The development-security nexus and security sector reform

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THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS

AND

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

MICHELA TELATIN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2011
To children living in war zones,  
and those looking after them
ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates the link between development and security - the ‘development-security nexus’ - which emerged during the 1990s, facilitated by the formulation of human development and human security. It examines how this development-security nexus has evolved over time and has influenced the interrelated significance of development and security for international relations. The thesis questions this interdependence and analyses the theory and practice that see development and security issues as reciprocally reinforcing each other, in particular through a set of policies called Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The research includes three main areas of interest related to the different meanings of development and security focusing in particular on human development and human security; the various interpretations of the development-security nexus since the 1990s; and the analysis of how Security Sector Reform, publicised as development-security nexus policies, are designed to translate it into practice.

The thesis argues that the nexus between development and security is under-theorised, and the originality of this research is to investigate the link between its theories and practices. The critical view of this thesis towards current dominant theoretical and operational orientations of the development-security nexus is based on an analysis of literature on Critical Security Studies, Post-Development, and Non-mainstream International Relations approaches.

The thesis contributes to existing scholarship by unpacking the different meanings of development and security embedded in Security Sector Reform policies and reveals the need to contextualise the significance of their interlinkages within each policy scenario. In particular the three case studies on Defence Reform of Armenia, SSR Afghanistan and SSR Guinea-Bissau highlight respectively: 1) the novelty of concerns raised by SSR and the complexity to categorise concerns on security within a single, even if inclusive, policy discourse. 2) the need to go beyond the narrow view of a militarised view of security and its inadequacy to support the implementation of development objectives and 3) that the link between development and security is still very much dependent on a vision of security linked to the state’s armed forces, and of development which is focused on state security governance capacity.
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.
I. INTRODUCTION

The significance of development and security and how they are perceived, exercised and experienced by different actors continue to change with time. Though since the birth of development studies in the 1950s, development and security issues have been framed alongside each other, this correlation was neither explicitly formulated nor were development and security regarded as mutually dependent in theoretical and operational terms. The theoretical shift in both discourses that occurred in the 1990s, represented by the concepts of human development and human security, favoured the vision that development and security reciprocally reinforce each other so much that this interlinkage has often been referred to as the development-security nexus.

Despite the current publicity of this nexus in the international policy arena, its exact meaning remains ambiguous because it depends on the definition of development and security and how the merge between these two discourses is formulated. The complexity of defining the multifaceted relations between development and security and how their merge is operationalised have as a substratum international relations which nowadays are made up of a multiplicity of interactions by diverse actors such as people, intergovernmental organisations, states, private corporations, and so on. These evolving patterns and proliferation of actors of international relations have been accompanied, in the last two decades, by a trend that diverges from a state-centric approach that has dominated the discipline of International Relations (IR) since its beginning. In particular, the elaboration of the concepts of human development and human security in the 1990s can be considered as an example of a trend that highlights the need to include, alongside states, how people are affected by international relations’ issues.

As the discipline of IR starts giving more attention to people, and including them as subjects and agents of international relations, the development-security nexus perspective facilitates this orientation by aiming at providing a comprehensive response to people experiencing insecurity and neglect. If in theoretical terms the emphasis given to the humanity in development and security has provided a consensus for developing a policy response based on people’s needs rather than on states’ interests, the state has still very much monopolised the development-security nexus discourse. This has created the need to clarify the diverse scenarios and expectations linked to policies addressing development and security concerns.

In fact, dealing with situations where there is a deficit of both implies that the spectrum of intervention of the development-security nexus policies and the magnitude of issues that can be included under this banner are wide. It derives that various interpretations and perceptions of the nexus between development and security are linked to international relations patterns which are
characterised nowadays by the will and expectation to tackle development and security issues under a unified and exhaustive policy response. One of the best examples of this nexus is a set of policies called Security Sector Reform (SSR). Despite their promotion by various actors such as the OECD, the UN, the EU, individual states such as the UK, these policies have benefited from diverse definitions which seem to fit each SSR stakeholder. While this opens up opportunities to format SSR policies according to each country’s needs, it also creates a need to investigate this multiform policy tools.

The research question focuses the investigation on how the development-security nexus is conceptualised and operationalised in order to highlight the significance of this discourse which has become increasingly popular in framing development and security relations at national and international level. I argue that the nexus between development and security is under-theorised, and the originality of this research is to investigate the link between its theories and practices. I contribute to this theorising by unpacking the multifaceted meaning of development and security and revealing the need to contextualise the significance of their interlinkages within each policy scenario.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis of the research question which focuses on how the development-security nexus is conceptualised and operationalised is driven by a Post-Positivist approach to research (Groff 2004; Smith et al 1996; Turenne Sjolander et al 1994). This approach challenges the hypothesis testing and deductive method of analysis which are typical of Positivism and offers a framework that allows me to look at real events without testing or building theories, but rather questioning existing practices (Morris 2006). The rationale behind the choice of this approach for addressing the research question (Goulding 1996) is that it does three things. First, it offers access to multiple qualitative sources of information to increase the understanding of the many interpretations of development and security and their interlinked discourses. Second, it regards SSR cases as unique and therefore it avoids the random sampling and generalisation of the Positivist approach. Finally, it allows for drawing up of conclusions by interpreting the findings of the research without comparing them with previous hypotheses and using them instead to enhance the understanding of the theories and practices of the development-security nexus. The Post-Positivist approach has guided me through the selection of specific events without regarding them as variables or samples from which generalise or generate theories but according to their potential to address the research question.
Furthermore, by highlighting that there are as many truths as interpretations and that there is no neutral knowledge, the Post-Positivist approach allows me to question the interpretations of the development-security relation with the awareness that there is no separation between a ‘neutral’ reality and the researcher as implicit in the Positivist approach. This subjectivity implies that each researcher carries out the research bringing into it her own implicit knowledge based on her own experience (Zalewski in Smith et al 1996). In the case of this research, I would like to point out that issues that I have dealt with in the thesis such as defence reforms, justice and prison reforms, DDR, train and equip policies and so on, are events that I have observed during my professional experience in Africa and Latin America where I worked as a humanitarian worker before starting this thesis. I only mention this because as a researcher I cannot ignore my past professional experience. However, it does not prejudice my thesis because had all my judgments been based on my experience I would see them as a bias. Instead it had provided me with skills such as familiarity with analysing policy documents, networking, knowledge of the functioning of intergovernmental organisations, and this has helped me in carrying out the research.

As far as the research design is concerned, this has been defined as “the logic that links the data to be collected to the initial questions of study” (Yin 1984:19). The research design of this thesis includes the choice for a theoretical and conceptual framework; methodology and access to data rather than collecting data (Yanov & Schwartz-Shea 2006:xviii) such as literature review, analysis of policy documents and material from conferences and from a SSR practitioners’ course that I have participated, interviews and correspondence with multiple stakeholders and case studies (see below).

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Theories are usually regarded as lenses to study a certain issue (Anfara & Mertz 2006). However, a theory is not only a “conceptual vehicle that assigns patterns to individuality”, it “not only reveals, it conceals” (Flinders & Mills 1993:vii,viii). Rather than using a theory or theories to investigate an issue, I have used a theory “as a verb rather than as a noun” (Zalewski in Smith et al 1996:346) and I have questioned the theorising about development and security. As far as the conceptual framework underpinning the research is concerned, this has been defined in general “as a synthesis of literature, development of models, applied to a theory or theories, with possible empirical testing” (Solomon & Solomon 2000:1,2).

The conceptual framework used in the thesis is that the development-security nexus which came to the fore in the 1990s under the aegis of human security is not an axiomatic binomial but
subject to a changing conceptualisation of development and security that deserves investigation. I research this change, namely the two theoretical trends of developmentalisation of security and securitisation of development which influenced respectively the 1990 and 2000 decades, and I elucidate policy makers’ validation for this nexus under the banner of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies. These policies are often presented as strengthening the security sector of states so that state institutions can then create an environment conducive to their citizens’ enjoyment of development entitlements (OECD 2005). The changing nature of development and security and the formulation of human development and human security have facilitated the merge of their discourses and the elaboration of the development-security nexus perspective. This has also facilitated the adaptation and adoption of policies responding to the theoretical orientation represented by the development-security nexus. The conceptual framework forming the basis for the contribution to this research addresses the relation between development and security, how these discourses have merged their concerns and have been translated into practice in SSR policies.

As far as the IR theoretical framework used in the thesis is concerned, I have adopted a Post-Positivist approach shared by Critical Security studies as well as Post-Development literature (Booth & Smith 1995; Escobar 1995; George & Campbell 1990; Groff 2004; Hoffman 1991; Linklater 1992; Rist 1997; Smith et al 1996). The Post-Positivist approach emerges from the IR theoretical landscape of the late 1980s and ‘90s as a response to the dissatisfaction with the mainstream positivist theories and as critical reflections on IR. It reexamines the basic assumptions of the discipline (Porter in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:125) by questioning the neutrality of knowledge, truth claims by Positivism, and the applicability of science to the study of world politics (Booth & Smith 1995; Lapid 1989). Post-Positivism questions the epistemology, the methodology, the ontology of Positivism. It challenges the formulation of objective truth about the social world through the scientific method as well as the rationalist assumptions about human nature (George & Campbell 1990).

In particular Post-Positivism points out that truth is not singular, ready-made and out there, but that there are many truths depending on different perspectives and that truths are constructed by these very diverse interpretations. Therefore, truth(s) is not to be described and given to the public as an imposed message because, as Post-Positivism would say, “there is in fact no such thing as a reality that does not belong in quotation marks” (Groff 2004:1). What the Post-Positivist approach does is to point out the existence of these quotation marks when analysing the world, thus highlighting that there are many actors that can voice their worlds through diverse interpretations of their realities. This implies that there are more than one method to construct knowledge, thus urging
for the adoption of other methods of investigation than the positivist scientific one. This Post-
Positivist way of interpreting the interaction between the social world and the researcher/people is
similar to the abolition of the so called fourth wall in the Realist Theatre which was initiated by
Pirandello in the 1920s. Like in the theatre where the abolition of this imaginary wall between the
actors and the public allowed the construction of the scene on the stage through a dialogue between
them, Post-Positivism advocates that there is not one reality separated from the researcher through a
wall of science. In fact, there are as many walls and lenses as there are interpretations, and there are
various methods that construct those lenses which allow the researcher to interpret and create her
reality(ies).

Post-Positivism is also defined as a reflexive approach because it challenges the IR discipline
itself, and in particular the way the discipline has used theory to choose its object of analysis, the
method of analysis and the interpretation of the findings (Ashley 1987). This reflexive approach
leads to interrogate how the discipline describes, interprets but also how it constructs the world. In
other words, “Reflexive IR theory accepts that theory is as much a reflection of the world as it is, as
a construction of the world as it might be” (Turenne Sjolander in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:10).
This questioning does not only imply the abolition of the dichotomy objectivity/subjectivity which
is the backbone of the Positivist approach, but also it draws scholars’ attention to reflect on what is
included and excluded as a subject of investigation by mainstream IR. In synthesis, the object of
observation, the method of observation as well as the theoretical framework used to approach this
analysis all undergo a critical reflection. This means that according to Post-Positivism science is not
“without a subject” as instead claimed by Positivism that says that the researcher, through the usage
of a scientific research method, does not influence the description of the world that she presents. It
highlights the underlying assumptions which are embedded in all interpretations, this “in the
absence of a neutral observation language” (Neufeld in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:13,14; see also
Hooker 1987; Margolis 1987).

This orientation leads Post-Positivism to challenge the hypothesis testing methods of Positivism
and the language used to understand and/or construct reality (Phillips 1977; Shapiro 1987; West
1989). This because, according to George “the world is always an interpreted ‘thing’, and it is
always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree or another”. This is
why “there can be no common body of observational or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral,
objective knowledge of the world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that actually
corresponds to reality per se” (George 1994:24). Consequently, Post-Positivism is a question-driven
rather than a problem-solving approach, and it offers a path of analysis that challenges the
assumptions of the discipline and patterns of inclusion and exclusion that are embedded in IR theories (Linklater 1992; Price & Reus-Smit in Chan et al 2009).

Post-Positivist theorists claim that truth is problematic and that there is a plurality of methods for creating and interpreting knowledge and this has led to define this approach as anti-foundationalist, meaning that “each theory will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral position available to determine between rival claims” (Baylis et al 2008:274). Post-Positivist perspectives such as Postmodernism, Feminism, Post-Colonialism, Critical Studies are characterised by this anti-foundationalist approach that makes them rejecting the foundationalist one of Positivism (Ling 2002). The latter is based on an empiricist epistemology according to which the same scientific method can be used to discover the social world and that there is a distinction between neutral facts and values (Baylis et al 2008:274). It was this empiricist epistemology that, according to Post-Positivism, “has determined what could be studied because it has determined what kinds of things existed in international relations” (Smith et al 1996:11; see also Der Derian 1992).

The dissent of Post-Positivism theorists (Ashley & Walker 1990; George & Campbell 1990) towards mainstream IR theorists is motivated by their criticism towards the way they conceptualise theory and reality, inhibiting their “ability or even desire to widen or change their existing agendas for IR theory” (Zalewski & Enloe in Booth & Smith 1995:289). The need to deepen and widen the “thinking space” of the discipline (George & Campbell 1990:269) is pointed out by Post-Modernism which examines “the ‘truths’ of IR theory to see how the concepts and knowledge claims that dominate the discipline in fact are highly contingent on specific power relations” (Baylis et al 2008:284). By stressing that knowledge is not neutral but that it embeds specific power relations (Foucault 1972), the Post-Positivist approach urges to unpack the significance of assumptions of mainstream IR theories such as their state-centric view which regards all other issues i.e. relations between world actors, security, power, threat, war and so on gravitating around the state (Lawson 2003; Linklater 1992); and the “different ways of thinking about the international” when talking about international relations (Bilgin in Chan et al 2009:282; Chan et al 2001, 2009; Neuman et al 1998; Waever 1998). As far as the former issue is concerned, according to Post-Positivism, this state-system should not be taken for granted but better theorised through other perspectives (Ashley 1983), rejecting the Positivist view that “the state does not need to be theorised, because it speaks for itself - just as the facts do” (Keyman in Turenne Sjolander et al 1994:155). As far as the second issue is concerned, questioning the meaning of international means challenging the very core of the discipline so much that nowadays some theorist say that “there is
no longer any clear sense of what the discipline is about, what its core concepts are, what its methodology should be, what central issues and questions it should be addressing. In many ways, it is now easier to say what IR is not that what it is” (Hoffman in Chan et al 2009:29).

The issue of what is regarded as international by the discipline of IR calls into question not only what are accepted dichotomies such as national/international but also from which point of view this issue of international is analysed. For instance, according to Bilgin, “The ‘Non West’, even when it was made the focal point of IR, was not treated as the referent object” (Bilgin in Chan at el 2009:287; see also Ayoob 1991; Luckham 1983). Moreover, there is also the questioning of who are the subjects of analysis in IR, and how these subjects have been represented and constructed by the discipline. In this regard, Post-Colonial literature analyses patterns of dominance and resistance that characterise not only historical defined colonial encounters but also beyond them (Darby & Paolini in Chan et al 2009; Doty 1996; Said 1979), instilling in the state-centric view of the discipline a sense that states are subjects to centripetal and centrifugal geopolitical and economic forces which influence states’ formation and transformation. This critical view on the theoretical boundaries of the discipline of IR and its “unhelpful dichotomies”, as Booths regards terms such as national order/international anarchy, and a reflection on what objects of analysis should compose the mosaic of international relations, also includes a re-visioning of security (Tickner in Booth & Smith 1995:185; Walker 1988a).

All these Post-Positivist insights directly feed into the research approach adopted in this thesis which aims at investigating the complex spectrum of interlinkages between development and security. Thus truth claims about development and security have been constructed through bodies of literature such as Critical Security Studies and critical approaches to IR that allow the analysis of the transversalities of these concepts implicit in the development-security nexus.

Security has been an inherent subject of analysis of IR and since the beginning of the discipline in the 20th century in the UK it has been framed according to a vision of the international made up of states or, as Post-Colonial and other critical IR theories claim, Western states (Krippendorf 1987). In fact, “The subject of security studies as it developed in its orthodox form during the Cold War was constructed in the image of political realism” (Boots 2005:2). The state-centric level of analysis of international relations offered by Realism influenced the conceptualisation of security which was regarded as a function of, a threat to and for the benefit of the state (Carr 2001; Datta 2008; Keohane 1986; Terriff et al 1999; Waltz 1979). This state straightjacket had the function to constrain security concerns within its borders and regarded threats as coming from outside the state and provoked by other states. The analysis provided by Realism was not deepened (Paris 2001) by
Liberalism, which would imply an investigation of the security ‘within the state’, but it was broadened. According to Liberalism, states are not regarded in isolation in the anarchical space of the international but they are interdependent, and therefore should cooperate because they face common threats (Doyle 1986; Richardson 1997; Smith 1982). Therefore the Realist concept of “anarchy” is transformed by the liberal institutionalism’ into a “mature anarchy” in which states can manage the chaos of the international arena by following collective security norms and practices (Lawson 2003:82).

A diverse conceptualisation of security which takes into account a non-state perspective, if not one de-linked from the state, is offered by Critical Security Studies (Booth et al 1991, 2005; Buzan et al 1998; Collins et al 2007; Linklater 1990), and my thesis may be seen as belonging to this disciplinary development. The meaning of the term “critical” has more to do with an “orientation towards the discipline than a precise theoretical label” (Krause et al 1997:xii). This body of literature points out the need to re-examine security because the “meaning of security is fluid” (Pettiford & Curley 1999:4), its character is contested and there is no neutral definition of security (Smith in Booths et al 2005: 27-28). Moreover, there is the criticism that “the security of units below the level of the state has rarely, if ever, been an important point at issue in most Western IR discussions and analyses of the concept of security” (Pettiford & Curley 1999:8). This has led Critical Security Studies to abstract the significance of security from the state by matching it with other referent objects of analysis: people, environment, development and so on. According to the Critical Security studies literature (Krause et al 1997; Linklater 1990), the emphasis on new dimensions of security is not simply due to an expansion of the conceptual realm of the term in line with the geopolitical expansion of the so called West after the demise of the Cold War in the 1990s. One reason can be that the broadening of security interests towards non-military issues, such as the environment or migration instilled a sense of urgency prompting a response by policy makers in these fields (Dewi et al 2005; Dodds et al 2005; Najam et al 2003; Nef 1999). For instance, the UNDP stated that “One of the clearest consequences of population growth and deepening poverty in developing countries is the growth in international migration” (UNDP 1994:35). Thus the UNDP, by stressing the link between an increase in the level of poverty, population, and population movement (for figures on the increased number of refugees and internationally displaced for the period 1980-2000s see also Human Security Centre 2005; UNDP 1990, 1997), it ends up contextualising an evolving demographic geography within a discourse of danger “The real threat to human security in the next century will arise more from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations” (UNDP 1994:34).
However, topics such as the environment and migration could simply be considered as problems rather than concepts (Dorff 1994). By seeing them as concepts this would change the primacy that they have within security studies but also, Walt has argued, this “would destroy its [security] intellectual coherence” (Walt 1991:213) causing what was regarded as “the paralysis of our ability to prioritise” (Foong Khong 2001:233) because everything becomes a security concern. This goes beyond the exercise of crossing the theoretical boundaries between disciplines, such as security and migration, development, conflicts, environment (Kerr 2007; Uvin 2004). By putting people at the centre of the theorising discourse, they are contextualised (and all issues related to them) into a framework of danger and a threat that so far had belonged primarily to the state (Campbell 1998; Walker 1990). The issue for Critical Security Studies was not to create a hierarchy of security discourses between people and state (Walker 1988), but that the sovereign identity of the state was to be regarded as one among many, this to avoid “the manifestly political exclusion of others” (Ashley 1988:251 George & Campbell 1990:287).

According to Critical Security Studies theorists (Booth et al 1991) the security discourse should include people as one of the referent object of analysis even if, according to Buzan, “the state is the most important and effective provider of security” (Tickner in Booth & Smith 1995:185). However, this re-examination of security does not simply imply a pluralistic focus of the security problematic, but a revisiting of how the meaning of security is constructed. In this security equation Weldes includes culture by saying that “all social insecurities are culturally produced” (Weldes et al 1999:1) and contests the view that takes for granted the hegemony of the state and its security in security studies. She affirms that:

this particular form of naturalisation ends up expressing the point of view of the (insecure) political actor, generally the state. Making such an ontological assumption force the analysts, willy-nilly, to define and investigate security and insecurity from the point of view of the (naturalised) state, with the consequences both that other sites of insecurity are ignored and that insecurities themselves are understood to be natural facts rather than mutable social constructions. It is hardly surprising, then, that most of the work in security studies adopts the standpoint of the state, takes state insecurities to be given rather than constructed, and neglects the investigation of other loci, or indeed victims, of insecurity (Weldes 1999:20).

The security concerns of this thesis fit with the ones of Critical Security Studies and contribute directly to this critical approach to IR. The analysis of the development-security nexus, which is the object of this thesis, needed a theoretical tool which did not impose a message about a predefined meaning of security and development. The Critical Security Studies perspective allows me to unpack the security discourse and contextualise it within contemporary international relations where security has become fluid (Pettiford & Curley 1999:4), where reality(ies) as well as what is national
and international is perceived by Postmodernist “in a perpetual state of flux - of movement, change, and instability” (George 1994:29), and where Post-Development theorists affirm that what is needed is “Not more Development but a different regime of truth and perception” (Escobar 1992:12).

In this scenario a state-centric approach alone would have been inadequate to explore the relations between development and security taking into account their changing interpretations and responses to a scenario where patterns of inclusions and exclusions are overlapping and fluid. The theoretical boundaries of Critical Security Studies orient my research by questioning the contemporary significance of development and security including as participants of the security equation diverse actors such as states, people, international and regional organisations, and analysing their security discourses without a predefined ‘security-mould’ that should shape this research.

My contribution to the critical approaches to IR is in having unpacked the significance of security and development which is embedded in the development-security nexus set of policies called Security Sector Reform. My research shows the necessity to go beyond dichotomies such as human/state security because by considering security as a plastic word, as much as development is perceived (Poerksen in Rist 1997), it implies that these dichotomies are regarded as mere representations of interests, power, knowledge, discourses. The contribution to the critical security studies literature is not to hollow or relativise the theorising about security. On the contrary it is to show how powerful the choice of language related to the security discourse is by taking as examples SSR policies in which the language of human security is used to address concerns related to state security and state governance development capacities.

The analysis of the meaning of ‘human’ within human security and development carried out in chapter II as well as addressing the ‘security for whom’ question when talking about security, have the purpose to highlight if and why concerns about the human(s) must necessarily pass through the state and in doing so be postponed because of the state’s responsibility to deal with its own citizens. Thus the research shows the need to investigate the interrelations between development and security and how these concepts are constructed. By taking the critical view that security is not given but it is what we make of it, that the inside and outside of the state are fluid boundaries (Walker 1994), and that the relation between state and people should be explored horizontally rather than vertically by accepting a pluralistic view of security, the research contribution to security is towards a vision of human security whose dialectic should not be limited to its relation with state security. Instead it should but contextualised within a situation of urgency of addressing the conditions that make
people secure according to their own vision of threats, dangers, safety, dignity of life. If the relation people-state security is locked in a continuum according to which you need a secure state to have secure citizens, the voice of the people will be subordinate to the one of the state, and the responses to them will also be postponed.

Despite the diverse conceptualisations of development and security, both concepts are regarded as plastic words; both have put human beings at the centre of their theorising efforts through the concepts of human development and human security; both these concepts need the state to fulfil the priorities framed by their definitions; and when these concepts are translated into policy objectives both development and security are moulded into state’s interests and concerns which means that despite the language of human development and security the state is still at the centre and indeed reinforced by this same language. This is why when talking about development, security and their diverse interpretations and interrelations it is necessary to question which interests and concerns they address. This is not because the language adopted to defined human development and human security is perfidious, but because the centric-view of international relations is still embedded in the significance, interpretation and construction of development and security so that it is necessary to disentangle the various development and security threads belonging to the various actors in the national and international arena. This is why the investigation on the current significance of the development-security nexus aims at elucidating as Weldes said, “other loci, or indeed victims, of insecurity” (Weldes et al 1999:20), and lack of development.

**METHODOLOGY**

**Bodies of Literature**

By adopting a Post-Positivist approach, I have not started with a theory but “with an area of study” and I have selected what is relevant to that area (Strauss & Corbin 1990:23). As Strauss and Corbin said, the role of the literature review is for the researcher to acquire what they defined as theoretical sensitivity, namely the comprehension by the researcher of the significance of data gathered (Strauss and Corbin quoted in Morris 2006:82). I have chosen three main areas of study: development, security, and SSR policies. Within these broad fields, I have selected three narrower topics: human development, human security and about SSR policies I have focused on the significance of the development-security nexus in the design of these policies. I have preceded the analysis of this aspect of SSR by an overview of the origins of these policies in the 1990s and this background has been provided by the Civil-Military Relations literature. I have also carried out
literature reviews related to the three case studies used to address the research question, but this will be dealt in the case studies section below.

I have analysed development literature to give an overview of the theoretical scenario that has accompanied the evolution of the concept of development since the birth of development studies in the 1950s to nowadays. This has included theories such as Modernisation, Dependency, World System, Post-Development. The purpose of this summary of diverse theories is to acquire an understanding of the changing nature of this concept and why the formulation of human development in the 1990s publicised by the UNDP (UNDP 1990) represented a powerful policy statement that facilitated the merge of development and security concerns.

The review of the security literature centres on understanding the meaning of human security and in particular how the role of the state is envisaged within a human security discourse and what is the meaning of ‘human’ within this discourse. The prominence of the notion of security in the IR literature and the internationalisation of security and development concerns and approaches mean that a changing conceptualisation of security and development, such as human security and human development, also implies a changed view of international relations. This is why the understanding of the novelty and significance of human development and human security has also been approached through the lens of IR theories, in particular Non-mainstream IR theories, in order to contextualise human development and human security within the weaving of international relations between world actors.

As far as SSR literature is concerned, I have focused on the academic contribution coming from the UK considering that this country has been at the forefront in the promotion of these policies, but also from organisations working on SSR such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). To elucidate the origins of this policies I have included the Civil-Military Relations literature considering that the language and concerns of SSR can also be traced back to the focus on democratic governance of the security sector during the 1990s. Considering that the main topic of the research is not on the changing methods of doing SSR but on contemporary theories and practices of the development-security nexus that SSR policies are publicised as addressing (OECD 2007), the section dealing with the Civil-Military Relations is relevant because it shows the continuity of policy makers’ concerns for the democratic management of state (security) structures which is the focus of SSR. This concern is further analysed in one of the case studies, namely Armenia.

The literature that relates to development, security and SSR also includes policy statements from governments, international organisations and other stakeholders working in the field of the
development-security nexus and SSR policies. In particular I have used policy documents from UK, and above all DfID, MoD, FCO, and OECD, UN agencies, the EU and NATO. These primary sources constitute an important source of qualitative information considering that the practice of SSR has seen a boom in recent years. Furthermore, the Practitioner Course on SSR that I attended in Birmingham (7-10 December 2008) organised by the Global Facilitator Network for SSR (GFN SSR) and funded by three UK departments, DfID, MoD and FCO, has been precious for gathering primary and secondary sources. While the majority of the literature that I have used is in English, a certain number of policy documents and government pronouncements but also secondary sources that I have used are in Portuguese, French, Italian, Spanish. The knowledge of these languages has also been necessary for conducting interviews (see below). While the bulk of this literature review material has been indeed significant for the analysis of the development-security nexus, a method that I have used for enhancing the understanding of this material is the interview.

**Interviewing**

The choice of conducting interviews as part of the research design is to have raw material to analyse that reflects different views on the theory and practice of the development-security nexus. I have started the interview process with the selection of the interviewees. They include academics who have been writing on the subject of SSR or on case studies selected for the research; practitioners on SSR such as national civil servants, members of intergovernmental organisations working on SSR, and SSR consultants. While a list of people interviewed is provided after the bibliography section, here I present the rationale for the selection of interviewees, the choice of method for conducting interviews, and data analysis.

As far as academics working on SSR is concerned, I have selected those who are UK based or knowledgeable on the SSR debate taking place in the UK. This is because this country has been the most vocal promoter of SSR, officially since 1999 by the then Secretary of DfID Claire Short (Short 1999), and this has encouraged a production of policy papers and links with different academic institutions, such as Kings College in London, to enhance the understanding of this policy tool as a response to countries experiencing a development and security deficit. Practitioners and consultants on SSR that have been interviewed include those working for UK government departments, DfID, MoD, but also in UN, NATO, OECD, EU.

The choice of interviewees has been guided by their insight on the topic and how their own work or the institution they represent reflect different points of view on the subject. The approach that I have used to interview them is the one defined as depth interviewing research or responsive
interviewing, namely each interview has its own dynamic and focus, and it is driven by the insight of the interviewee on a specific topic. With this method, I could guide “a conversational partner in an extended discussion” (Rubin & Rubin 2005:4). It is similar to the “focused interview” approach in the sense that the interviewees have first hand experience on the topic and I have a priori knowledge of the subject of the interview through literature review and analysis of policy documents carried out before interviewing them. However, having adopted a Post-Positivist approach, I have not used these interviews to test hypotheses that emerged from a pre-situation analysis on the subject, as typical of focused interviews (Merton et al 1990), but to enhance my knowledge on the subject under investigation through the gathering of diverse perspectives from academics and professionals of the field.

Some interviews could be done in-person while other were phone interviews; in both cases the completion time of the interview was more or less the same (Shuy in Holstein et al 2001). Some interviews were conducting in English while others in Spanish and French. In all cases, interviews were preceded by a written correspondence with the interviewee which included information regarding my academic and professional background; the focus of my research and how my research links with their area of interest; the purpose of the interview; and what is called an informed consent (Morris 2006:251). When requested, a list of indicative questions were sent in advanced above all with some interviewees related to the case studies for which I had specific questions. The majority of interviewees accepted to be quoted while it was agreed with all of them that they could check their quotes included in the text of the thesis before its final submission to the academic commission of the university.

As far as the method used to do the interviews is concerned (Patton 1990), generally interviews started with “opener or introductory” questions which allowed interviewees to give a “free-answer” type of response (Payne 1951:34). This allowed me to narrow down the interviewee’s point of view among the diverse perspectives on SSR policies, and to have a background from which building other types of questions such as reason-why questions, i.e. when investigating the relation between the development-security nexus and SSR policies; informational questions, i.e. when enquiring about the purpose of SSR policies; two-way questions, used to grasp the nuances between defence reforms carried out within or without a wider SSR framework as it is today understood (Payne 1951). The interviews were semi-structured (Bryman 2008), in the sense that even if I had a list of questions prepared in advanced, conversations depended on how interviewees formulated their responses and which issues within SSR policies they gave more prominence. The data analysis of interview material was used as a “source of raw data” (Patton 1990:24) inserted in the text as direct
quotations, but also it was used as “evidence-based interpretations” in the final chapter of the thesis (Rubin & Rubin 2005:201).

Apart from interviews, contacts with stakeholders were also made through email correspondence through which selected questions were sent on issues such as those related to the case studies. These contacts were preceded by an introductory email about my background and my research topic, the agreement of the stakeholder to exchange her view on the subject under investigation and the informed consent as for oral interviews.

Case Studies

It is quite common to use case studies in the discipline of IR (Harvey et al 2002; Maoz et al 2004) and this method is one of the tools used in qualitative research. However, “It is not a method of research technique that determines whether something is qualitative research; it is how the study is conceived, what is to be accomplished, and how the data are understood” (Willis 2005:150). The Post-Positivist approach that I have adopted in this research implies that I do not start the study presenting some hypotheses but by a “search for emerging concepts and themes as the study progresses and the data is collected”, followed by a “search for the connection between those concepts and themes” (Morris 2006:71). For this problem-setting analysis, the case study method is then used as a tool to provide with an in depth description and analysis of the subject of the research. In this framework, then, the selection of case studies is not done by random sampling but as a “purposive” sampling (Morris 2006: 90, 94), based on how they support the answer to the research question taking into account the diverse conceptualisations and operationalisations of the development security nexus.

Before explaining the rationale for the usage of this method it is necessary to define what a case is and what, in this research, has been framed as a case. A case has been defined as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007:19); as “an examination of a specific phenomenon such as a program, an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a social group” (Merriam 1988:9); as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1984:13); and a method that gives a “thick description” through the interpretations of the people most knowledgeable about the case (Stake 1995:102). The case study method provides with an in-depth analysis of what is framed as “a case”, enhancing the understanding of the nature of the topic and of the concepts that emerge from the research (Meckstroth 1975); it allows the breaking up of the research question into
sub-questions or case study questions creating some building blocks for analysing and questioning (Hamel et al 1992); and it is not used to generalise findings but to help conceptualising issues under investigation (Gomm et al 2000:4).

I have judged this method useful to explore how the development-security nexus is conceptualised and operationalised because it gives a thick description (Geertz 1973) of this issue through the view of specialists of this field, and this enhances the understanding of the concept and practice of the link between development and security. Furthermore, the unclear definitional boundaries of SSR policies and the fact that their implementation is contextualised in different timeframes require a methodology that can bring to the fore the uniqueness of each set of policies as well as providing with analytical findings about the relation between development and security. Considering that each set of SSR policies is unique in its design and implementation, the purpose of investigating SSR policies through case studies is not to generalise qualitative findings but highlighting inadequacies and other particularities in current designs and practices of framing together development and security issue (Harvey et al 2002).

The selection of the case studies, Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, corresponds to the tackling of the research question through different angles of analysis in order to understand the novelty of these policies and their significance in framing together development and security concerns. Before entering into the details of these cases, and “what was studied in the case; what was included and what was excluded; and how it was processed” (Maoz in Harvey et al 2002:181), it is necessary to point out that “While a case is always singular, a case study work or research design often refers to a study that includes several cases” (Gerring 2007:27). Despite presenting three different contexts for analysis, the method used is not a within-case comparison because there is not hypothesised relationships (Levy in Harvey et al 2002:145) or what was called by George a method of structured focused comparison with a comparative analysis of the cases (George 1979:61). This because the aim of the selection of cases is not to develop a “differentiated theory comprised of conditional generalisations” (George 1979:59) but to investigate the contemporary conceptual and operational significance of the development-security nexus. When comparison between cases was done (Lijphart 1975) it was to provoke and question and not to prove a certain issue (Stretton 1969). The cases were selected to explore the nature and outcome (Yin 1984) of the usage of the development-security nexus in contemporary policy settings. The boundaries of the cases were framed by the case study question that each case addresses, and they do not correspond to the classification of cases in different categories according to their capacity to test or generate hypotheses or on the value of the variables they contain (Gerring 2007; Levy in Harvey et al 2002).
The Armenia case study investigates the significance of using nowadays the language of SSR for reforms, such as the Armenian defence reform, which are not framed according to current SSR holistic parameters. According to an analysis of the legal framework of the Armenian defence reform, this country has initiated a defence reform with the support of NATO and is not implementing a SSR policy package which follows the development-security nexus rationale promoted by OECD. The reason it is chosen as a case study is because this defence reform allows for an investigation of the language adopted and adapted in this reform. This investigation contributes to researching the novelty of SSR policies and the rationale behind the international consensus for their promotion. The theoretical background of this study is the Civil-Military Relations literature which highlights that the language and concern of SSR policies were already there in the 1990s before the SSR promotion during the 2000s decade as the development-security nexus policies. Terms such as democratic control of the armed forces, rule of law, the role of the civilian oversight bodies in defence issues, scrutiny of the management of military expenditure that are SSR concerns are not a recent invention. The issue is, as pointed out during an interview with Dennis Blease, “if SSR is an old wine in a new bottle, or if there will be a new bottle in the years to come when the debate over SSR will move forward” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). This case study is introduced by an historical overview of the country which has the purpose to illustrate the current foreign policy of the country upon which its defence reform choices are based. I start the empirical research on the development-security nexus with Armenia because of the need to contextualise SSR policies within broader settings that reveal that policy makers’ quest for addressing issues related to security, justice and state democratic management is not only framed within the contemporary ways of doing SSR. This case study constitutes a launching pad for questioning the shift from the 1990s adoption of this type of language due to a concern for democracy and international security, to the years 2000s when the same language expresses a concern for the development-security nexus.

The Afghanistan case study is selected because it questions the decision of policy makers to adopt SSR policies in a war theatre; it questions the meaning of security embedded in this set of SSR policies; and it questions how this context and this conceptualisation of security promote the development-security nexus rationale for SSR policies. Investigating the implementation of SSR policies in a war theatre has the purpose to question not only the meaning of security but also about the spectrum of feasibility of these policies, the expectations about the implementation of the development-security nexus, and why the ambition of policy makers in rebuilding the Afghan security forces needed to be expressed through the language of SSR. The analysis of the legal
framework of SSR in Afghanistan shows that this country has been officially carrying out these policies since 2002 when SSR was included into a broader framework of rebuilding state institutions following the USA led military attack to the country in 2001. This case study starts with illustrating the legal framework of SSR without preceding it by an historical overview of the country because this set of policies is a direct consequence of the political fracture in the history of the country that happened in 2001 with the starting of the war between the Afghan regime and the USA led international coalition. Considering that Afghanistan is doing SSR, this case study is not exploratory such as the one of Armenia where I examined the choice of language in the defence reform. In this case, the SSR framework is analysed through the lens of the development-security nexus which is the leitmotif of SSR policies.

Guinea-Bissau is selected as a case study because this country has a security and development deficit but is not at war, and it is implementing SSR policies since 2008. Therefore it constitutes a policy theatre in the sense that it allows the study of how development-security nexus policies address this nexus in a country where both development and security are in high demand. The analysis of the SSR framework is preceded by an overview of the political and development situation of the country to show how political instability, militarisation of politics and the dire living conditions of the people of Guinea-Bissau call for a set of reforms which are publicised as addressing development and security concerns.

In this case, like the one of Afghanistan, SSR policies are analysed through the lens of the development-security nexus perspective which constitutes the promotional background of these policies. The choice of selecting two SSR cases is that these two contexts where these policies are implemented bring to the fore questions about the meaning of security and development that is adopted in the policy design of SSR; the feasibility of translating into practice the development-security nexus in a scenario of conflict and political instability; and how the conceptualisation of SSR in each policy setting challenges the interpretation of the development-security nexus. Furthermore, they raise questions about expectations, perceptions of success and failure of policy makers and of the addressees of SSR regarded as beneficiaries or as local owners of these policies.

Data collection regarding these cases includes secondary sources of the country under investigation in order to draw an historical overview of Armenia which explains the geopolitical foreign policy of this country and its choice for a defence reform with the auxiliary of NATO; a background of the adoption of SSR in Afghanistan which is the war that started in 2001 considering that SSR policies are a direct consequence of this conflict; and an overview of the current political and economic development situation of Guinea-Bissau which explains the need for policies to
address development and security issues. For the analysis of the defence reform in Armenia and SSR policies in Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, I have used primary sources such as policy documents produced by governments involved in these policies, international organisations, as well as material from conferences above all on Afghanistan, which was displayed in internet and referenced throughout the text. Selected interviews, discussed in the section above, also contributed to the gathering of data. Data from these cases were not used to formulate generalisations about the concept and practice of the development-security nexus because this method of research does not lend itself to an empirical sample inference due to the fact that these cases cannot claim to be “representative” of the many defence reforms and SSR policies that are carried out, even if there are “contingent generalisations that [can] apply to the subclass of cases that are similar to those under study” (George & Bennett 2005:30, 32). In this research, the conceptualisation of development and security that relates to each of these cases can be useful for understanding other cases, but I do not consider them as generalisation of findings (Yin 1984) done by inductive analysis (Patton 1990:44). This is also why I have not done any triangulation of data between case studies due to the uniqueness of the cases (Stake 1995:4). Each case has contributed to the understanding of a particular situation that I have later interpreted (Willis 2005:239) in order to highlight, from the ambiguous “space of signification” or the “semantic battlefield” (Åkerstrøm Andersen 2003:vi) represented by the concepts of development and security, what is the development-security nexus that is currently translated into practices through SSR policies.

CHAPTER LAYOUT

Chapter I introduces the research question which focuses on analysing the significance of the development-security nexus in conceptual and operational terms. It continues by presenting the conceptual and theoretical framework adopted in the thesis which is informed by a Post-Positivist approach, and the methodology used to gather and analyse qualitative data for the research mainly through literature review, interviews, and case studies.

Chapter II examines the changing conceptualisation of development and security and it focuses in particular on the formulation of human development and human security. This because while human development contributed to a new reading of the development problématique, human security merged development and security concerns, creating de facto the development-security nexus. As far as development is concerned, throughout the time this concept has changed its significance, aims and strategies. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s development concerns were used as a banner by anti-colonial movements for demanding independence to pursue development
and modernisation, but also by most postcolonial states that framed their domestic politics by adopting and adapting combined Western and USSR models of development. In the 1970s and 1980s development was also seen as a basic need to fulfil through an economic development of the state that used economic growth as a benchmark. The benefits of the trickle down of neoliberal economic theories started to be contested in the 1990s when the limits of a development model centred only on economic growth were recognised (UNICEF 1987, 1988; World Bank 1990). A part from contesting old development approaches, the 1990s saw the emergence of a person-centred development paradigm called human development. Its promoter was the UNDP and its inauguration was the publication in the 1990 of the Human Development Report (UNDP 1990). The analysis of this diverse perspective on development points out that despite questioning the market led economic growth, its weight in the development discourse remains unchanged. I regard human development as a powerful policy statement that paved the way for a discussion on the management of development and security issues that includes, in theory more than in practice, how these affect people.

The emergence of the human security perspective with its emphasis on the need to have states capable to create an environment where development entitlements of people are guaranteed (UNDP 1994), pushed for an analysis of the means and ends of security as well as for a debate on state’s responsibility which challenges the dichotomy national/international when dealing with security issues. In this regard, I focus my analysis on to what extent human security brings the human at the centre of its theorising and how it considers the role of the state. I argue that both human development and human security have left unaltered respectively the primacy of market led economic growth and the state in their theorising. However both these perspectives put the human being at the centre of theorising about development and security which paved the way for the acknowledgement that there is a nexus between development and security and that theories and practices of these two discourses should merge. The merge of development and security concerns in the 1990s was facilitated by a series of factors such as sharing the human being as their referent object of analysis; paying closer attention to issues linked to sustainability in the field of environment but also economics (Anand & Sen 2000; Haq 1995; WCED 1987); broadening of the spectrum of issues included in the field of security due to geopolitical changes in the 1990 decade which required more comprehensive responses that included security, development, state governance considerations to redraw the political boundaries following the demise of the USSR.

Chapter III rethinks the formulation of the development-security nexus and one of its set of policies, Security Sector Reform, by investigating the significance of two theoretical shifts that
regard development and security as interlinked, namely the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development, which occurred respectively in the 1990s and 2000s (Duffield 2001, 2007; Klingebiel et al 2006; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007). The first shift emerged in the 1990s and focuses on the imperative to link development and security concerns, exemplified by human security. This trend highlights the need to merge human development concerns with the urgency to secure them as expressed by human security. In particular, I argue that this trend is another powerful statement that emphasises that development and security concerns are intrinsically linked and should be addressed together. The emergence of new international security challenges in the 2000s prompts the vision of “underdevelopment as dangerous” (Duffield 2001:159) which characterises the interpretation of the link between development and security embedded in the securitisation of development trend. In particular, according to this trend, development assistance is regarded as a tool to prevent conflicts because “Without peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace is threatened” (UNDP 1994:iii). I argue that while the argument that lack of development causes war is weak (Beall et al 2006; Duffield 2001; Hehir 2007; Klingebiel 2006), there has been a validation of this trend by international policy makers about promoting policies which focus on state security while contextualising their interventions in the need to secure the human security and development of people. Therefore, while the developmentalisation of security trends stressed the nexus between development and security, the securitisation of development anchors development entitlements to state responsibility, thus justifying the need to have secure states in order to have secure citizens. This is what has caused the boom of policies focusing on state governance security which are nowadays contextualised within wider development concerns. One example of these policies is Security Sector Reform (SSR), and I analyse in particular the contribution to this set of policies by DfID and OCED which have been prominent promoters of SSR, as well as academics. I contribute to the recent literature on SSR by highlighting first of all that the multifaceted relation between development and security does not lead to a univocal definition of these policies. I argue that regarding security as a prerequisite for development is not sufficient to say that by addressing security we also address development issues. This implies that the development-security nexus that these policies address depends on the meaning given to these related issues in each policy context. This is why it is necessary to have an in-depth analysis of diverse policy contexts that illustrate the various significance of development, security and their interrelations.
Chapters IV, V and VI are devoted to the case studies of Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau. Their aim is not to analyse the progress or failure of these policies but to question the meaning that development and security acquire under the aegis of SSR policies and how their nexus is conceptualised and implemented. Armenia is doing a defence reform with the assistance of NATO and is not implementing SSR policies as nowadays defined. However, it includes in the text the technical language that is also found in SSR policies. This case study provides with a reflection on the origins of the concerns that these policies address such as the state governance of the security sector in a manner that is consistent with democratic rules. In this regard the Civil-Military Relations literature contributes to this discussion by stressing that these policies as they are currently conceived have not invented or monopolised the lexicon of SSR which has existed since the 1980s and 1990s when states started paying more attention to issues such as good governance (World Bank 1989a, 1992a). This case study contributes to contextualise current security-nexus policies within a broader temporal scenario in which the meaning of security and development, or maybe just their theories and rhetoric, have undergone a change.

Chapter V addresses this change through the analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of SSR policies that have been implemented in Afghanistan since 2002. Since then these policies have received a consistent international backing and financial support above all from USA and EU countries that are at the forefront in promoting SSR. The particularity of this policy setting is that it is also a war theatre and this raises questions about the applicability of these policies as well as the significance of development and security when they come to terms with military necessities of the battlefield.

The case study of Guinea-Bissau in chapter VI, instead, represents an idyllic policy situation because paradoxically this country, by being one of the poorest countries in the world according to the HDI (UNDP 2007-08), it does need policy makers attention for supporting, among various issues, security, development, governance, democracy, and people. This situation of poverty and past colonial and civil wars is the “recommended” background for the implementation of these policies which aim at addressing development and security issues. Indeed, the significance of implementing SSR in a country where the majority of its population of 1.6 million people live with

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1 The list of publications linked to the three case studies is the following:
less than two dollars per day (IMF 2007) is self-explanatory. The Guinea-Bissau case study raises questions about the significance of development and security embedded in the design of these policies, focusing in particular on one of the stakeholders of these policies which is the EU.

Chapter VII gathers the findings of this research that include the analysis of the conceptualisation of the nexus between development and security and how it is nowadays operationalised through SSR policies. In this regard, the three case studies question how this nexus is put into practice and how development and security concerns are framed within the SSR policy design. Nowadays the overarching policy framework of SSR has become prominent when dealing with security infrastructure of states. I argue that, despite being publicised as addressing the nexus between development and security, SSR policies end up focusing only on selected state security issues, postponing the answer to the development question to an unknown future. Even if the nexus exists theoretically, exemplified by the concept of human security, when it is put into practice the fulfilment of the development promise is postponed, or so it seems. This because addressing security in order to prepare the basis for development implies that these policies focus their attention on helping the state to develop its capacity to guarantee the human security of its citizens.

This absorbability of the ‘development slice’ of SSR into policy attention on state governance mismatches with the language used in the promotion of these policies that presents SSR as putting people, their security and their development at the centre of their policy attention. Even if an analysis of the concepts of human security and human development reveals that the role of the state has never been dislodged from the development and security discourses, this research highlights two main issues: the need to better elucidate the meaning of development and security and the means and ends of their theorising and practices; the inadequacy of the statement ‘development-security nexus’ considering that the theoretical merge between these two discourses is done at people-level through the concepts of human development and human security, but in practice this is done at state-level because security and development of people are regarded as passing through the state. This mismatch between the theory and practice of the nexus creates the perception that development-security policies such as SSR, while preaching their conceptual debt to the development-security nexus, have postponed the answering to the development question while focusing primarily on the security question. This development exclusion has weakened the development-security nexus, undermined its human security conceptual base, and reinforced policy attention to the management of state security. The study of the implementation phase of SSR manifests the weakness of these policies, unable to bind together the conceptual richness of human security with states’ security interests, in an inclusive development policy discourse.
II. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, security and development concerns were often raised in tandem and policymakers and scholars saw the discourse of security and development as interlinked in various ways. A conceptual shift in the early part of the 1990s in how theories of security and development were formulated facilitated as well as accompanied the convergence of their discourses. A key moment in this conceptual shift was the formulation of human development and human security. Since then, the development-security nexus trend has been a source of influence for the design of international development and security policies.

This chapter identifies the evolving debates on the concepts of development and security to understand how the nexus between the two emerged and became entrenched. It is divided into two main sections focusing respectively on human development and human security. The analysis of human development is preceded by an overview of theories and ideas of development because the elaboration of this concept in the 1990s is part of the theorising efforts since the birth of development studies in 1950s that saw a proliferation of interpretations about ends and means of achieving development. However, before investigating in the chapter the evolving significance of development, it is important to point out here that from the outset of the discipline in the 1950s a common denominator of its diverse theories is that development issues have been regarded not only as domestic issues but also as international ones (O’Brien & Williams 2007). In the 1950s development was primarily regarded as a domestic concern that anti-colonial movements and postcolonial states used as a mantra for claiming independence, for instance by the Non-Aligned Movement and the outcome of the 1955 Bandung conference (European Navigator 2004). During the years this concern acquired also an international character and shaped economic and political relations among states. The context of development was no longer simply “the study of policy choice in poor countries” (Kriekhaus 2006:165), but it became “a method of change that has been introduced in the former colonies to pull up standards of living of their people” (Dasgupta 1985: 10). Therefore, development had a national and international sphere, and the theorising efforts for instance of Dependency and World System theories included the analysis of the linkages between these two dimensions.

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2 Throughout the chapter I will maintain the difference between the spirit, the concept, and theories of development. By the spirit of development I mean the optimistic attitude, the feeling that inspired the development decades. The concept of development is the abstract or generic idea of development used to formulate theories which have been set out to explain a particular situation. The theory is “a logically interconnected set of propositions about [the] empirical phenomena [of development]” (Harvey et al 2002:136).
The internationalisation of development and the emergence of post-colonial states constituted a new terrain not only for development theories but for the discipline of IR in general. Despite the emphasis that the discipline put on relations, it was recognised by Non-mainstream theories of IR in the late 1980s and 1990, many of them adopting a Post-Positivist approach, that the discipline failed to adequately elaborate on past encounters between Western and non-Western people, thus ignoring their major influence on the creation of states and their international relations (Krishna in Jones et al 2006:89; see also Anand 2007; Barker et al 1994; Darby et al 1997; Escobar 1995; Rist 1997). Furthermore, the analysis of the regimes of representation such as the Third World, the South or the Global South with their underlying imperial encounters and security considerations, created an opportunity of sharing a common ground of research for the disciplines of development, international relations and security studies (Doty 1996; Grant 1995; Krause et al 1997; Thomas 1987; Thomas & Wilkin 1999, 2004).

Whether development is regarded as a shared concern among disciplines or as an expanded concept which has entered other disciplines’ remit, elucidating the past theoretical reading of this concept is however inadequate for understanding the contemporary significance of the concept and practice of development. This inadequacy is because the current trend that highlights the interrelation between development and security has made the analysis of the development (and security) problematiques more complex. This is why to understand the wider questions raised in the thesis, it is necessary to outline the theoretical developments in the development and security domains. Thus I introduce the analysis of the concept of human development by an overview of “the chaotic history of development theory” (Trainer 1989:177) and this is followed by an analysis of security theories.

According to the literature on human development, this concept had two main implications: it highlighted the limitation of an economic approach to development centred on market led economic growth (Suhrke 1999); and it enlarged the fulcrum of development by affirming that people are the subjects and objectives of development, but without rejecting economic growth as a development tool (Sen 1999). Human development entailed a ‘zooming out’, in the sense of moving beyond the narrow economic focus, of the development process by putting at the centre of this enlarged development context the human being. I argue that human development with its concerns about people’s choices and capabilities (Sen 1985, 1999) was a development statement, rather than a development strategy, despite being the basis for the formulation of the Human Development Index (Sagar & Najam 1998; UNDP 1990). Its questioning of the ‘development question’ was not so radical in the sense that it did not provide operational guidelines for an alternative to market
economic growth models. I contend that one attempt to overcome this weak policy strategy and to operationalise the concept of human development was the merge of development and security concerns in the 1990s. Their nexus emerged to rectify the weakness of human development as a development strategy but it also brought back the development discourse to talk about means and not only ends: security came to be regarded as a mean to development, as we will see with one set of development-security nexus policies called Security Sector Reform.

The relevance for investigating the significance of human development is not because it is another addition to the development series which attempted to address issues linked to widespread world poverty, deprivation and unequal access to resources. If this was the case, human development should be considered as only the product of its time, and it would have been by now superseded by other development trends more attuned with contemporary problems of international economic exclusion (Enloe 1989; Escobar 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree 1997; Saunders et al 2002). Human development facilitated the orientation of the discipline towards an integrative approach with other disciplines because of the need to frame a comprehensive conceptual picture of the human being, and to formulate a consequent policy response. This inclusive approach of development was also facilitated in the 1990s by the convergence of other discourses such as human rights, security, environment, democracy, debt relief as priorities on the agenda of policy makers. In particular, the international political climate of the 1990s decade increased the demand for concerted approaches when dealing with such issues as well as providing responses to the fading of the Cold-War apparatus which shook the fabric of Eastern European and authoritarian states. Considering that the focus of this thesis is on one of these products, the development-security nexus, the second section of this chapter focuses on the emergence in the 1990s of a trend in the realm of security studies which shared with the human development approach the human being as the referent object of analysis: human security.

Human security provided with a new reading of security issues. It was promoted by the UNDP through the publication in 1994 of its report titled *New Dimensions of Human Security* (UNDP 1994), but also by the Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003), the UN Secretary General (United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004) and the Human Security Centre (Human Security Centre 2005). The concept of human security has benefited from many definitions which have enlarged its spectrum of applicability by expanding its realm of interests beyond state military means (Chen et al 2003; Hampson et al 2002; Paris 2001; Thomas 2000). Among those definitions, the one provided by the UNDP is significant in the sense that it allows the analysis of how human security has embedded within its meaning the notion of human
development, paving the way for the investigation of the formulation of the development-security nexus. The relation between human security and development will be analysed in chapter III, and in particular why the fulfilment of security policies started to be regarded as dependent on development related policies and outcomes. In this chapter I analyse the manufacturing of a perception of danger and security centred on the human being and how this relates to the role of the state. I do this by addressing the question of ‘security for whom’ which will reveal that human security is not de-linked from state security. The analysis of the reading of the role of the state by human security is relevant because I contend that the state is still part of the human security analysis; and it still maintains its primacy in the implementation of security policies even when they are formulated in a holistic manner following a human security approach.

The human security perspective offers a vision of security which focused more on security relations within the state rather than between states. As we will see, this concept puts the emphasis on the need to investigate the security relation between the state and its citizens by ‘zooming in’, in the sense of focusing on people, the notion of state security and pushing for an analysis of state security governance capabilities.

However, in the 1990s, despite the launching of initiatives such as the ban of land-mines (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1997) which drew attention to the humanitarian consequences of conflicts, overall, human security was not translated into clear security strategies. Apart from an opening up of the discipline of security towards other disciplines, the Critical Security Studies for instance (Krause et al 1997; Lipschutz et al 1995) argue that it is also a matter of questioning ‘the security question’ and the security subject(s). Suffice to say here that the ‘zoom in’ of the security discourse towards the analysis of the management of state security and its consequences on people, and the ‘zoom out’ of the development discourse towards an investigation of the impact that the economic management of the state has on people - thus sharing the human being as the same referent of analysis - brought to the search for a common strategy that was sought to be provided by the development-security nexus policies, analysed in chapter III.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The Theories of Development

After half a century of theorising efforts, development is still seen as “a slippery concept” (Edelman & Haugerud in Nugent & Vincent 2004:86), as a plastic word which has lost its specialised meaning (Poerksen in Rist 1997; Sachs 1999), and for which there is still no consensus as to what it means or requires (Gertzel in O’Brien & Williams 2007). From its etymology (des-
“undo” and -veloper “wrap up”) it implies to untie, to liberate something. However, what etymology allows development to do in principle, depends more on other variables than on its semantic capacities. The initial idea of development in the 1950s was included within the idea of progress, as stated by Post-Development theorists, that was labeled by a succession of different wording such as progress, modernisation, development, growth (Shanin in Rahnema et al 1997). Since then, the context and its reading, its subjects and objectives, its policy responses and outcomes have all undergone changes (for a history of the evolution of development as a concept see Chari & Corbridge 2008; Jameson et al 1996; Rist 1997; Todaro & Smith 2009). Development became a discourse, a language “but also what is represented through language” (Grillo et al 1997:12), and embedded a framework (Makki 2004) that evolved during the years leading development theorists to talk about “The making and unmaking of the third world through development” (Escobar in Rahnema et al 1997).

The beginning of the discipline of development studies is traced back to the middle of the past century, and it became more and more institutionalised as politicians and theorists disseminated theories on how some areas of the world could change in order to enhance the living conditions of those people residing there (for the origin of development studies see Chari & Corbridge 2008; Corbridge et al 1995; Escobar 1995; Jameson et al 1996; Kingsbury et al 2008; Leys 1996; Rist 1997; Sachs 1996; Tornquist 1999; Toye 1993). Since the birth of development studies in the 1950s, development theories privileged the economic vision of development probably influenced by the need to “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” as USA President Truman declared in 1949 (Truman quoted in Rist 1997:71).

The mapping of the world exercise done in the name of development was very much influenced by the previous scramble for Africa and the other continents during the nineteenth century under the banner of colonialism (Escobar 1995). With a clear geography of intervention in mind policy makers used the discipline of economics to delivery the promises of development and in particular Modernisation theories headed by W.W. Rostow. His book The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow 1960) mapped out the future of those countries identified as in need of development; what they had to do was to follow the instructions, step by step. Modernisation theories magnified the progressive nature of the idea of development. They stated that this progress belonged to the Western world and validated its economic system because it was deemed capable to deliver a desirable standard of living. Western countries had to guide poor countries along this path and economic growth was regarded as the engine for allowing the economic “take-off” of poor
countries. Modernisation theories managed to secure the necessity of the idea of development while at the same time fossilising its image as a positive substratum for economic policies. Briefly, they sanctified both the idea of development and economic growth. All in all, economic growth policies were dominant during the 1950s and 1960s (World Bank 1990), and even during the following decades, economic growth concerns were always included in economic policies, even if only as the alter ego of development (Burki et al 1997; UNDP 1990; World Bank 1989a). However, by blindly siding with economic growth without keeping a safe critical distance from it, the idea of development occupied a fragile position. A criticism of economic growth implied an automatic questioning of development as an idea and as a theory. By putting the idea of development into mainstream economics, Modernisation theories sanctified a framework of subordinate relations between Western states and those aspiring to development, opening up the possibility of a future transformation of these international relations only when the latter would mirror the success of the former.

The first critique of Modernisation theories was put forward in the 1960s by Dependency theories which slashed the belief in the idea of development as a linear progress induced by Western economies (for a summary of these theories see Amin 1974; Amin et al 1982; Blomstrom & Hettne 1984; Cardoso 1972; Frank 1966, 1977; Lall 1975; Love 1980). They claimed that the future of poor countries was hindered by the same economic mechanism which enriched some rich countries of the world. One term that was born and bred out of Dependency theories was underdevelopment, and they used it to explain the multifaceted concept of development. Their theorists contributed with a new insight on the relations between the core and the periphery of the world, which represented the rich and poor countries respectively. Another dichotomy used was also the one of metropolitan and satellite countries. This geographical and conceptual division gave Dependency theories the context and tools to analyse relations within countries. They stated that there was an unequal relation linking the core and periphery which was responsible for the simultaneous production of wealth in the former and poverty in the latter, or rather for the production of development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery. Underdevelopment was then considered as a result of the economic relations with the core countries and as a condition affecting those satellite countries which were at the receiving ends of this economic mechanism. This term is distinguished from the term undeveloped which Dependencies theories applied only to a pre-capitalist Europe. The term undeveloped simply implied that those countries at that time lacked development, and not that their condition was the result of their relations with rich countries (Frank 1966). Therefore, Dependency theorists identified only one economic engine producing
simultaneous wealth and poverty but in two separate geographical zones. The condition of underdevelopment was portrayed as a mixture of poverty and more generally as the absence of the benefits enjoyed by the people in rich countries. However, it was not simply development on reverse; it meant that there was an economic mechanism producing poverty, rather than an embryonic economic mechanism that will produce wealth in the future. However, shortly this term would be de-linked from the meaning received by Dependency theories and used throughout the development age for describing countries that did not present the same economic patterns and achievements of Western countries. As we will see, in the 2000s it will also acquire a new fame.

The idea of development portrayed by Dependency theories was quite different from the one of Modernisation theories. It had lost its positive mystical allure and it became a more material one, a desirable fruit that everybody wanted but that only few could taste. Development was no longer a sentiment which inspired the action of goodwill politicians; it was a condition of living, a status that people in some rich countries enjoyed. The age of high mass consumption described by Rostow could not simply be achieved with the support of the idea of development. The idea itself was transformed into something negative. In fact, it was trapped in the same mechanism that produced simultaneous development in rich countries and underdevelopment in poor countries. Dependency theories constituted the first voice coming from the South which questioned the idea of development, and the first to point out that the transformation of rich countries had to be included within the one of poor countries in order to change the framework of international relations.

This inclusive approach of development continued with the World System theories (see Amin 1985; Amin et al 1982; Wallerstein 1974). From the negative dependency expressed by Frank (Frank 1977), these theories proposed an interdependent world, in which states were units relating to each other through capitalistic relations. These theories included the concept of semi-periphery within the Dependency theories discourse of core and periphery. Furthermore, they made these three structural zones mobile: core, periphery and semi-periphery could mutate their positions in the world economic hierarchy, and this was seen as ‘development’ or ‘regression’ (Wallerstein 1974). The idea of development portrayed by the World System theories is no longer fossilised in an economic system with a dual productive capacity, because the existence of the semi-periphery and world interdependence meant that the idea of development could still be used to unify the world under its banner.

This development effort was also marked by a succession of United Nations Development Decades. The first Development Decade (UN GA 1961) was inaugurated in the 1960s, and was based on the belief that economic growth was the magic wand for making development and
modernisation coming true. The second decade, 1970-1980, opened with less certainties and more modesty, as shown by the Basic Human Needs Approach inaugurated by the World Bank President Robert McNamara (McNamara 1981). This approach opened the debate on the limits of economic growth (Hammarskjold Foundation 1975; UNCTAD 1975; World Bank 1975) but it also reduced the view of the condition of development to the satisfaction of biological needs which could be seen, for instance, as a daily minimum calories intake or access to healthcare necessary to keep a person alive (ILO 1977). Despite showing that the definition of human needs was a debatable exercise, the Basic Needs Approach showed that the condition of poverty was so deepening and so widespread in the world that first of all it was necessary to be preoccupied with the fulfilment of these essential human needs.

In this period, the idea of development was still a condition to aspire but it also became a basic need to satisfy. People, thus, needed development to stay alive. The spirit of development was no longer materialised in a good gesture coming from generous Western countries, but it was a need that had to be imperatively realised in order to guarantee the survival of the poor constituting the majority of the world population. The title of a World Bank series *Poverty and Basic Needs* (World Bank 1980a) summarised the development orientation of the time and closed the second development decade. Also for the following decades poverty made the headlines of the World Bank Development Report (World Bank 1980, 1990, 2000-2001). The tone of the 1980s decade is set by the World Bank statement “For many of the world’s poor, the 1980s was a ‘lost decade’ – a disaster indeed” (World Bank 1990:7). The 1980s have been generally defined as a lost development decade for Latin American and Sub-Sahara Africa (Burki et al 1997; CEPAL 1996, 2002; Ocampo 2004; Ordoñez Cifuentes 1994; UNDP 1996; World Bank 1985, 1990, 1997). This decade was characterised by a decline in per capita income; deterioration in the terms of trade due to a fall in the price of raw materials; high inflation and an upsurge in the external debt of Latin American and African countries, deteriorating even further the living conditions of the poor. Economic indicators and statistics showed that:

The number of poor has almost doubled in Sub-Sahara Africa over 1981-2001, from 164 million to 316 million living below $1 per day. The share of the world’s poor by this measure living in Africa has risen from 11% in 1981 to 29% in 2001 (Shaohua & Ravallion 2004:20).

By the end of the 1980s, no much was left of the ancestral optimistic feeling linked with the idea of development. Reports dealing with global welfare made a widespread use of phrases such as fight against poverty or eradication of poverty (World Bank 1990), creating an ambiguous
metaphor: poverty became an enemy to kill or a disease to eliminate. Therefore, the poor were either “poverty-prisoners” or had the “poverty-sickness”, in both cases they were victims, waiting to be saved. Confronted with the human powerlessness characterising the world’s poor, the idea of development put on the shoulders of rich countries the development burden. The idea of development was then a need that the poor could not fulfil by themselves because they were victims, and had to wait for the rich world to liberate them. The response of rich countries to this development burden which was exacerbated by the oil crisis, the debt crisis and the international recession, was to increase the pressure on poor countries to continue with the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) that came under the aegis of neoliberal economic policies.

The IMF and the World Bank, following instructions by their shareholder states, turned SAP conditionalities into an arm wrestling with bankrupt countries which could not afford any social protection to their citizens (for a review of these policies see Corbo & Fischer 1991). Economic growth was no longer left to the biological metaphor of a “natural” take off of countries as Rostow used to preach; it became an “artificial selection” requiring the full and rapid implementation of structural adjustment economic programs. These policies, which were part of the trickle down theory of economic growth of the neoliberal doctrine, aimed at stabilising the state economy before adjusting it to the dictates of the market economy. They included strategies such as fiscal liberalisation, privatisation, de-regulation. This market deregulation did not imply an anarchical absence of rules but a new type of market-oriented regulations, a sort of re-regulations (Cerny et al 1993). The implementation of these policies by the Bretton Woods institutions requested a consensus by their major shareholders, lately defined as the Washington consensus. The original meaning of this phrase indicated a package of economic policies considered by the World Bank and IMF but, as his originator admitted, it acquired a more sinister meaning:

Audiences over the world seem to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery. There are people who cannot utter the term without foaming at the mouth (Williamson 2002).

The implementation of these policies was done against a background of street protests above all because of the negative social consequences of the privatisation of public services (for a summary of protests see Danaher et al 2001). The mainstream belief was that once economic indicators were under control, poverty alleviation would come. However, the balance of this certainty was drawn at the end of the decade, by the World Bank and by UNDP:
During the 1980s many developing countries had to cope with macroeconomic crises. Their experience drew attention to a new concern: the need to frame adjustment policies that give due weight to the needs of the poor. In many developing countries a period of painful macroeconomic adjustment was unavoidable. In the longer term the economic restructuring associated with adjustment is perfectly consistent with the two-part strategy. In the short term, however, many of the poor are at risk (World Bank 1990:3).

The number of Africans below the poverty line rose by two-thirds in the first half of the 1980s – compared with an increase of about a fifth for the developing world as a whole. Many countries recorded major reverses in the 1980s – with rising rates of child malnutrition and infant mortality, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Budget cuts greatly squeezed social spending. Some countries avoided reductions in social programmes through better economic management, but most countries in African and Latin America paid a heavy social price during the adjustment period of the 1980s (UNDP 1990:18).

How did the idea of development manage to face the 1980s? It was presented with a dilemma. It was no longer possible to defend the old friendship with the discipline of economics, especially after the social shock of structural adjustment policies. The good faith in the capacities of rich Western countries to eliminate world poverty was also gone, as revealed during the street protests in countries which adjusted their economies responding to the Washington consensus. Thus, after three decades the idea of development had to find new supporting actors, a new choreography where contextualising its strategies, and above all convincing the audience that the script, or the sentimentalist spirit, had not changed since the 1950s. When the actors were ready on the stage, the curtain opened and the act was titled Human Development.

Defining Human Development

The 1990s decade opened with a negative development balance sheet, as stated by the UN “The goals and objectives of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade were for the most part unattained” (UN GA 1990). However, there was still room for optimism among policy makers that not only the condition of development could be attained, but that the 1990s could be a decade of accelerated development “The principal aim of the strategy is to ensure that the 1990s are a decade of accelerated development in the developing countries and strengthened international cooperation” (UN GA 1990). Even if optimism and perseverance were still alive and kicking, after three development decades policy makers still faced huge challenges: the majority of the world population lived in poverty and this deprivation was exacerbated in the 1980s above all in Latin America and Africa (Van Der Gaag 1991) also because of the implementation of structural adjustment economic programs (World Bank 1990, 2005). The dissensus towards their implementation started to rise not only in those countries directly affected by them but also internationally. The publication of the UNICEF report on Adjustment with a
Human Face (UNICEF 1987, 1988) analysed the social effects of structural adjustment programs in countries under siege by these economic policies. With a posthumous assessment, the World Bank also recognised the limits of its approach:

But when structural adjustment issues came to the fore, little attention was paid to the effects on the poor. Macroeconomic issues seemed more pressing, and many expected that there would be a rapid transition to new growth paths. As the decade continued, it became clear that macroeconomic recovery and structural change were slow in coming (World Bank 1990:103).

This dissent was towards the sanctity of a model that preached economic growth and dismantled social services in countries where the majority of their citizens were, as Mark Duffield would say, “non-insured” (Duffield 2005:145). Despite the consensus among the major shareholders of the Bretton Woods institutions on this economic approach to development, there were economists such as Amartya Sen who during the 1980s rose concerns over the limitations of economic indicators as a measurement for social development (Sen 1984, 1985; see also Streeten et al 1981). However, it is only with the publication of the Human Development Report by UNDP in the 1990 that a new consensus emerged around the need to regard development as a process centred on the human being, namely as human development (UNDP 1990). Before analysing this international consensus it is necessary to elucidate the significance and novelty of this concept. The behind the scene work was orchestrated by Mahbub Ul Haq, who defined human development “not just (as) another addition to the development dialogue; it is an entirely new perspective” (Haq 1995:11). In the report, human development was defined as:

Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. ....The term human development here denotes both the process of widening people's choices and the level of their achieved well-being. It also helps to distinguish clearly between two sides of human development. One is the formation of human capabilities, such as improved health or knowledge. The other is the use that people make of their acquired capabilities, for work or leisure (UNDP 1990:10).

This new perspective was more articulated and contextualised in the opening statement of the report:

Not only political systems but economic structures are beginning to change in countries where democratic forces had been long suppressed. People are beginning to take charge of their own destiny in these countries. Unnecessary state interventions are on the wane. These are all reminders of the triumph of the human spirit. In the midst of these events, we are rediscovering the essential truth that people must be at the centre of all development (UNDP 1990:III emphasis added).
The novelty of this perspective due to this proclaimed humanity in development and the “triumph of the human spirit” in the 1990s need investigation. Despite its formal introduction in the development trend in the 1990, the origins of human development are traced back to studies on economic inequality and poverty (Desai 1991). Human development stresses that the human being is the fulcrum of development, but also it emphasises the importance of human agency, human capital and other economic means that sustain the process of enlarging people’s choices so that a dignified level of life can be achieved (Anand & Sen 2000). Thus it orients the discussion about development towards talking about people and the possibility for them to make choices which enhance their well-being. This pushes for a clarification of the human development slogan publicised by the UNDP which says that “human development is the end - economic growth a means” (UNDP 1996:1).

First of all, human development does not imply a rejection of a state economic growth as a tool to achieve an increasing standards of living, but it points out that the development process should not be reduced to this and should keep at the centre of its theorising the human being (Aturupane et al 1994). Therefore, the gist of the human development approach is not choosing between achieving economic growth and human development by other means, nor having different types of economic growth (Ravallion 1997). What human development preaches is the necessity to read development issues, tailor development strategies and assess their effects by keeping people as the ultimate goal of the development success (Streeten 1994). In the words of the UNDP “The Human Development Report series has been dedicated, since its inception in 1990, to “ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone” (UNDP 1996:III). If the purpose of human development was to end “the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone” it meant that it was an oppositional concept which called for an investigation of the link between economic growth and its effects on people (Ranis 2004). This meant that human development was a critique of the narrowness of the neoliberal framework that focused on the marked led economic growth model of development.

As UNDP asserted “Economic growth is essential for human development, but to exploit fully the opportunities for improved well-being that growth offers, it needs to be properly managed” (UNDP 1990:42). As Post-Development theorists pointed out, development was a form of humanity management more than economic growth management which aimed at bringing people into the formal economic sector and under state control (Rapley 2007), but also as a “management of a promise” (Nederveen Pieterse 2000:176) that so far failed. As far as human development is concerned, it was a weak management tool. I argue that it was a statement about how development
issues should be conceived but it did not show a strategy about how to achieve this comprehensive people-centred model of development. The concept of human development did not tackle the growing economic gap between rich and poor countries by proposing new development strategies. It was just delivering more rights to individuals who could not even meet their basic needs as recognised during the 1970s.

Therefore, the novelty that characterised the publicity of human development was not much about the sudden inclusion of a concern about humanity within the development discourse, but a statement saying that people’s life and aspirations are not circumscribed by economic indicators which, however, need to be “properly managed” to deliver the promise of development. While it is left to economic growth the task to “improved well-being”, as preached by past economic development theories, it sets a higher standards of development expectations without giving a policy strategy. While economic theories of development revealed different economic conditions between people living in poor and rich countries, by focusing on the ‘humanity in development’, the concept of human development used the concern with humanity to find a safe and unquestionable moral position. Consequently, after forty years, the proclamation of humanity in development puts back all the development discourse to square one: again, the idea of development, by emphasising its relation with the term humanity, became unquestionable. The concept of human development was the expression of this incontestability.

The problem with defining the humanity within human development “is that there has been too little focus on what the ‘human’ in human development should actually mean” (Sagar & Najam 1999:747). When it appeared, the concept of human development was regarded as a positive novelty because of its interpretation of the individual as a human being. The use of the term human development instead of individual development had the purpose of enlarging and equating the development discourse to a universal concern for those unfortunate of the world who lack opportunities and choices in life, as development was lately defined (Sen 1999). This change of focus was not a fortuitous change of lexicon, but it implied the will to provide every individual with positive rights contained in the definition of human rights. By adopting the concept of human development, the development discourse clearly positioned itself in favour of a vision of development which was person-centred, universal and focused on people’s capabilities which means, according to Sen, “the capacity to lead the kind of life that he or she has reason to value” (Sen 1999:87). The universalism embedded in the concept of human development also overlapped with the field of human rights, as shown by the debate on the Right to Development (Iqbal 2010; Raj Kumar & Srivastava 2006).
The essence of development has always been the amelioration of living conditions of people. However, with human development it was no longer a matter of presenting economic growth models which would deliver development; the focus was now on the individual, on her entitlements which included also those not readily marketable such as life expectancy, and political freedom. In fact, this concept did not imply an expansion of the to-do list for achieving the development goals. It emphasised that income was not the panacea, and that other conditions needed to exist to guarantee the well-being of individuals.

The emphasis on humanity in the development discourse was introduced to create a consensus for a new set of development-international relations after the failure of the previous one based on concerns for the economy of the state (McNeill 2007). As affirmed by the UNDP, “The 1990s are shaping up as the decade for human development, for rarely has there been such a consensus on the real objectives of development strategies” (UNDP 1990:61). However, six years after the publication of the Human Development Report, the UNDP said that “The paradigm shift in favour of sustainable human development is still in the making”:

_The paradigm shift in favour of sustainable human development is still in the making_. … The central message of Human Development Report 1996 is clear: there is no automatic link between economic growth and human development, but when these links are forged with policy and determination, they can be mutually reinforcing and economic growth will effectively and rapidly improve human development. Government policies are vitally important. We now know, for example, the limits of trickle-down economics (UNDP 1996:III emphasis added).

However, why was this so-called paradigm shift still in the making in 1996 despite the “triumph of the human spirit” (UNDP 1990) in 1990? Despite the empirical effort to measure human development with the Human Development Index (Sagar & Najam 1998) it was noticed that “There is no evidence that HDR’s [Human Development Reports] have led countries to rethink their policies, not is there any convincing reason to expect it to happen” (Srinivasan 1994:241). One reason for changing policies might be that the objectives have changed. In the case of development the World Bank stated a year after the publication of the first UNDP Development Report:

_The overall goal of development is therefore to increase the economic, political, and civil rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religions, races, regions, and countries. This goal has not changed substantially since the early 1950s, when most of the developing world emerged from colonialism (World Bank 1991:31)._ 

So, what distinguishes the consensus about new development objectives that the UNDP pointed out in 1990 if, as the World Bank says, the development goals have not changed since the 1950s? It appears that policy makers since the 1990s created a consensus for an international relations
approach under the aegis of human development which could continue the same development crusade by using the same boat but with a new flag. The reason why in the 1990s the concept of human development managed to hold a central position in the development discourse, so much that even if it was much criticised, i.e. its Human Development Index (Sagar & Najam 1998), it was not totally rejected might be that “The idea of human development won because the world was ready for it” (Sen 2000:21). This readiness could be interpreted in different ways, depending on the focus that we give to the variables of development: a change of context after the waning of the Cold War which opened up the possibility of different policy experiments; the need to respond to the negative consequences of the faith in the neoliberal economic growth of the Washington consensus by providing new responses; and perhaps the will to abandon the straightjacket of economics and its dismal measurement of development by embracing a sanguine faith in humanity while questing for alternatives in development, or to development (Munck et al 1999; Ziai 2007).

There were also critics who questioned if human development was indeed a new model or a “reinvention of the wheel” (Srinivasan 1994:1). Others said that “The human development approach assumed the leadership of a pluralist world of multiple concerns” (Sen 2000:23). This latter definition of human development seems to capture the essence of human development and identified what made the fortune of this concept through the analysis of development concerns and strategies:

Any development strategy for the 1990s will combine a number of objectives: among them, accelerating economic growth, reducing absolute poverty and preventing further deterioration in the physical environment. The departure from earlier development strategies lies in clustering all these objectives around the central goal of enlarging human choices (UNDP 1990:61).

The link between economic growth, poverty reduction and environment concerns also led to talking about a sustainable human development, expanding “the concern for human development from the present generation to those in the future” (Anand & Sen 2000:2040; Griffin & McKinley 1994). Moreover, from the term “sustainable development” the concept of human development drew from the sustainability broadly defined by the Commission the aspect of “sustainability of human opportunities” (Haq 1995:16). The concept of sustainable development influenced the one of human development in two ways: it facilitated the link between human development and security,

3 The Brundtland Commission Report defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs,’ in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs” (WCED 1987:43).
by stressing the necessity to guarantee resources for future generations; and it defined “the type of development that is securitised in human security” (Duffield in Klingebiel 2006:19). While the concept of human development highlighted the target of development which included political freedom among the enlarged basket of choices that should be made available to people, the concept of human security highlighted the role and responsibilities of state(s) in achieving development. This complementary and mutual interdependence, as well as having the human being as their shared focus, signed the birth of the development-security nexus.

**HUMAN SECURITY**

The field of human security has received increasingly attention by scholars and politicians since it officially entered the international relations domain in 1994 with the publication of the UNDP’s report titled *New Dimensions of Human Security* (UNDP 1994). The timing of the publication, the publisher and the title are per se issues for discussion before analysing the significance of this concept and the impact that it had and still has in theoretical and policy terms. The report came out amid a decade of geopolitical transformation that provoked the creation of a window of opportunity to reexamine international relations through different lenses. One of these was human security (Stoett 1999). In fact, the idea of human security (Bajpai 2003) has influenced international relations (MacFarlane & Foong Khong 2006) so much that it is now regarded as a sort of new diplomacy, and “a central organising principle of international relations” (Axworthy in McRae & Hubert 2001:10). Furthermore, human security is seen as having introduced and made available “a language and a rationale for raising the concerns of the majority of humanity on the diplomatic and scholarly international relations agenda” (Thomas 2004:354), as we will see in chapter III when we analyse Security Sector Reform policies.

It was a development actor, the UNDP, that presented this new security concept to the press, and this was per se an indication that the fields of development and security were no longer confined to their theoretical territorial trap (Agnew 1994), and that their concerns and strategies could be merged. The title is also indicative that human security was far from being a straightforward easily defined concept. The UNDP talked about “new dimensions of human security” and not about “concept and measurement of human security” just to build on the same title used for its report on human development four years earlier. This perhaps meant that human security, in 1994, was not something radically new but that the UNDP intended to highlight the existence of other security dimensions apart from the military, and their interlinkages. The unpacking of the components of security by the UNDP report brings out sets of questions about the different meanings of security,
which also implies that there seems to be no “common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are” (Haferndorn 1991:15).

I focus my attention on the significance of ‘human’ in human security and what this security approach reveals about the role of the state in the security domain. I approach this issue through the “security for whom” question, because searching for the answer to this interrogation will allow me to contextualise human security within diverse theories of security and reveal its novelty, nuances, challenges as well as what remains unchanged or unquestioned.

The Meaning of ‘Human’ in Human Security

When analysing human security it is important to keep in mind that “There is no single definition of human security today” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:9) as also summarised in the book edited by Chen (Chen et al 2003). This might be because security is not a neutral concept (Booth et al 2005:21) and how security is conceptualised and the vision of the world that it offers is bound to nurture debates (Collins et al 2007; Lipschutz et al 1995; Ullman 1983). As pointed out by Bain:

There is no essence of security that awaits discovery. There are rival conceptions of security, each of which is authentic in its own right and on its own terms, just as there are rival conceptions of order, justice, equality, freedom, and happiness (Bain et al 2006:4).

If we agree with the above statement that security is not a mysterious concept that awaits discovery, human security is then just another one among several interpretations of security provided by this field of literature (Hampson et al 2002; Krause et al 1997; Lipschutz 1995). However, if we agree that the elaboration of human security has disclosed a new nature of this concept by stressing the importance of relating security concerns to human beings, we might create different security discourses each of these embedding a different fulcrum of analysis. While this interpretation shows how this concept has linked diverse issues such as individual well-being, human rights, conflicts, development and environment with a security string, and included them into the realm of security concerns, the former interpretation recognises a plurality of security discourses without challenging the one of state security.

The existence of many interpretations of human security also implies that it can be translated into political practice in different ways. Rather than judging the hierarchy of security discourse, I find relevant to consider human security as a concept, and not simply a problem, that has instilled into the domain of international relations the need to monitor state’s security capabilities because of
the responsibility of the state to create an environment where human development capabilities can be enjoyed (Des Gasper 2005).

The UNDP offers a broad definition of human security that was included in its 1994 report published few weeks before the Rwanda genocide. The UNDP includes development concerns within a framework of danger, threat and security, and defines human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression … and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patters of daily lives” (UNDP 1994:23). Considering that the spectrum of this definition is vast, the UNDP points out seven areas which should be monitored not to threat human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP 1994:24,25). Its view also recognises that there are two broad dimensions of human security: the freedom from want and the freedom from fear (UNDP 1994:23). These expressions were first used half a century ago in different historical circumstances by the USA President Franklin Roosevelt⁴ (Roosevelt 1941) and had the state as their referent object. Sixty years later, the object of these combined freedoms shifted from the state to the human being, and into the concept of human security. The link between freedom from fear, freedom from want and the individual was also publicised by the Millennium Report of the UN (Annan 2000) and by the Commission on Human Security in its report Human Security Now (CHS 2003) requested by the UN Secretary General:

Human security means protecting vital freedoms…It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms - freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf… Human security complements state security, furthers human development and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centred and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. By looking at “downside risks”, it broadens the human development focus beyond “growth with equity”. Respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security (CHS 2003:1).

Other reports such as the Human Security Report favours a narrower definition of human security and focuses on the violent threats to individuals, and analyses statistics of civilian deaths in situation of violence and forced migrations (Human Security Centre 2005). Talking about broad and narrow definition of human security (King & Murray 2001-02) does not take us far in the

⁴ To quote Roosevelt “In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression…The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way…The third is freedom from want - which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour - anywhere in the world” (Roosevelt 1941). By appropriating this wording, the human security discourse shows its debt towards the one of state security, and opens up the debate about its differentiation.
discussion about its definition. In fact, the gist of the matter is not to zoom in or out the lens of security on only one issue such as the freedom from fear, avoiding the rest. It depends on what are the objectives of this theorising, and in particular on what is the meaning of ‘human’ in human security.

When we talk about human security it should be straightforward that we imply that we are talking about the security of the individual, and the gist of the matter should only be which dimension of her individual security we are talking about, considering the vast array of life situations experienced by a human being. However, the ‘security for whom’ question does not lead to a univocal answer. First of all, if we say that human security is about the security of people, it means that not only it belongs to them intrinsically, but they also own the right to manage it. Put it simply, if I own a car I can drive it, sell it, insure it against accidents, or destroy it. Is the ownership of security any different? If individuals own their security, they must have the possibility to enjoy it (i.e. by feeling free), to marketise it (i.e. as armed personnel when not compulsory recruited by the state), but also to defend it (self-defence against a robber), and to destroy it, namely committing suicide.

However, according to the literature on human security, by saying that human security refers to the security of people, it means that they have the right to be secure (Ramcharan 2002), but not to manage their security because this is delegated to the state (High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change 2004). What people can do is to manage their own (and the one of others) insecurity but avoiding, for instance, behaviours that could compromise it, such as driving over speed limits. So, it is a matter of half ownership and half tutorage, in which the individual own the right to feel/be secure but not to exercise directly the management of her security by, for instance, going to capture criminals, as it is the mandate of the state police. This give and take between the citizen and the state about security rights and duties is part of the difficulty in answering the question of security for whom. Furthermore, “human security should interrogates what makes people insecure” (Bellamy & McDonald 2002:374; see also Thomas & Tow 2002), but the individual is not isolated from the actor to whom she has to devolve the management of her protection. Therefore, it is not possible to leave out the state when we talk about human security.

This leads to a question whether we talk about secured individuals or states securing individuals. However, by including the state in the human security equation, we take for granted two issues: we contextualise the individual within a political territory called state, and therefore we talk about citizens rather than ‘abstract’ human beings; we take for granted the security institutions of the state; and we introduce a doubt on the functionality of this apparatus which could also be used to
repress rather than to protect. As Buzan said, “The security of individuals is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by, the state” (Buzan 2007:283), and he privileged focusing on the tension between different levels of security rather than only on the level of the individual. However, by taking for granted that the management of citizens’ security is done by the state, we end up with the absorption of the individual within the institutional security fabric of the state - which is what the concept of human security fundamentally wants to avoid. It was indeed this security trap exemplified by repressive state regimes that also pushed for the emergence of human security as a security statement that publicises the individuality of the security of people against the one of state (Des Gasper 2005; Fouinat 2004). I contend that human security is not a radical revision of security because it does not dismiss the state but it scrutinises the management of its security functions. Therefore, it is not a matter to “dislodge the state” (Booth & Vale 1995:293) but human security aims at analysing security interactions between various actors contextualised in different political spaces such as cities, rural areas, states and so on (Muller et al 2004) in order to fulfil its quantitative and qualitative aspects: the fulfilment of basic material needs and the achievement of human dignity (Thomas et al 1999:3).

Thus from the ‘security for whom’ question and its certainty about its subject of analysis, we are now catapulted into the broader picture of the international arena where insecurity is not simply embedded there but, as Constructivist theorists say, it is constructed by norms, ideas, culture, perceptions so much that interests, concerns and identities of world actors are interlinked (Huysmans 2002; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). This posits human security within the “vocabulary of international relations” (Acharya 2004:355) turning this concept into a tool used to investigate the world but also, as Critical Security studies tell us, into “a signifier of shared political and moral values” (Mack 2004:367) of which we should be aware of “the play of signifiers” (Der Derian et al 1989:xvi).

In fact, since the last few centuries, mainly in Europe, the face of security has been the state, which has also been the face of potential threat: states’ armies were used to attack but also to defend, or to deter. For instance, the Cold War, rather than a war as such, was a mark of the century, a military architecture used as a backbone of the international order. The perceived order or security of the Cold War period was also a matter of deterrence while the perceived disorder or insecurity of the post-Cold War was a matter of finding new security management tools. However, the difficult task that states had to face was that it was not a matter of another type of state military/nuclear deterrence, but to respond to the right/need of people to live in an environment conducive to peace by providing them with freedom from fear and freedom from want (Thomas 2000). If we accept
what Dillon says that politics is about defining danger (Dillon 1991) or that “security is a form of politics” (Kolođziej 2005:22), it implies that danger is the result of a political interpretation which is subject to change. As Campbell said, “The source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten” (Campbell 1998:31). This means that there is a need to re-imaging “human subjectivity so that it is disentangled from the social contract and ‘governmental’ forms of power” (Burke 2007:19), and investigate what Walker called “the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our ‘humanity’ and a secure identity defined and limited by the state” (Walker quoted in Burke 2007:31, see also Walker 1994). This is why it is important to explain how human security considers the role of the state.

**Human Security and the Role of the State**

If we say that the security discourse in the 1990s was experiencing a crisis due to the changing geopolitical situation and that this crisis was “linked to the crisis of the role and the nature of the state” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:76), then human security is seen as a possible response. The ‘security for whom’ question led us to see individuals as subjects of security who devolve its management to the state. Etymologically speaking, being subjects (of security) means to be “brought under” (the security umbrella of) the state, but also be “the element about which the rest of the clause (security discourse) is predicated” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2001). The human security view puts at the fore front this latter interpretation, contesting the vision of individuals as passive recipients of (in)security and the state as the referent object of analysis (Pettiford & Curley 1999: 119). However, even if “Human insecurity is understood not as some inevitable occurrence but as a direct result of existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not” (Thomas et al 1999:4), what remained unchanged is the significance of the state we talking about security.

What is challenged is that human security rejects a narrow view of security considered as the monopoly of the militaries, and one in which threats, solutions and agents are to be found in the military domain only. Human security gives to individuals the thermometer indicating the arising and lowering level of threats to their dignity. As stated, “Poverty is conceptualised as a human security threat – not because it can induce violence which threatens the stability of the state, but because it is a threat to the dignity of individuals” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:9). The above definition changed the components of security: tools of security are not weapons but freedom(s), agents are not soldiers but politicians, development workers, individuals, and threats are not nuclear weapons but hunger and diseases. The aim is not to protect the national interest but individuals,
wherever they live. However, new and old components of security are not considered mutually exclusive, for instance human security does not deprive the state of its sovereign power and military capacity. The paradox with this concept is that defining what it is, is as important as defining what it is not. This double necessity is because this concept a priori appears to be utopian, even revolutionary and anti-state.

The literature focusing on human security seems to privilege the reading that sees concerns highlighted by this concept complementing those related to state security (Biekart et al 2005; Buur, et al 2007; Fouinat 2004; Klingebiel et al 2006). However, it leaves aside the analysis on how both these concerns are addressed, namely if it is in an environment of conflict; of compromise; of autonomy and reciprocate reinforcement; or if both issues fall under the umbrella of state’s concerns. The human security literature only acknowledges that a) state security without people security is precarious and inadequate (Des Gasper 2005; Gasüer & Truong 2005); b) that there is a mutual reinforcement of these two concepts by stating that human security is “the ability to protect people as well as to safeguard states” (Heinbecker quoted in Thomas 2000:5); and that there is a need to defend people from the imposition of state’s security interests (Kerr 2007). However, it was the inclusion of concerns raised by human security in the wider framework of human rights underlined by the Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003), and democracy, (Thomas 2000) that oriented the discourses and practices of human security towards a clearer focus. In particular, the focus was the capacity of democratic states to guarantee the sustainability of human development entitlements in a political climate characterised by the respect of human rights. This orientation implied a shift from individual liberties to a human rights approach to be implemented thanks to an internationalisation of individual concerns which are no longer the exclusive national domain of states. Security concerns, like development ones, became internationalised. This approach propelled human security right into the foreign policy of Western states, as development was, and this merging of human development-security concerns created a base for shaping foreign policies. However, the way out to avoid clashing against the international legally sanctified rule of non-interference was to make state sovereignty conditional to the respect of human rights by the state (Newman 2004).

I contend that this made the concept of human security even more political, or politically manipulated, than the one of state security. In fact, it called for the reinforcement of political identities (citizenship rights and human rights) by national and international policy imperatives. The individual defined by human security is a citizen of a state demanding protection from threats, and a human being demanding respect of her human rights (Dodds et al 2005). Perhaps this is the
revolutionary aspect of human security: giving the individual the possibility to move in and out the state-box in order to have her human rights guaranteed. What human security did was to de-link the citizen from the state when her human development entitlements are not protected. Therefore, the respect of human rights, as doubling the security net of citizen rights, was included in the human security sphere.

Human security does not imply that state security has to be primarily inward looking, leaving aside international relations concerns. In fact, it accepts business as usual for international relations up to when the human development of citizens in a particular state is respected. Furthermore, human security allowed its proponents to start a dialogue with the state that did not exist before. It stressed that state policies have to guarantee and secure the human development of its citizens. Thus, the state has never been taken out from the human security scenario. This is why it could more explicitly be called a human state security. Human security implies a much closer investigation of the capacities of the state, asking for a balance sheet of state’s capabilities, achievements and failures. It is awkward that a concept that is publicised for putting the individual at the centre of state’s polices, ends up by showing that a new theory of the state is necessary (Del Rosso 1995). In fact, while the interpretation of security has changed throughout time, the one of the state has not benefited from the same theoretical elasticity. It could also mean that a new concept of security has clashed against the old one of the state, shaking it. This state inadequacy could be explained by the fact that citizens have gained more (human) rights and therefore the state has to work harder to meet its social contract with its citizens.

When analysing state capabilities, automatically different categories of states appear: there are states fulfilling their obligations vis-à-vis their citizens and they are simply called states, with no adjectives attached; those not fulfilling their duties or doing it partially are instead defined by a plurality of adjectives such as failed, quasi-state, weak, and fragile (Rotberg 2003). Whatever degree of incapacity is pointed out by these adjectives, the consequences at domestic and international level are worrying (Kaldor 2007). The analysis of state’s responsibilities highlighted by human security shows two main issues: one is the urgency of addressing state security management through security policies that target state security actors while framing them within a people-centred vision of security; the other is the need to investigate the contextualisation of the human security paradigm as a product of the waning of the Cold-War, and if after two decades we have absorbed that change. This means that if human security was only a response to a geopolitical change, after the emergence in the last two decades of new geopolitical equilibria with the rise of China, India, Europe, we could expect the rise of other security paradigms able to guide policy
makers in dealing with the insecurity in contemporary international relations. One attempt of providing this guidance is the development-security nexus but it keeps the human security insight at the centre of its analysis. This means that not only human security remains a security paradigm for which there is an international consensus, but that it is necessary to investigate the relation between development and security.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has analysed the changing discourses of development and security and in particular it has focused on the significance of the formulation of human development and human security that emerged in the 1990s. The analysis shows that while both concepts share the human being as the referent object of their analysis, human development and human security still include within their discourses respectively the importance of economic growth as a means to people development and the role of the state as a means to people security. Both concepts focus their attention one on economic and the other on state management, leaving unchanged the primacy of market led economic growth and state security within their respective discourses. The novelty of these two paradigms is that they constitute a statement about the preeminence of the individual which implies that success and failure of development and security strategies are measured according to the enjoyment of freedom from want and from fear of individuals. However, while both human development and human security are powerful policy statements, in the 1990s they were not translated into powerful policy strategies. This will occur with the international consensus on the development-security nexus trend that is analysed in chapter III.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS

INTRODUCTION

The evolving significance of development and security has shown that there is a perpetual need to analyse the world we are in to better shape our existence and master our future. By the 2000s, development and security have both benefited from a long and complex course which accustomed policy makers to regard them as multifaceted concepts with manifold possibilities and usages. Historically, interrelations and overlaps between development and security were always recognised but they were mostly seen as disparate until the 1990s when the formulation of human development and human security brought policymakers to acknowledge that there is a nexus and interdependence between development and security.

Both development and security issues have been part of states’ domestic and foreign policy for decades (Buur et al 2007; Duffield 2001; Klingebiel et al 2006; Tschirgi et al 2010). The Marshall Plan, for instance, had the purpose to accelerate the reconstruction of Europe so that it could become a market for USA products; these economic ties would also reinforce the political closeness between the USA and some of the European countries, and later guarantee their participation in the NATO in 1949. A united Europe, whose embryo was the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and sided with the NATO military forces, was a clear sign of the power and successful outcome of development assistance when used as a foreign policy tool. The establishment in 1961 of the USA Agency for International Development (USAID) was indeed the consequence of this interventionist foreign policy that saw development assistant used as an auxiliary to international security concerns. The waning of the Cold War in the 1990s seemed to have opened the way for the de-politicisation of aid. However, at the beginning of the new millennium, the Bush administration officially included development, together with defence and diplomacy, in the USA National Security Strategy in 2002 and 2006 (White House 2002, 2006) by stating “Development reinforces diplomacy and defence, reducing long-term threats to our national security” (White House 2006:33).

This trilogy is not a novelty for the USA political discourse because security and development have been constitutive elements of their foreign policy for decades, and the search for better clarifying their link is still on, as it is demonstrated by a conspicuous literature (Broad & Cavanagh 2008; Clarke et al 2007; Collier et al 2003; Datta 2008; Dinello & Shaoguang 2009; Dodds et al 2005; Kingsbury et al 2008; Klingebiel 2006; Kriekhaus 2006; Mavrotas et al 2009; Picciotto & Weaving 2006; Rapley 2007; Willis 2005). The novelty of the current debate about the interlinkages between development and security is that it focuses on their “convergence in conceptual and practical policy terms” (Klingebiel 2006:1). Thus the current development-security nexus is a
product of changing discourses and practices that see development and security concerns as interdependent and their policies are used to reinforce each other.

I contend that there is the need to analyse the development-security nexus that emerged in 1990s and 2000s facilitated by the formulation of the concepts of human development/security which share some common features such as the centrality of the human being when addressing development and security concerns; their interdependence and mutual reinforcement in relating development and security issues to people, but also their need to have common strategies to implement these new development and security statements. Despite the development-security nexus public validation in policy terms by OECD, DfID, UNDP, World Bank (Collier et al 2003; DfID 2000; OECD 2007; UNDP 1994) the fact that both development and security are multifaceted concepts implies that “behind the current security-development nexus proposition, there are multiple layers of confusion, contradictions and policy dilemmas” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:39).

In theoretical terms this nexus means that development and security are no longer disjointed and have been de-territorialised. What I contend is that with the development-security nexus vision, development studies have a field of applicability which is no longer confined to distant (from Western states) territories. In the past, the places where the phenomenon of underdevelopment was seen as happening or where development was needed were too distant from the West, and development and security issues were framed according to the dichotomy in vogue so far: namely West/developed/secure vis-à-vis the Rest/poor/unsecured and, I would add, distant too. Indeed, it was the distance that was felt between the West and the Rest of the world that was one of the factors that hampered the earlier inclusion of development concerns within the discipline of IR. The development-security nexus theoretical trend is an opportunity to breach this gap and to reformulate the development and security problématiques with discourses and practices that encompass the division of the world built around patterns of power and polarisation of wealth. This opportunity deserves investigation.

I start my analysis by focusing on the evolving significance of the relation between development and security issues embedded in the concept of human security. The attention of human security towards securing the development entitlements of citizens, called the developmentalisation of security, led towards a debate on security entitlements of people, and responsibilities of states. The developmentalisation of security means that “a number of basic human needs have been suggested as being indispensable for the survival of the individual” (Buur et al 2007:10). However, human security does not only mean the definition of a level of subsistence for people but also “the absence of severe threats to them of an economic or political kind” (Stewart 2004:262). With this view
security is not only a feeling, a process, an action, but also it is contextualised within a political space characterised by the opportunity to enjoy a dignified standard of living without threats. From this we can see that the state is included in this new security discourse as an agent of security for its citizens, a security provider more than a security receiver. This is why I argue that the most important contribution of the developmentalisation of security trend to the development and security literature is the appropriation by the concept of human development of the language of urgency belonging to the field of security, while contextualising both human development and human security within the political space of state’s responsibility.

In the years 2000s the interpretation of the development-security nexus has been characterised by another interpretation of the relation between development and security called the securitisation of development. It is regarded as a response to the challenges of the international scenario which presents issues of economic exclusion and war as interlinked and coexisting (Picciotto 2004), in particular since the beginning of the new millennium when new patterns of international insecurity emerged such as international terrorism and internationalised civil wars. Despite no clear link between poverty and terrorism (Beall et al 2006:53), the vision of “underdevelopment as dangerous” (Duffield 2001:159) requested a new significance of the development-security nexus: development acquired conflict prevention objectives and was shadowed by security concerns. The recognition of the validity of the securitisation of development trend by policy makers happened despite a weak conceptual base, and they created a consensus for the implementation of policies such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) that address together development and security concerns under the assumption that there is no international peace and security without development and vice-versa (Sachs 2005; UN 2004, 2005a, 2005b).

While the concept of human security provided with a conceptual base merging development and security concerns, creating de facto the development-security nexus, the creation de jure of this nexus is exemplified by SSR policies (Fitz-Gerald in Klingebiel 2006:107). Their complex conceptual architecture tends to symbolise an inclusive policy discourse in which security and development concerns are dealt. From a theoretical point of view, SSR policies exemplify the securitisation of development trend and contextualise it within a wider development discourse, the developmentalisation of security. This double theoretical architecture, the securitisation of development and the developmentalisation of security, has created a situation of nested dolls which requires investigation. In this chapter I focus on the task of defining these policies through the academic contribution to the SSR field of study that reveals that the development-security nexus provides SSR with a multiplicity of definitions and objectives. SSR is regarded as a foreign policy
tool for donor states and a national policy tool for SSR actor states (Helly 2006; Hendrickson 2005; Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005) that aims at strengthening the governance of the security sector of the state so that its institutions can guarantee the freedom from fear to its citizens. However, when we contextualise SSR within foreign and domestic policies it is necessary to take into account that “Security relations are power relations and security sector reform changes power relations, among political actors in developing countries, and among foreign assistance bureaucracies in donor countries” (Brzoska 2003:48). The agreement about the need for this change and the expectations that it raises can be seen, for instance, by the reorientation of working methods of ministerial departments in the UK and the USA,\(^5\) and the creation of the SSR unit in the UNDPKO (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d.) that is devoted to create an appropriate operational framework for these policies.

The 1990s transformative decade also saw a change of theories and practices of international development assistance (Brzoska 2003). The analysis of the meaning of SSR includes the important contribution that DfID and OECD have brought to the SSR above all through their analysis of the interrelation between development and security (DfID 2002; OECD 2001, 2007). The speech by the ex UK Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short in 1999 is regarded as the beginning of the SSR era (Short 1999). On the other hand, the OECD has been very vocal in putting SSR among the agenda of member states, pushing for the creation of an SSR climax among donor states while not necessarily narrowing down the field of applicability of these policies.

Considering the internationalisation of development and security issues, I would rather define SSR as a select set of policies aiming at transforming the security sector of states perceived to be conflict prone and with which donor states expect to create international security through national security policies, and national development. This definition includes not only the four issues that I contend to be key in the understanding of these policies, namely: selection, transformation, expectations and perceptions, but also it situates SSR policies as part of the dialogue between political actors in the international arena that use SSR policies to frame development and security international assistance (Brzoska 2003; Le Roux & Kidane 2007).

What raises expectations about SSR is their flexibility to respond to a case-by-case target contextualised within a selected scenario of insecurity defined as pre or post-conflict, transition to a

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\(^5\) In 2001 in the UK, the government created the Conflict Prevention Pool managed by the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and DfID, as well as the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) (DfID 2003a; Ministry of Defence UK 2009).

In 2006, in the USA, the ex Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice appointed as a Director for Foreign Assistance Randall Tobias who is also USAID Administrator, reporting directly to the Secretary of State (See Rice 2006).
democratic regime, and so on. Moreover, the fact that these policies talk about reforming and transforming but not inventing something from scratch, the objectives are perceived as attainable. Indeed, perception seems to be another certainty of SSR, because perception influences the selection of the problem and the strategies to adopt by donor and recipient countries; the evaluation of success about the transformation of their institutions; the design of these policies by SSR actors and coaches; and the availability of resources and commitment of those involved in implementing these policies. Moreover, perception influences the vision that international security can be created by the construction of national security using SSR as a policy tool. This definition includes the interrelation not only between development and security, at national at international level, but also between national and international actors as we will see in the case study chapters IV, V and VI that address how the development-security nexus is operationalised.

THE DEVELOPMENTALISATION OF SECURITY

In the 1990s, the theoretical power of the human development discourse is shown by the developmentalisation of security and exemplified by the concept of human security (Buur et al 2007; Clarke et al 2007; Picciotto & Weaving 2006). This is identified as a theoretical shift compared with the management of development and security issues since the birth of development studies in the 1950s and the time when state security reached its zenith during the Cold War period. Developmentalisation implies the transformation of the term development into an action: -ation is a suffix that, when it is added to a noun, it makes it into a noun of action, having the same meaning, for instance, of the verbal substantive in -ing. Developmentalisation indicates that development achievements must be secure and sustainable. The significance of the developmentalisation of security is that development and security concerns must be addressed together because security imperatives prepare the ground for development and/or protect development achievements. This concomitance and interdependence of development and security gives the impression that there is a circular argument in which there is no more difference between the two (Suhrke 1999:271). However, the UNDP pointed out that there are linkages but also differences between the two when it said that:

In defining security, it is important that human security not be equated with human development. There is, of course, a link between human security and human development: progress in one area enhances the chances of progress in the other. But failure in one area also heightens the risk of failure in the other, and history is replete with examples (UNDP 1994:23).
The difference, as academics and policy makers pointed out, is that human development is regarded as ‘growth with equity’ while human security as ‘downturn with security’ emphasising the need to protect people when facing adverse situations (Anand & Sen 2000; Haq 1995; CHS 2003; Sen 1999; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 2009). Despite this difference, the danger to see them as “co-conditionalities” seems to diminish by emphasising the nexus between the two rather than questioning which one comes first (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:116). In any case, both were regarded as a response to the challenges, that unfortunately have not changed even today, that policy makers faced during the 1990s decade “Behind the blaring headlines of the world’s many conflicts and emergencies, there lies a silent crisis – a crisis of underdevelopment, of global poverty, of ever-mounting population pressures, of thoughtless degradation of the environment” (UNDP 1994:ii). This composite view called for a comprehensive response where development, security, people, the environment, the present and the future were all intermingled.

The developmentalisation of security evolved from the emphasis on humanity that emerged in the development discourse in the 1990s which led to a) the creation of the concept of human development; b) the introduction of the concept of sustainability in development; c) and the security discourse embracing the humanism of development to tackle its referent object of analysis, the state, by a different angle.

When Haq formulated the concept of human development, it listed four components: equity, sustainability, productivity and empowerment. He meant that individuals needed to have equitable opportunities in life which must be sustainable also for future generations; that it is important to invest on people to enhance their standards of life, but also that they have to be able to make choices about their life freely (Haq 1995:16). When he talked about future generations, he included the concern for the environment and its future, but also the necessity to have a type of growth that sustains the human being. This sustainability of “human opportunities” is also reiterated by academics such as Duffield who says that the meaning of development embedded in the definition of human security is the one of sustainable development (Duffield in Klingebiel 2006:19; WCED 1987).

However, I contend, while the concept of sustainable development looks at future generations, its link with human security accelerates the urgency to secure the development entitlement in the present tense. Even if Qingxin Wang and Curley said, “poverty is a security issue in IR” (Qingxin Wang & Curley in Thakur, et al 2004:73), it is not only a matter of linking the IR literature that focuses on space and territory with the one of development studies focusing on time, i.e. the stages of economic growth by Rostow, or the development vocabulary that talks about backward and
modern states (Pasha 1996:640-1). I argue that human security is also about time and not only about space. It implies the need to defend the dignity of the human being in whatever territorial state she lives, but also the urgency that sees the intervention (in various forms) to tackle her insecurity now, at the present moment. Security shares with poverty a concern about time, or better about the urgency to save lives in order to close the gap between life expectancies of people living in different parts of the world. This is why the UNDP said that:

human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity (UNDP 1994:22).

When the UNDP talked about the strategy to tackle this urgency it proposed an international relations model that required “mutual interests, not charity; cooperation, not confrontation; equitable sharing of market opportunities, nor protectionism; far sighted internationalism, not stubborn nationalism” (UNDP 1994:4). This statement highlights the ambition to have an international scenario which legitimises neoliberal economic policies by emphasising the validity of a free market economy worldwide. This quote shows the centrality that the developmentalisation of security interpretation gives to the market and to the state that supports these economic views (Dodds et al 2005). This consensus on the international neoliberalism for responding to development and security concerns centred on people could explain why the concept of human development was not subjected to diverse interpretations and critiques as for instance the one of human security.

Human development was based on enhancing people’s capabilities, freedom of choice, and it was contextualised in a political environment that supposed a democratic framework (UNDP 1990:16) and an economic one characterised by an “opening of market system” this to achieve equitable growth (UNDP 1990:62). The formulation of human development does not propose a different role of the market and of the state in the economy that differs from the existent neoliberal models for which there was already a consensus above all among Western states. The concept of human security, in this respect, was much more contested because even if it paid lip service to the neoliberal economic model, it scrutinised the role of the state not as an economic actor but as a political actor in its domestic domain. However, the developmentalisation of security does not represent such a radical change as it claims to be even if it introduced some novelties.

First, its study on the security governance capacity of the state called for the need to open up the state military box and see how it affects citizens. Second, it amplified the discourse of human
development and related it to the one of human rights and democracy, as the UNDP did when it looked “at human rights as an intrinsic part of development – and at development as a means to realizing human rights” (UNDP 2000:1), and when it affirmed that “Democracy is the only form of political regime compatible with respecting all five categories of rights—economic, social, political, civil and cultural (UNDP 2000:56). I argue that the developmentalisation of security did not make such as a radical change because the degree of urgency of solving the development question created a consensus about the need to tackle development and security issues together, but policy makers did not translate the concern for securing the development achievements of people into a political strategy used by states for shaping their national and international relations.

The developmentalisation of security trend was a statement, although powerful, about the urgency of addressing development. This urgency does not mean that it made the development-security nexus trend theoretically more robust: human development expanded the definition of development by framing it within a democratic and market oriented state which should also guarantee the freedom from fear of its citizens. The nexus between these two discourses appears to be the state rather than a direct link between development and security. This implied a business as usual for policy makers which could continue to use their development and assistance schemes because so far these were not contested. It will be at the beginning of the new millennium when state security faces new threats that the development-security nexus will receive a new interpretation. The urgency of answering the international security question led policy makers to privilege an interpretation of the nexus called the securitisation of development. This created a proliferation of policy literature despite a more cautious academic view on this subject (Duffield 2001) which focused on the side effects that the re-appropriation of this urgency by the security concerns might have on the urgency to answer to the development question.

THE SECURITISATION OF DEVELOPMENT

The interpretation of the development-security nexus through the lens of the developmentalisation of security responded to a state of the world where the majority of its population lived in poverty, as they still continue now. It set the targets – measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) – of development achievements to be securitised, and it designated the state as the agent responsible to guarantee the human development of citizens. While it clarified why development and security had to be addressed together, it left unclear where and how to intervene, above all considering the widespread dire living conditions of the world population. This was solved by an interpretation of the development-security nexus that provided the answer not
only to those questions but also to those that emerged in the 2000s, following new international threats which this time were felt by the “secure” developed world rather than by the “insecure” Third world (Beall et al 2006; Buur et al 2007; Nef 1999). This new theoretical interpretation is called the securitisation of development (Buzan et al 1998; Duffield 2001, 2007; Lipschutz 1995), and proposes the usage of development as a security strategy preventing conflicts.

By talking about securitisation instead of security, we mainly refer to security as an action, as a speech of act, as something that we create by calling it a security issue (Buzan et al 1998). If the meaning of security that is included in the development-security merge is the one of an action, it may also mean that security is regarded as a process rather than a product (Doty in Chafetz et al 1999). However, it also implies that development has been affected by this new conceptualisation whose constitutive elements are urgency, threat, fear. In fact, the development-security nexus trend reiterates the mutual dependence between development and security, as the UNDP affirmed “Without peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace is threatened”; however it is also based on the assumption that security “lies in development, not in arms” (UNDP 1994:iii,1). This implies that fulfilling development achievements is seen as a preventive action to attain human security; and security is essential to sustain development and peace. This creates the so called conflict-trap (Collier et al 2003).

The analysis of the capacity of the state to guarantee the development entitlements of its citizens, through the eyes of human security, found that development efforts were hampered by what was defined by the UNDP as an evolving “geographical pattern of conflict” in which poverty is read as the catalyst for war:

The geographical pattern of conflict has changed over time, with a clear shift in security risks towards the poorest countries. During 1946-1989 low income developing countries accounted for just over one-third of all conflicts. Over 1990-2003 low income countries accounted for more than half of the countries and territories that experienced violent conflict. Nearly 40% of the world’s conflicts are in Africa… (UNDP 2005:154).

This geography of conflict sees 22 out of 32 countries at the bottom of the HDI having experienced a conflict since 1990s (UNDP 2005), even if there has been a slight overall reduction in the number of conflicts in the last ten years (SIPRI 2009). The exercise of overlapping the mapping

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6 When talking about the securitisation of development I do not include in its analysis the militarisation of humanitarian action (Duffield 2001; Hoffman & Weiss 2006) because I draw a difference between humanitarian assistance and development assistance. While development and humanitarian assistance overlap in the realm of “classic” development activities (health, food, education, shelter), humanitarian assistance and related issues such as armed escort for humanitarians do not belong to the security apparatus reinforcement realm which is how the development-security nexus is mainly interpreted nowadays.
of wars and poverty is not per se a novelty, considering for instance the poverty level and destruction in Europe at the end of World War II. That wars cause poverty was then an easy statement to prove with post-conflict statistics on levels of wellbeing; the reverse was more controversial. The gist here is not to express causality between poverty and war as with the relation between development and security. The securitisation trend affirms that development should be included within a larger security assistance effort to prevent, or deal with, a situation of conflict on a case by case basis.

Since the 2000s, not only the geographical spectrum of development assistance has evolved but also the terminology linked to a geopolitical division of the world. This is shown by the almost disappearance of the term Third World from policy papers addressing the challenges linked to the fulfilment of human development and human security. This is because the usage of a big apparatus for representation and self-identification as was the case with the term Third World is at odds with human security and development concerns which focused primarily on people within states rather than states themselves. If security is what we define as such, it means that there is the possibility to securitise diverse issues such as the environment, migration and so (Lipschutz 1995). Thus securitisation reveals the “politics of security” (Patomaki 2008:17) linked to the freedom to choose what is and is not a security issue.

An example is that post Cold-War states no longer needed to accept the “geographical Third World” and other blocs of states as fixed domains of insecurity, but were able to identify threats to their national security by directing their foreign policies on selected war/trouble spots. The danger with this selection is that “securitisation can thus be seen as an extreme version of politicisation” (Buzan et al 1998:4). War spots were not only located in the Third World: in every continent, Europe included, there have been conflicts in recent times. However, conflicts in the Balkans and in the Caucasus region, for instance, were considered to be linked to a disappearing Deuxième Monde, (Hovhannisyan 2004; Woodward 1995), while other situations of violence such as in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country were managed as domestic law issues. The geographical selection of war spots was done together with an analysis of poverty, or rather of this new type of poverty imbued with conflict capabilities which required a combined development-security response.

In the 2000s, policy papers related to poverty used this term together with the one of underdevelopment (DfID 2005; ECHO 2006; Raddatz 2005; Rajan & Zingales 2000; UN GA 2001; UNHCHR 2001) giving to the latter a new fame, but this new publicity did not present it with its radical meaning. Policy makers started using this term as a synonymous of poverty and they took
for granted that Dependency theories lost their validity in theorising issues of development in the contemporary period, considering that the world division into core and periphery no longer corresponded to the new interdependence and neoliberal scenario. Therefore, they thought that the term underdevelopment as well had hollowed its meaning, and that they could appropriate it for describing a mechanism of war production rather than a result of a wealth mechanism production characterized by unequal relations between the world core and periphery. However, it has not been demonstrated that wealth production does not produce war, nor that underdevelopment is an economic or social mechanism producing war. Currently this term is simply used by policy makers as an attribute that adds a tone of tragedy to the description of poverty.

The shift from the developmentalisation of security to the securitisation of development is not simply a matter of reversing the relation between these concepts, from security to be developmentalised to development to be securitised. It is a matter of interpreting a different usage of development and security issues in international relations. Through the securitisation of development trend, the development discourse is included within the one of security. This can be seen as a response to an international security question as it is shown by the foreign policy selection of aid by states such as the USA and UK which, for instance, increased considerably their aid to Pakistan after the military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Aljazeera 2009; Clarke et al 2007). However, the securitisation of development has a weak interpretation of the link between development and security, how these issues relate to war, but also the limits of the policy arena of this nexus are not clearly spelled out, “creating tremendous conceptual as well as policy confusion” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:43).

In fact, the presence of war does not per se guarantee a foreign response under the aegis of the development-security nexus. For instance, conflicts such as the one in Somalia, Colombia, Sudan, Philippines don’t benefit from as much attention by Western states as other conflicts included in the Western security equation such as Afghanistan. So, even if the securitisation of development includes development issues within Western foreign concerns, it is underpinned by a Western interpretation of events from which the West benefits (Chomsky 2006). However, the securitisation of development has opened up and legitimised new opportunities for intervention in the international arena through a changing attitude towards the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention conditioned by the fulfilment of human development/security/rights. Thus, the combined rationales of the developmentalisation of security and the centrality of the state in guaranteeing human security/development rights with the securitisation of development and its emphasis on the usage of development as conflict prevention, sanctified the development-security
nexus as the conceptual backstage of policies addressing development and security concerns. One example of a policy response that deals with national security through a comprehensive human development and security approach is Security Sector Reform policies.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICIES

The changing nature of development and security as well as their evolving interrelations could only have resulted into transformative policy responses. One of this came under the banner of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies (OECD 2007). These policies are defined as “the development-security nexus policies” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security and Development Group, 15 April 2010) and are included, as Ann M. Fitz-Gerald said, within the “‘joined-up’ thinking on security and development” (Fitz-Gerald in Klingebiel 2006:107). Together with SSR there are other policies which are regarded as addressing development and security concerns such as justice programs, policies addressing institutional change and accountability (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14.05.10), and DDR, peace building, conflict mediation (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010).

Since the 1990s, when searching for responses to the national and international security and development questions various intergovernmental organisations and individual donor states started endorsing that there is a link between development and security (CHS 2003; Commission of the European Community 2003; DFID 1997, 2009; NATO 2003; OECD 2001, 2004; UN 2005b). As we have seen, this link was contextualised in different ways: the developmentalisation of security pointed out that the changing significance of development and security led to the formulation of human development and human security which centred both their concerns on the human being and in particular on the linkages between her “freedom from want and from fear”. The securitisation of development focused more on the “freedom from fear” and thus gave a conceptual orientation to policy maker to work on the security sector of those states prone to or emerging from conflicts.

By defining SSR as one of the policy approaches that addresses the development-security nexus, (OECD 2007) it means on one hand opening up these policies to many interpretations on what development and security mean, what political actors, processes and structures - national and international - can contribute to them. Moreover, it is an attempt to overcome the gap between the need of people to experience development and security and the elusive nature of these processes. On the other hand, the development-security nexus propels SSR into the agendas of political stakeholders as the most comprehensive policy tool for which there is an international consensus.
From the statements "Without peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace is threatened (UNDP 1994:iii) to "lack of SSR was one of the root causes of conflicts or their recurrence", by Jan Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic talking about the role of the UN in SSR (UNOG 2008), SSR have been recognised as a viable policy tool addressing development and security concerns. Indeed, various political actors use SSR to achieve broad targets such as regional security (EU), development (DFID, OECD), national security and post-conflict reconstruction (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004), international civil-military relations more attuned to democracy (NATO).

This consensus is “not so much about what SSR is, but about the need to initiate the process of SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010), this because of the normative weight of SSR. In fact, a norm is defined as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:145). The normative character of SSR is reflected in their contextualisation within the scope of promotion of democracy and human rights, good governance, accountability, democratic governance of the security sector (Edmunds 2007; Hanggi in Bryden et al 2004; Kinsey 2006). According to Fluri and Cole, this means that those “who deplore the absence of a clear definition of SSR and clear norms for its implementation fail to acknowledge its nature” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:165). This because “If SSR is a transfer of norms, then it is not to be mistaken for a rigid system of rules aimed at homogenising a nation’s values in order to better integrate and control it” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:165). Thus, according to them, SSR is a norm to which states are invited to subscribe, and it is the acceptance of the norm what counts “how they are going to meet the requirements of the norm is left to themselves, as long as they stay within the statistical field of good practice” (Fluri & Cole in Dokos 2007:165).

This view of SSR as one of the norms that regulate state governance management, blurs the definitional boundaries of SSR. Moreover, if SSR are seen as a policy tool that orients states towards the acceptance of a set of international norms it implies that, according to Nicole Ball “the term SSR is not helpful anymore, as an organising concept it might be useful, but in policy terms it is devoid of meaning because it has become whatever you want it to be” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010).

From various definitions of SSR that will be presented in this chapter, the general trend is that SSR are regarded, for instance by OECD, as a means to achieve long-term objectives such as development, security, democracy, peace. When we look at their practices, however, SSR policies have broken down the fulfilment of these ultimate targets in a series of narrower ones such as the
reform of the army and police forces; judicial and prison system reforms; IHL training of the armed forces; promote civilian management and accountability of security forces, and so on (Ball 1998; Ferguson & Isima 2004). I argue that the conversion from an ideal multi-pronged policies to a narrow sector-based approach is not simply due to ‘pragmatism’ as if this is the only way in which SSR can be made practical. I see it as a flaw in the development-security nexus itself because SSR, despite lofty proclamations of addressing both concerns, have never been anything more than a renewal of state security.

By having multiple narrow and broad objectives it implies that each of them can be attributed to a particular SSR actor, SSR policy space, SSR financial contribution and SSR agenda. Like the idiom “all roads lead to Rome”, those roads that so called responsible states (United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 2004:2) should use or endorse all converge to SSR. While the narrow targets illustrate the most immediate response that these policies aim at delivering, their conceptual source as well as the leitmotif and the ultimate goal of these policies is the development-security nexus (OECD 2007) which is, as we have seen, characterised by the same elusive nature of development and security and their interrelations. Consequently, as there is no one-fit-all definition of SSR there is not one way of doing SSR, or a unique way of assessing this process, its end, success and failure. This means that exploring the multifaceted nature of SSR requires taking into account that there are different perspectives that look at this set of policies which is increasingly framing international security and development relations within and between states.

There is not a unique “Big Bang theory” that explains the origin of SSR policies. When facing with the task to explain why we talk about SSR, each academic, consultant, practitioner working on SSR cites a series of historical events, posterior interpretations, or backs up current reading of world poverty and insecurity with policy reports and quotes dating back a decade ago, showing that despite the current novelty of discourses and practices around the development-security nexus the view of the OECD that “SSR is a relabelling, a more effective repackaging that leaves the governance at the centre stage” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010) should not be dismissed. A sample of the anthology of SSR voices illustrating diverse perspectives on these policies is listed below:

There are lots of origins [of SSR], but the core lies in an evolution from study of civil-military relations (Jackson 2008).

The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy stated that the goal of U.S. statecraft is ‘to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and
conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.’ SSR can help achieve that objective, reinforce U.S. diplomatic, development, and defense priorities, and reduce long-term threats to U.S. security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies beyond our borders (USAID & DoD & Department of State 2009:2).

An unreformed security sector may cause, or may not be able to prevent, a relapse into violent conflict. Without reforms in the security sector, public expenditures may be diverted away from reconstruction efforts, leaving the way open for corruption and further delegitimization of the state. These new challenges have stimulated a variety of development actors to pay more attention to issues related to security and the reform of the security sector (World Bank 1999:12).

The development rationale for security sector reform, and for engagement with the conflict and security agenda more broadly, is clear and compelling....Why security sector reform matters for development: first and foremost, security is a priority concern of the poor themselves. ... An accountable, appropriately structured and trained security sector can help to provide a safe and secure environment for poor people and communities...Second, the world's poorest countries will not make progress in development unless we do get better at conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building... Third, bloated security sectors constitute a serious barrier to the type of economic reforms necessary to reduce poverty (Short quoted in DfID 2000a:24).

The nature of the issues raised by these quotes is complex. To analyse them Brzoska, for instance, identifies four dimensions of SSR such as the political, economic, social and institutional (Brzoska in Wulf 2000) in which he includes respectively issues related to the civil control of security institutions; their appropriate allocation of resources; citizens security; and the professionalisation of security sector’s actors. Another attempt to organise a reflection on this issue has been done by Hanggi who points out three SSR contexts such as development, post-authoritarian and post-conflict context (Bryden et al 2004:11). The perspective taken in this thesis is the development-security nexus and how this is theorised and implemented through SSR. It has to be pointed out that the analysis of the Civil-Military Relation (CMR) literature and the way SSR have been framed by the development and security literature greatly contributed to addressing the research question. In fact, the insight from these bodies of literature that try to “make sense of SSR” has been used to approach the case study chapters on Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau.

**Defining SSR**

The initial challenge with SSR policies consists in defining them because of the multifaceted relation between development and security. Understanding these policies by looking just at their name reveals that they deal with security concerns, and in particular with a ‘sector’, which implies a distinctive and separate domain of competence. Therefore, a narrow definition of SSR could be a set of policy aiming at reforming the branch of the state dealing with security issues, and this has been done in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, and so on (for a list of UK funded SSR see GFN SSR 2007).
The vision of security that is embedded within SSR found an echo in the definition of national security given by Truman more than sixty years ago:

National security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and an air force. It rests on a much broader basis. It depends on a sound economy of prices and wages, on prosperous agriculture, on satisfied and productive workers, on a competitive private enterprise free from monopolistic repression, on continued industrial harmony and production, on civil liberties and human freedoms-on all the forces which create in our men and women a strong moral fiber and spiritual stamina (Truman 1947).

Despite this similarity with a larger view of security promoted nowadays (Fitz-Gerald & Lala 2003), the approach of SSR has come a long way from the 1950s interpretation of development and security issues. In those days they were indeed part of the wider picture of national security, together with democracy, the market economy and civil liberties, but they kept independent conceptual basis. On the contrary, SSR policies regard security “as an explicit development objective” (Damian quoted in Chanaa 2002:27). These policies recognise that security needs development and vice versa, and their strategies must be integrated (Lilly et al 2002): with SSR the merge of development with security is no longer an option but an imperative, following the novelty of the current development-security nexus view that regards them mutually interdependent.

SSR are broadly considered as “good to structure our thinking about development and security, but weak as a policy response” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security and Development Group, 15 April 2010). Considering the various conceptualisations of development, security and their interrelations, if SSR can structure how we approach development and security problems and how we respond to them, it is a welcoming step. One definition of SSR is that it is a “conceptual umbrella, recognising that security issues cannot not be excluded from development strategies” (Lilly et al 2002:1). What is new here is not these concerns gathered under this conceptual umbrella such as good governance, public sector reform, but the fact that they are grouped together, that more attention is paid to their interlinkages, and that they are seen through the development lens (Brzoska 2003; Hills 2000; Kinsey 2006; Smith 2001). This development lens embedded in the development-security nexus means that the emergence of SSR is indeed the recognition that the realm of security cannot be seen narrowly but it has to include how state institutions affect the individual and her enjoyment of development (Born et al 2002).

This implies that the definition of these policies has to take into account the broad meaning of development and security. However, a broad view of SSR casts some doubts about the feasibility of their implementation. As Nicole Ball said, “At the conceptual rhetoric level, SSR has become big, but in terms of actually doing anything positively on the ground SSR policies are small” (interview
with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). However, the question here is whether any policy ever lives up to its rhetoric and if this is the correct benchmark for judging SSR policies. This is why “It would be preferable to talk about the objectives of SSR, what these policies do rather than what they are. However, there is no clarity on the objectives, this is why there are different definitions of SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010).

When analysing some of the objective of SSR, it seems obvious that they aim at reforming the security sector of a state, as the title of these policies indicates. However, the definition of security sector, the spectrum of this reform and how it is contextualised within state governance, its objective(s), and above all if it is the adequate response to the selected problem, are some of the questions addressed by scholars, as we can see by the following sample of academic contributions to the SSR debate:

The two major objectives of SSR are to establish good governance in the security sector and to enhance a country’s capacity to develop systems of economic and political governance that benefit society as a whole and foster the creation of a safe and secure environment at the international, regional, national, and local levels (Ball 1998:20).

SSR promises to assist the process of building democratic peace by fostering armed forces that reflect and promote liberal democratic values (Bellamy 2003:107).

SSR is about the transformation of security institutions so that they can play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. SSR has been conceptualised as a constituent part of good governance, democratisation (Lilly et al 2002:4).

SSR aimed at establishing the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within the framework of democratic governance (Hanggi in Bryden & Hanggi 2004:3).

SSR focuses on the challenges states face in using the instruments of force in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals (Hendrickson 2005:6).

The security-development nexus has been perceived predominantly in terms of establishing, or re-establishing, public monopoly of security (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006:3).

Security sector reform can be understood as an attempt to connect, in one concept, the opportunities of expanding development assistance into security-related fields and the challenges of new demands on development donors, and to provide both with a common vision (Brzoska 2003:4).

The overall aim of SSR is the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens (Groenewald et al 2002:1).
The majority of the above mentioned quotes centres the objective of SSR on the ability of the state to exercise good and democratic governance of its security sector to achieve national and international security. First of all, it is necessary to clarify what the security sector of a state is. There is a general agreement among academics, but also among policy makers such as DfID, OECD, EU (Commission of the European Community 2006; DfID 2000a; OECD 2004a), that it is constituted by the following sub-sectors and bodies:

- defence and intelligence bodies: armed forces, intelligence services, coast guards;
- public security bodies: police, judiciary, correctional services;
- security-sector management and oversight bodies: such as ministries of defence, internal affairs;
- non-core security institutions: customs;
- non statutory security force bodies: private security companies, political party militias;\(^7\)

By linking the objectives of SSR with their spectrum of action, namely the security sector, one of the main challenges lies with the key word ‘democratic’ that appeared many times in the quotes listed above. This because we find ourselves in a catch-22 situation. Namely, do SSR create a

\(^7\) Research is needed to analyse the role of non-state actors in the security sector of a state and in particular of Private Military Companies (PMCs) (DfID 2002; OECD 2007). It has to be noticed that SSR literature distinguishes between PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSC)s. This distinction is a commercial label and not based on a legal definition, thus each company, state, scholar has a choice about which name to use, until a more appropriate set of definitions is formulated.

The OECD says that the definition of security sector, which also includes these companies, “has become established internationally” (OECD 2007:5), which means that nowadays the inclusion of PMCs within the security sector of a state is official. In this regard, SSR literature says that “Non-state actors are playing an increasingly important role both in assisting security sector reform, generally as part of an effort supported by a bilateral or multilateral actor” (DfID 2000a:4).

Despite their official and increasing role within state security, this topic is still under-researched. A sample of the need to have a further investigation on this issue is the analysis by Bryden and Hänggi of the contexts of SSR. In post-conflict settings they include PMCs together with other “key external actors” such as multinational peace troops (mostly UN-led); Western donor countries, and so on (Bryden & Hänggi 2005:30). PMCs are also included in transitional countries context together with EU, NATO, OSCE, governments, etc. (Valasek 2008:18). However, these scholars do not include PMCs as part of developing countries and developed countries settings.

Thus, if PMCs are external actors in post-conflict and transitional contexts, it means that they are housed in stable countries which include them as part of the SSR support operations in countries having a security deficit due to conflict or instability. Therefore, the absence of PMCs under the ‘developed countries’ context raises the question about the “home” of PMCs.

Furthermore, when the link between these companies and SSR is analysed, for instance in the OECD handbook on SSR, these companies are seen as a subject of reform rather than as partners in these reforms (OECD 2007). This sample of research on PMCs involvement in SSR indicates the need to extend the analysis on the role of PMCs as subjects and partners of SSR in contracting states and states where they operate. This to clarify their influence within the security sector of their home state, and their contribution to the reform of the security sector in states where they provide their services.

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democratic environment or do they need it in order to reform the security sector? Also here, there are opposite views: some says that “Solving the security problem is perceived to be a prerequisite for development and democratization” (Brzoska & Law 2006:4), while others say that “The political context that the SSR agenda envisages requires a democratically elected government with the ability to exercise control and oversight of the security sector (Chanaa 2002:29). In the following chapters I will address the question about the environment that SSR require or the environment that SSR policies aim at creating through three case studies of countries that have engaged in different terms with SSR, despite having different political scenarios and each of them aiming at changing it according to the need/will of the state.

Another set of words that appears in the definitions about SSR objectives relates to citizens and their security, human security and human development. This shows the will to unpack the concept of security following the analytical path initiated by the concept of human security and the need to make sure that while SSR focus on the state ability to govern its security actors, the result of this governance will be made visible by the degree of human security and human development enjoyed by the people. As far as governance is concerned, it is interesting to analyse the policy literature of SSR by DfID and OECD, both big promoters of these policies, and in particular how they address the governance of the security sector following the centrality that good governance acquired in the development discourse since the 1990s when it was promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions (Stoker & Chhotray 2009).

One issue that needs clarity is why only one of the above definitions, the one by Hendrickson, mentions human development as one of the objectives of SSR. If SSR are conceptualised within the development-security nexus which is, in turn, the expression of the merge between development and security facilitated by the sharing of a people-centred approach, it should be obvious that SSR have as their main concern people’s development. If development, and in particular its interpretation as human development, does not have a prominent position within SSR objectives, this puts into question what type of development is promoted by development donors. This is why the search for defining SSR also includes the view of DfID and OECD to understand how they interpret the weight and role of development in SSR.

While the academic contribution to SSR reveals that the development-security nexus which underpins the elaboration of these policies is multifaceted and allows for many interpretations, it has to be considered that the “links between security and development policies is the centrality of politics – both for problem identification and policy response” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:61). In this regards, the conceptual background of the development-security nexus and the multiplicity of
its interpretations mean that it can only be the source of an adjustable policy product that policy makers can adopt and adapt according to national and international political decisions.

One important aspect to be taken into account with SSR is that despite the current proliferation of SSR experts (DPKO 2010) and institutional expertise publicised by donor states, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, SSR policies represent a political process which is directed to change the political organisation, structure, orientation of a state (Brzoska 2003:48). Considering the “importance of local ownership in SSR so much that their future is regarded as depending on it” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010), the only actor that can say to be doing SSR is the state where the SSR process takes place. All the external actors intervening in “its SSR” as donors’ states, advisers and so on can only fund and/or accompany the process as SSR-coaches, but cannot say “to be doing” SSR. This raises the issues of the ownership of SSR, or better of the ownership of development and security. While the concepts of human development and human security centred this ownership on the human being and delegated its promotion and protection to the state, we will investigate in the case study chapters if the ownership question about SSR highlights that development and security are just a framework for donor SSR-coach states, a political mantra for the SSR-actor state, or an illusion for its people.

Indeed, considering the interpretation of the development-security nexus as the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development, one could see that both development and security are recognised as means and ends, but each SSR stakeholder chooses the most appropriate one within the multiple-choice of strategies and objectives of SSR. This allows for a flexibility that can take into account the needs and demands of a specific context. However, we might also face the “SSR-lottery” which will add more uncertainties to this policy tool because policy makers, and above all beneficiaries, will no longer know what to expect when the term security sector reform is pronounced.

The validation of SSR as a policy tool addressing development and security was also recognised in 2005 when the OECD countries agreed to make SSR activities eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) (OECD 2005a) this due to the fact that “donors’ support for SSR over the last 5 years have increased substantially” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010). If this extension of development cooperation to include SSR should not be a surprise, after all SSR are presented as fulfilling the development-security nexus, when the European Commission mentioned this extension it regarded it as an extension of ODA funds “to the area of security” activities (Commission of the European
Community 2006:6). This perception of SSR as a set of security policies that should be financed by development funds (Bellamy 2003) will be analysed in particular in the Guinea-Bissau case study. The problem is not lack of proportionality between development and security funds used to finance SSR, as these concerned are merged according to the development-security nexus which conceptually sustains SSR. The question is about the significance of development in SSR policies and about the recognition by development actors of the validity of SSR to fulfil also development objectives.

The DFID View on SSR

The genesis of the interest of DFID in SSR is dated 1997 when in its White Paper it stressed that conflicts hamper development, and that it is important to promote political stability and responding effectively to conflicts in order to reduce poverty (Ball at al 2007; DFID 1997). DFID stated that “Political stability both within and between states is a necessary pre-condition for the elimination of poverty” and that “Half of the world’s low income countries are suffering, or have just emerged from, serious conflicts” (DFID 1997:70). In the same document, among the initiatives proposed by DFID to address the root causes of conflicts, it offered to help “countries to develop democratically accountable armed forces” but also it raised concerns about “excessive military expenditure in developing countries” (DFID 1997:70).

Since then, DFID has produced a vast literature on the need for development actors to get involved in the security sector and on SSR as a policy tool to help advancing the development effort. In 1999, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short said in her speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London titled Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty that “I believe that a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed, is a key issue. We are therefore entering this new area of security sector reform in order to strengthen our contribution to development” and that, “Security sector reform is now firmly on our development agenda” (Short 1999).

The fact that it was the UK Secretary of State for International Development promoting SSR meant that these policies were seen as directly answering the development question. The link that she saw between the security sector and the development agenda was constituted by the necessity to defend and secure development entitlements from internal and external state threats, to prevent conflicts and human rights violations, and to have an allocation of state resources which responded to development needs. In this regard she affirmed that:
The overall objective is to help to promote stability and peace through making the security sector more transparent, accountable and subject to proper civilian control. Our aim is to make the security sector better able to play their legitimate role - defending against internal and external threats - in a way which complements our development and poverty reduction objectives (Short 1999).

Short’s conceptualisation of SSR is useful in reminding the development roots of these policies, and the development fruits that these policies are supposed to bear. This link with development was also included in DfID’s attention to the military expenditure in poor countries and how this influences development returns. As DfID pointed out, “Development expenditure in the social and economic sectors may not bear fruit unless the security sector fulfils its legitimate functions relatively efficiently and effectively” (DfID 2000a:3). The involvement of DfID in the security sector of a recipient state is permitted by the International Development Act (OPSI 2002) because DfID has stressed the link between SSR policies and poverty reduction. Indeed, this link and the support of DfID for SSR have been pointed out in its numerous publications during the last decade (DfID 2000a, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; 2009).

This literature recognises a link between development and security concerns and the challenge for DfID was how to implement the development-security nexus. DfID made several statements about what SSR policies are, offering broad definitions such as “SSR is a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognised democratic norms and principles” (FCO, DfID, MoD 2002:3). It also said that SSR “help governments of developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict” (DfID 2004:6); or narrow definitions such as “Security sector reform (SSR) describes the process for developing professional and effective security structures that will allow citizens to live their lives in safety” (DfID 2003:2).

What the literature on SSR by DfID tell us is not its search for the final definition of these policies, but the existence of possibilities for donor and recipient states to frame development and security assistance according to selected agreed concerns within the gamut of development and security. Therefore this means that the limits of SSR do not depend on the definition(s) of these policies, but on the definition of their context, namely the development-security nexus. The multifaceted definitions of development, security and their interlinkages result in different interpretations of this nexus as it can be seen by policy initiatives taken as samples by DfID in its
literature. In 2000, for instance, DfID financed in Ghana a meeting on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation to bring together civil society, politicians, and actors from the security sector to discuss security matters (DfID 2000:21); in 1998 DfID financed a study of the defence budget of Uganda to maximise the efficiency of defence spending (DfID 2000:33); in Russia it funded a program to put in place non-custodial alternatives with Russian Civil Society Organisations supervising non-custodial sentences (DfID 2002a:21). Another example is when DfID, together with Transparency International, funded “a group of 10 Chief Justices from Australia, Canada, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Republic of South Africa to develop concrete action programmes to reduce corruption within these jurisdictions” (DfID 2002a: 24).

However, by the variety of these examples it is obvious to expect that the strong promotion of SSR policies by a state development actor creates the expectation, among SSR beneficiaries, that development is indeed what SSR policies are all about (1999). Thus, the meaning and the size of the ‘development slice’ within the development-security nexus as well as how many and how well people will benefit from it is a central question that the development lens addresses when looking at the SSR policy design. Before doing this in the case study chapters it is also important to see how SSR policies and their links with development are seen from an international perspective: the OECD

The OECD View on SSR

The OECD is one of the most authoritative voices on SSR and has enhanced the promotion of these policies among its member states (OECD 2001, 2001a, 2004, 2004a, 2005, 2005a, 2007). Its literature is taken as a point of reference by policy makers working on SSR (Commission of the European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2006; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007; Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008) as well as by providing a definition of these policies:

The overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i) the ability of the state, though its development policy and programs, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed; and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being (OECD 2005:16).

This definition is conceptually rich because it spells out SSR objectives namely development, poverty reduction and democracy, and it clarifies that the agent responsible for achieving these
targets is the state. In fact, the state is asked to mitigate the vulnerabilities of its citizens and to prevent or address security threats. This approach echoes the one of human development and human security, with an emphasis on citizens’ vulnerability and state’s responsibility as far as addressing concerns related to development and security. Thus this definition, while talking about the centrality of the state in SSR, frames state’s actions within the policy concerns of human security. The centralising attitude of SSR towards the state is not at odds with the human security approach. In fact, what human security and SSR have in common is their critical view of the role of the state as a security provider (Law 2005). This OECD definition provides the basis for a discussion not only about the main features of SSR, but also about the OECD conceptualisation of these policies taken from its extensive literature on this subject.

The starting point for this analysis is the OECD interpretation of the concept of security and how it has influenced its view on the significance of development and the development-security nexus. I claim that the OECD proposed notion of security is presented as inclusive and conciliatory in character but is actually misleading in terms. The OECD asserts that the notion of state security is inadequate and that it must be complemented by the notion of human security. In its words, “The conceptualisation of state security has been expanded therefore to include peoples’ security (or “human security”, as coined by the United Nations Development Program). Discussions of security systems and security actors have broadened as a result” (OECD 2001:33). It continues by saying that “state security and human security are seen as mutually supportive and necessary” (OECD 2001a:34).

This view of complementarity recalls the definition of human security by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, which also stresses the necessity of “creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood” (CHS 2003:4). Therefore, the view that states and citizens have different but interlinked security concerns and that there should be systems addressing these concerns is nothing new, and derives from the human security discourse. This is why OECD also acknowledges that “SSR is a key component of the broader ‘human security’ agenda” put forward by the UNDP (OECD 2005:11). The conceptual debt that OECD seems to recognise towards human security is the one of having complemented the notion of state security. However, this view contains an antinomy which is not defendable in conceptual terms, also considering the centrality of the role of the state in the concept of human security. It implies that the task of SSR policies is to build a framework which would work as a bridge between these two
security concerns. However, this security collage is a very simplistic portrayal of the conceptual background of the notion of security (and development) carried out by SSR policies.

While state security is a concern that has grown together with the birth of the state, and which is still an inherent preoccupation of governments which manage it together with their defence department, the concept of human security has a shorter chronology. The conceptual novelty of human security is the inclusion, in the security equation, of human development. In fact, human security implies that the state has to guarantee individuals’ development entitlements, putting together the “freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (CHS 2003:10). This definition of human security bridges the gap not only between state and citizens’ security concerns, but also between security and development concerns. The vision of security put forward by the OECD is framed within the dichotomy human security vs. state security, and does not articulate an in-depth analysis of how to address the development component included in the UNDP’s vision of human security; it simply affirms that the state is in charge of it (OECD2005). The OECD uses the concept of human security to validate and justify its attention to the state security system of governance, and it shows proclivity towards the development discourse without assuming it as a policy responsibility. For the OECD, development and poverty reduction are built on the democratic governance of the security sector (OECD 2005:12). This link, however, has to be extrapolated more explicitly to attract development actors to get involved in SSR such as DfID and UN agencies (DfID 2002; UN GA 2008). A simpler view about the development and security vision embedded in SSR, is that OECD member states want:

to get value for money for development aid. They don’t want to finance a bridge if this bridge will be destroyed the following day. Donors’ money should be spent wisely, ensuring that the security architecture of the country enables development money to be spent in a way that is value for money (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010).

The OECD says that SSR policies are a response to a new concept of security which takes into account not only the mere militarised security management provided by armed and security forces, but it also includes other sectors of governance with the duty of guaranteeing the freedom from fear of citizens, such as the judiciary and electoral bodies, rule of law, prisons, and those institutions supporting the democratic oversight of the armed forces. The OECD also says that the aim of SSR is to create “accountable systems of security” (OECD 2001a:35). It is then necessary to investigate the link between the latter statement related to the target of SSR policies with the one when OECD
says that the aim of SSR is “to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” (OECD 2005:16).

This investigation starts with elucidating the presence of the term democracy within SSR objectives (Bryden et al 2004). The inclusion of this term could imply that SSR not only aim at securing the state’s means of force, but also at creating a democratic state. This is in line with the ex USA Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s transformational diplomacy credo ”We want to see well-governed democratic states. We don't want to see well-governed dictatorships, and we don't want to see poorly governed democracies” (Rice quoted in Harris 2006). However, I argue, SSR policies aim, initially, at a targeted democratisation, as they focus on the governance of the security sector of the state. Namely, SSR endeavour to have a state where there is a democratic oversight of security issues which should, thanks to a whole of government approach, makes the democratic echo audible in other state’s departments (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006). Surely, this objective is not feasible without having the whole state structure functioning democratically, but SSR use the security sector as an entry point to achieve the democratisation of the state. In this regard, SSR cannot impose a regime change but in the short term they can help stabilising a country through a much closer attention to the working methods of its security apparatus. In the long term SSR can only aspire to support a country towards building institutions which function in a democratic way for the security of people (Hills et al 2008; Knight 2009).

This attention to state governance is not new, considering the campaign on good governance by the World Bank during the 1990s and its inclusion in the stream of political conditionalities put on development aid to recipient states (Stoker & Chhotray 2009). This emphasis on governance is also not at odds with the holistic and people-centred approach to security professed by OECD (OECD 2005:58) and with the notion of human security/human development. In fact, the OECD stresses that the pillar responsible to create an environment conducive to development is the state. Indeed, SSR policies are directed toward state institutions; in the words of OECD, SSR is “a question of governance” (OECD 2001:41). By addressing the governance of the security sector, these policies allow the opening up to international policy makers’ scrutiny this once secretive state sector. However, more than this, it shows what the OECD means by the development-security nexus.

The OECD says that in SSR policies security and development are “inextricably linked” (OECD 2007:13) and that these policies maintain the validity of the development-security nexus (OECD 2001, 2001a, 2005, 2007). According to the OECD, SSR fulfil the nexus between these two concepts through the democratic governance of the security sector: it is the way in which security is governed and managed by the state that creates the condition for development, poverty reduction
and conflict prevention. In its own words, SSR should help the state in “developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors” (OECD 2005:13).

The emergence of this focus on state governance is not a surprise. As we have seen, the designers, the interlocutors, the implementers and donors financing these policies are all states. The apparatus of a state dealing with foreign issues (diplomats, specialised civil servants, state agencies dealing with international development, foreign office, ministry of defence, and so on) has been created to deal with its states’ counterparts. However, what has differentiated the promotion of SSR policies from other states’ policies is that they aim at making a difference not only at “state-level” but also at “people-level”, as indicated by their emphasis on the need to guarantee human security. This is why SSR programs include human rights training to security forces, police and prison reforms, respect for rule of law and so on (DfID 2003a; FLASCO 2007; GNF-SSR 2008). Despite having this human approach towards security, SSR focus on state’s capabilities and responsibilities and not directly on securing and fulfilling people’s development entitlements. What these policies aim is to “create a state that can address issues of human development and human security” (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security and Development Group, 15 April 2010), and this is why they focus on how states design their (security) governance. Thus, by regarding the governance of the security sector as a development issue, SSR policies are interpreted by OECD as addressing the development-security nexus. This view went a long way from the humanistic spirit that led to the elaboration of the concepts of human development and security and the effort to design policies that take both concerns into account. The significance and interlinkages between human development and human security, how they are translated into policy objectives, as well as how the impact of their implementation is measured, are part of a political process of which many citizens of countries in need of SSR risk to be excluded. This is why it is necessary to analyse the designs of SSR policies to see if they replicate a pattern of exclusion of (human) development and security needs whose urgency was vividly expressed, for instance, in the Voices of the Poor report (World Bank 1999/2000) which highlighted the importance of keeping a people-centred approach when talking about development and security.

CONCLUSION
The chapter has analysed the formulation of the development-security nexus, and in particular of two trends that consider development and security as interlinked: the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development. This analysis shows how various interpretations of
the links between development and security inform the conceptual backstage of Security Sector Reform policies. These diverse interpretations of the nexus hamper a clear definition of the conceptual boundaries of these policies, leaving to policy makers the opportunity but also the challenge to translate into practice the development-security nexus.
IV. ARMENIA: A DEFENCE REFORM THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

INTRODUCTION

Armenia can be considered as the Switzerland of the Caucasus, both having a mountainous, lacustrine, and landlocked territory, and sharing one of their international frontiers with a peninsula. Armenia’s current borders have been unable to contain the marvels of its ancient civilisation, of its scattered nationality and its historical heritage. The solidity of its culture has clashed during centuries with an unstable surrounding environment, as the Caucasus has been an area of confluence and contrasts (Libaridian 1999; Payaslian 2007; Suny 1999; Tololyan 2007; Zurcher 2007). Historically, Armenia has been a country located between empires such as the Romans and the Parthians, the Arab and the Byzantine and recently the Soviet and Europe, and found itself “as a vessel of fragile earthenware, obliged to journey in company with many vessels of iron” (Manzoni 1827:20). Thus, Armenia has been a country between empires, but also a country linking empires; a nation between clashing cultures, but also a nation linking cultures, and people. Perhaps that is why mountain Ararat, once the fulcrum of Armenia’s settlement, is said to be the place where Noah’s Ark landed. Armenia, then, has been a launching pad for a new beginning. In this regard, this case study investigates if Armenia also marks a new interpretation of current policies linking development and security.

The background of what makes Armenia into a case study is the management of its national security strategy permeated by its foreign policy of complementarity, which implies that Armenia has expressed the will to maintain friendly relations with all political actors in the region, overlooking their historical Cold-War divisions (Kapidze et al 2007). This 360 degree foreign policy means that its national security strategy and the orientation of its defence department bear the influence and the balance of power between the different players in the Caucasian region. This might be why, in recent years, security imperatives have led Armenia to choose a path of defence reforms which are supported by NATO. The aim of this case study is to analyse the language adopted by Armenia in designing its defence reform in order to clarify how this language relates to the one currently used in development-security nexus policies such as SSR.

The case study is divided into four sections: the first section summarises the history of Armenia and how historical events are still politically alive and influencing its foreign and domestic policies. This historical overview is necessary because it explains the historical origins of its current foreign policy of complementarity which also informs its defence concepts, strategies and reforms.

While the first part of the case study addresses the domestic settings of this reform, the second part addresses the political bridges that Armenia has built with intergovernmental organisations on
issues of state reforms such as NATO, EU and OSCE. From an analysis of the cooperation documents between Armenia and these organisations, I show that Armenia is not formally doing a SSR if for SSR we mean those policies currently understood to implement the development-security nexus (OECD 2007). This despite a series of SSR style-policies that Armenia is implementing such as: army reform (with NATO support); police assistance programme (with OSCE support); a reform of the judiciary and prison system (with EU and OSCE support). These separate reforms, while representing some of the constitutive elements of SSR, are not linked under an official, comprehensive, co-ordinated and crosscutting ministerial framework centred on the governance of the security sector. Among these reforms, I focus on the defence reform of Armenia and I question the language used to write it, and what this says about the novelty of contemporary SSR policies.

The third part shows one way of looking at SSR which is through the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) literature. In fact, as stated in an interview, “each set of literature or actor involved in SSR views SSR from different lenses” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). The CMR lens highlights that the language and therefore concerns of SSR are not a novelty because they were in vogue before the SSR-boom of the 2000s under the promotional launch by development actors such as DfID. The expanded meaning that SSR has acquired with the adoption of the development-security nexus perspective puts into question the language and concerns of contemporary state defence reforms carried out outside the formal SSR umbrella.

The fourth section focuses on the language used in these documents. The one adopted in the defence reform of Armenia is not included accidentally but it is linked to the reading of its national security, to the need to harmonise with the language used by democratic political actors in the international arena, and to have a document which is politically acceptable by NATO in its capacity of military adviser. The terminology used in the design of this defence reform with the support of NATO does not reflects a borrowing of the SSR-ism lexicon because this language and the concerns that it addresses existed before the current strong promotion of SSR policies especially by OECD, DfID and the UN. This language shows that there is a relation between what is now conventionally framed SSR by the OECD and previous policies addressing issues such as governance, democratisation and democratic control of the armed forces that had at their disposal only some of the language that is now used by SSR. As an academic pointed out, “a lot of the paradigm of SSR were things that were taking place without the language of SSR, before the language came in” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010).
By focusing on the language of the defence reform of Armenia and showing its relation with the terminology adopted by SSR policies, this chapter raises questions about the novelty of SSR policies and their underlying concerns. This investigation needs to be compared with ongoing and legally framed SSR policy settings and this is done with the other two case studies on SSR Afghanistan and SSR Guinea-Bissau in the following chapters. This comparison will help in investigating the current expansion of the pre-existing language of SSR due to the introduction of the development perspective in 2000s, and how this new expanded SSR vocabulary addresses the development-security nexus in countries raged by poverty, war and insecurity.

ARMENIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Locating the state of Armenia is easier than locating the Armenian nation which extends beyond state borders and includes few million of its citizens scattered around the world (Marsden 1994; Walker 2005). Moreover, the historical calendar of Armenia does not correspond to the political calendar of this country, which in different centuries named Armenia with a different title: Persian Armenia, Byzantine Armenia, Arab Armenia, Western Armenia, Russian Armenia, Transcaucasian Armenia, Soviet Armenia, Independent Armenia. While the homeland went through different political labels and forms of oppression/government, Armenians have maintained their distinct traits which were transformed, in modern times, in political consciousness and led them towards demanding a political recognised homeland (Panossian 2006). The history of the Armenians is more than a succession of invasions, battles and scrambles for their land between the great powers of the time. Among various historical related issues, it is interested here to point out few elements that in a subtle or more striking way seem to have influenced the current Armenia state and how it organises the governance of its defence sector.

One element is the location of the Armenians settlements. The area where the Armenian dynasties structured their governance overlaps parts of the current states of Iran, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkey. This region is usually referred to as Historic Armenia, in which dynasties such as the Urartu, Yervandunis, Artashesian, Arshakunis, Bagratuni exercised their power. This centralised power dates back 870 BC with the Urartu living near lake Van, but the people of Armenia were mentioned living in this area since the second millennium BC. Like today, history was made up of wars and invasions, but also of resistance and compromise. From the time when their governance structure started to be recorded, the Armenians’ realm bordered with empires which did not manage to wipe out their cultural distinctiveness. Not only Armenians resisted cultural assimilation, but also their political domination was only done through compromises rather
than direct rule. In fact, during the Roman and the Parthian period of influence over historic Armenia, the Armenian ruler came from the Armenia/Persian dynasty, but received its crown from Rome; during the balance of power between the Arabs and the Byzantine, the Armenian king received his crown from both of them, plus from the Catholicos of Armenia. This third crown on the head of the Armenian king is because Armenians were the first to adopt Christianity as their official religion of their kingdom probably before the Edict of Constantine in 313. This choice marked the distinctiveness of the Armenians not only among their neighbours but also, since the sixth century, within the church itself: the Armenian Apostolic Church became a unifying symbol which was strengthened by the invention of the Armenian alphabet in 404.

The creation of an Armenian literature served not only religious purposes but also permitted the transmission of the history and legends of this people to future generations. This history-saving was above all necessary at the beginning of the new millennium, when the equilibrium between empires in the region underwent a change. At that time, the expansions of the Byzantine and Turks dominions towards orient, of the Arabs and Persian northbound and the Mongols westbound, all converged on the city of Ani. Once the centre of the Armenian kingdom and crossroads of the Asia commercial routes, it was destroyed in 1045 by the Byzantine, in 1064 by the Turks, in 1236 by the Mongols, and included within the Ottoman Empire in 1579. This city was not only famous for its one thousand and one churches, and for having been the birth place of Shiragatsi, the famous Armenian scientist who centuries before Galileo put forward his ideas in the field of astronomy. The defeat of Ani and of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia in 1375 marked the end of the political Armenia homeland. Only in 1918, due to an empire reshuffling, the Armenian nation succeeded in having a state.

In the sixteenth century, the scramble of homeland Armenia between the Turkish Ottomans and the Persian Safavids, was one of the causes which pushed the Armenians into what it can be called the merchant diaspora (Marsden 1994:135; Panossian 2006:75). It was during this migration to India, the near East, Eastern Europe, Italy, that language, literature and religion became fundamental in keeping a unifying consciousness about their distinctive identity as a group. This became even more so at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when the massacres of about one million Armenians living in current Turkey caused an exodus of the survivors of the executions ordered by the sultan Abdul Hamid first and by the Young Turks later (Movsesian 2010; Nichanian 2006; Walker 1990a). These atrocities found in 1944 their linguistic translation in the term genocide which defines, which means it expresses but also it delimits, a
nation deprived of their relatives and their intellectuals: the deaths are voiceless, but their silence made history.

Nowadays, one of the many consequences of these acts of killing, acts of dying, and acts of surviving, is that their centripetal force tends to polarise and encircle diverse Armenian issues which are not directly affected by it. This might be because genocide, as the Armenian religion and alphabet in the past, entered into the political consciousness of a people who became a nation, and it has become embedded in their identity, creating political categories such as Armenians and Diaspora Armenians. This human tragedy has become a laboratory of identity for the Turks too: unable, unwilling to be part of a dichotomy perpetrator/victim, their denial of the acts committed almost a century ago might become, in a paradoxical way, a two-bladed knife, and cutting a part of their history which they cannot avoid coming to term with (Akçam 2004). Being unable to pick their memory cards, the current Turkish government controls a territory which includes much of the homeland Armenia and symbols, such as Mountain Ararat and Ani. The troubled relations between these two countries are not just a heritage of the twentieth century: it is still very much alive in their current relations and defensive strategies. Indeed, politics is the present tense of history.

The declaration of the existence and independence of the Armenia state in 1918 was the dawn of another era for the Armenians and, finally, for homeland Armenia too. This new political day lasted less than three years, the time needed for a revolution and a civil war in Russia to swipe out the empire and laying the foundations for the Soviet Union in 1922. In 1920 Armenia was declared an Independent Socialist Republic, in 1922 it entered the Transcaucasia republic which was soon included in the USSR, and it became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936 (Panossian 2006; Walker 1990a). Despite its short-life, this first Armenia republic was a political rehearsal for the Second Republic in 1991, and perhaps even for the events in 1988. In fact, Armenia’s First and Second Republic have one major common denominator: the armed fight for the independence from Azerbaijan of the territory named Nagorno-Karabakh, or Mountainous Karabakh, or Mountainous black garden or, as the Armenians call it, Artsakh, stressing the Armenian historical roots of this land with the Armenian nation state (Hovhannisyan 2004:12). The common start of the two republics under the banner of claiming the area of Mountainous Karabakh not only implies that the history of this conflict should be dated far back than 1988 when the authorities of Stepanakert adopted a resolution to be included with Armenia, but that in 1991 when both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states, the status of Mountainous Karabakh could no longer be in a political-limbo, or an autonomous oblast, as it was called during the Soviet period.
In 1991 the creation of the Armenian state was declared and soon endorsed by the international community. This state did not include territories and symbols of the homeland Armenian which were lost during a long series of treaties in the 1920s. However, even if Ani and Ararat became Turkish soil, for the Armenians the land which hosted the first library after the invention of the Armenian alphabet in 405 was inextricably part of the Armenian state: the Mountainous Karabakh became a full fledged war between Armenia and the people of Mountainous Karabakh, against Azerbaijan. The frontline of this unresolved conflict has been fixed since 1994, with the Armenia military in charge of Mountainous Karabakh which is now linked to Armenia by the Lachin corridor, and of a part of Azerbaijan territory surrounding Mountainous Karabakh.

One of the elements which stands out when studying this conflict is that in Armenia the National Armenian Movement (ANM), a political party from Nagorno-Karabakh, gained in 1991 the majority in the Soviet Armenia and led the country towards its declaration of independence. Its leader, Levon Ter-Petrosian, was its first president until 1998, when he resigned. The other successive Presidents, Robert Kocharian and the current Serzh Sargsian are all from Nagorno-Karabakh. This emphasises how embedded this conflict is in the political life of Armenia. Serzh Sargsian, of the Republican Party of Armenia, was elected president in February 2008. These elections were contested by the opposition and violence spread in Yerevan causing the dead of eight people and numerous arrests (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). The system of government in Armenia is à la française with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system in which the president's actions are limited by the parliament: if the majority party in parliament is not the one of the president, the room of manoeuvre of the latter is very much reduced (Libaridian 1999, 2000).

Thus, the complexity of Armenia national security is due to manifold issues, both internal and external (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007). First of all, there is the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh area which dates back since the Russian empire and Soviet time. A military stalemate has been maintained since 1994 and a political solution, linked or not to a new military confrontation, is still out of sight (De Waal 2003; Hiscock et al 2003, 2007a, 2008a; Libaridian 1999; Mehtiyev 2005). Adding to this is lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey, despite latest developments (Republic of Armenia & Republic of Turkey 2009); lack of energy sources which makes Armenia depending on Russia and Iran; and a need for economic partners to promote national economy and raising citizens’ standards of living. These are some of the issues which brought Armenia to pursuit a foreign policy of complementarity which aims at avoiding taking side between Eastern (Russia) and Western (European Union/USA) partners and having relations with them all. This policy is rooted in the country’s decision to use its geographical and
geopolitical position to get the best from the military and political vestiges of all sides of the Cold War. Armenia’s national defence strategy, the subsequent defence reform and military doctrine are shaped by this panoptic view of its national security.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE DEFENCE REFORM

The independence achieved in 1991 managed to partially solved “the Armenia question”, but raised the “Armenia security question”. National security is an inherent preoccupation of all countries, and how they respond to it permeates the orientation of their domestic, foreign, and security strategy policies (Giragosian 2005, 2006). The defence department is the one in charge of the military defence of the territory of a state and of any other targets relevant for national security. Defence policies are then born and bred out of the wider foreign policy of a state, of its relations with other states, and of its analysis of vulnerability, domestic and international. The choice of Armenia to implement a defence reform with the involvement of NATO is an example of the political links that this country has built with other states and intergovernmental organisations as part of its international relations. To do so, Armenia needed to use a common language with its political international stakeholders. Before analysing if the language used by Armenia aims at bridging a Cold War military divide or a policy divide, namely between a defence reform and current more holistically designed SSR policies, we need to investigate the legal framework of its defence reform. The search for sources about Armenia’s defence reform stretches across various political, economic and military agreements that Armenia has signed with some major actors, in particular Russia, European institutions, and NATO.

Soon after having acquired political independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia started a policy of integration into various international and intergovernmental organisations, taking advantage of the opportunity to have become a member of the international community of states. Firstly there was the inclusion within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, followed by the inclusion with the UN in 1992, and in the same year with the Collective Security Treaty which was named Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 2002. Once Armenia’s sovereignty rights and military backup were all guaranteed, the country initiated a diversification of its foreign policy stakeholders.

The road leading towards a dialogue with the European Union started in 1996, when Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (European Union & the Republic of Armenia 1996), followed by the adhesion in 2001 to the Council of Europe. A more prominent engagement with the institutions of the European Union was its adherence to the European
Neighbourhood Policy in 2006 (Commission of the European Community 2005; European Commission 2007; Government of the Republic of Armenia 2007; Hovsepyan & Khudaverdyan 2006). This policy engagement was marked by the redaction of a country report (Commission of the European Community 2005a) and an Action Plan for reforming Armenia’s institutions in order for them to achieve European standards (European Commission 2006, 2006a; European Commission’s Delegation to Armenia 2008; European Commission & the Republic of Armenia 2006). The objectives of this plan are to strengthen national democratic structures and respect for human rights; the rule of law; reforming the judiciary; fighting corruption; enhancing poverty reduction and sustainable development. These objectives are also reiterated in the Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (European Commission 2006); in the Country Program 2007-2010 (European Commission 2006a), and in the progress report of the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission 2007).

Since 1992, Armenia has also held a parallel dialogue with OSCE (OSCE Office in Yerevan 2007). Since 2000, OSCE has opened an office in Yerevan and initiated a fruitful collaboration with Armenia in a plurality of fields such as: training of the National Assembly expert staff; police assistance programs; armed forces and legislative reform; human rights awareness; promoting media freedom; promoting economic development in distant and rural areas of Armenia and so on (Council of Europe 2003; OSCE Office in Yerevan 2007, 2008). Despite the promotion of these programs there is no mentioning in these documents that Armenia has initiated a SSR program with the support of OSCE, as also confirmed by an OSCE official (private email correspondence with OSCE official 24 July 2008).

These programs in the field of security have not affected the military alliance that Armenia has with Russia, also considering that Armenia does not intend, for the time being, switching its military patron and joining NATO. However, the Western-looking foreign policy of Armenia and the Eastern-looking expansionist policy of NATO have led to the signing of a Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement in 1994 which was followed by the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2005 and other collateral agreements such as Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIP) (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2005, 2007). The IPAP contains sets of broad orientations for reforms in many institutional spheres such as political-security issues, defence, civil emergency planning, public information and so on. The aim was to set the tone for the type of state functioning institutions that Armenia had to develop to facilitate its institutional dialogue not only with NATO.
but with the European Union. In fact, the type of security-management recommended by NATO is implemented and guaranteed by the type of state-democratic-management recommended by the EU.

These agreements with NATO have constituted an opportunity for Armenia to take advantage of NATO expertise in the domain of defence, without forgetting that the ultimate objective of NATO’s recommendations for defence reforms is linked to international stability and to the availability of a pool of military personnel with adequate military standards for participating in NATO’s mission (Fluri & Lunn 2007; NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2007). The national security concerns rest with the country itself. These agreements also constitute supporting documents of the legal framework of the Armenia defence reform (NATO 2006) which includes the national security strategy, the military doctrine and defence legislation (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007, 2007a, 2007b), as confirmed by the Armenian military representative at NATO (personal communication with the Armenian military representative at NATO 7 July 2008). However, the echo of the construction of a national legal framework for a defence reform is only heard within the Ministry of Defence. In fact, in the elaboration of other national policy papers for implementing institutional reforms there is no mentioning of this defence reform, or how its implementation might affect or indeed necessitate the involvement of other ministries.

One example is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulated in 2003 by the government of Armenia (Republic of Armenia 2003) and which has been monitored by the IMF (IMF 2006, 2008a). The PRSP opening page identifies poverty and inequality as threats to national security, and lists a series of national reforms to reduce poverty. However, it does not mention the need for adopting policies which address the development-security nexus and this is also why Armenia has not updated its PRSP by including comments related to the new National Security Strategy, as we will see in the case study on Guinea-Bissau. The document which says to bring together priorities and concerns of both the National Security Strategy and the PRSP is the latest Armenian government’s program for 2008-2012 (Republic of Armenia 2008). However, it does not specify how the reinforcement of the army’s fighting capacity relates to poverty concerns. This separation between national defence and poverty reduction concerns demonstrate the policy isolation of this defence reform, in stark contrast with the current SSR approach. Despite the difference between these two policy approaches, their sharing of a common language makes necessary an investigation, through the lens of the Civil-Military Relations literature, into the significance of bridging this policy divide by their adoption of a mutual technical wording.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS LITERATURE PERSPECTIVE ON SSR

The 1990s can be regarded as a transformative decade in the sense that there was a reshuffling in the way political relations were manufactured within and outside state’s borders. With the waning of the Cold War and the opportunities of regime change that it originated (Beall et al 2006), it became even more important to study the relation between democratic institutions and democratic politics, or between the political framework which should sustain SSR and how SSR can create this framework (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder in Bryden et al 2004; Luckham et al 2000). In particular, in the 1990s there was the enlargement of NATO and the vision that future member states had to reform at national level their civil-military relations, so that they could be part of this so called military alliance of liberal democracies (Williams 2001:543). The opportunity for a new set of political and military national and international relations led to the necessity to have a common vision about their orientation. This spurred policy makers to promote democratic governance (Youngs 2001) as the political framework that guarantees peace and respect of human rights, and to include SSR concerns, if not SSR policies properly titled, within this set of political/military norms for which there was a consensus. In this context, the Civil-Military Relations literature contextualises SSR policies within the evolution of international political and military relations influenced by the geopolitical events of the 1990s.

The process to support this democratic governance has been defined in various ways, i.e. defence diplomacy, security sector reform, democratic control of the armed forces (Forster in Born et al 2002:29). Despite the label given to these political initiatives, they all aim at altering the civil-military relations both at national and international level and informed them by the democratic ideal. The literature on defence diplomacy says that a shift has occurred in the military foreign policy of Western states in the 1990s due to the change of geopolitical equilibria in Europe and in the rest of the world (Cottey & Forster 2004; Carter & Perry 1999). The implication of this change, it is claimed, is that Western military assistance could started to be used:

to provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MoD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution (Ministry of Defence UK 2001:2).

Within this new set of tasks also defined as “other defence diplomacy activities”, assigned to the ministry of defence, SSR is included (Hills 2000:47).

The wind of change that accompanied the 1990s was sustained by the credo that democracy was the only legitimate form of governance and that global security could be “based on shared
democratic values” (Cawthra & Luckham 2003:3). The enlargement of the EU and NATO and the
democratisation process that it entailed are seeing as the validation of these values (Chanaa 2002;
Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009; Slocombe 2007; Spence & Fluri 2008). The reform of the security
sector of those states aspiring for EU and/or NATO membership was included in this process
(Kummel in Cole et al 2005:195) despite the lack of a thorough analysis of the impact of the
political conditionalities for their adherence to these new institutions (Edmunds 2003). This wave of
democratisation was a complex political process which implied a process of recognition, by the so-
called “liberal-democratic security community” exemplified by NATO (Williams 2001:543), of the
democratic-degree of the political structures of aspiring member states. However, when talking
about reform of state structures it should be taken into account that “any process of reform must
take place within - and interact with - the transforming political, economic and societal realities of
the society in which it occurs” (Edmunds 2007:10). This is why the 1990s transformative decade
saw an increased interest in civil-military relations whose essence “lies in the ideological
perceptions of what a political system, or regime, should be” (Edmonds 1988:136).

The literature on Civil-Military Relations is vast and embraces all sets of relations between the
civil component and the military forces within a political community, national or international
(Forster 2006). This includes not only how to guarantee a democratic control over these forces, but
also how to use them to “sustain democratic values” (Burk 2002:22). The democratic control of
armed forces includes “the non-involvement of the military in domestic politics; democratic control
of defence policy…and democratic control of foreign policy” (Cottee et al 1999:3). These aspects
emerged as a central question for those states aspiring to shift military alliance in the 1990s; but
also as a central question to which NATO was brought to the fore to support these states in this
process. This pushed for the expansion of the civil-military relations focus from the state to the
international.

This set of literature regards the democratic control of armed forces “in terms of political control
of the military by legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state” (Cottee et al 2002:6).
However, democratisation is a process of reforming state’s structure, and this is why the narrow
focus of the democratic control of the armed forces should be replaced by a focus on the
“democratic governance of the defence and security sector” (Cottee et al 2002a:31) in order to give
a comprehensive policy framework to countries in transition from authoritarian states or conflicts
which are engaged in this process (Baker 2010; et al 2006; Vankovska et al 2001).

The literature on Civil-Military Relations, which devotes to the study of the reforming of states’
security sectors in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, prizes the role of NATO in the
construction of the political framework of SSR. In particular, NATO enlargement is seen as the launching pad of SSR in Europe, so much that it is said that “It is difficult to see how SSR would have appeared in the Euro-atlantic region absent the enlargement of the alliance” (Law 2007:111). This statement takes for granted that NATO’s rules for memberships and the type of civil-military relations that aspiring states were required to achieve were synonymous with the SSR norms (Law 2007: 107). This assumptions, however, does not take into account the evolution of the significance of SSR since 1990s, in particular since when SSR have been part of the development domain as well as the security domain. As Hendrickson said:

SSR are not a new version of civil-military relations. Civil-Military Relations only address one component, the military, while SSR give a broader concept to these relations. We can say that SSR address the limitation of Civil-Military Relations (interview with Dylan Hendrickson 15 April 2010).

Nowadays we talk about these limitations because the development-security nexus perspective regards as inadequate a discourse on security which focuses mainly on the management of armed forces without underlying its links with state governance capacity in general, and the creation of an environment where human development/security/rights are respected. These limitations are now felt because the development-security nexus lens has enlarged the policy context by recommending a holistic approach to governance.

Therefore, while in the 1990s it was still possible, as academics did, to talk about NATO’s SSR and distinguish between first and second generation SSR (Edmunds 2007) now this distinction needs to be more contextualised due to the expansion of the meaning of SSR into the development field. This is what has emerged from a discussion with military practitioners at NATO when they say that “NATO does not do SSR and that there are no countries doing SSR with NATO, but only defence reforms” (interviews with NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010). As they point out, “it is difficult to find a definition of SSR in NATO”. According to them this is because NATO is a military organisations and cannot implement the holistic set of policies that now constitutes SSR. They say that NATO deals only with military aspects of defence reform, but they recognise that there is an overlapping between NATO defence reforms and SSR: for them NATO can do defence reforms inside the umbrella of SSR. One clear issue for them is that “the ownership of SSR must stay with the host nation, while NATO can only support the military aspects of a state defence reform”. The distance that NATO is taking from SSR is that according to them now “SSR have become too broad due to the inclusion of development concerns”. When in 1994 NATO enlargement under the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) program was established, the set of reforms for
the defence sector of aspiring member states was not called SSR. In fact, the interviewers say, SSR “was never included in the NATO language; what we talk is only about technical military support to defence reform”. Therefore, documents such as Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Planning and Review Process (PARP), Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIP) are not considered to support SSR but only aspects of a defence reform which may or may not be under the SSR banner. As stated during another interview, NATO does not use SSR but talks about “military aspect of Security Sector Reform” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010). This means that concerns and the language that now belong to SSR existed before the promotion of these policies in the 2000s by development actors, and that they can still be addressed outside the current enlarged policy framework of SSR, as Armenia does.

THE LANGUAGE OF ARMENIA’S DEFENCE REFORM

Many people might question if Armenia is implementing a defence reform, a SSR, or a concoction of initiatives which goes untitled (Avagyan & Hiscock 2005; BICC 2005, 2005a). Sometimes, the same fact can be examined through “a looking glass”, and therefore “‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things’” (Carroll 1871). Armenia is not implementing SSR policies if these are conceptualised in a holistic sense that incorporates the development-security nexus as their mantra. It is not under investigation here what the constitutive elements of Armenia state security are or should be, according to Armenia’s military strategies. The reason the defence reform of Armenia is considered as a case study is that it has adopted some of the language that is now used in the design of policies called SSR which have recently acquired a more enlarged focus of applicability due to the inclusion of a development perspective within the security domain of the state. This raises questions about the significance, the compulsion, and the reason for using this language to addresses a narrower part of the contemporary SSR policy framework. The choice between the narrower and broader policy framework is a domestic political decision that was not analysed here because the purpose of this case study is to analyse the language of the defence reform and not to do an assessment on security sector actors of Armenia and see if they should reform through a SSR framework.

The Armenia’s defence reform is the logical outcome of the National Security Strategy which was approved in 2007 by the government. According to this document, some of the pillars upon which the national security strategy of Armenia rests are an efficient system of governance; the rule of law; a consolidation of democratic values; an independent and impartial judiciary;
comprehensive social justice. Besides, there are those pillars which are linked to the army’s capabilities *per se*, such as adequate fighting capacity of the armed forces, and efficient law-enforcement structures (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007). The analysis of internal threats to national security lists as examples: an ineffective judiciary system which does not guarantee the rules of law; insufficient level of democracy within state structures; polarisation of wealth; lack of education. Therefore, what is said to constitute the Armenia’s security question is not only a direct military threat, such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also poverty and an inadequate guarantee of the rule of law.

The Military Doctrine provides with a more in depth look at the principles and goals of the defence reform (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007a). Its reading shows an anatomised analysis by the Ministry of Defence of the national security strategy to ensure an adequate and prompt response to those threats identified in the latter document. In the section titled “The Reforms in the Military Security System” it is stated that the objective of these reforms is to have a “modern Military Security System based on democratic fundamental principles of civil control”, and capable to protect Armenia’s national security. The document points out the need for the civilian control of the armed forces, and the civilianisation, wherever possible, of the defence department. These two issues, modernisation and civilian oversight of the militaries, were already included in the policy dialogue that Armenia has held with NATO since 2005 and are also reiterated in the public informing conception of the MoD which frames the presentation of the defence reform to the public (Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007b).

For Armenia, defence reform was one of the items in the agenda which has shaped the dialogue with NATO (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006). It has to be pointed out that as far as a defence reform is concerned, there is no agreed definition within NATO on what precisely it means. However, it usually implies:

defence restructuring and reform of defence management practices and institutions;
development of defence capabilities required to meet both new and traditional defence-related challenges; and actions that will increase countries’ ability to contribute to NATO-led crisis response operation (Katsirdakis in Gyarmati et al 2002:190).

The objectives of the defence reform of Armenia are “defence and wide-scale political institutional reforms, modernizing its security structures, defence and crisis management, ensuring military interaction with its Euro-Atlantic partners” (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2007). The defence reform framework is outlined in the IPAP and in other documents such as PAP-DIP (Fluri & Bucur-Marcu 2007; Lunn 2000). After having
submitted the IPAP agreement, “In December 2005 NATO accepted Armenia's plan for defence reform” (Mher 2005; NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006). In this document, Armenia stated its commitment to reform the defence ministry and it included training, modernisation of means of communication, improvement of planning, participating in NATO operations, and so on (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2007). The defence tout court objectives of this perestroika of the defence sector in Armenia is complemented by others such as the amelioration of the democratic control of its armed forces, increasing civilian participation in the designing of defence policies for which seminars were organised (European Center for Security Studies George C. Marshall 2007; Ministry of Defence of Armenia 2007c; NATO 2006; PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies 2008). The government of Armenia has also included a section titled “Democracy, human rights, rule of law and fighting corruption” which contains a series of reforms of the electoral system, the judiciary oversight of the defence sector, and freedom of the press.

The usage of this choice of language shows two things: 1) this language makes politically acceptable the advisory support of NATO in a defence reform which is not to build the military capacity of state armed forces but to support their democratic governance (as pointed out during an interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). 2) This language does not belong exclusively to contemporary SSR holistically defined by the OECD, so there is no policy perfidy by Armenia in its defence reform. The language is confined to a defence reform without the holistic frame of SSR but it does not reflect a borrowing of the SSR-ism lexicon because the concerns now addressed by SSR policies were present also in the 1990s when they were not called SSR - a view also shared by Nicole Ball and Robin Luckham during their interviews. So this pre-existing language continues to be used nowadays even when it does not address the broad field of applicability constituted by the development-security nexus which supports the current promotion of SSR policies.

As far as the first point is concerned, the involvement of NATO in the defence reform of Armenia can be seen as a “renaissance of the issue of the democratic control of armed forces” (Born et al 2004a:13) after the convergence of discourses on democracy and governance in the post Cold-War climate of the 1990s (Hänggi et al 2003; Pevehouse 2002). During the time of major changes of international security patterns, the issue of membership to NATO and/or EU for countries formerly under the Soviet sphere of influence was one element that encouraged the democratisation process in Eastern Europe (Epstein 2005; Hodge et al 1999; Kernic et 2002; Wallace 1999). The PfP
program of NATO was one of the tools that NATO used to promote democracy, as stated in its PfP manifesto:

This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership (NATO 1994).

The PfP objectives also included the promotion of the “democratic control of defence forces” (NATO 1994), and this objective of creating defence institutions that promote democratic civil-military relations is also stated in the PAP-DIP program that NATO launched in 2004 (NATO 2004). As we have seen, Armenia signed for all these programs: the PfP, the PARP, PAP-DIP and IPAP. Considering the non availability of some of these documents, as confirmed by an Armenian official at NATO who said that “PARP and some national plans are restricted and cannot be delivered to public” (personal communication with an Armenian military representative to NATO 7 July 2008), the document that could be investigated was the IPAP. In the IPAP NATO document (Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2005), the democratic control of the armed forces is the first objective to be mentioned in the section titled “Defence security and military issues”, despite having had a full section dedicated to it in another part of the same document. According to the National Security Strategy, the first pillar of national security is an “efficient system of governance” and it continues by listing the rule of law and an independent and impartial judiciary system. Without entering in a debate about the role of these pillars within the Armenian national security, it does seem awkward that in a National Security Strategy, which was also part of the NATO-package of defence reform, the armed forces are mentioned as a pillar of state security only after the judiciary system. While the pole position for the role of the army in the state security assets is by no means an indication of an aggressive foreign policy, this listing in the Armenia security strategy, a country currently at war with Azerbaijan, seems bizarre, especially if compared with the opening statement of the 2006 USA National Security which says that “America is at war” (White House 2006).

During the 1990s decade, several countries experienced a “transition towards democracy” which called for a more in-depth analysis of issues linked to the democratic control of the armed forces at national level (Kuhlmann & Callaghan 2000) which also had an international dimension considering the promotion by the United Nations of international peace and stability (Russett 1993; Vankovska et al 2001:9). One of the components for creating this democratic peace was that each
state should have a “well-governed security sector, which comprises the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within it” (Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2002:175). However, the relation between democracy and democratic control of the armed forces can be seen as a “cause versus consequence” in the sense that democratic control presumes democracy and democracy presumes democratic control of the armed forces, and for democratising countries unravelling this dilemma is problematic (Born 2004a:19). Thus it is important to regard both issues, namely the good governance of the security sector and the broad system of democratic management of the state (Cottey et al 2002, 2002a; Edmunds 2003a).

As far as the role of NATO in 1990s and 2000s in the promotion of the democracy-governance of the armed forces synergy is concerned, Boonstra says that “While in the 1990s Civil-Military Relation was ‘the only show in town’, nowadays the concept has become somewhat blurred, even for NATO” and that:

the issue became more complex with the introduction of the holistic concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which has received widespread attention among both academic circles and international organisations such as the EU, OECD and UN, and includes, for instance, reform of police, intelligence and border control services. This concept is often attributed to NATO to describe work done in the field of defence reform with the goal of strengthening democratic control. But NATO is most concerned with military-political affairs, and while involved in some aspects of SSR has its niche in the defence sphere and not the various other parts of the security sector (Boonstra 2007:9).

This deepening and broadening of SSR policies, influenced by a deepening and broadening of the concept of security and its articulation as human security, imply the search for the meaning of the definitional boundaries of the pre-existing language of civil-military relations within the expanded definition of SSR.

As pointed out by Robin Luckham, “the language of democratic control was there before SSR policies. These policies grew out from these three objectives: ensuring that you don’t have a military reverse of the democratisation process; government accountability; controlling the public sector management of security military institutions”. Nowadays, he says, SSR is not merely an “expansion of civil-military relations”, it is about transforming and not reforming the security structure of the state. The difference with past studies on civil-military relations is that the matter “is not just more efficiency and accountable security sectors but also rethinking them in the context of development and rebuilding political legitimacy” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010).

So, it is not surprising to find in the defence reform of Armenia wordings such as democratic control of the armed forces, rule of law, accountability, civilian oversight, included at the forefront
of each section despite having the modernisation of the army as the key topic of this document. This because the emphasis on the civilian control of the armed forces within a set of reforms aiming at having a more efficient army is a sign that these issues are intrinsic in the democratic structure of state governance and do not belong exclusively to the latest version of SSR policies (Born et al 2004a; Fluri & Cibotaru 2008). Indeed the uniqueness of SSR, as we saw in chapter III, was to regard the interlinked issues related to governance and security through the viewpoint of development (Brzoska 2003; Hills 2000; Kinsey 2006; Smith 2001). Phrases such as democratic control of the armed forces, civilian oversight, rule of law are indeed part of the language of democracy (Bruneau & Tollefson 2006; Pantev et al 2005) that received a revamp when Western states and institutions supported the democratisation processes of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Lambert 2006). However, it must be taken into account that when this language is used in different national and cultural contexts, a linguistic confusion might arise, as the case for instance of the translation of civilian democratic control in the defence reform in Ukraine:

In the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the dictionary definition of the term ‘control’ (translated as Kontrol) is ‘checking’ or ‘verifying’, which in political-administrative terms connotes ‘oversight’ at most. Only when Ukrainians are exposed to Western practices do they grasp that our [Western]concept intrudes into other domains: upravlinya (direction), zaviduvannya (management), keryivinstvo (administration), naglyad (supervision), as well as kontrol (Sherr 2004:3).

Being able to ‘talk SSR’ has become synonymous of talking the language of democracy. The language of SSR in the Armenia’s defence reform tries to facilitates the recognition and the perception by the international community of Armenia as a democratic-responsible state, thus defining and validating its positive state-identity with the international system of states. The inclusion of this language might be seen as a sort of reassurance that Armenia is making efforts to create democratic structures to manage its defence sector, while serving its national interests of having an army capable of facing military threats. Ultimately, this is indeed the strength of the SSR-language when it is not used to express the holistic SSR-framework: it becomes a policy sound of reassurance for Western-type democratic states. The challenge for SSR policies is not much to find support for this change of discourse, as the Civil-Military Relations literature has shown, but to demonstrate that there is a change of practice that addresses the holistic dimension of state governance and its interaction with citizens’ freedom from want and freedom from fear.

I would also add that SSR policies are not the sum of their parts, as shown by the case study on Armenia. For instance, the existence of separate assistance programs in support of the judiciary, training of police, and destruction of the rocket fuel component stocks by OSCE (OSCE office in
Yerevan 2008) does not constitute the evidence that Armenia is officially implementing SSR policies. The vice versa is also true: considering the panoply of interpretations about SSR, it would be misleading associating a policy’s title with its content. However, there is indeed the risk of the perception among donors that the presence of a SSR-type of policy among many government policies might end up scenting them all of SSR. Armenia defence reform has shown that sharing the language of SSR is not a sufficient element for implementing these policies because this language can be used to address issues within a narrower policy framework.

This case study reveals that policies dealing with state governance are not very clear cut. As a civil servant of the MoD said, “you should not boxed down the SSR as a term, it is only important to help people understand interactions between the security system. The key usefulness of SSR is to conceptualise these complex interactions” (interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). According to this civil servant, “you cannot do SSR in one go. There is no such a thing as SSR programs. SSR is the vision, it just stresses the connections between issues and departments”.

This view goes beyond the one of SSR understood not as a one-off action but as a process (Winkler 2002:10). This means that even if we can “drag principles from one context to the other, we must modify our action according to what it is found on the ground” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010).

The view of SSR as policies addressing interactions between state departments blurs even more the line with past and present experiences with their focus on civil-military relations and defence reform policies, making it difficult to define, frame, conceptualise this “web-reflex” of SSR. Moreover, the language that expresses this SSR “attitude” was built on the pre-existing one that belongs to concerns for good governance, democracy, state legitimacy and accountability. So while part of the language of SSR policies was there before and continues to exist, as we have seen with the defence reform of Armenia, its vocabulary was expanded by the inclusion of a human security perspective and a holistic vision taken from development actors. The expansion of this vocabulary has been favoured, it is said, “by a consensus among people in senior positions to have a holistic approach between government departments” (interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). The promotion of these policies despite a state of disarray about their definition has turned SSR into a label that is used “more and more, but we don’t know the meaning of this label anymore” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). To understand why the SSR label has become fashionable we have to investigate its terrain of applicability and this will be done in the case studies that relate to SSR Afghanistan and SSR Guinea-Bissau.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has addressed the question of the novelty of issues raised by SSR policies through the insight provided by the Civil Military Relations literature. In particular, the contextualisation of the Defence Reform of Armenia within a composite historical international relation scenario, and the study of the language of this package of reform have highlighted the complexity to isolate and categorise concerns on security within a single, even if inclusive, policy discourse.
V. SSR AFGHANISTAN: A POLICY THEATRE IN A WAR THEATRE

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan has implemented SSR policies since December 2001 because they were regarded as part of the process of state democratic governance building (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001). This case study investigates the meaning of the adoption in Afghanistan of this set of policies publicised as addressing development and security concerns.

From an analysis of the legal framework of these policies we can see that since the beginning SSR covered five main policy areas: military, police, judiciary, DDR, counter-narcotics (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005) and each of them had a donor state in charge, respectively the USA, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK (Nixon 2007; Sedra 2003). The focus in this chapter is not on the assessment of progress and failure in these areas of intervention, but rather on questioning how SSR policies have been operationalised. Moreover, despite these diverse fields of action, the choice of policy makers of using the SSR heading for a set of policies having a strong focus on recruiting and training armed and security forces calls into question the necessity of its usage vis-a-vis other policy packages. In fact, if we look at the history of Afghanistan, it is the fourth time in one hundred and fifty years that this country is rebuilding its military forces: once in the 1870s, twice following the second and third Anglo-Afghan war and nowadays following the civil war during the 1990s and the 2001 military attack (Jalali 2002).

The singularity of this last state defence rebuilding exercise is that it has been done through a policy package, namely SSR, that embeds in its formulation the development-security nexus. This means that development and security synergies should be reflected in the design, implementation and results of this policy intervention. Furthermore, there is another issue that should be considered in the SSR equation: Afghanistan is a country at war which started in 2001 with the USA-led coalition attack. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether the significance, the objectives, scope and methods of implementing these policies have all been shaped by the events in the battlefield. Here I use the term ‘battlefield’ loosely to incorporate different aspects of military, political, and social life in Afghanistan where there is a conflict between the coalition forces and the Taliban fighters. These events are not the concern of this case study hence there is no detailed discussion of this because the focus is on the conceptual underpinnings of SSR in Afghanistan promoted by the lead-donor countries mentioned above.

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8 This case study examines SSR policies and not other initiatives which address security and development issues such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (For more info on this topic see Carp 2006; Katzman 2008; McNerney 2005-6; Rubin 2006).
Afghanistan is not new to a military encounter with Western states. For instance, eighty years separate the last two UK attacks to Afghanistan: the Third Anglo-Afghan war (1919-1921) and the 2001 war conducted together with the USA armed forces. The lesson learned from the penultimate war was of no use in 2001: in 1921 Afghanistan gained full independence from Britain at the negotiation table, despite a UK military victory. In 2001 the scenario seems to be reversed: the USA led coalition forces have been trying since then to gain a victory at the negotiation table as a military victory is still out of sight. The implementation of SSR policies in Afghanistan is included within the search for a military victory by other means. This means that the implementation of these policies is seen as having direct consequences on the result of the ongoing war in Afghanistan whose end is still out of sight, and vice versa.

I argue that it is this relation, between SSR policies and the battlefield broadly defined, that has shadowed a discussion of the pertinence of using SSR in this policy theatre which is also a war theatre. If we look at the several studies on SSR Afghanistan, they focus their investigation on the progress and failure of these policies, on the lack of coordination among SSR lead-donor countries, and on the lack of the Afghan government capacity to support these policies (Brzoska & Law 2006; Miller & Perito 2004; Sedra 2003b, 2004, 2006; Sedra & Middlebrook 2005; Simonsen 2007; Suhrke et al 2004; United States Institute of Peace 2001; Wilder 2007; Zenkevicius 2007). However, they do not question the reason, relevance and feasibility of adopting a set of policies whose aim is to address development and security concerns within a human development/security approach. My case study takes a different approach because it aims at investigating how these policies have framed security, development and their interlinkages in a war theatre, and what the conceptual underpinnings of SSR in Afghanistan are.

The case study is divided into three parts: the fist part presents a brief background of SSR which is the conflict that started in 2001. The reason for the implementation of these policies is not a state with a poor track record in development and security indicators which needs SSR to solve a development crisis. Thus this has made secondary the analysis of the economic, social and human security of the country because the rationale behind the adoption of SSR policies is the hope for the birth of new state structures (for a briefing about Afghanistan history see Donini & Niland 2004; Orr et al 2004; Rotberg et al 2007).

The second part analyses the legal framework of SSR and it shows how development and security concerns are conceived in this policy design. The third section studies how the development-security nexus has been translated into practice by SSR policies in Afghanistan. This case study questions the mismatch between the promotion of SSR as the development-security
nexus policies and the meaning that this nexus has acquired since its implementation in 2002 in Afghanistan. In particular, it challenges the spectrum of applicability of these policies, namely what is the meaning of the security sector that they are focusing on, and the significance of putting into practice the development-security nexus in a country at war.

It is indeed the context where SSR are implemented that raises questions about the adoption of these policies. As we have seen in chapter III, these policies are part of the international development and security assistance to countries experiencing a complex spectrum of insecurity, and it was noted that “it is crucial that what is done in peace building is done taking into account local realities on the ground” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010). Through an analysis of the legal framework of SSR adopted in Afghanistan we will see how the massive recruitment of weapon bearers for a country that continues to be at war was framed within a SSR design. In fact, increasingly SSR practitioners are questioning “if you can undertake meaningful SSR in an unstable contexts” (interview with UN officials working on SSR 26 May 2010).

In this case study we see that the conceptualisation of security as human security with its inherent development concerns that is embedded in SSR policies is challenged when these are implemented in a context characterised by conflict. This is why it is important not to take for granted the adoption of these policies in Afghanistan but to question the design of their objectives and implementation methods. This is not because there is a right way of doing SSR but because, as we have seen in chapter III, the only certainty about SSR was their aim of addressing the development-security nexus. The study of SSR Afghanistan investigates if the design of these policies has erased this certainty from the start, or if this certainty is part of a future that is still in the making.

BACKGROUND OF SSR IN AFGHANISTAN

The benchmark for SSR in Afghanistan is 2001, which is the starting date of the ongoing conflict between coalition of armed forces, NATO, USA, and the Taliban armed forces (Biddle 2007; Cyrus Hodes & Sedra 2007). This conflict was the international military response to the 2001 attacks on the USA Defence Building and the Twin Towers that called for the application of article 51 of the UN Charter which allows the right of states to exercise self-defence (United Nations Security Council 2001). The reason for going to war against Afghanistan on 7th October 2001 was that this country provided a safe harbour for individuals defined as “Terrorists (who) attacked a symbol of American prosperity” (White House 2001a, 2001b). When the USA-led military response named
Operation Enduring Freedom was organised, the USA president himself did not know the framework of the conflict that was about to start. In fact, he stated that:

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its decisive liberation of territory and its swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. … Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have seen (White House 2001).

Facing the unknown, on 7 October 2001 the USA president informed about the beginning of the bombardment of Afghanistan (White House 2001a). Coalition forces managed to be in control of Kabul after one month of air strikes, while the majority of the country is still, after ten years of war, under Taliban control. The aim of this war was to defeat the Taliban who had the control of 75% of Afghanistan before the military invasion in 2001 (Katzman 2008:6), and to rebuild an Afghan democratic state. This objective was reiterated by the “Kabul winners”, namely some Western states and Northern Alliance, when they participated at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 which established, on paper, the foundation of new Afghan state structures (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001).

However, state-building is a political exercise which requires among other things a political space and not a battle-space. The lack so far of a military victory by Western forces and therefore the absence of a peace agreement between the parties in conflict, as war still continues, have made the national and international political effort of building the Afghan state a chimerical exercise, and SSR policies have been tasked to design it (Barnett & Hamidzada 2007; Nixon & Ponzio 2007; Ponzio & Freeman 2007). This design is part of the will of the coalition forces to have an Afghan state which is a guarantor of security and development for its own citizens but also a state that reflects this peace in the international arena. Therefore, two issues dragged the international community towards their intervention in Afghanistan: the defeat of terrorist organisations harboured in this country because they jeopardise national and international security.

These topics, namely what are the political conditions that allow for the harbouring of terrorists and how to deal with transnational security issue such as terrorism are not the focus of this chapter. There is a vast literature covering these matters in particular the one on failed states and on democracy as antidote to terrorism (DfID 2000, 2005, 2005a; Eizenstat et al 2005; Harris 2006; Litwak 2002; Logan and Preble 2006; OECD 1997, 2005, 2005a; Nixon & Ponzio 2007; Rice 2005, 2006; Rotberg 2003; UNDP 2005; USAID 2005; Vaisse 2007; World Bank 1999). They are mentioned here only because it might have been the haste to tackle these issues - namely the view
of Afghanistan as a state that has failed to respond to the human security/development of its citizens and that it harbours terrorists who harms national and international security - that called for the adoption since the very end of the airstrikes in Afghanistan of development-security nexus policies. This because there was then “a broad consensus that state-building is the central objective in fragile states, and that effective donor programs require integrated approaches across the political – security-development nexus, fast and flexible responses and long-term engagement” (World Bank 2005b:4 emphasis added).

The focus of the chapter is not on the analysis of Afghan state structures preceding the start of the war in 2001 or on the adequacy and justification of the international military response. What it concentrates on is the adoption of SSR policies publicised as addressing development and security concerns, and the meaning that these policies give to development and security. It suffice to say here that “Empirically there is no causal link or pronounced correlation between failed states and the proliferation of terrorism or between democratisation and the negation of terrorism” (Hehir 2007: 328). However, the exigency of the community of states to respond to an international threat was included in the text of the Bonn Agreement redacted in 2001 (see next section below), that specifies:

The Interim Authority [of Afghanistan] shall cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commit itself to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001).

Therefore, the vision informing the state building process in Afghanistan was that “capable and responsible States must be on the front line in combating today’s threat” (United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes 2004:2). In this regard, issues of national democracy, international security, state sovereignty and human security/development of citizens all became intermingled in Afghanistan, a country with a turbulent foreign relations.

The international relations of Afghanistan were heavily influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War and the country was almost cut off during the time of the Taliban regime which was not recognised by the United Nations (Katzman 2008:5). This interruption of the political normality of a state, as the Taliban was regarded by the international community, is also reflected on the collective participation to the redaction of international reports. For instance, a look at the Human Development Index reveals that since 1990 Afghanistan has figured within the bottom ten countries of the index, but at least it was in (UNDP 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). One of the consequences of the Taliban taking power in Kabul in 1996 is the disappearance of Afghanistan
from the HDI. However, not even the attacks of the coalition forces managed to put it back into the list when they took Kabul in 2001 (UNDP 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007-2008), or to get data from this country in the incoming years. However, the appearance of a separate National Human Development Report on Afghanistan compiled in 2007 (UNDP 2007) is an indication that something is happening in the country, as if Afghanistan has been having private tuitions in order, at least, to be listed as one of the world’s states in the HDI. These tuitions have been titled “state-reconstruction” and some of the lecturers are the USA, UN, and countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, Italy. Among these state-reconstruction tuitions, one of them was on SSR policies.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SSR AFGHANISTAN

By the time the Kabul winners sat at the conference in Berlin with the agenda of transforming the Afghan state, about 4000 Afghan civilians had been killed in the war (BBC 2002; Conetta 2002; Herold 2002). Their hope of ending the war and its humanitarian consequences was linked with the need to have a mechanism in place to support the process of adapting the Afghan state structure to its new democratic orientation. The legal framework of SSR Afghanistan has been placed within this national and international effort, and therefore primary sources related to SSR are included within documents which have marked the political path of the country since 2001. As stated in a World Bank report, “Constitution, budget, economic management, and security sector reforms. These core reforms underpin the state building agenda” (World Bank 2005a:49).

The storming of Kabul in November 2001 was followed by the Bonn Conference in December 2001 organised by the Kabul winners. The outcome of this meeting was the document titled “The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” and called the Bonn Agreement (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001). In the Bonn Agreement it was recognised the need for the state to have the monopoly of the armed forces within its territory:

Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001).

The document stated that this was to be achieved through recruitment, training and equipment of new armed and security forces, in particular “the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of
new Afghan security and armed forces” (Participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan 2001). This document also signed the first milestone of building the Afghan state as it established the Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) (AIA 2002a, 2002b). This body was put in charge of leading the country towards the elaboration of a constitution, the creation of state institutions, and presidential and parliamentary elections.

This first political phase was accomplished with the inauguration of the Afghan National Assembly in December 2005. Since the start, the term security sector reform has been mentioned and included within this state-reconstruction exercise. As affirmed by the Afghan Interim Authority, the “management of the security sector is the first and necessary step to reconciliation and reconstruction; indeed managing this sector may be considered the first reconstruction project… Failure to do so could critically impede or even reverse the Bonn peace process” (AIA 2002:1). These first documents mention SSR without explaining how these policies fit with their development-security nexus base promoted by OECD, DFID and other policy makers.

From 2001 to 2010, more than twenty major international conferences have been organised to discuss the situation in Afghanistan (HM Government 2010; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). Already in 2002, during the initial conferences held in Tokyo and Geneva, SSR policies appeared as one of the items in the agenda (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002; UNAMA 2002, 2002a, 2002b). As pointed out by the UN representative during the conference in Geneva:

Security is the basic element of this peace process, and therefore with this view the reform of the security sector, the establishment of a national army, a police force, demobilisation and reintegration, the judicial system; these are keys elements that have to be tackled as soon as we can, and by ‘we’ I mean the international community along with the Interim Administration (UNAMA 2002).

This statement by the UN is in line with the Afghan authorities, as it regards SSR as a tool to achieve peace. At this conference was decided how to implement SSR. Each component constituting the security sector of Afghanistan was coupled up with a donor state: the USA took charge of the army; Germany of the police; UK of counter-narcotics; Italy of the judicial system; UNAMA and Japan of DDR (German Embassy Washington 2005; German Federal Foreign Office 2007; Gootnick 2005; International Development Law Organisation 2007; Istituto Affari Internazionali 2009; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007a; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007; Ministero degli Affari Esteri 2007; Ministry of Defence of UK 2008; NATO 2006a; UNAMA 2004; United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre 2006; UN GA 2002; United States of America Department of State 2006; White House 2005).
A more detailed SSR plan was presented by the Afghan government at the Berlin Conference in 2004 (Relief Web 2004), as shown in the figure below:

![Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration](image-url)

The plans presented were very ambitious and included:

- The demobilization of 40 per cent of the Afghan Army (using stated troop strength as the base) by June 2004, including the decommissioning of military units.
- Agreement that NATO and the international military forces would continue to support the ANP and ANA.
- Extend full cooperation to the AIHRC Strengthen Afghanistan’s institutional capacity to meet in an adequate and timely manner its reporting obligations under international instruments.
- The Afghan Government will develop human rights monitoring, documenting and reporting mechanisms in partnership with the international community.
- Establish a Supreme Court according to the Constitution with the necessary capacity to fulfill its mandate.
- Strengthen the administrative and financial management capacity of justice institutions.
- Accelerate the legislative reform process through adoption of key laws that would be compatible with the Constitution, including laws and procedures on the organization of judicial offices, criminal and civil codes, and a penitentiary law.
- Establish a national legal training centre.

(UNDP 2004a: 154)

Three years into SSR policies, development concerns started to kick in. One document of this conference affirms that:

Security is a precondition for development in the short term, while over the long term development is the key to ensuring the sustainability of security and stability. Security sector reform is the vehicle that can achieve the baseline of security needed to advance the reconstruction and development process (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004:83).

What the document does not say is that this short term period will be as short as, or as long as, the war in Afghanistan. The switch from a short term emphasis on security to a long-term emphasis
on development is peace. However, why is there no document which includes an assessment of the fighting on the ground to see when war ends and peace begins? The policies’ focus is on the present tense, while the policies’ promises related to development lay in an unreported future. Policy makers wrote a SSR policy calendar which is clear, but what is unclear is in which year Afghani people will have their development entitlements guaranteed. Despite the above statement, the reason for the adoption of SSR in Afghanistan in 2002 is not mentioned in these documents, nor how the development-security nexus is conceptualised in this context and implemented. When the World Bank, for instance, mentions SSR it regards these policies as linked to state security governance issues, without mentioning how they link with development concerns, or explaining their mutual support:

(i) Implement security sector reform and build up well-trained, disciplined security forces (national police, national army) under the control of the national government; (ii) vigorously pursue DDR to meaningfully disarm warlords’ militias; (iii) strengthen legal and judicial system; and (iv) improve security of property rights, building on existing informal arrangements (World Bank 2005a:xxix).

The London Conference in 2006 marked a second watershed in the state-building process (London Conference on Afghanistan 2006). With a state structure finally in place, Afghanistan was deemed capable, on paper at least, to exercise a political centripetal force and to assume the responsibility, or better the coordination, of SSR policies. Thus, the lead-donor SSR scheme was put under the umbrella of the Afghan government, but questions remained if this was sufficient to say that a whole of government approach was achieved, which is one of the cornerstone of SSR. Moreover, there were also coordination concerns linked to the funds of SSR, considering that “With so many countries and with so little coordination, it is impossible to determine the total resources committed to Afghanistan” (Fair & Seth 2009:9).

The outcome of this conference was the Afghan Compact, which is the first document that the Afghan government produced following the national elections held in 2004 and 2005 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & the International Community 2006:3). This document maintains the SSR framework with its five pillars and it includes a request by the Afghan government to donor states to continue their engagement in training the armed forces (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & the International Community 2006). This document also supports the Interim National Development Strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan-Office of the President 2006) which says that:
The SSR Strategy addresses how the capacity of the Afghan security sector can be built so that they can eventually take on full responsibility for all national security activities. Over the past four years, security sector reform has been coordinated across five pillars, as follow: (i) defence (ii) policing (iii) justice reform (iv) DDR and (v) counter narcotics (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005:117).

The SSR five pillars approach fits in with the national security policy of Afghanistan as described below:

This SSR strategy maintains the vision of a security sector which includes the judiciary and other factors affecting security such as drug production and trafficking. However, this unity is not kept for long because when in the same document the security sector is mentioned it is interpreted narrowly, including only the armed and police forces, and it lists the judiciary in another sector. As illustrated in the graph below, instead of regarding the whole security sector as a crosscutting theme in the governance structure, which ought to be the orientation of SSR policies, only issues such as gender and the environment are considered as affecting all state departments. This narrow meaning of the security sector and its lack of a crosscutting impact within the governance of the state, have prevented SSR policies from being the fulcrum of state-reforming initiatives, and they were relegated to deal uniquely with some aspects of the security sector interpreted as constituted by the army and police.
Without any clear explanation by the SSR leading nations about the meaning of these policies and how they differentiate from other policy packages dealing with state security issues, years after the start of their implementation they are regarded as a training policy scheme:

In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to help Afghanistan address threats to its security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a security reform strategy for Afghanistan: the United States would lead the training of the Afghan army and Germany would lead the police reconstitution effort. (Government Accountability Office 2008:6).

This narrow interpretation is also shared by other academics and organisations researching on Afghanistan:

Building Afghan national capacity to provide security requires the policies known as security sector reform (SSR), including both the dissolution of irregular armed groups through demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), and the creation or transformation of previous forces into professional units (Rubin 2006:5 see also International Crisis Group 2008; Nixon & Ponzio 2007).

The issue with these views on SSR is that the legal framework of SSR Afghanistan does not elucidate why this set of policies has been adopted in this country in 2001; it does not say what is the meaning of development and security in a country at war; and how these policies address the nexus between these concerns. This void of meaning is what causes the focus of the SSR literature...
on the progress and failure of these policies without questioning the adoption of these very policies since 2001.

Moreover, as time passes, the war continues and the number of civilian victims and dead combatants increases, it seems that states intervening in Afghanistan are experiencing a “war fatigue” in the sense that, for instance, in both the inaugural speech and in the final declaration of the conference on Afghanistan in Paris 2008, words such as war and conflict are never mentioned. From the speeches of the participants to this conference (The President of the French Republic, The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Secretary-General of the United Nations 2008) the focus is more on the development needs of Afghanistan rather than on addressing the military efforts in the ongoing war. Terms such as army and military are only mentioned once in the opening statement by the French President Sarkozy when he said that “The military is not the only solution, but security is the precondition for development and reconstruction. They are both integral” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes 2008).

Is this a sign that, also in rhetoric, the nexus between development and security is not there considering that politicians did not mention development when using SSR mainly as a training policy scheme for the army and the police, and they avoided mentioning security, war and conflict as their military withdrawal from Afghanistan is approaching? However, SSR policies are still part of the agenda of the Paris conference and these policies are mentioned in both the key documents of this conference, the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007, 2008; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & the International Community 2006). Both these documents are also endorsed at the final declaration of this conference (The President of the French Republic, The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Secretary-General of the United Nations 2008).

A novelty is that the ANDS pays respect to the OECD interpretation of SSR, and defends the importance of local ownership of these policies. It also includes a link to the OECD SSR handbook (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007:55; OECD 2007). This unexpected appearance of the OECD SSR guidelines after six years of SSR policies implementation in Afghanistan was highly due. However, did this SSR awareness change the orientation of these policies? It did not. The orientation, so far, is that SSR have been used as a set of policies dealing with a large number of state security issues and by a large number of uncoordinated donor states without a clear overarching policy framework that links development and security concerns.

Other conferences were held in 2009 and 2010 in The Hague, London, Kabul (Government of Netherlands 2009; HM Government 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan 2010) but they
do not question SSR as the appropriate policy tool in Afghanistan. Rather, their focus is on the number of soldiers and police forces to be trained so that Afghanistan forces alone can continue fighting the war there “Conference Participants also welcomed the Government of Afghanistan’s stated goal of the ANSF taking the lead and conducting the majority of operations in the insecure areas of Afghanistan within three years and taking responsibility for physical security within five years” (HM Government 2010a). While this desirable objective is part of the accepted vision of international relations that each state is in charge of its own security through military means, the point here is that the focus when talking about security sector reform in Afghanistan is still on the progress that needs to be done in the army, police, judiciary, DDR, without questioning the meaning that SSR has acquired in Afghanistan, and how this has influenced the analysis of the strength and weakness of the development-security nexus policy approach in a country at war.

SSR AFGHANISTAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS

The implementation in Afghanistan of policies aiming at rebuild the armed and security forces, reform the judiciary, dealing with drug production and DDR is a consequence of the state reconstruction process that followed the 2001 military intervention. From the analysis of the legal framework of SSR, it is not clear why in 2001 the lead-donor states decided to title this set of policies dealing with state security issues as Security Sector Reform. If the decision to (re)create state structures in a ravaged country is fairly obvious, it is under scrutiny the reason for adopting SSR policies. The point here is to analyse what SSR have become when they have been designed for Afghanistan. In particular, how in this context they define and implement the nexus between development and security.

One main factor that led to talk about SSR in Afghanistan has been the storming of Kabul by NATO countries and the decision to transform Afghan state structures while continue fighting. As stated, “SSR in Afghanistan is used by most to refer to the processes of building and reforming the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police” (personal communication with a consultant working in Afghanistan 10 August 2010). From the legal framework it comes out that despite a broad vision of the security sector that includes the judiciary and counter narcotics, the adoption of SSR policies in Afghanistan was mainly devoted to respond to the country’s military necessities. This means that the need to fight a war that started in 2001 has been the driving force for using SSR as a policy banner under which gathering all the details about the recruitment of armed and police forces. This explains why the literature on SSR Afghanistan is to a large extent a progress report on the transformation and reform of security sector actors (Fair & Seth 2009; Gootnick 2005;
International Crisis Group 2007; Murray 2007; Sedra 2003, 2003a, 2004, 20210; Seema & Ross 2007; Suhrke & 2004). The overwhelming priorities of the battlefield took over the development-security nexus vision that informs SSR, and focused the main effort, USA in particular, towards train and equip programs. It was noticed that:

Considering the situation in 2002 in Afghanistan, it was premature to call these policies SSR, as they were essentially a train and equip program. Probably a better approach would have been to have a recruitment, train and equip program and later on or on a separate base starts talking about SSR. For SSR you need political commitment, the support of the people who must be protected, and with the SSR in Afghanistan there was a confusion among donor states between doing and helping the local to do. SSR was seen as a train and equip and exist strategy (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010).

The SSR implemented in Afghanistan is not only a case of SSR under fire (Slocombe 2004), namely doing reforms in a policy theatre which is also a war theatre. Or, as Sedra wrote:

Contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the challenges of creating security forces and using them in combat at the same time. As US General David Petraeus remarked when he commanded US forces in Iraq, doing so is “like building an airplane while in flight, and while being shot at” (Sedra 2010:19).

The issues is not whether in this context you can do SSR, considering that the “fundamental principles of the SSR model are gradually sacrificed to meet the exigencies of the security situation” (Sedra 2010:21). It is why a set of policies based on changing conceptualisations of development and security whose discourses merged through the language of human development and human security, has been chosen to title the scramble of state departments among lead-donor states. Above all, no attention was paid on how this fragmentation could have created or damaged a whole of government approach which is the fulcrum of SSR. Or, how it could have facilitated a communication channel which could cut across all government ministries and favour local ownership of these policies (Giustozzi 2008).

The definition of security sector ended up including the armed and security forces only, so that SSR have lost their transversal impact on different states departments. The distribution among donor states of security tasks without an overarching framework resulted in having state departments running at different speed which has impeded their coordination and their reciprocate support (Ayub et al 2009; Centre for International Governance Innovation 2009; Gootnick 2005). This narrow focus is far from constituting a policy architecture in which development and security concerns of Afghan citizens are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. As we saw,
for instance, the counter-narcotics program which was seen initially as one of the pillars of SSR, ended up as a crosscutting program, like gender equity and the environment (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005:25).

Moreover, the issue with the strong focus on making progress on the military sector (Waldman 2008; World Bank 2008d) is that SSR is not simply a matter of disciplined armed personnel, is having a state system that can produce and embed within its structure the various state components in a manner which is respectful of the rule of law. It has been pointed out that “Security is not about having a strong army is about ensuring that your army is professional, that respects civilians, that is under a democratic control, but you need a good governance architecture to achieve this” (interview with Rory Keane, Team Leader of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility at OECD, 7 June 2010). This was also underlined by another professional working on SSR that:

Increasingly, practitioners are realizing the importance of tying in SSR to reform in the judicial sector, as SSR relies on a strong legal framework and institutions to make sustainable progress. The separation of these two processes has been a major problem in the past, but this is changing quite quickly....In a sense, the new realization that legal reform and security sector reform are intertwined reflects an increased focus on the development-security nexus. This was not true for many years, though, and there is still a problem of focusing training efforts for soldiers and police too narrowly on counterterrorism efforts. Police in particular need to be trained in civil policing, and many in Afghanistan have just begun to realize this in the last year or two. Also, police training is dominated by the U.S. military, and there are not nearly enough trainers available who can teach civilian policing skills rather than paramilitary tactics (personal communication with a consultant working in Afghanistan 10 August 2010).

In 2002, when SSR policies were formally adopted in Afghanistan, the lead of this country was taken by a transitional authority in charge of forming the political structure that started to take shape in 2004 and 2005 with the national elections. If, it can be argued, “when you cannot do the reform straight up you have to put some building blocks” (Dennis Blease, Brigadier General, retired, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK, 8 June 2010), I argue that this is true if SSR policies are regarded as they were in the 1990s with a more selected focus on the management of the defence sector. With the inclusion of development concerns within SSR and the validity of the development-security nexus as the rationale for adopting these policies, designing SSR policies to recruit soldiers to fill the ranks in the battlefield has hollowed the significance of the comprehensive vision of SSR currently publicised by donor states.

The meaning that security has acquired in the design of these policies is about supporting the state in achieving the monopoly of force which must be adequate to neutralise military threat within its territory. This narrow view of security is at odds with the broad one of human security and human development that characterises the promotion of these policies in the years 2000s. Thus the
imperative to have the military personnel to fight the war seems to have narrowed the conceptualisation of security of these policies. Considering that when SSR were proposed in 2002 Afghanistan was at war, more consideration should have been taken to analyse the rationale for the adoption a set of policies which has a broad spectrum of implementation informed by human security/development concerns that are regarded as mutually reinforcing each other.

The catch-22 situation of 2002 was that the need to have local military personnel to support NATO countries in the war against the Taliban depended on the creation of a political framework capable to support and orient this effort, which depended on having a peaceful environment where the political can be exercised (Mouffe 2005). Inserting in this complex dynamic a set of policies like SSR that requires a strong local political will to reform; a whole of government approach; addressing synergies between development and security issues, without providing any explanation on the benefits and challenges of this policy tool, hollowed the significance of using SSR in this context.

Furthermore, the development-security nexus vision which is embedded in current SSR policies was also devalued considering that this nexus was not even mentioned in any key document related to SSR, apart from mentioning once the OECD handbook on SSR in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. As far as the meaning of development is concerned, after few years of implementing SSR in Afghanistan, the UNDP published the *Afghanistan National Human Development Report* (UNDP 2004a). This document introduces the section of Security Sector Reform emphasising how the concept of human security stresses the importance of addressing the freedom from fear and freedom from want of people. The UNDP affirms that the emphasis given in building a “strong central authority” in Afghanistan is justified by the need to address state security issues as a precondition for achieving human development (UNDP 2004a:152). This because UNDP regards SSR as “the transformation of a country’s security apparatus with the aim of ensuring that it is managed and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and principles” (UNDP 2004a:153).

The UNDP fully supports the vision of SSR as policies addressing the governance of the security sector, without mentioning how and when the development question in Afghanistan will receive an answer by policy makers. In this document the UNDP segments the concept of human security in several components, such as economic security, health security, personal security, and so on. SSR policies are listed within political security, and their objectives are limited to training army and police forces (UNDP 2004a:244). No doubt that this report missed out an opportunity to pay
attention to the challenge to put into practice the link between development and security in a country at war.

According to SSR Afghanistan, security means the “management of the security sector” (AIA 2002:1); development concerns are postponed to when armed forces will have “achieve the baseline of security needed to advance the reconstruction and development process” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004:83); and how these policies address the link, the fulcrum, the nexus between development and security is left unanswered by those documents constituting the design of these policies. Thus, development is regarded as a condition which will come after the creation of state structures; after a military victory in the conflict; after a political victory of strengthening state institutions. However, will the SSR echo still be heard that far?

SSR policies in Afghanistan are characterised by a narrow view of security, a development postponement and a lack of articulation of how these policies can be the bridge between a democratically governed security sector and the provision of development entitlements to Afghani citizens. In Afghanistan, the conflict could be held responsible for breaking the SSR vision of a whole of government approach that addresses the governance of the security sector in order to create an environment where citizens can enjoy the freedom from want and freedom from fear. However, nobody has questioned whether the advisory and soft approach of SSR was appropriate for dealing with military necessities at the front line in a state where state structures were to be redrawn from scratch. If with SSR policy makers included the war effort within the state building effort because these policies frame military necessities within a democratic and development imperative, in theory at least, in practice questions remain about the perception and expectations about these policies whose development-security nexus is, after ten years of implementation, still unquestioned by policy makers and longed for by people.

CONCLUSION

This case study has shown that while policy makers called SSR the set of policies to be implemented since 2002, in a continuing war context, the nexus of security with development - the core of SSR - got weakened. In particular, this case study has highlighted the need to go beyond the narrow view of security that has characterised the design of these policies from the start, as well as the inadequacy of this militarised vision of security to support the implementation of development objectives.
VI. GUINEA-BISSAU: AN IDYLLIC POLICY THEATRE

INTRODUCTION

The institutions of the European Union have adopted the development-security nexus as a guiding vision for some of their external foreign policy commitments. This orientation was included in a statement by the Council of Europe which also said that:

the Council has identified initial pragmatic actions for increased coherence in some of the areas spanning the security-development nexus: strategic planning, Security Sector Reform, partnerships with regional and sub regional organisations, and humanitarian aid and security” (Council of the European Union 2007:1,2).

In 2006 the government of Guinea-Bissau requested the support of the EU for a project of reform in the areas of state defence, police and justice (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010; Républica de Guiné Bissau – Comité Interministerial para a Reestruturação e Modernização do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 2006). The EU responded by sponsoring a program, the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, to assist this country where the population’s needs about development, security, and good governance are far from met. This case study aims at showing how the development-security nexus vision that underpins SSR policies is translated into practice in a recommended policy scenario such as Guinea-Bissau. What is favourable about the implementation of SSR in this country is: a) the request for donors’ support coming from state authorities which means that there is a political engagement; b) a favourable donors’ response, in particular from the EU, even if SSR is also supported by other actors such as UN agencies and individual states such as Brazil, China, USA, Senegal, France, Portugal, Angola, Nigeria (République de Guinée-Bissau 2006); c) the presence of a national development and security deficit but an absence of war so that national and international stakeholders can frame and analyse the development-security problematics and implement a comprehensive policy response without having to consider extraordinary state’s efforts typical of wartime.

The object of this case study is to examine how development and security issues have been translated into the SSR policy design, and it questions whether presenting SSR as the development-security nexus policies is appropriate considering that development concerns are not included within the main SSR framework of Guinea-Bissau. In the words of the Head of the EU SSR mission:

The starting point of the EU SSR mission is that Guinea-Bissau needs stability to achieve development. Juridical insecurity and lack of solid institutions determine lack of foreign investments in development. The reform of the security sector has been identified as key to
achieve a political and economic situation that favours a development takeoff of the country (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).

The view that you need security to have development, rather than vice versa, is also expressed by a UN agency that is giving a substantial support to SSR “The idea is that without the Security Sector Reform, there can be no Rule of Law and without Rule of Law, sustainable development is close to impossible” (personal communication with UNODC official 9 June 2008).

The case study is divided in four parts: the fist part focuses on the SSR theatre, namely the country, and it gives a brief overview of the development and security situation of Guinea Bissau which highlights the lack of human development, human security and the national political instability also linked to the militarisation of state politics. This scenario is what justifies the adoption of policies addressing development and security concerns. The second part introduces the main actors involved in the SSR Guinea-Bissau, and how they position themselves vis-a-vis these policies. The third part presents the legal framework of SSR policies, which is made up of policy papers produced by the European Commission, the European Council and the government of Guinea Bissau. These documents provide the base for the investigation, in the fourth part of the chapter, of how the link between development and security issues have been framed by these policies.

It is beyond the scope of this case study to judge if the necessity of Guinea-Bissau to restructure the management of its state security and solving the problem of its combatants for the homeland liberty is to be met within a SSR conceptual framework or not. The case study highlights the difficulties of addressing in policy terms the fulcrum between development and security, but also that the theoretical merge of these two discourses is still fragile despite the widespread use of the development-security nexus banner in the promotion of SSR. I argue that one reason for this inadequate response is the mismatch between the theory and the practice of the development-security nexus. While at theoretical level the merge between development and security was favoured by converging their discourses on the centrality of the human being, in practice a concern for the state as the actor in charge of state security and development has pushed development and security into two separate tracks. This implies that security concerns continue to address state security governance and development concerns are postponed to when the state is capable to create the conditions for it. This postponement of development can be regarded as one of the failure of a policy discourse publicised and funded to address the development-security nexus.

9 Considering that this program is ongoing, a balance cannot be drawn by observing empirical results. The study of this SSR focuses on the conceptual framework of these policies: technical details related to defence and security forces will be referenced throughout the text.
GUINEA-BISSAU: THE SSR THEATRE

As a brief outline of the country shows, Guinea-Bissau is beset with political, economic, and social instability and hence easy to be seen as a deserving recipient of SSR. The birth of the state of Guinea Bissau goes back to the 1974, after a decade of war against the Portuguese colonial rule. In the aftermath of independence, a succession of coups d’état, a civil war (1998-1999), interim governments, have all marked the political scene of this current presidential democracy of less than two million people (Adebajo 2002; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008a). Political instability started in 1980 when Luis Cabral, the first president, was overthrown by Joao Bernardo Vieira, the then prime minister and former armed forces commander. Twenty years after independence, and three attempts of military coups in 1983, 1985, 1993, the second democratic pit stop was the 1994 elections in which Vieira and his party, Partido Africano para la Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was re-elected, gaining against Kumba Yala representative of the Party of Social Restoration (PSR). A civil war erupted from June 1998 to May 1999 due to a deteriorating relationship between President Vieira and the Chief of General Staff Ansumane Mane. Vieira dismissed Mane, accusing him of supporting the secessionist movement, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC), in Senegal. These accusations were lately dismissed by a parliamentary inquiry.

The intervention of foreign troops by Senegal and Guinea in support of Vieira was followed by a regional intervention of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces which included Benin, Gambia, Togo, and Niger, and a UN peacekeeping mission in 1999, the United Nations Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). A Government of National Unity was charged of preparing the 2000 elections in which Kumba Yala won and remained in power until 2003 when a new coup and a new election brought back Vieira as head of state. The tradition of coups and attempted coup continued up to August 2008 when Viera dissolved the Parliament after an alleged attempt of a military coup by the head of the Navy (BBC 2008). The country’s elections in November 2008 and the victory of Viera put in doubt the feasibility of the implementation of SSR policies, considering the climate of political stability necessary for undertaking government reforms (IRIN 2008). These challenges increased because of the political instability caused by the murder on 1 March 2009 of the chief of staff followed few hours later by the murder of the country’s president, and new presidential elections in June-July 2009 with the victory of Malam Bacai Sanha of PAIGC against the ex-President Koumba Yala. Another sample of political instability happened in April 2010 when the Chief of the Armed Forces was overthrown by a coup and the Prime Minister temporary detained (Gorjao 2010). A common
denominator of all these events has been the militarization of politics, and the failure of developing a civilian-military relation within a democratic framework. Nowadays, policy makers have identified in the weakness of the governance of the security sector a major cause of national poverty, and promise to address it with SSR policies (Republic of Guinea Bissau Inter-ministerial Committee of the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector 2006).

By different sources and statistics, it also results that the country is in a dire state when it comes to delivering development to its own people. In line with the classification exercise of countries started with the World Bank in the 1970s (World Bank 2008c), the snapshot of Guinea Bissau using the lenses of human development indicators reveals a reality of entrenched poverty for the majority of the population. According to the HDI (UNDP 2007-08), Guinea Bissau is 175 out of 177, before Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone. For the everyday life of the 1.6 million people living there, it means that at birth they have 40% probability of surviving to the age of 65 with the average life expectancy of 45 years. Guinea Bissau has the second highest fertility rate in the world (7.1 births per woman) which is also matched by one of the highest under-five mortality rate in the world (200 per 1000 live births); 47% of the population is under 15 years. However, health expenditure per capita (PPP US$) is 28, compared with 6.096 in the United States. In 2004, 39% of the population was undernourished, only half had access to an improved water source. The government response to this grim situation has been inadequate: GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 had a negative annual growth rate of -2.6%; a mere 1.3% of the GDP was spent on health in 2004; 5.2% was spent in education between 2002-2005, while in 2005, 4% was spent on the military sector and 10.8% in debt service repayment to bilateral and multilateral creditors (UNDP 2007-08). The human security lenses see poverty as insecurity because it threatens the dignity of people. As underlined in the Human Security Now report, “Health security is at the vital core of human security – and illness, disability and avoidable death are ‘critical pervasive threats’ to human security” (CHS 2003:96). Human security is also concerned about access to education; in fact, the report says that, “Educational deprivations are particularly serious for human security” (CHS 2003:6). From this brief overview, the human development/human security situation of Guinea Bissau is a daunting one.

According to some economic development indicators, Guinea Bissau is classified by the World Bank as a low income country under stress (LICUS) and as a highly indebted country (World Bank 2008a). It is also seen as a conflict-affected country and as a failed state (Fund for Peace 2009). The chances to achieve in Guinea Bissau the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) are unlikely (République de Guinée Bissau & UNDP 2004; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006).
The World Bank and IMF have responded to this social tragedy using the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) form (Guiné-Bissau 2005). They created this policy instrument in 1999 to frame their lending to low-income countries and debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) (World Bank 2008a). At the end of the civil war, the government of Guinea-Bissau had to use this form to obtain foreign loans for rebuilding the country. An Interim PRSP was prepared in 2000, and in 2001 the government started the elaboration of a comprehensive one which was completed in 2006 and which relates to the period 2007-2010 (IMF 2007). The goal of the PRSP for Guinea-Bissau is to “overcome the challenges for sustainable human development” in a country where “64.7% of the population live with less than two dollars per day; 20.8% of the population live with less than one dollar per day” (IMF 2007:6,7). When the government revised this document in 2005, they added the reform of the security sector (IMF 2007:6). The IMF does not contest the inclusion of these policies, and it endorses the view that political instability and violence produce poverty:

…it is evident that a key determinant of poverty is instability and the recurrence of violence as evidenced by repeated coups d’état and armed conflicts. This situation has hindered the realisation of development programs and projects and continually weakened the already fragile institutions and infrastructure. Therefore, the prerequisites to make the poverty reduction strategy viable lie in the fostering of stability, good governance, reconciliation and peace consolidation in order to create the conditions to prevent a return to armed conflicts (IMF 2007:23).

The inclusion of SSR policies into the PRSP is a sign of the inadequacy of the policy response given so far to Guinea-Bissau, and the consensus of international policy makers about the validity of using in this country policies addressing the development-security nexus. Considering that nobody has questioned the choice of this policy theatre, it is timely now to analyse the coaches, the actors and scripts of SSR policies in Guinea-Bissau.

THE SSR-COACHES IN GUINEA-BISSAU

The OECD holistic approach for guiding the design and implementation of SSR spurred discussions among the EU, UN agencies and individual states willing to get involved in SSR (Commission of the European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2007a; DfID 1999; GFN-SSR 2003; OECD 2001, 2004, 2007; United Nations Security Council 2005; UN GA 2008a; UNOG 2008). The EU and various UN branches started a reflection on which SSR aspects they could take charge according to their mandate, expertise and legitimacy (Law 2007).
The EU, following discussions within the European Council and the Commission, has developed a policy framework which is based on the OECD principles but it also takes into account the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) concerns (Commission of the European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2007a). The reason for this EU involvement in SSR is that “The increased emphasis on human rights and democratisation in donor attitudes to ACP [African, Caribbean, Pacific] states also inevitably raised questions relating to the security sector” (Chalmers 2000:5). The EU has produced three main SSR documents: the European Council Concept for European Security and Defence Policy Support for SSR; the Commission Concept for European Community Support for SSR; and the EU policy framework for SSR which acknowledges the diversity of both orientations without creating a single EU position on SSR (Commission of the European Community 2006; Council of the European Union 2005, 2006):

Together, the two concepts (the concept for European Community Support for SSR and the Concept for ESDP support to SSR) constitute a policy framework for EU engagement in security sector reform (SSR), stressing the importance of taking a comprehensive and cross-pillar approach to SSR recognising the fact that SSR is a holistic, multi-sector, and long-term process encompassing the overall functioning of the security system as part of governance reforms (Council of the European Union 2006:1).

The different interpretations by the Council and the Commission, as highlighted by Law and Myshlovska, indicate a diversity in mandate and expertise of both institutions. The Council focuses on reform of security forces, police reform, justice and rule of law enforcement, border and customs sector, DDR; the Commission is more concerned with the reform of civil management bodies, civil oversight mechanisms, justice reform, law enforcement (Law & Myshlovska in Spence et al 2008:7). For the Council, SSR is a matter of “addressing issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled” (Council of the European Union 2005:9), while for the Commission SSR goes “beyond the notion of effectiveness of individual services (including the military, the police, the justice institutions, etc.) and instead focuses on the overall functioning of the security system as part of a governance reform policy and strategy of the public sector” (Commission of the European Community 2006:3). Moreover, according to the EU, SSR are not only part of a broader concern for governance, but part of the ESDP vision which sees SSR as the “exit strategy for international military forces engaged in a given theatre” (Permanent Representation of France to European Union 2006:10).

In the last few years the UN as well has debated its involvement in SSR (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2006; UN GA 2007e, 2008, 2008a). The reason for this is the recognition that human rights, security and
development are interdependent and that their fulfilment should be guaranteed by a legal framework which respects the rule of law (UN Security Council 2005). Moreover, SSR give to the UN the opportunity to have a framework to implement a “shared vision of security”:

For the United Nations, the importance of security sector reform is that it demonstrates that security goes beyond traditional military elements and involves a much wider range of national and international institutions and actors. … Equally, security sector reform underscores that effectiveness, accountability and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing elements of security. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing a shared vision of security (UN GA 2008:6).

This UN vision of SSR reflects different aspects from the one of the OECD which is taken as a base by the EU, due to the global composition of the UN and its different mandate. From an interview with UN officials working on SSR it emerged that:

the conceptualisation of SSR by the OECD is very much from the perspectives of donor states. What is missing in the OECD vision is a framework that provides recipient states with the opportunity to articulate their own vision. This is why the UN is working to help the African Union to get its own vision about SSR policies (interview with UN officials working on SSR 26 May 2010; see also Alao 2000).

The implementation of the SSR framework by the UN requires a division of tasks between different UN agencies as it can be seen in the SSR implemented in Guinea-Bissau (for information about UNOGBIS involvement in SSR see UN GA 2004, 2006, 2006a, 2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b). The UN Security Council has supported the EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau as it considers it as an initiative that strengthens governance and prevents drug trafficking (UN GA 2007d). According to United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), Guinea-Bissau is the epicentrum of drug trafficking between the Americas and Europe (IRIN 2007; UNODC 2007). The UN Security Council regards drug trafficking as a security problem which undermines the rule of law, and this justifies its inclusion within SSR policies. This is why Guinea-Bissau together with UNODC have drawn a plan aiming at combattting and preventing it. The UNODC is ready to:

support the efforts of the government of Guinea-Bissau in reforming its security sector in order to stabilise the peace process and protect the social development of the country against drug trafficking, organised crime, and crime more generally. Such a programme constitutes an integral part of the Security Sector Reform of the Government of Guinea-Bissau (Republic of Guiné-Bissau & UNODC 2007:5).

Another UN agency which has showed interest in getting involved in SSR is the UNDP (Gouvernement de la Guinée Bissau et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement
The UNDP interprets SSR as JSSR, namely as justice and security sector reform (UNDP 2003), focusing its action on the public sector delivery of justice and respect for the rule of law. While this interpretation is nothing new if compared with the definition of security sector provided by for instance DfID and OECD, it indicates that there is a need to specify and distinguish between a development approach from a security approach to SSR. Thus, this calls for a clarification of what constitutes the development-security nexus components of SSR.

THE LEGAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GUINEA-BISSAU

The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is situated within the wider cooperation framework between the EU and the African states. A brief description of the orientation of this intercontinental collaboration helps in better contextualising the meaning and objectives of the EU SSR initiative in Guinea-Bissau. The starting point for illustrating the collaboration between the EU and African states is the latest Africa-EU Joint Strategy inaugurated at the summit of Lisbon in December 2007 (European Commission 2005; European Union 2007). This document states that:

This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity (European Union 2007:2).

A section of this document includes a specific area of collaboration titled ‘Peace and Security’, and it mentions that one of the activities which should be promoted is to “Strengthen cooperation and enhance dialogue on issues relating to the security/development nexus” (European Union 2007:31). This statement can be regarded as paving the way for the introduction of SSR policies. The document specifies that SSR policies are a tool for supporting governance, while other policies deal with institutional development and human security (European Union 2007:7).

The EU-Guinea-Bissau relations are framed within the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and revised in 2005 with the aim of reducing poverty; helping the integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific States into the global economy; and promoting sustainable development (Conseil de l’Union Européenne 2005; European Union 2007b). The financial instrument relating to this type of cooperation is the European Development Fund (EDF), an intergovernmental fund set up by EU member states (European Commission 2002; European Union 2007c). The 10th EDF amounts at 22.682 million euro and it covers the period 2008-2013 for implementing programs that recipient countries have detailed in their Country Strategy Papers (CSP) (European Union 2007a). This
document is the base for receiving assistance from the EU (European Commission 2006b, 2006c). According to the European Commission’s guidelines for strategy papers “Conflict prevention should be presented as an integral part of poverty reduction and sustainable development policies” (European Commission 2006b:1). These guidelines contain also some examples of programs which indirectly address the issue of conflict prevention such as those related to water and rural development; and those directly having a conflict prevention impact such as security sector reform (including reform of police, border control, justice reform, parliamentary and civilian control over the security services), DDR, small arms and light weapons projects (European Commission 2006b:2).

These EU guidelines inform the redaction of Country Strategy Paper by recipient countries and therefore the type of cooperation projects and earmarked budgets that accompany them. The Guinea-Bissau Country Strategy Paper for the period 2008 -2013 was signed at the Lisbon summit in 2007, paving the way for the implementation phase of the EU development assistance: 100 million euro to be disbursed during this period, of which 27 million euro in conflict prevention in fragile states (European Union 2007c, 2007d). In the Country Strategy Paper, the government of Guinea-Bissau has listed SSR as one of the reforms considered indispensable for the country, together with the reform of the judiciary system, public administration and reform of public finance. It says that the purpose of SSR is to reduce the army and increase its efficiency to lighten the financial burden of the state (République de Guinée-Bissau 2007:12). This document offers a narrower view of the security sector. According to OECD, security sector should include the judiciary and all those institutions working for providing freedom from fear to citizens. The CSP documents redacted by the government of Guinea-Bissau focuses on the army, and it affirms that the aim of SSR is to downsize it and it excludes the judiciary sector and its reform from the SSR conceptual policy umbrella.

The PRSP that Guinea-Bissau produced to get loans from the Bretton Woods institutions includes this narrow view of the security sector which centres on the army (IMF 2007). The IMF welcomes and validates the narrow approach of these policies. The IMF reading of SSR is that these policies aim at resizing and restructuring the armed forces, and make them respectful of the rule of law, this to create the condition for human development (IMF 2007:22,24). In its view, these conditions for development derive from a shorter salary list of armed and security personnel which would make available resources for development projects (IMF 2007a:4; IMF 2008). The inclusion of SSR policies within the PRSP can be regarded as a sign of adopting a whole of government approach for their implementation. Moreover, having SSR policies crossed-referenced in various
policy papers open them up to different interpretations by various policy actors. The IMF and EU validation of a narrow definition of security sector presented by the government of Guinea-Bissau is not due to their nonchalance about the respect for SSR conceptual essence which praises interlinkages between state departments. This narrow approach might serve both the weak government institutions of Guinea-Bissau and international policy makers: the former might be unable to fulfil donors’ expectation to reform a state which cannot deliver services to its citizens – casting the shadow of state bankruptcy, while the latter might get a request to bail it out and the narrower the policy focus, the cheaper the bill.

**SSR Guinea-Bissau: the EU Script**


As stated by the Head of SSR EU in Guinea-Bissau, “The EU SSR is the first mission of this kind which covers army, police and the justice sector. In the Democratic Republic of Congo the EU also did a SSR mission but it only focused on the army and police” (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010). The EU press release says that this EU mission will advise the government of Guinea-Bissau on reforming the security sector and it is willing to cooperate with other donors10 (Council of the European Union 2007, 2008a). What the press release means by security sector is clarified in the Council Joint Action where it is written that the EU team will advise the government in the downsizing and restructuring of the armed and security forces (Council of the European Union 2008:2). For this military advisory mission, a general, Juan Esteban Verástegui, has been appointed as the Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Afriquenligne 2008; Council of the European Union 2008; European Agenda 2008; Political and Security Committee 2008). According to him, the objectives of the EU SSR mission are:

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10 Apart from UN agencies, there are also countries involved in SSR in Guinea-Bissau, such as Brazil, Angola, China, Portugal, France, UK, as emerged by interviews with policy makers working in SSR in Guinea Bissau.
restructuring and resizing of the army and putting it under the control of the democratic institutions of the state; reducing police bodies from eight to three, Police Public Order, National Guard and Judicial Police; ameliorate the structure of the justice sector and its relation with the Judicial Police (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).

From an analysis of the Council Joint Action document which presents the EU SSR mission, its rationale, objectives and structure, it emerges that this mission is a EU technical mission aiming at advising the government of the recipient country on military and related security issues. However, it should be noticed that this document is ambiguous about many issues. Its opening line says that the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe is a key priority of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. This statement missed out a key conceptual component of this strategy which is development. In fact, the aim of this EU-Africa strategy is to bridge the development gap between the two political areas with the promotion of sustainable development. This missing word cannot or should not be regarded as a “touch-typing error”; it indicates that the mission focuses on issues which relate to peace and security only. The usage of terms such as peace, stability, Africa, Europe, implies that the meaning of the concept of security, in this context, is more related to state security rather than human development/security. The second paragraph has also a missing word. It says that SSR is “essential for the stability and sustainable development of that country”. Here the missing word is security, which should replace stability or be added next to development, considering that this paragraph is dedicated to SSR policies. These first two paragraphs are highly ambiguous: not only have they missed out the concepts of development when talking about development policies, and the one of security when talking about SSR. They have not provided any explanation on how a strategy introduced to deal with peace and security is linked to a policy titled Security Sector Reform which, according to the text, deals only with the state army.

The European scribe tried to make up for this conceptual disarray by stating, in the eighth paragraph, that a “European and Security Defence Policy (ESDP) action in the field of SSR in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate, consistent with, and complimentary to, European Development Fund and other Community activity”. Thus this paragraph gives to the EU mission a security/defence identity which fits within SSR concerns. How and why this happens is left unsaid. Moreover, development, here, is stated as part of a title for a financial fund from which money for the mission is withdrawn. How these policies are essential for sustainable development is not clarified. The only clear issue is that a development fund is used to finance a technical defence advisory mission in Guinea-Bissau (personal communication with EU officials working in SSR 10 June 2008).
The ambiguity about the EU role in the SSR of Guinea-Bissau is visible in the title and this might influence the perception of the people of Guinea-Bissau about the expectations of the EU involvement in this reform. The title of this mission “EU SSR Guinea-Bissau” should be instead “EU Defence Advisory Mission to Guinea-Bissau” this because in the Council Joint Act, it is written that the objective of this mission is to give advice and assistance on SSR “in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy”. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the objective and the title of the mission: the former is to create the conditions, the background, for implementing these policies, while the latter might be perceived as if the EU is implementing those very same policies. It derives that a precise title for this mission should then be “EU Defence Advisory Mission Preparatory to SSR implementation in Guinea-Bissau”.

In its role as an advisor, it is obvious that the EU has got expectations about the engagement of national stakeholders and the positive results of this political process:

The EU expects that Guinea-Bissau is responsible. The principle of local ownership forces the government to boost the SSR process within its own state institutions as any other state governed by the rule of law. The political bodies in charge of the SSR process is the Interministerial Committee presided by the Prime Minister, while the body that controls the process is the Steering Committee presided by the Minister of Defence and its Permanent Secretary and here is where representatives of foreign countries and organisations sit with an advisory and not an executive responsibility which lies with the national government. The very fine line that separates advising, taking responsibilities and initiative causes that the timeframes of Brussels and Bissau collide creating frustrations in all sides due to the delays in the implementation of SSR (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).

Together with the EU expectations there are also those of the government of Guinea-Bissau towards the international community supporting the SSR which are spelt out in the analysis of the SSR documents produced by the national government.

**Guinea-Bissau: the Government Script**

The institutional framework of the restructuring and modernisation of the Defence and Security sector of Guinea-Bissau is Decree N.1 of June 2007 (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007:11). However, the starting date for “talking SSR” in Guinea-Bissau is 2006, when in a meeting in Geneva titled “Security and Development” its government presented two national strategy documents: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Security Sector Reform plan. Out of 538 million dollar asked by the government, they obtained pledges for 262.51 million dollars (World Bank 2008b). The government of Guinea-Bissau formally launched the SSR program on 23 January 2008 (UN
GA 2008b:6) and soon after it presented it to a donors’ conference (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008). In this presentation, the government clarifies how development and security concerns find separate responses in separate policy papers: PRSP and SSR. It says that the PRSP of Guinea-Bissau aims at alleviating poverty, and it is “based on a profound analysis of the human development situation in Guinea-Bissau” (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008:2). The key pillars for achieving this objective are: strengthening governance, economic growth, access to basic services above all for the most vulnerable people. In introducing SSR policies, the government says that “the SSR Strategy Document was based on different national and international documents, in line with the OECD guidelines” (Républic of Guinea-Bissau 2008:3), and that the key pillars of the SSR are: modernizing the armed forces; strengthening the security forces; and reforming the justice sector. The link between the two policy papers is given by their focus on governance, which includes the reform of security and defence forces. Within SSR, the significance of the reform of the judiciary is seen in relation with the security of the country. It is said that Guinea-Bissau needs a functional judicial system for fighting organised crime related to drug trafficking, a problem that affects Europe as much as Guinea-Bissau. In another SSR related document, the judiciary sector is treated together with security, and focuses on the construction of prisons (Républica de Guiné Bissau – Comité Interministerial para a Reestructuração e Modernização do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 2006).

The government of Guinea-Bissau introduces the document which illustrates the reforms of the defence and security sector, declaring its conceptual debt to the OECD guidelines, and agreeing with the interpretation that sees a transformation of the defence sector as a precondition for sustainable development (Republic of Guinea-Bissau Inter-ministerial Committee 2006:3). The background depicted to justify the need for SSR includes a summary of the army, police and judiciary sectors which highlights the strong influence of the army in the political life of the country facilitated by the period of the single-party regime; and oversized bodies of armed and security forces, aged, untrained and poorly equipped. The dire living conditions of its citizens, their widespread poverty and threats such as AIDS and natural disasters are seen as constraints for the achievement of SSR, but not as issues which should be directly addressed by these development-security policies. In particular, the year of civil war in 1998-99 is seen as the major cause of national poverty and hampering development. This is at odds with a quick look at the classification of Guinea-Bissau within the HDI by the UNDP which shows that in the last fifteen years the country has always been listed within the bottom ten countries of the index. While the destructive effects of any war are undeniable, this document does not extrapolate the source of poverty, or the
source of wealth from which the population would have benefited if the war had not occurred. Moreover, the document lacks any explanation of how and why a well-trained army and police can impact human development entitlements of citizens. It only states that:

In such a context, Guinea-Bissau’s survival clearly depends on solving the security question, which is also the key to a fresh start on the road to sustained development. Transforming the defence and security sector is hence the prior condition for internal stability, peace in the sub-region, and development. Thus, solving the security question will create the necessary conditions for asserting the Rule of Law, and promoting economic growth and human development (Republic of Guinea-Bissau Inter-ministerial Committee 2006:25).

This leaves unanswered the question of how lack of war, in itself, creates development entitlements. From this presentation to donors, it comes out that the government’s effort of linking development and security concerns has been translated into practice by formulating two separate documents, the PRSP and SSR (For more detailed information about the resizing and restructuring of the defence and security sectors see Republic of Guinea Bissau 2007; Républica de Guiné Bissau - Comité Interministerial para a Reestruturaçao e Modernizaçao do Sector da Defesa e Segurança 2006). The existence of these policy papers is not per se plausible evidence that development and security are addressed together as they follow separate conceptual trends, respectively human development and OECD guidelines of SSR, and it remains unclear what should bridge the gap between the two. Perhaps the government of Guinea-Bissau expected the EU to fill this gap and solve the development-security question of the country:

There have been growing expectations from the politicians of Guinea-Bissau that this EU mission was essential for SSR and that it was the panacea for the country. Moreover, civil society was left at the margin of this process due to lack of didactic work by the government that could not be overcome by the EU pedagogical efforts. It has to be taken into account that an overdoing of the EU in this issue would have consolidated the widespread image that it is the EU which is reforming the army and the police with ‘obscure’ objectives of controlling Guinea-Bissau. Following the political events in April 2010 the EU is reconsidering its participation in this project creating panic among the ruling class which disseminates the false reality, probably to blackmail the EU, that without EU involvement there could be no SSR (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).

Facing with these sets of expectations by the SSR coach and actor, it is important to analyse the wording used to frame the development-security question of Guinea-Bissau and its policy answer to understand, away from the mist of expectations and perception of this reform, what SSR in Guinea-Bissau is all about.
THE SSR LANGUAGE

From the above reading of the SSR script produced by the government, it derives that: a) SSR are policies aiming at the defence and security sector. This sector includes the army and the various police bodies. The inclusion of the justice sector is seen as accompanying the reforms of these bodies rather than be included for antonomasia; b) the aim is to restructure and modernise the army and the police; c) the underlying belief of these policies is that a restructured and modern army and police will prevent conflicts and reduce people’s poverty; d) the factotum of these policies is the state which also has to ensure that development concerns will be addressed once security sectors are modern and functional.

The study of the language used in the SSR is necessary because it reveals more information about the significance and objectives of these policies. The policy document under investigation is the strategy document of this reform, and it is titled “Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector” (Republic of Guinea Bissau – Inter-ministerial Committee of the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security Sector 2006). The language of the title reveals the subject and objective of the reform, respectively: the defence and security sector and its restructuring and modernisation. The designation of this sector as defence and security is a modification of the OECD definition of this sector which includes: core security actors; oversight bodies; justice and the rule of law; and non-statutory security forces (OECD 2007:22). This definition is also validated by DfID, which has been at the forefront in the promotion of these policies. Thus, the title of this document points out a distinction that policy makers had tried to overcome: the one between defence and security actors and the inclusion of other bodies involved in guaranteeing the freedom from fear to citizens. This title also introduces a fragmented and reduced view of security which jeopardises and confuses the role of the judicial sector. If the title aimed at clarifying the object of the reforms, namely the army and the police bodies, is the absence of the judiciary sector within the title a sign that: the judiciary is included within one of them? Or that the judiciary is excluded? Or that the role of the judiciary is secondary as it will be mentioned only when it is necessary for the reform of the other sectors? In fact, all three hypotheses seem to hold. This document does not specify where the judiciary is included, but it says that its support is essential for these reforms.

Another document, which illustrates the SSR action plan (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007) and which derives from the previous document, indicates four separate sectors included in the reform: defence, security, judiciary, and the sector for combatants for the homeland liberty. Both these documents say in their titles “the restructuring and modernisation of the defence and security
sector”. The wording of these documents shows a conceptual difference, not a simple lexicon ambiguity. It calls into question the synergies among different state departments that is the main constitutive feature of these policies; it fragments and traps government’s concerns and efforts within isolated departments; and it prevents the domino effect of these policies which was envisaged to benefit the whole government.

The title of this document also states that the objectives of these policies are the restructuring and modernisation of this sector. This creates even more ambiguity. In fact, it was not necessary to have such a long title, as it could simply have been “Security Sector Reform of Guinea-Bissau”. Those who redacted these policies felt the need to specify that this reform is about restructuring and modernising. They did not use the word transformation, even if it is used several times in the text, but more importantly they did not use the term democratisation. The ‘democratic control of the armed forces’ is one of the famous SSR slogans because it embeds all SSR beliefs: the importance of having a democratic state system ables to exercise its control over the armed forces, this to prevent conflicts and reduce poverty. The SSR document of Guinea-Bissau does not mention this slogan at all, nor does it mention the need for a ‘civilian oversight’ of the armed forces, which is another SSR favourite. Instead it gives prominence to issues such as Rule of Law, usually accompanied by the adjective ‘democratic’. This slogan is always written in capital letter, to indicate that its conceptual meaning goes beyond the wording. The Rule of Law indicates the government’s will to operate within rules which have been democratically approved, and to reform institutions to enhance their capacity and highlight their responsibilities to operate according to an approved legal corpus.

The language used to justify SSR fits in with the securitisation of development which designates war as the culprit for the country’s dire economic and social conditions. What is striking is that these reforms are seen as an attempt of the country to “begin afresh”, as mentioned in the text of this document. In the past, it was the colonial calendar which made tabula rasa of a country’s history and marked a fresh start according to Western Rule of Law. The meaning of this new start might be related to a new policy or political environment, which promises to address together development and security concerns. This linkage is not explained in the document, and statements such as ‘creating the conditions for’ remained isolated in the text, unexplained. What the document makes clear, however, is that the reforms of the defence and security sectors will concern men only. For instance, when talking about staff reduction and the number of people employed in the land army, it is stated “Land army component: 50% of personnel, i.e. 1720 men”. According to the language used, men only will be employed in the: Land, Navy, Air force army; in the public order
police; in the national guard; in the state information service; and in the judicial police. Setting the
tone for this over”man”ning in the defence and security sectors, was the description of the
justification for these reforms: “the strong influence of the revolutionary ideology, seeking to
construct a new society with a new man, impregnated the administration of justice which was given
the supreme role of defending the interests of the revolutionary state against its enemies” (Republic
of Guinea Bissau – Inter-ministerial Committee of the Restructuring and Modernisation of the
Defence and Security Sector 2006:8 emphasis added). This “man”power in the defence and
security sectors carries out the image that the duty to defend women - who are never mentioned in
the text – is a men only responsibility. Indeed, gender strategies were not considered in this SSR
(Gya & Thomsen 2009; Valasek 2008).

The Guinea Bissau SSR document does not bridge the gender gap, as it does not explain how a
bridge can be built between a restructured and modern army and the reduction of poverty
experienced by the people of this country. Despite the cross-referenced policy papers of this reform,
many foreign experts stationed in hotels waiting for a conducive moment for talking about
restructuring and modernising the armed forces, and the usage of an ambitious but ambiguous
language, all reveals that the meaning of security and development in this SSR might not match the
expectations, perceptions and results in what appeared to be a promising policy context.

SSR GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS

After having analysed the context of poverty and insecurity of Guinea-Bissau and the legal
framework of its SSR it is now time to look at how SSR policies have translated into practice the
development-security nexus. First of all, it is necessary to point out what is the meaning of security
and development embedded in these policies.

The security objectives of this reform relate to state security actors, in particular the army and
the police. The objectives of this reform, which have been classified in specific, short, mid and long
term, all focus on the resizing, restructuring and modernisation of defence and security sector, as
listed in the SSR Action Plan (Republic of Guiné-Bissau 2007). Even in the long term objectives,
that should favour a broader vision of security, the state military security apparatus remains the
focus “to propitiate the environment for the economic development, ending up with the Armed
Forces being perceived as ‘national burden’”. The type of security addressed by SSR policies is the
state military/security sector, and the EU involvement in this reform is a defence advice exercise
that has been carried out within the limits of its cooperation mandate (Agência Bissau Media e
The problem with this selected view of security is that the theoretical background of these policies calls for a meaning of security which is people-centred and that includes development concerns. From this changing conceptualisation of development and security it derives that security is no longer a field which is military-only, but the ‘round table’ where the state security reform is discussed should also include development actors, civil society groups and other representatives of the people whose security is at stake. This purpose of having a more comprehensive group is not because a narrow view of security as military-only requires nowadays a concerted effort to be implemented, but because this concerted action testifies that a narrow view of security is inadequate to solve the national security and development questions.

In Guinea-Bissau, the presentation of a defence reform using the SSR language has caused a domino effect of international policy makers’ expectations and commitments. This has put a strain on Guinea-Bissau, where advices and technicalities are set off against scarce national economic resources which should finance the bulk of SSR promises. What was presented as a program for restructuring the armed and police forces with the support of the EU turned out to be a “crowded” program, and segmented into different donors and budgetary lines (interview with UN officials working on SSR in Guinea-Bissau 12 June 2008). The view that it is a crowded project is also shared by the Head of EU SSR:

SSR is a complex and ambitious project where there is a place for everyone. The crucial problem is coordination. From one side there is the obsession of UNOGBIS that says that they have the role to coordinate the international community; on the other side there is the government of Guinea-Bissau which is not capable or interested in assuming its responsibilities of local ownership in order to give guidelines and coordinate the efforts of the SSR participants (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010).

This coordination problem is also due to a misuse of SSR language. While in the name of the development-security nexus the SSR framework foresees a large participation of security and development partners, development actors directly engaged in SSR and willing to tackle the development question find themselves without an adequate theoretical framework of action; and without a budgetary support. While the attention that international actors give to SSR is a blessing for these policies, this multi-focused character of SSR can transform this attention in a two-bladed knife. The framework of these policies is segmented during their implementation phase and divided among implementing actors who tailor their engagement according to their expertise and interest. Their search for their most suitable field of engagement within many policy objectives is accompanied by their interpretation of these policies which ends up informing/transforming the policy itself. This implies a loss of conceptual unity of these policies, making co-ordination
impossible, and engaging the government in too many dialogues, in too many fronts, and having to divert resources to too many sectors. Therefore, the plurality of actors involved with different mandates, budgetary lines and experts; the difficulties in using a whole-government approach in a fragile institutional environment; and the setting of ambitious SSR objectives at odds with a country ravaged by poverty, are all contributing to a policy impasse.

In the SSR agenda, poverty reduction is included only as an indirect objective, together with democracy, human rights and the environment (République de Guinée-Bissau 2006:12). Development concerns are not addressed by SSR, as also stated in an interview “The EU SSR mission does not have any task directly associated with development” (interview with Gen. Juan Esteban Verástegui, Head of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 22 May 2010). The only suggestion that there was a ‘development component’ in SSR related to civil servants’ salaries:

The ‘development’ component of the Security Sector Reform package presented in Geneva back in November 2006 was partially endorsed by the international community by means of supporting the emergency State budget to pay for salaries for civil servants while envisaging a larger reform of the public administration (personal communication with a UN official 9 June 2008).

From the analysis of the policy documents of this SSR, development is generally regarded as something that the government of Guinea-Bissau can do once its army and police are resized, restructured and well equipped. Despite the background of national poverty, SSR policies only respond to a precise state security issue. By stating that SSR prepare the condition for development, the government and donors’ states have managed to get ‘development people’ on board, and use all the bureaucracy linked to the development sector (financial resources, workers, access to government personnel) to facilitate their implementation. Apart from the presence of this development apparatus, the way development is regarded by SSR is through its postponement to an unknown future.

The interpretation of security as state security and the postponement of development are accompanied by a long timeline of implementation of these policies whose expectations and perceptions of all stakeholders, including the people of Guinea-Bissau, might converge or clash:

SSR is a medium-long term process in which not only work must be done in the technical field, namely the organisation and optimisation of the inadequate security structure, but it is necessary to modify the ‘mentality’ of those who are part of this structure. This job will last generations and therefore we start by taking technical measures which are accompanied by training of people to achieve an adequate functioning of the reformed institutions. At the same time, it is necessary to modify the habits which have deformed the perception of the functions of the security structure above all in a country that has achieved, de jure but not de facto, a separation ‘armed forces-state governance’ intimately linked since the independence from Portugal in 1974
In conclusion, it seems that perception is played at three different levels in the SSR Guinea-Bissau. Donors’ states have the perception that in a policy settings with a security and development shortfall, a policy package such as SSR is the adequate tool for giving a comprehensive response under the sponsorship of the development-security nexus for which there is a vast consent among donors’ states. This banner has guaranteed the support of a large number of states and this is unusual for a small African country. However, what makes this state security reform appealing at European eyes is also that this country is used as an international hub for drug-trafficking (UNODC 2007) which endangers European security: in fact, the EU SSR is a ESPD mission (personal communication with EU officials working in SSR 9 June 2008).

For Guinea-Bissau, presenting a reform of its security forces under the banner of SSR which followed OECD guidelines and underlying the importance of the development-security nexus approach guaranteed that this reform would have been positively perceived and approved by foreign donors, raising hope that this foreign involvement will finance the reform, reduction, modernisation of the security sector as well as dealing with the issue of the combatants for the homeland liberty. What has happened is that once the backing of foreign donors was obtained, they limited their involvement to an advisory role, and the task of matching the objectives of these policies with the political and economic capacity of one of the poorest countries of the world was left with the national government.

As far as the people of Guinea-Bissau is concerned, it is unknown how their perception of a malfunctioning security sector and the fact of seeing representatives of rich donor states only advising on state security issues rather than focusing on ameliorating their poor living conditions will make them react in case of a declared failure of these policies. While according to donors’ mentality it is necessary to deal with the state so that the state can deal with its own people, in a country ravaged by poverty this expectation is dim if not broken. Rather than the selective meaning of security embedded in SSR, it seems that it is the postponement of development efforts and the vision that financial resources must be put on state security first and human development later what might doom SSR policies as they do not match the expectations of people and their perception that the link between their development and their security cannot be left to an unknown future.
CONCLUSION

This case study has investigated the meaning of development, security and their nexus embedded in SSR policies implemented in Guinea-Bissau. The study has revealed a notion of security which focuses on the state’s army and security forces without offering a wider formulation that includes other political actors involved in creating citizens’ security and development. The analysis of the design of these policies has highlighted how the link between development and security is still very much dependent on a vision of security linked to the state’s armed forces, and of development which is linked to the state capacity to govern them.
VII. CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated the relation between development and security focusing primarily on the interface that these two discourses developed in the 1990s. I regarded this decade as a watershed for development and security due to the elaboration of innovative conceptualisations such as human development and human security which constituted the basis for the formulation of the development-security nexus. I argued that the novelty of human development and human security is not a radical change of focus but a proclaimed mutual interdependence to an extent that nowadays it is no longer possible to talk about development without security and vice versa. Thus, the analysis of the current promotion of the development-security nexus trend in international development and security policies must include a critical understanding of the meanings of development and security when their discourses are regarded as merged. It is also necessary to question this interdependence and analyse the theory and practice that see development and security issues as reciprocally reinforcing each other. This was the objective of this thesis.

The starting point of this research was not to take for granted the development-security nexus but to investigate the significance and interpretation of their merged concerns, and how they are operationalised. The investigation on the elaboration of the development-security nexus was broken down into three main areas of interest related to the different meanings of development and security focusing in particular on human development and human security; the various interpretations of the development-security nexus since the 1990s; and the analysis of how Security Sector Reform, publicised as the best illustration of development-security nexus policies, are designed to translate it into practice.

This path of analysis was chosen because I regarded the meaning of development and security not as unique and predefined but as constructed according to interests, concerns, challenges of international relation actors. Thus in line with other critical theories of IR, especially Critical Security Studies and Post-Development Theories, this study has taken a Post-Positivist approach. It derives that the research question did not aim at testing hypotheses according to a right or wrong way of regarding development and security, but it investigated the meaning of development and security within the development-security nexus approach.

The critical view of IR and in particular the Critical Security Studies literature fed into this study because this research is contextualised within an international scenario where hierarchies of power such as state/citizens, developed/underdeveloped, North/South of the world are questioned through an analysis of how development, security and international relations are constructed by a vast array of actors. The critical view of this thesis towards current dominant theoretical and operational
orientations of the development-security nexus had also the purpose to question the person-centric ethos embedded in the conceptualisation of human development and human security.

This thesis highlighted the importance of unpacking the contested meanings of these terms and of being aware of the relations of power and interests behind the language that is used to frame a particular discourse. This is why “critical”, in this thesis, means an approach that interrogates assumptions, investigates the “semantic battlefield” provided by concepts, and highlights different perspectives that look at the development-security nexus equation. The thesis’ originality and contribution to these bodies of literature lie in not taking for granted the validity and meaning of the development-security nexus but to bring to the fore the plurality of meanings and interests that are implicit in this catch-phrase.

The summary of the path of research undertaken is the following: after the introductory chapter one, chapter two analysed the changing interpretations of development and security focusing on human development and human security. This because with their formulation in the 1990s, policy makers acknowledged that there was a nexus between development and security that was centred on the human being. In particular the chapter investigated the significance of ‘human’ in human development and security, and how this focus was different from the traditional development and security concerns that had privileged respectively state economic growth and state security. The chapter argued that human development and security were not radical new phenomena because even if they used a powerful discourse linked to a concern for humanity, they lacked in operationalising their concerns.

Chapter three was devoted to the study of how the link between development and security has been interpreted since the 1990s. I investigated the nature of this interdependence and mutual reinforcement, and in particular of two theoretical trends that underpinned this nexus called the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development. These two trends that marked, respectively, the interpretation of the development-security nexus in the 1990s and in 2000s, are not expressing opposite views, according to which security is developmentalised and development is securitised. I saw them on a continuum, because human security asserted that there was a nexus between development and security issues, while the securitisation of development said that development should be used for conflict prevention. The chapter included an analysis of the implementation aspect of the development-security nexus, the primary illustration of which are SSR policies. The chapter continued with an analysis of the various interpretations of SSR by academics and policy makers by showing how their design depends on the ways in which development, security and their interlinkages are defined. The chapter argued that this set of
policies challenges the theory of the development-security nexus because even if conceptually development and security are merged, in practice they remain distinct or, at worst, the ‘human’ focus of their concerns disappears towards a renewed focus on the state.

Chapters IV, V and VI included three case studies, respectively Armenia, Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau. These case studies provided an in-depth analysis of the significance that development and security acquired in the design of these policies. The Armenia case showed that concerns addressed by SSR are not new but are part of the attention to state governance that nowadays is also promoted by SSR. What is new is the usage of the language of human development and human security to question and scrutinise the capacity of the state to maintain and govern its monopoly of force. While the Armenia case is useful in contextualising SSR within a broader policy dimension centred on state governance of its security sector, the Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau cases are specifically on SSR and on how development and security concerns are framed within the SSR policy design. These two case studies reveal that SSR policies respond to state security concerns only (or predominantly) despite using the wording of human development and human security. What SSR polices tackle directly is the security of the state and its capacity to control, democratically, its armed force. Therefore these case studies challenge the simplistic view that human development and human security imply the end of the state as the centre of theorising about development and security. Instead, the thesis concluded, with SSR we have a reassertion of the state as a direct beneficiary of these policies despite the language of human security/development used to promote them.

The originality and contribution of these arguments to the literature on the theory and practice of the development-security nexus is to have highlighted that phrases such as the “development-security nexus” and “security sector reform” are inadequate to convey a clear idea about security and development needs and achievements. Thus, what is necessary is not so much hypothesising the need for a post-SSR but an awareness of the urgency of dealing with the development and security deficit of people, and analysing how the choice of framing development and security in a certain way influences the tools that people have at their disposal to deal with these issues.

In this regard this research will be helpful to other academics and policy makers working on the interrelated fields of development and security because it underlines that it is pointless to put at the fore front of these discourses some interlinkages without elucidating their significance. My research could be extended in new but related directions in particular on the elaboration of the notion of the state implicit in SSR and how this could contribute to new approaches towards development and security and new policy opportunities.
The study of the evolving meaning of development and security has revealed that their focus was also on the ‘density’ of these concepts. Namely, security was defined as hard and soft (Aldis & Herd 2004; Lindley-French 2004); development and security as plastic words (Echavarría Alvarez 1982; Poerksen 1995) or security as fluid (Pettiford & Curley 1999). The interpretation of this density related to the deepening and widening of security and development issues as part of the evolving nature of international relations.

Considering the changing significance of these issues, the starting point of this thesis was the analysis of human development and human security because both discourses were regarded as interrelated since when in the 1990s they found in the human being a common ground where centring their concerns. However, saying that there is a nexus between development and security is not enough: it is important to research the nature of this interdependence often cited in policy papers (DfID 2000; OECD 2007; UNDP 1994). I investigated the meaning of this interdependence and mutual reinforcement, and in particular of two theoretical trends that underpinned this nexus called the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development.

I argued that the emphasis on the concern for the human being in the development and security discourse in the 1990s was not such a radical new phenomenon. This because human development, despite stressing the need for changing the way development was so far conceived, did not offer any implementing routes for addressing the development question. This study analysed the evolving significance of development and the impact that the elaboration of human development had in human security and in the formulation of the development-security nexus. Tracing the origin and the transformation of the idea and spirit of development implied a study on how those occupying a position of policy power shaped policy interventions in the name of modernisation, of solving underdevelopment, of satisfying basic need rights, of fulfilling human development entitlements, and of addressing the need to guaranteeing them. The power of the humanism of the 1990s expressed by human development was presented as creating a new development paradigm which gained a wide consensus for proposing a reading of the development problématique centred on the human being; on state’s culpability when development achievements are not met; and, as it will be stressed above all by the human security discourse, on the international system of states responsibility when individual states fail to act.

Despite the cited victory of ‘the human spirit’ after the waning of the Cold War (UNDP 1990:III) paved the way to the elaboration of human development, the meaning of ‘human’ in human development was almost taken for granted. However, the analysis of primary sources produced by
international policy makers revealed how human development highlighted first and foremost the limits of economic growth packages. The interpretation of development as human development was not used to dismantle neoliberal economic models but to show their inadequacy, as also seen by the numerous street protests during the 1980s and 1990s (Danaher et al 2001).

Thus, the emergence of human development happened at a time when the critique of neoliberal policies underpinning the lost decade was quite loud. This situation is not coincidental and it reveals that the link between human development and economic growth model to development is not of a secondary importance in the analysis of this concept. As we have seen in chapter II, human development highlighted the limit of economic models that conceptualised development too narrowly without taking into account the need to enlarge people’s choices (UNDP 1990:10). However, it did not propose a strategy that replaced or modified those existing ones that were economic-growth driven. So, if human development can also be regarded as a trend that opposes a narrow economically driven view of development, is its strength to be found only in its oppositional discourse (Ranis 2004)? Or in expressing a new development era by regarding the human being at the centre of its discourse (UNDO 1990)? Or in having included the contextualisation of the development problematics into a wider scenario where issues such as security, conflict, access to resources and so on are all interlinked and dependent on the responsibility of state(s) to guarantee them (UNDP 1994)?

In the thesis I argued that human development is just a powerful policy statement in the sense that it has not been operationalised because the international consensus that it achieved clashed against the role of the state as agent of development, and the credo that human development could not be concretised without it. Thus, I contended, the development approach of human development needed to be taken further above all in relation to the ability of the state to fulfil the human development entitlements of its citizens. This attention to state management capacity was later promoted by the human security perspective. In this regard, more than a merge of their interests based on sharing a people-centred approach, human development/security showed how development and security entitlements were tied to the state as their guarantor. Thus, rather than dislodging the state (Booth & Vale 1995), these concepts emphasised the significance of the state in addressing development and security issues.

My argument is that when talking about human development it is important to analyse its relation not only with other models of development, but also with human security and the merge of their discourses, and how all this was later on conceptualised within the policy design of SSR policies. In particular, its promotion as a people-centred approach gave to it the fame to be pro-
people and against state’s interests when these jeopardise people’s interests. As seen in chapter II, the human development paradigm that emerged in the 1990s preached to pay attention to a broader range of development entitlements such as access to health, knowledge, political participation (Sen 1999). However, this widening of development entitlements was not accompanied by the design of new development strategies to achieve them (Srinivasan 1994:241). Despite being an oppositional concept it was not so radical as an approach to reorient economic polices, so much that market-led economic growth policies remained in vogue. What changed was the view of economic growth as a mean and not an end to development (UNDP 1996:1), but this view was not operationalised.

The weakness of human development in its criticism of economic growth models put into question also its people-centred approach. This because, this concept reversed the hierarchy of the terms of the equation, such as economic growth as a means and not an end and the role of the state, but without constituting a radical change of its discourse. If up to the 1990s development was a state-only issue, the people-centred view of human development appeared as the novelty of the decade. However, rather than signing the beginning of an era where people came first when discussing development, I argued that this people-approach stressed even more the nexus between people and their respective states, considering that an international response to state failure is still inadequate such as in Somalia, Chad, Sudan, DRC and so on. The contribution of this thesis to the field of human development is that it was a policy statement that lacked implementation because it required a scrutiny of state capability that received a push further only by the view of security embedded in the concept of human security. These findings contributed to go beyond the false dichotomies human development vis-a-vis state development as if human development was siding with people’s interests and against the ones of states. This was done in principle, but the theory of human development still needed the state to guarantee citizens’ entitlements. So, rather than anti-state the human development is very much a pro-state approach when talking about the means of development, and a pro-people approach when talking about the end of development.

I consider that more research is needed on human development considering the widespread usage of this concept by policy makers when promoting development policies above all together with security policies such as SSR. I deem that my research on human development may be extended in new but related directions, such as the relation between human development and state governance in SSR. In particular more clarity is needed on the role of regional and international organisation to support those states which do not guarantee the “fulfilment of basic material needs and the achievement of human dignity” (Thomas et al 1999:3), as Thomas described the linked between human development and human security.
**HUMAN SECURITY**

While human development had the rhetoric of reorienting the theorising about development around a universalist approach centred on the human being, it was with the concept of human security that concerns were raised over the security of development entitlements. The thesis focused its attention on the interpretation of security as human security because this was regarded as exemplifying the development-security nexus due to its view of development and security as interdependent and centred on the human being. The approach of human security is not so radically new compared with other orientations of security. In fact, it keeps the state as the agent for security, even if as a security provider rather than a security receiver. Furthermore, its vocal support to the need to address together development and security issues was already included in the notion of sustainability in human development (WCED 1987).

My research brought to the fore that the importance of human security is not so much how it is defined, thus there is no right or wrong definition of human security or the so-called narrow and broader definition (Human Security Centre 2005; UNDP 1994), but what it allows to research. This is shown by the catalytic nature of this concept that has generated diverse studies on how conflicts, environment, migration, health and so on affect human security, and this without a unique definition of human security that is inclusive of all these discourses. In this thesis, human security guided the investigation on the links between diverse visions of development and security and in particular on the meaning and the contemporary popularity of regarding as interdependent development and security interests and concerns. My contribution to the field of human security is to have unpacked this term and to have analysed the meaning of human security in its two aspects: its relation with the state, in particular through a research on SSR, and with human development.

As far as the relation between human security and state security is concerned, the interpretation of security as human security aims at doubling the political safety net of individuals. The state is regarded as the actor in charge of guaranteeing the human security of its citizens, but this responsibility is also an international one because these security rights are included within the universalised discourse of human rights. By enhancing citizenship rights and human rights, the concept of human security got an international consensus because the hierarchy of its human-centred discourse did not challenge the concern over state security through the elaboration of security strategies that would put state security at stake. The fact that human security revises the role of the state back is significant because of the need to elucidate that its people-centred approach coexists with the role of the state embedded in this concept. Therefore, it is in the analysis of the meaning of what is the human and what is the state in human security and how both are linked with
the development conceptualisation that human security is concerned about, that the meaning(s) of the development-security nexus and its policy can be traced.

The interest with this argument is that human security does not treat the security of the individual in isolation from the state or in a hierarchical position above state security. It is not anti-state but instead it questions both the provider and receiver of security and by doing so it focuses on the security relation between the state and its citizens. Thus, the core of the manifold definitions of human security is about the scrutiny of the management of state’s functions and how they affect the construction of “building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood” of people (CHS 2003:1). When the definition of human security includes, for instance, “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease...” (UNDP 1994:23) or regards poverty as a human security threat because it threatens the dignity of people (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2007:9), the actor in charge of protecting people from poverty, hunger, disease is always the state (Buzan 2007).

The usage of human security as a research tool poses the question if there is anything else than state security if the state remains, after all, the agent and addressee of security even when security is centred on the human being. My study is helpful in highlighting that human security should not be considered as a ‘people-security’ approach in opposition to state-security interests. It points out that saying human security only means questioning this security equation taking into account its various terms such as people, states, other actors involved in security i.e. international organisations, Private Military Companies and so on, how their functioning and management of security issues affect people, and what is the relation of governance that these people have built with these actors. Consequently, human security should not be regarded as a label to put on people that simply highlights concerns for their protection, but as a “computer mouse” that can open up different windows containing files to explore, and see how security is constructed or threatened, and who are the beneficiaries and victims of these discourses.

The analysis of the view that regards human security as securing the development entitlements (UNDP 1994) highlighted not only the merging of development and security concerns, but also the role of the state in achieving both. While how these two discourses relate to each other will be analysed in the next sections devoted to the theory and practice of the development-security nexus, it is important here to underline how the human development interpretation has been informed and made dependent upon the state-centric view of human security. In fact, the human development approach was contextualised within a state management framework built upon the fulfilment of human security. This made implicit two things: one was the need to make development sustainable in the long term, and the other was that state management capacity became the key function to
achieve human development. This sustainability was regarded during the years as been achieved in different ways, from the management of natural resources (WCED 1987:43), to the management of the state security sector that creates an environment conducive to development (OECD 2005:16). This implied that human development was postponed prior the fulfilment of security conditions, and this despite the urgency of dealing with human beings as the referent point of development as expressed in the rhetoric of the human development discourse. Thus, while human security expressed the merge between development and security, the contextualisation of this merge occurred within a state-citizen relation that informed both discourses of security and development. Moreover, it made human development dependent on human security which was dependent on state security and state development. Thus the concerns for the ‘human’ in human development/security could only be addressed by the capacity of the state to manage development and security. It derives that the strongest link between development and security in the human security view is the governance management capacity of the state. The weakest link between the two is their humanness because despite the lexicon of these discourses pervaded by the ‘human spirit’ (UNDP 1990:III) their state-centric lens was not only justified but also reinforced by a vision that prioritised states’ security in the name of addressing, at a later stage, citizens’ security and development. By taking a Critical Security Studies approach that says that security is what we make of it, the analysis of the theories and practices of the development-security nexus revealed the multifaceted nature of the significance of ‘human’ in the security/development discourse.

THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS IN THEORY

Despite being still under-researched, the development-security nexus has increasingly made its appearance in primary sources of various state departments and international organisations (Collier et al 2003; DfID 2000; OECD 2007; UN 2004, 2005a, UN 2005b; UNDP 1994). The novelty of this approach is that it regards development and security as having shared concerns and reinforcing each other, namely using one to operationalise the other. Achieving development, then, to have security, and vice versa. If at first blush this nexus appears straightforward because of the obvious importance of having development guaranteed, as a second thought saying that there is a nexus between development and security is not the same thing as saying that one needs the other and vice versa.

The main point of my thesis was the need to question the development-security nexus which remains a hollow statement unless the meaning of development, security and their commonality is clarified, as well as the base from which their interdependence is analysed. Theoretically, the nexus
between development and security is expressed by human security which asserts the need to secure development entitlements. The nexus, in this regard, is that both human development and human security have a concern for the human being. However, an analysis of the meaning of these two concepts shows that the concern for the human being is the rationale for a continued attention to the state because this is regarded as the entity responsible for implementing human development and human security. Therefore, despite the publicised emphasis on the ‘human’ in human development and security, conceptually what we have is a reassertion of the state through the adoption of the language of humanity in security and in development, as it came out when analysing the theories and practices of this nexus and in particular Security Sector Reform. What is putting the development-security nexus on thin ice is not its mismatch between its rhetoric for the human and its theory and practice focusing directly on the state. If it was simply this, the promoters of the nexus between development and security would be justified by saying that the state is simply a mean to an end.

The gist is that the vulnerability of the development-security nexus discourse is in having failed so far to gain in proximity with people when conceptualising a perspective that takes into account both human development and human security. In this regard this argument highlights how necessary it is to elucidate that the consent for the human being coexists with a consent on the validity of the state, and that the timeframe of fulfilling the development-security nexus vision depends on the state willingness and capability to guarantee a dignified level of life to its citizens.

Moreover, the promotion of the nexus between development and security is usually done by citing their interdependence, and therefore omitting in explaining how these discourses merged before analysing how they can support each other. Interdependence makes the nexus discourse easier to sell because it creates a quicker and unanimous consensus by gathering all those professionals working in the fields of development and security by claiming that if you get one you will get the other. However, if we compare with the Cold War period, for instance, when development and security followed parallel but independent tracks, it was the case of a close complementarity between them. As the nexus is formulated nowadays, it is their interdependence more than their complementarity that is promoted, above all if we regard the link between human development and human security.

When analysing the interpretation of the development-security nexus I focused on two trends, the developmentalisation of security in the 1990s and the securitisation of development in the 2000s. The developmentalisation of security is exemplified by human security which implies a reassertion of the state through a thorough scrutiny of its governance capabilities, despite the
promotion of its people-centred approach and the need to guarantee human development entitlements. The securitisation of development ties development assistance to the security agenda to prevent conflicts and it gives particular attention to the governance of the security sector because of the need to keep the control of the armed forces under the state democratic governance. The significance of these two interpretations is how they regard the link between development and security. This research pointed out the need to unpack the interdependence, complementarity but also it questioned the proclaimed commonality of development and security issues. Approaches such as the developmentalisation of security and the securitisation of development simplify these interlinkages while converging their attention to the state as the starting point for guarantee security and development. While the state is arguably the main political actor that still centralises discourses on development and security, the language of human development and human security has so far not been powerful enough to push world actors to operationalise a vision of development and security that goes beyond a state to state dialogue. For instance, issues such as famine, refugees flows and epidemics have been regarded as humanitarian issues outside the mainstream of development and security realms. Thus, the full fledged integration within the vocabulary of international relations of a human development and security perspective de-linked from the state is still in the making.

The development-security nexus vision is bound to create clashes between perceptions and expectations because it has its interpretation anchored to the centrality of the state while using the language of human development and human security as the rationale for its promotion. This is why my research on the theoretical interpretation of the development-security nexus should benefit from further research to bring to the fore other relations of complementarity, dependence, antithesis that are shadowed and locked within a simplistic state-people relation and approach which so far has been incapable to offer a new conceptualisation and practice of the development-security nexus which is not centred on the state.

The theoretical implications of this nexus for development and security theories is that it is an opportunity for a deterritorialisation of concepts that could shake the state-centric view implicit in the mainstream elaboration of development and security. The initial euphoria of the 1990s for the consent on human development and human security appeared during a decade of dissatisfaction with economic and security theories due to, among others, the debt crisis, states’ financial imbalances, and the collapsed of the Soviet Union. This caused a feeling of inadequacy more than a loss of confidence towards the state as the agent of development and security. In this regard, the inadequacy was linked to the failure to trickle down state’s wealth to people; to keep up the Soviet
political apparatus and to predict its demise; failed to intervene to hamper atrocities in large scale such as in Rwanda; failed to solve issues such as the Nagorno-Karabakh which shows how a state militarised action or a militarised stalemate is still the way with which states deal with security matters. However, as shown by the Civil Military Relations literature that analysed the 1990s policy attention towards the governance of the security sector, the state came out from this decade reinforced in its role of providing stability, peace, security and development.

THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS IN PRACTICE

The evolving meaning of development and security embedded in the development-security nexus approach provides SSR policies with a multiplicity of definitions, objectives and means. The practice of SSR is a broad area and through the three case studies two aspects have been investigated:

1) What is the novelty of SSR policies considering that the concerns that they address are not new. In fact, already in the 1990s international policy makers devoted their attention to the governance of the defence sector and the importance to contextualise it within a national democratic political architecture.

2) The delineation of the spectrum of action of these policies, namely the meaning of the security sector of states and how this relates to security and development as defined by the SSR literature. Furthermore, the complexity of these two aspects and the contemporary enthusiasm of international policy makers towards a policy tools that takes into account the development-security nexus make necessary a clarification of the certainties and misconceptions linked to these policies.

1) The novelty of SSR policies is said to be their expanded definitional boundaries which nowadays include also development concerns. In particular, what is new is the usage of the language of human security and human development to scrutinise and question the state. This attention is indeed the result of the human security approach that is concerned with analysing the development and security contextualisation of the citizen within the security apparatus of the state, as well as the focus on state governance of the 1990s. With the appropriation by SSR in the 2000s of the language of human security and human development, it was the language more than the practice of these policies to have changed.

Saying that the governance of the security sector expresses the development-security nexus implies that the consent for the human which created the nexus between development and security concerns has been absorbed or superseded by state security interests. Human security was the conceptual driving force behind the formulation of policies which affirm the imperative to address
together development and security concerns. It was the concept which has linked concerns about people access to development entitlements, concerns about the security of these entitlements, and expressed all this through a language of “humanity”. Despite the publicity of incarnating the humanist spirit of the time and putting the human being before other state’s political interests, the language of SSR policies has adopted the technical wordings related to the governance of the security sector, using terms such as reform, democratic control of the armed forces, rule of law, civilian oversight, and so on. As we have seen through the Civil-Military Relation literature, and in particular with the case study of Armenia, this language was in vogue before the SSR-boom of the late 1990s, so much that states’ defence reforms are written with the language that is found in current policies titled SSR. The appropriation of this language in the 2000s coexists with the terminology related to human development and human security, but this composite language seems unable so far to address all the concerns that it raises. This ambitious policy tool might cause a “backlash from ordinary people who do not see an immediate change from SSR” (interview with Robin Luckham Institute of Development Studies 14 May 2010), this because of the expectations linked to the language of human development/security which might be perceived as providing with direct assistance to them as individuals rather than to their state’s élite. In this regard, the SSR implemented in Guinea-Bissau is an example of this set of policies raising expectations that external actors, such as the EU, will reform the country’s security sector.

If we look at the history of SSR and how development and security are conceptualised in the development-security nexus, the focus remains on state governance capacity. This means that SSR policies, by focusing on the state, subvert the radical edge of the nexus that was centred on the consent for the human publicised by human development and security discourses. However, considering that the development and security of people in both discourses were regarded as dependent on their development/security rights guaranteed by the state, it resulted that the state was never really absent. Thus this unchallenged primacy of the state calls into question the meaning of the development-security nexus. This can be investigated when considering the conversion from the ideal multi-pronged objectives of SSR, security, development and democracy (OECD 2005:16) to the narrow sector-based approach that takes place when looking at SSR in practice such as prison reforms, International Humanitarian Law training to soldiers, police reform and so on (DfID 2003, 2003a; OECD 2007). More than to do with ‘pragmatism’ because this sectorial approach can be regarded as the only way in which SSR can be made practical, it can also be that there is a flaw in the development-security nexus itself, or because SSR policies, despite various lofty proclamations,
have never been about anything more than a renewal of state security with the development-security nexus becoming its rhetoric.

This is why I have defined SSR as a select set of policies aiming at transforming the security sector of states perceived to be conflict prone and with which donor states expect to create international security through national policy security, and national development. This definition keeps the focus of SSR on state security governance while contextualising it within current international relations in which the governance of the security infrastructure of the state is included in the agenda of Western states’ foreign policy interventions. Moreover, it avoids mentioning human development/security not because these concerns are not there but because, at the current conceptualisation and practice of these policies, these discourses are still anchored on the state despite the language that they use.

However, it has to be stressed that SSR policies are not about imposing reforms but it is a cooperation agreement based on states’ willingness to accept foreign donor states’ recommendations on how to run their security sector. The case of Afghanistan is isolated in this regard, as SSR was established since 2001 by lead-donor states in a country where a proper political leadership was not even there. As a British civil servant said “I do not know why SSR Afghanistan was called SSR, there is no logic to it, there was nothing to reform” (UK civil servant working on SSR 18 August 2010).

2) The various definitions of SSR all agree that the spectrum of action of these policies is the security sector of the state. As said by an interviewee “SSR is about the security of the state” (UK civil servant working on SSR 18 August 2010). There is a consensus in the corpus of SSR literature on the definition of security sector which includes the following groups of actors: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and the rule of law and non-statutory security forces (DfID 2002:7; OECD 2007:22; Valasek 2008:2). SSR policies have very broad objectives such as security, development, democracy and this definition of the security sector, so far unchallenged, as their field of action has limited their field of applicability to this very sector, and in doing so it has raised questions about the nature of the linkages between the security actors and broad objectives.

If it is necessary for any policy to define its field of intervention, the issue with SSR is that by acting only on the security sector, even broadly defined, it leaves unanswered how this leads to development, apart from the common statement that a properly done SSR minimise the risk of conflict. In fact, the “freedom from want” is assumed to be hampered by a lack of a fair and functioning state security sector (Groenewald et al 2002; Helly 2006; Narayan et al 2000). Indeed
SSR, by having used the development discourse as a background to contextualise their significance as well as the ultimate objective of their intervention, have left unexplained how to achieve development results.

This implies that the meaning of development within SSR policies needs to be better formulated. As Nicole Ball said when interviewed about SSR, “conceptually the linkage to development was there, but in practice there has mainly been security, and policy makers working on restructuring the security services don’t move on to the other aspects of the SSR agenda” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). With SSR what is perceived as a postponement of development is actually a conceptualisation of development that mainly focuses on the state which has to be capable to guarantee human development/security of its citizens. Guinea-Bissau is a case where people’s expectations, but also those of donor states’ have been tested on this issue. In this regard, the Council of Europe stated that the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau will terminate end of September 2010 due to:

political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law in the country make it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as originally foreseen, without compromising its own principles. ...The EU intensified its political dialogue with the Guinea-Bissau authorities and asked for clear signs of commitment to the principles of the rule of law. The recent nomination of General Antonio Indjai to the post of Chief of Defence Staff constitutes another setback to the process of democratic consolidation and confirms that the conditions for deployment of the new mission are not met (Council of the European Union 2010:1).

This setback of the EU highlights the two big limitations of SSR as they are currently conceived: the delimitation of SSR to the security sector and the issue of ownership of these policies. As stated “SSR has no chances when the SSR coach is an international actor” (UK civil servant working on SSR 18 August 10). But what about the failure of the SSR objectives? Is a matter here of judging the means or the ends of SSR policies? Namely, in a country like Guinea-Bissau where the militarisation of politics has been the norm so far, does it mean that the impossibility to reform this sector has doomed this country not to achieve development? Rather than a conflict trap (Collier et al 2003), are we seen here that a set of security policies cannot overcome the ‘security sector trap’?

The same narrow conceptualisation of the field of applicability of SSR to the security sector is seen not only in Guinea-Bissau but also in Afghanistan. In both cases, most of the policy attention is given primarily to the armed forces and secondary to the police. SSR in Guinea-Bissau meant the EU giving advice on defence matters; in Afghanistan, states supporting SSR are mainly engaged in training and equipping Afghan forces so that they can replace Western soldiers at the front lines. The difference is in the policy theatre: war in Afghanistan and a protracted political instability in
Guinea-Bissau. The focus of SSR on the governance of the security sector with a strong engagement on the military aspect has hollowed the significance and objectives of these policies by depriving them of their conceptual richness. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, policy makers had time to formulate the design of these polices which implied an assessment of the security sector, a plan for a crosscutting and whole government approach, and the usage of an appropriate methodology for supporting the governance of the security sector. This idyllic situations clashes with the one in Afghanistan where a military intervention and a governance vacuum in Kabul required the start of a process of state governance building of which SSR was seen as part of it, in particular related to the recruitment, training and equipping of security sector actors. As we saw in the analysis of their legal framework, issues such as the judiciary, counter-narcotics were included in the security sector only at the beginning of the SSR exercise but later were dropped (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005:117).

The issue about the conceptualisation of the security sector in SSR policies seems to have affected the results of these policies more than the context itself. In the wide and complex spectrum of insecurity that a country can experience, SSR are regarded as a series of appropriate security responses, as seen by the many programs related to the security sector that can branch off from the SSR policy label (OECD 2007). However, in these settings of insecurity, policy makers refer to SSR as the reform of the security sector or its transformation (Lilly et al 2002), or reconstruction of this sector (Brzoska & Law 2006), or security system reform (OECD 2005), or justice and security sector reform (UNDP 2003a). These denominations of SSR fit into diverse labels that are attached to segments of state insecurity such as peace-building, conflict management, peace support operations, peace building (Brzoska & Law 2006; Hills et al 2008; Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005; Smoljan 2003), even if “little analysis has been done on SSR as a conflict prevention issue” (Groenewald et al 2002:2).

From examples of SSR implemented in various countries (DfID 2003, 2003a; OECD 2007) it comes out that there is no blueprint for these policies. This raises the question if it is possible to “speak of the existence of ‘international policies’ that are equal or appropriate to the multifaceted security and developmental threats facing many developing countries in the early years of the 21st century” (Tschirgi in Klingebiel 2006:62). While each SSR coach adapts SSR to its mandate and each SSR actor adopts SSR to solve selected state security problems, the issue at stake is what is certain about SSR. The certainty about SSR is that currently these policies are a response to a state security question and not much that “SSR address the security precondition for development” as Hendrickson says (interview with Dylan Hendrickson from the Conflict, Security and Development
Group, 15 April 2010). This because the link between the reform of a security sector and its impact on the human development and security has not been duly extrapolated.

Therefore this implies that where SSR are implemented there is a certain degree of insecurity measured according to political national and/or international considerations. Considering the broad meaning of security, from military security to securing development entitlements, and the wide spectrum of insecurity that a country can experience, from pre to conflict and post-conflict, it derives that there are umpteen contexts of insecurity in the world. Consequently, while the conceptual base of SSR is certain, namely the development-security nexus, its policy theatre is not because SSR are used to address the whole gamut of insecurity. The question is if this policy flexibility is possible. Afghanistan, for instance, is a war theatre, a policy theatre, a state-building theatre, in some areas a post-conflict theatre, or simply a worrying humanitarian disaster theatre. This is indeed a case where SSR seem to fit in every face of this destroyed country. However, what result should be expected in terms of fulfilling the development-security nexus in each of these situations depends on how SSR policies are designed.

In this regard, there are those who say that SSR has become too broad, and this “questions the disparity between theories and practice of this new way of framing security assistance” (interviews with NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010). This broadness also implies that the number of actors willing to get involved in SSR is increasing. Various UN agencies, the European Union, NATO, OECD, have all started “talking SSR” raising problems about “lack of coordination at political level about who does what within the SSR comprehensive approach and the inclusion of NGOs and development actors” (interviews with NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010; see also Welch & Mendelson Formann 1998). These challenges, however, don’t seem to deter policy makers from promoting SSR as the passe-partout to solve situations of insecurity which is seen as interlinked with poverty in countries characterised by a weak or undemocratic security sector management. This because, how stated by the ex USA Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on 18 January 2006 “In this world it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interest, our development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together” (Vaisse 2007:15).

However, the problem is that “there is a big confusion in people’s mind, if something has to do with security it must be SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). The question then is how far the SSR label should be stretched (Brzoska et al 2006). Indeed, as Nicole Ball affirmed “we cannot call all that relates to development and security SSR” (interview with Nicole Ball from the Center for International Policy, 21 April 2010). So, the
The definitional boundaries of SSR are difficult to draw, and there are academics who, rather than searching for their ultimate definition, regard SSR as:

the sum of changes in security thinking and practicing within the framework of a specific state. Thus, it is a composite syntagma that exceeds, as well as includes, a series of parallel, but relatively separate reforms of all security factors of a particular state (Hadžić in Fluri et al 2004:11).

This interpretation validates what Nicole Ball commented above, namely that nowadays all changes in security are related to SSR. However, taking SSR as the benchmark for the changes in the field of security, and I would also add in the one of development, is reductionist because of the current incapacity to have a conceptualisation of security and development that is not absorbed within the one of state security governance. The problem is how to disentangle security from state sovereignty, and development from state governance, and to create a security and development practice that is centred on the “humanness” of development and security. This in order to be able to formulate policies which can address people’s development and security concerns without locking them into the state governance trap, also considering the long timeframe of implementation of SSR.

At the moment, the current practice of the development-security nexus does not provide with a new strategy but it allows for business to go on as usual as far as the attention to state security and development is concerned. This impel us to think already about the future of this “SSR catchphrase” (interview with a UK civil servant from MoD on 12 May 2010). However, the future of these policies is said to “look good if you look at defence reforms, but it is difficult to assess the link between security and development. SSR is going to evolve, not to disappear” (interviews with NATO military practitioners 30 March 2010). Casting uncertainty on the future of SSR is not their rapid metamorphosis according to political necessities but their inadequacy to respond to the expectations that they arise by using the language of human development and human security while focusing primarily on state security. This inadequacy will continue to be felt unless SSR policies provide with a clear meaning their publicised banner which informed their conceptual and practical orientation, namely the development-security nexus.
GLOSSARY

AIA - Afghanistan Interim Authority
ANDS - Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANM - National Armenian Movement
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CMR - Civil-Military Relations
CSP - Country Strategy Papers
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DCAF - Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DfID - Department for International Development UK
ECHO - European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EDF - European Development Fund
ESDP - European Security Defence Policy
EU - European Union
GFN-SSR - Global Facilitator Network for SSR
HDI - Human Development Index
HIPC - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IHL - International Humanitarian Law
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IPAP - Individual Partnership Action Plan
IR - International Relations
LICUS - Low-Income Countries Under Stress
MDG - Millennium Development Goal
MFDC - Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCHA - United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE - Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe
PAIGC - Partido Africano para la Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde
PAP-DIP - Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PARP - Planning and Review Process
PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PMC - Private Military Companies
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC - Private Security Companies
PSR - Party of Social Restoration
SAP - Structural Adjustment Programs
SSR - Security Sector Reform
UN - United Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drug and Crime
UNOGBIS - United Nations Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
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