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Ali, J.

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Somali Resistance against Ethiopian State Nationalism:

A Discursive Inquiry

Juweria Ali

May 2022

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Abstract

Since the inception of the modern Ethiopian state, the relationship between the Somali region and the central government has been defined by unequal relations underpinned by a violent legacy of imperial conquests in the process of Ethiopian state-formation in the late nineteenth century. This thesis examines the discursive construction of Somali nationalist resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism employing an interpretive and critical methodology. Combining qualitative data with historical archival sources, this thesis challenges the canon in Ethiopian studies which: 1) emphasises the normative rightness of Ethiopian state nationalism and 2.) takes for granted the resistance mounted against this variation of state nationalism.

This study adapts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), specifically the Discourse Historical Approaches developed by Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) to investigate the discursive production of Somali resistance as expressed via written and spoken discourse. I adopt this methodology first by approaching discourse as a site of struggle for domination between competing ideas on Ethiopian nationhood, history and territoriality. The thesis examines the processes through and by which dominant Ethiopian discourses are legitimated, and concurrently, how such discourses are de-legitimated and discursively resisted by resistance movements in the Somali Region in Ethiopia. It considers the impact that the independence of the Somali Republic in 1960 had on igniting a sense of nationalist fervour in 'unredeemed' territories as articulated by the Greater Somalia '*Somaaliweyn*' political project.

Moreover, the thesis focuses on two national events following Ethiopia's two revolutions which gave rise to both old and new articulations of Somali nationalism triggering public debate on contested histories, territorialities and identities which are examined closely. The first event is the 1977 Ogaden/Ethio-Somalia War, and the second event is the fall of the Derg regime in 1991 marking the era of the Ethiopian people's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the rebellion of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The study adopts an integrative approach to Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) which combines an ethnosymbolist approach with the core tenants of critical discourse theory. I put into dialogue DHA's concern with the use of past cultural resources and the analysis of discourse within its socio-political and historic specificity, with ethnosymbolism's emphasis on past socio-symbolic resources used to imagine the nation,

construct a sense of sovereignty, and legitimate present claims and future aspirations in nationalist discourses.

Theoretically, this study contributes to the body of knowledge on contested statehood and sovereignties in post-colonial Africa capturing the ways that the state is experienced and imagined in the margins of society. With an emphasis on orality and indigenous knowledge systems, this investigation forges new ways of conceptualising Somali nationhood in Ethiopia through the exploration of conflicting nationalist claims, contested political pasts, and rival frontier imaginations in nationalist discourses. Empirically, the study expands knowledge on African identities, peripheral peoples, histories and nationalisms in the Horn of Africa. It contributes to the fields of Somali Studies, Ethiopian Studies, resistance studies, as well asstudies in nationalism and social and political movements in Africa. The thesis also adds new insights to the study of post-colonial dilemmas in state-formation by introducing novel empirical datasets and conceptual readings to these fields.

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

Map of the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia, UNOCHA

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Authors declaration

I declare that all material contained in this thesis is my own work

Acronyms, notes on orthography and translation

APDO - Afar People Democratic Organization

ANDM - Amhara National Democratic Movement

AU - African Union

BGPDP - Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Party

ENDF - Ethiopian National Defense Force

EPRDF - The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

ESDL - Ethiopian Somali Democratic League

EST - Ethiopian student movement

FDRE - Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GPUDM - Gambella People's Unity Democratic Movement

HNL - Harari National League

HRW - Human Rights Watch

JWXO - Jabhadda Wadaniga Xoreynta Ogaadeeniya

NFD - Northern Frontier District

ONLF - Ogaden National Liberation Front

OAU - Organization of African Unity

OHRC - Ogaden Human Rights Committee

OPDO - Oromo People's Democratic Organization

OYSU - Ogaden Youth and Student Union

PP - Prosperity Party

SALF - Somali Abo Liberation Front

SEPDM - Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement

SNL - Somali National League

SNM - Somali National Movement

SPDP - Somali People's democratic party

SRS - Somali Regional State

SSDF - Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SYC - Somali Youth Club

SYL - Somali Youth League

TGE - Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995)

TPLF -Tigray People's Liberation Front

WSLF - Western Somali Liberation Front

Notes on translation – all translations from Somali to English were done in collaboration with Huud, Ismaaciil and Fuaad. Where written materials were not available, I have relied on transcribing audio versions with the support of these colleagues.

The appendix section of the thesis contains the texts of the Somali materials used in this study. In cases where excerpts from longer verses are used, only the sections used throughout the chapters are included in the appendix.

Notes on interviews

To maintain anonymity, the names of some interviewees have been concealed using pseudonyms. Where permission was granted, real names have also been used.

1. Introduction

'On March 27th 1961, I was among a group of youth who wrote a letter to the head of the Ethiopian military stationed in Dhegehbour town. The letter contained the following words: The British and Italians gave independence to the countries they ruled, so why don't you do the same? We are both Africans, so we are closer to one another than the British and Italians are to our fellow Somalis. Since they left, we should also get our freedom from you (Ethiopians)' - Siyaad Da'ud (Jigjiga, 2019)

This excerpt from an interview with a former Somali military official captures the postcolonial dilemma many nations in the African continent faced as the birth of new nation states required newly independent states to embark upon a nation-building project constructing a new national imaginary, and a national identity inclusive of all communities within the borders of the new state. The quote also points to another postcolonial dilemma which affected the Somali inhabitants of the modern Ethiopian state. As neighbouring states gained independence from European powers during the twentieth century, Somali demands for self-determination were dismissed under Africa's new territorial consensus institutionalised in 1963 as heads of independent African states decided to maintain colonial borders. Unlike conflict in the rest of Africa, what is distinct about the Horn of Africa is that the source of conflict is often rooted in matters pertaining to territoriality and sovereignty as decolonisation gave rise to conflict across Somali, Ethiopian, Sudanese and Eritrean frontiers; whereas inherited colonial borders were generally accepted elsewhere- they represented a new postcolonial challenge for the Horn of Africa (Markakis, 2011, p.5).

Ethiopia, formerly known as Abyssinia, represents an anomaly in the African continent as the only state to have maintained her autonomy since the advent of colonialism. Modern day Ethiopia constructed a national character based upon the exclusive identity of 'highlanders' referring to the core group that inhabited historic Abyssinia before tripling its size and capturing Somali, Oromo and Sidama territories via conquest (Birru, 1980-81). The new territorial status quo in postcolonial Africa underpinned by the ideology of pan-africanism, coupled with Ethiopia's exclusive boundaries of nationhood (pan-ethiopianism) posed Somalis with a dual challenge within the Ethiopian state. The convergence of the ideologies of pan-Africanism and pan-Ethiopianism instituted new forms of oppression namely in terms of the narrow interpretation of the principle of self-determination, the concept of unity, and colonialism in post-colonial Africa. This thesis emerges from the vantage point

that modern Somali nationalism emerged from resisting this postcolonial territorial and ideological configuration of which Ethiopia was a leading architect, and secondly, resisting the Ethiopian nationalist project known as 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism.[1]

Ethiopia's state-building project has been met with fierce opposition from nations and peoples incorporated into the empire at the height of its expansion during the second half of the nineteenth century. Since the inception of the modern Ethiopian state, the relationship between the Somali region[2] and the state has been defined by unequal centre-periphery relations determined by a violent legacy of state-formation. This thesis challenges the canon in Ethiopian studies which 1.) Emphasises the hegemony of 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism and 2.) Understates the resistance mounted by Somalis against this variation of state nationalism. This study adapts the Discourse Historical Approaches developed by Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) belonging to the school of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) to investigate the production of Somali resistance. It does so by tracing the discursive formation of Somali nationalism as an expression of resistance against the institutionalised hegemony of Greater Ethiopian nationalism. I adapt this methodology first by approaching (nationalist) discourse as a site of struggle for domination demonstrating how Ethiopian discourses concerning its Somali constituents are legitimated, and importantly, how such discourses are de-legitimated and discursively resisted. Adopting an ethnosymbolist theoretical orientation, this thesis underscores the cultural and symbolic features that sustain Somali nationalist resistance and claims to sovereignty within the state.

Based on the centrality of oral traditions in articulations of Somali political realities, this thesis emphasises the significance of the discursive as a terrain for defining and re-defining power relations between the Eastern Somali-periphery and the Ethiopian- centre. Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) illuminates how resistance discourses can be transformative in deconstructing and destabilising the histories and hierarchies that produce dominant nationalisms and knowledge systems which have cemented relations of domination in Ethiopia. This study makes an empirical contribution to the field of Somali Studies and Ethiopian studies by deciphering the ideologies that uphold 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism and problematizing their underlying knowledge regimes through the lens

[1] From here onwards I use the terms 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism, Ethiopian nationalism, and state nationalism synonymously.

[2] From here onwards, I use the names 'Ogaden' region and 'Somali' region interchangeably to refer to the territory whereas I use '*Ogaadeen*' in the Somali form to refer to one of its inhabitant tribes.

of alternative Somali resistance discourses. By emphasising the historical dimension of nationalist discourse formation, the thesis reveals the contested nature of statehood, territoriality and identity in postcolonial Africa. In particular, it brings under investigation, the discursive articulation of Somali resistance capturing the ways that statehood is experienced in the margins using oral data and archival sources.

This thesis departs from demonstrating how the Ethiopian centre projects power in the cultural, territorial and political peripheries- a task which has been undertaken extensively in works such as *The Last Two Frontiers* by John Markakis (2011), and *Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia* by Donald L. Donham and Wendy James (1986). Instead, it moves towards bringing the resistance discourses of subject peoples and their exchange with the Ethiopian state to the centre of knowledge claims and contested meaning making processes on Ethiopian nationalism and state legitimacy. In doing so, this thesis refrains from treating Ethiopia's peripheries as a homogenous entity with linear relationships with the centre characterised by experiences of top-down violence and that of conflict and resistance alone. Instead, it emphasises how historical processes have shaped the peripheries' relationship and engagement with the state, the socio-political conditions which have given rise to Somali resistance, and the (symbolic and cultural) resources used to sustain and provide meaning to their resistance.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature on the formation of Ethiopian nationalism illustrating how it has taken shape as a powerful discursive paradigm which makes claims to uniqueness while reproducing difference and reinforcing essentialist notions of what it means to be Ethiopian. What Sorenson (1993) calls 'mythologizing of national identities' has served to reinforce the legitimacy of the power centred in the national core at the expense of the peripheries whose distinct national identities constitute a threat to the unity, continuity and ancient character of the Empire. Understanding key themes within the 'Great Tradition' thus establishes a framework for understanding 'Greater Ethiopian' Nationalism and the contested nature of this form of nationalism.

The chapter demonstrates the hegemony surrounding the dominant symbols associated with state nationalism and its sense of exclusivity, which is attributed to its ancient characteristics, biblical connections and overall mythic allure. This is followed by a discussion of the literature contesting the legitimising tools used to construct Ethiopian state nationalism. This section provides a critical

overview of the underlying themes within the dominant historiography of Ethiopia, framing the literature on the extent to which key works contribute to or depart from this dominant nationalist discourse. The chapter will begin by providing a background on the rationale of this study and a description of the research problems that the thesis stems from and is designed to address. It further presents the central question(s) that this thesis is structured around addressing, including its main aims and objectives. The remaining sections of the thesis serve as stepping-stone for thinking more critically about the contested imaginations around the Ethiopian nationalist project, and to lay the groundwork for examining the way that Somali resistance subverts dominant Pan-Ethiopian imaginations.

1.1. Background of the Study

The Somali Region spans across Ethiopia's eastern periphery and is host to ethnic Somalis who traditionally adhere to a nomadic pastoralist lifestyle. Historic animosity has defined relations between the predominantly Muslim (eastern) periphery and the (northern) Christian Abyssinian core based on Imam Ahmed's holy war against Abyssinia in the sixteenth century which led to the near destruction of the entire kingdom (Donham, 2002). In more recent historiography, Ethiopia's decisive win against Italian colonialism in the Battle of Adwa (1896) secured her autonomy and positioned her as a key player in the Scramble for Africa; her imperial ambitions began by expanding the empire via conquest. Then an empire, Ethiopia was formed as a result of the conquests of Menelik II at the end of the nineteenth century, and is made up of a collection of culturally and linguistically heterogeneous nations and nationalities (Hussein, 2006, p.272). Once Menelik II became the autocratic ruler of the Ethiopian Empire, he embarked upon not only annexing territories occupied by the Sidama and Afar but also reoccupied Eritrea following his victory over Italian colonialists at the battle of Adwa (McCracken, 2004, p.188). According to Ethiopian state nationalism, the violent incorporation of independent nations into the Ethiopian Empire is regarded as a 'unification' pioneered by Menelik II. Essentially, the 'Greater Ethiopia' narrative is a characterization of the military conquests and territorial expansion of emperors Teodros, Yohannes and Menelik II in the mid-nineteenth century which founded the modern Ethiopian state in the name of reunifying the empire (Sorenson, 1993, p.41).

Ethiopia's first attempts at exerting sovereignty over parts of the Somali territories occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century when Ras Makonnen sent his forces to collect tribute via raids and

incursions against Somali tribes. Britain's defeat of Italy in the Horn of Africa following the end of the Second World War resulted in her capturing Somali territories including the Ogaden and Reserved areas (comprising of modern day 'Somali Region'). In September 1948, Britain transferred the Ogaden under Ethiopian administration marking the first official confirmation of Ethiopia's sovereignty over the region (Lewis, 2002, p.130-131).[3] Yet the official introduction of the very idea of a 'Somali nation' entered the Ethiopian political scenery as late as 1991 (Hagmann and Khalif, 2008, p.38) with the advent of ethnic federalism spearheaded by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling coalition. Despite this official recognition of a distinct Somali nation, resistance movements continued to engulf the volatile region. The central political dilemma which continues to fuel resistance in Ethiopia is 'the assumed exclusive right of the Abyssinian elite to rule the state and plot the course to national integration' (Markakis, 2011, p.5) – In other words, to impose the dominant form of state nationalism upon the diverse peoples existing within the boundaries of the state.

The state's historical association with the dominant group results in the nation being identified with this core group such that nation-building becomes 'a moral cloak for intensified domination' via the imposition of the dominant culture upon the periphery (Young, 1982, p.175). The promotion of Ethiopian state nationalism faced the dual challenge of building state legitimacy to guarantee the loyalty of subjects incorporated into the empire during imperial expansion meanwhile forging a national identity that is able to encompass the diverse populations inhabiting the state (Markakis, 2011, p.4-5). The state attempted to assimilate the population via the policy of 'Abyssiniazation' (assimilation into the dominant state identity) through the expansion of Orthodox Christianity, the imposition of Amharic and the proliferation of *rist* system allowing state-sponsored generals and chiefs to acquire control over people (*gult* rights) and land (*rist* rights) (Donham, 2002, p.10-11). In opposition to this political project, throughout the twentieth century, successive movements have called for the self-determination of Somalis in Ethiopia. These movements took the shape of non-armed political organisations such as the Somali Youth League (SYL) in the 1940s and 50s, armed liberation groups such as the 1960s *Geesh,* Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in the 70s, and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) from the 80s until 2018. Throughout these multiple modes of political

[3] In Jigjiga, the capital of the Somali Region, a riot took place on the day of the transfer which left 25 dead. Various Somali liberation movements existing under Haile Selassie's monarchical regime, Mengistu's military dictatorship, or the most recent EPRDF era- all refer to this transfer of Somali territories under Ethiopian rule as a reference point for their call for self-determination.

organisation, the Somali in Ethiopia is seen to navigate along the lines of 'integration, independence, and irredentism' (Hagmann and Khalif, 2008, p.38).

Throughout this period of political mobilisation, the demands of the Somalis living on the margins of mainstream culture and politics were met with force and confronted with the limited options of 'quietism, partial assimilation through the few inadequate available channels, or revolt' (Clapham, 1975, p.81). Yet, Somali nationalist discourse continued to take shape in diverging forms adapting to the prevailing sociohistorical and political environment at any given time. This thesis posits that Somali nationalist discourse as an expression of resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism, can be best accessed by critically examining its discursive manifestation through the concept of 'context' emphasised by DHA.

Oral traditions are an integral part of the pastoral Somali lifestyle, and the strong adherence to this tradition over centuries has been able to reserve knowledge and information regarding past events such as conflicts, clan relations, genealogical lineages etc. Since the Somali language was scripted as recently as 1972, all written history available on Somalis has been constructed through oral data (Hjort in Abokor, 1986, p.i). As such, oral data and literature is indispensable for research concerning Somali societies, it is described as 'an essential reference material for the researcher. A research work lacking this vast oral data would certainly be incomplete' not least due to 'its important historico-cultural values' (Abokor, 1986, p.vi). There are particular discourses distinct to Somali Oral culture. Such discourses include war songs, folktales, and oral poetry distinct to the social, economic and political context of the Somali territories, particularly the way of life of pastoral nomadism where oral culture is most revered. Poetry, as with other forms of discourses hardly represents the private views of the Somali author, but often 'the collective tongue of a pressure group' more effective than any other form of communication (Lewis, 2002, p.5). This is why Somali nationalism was fostered through the wide appeal of Somali poetry, and its strong emotional component and ability to excite (Drysdale, 1964, p.15). The focus on orality in this thesis allows for a multifaceted access into the themes and ideologies underlying Somali nationalist discourses meanwhile introducing new empirical datasets for the study of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.

1.2. Research Problem

This thesis is centred around investigating a set of research problems that are both conceptual and empirical in nature. The first problem relates to the traditional exclusion of the lowland peripheries in Ethiopian studies and its centre-biased approach to the study of Ethiopia's diverse histories, politics and societies. Secondly, it is concerned with problematising an 'Ethiopian' national identity as constructed by Ethiopian nationalism by casting by underlining contested nationalisms in Ethiopia. Lastly, this study is concerned with the problematic conflation between 'Greater Somalia' and Somali nationalism in Ethiopia which paves way for conceptual questions on Somali identity and the dilemmas around the postcolonial African state.

Centre Bias

The lowland peripheries are described as 'a world little known to outsiders even in Ethiopia and, for that reason, neglected and unappreciated' (Markakis, 2011, p.17). One of the most significant limitations of the literature on Ethiopia is that it is centre-biased and does not adequately engage with the political relationship between centre and periphery. It also treats Ethiopia's eastern region as a homogenous entity, emphasising the conflict vs resistance dichotomy associated with the contestation between being incorporated into the modern Ethiopian state on the one hand, and the acts of resisting this process on the other hand (Matshanda, 2015, p.10-11). Yet the course of expansion, incorporation and resistance has not been a linear process, and experiences have varied drastically in accordance with a series of socio-political and historical elements governing state interaction with different communities. Lack of research and data on the Somali Region is also in part due to recurring insecurity, its remote position, and the Ethiopian state's systematic efforts at preventing independent data collection and dissemination particularly during periods of political and humanitarian crisis (Hagmann and Korf, 2012, p.211)

This thesis is grounded within a body of literature concerned with the study of the peripheries, specifically in relation to the problem described as 'the national question' in Ethiopia. At the height of the 1960s and 70s Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), Walleligne Mekonnen's *'On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia'* (1969) brought the dilemma associated with the rights of nations and nationalities to the national stage. It articulated the national aspirations of non-Abyssinian nations,

declaring their quest for self-determination and claims of a distinct nationhood as legitimate. Since this article, the question of the rights of nations has been at the centre of political debates in Ethiopia, culminating in the introduction of a multi-national federal system by EPRDF in 1991. This thesis makes an intervention on the persistent problem of contested nationalisms and sovereignties in Ethiopia, and the dominance of the variation of state nationalism critiqued by Walleligne Mekonnen (1969). The thesis elucidates the repressive disposition of Ethiopian state nationalism in terms of its incompatibility with diverse modes of identification, and the imperative to resist this by marginal societies.

'National identity' in Ethiopia

In Ethiopian studies, it is generally considered that successive Ethiopian emperors succeeded in creating a multi-ethnic nation state underpinned by a national identity accepted by its multi-ethnic population, and that it was only after the fall of the empire in 1974 that the state was confronted by growing calls for self-determination by various ethnic groups (Keller, 1995, p.622)[4]. This orthodoxy in Ethiopian studies has been challenged via numerous scholarly contributions highlighting the experiences that diverse nations and peoples have had with statehood across time, this includes Donham and James's (2002) social anthropological intervention and the scholarship of John Markakis. Scholarship critical of the centre-biased literature posit that in Ethiopia, national integration achieved via the assimilation of non-Amhara peoples by the ruling Abyssinian class is an underlying feature of Ethiopian state nationalism; it is considered that 'Ethiopian nationalism is actually Amhara nationalism' (Touval, 1963, p.137). Contrary to newly independent African states where state nationalism does not exclusively reflect the identity of a single ethnic group, a policy of assimilation has amharanized Ethiopian nationalism (Touval, 1963, p.137). This is the point of departure in this thesis; problematising Ethiopian state nationalism, its construction of nationhood, and how Somali nationalism resists this form of state nationalism.

[4] The rise of secessionist movements since the fall of the empire in 1974 refers to the heightened political consciousness of ethnic groups that the Amhara expanded into. The late politicisation of their ethnic consciousness and political critique of their position vis a vis the Amhara is related to the very process of incorporation which saw these groups (i.e. highland Oromos and Gurage) marry from the Amhara. Distant peripheries, including the lowland pastoral societies (i.e. Somalis) political and ethnic consciousness has been more developed due to their lack of incorporation into Abyssinian society (Donham, 2002, p.34-35).

Conflation between 'Greater Somalia' and Somali nationalism in Ethiopia

Another key problem which motivates the subject of this thesis relates to the literature on the historiography of Somali nationalism, and the Somali experience more broadly in terms of their economic, socio-political and historic positioning often presented as derivative (Clapham, 2002, p.42).[5] In addition to this, Somali nationalism is treated as a threat against Ethiopia's national character (i.e. anti-unity, secessionist etc.) and an imported concept merely serving the territorial aspirations of the Somali Republic. The argument that Somali history/nationalism is derivative is a pattern found within the centre-bias literature which groups together Oromo history, Somali history and other peripheral peoples arguing that they are rival histories. This thesis challenges this canon by re-articulating Somali experience with Ethiopian statehood through an interpretive and critical inquiry. It further challenges the notion that Somali nationalism in Ethiopia is an imported idea from neighbouring Somali Republic by recasting focus on how Pan-Somali nationalism bourgeoned in the 1940s in Ethiopia (Crummey, 2003, p.124), and the role of indigenous self-determination movements which are regularly unaccounted for when tracing the formation of Somali nationalist thought in Ethiopia and across multiple frontiers in the Horn of Africa. Further, the two nationalisms are often conflated as a means to undermine local claims against the backdrop of another state (i.e. Somalia) claiming the same territory. Haile (1986) for instance states that 'several attempts have been made, including outright aggression, to wrest this region from Ethiopia' (p.469). Critique of Somali irredentism in the context of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia, supresses the political self-definitions of Somalis in Ethiopia the agency which have been articulated by political movements throughout key historical periods. This thesis posits that it is in the discursive realm that we can best access a uniquely Somali-self-expression of nationhood based on their individual[6] experiences with the Ethiopian state.'

Moreover, scholarship on Ethiopia's peripheries focus on unequal centre-periphery relations in terms of their lack of incorporation or integration based on structural elements relating to distributions of power and authority. Such studies have been unable to account for the perspectives towards state nationalism emerging from the peripheries and the nuanced ways that they take shape and acquire meaning and value. In terms of the Ogaden, questions of power, inclusion and national belonging take

[5] This concerns Clapham's (2002) framing of emerging fields of Somali Oromo and Eritrean Studies.

[6] As ethnic Somalis inhabit ta number of states neighbouring Ethiopia such as the Somali Republic, Kenya and Djibouti, 'individual' here refers to the unique experience of Somalis within the recognised borders of Ethiopia, rather than the generic Somali experience with the state of Ethiopia.

shape in the discursive realm, likewise resistance and alternative knowledge systems are fostered through Somali oral traditions. As postcolonial scholars argue, anti-colonial nationalisms establish their own sense of sovereignty in the cultural domain prior to expressions of political confrontation (Chatterjee, 1991, p.524). Building upon this approach to the study of anti-colonial nationalisms, I argue that the Ethiopian state has been unable to extend its authority over the Ogaden as Somali resistance discourses articulate their own sense of sovereignty drawing on particular cultural and symbolic repertoires. They constitute a de-legitimation against the aspirations of Ethiopian state nationalism, and discontinuity of the Ethiopian nationalist project.

Using historical sources, oral data and discursive analysis, this thesis foregrounds new approaches to examining the complex production of Somali nationalist resistance in Ethiopia, while Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) deciphers the underlying meanings associated both with dominant state nationalism and Somali nationalism based on experiences from the margins of society. Contesting nationalist aspirations between Ethiopian nationalism and Somali nationalism have been widely documented, they are inherently at odds with one another as Ethiopia lays claim to Somali territory, while Somali nationalism emphasises Somali sovereignty.[7] This thesis asks how Somali nationalism discursively articulates Somali sovereignty, focusing on the significance of history, and cultural resources including past symbols and myths to legitimate present claims and shape alternative futures. It offers new empirical understandings to the study of contested nationalisms in Ethiopia, and the problems underpinning the dominance and persistence of Ethiopian state nationalism.

1.3. Conceptualising the Somali periphery and problematizing the 'nation'

In the Ethiopian context, periphery equates to marginality in terms of a lack of integration into various structures of the state, meanwhile the centre-periphery dichotomy denotes an uneven distribution of political power. Importantly, peripheral peoples are also demarcated by 'their degree of association with the legitimizing myths of nationhood' (Clapham, 2002, p.11). This is of key importance to the inquiry of this thesis which is concerned with Somali challenges posed against the legitimizing myths

[7] Somali sovereignty here extends beyond emphasis on territoriality; instead sovereignty in the context of this research entails sovereignty over history, symbols, memories and culture which are continually repressed by dominant state nationalism.

of nationhood promoted and institutionalised by Ethiopian state nationalism, including how they are experienced in the margins and subsequently resisted.

One of the most useful approaches to the study of peripheries in Ethiopia is the 'Negotiating Statehood' approach developed by Tobias Hagmann and Didier Pèclard (2011) signalling a departure away from treating state formation as a linear process in postcolonial Africa. This interpretive analytical framework serves to better understand how actors at different levels of society construct and re-construct the state 'through processes of negotiation, contestation and bricolage;' it is concerned with how state domination is manifested, where this takes shape (i.e. 'negotiation arenas'), and what the main objectives at stake in these negotiations are (p.5). The negotiating statehood framework emphasises the role of actors, resources and repertoires in the process of negotiating and contesting statehood in contemporary Africa. Actors draw upon symbolic repertoires to further their political agendas, to appeal for support, and to give meaning and attach significance to their actions. This is done by drawing upon existing, 'and by (re)-inventing, repertoires that legitimize their exercise of or their quest for political authority' (p.8-9). Key repertoires widely mobilised in the African context include discourses and references to nationalism, human rights, religious and cultural identities etc. to resist existing relations of power (p.9). However, the framework overemphasises the degree to which peripheral elites engage in co-constructing the state through negotiation and contestation, because as Markakis (2011) states, 'the elite in the centre make decisions; the elite in the periphery implement them' (p.8). While this does not render peripheral peoples as passive recipients of dominant forms of state nationalism, it points to the power disparity between dominant modes of identification and contesting nationalisms in the margins.

Nevertheless, the approach provides important analytical tools as it identifies objects of negotiation including 'memory, identity, and the politics of belonging' which speaks to processes of inclusion and exclusion such as questions of who belongs to the nation and who does not (Hagmann and Pèclard, 2011, p.15). Drawing selectively on this approach, my analysis focuses on the symbolic repertoires used to sustain Somali nationalist discourses, I highlight the production of alternative knowledge-regimes disrupting the myth of the unity of the Ethiopian state through the articulations of alternative territorialities. Adopting the view that nationalism(s) are culturally and symbolically constituted in the discursive realm, this thesis posits that Somalis in Ethiopia have exploited the cultural domain as a means to exert their sovereignty. This corresponds with the postcolonial focus on the cultural domain

as a means for marginalised peoples to exert their sovereignty which this thesis adopts. At the centre of this research project, is the problematisation that must be made concerning the idea of an 'Ethiopian nation', that is, 'the language of those who write of it and the lives of those who live it' (Bhabha, 1994, p.306). This captures the unequal relations between those who discursively construct the very idea of the nation- placing limits on what constitutes as legitimate discourse about the nation, and the lives of those who are subjected to experiencing its violent manifestations in the context of Ethiopia. Analyses of statist discourses examined in Chapter 4 allow us to interrogate the language of those who write of the nation, while Somali resistance discourses explored in the latter half of the thesis provide a novel insight into the experiences and lives of those who live it. This marks an important contribution to undertasndings of processes of state-formation and international relations literature more broadly.

1.4. Research questions

To garner an in-depth understanding of the structure of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia, I engage with postcolonial concepts of sovereignty, representation, and ethnosymbolist emphasis on cultural and symbolic resources used to construct the nation in Somali nationalist discourses.[8] The thesis is structured around addressing the problem of how Ethiopian state nationalism is experienced in the lowland peripheries, in doing so it addresses a core question: How do Somali nationalist discourses resist the repressive function of Ethiopian state nationalism? To address this broad question, I investigate how Somali sovereignty is conceptualised by Somali nationalism vis a vis the Ethiopian state, how symbolic resources are adapted from Somali cultural reserves to legitimise political and territorial claims, and how Somali resistance transforms the entrenched hegemony of pan-Ethiopian nationalism. This investigation prompts a reconsideration of the merits of dissenting nationalisms in Ethiopia in the way that Somali discourses re-define relations of domination between centre and periphery. Moreover, the central research question is also guided by an effort to examine the ways that state nationalism subsumes diverse nationalisms through assimilation policies, to de-mystify how Ethiopian state nationalism constructs and conveys territorial claims over the Somali Region, how

[8] I employ the term Somali nationalism to refer to the expressions of Somali resistance articulated by Somali minorities within the context of Ethiopia, as opposed to the mobilisation of Somali nationalism in the Somali Republic. Though there have been periods in history where the two have converged in pursuit of a wider Pan-Somali agenda, the geographic focus of this thesis is the Somali Region in Ethiopia.

truth-claims concerning territoriality and identity are constructed and contested in the discursive realm, and importantly, how Ethiopian state nationalism itself can be re-defined through the prism of its marginalised subjects. In addition to the central focus of the thesis, the thesis offers new conceptual readings on the implications of Somali nationalism for the postcolonial territorial status quo in Africa, and for broader Pan-African ideals.

To address these questions, this dissertation employs an interpretive and critical methodology combining qualitative data with historical archival sources. Such an approach allows for an in-depth understanding of the Somali experiences of statehood, and its implications for notions of territoriality and national belonging. Critical discourse studies emphasise the importance of locating discourse within its socio-cultural, political and historic specificity placing discourse in its meaningful context. To understand the meanings that Somalis associate with Ethiopian state nationalism and their experiences of statehood in the periphery, using Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the thesis focuses on historical trajectories which gave rise to new articulations of Somali nationalist resistance thereby defining and re-defining relations with the state. Two historical events which followed Ethiopia's two revolutions gave rise to new articulations of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia triggering public debate on contested histories, territorialities and identities. I examine these two events closely; the 1977 Ogaden War shortly after the fall of the imperial government, and the fall of the Derg regime in 1991 marking the start of the EPRDF era. Chapter 5 focuses on Somali nationalist mobilisation surrounding the 1977 Ogaden war addressing questions on territoriality and implications for African nationalism, while chapter 6 focuses on ONLF's mobilisation for a protracted insurgency during the era of the EPRDF. Such an approach allows for a novel interrogation of the way that symbolic and cultural resources are used as legitimising tools to exert sovereignty and authenticate nationalist claims, being able to theorise about their persistence and longevity, how we account for their appeal, and the varying ways that they compete for dominance against Ethiopian nationalism.

This approach is determined by the main aims of the research which are to:

- Contribute to the literature on post-colonial statehood in Africa and dissenting nationalisms in Ethiopia.
- To provide a detailed examination on the underlying structure of Somali nationalism against the backdrop of dominant state nationalism.

To achieve these aims, the following objectives shape the course of this research:

- De-mystify the underlying hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism,
- Redress the exclusion of the lowland peripheries in Ethiopian studies,
- Contribute to postcolonial understandings of the idea of 'nation' as an exclusive and oppressive space,
- Highlight indigenous Somali experiences with state practices
- Underscore the role of Somali oral traditions in transforming and de-legitimising dominant systems of nationalist thought which structure and reproduce colonial forms of knowledge and representation concerning peripheral peoples.

Studying the articulation of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia contributes to understandings of how its emergence was integral to the wider development of Somali nationalism across the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. It further demonstrates how present-day Somali Region provided the language and underlying knowledge for articulating and imagining a sovereign Somali nation. This is an epistemic project which casts the development of a Somali national consciousness in a new light, understanding how it is constructed against the hegemonic presence of Ethiopian state nationalism. To frame the research problem that the thesis is centred around, the following sections offer a background on the emergence and domination of the discourse of Ethiopian state nationalism and its underpinning historiography and symbolism.

1.5. Constructing Ethiopian state nationalism: Key tropes, historiography, and the African nationalist imagination

This section discusses key approaches and dominant themes within Ethiopian historiography, focusing on how scholarship in Ethiopian studies have reproduced these themes via common tropes and symbols, emphasizing its exclusivity and upholding its supporting ideologies to sustain the legitimacy of Ethiopian state nationalism. It elaborates the seminal place of state-sponsored Ethiopian historiography in imaginations around postcolonial African identity and its underlying assumptions of uncontested homogeneity which leaves power relations unproblematic. First, the name Ethiopia refers to the empire created in the second half of the nineteenth century through violent expansions. In

contrast, Abyssinia refers to the name of the ancient homeland of Orthodox Christians living in the highland kingdoms in Northeast Africa (Pankhurst, 2001, p.6-8). The modern imagination of Ethiopia as a unique (African) exception has been disseminated by several driving forces- namely the heads of states, monarchs, royal scribes and elite highlanders, which were in turn adopted by the Western world. This was subsequently cemented in the global consciousness during the reign of Haile Selassie as he institutionalized and monopolized Ethiopia's mythology. It was at the height of his power after 1941 that the 'Great Tradition' became both a hegemonic and stable mode of discourse in Ethiopian studies (Marzagora, 2017, p.431). This period was marked by a centralization of the political landscape and 'rigidification of both political thought and historiographical practice', it resulted in the institutionalization of the 'Great Tradition' through educational infrastructures and cultural and linguistic assimilation policies i.e. 'Amharinization' (Marzagora, 2017, p.431-432).

Scholarly representations of Ethiopia were heavily influenced by early travel writers, missionaries and other visitors who upon their arrival were both in awe of an 'ancient Christian civilization' amidst 'Muslim and pagan tribes' and blinded by the high civilization and culture of the imperial centre (Tronvoll, 2009, p.24-25). Scholarship on the Ethiopian past thus largely follows a consistent historiographical paradigm that has proven to withstand both scholarly challenges as well as political and cultural transformations throughout the twentieth century in Ethiopia. Standard Ethiopian historiography, the 'Great Tradition, 'Ethiopianist tradition', the traditional school of thought on the Horn of Africa or the 'Greater Ethiopia' thesis [9] (Tronvoll, 2009, p.25) as it is often called has a distinct set of narrative traditions[10]. First it begins with the ancient Axumite state before Christ followed by the Christianization of the kingdom in the fourth century AD. Following this, highlights include the Solomonic 'restoration', the *Jihad* of Ahmed 'Gragn', the Oromo 'tide' flowing up from the South, a period of extensive decline during the 'Era of the Princes', the rise of Tewodros, Yohannes and Menelik II who confronted foreign invaders marked by the triumph at Adwa, extending the boundaries of the state to incorporate neighbouring peoples, the course of modernization and the bureaucratization of the state, the rise of Haile Selassie followed by the Italian fascist invasion in 1935 and the 1974 revolution which marked the end of the feudal monarchy (Clapham, 2002; Tronvoll,

[9] The centrality afforded to the Ethiopian state in 'the traditional school of thought on the Horn of Africa' suggests the extent to which the 'Greater Ethiopia thesis' subsumes and lays claim to the majority of the Horn. For examples of this see Mesfin (1964). See Crummey (2002), Yusuf (2009), Marzagora (2017) for discussions on this.

[10] From this point forward, the 'Great Tradition' and 'dominant Ethiopian historiography' will be used interchangeably

2009).[11] This inherited and exclusive version of the past is based on the history of central and northern highlanders which is set to serve a historical- political project whilst obscuring elements of the Ethiopian past which may not serve this political project. More than merely capturing the history of the state- a continuous political entity which stretches over two thousand years- conventional Ethiopian historiography is also the history of a 'Great Tradition' on a par with ancient civilizations such as Persia (Clapham, 2002, p.37-39).[12] Dominant Ethiopian historiography establishes a two thousand year monarchical epic narrated in essentialist terms and inherently uncontestable, it is 'divinely-ordained… in a static and stable identity' both moulded and preserved by the monarchy (Marzagora, 2017, p.428-429).

Literature produced on the Ethiopian state by scholars such as Markakis (1974), Tronvoll (2009), Clapham (1969, 1988) and Zewde (1991) embody a cautious departure from the 'Great Tradition' but remain far from the type of forceful critiques offered by critical scholars which I describe in subsequent sections. Nonetheless, the sheer force of the 'Great Tradition' is perhaps best exemplified by its ability to permeate even the consciously 'balanced' accounts of Ethiopian history; Bahru Zewde's *A History of Modern Ethiopia* (2001) begins by situating Ethiopia within a mystical prehistoric period drawing on the Hadar hominid, the Omo Valley in the south-east, cave paintings and the Neolithic sites of Malka Qunture as is the standard trope in Ethiopian historiography. Not unlike other scholars who have played a key role in reproducing the history of the 'Great Tradition' however, Yusuf (2009) describes how Zewde continues onto describe the political conquests of various Abyssinian monarchs as merely 'pushing', 'expanding' or 'extending' (p.60, p.270) the boundaries of the empire as there was 'an expansive potentiality for Ethiopia' (p.113). He further describes the violent incorporation of southern nations into the Ethiopian empire as 'unification' (p.16). On the other hand, terms such as 'occupation' and 'aggression' are used when a foreign country had taken control of regions now considered 'Ethiopian' indeed Menelik II is described as having simply 'extended' his authority following the Egyptian occupation of Harar (p.20, 63).[13] Moreover, in *A Century of Ethiopian Historiography*, Zewde (2000) notes that despite Menelik's campaigns of territorial expansion being marked by violence and economic exploitation of southern peoples, 'the emperor on the whole

[11] For a detailed description on the chronology of the 'Great tradition' by Ethiopianists see Marcus (1994), Levine (1974), Pankhurst (1998), Ullendorff (1973).
[12] The Great Tradition itself faces tensions over the Eurocentric association of Aksum with Semitic and southern Arabian influences; See Kebede (2003) '*Eurocentrism and Ethiopian Historiography: Deconstructing Semitization.*'
[13] For a detailed discussion on this, see Yusuf (2009) *'The politics of historying: a postmodern commentary on Bahru Zewde's History of Modern Ethiopia.'*

exercised a benevolent influence when it came to matters of the intellect and of opening the country to new ideas' (p.4). It is in the same vein that the imperial state consolidation of Tewodros' reign is considered 'extraordinary' as it established processes of development in the Horn that was in stark contrast to other parts of Africa (Clapham, 2002, p.53).

In *Greater Ethiopia* (1974), Donald Levine embraces the hegemony of the 'Great Tradition;' he privileges the politically elite Amhara as representatives of Ethiopia by narrating the history of the highlands as the history of Ethiopia. Levine (1974) similarly describes political conquests as 'expansions'; he holds that 'traumatic though they were for most of the peoples subjugated, these conquests have been judged as beneficial in many respects' (p.26). Conversely, the 16th century Oromo expansion into present day Oromia is presented within the 'Great Tradition' by Ethiopian and European writers alike; as a 'purposeless flow of rivers' (Hussein, 2006, p.262). The significance of the role of 'truths' and 'falsehoods' in the historical discourses of the 'Great Tradition' cannot be overstated, Yusuf (2009) sums it up in the following way: 'colonization' is distinguished from 'expansion'; 'independence' and 'liberation' from secession'; 'massacre' from 'defense'… discourse creates what it speaks about: 'heroes' and 'heroines', the 'aggressors' and the 'aggressed upon' (p.382). The era of Haile Selassie is a particularly interesting period in this regard, the negotiation between victimization and aggression was at its height after World War II, in his speech to the 1949 General Assembly he stated that 'these provinces formed an integral part of Ethiopia but were torn away from her by force of *aggression*' referring to 'lost provinces' (Quoted in Mariam 1964, p.209, emphasis mine). While the theme of 'restoration' and of 'lost provinces' is central to the 'Great Tradition', Levine (1974) takes this a step further by arguing that the mere symbolism of the governing elite, from earliest times, as having the ability to mobilize diverse ethnic and religious groups on behalf of their 'national homeland.' It is worth noting that drawing on historic examples such as King Kaleb's sixth century expedition to Southwest Arabia and the mobilization of forces for expansion under the Solomonid emperors (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), and against the Turks in the following century (2011, p.315) is part of the narratives of the 'Great Tradition' which emphasizes the image of Ethiopia as an 'inclusive polity.'

Ethiopian state-authored/authorized history demonstrates the relationship between knowledge and truth production and how this manifest itself in the exercise of power Toggia (2008, p. 320). Importantly, state history also enabled 'a mutual accommodation between theological institutions and

political ruling groups' as royal scribes were often also clerics of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (2008, p. 320). Much of Ethiopian history was written by 'Abyssinian chroniclers' the majority of whom were court historians and were in a prime position to circulate particular narratives supporting the ruling group at the expense of suppressed nations who featured as negative constructions. In contrast to oral societies such as Somalis, Abyssinians' possession of a written script played a leading role in sanctioning state historiography as authoritative and legitimate. This thesis stems from the need to deconstruct this hierarchy between orality and the written script which has left Somali discourses to be accessed only through the dominant state narrative upheld by the power relations of successive ruling groups. Kebede (2003) argues that among the symbolic features which distinguish Ethiopia from the rest of the Horn of Africa is the possession of a written script, Christianity and state formation which cemented its unique position in Africa from the perspective of foreign visitors (Kebede, 2003). This was reinforced by the 'historiographical manipulation' of the 'Great Tradition' largely under Haile Selassie by actively controlling the way Ethiopian history was presented both in Ethiopia and abroad and destroying works on alternative versions of the past. His relationship with Westerners both domestic and abroad was 'personalized and monopolized' according to Marzagora (2017) enabling him to actively control their understandings of Ethiopian history (p.431), this marked a serious phase in the institutionalization of the 'Great Tradition' as a dominant historiographical paradigm both in Ethiopia and abroad. This powerful historiographical tradition is held together by pan-Ethiopian symbols which transcend the Ethiopian state occupying a central position in the global African imagination.

1.5.1 'Greater Ethiopia' in the African Postcolonial Imagination

According to Sorenson (1993), in part due to an extensive and highly regarded scholarly tradition in Ethiopian studies, there remains a significant degree of emotional investment in support of the image of a unified 'Greater Ethiopia' even especially amongst Africans and African- Americans (p.19). To people of African descent globally, over the years Ethiopia became a synonym for independence and 'Ethiopianism' gained momentum as an ideology to liberate the Black race[14].. This was also exemplified by the 'Ethiopian Church' in South Africa early in the twentieth century for instance. Further, the Abyssinian Baptist church in Harlem, New York and Marcus Garvey's back to Africa movement in

[14] as prominently advanced by J.E. Casely Hayford in *Ethiopia Unbound* first written in 1911

the 1920's culminated in Rastafarianism (and subsequently flourished in the Caribbean). The theme and reference to and of Ethiopia as a 'Mother Race' as opposed to the state was also prevalent in literary work among the African diaspora. One such example includes Paul Laurence Dunbar's 'Ode to Ethiopia' addressed to the 'Mother Race' reflects on the past and present struggles of Afro-Americans and forecasts their future triumph (Moses, 1975, p.413). Thus, independent Ethiopia became the exemplar of an 'unconquered historic African people and a bastion of prestige and hope to those who were under colonial rule' (Fabre-selassie, 2005, p.131-132). The Old Testament Psalms 68:31 states that 'Princes shall come out of Egypt and Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God', this prophecy of Ethiopia is considered by many as alluding to the messianic destiny of African peoples internationally, it is also considered as a nineteenth century prefiguring of the slogan 'we shall overcome' from the 1960s civil rights movement (Logan, 1999, p.27). Even in sermons, the standard trope of salvation from black pulpits in the nineteenth century became the prophecy of Ethiopia stretching out her hands. The term 'Ethiopianism' is argued to represent a dramatization and glorification of the African past, and the mysticism surrounding it is considered to be derived from this specific occurrence in the Old Testament (Logan, 1999, p.27-28).

Ethiopia's victory against Italian colonizers at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 and the symbol of Ethiopian independence against European powers further symbolized black defeat of white dominance over people of African descent and a fulfilment of the biblical prophecy that 'Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God' (Fabre and Faith, 2000, p.168). Similarly, Ethiopian resistance against the 1935-1936 Italian fascist invasion of Ethiopia fuelled anti-colonial movements across Africa. It formed the basis for the 'Pan-African image' which is one the key images associated with Ethiopia alongside the 'romantic image', 'civilization image', 'barbarism image', the 'black colonialism' image and the 'Adwa complex' image identified by Tibebu (1996, p.424-426). On the other hand, Pan-Ethiopianism is described by Iyob (1993) as embodying an ideology of superiority - 'narrowly defined as the subjugation of all "Ethiopian" peoples to the ruling Amhara elite either by coercion and/or assimilation... A far cry from the demand for independence and self-determination of colonized Africans' as the ideology of Habesha supremacy motivated Southern conquests (p.270). The mythic imagination of Ethiopia as the 'protonation of liberated Africa' and its emergence as a symbol of African liberation and nationalism consolidated Ethiopian colonial aspirations over the Horn of Africa without any sanctions or consequences from the international community (Iyob, 1993, p.261-269). The systematized use of a 'colonial mythology' which emphasizes claims of 'grandeur, uniqueness,

sovereignty, internal unity, shared history of people's and independence' has cemented Ethiopia's position as well as image both in the international sphere and the international consciousness (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990, p.10).

According to Sorenson (1993), such images of Ethiopia and of Haile Selassie[15], have served particular political functions in terms of legitimizing the power of (and therefore the transgressions of) ruling groups, and by acting as consoling symbols for people who have suffered under colonial oppression and racism globally. Ironically, Ethiopia came to represent a glory of African history, identity and liberation while ruling groups and elites rejected this from of African identity. Meanwhile oppressed peoples within the empire consider the same symbols of African liberation and identity to be 'the condition of their own oppression and the negation of their own identities' which only adds to this paradox (Sorenson, 1993, p.5). The complicated relationship between the images associated with Ethiopia, and the paradoxical functions which they serve is one which is underpinned by centuries of image construction centring on racial pride and prestige, mythic allure, an ancient Christian character and the decisive victory against Italian colonialism at Adwa.

Moreover, the Pan-Ethiopian symbol of Haile Selassie in the 1960's as an anti-colonial crusader while he framed the Empire as a victim of Italian colonialism as opposed to a state that practices colonialism, played a key role in extending the figurative attraction to Ethiopia, particularly among the Black diaspora worldwide. This occurred amidst competing images of the Ethiopian Empire's grandeur, mysticism, progress and claims of historical unity contrasted with images of impoverishment and disaster. Both category of images are products of specific historic and political circumstances, and are used strategically in order to further specific political aims and objectives of the dominant elite at any given time (Sorenson, 1993, p.20). Yet, Pan-Ethiopianist symbolism continues to rest on the allure of the 'Great Tradition' and its underlying historiography; both are mutually reinforcing providing essential ingredients for the discourse of Ethiopian nationalism.

[15] The figure of Haile Selassie is central to both the internationalisation of Ethiopianism and the symbolic prestige that the state had acquired during his reign.

1.5.2. National epics and myth-building in the 'Great tradition'

As a hegemonic historiographical paradigm, the mythologization of the 'Great Tradition' is centred on the Kebra Nagast (the Glory of Kings), a fourteenth century national epic. According to the epic, the Ark of the Covenant was relocated from Jerusalem to Askum where the Son of Solomon (the standard-bearer of the new covenant with God) and Sheba found a new 'Solomonic' dynasty, essentially it marked 'an ideology of chosenness' and served the basis of the inherently hierarchical distinction between Christian cores and their non-Christian peripheries (Marzagora 2017, p.428). It is why the Ethiopian state after 1855 (during the height of its expansion) is considered a form of restoration of an ancient empire- akin to the 'Solomonic restoration' of the thirteenth century which marked a continuity of this sense of 'chosenness' (Clapham, 2002, p.53). Moreover, the epic insists 'on the primacy of Ethiopia as God's favored among the nations', it is referred to as a sovereign, inclusive polity in possession of a special mission, without any mention of the various and well-documented ethnic divides within historic Ethiopia. Although various provinces within the country are mentioned, they are merely named as geographical markers (Levine, 2011, p.314). Their unification under the centralized state is exemplified in passages such as the following: 'all the provinces of Ethiopia rejoiced, for Zion sent forth a light like that of the sun into the darkness wheresoever she came' (Budge, 1922, p. 84). Thus, for Kebede (2003), the Kebra Nagast is 'the speaker of Ethiopia's self-proclaimed identity and mission' (p.3).

Alongside the Kebra Nagast, drawing on ancient Aksumite inscriptions as the foundations of the 'Great Tradition' is a dominant paradigm among Ethiopianists, for instance Mariam (1964) argues that since an Askumite inscription reveals that the peoples of the Land of Incense (Somalia) were ruled over by the King of Askum (Budge, 1928, p.242), present day Somali Region in Ethiopia (including Somalia) have always constituted part of 'Greater Ethiopia'. Whilst the debate on whether such inscriptions ever existed is beyond the scope of this thesis, Mariam's argument depicts the centrality afforded to the politically endorsed highland narratives of the past. Indeed, it is the hegemony and allure of such ancient inscriptions which lead Burton (1894) to assert that the Somalis are 'nothing but a slice of the great Galla nation Islamized and Semeticized by repeated immigration from Arabia' (p.72). On a very similar note, Pankhurst (1998, 2001) in *The Ethiopians: A History* uses the 'Land of Punt' and 'Ethiopia' interchangeably in describing the commercial and trade relations that the Pharaohs of Egypt had with the Land of Punt although its location was in the coastal areas of modern-day Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Northeast Ethiopia (Meeks, 2016).

The centrality of the highland elite in Ethiopian history has also perpetuated a distinct historical space of the contemporary state where the borders were 'projected backwards into a distinct historical period' (Sorenson, 1993, p.19). Such constructions according to Reid (2006), 'reflects current exigencies of remarkable continuity and consistency, and serves to underpin current regimes of truth, 'rectifying' past aberrations, and upholding perceived historical identities' (p. 102). Relatedly, a key feature of the 'Great Tradition' is the ahistorical use of the term 'Ethiopia' to describe the modern-nation state and the previous Abyssinian Empire (Marzagora, 2017 p.431). Yusuf (2009) notes that Ethiopia's permanence in name is not reflected in its territory[16], though it has been 'expanding' for centuries; the name 'Ethiopia' has persisted and the newly acquired territories immediately subsumed into the narrative of 'Greater Ethiopia', emphasis is placed on the longevity and antiquity of the Ethiopian state to the extent that it is irrelevant whether or not the people perceived themselves to be part of it (p.382). As suggested, the traditional historiography of Ethiopia is premised on the continuity between the pre-Askumite period,[17]Ancient Askum Kingdom and present-day Ethiopia which distinctly recounts the history of the politically and culturally dominant highlanders.

Mainstream Ethiopian historiography, argues Toggia (2008), reserves a privileged site as an incontestable domain of knowledge, charged with truth and legitimacy. This form of history writing is considered as a source of totalized knowledge and is used as an ideological project to legitimize state power; (the dissemination of selective past knowledge was systematized particularly under Haile Selassie) (p.319).[18] Considering that Ethiopian state nationalism is underpinned by these aforementioned knowledge systems, dissenting nationalisms in Ethiopia are engaged in a constant process of de-mystification and truth-making against the backdrop of state-sponsored discourses. As the chapters in this dissertation will demonstrate, Somali nationalist literature aims to subvert the legitimacy ascribed to state power and its underlying nationalism based on competing cultural values and symbols from which they derive their own sense of 'truth.' Moreover, the totalizing narrative of Ethiopian history has continuously reflected the history of dominant groups thus rendering Ethiopian history writing a state project reflecting a reductionist history (Toggia, 2008, p.319). As outlined, state

[16] Since the state occupies a privileged position in Ethiopian history, it is constructed as a 'transhistorical and epistemological entity', Toggia (2008) notes that this form of history writing privileges concepts such as menegest 'state' and be'herawi gizat 'national territory', they are treated 'as static and frozen in time; and therefore, as paradoxical as it may sound, as suprahistorical concepts' (p. 320-32).
[17] See the works of senior Ethiopianists such as Harold Marcus in 'A History of Ethiopia' (1994).
[18] This was later challenged to some extent following the 1974 revolution by Marxist Leninist ideology.

historiography is charged with the legitimacy granted by cultural tools such as the epic of Kebra Negast, however, such cultural symbols reflect the histories and identities of particular members of Ethiopian society.

1.5.3. Ethnic dominance

As discussed, Ethiopian historiography has traditionally privileged the study of Christian central and northern highlanders; namely the Amhara who are considered to be descendants of the Kingdoms of Da'amat (ca.700-400BC) and Axum (ca.100-800 AD) (Marcus, 1994) to the extent that this core group came to constitute the essence of Ethiopianness. They are described as the core group in historic Abyssinia; 'a hierarchical society, Semitic in speech and Christian in religion' (Crummey, 1998, P.14) who considered themselves as the 'God-chosen' people and the 'original' settlers who possessed a special mission (Triulzi, 1994, p.236).[19] Moreover, Keller (1998) notes that the Ethiopian state was not only a reflection of the elite, but that it was dominated by the 'ethnic hegemony of Shawan Amhara and other ethnic elites who had been assimilated into Ethiopian culture'[20] (p.111). Throughout history, a Habesha Politico-cultural conception has dominated the Ethiopian state. They are elite Orthodox Christians, central and northern highlanders, and a defining feature of this group is that at any given time in history, they have controlled how the state should be organized; 'monarchy, republic or federation' (Tronvoll, 2009, p.26).

Whilst the role of the Amhara in sustaining the' Great Tradition' may be considered from a number of perspectives such as the role of political or economic aspirations; this section will consider the racial dimension and modes of differentiation employed by the Amhara elite in nurturing the narratives of the 'Great Tradition' first from the perspective of racial pride as the emphasis on their Semitic origins and Christianity has sustained racial and cultural distinctions within the Empire, followed by their promotion of a pan-Ethiopian symbolism. Despite the decisive role played by European powers in the creation and maintenance of the Ethiopian Empire as discussed earlier[21], the will of the ruling classes in manifesting their own power in this case despite their relatively subordinate positions in

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[19] Triulzi (1994) elaborates on the work of Berhanou (1971) who cites two special missions which the highlanders believed to have been entrusted with: first the mission to 'colonize' and 'uproot' *(aqanna)* the country, and to 'fertilize' it (*alamma*) (p.35).
[20] Note that Ethiopian culture and Amhara culture are used interchangeably which is a testament to its hegemony
[21] See the 'dependent colonial' thesis in (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990).

relation to Western colonial powers suggests that they also play an equally decisive role in extending their own truths and can therefore not be considered passive participants from an analytical point of view (Sorenson, 1993, p.1-19).

The language of the 1931 Ethiopian constitution alludes to a system of categorizing citizens either as 'citizens of Ethiopia or subjects of the Empire' which has entrenched the 'citizens vs. subject dichotomy,' it privileges the dominant Amhara or to an extent Tigrean ruling classes also known as the 'Habesha' category. Habesha identity marks a distinctly separate, non-black identity defined by Semitism and descendancy from the Israeli King Solomon (Hussein and Ademo, 2016, p.25-26). Levine (1965) observes a unique system of social organizing among the Amhara, the dichotomies of superior-inferior characterize all elements of life such that a person is characterized on the basis of whether he is 'male or female, elder or youth, Amhara or non-Amhara, Christian or non-Christian, free or slave, and well-born or poor. Each of these dichotomies fall into a superior-inferior pattern' (p.257), the hierarchical ordering of social relationships is described as *Balayina Batach* in Amharic.[22] It is why 'Amhara' defines a superior socio-cultural or socio-political category rather than serving as an ethnic marker (Shack, 1976, p.169) and alludes to a very specific position of dominance in the core-periphery structure of the Ethiopian state (Donham, 2002, p, 12).

Throughout history, Ethiopia has not been characterized among other African states; rather, they have been placed in somewhat of an intermediate position somewhere between being White and Black. Such racial classifications have been reproduced by the West as much as they have been advanced by the ruling elite (i.e. the Amhara) who consider themselves superior to, and closer to whiteness compared to people of the South. The ruling elite were as much motivated in the expansion of their Empire into the South by a civilizing mission as white colonists believed they were bringing civilization to barbarians (Sorenson, 1993, p.12, Baxter 1983, Triulzi 1983). Whilst on the one hand Emperors such as Menelik and Haile Selassie promoted an image of Ethiopia representing grandeur and African liberty, paradoxically, they also reinforced the idea that 'Ethiopians were neither Africans nor blacks,' elites instead emphasized their links to ancient Israel as in the Solomon and Sheba legend. Such identity claims formed the basis of Amhara superiority over others in the Empire and served to justify their occupations and civilizing missions in the South (Sorenson, 1993, p.27). In *Ethiopia at Bay* (2006),

[22] See Tronvoll (2009) for an elaboration of *Balayina Batach* and its Tigrinya equivalent *'la'lowey ta'thowey meaninh 'superior-inferior'*, and how these ideas shape hierarchical relationships of Ethiopian Highlanders.

Spencer who later served as Haile Selassie's advisor recounts an infamous conversation between Menelik II and Benito Sylvian (a Haitian envoy) where Menelik II stated that he was not a negro- but a Caucasian. Similarly, Haile Selassie considered the Amhara to be a 'Hamito-Semetic' people and therefore not black (Hussein and Ademo, 2016, p.27).

Habecker (2012) argues that images of Ethiopians as being 'special blacks' or 'honorary whites' [23] suggests the fluid nature of racial identity. This is due to the idea that racial identity is more to do with the social constructions of those who possess power as opposed to any biological considerations, and is precisely why Ethiopian immigrants face challenges in positioning themselves within the racial hierarchies of western countries (p.1205). However, the non-black identity embraced by ruling groups in Ethiopia not only claimed superiority based on the amount of power they wielded in relation to colonized peoples of the South, claims of superiority were charged with the evocation of specific biological differences. Indeed, ruling groups rejected any element of a Black identity by emphasizing their links to ancient Israel according to the legend of Solomon and Sheba, and for centuries scorned black Africans using the term *'barya'* (slaves)[24] (Sorenson, 1993, p.27-29). This is in line with the 'Great Tradition' which emphasizes a connection between Ethiopia and the Semitic and Christian worlds and with the Mediterranean and the Red Sea rendering it both explicitly non-African and Anti-African (Clapham, 2002, p.48). Indeed, the construction of Habesha identity is centred on their biological differences to other black peoples of the South (and black people around the world in general), their self-image is based upon a sense of beauty that is markedly 'light-skinned, thin-nosed and wavy-haired' (Habecker, 2012, p.1214). In other words, Western standards of beauty are the defining characteristics of what Habashas consider in their self-image to be unique to them; namely that 'a Habasha identity emphasizes a non-black phenotype' (Habecker, 2012, p.1207).[25]

Whilst Habesha identity has consistently occupied a dominant position due to its rootedness in the 'Great Tradition' - certainly in comparison to Oromo and Somali identities; it has not always commanded the same degree of superiority. The manipulation of racial distinctions suggests that they occur in the operations of power rather than having any objective basis. The connection between

[23] This also served as a racist justification for the defeat of the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896
[24] See Ullendorff (1973) on 'Nilotic Tribes'- among them include the Benishangul or inhabit the area between the Blue Nile and Sudan; the name originates from 'shanqella' or 'shankilla' which is Amharic for 'negro' (p.42-43) see also Donham and James (2002, p.12).
[25] The idea of being between black and white represents the interplay between a colonial and nationalist construct, the pursuit of such colonial discourses in the Ethiopian nationalist project contributes to its hegemonic status.

concepts of race to that of power is indicated by that of competing discourses on Ethiopia, for instance in that famine (particularly the 1983-1985 famine) has historically been represented as the natural consequence of African qualities of savagery and thus a threat to Western civilization (Sorenson, 1993, p.29). Conversely, Ethiopians were distanced from blackness and afforded a proximity to whiteness following the display of their military might at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. The popular racist images used by fascist Italy in order to justify the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 further highlights the notion that racial classifications occur in the operations of power. To justify the need to civilize the only remaining independent African state, Mussolini's government selectively used images of Ethiopia as a country of barbarians who happened to be black Christians drawn upon from early European encounters with the country dating as far back as the 15th century. In doing so, all notions of uniqueness and antiquity were strategically left out, ultimately resulting in a war which violated numerous international agreements despite Ethiopia's membership of the League of Nations (Zahoric, 2008, p.92). The following sections describe why and how the hegemony of the Great Tradition and its underlying historiography is contested.

1.6. Critiquing the historiography of the 'Great Tradition'

The nationalisms of distinct nations and peoples in Ethiopia offer competing and often conflicting narratives and imaginations of 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism. At the core of these various national identities lie diverging imaginations and understandings of the past, all of whom are regarded by 'Greater Ethiopian' Nationalism as 'dissent forms of identity' and 'illegitimate secessionist movements bent on ripping apart an ancient state' (Sorenson, year, p.5).[26] This violent approach towards distinct national identities that do not identify with 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism serves to counter the challenges against the narratives of Ethiopia's past embodied within 'Greater Ethiopian' Nationalism. This dissertation focuses on how Somali peoples discursively resist 'Greater Ethiopian' Nationalism and its underlying hegemony including narratives of Ethiopia's past and exclusive cultural symbols which reinforce the marginality of peripheral peoples. This type of inquiry is grounded within existing critical scholarship on 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism.

[26] Examples of such dissenting nationalisms include Oromo, Afar, Sidama and Somali nationalisms.

Holcomb and Ibssa (1990), Sorenson (1993), Mohamed Hassen (1990), Birru (1980-1981), Iyob (1993), Jalata (1993) and Young (1997)[27] position their work in opposition to the state-centric 'Great Tradition' and the 'Greater Ethiopia' thesis endorsed by the exclusive and mythic history of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. They offer what Crummey (2001) refers to as 'anti-Ethiopianist' and 'anti-centrist' historiography (p.16). In varying degrees, they maintain that the modern Ethiopian state is a recent construction through which mythologies around its ancient attributes and mysticism around its biblical connections have been manipulated by the ruling elite to consolidate their power over occupied peoples. This was in turn incorporated within a larger western discourse around the empire (Sorenson, 1993, p.14).

The 1974 revolution saw the overthrow of the monarchy which in turn saw a gradual departure from accepting the hegemony of the 'Great Tradition,' Sorenson (1993) and Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) have offered some of the most critical expressions against the 'Great Tradition' among anti-Ethiopianist literature generally. In challenging notions of Ethiopia's grandeur, perceived uniqueness and political 'expansions' which dominate Ethiopian studies- they put forward the case of Ethiopian colonialism and the 'dependent colonial empire' thesis. In line with other critical scholarship in the field, Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) hold that the creation of Ethiopia can be traced back to the political conquests of Menelik II in the last part of the nineteenth century which saw the empire increase more than twofold in size. Abyssinian conquest of neighbouring peoples was assisted by European powers and maintained through sophisticated weaponry which facilitated the militarization of the conquered territories (p.8-10). They argue that particular historical circumstances enabled and sustained the popular notion of a unique Ethiopia both in its hegemonic ancient history and its independence which has remained an anomaly in the context of Africa; it is essentially this sense of anomaly which has fuelled the 'Great Tradition' as evidenced in the scholarship rooted within the 'Great Tradition' cited above. Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) trace these specific historic circumstances to the intense superpower rivalry between Britain, France and Italy for control over the Horn of Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century; specifically, over railway schemes such as the railway to the Red Sea and from South Africa to Cairo respectively. Whilst the British supported Emperor Yohannes IV, the French

[27] Sorenson's (1993) *Imagining Ethiopia: Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa* remains one of the most seminal works in this tradition.

Empire supplied Menelik II, King of Shoa with weaponry whose territory was strategically positioned around sources of coffee, gold, ivory etc.[28]

Moreover, Jalata (1993) holds that the nineteenth century alliance between European imperialism and Ethiopian colonialism predated Emperor Menelik II. It was around the year 1840 that European powers (namely the British and French governments) supplied Menelik's grandfather, Sahle Selassie with weapons in order to 'spread the seeds of civilization (i.e. Christianity) among the Gallas (Oromos)' (Quoted in Jalata, 1993, p.47-48). Both European merchants and missionaries actively encouraged their governments to support the Abyssinian kingdom. The term 'civilization' carried a number of meanings; on the one hand implying the spread of Christianity and bringing a sense of enlightenment to the South including the Oromo. But importantly, it echoes the very same rallying call used by European powers to justify their colonial occupation and control over colonized territories. Abyssinia at this time thus appealed to those very same sentiments whilst simultaneously highlighting their similarities with the European powers by means of their shared religion and beliefs. The question of what the appeal of Abyssinia was to the Europeans in the 19th century is explored by scholarship on both ends of the spectrum in Ethiopian studies; it is widely recognized that the existence of a recognized state system, Christianity, alongside a strong and modern army facilitated a form of diplomacy between Ethiopian rulers and European powers which 'deterred reckless European adventures into Abyssinia' whilst entrenching the authority and legitimacy of the ruling groups (Keller, 1981, p.527). On top of this, Kebede (2003) characterizes 'the Ethiopian anomaly' in terms of its unique place in black Africa, as is the norm among scholars of the 'Great Tradition', he cites the architectural remains of Aksum, the existence of a written script, state formation, Christianity and a sense of ideological solidarity as some of the unique features of Ethiopia whilst black Africa continues to be defined by characteristics such as 'stateless societies[29], absence of script, paganism, in a word, the attributes of primitiveness' (p.4). I examine the nuances of these features particularly as they manifest in Ethiopian nationalist discourses in greater detail in chapter 4.

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[28] The Italians too attempted to enter the region by supplying arms to Menelik; this was however hijacked by the French. Following the death of Yohannes, the British now without an ally resorted to supporting the Italians in the region at the expense of the French gaining supremacy (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990).

[29] The absence of a centralized authority in pre-colonial Africa is drawn upon as constituting a stark contrast to the recognized state system of Ethiopia among Ethiopianist. For instance, Zewde (2001) describes Somalis as 'scattered' in reinforcing the anomaly of Ethiopia.

According to critics of the 'Great Tradition', European interactions with Abyssinia reflected their own economic interests too as was the case in other parts of Africa, but following the Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896[30] at the hands of a centuries old Christian state system which happened to be positioned in a strategically important location; it was in the interest of the competing European powers to uphold the idea of an existing 'ancient', 'neutral' and 'sovereign' state and enable the Abyssinian Kingdom's imperial aims as a form of political accommodation to avoid large scale war among themselves (Holcomb and Ibssa, p.7-25. The British tried to fiercely block the French railway construction from Djibouti and the White Nile following the Battle of Adwa signalling a continuation of the competition over access to the Horn. The 1906 Tripartite Treaty between Italy, Britain and France which promised to project Ethiopia's territorial status exemplifies this political accommodation between the powers (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990, p.8). This agreement gave birth to what Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) refer to as the 'colonial mythology' of Ethiopia, giving rise to images of a neutral and independent Ethiopia, a 'political safety zone' that served to fulfil the interests of European colonial powers and a political and geographic space for what was to be known as 'Ethiopian sovereignty;' European powers propagated the image of a 'unique' Ethiopia in order to maintain the status quo of their arrangements in the Horn. Importantly, it was a collective decision on the part of European imperialists to ensure the survival of a dependent colonial empire which subsequently allowed for Menelik II (and successive Ethiopian rulers) to conquer neighbouring nations leading to armed settler occupations (Birru, 1980-81, p.93).

1.6.1. Internal colonialism

Popular images of a unique and ancient Ethiopia which successfully defeated European imperialism is the dominant point of view put forward by the 'Great Tradition' (Zewde, 2001); this is in the context of an academic tradition which narrowly defines colonialism. Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) dedicate a significant part of *The Invention of Ethiopia* (1990) to tracing the collusion between Ethiopian colonialism and European imperialism and establishing a case for Ethiopian colonialism, they argue that it was the very same colonial powers who directly benefited from the variation of colonialism placed in the Horn

[30] The Battle of Adwa is also considered to have been a battle where the French and British were indirectly at war with one another over control of the Horn where the French were funding the Ethiopians and the British were supporting the Italians (See Holcomb and Ibssa, p.7-25).

of Africa (in the form of the Ethiopian Empire) that actively advocated and promoted the 'Great Tradition' (p. 11). Similarly, critical narratives which subvert the 'Great Tradition' are generally premised on the following core assumptions: 'The Abyssinian empire got its present borders as the result of an aggressive expansionist policy, massive arms import and large scale wars of conquest…when more than half of the present area of the country was occupied and annexed' (Hutlin, 1996, p.90). As such, the relationship that the Ethiopian state has with occupied territories can only be described as 'colonial relations' which exists between various parts of the Empire, the nature of those relations lie at the heart of the crisis in the Horn of Africa generally, and in Ethiopia specifically (Jalata, 1998, p.268).

The idea that Ethiopia owns a unique and exceptional experience decidedly different from the rest of the continent in terms of political troubles is a widespread assumption disseminated by 'Great Tradition' scholarship. The only difference between the experience of colonization in Ethiopia and that of the rest of Africa is that the former originated with Abyssinians colonizing neighbouring peoples (with the assistance of Europe) such as the Somali and the Oromo as opposed to Europeans. In drawing similarities between Ethiopia and other colonial systems in Africa, critical scholars cite the role of missionaries in Ethiopia to pacify the population and spread the ideologies of the imperial government. It is well documented that the Amharic government during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie used Protestant societies such as the Christian Missionary Fellowship (CMF) to promote their imperial ideology. Moreover, the creation of artificial nations and borders not based on any historical understanding of the people of the land has caused ethnic strife both within colonial and postcolonial Africa, including Ethiopia (Gilchrist, 2003, p.100-101). This suggests that the colonial practices of the Abyssinian (and later Ethiopian) ruling groups directly mirror that of European or foreign colonizers in terms of tactics, and that being African does not disqualify one from being colonial and from practicing colonialism.

In *Civilizing the Pastoral Frontier,* Regassa et al (2019) explore the frontier imagination of '*terra nullius*'[31] and how the highland elites of Ethiopia have historically considered the lowland peripheries as underdeveloped in need of being colonized and developed to legitimize their occupation. The land is considered inherently empty, 'unproductive' and 'underutilized'; essentially, it is 'empty of people and

[31] See Makki (2012, 2014) for a detailed description on the *terra nullius* representation.

proper use, but full of potential' (Regassa et al, 2019, p.938). In the *Terra nullius* paradigm, the land is not literally empty; but its sense of emptiness stems from not being inhabited by people who are 'civilized' enough;[32] the territories are considered *herrenlos* in that no legitimate ruler would be recognized as having any real authority over these regions. The Feudal lords belonging to the highland elite under the monarchical regime, the military regime of the *Derg* and the EPRDF have all used the *terra nullius* claim to consider occupied territories especially the pastoral frontier as 'internal colonies' and to extract resources (Regassa et al, 2019, p.938).[33]

According to Triulzi (1994), the 'frontiers of the Christian polity' has seen the complete obliteration of minority groups (i.e. those labelled as *Barya* and *Cunama*, the multiple *shanqella* ethnies inhabiting border regions), whilst territories on the other side of the frontier have seen ethnic repression from groups such as the case with the Falasha and the Gumuz of Metekkel (p.239). The partial and violent integration of the Tulama Oromo through repressive assimilation and the forceful integration of western Mecha, Sidamo, various Omotic-speaking groups and the Ogaden into the Ethiopian body (Triulzi, 1994, p.239). Moreover, according to Spencer's personal account of the Haile Selassie years, the motive for the Ogaden in the southeast was entirely different, these 'vast stretches of scorching arid scrublands with nomadic tribes' was of no interest to Menelik II. Instead, he merely sought to protect the highlands of Ethiopia against British, Italian and Egyptian infiltration (2006, p.30-31). This view is consistent with the *terra nullius* claim of the Somali region as a territory which lacks any real value, but could easily be accessed and dominated. The seeming benevolence of the Ethiopian state to occupy it instead of European powers or that it be used as a bargaining tool which may be used in whatever manner dictated by the colonial power struggles in the Horn of Africa is consistent with the *terra nullius* themes of expendability.

According to Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) 'neither Abyssinians nor any combination of indigenous Africans created Ethiopia. It was cooperation between Abyssinia and Europe that fashioned the Ethiopian state; the state embodied the interests and needs of both parties' (p.389). This challenges dominant Ethiopianist approaches which fail to demonstrate the connection between world imperialism and Ethiopian colonialism by taking the Ethiopian empire itself as a unit of analysis (Jalata, 1998, p.268). Such approaches fail to recognize that both Ethiopian colonialism and European

[33] See Markakis (2011), Hagmann and Korf (2012) and Turton (2011).

imperialism together were instrumental in forcibly integrating territories such as Oromia and the Somali into Ethiopia. Moreover, the Ethiopian Empire's collaboration with European powers pre-dates the battle of Adwa, for instance Menelik II, as the Negus of Showa, welcomed closer collaboration with Italians as common Christian allies in a front against the Muslim Mahdists (Vestal, 2005, p.24). Abyssinian imperial forces were also in collaboration with the first set of Portuguese imperialists to have arrived in the Horn of Africa during the Sixteenth century, whose aim was to control the Indian Ocean trade and that of the adjacent Gulfs. It was under Ahmed Ibrahim Al Ghazi (known as Ahmed Gurey 'the left handed') when both imperial forces attacked what was then considered the symbol of Somali independence; the prosperous Northern state of Adal (Fitzgibbon, 1982, p.7-8). What gave Abyssinian expansion in the late Nineteenth century momentum was the flow of firearms following the arrival of European powers after the Berlin Act of 1884.

Moreover, Abyssinia's accession to the Brussels Act in 1890, among other purposes, served to prevent other Africans from possessing firearms whilst there was no restriction or limitation on the importation of any weapons into the country. This placed Abyssinia in a remarkably advantageous position over her neighbours and vastly increased the threat to Somalis and other neighbouring nations as this 'completely tipped the balance of power in her favour' at the expense of Somalis (Fitzgibbon, 1982, p.13-14). Whilst the alliance of European imperialism and Ethiopian colonialism was fundamental to the creation of what is now the Ethiopian state, dominant imaginations of Ethiopia was not merely a creation of Western powers; rather, it was built upon a previously existing powerful historiography, and notion of domination and rule of the Amhara elite as discussed earlier. A combination of all the above can thus be said to have reproduced and perpetuated the domination of the 'Great Tradition' and its underlying nationalism, and it is from this vantage point that competing nationalisms emerged to challenge the imperial authority vested within Ethiopian state nationalism.

1.7. Conclusion and plan for dissertation

This chapter has provided a background on the objectives of this research situating it within the literature in Ethiopian studies from which the questions of this project arise. The silences within the construction of Ethiopia (and its underlying nationalism) in the literature has given rise to the emergence of competing nationalisms and the contestation of dominant forms of state nationalism. The chapter has traced the emergence and persistence of a contemporary imagination of Ethiopia first

by exploring the dominant and exclusionary historiography of the 'Great Tradition' followed by the role of scholarship in perpetuating the 'Great Tradition.' Further, exploring critical narratives found that Ethiopian state historiography is a dominant unicentric narrative framework, and the hegemony of this form of history has led to the dissemination of certain types of knowledge (Toggia, 2008, p.320). Such history serves to consistently affirm the legitimacy of the state and its nationalist project, and in doing so continuously invites resistance from subaltern groups who occupy no space in this form of history (Toggia, 2008, p.320). The images of Ethiopia assumed and propagated by Ethiopian historiography such as that of African antiquity, civilization, grandeur, modernization, unity and stability are stained with several key paradoxes, namely in terms of the formation of the state under Menelik II. The construction and manipulation of images of both past and present and symbols of identity serve to rally support for the narratives they construct, this is the case for 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism which has relied on mythical arguments and constructions as well as appeals to ancient unity [34](Sorenson, 1993, p.20-186).

The chapter which follows presents the theoretical framework of this study and the conceptual underpinnings which anchor the research discussing theories on nations and nationalisms. It develops a framework for investigating the production of Somali nationalism through emphasis on cultural elements forming nationalisms, specifically postcolonial and ethnosymbolist theorisation on the cultural domain of nationalisms. Chapter 3 'Methodological Approaches' presents the methodologies used for data collection and data analysis focusing on interpretive and qualitative approaches, as well as detailing the use of Discourse Historical approach (DHA) as a key analytical tool. Chapter 4 'The discursive construction of Ethiopian state nationalism' traces the formation of Ethiopian state Nationalism following Menelik's consolidation of power in the late nineteenth century Vis a Vis opposing nationalisms. Once the Ethiopian empire was comprised of a vast range of marginalized ethnic groups, the aggressive promotion of a 'Greater Ethiopian' thesis/nationalism was not accompanied by an equally aggressive attempt to politically integrate groups on the margins save for the 'Amharinization' of particular groups. The chapter provides an analysis on the core tenants of Ethiopian state nationalism through key discursive instances throughout Ethiopia's recent history to conceptualise the role of 'the national question' (Keller, 1981, p.534) in relation to Somali nationalism.

[34] Such narratives have been adopted by African states, the African diaspora, the United Nations and other global powers.

Based on the centrality of historical analysis and the significance of integrating all contextual information in the study of discourse according to the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), Chapter 5 'Discursive formation of Somali nationalist resistance: Nasrullah, WSLF and the 1977 Ogaden War' contextualises the emergence of consecutive liberation movements throughout the twentieth century focusing on the regional dynamics, and historical events in the Horn of Africa during this period. Moreover, it pays attention to what is objectively contributing to the emergence of resistance movements and what socio-political processes influenced the Somali people to express their need to redefine their relationship with the centre. This is carried out through analysis of key nationalist literatures belonging to the genre of the Somali political verse expressed by Cabdullahi Macalin Ahmed 'Dhoodhaan,' Cabdullahi Suldaan 'Timacade' among others. Using Discourse Historical Approach, the chapter examines the expression of Somali nationalism by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) leading up to the 1977 Ogaden War. Using the analytical tools of 'discursive strategy' outlined in chapter 3, this chapter examines the articulations of alternative territorialities and its implication for the postcolonial territorial status quo in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa more broadly. Focusing on the cultural and symbolic resources deployed by Somalis to assert their sense of sovereignty during this war, this chapter establishes the core tenants of Somali nationalist thought in Ethiopia emphasising its regional ramifications and impact on constructing Somali nationhood across the Horn of Africa.

Chapter 6 'Reigniting the struggle: the politics of liberation under the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)' examines the most recent and contemporary articulation of Somali resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991. The chapter is guided by original documents belonging to the ONLF such as memos, personal diaries, archival recordings, public statements and other forms of publications as well as interviews with ONLF founders, rebels, cadres, members and army leaders, as well as former Somali Regional state presidents. The chapter underscores the continuities and transformations within articulations of Somali nationalist resistance, under the EPRDF's new political system. Through an in-depth exploration of the Somali experience of Ethiopian statehood using DHA during the era of the ONLF, the chapter reveals that the multinational federal structure instituted in 1995 to afford greater recognition to historically marginalised peoples, has done little to address the subordinate status of the Somali periphery in Ethiopia.

This final chapter (8): 'The future of Somali resistance and conclusions' presents the conclusions of the thesis and restates both empirical contributions to the study of Somali resistance in Ethiopia, and conceptual contributions to the ways that nationalism(s) are culturally and symbolically constituted in the discursive realm. Drawing upon the findings in the previous chapters on how Somali resistance is discursively constructed and fostered through the political verse, the chapter discusses conceptual understandings of how discourse relates to and shapes socio-political processes, particularly in the way that specific institutionalised practices are discursively shaped and the implications of power in these processes. I highlight how the discursive construction of Somali nationalist resistance de-mystifies the underlying hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism, contributing to the discontinuity of its dominant ideologies through a discursive struggle which re-defines relations of domination and historically entrenched hierarchies of belonging in Ethiopia. Lastly, the chapter reflects on its limitations and the implications of the research findings on postcolonial experiences of African statehood.

2. Theoretical Framework: Ethnosymbolism and the cultural construction of nations and nationalisms

2.1. Overview

The previous chapter introduced the content, rationale, and background of this study positioning the thesis within the contested debates on Ethiopian nationhood and that of the lowland peripheries,[35] underlining the hegemony of dominant Pan-Ethiopian nationalist imaginations. The chapter outlined how this thesis sets forth to decipher Ethiopian state nationalism as a powerful discursive paradigm and investigate the production of Somali nationalist resistance as a form of resistance against this. This chapter sets the theoretical foundations of this thesis, it proceeds to developing a framework for investigating the production of Somali nationalism through an emphasis on cultural elements, specifically drawing on postcolonial and ethnosymbolist perspectives. The chapter briefly describes Western theories of nations and nationalisms, first to locate and define the ethnosymbolist approach. It then moves on to postcolonial nationalism to identify ways of critically engaging with nationalist discourses.

Theories offer competing explanations on the emergence of nations and nationalisms; they are broad in their theorisation of a complex phenomenon displaying further nuances when applied to specific geographies and histories. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for analysing nationalist discourse by focusing on the discursive construction of contesting nationalisms and their core claims, the way that they shape dominant knowledge systems regarding said nationalist claims, and the discursive strategies used in legitimising certain claims over others. In line with constructionist approaches, I approach nationalism as discourse by focusing on what Finlayson (1998) terms 'concrete contents' (p.100) contained within national ideologies and manifested via nationalist discourse. This concept refers to the specificity of individual nationalisms through which we can theorise the functions, claims and specific discursive constructions, regimes and practices contained within specific nationalisms. The study of 'concrete contents' via nationalism as discourse enables are more in-depth examination of the structure of discourse as well as the concept of 'discursive space' as

[35] 'Lowland peripheries' is used to denote the position of The Somali Region in Ethiopia not just in terms of its geographical location or political positioning, but also its socio-cultural marginality. Markakis (2011) describes it as 'a world little known to outsiders even in Ethiopia…neglected and unappreciated' (p.17).

a site for competing political ideologies (Finlayson, 1988, p.116). This study pays particular attention to how symbolic and territorial constructions are (re)produced to shed light on the complexities of nationalisms in Ethiopia.

As Chapter 3 (Methodology) presents, CDA provides the analytical tools and framework for critically examining the discursive construction of core nationalist claims. CDA, understood as 'a theoretical and methodological undertaking to analyse the inter-relationship of the elements of nationalist discourse in the production of a particular political-ideological configuration' (Finlayson, 1998, p.100) is the approach adopted in this study. Specifically, I draw on Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak's (1999) Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). To supplement discourse analytical approaches with a broader analysis of the cultural resources that sustain nationalist claims, I use ethnosymbolist theory to illuminate our understanding of the 'concrete contents' contained within both hegemonic nationalist discourses, and marginalised (resistance) discourses. Such a theoretical approach foregrounds new ways of systematically analysing ways that discourse is deployed as a tool of resistance and the discursive construction of nationalist resistance, as opposed to merely scrutinising relations of domination from the perspective of the dominant. This study is aligned with approaches that take nationalism as discourse and the nation as a social construct as in the work of Ozkirimli (2003), Calhoun (1997), Billing (1995) and Balibar (1990).

This chapter will begin by offering a brief overview of theories of nations and nationalisms placing emphasis upon the ethnosymbolist approach. This is followed by a discussion on how to conceptualise the 'nation' as a construct. The chapter thereon focuses the discussion on African and postcolonial conceptualisations on nations which emphasise the significance of the cultural and spiritual domains in postcolonial nationalist articulations. This chapter lays the groundwork for conceptualising Ethiopian state nationalism and opposing Somali nationalisms through an ethnosymbolist lens and the postcolonial orientation towards the cultural that stresses the significance of evoking myth, motifs, symbols and pre-modern cultural tools in constructing nationalist claims and their corresponding nationhood. The chapter concludes by demonstrating how I deploy ethnosymbolist theory in combination with discourse Historical Approach (DHA), and the contemporary significance of pre-modern cultural tools in imagining nations. Finally, it restates the purpose of this thesis which is to examine the symbolic and cultural repertoires used to construct Somali nationalist resistance using cultural (ethnosymbolist) and postcolonial perspectives.

2. 2. Approaches to nations and nationalisms

The literature on nations and nationalism focus primarily on two questions: how and when nations come into being, which in turn defines their meaning. These are important debates that the first section of this chapter will take stock of in order to position the approach that I adopt within the wider literature before presenting my own theoretical orientation thereafter. Approaches to the concept of nations and nationalisms are generally considered through several key paradigms, these include primordialist, modernist, social constructivist and ethnosymbolist approaches. However, these predominantly western approaches are challenged by critical perspectives such as postcolonial approaches to nationalism which this thesis is grounded in, as well as constructionist approaches that stress the constructedness of nations arguing that they have no objective basis and are constituted via a combination of various social factors.

Primordialists consider nationhood as a predetermined natural occurrence, while *modernists* consider nations to be products of the modern era (Gellner, 1983). The key difference between the former and the latter is that one considers nationalism to be the product of nations whilst the other regards nations as a product of nationalism (since nationalism is a modern occurrence).Thirdly, *constructionists* hold that the essential character of the nation is 'its nature as a social construction' (Ashcroft et al, 1998, p.150), meanwhile *ethnosymbolists* consider that whilst nationalism is a modern ideology, many nations have been in existence postmodernity possessing a strong pre-modern or ancient character (Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005, p.3). The following sections will briefly describe the main approaches found in the study of nations and nationalisms.

2.2.1. Primordialism

The primordial approach proposes that nations have always existed; they are natural and thus represent a timeless and ancient form of social organization essential for survival. However, the sociobiological or 'objective' elements of the nation in primordial accounts have been widely rejected as a tool of analysis (Coakley, 2018, p.342). This is namely because there is no way to objectively determine a sociobiological explanation of the emergence of nations and nationalisms. As such, scholars have overwhelmingly rejected this approach to the extent that it is hard to find a social scientist who defends

or uses this position (Chandra, 2001, p.8). Since *Primordialism* draws political behaviour from instinctive biological traits, scholars generally accept that this approach denies personal freedom and does not provide clarity on the extent to which biology or human nature shapes political behaviour. It also obscures the significance of context which enables certain political conditions (and thus particular forms of expressions) while restricting others (Kellas, 1991, p10-19).

While primordialism as a category of analysis or explanation for nationalism is generally rejected, primordial values that form part of nationalist ideology can serve as actual data to be critically analysed (Coakley, 2018, p.328-9, p.341).[36] Due to the marginalisation of the *primordial* approach in the field of nationalism studies, following a brief overview of the modernist position, this chapter places emphasis on constructionist, postcolonial and ethnosymbolist approaches.

2.2.2. Modernist approach

The question of whether nations and nationalisms are a modern phenomenon is a highly contested issue in the study of nations and nationalisms. Connor's (1990) pioneering article titled *'When is a nation?'* argued that the possession of a national consciousness is fundamentally tied to characterization as a nation. He states that 'national consciousness is a mass not an elite phenomenon' (1990, p.92) and until recently, the masses were unaware of their sense of group identity. He posits that Europe's oldest nations such as the French, only date as far back as the nineteenth century. Therefore, if this is the case for what is considered to be one of the oldest nations in the world; then one should be sceptical of any nation which dates its origin within any period before the nineteenth century. One of the key arguments he uses to sustain this claim is that nation-formation is a process, not an occurrence; there is no particular way of certifying at what exact moment in time that a sufficient number of the masses of any given group acquired a sense of national consciousness to merit them being labelled a 'nation' (Connor, 1990, p.99-100). Connor (1990) further claims that the existence of 'even substantial numbers of intellectuals proclaiming the existence of a new nation is not sufficient' (p.99)- a point

[36] Coakley (2018) categorises primordialism in two ways; 'nationalist *primordialism*' is the study of actual data i.e. primordial values in the ways that they are invoked by nations and featured in nationalist discourses. On the other hand, 'analytical primordialism' refers to primordial explanations for the emergence of nations and nationalisms which is generally outdated. (p.328-9, p.341).

which marks a criticism against the 'top-down' approach of modernists which centres on the elites and prescribes the masses as objects of manipulation.

Other keys works which address the very same question Connor (1990) posed in *'when is a nation?'* include Giddens' *The Nation State and violence* (1985) and Greenfeld's *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (1992). These are considered as authoritative contributions to the study of nations and nationalisms. Such approaches conceptualize nations and their nationalisms as a modern phenomenon. this is captured in Gellner's often quoted statement that 'it is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way round' (1983, p.55). As Gellner (1983) emphasizes, the emergence of nations is directly tied to modernity and industrialization, and nations are therefore the expression of a literate elite who support industrialism that in turn promotes nationalism.[37] In instrumentalist terms, the nation itself is a modern phenomenon generated by particular modern historical and political conditions. It is also constructed by nationalists or elites and is 'neither natural, nor immemorial, much less self-generative' (Smith, 2004, p.35). Modernization theory holds that both nations and nationalism (as an ideology and as a movement) is a result of modernization and the global and societal movement towards modernity. Naturally, this obscures any room for inquiry into pre-modern notions of nationhood (i.e. ethnic descent) which pre-dates the eighteenth century. Other assumptions underpinned by the modernist perspective is the idea that nations are not simply discursive constructions, but instead real historical and sociological communities embedded in particular geo-cultural contexts (Smith, 2009, p.6-14).

2.2.2.1. State-centrism in modernism

Hobsbawm's (1990) argument that 'the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity' (p.214) both captures the essence of the modernist approach to nations and nationalisms and raises several critical concerns. One such concern is the idea that modern nations are argued to derive from ancient ethnic identities that precede any form of political mobilization, as most nationalist discourses draw upon the nation as 'an already-always existing basis

[37] In the modernization approach, the modernization of societies is directly linked to the emergence of nationalism and a consequence of modern conditions. Hobsbawm (1992) holds that it is nationalism that comes before nations through a series of constructed histories and myths - 'nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round' (p.10)

for action, whether as the continuation of ancient ethnicity or as the result of historically specific acts of foundation' -both definitions of the nation essentially legitimate certain claims to nationhood while delegitimizing others (Calhoun, 1993, p.214-215).

As advanced by Giddens (1984), the state-centred modernist approach describes nations as the product of the rise of the modern state system. He asserts that 'A "nation" as I use the term here, only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed' (p.116).[38] Calhoun (1993) rejects Gidden's state-centric approach for completely obscuring the entire ethnic dimension of nations and nationalisms by suggesting that the link between ethnicity and nationalism is merely coincidental, as such making it difficult to understand the reason why national identity or nation-ness that draw upon pre-existing notions of kinship has such a wide appeal and stir the passions of people in the significant ways that they does (p.218-219). Calhoun (1993) goes on to suggest that for such modernist paradigms and indeed state elites, ethnonationalism is in other words considered anti-modern; 'nationalism was bad when it was like ethnicity[39], but good when it was tied to a modernizing state' as ethnic groups are subordinate and 'internal' identities in comparison to the nation-state (p.220). The state centred approach to the study of nations and nationalisms is problematic both in that it excludes the category of nations without states whilst conflating 'nation-state' with 'national-state' and disregards the existence of pre-modern nations.

The view that there could be 'pre-modern nations' and 'pre-modern nationalisms' (Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005, p.2-3) however, is maintained by Smith (1986), Armstrong (1982) among others. In the modernist paradigm, nations and nationalisms are both recent and novel -the chronological argument stresses that nationalism (the movement and its symbolism) is a recent phenomenon while the sociological perspective holds that nations and nationalisms are an innovation brought forth by

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[38] As Kellas (1992) puts it 'the polity had to become a centralized state, the economy had to be modern and not feudal, and the culture had to replace ethnicity with something which can become nationhood' (p.37). Modernists hold that nationalism is based upon the modern state and its functions, they treat the modern-state as 'the shell within which nationalist sentiments take shape' and a point of reference for nationalist action in a way that pre-modern states could not, and did not enable (Day and Thompson, 2004, p.54). Interestingly, for Hobsbawm (1992) the nation is not only the product of a recent historical period, but a nation remains a social entity as long as the said nation is connected to a 'modern territorial state, the "nation-state"... it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it' (p.9-10).

[39] The idea that Africans represent communities, tribes or ethnic subjects rather than individuals is rooted within European colonial administrations' approach to African societies as divided along tribal lines. This mode of classification is elaborated by Mamdani (1996, p.22). The designation of Africans as ethnic communities first, relegates their nations and nationalisms merely as a form of ethnic mobilisation.

particular modern conditions. However, this explanation does not address the development of nationalism in conditions which did not mirror the conditions of the industrialized societies in Europe (nationalism in non-industrialized countries), or indeed the emergence of pre-industrial nationalisms (for instance Scotland in the Middle Ages) (Kellas, 1991, p.32, p.44). Similarly, the rise of nationalisms rallying against colonialism and its legacies and struggles for independence pose a problem for modernist paradigms on nations and nationalisms. As Smith (2001) sums up, the idea that nationalism created nations 'assumed not only that there were no nations before nationalism, but that there can be no pre-nationalist nations' (p.93).

Modernists side-line the 'sociological and historical antecedents of the nation' and neglect to consider the nation as a temporal construct rather than a one-dimensional unit politically motivated around boundary issues (Smith, 2004, p.52). This is namely due to their dramatization of the differences between modernity and tradition entirely (Smith, 2004, p.52). Moreover, disregarding the continuity of particularly nations, their deep/ancient ethnic roots and the inspiration provided by myths and memories in their cultivation of nations and nationalisms reduce modernist prescriptions as 'historically shallow' (Smith 2004, p.52). For this reason, an analysis on the motivations and overall development of nationalist discourses necessarily involves affording cultural components such as ancient roots, myths, collective memories and use of the past relevance and analytical significance. The following sections are devoted to illustrating alternative conceptualisations of nations and nationalisms which stress their contructedness, as well as constructionist and postcolonial approaches to nations as political entities as they will be adapted in this thesis.

2.2.3. Conceptualising the 'nation:' constructionist perspectives

There is no consensus on constructivism's[40] specific point of theoretical reference, but an understanding of nations and nationalisms as socially constructed; placing emphasis on social

[40] Constructivism and constructionism are often used interchangeably in the literature, however Charmaz (2006) offers two different (but similar) definitions for each. Constructivism is defined as 'a social scientific perspective that addresses how realities are made…assumes that people, including researchers, construct the realities in which they participate. Constructivist inquiry starts with the experience and asks how members construct it…Constructivists acknowledge that their interpretation of the studied phenomenon is itself a construction" (p. 187). Meanwhile Social constructionism is defined as 'a theoretical perspective that assumes that people create social reality(ies) through individual and collective actions. Rather than seeing the world as given, constructionists ask, how is it accomplished?..'(Charmaz, 2006, 189). Both definitions fundamentally hold that social realities are constructed.

construction as opposed to primordialist orientations is the shared premise among those who label themselves constructivists (Yeros, 1999, p.1). Anderson (1983), one of the foremost thinkers of the constructivist perspective of nations and nationalisms, formulated the concept of the 'imagined community' which serves as a common theoretical reference point for constructivist approaches. Nations are a social construction, not natural entities rooted in a stable identity and characterised by a homogenous set of national traditions; 'the instability of the nation is the inevitable consequence of its nature as a social construction' (Ashcroft et al, 1998, p.150). Anderson's (1983) concept of 'imagined communities' is an important conceptualisation of the nation for the purpose of this study. His analysis of the role of collective memories and national images in how nations come to imagine themselves (and imagined by others) is a departure from classic modernist prescriptions. His theory on the nation highlights the strong imaginative component underpinning it. This is based on the notion that members of a nation will not have met or heard of fellow members, 'yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (2016, p.6). Based on the idea of communities or nations as inherently imagined constructs, Day and Thompson (2004) suggest that the task of the student of nations and nationalisms is not to internalize the belief that nations and nationhood are real in the sense that they are to those who belong to them, but to understand how they come to be imagined as real (p.107).[41] Moreover, as Calhoun (1993) states, whether nations are a product of nationalist mobilisation, the existence of ethnic ties, or simply a consequence of modern conditions such as state-formation- nationalist discourses treat nations as a taken-for-granted and previously existing basis for mobilisation (p.214) . This is regardless of whether the nation has its roots in ancient ethnicity or the result of modern phenomena- 'we are all participants in the discourse of nations' (Calhoun, 1993, p.214).

This study interrogates the taken-for-granted essence of the very idea of 'nation' in the way that it is used as a mobilising force and as a basis for its own self-imagining, the underlying assumptions contained within it vis-à-vis opposing groups, and the implications for hierarchy and power relations this has. Definitions of the nation are highly contested as any definition will legitimate certain claims while delegitimating others (Calhoun, 1993, p.215). Yet as Anderson (1992) holds, 'nationess, as well as nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind' (p.4)- in other words, they are socially constructed. As such, nationalist discourses tend to be framed around idioms that invoke the nation,

[41] See Brubaker and Cooper (2000) '*Beyond Identity'* on rejecting reification in the study of nations.

centring their demands on the normative ideals underpinning the very idea of the 'nation' (Ting, 2008, p.454). In the same vain, Hall (1996) states that 'a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meanings – a system of cultural representation…A nation is a symbolic community' (p.612). Thus, the nation is not a concrete concept with a fixed definition, as Calhoun (1997) puts it; 'There is no essence of nation and therefore no essential definition of nationalism' (p.8).[42]

This study also subscribes to the idea of nations as a discursively constructed symbolic community and as 'systems of cultural representations' (Hall, 1996, p. 612). According to Hall (1994), national culture as a discourse constructs meaning which organise the actions and perceptions of given nations: 'National cultures construct identities by creating meanings of "the nation" with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories that are told about it, memories which connect its present to its past, and images that are constructed of it' (p. 613). Constructions of the nation constitute 'sites of control and domination' within society used both to legitimise the idea of 'a people,' and to forge the idea of a nation-state where all the functions of state power such as the military, educational system, judiciary etc are sanctioned as the natural and unquestioned expression of a unified national character by means of culture, language, history etc. (Ashcroft et al, 1998, p.150). Combined with the argument that nationalism is the 'the preeminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule' (Calhoun, 1993, p.335), approaching nations and nationalist discourse with an emphasis on cultural and symbolic elements underscores the significance of the way that power is negotiated within these meanings.

Similarly, the concept of 'the figured world of nationhood and nationalism' (Ting, 2008, p.463) proposes that nations be read as constructs that exist in the symbolic realm; elements within this figured world such as particular events and key figures may be dramatized and assigned symbolic significance which are in turn embedded within our cultural worlds, this is often reproduced and internalised in accordance with relations of power (p.461-62). The 'structure of meaning' of the

[42] Smith (1999) criticises what he terms as 'postmodernist' accounts of the nation for seeing it as 'a text…that must be read and "narrated", a particular historical discourse with its peculiar set of practices and beliefs' (p.169). This critique against the nation as a social construct, and nationalism as discourse obscures the difference between epistemic postmodernism (emphasising the end of the modern era), methodological postmodernism (a methodological critique), and constructivism which uses deconstructionist methods (such as CDA used in this study) to critically analyse, challenge and transform established belief systems and practices and the meanings they carry (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.342-3).

figured world of nations and nationalism is internalized, reproduced and reformed by ordinary people in their everyday lives, this process generates what Ting (2008) terms 'multiplicity and fragmentation of interpretation' (p.464). Constructing the nation involves the joint methods of (re)producing symbolic representations and forming cultural institutions and networks that further the idea of the nation (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.343). Considered as a variant of constructionism, ethnosymbolism, explored in subsequent sections, draws attention to the ways that cultural and socio-symbolic resources such as myths and collective memories are re-invented (Coakley, 2018, p.333). Having conceptualised the nation beyond its function as a political entity towards constituting a 'symbolic community' and a 'system of cultural representation' (Hall, 1996, p.612), the following section highlights postcolonial approaches to the nation which emphasise principles of sovereignty and re-imagining the nation beyond the limits of western approaches to the study of nations and nationalism centred on the modern nation-state. To understand the complexities of nationalisms in Ethiopia, and the particular construction of Somali nationalist resistance, this thesis places emphasis on the cultural components of nationalisms beyond the confines of the modern state towards a theorisation of how symbolic elements and (historical) memories constitute and re-constitute national self-imaginations.

2.2.4. Postcolonial perspectives

To overcome the shortcomings of major theories on nations, nationalisms and the nation-state concerning political developments in Africa; an emphasis on both context and history is necessary. The literature on African statehood has been unable to account for the dynamic modes of statehood found in the Horn of Africa due to over emphasis on Weberian conceptions of the state. This has led to the inability of the literature to consider African statehood and sense of national expression beyond the limiting category of the nation-state (Mastshanda, 2020, p.28). The African state system which was based on a new territorial framework adopted in 1963 deemed inherited colonial borders as sacrosanct while emphasising the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. In turn, the right to self-determination was narrowly defined as referring to African movements waging struggles against European colonialism, while denigrating the demands of contested territories forcibly included in sovereign states as secessionists and irredentists who posed a threat against the postcolonial status

quo in Africa (Iyob, 1993, p. 257, p. 261).[43] Pan-Ethiopianism- the doctrine which claimed neighbouring territories by virtue of conquest was sanctioned by the new African state system and ignored[44] by Pan-African leaders despite Ethiopia's domination and brutality towards fellow subjugated African (Iyob, 1993, p.269-70). Subjugated peoples under the Ethiopian empire throughout the twentieth century, including Somalis, forged a national consciousness premised upon resisting Ethiopian colonialism and its underlying nationalist project. Postcolonial scholars illuminate the way that non-western forms of nationalisms define their nationalist project, namely in ways which emphasise sovereignty, the cultural components of nationhood and the possibilities of resistance against (political) domination.

Postcolonial scholars offer a differing perspective to classic modernist theorisation on nations and nationalisms. According to Chatterjee (1991), there is an important distinction to be made between cultural and political nationalism when considering postcolonial nationalisms. Contrary to the way that nationalism is narrated in the West, postcolonial nationalism does not start with seeking political control. Western narrations refer to nationalism as a political movement focusing on the way that colonial power was confronted politically at the level of statecraft. In this approach to how nationalism is commonly narrated, non-western nationalisms are derivative of pre-existing western models (p.524). In attempt to broaden the conceptual scope of the 'imagined community' thesis, Chatterjee (1991) rejects its eurocentricity suggesting that anti colonial nationalism established its own sense of sovereignty within indigenous society prior to expressions of political confrontation against the colonial powers or embarking upon an anti-colonial struggle. Chatterjee (1991) further differentiates

[43] There are interesting parallels to be drawn here between Ethiopia and the South African context where the elimination of Apartheid and the guarantee of fundamental rights and equalities did not result in decolonisation, as Motha (2012) argues in *Colonial sovereignty, forms of life and liminal beings in South Africa*; 'Freedom was reduced to the guarantee of fundamental rights and this was a mistake. The morality and political legitimacy of the colonial "right of conquest" was left untouched' (p.132). As such, it is misleading to assume that apartheid was the fundamental issue in South African society. While liberation from apartheid was one component of a 'double-liberation' at stake, the other elements has to do with liberation from the deep-rooted socio-economic and cultural consequences of a longer history of colonial domination over the other (Motha, 2012, p.132). Likewise, in Ethiopia, and within the new 'post-colonial' African consensus spearheaded by Haile Selassie, the narrow definition of decolonisation referred to freedom from European colonialism alone. Legally, this disregarded the longer history of colonial domination that nations such as the Somalis conquered by the Ethiopian imperial regime in the late nineteenth century continued to exist under. For more on Ethiopia's colonial character, see *The invention of Ethiopia: The Making of a Dependent Colonial State in Northeast Africa* by Holcomb and Ibssa (1990).

[44] The fall of the imperial regime in 1974 marked the first occasion where the ills around the Ethiopian monarchy was discussed within African circles. For more on Haile Selassie and Ethiopia's complex role in Pan African circles, see '*From Adwa to OAU: Ethiopia and the Politics of Pan-Africanism, 1896-1963'* (Gebrekidan, 2012).

between the two domains as the 'material' and the 'spiritual,' the former relating to the domain of the external concerning statecraft and the economy whereas the latter refers to an "inner" domain bearing the "essential" marks of cultural identity' (p.521-2). Thus, if the nation is an imagined community, then it is in the inner sovereign domain of the cultural that it comes into being even if the state is under the political control of the colonial power (Chatterjee, 1991, p.522).

Moreover, in attempt to 'resist the sway of the modern institutions of disciplinary power' (Chatterjee, 1993, 75), anti-colonial nationalisms seek to maintain cultural difference between the coloniser and the colonised proclaiming sovereignty over aspects of language, culture, art and religion, whereas in the outer domain of statecraft, law and administration, 'nationalism fought relentlessly to erase the marks of colonial difference' (Chatterjee, 1993, p.26). The politics of maintaining 'difference' in the cultural realm has continued to manifest itself in rival claims over history, culture and symbolic components constituting the nation. The struggle for agency is an ideological one tied to the aim of maintaining difference, this in turn provides anti-colonial nationalisms with the language for subsequent organised rebellions. The complimentary roles of both cultural and political nationalisms rests on maintaining difference between coloniser and colonised on the one hand and resisting colonial difference on the other hand.

Moreover, Spivak's (2009) theorisation of postcolonial nationalism corresponds with this distinction between the outer domain at the level of statecraft, and inner domain of the cultural and spiritual. She argues that it is within the private realm that nationalism is birthed; 'nationalism is a recoding of this underived private as the antonym of the public sphere' (p.80), and it is reterritorialized to operate in the public sphere; the private is 'underived' In that it does not stem from the possibility of the public. Rather, it is the 'private' (i.e. one's mother tongue or piece of personal land) that is reproduced in the public sphere. Spivak (2009) asks at what point the love of one's mother tongue and their personal plot of land become the 'nation thing' posing that nationalism is produced by 'a collective imagination constructed through rememoration' (p.86). This collective imagination is fostered through discursive constructions of the nation popularised via nationalist discourse which functions beyond the level of mere language and rhetoric but tantamount to ideology with underlying set of beliefs, practices and institutional structures (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.343). Moreover, Calhoun (1993) suggests that 'the rationalist rhetoric of liberation' as well as 'the claim of deep ethnic history, tradition almost to the point of primordiality' (p.223) are both characteristic of anti-colonial and post-colonial nationalisms.

The former refers to the invocation of modern conventions on decolonisation and self-determination, while the latter refers to the formation of a distinct sense of nationhood which is juxtaposed against the colonial "other" (Calhoun, 1993, p.223). As this study proposes, this sense of distinctiveness which takes shape in the inner domain of the cultural/spiritual or the reterritorialized private in postcolonial nationalisms can be deciphered through analysis of the cultural and symbolic elements of the nation emphasised by ethnosymbolism. It may also be best accessed through access to Somali oral traditions, specifically the analysis of the traditional political verse presented in this thesis.

2.3. Beyond binaries: the need for a cultural lens

The significance of cultural components underpinning nationalist projects, as underlined in this thesis, is further emphasised by African and postcolonial perspectives. In *Provisional Notes on the Postcolony*, Mbembe (1992) sets fourth an important theorisation on the way postcolonial relations of power is enacted in a way which transcends binary categorisations of resistance v. passivity, hegemony v. counter-hegemony and so forth. He argues that colonial authority- and by extension, the state- institutionalises itself in a bid to achieve legitimacy by producing a set of symbols infused with non-negotiable meanings which cannot be challenged; 'the champions of state power…adopt a distinct set of cultural repertoires and powerfully evocative concepts; but they also have resort, if necessary, to the systematic application of pain' (p.3-4). Importantly, Mbembe (1992) goes on to argue that bringing a particular political consciousness into being is not the end goal- but to make it effective so that it becomes the new 'common sense.' Thus, it is necessary to critically examine how the meanings underlying these cultural repertoires are produced and structured as well as the norms, knowledge systems, institutions and practices which structure this view – including how discourse illuminates the nature of domination (p.4). If the state resorts to exploiting cultural and symbolic means of (re)producing power (i.e. the power invested in the imagination of a particular form of dominant nationhood) in a bid to achieve legitimacy and resist challenges, the same may be said on how anti-colonial nationalisms invoke their own set of distinct cultural repertoires within the inner sovereign domain of the cultural even within a state of political domination (Chatterjee, 1991, p.522). Examining this form of invocation lies at the heart of interrogating the structure of Somali resistance against Ethiopian nationalism in this thesis.

Moreover, there are regional differences in concepts of statehood in post-colonial Africa as depicted by the examples of South Africa and Ethiopia. Apartheid represented the greatest threat, meanwhile independence was from white minority rule- representing clearly defined categories (Matshanda, 2020, p.30). Claims to independence in the Horn of Africa is nevertheless defined less clearly as they shift between overlapping claims to independence which is at times expressed as complete secession from a state or tied to the irredentist claims of another (Matshanda, 2020, p.30). However, the case of Somalis in the Horn of Africa, and in Africa more broadly remains an anomaly in that Somalis sought to find a state for the nation as opposed to forging a nation out of the newly formed states. Following Somalia's independence in 1960, the Somali nationalist project was centred on turning 'a dismembered nation into one state' (Drysdale, 1964, p.22), by extension this meant reuniting with fellow Somalis living under continued colonial rule[45]. Studying this condition necessitates asking how the discourse of the colonial is constructed in this context, and in what ways they are imagined within the postcolonial era. Attempts to forge new nations which correspond with newly demarcated administrative units has come to represent new forms of coloniality.[46]

As this thesis interrogates, Ethiopia's constructed nationhood championed by Haile Selassie and Menelik II was that of a 'viable, unified nation-state which could trace its origins to antiquity' (Keller ,1981, p.522-23). The constructions of nationhood employ identifiers used to forge exclusive and homogenous notions of national character- such signifiers suppress existing heterogeneity within the existing 'national' community which they represent, instead, representing and furthering the interests of dominant power groups within a given national formation (Ashcroft et al, 1998, p.150). Chapter 4 discusses these state-sponsored identifiers; 'antiquity' for instance, as cited by Keller (1981) is recognised as a key identifier used to construct an Abyssinian-centric concept of Ethiopian nationhood. Rejecting the imposition of this homogenous national character, and the forms of coloniality this institutes is a central feature of Somali nationalist resistance in Ethiopia. Commenting on the oppressive enforcement of state nationalism and its exclusionary construction of nationhood, Clapham (2002) argues that the discourse of national unity in Ethiopia is just a pretext for suppression (p.14). Thus, the need for diverse nations and peoples in Ethiopia to invoke distinct modes of

[45] Those living under continued colonial rule included the Somali-inhabited territories of the Northern Frontier District (Kenya), Ogaden (Ethiopia), French-Somaliland.

[46] The notion that the nation-building projects spearheaded by independent African states instituted new forms of colonialism is associated with the imposition of a homogenous national image on a heterogenous collection of people. This results in the erasure of the cultural identities of marginalised groups leading to heightened contestations over key national images.

nationhood occurs within this context of cultural and linguistic suppression. As this thesis underlines, Somali nationalist discourses draw upon specific cultural and symbolic repertoires as a means to retain sovereignty under a system of political and cultural domination. While political domination was crystallised in the mid-20th century transfer of Somali territories under Ethiopian authority, cultural suppression was a parallel project designed to create an overarching 'Ethiopian' identity at the expense of diverse nations and peoples. While the project of 'Amharanization'[47] was rigorously enforced and violently institutionalised, early articulations of Somali nationalist thought rejected the cultural undertones of Pan-Ethiopian nationalism, and its accompanying political project as discussed in chapter 5.

The following sections underscore how nations and nationalisms are culturally constituted through an overview of the Ethnosymbolist approach, which places emphasis on (ancient) ethnic roots, languages and myths. Putting into dialogue postcolonial concerns with ethnosymbolist emphasis on the ways that nationalist discourses exploit past socio-symbolic and cultural repertoires to imagine the nation, the thesis foregrounds a novel reading on the way that peripheral nations in Ethiopia seek to establish a sense of sovereignty in resistance against the status quo (i.e. Ethiopian state nationalism).

2.4. Ethnosymbolism: Cultural and symbolic constructions of the nation

The ethnosymbolist approach offers a sociohistorical analysis and represents a critique of the modernist approach (Smith, 1998). It aims to contribute to its limitations by emphasising socio-symbolic and cultural elements of the nation such as the role of the past, ancient ethnicity, collective historical memory, and the vast array of symbolic and cultural components that sustain the nation. A sociohistorical approach underlines the cultural and symbolic construction of the nation through an understanding of language, ethnicity, and myth which this section presents. Anderson (2016) argues that 'nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time' (p.3), yet it remains a subject of intense dispute and has proven immensely difficult to theorize. How the nation came to be imagined, the rise of national consciousness, and once the subjective idea of the nation is formed, how it has been shaped, transformed, and subsequently used, are all part of an evolving debate. Yet, while social transformations and the development of consciousness provide an important

[47] 'Amharanization' refers to the project of assimilating diverse nations and peoples in Ethiopia by the ruling Amhara class, this policy of assimilation is widely believed to have amharanized Ethiopian nationalism (Touval, 1963, p.137).

insight into how the nation is imagined- it does little to explain the deep bonds of attachment felt by members of a nation for their imaginative constructions, or as Anderson (2016) puts it- why people are willing to die for these inventions (p.141). The persistent character of each type of nationalist ideology draws upon unique repertoires and cultural resources of ethno-history, collective memories, ethnic and religious myths and central lands, despite nationalism's relative modernity – their cultural bases are deeply-rooted even though they are now used for modern political purposes in a way that they would not have been used previously (Smith, 1999, p.257).

Ethnosymbolists adopt a middle ground between 'micro-nationalists' who focus on every grass-root expression of nationalist sentiments and the strong elitist component in the modernist paradigm who consider nations and nationalisms as an elite phenomenon. Without focusing on the structural levels of analysis, ethnosymbolists focus on the interplay between elite expressions of national ideologies by analysing the ways in which popular cultures and memories have shaped both the nation and the elites. They also pay attention to the ways that elites have sought to organize and appeal to their populations through symbols which resonate with their collective memories (Smith, 2009, p.14-21). In other words, how the nation is shaped through 'the interplay of elite proposals and majority responses' - the ways they are accepted, rejected, negotiated or even reconfigured (Smith, 2009, p.31). Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), as I describe in Chapter 3 (Methodology) combined with ethnosymbolism offers a middle-ground between a micro-nationalist and a macro-nationalist analysis – this is a necessary balance for analysing marginalised nationalist discourse emerging from the peripheries of the state. Further, contrary to the relegation of culture and ethnicity in favour of material and political factors in the modernist approach to nations and nationalisms, ethnosymbolism places great significance on 'symbolic resources' including that of myths, values, traditions, collective memories and shared symbols. It is through this that they can grasp the nuanced ways in which ideologies are shaped and inspired in a way that broad economic factors are unable to account for.

In this approach, significant attention is devoted to the subjective components that contribute to the persistence of nations and their subsequent nationalisms, they are what Calhoun (1993) terms 'the cultural "superstructures" of nationalism' (p.219). Collective memories or rememberings, the concept of Golden ages, myths, national images and events, sacred homelands, and myths of origins are mobilising tools used to legitimize and further a nationalist cause. This dissertation draws upon ethnosymbolist theory to illuminate how these cultural and symbolic assets are utilised by competing

nationalist discourses, what ideals are legitimated in the process, and the consequences this has for the way that power relations manifest vis a vis competing nationalisms in Ethiopia. This section will offer a description of the ethnosymbolist approach with an emphasis on the core features of pre-modern origins as manifested via ethnicity, language and religion, and myths (including collective memories and myths of origin), limitations of this approach will also be examined.

In this study, the ethnosymbolist approach towards nation-formation which stresses competing mythologies of the nation, the ways in which ethnic memories and myths are generated from wars and the legacies of internal cultural contentions, and an overall emphasis on the psychological and socio-symbolic (Smith, 2009, p.20-31) provides an innovate framework for examining both Ethiopian state nationalism and Somali nationalist discourses. This study does not take as a given claims of factuality with regard to the socio-symbolic resources that nationalist discourses invoke as legitimising tools, nor does it seek to justify or denounce the truthfulness of the claims. Indeed, it is not important whether traditions and myths of origins are factual as opposed to mere constructions, what is important analytically is how such ideas are mobilized within nationalist ideologies. Calhoun (1993) emphasizes the ideological power of claiming the primordiality and ancient character of a nation, he further highlights that sociologically, what matters is not whether the nation is in fact ancient, but rather, 'the efficacy of the process by which the tradition constitutes certain beliefs and understandings as unquestioned, immediate knowledge, as the basis for disputing or questioning' (p.222).[48] This relates to the distinction drawn earlier between 'nationalist *primordialism*' and 'analytical *primordialism,*' nationalist primordialism can be critically analysed in the way that primordial values such as ethnic origin, language and myths can form part of nationalist ideologies (Coakley, 2018, p.328-9, p.341).

Nonetheless, the ethnosymbolist approach still has limitations. Guibernau (2004) critiques the ethnosymbolist theory offered by Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson on the basis that its focus on cultural elements of nations and nationalisms such as the role of symbols, myths, traditions, collective memories etc. neglects any political considerations such as the role of the state. Guibernau (2004) highlights that there are political opportunities or consequences associated with being recognized as a nation in the modern world, similarly there are consequences for simply claiming to be a nation. Thus, he asks whether it is possible to side-line, or take for granted the role of the modern state in the

[48] See also Calhoun's (1983) *The radicalism of tradition: community strength or venerable disguise and borrowed language?*

construction and policing of national identities (Guibernau, 2004, p.126). Nonetheless, the ethnosymbolist preoccupation with cultural elements of nations and nationalisms is far from apolitical, rather the role of symbols, memories and myths are key aspects of all nationalist doctrines. Guibernau (2004) concedes that the ethnosymbolist approach provides the necessary tools and perspectives to reinforce the political legitimacy and claims of nations. *Ethnosymbolism* he argues, 'provides formidable cultural assets to be employed as legitimizing elements for a nation demanding self-determination' namely because pre-modern tools such as the notion of pre-modern ethnic roots and the sense of continuity it implies is a vital claim used by nationalists in general (p.126-127).

2.4.1. Pre-modern origins: Ethnicity

Nationalist discourses do not simply contain within them internal claims to common decent via ethnicity, religion or any other basis for promoting social solidarity and representing a political community, they also embody external claims to distinctiveness in relation to other nations (Calhoun, 1993, p.216). Ethnosymbolism emphasises the appeal to ethnic origins and the idea of common decent as a key factor in the self-imagining of the nation, a marker of distinctiveness, and a powerful mobilising tool for distinct nationalisms. First it is necessary to point out some distinctions between nations and an ethnic group. In the literature on nationalism, territory is considered as a key marker which distinguishes nations from other forms of social groupings. Territory is central to national identity whether or not the nation seeks its own state- believing in the right to territorial ownership is a unique indicator of the nation (Barrington, 1997, p.712). As Nodia (1992) notes, 'a nation is a community of people organized around the idea of *self-determination*' (p. 11). Nationalism described as 'an organized endeavour to control the national homeland' corresponds with the centrality of territory to nations and nationalisms in the literature, whether this 'control' is complete sovereignty and independence or some form of autonomy in an existing state (Barrington 1997, p.714). It is in the same vein that Brass (1991) defines nationalism as a 'political movement by definition' (p.48), and Smith (2001) as 'goal-oriented' which 'prescribes certain kinds of action' (p.9). It is what distinguishes ethnic solidarities from nationalist rhetoric, which stresses the rights of self-determination by referencing 'the people' of that territory, whereas ethnic identities are often claimed in situations where groups seek greater autonomy within an existing state. The key distinction between a nation and an ethnic community is that an ethnic group lacks a 'political referent', a territorial component and in some cases- a common public culture. Nations must be in possession of a homeland and aspire to be

recognized as a nation, whereas *Ethnies* do not necessarily occupy their homeland (Smith, 2001, p.12-14).

In *The Antiquity of Nations*, Smith (2004) calls for a conception of the nation, which accommodates both civic and territorial considerations, as well as the importance of pre-modern ethnicity. The civic approach stresses the following features of a nation: they are in possession of a specific territory, an economy, mass education, and designated legal rights.[49] On the contrary, the genealogical or ethnic approach is at odds with the norms of western modernity; it emphasizes common ancestry, historical, customs, vernaculars etc. and stands in contrast to western approaches to the nation. While accepting that the nation is a fairly modern construct as evidenced by the modern historical developments and conditions we find ourselves in, Smith's (2004) ethnosymbolist approach maintains that it is not entirely modern as 'it requires pre-modern ethnic elements, and is increasingly formed in the image of older ethnies' (p.41-43). This combined perspective appreciates the modern expressions of pre-modern ethnic ties, their overall survival, and the sheer forces of ethnonationalism in today's world (Smith, 2004, p.43). This echoes the postcolonial view that postcolonial nationalisms take shape in the domain of the spiritual and cultural, prior to any confrontation with colonial powers in the outer domain of politics (Chatterjee, 1991, p.522). This distinction between the inner and outer spheres, or public and private realms underscores the significance of pre-modern elements (i.e. ethnicity and language) fostered in the private realm and reproduced for the discursive production of the nation in the public sphere (Spivak, 2009).

For Connor (1994), nationalism cannot be explained rationally because ethno-nationalism is based on a felt ethnic kinship and psychological bond- and is the only kind of nationalism that exists. Therefore, although the shared conception of ethnic ties may not be biologically accurate, understanding nationalism is not based on 'what is, but what is *felt* to be, the case' argues Smith (2001, p.70-71; italics in original). Connor's (1994) definition of a nation as 'a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related…the largest grouping that shares such a belief' (p.212) corresponds with the idea that a non-rational (but not irrational) feeling among the nation is what powers nationalism, and while its appeal cannot be rationally explained - 'to try to do so is to miss the depth and power of national conviction' (Smith, 2001, p.70-71). Yet the widespread appeal of nationalism can be economically

[49] This is in essence the bases for the myth of the 'modern nation' and a western approach which necessitates such nations to be industrialized, See Gellner (1983).

functional,[50] and both intellectual and emotional; the power of ethnocentrism is testament to its emotional strength which socio economic approaches are unable to explain. In addition, as far as they are invoked in modern political struggles both by elites and the masses; both nationalism and ethnicity offer tools for creating and mobilizing particular versions of pre-existing identities (Calhoun, 1993, p.211). Ultimately, 'Nationalism can take psychological, cultural or political forms' (Kellas, 1991, p.32-33). Therefore, nationalism transcends claims of ethnic similarity alone, instead it stresses the 'claim that certain similarities should count as *the* definition of political community' and that national identities be placed above other identities or interests such as ethnic identity and gender for instance (Calhoun, 1993, p.229). Like ethnicity, language is another important pre-modern tool used for the cultural construction of the nation, emphasising distinctiveness as a community and ancient roots.

2.4.2. Pre-modern origins: language

In addition to ethnicity, ethnosymbolists place emphasis on the cultural components of nationhood and underscore the importance of language as a tool for nationalist mobilisation and political legitimacy. Hastings (1997) sets out the following norms for ethnicities that tend to develop nationalisms. First, they must be in possession of a clear territory and population size, a distinct literary vernacular and be in possession of 'a religion or historical tradition markedly different from that of the majority in the state of which it has been part'- with the linguistic component being the most significant (p.31). Language is considered one of the most significant pointers for the existence of a nation prior to modernity because a 'few things seem as historically deep-rooted as languages, for which no dated origins can ever be given' (Anderson, 1991, p.196). For instance, Ge'ez (ግዕዝ), an ancient language which originates in historic Abyssinia dating as far back as the 4th century BC, according to 'Greater Ethiopian' Nationalism, constitutes a key marker of the nation's distinctiveness, and its rootedness in the distant pre-modern past. These core features are mobilized in nationalist discourses emphasising the antiquity and prestige of the Ethiopian nation. Calhoun (1993) identifies at least three ways that language features in nationalism- first it corroborates the claim that nations are products of pre-modern ethnicities- with regard to the 'historic depth' and 'distinctiveness' of each language. Secondly, a shared language among a community enables claims to a distinctive national

[50] Gellner (1983) argues that it is industrialism, and a move away from agrarianism that created the conditions for the wide appeal of nationalism.

identity (whether the language is ancient or even just unique to that community). Thirdly, nationalist elites suppress linguistic differences so that the state subsumes the nation or 'the nation fit the state' (Calhoun, 1993, p.226), while the language of the elite is generally the language adopted by the modern state by institutionalizing it via the public education system and other administrative ways (Hobsbawm, 1992, p.62).

In an attempt to create a homogenous nation and stable national-identity, states that are host to diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups have imposed policies of assimilation, restricted specific markers of ethnic identity such as language and sought to impose the culture and language of dominant groups on minority populations. Bulcha's (1997) study on the policy of linguistic homogenization in Ethiopia recalls the imposition of Amharic as a national language on Ethiopia's ethnically and linguistically diverse populations[51]. Linguistic suppression, assimilation or homogenization in the promotion of an 'Ethiopian nation' has remained a consistent policy of successive ruling systems as distinct languages indicate a distinct sense of identity, and therefore pose a problem for the promotion of a collective sense of Ethiopian nationhood, Ethiopian nationalism and unity of the Ethiopian state (Bulcha, 1997, p.325-327). This is examined more closely in chapter 4 illustrating Haile Selassie's emphasis on linguistic assimilation in his 1956 inauguration of Ethiopian state nationalism in Qabridahare.

Anderson (2016) devotes considerable attention to the role of print capitalism in the rise of nations and nationalisms. The role of print capitalism in nationalist projects and the material dimension of how a community is highlighted by Anderson (2016) as it gave a new sense of permanence to language contributing to the notions of antiquity and primordialism at the very heart of the subjective idea of the nation (p.44). This sense of shared imaging as Hastings (1997) puts it, is 'a growth in realization of, and preoccupation with, certain important shared characteristics' rather than a baseless imagining (p.22). Anderson (2016) stresses the role of print capitalism in enabling this, yet despite the absence of mass printing or indeed literacy in many parts of the world during the nineteenth century, vernacular literature and orality played a decisive role in shaping the social imagining of communities. Though Anderson (2016) does not consider the role of orality as opposed to written literature in people's self-awareness and self-imagining as part of a larger nation, it is an important element of inquiry with regard to Somali oral traditions in this study. In attempt to reconcile this tension between orality and

[51] Amharic is spoken by Ethiopia's dominant ethnic group- the Amhara who constitute less than 20% of Ethiopia's population (Bulcha, 1997, p. 325).

written literature, Hastings (1997) suggests that it is when a people possess a written literature that they are empowered enough to resist external domination. It is also a combination of written language (read by a few) and spoken language used by the masses which can together stimulate a self-consciously distinct identity and a linguistically inspired nationalism (Hastings, 1997, p.30-31).

The rise of print certainly enabled language to attain an unprecedented type of fixity adding to its sense of permanence and eternal character (Hobsbawm, 1992, p.61). It encouraged a stable orthography and form while contributing to the idea of the antiquity and longevity of national identity, importantly; print capitalism contributed to the standardization of administratively authorized languages at the expense of other languages (Calhoun, 1993, p.233). It facilitated the promotion of a dominant language in line with the promotion of a single national image, through a cultural and linguistic homogenizing project to the detriment of diverse peoples possessing unique cultures and languages. In Ethopia, Haile Selassie's institutionalized 'Amharinization' project sought to serve this function in the promotion of Amharic as the national language, with 'Amharinization' came the enforcement of a particular imagination of 'Ethiopianess' which obscured differential forms of identities within the state. Ethnosymbolist inquiry interrogates the use and abuse of pre-modern tools such as language and ethnic decent in the construction of nationhood which, as this thesis posits, may be deployed both as an instrument of domination or a mode or resistance.

2.4.3. Myths

Myths and collective memories form an essential component of ethnosymbolist concern with the use of past cultural resources to sustain the nation. Nationalist myths generally refer back to a distant past often considered as a golden age not only to validate or legitimize specific systems, but also to stimulate radical changes modelled upon a unique past. According to Smith (2004), 'myth exaggerates, dramatizes and reinterprets facts. It turns the latter into a narrative recounted in dramatic form' which constitutes its popular appeal (p.34). In the *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Smith (1986) questions the very existence of any sense of a coherent or single past, and the extent to which interpretations and reconstructions of the 'past' are invented to meet present needs (p.177-178). He describes 'national mythologies' and 'myths of ethnic origins and decent' as reconstructions of earlier communal memories and motifs combined with both objective data laced with legends, and fantasy for the purposes of an ethnic regeneration (p.191). Contrary to the idea that nationalists 'invent' or 'construct'

history, Smith (1986) proposes that rather than considering historical myths employed as complete fabrications designed to meet a certain need, we should approach them as 'recombinations of traditional, perhaps unanalyzed, motifs and myths taken from epics, chronicles, documents of the period and material artefacts' (p177-178). It is in this restricted sense of the word that nationalist mythologies may be referred to as 'inventions' based on the new ways of combining existing motifs and other elements (Smith, 1986, p.177-178).

Moreover, a key instrument of a nation's self-awareness and persistence is the use of myths of ancestry and origins, similarly, memories and myths of a collective ethno-history comprised of golden ages-history, territory, ancestry and community are among the key ingredients for the socio-symbolic elements of national self-perception. Myths of origin can be divided into myths surrounding ethnic/ or genealogical ancestry and myths on civic origins. The former recounts the ancestral lineages of particular communities for instance 'the ancient Greek myth of descent from Hellen, the Japanese myth of imperial descent from the Sun Goddess, the Turkish myth of ethnic descent from Oguz Khan, the Jewish myth of descent from Abraham' and so forth (Smith, 2009, p.91). The Abyssinian myth of ancestral and civic origin follows a similar pattern, Christian central and northern highlanders; specifically, the Amhara are considered to be descendants of the Kingdoms of Da'amat (ca.700-400BC) and Axum (ca.100-800 AD) (Marcus, 1994). It is based upon this continuity between the pre-Askumite period, Ancient Askum Kingdom and modern-day Ethiopia that Ethiopian nationalist mythologies draw upon. Smith (2009), describes the cultivation of myths of origins as cultural resources that delineate between those that belong to the nation, and those who exist outside of it (p.91-92). The 'degree of association with the legitimizing myths of nationhood' (Clapham, 2002, p.11) determines one's inclusion or degree of marginality in relation to the said nation. This thesis illustrates how the legitimizing myths of Pan-Ethiopian nationhood promoted and institutionalised by Ethiopian state nationalism remains exclusionary, and how these legitimising myths of nationhood are rejected and challenged in opposing Somali nationalist discourses and other dissenting nationalisms.

2.5. Operationalising Ethnosymbolism: contemporary significance of pre-modern elements of nationhood

For a meaningful exploration of the cultural resources that sustain any nationalist articulation, the myth of the 'modern nation' provides far too narrow a paradigm by exaggerating the role that modern

developments such as the rise of capitalism, industrialization and other modern conditions have had on the development of nations and their role in today's world. Therefore, as chapter 3 (methodology) elaborates, this study adopts an integrative approach to Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) which combines an ethnosymbolist lens with key postcolonial concepts on sovereignty and cultural elements sustaining the nation. Such an approach provides the necessary framework and analytical tools not just to investigate the research questions posed, but it provides a distinct way of framing the problem that this study is centred around- namely, the oppressive disposition of Ethiopian state nationalism, and the imperative to resist this. It helps legitimate why a discursive approach is important and helps make explicit the underlying assumptions regarding core concepts (i.e. nationhood, discourse and power) that inform this interdisciplinary project which draws upon multiple perspectives and theoretical traditions. Ethnosymbolism highlights the significance of pre-modern elements of the nation such as ethnic origins, language, and myths in terms of their contemporary manifestations. This study is not concerned with when a nation came into being (modern or pre-modern), because, as stated, the very fact of its constructedness is the basic premise of the approach to nations adopted in this study. Instead, this study draws upon the broad thematic architecture of the ethnosymbolist approach which emphasises 'the persistence and embeddedness of "the myths, symbols and memories" (the Holy Trinity of ethnosymbolism)' (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.348) in the self-imagination of the nation. Essentially, ethnosymbolist theory allows us to look at the contemporary significance of drawing on pre-modern cultural and symbolic tools.

Pre-modern elements of nationhood such as the appeal to shared ethnic ancestry are used as a means to draw legitimacy in the construction of 'the nation' and to legitimise nationalist claims. Pre-modern resources continue to have contemporary manifestations in the way that they shape cultural, political and social relations, they feature prominently in nationalist discourses particularly in resistance discourses to assert themselves against all-encompassing state narrations. Pre-modern socio-symbolic and cultural resources may be used as a tool of oppression or a method of resistance in the discursive construction of nationhood within contemporary rival nationalisms. Ethnosymbolysm allows us to critically decipher how present nationalist discourse is shaped by pre-modern elements through a detailed understanding of the past. The theoretical approach adapted for this study underscores the significance of pre-modern elements in invoking the nation, the politics of this invocation, and its significance in shaping contemporary nationalisms.

An integrative approach to DHA which combines an ethnosymbolist lens with its orientation towards critical theory essentially problematises the ways that myths, symbols, memories, historic figures and events, which constitute the very foundations of any nationalist doctrine, are used by nationalist discourses to legitimise certain political claims over others. They are significant cultural resources that may be used both by state-sponsored discourses seeking to legitimise claims over a given people (or territory) for political purposes, and resistance discourses as legitimising tools for seeking self-determination by establishing their distinct nationhood (Guibernau, 2004, p.127). As Ozkirimli (2003) argues, what is more important than the presence of pre-modern or historic cultural materials in nationalist discourses is the way that they are selected, how they are 'used and abused' which in turn reflects contemporary realities and concerns (p.347). For instance, while paying attention to the exclusions that are displayed or implied, this study finds that the construction of an overarching and common Ethiopian political past in statist discourses are achieved by evoking specific type of myths including myths of origin, heroic/mythical figures, victories, crisis etc. which correspond with the historical and political climate at any given time. I examine the way that Somali nationalist discourses appropriate these very tools to resist state-sponsored discourses, especially through the concept of 'recontextualization'[52] by dismantling, redefining or transforming the same tropes and symbolic resources used in state discourses which serve to reinforce domination.

In conclusion, the aim of this thesis is not to categorise the nationalist discourses under study as 'good' or 'bad' as nationalism is neither good nor bad and can take both 'benign and malignant forms' (Hogan, 2006, p.118). Instead, it seeks to highlight and bring to the forefront Somali nationalist discourses that have historically belonged in the margins of the Ethiopian state. By centring such discourses through the integration of indigenous knowledge systems for discourse production (i.e. oral histories), we are able to approach the discursive as a terrain for defining and re-defining power relations as opposed to centring statist discourses and focusing solely on how they perpetuate domination. At the centre of this research agenda, is to problematise the power relations between state-builders, and those subsumed and dispossessed under its nationalist project. This concerns the unequal relations between those who discursively construct state-sponsored discourses of nationhood- placing limits on what constitutes as legitimate discourse, and the lives of those who are subjected to experiencing its violent manifestations in the context of Ethiopia. Analysis of statist

[52] 'Recontextualization' in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) refers to the analysis of intertextual and interdiscursive links between genres, topics or arguments (*topoi*) and discourse contextualisation (Wodak, 2001, p.69-71).

discourses allow us to interrogate the language of those who write of the nation, while Somali resistance discourses provide a novel insight into the experiences and lives of those who live it.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has developed a theoretical approach anchored in socio-symbolic and cultural readings for examining Somali nationalist resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism. It provided an overview of approaches to nations and nationalisms with an emphasis on constructionist theorisations, followed by postcolonial concepts of the nation emphasising notions of sovereignty and the cultural constructions of postcolonial nationalisms which is drawn out more explicitly throughout the chapters of this thesis. As this study contends, Somalis in Ethiopia have exploited the cultural domain as a means to exert their sovereignty which corresponds with the postcolonial focus on the cultural domain as a means for marginalised peoples to assert their distinct modes of nationhood in the face of repression and political domination.

This chapter has further provided a discussion on core ethnosymbolist concerns including pre-modern cultural and symbolic elements (i.e. ethnic roots, language and myths) used to construct the nation as well as their contemporary significance, followed by outlining how I adapt an ethnosymbolist approach for a critical discursive inquiry. As it is not enough to argue that cultural resources such as symbols and myths are exploited in nationalist discourses to further particular political agendas, I take ethnosymbolist questioning further by asking how cultural symbols are used, under what socio-political conditions, what do they include and what do they omit? And what knowledge regimes are implied in their adoption. Such an approach allows for a novel interrogation of the way that symbolic and cultural resources are used as legitimising tools to sustain and authenticate nationalist claims. This enables us to theorise about their persistence and longevity, and the varying ways that they compete for dominance providing new insights into understanding the cultural construction of nationalisms.

This contributes an original theoretical interpretation of dissenting nationalisms on the margins of Ethiopian society. As the following chapter describes, this study adopts an integrative approach to Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) which combines an ethnosymbolist lens with the core tenants

of critical discourse theory. I put into dialogue DHA's concern with the use of past cultural resources and the analysis of discourse within its socio-political and historic specificity, with ethnosymbolism's emphasis on past socio-symbolic resources used to imagine the nation, construct a sense of sovereignty and legitimate present claims in nationalist discourses. The following chapter further provides a detailed discussion of the methodological framework, data collection process and tools for data analysis employed in this study.

3. Methodological Framework

3.1. Overview

Methodologically, this study is geared towards a political commitment to interrogate how certain knowledge systems relating to the core tenants of Ethiopian state nationalism came to be inscribed as the officialised national (and international) discourse, and more importantly, how these very discourses have been appropriated and challenged by opposing Somali discourses. The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of Wodak and colleagues (de Cellia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999; Wodak and Reisigl, 2009) belonging to the school of Critical Discourse Studies (Van Dijk, 1990; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) is the methodological approach adopted in this study, allowing us to examine how domination and resistance are discursively constituted. First, this historically focused approach to discourse analysis provides the framework for tackling the question of how politically and historically entrenched modes of imagining Ethiopia vis a vis the Somali Region came to be. Further, how the discursive challenges mounted against these established ideas constitute a disruption against the Ethiopian nationalist project through the production of alternative notions of nationhood and experiences from the Somali periphery. Moreover, this study asks how these institutionalised ideals are articulated, under what sociohistorical junctures, and how they have acquired a distinguished pedigree by evoking cultural and symbolic resources.

At the centre of this research project is the aim to interrogate the production of Somali nationalist discourses as a site of resistance against the institutionalised hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism, and how they are situated in larger systems of meanings and historical continuities of resistance. DHA illuminates how resistance discourses can be transformative in deconstructing and destabilising the histories and hierarchies that produce dominant knowledge systems which have cemented relations of domination in Ethiopia. It can also serve a transformative function by re-defining relations through the centring of marginalised resistance discourses which allows for the seeing or hearing of difference, as Charrett (2020) notes, this opportunity is inhibited by 'the ritualised reproduction of knowledge' as it performs and produces 'a static and unmoving recognition of the Other' (p.5). As will be elaborated in this chapter, this study is framed around the notion of discourse as a site for competing claims to political legitimacy. These competing ideas relate to opposing frontier imaginations, statehood, nationhood and belonging, national unity vs self-determination among others. They are articulated

and reproduced using a range of cultural and symbolic resources (i.e. historical memories, myths, shared symbols, and cultural tropes) that resonate with recipients. Discourse is considered as a site of struggle for competing ideologies/ nationalist claims where power exerted and resisted discursively also has material ramifications.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the general research approach used in this study followed by a discussion on the data collection process including a reflection on the associated challenges and opportunities. This is followed by an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) drawing attention to the key concepts central to all CDA schools such as power, ideology and critique followed by a brief description of different approaches to CDA. I then proceed to frame the key principles of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), which forms part of the field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), explaining how I operationalize key tools of analysis in this thesis. This is followed by an outline of how ethnosymbolist inquiry elaborated in the previous chapter is operationalised in conjunction with DHA. The Chapter concludes with a reflection on the overall research design, and how it meets the criteria of rigour necessary for researching complex social problems.

3.2. Research approach

The Somali Region in Ethiopia is defined by a serious data gap due to a long history of violence and protracted insecurity which has rendered data collection in the vast Somali terrain a difficult task to undertake, as Hagmann (2005a) notes; 'contributions on political developments in the Somali Region since 1991 have been rare and meagre in empirical information' (p.510). The critical and interpretive methodological approach adapted for this research is best tailored towards addressing the research problems that this study is designed around, namely to access the discursive[53] construction of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia and contribute to a new body of knowledge which departs from state-centric conceptions of existing nationalisms in Ethiopia. A critical discourse analytical approach meets the objective of de-mystifying the hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism and redressing the exclusion of the lowland peripheries in Ethiopian studies which this thesis sets out to achieve. Moreover, combining historical sources, oral data and discursive analysis, the research design adopted best

[53] In this thesis, 'discursive' entails all components of discourse and communication including orality, textuality and other aspects of meaning-making i.e. visual communication, this is in line with the principles of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) adapted in this study which is interested in the use of language beyond the textual level (Wodak, 2015, p.1).

addresses the question of how Somali nationalist discourses resist the repressive function of Ethiopian state nationalism, what cultural and symbolic resources are exploited to re-define relations of domination, and in what ways Somali resistance has transformed the entrenched hegemony of pan-Ethiopian nationalism. Through adapting critical and interpretive methodologies, this thesis demonstrates how Somali resistance discourses subvert dominant pan-Ethiopian imaginations and its underlying cultural meanings and symbolisms.

In order to determine the most suitable research design for answering the questions posed by this study, it is first necessary to gain a meaningful understanding of the underlying philosophy of the chosen methodology. It is equally important to establish the underlying assumptions about 'reality' and 'knowledge' that shape the chosen research design; this is done through understanding of the ontological and epistemological assumptions (Scotland, 2012, p.9). More broadly, it is key to establish the 'philosophical worldview' (i.e. philosophical conceptualizations about the world and the essence of research) which underpin the chosen subject of study, the fundamental ideas entailed within that worldview, and how this specific view informs the chosen approach to research in terms of methodology and methods (Cresswell, 2014, p.5-6).

This study is based upon both an interpretivist and critical paradigm. An interpretivist framework is underpinned by the ontological position which believes in the existence of multiple realities which are subject to alteration and are locally constructed (Laverty, 2003, p.26). Equally, it is a relativist perspective which stresses the subjectivity of reality as something negotiated which varies depending on the individual (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.110). A key challenge which emerges from this is the question of what makes certain claims to truth more credible than others. However, the purpose of this research is not to claim objective truth but to attempt to 'bring into consciousness hidden social forces and structures' (Scotland, 2012, p.12). This is enabled by interpretive methodologies which draw upon qualitative interviews; such a framework is primarily concerned with 'understanding and the reconstruction of experience and knowledge' through the perspective of the interviewees (Laverty, 2003, p.26). The following section describes the process of collecting empirical data before proceeding to establish the modes of analysis employed in this study.

3.3. Data Collection

There are two types of data I use in this research: 1. semi-structured qualitative interviews with political actors in the Somali Region in Ethiopia, and 2. archival data for the dual purposes of a.) collecting Somali nationalist literatures and visual data for discursive analysis, and b.) for acquiring historical data on the history of resistance in the Somali territories to supplement my analysis. DHA highlights the significance of methodical triangulation which can be achieved by using multimethodical designs which incorporate a variety of available empirical data and background information through the concept of 'context' (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.32). To enable triangulation, I use multiple datasets consisting of qualitative interviews and archival resources which facilitates the integration of all available historical knowledge about any given discourse. Methodological triangulation is further enhanced by integrating multiple perspectives via theoretical triangulation as elaborated in Chapter 2.

Discourse historical analysis allows for historically situating the discourses under study, considering the social and political grounds upon which such discourses take shape; this necessarily includes not only language, but other forms of meaning-making such as art, symbols etc. Moreover, analysis of historical dimensions allows for the examination of 'the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change' (Wodak, 2011, p.65) and under what specific conditions. As well as incorporating other forms of meaning making outside of language, I primarily use written texts ranging from archival records, political manifestos, organisational communication, artistic discourses (I.e. poetry and songs), as well as oral testimonies derived from qualitative interviews.

I completed the first phase of data collection from December 2018 to February 2019, the second phase from May 2019 to September 2019, and the third phase from November 2019 to January 2020. During these months, I spent time in various parts of the Somali Region conducting interviews, accessing archives and witnessing the significant changes happening in Ethiopia during this time. In the following sections I describe the data collection process in further detail.

3.3.1. Archival Research

Researching historical data relating to the history of Somali resistance in Ethiopia serves two main purposes: 1. to accumulate a large sample of discursive materials for the purpose of conducting a

critical discourse historical analysis, and 2. to develop a detailed historical context for the materials under study using archival historical data. I retrieved Somali nationalist literatures via personal collections belonging to elders and community leaders, while generic historical data was more readily available at archive centres such as the National Archives in London. Here I was able to access primary historical sources relating to Menelik's imperial conquests, the 1940s Ogaden disarmament campaign, the period of the British Military Administration (BMA), the independence of the Somali Rpublic in 1960, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and their approach to territorial disputes in the Horn of Africa, and documents on the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) among others.

The politics of archives, whether personal or public, has important implications for the selection of archival materials and their subsequent analysis in this research project. National archives reflect the collective memories of a nation illustrated through what materials are included, how they are classified, and how systems of classification reflect socio-political realities and structures of power (Brown and Davis-Brown, 1998). Archives are inherently political as they play an important role in shaping national consciousness and designating what is deemed important and thus worthy of preservation. In addition, whether privately owned or publicly held in larger cultural institutions, archival collections may be 'described just as much by what they don't contain, as by what they do' (Brandt and Glajar, 2017, p.193). For instance, some materials which I expected to encounter at the National archives in London were missing, these materials include documents reflecting local movements and developments in the Somali Region after the departure of the British Military Administration (BMA) in 1955. Likewise, national archive collections reflected elite exchanges and thus elite and statist conceptualisations of historical processes and key events. The interdisciplinarity of DHA allows for the complete integration of historical context in the analysis of discourse, as such, for the purpose of this research, elite discourses are significant for deconstructing the ways that Ethiopian state nationalism has acquired both meaning, and dominance. This analysis is further supplemented by accessing marginalised discourses via oral sources and community resources.

3.3.2. Sampling

As described earlier, there are two types of empirical data that this thesis is based upon; qualitative interviews and archival data comprising of Somali nationalist literatures for the purpose of conducting a discourse historical analysis, and for the purpose of acquiring primary historical data on the development of Somali nationalist resistance. The selection criteria used for generating both datasets

reflect the two main historical events which this dissertation is centred around; mobilisation surrounding the 1977 Ogaden War, and the ONLF armed insurgency against the Ethiopian state (1991-2018).[54] However, the selection of archival and historical sources is not limited to the two historical events alone. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century is when Menelik II began articulating the Ethiopian nationalist project, which came to feature as the corner stone of modern-day state nationalism; historical data starting from this period is also used in line with DHA's concept of 'context' in conducting historical discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.32).

Before conducting the interviews, I established a selection criterion for approaching prospective interviewees. Categories of interviewees include senior political figures who served in the Somali Regional Administration since its establishment in 1991. The second category include rebel actors involved in the 1960s rebellions headed by the *Geesh*, WSLF rebels associated with the 1977 Ogaden War, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (1994-2018) led insurgency against the Ethiopian state (spearheaded by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) led EPRDF regime). Like the selection of Somali nationalist literatures, this selection criterion reflects the two main historical periods that this thesis is based upon; the 1977 Ogaden War, and the era of the EPRDF (1991-2018) following the downfall of the Derg regime. Selection process was guided by ethical considerations and a constant state of reflexivity as I will describe in the following sections. Interviews were transcribed and reviewed based on the same 'content' areas or themes applied to the analysis of selected historical materials outlined in section 3.6.3. These themes focus on key nationalist claims, contested political pasts, territoriality, rival frontier imaginations, and how reference to these political claims mobilise ideas related to myths, political pasts, symbols, homeland (reference to place), ancestry, religion, triumphs and defeats, memories, historic figures and events to evoke legitimacy. Together, the two complimentary empirical datasets provide both the methodological rigour required for qualitative research and allowed for an intimate access into the cultural constructions of Somali and Pan-Ethiopian nationalisms. The association of Somali oral traditions with qualitative interviews is an added value where one of the methods of data collection complements the modes of expression unique to the society under study. Indeed, oral modes of communication (i.e. poetry) is employed in

[54] While the ONLF launched its armed insurgency against the Ethiopian state in April 1994, 1991 marks Somalis' integration into federal Ethiopia's 'new political order' (Markakis, 1994). As an active political group, clashes and outright confrontation between the ONLF and state forced began as early as 1991. For instance, see the battle of Birqot informally known among ONLF members as '105.'

Somali society 'as a mass medium of communication and a repository of knowledge about the past' (Andrzejewski, 2011a, p.9).

3.3.3. Qualitative interviews and Orality

Using methodologies that celebrate depth, nuance and complexity provide an unrivalled capacity to display the lived experiences of Somali peoples through their resistance as a marginalized peripheral nation in Ethiopia. Therefore, by using qualitative semi-structured individual interviews with actors who were instrumental in either organizing or participating in resistance movements inside the Somali Region in Ethiopia, there is an opportunity to uncover deeper meanings and capture different dimensions of the research questions posed by this study. Such methods can facilitate an in-depth inquiry into the impact of dispossession and silencing by the assertion of power through the Ethiopian nationalist project, as well as insight into discursively articulated modes of resistance. While the analysis of selected primary materials reveals forms of knowledge that are embedded in, and produced by, systems of power; qualitative interviews can capture the subjective experiences and forms of resistance that have emerged from effects of domination. This has led me to adopt a qualitative approach to data collection which serves to investigate and understand the various meanings that individuals, groups or particular segments of society attach to a human or social problem or phenomena (Creswell, 2014, p.4). I explore statist discourses advancing the nationalist vision of Ethiopian state nationalism in Chapter 4 followed by the use of uniquely Somali forms of knowledge transmission (i.e. the Somali political verse) combined with qualitative interviews in subsequent chapters, this centres Somali resistance discourses in an increasingly hierarchical context between centre and periphery in Ethiopia.

Moreover, the suitability of the use of qualitative interviews as the most conducive to answering the research questions posed by this study is further evidenced by understanding the history and traditions of the society that is being studied. Understanding the centrality of oral traditions and oral folklore in Somali society renders qualitative interviews as a prime method of data collection. Oral traditions are an integral part of the pastoral Somali lifestyle, and the strong adherence to this tradition over centuries has been able to preserve knowledge and information regarding past events such as conflicts, clan relations, genealogical lineages etc. Since the Somali language had no formal orthography until 1972, all written history available on Somalis has been constructed through oral data and history (Hjort in Abokor, 1986, p.i). As such, oral data and literature is indispensable for research concerning Somali societies, as Abokor (1986) notes, it 'is an essential reference material for the researcher. A research

work lacking this vast oral data would certainly be incomplete' not least due to 'it's important historico-cultural values' (p.vi). This further necessitates the use of particular type of discourses that are distinct to the Somali Oral culture as the object of study; such discourses include Somali war songs, folktales, poems and poetic chains which are distinct to the social, economic and political context of the Somali Region. Somali oral traditions comment on public affairs; from grand matters pertaining to 'the nation' to immediate concerns of the community successfully influencing events by shaping public opinion and inspiring their listeners to action (Andrzejewski, 2011a, p.9). As such, this study adopts the viewpoint of oral traditions as a legitimate reflection of historical, social and cultural references which marks a departure away from the ethnocentric gravitation towards written materials as symptomatic of historical objectivity (Lange, 1981, p.1). An emphasis on orality in this project serves particular analytical purposes; it constitutes a way of accessing marginalised histories as well as personal and popular memories concerning past events.

Qualitative interviews provide the tools and framework for achieving 'inter-subjective depth' by seeking to document and gain a deep understanding of participants' views, this perspective is thus awarded a 'culturally honored status of reality' (Miller and Glassner, 2004, p.126-127). In sharing the subjective experiences of the participant, as Charmaz (1995) notes, 'our task is objective in the sense that we try to describe it with depth and detail. In doing so, we try to represent the person's view fairly and to portray it as consistent with his or her meanings' (p.54). This is contrary to how 'objectivity' has been most commonly understood in the context of objectivism, which holds that there is a reality that exists in and of itself separately from the mind; and that this reality is accessible and can be known (Fay, 1996, p.200).

Moreover, interpretive methods such as qualitative interviews reveal complex patterns in social and political events as participants can draw connections that are often ignored, underplayed, or buried entirely. Forging new ways of approaching the subject in question driven by their particular experiences and insights is a further advantage. Qualitative interviews have the potential to uncover the often-complex multiple discourses and narratives that characterize what is generally termed as discourses of 'resistance' discourses for instance. Such discontinuities and ruptures, which is a key concern in discourse historical analysis, pose a challenge to the standardized discourses associated with any given topic. The act of shifting between various discourses reveals evolving perspectives, often competing ones, which provide a meaningful insight into the variations of perspectives available on

any given phenomena. Overall, my role as the researcher is not just to present their views, but to analyse them.

I analyse qualitative interviews using manual techniques such as coding thematically based on the content areas described in section 3.6.2. Narrative analysis and detailed note taking are also used to classify information and identify patterns and reoccurring features. I have captured instances where research participants asked that certain points be emphasised, and when permitted I have recorded interviews and stored them in a secure drive.

3.3.4. Access and research setting

I have gained access to interviewees through a network of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) officials in exile (before October 2018), and through contacts established in Jigjiga, the capital of the Somali Region. The process of identifying and recruiting research participants during the first half of 2018 coincided with a politically uncertain environment. Key informants inside the Somali Region including rebel leaders were inaccessible as they were either engaged in armed conflict or incarcerated serving life sentences, forcing me to shape this research project around exiled ONLF officials. Likewise, former Somali Regional State presidents resided in Jigjiga, the capital of the Somali Region which was inaccessible for outsider researchers who were not open supporters of the former president, Abdi Mohamoud Omar 'Abdi Iley.'

Following the appointment of President Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, there have been a series of developments towards opening the political space across Ethiopia including the release of political prisoners and the normalisation of relations with neighbouring Eritrea (Matshanda, 2020, p.25). However, the Somali periphery remained excluded from the series of reforms which swept across the country until August 2018 when Abdi Iley was removed from power. The sudden change of leadership in the Somali Regional administration as well as the removal of ONLF from Ethiopia's terrorist list meant that ONLF leaders and supporters could remain and assemble freely in the Somali Region Region. My fieldwork coincided with a historic moment in time which was unprecedented throughout the course of the past 24 years as ONLF was engaged in an armed insurgency against the Ethiopian government. For the first time since April 1994, ONLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian

government in October 2018 and operatives within the region were able to showcase their symbols publicly and assemble freely without fear of persecution. On top of that, ONLF leaders in exile all returned to Jigjiga, this facilitated my access to a wide range of key figures- both those with first-hand experience participating in successive resistance movements over the past few decades inside the region, and ONLF leaders who returned from exile. This shift in the political climate further facilitated my access to a collection of Somali archives in Jigjiga (consisting of internal organizational communications and historical literary materials). These materials were assembled by the head of Information and Resources of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), community elders and others.[55]

Interviews with all 30 research participants were conducted at their preferred location, while most interviews took place in Jigjiga, others took place in remote villages which required further travel. I found that the interview settings, particularly those conducted outside of Jigjiga with Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) rebels, corresponded significantly to the meanings and experiences articulated during interviews. Elders often made extensive references to surrounding historic sites evoking a greater a sense of depth in conveying their lived experiences as rebels. Interviews mostly lasted between 2-3 hours, while some lasted over the course of several days. Owing to the stable political environment, no explicit political or security threats were imminent while conducting interviews.

Several factors can be described as having facilitated my access to required research participants. The most significant factor relates to my status as what Greene (2014) calls 'insider researchers' who have the advantage of access that outsider researchers may not have so easily, this is intrinsically linked to the advantages of pre-existing understandings of the cultural context which facilitates an open and honest discussion with a researcher who is not deemed to be an outsider (p.3-4). Ganga and Scott's (2006) work on positionality in qualitative research drawing on the examples of an Italian researcher interviewing Italian migrants, and a British researcher interviewing British migrants in different contexts for instance revealed that sharing an ethnic, cultural and linguistic heritage with the participant grants the researcher the status of a 'community insider' and thus a sense of proximity to the participants which may be lost to other researchers. Similarly, my status as 'community insider' enabled me to develop a level of trust with the participants necessary for the type of sensitive political

[55] Hussain Nuur served as the ONLF head of information throughout the duration of data collection for this research project, but no longer serves in that capacity.

views they would share. Sharing a cultural and linguistic heritage further enabled me to make sense of common culturally constituted Somali references and idioms participants made to individuals, events, and key geographic markers. My pre-understandings of their significance and other cultural cues and inferences allowed for uninterrupted interviews without the need for explanations meanwhile building a crucial sense of rapport.

Despite my position as an 'insider researcher', the question of 'truth' in qualitative interviews still has important implications. As Brunner (2002) notes, 'memory and imagination supply and consume each other's wares', and 'fuse in the process' (p. 93). The issue relating to participants answering questions truthfully may be attributed to questions of memory and time; recollections of the past occur in the context of present concerns and future anticipations, and since the two are subject to continual change, the past becomes a mobbing target and 'our interpretation of it can hinge intensely on the context in which we recall it.' (Randall and Phoenix, 2009, p.127). As memory is invariably contested; the interplay between public memories and private recollections also carries specific cultural meanings important for accessing Somali nationalist thought. The inherent subjectivity of memory is valuable in that it reveals deeply personal attitudes, thus allowing for deeper examination of how these attitudes came to be, as well as the silences that emerge. As collective rememberings are (re)constructed through an accumulation of, and engagement with these individual memories and understandings of the past; we are able to theorise about the interplay between collective and individual memories.

Despite this, both language and time serve as constraints against the possibility of what could be shared by the participant, for instance interviews can only realistically take place for a set period as they are not infinite. Moreover, what participants choose to highlight and how they choose to do so may reflect how the researcher is perceived in relation to the participant. For instance, if the researcher is seen to belong to the same social category as the participant, membership of the same social group may determine the additional depth that the participant may go into. On the contrary, not belonging to the same social category as the participant may create a layer of distance leading them to refrain from sharing certain details. Similarly, categories of race, gender, class and age also shape participant and interviewer interaction (Miller and Glassner, 2004, p.126-p.128). My experience conducting qualitative interviews in Jigjiga has revealed this challenge intimately, on one hand I experienced the privileged depth in information acquired which stemmed from sharing a cultural and linguistic

background with the participants, yet categories of gender and age played an equally important role in influencing the interview process in less productive ways.[56]

Moreover, considering the long history of violent conflict in the region and the complex ways that alliances formed, sharing a cultural and linguistic background with interviewees was not enough to building rapport. While this may have been the case for the elite interviews conducted, it was not the same for rebels who possessed a deep-seated distrust for the government due to historical experiences of prolonged surveillance. Being perceived of as someone who had no affiliation with the previous repressive administration thus proved to be an additional advantage in terms of my ability to build rapport with interviewees. As Chapter 6 will explore in detail, the classification of 'opponent vs ally' is a common trope which features within ONLF discourses and entrenched within the institutional culture of the organisation; 'opponent' is not used synonymously with the state (with whom ONLF was at war), but rather, anyone who fought against the ONLF even if they shared a common Somali identity.

The institutionalised practice of state surveillance has rendered inhabitants of the region to be extremely cautious of sharing their political views, particularly when these views are in opposition to official or state-sanctioned discourses. In the context of post-October 2018 after the ONLF signed a peace agreement with the Government of Ethiopia in Eritrea, some former rebels would explicitly state prior to the interviews that they had nothing to fear and would speak freely given that they have survived worse than anything else that could possibly happen to them (as a result of these interviews). Ultimately, the existing political climate combined with my status as a community insider enabled me to attain a trusting relationship with the participants to the extent of being provided by them with additional visual data corresponding with the themes under discussion. Visual data has proven to be symbolic while serving an important analytical purpose within the framework of DHA's multimethodical design which I illustrate in the discussion chapters to follow.

[56] Patriarchal tendencies in Somali society, the considerable age gap between some participants and I combined with the significance assigned to 'elder' status in relation to 'youth' created a visible power imbalance in some of the interviews.

3.4. Reflexivity and ethics

Since 'value free knowledge' is an impossibility (Scotland, 2012, p.12), within an interpretivist paradigm, researchers constitute active participants in their chosen research topic in that their values, experiences, assumptions and beliefs all play a role in choosing what is deemed important enough to research and what the best way to research it is (Edge & Richards, 1998, p.336). Ensuring self-reflection throughout the research process and making transparent one's own position is key; my own history and identity have played a determining role both in my decision to study this topic, and in determining the best way to do that.[57] This renders me, as the researcher an active part of the data collection process, my embeddedness in the social, cultural and linguistic context under research all have an influence on my ability to relate to the participants and thereby extract information. This can have both negative and positive consequences. As the researcher, I am aware that though my analysis of the data generated by an interpretive approach will provide a deep insight into the participants' understanding of past events based on their personal recollections, the way that I understand and thereby analyse this data is ultimately based on my own interpretations of it. In this regard, Scotland (2012) rightly asserts that 'researchers need to make their agenda and value- system explicit from the outset' (p. 12). Thus, Reflexivity around one's own biases and preconceived values and assumptions in the way that they influence the research process, is a challenge which all researchers employing qualitative methods must be aware of.

My own pre-understandings and assumptions on the topic under investigation is signified by the overall methodological approach I adopt. As discussed earlier, from the onset, a critical discourse approach is centred upon the problematisation of a particular issue- in this research it is 'Ethiopian State nationalism' and how it is resisted via opposing nationalisms. Moreover, due to the open-ended nature of the qualitative interview methods that I employed, there is an increased risk in facing unforeseen obstacles around autonomy and privacy. Once trust is established, and a level of intimacy is attained, the open-endedness of such interviews makes it hard to determine the exact course that

[57] The researcher's embeddedness in the research process is an important component of the constructionist approach adopted in this study, it is in line with Charmaz's (2008) constructionism which makes the assumptions that '(1) Reality is multiple, processual, and constructed—but constructed under particular conditions; (2) the research process emerges from interaction; (3) it takes into account the researcher's positionality, as well as that of the research participants; (4) the researcher and researched coconstruct the data—data are a *product* of the research process, not simply observed objects of it. Researchers are part of the research situation, and their positions, privileges, perspectives, and interactions affect it' (p.402). Likewise, instead of dismissing their existence, prior knowledge and preconceptions about the topic which the researcher brings is acknowledged and subjected to scrutiny (Charmaz 2008, p.402).

the conversation is going to take. Unexpected discoveries may arise, including secrets or indeed dangerous or oppressive situations that the participant finds themselves in, which places the researcher in an unprecedented ethical dilemma on whether to maintain confidentiality or not (Howe & Moses, 1999, p.40). This is particularly applicable to a certain category of participants in this research; for instance, elite interviews conducted with former presidents of the Somali Region did not reveal any such ethical dilemmas and were unlikely to do so either. On the other hand, interviews with members of the ONLF, some of whom were involved in armed combat for 24 years carrying with them highly sensitive experiences, were more likely to reveal problematic secrets, or unexpected information. I found that elite interviewees specifically requested that I conceal some of the names of individuals they referred to as part of their narration of events. They displayed an awareness of the implications that their words may have due to their status in society and possible future political ambition.

This specific issue ties into a larger debate around whether differentiations should be made between research participants based on power and categorisations of elite as opposed to non-elite. The idea of 'researching up' has come to be associated with its own distinct set of challenges; 'working in an elite field poses major difficulties which stem from the challenges of researching up, which are quite different to those encountered in studying down' (Desmond, 2004, p.262). On the other hand, Smith (2006) problematizes the distinction made between 'elite interviews' and non-elite interviews, arguing that 'elite' interviews do not pose a distinct category. Rather, this categorisation stems from a particular conceptualisation of power, and relations of power between interviewer and interviewee (p.644-5). A 'structural' view of power subscribes to the notion that power is something which is possessed, the powerful are in possession of power whereas the powerless are lacking this type of power, Marxist conceptualization of power emphasise the essence of power in this manner i.e. something which is possessed by some (bourgeoisie) and not by others (Smith, 2006, p.644-5). On the other hand, a more fluid understanding of power not as something which is static as in the poststructural tradition associated with the work of Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault, consider it 'as far more diffuse and mobile; it is continually circulating and allows more possibility for the role of individual agency' (Smith, 2006, p. 645). As such, whether differentiations are made between different categories of interviewees based on their social or economic condition, every interview poses distinct challenges for the researcher, and the likelihood of encountering the unexpected is always a possibility.

Having discussed the methods of data collection used in this study comprising of qualitative interviews and archival data, the following sections proceed to outlining the methodological approach guiding

this work. Subsequent sections further develop the analytical tools used to conduct a critical discursive analysis on Somali nationalist literatures applying The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of Wodak and colleagues (de Cellia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999; Wodak and Reisigl, 2009) belonging to the school of Critical Discourse Studies (Van Dijk, 1990; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).

3.5. Overview of CDA

The research agenda of Critical Discourse Analytical (CDA) approaches centre around understanding, explaining and subsequently analysing the relationships between complex and often contested historical processes and hegemonic narratives (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.11). CDA is not politically neutral and makes explicit its emancipatory agenda from the outset by uncovering the relationship between discursive practices and the reproduction of unequal power relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.63). CDA necessitates the consideration of 'force, power and relations in formation within the ever changing 'non –discursive' global processes such as economic, political and cultural' processes (Irene, 2014, p.10-11). Furthermore, CDA research is interested in the way that discourse reproduces systems of domination; however, it is not solely confined to focusing on the power abuse of dominant groups over others, but also on 'how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse' (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.9). This is the twofold agenda taken up in this study; first to trace the production of dominant discourses underpinning the ideology of Ethiopian state nationalism, and secondly, to reveal how this is discursively resisted by Somali nationalist discourses from the margins.

Nationalism is considered as the foremost and most /commonly used discursive form for contemporary claims to self-determination or greater political autonomy (Calhoun, 1993, p.213). It has the capability to mobilise people towards a specific political action, for instance discursive constructions of identity manifests itself materially in the form of action -whether this is violence by the perpetrator or resistance against domination. This study subscribes to the notion of discourse as defined within CDA: 'as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it' (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 259). Discourse is constitutive in that it 'represents, creates, reproduces, and changes social reality' (Reisgil, 2017, p.51), thus nationalism as an 'ideological discourse' 'can only be understood when it is considered always as 'part of the discursive articulation of particular social formations' (Finlayson, 1998, p.103, p.111). Discursive

events are 'in dialectical relationship with the situations, institutions, and social structures which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them but it also shapes them' (Wodak, 2002, p. 8). The discursive events under study in this dissertation is that of specific cultural repertoires used within nationalist discourses which draw upon, and subsequently inform broader socio-historic and political processes. Symbolically, they shape meanings and values associated with their desired political agenda; they have symbolic and material manifestations.

Norman Fairclough's (1995) three-dimensional model is considered one of the most sophisticated systematic approaches to the study of the relationship between language and social practice/relations in the field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). His model relates to three levels of analysis: text, discourse practice, and social practice. At the level of text, close textual analysis pays attention to grammar, metaphors and so on seeking to unpack how text constructs certain interpretations while discourse practice looks at the conditions that shape the production and consumption of discourse. Finally, an analysis of social practice relates to the non-discursive elements that inform the wider context around the discourse under study (Fairclough, 1992, p.237).

Though they share important similarities, differences remain between the various approaches that come under the school of CDA. One such difference pertains to varied approaches to discourse, for instance Wodak's DHA and Fairclough's approach adopt a postructuralist consideration of discourse and the social as mutually constitutive, which is evidenced by their empirical focus on the function of discourse in social, political and cultural change. This contrasts with approaches in the same school that focus empirically on the role of discourse in social reproduction and discourse as a manifestation of an underlying power structure (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002 p.91). Another example of such differences is van Dijk's (1991, 1993, 1997) socio-cognitive approach which emphasises the role of cognition in mediating between discourse and social practice. Within CDA, Wodak's DHA and Fairclough's approach is rooted in Gramscian notions of power and hegemony which considers power as something which may be 'negotiated' and potentially even resisted (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.91). CDA approaches further adhere to Foucault's theory on discourse which considers it 'as partly constitutive of knowledge, subjects and social relations' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.92).

Studies in CDA do not adhere to a single methodological orientation as there is no consistent or fixed CDA methodology or theoretical perspective (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.31); they are varied and adopt several different approaches. For this reason, it is important to clarify the specific school within CDA

that this research adopts, its conceptualisation of key themes such as 'ideology' and 'power,' as well as defining the notion of 'discourse' and 'criticality' which features throughout this study. CDA is strongly grounded in theory as different approaches within CDA have a variety of theoretical influences such as social cognition theories, Marxist theories among others, yet there is no overarching theoretical perspective that is adopted exclusively or coherently within CDA studies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.23). Subsequent sections proceed to describe the conceptualisation of key concepts featured in CDA research, the way that they are adapted in this study and their situatedness in wider theoretical traditions.

3.5.1. Critique:

Criticality in CDA refers to political critique or critique aimed at the status quo. Adopting this concept as a central research agenda marks a departure away from descriptive or abstract discourse analytical approaches. Critique against the status quo may relate to the specific order of discourse for instance against an alternative or preferred ideal. The understanding of critique in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) is theoretically attributed to the Critical Theory of the first generation[58] in terms of how oppressive ideologies and systems of abuse are enacted and resisted, while the second source of inspiration is drawn from Foucault's notion of critique which is centred around questioning the naturalisation of social relations (Reisigl, 2017a, p.50).[59]

Criticality is the common feature shared by all CDA approaches, it has an emancipatory dimension with an emphasis on critical knowledge production and promoting a greater realisation on how forms of domination are (re)constituted and enacted in society. For instance, in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) used in this study, validity claims such as those relating to (theoretical) truth and normative rightness serve as important pillars of DHA's concept of critique (Reisigl, 2017a). This is because the notion of truth is almost always at stake in political discourses, particularly those criticising or justifying past actions or histories, and deliberative discourses based upon ideas on what should be done (i.e. the justification of state action/violence) or what shouldn't be done (Reisigl, 2017a, p.50).

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[58] See *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947).

[59] Wodak and Meyer (2009, p.6) argue that that the term 'critical' in CDA can be traced to the influence of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School in the work of critical linguists. Meanwhile Reisigl (2017a, p.50) cites Critical theory (as well as Foucault's approach to critique) as theoretical sources necessary for the understanding of 'critique' as it appears in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA).

Critical discourse theorists focus on the 'ideological effects' of discursive practices in the way they create and (re)produce unequal power relations, this is in line with the Marxist notion of ideology as an instrument of subjugation. Thus, CDA is concerned with '*both* the discursive practices which construct representations of the world…including power relations, *and* the role that these discursive practices play in furthering the interests of particular social groups' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.63). Essentially, CDA seeks to bring to the fore power relations that are otherwise obscured or hidden. Based on the assumption that discourses are historical and must be understood in their given context, CDA approaches integrate extralinguistic factors such as ideology, politics and culture to reveal the ways that power relations operate within discursive practices (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.20). As Fairclough (1995) notes, the relationship between discursive events and wider socio-political structures, events and processes 'are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power… these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony' (p.132-33). The following section describes how the relationship between discourse and power is approached in this study according to the methodological orientation of DHA and influences from Foucault.

3.5.2. FDA and DHA: Power and Ideology

The link between power and language is a primary concern not just within CDA but within sociology as in the work of Bourdieu (1991) and in sociolinguistics (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.9). CDA subscribes to the Foucauldian notion of 'power'[60] which holds that power is an invisible and constitutive element of society, while in CDA language is considered as social practice which is embedded within larger societal structures and relations of power. Foucault theorises the way that 'truth' and 'knowledge' function as a site for enacting power relations, he describes power-knowledge regimes as the 'general politics,' processes, discourses and mechanisms which determine what is considered as legitimate discourse or as 'truth,' and what actions are thus sanctioned and legitimated (Foucault, 1984, p.73); this is because power sustains certain 'truths' while truth determines what is accepted as legitimate knowledge- this is the role of power which determines power-knowledge regimes (Foucault, 1984, p.75). Both CDA and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) subscribe to

[60] Some CDA approaches do not subscribe to the Foucauldian notion of power such as Van Dijk's sociocognitive approach.

certain epistemological assumptions on knowledge, namely that it is not neutral and that it has an ideological function creating dominant 'truth claims' which reproduce hierarchical relations of domination (Moosa-Mitha, 2015 p.74-75). Foucault's epistemological assumption on truth and knowledge as questionable and shaped by power relations, leads to the methodological task of not seeking the truth in discourse, but interrogating the way that truth comes to be associated with certain types of discourses over others (Foucault, 1981).

Interrogating the process by which we come to accept something as the truth is a question of power, thus FDA is concerned with the process of truth-making, and by paying attention to power relations, it asks what is implied in a given discourse, what it includes and what it excludes (Macias, 2015, p.225). Moreover, it traces how discourse is situated within 'larger systems of thought' which throughout history shape the production of truth (Macias, 2015, p.226). This relates to CDA's notion of discourse as 'text in context,' and more specifically, the DHA's concern with the broader historical context of a given discourse, as well as the way that discourse forms part of a larger set of discourses by drawing from one another and from existing repertoires. Moreover, the importance of situating discourse within the material world is key to both DHA and Foucauldian discourse studies. In the case of the latter, Hook (2001) argues that power in discourse 'links to, and stems from, external, material and tactical forms of power' (p530); power is not manifested within the internal structure of text but links to external material conditions too. This further relates to the study of discourse necessarily involving close attention be paid to the 'conditions of possibility' which determine what can or cannot be said, and the conditions and relations that determine who is considered to have the right to authoritatively speak on a given subject thereby producing certain truths (Foucault, 1986, p.149).

In the context of Ethiopia for instance, the authority vested within the imperial court determined what was possible to be said about the country, its borders and its political claims. Such discourses came to take the form of a ritualised state narrative composed of taken-for-granted truths and dominant knowledge-systems regulated both physically (via institutional force) and discursively within the realm of discourse in interconnected ways. Chapter 4 explores this in detail with emphasis on the role of Haile Selassie in institutionalising specific power-knowledge regimes as part of the dominant state narrative placing limits on what can and cannot be said through processes of legitimation and de-legitimation. As Macias (2015) states 'discourse is not only what is, but also what we are able to hear within specific fields of intelligibility' (p.228). Thus, drawing selectively on Foucault's genealogical approach allows us to determine the specific historical moments where discourses acquire the status

of 'truth' or a hegemonic status, which simultaneously points us to the specific moments where other discourses became excluded and deemed illegitimate thereby sparking resistance (Foucault, 1986).

Since discourse is considered as 'a node within a network' (Foucault, 1972, p.23), both the concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality feature significantly in FDA and DHA analysis, they reveal how such normative discourses are situated within broader socio-political events and historically situated ideas about state formation, colonialism, repression and resistance in the context of Ethiopia. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity point to the significance of context and broader systems of meaning that inform discourse which is a core feature of interdisciplinary discourse historical approaches; the concepts extend beyond analysis of relations between different texts, but instead points to DHA's incorporation of the broadest range of possible factors that may influence discourse (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.11, 21). As Wodak and Reisigl (2009) explain: 'DHA considers intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, as well as extra-linguistic social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames' (p. 90). The thesis demonstrates the intertextual connections between various Somali nationalist literatures from Sayyid Mohammed's early 1900s political verses, to ONLF's articulations of resistance a century later by incorporating broad historical patterns and continuities in the analysis.

Moreover, In the DHA, ideology is conceptualised by Reisigl and Wodak (2015) as an often-one-sided perspective, 'a system composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, values and evaluations which is shared by members of a specific social group' (p.36). Ideologies serve to develop shared representations on key social and political issues, they help shape a coherent answer to such issues in relation to other groups, or often in opposition to them. In this sense, ideology may be defined both as 'social systems' shared by groups, institutions, organisations etc and 'mental representations' that determine, and to some extent control what groups, organisations and institutions hold as true beliefs (Van Dijk, 1997, p.27-28). Ideologies further 'monitor the structure of knowledge as well as its acquisition' (Van Dijk, 1997, p.29) regulating what is possible to be said.

As described in this section, the role of power is central to the discourse analytical projects of both Foucault and the DHA. What sets apart approaches that come under the CDA school from both Foucault and Lacau and Mouffe's abstract approach to discourse analysis, is that CDA approaches such as Fairclough's three dimensional model, Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach and van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach are textually oriented and systematically analyse language use as part of a

wider social practice where discursive practices are rooted (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.92).[61] The following sections provide a more detailed overview of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) and its core tenants, describing how it is adapted for this study.

3.6. Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)

The distinguishing feature between DHA and other approaches within CDA is that it is modelled on historical analysis through the concept of 'context' (i.e. history) and is defined as one of the most linguistically oriented approaches to the study of discourse. DHA focuses on developing frameworks for the study of political discourse using linguistic theories (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.26-7). This study adapts the Discourse Historical Approaches developed by Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) and the analysis presented by Risigl & Wodak (2001) in *Discourse and Discrimination* on three separate case studies on the discourses of populism, racism and anti-Semitism.

The discourse historical approach (DHA) was first developed for the systematic analysis of discriminatory discourses, specifically anti-semitic stereotype referred to as `Feindbild' in the 1986 Austrian presidential elections (Wodak et al., 1990; Mitten, 1992; Gruber, 1991) and later elaborated in other studies on discourses on nationhood and the construction of national identity relating to the discursive construction of national difference and sameness (Wodak et al., 1998, 1999; Matouschek et al., 1995). Recent use of DHA in the study of commemorative events focus on the way that they symbolise or project hegemonic ways of dealing with and addressing traumatic pasts in different societies, such studies have looked at the media and speeches at national (memorial) events to analyse the way that specific myths are constructed to dispense new 'sanitized narratives' which obscure any problematic ruptures such as past conflicts which may have happened in the past (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.19)[62]. The way that DHA has been developed for the study of commemorative events is important for the adaptation of specific DHA concerns in this research project, as commemorative events are some of the keys moments where myths that perpetuate hegemonic narrativess can either be constructed (I.e. elements of Ethiopian state nationalism) or resisted by opposing nationalist discourses. Moreover, I pay attention to the cultural and symbolic resources that ethnosymbolist

[61] Foucault's discourse theory nonetheless features prominently within different CDA approaches including the French Structuralist approach and social semiotics.
[62] For more details on the use of DHA in the study of commemorative events see Ensink and Sauer, 2003; Anthonissen and Blommaert, 2007; Reisigl, 2007.

theory outlines as the devices used in nationalist discourses to manifest or resist hegemonic conceptualisations of state, territoriality, identity and other core nationalist claims.

DHA adheres to a multifaceted concept of social critique; the first relates to the level of text or discourse also referred to as text/discourse immanent critique aimed at revealing contradictions and conflict in discourse or text-internal structures with special emphasis on rhetorical and argumentation schemes (Wodak, 2001, p.64-65). The second dimension is the 'socio-diagnostic critique' which takes into account the broader context within which discursive practices are situated in order to demystify the underlying (and potentially problematic) meaning of discursive practices. The last principle aims at transforming communication by producing guidelines for relevant institutions such as tackling language barriers in court rooms, media institutions, hospitals and so on (Wodak, 2001, p.64-65). The notions of critique in DHA relating to text/discourse imminent critique and the socio-diagnostic critique is drawn upon more pronouncedly in this study. This is due to the emphasis placed upon integrating historical, social and political knowledge in critiquing ideology and examining the way that discursive practices relate to wider social processes providing a comprehensive social and political critique (Reisigl, 2017a, p.51). DHA research does not focus on the historical dimension of discourse alone, but has a particular interest in specific areas of discourse studies including, but not limited to discourse and politics, discourse and identity, discourse and history, and politics of the past which fall within the domain of this research project (Reisigl, 2017a, p.48).

Other examples of DHA studies that this thesis is influenced by include 'Languages of the Past' (Wodalk et al., 1994) which was concerned with various aspects around way that the 50th anniversary of Hitler's occupation of Austria was commemorated. Among other themes, the study focused on the official commemoration of the Austrian 'Anschluss' in 1938, the controversial discussions around the unveiling of a 'memorial against war and fascism' and the premier of a play exploring Austrian anti-Semitism and its long-term impact on survivors (Wodak, 2001, p.71). The study integrated a large dataset comprised of media sources such as printed media and television and political addresses providing a differentiated examination not just of the media's recollection of the event, but a differentiated scrutiny of the officialised and political discourse. Moreover, it problematizes the way that the Austrian national past is remembered, highlights conflicting historical narratives and prompts a critical reconsideration of official and convenient myths (Wodak, 2001, p.71). This type of problematization has an application beyond the Austrian context and beyond the specified focus of the above-mentioned study. As such I have adapted this approach to deconstruct ritualised Ethiopian

nationalist political claims and the underlying resources that sustain these claims (I.e. myths), and how Somali resistance discourses take shape discursively and engage with these ritualised state narratives.

3.6.1. Approach to 'discourse' in DHA

Stuart Hall's (1992) conceptualisation of discourse as a set of expressions which provide language for talking about or representing a specific type of knowledge concerning a topic, is a strong influence in this study. Discourse determines the possible ways that a topic may be constructed- 'it also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed' (Hall 1992, p.291). Discourse structures what can and cannot be said on a given topic placing limits on what constitutes as legitimate discourse. The framework of this study is based on the central assumption that discursive processes contribute to the establishment of systems of meaning and knowledge, and that discourse is a form of social practice which constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social and political processes and structures (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.61). Discourse is not a closed or static unit and discursive boundaries are difficult to demarcate, I approach discourse as a 'dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation and continuation' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2011, p.89). Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) as presented by Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Wodak & Reisigl, 2001; 1999; Wodak, 2002 also approaches discourse (both spoken and written language) as a form of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). In other words, discourse is best understood as the way that 'political, social and linguistic practice impose themselves practically' (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 17). It is a way of presenting a specific domain of social practice from a specific point of view (Fairclough, 1995, p.14). DHA is interested in the use of language beyond text and the sentence level towards various other forms of meaning-making, as discourses are in a mutually constitutive relationship with other semiotic elements and institutions (Wodak, 2015, p.1).

Thus, in the DHA, discourse is defined as the following:

- a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- socially constituted and socially constitutive;
- related to a macrotopic;
- linked to the argumentation about validity claims—for example to truth and normative validity, which involves several social actors with different points of view (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 89).

The interdisciplinary nature of the DHA requires that the researcher looks beyond the study of language alone by accessing various data sets and analysing them from different analytical perspectives. The concept of 'context' is at the heart of the triangulatory essence of the DHA which requires taking into account various data sets, methods, theories and contextual information. The concept of 'context' is also referred to as historical situatedness emphasising the strong historical component in the analysis as the name of the approach suggests (Wodak, 2009, p.26). In Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), discourse is commonly referred to as 'text in context' focusing on the historical, social, political and cognitive context which his at the heart of DHA's triangulatory approach.

3.6.2. Operationalisation of DHA in this study

The approach to discourse adopted in this study is discourse as a way of organizing and producing knowledge, a site for enacting and executing power as well as contesting and questioning it (Negm, 2015, p.285). Discourse Historical Analysis is methodologically oriented towards deconstructing the hegemony embedded within specific discourses, this is done by 'deciphering the ideologies that serve to establish, perpetuate or resist dominance' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2015, p.25). I adapt this methodology first by approaching discourse as a site of struggle for domination between competing political claims via dominant Ethiopian discourse including how they are legitimated, and importantly, how such discourses are de-legitimated and discursively resisted.

The DHA follows a three-step analytical model, first the content or specific topic of a discourse is identified followed by an assessment of the discursive strategies employed, lastly the context-dependent linguistic means of realisations are examined (Reisgl & Wodak, 2015; de Cillia et al.). As depicted in table 1 in this section, I adapt Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) discursive strategies of *construction, perpetuation, transformation and dismantling*, with a focus on argumentation schemes (I.e. *topoi*). Moreover, I analyse the discursive construction of Somali resistance in terms of its 'multi-modal realisations' drawing oral and textual genres, as well as visual communication such as political posters using DHA categories of analysis. This is informed by a broader application of DHA in recent critically acclaimed studies incorporating various facets of discourses such as Wodak's (2015) work on multimedia discourses with regard to the recontextualization of persuasive images and posters across populist parties in Europe (Reisgl, 2017, p.47). The following sections explain the three-step analysis stated

above as captured in Table 1 (content, strategies, and linguistic means of realisation), and elaborated in section 3.6.3. to follow. Reflecting the different levels of analysis employed in discourse historical analysis, the table below is adapted based on the discursive strategies outlined by Wodak and Meyer (2001, p.73) in Table 4.1. However, the discourse content areas in this table reflect the particular focus of this study.

Discourse Content (focus areas):

Territoriality, frontier imaginations, ancestry, myth, historic figures, belonging, conflict, statehood, unity, golden ages, collective memories, triumphs and defeats.

Macro-Strategies:

Construction, perpetuation, transformation, dismantling, (de) legitimisation, (mis) representation

Discursive Strategies (Sub-strategies)

Referential/nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, intensification/mitigation

Linguistic Means of Realisation:

topoi, dectics, metonymy, synecdoche, personification, typonyms/geonyms, personal reference (i.e. pronouns), temporal references (i.e. temporal prepositions) etc.

3.6.3. Content

In historical discourse analysis, 'content' refers to the thematic scope of a given discourse as well as the topics and genres contained within. Within the discourse of nationalism, the construction of a unifying political past or the celebration of historical figures represent examples of topical areas within that discourse. Another way to establish 'content' is through the concept of 'context' looking at the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between genres and discourses as well as the histories of the discourse topics, fields of action and discursive events while integrating a macro-level socio-political and historical analysis (Reisigl, 2017, p.53). Table 1 illustrates examples of topical content areas which are subject to investigation in this study including ideas around territoriality, myths, historic figures, collective memories etc. contained within discourse.

Identity is a key concept within CDA as well as a topical area within nationalist discourses, it is concerned with the way that groups see and present themselves in relation to others. This study is interested in the construction of group identity as manifested through discursive practice; constructed through discourse and subsequently projected onto others (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2017, p.4). I focus on the notion of 'self-other' representation as a discursive terrain where power relations are enacted through the discursive strategies of '*construction*' and '*perpetuation*' and how they are resisted

leading to the emergence of new modes of representations which contribute to the transformation of identity categories.

Due to the breadth of data available for examining the research questions posed by this study, I have adopted a data reduction strategy for selecting materials to analyse. As any single discourse can contain a wide range of themes, I selectively focus on content areas within Ethiopian nationalist discourses and Somali nationalist discourses exploring conflicting nationalist claims, contested political pasts, territoriality and rival frontier imaginations. Secondly, I focus on how reference to these political claims evoke ideas related to myths, political pasts, symbols, homeland (reference to place), ancestry, religion, triumphs and defeats, memories, historic figures and events to evoke legitimacy. To analyse selected texts, I conduct a discourse historical analysis using macro-strategies, sub-function strategies and linguistic tools which I explain in subsequent sections.

3.6.4. Strategies (Macro-strategies and Sub-function strategies)

In DHA 'strategy' refers to a set of practices such as discursive practices used 'to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim' (Wodak, 2001, p.73). In their study on the construction of national identity, de Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) outline five maco-strategies: *construction* which aims at constructing a particular idea of the nation, identities and collective nationalist claims. Strategies of *perpetuation* which reproduce and preserve these constructions, as well as to justify and defend, while *transformation* strategies seek to transform established constructs into an altered version revealing how discourse patterns are subject to change through continuities and discontinuities. Finally, strategies of *dismantling* aim at dismantling these constructs. These strategies are underpinned by sub-strategies which Reisigl and Wodak (2001) present; five types of discursive strategies are outlined in the table below. These strategies reflect the five questions Discourse-historical analysis recursively and systematically addresses in the analysis of discursive strategies: how are objects, phenomena, processes and actions referred to linguistically? What features or characteristics are attributed to them? What argumentation schemes are deployed to validate truth claims? From what perspectives are these arguments expressed? Are they intensified or mitigated? (Reisigl, 2017a, p.51).

Strategies	Objectives	Devices
Referential/Nomination	Construction of ingroups and out-groups	· membership categorization · biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	· stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits · implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	· topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivation/ framing of discourse representation	Expressing involvement Positioning speaker's point of view	· reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
Intensification/mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	· intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances

Table 4.1 Discursive Strategies (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p.73)

In line with argumentation theory, the analysis of argumentative strategies is an important component of DHA. '*Topoi*' is a content-related argumentation scheme, they are 'conclusion rules' which connect arguments with the conclusion or the central claims by justifying the transition from the arguments to their conclusions (Wodak, 2001, p.74). List of *topoi* include the *topoi* of danger and threat, justice, history, culture, law and rights among others that are used in arguments for or against an idea. Analysis of such argumentation schemes are able to reveal underlying content within normative claims to territorial rights, the essence of nation-ness and the construction of particular versions of historical pasts while highlighting forms of exclusion and silences within different modes of representation. Discourses are also located within specific fields of action (i.e. political fields of action) which form the frames of discourse constituting goal-oriented knowledge systems that organise, legitimate, reproduce and change power relations, positions knowledge-structures, institutions, ideologies and identities (Reisigl, 2017a, p.50-1). Argumentation schemes further reveal discourses perpetuating difference through the discursive construction of an 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, this is what Wodak (2001) terms the 'positive self- and negative other presentation' (p.73). I examine the use of this strategy in Ethiopian nationalist discourses as a method of reproducing systems of domination, and

Somali resistance discourses as a means of asserting opposing self-representations and distinct modes of nationhood centred upon Somali cultural imaginations. In line with Discourse historical analysis, I employ these modes of analysis in a recursive manner to reflect how multiple strategies in discourse are used concurrently.

3.6.5. Linguistic Means of Realisation

CDA has a strong linguistic component which differs from other approaches to discourse analysis such as content analysis or conversation analysis for instance. Linguistic categories of analysis lie at the centre of CDA approaches while simultaneously paying attention to 'topics' and 'contents' outlined previously, nonetheless there is no exhaustive list of linguistic devices or tools of analysis provided by CDA or discourse historical approaches as selection is determined by the nature of the research questions posed by individual studies (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p.25). In DHA, Linguistic means of realisation is a category of analysis which refers to the lexical devices and syntactic units used in the realisation of the discursive practices under investigation, Table 1 captures examples of linguistic devices used for various discursive strategies.

3.6.6. Limitations and Triangulation

CDA has attracted criticism which hold that the approach is too deterministic (Hammersley, 1997), and that it provides biased interpretations as analysis is conducted on pre-determined materials chosen to reveal the desired results. Prior to this, the ideological commitment of the approach contributes to the biased selection of materials and its subsequent interpretations (Widdowson, 1995, p.169). The way that sampling is conducted in CDA has also drawn criticism as most CDA studies analyse 'typical text,' but question remains over what may be considered typical under what specific social or political situation, and what the limits may be (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.23). Nonetheless, the role of the analyst is made explicit and both the internal perspective (contained within discourse) and the perspective of discourse analysts is time related. This requires that attention is paid to the perspectives of discourse historical participants too in order to meaningfully capture the historical situatedness of discourse; discourse historical analysis is time-related and is concerned with the present as well as the

past (Reisigl, 2017a, p.54). However, the main agenda adopted by DHA to address the limitations posed above is the concept of triangulation.

Triangulation is a key principle in DHA, the use of varying empirical data sets, the integration of all available historical knowledge and the socio-political context where discourse is located is what distinguishes DHA from other CDA approaches. Triangularity prevents the risk of bias towards a pre-conceived or pre-determined interpretation of discursive events and helps justify arriving at a particular interpretation over another (Wodak, 2001, p.65). CDA is increasingly geared towards incorporating different modes of communication in the analysis of discourse as discourse is multimodally realised, this extends beyond text and talk and includes extralinguistic elements such as images which allows for deeper contextualisation and greater interdisciplinarity (Van Leeuwen, 2006, p.292). Wodak (2001) elaborates on the most salient features of the DHA; it is interdisciplinary both in theory and in practice, it is problem-oriented, both methods and theory are integrated, historical context plays a major role in the analysis of discourse and tools of analysis are tailored according to the specific research agenda. Moreover, intertextual and interdiscursive links between genres, topics or arguments (*topoi*) and discourse contextualisation are analysed and connected through the concept of recontextualization (Wodak, 2001, p.69-71).

Bridging the gap between the discursive and non-discursive is another important feature of triangulation. Discourse analysis alone is not sufficient in the analysis of the wider social practices associated with discursive practices as this includes both the discursive and non-discursive (I.e. the material and non-material world), it is necessary to draw upon social, political or cultural theory (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.69). The discourse historical analysis used in this study incorporates both discursive and non-discursive analysis, as Wodak and Reisigl (2009) state; the DHA considers 'intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, as well as extra-linguistic social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames' (p. 90).

As set out in the methodological guidelines of CDA, I integrate middle range political theories on nationalism as elaborated in Chapter 2, discourse theories (I.e. Discourse historical approach) as well as linguistic theories enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the function of discursive practices in shaping social and political processes and illuminating the link between the discursive and non-discursive.

3.7. Operationalising Ethnosymbolism and Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)

A core feature of Ethnosymbolism, as outlined in the previous chapter, is its concern with the use of the past to draw legitimacy, similarly, historical analysis and the notion of 'context' is central to the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) adopted in this study. Specific historic events have the potential to institute long-lasting socio-political consequences and processes which overtime can alter the underlying components of a given nation. Such events have the power to shape the collective memory of the nation to the extent of both shaping and re-defining its very expression of nationhood- such events feed and sustain nationalist discourses (Ting, 2008, p.474). The transformation and reproduction of discourses overtime can only be traced through an appropriate historical lens. The significance of historical context in DHA, the interrelationship between the changes that discourses undergo and their situatedness in varying contexts is captured in the statement below:

> 'the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate all available information on the historical background and the original sources in which discursive events are embedded. Second, it explores the ways in which particular types and genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change, as has been shown in a number of previous studies '(de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 156).

Similarly, Smith (2009) explains how historic elements such as myths and memories 'continue to play a vital role in shaping social structures and cultures, defining and legitimating the relations of different sectors, groups and institutions within a community' (p.25). The compatibility of the DHA and the ethnosymbolist framework may be derived from their shared emphasis on history – whether as a tool of analysis as in the case of DHA through the concept of 'context,' or the emphasis on specific historico-cultural resources in shaping social structures and political developments. In this study, I focus on the way that nationalist discourses relate to, produce and reproduce a particular national imagining. Additionally, how they draw on historico-cultural elements as legitimating tools for perpetuating or challenging dominant knowledge systems entailed within Ethiopian state nationalism and Somali resistance discourses respectively. I put into dialogue the DHA's concern with the analysis of discourse within its socio-political and historic specificity, with ethnosymbolism's focus on specific symbolic resources drawn upon in nationalist discourses. Ethnosymbolism is credited for offering a 'path-breaking contribution to the study of the cultural aspects of nations' but is criticised for its less pronounced consideration of political implications related to these cultural

aspects (Guibernau, 2004, p.141). This is overcome by the critical agenda of DHA which emphasises the role of nationalist discourse as a site for constituting and re-constituting power relations, as such it takes the cultural resources identified by ethnosymbolism further by interrogating their selection and the political interests that they serve. Ozkirimli (2003) aptly captures the mode of inquiry that the ethnosymbolist lens in this study foregrounds by asking: 'who does the selection? Who decides what is authentic, what is not? For which purposes? How does the selection process take place? Which premodern materials are selected, which ones are left out? In what ways are they reinterpreted and to what extent?' (p.347).

A discursive inquiry into the ways that myths, symbols and memories are disseminated by nationalist rhetoric problematizes these very elements through conducting a close study of the varying sociohistorical and political conditions under which specific myths and symbols gain prominence, and circumstances where the same symbols are resisted (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.350). DHA applied to nationalist discourse takes the level of analysis a step further, by asking the questions of 'which people' and 'whose memories' (Ozkirimli, 2003, p.348), emphasising the role of power and privilege in authenticating certain voices, while invalidating others. In terms of statist discourses, I focus on inclusions as well as exclusions. Moreover, through this line of inquiry, we are able to inquire about how a set of meanings about the Somali region in Ethiopia are produced, how existing relations of domination are re/produced, and how centre- periphery relations are conceptualised from either side. This fciliattes a critical assessment of Somalis' positionality in the Ethiopian body politic. Approaching nationalism as discourse using the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) further illuminates the relationship between dominant modes of imagining the nation and repressed forms of national identification (i.e. the 'Other') (Ting, 2008, p.473). Ethnosymbolism allows us to dissect 'the present self-understandings of nations' (Smith, 2001a, p.119) and how this is articulated and discursively constituted.

3.8. Conclusion

As this chapter has illustrated, this study emphasises the historical dimension of discourse formation considering discourse as a site of contestation and resistance which structures, reproduces and legitimises systems of domination. DHA emphasises the social and historical conditions where discourses are embedded, allowing for a comprehensive theorisation of how Somali resistance has

been defined and re-defined against the claims of Ethiopian state nationalism, disrupting the way that hierarchical systems of domination in Ethiopia are (re)produced and manifested discursively. This study makes an empirical contribution to the field of Somali Studies and Ethiopian studies by examining discursive articulations of resistance capturing the ways that state domination is experienced in the margins through the use of oral data and new empirical datasets produced and preserved by indigenous centres of knowledge in the Somali Region.

The chosen methodology is not without criticism, as with most interpretive approaches, the researcher's embeddedness in the data collection and analysis process risks the influence of preconceptions and personal experiences on the whole research process. Moreover, semi-structured qualitative interviews tend to produce results which may not be generalised outside of selected sample group. Yet it allows us to gain an in-depth and unparalleled access to the perceptions and motivations which shape participant understandings of complex socio-political phenomena. The combination of interpretive and critical approaches using qualitative interviews and a (critical) historical discourse approach allows us to answer the central question that this study is designed around; namely how Somali nationalist discourses resist the repressive function of Ethiopian state nationalism, and how cultural and symbolic resources have sustained the continuity of Somali resistance against this dominant form of state nationalism. Though critical discourse approaches tend to overemphasize dominance, this research design emphasises attempts at subverting the dominant discourse. This constitutes a contribution to knowledge both methodologically, and empirically in terms of producing novel empirical data on the construction of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia.

The chosen methodological approach is most fitting for exploring complex social and political processes which are distinctly context-specific such as the topic at hand. Moreover, such an approach allows us to convey the meanings that the people under investigation attach to their personal experiences of resistance and domination. Using triangulation as a cornerstone of the DHA by applying multiple empirical data sets and incorporating all available historical knowledge prevents bias and the risk of arriving at preconceived conclusions. Finally, the flexibility of the approach enables the researcher to be able to choose from the tools of analysis strategically in accordance with the research agenda.

4. The Discursive Construction of Ethiopian State Nationalism

The opening chapter provided an overview of the literature on the formation of Ethiopian state nationalism, 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism, pan-Ethiopian ideology or the 'Great radition' all used to denote the dominant variation of state nationalism. It established how this form of nationalism has become inscribed as the official discourse on Ethiopian nationhood. This chapter illustrates how Ethiopian nationalism has taken shape as a powerful discursive paradigm that makes claims to uniqueness rooted in an exclusive conception of Ethiopian nationhood. It does so by examining how two key Ethiopian monarchs have mobilised such discourses; Menelik II (1844-1913) and Haile Selassie (1892-1975). Their selection is informed by their formative role in shaping the modern Ethiopian state and its underlying nationalism.

Having discussed the conceptual approaches used in this study and the framework developed for the study of nationalist discourses, this chapter examines the discursive construction of Ethiopian state nationalism using the discourse historical approach (DHA) as outlined in the methodology chapter. I focus particularly on the macro strategies of *construction* and *perpetuation*: i) strategies of construction serve to establish a particular national imagination; this includes the construction of a particular national identity, history, and territory, which simultaneously implies the marginalisation of an 'other' (i.e. the Somali), ii) Perpetuation strategies, often referred to as justification strategies, maintain, justify and reproduce this national imagination through the discursive construction of a sense of threat against this national imagination. Key examples of perpetuation strategies include legitimation and de-legitimation strategies used to preserve and defend an often-problematic status quo or political past (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999, p.160-1). As categories of analysis, I focus on the sub-strategies that underpin the macro strategies serving the construction and perpetuation of Ethiopian nationalist claims; they include strategies of *nomination, predication, argumentation* and *perspectivisation*[63]. This chapter further examines what truth claims are embedded within Ethiopian state nationalism as perpetuated by Menelik II and Haile Selassie, the knowledge regimes that are implied or made explicit, and how they are conveyed discursively, focusing on what argumentative strategies are used to validate them.

[63] As described in the methodology chapter, these sub-strategies focus on how events, characters, places etc. are referred to, what characteristics they are ascribed, what persuasive argumentative strategies are used to justify these characterisations, and what point of view or perspective the statement under analysis emerges from (Reisigl, 2017a, p.52).

Rooted in historical analysis, this chapter illustrates how the hegemonic discourse of Ethiopian nationalism is constituted discursively by two of the state's leading architects focusing on key historical junctures during their reigns. The chapter emphasises the importance of 'context' in discourse historical analysis which entails the integration of all available information and historical background where discursive events are embedded (de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 156). As such, the chapter begins by conceptualising the politics of 'difference' as manifested via Menelik II, founder of the modern Ethiopian state. As he spearheaded violent conquests, he articulated the vision and limits of an 'Ethiopian nation' based on Abyssinian exceptionalism (to the detriment of other forms of identification). This is followed by an examination of the discursive construction of 'sameness' and 'unity' under Haile Selassie particularly during the formation of the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU). The chapter deciphers the way discourses of 'sameness' also instituted new forms of exclusions.

This chapter aims to put into context the source of contestation between Somali and Ethiopian state nationalisms. Also, to historicise the discursive instances that articulated Ethiopia's key political aspirations, particularly in terms of territoriality and frontier imaginations. In addition, how these articulations have acquired a hegemonic status vis a vis Somalis lays the groundwork for investigating Somali resistance against Ethiopia's nationalist project, which the rest of the thesis is devoted to. This study contributes to understandings on the implications of Somali nationalism for the postcolonial territorial status quo in Africa, and for broader Pan-African ideals. Finally, this chapter illustrates Ethiopia's leading role in instrumentalising pan-Ethiopian symbolisms to shape the norms and regimes which were to govern the postcolonial order in Africa.

4.1. Discursive Construction of difference: Abyssinian exceptionalism

Whilst historic Abyssinia refers to the ancient homelands of the peoples of the highland kingdoms in northeast Africa, Ethiopia refers to the empire created in the second part of the nineteenth century as a result of annexing the lands of independent nations and peoples South of the highlands (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). As such, modern day Ethiopia is inhabited by a vastly diverse set of ethnic and religious polities with contesting as well as distinct nationalisms. Ethiopia's Solomon and Sheba myth of descent, ancient written script, and expression of an organized state system dating back to 250 B.C. Aksum, biblical connection and triumphant victory over European colonialism at the battle of Adwa

in 1896, has bestowed upon the ancient empire, a prestigious sense of mystique unique only to itself. In addition, as the home of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) it has come to be considered as the official 'capital of Africa' (Geshekter, 1985, p.4). Ethiopian discourses of nationhood and state mythology are centred on a three-thousand-year history, and conceptions of 'state' in the twentieth century following the expansion of Abyssinia was heavily influenced by Emperor Haile Selassie as he exported and appropriated the Western nation-state model whilst maintaining a central Amharic core (Marzagora, 2017).

Late nineteenth century discourses provide formative articulations of the pan-Ethiopian nationalist project. Based on historical records, examples of such articulations are first found in the proclamations of King Menelik II - the founder of the modern Ethiopian state. Secondly, the far-reaching statements made by Haile Selassie both within the context of African diplomacy via the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) as he sought to institutionalise Ethiopian nationalist claims, and in the Ogaden in 1956 are equally important. However, prior to them both, in a letter Emperor Yohannes IV of Abyssinia wrote to Queen Victoria in 1879[64], historical archives reveal how explains the early mission of Ethiopian state nationalism. He states:

> 'With God's power, I became strong by Your Majesty's cannons and guns and sat in the throne of my fathers. After I was crowned, there was Heathens who worship idols, and I went to submit them and bring them to Christianism.'

This statement by King John of Abyssinia in 1879 represents one of the earliest remarks of a sitting monarch capturing both the underlying mission of the pan-Ethiopian nationalist project, as well as the construction of differential identities which are to inhabit the Ethiopian empire once the process of conquest began in the late nineteenth century. The discursive strategies of *nomination* and *predication* outlined in chapter 3 are most evident revealing the discursive construction of events, actors, and actions through particular characterizations. This is done through attributing both negative and

[64] Yohannes's words are inscribed in the image of a letter extracted from *Through Abyssinia. An envoy's ride to the King of Zion* (1890, p.075) by Smith, Horace Francis Harrison – Sir, K.C.B. digitised by the British Library.

stereotypical characteristics to those outside of the Abyssinian core while stereotypically grouping diverse nations and peoples under the term 'heathens.' Central and Northern Highlanders are considered to be 'the carriers of the historical civilization of semitized Ethiopia' and the 'distinguishable Abyssinian type (Ullendorff, 1973, p.31-35). In Ethiopian studies, this is also referred to as the 'Aksumite and Orientalist Semeticist paradigms' (Tibebu, 1995, xxiii) which has also historically privileged the study of Christian highlanders as representing true Ethiopians.

Moreover, 'the throne of my fathers' draws upon both spatial and temporal references referring to his position as the sitting monarch, but more importantly, it captures the temporal and historical establishment of a unique ancestry through the term 'fathers' with no clear demarcation of the point of origin. Anderson (2016) establishes that the nation is imagined as both limited and sovereign (p.7).[65] While the spatial limitations of any given nation may refer to clear demarcated boundaries, temporal limitations are not as clear-cut. Indeed, a core feature of Ethiopian state nationalism is the insistence on a nation-ness which can be traced to the very beginning of time. While the ancient Solomonic Empire has been both multi-ethnic, multilingual as well as multi-religious, Menelik II's military conquests towards the end of the 1800s gave birth to the modern configuration of Ethiopia (i.e. the modern state), the diversity of nations which came to make up this new state was unparalleled (Marzagora, 2017, p. 429). Solomonic emperors and leaders were presented with the difficult task of formulating new concepts of nationhood and the policies that would uphold this (Marzagora, 2017, p. 429). Ethiopian state nationalism is not only premised on a pre-modern sense of shared kinship as claimed by many nationalist ideologies, but on a specific ancestry which dates back to biblical times providing an ancient, exclusive and core identity.

However, as de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) state 'the relationship of uniqueness is nothing but a relationship of difference to all other elements involved in the comparison' (p.162), and King John's statement suggests a marked difference between Christian highlanders, and 'heathens' who needed to be submitted to Christianity thorough violent conquest. The positive-self and negative-other representation of Christians vs. heathens marks a distinctly Ethiopian reproduction of the 'colonial

[65] It is limited due to the 'finite' boundaries of any given nation and sovereign because of the challenges that the Enlightenment era posed to the authority and legitimacy enjoyed by monarchical ruling systems (Anderson, 2016, p.7).

paradigm of Christianity versus paganism' (Kebede, 2003, p.14).[66] Ethiopian history thus retains a 'core' or a 'nucleus' from which history began (i.e. the Abyssinian monarchy), and the natural perspective from which history will continue (Yusuf, 2009, p. 382). This core is what is also identified as 'Abyssinia proper' and 'Abyssinians proper' (Ullendorff, 1973, p.31-32). Orthodox Christians, particularly those who speak Amharic and Tigrinya *are* Ethiopia whilst other nations merely *become part of* Ethiopia, and as such it is only the Amharas and Tigrayans that have a history whilst other people's possess somewhat of a 'sub-national sub-history' which is ultimately absorbed within the national epic (Clapham, 2002, p.40).[67] Yohannes IV's statement captures the notions of bringing the 'civilizing mission' to a barbaric population, the maintenance and continuity of an ancient Christian kingdom, and the exclusive identity upon which Ethiopian state nationalism should be centred. Illustrating the continuity in key messaging articulated by leaders of the Ethiopian state pertaining to identity construction and the imagination of an exclusive concept of Ethiopian nationhood, Menelik II provides an important insight into the rationale behind Ethiopian state nationalism. First it is necessary to frame the mythic image of Menelik II himself which plays a key role in shaping the imagination of state nationalism.

4.2. Menelik II

The figure of the 'hero' is a central motif which features prominently in any given national imagination. This is because the various stages of the development of a community's national mythology require heroes to realize and pursue the destiny of the community whose 'genetic code' is already laid out (Smith, 1986, p.192). The commemoration of heroes and personalization of legends as part of specific golden ages is a universal phenomenon illustrated via memorials, national buildings and statues (Smith, 1986, p.192).[68] The controversial figure of Menelik II is a case in point, as mentioned, he is credited for the significant expansion of the empire through military conquests during the last part of the 1800s,

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[66] In the course of the 20 years following the Berlin Act of 1884, the supply of firearms turned the Abyssinian kingdom into a great empire whilst continuing to maintain that the arms were needed to 'subject savage heathen people' and 'prevent them from battering their outpost of Christianity' (Fitzgibbon, 1982, p.13).

[67] It is interesting that huge tracts of territory and the people within them who are under the control of the Ethiopian Empire are featured within Ethiopian history selectively whilst entirely excluded at other times. Whilst they are central to the 'Great Tradition' in substantiating Greater Ethiopian nationalism, they are afforded the least agency. See Christopher Clapham (2002, p.40)

[68] The Equestrian statue of Menelik II located, the Lion of Judah monument symbolising past emperors including Menelik II, including Abiy Ahmed's most recent opening up of Unity Park (palace of Menelik II) in Addis Ababa has drawn criticism from diverse communities for lionising the violent legacy of Menelik II and past emperors through public commemorations and displays. See for instance the mass coverage of Hachalu Hundessa's criticism of Menelik II statues aired on Oromo Media Network (OMN) prior to his assassination.

and as such he is credited for the creation of the modern configuration of Ethiopia (Sorenson, 1993). Menelik II conquered Wollo between 1868 and 1876, and by 1882 conquered Somali and Oromo territories. The addition of Gurage, Arussi and Harar by 1887, gave Menelik control of some of the most strategically important south-easterly trade routes, outlets to the sea and the access to exploit coffee, ivory and gold found in these newly conquered territories[69] (Keller, 1981, p.527). Between 1890 and 1906, Menelik added the Ogaden, Wollamo, Sidamo, Kaffa, and Bale to his territories expanding the state of Ethiopia to its present-day configuration (Keller, 1981, p.527).

Moreover, he is further commemorated and mythologized for spearheading Ethiopia's defeat against Italian colonialism at The Battle of Adwa in 1896, this historic win fuelled the image of Ethiopia as the 'protonation of liberated Africa' and its emergence as a symbol of African liberation and nationalism consolidated Ethiopian colonial ambitions over the Horn of Africa (Iyob, 1993, p.261-269). In Ethiopian nationalist mythology, Menelik II presumes the figure of a central hero in Ethiopia's symbol of African independence against European colonialism, preservation of a unique and ancient kingdom under threat, and the psychological rewards of nationalist pride and superiority produced by the unique image of an independent African Kingdom (vestal, 2005, p.32).

4.2.1 Identity Construction via Menelik II

> 'From Menelik, King of Shoa and all the Gallas, good and bad! How are you? By the grace of God I am well! Amir Abdulla would suffer no Christian in his country. He was another Gurne (Gurey). But by the help of God I fought him, destroyed him, and he escaped on horseback. I hoisted my flag in his capital and my troops occupied his city. Gurne died. Abdalla, in our day was his successor.' (F.O.881/6943, Menelik to Rodd 1897)

Harar was captured by Menelik's forces on January 8th, 1887 which opened doors for further expansion into Somali territories where raids were orchestrated immediately after. The political significance of incorporating Harar into the Empire is derived from its status as 'the city which for so long had been a menace to the Christian highlands' (Henze, 2004, p.152). This statement by King Menelik following

[69] For a more detailed account of Menelik II see Marcus, H (1975) *'The Life and Times of Menelik II.'*

the capture of Harar draws upon discursive strategies of argumentation using the *topos* of history and the *topos* of threat. The *topos* of history appears in Menelik's reference to Ahmed Gurey, a prominent sixteenth century historical figure who waged a war against Abyssinia, and whose reference serves to legitimise the attack on Amir Abdulla's city. *Topos* of history often allude to historical lessons learnt as a means to establish normative rightness, in this case it is the rightness of conquering Harar and a justification for why Amir Abdulla should be considered as the enemy of the state the same way that Ahmed Gurey is designated as the enemy of historic Abyssinia[70]. Moreover, the *topos* of threat appears in the discursive construction of a sense of threat against the Ethiopian nationalist project which serves to justify why victims (constructed as threats) are responsible for the injustice they face. This is also achieved through the use of declarative sentences i.e. 'He was another Gurne (Gurey)' which appear factual. Since the capture of Harar violently symbolises conquest, these argumentative strategies contribute to establishing the normative rightness of Abyssinian expansionism as means of legitimising the territorial status quo of present-day Ethiopia.

In addition to this, an important function of the *topos* of danger or threat as described by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) is the reversal of the role of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' when the victim is ascribed with threatening qualities in a bid to justify prejudicial treatment and subjugation. Menelik does so by ascribing Amir Abdulla, and by extension the people he represented, with the threatening qualities associated with Ahmed Guray in the Ethiopian nationalist imagination. Moreover, the reference to Ahmed Gurey also presupposes a particular representation of him as an evil force against the state according to dominant Ethiopian historiography,[71] whereas in Somali nationalist discourses, Ahmed Gurey is celebrated as a hero for the war he waged against Abyssinia. As Mpofu (2017) states, postcolonial African states imagine their sense of nationhood based upon 'having had and having conquered a common enemy – the settler – as having created the nation-as-a-people' (p.64). The symbolic significance of Ahmed Gurey as the common enemy of Abyssinians (and therefore Ethiopian nationalism), is precisely why he is hailed as a hero for non-Abyssinian nations within

[70] In Ethiopia, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (al-Ghazi) or Ahmed Gurey is known as 'Gragn.' He is considered to have waged a war (or *Jihad*) against Christian Abyssinia during the Gragn wars of 1529-1543 (Churnet, 2017, p.68). For a detailed account on Ahmed Gurey's war, see: *The Conquest of Abyssinia (16th Century)* by Sihab ad-Din Ahmad And al-Qader also known as *Futuh Al-Habasha* derived from his original Arabic account.

[71] References made to Ahmed Gurey made by the Abyssinian monarchy throughout history reveal interdiscurive connections. It reflects an agenda to justify their political acts (often relating to forceful religious conversion, cultural assimilation or territorial expansions) by exploiting the fear of Islam. For instance, to justify his violent campaign against the Muslims of Wollo, Yohannes referenced Ahmed Gurey's Islamization of Ethiopia as a means 'to activate his audience's nationalist sentiments' (Bulcha, 2005, p.15-6).

Ethiopia. The contested image of historical figures such as Ahmed Gurey and how they are appropriated by anti-Ethiopian nationalisms is featured in Somali nationalist literatures, for instance 'Ahmed Gurey is not dead' written by Maxamed ibraahim Warsame 'Hadraawi' for '*Aqoon iyo Afgarad*' – a 1972 stage play contains the following verses:

'Ahmed Gurey is not dead
The 'Dervish' is not barren
My mere is not tired
My arrow is not blant (it is sharp)
If a brave one stands for me, I will conquer my land…'[72]

Furthermore, the *topos* of religion and positive-self representation are also key argumentative strategies used by Menelik to establish the normative rightness of his claims and justify his actions, he does so by establishing that God is on his side, thereby drawing legitimacy from the divine: 'by the help of God I fought him.' The allusion to divine support in extending the boundaries of the kingdom reveals interdiscursive connections to other genres displaying the symbolic elements of Ethiopian nationalist construction i.e. The *Fetha Negast* (Law of Kings), a legal code dating back to 1240:[73]

> 'When you reach a city or land to fight against its inhabitants, offer them terms of peace. If they accept you and open their gates, the men that are there shall become subjects and give you tribute, but if they refuse the terms of peace and give you battle, go forward to assault and oppress them, since the lord your God will make you master of them.' (Collection of customary law: The Fetha Negast Law of Kings p.501).

[72] A more contemporary example is a 2016 resistance song by ONLF activist, Abdifatah Jarmal containing the words: 'The fire Ahmed Gurey lit has not been extinguished' illustrating continuity and the centrality of Ahmed Gurey in Somali nationalist thought by means of symbolising a threat against the Abyssinian establishment. It further reveals continuities in the relationship between the centre and peripheries across varied historical periods and political systems.

[73] Ethiopia's 1930 Penal code is heavily influenced by the *Fetha Negast*. The principal importance of the Fetha Negast, according to Tzadua (2009) Is as a symbolic document which 'strongly reflects the Christian character of the Ethiopian highlands that remains at the core of national character (p.xxxiv).

The *Fetha Negast* echoes the exclusive divine support reserved for the Abyssinian core and the monarchy who possess a unique and distinct identity, and whose territorial expansion is divinely sanctioned according to the underlying rationale of Ethiopian nationalism. 'The Lord your God will make you master of them' indicates that the Lord is not the God of the conquered, and that the *Fetha Negast* is the source of reference used by Menelik II and King Yohannes as argumentative strategies for legitimising their expansionist project as both claim that they fulfilled their nationalist missions with the help of God. Intertextual connections made across texts, namely the *Fetha Negast* wherein moral and religious authority is vested, reconstitutes ideologies of chosenness and the moral legitimacy of carrying out these conquests.

Moreover, *Kebra Nagast* (the Glory of Kings) is another important pre-modern cultural and symbolic tools that the mythology of Ethiopian state nationalism is centred upon. This fourteenth century national epic. This epic contains a number of important claims; among the most critical is the idea that the Ark of the Covenant was relocated from Jerusalem to Aksum where the Son of Solomon and Sheba found a new 'Solomonic' dynasty. The Glory of Kings essentially propagated 'an ideology of chosenness' which became the philosophical basis for legitimising a hierarchical ordering between Christian cores and their non-Christian peripheries (Marzagora 2017, p.428; Ahmed, 1992). Moreover, The Glory of Kings also directly represents Ethiopia's sense of unique past, present and destiny, as well as 'the speaker of Ethiopia's self-proclaimed identity and mission' (Kebede, 2003, p.3). The epic stresses 'the primacy of Ethiopia as God's favoured among the nations', it is both a sovereign and inclusive polity entrusted with a special mission (Levine, 2011, p.314). As a pre-modern cultural tool, the *Kebra Negast* acts as a legitimizing tool for the nation born out of the narrative of the text, it provided the Solomonic decedents with the mandate to embark upon holy wars against pagans and Muslims in the form of violent expansions (Reid, 2011, p.26-27). Interdiscursive links containing both implicit and explicit connections between the *Fetha Negast*, the *Kebra Negast* and Menelik's statements above reinforce the same allusion to a sense of 'chosenness' and antiquity that Ethiopian nationalism is premised upon.

Moreover, the notion of antiquity through the evocation of ancient epics also constitutes a unique form of legitimacy for a nation, its cultures and traditions by reinforcing the continuity of a sense of shared kingship with their ancestors so essential to nationhood. This further enables 'the preservation of the collective self. Acknowledging and documenting cultural antiquity is a modern activity which also provides nations and their cultures with a distinguished pedigree' (Guibernau, 2004, p.136). The

Abyssinian myth of ancestral and civic origin states that Christian central and northern highlanders, specifically, the Amhara are considered to be descendants of the Kingdoms of Da'amat (ca.700-400BC) and Axum (ca.100-800 AD) (Marcus, 1994). It is based upon this continuity between the pre-Askumite period, Ancient Askum Kingdom and modern-day Ethiopia that Ethiopian nationalist mythologies draw upon. Smith (2009) sums up the cultivation of myths of origins as cultural resources with 'the conviction of "ancestral self-hood" and of difference between members of the nation and those outside its frontiers, which these myths symbolized and enhanced, remain largely intact' (p.91-92). Central and Northern highlanders are considered to constitute the core group in historic Abyssinia, 'a hierarchical society, Semitic in speech and Christian in religion' (Crummey, 1998, p.14). They considered themselves as the 'God-chosen' people and the 'original' settlers who possessed a special mission (Triulzi, 1994, p.236).

Smith (1996) describes how the narrative of a chosen people coupled with 'myths of ethnic selection' was traditionally associated with religion and in the ancient worlds of the Egyptians, Greeks, Persians and others (p. 452). These old ideals have gained importance in modern nationalist doctrines where a nation must have a distinctive identity, culture, history and destiny which produces a sense of 'chosenness' (p. 452-3). The continuity of an ancient Christian civilization lies at the very heart of the nationalism of the 'Great Tradition', while Ethiopian political conquests were underpinned by 'an entrenched sense of Christian mission' and ideological superiority (Triulzi, 1994, p.237). Abyssinians exerted their dominance over regions in the south-west and southeast by means of tribute extraction, trade and raiding for livestock before the late nineteenth century when the Abyssinian kingdom conquered the southern regions. Such conquests are characterized as 'dispossessive, extortionist, and very repressive' (Tareke, 1996, p.19-20) which marked the formation of the Ethiopian state. Having established Menelik's widely regarded role as the founding father and architect of Ethiopian state nationalism, in formulating this nationalism, he weaponizes religion as a key pre-modern and symbolic component of his national project.

4.3. Religion as state ideology

Markakis (1987) describes Christianity as the 'dominant feature of Abyssinian culture and the reigning symbol of their national identity' while having functioned as the Abyssinians' 'ideological shield against the Muslim lowlands' (p.12). The interplay between religion as state ideology and its central role in the construction of Ethiopian nationalism is most vividly linked to the Solomonic Monarchical rule which

claimed the divine right to govern which ended as recently as 1974. Religion, specifically Biblical Christianity is argued to have had a very significant impact on certain 'state-shaped' nations and the variations of their nationalisms (Hastings, 1997, p.4). This is reflected both in Menelik's nationalist articulations and Haile Selassie's political centralization in the 1930's which drew heavily upon the divine right to rule (Marzagora, 2017, p.431). Menelik's earliest expressions on his territorial visions for 'Greater Ethiopia' which formed the basis for Ethiopian nationalist claims capture the centrality of religion in constructing Ethiopian nationalism:

> 'I shall endeavour, if God gives me life and strength, to re-establish the ancient frontiers (tributaries of Ethiopia up to Khartoum and as far as Lake Nyanza with all the Gallas…Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian land in a sea of pagans. If Power at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator. As the almighty has protected Ethiopia up to this day, I have confidence He will continue to protect her, and increase her borders in the future. I am certain He will not suffer her to be divided among other Powers' (F.O.881/6943, Menelik to Rodd 1897)

Discursive strategies of legitimation and de-legitimation feature prominently in this excerpt as Menelik articulates his vision for partaking in the scramble for Africa. He cites historical grounds and draws on religious symbolism to justify his nationalist claims as divinely sanctioned; the *topos* of authority is an argumentative strategy that establishes continuity and a sense of unquestionable justification for a specific political agenda. While Ethiopia refers to the integration of various nations and peoples following Menelik's conquests in the last part of the 1800s- historic Abyssinia refers to central and northern Christian highlanders. As religion has constituted a core component of the dominant imagination of Ethiopia, the imagined construction of a 'Christian Island in a sea of pagans' has reinforced the necessary continuity of a historic and ancient Christian kingdom under threat. Christianity in Ethiopia is not just a religion but a state ideology (Jalata, 1993, p.47). During the conquest of Wollo in 1855, Emperor of Abyssinia Tewodros II declared his intention of establishing a markedly Christian empire while destroying anyone who resisted complete submission (both to Christianity and colonization) in his quest for establishing a distinctly Christian kingdom (Birru, 1980-81, P.93-94).[74] This 'entrenched sense of Christian mission' (Triulzi, 1994, p.237) is strikingly

[74] Three types of 'holy nationalisms' put forward by O'Brien (1999) in *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* provide a useful tool for theorizing the way that religion has shaped the construction of Ethiopian nationalism. They include the idea of 'chosen people', 'deified God' and 'holy nation'- the concept behind 'chosen people' is a combination of both national pride, but also fear and a sense of humility in that God can simply choose another set of people in their replacement (For instance, in the sense that God Chose Christians in the place of Jews in the Ethiopian myth of

connected to the role of 'holy nationalism' specifically as it pertains to the nationalist manifestation of religion in the Abyssinian Highlands. King Menelik II best exemplifies this sense of 'chosenness' by God through his proclaimed title 'The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Menelik II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia' as the opening of his letters would declare (1887, Inclosure 2 in No. 25, FO.881/6943).

Through the discursive strategy of 'autonomisation' which emphasises autonomy and independence, Menelik II maintains that it is God that has safeguarded Ethiopia's independence and will continue to do so in enabling him to extend the frontiers of the state. 'autonomisation' further highlights the exclusive relationship between God and Ethiopia placing Ethiopia herself on a distinguished pedigree. Such constructive strategies reinforce the exclusivity of a 'we' group and a 'they' group, and invites solidarity and a sense of identitification with the 'we' group while alluding to the 'distanciation' and marginalisation of the 'they' group (Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p.92-93). In addition to differences evoked by differential forms of identities related to ethnic, spatial i.e. lowlands Vs highlands/ core Vs peripheries, religion constitutes an important mechanism for reinforcing difference in Ethiopian nationalist thought. What is powerful about religion as a mobilising tool to establish a sense of difference is not related to specific religious beliefs per se, but its evocation of 'symbols of collective unity' which may even be used 'in more secular vein as the celebration of political ideals' (Giddens, 1991, p.207) in other contexts.

4.3.1. Religion as a tool to reinforce difference

Much of Ethiopian history was written by Abyssinian chroniclers the majority of whom were court historians and clerics of the Orthodox Church who were in a prime position to circulate ideologies supporting the ruling group (Toggia, 2008, p. 320) at the expense of suppressed nations who featured as negative constructions and as outsiders.[75] The 'frontiers' of the Christian core group has consistently been presented as the divide between barbarism and civilization, and the external limits of the civilized

descent). The 'Holy Nation' remains under God 'basking in his permanent favour', while the last category- 'deified God' is the most destructive and dangerous as no rules or ethics guides the nation; there is nothing more superior than the nation and what is done for, and in the name of the nation by the leader. In other words, it is 'The nation idolizing itself' (p.42-43). The category of 'chosen peoples' within holy nationalism reflects how Christianity in sanctions and empowers the Imperial Court as the political layer between Christians and God (O'Brien, 1999, p.11-12).

[75] The same constructions and binaries of civilized vs uncivilized continued to be reproduced by Western writers in both ethnographic and historical publications on Ethiopia. See for instance Ullendorff (1965); Jones and Monroe (1953).

world. These 'frontiers' also divide the presence of God's Law on one end and the realm of the unlawful and uncivilized on the other (Triulzi, 1994, p.237-238). As such, the Christian campaign against the Oromo in Ethiopia's state formation is both glorified and considered a just Christian campaign compensating Ethiopia from centuries of isolation as a Christian kingdom surrounded by Muslims, the Oromo movement is explicitly described as having brought a 'reign of darkness on the Christian Kingdom' (Hussein, 2006, p.262). Braukämper (2002) for instance, states that the sixteenth century Oromo migration[76] 'abruptly discontinued the indigenous historiography concerning southern Ethiopia' (p.13). He further emphasizes the inferiority of the Somalis and the Oromo alike stating that both the Oromo and Somali were 'predominantly a nomadic people who possessed no tradition of stone architecture, and state organization' highlighting the primitiveness of stateless societies (2002, p.18). Menelik's statement that Ethiopia has been 'a Christian land in a sea of pagans' constructs a divide between the frontiers of the civilised and the non-civilised, discursive strategies of exclusion and dissimilation are used to construct hierarchical binaries within the Ethiopian national context- grouping non-Abyssinians as 'pagans' or 'gallas.' This use of synecdochical anthroponyms emphasises the distinction between the two identities providing an essentialized identity category that is distinctly non-Christian and thus subordinate.

Christianity is viewed as both a religion and a state ideology in the way that it established a longstanding alliance between Ethiopian colonialism and European imperialism in the nineteenth century (Jalata, 1993, p.47). Non-Abyssinians such as the Oromo are widely conceived of by Abyssinian highlanders and Europeans alike; as plaguing the unique establishment of an ancient Christian civilization, and as such, any measure of preserving this establishment including the colonization of neighbouring lands was deemed both acceptable and necessary. As Ullendorff (1965) writes, 'Not until the advent of King Theodore in the mid-nineteenth century does Ethiopia emerge from her isolation. Only then, in her rediscovered unity under the Emperors John, Menelik, and Haile Selassie, does the country find its soil and genius again, its spirit and its sense of mission' (p.75). Territorial expansion and the conquering of indigenous lands is directly imagined in terms of a sense of triumph and a 'renaissance' following a period of darkness. Discursive strategies of rationalisation/harmonisation are used to justify the preservation of a Christian kingdom; this is done by drawing upon the *topos* of threat where a

[76] For a detailed description of the sixteenth century Oromo migration see Mohammed Hassan (1990) *The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, 1570-1860.*

(potentially fictional) threatening scenario is constructed. In this case, the metaphor of Ethiopia as an island 'in a sea of pagans' constructs a threat of encirclement to justify the Ethiopian nationalist mission of territorial expansion and maintaining differential identity categories. The presence of Oromos in Ethiopia was presented as perpetuating her backwardness and a direct result of Ethiopia's depressed state; thus, a hindrance to the renaissance of Ethiopia and subsequent emergence as a modern state (Hutlin in Baxter et al, 1996, p.89). In other words, Ethiopia never found 'its soul and genius' again until the land of the Oromo was domesticated, conquered and integrated into the empire by 'enlightened emperors' (Hutlin in Baxter et al, 1996, p.89).[77]

This Eurocentric portrayal based on the constructions invented by Ethiopian chroniclers is typified by writers such as Lipsky's (1962) description of Oromos as belonging to a lower civilization (in comparison to the Amharas and Tigray) and being 'among the main factors contributing to the isolation and depression of the country' and that 'their penetration diminished the effective response of Ethiopians to the crisis through which they were passing' (p.13). Moreover Ullendorff (1973) further reinforces the binary construction of the Oromo as a social evil in contrast to the ancient Abyssinian civilization in need of protection and whose continuity is at stake. He states that 'the Gallas had little to contribute to the semitized civilization of Ethiopia …' (p.73). The need for the perseverance of a holy Christian civilization at risk of destruction by 'barbaric' and Islamic influence and encirclement is a consistent theme in dominant Ethiopian historiography. This 'entrenched sense of Christian mission' which characterized Ethiopian political conquests, was marked by an undertone of ideological superiority (Triulzi, 1994, p.237) and has fuelled the production of Ethiopian nationalism. Despite the reinforced hierarchical distinction between core Abyssinian identities and marginalised identities, paradoxically, Ethiopian nationalism also appealed to notions of 'sameness' and discourses of unity to consolidate Ethiopian nationalist claims during the era of decolonisation. Focusing primarily on the figure of Haile Selassie, subsequent sections illustrate the evocation of 'sameness' for constructing the same type of nationhood constructed via 'difference' as previously discussed.

[77] According to Hassen (1990): 'In such writings [the negative portrayal] the Oromo were never credited as creators of an original culture or as having religious and democratic political institutions... Oromo were arbitrarily degraded to a lower stage of material, as people who needed the "civilizing mission" of their Abyssinian neighbors' (p. 2).

4.4. Discursive construction of sameness: the discourse of African Unity

Having discussed the way that difference is deployed in the construction of Ethiopian nationalism, particularly as it pertains to identity and religion**,** this section explores the discursive construction of concepts of African Unity and Ethiopian Unity. These discourses emphasise sameness as opposed to difference in a bid to institutionalise Ethiopian nationalist aspirations during the reign of Haile Selassie. This period spearheaded by Haile Selassie, where he built upon the legacies of Menelik II, marked an important defining moment in the internationalisation and consolidation of Pan-Ethiopianism both at a national and regional (African) level.

The emergence of Pan-Africanism can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century, borne out of a conscious struggle to achieve independence and spark a wake of decolonization in the African continent. This movement was first spearheaded by members of the African diaspora and gained prominence in the philosophies of 'Pan Africanism', 'negritude' and 'African personality.' The defining feature of Pan-Africanism centres upon the interconnectedness of all those with African descent through a shared history of oppression and colonialism, and the equally shared desire to liberate themselves from such a legacy (Brown, 2006, p.66, p.69). This is highlighted by the three principal functions of The All- African People's Conference in Accra 1958, which was; 'to provide a meeting ground for African leaders, to establish a base for Pan-Africanism, and to accelerate the struggle for independence and equality' (Houser, 1961, p.11).

Haile Selassie is considered to be the driving force behind the 1963 Addis Ababa summit where the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) charter was adopted. As a pan-African icon, and the first president of the OAU, Haile Selassie had a momentous impact on the formation of the norms and principles of this new organisation. I focus on the twin principles of territorial integrity and non-interference as the foundational principles of the OAU, specifically, how Haile Selassie's newly attained pan-African legitimacy enabled him to co-construct widely encompassing discourses on African Unity and Ethiopian unity as complimentary. He did so while strategically shaping the new norms which were to govern the post-colonial order- as expressed most significantly by institutionalizing the principles of non-intervention, respect for territorial integrity, and limiting the scope of self-determination claims to exclude cases of non-European colonization (Iyob, 1993, p.268-p270).

The aim and purpose of the OAU is to be found in the Preamble, and Article 2 (1). Of particular significance is section a, b, c and d:

(a) To Promote the Unity and Solidarity of African states
(b) To co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa (Elias, 1965, p.247)

The fundamental commitment to the principle of territorial integrity is reaffirmed in Article 3, members declared;

(1) The sovereign equality of all member states
(2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states
(3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence (Elias, 1965, p.247-248)

At the July 1964 OAU Summit in Cairo, the emperor argued that lasting peace in the African continent could only be achieved by maintaining colonial borders despite Ethiopia suffering herself at the hands of the imperialists (Haile Selassie I, July 1964, Cairo). He draws a direct parallel between the preservation of the arbitrary borders inherited by colonists with lasting peace in the African continent, while appealing to the dual image of Ethiopia as an aggressor, and Ethiopia the victim of Italian aggression. Image construction both as The Lion of Judah, and an anti-colonial crusader was crucial to institutionalizing specific norms i.e. maintaining arbitrary borders and normalizing their implementation without appearing as an aggressor (Iyob, 1993, p.271). At the 1963 OAU founding conference in Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie's statement articulated his vision for African Unity stating the following:

> 'Africa's victory, although proclaimed, is not yet total, and areas of resistance still remain...Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are free. Our brothers in the Rhodesia, in Mozambique, in Angola, in South Africa, cry out in anguish for our support and assistance' (Haile Selassie, 1963).[78]

The statement captures an exclusive definition of liberty and resistance that the OAU came to be established upon, i.e. liberty from non-African colonialists and resistance against non-African

[78] *Speeches and Statements made at the first Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U) Summit* (1963, p.7). Published by the African Union. [online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/38523-sp-oau_summit_may_1963_speeches.pdf [Accessed 26 Mar. 2022].

colonialists only, both of which support the maintenance of the territorial status quo for Ethiopia. Haile Selassie's reluctance to have the Somali issue discussed in the OAU reveals the suppression of domestic resistance movements as 'internal matters'. In 1964, J.K.E Broadley of the British Embassy in Addis Ababa writes that Ethiopia 'would not wish to see the Ogaden situation discussed in the O.A.U while the rebellion continues since this would imply that they were incapable of maintaining order within the Empire' (North and East Africa Department, VK1071/1). Moreover, in his speech at the July 1964 OAU Summit in Cairo, Haile Selassie evoked the two fundamental principles of self-determination and non-interference in his call for the acceptance of territorial boundaries instituted by colonial powers, he states the following:

> 'The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states is repeated in the OAU's Charter no less than three times, and it is only for us to observe it as scrupulously as it deserves. Ethiopia supports this view...the Charter's signatories have declared their adherence to the complementary principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and this principle, too, must be rigidly observed if conflict between Africans are to be avoided.'

Haile Selassie employs hyperbole by exaggerating the causal relationship between the principles of respect for territorial integrity and non-interference, and the prevention of conflict between Africans. As history shows, signatory states could not suppress the eruption of intra-state resistance against inherited frontiers by means of preserving existing borders. Establishing a hyperbolic causal link between non-interference and lasting peace as far as border issues are concerned serves as a delegitimation strategy to obscure the legitimacy of local demands for self-determination. It suggests that local demands for self-determination, independence or greater autonomy will not emerge as long as signatory states adhere to these principles, the *topos* of threat in the form of violence induces fear and serves as a rhetorical device for appealing to the benefits of these principles.

Relatedly, resistance against Ethiopian rule within the Somali territory was methodically tied with the construction of a wider conspiracy against the Ethiopian state supposedly spearheaded by neighbouring Somalia. This narrative of threat construction was championed by Haile Selassie under the fear inducing catch-phrase 'Somali Irredentism' encroaching on his territory and that of neighbouring countries such as Kenya via the Somali Inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD). As the following chapter discusses, this is poignantly exemplified by the massacres of Aysha'a (1960) and

Dhegehbour (1961), where Haile Selassie carried out widespread atrocities to suppress local calls for self-determination and the rise in nationalist fervour following Somalia's independence in 1960. Siyaad Dau'd was among a group of youth who wrote a letter to Ethiopian authorities requesting independence just like their neighbouring kinsmen, on the following day, 83 people were killed by the military.[79] That a mere handwritten request warranted such a brutal response marks an early manifestation of the threat construction of 'Somali Irredentism' later appropriated and institutionalised in policy circles with the founding of the OAU in 1963.

Moreover, the use of generalised synecdoche in 'Ethiopia supports this view,' is a linguistic strategy of referential assimilation where the state is equated with the masses or as champions for the preservation of the territorial status quo. In the context of Ethiopia- this refers to the maintenance of Ethiopia's recently extended borders discussed earlier. This synecdochisation and generalised use of 'Ethiopia' serves as a legitimation strategy in discourses emphasising sameness, it is similar to his use of 'Africa' in reference to unity or 'Africa's victory' against colonialism. In emphasising sameness for the purpose of promoting territorial integrity, African unity becomes an oppressive concept re-instituting new forms of colonialism and domination. Legitimation strategies are key components of strategies of 'perpetuation' most commonly used to justify a problematic status quo or a problematic and/or contested political past. As such, historical context is key for determining what is at stake when strategies of perpetuation are employed. In Haile Selassie's above statement, the evocation of territorial integrity and the sacrosanct nature of borders serve to justify the violent conquests which multiplied the kingdom forming the modern configuration of the Ethiopian state (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990). Moreover, it justifies the violation of the 1884 agreement with Somali tribes[80], and the subsequent

[79] Siyad Da'ud recalls the letter they wrote to the Ethiopian authorities containing the following words: 'The British and Italians gave independence to the territories they ruled (British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland), why don't you do the same?...We should also get our freedom.' On the following day military convoys from Jigjiga, Aware and Harta-sheikh arrived in Dhegehbour, the sound of guns started at 14:45pm on March 27th 1961 which left 83 people dead destroying the town's properties and businesses.

[80] The 1894 agreement between Britain and Somali tribes was violated by the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian protocol of May 1894 which delianates the border between the Ethiopian Empire and Britain's sphere of influence. Prior to this treaty, Somali chiefs signed an agreement of protection (from Ethiopian occupation) with the British. An ONLF memo hosted in the national archives (JEE051/8) emphasises the betrayal behind this violation stating that Britain recognised Ethiopia's annexation of Harar in 1887 as evidenced by Menelik and Rodd's lengthy exchange documented in (F.O.881/6943). This recognition is considered as a breach of the 1894 agreement with Somali tribes, as the 1991 ONLF document states, Britain recognised the occupation of 'Harar and its suburbs' (JEE051/8). This is reinforced by Rodd's surprise that Menelik II had conquered areas surrounding Harar i.e. Somali territories: 'He had gained Harar by conquest, and looked on all these regions as part and parcel of the Harar province' (F.O.881/6943, Rodd to Salisbury, p.27). Henze (2004) similarly notes that following the final confrontation with Harari forces at *Chelenqo* on January 1887,

handing over of the Somali territories including the Ogaden and the Hawd and Reserved areas to Ethiopia in the 1940s and 50s. Overall, Haile Selassie's leading role in the construction of discourses centred on African unity, and the need for the principles of non-interference and respect for the territorial integrity enshrined within the OAU charter served to directly benefit the expansionist state of Ethiopia. This was done by legitimizing the core tenants of Ethiopian state nationalism, namely the preservation of its newly extended borders.

4.4.1. Discursive constructions of sameness: African Unity as Ethiopian Unity

The discursive construction of discourses of unity in Africa and Ethiopia, more specifically, served to cement particular norms relating to territoriality through institutional backing. The concept of 'African unity' is invariably contested, and the paradox which came to characterize the official position on preserving colonial borders becomes all the more complex when one considers the Ethiopian quest for 're-unifying ''Ethiopian peoples'' torn asunder by European colonialism'- a Pan-Ethiopianist endeavour centred upon a need to access the Red sea and to assert itself as the only responsible state that can guarantee the security of the region (Iyob, 1993, p.270). Haile Selassie not only sought to maintain existing borders but sought to further extend his borders under the guise of 're-unifying Ethiopian peoples' echoing Menelik's nationalist claims which stunned even Europeans. Mr Rennel Rodd's 1887 report following his mission to Menelik contains the following:

> 'The Emperor then again referred to the ancient limits of Ethiopia. I asked him how Somalis, who had been established in these regions for so many centuries, could possibly be looked down upon as included in the ancient limits of Ethiopia' -1887 report by Mr Rennel Rodd Following his mission to King Menelik II (F.O.881/6943, p.25)

The general use of 'Somali' indicates that Menelik laid claim to all Somali territories in the Horn of Africa and not only the Ogaden which was officially transferred to Ethiopia in 1954 as his claim also included present-day Republic of Somalia. Both spatial and temporal reference to Ethiopia's

Menelik turned Hararge, 'which included vast stretches of the Ogaden whose borders were still undefined, over to his cousin, DejazmachMakonnen Wolde Mikael' (p.152).

territoriality suggests that it is limitless extending beyond any limitations that could be placed upon it by means of boundary agreements. The same sentiment is intertextually evoked by Haile Selassie in his 1956 speech in Qabridahare:

> 'With the re-union of the Ogaden to its ancient Motherland, His Imperial Majesty was at last able in August 1956 to visit the region again and make close personal scrutiny of the hardships and privations experienced by His Ogaden subjects…'[81]

The same pan-Ethiopian symbolism of an ancient and exclusive national image is evoked through the use of 'ancient Motherland' suggesting continuity. But more importantly, 're-union' captures Haile Selassie's notion of unity as extending beyond maintaining territorial borders, but necessarily expanding even further to unite 'Ethiopian peoples' segregated by European colonialism. He states for instance that 'The people of ex-Italian Somaliland are to achieve independence in the near future. We are confident that they will also remember that unity is strength' (Haile Selassie, 1956). Essentially, the expansionist agenda of the Emperor was expressed in terms consistent with the discourses of decolonization, African unity, and the OAU's principal norms on non-intervention and territorial integrity. This not only authorized Ethiopian claims, but made them appear Pan-Africanist. Meanwhile, the struggle of Somalis and Eritreans was 'equated with the abhorred vision of atavistic religious and ethnic secessionism' and simultaneously undermined by the Pan-Ethiopian vision of 'Greater Ethiopia' extending to the Red Sea (Iyob, 1993, p.270-1). Geshekter (1985) suggests that African members of the OAU were unwilling to set a precedent by supporting boundary changes, as any boundary adjustment in the Horn of Africa would not only alter, but potentially 'disember' the Ethiopian empire-state which enjoys a unique status among newly independent African states and members of the OAU (p.4). The crux of the problem is summarized by Lefebvre (1998) in the following way:

> 'Somali irredentist claims in the Horn threatened the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of the British colony of Kenya, French Somaliland (Djibouti), and a large chunk of Ethiopia - the Ogaden region - an area inhabited by approximately 350,000 ethnic Somalis that

[81] Excerpts of this speech are derived from a digitized pamphlet published by The Imperial Government of Ethiopia, Press and Information Department which includes an opening foreword section. I am indebted to Amiin Mohammed for providing me with a scanned copy of Haile Selassie's full speech delivered in Qabridahare 1956 from his personal archival collections.

> comprised about one-fourth of the Ethiopian empire's territory and containing a rich grazing region (the Haud) to which hundreds of thousands of Somali nomads migrated seasonally. Somali Militant irredentism posed a threat to the stability of Haile-Selassie's ethnically and religiously fragmented empire, which was dominated by a Christian-Amhara minority, as well as to Ethiopia's railway access to the Red Sea port of Djibouti' (p.613-614).

Moreover, the danger of 'Balkanization' was another recurrent theme underpinning the ritualised discourses on African unity as drawn upon by African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré. Whereas the term has traditionally referred to the dissolutions of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires into small nation-states- a form of decolonization, for prominent African nationalists the concept had inherently negative connotations (Neuberger, 1985, p.523-524). While some fragmentation is necessary as the organization of the world state system suggests, several leading African nationalists considered the present configuration of Africa as an expression of balkanization[82] while others only considered the further fragmentation of the existing states as balkanization (Neuberger, 1985, p.523-524). At the heart of this concern over fragmentation and disintegration, was the loss of African unity, in other words, the fear of colonization went hand in hand with the fear of balkanization. The Ethiopian state mobilised these fears in their promotion of the principle of territorial integrity and to oppose claims to self-determination which threatened the 'balkanization' of Ethiopia, and thus, posing a threat against the territorial vision of Ethiopian state nationalism. This sense of threat is articulated even more pertinently by Haile Selassie in Qabridahare 1956 in heart of present-day Somali Region.

4.5. Haile Selassie in Qabridahare 1956

Haile Selassie's 1956 visit to Qabridahare marks a significant moment in Ethiopian history as it followed the official incorporation of the Ogaden and Reserved Areas into Ethiopia signalling the end of the British Military administration (BMA). This speech, delivered on Haile Selassie's first visit to the Ogaden, marks the inauguration of Ethiopian state nationalism on Somali territory. He evokes the expansive territoriality of the Ethiopian state while articulating Ethiopian conceptions of unity in the heart of the Ogaden administrative area:

[82] Nyerere has spoken on the need to remove balkanization from East Africa, while Nkrumah has warned against the dangers of 'remaining balkanized.' For more on this discussion, see *'The African Concept of Balkanisation'* (Neuberger,1976).

> 'Everyone is proud of the greatness of Ethiopia's history and aware of her wide territorial limits...Our country, Our unity, and the realization of Our plans demand your cooperation and assistance. As a people grows and develops, it becomes more conscious of the honour and beliefs of its freedom: and so also as its education develops and it assimilates greater knowledge, it recognises the dangers of disunion.'

As apparent in Haile Selassie's statements elsewhere in places such as at the OAU founding conference in 1963 mentioned earlier, he draws interdiscursively upon Menelik's wide territorial claims appealing to the ancient character of his kingdom. Using Metonymy in the form of anthropomorphization which assigns human qualities to abstract entities, 'her wide territorial limits' indicates permanence and stability which is reinforced by the possessive determiners 'Our.' The capitalization of the 'O' however, indicates a direct reference to the grandeur of the monarchy suggesting an exclusive representation of Ethiopia as equated with the monarchy and the Abyssinian highlands from which the modern state originated. Sheikh Cumar, an elder from the Qabridahare area who was among the youth who attended Haile Selassie's 1956 visit recalls being informed that 'the King is coming' with no sense of who this king is (2019). Moreover, Haile Selassie equates education with one's ability to uphold the unity of Ethiopia, 'negative-other' constructions are used by characterising the threat before he proceeds to clearly define what poses a threat against the unity of the state which is Somali nationalism.

Furthermore, the use of exclusive possessive determiners appears repetitively in Haile Selassie's speech:

> '...As Ogaden is but one of the integral parts of Ethiopia, Our soldiers here live happily with you. You are now linked in mutual confidence, and in brotherly love. Intermarriage has followed, and has cemented your unity…'

'Our soldiers' begs the question of 'who's soldiers?' considering that the speech was delivered just two years after the remaining territories in the Somali Region were transferred to Ethiopia without the participation of the people, soldiers were deemed as an occupying force whose presence was explicitly protested while the region was under the British Millitary Administration (BMA). Historical records show that in a 1947 petition of protest sent to the British civil affairs officer in the Ogaden, Somali elders expressed their outrage over possible Ethiopian rule: 'Under the Ethiopian government influence we are still suffering the worst enslavement...we mean them to leave *our* country' and warned that if Britain did place the Somali territory under Ethiopian rule, 'we shall be compelled to lay our souls for peril in purpose of self-defence' (P.R.O., CO 537/3641, Quoted in Geshekter, 1985, p.30).

The possessive determiner 'our' establishes the Somali territory as a separate entity outside of Ethiopia from a spatial perspective but 'under' the Ethiopian government in terms of political authority speaking to the hierarchical power dynamics and forms of violence committed by state forces in the Somali Region. Moreover, government brochures also reinforced the myth of Ethiopian unity which Haile Selassie emphasises in his 1956 Qabridahare speech excluding the way that Somalis experienced the empire as indicated by the Somali elders' petition in 1947. A brochure marking Haile Selassie's visit to Qabridahare states that following Italy's defeat and the restoration of Ethiopian independence in 1941,

> 'pursuant to the resolute efforts of Ethiopia's Emperor and her brace sons, the Ogaden was placed temporarily under the military administration of our British ally as a fraternal gesture…as a consequence, the Ogaden region was denied the opportunity of sharing the advantages of modern Ethiopian administration which has been enjoyed by the other parts of the Empire since the liberation' (Forward, The Imperial Government of Ethiopia, Press and Information department).

Intertextual links between contents of the brochure and Haile Selassie's speech are apparent in their construction of 'the Ogaden' as a willing and integral part of Ethiopia, the use of personified toponyms referred to metonymically i.e. 'Ethiopia', 'Ogaden' 'her brace sons' (de Cillia, Reisgl, Wodak, 1999) assigns human characteristics to abstract entities taking for granted the petition from Somali elders protesting against the transfer of their land to Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the co-construction of discourses on African unity and Ethiopian unity spearheaded by Haile Selassie reveal that they are inherently concerned with territorial ambitions more than anything else and institutionalising this cemented Ethiopian nationalist claim. As a result of this institutionalisation, public and private governmental correspondence and meeting minutes indicate Somalia's isolation over the Ogaden and NFD issue, particularly in the context of the OAU: 'possession is nine-tenths of the law in the case of Ethiopia…Somalia must be conscious of her isolation and of the fact of the OAU doctrine that existing boundaries are sacrosanct' (January 14th 1964, FO: VK1071/1). The sense of finality around sacrosanct borders in the OAU framework combined with Ethiopia's position as the one whose possession is in dispute indicated to observers early on that the Somali dilemma would not easily be solved as revealed by diplomatic correspondence: 'I myself think that if the Somalis are unsuccessful with their claim to the North Eastern Region- as they probably will be- then their chances over the Ogaden are even more remote' (January 14th 1964, Foreign Office: VK1071/1). The political and

diplomatic isolation of Somalis' quest for self-determination was further enabled by the cultural constructions of the Somali, by means of neighbouring Somalia, posing an irredentist threat against the Ethiopian state.

4.5.1. Construction of the 'other': the pan-Somali threat

The cultural construction of a pan-Somali threat in Ethiopia is premised upon the conflation of local expressions of Somali nationhood in Ethiopia and Somalia's quest to reunite Somali peoples dispersed throughout the Horn of Africa. The discursive construction and perpetuation of Ethiopian unity particularly in terms of its territoriality goes hand-in-hand with the construction and perpetuation of the dangers of disunity spearheaded by 'enemies' of the state. Haile Selassie's speech is rampant with repetition emphasising the insistence on preserving Ethiopian unity: 'Our efforts should be devoted to the development of Our country, Ethiopia, and towards the strengthening of Our fraternal ties and Our unity.' The use of normative-deontic modals such as 'should' reinforces strategies of perpetuating the defence of a particular idea, while foreshadowing consequences for not devoting towards strengthening 'development' or 'unity.' The *topos* of threat employed throughout his speech is even more pronounced as he introduces the consequences for disunity: 'Unity is strength, while disunion leaves the people to become the prey of the enemy.' The defining feature of the enemy is that they are against the unity of Ethiopia, in other words they are against the territorial configuration of the modern Ethiopian state.[83] Opposing nationalisms hold differential notions of what it means to be part of Ethiopia, and competing notions of the concept of 'Greater Ethiopia' put forth by various nations and peoples within the state are considered 'dissent forms of identity' and 'illegitimate secessionist movements bent on ripping apart an ancient state' (Sorenson, year, p.5).[84] An example of this is the threat-construction of Somali nationalism against the unity and continuity of Ethiopia; this itself

[83] This is by virtue of the 'Greater Somalia' agenda which sought to unify Somali people and their territories in the Horn of Africa (including the Ogaden). The Somali Youth League (SYL), founded in 1943 articulated their aspiration for uniting Somali peoples –'translating cultural nationalism into political nationalism'- as expressed to the Four Commission in 1948 tasked with examining Somali aspirations for the future (Lewis, 1963, p.149-150. Moreover, the first constitution of the Somali Republic following its independence captures the same Pan-Somali aspirations; Article 6, paragraph 4 states: 'The Somali Republic shall promote, by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories…' (https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so001en.pdf).

[84] Examples of such dissenting nationalisms include Oromo, Afar, Sidama and Somali nationalisms

becomes a feature of Ethiopian nationalism established upon a need to preserve the territorial status quo against Somali challenges.[85]

The construction of Ethiopian state nationalism is sustained vis a vis 'the other:' this relates to the dual threat of Somalia's territorial claims over the Ogaden, and domestic self-determination movements in the Ogaden against the Ethiopian state. Somali nationalism opposed the exclusive conceptualization of 'unity' in the pan-African context as employed by Haile Selassie and other heads of states. At the 1963 Addis Ababa summit, the President of Somalia proclaimed that the key hindrance to African Unity was the issue of 'misdrawn' boundaries and that it ought to occupy a central position in the debates of the conference, criticizing Ethiopia on her treatment of their boundary issue concerning the Somali-inhabited Ogaden (Padelford, 1964, p.532). Chairman Houphouet-Boigny rose to the defence of the Emperor; an act which was welcomed by the delegates suggesting the sense that such issues ought to be 'settled within the (African) family' and preserve the image of a united front to the rest of the world (Padelford, 1964, p.532). This idiom is a prime example of Ethiopia's exploitation of the prevailing norms, values and 'African consensus on 'unity' and 'balkanization' which to the detriment of occupied peoples, sought to preserve the territorial status quo and deprive demands for self-determination both external legitimacy and institutional sponsorship (Iyob, 1993, p.261). In line with the portrayal of those seeking self-determination as the spoilers of unity and the support that the emperor and his empire enjoyed, the Somalis were labelled as secessionists and irredentists.

Moreover, this label was not limited to the African diplomatic scene. Following Kennedy's sympathetic attitude towards President Sharmarke on his visit to the White House in 1963, Kennedy's staff and member of the national Security Council interjected: 'Good God, Mr President, they're the great irredentists of Africa...They're out to get a chunk of Kenya. They're out to take over a big chunk of Ethiopia...' (Quoted in Lefebvre, 1998, p.630). This attitude reflects the success of Haile Selassie's efforts to undermine local claims to self-determination in the preservation of the territorial status quo. In the case of Somalis, this is perpetuated through the construction of an irredentist pan-Somali threat.

4.5.2. Ethiopian Unity and the pan-Somali threat

Haile Selassie's 1956 speech in Qabridahare captures both the visions and essence 'Greater Ethiopian' nationalism as it relates to the Somali territories. Reproducing discourses on the threat of Somali nationalism features as a central element in the discursive construction of Ethiopian nationalism, particularly in the Somali territories. The following excerpt displays the inter-play between these two nationalisms:

> 'We can achieve this only by close cooperation and united effort and by **struggling firmly against all propaganda trying to break Ethiopian unity and violate her freedom.** It is inimical but easy to spread **irresponsible news,** trying to induce people to **betray their country and step outside the path of truth and love of their country…**
>
> Even as every individual has the duty to sacrifice his l for his country, so also he must defend himself against **subversive news and propaganda.** You must not believe those who, being unable to think clearly or achieve their ambitions, try to **break the unity of the country with malicious news**, in order to attain temporary personal benefits. As an example, you will remember **Olol Dinle who betrayed you to the enemy** for advantages he could not carry with him to the other world...
> The people of ex-Italian Somaliland are to achieve independence in the near future. We are confident that they will also remember that unity is strength, even as the Eritreans recognised that unity is strength. Not only they but the whole world recognise that we are united by race, colour, economics, and that we all drink from the same great river.
> ...it is the duty of Our Government to **reward the deserving, to punish the guilty, and to establish security**…
> As to the rumours of greater Somalia, We consider that all the Somali peoples are economically linked with all of Ethiopia, and therefore We do not believe that such a state can be viable standing alone separated from Ethiopia. We will speak of this more fully when the proper time comes.
> We place Our trust in the help of the Almighty in achieving the great programmes We are now initiating for the development of **Our Empire and the prosperity of Our people.**'

This extract features intertextual links drawing on pan-Ethiopian symbolisms that have been rigorously institutionalised. The most significant among which is the reference to Olol Diinle 'who betrayed you to the enemy' says Haile Selassie to the Somali people in reference to a historic figure that occupies a central position the Somali nationalist imagination. However, using intertextuality in the form of presupposition, Haile Selassie establishes Olol Diinle's treasonous and anti-Ethiopian posture as something already given. This contributes to the 'ideological constitution of subjects'

(Fairclough, 1992, p, 120-1). Without explicitly stating who the 'enemy' that Olol Diinle collaborated with is, we can infer from elsewhere in the speech and through his reference to ex-Italian Somaliland that the enemy is the Somali living on the other side of the arbitrary border, and the Italians following their 1935 invasion of Ethiopia. The *topos* of history is used as an argumentative strategy to emphasise the lessons learnt from a historic phenomenon, the people are warned against following the footsteps of Olol Diinle because he was a threat to the unity of Ethiopia. Intertextual links between the way that Menelik II justified the capture of Harar from the Amir's control in 1887 are evident. In the same way that he equated the Amir of Harar with Ahmed Gurey (the enemy of historic Abyssinia)- 'Amir Abdulla would suffer no Christian in his country. He was another *Gurne* (Gurey). But by the help of God I fought him, destroyed him,' so too does Haile Selassie justify the consequences that may come if the Somalis he is addressing are to follow the footsteps of Olol Diinle.

Moreover, the reference to Olol Diinle further depicts the contestation over different meanings associated with historical figures that feature both in Somali and Ethiopian historical memories. According to Somalis, Olol Diinle was a noble sultan and a heroic figure that fought against Ethiopian colonialism and was eventually murdered while defending his country against 'the enemy' (the Ethiopian state) (Ali Aden, 2019). The heroic figure of Olol Diinle represents an important cultural tool used to construct the nation's limits and self-awareness, he symbolises what Forest & Johnson (2002) refer to as 'historical figures that become national heroes and establish the historical incidents that become the formative events of the nation's identity' (p. 526).

Haile Selassie refers to Olol diinle as an example of someone who tried to break the unity of the country as he warns the Somali people to struggle 'firmly against all propaganda trying to break Ethiopian unity and violate her freedom.' He warns against the spread of 'irresponsible news' while 'trying to induce people to betray their country and step outside the path of truth and love of their country.' As the independence of British and Italian Somaliland approached, a pan-Somali nationalist fervour swept across the Somali territories including the Ogaden, yet Haile Selassie assertively characterises Ethiopian unity (i.e. the present territorial configuration) as the 'path of truth' rendering any opposing territorial imagination as 'un-truth.' Nuraddin Farah alludes to this very process of truth-making stating that 'There is truth in maps. The Ogaden, as Somali, is truth. To the Ethiopian map-maker, the Ogaden, as Somali, is untruth' (1986, p.229). Argumentative strategies of threat construction are significant modes of establishing the normative rightness of Ethiopian nationalist

claims, and by extension, the normative wrongfulness of any opposing nationalism. As discussed earlier, the normative rightness of preserving Ethiopian nationalism under threat by external forces is articulated in terms of territoriality i.e. preserving the 'unity' of the state as in the example here of Haile Selassie's Qabridahare 1956 speech, or in terms of mobilising religion and ethnic identity to construct a distinct 'we-group' (Christian highlanders) under threat by non-Christian peripheral peoples the way Menelik II did.

Another significant point concerning threat-construction in this extract is the way that Haile Selassie demonises Somali nationalism to the extent of threatening against following the footsteps of Olol Diinle. Paradoxically, he undermines the significance of the force of Somali nationalism and its underlying claims through discursive strategies of *trivialisation* by referring to it as 'subversive news' 'malicious news' and 'propaganda.' The same sense of downplaying Somali nationalist expression became more pronounced in 1963 when *Geesh* rebels waged an armed struggle against the state. According to historical records, Ethiopia's diplomatic correspondence with global powers reveal a dedicated effort to downplay local Somali resistance in Ethiopia namely by framing it as a threat engineered by neighbouring Somalia. Ethiopian government communication refers to the armed struggle and the military encounters between the *Geesh* and state forces as 'recent disturbances' carried out by 'armed guerrillas infiltrating from Somalia,' they're also described as 'bandits' that the Somali government should stop providing refuge and support for (VA103101/3). This government communiqué was written in August 1963 approximately 2 months after the armed struggle commenced, the use of language employs the same perpetuation strategies used to promote identification and a sense of national solidarity with a specific 'we-group' via the use of persuasive linguistic devices, meanwhile simultaneously implying distance from a marginalised 'other' or inherently perpetuating the marginalised 'other' (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak p.99, p.160). This specific 'we-group' is centred upon preserving Ethiopian unity while the marginalised 'other' are 'bandits' posing a threat against the Ethiopian state. This serves to demonise any alternative or dissenting national imagination which contests key Ethiopian nationalist claims. Similar strategies of the trivialisation of Somali resistance is evident in 1994 when the Ogaden National Liberation Front boycotted Ethiopian politics, vacated their political positions and waged an armed struggle against the Ethiopian state. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated that 'the real' ONLF still remained.[86] According

[86] See Khalif and Doornbos's (2002) *The Somali Region in Ethiopia: A Neglected Human Rights Tragedy* and Markakis's (1996) *The Somali in Ethiopia.*

to former President Eid Dahir, the intention behind downplaying the armed struggle was to dismiss the significance of ONLF's boycott of Somali Region Politics which undermined EPRDF's political project and state nationalism (2019).

Discursive strategies of trivialisation through repeated mentions of 'the real ONLF' still remaining in politics was later institutionalised through the creation of The Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP) in 1998, the creation of the party was based on a merger between an ONLF wing led by Bashiir Abdi Hassan and the former Ethiopian Somali Democratic League commonly known among Somalis as 'Leego' despite the on-going war (Abdullahi, 2007, p.557). The complimentary strategies of constructing and perpetuating Somali nationalism as a threat against the unity of Ethiopia, and the trivialisation of Somali nationalist expression and resistance against Ethiopian nationalism work simultaneously towards the production of Ethiopian state nationalism as a legitimate political agenda and a dominant discursive paradigm. The following chapter examines in detail how local Somali nationalism in Ethiopia sought to position itself as an indigenous movement opposed to the state nationalism envisaged by Haile Selassie in his 1956 speech, and simultaneously free from becoming subsumed under the 'Greater Somalia' discourse.

4.6. Conclusion

Markakis (1987) captures the essence of Ethiopian nationalism as the conscious integration of diverse nations of peoples under the identity and culture of the 'Abyssinian core' and 'empire builders': 'Ethiopian nationalism under the imperial regime was Abyssinian nationalism writ large. The state was named the Ethiopian Empire, a designation that broadened its identity without altering its essence. The essence derived undiluted from the Abyssinian core, and the process of national integration was tantamount to assimilation into the culture of the empire builders' (p.73). The nationalist project is based upon the creation of an overall sense of homogeneity out of the inescapable heterogeneity present in every state through the promotion of common national myths and symbols in order to establish the unique character of the state and its people (Tronvoll, 2009, p.171).[87] Paradoxically, Ethiopian nationalism is centred upon both the uniqueness of an essential core identity maintained

[87] In the context of Ethiopia, Ethnic heterogeneity and the existence of a wide range of linguistic groups is the consequence of conquest and state formation in Ethiopia (Tareke, 1996, p.32).

through its exclusive construction vis a vis other identities, and the promotion of an overarching Ethiopian identity centred upon the unity of diverse peoples and nations.

This chapter has examined the discursive construction of Ethiopian state nationalism by focusing on a selection of defining statements by two founding figures of the modern Ethiopian state: Menelik II and Haile Selassie. Within their nationalist discourses, the discursive construction of sameness and difference occur concurrently. On one hand, Ethiopian nationalist discourses construct and perpetuate an exclusive identity unique to its Abyssinian core centred upon mythology, strong biblical references, and ancient roots. Accompanying this particular self-imagining are exclusive pan-Ethiopian symbolisms and political memories of a divinely sanctioned process of territorial expansion. On the other hand, the discursive construction of sameness occurs at the level of territoriality to promote the unity of the state and obscure or deny any challenges to the status quo through the discourse of African Unity, and Ethiopian Unity. The aim of this is to construct a cohesive national image, legitimise the territorial status quo and effectively de-legitimise any alternative territorial imaginations as a threat/ danger. Thus, identity construction goes hand in hand with strategies of differentiation by demarcating what is possible to say or believe within the limits of being Ethiopian. By focusing on the way that Ethiopian state nationalism has been constituted historically, we have been able to demystify the underlying ideologies premised upon notions of 'unity' and 'sameness' which sustain nationalist claims as well as exploring both explicit and implied omissions and contradictions within these discourses.

Despite systemic political shifts in Ethiopia from monarchical rule, to present-day ethnic federalism, the persistence and self-awareness of 'the nation' has continuously been reinforced by pan-ethiopianist socio-symbolic elements of nation formation. This has served to consolidate power over nations incorporated into the state via conquest such as the Somali. The shaping of the modern configuration of the Ethiopian state is credited to the ruling elite who are also widely believed to have successfully constructed an over-arching image of an Ethiopian national identity that has been embraced by the diverse ethnic groups in modern day Ethiopia (Keller, 1995, p.622). Nonetheless, following the end of imperial rule in 1974, the state was confronted with the challenge of self-determination (though the reign of Haile Selassie was also confronted with self-determination movements) (Keller, 1995, p.622).

The following chapter examines the way that the challenge of Somali self-determination was articulated during the 1960s following the independence of Somalia, the rebellions of the *Geesh*, and

the 1977 Ogaden war. Both represent key discursive events in the history of the Horn of Africa which shaped the course of Somali nationalist expression in Ethiopia and beyond. The chapter examines the popularisation of Somali nationalism through the political verse by rebel actors and movements such as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War against Ethiopia. The chapter highlights the instrumental role of the 1960s rebellions and 1977 Ogaden war in providing language for Somali liberation discourses, and re-structuring relations between the Ethiopian centre and the Somali periphery.

5. Discursive formation of Somali nationalist resistance in Ethiopia: *Geesh*, WSLF and the 1977 Ogaden War

5.1. Introduction

Somali nationalist fervour began sweeping across the Somali territories following World War II. The Somali Region in Ethiopia was no exception to this trend where the Somali Youth League's (SYL) main headquarters came to be stationed in Harar. Modern Somali nationalism was also adopted as a national project by the Somali Republic in 1960 and enshrined in its first constitution after independence. Despite Somalia's act of constitutionalising the pan-Somali ideal (i.e. the unification of all Somali territories), grassroot movements in the Somali region in Ethiopia articulated their own desire for liberation based on reasonings unique to their historical experiences of Ethiopian statehood.

This chapter examines the construction and popularisation of Somali nationalism by the *Geesh* and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) leading up to the 1977 Ogaden War[88] highlighting continuities and discontinuities in expressions of Somali nationalist thought vis a vis previous resistance movements. Using argumentative strategies defined by the Discourse historical Approach (DHA) as analytical tools, this chapter examines the articulations of alternative territorialities ahead of the Ogaden War and its implication for the postcolonial territorial status quo in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa more broadly. Focusing on the cultural and symbolic resources deployed by Somalis to assert their sense of sovereignty lead up to this war, this chapter establishes the core tenants of Somali nationalist thought in Ethiopia emphasising its regional ramifications and impact on constructing Somali nationhood across the Horn of Africa.

The chapter draws on key literary sources such as the work of Cabdullahi Macalin Ahmed 'Dhoodaan'[89] and oral sources from members of the *Geesh* and WSLF demonstrating how key historical junctures are reflected in oral and literary narratives which provided meaning and direction for the masses as a means of mobilising. Underlining the role of discourse in shaping popular consciousness, the chapter illustrates the use of political orature as a means to achieve specific political

[88] Though 'Ethio-Somalia War' and 'Ogaden War' are used interchangeably, I use 'Ogaden War' predominantly in attempt to highlight the national dimension of the war (which this chapter is dedicated to) as opposed to internationalising it by presenting it as a war between two states.
[89] Abdullahi Macalin Ahmed 'Dhoodaan' will hereafter be referred to as Dhoodhaan as he was commonly known.

ends[90]: to dismantle and reject Ethiopian state nationalism. Emphasising the cultural and ideological dimensions of anti-Ethiopian discourses during the mobilisation of the 1977 Ogaden war, I argue that Ogaden resistance is a political and epistemic project centred upon enhancing alternative knowledge systems and re-defining their relationship with the Ethiopian state. By reconstructing the historical events which gave rise to Somali articulations of resistance ahead of the 1977 Ogaden war, we are able to uncover the ways that a revered indigenous resource- the political verse popularised by Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan and his contemporaries- have been deployed through intertextual and interdiscursive references by successive national liberation movements.

The chapter begins by examining the discursive formation of Somali resistance produced and popularised by movements such as the Dervishs headed by Sayyid Mohamed, Nasrullah and the *Geesh* in the lead up to the 1963-64 Somali-Ethio conflict through a discourse historical lens. I highlight the production of alternative knowledge-regimes through the articulations of alternative territorialities in the aftermath of Somalia's independence in 1960, disrupting the myth of the unity of Ethiopian statehood. I draw on the works of Abdullahi Suldaan Tima-cadde and Dhoodaan focusing on the three main components of the discourse historical method: discourse content, discursive strategies, and the linguistic realisation of the two (Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p.91). The analysis is enhanced by an emphasis on context and the incorporation of the broadest range of possible factors that may influence discourse (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.11, 21). Moreover, the chapter illustrates two main discursive strategies of DHA; 'construction' and 'dismantling' strategies (De Cillia, 1999, p.160-161) showing how Somali nationalism is constructed, and how core Ethiopian nationalist claims are deconstructed and de-legitimated. The chapter highlights how 'construction' and 'dismantling' occur concurrently.

This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the literatures which have come to define the mobilisation period of the WSLF. Through this analysis, I focus on the cultural resources that sustain Somali nationalist claims deployed through argumentative schemes, rhetorical tropes and discursive strategies with an emphasis on elements of myth, memory and a re-contextualisation of Somali folktales and symbols emphasised by the ethnosymbolist approach. The chapter then proceeds to examine the discursive denunciation of the 'Greater Somalia' project in the way that it undermined local liberation

[90] For a detailed examination into the use of political oratory as a political weapon by Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, See Said S. Samatar's *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mahammad 'Abdille Hasan* (1982).

efforts in the context of the 1977 Ogaden War. The chapter concludes with offering a view of the pollical scenery in the Somali region following the formal end of the 1977 Ogaden War, and the continuation of the WSLF's armed rebellion.

5.2. Early Somali encounters with the Ethiopian state and the rebellion of the Sayyid

When Menelik II embarked upon his conquests of eastern and southern nations in the late nineteenth century, the administrative presence of his empire was realised through the erection of garrison towns across the recently conquered peripheral territories. As such, military administrators came to represent Menelik's consolidation of the physical boundaries of the modern Ethiopian state (Keller, 1987, p.80). After conquering Harar in 1887, Menelik set his sights on the lowland plain stretching southward towards the Indian ocean and towards the Red Sea in the east inhabited by Afar and Somali nomads whom Britain, Italy and France have been negotiating agreements with through their traditional representatives (Markakis, 2011, p.102). Menelik's generals reached Jigjiga in 1891 seeking to control the important trade route linking Harar with the Red sea ports of Berbera and Zeila.

The projection of Ethiopian state power in the Somali territories reveals the context from which anti-state sentiments among Somalis arise as their main contact with the state consisted of confrontations with soldiers exacting tributes and carrying out raids in the Somali lowlands. The 1880s famine in the highlands resulted in Ras Makonnen's forces turning to the lowlands as form of survival via economic exploitation; Ethiopians enacted their sovereignty via periodic raids against the 'warlike' *Ogaadeen* people whom they encountered too difficult to administer in their harsh terrain (Samatar, 1982, p.118). Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan appealed to the sentiments of the *Ogaadeen* at this important juncture who amassed a force of 6,000 attacking the Ethiopian army garrison in Jigjiga where they recovered their looted camels- this event on March 5th[91] 1900 enabled the Sayyid and his Dervishes to position themselves as 'defenders of the pastoral clans against Abyssinian plunder' (Samatar, 1982, p.118).

Between the 1890s and the late 1940s, Ethiopian troops remained largely in their garrisons in the Ogaden leaving only to conduct raids to collect tribute from Somalis in the forms of livestock; accompanied by violence and brutality, this was the main form of sovereignty exercised by Ethiopians

[91] Other sources indicate that the attack took place in May 1900, see for instance Markakis (2011, p.102).

against Somalis (Geshekter, 1985, p.9-10). The egalitarian nature of Somali pastoral society where political authority is decentralised made it challenging for Menelik to establish dependable local chiefs whose collaboration he could rely upon (Markakis, 2011, p.101). Whereas Ethiopian authority was established with relative ease in the north-western areas of the Ogaden region by the twentieth century, the pastoral clans residing in the south-central regions[92] were supported by their impenetrable and harsh environment and thus remained relatively autonomous until as late as the 1940s save for periodic raids through which Ethiopian intrusion was felt intensely (Samatar, 1982, p.111-112). Tribute extraction and periodic raids led many to join the Sayyid whose mobilisation was framed around fending off Abyssinian incursions.

The Sayyid's attack on an Ethiopian military garrison in Jigjiga to recover looted camels with a force of 6000, is described as 'the opening act of a war that would last two decades' (Markakis, 2011, p.102). This event can also be described as the opening act of an organised resistance against the Abyssinian invasion of the Somali people, led by Sayyid Mohamed in the beginning of the twentieth century but which was not limited to two decades. The resistance sparked by this episode took on different forms spanning across various historical and political periods, providing the language and model for shaping modern Somali nationalism as a political project. As this chapter will demonstrate, Somali territory in Ethiopia represented a staging ground for Somali nationalist expression, manifested in the region through Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan who is considered as the founding father of modern Somali nationalism (Laitin, 1975, p.95). The Sayyid was able to exploit the favourable condition of 'Somalis' antipathy to Euro-Abyssinian colonization' (Samatar, 1982, p.197). Between 1890 and 1897, Menelik's military expeditions led by Ras Makonnen collected in tribute or extracted via raids 600,000 sheep and goats, 100,000 head of cattle, and approximately 200,000 head of camels from the *Ogaadeen* Somalis (Samatar, 1982, p.110).

The Sayyid's rebellion is described as embodying Somali nationalist resistance in a religious-militant form during the first two decades of the twentieth century, and shifting to a secular political project in the upcoming decades (Geshekter, 1985, p.3). However, the shift appears to have been a tactical one driven by regional dynamics relating to decolonisation as opposed to a shift in the essence and language of the Somali nationalist cause. Moreover, this chapter will demonstrate how the Sayyid's

[92] This represents around 80% of the Ogaadeen land mass according to Samatar (1982).

religious motivations may have been overemphasised as his message contains an explicit political doctrine centred on the ideals of self-determination and retaining the threatened sovereignty of Somalis in the Horn of Africa. It illuminates the ways that his verses, such as *Dardaaran* 'parting words of wisdom' for instance, has come to serve as a canonical text often emulated and referenced in nationalist literatures and adopted by nationalist movements over the decades.

5.3. Transfer of Somali territories and Pan-Somali aspirations

In the mid-1930s, The Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission attempted to demarcate the boundary between the Ethiopian empire and Britain's sphere of influence to reflect the territories acquired in the 1897 treaty.[93] In resistance against the legal demarcation of Somali territory to be placed under Ethiopian administration, Somalis rioted resulting in the death of a member of the commission. (Waterfield, 1956, p.55). The British Military Administration (BMA) faced administrative issues in governing Somali nomads relating to the unique social and judicial system that Somalis adhered to, including issues around access to pasture and water. Britain's Foreign Secretary Mr Ernest Bevin proposed the idea of 'Greater Somalia' to centralise authority for administrative purposes and administer all Somalis with a common policy. He proposed this to the Four Power Commission[94] in 1946 (Drysdale, 1964, p.63, p.67). Under the 1948 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, the Ogaden was placed under Ethiopian control – considered by Somalis as a betrayal of previous treaties with them (Morone, 2015, p.97). Further, in the re-establishment of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897[95], the Hawd and the Reserved areas were transferred to Ethiopia in 1955 who had controlled the area since the defeat of the Italians in 1941 (Waterfield, 1956, p.53). This complete transfer of Somali territory under Ethiopian administration is believed to have been in violation against previous treaties signed between Britain and Somali tribes securing their sovereignty in the late 1800s, and it is based on these treaties that Somalis argued for the nullification of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty.[96]

[93] Menelik II acquired a third of the protectorate territory offered as a concession by Britain to prevent Abyssinians assisting the Mahdist revolt. For details on this, See Bernard Braine's *The Somali Question* (1958).
[94] The Four Power Commission comprised of France, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States established after World War II.
[95] Approximately 25,000 square miles of Somali territory occupied by the British was transferred to Ethiopia Waterfield (1956, p.53). For details on the 1897 Treaty, see Mr Rodd's Special Mission to King Menelek (1897, F.O. 881/6943).
[96] Negotiations towards the 1897 agreement illustrate British consciousness of violating agreements signed with Somali tribes in the preceding years. See Mr Rodd's Special Mission to King Menelek (Inclosure 1 in No. 25, F.O. 881/6943).

Pan-Somali aspirations were encoded in party programmes that began emerging as early as 1935, for instance, The Somali National League (SNL) which emerged as a fully functioning party in 1951 in the British Protectorate included in their programme: 'to work for the unification of the Somali people and territories' (Lewis, 1963, p.148-149). Similarly, the Somali Youth League (SYL), initially founded as a youth club in 1943 organised into a political party in 1947 called 'to unite all Somalis generally, and the youth especially' (Lewis, 1963, p.149).[97]

The new Somali Republic formed by the amalgamation of the newly independent British and Italian Somaliland was a turning point for the Somali quest for self-determination in Ethiopia. Somali nationalism as a political project materialised in the pan-Somali aim of merging Somali territories separated by colonial powers, facing both constitutional and political difficulties with regard to the Somali territories in Ethiopia and Kenya due to the principle of territorial integrity (Lewis, 1963, p.159). Reminiscent of SNL and SYL party programmes in the preceding decades, Article VI paragraph 4 of the first Somali Constitution encapsulated the pan-Somali agenda of the newly independent republic by stating its intentions to unify Somali territories by legal means. For the SYL – the Ogaden, and the Hawd represented one of the unredeemed Somali territories along with Djibouti, the British colony of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) and British Somaliland (Monroe, 2015, p.96).

Throughout these historical junctures, little attention has been devoted to the discourses emanating from Somali society which grapple with key historical events affecting the micro-level experiences of Somalis Instead, academic scholarship focuses on the grand-politics associated with Somali nationalism at the level of statecraft. In Ethiopia for instance, as this thesis argues, the expression of Somali nationalism and the right to self-determination was a product of local experiences which sought to articulate a distinct Somali nationhood as a basis for rejecting Ethiopian rule. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the discursive construction of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia is as much a territorial and

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[97] The discourse on Somali unity encapsulated by the Pan-Somali nationalist project is not without problems, for instance Barnes' (2006a) *Gubo – Ogaadeen poetry and the aftermath of the Dervish wars* highlights the potential ruptures within the Pan-Somali ideal of achieving territorial unity based on the genealogical unity of Somalis. For instance, *Ogaadeen* clansmen's contribution to SYL made up a significant amount of the organisation's income (Barnes, 2007, p.288) – yet recent genealogical and territorial rivalries following the defeat of the Sayyid as captured by the '*Gubo*' series, could have had an impact on the call for geological and territorial unity carried by SYL in the 1940's.

political issue as it is about colonial power relations, hierarchies of belonging and histories of violence. The complexities of these experiences and subsequent nationalist aspirations and experiences of the Ethiopian state have been articulated through oral traditions. As the Somali language was alphabetized as recently as the 1970s, prior to this, Somali nationalism was fostered through the wide appeal of Somali poetry through its strong emotional component and ability to excite (Drysdale, 1964, p.15).

5.4. The Somali political verse

In Somali society, poetry is considered as 'the most profound expression of cultural and political discourse' (Barnes, 2006a, p.105) as well as a 'mirror and source of "national" culture and history' (p.106). Barnes (2006a) further notes that a major oversight in the study of Somali history, is the under-utilisation of poetry as historical discourse to reflect on for specific events, periods, and problems throughout Somali history (p.107). Somali poetry is generally accepted as a 'principal medium of mass communication' (Samatar, 1982, p.9) among Somalis namely due to its wide reach and the functions it serves. Firstly, the Somali verse is 'thesis-oriented' with a strong rhetorical and argumentative component (Samatar, 1982, p.58), and the purpose of Somali poetry is to advance an argument, Somali poetry is thus 'committed' in the sense that it is composed in relation to a specific situation and for the purpose of accomplishing a specific task (p.57). Andrzejewski (2011b) describes oral poetry as a favoured means of communicating political messages, and the Somali 'oral postal system' as an important means of transporting key messages enclosed within poetic verses to remote areas (p.28-29). This highlights the significance of the socio-political and historical context within which the Somali verse is situated. As this thesis posits, this designates Somali oral traditions as a key medium for accessing Somali nationalist thought, and deciphering its underlying ideologies.

Sayyid Mohamed was not only masterful in deploying political literature, but also in describing the power of his political verse appealing to his audience through their high regard for poetry. In *Gudban* (lines 43-45) for instance, he describes his poetry via symbols which resonate with his audience: 'they roar like cannons and rattle like gunfire…' 'they rumble like thunder and flash like lightning....' they are perfectly put together, like the silk furnishings completely covering the meeting place…' (Afdub and Kapteijns, 1999, p.39-40). Somali poetry is divided into two broad categories: poetry (*maanso*) and song (*hee*s or *hello*) (Samatar, 1982, p.74). Both categories of literature served as a key medium of mass political communication during the height of nationalist mobilisation in the Somali territories between the 40s and 60s, and in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War.

The following section examines the verses of Abdullahi Suldaan Timacadde and Dhoodaan through a discourse historical approach focusing on the cultural and symbolic resources used to construct Somali nationalist thought, and simultaneously dismantle the core tenants of Ethiopian state nationalism. It illustrates the bourgeoning language of nationalist rhetoric following the period of territorial transfer described in the previous section. Dhoodaan is nicknamed 'macalinka' –'the teacher' and is the first Somali poet to attain the title of '*Qaryaan*'[98] for his poetic prowess.[99] According to Somali literary database '*Doollo*,' Dhoodaan's verses are wholly focused on politics and the Somali 'national' question, making it hard to find anyone among the Somali populace who may disagree with his theorising on prevailing political and social issues facing Somalis; namely issues around colonialism, violence, injustice, and resistance. According to literary historian Ahmed Faarah 'Idaajaa', Dhoodaan is considered as the foremost Somali lyrical mastermind and political and social commentator (United Kingdom, 2021). This thesis is driven by a commitment to accessing Somali subjectivities through locally constituted knowledge systems, as elaborated by Dhoodaan, to reflect on the political realities of Somalis in Ethiopia during key historical junctures. The following section establishes the intertextual links between Dhoodaan and his contemporaries with the work of Sayyid Mohamed.

5.5. Key tropes in Somali nationalist thought: constructing the symbol of the 'colonizer'

Having offered a background on the conditions which gave rise to Somali nationalist resistance in Ethiopia, it is necessary to examine the fundamental assumptions which underline Somali nationalist thought and the socio-symbolic and cultural elements evoked in key works of literature as a means to construct a distinctly sovereign nationhood. In the following verse called Quduro produced in 1982, Qabridahare resident and former member of WSLF Cabdullahi Badal historically locates the emergence of the Ethiopian Empire while constructing its representatives in particularly antagonistic ways:

When the Europeans divided us, it was not a hidden matter
And we were joined with the Africans among them (Ethiopians)

[98] Qaryaan refers to the highest status that a poet or *Abwaan* can be awarded.
[99] Dhoodaan is also the founder of the '*jacbur*' style of Somali poetry unique for its wisdom and humour.

It was luck that tied us to the Amhara, the one who eats raw meat
They are not satisfied with (settling disputes via) the pen, politics or the constitution
In peace they do not eat, for liberation efforts are set in motion
As they continue to be subjected to slaughter and death

This verse is significant in that it offers a succinct summary of the status of the Somali territories that were incorporated into Ethiopia, the unwillingness of the Ethiopian state to relinquish its claims on the region through proper legal channels, and the necessity of using force to liberate the region. Since the emergence of the modern Ethiopian state, despite the character of the state, successive regimes have prioritised legitimizing Ethiopia's status as a viable nation-state comprised of multi-ethnic peoples, and preserving its territorial integrity by maintaining its present geographic boundaries (Keller, 1987, p.77). Cabdullahi Badal subverts this taken for granted territorial status quo by reminding listeners of a key historical event and alluding to the *topos* of history. This argumentation scheme connects the present manifestation of resistance- armed or otherwise- with the historical betrayal of Somalis by European, Ethiopians and international and legal treaties alike.[100] This theme serves as a key reference point for the narrative history of Somali resistance inscribed in the collective psyche of Somalis as will be illustrated in a range of political verses. The poet makes an argument for the natural causality of being an expansionist power if you refuse to revert to law in order to settle territorial disputes, and the way that the law itself favours powerful states as opposed to stateless nations.

Importantly, the verse conceptualises the Ethiopian state and its underlying nationalism in a manner consistent with canonical texts which encapsulate the *raison d'être* of Somali nationalist thought, namely that Ethiopia's claim on the Somali territories is unfounded, thus rendering it a matter of coloniality. This is evidenced by intertextual links with Sayyid Mohamed's *Gaala-leged* 'Defeating the infidels',[101] which is considered by Said Samatar (1982), a leading expert on the Sayyid, as belonging to a special category of poems which represent a type of 'state-of-the-union address' in terms of the significance of its message (1982, p.159).

'[112] My God, everywhere people are hostile to us.
[113] They are preparing to attack, these infidels…
[115] Without us taking a iota from them, they are oppressing us.

[100] For details, see Louis FitzGibbon's *The Betrayal of the Somalis* (1982)
[101] *Gaala-leged* 'Defeating the infidels' is also commonly known as *Gudban*

[116] If they had found us at fault, I would have lain down.
[117] Oh God, they herded us together just to make us enter their religion.
[118] Oh God, even if I beg them, they withhold peace.' (Afdub & Kapteijns, 1999, p.44)

In addition to Menelik's incursions on Somali territories, the Sayyid's war was jointly motivated by the threat of the British against the three main pillars of Somali society: 'their faith, their independence, and their socio-economic institutions' (Kakwenzire, 1986, p.662). The image of the colonising power in any given Somali territory was not that of a monolithic 'white' or 'European' orientation – but rather consisted of British, Ethiopian, French, and Italian domination (Lewis, 1963, p.148). This symbolic formation is particularly pronounced in the Somali territories that were conquered via Abyssinian incursions and later incorporated into Ethiopia, but who also came into contact with various colonial administration such as the British and the Italians. The poet makes explicit the special designation of Ethiopia as a colonialist by partaking in the Scramble for Africa. It is also reflected in the repeated use of '*gumeysiga madow*' – 'the black colonialist' in popular literature in reference to the variations of colonialism in terms of colour, governing style etc. Moreover, the repeated use of the deictic 'they' points towards the plurality in the forms of colonialism that they were confronted with as stated by Cabdullahi Badal via reference to the joint role of Europeans and Ethiopians in necessitating Somali resistance. As deictic expressions require understanding of the context in which they are uttered, it presupposes a common understanding that the Somali experience with colonialism in Ethiopia was varied; 'they' may refer to any power that has waged a war of conquest against Somalis or instituted any form of oppression as the Sayyid complains of.

Returning to Cabdullahi Badal's short and precise proclamation which serves as a blueprint for Somali nationalist thought, discourses on identity are deployed as a central component in his call to action. The poet asserts that Somalis have been unfortunate enough to end up under the subjugation of the 'Amhara'[102] further described as 'the one who eats raw meat.' Discourses of identity and difference are fundamentally predicated upon the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them,' and in the process of formulating a positive self- and negative other presentation (Wodak, 2001, p.73). While these strategies are apparent in discourses of discrimination to emphasise difference, in this example we find that they

[102] 'Amhara' and 'habahsi' are used interchangeably in Somali literature to denote dominance and allude to a socio-political grouping as opposed to implying a marker of ethnicity.

are likewise used to highlight difference in resistance discourses intended to subvert the dominant narrative.

The verse further reveals the use of predication strategies used to attribute certain negative characteristics to the state (Ethiopians) referring to them as 'Amhara'. This is because the term defines 'situationally a 'socio-cultural' rather than an 'ethnic' category' (Shack, 1976, p.169). The forcefully assimilated and those on the peripheries of Ethiopian society categorise dominant segments of Ethiopian society together into one political and symbolic category which they refer to as 'Amhara' (Triulzi, 1994, p.238). Deep-seated resentment against 'the Amhara colonialist' across the peripheries resonates with this poet's Somali audience – this resentment is in part due to Haile Selassie's socio-economic policies favouring Amharas, Tigray's and Amharized- Oromos, for instance in the post-war period where his socio-economic policies were centred on extraction, control and a lack of concern towards nation-building or national integration based upon justice and equality (Keller, 1981, p.541).

The description of the Amhara representing the Ethiopian state as 'the one who eats raw meat' is an example of referential and predication strategies which in this case serve to create in-groups and out-groups by assigning actors with negative or stereotypical attributions (Wodak, 2001, p.73). The effect of using synecdoche in this phrasing is that reference to the characteristic of eating raw meat presents an element of highland/Abyssinian culture as symbolizing the overall image of this culture. In Somali, '*qaydhiin-cune'* - 'the one who eats raw meat' – is a noun rather than an adjective which emphasises stereotypical and evaluative attributions of negative traits in Somali society. This presupposition underscores the shared assumption that eating raw meat is negative and a point which signifies the fundamental differences between highland (Christian) culture and that of lowland (Muslim) Somali communities. This sense of difference also alludes to identity differences along religious lines.[103] Somali nationalist literatures are replete with intertextual links with Sayyid's proclamations and ideological messaging. Similar examples of stereotypical attributes are evident in *Dardaaran* 'parting words of wisdom' composed in 1919, where he states:

'I, however, was eager to fight the Christians,

[103] Based on conversations with Somali elders, it is widely believed among Somali communities that it was out of fear of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi 'Ahmed Guray' that highland communities began to avoid using fire to cook their meat. Thus, '*qaydhiin-cune'* - 'the one who eats raw meat' is often deployed to invoke pride and historical triupth over Abyssinians.

'The country does not belong to you', I said to those people with the dirty foreskins.' (Afdub et al, 2000, p.33)

This farewell poem by the Sayyid encapsulates the core tenants of Somali nationalism between 1900-1920. This later served as a basis for the discourses of liberation to be articulated by both civilians and militant political parties during subsequent decades. *Dardaaran* is described by Afdub et al (2000) as distinctly 'fanonesque and prophetic' (p.27). Like Cabdullahi Badal definitively summarises the (Amhara) highlander as a raw meat-eating occupier, Sayyid Mohamed characterises colonisers as people with 'dirty foreskins.' Once again, he appeals to the shared assumption that foreskins have negative connotations which are at odds with the cultural and religious values of the society he is appealing to. This common trope in Somali resistance literatures may be considered as a discursive strategy which serves to appropriate the dominant colonial discourses that distinguishes occupier from occupied. This is done by othering subject peoples and assigning them inferior qualities that sanctions their subjugation as legitimate. Resistance discourses unsettle these hegemonic labels by assigning the same inferior qualities back to the colonisers. This is in direct dialogue with the way that imperial dominance in Ethiopia was accompanied by 'a chauvinist vocabulary of supercilious, condescending terms' employed by highlanders such as slaves '*barias*', bandits '*shiftas*' or 'shiretam' which denotes a certain attribute of weak cowardice associated with the long garments worn by Somali men from their waists (Geshkter, 1985, p.12). The appropriation of colonial discourses serves the parallel process of deconstructing these condescending labels, and affirming the normative rightness of rebelling against the producers of this form of domination.

5.5.1. Normative rightness of Somali resistance

Invoking the concept of normative rightness is a reoccurring theme in nationalist literatures. Sayyid Mohammed's verses employ argumentative and rhetorical schemes to justify the call to action in resisting oppression by emphasising the role of the transgressor which necessitates retaliation i.e. self-defence. The Sayyid's use of the epistolary style in his direct invocation of God complemented the role of the Somali verse in broadcasting a message in an egalitarian society where public opinion is significant, as such he used epistles 'to appeal or abuse, to enhance or discredit' by directly naming the individuals to whom his message was directed towards i.e. colonisers, collaborators, supporters, God etc. (Samatar, 1982, p.150).

Interrelationships between religion and nationalism plays a key role in contributing to the parallel processes of legitimation and de-legitimation. Religious messaging is not only deployed to highlight religion as a marker of identity and an important point of contestation between the opposing nationalisms, but to evoke a sense of legitimacy unique to the author. *Dardaaran* contains the following excerpts:

On the day they [the colonizers] said, 'Here, take this gift,' I refused.
I did not sell my religion in exchange for a place in Hell.
Of the two abodes, I did not mistake the earthly one for the most valuable. (Afdub et al, 2000, p.33)

The excerpt illustrates the evocation of the theme of religion as a rallying call by drawing on the socio-symbolic legitimacy associated with religion. By stating that he did not sell his religion as a means to represent the acceptance of colonial rule, and 'a place in hell' as the punishment for collaborators; he sanctifies commitment to the Somali cause and elevates it to the status of religious obligation. There is an interesting interplay between the Sayyid's use of 'Christian' and 'infidels,' and Menelik's simultaneous use of 'pagans' and 'Muslims.' Chapter 4 showed how Ethiopian state nationalism is discursively constituted as divinely ordained – and the expansion of the empire under Menelik II as a just campaign to convert 'heathens' and 'pagans.' The Sayyid complains of this mission devised by the Abyssinians in his plea to God in *Gudban*:

[117] 'Oh God, they herded us together just to make us enter their religion
[118] Oh God, even if I beg them, they withhold peace.' (Afdub & Kapteijns, 1999, p.44)

This is further reminiscent of Menelik's explicit command to offer peace only to those who submit to his rule and religion as apparent in his instructions surrounding the conquest of Harar (F.O. 881/6943). Nevertheless, the use of the possessive pronoun in 'My God, everywhere people are hostile to us' suggests the immediacy and accessibility of a higher power who bears witness to the transgressions against the Sayyid and his people. The Sayyid's plea evokes the historical memory of subjugation;[104] under the leadership of Tewodros II, Yohanness IV and Menelik II, as the history of

[104] *Alle bari* 'Invoking God' (1972) by Dhoodaan is a prominent example of this tradition, where he not only complains to God about the condition of his people, but follows the prophetic tradition and etiquette used to invoke God according to Islamic teachings. This is first to praise God, and send prayers upon the prophet Muhammad (pbuh) before making one's request according to Tirmidhi.

Abyssinian colonialism was one of 'conquest, annexation, incorporation, and subjugation of non-Abyssinian people and territories…to undermine every indigenous social and political institution' (Birru, 1980-1, p.97). The symbol of violence and subjugation are central to the collective memory of Somalis in Ethiopia which orators appealed to in order to justify the need for political mobilisation and rebellion against the status quo.

The following source selected for examination by Dhoodaan is called '*Ha midowdo'* - 'Be United,'[105] which continues in the tradition of constructing 'the coloniser' as envisaged by Somalis, and setting a stable narrative for how the Somali territories came to be conquered, including the powers involved. This serves the purpose of demystifying the rationale for resisting the Ethiopian state while locating Somali nationalism within a particular story of origin.

When the colonizers conquered the world
Many were the people tied by their necks and kept on a leash
Who had their possessions confiscated
But the exploiters did not succeed in benefiting from Somalis
Nor did they make us into disgraced pawns
They could neither wither our culture nor mutate it
We maintained the upper hand for long, and in times of combat
We used to defend it with strength and (powered by) unity
Even though they possessed missiles, vehicles and ammunition
I dipped my arrow with poison, and my piercing spear too
I once used on them the 'Maare' and 'Maadhiin' rifles

Whenever we encounter colonial forces
They often became disheartened or (turnd into) a collection of dead bodies
As for Somalis, they are known for their unique values wherever they are
Like honey, it is a heritage that tastes sweet to us
We never forget its existence, it is always within us
Part of our heritage states, that we are prohibited from provoking others
We even ask of the wicked, to kindly leave us alone
We don't slaughter him immediately, but try to calm him down
For those we show this mercy to, but fail to take heed
We will not cower in the face of their perceived superiority
At last, we smack them in the face
We will pierce into their hearts, (with) the dangerous weapon we have prepared for them
We readily give it to him, if death is what he wishes

[105] The literary repository 'Doollo.com' has been an invaluable source for accessing Dhoodaan's verses. However, I am equally indebted to multiple oral sources for verification of all details related to Dhoodaan's poems under examination in this chapter. All details associated with the poems including the dates they were produced, their historical context and their content was verified through oral sources and accessing personal archival cassette recordings of Dhoodans's poems.

He will be put to death, just like we slayed his counterparts

The theme of constructing Ethiopia as the aggressor, and perpetuating images of its aggressive character is evident in Dhoodaan's verses. Though produced following the 1974 OAU summit in Mogadishu much later than the era of the Sayyid, he embarks on the same narrative sequel of how the Somali territories came to be colonised by European and Ethiopian powers alike, characteristic of earlier nationalist verses.[106] Dhoodaan switches between singular and plural pronouns oscillating between the temporal and spatial boundaries of Somali experiences with Ethiopian statehood. He refers to himself in the singular to describe the type of weapons he used against the coloniser assuming the collective persona of liberation groups who came face to face with Ethiopian armed forces. Yet he collectivises the experience of resistance by switching between the singular and plural underlining the simultaneously personal and collective experience of domination and resistance.

The poem grapples with the broad themes of economic exploitation and cultural assimilation as the policy of Ethiopian state nationalism, both of which Dhoodaan argues Somalis have successfully resisted. He draws parallels between the rest of the conquered peoples, who have been left destitute and successfully overpowered by 'exploiters.' Appealing to the unique attributes of Somalis in resisting colonialism, he establishes a crucial sense of distinctiveness which is central to the mobilising role of the Somali political verse. This was particularly pertinent in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War when this poem was produced. Guibernau (2004) summarises this strategy in the following way:

> 'Calls for action and sacrifice in the face of threats to the nation are accompanied by appeals to the 'unique character' and 'qualities' of those who belong. This has the capacity to elevate people beyond their daily lives and routines, to transport them to a higher level in which their actions gain meaning and are qualified as crucial for the survival and prosperity of the nation' (p.135).

Moreover, the poem's reference to the global colonial-capitalist system centred upon resource extraction and oppression situates the Somali question in Ethiopia beyond a territorial dispute. Archival records reveal the role that the discovery of oil in the Ogaden played in fuelling Haile Selassie's desire to accelerate the transfer of the Ogaden to Ethiopia from BMA control,[107] as well as

[106] This except is part of a longer verse justifying the necessity to resist, the distinct role that Somali rebel groups should assume in Ethiopia vis a vis the Somali Republic whose role should be to provide technical assistance.
[107] For details, see FO 1015/83: Oil concessions in the Ogaden.

the disturbances surrounding the attempt of Sinclair Oil to conduct its operation in the Ogaden in 1947.[108] Discursive strategies of transformation and dismantling are used in the way that economic integration and cultural assimilation is imagined in Ethiopian nationalism vis a vis Somali nationalist rhetoric. Dhoodaan boasts how Somalis have fended off attempts at accessing the resources in the Somali Region and abandoning their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness, and as a result, the 'exploiters' did not succeed in making them into pawns or puppets. by highlighting their role as 'exploiters' as their defining characteristic through the use of synecdoche, he alludes to the *terra nullius* doctrine of 'nobody's land' which informed Ethiopian attitudes to accessing its pastoral frontiers (Regassa et al., 2019, p.938). The pastoral lowlands are deemed 'empty' by means of being inhabited by 'backward' communities in need of being civilised, and the land in need of being appropriated (Korf et al, 2015, p.883-884). The poem reflects on how lowland peripheries were deemed empty and valueless, but their worth rooted in the extent to which they could be used as a playing field for extracting resources. Evading economic integration, which is considered parallel to economic exploitation is celebrated as a form of resistance. This serves to unsettle prejudicial attitudes towards the lowland peripheries as backwards and poorly developed by claiming it as a source of victory.

In terms of cultural assimilation, the symbol of the collaborator often equated with qualities of a traitor, is also a recurrent theme in the literature; it rejects the principle of the 'integrated' Somali constituting a model citizen and a constituent member of the Ethiopian state. While line 4 refers to resisting economic integration i.e. exploitation, the following line alludes to resisting political domination in accepting Ethiopian sovereignty. The recurrent theme of the 'puppet' appropriates the negative constructions of Somalis as unruly and rebellious by reclaiming these qualities and re-constructing them as a source of pride in evading Ethiopian rule. The macro-strategy of positive-self and negative -other representation dignifies the category of the 'unruly' Somali who resisted cultural assimilation, while undermining its opposite. Moreover, Dhoodaan's mention of Somali resistance against cultural assimilation alludes to another important function of Ethiopian state nationalism, it highlights its incompatibility with multiple identities and modes of belonging. Ethiopian attempts to rule Somalis consisted largely of segregation as opposed to any policies of assimilation or integration, until Haile Selassie's 1956 speech which first introduced the notion of assimilating Somalis into the

[108] Markakis (1987) describes the relationship between Ethiopia's desire to retrieve the Ogaden and Haud and Reserved Area from British control following the expulsion of the Italians in 1941, and offering a concession for oil exploration to Sinclair Oil. Ethiopia also appealed to the United states for support by offering other incentives such as attaching the Ethiopian currency to the dollar among other things (Markakis (1987, p.173).

empire-state (Geshekter, 1985, p.11). For instance, as the previous chapter illustrated, Haile Selassie's pre-condition for Somalis' real integration into the Ethiopian state structure was 'education' through adopting the Amharic language. Underlining the sustained resistance against these state policies serves the purpose of juxtaposing their identities with that of the state-builders and highlighting themselves as a 'distinct social category, an ethnic nationality' (Geshekter, 1985, p.7). The following chapter explores the development of these identity categories in relation to the introduction of present-day ethnic federalism.

5.6. *Maandeeq:* Somalia's independence and the remaining unredeemed territories

Somalia's independence in 1960 marked a turning point for the national self-imagination of Somalis in Ethiopia, and their subsequent expression of sovereignty vis a vis both the independent Somali Republic and the Imperial Government of Ethiopia. The appeal of independence played a significant role in the 'stirrings of nationalism' among Somalis in late 1950s Ethiopia (Markakis, 1987, p.175). The 1963-64 Somali-Ethio conflict, and the 1977 Ogaden War provide insights into the dynamic positionalities of Somalis in their expressions of resistance against the Ethiopian state.

The independence of British and Italian Somaliland in 1960 was felt across the Somali territories who hoped to join the same path as their kinsmen leading to a significant rise in nationalist fervour. The liberation of remaining territories was thus conceived of during this period as inevitable, such feelings were accompanied by public displays of celebration and symbolic elements of nationalist expressions such as flags and surge in nationalist literatures according to witnesses (Ali Aden, 2019). Using literary means, Cabdullahi Suldaan 'Timacadde' was a regular commentator on Somali politics pertaining to the enduring question of liberation. In the following poem called *Maandeeq* selected for examination, Timacadde encapsulates the sentiments of the period describing the historical efforts to liberate the Somali territories under difficult circumstances, and the necessity of confronting Ethiopia in pursuit of the unredeemed 'homeland.'

The she-camel looted by the colonialist, the one I wanted to recover
For many years we did not sleep due to its absence
Wherever it (she-camel) stands I was nearby
The she-camel for which I made travels by the dark nights tumbling over every cliff
The she-camel I jogged after and met the enemy in combat

In defending the she-camel birds shrieked in distress[109]
In her defence, many men in retreat were eaten by venomous snakes
The she-camel that two related colonisers fought over viciously
They were forced to give us freedom, it was not voluntary
The day that man and woman stood united
And when, By the grace of God, the people became victorious
The she-camel that I eloquently described in my poetry[110]
The she-camel that I fed the *Galool*, *Maraa* and *Kidi* branches/trees to
the she-camel that I herded while severely hungry and thirsty
While in her full gestation, the day she was ready to deliver
With a filled udder, ready to be milked
An unwise one thinks he can disturb it, and stop it from being milked
Though we do not possess missiles and handguns
The camel for which I braved facing a deep-chested lion
To abandon it in fear of an ostrich, is an impossible matter[111]

The analysis of 'local meanings' in the Socio-cognitive Approach (SCA) considers various forms of indirect and implicit meanings such as allusions, implications, presuppositions and omissions (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p.29). As camels are known to constitute the very essence and symbol of nomadic pastoralist life in Somali society (Geshekter, 1985, p.14), employing the she-camel as an extended metaphor to represent the homeland, taps into the cultural and symbolic reservoirs of the collective Somali imagination. While some expressions are bound to be lost in translation, the poet refers to the familiar anatomy of the she-camel not unfamiliar to the pastoral society that his message is in intended to rally. First by describing the Somali territories i.e. 'the homeland' as a looted she-camel, the opening line establishes a crucial sense of ownership equated with the undisputed ownership of a nomad/pastoralist over their camel. Further, the symbolism of the she-camel in the final excerpts signifies camel milk as perhaps the most important form of sustenance for Somali nomads (Orwin, 2006, p.17). The act of milking the camel signifies the liberation of Somali territories still under Ethiopian rule, which is considered imminent and inevitable by the author. Imagining sovereignty as *Maandeeq* – a she-camel rich in milk- is a stable tradition in Somali oral practices. According to Afrax

[109] Birds shrieking in distress to signal danger is a natural sounding alarm which alerts pastoral communities to nearby threats. In this regard, the poet alludes to the act of armed resistance in defending the she-camel (i.e. homeland) and the resultant sound of gunfire which causes birds to shriek.
[110] Since the she-camel symbolises the idea of 'homeland,' describing the she-camel using poetry refers to the act of mobilising the masses in support of the land by educating, debating, and raising the consciousness of listeners. This act is reflective of the traditional Somali political verse that this poem itself is an example of.
[111] Some argue that this poem was made in reference to former British Somaliland. However, most informants provided the context offered here.

(1994), 'The reason for choosing a she-camel to embody the most valued ideal lies in the nomadic cultural background of most of the authors…the she-camel is the most valued of all property' (p. 241).

The socio-cultural symbol of the she-camel is a reoccurring trope used in Somali nationalist literature. In this instance, describing colonialism via the act of camel raiding serves to magnify a localised (but familiar experience) by linking it to broader questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consistent with traditional Somali protocol, the allusion to the act of camel raids suggests both the sanctioning and necessity of a counterraid to retrieve the camel i.e. to conquer the homeland back. Indeed, in traditional Somali society, 'the man whose she-camel is stolen does not rest…' (Afrax, 1994, p. 241). This reveals strong allusions to the 1900 counter-raid where the Sayyid along with his forces attacked a military garrison in Jigjiga to recover their looted camels (Samatar, 1982, p.118). It is also evocative of the 1940s British disarmament campaign in the Ogaden. This is remembered as the *geed-ood* 'camel enclosure' period which fostered strong anti-British sentiments among *Ogaadeen* clans who watched their camels suffer while enclosed in thorn fences (Barnes, 2007, p.284).[112]

Key argumentation schemes are used to underscore the normative rightness of the fundamental claims made by Somali nationalism on statehood and sovereignty. This is based on a particular historical memory on European and Ethiopian colonialism centred on violence and dispossession. Discursive strategies of construction and perpetuation ascribe certain negative attributes to the colonial powers in question. Through the use of depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies where European colonialism is equated with a 'deep-chested' lion and Ethiopia with an ostrich, the author speaks to their comparative status' of power in the world stage. He describes the struggles he has endured in resisting colonialism and recovering the she-camel i.e., the homeland; from hunger and thirst, to sleeplessness until the independence of British and Italian Somaliland which he stresses was not handed to them without a struggle. This evokes intertextual links and continuous dialogue with Sayyid Mohamed's highly acclaimed *Dardaaran* where he states: 'Many were the wounds inflicted on us, many the rivers across which we were forced to swim' (Afdub et al, 2000, p.32). Both literally and figuratively, the river represents the thorny path towards resisting imperial power- similar to Timacadde's tumbling over cliffs and being bit by venomous snakes in pursuit of liberty mentioned in *Maandeeq*. By highlighting that 'we' as a collective do not possess the same military capability as the Ethiopian state,

[112] Following the end of World War II, the British conducted a brutal disarmament campaign to tackle the spread of arms during the period of Italian occupation in the Horn of Africa.

Timacadde once again evokes and reconstitutes the historical memory of Somali engagement with colonial powers vis a vis various forms of dispossession and being rendered defenceless. Referring to treaties of the late 1800s – special arms clauses which favoured Ethiopia over other Africans – specifically the Somalis, Silberman (1961) states that 'the British strictly observed the policy of refusing arms to the Somalis' (p.155). The 1890 Brussels General Act of which Ethiopia became a signatory prohibited Somalis from importing arms which rendered them defenceless against Abyssinian incursions, while tilting the balance of power in favour of Abyssinians (Drysdale, 1964, p.62).

Constructing the image of Ethiopia as the last standing coloniser is perpetuated via the symbol of the powerful state which possess superior military capability i.e., missiles and guns who intends to undermine the milking of the she-camel which represents the liberation efforts underway. Witnesses describe the momentous impact that Somalia's independence had on Somali society at large in Ethiopia, which was felt and celebrated in major towns. However, there were serious consequences for exhibiting any form of aspiration in joining the newly independent Somali state across the border. Witnesses argue that the massacres of Ayshaca'a (1960), Danod (1960) and Dhegehbour (1961) were both related to the government's attempt at combating Somali nationalist sentiments by flexing its superior military capability against civilians. In Dhegehbour for instance, witnesses such as Siyaad Daud (2019) explains how the massacre of 1961 is remembered as 'the year of the canon' where 83 people were killed in one afternoon.[113] The name of the event is derived from the sheer lack of familiarity with weapons of this scale deployed against a civilian population, and the rationale behind using such heavy artillery was 'to fight against the mindset of liberation' borne out of Somalia's independence. Timacadde's reflection on the 'unwise one' (Ethiopia) who thinks to disturb the path to liberty symbolised via the milking of the she-camel, foreshadow both the physical and diplomatic manoeuvres to be employed by Ethiopia in its policy to maintain hold on what was considered an unredeemed Somali territory. The following section explores the significance of the 1960s liberation

[113] In light of an increase in solidarity among Somalis following the transfer of the Hawd and Reserved Areas, according to Waterfield (1956) 'Ethiopians hanged in a brutal manner seven Ethiopian Somalis of the Geri tribe for a revolt which took place in 1951; the Ethiopians were trying to collect arrears of taxes for a period when the British military Administration was in charge of the area.' (Waterfield, 1956, p.59). This among other examples illustrates the punitive measures taken by the imperial government to suppress dissent even before the wave of Somali independence reached its frontiers.

movements, how local commentators reflected on their opposition to Ethiopian state nationalism, and their own search for independence.

5.7. Nasrullah, *Geesh*, and the African diplomatic scene

Since the late 1950s, Somali elders began the recruitment process for a new rebellion group using the cover of '*nasrullah*' and the Ogaden Company for Trade and Industry (OCTI) (Hagmann, 2014a, p.729). According to Markakis' (1987) account on the origins of the *Geesh* front, Haile Selassie introduced a livestock tax in February 1963 – the grievances borne out of this helped fuel support for Makhtal Dahir's subsequent rebellion where the group's first gathering was held in Hodayo located in the Wardheer area (p.176-178). The leadership of the *Geesh*[114] was comprised of local chiefs, prominent elders, religious leaders, former members of Nasrullah, OCTI as well as former officials appointed by Haile Selasie such as former governor of Dhegehbour, Garaad Makhtal Dahir (Hagmann, 2014a, p.729). The new front enjoyed popular support as its leaders who were prominent chiefs 'capitalized on widespread anti-habesha sentiments and promises of integration with the new Somali state' (Hagmann, 2014a, p.729). Like other major social and political processes, the mobilisation of Nasrullah and the lead up to the subsequent formation of Makhtal's armed rebellion is captured in Somali oral traditions. They describe the continued resistance against the 'habesha' coloniser in the context of important regional dynamics around the period of Somalia's independence in 1960.

The following source selected for examination is called *Haw liicina* 'do not tumble' composed by Dhoodaan in 1959. The young poet was called upon from Walwaal to attend a *Nasrullah* gathering in *Hodayo* and recite some verses in the presence of the group's leadership including Dr Ibrahim Haashi and Abdinasir Haaji Mohamoud. The lengthy verse contains the following excerpt:

Except to howl, I could not lay down to rest
Day and night, I have raised my voice in recitation (of poetry)
In the middle of *Lushna Shira* I have stood (uncomfortably)
With great sorrow, I describe how the colonialist has led us astray
Surely, there is no uncertainty concerning the ongoing breeze[115]
Victory is near, for whomever holds victory close to his heart
The warning fire was lit by those whom they taught
The previously unaware masses, have now become vigilant

[114] *Geesh* stems from the Arabic term *al-Jaysh* 'army.'
[115] The breeze refers to liberation activities and other related mobilisation initiatives.

The ones who became accustomed to colonialism, have learnt to resist
We are wrestling with the Habesha, so do not tumble![116]

As the political verse constituted part and parcel of 'open warfare' in Somali society (Andrzejewski, 2011b, p.30), this verse became widely circulated by reference to its concluding declaration which actualised the status of resistance against Ethiopian colonialism as an active one. Considering that Dhoodaan's immediate audience was a resistance network comprised of prominent elders and traditional and religious leaders, his message of encouragement serves to rally listeners in realising that the path to liberation has already been treaded upon, as their own assembly is physically manifesting. The excerpt illustrates intertextual references to the instrumental role of poetry in political mobilisation and the deployment of the political verse as an exemplary act of resistance. As shown in previous excerpts from the Sayyid and Timacadde, this explicit reference to the role of poetry in conveying the author's message underscores the weight of the political message that poetry carries in general, and that this poem is intended to deliver specifically. Using the metaphor of a breeze to signify opposition activities, the author alludes to the extent to which nationalist sentiments were felt across the Somali territories. While the physical manifestations of this nationalist fervour may not have been apparent yet, like the breeze, its presence was certainly felt. Indeed, it is this breeze that culminated in the formation Makhtal's liberation front in 1963 which coincided with the founding of the OAU and the 1964 Ethio-Somali war which followed.

The temporal references to 'day and night' alongside the use of geonyms i.e. naming specific localities in the Somali Region, provides a concrete conceptualisation of the territory in question- bringing it into existence as a real place, with real people and real histories. The deictic 'we' reinforces the membership classifications of the 'Somali' and the 'habesha' mentioned in the same line, which constructs and perpetuates an in-group and an out-group membership categorisation. Similarities can be drawn between the symbol of the shrieking bird in the earlier Timacadde poem used to alert communities on incoming danger against the she-camel, and the 'fire' lit by young nationalists in the excerpt above. The repetitive theme of nature and the environment working in harmony with local liberation activities, suggests a usurpation of Ethiopian nationalist claims to natural and divine authority. In illustrating the instrumentality of nature in fuelling the nationalist fervour and supporting

[116] For the original Somali formatting of some of Dhoodaan's verses listed in the appendices, I have relied on 'Doollo.com' literary repository. In cases where written versions were not available, I have relied on transcriptions from cassette recordings.

liberation; Somali emancipatory rhetoric subverts the normative rightness underlying pan-Ethiopian nationalist imaginations showing that it is not a given, and that it is far from natural.

The poem concludes with an emotive warning prophesising the challenges to come in wrestling with 'the habesha' who are both militarily, politically and diplomatically superior, but reminding listeners to remain on course despite this reality. Following the Djibouti- Dire Dawa train assault[117] which occurred six kilometeres from Hadhagala, Haile Selassie launched a scorched earth campaign against Somalis burning the villages of Aysha'a, Danood and Biyo Qaboobe and the mass imprisonment of elders and community leaders. A 2021 publication by Ali Moussa Iye titled *Aysha'a Genocide of 1960: Shedding Light on a Hidden Tragedy* offers a detailed account of the Aysha'a massacre recounting the days long military campaign led by Colonel Kifle Edgetu. According to Iye (2021), an estimated 2500-3000 civilians were massacred by hundreds of soldiers who used armed vehicles and aerial bombardment encircling the village at the height of a religious ceremony commemorating Sheikh Moussa Rijaal (pp. 69-74). In addition to this, the Danod incident in December 1960 is another episode of Ethiopian state violence evoked in the collective memory of its Somali inhabitants. Ethiopian authorities refused a group of nomads from the Somali republic to access water from the Danod water-holes leading to skirmishes in the area (85 miles south of the de facto border between Ethiopia and Somalia) and later 'suppressed by Ethiopian ground and air forces' (Lewis, 1963, p.153).[118]

The considerations driving local rebellion were unaffected by the broader debates on how to approach colonial borders taking place at the OAU among heads of African states. As Somali rebels would later come to know, the 1964 Heads of State summit in Cairo approved a resolution formally condemning the Somali position on colonial borders within the framework of the OAU – legitimising Ethiopia's aspirations of maintaining possession of the Ogaden region (Morone, 2015, p.104). Opposition to state domination (i.e. via liberation movements seeking self-determination) which threatens the post-colonial territorial status quo were 'militarily contained and/ or diplomatically isolated from regional

[117] According to Iye (2021), the Aysha'a massacre was a premeditated assault considering that military activity had already increased in the vicinity of Aysha'a prior to the train assault, and the proliferation of state accusations of an illegal arms trade Dikhil to Aysha'a linked to neighbouring Somalia and pan-Somali movements. In addition to this, though Ethiopian authorities requested that the local *Ugaas* turn in those responsible for the train attack, they embarked upon their assault just 3 days after before receiving a response to their request (p.81). Iye (2021) Djibouti- Dire Dawa train assault was spearheaded by Hussain Lahdil in retaliation against injustices suffered at the hands of Ethiopian authorities, but Ethiopian authorities blamed prominenbt pan-Somali figures such as Mohamoud Harbi (p.67-68).
[118] The number of deaths in the Danod incident is unconfirmed.

and international institutions' tasked with addressing different forms of violations and with the mechanisms to address grievances such as the OAU for instance (Iyob, 1993, p.260). The Somali government retaliated against the OAU's position on the Ogaden question by providing continued support to local rebels in the Ogaden (Morone, 2015, p.104).

In February 1964, Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was forced to negotiate a ceasefire with the Ethiopians and withdraw support from the Ogaden rebels spearheading rebellion against the Ethiopian army in 1963,[119] promising to resume support at a more appropriate time (Morone, 2015, p.105). a ceasefire was declared on March 6th 1964 via the Khartoum accord where both parties agreed to withdraw their forces from the order (Markakis, 1987, p.180). However, rebel leaders belonging to Makhtal's *Geesh* insist on their independence despite technical and diplomatic support provided by neighbouring Somalia, arguing that rebellion in the Ogaden was locally driven and emerged from particular socio-political and economic conditions. According to Ali Aden (2019), reporters accompanying the UN during the ceasefire declaration interviewed his unit on their perspectives regarding the war to which they responded: 'we do not recognise this ceasefire or peace agreement, we are part of a liberation front and we only take orders from its leader (Makhtal Dahir). This echoes Makhtal's own response to the New York Times arguing that the ceasefire does not concern him or the agenda of the liberation group underlining its local agency and its existence as a separate entity from Somalia (New York Times, 1963). Navigating the tensions between Somalia's involvement in local liberation activities, ascertaining their own agency as an indigenous movement and the prevailing postcolonial territorial status quo remained a continuous challenge for Somali rebels in Ethiopia. The subject of subsequent sections is the next phase in rebel mobilisation which took place ahead of the 1977-78 Ethio-Somalia War.

5.8. Failure of diplomacy and renewed calls for armed resistance

A group of young Somali activists from Ethiopia were imprisoned by Siyad Barre's government related to their mobilising activities in Mogadishu 1974, but eventually released when Siyaad himself decided to support Somali rebels in a bid to exploit the weakening regime in Addis Ababa. The war in 1977

[119] The famous Slogan 'with one hand we fight, with the other we vote' was popularised by Abdirashid ali Sharmarke during the March 1964 elections to (Markakis, 1987, p.180).

was foreshadowed by literary sources which reveal dissatisfaction with the approaches towards liberation attempted thus far, calling instead for a change in strategy; namely an armed confrontation. The rationale for taking up arms, once again, is justified via historical experiences of resisting domination, and the failure of a peaceful resolution to the Somali question in Ethiopia in the diplomatic realm. Dhoodaan captures this sense of frustration In *Ha midowdo* (1974) where he states:

You have heard what Sayyid Mohamed has declared in his verses
If you also observe other sayings, a Somali proverb states
He who is not pierced by your spear, will not heed your words.

The excerpt demonstrates the 'institutional lionisation' of Sayyid Mohamed (Barnes, 2006a, p.109) as the embodiment of Somali nationalism following Siyad Barre's military coup in 1969. The Sayyid featured heavily in Somali nationalist discourses concerning the Ogaden as a key symbolic figure. Dhoodaan's explicit mention of Sayyid Mohamed is an important marker of historical continuity of resistance against the Ethiopian state. In his endorsement of the armed rebellion of the Sayyid, he signals Somalis to revert to his verses in all that he preaches on resisting foreign domination and aligning himself with the Sayyid in his chosen method of resistance, namely armed rebellion. The verses crystallise this endorsement through the use of an important cultural resource by citing a familiar Somali proverb '*maah maah*' which appears to speak to the exact predicament that Somalis found themselves in between a century of European and Ethiopian colonialism. The verse is an appropriation of the proverb '*Nimaan warankaagu galin, weedhaada ma gasho*,' in other words, it is only when one acknowledges your strength (via physical harm that you can subject them to), that you can negotiate or come to an understanding through dialogue. Conversely, if your opponent does not fear you, then he will not hesitate to transgress against you.

The choice of proverb makes an important allusion to the shared historical memory concerning the failure of peaceful dialogue or diplomacy in Somalis' attempt at safeguarding their territorial integrity. It serves as a direct evocation of the late nineteenth century treaties signed between Somali tribes and the British to protect their sovereignty, but later nullified by the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. A Somali delegation consisting of Suldan Biihi Foolay (Moumin) travelled to London in a bid to convince the government to postpone the implementation of the agreement to transfer the Hawd and Reserved areas in 1955, based on affirming the 1897 treaty. They also sent a petition in February 1955 to the

Secretary General of the United Nations and sought to argue before a court for the nullification of the 1897 treaty based on the treaties of 1884 and 1886 between the British government and Somali tribes (Waterfield, 1956, p.57).

The 1897 Treaty is recognised internationally because it was made between two sovereign states whereas earlier treaties are not recognised which the Somali delegation found difficult to accept, dissatisfied with the British position on the matter – they sought a ruling from the Hague. The British government's position was to oppose the hearing at the United Nations on the grounds that this was a domestic issue. (Waterfield, 1956, p.58).[120] Dhoodaan's choice of proverb appeals to the compounded sentiments of Somali disappointment and distrust in the international system as an instrument of safeguarding their right to exist. He highlights important power dynamics in the Ethiopian national space- that political disputes cannot be settled via dialogue, especially not when the fates of 'subject' peoples are in question. According to internal soviet documents, the Nigeria led OAU committee dedicated to the settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations, refused to accept the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) as a national liberation movement in the August 1977 session held in Gabon (Issue 164/3afo: IV.03.78).[121] The OAU stressed the inviolability of existing African borders – this reaffirmed Ethiopia's position that the Ogaden question is a domestic one which highlights the precedence afforded to states in determining the legitimacy of local nationalisms in the national and international stage.

The diplomatic isolation faced by the 'Ogaden' question is framed in Somali nationalist literature as part and parcel of a longstanding example of deliberately subverting the rights of Somalis to self-determination resulting in growing calls to take up arms. In *Odoros* 'The Prophecy' (1972), Dhoodaan sends a warning to Ethiopia via a direct appeal to Somalis reminding them of all the peaceful methods of resistance they have employed, but to no avail:

If the matter becomes deadlocked and complicated
And your counter-part denies you of what was (rightfully) yours
And you seek your rights through peaceful means and negotiation

[120] Haile Selassie was a staunch advocate for enforcing the 1897 treaty negotiated by his father while the Hawd and Reserved areas were under British Military Administration (BMA) (Waterfield, 1956, p.56).
[121] Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC international department background – April 3 1978.

If complaining and peace-making did not stop him
When you realized he does not want a solution
You have to confront him with whatever power you have
And give to him that which he deserves:

And wield your killer-knife! because he refused a solution
And set fire on him, and inflict upon him a deep wound
When he sees you angry and committed to revenge
He should seek forgiveness, and be disciplined
And he will have to strive to buy the lost peace

According to Laitin (1979), 'Somalis are often brought together through verbal assault, both within themselves and towards outsiders' (p.98). *Odoros* symbolises one of Dhoodaan's most overt forms of verbal assault intended to mobilise Somalis in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War while sending a threatening signal towards Ethiopia. He alludes to previously failed attempts at addressing the Somali quest for Somali self-determination via diplomacy and peaceful appeals, namely in Pan-African circles. As Keller (1987) explains, Haile Selassie remained silent on the issue of European colonialism in Africa until 1958 in Ghana at the Conference of Independent African states pressing for a resolution on preserving each other's territorial integrity thus avoiding Ethiopia to be branded as an 'African imperialist' due to the role it played in the partition of Africa alongside European colonialism (p.83). Dhoodaan offers a dual and seemingly contradictory construction of Somalis as experienced peacemakers and warriors alike in the face of domination, or as he states, in times when 'your counter-part denies you of what was (rightfully) yours.' Adverbs of time such as 'when' presents a timeless narration of experiences of dispossession and attempts at peaceful solutions. It is evocative of Sayyid Mohamed's open letter to the British stating that he did not want war, but would not hesitate to engage in war if he was forced to: 'I wish to rule my own country…if you wish war I am happy; if you wish peace I am also content. But if you wish peace, go away from my country to your own' (Jardine, 1923, p.122). Historical continuities in symbolising the failure of peace processes serves to legitimise Dhoodaan's call to arms in the lead up to the 1977 war as timely and necessary.

Moreover, the narrative suggests a presupposed reference to an 'outsider,' namely Ethiopia, but also any other power involved in undermining a solution to the Somali question in Ethiopia. As such, 'your counterpart' not only alludes to Haile Selassie whose exploitation of Menelik's legacy and capitalisation of the anti-facism which defined the post-war era enabled him to extend the boundaries of the state, but also the regional and international communities whose consent or underlying approval enabled

the incoorporaiton of the Ogaden (Iyob, 1993, p.267). The discursive construction of the opposing 'counterpart' in Somali nationalist literature oscillates between images of Ethiopia, newly independent African states, the international community, and even neighbouring Somalia as depicted in Dhoodaan's later verses. In these, he addresses the tensions between Somalia's political motives vis a vis the grassroot struggle for self-determination in the Ogaden as discussed in section 5.10.

Produced in 1972, *Odoros* 'The Prophecy' certainly prophesied the inevitability of an armed rebellion at a time when there were no explicit mobilisation activities in preparation for an armed revolt. In '*ha midowdo'* produced two years later in 1974, Dhoodaan states: *Dagaalkaa miskaha soo duwee, macasha noo dhiibtay*. He explains that the upcoming fight offered itself to us (Somalis) by gesturing its 'wattles' towards us suggestive of the rituals of animal slaughtering. The statement uses both the metaphor of Ethiopia handing itself over to be sacrificed/slaughtered, as well as assigning the 'fight' human characteristics through the use of personification where it takes on a life of its own. In both scenarios, the metaphor contributes to the discursive construction of positive-self and negative-other characterisations deployed in earlier literary works depicting Somalis as peace-makers who have exhibited persistent restraint, but resort to violence as the final option. Once the fight 'offered itself' to the Somalis, as Dhoodaan described it, continuities in the underlying messages of mobilising literatures directed at the rebels and the wider populace began to emerge. The following section examines Dhoodaan's message to WSLF rebels soon to embark on the first phase of the war in 1976. In his messages, he emphasises the objective contributors to the production of Somalis' anti-state-sentiments in Ethiopia such as economic exploitation, and the hardships that are symptomatic of colonial subjugation.

5.8.1. Framing WSLF's path to liberation: Dhoodaan's anti-colonial messaging

Once Siyaad Barre decided to offer direct support to WSLF rebels, training camps in Somalia were set up in Qoriile, Geedeweyne in Bakool, Guriceel, and Agabar between Borama and Hargeisa. According to a former instructor at Agabar camp, Siyaad Barre sought to exploit Ethiopia's weakness after the fall of the emperor by arming and training rebels, this was considered a mutually agreeable arrangement between local leaders and officials from the Somali government (Abdisalaam, 2019). Nonetheless, literature on the 1977 Ogaden War almost entirely understates the significance of local

rebellion in the origins of the war. For instance, Tareke (2000) states that by 1975 Somalia decided to wage war against Ethiopia – that for the first phase of the war Somalia was going to use 'dissident peasants from eastern and Southern Ethiopia' who would be trained for guerrilla fighting as Somalia has been training and organising these peasants since the rebellions of 1963 which they have 'partially inspired and sustained' (p.639). The term 'dissident peasants' suggests that the quest for liberation was spearheaded by a fringe group that the Somali republic took advantage of for its own political project, as opposed to a popular and widespread sentiment which has shaped social and political life in the Somali Region throughout the twentieth century.

Earlier political verses have described whom, in the experience of the masses, were considered colonialists and justifying the urgent need for emancipation. The following source selected for examination is called *'Xaajadii'* 'The issue' (1976) where Dhoodaan addresses a group of WSLF rebels in Qoriile camp who were set to embark upon their armed resistance. It addresses critical themes relevant to theorising the local Somali struggle for self-determination in Ethiopia, specifically in the context of Somalia's involvement, the ruptures in the discourses of broad-based pan-Somali solidarity, and the specificity of the Somali cause in Ethiopia. First, the path to liberation is depicted as one characterised by immense suffering, retelling local memories of suffering to mobilise and encourage, constructing a local history of resisting domination.

The path to liberation, is an arduous journey (struggle)
For whoever wants a shade to rest under, it is a treeless terrain
And he who expects a reservoir of water, (the journey) is thirst induced by dryness
And he who expects (a place of) respite, it is a vacant land[122]
And for he who refuses hardship, it is a life-sacrificing journey
He who seeks wealth, you will not prosper
He who seeks elegance, you will overgrow your hair
Rather, except that we charge through the scorching fire
We will not be equal to our counterparts, who are more honourable than us
And for Jabuuti and Hawd, Freedom will be illegal

The message to the departing rebels is a sombre reminder of the hardships that lie ahead of them. The repetitive use of the third person pronoun 'he' is specific enough to speak directly to the combatants he is facing, but generic enough to speak to whomever aspires for a 'free Hawd and Djibouti.'

[122] 'waa cidlaw hadafe' also suggests a type of vacant land where you are likely to become lost in the wilderness with no access to help.

Reference to specific geographic markers within the Somali territories is characteristic of Somali folklore which is full of yearnings to possess their lands as their environment is a promised land for Somalis (Samatar, 982, p.9). Rallying calls for rebellion and resistance are replete with evocation of the notion of a 'promised land' needing to be defended – allusion to names of different features of the land which the pastoral society holds in high regard such as fields, natural resources etc. and the names of specific localities enhances a critical sense of attachment. These geonyms represent a spatial representation of localities that have yet to be freed, yet the divergent histories of 'Hawd' and 'Djibouti' and the forms of colonial administrations they have experienced is obscured by Dhoodaan's call to action. His rallying call remains uniform despite the character of the colonial administration in question. His ethos preaches that not only must one free themselves from colonialism, but they must do so at great personal suffering.

Moreover, as demonstrated in early literary works by Dhoodaan and others, intertextual links with canonical works of Sayyid Mohamed continue to be evident at various historical junctures of mobilisation for resistance, even in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War. For instance, the poet's warning to the rebels of the harsh conditions which await them echoes the reflections of Sayyid Mohamed's *Dardaaran*: 'we were exhausted by the bushy terrain that made our feet bleed' (Kapteijns and Warfa, 2000, p.32). This illustrates an almost parallel description of the drought-prone, treeless terrain that Dhoodaan tells the rebels to expect in this excerpt of *Xaajadii* which draws on the final message of the Sayyid demonstrating continuities in the unchanged physical and political predicament of the Somali territory under Ethiopian rule. Invoking the idea of a 'scorching fire' is an example of metonymy where he substitutes the act of charging through bullets in the context of war with that of fire; this serves to produce multiple and vivid portrayals of the challenges associated with seeking liberation. In addition, by stating 'he who seeks elegance, you will overgrow your hair,' the poem prophesies what was soon to become a symbol of resistance for the ONLF, namely the long dreaded hair which demonstrates conditions of sacrifice, battle and not having access to ordinary day-to-day benefits.

5.8.2. Economic subjugation

The way that Somalis experienced the Ethiopian state and their encounters with its institutions is particularly revealing of the underlying anti-colonialism of Somali nationalism (Geshekter, 1985, p.5). Subtle and overt references to continued forms of economic subjugation and underdevelopment is apparent in the two literary sources produced around 50 years apart. Further intertextual links between Sayyid Mohamed's reference to the harsh terrain he faced is evident in the latter half of '*haw liicina*' where Dhoodaan states:

Endure, while they enjoy in plentifulness
While they pour their milk[123] remain hungry in the wilderness
Sleep in the dust, while they prepare their beds

The theme of suffering is brought to life by vividly juxtaposing the deprivation which awaits anyone who seeks to partake in liberation activities, against a presupposed 'they' who will continue to enjoy various luxuries. The presupposition is assumed to refer to the lives of military administrators vis a vis the lives of local Somalis suggesting that the Ethiopian military administrator maintains this lifestyle at the expense of the local population. Dhoodaan's underlying message is that of economic exploitation intended to stir anger within listeners. Moreover, the theme of deprivation at the expense of luxury and resources which may draw one close to colonial powers is evoked as a symbol of martyrdom and a distinguished pedigree that one should aspire towards. It is a form of mobilisation, once again, reminiscent of Sayyid Mohamed's boasting of not having fallen prey to the luxuries offered to him by British colonisers in exchange for his surrender in his 'parting words' *Dardaaran*.

Dhoodaan further alludes to the historical use of mass starvation as a method of war and a tool of repression and conquest in Ethiopia's history of state-making (Ibreck and De Waal, 2022, p.13).[124] WSLF rebel testimonies echo Dhoodaan's warning to them before their departure; to expect a difficult path characterised by thirst, hunger, sleeplessness and denial of all necessities required for survival. Dayib Ahmed Seed, a member of WSLF's Ahmed Gurey unit entered the region from Araarso with

[123] The term 'Labi' which I have translated here as 'wildnerness' may also refer to acacia plants found in deserts and tropical environments. Both translations represent conditions of hunger; i.e. in having to survive on the acacia plant, and having no access to food in the wilderness of the desert.
[124] Ibreck and De Waal (2022) note the use of mass starvation and concealed famines under Haile Selassie, Mengistu and Abiy Ahmed. In the Somali Region, mass starvation was imposed after the 2007 commercial blockade imposed by Meles Zenawi in the aftermath of the Obole bombing.

no food while soldiers were forbidden from hunting even as they engaged in major battles with the Ethiopian army such as the Qaaxo[125] battle near Dhurwaale:

> 'We used to eat a plant/tree called 'Likke' and after two days we had our first meal in Ora khaliif. As we continued towards Galaalshe, Yuusuf Dheere gave a spoon of butter to each soldier. This was the extreme level of hunger. We would have been hosted by civilians, but it was the dry 'jiilaal' season so local communities went to seek water towards the seasonal streams (Fafan and Jarar)' (2019).

Somali nationalist discourses appropriate and subvert orientalist descriptions of Somali region geography in literary and academic narrations of the 1977 Ogaden war. For instance, Tareke (2000) states that 'the Ogaden is mostly desert; only thorn vegetation thrives…it is a barren and bleak landscape…' (p.636-637). Dhoodaan's message insists that despite the physical features of the Somali territory, and what it has to offer, it is worth fighting for and to 'charge through the scorching fire' for. The hardships which define the path to freedom for rebels and civilians alike is a reoccurring motif in nationalist literature which suggest that the conditions of the rebels reflect the wider experiences of the population under occupation. Elsewhere, in *Salleello (1974)*, Dhoodaan speaks directly to Somalis from Ethiopia who remain in the Somali Republic either as government officials, civilians or refugees reminding them of the condition of their homeland.

Your land is occupied by the coloniser, where people are suffering
Openly and covertly, the people have been deprived of their resources
They are isolated, and shackled by the enemy
Who have been made into food (to be devoured), and suffered immensely
And on that day, abducting whomever demonstrates resistance
(who are told) I want the fattened livestock
And bring me those valuables (they say), while it is chained for them

According to Dheeg Xirsi, a former WSLF rebel fighter, nationalist literatures had a significant influence on their mindset, however he also stated that 'our anti colonial mindset was always there. We did not need mobilising, we were inherently/naturally opposed to these men; we did not want to live with Ethiopia' (2019). Young WSLF rebels witnessed the rebellions in the early 1960s described in section 5.7 where Ethiopian armies carried out reprisals of mass abuses against civilian populations. Anti-state sentiments among Somali society arose from Ethiopian military expeditions who raided

[125] According to Indhyare Hassan Nuur (2019), member of Ahmed Guray, this battle lasted for 24 hours.

communities confiscating their livestock and killing civilians suspected of sympathising with rebel groups such as the *Geesh*. The military poisoned wells and deprived nomadic communities of their basic source of livelihood, and imposed poll taxes on a deprived society who have not been beneficiaries of any state services- these factors contributed to political discontent followed by armed uprisings (Khalif and Doornbos, 2002, p.79). This reflects Keller's (1981) theorisation on what contributed to the antagonism and deep-seated division between subordinate peripheral peoples and the dominant Amhara-Tigre ethnic cluster; dominance and exploitation of this group focusing on socio-economic policies of extraction and control with 'less emphasis on redistributive and politically integrative policies' (p.545-546).

Cultural references to livestock underscore the specificity of the mobilising message for Somali pastoralists whose main sources of livelihood are confiscated 'openly' via military force and 'covertly' via taxation. In the excerpt above, Dhoodaan reflects on methods of economic subjugation in a region described as the 'most underdeveloped, unintegrated, and unincorporated territorial sector' in Ethiopia (Geshekter, 1985, p.4). The narrative embodiment of the Ethiopian military administrator who confiscates valuables of the most resourceful kind alludes to the taxation of Somalis used as an instrument in their own subjugation as opposed to benefiting from state services. In an interview with Mohamed Hassen (2019) in Jigjiga, he described Jigjiga as a colonial garrison serving as a surveillance and tax collecting city for tax that was never used in the Somali region. Under Haile Selassie, it was deposited and managed in his office, and Mengistu used it to destroy Somalia- 'Mengistu said he would destroy Somalis with their own money.' Mohamed Hassan believes that until today this money goes back to the centre which Somalis do not receive an equitable share of. It is reminiscent of successive military campaigns (*zämächa*) between 1891 and 1906 where imperial forces confiscated large amounts of livestock in the form of tributes from Somali pastoralists (Garretson, 2001 quoted in Hagmann and Korf, 2012, p.208).

Moreover, the historical memory of resisting unfair taxation can be traced all the way back to Somalis' early encounters with the Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century when the British sought the alliance of Ras Makonen from Harar against the Sayyid. This led to an unprecedented Ethiopian penetration into the Somali lowlands extending its rule via the extraction of tributes – the tributes collected enabled the military and economic objectives of the imperial government (Barnes, 2000, p.54). Essentially, through an influx of Ethiopian soldiers into the Somali lowlands, pressure on local

resources resulted in Somali resources essentially subsidizing Ethiopian military campaigns. This became a trademark characteristic of Ethiopian imperialism: placing the burden of financing its military on the very masses that it had conquered (Barnes, 2000, p.54-55).

Dhoodaan appeals to the shared historical memories of resisting taxation based on the rationale that the Ethiopian government did not provide any services in the Somali region, and thus should not tax its inhabitants. This is evocative of the 1963 rebellions which were partially instigated by the introduction of a new head tax, and as a warning to Somalis, Haile Selassie summoned two chiefs including Duulane Rafle to Addis Ababa who were then exiled to northern Ethiopia (Markakis, 1987, p.177). Dhoodaan's reference to the abduction of anyone who displays resistance appears to reflects this particular historical incident, as well as the practice of mass imprisonment and enforced disappearances.

Moreover, in June 1976, General Galaal delivered a speech to a group of departing rebels stating that 'Ethiopia has all of your shoes and all of your clothes and everything you own- so you need to retrieve everything back from them' (Axmedweli Sh. Abdullahi, 2018). This demonstrates a significant awareness of the central issues that drive successive rebellions against the Ethiopian state, namely the experience of dispossession among Somalis in Ethiopia which resonated with most people. According to Tareke (2000), 'the pastoral/nomadic Somali population of the lowlands universally and enthusiastically embraced the fighters' (p.641), this observation is consistent with the reflections of members of various WSLF factions who describe a large influx of youth from rural areas joining the rebels at the height of the war. This led to factions multiplying, for instance, it is in this manner that Horyaal, initially comprised of Ahmed Gurey members, became a military division in its own right. Ahmed Gurey started as a battalion of about 1500, then multiplied into a division of around 10,000 – 'the entire Somali population transformed into rebels' according to one of Ahmed Guray's commanders (Dheeg Xirsi, 2019).

The Ethio-Somalia war of 1977 played a huge role in falsely perpetuating the idea that the war was fuelled by a boundary dispute and the irredentist aims of Somalia, this obscures the agency of local Somalis and their specific motivations while neglecting the fundamental issues that led to recurrent cycles of insurgency and subsequent repression in the first place (Hagmann, 2014a, p.727). The above excerpt from *Salleelo* speaks to the atmosphere leading up to the war underscoring the indigenous

character of the Somali quest for self-determination in Ethiopia. It emphasises that the underlying motivation for the war is the conditions described in these excerpts, which constitute the central ideological underpinnings of resistance discourses across the decades. In support of Somali rebellion against Ethiopia, these discourses were enhanced and further popularised by neighbouring Somalia in the lead up to the 1977 War.

5.9. Pan-Somali solidarity and the national discourse

During Siyad Barre's nationalist campaigns, the 'national discourse' was raised through literary channels (i.e. poetry, theatre, songs etc) (Barnes, 2006b, p.492). This underscores the significance of Somali Oral traditions in articulating Somali nationalist aspirations, specifically the concept of 'Greater Somalia' fostered by Somali literature which is described as 'the root of self-expression and the method of both communication and propaganda' (Fitzgibbon, 1982, p.5). Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeisa played a leading role in broadcasting nationalist songs by Waaberi and Heegan bands.[126] However, while the national discourse encapsulated an overarching pan-Somali messaging, the aspirations for self-determination raised via reference to shared cultural and symbolic values also reflected the specific experiences of Somalis in Ethiopia. Further, they reflected the anti-colonial sentiment fostered by the prevailing conditions of Ethiopia's Somali inhabitants over the decades. Key national tunes served as morale boosting anthems which came to define the war period around 1977.

Examples of this genre include 'Qabridahare belongs to me' which became sensational for defining the limits of Somali territory and affirming 'the rightful owner' of key Somali towns in Ethiopia (Mohamed, 2012, p.158). Hibo Nuura's song re-affirmed Somali frontier imaginations by defining the spatial boundaries of Somali sovereignty in Ethiopia naming and claiming key towns such a Jigjiga which serves as the Somali Regional State capital today. In addition, '*Dhulka sow anigu ma lihi*?' sung by Waaberi national band, rhetorically asks 'is the land not mine?' and 'is the region not mine' in a recursive manner. Other anthems which came to serve as the soundtracks of the war period include *Guusha iygaa leh* 'victory is theirs' sang by Heegan band in reference to the rebels. Moreover, Abdi

[126] According to Laitin (1979), 'the heroic aphorisms that taunted the Russians or insulted the Ethiopians came from the Somali people, and not from their leader' (Laitin, 1979, p.108). It highlights the significance of grassroot mobilisation surrounding the 1977 war, and that Siyaad Barre's role stood in contrast to other liberation leaders who provided a language for their resistance causes. Examples include the literary works of Sayyid Mohamed as well as Yusuf Sugaal, a WSLF leader and prominent poet who articulated his experiences in the battlefield using oral traditions.

Kaamil Cawaale's '*Waxaan ahay naftii-hure'* came to serve an emotional embodiment of sacrifice and resentment borne out of colonial domination.

This foolish coloniser
(that inflicted upon me) unseen wounds
A resentment that will not leave me
That left me incapacitated
I cannot make peace with (it)
long ago, I made a vow
My intention is set (to free this land)
If I do not return
O sparkling flag!
May God keep you safe

The author uses the literary technique 'apostrophe' to address an object (the flag) complaining of the wounds inflicted upon him by the Ethiopian state. Importantly, his wounds are not necessarily physical which is a depiction of the symbolic and cultural embodiments of violence and resistance which sustained nationalist fervour across various historical periods. This is also apparent in Dhoodaan's *Odoros* (1972) where he frames resistance as a means of exacting revenge for past wounds:

We had a (previous) score to settle with you…
We are the people you have previously subjected to atrocities
And whom you have oppressed, now seeking retribution

The same sentiments rung from Radio Mogadishu and Hargeisa in a popular verse addressed directly to Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam which proclaimed 'the state of denial' that Ethiopia was in while rallying its Somali audience to seek redress for past abuses (Mohamed, 2012, p.158).

O you confused leader, how clueless you must be![127]
Indeed, you really have no clue
O Mengistu, how clueless you are
Everything you have committed
You will be held accountable for…
we will try you for the flock of sheep you killed

[127] The translation of this song is partially derived from the translation of Ali Noor Mohamed (2012, p.158)) in *Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa.*

Indeed, a nation does not fear the one that killed him
Did you know that those whose parents and siblings you have killed are aggrieved?

The rhetorical questioning serves as one end of a historical dialectic between the state, and its repressed margins through reference to historical and intergenerational violence. Similar to the verses in *Salleello* discussed earlier, livestock is again presented as an essential pillar in the livelihoods of pastoralist communities drawing on the historical memory of resource confiscation as a key motivator behind the rebellions. It would be an incomplete description of the role of the political verse in shaping the 1977 war without reference to the national discourse emanating from Mogadishu. As far as Somalis in Ethiopia were concerned, the pan-Somali discourse challenged the core tenants of Ethiopian state nationalism. While their anti-colonial messaging complemented their historical experiences with the Ethiopian state, the pan-Somali discourses took for granted emerging tensions between local liberation groups and Mogadishu's visions. The following section explores the parallel discourses that emerged during this period which dealt with these tensions in a bid to imagine a truly sovereign Somali liberation movement in Ethiopia.

5.10. The 'Greater Somalia' thesis' vs local Somali nationalism in Ethiopia

'We felt that the country was ours, the Somali national army should have respected this'

(Dheeg Xirsi, member of Ahmed Gurey, WSLF)

Scholarship on the 1977 Ethio-Somalia war reveals a general conflation between Somalia's pursuit of *Soomaaliweyn* 'Greater Somalia,' and local Somali rebellion against the Ethiopian state. For instance, Tareke's (2000) framing of the war is consistent with statist discourses on the nature of this war which designates the Somali republic as the 'aggressor' who invaded Ethiopia to realise its dream of establishing 'Greater Somalia' (p.635). He argues that 'the Somali state sought to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopia on ethnic and cultural grounds' (Tareke, 2000, p.637). This theorisation reveals the silences in both scholarly and popular representations on the war which excludes the role of local liberation groups not only in narratives about 1977, but concerning all local rebellions. This thesis aims to bridge the theoretical gap in the territorial imaginations of both Ethiopian and Somali frontiers as they relate to the Ogaden, in that the sovereignty of the Somalis in Ethiopia is overridden by legalistic interpretations of the Somali quest for self-determination which centres the prevailing postcolonial territorial condition. This relates to 'a status quo which gives primacy to territorial

integrity over the right of peoples to self-determination' thus violating the rights of minorities and forcibly incorporated inhabitants of contested territories for the sake of preserving the territorial integrity of African states (Iyob, 1993, p.257). As a result, liberation movements that stood for the right of self-determination, such as WSLF, were classified as illegitimate on the grounds of deviating from the postcolonial territorial consensus and thus classified as illegitimate (Iyob, 1993, p.257).[128]

Dhoodaan reveals the intricate tensions that lied within the pan-Somali solidarity displayed in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden war encapsulating the central argument of this chapter, and wider thesis. Namely, that Somali nationalist expression was not always in harmony with the nationalist aspirations of the Somali Republic underlining the specificity of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia. In *Salleello* (1974), a lengthy verse hailed for its contrasting subtlety in the first half and bluntness in the latter half includes the following verses:

If what you desire is entitlement, honour and respect
Do not wander under the scorching sun of the eastern Sool and Sanaag
Nor should you wander aimlessly in Hargeisa or Burco
Do not expect your counterpart, to persuade the infidel
He who controls you, will not deliver your pleas[129]

This excerpt brings to light the unfavourable position of Somalis from Ethiopia who held government positions in Somalia. They are rebuked for seeking 'entitlement, honour, and respect' by virtue of their governmental posts and leaving the fate of the Somali region in Ethiopia in the hands of the Somali Republic. Using the geonyms of 'Sool and Sanaag' located in the Somali Republic, metonymy is used to refer to these localities as representing Somalia as a whole. *Salleello* draws allusions to the theme of 'Greater Somalia' offering one of the foremost explicit discursive denunciations of the 'Greater Somalia' project due to its role in undermining local efforts and obscuring local justifications for pursuing freedom. The final line underlines this radical position; the declarative clause 'he who

[128] The Somali position was considered 'revisionist' as it stood in stark contrast to the broader consensus among newly independent African states on maintaining colonial borders (Morone, 2015, p.104).

[129] There is a lack of consensus on the meaning of 'Ergo kuguma saacido ileen, wiil ku saanyadayee'- specifically on the word 'saanyadayee' which may refer to 'he who controls you' or 'he who oppresses you- the former refers to Somalia who will not help in delivering your pleas meanwhile the latter refers to Ethiopia who will not accept your pleas. Either of these definitions highlight the underlying message of Salleelo, that the fate of the Somali territory in Ethiopia should be determined by local communities as opposed to neighbouring Somalia.

controls you, will not deliver your pleas' refers to diplomatic and regional African dialogue process on the Ogaden question represented by the Somali government in key platforms. For instance, In Abdurahman Barre Jama's statement to the UN General Assembly in October 1977, he stated that in order to maintain the empire, 'Ethiopia is trying to claim protection under principles which are inimical to the decolonisation process. In other words, it is trying to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds' (quoted in Laitin, 1979, p.109). In international forums, Somalia found itself in the impossible position of arguing 'that blacks too can be imperialists' (Laitin, 1979, p.109).

Salleello highlights the shortcomings of pan-Somali nationalism and solidarity, positing that despite how earnestly Somalia presented the Somali cause in Ethiopia to the world, it undermined the acceptability of the Somali call for self-determination due to the involvement of what was conceived to be a hostile foreign power (Somalia). In addition to the diplomatic disadvantages posed by the involvement of Somalia in the local liberation movement, there was also a disagreement over the degree of autonomy WSLF should have and the future of the Ogaden should it become independent. In the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden war, there were two contrasting camps among the WSLF youth: 1. For WSLF to be an independent group so as not to be seen as being tied to Somalia, 2) to support Somalia's advocacy for a 'Greater Somalia' in light of Djibouti's upcoming independence. According to Dhiire Caafi (2019), a member of the WSLF youth, key proponents of the first camp including Mahamed Diiriye Uurdox, Ahmed Nuur Sheikh Abdullahi and Dakhare Mahamed Sugaal were imprisoned by Siyaad Barre in 1974.

These discrepancies are apparent in the testimonies by actors[130] belonging to both ends of this debate; members and employees of the Somali government on one end, and WSLF rebels on the other. For instance, those (from the Somali region in Ethiopia) who held senior government positions under Siyad Barre indicate greater tolerance towards reconciling the differences in opinion concerning the question of liberation. Moreover, they emphasised the supporting role of the Somali Republic, and de-emphasised their government's own geopolitical aspirations which undermined local expressions of liberation. Essentially, painting a generally harmonious relationship between the Somali government and WSLF rebels, both in terms of strategic priorities, and the dynamics of their working relationships on the ground. In an interview with Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman (2019), former chairman of

[130] The discrepancies under examination specifically relate to Somalis from Ethiopia many of whom held senior positions in Siyaad Barre's administration.

ONLF, he used the analogy of a spear to describe Siyaad Barre's intentions surrounding the war explaining that WSLF was supposed to represent the sharp end, and the Somali government was the force and power behind the spear. He stated that 'every government has its own politics, and makes its decisions based on that.' While revealing a generally sympathetic attitude towards the motivations behind Siyaad Barre's physical entry into the Ogaden War, he underlines the geopolitical considerations that inspired this course of action. Key considerations included the attempt to exploit Ethiopia's weakness after the fall of the monarchical regime, and Djibouti's independence which inspired the urgency for Somali unification with the remaining unredeemed territory in the Horn of Africa.[131]

5.10.1. Subverting Pan-Somali solidarity

The discourses on pan-Somali solidarity came to represent a new hegemonic imposition on the marginalised rebels whose aspirations for self-determination and territorial sovereignty were articulated by the likes of Dhooadan. In *Xaajadii*, legitimation strategies are used to unsettle the romantic imagine of the Somali Republic aiding Somali rebels in Ethiopia revealing underlying power-dynamics and hierarchies of belonging within the context of the war:

Whoever flees, and leaves his homeland
They will forever be inferior to the one whom they sought refuge under[132]
I told you O people, that which we are yearning for and hastening towards,
Is our motherland, that is freely administered

This excerpt reveals several discursive strategies of legitimation used to justify a particular idea and action over others, namely to resist the Ethiopian state rather than fleeing to Somalia or relying on the neighbouring power to deliver 'freedom'. The strategy of abstraction is one way of displaying moral evaluations when reference to certain practices are done in an abstract manner which moralises them by tying them to specific discourses on moral values (Leeuwen, 2007, p.99). In this case, the practice of fleeing one's homeland (i.e. the Somali region in Ethiopia) and consequently becoming inferior in

[131] Somalia also sought to take advantage of its superior military capability. According to Tareke (2000), Somalia possessed a larger number of mobile battalions, ground -to-air capability, artillery, armour, tanks, combat aircraft possessing three times as many tanks (250 T-35s and T-55s) with greater range and better armour in comparison to Ethiopia's outdated weaponry (p.638).
[132]The term 'hayntolosh' refers to someone who is of equal stature to you, but who you eventually become inferior to due to a given circumstance or predicament. In this case, the predicament is that of the Somalis from Ethiopia being treated as refugees in Somalia.

their new host country (Somalia), attaches a moral legitimacy to the opposite course of action where the act of remaining to defend one's homeland is moralised by linking it to discourses of heroism and resistance. It is an abstract warning where the *topos* of threat uses the reasoning that one should not perform certain actions due to the dangerous consequences associated with it (Wodak, 2001 p.75). The analogies of fleeing one's homeland serves both as an abstraction and analogy to signify the failure to resist the Ethiopian state, but also a literal phenomenon which came to define the 1977 war dynamics, namely the influx of a large number of refugees into Somalia. In this instance, the active comparisons between 'staying' (to resist) and 'fleeing' (thereby not resisting) serves both a legitimatory and de-legitimatory function. It legitimises the central thesis of *Xaajadii, Salleello* and other political verses discussed in the previous section, namely that pan-Somali nationalism and 'Ogaden' nationalism are not identical, by placing emphasis on autonomy and sovereignty in determining what the goal of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia is: 'our motherland, that is freely administered.' The comparison further legitimises the shared understandings associated with the difficulty of being a refugee and fleeing one's home while criticising the principles of pan-Somali solidarity where all Somali territories are supposed to be a home for all Somali nationals regardless of their geographic location. The instructive and declarative assertation that 'they will forever be inferior' further foreshadows the anticipated plight of Somalis who fled from Ethiopia and were assigned negative labels such as '*laaji*' in Somalia to denote a particular refugee status. As Dhoodaan unequivocally states that the rationale behind rebellions Somali rebellions was to achieve a 'freely administered' region in *Xaajadii*, elsewhere, he specifies the exact type of domination they should be free from.

5.10.2. Somalia: the ambivalent ally

In '*Xaajadii'* Dhoodaan highlights the defining experiences of Somalis in Ethiopia which inspire their resistance vis a vis Ethiopian domination, as well as Somalia's sabotage of local self-determination efforts. In a direct address to WSLF rebels, Dhoodaan's ultimate reminder to them is to distinguish between *Somaliweyn* 'Greater Somalia' and local resistance:

The coloniser that enslaved you, and abuses you
Who confiscates your resources and displaces you from your land
And that which distracts you is the same

So fight equally with the two enemies, hidden or apparent[133]
So as to attain freedom, and tirelessly search for 'Hodan'

As Hagmann (2014a) argues, the motives of Somali rebels from Ethiopia have often been at odds with that of Somali state officials (p.727). The excerpts deal with challenging sentiments within the broad frame of Somali nationalism brought to the fore by the context surrounding the 1977 Ogaden War. After key members of WSLF, and traditional elders in Mogadishu failed to convince Siyaad Barre to maintain the autonomy of WSLF in its quest for liberation, Dhoodaan's rhetoric shifted to outrightly designate Somalia as yet another enemy of the Somali struggle in Ethiopia as evidenced in this excerpt. By asserting that he who 'distracts you' is the same as 'the coloniser,' he warns of the danger of obscuring the popular resistance against Addis Ababa as a border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. This is how it came to be framed due to Somalia's public diplomacy in search of the Ogaden, and Ethiopia's use of Africa's postcolonial territorial status quo. The use of the imperative command to resist both Ethiopia and Somalia highlight the struggle of the rebels, and the wider Somali masses in Ethiopia, battling multiple hegemonic impositions. Marginalised rebel perspectives on these power dynamics is captured by rebel trainer Abdisalaam (2019) in the following way:

> 'The rebels were paranoid to speak honestly to any observers and journalists who came to ask about their experiences, they did not feel that they were *free* rebels or *independent* rebels because anything negative they said about their treatment would be recounted back to Siyaad. It was our anger that was pushing us to keep fighting against the Ethiopians, but we knew that we were not independent. Part of why we were angry is that Siyad entered the war when he saw that we had the upper hand.'

Given the wide range of social and political themes covered in Somali poetry, it constitutes an invaluable and highly revealing source of historical data (Barnes, 2006a, p.107). The discursive construction of the Somali republic as an 'enemy' assigns evaluative attributions of negative traits to the state, despite the shared identity between Somalis across geographic divides, this designation perpetuates a radical new national imagination imagined outside the confines of the nation state. Though Somalia provided rebels with support, its influence in the liberation movement is described as an obstacle which undermined the efforts of WSLF as described in Abdisalaam's reflections. As such, Dhoodaan legitimises his call to resist Somalia's 'distracting' role in the local liberation efforts

[133] There is a general consensus among Somali literacy experts that Dhoodaan's reference to 'Haayir' refers to Somalia while 'tuuga' refers to Ethiopia; while the enmity of the former is concealed, that of the latter is more apparent and well-known.

by appealing to shared historical memories of enslavement, abuse, displacement and economic deprivation at the hands of the Ethiopian government.

Furthermore, strategies of depersonalization are employed by not naming Somalia directly, but rather describing it via characterisation as a 'hidden enemy' which suggests that Ethiopia and Somalia are similar in so far as they both hinder Somalis' attainment of liberation in Ethiopia. Similar instances of depersonalisation occur elsewhere in Dhoodaan's literary expressions, for instance by referring to Somalia as a 'counterpart' and 'the one whom they sought refuge under' in *Salleello*, and 'that which distracts you' in this excerpt of *Xaajadii*. Such discursive strategies of nomination actively construct new in-groups and out-groups (Wodak, 2001, p.73), in this case assigning to Somalia the negative attributions traditionally reserved for Ethiopia in Somali nationalist literature.

Moreover, Dhoodaan once again defines the contours which differentiate local resistance from 'Greater Somalia' by instructing that the distinguishing feature of local Somali nationalism is the search for 'Hodan.' The name 'Hodan' is a recurrent rhetorical trope in nationalist literature often used to name she-camels, whereas she-camels in general are commonly used in Somali literary traditions to symbolise 'the country, the state, and sovereignty' (Afrax, 1994 p.241). The aim of attaining 'freedom' and searching for 'Hodan' is predicated upon a distinct notion of sovereignty tied to the necessary emancipation from Ethiopia's visible colonialism, and Somalia's less visible role in undermining Somalis' self-determination efforts in Ethiopia. As such, dismantling all existing structures of power which impede Somali self-determination in Ethiopia. The use of 'Hodan' as a substitutive metonym for 'the homeland' encapsulates nostalgic yearnings for all that is associated with the term 'Hodan' such as prosperity.

As WSLF intensified the urban guerrilla campaign from 1976, by 1977 Somalia committed troops launching a full-scale military offensive to assist Somalis in their quest to separate from Ethiopia (Keller, 1987, p.84). This resulted in a political clash between the ranks of the Somali national army and the WSLF, as a former member of Ahmed Guray explained; Somali military commanders intended to manage all military activities and for the rebels to follow their lead. However, the rebels felt that they were of the region and its people and thus better versed in understanding local dynamics and context. Such clashes led to the imprisonment of a number of civilians which led to various WSLF factions forcibly breaking them out prison. For instance, rebels stationed in Fayaanbiiro belonging to

Ahmed Gurey came to Jigjiga forcibly releasing prisoners- Duufaan members carried out similar actions in Dhegehbour (Dheeg Xirsi, 2019).

Ultimately, Dhoodaan's central argument holds that the Somali cause for self-determination in Ethiopia was betrayed by all. The above excerpt from *Xaajadii* contains intertextual links with other explicit denunciations of Somalia's role in the Ogaden war. For instance, in *Garnaqsi* (1974), Dhoodaan expresses the desire to have WSLF be independent of Somalia following the imprisonment of WSLF members by Siyaad Barre in the same year. Similarly, in *'Yaa dirsaday?'* (literally meaning 'who sent them?'), Dhoodaan reiterates the way that local Somali nationalism in Ethiopia was deceived, where he compares Somalia and Ethiopia using the metaphor of a roaring lion versus a silent one. Similarly, in this excerpt of *Xaajadii*, he differentiates between the enmity of Ethiopia and Somalia only in the level of visibility of their deception: i.e. 'hidden or apparent.' According to rebel testimonies, the general feeling among the population was that the outcome of the war would have been different had the Somali government not entered the conflict at a time when the rebels had the upper hand as Ethiopian forces were contained in major towns after their movements had been restricted. However, Somalia's physical entry into the conflict assisted Mengistu's military regime in convincing the world that this was an invasion rooted in a dispute over borders as opposed to a local liberation struggle (Ahmed Hassan, 2019).

5.11. The aftermath of the 1977 Ogaden War

From November 1977, the Soviet Union used air and sea channels to provide arms and equipment to Ethiopia including 11,000 Cubans and 1000 Soviet military officers who were sent to the Ogaden over the course of the next few months (Keller, 1987, p.85). This is considered as the turning point in the war which swiftly enabled victory over Ogaden rebels. Super shift realignments in the Horn of Africa altered the balance of power in favour of Ethiopia as the Soviet Union and its allies turned to support Ethiopia in regaining control over the Ogaden (Lewis, 1989, p.575).

Ethiopia launched a counter insurgency campaign against the WSLF following the departure of the Somali national army. During the mid-1980s, Mengistu's soldiers poisoned wells essential for communities' access to water and for the survival of their herds (Africa Watch, 1991, p.79). The great famine of 1983-85 was exacerbated in the Somali region to achieve the political objective of crushing

dissent resulting in a humanitarian crisis in an already food-insecure region recovering from the 1977-1978 war. The forced displacement of civilians, mass reprisals against suspected supporters of the WSLF in the aftermath of the war is described as constituting 'a premeditated policy of depopulation' (Khalif and Doornbos, 2002, p.80). This policy was most apparent in major towns and cities such as Dire Dawa, Jigjiga among others.

Mengistu viewed the capture of Jigjiga and Karamardha on March 5 1978 'as part of the international proletarian struggle' (Tareke, 2000, p.659). Garrison towns '*ketmas*' erected in newly conquered peripheries were instrumental in expanding imperial authority and administering the collection of taxes and tribute while soldiers and military heads acted as 'watch' men for the imperial government (Keller, 1981, p.530). The massacre of 90 Somali elders in the immediate aftermath of the war symbolised the government's policy of depopulation and enforced displacements as means to achieve eventual dispossession. The aftermath of the war led to a large refugee influx estimated at around 1 million who entered Somalia between 1978 and 1979 (Lewis, 1989, p.575).

Nonetheless, after the formal end of the 1977 Ogaden war, the WSLF continued to be what Lewis (1989) described as 'an irksome torn in Ethiopia's side' (p.576). The continuity of the armed insurgency even after the formal end of the war highlights the local dimension of the war despite Ethiopia's attempt to frame it as an expansionist war. Though considerably weakened, until 1982, the rebels continued to mount resistance against the Ethiopian military reverting back to the guerrilla style warfare that they had originally trained for. According to Ahmed weli Sh. Abdullahi 'Sanweyne,' in battles such as one that took place close to Bulaale in September 1979, 75 military vehicles and a number of tanks were burnt by the rebels – he described the momentum of this display by how the smoke could be viewed from places as far as Nusdariiq. During this period, according to Ahmed wali, the Somali government was devoted to weakening the liberation front,[134] its leaders were promised government positions or to be promoted within the military ranks of Somalia which some accepted while many such as himself also refused. It is significant to note that many of the officials sent from Somalia to WSLF rebels to convince them to lay down their arms and accept their proposals, were themselves from the Somali Region in Ethiopia. In this regard, Dhoodaan's *Salleello* discussed earlier,

[134] Rebels note that WSLF was restructured after the formal end of the war, and in attempt to divide the group- rebel factions were assigned to specific geographic zones of operation undermining its unity and making it vulnerable to the forces of factionalism that had already infiltrated its ranks. According to Ahmedweli Sh. Abdullahi , each zone had a specific faction assigned to it with the following names: Dhegahbuur: 'Gurmad', Qorahay: Dhaarsane , Nogob: Yaacdu, Doollo: Yaasin , Afdheer: Guulweyne.

speaks directly to both the officials and those who joined them: 'If what you desire is entitlement, honour and respect, do not wander under the scorching sun of the eastern Sool and Sanaag.' In addition, WSLF faced a number of internal challenges such as clan division as the group splintered into clan-based factions which reached its peak in 1983. For instance, the formation of 'sii-Galbeed' reflected the desire of particular groups to separate from WSLF perceived to be dominated by the *Ogaadeen* clan, eventually resulting in actual clashes[135](Mahad Cismaan Ceelaab, 2019).

The demise of Somali nationalist solidarity was crystallised by the 1988 peace accord between Ethiopia and Somalia normalising relations and agreeing to stop supporting each other's rebel groups. Pressure exerted by the Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) against Siyaad barre's rule drove him to seek a deal with Ethiopia, likewise considering WSLF'S continued activities in Ethiopia, Mengistu also welcomed this deal (Lewis, 1989, p.576). Both the governments of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Siyaad Barre signed ceasefires with Ethiopia in March 1964, and in April 1988 respectively. On both occasions, Somalia's leaders agreed to effectively abandon their support of Somali rebels in Ethiopia (*Geesh* and WSLF) in favour of their own diplomatic considerations which its members felt betrayed by (Hagmann, 2014a, p.728). Against the efforts and aspirations of grassroot liberation movements, the 1977 war came to be seen as a war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Somali territory in Ethiopia. This served the competing interests of Addis Ababa and Mogadishu rather than the considerations of the local Somali population in Ethiopia (Morone, 2015, p.110).

5.12. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the way that Somali nationalist thought was fostered by Somali oral traditions, specifically in the aftermath of Somalia's independence in 1960 and in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden war focusing on the way that popularised political verses were used as a rallying call to recruit the entire nation to resist the Ethiopian state. The chapter demonstrated the ideological underpinnings of these discourses, and in what ways they stood in opposition to fundamental Ethiopian claims and dominant conceptions on how the state should be organised (i.e. preserving the

[135] The 'Somaali galbeed' vs 'sii galbeed' dispute is often used as a marker to indicate the difficulty in forging a common label that Somalis can rally behind, somaali galbeed meaning 'western Somali' while having no clan connotations still resulted in division along clan lines. The 'sii galbeed' phenomena is also used to rationalise the argument for the subsequent use of the term 'Ogaden' in the organisation which was to replace WSLF arguing that a unifying name does not necessarily result in unity.

territorial integrity of Ethiopia). It further highlighted the continuities in the way that earlier literary works such Sayyid Mohammed's political verse serve as canons in Somali resistance discourses in the way that they provided a blueprint for the fundamental claims envisaged within Somali nationalist thought, and a source of reference for subsequent political verses.

In line with DHA's emphasis on the principle of context and historically situating discursive analysis, the chapter offered analysis of literary commentary pertaining to key historical events such as the lead up to Somalia's independence and the impact this had on Somalis in Ethiopia, the 1960s rebellions, and the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War. The chapter demonstrated the essence of a discursive struggle between dominant statist discourses explored in chapter 4 vis a vis marginalised Somali discourses bringing to the fore the root causes for rebellion against the Ethiopian state. Specifically, objective contributors fuelling successive resistance attempts are vividly demonstrated by reference to economic exploitation/subjugation, historical violence and dispossession, cultural violence etc. Historical continuities in Somali encounters with the state across various political administrations is illustrated via recurrent motifs and symbols of struggle and sacrifice, religious symbolism, cultural proverbs and folktales, identity, golden ages of resisting the state among others. These symbols have come to serve as key legitimation strategies which underpin the normative rightness of popular resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism.

The postcolonial territorial dilemma in the Horn of Africa was crystallised by the conflicting objectives of the Ethiopian empire, and Somalis where the demands of the latter for self-determination undermined the principle of maintaining colonial borders enshrined in the OAU. The threat of dismembering the Ethiopian state in its current configuration constituted a further obstacle. So, to undermine local demands for self-determination, Ethiopia took measures to internationalise the conflict highlighting the role of Somalia in aiding local rebels while neglecting the local grievances that led to successive uprisings in the first place. Popular motivations for resistance, and aspirations for self-determination are reflected in popular verses which constituted a primary means of communication for Somali pastoralists. They draw upon symbolic and cultural repertoires centred on the historical experiences of Somali engagement with the Ethiopian state which constitute the foundations of a Somali nationalist thought in Ethiopia. The chapter argued that such a system of thought not only represents a counter-narrative to statist discourses, but also a stand-alone narrative which brings to the fore ruptures within the idealised 'greater Somalia' discourse which it is often subsumed under. This contributes to understandings on the particularised experiences of Somalis

within the Ethiopian state system in terms of political identification and loyalty, how the state is constructed in Somali nationalist thought, and the way that militarised encounters with the state shape these processes.

Examination of Dhoodaan's verses reveal repressed calls for a particular type of sovereignty for the Somali Region and its rebels which is fundamentally based on the absence of all forms of domination. Among the multitude of orators who described the way that Somalis articulated their aspirations for self-determination and territorial sovereignty in Ethiopia, Dhoodaan's expressions encapsulate the threat of statism and its variation of state nationalism with regard to both Ethiopian state nationalism and the 'Greater Somalia' political project.

6. Reigniting the struggle: the politics of liberation under the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

6.1 Introduction

Following the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991, a new political order which emphasized the rights of nations and nationalities was introduced. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)[136] spearheaded by Tigray people's liberation front (TPLF) set out to chart a new path for the country. The introduction of a new constitution in 1995 sought to address the core grievances of historically marginalized peoples. This chapter conducts a close study of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in its articulation of resistance against the Ethiopian national project during the EPRDF era. While ONLF is not the only opposition group operating in Somali Region politics during the EPRDF era, it was by far the most formidable in terms of the political challenges it posed against the state as well as its level of support among the populace.

The chapter dives deep into the institutional culture of the ONLF, focusing on the discursive tools used to communicate its message of resistance both among Somalis, and to the international community. It analyses the appropriation of both old and new cultural tools and discursive tropes associated with Somali nationalist literature. The chapter key discursve tropes encapsulated within ONLF resistance discourses as illustrated via the genre of '*suugaan halgameed'* (resistance verses) which re-define which provide language for Somali nationalist resistance in Ethiopia (1991-2018). Mass dissemination, were at times organized and displayed during ONLF training sessions, recorded for mass consumption to motivate and inspire the masses to join. The continued deployment of the political verse in resisting Ethiopian state nationalism shows its centrality as a method of legitimating Somali nationalist claims, and de-legitimating the Ethiopian nationalist project.

[136] The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a coalition of parties consisting of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) the major actor in the coalition, the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). Affiliate parties are: Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Party (BGPDP), Afar People Democratic Organization (APDO), Gambela People's Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM), Somali, People's Democratic Party (SPDP) and Harari National League (HNL).

Adapting discourse-analytical tools associated with the discourse historical approach (DHA), this chapter focuses on the rhetorical means by which cultural and symbolic tools are invoked to achieve certain political and ideological aims over others. It charts the continuities in the popular memories of the Ethiopian state in the Somali nationalist imagination. The chapter pays specific attention to argumentative strategies of '*construction'* and *'dismantling'* strategies (De Cillia, 1999, p.160-161) to de-mythologize and deconstruct Ethiopian statehood through analysis of nationalist literature associated with the ONLF. The chapter reveals the dual transformative agendas enclosed within these discourses – a concerted departure from the 'Greater Somalia' political project on one hand, and forging a common national consciousness which respond to old and new challenges through the political verse on the other hand. The chapter demonstrates the use of popular and recurrent resistance motifs associated with traditional Somali nationalism. This serves the purpose of anchoring ONLF's movement in a longer history of liberation while simultaneously responding to contemporary new challenges associated with the EPRDF. This is done by drawing on interviews with ONLF rebels, officials, representatives of the regional government and emphasizing the concept of 'context' and historical background in the discourse historical approach (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.11, 21).

The previous chapter illustrated the perceived constraints imposed against Somali nationalism in Ethiopia by the patronage and involvement of the Somali republic in the domestic politics of liberation among Somalis in Ethiopia. This chapter charts the evolution and development of a new national consciousness in the Somali region detailing continuities and discontinuities both in key tropes and symbolic resources used in nationalist literature, and in methods of communication and dissemination. Building on the last chapter, it underscores the symbolic legitimacy associated with the invocation of what have come to be constituted as traditional discursive tropes within resistance discourses. The chapter argues that the intertextual links between past and present political verses, and the ideological commandments and nationalist proclamations contained within, reflect the persistence of historical grievances against the Ethiopian state. While the EPRDF provided a symbolic validation of Somali existence and identity in Ethiopia, lack of tangible changes have been observed in terms of affording constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.

The chapter begins by offering a background of Ethiopia's 1991 regime change, how this was experienced in the newly established Somali Region including ONLF's early political mobilization. This is followed by examining the continued significance of the discursive space as a mode of resistance by providing analysis of the resurgence of liberation discourses in the face of government

crackdown. Subsequent sections focus on attempts at reigniting the national struggle by literary figures and rebels such as Iimaan Cubeyd and his contemporaries in their efforts to de-legitimize Ethiopian politics and to reject EPRDF's reconstitution of the state as representing the liberation historically marginalized peoples. This is followed by an examination of continuities and discontinuities in the way that the Ethiopian state is imagined in the popular Somali psyche particularly in terms of military symbolism, human rights abuses, and resource exploitation through the verses of Roda Ibaahim Abdi 'Af-jano'. The chapter concludes with a reflection of the changing dynamics in the Somali Region after the creation of the Liyu Police in 2009 and the status of the conflict today.

6.2. The era of nations and nationalities: Ethiopia's new political configuration

In 1991 the EPRDF set forth to restructure the state and called on a national conference inviting selected political parties, while excluding others, to participate in establishing the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The fundamental characteristic of the TGE was defined by the principle of 'the right to self-determination up to secession' described as 'the core political commandment of both the TPLF and the EPRDF' to be facilitated by decentralizing the state along ethnic lines (Gudina, 2011, p.667). The new ethnic federalist system was considered as an answer to the prevailing 'nations and nationalities' question championed by the 1960s-1970s student movement (Abbink, 2011, P.599). The debate on the extent to which EPRDF's introduction of the ethnic federalist system provided redress for historically marginalized nations and nationalities is an enduring debate in Ethiopian studies. Nonetheless, the EPRDF era was defined by the 'continuity of authoritarian policies and practices and the persistence of old problems' (Abbink and Hagmann, 2013, p.3) such as the repression of state institutions and the problem of authoritarian rule which denies political freedoms.

ONLF was established in 1984 by members of WSLF [137] in a bid to separate the quest for Somali self-determination in Ethiopia from the interference and patronage of the Somali Republic (Hagmann, 2014a, p.728). Chapter 5 through the political verse, demonstrated the sustained critique against the consequences of this form of patronage considered to have undermined the cause of Somali liberation in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, leading academics wrongly conceptualize the underlying motive behind forming ONLF. In the case of Markakis (1996) for instance, describes the formation of the ONLF as

[137] The six founding members of ONLF are Mohamed Ismail, Abdirahman Mahdi, Sheikh Ibrahim Abdalla, Abdirahman Yusuf Magan, Abdullahi Mohamed Sacdi, Abdi Ibaahim Geele.

the replacement of Somali irredentism for Ogaden nationalism by previous WSLF members (p.567). Moreover, that Somalis accepted self-government in 1991 and abandoned 'irredentist aspirations' or the Greater Somalia project as Markakis (1996, p.567) states, is a simplification of the evolution of Somali nationalist aspirations in Ethiopia. The presumed abandonment of 'irredentist aspirations' assumes a single interpretation of WSLF aspirations by privileging dominant post-colonial attitudes towards local liberation movements of which Ethiopia was both an architect and a primary beneficiary. Likewise, it undermines the ruptures and complexities which defined WSLF motives and indeed their strained relationship with the Somali Republic- the driving force behind the Greater Somalia political project.

Nonetheless, the political scenery in the early 90s presented new challenges for Somali nationalists in Ethiopia including the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and its associated consequences. With regard to cross-border Somali solidarity, Lewis (1989) states that 'the pan-Somali ideal founded on a cultural identity rather than the political unity, which was so strong in the 1950s and 1960s, has taken a severe battering' (Lewis, 1989, p.578). A close reading of ONLF's political programme formulated ahead of the July National conference in 1991 held in Addis Ababa, underlines the characteristics of the renewed search for liberation, how it differs from previous attempts (i.e. WSLF), and most importantly, how they seek to revive and reconstitute a shared Somali consciousness centred on resisting the Ethiopian state.

ONLF's 1991 political program contains the following excerpts:

> 'WSLF has played a disgraceful role in distorting the image of Ogaden people struggle, as it appeared to be a boundary conflict between Somali Republic and Ethiopia...The military Somali interference in war between Ogaden vanguards and the Ethiopian forces in 1977, (Ogaden War 1977/78) was the biggest mistake committed by the Somali Republic against the rights of Ogaden and its future.
>
> …freedom fighters and national leadership in Ogaden have exerted painstaking efforts to warn Somali Republic leadership from the consequences of waging a regular war against Ethiopia and the bad impact of such a war on Ogaden cause and the possibility of the interference of super powers in the Horn of Africa. Ogaden people endured the heavy results of such war...' (FCO 31/6371: 1991, p. 7)

The ONLF's imagination of a new sense of national identity is best illustrated by reference to the region as 'Ogaden,' the people as 'Ogaden,' and the Somali quest for self-determination in the Somali

Region as an 'Ogaden cause.' This in addition to the reference to a 'national leadership in 'Ogaden' demarcating a new sovereign space outside of the potentially convoluting term, 'Somali.'[138] ONLF's attempt to carve out a new sovereign identity free from affiliation with *Soomaliweyn* 'Greater Somalia' is also found in its direct condemnation of WSLF for 'distorting the image' of the true essence of the 1977 Ogaden War which was reduced to a boundary dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia due to Somalia's visible interference in the conflict. Therefore, the ONLF sought to delineate the limits of the Somali cause in Ethiopia by unambiguously rejecting the claim of Somali irredentism, and instead defining the Somali issue in Ethiopia as a colonial problem. ONLF's 'fundamental considerations' outlined in its 1991 political programme hosted in the UK's National Archives include the following provisions:

> 'The Ogaden cause is not at heart a dispute between the Republic of Somalia and Ethiopia. It is one of the visages of European Colonialism in Africa.
>
> The struggle of the Ogaden people and the aim of their movement is to obtain the right to self-determination, rather than a struggle aimed at realising the identity of a nationality. This is because Ogaden has never been historically or politically part of Ethiopia.
>
> The revolution of the Ogaden people is based upon the absolute rejection of the...unauthorized disposition of their territory by the British government...the people of the Ogaden are the sole possessors of the right to determine their future. (FCO 31/6371, p.9-10)

On how to achieve the aforementioned aims:

> 'To mobilize the Ogaden people in order to enable them to actively and widely participate in the national liberation struggle.
>
> To raise their political consciousness in order to be more articulate and aware of their inalienable rights to independence and justice.
>
> To unite the struggling masses into an invisible force that guarantees the inevitability of the victory over Ethiopian colonialism with God's help.'
>
> Building up reliable revolutionary cadres, who are capable of exposing all anti-liberation struggle attempts.

[138] Yet remarkable continuities are visible in the rebel culture and institutional set up shared by the two liberation fronts according to rebel informants. For instance, continuities between names of WSLF and ONLF military units i.e. Birmad, Ragaad, Gurmad.

> Establishing strong information and propaganda organs...making the world acquainted with the Ogaden just cause as a question of decolonization.' (FCO 31/6371, p.12-13).

These provisions from ONLF's 1991 political programme make explicit a number of important aims and objectives which provide an insight into the key considerations which guided resistance discourses throughout the 1990s and beyond. For instance, 'to unite the struggling masses,' 'to raise their political consciousness,' 'to mobilise the Ogaden people,'' etc. Such appeals to a sense of 're-education' foreshadows the future need to provide a coherent messaging on liberation in a context where the popular appeal of armed struggle diminished, and the new sense that the establishment of a Somali administration and the enshrined rights of nations and nationalities has finally provided the rights that Somalis have historically sought. Since the Somali Region persisted as 'a theatre of political turmoil' after the 1977 Ogaden War which resulted in a widescale refugee crisis and continued insurgency (Hagmann and Khalif, 2006, p.27), there was a growing need to take stock of the divergent memories of war, 'nationness' and state that diverse segments of the Somali community came with. Keller's (1981) view that 'conquered peoples merely acquiesced in Abyssinian authority; they did not accept it as legitimate' (p.530) enabled the new liberation front to claim a considerable level of political currency among 'conquered peoples' and to devote their efforts to merely igniting existing anti-state sentiments as reflected in the political program.

The ONLF's approach to Somali nationalism as a pedagogical endeavor (i.e. to educate the masses), and an epistemological project centered on constructing Somali nationalism as centered on justified and legitimate knowledge-regimes, is displayed by the significance afforded to the shaping of a new 'political consciousness' through 'establishing strong information and propaganda.' As encapsulated in ONLF's 1991 political programme, the chapter delves into the dual challenge of forging an indigenous rebel movement separate from the Somali Republic, and simultaneously navigating the unprecedented challenges posed by the new multinational federal system in Ethiopia. One of the main challenges for the ONLF was to articulate a liberation philosophy which transcended Ethiopia's central government to include its subsidiaries in the newly formed regional administrations, namely Somali regional state representatives.

6.3. Re-emerging discourses of liberation: 1991-1996

The context of the Somali frontier in the lead up to Ethiopia's 1991 regime change is an important catalyst in the persistence of particular continuities of local Somali resistance and its accompanying symbols. The 1980s was considered a 'vast military zone' defined by brutal abuses amidst state-led counterinsurgency campaign against active rebel groups such as the WSLF, this was made worse by the 1983-5 famine which hit the Somali region ahead of the rest of the country due to restrictions in cross-border movements, commercial activities and cultivation (Hagmann and Khalif, 2006, p.27-28). As Tareke (2000) argues, 'the Ethiopians regained the Ogaden but not the permanent allegiance of the territory's inhabitants' after the 1977-8 Ogaden War (p.667). In light of persistent contestation of Ethiopian sovereignty in the Somali frontier coupled with historical lack of incorporation into the state, the EPRDF inherited the problematic status of the Somali Region as somewhere that continued to be deemed 'particularly difficult to rule and control' compared to the rest of the country (Hagmann & Korf, 2012, p.206).

In '*The Somali in Ethiopia*,' Markakis (1996) provides a description of the early 1990's political scene in the newly formed Somali Region in terms of key actors and party politics. In 1992 multi-party elections were held where the ONLF won approximately 70 seats in the regional assembly out of 110 seats dominating the executive branch of the government as well as occupying the presidency - Abdullahi Mohammed Sa'di[i] and vice-presidency (Markakis, 1996, p.567). The relationship between the federal government and the Somali Region took a bitter turn in 1994 when the ONLF were removed from the Somali Region government led by Hassan Jire Qalinle, and the EPRDF's creation of its Somali affiliate party to counteract the secessionist agenda of the ONLF (Hagmann and Khalif, 2006, p.29). In February 1994, the Somali regional government voted to exercise their constitutional right to self-determination by triggering Article 39 of the constitution. However, Hassan Jire qalinle was removed under the guise of 'preventing the people of the region from enjoying the benefits of the transitional period'[139], Abdirahman Ugas Mahamud who replaced him as president was himself dismissed in December 1994 for 'obstructing development projects'[140] following the dismissal of most of his bureau heads and their deputies in the regional government (Markakis, 1996, p.568). The central government was involved in firing 3 Somali regional, presidents each holding office less than 3 months ((Markakis,

[139] (Ethiopian Herald, 9 April 1994) quoted in Markakis (1996) 'The Somali in Ethiopia.'
[140] (Ethiopian Herald, 6 December 1994) quoted in Markakis (1996) 'The Somali in Ethiopia.'

1996, p.568).[141] This period destroyed hopes of an autonomous regional administration in light of ruling party interference and control of Somali regional politics (Samatar, 2004, p.1133).

In light of these regional developments, the collapsed relationship between the central government, the ONLF, and all those affiliated with the group ideologically, sparked a resurgence of traditional nationalist literatures used to mobilise. During Siyad Barre's nationalist campaigns, the 'national discourse' was raised through literary channels (i.e. poetry, theatre, songs etc.) (Barnes, 2006b, p.492). Similarly, the new national discourse was carried by the literary expressions of Nuuriye Indhoole, Jeefad Macalin Ismaaciil, Cali Yuusuf Khaliif 'Cali Food', Iimaan Cubeyd, Ahmed 'Timojilic', Heelaale, '*Kooxdii fanka iyo suugaanta Wardheer*' and their contemporaries, widely considered as the soundtracks of liberation discourses in 1990s Somali Region. Their popular verses appealed to the transhistorical messaging of resistance against the Ethiopian state, and simultaneously, the specificity of resisting EPRDF rule while appealing to the collective Somali memory. Cali Food appealed to the discontented masses in the following way:

O people!
Do not ever forget the danger(s) we passed through
Our long struggle for liberation
Its dangers and difficulties, why do you not take heed?
How many gallant ones have been slayed?
Without attaining that which we are aspiring towards, and freedom, how can you rest?

Cali Food's song is a representative example of the highly popularized '*guubaabo*' genre used to inspire and communicate the political messages of ONLF to the masses. As Smith (2009) argues, in times of a decline in how members of a nation meet expected standards of national commitment or 'golden age,' elites or other vocal actors revive this by reminding people of 'the intimate landscapes of their homelands, recall to their minds the examples of former great ages, and of the heroic deeds of their illustrious ancestors' (Smith, 2009, p.98-99). Continued symbolic significance of past heroes and 'golden ages' as in the case of previous liberation attempts are discussed in chapter 5. It is comprised

[141] Abdullahi Mohamed Sa'adi (January–July 1993), Hassan Gire Qalinle (July 1993–April 1994), Ugaas Abdirahman Mahamud 'Kani' (April–December 1994), Ahmed Makahil Hussein (December 1994–July 1995), Eid Dahir Farah (July 1995–1997), Mahamed Macalin 'Khadar' (1997–September 2000), Abdirashiid Duulane (September 2000–July 2003), Omar Jibril Abubaker (July 2003–September 2005), Abdillahi Hassan Mohammed (September 2005-November 2008), Daud Mohamed Ali (November 2008- July 2010), (Abdi Mohamoud Omar 'Iley (July 2010- August 2018), Mustafa Muhumed Omer (August 2018-Present). This list is largely retrieved from Hagmann and Khalif (2006, p.44-5).

of emotive appeals to shared memories and collective histories of state violence and resistance through repetitive use of personal pronouns such as 'we' 'you' and 'our.' These deictic words assume an implied understanding of the history of Somali liberation in Ethiopia, the 'great ages' contained within, and the challenges faced by heroic ancestors in pursuit of liberation including the huge number of deaths. It illustrates how under different political administrations, the same conditions which gave rise to intense animosity and subsequent resistance in the 1960s, and 1970s also triggered the start of a 24-year armed struggle in 1994. When the Somali regional parliament approved a bill to trigger Article 39, the subsequent Wardheer massacre in February 1994 is considered as sparking the armed struggle. In the center of Wardheer town, 81 civilians were massacred by government forces in attempt to capture the chairman of the ONLF Sheikh Ibrahim Abdallah who was leading a peaceful rally on that day (Ogaden Human Rights Committee, 1999).[142]

Though ONLF did not embark upon its armed struggle until April 1994, this highly popularized verse by Cali Food provides an insight into the discourses of contending political forces during this highly uncertain transitional period. As this chapter will show in subsequent sections, ONLF adopted a liberatory discourse distrustful of the EPRDF's intentions prior, as well as spearheading the direct condemnation of their affiliates in the Somali regional state. The socio-historical basis for such a positioning can be grasped by the clashes between the government and ONLF leading up to April 1994. Clashes ranged from direct military confrontation to targeted attacks and enforced disappearances. The tone of Cali Food's verses assumes that he is rallying people towards a war that had already commenced. Based on interviews and conversations with members who participated in the 1992 military encounter between the ONLF and an Ethiopian military convoy consisting of hundreds of soldiers in Birqod, the battle was nicknamed '105' reflecting the number of military personnel killed. The number of ONLF casualties are estimated around 5 or 6, among them were Deeq Abdiqadir dhacar, Abdi Curri and Huweys. Such examples of direct military confrontation provide an insight into the full-fledged conflict that had already begun despite the party politics and political experiments Somali parties were engaged in vis a vis Ethiopia's new political system in the early 90s.

The visible degree of continuity in the narrative style between Cali Food's verses and that of earlier political verses formed during vastly different political conditions raises the crucial question of whether

[142] According to Koos Shariif who was present in Wardheer during this period, the number of people killed were 51.

or not the active war between the Somali rebels and the state actually stopped after the demise of the WSLF. Born in Dhanaan 1959, Mahad Cismaan Ceelbab 'Dhabuuke' stated that he has never laid down his arms after first joining the WSLF in 1976, not even after the group splintered in the early 1980s. He remained in the bushes until 1991 and immediately participated in the 1992 Biqod battle. He remained an ONLF rebel and commander until he imprisoned in 2017. In my 2019 interview with Dhabuuke in Jigjiga, he reflected on the oddities of urban life after spending over 40 years in the bushes as a rebel fighting the Ethiopian state.

Moreover, government hostility towards the ONLF became apparent early on. According to ONLF officials, by 1992 when the liberation agenda of the group became apparent to the EPRDF, it inspired the creation of up to a dozen new parties organized along clan lines in order to weaken the ONLF while exploiting the tribal resentments inherited from the Somali civil war.[143] Doing so was intended to have the convenient effect of framing ONLF's cause as a tribal one by virtue of the name 'Ogaden' to undermine their calls for greater freedoms. In addition to this, key ONLF figures were assassinated during this period in Qalafe, Qabridahare, Godey, Dhegehbour and elsewhere to deter people from associating with the group.[144] In a 2019 interview with Daahir Mahamed Cali 'Baasto' (ONLF member of the Somali regional state executive committee) in Jigjiga, he explained the rationale behind ONLF's decision to abandon Ethiopian politics in light of state hostility towards them:

> 'We had no other choice but to defend ourselves. Parts of the 1991 charter secured the rights of nations and in particular, there is a section which states that any nation that is not satisfied with the rights promised to them by the charter during the transitional period, have the right to do what they must to seek their fundamental rights. Not only did they not implement this, they completely destroyed this principle. All ONLF offices across the region had the Ethiopian military stationed in front of them under constant surveillance, some were vandalized including the main Godey office at the end of 1993. The military also vandalized the president's home, our leadership and key figures were assassinated and

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143 Reer Baare people's party, Ethiopian democratic movement, Isse and Gurgure Liberation front, Horyaal etc. all had a designated tribal constituency.

144 Assassinations and enforced disappearances targeted government officials including district and regional level officials, journalists and elders across the Somali Region. The following provides a glimpse into the figures whose names reoccurred in fieldwork interviews. In Qalaafe: Mahamuud Cumar Gorad, Duulane Hassan Gaabane; Qabridahare: Maxamuud Cumar Tube, Deeq Mahamuud Carab; Dheghebour: Deeq Yuusuf Kaariye, Bulbul, Abdullahi Cumar Dubad, Mahamed Sheikh Mahamuud Iraad, Haji Ahmednuur Sheikh Mumin, Abdirahman Sheikh Mumin, Mohamed Muse Ibrahim; Birqod: Kaafi Yuusuf Ali; Jigjiga: Abshir Abdi Suge, Abdullahi Abdi Tafla, Abdi Sheikh Muhumed Iraad; Wardheer: Ibraahim Sheikh Muuse; Godey: Miraad Leyli Siigaale, Miraad Sheikh Yusuf, Baarax Macalin Xareed, Mukhtaar Adan Geedaan. The Ogaden Human Rights Committee (1999) database provides a detailed account on extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and other forms of abuses committed by the EPDF during the 1990s.

some were even denied a dignified burial and left on display in the town centers instead. The Wardheer massacre of February 1994 is also unforgettable.'

Thus, Cali Food's appeal spoke to the present condition as much as it spoke to the historical conditions that Somalis in Ethiopia endured; 'How many gallant ones have been slayed?' provoked remembrance of key figures including traditional elders assassinated in the early 90s. However, perhaps the reason why this song resonated so widely, is that in 1995/1996 in the village of Waylo-laguxidh, Cali Food himself was beaten in public by the Ethiopian military, after which they took him away and threw his body over a cliff outside Qabridahare (Koos Shariif, 2021).[145] Degmo Abdi Ali nicknamed 'hooyo JWXO', leading member of *Kooxdii fanka iyo suugaanta Wardheer*', is another significant literary figure who was murdered in similarly abhorrent ways. The military abducted Degmo Abdi Ali during the 1994 February massacre of residents by state forces. According to Koos Shariif (2021), a resident of Wardheer during this period, when Meles Zenawi was asked about Degmo in his visit a week later, he responded: 'angry men flexed their angry muscles against her', painting a horrifying image of the torture she suffered before she was killed. Her body was never seen again by residents of Wardheer.

The significance of the role of discursivity in ONLF's movement is illustrated by the primacy of the roles of '*abwaan*' -poet or composer- embedded within the rank and file of the ONLF rebels. They served the role of composing poems and songs which served to encourage the rebels, mobilizing the masses, and conveying key messages through discursive appeals to diaspora communities and international audiences at large. For instance, Abwaan Abdijabaar 'Indhacade' and Abwaan 'Dhagacade', who were both composers and rebel fighter, are associated with this tradition whereby they attained the titles of both '*naftiihure*' and '*abwaan*' simultaneously. They travelled with their rebel units throughout rural villages to recruit and spread their message using oral literature reminiscent of 'the oral postal system' used in Somali pastoral society (Andrzejewski, 2011b, p.28). The murder of Cali Food, also a rebel '*abwaan*' designated the discursive terrain as a parallel battlefield in what was going to be a long and protracted insurgency between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government. Relatedly, military encounters between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government even before the formal start of the armed insurgency, provides a contextual basis for the nationalist literature emerging

[145] Cali Food's tortured body was found by the residents of Qabridahare where he was later buried (Koos Shariif, 2021).

in the early 90s in an otherwise de-militarized political setting with multiple parties competing in elections.

6.3.1 Iimaan Cubeyd and his contemporaries: reigniting the struggle though '*Guubaabo*' political messaging

Despite decentralising power to regional states, the EPRDF led Ethiopian state was stronger and more centralised than any previous Ethiopian administration through the development of strong systems of top-down rule which undermined local autonomy reflecting Ethiopia's traditional and historical authoritarian political culture (Abbink, 2011, p.596). ONLF's '*Guubaabo*' discourses reveal a concerted effort to discredit the promises of autonomy and self-determination of 'nations and peoples' ushered in by the EPRDF. More poignantly, they portray the EPRDF as standing in opposition to the fundamental principles of self-determination for Somalis. Iimaan Cubeyd laments this realisation in a popular verse titled 'Bukaan-socod' which he first recited in the village of *Baarta* in 1995, it contains the following excerpts:

Our beautiful flag is like a stray
There it is on the mountains, like wild species
Its rightful place to be is too dangerous
It was denied being poised on a long pole and waved
The owners of this flag are not hurt by this
He who becomes conscious, will die from rage
O God cure my people, for they are sick!

The flag is a recurrent motif in resistance discourses representing a symbol of hope and freedom. In this case, the flag being cast aside serves as a metaphor for the marginalization of certain ideals, namely- the appeal for greater autonomy and self-determination which was suppressed by the central government in the early 1990s. Iimaan Cubeyd universalizes and collectivizes the flag, though it is the flag of the ONLF and thus belongs to those who align with them ideologically. The poem is the first of many literary productions in the *Guubaabo* genre that moralize subscription to ONLF principles and ideals, and conversely, condemn those who participate in (Ethiopian) regional politics. In the same year Iimaan Cubeyd produced this verse, the central government supported the formation of an affiliate political party, and opposition against the ONLF: the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League

(ESDL) formed at a meeting at Hurso military camp near Dire Dawa in the presence of Prime Minister Tamrat Layne accompanied by Abdul Majid Hussein and Shamsudin Ahmed - two Somali members of his cabinet who came to serve as president and secretary general of the ESDL (Markakis, 1996, p. 568).

Iimaan Cubeyd offers a direct condemnation of all those whom the flag represents (i.e. all Somalis) who are content with the status quo which denies their fundamental rights by not resisting against this form of injustice. The mountain serves as a metaphor to crystalize the 'miyi-magaaalo' urban-rural dichotomy which is a recurrent trope in resistance literatures. Town centers are associated with the presence of the state and its security apparatus, whereas rural areas represent rebel strongholds. As such, the flag is not only lost, but also misplaced, as it is not safe in its rightful place in the town centers due to the presence of the military. As illustrated in earlier literatures, animal imagery is deployed as a powerful rhetorical strategy for conveying political messages. In this excerpt, the poet states that the flag is on the mountains just like the animals. Ethnosymbolist preoccupation with symbolic significance of national symbols such as flags provides important insight into the cultural tools that sustain nations' self-definition. The symbol of the 'flag' is a recurring motif in Somali nationalist literatures signifying distinct emblems which represent particular identities and causes - the central role of the flag in ONLF institutional culture is underlined by the organisation's fist anthem 'calanyahow bidhaan wacanow' and the direct reference to the national anthem as 'heesta calanka'- 'the anthem of the flag.' It is memorialised as embodying both the physical elements of the region, and the ideological basis for the ONLF struggle; the blue and white flag of the Somali Republic in the centre serves to subvert Ethiopian state nationalism and emphasise affinity with Somalis across the border, the red represents the difficulties associated with the historical quest for self-determination while the green represents the resources of the land.

Since the ONLF flag was banned, the poet describes the condition of the flag of liberation reduced to be positioned in the mountains, inaccessible and far removed from the sight of the people. It is the comparison to the wild species that underlines its wrongful position. However, 'banjoogeeda' may also allude to the armed rebels whose traditional operating fields are partly confined to rural areas as opposed to state administrators and their military bases that are confined to the urban centres. The submerged metaphor of the wild species and rebel fighters is a recurring theme in ONLF discourses where rebels emphasise their expulsion from society by the state, and their withdrawal to the wilderness as a necessary sacrifice in search for liberation. The politics surrounding the ONLF flag as

a site of contested identities is significant. This is because even the original flag of the Somali Regional state established by the first ONLF-led Somali Regional administration in the early 1990s, was countered by the introduction of a new official flag which mirrored the colours of the FDRE under Abdi Iley. This was characteristic of EPRDF's governance style where 'far from recognizing alternative centers of authority, it has sought consistently and universally either to co-opt or to marginalize them.' (Vaughan, 2011, p.635). Changing the flag to mirror that of the Ethiopian state undermined local symbols, specifically in terms of Somalis' adoption of the white star with a blue background which represents affinity with Somalis across the border. In vising the Somali Region weeks after the ONLF first arrived in Jigjiga in December 2018, the number of old and worn-out ONLF flags that appeared and were raised both in urban centers and rural areas was a point of fascination for observers who expected that due to the risk associated with any suspected (much less visible) affiliation with the ONLF, all flags have been destroyed. Yet retaining these flags under difficult condition constituted a form resisting symbolically for both rural and urban dwellers (Field notes, 2018-2019).

6.4. Forging a new consciousness based on historical memories

In '*Bukaan-socod*,' Iimaan Cubeyd continues in his call to undermine the type of self-government the EPRDF claimed to have instituted and the necessity for struggle and sacrifice to achieve genuine freedom. As illustrated by Dhoodaan's verses in the previous chapter, he taps into the idea of forsaking everything, specifically one's personal interests in pursuit of something greater. The cultural symbol of 'struggle' is described as 'a key ingredient of political romanticism' where the mythic and symbolic effects of such sacrifices inspire a sense of national destiny rooted in sacrifice (Smith, 2009, p.97).

Freedom is attained by hardship and war
Self-government is not achieved by pleading, except by struggling for it

The reference to a lack of collective awakening and consciousness of the Somali condition reflects the explicitly Fanonseque title of the poem 'Bukaan-socod' which implies a physiological ailment as opposed to a physical one. The allusion to the psychological realm suggests the invisibility of this form of sickness, and the significance of hidden and oftentimes invisible forms of domination. Thus,

heeding the call of the ONLF is framed as akin to regaining power by rejecting the powerlessness induced by colonial subjugation. The underlying message is not to be misled by the promises of the transitional period, namely in terms of democratization and improved relations between the Ethiopian government and Somalis, although many have decided to ignore this painful reality as articulated by the ONLF.

Iimaan Cubeyd laments the condition of Somalis in the following way:

> O people, the reason why I mourn and weep
>
> A man whose rights have been taken and left empty handed
> And refused the 'Baayir' (she-camel) that he used to tend to
> And watching from a distance his camels milked on a late morning
> In a state of hunger with no ability to avenge
> Whose people have left him on a mountain all alone
> O people, this is the situation I am in, and where I currently stand
> My people indulge with those who subjected me to this

The excerpt raises crucial questions around contested political identities in the 1990s political space where the ideals of liberation centred on historical continuities of resistance came head-to-head with the newly established Somali regional administration. It was from 1991 that the Somali in Ethiopia was first recognised as constituent members of Ethiopia's nations (Hagmann and Khalif, 2006, p.25). The unprecedented level of political and ethno-cultural and linguistic recognition that Somalis gained provided a new dimension to the enduring debates on the best way that Somalis should seek their rights, debates around armed rebellions, and broadly speaking - how to make sense of this period in history vis a vis Ethiopia's historical relations with the Somali periphery. Cali Food's imperative/declarative to never 'forget the dangers we passed through' appeals directly to the history of state violence, he reminds his audience that Ethiopia remains the same despite change in its political configuration. Similarly, Iiman Cubeyd alludes to the traditional metaphor of the prized she-camel which often serves as an emblem for freedom now outside of his grasp. Reference to the 'Baayir' she-camel has its roots in the cultural and symbolic construction of '*Maandeeq*' in Somali nationalist literature as a symbol of sovereignty (Afrax, 1994, p.241). However, in *Bukaansocod*, the poet gestures towards the shifting reality of the historically popular liberation groups under previous ruling systems

such as the monarchical regime and the Derg; that under the EPRDF, the idea of 'self-administration' has lured many in, and de-popularised the notion of 'struggle.' He insists that the conditions are the same in terms of subjugation and denial of livelihoods as exemplified by the confiscation of the 'Baayir' beloved among pastoralist communities. The observation that Somalis have never been incorporated meaningfully into the Ethiopian state-system (Keller, 1981, p.548), remained consistent in the eyes of many.

In Leeuwen's (2007) elaborated account on DHA's argumentative strategies, he identifies certain legitimation strategies used to justify certain ideas over others. In this excerpt, the use of mythopoesis-narrative storytelling (p.105) through the *Baayir* she-camel reminds those who have not yet heeded the ONLF message, that the she-camel being milked by occupiers is a collective problem affecting not only those who are aware of their condition- but also those whom the poem is aimed at rallying. This reveals intertextual links with Timacade's *Maandeeq* discussed in chapter 5, and his reference to the act of camel-milking as emblematic of attaining the freedom of unredeemed territories after the independence of Somalia in 1960.

Iimaan Cubey'd *Bukaansocod* laments the Somali elite's acceptance of EPRDF's definition of self-rule for Somalis. The excerpts above directly evoke the fundamental flaws that contradicted the basic tenants of federalism. For instance, The Ministry of Federal Affairs which reported directly to the office of the Prime Minister was in charge of conflict resolution and 'capacity building' while also overseeing security in the lowland peripheries- this institution represented the central government's aim of controlling regional states undermining the fundamental principles of self-rule (Abbink, 2011, p.601). Moreover, 'Highland wereda advisers' were placed across the lowland peripheries as part of a 2008 federal programme intended to "capacitate the local state" (Vaughan, 2011, p.634). A parallel process was also instituted at the regional level, this was highlighted in an interview I conducted with a former president in Jigjiga, he stated 'we were dictated to. The 'amakari' advisors assigned by EPRDF officials had the authority to fire whoever they wanted. When I confronted them about this their response was: the Somali party is not a member of the EPRDF, you are pastoralists and therefore do not have the experience that we agrarians have' (2018).[146] This is reflective of state attitudes towards the Somali frontier as 'devoid of civilization, waiting to become civilized' (Hagmann & Korf, 2012, p.206) by more enlightened state-builders.

[146] The names of former presidents have been concealed throughout this dissertation for personal and security reasons.

6.5. De-legitimizing Ethiopian politics

Considering these hierarchical dynamics between federal and regional officials to the detriment of Somali self-administration, Iimaan Cubeyd laments the way that members of his community have opted to participate in regional politics, describing their participation as a form of complacent at best, and at worst, designating them as co-conspirators in the state-sponsored violence engineered by the ruling party. In 1995, the ESDL participated in the regional elections well-resourced and strengthened by the backing of the ruling party (EPRDF), they won 75 seats out of 139 seats in the regional assembly (Markakis, 1996, p.569). State resources were used by the EPRDF as a form of patronage and resources such as the media to further their own political objectives, lack of fair and impartial government institutions such as the justice system also undermined the opposition's access to justice (Kefale, 2011, p.692-3). In condemnation of this, in 1998 Heelaale stated:

You are setting up roots as though you are in a free county
We did not prepare to liberate ourselves
No wise[147] individual would accept our present condition

The idea of 'permeance' in setting up a permanent life without permanent freedom is a direct criticism of the governing style of the central government. The first line also alludes to the inevitability of forced displacements and seeking political refuge in neighboring countries such as Kenya as many later did. Previous studies have covered the nature of client-patron relations between the Ethiopian central government and party heads in Addis Ababa and political elites in the Somali regional administration, shedding light on their role in shaping new forms of governance and politics in the Somali Region (Hagmann, 2005b; Samatar, 2004). This form of politics is dismissed in the '*guubaabo'* genre of ONLF discourses where participation in Ethiopian politics is not morally sanctioned. This is based on the mutually reinforcing notions that the Ethiopian state maintained the same attitude towards Somalis in terms of violently administering their territories, and the dangers of pacification based on constructing the new federal system as a remedy to the longstanding marginalization of Somalis. As Hagmann and Khalif (2006) argue, the realization of an Ethiopian-Somali identity category has not resulted in the attainment of democratic or harmonious relations between the central government and the Somali

[147] In 'Sidaan Manta Nahay Gobi ma yeesheene' - 'Gob' is a type of tree that never changes despite the circumstances; it is commonly used to refer to positive personality traits. In this instance, it is used to refer to wisdom. Heelaale accuses his audience of being fooled by the promises of EPRDF, and not having the wisdom to discern between truth and falsehood.

regional state, nor has it addressed the cultural divides between highland Ethiopians and Somalis (p.27). These are established upon condescending attitudes towards its historically designated subject peoples as discussed in Chapter 4.

Thus, Iimaan Cubeyd and his contemporaries were engaged in both an external and internal dialogue among Somalis, in a bid to make sense of this new political reality where the state on one hand has instituted a political framework which enshrines the rights of nations, but continues to undermine them in practice. Much focus is given to debunking the 'Ethiopian-Somali' identity, by continuing to reinforce the 'Ethiopian -Somali' binary where ONLF is positioned as the legitimate and representative voice of the region. This is exemplified in popular catchphrases such as 'intay jwxo soo gali Jigjiga jaahil haw taliyo' – 'Until JWXO[148] enters Jigjiga, let the foolish administer the region.' By labelling Somali administrators as 'foolish,' Iimaan Cubeyd alludes to the Fanonseque theme of the lack of consciousness that the colonized may have towards their conditions and evocative of the Marxist notion of false consciousness. It is also aptly Fanonesque in highlighting the short-term rewards of collaborating with colonizers in exchange for greater collective ideals such as liberty. Interdiscursive patterns of condemning Somali 'collaborators' as part and parcel of the Ethiopian state (if not worse), is characteristic of the significance that Sayyid Mohammed's political verses afforded to this form of condemnation as illustrated in chapter 5.

Iimaan Cubeyd's mirroring of the Sayyid's identity categories is reinforced by his intertextual reference to the traditional designation of those who are deemed to 'collaborate' with the state as traitors through the use of derogatory labels such as 'jaajuus' and ultimately, the revoking of their Somali identity by categorizing them as 'Ethiopian.' For instance, Iimaan Cubeyd's popular mobilizing verses include the following prayer:

O Lord be with us, and let the infidel and his traitors fall	Allahayow nala jir, gaalkuna ha jabo iyo jawaasiista

Whereas ONLF rebels, members, activists and other affiliates use names such as 'halgame' 'xag-u-dirir' 'naftiihure' to denote heroism, truth and sacrifice, collaborators are dismissed via demeaning terms such as 'babaqoodhi' and 'dabadhilif.' This has served to entrench identity divides between those who participate in Ethiopian politics and those who refrain from doing so as a form of resistance, and

[148] 'JWXO' is the Somali accronym for ONLF (Jabhada Wadaniga Xoreynta Ogaadeeniya).

at great personal cost. Intricacies within the establishment of these firm moral boundaries between 'Somali,' 'traitor' and 'Ethiopian,' is complicated by the perspectives of ONLF leaders and members who hold that despite the state of false consciousness that Somali regional administrators find themselves in, Ethiopian state attitudes towards Somalis as a whole (rebel or otherwise), is indiscriminate. Sulub Abdi Ahmed, previous commander of the ONLF armed forces was held as a political prisoner in 2002 after being captured in Hargeisa.[149] President Abdirashiid Duulane and members of his cabinet came to Dheghbour to celebrate the capture of Sulub who was considered a key rebel figure. The military heads at the base where Sulub was held denied the president his request to visit Sulub telling him that: 'we do not trust Abdirahid and his cabinet because they are probably ONLF. They will use the opportunity to tell you not to expose their working relationship with you' (Sulub Abdi Ahmed, 2019).

The incident reinforces the single dimension lens of the 'secessionist' stereotype through which the state approaches the Somali periphery whether or not one identifies with a rebel organization, and the serious lack of autonomy regional presidents had. Both this incident and the verses of Iimaan Cubeyd, speak to a larger discursive struggle over the compatibility of the ideals of Somali self-determination within the framework of Ethiopian politics and its underlying state nationalism, as well as the feasibility of an Ethiopian-Somali identity. It is important to highlight that the ONLF argument for the incompatibility of the two identity categories is representative of one specific mode of identification among other equally disputed modes of identification.[150] ONLF discourses are in dialogue with other forms such as the Ethiopian-Somali identity based on the newly found recognition of Somalis as members of the Ethiopian state after the coming to power of the EPRDF.

6.5.1. Evoking legitimacy though religious symbolism and customary authority

Islam remains a strong influence in ONLF's movement despite its secular orientation as specified in the political program of the organization (FCO 31/6371). ONLF composers drew on the tradition of

[149] One of the main characteristics of Ethiopia's counterinsurgency against ONLF rebels consisted of extending its reach beyond the confines of the Ethiopian state to supress their activities. The underlying intention was to limit the movement of the rebels and cut off their supplies, but resulted in mobility issues for Somalis often dependent on cross-border trade.
[150] Hagmann and Khalif (2006) describe the Ethiopian-Somali identity as heavily disputed but among 'a broad spectrum of identifications' (p.26).

invoking the help of God through prayer which is a common theme within Somali nationalist literature. For instance, Abwaan Nuuriye's early 90s mobilizing verses contained the following popular excerpts:

O God, the just
Only you can help the heavy voice of jwxo
When will it be victorious?

This appeal to the strength of God against a superior power (i.e. the state), and the characteristics of 'justice' underlines the significant role of religion in invoking legitimacy through associating God with the cause of the Somalis framed as a matter of good vs evil as illustrated in earlier literatures from the 1960s and 1970s. Historical continuities in the invocation of a higher being is exemplified by the poem 'Alle-Bari' – 'supplicating to God' by an ONLF soldier.[151] It consists of a prayer to God to aid them in alleviating Ethiopian colonialism, asking God to bear witness that he did not collaborate with the state, and that their fight is one of revenge. This reveals intertextual links with Dhoodaan's 1972 'Alle-Bari' where the narrative style follows the Islamic etiquette of making 'dua' (invoking God) which is to first praise God with the attributes mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah.

Witnesses recount a meeting organized in Jigjiga by the then Security head of the region Abdi Iley where he gathered traditional elders and religious leaders from across the Somali region. They were instructed to 'take ONLF out of paradise, condemn them to hell, and admit the Liyu to jannah' (Muhumed Faarax, 2019). This is a significant and unrecognized mode of fundamentally subverting the general legitimacy associated with rebel movements resisting the state. With the power of the state security apparatus, this incident highlights the way that counterinsurgency permeated the discursive field by essentially displacing the stable discourse of ONLF's moral claim on 'truth' and fighting a legitimate war. The use of religion as a playing field to legitimize and de-legitimize political discourses was exploited by both rebels and the Somali regional administration alike.

State infiltration of local ideological and cultural symbols was not limited to the realm of religion alone. EPRDF's appropriation of local structures is rooted in a longer history of state attempts at forging

[151] This poem is recited by an unidentified ONLF soldier, it was aired by Ilays TV and released on its streaming platforms in December 2013.

the loyalty of key personnel and their respective clans by awarding them imperial ranks and titles i.e. *Fitawrari*, *Balambaras*, *Dejazmach* etc. by Haile Selassie in a bid to project power in the Somali periphery. The effort to win the loyalty of *Ogaadeen* chiefs and elders by providing them with salaries and appointing them as advisors to the administrator of the Ogaden, reflected the Italian practice of politica dei capi 'chiefs' policy' practiced in Somalia under the Italian Trust Administration (Morone, 2015, p.107-108). The crucial difference between the two practices lies in the fact that the aim of the practice in the former Italian Somaliland was to achieve independence, whereas in Ethiopia, the Somali population were only allowed to have a certain level of autonomy within the broader establishment of the Ethiopian empire (Morone, 2015, p.107-108). This practice has evolved via the integration of paid *lataliye/amakari* (advisor) elders into the government structure in 2000, which reflected the federal government's response for a need to extend state presence and control into rural areas where government reach is traditionally limited thus serving as 'quasi-governmental administrators' (Hagmann and Khalif, 2006, p.29).

Ugaas Mohamed Omar Haguf – traditional elder and community leader- who was among these advisors explained that they did not have an office or an actual job title but merely added to the government payroll 'to pacify us and prevent us from joining the opposition.' (2019). While their selection was largely motivated by their perceived leadership legitimacy among their respective communities, the state sought to exploit the legitimacy of the customary authority they embodied. Their general involvement in politics that is considered inherently 'negative' in terms of the nature of the state and what it demands of its affiliates, is attributed to the state's effort to discredit their cultural and symbolic legitimacy. Due to the elders' lack of independence, they were seen to lose credibility among communities, their lack of independence essentially popularized disparaging terms such as 'plastic hat elders'[152] (Hagmann, 2012, p.65).

6.6. Historical continuities between the Derg and the EPRDF

One of the marked differences between liberation groups' literary forms of political mobilisation over the decades is the addition of the internet as a new discursive terrain where the struggle over ideas take shape. This marks a departure away from digital forms of dissemination i.e. cassettes, DVD's and

[152] In Somali: *Koofiyad Bacle*

CDs representing a shift in the popular liberation songs of the 1970s and 1980s particularly surrounding the Ogaden War, and popularized oral traditions which reflected the sentiments of the masses as discussed in Chapter 5.[153] ONLF communities re-introduced popular nationalist songs in public performances and online streaming platforms re-packaging them to serve a new audience and generation.[154] However, as illustrated in earlier poetic expressions, the political verse continued to pose as a key method of mobilizing communities, including rural communities who, often secretly, played popular ONLF verses in cassette players. Rebels partook in either performing poetic recitations, or by playing pre-recorded poems to civilian audiences which served the dual purpose of mobilizing them to join them or to remain sympathetic and continue providing them with direct and indirect support.

Rooda Abdi Guey commonly known as Roda Af-Jano is a leading female composer who has been active in the Somali political scene since 1991. Her poems have served as a key instrument in conveying ONLF's political message providing social and political commentary on key events, issues and debates around the Somali Region and its relationship to the Ethiopian state. In the following excerpt, I examine the way Roda highlights the acute continuity between the Derg regime, and the EPRDF using the DHA discursive strategies of *construction* and *perpetuation*.

The previous Derg and these (here) are brotherly peoples
Both are products of dictatorship, so they do not differ
Both are relentless towards whomsoever they choose
To loot resources, is in their nature
And to rape women, whenever they need
What these damned ones have in addition to those who collapsed
Firstly, is extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances
Random and unexpected attacks, and injustice
And the forceful relocation of peoples as though they were donkeys
The previous Derg and these (here) are brotherly peoples

[153] In *Discourses on moral womanhood in Somali popular songs, 1960 –1990,* Kapteijns (2009) Recounts the transformation of the Somali popular song as the central discursive site where 'nationalist modernity and moral womanhood were articulated and contested' which the internet has replaced as a central site of popular and public discourse (p. 121). Similar transformations are evident in the transformation of Somali resistance discourses.

[154] ONLF's international mobilization reveals a fusion of the two; for instance, popular resistance songs of the 1970's such as 'Ahmed Gurey ma uu dhiman' was reintroduced in a performance by Shankaroon Ahmed Sagal in a 2015 ONLF community association event in Minnesota. The song was written by Maxamed ibraahim Warsame 'Hadraawi' for the 1972 'Aqoon iyo Afgarad' stage play. Similarly, Abdi Kaamil Cawaale's 'waxaan ahay naftiihure' representative of the 1977 Ogaden War period re-emerged in a London stage play organised by the UK's ONLF community.

In this verse, Roda participates in the longstanding tradition of constructing and perpetuating a certain image of the state in order to justify the continued resistance against it. She draws parallels between the two regimes based on the fundamentally undemocratic nature of both ruling systems. Though this poem was produced in 2008, it illustrates continuity between the early and mid-90s ONLF poems warning the masses not to be fooled by the false promises of the EPRDF. State-society relations reveal that the political system spearheaded by the EPRDF has been content to inherit the Abyssinian tradition and contributing to its continuity (Reid, 2011, p.98). Not only have they suppressed distinct nationalisms, but ensured and instituted the longevity of the same oppressive system that they argued to have overthrown. Roda undermines the central narrative of EPRDF's claim to legitimacy which was largely centered on the liberation of 'nations and nationalities' in Ethiopia, and the toppling of the Derg (Abbink and Hagmann, 2013, p.5). Likewise, much of the Prosperity Party's (PP) present day political identity is centered on having liberated the people from the TPLF 'junta' whose oppressive state machinery ruled the country with an iron fist.[155] This is characteristic of successive Ethiopian regimes where every new ruling system positions itself as the liberator, whilst retaining its core undemocratic dispensation. This illustrates one the persistent characteristics of the Ethiopian state which has been detrimental to historically marginalized peoples.[156] Schlee's (2003) description of EPRDF's continuity in deploying old imperial symbols during the Eritrean War illustrates this point:

> 'In the course of the renewed war with Eritrea, the discourse of the EPRDF also now changed to centralism and unity, a discourse familiar from the imperial and Derg periods. The TPLF/EPRDF by 1999 was recycling precisely those old symbols which it had been busy deconstructing for the preceding eight years: Menelik's victory against the Italians at Adawa and the Emperor Tewodros. The new situation demanded that now one had to be Ethiopian or Eritrean. Hitherto that had not been the case to such a degree.' (p.357).

[155] The formation of PP coincided with a period marked by heavy state-sponsored propaganda which vilified TPLF leaders, and scapegoated for all of the country's problems though Abiy Ahmed and many of his colleague were members of the EPRDF. The use of inflammatory language such as 'day-light hyena' was broadcasted on state owned television, and the narrative of the 'evil junta' gained further momentum on November 4th 2020 when he Tigray war began.

[156] A former president explained that the Civil service college founded in 1993 was instrumental in teaching the 'Meles doctrine.' One of the lessons taught include the idea that there is no such thing as colonialism in Ethiopia, instead there has been neglect and the dominance of one ethnic group over others (i.e. Amhara dominance) which the EPRDF has liberated the masses from today (January 2019, Jigjiga).

Moreover, Roda's main justification for equating the Derg with the EPRDF is centered on their treatment of civilians, and by extension, equating the state as a whole with its security apparatus. This is namely because the military has historically served as the primary pillar of state authority in Ethiopia (Markakis, 2011, p.91). As described in the previous chapter, the theme of resource confiscation is an overriding theme in liberation discourses. Roda describes this as something in 'their nature' referring to the state's security thereby constructing in-group and out-group membership categorisations based on constant 'perpetrators' and constant 'victims.' This appeals to the historical memories of civilian encounters with the military dating as far back as the imperial era. The imperial army consisted of trained soldiers often accompanied by peasants carrying their own weapons. It is important to note that the solders did not receive any form of compensation for their services, instead, soldiers 'ate the land;' their mere presence was a punishment for local populations whose resources they plundered (Markakis, 2011, p.91).

The reference to 'TPLF,' the dominant member of the EPDF coalition, as the opponent or as constituting the Ethiopian state in popular resistance discourses is an important indicator of the linear temporality of the Ethiopian state; that it retains its core characteristics despite regime change. As Abbink (2011) states, 'the EPRDF-TPLF replaced a perceived "Amhara/highland"-dominated ethnocratic state with a multi-ethnic state, but with one clear leading core group' (Abbink, 2011, p.597). The direct invocation of the TPLF in ONLF resistance discourses serves to highlight their dominant role in shaping politics and reproducing power relations. For instance, Ahmed Timojilic's mid 1990s allying chant represents the first of many such discourses which use the terms TPLF, Tigray and Woyane interchangeably:

O youth! Wake up!
Retrieve your land back from the *Woyane*[157]

While the problems of resource confiscation and sexual violence are common themes within nationalist literatures, Roda specifies the type of abuses that are specific to the TPLF led EPRDF system such as enforced disappearances and 'forceful relocation.' Disappearances were characteristics of the 1990s political scenery as described earlier where traditional elders, religious leaders and key

[157] Woyane refers to 'revolution/rebellion' in Tigrinya- the TPLF referred to themselves as 'the Second Woyane' to establish a link with earlier Tigrayan rebellions (Forsén and Tronvoll, 2021, p.5).

societal figures were targeted by security forces never to be seen again.[158] Secondly, the reference to the policy of forceful relocation as a form of violence is in dialogue with the Ethiopian state's prejudiced attitudes towards pastoralism as an outdated mode of living. Korf et al (2015) state that sedentarization initiatives led by every Ethiopian ruling group was accompanied by the notion of a civilizing mission 'as a pretext for state expansion into the pastoral frontier' and a precondition for pastoralists to benefit from Ethiopia's development plans (p.886.). Under EPRDF, Vaughan (2011) contends that mobile communities such as pastoralists have posed challenges for EPRDF's state-building initiatives in the peripheries where 'a series of ambitious programmes to resettle large populations has recently begun' (p.634).

The relationship between counter-insurgency and villagization, and its impact on rebel movements is an understudied field. However, it poses important considerations for the way that traditional pastoralism and notion of 'movement' has historically enabled Somalis to evade the grasp of the state, and how they were simultaneously punished for this evasion.[159] Roda compares this to the relocation of 'donkeys' appealing to the inhumane act of forcibly relocating communities into controlled settlements in a manner which opposes the traditional Somali lifestyle. An interviewee reflected on this policy in the following way: 'they used to gather us together to restrict our encounter with the rebels, but when 500 families and their animals are forced to stay in one place, animals that are used to grazing freely outside cannot survive – this caused us to suffer immensely' (Ayaan Osman, Fiiq 2019). Thus, in constructing the EPRDF as a reincarnation of the Derg, like the earlier verses of the 1990s, Roda captures the sentiment that the ethnic, linguistic and cultural self-expression introduced by the EPDF did nothing to address the ethnic inequalities and hierarchies which persist between various groups such as highlanders vs lowlanders as encapsulated by policies towards pastoral communities as uncivilized (Abbink, 2011, p.603). These hierarchies are made further explicit in

[158] A discussion with Kamaal and Abdijabar recounted the 1997 abduction of their father by the Ethiopian military where he was taken to the military garrison in the Dahare mountains of Garbo. Residents describe hearing gunshots, and seeing a convoy from Godey arrive the next day for a military transfer, this is when they suspect their father was taken. The families of Yuusuf aw maxamuud and his two cousins Bashiir Ahmed Mataan and Yuusuf Abdi Dahir searched tirelessly for them, selling their camels to finance their search in prisons across Addis Ababa, Harar etc. They embarked on a renewed search in 2018 when old military garrisons became more accessible- they have yet to find any trace of them.

[159] According to a member of the Makhtal Dahir's 1963 Geesh liberation front, nomadic families would either offer support to the rebels and immediately relocate from their settlements to evade the Ethiopian military or exclaim 'hana gubin' – 'do not burn us' in reference to the state's counter insurgency strategy of burning villages and other settlements to punish rebel sympathisers and deter civilians from supporting the rebels (2019, Jigjiga).

Roda's commentary on the Somali Region's natural resources and serious underdevelopment in *Duufaan* (2008) which contains the following excerpts:

Gold, natural gas, and the salt scattered outside
It is treasure and silver that we have not tasted
The mighty stature of the mountains, and the scent of the grass
Honey drips naturally, Just as God bestowed it
And how destitute we are where people have divided (everything) among themselves
My heart breaks when I reflect back on this

The excerpt illuminates the abundance of resources within the Somali territory, including highly prized natural gas, and the rampant poverty which defines the lives of people. Roda elucidates the man-made nature of destituteness, and how natural resources have been divided by the state and other interest groups between themselves without considering indigenous communities. Korf et al (2015) describe state attitudes towards frontiers such as the Somali borderlands as 'empty' while simultaneously 'abundant' but 'underutilized' (p.883). Land and resource exploitation is considered as associated with a 'civilizing mission' where self-proclaimed 'advanced' societies adopt the right to exploit land that is deemed 'unoccupied' due to the presence of communities that are considered uncivilized (883-884).[160] The politics of oil and gas exploration is a case in point, where local communities bear the economic and environmental consequences of oil exploration ever since Sinclair oil in 1947, and the subsequent militarization around the Jehdin wells (Khalif & Doornbos, 2002,p.86-87). Historical memory around resources and land expropriation is entangled with the securitization of resources as demonstrated by the targeted burning of villages in close proximity to the Jehdin wells. This was carried out in retaliation against the 2007 Obole bombing which claimed the lives of up to 65 people including oil workers, local communities and others (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

[160] A 2000 press release by OHRC explains how Somalis were threatened with eviction and prevented from cultivating fertile farmland around River Shabelle in 1996 if they did not pay taxes. This highlights continuities in practices of taxing 'subject peoples' and a reproduction of the peasant/ landlord dichotomy which informed the history of Ethiopian-state making. This raises persistent questions of indigenous land ownership.

6.6.1. Historical continuities: reoccurring and re-contextualized tropes in ONLF's nationalist discourses

Military symbolism is a central feature in Roda's characterization of the Ethiopian state, her poem 'Duufaan' (2008) contains the following excerpts:

Us, and the uniform worn by the attackers
We will never leave each other alone, we are like fire and gas
The objective of imperialism, and the rejection of the people
Long-standing battle produced by open-ended enmity
The dervishes and Guray started this long ago
The fire they lit, has not dimmed for a single day
The evidence for this, is how we are still in the bushes
The blood pouring from us, is the search for liberation
Our record is filled with value and (good) history
The Ogaden victims who are all suffering
They do not tire, and do not accept evil, but they resist
Their culture was not abolished and its territories
Their religion, and language of origin has not altered

Reid's (2011) description of war and remembrance in modern political struggles highlights the significance of symbols in articulating memories of war including symbols of struggle and hardship critical for the self-definition of the nation in nationalist discourses (p.89, p.98). In *Duufaan*, Roda encapsulates ONLF's war against the Ethiopian state as a political struggle that dates back centuries, by referencing staple symbols associated with Somali liberation such as Ahmed Guray's sixteenth century war and the Dervishes.[161] Both periods are commonly attributed to representing 'golden ages.' This designation contributes to their memorialization and sustains myth-memories associated with these periods; the sense of national pride they serve to evoke encourages emulation of their heroism displayed in their respective historical periods or 'golden ages' of resistance (Smith, 2009, p. 96-97). Moreover, memories of hardship and experiences with the state is once again equated with its security wing. The use of synecdoche in using 'uniform' to represent the military alludes to the shared physical experiences of mass militarization throughout successive Ethiopian regimes. Since Ethiopian military

[161] Reference to Ahmed Gurey as a founding father of Somali nationalism is also revitalized in modern songs created by ONLF's diaspora communities. For instance, 'Ahmed Gurey' Dhaanto by Abdifatah Jarmal was produced in Nairobi 2016 includes the phrase 'Ahmed Gurey dabkuu shidey wali ma damin' i.e. 'the fire lit by Ahmed Guray is still bright' which is almost an identical statement found in Roda's 2008 '*Duufaan*.' The song further references Makhtal Dahir as a symbol of liberation whose resistance against the Ethiopian state should be emulated.

bases are concentrated in the lowlands where the highest number of bases are paced (Markakis, 2011, p.17), the EPRDF era is presented by Roda as a continued manifestation of this phenomena.

Reference to the persistent survival of Somali language and culture under unfavorable conditions such as state assimilation policies, reveals interdiscursive links with earlier political verses such as Dhoodaan's 1974 *Ha midowdo* discussed in chapter 5. The Ethiopian approach to undermining Somali nationalism is crystalized by Haile Selassie in his August 25th 1956 speech in Qabridahare where he replaces his previous approach centered on submission to a new policy of assimilation calling on Somalis to consider their 'lineages, color, blood, and costumes part of the great Ethiopian family' and to learn the Amharic language in order to integrate into Ethiopia (Morone, 2015, p 100). His complaint about using a translator to communicate with his Somali audience (Geshetker, 1985, p.11), is represented by Roda as a historic win for Somalis. Because just as he required a translator then, the Amharic language has continued to remain a secondary language in the Somali Region. Thus, the likelihood of Haile Selassie requiring a translator to communicate with a vast number of Somalis, would still be high today. Ultimately, Roda boasts about the failure of the state to change their religion and culture as a marker resistance. She also boasts about the difficulty faced by the state to incorporate and exercise control over the Somali periphery, as well as the longstanding tensions between two fundamentally opposed modes of production; mobile pastoralists and cultivators (Hagmann and Korf, 2012; Donham, 2002). In doing so, Roda subverts pan-Ethiopian imaginations of the lowlands as uncivilized due to their lack of integration into the state-system by reclaiming this lack of integration as a crucial form of survival.

Further, *Duufaan* illustrates the way that cultural and symbolic repertoires used to sustain the new discursive construction of Somali nationalism post 1991, was based upon re-contextualized emblems deployed in earlier periods. The persistent characteristics of the Ethiopian state despite regime change, namely 'the objective of imperialism,' and the people's response to this: 'the rejection of the people' result in the binary construction of 'fire and gas.' The metaphor of the 'fire' lit by Ahmed Gurey, is a common metaphor used to symbolize resistance. A member of the *Geesh* rebels stated that 'the fire of the liberation front has never been dimmed' referring to the commonalities and continuities between various liberation fronts operating in the latter half of the twentieth century (2019). Roda's reference to the modern project of imperialism and juxtaposition of 'fire' and 'gas' so as to constitute irreconcilable differences between Somalis and the Ethiopian state reflects the fusion of what Calhoun

(1993) terms 'the rationalist rhetoric of liberation' and the invocation of modern conventions on self-determination on one hand, and 'the claim of deep ethnic history, tradition almost to the point of primordiality' (p.223). It also reflects the formation of a distinct sense of nationhood which is juxtaposed against the colonial "other" which are both characteristic of anti-colonial and post-colonial nationalisms (Calhoun, 1993, p.223).

Moreover, reference to a 'good historical record' emphasizes the necessity of the ONLF to derive legitimacy from their sense of rootedness in a long tradition of resistance. This construction is framed as a moral issue, and thus, a moral requirement to resist the state despite the challenges. Using discursive strategies of moral evaluation via the use of abstraction (Leeuwen, 2007), Roda refers to 'the blood pouring from us' to constitute and moralize the act of resistance, and the qualities associated with it such as perseverance. The success of resisting under challenging conditions is almost equated with victory itself, particularly by the established link between the continuity of resistance and the subsequent reward of preserving the culture, religion, language, and the land. This is reflective of the reality that the administrative function of the state lacks meaningful presence in the pastoralist realm unable to perform its administrative roles appropriately - thus 'life in the pastoralist domain still follows the traditional rhythm and is regulated by custom (Markakis, 2011, p.16).Though practically speaking, the land is not 'free,' the construction of ONLF as the victorious party in its insurgency against the state is a common theme within their popular political verses. For instance, a video displaying a group of ONLF soldiers singing '*ilays baa noo baxaayoo Ogadenia wey xorowday'* became a popularized catchphrase to signal the imminence of actual victory as a means to boost morale. However, the message also communicates more complicated notions of sovereignty among 'subject peoples;' that internal sovereignty, as theorized by Chatterjee (1991) by emphasis on the inner and spiritual domain is attained through consciousness of one's condition and the decision to resist the status quo.

Regardless of huge disparities between the military capabilities of the ENDF and the ONLF, rebels described themselves as having won against the Ethiopian state. Mahad Cismaan Ceelbab 'Dhabuuke' states 'we won against Ethiopia. We defeated them in every battle where we directly confronted them. They were an easy target so we called them '*dhabar macaan'*- they would simply turn around and run' (2019). Besides the practical manifestations of ENDF encounters with ONLF forces, the conceptual and ideological construction of 'victory' in ONLF popular culture and discourses suggests that victory

lies in resisting as opposed to any quantifiable gains one may attain politically or militarily. Similarly, the spatial and temporal reference to 'still' remaining in the bushes since the time of Ahmed Guray in the sixteenth century encapsulates the '*Guul ama geeri*' – 'victory or death'[162] mantra embodied by rebel fighters in the Somali Region. It also underlines ONLF's discursive construction of the high degree of resonance their message had with the civilian population, among whom they found a strong support system (Alpeyrie, 2007). A former ONLF rebel described civilians as the key drivers in the war against the state: 'when we left in 1994 with 160 birr, we did not think about what we would eat- we had full confidence in our people. Whatever decision we took, the civilians took it with us. Both the living and the dead among us (ONLF) were taken care of by the people; they looked after the living, and buried the dead' (Dhabuuke, Jigjiga 2019).[163]

Roda echoes the sense of legitimacy associated with civilian support as translating into the normative rightness of the ONLF struggle and, by extension, the continued support expected of the local population in the following verses:

Except a foolish/brainwashed individual
Anyone with a conscious will reject such a life
I am inspired by the struggle launched by the ONLF
As they felt that this is the right thing to do

The idea of rejecting the Ethiopian nationalist project the moment one becomes 'conscious' of its subversive intentions towards the Somali, is a persistent theme within ONLF literatures, particularly as illustrated by Iimaan Cubeyd's *Bukaan-socod* discussed earlier. Roda equates the acceptance of the Ethiopian national project with being 'brainwashed' much like the 1990's literary expressions warned against deceiving oneself in accepting the legitimacy of the Ethiopian state. Though this excerpt was produced in 2008, ONLF's mobilizing literatures reveal the persistent need to counter powerful statist narratives emerging from the Somali Region faming the rebel group as 'anti-peace' and a 'fringe' group

[162] In Mengistu Haile Mariam's first public speech in November 1974, he stated that the only option available to Ethiopians is 'unity or death' (Markakis, 1987, p.245).
[163] An excerpt from ONLF's 1991 political programme states that 'The Ogaden National Liberation Front is a vanguard organisation leading the struggle of the people...supported by the mobilisation of the people and their initiatives as the foundation of its struggle.' (FCO 31/6371: 1991, p.10).

of secessionists with little support on the ground.[164] Such discursive struggles took shape through various mediums such as state-sponsored ESTV and ONLF's Ilays TV and Radio Xoriyo,[165] and also through diaspora communities particularly under the regional leadership of Abdi Mohamoud Omar 'Abdi Iley.'[166] Territorializing the ONLF diaspora communities by naming them after specific localities in the Somali Region and streaming their community gatherings via ONLF owned media represented a form of resistance. For instance, ONLF's Minnesota community was named *Fooljeex*, doing so spatially anchored the dispersed and often exiled Somali communities within their lands of origin. This was countered by Abdi Iley's use of state media to construct the ONLF as an agenda driven by 'diaspora elders' who are out of touch with reality on the ground. This was intended to order to undermine their stake in politics and connection to local realities.[167]

6.6.2. Securitization and human rights

'If you can't solve the security problem in the region, then you cannot lead any longer' (Former Somali Regional State president, 2018).

This statement was articulated by a high-ranking security official from the Ethiopian National Defense Force's (ENDF) eastern command in Harar, to a sitting president of the Somali Region. Successive Ethiopian regimes have governed the Somali Region in a 'state of exception' based on 'a particular logic of government that is based on the normalization of exceptional strategies' of violence and emergency rule (Hagmann & Korf, 2012, p. 206). This is legitimized by portraying the region as exceptional in terms of being 'unruly,' unsafe, uncivilized (Hagmann & Korf, 2012, p. 207). Human

[164] Ogaden Human rights Committee (OHRC) (1999) details top TPLF official Siye Abraham; Ethiopia's defence minister in a press conference in Addis Ababa that all rebel movements have been defeated in the Somali Region. Meles Zenawi also stated in a 2009 press conference that ONLF was almost wiped out.

[165] Programmes such as 'Aragtida Halgamaaga', Ilays TV's *Barnaamijka Naftiihuraha*, educational programmes such as 'Koorsada alifle' which trained newly sworn ONLF recruits and served to promote the ONLF cause and undermine state narratives.

[166] Songs, poems and stage plays made by ONLF communities abroad invited retaliatory productions of songs demonizing ONLF, glorifying the Liyu Police and emphasizing development and progress in the Somali Region. This discursive exchange served to counter the internationalization of the ONLF message, and in doing so, the regional president Abdi Iley (2010-2018) deployed the regional budget to coordinate a counter-campaign against the ONLF's advocacy through the creation of 'DDSI' communities. Opposing discourses on conflict, identity and belonging were aired on social media and by rival television networks such as state-backed ESTV and ONLF-owned Ilays TV.

[167] See ESTV's coverage of Abdi Iley's speeches on this particular topic.

rights have always constituted a contested theme where government supporters deny the existence of any abuses, and others amplifying these very abuses. The aftermath of 2007 Obole bombing at an oil exploration site internationalized the conflict in the Somali Region, and discursive processes of legitimation and de-legitimation in defining the ONLF and the broader condition of the Somali Region became more intensified. In the context of the government's renewed crackdown on the ONLF in 2007/2008, Roda states the following:

That Ethiopia is a bad neighbor, is testified by women killed
Evidence of this is the children she mutilated
That they are cannibals, crocodiles and caterpillars
Is known by he who is swallowed and devoured by them
That they are impoverished and hungry beasts
Is known by he whose most prized resources have been denied by them
It is known by he whose two legs are tied without violating any laws

In this excerpt, Roda characterises the Ethiopian state in reference to its treatment of civilian populations. First, it is worth noting the implicit spatial designation of 'Ethiopia' as a 'neighbour' as opposed to the state wherein the Somali region is located. Despite the assumption that such an assertion may be establishing closer networks with neighbouring Somalia, ONLF discourses often fluctuate between appealing to the indigenous character of their contemporary struggle, and emphasising relations with neighbouring Somalia. Though the establishment of ONLF in 1984 reflected changes brought on by new political conditions in the Horn of Africa and represented a departure from associating local rebellion with the Somali government, ONLF resistance discourses continued to appeal to the idea of a pan-Somali solidarity on the basis of shared ancestry, kinship and broader cultural identity. The idea of 'Ogaden nationalism' as a new discursive field is a simplistic characterization of the ONLF agenda often attributed to the adoption of 'Ogaden.' A 1991 ONLF Political program established the founding principles of the organization stating that the 'ONLF policy in general is based on fighting colonization with all its types...establishing a democratic, politically and economically free society…' (FCO 31/6371: 1991, p.11). The programme emphasises that the Somali question in Ethiopia is a fundamentally local issue which has no relationship with the Somali Republic. This had no bearing on EPRDF's systematic policy of excluding from public office Somalis with educational qualifications from Somalia. On the condition of anonymity, a former president of the Somali Region explained how EPRDF officials from Addis Ababa who closely observed all matters

of governance in the Somali Region would ask 'are they free rom Soomaliweyn' before approving the appointment of any government official including the president (2019).

Nevertheless, ONLF discourses appealing to Somali solidarity increased following Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 and subsequent years where Somali regional administrations such as Puntland and Somaliland played a role in Ethiopia's counter insurgency war against the ONLF by extraditing civilians into the hands of the Ethiopian government.[168] The collapse of the Somali government in 1991 deprived Somali rebels of a safe haven, specifically the military cooperation between Ethiopia and Somali regional administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland (Hagmann, 2014, p.728). This is reminiscent of the early history of pan-Somali nationalism and the cross-border mobilization which was facilitated by the porosity of the border demarcating Somalia and Ethiopia- while posing an advantage for the Somalis' political agenda, Ethiopia criminalized such cross-border activities for undermining Ethiopian authority (Morone, 2015, p.109-110). ONLF discourses point towards the need for the continuation of the porous border symbolic of the inevitable connection between the brotherly peoples. Examples of this include direct condemnations of the Somali government for collaborating with Ethiopia in its counterinsurgency war against the ONLF. For instance, Roda produced literature on the transfer of individuals from Puntland and even Mogadishu.[169] The interplay between Roda's designation of Ethiopia as a neighbor, and simultaneous appeal to Pan-Somali solidarity illustrates the longstanding process of constituting and reconstituting the Somali quest for self-determination in Ethiopia under different systems and historical circumstances. Importantly, it shows a deliberate attempt to overcome the inevitable limitations of adopting the 'Ogaden' name, and the narrow ethno-nationalist agenda that this may connote.[170]

Roda's detailed depiction of the human rights situation during the EPRDF era is consistent with ONLF's engagement in a discursive struggle of truth-making against the powerful state-machinery of the Ethiopian state. She reflects on the vast abuses committed by security forces in their crackdown on civilians, including imposing a region wide economic blockade (Gettleman, 2007). For instance,

[168] The first time a group of ONLF personnel were extradited was in 1996 from Hargeisa, the three individuals were Cabdullahi 'Xaliye', Cabdullahi Qaji and Gadhjubi.
[169] See Roda's verses responding to Mogadishu's extradition of ONLF commander Abdikariim Sheikh Muuse to Ethiopia in 2017.
[170] See Abdullahi (2007) *The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of Its Struggle in Ethiopia* for a discussion on the controversy of the 'Ogaden' name.

the use of depersonalizing metaphors to describe military personnel, taking human characteristics away from them via reference to their acts of 'devouring' and 'swallowing' people, and the explicit assigned characteristic of bestiality underscores their unique brutality. Similarly, their simultaneous designation as caterpillars/ moths, traditionally disliked due to their destruction of plants, also suggests their aggressive and destructive tendencies in perhaps less visible or expected ways (just like caterpillars). According to Leeuwen's (2007) strategies of legitimation, analogies and comparisons serve both legitimatory and de-legitimatory purposes to justify certain ideas over others. In this case, the construction of the Ethiopian state in the most explicitly violent way, is symptomatic of the blockade imposed upon the region which made it difficult for anyone to access the situation on the ground. Lack of data is owed to the Ethiopian state's concerted blocking of any access to independent data and its potential dissemination in a bid to manage the image of the region in the international sphere (Hagmann and Korf, 2012, p.211).

Ogaden Human Rights Committee (OHRC) carried out a comprehensive documentation of human rights abuses, recording 2395 extrajudicial killings, 1945 cases of rape and 3091 enforced disappearances in the period between 1995 and mid-2007 of suspected ONLF supporters by the Ethiopian army, or regional security forces (2007, p.7-8). This is prior to the 2007/2008 government crackdown, after which existing abuses not only increased in frequency, but became less accessible. A former ONLF fighter stated that 'in 2010 my sister was murdered in Ceelweyne where the Liyu paramilitary forces poured boiling water over. Afterwards, they shot her twice and killed her' (2019). Historical continuities of violence is described by Dayib Ahmed Seed who later became a WSLF rebel. He recounts his most traumatic encounter with the military in the 1960s: 'at the age of 8 or 9 we were in Bulaale, heading west (Jigjiga) towards the rainfall. An Ethiopian military convoy from Harshin stopped us, they killed 9 babies with the barrel of their guns by stabbing their stomachs; they killed our camels and took all the valuables they could' (2019).

Moreover, the excerpt touches on the important theme of resource confiscation and denial of livelihoods which reoccurs as a constant theme in nationalist discourses. A commercial blockade was imposed in April 2007 by Abay Tsehay (Prime Minister Meles' advisor) and ENDF general Samroa Yunis enforced by the ENDF's eastern command to cut off ONLF's supplies within the region and across the Somali border blocking the movement of vehicles and peoples. This led to a dramatic rise in food prices, and decrease in livestock prices plunging the region into dire humanitarian situation

(Hagmann and Korf, 2012, p.211). Legacies of the post-Obole period is marked by widespread atrocities and heightened forms of repression as Meles Zenawi promised to wipe out ONLF on all fronts; militarily, politically and ideologically. Witnesses recall the way he declared war on the masses in the following way: 'we will comb out the ONLF from the region the way knits are combed out hair (Ahmed Abdi Hirsi, 2019) alluding to the policy of collective punishment. Roda refers to Ethiopia's confiscation of one's most prized resources, specifically, the term 'dabaaxdiisa' refers to the best part of the meat; a staple and important form of nutrition in in Somali society. This is evocative of Dhodaan's *Salleello* discussed in chapter 5[171] where he recounts the amy's forceful seizing of the camels that appear the fattest, and therefore most beneficial while the people remain deprived of their own resources. Camels are considered 'the essence of Somali nomadic pastoralist life' (Geshekter, 1985, p.14), thus, as summarized by a rebel fighter during the height of the blockade: 'the intention of the government was for the people to submit once they became too hungry to resist' (Ahmed Hirsi, 2019).

Moreover, ONLF diaspora communities, youth associations such as Ogaden Youth and Student Union (OYSU) and activists were instrumental in organizing demonstrations, seminars and other awareness events to draw attention to the human rights situation in the region (Hagmann, 2014a, p.728). In addition to this, ONLF communities raised awareness through literary and artistic channels. For instance, they staged theatre productions which reenacted the daily lives of civilians under military rule[172] and used the proceedings to fund community initiatives and support the ONLF's political activities. Bands such as *Kooxda Gantaal* in Djibouti were comprised of victims of state violence who fled the region. *Kooxda Danab*[173] - Danab band in Nairobi also represented an important network of young artists, many of whom were exiled victims who fled to Kenya which was host to large refugee communities.

Just like the counterinsurgency strategies deployed by the EPRDF reveal marked continuities between abuses by the imperial regime (Hagmann, 2014a), so too do patterns of political imprisonment and

[171] The excerpt from Salleello states: 'Ee sogob baruur baan rabaa, ama sicii naaxay
Iyo subagga ii keen intaa, loo silsiladeeyo.'

[172] Popular stage plays produced in Nairobi include 'Seeftii xornimo doon wey seeto furantahay' (2013) and 'Kala guurki weeyee Ogaadenia garo' (2011), and in London, 'Hagardaamo gumeysi, halgama wax ma yeesho' (2010), and 'Xasuuqa shacabkeyga, xisaab ba ka dambeyn' (2008) by Ogaden Students Forum (OSF).

[173] 'Danab' group consisted of Abwaan Bashiir Abdi Yusuf, Abwaan Guuleed Abdi Hukun, Abwan Mahamuud Abdullahi , Abwaan Nasir Ibrahim , Abwaan Kaadheeri, Abwaan Abdirashid Gurmad Qaran, Jaamac Daweeye 'Lagatagay' among others.

the violent abuses conducted in jails. Roda states that 'he whose two legs are tied without violating any laws' knows that Ethiopia is a violent state. This abstract reference to imprisonment is a vivid representation of various torture methods deployed by security officials in various detention centers across the region, including in the infamous Jail Ogaden where a majority of ONLF political prisoners were detained (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Historical continuities both in the modes of physical torture, and the literary means of conveying this, reveals intertextual links with Cali Dhuux's 1916 poem detailing torture at the hands of the state which he recited as a political prisoner in Harar.[174] In 1916, the political verse served a crucial role in raising awareness among Somali communities at large on the dire human rights condition subjected against Somalis in Ethiopia. Almost a century later, Roda uses the same means to highlight the government's counterinsurgency campaign which was underpinned by a systematic policy of collective punishment, and a counter insurgency strategy that amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

6.6.3 Commemorating state abuses as historical events

The discursive function of political commemorations as underlined in the DHA approach serve the important function of producing and reproducing political identities by establishing a specific reading of past events (Reisigl, 2017b). Consistent with the role of Somali poetry being thesis-driven (Samatar, 1982) and corresponding with prevailing social, political and economic issues, ONLF's selective memorialization of historical events in the Somali region during the EPRDF served specific political objectives; namely to highlight continued government abuses and the normative rightness to resist. Such commemorations were disseminated through several different mediums, such as Radio Xoriyo featuring senior ONLF officials as well as oral testimonies by ONLF rebels and civilians. The 2005 'Qabridahare massacre' is an important example of this where over 20 ONLF youth captured in the battle of Mandad were detained in a Qabridahare prison for a period of time until they were killed, laid in the town center refused burial.[175] This event was commemorated yearly on November 15th by ONLF communities across the world, similar to the Wadheer massacre of 1994 commemorated on February 22nd every year. Ten years after the event, a song titled *'Xasuuqii*

[174] See Ahmed Faarah Idaaja's detailed description of Cali Dhuux's 1916 poem on VOA Somali.
[175] This information is based on a Radio Xoriyo program recorded a year after the massacre to commemorate the event narrated by Ahmed Yasin sheikh Ibrahim.

Qabridahare' - 'the massacre of Qabridahare' was produced in Nairobi recounting the lasting impact of this tragedy. In commemorating these communal tragedies, Qabridahare came to be memorialized as a site of collective memory of tragedy. To attach collective memories to specific territories is central to the self-imagination of nations and their nationalisms*(*Smith, 1996, p.453-4).[176] This is also the case for localities such as Qoriile where In 2007, ENDF executed by strangulation civilians accused of supporting the ONLF and their bodies left on display hanging off the trees (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.52-55).[177] Major events imprinted within Somali historical memory have become so through a concerted effort to memorialize them and attach them to fixed territorialities. This has led to the production of certain ritualized discourses, such that major atrocities committed by the state under EPDF have come to be associated with these specific historic episodes of violent events, and the locations where they took place.

Another example of a commemorated event which has come to be inscribed in the public memory is widely known as the 2007 'Obole bombing.' However, in ONLF discourses, it is referred to as 'the battle of Obole' as opposed to a 'bombing.' The linguistic differences in naming the event bring to remembrance a certain image of the event, namely as a legitimate (and necessary) military encounter as opposed to a bombing which suggests abuse on the part of the perpetrator. Battle over resources is an important feature of the conflict in the Somali Region ever since Sinclair Oil's first attempt at exploring for resources, [178] while Obole is largely conceived of as an extension of this as illustrated in poems and songs produced following the event. As Samatar (1982) states, in time of victory, the political verse not only serves to celebrate the occasion, but to solemnize it so that it becomes history (Samatar, 1982, p.181). This is as important consideration in the manner in which Obole has been solemnized by ONLF literature.[179] For instance, in *Jalfis* by Heelaale, he reminds anyone with continued interest in exploiting the resources of the Somali Region to reflect on the 'blow' against the Chinese. Similarly, Baadiye – member of *Kooxda Gantaal*, celebrates Obole by boasting that the Chinese

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[176] See the concept of 'territorialisation of memory' In *Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism (*Smith, 1996, p.453-4).

[177] Malqaqa, Galaalshe, Labiga, etc all fall within the same category.

[178] For details, see FO 1015/83: Oil concessions in the Ogaden.

[179] the glorification of the Obole war is accompanied by troubling events such as the civilian deaths of an unspecified number of Somali staff working as translators/ drivers and labourers working. On 24th april the attack happened and on 29th ONLF released without condition the 5 chinese staff (from company ZPEB) they held captive = this release is considered as a triumph of international politics over the immediate gains of the fighting ONLF force who may have leveraged the captives to gain an upper hand in terms of their future strategic goals (i.e. putting a halt to oil and gas exploration)

can testify on the magnitude of ONLF's display.[180] Obole is commemorated as an event which encapsulates the spirit of self-defense, where poorly equipped rebels can take on major powers. Communicating this through Somali poetry infuses language with a power that prose is unable to; an attack by verse is tantamount to a physical attack within pastoral society (Samatar, 1982, p.189).

6.7. Change in conflict dynamics after 2009

A senior ONLF commander stated that 'the people were on our side guiding our every step, the only thing that the ENDF had was military might' (Muhumed Faarah, 2019). Thus, in response to the inadequacy of military might alone, and the failure of the ENDF to eliminate the ONLF, particularly in the context of the 2007 Obole incident, the Ethiopian government created the *Liyu* police in 2009 also referred to as 'special' paramilitary forces comprised of ethnic Somalis trained for the purpose of counterinsurgency who operate with complete impunity (Hagmann, 2014b, p.49). This development inevitably altered conflict dynamics in the Somali frontier where the military tasked with addressing insurgency, and maintaining state presence has historically constituted an 'other.'

The state's response to the conflict in the Somali region was aimed at localizing it. Doing so helped combine their superior military capability with the local knowledge of context that new Liyu recruits had just like their ONLF opponents.[181] Highlighting the continuity in the way that Somali conceptualization of Ethiopian state violence is framed in terms of ethno-national stereotypes as perpetuated by an 'ethnic other' (i.e. habesha / Christian highlanders from the era Menelik II through to Meles Zenawi) who have adopted the same policies of violence, Hagmann (2014) notes that this stable narrative has furthered division and produced a linear account on the historical continuities which define the Ogaden conflict (p.729). Moreover, that a shift occurred post 2009 particularly after the creation of the Liyu police, a paramilitary force designated to suppress the ONLF comprised of Somalis, leading to the 'indigenization' of the conflict as perpetrators of state violence were no longer 'ethnic others' as they were under the Haile Selassie and Derg regime, and at the hands of the ENDF. Instead, the conflict changed into an armed struggle between ethnic Somalis divided along ONLF supporters and supporters of the Somali regional administration. The role of the Liyu police in embodying the state and assuming the responsibility of counter-insurgency, symbolized Ethiopia's

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[180] Baadiye states: 'Wixii shalaytoo aan dhigey shiinahaa la weydiin.'
[181] Some Liyu commanders were former ONLF rebels who were either defectors or prisoners of war that joined the Liyu in exchange for imprisonment in the notorious Jail Ogaden.

departure from the rhetorical space of contested Ethiopian statehood, localizing the continued discursive struggle to an intra-Somali level.

While the creation of the Liyu police certainly altered the dynamics of the war by obscuring the clearly demarcated categories of Somali Vs non-Somali (oppressed vs oppressor), the ideological divide between the two sides overrides the ethnic makeup of the Liyu Police. As illustrated in ONLF and general opposition discourses discussed earlier, those in support of the Somali regional administration, or the federal government were not deemed 'Somali first' but 'Ethiopians' first. Somali members of the estate and the Liyu were designated 'Ethiopian' as opposed to 'Somali'. It suggests that 'Ethiopian' was a category that one was relegated to depending on the extent to which they align themselves with the state. This is namely because the state is conceived of as inherently 'anti-Somali.' In addition to this, terms such as '*dabadhilif*' and '*dabaqoodhi*' used by ONLF supporters against state agents served to undermine Somali affiliation with the Ethiopian state, and to signal the impossibility of a 'Somali-Ethiopian' identity. Meanwhile ONLF rebels assigned each other nicknames evocative of heroism and emblematic of their national struggle such as 'peackock' 'lion' 'fearless' among others (New York times, 2007),[182] they used subversive language to refer to the Liyu i.e. 'hawaarin' as a form of resistance. This tradition is symptomatic of traditional resistance discourses dating as far back as Sayyid Mohammed, where those on the opposing side of his cause were deemed 'infidels' regardless of their ethnic affiliation.[183]

It is important to highlight that ONLF's nationalist messaging was not always necessarily cohesive as the group faced both internal and external challenges throughout its insurgency against the Ethiopian state. However, following the end of the armed struggle in 2018, internal struggles became more pronounced in the face of transitioning from an armed rebel group to a political party. Kefale's (2011) observation on the lack of internal democracy and consensus building within political parties in Ethiopia also appears true for the ONLF. He argues that internal division rising from a lack of transparency in leadership elections for instance and the continual domination of key figures within parties result in factionalism and deepened divisions (p.693). In the case of the ONLF, these challenges were worsened by the task of navigating a new political climate where clearly demarcated identity divides became blurred between 2009 and 2018 as state violence was no longer conducted in a top-down linear approach, but in more fluid ways where major perpetrators were Somalis. This

[182] See Jeffery Gettlemen's 2007 New York Times report.
[183] This is a common phasing found in most poems of his political verses, see for instance *Dardaaran* and *Gudban*.

complication of conflict dynamics among other challenges continue to impede the prospect of transitional justice and dealing with past atrocities in a meaningful way (Hagmann, 2020).

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter has offered an examination of the development of a new liberation agenda specific to the EPRDF era since 1991. This agenda was spearheaded by the ONLF established in response to the continued question of Somali liberation in the aftermath of the 1977 Ogaden War. ONLF's quest for greater autonomy was suppressed by the Ethiopian government which resulted in the continued de-legitimation of Ethiopian state nationalism similar to previous eras, but also the production of new contested sovereignties reflective of the particularities of the EPRDF era. The chapter has demonstrated the intertextual links between key tropes used in ONLF discourses and the recurrent themes in resistance discourses belonging to previous historical periods and political eras. The evocation of glorious pasts, heroic figures, flags, pastoralist analogies, myths and memories illustrate the continued importance of cultural resources and traditional Somali emblems in contributing to the self-awareness communities as emphasized by the ethnosymbolist approach. Political and historical continuities of violence, and subsequent continuities in symbols of resistance demonstrates the failure of the Ethiopian state to address the Somali 'issue' in Ethiopia. Importantly, the chapter has highlighted continuities in state violence against civilians in counterinsurgency operations between the imperial era during the1960s rebellions and the fight against the ONLF in the EPRDF era.

The role of ONLF in forging a specific national consciousness centered on resistance is often overlooked due to its military orientation. However, as demonstrated in the group's 1991 political program, the epistemological project of constructing a Somali nationalist narrative against the hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism, was not a secondary consideration for the group. Rather, it was very much the center of the ONLF's resistance against the Ethiopian state. As reflected by the literary composers of the 1990s tasked with making sense of the transitional period, they directly engaged with the new reforms promised by the EPRDF arguing that despite the formal recognition of the Somali nation in Ethiopia after 1991, Ethiopia maintained its historic characteristics and

attitudes towards Somalis. At the height of the counter-insurgency war, later verses provided first-hand accounts on the socio-political condition of the Somali region under a media and trade blockade via commentary on human rights and the memorialization of major atrocities committed against civilian populations. As demonstrated by the verses of Roda af-jano, discursive struggle over experiences of Ethiopian statehood was constituted and re-constituted via a didactic approach to informing and educating the masses; namely by recounting major historical episodes. Armed resistance in the Somali frontier is often reduced to sensationalist and unrealistic attempts at undermining the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state. However, this chapter has shown the significant but overlooked discursive component of armed struggle which is engaged in a continuous struggle over ideas on history, symbols, identity, culture, and politics. The chapter has foregrounded ways that discourse historical analysis can be utilized to deconstruct discourses intended to subjugate, as much as those that serve to resist structures of domination.

7. Conclusions

7.1. Re-stating research questions and objectives

This study was based on the central problematic presented by Ethiopian state nationalism, namely its exclusive construction of nationhood and its repressive modes of institutionalisation since the inception of the modern Ethiopia state. Another central problem motivating this study relates to the complicated status of the Somali Region in Ethiopia whose histories and sense of political identification is often subsumed under grand-Ethiopian narratives or competing Pan-Somali imaginations. This was addressed by answering the two fold agenda encapsulated in the research question which shaped this study; to examine the repressive function of Ethiopian state nationalism, and the way that resistance against this nationalist project is manifested and constructed in Somali nationalist discourses. This was done by adopting an interpretive and qualitative research approach which combined oral testimonies with archival resources both to de-mystify the hegemony of Ethiopian state nationalism, and to redress the exclusion of dissenting nationalisms-and the lowland peripheries more broadly- in the study of Ethiopian statehood.

To highlight Somali experiences with Ethiopian statehood, the study centred the study of Somali oral traditions. In doing so, it emphasised the discursive terrain as a fundamental site for simultaneously dismantling dominant national symbols and their underlying knowledge systems, and (re)producing contrasting national imaginations particular to Somali conceptualisations of Ethiopian state nationalism. Adapting the discourse historical approaches (DHA) developed by Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak (1999) enabled close attention be paid to the role of discursive strategies in the process of legitimating certain nationalisms and their underlying ideologies and political identities while de-legitimating others. The critical research agenda of DHA, situated within the school of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), corresponds with the methodological starting point of this research project; problematising the construction and institutionalisation of Ethiopian state nationalism. Likewise, interrogating the discourse of the ‘nation’ as an oppressive construction which sanctions certain legitimising truths on history, identity, frontier imaginations, and cultural symbols as sacrosanct at the expense of others.

This study drew on the ethnosymbolist perspective to investigate the cultural construction of Somali nationalism as a mode of resistance against the oppressive enforcement of Ethiopian state nationalism and its construction of nationhood. It traced the institution of a Somali nationalist doctrine in the context of a conflict dynamic which spanned over a century revealing contrasting cultural symbolisms and historiographies within the Ethiopian national space. The aim of adopting this particular approach was to interrogate the non-materialist resources (i.e. myths, memories, symbols) that produce and sustain the content, boundaries and rationale of Somali nationalist resistance. Doing so enabled an understanding of the persistence and popular appeal of particular cultural constructions that anchor Somali nationalist imaginations in Ethiopia.

7.2. Key contributions and findings

The type of contributions to knowledge made by this study are threefold: the application of a novel methodological approach to the study of Somali nationalism, illuminating the co-construction of dominant state nationalism and opposing nationalisms, and deconstructing the orthodoxy in Ethiopian studies through an investigation of repressed marginal voices. The hegemony of pan-Ethiopianism is a taken-for-granted discourse that structures the way we think about Ethiopian politics, history and culture. This study has found Ethiopian state nationalism to represent a totalising discourse that transcends political systems (at national and regional levels), historical circumstances, and individual leaders by focusing on the re-invention of myths and collective memories as stressed by the ethnosymbolist perspective (Coakley, 2018, p.333). Chapter 4 demonstrated how Ethiopian state nationalism is anchored by a set of reoccurring tropes that are reproduced across multiple historical periods. In doing so, dominant state nationalism is engaged in a continuous process of articulation and re-articulation against the backdrop of challenges against this variation of nationalism. The chapter further illustrated the way that core tenants within Ethiopian state nationalism are repackaged and vigorously deployed to respond to particular political crisis. For instance, the independence of the Somali Republic and the threat of Somali nationalist fervour on Ethiopian statehood resulted in a renewed articulation and re-articulation of Ethiopian state nationalism by evoking the themes of antiquity, symbols of African freedom, and the idea of an Ethiopian 'nation' as exemplified by Haile Selassie's 1956 Qabridahare Speech. Subsequent chapters investigated the way

that these Pan-Ethiopian tropes which are used to reinforce domination are subverted by Somali nationalist discourses.

Moreover, the methodological orientation of this study facilitated the development of new insights into the study of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia. Studying the cultural components which constitute Somali nationalist thought drawing on oral and archival resources, this thesis has foregrounded ways that socio-symbolic and cultural elements of struggle, sacrifice, golden ages, and historical figures have found permanent expression in popular resistance discourses. By emphasising the historical production of these cultural elements used to sustain Somali resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism within the framework of critical historical discourse analysis, the study has offered a re-construction of the political history of Somali Region.

Analysis of the Somali political verse popularised by Sayyid Mohammed extends established ways of analysing Somali politics, culture and society in the Somali territories. It demonstrates the centrality of the Somali political verse as a critical body of knowledge where sovereignties of the politically subordinate is fostered and reproduced for popular consumption. It is a site of knowledge production that represents the sovereign domain of the cultural where the nation is imagined and constructed even in the face of political control as theorised by Chatterjee (1991, p.522). The study of Dhoodaan in chapter 5 represents this theme aptly as he provides a language for the political and social struggles of Somalis in Ethiopia. The novelty in studying Dhoodaan, an indigenous knowledge-keeper, lies in the fact that his political verse has not received serious scholarly attention despite providing important empirical datasets for the study of resistance in the Somali territories. His verses have also provided critical access to day-to-day narrations reflecting Somali experiences in Ethiopia, and in doing so - connecting the local with the national, and the personal with the political. The work of Dhoodaan and other pioneers of the political verse within Somali society and beyond, introduces new possibilities for the decolonising of Ethiopian studies.

Moreover, as this thesis sought to delineate, the study of Dhoodaan's political verse brings new analytical insights into the conflation between 'Greater Somalia' and Somali nationalism in Ethiopia by confronting the postcolonial condition of the Somali in Ethiopia and its particularity as it pertains to nationhood, territoriality and identity. He elaborates the way that the convergence of burgeoning pan-Africanism and and pan-Ethiopianism in the 1950s and 1960s constituted a new and distinctly

post-colonial mode of political, cultural, and economic subjugation for Somalis in Ethiopia. By providing political commentary on defining historical moments such as Somalia's 1960 independence, and the 1977 Ogaden War, Dhoodaan's political verse offers a reconstruction of political pasts encapsulating key myths, memories and symbols used to imagine Somali experiences of Ethiopian statehood. This study deciphered the context and meaning of these socio-symbolic resources in the way that they are deployed as tools to evoke legitimacy for a nationalist project centred on resisting the totalising discourse of Ethiopian nationalism, and forging a sovereign national consciousness. Such findings contribute important new insights on the post-colonial African state and literature on third world nationalisms more broadly.

Investigation of the political verses deployed around the 1960s rebellions, in the lead up to the 1977 Ogaden War and by the ONLF during the EPRDF era revealed an oral re-enactment of historical memories of state violence. For instance, the evocation of collective histories of resistance, themes of suffering, national destiny, heroism are reoccurring cultural tools that mobilise support for local rebellions. The study found that memories of struggle against state violence are strategically resuscitated, and past liberation movements or figures are valorised in the discursive construction of the nation. As Cillia et al (1999) outlines, both discourses of political triumphs and decline are linked to the construction of a collective political past, present and future (p.158). Historical figures such as Ahmed Guray and Sayyid Mohamed are reoccurring emblems re-contextualised to respond to diverse challenges from the state, namely state violence. This contributes to the continuities that characterise multiple rebellions which have emerged in response to Ethiopia's diverse political arrangements (i.e. from monarchical rule to the EPRDF era). Deciphering Somalis' socio-symbolic resources that remain pertinent across historical periods and political arrangements to organise resistance, offers new interdisciplinary insights into the social, historical, and even literary contributors to the formation of political identities in the Somali Region, and the reproduction of Somali national symbols across time.

The theme of human rights and state violence in the Somali Region is a central feature of this thesis. This is associated with Khalif and Doornbos' (2007) work on state sponsored human rights violations in the Somali Region throughout successive political regimes in Ethiopia. Likewise, Hagmann's (2014a) parallels between past and present counterinsurgency campaigns and what this tells us about the continuities which govern the way that the Ethiopian centre projects power in the lowland peripheries. This thesis extends understandings of state violence not as a feature that inspires

resistance alone, but one which delineates the foundational relationship between the Ethiopian centre and the Somali periphery. This is achieved via the memorialisation of particular forms of state violence using the political verse while exalting the actors who resisted these abuses. An ethnosymbolist reading combined with the analytical strategies of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) enabled a nuanced interpretation of these specific modes of violence, why they are inscribed in collective historical memories and why they acquire mass resonance under specific historical circumstances. For instance, the theme of resource confiscation and economic abuse particularly in reference to livestock, is a reoccurring theme in the Somali political verse revealing intertextual references between various literary woks across different historical periods. Memorialising this particular form of violence appeals to a community whose present condition of economic marginalisation reflects the state's unchanging approach to its Somali constituents.

While the discursive construction of Somali contestation of the Ethiopian national project reveals continuities, it also brings to light discontinuities and contradictions as resistance discourses and movements adapt to a changing political environment. In addition to this, it is important to note the pluralities of political identification that exist in any given society, as such the study does not take for granted the idea of collective Somali 'historical memories,' 'myths' or 'golden ages.' There are class, economic, regional, and socio-linguistic dynamics that shape what nationalist mythologies resonate with diverse categories of peoples and in turn, the subsequent production of new and competing nationalist mythologies and memories (Smith, 2003, p.363-p.365). This is an enduring debate in the ethnosymbolist school of thought and an important point of consideration in this study. Reoccurring symbols, myths and motifs in Somali nationalist literatures remain contested, likewise the degree of popular resonance with these cultural repertoires which serve to fuel anti-state resistance, fluctuate across historical periods. For instance, 'hidden segmentary narratives' reflecting local intra-clan rivalries are captured in discursive struggles over wells, lineage politics, territory and resources in the *Gubo* series in the period following the Sayyid Mohammed (broader) nationalist campaign (Barnes, 2006a, p.113). This trend indicates that segmentary elements within Somali society become more pronounced in the absence of a unifying nationalist discourse which is accompanied by clearly demarcated categories of belonging i.e. 'freedom fighter', traitor/collaborator, opponent etc. By extension, the absence of an active nationalist struggle also suggests a decreased level of mass resonance with broad nationalist messaging.

Similar to the post-Sayyid era, parallels can be drawn with the aftermath of the 1977 Ogaden War when the WSLF splintered into clan-based factions re-grouping themselves to operate in the geographies inhabited by their respective clans. Chapter 5 described the formation of '*sïi galbeed*' and other splinter groups in the context of an increasingly decentralised rebellion continued by the WSLF. Similarly, we have seen this trend in the aftermath of the 2018 peace deal between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government which marked the end of a long history of armed rebellion which had defined the movement for Somali nationalist self-determination in the Somali Region. The post-2018 political scenery has been marked by heightened fragmentation among the traditional support base of the ONLF and the wider public in the absence of a clearly-defined armed struggle. These three key historical periods have an important point in common, namely that each of the proponents of the Somali nationalist struggle (i.e. Sayyid, WSLF and ONLF) were all defeated – militarily, diplomatically, or by virtue of changing political dynamics which invited rebel groups so seek their political objectives through peaceful means (as in the case of the ONLF – still without having achieved what they set out to). Such dynamics, bring to the fore both existing local-level fragmentary relations, and/ or pave way for the production of new forms of fragmentation in the absence of a unifying nationalist message. In the case of the post-EPRDF era, a major puzzle for Somali nationalists-whether ONLF or other political groupings- is the idea of participating in Ethiopian politics while retaining their historical mission to realise Somali self-determination. Additionally, to resist clan rhetoric and other divisive discourses which thrive in the absence of a broad-based nationalist struggle.

7.3. Limitations

One of the main limitations of this study relates to the emphasis placed on a specific demographic of Somali society, namely rebel figures, organisations and movements. The interpretive methodology adopted in the study enabled interviews which centred the world-view of these actors vis a vis Ethiopian state nationalism. However, the boundaries of the study necessitated a deliberate focus on a particular community, this yielded many insights in addressing the underlying problem motivating this thesis. For instance, the question of why Ethiopia has been unable to extend its sovereignty over its Somali frontier and why state consolidation of power has not translated into political loyalty requires a focus on the elements that inhibit the reach of Ethiopian state nationalism in Somali society. The post-2018 political context in Ethiopia provided an unparalleled access to conduct unfiltered

interviews with constituents best equipped to illuminate this enduring social and political problem defining relations of power in Ethiopia. To supplement my analysis, interviewees also included former senior officials in the Somali regional administration including former presidents. In many ways, the insights from such divergent groups of people (former presidents, WSLF and ONLF rebels) provide a more meaningful and comprehensive outline of state-society interactions, particularly, the fundamental causes of contestation between the Somali region and the Ethiopian centre during the era of EPRDF. Diverse groups echoed the same fundamental problem: a lack self-rule as guaranteed by the constitution. The main thing that distinguished these groups was how they chose to respond to this condition.

Moreover, no systematic application of discourse historical analysis is used as in the work of de Cillia (1999) and colleagues by following a rigid process of analysing the categories of content, discursive strategies and linguistic means of realisation. This shortcoming would have been more pronounced had this work been a primarily language focused study. Instead, the selective use of the DHA's analytical tools and its emphasis on historical context is combined with ethnosymbolist political and cultural theories as well as relevant postcolonial approaches to sovereignty and resistance in the face of political domination outlined in chapter 2. The combination of these methods provides an approach to the study of Somali nationalist discourses that capture its complex political, historical, cultural production.

In addition to this, translating previously untranslated works posed its own set of challenges considering that literary translation requires specialised skills. For this, I am indebted to Ahmed Farah 'Idaajaa' for his guidance, assistance and expertise in Somali literary traditions as well as other collegues specialising in Somali literature. Project constraints did not allow for a broader exploration of the Somali political verse; however, this study offers an entry into broadening the study of Somali literature to incorporate its important political communications particularly in the case of Dhoodaan as presented in this thesis. While he is hailed as a foremost political commentator through his verse, his work has not been made accessible to non-Somali speaking audiences. This thesis provides an opening for continued research into Dhoodaan and his contemporaries as a means to theorise prevailing social and political themes dominating Somali society.

New questions which arise from this study relate to the experiences of multiple identity groups in any construction of Somali nationalist thought. As specified in the main body of the thesis, the concerted use of 'Somali nationalism' or 'Somali nationalist discourses' does not assume a uniform conception of Somali nationalism or experience of Ethiopian statehood. Views of Somali nationalism are far from unified, and experiences with the state are certainly not uniform. Yet the repeated use of 'Somali nationalism' is expected to be mistaken for an assumption of homogeneity in the way Somali nationalism is imagined or experienced. To mitigate this, Somali experiences of Ethiopian statehood is not presented in this study as uniform. Instead, it is devoted to explore why those who experienced it in particular ways responded the way that they did i.e. resisting. How far the historic memories, myths and symbols that fuel Somali nationalist thought resonated with mass consciousness is beyond the scope of this study, but may open up new lines of inquiry that take stock of multiple identity groups and their experiences with Ethiopian statehood. For instance, it opens new avenues for further investigation into the gendered experiences of Ethiopian state nationalism- a significant limitation in this study due to the small number of armed female rebels in comparison to their male counterparts. This can still be overcome by broadening the categories of research participant to include activists associated with liberation groups. This is an important research agenda required to overcome the marginalisation of the study of female Somali rebel fighters in western academia (Hauwermeiren, 2012, p.25-6).

In addition to this, a class-focused approach or even a rural vs urban comparative study of centre-periphery relations is an important consideration emerging from this study which requires further investigation. For instance, the question of whether members of the urban middle classes who are more likely to have had contact with agents of the state or were beneficiaries of state services such as health and education, hold the same antagonistic views towards the state that is captured in popular nationalist discourses. Where or not the common historical memories and symbols of struggle and sacrifice used to memorialise past resistance and inspire new rebellion, resonates with these demographics, is a worthy consideration. This study has made a start in revealing patterns, themes and structures of thought which legitimise Somali resistance against Ethiopian state nationalism as conceived by those who participated in organised rebellions and those who provided the language to galvanise the masses towards the same goal through the political verse. Future studies can incorporate new data sets and offer new directions to the study of Somali nationalism in Ethiopia by integrating approaches to the study of political psychology with a focus on the themes of memory and grievance

politics. The politics of memory features significantly in the political verses addressed in this thesis, and in general, in the sentiments expressed by research participants; present political objectives are increasingly justified based on historical events of violence and dispossession. Likewise, there is a strong human rights dimension which emerges from this study and can be further developed by focusing on the question of justice and accountability for Somali inhabitants of the Ethiopian state, and the impact of continuities in state projection of violent power in the peripheries.

7.4. Future implications for researchers and practitioners

This study fills a gap in the literature on conflict in Ethiopia reflecting the lowland experiences of major wars- conventional or (counter)insurgency- that have shaped state-society relations throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. Recent works have similarly focused on the marginalised experiences of specific populations, and where they fit into the grand-narratives of state wars, victories and concepts of nationhood. In *The untold stories of militiamen from Gojjam,* Ayele (2021) introduces missing components of the 'highland' experience in the Ogaden and Eritrean fronts (1977-1991) tracing the experiences of militiamen from Gojjam located in present day Amhara Region. As local and individualised experiences of wars are commonly subsumed under grand narratives of major wars, Ayele (2021) brings attention back to the consequences of the Derg's large-scale conscription which resulted in the drafting of '300,000 peasants' (p.571) to the front-lines of the Ogaden War in 1977.

Several implications for future research emerge out of this study in terms of questions on conflict, history, identity and the marginalised status of the Somali Region in relation to the Ethiopian centre. Previous studies have emphasised the idea of negotiated and contested statehoods such as Hagmann's (2005a) observation that the relationship between the centre and the Somali periphery can be placed somewhere between full military domination to outright collaboration or co-optation suggesting hybrid forms of social, political and economic forms of domination/ state-society relations as opposed to top-down political control (p.509). From a historical point of view, Matshanda (2015) also illuminates the contested and negotiated forms of statehood that emerged in the state's attempt to incorporating the peripheries into the state-system. This study poses additional questions for future inquiry into these fields, for instance by drawing attention to the continuous ideological commitments of recurrent liberation groups such as the *Geesh*, WSLF and the ONLF though it is perceived by some

as more ethnocentric compared to its predecessors. The survival and relevance of these ideologies effectively shape prospects of peace and conflict so long as they remain unresolved. They play a key role in reproducing the discursive struggle over how the Ethiopian state should be organised and other fundamental beliefs about the state, competing frontier imaginations and historical memories. These elements ar all fiercely contested in contemporary Ethiopian society.

For policy makes and practitioners, this perspective offers practical approaches to the present-day political dilemma in the Somali Region in Ethiopia. ONLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in Asmara 2018 after declaring a unilateral ceasefire in August 2018 (Matshanda, 2020 p.36). The group has since attempted to transition from an armed group to a political party. While 2018 marked a formal end to the decades long insurgency that engulfed the region, de-mobilisation has yet to occur at the rhetorical level. This is partly due to a lack of comprehensive peace agreement. This is because the 2018 Asmara deal lacks in addressing the fundamental cause of conflict in the Somali Region. As such, war-time rhetoric where irreconcilable differences in attitudes towards the state and moral categorisations of state and opposition groups as good vs bad remains a feature of Somali regional politics. This is further complicated by questions around transitional justice and accountability which is an important concern for human rights practitioners and observers of Somali regional politics.

Local truth and reconciliation processes have been initiated since Mustafa Omer came to power in 2018, but no serious mechanism or commitment to addressing both the region and the country's violent past has been prioritised by the federal government (Hagmann, 2020). On the theme of historical injustices, this study is also in dialogue with recent new publications in the Journal of Genocide Research on mass atrocities and political violence in Ethiopia. It responds to Alex de Waal and Rachel Ibeck's (2022) call to recover histories of resistance against violent atrocities in Ethiopia, and the significance of paying attention to the normalisation of extreme violence and state disposition to resort to violent atrocities throughout diverse political, historical and economic contexts (p.95-96). This thesis has sought to highlight the histories and experiences of Somalis in a contested national space by examining how political transformations and regime change is experienced in the peripheries, and how historical memories of state violence is commemorated via orality and other marginalised modes of knowledge preservation. This underlines the implications of this study for practical approaches to providing redress to victims of state violence through the case study of the Somali

Region where 'exceptional measures' have shaped government approach to administering this region (Hagmann and Korf, 2012, p.207).

7.5. National political dynamics

The contemporary relevance of this study lies in its direct engagement with the prevailing social and political debates in Ethiopia today, namely the future of the multinational federal state. State-makers are confronted with the challenge of forging the image of a unified Ethiopian state in the context of violent conflict in the North and crackdown on opposition actors in Oromia following the assassination of Haachalu Hundessa,[184] and the start of the Tigray War in 2020.

Contemporary developments in Ethiopian politics shed light on some of the underlying arguments made in this study relating to the construction and deployment of the discourse of pan-Ethiopian nationalism and unity. Most recent examples include the context of the Tigray war and the interplay between the state and the TPLF illustrating how pan-Ethiopian discourses are deployed when ruling groups require diverse nations and peoples to submit to their rule by providing them with a single framework of nationness to rally behind. Conversely, discourses rejecting an overarching Ethiopian identity and state legitimacy are deployed when ethnic groups claim specific grievances or marginalisation which largely stems from their positions outside of the corridors of power. For instance, TPLF led EPRDF built a federal system with a very strong centre where the power of regional states was minimal over their own affairs. As discussed in chapter 6, even the official flag of the Somali Regional State was changed - and the colours of the FDRE were rigorously deployed in ceremonies and state events. Yet, when TPLF lost their hold on power in 2018, they opposed the Ethiopian grand narrative and in doing so were labelled as terrorists even though they spent 27 years rigorously institutionalising it. This example demonstrates two fundamental puzzles of Ethiopian political culture. First, that any entity or group who exhibits any ideological differences with the grand-narrative of Ethiopian state nationalism is deemed a threat. Secondly, that the discourse of state nationalism and its accompanying symbolisms is weaponised by successive ruling groups as the *modus operandi* of governing the modern Ethiopian state despite major differences in political systems (i.e. feudalism, military dictatorship and multi-national federalism).

[184] Government crackdown in Oromia began as early as 2019 when OLA (Oromo Liberation Army), the armed wing of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) declared its official break from the OLF.

Abiy Ahmed's leadership faces major challenges in attempts to reconcile vastly divergent communities with diverse experiences of the past, and hopes for the future - these discrepancies have come to light under Abiy's tenure particularly in light of the Tigray War and its devastating consequences. Prior to this, a statement by Abiy Ahmed in March 2020 concerning the Ogaden War brought to the fore the discursive struggle over history, symbols, collective memories of triumphs and defeats; in short, what discourses on statehood are legitimised. As presented in the case study investigated in this thesis, local histories face the challenge of being subsumed under dominant state discourses particularly when they are at odds with the state's national project. In the case of the 1977 Ogaden War, chapter 5 has shown how the war has been subverted and appropriated by dominant Ethiopian discourses to undermine the significance of local rebellion according to Somali nationalists. Abiy's reference to the stable state-sponsored narrative of the war, and the subsequent backlash from the concerned communities, underlines the continued significance of contested histories in shaping relations between center and peripheyr. It also signals towards the danger of irreconcilable differences over histories and national symbols. The discursive struggle over these themes has also been represented by dispute over historical figures such as Menelik II. What is significant about this is less to do with diverse perspectives on these national symbols, but the sheer contrast in views held by opposing forces; to some he represents a hero and the founding father of the state and to others, he represents a brutal monarch who conquered diverse nations and peoples while obliterating their social and cultural structures.

7.6. Future considerations

The Ethiopian state has yet to provide the federal experiment with the required environment to realise its fundamental provisions of self-rule for autonomous regional states due to its absolute hold on power (Matshanda, 2020, p.36). This is described in chapter 6 where current political developments in terms of the creation of the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) signals towards further centralisation. The ruling party won the 2021 elections in landslide victory, and at the Somali Regional level, continuities between the 1995 elections in terms of the challenges faced by the ONLF and other opposition groups remained visible. While ONLF boycotted Ethiopian politics in 1994, the ONLF splinter group who continued to participate in the elections faced serious election misconduct in the face of EPRDF

backed ESDL (Markakis,1996, p.569). The ONLF faced the same challenges in the 2021 elections resulting in their eventual boycott of the elections. The political space demonstrates continuities in that it is not set up for opposition parties to engage in competitive political processes such as elections as the ruling party is able to deploy state resources such as government facilities, media, public funds etc to further its reach (Kefale, 2011, p.682). In the context of diminished hopes for a democratic transformation after the 2018 transfer of power, the enduring question facing former liberation groups who have abandoned their armed struggle in favour of peaceful political participation, is the feasibility of engaging in political processes meaningfully while retaining their core identities i.e. advocating for self-determination.

This is further complicated by the elite-repositioning of key ONLF figures who joined the regional administration following PP's landslide victory in September 2021. This realignment has complicated the traditional divides between the state, the ruling party and its national project on one hand, and rebel politics and identity on the other hand. As this realignment occurred without a formal power-sharing agreement between the ONLF and PP, contemporary political developments point towards shifting conflict dynamics centred around questions of representation and power-sharing. Nonetheless, in a BBC interview following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, then Chairman of the ONLF declared that 'the struggle continues' suggesting that the prevailing political, economic and cultural concerns that first inspired rebellion still persist.

Finally, as one senior ONLF figure reflected on concerning their decades long insurgency, he stated that 'we were not only thinking in terms of war and conflict, we were also thinking in terms of peace' (Daahir Mohamed Ali, 2019). This seeming paradox brings us back to one of the central problems motivating this investigation; why Ethiopian state nationalism is considered as an imperial project which must be resisted. Reconfiguring our approach to dissenting nationalisms and rebel ideologies is an important task for practitioners and academics alike. By approaching these forces not as a source of conflict or threat against the survival of the state, but as a means to enable meaningful dialogue on redressing historical injustices, promoting economic justice and approaches to equitable development for instance (all of which are key concerns articulated by Somali nationalist discourses).

The findings of this thesis shed light on the enduring problem facing the postcolonial state in the Horn of Africa, particularly relating to the question of why the Ethiopian state has been unable to

extend its sovereignty in the Somali frontier as concluded by Markakis (2011) in *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers*. Aside from active rebellions throughout the 20th century inhibiting a physical consolidation of power, lack of political loyalty and identification with what Clapham terms 'the legitimising myths of nationhood' (Clapham, 2002, p.11) has impeded the success of national integration policies and Ethiopia's development from an empire into a viable nation state. Conversely, the discursive reproduction of fundamentally opposing knowledge-regimes on historical memories, myths and symbols compared to the national discourse, has instituted a stable Somali discourse of resistance. This 'dissenting' discourse is premised upon particular cultural repertoires reflecting the historic experiences of Somalis with and within the Ethiopian state; this has provided fertile ground for articulations of resistance which transcend political systems and historical periods as demonstrated in this thesis. This study has attempted to re-cast focus on repressed forms of nationhood and national expression in modern day Ethiopia through the lens of the Somali periphery and its recurrent rebel movements. However, key findings may be applicable to Ethiopia's various other subject peoples whose historical memories of state violence shape their contemporary relationship to the Ethiopian state and its underlying nationalist project. It remains to be seen what the sheer diversity in forms of national self-identification exhibited by diverse nations and peoples, and the state's failure to accommodate this will mean for the future of the Ethiopian state.

Appendix A: Semi-structured Interview Questions

Guiding questions:

1) What do you believe to be some of the fundamental claims of Ethiopian state nationalism?
2) What symbols, figures and/or historical events do you associate with Ethiopian state nationalism?
3) What is the fundamental contestation between Ethiopian state nationalism and Somali nationalism?
4) Can you provide some personal accounts of your earliest encounters with the Ethiopian state?
5) Were you involved in any form of organised resistance?
   If yes, why did you join? And what was your main source of motivation?
6) What was the role of the Somali political verse in local liberation movements?
7) What is the significance of historical memories and collective symbols in fuelling Somali resistance?
8) Did the aftermath of the 1977 Ogaden War have an impact on ideas around Somali identity in Ethiopia vis a vis neighbouring Somalia?
9) Do you believe 1991 was a turning point for Somalis in Ethiopia?
   Does multinational federalism address the historial grievances of Somalis in Ethiopia?
10) Reflecting on the significance of continuity in the Somali struggle for self-determination, how do you perceive the current status of Somalis in Ethiopia?

Appendix B: Somali Literary Verses

Maandeeq, Cabdullahi Suldaan Timacadde

Gumeysiga hashuu naga dhacay een gurayey raadkeeda
Gu'yaal iyo gu'yaal badan hashii gama'a noo diidey
Goobtay istaagtaba hashaan joogay garabkeeda
Guuraa habeenimo hashaan gebi walboow jiidhay
Gaashaandhigeedii hashu galowgu eedaamay
Hashii geeddankeedii rag badan goodku ku casheeyey
Gacmaa lagu muquunshaye xornimo noogumay garane
Garre iyo guntane maalintay gees isugu boodey
Allaa noo gargaaree xornimo noogumay garane
Geeraarradeedii hashaan annigu googooyey
Galool iyo maraa iyo hashaan kidiga geylaanshey
Gaajiyo harraad badan hashaan ugu garaacaayay
Goortuu sidkeedii go'ee galabtii foolqaaday
Ayadoo candhada giijisay oo godol ku sii deysay
Garaad midan lahayn bay la tahay waad ka gaagixine
Annagoo gantaalaha dhaciyo haysan qori gaaban
Hashaan gaadda weynow libaax uga gaboon waayey
Inaan Gorayacawl uga tagaa waa hal soo gudhaye

Haw Liicina, Dhoodaan

Inaan laaqsho mooyee waxaan, meel u ladi waayey
Leyl iyo nahaarkii waxaan, maansadaw laliyey
Lushna shira dhexdeedaa waxaan, uga likaysnaaday
Isticmaarku siduu noo lunshaan, laxaw ku sheegaaye
Wallee inayna laakiin ahayn, laydha socotaaye
Libin baa dhow ruuxii jihaad, laabta ku hayoowe
Lalabahaa waxaa shiday raggay, looxa u dhigeene
Shacbigii lulmaysnaa wakaa, qaylo laasimaye
Lugbaw kabantay Soomaalidii, baratay luufluufe
War haw liicinaay Xabashi, waan lagatamaynaaye

Nimankaa siddii dibi lix jir ah, luquntu waynaatay
Intay legaga buurbuuranyiin, luun iska ahaada
Laanjaha markay fuulayaan, lugo ku rooroora
Barwaaqada intay leefayaan, luusa garawgiina
Intay labanka daaranahayaan, lebi ku gaajooda
Iyagaa sariir leexsadee, luumiyaha seexda

Xaajadii, Dhoodaaan

Nimanyohow hambaabiray haddee, heeganka u taagan
Hankakoobsanayee maanta saan, ugu hadhuub qaadnay
Inkastoon hannaanku u ekayn, kaynu ku hungownay
Himmadaan la soo boodnay waa, loo han weyn yahaye
Hayaankaan raraynaana waa, geeddi hawl badane
Dhexda inuu hadhsado kii rabow, waa ban hoolane ahe
Oo kii haro biya ah moodiyow, waa harraad kulule
Oo kii hoyasho guri doonayow, waa cidlaw hadafe
Oo kii hadimo diidayow, waa naftaa huride

Kii xoola haabhaabanow, kama hodmaysaane
Kii hadaaf xarrago maagganow, haaruftaad bixine
Hayeeshee halaaggiyo innagoon, halasahaa jiidhin
Hareer joosan maynoo filkeen, haybad naga roone
Hawd iyo Jabuutiba xornimo, waa ka habartoodee

Oo haynraaf dhulkoodii gabiyo, heecay bay noqone
Wixii lagu harreenshaana waa, hoo adays gabaye
War ruuxii huleelee ka taga, hogobka ciiddiisa
Hayntoloshkuu maganta u noqduu, abid ka hoosayne
Hamuuntiyo dadkaan sheegayow, waxaan haliilayno
Waa dalkeenna hooyoo xornimo, lagu hoggaanshaaye

Wallee hibada guushiyo sadkaan, u hanqal taagayno
Cadaw inaad hankaagtaan raboo, idinla heesaaya
Oon ku lala hardamayoon ahayn, la is hujuumaayo
Oo hadimmadiinnii wadaa, qodaya haadaane

Nacabkii hoggaan kugu xidhee, heerya kugu qaata
Hantidana bannaan kaa tubee, hoygii kaa bixiya
Iyo wixii ku hoosaasiyaa, waa isla halkiiyee
War haw u kala hambaynina dagaal, haayirkiyo tuugga
Oo sidaa xornimo aan helliyo, hodan ku raadceeya

Ha Midwdo, Dhoodaan

Mudadii gumaysigu hantiyey, maamulkii dunida
Margiyada dad lago soo xidhoo, wada mareegaysan
Oo laga mulkiyey baa badnaa, waxay muhiibeene
Soomaalidase dhiig-miiradkii, kama macaashayne
Miskiin liita nagamaysan dhigan, oo midiidin ahe
Mulbis dhaqankayaga maysan badin, amase maydhaane
Mayalkaan u haynay iyo wax badan, maalin dirireede
Muruq baan ku difaaci jiray iyo, xoog mataano ahe
Inkastooy madaafiic wateen, mooto iyo saanad
Falaadh baan mariidka u daray, iyo maylinkii warane
Maarene baryaan ula tagniyo, waliba maadhiine
Milleteri gumaysi ah kolkaan, aragno muuqiisa
Dhaaxaay madluun iyo noqdeen, mayd la sii wado e
Soomaalina macnaa lagu yaqaan, meel ay joogtaba e
Oo waa hiddaha noo macaan, malab sidiisiiye
Mar kastana ma moogaano ee, waa naga dhex muuqdaaye
Wax ka mid ah annagu waa mamnuuc, inaan dad maagnaaye
Waliba kii marooraan nidhaa, maandhow naga daaye
Durba gawrac kuma miijinno, ee waw miyirinaaye
Qoladaan maslaxadaa tusno, een maaro uga weyno
Annagoo hadday muruq is bidi, kaga mildhaawaynin
Murugtaye dharbaaxaan indhaha, kaga malaasnaaye
Magligaan u haynaan wadnaha, kaga mudaynaaye
Midigtaanu ugu dhiibi kaa, mawd hadduu rabaye
Sidaan qeyrkiiba u madhin jirraa, loo makalayaaye…

Sayid Maxamed maansadii ku mari, waanad maqasheene
Murti kale haddaad fiirisaan, waxaan ku maahmaahnay
Warankaagu ruuxuusan mudin, weedh la marin waaye

Salleello, Dhoodaan

Dhulkiinaa sanaadigu furtay ee, lagu safaadaayo
Dadkaa sir iyo caad xoolihii, laga sabooleeyay
Ee siliga lugu meerin ee, cadowgu seeteeyay
Ee soor macaan laga dhigtay ee, aad u saxariiray
Ee kii siqsiqa maalinkaa, hoosta laga siibay
Ee sogob baruur baan rabaa, ama sicii naaxay
Iyo subagga ii keen intaa, loo silsiladeeyo

Saldaniyo haddii aad rabtaan, saajacnimo buuxda
Suud iyo ha meeraysanina, Soolashii Bariye
Socdaalkii Hargaysiyo Burcana, how sawaalina ee
Haka suginna qayrkaa inuu, kuu sasabi gaal ee
Ergo kuguma saacido ileen, wiil ku saanyadayee

Odoros, Dhoodaan

Abtirsiga dagaalkana baray oo arma aqoon ah…
Asalna geesinimo udhashay oo sida awaw good ah
Askar saasa yaan leenahay oo aa'du miidhanahe
Utuna waaban kuu siiqabnaa aamanow hore e
Eed iyo qalooc ayaan waxbadan ka abhinaynaae
Eeqoyinkaa hore ragii kugu argofahayay
Eed uus-xabaashay baanahay ee aaro doonka ahe

Xaajadu haday awdanto oo talo asheedawdo
Aynigaa-na waxii aad lahayd adiga kuu diido
Ergo iyo asluub iyo hadaad aayar kagadoonto
Ashtako iyo adeer qabo hadii lagaga ay waayo
Asxaandiid inuu yahaymarkaad dhab uogsoonaato
Itaal iyo sidii kuu-eg waa inaad la aada e
Oo wixii abaalkiisu yahay lala abaaraye
Ablaydana tus waakii ileen tuuray caaqibo
Oogadiisa waa inaad gubto oo arami gaadhaye
Adoo umalsan goortuu arko oo aana gudanaaya
Istag-furullah waa inuyidhaa edebna yeeshaa
Nabada anbatayna waa inuu iib kudaydayo

Quduro, Cabdullahi Badal

Ma qarsoona reer yurub markay ina qorsheyeene
Afrikaanka qeybtii ku jiray qoyska nagu racy
Nasiib baa amxaar nagu qafilay cunaya qeyriine
Qalin iyo siyaasad iyo dastuur kuma qancaayaane
Nabad kuma qadeyaan xarguhu qubane weyaane
Qow baa intaa lagu hayaa qowrac iyo leyne

<u>Pan-Somali nationalist songs:</u>

Talisyahow wareersani war li'idaa
Walee war li'idaa
Mengistoow war li'idaa
Waxaad geesatoo idil
Waa laisku haystaa…
Waxarihii aad leyseen waa laisku haystaa

'Waxaan ahay naftii-hure,' Abdi Kaamil Cawaale

Waxaan ahay naftiihure
Neecow qaboobiyo
Nimciyo barwaaqiyo
Sabab lagu nagaadiyo
Noloshaba iloobee
Nacasow gumeysigan
Nabarada qarsooniyo
Nacaan iga harayniyo
Igu reebay naafada
Nabad lama wadaagee
Nidir baan horey u galay
Niyadaydu waa meel
Hadii aanan soo noqon
Calankayga nuurow
Allahayow ku nabad geli

Post 1991 ONLF resistance verses

Bukaan-socod, Iimaan Cubeyd

Bildhaan wacane Calankenu Waa Baadido Kale
Waaka Buurta Lala Saaranyahay Sidii Banjoogeed
Oo Baladadiisii Ragbaa Looga Baal Maraye
Birta Dheer Inii Lagu Xidhoo Babada Loo Diidye
Bulshadii lahaydiyo Dadkuna Kama Bukaan Taase
Ciil Buu Bakhtiyayaa Ninkii Noo Baraaruge e
Allahayoow Bulshada Noo Bogsii Waa Bukaan-socode

Heelaale

Bulshayahay barortiyo Waxaa Igu Wacan Buuqa
Nin Xaqiisii Laga Buubsadoo looga Tagin Baaqi
Oo Baayirtuu Dhaqanjiriyo Baradii Loo Diiday
Oo Barqo Maalka Geeliisa Badan Baal Ka Fiirinaya
Oo Baahi Iyo Ciil Qaboo Aara Bogan Waayay
Ooy Bahdii Meel buur Cidla ah Saartay
Waa Sidaan Bulshooyo Manta ahay Iyo Bahdaan Joogo
Ninkii Taa ibaday Bay Bahday Wada Bariistaane

-

Gayi Xor ah dad Joogana Sidii Waad u Gogoshaane
Gobanimo Si Loo helo Marnaba Loo Guntani waaye
Alleelahay Sidaan Manta Nahay Gobi ma Yeesheene

Abwaan Nuuriye

Caadilow allahayow codka JWXO ee culus
Adigaa caawin karayee
Hadmaa caadka laga rogi?

Roda Af-Jano

Dhergigii hore iyo kuwani waa duul walaala
Dictaatoori baa wada dhaloo wax isma doorshaanee
Labaduba ninkay doorbidaan ha u darraadeenee
Duunyo inay dhacaan waa iyana shay dabeeca ahee
Dumarkana ha boobaan markay dano ka yeeshaanee
Kuwii dumay waxay dheer yihiin daaqad laga tuurku
Dil aan sabab laheyn aayarooy nala dusaan kow dheh
Doc wareenka iyo gaadmada iyo waliba daw dhaafka
Iyo dadkay rarayaan sidii inuu dameer yahayee

•

Dahabka iyo shidaalka iyo cusbada dibada taal taala
Dirham weeyee laga soomanyahay dirham iyo maadhee
Buuraha dangiigiyo dhirtuu uduga loo daayey
Malabkaa ka diliq leh siduu eebe ugu deeqay
Iyo saan dar xumo jiif u nahay meel dad kala ootay
Dib markaan u dharwaa qalbigu i dilaacshaaye

•

Anagu iyo direyskay qabaan nimanka so duuley
Isma deyneyno waxaanu nahay dab iyo baasiin ee
Isticmaarka damaciisa iyo shacabka oo diidey
Dagaal soo jireen ka dhalay col daah furay ee
Darwiisha iyo guray waakii duhur ay bilaabeenee
Dogobkay halyeeyadu shideen maalin damin waaye
Sidaan duur joog u nahay ayaa daliil u ahaee
Dhiiga inaga da'ayo waa xornimo doonee

Diiwaanka waxaa inoogu jiro dux iyo taariikhee
Dulmanaha Ogaadeeniya oo diiftu wada hayso
Ma daalaan ma deystaan xumaha way ka diriraanee
Dhaqankoodii lama duugin iyo dagalladiisiiyee
Ma doorsoomin diinti iyo afkay dir u lahaayeenee

-

Qofka madaxa laga daaray oo doqon ah mooyaanee
Nin damiir leh nolol saas ah waa inuu ka diiraayee
Dabkay maanta qaadeen ONLF waan ku diirsadaye
Oo waxay dareemeen inay saasi daw tahaye

-

Ethiopia inay daris xun tahay dumar la laayaa og
Oo waxaa daliil looga dhigay ubadkii ay dooxday
Dad cun inay yihiin iyo yixaas diiratadan baasi
Dibnahooda ruuxii galaee dalam la siiyaa og
Dugaag inay yihiin caydh ahoo duri u gaajeysan
Dabaaxdiisa kay qalatayay wax uga diidaa og
Isagoon dambiba galin ninkay dhabar ku jiidaa og

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