Modifying “a very dangerous message”: Britain, the non-aligned and the UN during the Cuban missile crisis

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The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, told the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 September 1962:

The latest estimate that has been made of the casualties in the first exchange in a nuclear world is over 300 million people dead in the first few days….and I would add to that unpleasant fact this, that there is the near certainty that local conflicts which draw in the Great Powers could not possibly be confined to wars with conventional weapons. We might try to do so, but with the best will in the world you cannot, with one kind of equipment, fight another kind of war.  

The immediate relevance of these words was not grasped, even by the speaker himself. However, exactly one month later back in London, Lord Home spent the anxious weekend of 27-28 October 1962 contemplating the Armageddon he had sketched out. In the interim, the crisis that unfolded in Cuba was to test to the limit his hypothesis of escalation. To prevent a process he had warned as nigh inevitable, it also prompted Home and others to explore the tension-resolving capabilities of the UN itself.

This dimension of the Cuban Missile Crisis has not heavily featured in the voluminous literature on the subject, and still less in discussion of the British role in these events. Although the UN had a high profile throughout the public phase of the crisis prompted by the American discovery that the Soviets had deployed long-range missiles on the island, its activity was downplayed in subsequent accounts.  

Similarly, the local nature of the conflict, which the Soviets had every interest in emphasizing, has been downplayed by their American counterparts. Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in his subsequent justification of his actions to the Supreme Soviet, presented the origins of the crisis as a response to American aggression against the revolutionary government Fidel Castro established in Cuba in January 1959: ‘They broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, have conducted and are conducting subversive activity and established an economic blockade of Cuba.’  

The risk of American
invasion was discussed at length with his senior colleague, Anastas Mikoyan, the First Deputy Prime Minister, who conducted a very successful visit to Cuba in February 1960. Shortly after this visit, the Americans began planning what became the Bay of Pigs episode of April 1961. Khrushchev’s response was to ship rockets and Il-28 bombers to Cuba.5

Castro’s government had unsuccessfully sought the sympathy of the UN Security Council against US threats since July 1960, most recently in February 1962 after the Americans prompted the Organisation of American States [OAS] the previous month to declare Communism incompatible with the Western Hemisphere, effectively expelling Cuba.6 One of the statesmen to follow Home to the General Assembly podium during the 17th Assembly meetings that autumn was Cuban President Dorticós. The British delegation noted that he ‘devoted almost all of his long, histrionic and intemperate speech to an attack on United States policy towards Cuba’. Denouncing the US base at Guantanamo and American violations of Cuban waters and airspace he declared that if the US would guarantee Cuban territorial integrity ‘Cuba would have no need of arms’. Otherwise, he ominously added, Cuba ‘would resist if attacked, for she did not stand alone.’7

In contrast, it was in the American interest to play up the missile launch sites first conclusively uncovered on 14 October 1962 as an act of Soviet aggression which changed the security of the Western Hemisphere. After all, the Soviets fraudulently claimed not to have any such bases outside their own territory.8 Indeed, although satellite pictures obtained by the Americans from 1961 onwards had indicated the hollowness of such claims, the Soviets boasted that their missile capacity was such that they did not need them.9

The Americans did not publicly reveal their discovery either to their public or the world until 22 October. U Thant, the Acting Secretary-General of the UN, learnt of the missiles from his military adviser, the Indian General Indar Jit Rikhye, on 20 October. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was not officially notified until late the following evening.10 In the interim, on 16 October, exercising his right of reply to Dorticós, the US representative at the UN, Adlai Stevenson, sought to refute for the fourth time the Cuban allegations. He drew attention to the flood of Soviet weapons and technicians into Cuba and Castro’s avowed intention to subvert Western Hemisphere governments. American warnings of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba had already elicited unanimous support – even from the normally more neutralist Brazil and Mexico – at the OAS on 2 October 1962. US counter-measures, Stevenson maintained, were therefore protective, as he assured ‘The US will not commit aggression against Cuba.’11
Once they choose to reveal the Soviet deployment, the Americans portrayed this as an act of aggression. The crisis was thereafter acted out as a confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, with Cuba serving as the setting for the contest. As the British ambassador to Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, acutely observed, ‘The whole American case is built upon the fact that this is a clear challenge by the Soviet Union and that Castro is a mere cypher in this game.’

As tension built over the next few days the focus of world attention inevitably became the relationship between these two principals. Both at the time and subsequently, the story of these days has been told – especially from the American side – as one of brinkmanship and blinking between an implacable and a more malleable protagonist.

The gradual way in which details of the events of October 1962 subsequently emerged reinforced the apparent gladiatorial nature of the crisis and diminished the significance of other dimensions. Early revelations, such as Theodore Sorensen’s ghost-written and misleading presentation of the President’s brother’s experience of the crisis in Thirteen Days, emphasized the crisis as a stand-off between Kennedy and Khrushchev. This interpretation shaped subsequent analyses, reaching an apogee in Dino Brugioni’s Eyeball to Eyeball (1991). It also impacted on British reflections on their experience of these events. Stung by contemporary allegations of lack of influence Macmillan, for instance, used his memoirs primarily to demonstrate his extensive contacts with Kennedy during the crisis. This historiography has obscured the important role ascribed to the UN in British attempts to reduce tensions.

Macmillan at least makes extensive reference to the UN, unlike most American memoirists and commentators. Indeed, careful reading of his chapter on the crisis, ‘On the Brink’, suggests that there was another central character to the drama, since his pages are populated by repeated references to U Thant. The Acting Secretary-General came to office on 3 November 1961 in difficult circumstances. The Congo civil war had claimed the life of his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld – killed in an air crash just outside Ndola in September 1961 – and over-stretched its finances, particularly because the Soviet bloc refused to provide funds towards UN operations there. U Thant had to supervise a bond issue to address immediate financial problems. Meanwhile, Russian demands for what they called a Troika arrangement meant they were unwilling to see Hammarskjöld replaced except on an interim basis. Instead, arguing that the UN was dominated by Western interests (amongst whom they included Hammarskjöld, who allegedly surrounded himself with American advisers) they called for three parallel Secretaries-General, respectively to represent the West, the Communist world and the burgeoning African-Asian contingent of non-aligned and newly-independent countries steadily growing in importance in the UN. U Thant himself represented the latter, having been as his country’s
ambassador to the UN part of the Burmese delegation to the conference of neutral countries in Belgrade in September 1961.17

Macmillan clearly saw U Thant as less dynamic than Hammarskjöld.18 Accounts of the Congo crisis rightly ascribe to the latter a central role. U Thant was much less combative. A Canadian appreciation the Foreign Office’s United Nations Department clearly found perceptive observed,

We doubt if he would ever respond to Soviet charges in the forthright manner adopted by Hammarskjöld….his observations of the effect on the [UN] organization of Hammarskjöld’s fight with USSR, added to his own experience as a neutralist representative and his own character, will incline him to avoid if possible a direct confrontation as a matter of policy.

The Canadian ambassador to the UN, C. S. A. Ritchie, continued: ‘There can be no comparing the intellectual capacity of U Thant and Hammarskjöld.’ However, instead of Hammarskjöld’s talent for inventive problem-solving, U Thant was deemed likely to favour delicate diplomacy.19 Hammarskjöld was the more overtly activist interpreter of his office, using Article 99 to bring the Congo crisis to the Security Council in May 1960.20 In the crisis of October 1962, however, arguably it was U Thant’s capacity for delicate diplomacy that was more needed.

British briefing papers for Anglo-American talks on 9-10 July 1962 concluded that ‘U Thant has shown himself to be an effective, independent and co-operative Secretary-General.’ The Americans and French apparently concurred. Because of his neutralist background, it was also hoped that making his appointment permanent would defeat the Troika proposals. He was indeed seen as the only viable candidate to do so. This did not mean that U Thant necessarily wanted the position. The Americans clearly thought that he did, telling their British counterparts that he was campaigning vigorously.21 British diplomats, in contrast, were more inclined to note his references to homesickness.22 Nevertheless, the fact that in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis he skilfully manoeuvred himself into being unanimously elected as Secretary-General on his own terms on 30 November 1962 and then stayed in post until 1971 suggests that U Thant was not as reluctant a holder of that office as he sometimes made out. He was, however, self-effacing in a way which might explain his low profile in accounts of the Cuban crisis. Indeed, aware of the continuing Russian hankering after the Troika arrangements, he diplomatically avoided all references to Cuba in his acceptance speech.23

U Thant had not anticipated that Cuba would bulk so large during the 17th Assembly of the UN convened in New York in September 1962. Neither had the British appreciated this possibility. Instead, their delegation under Sir
Patrick Dean expected to concentrate on responding to Afro-Asian criticisms of Southern Rhodesia and Oman or to the Venezuelan revival of border claims with British Guiana. Home nevertheless spent much of his speech to the General Assembly warning of the confrontation with a Communism bent on imposing its will upon the world, most apparently in the border clashes between China and India which were to flare to full-scale war on 20 October. This was the context for the Foreign Secretary’s only mention of Cuba, in which he responded to the speech to the same audience of his Soviet opposite number, Andrei Gromyko, on 22 September 1962. Gromyko, he warned, before preaching self-determination for Cuba, should look to the failure to allow it within his own country, or amongst satellite countries such as East Germany. More positively, Home focused on the prospects for agreement with the Soviets on banning nuclear tests, and on the recent settlement in Laos. Laos and Berlin were indeed the only subjects under discussion during Home’s meeting with Gromyko in New York. That Cuba was much more central to the latter was, however, apparent both from his speech and from his reiteration of its themes in his press conference of 13 October.

Although a British delegate observed, ‘The Communist speeches all make Cuba their main propaganda theme’, that there might be ulterior motives behind this rhetorical offensive was apparently not suspected. This is despite the similar concentration in Soviet propaganda outlets. Meanwhile in London a number of known Communist front and fellow-travelling organisations wrote to the Foreign Office condemning American aggression in Cuba. This culminated in a rebuffed request for a delegation to the Prime Minister from the hitherto unknown Britain-Cuba Committee on 11 October.

That more notice was not taken of these developments may be because the British did not fully share American concerns about the Cuban regime. On the day of his UN speech Home nevertheless asked Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, how the British might help. Rusk inquired if Britain could apply the rules on trading with the Soviet bloc against Cuba. On 1 October in Washington, Kennedy went further, trying to persuade the Foreign Secretary to join the American trade embargo that commenced in October 1959. Home had, however, just been instructed by Macmillan that ‘There is no reason for us to help the Americans on Cuba’. The Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Joseph Godber, indeed warned that American tactics would ‘merely force Castro to depend more and more completely on the Soviet Union’, thus helping him to ‘consolidate his position by building up hatred against the West’. The British were, in any case, of the view that there was no point in raising domestic political problems through an unprecedented peacetime embargo when their exports to Cuba were already minute.
Furthermore, American anxieties about Cuba were seen as exaggerated. Godber concluded: ‘We have, of course, been used to living for a long time now with Communism on our doorstep. We understand and sympathise with the regrettable fact that the United States now has a similar experience.’ However, ironically in view of subsequent events, his view was that ‘No-one would insult the United States by thinking that Cuba represents a military threat against her.’

Finally, Cuba may not have resonated with the British at the UN because the Americans had hitherto handsomely won any General Assembly votes about Cuba. This issue was therefore deemed unlikely to be inscribed for more detailed discussion in the General Assembly’s committees. Such processes, often culminating in critical plenary resolutions, could be embarrassing before the bar of world opinion, as the British were found over Southern Rhodesia at this session. Inscription and resolution, however, did not materially change anything. That the Russians might be addressing Cuba in other ways does not seem to have occurred to the British delegation. Instead, it was noted on 18 October that the Soviets had made little headway in the General Assembly in what, so far, was seen as a successful session.

That the Russians were up to something was nevertheless widely suspected. They had assiduously propagated rumours since the summer that Khrushchev intended to repeat his performance in 1960 and attend the General Assembly, probably in November once the American mid-term elections were out of the way. His previous attendance had culminated in a dramatic demarché. Not only had Khrushchev banged his shoe on the table to interrupt a Philippines delegate, but he had also used the occasion to launch major campaigns on decolonisation, disarmament and the mechanisms of the UN.

The first had appealed to the Afro-Asians and prompted the Fourth Committee, which spent much time causing imperial embarrassment to the British. This was seen as somewhat hypocritical by the British: in the midst of the Cuban crisis a violent attack on British policy in Southern Rhodesia by a Soviet delegate from Estonia was rebuffed by reference ‘to an example of colonialism which had occurred some 22 years ago in an area well-known to the USSR delegate.

The second tied in with the search for a nuclear test ban being considered by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. As Godber pointed out in the First Committee (dealing with disarmament) as the Cuban crisis reached its height, this initiative was also problematic. The Russians had introduced a moratorium on tests from 1958-61, during which time there were over a hundred unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union: the British nevertheless wanted to believe the Russians were acting in good faith ‘but events in Cuba remind us all of the need for stark realism’. Americans,
especially in Congress, were far more sceptical still. This mistrust, and consequent insistence on the need to be able to verify the other side’s activities throughout 1962 continued to stymie progress on the Test Ban Macmillan so urgently sought.\textsuperscript{37} It, and the increasing tempo of testing, with some 135 tests having been carried out by both sides since the Russians ended their moratorium in autumn 1961, also created the atmosphere of nuclear anxiety which formed the backdrop to the Cuban crisis.\textsuperscript{38}

The third was about the Troika proposal. It was assumed that if Khrushchev was coming again he would want similarly dramatic suggestions to put forward. The best guess the British could come up with, however, was either a renewal of calls for a World Trade Conference the Soviet leader had first raised in May, or some new proposals on the ongoing East/West confrontation in Berlin.\textsuperscript{39} Their US counterparts had similar views. It was only once the crisis broke that the idea that Cuba was likely to be central to Khrushchev’s theme was grasped.\textsuperscript{40}

A paper by the Foreign Office’s Northern Department in February had offered suggestive insights into Soviet thinking, observing that the main field of conflict with Communism was now in the Third World, wherein the Soviets would try to sap the frontiers of the West. That the Soviets might also seek to shore up their outpost of Cuba with nuclear missiles did not, however, occur to its authors.\textsuperscript{41}

The ceaseless Soviet bloc repetition at the UN that Cuba required protection against American aggression was seemingly designed to provide rhetorical covering fire for this deployment. So were the protestations of purely defensive intentions in Cuba – and a likely nuclear response to attempts at interdiction – presented in \textit{Tass} on 11 September 1962.\textsuperscript{42} This statement persuaded the American embassy in Moscow that Khrushchev still intended to attend the General Assembly, and Kennedy’s close advisers remained convinced of this as late as 16 October.\textsuperscript{43} In this first act of the Cuban crisis, before the Americans were even fully aware of its nature, the UN was thus being used by the Russians as a stage on which to set out their case. It is impossible to know precisely how Khrushchev might have used this situation if, with the missiles by then in place, he had indeed appeared in New York in November. Khrushchev was seen as an inveterate improviser by Western observers, such as the British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Frank Roberts.\textsuperscript{44} His earlier comments to Mikoyan about publicly revealing them in a way which redressed the nuclear balance in favour of the Soviets, prevented an invasion of Cuba and put the Americans ‘in their place’, however, suggests how he sought to use the trailed UN appearance.\textsuperscript{45} He might also have picked up on the two themes of Gromyko’s 22 September speech, which was presumably intended to set the scene for Khrushchev’s arrival. In this the Soviet Foreign Minister had not only insisted on the defence and self-determination of Cuba, but also ‘dealt at length with the question of a
preventative nuclear war’. The folly of such an idea – seen as favoured by many senior American figures who wished to exploit their nuclear superiority – was also highlighted in Khrushchev’s later speech to the Supreme Soviet. Either by the deployment or the subsequent withdrawal of the missiles, he undermined the force of such arguments, which were both inimical to Cuban security and to the peaceful co-existence that Khrushchev proclaimed as one of Lenin’s great legacies.\textsuperscript{46}

By the time Gromyko spoke, the Americans were well-aware of the Russian military build-up in Cuba. Overflight photography on 29 August confirmed eight surface-to-air missile [SAM] sites on the island. On 29 September, in response to Republican pressure in Congress, Kennedy publicly emphasised that if Cuba became ‘an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies’.\textsuperscript{47} The following month it became clear that Cuba had become such a base, and the secret conclave of Kennedy’s Executive Committee [ExComm] was established on 16 October to work out the US response.

By 18 October, when Gromyko reiterated defensive intentions in Cuba in his meeting with Kennedy, it was clear that the options consisted of diplomatic action, military action or interdiction through some kind of blockade. As Kennedy recognised, each posed diplomatic issues with allies as well as with Khrushchev. He pointed out that ‘an awful lot of conditioning would have to go in’ before America’s allies would ‘support our action against Cuba, because they think that we’re slightly demented on this subject.’\textsuperscript{48} Curiously, the obvious role of the UN as an arena for this conditioning does not seem to have occurred then to ExComm, which instead at this stage saw it largely as a potential back-channel for an approach to Castro.\textsuperscript{49} Limited attention was given to how to sell any action before world opinion. By 20 October consideration of such issues was largely confined to the – as it turned out, well-founded – assumption that OAS support would be readily obtained for a blockade, thereby demonstrating compliance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{50}

Rusk then suggested that the UN might have a more direct role in the crisis. On 22 October he raised with the President that UN observation teams could be used to freeze the nuclear missile capability in Cuba, Italy and Turkey. At the time, Kennedy made little of this. He was fixated on removing the Soviet missiles from Cuba, and had already privately indicated his willingness in a National Security Council meeting on 20 October to also remove the American missiles from Italy and Turkey, replacing them with more effective Polaris submarines.\textsuperscript{51} Instead, the UN’s prime function for the next stage in the crisis in the President’s eyes was therefore as the arena in which the appeal for removal of the Soviet missiles would be made.
On 20 October Kennedy decided that the first step towards that aim was through a limited quarantine on military shipments into Cuba, announced two days later. Macmillan’s initial reaction was dubious. Writing to Ormsby-Gore for guidance on the President’s intentions, he felt sure that it would take too long and lead nowhere. Nevertheless, ‘Since it seemed impossible to stop his action I did not make the effort, although in the course of the day I was in mind to do so.’ This was because the obvious alternatives were an American *coup de main* or an international conference. Both were fraught with danger, the latter being potentially open-ended and putting Berlin into play. However, the Prime Minister noted ‘I could not allow a situation in Europe or in the world to develop which looks like escalating into war without trying some action by calling a conference on my own’.52 This, however, was only as a final resort.

Earlier that afternoon in Washington, Kennedy met with his old friend, Ormsby-Gore. When asked about options the British ambassador reinforced Kennedy’s view that the quarantine would both be easier to sell to world opinion and less likely to have repercussions in Berlin than the alternative of air strikes.53 As Kennedy explained to Macmillan that evening in their first telephone conversation of the crisis, he did not want more precipitate action because ‘it invites [Khrushchev] so directly into Berlin.’54 Home was present at each of these calls and he made sure that British legations were instructed to deny any linkage between the crisis and Berlin.55

Meanwhile, at 4.30pm on Sunday 21 October, Stevenson was summoned to brief the Acting Secretary-General. At 10.00pm he urgently requested the chairman of the UN Security Council – which under its monthly rotation at that moment was the combative Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin – to convene a meeting at which he tabled an emergency resolution on Cuba. This resolution called for the dismantling and removal of the Soviet missiles under article 40 of the UN Charter, to be supervised by a UN observer corps, the removal of the quarantine as soon as this process was completed, and for the convening of American/Soviet talks to remove threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere and world peace.56

The Foreign Office perceived various problems with this draft: apart from the unhelpful imprecision of the term ‘quarantine’, it failed to mention the continued importation of offensive weapons or to seek UN authority for the US action to interdict those imports. Because of the dubious legality of the American operations, Home noted to Dean, UN authority would be particularly useful. He concluded: ‘I realise that the Americans may reject all these points. Nevertheless, although I attach importance to them, you may in that event still vote for the draft resolution.’57
The Cubans and Russians, meanwhile, responded to the quarantine by letters denouncing US aggression and themselves demanding an emergency meeting of the Security Council. The Soviets in particular argued a breach of the UN Charter right of all countries to organise their lives in their own ways and protect their own security. The Americans were portrayed as hypocritically objecting to Cuban defence, whilst they had themselves hitherto refused Soviet proposals that all foreign military bases around the world should be dismantled.\(^58\)

At a State Department briefing for the ambassadorial group of Britain, France and West Germany on 22 October it was pointed out that this was a false analogy. The deployments complained of had been in response to the nearby menace of Soviet missiles, at the request of the host governments at the NATO Council in December 1957 and before the Americans could provide long-range protection through Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.\(^59\) Stevenson went on to point out at the first meeting of the Security Council on the crisis the following evening that the US deployment had not been clandestine, as in Cuba. In response Dr Mario Garcia Inchaustegui, the Cuban representative, told the Security Council that the Americans had presented it with a \textit{fait accompli} by imposing the quarantine without first seeking UN sanction. His call for the immediate withdrawal of US forces was followed by Zorin, who presented his own draft resolution calling for an end to the quarantine and American interference in Cuba, and for talks between the Soviet Union, America and Cuba to remove the threat of war.\(^60\)

Earlier that day Stevenson and Zorin had staged the annual US/USSR clash in the General Assembly over which China should be admitted to the UN. Even though the Indian delegate argued three days later that the People’s Republic needed to be admitted to the UN in order to check the aggression his country was then suffering, the Americans once again secured the retention of the Chinese seat for the Nationalists at the 17\textsuperscript{th} Assembly.\(^61\) Standard and somewhat ritualised East/West clashes on other issues thus continued within the forum of the UN.

The UN had by then become the obvious public arena for a war of words between East and West over Cuba. In ExComm there was a mood that the Americans had seized the initiative.\(^62\) Dean, in contrast, felt that the Soviets were skilfully using the UN to their advantage. He noted that Zorin’s statement cleverly emphasized the right of every country to defend itself, and the failure of the US to seek prior approval for its actions from the Security Council.\(^63\) At the time, however, the quarantine was not yet in place. Having awaited OAS support, Kennedy only signed the executive order at 7.00pm Washington time on 23 October as the Security Council were meeting. The quarantine came into force at 2.00pm Greenwich mean time the following day.\(^64\)
Meanwhile, the Algerian and United Arab Republic [UAR] delegations at the UN called a meeting on the evening of 23 October of some 40 or so non-aligned countries to draft an alternative to the US resolution. Dean anticipated that this would urge an end to the quarantine and the convening of talks by the Acting Secretary-General, leaving the missiles in place. The US, he therefore noted, needed to build their case by releasing the photographic evidence of the missile sites. There was a risk of neutral delegations at the UN proving as sceptical as the British press. The doubts and hostility even of right-wing newspapers like the Daily Telegraph appalled the US ambassador, David Bruce. With Bruce’s support and the subsequently-rescinded authority of the Pentagon, the American intelligence officer Chester Cooper – at the prompting of Macmillan’s private secretary, Philip de Zulueta – released sanitised versions of the pictures that evening in London. They appeared on British television in time for the Newsweek representative to embarrass US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, at a press conference over his refusal to release this material to the American media.

The Security Council was due to meet again at 9.00am on 24 October, with Dean down to speak. In response to a request for Foreign Office guidance he had been advised to stick to a short intervention, stressing the provocation of the Soviet moves. This he duly did. Whilst reminding the Security Council that ‘We have never denied the right of the Cuban people to choose their own political regime or of the Cuban government to take such defensive measures as they think necessary’ he therefore stressed that ‘by no stretch of the imagination can a nuclear missile with a range of over 2,000 miles in Cuba be called defensive’.

It is not clear if by then Dean had received Home’s request ‘to have the earliest possible indication of whether U Thant is likely to take any initiative and, if he is, what it will be.’ The non-aligned countries, led by the UAR, Ghana, Indonesia and Cyprus, were certainly urging an initially non-committal Acting Secretary-General to take the initiative. A Ghana/UAR resolution was prepared, to be tabled when the Security Council re-convened at 6.00pm, urging U Thant to confer directly with ‘the parties directly concerned’ to address the crisis. Both the US and the Soviets tried to discourage this development. Dean, however, felt that the US had not done enough to win over the largely critical Afro-Asians at the UN. This mattered as long as the authority of a UN resolution was seen as desirable. To pass such a resolution in the Security Council required seven votes. As Dean noted, all three resolutions would fail: the Soviet and Ghana/UAR ones because of insufficient votes and the US one because it would be vetoed by the Soviets. The only alternative then available was the Uniting for Peace mechanism of Resolution 377 established in November 1950 during the Korean War, which involved instead securing a General Assembly majority. The Americans had already indicated their
intention to use this procedure. This had been relatively easy for the West in the early 1950s, but with the greatly increased UN membership of 1962 it was more of a challenge. Macmillan made clear his doubts this would work in his first message to Kennedy of the crisis. Dean meanwhile commented:

The Americans have done a certain amount by way of briefing friendly and non-aligned delegations about the missile sites but they still have a long way to go if they are to convince a good majority to vote in their favour in the event that the debate is carried from the Security Council into the General Assembly.

Such concerns were rendered nugatory by U Thant’s intervention when the Security Council re-convened that evening. Ironically, it was United Nations day. Once the Ghanaian representative had tabled their resolution U Thant announced that he had, during the customary UN day concert, despatched to Kennedy and Khrushchev messages urging a standstill on both shipments and the quarantine for two to three weeks to allow negotiations. After much American pressure, he also added an appeal to Dorticós to cease construction work on the sites.

The Security Council met again the following day. This proved to be the most dramatic visual moment of the crisis, as Stevenson challenged Zorin to acknowledge that missiles had been deployed in Cuba before, as Dean had suggested, theatrically providing the photographic proof. This focused the crisis on the existence and potency of those missiles. Accordingly, the debate on the various draft resolutions had been overtaken by U Thant’s initiative and Stevenson’s revelations. One phase of the UN’s involvement with the crisis had ended. The various committees of the General Assembly quietly continued their work with minimal reference to Cuba. The Polish delegate told the First Committee that there was no reason why American aggression should deflect their ongoing search for agreement on a nuclear test ban. Cuba ceased to be actively discussed at the UN and the focus of UN activity in the crisis shifted from the Security Council to the Secretariat.

Macmillan’s initial reaction to U Thant’s initiative was hostile. It was, he told Kennedy in their telephone conversation on 24 October, a ‘very dangerous message.’ The grounds for this observation have usually been overlooked. This was because, as the Prime Minister noted in his diary, ‘Now that [the] Russians have been proved blatant liars, no unpoliced agreement with them is possible.’ This oversight in U Thant’s communications was also unsatisfactory to the Americans. Very publicly, he had focused world opinion on the standoff rather than their problem of how to (verifiably) remove the missiles.

By this stage Macmillan had realised the drawbacks posed by an international conference. Home, however, raised the idea of a conference with Ormsby-Gore
on 24 October. Anticipating American reactions, the ambassador declined to raise the idea. It is important, however, to be clear on the role Home saw such a conference playing. Whilst potentially useful in resolving the crisis, Home’s emphasis was on it paving the way to tackling other important matters, such as disarmament. However, that it might also be used as a Soviet propaganda tool was apparent, particularly when the Polish ambassador invited himself to see the Foreign Secretary earlier that day. Dr Rodzinski deliberately raised the notion that ‘a conference would be the most practical way for both sides to get out of the present dangerous situation’. Home rebuffed this obvious invitation, instead merely observing that if a conference was desired it was for one of the two protagonists to propose it. Interestingly, he also emphasized to Rodzinski ‘the situation would be immediately eased if Dr Castro would accept a United Nations mission to inspect the nature of the Soviet missiles being installed in Cuba.’

A similar line emerged in the Prime Minister’s parliamentary statement at 11.00am on 25 October. The Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, pushed for Macmillan to intervene directly – an approach Rodzinski seemed keen to encourage. Instead, Macmillan stressed that it was best ‘to use the United Nations as an instrument.’ Earlier that morning he spelt out to Kennedy what he meant, suggesting immobilisation of the sites under UN inspection, obviating the need for military action.

There was, of course, another earlier danger point: Rodzinski had ended his interview with Home by raising alarm about what would happen when the Americans started stopping the Russian ships. That morning in Washington McNamara expected the first intercepts to occur at noon the following day. Following back-channel suggestions from Kennedy, after the Security Council meeting of 25 October, U Thant therefore sent a further message to each leader urging them to avoid confrontation around the quarantine line.

By the time of Macmillan’s Cabinet meeting at 2.45pm on 25 October, whilst some ships known to be carrying interdicted material were still on-course or halting, others were diverting from the area. The Prime Minister was also aware that work on the three Intermediate Range [IRBM] and six Medium Range [MRBM] missile sites continued apace and that all the latter would likely be operational within two days. Observations from the British embassy in Havana confirmed this evidence garnered from the continuing US surveillance flights over Cuba. This material, passed to Washington, provided additional intelligence about the situation on the island, though the fact that neither the embassy nor the British in general were informed by the Americans of the locations of the sites until 27 October somewhat hampered their utility.
There meanwhile remained, as Home pointed out at the same Cabinet, the problem of the UAR/Ghanaian resolution. Earlier that day he had tried to explain to the UAR ambassador the flaws in trying to tackle the crisis through a resolution which required the removal of the quarantine but left the missiles in place. The Egyptian took the view that difficult as it was for Kennedy to accept Soviet missiles in Cuba, it was much more difficult for Khrushchev to accept their removal. This misconceived view of both the crisis and the role of the UN in tackling it had to be modified if the issue was really to be addressed. As Home told his colleagues, for Kennedy to be able to end the quarantine and resolve the crisis, under the scrutiny of the UN the remaining in-bound Russian cargos had to be inspected and the missiles already in place dismantled.94

Not all were by then so clear on how to use the UN. Ormsby-Gore noted of his conversation with the State Department’s Harlan Cleveland earlier on 25 October that the Americans saw the private talks U Thant was initiating in two parts: starting with a standstill agreement followed by verification, possibly under UN supervision.95 The following day U Thant telephoned Rusk and obtained American assurance that if he could get Soviet and Cuban agreement to an UN verified standstill then the US would hold off invasion.96 Castro, however, had already broadcast his objections to the idea of UN inspection, prompting the British ambassador in Havana, H. S. Marchant, to wonder if ‘neutral diplomats already here’ might be an acceptable alternative.97 J. M. Brown of the Foreign Office’s United Nations Department had his doubts. If, for instance, neutrals were to be used ‘The Egyptian in particular is sharply anti-American and the Ghanaian chargé d’Affaires would not know a missile if he saw one.’98

The issue of what to do about the missiles already on Cuba was meanwhile becoming acute. This was because, although the British, French and West German ambassadors were briefed in Washington on 25 October that suspect Russian ships were heading home, the continuing work on the sites meant that a decision on whether or not to bomb them would, Rusk indicated, have to be taken in the next two to three days. As Kennedy told Ormsby-Gore by telephone the following morning, this meant that they could not give U Thant long to conclude his negotiations.

At the ambassadors’ meeting the French representative, Hervé Alphand, disclosed that the Russians in Europe had been asking questions about trading missiles in Cuba for those in Italy or Turkey.99 This seems, however, to have happened through discreet and deniable approaches via French or Italian diplomats. Interestingly, the Foreign Office’s Northern Department does not seem to have realised that this might reflect a Soviet search for an exit strategy, instead dismissing these developments as attempts to find chinks between the Americans and their allies.100
The British were disinclined to entertain missile swop suggestions, unless it concerned the Thor missiles deployed in 1958 which they had already decided to remove during 1963. Nor were they inclined to link inspection regimes. Macmillan’s message to Kennedy on the morning of 25 October referred only to UN inspection in Cuba. The same message was firmly conveyed when Home asked V. A. Loginov, the Soviet chargé d’Affaires, to call on him that morning. These moves predated the proposals prompted by Rusk put in New York later that day by Andrew Cordier, which envisaged an inspection regime in Turkey as well as Cuba. Cordier had been in Hammarskjöld’s inner circle when Assistant Under-Secretary at the UN and was now a Columbia University professor. For Dean, however, these proposals raised the problem of ‘how many United States bases should be brought under the surveillance of the United Nations Commission.’

In contrast, Dean was pushing U Thant to raise inspection and verification specific to Cuba with the Russians when he saw them at 1.00pm on 26 October. These talks initially made little progress as Zorin had not received instructions. In ExComm, meanwhile, Rusk presciently expressed doubts that the other side would welcome UN inspectors. Nor was inspection sufficient: McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser, warned that any negotiations at the UN ‘which presumes that [the missiles] might stay there, we’ve had it.’ The kind of standstill U Thant had initially envisaged of two-three weeks for negotiation was therefore no longer acceptable and it was stressed to Stevenson that instead the missiles had to be rendered inoperable. That afternoon Stevenson returned to New York and emphasized to U Thant that shipping and work on the sites had to cease and the missiles made harmless before the quarantine would be lifted. Afterwards he told Dean that U Thant, however, was pessimistic about the chances of Castro allowing access for the necessary verification.

This line contrasted with what U Thant had told Zorin earlier. The Acting Secretary-General had intervened prompted by non-aligned concerns about the quarantine, and on that he remained focused. With Zorin he therefore concentrated not on the missiles already on the island but those en route, looking to get the Soviets to suspend interdicted shipping in return for suspension of the quarantine. Earlier that day the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] had offered its services, prompting U Thant to suggest to Zorin that they might assist with policing the shipping if the quarantine was lifted.

Macmillan was more focused on the missiles on Cuba when he talked again with the President late on 26 October. At the time neither seems to have been fully aware of Khrushchev’s proposal to dismantle the offensive weapons in Cuba, firstly in return for a guarantee that Cuba would not be invaded, tightened
in a second message (on 27 October) by linkage with the *quid pro quo* of American withdrawal of their ballistic missiles in Turkey. Kennedy’s hints at such developments led the Prime Minister to enthuse about Cuban inviolability. This had been raised by the Acting Secretary-General himself earlier that afternoon with Stevenson. It was also raised with the Americans via the KGB operative Alexander Fomin in Washington that afternoon.\(^{108}\) It was, however, Macmillan who put forward the idea of U Thant himself leading an inspection team to Cuba to address the problem of verification.\(^{109}\) Home wrote to Ormsby-Gore that same evening with similar suggestions, also raising the idea of static observation posts to guard against surprises like Cuba in future.\(^{110}\)

British anxiety to secure reliable verification that the missiles had been rendered inoperable increased on 27 October, even before receipt just after 8.00pm of Kennedy’s message to Macmillan stressing that ‘we must secure the actual dismantling of the missiles currently in Cuba as the first order of business.’\(^{111}\) The President at least reassured Macmillan that he would not take ‘drastic action’ without first informing the Prime Minister.\(^{112}\) This did not comfort the British. They would have been even more concerned had they known that, contrary to Soviet assurances to U Thant, some Soviet ships were still heading for the quarantine line. This situation prompted ExComm to agree, about 10.00am on 27 October, to send an urgent message to the Acting Secretary-General to make sure that the Soviets knew where the line was drawn.\(^{113}\)

At the same time on the other side of the Atlantic, on the advice of the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia, Home at 3.00pm on 27 October despatched to Dean instructions to put in U Thant’s head the idea

\[P\]referably with but if necessary without any special authorisation from the United Nations, that he is going at once to Cuba with a team of inspectors in order to arrange that....the missile sites would be rendered inoperable, the work stopped and the import of offensive weapons into Cuba from any source prevented.

Dean was also told to make use of two ideas that they knew, from Ormsby-Gore’s report of a Rusk briefing for the ambassadorial group, were acceptable to the Americans. One of these was the inviolability of Cuba, which would immediately grant the Cubans the security they claimed they needed without the missiles. An implicit theme in British diplomacy throughout the crisis, this now became more and more an explicit goal. The other was the Brazilian proposal in the UN’s First Committee for a Latin American nuclear-free zone.\(^{114}\) As Llewellyn Thompson later pointed out to the ambassadorial group, once the immediate crisis was over, ‘it might be difficult for the United States to continue to violate Cuban airspace and a scheme of de-nuclearisation might provide continued adequate inspection.’\(^{115}\)
Three hours later Dean saw U Thant. The Acting Secretary-General had already the previous day under American pressure renewed his appeal for an end to work on the sites during negotiations, this time directly to Castro. Based on the messages which had just passed between the principals, notably Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy’s guarantee of Cuba from invasion in return for the removal of offensive weapons, he felt positive about Castro’s likely reaction. Dean was not so sanguine. Aware that there were at the UN ‘some allegedly neutral delegations who are seeking compromise at almost any price’ he felt it was important for U Thant to press on with his negotiations.

Dean noted that the Acting Secretary-General shared his view that Turkey would complicate matters. The issue was to concentrate on Cuba. Going himself to Cuba to try to break the log-jam, in the manner of Hammarskjöld’s trips to the Congo, does not seem to have occurred to U Thant until put to him by Dean. It was, however, an idea he obviously responded to. Later that afternoon he saw Raúl Roa Garcia, the Cuban foreign minister. These discussions seem to have prompted Castro to invite U Thant to Cuba as long as, during negotiations, the US desisted from aggression including the quarantine.

Ormsby-Gore received a generally positive response from Kennedy when he put the idea of U Thant going to Cuba to the President that morning. Before the Prime Minister received this news, at around the time ExComm convened at 4.00pm on 27 October, Macmillan followed up the messages to Dean by transmitting to Ormsby-Gore his response to Kennedy’s alarming message of the previous evening. This suggested a standstill for negotiations whilst the Soviets agreed to halt imports of ballistic missiles and work on the sites and to make the weapons inoperable. Macmillan suggested in turn that the US should agree to lift the quarantine and not take any action against Cuba during the standstill, all under UN supervision.

It is not clear when the ambassador received this or whether he discussed it with Rusk before the Secretary of State presented a draft response to U Thant about the Soviet proposals at ExComm. Stevenson had assured U Thant that morning of a reasonable response from the US. Early in the ExComm discussions Kennedy suggested that they should simply seek from the Acting Secretary-General ‘assurances from the Soviet Union that work has ceased.’ This line and the resulting note verbale telephoned through to Stevenson that afternoon were both very similar in approach to that counselled by the Prime Minister. In this response to Khrushchev’s letters of 26 and 27 October the President, avoiding the Turkey issue, indicated that the quarantine would be lifted and Cuba assured against invasion once Soviet weapons were removed and shipping halted under adequate UN safeguards.
Well aware by then of the American military build-up – as were U Thant and the British – Khrushchev later argued that this message gave him the assurances he had sought in his previous letters to Kennedy. He did not reveal to the Supreme Soviet that he had also been reassured by a clandestine offer to remove the American missiles from Turkey. The idea of this trade had been sympathetically discussed strongly endorsed by the BBC and much of the British Sunday press, though not the British government. It That it actually happened was, however, deliberately concealed from America’s allies.122

At 1.15pm (London time) on 28 October the message came through that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive weapons. Home and Rusk sent each other congratulatory messages tinged with relief. Ormsby-Gore found the latter and his colleagues had been ‘so preoccupied with the immediate problems that had been facing them that they had as yet no clear idea’ as to the next moves. Whilst the ambassador replied by looking ahead to addressing the broad range of disarmament issues Home had instanced during the crisis, for U Thant, however, the immediate problems were by no means over.123

As well as making the US/Soviet agreement work there was the issue that Castro wanted additional guarantees. His five point speech, repeated in a letter to U Thant, emphasized the need as well for the cessation of the following hostile American actions against Cuba:

1) Economic blockade and commercial pressures;
2) Subversive activities;
3) ‘Piratical attacks’ from the US and Puerto Rico;
4) Violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters;
5) Retention of the Guantanamo base.124

U Thant found Castro very bitter that he had not been informed by Khrushchev of the dismantling decision. Having been assured of Soviet support since Mikoyan’s 1960 visit, he felt betrayed.125 Dean noted that the Cuban ‘would have to be allowed to cool down before he will agree to United Nations inspection.’126 His five points also raised problems: Dean worried that the non-aligned and the Indian Deputy Secretary-General, C. V. Narasimhan, were broadly sympathetic to their aims.127 The Americans were particularly keen to avoid discussion on point five: indeed, the UAR representatives passed on to the British before U Thant’s departure that they were pressing Castro not to raise Guantanamo feeling he had achieved much already with the agreement not to invade.128 They were clearly unsuccessful and U Thant told the Indian chargé d’Affaires in Havana that he found the Cubans very difficult during his talks there of 30-31 October.129
Before his departure for Havana he obtained Soviet and American agreement to ICRC policing of cargos.\textsuperscript{130} The missiles in Cuba, however, remained a problem, with neither the British embassy nor American overflights detecting evidence of dismantling.\textsuperscript{131} V. V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet’s First Deputy Foreign Minister, who had flown to New York to manage the talks at the UN, told U Thant that the Soviets would only agree to verification of removal. For obvious reasons they would not let UN observers view the missiles, though U Thant was invited (and declined) to view one whilst in Cuba.\textsuperscript{132} Kuznetsov also pressed for immediate suspension of the quarantine at a Security Council lunch hosted by Zorin on 30 October.\textsuperscript{133} Meanwhile, in Cuba, the Acting Secretary-General made better progress with the commanding Soviet general, Issa Pliev. He, unlike Castro, had been kept informed of thinking in Moscow. Pliev told U Thant he received the order to dismantle at noon on 28 October and started work at 5.00pm that day.\textsuperscript{134} By then the MRBM sites were already operational. U Thant obtained a promise of dismantling the IRBM and MRBM sites by 2 November before returning to New York on 31 October.\textsuperscript{135}

American overflights confirmed dismantling had indeed substantially taken place by that date. They also observed, however, that work continued on the Il-28s and the SAM sites. The latter were deemed defensive, but the bombers, though essentially obsolete, in American eyes had to go.\textsuperscript{136} Progress on verification, however, was complicated by Castro’s intransigence. This prompted the Americans on 2 November 1962 to request the British to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba, a request swiftly turned down. As a later Foreign Office memorandum pointed out, the Soviet despatch of Mikoyan to Cuba suggested that Castro would come round. Castro certainly needed the massive aid received from Russia, aid which would render any economic sanctions pointless. Whilst Castro’s downfall was still seen as desirable, for the time-being leverage on him was, in the British view, best left to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{137}

Mikoyan’s support for the five points, stressed at his press conference in New York on 2 November, somewhat thawed relations with Castro. That same evening, he dined with the US delegation and repeatedly demanded (and was as repeatedly rebuffed) implementation of the five points, as well as an end to the quarantine. This the Americans would not concede until the ICRC inspection regime came into force.\textsuperscript{138} It was not until 6 November that Paul Rüegger of the ICRC met U Thant in New York and was able to agree how the regime would operate.\textsuperscript{139}

Two days earlier, Narasimhan told Dean that Mikoyan staying in Cuba despite the recent death of his wife seemed grounds for optimism.\textsuperscript{140} Mikoyan was trying to find ways to circumvent Castro’s objections. He seized upon the suggestion by John McCloy, who had been appointed by Kennedy to lead the US side of the negotiations at the UN, that US warships could come close to
Soviet vessels to see the missiles being transported home. This process began on 7 November. Such arrangements obviated the need for ICRC inspection.141 There nevertheless remained difficulties with the Cubans over the Il-28s, prompting Kennedy for the second time in the crisis to contemplate embargoing oil bound for the island. Some 140,000 US troops also remained marshalled for action.142 After pressure from Khrushchev, however, on 19 November Castro wrote to U Thant accepting the decision by the Soviets to withdraw them. This marked the final end of the crisis for the Americans, who stepped down security levels and formally ended the quarantine.143

It was not, however, the end for the Russians. It was only on 22 November that Mikoyan also persuaded a reluctant and suspicious Castro that the Luna tactical nuclear missiles, which had not been detected by the Americans and therefore hitherto excluded from the deal, could not be given to the Cubans on the grounds that there would not be a Soviet base there to manage them.144 Arguably it was not until Castro’s lengthy visit to the USSR of April-June 1963 that fences were fully mended between the Soviets and their new protégé in the Western Hemisphere.145

Mikoyan’s deal was as unknown to U Thant as it was to the Americans. The removal of the Il-28s, however, was also not the end of the crisis for him. Like Mikoyan, the Acting Secretary-General was concerned about the emotional state of the Cuban leader. In the First Committee on 16 November the Cuban delegate repeated the threat that US warplanes in Cuban airspace would be shot at.146 The risk that Castro would launch a nuclear Armageddon was something that Mikoyan took it upon himself to avoid through his tense and eventually successful four hour meeting with Castro on 22 November. Castro, however, had not dropped his five points. Although U Thant had told him in Cuba that there was no prospect of the five points being adopted by the Security Council the Acting Secretary-General privately sympathised. On 12 November he suggested to Stevenson an inspection regime for the Cuban exile camps to assuage the Cuban premier.147 This move, and its rebuff, was unknown to Castro, who on 26 November wrote to U Thant reiterating his demand for the five points and complaining that the US had reneged on the agreement not to invade on the pretext that Cuba had not allowed international inspection. This became a continuing refrain.148

Meanwhile, there remained the unresolved issue of the Security Council resolutions. U Thant had returned from Cuba determined to avoid early meetings at which these might again emerge. He was also avoiding meetings at which disagreement over his position might be raised. Mahmoud Riad, the UAR delegate who was that month’s Security Council chairman, tried repeatedly to get the Russians to agree to elect U Thant. Such agreement was complicated by the animosity between Zorin and the Acting Secretary-General throughout the
crisis, exacerbated by the Russian’s attempts to bully U Thant into the anti-American line he expected from Afro-Asian delegates. Dean informed Home on 27 November that ‘I do not expect that the Russians will move until they have had at least one more meeting with the Americans about Cuba.’ Although, three days later, agreement to elect U Thant was secured, the resolutions were not finally dealt with until Kuznetsov and Stevenson wrote jointly to U Thant on 7 January 1963 assuring him that, although not all issues between their governments in the Caribbean region were concluded, there was no need further to occupy the Security Council on such matters. Inchaustegui’s letter of the same date, unsurprisingly, disagreed and continued to raise the five points. In his response two days later all U Thant could do was seek to reassure the Cubans, who nevertheless continued to complain of American-sponsored incursions on their territory and airspace to the Secretary-General.

In his end of session report Dean was full of praise for U Thant’s effective intervention in the crisis. Furthermore, he felt that the crisis, far from building to a crescendo at the UN – as seems to have been Khrushchev’s original intent – instead ensured that the Russians were relatively ineffective during the 17th Assembly. Dean did not reflect on his own role in the crisis, merely complaining subsequently that Stevenson seemed to receive more information in a more timely fashion from Washington than he himself did from London. For him, Cuba was an interlude in a session crowded with other matters.

During that session the UN was a site for issuing and amplifying Soviet propaganda. The General Assembly was heavily used to build-up a picture of American threats to Cuba preparatory to Khrushchev’s aborted trip to New York. The purpose of this rhetorical offensive does not seem to have been suspected by Western delegates or U Thant. However, once the discovery of the missiles was revealed on 22 October, the UN’s role changed. It became the arena in which the two sides accused each other. In the process, it helped to contain the crisis. Neither the quarantine nor Security Council resolutions, however, would actually resolve the crisis.

The UN dimension of the crisis moved to a third stage with U Thant’s letters of 24 October, which effectively ended debate in the Security Council. These letters responded to non-aligned pressure and called merely for a standstill. The need to amend this unfortunate effect and prevent a non-aligned coalescence behind such unsatisfactory solutions was thereafter a constant of British attitudes towards the crisis. Dean’s subsequent concerns about the deleterious effect of Khrushchev’s demand for the removal of American missiles from Turkey reflected this anxiety about non-aligned attitudes, hence his encouragement of U Thant to focus instead exclusively on Cuba.
After all, the British were well-aware from their experiences in the Fourth Committee that Russian propaganda was directed at the non-aligned. Not least, there was sedulous promotion of the Soviets’ peaceful intentions. During the crisis this was, British diplomats felt, deliberately played up with both neutral and Western (but not American) legations around the world. This was not without success. As R. Heath Mason of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department subsequently noted ‘there is no doubt that his peace-maker theme is very acceptable to the non-aligned world’, and it was often Khrushchev rather than Kennedy who was regarded in neutral countries in the immediate aftermath of the crisis as a statesmanlike man of peace. Non-aligned voting with the USSR indeed increased during the 17th Assembly.

It was through such propaganda successes, rather than military action, that the Soviets sought to win the cold war. In that sense Khrushchev largely achieved his goals in the UN during the crisis, as well as preserving Castro and secretly getting the American missiles out of Turkey and Italy. This included undermining the case for preventative nuclear war put forward so forcefully by American military figures even after the formal end of the Cuban crisis. This success both validated Khrushchev’s preaching of peaceful co-existence and also helped to negate the nuclear imbalance with the US.

Despite noting the Soviet concentration on Cuba in the opening weeks of the 17th Assembly of the UN, the British did not pick up on its significance. Nevertheless, once the crisis broke they were acutely aware of its propaganda dimensions, not least amongst the non-aligned; hence Home and Dean’s concern at US failure to seek UN approval for the quarantine. Acutely aware of the growing importance of the non-aligned at the UN, they were also concerned to counter moves by these delegations which aimed at ending the quarantine without tackling the missiles. The need to steer any response by the Acting Secretary-General to such moves was immediately grasped by Home. That there was such a need was made clear by U Thant’s opening intervention on 24 October. As Macmillan rightly observed, this sent ‘a very dangerous message’ because it failed to provide for the verifiable removal of the missiles. As Home had pointed out to Rodzinski earlier that day, some form of UN inspection was needed. Thereafter this line was repeatedly pushed on U Thant by Dean.

Portrayals of U Thant as an ‘unsung mediator’ have failed to acknowledge the extent to which he was responding to pressure from others. His initial intervention was prompted by a non-aligned group. This might have met their fears, but would not have satisfied the Americans. Macmillan and Home, via Dean, therefore sought to steer U Thant into a role which offered a verifiable solution for both sides. By 27 October this solution, for the British, involved observable inoperability of the missiles on the one hand, and the inviolability of Cuba on the other, in both cases under UN safeguards. These safeguards
underpinned the US note verbale which secured the basis of a solution, while at Dean’s prompting U Thant acquired an invitation to Cuba to negotiate such matters. By such processes, the British modified the Acting Secretary-General’s ‘dangerous message’ and steered U Thant towards playing a role as mediator.

Dean praised U Thant’s handling of the crisis, but he himself deserves praise for his unsung part in shifting the Acting Secretary-General’s approach. The role U Thant was encouraged to play reassured those non-aligned countries suspicious of the US while providing an outcome which – unlike that enjoined on the Acting Secretary-General by neutrals on 24 October – would satisfy both the Americans and Russians, if not the Cubans. In the process, Dean thus helped to ensure that this local conflict did not develop into the conflagration Home had warned the UN General Assembly of on 27 September 1962.

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1 I am grateful for the advice of David Gioe, Walter Rønning, Len Scott and D. R. Thorpe on an earlier draft of this chapter.
4 TNA: FO 371/171934, Khrushchev speech to the Supreme Soviet, 12 December 1962.
6 U Thant, View from the UN (New York: Doubleday, 1978), pp.159-60.
11 TNA: FO 371/162377, Adlai Stevenson to U Thant, 16 October 1962; TNA: FO 371/162381, Organisation of American States press release E-488/62, 23 October 1962. The Americans estimated there were some 5,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba (TNA: FO 371/162386, Ormsby-Gore to Home, tel. 2671, 24 October 1962). Mikoyan (p.206) says there were 42,000.
Page 267-89.


20 U Thant, p.31.

21 TNA: FO 371/166893, UN2302/16 'Anglo-American talks on the United Nations', Foreign Office 9-10 July 1962 – briefing note, agenda item 4 'The Secretary-General'; UN2306/17, record of Anglo-American talks on agenda item 4; Note by Sir Pierson Dixon (UK ambassador to France), 18 July 1962.

22 For instance, TNA: FO 371/166886, Sir Patrick Dean to A. D. Wilson, 10 September 1962.

23 TNA: FO 371/166894, provisional verbatim record of the 1182nd plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 30 November 1962.
60 *Report*, pp. 2-3; TNA: FO 371/162375, Dean tel. 1718, 23 October 1962.
62 May and Zelikow, pp. 201-2.
63 TNA: FO 371/162376, Dean tel. 1719, 23 October 1962.
65 TNA: FO 371/162376, Dean tel. 1719, 23 October 1962; Dean tel. 1720, 23 October 1962.
68 TNA: FO 371/162375, Dean tel. 1703, 22 October 1962; FO tel. 3881, 23 October 1962.
69 TNA: FO 371/162377, Dean tel. 1723, 24 October 1962, giving text of Dean’s speech.
70 TNA: FO 371/162376, Home to Dean, FO tel. 3922, 24 October 1962.
71 TNA: FO 371/162377, Dean tel. 1728, 24 October 1962.
72 *Report*, p. 4.
75 TNA: FO 371/162377, Dean tel. 1742, 24 October 1962, received 7.50am.
76 May and Zelikow, pp. 201-2.
77 *Report*, p. 4; TNA: FO 371/162377, Dean tel. 1742, 24 October 1962, received 7.50am; Dorn and Pauk, p. 268.
80 Dorn and Pauk, p. 268.
85 TNA: FO 371/162379, Home memorandum of meeting on 24 October 1962, written up on 26 October 1962.
88 May and Zelikow, p. 227.
89 Dorn and Pauk, pp. 270-2.
90 The first indications of ships stopping came the previous evening, but at the time it was unclear whether this was simply in order to re-group in convoy: TNA: FO 371/162386, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2667, 24 October 1962.
96 TNA: FO 371/162386, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2691, 26 October 1962.


TNA: FO 371/162386, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2691, 26 October 1962; FO 371/162382, Ormsby-Gore tel. 2697, 26 October 1962.

TNA: FO 371/162347, C. M. Jones to Mason, 26 October 1962.

TNA: FO 371/162382, Home memorandum of meeting on 25 October 1962, written up 26 October 1962.


TNA: FO 371/162382, Dean tel. 1777, 26 October 1962.

May and Zelikow, pp.277-86.

TNA: FO 371/162382, Dean tel. 1784, 26 October 1962.


TNA: FO 371/162386, Dean tel. 1841, 30 October 1962.

TNA: FO 371/162392, Dean tel. 1855, 2 November 1962; U Thant, pp.185-6.

TNA: FO 371/162389, Marchant tel. 504, 1 November 1962.

TNA: FO 371/162391, Marchant tel. 523, 3 November 1962; FO 371/162392, Marchant tel. 521, 3 November 1962; Dean tel. 1889, 2 November 1962.

Fischer, pp.301-2.
140 TNA: FO 371/162394, Dean tel. 1905, 4 November 1962; Mikoyan, pp.192-3.
141 Mikoyan, pp.160-1; Fischer, pp.303-4.
144 Mikoyan, pp.224-5, 481-91.
145 Medvedev, pp.192-3.
147 U Thant, pp.187, 192.
149 U Thant, pp.164, 175.
150 TNA: FO 371/166894, Dean tel. 2182, 27 November 1962.
151 Report, p.8.
152 TNA: FO 371/172624, Dean to Caccia, 29 December 1962; Dean to Caccia, 19 March 1963.
153 TNA: FO 371/171934, Basil Boothby to Mason, 3 January 1963; Mason to Boothby, 18 January 1963.
154 TNA: FO 371/171934, Mason note, 28 December 1962. See also the comments on the line taken, for instance, in the Nigerian press, TNA: FO 371/162393, Lagos tel. 994, 30 October 1962.
156 Mikoyan, p.95.
158 Mikoyan, pp.185-6.