Management of the brain drain and its relationship with democratisation and human development in Libya

Giuma Gamaty

School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages

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Management of the brain drain and its relationship with democratisation and human development in Libya

PhD THESIS

GIUMA GAMATY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements of the University of Westminster For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London

February 2012
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the brain drain and its relationship with democratisation and overall human development, including political development, using Libya as a case study. However, its implications are applicable to a wider region of developing countries, especially the Middle East and Africa. The research attempts to make a new contribution to understanding the brain drain phenomenon by empirically testing the possible link between the brain drain and socio-economic and political factors, including the lack of democracy, rule of law and human security. It also critically evaluates the contemporary theories of evaluation of human development based mainly on economical/educational indices, and highlights the limitations of the Human Development Index (HDI), as a measure of human development. A more holistic measure, based on the capability approach that incorporates a wide range of reflective indices including freedom, democratic values and human rights, is advocated. The research also argues in favour of a shift from the brain drain to a ‘brain circulation’ paradigm and from a single ‘return’ option to a possible ‘Diaspora’ option by which the contribution to their countries of origin, of those who have emigrated, need not be measured purely by their permanent return. Although the migration of highly skilled people – ‘human capital flight’ – cannot be physically prevented, the underlying ‘PUSH’ factors should be tackled. These include lack of freedom, human security, democracy, and lack of investment in both education and research and development. They also include better job rewards and conditions. Receiving countries, mainly OECD members, also have a moral responsibility not to create ‘PULL’ factors, such as the incentives of selective immigration policies to attract human capital from developing countries, where it belongs and is badly needed. The new era of globalisation and ICT makes it possible for ‘Diaspora Networks’ to facilitate the contribution of migrants to their source countries. Diaspora migrants with high human capital can engage with home countries and contribute towards developing a strategic vision for overall development. One vital area that Diaspora migrants can contribute to is ‘capacity building’, not just at the individual level but crucially at the institutional and societal level. Diaspora migrants, as ‘experts’ in their fields, can contribute to democratisation, as a transitional process towards democracy, which in turn is beneficial to enhancing human development because democratic countries have demonstrated higher human development than non-democratic ones. Human development, as an outcome, can therefore be an incentive for embarking on democratisation. A process of democratisation that leads to democracy will reduce some of the push factors causing the brain drain and its detrimental consequences.
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I sincerely hope that my daughters and their generation of Libyan children, one day, will find a little benefit from my small and humble contribution related to my country of origin, Libya, which I have been away from for thirty five years, and I love and miss so much!

I confirm that this thesis is my own work.
List of abbreviations

AI  Amnesty International
AHDR  Alternative Human Development Report
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
ASTA  Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad
ASU  Arab Socialist Union
BP  British Petroleum
CA  Capability Approach
CEO  Chief Executive Officer
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CL  Civil Liberties
CPI  Corruption Perception Index
CSP  Concentrating Solar Power
EIU  Economist Intelligence Unit
EU  European Union
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FH  Freedom House
FSTC  Foundation for Science Technology and Civilisation
G8  Group of Eight
GATT  General Agreement of Tariff and Trade
GB  Green Book
GDI  Gender Development Index
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GEM  Gender Empowerment Index
GERD  Gross Expenditure on Research
GNP  Gross National Product
HCF  Human Capital Flight
HD  Human Development
HDCA  Human Development and Capability Association
HDI  Human Development Index
HDR  Human Development Report
<table>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Hewlett Packard</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPI</td>
<td>Human Poverty Index</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HSMP</td>
<td>Highly Skilled Migrant Programme</td>
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<td>HSP</td>
<td>Highly Skilled Personnel</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation of Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIST</td>
<td>Korean Institute of Science and Technology</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Libyan Dinar</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LIA</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
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<td>MARS</td>
<td>Moroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>Master of Business Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEED</td>
<td>Middle East Economic Digest</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NES</td>
<td>National Economic Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OBE</td>
<td>Order of the British Empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Points Based System</td>
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<td>PFI</td>
<td>Political Freedom Index</td>
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<td>PIIE</td>
<td>Peterson Institute for International Economics</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Political Rights</td>
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<td>QF</td>
<td>Qatar Foundation</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RIT</td>
<td>Rochester Institute of Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHD</td>
<td>Sustainable Human Development</td>
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<td>SHDI</td>
<td>Sustainable Human Development Index</td>
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<td>SPLAJ</td>
<td>Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>TIE</td>
<td>The InUS Entrepreneur</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOKEN</td>
<td>Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals</td>
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<td>TSC</td>
<td>Tunisian Scientific Consortium</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WGI</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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N.B. Although the final copy of this research thesis was submitted in February 2012, the research itself had been completed by the end of 2010, prior to the major political events that started in Libya in February 2011 and led eventually to a total political regime change.
Management of the brain drain and its relationship with democratisation and human development in Libya

Introduction

This thesis is essentially about investigating empirically the inter-relationship and possible causal linkage between three main themes being the brain drain, democratisation and human development within the context of Libya.

The phenomenon and term ‘brain drain’ has been around for almost fifty years, since the early 1960s when Britain was losing highly skilled scientists, academics, physicians and intellectuals to the United States and Canada (Gaillard, 1997). Brain drain as a concept has also been widely discussed in the less developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Chapter III of this thesis, the background to the concept of brain drain is further elaborated.

The concept of ‘democratisation’ has also been widely researched and discussed, especially in relation to its two crucial phases of ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’: the move to a democratic system of government and the establishment of democratic institutions, followed by ensuring the sustainability of those democratic institutions. This second phase is considered to be of even greater importance than the establishment of democratic institutions (Chandler, 1999: 13). A more detailed theoretical background discussion of the concepts of democracy and democratisation is offered in Chapter IV.

Human development is another key concept explored herein. Although the idea that social arrangements and activities should be judged by the promotion of ‘human good’ goes back at least to Aristotle (UNDP, 1990: 9), the pioneering popularisation and articulation of the modern concept and definition of human development can be attributed mainly to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) global Human Development Reports which started in 1990. Human development, as it has been articulated in the last two decades, offers a much broader approach than the traditional preoccupation with economic growth and development. A detailed theoretical outline of the concept, definition, measurement and challenges of human development is offered in Chapter V.
How are the three themes inter-related?

As the review, evaluation and discussion of the three concepts is developed, an attempt is made to establish a dynamic linkage and relationship between them, whereby human development is taken to include acquiring abilities and enlarging choices for people, not just economically and socially, but also in the areas of political participation, human rights and good governance which are essential components of a democratic discourse. Brain drain is concerned mainly with the loss of Human Capital (HC) represented by the knowledge, skills and competencies possessed by the people who emigrate from their home country. Brain drain also has a direct detrimental effect on capacity building and overall economic, social and political development, including democratisation. Therefore, brain drain may conceivably have an effect on all aspects of development.

Why the Libyan brain drain and what is the problem?

Although brain drains can and do occur in highly developed countries – British doctors and nurses emigrating to the USA, Canada or Australia, for example, or Australian doctors and scientists emigrating to Europe and the USA – it is widely accepted that the great majority of the brain drain movement is from developing countries, mainly of the third world or ‘South’, to the developed countries of the ‘North’. One of the definitions of brain drain is given as ‘an abnormal form of scientific exchange between countries characterised by a one-way flow in favour of the most highly developed countries’ was offered by (UNESCO).

Libya is a country with a small population, which has grown from about three million thirty years ago to about six million today, and considerable wealth based on natural resources of oil and gas. Libya has also relied heavily on large numbers of foreigners (estimated at a maximum of around two million) to drive its development plans, including skilled doctors, engineers and academics who meet an indigenous shortage. And yet it has been noticeable that thousands of highly skilled and highly needed Libyans have chosen to take their knowledge and expertise abroad, mainly to the USA, Canada, the UK, other European countries and some Arab Gulf states. Such movement constitutes a brain drain from Libya.

Other Arab countries, like those in the Gulf region, also share with Libya the characteristics of having small populations and immense wealth based on large oil and gas reserves and also of relying on imported foreign labour. And yet the highly educated and skilled citizens of
these countries do not migrate in their thousands to apply their skills abroad, which make Libya all the more intriguing as a case study. The comparison between Libya and Gulf Arab states is examined more closely later in the thesis (in Chapter I) in terms of the “Human Capital Flight Index” where Gulf States show the lowest level of migration out of the 13 Arab countries considered and also against the background fact that Gulf Arab States are not democratic. Yet they suffer low levels of migration of their own human capital while attracting hundreds, if not thousands, of highly educated and skilled Libyans.

Libya has acknowledged in recent years, especially through Seiful-islam Gadhafi (son of the Libyan leader) who is seen by some as a new champion for reform in Libya, that it is keen to attract back the thousands of its highly educated and skilled citizens who chose to emigrate, so that they can participate in the new impetus for reform and development, especially since the rapprochement with the international community that began in 2003. The Libyan health minister “Mohamed Hijazi” was quoted in various press interviews in 2009 as acknowledging the migration of a few thousand Libyan medical doctors whom he wishes to attract back to Libya in order to reduce reliance on foreign doctors and help improve the healthcare services.

Essentially, the problem of brain drain in Libya is that the migration of this valuable Libyan human capital in a country with such a small population creates a shortage that is not easily or sufficiently compensated for in order to meet the challenges of development. Vital drivers of development like high quality education, capacity building and a high standard of healthcare are all negatively impacted by this brain drain. Unfortunately, the suspected significant brain drain in Libya is not easily quantifiable due to the scarcity of reliable data, especially from the Libyan government, as we will see in Chapter I when literature on the brain drain in Libya is reviewed.

**Lack of human resource data**

Lack of reliable information and data is also extended to the wider area of ‘human resources’ in Libya where it is very difficult to ascertain total numbers of university graduates over the last three decades or of holders of postgraduate qualifications. Total numbers of lecturers, scientists, engineers, managers and others are lacking and the only detailed reliable human resource data available is in the field of healthcare, thanks mainly to the annual reports on Libya by the World Health Organisation (WHO). International institutions like the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international academic specialists on
Libya have repeatedly expressed frustrations and cautions against data generated by the Libyan authorities because of serious manipulations for political propaganda purposes.

**Research Aims**

The research aims are concerned to empirically evaluate and gain an understanding of the interrelationship between the brain drain, democratisation and overall human development in Libya over the last thirty years.

The research aims to critically evaluate the contemporary theories of evaluation of human development based mainly on economic/educational indices, and consider human development in terms of more holistic measures, based on the capability approach that incorporates a wide range of reflective indices, including freedom and human rights.

The research also aims to give an assessment of the state of overall human development in Libya, including political development and the state of democracy, and whether it has been detrimentally impacted by the brain drain, taking into account, however, the potential impact of the international sanctions imposed on Libya by the United Nations from 1992 to 1999 and the role of imported foreign skilled and non-skilled labour in Libya.

Finally, the research aims to explore possible strategies needed to attract highly educated and skilled Libyans to engage and contribute to their home country, and even more crucially if Diaspora Libyans can make an important contribution to developing an inclusive bottom-up new ‘strategic vision’ for the country and help meet the challenges of realiseing this vision.

**Research objectives**

The main objectives of the research are to:

1- Critically assess the contemporary relevance of measuring human development attainment purely on socio-economic factors as stipulated by the HDI and explore the advantages of a more holistic approach based on the Capabilities Approach (CA).

2- Establish a research baseline drawn from reviewing the literature, OECD skilled migration data base and a preliminary quantitative survey (questionnaire) of a sample of Diaspora Libyans to provide a framework for further empirical evaluations.
3- Assess whether key causes, or PUSH factors, of the brain drain are linked to democracy, lack of democratic values, ‘repression’ or socio-economic development factors.

4- Examine the role of foreign skilled labour in Libya, especially in terms of offsetting any loss in human capital due to the brain drain.

5- Assess the viability and importance of both the ‘Return option’ and ‘Diaspora option’ strategies in tackling the phenomenon and effects of brain drain in Libya.

6- Explore the potential contribution of Diaspora Libyans to realising a strategic vision and meeting the challenges ahead of overall human development in Libya.

Key Research questions

1- At what level, if any, was brain drain happening in Libya?
2- Who qualifies as part of the brain drain?
3- How is human development set back by brain drain in Libya?
4- Can skilled foreign workers offset the impact of Libyan brain drain?
5- Is it democracy or democratic values and liberty or development that drives brain drain and its reduction or reversal more?
6- Which strategies are best for tackling brain drain ‘return’ option or ‘Diaspora’ option?
7- What role can experts have in the process of democratisation?
8- How can Diaspora Libyans make a positive contribution towards articulating a new vision for Libya and realising its development objectives and aspirations?

Importance of this research

There has not been any published study to date on the brain drain in Libya, apart from a few articles highlighting the existence of the phenomenon and the detrimental effect it is having on the country’s development and reform plans. ‘Libya does suffer from the brain drain phenomenon; for various reasons some Libyans have decided to return home, while others have not’ (Zaptia, 2007). According to Tashani (2009: 129), there are four major reasons that may explain the problems facing scientific research in Libya in particular, the first of which is the brain drain. Lack of funding, lack of scientific infrastructure and teaching overload are also contributory factors. The other published research which partially tackles the Libyan brain drain is a paper by three Libyan medical doctors, Benamer, Bredan and Bakoush (2009), working in the Diaspora (in the UK, in Belgium and in Sweden). Their empirically
Based on my literature review and abstract scan of other completed research, I did not find any empirically based study even on the wider dimension of the Arab brain drain. Moreover, there has not been, to my knowledge, any research that attempted to evaluate or offers an empirically supported link between the brain drain and the lack of democracy, the rule of law and poor human development attainment levels. Although my research here is based on the brain drain in Libya, the implications can be extended to other similar countries in the Middle East and Africa regions.

For the first time, empirically supported findings test the contemporary understanding and theory of human development based mainly on economic/educational factors and attempts to presents evidence that human development is linked to more crucial factors such as freedom, democracy and human rights.

**Some important definitions**

The definitions of key concepts of the thesis, such as, the brain drain, democracy and democritisation and human development are covered respectively in Chapters III, IV and V. However, there are other equally important concepts that are widely discussed or referred to in this thesis, including human capital, social capital, capacity building, human security for which definitions are offered here. Another equally important concept is governance which is defined and discussed in terms of ‘good governance’ in chapter II and in terms of other forms of governance which could be even more relevant to a developing country like Libya such as: ‘humane governance’, ‘good enough governance’ and ‘collaborative governance’ discussed in chapter VIII.

In its fifth session held on (27-31 March, 2006), the Committee of Experts on Public Administration, part of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, adopted a Compendium offering definitions of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration. The definitions of these concepts covered in the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration’s paper included the following:
**Human Capital**

According to the UN (2006: 14), expenditures on education, training, medical care and so on, constitutes investments in human capital. They are called human capital because people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, expertise, health or values in the same way that they can be separated from their financial and physical assets.

**Social Capital**

An explanation based on a World Bank definition refers to social capital as the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. However, according to UN (2006: 14):

Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions that underpin a society; it is the glue that holds those institutions together. And whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.

**Capacity building**

Capacity building is explained as the process by which individuals, organisations, institutions and societies in general develop abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve goals and objectives. Capacity building needs to be considered at three interrelated levels: individual, institutional and societal. A specific definition is:

Capacity building encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, and institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of capacity building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options (UN, 2006: 7).
**Human security**

According to UN (2006: 13), human security encompasses protecting vital freedoms, protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations and building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the three vital building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security involves different types of freedoms: freedom from want; freedom from fear; and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. Human security can be achieved using two general strategies: protection and empowerment; protection shields people from danger and empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making.

**Structure and organisation of thesis:**

This thesis is organised into an introduction, eight chapters and a conclusion.

**The introduction** as shown above, introduces the three themes of this research and the possible interrelationship between them. It also addresses the choice of the Libyan brain drain, the possible importance of this research and defines in advance some of the key concepts discussed in the thesis.

**Chapter I** provides background and a historical perspective, discussing Libya’s political, economic and social development. This is important to help set the scene for detailed discussion and development of the main topics and components of this thesis, namely: the brain drain, democratisation and human development in Libya. The political ideology of the Libyan regime and the country’s economic performance in the last forty years are reviewed and linked to overall development attainment and the Libyan brain drain. The chapter also reviews the literature specifically on Libyan brain drain and attempts to signpost it with political and economic developments. The possible impact of skilled foreign workers in Libya on development is also considered.
Chapter II provides an account of the state of human development in Libya in the last three and half decades (1975-2010), supported by various indices and data on human development measures. These go further than those advocated by the HDI (life expectancy, education levels, literacy and income per capita) to embrace others that are more representative of the expanded and more comprehensive reflection of human development articulated herein. Such measures include: political participation and free elections, transparency levels, freedom of speech, press freedom, internet accessibility and penetration, respect for human rights, independence of the judiciary, women’s participation and governance. The impact of international sanctions against Libya in the 1990s is also reviewed in this chapter.

Chapter III provides a theoretical review of the concept of the brain drain. The definitions, origins and extent of the global brain drain phenomenon are discussed. The Arab brain drain is discussed in detail, including its magnitude and the possible causes and factors contributing to it. The chapter also discusses the ‘PUSH’ factors causing human capital to leave their countries of origin and the ‘PULL’ factors which developed nations are using to attract this human capital. Also explored is the recent shift from brain drain to a ‘brain circulation’ paradigm, in which Diaspora networks are encouraged to facilitate the reconnection of skilled migrants with their origin countries.

Chapter IV provides a theoretical review of the concepts of democracy and democratisation. A historical perspective on the origins and evolution of democracy is provided, whereby according to Keane (2009) in his recent book *The Life and Death of Democracy*, the origins of democracy go back not just two thousand years to the assemblies of Athens in ancient Greece, but nearly four thousand years to the popular assemblies of Syria-Mesopotamia. Democratisation, as a transitional process to democracy, is also discussed. Models for measuring democratisation and factors that affect its success are explored. Democracy and democratisation are also linked to the brain drain and overall human development.

Chapter V provides a theoretical review of the concept of human development including the origins of the human development ‘paradigm’ and its holistic approach to development generally, including sustainable development. The chapter critically evaluates how human development has been measured so far, based on the Human Development Index (HDI), and
the capabilities approach (CA) is considered in detail along with the interrelationship between human development and freedom, human rights, democracy, human capital and capacity-building. The chapter briefly discusses human development in the Arab world; since the highly publicised annual Arab Human Development reports began to be published by the UNDP in 2002, they have generated vibrant discussions on the issue of Arab human development. The future of human development in the era of globalisation is also briefly considered.

**Chapter VI** Provides the hypothesis, methodology and baseline drawn from a preliminary questionnaire as well as from the literature review and OECD census data on skilled migration. The baseline provides an analytical framework against which qualitative research in the form of ‘in-depth interviews’ can be carried out and analysed. The chapter also addresses methodological issues such as: research bias, data deficiency and any opportunities and limitations. Research Methodology literature is consulted.

**Chapter VII** provides the analysis and findings of the qualitative empirical research based on the in-depth interviews. A total of (11) interviews are analysed in detail against a framework set out in the research baseline and key research questions.

**Chapter VIII** attempts to provide a vision for Libya that is inclusive and based on a bottom-up approach and participation. It also considers the challenges, current and future, of human development in Libya. It argues that looking at human development mainly in terms of economic development is no longer adequate and that the debate has advanced rapidly in the last few years, demanding a much more comprehensive and holistic approach to our understanding of human development. Amartya Sen’s articulation of ‘Development as freedom’ has greatly contributed to and enhanced our understanding of human development. If human development is about enlarging choices for people, then political, social and intellectual choices are just as important. The chapter also links any potential contribution of educated/skilled Libyans in the Diaspora to meeting these challenges and realising the strategic vision.

**The Conclusion** attempts to summarise the key themes and findings of the research and suggests areas and directions where this research can be taken further.
Chapter I

The Politics and Economy of Libya

The chapter starts with reviewing what is scarcely available in the literature on the Libyan brain drain relying mainly on data published by OECD reporting on levels of migration of total number of expatriates and proportion of highly-skilled in OECD countries, by country of birth. The chapter then reviews Libya’s politics and economy concentrating mainly on the recent Gadhafi era and attempts to signpost any important junctures at which there has been a significant evidence of Libyan brain drain.

1.1 Is there a Libyan brain drain?

One of the definitions of brain drain offered in this thesis is that it is a ‘one-way movement of highly skilled people from developing countries to the developed countries that only benefits the industrialised countries’ (Gaillard, 1997).

It is important to note that the Libyan government has not published any reports or data on the brain drain from Libya, nor did it even acknowledge the existence of such a trend until very recently in 2009/10, when, for example, the Minister of Health admitted, in various press interviews with Libyan papers, that there were large numbers of Libyan doctors practicing abroad who are not easily persuaded to return and practice in their home country. Also, speaking at a seminar at the London School of Economics entitled ‘Libya; past present and future’ on 26 May 2010, Seiful-islam Gadhafi, son of the Libyan leader, acknowledged that there was a brain drain problem in Libya – attributing the causes mainly to economic factors!

The scarcity of literature on the brain drain in Libya is also due to lack of studies and research in the area, which makes the empirical research undertaken in this thesis the first in its field. Indeed, even within the wider Arab brain drain context, there has not been, to date, any dedicated primary empirical research exploring this important Arab phenomenon. The following is a review of what the key literature findings are for both the Libyan and Arab brain drain over the last three decades.
The first documented literature data on educated Libyans abroad can be found in (Zahlan, 1981: 128), where the total number of Libyan students in tertiary education studying abroad in 1975 was (2126) compared to (11997) studying in Libya, as per UNESCO’s statistical book of 1977, which equates to nearly one in five university students. My own personal experience, having arrived in the UK in September 1975 to pursue my university studies, is that the first large exodus of Libyan students in the mid-1970s was the precursor to the phenomenon of Libyan brain drain that started few years later. Many of those students and others who followed them later were on government sponsorship study programmes, but opted not to return to Libya as political events and other related dynamics inside Libya started to unfold.

One study which seems to be often quoted as a main source, when it comes to quantifying the extent of brain drain, is an IMF working paper published by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) which uses data on stock of migrants by educational level for those who migrated to member countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). For the USA, the data are drawn from census records; for other member countries, from the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration (Carrington and Detragiache, 1999: 2). The study covers migration from 61 developing countries, accounting for 70 per cent of the total population of developing countries.

An important study which concentrates on migration from North Africa is presented by Baldwin-Edward (2006), entitled: ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration and transit migration’. The paper covers in detail Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, and in relation to the last it states that ‘some limited temporary emigration occurred, mostly of businessmen and students to Malta and Egypt’, citing as a reference a report by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration following a fact-finding visit to Libya in June 2004. The Norwegian report is misleading because Malta and Egypt have the lowest levels of Libyan immigration, apart from the period between 1992 and 1999 when air travel to and from Libya was banned by the United Nations and both countries were used in travel transit. In order to reach further destinations around the world, Libyans went to Malta by sea or to Tunisia and Egypt by road.

The paper by Baldwin-Edward then attempts to address the issue of skilled emigration from North Africa, but concedes that reliable information is in very short supply. It goes on to
quote figures supplied by the OECD (2005) database: the total number of expatriates in the OECD and the proportion of them who are highly skilled, classified by country of birth, are given and a comparison made between five countries – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – highlighted in tabular format below. For Libya, the total number quoted is (27,481), of which 43.4 per cent or (11,927) are highly skilled in 2005. It is important to note, however, that countries like Italy, Greece and Turkey do not provide data for the OECD database; therefore, these figures have to be scrutinised and, where possible, supported by other sources and methods of quantifying the extent of the brain drain. (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005 & 2006).

(Table 18) - Total number of expatriates and proportion of highly-skilled in OECD countries, by country of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of expatriates</th>
<th>Of which: highly skilled (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,301,076</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>274,833</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,481</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,364,754</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>371,274</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2005: Table II.A2.6)

It is also important to remember that the numbers in the OECD database table above exclude Libyan migrants residing outside the OECD countries, especially in Arab countries such as Egypt, the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. A well respected international academic and specialist on Libya gives an estimated overall total numbers of Libyans living in the Diaspora when stating that ‘the estimated one hundred thousand Libyans now living in exile are in part a testimony to the persistent disintegrative effects of the lack of consensus’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 184).

Another study paper covering immigration from Arab countries to OECD countries is by Dumont (2006), entitled ‘Immigrants from Arab World to the OECD: From the past to the future’ and presented to a United Nations expert group meeting on international migration and development in the Arab world in Beirut, May 2006. The paper again uses census data compiled by the OECD countries around the year 2000 for all migrant stocks on the bases of country of birth and level of qualification. Its first important finding, which concerns the whole Arab world, is that:
In total, 4.9 million persons born in Arab countries were living in OECD countries in 2000. This represents 11.8 per cent of all foreign-born originating from non-OECD countries, a share that is more than double that of the Arab countries' population in the non-OECD world population of 4.9 per cent in 2000 (Dumont, 2006: 3).

As for Libya, the paper gives a total of (69,190) migrants born in Libya and residing in OECD countries in the year 2000, of which a total of (37,608) were residing in Italy alone and the remaining (31,582) in the rest of OECD countries.

The total number of Libyan migrants quoted above by Dumont (2006) is confusing and could be misleading, to say the least, because we know from casual anecdotal evidence and experience that the number of Libyan migrants in Italy is much less than (37,608). Also Baldwin-Edwards (2006) paper above stated that Italy is one of few member countries which do not normally contribute data to the OECD database! The only logical explanation for this is that this figure refers to people of Jewish and Italian origin who were born in Libya between 1911, when Italy colonised Libya, and 1970, when the Gadhafi regime decided to expel both communities from Libya, totalling over 40,000 people. Most went to Italy, although some of the Libyan Jews headed straight from Italy to Palestine (Israel). This explanation is supported by further data given in the paper, which states that almost half of these supposedly Libyan immigrants to Italy were women which is not consistent with recent Libyan migration being mainly male and that about 88 per cent of them did not become naturalised Italian citizens because they were ‘repatriated’ (Dumont, 2006: 11).

Dumont’s study paper then offers data on the specific type of migrants relevant to this research, the highly skilled. It suggests that a total of (969,726) highly skilled Arabs were residing in OECD countries in the year 2000, based on the census data. The total for Libyan highly skilled migrants is (15,547), which is slightly higher than the figure of (11,927) quoted above by Baldwin-Edwards (2006). It is important to note that all the OECD data are for migrants who were born in either Libya or the Arab countries as a whole. The figures do not take into account the children of these migrants, who constitute second- and even third-generation immigrants, because the majority of them automatically assume the citizenship of the OECD country in which they are born. As for the total number of Libyan skilled migrants, the OECD data do not cover Libyan migrants to Arab Gulf countries, which would
seem to be a sizable proportion based on casual anecdotal evidence; however, accurate systematic data is not available.

The Dumont study also offers data on the number of foreign students enrolled in tertiary education by country of origin and country of destination in OECD countries in 2003. The data for Libya give the total number of (2060) students, with (1052) in the UK, (227) in France, (224) in Germany and (33) in the USA (Dumont, 2006: 17). We know that this total number has increased sharply since 2003, as Libya normalised its relations with western countries, especially the USA. This data is very useful for comparison purposes against the first wave of Libyan students pursuing tertiary education overseas back in 1975, which was (2126) according to UNESCO data quoted by (Zahlan, 1981: 128).

It is important to remember that the exodus of Libyan students in the early 1970s was effectively the start of the Libyan brain drain, and now after Libya’s emergence from almost two decades of isolation during the 1980s and 1990s, we start to see Libyan students being sent again in their thousands to western countries for postgraduate studies, with the likelihood that many of them will again not return, adding to the existing brain drain phenomenon. This can only be averted if Libya tackles seriously the underlying fundamental causes of the brain drain that are discussed in detail in this thesis.

Mullan (2005), when examining the immigration of medical doctors to the USA, Canada, Australia and the UK in 2004, reported that there were (624) Libyan doctors working in these four western countries and that 63 per cent of them were practicing in the UK. Mullan also estimated that 8.9 per cent of all Libyan doctors were practicing in these four western countries. Also according to Clemens and Peterson, (2008), (585) Libyan doctors emigrated to seven OECD countries (the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK, France, Spain and Belgium), based on analysis of census data of estimated African-born doctors who migrated to these same countries.

The first empirically based study on one aspect of the Libyan brain drain was published by three Libyan migrant doctors, Benamer, Bredan and Bakoush (2009). Their study was ‘an attempt to identify some of the reasons behind the emigration of Libyan doctors and the factors that might induce them to return’. They obtained total of (225) e-mail addresses of Libyan doctors practicing outside Libya, and targeted them with a detailed three-part
questionnaire. They received (78) completed replies, giving a response of 35 per cent. Their findings showed that almost all respondents (97 per cent) obtained their first medical degree in Libya. The study also showed that the most important reason for initial migration was the desire for further education and research (88 per cent), while only (12 per cent) cited improving their income and living standard as the main reason. Furthermore, (54 per cent) would consider returning to Libya and (58 per cent) would be motivated to return by reform of the Libyan healthcare system.

In a review published in the Libyan Journal of Medicine (LJM), Tashani (2009) attributes the problems facing scientific research in Arab countries in general, and in Libya in particular, to four major reasons, the first and second of which are brain drain and lack of funding.

In a paper published by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute entitled ‘Highly-skilled Migration (Libya) Legal aspects’, Maghur, Azza (2010: 4), a prominent female Libyan lawyer, offers a theoretical review of the phenomenon of the Libyan brain drain and cites three main waves of migration associated with it: the first in 1973; the second in the late 1970s following the publication of the Green Book; and the third in the mid-1990s. Maghur identifies the main factors behind the Libyan brain drain as being political, and includes the suppression of any form of opposition and the classification of those who opted to reside abroad as opponents of the regime. Maghur also cites the harsh measures taken against Islamists, including the jailing of hundreds of them, as a direct reason for hundreds of others, highly educated and skilled, fleeing Libya. Maghur also highlights the brain drain amongst Libyan doctors and quotes a number of between 2000 and 3000 practicing medicine outside Libya. However, this number is not supported by any independently published empirical data and the total number arrived at in this thesis is around (1500), excluding those who are sent by the Libyan government for training purposes.

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1 Between 1995 and 1998 nearly 700 young Libyans mostly university graduates, students or working professionals escaped Libya to avoid arrest and imprisonment after clandestine Islamic organisations belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and ‘Islamic Grouping’ were discovered by Libyan authorities. They arrived and sought political refugee status in UK, Switzerland, Germany and other EU countries. This is well documented by Amnesty International and HRW. Some of these young Libyans were participants in the questionnaire for this thesis.
1.2 Factor of skilled / unskilled foreign workers in Libya
Since Libya has attracted and relied on both skilled and unskilled workers for its development drive since it started exporting oil in 1964, it can be argued that foreign labour has more than compensated for any loss of Libyan human capital through the brain drain. The study of the impact of brain drain on development in Libya cannot be investigated fully and objectively without considering the foreign labour dimension as well and without attempting to answer the question of whether foreign labour, especially skilled labour, has offset the loss caused by Libyan brain drain.

Libya is a wealthy oil-exporting country with a relatively small population (the smallest in North Africa). At Independence in 1951, it was just one million, rising to about 1.54 million by 1964 when commercial exports of oil were in full flow. With a continued high fertility rate, the population increases by about 4 per cent annually to reach nearly 6 million today (5.7 million, according to the last census in 2007).

Having a relatively small and youthful population, Libya had to rely on foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled, to help support its growth and development plans. These foreign workers were mostly from nearby Arab countries and started to flow into Libya in their thousands as the oil did. ‘There were about 17,000 of them in 1964, but the total had risen to 64,000 by 1971 and 223,000 in 1975, when foreign workers made up almost 33 per cent of the labour force’ (Chapin Metz, 1987). In 1980, although the official number of foreign workers in Libya was 280,000, unofficial estimates put it at more than 500,000 due to illegal entry and under-reporting. A large percentage of foreigners were unskilled labour working mainly in the agriculture and construction sectors.

According to Yahia & Saleh, (2008), the number of expatriates in Libya grew from 262,000 (12.2 per cent of total population) in 1972 to a total of 412,000 (7.1 per cent of total population in 2005 as shown by the table below. At the end of the 1973-75 development plan, ‘expatriate labour still provided 40 per cent of Libya’s unskilled labour, 27 per cent of its semi-skilled and skilled personnel, 35 per cent of all technicians, and 58 per cent of all its managers’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 89). By 1986, Libya still relied on expatriate labour for 35 per cent of all technicians and 60 per cent of all managers, many of whom came from Europe and the United States (Vandewalle, 1998: 119).
(Table 1) – Comparison of Libyan population & expatriates working in Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Thousand persons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals</td>
<td>1,888 (87.8)</td>
<td>2,805 (86.0)</td>
<td>4,590 (89.9)</td>
<td>5,438 (92.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>262 (12.2)</td>
<td>441 (13.5)</td>
<td>511 (10.1)</td>
<td>412 (7.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** figures between parentheses are percentages out of total population.

Sources: (Yahia and Saleh, 2009) collected by the authors

The majority of foreign workers in Libya have always been unskilled, drawn mainly from neighboring Arab countries; Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and to a lesser extent semi-skilled Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese, working mostly in the agriculture, construction and service sectors. Libya has also attracted skilled workers such as doctors, engineers, managers, teachers and university lecturers who tended to come from Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Europe, including Eastern Europe. Foreign skilled workers have mainly dominated the crucial oil sector, but the numbers are relatively low, around 3000, accounting for only one per cent of all foreign workers in 1980, according to (Chapin Metz, 1987, Congress Library). This is consistent with the fact that the oil sector is not a highly labour-intensive industry, although it provides the majority of revenue in oil-exporting countries.

The exact extent of both unskilled and skilled labour in Libya is not easy to ascertain as the phenomenon has been neither monitored nor recorded accurately. However, from all the scattered research data, it is estimated that the total number of foreign workers is over half a million and likely closer to one million. Research from different sources shows that numbers have been sensitive to, and affected by, different factors, such as political stability, fluctuating oil prices and overall economic activity.

According to Bhairi, (1981) and Keibah, (1987), the proportion of foreign workers increased sharply during the oil boom of 1972 to 1982, but many of them left in the mid-1980s when restrictions on the repatriation of earnings were announced, or were expelled by the Libyan regime as a result of political antagonism with countries like Egypt and Tunisia (Chapin Metz, 1987).
Yahia and Saleh (2008) carried out a detailed empirical analysis of the effect of economic sanctions and fluctuating oil prices on local and foreign employment in Libya, concentrating on the periods of sharp decline in oil prices (1983–1998) and sanctions (1990–2003). Their conclusions showed that both factors had a negative impact on the movement of skilled non-Libyan workers, resulting in a huge loss of this type of labour, which was almost impossible to replace in the short term. It is also the case that during the two decades (1980s and 1990s) during which Libya’s economic performance was poor as a result of the sharp drop in revenue and in the real value of local currency, and stagnation in many projects and sectors, the quality and calibre of foreign skilled workers also dropped. Foreigners with skills and expertise left, either to return to their home countries or to seek opportunities elsewhere.

Furthermore, during the 1990s Libya attracted thousands of highly skilled Iraqi doctors, engineers and university lecturers who had left home due to the conflict with the West and the comprehensive sanctions that the country suffered between 1990 and 2003. In essence, what was a brain drain for Iraq became a brain gain for Libya. In 1997 Col. Gadhafi, in pursuit of his vision of unifying all African countries, announced that all African citizens were welcome to come to Libya without visas. This opened the gates for a huge continuous influx of African migrants, mainly from sub-Saharan countries, for almost ten years and has pushed the total number of foreigners in Libya to about two million. ‘There are officially one million foreign workers in Libya, a country of six million, but the unofficial total of foreign workers – many of them staying illegally – is closer to two million’ (The Villager, 2004).

The presence of over one million unskilled illegal African workers in Libya since 1997 has imposed significant strains on Libyan society. There is anecdotal evidence of Libyans complaining that African migrants, unable to find work, have resorted to crime, drug selling, prostitution and other anti-social behaviour in what is a generally conservative Muslim country. Human trafficking and the smuggling of African migrants to southern Europe across the Mediterranean Sea have also become a hot political issue and a source of antagonism between Libya and the European Union. Hundreds of thousands of illegal African migrants have used Libya as a staging post on their way to Europe. They would spend years working in Libya to earn enough money to pay for the dangerous crossing, mainly to southern Italy. ‘Each year, with the help of the Libyan mafia, tens of thousands of African workers attempt to make it to Italy, smuggled across the Mediterranean in boats for $2000 per person’ (The Villager, 2004).
Many human rights organisations have reported the mistreatment of illegal African migrants by the Libyan authorities, describing how migrants are rounded up and kept in crowded camps in sub-human conditions. And many European and international commentators have accused the Libyan regime of using the human trafficking of Africans to Europe as a ploy to pressurise the EU into making concessions in its political and economic relations with Libya. As the primary target of the traffickers, Italy has attempted to court Col. Gadhafi and keep him happy in order to resolve the issue and gain economic favours in its special relationship with the Gadhafi regime.

It is important to remember that Libyan law prohibits foreign workers, skilled or unskilled, from working for government departments and institutions. In fact, even those Libyans who are married to a non-Libyan citizen require special permission from the government to work in the state sector. Foreign workers tend to work for hospitals or educational establishments, while those in the oil sector tend to be employed by international oil companies. Foreign companies who win contracts in the fields of construction, agriculture and manufacturing tend to bring the required human resources and skills with them. Libya does not grant foreign expatriates permanent residency or award them Libyan citizenship, and in the last few years has attempted to regulate closely the influx of foreign workers through official work permits and contracts which stipulate that each foreign worker should be sponsored by a local individual or company. There have also been moves recently to reduce the number of illegal African migrants and to expel those who do not have proper documents and work visas.

1.3 Can skilled foreign workers offset Libyan brain drain?

As discussed the great majority of the roughly one million foreign workers in Libya are unskilled, employed mainly in the agriculture, construction and general services sectors. The skilled workers – doctors, engineers, managers and university lecturers – constitute a small percentage of the total foreign workforce, estimated to be in the tens of thousands. A large proportion of the skilled workers tend to come as part of the staff of foreign companies which come to Libya to deliver specific projects. The number of foreign workers in Libya (both skilled and unskilled) has fluctuated over the last four decades, depending on how well the Libyan economy was performing. According to (Yahia and Saleh, 2008: 1717), fluctuations
in oil prices (particularly the decline from 1983 to 1998) and the internationally imposed sanctions of 1990 to 2003 had the effect of reducing the amount of foreign labour in Libya.

The following arguments can be made against the hypothesis that foreign skilled labour may have offset the loss in human capital through brain drain that Libya has experienced in the last three decades:

Foreign employees are prohibited by Libyan law from working for government departments and institutions, which means that they cannot fill managerial positions or contribute to the planning and implementation of economic and overall development strategies.

Foreign employees in Libya are not allowed to become naturalised Libyan citizens, no matter how long they reside in Libya, which means that they have no civic or political rights, and cannot engage or participate in the internal dynamics of Libyan development, including political development.

Anecdotal evidence exists of Libyans complaining about the quality and level of competence of foreign doctors recruited to work in Libya from countries like Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria and others. The language barrier is believed to make it difficult for these doctors to provide competent quality service compared to Libyan medical doctors. Therefore, these foreign doctors cannot substitute adequately and fully for those Libyan doctors who have emigrated.

Skilled foreigners may also have a negative impact on overall human development and especially political development in Libya, since the regime can afford to exclude or force the emigration of those highly skilled Libyans who are also critical of the regime, replacing them with foreigners who have no rights to engage in internal affairs and political dynamics. There have even been cases where the Libyan regime has recruited non-Libyans (mainly Arabs) to undertake propaganda campaigns on its behalf. Europeans (mainly from ex-Soviet bloc eastern European countries) have also been recruited into the security sector to help set up, train and even partly operate security agencies and apparatus, which in turn implement wide-ranging human rights violation of perceived critics and agitators of the regime.

1.4 Comparison with Arab Gulf states:
Libya should be comparable to the other oil-rich, lightly populated Arab countries in the Gulf region, which have a very low rate of migration and do not experience any brain drain. However, this comparison, on the surface, defies any proposition that brain drain has a direct causal relationship with democracy. The obvious argument is that if Gulf Arab states, who
are clearly not democratic, have very low migration of their own human capital and have also attracted many highly educated/skilled Libyan then lack of democracy is not a push factor?!

A study by the World Bank provided a human capital flight index for a total of 13 Arab countries, including five oil-rich Gulf States\(^2\) (see table below published in the UNDP Arab Knowledge report of 2009, page 209), which showed clearly that the oil countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar had the least migration or flight of human capital.

So why Libya does not enjoy similar wealth distribution, high levels of prosperity and well-developed infrastructure to that of the Arab Gulf States? An even more relevant question here is why Libya has experienced a brain drain phenomenon and the Gulf States have not. Why, relatively speaking, have the Gulf States been able to hold on to their highly educated and skilled human capital, when Libya has not? It can be argued that Libya is geographically different and has a different socio-economic history, structure and culture, but these do not adequately explain the disparity, since the demographic and economic fundamentals of a natural resource-based economy are very similar.

(Figure 1) Human Capital Flight Index for thirteen Arab countries.

The reasons are likely to be related to differences in political systems, structure and ideology. The Libyan regime under Gadhafi has pursued a revolutionary discourse attempting to export its political ideals to the wider arena internationally, and has sought to galvanise the Libyans behind these grandiose, but mostly ill-fated schemes. Those who did not subscribe to the revolutionary discourse were treated with suspicion.

\(^2\) Libya was not one of the 14 countries for which the World Bank has provided a human capital flight index based on the knowledge assessment methodology (KAM) 2008. This could be due to the unavailability of data from Libya, a common problem for many international organisations monitoring socio-economic trends globally.
and classified in many instances as ‘enemies of the revolution’.

The Libyan regime would not tolerate any dissent or criticism and clamped down ruthlessly on those whom it saw as obstructing the revolutionary ideals, leading to a widespread fear of reprisals, especially against students and those who held different ideological beliefs. It is this culture of intolerance of any differences and sheer oppression that led many young educated Libyans to seek safety and freedom outside Libya. During the late 1970s and 1980s, Libya witnessed a large-scale exodus of students, intellectuals and business owners who felt that their choices were becoming too limited, with even their lives and general safety at risk. This is symptomatic of authoritarian regimes that become so intolerant of freedom of expression, independent civil society and a pluralist culture in general.

It can also be argued that those Libyans with high human capital who either migrated directly from Libya to Gulf states or engaged in a second migration from places like USA, Canada and Europe to settle and hold high jobs in the Gulf states were possibly looking for an environment more closely resembling the culture of the home country, in which their children can still be educated to a high standard, yet in an Arabic/Islamic environment. They may have also been attracted by the high reward and recognition, financial and otherwise, for their expertise as well as by a safe, secure and stable environment where the role of law is strong. These factors, which are lacking in Libya, may have conceivably been important enough for those Libyans, even though in Arab Gulf states they would not live in a democracy or be allowed to participate critically in the indigenous political dynamics.

1.5 Libya, a historical perspective
Libya as an independent country within its present boundaries only came into existence in 1951, when it was declared an independent state on (24 December, 1951). An earlier vote by the United Nations General Assembly had passed a resolution on 21 November 1949 granting Libya independence (Khadduri, 1963).
To date, a momentous journey has been witnessed and experienced by Libyans since that Independence Day in December 1951. A small, extremely poor population of about one million people has grown almost six fold and harsh economic conditions have been transformed by the discovery of vast reserves of oil and gas. The political system and landscape have also undergone radical change from a pro-West conservative monarchy led by
King Idris to a radical revolutionary Jamahiriya or ‘state of the masses’ led by a maverick leader ‘Col. Gadhafi’, who put the name of Libya on the world map.

1.6 Historical overview

For most of the last (5000 years) Libya has been a zone of transition rather than a power centre (Parker, 1984: 64). It has been known by different names and subject to many invasions, whose settlers left their vivid marks, visible to this day, scattered everywhere.

In 1551 the Ottoman Turks extended their rule to Libya and the country became part of the Ottoman Empire for nearly four centuries, until it was conquered by Italy in 1911. The Italian occupation of Libya, which was to last for thirty-three years, had a devastating effect on the country; it was a brutal and bloody time, during which almost half the Libyan population (of about 1.5 million) perished, either killed in battle against the occupying force or dying of disease and starvation, as did the hundreds of thousands who were incarcerated in concentration camps by the Italy’s colonial fascist regime.

Tens of thousands of Libyans (some estimates put it around 150,000) also escaped the brutality of the Italian occupiers by migrating to neighbouring countries (Tunisia, Egypt and Chad) and to Syria and Turkey. This large migrant population included religious and political leaders of the resistance movement against the Italians and also many activists and students who sought to pursue their education in places like Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo and Zeitona mosque in Tunisia. Many of these Libyans migrant communities in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria became very active politically campaigning for Libya’s independence from Italian occupation and many of these leaders returned after the end of the war to play a crucial role in the setting up of a new independent Libyan state in 1951. Was this forced migration of tens of thousands of Libyans by Italian colonialist brutality an early example of Libyan brain drain? However, even if it was this is not within the scope of this research thesis. With hindsight, an argument could be made that the brutality of the Gadhafi regime has forces tens of thousands of high human capital Libyans who formed an active Libyan Diaspora that could play a similar role by contributing to the reform of Libya politically as well as socially and economically.

1.7 Libyan Independence and state formation

Following the end of the Second World War and the defeat of the Axis powers – Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan – by the Allies, Libya’s administrators changed again. The
victorious British army had taken control of Libya’s two main regions (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) by the end of 1943. Libya had officially become a British protectorate, with a British military administration in both regions. The southern region of Fezzan was allocated to the French forces advancing north from Chad, which was a French colony.

The British administration in northern regions began to create a native core civil service, with native Arabs encouraged to fill positions of responsibility. The services of those natives who had worked under the Italian administration and of those political exiles who returned after the defeat of Italy were also sought and encouraged by the British (Khadduri, 1963: 51). The number of native Libyan officials taking part in the administration of their people’s affairs grew steadily as young men returned from educational missions in countries such as Egypt and England.

The short eight-year period of British rule and administration contrasted greatly with Italy’s brutal, 33-year occupation and administration, under the leadership of Fascist Mussolini. The British were much more understanding and accommodating of local sensitivities and aspirations. They also promoted and capitalised on the notion that they were more a force of liberation from colonial Italy than another occupying force. This was reinforced when they started to implement some of the key agreements and promises they had made, prior to the outbreak of World War II, to the political elites of Cyrenaica in exile in Egypt, at that time headed by Prince Idris Sanusi, who would later become the king and leader of a newly independent Libya in 1951.

Under the British administration, a small number of the surviving Libyan elite, including intellectuals, were soon engaged in a dynamic new era of setting up political forums and parties, as well as publishing newspapers and magazines. The return of emigrant leaders from exile prompted the resumption of political activities in the relative freedom, safety and stability enjoyed under British rule. Libyan nationalism was becoming a dominant force in motivating the masses to demand total independence from the British and the transfer of power to native hands (Khadduri, 1963: 52). Such popular nationalist political parties included the ‘National Congress Party’, headed by a veteran popular leader, Bashir Saadawi, whose power base had its centre in the western province of Tripolitania, and the ‘Omar Mokhtar Society’, which mainly had power bases in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Derna and was named after the famous and internationally admired resistance leader, Omar
Mokhtar. He had led the military resistance to Italian occupation in the east of Libya until he was captured and hanged by the Italians in 1933, despite being an old man in his early eighties.

Eventually, it was the United Nations vote on 21 November 1949 which granted Libya full independence. What emerged from that vote was an agreement on the establishment of the United Kingdom of Libya under Idris Sanusi as King, with the three provinces of Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east and Fezzan in the south united as one country, with each of the three provinces having its own regional government within a federal system, modelled on those of the United States, Canada and Australia (Parker, 1984: 65). On 24 December 1951, Libya was declared an independent state under the leadership of King Idris I who was monarch not only of Cyrenaica, his power base, but the whole of the three provinces that made up the United Kingdom of Libya.

Economically, the newly formed Libyan state was very poor, relying heavily on aid from the United Nations and the export of three commodities – cuttlefish bone, esparto grass (used for making paper currency) and scrap metal from the battlefields. Education was still at a very embryonic stage, with the whole country having only a total of seven university graduates at the time of the declaration of Independence in 1951 (Parker, 1984: 64). The other source of income for the new country was rent from military bases leased by the United States and Britain. In other words, just under sixty years ago Libya was starting almost from a zero base of development.

At Independence in 1951 there was no hint at all of the huge, potential natural wealth that Libya possessed. Only ten years later, the discovery of oil would help transform the country from a barely self-sustaining agricultural and tribal society into a high-technology hydrocarbon economy with direct links to the international economy. Libya became one of the largest oil producers in the Middle East just over a decade after declaring independence (Vanderwalle, 1998: 42). In order to deal with the newly transformed economy, the country required complex state institutions and economic bureaucracies. Additionally, the oil-producing companies demanded unified legal structures and a central administrative control for the whole of Libya, leading to the abandonment of the federal system and in 1963 to complete unification under one central government with one political administration and one set of institutions for the whole country.
Only six years after the unification of Libya, it was clear that state-building and meeting the demands and aspirations of a rapidly evolving population was too much of a challenge for a traditional leadership that was characterised by indecisiveness and immobility as well as by a growing split within the ruling elite. King Idris, who was 61 when he became the political leader of an independent Libya in 1951, had aged and grown tired of the day-to-day demands of running the country effectively. He became disillusioned with power and at the age of almost 80 decided to write a letter of resignation (the contents of which were only made public years later), addressed to the leader of the Libyan senate, abdicating power and rule. He left the country on a sea-trip to Greece on the 7 of August 1969, probably intending never to return.

Just over three weeks later, on 1st September 1969, the Sanusi Monarchy regime was overthrown by a military coup, led by a 27-year-old junior army officer called Muamar Al-Gadhafi, who immediately gave himself the rank of colonel and who was to dramatically change the history of Libya thereafter.

1.8 The Gadhafi Coup and era of the Revolution
The military coup was not surprising at the time, considering that Libyans were agitating for a change from the monarchy, which was perceived as weak, corrupt and too pro-West, allowing the continued presence of American and British military bases on Libyan soil. The pressure for change was fuelled by growing nationalist and pan-Arab sentiments, which resonated throughout the Arab world and Middle East region, championed particularly by the charismatic and popular figure of President Nasser of Egypt.

The military regime headed by Gadhafi moved very swiftly to abolish the Libyan constitution that had served Libya for the previous eighteen years since independence and all political institutions, including the House of Representatives and the Senate. The new ruling body of the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council), headed and controlled by Gadhafi, assumed all executive and legislative powers and decided to make Libya a Republic. All the senior political elites and leaders of the monarchic regime were rounded up and put on trial for corruption and treason. The new revolutionary discourse was a mixture of nationalism, socialism, pan-Arabism, Islamism and anti-imperialism. It was clear that a revolutionary zeal was taking over from a traditional discourse of reform and state-building. One prominent ex-
prime Minster of the monarchic regime, Mustapha Ben-Halim, described his reaction to the new military leaders by stating that ‘the violent language they were using made me uneasy, but then I said to myself this was only to be expected from impetuous young men’ (Ben-Halim, 1994: 332). Mr Ben-Halim’s hopes that the new revolutionary leaders might embark on a reformist discourse were soon dashed when ‘it became clear that the coup leaders could not have been further removed from reform, and that they had no idea where they were going, that their regime was going to be repressive and totalitarian’ (Ben-Halim, 1994: 332).

1.9 Gadhafi’s Revolution:
The political change forced onto Libya by Gadhafi in 1969 was no isolated case; military coups swept many Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet Gadhafi insists to this day that what took place in Libya back in September 1969 was a popular revolution and not a military coup.

The first four years of the new regime, until the oil boom of 1973, were an interlude that allowed it to find its way and consolidate its power (Vandewalle, 1998: 80), before it started political mobilisation in support of its self-proclaimed revolution. Then in April 1973, Gadhafi started rolling out his own vision and ideas for Libya, which would effectively guarantee him absolute power. First, he declared the ‘People’s Revolution’, mobilising loyalists to form ‘popular committees’ that would run all institutions of power and civil institutions in the country. He then declared the ‘Cultural Revolution’, in which all those with political tendencies and ideological affiliations other than to the revolution would be purged, rounded up and imprisoned.

In 1975, Gadhafi announced the formation of ‘revolutionary committees’, made up of young revolutionary zealots, who would have widespread powers to enforce the will of the revolution and crush any individuals or groups who were deemed reactionary and to pose a threat to the revolutionary discourse. Then, in 1977, he proclaimed himself as the leader of the revolution and introduced his Third Universal Theory in the three-volume ‘Green Book’ political blueprint to which all Libyans would have to adhere and which would be implemented as the official, and only, political ideology in the country.

The Green Book advocated a new system of government based on ‘Direct Democracy’, whereby the country was divided into basic ‘People’s Congresses’, which debated and decided on all matters of public internal and external affairs, and ‘People’s Committees’,
which implemented the Congresses’ directives and policies. The declaration of political
cchange of Libya to a Jamahiriya, ‘state of the masses’ was made on 2 of March 1977. It was
supposed to give the Libyan people total control over all issues of political power and wealth.
Yet, in reality, the real power has always been firmly in the hands of ‘The Leader of the
Revolution’, Col. Gadhafi, a power he wields through a very effective, shadowy set of
intricate groups and apparatus consisting of security, revolutionary and tribal loyalists and
confidantes.

1.10 The Popular Revolution of 1973:

On 16 April 1973, in a momentous speech in the small coastal city of Zwara near the border
with Tunisia, Gadhafi launched his popular revolution as a new alternative to the one-party
system of the ASU. He argued that the ASU failed to mobilise the masses from above and a
mobilisation from below would achieve a popular revolution based on a five-point
programme which he outlined as: 1) the removal of all opponents of the revolution; 2) the
arming of the general population; 3) an administrative revolution; 4) a cultural revolution;
and 5) the suspension of all laws applicable at the time. The popular revolution, as envisaged
by Gadhafi, was meant to ‘destroy the classical bureaucratic system, by giving the public the
whole power and authority to change, dismiss and elect public officials on all levels’ (El-
Fathaly, Palmer and Chackerian 1977: 41). However, what this also showed, and what would
later come true, was that Gadhafi had no intention of extending the state, but rather intended
to dismantle whatever state institutions existed.

In his quest for political legitimacy, Gadhafi skilfully pursued populist measures and slogans
that were in tune with the sentiments and feelings of the Libyan population at large. His call
to remove American and British military bases from Libya, and the achievement of their
removal; his expulsion of nearly 50,000 Italians who had lived in Libya since the end of the
Italian occupation in 1944 and who owned large areas of fertile lands, huge farms, businesses
and properties, which were all nationalised and returned to Libyan ownership; his rhetoric on
Palestine and on the need for Arabs to unite so that they could confront Israel; his criticism of
the international oil companies and their dominance; his insistence on a more equitable share
of oil revenues with the oil giants; and his nationalisation of British Petroleum’s (BP)
operations in Libya in 1970 – all these were presented as the achievements of Gadhafi and
his revolution.
While appealing directly to the masses for support, Gadhafi was also pursuing another track, that of weakening and eradicating any potential opposition to his political vision and regime. In order to implement the first point of his five-point popular revolution programme announced in the famous Zwara speech on 16 April 1973, Gadhafi immediately ordered the rounding-up and imprisonment of hundreds of political activists with various ideological tendencies (Islamists, leftists, Baathists and Pan-Arabists), which in effect meant rounding up the entire political elite of Libya. Gadhafi accused them of being ‘reactionary’ forces that were trying to hinder and stifle the revolution, and of violating legislation that had been introduced a year earlier, namely Law number 71 of 30 May 1972, which prohibited all political parties and made belonging to one a crime punishable by death in some circumstances.

Although the popular revolution of April 1973 effectively ended the official role of the ASU as the ruling political party, the ASU was not officially dissolved. The following two years, during which the popular revolution and the ASU overlapped, ‘were marked by chaos and confusion, in part because the division of labour between the ASU and the popular committees had not been clearly articulated and no clear political programme existed for the committees’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 85). By the end of 1974, internal disagreements started to develop within the RCC, from which two camps emerged: those who were behind Gadhafi’s ideas and those who were critical of and opposed to some of his economic programmes and directives. In 1975, students in the two universities of Tripoli and Benghazi started to be vocal in their opposition to the Gadhafi’s military regime. They demanded the right to form free student unions and associations, a free press and freedom of expression, some even calling for Gadhafi and his military colleagues to go back to their barracks and allow the return of civilian rule.

The early crackdown on the Libyan political elite in April 1973 forced many who escaped imprisonment or were released after only a few months of being arrested to leave the country and seek refuge either in Egypt (which under Sadat was not on good terms with Gadhafi) or migrate to European countries such as the UK, Italy, France and others. This can be seen as an early sign of brain drain forced by political crackdown.

Daniel Kawczynski, a British Conservative member of parliament, in his recently published book *Seeking Gaddafi*, acknowledges this early student opposition to Gadhafi’s political discourse:
The year 1975 saw discontent with the regime erupt into widespread student
demonstrations, prompting the RCC to introduce compulsory military service for
young people as a solution to restive student politics. Gaddafi and his closest
allies had never much liked university students, viewing with suspicion their
tendency to ask too many questions (Kawczynski, 2010: 23).

Gadhafi’s response to the spread of students’ agitations was to order a harsh programme of
military service for all university and secondary school students during the two-month
summer holiday. It was clear that this was designed to discipline the students and break their
resolve. I was one of those tens of thousands of students who attended the military trainings,
starting in the summer of 1974. My military training was at the Bab-Alazizia barracks in
Tripoli, which was also Gadhafi’s headquarters. The division and disagreements between the
two camps (pro and anti-Gadhafi) within the now 11-member\(^3\) ruling RCC intensified in the
summer of 1975, coming to a head in August, when three RCC members attempted a military
coup to topple Gadhafi and his supporters from power. The attempt failed and its leader,
Umar Muhayshi, fled to Tunisia with some of his supporters in the aftermath (Bleuchot,
1983).

I recall vividly that during July and August of 1975 we were training at Bab-Alazizia
barracks supervised by high-ranking officers who knew Gadhafi well and had taken part in
the 1 September 1969 coup. The officer in overall charge of our training was a very
charismatic man called ‘Ahmed Bulifa’, with the rank of major. Major Bulifa and some of his
fellow officers were particularly nice to us during the summer of 1975, telling us that they did
not approve of us being humiliated by military training instead of spending our summer
holiday relaxing and getting ready again for the next school year. However, one day in
August 1975 we noticed that the whole barrack was on high military alert and some of the
officers training us had disappeared. Others took over, only to tell us that our training had
abruptly ended and we should go home. The following day, news of the attempted coup was
becoming public, and we learnt that those officers training us who had disappeared suddenly
were in fact part of the coup attempt, had been arrested and then later executed by military
courts on the orders of Gadhafi.

\(^3\) One of the twelve members of the RCC “Imhmed Mugarief” has died in a car accident in 1971, rumours at that
time were widespread that the death was not an accident! Because Mugarief was known for speaking his mind
and standing up to Gadhafi on many issues.
On 9 September 1975, only a few weeks after the major events of the attempted coup and power struggle within the RCC members, I left Libya for the UK to pursue my university studies. I know of hundreds of students who left Libya during 1974 and 1975 to complete their studies in the UK and the USA. The common ‘push factor’ was the overwhelming feeling of insecurity and the fear of a new culture of clampdown and oppression against public criticism of the regime. Many of those political activists (accused of belonging to ideologically based groupings) who had been purged and imprisoned immediately after the declaration of the five-point popular revolution in April 1973 were released about eighteen months later – most of them leaving immediately. 1974 and 1975 witnessed the first large migration of undergraduate and graduate students, as well as of political activists, and although their intention was to return to Libya once they had completed their studies, the majority of them never returned as the political and human rights situation worsened. They became part of the brain drain that Libya has experienced for the last thirty-five years.

1.11 Gadhafi’s hegemony of power and ideology

The events of the summer of 1975 and the involvement of three of its members in the failed coup attempt meant the end of the RCC as a ruling group and a political institution. Other RCC members who had not taken part in the coup attempt, but did not see eye–to–eye with Gadhafi, effectively resigned and withdrew from political and public life. This left only four members who were very loyal, including Major Jalloud, who was seen as Libya’s second-in-command, until he too was pushed out of political life and power in the early 1990s. Gadhafi, by now, was in total control of events in Libya, his power hegemony absolute; he felt that he had carte blanche to pursue his own vision and ideology of a stateless society and turn Libya into a Jamahiriyya, the Arabic word for a ‘state of the masses’. ‘From this point onward, Libya’s revolution turned ideological, and collegial decision making yielded inexorably to one-man rule’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 88).

As soon as the Green Book (GB) was published, slogans quoted directly from it started to appear everywhere, slogans such as ‘Committees Everywhere’, ‘Representation is Deception’ and ‘No Democracy without People’s Congresses’. Slowly, the old local government structure based on the one-party system of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was being replaced by Basic People’s Congresses and the ASU was abandoned to make way for Libya’s
emerging new political system. It was on 2 March 1977 that Gadhafi, in the city of Sabha, announced the ‘start of the era of the masses’ and the birth of the *Jamahiriyya*: Libya was renamed by Gadhafi as ‘The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya*’ (SPLAJ).

Immediately after the Sabha declaration,

All political control in Libya was now vested in the 187 Basic People’s Congresses and 47 Municipal People’s Congresses. The RCC was formally abolished, but Gadhafi and the four remaining original RCC members retained important positions, Colonel Gadhafi was from now on referred to as guide and leader, the same title Nasser had enjoyed in Egypt (Vandewalle, 1998: 98).

As the pioneer and founder of the new political order in Libya, Gadhafi became the leader of the revolution and the ultimate power, to whom everybody in charge of the new order referred for authority and guidance. The directive and instructions of the ‘brother leader’ as he later came to be known, were absolute and final. Everyone was accountable to Gadhafi—but he was, and is, accountable to no one.

1.12 The revolution replaces the state

What the military coup ‘revolution’ of 1 September 1969 achieved very effectively was to dismantle whatever state institutions had been achieved by the previous monarchy in the eighteen years after independence in 1951. The revolutionary discourse advocated the destruction of the old and its replacement with a completely new model. Libya no longer had a constitution, elected legislative bodies, independent judicial system or a privately owned and run, semi-free press. By October 1973, all independent newspapers had been nationalised (closed down) and replaced by an official revolutionary press. The process of breaking down the residual power of the previous monarchy’s bureaucratic structures continued inexorably (Vandewalle, 1998).

1.13 The Gadhafi student revolution of 7th April 1976

Against a background of high school and university students demanding freedom of political expression and the right to form their own free “Students Union”, Gadhafi ordered his own Loyalists within both Benghazi and Tripoli universities and other “Revolutionary Committee’s” members to crack down on the student agitators. The peak of the crackdown came on 7 April 1976 when two students were publicly hanged inside Benghazi University; similar, “commemorative” hangings were to take place in Tripoli University on the same day.
in 1977, 1983 and 1984. Following the initial, brutal crackdown many undergraduate and graduate students, especially those who were politically active and orientated, started to leave Libya in order to pursue and complete their studies abroad, mainly in the USA and the UK. This again constituted an early sign of migration and brain drain of Libyans at graduate and postgraduate level at a time in the late seventies when Libya needed every graduate for its development plans.

By 1980, the private economic sector had also been wiped out through waves of nationalisations and confiscations of private businesses and the closure of private shops and trading companies. Each family was allowed one house and one car (and not an expensive luxury one, either). Extra houses and cars were appropriated by authorities in the name of the revolution. Tens of thousands of businessmen, company owners, young aspiring entrepreneurs and others who wanted to fulfil their potential through economic and business activities decided to emigrate and leave the country for neighbouring Egypt or Tunisia, or to Europe and America. This constituted a loss in human capacity and capital and a brain drain.

In effect, the new revolutionary discourse of direct popular rule and public ownership embarked Libya on an experiment in unchartered territory: a very wealthy country with a small population was plunged into confusion and its citizens into sudden hardship and poverty. Basic public services, such as education and health, suffered greatly and complex bureaucratic systems for running public affairs were replaced by a culture of ruling through chaos, or ‘chaotic management’.

There was no tolerance of political dissent or of public criticism of this new revolutionary discourse, to the extent that protesting student leaders were publicly hanged in universities and prominent political critics inside Libya and abroad were hunted down and physically liquidated. In addition to a severe socialist economic order, sheer tyranny and rule by fear had become the political culture of revolutionary oil-rich Libya, especially during the 1980s.

Since 1977, Libya has had a ‘direct democracy’ system on paper only; in reality, it has been an absolute, totalitarian one-man rule. Indeed, the words of John Keane regarding the plausibility of a democracy based on the old Athenian ‘direct democracy’ concept (see Chapter II, Section 2.1.1) hold very true for the Libyan experience. According to Keane, (1998: 13) ‘heroic attempts to institute an undifferentiated system of self-government on a large scale normally end in confusion, disappointment and sometimes in a bloody fiasco.’
Indeed, confusion, disappointment and bloody fiasco are words that have been used by many observers to describe Libyan politics in the last three decades.

In 1992, things were complicated even further by internationally imposed sanctions against Libya, based on an accusation that it was behind the downing of a US civilian aeroplane, Pan Am Flight 103, above the village of Lockerbie in Scotland on 20 December 1988. These sanctions went on for over a decade and had a devastating effect on Libya and its population. Travelling by air was prohibited and the import of vital commodities and parts from the USA was not allowed. Healthcare and medical treatment was affected, as well as access to educational institutions and new technologies in the West. (The effects of the international sanctions on Libya and especially on overall development are evaluated in more detail in Chapter II on the state of human development in Libya).

1.14 No civil society in Gadhafi’s revolution

In a Libyan context, it is important to remember that although political parties and other independent political organisations have not been allowed to exist since Independence in 1951, other structures, mainly social and religious, do play a very prominent role. Social structures are usually based around family, clan and tribal associations. Religious Islamic institutions include the mosques, the Quranic schools, the Sufi orders and the Waqf (endowment) system. They have all contributed to providing people with social, cultural and economic support, as well as political inspiration and leadership at times.

Other forms of civil society organisations also started to emerge when Libya gained political independence and started the process of state building in 1951. The first Libyan trade union was set up as early as 1946 by those working in Tripoli harbour, and in 1949 the General Libyan trade union was established. Women, too, started their own societies to raise awareness of women’s rights and encourage young Libyan women to take up education and learn new skills. The first Libyan women’s society was set up in 1954 and in 1965 the Libyan Women’s Union was established.

It can be clearly concluded that some basic civil society organisations were growing after Libya gained Independence in 1951 and, as the country started enjoying the benefits of the newly discovered natural wealth through oil revenue by the early 1960s, economic and social development was taking root as well. However, the development of civil society
organisations in the form of independent trade unions, professional bodies, student unions and women groups came to an abrupt end when Gadhafi and his colleagues took over in September 1969. This major political upheaval ended the monarchic era and set out a radical new political discourse in which civil society evolved into ‘state corporatism’ model, as will be explained shortly.

If civil society associations are looked at as forms of corporatism, then they can exist, in terms of their relations with the state, in two models: ‘societal corporatism’ in democratic systems where groups are relatively autonomous of state control and exert a strong influence on the policy-making process; and ‘state corporatism’ in authoritarian systems where groups are subordinate to state control and are penetrated by official bureaucratic and party organisations (Bianchi, 1988: 229).

When considering the reality of civil society organisations in Libya, we find that the ‘state corporatism’ model fits almost to the letter, – a plethora of associations, syndicates, and unions representing the interests of all professional groups are tightly controlled by the state; they are created and abolished by decree. The government dictates their organisational structures, they are dependent on the state for most of their finances and the selection of their leadership is supervised and manipulated by the revolutionary committees. The law also stipulates that each profession or trade is to be represented by only one union (Mogherbi, 2005).

In a televised speech in January 2010, Gadhafi declared that there is no place for ‘civil society’ in Libya and he described the idea of civil society as a ‘bourgeois culture and an imitation of the West that has no place here’ (AFP, 2010). The extent to which civil society organisations are closely controlled by the state in Libya is stipulated in Law 19 of 2003 and Law 71 of 1972, which regulate the formation and activities of associations. Violators of the law can be put to death. Under these laws, hundreds of people have been imprisoned, yet others sentenced to death.

According to the Law 19 of 2003⁴, applications for the formation of an organisation or association must be signed by a minimum of fifty founders. If the organisation plans to work

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⁴ Law 19 of 2003 in effect bans the right of formation of independent civil society organisations in Libya and has been widely criticised by independent activists and intellectuals inside and outside Libya. One such criticism was voiced by a writer and well-respected intellectual living in Libya (Youssof El-Shereef), who wrote a
countrywide, its application goes to the secretariat of the General People’s Congress. If the proposed work is limited to a governorate, the application goes to the People’s Congress of that governorate. If the work is international, it goes to the whole General People’s Congress. There is no right to appeal a decision refusing an application (Carnegie Endowment, 2006).

1.15 The Libyan economy

At the time of independence in 1951, Libya had a total population of approximately one million and, with an estimated income per capita of US$30, was one of the poorest countries in the world (Vandewalle, 1998: 45). The country’s huge reserves of oil and gas hidden beneath its vast desert were unguessed-at, and for nearly a decade after independence Libya’s main income was from the sale of scrap metal left behind by the Second World War, the export of esparto grass and rent collected from leasing military bases to the United States of America and Britain (Vandewalle, 1998: 46).

The government of the new independent Libya led by King Idris signed agreements with international, mainly American, oil companies and exploration began in 1955. Commercially viable reserves of oil were discovered in 1959 and the first exports of crude Libyan oil began in 1961. Revenue from these exports started to pour in, growing from $40 million dollars in 1962 to $625 million in 1967. Within less than eight years of discovering oil, Libya had become the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil, a rate of growth previously unknown in the industry’s history. In the process, Libya moved from a stagnant to an exploding economy, from a capital-deficit state to a capital-surplus state, from an aid recipient to an aid extender (Bruce St. John, 2009: 128).

By the time the military coup led by Col. Gadhafi took place in 1969, Libya was exporting three million barrels of oil per day, and enjoying a decade-long economic boom in which annual income per capita rose from $50 in 1960 to $2000 in 1969. Libya’s economy in this decade grew by about 20 per cent a year (Waddams, 1980). With oil revenue constituting

very critical appraisal of the Law under the heading of ‘Reading into an oppressive Law’ and published in (Arajeen magazine, 2nd issue, June 2004) printed and published by another Libyan intellectual (Edriss Al-Missmari) in Cairo because of publishing restrictions in Libya.
over 98 per cent of Libya’s revenue, this had greatly extended King Idris’s ability to provide patronage to the relatively small Libyan population. The new culture of patronage had huge consequences for both the monarchy’s reluctant state building and the overall political process in Libya (Vandewalle, 1998: 49).

With the wealth generated from oil exports, the government was no longer in need of foreign financial assistance. However, ‘Libyan physical and human resource development continued to lag behind, necessitating sustained reliance on foreign technical assistance’. As the economy grew, so did the clear need for, and dependence on, foreign skills and it is ‘this pattern of dependence on foreigners to perform crucial skilled functions, which subsequent governments have been unable to eliminate’ (Chapin Metz, 1987). In other words, Libya was even then showing the clear symptoms of a country with a small population and vast natural wealth, but an undifferentiated human capacity to meet the skills needs, especially in the oil sector.

Immediately after Col. Gadhafi seized power in September 1969, the new revolutionary regime adopted a different socio-economic and political discourse to that of the previous monarchic regime. Gadhafi declared that ‘Socialism’ was the best economic system for achieving equality amongst the Libya people. He reiterated his vision of achieving ‘true economic independence’ for Libya (Chapin Metz, 1987) and consequently took on the international oil companies that were producing and exporting Libya’s oil for what he believed was their exploitation of Libya’s natural wealth at the expense of the people. He pushed for at least a 51 per cent stake in these companies’ operations in Libya. Oil prices on the world market had jumped from about $4.61 in early October 1973 to $15.76 a barrel in January 1974, as a result of OPEC’s action in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war, which meant that Libya’s revenue from oil had almost quadrupled (Vandewalle, 1998: 76).

The 1970s were characterised by an expansion in the private sector, as Libya enjoyed its second oil boom within two decades. Small businesses profited greatly as the Gadhafi regime adopted a ‘Libya first’ policy which assigned government contracts to Libyan companies. Government banks provided finance of up to 95 per cent for business ventures and in Tripoli and its regional areas alone ‘an estimated forty thousand new grocery licences were issued between 1969 and 1976’ (El-Fathaly and Palmer, 1980). The objective of this economic liberalisation and oil-financed boom was partly to increase the political legitimacy of the
Gadhafi regime. ‘The four years between the 1969 coup and the country’s second oil boom in 1973 were an interlude that allowed the new regime to consolidate itself and to attempt a first wave of political mobilisation in support of its self-proclaimed revolution’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 80).

1.16 Socialist centralised economy

The economic boom and flourishing of the private sector in the mid-1970s did not last for long in what Dirk Vandewalle coined ‘Thawra and Tharwa: Libya’s Boom-and-Bust Decade’, citing Nazih Ayubi’s epigraph ‘the pursuit of a populist and increasingly radical thawra (revolution) that relied overwhelmingly on the tharwa (wealth) produced by the country’s oil revenues’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 82-83). After he had dismantled and completely marginalised the bureaucratic elites that had existed under the monarchy, Gadhafi consolidated his political power and legitimacy aided by the vast accumulated revenues from oil, estimated at $95 billion following the oil boom of 1973. In the same year, he announced his ‘popular revolution’ and after the failed coup attempt of August 1975 eliminated all opposition within the RCC. He was now in a strong position to implement his own vision of a socialist stateless Jamahiriyya society, as outlined in his three-part Green Book. By the end of the 1970s the private sector was all but suffocated: ‘In May 1980, Libya declared all currency in denominations larger than one dinar to be void, giving citizens one week to exchange their cash. With the maximum exchange set at 1,000 dinars, all deposits in excess of that amount were frozen’ (Bruce St. John, 2009: 130).

Many other measures and doctrinaire socialist policies were put in place to reflect the ideology of volume two of the Green Book, The Solution to the Economic Problem: Socialism. By 1980 people were no longer allowed to own more than one property and renting properties was outlawed in favour of tenants becoming instant owners of the properties they had been renting. Another radical economic policy of the time was Gadhafi’s encouragement of workers ‘in both public and private sectors to take control of the enterprises in which they worked. By following his dictum: ‘partners not wage labourers’ workers were urged to involve themselves in the day-to-day management of the enterprises in which they worked’ (Chapin Metz, 1987).

The harsh socialist economic policies imposed by Gadhafi’s regime throughout the 1980s had a devastating effect on the Libyan economy: ‘the state by 1981 was in charge of virtually all
economic activity’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 107), including import-export. This meant not only that the private sector with all the jobs and relative prosperity it offered hundreds of thousands of people was wiped out, but also that standards of living and quality of life for the Libyan population in general declined sharply. There are documented anecdotal stories of people, during the 1980s, not being able to find even the most basic commodities, such as toothpaste or fruit (bananas and apples) in a country awash with petro-dollars. That decade was also characterised by very oppressive measures against dissidents and critics of the Gadhafi regime, measures that included public hangings and the imprisonment of thousands of young Libyans suspected of being members of or sympathising with opposition movements, and in particular Islamic ones.

The 1980s also witnessed other factors that were detrimental to the Libyan economy. Oil exports tumbled from 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) to 600,000 bpd by the end of 1981 (MEED, 1981). Libya was also forced to reduce prices of crude oil to between ($4 and $5 per barrel) and total revenue decreased by 31 per cent, Libya’s balance of payment showed a deficit of $4.8 billion and the country’s reserves tumbled from $15 billion to $2.4 billion (Vandewalle, 1998: 119). Another factor that had a negative impact on the economy was the political and economic sanctions imposed by the US on Libya following the accusations that Gadhafi’s regime had been involved in terrorist activities; key American oil companies like Exxon and Mobile withdrew their oil exploration and production from Libya in the early 1980s and this was to have an extremely detrimental impact on Libya’s oil exports.

Realising that the dogmatic socialist economic policies that he had imposed for nearly a decade had failed badly, Gadhafi announced in March 1987 a package of economic and political reforms, dubbing them a ‘Revolution within a Revolution’. He called for reforms in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, including the reversal of import substitution policies and the adoption of modern management practices. He called for a new role for the private sector, as well as increased liberalisation’ (Bruce St John, 2009: 131). On 2 March 1988, he ordered the release of hundreds of political prisoners in an initiative of political relaxation he dubbed ‘the dawn has broken’, and in September 1988 he called for an end to government control of trade and lifted injunctions against the retail trade, although the oil sector and heavy industry were exempt from the privatisation measures (Deeb, 1990: 149).
The new era of political and economic liberalisation and reform announced by Gadhafi in 1988, which was meant primarily to relieve the economic hardship Libyans were experiencing, did not last long. Another wave of economic reform was attempted after 1990 over a period of three years, designed to substantially reduce state involvement in the Libyan economy and pursue a liberalisation strategy that would give a much greater role to the private sector. This did not meet with much success either. ‘Both efforts failed or were abandoned at a very early stage, much of the rentier state literature has traced this failure of political and economic reform in oil exporters almost exclusively to a lack of political will or relative indifference to a higher economic efficiency’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 143).

Again and again it becomes apparent that the roots of the economic failures and poor performance in Libya, a country with huge natural wealth and a small population, are mainly ideological and institutional and have much to do with a rentier distributive state ruled by an absolute authoritarian ruler. As Dirk Vandewalle neatly describes it, ‘in the end the country’s announced reform faltered and was never implemented. The country had neither the administrative or institutional capability nor the political will to move forward with measures that could have reversed long-standing policies’ (Vandewalle, 1998: 161). The failure to reform either politically or economically is linked to the nature of a distributive state and its unique position of monopolising all aspects of life, and more fundamentally to its structural weakness of not allowing institution- and state-building.

1.17 Libyan economy under further sanctions

As if the US-imposed economic sanctions since 1980, mainly affecting the oil sector, had not been bad enough for Libya and its people, the further sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council on 15 April 1992 as a result of the regime’s lack of co-operation with the investigations into the terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 20 1988, inflicted still more damage during the 1990s. Although these second sanctions did not prevent the export of oil and gas, the country’s main source of revenue, they did ban the export of arms to and air travel over Libya. (See Chapter II for a more detailed discussion of the impact of sanctions on development in Libya).

Much hardship and suffering was caused to the ordinary Libyan people by the UN-imposed travel embargo and sanctions of the 1990s, generating mounting discontent. Col. Gadhafi was
implicitly blamed for the hardship and a major military coup against him was attempted in October 1993, but was again foiled. Militant Islamists, mainly the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), also became very active, staging several assassination attempts against Colonel Gadhafi and some of his security aids between 1995 and 1999. Also in 1995 a large network of hundreds of highly educated young Libyans belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, operating in secret, was uncovered by Libyan security agencies which led to the arrest of nearly 200 MB members, while almost 500 more managed to escape to settle mainly in the UK and other European countries, swelling the Libyan brain drain.

However, the militant LIFG, inspired by counterparts in neighbouring countries, clearly tried to destabilise the Gadhafi regime (Takeyh, 1998: 159), which depended almost exclusively on oil revenues for its economic performance. ‘Oil production had flagged throughout the decade (1990s) for a variety of reasons, including the imposition of multilateral sanctions, falling demand, and aging oil fields’ (Bruce St John, 2009: 133). The oil sector, the lifeline of Libya and Gadhafi’s regime, was suffering from an acute shortage of vital American technology that was not available, due to the US-imposed sanctions.

The IMF closely monitored the performance of the Libyan economy throughout the 1990s, and, as is shown in the table below, it is clear that while the Libyan population grew by over 25 per cent, oil revenues diminished slightly year on year and GDP per head fell to as little as $700 in real terms. While inflation soared out of control, unemployment also rose sharply to reach around 30 per cent (as confirmed by IMF and other reports), especially amongst young people coming out of tertiary education in a country where 72 per cent of the population are under the age of thirty.
Looking back at the period from 1970 to 2000, one can see that major political, economic and social changes took place in Libya.

During the 1970s, Libya underwent irreversible change; the standard of living of the population saw constant growth until it became one of the highest in the region. Libya’s growth made it a country of immigration, to which Egyptians, Sudanese and Tunisians came to work. Under the sanctions, this process ended, growth in Libya stagnated, and its funds dried up. In addition, the sanctions disclosed the bankruptcy of Libya’s chosen economic system (Martinez, 2007: 18).

The Gadhafi regime found it convenient to blame all its shortcomings and failures on the sanctions, rather than the ‘bankruptcy of its chosen economic system’. However, it is important to remember that these sanctions were not as comprehensive as those imposed on Iraq during the 1990s: Libya was always allowed to export its oil and gas and to import everything apart from arms and some selective US technology. The economic failure of the past four decades had to be, partly at least, seen within the context of a rentier distributive state run by an authoritarian regime, with all the symptoms of patronage, inefficiency, corruption, lack of institutions and accountability, and very bad management. The conclusions by (Yahiya and Saleh, 2008) that ‘conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the
earlier 1990s’ give only part of the reasons for the poor economic performance; other internal factors intrinsic to the regime’s ideology and bad management are also very relevant.

In April 1999, Col. Gadhafi as agreed with both the UK and US decided to remand the two Libyan Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Netherlands under the jurisdiction of Scottish law. This began the process of lifting the travel embargo and various other sanctions, a process which took over four years and culminated in Libya declaring on 18 December 2003 the abandonment of a programme of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and opting for a complete rapprochement with the West and especially the USA. Many saw the pragmatic turn-around in Gadhafi’s attitude *viz-a-viz* the West, especially the United States, as being motivated by the invasion of Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein. This made Gadhafi clearly see the writing on the wall. The US saw his surrender of WMDs and his change in policy as vindication of their illegal invasion of Iraq, or, as it had been described earlier, ‘a rogue regime has come in from the cold’ (Takeyh, 2001: 62-72).

Following the lifting of all sanctions by the end of 2003, Libya embarked on its third attempt in as many decades (previous attempts in 1987 and 1993) to liberalise and reform the economy with the aim of addressing the deep-rooted problems and placating an angry, disenfranchised population which could not understand why it was not enjoying the fruits of its vast natural wealth. In an address to the Arab strategy conference in Dubai, in December 2004, Libyan reformist prime minister Shukri Ghanem outlined a vision for development in Libya that would be centred on economic diversification, acknowledging that hydrocarbon revenues would be the growth engine, but also stressing the need to look for ‘alternative sources of income and to develop new industries so that oil and gas revenues could become a reserve for the economy’ (Bruce St John, 2009: 135).

The IMF has been very blunt about what Libya needed to do in order to achieve economic reform and growth, so badly needed to meet the challenges ahead, including rising unemployment. The IMF report on the challenges facing Libya stated:

The key challenge facing the authorities in the medium and long-term is to achieve sustainable high rates of economic growth to generate employment opportunities for a rapidly growing labour force. The authorities agreed that this goal would not be achieved without a drastic reduction of the dominant role of the public sector...Unemployment, which may be as high as 30 per cent, remains one
of Libya’s greatest problems, with the bloated state sector unable to accommodate the many new job-seekers produced by the fast growing population. Until private sector reform starts delivering tangible results, the problem – compounded by Muammar Qaddafi’s 1997 move to open Libya’s border to 2 million African immigrants – is only likely to worsen (IMF, cited in Vandewalle, 2009: 226).

The jury is still out on the likely success of this latest third attempt at economic reform and liberalisation in Libya, started over five years ago. However, reports of deep institutional weaknesses, endemic corruption and a lack of any degree of transparency and accountability indicate that the reform attempts are not likely to meet their objectives. As argued elsewhere in this thesis, economic reform can only have a genuine chance of success political reform and a process of institutionalisation underpin it. Good governance, rule of law, a vibrant civil society, a free press and respect for basic freedoms and human rights, including political participation, are pre-requisites to putting Libya on a solid path to sustainable growth, development and prosperity.

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Chapter II

State of Human Development in Libya

This chapter complements Chapter I to put Libya in a fuller context. The previous chapter reviewed what literature is available on the Libyan brain drain and how skilled foreign workers may or may not have reduced the impact of such a brain drain. The chapter also reviewed the politics and history of Libya with more emphasis on the last four decades and attempted to identify junctures where brain drain has possibly occurred.

This chapter will focus in more detail on specific aspects of human development in Libya related to expanding choices and acquiring capabilities. Human development should illuminate and integrate a variety of concerns about people’s lives, their wellbeing and their freedoms (Sen, 2000), or what Fukoda-Parr called a human development paradigm, articulated in terms of a two sided equation: the acquisition of human capabilities balanced by the opportunities to use those capabilities (UNDP, 1990). The chapter will also attempt to identify and signpost how and when changes in human development may be linked to the brain drain in Libya.

2.1 Measuring human development in Libya

One of the key research questions of this thesis is how to evaluate the state of human development in Libya. As has been and will be argued throughout, such evaluation is not adequately served by considering only the three traditional factors that make up the HDI, namely: longevity, or a healthy lifespan measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, measured by adult literacy rates and combined enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and a decent standard of living, measured by real GDP per capita (UNDP-HDR, 1990).

Instead, in a pursuit of a truer reflection and more comprehensive understanding of the reality of human development, additional wider and equally important factors and indices based on capabilities and the Capability Approach (CA) articulated by Martha Nussbaum which include: Life, Bodily health, Bodily integrity, Senses imagination and thought, Emotions,
Practical reason, Play and Control over one’s environment. (See chapter IV for more theoretical consideration of the CA.

Factors that be adopted, amongst others, include: political freedom and participation; respect and regard for human rights; transparency and accountability of institutions; the existence of democratic values and practices; the existence of an independent free press, independent judicial processes and institutions; and other governance indicators as well as the state of healthcare in Libya. The impact of international sanctions on overall development drive in Libya will also be considered.

However, when studying Libya, challenging practical and methodological problems arise to do with the availability and reliability of data. According to Vandewalle (1998), available primary source materials in Libya are far from ideal, as they tend to reflect officially approved and selected data. Another point is that many of the standard data criteria may have little interpretive value. According to World Bank (1981), Libya’s officially published reports must be approached with caution. The political, economic and bureaucratic chaos means that the Libyan government has made documentation very difficult for academic observers and international institutions (Vandewalle, 1998: xv).

It is certainly the case that the Libyan government, in the virtual absence of independent sources of data and evaluations from within Libya, has politicised and exaggerated its development policy achievements purely for propaganda purposes. This is compounded by the fact that critical appraisal and accountability from within Libya has been almost non-existent. For example, no independent media, civil society or political institutions are allowed to co-exist with the government-controlled and -manipulated institutions, in order to prevent critical challenges to the reliability and integrity of government data and statistics.

Another challenge has been that access to, and cooperation with, international independent institutions that can give a more objective picture of the state of development in Libya has been very limited, if not non-existent. Authoritarian states do not take kindly to international organisations and institutions looking into their affairs, seeing it as interference, if not outright hostility. One example of this has been the unwillingness of the Libyan government to allow any of the international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and others, to visit the country for nearly two decades. Amnesty International visited Libya
regularly until 1989, after which it was not allowed back until 2004 (AI, 2004). Another organisation, Human Rights Watch, was only granted permission to visit in 2005 (HRW, 2005).

For the purpose of this thesis, an evaluation of the state of human development in Libya will be based mainly, but not exclusively, on the independent and relatively much more reliable and objective data sourced and quoted from international institutions such as: the UNDP, the WHO, Freedom House, Transparency International, Reporters without Borders, the World Democracy Audit, the World Bank, the IMF, the World Economic Forum, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others.

There is, however, the issue of time scale and how far back these international and regional organisations go in their monitoring and compiling of information and data in their various fields and spheres of interest. The Human Development Reports published by the UNDP, for example, only started in 1990 and they clearly state that the reliability, selection, use and presentation of the data has been revised and improved continuously as the annual reports have been compiled (UNDP, HDR, 2005).

Other organisations have only started compiling regular data on Libya in the last few years, as they are themselves considered to be relatively new organisations. For example, Freedom House has been issuing its ‘Freedom in the World’ reports since 1973, but data on Libya is only available from 2002. Similarly, the corruption-monitoring organisation, Transparency International, has been issuing its ‘Corruption Perception Index’ reports since 1995, but has only included Libya in its annual surveys since 2003. Amnesty International was banned from 1988 until 2004, when it was able to compile a detailed report on the state of human rights in Libya. The Heritage Foundation started compiling data and publishing its ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ in 1995, including Libya from 1996. The Economic Intelligence Unit started publishing its ‘Index of Democracy’ in 2006.

2.2 Libya ranking based on traditional Human Development Index indicators

According to the Human Development Index (HDI), issued annually by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its Human Development Report (HDR) since its launch in 1990, Libya has been ranked (see table below) in the medium development countries group. In fact, in the last three years (2007-2009) Libya has been classified as a high human
development country. It is important to remember that the HDI is based on the three traditional factors of longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge, measured by adult literacy rates and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in education, and a decent standard of living, measured by real GDP per capita.

(Table 3): Libya’s HDI ranking in the world since 1991 to 2009:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Libya Human development Index (HDI) Ranking world wide</th>
<th>Level of human Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>55</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


According to the most recent (UNDP, HDR, 2009) HDI ranking, Libya was ranked (55) in the world out of 182 countries in 2009, making it more developed or giving it a higher level of human development attainment than the following countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, all ranked lower than Libya: Turkey (79), Lebanon (83), Iran (88), China (92), South Africa (129) and India (134). Surely, if human development is about expanding choices for
people in all spheres of life, this is a clear example of how limited, if not misleading, the HDI is as a tool for informing us about the true status of human development.

It may be the case that Libya has the highest adult literacy rate and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in education in the whole of Africa, including sub-Saharan and North African countries. But this only reflects the quantitative aspects of education, not the qualitative aspects crucial to education’s role in meeting development needs where, as shown by the Global Competitiveness Report (2005-2006), Libya ranks very poorly, at the bottom with a ranking of 110 out of 111 surveyed countries in terms of quality of education. (more detailed consideration of this is offered further down in this chapter). Libya has also consistently showed, since 1980 to date, a higher level of GDP per capita than the average of MENA countries (WEF, 2009). However, this is an average and not a true reflection of the wider economic choices available to Libyan people in general.

Out of the six countries with supposedly poorer overall human development attainment levels than Libya based on the HDI, only Iran and China are known to be restrictive and repressive in terms of political freedom and participation. The other four countries, namely Turkey, Lebanon, South Africa and India are seen as countries where basic democratic values exist and many political as well as economic and social choices are available and much more widespread relative to Libya. Also, many capabilities articulated by the CA are available and being acquired in those four countries, again relative to Libya. If we consider the economic growth achieved by Turkey and India in the last decade and the degree of political choice in terms of genuine democratic elections and overall discourse available in Lebanon and South Africa relative to Libya, we see clearly how misleading the limited HDI can be in evaluating the state of human development.

To its credit the UNDP has stated in the Libya section of its 2009 report that ‘The Index is not in any sense a comprehensive measure of human development. It does not, for example, include important indicators such as gender or income inequality nor more difficult to measure concepts like respect for human rights and political freedom’ (UNDP, HDR 2009). It is these omitted ‘important indicators’ to which the UNDP report alludes, and others, which this chapter will explore to give a truer picture and ascertain for example whether Libya does have higher human development levels than countries like Turkey and Lebanon or not!
The HDI has been criticised, in this thesis (chapter IV) and widely beyond, for its limitations and shortcomings as a true reflection of overall human development. It is important, therefore, to evaluate human development using much wider indices and factors that can take into account important choices for people, choices that could be political, economic, social or cultural, that relate to freedom, democracy, rule of law, access to knowledge and basic human rights.

The case of the alternative human development index (AHDI) developed by Nader Fergany (discussed in Chapter IV) showed that when adding ‘freedom score and women’s empowerment’ as indicators, the measure of human development in Arab countries, especially oil-exporting ones, has dropped. So, if even more vital indicators can be included then a different and truer measure will be obtained. However, developing such more inclusive index is beyond the scope of this thesis and requires the input of statisticians, political economists and social scientists to develop a comprehensive objective measure applicable across the world.

For the purpose of this thesis, when we look outside the parameters and criteria of the HDI, we find a range of factors which international organisations and institutions monitor and which give a wealth of information and empirical evaluations on a regular basis for the majority of countries around the world. These factors provide a much wider and truer reflection of the state of human development in a given country or region. However, some of these indicators should be appraised critically in terms of the process and mechanism by which data is collated, analysed and quantified. One example of this is “Economic Freedom” measured and ranked by the Heritage Foundation where countries that score poorly on its measure are seen to have a good level of development.

2.3 What additional human development factors

Such factors, which will be presented here for Libya, include; human rights, political freedom, democracy index, freedom of the press, internet freedom, global competitiveness, including quality of education, transparency, governance, healthcare quality and others. The rational for selecting these factors is that they are indicative of enlarging choices for people and acquiring capabilities, which constitutes what the human development paradigm is all about. Each factor or indicator considered in this chapter will be linked to one or more of the capabilities articulated in the CA. It is important also to identify any correlation or link
between Libya’s performance on these indicators and the waves of brain migration that may have taken place.

2.4 Human Rights
The state of human rights in Libya has been followed closely by reputable international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). In 2005, a senior researcher at HRW, Fred Abraham, visited Libya on behalf of the organisation, and after the visit wrote the following:

For three decades, human rights violations in Libya were committed under the rubric of ‘revolutionary defense.’ The government and its extensive security apparatus imprisoned or ‘disappeared’ critics who challenged the ideology of the 1969 revolution that overthrew the monarchy or of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi’s system of Jamahiriyya, the ‘state of the masses’ (Abraham, ARB- Carneige-Nov. 2005).

In its 2009 report entitled ‘State of the World’s Human Rights’, Amnesty International stated the following on Libya:

Libya’s human rights record and continuing violations cast a shadow over its improved international diplomatic standing. Freedom of expression, association and assembly remained severely restricted in a climate characterized by the repression of dissident voices and the absence of independent human rights NGOs. Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants continued to be detained indefinitely and ill-treated. At least eight foreign nationals were executed. The legacy of past human rights violations remained unaddressed’ (AI, 2009).

The same report also stated that:

The government did not tolerate criticism or dissent and maintained draconian legislation to deter it. Under the Penal Code and Law No. 71 of 1972 on the Criminalization of Parties, independent political expression and group activity is banned and those who peacefully exercise their rights to freedom of expression and association may face the death penalty. The authorities continued to take action against anyone who openly addressed such taboo topics as Libya’s poor human rights record or the leadership of Mu’ammar al-Gadhafi (AI, 2009).
In its comprehensive world report of 2009, HRW also gave a detailed review of the state of human rights in Libya and the progress made, if any, so far, especially in light of the regime’s new direction of rapprochement with the international community. Since 2003, it has been trying to project an image of openness and revision of its internal policies and practices, including the area of human rights violations. The HRW report has summarised the state and progress of human rights in Libya as follows:

The Libyan government continues to imprison individuals for criticizing the country’s political system or its leader, Mu’ammar al-Gadhafi, and maintains harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. Libya continues to detain scores of individuals for engaging in peaceful political activity. Hundreds more have been ‘disappeared,’ some for decades. Many were imprisoned for violating Law 71, which bans any group activity opposed to the principles of the 1969 revolution that brought al-Gadhafi to power. Violators of Law 71 can be executed (HRW, 2009).

2.5 Civil and political rights

For the last four decades, Libyan citizens have been banned by law from forming independent civil society organisations or political associations, including political parties. On forming civil society organisations, HRW has repeatedly echoed that ‘Libya has no independent non-governmental organisations. Law 19, ‘On Associations,’ requires a political body to approve all such organisations and does not allow appeals against negative decisions’ (HRW, 2009).

On forming political organisations and freedom of political participation and expression, HRW stated that ‘Despite some improvements, the government still bans political parties and groups, non-state-run media and independent civic organisations working on human rights or political affairs’ (HRW, 2005).

2.6 Physical liquidation of political opponents

One of the most brutal violations of human rights in Libya has been the policy of ‘physical liquidation’ of political critics and opponents of the Gadhafi regime. Public hanging of opponents started in April 1976, when two students were hanged inside the University of
Benghazi. Similar hangings of student dissidents were carried out in 1977, 1983 and 1984 at both the Universities of Tripoli and Benghazi. In 1980, Gadhafi ordered the ‘revolutionary committees’ to start a physical liquidation campaign against what he called ‘enemies of the revolution’, both inside and outside Libya. Killings were carried out inside Libya and in various European capitals, including London, Rome, Athens and Bonn. On 17 April 1984, shootings took place from inside the Libyan Embassy in London at a peaceful demonstration outside the embassy building by a group of dissident students protesting against violations of human rights in Libya (I was one of the organizers of this demonstration and physically witnessed the shooting as it happened), as a result one British police woman ‘WPC Yvonne Fletcher’ was killed and eleven Libyan demonstrators were injured⁵.

In May 1984, a series of public hangings of political opponents of the regime were carried out in at least six cities and towns. The motive behind these public exhibitions of sheer brutality was to instill fear in and to send a message to all those who might dare to criticise or oppose the rule of Col. Gadhafi. Such public killings and assassinations continued sporadically until 1995, when on 25 November 1995 an opponent of the Libyan regime, ‘Ali Abuzeid’, was assassinated inside his shop in London.

2.7 Abusalim prison massacre of 1200 political prisoners

On 29 June 1996, a total of nearly 1200 political prisoners inside the notorious ‘Abusalim’ prison on the outskirts of Tripoli were rounded up in the main prison courtyard and shot dead by security forces. The killing spree lasted for at least four hours, between 7am and 11am, according to eye-witnesses as reported by main human rights organisations AI, HRW and Libyan human rights organisations operating outside Libya. (AI, 2004 and HRW, 2005).

2.8 Laws violating human rights in Libya:

In countries where human rights are respected, it is essential that this respect is underpinned and guaranteed by a framework of laws and declarations adhered to by all. Without such a protective constitutional legal framework, major violations of basic human rights can take place. However, in Libya the situation has been such that not only does the legal protective framework not exist, but the deliberate abuses and violations of human rights became an

⁵ Recently on 2 September 2010 a documentary on the demonstration and the shooting that took place was aired by British broadcasting television (ITV 1) from London. The programme interviewed many witnesses including myself.
institutionalised process, justified and legalised by a set of laws and decrees issued and enforced over a period of more than three decades.

Examples of these laws include: Law No 45 of 1972, known as the law prohibiting and criminalising strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations. Law No 71 of 1972, also known as the ‘Prohibition and Criminalisation of Party Politics Act’, defines party political activities in such a way that encompasses almost any form of group activity based on political thinking that diverges from the ideology of the Gadhafi revolution of 1 September 1969. Law No 5 of 1988 established the People’s Court, an exceptional or extra-ordinary tribunal created outside the judicial system specifically to try political offences.

The People’s court was abolished in early 2005, only to be replaced by the ‘State Security Court’, which has exactly the same powers as the previous People’s Court. Law No 75 of 1973 was specifically enacted to nationalise and then close down all independent newspapers and magazines, or any private publication outside the ownership of the Libyan regime. Law of the Covenant of Honour, decreed on 9 March 1997 by the General People’s Congress and known as ‘Code of Honour’, effectively allows for the collective punishment of the families, relatives or tribes of persons accused of political crimes.

In conclusion, the state of human rights in Libya for nearly four decades has been very poor, with widespread systematic institutionalised violations of many basic individual rights. The Libyan regime is clearly an oppressive authoritarian one that tends to be pre-occupied by security of the state and of the ruling elite, often at the expense of the individual or ‘human’ security of members of society. Security of the state and ruling elite is manifesting itself in a culture that instils fear into citizen’s minds through various oppressive security measures in order to stifle opposition to and rebellion against the hegemony of an authoritarian rule. This coercive paradigm, in turn, increases the insecurity of individual citizens and reduces...
drastically their choices for participation and innovation. Consequently, this is detrimental to overall human development. It is only the elimination of human insecurities that enhances human development.

Vital capabilities are denied to the Libyan people due to this culture of extensive violations of human rights and capabilities such as: life, bodily integrity, senses of imagination and thought, practical reason, affiliation and control over one’s environment. It can also be seen that periods of major crackdowns on political opponents, public hangings and killing or shooting at opponents of the regime abroad can be linked with Libyan activists either leaving their home country for safer destinations or being inhibited from returning from the abroad. These junctures were in 1973, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1995 and 1997 as discussed in Chapter I.

2.9 Political freedom
The state and extent of political freedom around the world is monitored by the US-based organisation, Freedom House (FH). In its methodological evaluation of political freedom, FH uses two main categories: political rights (PR), consisting of three dimensions (electoral process, political pluralism, participation); and civil liberties (CL), consisting of four dimensions (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights). A score of 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results compiled by Freedom House. The following table gives the ranking score for Libya for both parameters between the years 2002 and 2009.

(Table 4): Libya’s score for Political freedom (PR and CL) published in the annual reports of FH since 2002 to 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PR (Political Rights)</th>
<th>CL (Civil Liberties)</th>
<th>Combined Average Rating</th>
<th>Freedom Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom House: ‘Freedom IN The World’ reports
www.freedomhouse.org

In a 2009 report entitled ‘Worst of the Worst 2009: The World’s Most Repressive Societies’, Freedom House listed seventeen countries designated as the most unfree countries in the world. Libya ranked the third worst in the world, exceeded only by Equatorial Guinea in second place and Burma in first as the very worst (Freedom House, 2009).

In its 2009 ‘Freedom in The World’ report, under the heading ‘Political Rights and Civil Liberties’ Freedom House stated the following:

**Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Libya:**

‘Libya is not an electoral democracy. Power theoretically lies with a system of people’s committees and the General People’s Congress, but in practice those structures are manipulated to ensure the continued dominance of Mu’ammar al-Gadhafi, who holds no official title. It is illegal for any political group to oppose the principles of the 1969 revolution, which are laid out in the Green Book, although in recent years market-based economic changes have diverged from the regime’s socialist ideals. Political parties have been illegal for over 35 years, and the government strictly monitors political activity. Organising or joining anything akin to a political party is punishable by very long prison terms and even the death sentence. Many Libyan opposition movements and figures operate outside the country’ (FH, 2009).

FH states that the ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results compiled by Freedom House, but it does not outline in detail how these surveys were conducted, by whom, and if conducted inside Libya or from the outside. It is unlikely that the Libyan government would have allowed an American organisation that it considers to be biased or even hostile to freely carry out surveys within Libya about sensitive issues like political rights and civil liberties.
On the other hand, considering the very poor rating that Libya gets on these indicators and informed by political review covered in the previous chapter, one can conclude that there are problems and restrictions in these two vital areas. Applying the capabilities approach it can be argued those vital capabilities such as: senses, imagination and thought, affiliation and control over one’s environment would be restricted affecting adversely human development attainment in Libya.

As discussed already in Chapter I, the clamp-down on political elites in 1973 and the banning of political parties, free press and civil society organisations in 1972 caused many intellectuals and political activists to flee Libya, constituting an early sign of brain drain.

2.10 Democracy index
The state of democracy around the world is monitored and measured by various international organisations and groups. The two most popular measures, followed and quoted widely, are: the ‘Index of Democracy’ by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Polity IV.

The ‘Index of Democracy’ by EIU was launched in 2006 and has published two reports so far (2006 and 2008). It is based on the view that measuring democracy by reflecting only political freedom and civil liberties (which are the two categories adopted by the Freedom House index) is not broad enough and does not encompass substantive features of democracy (EIU, 2007).

The EIU Democracy Index according to EIU, (2007) is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties and covers 165 independent countries worldwide. The index on a 0 to 10 scale is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the five categories listed above. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index is an average of the scores or indexes of the five individual categories. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes as follows:

1- Full democracies score of 8-10. 2- Flawed democracies score of 6-7.9. 3- Hybrid regimes score of 4-5.9. 4- Authoritarian regimes score below 4.
(Table 5): Libya’s ‘Index of Democracy’ score and world ranking for 2006 and 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electoral process and pluralism</th>
<th>Functioning of government</th>
<th>Political participation</th>
<th>Political culture</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Libya Overall score</th>
<th>Libya World ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist Intelligent Unit, Index of Democracy 2006 and 2008

As the table above shows, Libya scores zero in electoral process and pluralism and very low in all the other categories for both 2006 and 2008. The overall index ranks Libya very low, near the bottom, for democracy and classifies it as an authoritarian regime.

**Polity IV**: publishes individual country profile reports based on three dimensions; political competition and opposition, executive recruitment and independence of executive authority. Polity IV gives an overall score ranging from a maximum of 10, representing the most democratic, down to -10, representing the most authoritarian.

The Polity IV score given for Libya, since its independence in 1951 until 2007, as shown by the figure below is consistently around (-7) which makes the political system highly authoritarian.

(Figure 2) Polity IV Authority Trends 1951-2008 for Libya

![Authority Trends, 1951-2008: Libya](image-url)
Both the EIU index and the Polity IV are widely quoted and adopted internationally with regard to democracy and the scores they offer for Libya indicate lack of democracy and the presence of a highly repressive, authoritarian political order that denies citizens the most basic political freedoms and rights of participation. It is a fact that Libyans have never experienced elections since Gadhafi came to power in 1969 and political parties have been prohibited by law. It can be argued that based on the capabilities approach Libyans have been denied essential capabilities to do with affiliation and control over one’s environment.

It can further be argued that “Push” factors for the migration of educated/skilled people did exist, including the imprisonment of political activists, public executions in universities and other public places, or the mass-murder of large groups (Abusalim prison massacre of 1200 political prisoners in 1976) – these incidents forced many to leave Libya in waves during 1973, 1975, 1980, 1984, 1995 and 1997 to escape repression or prevented those residing abroad from returning for fear of repression.

However, the link between the lack of democracy and poor development attainment is not conclusive, as we find from the literature (reviewed more in Chapter IV). There are at least two schools of thought, one arguing for development first democracy later and the other for democracy first development later. The argument that lack of democracy is a main causal factor for brain drain in the Libyan case is also challenged and tested by the fact that some highly skilled Libyans chose to migrate to non-democratic countries in the Arab Gulf region. What can be argued however is that in the Libyan case repression, which is indicative of a lack of democratic values, can be a push factor for the brain drain. Lack of participation by the Libyan people in their political process denies them a fundamental political choice and capability, and consequently impacts negatively on the true level and state of human development.

2.11 Freedom of the Press

The existence and extent of freedom of the press around the world is monitored and reported by the reputable international organisation, Reporters Without Borders, founded in 1985. It campaigns and fights for press freedom throughout the world and one of the ways it evaluates
and compares freedom of the press is through its annually published ‘Worldwide Press Freedom Index’.

The ‘Worldwide Press Freedom Index’, issued in October of each year, measures the degree of freedom journalists and media organisations enjoy in more than 160 countries. The Index is compiled by sending a questionnaire with forty criteria that assess the state of press freedom in each country to partner organisations, freedom of expression groups and a network of 130 correspondents around the world (Reporters Without Borders, 2009).

(Table 6): Libya’s press freedom index world ranking 2002 - 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Worldwide Press Freedom Index for Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>129 (out of 139 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>153 (out of 166 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>154 (out of 167 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>162 (out of 167 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>152 (out of 168 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>155 (out of 169 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>160 (out of 173 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>156 (out of 175 countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in the table above, since 2002 Libya has consistently had a very poor ranking when it comes to freedom of the press. This ranking is echoed and supported by Freedom House in its reports and by human rights campaigners such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in their comprehensive reports on Libya in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Lack of a free press stifles freedom of expression, deliberation and critical appraisal of policy and decision-making. It denies people capabilities like; Senses, imagination and thoughts, control over one’s environment and affiliation based on the CA.

The lack of a free press and the banning of free independent press publications in 1972 forced Libyan proprietors, journalists and many intellectuals to migrate and set up newspapers in places like London (Al-Arab newspaper), Cyprus and Egypt and other places. In April 1980, according to the British government agents of the Libyan regime murdered a Libyan journalist who was writing critical reviews of the Gadhafi regime in Al-Arab outside the central mosque in London.
2.12 Internet penetration and freedom

Global advances in ICT in the last two decades mean that people have much greater and faster access to information and knowledge through the Internet and other tools of communication in an era of ‘media convergence’. Statistics on the level of Internet access, as a percentage of total population, in different countries and regions of the world are provided regularly by the organisation ‘Internet World Stats’. Internet access per capita was used as an indicator by Fergany in his constructed AHDL (Alternative Human Development Index) which was discussed in chapter III.

The table below gives percentage of Internet penetration of total population for the Arab Countries in September 2009 as collated by the “Internet World Stats”.

(Table 7): percentage of Internet penetration of total population in 21 Arab countries of the MENA Region - 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% (Internet penetration) of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>60.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>55.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>48.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>52.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>37.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>32.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>26.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>26.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>23.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>16.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (west Bank)</td>
<td>14.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>13.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When comparing statistics for the use of the Internet across the two regions of which Libya is a part, the Middle East and Africa, we find the average Internet penetration for the Middle East is 28.3% and for the whole continent of Africa 6.8%. Libya scores very poorly, coming below even the African average. Compared to the rest of the Arab World, the percentage of the total population that can access the internet in Libya (5.1%) outdoes only Mauritania, Yemen and Iraq, and the latter has experienced the total destruction of its infrastructure due to war in the last seven years. Libya, being a rich oil-exporting country with a relatively small population, should be in a comparable position to similar Arab oil countries which show much higher internet penetration, such as the UAE (60.9%), Bahrain (55.3%), Qatar (52.3%) and Kuwait (37.1%).

One key factor that limits Internet use is the lack of modern ICT infrastructure and fibre optic networks that give speedy and high capacity connections. Two other factors are the repressive measures and policies of the state against Internet freedom, and the cost of Internet use, which on average is six times more in the Arab World than in Europe (Hroub, 2009:267). In the case of Libya, the limited extent of Internet penetration can be attributed to the poor telecommunication infrastructure and repressive policies against Internet freedom, as highlighted by international human rights organisations only as recently as March 2010, when the Libyan authorities blocked access to ‘YouTube’ and many websites critical of the regime. The poor level of access to the Internet in Libya impacts negatively on information acquisition and knowledge transfer. And this consequently impedes and limits expanding capabilities and impacts negatively on the drive for overall human development.

2.13 Transparency

Levels of corruption around the world are monitored and evaluated by the reputable Transparency International (TI) organisation. TI publishes regular reports, at least once a year, and adopts a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for individual countries, ranking countries accordingly. CPI scores relate to perceptions among business people and country
analysts of the degree of corruption and range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

(Table 8): Libya’s CPI and its international ranking (2003 – 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Libya</th>
<th>Libya’s international ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>119 (out of 133 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>109 (out of 146 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>120 (out of 158 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>120 (out of 162 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>132 (out of 179 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>126 (out of 180 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>130 (out of 180 countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International ‘Corruption Perception Index’ reports
www.transparency.org

Transparency International’s poor CPI score and world ranking for Libya reflects a high perception of corruption. Corruption informs and is related to other serious weaknesses, in particular to aspects of the rule of law, where a strong independent judicial system is non-existent or is too weak to consistently apply the law to all those who engage in corruption.

High levels of corruption are also a reflection of the poor state and level of governance. The patronage culture that is symptomatic of an oil-dependent economy like Libya invites widespread corruption and destroys the political will to tackle it, as patronage becomes a vital tool for securing loyalty and manipulating political power by the authoritarian regime. This is a major obstacle to development in Libya.

2.14 Governance

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) presented here are collated and published in an annual report entitled ‘Governance Matters’ by Kaufmann and Mastruzzi and are sponsored by the World Bank (WB). The World Bank explains how these governance indicators are collated and determined and states that:

the governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and
international organisations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources (The World Bank, 2009).

2.15 The six governance indicators adopted by WB and their definitions are:

1- **Voice and Accountability**: Measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.

2- **Political Stability**: Measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism.

3- **Government Effectiveness**: Measures the quality of public service, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.

4- **Regulatory Quality**: Measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

5- **Rule of Law**: Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence.

6- **Control of Corruption**: Measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.

(Table 9): A summarised table of Libya’s scores on the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996 – 2008). Ranking (0% - 100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Indicator</th>
<th>Year 1996</th>
<th>Year 2003</th>
<th>Year 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>5.3 %</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>13.5 %</td>
<td>37.5 %</td>
<td>63.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>17.1 %</td>
<td>19.4 %</td>
<td>18.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Quality</td>
<td>2.0 %</td>
<td>4.9 %</td>
<td>17.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
<td>28.1 %</td>
<td>29.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>23.3 %</td>
<td>26.7 %</td>
<td>21.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Libya shows a very poor world ranking in the areas of ‘Voice and Accountability’ (2.4%) and ‘Government Effectiveness’ (18%) in 2008. ‘Regulatory Quality’ and ‘Rule of Law’ have improved slightly over the last ten years, albeit from a very poor base. The relative high improvement in political stability could be related to the silencing and elimination of all internal opposition threats and to Libya’s rapprochement with the West.

Although Libya scores very poorly in both ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Regulatory Quality’, it is, however, important to highlight that ‘Voice and Accountability’ has much greater relevance to the acquisition and expansion of capabilities in human development than ‘Regulatory Quality’. Voice and Accountability is directly indicative of the majority of the ten capabilities articulated in the CA and therefore the poor rating can be interpreted as a reflection of poor capabilities, hence the poor level of development attainment.

2.16 State of Education in Libya
It is indeed the case that Libya has the highest adult literacy rate and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in education in the whole of Africa, including other North African countries. However, this only reflects the quantitative aspects of education, not its strength and qualitative content, both of which are vital to capacity building and meeting development needs. Indeed, as shown by the Global Competitiveness Report (2005-2006), Libya ranks very poorly, at the bottom with a ranking of 110 out of 111 surveyed countries in terms of quality of education system as shown in figure 24 below.
Similarly, it can be argued that the loss of university lecturers and trained teachers impacts negatively on the quality of education in Libya. The loss of researchers affects scientific research and development. According to Nunn (2005: 56), there were a total of 33 academic staff of Libyan origin in UK Higher Education Institutions in 2002 (maybe even more now), and even larger numbers of Libyan academics teaching at universities in USA, Canada and Arab Gulf states have been reported. Education is crucial for capacity building and for driving development; the loss of hundreds of Libyan academics has left a shortage and a gap, especially in the quality and standards of tertiary education in Libya as alluded to above.

Indeed, the quality of university education has been widely criticised in Libya for its failure to match accepted international academic standards. There are over twelve universities in Libya (restructured down to ten recently), but all of them rank very poorly at international level. There is only one (University of Garyounis) in Benghazi which ranks 67th out of the top 100 African universities and 68th out the top 100 Arab universities, and has the very poor world ranking of (6781) in the most recent survey of 2010. None of the other Libyan universities make any ranking according to University Directory, (2010).

How is quality of education related to human development? Well the definition of one of the main capabilities based on the CA states: ‘Senses, imagination and thought: being able to
use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training’.

If we consider the tens of thousands of Libyan students who graduate from universities every year from institutions that offer a very poor quality of education, we can deduce that a vital capability for those graduates, who are the leaders and managers that would drive development plans, is not being expanded and adequately acquired.

2.17 State of healthcare in Libya:

During the oil boom of the mid 1970s, Libya invested in developing a modern healthcare system and infrastructure to meet the needs of a growing population that wanted to enjoy the fruits of its vast natural wealth. However, from the early 1980s healthcare services started to deteriorate due to multiple factors. According to Ben Irhuma (2007), these included the massive drop in the price of oil in the 80s, the US and UN sanctions, the emigration of qualified doctors ‘brain drain’, the mismanagement of the system at all levels by inexperienced, unqualified bureaucratic people, lack of a policy-making central body and, most importantly, the lack of trust between the people and the system.

According to a detailed analytical United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) 2007 report on the state of the Libyan health sector (see graph below), Libya does not allocate enough financial resources to healthcare despite being a rich oil-exporting country: ‘in comparison to its MENA peers, Libya spends much less on healthcare as a percentage of GDP – about 3.3% - but a similar amount in absolute terms. When adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries, Libya spends only US$222 per person per annum’ (WHO, 2007).

When compared to selected Arab and western countries, Libya’s average spending is only slightly better than that of Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, but less than half that of Saudi Arabia and less than third that of the UAE, which are both, like Libya, oil-exporting countries.

The report goes on to state that ‘the Government spends 60 million Libyan dinars (LD) annually for medical treatment of Libyan citizens abroad. More is spent out-of-pocket
(privately) by Libyans travelling for treatment to Arab countries and Europe’. The report also states that ‘for more serious procedures, Libyans travel abroad for treatment in Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt or further’ (WHO, 2007).

(Figure 4): Libya’s spending on healthcare (per person per annum) compared to selected Arab and western countries.


Distribution of expenditure on health

Source: Social and economic study carried out by National information authority 2003

2.18 Why do Libyans, en masse, seek medical treatment abroad?

One of the clearest indications of the poor quality of Libya’s healthcare system, and the general populace’s apparent loss of confidence in it, is the trend of Libyans in their tens of thousands to seek even the most basic medical care in neighbouring countries, such as
Tunisia and Egypt, and even as far afield as Jordan. As a well-known Libyan surgeon working in the US puts it: ‘in Libya we are still talking about treatment abroad. We are talking about individuals selling their belonging to go to Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Europe to have a cardiac checkup or chemotherapy or resection of a colon’ (Elkhammas, 2007).

According to the WHO, 23 per cent of the total expenditure on healthcare in Libya is ‘out of pocket’ (see table above), spent by ordinary Libyans travelling for treatment abroad, people who, in many cases, have to sell their most valuable possessions in order to afford such expense. According to Elkhammas (2007), Libyans spend more than one billion dollars on medical treatment in Tunisia: ‘it is really sad to see that we spend more than a billion dollars on medical tourism in Tunisia, a country that is poorer than us with a health system that gained the trust of Libyan citizens and made them travel there on a daily basis seeking medical help’.

Tunisians, over the last two decades, have become accustomed to seeing thousands of Libyans frequenting private medical clinics throughout Tunisia for treatment and surgery. The Tunisian government is believed to be very happy with the lucrative contribution gained from Libyan ‘medical tourism’ to the Tunisian economy. Jordan is another popular destination for ordinary Libyan citizens for basic medical care. A perfectly reasonable question to be asked here is: how a country like Jordan, with far less wealth than Libya, managed to develop a high quality healthcare system that is trusted and sought after, whereas Libya, despite its vast wealth, did not?!

It seems that the Libyan population has lost all confidence in the healthcare system provided and run by the Libyan government. This loss of confidence is not without justification; indeed one of the most serious and strangest stories related to healthcare in Libya was the news that there had been an outbreak of ‘bubonic plague’ in the coastal town of Tubruq in the east of Libya some 125 km from the Egyptian border in June 2009. The WHO confirmed that it sent a team to investigate the outbreak following a request from Libya for help, according to John Jabbour, a Cairo-based expert from the WHO. ‘At least 16 to18 cases, including one death, had been reported by the Libyan authorities when they asked for the WHO to help’ (Reuters, 2009).
2.19 Healthcare and human resources

The Libyan healthcare sector not only suffered from inadequate financial resources, but more importantly from a weakness and shortage of human resources. For the last four decades, Libya has relied on recruiting foreign doctors to supplement the supply. Recruitment of and reliance on foreign nurses, pharmacists and other personnel have also been heavy. Accurate, reliable data for 1980s and 1990s on the total number of doctors and other personnel is not readily available. According to WHO (2005), the total number of physicians per 10,000 head of population in Libya in 2004 was (13), compared to a selected number of other countries (see table below). This ratio increased from 13 to 17 in 2007 and 18 in 2009, according to data published by the Libyan Ministry of Health.

(Figure 5) – Libyan physicians per 10,000 populations, international comparison

![Figure showing physicians per 10,000 populations](image)


When considering the actual numbers of medical doctors in Libya, the total in 2005 was (8847), of which (7429) were Libyan and (1418) foreign (see table below, WHO, 2007). In 2007, the total was (9416), of which (8000) were Libyan and (1416) foreigners. In 2009, the total increased to (10230) of which (8612) were Libyans and (1618) foreigners (Libyan Ministry of Health, 2010).
The WHO report concludes that Libya has a major lack of other health workers – pharmacists, medical technicians and trained paramedics. The report also criticises Libya’s policy of sending doctors for postgraduate training abroad and alludes to the brain drain this policy has encouraged by saying that:

The expansive funding of Libyan doctors pursuing postgraduate specialisations abroad has also been inefficient, as Libya has not derived any benefit from their skill. Faced with low salaries, they have chosen to make their careers abroad and Libya has been forced to import expensive foreigners to replace them (WHO, 2007).

(Table 10) – Distribution of different healthcare staff by Libyan and Non-Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel (Number)</th>
<th>Libyans</th>
<th>Non-Libyans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>7429</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>8847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses &amp; midwives</td>
<td>30273</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>32349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>15196</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>16700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>37745</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92631</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>96791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
- Health information center, Libya

The United Nations WHO report also highlights the acute shortage of specialised doctors in certain crucial areas of medicine and concludes that, ‘Libya still finds itself lacking in specialists in a number of key areas such as anesthesia, cardiology and radiology’. This shortage applies equally to nursing; the report concludes that ‘the standard of nursing care in Libya is also inadequate due to poor quality nursing education. Nursing practice is dependent on expatriate staffing. Most qualified nursing staff is not Libyan.’ The report goes on to criticise nursing education and training in Libya ‘Nursing is not taught to degree level, and curricula are out of date and lacking in clinical experience content. Libya remains dependent
on expensive foreign nurses for almost all quality and specialised nursing care, and for midwifery’ (WHO, 2007).

2.20 Crisis of management in healthcare

It is ironic and intriguing that despite Libya having a relatively small population and huge wealth as an oil-exporting country, the healthcare services and system have been so poor for over three decades that ordinary citizens have totally lost confidence in it. The reasons and causes behind this are multiple. It is partly a lack of financial allocation - Libyan government expenditure on healthcare was only 2.6 per cent of GDP and 5.4 percent of total government expenditure in 2007 (WHO, 2009). It is also partly to do with a lack of human resources, as thousands of Libyan doctors are residing abroad; either training or working, and the government had to recruit thousands of foreign doctors (often with less than average ability) from countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Poland and Ukraine.

However, the most serious factor contributing to poor healthcare service in Libya is poor management and administration, poor quality of delivery and lack of strategic planning and utilisation of resources. According to (Elkhammas, 2007), ‘we do have many sincere doctors and nurses and other medical professionals who love to help but we lack a health system. We do not have a health system with clear policies and smooth procedures to assure delivery of some healthcare with some justice.’

Should the majority of the nearly two thousand Libyan doctors working abroad, who have gained clinical and management expertise and experience, return to Libya, attracted by a change in environment and better working conditions, they would make a huge and positive contribution to creating a healthcare system that would earn the trust and confidence of Libyan citizens once again.

In summary, the data from the mainly reputable (WHO) on the state of healthcare in Libya is comprehensive and reflects a very poor state of affairs. Libya’s average expenditure on health is one of the lowest in the region and in an oil-rich country with a small population. Moreover, (23%) of expenditure is made privately by ordinary Libyans travelling abroad for treatment. The number of physicians per 10,000 populations is low and almost half of that of Egypt and Jordan. Foreign doctors working in Libya (1,618 in year 2010) number almost one
in five while there are nearly 2000 Libyan doctors working in the USA, Canada, Europe and Gulf Arab states, whose levels of expertise excel world standards.

Vital human development capabilities, based on the CA, have been impeded and restricted, such as the capabilities of life, bodily health and control over one’s own environment, mainly the material one. The loss of almost 2000 Libyan doctors through brain drain has undoubtedly impacted negatively on the state of healthcare in Libya and the return of a good proportion of them would contribute positively to better healthcare management and improved standards of care for the Libyan people.

2.21 Impact of international sanctions on human development in Libya
The impact of international sanctions on the Libyan economy has already been discussed in previous chapter. Libya has experienced two major international sanctions as a result of political antagonism with the West mainly the USA, during the 1980s and 1990s. One set of sanctions was imposed unilaterally by the USA, the other by the United Nations (from 1992 to 1999). In April 1999, the UN announced that sanctions against Libya would be suspended and could be lifted after 90 days. In September 2003, the UN Security Council formally lifted the 11-year sanctions against Libya after Libya and France reached a tentative agreement on the downing of the French UTA plane issue (Financial Times, 2003).

According to the Economist (1999), the World Bank estimated that sanctions cost Libya as much as $18 billion in lost revenue, mostly as a result of underinvestment in oil. The EIU also stated earlier in 1995 that ‘sanctions have also put an effective stop to privatisation and to any liberalisation of the economy and trade. Privatisation Law No. 9, of September 2 1992, has not been implemented because the state has tightened its control over the economy to deal with the sanctions’ (EIU, 1995: 18).

The Libyan government, however submitted in September 1996 a detailed report to the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, detailing the effects of sanctions on various economic, social and healthcare fields and claiming that ‘all infrastructure development programmes and plans have been adversely affected, dashing the hopes and aspirations of the Libyan people to achieve progress, wellbeing, development, stability, security and peace’. The Libyan government report details other effects in the field of healthcare, including the claim that more than 780 seriously injured patients (most of whom were the victims of road
accidents) died in ambulances en route to airports in neighboring countries so that they could be transported by air for treatment abroad. The report goes on to claim that there were 1,135 still births and 514 deaths of women in childbirth in various hospitals as a result of the shortage of medicines, serums and vaccines. Prior to the air embargo, such supplies had been imported regularly by air (Martinez, 2007: 14).

Libya has estimated that the sanctions have deprived its economy of about $33 billion. However, the World Bank puts the losses and damages at a lower estimate of around $18 billion (Takeyh, 2001). The effect of the sanctions was also exacerbated by the decline in world oil prices in the early 1980s, when Libya’s income from the sale of oil fell from $20 billion dollars in 1981 to $5 billion dollars in 1986 (Martinez, 2007). The decline of world oil prices continued in the 1990s, when Libyan unemployment reached almost 30 per cent and inflation around 50 per cent, which led to the country undergoing an austerity programme that included freezing salaries and reducing subsidies. This was a dangerous policy for a political regime that depended for its survival on buying the population's acquiescence (Takeyh, 2001).

The Libyan government report submitted to the UN in September 1996 claimed that sanctions have adversely affected development programmes consequently ‘dashing the hopes and aspirations of the Libyan people to achieve progress, wellbeing, development, stability, security and peace’ which are all related directly to main capabilities articulated in the CA.

It can be argued therefor that sanctions did have a detrimental effect on human development in Libya, it is difficult however to evaluate whether these selective and targeted sanctions (mainly banning air travel to and from Libya and banning exports of arms and US technology for the oil sector to Libya) were the dominant cause of the slow-down in development momentum, or whether the decline in the world price of oil, which accounts for more than 95 per cent of Libya’s revenue to finance its development programmes, was also a key contributory factor, coupled with incompetent management, lack of an institutional framework, of good governance and of accountability and transparency.

2.22 What do we conclude on the state of human development in Libya?

When we evaluate human development in a more comprehensive holistic approach, considering a wider range of freedoms and choices that should be available to people, we find
a totally different reality to that represented by the very limited and widely criticised human
development index (HDI). Additional wider and equally important indices reflecting human
development based on the more representative and holistic capabilities approach paradigm
can include: political freedom and participation; respect and regard for human rights;
transparency and accountability of institutions. They also include: the existence of democratic
values and practices such as political parties, regular elections; the existence of an
independent free press, independent judicial processes and institutions, governance
indicators, quality of healthcare, quality of education, quality of ICT infrastructure and access
to information and knowledge.

When all these aspects are evaluated for the last three decades in the case of Libyan, based on
international organisations independent reports and data, Libya is clearly shown to have a
poor ranking in almost all the indicators, reflecting very poor human development attainment.
Data on levels of development attainment by international organisations should not be taken
at face value and the methodology of how these international organisations collate and
produce these data needs to be critically assessed; however, these organisations produce
global reports across the whole world and their reports are adopted and used widely.

The limited international sanctions that Libya experienced in the two decades of 1980s and
1990s cannot be ignored and entirely dismissed as having no negative effect on its
development; nor can they be used as the sole reason for poor levels of development. It is
evident that this twenty-year period also saw widespread violations of human rights,
extremely oppressive policies and total lack of any democratic practice or participation, all of
which contributed to the outflow of educated and skilled Libyans and at certain junctures
increased sharply the brain drain. The numbers and quality of foreign skilled labour also
declined according to Yahia and Saleh (2008), meaning it is even less likely to fully offset the
loss of the Libyan human capital.

The state and level of attainment of human development in Libya has been set back by the
brain drain and loss of vital Libyan human capital to the Diaspora.
Chapter III

The brain drain: different perspectives

3.1 The brain drain
The concept of brain drain was first developed in the early 1960s when Britain was losing intellectuals, scientists, academics and physicians to the United States and Canada (Gaillard, 1997).

Brain drain is concerned mainly with the loss of human capital, that is to say, the qualifications, skills and abilities possessed by the people who emigrate from their home countries. Having invested resources in educating and training such people, the home countries would expect the return on their investment to be the application of the acquired skills and expertise to overall development at home. Once these highly educated and skilled people emigrate, they become a loss to their countries; a drain on what is any country’s greatest wealth, its vitally important human resources.

The host countries attracting these highly educated and skilled emigrants benefit from their skills, talents and innovative potential without having had to invest in them in the first place, thereby making a gross profit on human resources and wealth. The brain drain has been largely unidirectional, flowing from developing countries in the south (mainly Africa and Asia) to the developed countries of the north, namely Europe, the United States and Canada, although Australia and New Zealand are also recipients.

The impact of the brain drain has been devastating in some regions of the developing world, and particularly in certain services and skills, such as medicine. It is, for instance, estimated that more than half of African medical doctors have emigrated to the west over the last three decades, and continue to do so in similar proportions. About 70,000 highly qualified Africans are estimated to leave their home countries annually (Odumasi-Ashanti, 2003).

3.2 Definition of brain drain
There are many definitions of brain drain, of which some of the most commonly used are:
‘The emigration of a significant proportion of a country's highly skilled, highly educated professional population, usually to other countries offering better economic and social opportunity, for example, physicians leaving a developing country to practice medicine in a developed country’ (Haupt and Kane, 1998).

‘One-way movement of highly skilled people from developing countries to the developed countries that only benefits the industrialised countries’ (Gaillard, 1997).

‘An abnormal form of scientific exchange between countries characterised by a one-way flow in favour of the most highly developed countries’ (UNESCO, 1969).

3.3 The Arab brain drain
The literature review on specific Libyan brain drain has been covered already in Chapter I when reviewing the overall political and economic background for Libya. The review of the literature on brain drain in the wider Arab sphere is useful and helpful in putting Libya in context within its natural region.

The Arab world has lost many of its brightest and best through the global phenomenon of brain drain. The investment that Arab countries put into educating and training people to become doctors, engineers, IT specialists, researchers and many other kinds of professionals is lost when these people emigrate and apply their skills elsewhere. The loss of financial and human capital has a detrimental effect on efforts for economic growth and development in Arab countries. The Arab brain drain can be traced back to the early 1960s when many of the newly independent Arab countries embarked on the road of ambitious development and started to send hundreds (which became thousands, then tens of thousands, in the seventies and eighties) of students to pursue university and postgraduate education, mainly in Europe and the USA, in order to acquire skills and expertise vital to meeting development needs.

Arab countries, oil- and cash-rich, including the Gulf states, Libya and Algeria, have pursued an aggressive policy of sending government-sponsored students to countries such as the USA, the UK, France, Germany and others. A downside to this policy, which only became apparent years later, is the low rate of return of these students, especially in the cases of Libya and Algeria. A high percentage of their students decided to settle in their ‘adoptive’
countries, where they have enjoyed the rewards of good working conditions and a degree of stability and freedom that would not be available in their countries of origin.

According to the (UNDP-AHDR, 2003: 144), the loss of highly qualified Arabs through emigration, mainly to the West, is considered to be one of the most serious factors undermining the acquisition of knowledge and development, so serious that it can be characterised as a ‘haemorrhage’, although the report acknowledges that accurate data and statistics documenting the extent of the Arab brain drain are not easily available. It also classifies the Arab brain drain as a ‘reverse development aid’, since most of the investment that Arab countries make in educating and training their citizens who emigrate is lost to the receiving countries, which benefit from the skills and expertise of these people without having had to invest in educating and training them in the first place.

3.4 Extent of the Arab brain drain

One problem encountered when considering the extent of the Arab brain drain and the exact numbers of emigrants over the decades is a lack of accurate data, caused by the fact that the source Arab countries do not keep track of who migrated, their characteristics and the countries where they resided. Some receiving countries do keep records of the stock of immigrants, mainly through the regular censuses they conduct. The USA, for example, asks through the census about country of origin and level of education, which can give a good picture of the spread of migrants who are settled in the USA. The OECD countries also regularly provide statistics on migration, although data from the OECD can be problematic, as different countries may have different criteria for classifying individuals as immigrants and only those immigrants from the top five or ten countries numerically to each OECD country are recorded. This means that the level of immigration recorded for the receiving OECD country may seem small, but can still be significant for the source country with a small population, such as Libya or Bahrain. Furthermore, some OECD countries, such as Italy and Greece, do not provide any data on immigration and yet large numbers of people from Egypt tend to head for those two countries (Carrington and Detragiache, 1999: 8).

Data are also available from international organisations that track and report on international labour and migration movements regularly. Such organisations include: The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), as well as UNESCO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More specific to
the Arab world, the Arab League publishes a bi-annual report on migration in the Arab countries, but its data tends to be recycled from international statistics, mainly those of the OECD, UNESCO and others, which reflect and confirm the shortcomings of individual Arab countries’ own monitoring and recording of their emigrant citizens.

A highly publicised recent study, discussed already briefly above in the introduction section, is that by the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, commissioned by the Arab League and published in May 2004, and estimated the total number of highly educated and skilled Arabs who migrated, mainly to the West, to be around 450,000, which equates to about one third of the total brain drain from developing countries. About 75 per cent of these have migrated to and settled in just three western countries: the United States, Canada and Britain. The study also revealed that Arab countries lose about 50 per cent of their newly qualified medical doctors, 23 per cent of engineers and 15 per cent of scientists each year, and estimated that about 45 per cent of Arab students who travel to western countries for study do not return after graduating. This is estimated to cost Arab countries more than US$ 2 billion annually and over US$ 200 billion so far (Sawahel, SciDev.net, 2004).

The Arab world has very weak manufacturing output and its share of world manufacturing exports is less than one per cent. According to (Noland and Pack, 2007), the strongest Arab export has been its smart, educated people, of whom many have chosen America and Canada as their countries of residence. The North American (USA & Canada) Arab community is estimated to be around 1.5 million. The 2000 census for the USA gives a figure of around 1.2 million Arabs, the 2001 Canadian census a figure of around 250,000 Arabs and those of Arab ancestry. The largest single grouping in the North American Arab community is of Lebanese origin, the second largest group from Egypt (Britingham and de la Cruz, 2005). Arabs of Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi and Moroccan origins are also prominent, as are those from almost every other Arab country.

According to statistics cited by (Noland and Pack, 2007: 253) in their book *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, the Arab community in America is both richer and more educated than the average American population as a whole. The average median family income of Arab families, especially Lebanese and Egyptian, is about 20 per cent higher than that of the average American family, a discrepancy most likely related to Arabs’ educational attainment: the proportion of adult Arabs in America with a Bachelor’s degree is (41 per
cent) compared to the overall American average of (24 per cent). In Canada, the proportion of adult Arabs with a Bachelor’s degree is about (30 per cent) more than twice the national Canadian average of (12 per cent).

According to Zahlan, (2007), the total number of Arabs considered to be Highly Skilled Personnel (HSP) who had emigrated to OECD countries by 1999 was (967,548), as reported by the OECD. As can be seen in the table below, this is about 300,000 more than migrants from India and only slightly fewer than migrants from China, figures that are all the more notable as both India and China have populations about three times the size of the whole Arab world. One possible explanation for the difference between the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies’ figures for the total number of Arab emigrants (450,000, cited above) and Zahlan’s, based on OECD tracking of international migration, is that the OECD survey includes more countries – Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and many ex-Eastern European countries which are now members of the OECD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Expatriates</th>
<th>HSP %</th>
<th>HSP Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab World</td>
<td>4,462,391</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>967,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,928,199</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>1,000,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,649,711</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>653,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is clear, based on the above table that on a per capita basis the Arab brain drain is about four times greater than that of China, and about five times that of India. The table also shows that overall migration from China and India combined is (3.6 million) compared to (4.5 million) from the whole Arab world\(^7\). Although China has a population about four times that of the Arab world, the latter exports an equal number of HSP to the OECD countries (Zahlan, 2007: 4).

Although there are more than 300 universities today in the Arab world, compared to only ten sixty years ago, and although the number of Arab students who have graduated from Arab

\(^7\) The relatively high proportion of not highly skilled expatriates amongst the 4.5 million Arabs residing in the OECD countries could be related to large numbers of low skill migrant labour from North African countries (mainly Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) residing in EU countries like: France, Belgium, Holland and Germany and others.
universities so far exceeds 15 million, it is still in the area of further research and graduate studies that the Arab world is lacking and lagging behind (Zahlan, 2007). According to UNESCO, (1999) statistics, the total number of Arab students enrolled in universities outside the Arab world was (120,602), compared with (106,036) Chinese and (52,932) Indians. It is estimated that about (82 per cent) of these students from the Arab world pursue postgraduate education outside their countries, in OECD countries, mainly at European universities, and many of them do not return to their source country, constituting a brain drain and loss of vital human capital (Kearney, 2008: 8).

3.5 Causes of Arab brain drain
The causes of the Arab brain drain can be attributed to different factors, mainly economic, social, scientific and political: lack of stability; lack of sustained development strategies that offer employment and opportunities for graduates and educated people in general to use their skills and talents; and the very poor financial resources made available for scientific research and development (as discussed in detail below).

Many professionals find the severe infrastructural limits and weaknesses in their countries a major barrier that makes it ‘impossible to contribute to their fields of expertise at the desired level of technical sophistication’ (Bach, 2003: 237). So, many of these professionals, especially in the Arab world, end up migrating, attracted by the advanced infrastructure of developed countries that allows them to fulfill their potential.

Postgraduate studies and research in Arab universities are still limited, mainly due to lack of the funding and investment in research and development that enable universities to become ‘centers for excellence’ which support the economy and development in general. Arabs are still continuing to depend on study abroad for their post-graduate education. According to Zahlan, (2007: 3), on the basis of UNESCO statistical information, it is estimated that 12,000 Arabs obtain PhDs abroad annually and that 85 per cent or more of these do not return, becoming a brain drain. This is a loss to the Arab world of about 10,000 PhD graduates annually. There are estimates of about 60,000 to 70,000 Arabs with PhD qualifications working in the Arab world, compared with an estimated 150,000 abroad. Out of the scientific community holding a PhD in the Arab world, only about 10,000 publish one or more scientific papers in refereed international periodicals per annum, a very poor research publishing record that is almost entirely due to inadequate research working conditions and a lack of R&D spending.
The table below summarises some comparative data on gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) as a percentage of GDP presented in a (UNESCO Report, 2002). It is clear that those Arab countries, along with the group of less developed countries (who happen to be the poorest in the world), allocate the least proportion of their GDP to R&D. If we compare Arab countries’ spending on R&D with that of China and India, we find that the latter’s governments allocate far more, as a percentage of GDP, on R&D than do Arab governments. China spends about six times more, India three. This is an important reason why the Arab brain drain is much higher, on a per capita basis, than that of China or India (Zahlan, 2007). Israel has shown the highest spending on R&D, as a percentage of GDP, in the world (4.9 per cent), which equates to 24 times more than what Arab countries spend.

(Table 12): Comparative Support for R&D (2002) in Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GERD $billion</th>
<th>GERD % of GDP</th>
<th>GERD per inhabitant $</th>
<th>Researchers per million inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>829.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>134.4</td>
<td>894.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>645.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>540.4</td>
<td>3,272.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>42.8</td>
<td>374.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>159.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States Asia</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO op.cit. Table1 p.4. cited in Zahlan, (2007: 8)

Blame for the Arab brain drain can also be directly laid at the door of political instability and the lack of democracy, restrictions on basic freedoms and the absence of respect for human rights, all prevalent to differing extents in all Arab countries. External factors to do with conflict and destabilisation of the region are also involved. It is ironic that the foreign invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 has accelerated the brain drain to a rate even greater than that which it used to be under the previous repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. This acceleration in the Iraqi brain drain is manifested in the number of Iraqi academics, scientist
and doctors who have been deliberately targeted for kidnapping and assassinations in the last four years, having been forced to flee for their lives and seek refuge in western countries where there is comparative security and stability.

Other causes of brain drain, concluded from the empirical research undertaken in this thesis about the brain drain in Libya, are also relevant in their implications to the wider Arab region (this is discussed more in the Conclusion).

3.6 Arab Gulf ‘Foundations’ to attract Diaspora skilled Arabs

A very interesting phenomenon that has emerged in the last decade is the pull factor of some Arab Gulf states for thousands of highly skilled Arab academics and scientists who had emigrated to America and other OECD countries. Countries such as the UAE and Qatar, which have embarked on huge development programmes financed by the abundant cash from oil and gas exports, have become popular destinations for highly qualified Arabs, and others from Asia and Africa, taking up well-paid jobs in the education, health, IT and oil sectors. In addition to the economic attractions, the Gulf States offer cultural advantages to Arab expatriates who have lived in the West for a long time: an environment with an Arabic and Islamic flavour. Gulf States also offer stable, safe and comfortable living conditions – with one crucial difference, compared to living in a western country: the prohibition of political activities or public criticism of the local regimes.

Both the UAE and Qatar have set up foundations with the specific objective of acting like ‘centres for excellence’ to attract highly reputable western universities to set up branches that offer a similar quality of education and research to the local population of students and residents alike. The idea is that Arab academics will relocate from western countries to teach in these universities. Science cities and other research institutions have been established to act as conduits for the transfer of technology and knowledge to the Gulf region and Arab world as a whole. ‘If successful, these initiatives could attract Arab scientists and engineers to come back to the region, but it could also set off an intra-regional brain drain… as countries like Egypt will find it difficult to compete with countries in the Gulf region’ (Noland, 2009).

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8 One example with a Libyan relevance is the American Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) setting up its Dubai University in 2008 and appointing Professor Mustafa Abushagur, a well accomplished Scientist in the USA who is originally from Libya, as its President. (see more on Prof. Abushagur in Appendix A).
The movement of highly skilled Arabs from one Arab country to another or their relocation from the west to an Arab country may not necessarily constitute a brain drain – more of a brain circulation, since it is easier or more likely for these people to be in regular contact with their country of origin. This is the case, for example, for the Egyptians and Sudanese who apply their knowledge and skills in Gulf countries, but visit their own countries regularly and consequently make a positive contribution to them.

The State of Qatar set up the Qatar Foundation (QF) some fifteen years ago with the mission to attract high-calibre people who had migrated to the West. The QF today hosts within its ‘Education City’ six of the world’s top universities, research facilities in technology, medicine and social sciences. The student intake is from local Qataris and foreign students whose parents are working in Qatar or from other Arab and non-Arab countries. The QF has made a specific commitment to help reverse Arab brain drain by attracting those highly successful Arabs in the Diaspora, especially to work in its Education City. It has also started, since 2006, to organise annual forums which bring together Diaspora Arab scientists and academics. However, it is early days to establish if the QF has been successful in reversing Arab brain drain even by a small percentage, and long-term success may depend on the sustainability of such programmes in a country that depends on the volatile market for natural commodities.

3.7 Reversing the brain drain
It has already been established in this thesis that brain drain is a real phenomenon that poses challenges to Libya, the Arab countries and many other developing or less developed countries (LDC) around the world. This is especially true in Africa where brain drain has reached such seriously high levels that the whole drive to eradicate poverty, poor economic conditions and achieve sustainable development is threatened. Brain drain, explained in this thesis as the movement of highly educated and skilled people from developing countries to highly developed countries such as those in the OECD, is also seen as high human capital flight (HCF) and a major loss of investment to the source countries which incurred the cost of the emigrants’ education and training.

How can developing countries in the traditional South (Africa, Asia and Latin America) be expected to bridge the knowledge gap that is so vital for growth and development, when they are rapidly losing their brightest and best to the highly developed North (Europe and North
America)? Answering this question is particularly difficult when both migration movement generally and human capital loss through brain drain are on the increase; the latter is in fact increasing so rapidly, especially in the Arab world, that the UNDP Arab human development report of 2002 called it a ‘brain haemorrhage’. Some analysts have described the leading Arab countries’ main export today, especially densely populated countries like Egypt, as being their smart, educated people (Nolan and Pack, 2008).

Brain drain is likely to increase rather than slow down; this is due to many factors, such as local national conditions and globally changing conditions, as well as paradigm shifts in human behavior and thinking. Transnational mobility and travel has undoubtedly rapidly improved as a result of faster and more convenient modes of transport. The decreasing costs of travel and advances in ICT (Information and Communication Technology) are also lowering cognitive and informational barriers and helping to increase the circulation of people across borders (Kapur, 2001: 266). Another factor that has facilitated brain drain in the last few years is the selective visa and immigration policies undertaken by developed countries in the North, including the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and other European countries. Immigration policies have shifted in favour of more and more skilled migration, to an extent that has led some African and Latin American countries to say that ‘the North is stealing our people’ (Roland, 2008: 7).

It is ironic that while the free and democratic countries of the North are raising the barriers and almost shutting the gates to normal, usually low-skilled immigrants, even to victims of persecution and conflicts who have genuine reasons to migrate to a safer more stable environment, they are simultaneously using selective immigration policies as a tool to compete with each other to fill places and shortages for skilled workers by attracting the cream of global human capital (Kapur, 2001: 268). IT specialists from India, medical doctors from Africa and Latin America, experienced nurses from the Philippines and other Asian countries, scientists and engineers from the Middle East – all are generally encouraged to apply for work visas (so-called H1-B visas) by the USA, and the UK has introduced a similar fast-track points system which gives priority to those with skills and expertise when applying for a visa to work in Britain. (These visa policies are discussed in more detail shortly.)

There are also major demographic factors, in both developed and developing countries, which are likely to increase migration of skilled labour and contribute to increased brain drain. The
current demographic changes in the European Union (EU), for example, are such that birth rates are declining and populations are aging and living much longer than before. These trends are predicted to cause a decline in total EU population by about 12 per cent by the year 2050 (Kapur, 2001: 265) and are likely to lead to a negative effect on living standards as government spending on the aging population diminishes in line with reduced tax revenues. According to OECD, (2000: 197), living standards in the USA and the EU could fall by 10 and 18 per cent respectively, and without an influx of new workers European pension policies and systems could become unsustainable. The situation could be alleviated by migrants of working age who would cater for the needs of aging populations by paying taxes and hence financing pension schemes.

United Nations and OECD studies estimate that the net number of immigrants needed by the EU to meet the demographic challenge and maintain the size and balance of the population, including that of working age, will be about 1.5 million yearly, an increase of 15-fold on current migration rates (OECD, 1998; United Nations, 2000). Against this, consider the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, where population growth is among the highest in the world, and the working-age population, female educational attainment and participation in the labour force and urbanisation are all on the increase, yet unemployment especially amongst graduates and young people is estimated at around 25 per cent (Gardiner, 2003). The MENA region faces serious demographic pressure to create employment opportunities for its young people, estimated to be about 70 million extra jobs in the next twenty years. Otherwise, ‘push factors’ will make millions of young educated Arabs migrate, attracted by the ‘pull’ factors, including demographic ones, in Europe and the OECD countries generally, as highlighted above.

3.8 From ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’

The literature on brain drain has moved on in recent years to stress that brain drain need not be a permanent loss of highly skilled and educated people who are the ‘vital driving force for any country’ (Horvat, 2004: 77). It has been highlighted throughout the last decade that there is a ‘paradigm shift’ (Meyer, 2003) from ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’ (Cao, 1996; Meyer & Brown, 1999). As one of the earliest proponents of this paradigm shift, (Cao, 1996) has argued that brain drain should be seen as ‘an ongoing and global phenomenon that is neither permanent nor irreversible’. 
In this era of globalisation, when cultural barriers are being dismantled thanks to the vastly
greater exposure created by cheaper and more convenient transnational mobility and by fast
and instantaneous communications between people throughout the world, strategies and
policies that seek to block or hinder the movement of highly skilled personnel (HSP) are
bound to be ineffective and unacceptable. It is also the case that the international mobility of
human capital is driven more by global market considerations over which national
governments have little or no control (Cao, 1996).

Brain circulation shifts the emphasis from either blocking the brain drain or seeking the
permanent return of those highly skilled and educated emigrants to a more flexible and
realistic approach that seeks to minimise the detrimental effect and maximise the benefits of
may consider encouraging or supporting their highly skilled population to take part in brain
circulation instead of trying to contain them’ or seek their permanent return.

Brain circulation can be a multi-dimensional strategy implemented through different policy
options. These include encouraging the temporary return of lost human capital for visits;
maintaining a ‘virtual’ contact with the home country via global advances in communication
technology; setting up ‘Diaspora networks’; and, most importantly, matching these policies
with a genuine improvement in the home country’s political, social and economic
environment (Cao, 1996). In addition, ‘Long term strategies to promote economic growth are
needed to enable developing countries to re-attain and draw back their highly skilled and
address the negative effects of brain drain’ (Quaked, 2002: 153). Other indirect preventative
or protective measures, such as democratisation and socio-economic development, can help
minimise loss through brain drain without the need to prohibit migration (Iredale, 1999: 108).

Brain circulation, as migration form and strategy, can be seen as both a cause and a
consequence of political and socio-economic development in both source and destination
countries.

In this sense, a well-developed scientific infrastructure, higher investments in the
science sector and the stability of a consolidated democratic government that
assures human rights and academic freedom all provide a suitable environment
that allows this form of migration to occur (Horvat, 2004: 83).
Brain circulation can play an important role in the success of a country’s transitional process of economic development and democratic consolidation by utilising ‘the reservoir of knowledge and skills located in those expatriate nationals’, if the political will exist (Horvat, 2004: 91).

3.9 Successful examples of reversing the brain drain:

Some countries, such as Ireland, Taiwan, South Korea, China and India, have been very successful in slowing down the rate of emigration of their skilled people and have developed strategies to attract back those in the Diaspora, in effect reversing the brain drain. It is important to note that countries like Taiwan and South Korea have rapidly achieved a high level of development, partly through utilising their skilled human capital in the Diaspora. China and India, on the other hand, are currently experiencing the highest rates of economic growth and diversification in the world and the engagement of their successful citizens in the Diaspora is contributing to this growth and development. The key issue is whether Libya and Arab, African and Latin American countries can utilise and benefit from their Diaspora communities to attain similarly successful growth and overall development.

The Irish have always been associated with immigration all over the world, to the extent that there are more people of Irish descent outside than in Ireland. However, in the last two decades, emigration has slowed considerably and many in the Irish Diaspora have returned to settle and work in Ireland. The brain drain reversal could be attributed to Ireland joining the EU and having a much more liberalised economic system and a robust stable legal and political environment. Whatever the reasons and dynamics, the fact is reversing its brain drain helped Ireland’s economic growth and boosted development. One direct benefit has been to raise the social and economic rate of return on educational investment by a significant margin (Noland and Pack, 2008: 251), as those who attain high levels of education and skills are retained to work in Ireland and contribute to overall development.

Taiwan and South Korea are further salutary examples of the benefits of having strategies in place to reverse brain drain. The two countries have pursued similar strategies to achieve the physical relocation of their highly skilled and successful citizens in the Diaspora to their home countries. Taiwan, for example, has set up a government agency, the National Youth
Commission, to encourage and coordinate the return (Chang, 1992). The Taiwan government has also established a ‘Science Park’ and provided tax and financial incentives for returnees to establish high-technology firms. Much of today’s prosperous and fast growing high-technology sector in Taiwan is attributed to firms established by returnee scientists and engineers (Noland, 2008: 3).

South Korea has also focused on attracting back its Diaspora scientists to help upgrade and boost its research institutions, such as the Korean Institute for Science and Technology (KIST). Returnees who joined KIST are allowed a great degree of research and management autonomy to reproduce the environment they experienced and enjoyed in the USA. They are also offered salaries, housing and working conditions similar to those they enjoyed in the USA. This emphasis on enhancing research and development through Diaspora returnees was crucial in South Korea’s massive drive for industrialisation in the 1970s (Yoon, 1992). Statistics also show that during the 1960s only about 16 per cent of Korean scientists and engineers with a PhD in the USA returned to South Korea, this percentage jumping to about two-thirds in the 1980s (Kapur, 2001: 279).

China today presents similar internal social and political dynamics to many Arab countries, including Libya, and can offer very useful lessons in how to deal with the brain drain challenge. According to Bolt, (1996), China’s policies for attracting inward investment in the 1980s and 1990s were directed primarily at its migrants in the Diaspora. It offered its citizens residing abroad special reduced rates for using land and real estate to set up businesses and manufacturing facilities. However, many expatriate Chinese, including those born and bred in China, were reluctant to return for good due to the political conditions, fear of political instability, lack of freedom and the potential difficulties in leaving China again for a second or third time, if they wished to have that option, according to studies by Zweig, (1997) and Chang & Deng, (1997). This may suggest that if the Chinese government adopted less politically repressive policies in favour of more democratic values and freedoms, the rate of brain drain reversal would potentially be greater.

India’s case is slightly different. Government efforts have been concentrated on attracting financial remittance from successful migrants in the Diaspora. The return of highly skilled
Indians, especially in the field of information technology (IT), has been mainly driven by non-government voluntary initiatives. Indians living abroad, especially in the USA and Europe, have sought to invest in higher education institutions, especially in the field of science and technology. Diaspora Indians have also been active in facilitating technology transfer by setting up IT firms, usually as extensions, branches or manufacturing facilities for firms already established overseas (Kapur, 2001: 280). However, it is the Indian Diaspora networks, established especially by those in IT, that have been very useful in the re-transfer to India of knowledge and the entrepreneurial culture vital for growth and development.

According to Quaked, (2002: 153) strategies for the promotion of economic growth by developing countries are helpful and necessary to draw back their highly skilled to help address the detrimental effect of the brain drain. Economic growth also reduces the rate of migration, as the disparities in salaries, quality of facilities and investment in research and development are reduced. When the powerful attraction of much higher levels of income and quality of life no longer obtains, highly skilled people are less likely to uproot themselves from their home environment and culture to move and live in a totally new one. The high level of economic growth that China and India have been enjoying for the last few years have had a positive effect on slowing down the rate of brain drain.

In conclusion, three out of the five countries considered above as successful examples of reversing the brain drain, namely Taiwan, South Korea and China, were not democracies when they started reversing their brain drain. This suggests that development drive and economic growth were the crucial factor, as highlighted by Quaked above, although in the case of China the literature above suggests that more guarantees of freedom of movement and political freedom and stability may have boosted the rate of brain reversal. Whether democratic values or economic considerations are the overriding factors in encouraging a successful reversal of brain drain will be one of the key questions and hypothesis investigated in this research.

3.10 Diaspora Networks strategy
The reversal of brain drain through the offer of a ‘return option’ by the source country has been a very successful strategy undertaken by newly industrialised countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore and, to a lesser extent, by China and India. The return option has been very effective in attracting back highly educated and skilled people from countries like
the USA, Canada and other OECD countries. Their vital knowledge and expertise helped enhance research capabilities and develop labour-intensive industries that, in turn, drove growth and development, especially in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore.

However, the last two decades have witnessed a global explosion in the field of information and communication technology (ICT). The world has become a truly global village where tools like the internet and satellite communication make it possible for people to connect, communicate and interact easily.

This paradigm shift in communication and how people can link together virtually, without the need for physical movement or relocation, has stimulated debate and innovation into how source countries can tap into their lost human capital abroad using the virtual world. So, instead of the return option, we have the ‘Diaspora option’, which is based on a networking approach. Highly skilled expatriates can set up networks or associations based on their country of origin (Libya, Egypt or Ghana) or regional groupings (Arab, African or Latin American). Such networks have been classified in many different ways, as Intellectual Diaspora Networks, Scientific Diaspora Networks, Expatriate Knowledge Networks; Virtual Participation Networks, Virtual Linkage Networks and so on. The prime aim of such established networks is to turn a brain drain into a brain gain for the source countries. Diaspora networks help to harness and disseminate knowledge back to the source country without the need for expatriates to return permanently.

The Diaspora option takes into account that many expatriates are well settled in their host countries and are not likely to want to return to their countries of origin. However, they may still be connected to the need for development in homeland through cultural, family or other ties (Meyer and Brown, 1999). One good example of a successful Diaspora network is called The IndUS Entrepreneur (TIE), a networking group of Indian IT specialist entrepreneurs based in the USA and founded in 1992. TIE benefitted from the presence of a large number of highly skilled Indians in America, including around (200,000) IT specialists in Silicon Valley (Kapur, 2001: 272).

To date, tens of Diaspora networks have been set up in the USA and Europe, based on either specific source country or regional affiliations. Examples of Arab networks include the Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA), Moroccan Association of
Researchers and Scholars Abroad (MARS) and Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC). The only example of a Libyan Diaspora network is the Libyan Doctors Society\(^9\) (LDS), which was set up in the UK in 2002 and which inter-connects about 150 Libyan doctors working abroad. LDS also offers newly graduated doctors inside Libya some help on medical education and training mainly on line. (See more details on LDS in Chapter VI.)

Some networks were the result of initiatives by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), including the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), a network which assists highly skilled expatriates to return to their home country for short visits, between three weeks to three months, to engage in development projects and undertake teaching and training assignments in local universities and other institutions. Many developing countries have utilised this programme in the last two decades (Meyer and Brown, 1999).

UNESCO, in co-operation with Hewlett Packard (HP) Company and other partners, has undertaken a similar initiative, whereby computing technology and finance have been supplied to help set up university networks through which the participating universities can re-establish links between brain-drain researchers and those who stayed in their countries. By giving scientists and researchers access to their peers and advanced research going on in developed countries, the initiative aims to reduce the number of academics and scientists who leave their countries of origin. In October 2009, the initiative had fifteen institutions connected, mainly in Africa, and was aiming to extend the service to over 100 education institutions in Africa and the Arab world by 2011 (UNESCO, 2010).

### 3.11 Policy options for tackling the brain drain

As long as less developed countries continue to lose their most valuable resource, human capital, then their drive to bridge the knowledge and development gap and achieve sustainable human development will always be severely handicapped. The loss through brain drain is not only human, but also financial, since there is no return on all the investment in education and training, a return from which the receiving countries in fact benefit without having invested anything in those people they attract. Moreover, any remittance sent back by

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\(^9\) Important to note that the Libyan Doctors Society was the initiative of a group of Libyan doctors abroad and the Libyan government did not play any part in initiating or facilitating the set up of this group. This reflects a lack of policy choice or interest yet in utilizing Diaspora networks as a strategy for Libyan brain circulation.
some in the Diaspora is no compensation for the initial investment or the loss of human
capital. Nor is the Foreign Direct Aid (FDA) received by some poorer countries in Africa and
Latin America any compensation or substitute for what is lost through brain drain.

The loss of human capital through brain drain is sometimes discussed and pitted against the
potential gains through financial remittances that skilled people in the Diaspora can send
back to the source country. Financial gains through remittance can be important for low-
income countries and then mostly for lower-skilled workers who are temporary migrants
(Kapur, 2001: 269). In oil-rich countries, such as Libya, Algeria and Iraq, financial
remittance from skilled migrants lost through brain drain is irrelevant, as the reasons for
migration in the first place were not mainly economic and sending money back to families
and relatives can be problematic in politically repressive source countries.

A possible and more important form of remittance is ‘social remittance’, whereby highly
successful and skilled migrants returning from the Diaspora play a significant role in
reshaping social preferences, norms and expectations in their country of origin, which could
potentially lead to beneficial political, economic and cultural consequences (Levitt, 1998).

There are three main areas of policy that source countries of brain drain can contemplate,
possibly in combination: reducing or stopping brain drain in the first place; reversing the
phenomenon through the physical ‘return option’; and reaping some benefit from it through
the virtual ‘Diaspora option’ (as discussed above). Of paramount importance are addressing
the ‘push’ factors that make highly skilled and educated people leave their countries in the
first place and understanding the ‘pull’ factors and policies that make developed countries
seem so desirable. There are important issues involved, issues related to social and political
stability and freedom, expenditure on R&D and immigration policies by both source and
receiving countries.

Slowing down and reversing the detrimental effect of brain drain on source countries needs
also to be tackled on regional and global levels, in which transnational co-operation is vital.
Initiatives made by the UNDP, UNESCO and international companies like HP and others, are
helpful but do not go far enough. Regional political organisations, such as the AU and the
Arab League have been mere talking shops on the problem, at best issuing some poorly
collated reports and data on a phenomenon that threatens the whole development ethos of the regions they represent.

3.12 Tackling the ‘push factors’ from source countries

Strategies to slow down and eventually stop brain drain have to come in the first place from the source countries which are losing human capital. Such countries need to consider deeply and seriously the underlying causes, the ‘push factors’, which make their brightest and best citizens leave. These factors are multiple and vary in priority and importance from one country to another. In some countries it could be the economic conditions which mean that jobs are not available, or not rewarded well compared to salaries and rewards for the same jobs in developed countries. In this case, remuneration policies need to be reviewed to make it worthwhile for the highly skilled and qualified people to stay and work in their homeland.

Other factors include local universities’ investment in postgraduate studies and research, and overall spending on R&D as a percentage of GNP, in which areas statistics show that the Arab world and African countries are at the bottom compared to other parts of the world. Probably the most crucial area for policy consideration is the social and political environment; the creation of a stable environment in which rule of law and basic human rights are guaranteed and respected is essential. According to (Iredale, 1999: 108), source countries should implement measures such as democratisation and socio-economic development to minimise loss of their best and brightest people.

Source countries, particularly in the Arab world and Africa, need to pursue policies of openness and genuine reform to allow much wider participation in public affairs. People with high intellectual capacity who feel marginalised and excluded from the public affairs of their country are more likely to leave than if they were living in an inclusive culture. For developing countries, highly skilled human capital is important for economic and overall human development, including political development. Developing countries engaged in institution and state building need to realise and appreciate the important contribution that their highly educated and skilled people can make, and that successful institutional development often depends on a critical mass of individuals with high levels of human capital (Kapur, 2001: 274).
3.13 Selective immigration policies by receiving countries a ‘pull factor’

Immigration policies in the developed North have changed dramatically in the last few years, motivated by demographic changes as their populations shrink and age, and consequently fewer people enter the labour market, fuelling shortages in vital skills and diminishing tax revenues. When some African and Latin American countries say that ‘The North is stealing our people’ (Noland, 2009), it is not an exaggerated cry. Selective immigration policies mean that people with high human capital and vital skills – doctors, nurses, IT specialists, engineers and others – are being encouraged to apply for jobs in the West and are given entry and visa priority. Some countries, such as the UK, have adopted a points system whereby the higher the qualifications and skills an applicant has, the more likely they are to be granted entry to the UK. Overseas students who complete their university and postgraduate education in the UK are given a working visa for a few years.

An illustrative example of this selective immigration policy according to (Kapur, 2001: 268) is the legislation adopted by the USA in 2000 to allow an extra (200, 000) working visas, known as (H1-B visas), to be granted annually for the following three years to highly skilled professionals. A profile of the type of H1-B visas approved by US immigration authorities between October 1999 and February 2000 show that (812,262) visa were granted, 42.3 per cent of which went to immigrants from India against 9.8 per cent from China. Also 56 per cent of those granted the visas had Bachelor’s degrees and the rest had a Master’s or other high qualification.

Visas granted are not always extended to families of migrants as well. ‘Some visa programs, for instance, restrict family members from accompanying the migrant. The goal is often expressed in terms of reducing the potential demand on social expenditure for the dependents’ education and healthcare. Such programs compound the advantage to the developed countries’ (Bach, 2003: 238).

The UK operates a similar selective immigration policy to attract highly educated and skilled workers from overseas, based on a points system. The British Home Office states that ‘the Points Based System (PBS) is a system for managing migration for those wishing to enter the UK for work or study.’ Previously, the UK ran the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme
(HSMP), which was replaced on 30 June 2008 by an extended PBS with new sub-tiers to cover people resident overseas\textsuperscript{10}.

The sub-tiers covered by the PBS include: Tier 1 (Highly skilled worker), Tier 1 (Entrepreneur), Tier 1 (Investor) and Tier 1 (Post-study worker). Applicants in these categories are awarded points for different ‘Attributes’ and if they score a minimum of 75 points they are granted a visa to enter the UK for work. Attributes are based on four categories; Age, Qualifications, Previous earnings and UK experience. Those aged less than 28 years are awarded 20 points and those aged 28 or 29, 10 points. For qualifications, an MBA gets 75 points, a PhD 50 points and a Masters degree 35 points. For earnings in the year prior to coming to UK, those who were earning the equivalent of £40,000 + get 45 points, £35,000 to £39,000 40 points, with points reducing in line with earnings. Those who already have a good command of the English language get an extra 10 points and there’s an extra 5 points for those who already hold a degree from a UK institution. (biaho, 2010)

It is clear from this distribution of points that the UK has devised a system which is biased towards and makes it easy for highly qualified people who are in well-paid jobs abroad and are still relatively young (under 30) to come and apply their skills in the UK. At the same time, a very stringent policy that ensures the gates are shut to ordinary migrants who wish to take refuge from persecution or improve their social and economic conditions in the UK is being enforced. A person with a PhD, earning the equivalent of around £35,000, with a good command of English language and a degree level qualification from the UK sometime in the past, and who is still just under 30, can score 110 points – well over the 75 points required to enter the UK.

Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other OECD countries operate similar selective, points-based immigration policies that favour highly educated and skilled migrants. Such policies are encouraging ever greater brain drain from developing countries and are seriously undermining development efforts by those source countries. If OECD member states are serious about helping countries in Africa, Asia and the Arab world to develop, then they should stop encouraging brain drain and aggravating its detrimental effect.

\textsuperscript{10} For more details on the recent changes in work visa policy for educated and skilled workers, see the official Home Office website detailing all these changes at: www.biahomeoffice.gov.uk
It is ironic that while the highly developed North is awarding direct foreign financial aid to poor and less developed countries in the South with one hand, it is stripping away their most important capital, their human capital, with the other. Foreign aid in the absence of any serious attempt at institution and state building, and in the absence of good governance and accountability, will not achieve much. Helping those developing countries to retain and utilise their high human capital can be much more beneficial to long-term sustainable development. Human capital is critical for growth and the loss of such scarce human capital to other countries can be debilitating and impeding to endogenous growth and development in the source country (Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991). Furthermore, according to (Haque and Kim, 1995), the migration of highly skilled people reduces income levels and long-term economic growth11.

Even as developed countries and international institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO and others) demand that poorer developing countries adopt major reforms, often as a condition of FDA, to create economic growth, better public sector management and financial liberalisation, they ignore the fact that such reforms require substantial human capital. They seriously undermine their own demands for reform by encouraging the migration of highly skilled human capital through brain drain (Bach, 2003: 238). They jeopardise the very reforms they want implemented through their selective immigration policies that weaken the human capacity and capital of these poorer developing countries, especially in Africa. Indeed, as Baldwin-Edwards (2006) points out in his critical appraisal of European policy towards migration from Africa to Europe through the transit route of North African countries, mainly Libya:

> European policy promotes the human rights abuses of North Africa with regard to illegal migrants and asylum-seekers, yet welcomes skilled (as opposed to semi-skilled) African migrants to Europe territory. Europe thus guarantees the continuation of African underdevelopment (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006: 1).

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11 Some argue that remittance sent back by migrants to their source country are a benefit and a positive outcome of brain drain, it is important to remember however, that remittance does not exceed the financial loss through investment in the human capital that is not recovered and also remittance is only associated with first generation migrants and where the main motive for migration in the first place was an economic one to earn better income abroad.
3.14 Encouraging the setup of Diaspora networks
Many developing countries suffering today from the negative impact of brain drain on their development and capacity-building aspirations can learn useful lessons from the experience of countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, China and India who benefited from their Diaspora human capital by establishing Diaspora networks. Diaspora networks and associations offer the second-best option if emigrants feel that returning to their country of origin is no longer possible. Reluctance to return could be due to many factors: economic, cultural, political or personal. Many migrants find themselves well settled and integrated in their receiving countries; they find themselves accustomed to a new environment where they enjoy stability, comfort and a good quality of life. Issues such as human security, rule of law, freedom, recognition and reward for their successes, and self-fulfillment or even self-actualisation become too important to sacrifice by relocating to their country of origin.

Many migrants who choose not to return home permanently are still enthusiastic about contributing their enhanced skills and expertise to their country of origin. The Diaspora networks provide the ideal organised media or channels by which to do so, especially if these networks are well managed. Networks can bring people of similar interests and disciplines together in regular conferences and seminars or through newsletters and journals. Members of networks can also go back for regular visits to offer training, run workshops and take short work or teaching placements. All these activities allow for interactions with people in the country of origin, and more importantly, allow for the transfer of knowledge, information and technology from the more developed receiving country of residence to the developing origin country. Such a strategy, if implemented well, is likely to turn the brain ‘DRAIN’ into a brain ‘GAIN’.

3.15 Taxing brain drain to compensate source countries
The idea that either the receiving country, who benefits from brain drain, or the individuals that choose to migrate and apply their knowledge and skills elsewhere should pay a tax as a fiscal compensation for the loss in return on investment the source countries suffer as a result of brain drain was first proposed by (Bhagwatti, 1977). It is expected that selective immigration policies by key OECD members – the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and others (discussed previously) – are likely to increase brain drain from developing countries in the future. These policies are designed to meet the skills shortage
likely to be created by demographic changes and shifts caused by ageing populations and falling birth rates. Receiving countries will not only benefit from the skills and expertise of attracted migrants, but also from the tax revenue generated by the well-paid jobs that immigrants will take up.

One potential way of compensating source countries for the loss incurred from brain drain is through a global tax policy agreed by the various countries involved. According to Desai et al. (2000), there are four possible alternative regimes for taxing flows of human capital. These mechanisms include: (a) an exit tax paid by the migrant or their employer at the time of being granted a visa to travel to the receiving country; (b) a flat tax that migrants overseas pay on their income (say 1 per cent) to their original country, which is not easily administered; (c) the American model where people are taxed on the basis of nationality not residency; and (d) the co-operative model, also not easily administered, ‘where a multilateral regime would allow automatic inter-governmental transfers of payroll taxes or income taxes paid by nationals of other countries’ (Kapur, 2001: 283).

Potentially, the co-operative model has the most potential for successful implementation and enforcement; it is also likely to generate substantial financial gains for the developing country of origin. However, potential difficulties include migrants becoming naturalised citizens of the receiving country reasonably quickly (five years in the UK) – any bilateral agreements would need to allow for continued shared tax revenues after naturalisation. Such global tax agreements would also depend on the rich developed receiving countries having the political will to implement the scheme. They might not understand the incentive or feel any pressure to go along with such a scheme.

Taxes levied in favour of source countries as a form of fiscal compensation for their lost human capital is only one potential strategy that partly addresses the problem, but it should not been seen as a substitute for stemming the brain drain in the first place, or reversing it through either the return option or the Diaspora networks option. As Kapur, (2001: 284) says:

A harmonised international tax regime for human capital flows would considerably compensate LDCs in the short-term for the loss of their scarcest resource: human talent. But long-term benefits will not materialise unless LDCs themselves create the political and economic environment that will allow them to
tap into overseas networks of their nationals so as to ensure that the ‘brain drain’ turns into ‘brain gain’ for these countries.

3.16 What can we conclude from this chapter?
The brain drain phenomenon is mainly associated with human capital flight from developing countries to developed ones, especially in the OECD. The Arab brain drain, on per capita basis, is four times greater than that of China and five times that of India. The causes of the brain drain are multi-factored but it is noticeable that the Arab world has the least gross expenditure on R&D as part of GDP in the world (0.2%), whereas Israel as a comparison example spends 24 times more (4.9%) than the Arab world.

There has been a paradigm shift recently from ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’ and advances in ICT has given rise to new strategies in dealing with brain drain through the ‘Diaspora option’ instead of the ‘return option’. The setting up of Diaspora network and other ways of re-engaging with source countries means that the permanent return of human capital is not the only option in order that migrants contribute to the overall development of their countries of origin. There are good lessons to be learnt from the experience of, and strategies adopted by, countries like Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea in how they utilised their Diaspora human capital to play a crucial rule in their successful development drive in the last three decades.

It is not easy to quantify in terms of economics whether the gains made by ‘brain circulation’ would adequately compensate for the cost of brain drain, as the literature does not offer any study or assessment in this area. Another important conclusion is that countries suffering from brain drain need not rely only on the ‘return option’ or the ‘Diaspora option’, but could adopt and pursue both strategies simultaneously, as no doubt there will be people who prefer not to return permanently and only engage with the home country at a distance, whereas others may be tempted, due to economic or political changes, to return permanently.

Developed countries, mainly the OECD members, also have a moral responsibility not to exacerbate the brain drain problem through their pull factors of selective immigration policies. The option of a brain drain ‘tax’ as a small fiscal compensation to developing countries for their loss of human capital should be revisited and seriously considered.
The literature suggests that it is mainly development drive and economic factors, such as reducing disparities in salaries, offering high standard of facilities and higher expenditure on R&D, that would be the main factors in attracting human capital back and reversing the brain drain as articulated by Quaked, (2002: 153). However, tackling the push factors at source, such as more respect for human rights and undertaking political development, including democratization and socio-economic development are also important in reducing brain drain and facilitating brain circulation as argued by (Iredale, 1999: 108).

The next chapter will concentrate on reviewing ‘democratisation’, the second of three key themes inter-related in this research. But we cannot discuss democratisation without considering briefly first ‘democracy’ itself, its historical origins and its evolution into what it is today. Equally important and relevant to this research is the question of why Libya and the wider Arab region it belongs to are still suffering from a major democracy ‘deficit’, and how this democracy deficit relates to the problem of the brain drain and weak overall human development attainment levels.
Chapter IV

Democracy and democratisation

4.1 Democracy

Democracy as a term and a concept goes back thousands of years and as such is very difficult to strictly define. Over time, democracy has evolved and ‘has meant different things to different people at different times and places’ (Dahl, 1998). The word itself is derived from two Greek words, ‘demos’ (the people or community) and ‘kratos’ (rule by, power or authority) which essentially give democracy the meaning of ‘rule by the people’. Most historical accounts put the birth of democracy in ancient Greece and the assembly of Athens about two thousand years ago. However, according to John Kean’s fascinating account Life and Death of Democracy, it actually goes back to the popular assemblies of Syria-Mesopotamia some two thousand years earlier (Keane, 2009).

4.2 Definition of democracy

There have been many definitions of democracy, one of which defines it in terms of mass participation and contested elections (Dahl, 1970). Robert Dahl also argues that democracy has two critical dimensions, namely ‘Contestation’ and ‘Participation’. Others have defined it in terms of respect for core human rights (Diamond, 1999). The classical definition of democracy as the will of the people was criticised by Joseph Schumpeter in 1947 as deficient. In its stead, he put forward what he termed the ‘democratic method’, defined as ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’ Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy combines the importance of establishing institutional arrangements with the exercise of contestation and participation, which Dahl saw as essential dimensions, through free and fair elections.

Following in the Schumpeter tradition, Samuel Huntington offers this definition of a democratic 20th-century political system: ‘its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote’.
By offering this definition, Huntington also argues that democracy involves the two dimensions of contestation and participation which Dahl saw as critical, and also implies the existence of the civil and political freedoms to speak, assemble and organise which are essential for political debate and the electoral process (Huntington, 1991: 7).

The main features of democracy are generally taken to include: the establishment of democratic institutions, the holding of regular free and fair elections, rule of law, a free press, civil society, good governance, accountability, transparency and an independent impartial judiciary.

4.3 Direct democracy

The classical Greek model of democracy, as existed in Athens some two thousand years ago, was an attempt to promote some ideals such as equality (among those who were privileged to participate), liberty, justice and respect for the rule of law. It was marked by a commitment to the overall interest of the community and ‘the common good’ (Held, 2006: 33). However, Athenian democracy had serious fundamental shortcomings when seen through the filter of contemporary democratic values. For example, only Greek men over the age of twenty were allowed to participate in the ‘direct democracy’ model of the assemblies that would debate and decide on issues of public concern. Women, slaves and immigrants were excluded and marginalised and ‘rule by the many’ was effectively rule by the few (Ward and Yoganathan, 2010: 6).

From the early Greek model of ‘direct democracy’ to the seventeenth century, the practice of democracy was constrained within a long dark period of monarchic and religious authoritarianism, with some limited regional experiments. In the northern Italian City States during the 12th and 13th centuries, for example, ruling councils were elected to govern by exclusive groups of men who were eligible to vote (Ward and Yoganathan, 2010: 6). This model was based on liberty and the right of citizens (an exclusive group) to participate in choosing their government which, according to Held, (2006), created a distinctive role for ‘leading social forces’. The practice of this restricted form of democracy was clearly characterised by the limitations on who could participate in it. Furthermore, its democratic institutions were incomplete and unsustainable, and hence did not consolidate and evolve. Other embryonic forms of democracy could be found in many areas of the world where
‘tribal chiefs had been elected for centuries and in some places democratic political institutions long existed at the village level’ (Huntington, 1991: 13).

The foundations of democracy as we know it today can be attributed to the major social evolutions of the 18th century, particularly in Northern America and Europe. It was the American and French revolutions, as well as the ideas of political philosophers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke and John Stuart Mill amongst others, who articulated and shaped thinking on political life, which led to democracy becoming a dominant political system (Nef and Reiter, 2209: 20). Over the last two hundred years, democracy has evolved, gained grounds and consolidated in three major waves of democratisations. According to Huntington, (1991), the first long wave came between 1928 and 1926, a second short wave 1943 and 1962, and the third between 1975 and 1990.

As total populations and citizenry grew, societies becoming more complex with clearly developed social arrangements and structures, so too did the process of democracy. The simple classical model of direct democracy that had existed in Athens or the northern states of Italy in the 12th century was no longer adequate by the 18th century. A preoccupation with the role of elected representatives and their accountability had developed and it was this focus on the process of ‘representation’ that helped democracy hold sway across many territories and interests (Held, 2006). The sustainability of simple direct democracy in modern times has also been questioned: according to Keane, (1998: 13), who states that:

The homogeneous political community of the Greek polis, where citizens rule and are ruled in turn, cannot be recreated in the modern world, except sometimes in the momentary ecstasy of revolutionary situations. Heroic attempts to institute an undifferentiated system of self-government on a large scale normally end in confusion, disappointment and sometimes in a bloody fiasco¹².

John Keane’s insight into the implausibility of a democracy based on the old Athenian concept is very relevant to Libya, which announced the introduction of a direct democracy model on 2 March 1977, the implementation and practice of which has been closer to the case

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¹² This is very relevant and informing of the current Libyan political system supposedly based on a model of ‘direct democracy’ since 1977 as prescribed by Gadafi’s Green Book inspired by the original Athenian model. The reality though is much closer to what Kean describes here.
of ‘confusion’ and ‘bloody fiasco’ that Keane describes. (as will see from the detailed consideration of Libya’s political progress in the last three decades in Chapter IV.)

4.4 Representative democracy

It was the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill who argued and articulated the case for representative democracy when he wrote in 1861, “since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but very minor portions of the public business it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative” (quoted in Dahl, 1989: 95). On the other hand, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau criticised representative democracy, arguing that ‘the English people believes itself to be free. It is greatly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. Once they are elected the populace is enslaved; it is nothing’ (Rousseau, a translation by Cress, 1987: 5).

Clearly, Rousseau’s critical observation of parliamentary representative democracy has echoes in contemporary political life and is still found to be valid by some observers.

In addition to a system of ‘representative democracy’, liberal philosophers also argued for limiting and rolling back the powers of the state in favour of the creation of a sphere of civil society in which social structures and relations could evolve and be fostered. They emphasised the importance of a thriving private sector, respect for and guarantee of private property and support for a market-based economy. They argued that state powers must be based on the sovereign will and that citizens should be protected from state interference. Yet even John Stuart Mill did not commit totally to the idea of equal rights for all citizens in a universal suffrage and argued instead that enfranchisement of citizens should be based on a plural voting system where people who are ‘wiser and more talented’ are given more votes than the ‘ignorant and less able’ (Sorensen, 2008). With contemporary eyes, we can see that this notion was clearly biased towards an elitist form of democracy.

4.5 Democracy and the nation-state

The emergence of modern democracy has been associated with the emergence of the modern nation-state (Huntington, 1991: 13). However, philosophers like De Tocqueville warned against what he called limitless state powers without social checks as dangerous and undesirable and a ‘license for despotism’ (Keane, 1998: 51). De Tocqueville, while acknowledging the importance of state institutions in a modern democracy, warned against
the state becoming regulator, inspector, adviser, educator and punisher of personal morality. Modern states with such powers, he argued, would threaten to ‘sabotage the decisive victories of the democratic revolution and its goals of equality and freedom for all citizens’ (Keane, 1998: 49). The challenge would be to prevent the state from abusing its powers and denying its citizens their freedom.

So, how can the equality and freedom which modern democracy has won be consolidated and preserved within the differentiated complex structure of the modern institutional state? Can the two co-exist in equilibrium? Or do state institutions have to be kept to a minimum? Here De Tocqueville repeats an argument (also articulated by Locke) that strong political institutions of state are important, but mechanisms to prevent monopolies of power must exist within the spheres of both state and civil society (Keane, 1998: 50).

Democracy can be preserved by ensuring that political power is separated and distributed among many hands; legislative power, a separate executive authority, independent judicial power and a vibrant independent civil society. It is this last in its multifaceted forms and social structures that De Tocqueville described as the ‘independent eye of society’ (Keane, 1998: 51). John Keane himself argues that ‘a pluralist and self-organising civil society that is independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy’. Keane is clearly re-enforcing De Tocqueville’s argument that the unification of state and civil society endangers the gains of the democratic revolution and is a ‘license for despotism’ (Keane, 1998: 51).

Although the first push towards democracy in western countries took place in the first half of the 17th century, yet in 1750 no democratic institutions at the national level existed in the Western world. By 1900 such institutions existed in many countries. By the late 20th century, many more countries possessed democratic institutions and institution building took place in waves of democratisations (Huntington, 1991: 15).
The most quoted studies of historical global trends of democratisations are by Samuel Huntington, who describes in detail three major long democratisation ‘waves’, and by Dirk Berg-Schlosser (2009), who describes distinct long ‘waves’ and brief ‘conjunctures’ (these accounts of democratisation processes are discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter).
4.6 Participatory democracy

One criticism of representative democracy is that it has the inherent potential to lead to a form of hegemony by the majority against the minority. This potential for ‘tyranny of the majority’ can only be reduced if structures and mechanisms of participation and deliberation are established and maintained at the local societal level. This is what Habermas termed the ‘participatory society’ that will help people achieve equal rights to liberty and human self-development (Habermas, 1996; cited in Held, 2006).

One mechanism that offers a forum for participatory society and facilitates dialogue and public scrutiny is ‘civil society’, which according to De Tocqueville, (1864) offers a means of generating a vibrant political society. ‘Civil society has come to be seen as central in facilitating a more informed, aware, active society that is able to hold its representatives accountable’ (Ward and Yoganathan, 2010: 9).

Participatory democracy is not without its critics. There are those, Robert Dahl among them, who argue that most people are generally uninterested in politics and only a small group of people will take up decision-making (cited in Ward and Yoganathan, 2010: 10), or what (Held, 2006) calls the ‘deliberative deficit’. In other words, inequalities, be they social or economic, may deny citizens equal political rights in practice where their voices are not heard and taken into account. The challenge remains: how to ensure that a significant part of the population is sufficiently interested in playing an active deliberative role in the process of democracy. Apathy and lack of interest in polity may be due to many factors, not least of which is the feeling among ordinary citizens that they cannot make a real difference to the political process.

4.7 ‘E-democracy’

With the global advances in information and communication technology (ICT), the world has in the last decade experienced a major transformation of how ordinary citizens use the internet and other media tools, the social and political implications of which are still evolving and unfolding. People have much greater access to information and knowledge and are becoming more informed about the real issues and crucial debates. Websites such as YouTube, MySpace, social networks like Facebook, Twitter and blogs are creating a space for interaction and deliberation that transcends geographical, social and political barriers. These developments brought about by the ‘digital age’ are having an effect on democracy and are possibly shaping its future.
The concept of electronic democracy, or ‘e-democracy’, is rapidly becoming a distinct field of research and analysis. Professor Stephen Coleman, Oxford University’s first professor of e-democracy, defines it as ‘using new digital technology to enhance the process of democratic relationship between governments and governed, representative and represented’ (Guardian Online article, cited in Parry, 2004).

E-Democracy can be understood to mean enhancing the quality of debate through new digital media; it could also mean utilising electronic voting in elections and fundraising, mobilising people behind specific campaigns and using the internet and mobile phone messaging for targeting voters with political messages during general elections (examples are the US presidential election of 2009 and British general election of 2010).

In regions of the world where democracy has not been realised as a system of government, and people are still suffering from oppressive totalitarian regimes (such as in the Middle East and North Africa), advocates of democracy and human rights in their struggle for democratisation are utilising the digital space to break the stranglehold of censorship. The internet and social networks like Facebook and Twitter are rapidly becoming tools of communication and of lively and voluble free debate. Examples of people using the virtual cyberspace to promote democracy include Iranian activists ‘twittering’ to communicate to the outside world what they saw as the deliberate rigging of the last presidential elections in 2009; and Tunisian activists setting up a ‘virtual parliament’ on Facebook in order to debate and to hold what they call regular free elections, in marked contrast to the lack of these rights in the polity of contemporary Tunisia.

4.8 Eco-democracy

Eco-democracy, or ‘environmental-democracy’, is understood to consider ‘the ‘fit’ between democracy of various kinds and the various forms of environmentalism concerned with the maintenance and improvement of environmental quality’ (Ward and Yoganathan, 2010: 34).

In his book Environmental Democracy, Michael Mason offers this definition of eco-democracy: ‘a participatory and ecologically rational form of collective decision-making: it prioritises judgements based on long-term generalisable interests, facilitated by communicative political procedures and a radicalisation of existing liberal rights’ (Mason, 1999: 1).
Eco-democracy can be considered as a sub-set of deliberative democracy. Policy and decision-making take on board the views of interest groups and respond to social pressure for addressing such issues as protection of the environment, climate change and a cleaner, healthier quality of life. Eco-democracy also concerns itself with maintaining natural resources and utilising them in a manner that does not compromise the needs of future generations, which is the essence of ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’.

Eco-democracy can also be about prioritising the models for growth and the consequences for the environment of pursuing rapid economic growth. Much debate has concentrated on how the rapid economic growth of highly populated countries like India and China is contributing to world pollution and global warming. However, the reluctance of a strong economy like the USA to ratify certain global pollution reduction treaties raises the question of whether even it takes eco-democracy seriously.

4.9 Monitory democracy

British academic John Keane articulates this new concept in his recent book *The Life and Death of Democracy* (2009). Keane argues that the West finds itself now in a phase of ‘monitory democracy’, which entails a process of monitoring and surveillance, as well as the disciplining of politicians, decision-makers and elected office-holders through mechanisms of publicity, campaigning, watchdogs, access to information and constant feedbacks (Keane, 2009).

Keane argues that what is distinctive about ‘monitory democracy’ is the way that all fields of social and political life can be scrutinised, not just by the standard mechanisms of representative democracy, but by ‘a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies operating within, underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial states’ (Keane, 2009: 695). Keane’s model of monitory democracy can be envisaged as working most effectively when it utilises advances in ICT and the extra space for deliberation which that created, combined with e-democracy (discussed above). Another crucial factor in a successful monitory democracy is an active citizenry: public apathy and lack of interest in matters of political activism and public affairs would not be conducive to successful monitory democracy.
4.10 Democracy in the age of globalisation

Before we consider the effects that globalisation may be having on democracy, it is important to establish what we mean and understand by the much-used term *globalisation*. The multiple dimensions and vast scope of globalisation favours a fluid definition.

For example, we talk about economic globalisation when free trade and economic production transcend the barriers and borders of traditional nation-states. We talk about cultural globalisation when quantum advances in the ease of communication, travel and movement around the world mean that people everywhere are exposed to specific regional cultures, with all the cultural interaction and exchange of cosmopolitan beliefs and values that follows.

One concise definition of globalisation is that offered by Habermas as ‘the increasing scope and intensity of commercial, communicative and exchange relations beyond national borders’ (Habermas, 2001: 66). Globalisation also has a social dimension: ‘a fragmentation of social groups and identities, as well as growing transnationalisation of civil society organisations and protest campaigns’ (Della Porta, 2005: 668). Political globalisation can be seen as the increasing role and influence of international organisations and systems against the greatly diminishing power of nation-states within defined borders.

The challenge of globalisation, from whatever dimension we look at it, to democracy stems from the fact that democracy has been conceived and practised on a national level within a nation-state, yet is now influenced by global trends and transnational players on a supranational level. Most, if not all, of these global or transnational players lack accountability and cannot be scrutinised by the ordinary citizens whose lives they directly affect. ‘Not only do international organisations usually have no electoral accountability (the European Parliament is an exception), but a transnational conception of citizenship and citizenship rights is difficult to develop’ (Della Porta, 2005: 669).

Globalisation has been an important factor in the promotion of democratisation around the globe, and yet it has also posed a real challenge to democracy. According to Freedom House, (2002), the number of countries with elected governments has increased from (39) in 1974 to (117) in 1995 to (193) at the start of the third millennium, although the definition of democracy here is a minimalist one where availability of elections is the main criterion. Yet if global organisations are undermining the authority and power of elected national
governments, then the quality of democracy and its consolidation could be compromised. Conceivably, we could be experiencing nationalist aspirations for greater democracy and accountability being at odds with the agendas, driven sometimes by greed, profit and self-interest, of transnational or global forces. David Held explains this paradox thus:

There is a striking paradox to note about the contemporary era: from Africa to Eastern Europe, Asia to Latin America, more and more nations and groups are championing the idea of democracy; but they are doing so at just that moment when the very efficacy of democracy as a national form of political organisation appears open to question. As substantial areas of human activity are progressively organised on a regional or global level, the fate of democracy and of independent democratic nation-states in particular, is fraught with difficulties (Held, 1998: 11).

4.11 Democracy and human development

The relationship between human development and democracy is also discussed briefly in Chapter III. It has been argued that freedom and human rights are pivotal to comprehensive human development, which is mainly concerned with enlarging people’s choices, including political ones. It has also been argued that freedoms and human rights are essential constituents of the democratic discourse. Democracy is also about engaging with politics and empowering people through political participation. The Human Development Report by UNDP, (2002) states:

Politics matter for human development. Reducing poverty depends as much on whether poor people have political power as on their opportunities for economic progress. Democracy has proven to be the system of governance most capable of mediating and preventing conflict and of securing and sustaining wellbeing. By expanding people's choices about how and by whom they are governed, democracy brings principles of participation and accountability to the process of human development (UNDP,HDR, 2002: 1).

One of the core concepts of human development and the capability approach is agency, which is about enabling people to become agents in their own lives and in their community’s affairs, or as the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, one of the principal pioneers of the discourse on human development, puts it ‘the people have to be seen as being actively
involved – given the opportunity – in shaping their own destiny’ (Sen, 1999: 53). This expression of agency through active involvement is very much dependent on political participation, deliberation and democratic decision-making. Agency, therefore, is essentially expressed through democracy.

Democracy as a form of government and as a mechanism by which people can rule themselves is significant for human development because it has three key values. According to Sen, these are:

1. Its *intrinsic importance*, derived from the fact that ‘political freedom is part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings’ (Sen, 1999: 10);
2. Its *instrumental contributions*, which means that democracy leads to good consequences where civil and political rights lead to economic and social and cultural rights; and
3. Its *constructive role* in the construction of collective values and norms around which a society is arranged, such values including tolerance, social equity and giving priority to those in need (Sen, 1999).

It is important to remember however that democracy does not always lead to the enjoyment of comprehensive freedoms and liberties. There are cases, which Farid Zakaria calls ‘illiberal democracies’, in which established democracies around the world restrict some economic and social freedoms, which is reflected in existing poverty and inequality for some of their citizens. This can be seen clearly in a democracy like America, or for marginalised minorities in the UK. The same argument can be extended to the link between democracy and human development, where a dichotomy between the two concepts exists, especially when small elite in a democratic society dominates economic and political decisions (UNDP, HDR, 2002). Examples of this can be seen in democratic countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

There is on the other hand empirical analysis to show that democracy and human development are linked in a direct causal relationship. If we consider the relationship between democracy and economic growth, we find that all the rich countries with income per capita above $20,000 are democratic except for two, one of which is the state of Bahrain. We also find that (42 out of the top 48) countries that are high on human development attainment,
based on the HDI measure, are also high on the democracy scale, and enjoying a genuine democratic system. (UNDP, HDR, 2002: 56)

Democracy is essentially about free deliberation, participation in decision-making, establishing good governance, social equity and accountability. These important aspects of the democratic process can be seen as part of enlarging choices for people, and as a capability that people have the right to acquire. In other words democracy, as well as being of intrinsic value and an end in itself, is also instrumental in giving people a voice and a constructive role in shaping values and norms (Sen, 1999). It is also strongly argued that, when measuring human development, we cannot give a true picture of its overall state without examining the state of democracy and the adoption of a democratic discourse in both acceptance and practice (Sen, 2000).

4.12 Democracy and sustainable human development

The concepts of sustainability and sustainable human development (SHD) are discussed in more detail in Chapter III, where ‘at the core of the idea of sustainability, then, is the concept that current decisions should not damage the prospects for maintaining or improving living standards in the future’ (Robert Repetto, 1985: 10). Moreover, according to (UNDP report, 1994: 12), SHD not only places people at the centre of development but also advocates protection of the life opportunities of current and future generations and respect for the natural systems on which all life depends.

Democracy serves SHD through emphasis on eco-democracy (discussed above), and on the deliberation, consultation and involvement of those interest groups advocating that a cleaner and healthier sustainable environment should be a factor in policy formulation and decision-making. Democracy also serves SHD by prioritising growth models that do not depend on the depletion, and therefore compromise, of non-renewable natural vital resources such as green forests; by developing cleaner, renewable sources of energy; and by making development that puts enlarging choices for current and future generations and the improvement of their well-being an overriding goal and priority.
4.13 Democracy today

When we recall that full adult suffrage rights have been elusive until very recently, one can argue that democracy has not evolved much from those early Athenian practices of some two millennia ago. For example, black men and women in America have only been fully enfranchised in the democratic process since the late 1960s and in South Africa only since 1994. Moreover, women were only granted the right to vote on a federal level in Switzerland in 1971 and to this day they are denied the right to vote in some Arab countries (IWDC, 2010). It is also the reality today, thousands of years after those Syria-Mesopotamia and Athenian assemblies, that people in some parts of the contemporary world do not enjoy any form of democratic practice and participation.

However, contemporary realities do not diminish the fact that democracy as a concept has been dynamic, in the sense that it has brought about paradigm shifts and changes in societies, and that those changes, be they political, economic or cultural, have also had implications and effects on democracy itself in both theory and practice. The debate on democracy is as vibrant and lively as ever, the understanding of and attitudes towards it varied and continually enriching. Some see it as a political ideology, others as a process and form of government, while others still even suggest that it has become ‘a way of life’ (Zakaria, 2007: 17).

4.14 Democracy and the brain drain

The concept and phenomenon of brain drain is already discussed in detail in Chapter I. To understand whether democracy can have either a direct or indirect causal effect on the existence and extent of brain drain, it is important to consider first some of the causes of and contributory factors to brain drain: expenditure on research and development, quality of the education system, level of development and economic growth that creates demand for employment and skilled jobs; policies for building human capacity and human capital, policies regarding intellectual rights, policies relating to human security, respect for human rights and individual freedom; policies relating to rule of law, transparency, accountability and general good governance.

Causes and factors contributing to brain drain are explored in the empirical research that is part of this thesis (see Chapter VI for analysis of questionnaire and interviews). Possible causes of outward migration of highly skilled human capital ‘include the violations of human
rights or academic freedoms’ (Horvat, 2004: 77). Bad governance also plays an important role in pushing highly skilled people to migrate as ‘they find the human rights/governance situation in their home country unacceptable’ (Olesen, 2002: 137). It is also conceivable that non-democratic governments which do not tolerate criticism and scrutiny by their citizens tend to be ‘often pleased to see potential critics leave rather than having them as a source of local criticism’ (Olesen, 2002: 11).

One factor that contributes to brain drain and loss of human capital is the migration of students from developing countries to developed countries (mainly USA, Canada, UK and Germany). They initially leave to pursue university and postgraduate education, but many of them end up staying in those host countries where they apply their acquired knowledge and skills, either permanently or for long periods, therefore becoming a human capital loss to their countries of origin. A recent intriguing study (titled ‘Democracy and Foreign Education’ by Antonio Spilimbergo of the IMF and published in the American Economic Review 2009) has suggested that foreign-educated individuals do foster democracy in their own countries, but only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries (Spilimbergo, 2009: 528).

Brain circulation, or the reversal of migration of high human capital, would only succeed if source countries endeavour to have ‘a well-developed scientific infrastructure, higher investments in the science sector, and the stability of a consolidated democratic government that assures human rights and academic freedoms’ (Horvat, 2004: 83).

We can therefore conclude, with confidence, that the presence of a democratic political environment would reduce the ‘push’ factors for brain drain, and that democracy is conducive to a country’s ability to retain its stock of highly skilled human capital. Democracy guarantees basic rights, including intellectual and academic rights, and it provides the space for participation and deliberation for all. It is no coincidence that the highest and most severe rates of brain drain are from regions like Africa, the Middle East, China and Burma where democracy is very weak or non-existent.
4.15 Democratisation
What is meant by democratisation? And how does it relate to the concept of democracy? These are two questions that need to be explored in order to establish a good theoretical framework of this concept.

4.16 Definition of democratisation
Democratisation is the process through which states (or organisations) become democratic or more democratic (Ward and Yoganatan, 2010: 19). It is generally understood as the process of transition from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian systems to democratic political systems, where democratic systems are taken to be those having regular elections, a civil society, rule of law, and an independent judiciary. This understanding of democratisation is based on the assumption that having regular elections is the essence of democracy. However, this is an oversimplification.

The overall process of democratisation before and after holding that first popular election is usually complex and prolonged, according to Huntington, (1991: 9) ‘It involves bringing about the end of the non-democratic regime, the inauguration of a democratic regime, and then the consolidation of a democratic system.’

Democratisation should not be confused with ‘liberalisation’ or economic privatisation, which some authoritarian regimes – under internal or external pressure – may entertain, usually by offering concessions like releasing political prisoners, allowing limited debate and criticism, tolerating the existence of some independent civil society and perhaps even holding limited controlled elections that do not lead to the removal of their hegemony of power. Liberalisation may, in some cases, lead to democratisation if the liberalising measures cannot be reversed, thus forcing further and much wider concessions from the ruling authoritarian regime.

Building democratic institutions and holding elections represent only part of the mechanism of achieving democratisation, it being a process of moving toward sustainable democracy (Gunther et al, 1996: 153). The first free and fair elections in a new democracy represent only the beginning of the process of democratisation (Dawisha, 1997:42). Democratisation should

13 This very much applies to Libya recently where since 2003 there has been moves by the Libyan regime to appear to be making some political concessions by releasing political prisoners and tolerating some criticism of violation of human rights and corruption but in reality no genuine political reform has been initiated.
also be viewed in terms of the two equally crucial phases of ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’. Concerns about the consolidation phase, or the sustainability of democratic institutions, are even deeper than concerns about the transitional phase, or the establishment and operation of these institutions (Chandler, 1999: 13).

The world has witnessed the establishment of democratic regimes that have regressed to authoritarian systems because the institution building and consolidation phase did not take deep enough roots to sustain the fragile new democracy. Many examples of reversals from democratic to authoritarian regimes are detailed in Huntington’s famous book *The Third Wave*, which cites Greece after 1920 and Italy in 1922 when Mussolini deposed a fragile democracy as examples. Hitler finished off German democracy in 1933 and ended Austrian democracy the following year. Between 1958 and 1975, many civilian and democratically elected regimes in Latin America were overthrown by military coups: Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay all failed. In the early 1970s, a military coup lead by General Pinochet overthrew a democratically elected regime in Chile with the support of the American CIA. Yet Huntington argues that, on other occasions, the American administration through the CIA has channeled money and information in support of the democratic overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Europe and Latin America.

4.17 Measuring democratisation

How can the extent and degree of democratisation be evaluated? And is there a specific point at which it can be claimed that democratisation has been achieved? If democracy is seen as the ultimate stage in an ongoing process of political development and evolution, then one cannot evaluate effectively the degree of democratisation achieved without establishing a common understanding of what constitutes a democracy. Various ways of defining democracy have been discussed above. However, the consideration of systematic criteria for measuring what characterises a democratic system is also helpful in this context. Although a country is expected to reach a minimum threshold before it can be said to have achieved the transition to democracy, it is also the case that the extent and depth of an existing democratic system is subject to a scaled degree. The following are some of the well-known international indicators and measures of democracy:

**Freedom House**: uses two main categories for evaluating and measuring democracy around the world. *Political rights*, consisting of three dimensions (electoral process, political
pluralism, participation); and Civil liberties, consisting of four dimensions (freedom of expression and belief, rights of association and organization, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights). Freedom House gives a score of 1 for the freest and 7 for the least free. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results compiled by Freedom House through its network of contacts and associates worldwide (Bernhagen, 2009: 33-34).

**Polity IV**: publishes individual country profile reports based on three dimensions: political competition and opposition; executive recruitment; and independence of executive authority. Polity IV gives an overall score ranging from a maximum of 10, representing the most democratic down to -10, representing the most authoritarian.

**Economic Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy**: this was launched in 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit and has already published two reports (2006 & 2008). The EIU Democracy index claims that it encompasses much more than just the political freedom and civil liberties adopted by the Freedom House index. It claims that only measuring democracy by political freedom and civil liberties is not comprehensive enough and does not encompass substantive features of democracy. (EIU, 2007)

The EIU Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties and covers 165 independent countries worldwide. The index on a (0 to 10) scale is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the five categories listed above. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index is an average of the scores or indexes of the five individual categories. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes as follows:

1- Full democracies score of 8 -10
2- Flawed democracies score of 6 -7.9
3- Hybrid regimes score of 4 -5.9
4- Authoritarian regimes score below 4

(EIU, 2007)

**4.18 Factors affecting democratisation**

There is a wealth of literature and research in agreement on the common factors and conditions believed to be important to the mechanisms and process of democratisation and
which greatly affect its outcome in a given society. These factors fall mainly into economic, political, social and cultural categories, and are also important for the sustainability and strengthening of new democracies, preventing their quick collapse. ‘Democracies can and do collapse if the right institutions and checks and balances are not in place. Such institution building needs creativity, charisma, leaders who are open to compromise, and improving cultural and economic conditions’ (El-Affendi, 2005: 36).

Such factors may include: the level of economic wealth and degree of industrialisation in a given society; the existence of a substantial middle class of educated and prosperous citizens who can mobilise and energise the drive for democratisation; a healthy and vibrant civil society and other social networks and organisations; a coherent society which is not deeply divided or fragmented along ethnic or religious lines; and a strong culture of citizenship rights, along with high awareness and appreciation of fundamental human rights.

4.19 Importance of a democratic culture

If democratisation is understood in terms of both its transition and consolidation phases, then establishing new democratic institutions underpinned by a written constitution may not be sufficient in itself to make a new democracy take root and flourish. A very important and necessary ingredient is the presence of an appropriate democratic political culture, defined as ‘the attitudes, beliefs and values that underline a political system itself’ (Burnell and Randall, 2008: 278). Democratic culture is about educating citizens to live by democratic norms, practices and precepts. It is about people seeing themselves as citizens with rights that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely as clients of a patron authoritarian ruler. In a study conducted in 2001 in the Dominican Republic, where a dictator (Trujillo) had ruled for 31 years until 1961, it was found that ‘86 per cent of Dominican citizens still identified the role of a good president with a paternalistic figure who should solve the problems directly affecting their lives’ (Whitehead, 2002: 12).

The degree of political activism and the level of citizens’ participation in public spheres are good indicators of a strong democratic culture. Participation in public affairs is an important manifestation of the existence of a genuine democratic process and

in democratic societies people participate in the public sphere in many ways –

debating issues with friends and neighbors, writing to newspapers on the rights and wrongs of government policies, marching in protests, becoming members of
political parties or trade unions – giving them a say in decisions that affect our lives (UNDP, HDR, 2000, 75).

A weak democratic culture, on the other hand, can be a hindrance to the successful democratisation of countries and societies that have been conditioned by totalitarian rule or patronage systems for a long time. Examples of this can be found in regions like the Middle East and most parts of Africa. The education system, which is vital in shaping culture, does not usually help instill such democratic culture because education is controlled and manipulated by authoritarian regimes. Family, tribal and social norms in general can also be detrimental to the spread of a democratic culture. In a society like Egypt, loyalty to and acceptance of the will of elders and rulers is believed to be paramount. A very useful study by the late Hisham Sharabi on what he calls the ‘Neopatriarchy’ in the Arab world offers a unique insight into what he sees as cultural obstacles to democratisation and state-building in the Arab world (Sharabi, 1988).

4.20 Challenges of democratisation in the Arab World
Despite the many waves of democratisation that the world has experienced, including the last one between 1974-1990 as described by Huntington, (1991), during which the number of democratic countries increased from (40) in 1974 to a total of (76) in 1990 and dramatically increased to (117) by the year 1995 (Diamond, 2010), the Arab world region is still resistant to this shift from authoritarian to democratic rule.

A question that a large number of academics and researchers, both within and outside the Arab world, have pondered and explored extensively is why? Why is it that Arab societies have failed to achieve democratisation, despite the strivings of democracy activists and the general populations and the great sacrifices they have made?

Wide-ranging theories have been offered to explain the democracy deficit in the Arab world, based on both internal and external factors. Some assumptions suggest that the economic system and lack of highly industrialised manufacturing economies have helped to consolidate power in the hands of authoritarian elites who rely on the wealth generated from natural resources such as oil and gas to control populations through a system of patronage, without feeling the need or pressure for accountability and representation.

Examples of important research (discussed in more detail shortly) include empirical work by (Badawi and Makdisi, 2006), which attempts to explain the democracy deficit in the Arab
world in terms of oil and conflict. The argument is that oil-based economy and wealth will result in minimal institution-building, lack of political participation and accountability, weak or non-existent civil society, eroded civil liberties and freedoms and no rule of law, all of which are essential elements of a democratic discourse and a democratic government. This is very relevant to Libya, an oil-based economy.

4.21 Natural resource based development and democratisation

In oil-producing Arab countries and in a country like Libya, whose economy is based on oil and gas (representing over 70 per cent of GDP, over 90 per cent of government revenue and over 95 per cent of export revenue) and is one of the least diversified in the region, it is essential to explore the socio-economic and political impact of this natural resource and understand the dynamics of or causal relations between oil, democratisation and overall development. Does oil hinder democracy? And does reliance on oil exports and revenue have a detrimental effect on real growth and development? What is the ‘Dutch Disease’? Does the ‘oil curse’, or resource curse, exist? These are some of the key questions that have been researched and discussed widely by experts and specialists.

4.22 Oil and Development, the ‘Dutch Disease’

The term or hypothesis ‘Dutch Disease’ was first introduced by the ‘Economist’ in 1977 to describe the overvaluation of the Dutch currency (the guilder) and the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas in the 1960s and the subsequent boom in revenues from this natural source. This sudden boom was blamed for the de-industrialisation of the country that followed the rise in the rate of exchange, which made the manufacturing sector less competitive.

Study after study has shown the paradox that countries with large natural resources, specifically oil, gas and minerals, tend to have less economic growth and worse development than countries with no or fewer natural resources (Karl, 1997 & 1999). According to Auty, (1997), between 1970 and 1993, countries that are considered to be natural resource-poor (without oil) were found to have grown four times more rapidly than countries which are resource-rich (with oil) and according to Ross, (2001), there is also strong evidence that resource wealth may harm a country’s prospects for development.
The consequences, or detrimental effects, of the Dutch Disease is that it becomes easier for a natural resource-rich government to be more authoritarian and use low, or no, taxation to ensure a patronage system of control, thus avoiding any pressure for accountability. The vast income from the natural resources creates and fuels an environment of corruption, and governments feel no need to build the institutional infrastructure necessary for the regulation of a diversified productive economy. There is also empirical evidence of severe deficits of governance and human capital.

Poor development however, is not an inevitable consequence of a natural resource-driven economy, as some countries have demonstrated, including Norway and Malaysia. Norway consistently achieves a high level of development and registers a very high score and ranking on all development indicators. This could be explained by the nature of the political system: Norway had been a fully-fledged democracy with well-developed state institutions long before oil and gas were discovered. Furthermore, Norway has a diversified economy in which oil revenue is used to finance and boost the growth of other productive sectors. Low levels of corruption, clear transparency, excellent education and strong human capacity-building are also important contributing factors.

4.23 Oil and democracy

The relationship between oil and democracy (or lack of it) in countries which are heavily dependent on oil exports, characterised as ‘rentier’ states, has been researched extensively. Such studies have been especially relevant in the Middle East where there is a concentration of oil-producing countries accounting for almost two-thirds of world oil reserves and production, and where a democracy deficit is also clearly visible. The Middle East is a politically unstable and authoritarian region that suffers from substantial lag, in comparison to other regions of the world, in terms of participatory governance (UNDP-AHDR, 2002). It is also lagging in terms of basic freedoms and human rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens.

As already mentioned, an important empirically researched work by (Badawi and Makdisi, 2006) attempts to explain the democracy deficit in the Arab world in terms of oil and conflict. This work has since been incorporated in a book, Democracy in the Arab World, to be published in August 2010. Situating the democratic position of the Arab World within an international context, the book is expected to be an important contribution to the study of development, conflict and democracy in the Middle East.
Another important research contribution has been that of (Ross, 2001) entitled *Does Oil Hinder Democracy?*, with reference mainly to the Middle East. Judging from pooled cross-national data from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997, it seems that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; and the effect is not limited to the Middle East. In answer to his own question, Ross offers three causal mechanisms by which oil affects democracy: the ‘rentier effect’, whereby oil-exporting governments use low taxation, if any, to establish a system of patronage which avoids democratic pressures; the ‘repressive effect’, whereby the wealth generated from natural resources pays for strong internal security to repress democratic movements; and the ‘modernisation effect’, whereby the growth and development based on wealth acquired through natural resources will not bring about the social and cultural developments that foster a democratic discourse and lead to democracy. It can be argued that the three causal mechanisms have been relevant and applicable to Libya.

The negative effect modernisation has on democratisation in rich oil-exporting countries, as suggested by Ross above, is in contrast to the popular belief put forward by Lipset (1995) in his development theory, which argues that increased wealth in a country helps with the process of democratisation. It is empirically clear that oil-exporting countries prove an exception to this modernisation theory.

The impediment to democracy of oil wealth occurs in other areas as well. These include weak social mobilisation, the undermining of political participation, and little demand by the people for representation and accountability, since the state extracts wealth from foreign exports rather than from taxation. The state becomes merely a distributor, not an extractor, of wealth. It also undermines and suppresses the formation of independent social groupings, especially civil society. Oil production is also characteristically ‘capital intensive’, not ‘labour intensive’, which hinders the development and diversification of internal labour markets.

In effect, an oil-based economy results in minimal institution building, and hence no political participation, no civil society, no civil liberties and freedoms and no rule of law, which are all essential constituents of a democratic discourse and democratic government. It results instead in corruption, inefficiency, poor governance and weak development. According to Badawi &
Makdisi (2006: 830), oil’s effect on the democracy deficit in the Arab World has other unique causal dimensions, whereby

The immense oil resources commanded by several Arab countries have either facilitated the emergence of repressive militaristic regimes\(^\text{14}\) in some, or non-democratic traditional authoritarian regimes in others. Also, the control of a handful of Arab countries, mostly small nations, of the largest global oil reserves ensures tremendous foreign influence, which by and large, has not been in favor of democratisation.

Badawi and Makdisi offer another, equally important, causal factor in the democracy deficit in the Arab World: the ‘conflict’ in the Middle East region, which has been dominated in the last sixty years not just by the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli wars, but also those in Afghanistan and Iraq. They state that the arguments for the relevance of both factors (oil and conflict) to the democracy deficit in the Arab World are very compelling, supported by an empirical model with unique Arab dummy factors, and conclude that Arab oil-dependency has been a drag on the region’s democracy. Secondly, while inter-state wars and violent conflicts usually lead to democratic transformations, the Arab region has been an exception, with conflict and violence only having a detrimental effect on democratic transformation.

\textbf{4.24 Other obstacles to democratisation}

Many authoritarian Arab regimes have become very effective at repressing all forces and voices for freedom and democratisation by sheer oppression. The security and continuation of the ruling regime has become the main priority and Arab countries are leading the world in the proportion of GNP spent on security. Middle East countries spent on average 6.7 per cent of GNP on security and defense in 2000, compared to a world average of 3.8 per cent (Posusney and Angrist, 2005). This contrasts with an average Arab spending on R&D of only 0.2 per cent of GNP, which is almost the lowest in the world.

Another factor hindering democratisation in the Arab region is the external support that authoritarian Arab regimes enjoy, reinforcing their internal hegemony. This external support

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\(^\text{14}\) The two Arab oil-producing countries that have witnessed military coups and the emergence of very authoritarian brutal military regimes are Algeria and Libya. It is not clear if the enormous oil wealth of Libya was what inspired Col. Gadhafi to lead a military coup in September 1969 or whether it was mainly the influence of strong pan-Arabism fever in the region at the time, as propagated by Nasser of Egypt.
‘historically coming in part from the Soviet Union but now mainly from Europe and the United States, confers on Arab autocracies crucial economic resources, security assistance, and political legitimacy’ (Diamond, 2010: 101). Many Arab intellectuals make, with a degree of cynicism, the argument that western governments see the undemocratic totalitarian regimes in the Arab world as the better option for guaranteeing western strategic and economic interests in the region, especially as democracy and free elections are seen likely to bring Islamist groups to power. Islamists are perceived by the West to be hostile to its interests and the main Islamic political groups have not sought to engage in a deep, open dialogue with it to redress this perception.

While lack of respect for human rights, poor governance and the very limited space available for political change, including the suppression of open opposition movements, have been seen as impediments to democratisation, according to Hamzawy, (2009) this is not enough to explain stagnant democratisation. ‘The increasingly weak nation-state and the erosion of its social legitimacy deserve serious considerations as well’. Hamzawy argues that research on democracy in the Middle East has marginalised the issue of state failure to concentrate mainly on theories of political reform and rotation of power; he believes that restoring the ‘social legitimacy’ and ‘institutional adequacy’ of the nation-state remain crucial to the modernisation of Arab societies. This adds credence to the argument that democratisation should be underpinned and consolidated by strong state and democratic institutions.

4.25 Is Islam an obstacle to democracy?

Some arguments cite culture and religion in a region dominated by Islam as major obstacles to democratisation. Scholars like Bernard Lewis argued that ‘the future of the Arab world will depend on the outcome of a battle between those advocating Islamic theocracy and those seeking to establish liberal democracy’ (Lewis, 2009), with an implicit assumption that Islam, or the form of Islam advocated by the Islamic political movements and groups, and liberal democracy are not compatible. Similar arguments are found in Samuel Huntington’s famous book *Clash of Civilizations*, published in 1996, in which he argues that the concepts of pluralism and civil society that led to the development of modern democratic institutions, such as political parties and parliaments, are essentially western concepts in inception and origin, belonging to that part of western civilization which is on a collision course with the Muslim world.
However, his arguments regarding the incompatibility of Islam and democracy are not consistent with those he advanced in his equally famous, earlier book *The Third Wave*, published in 1991. In this, he qualifies his position that Islamic and Confucian cultures pose obstacles to democratic development by stating that ‘arguments that particular cultures are permanent obstacles to development in one direction or another should be viewed with a certain skepticism’. Cultures, argues Huntington, are dynamic, not passive, as dominant attitudes and beliefs change over time and could differ significantly from the prevailing culture of even one or two previous generations (Huntington, 1991: 311).

The argument that democracy cannot be rejected or disposed of by cultural taboos or assumptions about civilization predispositions is also made by Sen, (1999) in his claim that ‘democracy is a universal value which includes its intrinsic importance in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive function in the formation of values’. Amartya Sen emphasises that these merits are not regional in character, but valid for all cultures and regions of the world. Sen explains that a universal value does not mean that people everywhere must consent to it, but that people anywhere may have a reason to see it as valuable.

Benjamin Barber, not only criticises Lewis, Huntington and others who prescribe to the notion that Islam as a religion and culture is an obstacle to democracy, but goes further by arguing that ‘it is absurd to think that Islam cannot accommodate democracy or that democracy cannot accommodate Islam’. Barber, in a paper presented in Istanbul in 2008, goes on to give six historical, sociological and philosophical arguments to support the notion that Islam and democracy are not at odds. He argues for democracy to be constructed bottom up, based on strong foundations of education, civil society and political infrastructure. (Barber, 2008)

Another factor which very much weakens the argument that Islam as a religion is at odds with democracy is the fact that many non-Arab Muslim countries in Europe, Asia and Africa are seen today as democratic. Free and fair elections are held regularly to determine who rules and basic political and civil freedoms are observed in countries such as Albania, Bosnia,
Turkey, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Mali. According to Stepan and Robertson, (2003), the democracy deficit is an ‘Arab’ more than a Muslim gap, as many non-Arab countries which are totally Muslim or with an overwhelming Muslim majority are enjoying a democratic system of rule, whereas no Arab countries are rated by Freedom House as democracies today.

However, it is perhaps simplistic to claim that this notion of Islam and democracy being totally compatible is widely accepted when, in reality, there are powerful social and political movements across the Arab world advocating the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’ or the ‘Islamisation of society’. Powerful Islamic movements like the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ have championed these populist slogans without giving any concrete content to what an Islamic state would entail or be like. Would it be based on the historical ‘Medina’ model that lasted just over two decades some fourteen centuries ago following the death of Prophet Mohammed? Or would it be based on a contemporary understanding of the needs and complexities of a modern state? According to El-Affendi, (2008: 186), the concept of an Islamic state based on a historical model should be completely abandoned in favour of a concept of a state for Muslims or an Islamic political community where Islamic values are actualised into a viable modern democratic model.

4.26 Role of ‘experts’ and expertise in democratisation

The role of ‘experts’ in democracy, and in particular their role in the transition to democracy, must also be considered. ‘There is a widely shared agreement that transition to democracy is an elite-driven process’ (Horvat, 2004: 90) and that reliable democracies are not made by the masses but crafted by the elites (Bozoki, 2002: 1).

Experts can utilise their expertise to boost and energise, or even initiate, the democratisation process in many different ways. Leaders of political, civil society and human rights organisations, as well as free thinking academics, writers and journalists can help organise the masses in a public civil struggle for democracy. Such experts can also use their intellectual capacity to articulate a crucially needed vision and course for democratisation, and boost the aspirations for freedom of the many in society.
Experts in law, especially constitutional and electoral law, can play a vital role in institution building and the drafting of new democratic constitutions and election laws. What is also important is the role of experts in sustaining new democracies and keeping them in good working order by influencing policies, and connecting the public to governments by providing them with information, or by persuading them of the rightness or wrong-headedness of a certain course of action (Keane, 2006).

Experts can also enhance democracies by putting forward well-informed and objective choices for policies, thus helping democratic governments and decision makers make rational decisions that serve the best interests of the collective agency and society at large. Contributions by experts to better, well-informed and democratic policies can be made in all areas of public life, and in particular, in important fields such as the economy, education, health and the environment. Such expert contributions would and will help democracy to consolidate and thrive. In turn, such a strong and thriving democracy contributes to enhancing and expanding overall human development.

We can view human capital lost via the brain drain as a loss of highly educated and skilled people who are ‘experts’ in their fields. This loss of expertise leaves behind a deficit in terms of capacity building and contributing to democratisation in both its transition and consolidation phases. On the other hand, these expert emigrants can still contribute to the democratisation of their country of origin through brain circulation and various strategies of re-engagement, as discussed in Chapter III.

The next chapter will concentrate on reviewing ‘human development’, the third of three key themes inter-related in this research. How is human development assessed and measured will be critically assessed and the socio-economically based measure of the Human Development Index (HDI) will be challenged. The potential linkage between human development, democracy and the brain drain will be explored and reviewed.

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Chapter V

The Concept of Human Development

This chapter provides a theoretical review of the human development ‘paradigm’, including its origins and its holistic approach to development generally, and the need for sustainable human development. The theories of evaluating and measuring human development are critically appraised, including the Human Development Index (HDI). The capabilities approach (CA) is considered in detail and also the interrelationship between human development and other concepts, such as freedom, human rights, democracy, capacity building and human capital. Human development in the Arab world is also briefly discussed, especially since the highly publicised annual Arab Human Development Reports that the UNDP has published since 2002 have helped to focus minds on the issue and generate wide debate. Human development in the era of globalisation is also discussed briefly.

The state of human development in Libya is evaluated in detail in Chapter II, dedicated to this issue. What this thesis will attempt to do throughout is to explore the dynamic link and interrelationship between the brain drain, democratisation and human development. This will be pursued in a general context and more specifically with regard to the Libyan dimension.

5.1 Human development

The real wealth of any given nation or society is its people, and the primary objective of development is to benefit those people. This objective can only be achieved by creating an environment in which people enjoy a long, healthy, prosperous and free life.

5.2 Definition of human development

Amartya Sen, one of the principal pioneers of the discourse on human development, articulates the concept as one that illuminates and integrates a variety of concerns about people’s lives, their wellbeing and their freedoms (Sen, 2000).

Another well-known pioneer of the human development concept is Mahbub ul Haq, the main author of the first HDR launched in 1990 under the sponsorship of the UNDP. According to Mahbub ul Haq, the purpose of the 1990 HDR was “to shift the focus of development
economics from national income-accounting to people-centred policies’ (Mahbub ul Haq, 1995). The report had the broad ambition of setting out a comprehensive approach to development, including an agenda of policy priorities, tools of analysis and measurement, and a coherent conceptual framework. (Fukoda-Parr, 2003)

In the 1990 HDR, the definition of human development, or what Fukoda-Parr called a human development paradigm, was articulated in terms of a two sided equation: the acquisition of human capabilities balanced by the opportunities to use those capabilities (UNDP, 1990).

Human capabilities may include good health, knowledge and skills. Opportunities are taken to mean having those choices, economic, political, social and cultural, which human beings make every day. These include political participation, freedom of expression and respect for essential human rights. Further choices include the enjoyment of social justice, cultural fulfilment and technological advances.

Therefore, while human development may be defined simply as a process of enlarging choices (UNDP, Arab Human Development Report, 2002), it is also seen as an outcome. It is a process through which choices are enlarged, and an outcome measured by the degree to which those choices have been enhanced. In the attempt to enhance both the capabilities and the opportunities to use those capabilities, it is important to keep the two sides of the human development equation balanced, in order not to frustrate the whole process.

It is also important to remember that there are other people-based approaches to development, such as the concept of ‘Human Resource Development’, which focuses on human capital and the role of human beings themselves as an input to the development process. There is also the ‘Human Welfare Approach’, which emphasises human beings as recipients of, rather than participants in the development process. However, the concept of human development offers a much broader, holistic approach than these, or any other people-based theories, as it encompasses them all (UNDP, AHDR, 2002).

However, such a broad, holistic definition of human development poses the question of whether the concept is qualitative or quantitative? Can human development, with its multi-
dimensional, multi-component constituents and many variables, be statistically measured, expressed and monitored?

5.3 Sustainable human development (SHD)


The concept of sustainable development arose from the anxieties and worries expressed by ecologists and environmental scientists that world natural resources were finite and that if consumption of them continued without regard to the needs of future generations the world would have a major problem. Economists and policymakers acknowledged these concerns and attempted to formulate concepts of ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’. An early attempt at a formulation of sustainability went as follows: ‘At the core of the idea of sustainability, then, is the concept that current decisions should not damage the prospects for maintaining or improving living standards in the future’ (Repetto, Robert, 1985: 10).

The widespread adoption and use of the term ‘sustainable development’ was triggered mainly by the Brundtland Commission Report (1987), Our Common Future, which defined it as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland Commission, 1987) and to date there has been a proliferation of over fifty definitions of sustainability and at least seven different concepts of sustainable development (Jabareen, 2008).

Sustainable development, as simply illustrated above, is about maintaining a delicate balance between the human need to improve the lives and sense of wellbeing of people on one hand,
and on the other preserving natural resources and ecosystems, on which present and future generations depend.

So what is sustainable human development? And could there be a conflict between the goals of sustainability and those of human development? Dealing with the second question first, it can be argued that achieving higher human development implies the use of more resources, whereas ensuring sustainability for the future may require limiting or constraining the use of resources. Therefore, what is needed is a balance which optimises hoped-for levels of human development with a sustainable use of natural resources that does not compromise the needs of future generations.

The term Sustainable Human Development (SHD) has been introduced and used in the UNDP reports since 1991, with regular variations and differences in emphasis. According to UNDP HD report (1994: 12), sustainable human development not only places people at the centre of development now, but also advocates protection of life opportunities of present and future generations and respect for the natural system on which all life depends.

It is important to note, however, that there is a difference of emphasis between the advocates of sustainability and the advocates of human development. Where the sustainability way of thinking sees sustainability as a core or key concern for our future existence, the human development paradigm sees sustainability as just another dimension of human development goals (Dewan, 2009). This is echoed by a UNDP policy document published in January 1997 entitled ‘Governance for sustainable human development’, in which it is argued that there are five aspects of sustainable human development that affect the lives of people, especially the poor and vulnerable, namely: empowerment, co-operation, equity, sustainability and security.

Whenever we discuss and define human development, or develop and construct models for measuring and evaluating it, it is important to take sustainability into consideration. The link between, for example, the level of consumption of resources (especially natural resources) and human development is clear, as are the implications thereof.

It is also inadequate and shortsighted to pursue human development without considering our attitude towards our environment and our awareness of the need to protect and preserve it. Environmental issues to do with climate change, carbon emissions and deforestation are
global issues and we therefore cannot envisage human development without global co-
opperations and partnerships. All this supports and gives credence to the SHD paradigm. Some
advocates are already calling for measuring human development in terms of SHD and
suggesting the construction of a composite index called the SHDI (Costantini & Monni,
2004: 42).

5.4 Measuring human development

Not every aspect of a broad complex concept like human development can be quantified and
measured. The UNDP-sponsored human development report of 2001 stated that ‘it is
impossible to come up with a comprehensive measure – or even a comprehensive set of
indicators – because many vital dimensions of human development, such as participation in
the life of the community, are not readily quantified’ (UNDP, HDR, 2001: 14).

The traditional way of measuring development has been based on measuring GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) per capita. However, this measure only considers one aspect of
development, the economic, and does not reflect others, such as the social, political and
cultural.

The first human development report published in 1990 therefore constructed a more
comprehensive measure than GDP per capita. This was called the HDI (Human Development
Index). The 1990 report suggested that the HDI should focus on three essential elements of

The first component – longevity, or enjoyment of a long healthy life – is measured by life
expectancy at birth; the second – knowledge – by adult literacy rates and combined levels of
enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and the third – a decent standard of

To their credit, the authors of the HDI acknowledged in the same report that the above three
measures suffered from a common failing: they are averages that conceal wide disparities in
the overall population, such as the different life expectancies of various social groups, the
disparities between male and female literacy and the inevitable uneven distribution of
income.
On the other hand, one of its main pioneers, Mahbub ul Haq argues that the HDI is a significant advance on GNP-based measurement, as it captures far more reality than GNP does. He argues that it can also be disaggregated by income class, gender, geographical region, ethnic group or other classifications to bring out a graphic profile of society (Mahbub ul Haq, 2003: 132). Recognising that human development is a much broader and more complex concept than that captured by the HDI in its measurement indices, other indices have been developed in the search for further methodological and data refinements, such as those introduced in the 2001 HD report: HPI (Human Poverty Index), GDI (Gender Development Index) and GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure).

Despite the reinforcement and broadening of the HDI by these additional indices, the fact remains that these measures project human development as essentially being about education and health. The critical appraisal and re-evaluation of the adoption of the HDI as a reflection of human development continues and has gathered momentum in recent years.

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, a well-known contributor to development thinking and to the various HD reports, has been vocal in highlighting the shortcomings of adopting the HDI as the sole reflection of human development. She argues that there has been a tendency to confine human development strategies and ideas within the human development index. The success of the HDI, she argues, has ironically only served to reinforce the limited narrow interpretation of human development. Fukuda-Parr maintains that there are two flaws in the design of the HDI – namely, the simplification of a complex idea and the exclusion of references to political freedoms and participations (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 307)

However, political freedom and participation and guaranteed human rights were not explicitly mentioned in the overall definition of human development in the 1990 HD Report. This stated in (box 1.1 page 10) that:

> Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible.
The report then qualified this as follows:

But human development does not end there. Additional choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed human rights (UNDP, HDR, 1990: 10).

However, this rider that other important capabilities not encompassed by education and health, namely political freedom and human rights, be added to the definition of HD was dropped in the HD Report of 2001 (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 308).

In 2001, the UNDP published a report titled ‘A Human Rights-based Approach to Development Programming in UNDP – Adding the Missing Link. The report argues that ‘a human rights-based approach is not only about expanding people’s choices and capabilities but above all about the empowerment of people to decide what this process of expansion should look like’ (Weerelt, 2001: 2). It goes on to list examples of civil and political rights which are inherent to the individual and belong equally to all human beings, including: the right to life, the right to liberty and security of person, freedom of movement, equality before the law, independence of the judiciary, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected, the right to freely determine political status (, Weerelt, 2001, Box 2).

Can economic growth and income per capita alone be a true reflection of development? Alexander and Decancq, (2005) argue that economic growth devoid of people’s participation; empowerment and equity cannot be called development. It is true that economic and political freedoms are interlinked, but in some cases you can have one without the other. A good example of this paradox is when we compare the countries of China and India in terms of their overall HDI score and ranking. China in recent years has achieved a high level of economic growth and made considerable economic progress, which has pushed its ranking on the HDI in 2004 to (94th) in the world as a ‘medium’ human development country, despite its poor record in the crucial areas of human rights and political freedoms (UNDP, HDR, 2005).
A country like India, on the other hand, is recognised for its impressive record on cultural liberties. Its constitution recognises and accommodates the distinct group claims within society and enables polity to be cohesive despite vast cultural diversities. On indicators to do with trust in institutions and support for democracy India scores very high. And yet its performance and ranking in human development according to the HDI is poor, (127th) in 2004, which is a worse score than China’s for the same year (UNDP, HDR, 2004).

The apparent disparity between India and China and the incongruity between the HDI ranking and the realities of the state of people’s choices in both countries clearly highlights the limitations and controversies of evaluating and measuring human development only on the basis of three basic human capabilities (longevity, education and income per capita) This approach only captures a few of people’s choices and leaves out some other key important ones that people value, such as political freedom and participation in all aspects of public life. Disparity between the HDI ranking and realities of people’s choices also applies to Libya, as will be illustrated and discussed in depth in Chapter V.

When in 1992 the HDR attempted to construct a Political Freedom Index (PFI) based on five components, or broad clusters, that reflect values common to all cultures, all religions and all stages of development – ‘personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of opportunity (UNDP, HDR, 1992) – many authoritarian regimes and populist governments objected to it and the (PFI) had to be dropped in the following year (Alexander and Decancq, 2005).

It is difficult to accept today that human development can be measured reliably and more comprehensibly without the inclusion of such vital variables as political freedom, social freedom and human rights. The HDI-based measure as originally developed has continually evolved, with constant re-evaluation, appraisal and constructive criticism, leading to the addition of other indices and variables. Today there is a consensus, of respected critics which states clearly that a human development index that does not include political freedoms is incomplete (Mahbub ul Haq, 2003: 135) and out of date.

5.5 Human development and the ‘Capabilities Approach’:
The capabilities approach was first fully articulated by Amartya Sen, (1985) and discussed by Sen and Nussbaum (1993). Its applications to development were discussed by Sen (1999),
Nussbaum (2000), and Clark (2002, 2005) and are now so numerous that it is widely accepted as a paradigm shift in human development. Both Sen and Nussbaum state that the roots of the Capabilities Approach (CA) can be traced back to Aristotle and more recently to John Rawl’s *Theory of Justice* (1971), with its emphasis on ‘self-respect’ and access to primary goods. According to Sen, (1992: 8) Rawl’s *Theory of Justice* has deeply influenced the capabilities approach.

The first Human Development Report of 1990 offered a definition of human development as ‘both the process of widening people’s choices and the level of their achieved wellbeing’ (UNDP, 1990: 9). Widening people’s choices can also be expressed and explained in terms of enhancing people’s capabilities in all aspects of their lives – economic, political, social and cultural.

The capabilities approach can also been seen as a proposition:

That social arrangements should be evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value. If equality in social arrangements is to be demanded in any space – and most theories of justice advocate equality in some space – it is to be demanded in the space of capabilities (Alkire, 2005: 122).

A similar argument is also made by Robeyns, (2005: 4) that the capabilities approach is not a theory to explain inequality, poverty and wellbeing, but rather provides a tool and framework to conceptualise and evaluate these issues; ‘it is a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual wellbeing and social arrangements, the design of policies and proposals about social change in society’ (Robeyns, 2005: 94).

The CA evaluates policies in terms of people’s capability (freedom) to be healthy and well-nourished: people may choose to fast as a religious duty or go on hunger strike, but their capability to be well-nourished is still an option. The CA also evaluates policies in terms of people having access to high-quality education, to political participation, freedom of thought and expression – basically all dimensions of life, be it material or intellectual, economic, political, social or cultural. The CA is about having the freedom to access all utilities that lead to the goals or ends of individual wellbeing, justice and development. One criticism of the CA, however, is that it stresses individual human agency, but not the organisations (such as
markets or governments), and groups, social entities and structures which makes these things possible (Robeyns, 2005: 108).

It has already been argued and made clear that development should be judged by the expansion of substantive human freedoms and not just by economic growth (GNP and income per capita) or by social modernisation and technical progress (Robeyns, 2005). This is not to say that technical, economic and social advances are unimportant. On the contrary, they can be very important, especially if seen and utilised as instruments for enhancing human freedoms. That is why these advances need to be appraised in terms of their effectiveness in enriching the lives and liberties of people, not just seen as valuable in themselves (Dreze and Sen, 2002: 3).

The limitations of the HDI and its three components, including GNP and income per capita, as a reflection of the state of human development, compared to the capabilities approach, has already been highlighted. A very eloquent and articulate critique of the limitations of relying on GNP as a measure of what makes life valuable can be found in a speech given by Robert F. Kennedy on 4 January 1968, He stated that:

The Gross National Product of the United States is the largest in the world, but that GNP, if we should judge our nation by it, counts air pollution and cigarette advertising and ambulances to clear the highways of carnage. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear warhead and armoured cars that fight riots in our streets. Yet the GNP does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile (Kennedy, 1968).

What the capabilities approach argues is that while economic growth is important for human development it is not enough and, more importantly, it is a means and not an end in itself. Sen articulates this, drawing from an old Aristotle argument, by stating that ‘wealth is
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else’. (Sen, 1990: 44) In effect, commodities, services and social institutions are not an end in themselves but a means to an end, that of freedom, wellbeing, justice and development. These ends should be articulated and conceptualised in terms of people’s capabilities to function. (Robeyns, 2005)

It was in 2003 that Martha Nussbaum, together with Sen and a group of younger scholars, founded the Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) and, with Sen, promoted the capabilities approach to development, which views functional capabilities (‘substantial freedoms’, such as the ability to live to old age, to engage in economic transactions or participate in political activities) as the constitutive parts of development, and poverty as capability-deprivation.

The capabilities approach is based on three central concepts: functioning, capability and agency.

Functionings are defined as ‘the various things a person may value doing or being’ (Sen, 1999: 75). In other words, they are activities and states that people consider to be valuable and which contribute to their wellbeing, such as being healthy, safe, educated and employed.

Capability refers to the freedom to enjoy a combination of the various functionings (both being and doing) that a person can achieve. Capabilities can be simply defined as ‘the substantive freedoms a person enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value’ (Sen, 1999: 87). In other words, capabilities are the freedoms people have to be or to do things that contribute to their wellbeing.

Agency is the ability of people to pursue and achieve goals that they value or have reason to value. A person with agency or an agent is ‘someone who acts and brings about change’ (Sen, 1999: 19); the opposite of having agency would be suffering coercion and oppression.

5.6 Differences between Sen and Nussbaum on the Capability approach:

Although the CA was originally introduced by Sen, others, especially Marta Nussbaum, have developed it further. According to Robeyns, (2005: 103) Nussbaum wanted to use the CA to develop a partial theory of justice by approaching it from a ‘moral-legal-political philosophy’ perspective, and argued for political principles to be guaranteed by governments to all their
citizens through constitutions. To this effect, Nussbaum has developed a list of central or ‘universal human capabilities’ (listed below). She argues that governments should endorse these universal capabilities and convert them into political principles underpinned by constitutions. Nussbaum has argued that for Sen’s capability approach to have any effect with respect to justice, he needs to endorse such a universal list (Robeyns, 2005: 105). Others have also argued that for the CA to become operational, a list of capabilities needs to be identified.

Sen has responded by arguing that the problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with endorsing one predetermined list. This, he argues, is not the task of the theorist, but rather the task of the democratic process (Sen, 2004: 77-80). Lists are used in different social, cultural and geographical settings and should not be universally standardised. Nussbaum, on the other hand, has stressed that her list is a list of highly generalised capabilities, which can and should be made more specific by local people (Nussbaum, 2000, 2003). Nussbaum’s advocacy of the adoption of specific capabilities lists implemented through constitutional guarantees for essential human and political rights is highly significant and important. The methodological framework provided by Nussbaum can be tailored to specific development needs and priorities on regional, country and local levels. It can be applied to specific communities and groups, including groups marginalised for ethnic or political reasons. It allows for the development of much wider and more inclusive indices to measure human development than the limited, and much criticised, universal HDI.

5.7 Universal Human Capabilities by Martha Nussbaum

How can the CA be used as an advocacy for development strategies and policies? And how can it be practically relevant to what constitutes the wellbeing of individuals on national, regional and local levels? Concerns have been highlighted that listing specific capabilities faces at least two challenges: omission and power (HDCA, 2009). Omission means that important capabilities might be overlooked; power, that powerful individuals, groups or parties may select the capabilities that reflect their views. In an attempt to address the above concerns, Martha Nussbaum has proposed a list of ten universal human capabilities that, in her view, are vital to avoid the issues of omission and power and ‘should be the basis of constitutional guarantees’ (HDCA, 2009).

The list is as follows:
1. **Life**: Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2. **Bodily health**: Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

3. **Bodily integrity**: Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction

4. **Senses, imagination and thought**: Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing expressive works and events of one's own choice – religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression, in both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and avoid non-necessary pain.

5. **Emotions**: Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us; to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear or anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)

6. **Practical reason**: Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of conscience and religious observance.)

7. **Affiliation**: (A) Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting freedom of assembly and political speech.)
(B) Having the social basis of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. (This entails protection against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity or national origin.)

8. Other species: Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

9. Play: Being able to laugh, to play and enjoy recreational activities.

10. Control over one's environment: (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the rights of political participation, protection of free speech and freedom of association.

(B) Material: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, to be able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationship of mutual recognition with other workers.

Source: Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999: 41-42)

5.8 Measuring capabilities as indicators for human development

How can the capability approach, based on Nussbaum’s list of additional factors, be put into operation? How can the empirical data that directly reflects human activity and wellbeing and which can be used as an advocacy tool for changing policy priorities be generated? According to Anand et al, (2009), they have ‘developed a short(er) list of capability indicator variables for which there is the strongest evidence of a statistical link to subjective wellbeing.’ A ‘survey instrument that provides indicators of capability across a wide range of life domains and issues’ was also constructed, the idea being to link some of the capability indicators to various variables, including environmental ones, that policy-makers can influence and change. There is no doubt that translating expanded capabilities into empirical indicators of multivariate aspects of wellbeing will transform and advance how human development is assessed, measured and contrasted far more effectively than the inherently deficient and problematic HDI.
Making the capabilities approach operational would be highly influential in development policy where it would replace the human development index (HDI), which is now considered limited and not a true reflection of the state of human development. An empirically based and developed construction of measuring capabilities utilising the CA will also be highly beneficial in other disciplines, such as philosophy and a range of social sciences. The adoption of capability lists is the least of the methodological challenges and, according to Qizilbash, (2002), many of the different lists suggested can be reconciled. However, what is more important is to build the democratic institutions that the capability approach requires in practice. Another important aspect is to develop methodological guidelines by which social scientists can empirically assess capabilities, whichever capabilities list is chosen.

5.9 Alternative Human Development Index (AHDI)

A well-known Arab academic in the field of development, Nader Fergany from Egypt, has also researched extensively what he called an adequate measure of human development, and has articulated the AHDI (Alternative Human Development Index). Fergany argues that the HDI does not capture the rich content of the human development concept, hence the need to develop and expand this measure further to encapsulate other vital variables such as human freedom.

In constructing his AHDI, Fergany argues that proposed new indicators were partly motivated by the human development deficits in the Arab region and are defined to express human functioning, or human capabilities and freedoms. The indicators put forward by Fergany include not just life expectancy at birth and educational attainment, which are incorporated in the HDI, but also freedom score, women’s empowerment, internet hosts per capita and carbon dioxide emissions per capita. Fergany also argued that these proposed indicators have a global relevance that extends beyond the Arab countries (See box 1.6, page 21 of UNDP, AHDR, 2002).

When fourteen Arab countries were ranked based on the AHDI measure, they were all found to have dropped in their level of development ranking compared to their ranking on the HDI. ‘As expected the position of all Arab countries deteriorates, to varying extent, on moving
from HDI to AHDI, but especially Kuwait and the UAE lose place considerably’ (UNDP, AHDR 2002: 21). This is a significant finding which confirms that oil-rich Arab countries may have high rates of life expectancy, educational attainment and income per capita which will give them a high human development score based on the HDI, but when other indices like freedom score, women’s empowerment and internet penetration per capita are included in the analysis and measurement, the human development score drops considerably. This is a clear case for the limitation and deficiency of the HDI as a measure. It is also very relevant to Libya which, like Kuwait and the UAE, is an oil country that scores high on the HDI, yet it has a poor record on many other measures like freedom, women’s empowerment, internet penetration and political agency in general. The case of evaluating human development in Libya will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.

Adopting the AHDI to evaluate the state of human development is an improvement on the HDI, yet the AHDI itself does not incorporate other important capabilities highlighted by Nussbaum’s universal list. Developing a more inclusive and reflective measure of human development that goes beyond the HDI and the AHDI is a challenge for all those concerned with the human development discourse. It is a challenge well beyond the scope of this research because it requires the creativity and innovation of experts across multi-disciplines, such as political economy, statistics, human development and social science in general. Incorporating essential human capabilities in the constitutions and human rights declarations of countries is the perhaps the way forward.

5.10 Human development and freedom

In his well-received book Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen argues that ‘Expansion of freedom is viewed both as the primary end and as the principal means of development’ (Sen, 1999). He continues to argue that development is essentially about the removal of various types of ‘unfreedoms’ that leave people with little choice and little opportunity to exercise their ‘reasoned agency’. The removal of substantial unfreedoms, Sen argues, is constitutive of development and is also essentially an expansion of human freedom.

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15 If Libya was included in the ranking based on the AHDI then most probably it would show a significant drop similar to that of Kuwait and UAE.
This shift in development thinking over recent years is very significant, as it moves the focus from income, wealth and education levels as the main measures of development to the enhancement of human capabilities as substantive human freedoms, reflecting the freedom to achieve the various things that people value. It is also important to stress that freedom as the capability to achieve things that people value must be linked with freedom as an opportunity to achieve those things that people deem to be of value in their lives. This encompasses clearly how freedom is both a means and an end in itself within the framework of human development.

Amartya Sen argues that freedom is both constitutive of development and instrumental to it. He went on to identify five distinct types of instrumental freedoms being significant and direct contributors to the general capability of a person to live more freely. The five instrumental freedoms, which are different but interconnected and which complement one another, include political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security (Sen, 1999: 4).

Freedom can be considered as both a primary end and a principal means of development. As freedom is an essential means, then it follows that ‘Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states’ (Sen, 2001). Sen, argue that freedom is essential and central to the process of development for two distinct reasons: an evaluative reason, whereby progress and development are assessed in terms of whether the freedoms the people have are enhanced; and secondly, an effectiveness reason, whereby achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people. (Sen, 2001)

If we accept the strength of the argument that human development is intrinsically linked to human freedom, which in turn is both a capability (means) and an opportunity (goal) within the overall concept of human development, then we are faced by a crucial question: how can we measure freedom?

One organisation that has been publishing an annual assessment and measure of the state of freedom around the world since 1972 is ‘Freedom House’, an American non-governmental organisation. The freedom measure developed by Freedom House takes into consideration the
availability of a range of political and civil rights freedoms actually enjoyed in countries and regions around the world. The measure looks at two specific criteria: political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) respectively. A combined average rating score of 1 represents the freest and 7 the least free. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results compiled by Freedom House. (Freedom IN The World reports, 2002). The ‘Freedom Index’ method developed by Freedom House is also supposed to reflect the extent to which freedoms, necessary for good governance, are available in a given country or region (Box 1.5, UNDP, AHDR, 2002: 20).

5.11 Human development and human rights

The common traditional definition of human rights has been concerned mainly with civil and political rights, such as the right to life, freedom and security; the right to be treated equally and not discriminated against on the basis of ethnic background, colour, religion, gender or social class; the right to freedom of thought and speech; and legal rights to the due process of law whereby everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

However, a more holistic approach to human rights now prevails, which adds to political freedoms, civil liberties and democratic rights, crucial social, economic and cultural rights: freedom from poverty and enjoyment of a decent standard of living; the right to a good education and health service; the right to work, and to equal pay for equal work for both men and women; the right to protection of minority and disadvantaged groups, including women, children and people with disabilities.

Human development, on the other hand, is also defined as expanding choices for all people, choices which range from the economic and social to the political and cultural. Sustainable human development also adopts a holistic approach to human needs, and views people as both a means and an end of development, now and in the future.


Human development and human rights also have a common denominator – human freedom. This can be seen clearly when we consider that human development, by enhancing human
capabilities, creates the ability to exercise freedom, and human rights, by providing the necessary framework, create the opportunity to exercise it. Hence freedom is both the guarantor and the goal of both human development and human rights (AHDR, 2002: 18).

Human rights and sustainable human development are thus inextricably linked, complementary and multidimensional (UNDP Policy document, 1998). Developing a human rights approach to sustainable human development is crucial, which means that monitoring and measuring human rights should be an integral part of measuring and evaluating human development.

To this extent, the HDR 2000 has argued for using indicators for human rights accountability, and human rights indicators are needed to create and foster a culture of accountability. ‘Developing and using indicators for human rights has become a cutting-edge area for advocacy’ (HDR, 2000: 92). The report argues that adopting a human rights approach may offer an additional and very useful perspective for analysis of human development.

Human rights indicators may include statistical data on violations, such as imprisonment, torture and the disappearance of political activists and critics of governments, as well as data on processes of justice, including the existence of, and access to, independent judicial civil courts and free trials; access to defending lawyers and independent observers; and the existence, or prohibition, of independent political institutions, press and civil society organisations.

Human rights advocates are increasingly arguing for human rights measures to be fully incorporated in the construction of the overall human development measurement process, as acknowledged by Amartya Sen: ‘The advocates of human rights have suggested that the enterprise of human development should take them more seriously. This is a justified demand. Perhaps this will be a good extension’ (Sen, 2000: 22).

5.12 Human development and democracy

A more detailed discussion of the interrelationship between democracy and human development was provided in the last chapter, covering the whole concept of democracy and democratisation. However, it has already been argued and stated here that freedom and
human rights are pivotal to human development in its comprehensive approach and understanding as a concept. It can also be argued that freedoms and human rights are essential constituents of the democratic discourse.

A recent study to test the hypothesis that democracy improves human development looked at the rate of infant mortality as a measure of human development. It conducted cross-national statistical tests of the relationship between levels of democracy and infant mortality and found a strong relationship between the two, concluding that empirical evidence proves a strong association between democratic stock and human development. There is also good reason to believe that this relationship is a causal one (Gerring, 2005).

As stated in Chapter II, we find that (42 out of the top 48) countries that are high on human development attainment, based on the HDI measure, are also high on the democracy scale, and enjoying a genuine democratic system (HDR, 2002: 56).

5.13 Human development, human capital and capacity building
Definitions for the concepts of human capital and capacity building are offered above (see Introduction section). The concepts of human development, human capital development and capacity building are closely intertwined and interlinked. Capacity building is about developing abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve goals and objectives on three key dimensions; individual, organisational and societal. Human capital is the acquired education, knowledge, skills, expertise, health and values that cannot be separated from the individuals who acquire them. ‘Capacity building helps create conditions that enable people to derive maximum benefits. It is an ongoing process that involves developing competencies (skills, knowledge, attitudes) to enable people to make things happen’ (UNDP, 2006: 26). Capacity can also be defined as the ability of individuals and organisations to perform functions effectively.

As already discussed in this chapter (see section 3.3 on the capabilities approach), human development is essentially about acquiring capabilities or substantial freedoms to enjoy a combination of various functionings (both being and doing) that a person can achieve. One can conclude that capacity building and capacity development is a core objective of overall human development attainment.
Human development and human security

Human development is primarily about the enlargement of people’s choices. Human security, on the other hand, is concerned with allowing people to exercise these choices safely and freely. As defined and discussed already (see Introduction section), human security can be achieved using two key strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection shields people from danger or removes the insecurity; empowerment enables people to become full participants in decision-making related to all aspects of their life.

Human security can also be viewed in terms of basic individual security and protection, and, as the table below highlights, a necessary condition for human development; it can be seen as removing unfreedoms and insecurities in order to create an environment conducive to human development. ‘People not only need to be educated, well-nourished and respected, they need assurances that nothing will prevent them from exercising these rights’ (UNDP, 2006: 22). It is concluded that human development aspirations are directly dependent on the existence of human security and a culture guaranteeing human security.

Countries engaged in conflict are characterised as low on human security where functioning, capabilities and exercised agency for citizens become constrained and limited, this will inevitably lead to low human development attainment. Similarly, oppressive totalitarian regimes that are mainly concerned with state security, at the expense of human ‘individual security’ are also bound to have low human development levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Human Development</th>
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<td>Protection</td>
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<td>Threats</td>
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<td>Basic Rights</td>
<td>Entire range of options</td>
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<td>Negative liberties</td>
<td>Positive liberties</td>
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Source: Conflict Prevention NHDR Thematic Guidance Note, 2004, UNDP

Human development in the Arab countries

The publication of four annual human development reports sponsored by the UNDP dedicated solely to the Arab countries, starting in 2002, has been hugely instrumental in concentrating minds on the key issues and challenges of human development in this region,
especially in the areas of freedoms, access to knowledge and information, and women’s empowerment and participation.

The reports have generated a very comprehensive debate amongst politicians and intellectuals, as well as among human rights activists, democracy advocates and others. The critical appraisal of the state of democracy, along with social and political participation, put many Arab governments on the defensive. They had to acknowledge the need to do much more in areas such as freedom of speech, tackling corruption and adopting genuine comprehensive reforms that would lead to wider economic and political participation, greater transparency and good governance.

The annual international HD reports published by the UNDP since 1990 have presented country rankings of the state of human development as measured by the HDI, an index which, as argued already, does not necessarily take into account important variables such as political freedom, social participations, human rights and the acceptance and practice of democracy. Therefore, the ranking of many Arab countries does not necessarily reflect the true state of human development in its holistic comprehensive concept. Were factors such as freedom, human rights and democracy incorporated in the construction and calculation of the ranking of these countries many of them would show a different, most likely, weaker state of human development. This has already been demonstrated by the application of the AHDI articulated by Nader Fergany, as discussed earlier in this chapter (see section 3.3.5).

5.16 Future of human development in the era of globalisation
The human development discourse has come a long way since the days of development based on central planning, driven by economic growth (GNP). It has also been almost two decades since the publication of the first HDR in 1990 and the subsequent annual reports, covering both international and regional parts of the world. These reports have contributed to and reflected the proliferation and advancement of human development research and thinking.

More attention has been focused, over the last decade, on the agency aspects of human development, including political freedoms and institutions, as well as political processes. Advocating equality, including equal rights for women, has also been part of an evolving approach to human development (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 315).
People today, as a collective agency, are exercising empowerment through economic and political liberalisation and social action. The role of civil society has become much more prominent and powerful with evolving globalisation, and it now plays a larger part in shaping both debate and policy for overall human development.

The human development concept of today and the future is a much more comprehensive, holistic one; it is a concept that encompasses, at the heart of it, capabilities and choices such as political and social participation, freedom, respect for human rights and the acceptance, as well as practice, of democracy and core democratic values. It is also no longer acceptable to examine and measure human development on economic and social parameters alone, such as income per capita and educational attainment.

The key tool by which human development is measured, the HDI has received a comprehensive critical appraisal, and overwhelming conclusive arguments have been articulated that postulate a major evolvement of the HDI measure to incorporate new indices for political freedom, human rights and collective agency. ‘In today’s era of globalisation the current and future agenda of HD Reports should be to give more balanced emphasis to political freedoms and collective agency’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 303).

5.17 How is human development evaluated in this thesis?

In researching the key questions of this thesis, human development evaluation will be considered not only on the basis of the traditional HDI factors which are: life expectancy; education; and GDP per capita. But, in pursuit of a more holistic understanding, other equally important factors and indices will be adopted which include: political freedom and participation, economic freedom, respect for human rights, transparency and accountability, existence of democratic values and practices, existence of an independent free press and independent judicial processes and institutions. This have already been illustrated in Chapter II dedicated to evaluating the state of human development in Libya.

What we know so far and what is next?

The first two chapters were dedicated to reviewing the politics, economy and state of human development in Libya signposting whenever possible clear junctures where brain drain from Libya was taking place and how it was setting back overall human development.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provided my extensive literature review on the three key themes of brain drain, democratisation and human development and an inter-relationship or any linkage between them at the theoretical and conceptual level were highlighted and contextualised. Any causal impacts and relationships between the three themes are not necessarily unidirectional, but move in opposite directions as well.

The next chapter will build on the framing of the brain drain problem in Libya and the literature review in order to synthesise the hypotheses, methodology, a research base line which will also provide an analytical framework for the main empirical research in the form of qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews.
Chapter VI
Hypothesis and Methodology

6.1 Introduction
The last five chapters have reviewed extensively the politics and economy of Libya, the state of human development in Libya and the literature related to the three themes of this thesis, namely: brain drain, democracy & democratisation and human development. It is also important to highlight that the central subject of the last five chapters is the very subject of this thesis, the brain drain in Libya, and this has been signposted whenever possible.

The next step is to distill my hypotheses from the last five chapters and summarise my theoretical framework. Based on the hypothesis and theoretical framework a methodology is designed and set out. The methodology is critically considered in order to addresses potential weaknesses of research bias, reliability, validity, data deficiency, limitations and missed opportunities. Methodology literature is consulted as much as possible.

Following the methodology, a research baseline is established, drawn from three sources; OECD data on brain drain, literature review and the findings of a qualitative questionnaire carried out as part of this thesis. The research baseline is used as the frame and guide for the execution of the main qualitative empirical investigation, using in-depth semi-structured interviews; it helps to inform the key topics to be investigated and can also be seen as an analytical framework.

6.2 Hypothesis
Hypothesis is essentially a ‘tentative proposition which is subject to verification through subsequent investigation’ (Verma and Beard, 1981: 184). It is, in many cases, just the researcher’s hunch about the possible relationships between variables. So, hypotheses ‘make statements about relations between variables and provide a guide to the researcher as to how the original hunch might be tested’ (Bell, 1999: 25).

The following are the key hypotheses set out to be investigated in this thesis:

- H1: The brain drain or migration of educated skilled people can also be seen as human capital flight (HCF), which leaves behind weakened capacity-building and has
a detrimental effect on economic, social and political development, or overall human development.

- **H2**: Lack of democracy manifested in the absence of security, of rule of law, of freedom of thought and expression and of basic human rights can become a ‘PUSH’ factor, exacerbating human capital flight.

- **H3**: The highly educated Diaspora are those with high levels of knowledge, skills and competencies who can be viewed as ‘experts’ in their fields and who can use their intellectual capacity to articulate and craft a crucially needed vision of and course for democratisation, boosting the aspirations for freedom of the many in society.

- **H4**: The brain drain, democratisation and human development, are intertwined and interrelated. The causal relationships and effects between them are not unidirectional, but run in both directions. Human development is set back by brain drain and brain drain can be reduced by high human development attainment.

### 6.3 Summary of the theoretical framework

The theoretical framework for this thesis synthesized from the literature review covered in the chapters (3, 4 and 5) dealing with the concepts of brain drain, democratisation and human development. A brief summary of the theoretical framework is offered here:

Brain drain is associated with the loss of highly qualified and skilled people with knowledge, expertise and competencies that constitute a valuable human capital. The brain drain or migration of educated skilled people can also be seen as human capital flight (HCF), which leaves behind weakened capacity-building and has a detrimental effect on economic, social and political development, or overall human development.

Democratisation can be seen as part of political development and, in turn, part of overall human development. However, lack of democracy manifested in a lack of security, of rule of law and of basic human rights can become a ‘PUSH’ factor exacerbating human capital flight. It can be argued that democracy is conducive to a country’s ability to retain its stock of highly skilled human capital, unless there are other overriding push factors, such as lack of
employment and economic prosperity. On the other hand, it has been shown that democracy is good for economic growth and prosperity.

However, three out of the five countries considered to be successful examples of brain drain reversal, namely Taiwan, South Korea and China, were not democracies when they started attracting emigrants to return. This suggests that development drive and economic growth were crucial factors, although in the case of China the literature also suggests that further guarantees of freedom of movement, political freedom and stability may have boosted the rate of brain drain reversal. Is it democratic values or economic factors? Identifying the overriding factors in successful reversal of brain drain will be one of the key questions and hypothesis investigated in this research.

People with high levels of knowledge, skills and competencies can be viewed as experts in their fields who can also use their intellectual capacity to articulate and craft a crucially needed vision of and course for democratisation, and boost the aspirations for freedom of the many in society. They can also play a crucial role in the institution- and state-building that is vital for the consolidation of a democratic discourse. Migrating human capital in the Diaspora can therefore contribute to their origin countries through various strategies of re-engagement, whether by supporting a process of democratisation or through overall capacity-building and human development.

It is important to appreciate that the dimensions of the three elements, the brain drain, democratisation and human development, are intertwined and interrelated. The causal relationships and effects between them are not unidirectional but run in both directions.

Skilled foreign workers in Libya are a factor in brain drain in so far as they offset or not the loss of human capital through brain drain that Libya has experienced in the last three decades.

There is conceivably a detrimental impact that brain drain may have on capacity-building, not only at the individual level but more crucially at the institutional level.
6.4 Research Methodology

According to (Bryman, 2009), when choosing a research design a decision is made about the importance that can be attached to ‘expressing causal connections between variables, generalising to larger groups of individuals than those actually forming part of the investigation’ (Bryman, 2009, p.31). Qualitative and quantitative models of research should not be seen as two distinct epistemologies that cannot be mixed together by a researcher.

The survey research approach encompasses a cross-sectional design by which data are collected mainly by questionnaire or interview techniques on two or more cases at a single point in time so as to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data as well as qualitative data regarding two or more variables to identify their patterns of association (Bryman, 2009, p.46). According to (Yin, 2009) if a researcher wants to know the “what” outcomes of a research, a quantitative survey could be used to provide the answers while if they need to know the “how” or “why” outcome then an interview technique could be used.

6.5 Quantitative Research

6.6 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire employed in this thesis and its findings are used as an initial indication to complement the OECD data and literature review to help establish a baseline for my qualitative empirical research.

While much effort and energy has been spent in designing, conducting and analysing the questionnaire (total sample of 203), it none the less has methodological weaknesses in terms of how representative the sample is and the reliability of the concluded analysis as discussed next.

6.7 Questionnaire design

Much thought went into designing the questionnaire, its objectives, format, content and the methods of distributing and carrying it out with the targeted participants. The design of the questionnaire was carefully considered, not only to reflect the key questions relevant to the research, but also to ensure that the questions offer a comprehensive and distinct range of
options as answers from which to choose, with an extra option for ‘any comment’. A draft sample was tested with five candidates, in which each was asked for their thoughts on the design and scope of the questions and whether they were clearly formulated and offered a clear and distinct choice of answers. Their feedback and observations have been very useful and largely taken into account in the final revised format.

6.8 Selection and sampling process
The target population for the quantitative questionnaire is all Libyans living abroad, estimated to be around 100,000. The sample frame is those highly educated and skilled Libyans who applied their knowledge and expertise outside Libya, estimated at over 40,00016. The sample aimed at was 200 participants, taking into account time constraints, response rate and the geographical as well as professional spread of these participants.

Sampling cannot be described as strictly random and the principal method used for sampling was ‘Stratified Sampling’, whereby sub-groups are identified, then targeted randomly, according to specialty and area of profession. ‘Snowball Sampling’, in which participants from the same specialty group or category who tend to network together, recommend others as candidates for the questionnaire, was also employed. Additionally, a self-collected small database of names that belonged to the sample frame, comprised of my personal contacts, networking and contacts made while travelling, has been utilized as well. This could be seen as ‘bias’ selection, where my personal contacts may mostly share my political views.

An electronic-format copy of the questionnaire was designed so that it could be emailed to prospective candidates.

6.9 Conduct of questionnaire
Questionnaires were collected using face-to-face meetings, the postal service and email. A log was kept of the number of questionnaires sent by post, those left with people who promised to return them by post and those emailed to prospective participants.

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16 This is based on anecdotal estimates, but is supported by literature review as can be seen later where OECD census data in 2005 gives the percentage of highly skilled to be (43.4 per cent) of total number of expatriate Libyans.
The largest number of questionnaires (132) was conducted in face-to-face meetings, either in the UK or during my travels to various countries between 2006 and 2009. I travelled to the USA in June 2006 to attend a seminar on Libya run by a Libyan Diaspora organization, at which a number of highly qualified and educated Libyans living in different parts of the USA were present, some of whom participated in the questionnaire. In Europe, I met Libyan migrants who filled in the questionnaire in Holland, Germany and Switzerland. I also travelled to Arab countries – Qatar, the UAE and Egypt – where I met migrant Libyans who participated in the questionnaire.

I have left hard copies of the questionnaire with a total of (67) others, of which a total of (29) returned a completed copy by post. I have also emailed the electronic copy to a total of (97) possible participants, of which (42) were returned. Overall, the number of questionnaire copies attempted was (296). A total of 203 questionnaires were collected, which met my target sample size of 200, with a response rate of (68 per cent).

6.10 Language and interpretation
The questionnaire was only conducted in English and was not translated into Arabic or other languages of the countries of residence, on the assumption that the prospective participants all spoke English. This is obviously the case with those who have lived in the UK, USA and Canada for a long time. However, some of those living in other countries did not have a good command of the English language, although possibly only a few may not have understood and interpreted the questionnaire accurately. It might also be possible that some participants were not familiar with the narrative and terminology of ‘brain drain, human development, reform and democratisation’. However, in the cases where the questionnaire was conducted face to face, elaboration and explanation of the terms and concepts were offered when the participants expressed confusion and asked for clarification of the meanings of some words or phrases. There were less than ten such cases and in each case explanations and clarifications were given without influencing in any way the participant’s choice of answers.

6.11 Limitations of the questionnaire
In addition to the limitations of language and interpretations discussed above, in the questionnaire I did not ask where the respondents obtained their qualifications. As Libyan universities and other institutions have only started to offer postgraduate research programmes in the last few years, mainly in social studies and the humanities fields, it is
assumed that respondents’ postgraduate degrees were obtained abroad. All pure science and medicine postgraduate training is still only available from foreign institutions, mainly in Europe, Canada and the USA.

6.12 Critique of the questionnaire method

The sample frame was not strictly random as only (296) potential participants were targeted; for a truly random sample, many more, possibly thousands, would have needed to be targeted. Participant bias may have also occurred when selecting the sample. Another critical issue is that as (132) out of total (203) were questionnaires that were carried out face-to-face it is conceivable that participants were influenced by my position and background as a political critic of the Libyan regime. ‘People respond differently depending on how they perceive the person asking the questions’ (Denscombe, 2001: 116).

Some participants may feel and find it more dignified to give political rather than socio-economic reasons for migrating from Libya, or just ‘supply answers which they feel fit in with what the researcher expects from them – fulfilling the perceived expectation from the researcher’ (Denscombe, 2001: 116).

Out of the total number of participants in the questionnaire (11%) were residing in Arab Gulf countries which are outside the OECD group where these three are countries are not considered democratic. This makes it difficult to make a correlation for this sub-group between brain drain and democracy in host country as a ‘PULL’ factor.

The analysis of the questionnaire was carried out manually rather than using a sophisticated IT-based tool such as (SPSS), which would have required extensive training not easily available. Another weakness of the quantitative analysis is the absence of ‘Statistical Significance’ calculation. The findings of the questionnaire are presented below as part of establishing a baseline for further qualitative research.

6.13 Qualitative research

The most common qualitative research tool is the interview which is essentially about ‘collecting more detailed information from a small group of people’ (Denscombe, 2001: 110).
Qualitative research can be a powerful strategy for exploring issues and social phenomena in-depth: a ‘vital part of the reflections undertaken by the qualitative researcher is the attempt to identify patterns and processes, commonalities and differences’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 9)

Interviews allow in-depth exploration of the key issues; they help to ascertain answers to the (why) questions of the rationale and thinking behind the perceptions of the interviewees, which is not easily ascertained from those completing the questionnaire. ‘A major advantage of the interview is its adaptability, a skilful interviewer can follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives and feelings, which the questionnaire can never do (Bell, 1999: 135)

They also supplement the data ascertained from the questionnaire by going much deeper than the quantitative questionnaire allows. Combining the quantitative questionnaire with the qualitative in-depth interviews is a common popular option for contemporary research methodology in social studies. There are, however, pitfalls associated with conducting qualitative research by the interview method; and the researcher needs to adopt a ‘passive and neutral stance’ and also ‘remain neutral and non-committal on the statements made during the interview by the interviewee’ (Denscombe, 2001: 117).

There are criticisms of the interview approach. Firstly, it is criticised for lacking academic rigour or a researcher not following systematic procedures and allowing his/her biases to influence his/her findings and conclusions. Secondly, it is also not “generalisable” if it does not cover a representative “sample”.

The interview method, or any other research method and their conclusions, has to be justified and to demonstrate that it does, not suffer from common serious problems to do with objectivity, bias, reliability and validity.

I will now describe in detail how the interviews for this research were carried out including selection, conduction and analysis. Then I will critically address any weaknesses, including aspects related to objectivity, bias, reliability and validity.

6.14 Interviews

I have conducted a total of eleven qualitative in-depth interviews, six with highly educated first-generation Libyan migrants working in the Diaspora and two with second-generation
Libyan migrants (one was seven years old when his family emigrated, the other was born in the Diaspora). The two second-generation migrants may not necessarily qualify as a brain drain from Libya, however, they would constitute a potential human capital gain for Libya if they decided to return or engage with development in Libya in general. They also belong to a category of Libyan migrant who may not be as attached socially and culturally to Libya as their parents are. This is a sub-question that is worthy of exploration because it may give an insight into the sizable number of second-generation Libyan migrants who could still be of potential benefit.

The three other interviewees were highly educated and skilled Libyans who chose not to emigrate permanently, returning after they had completed their studies and training to live and work in Libya. These helped to explore the rationale for staying in or returning from abroad to live in Libya, and also provided a perspective by which to compare those who did emigrate.

6.15 Selection of interviewees

The selection of interviewees was not totally random and this opens the possibility of ‘bias’ and potential problems with reliability and validity which I will discuss in more detail shortly. The total number of interviews may potentially be not large enough to qualify as a representative sample that will allow me to draw ‘generalisable’ conclusions when analysing the contents.

I wanted to have a sample representing three main categories: first-generation migrants, second-generation migrants (who either left as very young children or were born in the Diaspora but not strictly qualify as brain drain as already explained above) and ‘stayers’ and permanent ‘returnees’. Ideally, I would have liked a greater number of interviewees spread across a greater variety of countries, but geography, the availability of willing candidates and time were all constraints.

One of the (11) interviewees was residing in an Arab Gulf country (UAE) which is not considered a democratic country or part of the OECD block. This does not help with evaluating democracy or democratic values as factors related to brain drain and hence this particular interview is analysed separately for consistency of analysis.
The backgrounds of the interviewees were reasonably varied, with two current and one retired university academic (all with PhDs, who have carried out extensive research and are well-experienced in their field), three medical doctors, one researcher with a PhD in Microbiology, one PhD student, one business manager, one academic director in a university and one law expert with a PhD in law.

One interview took place in Abu Dhabi in the UAE and two interviews took place in Washington DC in the USA; the other eight interviews took place in the UK (the three interviewees who live in Libya were met in the UK while on short visits). The average duration of each interview ranged from 40 minutes to 75 minutes, and the average transcribing took about between three to five hours per interview.

6.16 Conduct of interviews

The interviews served as a qualitative research tool to obtain in-depth primary data that would build on findings from the quantitative primary questionnaire data. Apart from the three interviewees who are resident in Libya, all the interviewees also participated in the questionnaire. The interviews were conducted face to face, recorded and then transcribed (five were recorded using a sound recorder and six were recorded by simultaneous transcription and then reading back their answers to confirm accuracy). Two interviews were conducted in Arabic, transcribed in Arabic and then translated by myself into English. It was very important for me not to ask any leading questions and not to express any view on the answers that the interviewees gave. However, when interviewees asked me to clarify what was meant exactly by a given question, a clarification was given and this helped to ensure that the answers were more directly relevant to the questions. It was very important for me to adopt a ‘passive and neutral stance’ and also ‘remain neutral and non-committal on the statements made during the interview by the interviewee’ (Denscombe, 2001: 117).

All interviews followed a semi-structured format, whereby a list of key questions was asked, but the interviewee was encouraged by prompting and probing to elaborate, where needed. Interviewees were also asked at the end to add any extra points that were relevant and not covered by the set questions. The questions were around the same topics covered in the quantitative questionnaire, which findings were used to contribute to establishing a research
baseline for further in-depth investigation and directly related to the main research questions set out for this thesis.

An insight was also sought into how the interviewees perceived the state of overall human development in Libya, how they might contribute to the country’s development and what conditions or particular environment would encourage them either to return or to interest themselves in and contribute to their country of origin. This area is important in order to gain an insight into potential contribution towards developing a new ‘vision’ for Libya and how Diaspora Libyans may contribute to meeting the challenges for realising such a potential vision.

The area of second-generation Libyan emigrants, who despite not strictly qualifying as brain drain none the less represent a reservoir of Libyan human capital, offers huge potential for further research: the numbers involved are quite large and the level and quality of education and training they received quite high, since these second- and even third-generation migrants enjoyed the standards of education prevalent in countries like the USA, Canada and Europe. There is much anecdotal evidence of second-generation Libyans who were fully educated in the USA, the UK and other countries currently working for top international companies in the fields of IT, banking, law, engineering and business management. Can this human capital ever engage with Libya again? And what are the cultural and sense of identity issues involved?

6.17 Analytical methodology of interviews
After all the interviews were transcribed, they were analysed by looking for common or repeated themes or similar views on a particular point or issue. In addition, differing views and points of view were highlighted. Colour coding was used and specific words and terminologies that were quite common across all interviews were identified. For example, words like ‘safety’, ‘security’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘reform’ were quite prevalent. A detailed analysis of the interviews is covered in next Chapter VII.

6.18 Critique of the qualitative methodology
The qualitative method of in-depth interviews which have been of the semi-structured type in this thesis can be subject to criticism on grounds of possible bias that may creep in, lack of
reliability or validity and also, crucially, difficulty in or impossibility of generalising the findings.

6.19 Bias

Objectivity in conducting a research is about the degree of detachment or involvement of the researcher’s self-identity, values and beliefs. It is more likely that the interviewee will be influenced and led in an interview than in a questionnaire. Sometimes, exactly the same question asked by two people ‘interviewers’ but with different emphasis or even a different tone of voice can invite very different answers and responses (Bell, 1999: 140). This, obviously, may well result in creeping bias. It can very well be the case that the ‘eagerness of the interviewee to please the interviewer, or the tendency of the interviewer to seek out the answers that support his preconceived notions are factors that may contribute to biasing of data obtained from the interview’ (Borg, 1981: 87). As explained already, as ‘interviewer’ I have been careful to remain totally neutral and not attempt to lead the interviewee either explicitly or implicitly to give certain preconceived answers.

6.20 Reliability and Validity

In designing a research, analysing results and assessing the quality of the research, validity and reliability are two key factors that should be of prime concern to the researcher (Patton, 2002).

Reliability is mainly about whether the research tools are neutral in their effect, and would measure the same result when used on other occasions applied to the same object. It is about the question: ‘if someone else did the research would he or she have got the same results and arrived at the same conclusions?’ (Denscombe, 2001: 213).

Validity, on the other hand, ‘is concerned with the integrity of conclusions that are generated from a piece of research” (Bryman, 2009, p.32). Validity refers to whether ‘you are observing, identifying, or measuring what you say you are’ (Mason, 1996, p. 24 cited in Bryman, 2009, p. 376).

One rigorous method of checking the validity of the findings of the research is to have the findings ‘triangulated’ with alternative sources as a way of bolstering confidence in their
validity. Another is to establish how far the findings and conclusions fit with existing knowledge on the area. And how far they translate to other comparable situations, known as ‘external validity’ (Denscombe, 2001: 214).

6.21 Triangulation

Triangulation in academic research is a concept and method adopted from the field of ‘navigation’ and involves locating a true position by referring to two or more other coordinates’ (Denscombe, 2001: 85). When findings have been ‘triangulated’ with alternative sources of data, it bolsters confidence in their validity.

Triangulation is ‘a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p.126). In effect, triangulation is the use of multiple sources of data which enables the researcher to double check on the findings (Denzin, 1970; Bryman, 2009).

The quantitative questionnaire findings were used as a research baseline for further in-depth research using the semi-structured interview method. Documentary materials from international monitoring organisations (covered in detail in chapter II) were also used to complement the findings of semi-structured interviews and to support and establish confidence in the findings of the study. This is the nearest attempt to a process of triangulation, while bearing in mind as well that the reliability and validity of some of the documentary data may also be questioned.

6.22 Data Deficiency

As already eluded to in chapter II, there are challenging practical and methodological problems to do with the availability and reliability of data on Libya. According to Vandewalle (1998), available primary source materials in Libya are far from ideal, as they tend to reflect officially approved and selected data. Another point is that many of the standard data criteria may have little interpretive value. According to World Bank (1981), Libya’s officially published reports must be approached with caution. The political, economic
and bureaucratic chaos means that the Libyan government has made documentation very
difficult for academic observers and international institutions (Vandewalle, 1998: xv).

It is certainly the case that the Libyan government, in the absence of independent sources of
data and evaluations from within Libya, has politicised and exaggerated and even
manufactured data on its development policy achievements purely for propaganda purposes.

6.23 Difficulties faced in the study

One of the main difficulties related to data and methodological analysis is the unreliability of
data evaluating economic and overall human development originating from official Libya
government sources. Such official Libyan data as do exist have been criticised by many,
including the World Bank and well-known and respected international specialist researchers
on Libya, such as Kirk Vandewalle and others.

Another difficulty is personal. I was not in a position to visit Libya to carry out field studies
as I was not holding or able to obtain a valid Libyan passport and the Libyan authorities have
a firm policy of refusing visas to Libyans who carry a passport of another country. However,
as the study is concerned mainly with the Libyan brain drain and the research population is
by definition based outside Libya, the need to travel to Libya was not essential and did not
have a detrimental effect on my ability to gather the necessary information and data to
complete the research.

A yet further challenge was the geographical spread of the population and sample frame,
being mainly those Libyans who are highly qualified and skilled in their relevant fields. The
geographical spread is literally global, extending from the USA and Canada to most of
Europe, the Gulf region of the Middle East and as far as New Zealand.

6.24 Opportunities

No major research project can be perfect and fulfil all the steps and design set out at the start.
There were opportunities in this research project that, due to difficulties and various
constraints, were not fully realised. For example, the sampling for the quantitative
questionnaire could have been wider and more random to give better representation. The
analysis of the questionnaire could have been more extensive, with many possible
correlations established if the (SPSS) Statistical Package for Social Sciences software programme had been applied for analysis.

The sample size for the qualitative in-depth interview could have been larger to give a wider representation of the stock of highly educated Libyan migrants in the Diaspora and concentrated mainly on residents in OECD countries. The interview questions could have been trialled on a small sample to evaluate their relevance to topics researched and refined accordingly. Other qualitative research tools, such as ‘focus group Discussion’, could have been adopted and observed to give a different angle to the empirical research and to see if similar outcomes would have been achieved which in turn would have strengthened the findings and provided a form of research ‘triangulation’.

6.25 Documentary Survey data
In addition to academic books, journals and articles, the documentary survey largely concentrated on publications and reports giving comparative data for individual countries, published by reputable and credible international organisations which monitor all aspects of human development internationally. The sources and authors of these reports and publications ranged from the World Bank and UNDP to the IMF, Freedom House, Transparency International, Economics Intelligent Unit, World Economic Forum, WHO, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, in addition to others.

The data relating to Libya, and in some cases to the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), were, for the purposes of comparison, consulted widely to ascertain an independent evaluation and overall picture of the progress of various aspects of development in Libya in the last three decades. This documentary data is covered in Chapter II, ‘State of human development in Libya’. It is important to note, however, that methodological weaknesses and inconsistencies in these reports are examined, challenged and criticised 17.

6.26 Ethical issues
It was very important to assure and make it clear to those people approached whether to take part in the questionnaire or to be interviewed, that this was solely for the purpose of academic

17 This is applied in some detail later on especially to the Human Development Index (HDI) values and ranking as a measure of human development levels, not just for Libya but also other Arab countries with similar socio-economic backgrounds.
research for a PhD research programme. While carrying out the empirical research for this thesis, the University of Westminster code of practice for research has been adhered to throughout.

All interviewees were informed at the start of the interview that anonymity was guaranteed and that their names would only be quoted following formal consent from them. Five of the eleven interviewees have expressed the wish to remain anonymous and only be referred to by some arbitrary initials, whereas six gave their consent in writing to be openly quoted. All the data obtained from the empirical research was original data ascertained for the first time for the purpose of this research project, and I was careful not to express my own political or other views that could have had any influence on the participants, in both questionnaire and interview, prior to or while providing their answers.

6.27 Establishing a research baseline

Why use a baseline?

Establishing a baseline in research is important as a first step to establish a frame of reference (Weathington, 2010: p480). The baseline provides a framework against which key issues can be synthesised for further empirical investigation using the qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews explained already in the methodology.

There are three main sources that contribute to establishing the baseline namely;

1- OECD data on brain drain.
2- Literature review on the three themes of this thesis (brain drain, democracy and human development)
3- Findings from the preliminary quantitative questionnaire I carried out as part of this research.

Total of (23) key points drawn from the three sources above and proposed to make the baseline frame and can also make the analytical framework are now highlighted:

From OECD Data

- WE are informed by OECD (2005) database: the total number of expatriates in the OECD and the proportion of them who are highly skilled, classified by country of birth, are given in a comparison made between five North African countries – Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. For Libya, the total number quoted is (27,481), of which 43.4 per cent or (11,927) are highly skilled in 2005. It is important to note, however, that countries like Italy, Greece and Turkey do not provide data for the OECD database; therefore, these figures have to be scrutinised and, where possible, supported by other sources and methods of quantifying the extent of the brain drain. (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005 & 2006).

Another study paper covering immigration from Arab countries to OECD countries is by Dumont (2006), entitled ‘Immigrants from Arab World to the OECD: From the past to the future’. Dumont’s study paper offers data on the specific type of migrants relevant to this research, the highly skilled. It suggests that the total for Libyan highly skilled migrants residing in OECD countries based on census data in the year 2000 is (15,547), which is slightly higher than the figure of (11,927) quoted above by Baldwin-Edwards (2006).

From Literature review

From the first literature review chapter on brain drain we can synthesise the following key points to contribute to a research baseline framework:

- Extent of brain drain in the Arab world is 4 times greater than China and 5 times greater than India on per capita basis.
- Spending on R&D in terms of GERD as a percentage of GDP is lowest in the Arab world (0.2%) compared to (1.2%) in China and (4.9%) in Israel.
- Many professionals in the Arab world find the severe infrastructural limits and weaknesses in their countries a major barrier that makes it ‘impossible to contribute to their fields of expertise at the desired level of technical sophistication’ (Bach, 2003: 237). So they end up migrating, attracted by the advanced infrastructure of developed countries that allows them to fulfill their potential.
- Brain drain is likely to increase rather than slow down; this is due to many factors, such as paradigm shifts in human behaviour and thinking, transnational mobility and faster and more convenient modes of transport. The decreasing costs of travel and advances in ICT (Information and Communication Technology) are also lowering
cognitive and informational barriers and helping to increase the circulation of people across borders (Kapur, 2001: 266).

- There is a paradigm shift from brain drain to brain circulation where brain drain should be seen as ‘an ongoing and global phenomenon that is neither permanent nor irreversible’. (Cao, 1996) Brain circulation can play an important role in the success of a country’s transitional process of economic development and democratic consolidation by utilising ‘the reservoir of knowledge and skills located in those expatriate nationals’, if the political will exist (Horvat, 2004: 91).

- Examples of countries successful in reversing brain drain (Taiwan, South Korea and China) suggest that economic factors rather than democratic values may be dominant. What are the overriding factors in encouraging a successful reversal of brain drain?

- ‘Diaspora Networks’ as a strategy can contribute to brain circulation.

- Globalisation not only has an economic and social dimension, but a political dimension as well where political globalisation can be seen as the increasing role and influence of international organisations and systems against the greatly diminishing power of nation-states within defined borders. Can Diaspora migrants influence political dynamics in their home country through transnational organisations and groups?

- Democracy as a form of government is significant for human development because it has three key values. According to Sen, these are:
  1. Its intrinsic importance ‘political freedom is part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings’ (Sen, 1999: 10);
  2. its instrumental contributions, which means that democracy leads to good consequences where civil and political rights lead to economic and social and cultural rights; and
  3. its constructive role in the construction of collective values and norms around which a society is arranged, such values including tolerance, social equity and giving priority to those in need (Sen, 1999).

- Possible causes of outward migration of highly skilled human capital ‘include the violations of human rights or academic freedoms’ (Horvat, 2004: 77). Bad
governance also plays an important role in pushing highly skilled people to migrate as ‘they find the human rights/governance situation in their home country unacceptable’ (Olesen, 2002: 137).

- Reversal of brain drain would only succeed if source countries endeavour to have ‘a well-developed scientific infrastructure, higher investments in the science sector, and the stability of a consolidated democratic government that assures human rights and academic freedoms’ (Horvat, 2004: 83).

- ‘There is a widely shared agreement that transition to democracy is an elite-driven process’ (Horvat, 2004: 90) and that reliable democracies are not made by the masses but crafted by the elites (Bozoki, 2002: 1). Diaspora migrants who are ‘experts’ in their fields can be seen as part of the ‘elite’ but can they contribute to democratisation in their home country? And how?

- The human development paradigm was articulated in terms of a two-sided equation: the acquisition of human capabilities balanced by the opportunities to use those capabilities (UNDP, 1990).

- Human development does not end in socio-economic factors measured by the HDI, Additional choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed human rights (UNDP, HDR, 1990: 10).

- The Capabilities Approach (CA) evaluates policies in terms of people’s capability (freedom) to be healthy and well-nourished, also evaluates policies in terms of people having access to high-quality education, to political participation, freedom of thought and expression – basically all dimensions of life, be it material or intellectual, economic, political, social or cultural.

- Martha Nussbaum has proposed a list of ten universal human capabilities that, in her view, are vital to avoid the issues of omission and power and ‘should be the basis of constitutional guarantees’ (HDCA, 2009).
The concepts of human development, human capital development and capacity building are closely intertwined and interlinked. Capacity building is about developing abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve goals and objectives on three key dimensions; individual, organisational and societal. Human capital is the acquired education, knowledge, skills, expertise, health and values that cannot be separated from the individuals who acquire them.

From Questionnaire (sample of 203)

(Full graphical representation and analysis of questionnaire is enclosed in Appendix A)

- The great majority of the participants in the questionnaire sample were men (89%) and the great majority were under the age of fifty-four (82%). Education wise (64%) had postgraduate qualifications, including 33% with a PhD and 31% with a Master’s Degree; a further 34% were university graduates. The great majority was first-generation migrants (92%) and the remainder second generation which may not strictly qualify as a brain drain.

- On the question of whether, according to their perception and view, there had been a brain drain from Libya in the last three decades, (50%) believed the phenomenon had been huge, with another (45%) believing it had been fairly large. On their perception of the effect of the brain drain on the state of overall development in Libya, (49%) believed there was a very large negative effect and (43%) believed there was a fairly large negative effect.

- When asked why they had emigrated from Libya, about a third (32%) cited education as the main reason and nearly a quarter (23%) lack of safety as the main reason. Another combined third (32%) gave lack of security and a culture of oppression in Libya as the reason. This indicates that reasons to do with fears about safety and personal security (human security) may be factors involved and only contribute to an analytical framework to explore further whether ‘repression’ or ‘lack of democracy’ or ‘socio-economic’ that are genuine PUSH factors of the brain drain from Libya.
When asked, crucial to possible strategies of reversing the brain drain, what would persuade them to return to Libya, the largest group (38%) cited steps towards the significant reform of political and civil society institutions and respect for rule of law. About a third (34%) cited a complete change of Libya to democracy and about (15%) an open political environment as reasons enough for them to return. Only (2.5%) cited improvement in socio-economic conditions as the main motive to return, which seems to make the economic factor a low priority in the case of the Libyan brain drain.

6.28 What will the interviews explore?
The qualitative in-depth interview will attempt to explore in more detail and elaboration some of the key findings from the quantitative questionnaire highlighted above, as well as other key points identified in the research baseline as set out. In particular, the interviews will explore the underline reasons for the brain drain in Libya and the most likely conditions or strategies that will reduce brain drain and encourage a return option for those who have migrated and constituted a loss in human capital for Libya.

The detailed analysis of the interviews is offered in the next chapter, taking into considerations the limitations and methodological weaknesses already explained in this chapter.
Here, also, is a reminder of the key research questions set out in this thesis:

6.29 **Key Research questions**
1- At what level, if any, was brain drain happening in Libya?
2- Who qualifies as part of the brain drain?
3- How is human development set back by brain drain in Libya?
4- Can skilled foreign workers offset the impact of Libyan brain drain?
5- Is it democracy or democratic values and liberty or development that drives brain drain and its reduction or reversal more?
6- Which strategies are best for tackling brain drain ‘return’ option or ‘Diaspora’ option?
7- What role can experts have in the process of democratisation?
8- How can Diaspora Libyans make a positive contribution towards articulating a new vision for Libya and realising its development objectives and aspirations?
Chapter VII

Analysis

7.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the analysis of the main empirical research based on in-depth interviews with a total of (11) highly educated and skilled Libyans. Six of these are first-generation emigrants, two are second-generation, and three non-migrants who opted to return permanently to Libya once they had completed their postgraduate education and training abroad.

7.2 Analysis of interviews
As explained already in the Introduction, I conducted a total of eleven qualitative in-depth interviews, three with highly educated and skilled Libyans who chose to return to live and work in Libya permanently once they had completed their studies and training abroad. The other eight interviews were with Libyans living in the Diaspora, six with highly educated first-generation emigrants, and two with second-generation emigrants (one was seven years old when his family emigrated; the other was born in the Diaspora). The three interviews with non-migrants helped to explore the rationale for staying in or returning to Libya and give a comparative perspective with those who did emigrate. Those interviewees who requested anonymity are referred to by arbitrary initials; the others gave their formal consent to be quoted by their real names.

Only one of the eight interviewees Diaspora Libyans was not living in an OECD country. He lived in the Arab Gulf state of UAE and his interview will be analysed separately for consistency when relating the analysis to data in the baseline on skilled migration levels ascertained from OECD sources. Also, interviewees living in OECD countries are essentially living in a political environment characterised as ‘democratic’. The same cannot be said about the Arab Gulf states where some Diaspora Libyans are residing.

7.3 Advantages of qualitative analysis
There are two clear strengths to qualitative analysis that make it valuable in empirical research. One is that the descriptions and any associated theories are normally ‘grounded in reality’, in other words ‘the data and the analysis have their roots in the conditions of social existence. There is little scope for armchair theorising or ideas plucked out of the air’
(Denscombe, 2001: 220). The other advantage of qualitative analysis is the richness and detail it offers. The in-depth investigation of a focused area even with small-scale research tends to generate ‘thick descriptions’ and ‘scores well in terms of the way it deals with complex social situations’ (Denscombe, 2001: 220).

7.4 A caution on qualitative analysis
There is a general acceptance among advocates and practitioners of qualitative research that the researcher is inevitably going to be an integral part of the process of analysis. Although the researcher should be entirely neutral and passive when conducting the research, when it comes to analysis and interpretation ‘the researcher’s identity, values and beliefs cannot be entirely eliminated’ (Denscombe, 2001: 208).

The analysis will review and evaluate, as critically as possible, the interviewees views, thinking and perceptions on specific topics and themes related directly to the key research questions and analytical frame set out in the research baseline.

7.5 Political environment in Libya 1970s
Two of the interviewees recall in some detail what was going on in Libya in the middle to late 1970s.

Dr Bashir Shetewi was the first Libyan to obtain a PhD in pharmacy, from Bath University in 1975. He then went straight back to Libya to set up the School of Pharmacy at Tripoli University, becoming Dean of Faculty. Dr. Shetewi recalls how politically and ideologically charged the environment of Tripoli University became after 1975:

About a year later in 1976, I noticed that some students from the revolutionary committees started to run the show and not the professors or academics. When politics entered the university, academia went out through the window.

He then recalls a specific incident while he was running the School of Pharmacy:

Once, in 1977, I had a telephone call from the office of the prime minister at that time, 'Jalloud', giving me the names of two students in my School of Pharmacy who I should pass and allow to go to the second year, although they never attended a single lecture, but
just because they were revolutionary. I refused this and said to them on the phone that these students could kill people when they start working as pharmacists one day.

Dr Shetewi describes more examples of what was clearly a purge on university students who dared to be vocal and criticise the regime of Colonel Gadhafi. He states that:

Things got very bad very quickly at Tripoli University after 1976, and I saw with my own eyes three students hanged there, at which moment I realised that Libya was becoming a fascist state like those we read about in other parts of the world.

Dr Shetewi’s most intriguing encounter, and the one that convinced him that he had to leave Libya, happened in 1979. He recalls receiving a well-known visitor at the School of Pharmacy, who asked him a strange question!

The straw that broke the camel’s back for me was when Gaddafi came to visit us at the School of Pharmacy. As the Dean, I sat opposite him at the table...he was looking at the ceiling and not at me and asked me ‘do you teach the Green Book to students here?’ I said to him that we usually send the students to another place, the Faculty of Education for that... He said to me ‘no, no, I want you to teach the Green Book here in the Faculty of Pharmacy or I will put a match to it!’ Immediately after that encounter, I realised that I had to leave Libya.

Dr Shetewi left Libya with the intention of emigrating to the UK, which he did, and on arrival immediately joining the pharmaceutical company ‘Boots’. He has served the National Health Service in the UK ever since. He goes on to describe the situation in Libya at the time of his departure:

I left Libya in June 1979, but while I was there running the School of Pharmacy for four years (1975 – 1979), I was active on many academic committees and at academic conferences. However, the University was not simply an academic institution anymore, but rather a boiling pot with a lot of revolutionary fever, people could not talk freely, they were whispering. People were being expelled, both students and teaching staff, just because they did not publicly show support for the revolutionary regime of Gadhafi. There was an atmosphere of fear and oppression and no freedom of expression at all. Censorship was everywhere; for example, foreign magazines would have pages torn out of them, and I used to joke with the person selling them that I should pay less than the
asking price for it. Someone was controlling what you could read and not read and what you could say and not say.

Dr Shetewi paints a vivid picture of an atmosphere of fear, oppression, curtailing of basic rights and an imposition of a top-down cult and vision for Libya articulated by Gadhafi. This is consistent with the detailed review of politics in Libya offered in chapter I. However, one cannot eliminate a degree of subjectivity in the interviewee’s reflections influenced by his own political beliefs and views, and influenced possibly by his knowledge of my own beliefs and views as the researcher. The interviewee while clearly describing a poor level of quality of education did not balance that with the rapid improvement quantitatively when during the 1970s access to education in Libya at all levels became much wider and available.

7.6 Has there been a brain drain from Libya and at what level?

Dr Faraj Najem (who obtained a PhD in social sciences from the University of Westminster and currently works as the Academic Director of a London college offering postgraduate business and management studies) believes that:

There has been huge brain drain, especially of those who were sponsored by the government to study in countries in the West and overtly decided not to go back to Libya but to settle in those countries. These people are the brightest, the cream of those graduates attracted by western institutions by offers of the jobs and incentives that Libya denied them.

Dr Bashir Shetewi describes what he believes has been the trend in Libya in the last three decades with regard to highly educated and skilled Libyans:

In a country like Libya in 1975, I was the first Libyan with a PhD in pharmacy, so highly qualified Libyans at that time were like gold dust! Today in 2007, I know of many doctors, pharmacists, dentists, scientists, academics, engineers and others who have left Libya. Many people said enough is enough and when your dignity and freedom is taken away then you have to go somewhere else where you can have those things, and can compete and achieve whatever you want. But at the same time, I feel so sad and sorry
that I could not have contributed a lot more to my country. I am aware that there are about 2000 Libyan doctors working abroad in the UK, the USA, Canada and other parts of the world. We have so many highly educated people contributing to other economies. If I had had dignity and freedom for me and my family, I would not have left!

Both interviewees (Dr Shetewi and Dr Najem) seem to acknowledge that there has been a phenomenon of brain drain in Libya and that it took place mainly at graduate level, either by graduates seeking to complete their postgraduate studies or by seeking better job opportunities and rewards abroad, mainly in OECD countries. Dr Najem suggests that Libyans migrating or deciding not to return were motivated by ‘offers of jobs and incentives that Libya denied them’ whereas Dr Shetwi implies that the removal of ‘dignity and freedom’ was a motive for leaving Libya. This seems to suggest that both socio-economic (development) and political factors are involved in the dynamics of causes of brain drain in Libya.

7.7 A perspective from within Libya on the brain drain

One interviewee who has returned to Libya after completing her PhD and who has been working as an academic and researcher in the University of Garyounis (formerly the University of Benghazi) is Dr Amal Obeidi.

On the specific issue and extent of brain drain in Libya, Dr Obeidi says:

Yes, we can say that there has been a clear brain drain trend in Libya, especially in the last three decades, although migration generally is not new – Libyan society knew waves of forced migration to neighbouring countries during the era of Italian occupation due to policies of oppression and forced expulsion. But the brain drain, in my opinion, has started to appear as a trend since the 1980s. And despite the policies of receiving countries to limit all types of immigration, this has not stemmed the emigration of Libyans generally and of brain drain in particular. Despite officials not being attentive to this phenomenon officially in Libya, it is on a noticeable increase especially amongst young university graduates and postgraduate students looking for opportunities to study and work abroad. This segment of between 25- to 35-year-olds is always looking for the opportunity to migrate from Libya by any means, and their desired destination is mostly European countries, Canada and the Arab Gulf states.
Another interviewee who returned to Libya (Dr M.E.) is a medical doctor who graduated from a medical school in the UK and trained as a surgeon. Dr M.E. gives another perspective from within Libya on whether there has been a Libyan brain drain and at what level:

During the two decades [the eighties and nineties], many postgraduate students reading engineering, medicine or science, etc, in the West, usually on government grants did not return home. The reasons were many, primarily lack of facilities and ancillary staff at home, also violation of seniority and being liable to suspicion and possible persecution at the hands of younger staff or even some of their students who were members of revolutionary committees cum informers. This last phenomenon inculcated lack of confidence and fears in the intelligentsias in general, causing much inertia and indifference.

Both the above interviewees, who reside in Libya and elected not to remain in the Diaspora, seem to agree that the brain drain was taking place at the graduate and postgraduate level, among those who sought to migrate and among those who once completed their study decided not to return home. However, the two interviewees seem to give different explanations for the causes or motives behind the brain drain. For example, while Dr Obeidi relates the brain drain to socio-economic factors which she explains in terms of ‘looking for opportunities to study and work abroad’, Dr M.E. gives reasons of ‘lack of facilities’, in other words ‘infrastructure’, as well as ‘lack of confidence and fears in the intelligentsias in general’, which can be related to political factors such as a culture of ‘repression’.

7.8 More on the reasons for the perceived brain drain

When asked why they thought there has been a brain drain in Libya, some interviewees expressed their own specific reasons, as well as general ones.

Dr Adel Mekraz left Libya in 1979 to study in the UK. In 1986, he moved to the United States where he completed his education, obtaining a PhD in marketing, a different field from the one in which he obtained his degree in the UK. On why he decided not to return to Libya, Dr Mekraz says:

I left Libya in July 1979 with the purpose of studying electrical/electronic engineering in the UK, and then go back to Libya to work for Sea Transportation. While studying in the UK, I became politically active against the dictatorship regime of Muammar Gadhafi,
and in 1984, it became apparent to me from communication with my family that my safety and life would be at risk if I returned home. The situation in Libya remains unstable and volatile enough for me to decide not to take any chances with the government of Mr. Gadhafi.

Dr Faraj Najem believes there are a variety of reasons behind the apparent brain drain, including the economic factor lack of freedom, safety and law and order:

One of the main reasons for the brain drain is economic, meaning experts are not paid enough, nor are they appreciated and valued like they are in the West where they’ve settled. Another reason is the poor infrastructure the whole of Libya is suffering from. Other key factors are the lack of the safety that facilitates freedom, both personal and collective, and the absence of law and order and the lack of equal opportunities when tribalism, regionalism and political allegiance take a priority.

While Dr Mekraz cites clearly political reasons for him not returning to Libya, this could be motivated by his own choice of becoming an active political opponent of the Gadhafi regime once he was residing abroad. It does not mean that his reason for leaving Libya was political. On the contrary, he was a sample of thousands who were on government scholarships to study abroad but never returned. The phenomenon of Libyans who left Libya purely to further their education and then became politically active and could not return for fear of persecution is quite prevalent, and the example of Dr Mekraz can be ‘generalisable’ in my view.

The causes which Dr Najem highlights are a mix of lack of infrastructure, lack of good pay and rewards and lack of freedom, safety and law and order. The last of these can be characterised as lack of some ‘democratic values’ and not necessarily absence of democracy. We can already see a repeated theme here, attributing causes of brain drain to socio-economic ‘development’ factors and political in terms of curtailed ‘liberty’ and some democratic values, but not the absence of democracy in Libya.

Dr Amal Obeidi with her perspective from within Libya also cites multiple reasons for Libya’s brain drain, which she believes are mainly economic, social and political:
We can state some reasons for migration from Libya as follows: Economic reasons: due to endemic unemployment amongst most qualified graduates where official statistics point to an unemployment level of between 20% to 30% amongst the workforce in recent years. We can also include the low salaries as stipulated by Law 15 for 1980 and the restricted role of the private sector in Libya, which limits its ability to employ large numbers of graduates and job seekers.

Additionally, Dr Obeidi elaborates on specific social reasons relating especially to young Libyan women and also to political and ideological factors:

Social reasons: where many families have migrated to join their members who migrated earlier and to look for better opportunities for study and work. Some Libyan women migrated to marry Libyan men already settled abroad. Also, political reasons, generally as a result of lack of freedom, either freedom of expression or press freedom, or as a result of lack of democracy and the increased violations of human rights. Some of these violations, either through imprisonment or torture, which many have been subjected to, were amongst the most important reasons for migration. Also, the political and ideological changes that took place since the middle of 1970s and their consequences in terms of policies and programmes that caused the migration of people with financial capital and business owners in the private sector who were the target of these political and ideological policies and programmes.

The perspective from within Libya given by Dr Obeidi seems to supplement and support the views given by the Diaspora interviewees attributing the driving forces behind brain drain to a mix of the socio-economic and the political. The convergence of the similar results by both interviewees from Diaspora and from within Libya can be seen as a simple ‘triangulation’ confirming and giving strength to the findings.

7.9 On the specific Libyan medical doctors brain drain
As Libyan medical doctors constitute the largest single professional group that has emigrated and settled to practise medicine in the Diaspora, three out of the eleven detailed interviews were with medical doctors. Two of these, one an emigrant, the other a non-emigrant, asked to remain anonymous.
Dr H.B. is working in the UK as a consultant in a highly specialised field, which cannot be mentioned for fear of breaching the anonymity he requested. On the specific point of the extent of Libyan doctor’s brain drain, Dr H.B. seems to confirm a new trend, or a second migration, that of Libyan doctors who have been living and working in Western countries now moving to Arab Gulf countries, but not back to Libya. He says:

The problem with the Libyan brain drain, including medical doctors, is, in my opinion, getting worse as it seems that on a yearly basis a good number of newly qualified doctors leave the country. Since a lot of Gulf States are also welcoming Libyan doctors, I have noticed that some of them are moving from the West to the Gulf States (people who have difficulty settling in Western countries usually elect to settle in the Gulf States rather than Libya). I also know some Libyan doctors who have actually moved back from the West to Libya, just to move again after a year or two to one of the Gulf States or return to the West. Also, the majority of doctors who leave Libya tend to be the top performing students during their undergraduate course. Therefore the country is deprived of its best talent.

Dr H.B. highlights two trends; the first is that the most talented of Libyan doctors are continuing to leave Libya, and the second is that there is a form of ‘secondary’ migration of Libyan medical doctors relocating from western countries (OECD) to Arab Gulf states. This challenges directly the theory that migrating human capital is attracted by settling in ‘democratic’ countries in contrast to the lack of democracy in the home country.

It is conceivable, however, that the attraction of relocating to Arab Gulf countries is mainly financial, as salaries awarded are even higher than in OECD countries; ‘cultural’ factors to do with an intrinsic desire raise and educate children in an Arab/Islamic environment may also play their part.

It could also conceivably be the case that those who relocated to the Gulf region have opted to trade living in a totally free democratic country where they can freely engage and express themselves politically for living in a safe, secure environment with excellent infrastructure and facilities. It is also important to remember that Libyan Diaspora in the Arab Gulf region are not deprived of publicly criticizing and debating the political situation in Libya as long as they do not involve themselves in any way in the political dynamics of the host country.
Another interviewee, Dr Nagi Barakat, graduated from medical school in Benghazi in 1984 and left Libya in 1985. After few years in Switzerland, he came to the UK in 1989 and has been here ever since. He is currently working as a consultant paediatric neurologist at Hillingdon hospital in west London and also runs clinics at Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children in central London. Dr Barakat was also one of the main founders of the Libyan Doctors Society (LDS) in 2002 with the specific aim of connecting Libyan doctors in the Diaspora to each other and also facilitating their contact with fellow doctors inside Libya.

On the extent of the brain drain of Libyan doctors, Dr Barakat offers a quantitative evaluation and says:

I believe there are about 1500 Libyan doctors practising outside Libya and, of them, about 650 are in the UK, about 400 are in the Arab Gulf States, about 200 are in Canada, about 35 are in USA and about another 200 in various European countries, such as Ireland, Sweden, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. There are also a few Libyan doctors in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Hong Kong. There are also currently about 800 young Libyan doctors undertaking training outside Libya, mainly in the UK and USA, being sponsored by the Libyan government. And if things remain as they are in Libya, then most of these training doctors will probably not return and will add to the brain drain of Libyan doctors.

Dr Barakat highlights three key points: firstly, that brain drain is taking place at the graduate level; secondly, many of those who leave Libya to pursue their postgraduate studies or training are sponsored by the Libyan government; and thirdly, that many may not return once completing their studies/training unless there is a marked change in Libya generally. But what change? We deduce that it is not just political change that is necessary but movement also in the fields of education, training, R&D, job rewards and general socio-economic conditions.

7.10 Potential contribution to development in Libya

When asked how they would envisage playing a role or making a contribution to overall development in Libya, Dr Shetwi says:
I feel very passionate about training and teaching especially in the healthcare sector. If I am in the UK doing a job where I am training people in the NHS healthcare sector, then imagine what my expertise would do to Libya. This expertise I have would help overall healthcare in Libya and the development of the country, and it is breaking my heart that I am not doing that and I probably never will!

Dr Faraj Najem, the educationalist based in the UK, also believes that he can contribute positively in the area of education, training and knowledge transfer:

I could take the expertise that I have accumulated over the last twenty years and invest in Libya. For example, I can help run an education campus in Libya whereby western education techniques and training can be put on the doorsteps of average Libyans without costing the Libyan treasury as much as it does to send students abroad and losing the brightest of them, as we have witnessed. This will contribute to reducing the brain drain and transferring knowledge and technology.

Dr Adel Mekraz, the academic teaching business studies at an American university, expressed similar readiness to help with teaching and training new generations of Libyans, but also highlighted other areas where he would like to contribute:

I would like the opportunity to go back and teach in a Libyan university and help in preparing the youth who hold the key to the future of Libya. Enlighten them, inspire them, help them to dream, and show them ways in which they can pursue their dreams. I also see myself becoming active in the political process towards the promotion of democracy, human rights, the building of institutions in the country, and a vibrant civil society.

It is interesting that the three interviewees have expressed a common willingness and passion to re-engage with the home country and contribute in the fields of education and training. Education and training are directly linked to ‘capacity building’ on both ‘individual’ and ‘institutional’ level. It can be deduced that the fact so much Libyan talent is currently applying its skills outside Libya must have left a shortage and impacted detrimentally on capacity-building and development in Libya.
Dr Mekraz has also expressed a desire to contribute to the promotion ‘of democracy, human rights, the building of institutions in the country, and a vibrant civil society’. Diaspora Libyans can conceivably make a positive contribution towards developing a strategic ‘vision’ for Libya and help meet some of the challenges linked to realising such a vision, including ‘institution building’ and developing a ‘vibrant civil society’.

7.11 What can make them return to Libya? ‘Return option’

It is important to note that out of the eight interviewees who are residing in the Diaspora, four do visit Libya occasionally or have visited Libya in the last three years. Yet when it comes to a permanent return, a common theme of what needs to happen before they make that step develops. This revolves around reform, freedom, safety and rule of law.

Dr Faraj Najem states:

I will only return permanently if there is better infrastructure, personal safety and freedom, access to equal opportunities with a political reform that generates and leads to democratisation and a real sense of participation. Also when there is prevalence for rule of law for all and respect for human rights.

Dr Adel Mekraz says:

I will return if there is stability and the return of rule of law, and if the conditions in the country look promising with the potential to become a multi-party democracy.

Dr Shetewi states:

Here in the UK, I feel that I am free, I can speak, I can criticise and this to me is priceless, it is very very important.

Dr Barakat, one of the main founders of the Libyan Doctors Society (LDS) in the Diaspora, believes that Libyan doctors abroad need good incentives to return permanently:

Incentives for the doctors to return should include trying to match what they receive in the Diaspora in terms of salaries and other important things like quality of education for
their children. Also equally, if not more, important is overall safety and rule of law in Libya and freedom of expression and transparency, especially as these migrating doctors have been accustomed to this in countries where they reside like Europe, the USA and Canada.

Dr H.B. who is also working in the UK, is pessimistic about the chances of Libyan doctors returning as long as the healthcare system is still in as poor a state as it is now:

I personally cannot see a large number of Libyan doctors returning to the country. As I mentioned, from my personal experience, some of the Libyan doctors actually return only to leave after a year or two. The people, who settle in a good career outside the country, either in the Western countries of the Gulf States, will find it very difficult to cope with the poor healthcare system in the country.

One interviewee Dr A.T. who obtained a PhD in microbiology from the USA and worked for a short time as a researcher, before setting up his own business in ‘Biotechnology’. Driven by mainly social and cultural considerations, Dr A.T. has recently returned permanently to Libya:

I also had high expectations that I could either use my knowledge and expertise in microbiology to teach in a Libyan University or I could set up my own business in Libya in the same biotechnology field I was working in America. My expectations were raised because Libya came out of the international embargo in 1999 and there was much talk of openings for the private sector and reform of the country.

It is interesting that when asked about the ‘return option’, the likelihood of them returning permanently to Libya, a clear theme reoccurs, which seems to require, as a condition for return, a change in the political environment in Libya, specifically a change that instills values of ‘freedom, safety, rule of law and respect for human rights’. These are related to ‘liberty’ more than to ‘democracy’, although they do constitute democratic values that are a key manifestation of an established democracy.

The sub-group of medical doctors, on the other hand, seems to, according to the two interviewees; specify changes to do with the ‘Healthcare sector’ in Libya, demanding major reforms and improvements in both infrastructure and human resource strategies.
The emphasis that the ‘return option’ for Diaspora Libyans is conditional on Libya undertaking major political reform and instilling of democratic values is a strong one that can be ‘generalisable’ with a degree of confidence. This can point to two possible dual-track policy options: one is for Libya to seriously embark on genuine political reform and change; the second is to adopt strategies of ‘brain circulation’ and the ‘Diaspora option’ as useful strategies for Libya to tap into and engage with its human capital wealth in the Diaspora without the need or expectation for this human capital to return permanently to Libya.

Unfortunately, Libyan ‘Diaspora networks’ are very few and weak. The only obvious example of a Diaspora network is the LDS set up by some 150 Libyan medical doctors abroad. Many more in many different fields and disciplines should be encouraged to start.

**7.12 A second-generation perspective**

The second generation of Libyan emigrants are the ‘unknown quantity’ when it comes to researching the Libyan brain drain. Second generation, and even third generation in some cases, are those who were either small child when their parents left Libya or were born in the Diaspora. Second-generation migrants are NOT strictly characterised as direct brain drain from Libya. However, they can be seen as indirect or secondary migrants who constitute a potentially high human capital and offer potential benefit to Libya.

They warrant dedicated research into their perspectives and their attitude *viz a viz* the home country of their parents. They have benefited from an education system and living conditions in the Diaspora very different from those experienced by their parents. Second-generation migrants are much more integrated in the societies they were raised in, and have assimilated aspects of a Diaspora culture. Many second-generation migrants feel that countries like the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany and others are their real homes, being the countries they grew up in and have come to know well. Also, based on the expectation that the average Libyan family will have at least four children, the number of second-generation migrants is likely to be in the tens of thousands. This is a huge human capital potential to tap into if there is the will and the strategies to do so.

However, the beliefs and attitudes of the second generations, related to identity and allegiance, are not necessarily the same as those of their parents. Second-generation migrants
may feel much more settled in the Diaspora, they may feel much less attached to Libya, a country only known through the nostalgic stories of their parents. And while the quality of educational attainment and the skill levels of second-generation migrants is very high as a result of being raised in highly developed countries, the likelihood of their taking their knowledge and skills to Libya is probably fairly low. Second-generation migrants could face a multiple of obstacles if they were to return to their parents’ country of origin; obstacles and difficulties which could include language, culture, technology, lifestyle and denial of some political rights because they are dual nationals.

In order to discover something of the mind-set of second-generation migrants, two of the interviews were with people from this group. Mohamed Ermes was only eight when he arrived in the UK, as he explains:

I was eight years old when I arrived in the UK with my parents in 1981. There were also two brothers and two sisters with me. Two more brothers were born in the UK in the few years after we arrived. All seven children of us have been educated and have graduated from universities here in the UK. Myself, I studied project management in construction at UCL, London.

And on his current profession and work experience he states:

I am currently running my own business. My other brothers studied engineering and business studies. My two sisters studied geography and economics. All my brothers and sisters are in jobs, either working for companies or self-employed. One brother is working abroad in Dubai. I have never been back to Libya since I came in 1981, due to lack of the right conditions and also my father never went back.

The other second-generation interviewee is a highly successful young Libyan woman, A.T. who is 31 years old, was born in the Diaspora and is currently undertaking PhD research at London University. A.T. explains:

I was born in London in 1979. My parents came to London on holiday at the end of 1977 but ended up staying here permanently as the British government declared it unsafe for them to travel back to Libya after assassination attempts on family members. I received
a BA in History and an MSc in the History of International Relations and I am currently pursuing a PhD.

And on her profession and work experience states:

I have been working since I was 18 in various administrative and retail positions but I don’t consider my career in foreign affairs to have begun until I joined Chatham House (after my Masters). From 2004 to 2009, I worked at (a well-known London based think-tank) as a Programme Manager, International Security Programme and Libya analyst. In 2006/2007, I was seconded to Adam Smith International to work as a consultant for government reform projects in Tripoli. I was the first in my family to go to Libya since my parents first arrived in London in the 70s.

7.13 Second generation and sense of identity

When asked to describe their sense of identity and belonging, Mohamed Ermis describes his identity as more universal than exclusively Libyan. He points out that:

My identity is universal as someone who can live outside Libya but still has the Libyan tradition. I don’t feel that I have to live in Libya; I see my identity as a mix of Libyan and British and have the best of both, and take the best of both. I also see myself as a British Muslim but not exclusively, there is still a Libyan side to me and my roots will always be maintained.

A.T., on the other hand, seems to have rediscovered and re-assimilated some of her Libyan identity very quickly. And although still keeping an international perspective, she clearly views Libya as her country, which she would like to help, she says:

The older I get, the more Arab/Libyan I become. As the exposure to the region has increased with the shift in international developments, I have also been surprised that other people choose to label me differently – for example, when I started my Masters a few months after 9/11, to others I was simply a Muslim, they weren’t really concerned where I was from. Similarly, working at (the think-tank), I went from Muslim to Arab to Libyan – very odd! I consider myself to be all these things all of the time, as well as European, British and female etc. It isn’t possible to prioritise which aspect of my
identity is stronger than the other and I therefore hope that whatever I end up doing in the future will contribute to each aspect of who I am. With regards to Libya, I can say that I was surprised by the rapidity with which I developed an affinity for Libya; I do consider it my country which is what drives me to want to help better it.

Libya could develop programmes and strategies to help the second-generation stock, it clearly being of high human capital value, re-connect with the home country of their parents. Second-generation Libyans can be an important conduit for knowledge and technology transfer, they can be encouraged to build on and utilise the best of both home and adopted countries. As one of them succinctly put it, ‘I see my identity as a mix of Libyan and British and have the best of both’.

7.14 Second-generation migrants and the ‘return option’

Second-generation migrants with high human capital are assumed to be less attached to the home country than their parents, who grew up there and were much more attached, socially and culturally at least.

When the two second-generation migrants were asked if they would consider returning to Libya and possibly settling there, Mohamed Ermis explains:

I only see myself going back on regular visits but not to settle there permanently. I am set up in the UK with my business, family, friends, contacts, activities, interests and interacting with my community here. Also for me, in addition to stability, I look for safety and security in Libya, which are important for stability. And stability is political as well as social and financial, everything is interconnected.

The young woman, A.T., on the other hand, who had a taste of Libya for the first time in 2006 and has been back for annual visits since, is more open to the idea of a permanent return provided certain conditions are there:

A job with genuine responsibility or working with a team who are genuinely interested in making a contribution to the country – that would encourage me to return to Libya for work but I am not yet sure it is the country in which I would choose to raise my family in the future. For that to happen, the education system would need a complete overhaul.
Again, we see almost the same themes recurring even with second-generation Libyan migrants as the conditions desired and required before they would contemplate returning, even for regular visits. These themes include: ‘stability, safety, security, good job prospects and good education system’. Again, they are mainly socio-economic factors, as well as liberty and democratic values. I believe this is a ‘generalisable’ finding from the analysis.

7.15 Separate analysis of one interview from a non-OECD country

The next interview studied and worked in the UK until 1996, then moved to work in the Arab Gulf region as a legal expert and advisor to private and governmental institutions. Because the data on Libyan brain drain came exclusively from OECD countries which are characterised as ‘democratic’, it is not consistent to analyse data to assess whether democracy was a crucial factor when some of the empirical research is obtained from Libyans residing in countries outside the OECD and characterised as ‘not democratic’.

7.16 Political environment in Libya 1970s

Another interviewee is (Dr A.B.), who graduated from the Faculty of Law at Benghazi University in 1977. In 1980, he left Libya for the UK where he started postgraduate studies in Law, obtaining an MA in International Law and a PhD in Law. He worked in the UK until 1996, when he went to Kuwait as a legal consultant for a few years, before moving to the UAE, where he still works. In the Gulf region, he worked on large development projects as a legal consultant to the government of Dubai and contributed to the setting up of the ‘free Zone’ area and the ‘Palm Tree’ construction project in Dubai.

For the last seven years, he has been working with the Abu Dhabi emirate as the chief legal consultant and advisor to the Department of Economic Planning in charge of all economic activities in Abu Dhabi. He directly advises the Emir who heads the department, and has set up the legal framework for many large projects.

Dr A. B. remembers what Libya, and in particular Benghazi, was like around 1980 when he left for the UK, never to return:

When I left in 1980, Libya was going through restrictions of freedom of thought and expression, intellectual freedom was restricted, there was an iron veil being drawn over
Libya. In the late 1970s, I saw with my own eyes people being hanged in Benghazi just because of their thoughts and ideas and this was very sad. Inside Benghazi University there were beatings of students thought to be anti the revolution.

The political picture which the Dr A.B. paints of Libya in the 1970s is consistent with other interviewees; it is a picture of culture of fear, oppression and ‘an iron veil being drawn over Libya’, a picture of public hangings for political opponents to instill fear and stifle any dissent.

Dr A.B. alludes to other aspects of freedom related to freedom of economic activity and participation:

By the late 1970s, there were restrictions on economic freedom as well; owning property and individual economic activities were banned. The state took over all economic activity and this made people into slaves to the state. We cannot even call it a state, but political control by a few individuals. The purge of the independent student movement in 1976/77 ended all aspects of intellectual activities and innovation. The language of dialogue ended when the language of force started being used against those who disagreed with you.

Clearly, many business people who found it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue their economic and business activities in Libya may have been driven to leave and settle in a more open, economically free environment. However, economic freedom and participation is an important aspect of freedom holistically speaking, and is an important capability that should be available to people.

7.17 Has there been a brain drain from Libya and at what level and why?
Dr A.B. also spoke in some detail on the extent of brain drain from Libya. He says:

Many people who left Libya around 1980 were hoping to return after a few years in the hope that things would get better, but unfortunately things got much worse, and many people, including myself, decided to emigrate and live in safety and freedom. Emigration from Libya continued and those who left Libya after us were planning on emigrating, not just leaving only to return after a few years. When I worked in the UK in immigration
law, I saw tens of Libyans who were applying for political asylum and who said they had emigrated because of lack of freedom. I also met many highly qualified Libyans working in the Arab Gulf countries who wanted to apply their expertise and skills in a stable and free environment. The steady migration of highly skilled and educated Libyans continues today, more Libyans leave than return, but recently the economic motive has also been a factor.

Dr A.B. acknowledges that he has seen many highly qualified people working abroad, especially in the Arab Gulf countries who wanted to apply their skills ‘in a stable and free environment’, as he puts it. However, while migrating to democratic OECD countries meets the desired condition of a ‘free environment’, the same cannot be said for the Arab Gulf countries. There was a missed opportunity here to ask the interviewee to justify and elaborate further on this specific point. Is it really freedom? Or is it safety and stability that those highly skilled Libyans were seeking when migrating to the Gulf countries? Or is the overriding motive and factor an economic one, where much better job prospects, satisfaction and financial rewards are available to them?

7.18 Potential contribution to development in Libya

Dr A.B., the law consultant working in the UAE, expressed some abilities and skills that he can contribute based on his expertise in the field of Law:

I can contribute to my country as a legal expert, [helping] to set up legislation and legal frameworks for all the changes and reforms that are needed in Libya. I can also contribute through training executives and high-ranking civil servants; I also train in the field of business law and can teach at University. Once there is a genuine will to reform, then I can contribute in many ways.

Dr A.B. feels confident of sharing his human capital and contributing vital knowledge, skills and expertise at the highest level in Libya if the political environment in Libya was conducive to this. What Dr A.B. can offer back to his home country can be very relevant to helping towards developing a ‘vision’ for Libya. It is also very relevant to the challenge of ‘capacity building’ in Libya at the individual and institutional level.

7.19 What can make them return to Libya? ‘Return option’
Dr A. B says:

For me to return to Libya, freedom, especially freedom of expression, is essential. I need an environment where I can speak my mind and can express myself freely. Things like rule of law, establishing a constitution, independent judiciary, separation of powers and freedom for civil society are all important and I know that these things take time but we need to see clear true intentions to achieve this and institutions to guarantee this.

It is clear that the conditions set out by Dr A.B. him to be able to return and contribute to development in Libya are consistent with almost all other interviewees and with the preliminary findings of the quantitative questionnaire, being mainly factors related to liberty and democratic values. However, what Dr A.B. did not explain, and I failed to challenge him, is why he sought to settle in a Gulf Arab country when he says: ‘I need an environment where I can speak my mind and can express myself freely’. One can only deduce that for those Diaspora Libyans who elected to apply their skills in non-democratic countries ‘freedom to speak and express themselves’ is not an overriding factor. It is more likely to be socio-economic factors which are the real drivers.

7.20 What can we conclude from the interviews analysis?

The in-depth qualitative interviews provide a much deeper insight into the reasons and motives behind the migration of highly educated Libyans. They also give an insight into the way forward in tackling factors related to the brain drain and also strategies to limit its detrimental effect and move from brain drain to brain circulation.

Seven out of the eleven interviewees are first-generation migrants and a consistent theme emerged from their description of conditions in Libya around the late 1970s and early 1980s when they emigrated. They paint a picture of an environment of oppression in which arrests, torture and even public execution by hanging of those who were seen as political critics or ‘enemies of the revolution’ were common. The interviewees confirm that the oppressive culture and coercive policies created an atmosphere of fear, danger and insecurity, which partly drove away many of the educated and intellectual Libyans.
Political factors are not the only or even the main reasons for brain drain in Libya; socio-economic factors related to salaries, infrastructure and job satisfaction and reward are also strongly associated with the brain drain.

7.21 Here is a summary of the main findings from the in-depth interviews:

- Brain drain in Libya has been happening at the graduate and post-graduate level.
- Many students left Libya to pursue post-graduate education but once they had become politically active abroad could not return home.
- Both political and socio-economic (development) factors are involved as causes of the brain drain.
- Political factors are associated with ‘liberty’ and some democratic values, ‘safety, security, rule of law and respect of human rights’ and not necessarily democracy.
- Many highly educated and skilled Libyans either migrated directly or relocated from OECD countries to Gulf Arab countries which are not democratic, suggesting that socio-economic factors are strongly involved.
- Potential contribution by Diaspora Libyans to development in Libya is mainly, but not exclusively, through education, training and capacity building at individual and institutional level.
- All this Libyan talent and high ‘human capital’ applying their knowledge and skills outside Libya must by implication have slowed down and set back human development in Libya.
- Diaspora Libyans can and are willing to contribute towards a strategic ‘vision’ for Libya, to institution building and to a vibrant civil society.
- The ‘return option’ is only likely to succeed if there are major changes to the political and socio-economic environment in Libya.
- ‘Brain circulation’ and the ‘Diaspora option’ are more plausible strategies that can be pursued to limit the detrimental effects of brain drain.

More will be offered in the summary of overall key findings of this research project in a conclusion section at end of the thesis following the next chapter which is dedicated to developing a ‘vision’ for Libya and the potential contribution of Diaspora Libyans towards it.
Chapter VIII
Towards a New vision for Libya: challenges ahead and role of Diaspora Libyans

8.1 Introduction:
This last chapter attempts to develop a strategic future insight for Libya by linking three main elements. The first is to articulate a vision for Libya in the year 2030 that should be crafted as a result of comprehensive participation and debate by all Libyan stakeholders; a process that evolves bottom-up and not imposed top-down, as has been the case with Gadafi’s own vision for Libya in the last four decades.

The second element is to list and discuss the key challenges to realising such a vision for Libya, challenges in the areas of institution building, Governance, civil society, economic diversification, women empowerment and a shift to a new ‘human security’ paradigm and capacity building.
Economic diversification is discussed in terms of identifying new clusters of economic activity, setting up SMEs, developing a solar energy sector and the role of the Libyan ‘Sovereign Wealth Fund’.

The third crucial element explored in this chapter is the potential contribution of the Libyan Diaspora to the development of a strategic vision for Libya, meeting the challenges critical for realising such a vision, and how to adopt a ‘brain circulation’ strategy in Libya that will boost its efforts to forge a new way ahead and aspire to a better, free and prosperous future, shedding the ills and failures of the last four decades and leaving them behind.

8.2 Towards a Libya 2030 Vision
Strategic thinking and planning needs to incorporate at least three key elements: firstly, an evaluation and analysis of the current position with a holistic view of strengths and weaknesses; secondly, clear goals and objectives that reflect an aspiration or a vision to be achieved in the future; and thirdly, a clear national strategy of how to achieve those aspirations and vision.
Libya has numerous strengths that it can build on: a strategic geographical location in North Africa on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, with a coastline approximately 2000km long and within close reach of southern Europe; it has huge reserves of natural resources (oil and gas), estimated to be the largest in Africa, and huge potential for solar energy from its vast desert and hot climate; and it has a relatively small, youthful population that is growing fast (around 4% annually), with homogeneity of society that is not plagued by ethnic, religious or sectarian tensions.

As Libya reconciles itself from its turbulent past over the last three decades and attempts to shed its image of a pariah state sponsoring terrorism, constantly on a tense, hostile collision course with the West, it has a golden chance to concentrate on the real priorities that will allow it to build on its strengths and push for attainment of genuine overall human development.

Libya can, and should, develop a vision and a strategic project to fulfill its potential to be transformed into a developed, prosperous and democratic country with high levels of human development attainment. This vision can potentially be realised within two decades and Libya can become the ‘Norway’ of the Middle East, considering that Norway has a smaller population than Libya and has large natural resources (oil & gas), as well as a sovereign wealth fund that is the best managed in the world.

The vibrant Libyan Diaspora, who are highly educated and skilled across many fields and disciplines, can play a crucial part in articulating this Libya 2030 Vision and putting strategies in place to realise it. However, before we consider in more detail the potential contribution of Diaspora Libyans to a national vision in Libya, it is important to explore what a vision is, and look at two examples of national visions developed in other parts of the world; Malaysia and Qatar.

### 8.3 What is a vision?

It is important to explain what we mean by a vision in terms of a large organisation or a whole country, as is the case here. ‘Vision is a long-term objective that provides an insight into the direction, which a nation/organization needs to move. It gives focus and direction to the formulation of current programmes and in turn links current actions to the achievement of future goals’ (Islam, 2009).
8.4 Who develops a national vision?
Visions or national strategies can either be imposed top-down by the political leadership or evolve through a national debate and a consultative process that allows key players, including intellectuals, academics, political activists, civil society and even Diaspora networks and members, to participate. A participatory framework and process is important so that people generally can take ownership of such vision and contribute enthusiastically to realising it.

It is important that various visions already visualized by individuals and groups are harnessed together to craft one national vision once the country has embarked on a new era. Sultan Barakat (2005) has argued, in the context of the aftermath of the Afghan war but none the less relevant to other places, that:

“The post war-task is to bring these visions into the open, engaging the participation of other previously excluded groups (such as former combatants, returning refugees, women) to reach an early consensus on some essential medium term goals that do not pre-empt decisions that the society is not ready to make. A more comprehensive vision of the countries direction can then evolve hand in hand with the reconstruction process” (Barakat, 2005: 252)

A key point here highlighted by Barakat is the engagement and participation of what he called ‘previously excluded groups’, citing returning refugees and women as key examples. Indeed in the case of Libya, we could use this framework to emphasise that ‘Diaspora Libyans’ should be an integral part, utilizing their high intellectual capital, of this national participation in forging a new vision for Libya. However, potential obstacles can be envisaged, including negative perceptions and attitudes of the main population towards returning diaspora Libyans with ‘dual citizenship’, who resided and stayed away for decades outside the home country.

8.5 Examples of other countries’ Visions
Libya could learn from the experience of other countries that have developed visions and embarked on ambitious goals to transform themselves into a ‘developed country’ status in all aspects of human development. One of the best examples that Libya can learn from is Malaysia. Other countries that have announced a vision strategy include Qatar 2030 vision and Kenya 2030 vision.
8.6 Malaysia 2020 Vision

Malaysian Vision 2020 was unveiled by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council on the 28th of February, 1991. The gist of this vision is to develop Malaysia as a fully developed country. The Vision 2020 statement is: “By the year 2020, Malaysia is to be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.” (Rahman, 1993, p. 271)

Specific objectives of Malaysia V-2020 are as follows:

• To have sufficient food and shelter with easy access to health and basic essentials
• To eradicate poverty
• To remove the identification of race with major economic functions and to have a fair distribution with regard to the control, management and ownership of the modern economy.
• To maintain annual population growth rate of 2.5%
• To double real GDP every ten years between 1990 and 2020 AD
• To have a balanced growth in all sectors namely: industry, agroforestry, energy, transport, tourism and communications, banking, that is technologically proficient, fully able to adapt, innovative, with a view to always moving to higher levels of technology. (Islam, 2009)

The former Malaysian PM identified nine challenges and according to him, if these challenges are successfully addressed, then Malaysia will be able to realize V-2020. Those nine challenges are:

1. Establishing a united Malaysian nation
2. Creating a psychologically liberated, secure, and developed Malaysian society
3. Developing a mature democratic community
4. Forming a community that has high morale, ethics, and religious strength
5. Establishing a mature, liberal and tolerant society
6. Establishing a scientific and progressive society
7. Establishing a fully caring society
8. Ensuring an economically just society
8.7 Qatar 2030 Vision

Launched in July 2008, Qatar’s National Vision 2030 is underpinned by four interrelated pillars as follows:

*Human Development*

*Social Development*

*Economic Development*

*Environmental Development*

Each pillar encompasses a set of development outcomes towards which the country aspires.

Under the first pillar of Human Development the vision states:

“Human Development is an approach to development that goes beyond income considerations alone. It is a process of increasing people’s capabilities and choices. Qatar’s Human Development Pillar foresees the nation building world-class education and health systems that provide all citizens with opportunities to realize their potential.” (GSDP, 2008)

The vision statement then states that Qatar must balance five major challenges:

- *Modernization and preservation of traditions.*
- *The needs of this generation and the needs of future generations.*
- *Managed growth and uncontrolled expansion.*
- *The size and the quality of the expatriate labor force and the selected path of development.*
- *Economic growth, social development and environmental management.*

8.8 Interesting comparison

It is interesting to note that one of the nine challenges set out in the Malaysia vision is directly concerned with democracy, where the third challenge states ‘Developing a mature democratic community’. On the other hand, the Qatar vision does not at all mention democracy or include it as one of its challenges and instead focuses on economic growth and on sustainable development (‘Sustainability’), where it states in the second challenge the need to balance the needs of contemporary generation with the needs of future generations. The Qatar vision, in its first pillar, also articulates human development in a clear paradigm shift ‘beyond income considerations alone’ to ‘a process of increasing people’s capabilities
and choices’, with an emphasis on developing world class education and health that should provide citizens with opportunities to fulfill their potential.

It is critically important to remember that the capabilities approach (CA), discussed in detail already in this thesis, stipulates capabilities (freedoms) across a wide range, including political participation and guaranteeing of basic rights of thought and expression. If people are suffering from malnourishment due to living in poverty and hunger, then they are denied the capability to be nourished adequately. However, if people choose to fast or go on a hunger strike, then they are exercising a capability which is freedom of choice, and their capability to be fully nourished is still there.

8.9 Mechanism for developing a vision
The Malaysian Vision 2020 was pioneered and unveiled by the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council on the 28th of February 1991. It is not clear whether this vision was a culmination of a wide process of consultation and participation by key players in Malaysian society with a clear mechanism of arriving at this vision or, as is suspected, was mainly a top-down vision by the Prime Minister.

It is vitally important for any proposed Libyan vision to be a living vision and a process that evolves and progresses in stages in order to allow the maximum and widest possible participation of all interested individuals and groups in society. Intellectuals, academics, social scientists, politicians, political parties, civil society, women’s groups and even more pertinently youth groups and organisations should all be allowed to participate.

It should be a living, bottom-up process, involving an open vibrant public debate and many dedicated seminars and workshops. A national, non-partisan body or authority or a ‘national secretariat’ can be set up to organise and steer the process of developing a living vision for Libya. Such a mechanism should also facilitate Diaspora Libyans making a vital contribution, considering the high human capital and expertise they possess. Harnessing the talents, energy and intellectual strength of the Diaspora will add quality and value to the living process of developing a bottom-up vision for Libya administered by an independent national body or mechanism.
8.10 What should a Libya 2030 Vision be based on?

As argued already, a national 2030 vision for Libya should be developed and articulated through a process of participation by all the stakeholders and interested elements of Libyan society, including those thousands of highly educated and skilled Diaspora Libyans. The process should evolve bottom-up and should allow the widest degree of consultation.

A Libya 2030 Vision for Libya could include the following seven objectives:

- Guaranteeing and protecting Libyan national unity with cultural diversity.
- Achieving a free consolidated democratic society.
- Achieving high morale, values and spiritual fulfillment.
- Achieving economic justice and prosperity.
- Establishing an entrepreneurial and innovative society through radical reform of the education system to a high quality standard.
- Diversifying Libyan economy to reduce proportion of national income from (Oil & Gas) to 25% of GDP by year 2030.
- Achieving high degree of access to knowledge and information facilitated by highly advanced ICT infrastructure.
- Achieving high level of protection for the environment and utilizing current resources with future generations’ interest at heart.

With the political will and determination, and with a reconciliation culture that allows all Libyans to participate in and contribute towards their future, Libya could conceivably become a ‘North African tiger’ or the ‘Norway’ of the Middle East by year 2030.

8.11 Challenges ahead:

The seven key challenges that need to be addressed by Libya to help realise the 2030 Vision outlined above are now discussed in more detail, and linked to what Diaspora Libyans can contribute to help meet these challenges:

1- Institution and state building.
2- Governance.
3- Civil society.
4- Economic diversification.
8.12 The Challenge of Institution and state building:
It is argued that successful institutional development often depends on a critical mass of individuals with high levels of human capital (Kapur, 2001) and human capital flight reduces the opportunity to build this critical mass. However, what has made institution and state building in Libya much weaker is also the type of economy that has evolved in Libya over the last half century, being mainly natural resources based, characterizing Libya as a ‘rentier’ state.

8.13 Institution and state building in a ‘rentier’ state
States that depend on extracting income from the economic activities of their citizens tend to have a vibrant productive economy characterised mainly by being industrial and entrepreneurial. In such economies, risk-taking and wealth creation are encouraged and the state’s income depends largely on the collection of taxes from its citizens, who in return have representation in government: ‘no taxation without representation’. Citizens have a say in who runs their affairs through regular elections, accountability and transparency, with well-developed and sophisticated state institutions. The three points of the triangle – taxation, legitimacy and representation – are linked (Vandewalle, 1998: 20). On the other hand, states whose main source of revenue is derived from rents received from the selling of natural commodities and resources are called ‘rentier’, ‘distributive’ (Vandewalle, 1998; 21) or ‘allocation’ (Luciani, 1987) states. Such states tend to be mere distributors of income (rent
accrued) from natural resources to its citizens; Libya is a clear example of such a distributive state.

The concept and term ‘rentier state’ and its application to the Middle East can be traced back to Mahdavy (1970) when he applied the patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states to Iran. Luciani (1987) further developed the concept of ‘rentierism’. However, there are various definitions and disagreements on how much rent a country must receive, and how much control over the inflow of rent it must have, before it can be called a rentier state. Rent can also be privately extracted in some economies, or it can be outside government control in some instances, such as remittances from a large number of people working abroad. According to (Mahdavy, 1970: 428), a rentier state is one receiving ‘on a regular basis substantial amount of rent’, whereas (Davis, 1987: 263) sets ‘the dividing line at about 90 per cent of total revenues’. In the case of Libya, oil and gas exports account for about 95 per cent of total revenue. Two other concepts related to the rentier state are ‘the oil curse’ and ‘the Dutch disease’, both discussed in detail in Chapter II.

8.14 Institution building

In countries with diverse and productive economies which are not dependent solely on natural wealth and in which state income is dependent, to a large degree, on taxes paid by citizens, we find formal structures and institutions designed to meet the complexities of the state’s activities. This process of institution building, or institutionalisation (defined as ‘the tendency of patterns of behaviour, norms, or formal structures to persist through time’ (Krasner, 1989)), is vital to provide a mechanism of checks and balances, transparency and accountability; such sound institutions are found to promote long-term growth and development.

Since 1969, Libya has ceased to have clear institutions or a clear political structure; neither the decision-making process nor those who hold power and make decisions are easily identifiable and accountable. Instead, Libya has experienced an informal, opaque system in which Colonel Gadhafi and his handpicked aides and loyalists are the real powerbrokers. ‘Gadhafi has been able to maintain power for so long through his ability to manipulate these informal power networks, a complex hierarchy of security structures and tribal alliances, his own family and members of his own tribe’ (Al-Baddawy, 2008).
Development financed by oil revenue in a country that lacks essential basic institutions is inevitably going to be erratic and unsustainable in the long-term. Weaknesses related to lack of transparency, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, weak rule of law and poor quality of governance had a severely detrimental effect on the level and quality of overall human development in the last three decades.

Literature suggests that good institutions tend to promote high-level growth and other aspects of development in oil-rich societies (Elbadawi, 2009); institutions have the effect of restraining dysfunctional behaviours. An example of a country with a comparable size of population (5 million) to that of Libya (6 million), which has managed its vast oil revenue extremely well, achieving high levels of sustainable development, is Norway. The main reason is that Norway is a properly functioning democracy with well-established institutions. The comparison, though, may be a little unfair in that Norway had established and developed its institutional framework prior to the discovery of oil and gas. Libya, on the other hand, had not, hence the need for institution building.

8.15 Potential contribution of Diaspora Libyans to institution building

Libyans from the Diaspora can, through brain circulation, help build institutions utilising their strong human capital to set up systems and processes vital for the success of any institution. Well accomplished Libyans abroad have worked for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organisation and with international commercial and investment banks. Successful Libyans have been appointed to head branches of American universities set up in UAE and also to head many university departments as well as hospital departments. This accumulated expertise and experience can be replicated or transferred to Libya to harness a programme of institution building.

Successful Libyan lawyers in the Diaspora specialising in ‘constitutional law’ can provide vital expertise in the area of constitutional frameworks and political institutions in general. Human rights activists and civil society activists in general can help set up transparency and accountability monitoring institutions. Diaspora Libyans with their valuable human capital would also enhance capacity building in Libya, not just on the individual dimension but also through institutions that they can support. This strengthens ‘institutional capacity’ which is even more vital for successful development.
8.16 The Challenge of Governance

Although international governance monitoring and assessment organisations, and the literature in general, do not agree on the specific constituents of good governance, some key characteristics nonetheless, or categories of characteristics, are found to carry a consensus of opinion and agreement amongst governance experts and the literature in general. These include: voice and accountability, rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency and transparency (UNDP, 1997).

Governance is important for development and there is clearly interdependence and interrelationship between governance and human development, where human development cannot be sustained without good governance and governance can only be sound if it is sustaining human development, but which governance are we talking about?

8.17 Which Governance concept to use?

When discussing governance in Libya as part of reviewing the state of overall human development (chapter II), I relied mainly on the concept of ‘Good Governance’ as adopted and defined by the World Bank with its six indicators used to assess the state of overall governance around the world. It is also the case that the WB is the only organisation which provided comprehensive data reports on governance in Libya since starting in 1996.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that there are other definitions and ways of considering and assessing governance which are more suited to political and institutional realities of developing countries. Critics argue that there is an issue of transferability of the notion of good governance to developing countries because as (Jabeen, 2007) argues, ‘the paradigm of governance has basically evolved in developed countries with stable democratic political systems and competitive markets’. She argues further that ‘the application of the concept of good governance to developing countries that are at different development stages may have unintended and serious consequences for the citizens especially the poor’.

International development agencies have been criticised for pushing the good governance agenda which ‘tends to be generic, imitative, and ambitious and it largely fails to take account of the institutional and developmental context of developing countries’ (Jabeen, 2007). In other words, developing countries are being asked to do everything which works in developed countries.
In view of the above, the concepts of humane governance (HDC, 1999) as well as good enough governance (Grindle, 2004) and collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007) have also been developed and articulated. The definitions of two of them are as follows:

**Good enough governance** is defined ‘as a condition of minimally acceptable level of government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward’ (Grindle, 2004, p.526).

**Collaborative governance** is defined as ‘A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

One succinct definition that is worth re-iterating is that offered by Hirst (2000) who states that it means ‘creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action: stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient State administration adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform and a strong civil society independent of the State’.

In a policy document entitled *Governance for sustainable human development*, published in January 1997, the UNDP stressed the three pillars or spheres of governance: ‘Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society.’ Why are all three spheres critical for sustaining human development? According to the UNDP (1997) document, it is because ‘the state creates a conducive, political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction - mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities’.
However, in order for the three spheres of state, private sector and civil society to facilitate and sustain good governance, they need to be developed and differentiated through a process of institutionalisation.

8.18 How can Diaspora Libyans contribute to governance?
One can argue that Libyans who have lived in western countries have adopted western liberal political values, including ‘good governance’, which they may attempt to transfer to a Libyan environment without considering the practicality and feasibility of this, considering Libya is still suffering a huge institutional deficit. It is arguably better to develop an indigenous model of governance along the concept of ‘good enough governance’ that can be used to monitor and influence practices in Libya, and Libyans in the Diaspora who have knowledge and expertise can contribute to such a task. They can also influence progress through civil society organisations and setting up groups and platforms advocating accountability and transparency. Many Libyans in the Diaspora have good experience of setting up organisations, events and campaigns.

8.19 Role of Civil Society:
One of the rationales for civil society is that for maximisation of liberty and equality among citizens it is important to have a ‘division of decision-making powers into a variety of institutions within and between civil society and the state’ (Keane, 1998: 13). True civil society representing and continually striving for the interests of differentiated social and civic groups can only achieve its role if it is totally independent and becomes ‘a permanent thorn in the side of political power’; ‘without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous public spheres, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory planning and community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans’ (Keane, 1998: 15).

Civil society organisations or non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) can be instrumental in channelling people’s participation in social and economic activities and can influence public policies and contribute to good governance. They can be very effective in providing checks and balances on government power and abuse. According to (Keane, 1998), civil society organisations are important to guard against the authoritarian potential of the centralised state or political power by fostering the growth of independent ‘societies’ within
civil society. On the other hand, Gellner (1990) sees the idea underlying the concept of civil society as that of plurality of voluntary associations capable of opposing the ideological monopoly of the political and economic order.

8.20 The Challenge of economic diversification

As already stated, development based on oil exports and wealth extracted from natural resources does not bring about the social and cultural developments necessary for fostering a democratic discourse leading to democracy. Oil is a finite natural resource that will one day be depleted; it is also characterised by being ‘capital intensive’, rather than ‘labour intensive’, which impedes the development and diversification of internal labour markets and specifically the development of highly skilled human capacity associated with a diversified productive economy.

The challenge for Libya is to pursue growth in the non-oil sector, a vital strategic choice in the preparation for the depletion of oil reserves estimated currently at 46 billion barrels. Diversification is also important because oil as a source of energy may not be in demand indefinitely as the oil-consuming economies around the world actively develop alternative sources of energy that are renewable and less damaging to the environment. Another disadvantage of relying on oil revenue as an engine of growth and development is the volatility of oil prices and the boom/bust cycles associated with it, which are very damaging to sustained development plans.

Libya has essentially two types of economies: a high-value/low-employment oil sector which accounts for more than 60% of GDP, but only provides employment for 3% (43,000) of the working population; and a low-value/high-employment non-energy sector accounting for less than 40% of GDP but providing employment for nearly 87% (840,000) of the workforce, mainly in general public services, education and health.

(Figure 6) – GDP and total employees by sector in Libya in 2003
Libya has one of the least diversified economies compared to similar oil-producing countries in the MENA region. According to IMF data from 2003, the energy sector accounted for 61% of GDP in Libya compared to 43% in Kuwait, 40% in Saudi Arabia, 39% in Algeria and 32% in the United Arab Emirates. It is clear that Libya faces a real challenge when it comes to diversifying its economy, not just for the economic reasons of maintaining prosperity and providing opportunities for the majority of people to engage in a productive sector and increase their standard of living, but also for social and political reasons. A diversified economy is important to help Libya and its people move away from wealth distribution by the state, with all the inefficiency, corruption and patronage it creates, to wealth creation and prosperity by individuals, which will empower them economically and politically and ultimately facilitate social and political development.

In 2006, Libya commissioned the services of the Monitor Group, headed by the American Harvard academic Michael Porter, to look at the general competitiveness of the Libyan economy. In its subsequent report, a National Economic Strategy (NES) was proposed; this highlighted the weaknesses and opportunities for growth and the need to improve competitiveness and push for diversification into other sectors. According to the Monitor Group (2006), Libya can diversify its economy away from the hydrocarbon energy sector by
concentrating on and developing clusters defined as ‘geographically proximate groups of interconnected companies, suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions, which are linked by commonalities and complementarities’. The NES incorporated a detailed assessment of five possible clusters – energy, agriculture, construction, tourism, and transit trade – that would lead to economic and social growth and reduce dependence on oil-based wealth.

Other clusters and areas of diversification could include fishery, IT based light industries, Libya becoming a financial centre in the region and solar energy, which will be discussed in more detail shortly.

A successful diversification strategy requires satisfying many critical criteria, not least of which is the existence of a political will and the participation of various groups and society as a whole. Other crucial factors are the promotion of transparency and rule of law, and fighting corruption, nepotism and cronyism, all of which require a strong, independent judicial system. Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is also vital to providing expertise and technical know-how, but such foreign investment will only be forthcoming if the local environment in Libya is encouraging and reassuring. A law allowing foreign companies to set up joint ventures (JV’s) up to a ratio of (70:30) to foreign companies has been passed in the recent few years but companies are still worried about the risks of weak governance and safety of investment.

It has been suggested that Libya wants to emulate other Arab oil-producing countries such as Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which have made good progress in diversifying their oil-based economies by attracting foreign expertise and capital to develop trade zones, business services and other industries. However, according to analyst and investment expert Geoff Porter from Eurasia Group, ‘Libya needs to reform state institutions first’, pointing out that in those other Arab Gulf countries ‘there is some respect for rule of law and a judiciary independent enough for foreign companies to feel confident putting capital there’ (Porter, 2008).

Another important requirement for successful diversification is the development of human resources and capacity building (discussed in more detail as a challenge shortly), which provide the vital core skills necessary to meet the challenges and needs of a productive
economy. Skills in management and leadership, skills in IT and communication, requiring a level of education geared to meeting the requirements of a modern economy, greatly boost competitiveness in a global economic environment. The nurturing of an entrepreneurial culture, in which Libyans are encouraged to be creative and innovative in developing ideas and businesses (example is SMEs discussed in detail shortly), would eventually build a private business sector that could stimulate and drive growth and development. The government could play a key role in harnessing and supporting entrepreneurs and their businesses.

Attracting Libyan human capital in the Diaspora to return to Libya could boost chances of a successful diversification strategy, as many of those tens of thousands of Libyans lost through the brain drain possess advanced skills and expertise in fields of management, IT, human resource training and development, academic teaching and research, setting up business ventures, communication and international business culture awareness and other vital skills that could stimulate the development and rapid growth of the private sector. Indeed, the experience of Asian countries like Singapore, South Korea and India, shows that their emigrant stock in the West have contributed to technology and knowledge transfer and to the setting up of extensions of their western entrepreneurial businesses in the home countries.

There are tens of highly successful Libyan bankers, investment specialists and fund managers working for international banks and financial institutions in New York, London, Switzerland, Turkey and other countries, and their international experience and expertise could be an asset to Libya with regards to reforming its financial sector and providing fiscal support and expert advice to new businesses. Diaspora Libyans can help with setting up SME’s and Incubators for new innovative business start-ups, as we will consider in detail next.

8.21 Small and Medium Enterprise (SME’s)
According to EU Commission recommendation (dated 6 May 2003), ‘small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million’
SME’s constitute over 50% of total number of businesses around the world and are considered to be the real economic engine for stimulating economic growth and providing
employment. Many SMEs are entrepreneurial set ups which can grow and become well established large businesses.

Libya has set up the ‘National SMEs Programme’ in 2007 as an independent national authority with the aim of encouraging an entrepreneurship culture and setting up new start-up businesses by the private sector. The programme, so far, has set up three general business ‘Incubators’ and four specialist ones catering for businesses in IT, Agriculture, Business women and Business people with special medical needs. The Programme has also carried out feasibility studies for a total of 593 projects, which are ready for bank loans. The programme can potentially create employment for thousands of unemployed university graduates and help boost the growth of a potentially vibrant private sector.

In early 2010, a successful Libyan Diaspora academic (Dr Abdurrazaq Gredy) who is an expert on setting up business ‘Incubators’ was attracted back to Libya to head the ‘National SMEs Programme’ in order to take it to a new level of encouraging setting up new entrepreneurial businesses and creating employment and business opportunities for young, aspiring Libyan university graduates and others. Dr Gredy has a track record of 25 years’ experience in Canada and the UK, where he was a university lecturer and advisor to various institutions, including advising the British government on setting up special Incubator centres for business enterprise. This is a clear example of how successful Diaspora Libyans can help their home country in achieving economic reform and growth.

8.22 Developing a Libyan solar energy sector for the future

The high energy-consuming economies around the world, such as those of the USA, Europe, India, China and South East Asia, are investing heavily in developing alternative sources to finite fossil fuels, i.e. sources that are infinite, or at least renewable, and also kinder to the environment. These sources include, amongst others, wind power, bio-fuels and solar energy. The Sahara Desert of North Africa covers a vast region, stretching from Morocco to Libya, which enjoys clear skies and a hot sunny climate throughout the year, offering huge potential as a source of solar energy.

In June 2009, a consortium of twenty German companies launched an ambitious project to harness solar power from the desert of North Africa and transport the clean electricity to Europe, supplying around 15% of Europe’s electricity needs. According to a news report
(Guardian, 2009), the project (to be called ‘Desertec’) will cost around 400 billion Euros and will involve building Concentrating Solar Power plants in several North African locations, including Morocco, Algeria and Libya, all considered to be stable countries where land is also inexpensive. The technique of collecting solar power is called CSP (Concentrating Solar Power). It uses banks of mirrors to focus the sun’s light to heat water, vaporising it into steam which is then used to drive turbines that generate electricity, which in turn would be transmitted through high-voltage direct-current lines thousands of miles to Europe.

According to the European Commission’s Institute for Energy, if only 0.3% of light falling on the Sahara is captured, it could provide all Europe’s energy needs. Clearly, this project highlights the way forward for energy sourcing and production as the world becomes more and more committed to cleaner and more durable sources that have a much less detrimental effect on the environment. It also offers huge potential as strategic diversification for Libya, with its vast desert area and its proximity to Europe, to plan for an alternative engine of economic growth and development before the oil reserves eventually run out.

What makes this potential project even more relevant and potentially more rewarding is the idea that ‘silica’ from Libyan desert sand is of a very high quality and suited to manufacture the ‘solar panels’ needed for such a project. Libya needs to set up a task force for ‘Solar Energy’ and initiate a research programme, including specific courses at university degree level and postgraduate research in the area of renewable energy. Many Libyan academics and scientists in the Diaspora (mainly USA, Canada and Europe) can be incentivised to return and lead such research and education programmes. A whole discipline of renewable or solar energy engineering can be introduced as a study programme in all Libyan universities, set up with the help of Diaspora Libyan academics and researchers.

The potential employment, either directly by a solar energy investment project or indirectly as a spinoff, could be large. In addition to employing hundreds of engineers and many more technicians and support staff, young Libyans could also be encouraged to set up small and medium size businesses that will provide services and logistics to such a major investment, which will inevitably involve international investors. Such a hybrid business interaction model will facilitate and harness technology and knowledge transfer, from pioneering international companies to local Libyans. Knowledge and technology transfer is important for
Libya’s development drive and ambitions and it can be facilitated by successful Diaspora Libyans who have excelled in developed countries, and by international companies who are attracted by investment and business opportunities in Libya.

Desertec proposed project map

(accessed on 05/02/2012)
8.23 The Libyan Sovereign Wealth Fund and Democracy

Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa, estimated in 2007 (see graph below) at around 40 billion barrels\(^{18}\); but experts say the reserve could be as high as 100 billion barrels considering that many parts of Libya have not yet been explored due to international sanctions. However, since the United Nations and the United States lifted sanctions, in 2003 and 2004 respectively, international oil companies have signed major exploration contracts with Libya and have stepped up oil and gas exploration efforts throughout the country. Libya currently ranks eighth in the world in terms of oil reserves, exceeded by Saudi Arabia with the largest reserves, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Venezuela and Russia.

Like many other oil-producing countries, Libya established a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in August 2006 under the name Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), into which were transferred the assets of other previously set up investment bodies such as the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, the Libyan African Investment Portfolio, and Oil-invest Company. In addition, excess oil revenues are also transferred to the Libyan Investment Authority, whose capital stands at US$70 billion and is expected to rise to US$100 billion (SWF Institute).

\[(\text{Figure 7}) – \text{Top five African oil reserves holders in 2007}\]

\(^{18}\) The estimate of Libya’s oil reserves has been revised upwards to about 46 billion barrels in 2010 according to the National Oil Corporation which is the body in charge of running the oil sector in Libya. The estimate of the reserves level is likely to increase again as much more active explorations are taking place in recent years.
The Libyan government announced recently that LIA was preparing to increase its investment total of the fund to about US$100 billion of oil revenue from record oil prices in foreign stocks, bonds and real estate. The investment fund is seen as a way of diversifying oil revenue into other economic sectors, including financial markets and real-estate sectors around the world. However, the fund is pursuing a strategy of investing in international markets and not within Libya where investment in diversification is most needed.

The table below shows that the Libyan sovereign fund is investing mainly in non-oil producing Arab countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, in addition to Malta, Italy and Canada, where the fund took 100% ownership of the Canadian energy company, Verenex. The strategy that LIA is following, to invest in Arab countries and some western countries in financial, energy and real-estate sectors, raises questions about the commercial rationale and the security of these investments against global fluctuations and downturns in global economic activities. Another key question is the real independence and transparency of LIA operations and decision-making mechanisms and how free LIA managers really are from interference by the political leadership in Libya.

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19 LIA investment in Italy also includes buying stakes in publicly owned companies such as 7.5% share in Juventus football club and 6.7% share in the Italian Bank UniCredit.

20 According to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, the Libyan sovereign wealth fund has a transparency rating of 2 out of 10 (where 10 is maximum transparency and 0 is no transparency). The Libyan fund’s poor transparency is in contrast to Norway’s, with a rating of 10. This is obviously consistent with Norway being a democracy, whereas Libya has an authoritarian political system.
### Table 13 - Major LIA Direct Foreign Investments (Private)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>% Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verenex Energy</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafico Algeria Holding</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar Hotels and Resorts</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Meridien Amman</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak-Libya Holding Company</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinthis Group</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olcese</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Bank for Trade and Finance - Algeria</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3I</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Petrochemicals Company</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zara Investment (Holding) Company</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociiti El Wifack Leasing</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Mining Company</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Private Stock</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Freeing Libya’s oil-generated wealth from control and manipulation by the political leadership is crucial to reducing corruption and patronage and to enhancing transparency, accountability, good governance and rule of law, all essential constituents of democratisation and the consolidation of democracy. However, in reality, Libya is still under an authoritarian political system, with Gadhafi controlling everything; it is difficult to envisage the existence of an independently controlled and run sovereign wealth fund without the political will and consensus to make it happen as part of a new social contract. For Libya to have a chance of achieving democratisation in the future it will be essential to free the natural resource rent extraction from the control of, and manipulation by, the political leadership. This could be achieved by making the management of the SWF the responsibility of an elected body with rigorous scrutiny by the judiciary.

#### 8.24 How can Diaspora Libyans strengthen the SWF?

The Libyan SWF can target and recruit tens of highly successful Libyan bankers, fund managers and investment specialists known to work in the financial city of London, as well as in the USA, Switzerland, Turkey and other places with institutions like Meryl Lynch, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, UBS, HSBC and others. This Libyan talent in financial investment is global and understands world markets well, which can be a huge asset for the Libyan SWF.
There are many successful SWFs around the world, such as those of Norway, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, and Libya, having relatively a new SWF, can learn much from those more established and successful funds. Libya Diaspora expertise in the field can be a bridge to understand and emulate successful business models adopted by successful funds of other countries.

8.25 The challenge of women’s empowerment and development

According to the UNDP, women’s empowerment is central to human development. It has already been argued that human development is about enlarging people’s choices; hence no true development can be attained when the choices of half of society are restricted. ‘Targeted actions aimed at empowering women and righting gender inequities in the social and economic sphere, as well as in terms of civil and political rights, must be taken alongside efforts to en-gender the development process’ (UNDP, 2009).

Libyan women achieved suffrage in 1964 under the constitution of the monarchic regime and to date they have enjoyed all the legal rights of equality with men and the prohibition of discrimination based on gender. However, social and cultural norms and practices, according to Pargeter (2010: 297), still ‘consider women’s primary role to be in the home. Whilst young women in Libya are increasingly aspiring to pursue professional careers, these careers are often cut short when they marry.’

Women in Libya have the right to own land and property and they are free to engage in business activities at all levels. However, the main economic areas of activities are concentrated around the small service sector, such as running private schools, wedding halls, sewing clothes and other related activities. The overwhelming majority of working women is still employed by the public sector, especially in education and healthcare.

The most significant progress Libyan women have made in the last two decades is in the field of education, as women have benefited from Libya having made education compulsory up to intermediate level. ‘In fact, women tend to outperform men in education. In 2006 the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education was 105%’ (World Bank, 2009). Currently, the girls are outperforming the boys in education and according to official statistics from
Libya, ‘the number of girls going to higher education is also significantly higher than that of boys. For the academic year 2007-2008 there were (101,537) females enrolled at university as opposed to (59,179) males’ (Statistics book, 2007).

While young Libyan women are doing well in education and enjoy, officially at least, all the rights of equality, this is not reflected in their participation and empowerment in public life. In a seminar delivered at the American University in Cairo, Saif Al-Islam Gadhafi, son of the Libyan leader, spoke on the position of women in Libyan society and, while he believed that ‘women don't face any kind of discrimination in Libya. Women and men are equal’, he also argued that ‘women are very powerful in Libyan society. They are in the army, they are pilots... women are taking part in every company, any ministry and they can drive!’ He then went on to highlight what is clearly a fundamental trend that strikes at the heart of women’s empowerment and contribution to development by stating that ‘the problem in Libya is that they waste the resources of the society... the state spends a lot of money to educate women and then they get married and stay at home’ (Seif-ul-Islam Gadhafi, 2010).

So, what makes many young Libyan women achieve high education attainment and then end up as full-time housewives without utilising their knowledge and skills in the work place? Is it those social and cultural traditions? Or is it male dominance that is the obstacle to women achieving high positions and meaningful jobs that can empower them to make a difference, especially in decision-making and political influence?

According to Obeidi (2008: 121), out of a total of 132 people who held cabinet positions as ministers in various Libyan cabinets (executive elites) between 1969 and 2006, only 3 ministers (2%) were women, ‘such a small representation once more clashes with the official ideology of the regime, which encouraged women to play a significant role in the social, political and economic development of Libyan society’. The table below accentuates the true picture of the role women are playing in the crucial decision-making structures and provides an indicative reflection of the level of women’s empowerment in Libya.

(Table 14) - The gender representation in the political executive elite in Libya from 1969 to 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Representation in cabinet</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some women do hold ambassadorial posts\textsuperscript{21}, but ‘for all its discourse on women’s rights, the regime is still extremely reluctant to appoint women to senior political positions’ (Pargeter, 2010: 302). Women are also represented in the judiciary and have been able to become judges since 1981, although they are very few in comparison to men. The first Libyan female judge was appointed in 1991 and there are estimated to be around fifty to date (Obeidi, 2010).

To realise the aspirations of high development, the whole of society must enjoy full participation and acquired functioning. This applies to both men and women and equally to political, economic, social and cultural participations. Yet despite the public claims of guaranteeing women’s rights, the Libyan political regime has delivered very little, in practice, in the crucial area of women’s empowerment; and especially political empowerment. Women’s empowerment remains a real challenge and a priority for overall sustainable human development, including political development in Libya.

What those Libyan women advocating women’s rights to equal opportunities in the work place need is to organize themselves effectively and form pressure groups that can force the debate and put women empowerment issues clearly on the public agenda. Many Diaspora Libyan women, especially those educated to a high level, have skills and experience in setting up women groups and running campaigns, utilizing the media, including social media, effectively. Such activism can be very helpful to enthuse and energise women activism inside Libya for empowerment. The obstacles facing women participation and empowerment in Libya are legal, but mainly social and cultural, and more women participation in public spheres and the work place will contribute to development in Libya, including political development.

\textbf{8.26 The challenge of a shift to a ‘Human Security’ paradigm}

\textsuperscript{21} including Najat al-Hajaji who is Libya’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva and who in August 2008 was appointed to chair a series of United Nations anti-racism conferences.
Is human ‘individual’ security more or less important than state security? Can the two ever be in harmony? And when are they at odds? The threats that make individuals feel insecure differ from one global region to another and from one country to another. Threats come from different sources and causes and could be related to conflicts, wars, natural disasters, famine, poverty, infectious diseases, high crime or unemployment rates. According to the UNDP global HDR (2004), there are at least seven identified areas of concern for human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political – these dimensions are important in shifting the focus from the security of the state to security of the individual. In essence, it is the elimination of human insecurities that enhances human development.

Countries characterised by authoritarian rule tend to be pre-occupied by the security of the state and, in particular, the security of the ruling power elite, often at the expense of the individual security of members of society. Lack of democracy means that security forces are not under democratic control and, therefore, ‘far from ensuring personal security and peace, security forces can actively undermine them’ (UNDP, HDR, 2002: 6). Maintenance of the security of the state in authoritarian countries can manifest itself in a culture that instils fear into citizens’ minds through oppressive security measures and widespread human rights violations in order to stifle opposition and rebellion. This, in turn, increases the insecurity of individuals and reduces their choices for participation and innovation, which is detrimental to overall human development. It is clear in this case that state security is at odds with human security and with human development.

The challenge in Libya is to shift the discourse from state security or security of the ruling political power elite to human security. The former has characterised the last four decades of Libya’s political history, during which the safety and survival of the political regime has been seen as paramount, any manifestations of criticism or dissent being dealt with in a brutally oppressive manner through various state security institutions. However, in reality this is not a singular objective that can be achieved independently, as it is embedded in the wider perspective of transition to rule of law, accountability, good governance and democracy.

It could be argued that the above adopted definition of human security is somewhat ideal and can only be realised in countries that have had long traditions for respecting the rule of law.

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22 The regular reports by international human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have detailed accounts of the oppressive nature of the security apparatus in Libya.
and guaranteeing essential human rights. A human security approach in developing countries can also advocate security from poverty, diseases, crime or unemployment.

8.27 Diaspora Libyans and their fear for security back in Libya

Many Libyans in the Diaspora may feel that an environment guaranteeing personal security, intellectual rights and freedom of thought and expressions essential before they can engage positively with their home country and contribute to its development. Putting legislative and policy mechanisms in place that meet many of the security concerns of citizens is essential to providing a safe, conducive environment in which people can think freely, use capabilities and choices available to them, be innovative and fulfil their potential.

8.28 The Challenge of capacity building

Libya cannot realise its vision without building a strong capacity on the interlinked three dimensions of individual, institution and societal level. It is important however to consider what we mean by capacity building in this context.

What is Capacity Building?

Capacity building is explained as the process by which individuals, organisations, institutions and societies in general develop abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve goals and objectives. Capacity building needs to be considered at three interrelated levels: individual, institutional and societal. A specific definition is:

“Capacity building encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, and institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of capacity building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options” (UN, 2006: 7).

Capacity building can also be defined as: ‘an on-going process that involves developing competencies (skills, knowledge, attitudes) to enable people to make things happen.’ (UNDP, 2006: 26)

8.29 How can Diaspora Libyans contribute to capacity building?
Capacity building in Libya will be enhanced by addressing the chronic problem of poor quality of education, especially in universities (addressed already in chapter II). An effective programme to attract back, even on regular visits, hundreds of Libyan academics in the Diaspora will contribute to improving quality of education. Libyan Universities need urgent investment in terms of improved education and research facilities and setting up ‘Centres of Excellence’ that can provide vital research on feasibility on ambitious development plans.

Libya suffers from a water shortage problem and has the potential to develop a whole sector based on solar energy (as discussed already), so why not set up whole faculties or centres of study and research inside Libyan universities dedicated to these two areas? Tens of Libyan Diaspora academics and Researchers can be attracted back, with the appropriate incentives and facilities for them and their families, to set up and run such research projects.

Capacity building is also enhanced through continuous training in core skills like leadership, management, planning, IT, business start-ups, communication and inter-personal skills. This type of training can be very effective in helping tens of thousands of young unemployed Libyan graduates to become employable or even better, to set up their own new businesses and benefit from the SMEs programme discussed already above. There are Libyans in the Diaspora who have their own training companies in the UK, Europe and USA and some of them can be encouraged to set up branches of their companies in Libya or recruit others as individuals to return and set up such training programmes in Libya with government grants and support.

The most important and vital level of capacity building for development needs is ‘institutional capacity’ and this has been harmed by the brain drain through the loss of many Libyans with high human capital such as lawyers, experienced managers, engineers, doctors, journalists, human rights activists, political activists and others with various skills. The return of some of them will contribute to stronger institutions and consequently stronger growth and development.
Conclusion

In this final brief conclusion, a summary of key findings from the research project is highlighted. The dynamics and inter-relationships between the three themes of brain drain, democratisation and human development which have been explored in this way and context for the first time and highlighted in this thesis have great and relevant implications for developing countries which are striving to boost development and join the elite of developed countries. In this respect, some of the findings here are new and can be seen as making an original contribution to human knowledge.

Some suggestions for useful further research uncovered by this thesis are also given below to expand knowledge in an area that has seen limited original empirical research.

Summary of findings

- Extent of brain drain in the Arab world is 4 times greater than China and 5 times greater than India on per capita basis.

- Spending on R&D in terms of GERD as a percentage of GDP is lowest in the Arab world (0.2%), compared to (1.2%) in China and (4.9%) in Israel.

- Brain drain in Libya has been happening at the graduate and post-graduate level.

- The proportion of highly skilled Libyans out of the total number of Libyan expatriates in OECD countries exceeds (40%) and is the second highest proportion after Egypt amongst North African countries.

- Causes of outward migration of highly skilled Libyan human capital include repression, lack of safety and rule of law, the violations of human rights and absence of basic democratic values.
• Socio-economic and development factors, furthering education, infrastructural facilities, salaries and job rewards are also important factors involved as causes of Libyan brain drain.

• All this Libyan talent and high ‘human capital’ applying their knowledge and skills outside Libya has slowed down and set back human development in Libya.

• There is a paradigm shift from ‘brain drain’ to ‘brain circulation’ where brain drain should be seen as neither permanent nor irreversible and where brain circulation can play an important role in the success of a country’s overall development by utilising the reservoir and stock of human capital being the knowledge and skills located in their expatriate nationals. ‘Diaspora Networks’ as a strategy can contribute to brain circulation.

• Potential contribution by Diaspora Libyans to development in Libya is mainly, but not exclusively, through education, training and capacity building at individual and institutional level.

• Human capital lost via the brain drain as a loss of highly educated and skilled people who are ‘experts’ in their field leaves behind a deficit in terms of capacity building at institutional and societal level. Such ‘experts’ can contribute to democratisation in both its transition and consolidation phases. For example, experts in law, especially constitutional and electoral law, can play a vital role in institution building and the drafting of new democratic constitutions and election laws.

• Diaspora Libyans can and are willing to contribute towards a wide bottom-up process of developing a strategic ‘vision’ for Libya, towards institution building and towards a vibrant civil society.

• The ‘return option’ is only likely to succeed if there are major radical changes to the political and socio-economic environment in Libya.
• ‘Brain circulation’ and the ‘Diaspora option’ are more plausible strategies that can be pursued to limit the detrimental effects of brain drain. Addressing the socio-economic and political factors causing outward migration could facilitate brain circulation.

Further possible important research highlighted by this thesis

Although this thesis has attempted to answer some key research questions related to the management of the brain drain in Libya and the interrelationship between the brain drain, democratisation and human development, it has also uncovered more questions and related research areas that could usefully be explored further in our never-ending quest to expand human knowledge. These include:

1- Methodology and ways of quantifying the extent of brain drain beyond relying on census data from receiving countries. Also, quantifying the financial cost to the home country of losing highly educated and skilled people to the Diaspora.

2- Contributing to the construction of a more reflective and holistic index of evaluating human development that encompasses wider indices and capabilities inspired by the capabilities approach.

3- Research into developing better ‘Models’ of ‘Diaspora Networks’ that utilise global advances in technology and shifts in political paradigms to make brain circulation more effective and beneficial. For example, could Diaspora Networks dedicated to issues of human rights, governance, other democratic values and democratisation engage with and boost efforts of like-minded local activists in the country of origin?

4- How Diaspora members are viewed by their fellow citizens in the home country: do possible tensions and conflicts of culture and loyalty arise when the Diaspora which escaped poor socio-economic and political conditions for decades acquired a second citizenship returns to dominate the debate about the direction of the renewed country?

End of Thesis – thank you
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Appendix A

Analysis of Questionnaire:

The questionnaire has been analysed statistically as a breakdown in percentages, represented graphically below.

A- Background information

The first part of the questionnaire addresses the background of sample respondents and covers essential information such as gender, age, marital status, qualifications, current occupation, first or second generation migrant status, current country of residence, place of origin in Libya, year of emigration and involvement or not in any political activity.

(Figure 5) – Gender distribution of participants in the questionnaire, based on the total sample of (203)
The overwhelming majority of respondents were males, possibly reflecting the perceived socially conservative nature of Libyan society, in which women are not likely to migrate on their own, but mainly with their spouses or parents. It may also reflect the trend in Libyan society whereby young women are more likely to choose marriage and motherhood over further and higher education or a professional career.

It is important to highlight, however, that inside Libya the ratio of women to men involved in education and professional occupations has grown steadily over the last three decades and is much higher today than is reflected in this sample of Libyans residing abroad.

(Figure 6) – Age distribution of participants in the questionnaire
A clear majority of questionnaire participants, 72%, were in the age group (35-54) years old. This is not surprising, as these people are mainly professionals with well-established careers, having mostly left Libya between the ages of 18 and 30.

It is also important to note that those in the majority age group could still potentially return to Libya and contribute many years of their professional working lives, having established track records and gained a wealth of experience and expertise in the Diaspora.

On the other hand, people over 55 years old (18% of the sample) may be contemplating winding down to retirement. The age group (18 – 34) years old, accounting for only 10% of the sample, reflects either recent or second-generation emigrants.

(Figure 7) – Marital status distribution of participants in the questionnaire

The overwhelming majority of the sample (94%) are married, which could be related to the age range where (90%) are over 34 or to the conservative cultural tendency of Libyans to
view marriage and setting up a family as very important. This could be related to the finding in the questionnaire which showed that (90%) of those who are married also have children. The corollary of this is that all these children will grow up and be educated outside Libya, in which case they may become more attached to their adoptive societies and cultures. And once they complete their education and enter professional life they become second-generation Libyan emigrants who constitute a secondary brain drain and human capital loss for Libya.

(Figure 8) – Qualifications distribution of participants in the questionnaire

![Qualification graph]

The questionnaire sample showed a large percentage with high educational qualifications of which (64%) have postgraduate qualifications, including (33%) at PhD level and (31%) with masters degrees. This reflects the high calibre of people whose knowledge and expertise is applied outside Libya, constituting an intellectual loss. Another (34%) is comprised of graduates with university degrees. Only (2%) of respondents had finished their education after secondary school.
At 23%, managers form the largest single occupation group, either working for companies or running their own businesses. Management skills are vital for capacity building and very important for a developing country like Libya, especially when embarking on a programme of economic diversification and boosting the role of the private sector. The second largest group is university lecturers, followed by medical doctors and then researchers.

According to Nunn (2005: 56), there were a total of thirty-three academic staff of Libyan origin in UK higher education institutions in 2002, a figure that could well be even higher by now. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are even more Libyan university lecturers in the USA than there are in the UK, with similar numbers in Canada as well. Libyan academics are heads of entire universities (see Appendix A, Professor Mustafa Abushagur of RIT in the UAE) and of entire departments at universities in Sharja and Qatar. The fact that there are
Libyan university lecturers applying their knowledge and expertise outside Libya constitutes a major loss and could make a significant difference to the quality of education in Libya, which is very poor according to ‘Global Competitiveness’ reports. All twelve universities in Libya compare very poorly to universities at international level. Indeed, there is only one (University of Garyounis) in Benghazi which ranks at all; it comes 63rd in the top 100 African universities and 68th in the top 100 Arab universities, with the very poor world ranking of (6781) in the most recent survey of 2009. No other Libyan university makes any ranking.

Many reports, including those by the Libyan Doctors Society set up by medical doctors working outside Libya, have indicated that large numbers of highly trained medical doctors are working in the UK, Canada and the USA, as well as in some Arab Gulf countries. The numbers range from 1500 to 2000. This is of great importance, as Libya still suffers from a shortage of trained doctors and still actively recruits foreign doctors (some 1500 have been recruited recently from Egypt).

**Place of Origin in Libya**

The participants in the questionnaire sample came from a total of (16) different cities and towns in Libya with the largest group (38%) being from Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya, and (30%) from the capital, Tripoli, being the largest city in Libya. Also (8%) came from Misrata, which is the fourth largest city in Libya, (6%) from Derna and (5%) from Gharian. The fact that fewer participants came from Tripoli than from Benghazi, although Tripoli has almost double the population of Benghazi, could be explained by internal migration from adjacent cities and towns to the capital: many who study and live in Tripoli still consider their place of origin to be the place of their birth.
The overwhelming majority of the sample (92%) was first-generation migrants, with only eight% being second-generation. These were probably either very young children when their parents emigrated or were born in the Diaspora. This percentage breakdown correlates to the age distribution of the sample, where only ten% of the sample participants were aged between 18 and 34 years old.

**When did they leave Libya?**

The breakdown of the periods when the participants in the questionnaire left Libya is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1975</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - 1979</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 - 1985</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of Year</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 - 1989</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1995</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 - 1999</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 2009</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that the largest percentage of participants (26%) migrated between (1980 - 1985) followed by almost equal percentages of two groups migrating (19%) between (1976 - 1979) and (21%) between (1996 – 1999) seem to correlate with the periods in Libya associated with radical political changes and increased degree of crack down on political critics and dissidents and brutal policies of oppression witnessed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s as described in detail already in chapter IV. The period of the late 1990’s was also associated with a major crack down on Islamist groups which forced over 700 members of such groups to leave Libya and seek political asylum in UK and other European countries. This also correlates with what Maghur, (2010) cited as three main waves of migration of Libyans: the first in 1973; the second in the late 1970s following the publication of the Green Book; and the third in the mid-1990s. Maghur identified the main factors behind the Libyan brain drain as being political.
The largest group of participants in the questionnaire sample was based in the UK, followed by the USA and then the UAE, out of a total of eleven destination countries, including one participant from New Zealand. The fact that the largest group is in the UK is partly because the research is being done in the UK, but it is also consistent with the spread of Libyan migrants in general, the largest concentration of which is in the UK.
When asked if they were involved in any political activities, either related to Libya or the country where they are residing, just over half the participants (54%) said that they were politically active. However, political activity could mean some association or involvement with political groupings in the Diaspora sometime in the distant or recent past, especially while people were studying at university, and current involvement is more passive than active.

The questionnaire asked those who stated that they were politically active what kind of activity they participated in. The answers ranged from a sizeable group stating that they were human rights activists to those who explained their political activity in terms of writing and contributing to Internet sites and blogs on topics relating to Libya. Some said that they were members of Libyan opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and one participant stated that he was an active member of the Respect party in the UK. The fact that over half the participants perceive themselves as politically active could correlate to politics being a major reason for their emigration in the first place.
For those who stated that they are not politically active, the questionnaire asked why not and the overwhelming majority of the answers were either ‘committed to my career’ or ‘busy with my family’ or ‘not interested in politics’.

(Figure 12) – Perceived extent of brain drain from Libya

When asked about the scope and extent of the brain drain from Libya in the last thirty years, an overwhelming majority of the participants thought that there had been a very large (50%) or fairly large (45%) brain drain in their view. However, it is important to note that this is a reflection of how a sample of Libyans living abroad perceived the extent of brain drain and not necessarily a scientific measure or quantification of the degree and magnitude of the drain, which will be addressed through other sources of statistics.
Perceived effect of brain drain on overall development in Libya

When asked about the effect of brain drain on overall development in Libya an overwhelming majority of the participants thought that it had a very large (49%) or fairly large (43%) negative effect; again this only reflects the perceptions of a sample of Libyans living abroad. The state and extent of human development in Libya are discussed in detail in Chapter V and a correlation between levels of development and loss of highly educated and skilled people was critically discussed and evaluated, taking into consideration other factors that impacted on development programmes, including internationally imposed sanctions and the contribution of foreign skilled labour imported by Libya.
When asked their reasons for leaving Libya, about a third of the participants (32%) said to further their education and research work. This group is likely to have benefited from government scholarships to pursue postgraduate or graduate education abroad as part of Libya’s policy of supporting higher education and training for its graduate students in order to fill gaps in skills and expertise needed for overall development programmes. However, the fact that these were likely to be postgraduate students on government scholarships who did not return constitutes a loss, not only of their acquired skills, but also of the investment in them while studying abroad.
The answers to this question also show that there is a sizeable group (23%) which cited safety and fear for their lives as a reason for leaving Libya, and approximately another third comprising those who cited lack of rule of law and security (16%) and those who believed that oppression or the absence of freedom and democracy (16%) as reasons for leaving.

An equally important supplementary question here should have been: why they chose not to return. This, however, is partly covered in a later question on what would make the participants return.

(Figure 15) – How settled participants in the questionnaire are in their country of residence in the Diaspora.

How settled and integrated in current country of residence in Diaspora?

![Bar chart showing settlement levels: 34% well settled, 47% reasonably settled, 17% only partially settled, 2% not settled at all.]
When asked how settled and integrated the participants were in their country of residence just over a third stated that they were well settled, while nearly half were only reasonably settled. This could be due to social, economic and cultural challenges that will be explored and eluded to further in the in-depth interviews.

(Figure 16) – Participants in the questionnaire who returned to Libya for visits

Have they returned to Libya for visits?

When asked if they had been back to visit Libya since their emigration, just under half (45%) said they had and just over half (55%) said they had not. This could be correlated to the reasons for leaving Libya in the first place: if any of those who have been back for visits left originally due to lack of safety or security, have they found changed and improved conditions in this area recently? And how many go back only once before deciding not to visit again? The answer to this question also correlates to political activity: those who never engaged in political activity would find it easy to go back for visits without fear of possible interrogations and persecution by the Libyan security agencies.
When asked what would persuade them to return to Libya, the largest group of participants (38%) cited increased respect for rule of law and significant reform of political and civil society institutions. However, only slightly fewer (34%) stated that only a complete political change of the regime to a democratic one would make them return. A smaller group of (15%) cited an open political environment as an incentive for returning and only (2.5%) expressed the view that improvement in the socio-economic situation would persuade them to return.

This suggests that the economic factor is very low in the order of reasons either for emigrating in the first place or for returning. It is clear that the dominant reasons are related to political factors, such as rule of law and the existence of civil society and democratic institutions. This highlights another reason that Libya should adopt political reforms as a priority in order to create an environment of safety, stability and freedom which would help
attract back many of its highly skilled and educated citizens lost through emigration. The challenge of political reform in Libya is discussed in more detail in the Chapter VII.

(Figure 18) – Would participants in the questionnaire return to Libya permanently or just for visits

Returning permanently or just for visits?

When asked if they would return permanently or just for visits if their stated condition for returning to Libya was fulfilled, an overwhelming majority (88%) of the participants stated that they would return permanently and settle in Libya. This correlates to the combined majority of (87%) in the previous question who cited political reform, transition to democracy and open political environment as reasons and incentives that would persuade them to return to Libya. Clearly creating the environment to attract highly skilled and educated people back to Libya will also have the benefit that their return will be permanent.
If returned to Libya permanently what would they do?

When those who said that they would return permanently to Libya (88%) were asked about the kind of job or activity they would take up, a quarter (25%) stated that they would work for the public (government controlled) sector, but an almost equal sized group (27%) stated that they would take a job in the private sector. The largest group (39%) said that they would take up a political/intellectual activity, while only (8%) thought that they would retire completely. It appears that there is a correlation between those who stated they would take up political/intellectual activity and those who are already active politically in the Diaspora and cite political reform and change towards democracy as incentives for return.
Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is for a PhD research program by Giuma Gamaty on "Libyan brain drain and its effect on Democratization and Human Development in Libya", carried out at the Centre for Study of Democracy, Westminster University, London. My aim is to interview about 250 people for this. Your answers will not be attributed to you personally, and anonymity is guaranteed in accordance with University of Westminster code of practice for research.

Giuma Gamaty 07/02/2006

Email: gelgamaty@hotmail.com

Date of interview: Serial No:

A- Background questions:

1- Gender: M □ F □

2- Age: (18-34) □ (35-54) □ (55 +) □

3- Marital status: Married □ Not Married □

4- Children: Yes □ No □

5- Your Education: - Secondary □
6- Current occupation / speciality

7- Place of origin in Libya

8- First or second generation migrant
     First
     Second

9- Year you left Libya

10- Current country of residence

11- Political activity:
     Yes
     No

12- If yes, what kind of activity?

13- If no, why not?

B- Do you think there has been a significant brain drain of educated and skilled Libyans migrating from Libya in the last thirty years?

Please tick one box only.

1- There has been a very large brain drain.

2- A fairly large brain drain.

3- A small brain drain.
4- No brain drain. □

5- Any comments?


C- How do you think the migration of educated and skilled Libyans like you has affected overall development in Libya?

Please tick one box only

1- Had a very large negative effect. □

2- Had a fairly large negative effect. □

3- Had a small negative effect. □

4- Had no negative effect at all. □

5- Had a positive effect. □

6- Any comments?


D- Reasons why you left Libya?
Please tick one or more boxes

1- (Educational) To further my education & Research work. □

2- (Economical) To seek better income and life standard. □

3- (Personal) For family or other personal reasons. □

4- (Safety) For fear for my life. □

5- (Security) Due to Lack of rule of law and security. □

6- (Oppression) Due to Lack of freedom and democracy. □

7- Other reasons □ Please specify ____________________________

8- Any comments? ____________________________

E- How settled and integrated are you in your current country of residence?

Please tick one box only.

1- Well settled and integrated. □

2- Reasonably settled and integrated. □

3- Only partially settled and integrated □
4- Not settled and integrated at all. □

5- Any comments? _____________________________________________
______________________________
______________________________

F- Have you been back to visit Libya since you migrated and settled abroad?

Yes: □ No: □

G- If yes. How often?

1- Every year □

2- Every two years □

3- Every five years □

4- Other option □ Please specify ________________________________

H- What would persuade you to go back to Libya?

Please tick one or more boxes.
1- Improvement of the general socio-economic situation in Libya.

2- Good job prospects for me and/or family members.

3- An amnesty on Libyans who lived abroad and feared for their return.

4- A more open environment politically, socially & economically.

5- Significant reform steps of the country towards rule of law and political and civil society institutions.

6- Complete political change of Libyan regime to a democratic one.

7- Other reasons □ Please specify ________________________________

8- Not return in any circumstances □

9- Any comments? __________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

I- If your condition(s) above is fulfilled would you:

1- Return permanently and settle in Libya. □

2- Only go for (regular/occasional) visits. □

3- Any comments? ________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

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J-If you decided to return to Libya permanently would you?

Please tick one box only.

1- Return and take up a job in a public government institution. □

2- Return and take up a job in the private sector. □

3- Return and take up political / intellectual activities. □

4- Return and completely retire from all activities. □

5- Other options □ Please specify ____________________________

6- Any comments? ____________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

Thank you very much for answering this questionnaire.

Giuma Gamaty (PhD. Student)

For any information you may contact:

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Appendix C

INTERVIEW

This Interview is for a PhD research program by Giuma Gamaty on "Libyan brain drain and its effect on Democratization and Human Development in Libya" at the Centre for Study of Democracy, Westminster University, London. The answers will not be attributed to you and anonymity is guaranteed in accordance with University of Westminster code of practice for research.

Carried by: Giuma Gamaty

Date:    Serial No:   

Background questions:

1- Gender:  M   F

2- Age:     (18-34)   (35-54)   (55 +)   

3- Marital status:  Married  
                   Not Married   

4- Children:  Yes  How many?  No

5- Education:  - Secondary
                   - University
                   - Postgraduate
6- Current occupation / speciality

7- Place of origin in Libya

8- First or second generation migrant  First  □  Second  □

9- Year you left Libya

10- Current country of residence

11- Political activity:  Yes  □  No  □

12- If yes, what kind of activity?

13- If no, why not?

**Question 1:**
Why did you leave Libya?

**Question 2:**
So how would you describe the general situation in Libya at the time you left the country including for example?

- Social environment.
- Economic situation.
- State of Education and scientific research.
- Cultural / intellectual activities.
- Political participation.
- Freedom of expression.
- Rule of Law and personal security.
- State of Infrastructure and development.
- Any other important points to add?

**Question 3:**
How do you think your migration has affected Libya? And what difference do you think your return will make?

**Question 3:**
After living in your current country of residence for so many years, do you feel you have improved and benefited from your stay? And how?

**Question 4:**
Since you left Libya how would you describe its progress to date?

**Question 5:**
Where do you see Libya progressing to in the near and medium future?

**Question 6:**
Does that mean you could be tempted or persuaded to go back to Libya one day? And if so what role will you play and activities will you undertake?