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# **Between the state and citizens: Changing governance of intermediary organisations for inclusive and sustainable urban regeneration in Seoul**

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## **Abstract**

Cities across East Asia once experienced rapid economic growth and urban development under a strong interventionist state. The recent economic slowdown and political changes have pressured them to find alternatives to the previous state-led or market-driven urban development. New forms of participatory governance have been devised to mobilise citizen participation in decision-making. Citizen participation, however, is not simply about direct interactions between the state and citizens. It is also guided and facilitated by intermediary organisations that are state- or self-funded bodies working between the state and citizens. Seoul in South Korea is a case in point. Over the past decade, Seoul Metropolitan Government has institutionalised intermediary organisations to expand citizen participation in diverse areas of urban life. In urban development, a more inclusive approach has been put forward through new partnerships between government, intermediary organisations, and citizens. In this article, a case study of such partnership is critically examined. Urban regeneration in the Changsin-Sungin Area shows two meaningful changes in the governance of the intermediary organisation. The first change occurred when the intermediary organisation recruited residents as staff members and helped them to create a new local cooperative. The second change happened when the local cooperative took over the role of the intermediary organisation. Analysis of these changes revealed that intermediaries have a contradictory role in urban regeneration. On the one hand, the intermediary intervention has expanded citizen participation and improved consistently the engagement of the community of practice. On the other hand, intermediary intervention has served to instrumentalise citizen participation and constrain the growth of an autonomous community of practice while helping the state to retain control over urban regeneration. In this sense, the intermediary-led participation contains seeds of yet-to-be realised potential, albeit with the current flaws, for more inclusive and sustainable urban regeneration, which this study recognises as an integral part of emerging post-developmental urbanisation in South Korea.

**Keywords:** Citizen participation; Intermediary organisation; Participatory governance; Urban regeneration; Post-developmental urbanisation; South Korea

## 1. Introduction

In the second half of the twentieth century, the so-called Four Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea – underwent late but rapid industrialisation and urban development under a strong interventionist state (Hamilton, 1983; Gulati, 1992; Dunford and Yeung, 2011). Since the 1960s, these countries rationalised a growth-first agenda to maintain high economic growth and transform their productive systems through centrally-governed market mechanisms. An interventionist state that prioritises extensive industrialisation for national development over other policies is referred to as a ‘developmental state’ (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Castells, 1992; Huff, 1995). South Korea (hereafter Korea) is a case in point. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, its rapid economic growth was made possible by harnessing national resources and directing financial incentives through a strong alliance between the state and a small number of large industrial conglomerates (Joo, 2019). The state has systematically intervened in and expanded cities to sustain rapid economic growth by developing new industrial clusters, infrastructure and built environment, particularly massive residential complexes to accommodate a growing urban population (Shin and Kim, 2016). ‘Developmental urbanisation’ took place while the developmental state instrumentalised the built environment to support its industrial and social policies, aimed at maximising national economic growth (Park et al., 2011).

Following the democratisation and globalisation of Korea’s society and economy during the 1990s, the state has liberalised domestic markets and repositioned itself from a leader to a facilitator of economic growth. The neoliberal turn, however, followed a different course compared to the West. While Western neoliberal states dismantled the social-welfare state, the developmental state in Korea embraced neoliberalisation to revive the domestic economy, hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Choi, 2012). The neoliberal turn in Korea thus represented a departure from, as well as continuity with, the earlier policies and institutions of the developmental state. The emerging ‘neo-developmental state’ mobilised urban real estate markets to attract speculative private investments to revive the sluggish domestic economy. In contrast to the past, the ‘property state’ served to facilitate rather than control urban development (Choi, 2012; Joo, 2019).

The New Town Programme (hereafter NTP) is a case of state-facilitated neo-developmental urbanisation (Cho and Križnik, 2017). It was introduced in Seoul in 2002 and spread across the country after the introduction of the national *Special Act on Urban Renewal Promotion* in 2006. The NTP became a statutory urban redevelopment approach that brought together construction firms and property owners to transform deprived low-rise neighbourhoods into high-rise residential complexes (Jang and Yang, 2008). The transformation took place under a speculative mechanism where the redevelopment association could reap profits by distributing new housing units to the property owners at construction rate while selling the rest on the market. The NTP was one of the most effective tools for improving the built environment while reviving the domestic economy in the 2000s (Shin and Kim, 2016). However, it has slowed down considerably after the 2008 global financial crisis when more than half of the

planned redevelopment projects, including many NTPs, were cancelled, with market investments or state support being withdrawn without any backup plans (Jang et al., 2013). Areas where the redevelopment was cancelled remained undeveloped and faced further deprivation, with growing conflicts among the residents, and between the residents and the state, which has prompted calls for alternatives to the previous state-facilitated or market-driven urban development.

As one of the alternatives, the state launched a new Urban Regeneration Programme (hereafter URP) by introducing the national *Special Act on Promotion and Support for Urban Regeneration* (hereafter UR Act) in 2013. The URP was devised to incorporate local residents beyond property owners or investors and create community organisations as acting associations to improve deprived neighbourhoods. In contrast to the NTP, the URP is thus focused on community development as the basis for fostering and sustaining communal life and shared identities as well as improving the built environment in the deprived neighbourhoods. In this respect, the URP can be seen as a community-based urban regeneration approach based on a partnership between the state and citizens, which aims to create a more inclusive and sustainable local development framework.

Recent studies recognise growing citizen participation through participatory governance as distinct characteristic of emerging ‘post-developmental urbanisation’ in Korea (Jeong, 2016; Cho and Križnik, 2017; Park and Hong, 2019). Participatory governance, however, is not only about interactions between the state and citizens but also about interventions of intermediary organisations that are state- or self-funded bodies working between the state and citizens (Seo et al., 2014; Park and Lim, 2014). Intermediary organisations are not new to Korea. In the 1970s, neighbourhood organisations were introduced to expand communication between the state and residents (Lim and Kim, 2015). Since the introduction of the *Non-profit Organisation Aid Law* in 2000 and the *Framework Act on Volunteer Service Activities* in 2006, the state has officially provided civil society organisations with subsidies and institutional support to increase their intermediary role, particularly in social welfare provision (Kim, 2011; Kim and Jeong, 2017). Recently, intermediary organisations have also been introduced in urban planning and management. The UR Act has institutionalised local urban regeneration support centres (hereafter local URCs) as state-funded intermediary organisations that serve to encourage citizen participation in the URP.

In spite of their growing importance, the contribution of the intermediary interventions to urban regeneration in Korea has seldom been studied. This article tries to fill the gap by examining the changing governance of intermediary organisations in the URP against the backdrop of emerging discourse on post-developmental urbanisation in Korea. A growing body of literature demonstrates its significance, arguing that the intermediary-led citizen participation (hereafter intermediary-led participation) can reduce bureaucracy and enhance the efficiency of urban regeneration (Seo et al., 2014; Park and Lim, 2014; Y. Kim, 2017; Kim and Choi, 2017; Kim, 2020). These studies, however, are focused on the ‘functional’ aspect of the intermediary-led participation, such as operational structure or management, and pay comparatively less attention to ‘social’ aspects such as organisational identity,

memory, or culture, which could provide an additional insight into its underlying participatory mechanisms. This article, thus, pays attention to participants' experience of what has 'actually' happened in the intermediary-led participation and how it has 'actually' contributed to urban regeneration in Korea. Better understanding of intermediary-led participation in the URP could expand the empirical basis for a wider discourse on post-developmental urbanisation in Korea and East Asia (Cho and Križnik, 2017; Douglass et al., 2019).

The article investigates the changing governance of an intermediary organisation in the Changsin-Sungin Area in Seoul (hereafter CSA) and examines opportunities and challenges of intermediary-led participation for inclusive and sustainable urban regeneration. The URP in CSA is narratively explored to identify the characteristics and evolution of intermediary-led participation and critically reviewed to understand the intermediary organisations as a part of the post-developmental urbanisation in Korea. The article has six sections. A literature review follows the introduction to construct a conceptual framework, which represents a basis for the methodological framework set out in the next section. Afterwards, the article explores the background of the URP in CSA and analyses the changing governance of its intermediary organisation. The following section discusses the key findings and tries to situate them in the conceptual framework. The article concludes with a critical reflection on the study and suggests recommendations for future research.

## **2. Conceptual framework**

### *2.1. Post-politics and post-developmental urbanisation*

The theoretical underpinning of this article is the notion of the 'post-developmental urbanisation' that is taking place through participatory governance to 'facilitate the participation of ordinary citizens in the public policy process' (Andersson and van Laerhoven, 2007, p.1090). Douglass, Garbaye and Ho (2019) advocate that various approaches to participatory governance have increasingly emerged in what they call 'progressive cities' such as Jakarta, Singapore, Chengdu, Taipei and Seoul, where the local and national governments have taken a progressive stand on their urban policies. They argue that these cities are not solely directed towards promoting economic or material benefits but also social inclusion by placing citizens in the centre of participatory governance. This calls for the reconceptualisation of urban development in East Asia beyond economic and material aspects to encompass its social elements, such as 'human flourishing' (Douglass, 2016; Cabannes et al., 2018).

Human flourishing is a fundamental human right to the 'full development of intellectual, physical and spiritual potentials in the context of wider communities' (Friedmann, 2000, p.466). It contrasts with human happiness, which indicates a state of individual satisfaction, while human flourishing contains 'the idea of a process, of both a personal project and a goal for humanity' (Triglav Circle, 2005). In this interpretation, human flourishing is about well-being that can be realised through interactions and

engagement with society, not in isolation from it. Hence, it is seen as a collaborative expression of citizens' capabilities and aspirations for alternative ways to construct cities as theatres of social action (Cabannes et al., 2018). Prioritising collaboration between citizens and the state to expand human flourishing over economic growth is central to post-developmental urbanisation in East Asia (Douglass, 2016).

Concerns have been raised at the same time that the persistent legacy of the interventionist state could constrain participatory governance and allow the state to retain its control over urban development in East Asia (Park et al., 2011; Doucette and Park, 2018; Shin, 2019).

This legacy can be observed in the state's technocratic top-down decision-making, which is often legitimised to be in the larger public interest and is thus difficult to oppose. Lam-Knott et al. (2019) recognise depoliticised decision-making, which aims to neutralise potential political tensions through technologies of expert administration or management as constitutive of 'post-political governance'. While traditional politics offers a space to express dissent or discontent, post-politics, on the contrary, emphasises 'democratic inclusion of all, thereby suturing the totality of the social and precluding the rise of the political moment' (Swyngedouw, 2009, p.609). Hence, post-politics is seen as 'consensual politics' that replaces antagonism with consensus. In consensual politics, conflict has not been resolved, but rather managed or otherwise residualised by centralising an assumedly neutral technocracy, meaning that there exist neither internal social tensions nor internal generative conflicts. Instead, the adversary is always externalised and objectified while technocrats or knowledge elites serve as judges. Accordingly, the emphasis in consensual politics is placed on technocratic discretion, preventing rationalisation of dissent and promoting consensus-building based on expertise and professionalism, which could create a 'post-political trap', especially in contemporary urban planning and management (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). Central to the post-political trap is the consensus-building process, which could exclude a number of minority voices by relying on technocracy with an emphasis on expertise and professionalism. Consensus-building no longer serves to find alternatives but rather to render fundamental disagreements as apolitical and invisible through the logic of assumedly unbiased experts. Under these circumstances, the ideas of inclusivity, diversity, pluralism, and tolerance are downplayed. In this regard, post-political consensus-building could hardly contribute to genuine human flourishing (Lam-Knott et al., 2019).

Post-political governance has been also observed in citizen participation in urban regeneration in Korea (Kim and Cho, 2019). In the past, social movements struggled for their collective right to the city, which has recently gained considerable institutional attention, resulting in a variety of progressive urban policies that promote citizen participation in urban life (Kim, 2017; Shin, 2018; Križnik and Kim, 2021). Although this was an unprecedented turn towards more inclusive and sustainable urban development, the institutionalisation of such collective right hides the post-political trap (Park, 2013; Kim and Cho, 2019; Križnik et al., 2019). In this regard, the concept of the post-political trap is critical to an understanding of citizen participation in URP as an aspect of post-developmental urbanisation in Korea.

## 2.2. Community development and networks in post-developmental urbanisation

Somerville (2016) shows that community engagement has become instrumental for the state to expand citizen participation. Community, however, is also a domain of collective learning that creates bonds among the members, who thereby make their own rules and norms, often in a conflict with the state. Collective learning that values collaboration and pragmatic problem-solving over shared goals rather than the subordination to the state is important for community engagement, which goes beyond participation and implies ‘commitment to process which has decisions and resulting actions’ (Aslin and Brown, 2004, p.5). That is, collective learning is at the heart of community engagement. Learning can be conceptualised in two distinctive approaches: learning as a product versus learning as a process (Beckett, 2005). The first approach refers to the acquisition of facts, skills or methods produced through scientific evidence or explanation, and emphasises a safe delivery of universal knowledge by qualified instructors and a quantitative increase in learners’ knowledge. Learning as a product is focused on building ‘explicit knowledge’ of ‘know-what’ that is coded and conveyed in papers and books for instance (Smith, 2001). The second approach sees learning as a ‘process by which behaviour changes as a result of experience’ (Merriam and Caffarella, 1991, p.124). Here, learning is not a discrete instance of knowledge acquisition but a continuing process of learners’ participation in making sense of thoughts, feelings or experiences by interacting with each other. It is a process of accumulating and sharing locally oriented interpretations rather than delivering and acquiring universal knowledge, and is oriented towards expanding ‘tacit knowledge’ of ‘know-how’ that is stored and transferred in the form of memories and experiences of learners through their constant interactions (Smith, 2001). This approach underpins the formation of what Wenger (1998) refers to as ‘community of practice’.

The community of practice (hereafter CoP) is ‘a group of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ (Wenger et al., 2002, p.4). CoP has three distinctive features: a *domain* of knowledge, which defines a set of issues; a *community* of people who care about this domain; and the shared *practice* that they are developing to be effective in their domain (*ibid.*, p.27). CoP members learn through co-participation in the shared *practices* of the *community* in order to develop their identity in the *domain*. Hence, learning within a CoP is focused on the formation of collective identity rather than the acquisition of knowledge.

It is, however, worth noting that its collective identity is transformed while CoP’s participation changes. Wenger (1998) captures the transformation with five developmental stages of CoP: potential, coalescing, active, dispersed, and memorable. In the potential stage, people, participating in collective activities, explore a domain of interests and discover common values, while the coalescing stage promotes community formation and rapport-building through enhanced mutual trust and confidence. In the active stage, the people as community members clarify their responsibilities by engaging in shared practices, creating artefacts and adapting to changing circumstances. Entering the dispersed stage, the community

activities begin to decline. The members no longer engage intensively, but the community remains alive as a centre of knowledge. In the memorable stage, the community undergoes dissolution or revival while old members exit and new members enter. Regardless of its death or rebirth, the old community is remembered as a part of the local identity through stories, artefacts, and memorabilia that continuously inspire future participation.

The temporal aspect of a CoP helps to conceptualise community formation, growth, decline, or eventual revival, and thus to better understand the change in the power mechanisms of intermediary-led participation. However, understanding intermediary-led participation is not only about interpreting its power mechanisms. It must entail a deeper understanding of network mechanisms underlying the landscape of power in urban regeneration. The network mechanisms are based on the 'spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices' (Harvey, 1989, p.5). Central to the spatially-grounded social practice is a process of creating a set of trust, reciprocity, co-dependency and cooperation values among participants, leading to the production of social capital. In this respect, social capital provides a conceptual frame to analyse the network mechanisms of intermediary-led participation in urban regeneration.

Putnam (2000) and Szreter and Woolcock (2004) differentiate three types of social capital: bonding, bridging, and linking. Bonding social capital refers to relationships between individuals within a community, characterised by high levels of similarity in attitudes, interests, and available information or resources. It is often found in a group of individuals with exclusive and homogeneous characteristics such as familial relationships or friendship. In contrast, bridging social capital refers to relationships between individuals and communities with different social backgrounds, such as class, race, ethnicity, gender or education (Putnam, 2000). It is more open-ended, outward-looking, and accordingly welcoming to new members. The bridging social capital mediates between otherwise unrelated groups rather than reinforcing a narrow grouping. Finally, linking social capital refers to trusting relationships among individuals who are 'interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalised power or authority gradients in society' (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004, p.655). In contrast to bonding and bridging social capital, which exist within horizontal networks, linking social capital exists across explicit vertical power differentials, enabling people to 'leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions' (Woolcock, 2001, p.13) such as government or the legal system.

In East Asian societies, Neo-Confucian ethics and cultural orientations used to affect the formation of social capital. Affective emotion was valued over intellectual cognition, while individuals and communities were expected to serve the state rather than pursuing their interests (Lew, 2013; Yang and Horak, 2019). This has resulted in strong ties, sentimental logic and closed network structure, strengthening bonding rather than bridging social capital. In comparison, weak social ties were neither preferred nor truly effective. Authoritarian regimes in East Asia tried to instrumentalise such cultural orientations, which rationalised the state over the social, economic and intellectual sphere, to overcome



their lack of political legitimacy and ‘impose and internalise their logic on civil society’ (Castells, 1992: 64). For the developmental state in Korea, it was crucial to control the civil society to implement its nationalistic economic and political agenda, which resulted in brutal oppression of civil society until the 1980s. Such control and oppression, however, provoked strong resistance and the formation of well-organised social movements that contributed to the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1987.

After democratisation, the civil society has grown in size, diversified, and expanded its focus from political democratisation to a wider range of social and political issues, including community restoration and expansion of local autonomy (Bae and Kim, 2013). Accordingly, the state started to collaborate with the civil society in addressing the mounting social and economic problems in Korean cities. This suggests that the recent rise of bridging and linking social capital is not only a result of changing state involvement but also of the long history of struggles for the collective right to the city (Koo, 2001; Lee, 2007; Križnik and Kim, 2021). However, doubt has been also raised as to whether bridging and linking social capital have been effective in a highly competitive and individualised Korean society, where priority is given to personal gains over universal egalitarianism (Lew et al., 2011). Citizen participation has often been patchy and tokenistic as the strong ties between property owners, investors and the state continue to forward profit and constrain social relations among citizens and between citizens and the state (Cho and Križnik, 2017; Kim and Cho, 2019). In this sense, the URP can be seen as an ‘opportunity structure’ (Docherty et al., 2001) to expand bridging and linking social capital in neighbourhoods through collaboration between citizens and the state.

However, this opportunity structure is formed with the help of intermediary organisations, which mediate between the state and citizens to overcome what Burt (2000) calls ‘structural holes’. Structural holes refer to lack of direct contact or ties between groups of people: in this case, between the state and citizens. This does not mean that they are unaware of one another. This means that people on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to broker the flow of information between different groups (Burt, 2000). Groups on either side of a structural hole can gain access to different flows of information through an intermediary actor called a ‘structural hole spanner’ who has direct access to non-redundant information and flexible control over information flow among otherwise disconnected groups (Lou and Tang, 2013; He et al., 2016). The structural hole spanner takes the role of a broker and serves to gatekeep or transfer new resources from one group to the other by filling the structural hole, which in this way becomes an opportunity structure for cross-boundary interactions.

The structural hole can be conceptually combined with social capital to draw a comprehensive conceptual frame that can help to understand the evolution of intermediary-led participation in urban regeneration and interpret its significance for post-developmental urbanisation in Korea.

### 3. Methodology

A qualitative case study research approach has been adopted for this study to capture the changing dynamics of intermediary-led participation and understand unique situations in their particular contexts with its embedded interactions (Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994). Throughout the research approach, particular attention was paid to identifying the ‘subjective reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) of each participant in intermediary-led participation in the URP. To this end, the Changsin-Sungin Area in Seoul (hereafter CSA) was selected as a case study (Yin, 2003) to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of complex issues in a real-life setting of the URP. CSA belongs to the first group of URPs implemented in Seoul, which makes it possible to observe and analyse the entire process of planning, implementation, and stakeholders’ experience and evaluation of urban regeneration. Another reason behind the selection is to examine the intervention of a specific intermediary organisation, which has been introduced with the UR Act. Although there are other intermediaries active in CSA, the study is focused on the local URC as the main state-funded intermediary organisation in the recent urban regeneration framework in Korea. In this regard, the case study could explain causal links and pathways resulting from the involvement of the local URC. In particular, the case study serves to provide insights into *why* and *how* intermediary-led participation has affected urban regeneration in Korea through the lens of the above conceptual framework.

To conduct the qualitative case study research, two main data collection methods were applied: documentary collection and in-depth interviewing. A documentary collection method was used to gather written sources about the URP in CSA, including documents such as codes of laws, public institute working papers, books, journal articles, community reports, and online community blogs. Each document was carefully reviewed as a repository not only of simple facts or details but also of ‘social facts’ (Durkheim and Lukes, 1982) such as collective norms, values or beliefs that exist external to the individual and affect individual behaviours. The documentary collection was carried out before the interviews to minimise redundant data collection efforts and improve data collection efficiency. In-depth interviewing method was used to conduct ‘intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives’ (Boyce and Neale, 2006, p.3) on intermediary-led participation in the URP. In-depth semi-structured interviews were used, with open-ended rather than formalised questions, allowing for a richer discussion between interviewee(s) and the interviewer (Galletta, 2013). Interviews served to provide complementary information that could not be obtained from the documentary collection.

One of the methodological challenges was to gain direct access to potential interviewees because they were reluctant or sensitive to conduct a formal interview about the publicly funded URP. For this reason, this study used a ‘snowball sampling technique’: a non-probability sampling strategy through which the first group of interviewees help to recruit the next cohort of interviewees among their acquaintances (Gray, 2004). Through the snowball sampling, eleven interviews in total were carried out between

December 2018 and January 2019. Two interviews were conducted with actors from intermediary organisations, and three interviews with local community actors. Two interviews were held with public officials from the national and Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereafter SMG) engaged in the case study. In addition, four interviews were conducted with participants involved in other similar activities in Seoul – including a social entrepreneur, an urban activist, an urban researcher, and a public official – to keep a broader view and to avoid potential bias from the data collection. All the interviews took between 30 and 120 minutes, either in single or multiple sittings. Each interview was recorded with the interviewee’s informed consent after their right to withdraw data had been thoroughly explained. All the interviews were organised by assigning identification codes to ensure the privacy and anonymity of interviewees (see Appendix 1 for details).

## 4. Case study: Urban Regeneration of Changsin-Sungin Area

### 4.1. Background of Urban Regeneration Programme

CSA was one of the first neighbourhoods designated for URP after being lifted from the NTP zone in 2014. CSA is a high-density low-rise residential area of 1.38 square kilometres in Jongno-gu Ward in central Seoul with a population of 42,301 in 2016 (Table 1). CSA stretches over five small *dongs*<sup>1</sup>: Changsin 1-dong, Changsin 2-dong, Changsin 3-dong, Sungin 1-dong, and Sungin 2-dong. These dongs are typical inner-city mixed-use residential and industrial areas adjacent to the Dongdaemun Fashion Market (DFM), which is known as a K-Fashion centre (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2012).



Figure 1. A location and images of CSA. Source: Map (Google Maps), Photo (by author, 2018)

<sup>1</sup> A dong is the smallest administrative unit in Seoul.

DFM served as the main hub for Korea's textile industry during the rapid export-oriented industrialisation of the country from the 1960s to the 1980s. While the textile industry was booming, garment factories combined with retailers' shops mushroomed in DFM and its adjacent residential areas, including CSA. Moreover, many houses in the area were rented out as sewing factory spaces or factory workers' rooms (Kim, 2015). As a consequence, CSA gained fame as a traditional textile-manufacturing cluster where numerous sewing factory workers resided and worked during the developmental period. Entering the 1990s, however, the sewing factories experienced a decline in business, since the textile industry has moved to other parts of Asia with cheaper labour, such as China and Vietnam. This has resulted in social, economic, and physical deprivation in CSA during the past decades (Kim and Cho, 2019). Overall deprivation of CSA is evident in the National Indices of Multiple Deprivation (NIMD), including three key figures: population growth rate, business growth rate, and old building rate (Table 1).

Table 1. National Indices of Multiple Deprivation figures in Changsin-Sungin Area

	Population (2016)	Population growth rate (1986-2016)	Business growth rate (2006-2016)	Old building proportion (built before 1996)
Changsin 1-dong	6,590	-55.6%	6.6%	90.6%
Changsin 2-dong	10,701	-59.2%	-16.2%	78.6%
Changsin 3-dong	7,753	-50.5%	4.8%	89.3%
Sungin 1-dong	7,109	-49.3%	-0.6%	83.8%
Sungin 2-dong	10,148	-42.9%	2.7%	75.1%
Seoul	10,204,057	5.1%	11.7%	67.7%

Source: National Urban Regeneration Information System (2016); Seoul Open Data (2016)

These figures show that CSA has experienced a sharp decrease in population by about 52 per cent over the last three decades, while Seoul had a moderate increase by 5.1 per cent as a whole. CSA also witnessed a decline or only slight growth in local business, although the neighbouring DMF has grown greatly as the K-Fashion centre for the last decade. Particularly, Changsin 2-dong, where many sewing factory workers once resided, showed a significant drop in the number of local business by 16.2 per cent. Furthermore, CSA had a high proportion of buildings aged 20 and older compared to Seoul's average. This shows that the extent of social, economic, and physical deprivation of CSA was noticeably higher compared to other parts of the city.

Amid these changes, CSA was selected for the NTP in 2007. However, there was little progress with the NTP due to persistent conflicts of interest between two groups of residents: the anti-NTP group and the pro-NTP group. Most of the NTP opponents were middle-class property owners or tenants who were reluctant or unable to pay the ‘redevelopment charge’ incurred when the redevelopment makes a profit. For the opponents, the NTP was simply a project that would force them to vacate their homes unless the high redevelopment charge was paid (Interview: CS-1). In contrast, advocates of the NTP were upper-class property owners who were willing to pay the charge, and in return sought to reap profits from redevelopment. Eventually, the redevelopment charge in CSA turned out to be much higher than in other redevelopment areas due to building regulations that restricted the height of new buildings and prevented high-density urban development.

After seven years of struggle, the NTP in CSA was withdrawn in 2013. The following year, SMG designated CSA as the first URP zone in Seoul. The national government and SMG pledged a matching fund up to 20 billion KRW (worth £14 million) and the URP was carried out between 2014 and 2018. It is now in the post-management period, for which SMG provides a small three-year subsidy (about 200 million KRW worth £140,000) (Interview: PS-2).

#### *4.2. Changing governance of intermediary organisations*

Over a period of four years, the URP in CSA progressed from the planning step (one year), to the implementation step (two years), and then to the self-sustaining step (one year) (Figure 2). This framework was established because the URP was carried out with a four-year grant based on the UR Act. In the planning step, residents were invited to a series of regular meetings where they began building a rapport and an initiative to map out a neighbourhood plan that served as a detailed guideline for the following steps of the URP. In the implementation step, the residents were engaged in an array of community activities such as creating communal spaces to put the neighbourhood plan into practice. This was followed by the self-sustaining step, where residents were encouraged to incubate a local cooperative as a platform through which to sustain community activities in CSA (Interview: CS-2).

The local URC guided these steps and invited residents to attend the workshops, create the neighbourhood plan, participate in the community activities, and incubate the local cooperative. In this three-step process, the role of the local URC has changed, while its governance has been transformed. A closer look at the changing governance is needed to better understand the local URC’s involvement in the URP as the main state-funded intermediary organisation in CSA. The following diagram illustrates the changing governance of the local URC during and after the URP (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Changing governance of the local URC in CSA

(Source: Authors)

The local URC was established in CSA when the URP was launched in 2014, soon after the NTP's cancellation. Originally, it had four staff members: a director, two community organisers (COs), and a public officer. The director was an architecture professor from a local university, while the two COs were recruited from an architectural firm. The COs were approached through personal connections of the director, who was directly appointed by SMG. One public officer from SMG was sent to assist with the administrative work, such as monthly accounting or conducting surveys on local buildings. The entire staff was under a direct contract with SMG which allowed clear and direct communication with SMG and, accordingly, took prompt and efficient action to create a new neighbourhood plan.

In the implementation step, the local URC maintained the same contractual system, but its organisational structure was expanded by hiring a new planner from an engineering firm and two COs, who were recruited from local residents. They were hired without open recruitment, as the participating residents agreed that residents-turned-COs are the most capable in assisting the local URC (Interview: CS-1). From their perspective, this became the first opportunity for direct communication with SMG while working as official staff of the URC rather than only being invited by the URC (Interview: CS-2). From the URC's point of view, involvement of residents-turned-COs can be seen as a change of its organisational identity towards a community-based form rather than merely a professional intermediary from outside (Interview: IS-1).

Such community-oriented changes continued in the self-sustaining step. During this period, the local URC was focused on incubating a local cooperative capable of taking over its intermediary role by encouraging residents to create a community-based social enterprise. Importantly, the residents-turned-COs played a significant role in this process. They simultaneously assisted in creating the local cooperative while also participating as members of this cooperative (Interview: CS-1). By playing a

dual role in the URP, they contributed significantly to the shift in the strategy of intermediary intervention from ‘making things happen’ to ‘helping sustain things’.

However, this shift was carried out in a tight time frame. The active residents could not learn all the know-how from the local URC during the one-year self-sustaining step. They only managed to pick up administrative skills such as accounting or documentation to ensure good communication with the public sector, which turned out to be useful for the management of the local cooperative after the local URC was disbanded. For example, documentation skills were used to make reports to SMG, while accounting skills were used to write public funding bids to sustain the local cooperative. Despite this, the residents were frustrated about working merely as administrators securing public funds, according to a member of the local cooperative who worked as a resident-turned-CO.

“After the URP was completed, we could fortunately secure a small amount of public subsidy that enabled us to recruit young graduates or early career social workers. But the subsidy is time-limited. It is not guaranteed that we can continue to get such financial support in the future...To be honest, more time should’ve been given to make our local cooperative financially autonomous. I mean incubating the cooperative should’ve started earlier or lasted longer during URP. Then, our local cooperative might have been able to develop an adequate level of autonomy.” (Interview: CS-2).

The transition from a state-led (local URC) towards a community-driven intermediary organisation (local cooperative) was focused on quick acquisition of administrative skills rather than an improvement of self-reliance due to time constraints. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the local cooperative to become autonomous. After the URP was completed in 2018, the local URC was disbanded and replaced with the local cooperative. However, the local cooperative could not be immediately financially autonomous, as it had limited chances to create revenue-generating activities during the URP. As a result, the local cooperative continues to depend on public funds for its operating costs. Moreover, such public funds are often made available on a piecemeal basis and can be discontinued at any time, which creates another tight time frame, segmented into a series of small funding bids. For this reason, the local cooperative has to compete with other local groups for the limited public funds. Unsurprisingly, the local cooperative has been under pressure to secure an adequate level of financial resources to maintain its activities, as one of its members admitted.

“Size-wise, our local cooperative has seen rapid growth during the last year. More than 100 people across five small districts signed up for membership. But money-wise, we have been in difficulty since the national funding ceased. We still have no stable sources of income and can barely pay our own way.” (Interview: CS-1)

In CSA, there was an additional subsidy in the post-project step, from SMG, which decided to grant this subsidy to enable the local cooperative to continue hiring community organisers and sustain community activities for the next three years until 2021. According to the above

interviewee, this was nothing more than a temporary solution to the local cooperative's weak financial autonomy.

“We're lucky to get an additional subsidy, but it's only a stopgap. The fund does not cover all costs, but only staff salaries and property rental fees. To maintain the cooperative, we need more money. We have no option but to apply for as many funds as possible to ensure our adequate finances, but I'm not sure if this is the right way to fund our local cooperative.

How much longer will it survive in this competitive bidding war?” (Interview: CS-1)

Although the new local cooperative engaged residents in 'bottom-up' community activities, they were still obliged to undergo the 'top-down' process of competitive public funding bids to maintain their community activities. In other words, the local cooperative struggled with a contradictory situation where bottom-up participation is promoted through top-down competition for financial resource allocation. Under these circumstances, the local cooperative was reluctant to interact with other neighbourhoods despite being aware of the importance of such interaction, according to one of the participants.

“Well, it's embarrassing, but I must admit that the funding bids were usually prepared discreetly rather than openly. Other neighbourhoods that applied for the same public funds were our competitors rather than collaborators. So, it is quite challenging for us to balance competition against and collaboration with other neighbourhoods in such a competitive environment.” (Interview: IS-2)

This shows that the demand exceeded the supply of the public funds, thus strengthening its competitive bidding system to achieve URP's national goals: maximising noticeable improvements in neighbourhoods and systematising their effective management across the country (Interview: PS-2). It is no surprise that the local cooperative tended to foreground national goals over its local interests to win the public funding competition in the course of urban regeneration. Furthermore, the local cooperative was required to convince the funder (SMG) of its distinctiveness to increase the chance of winning. For the local cooperative, establishing a competitive advantage far outweighed collaboration with other neighbourhoods in urban regeneration. Under these circumstances, the local cooperative tended to develop its competitive and individual orientation, although the UR Act stresses the importance of interaction with other neighbourhoods.

From a legal standpoint, the local cooperative had no legal rights for its employment contract, annual budgeting and business operation for community activities (Interview: IS-2). All the legal rights were vested in SMG, particularly for the use of new community spaces, which were created during the URP, such as a community café, a community art gallery, a local learning studio, a local history museum, and a children's playground. Although the residents were encouraged to give their ideas or opinions when designing these spaces, they were not invited to take part in detailed decisions about their ownership and management, which were mostly made by SMG. As a result, there has been no legal basis for the local cooperative to claim ownership or manage new communal spaces in CSA. This has emerged as a



major local issue, because the local cooperative was declined permission to offer public services in the communal spaces.

“Actually, I was sure that our local cooperative would provide new communal services in our new communal spaces. But it was not the case in reality. The local cooperative was given a very limited remit, such as short-term free use of communal spaces or temporary running of communal services with a small subsidy from SMG... It is obvious that SMG does not regard our local cooperative as an official partner due to its lack of experience in public service provision. But if this continues, I’m afraid no opportunities will be given to our local cooperative, but to an external corporate with a proven track record... I’m still not sure if we can make good use of the new spaces and services when managed by a stranger from outside.”

(Interview: IS-2)

The new communal spaces in CSA were designed to provide welfare-related public services such as elderly care, lifelong education, after-school childcare or young business incubation. For the residents, it was taken for granted that these services should be provided by their local cooperative. However, for SMG, the local cooperative was one among several possible candidates and had to compete with other professional firms for public service provision. In this competition, SMG gave priority to quantitative standards that measure the past performance of the local cooperative, while the qualitative aspects of its future value, merit, or potential were barely considered. In this way, professional firms have challenged the local cooperative for the right to provide their public services, while SMG has deprived it of the right to manage the communal spaces.

The local cooperative ended up with no substantive rights for their communal spaces or services despite being encouraged to activate them. For example, the cooperative proposed to use a new communal space for incubating start-ups such as an organic food market or a local sewing studio. This proposal was important, as it aimed to improve the cooperative’s financial autonomy. But the proposal was turned down because it promoted for-profit activities, which are banned in public-owned properties (Interview: CS-1). Under the existing legislation, the rise of claimed communal spaces was limited, while the use of invited communal spaces was strictly regulated. Such inflexibility, however, does not result simply from SMG-level regulation but is rooted in national-level legislation, as a public officer from SMG has pointed out.

“SMG tried to make a free contract with the local cooperative for the public service provision in CSA, but this was impossible because a free contract was ruled out by a national law. We were instructed to undertake open bidding to commission the service provision, but we found that the community-based cooperatives were rarely successful in the formal bidding process due to weak track records. So, we attempted to find another legal basis to benefit the local cooperative from the new national UR Act. But there was no such legal provision. Ultimately, we had no option but to give them a provisional subsidy at our discretion. I think this issue will remain unsolved without amendment to relevant national Acts.” (Interview: PS-2)

This shows that the current national legislation prevents the community-based cooperatives from undertaking self-management of communal spaces and autonomous public service provision in the new urban regeneration framework. For example, the *Public Property and Commodity Management Act* strictly limits for-profit activities in publicly owned properties. Thus, it is hard for the local cooperative to run start-ups, albeit for communal interests, in the new communal spaces owned by SMG. Moreover, the *Fair Trade Act* does not consider the local cooperative as a vulnerable organisation to be protected from market competition, but rather, as a corporation that is required to bid on government contracts for public service provision. Furthermore, even the UR Act has no legal provisions enabling the local cooperative to autonomously manage their communal spaces or provide communal services despite stipulation of its importance in the Act. As a result, the residents remain legally powerless to manage their community assets.

In conclusion, the narrative exploration of the changing governance of an intermediary organisation in the URP in CSA shows that underlying limitations such as a limited bureaucratic time frame, a competitive public funding mechanism and conservative national legislation constrain intermediary-led participation from contributing to sustainable urban regeneration. In the following section, the findings are discussed from a power and network perspective.

## **5. Discussion: Instrumentalisation of intermediary-led participation?**

### *5.1. Transformation of Community of Practice*

Looking at its transformation, the local initiative appears to be more than a group of residents living in CSA. It has developed while its members identified a common interest and learnt to put it into practice through collaboration. Central to the initiative was a ‘learning partnership among people who find it useful to learn from and with each other about a particular domain’ (Wenger et al., 2011, p.9). In this respect, the local initiative in CSA can be seen as a ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998). Drawing on the temporal aspect of the CoP, the initiative’s collective identity has clearly changed through the URP process. The following diagram shows the change of its collective identity in four steps: from a simple invitee to a leading practitioner (Figure 3).

As mentioned earlier, the residents were divided into two opposing groups in the past – one against and one in favour of the NTP. The groups remained in conflict even after the cancellation of the NTP, so the local URC tried to ease the conflict and resume interaction between them. To this end, the local URC organised regular meetings in the planning step (step 1), where the residents could gather and interact regardless of their position. In the meetings, both groups were invited to participate, building mutual trust and defining common interests. Looking at the composition of participants, more than half were owner-occupiers and their family members, along with some tenants (Interview: IS-1). Other groups from the area, such as business owners, were hardly involved, as they could not afford the time

for the meetings. The participants' interests were often related to neighbourhood beautification or the establishment of new facilities that could provide necessary communal spaces or services. During the meetings, the level of resident participation differed between the two groups. The former anti-NTP group members were actively involved in collaboration with the local URC (active invitees), while the former pro-NTP group members were less actively involved (passive invitees). Despite such difference, both groups have participated as 'invitees' with a common goal of improving the neighbourhood through the URP.



Figure 3. Change of collective identity of the local initiative in CSA. Source: Authors

In the implementation step (step 2), the local URC invited some of the active residents as 'advanced invitees' to take part in community activities, ranging from repainting façades or planting trees to creating communal spaces or organising neighbourhood tours. The advanced invitees could participate in these activities easily, as a level of mutual understanding had already been established during the previous planning step. They managed to define shared goals, take necessary actions to achieve these goals, and exchange their experiences or knowledge in the process of forming collective intelligence, which inspired them to continue participating in the URP. In this way, the collective intelligence expanded beyond 'explicit knowledge', provided by the state, and developed as 'tacit knowledge' (Smith, 2001), which became a significant set of consensual norms underpinning CoP in CSA.

Entering the self-sustaining step (step 3), the advanced invitees were actively working with the residents-turned-COs to expand the collective intelligence in CSA. They were no longer invitees but had become 'assistant practitioners' supporting the local URC. Such invitees-turned-practitioners took multiple roles in the self-sustaining step. As administrators, they contributed to knowledge exchange between the residents and SMG while having frequent gatherings, for example, for feedback on

community activities or public support. As practitioners, they also tried to pass their knowledge to new invitees by running a series of hands-on training programmes. Moreover, they promoted external knowledge exchange by organising events where the residents listened to and learned about experiences from other URP areas in the city.

After the URP in CSA was completed (post-project), the local initiative evolved into a local cooperative, which replaced the local URC as the main intermediary organisation. In this transition, the members of the local cooperative began to act as 'leading practitioners' rather than just assistant practitioners, while the local URC's staff members left CSA. However, due to the lack of financial autonomy, the leading practitioners had no choice but to conduct one-off community activities that produced immediate results, such as repaving footways or repainting façades, to secure public funds for the next term. It was difficult to promote constant community activities, such as alleyway management or housing maintenance, where the CoP could take participation a step further towards community empowerment while securing adequate financial resources for self-management of community assets. Although the CoP was able to participate in urban regeneration and successfully transformed its role and identity from a passive invitee towards a progressive practitioner, its opportunities to apply tacit knowledge in practice were limited. Due to its limited autonomy, the state retained indirect control over the CoP.

## *5.2. Centralised Social Networks and Powerless Structural Hole Spanners.*

The formation of the CoP has been facilitated through a top-down intervention of the local URC. This intervention also influenced the development of its social networks, which can be explained by using the concepts of structural holes (Burt, 2000) and social capital (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock, 2001). The following diagram shows a comprehensive social network structure with structural holes and social capital that emerged in CSA as a result of the local URC's intervention (Figure 4).

There are three distinctive groups of stakeholders across different social networks in CSA: the pro-NTP group, the anti-NTP group, and the SMG. At the beginning, the residents from both groups were invited to regular meetings to build rapport and create a neighbourhood plan, which has eased overall tensions between them. While the former anti-NTP group was supportive of the URP, the former pro-NTP group was reluctant to support it due to its low profitability. Opposing interests have caused a gap in the levels of participation between the groups that can be seen as a 'structural hole' (Burt, 2000). Despite the efforts to bring the two groups together, the structural hole remained largely unfilled due to the lack of time and autonomy of the local URC, which has limited its role as a structural hole spanner between the two opposing groups. Instead, the local URC focused on reinforcing internal ties in the former anti-NTP group (bonding social capital), which was considered more effective for the implementation of the URP. Only a few cross ties between them were eventually created (bridging social capital), although the overall tension among the groups was reduced.




Figure 4. Comprehensive social network structure with emerging structural holes and social capital in CSA.  
Source: Authors.

Meanwhile, some residents, particularly from the former anti-NTP camp, took a more active role in the local URC. They participated in community activities, such as creating communal spaces or organising neighbourhood tours, which has opened new opportunities to communicate with SMG. This has created new social ties across vertical power differentials akin to ‘linking social capital’ (Woolcock, 2001). Taking advantage of new social ties, the local URC acted as a structural hole spanner and managed to bridge a gap in social interactions between the residents and SMG by strengthening their mutual trust and understanding. Entering the post-project step, however, the local URC was disbanded and the local cooperative took over the role of structural hole spanner, which signalled a change in the organisational identity from a state-led towards a community-driven intermediary organisation. In this transition, the local cooperative emerged as a new structural hole spanner in CSA.

However, the SMG has strongly influenced the intermediary organisation even after the end of the URP. As a structural hole spanner, the local cooperative could neither achieve financial autonomy nor have statutory rights to make practical use of community assets such as communal spaces or services due to its limited ability to make decisions without governmental consent. The local cooperative played only a limited role as a structural hole spanner in urban regeneration. In spite of its contribution to improving citizen participation in the URP, the local cooperative could not expand its role as a structural hole spanner to empower the residents to autonomously manage their community assets.

This suggests that intermediary intervention was limited in elevating the community engagement to the next level of community empowerment. While the intermediary intervention has been mainly instructed by the state, community engagement has become standardised rather than diversified. Although the state gives more prominence to community engagement in urban development, compared to the limited citizen participation in the past, it has imposed more regulations on citizen participation and institutionalised it through state-funded intermediary organisations to mobilise and involve citizens in urban regeneration. In this way, the state enacts the technocratic rules of the game while the intermediary organisation implements the rules to expand citizen participation in the URP. This leads to a post-political trap where technocratic rationality becomes the legitimate basis for decision-making, whereas diverse minority voices are excluded as less legitimate or illegitimate. Hence, it is difficult for the intermediaries to empower the residents despite expanding citizen participation in CSA. By instrumentalising citizen participation for its own agenda rather than for meeting diverse local demands, the state remains influential in steering urban regeneration through centralised financial or legal measures. This points towards the sticky nature of the developmental legacy in post-developmental urbanisation in Korea.

## **6. Conclusion**

The article examines the changing governance of intermediary organisations by discussing intermediary-led participation against the backdrop of post-developmental urbanisation in Korea. The case study of CSA in Seoul shows that the local URC, which served as the main state-funded intermediary organisation, had an important role in initiating and sustaining citizen participation in the URP. As a result, the residents formed a CoP and established a local cooperative. In this way, they gained the skills and confidence to collaborate with one another and with SMG, which created an opportunity structure to improve social relations, collaboration with the state, and community engagement in urban regeneration. Hence, the study reveals how participatory governance in Seoul promotes human flourishing through citizen participation in decision-making based on a partnership between the state and citizens. In this regard, the URP in CSA represents a significant departure from the previous developmental or neo-developmental approaches and signals a qualitatively different urban paradigm which this study recognises as post-developmental urbanisation in Korea.

At the same time, the study reveals that the local URC had limited success in expanding community engagement beyond participation under governance armed with post-political technologies and rationalities. The local cooperative, which has replaced the local URC as the main intermediary organisation in CSA, is struggling to achieve significant financial and organisational autonomy from the state due to its short incubation period, limited public funding and imposed focus on producing quick and tangible results rather than expanding its long-term self-reliance. Moreover, it has been difficult for the local cooperative to effectively manage community assets even with adequate financial

resources due to inherent institutional limitations such as a limited bureaucratic time frame, competitive public funding mechanism and rigid national legislation, which in practice constrain intermediary organisations from contributing to community empowerment.

In this respect, the new partnership between the state and citizens could be seen as a ‘post-political trap’ where a diversity of citizens’ interests that do not fit the normative governmental agenda were not addressed but were excluded from decision-making. Instead of being recognised as potential for human flourishing, these interests were downplayed through the intervention of the local URC in conformity with the state’s technocratic expertise and professionalism. Rather than fully representing the diversity of citizens’ interests, the intermediary-led participation rationalised and implemented the governmental agenda in the URP. In such a context, the state was able to mobilise intermediary organisations to govern decentralised social networks from a distance, which reveals its long arm in managing urban development through citizen participation. As a result, community empowerment remains stagnant despite improved citizen participation in CSA, which suggests that state-funded intermediary organisations have a dual role in emerging participatory governance in Seoul. On the one hand, they are expected to contribute to community empowerment to build sustainable neighbourhoods, while on the other hand they are following the governmental agenda and helping the state to retain control over urban regeneration. The contradictory role of intermediary organisations, which can be linked to the legacy of the developmental state, has served to instrumentalise citizen participation and constrain the growth of autonomous CoP.

In spite of these constraints, intermediary intervention has expanded citizen participation and improved engagement in CoP even after the end of the URP, which is considered an important step in building inclusive and sustainable neighbourhoods and cities. The former COs have organised a study group where COs from different URP areas gather to discuss and reflect on their community work and share their experiences with the residents in CSA. In this way, the CoP continues to evolve on a trial-and-error basis through ongoing, albeit informal, engagement of the former COs. From a wider perspective, intermediary-led participation in urban regeneration can be seen as a trial-and-error attempt to find an inclusive and sustainable approach to urban regeneration in Seoul, which would enable citizens to become active agents of social and urban change. This suggests that intermediary-led participation contains seeds of yet-to-be realised potential, albeit with the current flaws, for more inclusive and sustainable urban regeneration. The study, however, covers a single intermediary organisation and does not discuss other state- or self-funded intermediaries taking part in participatory governance in Seoul. A follow-up study would have to extend the scope and provide a more encompassing framework to better understand the opportunities and challenges of intermediary-led participation and situate it as a part of post-developmental urbanisation in Korea.

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## Appendix 1: List of interviewees

Group	No.	Identification Code	Affiliation	Interview Date	Duration (hours)
Public Sector	1	PS-1	An official from the Ministry of Land (involved in CSA)	11 December 2018	1
	2	PS-2	An official from Seoul Metropolitan Government (involved in CSA)	7 January 2019	1
Intermediary Sector	3	IS-1	A former community organiser in CSA	4 January 2019	1.5
	4	IS-2	A resident-turned-community organiser in CSA	20 December 2018	2
Community Sector	5	CS-1	A local resident in CSA (former anti-NTP representative)	29 December 2018	0.5
				12 January 2019	2
	6	CS-2	A local resident in CSA (local cooperative member)	29 December 2018	0.5
				12 January 2019	2
	7	CS-3	A local resident in CSA	29 December 2018	0.5
Extra interviews	8	OT-PS-1	An official from a local authority outside CSA	12 December 2018	1
	9	OT-IS-1	A social entrepreneur from Sharing for Future	18 December 2018	1.5
	10	OT-IS-2	An activist from Jegi-dong Sarangbang	8 January 2019	1
	11	OT-RC-1	An urban researcher from the Architecture and Urban Research Institute (AURI)	5 January 2019	1