

1 **Competitiveness AND Sustainability – Can ‘Smart City Regionalism’ Square the**
2 **Circle?**

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13 **Abstract:**
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15 Increasingly, the widely established, globalisation-driven agenda of economic
16 competitiveness meets a growing concern with sustainability. Yet, the practical and
17 conceptual coexistence – or fusion - of these two agendas is not always easy. This
18 includes finding and operationalising the ‘right’ scale of governance, an important
19 question for the pursuit of the distinctly trans-scalar nature of these two policy fields.
20 ‘New regionalism’ has increasingly been discussed as a pragmatic way of tackling the
21 variable spatialities associated with these policy fields and their changing articulation.
22 This paper introduces ‘smart (new) city-regionalism’, derived from the principles of
23 Smart Growth and New Regionalism, as a policy-shaping mechanism and analytical
24 framework. In so doing, it brings together the rationales, agreed principles, and
25 legitimacies of publicly negotiated polity with collaborative, network-based and policy-
26 driven spatiality. The notion of ‘smartness’, as suggested here as central feature, goes
27 beyond the implicit meaning of ‘smart’ as in ‘Smart Growth’, as introduced in the mid to
28 late 1990s (Miller and Hoel 2002) vis-à-vis the specifically North American phenomenon
29 of suburban ‘sprawl’, and with its planning and transport-focused orientation. Since
30 then, the adjective ‘smart’ has become used ever more widely, albeit in varying
31 contexts, and advocates innovativeness, participation, collaboration and co-ordination
32 of, and between, policy fields, actors and (their) territories (EC, 2010). A resulting
33 ‘smart city regionalism’ is circumscribed by the interface between sectorality and
34 territoriality of policy-making processes. Using the examples of Vancouver and Seattle
35 with their similar geographical-functional, yet different historic-developmental and
36 governmental characteristics, the paper then looks at the effects of the resulting
37 specific local conditions on adopting ‘smartness’ in the scalar positioning of policy
38 making.
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41 **Introduction:**
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43 Increasingly, in economic development, the established dominant neo liberalism-driven
44 agenda of competitiveness (Boschma, 2005; Camagni et al, 1998; Bristow, 2005), set
45 against the paradigm of globalization (Gordon, 1999), meets a growing concern with
46 sustainability (Campbell, 1997). Yet, the practical and conceptual coexistence, or
47 fusion, of these two agendas is not always easy, as they allow differing interpretations,
48 weightings and forms of implementation. They thus require negotiations, debates and
49 contestations across both spatial scales and policy fields. This complexity, even
50 possible contradiction, between the two, potentially conflicting, agendas, and its effects
51 on policy-making, is the subject of a recent article in *Regional Studies* (vol 42, no 9, pp
52 1223-1236, 2008), in which Haughton *et al* observe that sustainable development
53 illustrates well the inherent contradictions of meta-governance as a means and
54 mechanism for defining and implementing collaborative policy. The two policy fields
55 produce their own agendas, are advocated by ‘*their*’ respective actors and established
56 ways of making policies and building networks in response to policy opportunities, and
57 produce their separate associated (new regionalist) territorialities. And it is this multi-

1 faceted process of negotiated co-ordination and collaboration that is central to the
2 concept of 'smartness' as discussed here.

3
4 The 1987 Brundtland Report first drew attention to the importance of cities in both
5 challenging - through their growing size and number and associated environmental
6 costs (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000; Gibbs et al, 2002) - and, eventually, helping to address,
7 sustainable development as a global task. Subsequently, the 1992 UN Conference on
8 Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro explicitly placed *local* (especially urban)
9 government in a leading role to seek and develop partnerships with local stakeholders
10 and communities in the search for more sustainable ways and forms of development
11 (Freeman et al, 1996; Portney, 2003). This reflected the realisation that the quest for
12 sustainability requires acknowledgement of, and thus responsiveness to, the
13 interconnectedness of local and wider (global) processes. Local policies thus need to
14 fuse wider strategic perspectives with specific local interests by the electorate. It was
15 thus from the late 1980s/early 1990s onwards, that such debates were moving into
16 mainstream politics, such as in the form of the Local Agenda 21 which, in the UK, has
17 since translated into a framework for developing 'sustainable communities'" (Bulkeley
18 and Betsill, 2005, p 42).

19
20 As part of this shift in the public policy realm, Local Agenda 21 triggered a growing and
21 increasingly more visible local government engagement in policies on sustainability. This
22 included the accepted need to reach beyond, and across, divisions between actors,
23 their strategic scalar perspectives, policy agendas and associated spatialities, using
24 negotiated collaborative approaches. While sitting within their respective national
25 frameworks, municipalities began to become more pro-active in sustainability policy
26 making which, especially in metropolitan areas, brought together new political and
27 strategic agendas, alliances, but also divisions. These were based on the particular
28 interpretations of 'sustainability' between a narrower focus on 'greenness' and a more
29 holistic notion of 'quality of life' and civic engagement (Selman, 1998). There was thus
30 emphasis not merely on technocratically oriented policy instrumentation, but rather an
31 encouragement of broader debate and consensus building, starting at the local level
32 and reaching 'upwards' in scale. This involved innovativeness and entrepreneurialism in
33 identifying, shaping and implementing sustainability-focused policies – all key
34 characteristics of 'smartness' in spatial governance, as discussed below.

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36 In that process, city regions have emerged as the most prominent scale of negotiating
37 and implementing conflictual agendas of those pursuing sustainability and
38 competitiveness respectively (Camagni et al, 1998; Portney, 2003): (1) neo liberalism-
39 inspired and globalisation-driven place-based competitive economic policies and (2)
40 critical reflections about the immediate and longer-term ecological costs of growth,
41 including for 'quality of life' (Begg 1999). Both policy agendas come with their respective
42 own internal policy-making dynamics, their particular range, roles and relevance of
43 actors and actor networks, their varying public acceptances, and their particular forms of
44 institutionalisation and territoriality. By their very nature, these policy agendas
45 transgress institutional, jurisdictional and spatial boundaries and divisions, as they seek
46 continued relevance and effectiveness. And policy efficacy is a further key feature of
47 'smartness' in spatial governance.

48
49 There are thus two dimensions which are addressed here, and which are intrinsically
50 interconnected by the proposed concept of 'smart (new) city regionalism': Territoriality
51 and sectorality (agenda) (see Figure 1). The former revolves around the variable
52 territorial 'reach' of policies, i.e. their variable scalar perspectives which are adopted and
53 negotiated, or defended, by the participating actors. This is achieved through re-scaling
54 governance and policy-making arrangements either through modifying existing
55 governmental-administrative territory or territorialising the identified (necessary) 'reach'
56 of politics as starting points. Two routes to this may be taken: Superimposing a *new*
57 (higher) spatial level of governance altogether, or rescaling competencies – both
58 existing and new ones - by shifting them 'upwards' between *existing* levels of

1 government. Consequently, spatial scale shapes policy perspectives and thus detail: A
2 wider spatial dimension often goes along with a broader, more strategic, rather than
3 detailed project-specific policy perspective. This matters when local competencies are
4 affected by a regionally co-ordinative agenda, such as advocated by 'smart growth', for
5 instance. The latter, political 'sectorality', refers to equally scalarly variable policy
6 negotiations and topical constellations, sitting within, or reaching across, institutional
7 and/or governmental-administrative structures in the pursuit of greater policy efficacy.
8 Such is expected by participating actors to benefit them all, and that brings them 'round
9 the table' (Feiock, 2012). This includes those representing different policy sectors with
10 their 'own' specific agendas, and thus helps overcoming 'silo mentalities'. It is here that
11 the notion of 'smartness', as implicit in 'smart city-regionalism', can offer an operational
12 framework for linking the spatial and policy-specific perspective to the more strategic-
13 conceptual 'bigger picture' with its lesser implementational detail and thus perceived
14 reduced 'threat' to individual interests and policy-making autonomy. 'Smartness' can do
15 this by facilitating inter-actor communication, collaboration and political negotiations -
16 and thus inter-actor trust - through a combination of both spatial scale (e.g.
17 regionalisation) as driver of policy negotiation and co-ordination, and political agenda as
18 lead agent of co-operation. Smart city regionalism thus brings together the rationales,
19 principles and legitimacies of publicly negotiated, collaborative sectoral polity with
20 network-based and policy-described spatiality (see Figure 1). In both instances,
21 reaching across boundaries and divisions is intrinsic to the notion of 'smartness'.
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28 *Figure 1 near here: Smart City Regionalism as product of variably co-ordinated*
29 *and co-operative spatiality and sectorality*
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34 Figure 1 shows the intersection between of the two variables 'sectorality' (political
35 agenda) and 'territoriality' (spatial dimension) 'in their respective varying roles in
36 shaping degrees of policy co-ordination and cooperation. Both variables are also
37 illustrated for their relative 'extreme' positions of 'narrow focus' (e.g. localism, focus on
38 technocratic projects) versus 'broader perspective' ('bigger picture'). This matters for the
39 likelihood of collaborative engagement. The different scenarios shown may serve as
40 conceptual framework for future case study analyses to investigate the varying factor
41 combinations in the interaction and negotiation between two (or even more) policy fields
42 and narratives such as 'sustainability' and 'competitiveness' respectively, and the
43 corresponding territorial outcomes. Each policy sector may be expected to seek staking
44 out its own, most effective territory to underpin its specific policy agendas. The resulting
45 spaces may intersect to a lesser or greater degree, including near-complete
46 separateness or almost complete congruence. Scope to achieve such territorialisation
47 will vary in response to local conditions, including political capacity and capability
48 among key actors, and acceptance of such moves among the local electorate. Any
49 such political capital may change over time in response to learning experiences – a
50 further feature of 'smartness' - and shifting public debates. And the degree of
51 complexity of negotiated shared agendas may well change, too.
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54 **'Smartness' as policy conflict resolution through collaborative engagement** 55 **between policy sectors and spaces** 56

57 The notion of 'smartness' in managing urban growth emerged in the U.S. in the 1990s
58 as a central feature of the new Smart Growth concept. In its essential rationale – and

1 there are many variations in its definition (Knaap and Talen, 2005), it is an inherently
2 North American, specifically US-based, concept, and needs to be understood in its
3 specific neo-liberal, locality-centric and 'home rule' context with its strong sense of local
4 self-government. 'Smart growth' emerged as a concern about the environmental, social
5 and economic costs of continuous suburban sprawl (Alexander and Tomalty, 2001;
6 Dierwechter, 2008). The concept is inherently political. Following Scott (2007, p 20),
7 "what smart growth advocates have done is to weave together various strands of anti-
8 sprawl discourse into a coherent polemic of sustainable development that integrates
9 economic, environmental and social equity issues". From a more partisan, anti-
10 regulation angle, some view Smart Growth strategies as a "folly" (O'Toole, 2001) and
11 even inherently counterproductive in making housing increasingly unaffordable. This, so
12 the claim, turns a 'planner's dream' into a 'middle class nightmare' (O'Toole, 2001, p
13 20). It is a problem generally associated with planning control and protecting open land,
14 such as urban green belt policies (Jones, 2007). A critical blog from 26 June 2011 on
15 Smart Growth policies in the Seattle city-region put the choice like this: "Do You Want 5
16 Acres, or 5 Feet?", referring to the contrast in size – for the same price - between the
17 building plots inside and outside the set regional Growth Boundary
18 ([http://smartgrowthusa.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/seattle-smart-growth-urban-growth-
19 boundary-vision-2040-puget-sound-regional-council-psrc-rural-residential/](http://smartgrowthusa.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/seattle-smart-growth-urban-growth-boundary-vision-2040-puget-sound-regional-council-psrc-rural-residential/), accessed 5
20 Apr 2012).

21
22 This interpretation is in stark contrast to the praise heaped on Portland's (Oregon) smart
23 growth strategies, as illustrated by the comments of a reporter from one of Vancouver's
24 (British Columbia, Canada) main newspapers, the Vancouver Sun. He is entirely taken
25 by the success of Portland's Urban Growth Boundaries as fixed demarcation line for
26 permitted development, accompanied by investment in 'green' transport and living,
27 which also produce economic dividends. This, he labels 'progressive' policy making
28 (Tammemagi, 2008). Yet, it is far from clear, as Downs (2005) points out, that such a
29 visibly and formally restrictive policy could be applied and replicated at will, given
30 differing local political and societal milieux. By contrast, the concept of 'smartness' per
31 se is less place-specific, and thus more widely applicable, while 'Smart growth' is
32 inherently more pragmatic, task-specific and technical-instrumental in its outlook
33 (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005). This is draws on an underlying techno-rationalist notion
34 that technical fixes may be possible (Guy & Shove, 2000) to allow squaring the circle of
35 continueing with a growth agenda, while also responding to quests for sustainability.

36
37 This may facilitate engagements among policy makers to negotiate and, eventually,
38 implement more co-ordinated and co-operative policies across both institutional and
39 territorial boundaries, e.j at city-regional level. And such may go beyond the immediate
40 focus on Smart Growth as a planning-based policy tool, as it was advocated by the
41 American Planning Association in the early 1990s (Downs, 2005; Burchell et al, 2000).
42 One of its main, rather conventional, policy tools is the drawing up of urban growth
43 boundaries as spatial 'demarcation lines' for suburban sprawl (see *inter alia* Katz, 2002;
44 Downs, 2005, Brain, 2005; Dierwechter, 2008). Yet, "Smart Growth is NOT NO
45 GROWTH; rather it seeks tofoster efficient development at the edges of the
46 regions, in the process creating more livable communities" (website of the Association
47 of Bay Area Governments (capital letter emphasis added,
48 <http://www.abag.ca.gov/planning/smartgrowth/whatisSG.html>, accessed 20 Nov 2011).

49
50 Now, what is 'smartness' in 'Smart Growth', which also, it is argued here, sits at the
51 centre of 'smart (new) city regionalism'? This distinction between 'smartness' and 'smart
52 growth' matters, as the argument here is about the very nature of the idea of
53 'smartness' as a vehicle for reconciling conflicting policies and their associated
54 territorialities, rather than an instrumentalised mechanism of development control. Thus,
55 for instance, Ramirez de la Cruz (2009) associates 'smartness' with greater democratic
56 input and a search for broader legitimacy of development goals, in housing policies. Yet,
57 there is a growing range of applications of the adjective 'smart'. Taking its very meaning
58 of 'intelligent' and 'shrewd', and contrasting it with 'unintelligent' or 'dumb', makes it ,

1 unsurprisingly, a favoured quality for a wide range of spaces and policy agendas. The
2 result has been a degree of 'trendiness' in using the adjective 'smart' in policy
3 discourses; e.g. 'smart cities' or 'smart state', 'smart energy region', or 'smart defence'.
4 There is thus a clear spatial (scalar) and sectoral (policy agenda) dimension to being
5 'smart'. This revolves around the efficacy of policies through a best effective use of
6 resources to produce the desired policy outcomes. Accordingly, particular emphasis
7 rests on the negotiating, compromising nature of finding policy solutions which are
8 publicly accepted and politically supported. Predictably, co-ordination, co-operation,
9 innovativeness and learning are key adjectives found in the notion of 'smartness' across
10 its varying applications. And this includes pursuing such seemingly conflictual policy
11 fields as 'competitiveness' and 'sustainability' concurrently (Portney, 2003). 'Smartness'
12 is thus essentially about finding a policy-making formula that reaches across institutional
13 and territorial boundaries. External factors may add important stimuli to 'kick start' a
14 change in local policy agenda and policy making, or may be obstructive to such. If the
15 former, the outcome is a product of local conditions, political leadership and external
16 'stimuli'. Spatially, this translates into 'new regionalist'-style forms of collaborative policy
17 making, based on variable spatial networks of cooperation and collaboration, with their
18 associated ('virtual') policy spaces (Herrschel, 2007). There, functional networks (Ernst
19 and Kim, 2002; Coe et al., 2004) circumscribe such space, rather than administrative
20 boundaries, expressing a 'new spatial logic' (Castells, 1989). And it is the underlying
21 "*interactive effects* that contribute to regional development" (Coe *et al* , 2004, p 469), or,
22 just as well, the development of regions as space-political entities.

23
24 Smart city-regionalism is one particular scalar application of 'smartness' as outcome of
25 the interloping of two key dimensions: Policy sector and territoriality. For once, it
26 focuses on the regional level as the negotiated collaborative territoriality, and, secondly,
27 it flows out of a perceived need to find a more effective scale for representing,
28 negotiatng and implementing two (or more) sectoral policy agendas, as negotiated
29 between municipalities, for instance. By the same token, the negotiated spatiality, here
30 'virtual regions', also feeds back into the co-ordinative policy-making process per se,
31 ideally enhancing it. There is thus some form of feed-back loop between identifying a
32 collaborative policy agenda and the willingness to engage with, in the case of smart city-
33 regionalism, a regionalisation process/agenda, however 'virtual' or 'real' in the end. As
34 part of that, policy networks and relations between actors with shared objectives and
35 priorities have become increasingly important. They transgress established institutional
36 and associated territorial structures as they renegotiate and re-allocate responsibilities
37 and powers in the pursuit of collaborative policy making. In some instances, as Healey
38 (2003) points out, this "may have the potential to be transformative, to change the
39 practices, cultures and outcomes of 'place governance' "(p 107), and this draws on the
40 'political calibre' of relevant actors (Healey, 1997).

41
42 These may include new interest and pressure groups and political groupings with their
43 respective networks, as they seek to gain access to the main policy-making platforms.
44 The inherent conceptual broadness of 'smartness' permits a variety of interpretations
45 and implementations, with conflict resolution and policy efficacy as defning qualities.
46 Yet, while such networks and informal linkages may be more responsive and problem-
47 solving than their more bureaucratised, formalised counterparts, they are also less
48 predictable. Chisholm (1989), based on insights from the San Francisco Bay Area,
49 identified informal networks as more capable of solving policy conflicts, than formal
50 mechanisms and procedures. Their relative 'messiness' may add, as well as reflect, the
51 varied searches for compromise and mutual accommodation of differences in policy
52 objectives, as subsumed under 'new regionalism' in all its fuzzy, yet dynamic, variable
53 and 'virtual' spatiality (Keating, 1998; Söderbaum and Shaw, 2002; Tomaney and Ward,
54 2000; MacLeod, 2001; Herrschel 2007).

55
56 'Smart (new) city regionalism' as the fusion of the two concepts – new regionalism and
57 smart growth - may thus offer a way forward to bridging divisions in associated
58 governance – both spatial and sectoral, and between the public and governmental

1 spheres - and locating individual city regions in that framework on the basis of the
2 relative importance of 'smartness' in relation to either – or both - cross-sectoral policy
3 making and cross-border spatial policies as proposed under 'new regionalism'. This
4 highlights the link between new regionalist virtual, policy-based territoriality, and an
5 innovative, learning-based framing of policies, as suggested here as underpinning
6 'smart city regionalism'. Smart city regionalism thus offers flexibility in formulating
7 negotiated inter-sectoral policies, together with associated variably scaled policy
8 spaces. Just as importantly, the notion of 'smartness' also offers a more visible 'rallying
9 point' for public debate on the balancing between competing policy agendas – be that
10 based on topicality, political conviction, or position inside or outside of public
11 administration, and the implications of such for rescaling and/or re-bordering policy
12 spaces.

15 **'Smart City-Regionalism' in the American Pacific North West: Adopting spatial 16 and sectoral 'smartness' in Vancouver and Seattle**

18 The two North American examples discussed here, Vancouver and Seattle, were chosen
19 because they (a) exemplify North American 'smart growth' conditions; (b) possess quite
20 similar geographical characteristics and functionality to allow comparisons; (c) show
21 different historic-developmental and governmental arrangements and national
22 circumstances; and (d) illustrate different local historic-cultural circumstances as
23 determinants of local policy-making characteristics. Both cities are renowned for their
24 livability and 'trendy' urbanity and thus offer interesting cases to explore processes of
25 adopting and operationalising the concept of 'smart (new) city regionalism' as a fusion
26 of inter-sectoral policy co-ordination with inter-local co-operation at the regional scale.
27 The two cities illustrate differing city-regional 'milieux' with their specific local and
28 external characteristics which circumscribe scope for, and practice of, smart city-
29 regionalism. The two policy fields of seeking greater economic competitiveness and
30 sustainability exemplify frequently conflictual policy agendas. By the same token,
31 Seattle and Vancouver possess similar qualitative economic and environmental features
32 to serve as common ground for a comparative appraisal of their negotiation under
33 'smart city-regionalisation'. External differences include a greater acceptance of state
34 regulation and state presence in society in Canada than the US, where 'home rule' is a
35 defining ideology. While both share a strong sense of local democracy, they differ in the
36 degree to which central government (Province, State) may get directly involvement in
37 Canadian compared with U.S. cities' affairs, including planning regulation.

39 Among internal factors, there are variations in the recognition and political cudos of
40 'quality of life' as a general policy agenda, subsequent acceptance of the value of inter-
41 municipal cooperation, the need for a regional perspective, including guidance for local
42 policy making, a politically active urban-based (as against suburban) citizenry and its
43 values, and the political skill and shared values among local government and interest
44 groups. It is here that Vancouver scores particularly strongly, helped by a city-centred
45 active citizenry going back to the early 1970s (Donald, 2005). This reinforced
46 Vancouver's position as the primary focus of the city region, whereas in Seattle urban
47 flight has left a politically much weakened core city vis-a-vis strengthening suburbs and
48 a strong sense of independence (e.g. Renton with a Boeing production site, and
49 Redmond with Microsoft).

51 The analysis broadly follows the conceptualisation and criteria shown in Figure 1, with
52 Vancouver showing characteristics of relatively advanced smart city regionalism
53 (Scenario 2), and Seattle showing features of smart city regionalism 'in progress'
54 (Scenario 1). Here, a city-region-wide, territorially based and technocratically focused
55 ('narrow') institutionalization, **the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC)**, gained in
56 policy contents and responsibility as a result of shifting political discourse towards
57 broader, more strategic, agendas. This shift became evident from information gained
58 over a 10-year period since 2002 through personal interviews with key local and

1 regional organizations in the two city regions. They include local economic development
2 units and planning departments, business representations and advocacy groups
3 (Chambers of Commerce). These embrace both the core cities and, as suburban cities
4 (exurbs), Surrey (Greater Vancouver region), and Renton and Tacoma respectively in
5 the Puget Sound region. In addition, the respective primary region-wide governmental
6 planning organisations PSRC and **Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD)** were
7 included. These interviews were essential for obtaining insights into the local political
8 'climates' and debates, as well as challenges. This information was supplemented by
9 documentary analysis of strategy papers and plans from different points of the last
10 decade, with a particular focus on economic development as strategic context for
11 addressing both competitiveness (of course) and (increasingly so) sustainability. Key
12 factors looked out for concerned evidence of spatial collaboration between
13 municipalities, a sense of regionality in the two city regions, the nature of leaders in
14 shaping policies (citizenry, the Vancouver mayor) and business interests (chambers of
15 commerce). Evidence thus gained suggests a positioning of Vancouver's 'smart city
16 regionalisation' under Scenario 2, owing to its stronger reflection of Smart Growth
17 principles at a more fundamental, holistic level, while Seattle emerges as nearer
18 Scenario 1. This reflects a greater influence of the relatively 'soft' – and thus perceived
19 as less 'threatening' for local autonomy - 'new regional' governance arrangements. Yet,
20 their limited, technocratically-centred policy brief broadened over time under the
21 auspices of 'smartness' as it gained recognition in public policy discourse.

22
23 Both cities show distinct differences in their adoption of a city-regional perspective,
24 including readiness to engage in topical and spatial collaborations across municipal and
25 institutional boundaries, although with different timing and at different pace. Differences
26 emerged in particular between core city and respective suburbs. Sharing comparable
27 geographic-environmental settings, economic qualities and polycentric functional
28 structures, Seattle and Vancouver differ in their awareness and adoption of 'smartness',
29 exemplified by 'smart growth', as a conduit for collaborative policy making across spatial
30 and institutional boundaries, and thus as a vehicle to seemingly 'square the circle'
31 between the quests for economic competitiveness and more sustainability. Both cities,
32 irrespective of their somewhat different national contexts for governance, share
33 elements of a distinct Pacific Northwestern mentality (interview with PSRC, 14 Nov
34 2002) shaped by a not always easy fusion of elements of a strong sense of individuality
35 and independence vis-à-vis an attractive 'great outdoors' as highly valued (common)
36 good, and equally valued metropolitan characteristics of livability and urban life-style.
37 Still, there are distinct variations based on respective degrees of urbanization
38 (Dierwechter, 2008). Both cities have acquired an internationally well established
39 visibility and image as 'trendy' and desirable, urbane places to live (and work), such as
40 associated with Richard Florida's (2005) 'creative class', and are key ingredients in the
41 two cities' respective public (economic) policy discourses. Yet, national differences in
42 the relationship between state, society and the individual, as between local and central
43 government in the scalar allocation of responsibilities, manifest themselves
44 nevertheless (Fox, 2010).

45
46 Differing planning and legal arrangements for identifying sprawl as a potential problem
47 that needs a regional response, and to act upon this insight, is one of the key
48 differences; the other one is the extent to which there is a public perception – in urban
49 and suburban environments - that such regulative policies are required and, indeed,
50 desirable. While in Vancouver development planning control (that is 'zoning') goes back
51 to the city's first development plan of 1929 courtesy of the Provincial government of
52 British Columbia to protect land resources from urban expansion (Donald, 2005), no
53 such thing existed in Seattle until the early 1990s. And when it tentatively began, this
54 was only in response to 'high impact' external intervention: the Washington State
55 government's 1992 requirement of a regional development plan, and, as a second
56 warning, the 2001 pullout of Boeing's headquarters and transfer to Chicago. This was
57 intended as a deliberate 'shot across the bow' of local policy makers in the Seattle city
58 region for them to 'get a grip' on the economically costly, and thus uncompetitive,

1 continuous traffic congestion problem through a region-wide (collaborative) approach
2 (Seattle Chamber of Commerce, interview, 20 June 2004).

3
4 By comparison, in Vancouver, and not just in the city itself, but also the surrounding
5 suburbs/exurbs, public debate expressed, and reinforced, a preparedness to accept the
6 principles of development control per se, and do so at the regional scale. And this was
7 begun much earlier, in the early 1970s, in a bid to enhance urban living and quality of
8 life. The then liberal political middle-class movement, TEAM (The Electors' Action
9 Movement) gained control of Vancouver city council in strongly contested elections. The
10 backdrop to this was a perceived assault on 'urban living', and social equity and
11 inclusion, by rapid urban expansion and associated extensive new road building, driven,
12 so it was seen, by the self-serving interests of a narrow local elite of remote,
13 "inaccessible politicians" (Ley et al, 1992, p 281). This had produced a receptive mood
14 for 'smart growth' principles per se (the terminology emerged only later), including more
15 strategic, longer-term perspectives as guidance to local policy decisions, and a pursuit
16 of co-operative policy co-ordination with neighbouring municipalities. The election
17 results showed that such agendas had gained sufficient political currency for delivering
18 votes, and this produced a readiness among local politicians to engage in policies that
19 go beyond short-term, locality-centric goals. The comparatively early start in debating
20 and formulating such concerns publicly and visibly gave the city-region a policy
21 innovator's edge, and also time for building a broader coalition to develop and manifest
22 such 'smart' policies as an integral part of local political discourse which, in itself, has
23 become a competitive advantage. The current mayor's decision to use 'greenness' as
24 an obvious boosterist (Short, 1999) and urban entrepreneurial (Hall and Hubbard, 1996;
25 While et al, 2000) policy tool to promote the city's competitiveness is an extension of
26 this expertise. Launching the Greenest City 2020 Action Plan in 2009 (available from
27 <http://vancouver.ca/greenestcity/>, accessed 5 April 2012), just ahead of the 2010 Winter
28 Olympics as the then touted 'most sustainable' Games, is a clear statement of that. It is
29 also an attempt to further strengthen the perception of Vancouver as innovative and
30 creative - appealing to, and representing, the 'creative class' Florida's (2005) - ,and
31 even *avant-garde* in fusing often conflictual policy fields and pursuing an economically
32 successful sustainability agenda. The new slogan of 'Vancouver 2020 – a bright green
33 future', is intended to propagate just this, and suggests sufficient political capital (in
34 terms of voter acceptance) for such a policy agenda as expression of being embedded
35 in societal values in the city region (interview GVRD, 3 Nov 2003). And these accept
36 and support a shared vision as guide to co-operative local policy making (Healey
37 2002).

38
39 The primary actor in Vancouver city region's governance system to deal with
40 sustainability in a Smart Growth, planning-oriented sense across the city region, is the
41 Greater Vancouver Regional District.. Formally established in 1967 through the merger
42 of several single task special bodies (interview GVRD, 3 Nov 2003) by the then British
43 Columbia government, i.e. 25 years earlier than a similar organisation, PSRC, was put
44 in place in Seattle, GVRD was part of a Province-wide "network of regional districts" to
45 "provide(s) a mechanism for metropolitan government" (Sancton, 2005, p 324) for
46 British Columbia's two dominant city regions, Vancouver and Victoria. GVRD is to act
47 on behalf of the participating municipalities and is indirectly legitimated through
48 councillors delegated to its board by those municipalities. GVRD was thus top-down
49 implemented and then bottom-up legitimated, albeit solely as a strategic body to offer a
50 regional perspective as *guidance* for local policies (Sancton, 2005). Renamed Metro
51 Vancouver a few years ago to raise the city-region's profile and reflect a competitive
52 image consciousness of the value of the label 'metropolitan' for the Vancouver city
53 region's urban attractiveness as a place, its latest strategic development document,
54 'Metro Vancouver: 2040 strategy', seeks an explicit fusion of both competitiveness and
55 sustainability. The Strategy thus is in the mould of 'smart city regionalism'. Its
56 sustainability agenda, so it is pointed out, is not a fashionable ad hoc add-on, but goes
57 back to the 2002 'Sustainable Region Initiative'. That was followed shortly afterwards
58 (2008) by a more explicitly growth-oriented 'Sustainability Framework' for a Regional

1 Growth Strategy (p 1). It was approved by all municipalities in the city region as joint
2 'shareholders' in Metro Vancouver, including the two main suburban cities of Surrey and
3 Richmond which, in terms of population, are themselves the size of Vancouver, and
4 strongly in favour of 'growth' (interview, Surrey EDU,, 4 Nov 2003). And on 29 July
5 2011, the latest regional plan was adopted by all municipalities covered by the GVRD,
6 explicitly referred to as 'Regional Growth Strategy'
7 (<http://www.metrovancouver.org/planning/development/strategy/Pages/default.aspx>,
8 accessed 13 July 2012).

9
10 The main 'voice' for *economic development* is the small organisation Vancouver
11 Economic Committee (VEC), an advocacy group well connected to both the business
12 community and the city council (the city mayor is the VEC chairman). Its primary
13 mission is to promote Vancouver as a place to invest and act as a platform to
14 communicate business interests and concerns to the administration (VEC interview, 4
15 Nov 2003). VEC thus sees itself as a key player among the 'context people' focusing
16 on strategy, rather than detailed implementation of policy (interview with VEC, 23 Oct
17 2006). Its recent Economic Development Strategy document, (available from:
18 vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20120131/documents/rr1.pdf, accessed 5 April 2012)
19 shows sustainability clearly presented as an integral economic quality, inherent in the
20 city as a 'smart', economically successful location. And this squaring the seeming circle
21 is confirmed by observations made by Smart Growth British Columbia (SGBC), a
22 lobbying and research organisation advocating 'Smart Growth' for B.C. (Alexander, et
23 al, 2004). The key characteristics of 'smartness', as understood here, have thus entered
24 Vancouver's policymaking on the back of long-established popular concerns about
25 maintaining the city's competitive edge, including environmental values as presumed
26 'appeal' to the 'creative class' as perceived bedrock of the city region's economic
27 capacity.

28
29 In Seattle, regionalisation of the political, (rather than the technocratic) arena has been
30 slower to evolve than in Vancouver. Only since the late 1990s (interviews at the
31 Tacoma Economic Development Unit (EDU), 6 Oct 2002 and Seattle Corporate
32 Planning Dept, 5 Oct 2002), has the regional scale entered the wider political realm
33 within the city region as a debated potentially useful device in economic policy and
34 urban development generally, rather than as a mere tool for the technically-driven
35 provision of public transport. Yet, it was the latter that established a city-regional
36 approach in the shape of the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), established in
37 1990 by the State of Washington. Similar to Vancouver and the GVRD, formal regional
38 agency was thus installed from the top down. Otherwise, localist competition prevailed
39 in this polycentric city region around the two main poles of Seattle and Tacoma
40 (interview at Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct 2002). This public recognition of a regional policy-
41 making dimension, became, shortly after the passing of Agenda 21 at the Rio Summit,
42 manifested by the 1994 statutory requirement by Washington State for the city to adopt
43 an area-wide comprehensive development plan to address rapid sprawl, road
44 congestion and the insufficient provision with public transport outside the central city
45 area. Up to then, no spatially contiguous strategic plan existed for the municipalities in
46 the city region. Seattle's new plan followed the then newly articulated basic principles of
47 'Smart Growth' as a then politically debated and less contentious 'face' of more
48 restrictive development control policies in conjunction with a regional perspective.
49 Adopting elements of Vancouver's plan as exemplary allowed policy makers to
50 advocate the city-regional agenda on the back of Vancouver's recognised positive and
51 successful 'livable' image as a strategy to follow.

52
53 Institutionally 'soft' (MacLeod, 2001), and thus perceived by municipalities and the
54 electorate as less of a potentially irrevocable surrender of local autonomy, PSRC has
55 since the mid 1990s continued to raise its profile beyond its original public transport
56 focus, and established itself as a regionally operating agency with a wider development
57 strategy remit. Its current "mission is to ensure a thriving central Puget Sound now and
58 into the future through planning for regional transportation, growth management and

1 economic development” (psrc.org, accessed 5 April 2012)). This is not dissimilar to
2 GVRD’s goal in Vancouver, the example it was modelled on. The region’s somewhat
3 anodyne name, Puget Sound, based simply on a geographic feature, rather than place,
4 reflects its attempt to not upset local sensitivities among the smaller municipalities – but
5 also the ‘second city’, Tacoma, about Seattle’s dominance (Fox, 2010). For marketing,
6 Greater Seattle would be a more effective name, as indeed used by the Trade
7 Development Alliance of Greater Seattle. In addition, the two port authorities of Seattle
8 and Tacoma jointly sought to raise the city-region’s international profile (interview,
9 Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct 2002) through co-ordinated marketing. But this was about external
10 visibility, rather than addressing internal city-regional divisions which were strongest
11 between the urban centres and their suburbs – and also embraced transport strategies
12 (interview, Renton Mayor’s Office, 5 Nov 2003).

13
14 The low key, locally ‘non threatening’ nature of ‘region’ is also reflected in PSRC’s web
15 address extension ‘.org’: It is clearly an organization outside the governmental hierarchy
16 and thus without statutorily established powers that could cut across, and challenge,
17 local interests. Instead, it operates akin to “a regional UN [United Nations]”, as a leading
18 PSRC planner commented (interview PSRC, 14 Nov 2002), with much debating and
19 slow decision making. Yet, the PSRC offers a publicly visible political arena for debating
20 conflicting interest and policy priorities across municipalities and between policy fields,
21 including conflicting agendas, and formulating compromise policies. And it is this
22 capacity as a catalyst of a wider, more integrated, regional policy-making dimension that
23 sits at the heart of the notion of ‘smartness’ in city-regional governance, rather than the
24 search for a ready-made agenda and planning mechanism as under seemingly offered
25 by ‘Smart Growth’.

26
27 With no public preparation for a regional agenda in development policy prior to the
28 1990s, it was business interests that first engaged with the idea of collaborative, more
29 policy-oriented ‘smart new city regionalism’, rather than governments or the electorate.
30 In contrast to developments in Vancouver as early as the 1970s, in greater Seattle,
31 adoption has been relatively slow of a city-regional dimension in policy making, in the
32 pursuit of a win-win solution for all actors involved – across spatial and topical divides.
33 The many boundaries and divisions – mental and administrative - criss-crossing the
34 Puget Sound region - manifest established individualism, self-interest, localism and
35 socio-economic differences, especially between city cores and suburbs. Finding and
36 adopting a shared and generally accepted collaborative way forward faces many
37 obstacles, especially concern about losing local financial control (taxation) and,
38 politically important, popular local support. “Cities are like little kingdoms”, as an official
39 in the Mayor’s Office of the suburban city of Renton observed (interview, 5 Nov 2003).
40 Yet, to promote their interests, they are willing to co-operate with like-minded
41 municipalities as a pragmatic vehicle to pursue their own interest, such as in the
42 Suburban Cities Association in King County (interviews PSRC, 14 Nov 2002). The
43 PSRC’s office location in central Seattle, unlike GVRD’s suburban location outside
44 Vancouver, however, will have done little to alleviate concerns about Seattle seeking to
45 ‘run’ the region by proxy.

46
47 A change in public perception, and thus acceptance of the also *local* merits of pursuing
48 regionally collaborative political agendas, is required for accepting as useful ‘smart new
49 city regionalism’. Yet, innovative policies may emerge from that, such as currently
50 developed in one of the counties in Puget Sound. There, individual municipalities can
51 agree a partnership deal with the county about transferring (for a fee) development
52 rights (TDRs) for a piece of green space to the County, effectively taking it out of
53 municipal control and thus removing it from direct local political contestations about its
54 development potential.

55
56 The political-conceptual underpinnings for adopting the principles of smart city-
57 regionalism differ between the Vancouver and Seattle city-regions, as in the latter, ‘soft’
58 administrative structures came first as part of a technocratic agenda, to then tentatively

1 move onto the broader, political-ideological ground of sustainable development planning
2 and policy as a regional, rather than local, agenda, while faced by a skeptical local
3 government and public. In the Vancouver region, such a policy perspective has existed
4 much longer as part of public discourse than in Seattle, allowing the GVRD to base its
5 policies on their latent acceptance by the electorate. In Seattle, by contrast, public and
6 political opinion needed to be convinced of the virtues of regionalization first – in
7 principle requiring such symbolic actions as by Boeing to kickstart debate. Thus,
8 PSRC’s current 2040 Vision strategy claims to focus on “people, property, planet” as
9 guidance of the Growth Management, Environmental, Economic and Transportation
10 Strategy for the Central Puget Sound Region (document available from:
11 <http://psrc.org/growth/vision2040/pub/vision2040-document/>, accessed 5 April 2012).
12 This reflects an attempt to publicly reconcile competing (individual) economic interests,
13 expressed in property ownership and its value, and global sustainability (Freilich et al,
14 2010).

15
16

17 **Conclusions and Outlook: ‘Smart city-regionalism’ as framework for** 18 **collaborative and negotiative policy making.**

19

20 Drawing on the core rationale of the North American-based concept of Smart Growth as
21 a planning vehicle, this paper has sought to extricate and develop the notion of
22 ‘smartness’ as a mechanism for reconciling conflicting policy ideals and trajectories in
23 local policy making. Smart Growth seeks to facilitate a shift in values, priorities and
24 perspectives from a narrow, short-term and often monetary, perspective, to a broader,
25 more holistic and longer-term view embracing both collaborative political processes and
26 spatial perspective. City regions provide a particularly potent and interesting scalar
27 arena for such discussions, as they bring together varying political-economic, social and
28 governmental-administrative arrangements and agendas, with some being more
29 congenial than others. Contestations, negotiations and objections are thus an integral
30 characteristic of city-regional governance.

31

32 ‘Smartness’ has been distilled as the central concept out of Smart Growth, taking it out
33 of its particular planning-focused, technocratic context, and discussing it as an analytical
34 framework for exploring the intersection between territoriality (spatial scale) and
35 sectorality (political agenda). Discussions may be broad and inherently complex,
36 contested and diffuse as both growth-oriented ‘competitiveness’ and ‘sustainability’ are
37 being pursued. One of the key features of ‘smartness’ is a preponderance for the
38 regional scale as mediating platform between local and international considerations for
39 ‘competitiveness’ and ‘sustainability’ policies. It is regionalism, in its ‘new’, i.e. less
40 structure- and more relationally and topically-driven nature, with variable governance
41 territoriality organisation, that has been connected here with the notion of ‘smartness’ as
42 effective organising rationale and principle. ‘Smart (new) city regionalism’, offers a
43 conceptual strategic scalar platform and spatial reference – including a temporal
44 perspective - for potential policy negotiations and compromises, as well as analytical
45 comparisons of collaborative arrangements and agendas between territories and policy
46 sectors, such as also found in Healey’s (1997, 2003) notion of ‘collaborative planning’ –
47 or ‘collaborative governance’ respectively.

48

49 Two examples, Vancouver and Seattle, have been used to illustrate different trajectories
50 of engaging with ‘smart (new) city regionalism’, discussed here as a means of ‘squaring
51 the circle’ in the pursuit of the two policy fields of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘sustainability’.
52 Developments in the two cities point to the respective roles played by territory and
53 politics in framing collaborative arrangements for ‘smart city regionalism’ as a vehicle for
54 negotiating between the conflicting and competing goals of ‘competitiveness’ and
55 ‘sustainability’. In Vancouver, an existing civic acceptance of the benefits of placing the
56 individual and local into a wider spatial and value context had provided a receptive and
57 supportive political ground for accepting ‘smartness’ as a guiding principle. This was
58 also shaped by a national appreciation of the positive roles of state and regulation, and

1 of society as a context for the individual,.And this included a city-regional scale of
2 governance, values, actors, public discourse and agency-shaped structure. In Seattle,
3 by contrast, a nationally more critical, pro- individualism and localist view, often coupled
4 with a short-term perspective, made the framing of city-regional governance more
5 challenging, needing to 'grow' from a limited technocratic agenda. Installing an
6 'unthreatening', low key regional structure first seems to have sown the seeds for
7 accepting broader- defined collaborative city regional governance.
8
9

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