Creative Industries and Cultural Diversity.
Part 1: Understanding the UK Policy Ecosystem

A working paper collection for Creative Impact Research Centre Europe, commissioned and edited by the London Cultural Diversity Laboratory (City, University of London)

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About the Cultural Diversity Laboratory

The London Cultural Diversity Laboratory is a CIRCE funded research lab, based at City, University of London. Over the course of 2023, the team is conducting a critical inquiry into the multidimensional nature of "diversity" for the UK's cultural and creative industries, across five inter-related themes:

1. the range of challenges and initiatives related to demographic diversity in the cultural and creative workforce;
2. the plurality of organisational forms, funding mechanisms, value-chain interactions;
3. spatial dimensions of regional inequality, migration/mobility and access to housing;
4. representational issues of visibility and reception of cultural expressions and media outputs;
5. implications for transversal policymaking across multiple siloes of governance.

This inquiry takes the form of an extended review of literature, statistics, industry interventions and public policy action; alongside a series of pilot qualitative research projects, themed discussion events with experts and practitioners, and commissioned work. The lab's aim, in line with those of its funders CIRCE (Creative Impact Research Centre Europe), is to develop a body of knowledge and a network of expertise that can inform coordinated strategic action and future research on cultural diversity at trans-European level.

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Working Paper Authors

Eliza Easton (Erskine Analysis)

Eliza Easton is a creative industries expert who has published more than thirty policy and research papers, including on arts funding in England, research and development, the UK's export strategy, the changing skills needs of the economy, and the impact of Covid-19 on diversity in the creative industries. Before starting her own business, Erskine Analysis, Eliza spent five years as Head of Policy and then Deputy Director of the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre at Nesta. Prior to this, she was part of the founding team of the Creative Industries Federation (now CreativeUK).

Sarita Malik (Brunel University, London)

Sarita Malik has been Professor of Media and Culture in the Division of Sociology and Communications at Brunel University, London since 2016. Her research examines issues of inequality and culture (representation, production and participation) in shifting sociopolitical, cultural and technological contexts. Since the 1990s, Sarita's work has made a major contribution to how 'diversity', social justice and the role of arts and culture are understood through policy and practice, most notably in the film and television sectors. Publications have spanned topics including 'race', representation and diversity in film, public service broadcasting and the cultural industries, racialised terminology in organisational cultures.

Dave O'Brien (University of Manchester)

Professor Dave O'Brien is a Professor of Cultural and Creative Industries at University of Manchester and is a leading name in the field. He is a co-investigator at the Arts and Humanities Research Council's Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (AHRC PEC), and the AHRC funded Impact of Covid-19 on the Cultural Sector research project. He has published extensively on inequality in the creative economy, including his latest book Culture is Bad for You, which is co-authored by Dr Mark Taylor and Dr Orian Brook. Current research themes include a focus on inequalities in creative higher education; downward social mobility; new forms of distinction in cultural consumption; and the meaning of 'good' work in the cultural sector. In 2023 he is an AHRC Policy Fellow at the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.

Andy Pratt (City, University of London)

Professor Andy Pratt is an internationally acclaimed expert on the topic of the cultural industries. He joined City University as Professor of Cultural Economy in 2013 and was appointed as UNESCO Chair in Global Creative Economy in 2022. Andy's work has two key strands: the first focuses on the urban spatial clustering of cultural industries; the second concerns the definition and measurement of employment in the cultural, or creative, industries. He has developed definitions of the cultural sector that are used as standard measures by UNCTAD and UNESCO. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences and has worked as a consultant or advisor for national and urban policy makers worldwide.

Introduction and summary of papers

This collection assembles four expert contributions that together address the relationship of UK cultural and creative industries (CCI) policy to Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI). It is the first of two reports published by the London Cultural Diversity Laboratory in 2023 addressing these concerns, the second of which focuses on what we can learn from the experience of London's cultural ecosystem, and that of the wider UK, in the recent period of "polycrisis".

The overarching aim of this scene-setting collection is to explain core aspects of the CCI-related ecosystem of evidence and policymaking in this field, and its development in the UK, to audiences unfamiliar with the details. It was commissioned and guided by the aims of the Creative Impact Research Centre Europe (CIRCE) to retain and develop understanding of the UK's experiences in this field after its departure from the European Union.

The UK has a well-developed CCI sector, with a distinctive relationship to government and the wider public, informed by evidence-based policymaking and a rich tradition of critical reflection representing its diverse aims and constituencies. Continental Europe has profited from the vibrant creative ecosystem in the UK in several regards: from creative production processes - and extensive knowledge production on such processes - to the implementation of programs and strategies. Brexit has disrupted cooperation, collaboration and knowledge transfer. In order to preserve, build and operationalize infrastructures of knowledge on the CCI in the countries of continental Europe, a better understanding of the functioning of the CCI-related creative ecosystem in UK will prove a useful navigational aid.

The four papers present narratives drawn from academic and policy experts with a wealth of research and professional experience in these concerns. These authors represent a cross-section of the contribution that the social sciences have made to informing and shaping policy and professional practice in the UK. Each presents a distinct but mutually complementary perspective, drawing both on their own work and wider literature, alongside illustrative case studies.

1. Spatial inequalities (Andy Pratt, City, University of London)

The first contributor is Professor Andy Pratt, an economic geographer and UNESCO Chair of Global Creative Economy. In a short paper, Pratt provides an overarching view of the last thirty years of creative industries policymaking in the UK with a particular focus on how questions of policy and practice are shaped by its particular geography: first in terms of workforce distribution; then levels of governance; finally, the substantive policy mechanisms put into practice as a result.

London continues to dominate the national creative economy, despite repeated rhetoric and several initiatives to rebalance (or in more recent terminology 'level up') the field at local, regional and devolved national scales. His conclusion is that these spatial imbalances, and resultant inequalities, have long been recognized but have not been properly addressed due to a lack of coordinated attention at UK government level.

Learning from this multi-decade experience, he observes that:

First, *locality is recognized as a distinctive characteristic of cultural and creative production*: this principle has now been established as an important contributor for policy attention but is missing a more 'joined up' national strategic approach.

Second, however, *the cultural policy system has been buffeted by swings of the political pendulum*: throughout changing emphases on entrepreneurial incentives and more

strategic direction, different geographies have come into visibility (and fashion) – from local enterprise zones, to regional devolution, and back to a national industrial strategy – but served poorly by an inconsistent policymaking system.

Third, *a longterm negative trend has been the disempowerment of the local*: 'creative industries' were birthed in local urban and municipal initiatives, yet local authorities have consistently been stripped of powers and funding over the intervening period, despite recurring calls to decentralize decision-making and authority.

This longterm overview then sets the scene for three further interventions, focusing on the period since 2010.

2. Evidence and lobbying (Eliza Easton, Erskine Analysis)

The next contribution is from Eliza Easton, a policy analyst who previously acted as Head of Policy and Deputy Director for the Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre and was a founding member of the Creative Industries Federation (now Creative UK). Easton maps out the contemporary policy and evidence ecosystem by taking a tour through three key institutions set up over the years 2010-2020:

- the Creative Industries Council, a forum for industry leaders and government representatives;
- the Creative Industries Federation (now Creative UK), an independent trade association representing the interests of the entire sector;
- the Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre, a UK Research & Innovation council funded body designed to co-create and commission research that would help build the evidence base in line with both industry and government needs.

For Easton, key lessons are as follows.

First, *the importance of independence*: a self-interested trade body is necessary in addition to a coordinated approach, in order to actively shape policy and respond to areas of concern beyond those recognized by the government of the day.

Second, *evidence is not enough*: good relationships with those in government are crucial and a single independent body can offer a useful forum and a single coherent voice to achieve this.

Third, *research requires strategic communication*: it is not just about providing evidence to the right policy actors but about campaigning to connect research to their specific concerns and timelines.

3. How diversity and inequality became central problems for UK cultural policy (Dave O'Brien, University of Manchester)

The collection moves on with a third paper authored by Professor Dave O'Brien, a cultural sociologist currently working with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport as an AHRC Policy Fellow. O'Brien lays out the process by which diversity and inequality – specifically social mobility – rose to the forefront of the cultural policymaking agenda, beginning from the spread of auditing regimes and the increase in production of sector-relevant data. He examines three representative organizational initiatives that exhibit this process:

- a bursaries programme administered by Jerwood Arts
- the British Film Institute's Film Fund
- the Let's Create programme of Arts Council England.

Ending by reflecting on the post-pandemic moment, the Creative Industries 2030 Sector Vision and a recent emphasis on 'good work' in CCI contexts, O'Brien draws three main conclusions, which echo those of the previous contribution.

First, **data collection is a preface to policy action**: the "problem" of inequalities and social mobility only becomes salient for cultural policymakers once it is made visible through regular data gathering exercises.

Second, **data collection is not enough for policy action**: visibility is only the first step; more concerted and active state intervention may be needed for substantive change to be effected – and so very much dependent on an overarching direction of travel.

Third, **data collection is nationally embedded**: both the methods and the impetus for collecting data on, for example, "class" and "race" are specific to the British context, where few prohibitions on demographic data classifications exist and there is a lively public conversation over their salience in everyday life – a dynamic that may look very different in other national contexts.

4. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in the CCI (Sarita Malik, Brunel University London)

The final contribution comes from Professor Sarita Malik, a media and communications scholar and member of the DCMS College of Experts. It explores the distinction between DEI as a strategic policy and governance framework and the lived experience of multicultural diversity, with a focus on screen industries as spaces that must mediate that distinction. Malik looks first at the nature of race and ethnicity data and diversity discourse in this sector before enumerating the various practical challenges that these generate. She identifies five:

- negotiating social and economic goals;
- skills, education and training;
- industrial conditions, inclusive work cultures and practices;
- data practices, capture and accountability
- heterogeneity, intersectionality and lived diversity.

Malik's conclusions, complementing those of previous authors, revolve around the observations that:

First, **DEI frameworks have been remarkably resilient**: throughout multiple crises and, indeed, political attacks, CCI have witnessed an explosion in multiple remits, mission statements, plans and regulations, not to mention data collection exercises, at a national level.

Second, nevertheless, **the organizational realities are themselves mixed**: the "promise" of diversity is often misaligned with empirical experience, with the latter patterned by wider crises.

Third, by implication, **further analysis and strategic planning continues to be required at institutional levels**, where there currently exists no real consensus over what to measure, for what purposes, and, crucially, where accountability might lie.

The collection ends with two appendices:

- a skeleton timeline of relevant events mentioned in the working papers, spanning the past thirty years;
- a glossary of bodies, policies, strategies and other acronyms relevant to the content of the collection.

1. Spatial inequalities of the creative industries in the UK

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the spatial dimensions of inequalities across the creative economy in the UK. It seeks to cover the last thirty years, from Labour municipal interventions in the cultural industries to the 1997 Creative Industries headline strategy, and onwards to the period of Austerity in 2010, and the effects of Brexit. An overriding concern across this whole period is *the dominance of London* as (English) capital and seat of government, both in terms of industry concentration and policy attention, and the stark regional inequalities this gives expression to. In response, we see the pendulum swing back and forth between *local and cluster strategies* to *national strategic concerns*. On top of this is a process of *administrative devolution* to the UK's constituent nations, that has transformed the pattern of UK governance. Accordingly, we begin with outlining the empirical changes in the spatial patterns of employment, then turn to administrative shifts, and finally, we focus on policy changes.

Spatial patterns of employment

The earliest mapping of the Creative Industries (CI) in the UK highlighted a stark pattern of spatial inequality of employment, with a comprehensive bias towards cities and the massive dominance of London (Pratt, 1997). This comes as no surprise, as traditionally the capital has been the focus of investment and activity in publishing, music, TV and film industries, fashion, and design, as well as theatre, museums, and galleries. National headquarters were located in London, and it represented the largest market and audience. Furthermore, the organisational structure of most of the creative industries was such that accessing specialist services, particularly legal and financial services, which were primarily based in London, was necessary for growth and development. For individuals and firms, this invariably required relocating to London.

The question of job distribution was slow to find its way onto the policy-making agenda; it took until the second 'Creative Industries Mapping Document' in the early years of the new millennium before a 'regional annex' was added (DCMS, 2001). As noted below, this coincided with a broader political discussion of a devolution agenda. This is but one aspect of a wider set of concerns regarding the distribution of spatial access to culture, its variety and diversity, and employment opportunities – longstanding issues which have increasingly become a focus of public debate and policy attention in the last decade.

Within this context, it is interesting and indicative to examine the changing spatial distribution of employment in the creative industries in the UK over the last decade. In 2010, 30% of all creative industry jobs in the UK were located in London, and by 2021, that figure had risen to 52%.[1] In parallel, the proportion of all employment in London increased from 17% to 19% of the UK total. Moreover, the creative industries grew as a proportion of all jobs in London from 11% to 15% in 2021, while in the rest of the country, creative industry jobs grew from 4% of all

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[1] Figures in this paragraph derive from the Annual Population Survey (ONS) produced for the GLA Intelligence Unit 2022.
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/adhocs/15036jobsinthecreativeeconomyinlondonandallotherregionsoftheuk2010to2021

jobs to 6% in the same period. Clearly, this points to the continued dominance of London generally at the expense of the UK, but with a dramatically increasing concentration and growth of the creative economy.

Governance

The governance of the creative industries is a complex and evolving story. The labelling of creative industries as a new sector worthy of policy attention at national level coincided with a refocused concern on social exclusion and the devolution of powers to the UK's constituent nations and regions.

Pre-1997, national government did not recognise the creative industries, and they were not subject to debate within the relevant national department.[2] Notably, however, responsibility for these activities was first taken by local governments, notably urban authorities in the context of urban regeneration, with the particular goal of job creation. Local government in the UK has traditionally been the site for decisions on planning, and local economic development, as well as having responsibility for local cultural service provision, and local museums and galleries.

In the 1980s and 1990s urban authorities responded to economic decline and deindustrialisation with initiatives to refocus and redevelop local economies and provide employment prospects for the youth. The national government had, since the 1930s, had a regional policy which sought to 'rebalance' the effects of deindustrialisation, primarily in the declining coal and steel regions, and later with manufacturing more widely. The novel initiative was to treat the cultural creation and production *as an industry* and to include it within these general (urban) initiatives. As will be noted below, this led to specific local policy initiatives.

The change in name – cultural to creative – was in no small part a political one; but it also signified a change in the scale of governance from local to national.[3] Indicative here is the experience of the Greater London Council (GLC) in the 1980s, which was seen to represent 'left-wing' municipal socialism. The GLC had led a metropolitan campaign for an 'alternative economic strategy' to the Conservative government at a national level – a key part of which was, for the first time, the inclusion of the cultural industries (Greater London Council, 1985). The GLC was abolished by the Thatcher administration in 1986, just after this industrial strategy was published but other authorities – notably Manchester and Sheffield – also had active cultural industry policies and programmes that continued into the 1980s and 1990s. 'New Labour' picked up on these initiatives, although its project (as a centrist political formation) was to cast off its 'old Labour' radical left reputation; thus the *creative industries* formed part of a broader rebranding exercise that acted as a youth vote winner.

Critically, then, the New Labour administration's adoption of the 'creative industries' as a national policy focus, with the formation of the DCMS in 1997, was inspired by local initiatives such as these (discussed further below). Yet, as a new ministry, the DCMS had a full agenda. Its primary concern was the promotion of commercial creative industries *as well as* the traditional arts and heritage (managed via the Arts Council and National Heritage agencies). Much of the initial focus was led by international branding imperatives ('Creative Britain') and

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[2] The Department of National Heritage was re-named the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in 1997; the name was amended to Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in 2017, and in 2023 back to DCMS as digital was moved to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. See Appendices for a glossary and timeline.

[3] There are several additional definitional and terminological debates which need not concern us here (but see Pratt 2001).

the economic contribution of these (new-found) industries, as well as promoting affiliation with young people. Substantive policy development, particularly around regional and urban concerns, was placed on hold to return only at a later date.

An important contextual point about the New Labour administration was its mobilisation around social exclusion (Byrne, 2005). This was a shift away from conceptions of *absolute* poverty to those of *relative* poverty: the notion that exclusion based on individual/population characteristics and multidimensional deprivation meant that citizens were unable to play a full part in society. Accordingly, much of the early concern across government was with addressing social exclusion. Culture and the creative industries were no exception. This set in-train a focus on both the *distribution* of spending on culture across various social groups, as well as the *instrumental* role that culture could play in alleviating social exclusion.

Another dimension of concern to New Labour's administration was the devolution of administration actioned in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998. In 2002 this went further with the establishment of Regional Assemblies in England, who had sub-national responsibilities for strategic development. Critically, one of those responsibilities was culture, representing something of a return to a more localised mode of cultural industry governance. This 'third tier' of UK government was short-lived, however, and progressively abolished in 2008-10.

The London question remained another pertinent dimension of the devolution agenda. The abolishment of the GLC in 1986 had effectively dismantled a third-tier authority, returning power to local authorities within the capital, and removing London of an overarching strategic authority. Labour subsequently re-established a 'stripped down' version, the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000, with reduced powers and expenditure. Meanwhile, although the devolved government of Wales was still under the aegis of DCMS, the administrations of Scotland and Northern Ireland were independent from the powers of London and had their own bodies, and crucially budgetary control, such as Creative Scotland.

The Conservative administration from 2010 onward have been resistant to strategic development or regional development, preferring to focus on individual places. A series of urban growth initiatives have followed with the creation of 'City Mayors': distinct from the merely symbolic mayors of old, these were elected leaders of a strategic authority (although again, in the GLA mould, being very 'light' on actual powers).

Finally, we can note that the desire to promote cities and culture, after the model of the European Capital of Culture, has caught on over this period. The Liverpool 2008 ECOC was deemed a success, and the UK set up its own City of Culture model, which encouraged cities to compete for the title – starting in 2013 with Derry/Londonderry, and following every four years. This competition has come into its own in a post-Brexit context with ambitions to continue addressing inclusion and regeneration goals amid heightened recognition of ongoing regional inequalities. Crucially, the very process of bidding is considered as important as the awarding of the title itself in galvanising local coordination initiatives. In 2017, the GLA followed, setting up its own even more focused 'Borough of Culture' model.

Policy

As indicated above, the origins of a concern with and a focus on the Cultural Industries in the UK came from a series of metropolitan authority initiatives which in many respects were 'oppositional' to national government policy and politics of the period. Metropolitan authorities

had powers and revenue-raising capabilities, with a legitimacy drawn from elected members. As part of their focus on local economic development in the early 1980s, they pioneered new interventionist economic development approaches, in opposition to the more 'entrepreneurial' approaches favoured at a national policy level, such as local 'enterprise zones' and efforts to attract foreign direct investment. Labour-controlled metropolitan authorities developed a number of initiatives to promote and support the cultural industries' economic potential, expanding town planning to include economic and strategic aims. Equally, this contributed to social regeneration initiatives (dealing with local youth unemployment) and a vote-winning left popularism.

One of these post-1980s municipal initiatives, popular across many cities into the 1990s and 2000s, was the establishment of a 'cultural quarter'. Premises were provided at low rents and various initiatives were focused on supporting local cultural businesses. What was critical here was that this articulated a strategy focused on the cultural industries, jobs and participation, serving a suite of urban regeneration aims: replacing lost manufacturing jobs, re-using vacant buildings, and bringing people back to visit the cities (Evans, 2009).

The national DCMS 'creative industries' narrative about economic growth and renewal initially took some of the focus away from these local experiments. They returned in 2001 under a different guise: this time the inspiration was business 'clusters', following the business strategist Michael Porter's work on the importance of proximity to value chains (Porter, 1995). The creative industries were identified as a field in which clustering was important and should be promoted, very much with a technological focus, as emphasised by the work of another New Labour creation, the 'innovation foundation' NESTA (Mateos-Garcia & Bakhshi, 2016).

In parallel, the devolution agenda was developing and, in England, regional cultural strategies were launched. These were an attempt to develop joined-up strategies for urban and regional planning of industries (in this case culture and creativity). Regional agencies were encouraged to collate and publish their own data and it appeared that the visibility of the regional dimensions of the creative economy had been recognised. In addition, the attempts to devolve programme-making within the BBC from London were pushed forward from 2008. In 2011 the new Salford Quays urban regeneration project was developed with a theatre and museum, as well as the new BBC site; this was replicated in Cardiff and Glasgow and a plan to spread programme-making around the country and decant from London. Channel 4, which had been set up to diversify programme-making under the Conservative administration, was legislatively required to devote a proportion of its programme-making outside of London and the SE. In 2017, it was proposed that Channel 4 relocate its headquarters to Leeds.

This flurry of activity in the first decade of the twenty-first century was brought to a halt by an incoming the imposed austerity and public finance cuts, especially in the 2010-15 period of 'coalition' government.[4] Predictably, culture faired proportionately worse in this process, while DCMS adopted a more promotional economic ambition. Critically, local authority funding was cut radically, and this continued to 'hollow out' local capacities to regenerate and support culture. Indeed, some local authorities declared a zero budget for culture. Local authorities increasingly reduced labour and replaced it with part-time and voluntary staff (Pratt & Hutton, 2013; Pratt, 2017).

In 2018, the pendulum swung back in the direction of strategic governance when a UK Industrial Strategy was proposed. What was significant about this was that along with

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[4] The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition of 2010-15; since followed by three different Conservative administrations in the period to 2023. English local authority funding was cut by 40% 2010-16; and in 2012 ACE (Arts council England) had a 28% budget cut https://www.culturalpolicies.net/database/search-by-country/country-profile/category/?id=42&g1=1

aerospace, construction and life sciences, the creative industries were promoted as a key focus for economic development. The sector deal (DCMS, 2023) was intended to focus on industry and place, although many critics pointed to the fact that the 'placemaking' element was pre-eminent. In fact, placemaking and support for a (competitive) 'pepper pot' allocation of resources had long been the *de facto* urban strategy; indeed it had been highlighted in the review led by (former television executive and Arts Council chief) Peter Bazalgette, which proposed a cluster policy for the arts sector (Bazalgette, 2017). Uniquely, as part of the Sector Deal, this approach was supported by university research funding. So, the UK research funding body, the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), joined to support the Creative Industries Cluster programme for the creative economy: the establishment of nine partnerships to develop creative clusters, particularly based on research and development funding and support for small business. Porter's work and its application to the UK cluster programme had previously been criticised (Martin & Sunley, 2003); this new iteration, despite its academic foundation, was even weaker (Swords & Prescott, 2023).

As part of a post-Brexit strategic positioning, the (renewed) Conservative administration elected in 2019 adopted the phrase 'levelling up' to articulate regional and urban inequalities.[5] This was not proposing a renewal of regional policy but rather a scattering of initiatives, branded with a (hollow) slogan. To date, very little has come of this. It has suffered from a lack of focus, becoming mired in both the Covid-19 period and a lack of continuity: this has been a period characterised by repeated Conservative leadership contests, with a rapid turnover of Prime Ministers – and culture ministers.

Neither the pandemic nor Brexit prompted any distinct sub-national policies for the creative economy, and hence their effect was likely to reinforce existing distributional trends, as suggested by experiences of those cultural organisations in receipt of DCMS funding.[6] The economic consequences of Covid-19 continue to have a negative effect on live audiences, with all cultural organisations struggling to win them back. Of course, online services received a massive boost in the immediate aftermath of 2020 – but they too suffered the problem of an interruption in pipelines of production and, in the post-Covid recession period, a 'de-subscription' from streaming services.

Conclusion

We began this paper by noting the stark inequalities of distribution of employment in the creative economy in the UK: both the urban focus and the dominance of London. Crucially, that dominance has intensified over the past thirty years. The policy environment to support the creative economy has not been consistent with the regular changes in approach: from local, to regional to national (and back again); or between entrepreneurial incentives and strategic direction. It has been established that locality is an important characteristic of culture and the creative economy, especially with respect to clusters, this has been pursued at the

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[5] Levelling up and Regeneration Act 2023, https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3155
[6] DCMS data suggests that "In 2021/22, the total income of DCMS-funded cultural organisations was £4.1 billion, lower than £4.2 billion in 2020/21 but higher than £3.6 billion in 2018/19 (the last financial year unaffected by the Covid-19 pandemic). Adjusting for inflation, this was a 2.2% decrease compared to 2020/21 and a 4.9% increase compared to 2018/19. In 2021/22, DCMS-funded cultural organisations received a total of £1.7 billion in Grant-in-Aid. This is a decrease of 6.2% from 2020/21, after adjusting for inflation. However, this is a 50.4% increase, after adjusting for inflation, since 2018/19, the last year unaffected by the coronavirus pandemic. These trends are largely driven by a substantial increase in 2020/21, particularly to Arts Council England as part of the Culture Recovery Fund, which then tapered off slightly in 2021/22."

expense of attention to a balanced approach to national and strategic growth. The situation has not been helped by a shift in the administrative culture through devolution in the UK – in particular, English regional creative economies have become worse off. Innovative initiatives have, however, been proposed for the devolved governments of Wales and Scotland and the latter have benefited from a more strategic and 'joined up' approach. A final characteristic of this thirty-year period is the long-term impoverishment of local authorities as the primary provider of cultural and creative economy support, replaced by a nationally-focused techno-economic boosterism aiming at export-led growth.

2. Evidence and Lobbying – how the UK's Creative Industries policy and research ecosystem developed during the 2010s

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Introduction: A brief history of the UK's Creative Industries policy and research ecosystem from 2000-2010

The Creative Industries were first mapped by the UK's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1998, the same year that Chris Smith, Baron Smith of Finsbury (then UK Secretary of State for DCMS) published his seminal book 'Creative Britain' (DCMS 1998; Smith 1998; 2013). This book, and the Government's mapping, looked to make a newly defined sector - comprising those businesses that were dependent for their success on "*artistic creativity*" - more central to UK policy making. This was not only because of the economic advantages of doing so but because they recognised that many creative sub-sectors also produced social benefits within their local communities, and at a national level. Coming shortly after the landslide victory of Tony Blair at the 1997 General Election, this mapping exercise drew from a feeling of economic and social optimism within government – but it also reflected Smith's very distinct interest in this area of the economy, alongside that of a small group of advisors working with him (Gross 2020).

In 2001, this initial mapping was updated and the sector was re-defined as "*Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property*" (DCMS 2001). This was partly in recognition of the legal framework to protect Intellectual Property – essential for monetising the innate creativity of the sector and particularly important to emphasise in the early 2000s, as music streaming services - initially in the form of peer-to-peer file sharing services like Napster - were being developed, challenging commercial and legal orthodoxies (Mark 2023).

Over the subsequent years the academic and political interpretations of the sector became more debated and nuanced, both in the UK and abroad. The developing academic debate can be seen by looking at the expanding literature over this time period (cf. Pratt 2008; Work Foundation 2007; United Nations 2008), while the increasing level of political debate is indexed by the number of times the sector was mentioned in UK Parliament over this period (Fig 1). Political interest in the sector was also emerging elsewhere in the world, including notably in South Korea and Australia (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Yong Jin 2012).


Fig. 1. Mentions of the Creative Industries in Hansard, the official report of all Parliamentary debates, from 1/1/2000 to 31/12/2009[7]

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[7] *Find references to "Creative Industries"- Hansard - UK Parliament* (01/01/2000 to 31/12/2009). Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/search/ContributionsendDate=2009-12-

As might be expected, alongside this increasing scholarship and political debate, several sector-focussed groups and organisations were set up over the course of the 2000s to provide creative businesses and communities with different types of support. Some of these were international – such as the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, which promoted creative co-operation in cities around the world.[8] Some were much more domestically focused: the Creative Rural Industries Consortium was created in 2006 to promote culture and creative networking in rural areas in the UK.[9]

2010 marked an important milestone in the trajectory of the UK's Creative Industries, with the publication of the first mapping of "creative clusters" by Innovation Foundation Nesta (Chapain et al. 2010).[10] This highlighted the benefits creative businesses gained from being physically close to one another ('clustered') – for example, that co-location made them more able to share staff and services. The research also confirmed that London was not the only creative hotspot in the UK, identifying nine others. 2010 was also the year that the remits of both Scottish Screen and the Scottish Arts Council were inherited by a new organisation – Creative Scotland – part of a move towards a Creative Industries approach in Scotland: the arms-length body would from that point fund organisations across the screen and arts sub-sectors (Creative Scotland 2023).[11] Conversations about the Creative Industries were not only progressing in the UK. At the European level, the European Commission published a Green Paper in 2010 which overtly embraced the creative sector entitled 'Unlocking the potential of cultural and Creative Industries' (European Commission 2010). It highlighted other European efforts to support the Creative Economy, for example those policies being introduced in Estonia and those endorsed by the Nordic Council.

The remainder of this paper tracks the development of this policy-facing ecosystem, and the evidence base it sought to bring into existence, across three key organisations: The Creative Industries Council (founded 2011); The Creative Industries Federation (2014); and the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (2018). It ends with some reflections on what has been gained through this process and some lessons to take forward.

CIC: The Creative Industries Council (2011)

The Creative Industries Council (CIC) was set up by the UK Government in 2011 to provide a singular industry and government forum that could support partnership working, stimulate policy and industry change. Its launch marked an important moment in the history of the UK's creative sector; in many ways it was the culmination of the previous decade of research and policy work. The Council was announced as part of the UK's Government's 'Plan for Growth', which "identified ways to increase economic growth in key industries such as music, film and video games" (UK Government 2011a). This plan was published alongside the announcement of new Creative Industries focussed tax incentives in the 2011 Budget, which was delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne.[12] This was the second

31&partial=False&searchTerm=%22creative+industries%22&sortOrder=0&startDate=2000-01-01 (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

[8] See *UNESCO Creative Cities Network*. Available at: https://en.unesco.org/creative-cities/home (Accessed: 9 August 2023).

[9] *Creative Rural Industries Consortium*. Available at: https://www.ruralculture.org.uk/ (Accessed: 9 August 2023).

[10] Nesta had been created in 1998 as the first publicly supported national endowment in the UK with one of its ambitions to "advance public appreciation of the Creative Industries, science and technology" (Smith 1998: 8). Its importance to Creative Industries discourse is not the focus of this paper, but it is mentioned throughout and discussed briefly in the glossary (Annex 1).

[11] At first glance, the timing of these initiatives might suggest they were a response to the results of the General Election of that year (in which a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition Government took power after thirteen years of Labour leadership). However, Nesta's work would be better understood as a continuation of their ongoing prioritisation of this research agenda, rather than the beginning of a new area of study, and the creation of Creative Scotland had been announced several years before (Museums Association 2007).

[12] *2011 Budget: A strong and stable economy, growth and fairness* (2011). HM Treasury. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2011. (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

budget of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition Government that had been formed the year before. The first budget had introduced sweeping spending cuts to bring down the UK's deficit, and this second budget was focussed on "reforming the nation's economy, so that we have enduring growth and jobs in the future", with a particular interest in growing enterprise, explaining the newfound focus on the Creative Industries as a now demonstrable high growth area of the economy (BBC 2011).

The foundation of this Council suggested that the sector had 'come of age' and was now recognised as a strategic priority. Equally, it hinted that the new coalition Government saw the opportunity to formalise and publicise their relationship with the sector as a way of marking a break with the previous thirteen years of Labour leadership. This is indicated by the language used in a parliamentary debate at that time.[13] The Liberal Democrat spokesperson for the arts in the House of Lords, Baroness Bonham Carter of Yarnsbury, described the Council's remit as to "engage with the industry in—this is crucial, and here I steal a new Labour term—a joined-up way". The response from the Labour party peer Lord Macdonald of Tradeston all but confirms this suspicion, at least from the perspective of those in his party:

> *My Lords, as I recall, the term "Creative Industries" was first coined by the new Labour Government back in 1997 to define activities that deserved strong support. The subsequent growth over the years until 2010 was, I believe, among the finest achievements of Labour in power. No doubt this debate—I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bonham-Carter, on initiating it—will help make the measure of Labour's success more familiar to your Lordships.*

The same debate also suggests the importance of evidence in making the case for such a Council: Baroness Bonham Carter overtly links its creation to research from Nesta which indicates the potential economic contribution of the Creative Industries "could grow to £85 billion by 2013 creating 150,000 jobs". Such links make clear that the sector and its associated policy ecosystem were viewed, at least within the political establishment, as something of a New Labour project.

Beginning its work in July 2011, then, the Creative Industries Council was chaired by Business Secretary Vince Cable and consisted of leading figures from across the sector alongside the UK Government's Creative Industries Minister Ed Vaizey (given the nature of the coalition government it was critical to have representatives from both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties) (UK Government 2011b). Since its launch, the Council's Terms of Reference (Creative Industries Council 2022) have clarified a more comprehensive set of ambitions, to:

- Enable close working between industry and government on issues relevant to the Creative Industries;
- Represent, champion and support the Creative Industries;
- Highlight the significant impact the Creative Industries make to the UK economy;
- Address key concerns and opportunities for the Creative Industries with a view to boosting their growth and competitiveness;
- Develop and promote practical action and policies to address key priorities for the sector;
- Address social and cultural issues affecting the sector.

The council met once in 2011, and meetings have been recorded two to three times each year thereafter (although its Terms of Reference suggests aiming to meet three to four times per annum). Edited meeting notes have historically been published by the Government to

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[13] *Creative Industries - Hansard - UK Parliament* (2011). Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2011-11-03/debates/11110357000101/CreativeIndustries (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

ensure transparency (DCMS n.d.), although notes from recent meetings have not yet been made available.[14]

Work on the Sector Deal and Sector Vision

The two most notable successes of the Creative Industries Council are the 'Creative Industries Sector Deal' (2018) and 'Creative Industries Sector Vision' (2023) – both papers with growth objectives and policy supports agreed between the industry members of the Council (as the sector's representatives) and the Government of the day.

The Creative Industries Sector Deal was one of a number of Sector Deals made as part of the Conservative Government's Industrial Strategy in 2018 (DDCMS/BEIS 2018). These deals were partnerships between government and industry aiming to increase sector productivity, with the first Sector Deals in life sciences, construction, artificial intelligence, and the automotive sectors. In the Creative Industries Sector Deal, commitments were made under four themes: places; ideas; business environment; people. Each of these themes referenced the Government's ambitions (e.g., one ambition in the 'Business Environment' section was to "Boost job creation: higher than average growth rate implies 600,000 new creative jobs by 2023"). The Deal then set out the action the Government was taking to help achieve this goal (e.g. "we will establish a new Creative Industries Trade and Investment Board, with at least £4m from existing Department for International Trade budgets to support exports in 2018/19") as well as an action that 'industry' had agreed to take (e.g. "Industry will help to train and educate SMEs and microbusinesses on how to police their content and products online and investigate partnerships between small and large players to assist in enforcement").

The way in which the Sector Deals required commitment from industry made the Council indispensable. They were involved from the outset - the Council championed the Creative Industries as a priority for a 'Sector Deal' in the first place, their influence undoubtably enabled through having Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and DCMS Secretaries of States as Co-Chairs (Creative Industries Council 2017). Others could also advocate for the sector's inclusion – for example, the Creative Industries Federation was making this case directly to policymakers in DCMS and BEIS. However, the CIC was structured in such a way that Government could include them as co-signatories of the Deal (as they would also be for the later Sector Vision) (DDCMS/BEIS 2018). Put simply, given the extremely high number of freelancers and micro businesses in the Creative Industries, having an official forum which brought key industry players together enabled the sector to benefit from this type of Government scheme. If the Council had not existed, it seems likely that the Government would have defaulted to working with those industries with a few leaders that it could more easily negotiate with – the UK automotive sector for example.

The Council was equally critical to the later Sector Vision, although this wasn't an overt part of a larger industrial strategy programme. This is because the Vision followed a similar model, making £77m of spending commitments (Fig 2.) alongside other actions and ambitions that needed to be co-signed by the Council as industry representatives (DCMS 2023).

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[14] See: Creative Industries Council, *GOV.UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/creative-industries-council (Accessed: 11 August 2023).

Fig. 2. Spending commitments made as part of the '2023 Creative Industries Growth Moment' in the Creative Industries Sector Vision (DCMS 2023)

Working groups

From its earliest years, the Creative Industries Council had a number of detailed working groups which focussed on issues ranging from internationalisation to skills, to access to finance (Creative Industries Council 2013a). Throughout the lifetime of the CIC the topics covered in these have varied. For example, in 2014 the working groups were on access to finance; international; education and skills; infrastructure; and intellectual property (Creative Industries Council 2014). In 2022 they were on regions and clusters; education and skills; intellectual property; R&D and innovation; diversity; trade and investment; and research and evidence (i.e., the Technical Working Group).

These groups not only allowed the development of the detailed thematic work which fed into the Sector Deal and Sector Vision, but have provided an ongoing environment in which civil service officials can discuss emerging ideas with industry representatives. This is in part because, whilst the Council's meeting notes are published, these working groups have been able to operate in a more independent and private manner. It is also because membership of these groups has historically included experts who are not members of the Creative Industries Council itself, as agreed by the Chairs of each group (including the author of this paper).

The Apprenticeship Levy is one example of a critical policy changed by the intervention of a CIC Working group. The Levy was initiated by the UK government in April 2017, and required all employers paying a wage bill of more than £3 million per year to pay 0.5% of their payroll each month as a levy tax unless they reinvested this money back into their workforce in the form of Apprenticeship training (The Apprentice Academy n.d.). However, there were issues in making this work for the Creative Industries – a point that the Council was critical in making to Government: it was misaligned with existing voluntary training options, and vouchers could not be shared with the SMEs that make up the majority of the sector, as indicated by the 2018 parliamentary debate on the subject (UK Government 2021).[15] However, their Skills and Education group (and a sub-group they set up on T-Levels and Apprenticeships) was able to do the close working with policymakers that was required to secure opportunities to run more flexible apprenticeships which better suited the needs of the sector.

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[15] *Apprenticeship Levy: Creative Industries - Hansard - UK Parliament* (2023). Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2018-07-23/debates/991298C8-3740-4DCC-B9A7-160F686D4D9F/ApprenticeshipLevyCreativeIndustries (Accessed: 14 September 2023).

Over time, these working groups have gone through several changes, with the most significant being a recent move away from sitting working groups to task-and-finish groups identifying specific ambitions (for example a group working towards a cross-industry Diversity charter or a cross-industry Climate Charter). This suggests a desire to build from the working groups' successes up to this point and to better harness their power. This is further suggested by the fact that, in 2018, the international working group was developed into an independent Creative Industries Trade and Investment Board, with a remit to "promote UK creative industry exports and inward investment" (Creative Industries Council 2023). More recently, as part of the Sector Vision, a Climate task-and-finish group was set up to work on an industry-led Creative Climate Charter (DCMS 2023).[16]

Defining the Creative Industries

The Creative Industries Council has only occasionally funded and commissioned its own research (for example, in 2022 the industry members worked with the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre to commission a paper about how and why local authorities and LEPs in England are supporting the growth of the creative industries in their areas (Fleming 2022). However, the earliest published minutes recorded from Council meetings (from 2013) demonstrate an ongoing interest in data and measurement (Creative Industries Council 2013b).

Critically, the Council supported an updated definition of the Creative Industries in 2014, which has been used by the UK Government since this time (DCMS 2014). This definition adopted Nesta's Dynamic Mapping approach, which considers whether a sub-sector has a high percentage of their workforce employed in creative occupations (Bakhshi et al. 2013). This change brought to the fore the skills challenges facing the sector, and the fluidity of roles both between Creative Industries sub-sectors, and between the Creative Industries and other areas of the economy.

This definition includes the following sub-sectors:

- Advertising and marketing
- Architecture
- Crafts
- Design and designer fashion
- Film, TV, video, radio, and photography
- IT, software and computer services
- Publishing
- Museums, Galleries and Libraries[17]
- Music, performing and visual arts.

As with previous UK versions, this definition includes both for-profit businesses and non-profit organisations; for example, it includes firms such as fashion label Burberry and Aardman Animations, the producers of Wallace and Gromit, as well as the BBC and the National Gallery. As such, the Council has always had representatives from publicly funded organisations as well as individuals representing either private companies or groups of companies.

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[16] N.B. the author is a member of this group.
[17] SIC codes 91.01 and 91.02 (representing Museums, Galleries and Libraries) were included after consultation, despite having creative intensities below the necessary threshold. One reason they may have a lower creative intensity is due to large numbers employed in facilities maintenance in Museums, galleries and libraries (DCMS 2016).

Whilst this has been the dominant definition of the Creative Industries used by the Creative Industries Council, Westminster policymakers and in British scholarship for eight years (allowing the Government, researchers and industry bodies to interrogate broadly comparable data on GVA and employment), other definitions of the sector do exist in the UK, including that currently used by the Scottish Government (2023; Brook et al. 2020). More broadly, the definition has been the subject of academic debate since its first usage. Definitional debates are by no means specific to the Creative Industries, and it is possible to articulate many different reasons for these discussions. One of these specific to the sector is a discomfort with the focus on capitalistic production rather than social or cultural value (Mould 2018); another, that notions of creative intensity draw analytic and policy attention away from the support work that goes on inside organisations and along the value chain (Bennett 2020);[18] a third - common in discussions regarding the publicly funded arts and/or the software sector, including amongst those sitting on the Creative Industries Council - is a suggestion that the sector is just too broad for cohesive policy support.

One point of interest about this move to a skills-based definition was that, in theory, it allowed greater discussion of the creative workforce, and to this end went hand-in-hand with a greater consideration of the Creative Economy. The UK definition of the Creative Economy encompasses both those sectors that are part of the Creative Industries and those working in creative occupations outside of the Creative Industries - for example, designers working in the manufacturing sector (Fig 3.). However, given the focus on industrial strategy in the UK, most of the significant commitments at the UK level have been made using the language of the Creative Industries rather than the Creative Economy, as this has aligned best with the Government's overall approach and, indeed, was best supported by the existence of groups like the Council (UK Government n.d.).

Fig 3. Defining the Creative Economy in the UK (Pinoncely and Washington-Ibieme 2019)

Remaining areas of concern for the Creative Industries

By the mid-2010s the UK Creative Industries sector was more clearly defined, had built political capital, and was supported by a growing research base and a number of sector organisations. However, given the sector's size and importance to the UK economy, many in the Creative Industries felt they were still 'punching below their weight' in the political sphere.

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[18] For example, SIC codes 91.01 and 91.02 (representing Museums, Galleries and Libraries) were included only after consultation, having creative intensities below the necessary threshold. One reason they may have a lower creative intensity is due to large numbers employed in facilities maintenance in this part of the sector (DCMS 2016).

Specifically, conversations between some sector leaders had begun to focus on the ability of the sector to lobby in those areas where they disagreed with the Government (from May 2015 this was a solely Conservative Government, rather than a coalition Government). As the Creative Industries Council was initially chaired by a Government minister, and latterly co-chaired by an industry representative and at least one Government minister, it was inevitably best suited to areas where Government and industry both believed investment or change was needed - for example, in growing creative clusters, or increasing exports. However, there remained areas where the views of many in the sector diverged more dramatically from that of the government of the day (Cameron 2014; Easton and Di Novo 2023). Although independent membership bodies had existed for many of the creative sub-sectors for decades (e.g. the Publishers Association, which was founded 1896 (Barker 1971) or UKIE, the membership group for the video games industry, which has its origins in the 1980s (UKIE 2023), a significant group of individuals had begun to feel that they needed to work in a pan-sector alliance to convince the Government to change tact on critical issues like education. This group "bemoaned the fact that UK creativity is the one calling card that defines us internationally but we were all still working in silos and not as one coherent voice" (Kampfner 2015).

Another area of remaining concern was the availability of research on the Creative Industries. Sir Peter Bazalgette's (2017) independent review of the Creative Industries for the UK Government noted that "Countries around the world already regard the UK as a leading authority on Creative Industries policy and metrics. Our measurement and mapping tools continue to generate interest from countries such as South Korea, Australia and Norway". This was undoubtedly true - by the mid-2010s the UK had built an impressive library of Creative Industries research, and UK consultancies, universities and charities were supporting nations around the world with their own research on this subject. As such, in his paper Bazalgette recommended that "Government, academia and industry should establish a Global Creative Industries Observatory within the UK to cement our position as the leading international authority on Creative Industries strategy and policy for, and measurement of, this sector".

However, others in UKRI (the non-departmental public body of the Government of the United Kingdom that directs research and innovation funding), the Creative Industries Council, broader industry and in the research sector felt that the level and quality of evidence in the UK was not yet good enough for a new organisation with solely an observatory function. A growing number of university departments, charities like Innovation Foundation Nesta, and consultancies like BOP Consulting, were focused on the sector. However, funding for research on the Creative Industries was still not as readily available as that in other areas. In a paper on cultural policy Hasan Bakhshi, at that time based at Nesta, wrote that "There are enough evidence-related, including statistical, challenges here to keep a culture department and cultural policy analysts busy for some time" (Bakhshi and Cunningham 2016). The same might equally have been said for other creative sub-sectors or other key policy areas. Moreover, whilst discourse around the geography of the sector, skills in the sector and intellectual property had been rapidly growing, there were still some areas which were relatively unexplored by academics, in particular in the area of internationalisation (Fazio 2019). The referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union in 2016, and subsequent 'Brexit' in 2020 only made the need for detailed data and thoughtful analysis on trade and migration more urgent.

These two remaining questions - how to give more independent lobbying heft to the sector and how to improve the quantity and quality of independent research - led to the founding of two organisations over the 2010s. As a founding team member of both of these organisations, I want to discuss here how they aimed to solve the issues already raised in this paper and consider the lessons others might learn from their experience.

CIF: The Creative Industries Federation (2014)

The Creative Industries Federation (the Federation) was the brainchild of Sir John Sorrell, the designer, philanthropist and UK business ambassador, alongside leaders including Sir Peter Bazalgette (then at Arts Council England), Sir Nicholas Serota (then at the Tate), Tim Davie (then at BBC Worldwide), Caroline Rush (British Fashion Council) and Amanda Nevill (then at the British Film Institute). The Federation's initial aims were to provide lobbying, research and networking across the Creative Industries (Montgomery 2014).

The speech made at the launch of the Federation indicates the place of the sector in public discourse in 2014. By this time the Creative Industries were garnering interest from policymakers, as demonstrated by the presence of the (then) Chancellor of the Exchequer - George Osborne - alongside representatives from all of the major political parties (Pratt 2014). Still, the speeches made that night highlighted how those who had founded the Federation felt that the Creative Industries were still struggling to turn this interest into the policy action they felt was required. Speaking at the launch event at London's Central Saint Martin's College of Art and Design, John Kampfner, the Federation's first Director, said: "Why are the Creative Industries so successful worldwide yet struggle to be heard at home? Why is creative education so denigrated when it is providing the next generation of talent?" (Kampfner 2014).

The Director's speech at the launch party also indicated how the Federation's approach would contrast with that of the Creative Industries Council: "The Federation will bring together the public arts and commercial creative companies", Kampfner said, "it will be fearless in challenging politicians and the industry to understand that Britain's success is imperilled if we fail to invest in our arts and cultural education". As suggested by this, the ambition of the Federation was to give "fearless" political clout to a sector that had at that time been the fastest growing part of the UK economy over the last decade - meaning that it would publicly and privately lobby the government of the day for improved conditions for the sector. Like the Creative Industries Council, the Federation also made a key part of its mission the bringing together of the publicly funded parts of the sector with those that were more commercially focused. As Kampfner put it, "these different sectors are absolutely interdependent on each other - you can't have a successful commercial sector without investing in education, training and publicly funded organisations".

The desirability for such a voice from industry's perspective can be seen not only by looking at the impressive board which set up the Federation, but also by the fact that more than 200 so-called "founder supporters" funded early development before the membership scheme launched in January 2015 (Creative Industries Federation n.d.).

Policy priorities

As indicated by Kampfner's speech, from its foundation the Federation focused on those areas where the views of many in the sector differed most dramatically from the Government of the day. In its first year, these foci included public investment in the arts (and their importance for the wider creative sector), and the concerning trends around fewer children, particularly at school in England, taking creative subjects (education is a devolved priority in the UK) (Easton 2015; Easton and Neelands 2015). Of course, across the lifetime of the Federation these priorities would shift and change, with other priorities including Public Service Broadcasting, Higher Education policy, the impact of Brexit, freelancers and diversity (see Fig. 4 for a 2017 snapshot of these priorities).

There was no uniform way in which the Federation collected or responded to these priorities - the Policy and Research teams worked alongside the membership team to understand sectoral concerns (mostly through in-person meetings with members, although surveys were

intermittently used), but the team also made their own judgements about those areas of policy most likely to impact the sector. The majority of priority areas were driven by the membership's frustration with the Conservative Government's policy direction - although work on diversity and freelancers were focussed on both industry and policy change (Easton 2015b; Easton and Cauldwell French 2017).

Fig. 4. Creative Industries Federation priorities from 2017

Core activities

In order to 'make the case' in these priority areas the Federation prioritised two activities.

First, it looked to produce its own evidence which could attract industry, policy, and media attention. This research would be published alongside clear policy recommendations that the sector could rally behind. That is why the Federation published its first piece of research just five months after launch: a partnership with the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) which showed that, at that time, 36.5% of top engineers had art or design as an A or AS level and 35.4% played a musical instrument (Easton 2015a). Using this evidence the Federation suggested that a lack of proper arts education might damage civil engineering as much as it hurt the Creative Industries and suggested ways in which the Government could turn the tide on the dwindling numbers doing arts subjects at schools. The 'Creative Education Agenda' combined a clear call for action with criticism of the Government's current approach, and new evidence which not only pushed forward the debate but also enabled the research to get media traction (Richens 2015).

Across its lifetime the Creative Industries Federation followed this formula and published research in conjunction with policy/industry influencing campaigns on a number of subjects. In fact, in just its first year, the Federation published three additional papers: 'Creative Diversity', 'How public investment in arts contributes to growth in the Creative Industries' and submitted evidence to the Government on the BBC (Easton 2016). The latter two of these responded to critical areas of concern regarding the direction of the Government - namely that austerity measures had limited much-needed investment in the arts and that the Conservative Government's long standing distrust of the BBC might lead them to change how it was funded and disempower the organisation, and harm the wider sector as a result. The focus on industry in the piece on arts funding was not an accident; this was a strategic choice as it was felt this would best chime with the ambition of the Conservative government to boost productivity and grow the economy.

The other major priority for the Federation was its policy work, which initially focused on conversations with leaders in the Government and the opposition, as well as high ranking officials. These would often be synchronised with the research agenda - for example,

following the launch of the paper on creative education the Federation held a high level private roundtable with Schools Minister Nick Gibb MP at the Institution of Civil Engineers, which brought together representatives from across the creative sector, as well as individuals from the engineering sector who had been part of the original research. Other political events in the first year of the Federation included a Creative Industries hustings with representatives from five political parties; a speech by Ed Miliband MP (then Leader of the Opposition); an event with the then Education Secretary Nicky Morgan; four events with then-Minister for Culture and the Digital Economy, Ed Vaizey, and a speech by Scotland's then-Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Europe and External Affairs Fiona Hyslop MSP.

All of these public events were supported by numerous conversations behind closed doors with relevant elected politicians and senior officials, and were initially enabled by the existing networks of Federation leaders (including the board and Chief Executive), although the team quickly built their own relationships. One thing which made this level of access possible was the way in which the Federation enabled policymakers to consider a large area of the economy in a single interaction. Whilst those policymakers working, for example, in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (like long-running DCMS Minister, Ed Vaizey) might have had capacity to build individual relationships with each trade body, time-poor MPs were attracted to the idea of being able to understand the concerns of many sub-sectors in one meeting or address a large group of sub-sectors at a single event.

Other priorities - outside of London and broader representation

In the first years of the Federation there was also a recognition of the need to ensure that those creative organisations based outside of London felt they had a voice on the policy issues that mattered to them. This was historically lacking in the UK context, which is perhaps unsurprising as - according to the available definitions - London and the Greater South East (London, East and South East of England) represent 54% of Creative Industries employment, 62% of CI businesses and 74% of CI economic output (GVA), despite being home to just 26% of the British population (DCMS n.d.; 2022a; 2022b; ONS n.d.). It was also the case that membership of the CIC had primarily been dominated by national organisations with London headquarters. To try and ensure better representation for those in clusters outside of the capital, in their first year of operation the Federation held seven events outside of London - in Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, East Anglia, Liverpool, Glasgow and Newcastle Gateshead (Easton 2016). This was also in recognition of a contemporary political push for investment outside of the capital (e.g. the Chancellor George Osborne coined the term 'Northern Powerhouse' the year the Federation launched) (Alliance MBS 2023).

At the same time, the Federation's focus on partnership working with members increased. One benefit of this was it enabled the Federation to hear from a greater diversity of creative businesses about the issues they were facing. The strength of the Creative Industries Council was that it provided a forum with a small number of leaders who could present a sectoral view to the Government. However, this small group could inevitably never represent all Creative Industries companies' views, and the Federation's operating model meant they could in theory represent a greater diversity of practitioners - meaning they actively aimed to involve people who did not feel represented by the CIC, for example those at a variety of points in their careers (e.g. just starting out or nearing retirement), freelancers, those who were not white, and those who were working class.

In addition, the Federation could also represent a group of organisations which were not technically creative businesses themselves, but nevertheless whose business models were based on the activity of CI businesses - for example, law firms specialising in Intellectual Property, or the large numbers of higher and further education (HE and FE) institutions who are training the creative practitioners of tomorrow. In the first few years of the Federation, a HE and FE working group was set up, chaired by then-Vice-Chancellor of University of Arts

London Sir Nigel Carrington, to specifically take forward this cohort's concerns. Of course, ensuring members were aware of the work the Federation was doing was also incredibly important as the organisation was, at this time, solely funded by its membership.

Over time, the purpose and focus of the Federation shifted and changed. The most notable change came in September 2019 when it was announced it would be merging with Creative England, becoming 'Creative UK' (a move which finally took place in 2021). Creative England was set up in 2011 as the first national development organisation for the Creative Industries, consolidating a number of regional screen agencies, and had been primarily an organisation focussed on providing practical training opportunities and funding (Creative UK 2022; Oakley and O'Connor 2015). This merger aimed to combine "the industry insights and advocacy work of the Federation, with the practical support and investment work of Creative England" (Creative UK 2022).

Creative PEC: The Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (2018)

Coming four years after the launch of the Creative Industries Federation, the rationale for the creation of the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (Creative PEC) was clear - many UK policy-makers and industry leaders (including those represented by both the Creative Industries Federation and the Creative Industries Council) felt they didn't have the evidence they needed to make the best arguments and decisions possible when it came to Creative Industries policy. Put simply, the political need for research was outstripping the growth in the number of academics working in this area, as well as the level of research being published by consultancies and membership organisations like the Creative Industries Federation.

This provided justification for funding a Centre aiming to incentivise a jump in the level of evidence on the sector, announced in the 2014 Creative Industries Sector Deal (the writing of which had made visible the gap in evidence), with funding secured ahead of this date as part of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (DDCMS/BEIS 2018).

How to achieve robust and independent evidence, in an under-resourced research area, was less clear. An observatory model didn't fit the bill, for reasons previously discussed. At the same time, with such limited resources it was clear that funding towards new research would need to be carefully channelled, avoiding the frequent pitfalls of missing political timeframes or framing research in a way which didn't make sense to policymakers.

Centre design and workstrands

After a tender process, won by Nesta alongside a set of University partners, the Creative PEC was launched publicly in November 2018 with the express intention to achieve a "step-change for three main stakeholders – industry, policymakers and the wider research community – in the quality of evidence for the Creative Industries, tasking some of the best researchers across the UK with answering some of the most pressing questions about the sector" (Nesta 2022). This meant the Creative PEC was explicitly embracing a triple-helix model of innovation (although not necessarily using that expression), by prioritising University-Industry-Government (U-I-G) interactions (Etzkowitz and Zhou 2017).

The Centre was designed as a network of over 30 co-investigators covering multiple disciplines and based in 10 research universities, spanning the nations and regions of the UK (Fig. 5), with a central team led by the Director at Nesta. The Creative PEC, it was agreed, would also commission and co-commission work from other experts outside of the consortium, in recognition of the quality of research taking place across the UK and across different types of institutions.

Initially the work of the Creative PEC was both structurally and publicly organised by five work strands:

1. **Creative Clusters and Innovation**, led by Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University
2. **Skills, Talent and Diversity**, led by the Work Foundation, Lancaster University (and latterly by Work Advance, a consultancy created by leading academics from the Work Foundation)
3. **Intellectual Property, Business Models, Access to Finance and Content Regulation**, led by CREATe at Glasgow University
4. **Arts, Culture and Public Service Broadcasting**, led by The School of Journalism, Media and Culture, Cardiff University
5. **Creative Industries and International Competitiveness**, led by Newcastle University Business School.

Each of these work strands had a nominated lead at the appropriate institution who was charged with overseeing those pieces of research in their work strand's themes taking place across the consortium, as well as supporting the commissioning and co-commissioning of research in those themes outside of the Creative PEC. Each work strand lead, alongside the Centre Director and Research Director, also had a place on the Creative PEC Management Board and worked closely with the Creative PEC's Policy Unit on prioritisation and communication.

Over time, the Creative PEC would publish a rearticulated version of their themes with a focus on making them accessible to an external audience (Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre n.d.). These simplified themes were:

- Geography of the Creative Industries
- The Value of Arts and Culture
- International, Trade, and Immigration
- Skills, Jobs and Education
- Intellectual Property and Regulation
- R&D and Innovation
- Diversity and Inclusion
- Business Models and Access to Finance
- Public Service Broadcasting
- Cross-cutting

Fig. 5. The Creative PEC Consortium in 2018[19]

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[19] Author's archive

Approach to policy impact

The Creative PEC saw the key to its success as not only ensuring it produced quality academic research, but in enabling the Director and Policy Unit to guide funding directly to those pieces of research that could answer policy-critical questions within the timeframe in which they needed to be addressed. The Policy Unit was intended to have strong and trusting relationships with policymakers, ensuring the research could have impact, but also allowing for embedded policy work within relevant departments.

The Policy Unit also introduced a campaigning approach to the Creative PEC: having consulted industry and policymakers on priorities, they went about drawing up a timeline of when critical political decisions were likely to be made. The fact they were funded by the Government itself helped to facilitate many of these initial conversations. The Policy Unit then used this information to develop a 'Policy Campaigns Planner', which organised the year into a number of campaigns in which multiple pieces of research would be published on the same subject over a short time frame. These were timed to feed into specific policy opportunities.

An example of this is the Creative Places campaign of July 2021, in which the Creative PEC published seven pieces of content over a week, including a summary policy briefing (Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre 2021). The timing of this campaign was decided to ensure there was time to feed the published papers and their recommendations into an upcoming Spending Review, as well as the UK Government's flagship paper 'Levelling Up the United Kingdom' which was published in February the subsequent year (and which did ultimately reference PEC research) (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities 2022).

Industry Champions

As a research centre, the Creative PEC wanted to work not only on behalf of the Creative Industries but have industry insights and representation embedded within the Centre design. To meet this need, the PEC agreed with the CIC that they would have a representative on each Working Group, but in recognition of the need to consult with the breadth of the sector, the Creative PEC also introduced a network of Industry Champions. These Champions were a diverse group of around 80-100 creative practitioners from across the UK, chosen on the basis of their unique experiences in their roles - so one might be a freelance designer just starting out in Glasgow, another might be a person heading up HR for a creative multinational in London.

The Creative PEC used meetings and surveys to allow the Champions to feed in on research priorities. In addition, the Creative PEC convened Industry Panels to advise on particular policy research questions, give feedback on specific insights and to advise on policy recommendations. In these panels a group of 8–20 Champions would be briefed on existing research in an area, and then would be asked for their personal experience of the issue as someone working in the industry. Panel subjects included Higher and Further Education; the importance of local development policies for creative businesses; the need for business model innovation in creative content industries in the post-COVID-19 world; the impact of COVID-19 on diversity in the Creative Industries; recovery and growth for creative freelancers; and placemaking (Burger 2020; Chandler 2021; MacFarlane 2021). The insights from these panels were then published on the Creative PEC website under Chatham House rules (meaning the Creative PEC published summaries of the discussions, but didn't identify who made any particular comment). These panels also formed the basis of partnerships with external organisations. For example, the Creative Diversity All Party Parliamentary Group

partnered with the Creative PEC on an Industry Panel looking at the impact of COVID-19 on diversity in the Creative Industries (Burdger 2020).

Move to the RSA and Newcastle University

The Creative PEC was initially funded for five years as part of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund through the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). Following the conclusion of this funding, the AHRC decided to re-invest in the Creative PEC, awarding it an increase in funding (amounting to £11m) over another five years. However, over the PEC's lifetime the overall strategy of Innovation Foundation Nesta had radically changed, and as part of this upheaval the organisation had moved away from working on the Creative sector (Nesta n.d.). As a result, a competitive funding round was launched to find a new home for the Creative PEC (including those members of the centre hired by Nesta who might want to move with the organisation).

The Royal Society of Arts (RSA) in London and Newcastle University won this tender process. On announcement of this the Creative PEC Director Hasan Bakhshi, MBE (who stayed on at the Creative PEC), said:

> *Over the past five years, the Creative PEC has helped bring about a step change in the quantity and quality of evidence available to inform policies for the Creative Industries. As well as publishing new research, we have embedded our researchers in the design, planning and implementation cycles of policies. In our next phase of work, our ambition is to work with our colleagues at Newcastle University and the RSA to undertake this "embedded knowledge exchange" activity in both our Northern and Southern Hubs* (Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre 2023).

Key changes to the Creative PEC from its first to second stage include a smaller consortium, a greater focus on commissioned and co-commissioned research (as opposed to work being produced by the consortium) and a better resourced Policy Unit, as well as a novel two-hub model (which is still emerging).

Lessons from the UK's Creative Industries political ecosystem in 2010s

As should be clear from this paper, the story of the Creative Industries in the UK is not finished, not least because both the Creative Industries Federation/CreativeUK and the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre are at new stages in their evolution. However, there are lessons that those looking to the UK Creative Industries ecosystem may want to take from their foundation.

These are as follows:

1. Forums that work in partnership with Government may not be the best lobbyists: the creation of the Federation is testament to the fact that an independent body may be needed alongside a Government-chaired advisory group, as only an independent body can publicise those areas where the view of industry differs more dramatically from the Government of the day.

2. Building relationships with high-level political actors across parties is a key part of ensuring that the sector's needs are represented in parliament. By working across Creative Industries sub-sectors you may be able to garner more high level attention than any single industry could achieve.

3. Funding for new independent research in the Creative Industries is not enough given the limited resources available to pursue research on the sector. Research

organisations in this area should consider how they build strong links with industry, and how they focus as well as time publications to ensure they can be used by policymakers. A campaigning approach may be useful in achieving this and an excellent relationship with policymakers will be essential.

3. How diversity and inequality became central problems for UK cultural policy

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Introduction

This paper offers an overview of recent trends and research on inequality in UK cultural policy. It does this by considering two, interlinked, issues: the drive for greater diversity in audiences and workforces, alongside concerns and debates over rising inequality in the cultural sector. It focuses on how social class- and the associated social mobility agenda- became central to cultural policy decision making.

The paper is divided into four sections, beginnign by telling the story of 'managing' culture in the UK. It sets out the impact of various public administration reforms, specifically the rise of auditing and accountability measures and their impact on cultural policy. It then turns to consider how these auditing regimes were populated by statistics on the audience and workforce. These statistics have shaped current debates over issues of diversity and inequality, as they have made the problem of inequalities *visible* to policy makers. This point is substantiated with the case study of social mobility in the creative sector. Academic research on the low rates of social mobility into cultural and creative jobs, and low levels of working-class representation in the audience for the arts, have seen various responses from policy including funding decisions, organisational reforms, and new regimes of data collection.

To further illustrate this discussion, the paper offers three case studies of arts organisations who have been active in this policy space. Jerwood Arts reshaped its creative bursaries programme in light of both data on social class and critiques of the social mobility agenda; The British Film Institute began a data collection regime for social class in its funding streams in 2018; and Arts Council England's most recent 10-year strategy, *Let's Create,* is a response to both political, sector, and academic concerns over class inequality in the arts.

However, as the paper describes, policy responses have done little to shift the persistent inequalities in the creative sector. These problems have been exacerbated by a decade of declining funding for the arts and 'austerity' within the British State; Brexit; and the impact of the Covid pandemic of 2020. The penultimate section considers these impacts and the associated policy response, bringing the analysis up to the present with discussion of the UK Government's *Creative Industries Sector Vision.*

Managing culture in the UK

Cultural policy in the UK is a complex system of national, regional, and local governments, along with a variety of Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs). This complexity reflects a legacy of differing governments' aims for cultural policy, as well as reforms to the way public administration is conducted by central government and devolved national administrations.

This paper will not rehearse the full history of British cultural policy (see Hewison, 1997, 2014; O'Brien, 2013; Upchurch, 2016). Some history is important to fully understand how specific issues associated with inequality became important to cultural policy. In particular, the history of public management reforms since the 1980s in the UK helps to explain how specific inequalities became *visible* problems for current cultural policy.

The 1980s saw the introduction of a range of reforms to public administration that was dubbed the 'New Public Management' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Two trends are most significant for the present discussion. These reforms aimed to withdraw the state from direct provision of public goods and services; and to introduce management techniques from the private sector into public administration. Economy, efficiency, and effectiveness were to be the three core aims of public service, and public administration provision.

These reforms began under the Conservative governments of the 1980s. They were developed, albeit with important and distinctive characteristics, by the New Labour administrations of 1997-2010. New Labour embedded a management regime of measurements and targets across the public sector, including cultural policy (O'Brien, 2013). NDPBs, such as the Arts Council England (ACE) and the British Film Institute (BFI) continued to make funding decisions- and thus deliver cultural policy- at arm's length from central government. At the same time, they were supposedly held accountable via a regime of measurements, indicators, and targets.

Both New Public Management and the subsequent attempts to govern via indicators and targets were subject to extensive critiques (Hewison, 2014, Hesmondhalgh et al, 2015). Notably, critics questioned the appropriateness of numeric forms of data for the cultural sector. Fitting in to this agenda saw both government and the cultural sector develop numeric proxies for the economic impact of culture; the social impact of culture; the economic value of culture; and a host of policy frames including the use of culture in urban regeneration, alongside the creative industries agenda as a whole (O'Brien, 2013).

What is striking is that this approach to cultural policy has remained largely unchanged since the mid-2000s. This is irrespective of the government, the particular prime minister, and major political and public administration changes such as the UK leaving the European Union. The Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) today has a list of priority outcomes, alongside a range of performance indicators. In turn, Arts Council England's latest 10-year strategy *Lets Create* is assessed and monitored via an impact framework and a set of key performance indicators.

This approach to the public administration has not only created new modes of monitoring via metrics and performance indicators; it has also, alongside the creative industries agenda (Hesmondhalgh et al, 2015) seen a focus on new categories in cultural policy. In the 1980s, the Arts Council shifted language from 'audiences' to 'consumers' and from 'subsidy' to 'investment' (Quinn, 1998:177). In the current context, DCMS publishes detailed information on employment in a range of arts and cultural sectors, and the Arts Council has added 'participants' and 'creators' to its understanding of cultural policy (Arts Council England, 2020, 2021). It has also adopted a geographic lens to its decision-making and policy, seeking to rebalance the funding disparities (Stark et al, 2013, 2014) between London and those parts of England outside of major regional cities.

Auditing Regimes

Who consumes culture in the UK?

The regime of managing culture through data and indicators is made possible, in part, by the UK's excellent data sources (for a critical history cultural data regimes see Selwood 2019). The DCMS collects data on engagement with culture in England in its annual *Participation Survey.* This is the successor survey to the *Taking Part* survey, which had both a longitudinal and annual version. A major difference is the latter was a face-to-face survey, whilst its

replacement is online and paper and postage based, but there is continuity and consistency between the two in terms of key questions and subject matter.

This sort of data is a hugely significant resource, offering rich and detailed levels of information on cultural engagement often only available from bespoke commissioned surveys in other nations, or at much less detailed (and frequent) levels for cross-EU trends (Anand et al, 2020).

Taking Part launched in 2005, reflecting the need for data on culture to fit into the indicator regimes interested in the effectiveness of government spending on- or 'investment' in-cultural institutions. Key questions at that time reflected concerns over audiences missing the potential benefits of cultural engagement (Dawson, 2019 O'Brien, 2013), as well as the need to understand general patterns of attendance, and later, participation and engagement in a variety of cultural forms.

Since 2005, the DCMS data, whether from *Taking Part* or the *Participation Survey* has shown consistent results. Typical headlines are that 90% of the English population engage with the arts at least once a year, 80% at least once a week. This is driven by reading, going to the cinema, playing video games, or going to live music. More traditional arts attendance, such as visits to galleries and museums, are a much smaller percentage of that engagement figure (DCMS, 2023).

DCMS offers a wealth of detail on these headline figures. These include demographic characteristics, such as race, gender and (proxies for) social class, as well as information about how engagement differs by geography (DCMS, 2023).

Although the headlines suggest the English have a rich cultural life, the dataset has provided the basis for a longstanding critique of inequalities in the country's patterns of cultural consumption. Miles and Sullivan (2012), Taylor (2016), Leguina and Miles (2017) Mihelj et al (2019), Hanquinet et al (2019), and Brook et al (2020) all used this dataset to demonstrate class, race, gender, and geographic inequalities in cultural consumption and participation.

Most notably, this history of analysis demonstrated that individuals with intensive engagement in culture - for example, repeated attendance at opera *and* art galleries *and* theatre performances- were a relative minority in the English population. Rather, the cultural norm for England was watching television, reading books, spending time with friends and family, and perhaps visiting the cinema. Activities that attracted most government investment were most detached from the everyday lives of the English population. Moreover, this series of research papers demonstrated the segment of the population benefitting most from government investment were white people, from middle class backgrounds, in professional occupations, with high levels of education, living in the Southeast of England.

These inequalities manifested in policy debates associated with Arts Council England's 10-year strategy reviews for 2010 (*Great Art and Culture for Everyone, 2010-2020*) and 2020 (*Lets Create, 2020*). The consultation and development materials for both of these long-term strategies reflect the ongoing policy desire for the arts audience to better reflect the demographics of the overall English population. Moreover, *Lets Create* offered a radical rethink of the meaning of arts and culture in England to address the inequalities that government data, alongside academic research, were demonstrating had been unmoved and unchanged since the mid 2000s, when high quality population level arts data was first collected at national governmental level.

Who works in culture in the UK?

The data collection regime and policy concerns over audience inequalities are echoed in the case of the cultural workforce. DCMS defines Cultural and Creative Industries as nine clusters of occupations within the economy: Advertising and Marketing; Architecture; Crafts; Design (product, graphic and fashion design); Film, TV, radio and photography; IT, software and computer services; Publishing; Museums, galleries and libraries; and Music, performing and visual arts. These sectors correspond with 30 groups of occupations, for example Music, performing and visual arts is constituted by: Artists; Actors, entertainers and presenters; Dancers and choreographers; and Musicians.

For the workforce, DCMS publishes details of sector Gross Value Added (GVA), employment, and business demographics for the whole of the UK. The key data sources here are the Office for National Statistics' (ONS) Annual Business Survey (ABS) and the ONS Annual Population Survey (APS). The APS draws on data from the ONS Labour Force Survey (LFS).

GVA and employment figures have been central to cultural policy since New Labour. The economic contribution of culture, both in terms of money and in terms of employment figures, has been widely used as a justification for both public investment in, and policy salience of, the sector.

The economic contribution of culture in central government data has gone hand-in-hand with a variety of cross-national arguments and justifications for culture, such as the economic benefits of hosting major cultural events; the need to attract a wealthy tax base of creatives to urban areas (Florida, 2002); and the impact of culture on the regeneration of places (see O'Brien, 2013 for summaries of these arguments). Needless to say, all three of these have been hotly debated, if not roundly debunked (e.g. Stevenson, 2023).

The same data sources used by central government to show positive GVA and employment figures have also shown inequalities within the workforce. Using the same sets of data we can see that inequality, by gender, ethnicity, and social and economic status or class, is an important characteristic of cultural and creative work (Carey et al, 2023).

Issues of gender and racial inequalities in the creative workforce, as captured in academic research and government statistics, had been well known for a long time. However, social class inequalities have only recently entered the data collection regime. In 2014, the ONS introduced questions about social class origin to the LFS. This has enabled a new area of demographic analysis- and the emergence of a new, but also well-known and longstanding, set of inequalities.

Fitting social mobility into cultural policy

Since 2014, for a variety of reasons, class inequalities have been discussed as part of a broader government and arts sector focus on social mobility. This history is intertwined with both data collection regimes and with a specific politics associated with the concept of social mobility.

Social mobility is, unfortunately, a confusing term. This is because it has two main uses, one is a technical academic term, the other reflects policy and media use(s). Whilst these two uses seem superficially similar, they are distinct in several ways. Moreover, academic work has critiqued the policy and media versions of social mobility, further adding to some of the confusion.

In policy and media, social mobility captures a range of social inequalities in contemporary Britain. It is also embedded in a broader political project of social fairness and meritocracy (Littler, 2017).

For academic research, social mobility has a precise definition. It describes the rates of individuals moving from one social position to another, from their *origin* to their *destination*. These origins can be based on parental occupation, with the occupation an individual ends up doing later in life as the corresponding destination (Goldthorpe, 2016). Origins and destinations can also be based on income, with parental income for origins, an individual's income later in life as a destination. Social mobility, in academic usage, involves a description of probability of moving classes or moving up the income scale, rather than a comment on the fairness, or morality, of society. Social mobility research captures how for some people there is no movement, the class they are born into is the class they end up in. For others there is long- or short-range mobility between classes.

This idea of long- or short-range mobility is usually associated with class being defined as a set of occupational groups. This is based on the Office for National Statistics' occupational classification (NS-SEC) that places individual occupations into a set of seven groups, with an extra one for those who are unemployed. NS-SEC clusters range from I (higher managerial and professional, which includes doctors, CEOs and lawyers) to VII (routine occupations such as bar staff, care workers, and cleaners), while VIII is those who have never worked or who are long-term unemployed.

In 2014, as part of the Labour Force Survey, ONS began asking people a set of questions about their class origins. The central question was what the main income earner in their household did for work when they were 14. Along with additional information about the type of work associated with the childhood household, this question meant people could be classified into the NS-SEC categories for social origins. For example, if they had a parent who was a doctor (NS-SEC I) or a cleaner (NS-SEC VII).

This information allows estimates of how many working-or middle-class origin people there are in the economy, as well as comparing people's parental occupational origins to their own occupational destinations. The data shows how many children of cleaners (NS-SEC VII) end up working as doctors (NS-SEC I), allowing an understanding of social mobility in society and revealing how many individual origins are different from destinations. The data gives the overall rates of social mobility in British society.

The data also provides information on social mobility in creative occupations. It shows significant class inequalities. The most recent analysis, by Carey et al (2023) suggested around 25% of all creative workers were from routine and manual- working class- social origins, compared to around 37% of all workers.

More detailed analysis (Carey et al 2021) shows creative industries are dominated by those from professional and managerial- middle class- social origins. 2020 data from the LFS indicates that over half (52%) of all creative workers are from these middle-class backgrounds. Aside from Crafts, all creative industries and all creative occupations have over representations of those from middle class origins, with specific, key, cultural occupations including journalists and newspaper editors (69% middle class origin), musicians (67%), artists (62%), and authors and writers (57%), having acute class inequalities.

There have been few to no changes in these patterns since the data was first collected in 2014 (Brook et al, 2020). Moreover, O'Brien et al (2016) in the first analysis of the 2014 ONS LFS data, found evidence of pay gaps between those from upper-middle class origins and

those from working class starting points. For example, in Film, TV, Radio and Photography occupations there is evidence of a class pay gap of up to £23,000 a year. Their analysis also suggested that much of this class pay gap is related to individuals' education levels.

The pay gaps, and associated analysis, reinforce existing research that suggests even when women, ethnic minorities, and working-class origin individuals make it into cultural and creative occupations, they face significant penalties based on their demographic characteristics.

The limits of social mobility

The influence of these statistics is difficult to disentangle from media and sector concerns along with political scrutiny of inequalities in the cultural audience and workforce (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 2019, 2022; House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee, 2023). Sector, media, and policy concerns have seen several responses from the government, particularly following regime changes since the 2016 referendum on Britain's relationship with the European Union.

The government launched a formal industrial strategy for the creative industries in 2018. The *Creative Industries Industrial Strategy Sector Deal* (BEIS, 2018) is noteworthy because it addressed the need for a more diverse creative sector, even though social mobility was not a specific focus.

The centrepiece to address inequality was an industry-led creative careers programme for 2,000 schools and 600,000 individuals. This was seen as a way of raising awareness of the range of jobs available in the sector, along with upskilling and retraining programmes. The focus was on the 'talent pipeline' framed as a set of skills mismatches and lack of awareness of potential jobs in the sector. The core strategy focused on digital skills (as a result of the conflation of IT occupations and cultural and arts jobs within DCMS statistics Campbell *et al,* 2018) and advertising and awareness programmes, with little direct intervention from DCMS. The approach was also based on existing creative clusters, focused on cities and regions with existing capacity for creative industries development. Political turbulence and the change of government in 2019 meant although the creative careers programme went ahead, little else of the industrial strategy survived; Government rhetoric in 2019 about 'levelling up' regional inequalities also failed to stand the test of the pandemic in 2020 and then three changes of Prime Minister in 2022.

In 2021 The Social Mobility Commission (SMC), the non-departmental public body that monitors social mobility and advises the government on policy, published a toolkit on the creative industries (Social Mobility Commission, 2021). This set out current analysis on the extent of class and social mobility inequalities in creative jobs, and offered advice to organisations on measuring and addressing class inequalities.

This was perhaps the high point for the social mobility agenda regarding class inequality in the cultural sector. Subsequent changes in leadership at SMC, coupled with a shift in focus by SMC away from mobility into the professions (including the arts), have seen relatively little from SMC to follow up its creative industries work of 2021. Two leading sociologists of social mobility, Goldthorpe and Bukodi (2022:583), have suggested that SMC's approach is now "characterised as one encouraging the working class to keep to their place, both socially and geographically". This is in contrast to the previous focus on widening access to professional occupations, such as the creative industries, for those from working class social origins (see also Maslen, 2022).

The decline of formal policy support for social mobility in the creative industries has been matched by the continued influence of critical voices questioning social mobility as an appropriate framework for both the cultural sector and for addressing social inequality more generally (e.g. Gamsu and Ingram, 2022, Ashley, 2022). Politically, this found expression in the Labour Party's 2019 rejection of social mobility and its associations with individual success coming at the cost of societal injustice. These two trends, coupled with the shift in direction (and controversy over leadership) at SMC, seemed to marginalise social mobility within arts discourses and as a policy framework for creative industries. However, the data collection regimes, and the ongoing inequalities associated with social class in the cultural and creative sectors, are still present (e.g. Carey *et al,* 2021).

Organisational and Policy responses: Jerwood Arts, British Film Institute, and Arts Council England

How has this agenda played out practically for cultural policy? Three short case studies serve as illustrations of the practical impact of both the social mobility policy moment, as well as the impact of the ability to collect data on social class in the cultural workforce and audience.

Jerwood Arts Creative Bursaries Programme: from individual social mobility to organisational change

Jerwood Arts is a private sector arts funder with a variety of programmes. Since 2010 it has run the Weston Jerwood Creative Bursaries (WJCB) programme. It has supported over 150 early career creative workers from working-class backgrounds. Originally using university grant eligibility data to decide on admissions to the programme, the 2020 edition saw major revisions to the data collection regime. This reflected changes in data collection based on the ONS LFS data on social class, and was also a response to academic analysis of class inequalities and social mobility in the creative sector.

In 2019, in preparation for the 2020-22 programme, Jerwood Arts published the *Socio-economic Diversity and Inclusion in the Arts: A Toolkit for Employers* (Jerwood Arts, 2019). Whilst Jerwood were not the only arts organisation working on class issues (for example Create London and Arts Emergency's *Panic!* programme, and more general work by Sutton Trust and the Bridge Group), it set out a data collection regime for social class that mirrored the ONS's. The intention was that the Jerwood toolkit could be adopted by other arts organisations.

The *Toolkit* also saw shifts in the focus of the programme. Academic research suggested the sector's longer-term nature of class inequalities had not been transformed by Jerwood's individually focused social mobility programmes. In response, 2020-22 saw a move to include organisational development alongside ongoing support for individual social mobility into the arts.

Working with 50 host organisations, as well as 50 individuals, the programme used the *Toolkit* to try to change how hosts approached social class in the context of recruitment. This produced a follow-up toolkit, *(Team) Work in Practice: Collective Insights, Ideas, and Challenges to Drive Socio-economic Inclusivity in your Organisation* (Jerwood Arts, 2022)*.* Much of the focus in the second toolkit was on organisational change, rather than personal adaptation to the existing, often exploitative and exclusionary, working culture of the arts (cf. Ashley, 2022).

This shift in focus reflected a shift in social mobility discourses. The programme's support for organisational development, along with the stress on what organisations need to do, rather than solely on how individuals need to be supported, recognised critical perspectives on social mobility. These critical perspectives argued social mobility's focus is on making individuals fit their destinations, rather than demanding systemic change to make sectors (and society) more equal and just (Ashley, 2022). Moreover, in the case of the cultural sector, social mobility was often for only small numbers of individuals (Brook et al, 2022).

The persistence of inequalities in the arts, and the changing socio-political circumstances, were important to WJCB's interventions. Notably, by 2022 class inequalities were a mainstream part of cultural policy discourses. Social class, and issues of social mobility in the cultural sector were given more prominence as Arts Council England published research on understanding the class characteristics of the arts workforce (Oman, 2019) and instituted a new data collection regime for NPOs.

BFI Film Fund: A new data regime on social class in the film industry

The BFI launched its data collection regime for social class in 2018. This adopted the approach used by the ONS in the LFS and recommended by Jerwood Arts (2019). A similar approach formed part of the framework that would later be recommended by the Social Mobility Commission (2021). A target of 39% working class origin individuals funded through BFI programmes was launched in April 2023 (BFI, 2023). However, it was not until the summer of 2023 that the BFI published analysis of the data it had collected.

The BFI Film Fund is an open access fund that offers financial and other forms of support to writers, producers, and directors at three stages of film creation. These range from "Network", which supports those at the start of their career, through to "Development" and "Production", with rising levels of funding for each strand.

The analysis of 2019/20- 2021/22 data showed ongoing and significant inequalities in social class representation in the BFI Film Fund, both in terms of who applies and who is funded. The 2023 analysis also showed important intersectional inequalities, with working class origin women likely to struggle to access and be awarded funding when compared to working class origin men, who in turn struggle in comparison to their middle-class colleagues.

At this time of writing the BFI has yet to announce a major policy response to these figures, although the commitment to a target for working class representation is in itself significant. How the BFI will achieve this in light of the systemic and substantive issues revelled by the data remains to be seen.

Arts Council England's Lets Create

Whilst data collection regimes have proved influential in framing cultural policy's interest in social mobility, the broader policy landscape after 2016 has also been important. This plays out in the case study of Arts Council England's most recent 10-year strategy, *Lets Create*.

Arts Council England concluded a research project on measuring class origin for its National Portfolio Organisations (Oman, 2019). This took place against the backdrop of its *The Creative Case for Diversity* (2017) policy work, and the then development of a new 10-year strategy.

Social class inequalities and the associated social mobility agenda were given much more prominence as a result of this work. They were also given prominence as a result of more directly political interventions.

ACE were given instructions from one of 2022's Secretary of States for Culture to shift some of its funding away from London. ACE makes funding decisions to major organisations based on a 3 year-round that brings 600-700 organisations together into National Portfolio. The November 2022 National Portfolio Organisation (NPO) decisions saw some of the larger, city-based organisations lose all funding and many receive standstill (and thus real-term reductions given the rate of inflation) or reduced funding settlements. A range of smaller, regionally based organisations joined the funding portfolio for the first time.

These funding decisions reflected both financial constraints and the 10-year strategy for ACE, '*Let's Create*'. The strategy aims at three outcomes for individuals, communities and the nation's creativity, delivered through a framework of four investment principles: ambition and quality; dynamism; environmental responsibility; and inclusivity and relevance (Arts Council England, 2020, Arts Council England, 2021). The debates over the 2022 NPO round, and more generally over '*Let's Create*' are still ongoing. The strategy and attendant funding decisions marked a shift from the previous '*Great Art and Culture for Everyone*' 10-year strategy, although the majority of major cultural institutions in England's cities, particularly in London, have remained in the portfolio. '*Let's Create*' aims to give prominence to less institutionalised cultural activity. There is less emphasis on audiences and venues and more on participants and creators, of whatever form.

'*Let's Create*' is partially a response to inequalities in arts and culture in England, both in the workforce and in the audience. Awareness of these inequalities, in turn, reflects both the national data collection regime as well as ACE's own work on collecting class data. Alongside the political pressure for changes in funding patterns, scandals within arts organisations following the #MeToo movement in the 2010s, and organisations' responses, and failures to respond, to the Black Lives Matter movement of 2020 (e.g. Barbican Stories 2021) also shaped awareness of inequalities as policy was being made.

ACE's *Let's Create* agenda fixed cultural policy in the direction of more participatory forms of culture. It remains to be seen how effective this strategy will be when set against the reality of longstanding traditions in cultural practice and dominance of specific genres and organisations within England's cultural policy. Irrespective of *Let's Create*'s potential struggles and limitations, the changing orientation will have implications for how organisations are supported to bring socio-economic equity to their staff and audiences.

The Sector Vision, 'good work', and the post-pandemic cost of living crisis

By 2023 cultural policy was struggling to come to terms with the impact of the pandemic, and political turbulence in central government. The pandemic accentuated the longstanding issues of inequality in both the arts workforce and the arts audience. Data from 2020 and 2021 suggested a slower than expected return of in-person core audiences (Walmsley et al, 2022) and little evidence of new audiences developed by digital innovations during lockdown (Feder et al 2022). This raised questions for those organisations dependent on both ticket sales and in-person spending for their revenue.

Research also highlighted the specific impacts for early-career creative workers (Walmsley et al 2022). Whilst almost every worker in the performing and visual arts was negatively affected by the necessary public health interventions of 2020-22, data from the Office for

National Statistics (ONS) suggested younger workers, most likely at the beginning of their careers in the arts, were more likely to be losing work.

The impact of the pandemic exacerbated longer term trends in the sector linked to 'austerity' and reductions in funding streams for arts and culture. Following the election of the Coalition government in 2010, various areas of policy were subject to reductions in both absolute and real terms funding. Central government's cultural budget was not reduced as much as local authority funding, but the overall impact was lower levels of government support for culture (Gilmore et al, 2024)

The impacts of austerity, as with the pandemic, were felt unevenly. Campbell and Rex (2022) note that some local authorities in England cut cultural budgets entirely, whilst others carried on with substantive, but reduced, levels of support. Overall though, the sector was less resilient and less well prepared than it might otherwise have been by the 'shock' of covid (Gilmore et al, 2024).

Some arts organisations were able to diversify revenues, drawing on more philanthropic sources of funding. However, as the House of Common's Culture Media and Sport Select Committee (2011) noted in 2011's, this type of revenue skewed towards larger and more prominent organisations based in the South East of England. The diversification of revenue streams, including towards a greater number of philanthropic sources, generated considerable debate over the influence (or not) of the changes in funding regimes on the practices of arts organisations (Alexander, 2018).

These debates and discussions were neither new (e.g. Upchurch, 2016) nor have they been concluded. By the early 2020s, O'Brien et al (2022, 2023) noted a distinctive shift in the governance of arts organisations since both the 1970s and 1990s (charted by Griffiths et al, 2008). Whilst arts governance in the 1970s was still gentlemanly and aristocratic, and the 1990s more public sector and technocratic, the early 2020s saw a greater influence of board members with expertise in property development and tax regulations.

Concurrent to the negative impacts of the pandemic, political changes saw key agendas lose salience. By Autumn 2022, central government's 'Levelling Up' agenda, which seemingly focused on funding suburban regions of England for the purposes of regeneration (Jennings et al 2021), had been all but abandoned. The end of the Johnson administration and the financial crisis under the Truss regime saw a shift away from both the language and the concerns of rebalancing the economy with funding given to 'left behind' regions and places. Whilst there were signs of culture-focused funding as part of Levelling Up, the agenda stalled in the face of persistent structural inequalities in arts funding and the arts sector in England (DCMS Select Committee, 2022).

The impact of the pandemic, alongside the shift away from 'levelling up' of place-based inequalities, represented a cultural policy context ill-equipped to deal with high inflation and what became known as the 'cost-of-living' crisis of 2022-2023 (Corlett and Try, 2022, Brewer et al, 2023). The causes of this ongoing cost-of-living crisis are multiple, and its effects are unevenly distributed. Work from the Resolution Foundation's most recent Intergenerational Audit suggested that younger workers, for example, confronted the cost-of-living crisis with 'low levels of financial resilience' (Broome et al, 2022).

This more general trend is important as it is likely to increase inequality in the arts workforce. Existing research on the arts workforce demonstrated that those with economic, social, and cultural resources are much more likely to be able to sustain the low pay and insecure working practices that characterise early-career creative occupations (Brook et al, 2020). At the same time, labour market data suggested there has not been a strong recovery in

numbers of artistic and cultural jobs since 2020, with evidence of longer working hours for existing workers rather than new jobs being created (O'Brien et al ,2023).

Summer 2023, against this uncertain context for cultural policy, saw DCMS publish the first significant cultural policy intervention since the industrial strategy sector deal for the creative industries in 2018. The *Creative Industries Sector Vision* sought to re-orientate creative industries policy, as the central part of the UK's cultural policy, towards economic growth based on successful 'clusters' of creative industries; better working conditions and more people employed in the sector; and creative industries contribution to diplomatic, environmental and wellbeing objectives. These broad objectives were complimented, and made visible, by a commitment to a data collection regime, spending evaluations, and policy-orientated research projects (DCMS, 2023).

As part of the sector vision DCMS co-funded a new framework for measuring job quality in the creative industries based on a variety of existing data sources, including the ONS LFS (Carey et al, 2023). This demonstrated how creative work provides fulfilment, identity, and potentially high levels of job satisfaction. Yet, low pay, lack of career development, precarious contractual relationships, and evidence of poor health outcomes and exploitative employer and commissioner expectations, are also key aspects of work in the sector.

Precise government actions across all sections of the Sector Vision remain to be seen. There is little to address the impact of Brexit, which has seen uniformly negative impacts on the cultural sector and the broader economy. Indeed, the lack of economic growth associated with austerity, the pandemic, and Brexit are likely to mean little to no growth in the state's support for culture in the coming years.

It is also worth remarking here on the tension between the push for growth in jobs and the potentially negative aspects of the creative economy. To return to the theme of this paper, the often-poor working practices and working conditions that characterise several occupations in the cultural sector are well known from a variety of academic research (see Brook et al 2020 for a summary). Any growth of poor quality jobs in the sector is unlikely to do much to address issues of workforce inequality.

Conclusion: How diversity and inequality became central problems for UK cultural policy

Writing in 2021, the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Creative Diversity challenged and demanded new, bold and visionary leadership from organisations and policymakers to support diversity in the cultural and creative workforce. This call reflected how a range of cultural and creative organisations were keen to see more progress on making their workforces and their audiences more diverse. It also reflected the perceived (and actual) lack of progress on equity, diversity, and inclusion in the creative sector.

The lesson from interventions designed to shape the policy discourse is twofold. On the one hand, it shows how the sorts of data regimes present in British cultural policy have made the issue of inequality clear. In doing so, it has allowed the problem of inequality to become a problem that cultural policy seeks to address. Race, gender, disability, and geographic inequalities could all have served as case studies alongside social class in this paper. Social class is especially useful as it is the most recent example of the intersection of data collection, policy salience, and then policy failure.

This is the second lesson from interventions designed to shape the policy discourse: that *only* making a problem visible is unlikely to lead to much in the way of policy that is effective

in addressing that problem. For this, much greater and much more direct policy approaches are needed, most of the sort that are not possible under a public administration regime that seeks to have the state steer, but not row.

As a final point, it is worth reflecting on the peculiarities of the British context that has given rise to both knowledge about, and inertia in the face of, inequalities in cultural policy. Class is a great British obsession, meaning technical data on the social origins of individuals derived from family positions within the NS-SEC translates readily into policy discourses. There are few prohibitions on demographic data collection in administrative data and national level surveys, a key difference with many Continental European countries. The UK has an emerging cultural policy research culture that is keen to engage with both sociological and economic approaches to quantitative data (Selwood 2021), and the keenness of this academic community has done much to drive the policy agenda. Indeed, British academics are now incentivised, as part of research funding allocations, to have demonstrable policy 'impact' (Pardo-Guerra, 2022) in ways that are highly distinctive to other nation's academic systems (Benneworth, et al 2016).

The British context also reflects a particular insistence by the British of their own peculiarity (Edgerton, 2018). Much of the research on inequalities in cultural audiences discussed in this paper is a direct descendent of Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of cultural consumption in France (Bourdieu, 1984). Research on workforce inequality owes much to the insights of German cultural and media studies (McRobbie et al, 2023). This suggests that, although the statistical regimes are very different, academic knowledge of cultural policy inequalities is well established. Thus there may be very different, distinctive, routes to establishing the extent of inequalities in cultural audiences and cultural workforces elsewhere – ones that avoid the dead end of data collection with no discernible change.

4. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in the CCI – as Formation and Challenge

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Introduction

This paper provides an overview of DEI (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion) in the UK's Creative and Cultural Industries (CCI), commenting on the empirical status quo, policy and current state of research.

The creative sector is continuously evolving, and societal awareness plays a crucial role in shaping the industry's future. It is widely agreed that diversity is one of the key pillars for ensuring a strong, healthy and sustainable creative sector. Diversity, in its empirical form, is the presence of lived multiculture shaped by shifting social, political, economic and technological environments. Recently, this has been permeated by an emerging polycrisis stemming from austerity, Brexit and Covid-19, which have each had differential levels of impact within this lived multiculture, as well as on the institutional story of diversity in the CCI.

In the UK, the term 'DEI' is a quite recent articulation of 'diversity' within a CCI that has, over the past twenty or so years, positioned diversity as a cornerstone of cultural policy and a key trope within CCI organisational discourse. Since the mapping of the Creative Industries in 1998 as part of a centrist-Left New Labour project, diversity has been architected as top-down national strategy, to position social cohesion and diversity of thought as modes of social and cultural value.

We can think of diversity in two main ways: market diversity, which is the spaces, outputs and providers within the ecology encompassing a broad range of CCI subsectors; and representations of diversity, which covers portrayal and workforce within the CCI. As described in this paper, the conflation of these has led to an overarching and ambitious narrative of diversity to promote tolerance, boost export development, support economy and innovation, address skills shortages, provide equality of opportunity, and reduce inequalities across: content and representation, workforce demographic, and organisational culture.

The CCI has been at the forefront of the DEI agenda, ahead of other parts of the UK economy. This makes the CCI a fertile site for understanding formations of DEI, but also because the CCI is underpinned by assumptions of its flexible, diverse and meritocratic nature: a cultural 'ecosystem'. This implies that the CCI functions in egalitarian and organic ways. In fact, the CCI is a social site where relations of power and inequalities are produced and sustained, and functions as a managed operating system that develops over time. Cultural policy research has asserted that when we consider DEI in the CCI, we therefore have to address the matter of inequality (see O'Brien and Oakley, 2015); and understand the CCI as organisational spaces that are practiced as hierarchical and unequal, resulting in a problematic diversity/inequality complex.

Beyond the UK, and in a post-Brexit context, cultural diversity within the creative economy is widely considered as a core part of civic life and representational rights, as well as part of our national and European future contexts. The UK context constitutes a particularly salient example for 'diversifying the creative' because it is widely perceived to be ahead of the curve compared to other parts of Europe when it comes to developing frameworks 'for mediating, and being held to mediate, lived multiculture' (Titley, 2014: 247). The UK's long multicultural history, shaped by the legacies of Empire, has broadly been underpinned by strong, 'British' liberal intentions aspiring to diversify cultural access, participation, and representation.

Public service media has been acclaimed as a shining example in this regard, but so too has the UK's established record of participatory modes of creative practice and new radical forms of creative expression which have overlapped with diasporic arts and culture by moving from source and tradition to occupy one of the most dynamic aspects of cultural globalisation.

Whilst we might understand 'crisis' as socially constructed (Hall, 1978), this is a conjunction that is materially and differentially experienced, inaugurating new pressures and demands on the CCI. How is diversity to be (re)designed to contend with new kinds of precarity, fragility and political contestation around struggles over the settlement of rights? On the one hand, and in spite of the verifiable 'lived multiculture', Brexit has imposed deeply unsettled feelings of belonging for many UK citizens who are also witnessing a mainstreaming of anti-multiculturalism rhetoric in today's UK politics, a rhetoric that many parts of the UK press actively help frame. On the other, powerful responses and resistances have lobbied for change through social movements such as #OscarsSoWhite, #MeToo and #Black Lives Matter (BLM) (BLM following the murder of George Floyd in the US in 2020), seeking a variety of forms of social justice. This has provided new opportunities for the CCI to respond to the cultural vitality that is often overlooked within racially marginalised (global majority) communities, and look inwards at its institutionalised practices that structure the social organisation of race inequality. Throughout these challenges and transitions, the CCI and many of those who work within it have demonstrated remarkable capacity and resilience, but the institutional modality of CCI diversity has proven to be dislocated from lived multiculture in its heterogenous form. A benign mainstream diversity project sits in tension both with a centre-ground anti-multiculturalist sentiment and the systemic forms of sector exclusions that have been found to exist.

The first part of the paper therefore focuses on the formation of 'diversity' as a policy discourse and the second part identifies some of the major challenges that emerge from this formation, primarily focusing on workforce representation.

The paper is broadly structured around two questions:

1. How are societal concerns around DEI articulated in the CCI?
2. What are the major DEI-related challenges that the CCI face today?

These questions are addressed by examining the CCI in an expansive sense, though the analytical *foci* are the UK Screen Industries, with race/ethnicity applied as an example of a particular DEI concern.

Race and Ethnicity in the Screen Sector

The UK Screen Industries is a creative subsector that falls within the 'Film, TV, video, radio and photography' category, as defined by the UK Government's Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in its Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The subsector has been identified as being 'ahead' of other creative subsectors when it comes to DEI practices including target-setting and data reporting (Eikhof, 2023). Therefore, it is useful to consider what DEI strategies the screen sector has deployed, how these have been articulated and what challenges it faces. Since one of the wider criticisms of the CCI is that it has lacked cross-sector collaboration, not always shared good practice across subsectors or effectively measure what does or does not 'work', with regards to DEI outcomes, zooming in on the screen sector can potentially yield helpful insights for other subsectors and national contexts. The screen sector also offers a particular utility when it comes to considering DEI, as it encompasses a range of socio-economic models spanning public and private media, involving state and non-state actors. This enables us to think about how DEI is negotiated alongside social and economic requirements and make sense of the discursive re-orientation

from 'citizen' to 'consumer', best captured in the ambivalence of the sector-wide regulator, Office of Communications (Ofcom)'s concept of 'citizen-consumer'.

DEI in the screen sector is most applied, for example in policy and target-setting, to 'sex/gender and race/ethnicity' (Eikhof, 2023: 18).[20] Within sociological measures of inequality, the UK's racially marginalised population has experienced everyday race-based discrimination across parts of UK society. Consequently, the UK's Black and Brown communities[21], have for many decades mobilised a dual politics calling for recognition and institutional change that has asserted the need for better representational rights and access, insisting that 'culture' has real social effects. The formation of Channel 4 in 1982 is held as a beacon for its diverse content that resulted from a redirection of state funding towards supporting values of freedom and democracy following a series of race rebellions in the few years preceding the Channel's arrival. Historically, public service broadcasting (PSB) has been a key target of such calls for action, given its guiding democratising, unifying principles of informing, educating and informing all parts of the nation. PSB is tasked therefore with being 'representative', whilst grappling with the nuances of living with difference in a multicultural, if not multicultural*ist*, society. The power of culture is therefore implicitly recognised, and the CCI acknowledged as a productive site from which to mount challenge.

It is useful to highlight a few points at this stage: first, there are variations within and across parts of the 'Film, TV, video, radio and photography' subsector when it comes to the formation, articulation and challenges of implementing DEI. Second, experiences differ between minority ethnic groups who occupy a heterogenous space of experiential and empirical realities in which distinct forms of racisms exacerbate variations in cross-sub sector comparisons. And third, since lived diversity is multi-dimensional, race and ethnicity cannot be easily separated from other characteristics such as socio-economic background, disability, sex, gender, sexual orientation or age, because it can involve intersectional[22] ('diversity within') dimensions of social inequality.

According to UK Government (2023) data about the UK's ethnic composition, approximately '82% of people in England and Wales are white, and 18% belong to a black, Asian, mixed or other ethnic group (2021 Census data)'. The DCMS Sector Economic Estimates: Workforce, 2021 found that, whilst there is great variation in demographic representation between different creative subsectors, women occupy 44.5% of jobs (excluding Tourism) compared to making up 48.1% of the overall population (DCMS 2022). 13.2% of these classified as being part of a minority ethnic group (excluding white minorities) and 15.0% by those with a disability. DCMS (2022) also found a similar representation of minority ethnic groups (excluding white minorities), and of individuals with a disability under the Equality Act 2010, to that of the UK workforce overall (13.1% and 15.4% respectively).

Analysis of UK-focused data suggests that the creative economy and jobs for minority ethnic people in the CCI are expanding, even in the aftermath of crisis (see for example Brook et al. 2023 regarding the data on graduates seeking core creative work). A specific look at individual sectors within the CCI shows contradictions and tensions in the levels of workforce diversity across individual sectors (Malik and Shankley, 2020). The 2019 ONS Labour Force Survey indicates that the percentage of White people working in 'Film, TV, video and radio' is

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[20] There are, of course, important distinctions between 'sex' and 'gender', as well as 'race' and 'ethnicity', revolving around their process of social construction (it is, for instance, useful to refer to individuals or groups as 'gendered' or 'racialised' by wider process and structures). Such a distinction is not always captured in data collection exercises or strategic targets which tend to classify and count static objects – part of the divergence between the management and the experience of diversity that the paper deals with more broadly.

[21] UK Black and Brown communities emerge from a coalition of African, Caribbean and Asian communities that share legacies of migration and as the subjects of British colonial rule. Reference is made in the paper to 'ethnicity' and 'minority ethnic' groups which excludes White minorities, and the White ethnic group but refers to 'Black, Asian, mixed or other ethnic group' as examples of being 'Other' than White in the UK.

[22] The term 'intersectionality' was first used by the critical race and legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989).

91%, compared to 87% of the overall entire workforce (Brook et al. 2020); this suggests a less stark ethnic inequality than other subsectors, such as publishing, which have a larger percentage of White representation (Saha and van Lente, 2022). Within the screen sector, DEI targets are routinely set around three areas of representation of individuals with certain protected characteristics, including race/ethnicity: off screen (workforce), on-screen (content) and participation (in training programmes of interventions) (Eikhof, 2023). Workforce targets for race/ethnicity off-screen have increased to 15-20% in London, which has a higher-than-average level of ethnic diversity and CCI presence, sometimes setting a target of 40% (Eikhof, 2023).

Recent figures from DCMS (2022) show that in the Digital Sector, the minority ethnic (excluding white minorities) share exceeds the UK workforce average, but this comes mainly from a high proportion of workers identifying as Asian/Asian British in the sector (10.6% vs 6.9% for the UK) and who may be in 'non-creative' job roles. The Digital Sector and Creative Sector share subsectors such as 'IT, software and computer services' and 'Computer programming, consultancy and related activities' which accounts for that proportion of workers identifying as Asian/Asian British. The Digital Sector also had the smallest representation of women and people with a disability (DCMS, 2022).

Beneath the data

What the 'headline' findings about workforce diversity do not specify is where inequalities, variations and barriers reside within DCMS sectors, for example in pay gaps, barriers to entry and working cultures that also take on different levels of acuteness at local, regional and national levels. CCI researchers have responded to this challenge through collaborative, cross-sectoral qualitative research (with academic, industry, public and third sectors). Outputs have included the gathering and dissemination of interview data, direct testimonies, labour force data and case studies from across the CCI and within specific sub sectors, from podcasting to publishing.

When drilling down into the available data and engaging in analysis over time, CCI research has also helped to identify not just the fluctuations and unevenness in where various social groups are represented in the workforce demographic, but how cultural workers negotiate their work in the CCI – challenging any idea that diversity follows a simple progress model or merely has utility as an accounting tool.

A review by CAMEo (2018) examined the socio-demographic profile and found that minority ethnic employment across the screen sector had steadily declined between 2006 and 2012, from 7.4% to 5.4%, with different levels of minority ethnic workers in different sectors. Cobb et al.'s (2015: 1) study of the British film industry found for example that Black, Asian and minority ethnic women represent less than 1.5% of all personnel working in six key roles. Liddy et al. (2022: 752) offer qualitative insights into EDI in the Irish screen industries asserting that 'visionary leadership from the top down', along with government-supported dedicated resources are needed to effectively embed diversity in the screen industries.

Moody (2017) provides a contextual analysis of the UK Film Council's 'cultural diversity agenda' and the decision-making processes behind diversity approaches at the UK's then national body for film production (2000-2011) which helps to understand the experiences and interactions beyond the data, and the limitations of a policy that conflates 'social' questions of equality with commercialisation. This is a claim supported by Newsinger and Eikhof (2020), who suggest that the business case for diversity (as a form of what they describe as explicit cultural policy) undermines arguments for equality that are rooted in social justice (the basis for what they describe as implicit cultural policy).

There have been important interventions by researchers proposing that the social and moral dimensions of diversity can be usefully foregrounded when devising DEI policy. In their *Creative Majority* report (Wreyford et al. 2021), the Creative Diversity All Party Parliamentary

Group (APPG)/Creative Policy Evidence Centre propose five benchmarks: allyship, accessibility, adaptable tools, and accountability, to deliver immediate and long-term change in the media industry. These are targeted at government, business, and organisations. The report (also cited later in relation to its consideration of Covid-19 impacts on the CCI) followed the formation of the APPG for Creative Diversity in 2019 and emphasises the need for leadership and collective responsibility in the diversity space.

Research contributions and gaps

The current state of academic research provides significant weight and theory-relevant insights. In terms of the disciplinary configurations, much of the literature has stemmed from Sociology, Business and Organisational Studies, Geography, Media and Cultural Studies and Screen Studies, signalling the interdisciplinarity of the area and its thematic concerns, as well as an exciting situatedness of knowledges across a range of disciplinary dimensions. An analytical distinction can be made between industry-led diversity discourse and scholarly approaches, the latter of which has systematically addressed, in Titley's words, 'diversity of ownership and control of the distribution of communicative resources and power and, ultimately, the pluralism of the mediated spectrum of information, opinion, perspective and values and its salience to citizenship and democratic participation.' (Titley 2014: 247).

There are gaps, as well as opportunities within the research base. For example, there is inconsistency in the use of terminology and variation of categories applied, as well as a lack of research that connects similarities and differences across creative subsectors and intersectional aspects or characteristics of social and cultural identity (for example, sex and gender, disability, race and social class) that shape and complicate inequality.[23] The focus has tended to be on the mainstream CCI rather than on production and representation within independent, alternative or community-based creative subsectors. In fact, these 'alternative' spaces help make the case for a diversity that can be successfully mobilised, managed and 'delivered' within alternative, typically micro sites of creative production, as was previously the case with the UK independent film workshop movement primarily in the 1980s. As Malik et al. (2017) point out, the value of so-called 'grassroots' creative production practices such as community filmmaking (that tend to be small, under-capitalised, micro-businesses) can be measured according to their potential for creating new social and economic models for otherwise marginalised activities and actors to both participate in creative production and broaden access to knowledge and skills in creative spaces. Within their study, cultural diversity is generated as a mediated process that can be strengthened by civic agency and collaborative, participatory modes of production that create new, 'bottom-up' symbolic spaces.

The formation of 'diversity' as discourse

One of the key provocations to industry surfaces within the diversity-critical literature, pointing to the disconnect between DEI policy and DEI practice. On the one hand, this work has pointed to the prevalence, even ubiquity, of the diversity-creative paradigm's talk about inequality and its normalisation within cultural policy frames. On the other, it identifies ongoing patterns of inequality which calls into question the real effects of industrialised diversity in producing meaningful change to level the field for all the UK's communities. It is argued that, because diversity initiatives and sector inequalities co-exist, 'diversity' (as a form of evolving discourse) does the work of *maintaining* structural inequalities.

As the CCI has grown, so too has research on inequalities in the sector, analysing how different social groups have been involved in, represented by, and experience the CCI, as

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[23] The creative industries remain a largely under-researched area, even in studies of racial inequality (Malik and Shankley, 2020). There are few sociological studies of race and racism that have been particularly attentive to questions of representation, including in terms of media and cultural production.

well as how policy responses have been devised, framed and acted on. It is even suggested that the widespread image of the CCI as a site of openness, becomes a mechanism for concealing its empirical realities that include deep inequalities based on race/ethnicity, gender, disability, social class and other protected characteristics (Gill, 2014). The task of 'managing diversity' has therefore been identified as a form of organisational performance that routinely fails to deliver the changes it promises, keeping unequal power relations within the CCI intact. Sara Ahmed's analysis of the concept of 'inclusion', suggests the 'work' of diversity upholds institutional whiteness, obscures racism and provides a useful evidence-base (for institutions) that they are beyond racism because of their hyper-visible, active defence of diversity (Ahmed, 2012). According to these analyses, it is not so much that diversity does nothing, it is that diversity *does much* – but not according to its claims.

Oswick and Noon's (2014) bibliometric analysis maps how the 'discourse of equality' that dominated throughout the 1970s - early 1990s) was overtaken by a 'diversity discourse', stemming from within industry, from the early to mid-1990s. Their research anticipated a 'rhetorical distancing from diversity' that will be overtaken by the rise of inclusivity discourse within management contexts, a prophecy that has been realised within diversity critiques and a subsequent move to 'inclusion' (DEI) in the latest discursive framing.

Within this field of critical diversity studies, Malik (2013) has traced how 'diversity' has been constructed through the language of cultural policy over time. A shift can be identified, away from earlier incarnations of DEI predicated on structural forces underpinning inequality, towards a focus on the more universalist principle of 'diversity' – and, we might now say, 'inclusion' – though not explicitly grappling with systemic social conditions (Ahmed and Swan, 2006; Ahmed, 2012; Malik, 2013; Nwonka and Malik, 2021). Related specifically to diversity in PSB contexts, Malik (2013) argues that the term 'creative diversity' has become a dominant frame, away from multicultural and anti-racist policy frames in the 1970s to mid-1990s and towards economic rationalism. Malik says this signifies a post-multiculturalist, falsely post-racial understanding, stemming from post-racial rhetoric, not (in other ways) post-racial society. Malik ties this to the creative marketisation of television and multiculture accommodated by a wider shift from state to market in public provision in the early 2000s.

The business case for diversity functions as a key driver within the creative economy such that it actively obscures and depoliticises the representational aspects of 'race' (Malik, 2013; Titley, 2014). These analyses do not simply identify a crude commercial overriding of the cultural/moral/social, but also a tension between different forms of moral imperative in the latter. Here, a distinction is made between diversity (for some, a form of liberal anti-racism) and anti-racism in policy-making where diversity acts as a remedial measure to address under-representation, while anti-racism takes a more interventionist and structurally focused approach (Nwonka and Malik, 2021).

The emphasis on diversity as discourse, a rhetorical device that is socially formed and an evolving dimension of the social fabric of the CCI, unsettles the idea that its mere presence simply translates into diverse outcomes. This links to the literature on cultural policy as a form of political instrumentalisation, reflecting how art and culture more broadly, are geared towards external cultural and commercial goals present in other parts of society. The 'instrumentality discourse' identifies how culture has been tied to aspirations linked to health and wellbeing, environment and social cohesion (Røyseng 2008). Røyseng focuses their analysis (within the Norwegian context) on cultural diversity as a significant goal; using this as an example of 'ritual cultural policy' underpinned by a 'belief in the transformative power of art and culture' (2008, 10); a utopic impulse that situates art and culture as innately positive, and as a vehicle to deliver social impacts. Building on critiques of the easy idea of art and culture's transformative potential, we might classify DEI as a key form of 'ritual cultural policy' that is configured around, even hinged on, hope.

Connected to these interventions and formations is a set of challenges faced by the CCI which the paper now goes on to describe, continuing with the analytical foci on race/ethnicity in the Screen sector.

What are the major DEI-related challenges that the CCI face today?

As many critical CCI scholars have surmised, the CCI themselves benefit from actively promoting diversity and inclusion, but the true benefit is in implementing equitable practices.

This section points to some of the major DEI-related challenges facing the CCI that can be connected to the 'diversity' formation discussed in the first section. These challenges might be grouped into 5 broad areas:

- Negotiating social and economic goals
- Skills, education, networks and opportunities
- Industrial conditions and cultures
- Data practices, capture and accountability
- Heterogeneity, intersectionality and lived diversity

Diversity for what? Negotiating social and economic goals

One of the key challenges is the question of where 'diversity' and the DEI agenda more specifically sits within a wider UK creative economy. This is because the creative economy has multiple dimensions, and 'creativity' itself overlaps across a range of government departmental structures and strategies, including industrial, education, technology, economic and culture. The United Nations (2008) Creative Economy Report signalled these various interfaces and the UK's two-pronged approach where the value opportunity of the creative economy spans culture and commerce, and this has carried through into interventions such as the 2018 Sector Deal between government and CCI as part of industrial strategy.

As outlined, the case for DEI moves between civic, moral and social arguments (widening access, equality of opportunity, geographical distribution of opportunity, promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development) to more market-oriented ones (boosting the economy and innovation, diversification of talent and audiences, addressing skills gaps and shortages, mainstreaming of diversity). DEI is now vernacularised within CCI, but there are times when it is marked off from other strategic, budgetary, resourcing and governance frameworks, separated from core business and development.

Commercial players in the CCI have come to view engaging with diversity issues as one way of diversifying the audiences they target and in turn maximise profit, as seen with subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) services, such as Netflix, Disney+ and Amazon Prime Video. This business case for diversity has also been complemented by an emphasis on 'diversity of thought' as an asset for commercial growth and export development, especially for reaching new markets. Even in a highly competitive global environment, the UK screen sector, including both linear and on-demand television, has shown immense resilience, acting as a key site for demonstrating to the world its distinctive (multicultural) value. To this extent, it has, even within a stark cost of living crisis and political turmoil, responding well to the UK Government's aspirations of 'Global Britain' and is well aligned with the Creative Industries Sector Vision (2023). The global power of the UK CCI has been recognised in the Soft Power index (Portland, 2023), with cultural organisations such as the BBC's World Service (which has faced serious funding cuts following the BBC licence-fee freeze since 2022) linked to positive perceptions of the UK, and scripted drama as a key driver of international exports for UK companies (PACT 2022). The UK's globally acclaimed PSB is a key site where 'diversity is practiced materially and symbolically' (Gray, 2016: 242), adding a new dimension to diversity imperatives that have also helped shape European policies including those targeted at managing diasporic differences in the cultural space

(Malik, 2010). For all this, the squeeze on public funding and one might say ideological threats on PSB (threats of Channel 4 being privatised and to the BBC licence-fee) form part of the conditions in which diversity is being navigated.

Running concurrently, the BLM movement renewed the focus back to racial justice, structural racism and anti-racism and catalysed highly visible Industry-wide Commitments within the UK CCI (Ali et al., 2022). Now, the moral case for diversifying the field was underpinned by an assertive commitment in the CCI to address anti-Black racism and provide space for dialogue and action. Despite such hyper visible proclamations, changes have been slow to follow. Combined with the parallel impacts of Covid-19 and Brexit, research has found that ethnically diverse creative workers are currently facing a range of negative impacts including in terms of increased precarity, barriers to entry, progression, and retention, race and religious-based discrimination and negative effects on mental health (Ali et al., 2022).

Skills, education, networks and opportunities

One of the major contributing factors to the acute skills shortage in the sector, is a lack of diversity and inclusion *in practice*. There are spatial considerations, including the dominance of CCI employment in London and the Greater South East (London, East and South East of England), and which is also more ethnically-diverse than other parts of the UK. There has been a failure to sufficiently extend growth to creative clusters outside of the capital which has acted as a hindrance to attracting and retaining diverse skills from diverse communities across the UK, as well as to networking opportunities and regional growth. [24] The relocations to the North of England for parts of Channel 4 and the BBC are interesting recent examples of how funding is being allocated outside of London to reorganise, perhaps repair, growth and meet the CCI's social mobility aspirations.

There remains a strong emphasis in diversity policies and programmes on skills, with the reason for under-representation of diverse talent commonly attributed to a lack of relevant education, training and skills. This over-emphasis places the onus on individuals rather than on organisational structures that might prohibit skills development or indeed, the recognition of skills that exist. Diversity initiatives and schemes based on training and upskilling now coincide with the growth of high-skilled roles and the need for 'fusion' skills (Carey et al. 2023).

These tend to concentrate on young, emerging talent, although there is a long history of arts and media practitioners, including in the screen industry, that are routinely overlooked but have the potential to contribute to the CCI skills base (Nwonka and Malik, 2021). Although creative arts and media education is not mandatory for entry into all aspects of the CCI, the de-valuing of such education within UK Government Education policies (sometimes positioned using populist rhetoric as 'rip-off' degrees) locates it as high-risk, thus reducing social mobility for those with less financial security. There is a mismatch between skills and education, and how some parts of the arts education sector such as drama schools are found to be particularly exclusionary and lacking in diversity, especially at the intersections of race/ethnicity and social class (where we might think of race as class). This has impacts on the skills pipeline and the transition into the various CCI sectors of the labour market, often reproducing the ethnic inequalities and norms of the wider workforce throughout career trajectories. Having said that, recent data from the ONS Longitudinal Study has been analysed to find that racially minoritised graduates are in fact not shown to have less chance of securing core creative work compared to White graduates (Brook et al., 2023), suggesting the picture is not clear-cut, as the authors themselves note.

The recent set of crises has exacerbated the fragility of cultural work in an already precarious sector that is characterised by the low-paid precarious work, freelance, casual

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[24] See Pratt's contribution to this volume.

and internship labour and short-term contracts that disproportionately impacts on minority ethnic workers and aspiring workers. Economic, social and cultural resources have helped support new entrants in sustaining these conditions (Brook et al., 2020). The CCI has long had an internal industrial culture where creative workers, particularly new entrants, have to subsidise their creative work with parallel work outside the CCI. These insecure working practices and conditions are more acute for minority ethnic people who, while they make up 15% of the UK population, account for 26% of those in deep poverty, with the UK having one of the highest levels of income inequality in Europe (Edmiston et al., 2022; The Equality Trust, 2023).

Access to the creative sector often requires following an unofficial route, which includes unpaid internships and utilising social networks to gain entry via contacts already working in the sector. Minority ethnic people are less likely to have the same financial capital (and thus capacity for risk) as white groups to resource these routes, notwithstanding the widespread variations in the social, cultural and economic aspects of capital within the UK's minority ethnic population that shapes networks and opportunities, and can also conceal forms of privilege. Entrants to the CCI are however predominantly from financially privileged backgrounds and have access to the economic capital to be able to undertake internships and cope with fragmented employment and unstable wages (Friedman et al., 2017). Consequently, many of the sectors exist as predominantly white spaces where exclusionary mechanisms inhibit minority ethnic entry, and potentially effect attrition, retention, promotion and career progression although data is lacking in this area.

Industrial conditions and cultures

Academic research, while acknowledging some of the gains that can be made from training, mentoring and other diversity schemes, calls for the need to supplement these with more 'systemic initiatives' (CAMEo 2018, 46). Drawing on Ahearne's (2009) model of 'explicit and implicit cultural policy', Newsinger and Eikhof (2020) explore the dynamic between policies and outcomes in the screen sector's workforce demographic. They suggest that implicit diversity policies such as 'deployment practices, conceptualisations of diversity and justifications for diversity constrain or even undermine the diversity outcomes explicit diversity policy can achieve', with explicit diversity policies prioritising 'empowering interventions over transformational ones' (24).

Just as having DEI policies does not simply translate to positive DEI outcomes, there is scant evidence that having a more diverse workforce holds guarantees for 'better' representation in content or resolving perceived deficits in representation. And yet strategies still frequently revolve around the assumption that increasing the ethnic diversity of the workplace necessarily produces an increase or 'improvement' in the ethnic diversity of the content produced. This builds an implicit link between employment and editorial practices and makes the case for the efficacy of a 'counting heads' approach to diversity in the CCI.

Data capture based exclusively on socio-demographic profile does not give us the full picture. For example, what kinds of creative (or 'non-creative') roles are occupied by whom and how are different protected characteristics represented in strategic and decision-making positions? While recent statistics highlight that a lack of ethnic diversity is endemic across the CCI, a survey by Arts Council England (2019) examined the nature of diversity of decision makers and those in senior positions in the CCI. These roles included the Chief Executives, Artistic Directors and Chairs of organisations. The Arts Council England (2019) report examined 663 arts organisations in its national portfolio, with only 9% of chief executives, 12% of artistic directors and 10% of chairs of organisations coming from a minority ethnic background. Ofcom found in 2019 that, minority ethnic employees in leadership roles had only slightly increased in one year, from 7% to 8%" (Ofcom, 2019).

Perhaps more significantly, there is the question of what cultural workers, 'leaders' or otherwise, *do* when in their position and what it takes to be there, linking to questions of power and authority. Even though ethnic diversity in certain organisations can increase, minority ethnic workers too can revert to modes of cultural production that depend on familiar, racialised representations, 'thereby reproducing stereotypical representations of race' (Hesmondhalgh and Saha, 2013, 192). There is little evidence to show that those cultural workers have the will, power or persistence to implement change in the content or have the creative freedom – or indeed desire – to connect to audiences deriving from the same communities they come from. Not only does the focus on representation politics (the number of minority ethnic representation individuals represented) fail to unsettle the basis of industrial cultures or guarantee more autonomy, it holds in place identity-based hierarchies predicated on assuming the attributes, skills and ideas an individual will bring to their work.

Racially minoritised creative workers can also be ghettoised through specialised schemes and ring-fenced budgets that preclude access to wider resources, exhibition and distribution. O'Brien et al. (2022: 12), in their engagement with new entrants in the media sector find that they are so 'economically circumscribed by the neoliberal structures of their working lives that they are genuinely in a vulnerable situation if they do attempt to directly or individually address EDI issues' so that there is very little incentive for them to address the latent inequalities in the CCI. Outside of these mainstream DEI models, we can find a strong ethos of participation and representation through collaborative creative practices and modes of cultural production, suggesting the possibilities of alternative forms of 'diversity value' based on self-organised, collective forms of cultural and economic organisation (Malik et al., 2017).

Data practices, capture and accountability

Diversity is caught up in a social-economic conundrum which can produce a lack of coherent rationale, acting as a barrier to (perceptions of) progress and measurability. Historically, a major obstacle in tackling inequality in the CCI is that many arts and cultural organisations were failing to supply EDI data and engage in diversity reporting. More recently, we have experienced the escalation of data regimes, but there are resultant questions about what data practices exist, who should collect it, how data is captured, what it is used for and where accountability lies.[25]

There is considerable data on ethnic representation in the workforce, but that progress is measured and reported against targets that have been set by creative subsectors themselves, thus the idea that the CCI is 'marking its own homework' and not externally audited or held accountable by an independent body. Equally, quantitative data can arguably become a technique for hiding the qualitative basis of lived experiences and deployed against criticisms of opacity. More particularly, a holistic sense of data requires strong levels of accountability for CCI gatekeepers, over time, for the legacy and design of diversity measures, targets and initiatives that have routinely fallen short.

Better processes and systems of measurability and evaluation can support robust accountability. The ScreenSkills review of D&I in the Screen industries states that the existing quantitative data often lacks clarity in terms of the targets and outcomes of diversity initiatives (Eikhof, 2023). The ScreenSkills report is joint industry-academic research and recommends that diversity targets should be regularly reviewed and need to be aspirational, achievable, action-based, explicit and accountable. Its specific recommendations for industry are for transorganisational targets involving better transparency and insights to support more ambitious target setting; diversifying D&I targets to cover a broader range of aspects such as socio-economic background, caring responsibilities or refugee status and to extend targets into additional areas beyond pay gaps or investment; The need to set meaningful, evidence-based, measurable targets which also achieve clarity to help better delivery and coherence

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[25] See O'Brien's contribution to this volume.

with wider organisational strategies; Monitoring and reporting data; devising target ranges and addressing Intersectionality to take into account those with combinations of diversity characteristics (Eikhof, 2023).

Another challenge that has been identified with regards to data practices, and which reflects a wider issue is about who is included in the DEI frame, captured in data and 'Other-ed' through data practices. In her analysis of gender equality data in the UK and US film industries, Cobb (2020) argues that 'cis, hetero, abled, middle-class, white men' are the 'structuring absence' of inequality discourse and inclusion rhetoric because they are not regarded as embodying an identity category of their own that would require data capture.

Within data collection processes, there is a very specific issues around data precision which can impact on any subsequent resource allocation. A recent study of racialised terminology in the CCI, commissioned by BBC Studios and the Lenny Henry Centre for Media Diversity, finds deep confusion around language, especially when using broad categories like "BAME" (commonly used in the UK to refer to Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic, or sometime Black And Minority Ethnic') that fail to capture the nuanced experiences of different ethnic and cultural groups (Malik et al., 2021). Within the new environment of data capture, there are inconsistencies, and typically one protected characteristic is considered at a time (Ozimek, 2020). Moreover, the available data does not adequately represent intersectional experiences or the distribution of labour within organisations, varying by work area, seniority, and across different parts of the UK (Liddy et al., 2022). All of this occludes the possibilities of neat metrics being used to boost the case for the creative economy, or the social arguments for who gets to participate in it.[26]

Heterogeneity, intersectionality and lived diversity

Whilst the protections for nine characteristics under the UK's (2010) Equality Act 2010[27]. provide the legal basis across the regions and nations of the UK, these characteristics socially evolve and are not definitive. One observation is that there are emerging variations across the union of four nations that make up the UK in how research, policy and activism are beginning to recognise other characteristics (e.g., refugee status in the case of Northern Ireland) within a broader conceptual landscape of equality and human rights. This indicates the limits of the mainstream equality agenda (underpinned by the Act) within the devolved nations of the UK (Hankivsky et al., 2019).

Research has pointed out how cultural policy has failed to account for the intersecting categories of inequalities and experiences, although intersectionality is a part of diversity (Moody 2017; Newsinger and Eikhof, 2020). There is an over-categorisation of social identities in diversity data that tends to be quantitative and assembled along rigid lines. Whilst quantitative diversity data has drawn attention to inequalities and been used to mobilise and validate resultant DEI policies and interventions, qualitative data can solicit deep insights into the realities of a heterogenous, complex lived multiculture which might include how race-based discrimination and inequalities affect individuals in the CCI. One of the issues is that the data is not always nuanced in relation to how ethic communities are categorised, or how the intersections of gender, race and class form particular outcomes, including pockets of privilege that might shape these.

It is impossible to talk about the CCI and lived multiculture, and the limits of the mainstream diversity approach, without referencing the role of diasporic media. Market diversity accounts for the spaces and providers that are made visible, marketed and promoted in the circuit of cultural production, distribution and exhibition. Diasporic media is both significant and

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[26] See Easton's contribution to this volume.
[27] The Equality Act (2010) identifies nine protected characteristics: age, race, religion and beliefs, ability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnerships, pregnancy and maternity, sex and sexual orientation. It covers England, Scotland and Wales but not Northern Ireland.

advanced in the UK and, since the rise of digital and satellite in the UK in the late 1990s, served as pervasive everyday practice for many minority ethnic audiences (Malik, 2010). For the CCI, the lure of diasporic media now extended much beyond first generation migrants, is perhaps the clearest sign of how a majority and minority popular culture is established and the ways in which the CCI might be regarded as complicit in its binary composition.

In terms of lived realities within the CCI, there is evidence to suggest that improvements to job opportunities, access and security have been limited, worsened or transitory in spite of industry claims to move from aims to action (Ali et al., 2022). Wreyford et al. (2021) found in their analysis of Covid-19 impacts on diversity in the CCI, that there have been some positive changes and moves to address inclusion, but also undue pressure on Black representatives in organisations to drive change in the 'spotlight moment' that BLM has come to represent (Burger, 2020). Such pressures affirm an extractive form of representation politics where it is assumed that identity characteristics should determine who is best placed to be an EDI leader or advocate. Austerity, Covid-19 and Brexit provide a significant backdrop for new approaches to diversity as pre-existing inequalities deepen within lived multiculture.

Conclusion

Even during the compounding material crises that the UK has been experiencing, the survivability of DEI has demonstrated itself through policy frameworks, remits, mission statements and institutional plans. And yet there remain several challenges faced by the CCI that continually act as macro-organisational and individual-level barriers to progress and to equitable outcomes, and that are now complicated by the differential experiences of wider crisis. This paper suggests that the promise of diversity often bears no relation to the empirical realities of inequalities within the CCI. This is exacerbated by a lack of clear measurement, analysis and accountability of what empirical realities actually are.

These interconnected challenges require a comprehensive and sustained effort from industry and wider society to pinpoint and build consensus around the precise aims of a 'diversity' formation which need to strategically deliver against antithetical messages in the political mainstream and latent inequalities in the CCI to be effective. 'Diversity for diversity's sake' is a valid critique if one refocuses on what diversity does, rather than simply where it can be seen. There is a large body of relatively accessible industry data, and whilst it is useful to assemble some of the key findings, an analytical lens might usefully be applied to explain why it is that the patterns have been able to exist for so long, and in parallel with DEI governance and frameworks.

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Appendix 1: Timeline

Thirty Years of a UK Creative Industries policy ecosystem

1992   Founding of the Department of National Heritage under Conservative government

1997   General Election: Labour Government comes to power
Transformation of the Department of National Heritage to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport

1998   Key publications:
Creative Britain (Smith 1998)
Creative Industries Mapping Documents (DCMS 1998)

2001   Updated mapping documents published, with new definition of creative industries (DCMS 2001)

2008   Global Financial Crisis prompts a period of widespread austerity

2010   General Election: Coalition (Conservative/Liberal Democrat) Government comes to power
Creation of Creative Scotland, combining Scottish Arts Council and Scottish Screen
UK's Creative Clusters first mapped (Chapain et al. 2010)

2011   Founding of Creative Industries Council

2012   Launch of Creative England

2014   Founding of Creative Industries Federation

2015   General Election: Conservative Government takes sole power
DCMS adopts of the Dynamic Mapping approach to creative industries measurement

2016   Referendum on UK's membership of the European Union

2017   General Election: Conservative Government
UK launches industrial strategy

2018   Creative Industries Sector Deal agreed, via the Creative Industries Council
Launch of the Creative Industries Clusters Programme and Policy & Evidence Centre (administered by Arts & Humanities Research Council)
DCMS Creative Industries Economic Estimates take on Official Statistic status
Launch of Creative Enterprise Zones in London

2019   General Election: Conservative Government
Creative Industries identified as a growth sector as part of Scottish Economic Action Plan

2020   UK leaves the European Union
Covid-19 Pandemic

2021   Creative Industries Federation and Creative England combine to form Creative UK

2022   Government publishes its Levelling Up white paper to address geographic inequalities
Publication of the Creative Industries 2030 Sector Vision, via Creative Industries Council
Founding of CIRCE: Creative Impact Research Centre Europe

2023   Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre moves to a twin north/south model
Launch of Convergent Screen Technologies and performance Realtime (CoSTAR) R&D investment

Adapted from *The State of Creativity* report (Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre 2023)

Appendix 2: Institutional Glossary

APPG (All Party Parliamentary Group)

All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are informal cross-party groups that have no official status within Parliament. They are run by and for Members of the Commons and Lords, though many choose to involve individuals and organisations from outside Parliament in their administration and activities.

AHRC: Arts and Humanities Research Council (2005 -)

The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) is a national funding agency supporting arts and humanities research and study in the UK.[28] The themes of their research range from world-class, independent research in subjects from philosophy and the Creative Industries, to art conservation and product design.[29] The AHRC was created in 2005 following a government review of research funding in the arts and humanities and was the successor to the Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB), which had been created in 1998.[30]

Arts Council of England (1994 –)

Arts Council England is a non-departmental public body of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. It is a so-called 'arms length organisation' which means that it is not directly controlled by politicians, but managed at one remove to protect its independence. It is a registered charity. The current iteration was formed in 1994 when the Arts Council of Great Britain (founded in 1946) was divided into three separate bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. Arts Council England has been responsible for distributing lottery funding. The arts funding system in England underwent considerable reorganisation in 2002 when all of the regional arts boards were subsumed into Arts Council England and became regional offices of the national organisation.

Arts Council of Wales (1994 –)

The Arts council for Wales was established in 1994, it became accountable to the National Assembly for Wales in 1999. The Welsh Government provides ACW with money to fund the arts in Wales. ACW also distributes National Lottery funding for the arts in Wales, allocated by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).The Arts Council of Wales is a registered charity.

BBC (1922 -)

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a British public service established in 1923 under a royal charter and operates under its agreement with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. Its work is funded principally by an annual television licence fee which is charged to all British households, companies, and organisations using any type of equipment to receive or record live television broadcasts or to use the BBC's streaming service, iPlayer. The fee is set by the British Government, agreed by Parliament, and is used to fund the BBC's radio, TV, and online services covering the nations and regions of the UK.

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[28] *Arts and Humanities Research Council* (2017) *GOV.UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/arts-and-humanities-research-council (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

[29] *About AHRC* (2023). Available at: https://www.ukri.org/who-we-are/ahrc/ (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

[30] *Arts and Humanities Research Council - Articles - Making History* (no date). Available at: https://archives.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/AHRC.html (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

Since 2014, it has also funded the BBC World Service (launched in 1932), Some of the BBC's revenue comes from its commercial subsidiary BBC Studios (formerly BBC Worldwide), which sells BBC programmes and services internationally and distributes the BBC's international 24-hour English-language news services BBC World News, and from BBC.com, provided by BBC Global News Ltd.

BIS: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009-2016)

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) was a ministerial department of the United Kingdom Government created in 2009 by the merger of the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). It was disbanded on the creation of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in 2016.

BEIS: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2016-2023)

The Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) was formed during a machinery of government change in 2016, through a merger between the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). In 2023, the department was dissolved. Its functions were split into three new departments: the Department for Business and Trade, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, and the Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology.

BFI: British Film Institute (1933 -)

The British Film Institute (BFI) is a film and television charitable organisation which promotes and preserves film-making and television in the United Kingdom. It was established in 1933 to encourage the development of the arts of film, television and the moving image throughout the United Kingdom, to promote their use as a record of contemporary life and manners, to promote education about film, television and the moving image generally, and their impact on society, to promote access to and appreciation of the widest possible range of British and world cinema and to establish, care for and develop collections reflecting the moving image history and heritage of the United Kingdom. The BFI uses funds provided by the National Lottery to encourage film production, distribution, and education. It is sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and partially funded under the British Film Institute Act 1949. BFI is an executive non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

BOP: Burns Owens Partnership (1997 -)

BOP Consulting is a global research and consulting practice for culture and the creative economy. Established in 1997 working primarily on local cultural development issues it is now an international consultancy delivering over 100 projects each year. BOP works with its clients – among them government bodies, leading arts and cultural organisations, property developers and international agencies – to plan, design and deliver sustainable cultural projects through rigorous and effective research. BOP has offices in London, Edinburgh, Taipei and Shanghai, and continues to play a central role in promoting culture and the creative industries within broader economic, social and educational agendas.

Business Improvement District

Business Improvement Districts are business led partnerships which are created through a ballot process to deliver additional services to local businesses. They are a tool for directly involving local businesses in local activities and allow the business community and local authorities to work together to improve the local trading environment. A Business Improvement District is a defined area in which a levy is charged on all business rate payers in addition to the business rates bill. This levy is used to develop projects which will benefit businesses in the local area.

CEZ: Creative Enterprise Zone (2018 -)

Creative Enterprise Zones are a Mayoral initiative to designate areas of London where artists and creative businesses can find permanent affordable space to work; are supported to start-up and grow; and where local people are helped to learn creative sector skills and access pathways to employment. The programme launched in 2018. The zones are in Brent, Croydon, Haringey, Hounslow, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham, Hammersmith & Fulham, Ealing, Waltham Forest, and Westminster, with a single zone across both Hackney and Tower Hamlets.

CIC: Creative Industries Council (2011 -)

The Creative Industries Council (CIC) is a joint forum between the Creative Industries and government. The Creative Industries Council (CIC) was created by the UK Government in 2011, to provide an industry and government forum that could support partnership working and stimulate policy and industry change.[31]

CIF: Creative Industries Federation (2014 - 2021)

The Creative Industries Federation was a membership body which aimed to represent, champion and support the UK's Creative Industries. Its membership included a large number of Creative Industries businesses as well as freelancers. In September 2019 it was announced that the Creative Industries Federation would be merging with Creative England, becoming 'Creative UK' (a move which finally took place in 2021).[32]

Creative England (2011 - 2021)

Creative England was a national agency which invested in and supported creative ideas, talent and businesses in film, TV, games and digital media.[33] It was initially set up in 2011 as the first national development organisation for the Creative Industries, consolidating a number of regional screen agencies, and was primarily an organisation focussed on providing practical training opportunities and funding. Creative England had a particular focus on channelling investment and opportunities outside of London. In September 2019 it was announced that the Creative Industries Federation would be merging with Creative England, becoming 'Creative UK' (a move which finally took place in 2021).[34]

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[31] Ibid.
[32] 'How we are run' (2021) *Creative UK*. Available at: https://www.wearecreative.uk/about/how-we-are-run/ (Accessed: 10 September 2023).
[33] *Creative England - The Creative Industries Partners* (2020). Available at: https://www.thecreativeindustries.co.uk/partners/creative-england (Accessed: 10 September 2023).
[34] 'How we are run' (2021) *Creative UK*. Available at: https://www.wearecreative.uk/about/how-we-are-run/ (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

Creative Industries Clusters Programme (2018 – 2023)

Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and its partners in UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) launched the Creative Industries Cluster Programme in 2018, bringing businesses, organisations and universities together in local ecosystems. The £80 million investment aimed to drive innovation and skills and to create products and experiences that can be marketed around the world. The nine creative clusters were announced following a year-long selection process and drew from some of the UK's best performing and world-renowned creative companies, from the screen industries and digital storytelling to fashion and video games. The Creative PEC and an Immersive Storytelling centre were also developed alongside the clusters. The initial programme ran from 2018-2023 at which point it was identified as part of the 'growth moment' outlined in the Creative Industries Sector Vision.

Creative Industries Sector Deal (2018) / Creative Industries Sector Vision (2023)

The government and the creative industries sector, through the Creative Industries Council (CIC), have agreed a Sector Deal to unlock growth for creative businesses in 2018. It set out almost £150 million of public investment, matched by more than £200 million from industry. This included support for creative clusters in the form of the £56 million Creative Industries Clusters Programmes which drove Research and Development (R&D) across the UK. The 2023 sector vision sets out actions that the UK government and industry have committed to delivering now. This includes £310 million in government spending, with approximately £233 million of existing public funding since the 2021 Spending Review and £77 million in new government spending announced at the 2023 creative industries growth moment. This new spending is focused on boosting creative clusters and supporting businesses to grow and export, underpinned by a new commitment to deliver a pipeline of skills and talent. It is accompanied by a plethora of undertakings from creative industries sub-sectors.

Creative PEC: Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (2018 -)

The Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (Creative PEC) is a policy and research centre which works to improve the quality of evidence for the Creative Industries, for three main stakeholders: industry, policymakers and the wider research community.[35] It was first funded for five years alongside the Creative Industries Sector Deal, with funding secured ahead of this date as part of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund.[36] At this stage the Creative PEC was led by Innovation Foundation Nesta and included a consortium of universities based across the UK. Following the conclusion of this funding, the AHRC decided to re-invest in the Creative PEC, awarding it an increase in funding (amounting to £11m) over another five years. As the priorities of Nesta had changed since the Creative PEC's launch, a tender process was launched to support a new organisation to lead the Creative PEC. This was won by the University of Newcastle, alongside the Royal Society of Arts (RSA). The PEC works by consulting industry about the challenges that the sector faces, from its limited diversity, to skills gaps, barriers to trade, and local growth in the sector. They then put these questions to a UK-wide group of researchers, and feed the evidence and policy advice back to policymakers.[37]

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[35] *About the PEC* (2023) *Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre*. Available at: https://pec.ac.uk/about-pec (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

[36] *Creative Industries: Sector Deal* (2018). Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, and Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/creative-industries-sector-deal.

[37] *About the PEC* (2023) *Creative Industries Policy & Evidence Centre*. Available at: https://pec.ac.uk/about-pec (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

Creative Scotland (2010 -)

Creative Scotland is the public body that supports the arts, screen and Creative Industries in Scotland by distributing funding from the Scottish Government and the National Lottery and by advocating for the creative sector.[38] It was created by the Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act in 2010 and combined the remits of Scottish Screen and the Scottish Arts Council.[39] Screen Scotland is a screen unit within Creative Scotland which was launched on 21 August 2018 in response to industry lobbying that the sector needed a distinct unit.[40]

CCSkills: Creative & Cultural Skills (2005 – 2023)

Creative and Cultural Skills was a UK charity, whose role was to act as the sector skills body for the cultural industries. Established in 2005 as one 25 sector skills councils tasked with reducing skills gaps and shortages, boosting sector skills and promoting career routes such as apprenticeships, it was abolished in 2023. During that period CCSkills ran many impactful programmes and events, delivered thousands of advice and support sessions, fostered important relationships and authored research.

CreativeUK (2021 -)

CreativeUK is a not for profit organisation created in the merger between the Creative Industries Federation and Creative England in 2021. The organisation combines the practical support (e.g. investment funds and training opportunities) of the latter, with the advocacy work of the former. They continue to have a membership function, and run a flagship annual festival called the Creative Coalition Festival.[41]

Creative Wales (2020 -)

Creative Wales is a Welsh Government agency set up in 2020 to support the Creative Industries in Wales, with the exception of fine art, dance, theatre and poetry which fall outside of their remit (these sub-sectors are covered by the Arts Council of Wales).[42] They connect people and businesses to foster new opportunities; provide knowledge and resources to upskill the workforce and support our trainees; and invest in ideas and people to help our creative economy flourish.[43]

DCMS: Department for Culture, Media and Sport (1997-2017; 2023 -)

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport is a department of the UK Government focussed on supporting culture, arts, media, sport, tourism and civil society across every part of England.[44] Its remit covers the Creative Industries, the National Lottery, licensing, gambling and the historic environment.

[38] *About Us* (no date) *Creative Scotland*. Available at: https://www.creativescotland.com/about (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

[39] *Creative Scotland Strategic Framework* (2023). Edinburgh, Scotland: Creative Scotland; Screen Scotland. Available at: https://www.creativescotland.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/93795/CS-Strategic-Framework-FINAL.pdf; *Screen Agencies: An Overview* (2017). ekos. Available at: https://www.creativescotland.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/46551/Screen-Agencies-Working-Paper-Final.pdf.

[40] *Screen Scotland Business Plan* (2021) *Screen Scotland*. Available at: https://www.screen.scot/funding-and-support/research/screen-scotland-business-plan (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

[41] 'Annual Creative UK Festival is back for 2024' (no date) *Creative UK*. Available at: https://www.wearecreative.uk/event/annual-event/ (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

[42] *About us* (2022) *Creative | Wales*. Available at: https://www.creative.wales/about-us (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

[43] ibid.

[44] *Department for Culture, Media and Sport* (2023) *GOV.UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-culture-media-and-sport (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

DDCMS: Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport (2017 - 2023)

The Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport was a department of the UK Government founded in 2017 under the premiership of Theresa May which had a remit to "*protect and promote our cultural and artistic heritage and help businesses and communities to grow by investing in innovation and highlighting Britain as a fantastic place to visit.*"[45] Alongside the areas which were already the responsibility for the DCMS, its expanded brief included the digital sectors - namely telecommunications, data protection, internet safety, cyber skills and parts of media and the Creative Industries.[46] The Department was dissolved by Rishi Sunak MP in 2023 and replaced by the re-created Department for Culture, Media and Sport, with the digital brief moved to the newly created Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.[47]

Equality Act (2010)

The Equality Act 2010 has the primary purpose of consolidating, updating and supplementing the numerous prior Acts and Regulations, that formed the basis of anti-discrimination law : These consisted, primarily, of the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and three major statutory instruments protecting discrimination in employment on grounds of religion or belief, sexual orientation and age. The Act protects people against discrimination, harassment or victimisation in employment, and as users of private and public services based on nine protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. In the case of disability, employers and service providers are under a duty to make reasonable adjustments to their workplaces to overcome barriers experienced by disabled people.

ESRC: Economic and Social Science Research Council (1965 -)

The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), formerly the Social Science Research Council(SSRC), is part of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI). UKRI is a non-departmental public body (NDPB)funded by the UK government. ESRC provides funding and support for research and training in the social sciences. It is the UK's largest organisation for funding research on economic and social issues. It aims to promote and support, by any means, high-quality research and related postgraduate training on social and economic issues: develop and support the national data infrastructure that underpins high-quality research; advance knowledge and provide trained social scientists who meet the needs of users and beneficiaries, thereby contributing to the economic competitiveness of the UK, the effectiveness of public services and policy, and the quality of life; communicate clearly and promote public understanding of social science.

Jerwood Arts (1999 -).

Jerwood Arts is a charity supports excellence and emerging talent in the arts and crafts in the UK. It was established in 1999 by Jerwood Foundation to take on and develop project funding activity through an endowment fund of £25 million which was set up in 2005. It merges with Jerwood Foundation in 2024. Up to £2 million of grants will be awarded each year.

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[45] *[Withdrawn] About us* (2023) *GOV.UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-digital-culture-media-sport/about (Accessed: 10 September 2023).
[46] *Change of name for DCMS* (2017) *GOV.UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/change-of-name-for-dcms (Accessed: 10 September 2023).
[47] Jackson, M. (2023) 'Cabinet reshuffle sees DCMS changes', *PPA*, 10 February. Available at: https://ppa.co.uk/cabinet-reshuffle-sees-dcms-changes (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

LEP: Local Enterprise Partnership

There 36 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) across England. They are business led partnerships between local authorities and local private sector businesses. They play a central role in determining local economic priorities and undertaking activities to drive economic growth and job creation, improve infrastructure, and raise workforce skills within the local area. LEP boards are led by a business Chair and board members are local leaders of industry (including SMEs), educational institutions and the public sector.

Levelling Up (2019 -)

"Levelling up" is a political programme first articulated in the 2019 Conservative Party manifesto that aims to reduce the imbalances, primarily economic, between areas and social groups across the United Kingdom. It seeks to do so without acting to the detriment of prosperous areas, such as much of South East England. In September 2021 the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government was renamed the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. The successful bids for the first £1.7 billion tranche of the Levelling Up Fund were announced with the budget. Of an original £600 million ambition in the 2021/2022 financial year, only £107 million of levelling up funds were delivered to projects, later reduced to £200 million in plans. The 2022 White Paper lists 12 missions, aimed to be achieved by 2030: Increase pay, employment and productivity; Domestic public investment in R&D outside south-east to rise by at least 40%.;London-style public transport connectivity across the UK; Nationwide broadband; Fixing the education gap; Skills training; Narrowing life expectancy gap, with a UK-wide rise of five years by 2035; Rise in wellbeing; Decreased inequalities; Rise in overall number of first-time homebuyers; Crime reduction, and Devolution in England.

Nesta (1998 -)

Nesta was created in 1998 as the first publicly supported national endowment in the UK: the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts.[48] Its three objectives, as articulated by Chris Smith, the then-Secretary of State, were to "help talented individuals to develop their full potential", "to turn creativity into products and services", and to "advance public appreciation of the Creative Industries, science and technology".[49] The first chair of Nesta on its creation was David Puttnam, a celebrated British Irish film producer. From its inception, Nesta had a focus on creative work, and over its lifetime has published several of the key texts on the Creative Industries - including on the geography of the Creative Industries and work on the definition of the sector. In 2021, following a change in leadership, Nesta announced its new strategy which for the first time did not have the Creative Economy or arts and culture listed as priority areas.[50]

New Public Management

New Public Management (NPM) is a form of public-sector reform inspired by ideas associated with neoliberalism and public choice theory. The impetus for NPM came from fiscal crises. Talk of the overloaded state grew as oil crises cut state revenues and the

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[48] *A brief history of Nesta* (no date) *nesta*. Available at: https://www.nesta.org.uk/brief-history-nesta/ (Accessed: 10 September 2023).

[49] Smith, C. (1998) *Creative Britain*. London, United Kingdom: faber and faber. p.8

[50] *Nesta's Strategy to 2030* (2021) *nesta*. Available at: https://www.nesta.org.uk/report/nesta-strategy-2030/ (Accessed: 11 September 2023).

expansion of welfare services saw state expenditure increase as a proportion of gross national product, leading to a quest to cut costs. Using government guided private-sector principles rather than rigid hierarchical bureaucracy, was thought to improve efficiency. NPM promotes a shift from bureaucratic administration to business-like professional management but is commonly associated with narrow target setting and target delivery in the public sector (including public-funded culture).

Non-departmental public bodies

In the United Kingdom, non-departmental public body (NDPB) is a classification applied to public sector organisations that have a role in the process of national government but are not part of a government department. NDPBs carry out their work largely independently from ministers and are accountable to the public through Parliament; however, ministers are responsible for the independence, effectiveness, and efficiency of non-departmental public bodies in their portfolio. The term includes the four types of NDPB (executive, advisory, tribunal, and independent monitoring boards) but excludes public corporations and public broadcasters (BBC, Channel 4, and S4C).

NPO: National Portfolio Organisation

National Portfolio Organisation status is given to arts and cultural organisations/agencies in receipt of longterm funding from the Arts Council England (ACE). ACE invested more than £1.5 billion in the National Portfolio programme from 2018/19–2021/22. NPOs are viewed as leaders in their respective areas, with a collective responsibility to protect and develop the national arts and cultural ecology.

NS-SEC

The National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) has been constructed to measure the employment relations and conditions of occupations. The NS-SEC is an occupationally based classification, but it has rules to provide coverage of the whole adult population. The information required to create the NS-SEC is occupation coded to the unit groups (OUG) of the Standard Occupational Classification 2020 (SOC 2020) and details of employment status: whether an employer, self-employed or employee; whether a supervisor; and the number of employees at a workplace.

Regional Development Agency (1998 – 2010)

In the United Kingdom, Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were nine non-departmental public bodies established for the purpose of development, primarily economic, of England's Government Office regions between 1998 and 2010. There was one RDA for each of the NUTS level 1 regions of England. In 2010 the UK government announced the abolition of the RDAs which took place on 2012, with a view to reducing the government deficit; similar economic development would be undertaken by local councils and local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). There was no direct replacement for the RDAs as LEPs did not at first receive funding from central government, and local councils did not receive an equivalent injection of income from central funds, having been called upon to make savings and support similar initiatives.

Resolution Foundation (2005 -)

The Resolution Foundation is an independent British think tank established in 2005. Its stated aim is to improve the standard of living of low-to-middle income families. It produces some recurring research publications. These include annual 'Low Pay Britain' reports, an

annual 'Living Standards Audit', an annual 'Living Standards Outlook', and a quarterly 'Earnings Outlook'. The Foundation also calculates the rates of the voluntary UK and London Living Wages each year, on behalf of the Living Wage Foundation and using the Minimum Income Standard.

RSA: Royal Society of Arts (1754 -)

The Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce , commonly known as the Royal Society of Arts (RSA), is a London-based organisation committed to finding practical solutions to social challenges. The RSA's mission expressed in the founding charter was to "embolden enterprise, enlarge science, refine art, improve our manufacturers and extend our commerce", but also of the need to alleviate poverty and secure full employment. It is built upon the expertise of its Fellowship and organises local and nation talks and debates, and publishes a regular magazine and reports.

Select Committees

Select committees run inquiries on specific topics. The outcomes of these inquiries are public and many require a response from the government. Select committees also carry out their work through correspondence, by engaging with the public through events and surveys, holding round-table discussions and undertaking visits.

ScreenSkills (2018 -) / Creative Skillset (1992 - 2018)

ScreenSkills (Formerly Creative Skillset) is the industry-led skills body for the screen industries – film, television (including children's, unscripted and high-end), VFX (visual effects), animation and games. Identifying skills gaps – current and future – across the screen industries and the whole of the country to provide an evidence base for investment in skills and training; Providing careers information; Mapping and quality-marking professional pathways to improve entry-level diversity and work readiness; Supporting development at every stage of a professional career in screen including through mentoring and offering bursaries. Funding is via contributions paid by industry into the Film/High-end TV/Children's TV/Unscripted TV/Animation Skills Funds; National Lottery funds awarded by the BFI as part of the Future Film Skills strategy; Awards from partner organisations such as Arts Council England. Partnership with other organisations such as Creative & Cultural Skills (CCSkills) reinforces key messaging on the importance of skills and training to the country's creative industries.

Social Mobility Commission (2010 -)

The Social Mobility Commission (SMC) is an independent statutory body (an organisation created by an act of Parliament), it is a continuation of the body previously called the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission. Social mobility is defined by it as the link between a person's occupation or income and the occupation or income of their parents. Where there is a strong link, there is a lower level of social mobility. Where there is a weak link, there is a higher level of social mobility. The SMC publishes an annual report on the progress made towards improving social mobility in the United Kingdom. It is also tasked with promoting social mobility in England, for example, by challenging employers, the professions, universities and schools to play their part in promoting social mobility; carrying out and publishing research in relation to social mobility; providing advice to ministers (at their request) on how to improve social mobility in England.

Taking Part (2005 – 2021) / Participation Survey (2021 -)

The Taking Part survey was DCMS' flagship survey: a continuous face-to-face household survey of adults aged 16 and over and children aged 5 to 15 years old in England. It ran from 2005 and became the main evidence source for DCMS and its sectors. In 2021, it was updated to the Participation Survey, primarily moving to web-based data collection. The survey's main objectives are to provide a central, reliable evidence source that can be used to analyse cultural, digital, and sporting engagement, providing a clear picture of why people do or do not engage; and, to underpin further research on driving engagement and the value and benefits of engagement. The survey is commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and three partner organisations (Arts Council England, Historic England and Sport England).

UK Film Council (2000-2011)

The UK Film Council (UKFC) was a non-departmental public body set up in 2000 to develop and promote the film industry in the UK. It was constituted as a private company limited by guarantee, owned by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, and governed by a board of 15 directors. It was funded from various sources including The National Lottery. It distributed more than £160m of lottery money to over 900 films. Lord Puttnam described the council as "a layer of strategic glue that's helped bind the many parts of our disparate industry together." UKFC closed on 31 March 2011, with many of its functions passing to the British Film Institute.

Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value (2013)

The Warwick Commission model began in 2007, drawing on the scholarly expertise of University of Warwick academics as well as practitioners and policy makers to address issues of global importance. The Commission on the Future of Cultural Value (2013) undertook a one year long comprehensive and holistic investigation into the future of cultural value. A diverse group of cultural leaders, supported by academics from the University, were invited to gather together the evidence and arguments to create a blueprint for the future of investment and engagement in cultural lives in the UK. The Commission's report brought together the findings of a series of public and private meetings with artists, creative and cultural professionals, economists, business leaders and other stakeholders, backed up by targeted research. A key message from its final report, *Enriching Britain: Culture, Creativity and Growth*, was that a wide gap needed to be addressed between the UK population and the primary contributors to, and beneficiaries of, its culture and creative ecosystem.