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Shades of White Complicity: The End Conscription Campaign and the Politics of White Liberal Ignorance in South Africa

Daniel Conway

It has become a standing joke that since democracy in South Africa one cannot find anyone who supported apartheid. Increasingly some white South Africans claim that they did not know what was happening during apartheid; that it was not their generation that was responsible for apartheid, but that of their parents; and even that it was not as bad for black people during apartheid as it is for white South Africans in post-apartheid South Africa.

The public hearings and official reports of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) comprehensively documented how white South African complicity was essential to the political, economic and social operation of apartheid in all its multifaceted forms. In contemporary South Africa, white people deploy multiple discursive strategies to obscure, or misrepresent their complicity in the apartheid past and to make claims about their entitlements in the new South Africa. Melissa Steyn identified one such strategy of white complicity in the quotation above. The TRC’s official report observed another when it concluded ‘the white community often seemed either indifferent or plainly hostile to the work of the Commission’; many of whom dismissed the work of the TRC as that of the ‘crying and lying commission’. White conservatives were particularly sharp in their denunciation of, and disengagement from, the Commission: former President PW Botha refused to testify and his successor in office, FW de Klerk, withdrew from the process and used legal channels to successfully suppress the official conclusions of the TRC about his Presidency. White liberals, those who were actively opposed to apartheid either via white anti-apartheid organisations such as the Black Sash or End Conscription Campaign (ECC), or who were part of the institutionalised opposition in white parliamentary politics, such as the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), embraced the TRC more fully and have been more vocal in apparently proclaiming the non-racial values of the new South Africa. There were also whites active in the African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) who would most likely have been critical of what they perceived as the complicity of white liberals and the institutions of white liberalism.
with apartheid and thereby more radically leftist and non-complicit in their political motivations. It does not follow, however, that whites who were actively opposed to apartheid were entirely free from complicity, or that they have subsequently embraced the values and political imperatives of the new South Africa.

There are gradations and variations in levels of white complicity and these have varying social, political and economic consequences for South Africa. There is, of course, a difference between white conservative, white liberal and white radical responses to contemporary South Africa, as there were differences at the time when some whites openly opposed the principles and practices of apartheid whilst others actively supported and enforced them. As this chapter will argue, white liberals and white radicals were often complicit in white privilege during apartheid and faced difficult choices when choosing strategies of opposition to white minority rule. In the years following the end of apartheid, white liberals and the discourses of white liberalism in South Africa were also complicit in the perpetuation of an often partial, and sometimes entirely ignorant, knowledge about South Africa’s past and present. Furthermore, there is evidence that not only have some former white anti-apartheid activists struggled to accept the norms of the new South Africa, but they have been among the ANC’s most vocal critics, opposed to its racial “transformation” agenda and fiercely defensive of their socioeconomic position. White supremacy during apartheid presented a clear, morally reprehensible enemy. For many whites, white privilege as it manifests in the new South Africa does not do so.

This chapter explores the politics of white complicity, both in terms of how the past is commemorated and obscured and how ongoing privilege is legitimated and justified. Essentially, I argue that these discourses are premised on intentional ignorance about the past and also a desire to ignore and discount inconvenient and disruptive perspectives, arguments and facts. As will be discussed below, in post-apartheid South Africa, it has been very clear that white South African liberal discourses deliberately seek to shut down and discredit any critique of their position, or exposure of their ongoing racial privilege. This provides evidence that certain white discourses and white people are culpably ignorant of their complicity in ongoing white privilege. Focusing on contemporary debates about framing and commemorating white activism against apartheid, specifically, war resistance in 1980s South Africa, reveals how a particular group of white liberals seek to emphasise their agency in ending apartheid using discourses that are particularly brittle and hyper-vigilant to critique.
The chapter’s focus is a reflexive account of researching and analysing the social and political activism of the End Conscription Campaign, a white led anti-apartheid movement and specifically the responses to published work and analysis of the ECC, including my published work and analyses. The ECC challenged many fundamental aspects of militarised apartheid governance, but my analysis of the movement also traced the compromises and contradictions of the ECC and the gendered political messages it posed. Furthermore, when researching in the 2000s, I became aware that former activists and conscientious objectors were keen to obscure divisions in the movement and emphasise their agency and heroism in opposing apartheid; narratives that fed into broader political discourses premised on white demands for socioeconomic and political entitlements in contemporary South Africa. As such, I explore the ethics of my own researching and writing of an aspect of apartheid history. I reflect on the complex and often sensitive dilemmas of maintaining intellectual integrity in analysing the movement whilst being aware, at the same time, that such a critique would be unwelcome and resisted by former activists.

The chapter concludes that the outraged responses to analyses by some former ECC activists and resistance to the study and questioning of whiteness as a salient category of research is interrelated with the increased focus on supposed white suffering during apartheid (of conscripts and other soldiers) and the decentring of injustice suffered by the black population. For example, in focusing on the supposed ‘lingering, unspoken pain of white youth who fought for apartheid’ as conscripts, one not only posits that whites did indeed suffer, but that discussion of that suffering becomes on a par with the gross injustices and abuses inflicted on the black population by whites (and white soldiers, in particular) during apartheid. This white “victim” paradigm legitimates a political claim that it is not only unjust to interrogate white complicity in apartheid and in ongoing racial privilege, but that it is the white community who are the real victims of post-apartheid South Africa. As I will outline below, the focus on white agents of apartheid as “victims” and the narratives of white anti-apartheid activists have aligned in the new South Africa and perform the same reactionary political function. Both seek to obscure and obfuscate analysis of previous roles played. Yet, whereas to have been an agent of apartheid may now be premised on either victimhood or denial, anti-apartheid activism emphasises heroism and entitlement. This prevents analysis of how they may have benefitted from and constituted themselves and their privileged position through apartheid, and obscures those who really suffered
during apartheid. This in turn takes attention away from ongoing racist practices today, and hence becomes complicit in ongoing racial privilege. I argue that that these socio-political narratives are premised on ‘white talk’\textsuperscript{xii} and ‘white ignorance’: a politics of obscuring that is complicit with ongoing white privilege. Finally, the dilemmas I faced in researching and writing about the ECC activists and objectors and the responses to my published work provoked an uneasy feeling that I too had been complicit in centring white action in helping end apartheid.

**Whiteness and Complicity in South Africa**

The complicity of South African whites in apartheid has been a dominant theme of post-apartheid social and political discourses, and the complicity of whites in *whiteness* as a mode of racial privilege and domination has been evident and theorised transnationally. Conceptualising whiteness requires a focus on the operationalisation of racial privilege in social, material and embodied forms.\textsuperscript{xiii} As with other power hierarchies, such as gendered and class based socioeconomic relations, white people are by their race to a degree complicit in inequality, prejudice and exploitation. Whites who wish to challenge and deconstruct whiteness as a form of racial domination face a difficult and contentious task.\textsuperscript{xiv} Marilyn Frye makes a direct comparison between being white in society (‘whiteness’) and gendered authority, i.e. being masculine. As she writes, ‘whiteness, like being masculine, involves a belief in one’s authority and in one’s own experience as truth. In addition, whiteness entails an unwillingness to be challenged that is protected by perceived white moral goodness’.\textsuperscript{xv} The universal claim of whiteness to truth, knowledge and morality is brought in to sharp and unstable focus when whites and whiteness is analysed in South Africa. As one of the most infamous and violent institutionalised forms of white supremacy, apartheid automatically conferred political, social, legal and material benefits on the white community. Apartheid necessitated overt white complicity in political terms, i.e. voting for successive National Party governments to maintain white minority rule and from the 1970s onwards, and in military terms, when compulsory conscription for all white men in the South African Defence Force (SADF) was instituted to defend the state against external and internal threat. This was in addition to the everyday racisms and silent complicity with injustice that apartheid required in order to perpetuate itself. The liberation struggle against apartheid and the negotiated transition to non-racial
democracy in the 1990s necessitated some form of recognition that state enforced racism was wrong. Confronting and coming to terms with the country’s past has been more urgent than in other contexts, as addressing and overcoming racial division and the role of the white community in being both overtly and silently complicit with apartheid is an integral part of nation building.

As discussed above, white liberals in South Africa have, superficially at least, proclaimed their support for the new non-racial dispensation, articulating what Steyn and Foster define as ‘new South Africa speak’. However, by doing so white liberalism continues the logic of whiteness as the voice of authority, the definer of social and political reality and as being legitimate and righteous agents in the new order. By defining the terms of non-racialism, progress, transformation and tolerance, liberal whites also ensure that their status is preserved. As Makgoba notes about contemporary whiteness in South Africa, ‘A very curious feature of our society and its transformation, is that those who were recently our oppressors, have now suddenly become experts and our saviours in transformation’. Charles Mills, writing primarily about the US contexts, explains that the articulation of ‘a feel good history for whites’, in which whites create a more favourable, comfortable and morally righteous self-construction that is premised on the maintenance of ignorance. Applebaum argues that ‘while not only whites are susceptible to white ignorance, whites are particularly susceptible because they have the most to gain from remaining ignorant’. Indeed, Mills considers ignorance to be a foundational aspect of the ‘racial contract’ that perpetuates white power and disempowers black subjects. To argue that whites, across national and temporal contexts, are complicit in ignorance raises questions about moral agency and culpability. It also raises the question as to whether claiming that whites collectively engage in a ‘passion for ignorance’ and on at least some conscious level avoid or denounce ‘difficult knowledge’ that could destabilise their moral self-image, risks invoking Arendt’s caution that ‘where all are guilty, nobody is’ and therefore no-one in particular can be held culpable. However, as the South African case demonstrates, many whites proclaim ignorance when even the mere question of complicity in racial inequality and past injustice is raised and denial of complicity becomes a characterising feature of white ignorance. This does not mean that all white South Africans are equally culpable in the crimes of apartheid. Indeed, white liberal activists were not ignorant of the injustices of apartheid; that is why they actively opposed them. However, as will be discussed below, the extent and premises
of this opposition were variable and controversial at the time. There is an ongoing ‘ignorance’ in denying these variations and this has major implications for contemporary discourses of whiteness. More broadly, it is accurate to claim that all whites were economic, social and, in broad terms, political beneficiaries of apartheid. Therefore, all whites were complicit in apartheid to some degree.

One could argue that because of the highly bounded and authoritarian nature of apartheid and the material, social and political advantages automatically conferred on white South Africans, non-complicity was not possible for whites during apartheid. The reasons for opposing apartheid and the expectations of what political situation would emerge from this challenge diverged considerably between white liberals, both during apartheid and in the post-apartheid era. As the former ECC activist, Janet Cherry remarked in the 1980s, ‘we [white anti-apartheid activists] all go through a process, to some extent, of breaking away from our backgrounds and our parents and from our very sheltered upbringings’ in order to challenge apartheid from within white society. This breach from white society implies rejection, defiance and non-complicity. However, as Cherry states, ‘breaking away’ was ‘to some extent’ and varied between activists and also over time.\textsuperscript{xxv} There were degrees of complicity and non-complicity and white liberal activists faced difficult choices in situating their protest in radical, or complicit terms. The fraught dynamics of white complicity in apartheid led to friction within and between the white anti-apartheid organisations, as fierce debates about, for example, to what extent the movements should be openly allied to the PFP, or the organisations led by the black community, were continually conducted. The desire to radically reject apartheid and white social norms sat uneasily with a perceived need to be heard by white society and also to appear respectable in white political and social terms. As beneficiaries of the apartheid system, white anti-apartheid activists in South Africa struggled to fully reject their complicity in that system.

\textbf{Intentional Ignorance}

Ignorance, as an ongoing collective social process, is apparent in South Africa, where distinct modes of white discourse, or ‘white talk’\textsuperscript{xxvi} serve to create common sense understandings of the socioeconomic and political order that exclude alternatives and
quickly and often viciously discipline voices of dissent. As such, complicity may be accomplished via a ‘white ignorance contract’. This contract is not premised on an absolute ignorance of history or present realities, in the terms that individuals are not and could not possibly be aware of the country’s history or broader society, but more generally it is an ignorance, in either intentional or unintentional/unconscious terms, that serves to perpetuate racial hierarchies and neutralise threats to expose or destabilise white privilege. As an economically powerful racial minority that enforced and upheld a violent white supremacist state until 1994, Steyn and Foster argue that ‘the central question for whiteness in post-apartheid South Africa can be put simply: how to maintain privilege in a situation in which black people have achieved political power’. ‘White talk’, according to Steyn and Foster intentionally ‘represents the New South Africa in an attempt to define the terms by which (not only white) people will understand it, and relate to it. A great deal is at stake in the battle over whose definitions of the current and transforming social, economic and political arrangements and developments should prevail’. White ignorance is, by its very definition, unstable and subject to contestation: the discursive struggles about the TRC and the subsequent disavowal of white South Africa’s complicity with apartheid reveal the fraught social process of attempting to maintain ignorance.

The presentation of the past continues to frame political, academic and social debates. Dissenting voices (particularly white voices) that highlight or problematisate ongoing racial privilege, who critique the articulation of “feel good” histories for whites, or who even raise and discuss openly the topic of whiteness and complicity have been targeted for criticism. A common feature of responses to academics, social commentators or politicians whom debate or critique whiteness is the use of personal and ad hominem insult, demonstrating a desire to discipline, delegitimise and silence critique. These responses range from shutting (and shouting) down discussion, to violence directed against those who speak about white guilt and complicity. For example, Samantha Vice, who wrote in an academic paper that white South Africans should accept their moral guilt in apartheid and act with humility and often silence in public discourse, was met with media denouncement and bitter criticism of Vice and insults directed against her in internet chat rooms. Melissa Steyn has been subject to sexist abuse and violent threats on internet forums as a result of her work on whiteness. A former South African paratrooper physically assaulted Anton van Niekerk in his university office after he had published a paper arguing that white South
Africans should accept their guilt for the past.\textsuperscript{xxxii} In response to an international conference about whiteness held at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2013, a national newspaper editor wrote that research into whiteness was ‘boring’, ‘naval gazing’ and irrelevant in a South Africa that was now claimed to be meritocratic and non-racial.\textsuperscript{xxxiii} Ultimately, these speech and physical acts attempt to deflect attention from whiteness as a mode of privilege, maintain white ignorance about the past and sidestep questions of complicity.

South African universities have become the focus for increasingly bitter contestations of white power and white liberalism. In these contestations, white academics and university managers are faced with a literal loss of power and more broadly the loss of a key site for maintaining and perpetuating white discursive and material privilege in South Africa. More broadly, white liberalism, that defines the university as its model, embodying free speech, tolerance and progressiveness\textsuperscript{xxxiv} stands accused of perpetuating racial privilege, ignoring the racial injustices of the past and stunting the development and racial transformation of South African society.\textsuperscript{xxxv} In order to preserve their personal positions of power (essentially, to keep their jobs) and more broadly to preserve the European liberal model of the university and define the terms by which inclusion and exclusion operates at the university, white liberals have been intentionally ignorant and on occasion, exceptionally aggressive in defending their power. In this defence, their peers and contemporaries in the media have often aided them in this ‘new South Africa speak’.\textsuperscript{xxxvi} This is because predominantly English speaking universities, such as the University of Cape Town (UCT) and the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), English language newspapers, such as the Rand Daily Mail (later the Mail and Guardian) and both English and Afrikaans speaking academics were at the forefront of white opposition and activism against apartheid. As a result, white liberals have sought to emphasise that transformation should not apply to them, as they were former opponents of apartheid and that therefore their ongoing privilege should remain unquestioned. As a profile of a senior white professor at Wits, who was seeking to remove a black Pro-Vice Chancellor who was critical of white liberal academics, noted:

for years, his generation of Wits academics have been fighting conservatism from above and preparing themselves to take over the running of the institution according to their non-racial principles and
model of transformation. Now, at the very moment they should be given their chance, the vagaries of history mean that black people must be at the helm.xxxvii

The sense of collective entitlement and injustice engendered when whites are called on to step aside has occasionally and very suddenly evolved into high profile struggles played out in the media and in parliament. The ‘hidden transcripts’ of tensions about South Africa’s racial transition erupt into ‘life or death’ rhetorical and political struggles when they emerge.xxxviii As ideological battles, and protests that have grown more widespread and bitter, these life and death struggles in South African universities have been increasingly difficult to resolve. In 2015, Siona O’Connell, a mixed-race academic at the UCT was the recipient of hate mail and was ‘pretty much ostracised’ by her white colleagues after writing an article complaining that UCT had failed to adequately racially transform its staff profile and was still predominantly white.xxxix Less than two months later there were mass student protests at UCT, led by black students, demanding the removal of a statue of British imperialist Cecil Rhodes from the campus and calling for UCT to increase the number of black academics and adopt a more inclusive policy towards black students.xl

The #RhodesMustFall protests spread to other universities in South Africa and prompted a national debate about racial transformation (or lack thereof) in the South African media. Some white South African academics have been particularly strident in at once proclaiming support for racial transformation yet denouncing the tactics and the rationale of the protestors. For example, UCT academics Jeremy Seekings and Niccoli Nattrass argued that the #RhodesMustFall protests ‘foster an intolerance of both the diversity of opinion and of reasoned deliberation’.xli Rebecca Hodes, also at UCT, criticised the movement for placing racial injustice at the centre of its demands, accused it of violent acts and vandalism, and mounted a blinkered defence of white liberalism in South Africa. As the protestors themselves noted, Hodes had ‘gone to great lengths to ignore the contributions of the #RhodesMustFall movement by dehistoricising and decontextualising our activities’xlii Seekings, Nattrass and Hodes’ responses (along with earlier hostile white liberal responses to transformation at universities, such as by Robert Morrell),xliii all seek to discipline, silence and debase efforts to racially transform South African universities and by
extension, South African society. As such, they use discourses of “white talk”, premised on white liberalism, to defend their ongoing privilege and distract attention from the reality of that ongoing privilege and the injustices it perpetuates. At UCT, the statue of Rhodes was removed, but the protests and demands to change the racial profile of the institution’s students and staff are ongoing and have broadened to incorporate other issues of racial injustice. That these tensions are so vividly exposed and played out in higher education reveals the contradictions between white liberals who argue they embody the spirit of racial tolerance and progressiveness and the criticism that white liberals have failed to fully respond to or accept contemporary political and social realities in South Africa. The accusation here is that white liberals essentially are actively and intentionally complicit in defending and perpetuating ongoing forms of racial privilege. They are also culpably enforcing ignorance by denying and obscuring the full contours of racial injustice and exclusion in South African higher education.

The Researching and Writing of White Narratives

As discussed above, neither the Truth and Reconciliation process nor the publication of the TRC’s findings settled the question of an official narrative of apartheid or a truly reconciled national community open about acknowledging complicity in past injustices. In the absence of this settled national narrative about the past, different strands of “white talk” have sought to rewrite the historical narratives of late apartheid. These different strands reveal different degrees of complicity in both the past and present. For example, former white conscripts and soldiers have become increasingly vocal about their personal and collective histories in the SADF via internet chat rooms, dedicated websites and works of fiction and non-fiction on sale across the book shops and newsagents of South Africa. White liberals in the media and academia have increasingly reproduced these narratives. Such sources either celebrate the SADF and ruminate on the betrayal of former troops by political elites, or somewhat disingenuously proclaim the former wars as ‘unpopular’ while reproducing nostalgic accounts of life in the army, as a bestselling non-fiction book did. An entire genre of fiction has arisen about national service and an academic subdiscipline focusing on the “ legacies” of apartheid’s wars has developed. In these discourses the negative affects of militarisation on whites is
emphasised: the evidence for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in former troops; the coming to terms with wars that were “lost” and unjust; and the claim that whites were both made victims of apartheid by being subject to conscription and dehumanised by participating in racism. While there is evidence, in terms of interpersonal violence, suicide and other social problems, for the negative effects and legacies of militarisation, centring white narratives risks marginalising the main victims of apartheid: black South Africans and the southern African region. The focus on PTSD in particular has been criticised as being used by former white troops as an ‘alibi for avoiding accountability for their actions during the conflict’.

The proclaiming of white heroism or victimhood as a legacy of militarisation has characterised white conservative attempts to justify past actions and denounce the present political settlement, but the desire to emphasise heroism and/or victimhood is also apparent in white liberal talk, and both discursive strategies seek to place whites at the centre of public discourse and deflects attention from, and hence becomes complicit in, ongoing white socioeconomic privilege and the perpetuation of black disadvantage in post-apartheid South Africa.

White Non-Complicity in Apartheid?

As I have written elsewhere, conscientious objectors to military service in the 1980s and the members of the ECC can rightly claim to have opposed the militarised and racist norms of apartheid South Africa. My research on the ECC and its subsequent publication forms part of the cultural discourse on white complicity in apartheid and the legacies of apartheid on white society. As such, it is part of a contentious and politicised field and subject to the same discursive and disciplining pressures. In my work, I conceptualised the gendered nature of apartheid South Africa’s militarisation, exploring the ECC as a new social movement that opposed the compulsory conscription of all white men into the SADF and interviewed white men who objected to military service for political reasons. The ECC and conscientious objectors worked in a fraught and contested environment, one in which family and friends could ostracise them for the political stance they had taken and where the state, and a plethora of social and popular discourses, stigmatised them as masquerading political arguments for what was actually motivated by cowardice, naivety, communism and/or sexual deviance. In this contested environment there were internal pressures about how to best present a
campaigning message in order to be heard by a generally unreceptive white audience. As a campaign tactic the ECC eventually adopted a language and identity that was unthreatening to conservative white norms. These tensions around the need to appear respectable in white social and political norms, or to be radically challenging in activism and political standpoints brought questions about complicity to the fore.

In 2013, I was contacted by a South African based research student who commented that the former ECC activists she had interviewed ‘have a very clear tendency to put across a particular view and history of the ECC and its members – combined with a positive representation and general lack of critique’. This very much reflected my own experience of researching the ECC (with the exception of Ivan Toms, who was candid about divisions centred on his trial for objection). Evidence of divisions over strategy and personality were evident in archives as well as in previous research. It is perhaps not surprising that a social or political movement would have controversies or divisions, yet some former ECC activists were insistent there were none and angry that I discussed such divisions and debates in my work. Conducting the research in the early to mid 2000s, I became aware how strongly former objectors wanted to emphasise their contribution and the sacrifice they had made to bring about the new South Africa. I also saw how they, in different ways, felt overlooked in the new dispensation, being categorised with other whites who had upheld the system. Affirmative action policies in South Africa have more broadly become a critical aspect of “white talk” and a policy through which whites proclaim their “victim” status or as proof of the ANC’s maladministration of the country and some former objectors felt they should not be subject to such policies and were annoyed that they had been. It was clear in my research interviews and in subsequent conversations and forums where former ECC activists discussed their life histories, that some openly supported the ANC government, whereas others bitterly opposed it. Helen Zille, a former leading activist in the ECC, became an opposition politician in the Western Cape and later leader of the official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA). In this context I became aware that there were expectations of me to present a specific narrative about the ECC that suited specific political ends and that this narrative should erase any reflection on controversies or divisions in the past.

In 2009, an End Conscription Campaign 25th anniversary event was held at the Spier Wine Estate and resort outside of Cape Town. It was a glamorous occasion opened by Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille and closed by the Deputy President
of South Africa. Art and photography exhibitions, discussions and music were the centre of the commemorations. By contrast, a colleague of mine observed what a sad sight she had witnessed when attending the small anniversary event held by the black former soldiers of the armed wing of the ANC (MK) the previous year, ‘they have been entirely left behind’ she remarked and appeared to be in poor health and poverty. In my subsequent book, I discussed how some former members of the ECC didn’t want to hold an anniversary event in 2009, considering it inappropriate for what had been a white movement during apartheid to do so, or others who wanted to invite the then youth leader of the ANC Julius Malema (Malema has often been sharply critical of the white community and at various times has demanded faster racial transformation including nationalisation of white industries and land restitution) to the event, to ‘show him’ that whites had contributed to the liberation struggle in an attempt to stop his frequent criticisms of and hostility towards the white community. When at the event, the most frequent public remark I heard was “where is our voice?” in a society that fell short of the ideals the former activists had apparently believed in. “Where is our voice” also seemed to be code for where was the voice of white South Africa. The event was covered positively and extensively in the local and national press. A documentary about the event was produced and narrated by Desmond Tutu. Former divisions in the movement could be discerned at the event, cheers of adulation greeted the introductory welcome by Helen Zille by some in the audience, but others muttered at how they had never supported Zille because of her then allegiance to the white liberal PFP. In the discussions during the weekend some openly expressed their ongoing support for the ANC government, others bitterly attacked it. Former activists reflected on their motivations for involvement in the campaign, for some there were deeply held political convictions, others personal fears for the future of their children as potential conscripts, but some were open that their involvement was socially motivated: the ECC was a space for alternative youth culture, music, sex and the political motives and potential dangers associated with anti-apartheid activism were largely obscured.

It was in this highly politicised environment that my book on the End Conscription Campaign was published in 2012. As an academic book, I had not fully anticipated how easily accessible it would be in South Africa and thus how widespread its impact would be. Published in paperback, it was widely distributed across South Africa and sold alongside the other literature about South Africa’s apartheid wars through mainstream bookshops in shopping malls and airports. With hindsight, the
nature of South African society and the fact that a white liberal elite continues to occupy the higher echelons of sections of the media and society meant that the work was read and commented on beyond the usual confines of academia. As the first single study to be published about the ECC in the post-apartheid era, I was aware that I might be subject to opprobrium from former ECC activists and other white South Africans who could be deeply invested in particular modes of presenting their past activism for contemporary political ends. By reflecting on what I had observed at the ECC anniversary, on the divisions of the ECC and even by adopting a feminist and gendered analysis my work may be interpreted very differently in white popular culture as opposed to peer academics.

In 2013, I was invited to speak at an academic conference at Rhodes University about the “Legacies of Apartheid’s Wars” and at the South African National Arts Festival about my work. In the weeks leading up to the conference, an article was published in the *Mail and Guardian* newspaper attacking my book. I was given no right of reply. Written by a former ECC activist, the article took exception to almost every aspect of the work, from the front cover (that reproduced an ECC poster), the wording of the title, to the referencing style (in text), the use of academic language and theory, the focus on gender and women activists, the implication that the ECC’s tactics were in any way related to the broader liberation movement’s ‘shift’ in the later 1980s and also the claim that there were divisions in the movement (the ECC was ‘factionless’ according to the author, if not the evidence present in the archives. The article also misrepresented a number of key arguments and entirely ignored others. I recalled how the white editor of the *Mail and Guardian* had also been present at the ECC anniversary celebrations and the newspaper had published some of the most glowing tributes to the movement at the time. Evans’s article sought to debase the analysis of the ECC in the same terms as white conservative and white liberal attacks on academic and other critiques of white privilege discussed previously. As such, it was a discourse sought to maintain ignorance about the past.

Upon arriving at the conference I realised that the main focus of the event was on white experiences of apartheid rather than on South African society more broadly. Attendees were mainly white former SADF soldiers, privileged white former ECC activists and South African liberal white academics and authors of works of fiction that focus on apartheid wars. The conference organiser introduced herself as the Director of the Legacies of the Apartheid Wars Project, and announced that the conference would
be a “healing space” for “compassionate conversations” between former foes, albeit predominantly between white people. It was a deeply uncomfortable experience, sharpened not least because the venue of Rhodes University is itself a predominantly white institution that embodies a lack of transformation and was in complete contrast to the poverty of the township at the opposite end of the city. The focus on the effects of conscription and apartheid wars on white society, ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder, to suicide and guilt seemed more premised on re-centring white experiences of apartheid and claiming and pro-claiming white victimhood, than a more productive exploration of ongoing racial inequalities and white agency (or lack of) in socioeconomic transformation. It was a white space, without critically interrogating whiteness or the ongoing white privilege in South Africa.

It became clear that the discourses at the conference were premised on forms of white liberal ignorance and complicity. The chair of my panel at the conference announced that some former ECC members had, in light of the *Mail and Guardian* review, refused to attend the conference because of my presence. At the conference some former activists loudly attacked me for my work, although, by their own admission, none had actually read my book. However, they had read the *Mail and Guardian* review. One member of the audience even announced that she had not read the book and would refuse to read it in the future - something I considered to be a remarkable expression of ignorance and intolerance to academic discourse. Although a difficult experience, it was a somewhat unsurprising one and I reflected on what it revealed (and also concealed) about discourses of whiteness in contemporary South Africa. By polemically attacking my socio political analysis of the ECC (and my right to even embark of the study as a younger, UK born “outsider”) and even refusing to read the work, the audience reflected how the white liberal discourses at the conference were premised on ignorance and a desire to present a celebratory and unproblematised account of white social and political agency in ending apartheid. The attacks mirrored those directed to other white (and black) academics that critique whiteness and also in similar terms, inflating what might have been an intellectual discussion about the analysis of a now defunct political movement into a “life or death” struggle over whose narrative would prevail in the account of the recent past.

This is a struggle that has taken place in South African academia, but in 2013 it was also taking place in South African politics. In 2013, the Democratic Alliance (DA) party, South Africa’s official opposition that emerged out of the white liberal PFP,
launched a campaign to highlight the contribution of the former PFP MP, Helen Suzman to the anti-apartheid struggle and also the anti-apartheid (and ECC) activism of the current DA leader, Helen Zille. The DA’s message, that white liberals were and remain at the vanguard of the liberation struggle and that the black government has betrayed the ideals of liberation provoked considerable controversy, with debate focusing on the legitimacy of the old white parliament and the reality and extent of Helen Suzman’s actual opposition to or complicity with apartheid governance. The responses to my work drew from and took place within this discursive context, and reveal a desire to control and frame the ECC’s history with an aim to maximise and celebrate white agency in ending apartheid: narratives that belie the evidence held in the archives. These narratives also sought to wrest focus away from black experiences during apartheid, shifting it to white experiences. In debunking critique of white liberal activism during apartheid, “white talk” sought to construct and valorise white heroes of the liberation movement, and re-centre whites as the authority of South African history and society.

Academic research can be used to confer legitimacy and importance upon actors and movements. Moreover, merely publishing research amplifies the significance of the research subject. This can generate further discourse that influences popular perceptions. I believe I was invited, in part, to the Legacy of Apartheid’s Wars conference and to the South African National Arts Festival in order to provide this academic legitimacy and amplification. In many respects I had been complementary about the ECC, and objectors and had demonstrated how their campaigns had helped destablise militarisation and increase white social and political fractures that fed into the demise of apartheid. However, in my book I openly discussed the politicised and problematic nature of white discourses about activist pasts in contemporary South Africa and critiqued the movement’s rationale and divisions. In addition, my book was on sale in popular bookshops across South Africa and reviewed by the popular press. In resisting complicity to conforming to the white liberal narrative of the ECC and seeking to expose and destabilise intentional white ignorance, whilst having a relatively high public profile for my published work and presence at the National Arts Festival, I marked myself as a target. Attacks on my work sought to undermine legitimate academic discourse, and served as an opportunity to overemphasise the ECC’s role in ending apartheid and narratives of white agency in ending apartheid.
Conclusion

Transnationally, all white people are complicit to a greater or lesser extent in “the Racial Contract” that confers privilege and entitlement to whites and whiteness. In South Africa, the breach of this racial contract by the dramatic ending of apartheid, the election of a black led government and the open exploration of the past and who should be held to account for it, has raised the stakes for whites, who now potentially see their positions of privilege exposed and their power diminished. The desire to present the ECC in only heroic terms and to aggressively “shout down” non-insiders from analysing or critiquing the history of the movement reveals not only intentional ignorance and a commitment to modernist and reductive understandings of history, but a desire to keep whites and whiteness at the centre and displace black experiences, both in the past and the present. The rise of the focus on the legacies of apartheid’s wars, both in popular culture and academia has primarily been concerned with white “suffering” and thus with the construction of a notion white “victimhood” equivalent to and even superseding the experience of black people during apartheid. This directly contributes to the white conservative claims that it is whites that suffer and are the victims of the new South Africa. In this complex and fraught political context, I as a researcher and writer faced a dilemma over the extent of my personal complicity and I was well aware when writing my PhD and subsequent publications that I was balancing academic integrity with the expectations of those I researched to tell their story in the terms they wanted. By not fully satisfying the latter, I unintentionally provoked a “life or death” discursive struggle about the “hidden transcripts” of white South Africa’s past.

It has become commonplace in contemporary South Africa for white liberals to loudly denounce other political and social actors who threaten to expose or damage their ongoing racial privilege, as well as to define the terms of debate in their own self interest. As Pierre De Vos commented, when discussing the DA’s rebranding of its white liberal apartheid past, ‘how you engage with the past is profoundly political. But because of the explosive political power of the past and the real and imaginary memory of it, there is a tendency to simplify the past to suit individuals’ emotional and political or other selfish needs. White liberals dominant position in leading universities and media outlets of the country, as well as their ongoing economic and (in some geographical locations) political power gives them the opportunity to occupy and to a
greater or lesser extent control very influential public platforms. In response to challenge and critique “white talk”, combines a disingenuous proclamation of support for the post-apartheid socio-political order with a simultaneous rejection of the very means by which such an order can really come to pass and a genuinely empowered black community can arise. My experiences with the former ECC activists and objectors, as a researcher and later as an author, is a small, but vivid example of how a section of white liberals seek to discipline and reject any critique that threatens their perceived power interests and to exploit the opportunity to re-centre focus on themselves and decenre black experiences. The broader and sharp social and political conflicts that continue to arise in South African universities reveal both the lack of genuine transformation at those institutions and the efforts and lengths to which white liberal academics and university managers will go to preserve their personal and ideological positions. In these struggles, how the past is framed relates to how whites sit as privileged subjects in the present.

If white liberals are complicit in ongoing racial privilege and are culpably or unintentionally perpetuating ignorance about the past and present, how should whites respond in contemporary South Africa? Melissa Steyn believes that some white liberals are making demands for recognition about their activist pasts that they do not deserve: ‘being part of the [anti-apartheid] struggle by choice was vastly different from fighting for one’s survival due to being trapped by apartheid’s racism’. She argues, further, that ‘petulance for not being rewarded for past contribution to the cause only betrays that an element of paternalism must have informed the choice in the first place’. From this perspective former ECC activists should accept their place in South African history as a marginal one and aside from the main dynamics of the black Liberation Struggle. They should also be aware of their ongoing and highly privileged status in an unequal South Africa. For Vice, because of white complicity and unresolved guilt, the community should be silent in political affairs. Eusebius McKasier, qualifies this and says that actually whites do have the right to speak, but he advises South Africa’s white population to be mindful of how your whiteness still benefits you and gives you unearned privileges. Engage black South Africans with humility, and be mindful of not reinforcing whiteness as normative, just as a loud, boisterous, rugby-obsessive chief executive should take care of his unearned
privileges as an aggressive, masculine male in the boardroom.\textsuperscript{ix}

White liberals have mostly disregarded this advice and it remains imperative that scholars and public commentators continue to expose and deconstruct both white complicity and white ignorance about the past and present racial injustices in South Africa.


\textsuperscript{iii} Antjie Krog, \textit{Country of My Skull} (London: Vintage, 1999), 245.

\textsuperscript{iv} Truth and Reconciliation Commission, \textit{South Africa Report}.

\textsuperscript{v} A white women’s anti-apartheid organisation founded in 1955.

\textsuperscript{vi} Founded in 1983, the ECC campaigned against compulsory conscription in the South African Defence Force, supported conscientious objectors and opposed apartheid. It gained most support in English speaking white universities.

\textsuperscript{vii} The PFP was founded in 1977 and was the official opposition in the whites only South African parliament until 1987. The PFP advocated mixed-race power sharing and drew its support primarily from the white English speaking population. In 1989 the PFP became the Democratic Party, a precursor to the Democratic Alliance that is now South Africa’s official opposition.

\textsuperscript{viii} The UDF was formed in 1983 and was an umbrella organisation incorporating a plethora of civil society organisations opposed to apartheid. It became the primary focus for active opposition to apartheid within South Africa.

\textsuperscript{ix} Daniel Conway, \textit{Masculinities, Militarisation and the End Conscription Campaign: War Resistance in Apartheid South Africa} (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2012); Linda Price, “Making Sense of Political Activism: Life Narratives of Activists from the South African Liberation Movement” (PhD diss., Cape Town: University of


xvi Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White.”

xvii Ibid., 40.

xviii Ibid., 40.


xxi Mills, “White Ignorance.”


xxiv Steyn, “The Ignorance Contract.”
Cited in Conway, *Masculinities, Militarisation*, 86.

Steyn, *Whiteness Just isn’t*; Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White.”

Steyn, “Ignorance Contract.”


Ibid., 26.


Statman and Ansell, ‘the Makgoba Affair’, 284–86; and Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White.”


#RHODESMUSTFALL, “Rebecca Hodes.”


Baines, Border War, 75.

Conway, Masculinities, Militarisation; Daniel Conway, “‘Somewhere on the Border – Of Credibility’: the Cultural Construction and Contestation of ‘the Border’ in White Society,” in Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late Cold War Conflicts, ed. Gary Baines and Peter Vale (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2008), 75–93.

Pippa Cochrane, e-mail message to author, October 23, 2013.


ii Conway, Masculinities, Militarisation, 12; Daniel Conway and Pauline Leonard, Migration, Space and Transnational Identities: the British in South Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White.”

iii Conway, Masculinities, Militarisation, 13.

iii Gavin Evans, “Campaign of Errors,” Mail & Guardian, June 14, 2013, accessed June 29, 2016, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-14-00-campaign-of-errors. The review was uncannily redolent (albeit on a much smaller scale) of the ferocious scrutiny and attacks against the then Wits Deputy Vice Chancellor M. W. Makgoba, who had challenged white dominance of the university. Statman and Ansell noted that Makgoba’s white critics ‘seem to be doing nothing more than trying to get-the-goods, to find a way, a tool, a means through which to promulgate their campaign against him. They do not object to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor because of the discovered “inconsistencies” or misrepresentations in his [curriculum] vitae, they have already found M. W. Makgoba sufficiently objectionable that they initiate a concerted search to and a reason, a discrepancy, a misrepresentation, an academic skeleton-in-the-closet through which to dispose of him.’ Statman and Ansell, “the Makgoba Affair,” 284.


Steyn, Whiteness Just isn’t, 59.

Steyn, Whiteness Just isn’t, 59.

Vice, “How Do I Live in This Strange Place?”