. Instead of being allowed to speak for themselves, they are spoken for.

Spivak sees this academic understanding of the subaltern as a unified group that needs to be spoken for, as an epistemic approach that continues the ethnocentric Western imperialist domination of the world and does not take into account the heterogeneity of the colonized body politic. Thus, speaking for the dispossessed, one risks reinscribing their marginalization. Representation of a certain group in media depends on who controls the media.

For the Pakistani diaspora, who are marginalized in many ways, their representation in mainstream media remains questionable, like other marginalized groups. While discussing the representation of diasporas in media as minority social groups or communities, Georgiou (2014) holds that media can be revealing of the position of minorities in a society, especially through their representation or lack of representation in the media.

**Challenges of negotiating identities**

In the situation where British-Pakistani youth may perceive misrepresentation by the mainstream media, their response may invoke a reflexive process to re-assert position or reposition through strategies of putting forth their narrative. The view of the participants was that mainstream media does not include their opinion as it works on its agenda. Some of them spoke about writing letters to the editors, which they said were never published. Though they were engaged with social media platforms, they were not conscious of various strategies to counter the narrative or were not resourceful enough to employ means to conduct organized campaigns.

In describing digital media as a useful resource for the diaspora, Georgiou (2014) argues that the diversification of the media means that minorities, including diasporas, not only see themselves on the receiving side of a singular mainstream media system but also can
increasingly become engaged with multiple systems, many of which are interactive. In
the context of diasporas, digital media are now seen as spaces where they increasingly
communicate interests, make claims and mobilize identities.

The participants of this study spoke about some tactical level efforts to present their
narrative through social media platforms but expressed limitations due to regimes
governing the digital space. They may attempt to represent themselves individually
through social media platforms, but the dissemination of that information is very narrow
and may be confined to those who already know them.

**New media and old regimes: the myth of digital media as an instrument of the voice
of the marginalized**

While new media might open up new spaces for communication and information
exchange, they can often adopt old media systems of representations (Fuchs, 2011 and
Fenton, 2016). The political economy and advertisements play a big role in the regime
of digital media as well. The participants of the study revealed not having many follow-
ers. Moreover, their followers usually friends or colleagues would already know at least
something about them. They are aware that those who misperceive them may not be
following them, so the voice will not be heard by those who need to know. Hence they
may not be concerned about adopting a conscious strategy to tackle misrepresentations.

Though digital media may help the audience to be on the telling side, the scope of the
hearing side may depend on outreach and tactics. Fenton (2012) asserts that what matters
is who is communicating what to whom because prod-usage of social media is highly
uneven amongst participants, and only a few people dominate the content.

A survey by the Harvard Business School (Heil and Piskorski, 2009) found that ten per-
cent of Twitter users generate more than 90 percent of content, and these users are dom-
inated by celebrities or mainstream media corporations such as CNN. Thus, domination
on the telling side of participation remains the preserve of a few. Research suggests that,
far from broadening communicational horizons and deliberative understandings, social
media work to reinforce already existing social hierarchies. The accessibility and afford-
bility of platforms like Twitter may help to amplify voices belonging to Muslims and
other marginalized groups. For example, Muslim women created the hashtag #Mus-
limWomenDay to share their first-hand experiences and fight Islamophobic prejudices
Lack of clarity and conscious collective strategy

Giraud and Poole (2021) discuss various dimensions of social media campaigns and point out that efforts of groups trying to build a narrative, such as minority groups, may be thwarted by the opposing side, such as members of mainstream society, by using similar techniques, and through mobilization of more resources to manipulate free social media. The participants of this study revealed that they would hardly take any organized conscious action to counter the mainstream narrative against Muslims and Pakistanis, but unconsciously they do strategize consumption of media at the levels of individuals or smaller groups.

They may seek information and news from sources other than British media and would share information and pictures about the issues of Muslims through social media platforms. They may participate in the greater threads of social media production through a comment or even expressing like or dislike. They may participate in political or religious cultures at transnational and global levels, like the debates of an imagined Muslim nation to develop solidarity.

Concerning the repositioning of identity, the participants could not offer any clear ideas that what aspects of identity should be repositioned and how. They pointed out that their representation as underachievers and misfits as South-Asians or the representation as extremist Muslims incompatible with the Western value system needs to be changed, but they did not how and in what ways to rectify the perceptions.

It is the collective identity of Muslims that is challenged and needs repositioning, but they may not have in mind any collective action to counter the dominant narrative through media. They do not pro-actively or consciously strategize the use of digital media for creating their narrative, nor would they ever try to approach mainstream media.

At the micro-level of identity they may share their day-to-day activities and aspirations and curate the performance of aspects of their multiple identities with more ease and as a conscious effort. Their participation in the aspects of issues and aspirations of other young people and British mainstream culture through the groups of class fellows and clubs would be more diversified. In a way their engagements with digital media is confined to day to day matters like other young people but may not rest on any strategies to put forth a narrative of collective identity or issues.
Findings concerning the hypothesis and research questions

This section will discuss whether the hypothesis is supported or not and the research questions answered. These will be discussed one by one.

Hypothesis: “Young British-Pakistanis develop strategies and practices of media usage that constitute at least partly in response to the dominant representation of their communities, and, through these, they attempt to construct their own distinct identities.”

The analysis of empirical research affirms that media usage, consumption, prod-usage and pro-sumption by the young British-Pakistanis who participated in this study may be influenced by their dominant representations through media. Their media engagement may be determined at least partly in response to their dominant representation, which would be tactical rather than strategic. At the individual or micro levels, they may interpret the messages from media within the context of collective Muslim identity.

In response to their representation in mainstream British media, they identify themselves as victims and targets of hatred, discrimination and marginalization. As active audiences who interpret messages in the light of their social context, they may perceive mainstream British media as misrepresenting Muslims and may access other international media perceived by them as more sympathetic to Muslims.

Their activity on media may include sharing material about Muslims, like photographs and write-ups strengthening their political Muslim identity and solidarity, but the strategies based on these responses may not be well organized or well-coordinated. These would be mostly unconscious actions triggered by challenges to identity and having explanations in the psychological approaches and politics of identity.

In terms of the notion of participatory cultures, they may be participating in virtual communities which relate to their youth identity and British civic and political identity. It provides a common cultural space for hybridity through receiving, interpreting and producing material that may relate to one or many of the various building blocks of their British-Pakistani identity.

The first research question was how young Pakistanis perceive dominant representations of their communities and themselves. This question was very well explored during the focus group discussions. The participants of this research were clear in asserting that the dominant representations of British-Pakistanis, both as Pakistanis and as Muslims, are negative, and mainstream Western media portray them as ‘incompatible others’. With
reference to their South-Asian identity, their representation is that of backward working-
class migrants from inferior cultures and in the context of Muslims as a threat to the
security of the British and Western value system. Their perception is that the Muslims
and Pakistanis may suffer from negative stereotyping, and they perceive themselves as
victims of discrimination.

Regarding the second research question, which was about their response to these in terms
of attitudes and strategies of media consumption and practices, the study revealed that
their attitudes are based on reactions and their strategies are unorganized. unconscious
actions to deal with the misrepresentation of collective identity. Their attitude towards
dominant media is oppositional, and they tend to mistrust representation with the same
blanket approach as they perceive media’s blanket approach to representing them.

As far as the third research question is concerned: how these strategies and practices
relate to the construction of their identities and self-representation, it could be inferred
that these strategies strengthened their political identity and contribute to the recontext-
tualization of identity. Their self-representation is confined to digital media platforms
and the self-narrative may not be able to counter the dominant representation.

The fourth research question was: “Are those processes gendered and if yes, what are
the differences in male/female media consumption and identity formation processes?”
The analysis reveals that only some aspects are gendered. Women of Pakistani origin
tend to watch dramas on Pakistani channels. The Western media’s portrayal of Muslim
women as suppressed and victims of forced marriage and honour killings triggers reac-
tions among Muslim women. They assert their Muslim identity by using politico-religi-
ous symbols like headscarves and joining women’s groups on social media which
reflect concerns about the identity of Muslim women.

Concerning the question “Is there a relationship of class with the representation and per-
ceptions of Pakistani origin youth about their identities?” this research revealed a clear
relationship between class and representation. Pakistanis are represented as working,
backward and low achievers. Youth identity remains challenged under the negative por-
trayal of young people rather than the curation of their achievement. Since British-Paki-
stanis are positioned as low achievers and belonging to a lower socio-economic class,
this perception of self did not create much difference within the participants in terms of
media consumption patterns and response to dominant representation and response.
Contribution to knowledge

Construction of identity through consumption of media concerning diaspora of Pakistani origin remains an under-researched area. Most previous studies on British-Pakistanis have been carried out regarding the identity and integration in the context of multiculturalism. Adding the dimension of media particularly to the nexus of diaspora and youth may be seen as studying the identity of British-Pakistanis with a new perspective.

This study attempts to present the ‘voice’ of young British-Pakistanis and an effort has been made to explore heterogeneity among them, as the findings are based on the interpretations of perceptions of a representative sample including members of the Pakistani diaspora who follow different Muslim sects and different religions. Similarly, an attempt has been made to compare the attitudes in two cities.

Against the prevailing notion that diaspora depend on the media of country of origin for information and connectivity, the study found out that participants had very little voluntary interest in the Pakistani media. The findings of the study revealed that, with an oppositional view to British/Western media regarding news about Pakistanis and Muslims, the participants would not take recourse to Pakistani/ethnic media but they would seek information from other international media like Al Jazeera and RT.

The study investigated not only the consumption of old media but also the pro-sumption of new media. Many studies in the consumption of media by ethnic minorities may be restricted to explaining the issues of representation in terms of under representations and misrepresentations; this study moved on to discuss the reactions and strategies to counter the dominant narrative. The study highlighted the limitations of digital media in putting forward counter-narratives of the minority ethnic group.

Another contribution would be the profile of media consumption patterns in terms of channels of communications and content and the pro-sumption of social media platforms highlighting the similarities and differences in consumption pattern with mainstream youth. An elaborate discussion on the pattern of consumption and needs of the sample, both as youth and as diaspora, may be considered as a contribution.

In terms of viewership, the study touches upon the concept of voluntary and involuntary media consumption, particularly television viewership in the setting of Pakistani families, where television still remains a family affair and Pakistani channels are watched religiously by the older members of the family, like parents and grandparents. Though young British-Pakistanis have no interest in Pakistani media they may be compelled to watch Pakistani TV channels.
The study also attempted to weave in the concept of hyper-communications with reference to consumption and presumption of media. A reflection on the characteristics of digital media may elucidate that the digital media and social media platforms combined with traditional media constitute a state of hyper-communication in terms of speed, scope, scale, space and possibilities of actions and interactions and the potential of impact on processes of construction and positioning of identity.

**Limitations and way forward**

Limitations in conducting this research included:

- An atmosphere of doubt and mistrust prevailed when discussing issues related to terrorism and Muslims, as the UK government’s Prevent strategy to stop terrorism was active and media reported that it was being used as a tool of espionage on Muslims.

- Young people were not ready to share information about recruiting websites, though some of them might had a clue.

- It was difficult to recruit focus groups of females due to cultural constraints of Pakistani families. Female participant were usually accompanied by a family member, most often mothers.

Potential to expand this research in future exists. If given the opportunity research could be focussed on just one aspect of media, may be the social media where the researcher may embed with the study group. It can be expanded to continental Europe to make a comparison between the continent and Britain. The focus of research can be on the utility of research for the policymakers for better integration of young Pakistanis in mainstream British society.
**Glossary**

Apney: Your own (us).

Bhangra: A folk dance of Punjab.

Desi: Belonging to country of origin.

Dhol: A traditional percussion musical instrument used in folk and Sufi music.

Hamd: Poetry in praise of God.

Khala: Maternal aunt.

Marsiya: A form of mourning poetry sung in Moharram to mourn Martyrdom of grandson of Holy prophet Muhammad.

Naat: Poetry in praise of Holy prophet Muhammad.

Noha: A genre of religious poetry in Shiaite Muslims dedicated to mourn martyrdom of Holy Prohphet Muhammad’s grandson, sung with chest beating.

Sitar: A string musical instrument used in classical and Sufi music.

Tabla: A percussion instrument used in classical and Sufi music.

Ummah: Muslim Nationhood.
Acronyms

CFMEB : The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain
Ofcom: Office of Communication (UK)
ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MAMA: Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks
MTA: Muslim Television Ahmadiya ,
PEMRA: Pakistan Electronic Media Authority
RT: Russia Today
UGT: Uses and Gratification Theory
UGC: User Generated Content
Questions for Focus Groups

1. What do you think about your personal, ethnic and national identity? How your identity is formed in these three spheres. How would you introduce yourself to people, what are the most important things you would choose to tell them, would your nationality or your ethnicity be important?

2. Do you think media has a role to play with the formation of characteristics of your personality and how?

3. Do you think media dedicates enough space to people of your age group and ethnicity and issues related to you?

4. Are the issues faced by youth covered well in media?

5. Do you think stories in mainstream and ethnic newspapers and channels reflect true picture of young Pakistanis in the UK.

6. How would you respond if you find any media portraying you in light which you think is not what you think should be the portrayal of your: age group, gender, community and ethnicity?

7. Do you ever take initiatives to start discussions on the issues important to you?

8. What are these issues?

9. Do you find media a source of keeping you connected with the country of your ethnic origin (your parents’ origin)? Is this important to you?

10. Which aspects you like most that you think media connects you with? For example keeping abreast with fashion trends in country of ethnic origin or staying in touch with grandparents or programmes on cultural festivals or religious events.

11. Do you feel empowered or further marginalized in terms of use of digital media and how?

12. What groups or networks you associate with mostly on social media? Like predominantly Pakistani and Muslim or just your age group or your gender only or Asians from any country or friends from your host country or your cousins in other countries etc.

13. Do you watch sports matches on media between the country of your /your parents’ origin and your host country or any other country and whom do you usually support and why?

14. Do you share music, films, and entertainment programmes with your friends? Of what kind?
15. Do you use media to follow politics in country of your origin and your host country? Which interests you more?

16. Do you get moved by disasters in country of your origin and which media do you find more helpful in keeping you informed about situation? Does this motivate you to do something for those in need?

17. Do you engage with DIY media production or writing blogs and comments?

18. What do you usually create?

19. With whom do you like to share your creativity?

20. Do you think others understand your communication?
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