Politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan, Pakistan

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POLITICS OF EDUCATION, CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BANOCHESTAN, PAKISTAN

JALAL FAIZ

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 2015
Author’s Declaration

This thesis is carried out as per the guidelines and regulations of the University of Westminster. I hereby declare that this thesis is solely based on my own research and that appropriate credit has been given (directly or indirectly) where references have been made to the work of others.

Jalal Faiz
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Thank you all for your love and care.
Dedication

To all the Stateless nations (particularly the victims of conflict and violence) who are being suppressed and brutalised because of what is theirs: distinct identity, history, culture and language, concept of nationhood and enormous potential of resources.
Abstract

Balochistan is one of the federating units (provinces) of Pakistan; it constitutes 44% of Pakistan’s total territory and has been in a state of confrontation with the state since 1948. This is because the majority of the Baloch consider that the Pakistani state annexed their land forcibly, against the will and desire of the people. The Baloch nationalists have never accepted this annexation, and as a result the state has been facing serious crises precipitated by various factors. Ever since Pakistan’s annexation of Balochistan, there has been an on-going conflict between the Baloch (i.e., the Baloch people) and the state of Pakistan. The fact is that the conflict in Balochistan is multidimensional, including political, social and economic factors, the avarice of the Pakistani state and the grievances of the Baloch people. In order to aid an understanding of the various backgrounds to the conflict, this thesis contributes to debates on the politics of education and conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan.

I have used statistics and analysed data gathered during my fieldwork in Balochistan and Pakistan to investigate the politics of education and examine various policy frameworks, rationales and perspectives on the role of education. In order to do so, this study adopts a qualitative method and employs multiple data sources: documentary data, semi-structured interviews with twenty-eight stakeholders (in the province and country), visual data, and observations.

Drawing on functionalist and conflict perspectives on the role of education, this thesis examines whether education in Balochistan is designed to empower the people or is simply used as a tool to control them. I have found that the state is not willing to educate the Baloch people; rather, it wishes to control them. There are two ways in which education in Balochistan is being used to serve the purpose of control.
Firstly, the state of education in terms of its type, quality, quantity and infrastructure is considered by the majority of Baloch to be a failure of government’s strategic policy. For instance, education in Balochistan has lagged behind in various areas of government policy and decision-making. Major problems in Balochistan’s educational system include a deeply inadequate supply of textbooks, insufficient monitoring of schools, shortages of teachers and schools for both boys and girls, and insufficient funding. Secondly, many Baloch decry Pakistan’s unjust efforts to impose its culture, language and radical religious ideologies on the Baloch people. Indeed, the politics of (mis)representation of the Baloch and their history, culture and language are implemented through the state’s official textbooks. Education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is highly biased against the Baloch culture, history and social set-up, and it is thus a contributory factor in the generation of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. Formal education in Balochistan is structured in ways that indoctrinate children with a different language, culture and history. To many scholars, controlling education negates Baloch national aspirations and thus contributes to the conflict in Balochistan.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIML</td>
<td>All Indian Muslim League</td>
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<tr>
<td>AINC</td>
<td>All Indian National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBISE</td>
<td>Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEMIS</td>
<td>Balochistan Education Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHRC</td>
<td>Baloch Human Rights Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNM</td>
<td>Balochistan National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP (M)</td>
<td>Balochistan National Party (Mengal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoC</td>
<td>Bureau of Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSO</td>
<td>Baloch Students Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUETK</td>
<td>Balochistan University of Engineering and Technology Khuzdar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUITEMS</td>
<td>Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARs</td>
<td>Central Asian Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Dakar Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Dakar Framework of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Economic Survey of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>Global Campaign for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross Enrolment Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoB</td>
<td>Government of Balochistan</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Gender Parity Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Geological Survey of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HECP</td>
<td>Higher Education Commission of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crises Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGFC</td>
<td>Inspector General of the Frontier Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVBMP</td>
<td>International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jammat-e-Islami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWP</td>
<td>Jamoori Watan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSNP</td>
<td>Kalat State National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUAWMS</td>
<td>Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Awami Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER</td>
<td>Net Enrolment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>National Finance Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDP</td>
<td>Public Sector Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBKWU</td>
<td>Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UoB</td>
<td>University of Balochistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UoL</td>
<td>University of Loralai</td>
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<tr>
<td>UoT</td>
<td>University of Turbat</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 The Background

This research contributes to the debate over whether education ameliorates or exacerbates conflict, focusing on Balochistan province in Pakistan. The emphasis here is not on theorising conflict but on providing a conceptually sound and empirically rich analysis of the politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan.¹

In the literature, there are three approaches to education and conflict. The dominant approach is that education serves the purpose of care and reduces conflict. Functionalist theorists look at the function and role of education. According to this view, education is a binding force of any society and is capable of keeping it together. It creates unity, solidarity, norms and values, skills and socialisation for that society. Functionalists such as Emile Durkheim (1956, 1962), Talcott Parsons (1959), and Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (1945) believe that education provides universal values, merit, training, status, employment and better futures for people. This perspective on the role of education is always positive and mentions the caring part of educational institutions. However, this view has been challenged by the conflict theorists.

The second approach is that education is about control. Conflict theorists reject the functionalist view of education and argue that the purpose of education is to maintain

¹ The literature on education and conflict uses expressions such as 'education generates conflict'. In the Balochistan context, however, I will use alternative words such as 'contributes to' and 'exacerbates' since, in Balochistan, conflict is already present and multidimensional. The nature of the Balochistan conflict is discussed in a separate chapter.
social inequality in society. Conflict theorists, such as Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976), Randall Collins (1979), and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), argue that education dictates the ideology of the ruling class to the poor and preserves the power of those who are well-off. Education is about the ideas of the dominant class potentially annihilating the history and culture of the socially lower-status people. In this regard, conflict theorists have provided many reasons to justify their argument that poor students do not have equal opportunities for education compared to their wealthier counterparts. Rich people with good incomes and salaries are able to provide better education for their children. Scholars holding this perspective reject the idea of ‘merit’ held by the functionalists. Merit is about maintaining the status of the ruling elite. This is because they have access to better educational facilities. Proponents of this view see education only as a source of maintaining the power of the ruling elite in society.

The third view states that education suffers due to conflict. Education, in particular, faces a deepening crisis in many countries suffering economic hardship on the one hand and political repression and social/ethnic conflict on the other. Many scholarly works, including those by Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli (2000), Lynn Davies (2004 and 2005a and b), Paulina Rose and Martin Greeley (2006a and b), and Alan Smith (2005), call for a more nuanced view of the relationship between education and conflict.

After defining the critical terms for the purpose of this thesis, two main questions are addressed. Is education a catalyst in conflicts or is it actually a tool in conflict resolution? Both policy-makers and scholars have turned their attention to education as a means of managing inter-state\(^2\) and intra-state conflict, but the theoretical literature and the

\(^2\) Two kinds of conflict are discussed in the literature: ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ state conflict. Since the latter form of conflict has become the dominant form of armed conflict, this research discusses intra-state conflict, leaving inter-state conflict for future researchers to tackle. Secondly, education (formal education, as attained at
researcher’s empirical research for this PhD thesis have led to contrasting conclusions concerning education’s role in preventing conflict. In this study my aim is to show that education in Balochistan has not been employed to prevent conflict; rather, it is a source of the conflict.

Conflict is an extremely broad and overused term. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to focus on both inter- and intra-state conflict. Thus, in this project the term ‘conflict’ will refer specifically to an intra-state conflict. Education is also a contested phenomenon. This thesis is not an investigation into the ‘meaning’ or the ‘idea’ of education; rather, it is about its relationship with conflict. The emphasis is on the politics of formalised education as enacted by the state. It investigates this by focusing on how education is formulated and implemented by public institutions. Thus, this is a study of the top-down implementation and not the bottom-up reception of formal education. There is a reason for avoiding the reception of education by students. In this research I do not seek to engage with vulnerable groups such as school children or ordinary college students. The actual impact of education on youngsters requires a more comprehensive study that is not possible within a PhD, especially since the area of focus is a conflict region. Public policies around formal education can be studied without the need for research amongst vulnerable groups. Within education, the focus is on the curriculum, pedagogy and textbooks, as well as some qualitative and quantitative statistics.

school at various levels, and which is enacted through public policy on a national level) is used as the main ‘cause variable’.
1.2 The Case-Study of Balochistan

For a work of this scope, this thesis is based on the investigation of a single case-study: Balochistan. Balochistan, one of the four federated units (provinces) of Pakistan, is a region of geo-strategic importance. It is rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. This region has remained a conflict-ridden area since 1948 (Bansal, 2006; Grare, 2006). Balochistan became part of the newly-created state of Pakistan in 1948 under controversial circumstances. With a geographical area of 347,190 sq. kms, Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan, comprising 44% of the country’s total territory. It shares international borders with Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the north.

The Baloch people have traditionally inhabited the land that includes not only this province but also areas beyond it, in Iran and Afghanistan. After the invasion of Balochistan by the British Empire in 1839, Balochistan was divided into many parts. Presently, the eastern part, called Balochistan province, is under the control of Pakistan; the western part is also a province in Iran, called Sistan and Baluchestan, and a section of the northern part is in Afghanistan. Then there is the historical and cultural Balochistan, conceived as a nation without a state by most Baloch people. The focus of this thesis is on the Balochistan that is controlled by Pakistan and is one of the provinces in the federal structure of the country.

The confrontation between Balochistan and Pakistan is fuelled in part by a commonly held view among the Baloch (the inhabitants of Balochistan) that Pakistan has illegally and forcibly annexed their homeland. The Baloch nationalists are convinced that the dominant

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3 Since the division of United India in 1947 into two sovereign states, Pakistan has, constitutionally, become a federal state. In order to keep the culturally and linguistically distinct nationalities united in Pakistan, political, administrative and financial powers are distributed among federal and provincial governments. Secondly, ‘Balochistan’ has been spelt differently by different authors; however, in this dissertation I have used ‘Balochistan’ and ‘Baloch’ rather than ‘Baluchistan’ and ‘Baluch’.

4 Here we need to clarify that Baloch is a generic term referring to people but Baloch is often used as a surname by individual Baloch.
Pakistani polity (the army, the civilian bureaucracy and the religious leaders) not only usurped their independence but has also been exploiting their natural wealth ruthlessly for decades. These deeply held convictions have led to a series of insurgencies against Pakistan. To suppress these insurgencies, Pakistan launched five army operations, in 1948, 1958-59, 1963-69, 1973-77, and 2002 to the present day. In addition to a critical discussion on education, conflict and conflict resolution as conceptualised by leading researchers, the thesis contributes to debates over the conflict in Balochistan. One of the chapters (chapter 2) examines the political, economic, historical, social, and geopolitical factors that have contributed to Balochistan’s conflict with Pakistan.

The Baloch also argue that the federation of Pakistan did not undertake any social sector development, such as in education and health, to the level that is enjoyed in other provinces of Pakistan. One of the indicators of its under-development is the poor state of education: all the indicators of education standards show that Balochistan lags far behind the other three provinces of Pakistan. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore whether education ameliorates or exacerbates regional ethnic tensions, and what effect it has on the conflict in Balochistan.

While policy-makers and international organisations such as the UNDP focus mostly on quantifiable aspects of education such as the level of literacy or extent of schooling, in this research the primary emphasis is on the quality of education, most specifically on what notions of nation, ethnicity and history are being promoted through the Pakistani education system in Balochistan. What versions of history and identity politics are being removed and excluded? Do Baloch nationalists see these politics of silence and selective emphasis as contributing to the conflict?
According to the World Bank (WB) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), the current state of education in Balochistan is extremely poor (WB, 2005 and HRW, 2010). It has failed to produce the human capital that the province requires to run its public and private sectors. The state education system is functioning beyond its capacity in order to run schools in far-flung areas. The education policy of Pakistan does not take into account the poor infrastructure, difficult terrain and scattered population of the province. Hathaway and Burki (2005) are of the opinion that the education policy of the government pertaining to Balochistan has adopted a ‘top-down’ approach, where the central government barely considers local demands and ground realities. They further add that education, along with other social sectors in Balochistan, has become the scapegoat for the troublesome political relationship between the centre and the province. The number of teachers in Balochistan is insufficient. It is worth mentioning that in one of the policies the government defined a primary school as consisting of two rooms with five teachers with no consideration for overcrowding. This example illustrates the extent of the authorities’ indifference to the state of education in Balochistan compared to other provinces in Pakistan.

Another argument that might be made here is that formal education in Balochistan is structured in such a way that it negates Baloch national aspirations and thus contributes to the conflict. Formal education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is biased against the Baloch culture, history and social set-up, and is a potential factor in generating retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. The student organisations, active in educational institutions, highlight the biased syllabus to support their arguments that the state has engineered the education syllabus in order to suppress the distinct identity of the Baloch people. This mundane fact provokes Baloch students into political activism and, subsequently, into joining the Baloch resistance movement against the state of Pakistan.
The thesis also explores how the formal education pursued in Balochistan does not reflect the history, culture, national identity, and social and economic wellbeing of Baloch. Balochistan, with a weak and dysfunctional educational infrastructure, has the lowest literacy rate of all the provinces in Pakistan. My research also intends to show how a shift in quality and type of education may aid conflict resolution. The shift in the policy will be a sign that the Pakistani state has changed its strategic plan and wants to normalise its relationship with the Baloch. The existing education system in Balochistan is not the panacea for conflict resolution between Balochistan and Pakistan. Policy-makers at federal level should make serious attempts to resolve this long-lasting conflict by giving priority to education in Balochistan and by empowering the Balochistan government to make major changes in the educational system. Only a major change in Pakistan’s approach to Balochistan will resolve conflict in the province.

1.3 Rationale for this Study

Despite the long-lasting conflict and the depressing state of education in Balochistan, no academic research using primary ethnographic sources has been conducted on the relationship between education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan. No one has conducted any empirical research on this topic. No scholarly work has been conducted to answer questions such as the following: Do the nature, type and extent of education designed by the state of Pakistan in Balochistan exacerbate the conflict there or do they offer an effective venue for conflict resolution?

Baloch claim that the failure of the state and its policies towards Balochistan has resulted in this conflict. This is a historical perspective on the conflict. The current state of education in Pakistan is being used as a political tool to control the Baloch people and
make them loyal to Pakistan. The official educational textbooks either represent the Baloch people, their history, culture and language negatively or ignore them altogether. This type of education is primarily a mode of control. In reaction, in schools and colleges in most parts of Balochistan, students do not sing Pakistan’s national anthem or fly Pakistan’s flag. In the majority of the Baloch areas, students perform the Balochi anthem *Ma Chuke Balochani*... (we are the sons of the Baloch, free and sovereign, masters of our own destiny) and hoist the flag of Greater Balochistan (envisaging independence) consisting of all Baloch lands currently under the control of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This resistance leads to more conflict.

The available literature on the topic of this research is very limited, both in scope and depth. However, there is a huge body of literature discussing the causes of backwardness of Balochistan province in terms of the vastness of the territory, lack of funds, tribal structure and so on (see Ahmed, 2013; Dashti, 2012; Baluch, 1987; Harrison, 1981). Although these are not the only causes of conflict, the prevailing literature on the subject also fails to critically analyse the educational policies and their implementation by the federal government in Balochistan. Hence, this research aims to identify and classify the politics of education and explore how the conflict shifts the balance between the state and the Baloch people.

In short, this research aims to fill the gap in the existing literature on the link between education and conflict in Balochistan. The research will make a substantial contribution and might be used by international academics with an interest in education and conflict as well as by policy-makers in Balochistan and Pakistan. This study is the only one of its kind in this area of research to use extensive literature, expert opinions and descriptive statistics.
It provides an in-depth insight into this conflict, explaining how education has been employed to exacerbate it, and how it might be used to resolve it.

The location of the fieldwork I selected to investigate the main questions is Balochistan, one of the most dangerous places in the world for reporting and conducting interviews. Although education is potentially a source of conflict resolution, this research describes the education system in Balochistan as poor (as a result, on the one hand, of ‘radical indoctrination’ and, on the other, of the Pakistani government’s refusal to allow the inclusion of Baloch rights). Therefore, one cannot imagine how it might play such a role. In this thesis I try to explain the notion of how, exactly, education might ‘resolve conflict in Balochistan’. I have interviewed various individuals and clarified what we are seeking to uncover. I have also focused on the limitation of this approach that considers education to be exacerbating conflict in Balochistan.

1.4 Research Topic and Questions

The topic of this thesis is ‘The politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan, and Pakistan’. Since 1948, when Pakistan annexed Balochistan, there has been an on-going conflict between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan. The provision and quality of education in Balochistan has always been extremely poor, and it is very likely that this has a causal relationship with the conflict: education, potentially, has a massive impact on the conflict while the conflict, equally, is likely to affect the quantity and quality of education provided. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been examined systematically until now. To examine the politics of education and conflict I have selected Balochistan as a case-study. Thus, the main research question for this project is as follows:
In what ways do the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled Balochistan exacerbate the on-going conflict there? Can education offer opportunities for conflict resolution?

In order to investigate the key research question, this thesis also explores the causes of conflict in Balochistan, the politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani state, and the significance of those politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict.

1.5 Research Methodology

This section describes the proposed methodology for this study. An analysis of the research requirements for this topic indicated that a qualitative method would be most suitable. Prior to discussing the method and research framework under which this research was conducted, it is relevant to highlight some of the theoretical issues concerning the research methods of any social research.

It is important to discuss various research paradigms and the matter of ontology and epistemology while conducting research. When undertaking research, one needs to develop a well-defined frame of scientific methodology comprising different ideas, rules, techniques and approaches in order to produce and assess information. There is no single best way to undertake a research scheme. Therefore, the researcher must select the approaches, strategies and methods that are most suitable for the researcher’s own research project. This frame is essential at this stage of the research project in order to consider the philosophical position of the study.

This project applied a semi-structured method to interview the stakeholders (educationalists, academics, historians, scholars, policy-makers and politicians) and used
primary sources (stakeholder interviews, statistics, reports etc.), secondary data and grey literature in order to explore the state of education and conflict in Balochistan. The purpose of using numerous methods was not only to reduce the limitations of one method but also to increase the reliability and validity of the results of this research. This research is a critical analysis of primary and secondary literature/data and a discourse analysis of educational textbooks. Through interviews, observation and visualisation in the field, it was possible to determine the significance of both education and conflict affiliation in the province. Layder (1998) argues that a multi-strategy framework in social research employs various data collection techniques. This helps in the investigation of social reality, formulation of research questions and choice of research project.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of research methodology, further examination is necessary. Here, I briefly examine the process of data collection (both primary and secondary data), discourse analysis and stakeholders’ interviews. Second, the data analysis and various ethical dimensions of the research are described. These include the issues of reflexivity, confidentiality, and personal background of the researcher.

Primary data were collected from various sources, such as policy documents, government statistics and content analysis of educational literature. Data sources for education and other variables came mainly from the provincial government’s Education Department as well as from the Economic Survey of Pakistan (various issues), Pakistan Year Book (various issues), State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports (various issues), reports of human rights organisations, and the database of the Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan. It should also be mentioned that I visited Balochistan and had access to the datasets on primary, secondary and tertiary education in Balochistan, which are mainly used to show the quality and quantity of education in the province. The conflict
data and materials came from different national and international sources, such as Human Rights Watch, United Nations, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and International Crises Group, and through interviews and observations.

In addition, I interviewed 28 public figures, educationalists and policy-makers. The research was conducted through: 1) individual interviews with relevant government officials, Baloch leaders and intellectuals, and experts on the subject; and 2) analysis of school textbooks and curricula to examine how Baloch identity is ignored or subsumed within the larger Pakistani nationalist narrative. In this aspect of my research, Discourse Analysis (DA) helped me to realise the shortcomings in the policy texts, curricula and textbooks, and to transcribe interviews. That is because this is a study of top-down implementation rather than bottom-up reception of formal education. This investigation was intended to address the Baloch grievances that their culture, language, history and people are alienated in the Pakistani education system.

I gained access to participants to conduct semi-structured interviews. In order to approach them and make appointments with them for the interviews, I contacted them by telephone and e-mail. I sent separate e-mails along with a covering letter to all potential participants, explaining the aim of my research (see details in appendix I and II). The letter also included my personal details. As mentioned above, potential participants included education experts and subject specialists, government officials, social scientists, academics and politicians (see list in appendix VI).\(^5\)

All interviews were recorded, archived and transcribed during the fieldwork. The interview language was English (preferably), Urdu (another option as a national language in

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\(^5\)Observing interviewee behaviour during interviews is an important tool, and interaction with interviewees, in most cases, produced more information for my research questions. In this research, observations also took place during the stakeholder interviews.
Pakistan) and Balochi (the language of the Baloch). Where English was not used, I translated the interviews into English as I can read, write and understand all three languages. The translation of the interviews contained only the analysis of relevant parts. The subsequent Table 05 (in the appendix IV) provides information and the participants’ biographies.

Interviews were conducted individually. Participants did not receive any kind of compensation or money for providing information. I have named these interviewees in my thesis because the majority of them are well-known writers, political commentators, academics and educationalists. I used the actual names of the majority of my participants because they had already given me their consent (see consent form in appendix I) for the use of their names, and I quoted some of them openly in my thesis. However, it has been noticed by the researcher that there are a few sensitive statements given by the research participants. Therefore, the researcher has decided to use pseudo names for six interviewees. They are renamed with fictitious names. This decision has been made on the basis of security concerns and the changing situation in Balochistan.

Conventionally, no one asked me not to mention them. Had they done so, I would have used pseudo names for all participants to protect their anonymity. The exact dates and locations of interviews and additional identifying details have not been withheld (apart from six of them) since the interviewees gave their consent (see interview questions in appendix III).

I kept a diary in order to record the reflexivity of this project during my fieldwork. I took notes as soon as possible after each interview. The note-taking process began by describing the setting, place and the way the interview took place. The field study and interviews were conducted in various locations such as public places, government offices and educational
institutions. This diversity of interviewees provided both Baloch and non-Baloch perspectives. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face, for which purpose I travelled to Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan. I stayed in the field for a maximum of five months. For various reasons, a few interviews could not be arranged in person; in such cases, electronic means such as e-mails were used to conduct them. For face to face or electronic interviews (telephone, skype, e-mail, and video links), a tape recorder was used to record the respondents’ answers.

Given that Balochistan is a conflict-ridden province, accessing potential participants was a daunting task. However, due to my personal origins and work in the same province, I was able to access the majority of potential participants without any associated risks to them or to myself. Those potential participants who hailed from other provinces of Pakistan were easy to approach because of the academic links that were established while I was in a public sector university in Pakistan (see Table 05 in appendix IV, which provides the names included as participants).

Baloch nationalist political parties and student pressure groups have been in existence for decades, and some of them have been mounting an armed insurrection against the government of Pakistan in various phases for the last six decades to gain greater autonomy or independence. Thus, the evidence of all insurgencies was used to measure the intensity and magnitude of the conflict in Balochistan.

For the description and presentation of the historical background of conflicts between Balochistan and the state of Pakistan, I analysed secondary sources such as books, journal articles, working papers, and reports. This literature was used to gauge the relationship between education and conflict in Balochistan and to explore the ways in which they have been interconnected.
This research contains documentary reviews and secondary data analysis. It has utilised various sources, such as official statistics and texts. Bryman (2004) argues that, in social research, researchers study documents such as newspapers, books, articles, magazines and governmental reports. I had access to these materials, which provided important sources to gain a deeper understanding of the research topic. In addition, online newspapers, reports of international organisations and magazines are considered important for such research. Thus, the collection and review of grey literature, including newspapers, was a valued part of the field research, providing a sound background and theoretical knowledge in conducting and writing up this research work.

This research also used discourse analysis (DA) as a tool to describe and analyse the ways in which education affects conflict in Balochistan. There is no single definition of discourse analysis but it is capable of showing reality in the form of text and narratives (Hewitt, 2009). It is about the interpretation of texts. Scholars in the field of DA argue that discourse is a reality itself. Therefore, our conception, perception, recognition and imagination of reality can be interpreted by discourse (Hewitt, 2009). Discourse analysis can neither resolve any problem nor provide any absolute solution but it can provide an opportunity to highlight the reality behind the text, such as narratives and ideological issues. In other words, it can highlight a specific problem in the text and help the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues under investigation.

In this thesis, DA, particularly critical discourse analysis (CDA), helped the researcher to understand the philosophical issues in the textbooks of Pakistan’s education system. It enabled the researcher to identify the main messages around identity and nationalism as provided by the education system and, thus, to determine whether these messages were affirmative to those being educated or whether they were primarily a political tool to
represent a certain nation-state ideology of Pakistan. “More specifically, critical discourse analysts want to know what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (Van Dijk, 1993: 250). In this research, apart from educational texts, various other data from government, non-government and scholarly literature are used.

Although qualitative research is undertaken in a visible world, using visual data for a research study, it is rarely used in methodological literature (Brannen, 2002). Collecting visual data in terms of taking pictures helps the researcher to capture the visual dimensions of social life. Emmison and Smith (2000) argue that visual research is about images, objects, places and everyday interactions. For scholars, visual data are not only photographs and advertisements but also material objects such as buildings, clothing and body language.

Bearing this in mind, pictures were taken to visualise, for example, buildings where the interviews took place or rallies on behalf of conflict victims and against educational disparity. It should be mentioned here that, during the time of my fieldwork, the International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (IVBMP) and Baloch Human Rights Council (BHRC) were jointly holding protests and hunger strikes in various cities in Pakistan, especially in Karachi and Quetta (the capital city of Balochistan), calling for the return of disappeared political activists. Likewise, other organisations in Balochistan often hold rallies to show their solidarity with those who have disappeared or are engaged in direct conflict with the state of Pakistan. I took some pictures of schools and rallies organised by the various organisations during my fieldwork. Visual data such as photographs play an important role in describing such situations.
With regard to education, it is believed that the state of education has been very poor in terms of quality, and the majority of the schools’ infrastructure is in a poor condition. Visual representation of school buildings and other amenities helped me to illustrate the state of education in Balochistan.

The process of data analysis involved decisions about the following: firstly, transcripts/field notes and interpretation; secondly, which data to use and which to omit; thirdly, whom to quote and how to quote them. This was an ethical issue because it exposed power and privilege in relationships, decision-making around maintaining or curbing relationships with research subjects, and the potential for profound relational violations (Doucet and Mauthner in Mauthner et al., 2002).

In my research, the main part of the qualitative analysis of the material was the interpretation of the analysed text and interviews. I interpreted the qualitative analysis of the material and analysed the characteristics of the phenomenon based on my judgement. The field notes and stakeholder interviews were first transcribed. All other data collected from the study were tabulated. The data analysis, collection, and storage as well as all interactions with research participants were undertaken according to the University of Westminster’s ethics policy and under the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality.

Many ethical issues had to be taken into serious consideration for this research. Fieldwork can give rise to a plethora of ethical dilemmas, many of which are related to power gradients between the researcher and the researched. Combined with this were complex issues of knowledge generation, ownership and exploitation (Scheyvens et al., in Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). I was aware of having the responsibility to secure the actual permission and interests of all those involved in the study. I did not misuse any of the information, and maintained a certain moral responsibility to the participants. It was my
duty as a researcher to protect the rights, privacy and sensitivities of the people in the study. The confidentiality of those who could be at risk has been preserved. Thus, when visiting Pakistan and Balochistan I obtained consent from the respective interviewees (all stakeholders) through written correspondence, clearly outlining the method and intentions of the research.

Invasion of privacy of potential respondents can be viewed both as a harm in its own right, in the sense of being morally wrong, and also as a condition that subjects people to the possibility of future harm by depriving them of the protection that privacy affords (Kelman, 1982). People give information on the basis that it will be used for the agreed purposes of the research; researchers are responsible for preserving information confidentially and anonymously unless explicitly agreed otherwise. With regard to information furnished by individuals, the risks of public exposure can be virtually eliminated by maintaining the confidentiality of the data and scrupulous adherence to the procedures agreed.

A researcher may be entrusted with private information. Hence, I stored my field notes, tapes and questionnaires in a safe place. Secondly, I only used data for the purpose agreed with the participants and did not share them with others, apart from my supervisory team.

Here it is vital to provide a description of my personal background and an explanation of the limitation of the research process in describing the impact of my dispositions as a researcher. According to Jemielniak and Kostera (2010), the accuracy of an investigation starts with the identity of the researcher. It is an important part of the research process. Describing my personal background and, hence, giving an idea of my identity is particularly necessary considering the research topic under scrutiny in this study.
I am a male, and was born in Balochistan. I am a Baloch national and obtained my early education in Balochistan. I read for an MSc. in History from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, in 2006. I joined Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences (LUAWMS) Uthal, Balochistan, as a lecturer in Social Sciences in May 2007 and have been employed there ever since (on study leave since September 2010). I applied for and was awarded a four-year fully-funded scholarship for a Master’s leading to a PhD under the faculty development programme of the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HECP).

I gained admission to the University of East Anglia (UEA), Norwich, in the School of International Development. In the said School I took an MA in the field of Conflict, Governance and International Development, which ended in September 2011. Since my scholarship was for four years, I continued to study for a PhD in September/October, 2011, at the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Westminster, London.

Studying History, Politics and Conflict as a main subject, I focused my interest on Balochistan’s conflict in Pakistan. However, I designed a Research Proposal during my MA on “The Effects of Education on Conflict and Conflict Resolution: the Case of Balochistan” (initial title of research proposal). Apart from this, as I was already working in a public sector university in Balochistan, I decided that I would like to continue working in this field.

Keeping in view my personal background, I now move on to a brief account of the research process. The research process starts with an idea, a research question or a couple of questions. Similarly, in this research the question(s) and selection of interviewees were partially the result of my personal background. Some of them may or may not represent the
Baloch perspective and many of them are non-Baloch scholars, educationalists and policymakers. The selection of these participants was a very conscious decision based on the need to have ethnic diversity in the field. Because of the nature of my research topic, I was aware of the risk involved in securing access to my research data. But my origins, personal relations and sentiments do not dictate the conclusions and analysis in my research project. Therefore, it was necessary for me to handle every type of situation very carefully.

This thesis provides various insights into education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan. Like other projects, this PhD thesis has its limitations. The first concern was time and funding restraints. Time and resources often play a crucial role during the undertaking of PhD research. Both time and funding remained conditional for me to carry out this research project. I was sponsored and given a minimum time and a specific stipend. This stipend was insufficient for me to stay in London, and it is very difficult to complete a PhD study in a minimum of three years.

Secondly, I faced difficulties in gaining access to many of my interviewees. This research was conducted through individual interviews with relevant government officials, the Baloch and non-Baloch leadership, intellectuals, and experts on the subject. In order to approach them and arrange appointments with them for the interviews, I contacted them by telephone and through e-mails. I sent separate e-mails along with letters of request to all likely participants, explaining the aims of my research. The letters also included my personal details. Despite all this, there were some misperceptions. A few of the non-Baloch treated me as a Baloch while some of the Baloch considered me a government person. This mixture of Baloch and non-Baloch interviewees was very important for my research. Hence, it took many days for me, as a researcher, to gain their trust. All (except two) of

6My note-taking process was often disturbed because the field study and interviews were conducted in various locations such as public places, government offices and educational institutions.
the interviews were conducted face to face. For these, I travelled to Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan.

Thirdly, out of twenty-eight participants, I managed to interview only four females. I actually wanted to interview more females to maintain parity among the interviewees but, ironically, very few females were available. It is a limitation of the system that patriarchy exists not only in Balochistan but also in other parts of the country. It was very important that females participated in my research if I was to obtain more information about girls’ education in Balochistan. In Balochistan female education is among the least prevalent. This gap is more visible in rural areas of the province. One of the main reasons for the small number of female interviewees is that they are not occupying government positions and do not have an effective role in political decision-making.

Fourthly, given that Balochistan is a conflict-ridden area, accessing potential participants was a daunting task. I was able to access the majority of potential participants without any risk to them, despite some crucial methodological challenges. For instance, soon after my departure from the UK the government of Balochistan province was dismissed as a result of a Hazara killing. This was an excuse for the central government of Pakistan to take such action. Hazara\(^7\) is a small ethnic group in Balochistan and they are ‘Shiite’ Muslims.

Lastly, the election in Pakistan (11\(^{th}\) May, 2013), which I consider to be a crucial time for my research, has left me with unforgettable memories. During that time I had virtually no access to the Internet or the news channels (both electronic and print media) in most of Balochistan. The state news channels were banned from broadcasting by the various

\(^7\) It is believed that some of the Sunni militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were involved in the killing. Most of the LeJ accept responsibility for targeted killings and suicide bombings. The federal government had imposed ‘Governor’s Rule’ in the province after a suicide bomb blast in Quetta (the capital city of Balochistan) that killed more than a hundred people from the Hazara community. Under these circumstances and a new bureaucratic set-up (so-called Governor’s Rule), my fieldwork was disrupted. Some of my interviewees, with whom I was in touch, left the country and I had to wait many days for them to return.
Baloch armed organisations, whose members started wall-chalking and distributing pamphlets against the election. I received various pamphlets/literature from the Baloch guerrillas by hand. The literature declared that the Pakistan election was not the solution to the Baloch problem. The security forces wanted to cast their votes by hook or by crook, while the Baloch organisations had already warned everyone to boycott the election. Government servants were taking part in strikes against the election because they were being threatened by both sides. I have gained new insights from these challenges during my research fieldwork.

1.6 The Structure and Organisation of the Thesis

Overall, this study is organised into seven chapters. These chapters can be briefly described as follows:

Chapter I (the present chapter), the introduction to the thesis, presents the research aim, a brief overview of the politics of education and conflict, the rationale for this study, the research topic, and the questions that this project intends to explore. Then, the research methodology and structure of the thesis are introduced.

The second chapter investigates the national, historical and geopolitical background to the conflict. It highlights the different aspects of this multidimensional conflict in Balochistan and provides a context for understanding the grievances of the Baloch, which it is crucial to mention as they are fundamental causes of the conflict. First, there is a historical overview of Balochistan, including its relationship with the British Empire and the newly-formed state of Pakistan in 1947-48. Second, the five phases of the conflict since Balochistan’s annexation by Pakistan are discussed. Finally, the factors behind the conflict,
i.e. the distinct cultural identity and sense of historical nationhood of the Baloch, the grievances of the Baloch people, the exploitation of their natural resources, and the geopolitical and international causes of the conflict, are explored.

In brief, it is argued that, in the past six and a half decades, state officials at both the federal and provincial levels have continually made false promises concerning the Balochistan quagmire, where people are suffering, living below the poverty line, and lacking education, development, nutrition and health facilities. Each newly-elected government coming to power in Pakistan apologises to the Baloch people for the past wrong doings and promises to change the living conditions of people, but unfortunately all of them have failed to abide by their promises. Therefore, it can be argued that the grievances of the Baloch people and the excesses of the State have resulted in a conflict that is bringing systematic economic exploitation and political and historical discrimination.

The third chapter discusses different issues pertaining to the relationship between the concepts of education, conflict and conflict resolution. This chapter has enhanced my understanding of the politics of education and conflict between Pakistan and Balochistan in a much wider context. This chapter also forms the foundation of my research. It attempts to answer this question: Is education a mode of control or empowerment?

In this chapter, various themes related to education and conflicts are analysed: what is education; what are its purpose and its relationship with conflict; how might it generate conflict, and in what ways can it be used as a political tool? Furthermore, to what extent might it be effective in resolving conflict? The concepts and approaches are critically reviewed for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the politics of education by theorising about its perspective on conflict. This perspective is known as the functionalist
theory of education or ‘functionalism’. The functionalist perspective on education looks at how it plays a role in serving the demands of society. This perspective emphasises the positive aspects of education such as skills, learning, behaviour and attitude, and the provision of a sense of solidarity.

However, in order to understand the politics of education, conflict perspective, one of the major theories, is discussed here. This is also known as a Marxist perspective on the role of education. It is the opposite of the functionalist view. According to this view, the purpose of education is to maintain inequality by keeping power in the hands of those who are influential in society. Criticising the functionalists, this perspective maintains that the education system moulds the lower classes and social groups into obedient citizens and workers. In this viewpoint, education policies have served to control citizens and make them subservient.

The main conclusion of this chapter is that education is a double-edged sword in terms of its effects on conflict. That is, effective and balanced education may help to redress conflict but, at the same time, biased education will increase the level of conflict. In this chapter I have noted that education often contributes to the promotion of conflict. In theorising about various concepts regarding education and conflict, this chapter will follow the main argument that education, as a means of fundamental human rights, will help to resolve conflict if the state provides objective, good-quality education. In response to intra-state conflicts in the context of severe socio-economic deprivation, policy-makers and scholars often talk of education as a possible tool for conflict management, and even for conflict resolution. The emphasis is on raising the level of education, assuming that education will open up employment opportunities for people and thus divert them from the
business of conflict. In mainstream politics, activism and even development studies, this simplistic assumption remains dominant.

The fourth chapter is about the state of education in Pakistan generally and in Balochistan in particular. It looks at the causes of the worsening educational infrastructure, its type, quality and quantity, and the emergence of student politics such as the formation of the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO). This chapter also includes statistics and interviews with various participants. A case is made in this chapter that the state has failed in its duty to provide good-quality education in Balochistan.

In this chapter I have pointed out that Pakistan’s education performance has been in severe difficulties throughout its history. Although Pakistan declared ‘universal education for all’ in the very first year of its existence (1947), the allocation of state resources for education has been its lowest priority. As is pointed out in this chapter (see chapter 4), there are wide variations in literacy between the provinces. In the province of Punjab, the overall literacy rate stands at 59%, while in Balochistan it is only 45%. The pace of improvement in the literacy rate has been higher in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh over the last couple of years. The female literacy rate, particularly in Balochistan, has remained dismally low, at only 23%, which is one of the lowest rates in Pakistan.

In brief, I find that education in Balochistan is lagging behind all other policy- and decision-making. This research shows there is no doubt that the education sector in Balochistan demands special attention and rigorous planning. There are currently many difficulties with literacy in Balochistan due to the following issues and challenges: 1) a shortage of girls’ schools; 2) dysfunctional teaching methods; 3) schools with just one teacher; 4) schools without roofs and overcrowded schools; 5) a shortage of middle and secondary schools; 6) a shortage of teachers’ accommodation; 7) accessibility of schools;
8) a review of the curriculum; 9) the medium of instruction; and 10) an outdated/conventional examination system. The situation regarding primary, secondary and higher education paints a dismal picture. It should be noted that the Baloch are unhappy with the existing state of education and are struggling to gain either more educational facilities or control over their own educational affairs, i.e. policy, review and textbooks.

The fifth chapter is about the representation of the Baloch in Pakistani textbooks and the politics of control. It provides a critical analysis of pedagogy, the curriculum and the politics of exclusion. For the purposes of this chapter, all Balochistan textbooks from levels one to twelve of primary and secondary education are studied. Moreover, the other provinces’ textbooks are also examined in order to produce an in-depth analysis of the nature, purpose and role of education in the country. The question here is this: How does Pakistani education, at both school and college level, exclude or include Baloch history and identity? The main argument is that the Baloch people, their history, culture, language, music, art and personalities/characteristics are systematically excluded from the textbooks of their own provincial educational system. They are either not part of the education system or are misrepresented there. For example, they are called backward and tribal. The Baloch are excluded from and alienated in education. Balochi, the language of the Baloch people, is not being taught either as a compulsory or as an optional language. The children are forced to read and write in imported languages, such as Urdu, English and Arabic.

The analysis shows that the state aims primarily to control/dominance the Baloch through education. It is argued that the state does not care about the Baloch people and wants to control them through their schemes of indoctrination. This is done in various ways, such as excluding their language and culture and imposing imported history, language, culture and heroes, as mentioned by experts on this subject. In this chapter, two other main issues are
discussed: Islamisation, and the propagation of the ideology of Pakistan. Many scholars believe that the dominant influences in the textbooks are those of religious prejudice and the serving of the agenda of the dominant ruling establishment. Non-Muslims, especially Hindus, are presented as enemies of Islam. As the Baloch are Muslim, the prejudices in the textbook against non-Muslims do not affect the Baloch.

Chapter six brings together the theoretical strands, empirical discussion, and critical discourse analysis of textbooks to identify and analyse the politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan. This chapter is based on the interviews and the opinions of experts. This is primarily empirical, as it is based on interviews and other primary sources such as policy documents on education, as well as textbooks. In this chapter the research question is investigated more empirically. The key themes of the research re-emerge in this chapter. For instance, from the field research and secondary sources it is clear that the majority of Baloch blame the central government of Pakistan for not allowing Balochistan Province to have control over its educational affairs. They also blame state policies for subjugating the Baloch history, culture, language, art, music and heroes. They hold the federal government and its institutions responsible for marginalising Balochistan, a centuries-old nation with a distinct history, culture and geography. They argue that Balochistan was an independent state that was forcibly annexed by Pakistan. For this reason education has been designed to control rather than inform people. This is one of the reasons why the state used education as a mode of control, a ‘top-down approach’ that was imposed on the Baloch people.

Furthermore, based on past historical facts from the field interviews with officials, educationalists and other experts in Balochistan, Baloch nationalists blame both the federal and provincial governments as well as the Baloch tribal leaders for the very poor education
system in Balochistan. For instance, they hold the ‘sardars’ (tribal chiefs) responsible for the Baloch issue and for failing to provide education to their areas. They also assert that a few Baloch tribal chieftains, with the help of the government, are responsible for the poor condition of education in Balochistan. The emerging narratives are all used to illustrate and critically assess the existing literature on education and conflict in Balochistan. To explore these narratives, the opinions of Baloch writers, scholars, nationalist leaders and government officials are discussed in different parts of this chapter.

This chapter explores whether or not a change in the education system (the level and intensity of education as well as its quality) might act as a tool in conflict resolution. In addition, it ponders the issue of whether Pakistan might promote education to assimilate the Baloch people. Of course, the answer largely depends on the nature of the Pakistani state. In Balochistan, if the state is amenable, there will be chances for conflict resolution in the future.

Chapter seven is the conclusion. This chapter comprises the results and conclusion and some key potentials of Balochistan that, under a much more enlightened political and legal system, might have enabled the province to be much more developed with a highly educated population. From the above point of view, it can be concluded that the educational system in Pakistan has made many mistakes, total or partial. It is highly defective and is one of the chief sources of the country’s chronic instability and underdevelopment. No one seems to pay due attention to these issues. Hence, the lessons of history may be able to prevent the educational system from repeating those errors already committed. It is hoped that this research will be a first step to examining the failures of the educational system in its entirety in Pakistan and its almost total collapse in
Balochistan. This may provide a lesson in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.
Chapter Two

The Nature of the Balochistan Conflict: Its Historical, Regional, National, International and Geopolitical Dimensions

2.1 Introduction

Balochistan, one of the four federating units (provinces) of Pakistan, is a region of geo-strategic importance rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. It has remained conflict-ridden since 1948 (Grare, 2006) when, under controversial circumstances, it became one unit of the newly created state of Pakistan. Geographically, with an area of 347,190 sq kms, it is the largest province of present-day Pakistan, comprising 44% of the country’s land area and sharing international borders with Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the north. The population of Balochistan is the smallest in the federation of Pakistan; it has around 6.5 million people, the majority of whom are ethnic Baloch, while the total population of Pakistan is about 132 million (see Baloch, 2006 and 2007: 6; Baloch and Tanik, 2007; Census Report of 1998). The figure is from the census in 1998 and may not be accurate, but there has been no census since then.

According to Sabir (2003: 229) and Jahani (2013), the Baloch people have inhabited the land that includes not only this province but also the areas beyond in Iran and Afghanistan. Spooner (2013: 142) mentions that “the Baloch claim a wide diversity of origins for particular communities and tribes in a number of countries, including Afghanistan, India,

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8“Besides the Baloch, there are other ethnic groups who have lived in Balochistan for ages but they do not consider themselves a part of the Baloch nation because they have their own ethnic and national identities. For instance, Pashtuns are the second largest group who have lived in 10 out of 30 districts of Balochistan for centuries. According to the 1998 Census Report, Baloch are about 55% of the population, Pashtun are about 30% and the rest 15% are the Punjabis, Sindhis, Saraiki, Mahajir, Hazara and others” (Khan, 2014: 1).
Iran, and countries on the Arabian Peninsula”. The British occupation of Balochistan in 1839 was part of the Imperial Forward Policy to gain control in the region and to deal with growing Russian power in Afghanistan (Harrison, 1981). The hegemonic desires of these great powers had brought about a series of wars including the Anglo-Afghan wars as well as the drawing up of lines of control and influence. The so-called ‘great game’ with Russia was one of the key dynamics that influenced British policies of warfare, peace and boundary-making in this region (Dashti, 2012). Balochistan and Afghanistan were divided and subdivided for imperial purposes. The British Boundary Commissions of Major General Goldsmid, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Sir Arthur Henry McMahon drew new lines.

Since 1839, there have been many Balochistans. There is a Pakistani Balochistan, an Iranian Balochistan (known as Sistan and Baluchestan) and an Afghani Balochistan (Helmand and Nemroz); there is also a historical and cultural Balochistan imagined as a nation without a state by many Baloch people living in the region and beyond (see Baluch, 1987; Harrison, 1981). Even though at one point in history, the Baloch were a nation with state before becoming a stateless nation.

Many scholars, including Wirsing (2008), Khan (2009), Baluch (1983) and Grare (2006), underline the factors that are primarily responsible for this conflict: 1) the exploitation of Baloch natural resources by the Pakistani state while leaving native Baloch in an economically and socially deprived position; 2) the geo-strategic importance of Balochistan; 3) its distinct cultural identity and sense of historical nationhood; and 4) the Baloch grievances.

These and other factors of lesser magnitude have compelled the Baloch to resist Pakistan’s policies, which the Baloch people regard as exploitative. According to Ahmad (1992) and
Wirsing (2008), due to its location at the crossroads to the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, Balochistan has attracted international and regional powers alike in their attempts to gain access to Central Asia’s riches throughout its land. This is one of the reasons why Balochistan is prone to conflict. According to Bansal (2006: 46) “[T]he current spate of insurgency in Balochistan is a product of repressive policies coupled with historical grievances that have led to increased alienation amongst the Baloch and a general perception that they are being exploited” (Italics in original).

As a result, Balochistan has been locked in a serious conflict and a chaotic relationship with the state of Pakistan (International Crises Group, 2006; Cohen, 2005). This is because the Baloch are convinced that the domineering Pakistani state policies have not only usurped their independence but have also been exploiting their natural wealth ruthlessly. This chapter highlights the different aspects of this multidimensional conflict in Balochistan and provides a background for understanding the grievances of the Baloch, which it is crucial to mention as they are fundamental causes of the conflict. Firstly, a historical overview of Balochistan is provided, and its relationship with British India and the newly formed state of Pakistan in 1947 is outlined. Secondly, five phases of the conflict post-integration into Pakistan will be discussed. Finally, the factors behind the conflict, i.e. the grievances of the Baloch people, the exploitation of their natural resources and the geopolitical and international causes of the conflict, are explored.

2.2 Historical Overview

“We can trace Baloch history back a millennium and a half. But since they have no writing tradition of their own, all the information about them, down to the very recent past, comes from non–Baloch sources – from writers in the service of the Islamic urban establishment,
in which the Baloch have not participated and with which they have often been in conflict” (Spooner, 2013: 135). The Baloch people perceive themselves as an ancient nation and one with a vibrant history. Many writers agree that the Baloch have their distinctive culture and background which differentiate them from other nations in neighbouring countries (Baluch, 1987: 49). Similarly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, a prominent Baloch political leader, describes in his autobiography how the Baloch as a nation and a tribal society spread not only within present-day Pakistan but also into present-day Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (Kutty, 2009).

Gichki (2010) argues that written Baloch history is only 150 years old, but Breseeg (2004: 57) states that “terms like “Balochistan” and mulk Balochi (country of the Baloch) are frequently encountered in Balochi classic poetry of the 15th and 16th centuries”. It has a great impact on Baloch national feelings. Thus, while the written history is one and a half centuries old, oral transmission of a collective identity has a far longer antecedent.

The exact time of the establishment of the first Baloch confederacy is disputed by various scholars (including British travellers and other colonial writers), but Breseeg (2004: 138) claims that the unity of Baloch begins in the 12th century when Mir Jalal-Han was the head of 44 Baloch tribes. “Mir Jalal Han founded a large tribal union in Makkoran with its capital at Bampur. The union was based on an egalitarian system. The Baloch under Mir Jalal Han recognised their military organisation by dividing the forty-four Bolaks into five military divisions” (Breseeg, 2004: 138). Similarly, to Baluch (1987) and Dames (1907) the 44 tribes of Mir Jalal-Han later became the basis of five major Baloch tribes: Rind, Lashari, Korai, Houth, and Jatoi. Stretching back from the ‘Rind-Lashar Union’ in 1485 under Mir Chakar Khan Rind, the Baloch people have a long history (Dashti, 2012). According to Janmahmad (1989), the Rind-Lashar Union was one of the largest Baloch
tribal confederacies, stretching from Kirman (now in Iran) to the Indus River Valley (in Pakistan) in the east.

Baloch unification took place later. According to Breseeg (2004: 141), the first ever union of the entire Baloch area occurred in the early 16th century, but this was short-lived as the region and the people underwent frequent divisions and struggles. It was also recorded by British historians and travellers (see Dames, 1907; Pottinger, 1816; Hughes, 2002) that the Baloch tribes were unable to gain political unity, due to internal tribal conflicts and civil wars, until 1666. Later, the Ahmadzai tribe established the Kalat Confederacy in 1666 and this was an argument mentioned by the majority of the scholars (see Axmann, 2009; Dashti, 2012). The Khanate Confederacy was known as the Khanate of Balochistan or the Khanate of Kalat.

**Map 1: Khanate of Balochistan, 1758-1795**

![Map of the Khanate of Balochistan, 1758-1795](source: Baluch (1987))
2.2.1 The Khanate of Kalat

The Khanate of Kalat was established in the middle of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. It included all the territories of the Baloch inhabitants and the areas of former Baloch ruler Mir Chakar Khan in Sibi (see Breseeg, 2004: Dashti, 2012). According to Breseeg (2004: 148) “Makkoran, Western Balochistan, Derajat, Sistan, and Lasbela” were all under the authority of one central body. “The Khanate of Balochistan later became known, as the Khanate of Kalat or Kalat State because of its capital city, Kalat” (Breseeg, 2004: 148-9).\footnote{Naseer Khan (the 6\textsuperscript{th} Khan of Kalat) ruled for almost half a century. He created a centralised bureaucratic structure of government and a unified Baloch army from all the Baloch tribes for the first time. Many nationalist Baloch historians describe the strength of the army as being 25,000 men and 1,000 camels. There is some confusion among Baloch historians about Naseer Khan’s role; however, for Baloch nationalists and the British traveller Henry Pottinger (1816: 285), his achievements remain an important symbol for Baloch people’s rule.}

\textbf{Map 2: Kalat during the reign of Mir Naseer Khan Noori I}

![Map of Balochistan](image)

Source: Dashti (2013: 186).
On 13th November 1839, the British forces attacked the Palace of Balochistan’s ruler, Mehrab Khan, and he and several of his friends were killed. According to Dashti (2012), due to the British manipulation and the ‘great game’, the Baloch lost their Khanate. He argues that the Baloch state has fallen twice: once in 1839 at the hands of the British and again in 1948 with the advent of the newly formed state of Pakistan (this is discussed later in this chapter). The British were mainly responsible for the plight of the Baloch people, which he called the demise of the Baloch state (Dashti, 2012).

There is some debate amongst historians as to whether or not there was a continuous war going on between the British and the Khanate of Kalat. The majority of them agree that hostile British-Khanate engagement began in 1838-39, after the British occupation of Kalat State. According to Zaidi (1993: 288), “the first British contact with Kalat State takes place
in the year 1838, in connection with an expeditionary force sent by the British Government to Afghanistan via Baluchistan”. Consequently, the British had succeeded in occupying the Kalat state. They occupied Khanate Kalat not because they wanted to control Khanate Kalat directly and incorporate it into British India, but because they wanted to create a buffer zone to secure their control of India at the expense of Russia (Harrison, 1981).

2.2.2 British-Russian Rivalry in Afghanistan

British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan generated a regional clash that was named ‘the Great Game of the 19th century’ by many writers. According to the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) report entitled *Balochis of Pakistan: on the Margins of History*, the expansionist policy of Russia had threatened the British Empire in India (FPC, 2006). The British concern was that Afghanistan would become a base for the Russian Empire. The fear of the Tsarist hegemonic design and its expansion had compelled the British to retain control of the indigenous people of India. Therefore, in 1838 the first Anglo-Afghan war began, threatening the entire region. According to Harrison (1981), Balochistan, as Afghanistan’s neighbour, became part of the 19th century ‘great game’ scheme. He holds that it was the ‘Forward Policy’ of the British Empire in India to push “the jurisdiction of the Raj to the Afghan frontier” (Harrison, 1981: 19).

Many other writers such as Bizenjo (2006) agree that Balochistan acquired a new strategic significance in the 19th century when Afghanistan became a buffer zone. The British fought many battles with the Baloch people over a span of more than forty years to establish direct control over the access routes to Afghanistan. In 1876 they finally succeeded in subduing Kalat and obtained the right to station their troops there through treaties (Zaidi, 1993). Since the British occupation, the British and Kalat rulers had signed
treaties in 1841, 1854 and 1876. These treaties, according to many writers such as Brahui (2009), were the basis of British-Kalat relations, which are discussed below. Harrison (1981) mentions that the British did not try to extend their rule into the Baloch areas (with the exception of British Balochistan) but these treaties were indeed the main reasons for the division of Kalat State. Under these treaties the Kalat Balochistan was divided. According to Harrison (1981), the British Empire proceeded systematically to divide the Baloch area into seven parts. He argues that,

In the far west, the Goldsmid line gave roughly one-fourth to Persia in 1871; in the north, the Durand line assigned a small strip to Afghanistan in 1894; and in British India, the Baluch areas were divided into a centrally administered enclave (known as British Baluchistan) guarding a key mountain pass, a truncated remnant of the Kalat Confederacy, and three smaller puppet principalities (Harrison, 1981: 19).
In 1871 the ‘Goldsimid Line’ was drawn, dividing Balochistan between the British and Persian Empires. The western part of Balochistan went to Persia, which is modern-day Iran. Breseeg (2004: 171) states that “with the help of the British, the Iranians succeeded in dividing Balochistan”. The connections between the British and the Iranians were not explained in the literature but it is argued that the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ and the Iranian expansionist policies were similar. Balochistan, due to its arid desert area and tribal structure, created administrative problems for the British. There is a debate in the literature on whether the British were interested in ruling over Balochistan or not. A few scholars argue that the British ambition was not to rule Balochistan. However, they were interested in creating a buffer zone to control it because of the perceived threat from the Tsarist
Empire (Bizenjo, 2006). Bizenjo argues that the British were well aware of the Russian Tsarist ambition to control the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

In the 1870s, under the ‘Gandamak Treaty’, the British detached the Afghan territories of Zhob and Loralai (Breseeg, 2004: 161). In 1883, an agreement was made between the British and Kalat. Under this agreement the British leased Quetta, Bolan Pass, Nasirabad, Chagai and the Marri-Bugti areas of Eastern Balochistan and combined those leased Baloch areas with the Afghan (Pashtun) areas, making up ‘British Baluchistan’ (Marri, 1985: 18-20). All these areas were declared to be British territory. As a result of these divisions the Kalat state had shrunk in size and population. Thus, the east became British Balochistan. Matheson (1997) argues that during this seventy-year period British Balochistan’s territories were subject to more or less direct British rule.

In 1894 the ruler of Afghanistan (better known as the Afghan Amir) and the British had established the northern ‘Durand Line’. They had signed an agreement and transferred a large area of the northern region of British Balochistan (Helmand and Nemroz) to Afghanistan (Brahui, 2009). With this division the northern region of British Balochistan became part of Afghanistan. The line drawn in 1894 is still the political boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although Afghanistan has not yet recognised its legitimacy. According to Bugti (1996), this division resulted in a large segment of the Pashtun area being given to British India, while the northern part of Balochistan was given to the Afghan ruler.

Thus, after this division (except for Kalat State) the Baloch remained under the control of three states: British India, Afghanistan and Iran. The final outcome of the boundary settlement was as follows: Sistan and Baluchestan including western Makran became part of Iran; outer Sistan including Helmand and Nimrouz came under the control of
Afghanistan; Jacobabad, Derajat, Sibi including Marri-Bugti tribal areas became British Balochistan; and, finally, the shrunken state of Kalat was recognised as an independent state with the status of protectorate (see FPC, 2006; Harrison, 1981). Under the political settlement and the treaty of 1876, Kalat was given independence in its internal jurisdiction and non-interference surety by the British despite losing its territories and past glory.

2.2.3 British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat: the treaties of 1841, 1854 and 1876

There are two distinctive views on relations between the British and Khanate Kalat. One is that the relations were based on amity, through agreements and treaties, but the other holds that there was a forced subjugation of Kalat State by the British. The treaties with the State of Kalat and the revolts by Baloch tribes illustrate both these viewpoints. Zaidi (1993: 288) argues in the Jinnah (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan) papers that “the history of British relations with the Kalat State and its rulers has been one of friendly alliances and treaties of mutual friendship and amity throughout”. After the occupation of the state of Kalat by the British, they finally signed a treaty and recognised Naseer Khan II as the ruler of Kalat in 1841. This treaty mentions that the “British troops might be stationed in Kalat territory” (Breseeg, 2004: 160). Various other treaties were signed at different times, providing the British with opportunities to station their forces in British Balochistan territory en route to Afghanistan. In return for these concessions, Kalat would receive handsome subsidies and guarantees of tribal autonomy (Harrison, 1981). Of all the treaties and agreements signed, the treaty of 1876 was the most important.

It had become expedient to sign the treaty of 1876 in order to renew and reinforce the old treaty of 1854 and “to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bond of friendship and amity between the two governments” (Zaidi, 1993:
According to the treaty of 1876, the British were committed to respect the independence of Kalat and to protect the territory from external aggression (Brahui, 2009; FPC, 2006). Article 3 of this treaty states the requirement for “the British Government to respect the Independence of Kalat” (Zaidi, 1993: 288).

However, it may be difficult to claim that relations between the British and Khanate Kalat were friendly, considering the Baloch protests and revolts against the British. For instance, the Marri-Bugti tribes fought continuously against the British occupation mainly because the British had divided up Khanate Kalat without any process of negotiation.

Furthermore, Dashti (2012) argues that various tribal people including their chiefs had launched an armed struggle against the occupying forces. However, to control the Baloch revolts the British had nominated heads of tribes as alternative tribal chiefs by giving them land. Baloch society was tribal by nature in which lands belong to the people rather than chiefs of the tribes. However, the British divided the Baloch into various factions and rewarded them with land. The most important point to discuss here is the manipulation of tribal society by the nomination of Sardars. There are two different issues here: the corruption of the Baloch ruling elite, and the general Baloch public. Most Sardars enjoyed prestige and luxury during British rule. The consolidation of the Sardars was a phenomenon constructed by the British to prolong their rule (Naseer, 2010).

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10 Many of the Baloch believe that Kalat State enjoyed an independent status under the treaty of 1876 and that the British became responsible for protecting Kalat State’s independent status. In 1947, before the division of United India, the Kalat State National Party had presented their case to the British for a fully independent Balochistan. The territory included the Kalat State, British Balochistan and all other Baloch areas which were leased by the British Empire to Iran and Afghanistan. According to Baloch nationalists and historians, the British agreed to support an independent Balochistan and the case was submitted in the form of an official memorandum in March 1946.

11 In Baloch tribal structure or society, lands always belonged to the people of tribes, not to the heads of tribes. But the British introduced the Sandeman System, in which they distributed land to the nominated heads of the tribes called Sardars.
In 1877 the British had established the Balochistan Agency with its headquarters at Quetta. Robert Sandeman was appointed agent to the Governor General. He became head of the Agency for Balochistan (Hughes-Buller, 1908). Before 1877, he had been the district officer in Dera Ghazi Khan (a Baloch-claimed district now in Pakistan’s Punjab). Sandeman had introduced a new system in Balochistan known as the ‘Sandeman System’. The system was introduced in order to contact tribal chiefs directly, bypassing the Khan of Kalat (Breseeg, 2004: 161). This system had both encouraged and divided the people of the different tribes. People found themselves divided into segments rather than living under one authority. Thus “Sandeman managed to have his way, and earned the loyalty of the Sardars by granting them allowances” (Breseeg, 2004: 161). The system helped the British to manage their ‘divide and rule’ policy in Balochistan and enabled them to easily control revolts in the region.

Many historians such as Baloch (1985), Baluch (1987: 141) and Janmahmad (1982: 158-59) believe that British rule was responsible for promoting tribal culture in its own vested interests. The British divided up Balochistan for administrative and security purposes. Similarly, Matheson (1997: xiii) states: “the financial and military backing the British gave to tribal leaders made the tribal system more hierarchical and less democratic”.

The legacy of this British imperial practice can be seen in today’s Balochistan. The Sardars and the Baloch tribal system have to this day remained the cause of many problems including lack of unity, feudalism, and animosity between tribes, leading to internal tribal wars. Dehwar (1994), states that the main problem of the Baloch is the Sardari system. This system has contributed to the backwardness of the Baloch people, 12

12 Many writers, such as Harrison (1981: 22), describe how “the British attempted to suppress nationalist activity and resisted pressures for the introduction of education in the Baloch areas”. However, a few hundred Baloch were allowed to have an education, most of them from Sardar families. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch (Khan of Kalat, an educated youth) was one example.
both in the past and more recently. For example, the system has created hurdles to the unification of their territory as the Baloch Sardars remained part of the British Empire. They (the chiefs) had helped the British to divide the territory by signing various treaties. In the early 1930s, the Kalat State National Party, Anjuman-e Itehad-e-Baluchistan (Association for Unity of Balochistan), and weekly newspapers such as Al-Baloch began to raise their voices against these Sardars, demanding freedom for Balochistan. Their leaders were arrested, not only by the British but also by the ruler of the State of Kalat.

2.3 The Role of Kalat State National Party

In the 1920s, a group of people including Yousuf Aziz Magsi, Abdul Aziz Kurd, Malik Faiz Mohammad and Gul Khan Naseer began a movement that demanded equal rights for the Baloch people in both Kalat state and British Balochistan. They established Anjuman-e Itehad-e-Baluchistan, which was a political party and a social organisation. Its principal aims were as follows: 1) struggling against the colonisation of Balochistan; 2) a greater and unified Balochistan; 3) the abolition of the Sardari system in Balochistan; and 4) an independent Balochistan free from all powers within or without (Bugti, 1996, 93-105; Naseer, 2010; Baluch, 1987). Later, in 1931, the Kalat State National Party was formed following the Persian occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928. Anjuman-e Itehad-e-Baluchistan and Kalat State National Party (KSNP) are still considered secular, social unifying parties among Baloch writers. The two parties have provided a social and political platform for the Baloch youth to work for the Baloch people.

For the unification of Balochistan, conferences were held in 1930s by the Anjuman-e Itehad-e-Balochistan. At that time, according to Baluch (1987), a delegation from the western side of Balochistan (Iran) attended ‘the Balochistan and all India Baloch
Conference’ at Jacobabad in December 1932 (Weekly Young Baluchistan, 1934). The main reason for sending this delegation was to endorse the Baloch cause for a unified and independent Balochistan. Similarly, the first map of ‘Greater Balochistan’ was published in 1933 by Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, demonstrating the Baloch opposition to the continuing division of Balochistan since 1839 (Baluch, 1987). On the political front, the KSNP had to play an important role in both British Balochistan and Kalat State. The KSNP had prepared the case for independence and asked the ruler of Kalat to urge the British to allow Balochistan to be unified. The ruler of the Kalat state, Mir Ahmed Yar, endorsed the case for independence for Balochistan and prepared a memorandum (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975: 142). Ahmed Yar Khan writes in his book that he presented the memorandum of the Balochistan case to the Cabinet Mission.

2.4 A Memorandum for Balochistan Independence in 1946

In the various treaties signed in the 19th century, it was mentioned that the British Government was to respect the independence of Kalat. According to the treaty of 1876 the Khanate of Kalat was not part of British India but had a separate status linked with British India by a treaty of alliance (Zaidi, 1993).13

At the time of the division of united India, the issue of the independence of Kalat State was at its peak. As per the agreement, the British would withdraw. The nationalist leaders of KSNP asked the ruler of the Khanate for the independence of Kalat State, British Balochistan and the leased areas (Harrison, 1981). Some areas of the Kalat State, Arund,

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13The Government of India Act of 1935 treated the Khanate as an Indian state. To many writers this was because of British Balochistan which was under the control of the British; therefore, the 1935 Act failed to differentiate between Kalat State and British Balochistan (Baluch, 1987).
Dajal and Derajat, were leased and directly administered by the British Empire, as mentioned earlier. According to Dashti (2012), Dera Ghazi Khan was given to Punjab and Jacobabad (originally Khangadh) was given to Sindh; Chagai, Sibi, and Bolan Pass were taken away from Kalat state and leased to British India.

With regard to the problem of the unification of Balochistan, the Khan of Kalat made a legal case for the unification and independence of Balochistan (known as the memorandum) that was supported by the nationalist leaders of the KSNP (Baluch, 1987: 174-75). Dashti (2012: 321) claims that “The Khan of the Baloch, under the pressure of Baloch nationalists and anticipating the coming political scenario in the region, began to formulate strategies for regaining the lost sovereignty of the Baloch state”. It was also argued in the case of Balochistan that the Kalat State, like Nepal, had enjoyed a legal status based on direct treaty relations with the British government (Harrison, 1981: 23). Harrison further argues that, under these treaties, particularly the treaty of 1876, Kalat State was not bound to deal with British India or with any of the other princely states. Kalat State had maintained its “treaty relations directly with Whitehall” (Harrison, 1981: 23). The Khan of Kalat also raised the treaty of 1876, according to which the British had committed themselves to respecting the independence of Kalat State and protecting its land (see Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975; Zaidi, 1993: 288; Brahui, 2009).

The Khan of Kalat submitted the case in the form of an official memorandum to the Cabinet Mission in March 1946.\(^{14}\) According to the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan

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\(^{14}\) In 1946 the Cabinet Mission came to India to discuss the transfer of power. Among the members of the Mission were the secretary of state for India, Lord Pethic, and A V Alexander. Many of the people (Dehwar, 1994; Baluch, 1987; Harrison, 1981) were of the opinion that the case for Kalat independence was prepared by Khan of Kalat and supported by M. Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan) because Jinnah had been legal advisor and lawyer to the state of Kalat since 1936. Dashti (2012: 326) argues as follows about Khan of Kalat and Jinnah: “One of the blunders he made in this regard was the hiring of a known protégé of the British authorities, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the lawyer to represent the interests of the Khanate in New Delhi”.

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Baluch, in his autobiography *Inside Balochistan* (1975), he had approached the Mission in 1946 to discuss the future status of his State. The main demand of the Khan of Kalat was to restore Kalat’s independence with the British departure from India. He further argues that, in the memorandum, Kalat State was expected to restore its position by regaining its pre-occupation independent status.

That Kalat is *not an Indian State*, its relations with India being of only a formal nature by virtue of Kalat’s agreements with the British; that with the ceasing of the Agreements of 1876 with the Kalat Government, Kalat would regain its complete independence, as it existed prior to 1876; and that the Kalat Government would then be free to choose its own way without any interference by others (Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, 1975: 142).

The British agreed with the Balochistan case and dealt with it in a different way (as per the agreement) to other princely states, but the issue of the Kalat State was unresolved, including that of British Balochistan (see Baluch, 1987; Naseer, 2010; Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975). In August 1947 British colonial rule ended in Balochistan. In March 1948, Balochistan (Kalat State) was taken over by Pakistan. This development occurred in Kalat State in March 1948 when the Khan of Kalat signed the treaty and Balochistan became part of Pakistan (see detailed discussion later in this chapter). Ever since Kalat State and British Balochistan came under Pakistani control, conflict has been present in the region.

### 2.5 Events in 1948 and Different Perspectives

Various events took place when the State of Kalat and British Balochistan became part of Pakistan in 1947-48. The most important event was the issue of annexation. The disagreement among writers, historians and various other scholars demonstrates a divergence of opinion on whether this was an accession or an annexation. Pakistani
historians hardly ever discuss the Khanate of Kalat’s relations with Pakistan. A few writers seek to magnify the role of the Muslim League only.  

They mention that the stance taken by the Khan of Kalat (the ruler the State) was not representative of Baloch sentiments. On the other hand, many Baloch nationalist historians argue that it was a forceful annexation of Balochistan (the Kalat State and British Balochistan) by the state of Pakistan. The Baloch nationalist writers also ignore the decision of the Royal Assembly (the *Shahi Jirga*) of Quetta Municipality.

In this section I will present a different view of both the Baloch people’s and the State of Pakistan’s perspectives on the Balochistan position in Pakistan. In fact, no writer has distinguished between the two perspectives regarding the accession and annexation of the British Balochistan and the State of Kalat. There are two different arguments in this section. The first is the Pakistani state perspective on the decision of the *Shahi Jirga* of Quetta Municipality which voted in favour of Pakistan. It was based on British Balochistan, but the writers failed to clarify this. The second is the Baloch perspective on the issue of the Kalat State. They argue that Kalat state was annexed by the State of Pakistan in March 1948.

### 2.5.1 Pakistani State Perspective on the decision of the Royal Assembly (*Shahi Jirga*) of Quetta Municipality

According to the official Pakistani version of the episode, Balochistan became part of Pakistan in two ways; one was through state nationalism and the other was through the assembly of the leaders (Baloch and Pashtun) in Quetta on June 29, 1947, who voted in favour of Pakistan (Harrison, 1981: 24). The creation of Pakistan is claimed to have been

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15 A branch of the Muslim League was established in British Balochistan in 1939 by Qazi Essa.
the first time a country had won its independence in the name of religion. In Pakistani nationalism, the entire ‘Muslim majority’ provinces and princely states had to be part of Pakistan and these areas were obliged to unite in order to establish Pakistan. State nationalism is the basis of Pakistani ideology, which emphasised the Muslim brotherhood and Muslim nationalism (Fatah, 2008). It clearly rejects the right to nationhood of the other peoples who have a distinct culture, territory, language and history, such as the Baloch, Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtun and Muhajir presently living in Pakistan, considering them to be part of one Muslim nation under the banner of Islam.

In British Balochistan (see map of British Balochistan in 1947 below) the organisation of the All Indian Muslim League (AIML) was brought into existence in 1939 by Qazi Mohammad Essa while Mohammad Khan Jogeza and Mir Jaffar Khan Jamali joined the Muslim League later (Ahmad, 2008: 1). According to Ahmad, it was these leaders who prepared the people in Balochistan for the creation of Pakistan. However, there is no clear record to indicate who these leaders were. In fact, the majority of the leaders were not Baloch. They were Pashtun and Punjabi. The Balochistan Muslim League favoured the Pakistan movement. The leadership of the Muslim League held meetings from time to time and supported the Pakistan resolution asking for the partition of India and the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims in Pakistan.
In April 1947 a Pakistan Conference was held in Quetta in which the Muslim League strongly demanded a separate and independent state of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008: 4). Ahmad states that “the fourth meeting was held under the auspices of the Balochistan Muslim League attended by about 6000 persons”. However, contrary to Ahmed’s claim, there is no record, once again, to indicate whether these participants were Baloch or what they actually discussed.

Finally, on June 3, 1947, it was declared that the Royal Assembly (Shahi Jirga) of Quetta Municipality) would decide the future of Balochistan (FPC, 2006). The British nominated a council of tribal elders, the Royal Assembly (called Shahi Jirga) in British Balochistan (Baluch, 1987). The member of the Shahi Jirga of Quetta Municipality had been appointed
by the British and “the Assembly’s recommendation related only to British Balochistan” (FPC, 2006: 19). The Shahi Jirga, which was given the authority to decide whether to join Pakistan or to be independent, voted in favour of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008). An important question should be considered: was it an overwhelming vote or a divided one? The majority of scholars in this field have failed to find an answer, because there is no clear record of it. According to Dashti (2012: 333), “they were unable to muster the support of majority members of the Jirga. The date of the referendum was brought a day earlier, and without a voting, it was announced that the members of Shahi Jirga voted for the annexation with Pakistan”. Finally, in 1947, due to a decision by the Shahi Jirga of Quetta Municipality, British Balochistan became part of Pakistan.

Most of the literature deals with the subject from the perspective of the new Pakistani state, which could not differentiate between Kalat State and British Balochistan. However, many Baloch nationalists and non-Baloch historians consider the decision of Shahi Jirga to have been illegal and not to have involved Kalat State (see Bugti, 1996; Naseer, 2010; Dashti, 2012: 333). According to them, the decision of the Shahi Jirga was a brutal act executed forcibly. The arguments of various writers and Baloch nationalists are discussed in this chapter.

2.5.2 The Baloch Perspective on the 1948 Annexation

In August 1947, a round-table conference was held in Delhi to discuss the future of Kalat State and its leased areas that were under British control, including British Balochistan. At the conference, Lord Mountbatten, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan (PM of the soon-to-be Pakistan), Sultan Ahmed (PM of Kalat State) and the Khan of Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, all participated (see Dashti, 2012). According to many writers,
Balochistan was given the option of joining Pakistan (which was to be severed from the united India) or remaining independent (see Naseer, 2010; Bugti, 1996: 93-105). The ‘Standstill Agreement’ between the Kalat State and Pakistan, was signed on August 11, 1947 (Dashti, 2012: 330). “The very first clause of the agreement declared that the Government of Pakistan agrees that Kalat is an independent State, being quite different in status from other states in India” (Baluch, 1987: 256 cited in Dashti, 2012: 330). Gulawar Khan, in his doctoral thesis, mentions:

In order to judge the demands and position of Kalat, a meeting was called on 4th August 1947 in Delhi, which was chaired by Lord Mountbatten (the then Viceroy of India) and his constitutional advisor Lord Ismay. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan (the first PM of Pakistan) represented Pakistan, while the Khan of Kalat (Mir Ahmed Yar Khan), Prime Minister of Kalat (Muhammad Aslam Khan), and a constitutional advisor to the Khan of Kalat (Nawabzada Sultan Ahmed) represented Kalat. After lengthy discussions over the future organization of Kalat, an agreement was reached which was issued in the form of a communiqué from the Viceroy’s House in Delhi on 11th August 1947 (Khan, 2014: 183).16

There is some confusion surrounding this event, or perhaps it is a question of interpretation, since another version (an argument in this regard about the declaration of independence) indicates that the Khan of Kalat declared Balochistan’s independence on August 15, 1947 (Dehwar, 1994: 308). However, many are of the opinion that the agreement was reached and formally announced on 11th August and that the Khan of Kalat proclaimed independence on August 15, 1947. Dehwar (1994: 308) argues that the “Khan of Kalat, on the 15th August 1947, has proclaimed the complete independence of his state”. Kalat State regained its sovereign status and independence (see letters of the Khan of Kalat in Jinnah’s paper, Naseer, 2010; Dehwar, 1994).17 Bugti (1996: 93-105) and Dehwar

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16 For the communiqué full text see Mss Eur D971/2 and IOR/R/3/1/166

17 Dehwar mentions that the Khan of Kalat declared independence while addressing the people, who had gathered in large numbers. He expressed his determination regarding the achievement of the objectives,
(1994: 308-316) describe how, after decolonisation in September 1947, elections were held in Kalat State and the first two Balochistan legislative assemblies were formed. This was the first general election in the history of Balochistan. Members of the Kalat National Party participated in the election as candidates, winning 39 of the 52 seats.18 Further, “Balochistan’s two Houses of Parliament” (Upper and Lower based in Kalat) unanimously rejected Jinnah’s proposal after discussions (also see Dehwar, 1994: 311). The Khan of Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, commented on Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s proposal thus:

I have great respect for your advice, I replied, and it is my considered opinion that Kalat’s merger is necessary in order to make Pakistan stronger. In this connection, I would suggest that Baluchistan, being a land of numerous tribes, the people there must be duly consulted in the matter prior to any decision I take; for, according to the prevalent tribal convention, no decision can be binding upon them unless they are taken into confidence beforehand by their Khan (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975: 153).

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, an assembly member at that time and a veteran Baloch leader in 1947-48, was the principal spokesman for the independent forces, according to Harrison (1981: 25). He declared the Baloch to be Muslims but this fact did not mean that it was necessary to lose their independence and to merge with other nations because of their faith. If their accession to Pakistan was necessary, as Muslims, then the Muslim states of Afghanistan and Iran should also merge with Pakistan (Kutty, 2009: 62-63). However, after 227 days (in 1948) Pakistan attacked Balochistan (Kalat) occupied it and coerced its ruler into signing a merger treaty (see Naseer, 2010; Dehwar, 1994: 308-315). According to Dashti (2012: 339),

namely the unity of Baloch as a nation spread over a large part of Asia, and complete independence for the country.

18 The first political reform was the formation of the two Houses (Upper and Lower). The Upper House (Darul Umara) members consisted of tribal Sardars who automatically filled the seats without being elected. The Lower House (Darul Awam) members were to be elected on a limited franchise by the provincial Jirga members. At that time the total number of members of the Darul Awam was fifty-five (see Dashti, 2012: 332). According to Dehwar (1994: 310), the election was held in September, 1947, and the Kalat State National Party won the majority of the seats in the Lower House.
The short-lived independence of Balochistan ended on March 27, 1948. The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, after hearing the news that the Pakistani troops had moved into southern coastal towns of Pasni and Jiwani, eventually succumbed and affixed his signature to the Agreement of Accession on March 27, 1948, terming his action as “dictate of history”.

The Khan of Kalat said, “I confess, I knew I was exceeding the scope of my mandate . . . Had I not taken the immediate step of signing Kalat’s merger, the position of Pakistan would definitely have gone worse. The British Agent to the Governor-General could have played havoc by leading Pakistan into a fratricide war against the Baluches” (Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, 1975: 162).

2.5.3 The British Role

British colonial rule and its final withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent changed the course of the history of the region. The departed colonial power left behind a legacy of artificial borders, territorial demarcations, mass migration, and various newly founded states in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The newly emerged states have been engaged in conflicts and wars ever since. The case of Balochistan being under Pakistani state control is one illustration.

Other literature produced by British historians and travellers, along with a few autobiographies (see Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975; Naseer, 2010; Kutty, 2009; Harrison, 1981; Axmann, 2009), shows another picture of the British role. According to them, it was neither the Khan of Kalat nor the state of Pakistan but the British Empire that wanted to merge Balochistan (Kalat State and British Balochistan) with Pakistan. Further, it is argued that Kalat State was recognised as an independent state by the British but a newly independent Balochistan would not be in their favour. They only recognised Kalat State
because they were bound by treaties, as discussed earlier. The FPC (2006: 21) maintains that it was the British instruction that led to the forcible accession of the State of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948. This study states the following:

Initially, the British favoured honouring their commitments under the 1876 treaty regarding Kalat’s independence based upon the prospects of using an independent Balochistan as a base for their activities in the region…by 1946 when it was decided to partition India, the British felt that instead of locating a base in a weak Balochistan, such a base could be established in Pakistan which was more than willing to accommodate the British. Hence, it was in British interests to ensure that Balochistan was kept within Pakistan and did not become an independent entity (FPC, 2006: 21-22).

Therefore, it was the British who decided that the independent Balochistan could not serve their interests, and it was therefore to be merged with Pakistan. Another example is a memorandum signed by the Baloch chiefs (British Balochistan) of the Marri-Bugti areas, Sardar Doda Khan Marri and Sardar Mohamed Akber Khan. According to Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch (1975: 143-144), the memorandum was sent to the British government demanding to be allowed to re-join the Khanate. Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari and other chiefs of Derajat also demanded separation from Punjab and wished to rejoin the Khanate. The British ignored these demands and established the *Shahi Jirga*. This is one of the reasons why many Baloch believe that the *Shahi Jirga* was not an elected body of the Khanate but the representative institution of British Balochistan created for the purpose of merging Balochistan against the wishes of the Baloch people (Brahu, 2009). Harrison (1981: 24) calls it “a pro-Pakistan assembly of Baluch leaders”. He says that Pakistani historians fail to note that “the participants had been appointed by the British Raj and that the assembly’s recommendations related only to the small area known as British Baluchistan” (Harrison, 1981: 24).
However, the contested version of the Pakistani annexation of Balochistan concerns the site over which the conflict took place. The history of the Balochistan conflict is one of contested annexation and is mostly un-integrated within the history of India and Pakistan. Thus, what the Baloch people had faced in 1948 was a new reality. The new reality can be understood in terms of various phases of conflict that are discussed in this chapter. It is thus logical to raise a pertinent question: why did Baloch insurgency crop up every 10 to 12 years and then become subdued again each time? It is worth mentioning that Balochistan has experienced five insurgencies against the state of Pakistan since 1948, including the current one that surfaced in 2002. Further Baloch resistance, resulted in at least one major military campaign by the Pakistan Army in Balochistan in each subsequent decade.

2.6 Balochistan in Pakistan: Five Phases of the Conflict

Pakistan witnessed the first Baloch nationalist insurgency in 1948 soon after its independence; this was followed by the second phase of conflict (1958–59), the third phase of conflict (1962–68), and a guerrilla war in the fourth phase during the years 1973–77. Since 2002, the fifth phase of the Balochistan conflict has been carried out through guerrilla warfare, which is largely supported by the various militant organisations, i.e. the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch student organisations (Barakzai, 2009 and Bansal, 2010). The conflict in Balochistan started between Baloch and the government of Pakistan in 1948. Many Baloch nationalists demanded the reinstatement of independence from Pakistan. However, some of the Baloch demands included autonomy, control over natural resources, economic and social development projects, and prevention of excessive demographic change on the basis of the Constitution. According to many writers, there
were phases of active conflict, latent resentment and relative calm. Violence erupted when the federal government of Pakistan announced mega construction projects and the local Baloch perceived that they had been excluded from decision-making in these projects. The government of Pakistan, instead of considering the grievances and demands of the Baloch, has launched a series of military operations to counter Baloch insurgency since 1948.

In recent years the conflict has become increasingly bloody. The rebels adopted guerrilla warfare, attacking the army and paramilitary forces and sabotaging gas and oil pipelines. The Pakistan Human Rights Commission (2011) and Human Rights Watch (2010) have reported indiscriminate bombing and strafing by the government side, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of students, doctors and civilians, with many thousands of Baloch activists disappearing.

2.6.1 The First Phase of the Conflict: 1948

The first war of resistance started within one and a half months of the takeover of Kalat state by Pakistan. According to Harrison (1981: 25), “The showdown between Kalat and Pakistan came on April 1, 1948, when the Pakistan Army ordered its garrison commander in Baluchistan to march on Kalat and arrest the Khan unless he signed an agreement of accession”. On May 16, 1948 Prince Abdul Karim (younger brother of the ruler of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch) and his people started a guerrilla war against Pakistani aggression. A considerable number of his followers crossed over into Afghanistan to organise this guerrilla war (Naseer, 2010; Bugti, 1996; Marri, 2000). Some of the prominent leaders who joined him were Mohammed Hussain Anka (the secretary of the Baloch league and the editor of the weekly Bolan Mastung), Malik Saeed Dehwar (the secretary of the Kalat National Party) and Qadir Baksh Nizamami (a prominent member of Sindh-Balochistan branch of the communist party).
rebellion led by Prince Karim is known as the first armed Baloch resistance against Pakistan.

There were two kinds of response to the annexation of Balochistan in terms of resistance. One was through mass agitation, but this failed. Many of the leaders of KSNP, i.e. Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Gul Khan Naseer, wanted peaceful agitation against the merger of Kalat State. According to Naseer (2010), the leaders of KSNP were arrested and sent to prison when they started mass agitation in 1948. The second reaction was through guerrilla war (see Naseer, 2010; Dashti, 2012). This was in parallel to Prince Abdul Karim’s actions against the merger of Kalat State. Here, one might say that rebellion began as a result of harassment by the state. 20 Many of the Baloch leaders remained behind bars, such as Muhammad Husain Anka, Malik Saeed, Abdul Wahid Kurd and Qadir Bakhsh Nizamani. As a result of state brutality those leaders joined the guerrilla war after they had failed to negotiate through peaceful agitation.

The other group of people who were in favour of guerrilla war supported Prince Abdul Karim (Dehwar, 1994: 323). According to Marri (2000: 307), more than 1,000 people crossed the border into Afghanistan with him and set up camp at Karez Nazar Mohammad Khan. Brahui (2009) mentions that the prince and his militant group were asked to return to the Khanate by the government to negotiate peacefully and settle the Balochistan issue. The weak socio-economic structure and lack of foreign support forced Prince Karim to return to Pakistan, where he was arrested and subsequently killed. 21 On July 8, 1948, when he entered Balochistan he was attacked by the state military under the command of Major

20 Prince Karim had invited the prominent members of the nationalist parties, i.e. Kalat State National Party and the Baloch League, to join his guerrillas to regain the former status of the Kalat state.

21 However, it is argued by many Baloch that Prince Karim was asked to leave Afghanistan by the Afghan ruler because Kabul was demanding its land back, which had been leased by the British and made up British Balochistan. The idea of an independent Balochistan was not supported by the Afghan ruler. Prince Karim was seeking help from him, it being a long-standing tradition for the two leaders to help each other. Thus, a point of disagreement emerged between Prince Karim and the Afghan ruler. On the other hand it must be noted that an agreement of non-interference had been signed by Baloch-Afghan rulers after the 1758 war.
General Akber Khan. At Harboi the prince was captured and imprisoned in the Mach and Quetta jail, and many of his friends were arrested (Naseer, 2010: 526).


In 1958 the first Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan, and Nawab Nauroz Khan led the second rebellion against the State forces during his regime. The second and third phases of the conflict took place during the same period when Pakistan was under the control of General Ayub Khan. Some writers argue that Nauroz Khan took up armed resistance against the One Unit Policy but one of his main demands was the release of the Khan of Kalat with due honour and respect. The Khan of Kalat had been arrested in 1948. Nauroz Khan Zarakzai led the second insurgency when the government of Pakistan declared itself to be one unit and merged all four provinces of West Pakistan. Of special concern to the Baloch, according to Matheson (1997), was the merger of the four different ethnic groups of West Pakistan into one unit.

After many years of intense guerrilla fighting against the government of Pakistan, the insurgency came to an end when Nauroz was arrested by the military regime of Ayub Khan. The Khan of Kalat argues in his autobiography that the Pakistan Army assured Nawab Nauroz of peace if he led his men down from the mountains for negotiations. But he was betrayed and arrested (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975). The Nawab’s sons and companions were condemned to death by hanging whereas Nauroz himself was spared due to his old age. He was given life imprisonment and later died in a Pakistani prison (Harrison, 1981). According to Brahui (2009), one of the government’s strategies was the

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22 ‘One unit’ was imposed by the Federal Government of Pakistan in 1954. Under this policy they merged the western wing (present Pakistan) into one body. Thus, Pakistan became two wings: West Pakistan and East Pakistan, the latter becoming Bangladesh in 1971.
use of religion to reassure its enemies. The government took an oath on the Quran (the Holy Book) guaranteeing safety for the Baloch militants (who were fighting against the state) if they abandoned their resistance. The Quran was used to suppress armed resistance. When the Baloch guerrillas abandoned their resistance and came down from the mountains, they were arrested and killed despite the government promises and oath sworn on the Quran. The cases of Abdul Karim and Nauroz Khan exemplify this. Many writers argue that this game of spurious negotiations, betrayal and the killing of leaders who refused to accept the Pakistan state line continued throughout the history of involvement of the state of Pakistan in Balochistan.

2.6.3 The Fourth Phase of the Conflict: 1973–77

The fourth resistance movement was launched in the early 1970s, mainly by the Marri and Mengal tribes, when the elected government of Balochistan was dissolved by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In the 1970 general elections the National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam Party (JUI) secured the majority of the seats in the Balochistan assembly. As a result of the election, the NAP and JUI formed a coalition government in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Balochistan government was headed by Attaullah Mengal, with Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo as governor (Mahmood, 2002). The government of NAP was dismissed in a pre-planned way by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, and the leaders were declared traitors, which resulted in another of the bloodiest wars in the history of Balochistan (Kutty, 2009).

The Baloch and many of the Pashtun leaders such as Attaullah Mengal (Chief Minister of Balochistan), Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo (Governor), Wali Khan and Samad Khan Achakzai were sent to jail for treason (Kutty, 2009). During this revolt the Shah’s regime in Iran sent
planes to support the Pakistani Army (Harrison, 1981: 37). Harrison states that, “in mid-1974, Iran sent thirty US-supplied Huey Cobra helicopters, many of them managed by Iranian pilots” (Harrison, 1981: 37). Harrison and Kutty both conclude that the Shah of Iran feared that the nationalist government in Balochistan might arm the Baloch nationalists in their struggle in Iranian Balochistan.

To crush the early 1970s resistance, General Tikka Khan was appointed to launch the military operation in Balochistan. This insurgency lasted until 1977–78 when the then civilian government of Z. A. Bhutto was overthrown by a military junta. A reconciliation process was launched by Zia-ul-Haq to remove the Baloch grievances and bring them into line with mainstream policy in Pakistan. During the eleven-year rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977 to 1988) there was no direct conflict.

The leadership of the NAP was given a general amnesty and Zia-ul-Haq himself made several visits to Balochistan. He met with NAP leaders in jail and all their sentences were remitted and their confiscated properties returned. It cannot be said that the military regime (of Zia-ul-Haq) was better than the democratic civilian government (of Z. A. Bhutto) simply because the Balochistan conflict subsided into latent resentment and relative calm. But when it came to dealing with the Baloch people, the Zial-ul-Haq regime was relatively better. The reasons for this are not discussed in the literature, but one can say that this calm continued during the 1990s. The reason is simple: there were no longer any military operations or state actions. Zia-ul-Haq had even reversed the policy of previous regimes and dropped the Hyderabad conspiracy case against Baloch and Pashtun leaders (Khan, 1997). The situation became normal and he gave a general amnesty to those who had taken up arms against the state. According to Roedad, Khan (1997) declared that, had Zia-ul-Haq
followed the policies of confrontation of previous governments, the consequences would have been much more dangerous for the country of Pakistan.

The 1973 conflict was also a reaction against government policies and it did not end until the Baloch were invited to negotiations (Janmahmad, 1989). During the period of Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88) the conflict in Balochistan was pacified by the regime’s co-option policies, and similar policies were followed by the regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif until 1999. During these periods the whole of Balochistan remained relatively quiet and there was no armed resistance.

2.6.4 The Fifth Phase of the Conflict: 2002 to the present day

The fifth and on-going insurgency began in 2002 during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. According to the reports of Human Rights Watch (2010) and Bansal (2010), the struggle has now engulfed the whole of Balochistan since Musharraf began operations in 2006. In a military operation, a Baloch politician, Akbar Bugti, was killed and the problem became more severe. Before the assassination of Nawab Bugti, the conflict between the State and Balochistan had been a low-level insurgency in the Marri–Bugti area.

This insurgency is different in every respect from the previous one, as it has spread throughout Balochistan. The disappearances and extrajudicial killings continue in Balochistan through the abduction and murder of Baloch as well as non-Baloch activists, students, professionals, lawyers, teachers and politicians (see Human Rights Watch, 2010; International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2011 and 2012; Balochwarna News, 2013). Baloch professors, politicians, intellectuals,
human rights activists and journalists have all been brutally gunned down during the fifth phase of the conflict, in which there is a new ‘killing-dumping’ policy, unlike in the previous ones. In previous conflicts there was no such strong evidence of the killing of doctors, students and teachers. In retaliation, a number of non-Baloch have been killed by the Baloch militant organisations such as the BLA and BLF (HRCP, 2011).

According to Amnesty International (2011), however, the victims blame the country’s intelligence agencies for these hideous acts. National and international human rights organisations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) (2011), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (2010 and 2011) draw similar conclusions, blaming state institutions including the secret service agencies. The officials of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, however, deny such allegations. To date, these intelligence agencies have held ‘foreign hands’ responsible for the chain of assassinations in Balochistan. The continued alienation and denial of economic and political rights by the state of Pakistan and the current political turmoil have led some of the Baloch to once again abandon hope and join various armed organisations. Many of these organisations such as the BLA and BLF are demanding independence. They are actively involved in armed struggle and guerrilla-type warfare against the state. On the other hand, the nationalists, who have been part of the mainstream Pakistani polity, have been changing their demand for self-determination within the country. The past insurgencies were fought by the tribal chiefs in the specific areas whereas the current movement for the independence of Balochistan is led by the educated middle class along with federalist politicians, such as Ghulam Muhammad Baloch, (Balochistan National Movement), Late Nawab Akbar Bugti (Jamoori Watan Party) and Hyrbyar Marri (Baloch Haq Tawar).
Thus, there is a long-established pattern of suppression and even killing of Baloch leaders who resist the Pakistani state’s control. Since 1948, relations between the centre of the country and the province of Balochistan are not cordial. Whether Baloch people remain engaged in the struggle for the right to self-determination or for provincial autonomy is a question of debate due to the various different stances to be found within Balochistan. One thing is clear: the hostilities that have occurred in Balochistan can be considered a reaction to government policies. Many Baloch think that, during the 64 years of the Pakistan-Baloch relationship, Balochistan has been pushed down the road of complete alienation through exploitation, deprivation, and military operations.

Balochistan has been repressed and successive Pakistani regimes have occasionally admitted their excesses against Balochistan but have done little to amend them. For instance, the fighting continued after the Baloch leaders were arrested and hanged. The tension was only transformed into peace when the state freed the leaders from jail. The first phase of the conflict was a reaction to state policies, as has been discussed by many writers mentioned above. The fighting only stopped when the government offered to release the Baloch leaders and resolve all issues amicably. The case was similar to the second rebellion of Nauroz Khan, when the government of Pakistan decided to impose its ‘one unit’ policy to counter the majority in Eastern Pakistan, in order to ensure Punjabi domination and control over the government of Pakistan (Ahmed, 1996).

The Baloch had resisted the policies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (the Prime Minister of Pakistan) for the fourth time during his regime (Janmahmad, 1989). As discussed above, during the third phase of the conflict the entire leadership of the NAP was in jail. The political policies of the NAP were adopted but they were then dissolved due to lack of trust between the federal government of Pakistan and the province of Balochistan (Kutty, 2009).
When Pakistan finds itself at a political crossroads the military takes charge (Pervez Musharraf, 1999–2008), and the recent democratic regime (2008 to the present day) has coincided with the country having to face the fifth phase of the insurgency. This on-going phase of conflict can also be seen as a reaction to the military operations and the ‘kill and dump’ policies of the state. An example is that of Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in a military operation at the age of 79. He had led his tribe since 1946, before the independence of Pakistan (Matheson, 1997). He had served as provincial governor, chief minister and as a member of the National Assembly since the 1970s.

Baloch society is partially tribal, where tribal chiefs (Sardars) exercise the power of control over their tribes (Baluch, 1987; Matheson, 1997). Many Baloch nationalists and tribal leaders have remained part of the Pakistani political process. One example is the current government of the Baloch nationalist parties, such as the National Party and the Balochistan National Party (Mengal) who contested the election in 2013. They are part of both the provincial and federal governments. They share the fundamental belief that the federal government has not given the province its fair share of the region’s mineral wealth since its creation. Nevertheless, they believe in the democratic process. Additionally, many of the activists, including both ethnic Baloch and non–Baloch, take a sympathetic approach to the Baloch political movement and perceive that separation from the state of Pakistan may not be possible. They demand, therefore, equal political, economic and social rights for the Baloch within the state of Pakistan. In other words they require a greater share of political and economic rights and complete ownership of the natural resources in their province. They disapprove of the violent struggle and instead prefer to pursue a soft brand of nationalism that asks for maximum provincial autonomy within the orbit of the Constitution of Pakistan.
In this context I have presented the historical and political nature of the conflict, which included five phases. However, the question of Balochistan can be seen from many other viewpoints such as the economic nature of the conflict, which includes Baloch grievances and the exploitation of natural resources. The geopolitical and international factors of this conflict will now be examined.

2.7 Factors behind the Conflict in Balochistan

Examining the nature and causes of conflict in Balochistan reveals a great deal of similarity with other conflicts taking place around the world. For example, major causes of the eruption of such conflicts are mentioned by scholars such as Tilly (1999), Napoleoni (2004) and Stewart (2010). These causes are inequality, discrimination, resentment, the perception of inequality, socio-economic factors, marginalisation, and the lack of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Similar factors caused the conflict in Balochistan, as they do in other conflict-ridden regions. The Balochistan conflict is also driven by geopolitical factors which may be similar to those in other regions or countries. Therefore, it seems pertinent to outline both the socio-economic and geopolitical factors that have caused conflict in Balochistan, which will be discussed further in this chapter.

2.7.1 The Grievances of the Baloch

As noted, if greed can be perceived as ‘taking advantage of economic opportunities’, then grievance would mean the ‘motivation’ of a group to fight against injustice (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The concept of identity (culture, religion and ethnicity) also plays an important role in group formation and in the perception of the group’s position in society.
(Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). Conflicts can be influenced by identity, such as the mobilisation of a great number of people with a common feeling of belonging to a group (Stewart, 2008).

Researchers have challenged the validity of the ‘greed’ theory analysis of conflict and have mainly cited cases of ethnic, religious and economic grievances, as well as government ineptitude and an inclination on the part of rebels to alter these conditions, as reasons to support their view (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003; Sambanis, 2001; Stewart, 2010 and 1998).

In this sense, the greed of the Pakistani state and the grievances of the Baloch people resulted in a conflict which is mainly multidimensional, related to systematic economic exploitation and political and historical discrimination. The Baloch have a fear of losing their language and territory. These economic, socio-political and cultural grievances among the most deprived groups of the Baloch have provoked conflict over the last six decades. The Baloch grievances are now causing them to reassert their ethno-nationalist identity, thereby posing a challenge to the concept of Pakistani nationalism.

According to Bansal (2010), Baloch grievances started within the federation when the federal government concentrated all power, including political and socio-economic power, in its hands.23 The Baloch people in this milieu feel that the federal government’s behaviour towards them is totally exploitative (Barakzai, 2009). As a result, a new wave of insurgency erupted once again in 2002, differing from the ones in 1948–52, 1958–60, 1962–69 and 1973–77 only in the scale of the violence and the geographical spread of the insurgency. However, the causes, issues, demands and the goal continue to be the same.

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23 Pakistan came into existence as a federation in which all administrative and financial powers are distributed on the basis of the Constitution, but it has failed to implement a true spirit of federalism or allow provincial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Constitution.
It is crucial to mention that, without the accountability that comes through sustained mass political participation, the State will fail to provide solutions to basic grievances such as provincial autonomy, control over natural resources, educational access and basic needs of the province (Balochistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2003; Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Funds, 2013). As a result of the State policies, Balochistan is the poorest province and is entirely dependent on the federal government for the transferral of its own resources through the National Finance Commission (NFC) Awards on the basis of population. According to Tariq (2010: 30), “Balochistan also produces more than 40 percent of Pakistan’s primary energy, consisting of coal, oil, natural gas and other electricity”. However, it receives only a handful for its own consumption in return. The result is that popular grievances against the military and political establishment are finding a violent outlet in various militant groups such as the BLA (Hasnat, 2011: 99). With an abundance of resources, there are elements of resistance that might actually validate the state colonial policies in Balochistan. My own sense is that the Balochistan conflict is essentially grievance-based, as well as being due to the greed of the state, as argued above.

Bansal (2010) and Barakzai (2009) maintain that, of all the nationalist movements, the biggest threat to Pakistan at present is posed by the Baloch revolts. They argue that over the last six and half decades the Baloch have always been out of the mainstream of Pakistani politics, which has caused them to drift away from the main Pakistani society while other small nationalities have been assimilated into Pakistani society. This has created a trend of frequent outbreaks of violence in the region.

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24 The NFC is the mechanism through which the central government distributes resources among provinces on the basis of population. Balochistan receives only 5% of these resources. Nationalist leaders in Balochistan feel very dissatisfied with this state of affairs because it constitutes 44% of the total national territory and is unable to provide public service deliveries across the province.

25 There is a provincial government set up in the capital of Balochistan with its elected head of government known as the Chief Minister. The Governor is nominated by the President of the country. Many of the
2.7.2 Natural Resources

According to the Balochistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003), Baloch anger is rooted in the exploitation of their natural resources by the federal government. They wonder why, despite the territory’s vast natural wealth, the people of Balochistan live in abject poverty. Balochistan is desperately poor, although Balochistan provides one third of Pakistan's natural gas, only a handful of towns are connected to the supply grid (Wirsing, 2008). According to Grare (2006), Balochistan has failed to benefit from its own natural gas deposits. “The first deposits were discovered in Sui in 1953” (Grare, 2006: 5). Currently, over 70 per cent of Balochistan is without electricity, gas and other basic facilities (Baloch, 2007).

The classic example, described by Bugti (1996: 13), is the Sui Gas where natural gas was discovered in 1953 and remained the main source of energy in Pakistan. Since the Sui oil and gas field was discovered some 400km southeast of Quetta, it has created considerable resentment. The natural gas was first pumped to Punjab in the 1960s, 20 years before it reached Quetta, the capital of the province. By 1984 only the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta, and a few other towns were receiving gas, according to Bugti (1996: 13), while the rest of the province has remained without gas and electricity (Baloch, 2007; Wirsing, 2008). According to the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP), Pakistan is currently exploring for 50 minerals, of which approximately 40 are from Balochistan.

At Reko Diq, 70 miles from the Afghan border, a Canadian-Chilean mining consortium has struck gold, big-time.\textsuperscript{26} The Tethyan Company has discovered 4bn nationalist leaders claim that they are not true representatives of the Baloch people. According to one rough estimate, only 12 \% of the population cast their vote in the election.\textsuperscript{26} The matter of gold and copper resources of Riko Diq, in the Chagi hills, has ended up before Pakistan's Supreme Court. They are estimated to be among the three largest gold and copper deposits in the world according to GSP. It is important to mention that the Balochistan provincial government refused to issue licences to the international companies but the ultimate authority lies in the hands of central government.

\textsuperscript{26}
tonnes of mineable ore that will produce an estimated 200,000 tonnes of copper and 250,000 ounces of gold per year, making it one of the largest such mines in the world (The Guardian, 2011a).

This development scheme is presently being slowed down by a dispute, but it indicates the potential of Balochistan’s natural resources, such as platinum, iron ore, zinc and coal (Mines and Mineral Development Department Government of Balochistan). GSP discovered the most important resource deposits which are now being exploited, such as Saindak copper-gold deposits, Reko-Diq copper-gold deposits, Duddar lead-zinc deposits, and Dilband iron ore deposits (GSP, 2008; Baloch, 2007). Many writers argue that the Baloch revolt is about seeking control over their own natural resources, and this is the main cause of the insurgency. In the desire to take control of their resources, the Baloch have initiated a guerrilla-style struggle against the Pakistani state (Hasnat, 2011).

According to the Mines and Mineral Development Department, Government of Balochistan, coalmining in Balochistan probably started in 1872 in Khost Region District Sibi, while chromite has been mined in Muslimbagh since 1902. Vast areas of Balochistan have been covered by Canadian mapping in 1952 with the help of aerial photography; however, large areas still remained unmapped, such as Barkhan region. Exploration/large-scale mining activities for metallic minerals such as copper and gold started in the 1990s with the launch of the Saindak Copper-Gold Project. Developments of other large projects such as the Duddar Lead Zinc Project and Reko-Diq Copper Gold Project are under way.

In pursuance of the National Mineral Policy 1995 and the enactment of friendly investment mining rules in 2002, many multinational Exploration and Mining Companies have become involved in exploration/exploitation, e.g. B.H.P Billiton, Tetheyan Copper Company, (Berack Gold, Antafagusta), MCC, Lake Resources NL, MRDL, Benway. If these resources are properly explored, evaluated and developed, the mineral sector might
play an important role in the economic development of the province and the country as well. Exploration activities are in progress with the collaboration of foreign investors. Unfortunately, however, all the mining activities are currently being carried out by private as well as public sector and foreign investors without the consent of the Baloch people. Further, the Mines and Mineral Development Department, Government of Balochistan, mentions:

More than 50 important metallic and non metallic minerals have been discovered in the province. Metallic minerals are Chromite, Copper, Gold, Silver, Iron, Lead, Zinc, Manganese and Antimony whereas the non metallic include Barite, Fluorite, Calcite, Magnesite, gypsum, pumice, quartz, asbestos etc. Coal and Dimension stone such as Marble, both Onyx and Ordinary, Granite, Gabbro Basalt and Dunite are also available in large quantities.

Other resources of Balochistan are similarly being misappropriated by the federal government of Pakistan. For instance, the Port of Gwadar was handed over to the Singapore government on a 40-year lease without any involvement of Balochistan’s provincial government.

The Baluch have had only a small role in the construction of Gwadar port, a project entirely under the control of the central government. The project will benefit the people of Baluchistan only if a massive effort is undertaken to train and recruit local residents and if the port is linked with the rest of Baluchistan, which is certainly not the case at the present time (Grare, 2006: 6).

Likewise, Reko-diq gold and copper project, which is the largest gold and copper project in the country, with estimated deposits of millions of tons, is being handed over to an overseas consortium by the federal government of Pakistan. In a similar fashion, while bypassing the Balochistan government, the Saindak copper and gold project situated in the northeast of Balochistan is operated by a Chinese company, which deals directly with the federal government. This is thought to be the prime reason for the sense of deprivation that has pushed the Baloch into violent conflict with the state of Pakistan.
2.7.3 Geopolitical and International Factors of the Conflict

Harrison (1981: 1-2) posits that Balochistan has been a source of constant conflict and insurgency for decades due to its geopolitical position, with its port city of Gwadar on the Arabian sea. He also states:

[A]n area slightly larger than France - the Baluch homeland commands more than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, including the northern shores of the Strait of Hormuz, through which oil tankers bound for the West and Japan must pass on their way out of the Persian Gulf (Harrison, 1981: 1-2).

The port city of Gwadar is located on the coastline of the Arabian Sea, close to the border with Iran.²⁷ The expectation was that Gwadar port would become a regional hub for commercial and industrial activities and connect the Central Asian Republics (CARs) to the rest of the world, where the vast oil and gas reserves of the CARs would be exploited and transported around the world via Gwadar port (Grare, 2006). Gwadar is located near an important shipping lane and was built by the ‘China Harbour Engineering Company Group’. “The Chinese government invested heavily in this project, up to $200m, some say, so that landlocked western China could benefit from access to the sea” (The Guardian, 2011b).

Although the port has been completed, it is not yet operational, for many reasons. Scholars such as Grare (2006: 6) believe that “[t]he Baluch in Gwadar fear that they will become a minority in their own land”. Instead of the port being handed over to the Balochistan provincial government, it was leased out to Singapore for 40 years by the federal

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²⁷ Gwadar deep-sea port is situated in Balochistan. It is in the north of the Arabian Sea and close to the Persian Gulf. This port is around 460 km from Karachi.
government. Finally, in 2013 Gwadar Port was taken from the Singapore authority and handed over to the Chinese government. This Port employed Chinese nationals and non-Baloch from other provinces of Pakistan, which resulted in marginalisation and resentment, as mentioned by Grare. “Of the approximately six hundred persons employed in the construction of the first phase of the project, only one hundred, essentially daily-wage workers, were Baluch. There has also been only one road, which joins Gwadar to Karachi, opening the port to the rest of the country” (Grare, 2006: 6).

Gwadar, in spite of having an immense resource base and potential sea route to Central and South Asia, has descended into poverty and economic stagnation. This is largely because the province is being marginalised by the federal government. It is treated merely as a strategically important region with resource reserves (see Bizenjo, 2006; Bugti, 1996: 13). The aforementioned authors argue that the geo-strategic location of Gwadar, with its warm water (the Arabian Sea), and the NATO supply line through Balochistan to Afghanistan for the ‘War against Terrorism’ have created a sense of insecurity among the Baloch, which has resulted in conflict. Many scholars argue for the geopolitical importance of Balochistan, which is attracting the interest of the international community, primarily because it has a strategic location.

Balochistan has been an over-sensitive region for the international community due to its location and the vastness of its territory and borders. There is a Taliban presence on its border with Afghanistan, which is about 800 miles long. Besides, a report published in The Guardian, entitled Pakistan’s secret dirty war, states:

Balochistan has long been an edgy place. Its vast, empty deserts and long borders are a magnet for provocateurs of every stripe. Taliban fighters slip back and forth along the 800-mile Afghan border; Iranian dissidents hide inside the 570-mile frontier with Iran. Drug criminals cross the border from Helmand, the world’s largest source of heroin, on their way to Iran or lonely beaches on the Arabian Sea.
Wealthy Arab sheikhs fly into remote airstrips on hunting expeditions for the houbara bustard, a bird they believe improves their lovemaking. At Shamsi, a secretive airbase in a remote valley in the centre of the province, CIA operatives launch drones that attack Islamists in the tribal belt (*The Guardian*, 2011a).

All these factors are responsible for the importance of Balochistan on the one hand and its vulnerability on the other. To sum up, it might simply be said that there is a dire conflict not only for resource-related and geo-strategic reasons but also for various other reasons as mentioned above.

Due to its location at the crossroads, the problem of Balochistan has been treated as a foreign conspiracy by the state of Pakistan (Bansal, 2006 and 2010). It is naturally an attractive location for regional powers who try to access central Asian riches through its land (Bizenjo, 2006). At the regional level, India and China have always been part of the equation for economic and geopolitical reasons. According to Wirsing (2008), Grare (2006) and Baloch (2007), there are compelling reasons for urgent action by either country or the Baloch people due to their various interests. For example, the Baloch public response to India is different from the rest of Pakistan. The Baloch see India as a likely supporter, while the government of Pakistan supports China due to strategic and mutual interests. Both countries are regional economic and military powers as well as engaging in their own hostilities among themselves.\(^{28}\) Another report published by *The Guardian*, entitled Gwadar: Pakistan’s new Great Game, states:

> It appears that there is a long-term plan to eventually connect the Karakoram highway with Gwadar. This is upsetting the other emerging superpower of the

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\(^{28}\)United States and British intelligence broadly agree, according to recent discussions, that India sees Balochistan as a payback for Pakistani meddling in Kashmir (see Daily Dawn, 2012, BBC, 2012 and cited by Rehman Malik in-camera briefing to the parliament). Rehman Malik is a politician and former member of the Upper House (the Senate) of Pakistan. He was the Interior Minister of Pakistan under the administration of the previous Peoples Party. The state believes that Baloch separatists and nationalists are being supported by India.
region, India, who does not want China's security establishment to have safe passage to the Arabian Sea. The fear they have been articulating is that Gwadar might become a naval outpost for the Chinese (The Guardian, 2011b).

The stance of the state of Pakistan on the Balochistan conflict is different from that of the Baloch nationalist leadership. The Pakistani State sees it as a problem of the Sardars. According to this representation by Pakistani historians, only a few Sardars are supported by foreign countries (particularly Israel and India) in their attempts to break up Pakistan. The official approach in Balochistan is that ‘everything is alright’ and only a few hundred miscreants and Sardars, supported by foreign hands, have to be dealt with. By eliminating these few Sardars and their supporters, they argue, Balochistan will return to normality. Their preferred approach, like all occupying forces, is simply to eliminate them. One might argue that the problem of Balochistan is not the issue of a few Sardars but a multidimensional conflict that includes socio-economic, political and historical grievances that need to be addressed.

In order to crush the insurgency, the government of Pakistan launched five army operations, in 1948, the 1960s, the 1970s and 2002. According to Bansal (2006), Baloch (2007), International Crises Group (2007) and Cohen (2005), the situation became worse when the previous dictatorial regime of Pakistan decided to wage a large-scale army operation to oppress both the nationalist and separatist leadership of Balochistan. This military adventure not only further alienated the Baloch masses from Pakistan but also squeezed the role of those Baloch political leaders who still believed in a democratic and political solution and the distribution of natural resources on the basis of constitutional division.

There are, however, many hurdles to conflict resolution, such as the role of the military and the state secret agencies. For example, the ‘kill and dump’ policy aimed at the Baloch
people has created further resentment among the Baloch against the state of Pakistan. A report published by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that, since 2000, some 198 cases of enforced disappearance have occurred in Balochistan. Of these 198 people, 46 have been traced, 57 have been found dead (their corpses found in various part of the province) and the rest are still missing. Various Baloch websites and nationalist leaders claim that the true number of missing persons in Balochistan is actually more than 18,000. Qadeer Baloch, vice president of the International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (IVBMP), claims that as many as 18,000 people, including 150 women, have disappeared in Balochistan since 2001, and 900 mutilated bodies have been found in different parts of the volatile province so far (Khan, 2014).

For the state and its institutions, including the judiciary, the excesses inflicted on the Baloch people do not register as crimes against humanity. Had these been considered abnormal and abhorrent, someone or something would have stirred, but as far as Baloch are concerned the state and its institutions are silent. No institution has redressed the grievances of the Baloch because they all seem to want the status quo to be maintained at all costs, even if that cost is the lives of thousands of people.

2.7 Conclusion

When there is extreme oppression, discrimination and violation of human rights, the reaction provoked can also be extreme. As mentioned before, many writers argue that the demarcation of Baloch land has divided the 700-year-old sovereign nation of Baloch into Iran and Afghanistan. The remaining part of Balochistan, however, stayed under British control and was annexed by Pakistan on March 27, 1948. They claim that the conflict in Balochistan is historical and political. This chapter has clearly illustrated that the conflict
in Balochistan has been on-going since the very beginning of the existence of Pakistan, and it has multiple causes. Whatever the reason for the conflict, Balochistan became part of Pakistan under controversial circumstances, but no serious attempt has been made to solve the problems of the Baloch people.

Since the creation of Pakistan there have been many false commitments and promises by both federal and provincial government officials but they have all been in vain due to the insincere attitude of the state policy-makers. However, this is no simple matter. As a result of the mayhem in Balochistan, people have been suffering due to poverty, lack of education, lack of development, and poor health and nutrition facilities for many decades. In the same way, every newly elected government apologises to the Baloch people for their wrongdoings but continues to rule with the same suppressive policies. Thus, I would argue here that the Baloch people’s grievances and the nature of the Pakistani State have resulted in a conflict that is bringing systematic economic exploitation and political and historical discrimination.
3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a critical discussion of scholarly literature on education and conflict in order to help analyse the case-study of the Balochistan conflict in Pakistan. Scholars have approached education and conflict relationships in different ways. Broadly speaking, there are different ways in which the role of education is seen in academic literature. The dominant view is that education is about care. The functionalist theorists such as Emile Durkheim (1956, 1962 and 1977), Talcott Parsons (1959), Kingsley Davies and Wilbert Moore (1945), and Michael Young (1961) adopt this view. The functionalist perspective emphasises the positive aspects of education such as skills, learning, behaviour and attitude, and the provision of a sense of solidarity.

There is an alternative view; the conflict perspective on the role of education reaches a contrary conclusion. According to the conflict perspective, education is about mode of control (Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 1976; Randall Collins, 1979; Pierre Bourdieu, 1977). The purpose of education is to maintain inequality by keeping power in the hands of those who are influential in society. Criticising the functionalists, this school maintains that the education system and policies mould the lower classes into obedient followers.

The third argument is that conflict has a clearly detrimental effect on education. Moreover, education, as one of the contributors to human development, is also affected by conflict. Looking specifically at education and conflict, the bulk of the literature discusses how conflict can be detrimental to education. I will return to this issue later in the chapter.
Few scholars have looked at how education affects conflict. Within this theme, the
dominant view is that education reduces conflict. Paulson and Rappleye (2007) and the
World Bank (2005) claim that education is instrumental in pacifying a conflict. Similarly,
the World Bank suggests that there is a fundamental role for education in conflict
resolution, wherein the former provides recommendations and helps to reform society.
Likewise, other scholars including French (2005), Bhaskaran (2003), Novelli and Cardozo
(2008), and Tawil (2001) argue that education enables communities and nations to resolve
their internal socio-economic and political conflicts through dialogue and in various other
constructive ways. According to these authors, the right kind of education can provide an
undisputable solution to all human, social and economic problems. The ‘right kind of
education’ refers to a high-quality education that ensures excellence, measurable learning,
literacy, and the learning of the essential skills of life (Leach and Dunne, 2007).

Nevertheless, even those who believe in the pacifying role of education do not necessarily
assert that there is a direct causal relationship between formal education and conflict
resolution. That is, education itself may not be a neutral actor in the resolution of conflict;
it can affect conflict through various channels, which are discussed later in the chapter.

However, an opposing view is that education actually exacerbates conflict. Challenging the
above view, one can say that education may generate conflict if it is used as a weapon of
cultural repression through school textbooks that promote intolerance (Bush and Saltarelli,
2000; Davies, 2004). Davies (2004) holds this opinion and consequently argues that it is
the structure of the education system itself that, by promoting certain ideologies, will
ultimately enhance inequalities and therefore have the potential to fuel conflict. Similarly,
based on various case-studies on the structure of the education system, such as the one on
Sierra Leone, Gallagher (2005) also argues that education provokes conflict. For example,
children learn how to count using photos of guns; they learn about war tactics and landmines, and the content of the teaching contains religious messages and words of hatred (see also Davies, 2005b).

In order for us to gain a deeper understanding of education and conflict, further examination is necessary. We need to arrive at some understanding of how education and conflicts are usually understood within academic scholarship. First, concepts and approaches such as ‘functionalist’ and ‘conflict’ perspectives are critically reviewed in this chapter for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the politics of education. In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the ‘functionalist’ and ‘conflict’ perspectives on the role of education in order to explore the politics of education, highlighting the key areas where education may prove effective by focusing on both conflict resolution and conflict generation. Second, I will provide an overview of the literature on the relation between education and conflict. This chapter also describes the tendency in both scholarship and policy-making to see education as a potential tool for the reduction of conflict. Third, this chapter focuses on these writings, examining how they may be problematic, by giving an alternative scholarly view on how education foments conflict. Fourth, in the conceptualisation of various trains of thought on education and conflict, this chapter will follow another argument: that viewing education as human development and a fundamental right will help to resolve conflict if the state provides appropriate education. Finally, this chapter ends by discussing ‘grievance’ with regard to education in Balochistan. Some believe that the state doesn’t care and only wants to control the people. This may be one of the attitudes acting as a catalyst to the conflict in Balochistan.
3.2 The Role of Education

This part provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives on the role of education: the functionalist perspective and the conflict perspective. According to functionalism, the role of education, particularly in schools, is to maintain the prevailing social order. The functionalists’ view of the role of education is split into the following parts: socialisation, skills provision, and role allocation. The conflict approach, in contrast, describes the role of education as being to serve the interests of a particular class. According to later arguments, schools serve the interests and ideas of the dominant classes in society (see the next section). Before delving into a theoretical discussion on the role of education, it is important to describe very briefly the scholarly literature on the philosophy and idea of education in Western civilisation from the ancient era to the modern one.

3.2.1 The Idea of Education in Western Civilisation

The scholarly growth and development of education is not straightforward. Modern education in Western civilisation evolved during the Ancient Greek, Renaissance, Reformation Movement, and later Enlightenment periods. This gradual development continued through the early seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, later, in the modern world. Consequently, the advanced doctrine of education has undergone numerous phases of change.

The idea of education in Western civilisation had emerged in ancient Greece. The most important Greek philosophers were Socrates (470/469–399 BC), Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), all world-renowned philosophers. The thought and
ideas of these great philosophers on education have influenced nations from ancient times to the modern world.

Plato was born in 428/427 BC to a wealthy family in Athens. He pursued a career in philosophy as a student of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, to continue his philosophy Plato established a school of philosophy in Athens, around 387 BC. Plato’s ideas on education emerged in his famous and widely-read book the ‘Republic’. The work focused on the importance of education for the evolving society. This seminal work is a compilation of dialogues dealing with the essence of education in greater detail. Plato believed that education was the key factor in creating and sustaining the Republic (Rusholme, 1975: 2). Plato believed that the main purpose of education was to recognise the good that prepared human beings for better lives in the state (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002).

Scholars have described the established learning Academy of Plato as the first European university and learning institution. According to Rusholme (1975), in Plato’s idea of an education system children first learn reading, writing and counting at the age of six when they go to school. His education system is based on learning, dialogue, motivation and interest. His idea of learning consisted of facts, skills, physical discipline, music and arts, which he considered the highest form of endeavours in society.

Plato’s state or Polis is basically an educational community. The survival of the Polis was based on education that enabled its citizens to accomplish rational thinking and decision-making. It is to be noted that the objective and purposes of education were not meant to be individual personal interests; rather, education should serve the interests of the state (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 17). Thus, the state should be the guarantor of the pleasure of its people for as long as they allow it to be the embodiment of justice.
Plato attached greater importance to the subject of education. For Plato, “education is a basic component of life” (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16). Plato saw education as a nursery that played a vital role in the education of man, helping to build his moral character and state of mind (Rusholme, 1975: 2). In his view, nursery education played an important role in building moral character in the Polis. “A good society was one in which all individuals played a useful part” (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16). Thus, proper training at nursery level plays an important role in creating the best rulers.

Plato’s Republic was a kind of Utopian recipe for a stable, just society in which the citizens could enjoy a ‘good life’. Plato’s central idea was that his ideal society would have three levels of citizens: the workers or men of bronze; the warriors or men of silver; and the guardians or philosopher-leaders, the men of gold. Each of these three groups would be carefully educated and trained specifically for their future roles in society (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16).

As a young man, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), a Greek philosopher, joined Plato’s academy in Athens. He is one of the founding figures of Western philosophy (Hummel, 1999: 1). The writings of this great thinker have largely been lost; only one third of the original works have survived for the modern world to contemplate the significance of education. A number of disciplines are saturated with his philosophy such as, politics, ethics, poetry, psychology, metaphysics, philosophy and education (Hummel, 1999: 1). It is believed that Aristotle contributed to every field to explore the complete domain of knowledge.

Aristotle devoted his life to teaching, learning and spreading educational thoughts in society. Libraries and museums were established to preserve knowledge and to proliferate education. The Lyceum (his School) was his great achievement. According to Hummel (1999: 2), the Lyceum “was a type of university where research was pursued as an extension of higher education”. Research, the philosophy of education, and politics are his most important contributions. Moreover, Aristotle laid the foundations of knowledge and
methods of teaching with the principal aim of education. The intellectual and moral virtues were emphasised in his teachings on the correct actions. The Aristotelian viewpoint counted education as a powerful force in every sphere of social life (Curren, 2000).

Man alone lives by reason, for he alone possesses rationality. In his case, therefore, nature, habit and the rational principle must be brought into harmony with one another; for man is often led by reason to act contrary to habit and nature, if reason persuades him that he ought to do so. We have already determined what natures will be most pliable in the legislator’s hand. All else is the work of education; some things are learned by habit and others by instruction. Hence certain attributes are necessary in order to achieve happiness, the full development of the human being. One must be fortunate enough to possess from birth certain natural gifts, both physical and moral (a healthy and beautiful body, a certain facility, intelligence and a natural disposition towards virtue). But these are insufficient. It is only through education that potential happiness can become truly accessible. Education is the touchstone of Aristotelian ethics. The virtues, wisdom and happiness are acquired through education. The art of living is something to be learned. Aristotle’s ethics are based on such concepts as happiness, the mean, leisure and wisdom, which we also encounter in his theory of education (Hummel, 1999: 3).

From the remaining fragments of Aristotle’s treatise on educational philosophy, it can be argued that he studied and debated human nature as an important force demonstrated in education. The principal function of education was to produce virtuous and good citizens for the Polis.

Despite the philosophical, political and intellectual contributions of ancient Greek scholars, the Church and religious class had an immense impact on society in Western civilisation. The middle ages witnessed the dominance of the priesthood in the life of the masses. Eventually, this led the Orthodox Church, the nobility, and the ruling class to play a powerful and supreme role in social affairs. This supremacy brought the layman and the weaker classes under the suppression of the religious elite.

The debate over “the idea of original sin”, according to Manuel (1965: 4), was still prevalent as a subject of concern during medieval times. The religious class’s influence
was not limited to certain spheres of society; in fact, the nature of truth, scientific knowledge and educational thoughts were controlled by the religious institutions. In this regard, Manuel (1965: 4) states that, “crucial for the traditional theology of all Christian sects, whether Protestant or Roman Catholics, had been the belief that man after the Fall was naturally corrupt, and that from the time of Adam this corruption had been passed on through every successive generation”.

The religious domination and debate over the good and bad nature of human beings resulted in the emergence of an independent and secular philosophical movement during the 17th and 18th centuries, known as the Enlightenment or Age of Reason. The beginning of this intellectual and educational revolution was aimed at curbing the rampant repression that had spread to every aspect of human life. Evidently, the forerunners of the Age of Enlightenment found societal redemption in education. The wide dispersion of educational philosophy brought awareness and produced great scholars. Most leading philosophers of this period, particularly Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Morelly and Helvetius, according to Karimzadi (2015a: 18) “offered a diametrically opposite description of human nature to that of the prevailing time and religion”.

Instead of the belief that by nature man was evil, Voltaire and Rousseau, Hume, Morelly, and Helvetius all held the conviction that man was by nature good, or at least neutral. If he was naturally good then the good in him should be allowed to express itself; if he was neutral then could easily be persuaded to the good by education (Manuel, 1965: 5).

They believed that the “human race is not wicked by nature” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 18). The philosophers emphasised that the human being is essentially kind and compassionate. “If human beings are naturally good then the good in them should be allowed to develop and grow. If they are neutral then they can nurtured and educated to become good. So the
human race by its nature is said to be good or capable of being good” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 18).

Despite overt religious conformity and even nominal acceptance of the doctrine of original sin, many came to regard man as by nature good, or at least capable of becoming good. Given a proper environment he would be gentle, loving and unwarlike. He had a natural benevolence and a natural sympathy for other men (Manuel, 1965: 5).

Karimzadi (2015a: 18) writes “[If people are ruled by reason and are allowed to live freely without the intrusion of outside irrational influences, they will create societies that are good and harmonious”. But what are the causes of peoples’ greed, viciousness and brutality? He continues “[T]hese characteristics are described as not being innate. John Locke (1632–1704) described the brain of the newly born child as a clean slate which is empty of any facts” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 19).

John Locke, the influential English philosopher and Enlightenment thinker, had influenced scholars such as Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Locke’s idea of ‘consciousness’ explains that a child’s mind is a ‘blank slate’ or *Tabula Rasa*. His idea suggests that human beings are born without innate ideas (Gianoutsos, 2006: 1). Common knowledge and education can be inculcated to people through interactions in society via shared experiences and a sense of perceptions (see Baldwin, 1913: 180). Thus, “In attempting to combat Descartes’ theory of innate ideas, Locke apparently takes the opposite extreme in his philosophy and holds that knowledge is entirely the product of experience, for the mind at birth is an ‘empty tablet’” (Baldwin, 1913: 180).

Locke’s doctrine on education holds that ideas develop through experience, sensation and reflection (Rickless, 2014: 67). In an essay, ‘Human Understanding’, he debates ‘Sensation’ because this is a tool through which senses are conveyed as perceptions in the
mind, while ‘Reflection’ makes the mind work with perceptions to generate ideas. His original belief saw the mind as a Blank Tablet of experience, but he never claimed that all human minds are similar. In his contribution ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’ (1963), he mentions that some minds have greater intellectual potential than others. However, the philosopher’s idea of Empiricism is based on focused learning that is achieved with experience.

In Jean Jacques Rousseau’s (1712–78) ‘state of nature’, human beings are regarded as pure and innocent (MacIntyre, 1998: 183–84). Rousseau was an eighteenth-century philosopher, writer and intellectual who wrote a discourse on inequality and a historical account of the development of the human race. He distinguished between natural man (man formed by nature) and social man (man shaped by society), arguing that a good education should develop the nature of man. Rousseau discovered that mankind has several forms of nature. According to him, man had originally lived in a pure state of nature (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 94).

Rousseau describes the education of children not in a school but at home, protected from the corrupting influences of society. It provides us with one of Rousseau’s fundamental articles of faith: that children are born naturally good, but become infected by the evils of society unless measures are taken to keep the child away from them (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 94).

Rousseau’s philosophy revolves around the nature and the child themes, which have also influenced the field of education greatly. Among his writings, Emile and On Education have had a great impact on political, social and educational thought. Rousseau’s Emile (1762) sheds light on the nature of education and the nature of human beings. It established a profound influence on the Enlightenment era and has influenced contemporary political thought and the idea of education. Emile describes an attempt to educate a simple and pure child for life and work (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 95). Rousseau’s aim was to show
how natural education, unlike the artificial and formal education of society, enables Emile
to become social, moral and rational while remaining true to his original nature. Because
*Emile* is educated to be a man, not a priest or a soldier, he will be able to do whatever he
wants.

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), tutor to the father of ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ Adam
Smith, wrote in *A system of Moral Philosophy* (1755) that people are born with sympathy
and fellow-feelings. Like many other Scottish philosophers, Hutcheson had an important
role in eighteenth-century writers’ debate concerning the moral sense. Consequently, the
natural goodness of the human race and the ‘moral sense’ school beliefs emerged from his
pen.

Claude Adrien Helvetius, another French philosopher, presented an argument against both
the ‘moral sense’ school, as presented by Hutcheson, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s belief
in the natural goodness of man (Manuel, 1965: 76). According to Helvetius, “man in the
cradle is neither good nor evil” (see Manuel, 1965: 76). Helvetius’ *Essays on the Mind,
and Its Several Faculties*, published in 1759, proposed that all men are equal. They
naturally have the same understanding and the same level of learning. However, the
differences between men are due not to innate characteristics but to the education system.
In this regard, the distribution of educational facilities matters. Therefore, it is education
that shapes the child’s mind.

Helvetius is really an adherent of the “clean slate” doctrine in John Lock’s sense:
all of man’s capacities and his principles of morality are exclusively the result of
training and experience, and if an appropriate system of education were devised,
men, motivated by self-interest alone, could be conditioned to will the good of
society (Manuel, 1965: 76).

“The good can be achieved only through an education of a particular kind, and if this
education is to be available to more than a random selection of mankind, it will have to be
institutionalised” (MacIntyre, 1998: 53). If human beings are good by nature, then it is the environment that will make them good or bad. Humans have inherent abilities and potentials for developing. Hence, education is not about creating moral or personal character but about seeing society develop successfully. Men’s “misfortunes, therefore, lie in the conditions in which they live. The clue to their well-being was in education and in social, political and economic reforms. By introducing an appropriate system of education and reforms, people would be guided to behave in accordance with their natural goodness” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 19).

Helvetius influenced writers of the utilitarian school of thought, such as Jeremy Bentham. The utilitarian school, including Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), J. S. Mill and others, based their analysis on this principle. The utilitarian psychology was one of the important contributions of James Mill (1773–1836). Mill’s theory of the association of ideas, according to Lawton and Gordon (2002: 116), had contributed to the field of educational development in the Western world. His emphasis was on “the intellectual processes of a child rather than the emotional and was too mechanistic an approach” (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 116).

A vast body of literature exists on the philosophy and idea of education. Many scholars contributed to this subject, including Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), John Dewey (1859–1952) and Paulo Freire (1921–1997). The viewpoints of others in education are quite significant in society. The aim of education, according to Kant, “is a moral and socially better world which leads to the perfectibility of man” (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 134).
Education was seen as a means of achieving different goals in different societies, as is evident from the vast philosophical debate on the idea of education. Moreover, socialist writers have also considered education very helpful both in terms of improving the wellbeing of the masses and in terms of educating the working class to realise its historical role and its rights. This thesis neither intervenes directly in the history of the philosophy of education nor includes it in its scope. However, it has been worthwhile discussing the contributions of these scholars to corroborate the inferences made in the field of education.

3.2.2 The Functionalist Perspective

A functionalist’s perspective on education emphasises the positive aspects of education, such as skills, learning, behaviour, attitude and providing a sense of solidarity. According to functionalists such as Durkheim (1956 and 1977)\(^{29}\), Parsons (1959), and Davies and Moore (1945), the main role of education is to ensure the acquisition of basic knowledge. It does this by teaching such skills to children as will be required for their employment on leaving school. The education system also has a key role to play in socialising the population into accepting society, its norms and its values. Functionalist theorists such as Durkheim (1956), Parsons (1959), Davies and Moore (1945), and Young (1961) all have the same opinion on the role of education, arguing that it teaches solidarity, integrity and social values, which must be functional. They declare that providing education is the way to maintain competition, equality, opportunity and skills for improving the economy and the norms and values of society by creating social solidarity for young people. It provides

\(^{29}\)Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), was a French sociologist and his original works were published in the French language. The works of the writer used in this thesis have been edited or translated into English by other scholars. His major contributions to academic writing on education were *Education and Sociology* (1956), *Moral Education* (1962), and *The Evolution of Educational Thought* (1977).
jobs for them in accordance with their talents by using examinations and qualifications, a system known as ‘meritocracy’.

The French sociologist David Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the founder of functionalism. In his opinion, the structure and level of education is not the same in every society. Education is an important force in the creation of moral unity, social cohesion and harmony in all societies (Durkheim, 1956). For Durkheim, moral values were the foundation of society.

Durkheim’s argument states that education is the main agent of primary socialisation. He says that “education is socialization . . . of the young generation” (Durkheim, 1956: 28). Education integrates people into society by teaching them the consensus of its values and helps them to feel they belong to the same society. Education transfers culture, common beliefs and values while school maintains the cooperation, integration, rules and instructions, and principles of society. According to Durkheim (1956), school is a vehicle for transmitting norms and values, and for maintaining the consensus on these matters. The functionalist theorists view education, its role and its function as something without which a society cannot function (see Durkheim, 1956). According to functionalists, society and education are related to each other. Sadovnik states:

Functionalists view society as a kind of machine, where one part articulates with another to produce the dynamic energy required to make society work. Most important, functionalism stresses the processes that maintain social order by stressing consensus and agreement. Although functionalists understand that change is inevitable, they underscore the evolutionary nature of change. Further, although they acknowledge that conflict between groups exists, functionalists argue that without a common bond to unite groups, society will disintegrate. Thus, functionalists examine the social processes necessary to the establishment and maintenance of social order (2007: 3).

Functionalists such as Durkheim feared that ‘traditional rituals’ were declining in society (see Durkheim, 1893/1947; 1915/1954). He believed that this may have been happening
because of the transition from ‘traditional to modern societies’. Sadovnik notes that, for Durkheim,

[T]he processes of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization led to the breakdown of traditional rituals and methods of social control, which in turn led to the breakdown of social solidarity and cohesion. In *Suicide* (1897/1951), he demonstrated empirically how the breakdown in the traditional community resulted in the decline of collective conscience and the rise of individualism. Such a breakdown led to what Durkheim called anomie, the condition of normlessness in individuals and society (2007: 4).

Durkheim knew that urbanisation and modernisation would affect social cohesion and control over people. He was greatly concerned about the disintegration of society and wanted a kind of education and schooling system that might serve as a binding force to maintain its integrity in order to control it. He wanted a schooling system that could connect individuals with one another politically, socially and mentally. He states:

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the especial milieu for which he is specifically destined (Durkheim, 1956: 71).

Functionalists see school as a vital part of the organic analogy: a society is like a body; if one organ fails the body will die. They have linked this to the idea of the ‘human body analogy’ (Urry, 2000). They believe that, without education, society will fail to function. Education helps in maintaining a functional society. Functionalism became popular in the mid-twentieth century through the work of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), who was known as a modern functionalist. Parsons believed that

[E]ducation was a vital part of a modern society, a society that differed considerably from all previous societies. From this perspective, schooling performs important functions in the development and maintenance of a modern, democratic
society, especially with regard to equality of opportunity for all citizens (Sadvonik, 2007: 5).

Parsons (1959) talks about the idea of role allocation. According to him, education sorts people into their most suitable roles for society based on talents and skills, determined through the use of exams and qualifications. As a result, many people will become doctors, nurses, pilots and engineers as well as holding other prestigious positions. Functionalists argue that schools prepare children for different roles in society. Furthermore, rewards are given to motivate people to aim for the top. This encourages competition according to abilities, creating upper, middle and lower band classes.

This idea of role allocation is also linked with the idea of meritocracy. Functionalists such as Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (1945) see education as working according to ‘meritocratic principles’. ‘Meritocracy’ is the way in which someone is rewarded according to his or her ability and achievements. It is a political philosophy which states that power should be given to people according to their abilities and merit. The concept of ‘meritocracy’ is an old one, having been first coined in 1961 by British sociologist and politician Michael Young (see Young, 1961; Kamolnict, 2005; Best, 2005). According to Young (1961), meritocracy is the system through which every individual should have equal opportunities. To achieve goals, effort and ability are required. Thus, one’s job is based on the skills and abilities one demonstrates during one’s education. If someone puts more effort into their education they will gain more rewards, whereas the opposite applies to those who make less effort. Young’s essay describes the governments that were focusing on intelligence, overlooking the deficiencies and failure of education systems on the one hand and using the brilliant members of their societies appropriately on the other (Young, 1961: 13).
Davis and Moore (1945) see the function of schools as ‘based on merit, not one’s status’. They argued:

[T]hat inequality was functional and necessary in all societies, as it ensured that the most talented individuals would fill the functionally most important positions. Nonetheless, modern democratic societies differ from previous, traditional agrarian societies because they are meritocratic; that is, talent and hard work should determine the allocation of individuals to positions, rather than accidents of birth. Thus, in modern societies education becomes the key institution in a meritocratic selection process (see Sadvonik, 2007: 5).

Parsons (1959) considers that education imparts the importance of competition, parity and individuality. He agrees with Durkheim’s view that school is like a bridge between childhood, adulthood, family and society. It transmits the values of high achievement because it is meritocratic. Functionalism is a structural perspective, identifying multi-functional institutions such as the mass media, family, religion, the state and education (see Durkheim, 1954; 1956). As mentioned above, scholars in this field of study argue that education is a functioning social institution in society. In their opinion, the education system plays a key role in socialising young people into accepting society’s norms and values. Education teaches us to have a sense of belonging. It helps us to become integrated into society. Functionalist theory remained a prominent perspective in the field of education until the 1960s. Since then, however, this perspective has had to face significant criticism from conflict theorists. Scholars in this field (the conflict perspective) argue that schools function in the interests of dominant groups rather than for everyone. According to them, functionalists are confused about the role of education. Schools ought to have been democratic or meritocratic, but the empirical evidence does not support the functionalist contention.
3.2.3 The Conflict Perspective

The conflict perspective is the opposite of the functionalist approach. It is another important perspective on the role of education. The founder of this perspective is Karl Marx (1818–1883). Marx did not write much about education itself, but the conflict perspective is known as the Marxist perspective on education (see Ballantine and Spade, 2007: 12). He was nonetheless the initial intellectual articulator of the conflict school in the sociology of education.

Proponents of this perspective have challenged functionalism. They argue that the relationship between schools, jobs and skills is problematic (see Hurn, 1993). Hurn argues that this relationship is less rational and is exaggerated by the functionalists. Furthermore, he says that the role of school is itself problematic in providing equality and equal opportunities to students (Hurn, 1985).

The conflict paradigm offers a very different interpretation of schooling in its relationship to society. Like the functional paradigm, the conflict paradigm sees schools and society as closely linked- and, I shall argue, too closely linked-but it stresses the links between schools and the demands of elites rather than the needs of the whole society (Hurn, 1985: 61).

From a conflict perspective, schools are similar to social battlefields, for various reasons. According to the Marxist perspective, education transfers the ideology of the ruling class. Other Marxists also argue that the culture to which Durkheim refers is in fact the culture of the bourgeois, or the rich. This is a vital point, since no schools or colleges seek to transmit working-class norms and values, or ways of thinking or speaking. According to this theory, the purpose of education is to maintain inequality and to gain even more power for those who are already influential in society (Ballantine and Spade, 2007). Moreover, Collins
(1971) argues that higher education is a weapon and tool to maintain the status of the elite class. The ruling class often uses education for these purposes.

Durkheim is criticised for assuming that there was a shared culture for all young people. Today, however, we have different cultures associated with different classes. We have different ethnic and religious cultures that may not identify with or wish to accept the culture transmitted by the education system. Functionalists also assume there are equal opportunities for all pupils, whereas there is evidence that the working class and minority groups do not enjoy the same level of opportunities.

Tumin (1953), an American sociologist who challenges Davis and Moore’s (1945) hypothesis of social stratification, maintains that only the rewarding jobs with good positions and salaries are considered important. His argument on social stratification is based on the idea of ‘functional necessity’. According to Tumin (1953), Davis and Moore only present a positive role of education for society. Dennis Hume Wrong is an American sociologist who wrote many books and essays and a famous critique of Talcott Parson’s functionalist views. For Wrong (1976), pupils and students are only puppets, and they are supposed to accept the norms and values as well as regulations of the school. They cannot reject them.

With regard to meritocracy, the most important critics of the functionalist view of education are the conflict theorists, who regard meritocracy as a myth because there is no clear definition of ‘merit’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Davis and Moore’s and Parsons’ view of ‘meritocratic’ education has been criticised by Bowles and Gintis, who argue that class background matters a great deal. How can one define ‘merit’ and ‘standard’? Which merit and for whom? According to Bowles and Gintis (1976), it is a myth that education is based on merit. Rather, it is based on social status, class, gender, sex and unequal
economic conditions of the people. We are guided towards success in the way that merit discriminates and discourages pupils. Merit is based on stereotyping and assumptions. Conflict theorists argue that the criteria for obtaining good grades are inadequate for judging people’s capabilities. Many people do not achieve good grades but are still successful in the world.

For instance, Bowles and Gintis, like other conflict theorists, also criticise the functionalist view. In *Schooling in Capitalist America* (1976), they talk about the unfairness and hierarchical structure of the schooling system. According to them, students are expected to obey their teachers and follow the rules of the school. In terms of rewards, pupils learn how to be punctual and obedient. They oppose the idea that education brings people together. In their view, education creates a divide because of these hierarchies. According to Samuels (1996: 3)

    Bowles and Gintis further argued that the educational system fundamentally stratifies students according to their future positions in the workplace hierarchy, through the ‘correspondence principle’. Schools do not just teach more or less; they teach different things to different people. In working-class school, students are rewarded for rote learning and following the rules, while in the schools of professional/managerial families, students are rewarded for creativity and independent thought.

Some of the criticism of Durkheim is not always entirely fair because what he said was an accurate account at the time of writing, namely the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many have criticised his perspective on education, claiming that the classification of role allocation is not actually competent and that, historically, schools only reflect a majority class view (see Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Collins, 1979). “Bowels and Gintis present evidence that education produces compliant, disciplined workers; historically, it has been imposed on workers from above” (Collins, 1979: 10). An example of this can be found in the US, where African-American history was only recently inserted into the curriculum. In
this context, the curriculum, textbooks and education policies have served to control the population and make obedient citizens of them. However, functionalists are mistaken in their structural beliefs that students accept the norms and values and learn to be modern citizens. Many reject the values of the schools and the instructions of the teachers.

“[E]ducation is increasingly used by dominant groups to secure more advantageous places in the occupational and social structure for themselves and their children” (Sadovnik, 2007: 7). As mentioned above, one might argue that the functionalist perspective is highly idealistic and sees only the positive aspects of social institutions. Education’s role and values are not about the consensus. Students are trained to accept failure. This creates inequalities based on race, gender and the economic status of the upper (ruling) class. For example, if one has money one can gain entrance to a good school and thus obtain a better education. Hence, the elite can provide a good education for their children. According to Marxists, there are no equal opportunities for pupils. Unlike the functionalists, Marxists maintain that the education system turns the working class into obedient citizens who accept the dominant political establishment.

3.3 Education and Conflict Nexus

The ‘education and conflict’ nexus is addressed through different perspectives. The question in this chapter is: how does education relate to conflict? However, education and conflict scholars are mostly interested in how conflict affects education. This is the dominant approach. This chapter will deal with both approaches to education and conflict.

According to many writers, conflict is detrimental to education. The impact of conflict on education is immense and multidimensional (see Seitz, 2004; Tomlinson and Benefield,
Effects have included damage to infrastructure, the division of education systems, and traumatic and long-term psychological effects on children (Davies, 2004). UNICEF and World Bank statistics show that during the 1990s six million children were badly wounded and disabled during conflicts, and two million children died (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 8; Paulson and Rappleye, 2007: 342; Seitz, 2004). According to UNESCO (2004), half of the 104 million out-of-school children live in conflict zones. School infrastructure is often seriously damaged by conflict as well. Another report from UNESCO (2010) states that armed conflict has affected thirty countries, 80% of the conflict areas being in Africa and Asia. The destruction of educational infrastructure represents one of the most serious human development setbacks for countries in conflict regions. One example of this is the situation in Uganda, which has been engaged in conflict since 1962. As a result of the conflict between the state and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, the infrastructure for education, health and agriculture has all been destroyed.

The UNDP (2005) report describes how the majority of primary schools were closed or destroyed during Mozambique’s civil conflict, which started in 1976. The Oxfam Education Report maintains that the majority of countries affected by conflicts are in Africa. These countries have a much lower school attendance, enrolment rates being less than 50 per cent (see Watkins, 2000). According to UNICEF (2005), 63% of the primary schools in the Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Lira districts of Northern Uganda remain closed due to forced displacement and conflict.

A report published by the UNDP (2005) highlights the fact that conflict-zone countries spend a much smaller percentage of their annual budgets on education than countries that are not in conflict. According to this report, the lion’s share of their budgets is being spent on weapons and military equipment. Indeed, education has never been these governments’
top priority. Additionally, parents are reluctant to send their children to school for fear of violence. “The ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary schools was 0.83 for 18 low-income countries that were in conflict at some point since 2000 and for which data were available. The ratio for low-income countries not in conflict was 0.9” (UNDP, 2005: 159).

Children who are poor are deprived of education due to conflict in conflict-ridden countries, compared to wealthier children and those living in developed countries. Thus, conflict harms the functioning of education systems and often leads to extensive damage to the schools and the education infrastructure itself (Seitz, 2004). In this case, one might consider the examples of Afghanistan, Palestine, Syria and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) region in Pakistan. According to official data, more than 758 schools in KPK province of Pakistan had been destroyed between 2009 and 2011 by militants (Conflict Monitoring Center, 2013). The majority of schools were completely destroyed by militants’ attacks and many others were partially damaged by military operations. For the reasons elaborated on above, there is increasing agreement in the literature that reaching the educational Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) seems to be a distant dream.

This trend in ever-increasing conflicts can be interpreted in a variety of ways. As the UNDP (2005: 153) and Novelli and Cardozo (2008) mention, in 1991 there were 51 conflicts taking place globally in which more and more people were dying. For instance, the Rwandan genocide left 1 million people dead and the Democratic Republic of Congo lost 7% of its population, while in Sudan 2 million people died. Most of the dead were civilians (see UNDP, 2005: 153). Furthermore, the twentieth century was one of the bloodiest centuries in human history due to numerous wars between countries. The Cold War, a confrontation between the two superpowers, was also on-going. Today these fears
have given way to fear of local and regional wars fought predominantly in poor countries. In this regard, one might argue that violent conflict erupts for many reasons. Poor human development indicators are among these reasons.

There is a direct relationship between education and conflict. In this relationship, education is a victim of conflict. The above discussion demonstrates that conflict has a considerable impact on education. Education in turn can influence situations of conflict - by contributing to peace and conflict resolution - as can be seen in the writings of several researchers (see Harber, 2004; Davies, 2005b; Smith, 2005: 367). However, this argument is challenged by an alternative view stating that education exacerbates conflict as well.

3.4 Dominant Scholarly View: Education is Helpful in Reducing Conflict

Education can be used as a means of reducing conflict (see Novelli and Cardozo, 2008: 6; Tawil, 2001; UNDP, 2005 and 2010). Many scholars believe that education can provide an arena for change. It makes students aware of the potential for change and, through new knowledge, can highlight potential avenues through which collective agencies might be built to alter the power relations that underlie conflict, as mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Global Campaign for Education (GCE) documents (2011). The positive notion of education is that it may provide ‘education for peace’ programmes, social cohesion and socio-economic empowerment (see Brown, 1991: 1; Tawil, 2001). This is a crucial point, as it is believed that education is the key to eliminating conflict and achieving peace.

30Details of conflicts’ impact on education can be found across the literature. These are the established arguments built up by various scholars; however, the relationship between education and conflict is dealt with from a different angle vis-à-vis how education affects conflict.
The right kind of education is needed to redress the imbalances of these societies through the process of education. The right kind of education is education that provides quality and job-oriented skills. It is therefore crucial to acknowledge the role that education plays in supplying skills and knowledge, and in facilitating understanding, as this may be able to provide the foundations for resolving conflict (Chege, 2007). Bhaskaran (2003) contends that depth of knowledge, awareness, and the creation of a new educational outlook are the best ways to deal with violent conflicts. Likewise, French (2005) underscores the importance of education in conflict resolution. He remarks that education sharpens human understanding of the consequences of conflict. Smith (2005: 376) agrees with other scholars who believe in the two facets of education. He acknowledges that education is part of the problem as well as the solution in the reduction of violent conflict. This provides the basis for arguing for a ‘right’ kind of education or high-quality education that takes into account the nature of the values and needs of the community. Thus, it is pertinent to emphasise that educational attainment through the creation of cognisance and consciousness has a lot to contribute to conflict resolution. Therefore, it is necessary for the attainment of lasting peace.

The powerful role that education might potentially play is clearly demonstrated in the literature. Education is described as the ‘peace dividend’ since it is “a critical element in ensuring lasting and sustainable peace” (Save the Children, 2008: 5). In this regard, education provides hope, protection and belief in the possibility of a better future. The MDG and Education-For-All Declaration have both placed education at the centre of efforts to achieve human development. In evaluating the link between conflict and education, Davies (2005a) indicates that these declarations seem to be based upon the assumption that education is benign and thus promotes greater peace-building and conflict resolution. According to her, it is important to know what type and ethos of education
should be promoted. Education for peace is vital in order to resolve the conflicts we have encountered (Davies, 2005a and b).

Save the Children (2008)\textsuperscript{31} highlights the role of schools in providing a safe environment and an opportunity for children to explore ‘difference’ in a non-confrontational context. This is an essential function of schools. They educate children to confront differences in a constructive and co-operative manner. In this regard, education can be seen as a tool to promote social cohesion and reduce violence (Tawil and Harley, 2004; Salmi, 2000: 14).

Social cohesion is the interplay between horizontal and vertical relationships. According to Smith and Vaux

\begin{quote}
In practice societies with strong social cohesion exhibit strong horizontal ties between members of groups based on kinship, ethnicity and religion; high levels of involvement and commitment to community associations and networks that bridge across differences in kinship; and high levels of interaction between civil society and government (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 45).
\end{quote}

Education can establish the teaching and practice of respecting human rights. This might be achieved through the experience of the normality of learning from teachers as well as from fellow pupils (Save the Children, 2008: 12). Through this process, people will pay greater attention to human rights (Salmi, 2000).

The role of education can be seen as that of a facilitator for greater reconciliation, as Save the Children (2008: 12) advocate, after a peace agreement has been signed. The agreement states that schools should serve as a model for reconciliation, paving the way for the reintegration of ex-combatants and the displaced, and for wider conflict-transformation through personal relationships. Smith and Vaux (2003) express caution about the concept of reconciliation, as it is a potentially contentious issue. They draw attention to the fact that

\textsuperscript{31} Save the Children is an international non-governmental organisation that ensures that children’s rights are protected in developing countries.
each conflict is different. For this reason, those affected by conflict will have different perceptions of what might realistically be expected with regard to a commitment to reconciliation. Tawil (2000: 3), referring to UNICEF (1999) on peace education, argues that it is

[T]he process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (UNICEF, 1999: i).

This definition highlights three components of peace education. These are: a) conflict prevention, b) conflict resolution, and c) creating conditions for peace. The effect of education on peace is clear in the case of Afghanistan, where approximately 60% of Afghani children returned to the classroom (Paulson and Rappleye, 2007: 341). Similarly, in conflict zones such as Sierra Leone and Liberia an environment was created which allowed thousands of child soldiers to return to formal education (Paulson and Rappleye, 2007: 341).

The crucial role of education in the reduction of conflict is to maintain peace-building and social cohesion, as stated by Tawil and Harley (2004), and Chehimi, (2012). This being the case, education will then provide economic opportunity and development to all members of society. Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 23) advocate a move from peace education to peace-building education. They argue that peace-building education

[W]ould be a bottom-up rather than top down process driven by war-torn communities themselves, founded on their experiences and capacities. It would be firmly rooted in immediate realities, not in abstract ideas or theories. It would be applied, immediate, and relevant, which means that it cannot be restricted to the classroom (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 23).
The shift from peace education to the peace-building education promoted by these authors is perceived as the next step in the evolution of peace education. They criticise peace education for being a narrow method, too heavily dependent on training workshops. The objective of peace-building education is to initiate or support an educational process that allows students to articulate, accommodate and accept differences between and within groups, particularly (although not exclusively) in regions characterised by latent violence.

The main factors distinguishing ‘peace-building’ education from ‘peace education’ include the notion that peace-building is a process, not an immediate outcome. In addition, peace-building is a long-term rather than a short-term process. It relies on local rather than external inputs. Finally, it seeks to create opportunities rather than more threats (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 27).

The literature on education, conflict, and conflict resolution clearly states that curriculum and curriculum policy, pedagogical practice and the structure and process of educational delivery through textbooks are important in peace-building (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). These elements intricately influence one another. A number of case-studies, especially on Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Northern Uganda and Pakistan, for instance, state that desegregation reforms in school, the curriculum, textbooks, pedagogy and structure are not by themselves sufficient for peace (see Aziz, 1993a; Jalal, 1995). The curriculum is important in the formation and transmission of identity, in encouraging a sense of belonging, citizenship and shared history. According to Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 12), history is crucial for developing a curriculum and removing hate material.

In this context, the historical narratives included in the educational curricula that are based on hatred, bigotry and religious intolerance will threaten peace. This process of historical bias through the curriculum is described as ‘chosen glories’ by Volkan (1997). According
to Volkan, these selective narratives bring feelings of loss, vengeance and hatred that disrupt inter-group peace. Most scholars agree that the curriculum should contain appropriate material in order to ensure a tolerant atmosphere, and it must be acceptable to all ethnic groups. This encouragement of religious tolerance in every segment of society will help to bring the various groups together. Thus one may say that narratives may also bring peace and that these should perhaps be based on historical truth, positive criticism, cooperation and the promotion of a common vision for the future. The curriculum must not be biased against any member of society.

Therefore, curriculum, textbooks, content materials and concepts of pedagogy play a key part in the empowerment of students to meet this challenge. Over the last decade, scholars have increasingly focused their attention on supporting educational institution-building and educational policy development in countries emerging from conflict and war and those experiencing chronic conflict. Davies (2004) suggests some areas that will need to be addressed in the curriculum to ‘settle down’ conflict. For example, there must be tolerance and a positive relationship between the various ethnicities and their cultures of learning. Their differing uses of language need to be appreciated in the content of the curriculum and the textbooks. In this way, education can be better designed to help resolve conflict. Scholars argue that education might resolve conflict in various ways. This also prompts us to ask how education might contribute to conflict resolution when most of the marginalised groups never receive any education, or at least education of any quality.

3.5 The Alternative View: Education that Exacerbates Conflict

The relationship between education and conflict has been analysed extensively by many authors, including Bush and Saltarelli (2000), Davies (2005a and b), Rose and Greeley
(2006a and b), Seitz (2004), and Smith (2005). The arguments of these writers can be seen in the context of the changing geopolitical situation that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. There is a consensus among scholars such as Davies (2006) and Smith (2005) that more research is needed for an understanding of the relationship between education and the on-going unstable situations of conflict among marginalised groups.

In this regard, the majority of writers express the view that there is no sign that conflict will be rooted out through education alone in the near future due to the changing global context in which conflict and security issues have become a worldwide concern (see Novelli and Cardozo, 2008; Smith, 2005; Davies, 2004: 357; Tawil, 2001). For most experts, ‘the changing global context’ refers to the military conflicts, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and there is increasing concern over the violent conflicts and challenging emergencies that have dominated the first decade of this century (Novelli and Cardozo, 2008). Thus it must be acknowledged, if we are to consider the extent to which education can help in resolving conflict, that formal education itself is not a neutral actor (Greaney, 2006), and that it does indeed have the potential to reinforce violence.

Davies (2004, 2005b and 2006) demonstrates the many ways in which school systems can reproduce social and gender inequalities. Thus, they will increase tension, which may act as a catalyst for war. In some countries the school system itself contributes, along with other factors, to the promotion of xenophobia and racism towards ethnic groups and religious minorities. This can sow the seeds of conflict. Here we need to emphasise that education (for example, schools) forms part of the wider society in which it functions. The structure of schooling often contributes to the generation of conflict. Schooling, according to Davies (2004), has the potential for fuelling social conflict in that it can deepen
inequalities and promote false ideologies. She distinguishes three main ‘roots of conflict’ in which education plays a role. Firstly, it may reproduce economic and class distinctions through the exclusion of already marginalised groups. Secondly, schools may exacerbate existing violent tendencies and gender inequality. Finally, education may transmit or reinforce certain essentialist identities based on ethnicity, religion, tribalism and nationalism (Davies, 2004).

Bush and Saltarelli (2000) believe that there are two facets of education: positive and negative. As discussed above, the positive notion of education, for Bush and Saltarelli (2000), is that it reduces conflict, while the negative facet of education is that it can breed conflict. For these authors the negative facet of education is its propensity to exacerbate conflict. In this context, the uneven distribution of education creates or preserves privilege when it is used as a weapon for cultural repression and employs textbooks that promote intolerance (Tawil, 2001).

Pakistan may serve as an illustration of the radical indoctrination of schoolchildren, carried out by government-run schools and Madrasa32 or Mosques (Aziz, 1993a). Winthrop and Graff (2010) argue that for decades these state-sponsored institutions have produced a radicalised creed that is much inclined to encourage religious violence. According to a study by a US government commission report on international religious freedom (2011), the government of Pakistan announced the reform of the curriculum in order to change the problematic content of their system, but this has not yet been done.33 The report finds that

32 The term ‘Madrasa’ usually refers to the specifically Islamic institutions devoted to the teaching of Islamic literature. The country has a class-based education structure and runs different types of systems in parallel. One of the types is madrasa which are networked with mosques and various religious groups/parties. The madrasa graduates with weak or no modern skills are not absorbed by the jobs market (both public and private). Therefore, the majority of them will become Ulema- known as religious teachers in madrasa.

33 The study reviewed more than 100 textbooks, from grades 1-10, in Pakistan’s four provinces. Researchers visited 37 public schools, interviewing 277 students and teachers, and 19 madrasa, where 226 students and teachers were interviewed. According to this study children are ordered to read a carefully selected collection of falsehoods and memorise them.
there has been a systematic negative portrayal of minorities, particularly Hindus and, to a lesser extent, Christians.

Pakistani primary and secondary schools continue to use textbooks that foster prejudice and intolerance of religious minorities, especially Hindus and Christians. Fifth-grade students read official textbooks claiming that “Hindus and Muslims are not one nation but two different nations. The Hindus could never become sincere in their dealings with the Muslims.” Hindu beliefs and practices are contrasted negatively with those of Islam. Bangladesh’s struggle for independence from Pakistan is blamed in part on the influence of Hindus in the education sector of the former East Pakistan. Such references are not restricted to Islamic studies textbooks but take place in both early elementary and more advanced social studies texts used by all public school students, including non-Muslims. Moreover, the textbooks contain stories, biographies, and poems with an Islamic religious character (Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2011: 118).

Fatah (2008) maintains that, from a young age, Muslim children are taught to pray for the downfall of other religions. According to him, Pakistani textbooks support this attitude, which considers non-Muslims enemies. This argument is clear when the state supports this type of education. In Pakistan, school performance across the country is very poor (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The recognition of qualifications (diplomas and certificates) of these parallel educational systems is accepted in nationwide education and will remain a risk factor for conflict.

Through social exclusion, violence and indoctrination, schools can serve as powerful weapons in the production of conflict (Tawil, 2001). One example of this relationship is pointed out by the UNDP, which highlights how school exclusion because of poverty in Sierra Leone contributed to the phenomenon of young people joining the rebel armies.

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34Another report, by the Hindu American Foundation (HAF), entitled Teaching Hatred: A Glimpse into Pakistan’s Education System, mentions that “Several studies on Pakistan’s education system have found inherent biases towards minorities in government approved textbooks. For example, a study managed by two British Pakistanis indicated that social science and history textbooks contained “disturbing” themes such as “Pakistan is for Muslims alone,” “[t]he world is collectively scheming against Pakistan and Islam,” and “Muslims are urged to fight Jihad against the infidels.” The study also said that textbooks portrayed Hinduism as an inherently iniquitous religion: devoid of equality” (HAF : 1).
According to a DFID-commissioned report (see Smith and Vaux, 2003: 9), 82% ‘of the reported 113 million children’ not going to school were not doing so because of social exclusion. Although these figures vary, millions of children worldwide do not attend school due to conflict.

There are many ways in which education is complicit with and has even contributed to the exacerbation of conflict, such as the phenomenon of child soldiers and their military training. This may constitute direct preparation for the perpetration of violence (Davies, 2004). Some schools have become bases for the rebel militants. An example of this is Gulu High School in Northern Uganda, where the school infrastructure either hosted militants or served as a training place for them. Training for war is not restricted to military schools. There are training programmes for ‘defence’ at ordinary schools.

In this regard, Kosovo is a good example. According to Davies (2004), ‘at the end of the conflict in 1999’ a Serbian school was discovered with textbooks containing diagrams that served ‘as military training aids’. Children were given instructions on how to use mines and booby traps, how to determine and attack a tank’s weak points and how to set mines. These types of education and study are not confined to one country. They are common in most of the low-income countries. Similar instructions were found in Albania and, later, in Serbo-Croatia. Davies argues that the implication of this is that both Serb and ‘Albanian children had been taught bomb-making techniques’ at different stages of their schooling (Davies, 2004). “The ‘defence’ curriculum was deeply ingrained in both sides” (Davies, 2004: 110). It is thus clear that education is often used to prepare children for conflict.

Indeed, school education may lead to the desensitisation of children towards violence. This abject misuse of education is common in schools (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). There are many schools where violence is a matter of routine - among students, and also between
students and teachers. One explanation is that the school may find itself within a broader culture of social violence. Pakistan provides a classic example of schools operating in a culture of violence. According to Aziz (1993a), textbooks in Pakistani schools foster prejudice against religious minorities. Most teachers are of the view that non-Muslims are ‘enemies of Islam’. He argues that what is being taught in the country’s schools and colleges is nationalist mythology. Social studies textbooks are nothing but vehicles of political indoctrination. This phenomenon has been clearly demonstrated in the study conducted by the Centre for Universal Education (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). In this study, according to the authors, there are many facets of state militancy. The main thrust of their argument, however, is that the Madrasa education system is not the only cause of violence in Pakistan. There are other causes including failure to provide education, lack of standard curricula, and an inequitable education system, thereby accelerating the conflict.

The curriculum and the textbooks that are used constitute other ways in which education has contributed to the exacerbation of conflict. This has been explained in a recent report on Pakistan as mentioned earlier, and also by Aziz (1993a) and Fatah (2008). According to Elie (2000), both the curricula and the textbooks are directly or indirectly encouraging violence. Elie gives as an example the portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict in educational textbooks. A study was conducted by the Institute for Monitoring, Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT–SE) in 2012, entitled Peace, Tolerance and the Palestinian "Other" in Israeli Textbooks. The study focuses on the textbooks approved by the Education Ministry of the Israeli government. This report describes the nature of the

35Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, ex-president of Pakistan, who wanted Islamists to support his rule, started the process of Islamisation in education curricula and textbooks.
36An example in Pakistan occurred on October 9, 2012, when Malala Yousufzai, a fourteen-year-old girl, was gunned down by the Tahrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Taliban are mostly the product of the state madrasa education system) for voicing her views on equality for women, and for fighting for educational rights for girls in a very conflict-sensitive region. According to a BBC report, more than 500 schools (the majority of girls’ schools) were attacked and destroyed by the Taliban in the Federally Administered Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province of Pakistan.
Israeli education system’s attitude to the Palestinian people. According to this report, Israeli textbooks were used:

[As a tool to advance the collective ethnocentric Zionist narrative as well as hostility, stereotypes and prejudice aimed against Palestinians, stating that the Israeli educational curriculum has damaged its students’ attitude towards Palestinians and an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (IMPACT-SE, 2012: 2).

Manipulation and bias can occur in their contents through the addition or omission of key facts, especially in subjects such as history and social sciences. In this case, powerful forces act rationally to promote their own interests through educational textbooks on history, religion, and nationalistic curricula which serve favoured ideologies.

Davies (2004: 118) points out that many of these textbooks are overtly nationalistic and depict the ‘enemy’ as being ‘evil’. Equally, some simply fail to represent reality. In addition, discussions of peace are sometimes side-lined in favour of legitimising military activity. Promotion of violence is entrenched by downplaying its real horrors (Davies 2004: 118-119). Thus, we might argue that a population sharing common characteristics, i.e. religion, tradition, culture and language, is being manipulated through textbooks, which may eventually lead to discrimination and violent conflict, as discussed earlier.

The use of physical punishment is another means by which schools have contributed to exacerbating conflict. Davies maintains that corporal punishment is violence and that this is one of the ways in which schools nurture a specific type of intra-state conflict. This ongoing practice violates the UN Convention on the Rights of Children. This kind of punishment is now illegal in many countries. Nevertheless, it still occurs in the form of beatings, torture, sexual violence, corporal punishment and other illegal acts.

Some scholars focus primarily on the links between education and ethnicity. In real life, drawing attention to ethnicity appears to be a way of manipulating an idea to fit an
ideology that is often used in the teaching of history, social studies and geography. “Ethnicity has been variously conceptualised as a sense of ethnic identity consisting of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture in order to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups” (Brinks, 1991, cited in Okuku, 2002: 8). For many writers, education has impaired inter-group cohesion under conditions of ethnic tension in several ways.

Firstly, there have been numerous historical cases where certain “ethnic groups— and more broadly, social groups— have been denied access to educational resources, and therefore, excluded from full participation in the economic and social life of the country” (see Chakraborty and Ghosh, 2013: 131). Consequently, the restriction of access to education should be seen as an indicator of declining relationships between groups. In this regard, the limitation of access to education might serve as an early warning mechanism for the impending exacerbation of tensions.

Bush and Saltarelli (2000) identify the fact that, on average, privileged ethnic groups usually attain a higher level of education than subordinate national groups. This is not always the case as some minorities, who are neither dominant nor marginalised, rise up the social ladder through education. This might be attributed to factors such as a privileged background, which enhances the likelihood of the attainment of a higher educational standard. In addition, dominant social groups may influence the education structure to ensure their privilege.

Secondly, dominant social or ethnic groups may control the political process through which schools are structured (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). It is argued that the education system has a powerful influence on people’s identities, through both its content and its structure (Johnson and Stewart, 2007: 247). According to the latter’s paper, the education
system is designed to divide society by fuelling differences and promoting the superiority of one ethnic group over another. “The structure may similarly unite or divide, providing for schools which young people from all groups in a society attend, to be educated together, or segregating ethnicities” (Johnson and Stewart, 2007: 247).

Thus, it is argued, various means of repression may be used through education in order to subjugate the culture, language and history of particular ethnic groups or nations. In addition to this, the imposition of a certain language and the suppression of others can serve as cultural repression. Therefore, suppressing a language by excluding it from the school curriculum will deprive an ethnic group of the knowledge and understanding of their culture, history and social norms. This brings us to the question of the choice of language in the education system (Annamalai, 1998: 32). Language is important in terms of rights, but the state’s imposition of a language generates conflict. Whatever may be the case, there is a potential danger of conflict when the interests of the state and those of the people clash. Despite the fact that a relationship might exist between human and educational conflicts, as suggested by the writers discussed above, another group of scholars with the same strength of argument takes an optimistic view of the relationship.

Literature on education as a tool for conflict resolution and the functionalist perspective on the role of education make similar arguments in many ways. Both believe in the positive role of education that could provide an arena of change for conflict resolution. For example, literature on conflict resolution looks at the structure of the school, socio-economic development, employment, type of education, skills, knowledge, and social cohesion. In a similar way, the functionalists also have a positive perspective on the role and purpose of education. Functionalists argue that education provides jobs, skills, merit, norms and values, training, social cohesion and integrity to the people.
In contrast to functionalism, this research has challenged the role of education as a facilitator of conflict resolution for the case-study of Balochistan. However, an alternative argument has developed that is supported by conflict theorists, particularly regarding the politics of education and conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan. In Pakistan the current education policy discourse has found it ‘hard to reach’ the Baloch people, who are considered ‘beyond the mainstream’ and a ‘marginalised’ ethnic group. The Baloch people (particularly students) take a critical look at analysis and discourses of marginalisation in terms of educational policies and development in order to respond to the perceived problems of exclusion. They also address questions of equity, inclusion, the implementation of policy and the ‘delivery’ of education.

Bearing in mind all of the above, this chapter has not set out to reject one or the other of these perspectives but has sought to learn from both of them from different angles. Theory seeks to explain how the world works. However, there are some related issues; for instance, if knowledge is power, then how might people be empowered? In this idea one might say that social groups are competitive with one another. If we are privileged, then we inevitably wish to protect that privilege. Many powerful people and groups are part of this struggle. Thus, we see minority groups in conflict with dominant groups. Education forms part of these power politics, as mentioned by the Marxists or conflict theorists. They argue that education teaches the norms and values of the powerful ruling elites. These norms and values will be transmitted through various tools, such as the control of educational policies, textbooks and the provision of education. In this context, I am referring to the politics of power presented in the Pakistani state school textbooks and the country’s educational policies that have been in place since its existence. The term ‘politics of education’ was deployed because education has been used as an arena for political struggle and power rather than as an instrument for capacity-building in Balochistan.
3.6 Conclusion

The distinction in this work refers to the tension between ‘care’ and ‘control’. This is also a phrase that features in educational literature, often in the form of education as either ‘empowerment’ or as a ‘weapon’ or means of repression. The functionalist theorists broadly describe the ‘care’ part of education. According to them, educational institutions, particularly schools, provide life-learning skills and enable pupils to achieve their goals. However, this perspective has been challenged by the conflict theorists, who maintain that education is not always positive. It is designed to control the students. The idea of equal opportunities for education is merely a myth to impose the ideas of the upper class.

It is the balance between these two forces, ‘care’ and ‘control’, which concerns us. How that balance might be studied in a real situation such as Balochistan is the actual challenge. I am keen to keep the Baloch conflict centre stage because ‘conflict’ is simply an intensive crisis of power and is thus better studied as an expression of power relations than as conflict. This is why the phrase ‘politics of education’ is used in the title of this thesis: the study is indeed about power politics (here very conflicting) in educational policy, and it serves as an example allowing us to see which interests are informing the creation of policy in terms of the fundamental balance of care and control that education embodies.

It is thought that education and conflict have a reverse causality; that is, education may help to redress conflict but, at the same time, conflict may have a damaging effect on education. Education, in particular, faces a deepening crisis in many countries facing economic hardship on the one hand and political repression and social/ethnic conflict on the other.

The literature discussed in this chapter also emphasises the relationship between education and conflict, which has received considerable attention, not only in public discourses but
also in a great deal of academic research. The literature is devoted to exploring the various
dimensions of this relationship. Education can play a major role in resolving conflict. This
is because socio-economic outcomes such as economic growth, the development of human
capital, democratisation and the promotion of tolerance through provision of high-quality
education all play a part in resolving conflict. For instance, countries that have high
literacy rates, in contrast to those with low incomes and poor levels of literacy, are less
prone to conflict. In this case, I agree with the assertion that there is a connection between
education and conflict. Education can be employed as ‘an instrument for providing the
knowledge and skills necessary for economic development’. Moreover, education is used
as a means of transmitting social and cultural values, as many scholars have argued.

On the other hand, it may also generate new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones.
Education is used as a ‘political tool for ideological development’. This chapter has noted
how education often contributes to the promotion of conflict. Theorising about various
concepts regarding education and conflict, this chapter follows the main argument that
education is very important and a fundamental right but has failed to resolve conflict in
many cases.
Chapter Four

The State of Education in Balochistan: Failure to Care

4.1 Introduction

Every man, woman and child has the right to an education. This is a fundamental human right entitlement. The right to education is set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Article 25A of the Constitution of Pakistan states: “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law” (The Constitution of Pakistan 1973: 15). It is the social, moral and constitutional responsibility of the state to provide education for all children of school-going age without any discrimination on the basis of colour, creed, cast, gender or ethnic background. Pakistan is a signatory to various international commitments and declarations, such as the Dakar Convention (DC) of the Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These conventions make it obligatory for Pakistan to ensure that education is accessible to every child of school-going age.

In this chapter, I argue that in spite of the written pledges and claimed intentions of the reforms, the ‘paternalistic’ role of the education system has not been realised. Instead, the system has tended to exacerbate existing antagonism, embedded as it is within a system that seeks to assert the exceptionalism of the Pakistani nation. The state has failed to fulfil its responsibility for the provision of education in terms of ‘care’ and the paternalism function in Balochistan, as I demonstrate in this chapter.
In the light of these international commitments and the dire need of the people for education, the Government of Pakistan has prepared numerous educational policies and a National Plan of Action on Education. The national educational policy of Pakistan has been framed in the perspective of modern trends in education: training and the emerging requirements of the national integrity and socio-economic development of society (see NEP, 1998–2010; Rahman, 2004). These policies can be analysed by looking at the educational policy documents that various governments have churned out periodically, the majority of whose stated goals have not been achieved (NEP, 1998–2010: 1). Pakistani educational policies professed a commitment to universal primary education by 2015 under the DFA, but this has remained elusive due to the region’s slow and declining net primary enrolment ratio (UNDP, 2010). There are many reasons for this, one of which may be that education is being used as a tool to promote the ideology of the state of Pakistan. According to Ahmed (2013), Pakistan has always searched for its identity through its education policy and distorted its history based on religion, on the pretext that the majority of its population is Muslim by faith.

Examining the literacy rate at provincial level, the data show that “Punjab leads with 60 percent literacy followed by Sindh with 59 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 50 percent and Balochistan with 41 percent” (ESP, 2011–12: 138). In urban areas of the country literacy remains much higher than in rural areas. Economic Survey of Pakistan (ESP) states that the literacy rate also remains higher for men than for women. As in many other developing countries, the situation regarding the education sector in Pakistan has not been very encouraging due to poverty, ideological conflict, the Madrasa (Mosque) culture and religious, anti-West, pro–war feelings against India perpetuated in the textbooks, along with the dismal economic situation (see Rahman, 2004; ESP, 2009–2010; Hoodbhoy and
A particularly pernicious relationship between state power and schools is manifested through the way in which education is enforced by the state of Pakistan, which practices a process of segregation that serves to maintain inequality.

This chapter explores the state of education in Pakistan generally and in Balochistan in particular, and the causes of the persistent backwardness of educational infrastructure, its type, quality, quantity and the other factors overall in the province. Many scholars and government policy-makers (their details are given below in this chapter) believe that Balochistan has one of the worst scenarios in the country, facing challenges such as poverty and a lack of quality and quantity of education. In Balochistan, education should be given the utmost priority as it is far from satisfactory from the perspective of either the provincial or national governments. The reasons for the lack of standard education in Balochistan become obvious when one looks at the education infrastructure, the law and order situation, and the lack of facilities. This situation, in turn, exposes the lack of interest shown by the government.

Statistics and interviews with respondents show that the restricted access and the quality of the education, syllabus and curriculum are other symptoms of politics within education, indirectly elicited by the State. Similar issues prevalent in Balochistan today – poverty, feudalism, political violence, discrimination and injustice - represent the state of education which perpetuates conflict in the province. There are not enough teachers in Balochistan, and there are very few schools. Many regions of Balochistan are without government schools.

37 It should be made clear that this chapter will draw comparisons with other provinces of Pakistan in terms of education facilities and statistics but, as a whole, this study is specific to the province of Balochistan. I appreciate the benefits of comparison as, without this, there is a risk of losing details and empirical depth in the case-study approach. Thus, I have decided to remain focused on Balochistan only. If I include other regions, my topic will become too vast and it will not be possible to complete it within the specified time period.
This chapter also includes critical analysis of the statistics and the interviews given by various participants, and poses these questions: Has the state succeeded in its goal of providing education to the Baloch? Or has the state failed in its duty of care to provide high-quality education to the people of Balochistan? To answer these questions this research highlights various educational issues. Firstly, the history of the state educational policies and developments since 1947 is discussed. Secondly, a profile of the condition of education in Balochistan is outlined. Thirdly, this chapter identifies and compares the education infrastructure in Balochistan with other provinces in Pakistan. Fourthly, the causes of the decline in standards of education in Balochistan are examined. Finally, the role of student politics, formal education and student activism in educational institutions such as schools, colleges and universities is examined.

4.2 Brief History and Development of Education Policy in Pakistan

The history of the educational development in Pakistan is generally considered as comprising the following milestones: the All Pakistan Education Conference 1947; the Education Conference in 1951; the National Commission on Education in 1958; the Commission on Students’ Problems and Welfare 1966; the Educational Policy 1969; the Educational Policy 1972; the new National Educational Policy 1978/79; and the National Educational Policy 1998–2010. The most important of these periods are discussed below.

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, an all-Pakistan Educational Conference was organised to discuss the existing education system. The conference was presided over by Fazal-ur-Rehman. An important element of education that was emphasised at the conference was the spiritual element, as it subsequently formed the determining basis of the country. Behram Imtiaz (his fictitious name) held that the spiritual element had been
the foundation of the country, which is based on strict Islamic ideology. Behram Imtiaz is an educationalist and Director one of the School and English Language Centre in Balochistan. In 2013, he was working in an administrative post when I interviewed him. According to him, at the conference it was emphasised that, without the implementation of religious ideology, the aims and objectives of Pakistan could not be fulfilled. The first educational conference document was a brief outline that remained as a preamble for the coming educational policies. Thus, educational development had been under the influence of religious-ideological factors since the birth of the country. In subsequent years a number of attempts were made to promote education through the implementation of various policies and planning.

In 1958 the first Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan. In the same year the government had appointed a Commission on National Education to study educational policies and the educational system, and to make suggestions for the future plan. The Commission was formed under the chairmanship of S. M. Sharif and was also known as the Sharif Commission. There were ten other members of the Commission in addition to the chairman. Prof. Dr. Gishkori (his fictitious name), maintains that the Commission was under pressure to set out certain policies which would better express the ideology of the country through the education system. Dr. Gishkori has served as Chairman one of the Department at the University of Balochistan (UOB). At the time of my interview, he was also serving at one of the institutions in Balochistan.

Similarly, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, (his fictitious name), a medical doctor by profession, has been working in various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Those NGOs mainly deal with the education sector in the province. Dr. Hafeez was also actively involved in the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) politics during his student life. During an interview
with him in 2013, he stated that the ideology means that Pakistan was the first country in
the world to come into existence in the name of religion, i.e. Islam. In the Pakistani worldview, all the ‘Muslim majority’ areas were obliged to unite in order to establish Pakistan. These factors justified the creation of Pakistan as a unique political entity because it came into being on the basis of the religious demand of the ‘Two-Nation Theory’. The Commission recognised the importance of education for a nation and its socio-economic, as well as political, development. It also emphasised the importance of primary universal education for all. This Commission had prepared a comprehensive report. One of the central themes of the report was that education must be productive and be regarded as an investment in human resources that were vital for the country’s development. This Commission also suggested decentralising educational policies, planning and implementation.38

After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came to power. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (a martial law administrator who later became prime minister), had announced a Commission for Educational Policies, as mentioned by Dr. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, Chairman of the History Department of UOB, during his interview in 2013. According to Dr. Bareach, a prominent federal education secretary, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, was nominated head of the Commission and was responsible for making new policies and reforms. In 1972, the PM of Pakistan announced the new educational policy under which all educational institutions (at various levels including elite schools) were nationalised and became government domain. According to government claims, many sections of society remained deprived educationally in urban areas, due to high educational

38 In 1969 the military government of Ayub Khan ended but was followed by another military regime led by General Yahya Khan. He came to power as a result of the second Martial Law in Pakistan. This military government also established a committee under the supervision of Air Martial Noor Khan. This committee did not accomplish much due to the separation of East Pakistan to form an independent state (now Bangladesh).
costs and elite policies. The government therefore wanted to balance the educational opportunities for all sections of society through nationalisation of the education system. Education was made free and universal as well as compulsory (up to the 10th class) for all children. According to this educational policy, the target of universal primary education for boys had to be achieved by 1979 and for girls by 1984.

In 1978 a third Martial law was imposed in Pakistan. In 1979 an educational policy was introduced, commonly known as the new educational policy. It changed the direction of education through the implementation of General Zia-ul-Haq’s ‘Islamisation’ policy. In 1979 a programme of Islamisation included the reform of both the textbooks and the education policy. The highest priority was given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganising the entire content around Islamic doctrines in order to refashion society according to Islamic tenets.

Prof. Dr. Gishkori mentions that the educational policy’s aim was the ‘Islamisation’ of Pakistani society. He claims that the aim of these education policies was to develop the spirit of the Muslim nation, which would ensure the adoption of Islamic rules and commands. It has been the purpose of education since the 1980s to create an obedient class, as stated by Dr. Shazawar Ali (his fictitious name) during my interviews in 2013. Dr. Shazawar Ali is a prominent author who has written many books on Balochi literature and history. At the time of the interview in 2013, he was serving in one of the institutions in Balochistan. He says that this was the avowed goal from the very beginning. Similarly, Additional Secretary in Secondary Education, Government of Balochistan, Rashid Razaq has stressed that the purpose of education is to create ‘responsible citizens’. An interview with Rashid Razaq, a government official, took place in the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta, in 2013. It should be mentioned here that a separate chapter has been written on the
politics of representation. The argument on controlling citizens through the process of Islamisation and imposing ideologies is discussed there.

Thus, the nationalisation policy of the previous government had been reversed. Under this new system the government encouraged the privatisation of educational institutions at all levels, including primary, secondary and higher educational levels. The nationalised institutions once again became the property of their owners. Zia-ul-Haq’s system of Islamisation remained unchallenged even by the subsequent civilian governments.

In 1998 the Prime Minster (PM) of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, asked the Ministry of Education to formulate a national education policy that would lead the nation into the next century. The Ministry embarked upon a comprehensive process of consultation with educationalists, scholars, subject specialists, leaders of public opinion and representatives of NGOs to design an initial draft. In January 1998 the main features of the policy were received by the cabinet. The cabinet had appointed a sub-committee of Ministers from various departments. Finally, on 21st February 1998, the PM of Pakistan, in a national convention on education, announced the salient features of the policy.

Like previous attempts, the performance of the 1998 educational policies has been deficient in several key aspects stated by Behram Imtiaz. Most crucially, it has been inadequate in areas such as access and in quality and equity of educational opportunities in the face of international challenges. Qaisar Jamali, Provincial Coordinator UNESCO, argues during an interview with the researcher that the main challenges are posed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Dakar Framework of Action (DFA), Education for All (EFA), the goals and challenges triggered by globalisation, and the nation’s quest to become a knowledge-based society. The review of the national education policy 2009 was undertaken because of deficiencies and international commitments. It came after extensive
consultation amongst the public, private and civil society sectors. The review, like subsequent policies, adopted a religious scheme in the education system expressed by Dr. Shazawar Ali. Interviews with numerous people including the majority of educationalists, historians and experts mentioned above agreed on the salient features on which the Pakistani education policies are based.

According to the Chairman of the Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BBISE), Balochistan, Professor Saadullah Khan Tokhai, the main objectives of the policies are as follows: 1) protection of Pakistan’s ideology; 2) promotion of religious education; 3) development of the spirit of a Muslim nation and Pakistani nationalism; 4) national language (Urdu) as a medium of instruction; 5) minimisation of the effects of English education; 6) protection of Islamic codes and a way of life; 7) free education for every citizen at grass-roots level; 8) attaining an acceptable level of literacy by the universalisation of primary education; and 9) ensuring quality and higher education across the country. An interview was conducted with Saadullah Khan Tokhai in his office in Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013.

He mentions that the educational policies, despite the good intentions, remained unsuccessful for various reasons such as military interference, the reversal of the nationalisation of education on the basis of political revenge, the indoctrination of children with religious ideologies in educational textbooks, language crises in the educational system, and lack of proper funding for education. Similarly, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Dr. Hafeez Baloch maintain that the policies are closely tied to the ideology of the state and religiosity.
4.3 The State Education: A Comparative Analysis

Pakistan’s educational performance has been dire throughout its history, despite its declaration of ‘education for all’ in the very first year of its creation (1947). But allocation of state resources for education has been its lowest priority, according to Dr. Abdul Rafiq. An interview was conducted with Dr. Abdul Rafiq, (his fictitious name), an academic and educationist, who talked about the government’s minimal interest in the education sector in Baloch, as mentioned later in this thesis.

As Table 1 shows, there is also a wide variation in literacy between provinces. In 2008–09, the overall literacy rate for Punjab Province stood at 59%, in Balochistan province it was 45%. The literacy rate has increased sharply in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh (see Ahmed, 2013: 89). In Sindh, according to Ahmed, “the literacy has increased from 51% in 1989-99 to 59% in 2008-09. Similarly, in KP it increased from 37% in 1998-99 to 50% in 2008-09. Female literacy rate particularly in two of the four provinces - KP and Balochistan - has remained dismally low with only 31% in the former and 23% in the latter, which probably would be one of the lowest rates in World over” (Ahmed, 2013: 89). However, according to Qaisar Jamali, only 16% of females are literate in Balochistan.

According to Table 1, the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of children, including females, in the country as a whole has increased. However, compared to other provinces the Balochistan GER for both males and females paints a truly miserable picture. Similarly, Table 1 also highlights the Net Enrolment Rate (NER). NER is about the measurement of school attendance. On this measure, Punjab shows a better growth rate of 22 percent between the periods 1998–99 and 2008–09, “while, Balochistan could increase its NER by only 8 percentage point, from 36% to 44%, during same period of time” (Ahmed, 2013: 92).
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SOURCE: AHMED, MANZOOR (2013) FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY REDUCTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

*GER is Gross Enrolment rate. ** NER is Net Enrolment Rate and *** GPI is Gender parity Index
Another deteriorating trend indicated by these data (see Table 1) is the rural-urban literacy gap. Moreover, the differentiation is not confined to geographical areas but also includes the genders, as shown in Table 1 below. Ahmed (2013) states:

One of the main reasons for low literacy rate in Pakistan is due to the lack of attention to its female education. The latter has not only remained dismally low, but it also left a negative consequence on overall education in the country. From the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which is the ratio of female to male enrolment rate, one can easily judge the gender parity in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013: 92).

Efforts have been made to combat illiteracy but they lack continuity and are unsuited to local circumstances and the needs of society (Education for All Plan Balochistan 2011-2015). Problems exist at both provincial and federal levels, such as lack of uniformity in the social structure in different provinces in the country. Of all the problems, the gender gap is the most crucial. This gender gap exists because there are very few schools, and they cover vast distances. It is not very safe for females to travel such long distances to go to school. However, young boys are often sent to live with other families to obtain an education, which is not the case with girls. This gender gap in Balochistan in particular is due to male domination, social pressures, the family system and inequalities in educational institutions to the disadvantage of girls.

4.4 The State of Education in Balochistan Province

Education is one of the most important sectors in any country, as are health, economics and politics. A prosperous and developed society undoubtedly considers education its major pillar. It demands extensive planning and efficient resource allocation along with an effective implementation strategy, as mentioned by a government official Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, an Additional Director of Education (Schools),
Balochistan, claims during an interview in 2013 that education in Balochistan is lagging behind at various levels, primarily due to the central government’s policy towards Balochistan. Like other parts of the country, the education sector in Balochistan demands special attention and careful and consistent planning. The Economic Survey of Pakistan documents in its 2009–10 report that educational conditions in Balochistan are worse than in any other part of the country, and the Baloch are also lagging behind in terms of literacy rate. These unequal divides on the basis of gender and area suggest that a substantial portion of the population has not been given the opportunity of obtaining education and is thus not fully active in the process of development.

In Balochistan the current state of education is extremely poor, and it has therefore failed to produce the human resources that the province requires to run its public and private sectors. The state-run education system is functioning beyond its capacity in order to run schools in far-flung areas, as argued by Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. The education policy of Pakistan, as far as Balochistan is concerned, does not take into account the poor infrastructure, hard-to-access territory and scattered population of the province, as highlighted during an interview with Rashid Razaq in 2013.

Qaisar Jamali opines that the government’s education policy pertaining to Balochistan has become a “top-down” approach, in which the central government barely considers the local demands and ground realities. He further states that education, along with other social sectors of Balochistan, has become the scapegoat for the difficult political relationship between the province and the centre. It is worth mentioning here that one of the previous education policies defined a primary school as consisting of two rooms with five teachers. According to him, the major problems in Balochistan’s education are as follows: 1) high dropout rate in primary, middle and secondary schools; 2) insufficient and low-quality
books; 3) lack of efficient monitoring of schools; 4) shortage of trained teachers; 5) shelterless and overcrowded schools; 6) lack of teachers’ accommodation facilities; and 7) shortage of girls’ schools. Some of the important issues are explored below.

### 4.4.1 Types and Levels of Formal Education in Balochistan

Formal education in Balochistan has five levels: Primary education (grades I–V); Middle education (VI–VIII); High school education (IX–X, leading to the secondary school certificate); Higher Secondary / Inter Colleges (XI–XII, leading to a higher secondary school certificate); Degree Colleges education (XIII–XIV) and University education programmes leading to graduate and advanced degree classes (XV onwards).

According to the Balochistan Board Chairman, Saadullah Tokhai, there are various types and media of education in Balochistan. These include the government-run Urdu-medium schools, English-medium private schools, military schools, and religious schools known as Madrasa (Mosque). This term Madrasa literally refers to study or learning. But this term has acquired strict religious connotations in Pakistan. An Islamic religious school generally offers subjects of religious study. For instance, a person who memorises the entire Quran is called a Hafiz, and an Alam is a course enabling the candidate to become a religious scholar. In Balochistan, according to Qaisar Jamali, provincial coordinator for education (UNESCO), the Madrasas are providing 8% of the country’s education. Private schools cover 7% of education while 3 to 4% of the education is being provided by military schools and cadet colleges. The remaining 81% of the education provision is public sector education, which comes under the domain of the education department of Balochistan. The majority of students are in the government sector education system.
Besides *Madrasas* and state-run schools, Balochistan also has a rapidly increasing number of privately-run English-medium schools in cities, towns and even some villages (Ahmed, 2013: 93). Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch was the ex-Chairman of the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO) during his student life. At the time of his interview he was working as a Director General (DG) of Special Education, Government of Balochistan. He stated that the province has also inherited a fair number of elite schools and colleges from the British Empire, which were built during British rule by Christian missionaries and the British Indian government. These institutions were purposely built to educate the aristocracy and train personnel for the civic and military establishment of British India. After the British departure from the subcontinent, these institutions’ standards remained intact, but they only serve members of the Establishment.

The type of education Balochistan provides is a huge problem for the majority of students, who are in publicly funded government schools. Very few schools, mostly situated in Quetta, are English-medium schools with high standards of teaching and pedagogy. These schools charge very high fees that are affordable only by the ruling elite of Balochistan, the majority of these being non-Baloch, as mentioned by Atiq-ur-Rehman during an interview. I interviewed Mr. Rehman in Quetta (the capital of Balochistan) in 2013, where he was working in the capacity of Senior Coordinator Strategic Planning and Institutional Development Officer (USAID), Balochistan. He told me that another category includes those schools in which both English and Urdu are used as media of instruction. The third category of schools consists of those where Urdu is the exclusive medium, and a very large majority of these are public sector or government-run schools. Despite various media and categories of education, in Balochistan, Balochi is not a medium for schools in the province and it is not being taught as an optional or compulsory language therein. In government schools, untrained and poorly qualified or unqualified teachers are appointed
on a political basis or through the bribing of educational authorities, which must surely hamper the quality of education in the public sector of Balochistan in particular.

4.4.2 Numbers of Government Schools and Teachers

The Education Department of the Government of Balochistan puts the overall number of boys’ primary schools for the year 2010 at 13,692, of which 7,530 were boys’ middle schools and 11,522 were boys’ high schools. For girls there were 5,993 primary schools, 4,440 middle schools, and 5,158 high schools. Clearly, there were far fewer schools for girls. Tables 2 and 2a below show the number of schools by district, gender and level for boys and girls.
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## Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), Education Department, Government of Balochistan

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Source: Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), Education Department, Government of Balochistan
Table 2a: Number of Schools by District and Gender Level

As Per School Census (2007–2008)

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<td>43214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), Education Department, Government of Balochistan
One of the reasons for the often poor quality of teaching is the shortage of schools, trained teachers and subject specialists. In interviews with the educationalists and policy-makers, the majority of them agreed about the shortage of teachers and schools in the province.

Rashid Razaq describes many problems, but the inadequate number of teachers and the presence of only one schoolteacher in many schools are perhaps at the top of the list. Table 3, below, shows the number of government teachers by district, gender and level in Balochistan (School Census, 2009–10). According to this census the total number of teachers available for primary, middle, high and high secondary schools for boys was 31,258 and for girls it was 14,412. The total number of teachers for both girls and boys, as shown in Table 3 below, is 45,670.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>primary</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaran</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barkhan</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaghi</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derabugti</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwadar</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harnai</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jafferabad</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhalmaragi</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachhi</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalat</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kech</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharan</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzdar</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killalabdullah</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killasaifullah</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>311</td>
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<td>Kohlu</td>
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<td>162</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lasbela</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>662</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loralai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mastung</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>264</td>
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<tr>
<td>Musakhel</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>162</td>
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<td>Naseer abad</td>
<td>435</td>
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<td>165</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>341</td>
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<td>Panigur</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>381</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pishin</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetta</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherani</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibi</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washuk</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhob</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziarat</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>12955</td>
<td>7489</td>
<td>10764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), Education Department, Government of Balochistan

According to the Government of Balochistan (2012), Balochistan province faces a very grave problem in the shortage of teachers. The dearth of teachers is not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of professionally qualified and trained teachers. Balochistan covers a huge geographical area with low population density compared with other provinces of Pakistan. People who inhabit far-flung areas do not have access to education. There is a severe dearth of schools and teachers in rural areas, especially for females (GoB, 2012: 3).

However, as the above Table shows, the number of teachers was increased due to pressure and international commitments to education, but the gap between the demand and supply of teachers and the existing gender gap in the teaching workforce are still critical. This gap, according to Aziz Bugti, is due to many factors such as funding and conscious policy as well as the negligence of the state, all of which are discussed later in this chapter. Professor Aziz Bugti is the former Chairman, Department of Political Sciences, UoB and also served
in the education department, Government of Balochistan, as a Director. The interview with Aziz Bugti was conducted in written form due to his advanced age and disability in 2013.

Schools, colleges and universities, including one medical college and one engineering university, are functioning in Balochistan, for both males and females. But they are insufficient to accommodate the increasing population of young people in the province even though it is the least populous province in Pakistan, bordering Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. I interviewed the Inspector General of the Frontier Core (IG FC), Major General Zia Ullah Khan (Retd), in Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013. He stated that Balochistan is a frontier area on the crossroads between the Indian subcontinent, central Asia and Iranian territory. On the one hand, due to the widespread remote areas and poor or absent infrastructure, a sizeable portion of the population has no access to basic education. On the other hand, extreme poverty makes it difficult for parents to send their children, especially girls, to the cities both within and beyond Balochistan to gain an education.

The above statistics were provided by the various government departments; however, I have reservations about the record-keeping process of the education department of the government of Balochistan. The data and statistics may not be accurate because there are many ghost schools in Balochistan. The ghost schools exist only in official records. In reality they do not exist. The records of a number of schools are to be found in government offices but they are in fact bogus. In fact, the evidence provided by my own research interviews contradicts these official records in various significant ways. Furthermore, the former education minister of Balochistan disclosed results of a survey conducted by the education department indicating that the province has 3500 ghost schools (Daily Dawn News, 2009).
In Balochistan there is a clear-cut division of theory and practice in terms of educational statistics. As mentioned by the Director of Education (schools), Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, in his interview in 2013, the record-keeping system is antiquated and incorrect. The following chart, made in the light of fieldwork interviews, provides a view of education indicators of Balochistan. This also differs from some of the statistics provided in official records. I have met and interviewed many education policy-makers and other relevant professionals during my fieldwork. These figures and statistics are from my field interviews and note-taking with various educational and political figures. They are markedly different from the literature statistics that appear in official government records.
Above 12,000 Government Schools in Balochistan

Above 1,000,000 Students

8939 Boys Schools
3408 Girls Schools

Above 50,000 teachers

642488 Boys
429784 Girls

33,958 Male
16,693 Female

71 Principals

60 Male
11 Female

28 Vice Principals

468 Male
196 Female

664 Headmasters

21 Male
7 Female

Source: Various interviews and discussions with Education Department Members, Controllers of Examination, Balochistan Board, Educationists, Policy-Makers, Officers and Students in 2013.
According to the above chart, there are more than 12,000 government schools in Balochistan, with boys’ schools in greater abundance than girls’ schools. Likewise, the number of students studying in these government schools is 642,488 boys and 429,784 girls. Over 50,000 teachers are employed in these government schools: 33,958 male teachers and 16,693 female teachers. Of 71 principals, 60 are male and 11 are female. Of 664 headmasters, 468 are male and 196 are female. Similarly, of 28 Vice Principals, 21 are male and 7 are female. Government statistics do not tally with my interview data as there are differences (either more or less) in the number of schools and teachers. For example, the official records of the government of Balochistan show that there are more teachers and schools but a few figures from my interview statistics show that there are fewer than indicated in the official records.

In addition, the issues of accommodation/logistics for teachers, accessibility, medium of instruction and conventional examination/assessment are considered as little hindrance to the provision of high-quality education for children. The quality of education in Balochistan can be seen in the figures for the number of government schools in Tables 2 and 2a, and in the number of government teachers in Table 3. In this context the majority of scholars, such as Dr. Abdul Rafiq, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, believe that the quality and quantity of teachers and schools, as well as other problems, are directly affected by allocation of funding.

4.4.3 The Education Budget of the Province

One government official, Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, states that in Pakistan the total budget for education is only 2% of GDP. This is claimed by the government. Unlike Pakistan, many countries in the region are spending 5% to 6% of their GDP on education. Without
mentioning the names of these countries, he claims that the total budget being spent in Balochistan is 1.5% of the province’s GDP. The education budget in the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) in 2005–06 was 16.92%, which then decreased considerably to no more than 5.96% by 2012–13 (PSDP, 2013).

Source: Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) Balochistan

The meagre budget allocated to education is barely enough for quality improvements such as teacher training, curriculum development, supervision and monitoring. In this situation the expansion of education has remained a dream. A very high portion of the education budget is spent on incumbent and recurrent heads, consisting mainly of their high salaries, in contrast to the inadequate amount spent on quality improvements.

This demonstrates the lack of priority given to education in Balochistan by the government. According to Prof. Dr. Gishkori, education has always been a dream of the people of Balochistan, which clearly shows that education in the province has never been considered a priority by the ruling elite. The no-cost/budget activities are more relevant to
management, governance and coordination. If identified actions were taken in the ‘real’ spirit, the majority of the issues would be solved, such as the provision of furniture, the construction of additional classrooms and provision of basic facilities including electricity and drinking water. There is a strong need for cohesive planning and the provision of adequate financial resources in order to obtain the optimum results from these schools. Delays in construction/repair work usually negatively affect enrolment, increase the dropout rate and reduce the overall quality of education, besides demotivating the teachers who, despite all these difficulties, are performing their duties honestly and efficiently.

According to Ahmed (2013: 92), a critical look at the education budget in Balochistan shows that education has been neglected under both dictatorial regimes and civilian governments. Similarly, another government official, Munir Ahmed Nodazai, Controller of the only Textbook Board, Balochistan Board, Quetta, says that even today female education is the worst of its kind, on which point there is a common consensus. He believes that the government’s dismal policies and the culture of the Baloch society have been a continuing impediment to the education of females. The Baloch women have been part of the semi-tribal and semi-feudal society in Balochistan for centuries. The successive provincial as well as federal governments have not taken any substantive measures to encourage female education in the province. Consequently, the Baloch cultural traditions have greatly discouraged the spread of education in the tribal areas.

Furthermore, Mr. Nodazai mentioned during his interview with the researcher that the equalisation of education levels reduces local disparities. However, in the case of Balochistan–Pakistan, the unequal allocation of educational resources has created a sense of deprivation and resentment among the Baloch people. Under these circumstances, one could say that the educational institutions have simply become degree-awarding
institutions without providing due quality of education and qualifications. As a result, the young generation feel resentment and have been pushed into joining various political organisations.

4.4.4 Scattered Population

The government claims that, there are so many challenges, little can be done for education in Balochistan. For example, according to the official stance, Balochistan’s topographical structure/location, its vast mountainous areas and great expanse of territory, its deep valleys with sparse populations, and its tribal structure have all remained hurdles to be surmounted (GoB, 2012: 18). Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan in terms of land area. It is the smallest in terms of population and is lacking massive inputs of capital and technical expertise, communication, and transportation networks.

According to Rashid Razaq, the challenges are much greater than those in other provinces due to its geographical spread and pollution density. The province lags far behind other provinces of Pakistan in terms of economic growth (with $410 GDP per capita, the lowest in Pakistan), education and development (GoB, 2012: 18–19). With limited human and financial resources, the Education Department in Balochistan is faced with multiple challenges in providing access to education in widely-spread and far-flung areas. The situation with girls’ education is particularly challenging in rural areas. During the process of consultation in the remote areas carried out by the government of Balochistan, a range of issues emerged. Among these difficulties are a shortage of schools, especially for girls, a shortage of trained teachers, including subject and teaching method specialists, a shortage of middle and secondary schools, and too many ‘single-teacher’ and/or overcrowded schools.
There are many difficulties with and challenges to current rates of literacy in Balochistan for the above-mentioned reasons. The situation of primary, secondary and higher education presents a dismal picture. Until the year 2000 there was only one university in the province, the University of Balochistan (UoB), which is situated in the capital city of the province, Quetta, access to which is not easy for the majority of Baloch-populated areas mentioned by Dr. Abdul Rafiq. I interviewed him in Quetta, Balochistan, during my field trip. He argues that trained human power in Balochistan is deficient, especially in the fields of education, medicine, engineering, and other professions. To fill this gap, the government decided to establish schools, colleges and universities in the province.

From 2000 to 2015, seven universities, the University of Balochistan (UoB), Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences (LUAWMS), Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Science (BUITMES), Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University (SBK), Balochistan University of Engineering and Technology Khuzdar (BUETK), University of Turbat (UoT), and University of Loralai (UoL), have been established. Nevertheless, the total number of universities (including those run privately) in the province are seven, compared to a total of 135 degree-awarding institutes (DAIs) in Pakistan as a whole. Out of seven universities, three are located in Quetta. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, the president of Academic and Staff Associations, University of Balochistan (UOB) and the president of the Federation of all Pakistan Universities Academic and Staff Associations (FPASS), claimed that if we calculate this on the basis of population rather than territory, the number of universities per province is still disproportionately low in Balochistan Province.

The educational policies in Pakistan did not produce the desired outcomes and performances in Balochistan. The policies remained deficient in several key aspects such
as quality and equity of educational opportunities in the province. Secondly, due to its existing situation regarding education, Balochistan province cannot fulfil all its international commitments, such as MDGs, EFA and the DFA, to become a knowledge society (see NEP, 2009: 1). According to various interviews, Balochistan province is lagging far behind in attempts to achieve these international commitments. Universal access to basic education and the achievement of primary education is one of the most important goals of the MDG.

Although the government claims to care about the provision of education in Balochistan, much needs to be done to improve education in the province. Pakistan Education Task Force’s Action Plan for Balochistan, the Provincial EFA Plan for Balochistan 2010-2015 and Government of Balochistan reports claim the following:

1) it has the lowest enrolment rates in Pakistan;
2) it has an overall literacy rate of 33.9%;
3) it has a wide gender gap (almost double) between literacy rates for men (45%) and women (22%);
4) the dropout rate of students at primary level is more than 50%;
5) there are 12,000 public schools for 22,000 settlements; and
6) there are more than 5,000 single-teacher schools in Balochistan.

According to Government of Balochistan statistics, more than half the schools (57%) are without drinking water, 52% do not have electricity, 29% have no toilets, 9% do not even have a building, and 46% of schools have no boundary wall (GoB, 2012: 19). It has already been mentioned that there is a huge difference between government records and statistics and other national or international organisations’ figures. For example, the HRW
fact–finding report in 2010 present a different picture of the statistics compared to the government of Balochistan (see below).

Balochistan’s education facilities are also the poorest in the country according to the HRW fact–finding report in 2010, which finds that the highest percentage of primary school buildings are rated as either needing “major repair” (36% compared to a national average of 11%), or “dangerous” (12% compared to a national average of 11%). Only 15% of primary schools are rated as “satisfactory”, compared to a national average of 36%. At least 4% of schools do not have buildings, 81% lack electricity, 34% have no drinking water, 72% are without a toilet and 66% are without a boundary wall (HRW, 2010: 13).

Educational opportunities and facilities for the vast majority of children in Balochistan are very few, insufficient and sub-standard. According to survey data collected by the government of Pakistan’s statistical department, the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Human Rights Watch (2010):

> Only 32 percent of Balochistan’s population over age 10 has completed primary level education, the lowest proportion in the country, compared with a national average of 47 percent. Only 42 percent of the population older than 10 has ever attended school. In rural Balochistan a mere 8 percent of females over age 10 has completed primary school (HRW, 2010: 12).

Many interviewees, such as Aziz Bugti and Abdul Rahman Buzdar, hold that the state of the education system is mainly responsible for shaping the socio-economic structure of Balochistan. Due to poor education the people in Balochistan do not have the skills required for jobs. Thus, limited and poor education is responsible for the socio-economic situation in Balochistan. This is one of the reasons why, according to Rashid Razaq, more than 50% of the people in the province do not have an opportunity to receive education.
One might say that the state policy is the cause of this, a point endorsed by various scholars.

The people of Balochistan (including all ethnic groups) are dissatisfied with the existing limited education, according to various interviewees. They made the claim on the basis of the facts that the state of education in the province is poor and the number of students dropping out is increasing. Researchers and academics often blame and criticise both the provincial government of Balochistan and the federal government of Pakistan, holding them primarily responsible for this devastating condition of education in the province.

Allegations of corruption became one of the ‘elements’ of policies. Atiq-ur-Rehman notes that these types of issues took on new dimensions and have politicised education. As a result the government expanded the number of institutions, and likewise, universities in particular, and funds began to pour in. These greater opportunities for funding and appointments through political influence increased the mass resentment. As a result, underprivileged social groups (including students) began to express their frustration. Many writers argue that this is in response to poverty and discrimination. The frustration of the people increased to such an extent that it compelled the federal government to announce the Balochistan Package, Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009 (see Rais, 2010).

Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan means ‘the beginning of the right of Balochistan’. This package discussed many of the provincial issues related to federal government, such as administrative matters, resources issues, missing persons, constitutional reforms, political problems, dialogue and the problem of the exiled Baloch leaders (Haq, 2010). According to Haq (2010), this was the first time that the federal government had initiated a socio-economic package for the people of Balochistan. Under this package the provincial
government appointed five thousand teachers from Balochistan. This was a good initiative taken by the government, but it was not implemented properly at all.

In a country with wide social and economic gaps, reducing social inequity is one of the principal objectives of government policy. One obvious point considered essential by EFA (2011–2015: 11) is to “forging social cohesion and moving towards inclusive development to avoid inequity pitfalls that may cause serious upheavals”. This requires an impartial allocation of resources to remove the gender gap, disparities in the urban-rural division, and ethnic tensions at both provincial and federal levels. Developing and implementing education standards is a step towards improving the quality of education and is strongly advocated by the policy. Deriving optimum results from foreign investments in education is an important priority area. Education is undoubtedly very important for every human being. Despite occasional government claims, it is very obvious in this chapter that the state does not care about educating the people of Balochistan. The Education for All Plan Balochistan (2011–2015: 24–25) states:

Education is a vital prerequisite for combating poverty, empowering women, protecting children from hazardous and exploitative labour, promoting human rights, protecting the environment, and influencing population growth. In Balochistan, about two thirds of the population (68%) 10 years and over have never been to school; 77% of the population 10 years and over have not completed primary school or higher. For all results, there are major differences between males and females, averaging 10-20% in favour of males.

Education is not only a path towards economic development and social progress but is also the push factor towards human excellence and intellectual liberation. It is through education, fundamentally high-quality education, that the process of openness of heart, mind and soul takes root. A high-quality education is an indispensable solution to many of the human, social and economic problems. The future of Balochistan is inextricably linked to education. High-quality education is possible through motivated, skilled and competent
teachers. Hence, the dearth of education and increase in insurgency in Balochistan provides a good case for conducting an academic inquiry, which would not only aid an understanding of the Balochistan conflict and the role of education in resolving this conflict, but would also provide evidence that it is the form of education in Balochistan that is actually the lowest priority of the State, as has been explored in this chapter.

In the light of these considerations, it can be argued that the policies for the wider participation in and better quality of education and, above all, universal education, have not been fulfilled in Balochistan. At the secondary and post-secondary levels, the system has failed to provide skills either for the labour market or for providing input to the tertiary system. Access and participation rates at this level of schooling in Balochistan are low and there is a clear need to expand the provision. At the same time, efforts should be made to cut the high dropout rates and induce more out-of-school youths to return to the school system, especially girls, whose participation is still very low.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, it is argued that in Balochistan the current state of education is extremely poor. It has failed to produce the human capital that the province requires to run its public and private sectors. The state education system is intentionally neglected and virtually ineffective. The state has failed in its ‘duty of care’ to provide education to the Baloch people in terms of quality, quantity, type and policy level. The education policy of Pakistan does not take into account the poor infrastructure, difficult terrain and scattered population of Balochistan. Neither does it promote the creativity and innovativeness that are essential for advancement in the area of human endeavours. The statistics and the experts’ views (primary research) show that the state has failed to provide even basic education to the
Baloch people. Thus, the responsibility of the state for the provision of education may be challenged on various levels.
Chapter Five

Representation of the Baloch in Pakistani Textbooks: Politics of Control

“Pakistan is an Islamic Republic established in the name of Islam. We need a type of education that is in accordance with Islamic Ideology so that the students prepared in the educational Institutions should love this country wholeheartedly and should sacrifice their self-interest for its loyalty” (Textbook for Classes IX & X, Balochistan Board, 2012: 171).

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter the primary emphasis is on the politics of representation of the Baloch within education and, most specifically, on what notions of ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘history’ are being promoted through the State of Pakistan’s education system. The focus of the study here is on the textbooks. The Pakistani establishment propagates the idea that this state came into being in the name of religion (Islam), and that all nationalities have to surrender their respective identities and come under the flag of Islam. Therefore, it is every Pakistani’s prime duty to preserve the interests of Islam. In other words, Islam is to guard and protect Pakistan. Do the Baloch nationalists see these politics of silence and selective emphasis as contributing to the conflict? What versions of history and identity politics are being removed and excluded? How does Pakistani education, both at school and college level, exclude or include Baloch history and identity? These are some of the questions that are investigated in this chapter.

In Pakistan, only officially published textbooks are taught in schools and colleges. During the military rule of Ayub Khan, Social and Pakistan Studies textbooks were issued for mandatory use in schools, colleges and professional engineering and medical institutions (Haqqani, 2005: 149; Saigol, 2005). Since the 1960s all students have been required to take courses called Pakistan Studies. The Social and Pakistan Studies curriculum and textbooks
in Pakistan portray the ‘Ideology of Pakistan’. These official texts praise military dictatorships, Arab invaders, religiosity and wars against India. According to Haqqani (2005: 149), Islamisation was accelerated in 1979 by President Zia-ul-Haq (the military ruler from 1978 to 1988) and included the reform of the textbooks, curriculum and education policy. During his rule, numerous changes were made to the educational texts in the name of Islamisation in order to portray ‘religious ideology’ (Aziz, 1993a). The aim of imposing the ideology of Pakistan on the population through Islamisation is to merge various regional entities into a single and centralised education system (Ahmed, 2013: 243). According to Saigol (2005), this is done by relying heavily on the identity-forming subjects such as history (sense of time), civics (a sense of power), and geography (a sense of space). Collectively these are known as Social and Pakistan Studies.

This chapter will argue inter alia that formal education in Balochistan is structured in such a way as to negate Baloch national aspirations. The formal education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is highly biased against the Baloch culture, history and social structure. This false representation of reality is an important contributory factor in the generation of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. The student organisations, being active in educational institutions, highlight the biased syllabus to support their arguments that the state has engineered the education syllabus in order to suppress the distinct identity of the Baloch people. This chapter examines how the textbooks of Balochistan have been conjured up and disseminated by the state education system.

Firstly, an overview of the contents, history and development of the textbooks is provided. Secondly, the use of textbooks as a mode of control is explored. This part also explores the concepts of ‘Pakistan: the Fortress of Islam’, ‘the Ideology of Pakistan’, and ‘Islamising
the Pupils and Citizens through Education’. Thirdly, the chapter discusses ‘The Baloch and Balochistan: Its History, Language, and Culture in Textbooks’ including expert and official opinions on this subject.

5.2 An Overview of the Contents, History and Development of the Textbooks

The planning, preparation and publication of textbooks has been the responsibility of the Textbook Board since the 1960s. There is a Textbook Board in each province, and the primary, secondary and tertiary textbooks are prepared under the supervision of provincial education departments. According to Aziz (1993a: 1), the “textbooks are generally written by a team of authors, then corrected and supervised by another person or a group of persons, and finally edited by another individual”. He goes on to say:

For the young student, the textbook is the most important book in his little world: he is forced to buy it, he carries it to the classroom every day, he has it open before him when the teacher is teaching, he is asked to learn portions of it by rote, and he is graded by the quantity of its contents that he can regurgitate (Aziz, 1993a: 1).

The Ministry of Education Government of Pakistan checks the accuracy and contents of the manuscript, which is submitted to the National Review Committee (NRC). After publication, the provincial government’s education department will prescribe and implement the textbook as part of the studies. These textbooks for Social Studies and Pakistan Studies are the foundation of pre-university education because most of them are compulsory for any degree in the Pakistani education system. Textbooks in Pakistan first need to be approved by the Bureau of Curriculum (BoC) of the Ministry of Education in the country’s capital (Islamabad), after which they are published by the provincial textbook boards located in Jamshoro in Sindh, Quetta in Balochistan, Lahore in Punjab, and
Peshawar in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The process of textbook reform began with the introduction of Pakistan Studies and *Islamiat* (Islamic studies), which were made compulsory subjects in the national curriculum by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1971.

In this chapter the Social Studies and Pakistan Studies textbooks are selected at school level to intermediate college level (grades 1–12) published by the Balochistan Textbook Board (the only Textbook Board in the Province). Meanwhile, the other Provinces’ textbooks - Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (in texts it is NWFP, the old name of the province) - are also used respectively (See Table 4 below). This selection of various textbooks provides a fair reflection of the representation present in the education system of Pakistan as a whole. In this research, ‘texts’ refers to the textbooks for subjects such as Social/Pakistan studies and history. These textbooks are the pre-university stages of instruction and are compulsory from class four onwards.

### Table 4: Social and Pakistan Studies Textbooks examined by Class, Language, and Number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Social and Pakistan Studies Textbooks written in Urdu</th>
<th>Social and Pakistan Studies Textbooks written in English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>9 and 10</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>11 and 12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Many scholars believe that the contents and themes of the textbooks are similar in all four of the Pakistani provinces. These have the same agenda: the ‘politics of silence’ for the regional entities such as the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun and the Baloch, and the ‘politics of negative representation’ for the other foreign nations. Representation in Pakistan’s education system is one of the instruments used for imparting knowledge to promote a selected ideology. To serve political aims, the educational curricula and textbooks are formulated in such a way as to represent other nations as conspirators and other religions as ‘the enemy’ (see Social Studies Textbooks for Classes VI, VII and VIII, 2012). The prevailing representation is reflected in the content of the textbooks, which is considered to be ‘officially appropriate’. Education is playing a crucial role in creating this culture of hatred in the education policy of the government at all levels of the state. The government schools’ prescribed texts are promoting hatred not only of India and the Hindus but also of the West and the non-Muslim countries. The culture of hatred and the distortion of history became part of the curriculum.

The Muslims deviated from the Islamic way of life, therefore Hindu customs and superstitions crept into Muslim Society. When the Muslims got alienated from their religion, moral degradation and waywardness set in. They lost the spirit of Jihad and could not withstand the revolts and conspiracies of non-Muslim (Pakistan Studies Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 12).

Indeed, the syllabus in school textbooks for subjects such as Pakistan Studies and Social Studies has been created in order to engender a patriotic and religious mindset and attitude. This culture of hatred is cultivated in children at an early age, and it influences the rest of their lives. This official approach forms part of the instruction through which the Social Studies textbooks are written. The instructions provided by the Bureau of Curricula are well defined and written, and they clearly portray Muslims as superior and non-Muslims as inferior (See Qureshi, 1992; Rabbani and Sayyid, 1995).
justifies and maintains the superiority of Islamic religious philosophies, social customs and literature. It can be noted that the representations of nationalities other than Pakistani and of religions other than Islam are the same in nearly every textbook. For example, in the education system the religious groups presented as the permanent enemies of Pakistan include the Hindus, Christians, Jews and Sikhs, and the enemies within the country are regional ethnic minorities such as the Bengalis and the Ahmadis. Saigol (2005: 1008) states that the ‘enemy within’ was the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In current educational texts this is forgotten history which is either ignored in the official textbooks or represented with excruciating pain.

It was also perceived by the Pakistani leadership and policy-makers that keeping the ethnically and linguistically divided society united would not be possible without a strong sense of submission within the state of Pakistan. Therefore, they looked upon education as a decisive factor in the integration of the diverse society. During the era of President Ayub Khan, ‘History’ as a subject was abolished and replaced by Social Studies (Masharti-ulum in Urdu) for Classes 1–8 and ‘Pakistan Studies in English’ (Mutalah-e-Pakistan in Urdu medium) for Classes 9–12.  

However, Ahmed (2013) is of opinion that the paranoid idea of one nation was challenged, although the leadership did not realise the complexities involved in it. Ultimately Bengal, which was part of Pakistan, was separated from Pakistan in 1971 and become Bangladesh. Thus, the idea behind the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ collapsed, at least for Bengal if not for the remainder of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013). However, things changed rapidly after the separation of Bangladesh. There were two reasons for such change. Firstly, the separation of Bengal occurred mainly on the basis of ethnicity, coupled with other factors such as

These two syllabuses both comprised mainly descriptions of geography, history and civic matters. In a similar way, Arabic, Islamic education was made part of the syllabus. Apart from social sciences, the Quranic verses in Arabic were made part of the other subjects and were justified as such.
language crises. Secondly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the PM of Pakistan, became aware that his power base around Pakistan was weakening. Country wide protest rose against his rule. He then used the Islamic card to prevent ethnic disunity and to gain the support of the right-wing religious parties such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), and Jammat-e-Islami (JI). In this regard, under a second constitutional amendment, he declared the Ahmadi (a sect in Pakistan) to be a non-Muslim minority and introduced Friday as a public holiday. Such a move also brought the country closer to Saudi Arabia (Ahmed, 2013). This move by Z. A. Bhutto can be viewed as the first step towards the Islamisation of Pakistan after the secession of Bengal.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had provided space for the religious parties and, ironically, the same right-wing parties such as JUI and JI would turn against him later. The countrywide protests led by the religious parties under the banner of Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet) against the Z. A. Bhutto government and its alleged rigging of the 1977 elections brought General Zia-ul-Haq (a military dictator) into power in the same year. He relied heavily on the Islamist Parties, especially Jammat-i-Islami (JI). This was one of the most important eras in the history of the textbooks reforms of Pakistan. Two international events were critical in this process: the Iranian Revolution\textsuperscript{40} of February 1979 and the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan\textsuperscript{41} in December 1979 (Ahmed, 2013). During that time of the

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\textsuperscript{40}The Iranian Revolution had instigated sectarian violence in Pakistan. Two regional powers, i.e. Saudi Arabia (an extreme Sunni Wahabi country) and Iran (an extreme Shiite state) had started pouring money into their respective ideological sects, Sunni and Shia respectively. In due course some seven principal sectarian parties emerged such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan’s Army of the Prophet Companions) 1984, Laskar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army) 1990, Lahkan-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure) 1997, and Tehrik-i-JafariaPakistan (Pakistan’s Shia movement) 1979, along with its militant offshoot, Sipah-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) 1991. The former four were Sunni parties and the latter two were Shia parties. They remained actively involved in sectarian violence and were campaigning to safeguard the interests of their respective religious communities. However, Zia, being a staunch Sunni himself, took the side of the Sunni sects.

\textsuperscript{41}The Afghan war had brought the gift of Mujahideen (holy warriors) to Pakistan. In the 1980s the whole of Pakistan, especially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, became a launching pad for the Mujahideen supported by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s ISI in order to eject the USSR from Afghanistan. Jihadi culture was introduced to radicalise Pakistanis in order to get them to fight against USSR forces in Afghanistan. For this purpose,
military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, all educational curriculums and textbooks were changed. Education was used as a strategy by the Zia-ul-Haq regime to create Mujahids (warriors) for the Afghan War in the 1980s. The regime also aimed to curb the Shiite (a sect in Islam) ideology after the Iranian Revolution and to promote Saudi Arabian Sunni Wahabism through education. Pakistani schoolchildren grew up learning about the specific ideology of Pakistan: ‘What is the meaning of Pakistan (Pakistan ka matlab kya)?’ Pakistan means “La Ilaha Illalah ... [T]here is no God, but God” (Prashad and Mir, 2012: viii).

The state of education in Pakistan created a wider debate and concern among educationalists, in both national and international policy circles. Education has never been a priority for Pakistani governments. During the Zia-ul-Haq era this sector suffered the most. General Zia was convinced that the scholarship and rational thinking that might emerge from colleges and universities would present an insurmountable challenge to his dictatorial regime. Moreover, during his regime the public sector schools were used for his Islamisation process throughout society. The higher institutions (colleges and universities) were politicised, and this consequently turned them into a hotbed of conflict between hostile and highly indoctrinated rival student groups.

5.3 Textbooks as a ‘Mode of Control’


thousands of madrasas (Islamic seminaries) were established around Pakistan. After the USSR forces had withdrawn from Afghanistan, these Jihadi puritans created problems.
The goal, it seems, is to produce a generation with the following traits: docility, inability to ask questions, capacity to indulge in pleasurable illusions, pride in wearing blinkers, willingness to accept guidance from above, alacrity to like and dislike things by order, tendency to ignore gaps in one’s knowledge, enjoyment of make-believe, faith in the high value of pretences.

Among the core themes that all scholars have identified in their writings about the textbooks are Islamisation and the propagation of the ideology of Pakistan. These are commonly and repeatedly used in textbooks. For example, 1) Pakistan shall be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and 2) Islam is the state religion of Pakistan. Furthermore, the state education system states that Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah: “Pakistan is our homeland where we can freely promote Islamic civilisation and culture ... Pakistan is the fortress of Islam in the real sense of the world” (for Classes IX and X, 2012: 168). The central theme in all the textbooks I have examined for this research is that the creation of Pakistan is intended to render it free from infidels (Pakistan Studies Class 12, 2011: 106–107). A Discourse Analysis (DA) can be employed to find the truth behind the text. Through DA, one might examine the hidden aims of the school textbooks in the state education system. The majority of textbooks mention the following:

Firstly, the religion of Islam is presented as the sole basis for the creation of Pakistan. In Pakistani nationalism, all the ‘Muslim majority’ areas were obliged to unite in order to establish Pakistan. State nationalism is the basis of Pakistani ideology, which emphasises the Muslim nationhood and Muslim nationalism (see Textbook for Classes IX and X, 2012).

Secondly, in describing the creation of Pakistan the textbooks mention the animosity of Hindus towards Muslims in India. One text mentions that the Muslims were subjected to
such persecution as has only been seen a few times before in history, according to Social Studies for Class 8 (2010: 77). This textbook states, on Page 79, that the prejudice of the All Indian National Congress (AINC) and their anti-Muslim policy, the Muslim exploitation by Hindu landlords, the replacement of the Urdu Language by Hindi in schools, the permanent slavery of Muslims under Hindu domination and the adoption of Bande Matram as the national anthem finally provoked the movement that ended the Hindus’ supremacy through the creation of Pakistan. Further, this textbook states on Page 78 that “this long and huge struggle is collectively known as the Pakistan Movement”.


[L]ack of clarity on national identity drove Pakistan towards a search for an Islamic identity that should also be democratic. However, over time, this acquired more and more dogmatic features and fundamentalist overtones. The convergence of such external and internal factors created the metaphor of Pakistan as a fortress of Islam (Ahmed, 2013: 1).

The name ‘Pakistan’ literally means ‘Clean Land’. However, this is a contested term and sometimes it is rendered as ‘Land of the Pure’. These textbooks state that Pakistan had demanded not just a piece of land but a piece of land that will be Islamic, where every Muslim will be free from Hindu domination (see Pakistan Studies Class 12, 2011: 106–107). Almost all the Social and Pakistan Studies textbooks have traced the creation of Pakistan to the arrival of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. For example, a textbook for Social Studies Class 6 (2012: 70–71) includes a complete chapter entitled ‘The Coming of Muslims into South Asia’ (711–1707), which describes the territory in Sindh (now a province of Pakistan) as part of the Islamic Empire before Mohammad Bin Qasim (Bin
Qasim)\textsuperscript{42} and his army set out to attack the subcontinent. The same textbook called this a *Jihad* (holy war) against non-Muslims. According to this textbook (Page 72), the conquest of Sindh has a great importance in the history of Islam because “Muslims for the first time got a foothold in South Asia”. The same chapter concludes with the creation of Pakistan since the Arab invasions in 712 A.D.

For instance, one textbook describe how the freedom movement for the creation of a new homeland for the Muslims in South Asia was created in 1867, when Sir Sayyad Ahmed Khan “realized that Muslims and Hindus could no longer remain united” (Pakistan Studies Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 23). This textbook further describes:

Sir Sayyad knew it well that if once the Hindu majority captured power in the subcontinent, the Muslims would be reduced to great straits. That’s why he opposed every step taken to impose Hindus on the Muslims. He told the people that Hindus and Muslims were not one nation and their ideologies of life were so much diametrically opposed to each other that both could not co-exist. Sir Sayyad used the word “nation” and explained the two nation theory that became the basis of the establishment of Pakistan. In fact Sir Sayyad was ‘The Leader’ who laid foundation stone of Pakistan (Pakistan Studies Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 24).

There are many contradictions and errors in the textbooks, as mentioned in this chapter. Another Pakistan Studies textbook for Class 10 (2011: 9–10) proposes a similar argument about the creation of Pakistan and Bin Qasim’s establishment of rule on the subcontinent. According to this (Page 17), to eliminate non-Muslim influences from Muslim society “the Muslims began a *Jihad* movement against the Sikhs”. This text also provides an example of *Tehreek-e-Mujahideen* (movement of holy warriors) which was carried out against the Sikhs by the Muslims.

\textsuperscript{42}Bin Qasim was an Umayyad General in the 8\textsuperscript{th} century who came from the Middle East and attacked Sindh in 712 A.D. He was an invader and a plunderer, but in Pakistan’s textbooks he is portrayed as a hero and defender of faith (Islam). According to the textbooks, he brought Islam to the subcontinent.
A textbook for Pakistan Studies claims that Pakistan was established for the first time when the Arabs occupied Sindh under the command of Bin Qasim in 712 (see a textbook for Pakistan Studies by Zafar, 1988, and one for Pakistan Studies and Affairs by Dogar, 1993). For Zafar (1988: 4-8), the country “came to be established for the first time when Arabs under Bin Qasim occupied Sindh and Multan”. The creation of a Muslim country was inevitable when Muslims set foot in India for the first time in the history of humankind. Similarly, textbooks further elaborate on the fact that the invasion and expansionism of Bin Qasim in Sindh had remained a building block for a Muslim homeland. Looking at it the other way around, these textbooks undoubtedly had an impact. Ahmed (2013: 244) and Nayyar and Salim (2004) claim that the State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan justified the “Glorification of War and the Military”, especially highlighting jihad (holy war), shahadat (martyrdom), ghazi (victor in war) and shaheed (martyr).

However, it is interesting to note that various other perceptions are also reflected in this debate about Bin Qasim’s arrival in Sindh and the subcontinent. Just as conquering Arabs were characterised as ruthless and barbaric, motivated by plunder and economic gain, the period of Qasim's rule has been called the darkest period in Sindh’s history because of the massive forced conversions of non-Muslims, the destruction of temples, slaughter, and genocide. Before the arrival of Arabs in Sindh, the people were mainly Hindu and Buddhist by faith. None of the texts discuss this side of the story.

Under the direction of the Bureau of Curricula, the textbooks had to declare that the creation of Pakistan had been founded not on racial, linguistic or geographical factors but on the basis of ideology and religion, i.e. Islam. Therefore, students must know and appreciate the ideology of Pakistan and popularise it with slogans. On the other hand,
students needed to memorise and root the objectives and goal of the country’s creation as an Islamic State. The majority of Pakistan Studies textbooks are about Islam and its relationship with the ideology of Pakistan, and they are criticised by many Pakistani writers and scholars (see Aziz, 1993a and 1993b; Saigol, 2005). According to them, the ideological representation of the Pakistani State is not viable in the education system of a multi-ethnic country.

For Jalal (1995: 6), the textbooks’ authors are “chasing Pakistan’s mirage in the Arabian desert bridge the temporal and spatial distance between the origins of Islam and Pakistan in an imaginative leap fired by an ideology of Muslim supremacy in the world and a geographical vision that is pan-Islamic in scope”. Jalal (1995: 8) even cites Justice Mohammad Munir, who argues that the claim “that the ‘term ideology was never used in the Pakistan movement days is absolutely wrong [sic]’”. According to her, the two-nation theory was the other name for the Pakistan Ideology and was an opinion that was projected in the texts. The Pakistan Ideology was invented by a particular ‘religio-political organisation’, the Jammat-e-Islami. This is a staunch religious party which states that those who do not believe in Islam cannot have equal rights of citizenship in an Islamic country.

5.4 The Baloch and Balochistan: Its History, Culture and Language in the Textbooks

As I have mentioned in my previous chapter on educational policies, since 1947 no serious attempt has been made to reform the educational textbooks. As in other provinces in the country, only the officially published textbooks are used in Balochistan’s schools and colleges. In Balochistan the current curriculum and the textbooks are highly obsessed with “national ideology”, which is alien to Baloch culture, history, language, social structure
and their legal rights. Many myths and facts have been merged in the texts and the curricula of the Balochistan education system.

5.4.1 History of the Baloch and Balochistan

To many historians, the textbooks in Balochistan consist of misinformation, hatred and bigotry, which were introduced to create false patriotic citizens, as argued by Shazawar Ali. In his view the official textbooks are inverted bigotry representing a constructed Pakistani nationalism that portrays the Baloch negatively or excludes them entirely from history. In Balochistan, the Textbook Board and developers of curricula consider it their duty to infuse Pakistan’s national spirit at school level to encourage students to become patriotic citizens. Textbooks in Balochistan are particularly prone to the omissions and errors that often characterise historical narratives designed for Social Studies classes. According to Dr. Shazawar Ali, the Baloch consider themselves a nation with thousands of years of history, having a distinct culture, language and territory.

It is believed that the Baloch people, in terms of identity, are different from those in neighbouring countries. In educational texts, the Baloch and Balochistan culture, language, history and heroes are swept under the carpet (see the Social Studies textbooks, Balochistan Board for Classes V, VI, VII and VIII, 2012). Surprisingly, in the Social Studies textbooks for Class VII (2012), the word ‘Balochistan’ appears in the whole textbook only twice, on Pages 65 and 67. Similarly, in the Social Studies textbooks for Class VIII, (2012) the word ‘Balochistan’ appears only twice in the whole text, on Pages 84 and 85. In Class IV, (2012) there are two pages (p 5 and 6) entitled ‘History of Balochistan’. The following is written:
Before the advent of the British, Balochistan was an independent state. It was ruled by the Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan. The Khan of Kalat was killed in 1939 after the British occupation. Balochistan was divided into two parts by the British, i.e. the Kalat state and the British Balochistan (p. 5).

It goes on to describe the question of Balochistan and its merger with Pakistan, mentioning that “Balochistan was a frontline region for the Pakistan freedom movement. Jinnah (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan) visited Balochistan. The members of the Quetta Municipality and Shahi Jirga joined Pakistan” (p. 5). This is the only textbook from Classes 1–12 to contain a whole page on Balochistan, although the year and date mentioned are incorrect. It also excludes the personalities, language and culture of the Baloch people. The British occupied Kalat state in 1839 rather than 1939.

With regard to the Baloch and Balochistan history in textbooks, I elicited diverse opinions from my respondents. Abdul Qayyum Babai remained in the education department of the Government of Balochistan in various capacities for a long time. He has been a District Education Officer, a Principal, and a Director of Schools, Government of Balochistan. At the time of the interview he was serving as Chairman of the Textbook Board Balochistan. The respondent replied to a question about the history of the Baloch and Balochistan. He states: “of course, some subjects in our education system are called national subjects. There is nothing about the Baloch people, their history, culture and language, but all these will be highlighted in history, geography and Pakistan studies”.

However, in an interview with the Chairman of the Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BBISE), Balochistan, Professor Saadullah Khan Tokhai, I asked the following question: “Do you think the Baloch people, along with their history and culture, have been adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the province”. His reply was simply, “No”. He suggests that our textbooks are irrelevant to our lives -
irrelevant in the sense that nothing is about us. Tokhai has served as a director of the Bureau of Curriculum (BoC) as well. He mentions that everything regarding textbooks and education policies is prepared by Islamabad (the capital of the federal government): “They prepare the curriculum and ask us for comment, but never include our feedback. Frankly speaking, we are puppets in the hands of Pakistan’s ruling elites”.

According to Provincial Coordinator UNESCO, Qaisar Jamali, during an interview, the people of Balochistan have been ignored due to the centralised educational policies of Pakistan, because everything is determined by Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, while the local needs of the Baloch and Balochistan are ignored. Secondly, they are using top-to-bottom approaches instead of working upwards from the bottom to the top, involving local stakeholders. They also ignore the need for basic planning. These policies have a negative impact on education in Balochistan, and particularly on that of the Baloch and their culture, language, history and heroes. Qaisar Jamali called this the politics of isolation. According to him, this is because of the distance between Islamabad and Balochistan. Smiling, he explained:

I am not talking about distance in terms of geography or physical distance but distance in terms of mind and heart. This is one of the reasons people in Balochistan think that Islamabad has never given them educational opportunities in terms of policy-making, ignoring the Baloch personalities, history and culture in the educational curriculum, textbooks and syllabus.

Ali Rehman (his fictitious name), better known by his literary name in Balochistan, and now as an academic in Literature and Linguistics in one of the institutions of Balochistan, used to be a teacher in public sector government schools prior to his current job. He says that, as a teacher, he taught those textbooks that are part of the education system, such as the history of Pakistan, its heroes and poets:
I was not satisfied with the teaching of the textbooks because the texts are either alienating the Baloch history or representing them negatively. My aim was to get rid of that from the education system, which hates other nations and their history. Now I am at the university here and I am teaching our writers, our people, our books and feeling relaxed.

He further states:

To me this is not an education that we are gaining in our formal state education system. Education in Pakistan doesn’t have any capacity, creativity to create an able person, a philosopher, scientist or literary person. Education means to know yourself first, your surroundings, and then others. Others to me mean other nations, religions, about countries, their, social, political and economic systems. Then, to contribute to human civilisation, culture through creativity. Education’s contribution should be for peace and prosperity for human beings and the betterment of society. However, Pakistani education destroyed the history of other people and other foreign nations such as India, Israel and the West. The Baloch as a nation is represented badly in the textbook. The killers of the Baloch people as a hero and the Baloch as a villain. This system of education reminds the Baloch people that they are third-class citizens, illiterate, backward, Sardar and Nawab. We want an education that creates human beings, not obedient citizens. Not a hate culture and hate-loving men. There are certain aims of the Pakistani education system. Therefore, this system is afraid of giving proper education to the Baloch people.

Ali Rehman, during his interview, said that ignorant and illiterate people are producing the education syllabus and curriculum in Pakistan: Many reasons are involved, for example, either it is misrepresented deliberately or they are really ignorant people. For example, sometimes in social studies I used to ask myself, ‘Where am I?’ When I taught in schools I was not satisfied and searched for a place. The way they are analysing the Baloch people, to me, is a distortion of the Baloch history, a negation of the Baloch identity and a state of denial of Baloch existence. This is being done to create an Islamic Ideology Islami Nazria, or a Pakistani ideology.

His argument is endorsed by another interviewee, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, (whose details and pseudo name are given in the previous chapter). According to him, the developers of the educational textbooks do not even know the essence of history. Policy-makers deliberately judge the Baloch as part of the Indus valley civilisation, although the Baloch have a
completely different civilisation and culture. Mehrgarh in Balochistan, according to him, is one example of a place that is considered to be older than the Indus valley civilisation located in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X (2012) calls the symbols of the Indus civilisation ‘the historical legacy of Pakistani culture. It goes on:

The excavations at the mounds of Harappa and Moenjodaro have brought to light a five-thousand-year old human civilisation. The recent excavations at Mehrgarh (District Kachhi, Balochistan) show that its remains are older than those of Harappa and Moenjodaro by about three thousand years (P. 166).

5.4.2 Culture and Language of the Baloch

Urdu is mentioned as a language in Balochistan (see Class V, 2012: 66). On the same page it is also stated that Balochi, Pashto, Brahui, Sariki, Sindhi, Persian and Punjabi are commonly spoken languages in Balochistan. In Balochistan the medium of education/instruction is not Balochi. “Balochi is neither an official language nor a language of education in any of the countries where it is spoken” (Jahani, 2010: 459).

There is no official use of Balochi as a language of administration or education in Pakistan, even if voices have been raised in particular for introducing it as a language of education. The official support the language receives in Pakistan is that it is taught at the University of Balochistan in Quetta, that it has an official academy, the Balochi Academy, founded in 1961 and that it is used as a language for radio and TV transmissions. There is also a periodical, Ulus, published in Quetta by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Jahani, 2005: 155).

Urdu is implemented as a national language and English as an official language. In the Pakistan Studies Textbook Mutalah-e-Pakistan in Urdu Medium for Class X (2012: 157), it is mentioned that Urdu is the national language of Pakistan but there are some local languages too. About the Balochi language, it is written, “the Baloch are nomadic people
and due to this their language couldn’t flourish” (p. 157). Again, it states that “Balochi literature has progressed after the creation of Pakistan” (p. 157).

With regard to local languages, a response was elicited from the Chairman of the Textbook Board in Balochistan, Abdul Qayyum Babai, in 2013. He replied to the question about the Balochi language as a medium of instruction by saying that there was no Balochi language either as a compulsory or optional subject in our schools’ education system. According to him, during 1980–85\(^43\) the local languages such as Balochi, Pashto and Brahui were adopted in primary education but were later withdrawn by the government. He is optimistic that they are assessing the mother tongues’ impact on education through a project. According to him, the project is in the pipeline with the help of UNICEF, and it is hoped that the local languages will be implemented in the education system. However, he acknowledged that “we are implementers, not policy-makers”. A question also remained unanswered: Why were the local languages withdrawn during 1980-85 and by whom? I tried to find the relevant government notification but was told by an official that it was done for no reason. The following reason is mentioned by Jahani:

In the early 1990s measures were taken to introduce Balochi as a language of primary education in those areas of Pakistani Balochistan where it is spoken by a majority of the population. This experiment was not very successful, however, due to several reasons, including disagreement among the Baloch on orthographic issues and the lack of qualified teachers. What was perhaps more important was the speakers’ attitude towards Balochi, which many Baloch see as a ‘backward and rural’ language, knowledge of which offers no improvement in terms of social or economic status in today’s Pakistan. Likewise, people felt threatened by the fact that the Brahuis and the Baloch would be taught in different languages, even though as a result of their political alliance in the Khanate of Kalat, they strongly identify as one people (Jahani, 2005: 155).

\(^{43}\)According to Spooner, “Pakistan introduced Balochi-medium schooling under Benazir Bhutto’s government in the 1980s, most parents were more interested in their children gaining literacy in Urdu. However, since then, as nationalism has intensified in recent decades, Balochi-medium schooling has been included in the nationalist agenda (2013: 142).
The Chairman BBISE, Balochistan, Saadullah Khan Tokhai, argued that the languages of the people of Balochistan, including the Baloch, the Pashtun and others, are not part of the educational system. Our mother tongues are not included in textbooks. Our children are forced to learn Urdu and English at school while speaking their mother tongues at home. He mentions that there is a Sindhi language in the province of Sindh, and a Pashto language in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Therefore, why are our languages not being used in Balochistan? According to him, Punjab, being the ethnic majority province, has already adopted Urdu as a language. Being a dominant and ruling ethnic group, Punjabi have no fear of being dominated by other nations in Pakistan. Ali Rehman claims that the adherents of the Pakistan education system project the Balochi language as a broken wing of the Persian language.

The Pakistan Studies Textbook *Mutahal-e-Pakistan* in Urdu Medium for Class X (2012: 153-54) talks about ‘local or regional cultures’. It claims that in Pakistan there is no difference in terms of culture and traditions because we are all Muslims and have a similar way of life, although there are a few variations such as the hospitality of the Baloch people (p. 153). They are tribal people who have respect and dignity for their elders (p. 154). Another textbook says that “the Baloch people are an embodiment of self-respect, courage and self-sacrifice in spite of their backwardness” (Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, 2012).

The Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X (2012) describes Pakistani culture. According to this textbook, “the people of Pakistan inherited the great culture that was developed during the one thousand years of Muslim rule over the subcontinent. With this distinct culture we maintained our own identity, in spite of living with Hindus for one thousand years” (p. 159–60). It further mentions that the outstanding aspects of Pakistan
culture are religion and religious festivals, such as Eid-ul-fitr and Eid-ul-Azha (p. 160). “The folk literature of our provinces reflects Islamic ideas and values” (Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, 2012: 162). On the question of national literature, it states: “Urdu holds a unique place in our national literature and no other language can rival it, the reason being that the Urdu language possesses a vast, rich and multi-faceted literature that fully reflects our Pakistani culture and civilization” (p. 162).

Urdu is declared a national language. As for Balochi, it states: “Balochi is spoken in Balochistan and Iranian and Afghani Balochistan as well as in some parts of the Punjab and Sindh. Balochi poetry is replete with Islamic mystical and moral themes like truthfulness, hospitality, justice, equity, and self-sacrifice” (p. 164). Further, “The cultural heritage of a Pakistani Muslim is, more or less, reflected in every regional language”.

The discourse analysis of the educational textbooks shows that the Baloch and their culture, language and history are not part of these textbooks. In this regard the majority of respondents, including policy-makers, are of the view that textbooks in Balochistan are a narrative of silence, deception and misinformation.

The question of the Baloch and their representation is considered a political matter and is avoided by respondents such as the Additional Secretary in the Secondary Education Department, Government of Balochistan, Rashid Razzaq, and the Managing Director of the Education Foundation, Balochistan, Dr. D. K. Riaz Baloch. However, responding to this same question, Talat Abbas (Deputy Focal Person Capacity Development Education Department of Balochistan) acknowledged the following:

I must admit that the previous policies were not addressing this factor, but new curricula, including early childhood education, focus on the mother tongues. These are also concentrated on promoting local culture, as well as regional languages. I am hopeful that these will be addressed in the horizon of education. Since 1947 the policies have not been up to the mark; textbooks are not quality textbooks. The
teacher training programmes are not effective. But now we are trying to address all these problems.

His argument was considered persuasive by the Additional Director of Education (Schools) Balochistan, Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. In an interview, a government official, Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, argues that federal government is responsible for preparing our curriculum and that nothing is in our hands. Further, he believes that it is the right time to address the genuine grievances of the people of Balochistan and their desire for an inclusive education that represents their language, culture and heroes in the educational system.

Concerning the Baloch representation in the textbooks, a similar kind of response is given by interviewees such as Nasreen Ayaz Baloch, a female Lecturer in the Education Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, Zarina Rashid, a female Lecturer in the Education Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, Sadia Rasheed, a female Lecturer in the Education Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, Aamir Naeem, Professional Development Specialist USAID, Teacher Education Project, Munir Ahmed Nodazai, Controller of Balochistan Board Quetta, and Dr. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, Chairman of the History Department, University of Balochistan. All of them argue that the purpose of education and the politics of power, curricula and textbooks is to Islamise society.

Then, a very important question might be asked: Why are the Baloch people and their history and culture not adequately and fairly represented in the education system? One might say that education is a site of political struggle. It has not been used as an instrument for capacity-building. For these purposes, religion and the national identity are used in the textbooks to control the people as one nation. According to the textbook for Classes IX and X, education should be provided according to the ideological foundation of the country.
This means that the state uses history as a political and ideological tool. It is believed that the ideology of Pakistan emerged after the immense Muslim struggle on the subcontinent. Therefore, an official version of the narration of history is that the state aims to enforce national ideology as a law of the state. It is written in a way that serves only the vested interests of the ruling class elite.

Ali Rehman, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Dr. Gishkori seem to agree on this point: the students are not introduced to their own history, culture and languages in the educational textbooks in Balochistan. According to these respondents, the textbooks are closely tied, firstly, to religiosity and state ideological factors and, secondly, to the creation of a holy warrior (Jihadi) mindset. Thirdly, Islamic conquerors are presented as heroes in history to produce a sense of Muslimhood. Fourthly, the textbooks aim to curb the modern scientific inventions or oppose them. Using the curricula is the best way of achieving these aims and objectives in educational textbooks. Hence, in Balochistan the ideology of the state and the religion is used to fulfil those objectives. In this context, textbooks are used as a weapon to control the minds of school-going children between the ages of 5 and 14.

5.5 Analysing the case of Balochistan

Pakistan emerged as an ideological state where national identity was defined in terms of religion, two-nation theory and the Urdu language. In a country that was ethnically diverse and religiously homogeneous in nature, Islam was imposed to serve as a bond that would unite the diverse nationalities. Since its inception, however, the state of Pakistan has been challenged by the slogans of diverse ethno-nationalist groups who have articulated their unease at the creation of Islamic nationalism by the state. To gain a sense of their distinct cultural and linguistic identity in the newly created federal state of Pakistan, these ethno-
nationalist groups have been demanding their cultural recognition in a more inclusive national narrative and regional autonomy within the Pakistani federation. Among them, it is crucial to mention here the Bengali, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi.

The state’s response has primarily focused on subduing these regional identity expressions through the use of Islam and ideological orientation as the main tool in the creation of a Pakistani nation. For these purposes, the state is obliged to create a standard narrative of Pakistan's history. The highest priority was given to the revision of the curricula, with a view to reorganising the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation in order that Islamic ideology might permeate the thinking of the younger generation and help them to acquire the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets. Since the 1970s, school textbooks have systematically inculcated hatred of other nations through historical revisionism. For these purposes, Social and Pakistan Studies, which was made a compulsory subject in all primary and secondary schools and colleges, is used. Numerous textbooks have been published under this heading. Broadly, the textbooks are amalgamated patriotic discourses that justify not only the two-nation theory but also biographies of Muslim rule. Endemic to the discourse is the polemic about the superiority of Islam as a religion over other religions.

Meanwhile, with the separation of the eastern wing of the country (now Bangladesh) in 1971, the Pakistani state became ever more conscious of its territorial integrity. This has reinforced its commitment to suppress any form of ethnic or national identity, according to Ali Rehman in an interview. Given Islam’s Universalist worldview that perceives any identity based on birth, race and language unfavorably, Islamism became the strongest tool in the hands of the security- and identity-conscious Pakistani state to counter regional
ethnic movements. Not surprisingly, Islamabad began supporting Islamists as part of its strategy to curb nationalism, particularly the Baloch nationalism in Balochistan, as argued by Dr. Gishkori during an interview in 2013.

Historically, the religious card had been played by states and even by colonial empires to divide and rule. This might be exemplified by the history of the British Empire in India. In post-colonial states, such as Pakistan, it is evident that religion has always played a role. Further examples are provided by the recent history of Iraq and Syria, where the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is using Kurdish people against Kurds in the name of religion. The Kurdish people are fighting for their own separate state on the one hand; on the other hand, however, there are Kurds in ISIS, a religious fundamentalist group. A similar example can be found in the case of Balochistan.

Pakistan sought to unite different nations under the notion of a Muslim state of Pakistan. But Prof. Dr. Gishkori said that the call for a Muslim nation was not well received by the Baloch masses, as they have identified themselves as Baloch for thousands of years and their ethnic identity was much stronger than their religion. He states that the Baloch people’s sense of themselves as a distinct nation is not a new phenomenon. It has deep historical roots but has gained momentum since the inception of Pakistan in 1947 and its educational policies towards the Baloch people. The prominent Baloch leader, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, clearly denounced the concept of joining the Muslim state of Pakistan in his historical speech in the Kalat Assembly. He said that, as two states, we had as separate a historical background and culture as our neighbouring states of Iran and Afghanistan. He said that “[w]e have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afganistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan” (Kutty, 2009: 62). The fact that we are Muslims does
not mean that we have to sacrifice our freedom and amalgamate our country with others. If, as Muslims, we are required to join Pakistan, then Iran and Afghanistan, which are also Muslim states, should, perhaps, also be required to merge with Pakistan (Kutty, 2009).

When the idea of joining Pakistan was rejected by the Baloch representatives, the Pakistani army marched on Kalat in April 1948. Since then, the Baloch have never come to terms with the idea of their homeland being merged into the religious state of Pakistan. Furthermore, since the merger of the Baloch state into Pakistan the Pakistani government has been treating the Baloch and Balochistan, its land and people, as a threat to the national solidarity of the country. Thus, the Baloch people have been excluded from all state power-sharing and policy-making. As mentioned above, an unfamiliar and foreign language (Urdu) was imposed on them, and their native Balochi language was excluded from their schools. Their culture, history and heroes are either ignored in the educational textbooks or represented negatively. Pakistan’s education of the Baloch people is a mode of control.

The purpose of this type of education in Balochistan is to produce a good ‘Practising Muslim’ and an obedient country-loving person. For this reason, the idea of the two-nation theory and Muslim brotherhood were implemented through educational textbooks in Balochistan. However, as we observed, the Baloch people and the history of Balochistan have been mostly excluded. The exclusion of the Baloch from all state-run institutions has led them to believe that there is no hope for their future with Pakistan, as noted by Professor Aziz Bugti. It can be argued that the education system of Pakistan ignores the ancestral history of Baloch which is highly significant for the Baloch students’ education about their past. The government textbooks do not mention the Baloch heroes and rulers of Balochistan.
In educational institutions, the state is facing a multi-faceted resistance from the Baloch students’ organisation (BSO) for ignoring them and their history. One example of student reaction can be seen from the recent raid by Pakistani security forces (January 13, 2014) on Attashad Degree College in the Turbat district of Balochistan. The spokesperson for the forces announced that “A large quantity of anti-Pakistan literature as well as maps of a separate Balochistan were recovered during a raid of Attashad Degree College in Turbat district of Balochistan” (Tribune Express News, 2014).

He further stated that “[T]he recovered material included separatist leaflets, banners and posters. The books include Nehru and Gandhi’s biographies as well as books about Baloch separation. The books were printed in Karachi and neighbouring countries”. In this hostile environment, the education sector, according to HRW, has been grossly neglected. Educational institutions have become safe havens for student politics. The Baloch Student Organisation (BSO) and others are providing a platform for strikes, the killing of teachers and the targeting of security forces. As a result, hundreds of students have disappeared. Many of them have been killed or abducted by security and military forces. The question that one needs to ask is as follows: Is there an element in the Pakistani education system that causes such alienation among Baloch students?

5.6 Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter shows that the state primarily aims to control/dominate the Baloch through education; this has contributed to the existing conflict in Balochistan, which will be discussed later (in chapter 6). The history, culture and language of the Baloch people are ignored in the curriculum, and the educational textbooks are used to control them. For this purpose, educational policies, Islamisation and the narration of
ideological contents are constantly used by the state. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, education has remained part of politics and has been used as a tool under the military regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahiya Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq to impose their notion of Islam and nationhood. Apart from a few textbook reforms, the majority of educational policies and reforms were made under the various military regimes, in particular during the Islamisation policy of Zia-ul-Haq. The experience of 1971 demonstrated that the politics of religion and education does not work. It could not prevent the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The educational policies became even more closely tied to the ideological factors because dissent still existed in the remainder of Pakistan. Other ethno-lingual groups and nationalities were struggling to separate themselves from Pakistan, including the Baloch people.

On the other hand, the ruling elite and policy-makers have been in a state of complete denial regarding the educational rights of small nations, including those of the Baloch. Similarly, in Balochistan the Pakistani rulers have been using the state’s Islamic character to keep the country united. In fact, however, they have been producing religious sectarianism and fanaticism through their educational reforms, demonstrating their fear of the weak structure of their political system. In view of the resistance by the nationalists and students, Pakistan appears to be undergoing a crisis of identity. It is fighting a war within Pakistan and its Muslim Nation because it has forgotten that it is a multinational state. The historical and cultural backgrounds of these ethnic groups or nations, particularly the Baloch, which go back thousands of years, cannot be ignored.
Chapter Six

Politics of Education, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Balochistan

6.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the Politics of Education and Conflict in the case of Balochistan. This chapter consists of the outcome of the argument formed on the basis of the significant themes that emerged from my fieldwork.

Broadly speaking, for this research work there are two different theoretical views on the nature and purpose of education. The dominant view emphasises the positive role of education, as can be seen from the functionalist perspective outlined in chapter 3. Functionalists argue that the role of education is to maintain social order. This role can be played by schools. Schools provide children with skills, attitudes, behaviour and learning. The crux of the functionalist argument is that education is about caring for people by helping them to find jobs, acquire certain norms and values, have greater opportunities, and live their lives in solidarity and with integrity.

This thesis has challenged the dominant view of the role of education and has argued that there is another side to education. Conflict theory takes a contrary view to that of the functionalists, stating that education serves the purpose of control. According to conflict theorists, education (school) is politically based on inequality and the social status. It is a contested domain that propagates the ideology of the ruling class in society. The conflict perspective has numerous explanations of the role of education, as evidenced in Balochistan’s education system. In the Balochistan context, an understanding of the conflict theory of the role of education is vital, as the Baloch people believe that education
is a tool that is used to control them by replacing their history, culture and language. In addition, they have limited access to educational opportunities. This chapter will thus argue that the education system of the state of Pakistan has accelerated conflict in Balochistan.

However, education as a tool for conflict resolution is also discussed in this chapter, as I discuss the ways in which education might play a role in conflict resolution in Balochistan. A crucial question is examined in the context of education and conflict resolution in Balochistan: Why do the Baloch dislike the state education? One might argue that, were Pakistan to offer a better education system, including better textbooks, it might overcome the resentment of the Baloch people. I argue that this will depend on the state and its policies on the Baloch people. Should it wish to do so, the Pakistani state might find a solution to the long-lasting Baloch problem.

### 6.2 Education and Conflict in Balochistan

The conflict situation in Balochistan, which appears to have political, socio-economic and ethnic dimensions, has serious implications for the already dysfunctional education system in the province. Chapter 2 has examined the historical, political and economic background of Balochistan. The chapter mentions that the economic and social disparity among Pakistan’s provinces, with particular reference to Balochistan, has created a sense of discontent among the ethnic Baloch with the state of Pakistan. The Baloch are not only preoccupied with the sense that their economic, political and social rights are being usurped by the dominant ethnic group in Pakistan, the Punjabis, but also feel that their national identity is under serious threat. That is because the demographic changes taking place in Balochistan, with the arrival of other ethnic groups, are believed to be rendering the Baloch a minority in their own province.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the major concern over demographic change came to the fore when the government of Pakistan launched a series of strategic and economic projects in Balochistan during the Musharraf era (1999–2008). These included the Gwadar Deep Sea Port, Makran Coastal Highway, Merani Dam, Subabzai Dam and a couple of universities: Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences; Balochistan University of Information Technology Engineering and Management Sciences; and Bahadur Khan Women’s University. The nationalist forces termed these developmental schemes of the regime a tool to marginalise the Baloch nation in their homeland. Moreover, the Baloch feared that there would be an influx of non-local workers and officials to staff these projects.

Due to insufficient educational institutions, including those offering technical training, there is a huge skills gap between the Baloch and rest of the Pakistani people. This huge skills gap in Balochistan has arisen not because Baloch are incapable but because of the very poor education system that has been unable to impart skills to local people, thus allowing outsiders to fill the gaps in jobs and numerous mega projects. Hence, in order to resist these projects and the resulting non-local influx, the Baloch reacted violently. They have resisted this move by using all means available to them. Whatever the reasons for it, the conflict is multidimensional. Therefore, conflict has been present since the inception of Pakistan. As also discussed in a previous chapter, there are various factors in the Balochistan conflict. No previous authors have underlined the desperate state of formal education in Balochistan as one of the potential factors fuelling conflict in the province.

Many scholars, including Davies (2005a and b) and Smith (2005), postulate that formal education may play a critical role in resolving conflict; however, this thesis takes a somewhat different view and argues that education cannot always be neutral or reduce
conflict but under certain circumstances may promote conflict, with particular reference to Balochistan. Research also confirms that

[E]ducation can entrench intolerance, create or perpetuate inequality and intensify social tensions that can lead to civil conflict and violence. Education is a key determinant of income, influence and power. Inequalities in educational access can lead to other inequalities - in income, employment, nutrition, and health as well as political position, which can be an important source of conflict (Johnson and Kalmthout, 2006: 3).

Many studies have shown the income gap between the Baloch and non-Baloch. This gap is about earnings, income and employment. The local Baloch people are far behind in terms of socio-economic status as compared to non-Baloch. “Within Pakistan Balochistan’s per capita income is less than half of the country’s average, meaning that an average Baloch is likely to be twice as poor as his counterpart living in any of the other three provinces” (Institute of Public Policy, 2011 cited in Ahmed, 2013: 104). Ahmed further states:

It is unfortunate but true that even within the province of Balochistan; an average Baloch is twice as poor as an average Punjabi, Pashtun, or Hazara resident of the province. Even in the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta, less than one third of the households of the provincial metropolis are actually connected with the government water supply system and receive between 1-2 hours of water supply in 24 hours. The education system in the province is so inferior that those who can afford it would prefer to send their children to educational institutions outside the province; Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore. The same is true of medical facilities in the province; with a little affordability most people prefer to take their sick loved ones to Karachi or elsewhere for medical treatment (Ahmed, 2013: 104).

Johnson and Kalmthout (2006) argue that, despite the availability of formal education to all in many parts of the world, it (education) has sometimes failed to prevent conflicts from taking place. They maintain that, due to increasing globalisation and other global and domestic factors, the social and income inequalities among citizens in numerous states have plunged the ‘disadvantaged’ classes or ethnic groups into conflict with the privileged classes or ethnic groups. During the 1970s and 1980s the Baloch struggle was seen as
confined to specific tribes, especially those excluded and impoverished such as the Marri, Bugti and Mengal tribes. But now it has changed in nature. The conflict is no longer seen as localised or a struggle of poor against rich or disadvantaged against privileged class. Many examples might be quoted here; most importantly, non-tribal regions, such as Makran division in Balochistan, are intensely engaged in conflict. As the previous nationalist movements were based in the Marri–Bugti areas in the east of the province, the south-west part remained peaceful. The current nationalist upsurge has seen widespread resistance across the region except in the northern districts where Pashtuns are in the majority.

This thesis follows a similar line of argument in the case-study of Balochistan-Pakistan relations. The alternative argument discussed here is that education is contributing to conflict in Balochistan because of the nature, purpose, policies and role of education in the federal structure with regard to smaller ethno-national groups. There is no evidence that education is a neutral actor in the case of Balochistan. As in other conflict zones, education is always part of the problem. Therefore, I might argue that an education system that is constructed on pre-concerned political and ideological grounds is bound to be political and confrontational. Again, whether education is part of the problem or part of the solution depends on the nature, purpose, function and role of the state educational policies.

6.3 The Purpose of Education: Its Nature and Role in Balochistan

In Balochistan, the nature, role, form and purpose of education have been shaped in ways that have been prone to many errors. On the other hand, it is a controlling education system that hides the identity, history, culture, languages, and socio-economic conditions of the nations, such as the Baloch. From Pakistan’s educational policies towards Balochistan, one
can see that education is part of the problem in two ways: 1) education fails to care for the people of Balochistan; and 2) it is a tool used to control the Baloch people.

As mentioned in the previous two chapters, 4 and 5, the purpose of education in Pakistan is to create good, loyal Muslim Pakistanis. Many scholars and interviewees claim that the education policies, curricula and textbooks have all been used simply to promote and project this type of narrative. The policy-makers have not hesitated to falsify history whenever it has suited this particular purpose. Their narrative of Bangladesh’s freedom is one such example. The fact of the matter is that the Bengal was separated due to the weakness of the political elite in Pakistan (Kokab and Abid, 2013: 1). The failure of the Pakistani political system and leadership led to the disintegration of the country; however, according to Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur in his interview, India was blamed for Bangladesh achieving freedom. The policy-makers hide the atrocities committed by the Pakistani military and blame India for the separation. The education they impart is aimed at making people believe in Pakistan and its invincibility and purity, as pointed out by Talpur in his interview.

Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur is a 67-year-old Baloch political activist and writer who has been associated with Balochistan’s Independence movement for many decades. Since it was not possible to meet him in person, the interview was conducted via e-mail exchanges in 2014. He taught Baloch refugees in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992 and argues that the nature of the education that Pakistan imparts and delivers can only aggravate the conflict. This is because it is entirely at odds with the ground reality. It talks about the glory of Islam while, in reality, people are experiencing religious fundamentalism, bigotry, fascism and brutality. It has been observed that the writer has published similar contents in a few
mainstream newspapers since then. Direct quotes from Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur in this thesis are directly taken from his interview. According to Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur,

The best way to overcome the resistance of an opponent is first to silence him so that he can neither communicate with his own kind nor relate the injustices to others. The opponent can be silenced either by physically restraining him from speaking or by denying him his language; and this latter device is equally effective. It is for this reason that Urdu was made the national language. The aim of education in Pakistan is to speed up the process of rejection of one’s culture and history by the nations it subjugates, and these results in a loss of identity for those learning in its schools. Once the sentiments of rejection set in, the attitude of insensitivity towards one’s national resources, culture, history and goals take a stranglehold on the person’s psyche, which not only makes it easier for the subjugator to exploit the wealth and resources of the victim country but also gives him an active abettor and conniver in the rejectionist.

Many academic experts describe the religiosity in school textbooks and in educational policies since 1947. Educational policies and textbooks have been used to project the state narrative to create a spurious sense of unity on the basis of religion and state ideology. Apart from the ideological notion of education, the state is afraid of providing democratic, rational and philosophical education to students. In Balochistan, many people believe that the state has tried to bury the rich cultural and historical heritage of Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and even Punjabi in order that the fabricated and spurious Pakistani culture and history might become acceptable to people. An example that can be quoted here concerns the Pakistani security forces’ recent raid on a book fair at Atta Shad Degree College in Turbat, Balochistan. Apart from the progressive literature, they even confiscated books by Bertrand Russell, autobiographies of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Che Guevara, and books about Baloch and Balochistan. This is what Baloch writers and online news sources have said. According to Baloch sources, it (the state) deemed these books subversive literature. Anything that deviates from the ideology of the elite is termed
subversive. This mindset cannot by its very nature allow historical truths and facts in textbooks.

Another example can be found in the same district of Turbat where many schools and English language centres were closed down, including the Dynamic English Language Teaching Academy (DELTA). Barkat Ismail is an educationalist and the Director of the DELTA School and English Language Centre, District Kech, Balochistan. I had a verbal communication with him in 2013, when he was working as Divisional Director Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). He stated that 1800 students are enrolled in the DELTA English language centre. Similarly, in another district of the Makran division of Balochistan province, many of the English language centres and girls’ schools have been threatened and closed down by an Islamic fundamentalist organisation known as Tanzeem Islami Al-Furqan. According to print and electronic media,

_Tanzeem Islami Al-Furqan_, a previously unknown organisation, which has distributed pamphlets inside private schools and English language/computer centres in the main towns of Panjgur, a district bordering Iran. These Urdu pamphlets warned school administrations to immediately stop the co-education system and asked teachers to refrain from educating girls (see Newsline, 25 June, 2014).

A total of thirty-five schools have been closed down in Panjgur district. According to one estimate, more than 25,000 students are enrolled in these institutions and around 500 teachers (both male and female) are employed therein. Shahzavar Karimzadi, a UK-based academic and Baloch activist, in his forthcoming book _Methodology of Deception_ (2015), blames the state of Pakistan for attacks on girls and private education in various districts in the province. He writes:

_Pakistan state and security forces are directly responsible for this dire situation. They fear most from educated people. In May 2014 an ISI backed Muslim fundamentalist group (Al-Furqan) in Panjgur, in eastern occupied Balochistan, distributed a leaflet threatening all private girls schools to shut down otherwise they_
would deal with them according to the worst consequences as prescribed in the Quran. Subsequently, all girl schools in Panjgur were closed down for an unspecified time (Karimzadi, 2015b: 131–32).

Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur argues that “the Baloch should acquire what colonisers call subversive education because the education that colonisers provide can only pollute minds and blunt the will for liberty”. 44 People of other provinces gladly serve the government after education but the government is unsure about Baloch loyalties and therefore systematically excludes them. Like many other writers, Karimzadi also describes the nature of education in Balochistan as colonial. He argues that:

One of the most devastating and long-lasting effects of colonialism has been on the state of education in Balochistan. All colonial powers that ascended to political power in Balochistan have purposely kept this sector incredibly underdeveloped. At present, in both western and eastern occupied Balochistan, the standard of education is the lowest not only within the boundaries of Iran and Pakistan but in the whole world. In eastern occupied Balochistan, girls probably have the lowest literary rate in the world. The rate of education hardly reaches double figures among Baloch women on this side of Balochistan (Karimzadi, 2015b: 131).

Furthermore:

One area where the colonising establishments have directed their greatest effort has been to keep the Baloch people in ignorance. They have tried their utmost to keep them from having a true knowledge of their history, culture and resources. By design they have put every imaginable hurdle against conducting independent and reliable research on Balochistan’s environment, history, economy, society, language, culture, music, and political and legal rights. The occupying states have been resolute in their intention to prevent Baloch society from enjoying development (Karimzadi, 2015b: 193–94).

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44 It should be mentioned here that the writer participated in my research as an interviewee and gave me a written interview via e-mail. I have noticed that he published a few materials in different online newspapers later. Thus, I have quoted him in a few places in my research from his interview comments rather than the published articles.
Moreover, not only academic experts but also the Baloch nationalist leaders and students consider the nature of education to be colonial. Salam Sabir mentions in his book *Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Ka Interviews* (Interviews with Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri) that someone asked a veteran Baloch nationalist leader, Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, why he has closed around 47 government schools in the Kahan area in Balochistan. Khair Baksh Marri replied:

> I wish I could destroy a few schools where the Baloch people are colonised and being taught in favour of Punjab. They are taught only to memorise like parrots. I salute those people who are able to do this job of destroying the colonial education system. However, no one can deny the fact that education is an important element of life. No nation can progress without education. This is a universal fact. By education I mean a proper education and quality education, not state-sponsored education. I am not in favour of the Pakistani or Punjabi education system for the Baloch people. I am against those schools that force us to be Pakistani (Sabir, 2011: 71–72).

As well as academics and nationalist leaders, Baloch writers and bureaucrats also think that education in Balochistan is colonial. According to Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch, Director General (DG) Special Education, Government of Balochistan, Pakistan is a colonial product of the British. Therefore, during the colonial rule the masters wanted to create clerks and obedient servants through education. Unfortunately, the ruling elite in Pakistan or the Pakistani ruling elite have tried to follow the same aims of colonial education since the creation of Pakistan. A majority of scholars seem perturbed by the specified purpose of education in Pakistan or in Balochistan. Dr. Shazawar Ali says that education in Balochistan is non-existent. It is shaken and ruined, degenerating, de-culturing and dehumanising human beings. He further argues that this education system is generating not only conflict but also many other things, such as passiveness and idleness. He specifically describes how education in Balochistan is uprooting the Baloch from its culture, language, history and heroes at any cost.
Similarly, other non-Baloch scholars reject the existing educational system in Pakistan too. One of them is K. K. Aziz, a prominent Pakistani scholar based in the United Kingdom. In his book *Murder of History* he states the following about Pakistan educational textbooks, describing

[T]he various ways in which history has been manipulated, polluted, ill-used and trampled underfoot. Every means of destruction has been employed to achieve the purpose. There are plain lies, things which have absolutely no existence in reality or fact. There are deviations of all kind: lapses, flaws, self-deception, wishful thinking, subjective views, warped notions, loose arguments, pre-conceived ideas, parochialism, superficiality, misjudgement, disbelief, oversight, slips of pen, inattentiveness, and aberrations of every variety. There are mists of errors and eccentricity which conceal the facts. There is a general blankness of mind which wallows in ignorance. The adult reader of these textbooks can only stand and stare at the drift, shift and swing away from the truth, and slowly sink into a state of mental numbness (Aziz, 1993a: 121).

In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), Paulo Freire describes ‘The Banking Concept of Education’. Banking Education is about the traditional style of forcing and lecturing. The traditional style of teaching is not interactive, and questions are not allowed. Students accept everything that is taught. These ways of teaching make students passive and uncritical. According to Freire’s banking concept of education, the teacher teaches, and students are taught. The teacher knows everything, and the students are mere subjects. The teacher thinks, and the students have no option but to agree with the teacher’s thoughts. The teacher chooses and enforces his or her point of view. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher.

According to *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), oppression exists. Oppression is the exercising of an authority that is unjust and cruel. It is about complete control of one’s actions, thoughts and desires - complete control of one’s freedom. Freedom is a myth for an oppressed person, who accepts the cruel reality of oppression rather than looking into its cause. The causes may be economic, social or otherwise, and they keep people oppressed.
It is important to focus on oppression, because oppression in any form results in dehumanisation. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* was published in the early seventies, at the time of decolonisation when former colonies of Latin America, Asia and Africa were becoming autonomous states. Decolonisation is an important subject of the book.

Freire criticised the banking education system and called it an undemocratic way of learning and an undemocratic way to glorify a country. Democracy is about raising one’s voice. It is about freedom of expression. However, the banking education system lacks freedom of thought and action, resulting in oppressive attitudes and practices in society. In many countries, including Pakistan, the oppressed people, such as the Baloch, have been alienated. As a result, they do not have control of their own thoughts and creativity. Thus, people become alienated from their own lives. Freire was concerned about oppression in general, but for the *pedagogy of the oppressed*, the main concern is oppression in education. Pakistan is one of those countries where people are oppressed, and they do not have control of their educational freedom.

Statistics, experts’ views and empirical research suggest that the government is either unable or unwilling to provide high-quality and secular education (at all levels) to the Baloch people. It seems, from the above, that the controlling education system is a vital condition if the Pakistani State is to achieve its purposes. As highlighted in the nature and purpose of education, one might say that the state wants to control the Baloch people by limiting their access to education (see Chapter 4) and promoting the ideological inclination of the elite in textbooks (see Chapter 5).
6.4 The Lies and the Ills: Status of Education in Balochistan

Although Pakistan as a country is herself far behind in terms of her international commitment to fulfil the basic educational needs of the country (chapter 4), education in Balochistan is worse, in terms of quality and quantity, than in the rest of the Pakistan. For instance, the Education for All (EFA) target, which was set to be achieved by 2015, will not be achieved in Pakistan as a whole, according to the EFA Global Monitoring Report. Moreover, Balochistan is the most neglected province and will suffer even more in its education sector. Adult illiteracy in Pakistan is expected to reach ‘an appalling 51 million by 2015’ (UNESCO, 2014), of whom ‘65% will be females’. As a percentage of the population, it will be highest in Balochistan. In answer to the more specific question on Balochistan, Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur says that education in Balochistan has been systematically and wilfully left in tatters. Literacy rates and standards are very low. With regard to the availability of libraries in primary schools and functioning computer labs in schools, Balochistan is far behind the other provinces in the country. Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur, in his written interview referring to the ASER (2013) report, argues that

[F]unctional toilets are available in 86.4 per cent of primary schools in Punjab, 56.7 per cent in KPK, 49.6 per cent in Sindh and 16.6 per cent of schools in Balochistan. As many as 80.5 per cent of primary schools in Punjab have boundary walls, as compared to 65.9 per cent in KPK, 63.2 per cent in Sindh and 24.7 per cent of primary schools in Balochistan.

Since 1947, when Pakistan came into existence, education has remained a battlefield of political struggle rather than being used for the capacity-building of the people. This picture is clear from the fieldwork data I have used in chapter 4 and this chapter, including experts’ views and government statistics. Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur mentions that capacity-building proceeds when states have no doubt about their ability to survive. According to him, “a country like Pakistan, which always seems to be in crisis and is
slowly becoming a failed state, tries to survive through projection of its narrative and, therefore, education becomes a part of political struggle”.

I asked Talpur the following question: “In your opinion, do people in Balochistan in general and the Baloch in particular have satisfactory and equal access to education”? He replied, “No, they do not have equal access because education apartheid is practised vis-à-vis Balochistan”. He says that the “education apartheid from which Balochistan suffers becomes even more evident when the allocations for Islamabad are compared, because this comparison nullifies the population-difference argument”. The two top beneficiaries of the Higher Education Commission’s (HEC) largesse in the capital are the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) and Comsats Institute of Information Technology (CIIT). The HEC discrimination against Balochistan has been further reinforced since its inception, claims Talpur. He states that “the Balochistan University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), Khuzdar, has received Rs 284 million (eight projects) in 10 years but Lahore’s University of Engineering and Technology was granted Rs 8,361 million (23 projects)”.

Kaleem Ullah Bareach, a historian, mentioned during his interview in Quetta, Balochistan, that since 2002 the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) has sent around ten thousand Pakistani students to study for PhDs overseas. One may be surprised to learn that only a hundred such scholarships were given to students from Balochistan. He also mentions that, of these hundred students, only 40 Baloch and Pashtuns were awarded scholarships, with the remainder being given to Punjabi settlers. He claims that, according to the federal quota formula, 960 scholarships should be reserved for Balochistan province.

It is clearly mentioned here and in chapter 4 that the state does not care about giving the Baloch people an education. Conflict theorists identify higher education as a means by
which the upper class maintains its higher economic and social status over lower social groups (Collins, 1971). In terms of higher education, Balochistan presents an even worse picture. An interview was conducted with Siddiq Baluch, a prominent Baloch journalist, who believes that there is a reason for keeping Baloch away from higher education. He says that all qualified and educated Baloch are declared dangerous and untrustworthy in Pakistan. “An educated Baloch has the potential to understand the world and the subtlety of exploitation by neo-colonists” argued by Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur in his written interview in 2014. According to him, “the systematic policy of keeping the Baloch illiterate” has relegated them to the backwaters of literacy. Furthermore, the “Establishment knows that the best way of keeping people enslaved is to keep them illiterate”.

Similarly, it is argued by Carina Jahani, in State Control and its Impact on Language in Balochistan, that “The State, i.e. the ruling elite, may desire to keep the Baloch uneducated and unable to participate in modern political discourse, but that is definitely no longer the desire of a majority of the Baloch” (Jahani, 2005: 156). She argues these points in the contexts of both Pakistan and Iran, where, according to her, educational opportunities for the Baloch people are very limited. Literacy rates are very low, and girls’ education is even worse than boys’ education. According to her observations, despite these limited resources and facilities the state of education is gradually improving. The educated enslaved will rebel and demand their rights and liberty. Moreover, people understand that education will speed up their attainment of liberty.

As was highlighted in chapter 4, education in Balochistan is lagging behind in terms of shortages of schools and teachers, low literacy rates, inadequate budgets, and poor quality and quantity of education. Major problems including high drop-out rates, multi-faceted
problems of girls’ education, vastness of the territory and other issues were discussed by the Secretary of Education, Government of Balochistan, in conversation with the researcher. The Secretary of Education, Munir Ahmed Badini, admits that the problems of education in Balochistan schools and colleges are numerous. He acknowledged many issues in Balochistan’s education system. In his view, all the problems are due to structural flaws in education policies for the Baloch and Balochistan. Being a Baloch as well as Secretary of Education, he wants to improve the state of education in Balochistan but feels helpless to do so.

He further mentions that the basic problem is the politicisation of educational policies. There is a lack of government will to solve the underlying problems. According to him, policies are centralised and represent specific aims of the state rather than the needs of the Baloch people. It can be argued that the state controls the Baloch people by excluding and marginalising them. One area of policy is systematically applied in education. For these reasons, textbooks are systematically revised and shaped to ignore the Baloch people and represent the ideological notion of the state.

6.5 Annihilating the Baloch History, Language and Culture

Many scholars believe that curricula, textbooks, and education policies in Pakistan have served to create and control submissive followers. The element of care evidenced by the creation of opportunities for the people is absent. The interviewees were asked the question, “Do you think the Baloch people along with their history and culture have been adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the country”? The majority of them, such as Kaleem Ullah Bareach, Qaisar Jamali, and Atique-ur-Rehman, simply replied ‘No’. Abdul Rahman Buzdar, Secretary of Fisheries (at the time of the interviews)
in 2013, who has served as a Section Officer and Additional Secretary Education, Government of Balochistan, argues that the Baloch culture and history have not been fairly represented in the education system primarily because the medium of instruction is not Baloch. Balochi is the language of Baloch people living in various countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Jahani, 2013: 154). She mentions:

Balochi is spoken in southwestern Pakistan, in Balochistan Province, by smaller populations in Punjab and Sindh, and by a large number of people in Karachi. It is also spoken in southeastern Iran; in Sistan and Balochistan province; by who have settled in the northeastern Khorasan and Golestan provinces; by smaller communities in Afghanistan (particularly in Nimruz Province); in the Gulf States (especially in Oman and the United Arab Emirates); in the Mari region in Turkmenistan; in India and East Africa; and nowadays, also by immigrant Baloch in North America, Europe, and Australia (Jahani, 2013: 154).

Karimzadi (2015b: 27) states:

Baloch have been denied the right to use and develop their language. Two other languages, Farsi and Urdu, have been imposed on the Baloch people. The restriction on the free use of their language has debilitated the cultural development of the Baloch nation. Right from the inception of colonial rule in Balochistan the colonial states have systematically targeted Balochi art, music, civic institutions, library and learning institutions, museums and cultural centers, recreation and sport centers. The final blow in dismantling of the whole Baloch identity and homeland were the creation of the artificial boundaries of Iran and Pakistan.

Moreover, all the textbooks are geared to represent the state narrative which advocates religion and a spurious Pakistani identity. All the heroes and stories are either those of post-1947 persons or those of the Mughal and pre-Mughal rule era. There are examples of foreign invaders, such as Arab, Afghan, Turkish and Mughal, who are glorified as heroes in the various textbooks of the Balochistan Board. Dr. Shazawar Ali, during his interview, says that the heroes of the state are imported ones. They are neither Baloch nor from Balochistan. None are from the rest of Pakistan either. For example, Mohammad Bin
Qasim, Mohmood Gaznavi, Khalid bin Waleed, Aurangzeeb Alemgeer, Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali, and Shahab-ud-deen Gori are all outsiders.

One can argue that this may be the nature of the religious state. For example, being Muslim does not mean not being Baloch or any other ethnicity. In a wider context, the nature of the Pakistani state is about the glorification of Islamic figures rather than its own ethnic nations. Everything is borrowed from outside, including culture, language and ideology. Pakistan had in fact brought Arabs, Turko-Mongols and others together for the sake of the creation of a new identity, i.e. *Pakistaniat*. It is clear that the essence of the textbooks is extremism and fanaticism. The content includes *Jihad*, conquerors, anti-Western feelings, and bigotry. On the other hand, the emphasis is on such themes as ‘Pakistan is a fortress of Islam’ and ‘Pakistani people are defenders of the faith’. Karimzadi (2015b: 22) goes on to say:

> Human history is littered with invasions by powerful nations, groups or tribes leading to the painful subjugation of others. The undemocratic view perceives this as a natural order. Their invasions are glorified and the leaders of invasion, the plunderers and mass killers are held in high esteem and presented as historical heroes. To this very day the name of Alexander III of Macedon (356-323BC) is followed by the adjective ‘The Great.’ Those who conquered and pillaged much of America, Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, who subordinated many nations and gave free rein to unconstrained power, are still remembered as brave victors.

The Baloch are represented negatively, like ‘backward’ people and ‘nomads’. The killers and plunderers, on the other hand, are projected as ‘great’ conquerors. For example, the people from the rest of the country came to teach the Baloch how to be civilised. This is the post-partition Pakistani mindset which exists to inculcate the Baloch generation because their elders are nomads, illiterate and backward. This is a colonial mindset in the Pakistani elite which perceives itself as more civilised than and superior to other ethnic nationalities in the country. Inferiority complexes develop when people from other
provinces arrive with a negative approach and a superior mindset. Their high-handed and superior approach is part of a project to educate Baloch people or the people of Balochistan. They carry out this project through radio, television, syllabuses, educational textbooks, poetry, music, culture, and mainstream print and electronic media.

The majority of the respondents in this research agreed that the Pakistani state is afraid to give a proper education to the Baloch people. In reality, Pakistan is not a one-nation country with one culture, language and civilisation. There is in fact no one Pakistani nation and nationalism. It is clear that Pakistan is a collection of different nations, such as the Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi, Punjabi and others. The people living therein have nothing in common, and policy-makers have no clear education policies and educational system to accommodate the ethnic diversity of the country. The aim of education is to teach hatred of other people and nations to forge an invented nation. Dr. Shazawar Ali talks about Balochistan education texts and says that they evidently understand that every nation has its own language and culture that must be respected. One textbook claims the following:

The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, also supported the Pakistan movement and when Quaid-e-Azam came to Balochistan, the Khan extended every possible help and encouragement to him. As a result the Congress was almost liquidated. When a referendum took place in Balochistan, the members of Shahi Jirga as well as the non-official councillors of Quetta Municipal Committee unanimously voted for inclusion in Pakistan (for classes IX–X: page, 43).

Interestingly, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, himself rejects this notion in his auto–biography Inside Balochistan (1975). This may be why Siddiq Baluch, a writer and journalist, opines that the textbooks are full of lies and are chauvinistic towards other cultures, religions and histories. According to him, Pakistani education has destroyed the history of not only the Baloch but also other nations such as its neighbour, India. Similarly, at the time of the creation of Pakistan, the war was with the British, but the state ideology
and textbooks declared war on Hindus, not the British. It is a fact that people in the united India fought alongside Hindus against the British. In fact, if we look at pre-partition Muslim League politics in India, the Muslim League never fought against the British. The Muslim League had close connections with the British and was in conflict only with Hindus and the All Indian National Congress. Even Muslim leaders were not concerned about British rule; they only wanted to escape Hindu dominance.

In Balochistan, the state wanted to use education to impose a new culture, which is an *Islami* (Islamic) culture, as expressed by Dr. Shazawar Ali during an interview with the researcher. However, this is not a new religion at all. The Baloch are Muslim by faith and have a sort of Islamic culture. Pro-Pakistani right-wing historians and scholars agreed upon the creation of a specific culture, to be called a Pakistani culture. They wanted to implement a certain type of education to create *Pakistaniat* to reflect an Islamic nation. The inhabitants of Pakistan have cultures and histories stretching back thousands of years. Every nation has its own way of life, including culture. Siddiq Baluch says that any attempt to dispose of an existing culture and create a new nationalism of *Pakistaniat* through educational propaganda is unacceptable. Hence, education textbooks are used as a controlling system.

The aim is to root out regional languages and create a *Tasawry-i-Pakistan* (idea of Pakistan). It is the universal right of the people of every nation to be taught in their mother tongue, and the textbooks should include their heroes and history. However, education in Pakistan means *Ak Komi-tasawar* (one-nation idea). This aim cannot be adopted by the Baloch, claims Ali Rehman (his fictitious name). He says that this belongs to a certain people, while our culture already inherently exists. We cannot adopt something that opposes our existence through indoctrination by the state education.
It is worth mentioning that, apart from the subject of Islamic education, the science subjects are saturated with texts of Islamic education and religion. Here, it is very interesting to observe that, in addition to Islamic education (which is compulsory for any degree), other subjects in science and social studies contain a huge amount about religion. The science books contain religion. For example, they speak of Islamic physicists, Islamic chemists and Islamic biologists and give many examples and names of those declared to be Islamic scientists, such as Muhammad al-Fazari, Al-Khwarzami, Abu-al-Biruni, Ibn al-Haytham, Omar Khyyam and many others. Similarly, in English textbooks, many of the personalities represent the religious ideology. The idea behind this is the oneness of God and Muslims as an *Ummah* (one nation), as claimed in a textbook:

Starting in Arabia, Islam rapidly spread into Iran, Syria, Iraq, North Africa, Spain and India. Along with the preaching of faith, the Muslims established great Muslim Empires in these lands. So long as the Muslims acted upon Holy Quran and Hadis in these countries, their empires remained strong and stable but when they neglected them, deterioration set in. They forgot God’s Command. Hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah and do not separate (Textbook for class VII, Balochistan Board, 2012: 31).

Here, one notes how the textbook glorifies invasion, rule by outsiders, and plunder. In this education system, students are taught to break away from their native culture and forget their language and history. This education alienates every individual from their simple human status as members of their societies and nations. In this regard, Karimzadi argues:

The entire media and education in Balochistan is controlled by the occupying states. The Baloch people are prevented from using their mother tongue in their homeland. Instead they are compelled to speak in the languages of their occupiers. This policy puts Baloch children at once at a disadvantage. This discriminatory policy gets deeper when Baloch students are deprived of their culture, moral codes and history. Baloch history is obliterated totally and in its place there is a made-up farcical distorted history that has no base in Baloch past and present. The chief aim of this fictitious history is to naturalise colonialism in Balochistan. In their made-up history, the Baloch are described as the victims of their own follies - as if the causes of all Baloch problems are the Baloch themselves. Lurking beneath this ill-founded vision is the argument that by taking over the Baloch homeland and ruling
them, the colonial states have served the Baloch at their own cost. The invasion of Balochistan is seen as an act of kindness and generosity on the part of the invaders! (Karimzadi, 2015b: 279).

Conflict theory scholars claim that the role of school is to create inequality in society and ‘false consciousness’. Schools mentally prepare and guide students to accept their failure as a consequence of their lower status (Ballantine and Spade, 2007 and 2015). According to conflict theorists, the term ‘false consciousness’ can be traced back to the ideas of Karl Marx. This refers to school as an institution. They argue that education maintains the status of the elite, their dominant culture and their role in society (Collins, 1971).

In Balochistan the system of education is based on a centralised bureaucratic structure and is shaped by the state to represent the myths of state ideology. The ideology of the Pakistani state is to preserve the supremacy of the ruling elite and their language, culture and history. In essence, this is the conclusion drawn by most Baloch academics and experts. Similarly, it is one of the core arguments of conflict theorists that education maintains the ideas and status of the dominant class (see Ballantine and Spade, 2015; Collins, 1971). In the same way, the Baloch experts examine education in Balochistan within the context of subjugation, annihilation of free thinking, monopoly of expropriation, and the lies and ills of the ruling elite.

In the case of Balochistan, conflict theory is the most suitable paradigm for describing the reality of the people’s existence. Baloch are marginalised and excluded from progress, development and a reasonably sound education. They face discrimination through limited access to educational opportunities, shortages of teachers and schools, insufficient funds, poor record-keeping and exclusive educational policies. Therefore, the Baloch masses, particularly students, believe that their schools are laboratories in which Baloch children
are indoctrinated with the values, attitudes and ideas of the dominant nationality in the manner expressed by Siddiq Baluch during his interview in 2013.

6.6 The Inquiry of Reality: Education as a Mode of Control

Several theories on education and conflict have been proposed to explain the dynamic, such as relative deprivation, or the feeling of being excluded from social, political or economic benefits. These theories also highlight the process of heterogeneity between two groups and the process of homogeneity within the groups, including religion, language and tribal affiliation (see Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009: 97–99). Most importantly, however, these theories ignore education as a mode of control. Functionalist theory also overlooks the controlling aspect of education. One strand of literature deals with the relationship between education and conflict. Therefore, this research deals not only with the causal relationship between education and conflict, or the politics of education, but also with education as a mode of control. It also provides a theoretical framework for the case of the Balochistan conflict in Pakistan. Baloch have experienced the state education and its policies, or the lack of them. Either way, they see how it serves the state to dominate the people. The Baloch people and their representatives explain that everyday life for them continues to be one of suffering, characterised by severely limited access to education.

Consequently, the Baloch masses, including young people, feel resentment against the political establishment that has imposed such a system on them. They blame the government for both the poor supply of education and the indoctrination of children with religious ideologies in the schools and colleges. Aslam (2011) does not blame the government alone for failing to address the grievances of the people. She states that the culture of greed encouraged by the Baloch tribal (Sardars) structure is also responsible for
the lack of education in the province. This is indeed a contributory factor to the low standard of state education in Balochistan. However, a few scholars reject this notion that the Sardari system or tribal structure has contributed greatly to Balochistan’s poor educational situation. Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur, in his interview, argues that the state blames the Sardars, but Makran has no Sardars and yet still suffers from the same policies. The Makran region of Balochistan is free of the Sardari system, but the state and its establishment have closed down many of its schools recently.

Having said this, education as a mode of control foments conflict in Balochistan. Low investment in education and a deteriorating educational system cause poverty and inequality in society, which will lead to hostility and instability as the exploited try to express their grievances. This point is connected to state greed and the Baloch grievances. In Balochistan, poverty and inequality are evident from various perspectives, such as level of income, earnings, education and socio-economic status of the Baloch and non-Baloch. It has been mentioned in previous chapters that poor education in Balochistan has created a skills gap that is directly or indirectly connected to the discrimination against the Baloch at various levels. As a result of these grievances, society finds itself in a chaotic state, thus increasing the probability of civil conflict (see Sambanis, 2001; Collier et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Pakistani education aims to control the Baloch people, because both the Baloch and the state have already decided that their relationship is not viable. Educational policies aim only to provide education for a few people in certain areas while retaining control of society. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that, through education, the Pakistani State applies its policy of divide and rule. In the meantime it pretends that the Baloch do not want education. Dr. Shazawar Ali argues that the purpose of education in Pakistan is to
serve only the ruling establishment interests. It has been the tool of the rulers to exploit the common people. Education is about ‘control’ and only ‘control’. This is a mixed education of a religio-tribal nature shaped by the state and used as a tool to control the people. Subsequently, it is a scheme to divide and rule (Karimzadi, 2015b). More specifically, Karimzadi, speaking of Balochistan’s education, states:

In its place they have instituted a culture of hypocrisy, deception, corruption, false promises and religious hatred. Educational institutions are converted to training centres for the art of deception and religious fundamentalism. However, one of the policies in Balochistan that has been upheld consistently is the scarcity of proper education (Karimzadi, 2015b: 278).

Suppressive and discriminatory state-run policies have led to the stirring of student politics in educational institutions such as schools, colleges, and universities on various student political platforms. Dr. Hafeez Baloch argues that the intermittent army operations and lack of government attention to provincial socio-economic development have created a sense of deprivation amongst the Baloch youth. They therefore have no other option but to seize their rights through strong political mobilisation and agitation, both on and off campus. Bansal (2010), supporting this argument, posits that, had there been an equal playing field for the Baloch in national policy and economy, there would not have been such radical political feelings and agitation amongst the Baloch youth.

The Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) was founded in 1967 in Balochistan. It has been a strong political platform for Baloch students across Pakistan. The BSO has provided a space for Baloch students to mobilise and carry out student politics in the province mentioned by Dr. Hafeez Baloch. Dr. Baloch maintains that the same organisation has also been a fertile ground for the development of political leadership for mainstream Baloch nationalist politics. The BSO is now split into several factions. Each faction is pursuing a different political line. For instance, BSO Azad was formed by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch and
is now headed by Bashir Zaib. Banuk Kareema Baloch, a female student activist, is the senior vice-chairperson of the organisation. They are demanding independence and will therefore settle for nothing less than the separation of Balochistan from the state of Pakistan.

Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch, a Marxist, who was the Chairman of the BSO during his student life, further argues that the BSO (M), another faction of the BSO led by Mohiuddin Baloch, is affiliated to the Balochistan National Party (Mengal). Another section of the BSO has a strong affiliation with the National Party (NP). NP is the mainstream Baloch nationalist party. It believes in federation and has a political ambition of achieving political rights within the framework of federation. In other words, this party does not demand the separation of Balochistan from the federation of Pakistan. This section of BSO has adopted a smooth approach to national and provincial politics. It centres its activities largely on academic issues and other student affairs within educational institutions.

Baloch students are aged between 12 and 27, attend various educational institutions (schools, colleges and universities), and form the membership of these organisations at local, regional or provincial levels. Students belonging to BSO Azad tend to support the Baloch guerrilla movement for the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s poor education system is nevertheless providing an educated workforce for militant organisations in Balochistan.

Several writers believe that the fragmentation of BSO reflects the tribal characteristics of Baloch society in which major tribes such as the Marri, the Bugti and the Mengal tend to

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45Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch is a separatist leader and former president of the BSO. He was abducted by security forces in 2005, with a few other Baloch leaders. He was released on bail after one year by an anti-terrorist court. Dr Nazar then joined Baloch guerrilla fighters and is now believed to be the head of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), an alliance of resistance organisations, which is fighting a guerrilla war against the state of Pakistan.
retain their separate organisations in order to maintain their tribal loyalties. Although these organisations differ in their organisational structure, command and control, they pursue the same goal as the other freedom fighter groups. The all share a common objective, which is an independent Balochistan.

Similarly, the Balochistan National Movement (BNM), currently presided over by Chairman Khalil Baloch, is a Baloch Nationalist party that has been struggling for an independent Balochistan, which they consider to be under occupation by the Pakistani state. In 2004 the BNM was redefined mainly by its then Chairman, Gulam Mohammed Baloch, who believed that peaceful struggle through democratic means would not achieve the Baloch aspiration of an independent Balochistan. Therefore, it focused its politics on a single agendum of “struggle until the independence of Balochistan” through peaceful political means but without participation in electoral processes administered by the state of Pakistan. The BNM believes that the Pakistani parliament and other state departments are parts of the occupier state and the Baloch should not participate in parliamentary politics under the domination of Pakistan.

Leaders of the BNM come from various Baloch student organisations. They were mostly ideologically close to the Baloch national struggle in their student organisations’ platforms during their student life. After the completion of their studies, many of the young people join either the BNM or other Baloch separatist organisations. For example, the Chairman of BNM, Khalil Baloch, remained an active member of BSO during his student life. The BNM, a peaceful political party, believes in humanity and international rules and wants to solve the Baloch Problem under the UNO Constitution, as claimed by its members in various discussions with the researcher. Although the workers of the BNM do not directly participate in the on-going armed struggle in Balochistan against the occupation, they
maintain a bold and unconditional political support for those organisations that are engaged in armed struggle. It is worth pointing out that the BNM is a purely political organisation, and although it takes a radical stance on Baloch rights and Balochistan’s independence from the Pakistani occupation it does not have a militant wing.

The Baloch National Movement has a long history in the Baloch struggle, going back to the 1980s when the party was first founded by a group of seasoned as well as young and energetic Baloch politicians. Initially, the party had had a single political objective. This was for the restoration of Baloch rights and the termination of Pakistan’s occupation of Balochistan. However, in 1988, when Pakistan entered yet another quasi-democratic phase, the party participated in elections. Nevertheless, a strong cadre within the party sensed that it had moved away from its original manifesto and programme of Balochistan liberation, which indeed was not possible through parliamentary processes. Therefore, the same cadre under the leadership of Gulam Mohammed Baloch reinvigorated the old spirit of the party and focused its political struggle for a just, independent, free and democratic Balochistan where peace, tranquillity, equality and humanity might flourish under the tenets of a liberal and secular political system.

Now, we must consider a logical question that needs a brief but lucid examination: To what extent might formal education in Balochistan be held responsible for student activism and resistance? Formal education in Balochistan is structured in a way that negates the rights of other nations. However, since the formal education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is highly biased against the Baloch culture, history and social structure, it is a potential cause of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. I have discussed the politics of the representation of Baloch culture, language and history in the government-run public schools in chapter 5. The student organisations, which are active in
educational institutions, seize upon the contents of the syllabus to support their arguments that the state has engineered the education syllabus in order to steamroller the Baloch identity. This persuasive assertion by student organisations incites the Baloch students to engage in student activism and, subsequently, mass resistance.

The leadership of BSO has trained its members and makes extensive use of study circle meetings, magazines and booklets as a part of the ideological training. This provides an opportunity for Baloch students (both male and female) to receive ideological education in reaction to state ideology. In the politics of resistance, this is the source of a constant supply of cadres for Baloch human rights, pressure groups and liberation organisations. The state is conscious of the threat posed by these student organisations. It has retaliated coercively and violently in order to crush and dismantle the student organisations in educational institutions. Dr. Hafeez Baloch argues that the state apparatus applies various coercive means: killings, disappearances, intimidation, torture and the economic blockage of students, teachers, and other professionals active in radical politics in order to crack down on the organisational structure of the BSO both on and off campus. This indiscriminate state retaliation is used by the student leadership to support its radical stance. They argue that, since the state is determined to crush even the legitimate political struggle for Baloch rights, the Baloch have no option but to adopt militancy as the only way forward in the struggle to safeguard Baloch rights.

At this juncture, a very important point warrants investigation. If students are actively involved in politics, particularly radical politics, during their student lives, and use educational institutions as fertile grounds for their political activism, thereby affecting academic activities through strikes, agitation and mobilisations, what might be the ultimate
academic outcomes for these institutions? This question was put to various interviewees during this research.

Balochistan has a history of army operations that go back to the initial years of the creation of Pakistan. Kaleem Ullah Bareach also mentions that the current one, which began in 2002 and was still on-going during the writing of this thesis, intensified in 2006 when Nawab Akbar Bugti, former Governor and Chief Minister of Balochistan and a veteran Baloch nationalist leader, was killed in a military operation. The Nawab Bugti assassination enraged Baloch students across Balochistan. They reacted violently, setting fire to university and college buses, buildings and other infrastructure.

This classic example of mass reaction illustrates how easily educational institutions have become victims in Balochistan. Students’ anger has been demonstrated in many ways in the past during armed resistance. On all those occasions the violent reaction was confined to the rural areas and mostly in tribal regions in Balochistan. The educational institutions situated in cities and towns were not the prime targets in the past. In recent years, the violence became brutal when college and university teachers started being targeted. As a result of the sensitive security situation on university/college campuses, the government deployed military and paramilitary forces in educational institutions. This provided an excuse for the military and paramilitary personnel to crack down on student political activities in order to secure the teaching community against targeted killings.

The apparent cause of the problems is of a political nature and has led to a sense of deprivation and socio-economic and political exclusion that has taken a violent course, not only engulfing the entire Baloch society but also putting the future of education in Balochistan in jeopardy. The violence in educational institutions has brought a heavy cost, as some of the most highly qualified and experienced teachers and academics have been
targeted and killed over the last two years, as noted by Jamila Qazi. Professor Jamila Qazi served as a Registrar at SBK Women’s University, Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013. I interviewed her at her residence in Quetta in 2013. She says that some of them had been living there for more than four decades and were immersed in the local culture. The majority of those who were assassinated during these years had one thing in common: they were all non-local and hailed from other provinces, especially from Punjab. The repercussions of these targeted killings are multidimensional but the main victim appears to be education, a fact that manifests itself clearly in the above findings.

It is crucial to acknowledge that the ultimate cause of the Balochistan conflict is political; however, every section of Baloch society is being affected by this conflict. Many people have been killed and wounded, most of them students, academics, professionals and ordinary people.

The recent phase of unrest that started with the murder of Akbar Bugti in 2006 took a ghastly turn when academics came under attack, many being killed and wounded. These killings had followed chain reactions. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, who is head of the History Department at Balochistan University, mentions that teachers who came from other provinces suddenly felt threatened and started applying for transfers to other provinces. According to one estimate, more than 70 faculty members of the University of Balochistan, which is the premier university in the province, have submitted transfer applications to universities situated in other provinces. This is a very large number of faculty members. A sudden and en masse departure of qualified faculty members would have a huge impact on the quality of education in the province, said Jamila Qazi.

Jamila Qazi says that, besides the universities, a large number of intermediate and degree colleges have also suffered from this state of turmoil: non-local teachers, for security
reasons, rejected postings to Baloch-populated areas. The school system, especially public sector schools, although staffed with local teachers, has also received a heavy blow over the last seven to eight years as politically motivated schoolchildren have joined routine political agitation and strikes.

She further expresses that this is a disturbing situation that has a direct impact on Balochistan’s younger generation. I agree with Qazi on a couple of details that she has rightly pointed out; however, one might disagree with her underlying narrative. For instance, she argues that the numerous closures of educational institutions, the sudden departure of qualified faculty members, the highly intolerant attitude towards other ethnic groups and a threatening environment on campuses has indeed had a long-lasting negative impact on academic life in Balochistan. The current political conflict in Balochistan has pushed the province back in every aspect of life - and it had already been lagging behind in terms of socio-economic and human resource development. Ultimately, it is predominantly education that has become the prime target. Her point concerns outsiders, the presence of whom, according to her, is inevitable.

Contrary to her argument, one might therefore conclude that a weak and dysfunctional education system that has been presided over, arguably, by biased central and provincial authorities, has produced illiterate, untrained or poorly trained human resources who are unable to compete for provincial and federal-level jobs (both public and private) and have become inclined to violence. Thus, it may be argued that, had high-quality education been provided to all people in Balochistan, irrespective of their ethnic background, the province might not have experienced insurgency after insurgency against the state over the last sixty-seven years.
One may not agree with this argument that conflict would not have occurred had there been more education in Balochistan. The simple reason is that many educated young people are involved in the Balochistan movement. Dr. Allah Nazar, founder of the BLF, is the most prominent example, and there are many others. However, I would argue that those people with better educations, degrees and jobs are not part of the armed struggle directly. Perhaps people have sympathy with the Baloch struggle, among them many of the service class.

During recent years the conflict has become increasingly bloody. The Pakistan Human Rights Commission (PHRC) has reported indiscriminate bombing and strafing by the government side, resulting in hundreds of students, doctors and civilians dead and wounded, and thousands of disappearances. The Baloch reacted and started targeting security forces, provoking a sudden mass departure of qualified teachers from Balochistan, which resulted in the long-term closure of educational institutions (HRW, 2010). This has had a negative impact on the academic environment in Balochistan, which is already lagging behind in terms of access to basic and higher education. Many of the scholars believe that the recent phenomenon of political revenge has been taken out on teachers and educational institutions that now see themselves as victims in a province where literacy is already alarmingly low and declining in terms of net primary enrolment (see HRW, 2010; ESP, 2009). Education in Balochistan is in a deplorable condition, with its low quality and poor literacy rate. Lack of education has impeded socio-economic development in Balochistan, and from this emanates a sense of deprivation, which ultimately generates conflict between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan. The former believe that the latter is solely responsible for keeping them backward socio-economically and politically. According to Karimzadi:
The introduction of correct education in Balochistan is incompatible with the colonial rule. That is why the occupying states have been targeting the most conscientious and informed Baloch. These states have killed most of those Baloch whom they considered to be aware of their democratic rights. Losing such people in such a manner, in their youth is the most critical reason for Balochistan’s severe underdevelopment, poverty and illiteracy. After all, these individuals are the progressive elements of their society. They are the thinkers who implant the seeds of freedom, democracy and prosperity in their homeland. Physically removing those who are able, who think rationally and critically, who ask for equality and freedom will only aim to push history backwards or keep it stationary (Karimzadi, 2015b: 278).

Analysing the situation since 1947, in terms of how successful the state’s controlling policies towards the Baloch students have been, it can be argued that the state has failed to achieve its aims and objectives in Balochistan compared to the other provinces. Clear examples are provided by the current insurgencies in Pakistan as a whole. It has even failed to impose the Urdu language as a symbol of the Pakistani nation. Although the state is powerful and has succeeded in specific places in particular provinces such as Punjab, the reaction and demands of the Baloch people are clear and unfulfilled to the present day. And these demands are to have their own way of life, their education in their mother tongue, and their own heroes in their books.

Consequently, Baloch youth, particularly university students, started attacking institutions: burning buses, destroying buildings, disrupting libraries and attacking non-local academics. These disgruntled students’ awareness of the consequences of such acts may be related to the formal education system they received before enrolling in universities for graduate and postgraduate courses. That is because the formal education system in the province is heavily biased against the Baloch culture, language, history and, above all, its national identity, causing the Baloch youth to feel that the state’s education policy is designed to erode Baloch identity, as mentioned in chapter five. Hence, when the same youths reach the graduate/postgraduate stage, they show their dissatisfaction in a violent
manner against the state of Pakistan using the BSO and other student organisations’ political platforms. This violent trend among resentful students will have dire consequences for Baloch education in the long run. The HRW (2010) Report and Bansal (2010) argue that, since 2008, more than 200 teachers and professors have either transferred from Balochistan or left the profession, and almost 200 others are in the process of being transferred.

The literature on education, conflict and conflict resolution clearly shows that most conflict zones are poor, weak and fragile. Two different issues are discussed in the literature. One is the notion that conflict impacts on education; this is empirically verifiable, which is what the literature does. As has been mentioned in chapter 3, education may resolve conflict through various channels. With regard to Pakistan and Balochistan, I make no bold claim that education might resolve this conflict. In view of the education and conflict literature, it is quite another thing to claim that education will resolve conflict in the case of Balochistan. I would say that no type of education will be able to resolve this conflict unless there is a major change in Pakistan’s approach to the Baloch people. Conflict resolution in Balochistan depends on the nature of the Pakistani state and its educational policies. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2 of this research, this conflict has historical roots and political grievances as well as economic exploitation. One must be optimistic that, should the Pakistani State wish it, there will be chances for conflict resolution.

6.7 Education and Conflict Resolution in Balochistan

This research found that the control over education is adding to the existing political conflict in Balochistan through various means. Control of education (schools in particular) should not be the necessary condition for achieving the state’s goals in Balochistan.
Education must be considered a fundamental human and democratic right of the Baloch people and children rather than the state’s controlling apparatus. Thus, one can argue that education as a human development tool may contribute to conflict resolution. Human development can be measured by life expectancy, educational attainment, and purchasing power (see UNDP, 2005 and 2010; Smith, 2009). Education is an important sector in any country, along with health, economics and politics. It is one of the sectors contributing to the human development of a society, according to Mundy and Murpely (2001). These researchers state that a prosperous and developed society should consider education a major catalyst for human development. In Balochistan, education demands extensive planning and efficient resource allocation along with an effective implementation strategy. It is argued by many scholars that education in any country acts as a barometer of human development (see Mundy and Murpely, 2001). The more educated a society, the better its chances of being able to develop its human resources. Education is a driving force in human development. It decreases the level and intensity of conflict among individuals, groups and states. This might be case in Balochistan.

Duggan (1996) declares that, since the 1960s, numerous countries have seen an enormous expansion in educational facilities at all levels: primary, secondary, tertiary, technical and professional. The provision of education for children, both as a human right and as an investment in human capital, has been broadening the capacity for human development in these countries, although Duggan does not name any particular country or region. It is clear that education has been taken into account in terms of human development and rights in developed nations.

Education must be considered a fundamental right of the Baloch masses, including their children, as stated in the 1973 Constitution of the State, Article 25A. The Baloch should
not be discriminated against on the bases of their distinct identity, culture, language and way of life, as promised in educational policies. In 1948, education was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and in 1960 there was a UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (Salmi, 2000: 7-8). These declarations proclaim education to be a fundamental right of the people and it is the duty of the government to provide it. Therefore, education in Balochistan should be treated as a right of the masses.

Education should empower the Baloch people politically, socially and economically. According to the functionalist theorists, education should provide jobs, skills, training and merit. Johnson and Stewart (2007: 247) point out that education is a source of power and income in modern societies. According to them, “access to jobs depends on the kind and level of education attained and, similarly, political participation at higher levels, particularly in the civil service, depends on education”. Lack of education, poverty and other social problems are generally acknowledged as being the key causes of conflict. Educational level, as one of the human development indicators, helps to improve people’s wellbeing and income and, most importantly, empowers people socially and politically. One might argue that education, delivered by properly trained teachers, will increase the level of understanding, empowerment and skills of the population in Balochistan.

In so doing, education in the province will not only help to increase human awareness but may also be highly effective in other aspects. A well-educated individual or nation has a much higher probability of earning a good living than does a poorly educated one. Likewise, individuals in Balochistan would have longer lives and healthier living standards were they to receive a good education, compared to having limited, or zero, access to
education. For instance, educated nations and individuals have a higher purchasing power than their uneducated counterparts.

Many scholars believe that education plays a pivotal role in human development. It is conceded across the board that developed nations are better equipped to resolve their internal socio-economic and political conflicts than less-developed nations. Therefore, arguments that maintain that there is a strong relationship between education and human development may not be spurious. Education is an important factor in overcoming violent conflict, since an educated population is less likely to resort to violence (French, 2005). Thus, it can be maintained in the case of Balochistan that better education would help to resolve both national and international conflict. Among other social indicators, education is considered one of the most important in the overall development of Baloch society.

In the modern world, a nation without a sound educational base will lag far behind in every aspect of socio-economic and human development, irrespective of its natural endowments. Those who have ignored the importance of education have been left far behind in their attempts to reap the rewards of their economic opportunities. In a country such as Pakistan, where social diversity is extremely high and ethnic divisions are numerous, the pivotal role that education might play in the scaling down of social and ethnic strife is undeniable.

As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, there is educational inequality in Balochistan. There is inequality in terms of funding, training, and limited numbers of schools, colleges and professional institutions. This is connected to the inequalities in educational access, a predominant form of inequality which leads to other horizontal inequalities in income, employment and health, as well as in political participation. Therefore, educational inequalities are likely to be an important source of violent conflict. These are some of the established arguments explaining how educational inequality leads to grievances. This
research also looks at the education/conflict relationship in a different way, as seen in the previous chapter, which discussed how education has created resentment among the Baloch students. They consider these limited educational facilities as a political tool of the state apparatus. The state should revise this strategy of providing few or very few educational opportunities.

Another important aspect that must be discussed here concerns the state and its education policies. The purposes of education policies should not be political, religious or military. From Chapters 4 and 5, it can be observed that Pakistan’s educational policies are closely tied to the religious-military establishment and bureaucracy. Policies are delivered via a top-down approach and aim to inculcate state ideology and praise for military dictators as well as illegitimate rulers in Pakistan, such as Ghulam Muhammad (1951–54) and Generals Sikandar Mirza (1955–58), Ayub Khan (1958–1969), Yahya (1969–1971), Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) and, last but not least, General Musharraf (1999–2008). In chapter 4 it is made clear that all educational policies are shaped by the military rulers according to their needs. Masood Akhtar Zahid, Assistant Professor, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, criticised military dictator Zia-ul-Haq’s educational policies. About Zia, he states:

He used education as a foil and as an instrument of state control. Diversity in curriculum was discouraged in Curzonian fashion with added emphasis on uniformity and Islamicity. National Curriculum Committee of the government was tasked to review and amend the work of Provincial Committees and standardise it in cahoots with the National Educational Policy. To inculcate national fervour and patriotism among the youth, a compulsory subject of Pakistan Studies was introduced for the Secondary, Collegiate and First Degree examinations. The syllabus of history courses was revised to begin with the Arab conquest of Sind in 712 and omitting the pre-Islamic period of Indian history. As in post-revolution France, Soviet Union, and Iran, government approved text-books became a vehicle of subjective history, official nationalism, and state biases. Democracy and pluralism received hardly any support from the obscurantist ulema and their patron, General Zia (Zahid, 2011: 16).
As mentioned above, this should not be the case in the Balochistan education system. There should be inclusive education for the whole country, particularly in Balochistan where people think that their history, culture and language have been ignored by the state policy-makers. The Baloch should be taught in their own language (Balochi). This argument is supported by various participants in this research. The Baloch heroes, music, art, culture and geography must be recognised in educational textbooks. This might represent initial steps towards conflict resolution.

In Balochistan, education must be made a provincial subject in a real sense, as advocated by the 18th Constitutional Amendment.\(^{46}\) Before the 18th Amendment, the Federal Education Ministry was responsible for preparing the Curriculum, Textbooks, Policy, Planning, and National Standards. But now education has become a provincial subject. The 18th Amendment should be properly implemented in practice. But in reality, nothing has been changed in the educational curriculum, pedagogy and policies as of the completion of this research in 2015. One example can be mentioned here. On October 28, 2014 the Higher Education Commission (HEC) issued a letter to the universities in Pakistan, entitled ‘Adherence to Ideology and the Principles of Pakistan’. This letter stated:

Universities and Degree Awarding Institutions (DAIs) have a great responsibility of promoting ideology and principles of Pakistan through teaching, dialogues, meetings, conferences, formal and informal gatherings and societal discourse. Demonstrations of such rightful perceptions promote nationalism, dispel confusion and infuse beliefs and principles that bring harmony in a society, and bolster unity and performance. Regretfully, it has been observed that a few activities that are directly or indirectly hosted or sponsored by Universities or DAIs include discussions or presentations contrary to the ideology and principles of Pakistan, perhaps due to the fact that program details are not reviewed and approved discretely by the Universities/DAIs. Such instances not only tarnish the image of an institution but fortify negativism and chaos. In view of the above, we would solicit your kind support to remain very vigilant and forestall any activity that in any

\(^{46}\)The various challenges that the provinces face include “expertise, institutional and capacity issues, forging national cohesion, uniform standards for textbook development, and quality assurance” (Education for All the Plan 2011–2015: 14).
manner challenges the ideology and principles of Pakistan, and/or perspective of the Government of Pakistan thereof (HEC, No.10–1/A&C/HEC/2013/869).

Looking at this official letter from the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, it might be argued that the federal government is still unwilling to implement the 18th constitutional amendment practically. This is a clear direction of and interference in the provincial educational structure; it even tells the universities what is to be included in and excluded from curricula. Universities are the highest educational institutions, in which the government should encourage creativity, research, thoughts and various perspectives on different issues. Unfortunately, in Pakistan higher education is also controlled by certain defined principles and policies which are no different from those applied to school textbooks and the curriculum.

There are various types of educational system in Pakistan and Balochistan, but they should be uniform for everyone. Among the various types of education, the elite children have a different syllabus and education system, such as city schools, Bacon House, Little Angel, English Grammar Schools and Cadet Colleges. The upper class has nothing to do with the public education syllabus. They import the ‘A’ Level and ‘O’ Level syllabuses or others from the UK and USA. Here, one can say that education should be for all and made compulsory for every school-age child, as mentioned in the Constitution of the country. This should not remain a mere promise.

Syllabus, curriculum and teaching methodology are academic issues that determine the quality of the educational system and behaviour of the pupils. They include the objectives of syllabuses and guidelines for the preparation of textual material, teachers’ training and evaluation objectives. Under the 18th Constitutional Amendment of the state of Pakistan, the Balochistan provincial government must be given complete authority to design its
syllabus and curriculum according to its needs and local demands. In this way, education might address the educational resentment, as mentioned by various participants. Dr. Shazawar Ali is of the opinion that there are no educational policies and planning. The only policy is for the masters to remain masters and for people who are subservient to remain subservient. In Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, the education system is an abuse and an organ of exploitation. He furthers states:

Educational policies are made in air-conditioned rooms somewhere in Karachi and Islamabad according to their (elite, either local or non-local) needs. They call it a policy. The education syllabus, whatever it is, comes from above and does not represent the Baloch people. It doesn’t come from within society and for society. The State itself is based on religious ideology, so anything that is contrary to the religion is left out of the course.

As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, the Balochistan conflict is not just political or strategic – it also has a strong socio-economic dimension, which is evident from the aforementioned statistics. The vast majority of the people in the province – mainly in its Baloch-dominated central and southern regions – live below the poverty line, with virtually no or very few means of earning a living (Ahmed, 2013). They have minimal access to education, health, roads, electricity and other means of communication. Therefore, one might argue, based on the above statistics and discussion, that the Balochistan conflict is a human development issue. Balochistan is lagging far behind in terms of all human development indicators. In the other two indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI) – health and per capita income - the province performs very poorly. However, it is education that is the worst affected. The HDI is believed to improve people’s consciousness and incomes; most importantly, it provides political and socio-economic empowerment (UNDP, 2005 and 2010). Better education helps to improve the other indicators of HDI, particularly per capita income. Therefore, high-quality educational provision to all Baloch people might be
a means of producing socio-economic development, which would consequently help to scale down their grievances.

The Baloch Student Organisation’s (BSO) argument in this regard may corroborate our stance on the significance of improved HDI in conflict resolution. The BSO highlights the weak human development conditions of the Baloch in order to incite them to violence. The organisation in its close circles often cites the weak educational infrastructure in Balochistan as representative of the excesses of the federal government. To them, this weak educational infrastructure is being used as a strong weapon to keep the Baloch backward in all aspects of life. Moreover, the elite and upper middle-class Baloch youth is not attracted to student politics. The BSO and other student organisations are strictly banned from the educational institutions, such as cadet and residential colleges and city and English grammar schools where those children are educated. Baloch families with better living standards and decent income levels have their children educated at leading educational institutions both within and beyond Balochistan. Thus, they are able to compete for jobs and become part of greater society.

On the other hand, the middle or lower middle classes, who send their children to poorly run government schools, boost the membership of various student organisations including the BSO. Meanwhile, the lower class in Balochistan, who constitute virtually 60 per cent of Baloch society, cannot afford to send their children to school. Due to the lack of education and dearth of any other opportunity to seek any kind of job or engage in other commercial activity, the lower-class youth are prone to joining the militant organisations in Balochistan. This illustration underlines the centrality of education in conflict resolution in Balochistan. Here, one can argue that the state, rather than prioritising education and other social provisions in Balochistan, has opted to resolve the provincial issue through military
means, which has produced a reaction from the Baloch, particularly Baloch students, against Pakistan. However, this reaction is found largely among the “disadvantaged” class, which therefore makes it easy to understand the vulnerability of illiterate or semi-literate social groups to the overtures of militant organisations.

For any conflict resolution, such as in Balochistan, political deliberations among the stakeholders are pivotal. Naseer Dashti writes in one of the online websites, ‘The Baluch’, that the political settlement of the Balochistan conflict will be possible when a serious dialogue between both sides (the state of Pakistan and the Baloch) takes place. A capable and aware Baloch delegation, be it mainstream Baloch political parties, militant organisations or student organisations, might negotiate and settle its issues with the state. Thus, an educated Baloch nation that produces a well-trained and educated leadership is more likely to resolve its conflict with the state of Pakistan than any ill-prepared and divided Baloch leadership.

The education situation might be improved in a variety of ways, such as through government investment in education or by providing a strong system of education. According to Thyne (2006: 734), grievances might be reduced if there is investment in education. In this way, education might generate economic development and social equality. This may be one of the solutions to the problem.

According to the World Bank report, if there exists a powerful tool to reduce deprivation and address the grievances of the people, it is surely education. It can empower a nation with techniques, skills and knowledge and, thus, earnings potential, and can also help to improve the health of the nation (Aoki et al., 2002: 4). The report goes on to describe how education serves as a means by which the government can ensure peace and address other grievances in society. For example, people need to be satisfied with the infrastructure and
atmosphere in their schools. Unequal educational investment and poor infrastructure demonstrate government ineptitude, indicating that the government cares little for its people, a situation that could encourage rebellion.

I have evidence in this regard that the lack of provision of education is considered by the rebels to be a grievance, and that this is one of the reasons why they join militant groups, which foments civil war. For example, according to Brown and Hunter (2004) most of the civil conflicts in Latin America are indirectly due to governments’ and regimes’ low investment in education. This is indeed why the vast majority of children who join militant groups do so. Thyne (2006: 735) argues: “we have at least preliminary evidence indicating that the lack of social investment in repressive regimes generates grievances, which may ultimately lead to rebellion”.

Other studies directly link education, grievances, conflict, and government policies. For instance, the Sudanese government has failed to deliver sufficient educational resources to its southern region. There have been major grievances for decades, resulting in an old and on-going civil conflict. Further it can be argued that poor investment in education might be one of the reasons. Similarly, Peters and Richards (1998: 187) suggest that there is a relationship between education, conflict and grievances. They refer to various interviews with ex-fighters in Sierra Leone, who declared that they had joined militant groups because of educational grievances. They argue that “[T]ime and again interviewees return to the theme of educational aspirations” as causes for joining the fighting (Peters and Richards, 1998: 187). This generates conflict in the region.

This supports the evidence that education in Balochistan is one of the main grievances of the people. Generally speaking, Baloch people consider the lack of education their strongest grievance. This illustrates (with reference to the two arguments above) how
education has both a direct and indirect effect on these grievances, which may either foment or resolve conflict in Balochistan. This research provides a way of examining how the provision of better education might address the grievances and help to resolve the conflict. There is a need for an increase in the educational budget at primary, secondary and higher levels and greater enrolment in order to deliver high-quality education to the population; this would decrease the likelihood of conflict by addressing the grievances of the Balochistan people.

For the Baloch people, the state should provide better education, more education and a different type of education to re-address their grievances. As I have mentioned above, under the 18th Constitutional Amendment and even the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, education is compulsory and declared the birth right of all children. Every child is guaranteed free and compulsory education according to the government policies, which need to be implemented without further delay or state control.

Education in Balochistan is an instrument for acquiring the knowledge and skills required for economic development, according to the government. In Balochistan, I argued that education is a potentially powerful tool that could be used for ideological purposes. I also mentioned that the purpose of education should not be simply to render the Baloch good Muslims or patriotic Pakistanis. It is very important to the policy-makers that education in Balochistan should be unlike the existing education in its type, quality, quantity and contents. Similarly, it should not serve the purpose of a group, a community and even the state itself. Different and better education must be based on creative thinking and interactive systems of learning, and it should be an empowering tool for the people and, particularly, for the students.
Hence, a constructive and qualitative education for all in Balochistan, incorporating Baloch culture, language and national identity, may produce a human resource that discourages violence and becomes a potential hub joining the Baloch masses to mainstream society. For instance, those students, particularly children of the elite class in Balochistan, who happen to receive their education from the only cadet colleges in Balochistan and from other premier institutions around the country, are not inclined towards violence and virtually none of them supports the conflict with Balochistan. The reason for this is obvious: the formal education they receive puts them on a par with the national level, enabling them to easily compete not only for provincial-level jobs but also for a fair share of those at the centre. This illustration supports our argument that high-quality formal education in Balochistan may help to resolve conflict in the province.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

This thesis contributes to debates over the politics of education and conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan. The main question examined in this research is the following: In what ways do the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled Balochistan exacerbate the on-going conflict there? Can education offer a venue for conflict resolution in Balochistan?

The literature has been critically reviewed, emphasising the relationship between education and conflict, which has received considerable attention, not only in public discourses but also in a great deal of academic research. This research is also devoted to exploring the various dimensions of this relationship. Education appears to be a double-edged sword. It can play a major role in resolving conflict; however, it may also generate a new conflict or exacerbate an existing one. This is because socio-economic outcomes such as economic growth, the development of human capital, democratisation and the promotion of tolerance through the provision of high-quality education will help to resolve conflict. Education is used as a ‘political tool for ideological development’.

To aid an understanding of these three views on education and conflict, this research has examined different perspectives on the role of education, such as the functionalist and conflict perspectives. The former argues that education serves the purpose of care. This theory is mainly about the positive role of education. However, the latter, known as the conflict perspective on the role of education, is the opposite of the functionalist perspective. According to this theory, education is a mode of control, which may exacerbate conflict.
Conceptually, it has been clarified that education is a contested phenomenon. Functionalist theorists have ignored the possibility that education plays a controlling role. Education is about control in Balochistan. To provide an understanding of Balochistan’s education and conflict, two separate chapters discuss the role of education; does education in Balochistan enhance the wellbeing of the Baloch people or does it serve the purpose of controlling them?

This research draws on data collected during my fieldwork. Qualitative methods, such as a case-study of a specific region (Balochistan Province), in-depth interviews, visual data and observations, were used for this research. Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders were conducted. The participants were educationalists, experts, subject specialists, political commentators, and government officials. Nineteen of the twenty-eight participants were Baloch, four were Pashtun and the remainder were Punjabi and Urdu speakers (Muhajir). There were four female participants, both Baloch and non-Baloch. The reason for interviewing only four females has already been mentioned in the limitations of this project. This diversity among my interviewees provided a rich insight and different perspectives that helped me to revisit the research question of this project. The research question is briefly revisited in a different section.

7.1 Reflections and Findings

Evidence from interviews and fieldwork helped us to conduct a theoretically and empirically rich research project. In order to aid an understanding of the conflict in Balochistan, chapter 2 discusses the various dimensions of the conflict in the province. I found that the conflict in Balochistan has existed since the inception of the province within the state of Pakistan in 1947–48. In addition, different schools of thought regarding the
annexation of Balochistan by Pakistan are discussed therein. According to government officials, Balochistan joined the state of Pakistan willingly. The Shahi Jirga (Quetta Municipality Committee) had voted in favour of Pakistan in 1947, as mentioned in Chapter 2. However, the chapter showed that many Baloch nationalists argue that the State of Kalat (Balochistan) was forcibly annexed by the state of Pakistan in 1948. It has clearly discussed and distinguished between the British Balochistan and the State of Kalat, in which both schools of thoughts (the Baloch and the State) are based.

Whatever the truths of the arguments, various other reasons for the conflict in Balochistan are proposed, such as local, national and international politics, geo-politics and historical background. The discussion identified various phases of the conflict in Balochistan between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan since 1948: the first phase: 1948; the second phase: 1958-59; the third phase: 1963-69; the fourth phase: 1973–77; and the fifth phase: 2002 to the present day. Thus far, the conflict in Balochistan has been multidimensional. In the Balochistan context, the researcher makes no bold claim that education is the only factor generating conflict in Balochistan. The outcomes of the chapter indicated that there are numerous other reasons too.

The conceptual chapter, chapter 3, has shown how the education system perpetuates conflict. It has reviewed the literature on the relationship between education and conflict. In a critical discussion on education and conflict as conceptualised in international scholarship, we found three fundamental possibilities: 1) education contributes to peace and conflict resolution; 2) certain aspects of education generate conflict; and 3) education is a neutral actor. Education as a neutral actor is not an insignificant part of the literature. However, the notion that education resolves conflict is the main argument of much of the scholarly research. This argument was also studied in this research.
Precisely, this chapter also mentioned the idea and philosophy of education in Western civilisation. It clarified that education has been considered capable of achieving different objectives from ancient times to the modern world. Enlightenment ideas replaced the traditional political hierarchy and social structure by bringing the ideas of freedom, equality for all and the principle of human reason based on philosophical enquiry. Yet, the reality of education’s role in society has been very different. For instance, the imparting of education and the access to it is limited to a specific class in Balochistan. Education policies are made by a specific group of people, the elite; to achieve particular objectives. Education has failed to care for the people while offering the State the means to exercise control.

The statistics are presented in chapter 4, which highlights a glaring but painful fact about the politics of education and the conflict in Balochistan. The empirical results presented in this chapter are derived from a close analysis of all educational policies to provide an understanding of the nature and purpose of the education system in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan. A clear picture emerges, indicating that all educational policies are closely tied to the interests of the ruling elite. The state has been shaping policies that are tied to national narratives and ideology as well as religiosity, i.e. Islam.

Since the birth of Pakistan, the declared educational policies have not been implemented in practice. In addressing the main research question, it is noted that the type and quality of education in Balochistan is inferior to that of the other provinces in Pakistan. There is a dearth of schools, funding and teachers, both male and female, in Balochistan. All the statistics provided by government officials and from interviews conducted with stakeholders show a huge difference. There are many ‘ghost schools’ in Balochistan. These are schools that exist on paper and in official records but not in reality.
A crucial factor is the vast size of Balochistan, which accounts for almost half of Pakistan but contains only six per cent of the country’s population. From fieldwork statistics it can be argued that a calculation of the area of Balochistan reveals one person for every two kilometres (KM). This factor has never been considered seriously by successive governments, and it remains unresolved in terms of the development of educational infrastructure. From the analysis, it became obvious that the state does not care whether the Baloch receive an education. Education has become an arena of political struggle in Balochistan rather than being used for capacity-building in the province.

Another leading argument that I have concluded from the empirical chapter, based on the representation of the Baloch and Balochistan, concerns its culture, language, history and politics of control. The crux of the argument in the aforementioned chapter is that the state wants to control the Baloch people through the education system. This has been done by alienating the Baloch and removing their history, culture and language from their educational textbooks. The result showed that the majority of the scholars agree that the Baloch students are forced to read, write and speak languages other than Balochi (their mother tongue) in schools and colleges. As argued by the interviewees, the Baloch children are learning three languages: Urdu, English and Arabic; however, their own language is not part of their education system.

The history of the Baloch and Balochistan has been absent from the syllabus. The Baloch are not part of the education system, and their heroes, history, geography and culture have been systematically ignored. This research mentions that the state is afraid of providing education to the Baloch people. Based on the research findings, one might conclude that there is a growing resentment among the Baloch masses, particularly the Baloch students,
that education is being used to make them obedient citizens. Moreover, people are more anxious about their own culture. They want to know about their own language and heroes.

The researcher observed that in many parts of Balochistan (in Baloch areas) parents have asked the private schools to teach the Balochi language to their children. Many private schools in the Makran division of Balochistan include the Balochi language and the Baloch heroes, poetry and history as an optional subject without any government support. I also mentioned in chapter 6 that many of these private schools and English language centres have been closed down, partly due to the fact that those schools and language centres were teaching the Balochi language as an optional subject.

*Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is one of the most influential books among Baloch students and insurgents. In this book, Paulo Freire presents the idea of ‘Problem–Posing Education’. According to him, there are two propositions of critical pedagogy. The first is to accept the existence of oppression, while the second is that transformation is possible if a nation struggles and believes in the right to self–determination. According to him, transformation is not a gift; it must be achieved through struggle.

Education must be based on creativity and critical evaluation. It should stimulate true reflection and action upon the reality of Baloch and their society. The teacher may no longer be merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who also learns through dialogue with the students. It is clear that problem-posing education cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. Baloch student organisations believe that the idea of education should be based on critical reflection and action, as argued in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

Baloch students believe that the idea of education should be based on critical discussions and dialogues. In educational institutions, the Baloch student circles emphasise dialogue. There is an interactive learning system in Balochistan. Within educational institutions,
albeit outside the classrooms, there are informal circles of Baloch students who always question the state education system. In addition to the school system, there are informal circles of student organisations based on an interactive system.

The central argument of the whole discussion is concluded in chapter 6, which mentions that the Pakistani state pretends to honour its duty of care to provide education to the Baloch people and the people of Balochistan. Looking at the various statistics and expert opinions, the ultimate question in the final analysis is as follows: “Has the State succeeded in its goal of providing good-quality education to Balochistan? If not, why not?” However, can the statistics and interviews with relevant people, educationalists and activists, as well as Baloch nationalists, sustain an argument that the Pakistani state has failed in its duty of care? To what extent do poor formal education and conflict go hand in hand in the province and how has the government failed in its duty of care in Balochistan? The answers to these questions may substantiate our argument that controlling educational policies and textbooks, religiosity, and weak and dysfunctional education in Balochistan are prime reasons for conflict with the state.

This empirical chapter has discussed the alternative arguments and the conflict perspective on the role, nature and purpose of education. This is also applied in the case of Balochistan, in that education in the province is being used as a controlling apparatus of the state through various means. There are many issues regarding the state of education in Balochistan, such as the drop-out rate from primary to middle schools, and again from middle to secondary schools, insufficient quantity of books, lack of coordination and knowledge-sharing between public and private schools, lack of efficient monitoring of schools, shortage of trained teachers, shelterless schools, overcrowded schools, lack of teachers’ accommodation and facilities, and shortage of girls’ schools; all these are
discussed in the chapter. Challenging the argument on the duty of care, this chapter mentions that the state seeks to control the Baloch people through educational textbooks, syllabuses and curricula. This is done by misrepresenting thousands of years of Baloch society, history, culture, language and political and legal development.

Finally, it has been argued that, to resolve conflict in Balochistan, the state must change the manipulative nature of education in Balochistan. Education in Balochistan demands special attention and rigorous planning and finance, similar to that applied in other parts of the country. Thus, we can conclude that the major problems of Balochistan education need to be discussed in order to identify the major issues at policy level. If this were done, education might be able to help resolve conflict in the province.
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*International Voice for Baloch Missing Person*. Available from: <https://www.facebook.com/media/albums/?id=155534177828258> [Re-accessed on 28/01/15].


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This thesis is also based on twenty-eight interviews conducted during my fieldwork to Pakistan and Balochistan from January to June 2013. All but two of the interviews were recorded in their entirety. The researcher noticed a few sensitive statements given by the participants; therefore, pseudo names are used for six interviewees for security reasons. The names and descriptions are withheld to protect the identity of these six interviewees.

**Aamir Naeem.** Former Deputy Director of Provincial Institute for Teacher Education (PITE). Professional Development Specialist, Teacher Education Project, USAID. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).

**Abdul Qayyum Babai.** Chairman, Balochistan Textbook Board, Quetta. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Urdu).

**Abdul Rahman Buzdar.** Secretary, Fisheries. Former Section Officer and Additional Secretary, Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).

**Ali Rehman.** (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Balochi).

**Atique-ur-Rehman.** USAID, Coordinator, Strategic Planning and Development, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

**Aziz Bugti.** Former Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Balochistan, Quetta. He also served as a Deputy Director and Director of Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013. Questions put by written interview due to disability and advanced age.

**Behram Imtiaz.** (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

**D. K. Riaz Baloch.** Managing Director, Education Foundation, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

**Dr. Abdul Rafiq.** (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape Balochi and Urdu).

**Dr. Gishkori.** (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Balochi).

**Dr. Hafeez Baloch.** (Name withheld). A Medical Doctor by profession, and affiliated with Baloch Student Politics during his student life. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

**Dr. Kahoor Khan.** Director, General (DG) Special Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

**Dr. Shazawar Ali.** (Name withheld). A writer, activist and a scholar. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Balochi).
Jamila Qazi. Registrar, Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University, Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in her residence in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).

Kaleem Ullah Bareach. Chairman, History Department, University of Balochistan (UOB). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Major General Zia Ullah Khan. (Retd), Inspector General, Frontier Core (IG FC). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).


Munir Ahmed Badini. Secretary, Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Munir Ahmed Nodazai. Former District Education Officer, Kech District, and Controller, Balochistan Board, Quetta. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Nasreen Ayaz Baloch. Lecturer, Department of Education, Sardar Bahadur Khan, Women’s University Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).

Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. Additional Director of Education (Schools), Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).

Qaisar Jamali. Provincial Coordinator Education, UNESCO. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Rashid Razzag. Additional Secretary in Secondary Education Department, Government of Balochistan, Quetta. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Saadullah Khan Tokhai. Chairman, Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BBISE), Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in both English and Urdu).

Sadia Rasheed. Lecturer in Education Department Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University, Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Urdu).

Siddiq Baluch. A writer and journalist. He was awarded lifetime achievement award by the Prime Minster of Pakistan, in 2015. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Balochi).

Talat Abbas. Deputy Focal Person, Capacity Development, Education Department, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).

Zarina Rashid. Head of Education Department, Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University, Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).
Appendices

Appendix I: Consent Form

Mr Jalal Faiz is collecting data in the form of taped/recorded interviews. These data will be used for his doctoral research and thesis at the University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom (UK).

This research is about 'The Politics of Education and Conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan’. In addition, the thesis will explore the causes of conflict in Balochistan, the politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani state, and the significance of these politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict. The primary research question is as follows: Does the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled Balochistan exacerbate the conflict there or does it offer opportunities for conflict resolution?

I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that:

- All the identities of the interviewees will be kept confidential. The material will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times.
- This study follows the voluntary participation of the interviewees in the research.
- All the names of participants will remain anonymous throughout the study if that is their wish.
- All personal data will be kept in a locked cupboard on University premises.
- Participants can withdraw from the interviews at any stage without providing an explanation.
- If you wish, you will be sent information on the results of the research.
- The researcher can be contacted after participation by e-mail or telephone (details below).

Personal Information of the Participant

Note: This consent form will be stored separately from any data you provide in order that your responses/views/opinions might remain anonymous.

I have read the information and I am willing to act as a participant in this research study.
1. Your name please: ________________________________.
2. Your age please: ________________________________.
3. Your gender please: ________________________________.
4. Your political affiliation and position please: ________________________________
6. For how long have you served or remained in Balochistan and in what post or position? ________________________________

Signature of the participant: ________________________________

Dated: _______ / _______ / _______
Appendix II:
Participation Information Sheet

Dear Participant (s),

I am Jalal Faiz, a PhD student at the Schools of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages (SSHL), Department of Politics & International Relations (DPIR), University of Westminster, London. I am undertaking my doctoral research on Politics of Education and Conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan. In addition, my research will explore the causes of conflict in Balochistan, the politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani state, and the significance of these politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict. The emphasis is not only on theorising conflict but also on providing a conceptually sound and empirically rich analysis of the politics of education in a specific conflict region. This research will intervene in the debate over whether education ameliorates or exacerbates regional ethnic cleavages in a conflict region by focusing on Balochistan in Pakistan.

My supervisors are Dr. Dibyesh Anand (D.Anand@westminster.ac.uk), reader (associate professor) at the DPIR, University of Westminster, London, and Dr. Ricardo Blaug (R.Blaug@westminster.ac.uk), reader (associate professor) at the DPIR, University of Westminster, London. This research is a critical analysis of primary and secondary literature/data and a discourse analysis of textbooks as well as interviews. A qualitative method will be adopted to carry out this research. In order to do so, this study employs multiple data sources: documentary data, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, visual data and observations in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. This research applies a semi-structured method to interview the stakeholders (educationalists, academics, historians, scholars, policy-makers and politicians) and uses grey literature in order to explore the politics of education and conflict in Balochistan.
The interview should take around 40 to 60 minutes of your time. I would like to assure you that all respondents’ comments will be anonymous and all transcripts will be treated as confidential. I would like to record the interview(s) so that I have an accurate record of our discussion. I have received ethical approval from the University of Westminster for this study according to United Kingdom rules for data protection.

I hope you will be able to take part in this study. Therefore, please specify a day and time that would be convenient to meet up. I am looking forward to hearing from you. I enclose a consent form in the hope of a positive response. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions about the research (please see further details in consent form).
Appendix III:
Interview Questions

Can you please say something about yourself?
May I quote you openly in my thesis?
May I use your name in my thesis?
What is your connection to Balochistan and education or education in Pakistan?

Section 1: Condition of Education in Pakistan and Balochistan
➢ In your opinion, what is the purpose of education in Pakistan?
➢ What are the main achievements and problems of the education system in Pakistan?
➢ How would you describe the current condition of the education system in Balochistan?
➢ In your opinion, do people in Balochistan in general and Baloch in particular have satisfactory and equal access to education?
➢ In your opinion, what are the key factors that keep Balochistan backward in terms of education as compared to other provinces?

Section 2: The Politics of the Representation of Power, Curricula, and Textbooks
➢ In your opinion, have curricula, textbooks, and education policies in Pakistan served to control and make obedient citizens or there is an element of care in creating opportunities for the people?
➢ Do you think the Baloch people along with their history and culture have been adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the country? Please give reasons for your view.
➢ How do you see the future of education in Balochistan in the present circumstances in the context of the closure of school premises, targeted killing of teachers/students, and teachers migrating from Balochistan due to the law and order situation?

Section 3: The Politics of Education and Conflict in Balochistan
➢ In your opinion, how has the current insurgency affected education in Balochistan?
➢ Do you think education is a site of political struggle or has it been instrumental in capacity-building?
➢ To what extent can education be effective in resolving conflict in Balochistan?
➢ Are there any additional comments you wish to make on the politics of education and conflict in Balochistan that I have not yet addressed but that may be helpful to me or my research?

Section 3: Extra questions, if you wish to answer
➢ As an academic/expert, how do you describe the politics of power in state school textbooks and all educational policies since 1947?
➢ How satisfied are you with the funding allocation for education in Balochistan?
➢ Do you think that education has been the priority of successive governments in Pakistan?
➢ In your opinion, has the primary purpose of education in Balochistan been to empower the people or to control them?
### Appendix VI:
Participant’s Biographies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>S.N</th>
<th>Name/Pseudonym</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Nizam- ud- Din Mengal</td>
<td>Additional Director of Education (Schools) Balochistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Professor Saadullah Khan Tokhai</td>
<td>Chairman Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BBISE) Quetta, Balochistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Qaisar Jamali</td>
<td>Provincial Coordinator Education (UNESCO)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Talat Abbas</td>
<td>Deputy Focal Person Capacity Development Education Department, Balochistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Muhajir (Urdu Speaking)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Rashid Razzaq</td>
<td>Additional Secretary in Secondary Education Department, Government of Balochistan</td>
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<td>Dr. D. K. Riaz Baloch</td>
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<td>Baloch</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Dr. Kaleem Ullah Bareach</td>
<td>Historian and Chairman History Department, University of Balochistan (UOB)</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Ali Rehman (his fictitious name)</td>
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<td>Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch</td>
<td>Director General &amp; Special Education, Government of Balochistan</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Munir Ahmed Badini</td>
<td>Secretary Education Government of Balochistan</td>
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<td>Baloch</td>
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<td>Professor Aziz M. Bugti</td>
<td>Former Chairman Department of Political Science UOB, Deputy Director and Director Education GOB. (written interview due to disability and old age)</td>
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<td>Baloch</td>
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<td>Abdul Rahman Buzdar</td>
<td>Secretary Fisheries and ex-section officer and Additional Secretary Education, Government of Balochistan</td>
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<td>Abdul Qayyum Babai</td>
<td>Chairman Balochistan Textbook Board Quetta, Balochistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>A writer and journalist. He was awarded lifetime achievement award by the Prime Minster of Pakistan, in 2015</td>
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<td>Atique-ur-Rehman</td>
<td>Sr. Coordinator Strategic Planning and Development Balochistan, USAID</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>35 to 45</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Aamir Naeem</td>
<td>Deputy Director PITF (EX) and Professional Development Specialist, USAID, Teacher Education</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Zarina Rashid</td>
<td>Head of Education Department and Lecturer, SBK Women’s University Quetta, Balochistan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Sadia Rasheed</td>
<td>Lecturer in Education Department SBK Women’s University Quetta, Balochistan</td>
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<td>Professor Jamila Qazi</td>
<td>Registrar SBK Women’s University Quetta, Balochistan</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Munir Ahmed Nodazai</td>
<td>Former District Education Officer Kech District and Controller Balochistan Board, Quetta, Balochistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Major General Zia Ullah Khan (Retd)</td>
<td>Inspector General Frontier Core (IG FC)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Behram Intiaz (his fictitious name)</td>
<td>Name and description withheld</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur</td>
<td>A Baloch political activist. He has been associated with Balochistan’s Independence movement. He taught Baloch refugees in Afghanistan from 1978-1992. He writes for political blogs since newspapers have refused to print his columns</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
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