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The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

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The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council

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Abstract The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We do find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, foreign aid does not predict election.

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections

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1. Introduction

Endowed with the legal power to authorize whatever foreign policies it deems necessary to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has become the preeminent organ of the United Nations (UN). It has the legal authority to suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorize the use of armed force (see Hurd, 2007; Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Voeten, 2001). The body includes 15 members: the five ever-present Permanent Members, and the ten Non-Permanent Members (NPMs), who must win election to serve limited two-year terms.

Our study seeks to explain which countries win election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as NPMs. Note that at least four NPMs must vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass, giving these members a central role on the world stage. The President of the Security Council – a position that rotates among the members – has influence over the agenda and the order of voting (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 130-131). Most importantly, the UNSC votes by open ballot so that the voice of an elected member has a global reach on central matters of world security. Accordingly, some countries appear willing to bribe and reward NPMs. For instance, the United States increases direct foreign aid by more than 50 percent when a country serves on the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Also, NPMs become more likely to receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with relatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2010). Asian NPMs see their loans from the Asian Development Bank rise around 30 percent (Lim and Vreeland, 2013).

Understanding which countries receive these rewards can serve to inform longstanding economic questions over the allocation and effects of foreign aid and IMF/World Bank loans (see, e.g., Easterly, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Does the UNSC election process direct these funds towards countries with particular characteristics? Kuziemko and Werker, following Malone (2000), assert that "Service on the Council is by no means random" (2006: 909). Yet, to our knowledge, no established study details the systematic determinants of election to the Security Council.[1]

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[1] Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) contains a brief analysis using a probit model, though the authors' primary concern is with the effects of UNSC membership. Narrower analyses of election from particular regions include Lim and Vreeland (2013), who use a logit model conditioned on year to examine the election of Asian countries to the UNSC. Also, Scharioth (2010) presents an analysis of election to various UN committees, including the UNSC, but solely for Western European countries. Part of our work here is based on the earlier working paper by Dreher and Vreeland (2009). Two working papers on the broader election of members to the

The power to elect the NPMs formally rests in the hands of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which includes delegates from all UN member countries. Usually, however, the UNGA vote serves as a mere ratification of decisions made by regional caucuses, which play a privileged role in the nomination process. The determinants of UNSC election may therefore differ across regions. Only when there remains disagreement at the regional level, which happens in 20 percent of elections by our count, does the UNGA vote become meaningful. On these occasions, the interplay of two separate sets of preferences – those at the regional level, and those at the global level (the UNGA) – determine election to the UNSC.

What shapes these preferences? To choose NPMs, the UN Charter calls on government representatives to consider "the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization." In practice, however, matters are more complex. A detailed set of procedural rules and at least two unwritten gentlemen's agreements also shape the UNSC election procedure. Moreover, UN Ambassadors appear to consider factors beyond contributions to peacekeeping: political affiliations, economic strength, and foreign aid may all play a role. For instance, Iceland's sudden financial collapse in 2008 seemingly derailed what had previously looked a secure candidacy, while US support for the candidature of Guatemala appeared important in stymieing the rival candidacy of Venezuela in 2006. Cases such as these might just represent idiosyncrasies, but they may also be part of a regular pattern. How then should one go about investigating the systematic determinants of UNSC election?

To investigate discrete choice settings, scholars often employ the conditional (fixed effects) logit model in which a *single* decision-maker chooses a *single* option according to utility maximization (see McFadden, 1973). The UNSC election process differs from this model in at least two respects. First, as discussed above, up to two different sets of preferences can be in play: the regional and the global. Second, in some election years the UNGA regularly elects two candidates from one region, not a single candidate. We therefore develop a multiple-discrete choice model that extends the conditional logit model to allow, in a simple way, for the separate identification of two intermingling sets of preferences, and for the number of choices from the set of alternatives to vary (from zero to two).

UNSC that have been presented at conferences since we first presented the preliminary results of this paper include Iwanami (2012) and Schmitz and Schwarze (2012). In contrast, thorough qualitative accounts of the selection of specific UNSC members have been published, such as those found in Malone (1998, 2000), Jayakumar (2011), and, for the early years of the UNSC, Padelford (1960).

Our empirical analysis of election to the UNSC considers five broad theoretical perspectives: (*i*) Does the UNGA follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace, as directed by the UN Charter? (*ii*) Does the receipt of foreign aid predict UNSC election? (*iii*) Is election driven by international power or close relationships with powerful countries? (i*v*) Do cultural traits play a role? (*v*) Do governments practice a turn-taking norm of sharing seats by rotating through the eligible candidates? The last hypothesis derives from the common misconception that membership on the UNSC "rotates" through the UN membership. Formally, membership does not rotate, but in practice the regional groups and the UNGA might follow such a norm.

Analyzing data on UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, we find some evidence of a commitment to peace. At least countries engaged in intra- or inter-state conflict since the end of the Cold War are less likely to win election from Africa or from Latin America and the Caribbean. There is also a positive link between troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and election probability for Africa and Asia.

As for international power, all regions exhibit some evidence of a preference for populous countries. We also find evidence that richer countries, measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita, enjoy an advantage in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

We find only patchy, and somewhat mixed, evidence that foreign aid determines election. US economic assistance does not predict election from the developing world. US military aid similarly plays little role in regional decisions. When the UNGA votes, however, countries that receive US military aid − as opposed to development aid − are more likely to win election.

Political-cultural factors appear to hold occasional influence within regions. Countries that share a common political ideology with their region are more likely to be elected in some regions, but not in others. There are also mixed effects for countries with a history of colonialism. A British colonial legacy helps in Asia, Latin America and Western Europe but not in Africa. Attitudes to corruption are also mixed: corruption pays only in Africa and Latin America, and the effect in Africa is of marginal statistical significance. Contrasting these findings, the UNGA has shunned corrupt countries since the end of the Cold War. Aside from the common role of population and a norm of taking turns, our results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity in the determinants of UNSC election across regions. Therefore, while culture and history do not seem to matter for UNSC election within regions, they may nevertheless drive differences across regions.

The data analysis does reveal a "turn-taking" norm in the regional selection process. A country whose turn arrives is more likely to receive regional nomination, which accords with the common "rotation" perception. This finding stands as the only one that holds across all regions and time periods without exception. As seems reasonable, however, the turn-taking rights that influence selection at the regional level do not seem to influence UNGA voting over contested seats.

The results of this study contribute to a number of literatures. First, they relate to the ongoing discussion of UN reform, and reform of the UNSC in particular (Franck, 2003; O'Neill, 1996; Hosli et al., 2011). This debate centers on the question of representation but strangely lacks a systematic understanding of the current determinants of UNSC membership. Our findings may help to mitigate this difficulty by clarifying whom the election practices advantage. With an understanding that the two main determinants center on a tendency to choose populous countries and to respect an egalitarian norm of turn-taking, we can recast the debate as connected to a central theme in democratic theory: majoritarian principals versus minority rights.

Our analysis also connects to the wider literature on whether the selection of leaders is fair in the sense that it can be explained solely by the quality of the candidates (e.g., Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003; Diamond and Toth, 2007). Although "quality" is not easily defined in the context of UNSC membership, we include in our analysis certain country characteristics that seem unrelated to quality, such as religion (the proportion of the population that is Muslim) and voting patterns in the UNGA (how often a country votes with the United States/Russia), and thereby provide an implicit test of the "fairness" of the election process. As we find that these factors do not have systematic effects, reformers can focus on the influences that do appear to matter and judge as to whether populous countries deserve to win election more often or if everyone should have a turn – the two patterns that the data analysis does support.

Our study further contributes to the related literature on the selection of political leaders more generally. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democracies select better educated leaders as compared to autocracies. A link between democracy and UNSC membership might therefore arise if better-educated leaders are better-able to negotiate for UNSC membership. To explore this, we consider whether democracy indeed predicts UNSC membership – we find, however, mixed results: Western Europe has long had a preference for democracy, and we see similar preferences emerging in Latin America and Eastern

Europe since the end of the Cold War. We do not detect a robust effect of democracy in Africa or Asia.

Finally, we offer a generic econometric model of elections where there is a nomination process at one level and an endorsement vote at another. In our case, the levels are regional and global, and the model has applicability to a wide range of selection processes including the selection of membership in other UN bodies and other international organizations. Scholars may further employ the model to analyze the selection of leaders within federalist systems or within countries with primary rounds of voting at different district-levels.[2]

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the UNSC election process, and Section 3 presents various hypotheses about the determinants of election to the UNSC. In Section 4 we formally develop the econometric model, providing a likelihood equation for UNSC election, and we discuss other details of our methodology. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes with a summary discussion of the implications of our main findings.

2. The election process

The UNSC election process for NPMs follows certain rules and agreements.[3] The ten NPM seats are divided among five regional caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe (EE); two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); two from the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – *el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño*); and five from Africa and Asia.[4] An unwritten, but unbroken, gentlemen's agreement divides the five seats for Africa and Asia into three seats for Africa and two seats for Asia. Around 1968, a further unrecorded agreement between Africa and Asia reserved one of their five seats for an Arab state with the regions taking turns every two years to provide a suitable candidate (Security Council Report, 2011: 7). This seat is often called the "Arab swing seat." We control for this institutional arrangement in the empirical analysis.

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[2] Recent contributions in this area with relevance to our approach include Glasgow et al. (2012) and Golder et al. (2012).

[3] Much of the background for this section can also be found on the web site of the Security Council Report, an independent non-profit organization affiliated with Columbia University: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org. We also draw on Luck (2006).

[4] Before 1966, there were only six elected members of the UNSC. Composition was typically: two Latin American countries; one Middle Eastern country; one East European country; and two from the British Commonwealth countries. The "others" in the modern-day WEOG include descendent countries of Western Europe, mainly from the British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The United States also caucuses with this group, as do Turkey and, more recently, Israel (see, e.g., Security Council Report, 2011). See Daws (1999) for a further account of the development of the UN regional groups.

The UNGA conducts staggered elections for five seats each autumn. Terms begin in January the following year.[5] To be eligible for election as a NPM, a country must, first, belong to one of the five regional caucusing groups. Prior to 2000, when it gained temporary membership in the WEOG, Israel was not a member in any group (Security Council Report, 2011: 6); and Estonia, having joined the UN in 1991, did not become a member in EE until 2004 (Estonia, 2011) while it awaited the outcome of an (ultimately unsuccessful) application to the WEOG (Daws, 1999). Kiribati, which has never delegated a permanent representative to the UN, is the only country to presently belong to no group (UN, 2012). Second, NPMs in the final year of their term cannot run for immediate re-election (UN Charter 23(2)). The Permanent Members of the UNSC – China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States – cannot be elected as NPMs.

Countries may declare candidacy by notifying the Chairman of their regional group.[6] Before voting begins in the UNGA, the Chairman of each group is invited to announce the countries that have declared candidacy (the Chairman's list).[7] Despite this apparent ease of candidacy, in practice, few countries make the Chairman's list. Although details of the negotiations at the regional level are scarce, there appears to be a preference for the choice of NPMs to be kept "in house," insofar as is possible. The vote in the UNGA is, as a result, usually sidelined by regional groups offering a "clean slate," whereby the Chairman announces only as many candidatures as seats available. Contested elections, when the Chairman announces more candidatures than seats available, appear to occur when efforts at agreement at the regional level have failed.[8]

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[5] The term of the single Eastern European representative begins in even years. The two representatives of the WEOG group begin their terms in odd years. The terms for the two representatives of the GRULAC are staggered; the UNGA elects one each year. The Asia group's two seats are similarly staggered. The three seats filled by the Africa group are also staggered with two terms beginning in even years and one term beginning in odd years. The term of the Arab representative (shared between Asia and Africa) begins in even years.

[6] We know from the UNGA minutes that the group Chairmen stand up in sequence before the vote and announce the group candidacies. The Chairman position rotates among the region members, and terms last one month. See various issues of the *Journal of the United Nations* for details on specific elections (http://www.un.org/en/documents/journal.asp, accessed 5 April 2012).

[7] Sometimes countries announce their intention to run years in advance. Other times they do so much later, even in the midst of the elections themselves. The timing of such announcements appears idiosyncratic and data are, unfortunately, not kept.

[8] For the 36 election-years (1970-2005) we analyze, the WEOG is the most competitive group, with nine contested elections, and EE is the least competitive, with just five. As we detail further in footnote 21, we define an election as "contested" if an additional candidate receives ten votes or more. Using this threshold, there are a total of 36 "contested" elections out of 180 total elections, or 20 percent.

Africa appears to have the most disciplined rules for selecting candidates.[9] It operates a system of turn-taking within sub-regional groups, which should, in theory, ensure that all countries in Africa eventually serve on the Security Council.[10] Even here, however, the situation is more complex than might first appear. According to Security Council Report (2011: 6) there are at least three complications. First, countries that can claim to straddle more than one geographic region have chosen to shift from one group to another. Second, challengers can emerge within the same sub-regional grouping, upsetting the rotation.[11] Last, within a subgroup, some members may choose to run more often, while others choose, or are persuaded, to run less frequently or not at all.

To win election, a country must receive at least two-thirds of the votes in the UNGA (UN Charter 18(2)). When no candidate meets this threshold, the UNGA holds runoff elections. On rare occasions, there are many rounds, and no country can garner the required two-thirds majority; compromise candidates have emerged in these instances. In theory, members of the UNGA face no requirement to vote for "Chairman's list" countries, though in practice, they seldom do otherwise (save for isolated protest votes). Therefore, to date, after a Chairman has announced a "clean slate" the UNGA has always ratified the regional selection.

3. Hypotheses

Who wins election to the UNSC? Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) present a cursory examination of this question using a simple probit model in an effort to show the exogenous nature of UNSC membership selection for their study of the effects of membership.[12] No published study has presented, however, an exclusively focused examination of the question of UNSC election using quantitative methods. In the next section, we offer the main contribution of our paper: a multiple-discrete choice model to examine the joint determinants of UNSC election at the regional and global levels. First, however, we draw on the broad literature in international relations and on qualitative accounts of UNSC election to develop the testable hypotheses that we apply to our statistical model.

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[9] Africa is the only region for which we have found explicit rules, codified by the African Union in their "Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System – Doc. EX.CL/213 (VIII)." See African Union (2006: 8).

[10] North Africa and Central Africa rotate one seat every two years; Western Africa has one seat every two years; and Eastern Africa and Southern Africa rotate one seat every two years. See Security Council Report (2011: 6).

[11] According to Security Council Report (2009: 6), such queue-jumping occurred three times in the sample period: Nigeria queue-jumped Niger in 1977, and Guinea-Bissau in 1993, and Ghana queue-jumped Liberia in 1985.

[12] Bashir and Lim (in press) challenge this assumption.

We begin with the UN Charter, which asks members of the UNGA to elect UNSC members on the basis of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. We thus propose to test the impact of the contributions that countries make to UN peacekeeping missions, measured as the log of the number of troops supplied. We also include indicator variables of whether a country is involved in conflict, such as an international military dispute or a civil war. We further test for an effect of democracy, which is linked to the idea of peace in the sense that it is associated with a commitment to openness and the principles of justice.[13]

Two further hypotheses reflect ideas coming from the political economy literature. A growing literature shows that countries receive perks from UNSC membership, including US foreign aid (e.g., Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), World Bank projects (Dreher et al., 2009a), and IMF loans with comparatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009b, 2010). If these same perks that result from UNSC membership were also found to predict UNSC membership, this would point to the presence of development cycles whereby countries that gain election receive perks that, in turn, increase their prospects of future election. Countries outside of this cycle would, however, lose out. To test this possibility, we consider whether the US economic and military assistance, IMF program participation, and the number of new World Bank projects, predict election to the UNSC.[14]

If countries expect perks from membership on the UNSC, then perhaps more heavily indebted governments push harder to be elected. Or causality may run the other way: perhaps when governments anticipate that they will be elected to the UNSC, they allow their countries to go deeper into debt, anticipating a bail-out on the horizon. Either way, levels of indebtedness may predict UNSC membership. We test this hypothesis using the log of debt service as a percentage of gross national income.

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[13] On the association of democracy with openness, see Hollyer et al. (2011). On the association with justice see Dowding et al. (2004). On the general proclivity of democracies to peace, see Russett and Oneal (2001). For a contrasting view, see Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008).

[14] IMF programs themselves come in cycles (Conway, 2007). Omitting participation in IMF programs might thus bias our results in favor of finding a turn-taking norm. A substantial literature argues that IMF and World Bank loans might be given for political-economic reasons rather than need (e.g., Copelovitch, 2009; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kaja and Werker, 2010; Kilby, 2009, 2013; Reynaud and Vauday, 2009; Stone, 2002, 2004). As for bilateral foreign aid, we limit our attention to the US role for two reasons: (1) its prominent place – both in quantitative magnitude and in the literature, (2) parsimony. If we include foreign aid from all potential countries, degrees of freedom become low in certain regions. Preliminary analyses of foreign aid patterns from other OECD countries did not reveal any statistically significant correlation with UNSC election. We suggest that more in depth analyses – for example Japan's use of foreign aid to win favor – be explored in country- or region-specific studies.

If UNSC membership is valuable, heavily indebted countries may well desire membership, but they may not be in a strong position to win. Stiff competition for UNSC seats may lead the most powerful countries to win election most often. Having worked with the Canadian government in their successful 1998 election bid, Malone (2000) notes the importance of campaign funds. Canada, for example, apparently spent $1.3 million. Scharioth (2010) argues that "realist" variables measuring a country's power predict election to a wide range of UN committees, at least for the WEOG. To test the impact of a country's strength, we consider three measures: population size (logged), per capita income (logged, measured in constant US$), and territorial size (logged).[15]

A government's connections to powerful countries might also affect its country's election prospects. We measure international connections in four ways. First, we include two variables to capture how frequently each country votes in the UNGA with the United States and USSR/Russia, respectively. Second, we include an indicator for countries with "pariah" status in the eyes of one or more of the major powers, and hence subject to US and/or UN sanctions, as defined by Morgan et al. (2006). Third, we test whether membership of various political groupings that operate within the UN – the Group of 77 (G77), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and JUSCANZ (a subset of the WEOG including Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) – predicts UNSC election.[16] Last, membership in other non-UN groupings may also be important, so we allow for an effect of membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

Cultural affinity may also matter. Variables we use to test the influence of culture include the percentage of the country that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. We also test if a history of British or French colonization plays a role.[17] Beyond religious and historical affinities, we test the importance of political affinity within the region, measuring the percentage of the region with which the chief executive shares the same broad political ideology (either left,

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[15] We use estimates of GNI/capita, as opposed to the more common GDP/capita, as it is the measure of income used by the UN in the computation of member state contributions to the General and Peacekeeping budgets. We also follow the UN's methodology in using US$ exchange rate estimates of GNI. These, we argue, are more appropriate than PPP estimates in this context, as what is more relevant is international, rather than domestic, purchasing power.

[16] Because of substantial overlap in membership between G77 and NAM, indicator variables for membership of each cannot be included in the same regression equation. Instead we create three separate indicator variables: one for countries that are members of both groupings, and one for countries that are members only of NAM or only of G77, respectively. We do not include membership of OIC in the Asia group due to strong co-linearity with another of our explanatory variables, the proportion of the population that is Muslim.

[17] Given that UNSC membership is consequential for foreign aid, membership is a transmission channel by which colonial history can affect current development. See Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Iyer (2010) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012) for recent analyses.

center, right, or non-ideological). We also consider another variable that may be related to culture: the level of corruption associated with a country. On the one hand, perceived corruption may hurt if regions and the UNGA disdain such countries. On the other, corruption may help if such countries willingly disregard norms of turn-taking, jumping the queue while paying whatever bribes necessary to win support.

Finally, behavioral norms that have evolved within the decision-making process may also play a role. One such norm, which is widely observed in human evolution, as well as in a wide range of other species, is that of turn-taking (Colman and Browning, 2009; Franz et al., 2011). In the context of the UNSC election process, the turn-taking norm implies that membership on the UNSC should rotate among the members of each caucusing group. This turn-taking norm relates to the egalitarian norm, which features importantly in the literature on distributive justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Deutsch, 1985), and is consistent with recent models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).

The Africa group explicitly claims to operate according to the turn-taking norm, but whether some degree of turn-taking occurs among the remaining regions is less clear. To test the possibility that a region practices the turn-taking norm, we construct a variable, "turn-taking," which is calculated as the number of years a country has waited to serve on the UNSC divided by the number of countries currently eligible for election.[18] If the turn-taking norm holds, this variable should be positively correlated with election.

Thus, we consider five broad perspectives: (*i*) a commitment to peace, (*ii*) a foreign aid story, (*iii*) a realist international relations perspective, (i*v*) a cultural approach, and (*v*) a turn-taking norm. Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses and the variables we use to test them along with their sources.

4. Econometric Model and Methodology

4.1 Preliminaries

Let the set of members of the UNGA in year t be decomposed into the set of member countries with permanent member status (*PM*) and the set of all other "ordinary" member

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[18] Using the empirical model, which we present in the next section, we tested several possible measures of a turn-taking norm against a benchmark of perfect turn-taking. In a given year, let t_i denote the number of years since C_{ij} was last elected to the UNSC (or since it entered the UN, if no such instance), $\bar{t}$ denote the mean of t_i and η denote the number of countries, excluding C_{ij}, eligible for election. The measures we considered were: (1) t_i; (2) t_i / η; (3) $t_i - \eta$; (4) $\mathbf{1}_{\{t_i > \bar{t}\}}$; and (5) $(t_i - \bar{t})\mathbf{1}_{\{t_i > \bar{t}\}}$, where $\mathbf{1}_{\{A\}}$ is the function taking the value 1 if condition A is true and 0 otherwise. We found the second of these measures to be best suited for capturing turn-taking effects.

countries. Let $J = \{\text{AF,AS,EE,GRULAC,WEOG}\}$ be the set of caucusing groups (regions), and let the set of ordinary member countries belonging to region j in year t be denoted R_{jt}, where $t \in \{0,\ldots,T\}$. Let $R_j = \cup_t R_{jt}$ denote the set of all past and present members of caucusing group j, and let C_{ij} be the ith country within R_j. The set of ordinary member countries belonging to a caucusing group in year t (a necessary condition to serve as a NPM in year $t + 1$) is therefore $R_t = \cup_j R_{jt}$.

Let NPM_t denote the set of NPMs on the UNSC in year t, then the UNSC in a given year, t, is defined by

$$UNSC_t = NPM_t \cup PM.$$

It is helpful to partition R_t to reflect different categories of eligibility. In any given year a set of ordinary member countries – NPMs in the first year of their terms – gain automatic membership of the UNSC in the following year (A_t):

$$A_t = NPM_t / NPM_{t-1}.$$

A second set of ordinary member countries, those that are in the final year of their term on the UNSC, are ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (I_t):

$$I_t = NPM_t \cap NPM_{t-1}.$$

The remaining ordinary member countries are eligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (E_t):

$$E_t = R_t / NPM_t.$$

Each of the sets $\{A_t, E_t, I_t, NPM_t\}$ can, in turn, be partitioned by region to give the sets $\{A_{jt}, E_{jt}, I_{jt}, NPM_{jt}\}$. Last, historical data on non-permanent membership of the UNSC are summarized by the indicator variable d_{ijt}, where: [19]

$$d_{ijt} = \begin{cases} 0 & C_{ij} \notin NPM_t; \\ 1 & C_{ij} \in NPM_t. \end{cases}$$

4.2 Preferences

Denote the utility to the members of region j from electing country i in period t to the UNSC (to serve in periods $t + 1$ and $t + 2$) as $u_{ijt} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_j \mathbf{x}_{ijt}$, where $\mathbf{x}_{ijt}$ contains the characteristics of C_{ij} in year t and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$ contains the preference weights of region j. Similarly, denote by $u_{it}^{GA} = \boldsymbol{\beta}^{GA} \mathbf{x}_{ijt}$

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[19] UNSC membership data are found on its official Web site (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc).

the utility to the members of the UNGA of electing country i in period t.

Election to the UNSC can be conceived as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the regional groups make nominations, resulting in the Chairman of each region announcing to the UNGA a set of candidate countries $N_{jt} \subseteq E_{jt}$ for election to the UNSC. In the second stage, the UNGA votes. As discussed in Section 2, because members of the UNGA almost always choose to vote for members of N_t, the vote in the second-stage can be viewed as taking place over these countries only.

One approach to estimation is to model this two-stage process explicitly (see, e.g., de Vries, Steenbergen, and Hangartner, 2009). The resulting likelihood function is complex, however, and often fails to converge in estimations that include more than a few variables.

Instead, we simplify the problem in two important ways. First, we treat the decision-maker in the first stage (the region) as myopic. That is, the region's selection does not depend on how the UNGA will act. To allow for strategic interdependence would make our model intractable. Moreover, we suspect that regions do not act strategically in proposing candidates, although we acknowledge that individual countries have made strategic decisions to enter – and not to enter – specific elections.

Second, we treat the actors in each stage as unitary decision-makers. We make this simplification because we are interested in a country's overall chance of election onto the UNSC. Our reduced-form representation of the real election process should be a good approximation, for the vast majority of elections result in landslides for the winning candidate. Regions tend to operate by consensus while the two-thirds majority rule in the UNGA tends to produce a single dominant candidate – with some exceptions. These exceptions notwithstanding, our decision to model each collective decision-maker as a unitary actor allows us to construct an estimable model that proxies the typical election process fairly well. Future work might explore modifications of one or more of these assumptions.[20] One could, for instance model the UNGA, for example, as a collective and estimate how many votes that the candidate-countries receive.

Under these assumptions we may employ a simple mathematical formulation to capture the idea that election to the UNSC may be co-determined by two separate sets of preferences: those of the caucusing group (which shape the nominations) and those of the UNGA (which

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[20] We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these two possible extensions.

votes over nominated candidates). Specifically, we model UNSC election as arising from a composite latent utility function, U, of electing C_{ij} at time t, given by

$$U_{ijt} = \alpha_{jt} u_{it}^{GA} + \left(1 - \alpha_{jt}\right) u_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \tag{1}$$

which is a weighted average of the underlying regional and UNGA preferences, plus a stochastic component ε_{ijt}. The parameter $\alpha_{jt} \in [0,1]$ measures the weight attributable to the preferences of the UNGA, and may vary by region and year. In particular, we relate α_{jt} to the size of N_{jt}. If $|N_{jt}|$ equals the number of eligible seats, n_{jt}, the UNGA merely "rubber stamps" the clean slate of nominations from the caucusing group, and its preferences play no role ($\alpha_{jt} = 0$). At the other end of the spectrum, if $|N_{jt}| = |E_{jt}|$ (every eligible member of a region is nominated to the UNGA), then the regional preferences play no direct role, thus $\alpha_{jt} = 1$. We assume that α_{jt} adjusts linearly between these two extremes, such that:[21]

$$\alpha_{jt} = \frac{\left|N_{jt}\right| - n_{jt}}{\left|E_{jt}\right| - n_{jt}}.$$

4.3 Election Probabilities

We view the elections to the UNSC as choosing, for each region, $n_{jt} \in \{0,1,2\}$ countries from the set of eligible countries according to the utility function U_{ijt}, where $n_{jt} = |NPM_{jt}| - |A_{jt}|$. This setting extends the well-known choice model of McFadden (1973) in two important respects. First, the set of alternatives is time varying. This occurs because (*i*) countries move between the sets (A_{jt}, E_{jt}, I_{jt}) from year-to-year as a result of the realizations of d_{ijt}; and (*ii*) entry and exit from R_t, principally as new members join the UN and others leave.[22] Second, the number of members to be chosen from E_{jt} is also time-variant, and need not be unity.

The tractability of McFadden's model is lost when, as in the UNSC, more than a single alternative is chosen simultaneously. To retain tractability, we therefore model election by the UNGA as a sequential process, in which countries are elected one-by-one. This methodology

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[21] We compute α_{jt} using Costa Rica (2005), which contains full UNGA voting records for all UNSC elections prior to 2004. Voting records for 2004 onwards are taken directly from the relevant UNGA minutes. Costa Rica (2005) does not explicitly identify the "Chairman's list" countries. In the overwhelming majority of elections the patterns of voting in the UNGA clearly identify the "Chairman's list" countries (who garner large numbers of votes) from countries who are merely recipients of votes cast in protest or error (who garner only one or two votes). In a small number of cases the voting patterns identify the "Chairman's list" countries less clearly, as a country garners an intermediate number of votes between five and fifteen. In these cases we identify the set of "Chairman's list" countries as those that received ten or more votes. Our main results are, however, robust to any choice of threshold between three and twenty votes.

[22] In the sample period 68 countries joined the UN, and four (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) left. Table 1 provides further details.

develops that of Manski and Sherman (1980), who use a multiple-discrete choice model to examine household car purchases. Whereas a family may buy two of the same car, however, a country cannot have dual membership of the UNSC in any year, so we must explicitly rule out this possibility. Formally, in each of n_{jt} rounds, there is a new realization of ε and a single country from E_{jt} is elected according to utility maximization ($d_{ij} = 1 \Leftrightarrow U_{ij} > U_{kj} \ \forall k \neq i$). In the case when $n_{jt} = 2$, if the same country is elected in both rounds, the result is annulled and the whole process repeated until two distinct countries are selected.

If we assume, following Manski and Sherman (1980), that the ε_{ijt} in equation (1) are independent across regions and time and have identical type-1 extreme value distributions, we then have that: [23]

$$\Pr\!\left(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 \mid C_{ij} \in A_{jt}\right) = 1; \tag{2}$$

$$\Pr\!\left(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 \mid C_{ij} \in I_{jt}\right) = 0; \tag{3}$$

$$p_{ijt}^{0} \equiv \Pr\!\left(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 \mid C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 0\right) = 0; \tag{4}$$

$$p_{ijt}^{1} \equiv \Pr\!\left(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 \mid C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 1\right) = \frac{\exp\!\left(\alpha_{jt} u_{it}^{GA} + \left(1 - \alpha_{jt}\right) u_{ijt}\right)}{\sum_{k \in E_{jt}} \exp\!\left(\alpha_{jt} u_{kt}^{GA} + \left(1 - \alpha_{jt}\right) u_{kjt}\right)}; \tag{5}$$

$$p_{ijt}^{2} \equiv \Pr\!\left(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 \mid C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 2\right) = \frac{2 p_{ijt}^{1}\left(1 - p_{ijt}^{1}\right)}{1 - \sum_{k \in E_{jt}} \left(p_{kjt}^{1}\right)^{2}}. \tag{6}$$

When only one seat is contested in a region, the distributional assumptions on ε_{ijt} imply that the probability in equation (5) of a single country being elected to the UNSC from E_{jt} follows the conditional logit form.[24] We then use p_{ijt}^{1} to form equation (6) as the binomial probability of observing a distinct country pair containing C_{ij}, where the denominator corrects for the impossibility of a single country obtaining dual membership. Note that, by construction, $\sum_{k \in E_{jt}} p_{ijt}^{n_{jt}} = n_{jt}$. Equations (2)-(4) require no further explanation.

Using equations (1)-(6) the likelihood of having observed a given NPM_{jt} is therefore

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[23] Elections are not independent across time, however. Each year's election depends on the outcome of the previous year's election in a recursive manner, owing to the evolution of E_t.
[24] Although these distributional assumptions are strong, we note their necessity for retaining the conditional logit form. Also, when estimating the final likelihood in equation (7), we can allow for the possibility of within-group clustering. Because we model the probability of choosing C_{ij} in year t as conditional on the number of eligible countries in year t, our model, like the original conditional logit, implicitly addresses fixed effects for year. For an approach that relaxes our distributional assumptions at some conceptual and computational cost see Hendel (1999).

$$
L_{jt}^{n_{jt}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad n_{jt} = 0; \\[2em] p_{ijt}^1 & \text{if} \quad n_{jt} = 1; \\[2em] \dfrac{2 \prod\limits_{k \in NPM_{jt}} p_{kjt}^1}{1 - \sum\limits_{k \in E_{jt}} \left(p_{kjt}^1\right)^2} & \text{if} \quad n_{jt} = 2; \end{cases}
$$

where L_{jt}^2 uses the relevant multinomial distribution to compute the joint probability of having observed a given country pair. The likelihood function for having observed $\{NPM_t : t \in \{1,\ldots,T\}\}$ is then

$$
\log L = \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \log L_{jt}^{n_{jt}}. \tag{7}
$$

4.4 Imputation

The Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of our data. Less than three percent of our data points are coded as missing, yet a significant number of country-years are incomplete for at least one variable (2,853 of 5,330). Dropping incomplete country-years is problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, as the probability of election in equations (5,6) are functions of the characteristics of every member of the eligible set, artificially excluding a country-year biases the estimates for the remaining countries in that year. From a practical perspective, the sample size becomes unduly small for some regions, leading to a failure of model convergence.

We therefore employ multiple imputation techniques (ten imputations).[25] Of the variables that contain missing values, those that are continuous are each imputed using a truncated regression (to reflect, e.g., non-negativity constraints) that includes as independent variables all those that are fully observed. IMF program participation (the only binary variable to have missing observations) is similarly imputed, but with a logistic regression.

4.5 Preference change

Preferences, both regional and global, may change over time. In particular, Kim and Russett (1996) present evidence of a shift in preferences around the end of the Cold War: voting

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[25] The variables that contain missing values are: United States and Russia voting in the UNGA; US economic and military assistance; debt service; shared regional ideology; control of corruption; and IMF program participation.

patterns in the UNGA shifted from an East-West orientation towards a North-South orientation.[26] Accordingly, we consider two distinct time periods – during and after the Cold War, where we deem the Cold War to end in 1989. We report separate estimates for these two periods for variables where the effects for each period differ.

4.6 Country-specific effects

We would like to control for country-specific effects, as outlying countries that exhibit an idiosyncratic effect might drive some results, and obscure others. Indeed, as is observed by Schwartzberg (2003) and Zacher (2004), the UNSC membership data in Table 1 does contain some surprises. In particular, these studies highlight Saudi Arabia, which has never served on the UNSC, or even gained a regional nomination, and Panama, which has been a UNSC member unusually often – it served three terms on the UNSC in the sample period (only Brazil and Argentina served more). We are also aware of the case of Mexico, whose participation in the UNSC elections of 2001 marked the end of two decades in which it had adopted a policy of not seeking election to the UNSC (Malone, 2000: note 7).[27]

A complication is that a country-specific effect, if present at all, may exist at either the regional or global (UNGA) level, or at both levels. We therefore allow separately for country-specific effects at the regional and global levels.

4.7 Model selection

The discussions above imply that there is a vector of explanatory variables $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s} \times \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{r})$ we would like to use to explain UNSC election, where $\mathbf{s}$ denotes the vector of substantive variables relating to the hypotheses discussed in Section 3 (see Table 2), $\mathbf{s} \times \mathbf{w}$ denotes the vector of interaction terms between each substantive variable and a Cold War indicator variable, $\mathbf{c}$ is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the region utility function, and $\mathbf{r}$ is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the UNGA utility function. Estimating this "full" model is infeasible however, for $\mathbf{x}$ contains some 436 variables, which exhausts the degrees of freedom for certain regions in the earlier years, and prevents estimation of the model.

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[26] Although Voeten's (2000) analysis suggests much subtler changes between the two periods.
[27] For more on the Mexican case, see, for example, Serrano and Kenny (2006: 298-314). We are grateful to Diego Dewar for this suggestion.

Instead, we adopt a model selection procedure that chooses a subvector of the explanatory variables for inclusion in the model. Our approach to model selection reflects a number of factors. First, because the full model cannot be estimated, backward-looking approaches cannot be applied. Second, because of the large number of explanatory variables, methods based upon computing a reasonable criterion for all possible subsets of **x** are also infeasible. These two considerations point to a forward-looking approach. As our model is non-linear, however, popular forward-looking algorithms for linear regression, such as the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Tibshirani, 1996) and least angle regression (Efron et al., 2004), are inapplicable in this context.

We therefore employ a stepwise forward selection procedure that, in each stage, selects one additional variable into the model. In each stage, all elements of **x** not already selected into the model are added individually into the model, and the t-statistic of each variable is recorded. The variable recording the highest t-statistic is added to the model (and a new stage commenced) if it records statistical significance at the ten percent level. Otherwise, the procedure ends.

We employ this model selection procedure to select two independent models. Model 1 is intended to provide a broad-based analysis of UNSC election in the presence of a full set of control variables. It is selected under the a-priori assumption that the elements of **s** belong to the model, such that the model selection procedure is applied only to the selection of Cold War interactions and regional and global country-specific effects. Model 2 is a test of the robustness of the substantive variables with respect to model selection, for it is selected without a-priori assumptions on inclusion.

A subtlety that arises in the selection of Model 2 is that it is possible that the interaction between a substantive variable and a Cold War indicator is selected into the model, but the substantive variable itself is not. Because the interaction variable takes the value of the substantive variable during the Cold War and zero thereafter, this implies that the substantive variable is, in effect, included in the model for the Cold War period only. As it stands, however, there is no means for the selection procedure to include a substantive variable in only the post-Cold War period. In selecting Model 2, we therefore augment **x** with a further vector, $\mathbf{s} \times (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{w})$, which contains the interaction between each substantive variable and a post-Cold War indicator variable.

We also note that, because of the different assumptions maintained in selecting the two

models, it is not, in general, expected that the variables selected into Model 2 will form a proper subset of those selected into Model 1. Also, although every variable selected into Model 2 shows significance at ten percent or better in the stage it is selected, in some cases variables already included in the model may gradually lose statistical significance as further variables are included. Not all variables will normally show statistical significance at ten percent level in the final model, therefore.

5. Results

We present two sets of results, which are both estimated using the likelihood function in equation (7) for UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005. The first set (presented in Table 3a) results from the procedure for Model 1 and thus includes the full set of control variables, as described in the previous section. The second set (presented in Table 3b) results from the procedure for Model 2 and thus includes the more robust findings, again, as described in the previous section. To match the timing of the election process, we lag the independent variables by one year relative to UNSC membership. We report robust standard errors, adjusted for the imputed data, and clustered on region × year, thereby allowing for within-region and within-year correlation, respectively, and heteroskedasticity.[28] We control for the operation of the Arab swing seat by the inclusion of an indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the seat in a given year (see Table 2).

The model selection procedure described in Section 4.7 selects 17 Cold War interaction effects into each of Models 1 and 2, although note that these 17 effects differ between models. In Table 3a, cases where a Cold War interaction is selected show two separate coefficients side-by-side in the relevant column. The left-side coefficient is only for the period during the Cold War, and the right-side coefficient is only for the post-Cold War period.

To present the results in this form, we re-analyzed the final selected model, and, instead of including the substantive variable alongside its interaction variable, we include instead the two interaction variables associated with the substantive variable − one for the interaction with the Cold War indicator and the other for the interaction with the post-Cold War

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[28] As in other contexts, we are unable to adjust the standard errors for the effective degrees of freedom used by the model selection procedure itself. As such, it is appropriate to urge caution in the interpretation of findings on the margin of statistical significance at conventional levels. We note the necessity of such model selection, however, given the weak steer provided by theory, and the number of potential explanatory variables.

indicator. The coefficients for these two interaction variables are those reported in Table 3a. Hence, the estimated coefficient we obtained for the Cold War interaction variable when included alongside the substantive variable corresponds to the difference between the two coefficients we report.[29] The interpretation of the results in Table 3b is similar. In instances, however, where the selection procedure selected either the Cold War interaction variable or the post-Cold war interaction variable but not the associated substantive variable, two coefficients appear side-by-side, of which one is missing.

The model selection procedure also selects a regional country-specific effect for 16 countries into Model 1, and a global country-specific effect for nine countries.[30] We include indicator variables for these countries in the model of Table 3a, though, for reasons of space, we do not report their effects in the Table.[31] As well as selecting the known outliers discussed in Section 4.6, the other countries identified as possible outliers include Nigeria, an African country which has pursued an overt policy of queue-jumping (Security Council Report, 2009: 6).

As discussed previously, the country-specific effects selected into Model 2 need not correspond to those of Model 1. In practice, however, we observe a high degree of congruence: each of the 16 region country-specific effects allowed for in Model 1 are also selected into Model 2; only one global country-specific effect not selected into Model 1 is selected into Model 2 (the Philippines); and only one global country-specific effect selected into Model 1 is not selected into Model 2 (Egypt).

Before discussing the results, we stress special caution in interpreting the results for Eastern Europe and the UNGA because of the limited number of observations that they include. The EE group contains the fewest countries and the most imputed data, while only 36 out of the 180 elections in our sample are contested in the UNGA.[32]

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[29] We do not include a separate Cold War intercept dummy because the conditional logit model has the property that any variable that takes the same value for every country in a group in a particular year (a Cold War dummy would come into this category) simply cancels out of the numerator and denominator (see equation 5 and footnote 24 above).

[30] The regional country-specific effects we allow for are (by region), Africa: Benin, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; EE: Bulgaria; the GRULAC: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama; the WEOG: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland. We allow for a global country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Greece, Madagascar, Romania and Slovakia.

[31] These are available in the replication materials.

[32] The estimates for the UNGA in Tables 3a-b seem of a different order of magnitude compared to the estimates for the regional groups. This can be explained with reference to equation (1), which weights UNGA preferences by α_{jt}, and group preferences by $(1 - \alpha_{jt})$ in the composite utility function. Even for election years with non-zero values of α_{jt}, its value is typically close to zero; $E(\alpha_{jt} \mid \alpha_{jt} \neq 0) = 0.039$, so the apparently large UNGA effects we estimate are offset by the very low weight UNGA preferences receive in the composite preference.

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5.1 Commitment to peace

Turning to the results, we hypothesize above that a country's commitment to peace should influence UNSC membership because of the explicit guidelines in the UN Charter. We test this hypothesis using a measure of inter- and intra-state conflict, a measure of peace-keeping contributions, and a measure of democracy. At the regional level, we find some evidence to support the commitment-to-peace conjecture, albeit in somewhat different guises in each region. We find no evidence supporting the conjecture at the UNGA level.

During the Cold War period we find little evidence of an association between UNSC election and engagement in intra- or inter-state conflict. The effect of conflict for the GRULAC is actually positive during the Cold War (in both models). The finding is mainly driven by the nomination of Peru in 1983, which was engaged in civil conflict with *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path). Note, however, that Barbados contested that election as a second GRULAC candidate. Since the end of the Cold War, Table 3b shows that, for Africa and the GRULAC, involvement in an international conflict significantly reduces a country's chances of sitting on the UNSC; for each region, the negative effect is statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. The implied marginal effects of the model in Table 3a suggest, for instance, that engagement in conflict reduces the probability of election by around 0.01 in Africa – post-Cold War.[33] This may seem small, but note that the average election probability in Africa for this period was only around 0.05. Hence, involvement in international conflict cuts this probability by around one-fifth.

The UNGA does not appear to have strong preferences over engagement in conflict: during the sample period it three times elected conflict countries in contested elections: Nicaragua in 1982, Peru in 1983, and Rwanda in 1993.[34] Overall, in neither time period do we observe a statistically significant at the ten percent level in Table 3a.

[33] We calculate elasticity and marginal effect estimates for 2006, the final year of our sample, using equation (5). We evaluate these using the mi predict command in Stata 12, at the group-specific means $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{jt}$. Different estimates apply to "clean slate" and "contested" elections. The former are evaluated at $\alpha_{jt} = 0$, and the latter at $E_j(\alpha_{jt} \mid \alpha_{jt} \neq 0)$. We find negligible differences between these estimates, however, so we do not report each separately. Estimates also vary according to n_{jt}: we report estimates for $n_{jt} = 1$, but in group-years with $n_{jt} = 2$, a different estimate based on equation (6) does apply in practice. Last, the estimates vary across years due to the evolution of the eligible set. We have evaluated the estimates for 2006 under different assumed eligibility conditions, and find this source of variation to be of minor proportions.

[34] Nicaragua defeated the Dominican Republic in three rounds of voting, 104 votes to 50. Peru defeated Barbados and Mexico in one round of voting, 106 votes to 38 and 4, respectively. Rwanda garnered sufficient votes (153) in the first round to win election, while Guinea-Bissau only receive 82 votes, at which point Nigeria entered the race, eventually winning election in four rounds, when Guinea-Bissau withdrew its candidacy. See Costa Rica (2005).

We also detect a role for peacekeeping troop contributions, although not in every region. Specifically, Table 3b shows that in Africa and Asia, the more troops a country contributes, the more likely it is to gain UNSC membership. The effect is significant at the one percent level in Asia and at the five percent level in Africa. A one percent increase in troop contributions is associated with a 0.41 percent rise in election probability in Asia, and a 0.19 percent rise in election probability in Africa. We find no evidence of a role for troop contributions in EE, the GRULAC, or the WEOG. Peacekeeping contributions do not appear to influence the UNGA either.

Both models indicate that democratic countries in EE and the GRULAC are more likely to be elected in the post-Cold War era. This contrasts with the effect of political regime in these regions during the Cold War, when autocracies were more likely to be selected (although the autocracy effect in Eastern Europe is essentially artifactual – only one country-year is coded as a democracy, Poland in 1989). Table 3a also shows that democracy is positively associated with regional nomination in the WEOG. As may be seen from Table 3b, this result is driven by the Cold War era, for all countries in the WEOG are coded as democratic in the post-Cold War era. The only authoritarian regime ever elected to represent the WEOG was Spain in 1968. The dictatorships in Portugal and Greece never won election. Since democratizing, Spain has been elected three times, and Portugal and Greece have each been elected twice. Democratic countries are less likely to be elected in the UNGA in Table 3a, but this result may not be robust, as democracy is not selected for the UNGA in Model 2.

5.2 Foreign aid and debt

With respect to foreign aid, we find only weak evidence that it plays a role, and not always in a consistent direction. In Table 3a, IMF program participation plays a role in the WEOG, where it is positively associated with election, and in Asia, where it is negatively associated with UNSC election. The IMF has become supremely unpopular in Asia since the East Asian Financial Crisis, so Asian support may genuinely decline for governments cooperating with the institution. Alternatively, IMF program participation might indicate political or economic weakness, reducing the incentives to apply, and the probability to receive, temporary UNSC membership. Neither of the IMF findings, however, is robust to the stricter selection procedure of Model 2, and IMF program participation is thus not present at all in Table 3b.

New World Bank projects are positively associated with receiving a regional nomination in Asia in both sets of results. The same finding also holds for the WEOG in Table 3a – but this effect does not survive in Table 3b – and for Africa in Table 3b, but the effect is not robust to the presence of further controls in Table 3a. Both sets of results show, however, that countries with more newly approved World Bank projects are actually less likely to be elected by the UNGA. As there are contrasting effects at the regional and global levels, it is unclear whether, in even in Asia, new World Bank projects have an overall positive effect upon election probability.

US economic assistance plays a role only in the WEOG, where it associates negatively with UNSC election during the Cold War (Table 3b). This result, however, does not hold in the presence of wider controls in Table 3a. A somewhat stronger role is found for US military assistance, which, in both sets of results, associates positively with the probability of election by the UNGA. We also find that, during the Cold War, receipt of US military assistance associated negatively with obtaining a regional nomination in the WEOG. This result is present at the one percent level in Table 3b, but at only the ten percent level in Table 3a. A final result, seen only in Table 3b, is that US military assistance is positively associated with regional nomination in EE.

Of interest, more heavily indebted countries are more likely to be elected in Africa and the GRULAC. As debt service contains the most imputed values of our variables, it is sensible to be cautious in interpreting these results. Indeed, the result for the GRULAC holds only in the Model 2 (Table 3b), not in the presence of all the control variables. Still, as we find evidence of a turn-taking norm in these regions, governments may have a good idea of when they will get their chance to serve on the UNSC, and thus pursue lax macroeconomic policies in anticipation of the windfall in foreign aid that UNSC membership brings.

5.3 International power: population, economic development, political ties, and Pariah states

Strictly speaking, US military aid does not count as official overseas development assistance, according to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development. The fact that this variable influences UNGA contested elections may indicate that politically powerful countries strategically employ their influence in the UNSC election process. Further exploring the role of international power, we find that the statistical significance of one of our measures holds across all-but-one region: the more populous a country, the more likely it is to

take a seat on the UNSC. In both sets of results the statistical significance of the effect holds at least at the one percent level in all regional groups except EE (although only during the post-Cold War period for the GRULAC). The coefficient estimates in Table 3b imply that a one percent increase in population generates an increase in election probability of between 0.46 percent (Africa) and 3.6 percent (Asia). Interestingly, however, we find no evidence that the UNGA takes population into account in its voting decisions.

In light of the significance of population, one might expect the statistical significance of a country's level of economic development. We find a robust effect in Africa, Asia and the GRULAC (significant at the five percent confidence level or better in Table 3b): richer countries in these regions are more likely to gain representation on the UNSC. Territorially large countries are also more likely to obtain a regional nomination in Asia and the GRULAC, as well as in EE, but these findings hold only in Table 3b. The UNGA does not appear to take either income or territorial size into account in its election decisions.

As for political connections to powerful countries, we find little evidence that voting with the United States in the UNGA has any effect upon election to the UNSC. Voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is, however, positively associated with gaining group nomination in Africa and the GRULAC (Table 3b). Interestingly, Table 3b also shows that voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a large positive effect in the UNGA, significant at the five percent level. The finding suggests a strong Soviet influence within the UNGA. None of these findings hold, however, in the presence of further controls in Table 3a.

The "Pariah state" indicator for countries subject to US and/or UN sanctions shows evidence of a change in preferences over time. During the Cold War, sanctioned countries were largely unable to obtain regional nomination, as indicated by the strong negative findings in Africa and Asia. The principal exception was Cuba, which won election from the GRULAC in 1989. Since the Cold War, however, Table 3b indicates that sanctions do seem not predict UNSC election, with the exception of a negative association in the GRULAC. For, in this period, Nigeria in 1993, Indonesia in 1994, Sudan in 2000, and Syria in 2001 all obtained a regional nomination. Indonesia and Syria went on to win election in "clean slate" votes in the UNGA, Nigeria triumphed in a contested vote, and Sudan lost in a competitive vote.

We also investigate whether membership in particular political groupings influences election to the UNSC. We find evidence that such membership matters in some regions, but not in the UNGA. Moreover, the effects on regional nomination go in different directions. In both

models, we see that membership in the G77 – but not in the NAM – has a negative effect in Asia, but a positive effect in the GRULAC. In the GRULAC, dual membership in NAM and G77 also positively predicts regional nomination. No statistically significant effects from OIC membership are found in Table 3a, and it is, unsurprisingly, missing from the model in Table 3b. Similarly, membership in JUSCANZ is included only in the UNGA in Table 3b, and the estimated positive effect falls short of significance at the ten percent level. As for groupings external to the UN, EU membership appears to raise a country's probability of receiving a regional nomination in EE, but not in the WEOG. NATO membership has a pronounced negative effect on regional nomination probability for members of EE, but also has no effect in the WEOG.

5.4 Culture: colonial heritage, religion, and corruption

Do cultural traits of a country influence its election prospects? In both sets of results we find evidence that countries with a history of British colonialism experience a greater probability of election in Asia, the GRULAC, and the WEOG, but the effect does not hold for Africa or the UNGA.[35] In contrast, countries with a history of French colonialism do not appear to experience a greater probability of election. A common political ideology is seen in Table 3b to be associated with an increased probability of election for EE and the GRULAC. The finding survives the presence of further controls for the GRULAC but not for EE. We find no evidence of an effect of shared political ideology for the other regions or the UNGA.[36]

We also consider religion, in particular the proportion of the country's population that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. There are three findings regarding Muslim countries that appear in both sets of results. The first is that in the GRULAC Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the UNSC in the post-Cold War era. Note that this finding may just be an artifact of the data, however, and not evidence of a real bias against Muslim countries in the GRULAC region. After all, there are only three countries coded as having a significant Muslim population (Suriname: 19.6 percent, Guyana 9.0 percent, and Trinidad and Tobago 5.9 percent). Both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago served on the UNSC during the Cold-War era, but none have served in the post-Cold War era.

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[35] The former British colonies in the WEOG are Ireland (elected twice) and Malta (elected once).
[36] Note, however, that Potrafke (2009) finds that government ideology affects a country's UNGA voting behavior

The second finding is that in the WEOG Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the UNSC. Here the effect appears driven by one country, Turkey, which never won election to the UNSC during the sample period, but served three earlier terms representing Asia and one subsequent term representing the WEOG. The third finding is that Muslim countries are more likely to be selected to represent Asia. This finding may, however, owe to the effect of political groupings for, as discussed in footnote 16, all Asian countries with significant Muslim populations are members in OIC. As for the Catholic variable, a higher proportion of Catholics among the population is associated with a lower probability of election in Asia (the finding holds in both Tables 3a and 3b). A much smaller negative effect is also found for the WEOG in Table 3b, but this result does not hold in the presence of further controls.

The regions appear to have heterogeneous preferences over the control of corruption. In Table 3b we find no role for corruption in Asia or the WEOG. In Africa, however, we find in both sets of results that corruption pays: we find a negative effect on a country's chances of becoming a UNSC member (significant at the ten percent level). A similar finding applies in the GRULAC, but only in Table 3b. On the other hand, the UNGA has tended to shun more corrupt countries at the global level, at least in the post Cold-War era (Table 3b). Ironically, Africa's commitment to fairness in taking turns may be what makes corruption pay in this region, while in more competitive regions corruption plays no role because countries disregard turn-taking norms regardless of how corrupt their governments may be.

5.5 The norm of taking turns

We find widespread evidence of the operation of a turn-taking norm – not only in Africa: the longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus. Both sets of results show the importance of the effect at the five percent significance level or stronger.[37] The estimates in Table 3b imply a range of substantive effects across regions: a one percent increase in waiting time increases election probability by 6.1 percent in the WEOG and 5.7 percent in Asia, down to an increase

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[37] Only in the GRULAC is the effect not significant at the one percent level. The marginally weaker evidence of turn-taking in this region could be due to the natural geographical partitioning of the GRULAC into the Caribbean islands and the countries on the mainland. Historically the majority of UNSC membership from the GRULAC has been mainland countries with only occasional membership by Caribbean nations. If the existing turn-taking variable for the GRULAC is replaced in the final selected model of Table 3b with an adjusted turn-taking variable that treats the Caribbean countries as a single entity in the implementation of the turn-taking norm, and which assigns an equal probability to each Caribbean country on the Caribbean's "turn," this adjusted turn-taking variable is significant at the one percent level, with all other results remaining qualitatively unchanged.

of just 1.8 percent in the GRULAC. The common misperception that membership on the UNSC rotates therefore finds some support in the electoral patterns at the regional level. As might be expected, the UNGA does not appear influenced by the turn-taking rights that apply within the regions.

6. Conclusion

The Security Council is the preeminent organ of the United Nations. Membership confers significant international influence and also economic benefits. We set out to consider the characteristics of countries toward which the UNSC election process diverts these economic benefits. To that end, we considered five different perspectives as to the determinants of election to the UNSC.

As candidature decisions at the regional level follow no codified rules (with the exception of Africa), and governments keep their negotiations behind closed doors, many factors likely remain unobserved. It is thus appropriate to treat our results with caution. Nevertheless, if election to the UNSC were entirely random, we would not expect the types of systematic relationships we report in Section 5.

Our results suggest that the regional nomination process tends to allocate membership, and its associated economic benefits, according to a compromise between a norm to elect more powerful countries – populous countries from throughout the world and richer countries from Africa, Asia, and the GRULAC – and a norm for each country to receive a turn. Mediating this central compromise are a norm against nominating countries involved in civil or international war (in post-Cold War Africa and the GRULAC) and norm in favor of countries that contribute more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (in Africa and Asia). During the Cold War, the regions of Africa and Asia may have followed a norm against nominating pariah countries whose presence on the UNSC would have upset one or more of the permanent members. If so, the norm seems to have weakened or disappeared in these regions during the post-Cold War era, and it may have emerged in the GRULAC.

The UNGA has the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the UNSC election process in only around one election in five. When it does have a say, we see some evidence of the influence of powerful countries. Governments receiving US military aid are more likely to win contested elections, while countries voting with the Soviet Union/Russia in the UNGA also win contested elections more frequently. The UNGA appears less likely, however, to select countries heavily reliant on projects funded multilaterally through the World Bank.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UNGA has also systematically directed membership away from countries perceived as having high levels of corruption. In contrast to the regional groups, however, UNGA decisions do not appear influenced by regional turn-taking norms or by a country's population or income. Broadly speaking, there is a lack of consistent evidence across regions and the UNGA for a role of foreign aid, and only occasional and heterogeneous evidence for cultural influences.

These findings speak to a number of literatures. For instance, our findings on the control of corruption inform the debate over whether corrupt governments receive more or less foreign aid (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 2002). Our finding that countries involved in armed conflict sacrifice foreign aid through fewer appearances on the UNSC suggests an additional cost of conflict that is yet to be considered in the literature that seeks to measure such costs (e.g., Bozzoli et al., 2011). Last, our finding that preferences over election to the UNSC exhibit heterogeneity across regions may prove useful, as a case study, to scholars interested in the evolution of norms (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 1994; Bendor, 2001). Because Security Council participation is consequential for different types of foreign aid, a heterogeneous election process implies that UNSC membership may serve as an instrument that such scholars can use as a measure of international political importance. UNSC membership should prove most useful if large population size, high income, and the turn-taking norm are exogenous to the outcome variable of interest.[38]

As no detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of UNSC election currently exists, we note that our study represents a first step and offer the following suggestions for future research. As an extension to our analysis, researchers may seek to augment country-level data with personal-level data on UN Ambassadors. Malone (2000), citing Dutch officials, notes that up to a quarter of UN representatives vote without instructions from their capitals. The personal characteristics and interactions of the individuals on the New York scene may therefore play a role in some elections. While we suspect that this avenue of research would prove fruitful, we note that it would involve intensive and detailed data collection.

As for reform of the UNSC, we propose considering what currently determines representation: Election depends partly on a random draw of idiosyncratic factors, partly on

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[38] We stress here that turn-taking is likely an exogenous source of variation that scholars can use, and it has a statistically significant effect for the 80 percent of the sample, where regions make the decision. Turn-taking, however, does not hold for the UNGA, so scholars may wish to flag the contested elections (20 percent of the sample) as factors such as voting with the Soviet Union/Russia appear to play a role. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Dreher et al. (forthcoming) for recent studies using UNSC membership as an instrument.

how powerful a country is – in terms of population and income – and partly on a norm of giving everyone a turn. Those who feel that powerful countries should serve on the UNSC more often – perhaps because they play a crucial role in global politics – should try to undermine the regional nomination process and push for more contested elections at the UNGA level. After all, we find no evidence of a turn-taking norm when the UNGA decides contested elections. Allowing for reelection, for example, would enable powerful countries to run for election more often.

Other reformers, who may feel that every country should have its turn on the world stage, should favor endowing the regional groups with the power to elect their own representatives. For, in contrast to the UNGA, all of the regions follow the turn-taking norm to some extent. Alternatively, one could ensure turn-taking if election relied on an actual rotation across all UN members. We suspect that interests on both sides – in favor of powerful countries and in favor of taking turns – counterbalance each other so that the status quo is likely to prevail.

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Table 1: UNSC Membership (terms held 1971–2006)

Africa		Asia		EE		GRULAC		WEOG	
Algeria	2	Japan	7	Romania	3	Argentina	5	Germany[5]	4
Benin	2	India	4	Bulgaria	2	Brazil	4	Italy	4
Cameroon	2	Pakistan	4	Poland	2	Panama	3	Canada	3
Congo	2	Bangladesh	2	Ukraine[6]	2	Peru	3	Spain	3
Democratic Rep. of the Congo	2	Indonesia	2	Yugoslavia[4]	2	Venezuela	3	Australia	2
Egypt	2	Malaysia	2	Belarus[6]	1	Chile	2	Austria	2
Gabon	2	Philippines	2	Czechoslovakia[3]	1	Colombia	2	Belgium	2
Ghana	2	Bahrain	1	Czech Republic[3]	1	Costa Rica	2	Denmark	2
Guinea	2	Iraq	1	East Germany[5]	1	Guyana	2	Ireland	2
Kenya	2	Jordan	1	Hungary	1	Jamaica	2	Netherlands	2
Mauritius	2	Kuwait	1	Slovakia[3]	1	Mexico	2	Norway	2
Nigeria	2	Nepal	1	Slovenia[4]	1	Bolivia	1	Portugal	2
Tunisia	2	Oman	1	Albania	0	Cuba	1	Sweden	2
United Rep. of Tanzania	2	Qatar	1	Armenia	0	Ecuador	1	Finland	1
Zambia	2	Rep. of Korea	1	Azerbaijan	0	Honduras	1	Greece	1
Zimbabwe	2	Singapore	1	Bosnia & Herzegovina[4]	0	Nicaragua	1	Malta	1
Angola	1	Syrian Arab Rep.	1	Croatia[4]	0	Trinidad & Tobago	1	New Zealand	1
Botswana	1	Thailand	1	Estonia	0	Antigua & Barbuda	0	Andorra	0
Burkina Faso	1	United Arab Emirates	1	Georgia	0	Barbados	0	Iceland	0
Cape Verde	1	Yemen[1]	1	Latvia	0	Bahamas	0	Israel[7]	0
Cote d'Ivoire	1	Afghanistan	0	Lithuania	0	Belize	0	Liechtenstein	0
Djibouti	1	Bhutan	0	Rep. of Moldova	0	Dominica	0	Luxembourg	0
Ethiopia[2]	1	Brunei	0	Serbia & Montenegro[4]	0	Dominican Rep.	0	Monaco	0
Gambia	1	Cambodia	0	TFYR Macedonia[4]	0	El Salvador	0	San Marino	0
Guinea-Bissau	1	Cyprus	0			Grenada	0	Switzerland	0
Libya	1	DPR Korea	0			Guatemala	0	Turkey	0
Mali	1	Fiji	0			Haiti	0		
Madagascar	1	Iran	0			Paraguay	0		
Mauritania	1	Kazakhstan	0			St Lucia	0		
Morocco	1	Kyrgyzstan	0			St Vincent & the Grenadines	0		
Namibia	1	Laos	0			St Kitts & Nevis	0		
Niger	1	Lebanon	0			Suriname	0		
Rwanda	1	Marshall Islands	0			Uruguay	0		
Senegal	1	Maldives	0						
Somalia	1	Micronesia	0						
Sudan	1	Mongolia	0						
Togo	1	Myanmar	0						
Uganda	1	Nauru	0						
Burundi	0	Palau	0						
Central African Rep.	0	Papua New Guinea	0						
Chad	0	Saudi Arabia	0						
Comoros	0	Samoa	0						
Equatorial Guinea	0	Solomon Islands	0						
Eritrea[2]	0	Sri Lanka	0						
Lesotho	0	Tajikistan	0						
Liberia	0	Timor L'este	0						
Malawi	0	Tonga	0						
Mozambique	0	Tuvalu	0						
Sao Tome & Principe	0	Turkmenistan	0						
Seychelles	0	Uzbekistan	0						
Sierra Leone	0	Vanuatu	0						
South Africa	0	Vietnam	0						
Swaziland	0	Yemen Arab Rep.[1]	0						

[1] Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic were separate members of the UN until 1990 when the two countries united, becoming represented on the UN by the single member Yemen.

[2] Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until around 1991. Eritrea officially joined the UN as a separate member in 1993 and Ethiopia retained its membership of the UNGA.

[3] Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1992. The Czech Republic and Slovakia subsequently joined as separate members in 1993.

[4] Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992, being replaced by separate membership in EE for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, TFYR Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro.

[5] East Germany was a member in EE and West Germany a member in the WEOG. With effect from 3 October 1990, the two German states united to form one sovereign state. As from the date of reunification, West Germany acts in the UN under the designation "Germany" (New Zealand, 2012). Hence, two of the four terms attributed to "Germany" were served as "West Germany," and two as "Germany."

[6] Although only gaining full independence in 1991, Ukraine and Belarus were founding members of the UN, having separate membership from the USSR. According to Nogee (2004), this arrangement was agreed between the UK, USA and USSR at the Yalta Convention in 1945, so as to give the USSR three votes in the UNGA.

[7] Israel joined the UN in 1949 but only became a temporary member in the WEOG, and thus eligible for election to the UNSC, in 2000.

Table 2: Potential determinants of UNSC election

Do governments practice a turn-taking norm, rotating membership through eligible candidates?

Turn-taking norm	Number of years since most recently becoming eligible for election to the UNSC divided by number of other countries eligible (author calculations).

Does foreign aid determine election?

IMF program participation	Indicator coded 1 if a country participated in an IMF program during any part of the year, 0 otherwise (http://axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20IMF%20and%20WB.xls, coded as in Vreeland, 2007).
New World Bank projects	Number of new World Bank projects starting during the year (http://axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20IMF%20and%20WB.xls, coded as in Dreher et al., 2009).
US Economic Aid (log)	Log (plus 1) of US economic aid going to the country in constant \$US (USAID, 2011).
US Military Aid (log)	Log (plus 1) of US military aid going to the country in constant \$US (USAID, 2011).
Debt service	Debt service as a percentage of gross national income (World Bank).

Is election driven by international power or relationships with powerful countries?

Population (log)	Log of population (UN Statistics Division).
GNI per capita (log)	Log of real GNI per capita in \$US (UN Statistics Division).
Territory (log)	Log of territorial size in square kilometers (CIA Factbook).
Pariah state	Indicator coded 1 if a country is subject to UN/US sanctions (Morgan et al., 2006).[1]
US voting in UNGA	Voting in line with the United States at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 0.5 (Strezhnev and Voeten, 2008; coded as in Dreher and Sturm, 2012).
USSR/Russia voting in UNGA	Voting in line with the Soviet Union/Russia at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 0.5 (Strezhnev and Voeten, 2012; coded as in Dreher and Sturm, 2012).
OIC	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of OIC, 0 otherwise (http://www.oic-oci.org/).
JUSCANZ	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of JUSCANZ, 0 otherwise. (http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&l=11).
G77 only	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and not a member of NAM, 0 otherwise (http://www.g77.org/).
NAM only	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NAM and not a member of the G77, 0 otherwise (http://www.nam.gov.za/).
G77 and NAM	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and NAM, 0 otherwise.
EU	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of EU, 0 otherwise (http://www.europa.eu/).
NATO	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NATO, 0 otherwise (http://www.nato.int/).

Do governments follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace?

Conflict	Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in a conflict, 0 otherwise (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012).
Peacekeeping troops (log)	Log (plus 1) of the average monthly military manpower supplied to UN peacekeeping operations per year (Heldt, 2008).
Democracy indicator	Indicator coded 1 if contested elections fill the executive and legislative branches of government, 0 otherwise (Cheibub et al., 2010).
Control of corruption	Score indicating perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (Kaufmann et al., 2011).

Do shared cultural traits play a role?

Muslim (%)	Muslims as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al., 2000).
Catholic (%)	Catholics as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al., 2000).
Shared regional ideology	Proportion of the chief executives in the region sharing the same political ideology – left, center, right (Beck et al., 1999).
Former British colony	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former British colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al., 2000).
Former French colony	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former French colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al., 2000).

Controls

Arab seat	Indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the Arab swing seat (coded 1 for Arab countries in Africa every fourth year beginning 1972; 1 for Arab countries in Asia every fourth year beginning 1970; 0 otherwise).

[1] We code a country-year observation as a "pariah" if it is subject to sanctions imposed by the United States and/or conducted through the United Nations (through the Security Council or General Assembly). We do not code country-years as "pariahs" if (1) sanctions target trade practices, (2) the anticipated costs are not coded as "major" or "severe" (so, we only consider pariahs as those under "major" and/or "severe" sanctions), or (3) the country acquiesced to demands before sanctions were imposed or capitulated at the threat stage. We use the 2009 updated version of the Morgan et al. (2006) dataset (TIES version 3.5), which covers 1971-2008. We extend the data by including four major sanctions episodes, which begin before 1971: Cuba (1960-present), North Korea (1950-present), South Africa (1963-1994) and Vietnam (1954-1994). For a discussion of these additional cases see Combs (2012) and Levy (1999). Our main findings on the pariah variable hold, however, whether or not we include these additional sanctions episodes.

Table 3a: Model 1

Variables	Africa ≤1989	Africa >1989	Asia ≤1989	Asia >1989	EE ≤1989	EE >1989	GRULAC ≤1989	GRULAC >1989	WEOG ≤1989	WEOG >1989	UNGA ≤1989	UNGA >1989
Turn-taking norm	4.90*** (0.98)		7.81*** (2.15)		1.74*** (0.66)		1.69** (0.76)		7.61*** (2.05)		-6.81 (10.49)	
GNI per capita (log)	0.30 (0.41)	1.35*** (1.05)	1.36** (0.56)		-1.03 (1.04)		1.38*** (0.50)		2.83 (2.14)		4.21 (14.16)	
Population (log)	0.75*** (0.26)		4.35*** (1.19)		0.65 (2.08)		0.61 (0.57)	1.32*** (0.51)	5.81*** (1.71)		16.56 (11.52)	
Territory (log)	-0.15 (0.19)		-0.60 (0.42)		1.78 (2.45)		0.58 (0.37)		-1.15 (0.74)		-9.27 (8.48)	
USA voting in the UNGA	-2.35 (5.24)		5.73 (5.92)		-1.02 (8.73)		-3.04 (6.88)		-24.14 (14.58)		-15.71 (224.63)	
Russia voting in the UNGA	6.53 (5.79)		6.71 (4.52)		-7.89 (12.05)		6.30 (6.12)		-7.95 (13.27)		102.27 (213.50)	
Pariah state	-15.54*** (2.01)	-0.54 (1.80)	-20.50*** (2.96)	0.66 (1.22)	—		-1.05 (1.70)	-10.29*** (2.65)	—		20.51 (58.40)	
IMF program participation	0.67 (0.57)		-1.42** (0.72)		1.75 (1.39)		0.32 (0.56)		4.64* (2.77)		-20.31 (17.75)	
New World Bank projects	0.18 (0.13)		0.28** (0.13)		-0.21 (0.28)		0.03 (0.08)		4.07*** (1.47)		-10.34** (4.55)	
US economic aid (log)	0.03 (0.04)		0.06 (0.07)		-0.07 (0.10)		-0.09 (0.06)		-0.25 (0.18)	-0.005 (0.08)	-1.49 (2.22)	
US military aid (log)	-0.08* (0.04)		0.01 (0.04)		0.42 (0.33)		-0.01 (0.04)		-0.26* (0.46)	0.03 (0.11)	7.93*** (2.10)	
Debt service (% GNI)	1.01** (0.41)		0.01 (0.66)		-0.49 (0.84)		0.82 (0.59)		-0.19 (0.98)		11.85 (12.11)	
OIC	-0.28 (0.75)		—		—		—		—		62.31 (53.10)	
JUSCANZ	—		—		—		—		4.46 (2.87)		58.24 (38.59)	
EU	—		—		40.68*** (4.58)		—		1.99 (1.89)		4.84 (36.59)	
NATO	—		—		-22.24*** (3.26)		—		-0.14 (1.84)		-40.66 (24.80)	
G77 and NAM	—		1.71 (1.81)		—		6.93*** (1.99)		—		-36.43 (60.51)	
G77 only, not in NAM	—		-7.79* (4.41)		—		4.64** (1.85)		—		-48.10 (64.42)	
NAM only, not in G77	—		—		—		—		—		-57.54 (64.69)	
Peacekeeping troops (log)	0.20* (0.11)		0.41*** (0.15)		0.08 (0.34)		0.23 (0.16)		0.36 (0.34)		-1.42 (4.03)	
Democracy	0.82 (0.69)		1.82 (1.11)	-1.52 (1.02)	-20.02*** (2.27)	16.79*** (3.10)	-1.53** (0.77)	19.42*** (2.01)	8.77* (4.89)		-63.88** (29.47)	
Former British colony	0.06 (0.59)		4.19*** (1.14)		—		3.75** (1.68)		7.74** (3.57)		19.05 (25.02)	
Former French colony	0.65 (0.46)		—		—		—		—		-16.36 (44.99)	
Conflict	-0.62 (0.89)	-18.49*** (1.91)	-1.86 (1.34)		—		2.33** (1.13)	-17.85*** (1.88)	—		21.53 (37.99)	-182.25 (143.71)
Muslim (%)	0.14 (0.96)		2.47** (1.08)		-4.49 (4.66)		0.16 (14.19)	-286.20*** (32.85)	-297.99** (131.44)		-40.74 (64.10)	-147.55** (59.09)
Catholic (%)	0.02 (1.02)		-90.66** (35.49)		2.29 (2.36)		1.90 (2.90)		-3.84 (3.51)		-0.51 (26.65)	
Shared regional ideology	-0.59 (1.14)		1.60 (3.28)		3.98 (2.79)		3.70* (1.89)		10.98 (14.62)	1.78 (4.02)	81.01 (51.07)	
Control of corruption	-0.75* (0.40)		0.38 (0.83)		1.54 (2.13)		-1.01 (0.50)		0.85 (1.76)		-29.41 (18.48)	15.69 (19.82)
Arab seat	2.01*** (0.42)		27.74*** (3.32)		—		—		—		-8.86 (37.76)	

Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 3b: Model 2

Variables	Africa ≤1989	Africa >1989	Asia ≤1989	Asia >1989	EE ≤1989	EE >1989	GRULAC ≤1989	GRULAC >1989	WEOG ≤1989	WEOG >1989	UNGA ≤1989	UNGA >1989
Turn-taking norm	3.84*** (0.72)	—	6.42*** (1.81)	—	1.05*** (0.40)	—	1.46** (0.59)	—	5.07*** (1.15)	—	—	—
GNI per capita (log)	0.52** (0.22)	—	1.21*** (0.34)	—	—	—	1.43*** (0.41)	—	—	—	—	—
Population (log)	0.46*** (0.14)	—	3.58*** (0.94)	—	—	—	0.92*** (0.28)	—	3.61*** (0.77)	—	—	—
Territory (log)	—	—	—	3.58* (0.94)	2.12*** (0.80)	—	0.76*** (0.24)	—	—	—	—	—
Russia voting in the UNGA	6.59** (3.34)	—	—	—	—	—	8.39** (3.48)	—	—	—	231.63** (95.44)	—
Pariah state	-16.40*** (1.04)	—	-18.44*** (1.84)	—	—	—	-13.67*** (2.68)	—	—	—	—	—
New World Bank projects	0.24** (0.24)	—	0.29*** (0.10)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-6.35** (2.56)	—
US economic aid (log)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.14** (0.06)	—	—	—
US military aid (log)	—	—	—	—	0.32** (0.14)	—	—	—	-0.24*** (0.09)	—	4.75*** (1.28)	—
Debt service (% GNI)	0.86*** (0.30)	—	—	—	—	—	0.89* (0.51)	—	—	—	—	—
JUSCANZ	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	31.06 (19.74)	—
EU	—	—	—	—	—	39.89*** (1.99)	—	—	1.25 (0.87)	—	—	—
NATO	—	—	—	—	—	-22.70*** (1.38)	—	—	—	—	—	—
G77 and NAM	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.58*** (1.15)	—	—	—	—	—
G77 only, not in NAM	—	—	-12.99*** (3.01)	—	—	—	2.34** (1.03)	—	—	—	—	—
NAM only, not in G77	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peacekeeping troops (log)	0.19** (0.09)	—	0.30*** (0.09)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Democracy	—	—	—	-1.87** (0.75)	-19.67*** (1.40)	16.29*** (1.36)	-1.23* (0.69)	19.70*** (1.25)	10.73*** (2.20)	—	—	—
Former British colony	—	—	3.66*** (1.00)	—	—	—	1.61** (0.70)	—	6.33*** (2.07)	—	—	—
Conflict	—	-18.80*** (0.98)	-1.45 (1.05)	—	—	—	2.52** (1.02)	-20.32*** (1.61)	—	—	—	—
Muslim (%)	—	—	1.81* (1.06)	—	—	—	—	-262.06*** (30.50)	-209.38*** (81.46)	—	—	—
Catholic (%)	—	—	-76.16** (30.34)	—	—	—	—	—	-4.36*** (1.65)	—	—	—
Shared regional ideology	—	—	—	—	3.55** (1.75)	—	3.97** (1.72)	—	—	—	—	—
Control of corruption	-0.58* (0.30)	—	—	—	1.06 (0.81)	—	-0.86** (0.39)	—	—	—	—	21.99** (10.60)
Arab seat	1.50*** (0.30)	—	24.13*** (2.16)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics (by region)

Variable	N (5757 max.)	Africa (n = 1823 max.)	Asia (n = 1519 max.)	EE (n = 502 max.)	GRULAC (n = 1123 max.)	WEOG (n = 790 max.)	UNGA[*] (n = 1199 max.)
Turn-taking norm	5757	0.507 (0.355)	0.826 (0.424)	2.065 (1.444)	0.951 (0.630)	0.986 (0.863)	0.877 (0.774)
GNI per capita (log)	5757	6.133 (1.017)	7.003 (1.572)	7.564 (0.794)	7.436 (0.937)	9.387 (0.964)	7.265 (1.562)
Population (log)	5757	15.368 (1.556)	15.424 (2.344)	16.004 (0.958)	14.787 (2.087)	15.381 (2.063)	15.270 (1.913)
Territory (log)	5757	12.143 (2.062)	11.326 (2.576)	11.533 (0.919)	10.998 (2.852)	11.306 (3.044)	11.522 (2.500)
USA voting in UNGA	5584	0.366 (0.121)	0.368 (0.136)	0.439 (0.115)	0.390 (0.127)	0.551 (0.103)	0.411 (0.136)
Russia voting in UNGA	5584	0.755 (0.108)	0.755 (0.110)	0.784 (0.103)	0.743 (0.105)	0.664 (0.103)	0.744 (0.105)
Pariah state	5757	0.037 (0.190)	0.085 (0.279)	0.010 (0.099)	0.045 (0.208)	0.003 (0.050)	0.039 (0.194)
IMF program participation	5716	0.417 (0.493)	0.188 (0.391)	0.396 (0.489)	0.398 (0.490)	0.042 (0.201)	0.319 (0.466)
New World Bank projects	5757	1.754 (1.852)	1.735 (3.012)	1.552 (2.068)	1.653 (2.418)	0.280 (1.054)	1.571 (2.292)
US economic aid (log)	5757	15.335 (4.748)	10.663 (8.236)	9.623 (8.298)	13.169 (6.905)	3.133 (6.504)	11.796 (7.754)
US military aid (log)	5757	7.862 (6.865)	6.729 (7.435)	6.806 (7.674)	10.964 (6.156)	4.623 (7.431)	8.150 (7.185)
Debt service (% GNI)	3258	1.497 (0.710)	1.435 (0.701)	1.549 (0.876)	1.814 (0.623)	1.639 (0.659)	1.644 (0.720)
OIC	5757	0.447 (0.497)	0.467 (0.499)	0.058 (0.234)	0.016 (0.126)	0.046 (0.209)	0.270 (0.444)
JUSCANZ	5757	0.000 (0.000)	0.034 (0.182)	0.000 (0.000)	0.032 (0.176)	0.338 (0.473)	0.068 (0.251)
EU	5757	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.036)	0.032 (0.176)	0.000 (0.000)	0.435 (0.496)	0.076 (0.265)
NATO	5757	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.070 (0.256)	0.000 (0.000)	0.576 (0.494)	0.101 (0.302)
G77 and NAM	5757	0.980 (0.139)	0.789 (0.408)	0.000 (0.000)	0.649 (0.477)	0.000 (0.000)	0.639 (0.481)
G77 only, not in NAM	5757	0.000 (0.000)	0.103 (0.304)	0.030 (0.170)	0.319 (0.466)	0.000 (0.000)	0.089 (0.285)
NAM only, not in G77	5757	0.020 (0.139)	0.036 (0.187)	0.072 (0.258)	0.000 (0.000)	0.046 (0.209)	0.028 (0.164)
Peacekeeping troops (log)	5757	0.933 (2.005)	0.972 (2.220)	1.542 (2.355)	0.671 (1.534)	3.367 (2.781)	1.270 (2.321)
Democracy indicator	5757	0.155 (0.362)	0.259 (0.438)	0.449 (0.498)	0.714 (0.452)	0.975 (0.158)	0.457 (0.498)
Former British colony	5757	0.309 (0.462)	0.496 (0.500)	0.000 (0.000)	0.326 (0.469)	0.100 (0.301)	0.295 (0.456)
Former French colony	5757	0.336 (0.472)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.113 (0.317)
Conflict	5757	0.075 (0.263)	0.088 (0.283)	0.018 (0.133)	0.026 (0.159)	0.013 (0.112)	0.063 (0.242)
Muslim (%)	5757	0.359 (0.388)	0.453 (0.433)	0.117 (0.240)	0.010 (0.037)	0.052 (0.207)	0.239 (0.368)
Catholic (%)	5757	0.220 (0.268)	0.096 (0.230)	0.495 (0.284)	0.657 (0.325)	0.529 (0.412)	0.361 (0.370)
Shared regional ideology	4715	0.127 (0.164)	0.079 (0.101)	0.419 (0.404)	0.291 (0.188)	0.376 (0.148)	0.187 (0.183)
Control of corruption	5345	-0.560 (0.627)	-0.213 (0.801)	-0.326 (0.693)	-0.073 (0.773)	1.595 (0.760)	-0.001 (1.035)
Arab seat	5757	0.048 (0.213)	0.068 (0.251)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.025 (0.156)

* UNGA statistics are reported for elections with a contested vote in the UNGA.