‘L’homosexualité? ça n’existe pas en banlieue’: the indigènes de la république and gay marriage, between intersectionality and homophobia
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Abstract

Since its founding in 2005, the anti-racist organisation Les Indigènes de la République has acquired a certain notoriety in the French public eye as a fresh voice of the anti-racist Left. The Indigènes combined postcolonial and intersectional analysis with more traditional forms of anti-racist activism. This article examines how the Indigènes engaged with LGBTQ minorities as they tried to articulate ‘intersectional’ views of the Republic. While the intersection of gender and race was central to the emergence of the organisation in 2004, the Indigènes have mostly avoided addressing issues relevant to the LGBTQ communities in France. The one exception to this rule occurred in the wake of the Marriage pour tous protests against the drive to legalise same-sex marriage, where the organisation chose to equate ‘homosexual identity’ with colonial oppression. Using interviews and publication material, this article explores the contradictions that led the Indigènes to their position on the issue of same-sex marriage, a position that lay between a left-wing discourse that prioritised an idea of social justice through inclusion of all oppressed minorities and the desire to represent a marginalised constituency that was often unsympathetic to LGBTQ issues. Their choice highlights the difficulties of analysing the volatile political reality in contemporary France through abstract notions of social justice.

‘L’homosexualité? Ça n’existe pas en banlieue’: The Indigènes de la République and Gay Marriage, between Intersectionality and Homophobia

In May 2017, a Muslim initiative in Germany opened a mosque in Berlin that was designed on the premises of Reform Jewish synagogues: it featured a single space for women and men and openly welcomed homosexuals to its congregation. In France, the new mosque received broad
media coverage as an ‘ambitious yet controversial’ project.\(^1\) One of the most vocal condemnations for the project came from Houria Bouteldja, the spokesperson for the anti-racist\(^2\) organisation *Les Indigènes de la République*, who, on her Facebook profile, presented the new institution as an ‘*agression vulgaire d’une civilisation qui tient à préserver son hégémonie sur ses éternels indigènes*’.\(^3\) The problem, according to Bouteldja, was that the mosque was but a ‘provocation’ aimed to humiliate Islam publicly. Here, she claimed this space was constructed for invented ‘*Musulmans improbables*’ rather than the ‘real’ people of the ghettos who do not identify with a Western ‘homosexual identity’. This was not the first time the *Indigènes de la République*, which by that time had become increasingly visible on the French radical anti-racist scene, waded into debates about perceived ‘incompatibility’ of Islam with Western ‘homosexual agenda’. This article examines the *Indigènes*’ trajectory and focuses on 2013, a moment when the organisation was forced into ‘choosing’ between a perceived anti-LGBTQ ‘base’ and its alliances within the progressive left. By exploring the example of the *Indigènes*, this article explores links between academic scholarship, particularly theories of intersectionality, and anti-racist activism in France. In so doing, it highlights the challenges of transposing theoretical critique of ‘multiple oppressions’ into an activist milieu that prioritises clear – and often simplistic – calls for action.

This article joins a growing body of literature on issues of intersectionality – and in particular the relations between race and sexuality – in France. What began with Kimberlé Crenshaw’s analysis of different modes of oppression in the early 1990s (Crenshaw, 1991) has since developed into a vivid, if Anglo-centric, academic discipline. In the French context, scholars have used the theoretical approaches of intersectionality to interrogate the ways women and

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\(^1\) See for example *Libération*, 17.06.2017 and *Le Monde*, 17.06.2017.

\(^2\) The term anti-racist is used here within a broad scope of anti-racist mobilisations in France and not only in reference to the ‘anti-racist moment’ of the 1980s.\(^2\) On the fragmentation of anti-racism in France, see (Gastaut, 2000, 190-205).

\(^3\) Facebook, ‘Houria Bouteldja’, 18.06.2017 at 12:05.
LGBTQ communities ‘issues de l’immigration postcoloniale’ navigate the multiple facets of discrimination they are subjected to. Just like Raissiguier’s *Reinventing the Republic* (2010), these interventions have mainly focused on reactions to the state, most notably the Republic’s instrumentalisation – and attempted ownership – of issues of sexual discrimination to control minority populations in France. This article takes a slightly different approach. Instead of trying to use intersectionality to make sense of the situation in France, and with it to trace its readership and assert its academic influence, it examines an organisation that has learnt to employ this academic term in the context of anti-racist activism. In so doing, this article explores the consequences of juxtaposition of discourse borrowed from a mainly American conversation about race into the context of anti-racism in the Fifth Republic.⁴

In this context, the *Indigènes* are a prime example of an organisation that uses academic language at times, but rejects it at others. It does not apply theories consistently, but appropriates them when they are convenient. This point is particularly important in a growing debate about the exact meaning of intersectionality theory, which the *Indigènes* have never acknowledged to have been a trigger of their political reflection, but adopted at a later phase as it converged with their approach to aspects of gender and race. In so doing, the article speaks of the divergence between the theorising of working through multiple forms of oppression and the activist view that reacts to these through forms of hierarchisation and - in some cases - dismissal.

**Intersectionality, Feminism and the Gestation of the Indigènes de la République**

The organisation *Les Indigènes de la République* was founded in 2005 by a group of activists of Maghrebi origin from the fringes of the French radical left. Of its founding members, the

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⁴ There have been other works that examined the borrowing of ‘American’ queer theory in France particularly in the context of the French debate on sexuality. This article therefore relies on the work on Bruno Perreau (2016) and Eric Fassin (2014).
The three most prominent actors were the former Trotskyist Tunisian activist Sadri Khiari, the pro-Palestinian activist Youssouf Boussoumah and the then fresh university graduate, Houria Bouteldja. The three met through campaigning within the structures of traditional anti-racism, most notably through the organisation Une école pour toutes et pour tous, which campaigned against exclusion of Muslim girls from schools for donning a Hijab.\(^5\) However, they were frustrated by what they considered was the dominance of the ‘\textit{gauche blanche bien-pensante}’\(^6\) rather than the interests of France’s racialised minorities. They identified a necessity for a ‘\textit{saut qualitatif de l’anti-racisme}’,\(^7\) which would create space for a new analysis that focused on links between France’s colonial history and modern-day racism. In January 2005, the newly founded \textit{Indigènes de la République} published their manifesto, which qualified France as a ‘colonial state’ and called to ‘decolonise the Republic’.\(^8\) This began a trajectory of a very distinct kind of political activism. The organisation’s methods combined prolific publication of lengthy, largely theoretical think pieces that denounced colonial continuities in France with an ever-growing presence in the media. Indeed, early media interest in the organisation was a direct result of their focus on colonial continuities to address the issue of race in France. The organisation’s development and growth owed much to a category of activism that, while claiming to address issues of discrimination on the labour market or police violence, became heavily associated with the development of a political discourse rather than changes on the ground. In this vein, their public image relied on a duality: on the one hand they were perceived as provocateurs because of their direct approach to race, while on the other, the academic style of their publications gave them a unique intellectual clout.

\(^5\) For more information on the earlier gestation of the organisation, see Interview Houria Bouteldja, \textit{Porte-parole des Indigènes de la République} with author, Paris, 24.11.2014, but also other works that have traced this period (Robine, 2006, 123; Lotem, 2016, 284-6; Bouteldja and Khiari, 2012, 24).
\(^6\) Interview Bouteldja with author, (2014).
\(^7\) Interview Mehdi Meftah, \textit{membre fondateur des Indigènes de la République}, with author, Créteil, 20.09.2014
\(^8\) For a discussion of the manifesto and with it the meaning of calls to ‘decolonise the republic’, see Robine (2006) and Lotem (2016). For the manifesto’s text, see http://indigenes-republique.fr/le-p-i-r/appel-des-indigenes-de-la-republique/ (last accessed 10.03.2018).
Simultaneously, from the moment of their creation, the Indigènes’ trajectory of appropriating ‘race’ in the French public conversation involved an engagement with the links between race and the roles of gender and sexuality. The main actor behind this reflection was Houria Bouteldja, who was the organising power behind the Indigènes, the organisation’s spokesperson and its face in the media. The daughter of working-class Algerian immigrants, Bouteldja had had no history of political activism prior to the early 2000s. She became politicised as a reaction to the general climate after the 9/11 attacks, but more precisely because of what she called the ‘folie totale’ of the debate around the law to ban ‘ostentatious signs of religious from the public space’, otherwise referred to as the ‘headscarf law’. This climate drew her to the organisation Ecole pour toutes et pour tous, where she met the other Indigènes.

In the context of the headscarf controversy – which mostly focused on the rights of girls to attend school in a hijab – the bulk of Bouteldja’s wrath was reserved for the organisation Ni putes ni soumises (NPNS). This organisation was founded by a group of feminists of mainly Maghrebi origin to protest violence against women in the suburbs and traditional Maghrebi milieus. During the debate about the headscarf, Ni putes ni soumises were vocal supporters of a ban, as they considered the headscarf a weapon for women’s subjugation by men. The most prominent member of the organisation was its founder, Fadela Amara, who often appeared in the media and denounced Islam to the approval of the establishment and especially the conservative UMP, which she later joined.

Bouteldja developed her argument against NPNS in her first lengthy think-piece, ‘De la cérémonie du dévoilement à Alger (1958) à Ni putes ni soumises: L’instrumentalisation...”

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10 The Law resulted from a 2003 initiative of the Chirac government designed to give a decisive answer to renewed public focus on Islam, following a history of focus on the Hijab in school. The public debate that emerged and occupied the public stage for a long period of time focused mainly on how to ‘protect’ girls from Muslim coercion (Bowen, 2006; Scott, 2010).
11 For more on the organisation, see for example Fernando (2013).
coloniale et néo-coloniale des femmes,’ (Bouteldja, 2004) which she published in October 2004. The article drew a direct line between NPNS and the unveiling ceremony in Algeria in 1958. To represent the strength of France’s civilising mission, colonial authorities orchestrated a ceremony, where Muslim Algerian women removed their headscarves to demonstrate how they discovered the light of French civilisation. For Bouteldja, NPNS perpetuated this colonial logic as ‘colonial traitors’, ‘un appareil idéologique au service d’une classe dirigeante’ (Bouteldja, 2004). She criticised what she called the ‘essentialism’ of the organisation’s discourse, or its sole focus on sexism in the suburbs, which NPNS saw as the root cause of violence against women. For Bouteldja, NPNS verbalised and confirmed an old colonialist trope of the Arab man as a bloodthirsty ‘voleur, violeur et voileur’ of women. In so doing, they supported a neo-colonial system of ‘divide and rule’ set in place in order to control the suburbs as if they had been a continuation of colonial soil. Speaking of violence against women in the suburbs, Botueldja suggested this was but a by-product of neo-colonial oppression that singled out and exotified Arab men. The piece ended with an appeal for a ‘féminisme décolonial’, which would give racialised Maghrebi women the opportunity to express solidarity and reaffirm the bonds with their ‘fathers, brothers and sons’. In other words, the piece was a first call to prioritise race over the concerns of white feminism.

This first foray into what could otherwise be considered intersectional waters was indicative of the Indigènes’ gestation. While Bouteldja began her activist trajectory through a reflection on and critique of feminism, she developed it to focus the conversation on race and stress a rupture with Western feminism. In launching the project of a ‘decolonial feminism’, Bouteldja did not seek to engage with white feminists to secure alliances in a debate about the role of the veil. She therefore steered clear from engagements of other Maghrebi feminist activists from Une Ecole pour tous et toutes with larger umbrella initiatives such as Maya Surduts’ and Suzy Rotjman’s Collectif national pour les droits des femmes (Fernando, 2014, 182-3). On the
contrary, one of the main motivations behind the creation of the new organisation was to create a ‘force indigène’, a way to mobilise France’s ‘population issue de la colonisation’ along the lines of the American black power movements. Bouteldja’s priority was a ‘rupture’ with white republicanism, and most of all with the white Left. To illustrate this priority, one of Bouteldja’s favourite formulations was Sadri Khiari’s quote that the established Left was the Indigènes’ biggest enemy, as it was its natural ally.12

Within this logic, issues of gender and sexuality were only relevant as a way to focus attention on the problem of race and to facilitate a mobilisation of the population indigénisée of the suburbs. The crux of the Indigènes’ activism, however, remained how to reach the constituency they aimed to represent. On the one hand, a major part of their activism consisted in public exposure and the idea of giving a voice to otherwise underrepresented population. Simultaneously, they lacked the organisational structures and the presence on the terrain. This became especially visible in the organisation’s late and uncoordinated response to the riots that overwhelmed urban centres in France in October and November 2005. The Indigènes’ lack of experience resulted in dithering facing the speed with which events unfolded, while more established organisations like the Mouvement des immigration et banlieues (MIB) were able to react more promptly and effectively to developments on the ground (Robine, 2006, 146). This discrepancy between the organisation’s goal of mass mobilisation and its actual reach resulted in further focus on issues that ‘mattered’ to the constituency of the banlieues in order to represent it and mobilise it into action. The three issues that Indigènes perceived as ‘relevant’ were the support of Palestine, state racism and police crimes.13 The adherence to these three priorities defined the Indigènes’ interaction with broader society and other debates. More

12 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014). Bouteldja often referred to Khiari, a Tunisian former Trotskyist dissident, as her political mentor.
13 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).
specifically, this defined issues of gender and sexuality as ‘unimportant’, or at the very least marginal to the *banlieusard* constituency.

From their very inception, therefore, the *Indigènes* were preoccupied with establishing hierarchies between categories of race, gender and sexuality in an effort to re-articulate power relations between the Republic and its racialised minorities. Nonetheless, while this interrogation of the relationship between these socially constructed categories is at the heart of intersectional theories, the *Indigènes* did not straightforwardly appropriate these. Bouteldja first began speaking of intersectionality in 2012, after the *Indigènes* had embarked on a trajectory of international alliance building (Bouteldja, 2013b). In 2005, however, the organisation’s relationship with postcolonial and intersectional theory was somewhat more complex. One of the main elements in Bouteldja’s self-fashioning pertained to her own ignorance of theory as a previously unpoliticised ‘*fille de l’immigration maghrébine*’. Accordingly, she discovered the focus on colonial continuities – and with it decolonial thinking – through the encounter with Sadri Khiari. The older Tunisian dissident, on the other hand, had not been aware of Anglophone postcolonial theory but had the ‘*bon logiciel politique dans la tête*’, which he was able to use together with vast experience of Trotskyist activism and knowledge of Francophone household postcolonial names such as Fanon and Césaire.¹⁴ This story not only allowed to place the *Indigènes* within a Francophone sphere, but also created a narrative according to which the *Indigènes*’ theory had been a product of experience on the ground rather academic borrowing. In other words, it became possible to say the discovery of the colonial focus preceded the discovery of other theoretical influences, which came to ‘*venir valider nos thèses en quelque sorte*’.¹⁵ This story of gestation, and with it the *Indigènes*’ self-positioning as both representatives of the terrain and public intellectuals, became even more

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¹⁴ Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).
¹⁵ Interview Meftah with author (2014).
important later, as the debate over Gay Marriage forced the Indigènes to take a position over homosexuality.

The Gay Marriage Debate: Forced out of Silence

For the Indigènes, the headscarf debate demonstrated a direct link to colonial oppression and therefore helped appropriate the themes of feminism and women’s rights within the logic of colonial continuities. The same applied to the organisation’s initial attitude to the issue of sexuality, and especially homosexuality, as a subject that was not entirely ‘relevant’ to their core base in the suburbs. Yet while the Indigènes did not actively wade into debates about LGBTQ issues in the Republic, the same dynamic that focused Bouteldja’s attention on women’s rights, headscarves and NPNS also applied in the context of the intersection of homosexuality and the suburbs. Here, when Bouteldja eventually committed the Indigènes to a position on homosexuality, she did so as a reaction to the trope of the Arab man as inherently homophobic in the same vein as she had formulated the idea of decolonial feminism as a counter narrative to the trope of the Arab man as an oppressor of women.

By 2012, the issue of homophobia in immigrant communities across Europe had become politicised by gay rights groups as well as by conservative – and often far-right – commentators and actors. Much ink has been used to describe the convergence of these two separate campaigns in the public sphere. On the one hand, campaigns of LGBTQ-right groups that focused on ‘normalising’ the image LGBTQ citizens for a mostly white, heteronormative majority appealed to an emerging discourse of so-called homonationalism. Accordingly, for many anti-racist activists, the basing of demands for equal rights on participation in individualist consumerism together with the desire to ‘pass’ or fit in as a relatively invisible

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16 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).
17 For the concept of homonationalism, see Puar (2007). For an analysis of the French context, see Fassin (2014, pp. 281-290) and Perreau (2016, pp. 113-137).
minority, marked LGBTQ privilege in Western societies. Simultaneously, the rise of the Dutch far-right gay politician Pim Fortuyn in the early 2000s, who based his brand of Islamophobia on the defence of ‘Dutch tolerance’ against the rise of Islam as oppressor of women and gay men, marked the emergence of a new kind of appropriation of LGBTQ-rights discourse by self-proclaimed ‘critics of Islam’. Within this logic of ‘clash of civilisations’, a growing number of conservative and far-right politicians in northern Europe began portraying themselves as defenders of ‘European values’ against violence perpetrated by immigrants of mainly Muslim origin. This continued appropriation of the issue of LGBTQ rights by anti-immigration politicians contributed to the emergence of a public narrative in which Muslim men were painted as a menace to an LGBTQ community that was imagined as predominantly white.

Nonetheless, while this narrative had many parallels to the one that had inspired Bouteldja to articulate the idea of decolonial feminism, the Indigènes largely ignored the issue of homosexuality and particularly its relation to immigrants in the first years of their existence. To some extent, this resulted from the relatively minor attention French conservative and far-right politicians dedicated to homosexuality in comparison to other Northern-European countries. While the Front national did eventually re-fashion itself as a defender of homosexuals against the ‘Muslim threat’, this only happened in 2013 when Marine Le Pen’s dédiabolisation project accommodated the rise of Florian Philippot, Le Pen’s number two, who was outed in 2014 and then embraced his position as the most prominent far-right gay politician. In this context, the subject of homophobia in the suburbs reached the press mainly through initiatives of LGBTQ groups. One such example was SOS-homophobie and their Groupe banlieue’s campaign to raise awareness to what they considered as a ‘specific’ kind of homophobia in the suburbs.18 While comparable campaigns that focused on violence against

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18 For SOS-homophobie’s focus on the banlieue, see for example the group’s 2006 report with its special dossier on the violence of the suburbs, on: https://www.sos-homophobie.org/sites/default/files/ra2006.pdf (last accessed 10.10.2017).
women often attracted Bouteldja’s attention, the *Indigènes* chose not to enter the fray when homosexuality was the main issue. The *Indigènes* even remained silent when Bouteldja’s favourite target, NPNS’s Fadela Amara, then the State Secretary for Urban Politics, gave an interview to the gay magazine *Têtu* in 2008. In it, the founder of NPNS not only expressed support for a future project that would legislate gay marriage, but also denounced homophobia in the suburbs and called for the emergence of a gay movement in the suburbs ‘*pour faire évoluer les mentalités*’.¹⁹ As the *Indigènes* later returned to Amara’s interview,²⁰ this suggests Bouteldja had untypically chosen to hold back and not react to Amara’s interview. Furthermore, this suggests the *Indigènes* did not remain silent due to any lack of awareness of the emerging narrative that focused on the specificity of homophobia in the suburbs, but decided to observe this specific debate from the side lines.

This changed with the nascent debate about the promulgation of the *marriage pour tous* in 2012, when the sudden national preoccupation with gay marriage rendered silence impossible. Like many other observers, the *Indigènes* did not initially perceive the new Hollande government’s project to legalise same-sex marriage as a priority that was in any way relevant to their activism. Neither did they expect the new law to become a national preoccupation more than a liberal measure, or a ‘box-ticking exercise’ that followed developments around Europe and the world.²¹ Even the Hollande government viewed the prioritisation of the reform, which had featured in the *Parti socialiste*’s (PS) election manifesto, as an easily winnable non-issue

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¹⁹ See *Têtu*, 20.03.2008.

²⁰ See interview Houria Bouteldja and Stella Magliani-Belkacem with the blog *StreetPress* on 06.02.2013: [https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/74580-plus-forts-que-frigide-barjot-les-indigenes-de-la-republique-denoncent-l-imperialisme-gay](https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/74580-plus-forts-que-frigide-barjot-les-indigenes-de-la-republique-denoncent-l-imperialisme-gay) (last accessed 10.08.2017). This article came under fire by both Bouteldja and Magliani-Belkacem for ‘misrepresentations’, nonetheless, none of them shed any doubt on the veracity of the quotes.

²¹ Perreau (2016). See also Independent polling agency IFOP (Institut Français de l’Opinion publique) studies in August, October, December 2012 and January 2013 which showed a broad – over 60% - favourability rate for the legalization of same-sex marriage: [http://www.ifop.fr/media/poll/1956-1-study_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.fr/media/poll/1956-1-study_file.pdf) (last accessed 08.10.2017).
following not only broad public support. This perception of the law as a quick fix also stemmed from the fact it did little more than consolidate existing practice that had been previously semi-legalised through the PACS, or civil partnership laws, in the 1990s.

However, predominantly Catholic resistance to the law resulted in a loud mobilisation of a so-called ‘silent minority’ that catapulted the issue to the top of the national conversation. The manif pour tous mobilisation, which expressed itself through the charismatic spokeswoman Frigide Barjot, appropriated the vocabulary and aesthetics of republican protest and branded itself as a movement by the ‘people’ that did not follow stereotypical views of conservative – and old – French Catholicism. Particularly the eccentric Barjot’s past as a fixture of the Parisian gay nightlife allowed her to brand the protest as a non-homophobic, even ‘gay friendly’ movement that was only interested in ‘opening the debate’ in favour of the preservation of ‘traditional families’ for the sake of child welfare. This strategy of rebranding of the Catholic – and often far-right – movement succeeded in attracting large crowds of demonstrators and ultimately forced the government’s hand to water down legislation (Perreau, 2016).

The emergence of organised Catholic protests also galvanised a broad progressive front among activists, especially on the Left. Bouteldja recalled that other organisations on the radical Left demanded the Indigènes to join them in supporting LGBT constituencies and to position themselves against the manif pour tous. These allies were angry when Bouteldja did not agree to cooperate, as she considered gay marriage was not a ‘priorité Indigène’. For Bouteldja, this ‘falling out’ was a sign of the fault-line between the Indigènes’ focus on the interests of

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23 For background of the gestation of the PACS, see for example Borillo and Lascoumes (2002).
24 For an analysis of this mobilisation, see for example Robcis (2015).
25 Frigide Barjot was an a-typical representative for a Catholic anti-gay movement, as she had been previously known for her cabaret performances in the Parisian gay scene. See Barjot’s autobiography (2014, p. 142).
26 See for example’s Barjot’s column in Libération, 17.09.2012, which even featured the sentence ‘Les homosexuelles sont une richesse pour la société’.
27 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).
racialised minorities and the gauche blanche’s definition of the Left as a general ‘progressive force’ with its prioritisation of ‘Western’ LGBT interests. As a result, she went on the attack against ‘certain nombre de positions qui se sont exprimées ici et en France quand on s’exprime sur cette question, on est soit à droite, soit à gauche, soit on est progressiste soit on est réactionnaire’, criticising the acceptance of LGBT-support as a sign of left-wing credentials.

Nonetheless, Bouteldja chose to wade into the argument after receiving an invitation to speak on the late-night debate show Ce soir ou jamais – where she had often appeared as the ‘provocatrice de service’ – to share a stage with Frigide Barjot and a number of well-known figures. She later claimed she had accepted the invitation to explain what she considered was a legitimate position of silence in the suburbs in this national debate (Bouteldja, 2013a). The programme began with Barjot’s introduction of her rejection of gay marriage for the sake of conservation of traditional paternal and maternal roles to the general disagreement of other members of the panel. Subsequently, Bouteldja introduced her argument as a person

situated in the history of immigration post-colonial and in the popular districts. If I’m asked this question […] I say, this question does not concern me. Because if you take a microphone and you go in the districts, […] and you ask people ‘what are your problems?’ the spontaneous, primarily it will be housing, police harassment, it will be discrimination, unemployment, it will be a bunch of questions linked to daily life, this question will not appear.

She continued by outlining what would become the Indigènes’ main argument about homosexuality in the suburbs. There, she claimed that that while the suburbs had their share of ‘pratiques homosexuelles’, these did not amount to a political ‘identité homosexuelle’, which

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28 Houria Bouteldja on Ce soir ou jamais!, France 2, 06.11.2012.
29 Ce soir ou jamais, France 2, 06.11.2012.
required a ‘homonational’ coming-out and ‘les revendications qui vont avec’. Accordingly, it was impossible to expect the population of the suburbs to care about LGBT rights, as ‘en réalité en France il y a plusieurs sociétés et qu’on ne vit pas dans les mêmes espaces temps’. While Bouteldja’s distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘practices’ has been criticised, noting the lack of consideration for LGBTQ lived experiences where the two unavoidably merge, her use of the very word ‘identity’ is noteworthy in and of itself, as it did not otherwise appear in the Indigènes’ publications when speaking of France’s racialised minorities. When Bouteldja spoke of racialised experiences, she defined belonging through the vocabulary of community and power, where racialised minorities did not share a sense of identity, but an underprivileged status. For her, identity was a ‘white’ preoccupation, which she commented on in debates about national identity, or here, gay identity. This fed into a cycle in which she fended off critics who addressed her position as ‘identitarian’. Simultaneously, she used this vocabulary to signal that LGBTQ preoccupations were less significant than those of racialised minorities, as these addressed issues of ‘identity’ and ‘practices’ rather than status.

Bouteldja’s appearance on Ce soir ou jamais became memorable for two reasons. Firstly, it was the first time the Indigènes expressed a position on the question of homosexuality and LGBT rights. Secondly, through the debate’s dynamic, this position painted the Indigènes as a reactionary, anti-republican actor. Indeed, as the members of the panel – some of whom as reactionarily conservative as Paul-Marie Couteaux – were all united in favour of the legalisation of gay marriage, the only person who agreed and supported Bouteldja was Frigide Barjot. For viewers, this illustrated a point many on the republican right and life had previously

30 Ibid.
31 See for example (Fassin, 2014).
33 The definition of ‘republican’ is used here within a context of contestation of republicanism that has defined French political conversations since the 1990s and has seen many different actors on the left and right reclaim a mantle of republicanism for different purposes. For a discussion of the revival of a republican discourse, see (Chabal, 2015).
made on a convergence between the *Indigènes* and the far-right. Particularly the alignment between these two women, who had emerged from scenes of the pluricultural, progressive left, but who united in denying rights of sexual minorities, quickly became a memorable ‘TV moment’. For Bouteldja, however, this position expressed the *Indigènes*’ logic of resistance to French universalism and imperialism. As the organisation’s project meant to ‘decolonise’ the Republic through the rejection of France’s universalist principles and their colonial roots, Bouteldja interpreted the internationalist argument in favour of gay marriage as another face of French universalism. Furthermore, being on the very margins of a debate only validated the *Indigènes*’ position as a ‘resisting force’, particularly as her ‘detractors’ represented the government’s position. Ultimately, as Bouteldja’s appearance on *Ce soir ou jamais* attracted criticism from fellow Left wing activists, Bouteldja perceived these negative responses as another proof of the necessity to combat the structures of the white ‘*gauche bien pensante*’.34

Thus Bouteldja dismissed the impression of synergy between her and Frigide Barjot, but rather interpreted the scene as a sign of the *Indigènes*’ independence and success in creating an autonomous organisation that did not align itself with the interests of the white Left.

**Homosexuality within Decolonial Logic**

Thereafter, Bouteldja began dedicating more time and energy to the ‘LGBT question’. If the appearance on *Ce soir ou jamais* amounted to ‘breaking a silence’, Bouteldja quickly compensated for lost time by integrating questions about homosexuality into the *Indigènes*’ decolonial project. In the early months of 2013, Bouteldja gave her support to other names in

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34 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).

35 The exact situation of the Indigènes within an international decolonial logic is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, Bouteldja uses the term ‘decolonial project’ from the very beginning of her trajectory, which she borrows from Sadri Khiari as a way to locate the Indigènes’ position on colonial continuities: it is neither postcolonial (as the organisation claims the republic is still a colonial entity), nor is it anti-colonial (as the plight of racialised subjects of the republic is not anti-colonial independence, but the decolonisation of structures).
the growing French decolonial anti-racist movement and articulated a position specific to the Indigènes. She did so in a lengthy think-piece, ‘De l’importance stratégique des discordances temporelles: Universalisme gay, homoracialisme et « mariage pour tous »,’ (Bouteldja, 2013a) published on the group’s website on 12 February 2013. The piece, which has since been often quoted for its many contradictions, quickly circulated on the anti-racist web as the Indigènes’ long waited official position. Just like other main think pieces posted by Bouteldja since the 2005 appel, it was written in the first person and combined personal reflections and postcolonial theory. Its main objective, beyond the stirring of controversy, was to formulate a ‘position indigène’ from Bouteldja’s appearance on television, and in so doing position the Indigènes as the voice of postcolonial minorities against the incursion of the ‘white left’: ‘même marchant sur des œufs, je sais que je n’hésiterai pas à sacrifier nos alliés blancs et disons plus largement l’opinion blanche de gauche acquise à la lutte des homos. […] Ce qui m’importe avant tout, c’est l’opinion indigène, et ses motivations profondes’ (Ibid.).

For Bouteldja, the struggle around gay marriage did not concern any real and living LGBT community, but rather the political affiliation of the Indigènes on France’s political spectrum. In this vein, her first priority was to establish a dichotomy between the Indigènes’ line of ‘resistance’ and LGBT integration into the oppressive mechanisms of white imperialism, ‘promue par les instances internationales en défense des minorités sexuelles sous leur forme LGBT’ (Ibid.) Here, Bouteldja listed Judith Butler’s critique of ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel’s occupation in Palestine in the same breath as the far-right Identitarian ‘kiss-in’ in front of the

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36 The most notable such support was to the project ‘Les féministes blanches et l’empire’ by Stella Magliani-Belkacem, an editor at La Fabrique, and Félix Boggio Ewanjé-Epée, a PhD student in philosophy. This unlikely duo met through the Indigènes and edited their 2012 publication Nous sommes les Indigènes de la République (Paris, Editions Amsterdam). The work took a decolonial line similar to Bouteldja’s based on Joseph Massad’s Desiring Arabs (which they were at that point translating into French), in which they exposed the whiteness of French feminism and gay-liberation movement and their complicity with France’s imperial project. Bruno Perreau (2016, 131-7) has analysed their work heavily. Interestingly here, while Bouteldja openly endorsed their work, both she and the two other writers denounced the Blog StreetPress’s equivocation of their work on https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/74580-plus-forts-que-frigide-barjot-les-indigenes-de-la-republique-denoncent-l-imperialisme-gay (last accessed 10.08.2017)
Great Mosque of Lyon in 2011 and the black\footnote{The adjective ‘black’ is used here to follow Tin’s own choice of words. As President of the Conseil représentatif des associations noires, one of Tin’s main priorities has been to appropriate a French form of blackness, or identité noire. See Interview Louis-Georges Tin with author, Paris, 10.06.2014.} gay activist Louis-Georges Tin’s 2011 campaign to de-penalise homosexuality internationally. She used the latter example as a collusion between LGBT activism and the oppressive republic, as the campaign received the support of Rama Yade, the Senegalese-born French Ambassador to the UNESCO under the conservative Sarkozy government. Tellingly, Bouteldja’s mixing of the Israeli government’s courting of gay opinion with French far-right adoption of ‘gay-friendly’ Islamophobia and campaigning by French black LGBTQ activists went beyond traditional international critique of ‘pinkwashing.’ This collation of examples portrayed LGBTQ activism as inherently compromised by racism and alliances with both the republic and the far-right and therefore incompatible with the \textit{Indigènes} programme of decolonial resistance.

This rejection of LGBTQ activism directed Bouteldja to her main point, which was the same one that had earned her broad condemnation after her appearance on \textit{Ce soir ou jamais}: that homosexuality did not exist in the suburbs. Bouteldja defined homosexuality as decoupled from individualised sexual identities and trajectories, but as an identity that she perceived as a white and western invention characterised through a claim to universality. As such, Bouteldja rejected the supposed universality of homosexuality in the same way as the \textit{Indigènes} rejected the universalism of the French republic and its values. For Bouteldja, both kinds of universalism emerged from a republican project to subdue its colonial (and postcolonial) subjects. In the case of the universalism of homosexuality, she claimed that western demands to ‘faire son coming out et les revendications qui vont avec’ amounted to a form of ‘homoracialisme’ that was incompatible with the reality of the suburbs. This reality, Bouteldja repeated the same line from her televised appearance, was the site of ‘pratiques homosexuelles’. Nonetheless, while these emerged from of pre-colonial ‘homoerotic
traditions’, they did not amount to an ‘identité homosexuelle’. Accordingly, Bouteldja articulated the goal of the decolonial project of resistance as a refusal to ‘céder au monde blanc dans sa tentative d’universaliser les identités LGBT’ in order to ‘mieux en préserver la pratique’ in its precolonial form (Bouteldja, 2013a).

For Bouteldja, decolonial resistance provided a blueprint to reject accusations of homophobia for two reasons. Firstly, Bouteldja returned to the argument of decolonial solidarity with men de la cité, which she had previously articulated in the framework of her decolonial feminism. Here, she argued that the ‘quartiers populaires répondent à l’homoracialisme par un virilisme identitaire et…toujours plus d’homophobie’, or in other words that violence experienced by homosexuals in the suburbs was an understandable response of racialised men to ‘homoracialisme’, or republican demands from postcolonial subjects to integrate and accept ‘progressive’ structures. As a result, Bouteldja repeated her demand not to join forces with the white establishment to denounce violence from the suburbs, but rather provide support for its perpetrators as brothers. She therefore returned to her decolonial feminism’s effort of hierarchisation, where she subordinated questions of gender, and in this case homophobia, to that of race, as in her declaration that ‘je suis une femme et n’ignore pas la puissance du patriarcat indigène. J’ignore encore moins son redéploiement et son énergie nouvelle du fait de la pression du racisme. C’est pourquoi, avec toute conscience, je négocie avec ce patriarcat.’

Bouteldja’s second rejection of suburban homophobia concerned the non-visibility of ‘homosexuels indigènes’. Unlike organisations fighting against homophobia in the suburbs, Bouteldja asserted that their inability to come out of the closet was not a problem to be dealt

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38 Quoted from Bouteldja (2013a), yet, Bouteldja (2012) also directly referred to the strategy of ‘solidarity’ with racialised men as a form of decolonial resistance and particularly to her claim that ‘L’homme indigène n’est pas l’ennemi principal. La critique radicale du patriarcat indigène est un luxe’ on Bouteldja, Houria, Pierre, Djemila, Dominique…et Mohamed, 08.03.2012 on: http://indigenes-republique.fr/pierre-djemila-dominique-et-mohamed/ (last accessed 17.02.2018).
with, but a sign of their – just like her own as a racialised woman – understanding and acceptance of the ‘nécessité de cette négociation [avec le patriarcat indigène] pour éviter une quelconque complicité avec l’impérialisme blanc dont ils savent qu’il ne peut que fragiliser le corps social indigène déjà mal en point, et poursuivre le démantèlement de la famille qui devient pour les indigènes le refuge ultime’ (Bouteldja, 2013a). In this same vein, she celebrated the decision of racialised homosexual men and women to submit to ‘une grande précarité affective’ of heterosexual marriage as a sign of prioritisation of traditional family structures within their racialised communities over the choice of ‘homosexual identities’ away. In so doing, these men and women fulfilled their duty to resist the ‘imperialist, capitalist, bourgeois and racist’ power of the republic. They sacrificed their own personal assimilation for the sake of dignity and the prioritisation of the ‘projets politiques des plus fragiles et des plus dominés’ (Ibid.).

**Between Intersectionality and Homophobia**

Unsurprisingly, the publication of Bouteldja’s arguments inflamed social media. Reactions oscillated between defence of Bouteldja as a voice of anti-racist resistance and demands of justification. These were often accompanied by demands to react to a piece by Abdellah Taïa, a Moroccan gay author living in Paris, who addressed wrote a reply to StreetPress’s article on Bouteldja and *Les feminists blanches et l’empire* on the *Nouvel Obsevateur*’s site rue89. There, he accused Bouteldja of stoking latent homophobia while ignoring real developments in the Muslim world beyond generalisations on the ‘quartiers populaires’:

> quand j’entends ce discours sur l’homosexualité venant des Indigènes de la République, je suis tout simplement meurtri. J’ai l’impression de faire une double peine. Surtout, et c’est cela le pire, je me retrouve encore une fois en France face à l’ignorance totale de ce qui se passe dans le monde arabe. Se
fonder sur ces visions erronées pour imposer un discours sur « les quartiers populaires », et au passage exprimer une homophobie latente, me paraît à la fois triste et dangereux (Taïa, 2012).

Subsequently, these exchanges consolidated the fault-lines that characterised the conversation about the Indigènes’ position on homosexuality (and with it homophobia). On the one hand, institutionalised and republican actors – on Left and Right alike – added homophobia to the list of communautarisme and antisemitism as another one of Bouteldja’s supposed sins.39 Particularly voices from different segments of the institutionalised Left denounced Bouteldja’s lack of ‘rapport au réel’40 in her claims that the category of homosexuality did not apply to the reality of the suburbs. On the other hand, Bouteldja’s defenders, beyond lauding her spirit of resistance,41 claimed that her detractors had misrepresented, simplified and caricaturised her actual arguments. Most notably, many such contributions suggested that Bouteldja’s prioritisation of race was vilified due to a particular French inability to import and understand Anglo ideas of intersectionality. These would not only enable an open debate of questions of race, but also the understanding of Bouteldja’s complex decolonial thinking.42 Nonetheless, while these references to theories of intersectionality came to highlight Bouteldja’s specific position as the embodiment of an activist informed by internationalist race theories, Bouteldja’s

39 This became particularly visible in another performance on Ce soir ou jamais, where the political scientist Thomas Guénolé, generally affiliated to the Left-wing party La France Insoumise, accused Bouteldja of being ‘racist, misogynist and homophobe’. This inflamed another debate, in which various commentators on the Left denounced Bouteldja’s ‘dérive identitaire’. See for example Marianne, 21.03.2016, Libération 24.05.2016 and Fabrice Pliskin on the NouvelObs Blog, 12.06.2016, accessible on: https://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/idees/20160613.OBS2489/l-homophobie-est-elle-une-resistance-farouche-a-l-imperialisme-occidental.html (last accessed 27.02.2018). For a debate of Houria Bouteldja and antisemitism, see Lotem (forthcoming).
40 See Libération, 24.05.2016.
41 See for example the letter published in Bouteldja’s defence in Le Monde, 10.06.2017, celebrating her ‘courage de secouer nos bonnes consciences’.
42 See for example the blog Genre!’s immediate response to the debate on 22.02.2013 (https://cafaitgenre.org/2013/02/22/anti-homophobie-et-anti-racisme-la-question-de-lintersectionnalite/ last accessed 24.02.2018).
own engagement with intersectionality – particularly in relation to homophobia – raises a different set of questions about the Indigènes’ decolonial project.

Bouteldja’s main appropriation of the term ‘intersectionality’ occurred in April 2013 in Berkeley, in the aftermath of Bouteldja’s intervention about gay marriage. Bouteldja’s intervention, entitled *Race, classe et genre : l’intersectionalité, entre réalité sociale et limites politiques*, attempted to provide the Indigènes de la République’s official position of the use of this academic theory in its activist trajectory. For Bouteldja, who by that time had been welcomed in American academia and particularly by contacts made at Berkeley as a voice of ‘intersectional resistance’ from Europe, this was an opportunity to differentiate the Indigènes’ position from academic theory. Her qualification of her project as a ‘materialist and decolonial’ – as opposed to a ‘culturalist, religious or identitarian’ one (Bouteldja, 2013b) – was meant to formulate a dividing line between the Indigènes’ activist priorities and academic discursive ones. With that liberty in place, Bouteldja began by welcoming feminist acceptance of intersectionality and with it the notion of multiple oppressions, but quickly turned to claim that the ‘demands’ of intersectional feminists did not apply to the Indigènes’ context and struggle.

In the same vein as in the case of homosexuality, Bouteldja defined political intersectionality as the result of two simultaneous ‘demands’ by the progressive left. Accordingly, intersectionality pushed to articulate oppressions through the lenses of race, gender, class and sexual orientation on the one hand, while calling on women of colour to follow white feminists and exclude racialised men from their activist circles. Bouteldja’s activism, however, claimed that ‘Confrontez au réel et aux luttes concrètes, ces « conseils » ne sont que de peu d’utilité même lorsqu’ils sont parfaitement sincères et bienveillants. (Ibid.)’

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43 The first time Bouteldja (2013b) approached the term was in August 2012 for the 6ème congrès international de recherches féministes in Lausanne. The Berkley intervention expanded on her initial talk in Switzerland.
Here, Bouteldja suggested that her activist interest in result over theory invalidated the very premise of intersectionality, when applied to the context of the suburbs, as it revealed that the articulation of multiple oppressions was unhelpful. She based this on the claim that race was the only category of oppression that was not manipulated and co-opted by traditions of white imperialism and colonial domination. As a result, for Bouteldja racialised sexual victims – whether women or homosexuals – saw their first priority to anti-colonial resistance and therefore rejected ‘coming out’ or the very concept of feminism, which was ‘perçu avant tout comme une arme de l’impérialisme et du racisme et par les hommes et par les femmes.’ The result of this, again, was Bouteldja’s call to reject ‘l’entre soi’ of women and LGBT communities in favour of solidarity with racialised men. Intersectionality, she concluded, was not a concept for the Indigènes to follow, but an opening in white consciousness that would help white feminists and LGBTQ activists to ‘cesser de nous donner des conseils et de s’ingérer dans nos luttes mais de convaincre les autres blancs que le féminisme tout comme les luttes LGBT, tout comme l’anticapitalisme sont eurocentriques et qu’ils doivent être décolonisés. (Ibid.)’

This follows the same logic Bouteldja has advanced since 2005, which saw the Indigènes de la République as a project of primarily decolonial resistance. Intersectionality therefore belonged to this project only as a part of the ‘logiciel politique’ that informed an hierarchisation of society according to a model that prioritised a conversation about race in France.44 But while a reflection about feminism had been pivotal in the initial articulation of Bouteldja’s decolonial project, it had never prioritised the experiences of women and used different formulations to subordinate these to the goal of addressing race. This contradiction became even more acute in the case of the debate on LGBTQ minorities, as Bouteldja used the same priorities that informed her decolonial feminism to articulate a position on gay marriage. There, she turned

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44 Interview Bouteldja with author (2014).
to acrobatics of terminologies on ‘homosexual identities’ and ‘homosexual practices’ to fit these into the contours of decolonial thinking, but in so doing did not address actual LGBTQ people and their experiences. In this instance, while Bouteldja’s activist discourse claimed to be only interested in the result rather than theory, her attention to the gay marriage issue as the concern of an abstract and theoretical community revealed quite a different relationship between the workings of academic discourse and the Indigènes’ activism.

Indeed, this intersection between academic theory and activism has always been one of the Indigènes’ main defining elements. From the very beginning of their trajectory, members of the group have continuously rejected the assertion that they were a ‘bac plus cinq’ (Robine, 2006, 141) club that spoke from an elite position to an elite audience. As a result, members often felt compelled to assert their credentials ‘with the base’ and to distance themselves from the image of elitist theorists through assertions like ‘ce qui est incroyable, c’est que nous, on n’a jamais lu un bouquin, une étude postcoloniale […] C’est l’appel des Indigènes de la République qui va tellement susciter des controverses qui va rendre légitime les études postcoloniales’.

In other words, the Indigènes’ reflection had supposedly come from a gut feeling that directly resulted from the rage of the suburbs, and which therefore was not intended to fit the mould of postcolonial thinking. However, the organisation’s visibility in the media and its attention from anglophone academia did not follow any particular success in mobilising the suburbs, as membership had never exceeded a few hundred. Instead, it resulted from their ability to harness a vocabulary of memory and postcolonial reflection in ways that were both controversial in the media and appealing for an academic audience. In this vein, Bouteldja’s particular embrace by the University of California in Berkeley’s was an example of academic

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45 See particularly Bouteldja’s (2013b) paragraph on ‘ce qui compte, c’est le résultat’.
46 Interview Mehdi Meftah with author (2014).
47 For an assessment on the number of activists and the organisation’s success with the ‘base’, see Interview Mehdi Meftah with author (2014) and Segré (2016).
desire to support an activist organisation that turned theories of decolonial resistance into practice in a fight against Islamophobia. Nonetheless, Bouteldja’s liberty with theoretical constructs on the subject of sexuality (and homosexuality) revealed the difficult negotiations between theory and activism.

Indeed, Bouteldja formulated the *Indigènes*’ position on homosexuality from the difficult position. On the one hand, the organisation wished to embody an autonomous project that claimed to unite – and in the process rejected any criticism of – a base that often showed little understanding or support for LGBTQ issues, while positioning itself on the anti-racist Left. She squared that circle through the main argument of her earlier decolonial feminism, which subordinated all issues of gender and sexuality to that of race and with it the goal of autonomy of racialised postcolonial subjects. Simultaneously, however, she went further by using these same theoretical constructs, and with them also existing theories on homo-nationalism and pinkwashing to negate the existence of homosexual communities within the racialised space of the suburbs. What interested Bouteldja in the mixing of intersectional theories and critique of homo-nationalism was the opportunity this gave to articulate a rigid hierarchical version of society. In it, the population of the suburbs remained ‘more oppressed’ and simultaneously, unlike feminists or LGBTQ activists, untainted by support of the white establishment. This theoretical characterisation of the very diverse racialised population of the suburbs allowed to also characterise ‘homosexual’ identities through the same simplistic theoretical and hierarchical lens. This defined LGBTQ experience through the imaginary white ‘demand’ to ‘come out’ and in so doing ignored realities of diverse histories, struggles and lived experiences.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Malika Amanouche (2015) referred to Bouteldja’s instrumentalisation of this imaginary demand.
One of the main issue with the *Indigènes the la République* was not that Bouteldja harnessed intersectional vocabulary in a way that disregarded the purpose of research into intersectionality, namely the examination of multiple oppressions and their effects. Bouteldja’s decolonial project was from the very beginning opposed to examining intersections between race and gender, as it was squarely interested in providing critique of race in the French republic. Bouteldja borrowed academic vocabulary to increase the organisation’s sense of legitimacy in a highly polarised political conversation. Moreover, her mastery of jargon enabled her to fashion her interventions as instances of resistance, as she imported and introduced terms from the anglophone postcolonial conversation into a French context. Similarly, the embrace of Bouteldja by scholars has been a sign of support for the use of such terminology for an activist critique of the republic. Nonetheless, Bouteldja often mobilised this new vocabulary not to provide new critique of society, but to cover the gaps in the logic of the decolonial project, which struggled to reconcile the complexities of experiences in 21st-century France, where the multitude of belongings and affiliations required a clearer explanation of what ‘decolonial’ meant. Lastly, the *Indigènes*’ case should, at the very least, encourage further examination of the helpfulness of academic critique based on intersectionality within the context of anti-racist activism. While intersectionality theories can help explain the many modes of oppression endured in postcolonial contexts, more focus is required on what these mean for modes of postcolonial resistance that is both interested in the ‘result’ and in the dignity of various victims of oppression.

**References**


