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# Negotiating feminist solidarity amid digital nationalism: analyzing Chinese debate to the 2024 South Korean deepfake sex crime

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## ABSTRACT

In August 2024, several South Korean women reported on the Chinese social media platform Weibo that they had been subjected to sexual violence through AI deepfake technology, sparking widespread debate. This paper explores the transnational feminist discourse between South Korea and China, with a specific focus on the responses to the deepfake scandal on Weibo. Through critical discourse analysis of highly engaged Weibo discussions, we examine how Chinese feminists interact with South Korean feminist narratives under China's authoritarian digital landscape. We explore how Chinese feminism navigates gender resistance under authoritarian rule and examine the unique characteristics and value of such transnational feminist activism. By identifying the tensions between nationalist misogyny and cross-border feminist solidarity, this study highlights the paradoxical space within which Chinese feminists operate, balancing state repression, online censorship, and the influence of external feminist ideologies.

**KEYWORDS** Solidarity; digital nationalism; critical discourse analysis; feminism; social media

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 7 January 2025; Accepted 24 April 2025

## 1. Introduction

Nationalism and gender issues intersect in online discourse where women, especially those linked to foreign ideologies, are marginalized (Liao and Xia, 2023). Since 2024, South Korea has faced a growing deepfake crisis, with AI-generated sexual content targeting women. The rise of platforms like Telegram has made it easier for these deepfakes to spread, and in response, some South Korean women have turned to Chinese social media to raise awareness. While some Chinese netizens have shown support,

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many nationalists have expressed hostility, questioned the victims' motives and identity, and resorted to misogynist rhetoric.

The evolution of feminist discourse in China has been profoundly shaped by external influences, with South Korean feminism emerging as a particularly significant force. The 6B4 T movement, originating in South Korea, advocates for women's autonomy by rejecting traditional gender roles and has resonated with Chinese feminists seeking alternative strategies to challenge patriarchal oppression and state-controlled gender narratives (Cheng, 2023). However, this transnational feminist influence exists within a broader geopolitical and ideological framework that complicates its reception. While some Chinese feminists embrace South Korean feminism as a source of empowerment, others, particularly nationalist actors, perceive it as a foreign ideological threat that undermines national unity (Liu, 2024).

China's authoritarian governance model imposes unique constraints on feminist activism, shaping both its strategies and limitations. Unlike South Korea, where feminist mobilization occurs within a democratic framework, Chinese feminism operates under strict state surveillance, censorship, and political suppression. The Chinese state often frames feminist activism as a destabilizing force influenced by "foreign hostile forces" (Liu, 2024), aligning feminism with Western liberalism or South Korean radicalism in order to delegitimize grassroots feminist movements. This nationalist framing, reinforced by online discourse, has contributed to the dual marginalization of South Korean feminist ideas in China, both as an external "foreign" threat and as an internal gendered subversion of patriarchal norms.

This paper explores how these dynamics manifest in digital discourse by analyzing Chinese social media discussions surrounding the 2024 deepfake incident, in which South Korean women sought support on Weibo. Through critical discourse analysis, we investigate two emerging competing narratives. The first is rooted in nationalist misogyny that marginalizes and stigmatizes Chinese and South Korean feminists. The other seeks to integrate a discursive transnational feminist solidarity into China's restricted digital sphere, recontextualizing discourse to reverse power dynamics. By examining this interaction, we contribute to broader discussions on the localization of feminist movements under authoritarian governance and the limits of cross-border digital activism in an era of rising nationalism.

## **2. Literature review**

### ***2.1. Historical context of nationalism and gender in China***

The historical context of nationalism and gender in China is intricately linked to the evolution of the modern Chinese national character, which has been shaped by various socio-political transformations from the end of the

Imperial period to the present (Sun, 2016). The Xinhai Revolution (1911) led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, with women actively participating in revolutionary activities, thereby challenging traditional Confucian patriarchal norms (Qian, 2020). The May Fourth Movement (1919) further shaped the intersection of gender and nationalism in China, especially through women's autobiographical writing and feminist discourse. It marked a turning point where women redefined their identities within nationalist and social reform narratives (Wang, 1998). This literary practice documented women's struggles and decentralized public narratives, gaining visibility in the post-Mao era (Wang, 1998). In the early twentieth century, intellectuals linked women's emancipation to national rejuvenation, arguing that gender equality was vital for democracy and industrialization (1966). Western feminist movements further shaped this view, framing women's rights within broader human rights and social justice struggles (Stearns, 2015).

The evolution of feminist discourse in China has been marked by fluctuating state responses. Initially, state feminism promoted women's rights as part of socialist ideology, characterized by the Chinese Communist Party's claims of commitment to women's empowerment. However, these claims are often juxtaposed with traditional gender roles that emphasize family values and neo-familism (Whyke et al., 2024). With economic reforms and the rise of digital technologies, there has been a shift towards grassroots digital feminism (Dong, 2023). This transition reflects the impact of policy shifts on feminist activism, as digital platforms have become spaces for women to voice concerns and mobilize support independently of state structures (Gu and Heemsbergen, 2023).

## ***2.2. Digital nationalism and gendered discourse***

Recent studies highlight how nationalist and populist sentiments are increasingly intertwined with gendered, racialized, and heterosexual normativity (Bjork-James, 2020; Heinemann & Stern, 2022). As Sara Liao and Grace Xia (2023) note, digital nationalist sentiments often incorporate misogynist discourses, where women and gender minorities are marginalized as "others" within the national narrative. This nationalism is particularly evident in the frequent backlash against women perceived as challenging or undermining national dignity.

Altman Yuzhu Peng (2022) observes that online gender debates often reveal the centrality of misogynist discourses in nationalist mobilization. Within these discussions, digital nationalism functions as a key driver, shaping gender politics in ways that marginalize and vilify women who do not conform to idealized roles of feminine national duty. Groups like the "Little Pink," a group of young netizens expressing fervent patriotism, often engage in online actions that suppress feminist voices, framing them as

unpatriotic or influenced by foreign ideologies (Fang & Repnikova, 2018). This digital environment complicates feminist activism, as misogyny is often cloaked in patriotism. Additionally, male digital nationalists refine their strategies by using anti-political correctness rhetoric and accusations of gender antagonism to integrate nationalism into anti-feminist arguments, reinforcing gender-equal sexism in more subtle ways (He, 2024).

### ***2.3. Cross-border feminism and digital activism***

Cross-border digital feminism between China and South Korea is a dynamic and contested space shaped by ideological exchanges and digital activism. The 6B4 T movement in China, which evolved from South Korea's 4B movement, reflects the influence of transnational feminist discourse, yet it also faces distinct challenges under China's authoritarian digital landscape (Pyo, 2023). South Korea's #MeToo movement, widely recognized as a catalyst for feminist activism in East Asia, provided a template for online mobilization, influencing Chinese activists who adapted its strategies to local constraints (Ghadery, 2019). However, digital activism in China is often met with heavy censorship and nationalist backlash, which frames feminist movements as foreign threats (Cheng, 2023). The transnational nature of feminist solidarity is further complicated by geopolitical tensions, as seen in the nationalist resistance against South Korean feminist ideas within Chinese online spaces (Zhang, 2024). Despite these barriers, digital platforms serve as vital spaces for cross-border knowledge negotiation and activist collaboration, showcasing the resilience of feminist networks in the face of state suppression (Megiddo, 2019). The hybridization of feminist digital activism across these borders underscores the transformative potential of online spaces in shaping resistance movements.

### **3. Research gap**

While existing studies explore nationalism's impact on gender issues and online identity formation, little research examines how nationalist sentiments shape gendered discourse within specific digital communities, particularly in Korean-Chinese relations. The cross-border dynamics of digital feminism between China and South Korea remain largely unexplored, especially regarding the adoption or contestation of South Korean feminist ideas in China's authoritarian digital space. This gap limits our understanding of how regional feminist solidarities emerge and how state control and nationalism influence transnational feminist discourse. By analyzing how Chinese feminists deconstruct and counter-nationalist rhetoric, this study highlights the evolving strategies, tensions, and resilience of digital feminist activism under authoritarian governance.

## 4. Research questions

This research focuses on understanding how nationalism influences gender dynamics in online interactions between China and South Korea. Specifically, it addresses the following questions:

RQ1: What nationalist and misogynist discourses emerged in the Weibo debate surrounding the mutual assistance between Chinese and South Korean feminists in deepfake sexual crimes?

RQ2: How are these nationalist and misogynistic discourses intertwined, and how do they marginalize and stigmatize Chinese and South Korean feminists in the discussion?

RQ3: How do Chinese feminists respond to this marginalization and stigmatization?

## 5. Methodology

This study adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its approach, guided by the view of discourse as a mediator for understanding and legitimizing viewpoints (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014). Using Norman Fairclough's framework (2013a), we analyze discourse at three levels: text (discourse themes), linguistic context (discourse strategies), and social context (interplay with nationalism and anti-feminism). Specifically, textual analysis focuses on the style and vocabulary choices of the text. Discourse strategy analysis involves how the text is organized in specific patterns. The analysis of social context focuses on how the text and discourse interact with the broader social context and power (Peng, 2021).

The data comprises discussions about Deepfake incidents on Weibo. We focused on four key hashtags, each with 50–100 million views: #Multiple Korean Women Seeking Help on Chinese Internet, #Korean Women Respond to Seeking Help on Chinese Social Media, #Korean Women Thank Chinese Netizens for Speaking Out for Them and #Korean deepfake. These four hashtags were chosen as they are most relevant to our research topic and they appropriately cover the social media discussions we want to follow. We focus on high user engagement posts with these hashtags, as they represent significant viewpoints in the discussion of deepfake sexual crimes. Specifically, our subjects are posts with this hashtag published by "high-contributing users," which is an indicator used by Weibo to measure the impact of specific user behaviors on the promotion of a hashtag. Although the exact mechanisms and weights remain proprietary to Weibo, factors such as posting frequency and engagement metrics (likes, comments, shares) may play a major role.

Specific quantitative indicators may include the number of original posts made by users using this hashtag and the total number of likes, comments,

and shares/retweets received by the content posted with the hashtag. Each hashtag publicly lists “high-contributing users” in descending order (in the Weibo client interface), which provides a way for us to select which users’ posts dominate the discussion centered on that hashtag. The method to obtain post content is to enter the Weibo webpage through a browser and search for the target hashtag, then access the detailed information page of these hashtags to obtain a list of high-contribution users.

Since Weibo’s webpage can only display the top seven “high-contributing users” for each hashtag, we only selected posts with the target hashtag posted by these users, collecting a total of 28 posts. The full text of these posts, translations, and detailed information can be found in [Tables 1](#) and [2](#) below. To ensure accuracy, two researchers independently transcribed these online texts into TXT documents to ensure the content posted by the posters is accurately recorded. To ensure privacy, all information other than the text content, including the publisher’s ID, nickname, etc., has been anonymized.

## 6. Discourse analysis

### 6.1. *Marginalization of feminist solidarity*

We identify several textual uses that exhibit a distinctly nationalist bent, which marginalize the claims of Chinese feminists. One observed textual use is to emphasize the selflessness of the Chinese and the ingratitude of the South Koreans: “Chinese people spoke up for South Koreans” ([Table 1](#), number 4) and “South Koreans are saying that deepfake videos are all done by Chinese people,” as well as “South Korean women are the group that dislikes China the most” ([Table 1](#), number 4 and 12). These sentiments construct a stark “us vs. them” dichotomy, portraying “Chinese people” as selfless and South Koreans, especially South Korean women, as ungrateful and hostile. At the same time, the narrative emphasizes Chinese victimhood, depicting Chinese people as wronged by South Korean ingratitude, with South Korean women singled out as the group that “dislikes China the most.” This framing shifts blame outward, fostering a sense of national grievance. Additionally, the feminist principle “Girl Helps Girl” (“GHG” [Table 1](#), number 4), originally intended to promote solidarity among women (Yang & Hu, 2024), is appropriated to mock Chinese feminists who reflect on domestic issues, thereby undermining feminist solidarity.

Meanwhile, some posts refer to China’s policies to emphasize the legitimacy of marginalized women’s solidarity. The post, “We don’t interfere in other countries’ internal affairs” ([Table 1](#), number 13) employs China’s foreign policy of “non-interference in internal affairs” (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017) to justify disregarding South Korean women’s concerns. Another post

**Table 1.** Nationalists' discourse.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Bu shi, gemenr, shi ni gan de a? ..... Ganxie ni wei tamen fasheng Peitu: yi ge wangyou qu Chaoxian fandian liuyan, bing pei shang Jin de biaoqingbao: Haizimen, nimen weishenme bu lai zhao wo #Hanguo nuxing ganxie Zhongguo wangyou wei tamen fasheng# Qiu Jiangjun nanxia, jiu Han nu yu shuihuo! Ji bai wan Han nv lunwei guojia qule de yinjian zhi wu, ci shi yi cheng tiannu renyuan! Qiu Jin Jiangjun shuaijun nanxia jiejie Han nu! Bai wan Han nu wu suo yikao zhi neng dao youguo Zhongguo gaozhuang zao ren quxia, zhe shi heteng bei'ai! Jiangjun! Nin nanxia ba! Mei guanxi, bao suiye shishu de #Hanguo nunxing huiying zai Zhongguo shejiao pingtai qiuzhu# Peitu: Hanguo manhua Kan Lian Shidai haocheng N haofang shijian Zhongguoren shi shizuoyongzhe	"No, bro, it was you who did it, wasn't it?" "... Thank you for speaking up for them." Image: A netizen leaves a message at a North Korean restaurant, accompanied by a meme of North Korea's Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un: "Kids, why don't you come to me?" #SouthKoreanWomenThankChineseNetizensForSpeakingUpForThem# "General, please march south and save the Korean women from their plight! Millions of Korean women have been reduced to mere tools of the state's amusement, a situation that has become an outrage to humanity and heaven alike! We implore General Kim to lead his army south and rescue the Korean women! It is a tragedy that millions of Korean women, with no one else to turn to, must appeal to a friendly nation like China, only to be mocked. General, please march south!" It's okay; (south koreans) will definitely fabricate history. #SouthKoreanWomenRespondToSeekingHelpOnChineseSocialMedia# Image caption: The Korean webtoon Lookism claims that Chinese people were the instigators of the Nth Room incident. (The Nth Room incident refers to a major digital sex crime scandal that surfaced in South Korea in 2019 and 2020. It involved a network of Telegram chat rooms where perpetrators shared explicit videos and images of women and minors that were obtained through blackmail, coercion, and exploitation.)	<a href="https://weibo.com/1671109627/OuHVem4sO?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/1671109627/OuHVem4sO?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	1
Han wang toupiao: Hanguoren zui taoyan de guojia, Zhongguo 44.3% duanceng top. Qici shi Chaoxian (25.6%), Riben (23.4%), Meiguo (4.1%). Qizhong, teshi shi 20 dai chuban de Han nu 60.3% dou huida bu xihuan Zhongguo, shi suoyou xingbie nianling ceng limian zuigao de. Zhongguoren bang Hanguoren fasheng, jieguo Hanguoren xianzai jingran shuo deepfake huanlian	A South Korean online poll shows that the most disliked country among South Koreans is China, leading with 44.3%. Following China are North Korea (25.6%), Japan (23.4%), and the United States (4.1%). Notably, 60.3% of South Korean women in their early 20s expressed dislike for China, the highest percentage across all gender and age groups. Chinese people spoke up for South Koreans, but now South Koreans are saying that deepfake videos are all done by Chinese people. I've said it before, South Koreans	<a href="https://weibo.com/7217947278/OuXeU6VT3">https://weibo.com/7217947278/OuXeU6VT3</a>  <a href="https://weibo.com/2970036311/OuG5c7Qvj">https://weibo.com/2970036311/OuG5c7Qvj</a>  <a href="https://weibo.com/7051157562/">https://weibo.com/7051157562/</a>	2  3  4

(Continued)





Table 1. Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
shipin dou shi Zhongguoren gan de le. Wo zao jiu shuo le ba, Hanguoren zui taoyan Zhongguo, Han nu shi zui taoyan Zhongguo de qunti. Shei gen ni GHG a. Zhiqian resou shang bu ma Hanguoren, er shi rang Zhongguoren fansi de, shuo Zhongguo ye you huanlian de, you yi ge suan yi ge, dou zai di daozi.	dislike Chinese the most, South Korean women are the group that dislikes China the most. Who's with your GHG (Girl Helps Girl)? Previously, the posts were not cursing South Koreans, but making Chinese people reflect, saying that China also has face-swapping, one by one, all passing the knife (to foreign enemies).	<a href="https://weibo.com/OvCcLu5sh?refer_flag=1001030103_">OvCcLu5sh?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	
Dou ren dou kanbuguan tamen, shui dou zhidao Hanguoren chou Hua, zhe ci wufeinei wai liandong ma Zhongguo nanren eryi. You ge jianyi hen hao: Hanguo ganjin ba zhe ge shi shenyi.	Even the Douyin users can't stand "tamen" (them, feminine pronoun). Everyone knows South Koreans are anti-China, and this time it's just a coordinated attack from both internal and external forces collaborating to criticize Chinese men. There's a great suggestion: South Korea should hurry up and apply for this matter to be included in the heritage list.	<a href="https://weibo.com/1298124720/OuNHEx9q?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/1298124720/OuNHEx9q?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	5
Han nu bushi feichang you guqi, shuo bu sheng jiu bu sheng, zai ting wu nian jiu quanmian shengli, Yanu de xiwang zai Hanguo, Han nu bu duo dan xin qi, xiaoxiannv bei kaimo ma?	Aren't Korean women very courageous, won't give birth if they don't want to, and will be fully victorious in five more years? The hope of Asian women is in South Korea, there are not many Korean women, but they are united, and they are role models for little fairies? Didn't someone explain how South Koreans scold Chinese people and will be bullied by little fairies online? Why is it that the role models of little fairies come to the Chinese social media for help at this time? Where's their backbone? The light of women's rights is in South Korea, but the result of the gender war is this? Come on, little fairies, learn from your role models, learn from their hatred of men, women, old age, young children, parents, and the country, and then learn from South Korean women to sue motherland all over the world.	<a href="https://weibo.com/3089487123/OuFu4mvzl">https://weibo.com/3089487123/OuFu4mvzl</a>	6
Erqie you ren kepu yixia Hanguoren zenme ma Zhongguoren de bu dou yao bei xiaoxiannv men wangbao me?			
Zenme zhe shihou xiaoxiannv men de kaimo pao lai Zhongwen shequ qiuzhu a? Guqi ne?			
Nüquan zhi guang zai Hanguo, jieguo jiu zhan chulai zHEME ge jieguo a?			
Na xiaoxiannv men jiayou xiang kaimo xuexi, xue tamen de yan nan, yan nu, yan lao, yan you, yan fumu, yan guojia, ranhou xue Han nu man shijie gao yangzhuang yo~~ (peitu Zhongguo nv wangmin dui Han nüquan de zan yang huayü)			
Weishenme Hanguo de mouxie jiduan sixiang, zai guonei meiyou shichang ne?	Why do some extreme ideologies in South Korea fail to gain traction domestically? One of their most typical and insidious claims, "women have no nation," is both absurd and self-contradictory.	<a href="https://weibo.com/6191604322/OuEHswo3U?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/6191604322/OuEHswo3U?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	7
Tamen zui dianxing he yinsun de yi juhua, "nuxing meiyou guojia", jiu feichang huangdan qie ziwo maodun.			

(Continued)

**Table 1.** Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
<p>Nuxing zaoyu AI huanlian de xing baoli, shi shehui wenti, dangran zhide fenkai, ke mubiao bushi tingliu zai fenkai he silie shang, er shi jie jue zhege wenti, wufei si ge fangmian:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. gongju cengmian: xianzhi AI de lanyong,</li> <li>2. qudao cengmian: jieduan chuanbo tuitong, yanguan liaotian ruanjian,</li> <li>3. weiguan geti: zhuizong chuanbozhe he moulizhe, bing shijia yange xingfa,</li> <li>4. hongguan huanjing: puji falü he daode guannian, zengqiang jiaoyu, tisheng quan shehui fan xing baoli de gongshi.</li> </ol> <p>Wenti lai le, shui qu zhixing zhexie cuoshi?</p> <p>Shi qidai AI gongsi, he liaotian ruanjian beihou de da ziben men, ziju lüxing zeren yiwu ma?</p> <p>Haishi qidai weifazhe liangxin faxian, dou qu zisou? Haishi yikao you yi bu “tai gan pai le” de dianying? Zuo meng ne. Haishi dei qiang youli de jianguan lilian xia chang.</p> <p>Hanguo de wenti, dei kao Hanguo zhege guojia (huozhe beihou zhangquan de caifa men) qu jie jue, huozhe kao tamen de junshi zongzhuguo jie jue, ruguo tamen yuanyi de hua.</p> <p>Kao zai Zhongguo de yulunchang Weibo shengtang, ye xu neng gei Hanguo dai lai “guoji guanzhan” de yulun yali, duanshijian de gaishan yixie qingkuang, dan wufa cong guzi li, zhidu hua de qu jie jue genben wenti,</p> <p>zheci hao le, xiaci hai lai.</p>	<p>AI-generated sexual violence against women is indeed a societal issue worth condemnation. But the goal shouldn't stop at outrage and division—it should be about solving the problem. There are essentially four aspects to address:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Technological control: Restrict the misuse of AI.</li> <li>2. Distribution channels: Cut off propagation routes and tightly regulate communication platforms.</li> <li>3. Individual accountability: Trace and prosecute those spreading or profiting from such materials, enforcing severe punishments.</li> <li>4. Macro-environment: Promote legal and moral awareness, strengthen education, and foster societal consensus against sexual violence.</li> </ol> <p>The question is, who will implement these measures? Should we expect AI companies or the big corporations behind chat platforms to take responsibility willingly? Or hope violators will have a sudden change of heart and turn themselves in? Or rely on yet another “daring” movie to spark action? Wishful thinking. It takes powerful regulatory forces to intervene. South Korea's problems must be resolved by South Korea itself (or perhaps by the conglomerates that hold power behind the scenes or their military ally, if they're willing).</p> <p>Trying to leverage public opinion on Chinese platforms like Weibo might create short-term pressure and superficial improvements, but it won't fundamentally or systematically solve the issue.</p> <p>Today it's resolved; tomorrow it will happen again.</p> <p>Solving systemic issues requires not the conscience of capital or violators, nor the pressure of neighboring countries, but the strength of the nation itself.</p> <p>Of course, South Korea's state power is weak, which is why it repeatedly fails. This has become a national tragedy, reducing it to the “double-stealing nation” of cultural appropriation and hidden cameras.</p> <p>In contrast, things are different here in China. Regulations against pornography-related content online are always strictly enforced.</p>		

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Jiejue genben wenti, kao de bushi ziben huozhe weifazhe de ziju, ye bushi lingguo de yali, er shi benguo de guojia lilian.	What domestic social platform or corporation would dare skirt these rules or allow widespread dissemination of such content? They'd face the iron fist of the law in no time.		
Dangran, Hanguo de guojia lilian hen ruo, suoyi yizhi shibai, na jiushi guojia beiju le, lunwei tou wenhua + toutai de "shuang tou daguo".	That iron fist is the strength of the state. So, the claim that "women have no nation" might hold in a failed state like South Korea,		
Dan women zheli bu yiyang, dui wangluo shehuang de guankong conglai dou shi gaoya xian, guonei nage shejiao pingtai, huozhe ziben, gan rang ziji chanpin cabianqiu? Dasi chuanbo shehuang neirong?	but attempting to smuggle this rhetoric into China to sow division and conflict is absolutely unacceptable. That's not about genuinely supporting South Korean women but about weaponizing their suffering.		
Zao jiu zaoyu tiequan le.	Using the plight of South Korean victims as a tool under the guise of "supporting Korean women" is merely a front—at its core, it's the same old anti-China rhetoric.		
Zhege tiequan, jiushi guojia lilian.	Ultimately, the goal of addressing societal issues is to resolve them, not to use Country A's problems as a weapon to destabilize Country B.		
Suoyi "nuxing meiyou guojia" zhe hua, zai Hanguo zheyang de shibai guojia ye xu chengli, dan ruguo xiang yao jiadai sihuo de yindao guonei, zhizao silie he renqun maodun, jiushi juegui de buxing.			
Jiu bushi danchun de zhichi Hanguo nuxing, er shi ba "Hanguo shouhai nuxing gongjuhua", shengyuan Han nu zhishi kouhao, benzhi haishi hanguo nei ge hen guo nei yi tao.			
Renhe shehui wenti, zuihou de mubiao, shi jiejie wenti, er bushi ba A guo de shehui wenti, dangcheng gongji he gaoluan B guo de fabao.			
Shenme dou yao duibi chu zhenzhi, Hanguo naban de liangxing huati, shi kongsu shu shi wan ji de AI yinhui huanlian, jishu zuo + xing baoli fangzui + jianguan quewei,	To uncover real insights, we need meaningful comparisons. In South Korea, gender-related discussions focus on condemning large-scale deepfake pornography cases, highlighting issues of technological abuse + sexual violence crimes + regulatory failure. In contrast, debates in China revolve around minor concerns, such as complaints about female characters in gal games and otome games wearing revealing clothes or male characters using explicit language. Compared side-by-	<a href="https://weibo.com/6191604322/Ouyy2iMr8?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/6191604322/Ouyy2iMr8?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	8

(Continued)

**Table 1.** Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
er women zhebian, chao de shi Galgame he yiyou li, nu de yifu you chuan tai shao le, nan de duibai ci you guoyu lubu le, duibi kan jiu gen guojia yiyang. Suoyi Zhong Han genben meiyong kebixing, zan zhe dianr maodun haishi zai kekong fanwei nei de, qie jueda bufen Guoren dou shi lixing keguan de, jue bu xiang Han wang nabian quntixing de duili fenlie, shenme nuer xiang dao fuqin, muqin dui erzi "buneng kuaxia sheng diren" zhezong tupo lunli de maodun dou lai le.	side, these issues seem almost guojiajia (children's role-playing games). Thus, South Korean and Chinese gender issues are fundamentally incomparable. The conflicts in China are manageable, with most people remaining rational and objective, unlike the polarized atmosphere on South Korean forums. There, discussions sometimes even escalate to ethically extreme scenarios, like daughters hypothetically wanting to harm their fathers or mothers stating they "cannot birth an enemy" in reference to their sons. However, it's important to remain vigilant about certain external forces on international platforms that eagerly attempt to import external conflicts into domestic discussions, causing divisions among people.		
Buguo zhide jingti de, shi waiwang mouxie shili de tuanjian, zongshi puo bu jidai ba waimian de maodun yin dao guonei, yinfarenqun silie.			
Bang Han nu fasheng, wo xianzai shi jinshen de. Yinwei, ni xianzai bang ta, ta keneng fanguo tou lai yao ni.	I'm now cautious about speaking up for Korean women. Because if you help them now, they might turn around and bite you later. The Nth Room case is a prime example.	<a href="https://weibo.com/6059492811/OuVMOpBnU">https://weibo.com/6059492811/OuVMOpBnU</a>	9
N haofang jiushi zheyang.	Even though it was an internal issue in South Korea, they turned around and created a manga blaming others.		
Mingming shi Hanguoren neibu de shiqing, tamen huiguo tou jiu zheng le ge manhua suiyue shishu. "Bu yao wei Hanguoren shuohua, hui biande buxing."	"Don't speak up for South Koreans; it will only bring misfortune."		
Zhe tiao xian weishenme haoduo ren ma Zhongguo nan de .....	"Why are so many people criticizing Chinese men ... isn't it Korean men who are problematic? I don't get it."	<a href="https://weibo.com/1842706721/OuWxltA92">https://weibo.com/1842706721/OuWxltA92</a>	10
Echou de bushi Hanguo nan de me .....	Texts in the accompanying image: #Korean Women Respond to Seeking Help on Chinese Social Media# Men, shut up. Why do issues concerning women's safety always escalate into your pseudo-patriotic sentiments? It's already been said that men should stay offline, but they just won't listen.		
Bu lijie			
Peitu: #Hanguo nunxing huiying zai Zhongguo shejiao pingtai qiuzhu#			
Nan de bizi @duiyu nuxing anquan wenti zenme you shangsheng dao nimen geren de wei jiaguo qinghuai li le @ ... dou shuo le nan de bie shangwang hai bu ting	#Korean Women Respond to Seeking Help on Chinese Social Media# Those who ignore these issues are mainly men, right? It doesn't matter to them because they aren't the ones facing these struggles ... After all, every place really "ai" (loves/favours) men		
#Hanguo nunxing huiying zai Zhongguo shejiao pingtai qiuzhu#			

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Top redu naxie shir guan ji gao gao gua qi de dou shi nan de ba, suoyi dui tamen laishuo bing wusuowei, yinwei zhe bushi shuyu tamen de kunjing ... bijing meige difang dou hen ai nan			
Zan jiu shuo, zheme da de shi bude tou dao Niuyue Shidai Guangchang shang qu ma? Zhe juran dou neng ren de xiaqu.	"Seriously, shouldn't something this big be displayed on the screens in Times Square, New York? How can they just let this slide? Those South Korean idols who are usually so loud and vocal are suddenly all silent when it comes to real issues."	<a href="https://weibo.com/5679508036/OuVNFjezq?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/5679508036/OuVNFjezq?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	11
Hanguo xhexie ge aidou pingshi jiaohuan de ting huan de, zhen dao shiqing shang, yige ge de quan bi mai le.			
Bujinjin diaocha xianshi nianqing de Hanguo nunxing shi quan Hanguo (you keneng ye shi quan shijie) zui taoyan Zhongguo de qunti (taoyan Zhongguo de bili chaoguo quan Hanguo suoyou xingbie nianling duan, youqi shi 19 sui dao 24 sui de Hanguo nunxing, taoyan Zhongguo de bili bi tongling de nanxing gao chu zhengzheng 16%).	Research shows that young South Korean women are the group that dislikes China the most in South Korea (and possibly the world). The proportion of those who dislike China exceeds that of all other gender and age groups in South Korea, especially among women aged 19 to 24, who dislike China 16% more than their male peers.	<a href="https://weibo.com/1671109627/OuXrP1J6P?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/1671109627/OuXrP1J6P?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	12
Erqie Hanguoren (baokuo Hanguo nunxing) taoyan Zhongguo de ji ge yuanyin shi:	Several reasons why South Koreans (including women) dislike China include:		
1. Tamen/tamen renwei Sichuan paocai bu pei jiao "paocai", ye bu pei shenqing guoji biaozhun renzheng.	1. They believe Sichuan kimchi shouldn't be called "kimchi" and shouldn't be eligible for international standard certification		
2. Tamen/tamen renwei Hanfu chaoxi Hanfu.	2. They believe Hanfu is a copy of the Korean hanbok.		
3. Tamen/tamen renwei Gaogouli shi Hanguo de.	3. They believe Goguryeo is part of Korea.		
4. Tamen/tamen renwei Hanguo de shachenbao shi Zhongguo gua guoqu de.	4. They think the sandstorms in Korea come from China.		
5. Tamen/tamen renwei Zhongguo de junshi lilian tai qiangda le.	5. They think China's military power is too strong.		
6. Yue qiong de Hanguoren dui Zhongguo de diyi yue da.	6. The poorer South Koreans have more hostility toward China.		
	This information comes from KoreaHerald and The Diplomat. When you speak up for South Korea, the majority of South Koreans might ask: "Do you even deserve to?"		

(Continued)

**Table 1.** Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Yishang ziliao lai yuan yu korea herald he the diplomat Ni wei Hanguo fasheng, zhan jue da duoshu bili de Hanguoren fanguo lai dao yao shuo le: ni pei ma? #Duo ming Han nunxing zai Zhongguo hulianwang qiuzhu#	Honestly, in this situation, South Korean women should seek help from the United States. We don't interfere in other countries' internal affairs; this is a matter for the U.S. to handle, not us.	<a href="https://weibo.com/3939426052/OuDM3wsVM?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/3939426052/OuDM3wsVM?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	13
You yi shuo yi, zhe shi, Hanguo nunxing yinggai xiang Meiguo qiuzhu, women bu ganshe bie gou neizheng, zhe shi gui Meiguo guan, bu gui women guan. Hanguo nu de, ba Taiwan yu yi zhong zhuchuan guojia binglie, hai haoyisi pao Zhongguo lai shengtang. Lian Zhongguo zui jiben de yuanze dou bu zunzhong, you lian la CN xia shui. Shenme dongxi. #Duo ming Han nunxing zai Zhongguo hulianwang qiuzhu#	South Korean women, putting Taiwan alongside other sovereign countries, yet still have the nerve to come to China and make demands. They don't even respect China's basic principles, yet they have the audacity to drag China into this. What is this nonsense? This matter originally had nothing to do with us. Clicked on the hashtag and took a look around, sure enough, those animals still pinned the blame on Chinese men in the end. The routine of Chinese feminism is that when encountering negative news about foreign men, they launch an attack on all men, criticizing Chinese men collectively. When facing negative news about Chinese men, they target China precisely and then praise how good foreign men are. As for "speaking logically, not double standards", feminism naturally does not consider these. Their most powerful weapon is not speaking logically, throwing tantrums to solve all problems.	<a href="https://weibo.com/5673874565/Ouz9bD7Uh?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/5673874565/Ouz9bD7Uh?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	14
Zhe shi benlai gen women mei renhe guanxi. Dian jinqu biaoqian guang le yi quan, guoran na qun shengwu zuihou haishi ba guo kou dao guo nan tou shang. Zhongguo nüquan de taolu shi ruguo yudao waiguo nanxing de fumian xinwen, jiu dui quanti nanxing chui, ba Zhongguo nanxing yiqi la jinqu pipan. Ruguo yudao Zhongguo nanxing de fumian xinwen, jiu dui Zhongguo jingzhun chui, ranhou kua waiguo nanxing duome hao. Zhi yu shenme "jiang luoji, bu shuangbiao", nüquan ziran buhui kaolv zhexie. Tamen shashangli zui da de wuqi jiushi bu jiang luoji, sapo dagun jie jue yiqie wenti. #Duo ming Han nunxing zai Zhongguo hulianwang qiuzhu#		<a href="https://weibo.com/1686096655/OuDxv8Uef">https://weibo.com/1686096655/OuDxv8Uef</a>	15
	#Multiple South Korean women seek help on Chinese internet# If South Korean feminism hadn't turned into a terrorist organization, South Korean women wouldn't be in such a dire situation now.	<a href="https://weibo.com/1553184325/Ouz6wtwFX">https://weibo.com/1553184325/Ouz6wtwFX</a>	16

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Danfan dangchu Hanguo nüquan meiyong cheng kongbu zuzhi, xianzai Hanguo nunxing dou buhui you zHEME zaogao de jingyu. O, wo shuo cuo le. Qing Hanguo nunxing zai jianchi ji nian, nimen mashang yao shengli le!!! Zhe jiu kaishi sui le, peitu: zai Kan Lian Shidai zuixin 285–289 hua neirong zhong liang wei weichengnian nusheng bei pian qian le yifen zuo chengren zhibo de hetong. Yitu yingshe jinqi zhenjing quanqiu de Hanguo “N haofang” shijian, dan zuozhe jing jiang zuopin zhong “N haofang guanzhong” sheding wei Zhongguoren, jiang zhibojian li de wenzi sheding wei Zhongwen, danmu zhong quan shi Hanzi. Bingqie manhua zhong liang wei nusheng shuo ziji buhui Zhongwen ye buhui Yingyu, laoban que he tamen shuo meiguanxi, nimen hen kuai jiu shi shuxi Zhongwen de.	Oh, I misspoke. Please hang on a few more years, South Korean women, victory is just around the corner!!!  It’s starting to fabricate history. Image caption: In the latest chapters (285–289) of Lookism, two underage girls are tricked into signing a contract to do adult livestreaming. The story seems to be a subtle reference to the recent globally shocking South Korean “Nth Room” incident. However, the author has set the “Nth Room viewers” in the work as Chinese, with the live stream’s text in Chinese and the bullet comments all in Chinese characters. Furthermore, the two girls in the comic say they don’t know Chinese or English, but the boss tells them not to worry, they will soon be familiar with Chinese.	<a href="https://weibo.com/7519706333/OuXA7hCkn?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7519706333/OuXA7hCkn?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	17

**Table 2. Feminists' discourse.**

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Wo yao zenme zhengming "wo" bushi wo? Yige kanshi haowu luoji de wenti, que ji you keneng yinwei deepfake jishu de lanyong chengwei xianshi. Zhe xiang jishu de xie'e zhi chu zaiyu, zai jiahaizhe yanzhong, huanlian shi wuzu qingzhong de wanxiao he naoju, dui shouhaizhe erylai que shi cixiang ziji de jiandao. Zai lian bei touzou de tongshi, women de shenfen, mingyu, yinsi, zunzhong ye dou bei touzou le. Dang ni faxian yizhi zhanglang de shihou, shuoming zhanglang yijing bianbu quanwu le. Zai guowai, deepfake de shouhaizhe, youqi shi nunxing, duo dao shenzhi wufa tongji. Ruhe cai neng rang deepfake bu zai siwu jidan de yingxiang renmen zhengchang de shenghuo? Zhe shi wo, women de tuandui, shenzhi women de shehui dou yinggai yao sikao de wenti. Al he jishu dou zhishi gongju, gongju benshen bing wu duicuo, jishu de lichang laiziyu shiyongzhe de dongji. Keji de jinbu yinggai zaofu renlei, er bushi chengwei moxie ren eyi xingjing de gongju. Jiran youren yong jishu zaojia, women jiu yong jishu shouduan shixian fanzhencha. 23 nian biye huiguo hou, wo jiu yizhi zai congshi deepfake jiance suanfa yanjiu de gongzuo. Women yijing ba jinqi canjia quanqiu Deepfake gongfang tiaozhansai de Al moxing xiang quanqiu kaiyuan, rang suoyou you xuyao de ren dou keyi mianfei shiyong moxing lai dui kang deepfake. Women xiwang tongguo jishu shouduan, wei mei yige keneng shoudao shanghai de ren tigong baohu. Women buhui tingzhi dui zhe lei xingwei de zhuiqiu, ye buhui fangqi dui jishu de tansuo he wanshan. Zhege shijie you hei'an, ye you zhaoliang hei'an de guang. Ruguo yige ren de huoba tai xiao, women jiu ba huoba chuan gei shijie de mei yige ren.	How do I prove that "I" is not me? A seemingly illogical question, but one that could very well become a reality through the misuse of deepfake technology. The evil of this technology is that, in the eyes of the victimizer, the face swap is an insignificant joke or farce, but to the victim, it is a sharp knife stabbed into him/her. As our faces are stolen, so are our identities, reputations, privacy, and respect. When you find a cockroach, it means the cockroaches have spread all over the house. In foreign countries, the victims of Deepfake, especially women, are so many that they cannot even be counted. How can we stop Deepfake from recklessly affecting people's normal life? This is a question that I, our team, and even our society should think about .... We want to provide protection to everyone who may be harmed through technology. We will not stop pursuing such behavior, nor will we give up exploring and perfecting the technology. There is darkness in this world, and there is light to illuminate it. If people's torch is too small, we will pass it on to everyone in the world.	<a href="https://weibo.com/5666579547/OuXW94G8R?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/5666579547/OuXW94G8R?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	1

(Continued)



Table 2. Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
<p>“Hanguoren de shiqing gan Zhongguo shenme shi” zhezong lundiao zhen ting dou de.</p> <p>Quan shijie nuxing mingyun gongtongti.</p> <p>Najiu lai kankan you meiyu guanxi ba:</p> <p>Gunshi zazhi biaoshi: shishang Hanguo nv mingxing zhan quanbu Deepfake shipin de 25%.</p> <p>Er zhaxie yi Hanliu nvxing wei zhujue de deepfake shipin daduo shi zai Zhongguo zhizuo de.</p> <p>Zhe shi yinwei Zhongguo shi kpop de zhuyao xiaofei guo.</p> <p>“Sui zhe Kpop yi fazhan chengwei jiazhi 50 yi meiyuan de quanqiu chanye, Kpop mingxing zhengzai chengwei Deepfake shipin de shouhaizhe.”</p> <p>Jieguo xianshi, zai Deepfake yingpian de shouhaizhe zhong 53% shi Hanguo guoji de ren.</p> <p>Meiguo ren zhan 20%, jin sui qi hou de shi Riben (10%)、Yingguo (6%)、Zhongguo (3%).</p> <p>Hanguo yadixing de zhanju di yi wei.</p> <p>Huanlian shouhaizhe dabufen shi geshou huo yanyuan, zai zhizuo Deepfake yinhuiwu zui duo de shijie qian 10 ming zhong, qian 7 ming he di 9 ming shi Hanguo geshou.</p> <p>Ye jiushuo, 10 ren zhong you 8 ren shi Hanguo ren.</p> <p>Yi Zhongguo zhizuo de K-POP nu ouxiang wei duixiang de Deep Fake seqing pian zhan jueuduoshu.</p> <p>Shouhaizhe xingbie 99% wei nuxing.</p> <p>Renjia ganxie de shi “Chinese sisters” zenme fanyi cheng Zhongguo wangyou le, sister shenme shihou you wangyou zhege shiyi le ma.</p> <p>Meiti men zongshi zheyang, haoshi jiu hui móhu xingbie, huaishi jiu xuyao tiaoming de,</p> <p>yaoshi waimian diss de shi Chinese sister ni cai zhaxie ren hui bu hui fanyi zhengque.</p>	<p>“What does it matter to China if it’s happening to Koreans?” is honestly quite amusing. There exists a global community of women with shared fates. Let’s take a look at whether there’s a connection: Rolling Stone reports that, in fact, Korean female celebrities make up 25% of all Deepfake videos. And these Deepfake videos, featuring mostly K-pop stars, are predominantly produced in China, as China is a major consumer of K-pop.</p> <p>“As K-pop has grown into a global industry worth \$5 billion, K-pop stars have become victims of Deepfake videos.” The data shows that 53% of Deepfake video victims are of Korean nationality. Americans make up 20%, followed by Japan (10%), the UK (6%), and China (3%). Koreans overwhelmingly occupy the top position. Most Deepfake victims are singers or actors, and in the top 10 list of the world’s most-targeted figures in Deepfake pornographic content, 7 out of 10 and the 9th spot are taken by Korean singers. In other words, 8 out of 10 are Koreans.</p> <p>Deepfake porn videos targeting K-POP female idols, produced mainly in China, make up the majority. Of the victims, 99% are female.</p>	<p><a href="https://weibo.com/1908695587/OuWlochRN?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/1908695587/OuWlochRN?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p>	2
<p>They thanked the “Chinese sisters,” but it got translated as “Chinese netizens.”</p> <p>When did “sisters” ever mean “netizens”? The media always does this—when it’s something good, they blur the gender, but when it’s something bad, they make sure to specify. If the criticism outside was aimed at “Chinese sisters,” do you think these people would translate it correctly?</p>	<p><a href="https://weibo.com/6311244201/OuFOlgS13?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/6311244201/OuFOlgS13?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p>	3	

(Continued)

**Table 2.** Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Shi "suoyou wangyou" haishi "sisters"? Peitu: 1. Hanguo nunxing fa zai Twitter shang ganxie Zhongguo nv wangyou de jietu: appreciate Chinese sisters; Thank you for the Chinese sisters I really appreciate it 2-6: Weibo wangyou pinglun: 【Zhichi Han nan】 Wutiaojian zhichi Han nan; dang nanren zhende fangkai le shoujiao, nüren cai hui mingbai ziji ruci bukanyì ji. 【Zidao ziyàn】 You meiyòu guonei zidào ziyàn de keneng; xiao zuowen dongde dòu dòu, guo liang tian fan zhuan kaishi dai huo le jiu le le; haoduo benlai jiushi tamen fenquan husi de shihou ziji zuo de you pi pi fanchuan tu, haiyou pi y zhao de, suibian sou ji ge nv mingxing fensi husi nan lang xing si nan nv mingxing husi dou shi ge zhong bu san lu huang wan wajia p tu; Han nu ziji huxiang baling ranhou ba guo shuai dao nan de tou shang, chuantong yinen le. 【Wo ye xiang kan】 Wo dou xiang shua huanlian le; Liu Tao, Yang Mi, Yang Tianbao dou shi huanlian qu chang ke; 【Zhiyi dongji】 Ni bu qu Twitter shang kangyi, bu xianxia baojing, pao lai Zhongguo de shejiao ruanjian shang ku sang; wo bu dong, chuanbo chulai you shenme yong, neng shiji jie jue shenme wenti me?; keneng shi guonei nüquan jie hua xian fo zuo shuju gao zhanshu, lianhe bangzi fenquan zuo huati.	#South Korean Women Thanking Chinese Netizens for Speaking Out# Is It "All Netizens" or "Sisters"? Attached Images: P1: Screenshots of South Korean women on Twitter thanking Chinese women; P2-P9: Misogynistic discourse on Deepfake incidents on Chinese social media. Attached Images: 1.Screenshots of South Korean women on Twitter thanking Chinese women: • "Appreciate Chinese sisters;" • "Thank you for the Chinese sisters, I really appreciate it." 2-6. Screenshots of comments from Chinese social media platform Weibo: • [Supporting Korean Men] "Unconditionally support Korean men; when men truly let go, women will understand how powerless they really are." • [Accusation of Fabrication] "Could this be a domestic fabrication? Small essays, you know what I mean; wait a couple of days, the reversal will begin, and they'll start selling products—it'll be hilarious. Many of these cases originate from their fan circles fighting among themselves, using fake pictures or Photoshop. Korean women bullying each other and blaming men is a traditional skill." • [Curiosity and Criticism] "I even want to try to use face-swapping technology; Liu Tao, Yang Mi, and Yang tianbao (These three are all Chinese female celebrities) are regulars in deepfake communities." • [Questioning Motives] "Why don't you protest on Twitter or report it to the police offline instead of coming to China's social media to cry? I don't get it. What's the point of spreading this online? Does it solve anything? Is this just domestic female boxing (feminists) using the situation to boost data and make tactical moves?" • [Dismissal of Credibility] "Friendly reminder: face-swap communities mostly feature celebrity faces. Ladies with pancake faces shouldn't fantasize about making it into the swap zone. Swapping in someone like Yang Li could serve as a form of abstinence or birth control. Seriously though, why are those "average yet confident women" so worried? Do they have no self-awareness about their looks? It's hilarious—AI face-swapping? Nobody would want them even if they showed their real faces!"	<a href="https://weibo.com/7847589792/OuGZp9PAp?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7847589792/OuGZp9PAp?refer_flag=1001030103_</a>	4

(Continued)

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
<p>"Yin nan ke bu guanzhe nimen", "huanlian? hai yiwei duo da dian shi", "chuan de sao jiu gai" ... .. gei Hanguo nv yangyou yidian xiao xiao de zhenhan Peitu: tong yige Weibo yonghu de duotiao fayan jietu:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Guo nu duoluo de youyin, jianyi fengsha yiyou, haiyou ge zhong xianrou tuan ye gai jin, zheyang guo nu jiu hui guaguai jiehun sheng haizi le. Qima buhui chengtian xiang ge feng pi yiyang daochu lie lie</li> <li>2. Zhe wenti wujie, shi nuren jiu you huaiyun de fengxian, suoyi zui lixing de zuofa jiushi zhao ge nan de, nu de tiansheng jiu juan bu guo nan de #nvzi shiyongqi gang guo xuanbu huaiyun bei jiepin#</li> <li>3. Shuo de tai dui le, nu de chuan de sao jiu huogai #Yindu xuesheng cheng nvsheng zai qiangjian an li ye you cuo#</li> <li>4. Hai yiwei da dian shi #Hanguo huanlian#</li> <li>5. Yindu nanren ke bu guanzhe nimen #Hanguo huanlian#</li> <li>6. Yige Han nu, meiren zhishi, hui pao dao Weibo lai shenyuan #Hanguo huanlian#</li> </ol>	<p>"Indian men won't pamper you," "Face swap? I thought it was no big deal," "If you dress provocatively, you deserve it" ... Giving a little shock to Korean female netizens.</p> <p>Image: Multiple posts from the same Weibo user:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The cause of the decline of Chinese women, I suggest banning Otome game and various idol groups, then Chinese women will obediently get married and have children. At least they won't be running around like crazy all day.</li> <li>2. There's no solution to this. If you're a woman, there's always the risk of getting pregnant, so the most rational approach is to find a man. Women can never compete with men. #A woman announced her pregnancy right after her trial period and got fired#</li> <li>3. Too true, women who dress provocatively deserve it. #Indian student says the victim in a rape case is also at fault#</li> <li>4. I thought it was no big deal. #South Korea face swap#</li> <li>5. Indian men won't pamper you. #South Korea face swap#</li> <li>6. A Korean woman, without being instructed by anyone, would go to Weibo to complain. #South Korea face swap#"</li> </ol>	<p><a href="https://weibo.com/7871567571/OuxHf8TLr?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7871567571/OuxHf8TLr?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p>	5
<p>"Ni bu qu tai shang shuo, bu xianxia bao'an, lai Zhongguo shejiao ruanjian gan shenme?" Zhe huashu kan zhe shuxi bu? Qian yi zhen mou boshi sheng shiming jubao daoshi xq de shihou, ye youren zHEME shuo. Peitu: Weibo yonghu 1: ni bu qu Twitter shang kangyi, bu xianxia baojing, pao lai Zhongguo de shejiao ruanjian shang ku sang Weibo yonghu 2: ni za zhidao tamen mei qu ne. 。 。 。 Shang zhi nv mingxing, xia zhi mei yige putong de nuxing, wulun guoji, women dou you keneng chengwei xia yige shouhaizhe. Peitu: Weibo yonghu shai de Zhongguo nv mingxing de AI huanlian seqing tu</p> <p>Hanguo deepfake liaotianshi li ye you bai fen zhi san de Zhongguo nanxing yonghu, suoyi women ye yao fasheng, zhe yu women zenme bu xiangguan ne, weilai nuxing de xiaoxiang quan, renga quan women yinggai zenme baohu, erqie xianzai yijing you guo nan zai Zhihu shang wen zenme xiazai deepfake le. 。 。</p>	<p>"What are you doing on a Chinese social media program if you're not going to tweet about it or report it offline?" Does this tactic look familiar? Someone said the same thing a while ago when a PhD student reported sexual assault by her supervisor.</p> <p>Image caption: Weibo User 1: You didn't go to Twitter to protest, you didn't report it to the police offline, but you're here on Chinese social media crying. Weibo User 2: How do you know they didn't?</p> <p>"From female celebrities to every ordinary woman, regardless of nationality, we all could become the next victim.</p> <p>Image: A Weibo user shares AI-generated pornographic images of Chinese female celebrities."</p> <p>There are also 3% Chinese male users in the South Korean deepfake chat rooms, so we need to raise our voices. How is this unrelated to us? In the future, how should we protect women's portrait rights and personal rights? And now there are Chinese men asking on Zhihu (a Chinese social media platform where users can ask questions, share knowledge, and engage in discussions on various topics) how to download deepfake ...</p>	<p><a href="https://weibo.com/7847589792/Ouy8SF4ue?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7847589792/Ouy8SF4ue?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p> <p><a href="https://weibo.com/7259760533/OuFzICXIV?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7259760533/OuFzICXIV?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p> <p><a href="https://weibo.com/7806388620/OuwlREODM?refer_flag=1001030103_">https://weibo.com/7806388620/OuwlREODM?refer_flag=1001030103_</a></p>	6
			7
			8

(Continued)

**Table 2.** Continued.

Discourse	Translation	Link	Number
Hen bei'ai, duiyu muqian hai youren jue de zhe zhishi Hanguo nanren lan de xianzhuang gandao wunai. Shenme shihou neng fanying guolai zhe bushi guoji de wenti er shi xingbie de wenti ne? Nanren zhende dou yige yang a.	It's sad, and I feel helpless about the current state of affairs where there are still people who think it's just Korean men who suck. When will they react to the fact that it's not a nationality issue but a gender issue? Men really are all the same.	<a href="https://weibo.com/5870223070/OuwOMxtAr">https://weibo.com/5870223070/OuwOMxtAr</a>	9

frames solving deepfake sex crimes as the responsibility of the United States due to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. This narrative reinforces South Korea's perceived dependence and subordination, suggesting that it must "seek help" (Table 1, number 13) from the U.S., thereby undermining its agency and aligning the poster with Chinese nationalist rhetoric that dismisses South Korea as a mere "watchdog" of "Western powers." Additionally, the text reflects a form of gendered nationalism, where concerns for South Korean women are deliberately dismissed in favor of a nationalist agenda that prioritizes sovereignty over transnational feminist solidarity.

Finally, some posts emphasized the differences in gender issues between China and South Korea, thereby downplaying the necessity of fighting against deepfake sexual crimes in China. A stark contrast between gender issues in China and South Korea is constructed by trivializing Chinese concerns as "guojiajia (children's role-playing game)" (Table 1, number 8) while emphasizing the "severe" problems of South Korea, "technological abuse + sexual violence crimes + regulatory failure" (Table 1, number 8). This selective framing presents China as rational and moderate, while portraying South Korea as extreme and socially fractured. At the same time, the narrative reinforces a sense of nationalist superiority by downplaying China's gender inequalities and exaggerating South Korea's, promoting a discourse of Chinese exceptionalism.

This discourse not only amplifies gender divisions between China and South Korea but also serves to alienate South Korean and Chinese women. This discourse positions South Korean feminist movements as radical and divisive, characterized by phrases such as "polarized atmosphere" (Table 1, number 8) and "daughters wanting to stab their fathers" (Table 1, number 8). It simultaneously reduces Chinese gender-related discussions to trivial debates over women characters' attire in video games to construct a stark contrast between the two movements. In this framing, South Korean women are depicted as disloyal and extreme, whereas Chinese women are positioned as rational and patriotic. Consequently, those who attempt to introduce a feminist discourse that challenges this narrative are labeled as subversive elements (Table 1, number 8) seeking to "sow discord" (Table 1, number 7) and "foment social divisions" (Table 1, number 8), effectively marking them as adversaries of the state.

By prioritizing national loyalty over transnational feminist solidarity, this rhetorical move discourages cross-border alliances and reinforces a nationalist agenda that subordinates feminist concerns to state interests. This framing serves a dual function: it deflects attention from China's internal gender struggles while reinforcing the status quo. By depicting South Korea's gender tensions as an example of "what happens" when feminist movements become too extreme, it implicitly justifies the suppression of similar movements in China. Additionally, the discourse facilitates digital vigilantism

(Mendes et al., 2019), as nationalist actors engage in monitoring, suppressing, and discrediting feminist voices in order to defend national and patriarchal stability. Through this process, domestic feminist critique is not only silenced but also rebranded as a foreign-influenced threat, further entrenching state control over gender discourse and curbing the potential for feminist activism to effect meaningful social change. This rhetoric also reinforces misogynistic tropes, portraying South Korean feminists as adversaries and marginalizing them on both national and gendered grounds. This dual marginalization frames them as threats to China's national identity and patriarchal order. South Korean women's experiences are shaped by their intersectional (Crenshaw, 2013) position of nationality and gender, leading to compounded exclusion within nationalist discourse. Positioned as both national enemies and gendered threats, their portrayal complicates transnational feminist efforts, highlighting how overlapping social identities create unique forms of marginalization.

## **6.2. Stigmatization of Chinese and South Korean feminists**

In these texts, many terms are used by nationalist misogynists to dehumanize Chinese and South Korean feminists and homogenize their opinions. For example, in case 15 (Table 1, number 15), "The routine of Chinese feminism" summarizes (and also criticizes) Chinese feminists and feminism as possessing the same action strategies. Similarly, South Korean feminists are summarized as "South Korean women" (Hannu) (Table 1, number 5), while all feminists who express opinions on this topic (regardless of nationality) are summarized as "they" with female pronouns (Tamen) (Table 1, number 6). These statements define Chinese and Korean feminists in general terms with an affirmative tone, making their stigmatization certain.

Additionally, some posts use dehumanizing and infantilizing narratives to stigmatize Chinese feminists. Feminists are referred to as "animals" (Table 1, number 15) in certain texts, showcasing their direct derogation by nationalist misogynists. On the other hand, the term "little fairies" (Table 1, number 6) is used to infantilize Chinese feminists, implying their childishness and immaturity. These posts create the infantilizing narrative that Chinese feminists are "not speaking logically," but are rather, "throwing tantrums to solve all problems" (Table 1, number 15).

Compared to Chinese feminists, South Korean feminists are described in these posts as an evil external force. These posts specifically stigmatize the South Korean feminist as a "terrorist" (Table 1, number 16), and claim they possess a "hatred of men, women, old age, young children, parents, and the country" and desire to "sue motherland all over the world" (Table 1, number 6). These posts emphasize that South Korean feminists will mislead Chinese women, turning them into feminists by "attempting to smuggle

this rhetoric into China to sow division and conflict” (Table 1, number 7). These posts not only stigmatize the activism of South Korean feminists regarding deepfake sexual crimes, but label it as extreme hatred towards other groups within China. These texts further attempt to divide “normal Chinese women” from “extreme South Korean feminists” by implying that Chinese women will be led astray by the misinformation promoted by South Korean feminists online.

Finally, men, especially Chinese men appear as innocent, rational victims in the discourse of nationalist misogynists. The term “pinned the blame” (Table 1, number 15) is used to position Chinese men as victims of any negative news about sexual crime. Similarly, claims that Chinese and Korean women are “collaborating to criticize Chinese men” and that Chinese women are “criticizing Chinese men” (Table 1, number 5 and 10) without substantiated evidence further reinforce this victimization narrative. These posts also claim that Chinese feminists do not hate all men, but rather “target Chinese men precisely and then praise how good foreign men are” (Table 1, number 15). This means that in the discourse of Chinese nationalist misogynists, there are two male images: the first is the innocent man, usually a Chinese man, who is typically attacked by Chinese feminists and the second is the man favored by Chinese feminists, usually a foreign man. These textual assertions can be understood as a discourse strategy, which constructs a dichotomy with South Korean and Chinese feminists on the one side and Chinese men on the other. This dichotomy is constructed in various ways and serves to obscure Chinese and South Korean women’s mutual assistance in deepfake sexual crimes, as well as benefit a more broader power dynamic of gender.

The above discourse of dehumanization and infantilization depicts Chinese feminists as overly emotional extremists who lack rational human agency. Such narratives often draw on a gender bias that frames women as emotional or irrational, and men as cultural or rational (Ortner, 1972; Vaes et al., 2011). This dehumanization allows for the subjugation of women due to their perceived lack of civility, rationality, and intellect (Vaes et al., 2011). These posts concurrently infantilize Chinese feminists and suggest they are childlike and unable to exercise mature autonomy. Katie Peters (2024) points out that infantilization portrays women as lacking sufficient knowledge or control, ultimately reinforcing imbalanced gender relations by naturalizing women’s subordinate position relative to men.

This stigmatization is politicized by emphasizing the supposed threat that Chinese and South Korean feminists pose to both the Chinese state and Chinese men. Qiqi Huang (2023a) and Kai Bao (2024) demonstrate that misogynist, anti-feminist narratives consistently depict feminists as dangerous extremists, subjecting them to abuse and humiliation. Such rhetoric often paints Chinese and Korean feminists as a monolithic group whose goals undermine national stability and men’s privileged positions. In China

specifically, these narratives center on the purported “Western roots” of feminism, suggesting that feminist demands contradict traditional Chinese values (Huang, 2023a). By portraying feminism as antithetical to the state, Chinese nationalist misogynists condone harmful acts—including deepfake sexual crime—that perpetuate imbalanced gender power and silence opposition to these crimes.

As an extension of this politicized stigma, nationalist misogynists also accuse Chinese feminists of being involved with foreign men (Table 1, number 15). This tactic employs what is commonly referred to as “slut shaming,” which involves humiliating women for their real or perceived behavior in romantic relationships. Qian Huang (2023b) explains that nationalist ideologies reinforce such shaming by suggesting that “good Chinese women” should neither desire nor engage in relationships with foreign men. As a result, women who violate these expectations are doubly stigmatized as both “sluts” and “traitors” to the nation-state.

In contrast, South Korean feminists are more intensely demonized rather than merely stigmatized, and are portrayed as external forces bent on destabilizing Chinese society. As noted in the textual analysis, discussions around Korean feminists emphasize not only their alleged harm to South Korea but also the potential spread of this “threat” into China. This demonization operates through two overlapping discourses: the appropriation of South Korean misogynist narratives and the recurrence of Chinese nationalists’ wariness of “Western hostile forces.” On the one hand, South Korean misogynist rhetoric often refrains from explicitly asserting male superiority, instead focusing on how men are purportedly victimized by extreme feminism (Kim, 2023; Oh, 2023). Chinese nationalist misogynists then adopt and appropriate these narratives to underscore the perceived danger posed by South Korean feminists.

Importantly, this appropriation is shaped by the geopolitical framing of South Korea as a westernized country in Chinese discourse. Despite its East Asian geography, South Korea is often positioned symbolically as part of the Western ideological bloc due to its democratic political system, close alliance with the United States, and visible liberal feminist movement (Lee & Wiegand, 2025; Maduz, 2023). This perception is further entrenched by the Chinese government’s use of the phrase “Western hostile forces” to describe values or groups perceived as undermining national cohesion (Xu, 2021). In this context, Korean feminists are constructed not merely as foreign, but as vectors of a Western ideology threatening China’s cultural and political integrity.

This appropriation aligns with the argument of Chen Zhang (2023) that misogyny has become a global phenomenon, in which far-right in Southern countries (like China) employ narratives that assert that Western or Westernized countries (like South Korea) are destroyed by feminism to defend misogynist views. Korean feminists are characterized as part of a broader



“Western hostile force,” a phrase frequently used by both the Chinese government and the public to describe ideologies or groups that threaten national stability (Xu, 2021). This portrayal aligns with existing geopolitical tensions between China and South Korea, which has intensified nationalist antagonism toward South Korean feminists (Liao & Xia, 2023; Wang, 2022). These two discourse strategies can be seen as two different patterns of misogyny: one is a traditional narrative, which emphasizes the opposition between feminism and nationalism, while the other is an emerging popular misogynist narrative, which highlights the harm of feminism to all men.

By outlining these threats faced by Chinese men, this post creates the narrative of rational Chinese men who are yet unable to confront extreme, evil Chinese feminists. This then positions Chinese men as victims of feminism, providing a justification to deny feminism wholesale (García Mingo & Díaz Fernández, 2023; Wojnicka, 2021). As Kai Bao (2024) points out, a common stigmatization of feminism on contemporary Chinese social media is to claim that it is a war against men. In this case, the victimhood of men can legitimize anti-feminist and misogynistic viewpoints, as it endows men with moral value as a vulnerable group.

This dichotomy is closely related to the power dynamics of gender politics in China. There is a clear stigmatization against feminists in these posts, however, Chinese and South Korean feminists are viewed differently in nationalist misogynist discourse. This is to some extent consistent with our analysis in 1.1 that nationalism and misogyny are in conversation with each other, and thus South Korean feminists are more heavily criticized by Chinese nationalist misogynists due to both national identity and gender. This stigmatization and demonization is not simply a top-down suppression, on the contrary, it is related to the popular misogyny that Sarah Banet-Weiser (2018) claims to some extent is a form of gendered hostility that operates not through overt assertions of male superiority, but through more subtle means, such as framing feminism as extreme and harmful to men or morally discrediting feminists on a personal level.

### ***6.3. Highlighting perpetrators transcends nation & gender boundaries***

We also focus on the feminist content in selected text, which forms part of the gendered politics around deepfake sex crimes. Through a critical discourse analysis of these online texts, we examine how feminists respond to and challenge the framing of gender-based violence, as well as the nationalist misogyny discourses mentioned above, to highlight the transnational nature of deepfake abuse, and construct transnational solidarity among women.

We identify some posts that refute the discourse marginalizing Chinese feminists (as we show in 1.1) which regard deepfake sexual crimes as

incidental events that only occur in South Korea, and belittle the efforts of Chinese feminists. The phrase “it’s just Korean men who suck” (Table 2, number 9) individualizes the issue, making it seem that this problem stems from the inherent nature of some individuals rather than being shaped by broader societal structures. This is a disempowering frame because it directs attention away from the social structures that influence behavior. The speaker critiques this limited perspective, aiming to reconstruct awareness by urging a more nuanced understanding of the issue as a broader “gender issue” (Table 2, number 9). Using a specific percentage “3% Chinese male user” (Table 2, number 8), it presents the claim as objective and factual, reinforcing the notion that Chinese male users are also actively involved in the deepfake chat rooms. It suggests that while South Korean men are primarily responsible, the issue has an international dimension. The phrase “Chinese men asking on Zhihu how to download deepfake” (Table 2, number 8) presents an active, immediate threat, and displays the men as perpetrators, raising the alarm over the expansion of digital misogyny.

Unlike the argument in Table 2, Number 9, which deconstructs nationality as a determining factor, stating that “it’s not a nationality issue but a gender issue,” Table 2, Number 8 takes a different but complementary approach by explicitly acknowledging the involvement of Chinese men. Rather than merely assigning blame, this approach illuminates the transnational nature of digital misogyny (Zeng, 2024), demonstrating how systemic issues manifest through specific actors and digital spaces. Meanwhile, it responds to the innocent portrayal of Chinese men by Chinese nationalist misogynists, as we mentioned in 1.1 and 1.2, demonstrating that within the context of gender politics, especially the dominant patriarchy, no individual can exist outside of this context. As a result, by grounding the discussion in concrete examples, the statement reinforces that deepfake abuse is not an isolated incident but part of a larger, interconnected problem that demands global attention and cooperation.

Despite their different emphases, both statements ultimately work toward the same goal: broadening the perception of deepfake abuse from a localized crisis to a global phenomenon. Whereas Table 2, Number 9 underscores the systemic nature of gendered oppression, Table 2, Number 8 complements this perspective by demonstrating how specific groups contribute to the problem, reinforcing the need for transnational solidarity. Meanwhile, they are a kind of rebuttal to the discourse of marginalized feminist solidarity in 1.1, through specific arguments and evidence. This framing not only strengthens the argument for global collaboration but also empowers action, emphasizing that addressing digital gender-based violence requires a multifaceted approach, one that acknowledges both the systemic structures enabling abuse and the responsibility of individuals and platforms in perpetuating it.

#### **6.4. Constructing a discursive transnational solidarity**

We identify some posts that construct a solidarity between women in different countries. Terms such as “we” (Table 2, number 1, 7 and 8) and “global community of women” (Table 2, number 2) are used to create a unified community, reducing the differences between women from different countries. Second, they emphasize a gender identity that transcends nationality and to some extent denies the importance of national identity, clearly acknowledging the existence and contributions of women (rather than all Chinese people) in the subsequent resistance against deepfake sex crimes. This more radical discourse arose from a Weibo hashtag that downgraded the presence of Chinese feminists in support of South Korean feminists, using the term “Chinese netizens” to refer to the group who helped South Korean feminists instead of “Chinese feminists” (#Korean Women Thank Chinese Netizens for Speaking Out for Them). In response, some Chinese feminists’ discourse emphasizes the central position of women, like “Is it ‘All Netizens’ or ‘Sisters?’” (Table 2, number 4) and “When did ‘sisters’ ever mean ‘netizens?’” (Table 2, number 3). By using the gendered term “sisters” instead of the term “netizens” that refers to all Chinese people, these discourses weaken national identity and emphasize gender identity. The two texts differ in the degree of radicalization they use, with the first emphasizing that women of different nations should be united, while the second directly challenges the division of “us” and “other” based on nationality and thus suggests that women’s solidarity can transcend national boundaries.

In addition, posts emphasizing cross-border women’s solidarity demonstrate a sense of women’s community that transcends nationalism. This differs from the negotiations between Chinese feminists and nationalism presented in many existing studies. Some terms, such as “pink feminists,” are used to describe Chinese feminists who simultaneously support nationalism and feminism, incorporating support for the Chinese authorities and nationalist sentiments into feminism, creating a unique ideology (Han & Liu, 2024). Unlike pink feminists, most feminist discourses in our case emphasize the solidarity among women across nations and an identification with gender that transcends national identity (Table 2, number 1,2,3,4,7 and 8). This can be interpreted as the intersection of grassroots feminism in China and the transnational feminist movement, which is also reflected in the Me Too movement (Huang and Sun, 2021). However, before the cases we observed, few Chinese feminists explicitly emphasized transnational gender identities and interests, due to the suppression following the Me Too movement and the further strengthening of Chinese nationalism (Huang, 2016). This reconfiguration of transnational women communities thus presents a new aspect of the dynamics between gender issues and nationalism in contemporary China.

### **6.5. *Recontextualizing misogynistic rhetoric to shift power dynamics***

In Table 2 number 5, the words in the original screenshots use language that reinforces traditional gender roles and victim-blaming. Screenshot 1 suggests women should be confined to domestic roles (“Chinese women will obediently get married and have children.”) defined by their relation to men. Screenshot 2 implies that women’s biological roles (“pregnancy”) make them dependent on men, reinforcing patriarchal norms (“Women can never compete with men”). Screenshot 3 blames the assault of rape victims on their attire, a classic example of rape culture, “women who dress provocatively deserve it.” Screenshot 4 minimizes deepfake harm (“no big deal”), while screenshot 6 dismisses a Korean woman’s complaint, suggesting her voice is unwarranted (“without being instructed by anyone”). As for the speaker, the word “shock” suggests that the statements should be disturbing. However, pairing it with “a little” downplays the intensity, signaling that misogyny has become mundane in Chinese online spaces. The phrase mocks the normalization of misogyny rather than accepting it.

Two opposing discursive forces are at play in Table 2, Number 5. The original misogynistic discourse in the screenshots relies on naturalization (Fairclough, 2013b), presenting sexist ideas as “common sense.” Furthermore, it seeks to enforce social control by discouraging women’s agency, as illustrated by the suggestion of banning Otome games to correct women’s behavior. This discourse operates within a patriarchal framework that reinforces traditional gender norms and suppresses alternative viewpoints. In contrast, the speaker de-naturalizes misogyny by exposing it to critical engagement, disrupting its assumed legitimacy. Through recontextualization (Wodak & Meyer, 2015), sexist statements are removed from their original echo chamber and placed within a space of feminist critique, stripping them of their intended power. This process reshapes public discourse by inviting resistance and fostering counter-narratives that challenge patriarchal ideologies. By documenting and exposing these comments, the speaker reverses the power dynamic, shifting these posts from expressions of unchecked misogyny to subjects of public scrutiny. This exposure invites feminist critique, actively challenging the normalization of sexism (Ahmed, 2024). In doing so, private digital misogyny is transformed into a site of feminist resistance, where oppressive language is interrogated, rejected, and ultimately dismantled.

The discourse strategies of these posts challenging nationalist misogynist discourses and constructing solidarity interact with the context of contemporary Chinese politics. First, both the direct refutation and indirect exposure of nationalist misogynist discourse are adaptations to the dynamics of gender politics in contemporary China. On the one hand, the direct refutation of nationalist misogynist discourse relies on the official recognition and

legitimization of anti-sexual harassment discourse in contemporary China. As Siyuan Yin and Yu Sun (2021) and Yige Dong (2023) note, under the influence of the grassroots feminist anti-sexual harassment movement Me Too, the Chinese government emphasized the need for anti-harassment to some extent, both through legal and administrative levels, although the effects are uncertain. Through this negotiation between authorities and grassroots feminists, the feminists in our case legitimize their claims in the name of the authorities by linking and equating sex offenders explicitly criminalized under Chinese law (Table 2, number 6) with deepfake sex crimes.

On the other hand, the general repression and surveillance of grassroots feminist movements by the authorities brought about more nuanced feminist discourses strategies, such as the indirect exposure of nationalist misogynist discourses in our case (Table 2, number 5). Many studies reveal the Chinese authority' surveillance and suppression of feminist ideology and movements, aimed at maintaining the stability of the regime (Han & Lee, 2019; Zeng, 2021). This means that if Chinese feminists wish to express their voices, they must be more cautious in their discourse strategies and not explicitly challenge authority (Caple, 2019). Thus, in contrast to examples of direct refutation, merely exposing the nationalist misogynist discourses brings about a recontextualization of these discourses, indirectly subverting the unbalanced gender power dynamics they uphold.

## 7. Finding

All these discourses shown above interact with each other. Chinese nationalist misogynists use nationalist discourses to legitimize their marginalization of Chinese and South Korean feminists' mutual assistance. At the same time, some of the posts displayed more overtly misogynist views that stigmatized and demonized both Chinese and South Korean feminists. As we demonstrate, these discourses differ from simple official suppression but rather represent a nationalist misogyny reinforced by popular misogynist strategies. In response, Chinese feminists countered nationalist misogyny on two levels in their attempt to emphasize sex crimes as a global phenomenon and create transnational women solidarity. Finally, we find that Chinese feminists maintain transnational solidarity and challenge nationalist misogyny through more strategic means. An obvious strategy is recontextualization, which deconstructs the hegemony of nationalist misogyny, placing the stigmatization of Chinese and South Korean feminists in new contexts, deconstructing the common sense they attempted to construct. The clash of these different discourses demonstrates the complexity of gender politics in contemporary China and how Chinese feminists seek to challenge the increasingly harsh pressures, not only of official surveillance and repression, but also of nationalist misogyny at a popular level.

## 8. Conclusion and discussion

In this paper, we explore the evolving landscape of transnational feminist solidarity within authoritarian regimes. As previously discussed, South Korean feminist discourse has influenced Chinese feminist narratives. However, in this particular case, the mutual support among Chinese feminists manifests primarily as an emotional response—one that transcends political, economic, and racial differences. This form of transnational feminist solidarity, while lacking the structural stability of institutionalized feminist movements, reveals complex dynamics between vulnerability and agency.

As Sheena J. Vachhani (2024) argues, examining vulnerability as and alongside agency exposes the productive tensions inherent in digital feminist activism, particularly as it manifests in different transnational contexts. These tensions not only reshape dominant feminist praxis but also necessitate a closer examination of organizational structures, the specific targets of activism, the social positions of activists, and the broader cultural, societal, and political environments in which they operate. In this light, digital feminist activism becomes a site of both precarity and potential, where solidarity is continuously negotiated and redefined.

Judith Butler (2016, p. 12) takes this argument further, challenging conventional narratives of vulnerability and resistance:

Vulnerability is enhanced by assembling, but we need to rethink this sequence in a way that gives narrative structure to the relationship between vulnerability and resistance. Rather than vulnerability arising from conditions of dispossession—where we are first vulnerable and then overcome that vulnerability through acts of resistance—we must consider alternative ways of framing this relationship.

This perspective suggests that vulnerability is not merely a condition to be overcome but an integral part of feminist mobilization. In the context of transnational feminist activism, this reframing invites us to reconsider how emotional solidarities, even in their fragility, might generate new forms of collective resistance and transformative action.

Moreover, within an authoritarian framework, this vulnerability paradoxically acquires a form of resilience. In this case, transnational feminist collaboration has strategically foregrounded shared women's experiences and collective emotional identification, while deliberately sidestepping overtly political critiques of state power. This strategic navigation has enabled feminist discourse to garner significant visibility within China's tightly controlled digital landscape. While some may argue that such an approach risks veering into pink feminism, it simultaneously circumvents the nationalist trap that positions nation as superior to gender. By avoiding direct confrontations that could be co-opted to legitimize state suppression of feminist

movements, this strategy creates room for feminist solidarity to persist, adapt, and expand within constrained political environments.

To some extent, this inclusive framework is consistent with the Mother Tag movement of South Korean feminists who challenged misogynist discourses in a wide range of misogynist contexts (Kim, 2017). Although specific strategies are different, both strategically adapt their tactics in the face of repressive and toxic environments, thereby realizing a challenge to the structural misogynist discourse. This especially highlights the tactical ingenuity required for feminist activism to survive and thrive under authoritarian governance. It can be considered that, although the phenomenon we are concerned with has not become an organized movement, it demonstrates the potential to connect emotion based on security considerations with broader feminist ideologies and transnational women's solidarity through the various strategies mentioned earlier.

In the strategic practices of feminist bloggers confronting structural nationalists, a recurring tactic has been recontextualization—a process whereby stigmatizing narratives about feminism are captured through screenshots and publicly displayed. This act of subversion, frequently observed across feminist social media accounts, serves not only as a form of resistance but also as a means of reclaiming discursive power.

By exposing and reframing these derogatory narratives, feminist activists effectively challenge the legitimacy of the original discourse. This process destabilizes the perceived authority and normative power embedded in these stigmatizing statements, undermining their ideological dominance. In doing so, they do not merely reject the existing narrative but actively work toward constructing a new feminist discursive order that counters misrepresentation, reclaims agency, and redefines the parameters of legitimate feminist discourse within digital and socio-political spaces.

Such acts of recontextualization resonate with broader feminist strategies of counter-discourse, where the deconstruction of hegemonic narratives becomes a crucial site of activism. By turning oppressive language against itself, feminist bloggers disrupt the assumed neutrality of dominant ideologies, exposing their constructed nature and inherent biases. This not only fosters critical awareness among audiences but also opens up space for alternative feminist epistemologies to take root, challenging the exclusionary frameworks that have historically marginalized feminist voices.

## 9. Potential limitations

This study has a major limitation, which is the insufficient sample size, primarily due to technical constraints. This potentially affects our interpretation of the discourse. Future research will benefit from further exploration of

discussions about deepfake sexual crimes on Chinese social media, which would be able to demonstrate richer power dynamics and discourse interactions.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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